Agrarian Crisis in the United States: Pathways for Reform [1 ed.] 1032360542, 9781032360546

Table of contents :
Cover
Endorsement
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Figures
Preface
Acronyms
Introduction: The Nature of Crisis in the US Agrarian System
The Pandemic Did Not Cause the Crisis, It Just Made Things Worse
What Is (And Is Not) Agrarian Crisis
Plan for the Book
Notes
1 The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy
Keeping Land in the Family, It’s Complicated
State Authority and the (Ideal) Nature of Land Transfer
Treaties and Racism in Constituting Property Relations in the US Agrarian System
The New Deal and Mixed Results in Addressing Enduring Problems in State Authority
Problems Concerning Land Transfer and Crisis During the Neoliberal Period
Conclusion – Evolving Property Relations Amid Ongoing Legitimacy Concerns
Notes
2 The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy
There’s More Than Cows in Dairyland
Labor and Race in Crisis Theory
The (Non-)Constitution of Agricultural Labor and the Persistent Problem of Control
Slavery and the Origins of Permanently Precarious Labor in US Agriculture
Partisan Stalemate and Neoliberal Reforms Turn Problems Into Crisis Tendencies
Conclusion: From Slaves to Undocumented Workers
Notes
3 The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy
Things Change as They Stay the Same
Habermas On Agricultural Commodity Markets and Their Contradictory Tendencies
Keeping Contradictory Tendencies at Bay as the Agribusiness Ideal Gains Ground
Neoliberal Reforms and the Aggravation of Crisis Tendencies in Markets
Conclusion: Contradictory Tendencies, New and Old
Notes
4 The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy
Watching the Tornadoes Go By
Environmental Issues – Including Climate Change – in Habermas’ Theory of Crisis
Consensus Building Practices in Environmental Policy Formation
Neoliberalism and Dissensus in the Failure to Confront Climate Change
Conclusion: California and the Crisis of Reproduction
Notes
Conclusion: Pathways for Reform
Hope for the Future Or More of the Same?
Contributions to Studies of Crisis and Agrarian Politics
Pathways for Reform
Past and Future
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

‘U.S. agriculture is in crisis: punitive neoliberal policies that hurt farmers, workers and residents; partisan divides that stymie cooperation; geographical and rural/​urban differences; and centuries of genocide of Indigenous populations to acquire land, and enduring racism all contribute. Pahnke analyzes crises in land, labor, market and environmental policy and practice, drawing from Habermas’s concepts of crisis and contradiction. But more than analysis of the issues, he offers proposals grounded in a thorough historical perspective of what worked in the past to overcome crises, salted with his deep understanding of how the current context requires new approaches. Again taking the lead from Habermas, Pahnke places policy proposals within communication strategy and social movement mobilization. This is a timely and important book for figuring out how we will move beyond crises to solutions for some of the most intransigent problems in U.S. agriculture.’ –​Molly D. Anderson, William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Food Studies, Middlebury College, USA

Agrarian Crisis in the United States

From fragile, corporate-​controlled supply chains breaking down, to millions of already hyper-​exploited farmworkers risking their lives in the fields without basic personal protective equipment, the COVID-​19 pandemic made it painfully obvious that US agriculture does not work. Agrarian Crisis in the United States: Pathways for Reform situates the many food system problems that the COVID-​19 pandemic laid bare in historical context across four key policy areas, namely, in land, labor, markets, and the environment. In applying and building from the work of Jürgen Habermas, Agrarian Crisis in the United States highlights how deep-​seated problems concerning systemic racism, economic inequality, and political legitimacy endanger the US food and farm system’s future. Besides analyzing crises, it presents solutions that would make agriculture in the United States more just and resilient through the implementation of certain communication and policy strategies. Its original argument, as well as a novel set of remedies, will appeal to scholars and activists with interests in agrarian studies, environmental policy, and social movements. Anthony Pahnke is Associate Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University. Raised on a dairy farm in Eastern Wisconsin, he has remained active with small-​scale farmer and farmworker groups for over 12 years. His research has appeared in journals such as New Political Science, International Studies Review, and Rethinking Marxism. He is also the author of Brazil’s Long Revolution: Radical Achievements of the Landless Workers Movement (2018). His popular writing on agriculture, immigration, and international politics has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, The Progressive, and The Hill, among other print and online publications.

Agrarian Crisis in the United States Pathways for Reform Anthony Pahnke

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Anthony Pahnke The right of Anthony Pahnke to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-​1-​032-​36054-​6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​032-​36055-​3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​003-​33006-​6 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/​9781003330066 Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Publishing UK

For healing in making a better agrarian system

Contents

List of Figures Preface List of Acronyms Introduction: The Nature of Crisis in the US Agrarian System

x xi xiv

1

1 The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy

21

2 The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy

43

3 The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy

65

4 The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy

88

Conclusion: Pathways for Reform

110

Select Bibliography Index

127 133

Figures

I .1 Crisis Diagram 1.1 Percent of Harvested Cropland Acres by Farm Size, 1969–​2017 3.1 Change in Number of Farms and Average Size by Acreage, 1940–​2017 3.2 Commodity Prices Received as Percent of Parity Price for Basic Commodities, 1970–​2021

10 34 73 76

Preface

Zombie movies often feature scenes in shopping malls. The social commentary is clear, specifically, that the individualist, self-​interested nature of consumerist culture in capitalist society makes us mindless, stupefied, or rather, “zombified.” While I don’t like malls, I spent nearly an entire day in one back in 2019. Fires, not zombies, drove me there. Living in California, the wildfires were so bad that the schools closed. My apartment smelt like a bonfire. Not knowing where to turn, I went with my two daughters to the mall for its large, open indoor spaces and air conditioning. I reflect on that experience because I found a short-​term solution for a problem, namely climate change, which is enormous. I mean, I sought refuge in a giant cement building, enjoying the A/​C that burning fossil fuels makes possible. Still, the real zombies in this story are the decision makers who saunter through our national and state capitols spitting partisan vitriol at one another as our forests burn and farmlands flood. Thinking about how to address climate change, among other issues, got this book project started in 2016. At that time, along with my family, I traveled around the country to meet and discuss problems concerning land access with movement activists. I was finishing research on agrarian reform struggles in Brazil and became curious about the chances of similar efforts developing in the United States. I quickly learned of other various pressing problems besides land access. For instance, I was quite aware of the perils of price volatility given that I had grown up on a farm. Environmental disasters, as well, were always a concern. Hearing about these issues on my travels, I also heard from farmworkers about the constant danger of pesticide poisoning. Additionally, I spoke with undocumented workers about their fear of immigration authorities, listening to how many of them were quick to take the next best thing in construction or some restaurant. In conversation with activists and movement members, I also heard of potential policy solutions to these problems. I discussed with activists how immigration reform would help workers claim rights, that farmers needed a return to New Deal style policies to stabilize incomes, and how addressing climate change required dedicating resources to small-​ scale, diversified

xii Preface operations. Corporations were denounced for their undue influence –​and there’s Anti-​Trust laws, on the books, to regulate them. This book put two and two together in so far as I increasingly saw the problems that were festering in agriculture as having to do primarily with politics. Or rather, life is full of problems. In agriculture, they are everywhere. Politicians are elected, in part, to work together across differences to resolve problems that are bigger than the things that people can do on their own. Still, on critical problems in our food system, it seemed that our officials struggled to provide adequate answers. Working on this project until the pandemic, I thought that I would finish as I learned that “COVID-​19” was the name of a new illness, not a Star Wars character. I also learned how to balance the needs of aging parents, a grandma, children, and a briefly unemployed partner. The people in my life became my priority and the book was put on hold. The late Spring of 2022 provided a moment to finish the project. It also allowed me time to reflect on the pandemic, seeing how many of the problems that existed before 2020, had only worsened when people went into lockdown. In terms of getting this book to completion under difficult circumstances, I would like to thank the people at Routledge who believed in the project. I also found encouragement from my wife, Marlene Rojas Lara, whose strength never fails to surprise me. I’m lucky to have someone in my life every day who is so determined, smart, and courageous. My parents, and Grandma, also supported me, offering comments and reminding me of anecdotes –​some that appear in this book. My daughters, Lisa and Maryeva, were always around to give my mind a chance to cool down, especially in our “pizza movie nights” that became ritual during the pandemic. There are so many others who, indirectly and directly, helped me think through the dynamics of agrarian crisis. Many I have got to know through my 12 years plus working with the non-​profit, Family Farm Defenders. Somewhere in this book, there’s probably something that Joel Greeno has mentioned to me. When I write the word “parity,” I hear the voices of George and Patti Naylor. Jim Goodman and I probably editorialized some of the problems discussed here, as John Peck knows the full extent of the dimensions of agrarian crisis better than anybody. I treasure talking with Lisa Griffith about agriculture, activism, and community work, especially having to relocate away from my family’s farm in Wisconsin, back to California. Ben Burkett and Darnella Burkett-​Winston helped teach me the importance of cooperatives. I found inspiration in the stories that I have heard from Mily Trevino-​Sauceda and Carlos Marentes. Their respective efforts with organizing farmworkers offer models for activists globally. And I would also like to thank everyone I have met over the years who work at the National Family Farm Coalition and Rural Coalition, especially Lorette Picciano, for providing me examples of what dedication should look like. So, writing this preface, I find myself again in the land of fires. I will try to avoid the malls this time, but I won’t make any promises. I write that, as one

Preface  xiii thing the pandemic has taught me is to be flexible and accept uncertainty. In taking those lessons to heart, I am still a work in progress. Our agrarian system is also in the process of transformation. The question is if our politicians together with serious movements have the creativity and focus to deal with our agrarian system’s many concomitant crises. For everyone’s benefit, let’s hope they can. As for myself and my family, we can only spend so much time in a mall. -Anthony Pahnke Oakland, California, October 2022

Acronyms

ARP AAA AIM BIPOC CCC CSA CAFOs CRP CEQ CCP DFA DACA DOJ EPA EQIP FLSA FCA FCS FSA FOR FTC GATT GCC GHGs INA IRA IRA NAWS NCLR NFO NLRA NOAA

Acreage Reserve Program Agricutural Adjustment Act American Indian Movement Black, Indigenous, and People of Color Commodity Credit Corporation Community Supported Agriculture Confined Animal Feeding Operations Conservation Reserve Program Council on Environmental Quality Counter-​Cyclical Payments Dairy Farmers of America Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Department of Justice Environmental Protection Agency Environmental Quality Incentives Program Fair Labor Standards Act Farm Credit Administration Farm Credit System Farm Security Administration Farmer-​Owned Reserve Federal Trade Commission General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs Global Climate Coalition Greenhouse Gases Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 Indian Reorganization Act Inflation Reduction Act National Agricultural Workers Survey National Conference on Land Reform National Farmers Organization National Labor Relations Act National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

newgenprepdf

List of Acronyms  xv NSM NAFTA ORAP SARE STFU SNAP TIAA UFW USMCA USDA WTO

New Social Movements North American Free Trade Agreement Outdoor Recreation Action Program Sustainable Agriculture, Research, and Extension Southern Tenant Farmers Union Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America United Farm Workers United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement United States Department of Agriculture World Trade Organization

Introduction The Nature of Crisis in the US Agrarian System

The Pandemic Did Not Cause the Crisis, It Just Made Things Worse From shuttering schools for months, to abruptly forcing millions to work online, the COVID-​19 pandemic disrupted the lives of most people in the United States and around the world. Still, as chaotic as the pandemic has been, for some who occupy critical positions in the US food, farm, and fiber system, it generated particular challenges as shocking, as they were bizarre, and in some cases, inhumane. Consider • •

•

•

Dairy farmers around the country dumping their milk despite no problem with its quality. Workers throughout the meatpacking industry, by a presidential executive order that declared processing plants “critical infrastructure,” having to labor with minimal personal protective equipment and risk falling ill in already exploitative work conditions. Farmworkers, who live in fear of deportation and face limitations in their ability to voice complaints because most lack legal immigration status, becoming labelled “essential workers” as they continue planting and harvesting the produce that citizens consume. People on the Diné (Navajo) reservation, as COVID-​19 spreads through a nation with minimal access to running water and that already featured high rates of alcoholism, diabetes, and heart disease, dying at disproportionate rates when compared to the US population overall.

The challenges that these groups encountered during the pandemic share an underlying commonality besides the fact of happening at roughly the same time. More precisely, while true that the pandemic and its effects unexpectedly cast the lives of millions around the country into disarray, it also exposed how the US’ agrarian system is in crisis. Not to abuse the term, which is easy to do by means of overuse and hyperbole, conceptual work on the meaning of crisis in this chapter and throughout DOI: 10.4324/9781003330066-1

2 Introduction the book offers a standard for analytical purposes. With respect to establishing such a standard, determining the existence of a crisis –​as I detail in governance dynamics concerning land, labor, markets, and the environment –​ involves pinpointing problems that turn into contradictory tendencies. To put it briefly, a crisis appears when a breakdown in social relationships takes place and decision makers, who have power to address social problems, fail to adequately respond to identifiable problems. Contradictions appear as intractable differences among policy makers. Times of crisis make political time circular; much debate and discussion occur, but activists, politicians, and other officials fail to come together and encounter challenges. In periods of crisis, people ask questions such as “where do we go from here?,” or, “what can we do now?” Declaring positions, groups protest, yet their struggles repeat in isolation as decision makers and stakeholders regularly fail to find the means to collectively work across differences. Each chapter in this book foregrounds problems in particular policy areas that have taken on crisis dimensions, which in turn cast doubts about the continuous operation of the US agricultural system. Crises concerning land, labor, markets, and the environment have appeared at other points in US history that I also mention in the book. Such moments, including the lead up to the US Civil War in the 1860s, as well as the 1920s, are presented as foils against which to reflect upon developments during the first couple decades of the twenty-​first century. That problems have become crisis tendencies in the first couple decades of the twenty-​first century, as I also argue, is due to two interrelated phenomenon –​one, the development of partisan, political divisions, which imperil constructive, restorative change, and second, the embrace of neoliberal policy reforms and ideology. This latter catalyst has cultivated among politicians a short-​term, piecemeal approach to agrarian problems. Neoliberal reform has also engendered significant economic barriers to new farmers, whether in terms of land access, or stabilizing incomes. Furthermore, not to simply describe the food and farm system as in a state of crisis, I advance remedies in the conclusion that could function to bridge differences and address critical challenges that exist within US agriculture. For those who doubt that a crisis exists, a sketch of supply chains and markets shows problems were ripe for COVID-​19 to exploit. First, by supply chain, I refer to the pathways over time and through space where food is produced, distributed, and circulated. Along this circuit, whether the product is milk, bread, pork chops, or corn, what we have seen globally as well as within the United States is decades of specialization and consolidation. One place where this is visible is on the farm. According to one study, when operations at the turn of the twentieth century would produce five commodities on average, at the dawn of the twenty-​first century, that number had decreased to one. Specialization increased along with farm size. The average operation in the United States is around 430 acres as of 2021, plateauing at that number in the 1980s. This represents a doubling of size from an average of about

Introduction  3 200 acres in 1950.1 Additionally, increasingly fewer large operations account for a disproportionate percent of sales. More precisely, according to the 2017 Agricultural Census, only 5% of operations –​approximately 100,000 of the country’s approximate 2,000,000 remaining operations –​constitute 75% of total sales.2 Still, regardless of size, most farms regularly experience dire financial problems, which in 2015, was reported by 69% of all operations.3 Stagnant incomes before and after that year indicate that producers of various crops faced critical economic problems, with the increase in the debt-​to-​asset ratio across every kind of farm operation since 2012 indicating financial distress.4 More troubling issues are found elsewhere in the supply chain. According to the Open Markets Institute, since the 1970s, the four largest poultry processors went from holding 35% to 51% of total market share, while in beef processing, that figure went from 25% to 85%, and in hogs, 33% to 66%.5 The dairy industry, as of 2017, saw its four largest cooperatives control over 40% of all unprocessed raw milk sales.6 One standard measure of market concentration is the share of the four largest firms in an industry, which is known as the four-​firm ratio (or CR 4). Hendrickson et al. recognize a pattern in documenting concentration, in that when the percentage of four firms approaches 40% in any given sector of the economy, then those entities with market share show a proclivity to engage in anti-​competitive practices that hurt small-​scale farmers, workers, and consumers.7 Such practices include price and wage manipulation, as well as dictating conditions to buyers and sellers. Additionally, innovation declines as with fewer and fewer actors involved in some market, competition is replaced by collusion. Overall, glancing at the numbers on sales and concentration reveal farming as an occupation where exploitation is endemic and barriers to entry for new producers, high. Digging into the numbers still further, on-​farm incomes over decades have fallen (the details on the difference between on-​ farm and off-​ farm income, and how these figures are used by the United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], is discussed more in Chapter 3). In a nutshell (food pun intended), farmers have over time received less and less for what they sell, or in other words, for the time and energy that they spend on growing food. In 1960, on-​farm income was about 50% of total farm household income. In 2000, that figure fell to a low of 5%, rebounding back to around 18% where it has remained.8 Additionally, in 2020, 72% of operations required non-​farm income to continue –​that is, one member of the farm household dedicating their time to physically work away from the operation.9 Some may claim that “big” is not bad. After all, as populations increase, where will the food come from to feed people? Big farms produce lots of food, and therefore, seem necessary. “American farmers feed the world,” which in the 1970s, became a mantra for those in favor of export agriculture and who embraced the call to think of agriculture as “agribusiness.” The reality, however, is not so simple. Concretely, we see the problems over time becoming troubling, contradictory tendencies. The main problem that becomes a contradiction is found in how markets do not provide the economic

4 Introduction means for farmers to remain in the profession. The tendency is for farming “not to pay,” or in other words, only an ever-​declining number of highly grossing operations actually “make it” in agriculture. Making this problem into a crisis, which I elaborate later in the book, are changes in pricing policies, as well as the deregulation of corporations, which together prompt farmers to scale up and produce more to improve their finances. Tied to this pattern are bouts with overproduction –​that is, moments when product is created in excess of what exports and domestic consumption remove from the market. Price booms and busts ensue, as markets become flooded with commodities. Price swings have trended downward overall, pressuring all farmers –​small-​ scale operators particularly –​to exit the profession. This crisis tendency, which reveals an occupation that cannot sustain itself over time, has a cultural component as well. Specifically, we have the ideal in the United States of the productive, family farm. This cultural image, depicted in the writings of founding political leaders such as Thomas Jefferson who wrote of the centrality of the “yeoman farmer” in maintaining democracy, is directly challenged by the fact that operators increasingly see their ability to persist endangered. This quick take on markets within the food and farm system offers a different way to conceive of the vignettes from the opening of this introduction. Tendencies in pricing answers the question why dairy farmers, for instance, dumped their milk in the early months of 2020. Specifically, consolidated supply chains on the processing side led farmers into bottlenecks when stay-​at-​home orders kept people out of schools, restaurants, and hotels. The virus-​halted tourism and travel when impromptu homeschooling became the reality for families. People did not stop eating; what changed was where and how they ate –​having to consume more in private than before.10 When consumption patterns changed, processors could not adapt. Within the supply chain, the packaging and distribution of products for schools and hotels are different than what is required for home use. As these shocks were taking place, pigs grew and cows gave milk. Processors then had farmers destroy their products –​killing hogs, dumping milk, and plowing vegetables into the ground. The country saw in these breakdowns how consolidated supply chains are not resilient. Meanwhile, supply chain problems have remained a concern throughout 2021 and into 2022, as export markets have been disrupted by work shortages and transportation matters.11 Equally as troubling is how, instead of seizing the opportunity that COVID-​19 brought to the attention of many with respect to problems in the supply chain, US government officials provided a temporary fix –​distributing direct cash payments to farmers who had been affected. By the end of 2020, taxpayer-​funded subsidies counted for upwards of 40% of total farm income.12 That such a tool was used to address the economic disaster of food supply chain breakdowns reveals a perverse political incentive structure within US agrarian system; when disruptions occur, decision makers do not seek creative solutions to challenges, but turn to short-​term, ad hoc relief. The

Introduction  5 problem that chronically inadequate incomes pose to US agriculture takes on crisis proportions when politicians fail to act effectively. Similar to how the government provided ad hoc relief in the face of the food chain disruptions that COVID-​19 provoked, the Farm Bill –​the signature piece of legislation that comes up every five years for debate and that focuses on US agriculture –​has over time turned into a legislative tool that tends to provide rural cultivators after-​the-​fact relief instead of establishing forward-​ looking, crisis mitigating reforms. In the most recent 2018 bill (at the time of this writing, the 2023 Farm Bill has not been introduced), after spending on nutrition (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), which is the single-​largest outlay in the law, is crop insurance. The issue is that insurance allows producers, with government support, to continue past practices with minimal change. Crop insurance as a policy, moreover, showcases dynamics that are problematic when considering the pressing need to develop adequate policies concerning climate change –​the focus of Chapter 4. If we turn to some kind of alternative, counterfactual scenario when thinking on reforming the US agrarian system, then we can appreciate how more decentralized supply chains would have mitigated the effects of abrupt changes the likes of which the COVID-​19 pandemic triggered. Bottlenecks would have been potentially avoided if there were more places for farmers to send their products. As a result, producers would receive improved incomes. Supply chains also would be more flexible with multiple avenues for producers to buy from and sell to. Decentralized markets, moreover, could have served as sites for innovation and resiliency. More people actively involved in economic affairs means additional stakeholders who could come up with solutions to challenges. Promoting pluralism in the economy –​instead of allowing for homogeneity and hierarchy to take root –​holds the potential for resiliency to develop. The Biden administration, as of 2022, is proposing changes that may lead to serious action concerning the food system, from strengthening the enforcement of Anti-​Trust law, to proposing debt forgiveness and technical assistance to farmers of color. In the former, consolidation is the target, while for the latter, the focus is on keeping farmers on the land while addressing a history of racial marginalization. If, and how such proposals materialize is an ongoing subject of debate. Overall, some decision makers are considering solutions that are more systematic than what we have seen in the past. Still, with bills debated and ideas generated, policies that could lead to significant change to the food system remain early in development. It is also critical to note that this brief sketch of pricing and markets highlights crisis tendencies in one part of the US agrarian system. Neither is the situation of workers addressed in this summary of supply chain dynamics, nor is the consistent land loss that different groups involved in food production, especially Indigenous people, experience. That crop insurance has received more focus than other areas in the Farm Bill is due to the threat of climate change, highlighting the environmental problems within the US

6 Introduction agrarian system. Further documenting such challenges and reading them in the context not only of policies concerning markets, but labor, land, and the environment, occurs in the following chapters.

What Is (and Is Not) Agrarian Crisis Irrational, wasteful, exploitative –​these are some of the ways that people have described the US agrarian system during, as well as before, the COVID-​19 pandemic. Afterall, a system that depends on millions of workers who daily live with the fear of deportation is neither sustainable, nor humane. Persistent droughts and concerns over water access in California –​where a significant amount of the country’s fruits and vegetables are grown –​is revelatory for how the mode of food production in the United States is stuck in rhythms that grind on, despite warning signs that reform is needed. For these reasons, deploying the language of crisis is not new when describing the US food and farm system. Even concerning the COVID-​19 pandemic and its effects, some note not only supply chain disruptions, but also how financialization contributes to volatility and insecurity.13 McMichael takes a more global focus, seeing the 2007–​2008 food shortage protests and price fluctuations as indicative of crisis. He blames neoliberal economic policy reforms that led to depeasantization –​that is, the driving of rural cultivators out of food production into either wage labor, or precarious subsistence living in the urban periphery –​and an increase in the power of international organizations and corporations.14 In commenting on developments roughly ten years before these protests, with a focus on the United States, Ikerd also finds a system in crisis.15 His target is industrial agriculture, which he indicates is in its “final stage,” as corporations seek not merely profits, but control. Still earlier accounts of food system crisis are found in references to the uptick in farm bankruptcies that took place in the 1980s, as well as during the Great Depression in the 1930s, when the Dust Bowl unfolded.16 Scholars who work with the concept of food regime also focus on crisis, calling attention to how such periods trigger changes. Globally, regimes change when “contradictions in food systems produce crises, transformation, and transition.17” Examples include the 1970s, when oil prices sparked a rise in input prices, or how in the nineteenth century, an increase in grain exports from the United States led to a corresponding farming crisis in Europe.18 While insightful for focusing on global change, one problem is the reductionist view of change and crisis. Or rather, contradictions may exist in certain systems and “produce” change; what needs specification is how they become represented and politicized. Furthermore, it remains unclear in this body of work what separates a contradiction and crisis conditions from problems, or challenges. How to differentiate a time when crisis tendencies dominate from a period of regularity is not empirical in the same way as is measuring gravity. The farmworker in deportation proceedings may see their livelihood in disarray as

Introduction  7 the supermarket shopper peruses fresh tomatoes. This caricature highlights the limitations for thinking about crisis from the vantage point of direct experience. Or rather, beyond appearances, for the concept of crisis to have analytical value, it needs to connect experience to underlying tendencies. McMichael ties financialization to depeasantization and protest. Still, what about politics? Or rather, how do moments of breakdown and disruption intersect with the actions of decision makers who craft the policies and programs that directly involve food system governance? In this way, for the talk of crisis in the US food, farm, and fiber system, there is the need for improving our definitions. What most studies share is either a normative claim, such as a problem with corporations or large-​scale farming, or references to disruptions that are depicted as prima facie evidence.19 In speaking of “systems” of whatever kind, studies too often speak in general terms without clearly delineating parameters. Ikerd notes that industrial agriculture is a problem. But what counts as agricultural? Farms, sure, but what of labor? Undocumented migrant workers have become integral to the US food system. Despite this fact, workers receive hardly a mention in Ikerd’s study. The point is that responding to a crisis without identifying the details of the system leaves us without a grasp of what effective change should look like. For guidance on this matter, we can turn to Jürgen Habermas’ book, Legitimation Crisis. Habermas conceives of crises as moments when problem-​ solving becomes difficult, if not impossible, as the continuation of a system is endangered.20 To illustrate by analogy, he describes medical crises. The system in this example is the body, which after contracting some disease, has difficulties operating. Habermas is quick to note that social systems are not so easy to delineate. Afterall, we can draw clear parameters around bodies. Yet, when speaking of an agrarian system, for example, do we include tractors? If we do, then is manufacturing part? If manufacturing is considered critical, then, do we need to also include mining, where iron ore for steel comes from? Habermas responds to such questions by considering social systems as constituted by historically specific and identifiable cultural, political, and economic relationships. Social systems are historical–​social composites that change over time, doing so more than what we find in the natural sciences. One example is the welfare state system –​of which Habermas was concerned when he penned his book. To speak of a welfare state system features not only public policies, but also cultural beliefs among people as to the legitimacy of, say, unemployment insurance and social security. Debates over the amount of taxes to be levied, while turning intense during periods, were resolved for decades within legislatures that managed state programs. Yet, high inflation, along with the expansion of the belief that individuals ought to care for themselves, cast doubt on the operation of the welfare state, and therefore, turned problems into crisis tendencies in the 1970s and 1980s. Divisions emerged between groups in many advanced capitalist societies over the efficacy of certain policies and how they were funded. Political parties staked rival positions

8 Introduction and economists provided rationales for rethinking the system. A certain kind of consensus took root around neoliberalism as waning public support, changing political allegiances, and worsening economic conditions surrounded the welfare state order of the post-​World War II era.21 Critiques of neoliberalism did and still take place; the point is that in a crisis, a system’s reproduction is endangered as problems fail to be addressed, and common agreed upon norms breakdown into apparently intractable political differences. Crises are political above all else; economic elements, no matter how apparently autonomous they may seem, whether in the form of inflation, or unemployment, are mediated by policy and institutions. Applying Habermas’ framework to US agriculture means delineating what is the system in question. In this way, at its most basic, agriculture involves food and fiber production. This involves not only crops, such as corn, but cotton and lumber. Fishing and livestock ranching also count. What delimits agriculture from other systems is the intentional, direct human effort to work with nature to cultivate raw materials –​products that may be consumed, or that are converted into something else –​for direct human consumption. By “direct,” I mean taking something and putting it into or onto one’s body. Iron ore, also, is a raw material, but people do not eat or wear it. Therefore, mining is not agriculture. Furthermore, human effort includes labor, with some people owning land, and others, working on land that is owned by others for some form of compensation and who neither access nor acquire it for the own immediate needs (e.g., a farmworker picks strawberries on a farm that they do not own, receiving pay, not the fruit, for their time). Labor produces food, feed, and fiber as raw materials, involving land, water, and air in the process. Also, as no one produces all their goods directly for themselves, some form of exchange, or market, is critical. Therefore, overall, an agrarian system involves land, labor, markets, and the environment. These elements, furthermore, are social, which means that they contain their own political, economic, and cultural dynamics. This book documents how such dynamics inhere within distinct policy areas, showing at particular moments the emergence of crisis tendencies. Habermas’ work, in addition to identifying the elements that constitute a system, provides conceptual assistance on the nature of crisis. As he explains, when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened… when the consensual foundations of normative structures are so much impaired that the society becomes anomic. Crisis states assume the form of a disintegration of social institutions.22 For a system to become “anomic” involves experiences of disruption or breakdown, involving the loss of consensus and shared meanings about legitimacy. In non-​crisis situations, problems in political, economic, and cultural

Introduction  9 relations –​or as Habermas states, “alterations” –​do not turn into problematic tendencies that people and policy makers fail to resolve. Moreover, consensual foundations in non-​crisis periods of time do not mean obedience, as much as entailing a shared belief that the political, economic, and cultural relationships in a system are legitimate and can deal with problems if and when they occur. Crises differ as problems feed into and aggravate polarization that appears in stalemate and gridlock. Habermas continues, foregrounding the concept of contradiction. As he writes, “we can speak of the ‘fundamental contradiction’ of a social formation when, and only when, its organizational principle necessitates that individuals and groups repeatedly confront one another with claims and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible.23” A crisis situation is apparent when divisions are so protracted that fundamental goals and objectives are disputed. Such a situation is not brief, but occurs over time as groups “repeatedly confront one another.” This point is key because a crisis is particularly found in governance, which appears as gridlock. This is where contradiction appears –​ when groups polarize and fail to resolve problems. Contradiction and “fundamental principle” are essentially two sides of the same coin; when intractable political divisions emerge, then the principle, or reason for the system, is in question. Habermas shows us that a system is not a static, or fixed whole, but regularly undergoes change. Problems often emerge, and it is the work of politicians and other decision makers to find solutions. Yet, there are times unlike others when matters give rise to prolonged disagreement and gridlock; the coherence of the system is placed in jeopardy as problems fester. Such problems become what I call contradictory tendencies that place in doubt the potential for the continual operation of a system. Problems become contradictory as they develop within feedback loops that decision makers participate in yet fail to break. Specifically concerning feedback loops, which I derive from the theory of path dependence,24 political figures make limited, uncontroversial proposals in policy areas pertaining to land, markets, labor, and the environment. Such initiatives may be well-​received by certain constituencies, but fail to address identifiable, ongoing problems. This elaboration may appear akin to Polyani’s concept of “double movement.25” Polyani, in analyzing capitalist development in Europe, notes how the expansion of markets leads to abrupt changes and social strain, which in turn leads government authorities to establish regulations and policies. The approach to crisis that I elaborate in this book differs in so far as politicians potentially offer solutions, as well as make crises appear. Problems that turn into contradictions are always embedded in political relations, never existing prior to them (see Figure I.1). A spiraling, expanding cone that increase in size from left to right shows a figurative description of the definition of crisis as theorized in this book. Figure made by Author

10 Introduction

Figure I.1 Crisis Diagram.

Others have taken Habermas’ general framework, deepening our understanding of crisis by focusing on the problems that neoliberal reforms exacerbate. Habbu notes how neoliberalism, with its centering of individual responsibility, the operation of free markets, and efforts to deregulate and shrink government, was challenged by the 2007/​2008 financial crisis.26 Other accounts, likewise, call attention to how worsening economic inequality calls into question the cultural norms and policies that neoliberal advocates had pitched to improve people’s lives.27 Fraser, also following Habermas, sees crisis in times of neoliberalism as administrative or managerial.28 Basically, for Fraser, crises appear in governments’ failed efforts to provide technical remedies for social problems and a decline of public support. Together, these studies highlight key elements of neoliberalism, from culture to economic policies. Calling attention to neoliberalism contrasts the nature of the US agrarian system at the beginning of the twenty-​first century from what had changed in the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on changes in governance. For instance, the introduction of neoliberal reforms in agriculture included changing legislative philosophies that led to a curtailing of Anti-​Trust law enforcement against corporations. Unionization efforts also declined, especially as the farmworker labor force began to include undocumented people who had been driven from their home countries, in part, due to the implementation of free trade policies.

Introduction  11 As of 2022, farmworkers outnumber farmers, and states such as Wisconsin, which has longed prided itself on family-​run operations, would find its dairy industry crippled without migrants.29 Meanwhile, financialization has increasingly become present in policies such as crop insurance, as well as in how corporations manage to move commodities around the world to influence prices.30 In fact, imports of most fruits and vegetables have risen to such proportions that as of 2014, approximately 50% of such items come into the United States from Mexico.31 A retreat of state intervention in terms of market supports left farmers exposed to price fluctuations more so than in the decades immediately following World War II. Immediately following the Great Depression before the introduction of neoliberal reform in the 1970s and 1980s, price supports and other initiatives, which are explained more in Chapter 3, mitigated the pernicious effects of market fluctuations.32 Throughout this book, I treat neoliberalism as a set of policies that promote an ideology focused on promoting individuality and short-​term solutions to social problems. By sets of policies, I draw on the work of Peck and Tickell,33 who differentiate between “roll-​back” and “roll-​out” neoliberalism. Briefly, the former includes macro-​economic policies, such as tariff reductions, as well as dismantling price controls. Financialization falls within the “roll-​out” category of initiatives. In a complementary fashion, the latter set of policies feature targeted, population-​specific initiatives that distribute resources to ameliorate the negative effects of the “roll-​out” phase. Concretely, these initiatives include cash payments to distressed groups, as well as programs to channel individuals into the lower rungs of the capitalist economy. Micro-​ finance, for instance, counts as a form of “roll-​out” neoliberalism,34 as does some Farm Bill programs that focus on dedicating resources to beginning farmers who work in conservation. The issue, as I explore more in the conclusion, is how to engage such localized, small-​scale initiatives while remaining politically active. Whereas neoliberal policy reforms catalyze the creation of crisis in the US agricultural system, its actual appearance is found in political gridlock and stalemate. One dynamic is the rural/​urban political divide, which often maps onto partisan differences. This division is where problems in US agriculture are aggravated, instead of being addressed and resolved. Donald Trump’s successful bid to become President of the United States in 2016, in no small way, relied upon the support of people who are directly involved in the food and farm economy. Surveys show that not only farmers, but rural people in general, overwhelmingly supported the Republican candidate, as opposed to urban populations.35 Obversely, Democrats strategically shifted their sights from rural and working-​class constituencies in the 1990s, eyeing the urban, college-​educated demographic as their base.36 The Trump administration’s trade war with China did little to affect the President’s approval ratings in this context, despite the clearly negative effects on commodity pricing and farm incomes.37

12 Introduction How Democrats have turned away from rural people abdicates to Republicans the political power to make decisions concerning critical parts of the US agricultural system. Moreover, as neoliberalism has become entrenched in economic reforms, it has become part and parcel of how politicians in both parties have come to view the appropriate relationship between citizens and government.38 Neither an entirely new phenomenon, nor one reserved for the United States, rural/​urban polarization has developed to fundamentally shape most Americans’ identities since the 1990s due to the work of politicians, single-​member electoral districts, and the two-​party system.39 As such, partisan polarization and the rural–​urban divide create conditions for feedback loops wherein policy makers and stakeholders work with isolated constituencies instead of bridging differences to face systemic problems. Meanwhile, politicians’ “go-​to” toolkits are full of neoliberal policy remedies, which instead of seriously confronting problems, aggravate them. This politicized rural/​urban divide shows an apparent intractable separation between groups. “Apparent” is the operative word here, as at various times in US agrarian history, people have worked across divisions to confront serious problems. Such experiences include the work of the farmer–​labor party in Minnesota in the early twentieth century and the creation of the rural–​urban coalition that pushed for grain reserves in the 1970s. Difference is not the problem; the issue is when rivalries fail to move beyond disagreements that affect the ability of systems to reproduce themselves. From climate change policy, to iniciatives dealing with falling or stagnant farm incomes, migrant labor, and land access, significant legislation needs to work itself through urban and rural constituencies. Representatives from both the Democrats and Republicans must collaborate, as parliamentary rules make effective single-​party governance virtually impossible in the United States.40 As such, we have political stalemate with respect to working on systemic change; addressing the critical tendencies in US agriculture requires bridging geographic as well as partisan gaps rather than continuing with the regular, ad hoc proposals that political polarization allows. A further problem characteristic of the crisis in US agriculture is racism. Specifically, in the form of hierarchies, whether in terms of land ownership, or labor dynamics, racism had functioned to address problems as they have emerged in the US agrarian system, as well as aggravate them. Particularly concerning land and labor, the establishment and development of policies illustrate the dynamics of racial capitalism.41 Concretely, this has entailed policies that privilege white, Euro-​Americans and their descendants within relationships that include Black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC) communities. Privilege is not only about social standing, but supplements the extraction of time and other resources, such as land and labor, to concentrate capital and make profit.42 As a problem endemic to US agriculture, which I explore throughout the book, racial divisions contribute to the formation of crisis tendencies when decision makers struggle to make legitimate, consensus-​based policies.

Introduction  13 One further note on how crisis is conceived of in this book –​via Habermas’ framework –​is in making the state the principal unit of analysis. This may appear strange, as the centrality of immigration and the increase of imports and exports, show the internationalization of US agriculture. If anything, especially when compared to most of the twentieth century, we find ourselves in a global –​not national –​system. Despite these facts, it makes sense to ground a system analysis of US agriculture on the nation-​state. To start, the state is the primary site where policy making takes place concerning the food and farm system. Corporations move around the globe, yet domestic Anti-​Trust law retains the prerogative to breakup, monitor, regulate, and punish firms. Climate change is global, but governments meet at international summits to broker deals that have no power short of states ratifying agreements. Pricing policy is more complicated, as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and bilateral trade deals restrain what states can do. Still, as former President Trump showed by refusing to fund the WTO, such institutions remain anchored in the realm of nation-​state politics. That Brazil won a case filed to the WTO’s dispute settlement tribunal with respect to how US cotton subsidies harmed the former country’s producers –​and that the US paid the fine instead of changing its policy –​shows how the political will of nation-​state leaders has significant leeway within supranational organizations. Further reasons to feature the state include how the Farm Bill is debated and updated every five years, which grounds most policies pertaining to the US food system, from conservation and the environment to commodity pricing. Furthermore, the state collects most data on everything pertaining to agriculture, from incomes to acreage. Lastly, that we can speak of crisis is due to political divisions that exist within the United States according to group identities and partisan affiliations that do not transcend borders. For these reasons, the nation-​state remains the indispensable unit in discussing agrarian politics and policy. One last matter in identifying crisis tendencies is tracing change over time. A historical perspective highlights how some problems are far from new. Problems that have turned into crisis tendencies concerning land access, as is the focus of Chapter 2, have long-​standing historical roots. Paying attention to change over time also allows us to pinpoint crisis conditions, mainly by presenting dynamics that can be considered normal, or regular. This historical work complements the conceptual apparatus on crisis that has been introduced in this chapter. Take for instance the crisis in agriculture at the time of the Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s. At this time of unregulated overproduction and environmental disaster, millions lost their land holdings. These events led to the passing of the Agricultural Adjustment Act within the first 100 days of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, which is discussed more in Chapter 3. While not perfect for missing issues of sharecroppers, particularly landless African American producers, this legislation is representative of an

14 Introduction event that bridged differences in facing a systemic crisis. Fast forward into the twenty-​first century and overproduction is once again decried. Extreme weather disasters that have been triggered by climate change parallel the storms that are synonymous with the Dust Bowl. Still, agriculture has also changed significantly. For example, in the 1930s, 25% of the country’s population were employed as farmers. Now, that figure is at around 2%. There were also four times as many people working on farms in the 1930s when compared to the first couple decades of the twenty-​first century, as the total number of laborers –​ including family members –​at the former time approached 13 million.43 The demographic and legal status of farmworkers has also changed, as the workforce was principally domestic in the 1930s. The internationalization of the US food economy in terms of imports and exports is also different, increasing substantially since the 1970s.

Plan for the Book Each chapter isolates one policy area that is critical to the US agrarian system and that features unresolved problems that have become contradictory tendencies. The areas include land, labor, markets, and environment. In exploring these areas, I historicize their development to highlight different moments of crisis, as well as to showcase how the era of neoliberal reform, with increased political polarization, has contributed to gridlock and stalemate. A significant, but not the only source for the evidence that I use comes from the USDA. I complement this data, which I arrange, with reports from other agencies and secondary sources. Chapter 1 focuses on land. Here, I provide a historical sketch of the US land tenure system, documenting Indigenous territorial dispossession and consequent Euro-​American appropriation. As such, we see the development and institutionalization of a white, male property-​owning ideal that has come to dominate landownership. The problem that repeatedly takes on crisis proportions concerns the structure of authority; racism, on the one hand, functioned to include some owners while excluding others, yet at the same time, rested on dubious, unclear foundations. At different historical periods, this problem concerning authority has reappeared, which in the twenty-​first century, is present in the lack of an adequate mechanism to assure transfer. Without an institutionalized means to ensure the place of farmland in agriculture as consolidation and land loss increase, we find a principal contradiction concerning land in the US agrarian system that policy makers struggle to address. Foreign interests, concentration, predation, and urbanization only compound the problem of how land is leaving agriculture, endangering the land base of the US food and farm system. Partisan and geographic divisions keep the land question from being answered. Part of the problem is age; rural, farming populations particularly overwhelmingly rely on government-​ subsidized conservation policies that

Introduction  15 have not changed for decades. As farmers increasingly age out of the profession, they retain farmland to sell to cover healthcare or housing concerns. Young farmers, therefore, struggle to enter the profession, as urbanization increasingly turns arable land into residential areas. Neoliberal policy has only harmed the prospects of developing a transfer mechanism, mainly as individualized forms of market-​based transfer have been encouraged over state-​managed potential alternatives. Ad hoc, informal attempts at land transfer show the need for reform. Options, as explored more in the conclusion, include land banks. Integral to this effort is to address the financial challenges of elderly, retiring farmers, connecting them to younger people who have an interest in acquiring and working the land. Indigenous land loss also needs addressing, especially through working on countering quiet titling transfers and fractionalization. Chapter 2 focuses on labor. The presence of farm labor in US agriculture is not new. The US agrarian system has regularly relied on wage workers, as books such as McWilliams’ Factories in the Fields documented in the 1930s. What has changed is that the number of owner–​operator farms has decreased to such an extent that large, factory-​style operations dominate production from coast to coast. Populists such as Trump, in this regard, exacerbated the crisis in rural America as the government amped up enforcement measures against migrants while at the same time using farmers as political props. In appealing to the white, typically male ownership ideal, former President Trump did not directly confront the economic challenges that a labor-​starved agrarian system needs. Moreover, the farmworker population is not finding replacements. Basically, children of migrants tend not to work in farming and their parents age out of the profession. Waves of migrants numbering in the millions, as were seen in the 1990s, are not developing. Last, the partisan divide on immigration, specifically around legislation either focusing on farm labor or migration in general, remains stuck as Republicans and Democrats fail to see eye to eye. As such, the labor problem in US agriculture worsens. The crisis of labor touches on the previous chapter on land and transfer. Basically, one overlooked, yet promising move to address the US land crisis is finding ways to turn laborers into farmers. Some initiatives in this regard exist, for instance, in California. Such localized efforts could be nationalized, particularly for the knowledge and experience that farmworkers have of agriculture. Additionally, immigration reform is critical when analyzing labor, which would provide stability and continuity to workers who chose to not acquire property. Chapter 3, on commodity markets, deals with pricing and concentration. Returning to the supply chain, economic problems abound as concentration has created an inflexible system. Politicians, such as current Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, has regularly expressed support in expanding export markets to resolve farmers’ problems concerning incomes. The issue is

16 Introduction that searching out international markets as a fix to economic woes has been tried for decades, functioning to further expose farmers to boom and bust cycles. Additionally, local, decentralized efforts at direct sales have emerged. Still, consolidation is developing even in this area, and the scale of such initiatives is at such a level that they have not made a significant impact on incomes. In terms of government action in terms of incomes, the distribution of ad hoc direct payments was momentary and not tied to any kind of long-​ term policy change. Some ways to address problems that have become contradictory in markets include enforcing Anti-​Trust law and developing programs that are part of supply management. The latter option, as various farmer groups have proposed, works to coordinate supply and demand around a certain goal price that would improve incomes. Changes in support for Anti-​ Trust law, specifically with large tech firms such as Facebook drawing scrutiny, could help forge a bipartisan focus on challenge corporate power. Chapter 4 deals with the environment. Similar to the dynamics that are discussed in the other chapters, we find within environmental policy the persistence of problems that endanger the reproduction of the agricultural system. This includes access to water, which is particularly a concern for farmers in California, where the people in the United States get most of their fruits and vegetables. The focus of this chapter overall is climate change, showcasing how political divisions have stymied the development of a sufficient response from decision makers. I analyze how such divisions have not always characterized environmental policy –​focusing on how movements successfully mobilized and pressured politicians in the 1970s to pass sweeping changes. Not only with respect to inaugurating Earth Day, but creating the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as key pieces of significant legislation, I analyze how political unity existed at this moment to subsequently dwindle in the subsequent years. As I also discuss, this moment’s effort to unite people failed with respect to including BIPOC communities. Still, how the demand for environmental justice is led by BIPOC communities illustrates the potential for the environmental movement to improve and become more inclusive. I end this chapter by mentioning carbon markets, which the USDA is floating in certain pieces of legislation. This response, while a start, runs the risk of falling into the “too-​little-​too-​late” column, especially as multiple problems and inadequacies concerning cap-​and-​trade policies have been documented. Better solutions emerge in encouraging more environmentally sustainable, regenerative production techniques. Countering the use of fossil fuels, also, is key. Developing more diverse operations with less pesticide dependence is critical, especially as the former are petroleum-​based and contribute to problems concerning water quality. To encourage diversify operations and involve more regenerative practices connects environmental and economic concerns.

Introduction  17 The conclusion, in summarizing the main points of the book, digs deeper into the policy options mentioned earlier that have the potential to bridge geographic and partisan differences. In this regard, there is some discussion of strategy and tactics, noting what has worked in the past, and what, politically, could change to assist efforts to persuade policy makers and make deeper reforms to the US agrarian system. Overall, to focus on crisis in the US agrarian system is not new. The approach adopted in this book, rooted in the concept of contradiction and describing distinct tendencies that policy makers struggle to address, clarifies the dimensions of the food, farm, and fiber system crisis. Locating and dissecting crisis tendencies in land, labor, markets, and environment, moreover, helps analytically pick apart problems while also providing targeted solutions. As such, this book seeks to be an intervention. Growing up on a farm, it seemed that a crisis was always around the corner. From droughts and floods, to unexpected animal deaths, stress from surprise problems was baked into the cake, so to speak. Still, none of these events count as a crisis on their own. Problems present themselves as risks. Managing and mitigating risk is part of production choices, as well as government programs. Yet, again from my own experience, there is a threshold for risk. Or rather, when you cannot deal with the drought, and neither can your neighbor nor the entire community, then something is different. When the country is in drought, year after year, no amount of government-​subsidized crop insurance will grow feed for your cows. That is something different. When such patterns emerge and divisions abound instead of solutions, then we are looking at a crisis. There is still reason for optimism. Many groups are working on proposals and policies that I analyze and present, particularly in the conclusion. Yet, policy alone is not the answer; such work, as I also highlight, must remain connected to relationship building and communication. There is potential in such efforts, from calls for Anti-​Trust reform, to demands for immigration reform. In discussing such efforts, I emphasize the connection between process and results –​that focusing too much at the detriment of one over the other will not lead to bridging divides and addressing contradictory tendencies in the food system.

Notes 1 Dimitri, Carolyn, Anne Effland, and Neilson C. Conklin. The 20th Century Transformation of US Agriculture and Farm Policy. USDA Report. 2005. 2 James M. MacDonald and Robert A. Hoppe. “Large Family Farms Continue to Dominate Sales.” 2017. 3 Hoppe, Robert. “Profit Margins Increase with Farm Size.” USDA-​ERS 2015. 4 Congressional Research Office. “U.S. Farm Income Outlook: September 2020 Forecast.” September 23, 2020. 5 Kelloway, Claire and Sarah Miller. Food and Power: Addressing Monopolization in America’s Food System. Open Markets Institute. 2019.

18 Introduction 6 USDA. “Marketing Operations of Dairy Cooperatives.” 2017. 7 Hendrickson, Mary, Philip H. Howard, and Douglas Constance. “Power, Food and Agriculture: Implications for Farmers, Consumers and Communities.” Consumers and Communities (November 1, 2017). 8 Glauber, Joseph W. and Anne Effland. United States Agricultural Policy: Its Evolution and Impact. International Food Policy Res Inst, 2016. More statistics on farm income by year can be found here, www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​farm-​econ​omy/​ farm-​househ​old-​well-​being/​farm-​househ​old-​inc​ome-​forec​ast/​ 9 Giri, Anil K., Dipak Subedi, Jessica E. Todd, Carrie Litkowski, and Christine Whitt. “Off-​Farm Income a Major Component of Total Income for Most Farm Households in 2019.” Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America 2021, no. 1490-​2021-​1312 (2021). 10 Yaffe-​Bellany, David and Michael Corkery. “Dumped Milk, Smashed Eggs, Plowed Vegetables: Food Waste of the Pandemic.” New York Times, April 11, 2020. 11 For a summary of supply chain matters, with a focus on agriculture, is “Supply Chain Crunches Are Affecting Every Corner of Agriculture.” Modern Farmer, December 13, 2021. 12 For figures and reporting on the subsidy payments, see Chuck Abbot, “Record High Ag Subsidies to Supply 39% of Farm Income.” Successful Farming. December 3, 2020. 13 Van der Ploeg, Jan Douwe. “From Biomedical to Politico-​Economic Crisis: The Food System in Times of Covid-​19.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 47, no. 5 (2020): 944–​972. 14 McMichael, Philip. “A Food Regime Analysis of the ‘World Food Crisis’.” Agriculture and Human Values 26, no. 4 (2009): 281–​295. 15 Ikerd, John E. Crisis and Opportunity: Sustainability in American Agriculture. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. 16 Coverage on the 1980s Farm Crisis can be found here, www.iowa​pbs.org/​mtom/​ classr​oom/​mod​ule/​13999/​farm-​cri​sis 17 McMichael, Philip. “A Food Regime Genealogy.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 1 (2009): 139–​169. 18 Friedmann, Harriet, and Philip McMichael. “The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologia Ruralis 29, no. 2 (1989): 93–​117. 19 For other studies that adopt such a view, see Hauter, Wenonah. Foodopoly: The Battle over the Future of Food and Farming in America. New York: The New Press, 2012; Leonard, Christopher. The Meat Racket: The Secret Takeover of America’s Food Business. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 20 Habermas, Jürgen. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. 21 On these factors in prompting the turn to neoliberalism, see the collection of essays in Gerstle Gary, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Alice O’Connor, eds. Beyond the New Deal Order: US Politics from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019. 22 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 26. 23 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 27. 24 Pierson, Paul. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–​267; for Pierson’s book length treatment of Path Dependence, see Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Introduction  19 25 Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, especially “Self-​Protection of Society, pp. 130–​134. 26 Habbu, Aditya Adi. “The Neoliberal Legitimation Crisis of 2008.” Working Paper (2011). 27 Bonanno, Alessandro. The Legitimation Crisis of Neoliberalism: The State, Will-​ Formation, and Resistance. New York:Springer, 2017. 28 Fraser, Nancy. “Legitimation Crisis? On the Political Contradictions of Financialized Capitalism.” Critical Historical Studies, no. 2 (2015): 157–​189. 29 Perez, Maria. “Wisconsin’s Dairy Industry Would Collapse without the Work of Latino Immigrants—​Many of Them Undocumented.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 12, 2019. 30 Salerno, Tania. “Cargill’s Corporate Growth in Times of Crises: How Agro-​ Commodity Traders Are Increasing Profits in the Midst of Volatility.” Agriculture and Human Values 34, no. 1 (2017): 211–​222. 31 Johnson, Renée. The US Trade Situation for Fruit and Vegetable Products. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 32 Graddy-​Lovelace, Garrett, and Adam Diamond. “From Supply Management to Agricultural Subsidies—​and Back Again? The US Farm Bill & Agrarian (in) viability.” Journal of Rural Studies 50 (2017): 70–​83. 33 Peck, Jaime, and Adam Tickell. “Neoliberalizing Space,” Antipode 34 (2002): 380–​ 404. Subsequent research that further explores and uses their framework includes, Keil, Roger. “Urban Neoliberalism: Rolling with the Changes in a Globalizing World.” In Handbook of Neoliberalism, pp. 413–​ 425. London: Routledge, 2016; Sparke, Matthew. “Neoliberal Regime Change and the Remaking of Global Health: From Rollback Disinvestment to Rollout Reinvestment and Reterritorialization.” Review of International Political Economy 27, no. 1 (2020): 48–​74. 34 Mader, Philip. “Financialisation through Microfinance: Civil Society and Market-​ Building in India.” Asian Studies Review 38, no. 4 (2014): 601–​619. 35 On farmer support in 2016 and 2020, see Wilson, Mike. “Survey: Farmer Support for Trump Is Overwhelming.” September 2, 2020. Farm Progress. On rural voters more generally, see Lemon, Jason. “Rural Voters Helped Trump Win in 2016 –​ How Do the Polls Say They’ll Vote in 2020?” September 26, 2020. Newsweek. 36 Nichols, John. The Fight for the Soul of the Democratic Party: The Enduring Legacy of Henry Wallace’s Anti-​Fascist, Anti-​Racist Politics. New York: Verso Books, 2020. 37 Zhang, Wendong, Lulu Rodriguez, and Shuyang Qu. “3 Reasons Farmers Hurt by the U.S. –​China Trade War Still Support Trump.” November 5, 2019. PBS Newshour. 38 Gerstle, Lichtenstein, and O’Connor, Beyond the New Deal Order. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2019. 39 Badger, Emily. “How the Rural–​Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault Line.” New York Times May 21, 2019. 40 Specifically, with 60 votes in the US Senate, no legislation can pass. Off year elections following Presidential elections, additionally, typically shows the party that does not hold the Presidency gaining seats, often taking one or both chambers of congress. As such divided government –​with both political parties in charge –​is more the norm than not in the United States.

20 Introduction 41 Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism, Revised and Updated Third Edition: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Durham: UNC Press Books, 2020. 42 Fraser, Nancy. “Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to Michael Dawson.” Critical Historical Studies 3, no. 1 (2016): 163–​178. 43 USDA figures on the number of farmworkers over time can be found here, www. nass.usda.gov/​Char​ts_​a​nd_​M​aps/​Far​m_​La​bor/​fl_​fr​mwk.php. In ­chapter 3 of this book, I delve more into these figures and the problem of measurement.

1 The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy

Contradictory Tendency –​Increasing Patterns of Land Concentration, Rising Values, and Urban Sprawl Impede New Farmers from Accessing Property and Replacing Retirees. Public Policies and Private Initiatives Repeatedly Fail to Address these Challenges, as well as Historical Patterns of Racist Discrimination, Revealing a Crisis in State Authority with Respect to Establishing Legitimate Land Transfer Mechanisms.

Keeping Land in the Family, It’s Complicated An ongoing discussion in my family is what to do with the farm. At one point, my father entertained the idea of taking over the operation. A drought, with a dismal farm economic situation in the 1980s, led him to question that endeavor. Years later, my family sold the cows. We rent most of our land to neighbors who grow crops to feed their livestock. Buying us time to ponder the farm’s future, members of my immediate and extended family formed a trust to establish collective ownership and mechanisms to transfer the land to future generations. Not every farm family is as fortunate. Sometimes fierce divisions emerge between individuals who want to “cash in” and sellout to real estate developers. In other cases, people are forced to sell their land to pay hospital bills or nursing home expenses. What may make the decision to part with farmland easy is if no one in the family wants to go into agriculture. Local governments may take advantage of such a situation, snatching up the land for an industrial park. Overall, this panorama of scenarios characterizes where I grew up, where emerging housing subdivisions buttress lots with dilapidated farmhouses and barns, and new highways crisscross acres where alfalfa, wheat, corn, peas, and barley once grew. This chapter is not meant to bemoan such changes in land use by appealing to a bucolic, agrarian past. In fact, the historical analysis in this chapter shows how the US agrarian past was anything but peaceful. Noting the violent, unjust developments concerning land in US history, I explore the nature of crisis tendencies within land transfer policy. I emphasize how since the 1980s, the lack of effective transfer policies, as well as real estate developments, increased DOI: 10.4324/9781003330066-2

22  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy land concentration, and rising values, make accessing property next to impossible for new farmers. Historicizing the development of property relations in the US displays how problems in terms of legitimizing transfer are not new, from the violence of colonial acquisition to the incomplete attempts to distribute land to former slaves after the Civil War. How the racialization of land policy intersects with state authority, as I present in this chapter, explains why the US agrarian system lacks legitimate land transfer policies. This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first, I present conceptual issues with respect to the nature of state authority and property. I place this discussion within the context of Habermas’ theory of crisis and legitimacy. Next, I provide a historical analysis of property relations, highlighting the emergence of a crisis tendency concerning authority and land acquisition that is found in the dynamics of treaty making between Europeans and Indigenous people. The following section documents changes in institutions during the Post-​World War II era, which improved transfer, but remained caught in legitimacy concerns due to ongoing patterns of racist discrimination. The last section shows how neoliberal policies perpetuate racial and economic inequality, exacerbating an already problematic manner of transferring land to future farmers.

State Authority and the (Ideal) Nature of Land Transfer MacPherson provides a starting point for understanding the relationship between the state and property. As he writes, whether we are discussing the nature of private, common, or public property, property in general is “a political relation” that “…requires some body to enforce it. The only body that is extensive enough to enforce it … in modern (i.e. post-​feudal) societies has always been the state.1” Subsequent theorists have recognized that legal institutions constitute integral elements of property.2 Overall, the nature of property is not the same as an object, or possession, which is seen in the former’s political and institutional qualities. For instance, a house or farm, in so far as they exist as property, involve courts, the police, and banks, which together play key roles in acquisition, retention, and transfer. The “political relation,” as MacPherson emphasizes, entails sovereignty. Following Weber’s often referenced definition –​the successful claim by a human community to the legitimate use of violence throughout a particular territory –​others have explored sovereignty in terms of the power to take human life, as well as in the context of Indigenous demands for self-​ determination.3 In terms of property relations, sovereignty entails practices such as surveying, measuring, and/​or partitioning space. Such practices create rules that grant ownership and/​or access for some and not to others.4 The cadastral map –​a form of measurement discussed by Scott in his study of state sovereignty –​partitions space into abstract, geographically uniform units that appear as a grid.5 Measurement, as one practice of sovereignty, emphasizes some qualities of an area over others. For example, how, or if

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  23 specific geographic markers demarcate certain areas reveals the contested nature of surveying and sovereignty. Some believe that the concept of access offers an alternative way to conceive of property and state relations. Such analyses highlight the processes of gaining, controlling, and/​or maintaining “things.”6 This research, while adding ways to conceive of acquisition, goes too far in ignoring the state. Or rather, “things” exist within a series of institutions, even if state actors are not immediately present at a certain time. People may access a community garden and use it to grow food, which is a form of control. Regardless, the enjoyment of that “thing” –​the space where the garden is located, for instance –​is ultimately dependent on the state and/​or some private owner allowing access. Not to write off the importance of access, this discussion adds ways to think about property relations in terms of control, retention, and acquisition. Habermas’ thought becomes relevant here, mainly for how bureaucracies of advanced capitalist states function by “eliciting mass loyalty” while “avoiding participation.7” In terms of crises, contradictory tendencies appear when political and/​or cultural differences take root.8 Essentially, within institutions that ought to operate neutrally and in ways that are transparent to the public, cases of nepotism or partisan loyalties that impact the allocation of resources, prompt people to question state legitimacy. Property occupies a privileged place in this discussion of legitimacy and bureaucracy. First, there is how territory –​and property –​involve sovereignty. Practices, such as measurement, may seem apolitical but may turn divisive. Moreover, property is embedded within institutions that facilitate or impede transfer, access, and retention. Crises are avoided when the operation of such institutions are considered neutral and impartial, or rather, when differing interests do not devolve into intractable divisions. When and if practices become contested show where problems may emerge, and crisis tendencies develop. How such problems take on crisis proportions appear when examining the historical roots of the US agricultural land base.

Treaties and Racism in Constituting Property Relations in the US Agrarian System Treaties are neither merely written agreements nor pieces of paper. Instead, a treaty is the product of negotiations between different parties that contain prescribed modes of conduct for future interactions. The Peace of Westphalia, which is a collection of three treaties that ended the Thirty Years’ war in 1648, established the norm that the nation-​state was the primary unit of international relations. As Anghie argues, privileging the state paved the way for colonization, delegitimizing the political power of non-​state forms of authority and community.9 The state, by arrogating the power as the primary treaty-​making authority, developed wide-​sweeping powers to claim territory according to abstract longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates. Belmessous adds that who could legitimately treat changed over time, as non-​Christians were excluded

24  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy initially.10 Still, in the European tradition the norm is for subjects of treaties to agree, or consent to provisions.11 These dynamics evolved in the US context, as treaties became integral to negotiations between Europeans, their descendants, and Indigenous people. The United States government, to end conflicts and expand its territorial base in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, signed treaties with European states. Such agreements include the Treaty of Paris (1783), Treaty of San Lorenzo (1785), Treaty of Ghent (1814), Adams–​Onís Treaty (1819), Russo-​ American Treaty (1824), Webster–​Ashburton Treaty (1842), Oregon Treaty (1846), and Alaska Purchase (1867). The United States also treated with the Mexican state to acquire land in the Treaty of Limits (1828) and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). Treaties made between US elites and their European counterparts denied non-​European, Indigenous people self-​representation. One notable example is the Treaty of Paris (1783), which concluded the US’ war of independence from Great Britain. There is neither mention in the document of Indigenous actors nor their potential land claims, despite the US allying with some Cherokee bands, as well as with the Oneida and Tuscarora of the Iroquois Confederacy who inhabited lands that were ceded by Great Britain. Meanwhile, US authorities dictated territorial boundaries as they concluded conflicts according to national security interests. For instance, article five of the Treaty of San Lorenzo (1795) made the US responsible for controlling “Indian nations” on its side of the border, as Spain “will not order her Indians to attack the Citizens of the United States, nor the Indians inhabiting their territory.”12 Later, the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which ends the War of 1812, stipulates that the United States will not engage in further “hostilities” with Indigenous people and return to them “possessions, rights and privileges” that the latter enjoyed prior to the conflict.13 Seemingly a form of recognition, the treaty qualifies this claim if hostilities that threaten security interests continue. Article six of the Louisiana Purchase (1803) also references the territorial claims of Indigenous people. The specific reference is to the Treaty of Nogales (1793), which the Seminole, Mvskoke (Creek), Choctaw, and Chickasaw people entered with the Spanish government.14 The problem is that agreements made after the Treaty of Nogales, yet before the Louisiana Purchase, had Indigenous people cede their land to US authorities. Relatedly, treaties signed between the United States and European powers denied Indigenous people citizenship. For instance, the Russian–​American Treaty of 1867 allowed Russians to leave what would become US territory, or receive US citizenship if they stayed. Indigenous people were considered differently, as “the uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may from time to time adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.15” In this way, Russians were given choices, while Indigenous people were made into subjects without agency. The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo makes a similar differentiation, allowing Mexican

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  25 nationals to change their legal status if they desired. Indigenous people who lived in the territory subject to the 1848 agreement were considered exclusively a security threat and therefore subject to US power.16 The US Supreme Court, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), described Indigenous people as “domestic dependent nations.” A qualified, ambiguous form of recognition that provide tribes some political autonomy over internal affairs, Indigenous people were provided no powers with respect to authorities beyond the US’ borders. Whatever Indigenous political autonomy that existed was progressively eroded by commercial interests.17 Treaties contained provisions dealing with farming tools, such as plows, as well as for blacksmiths, housing, and schools. Annuities were stipulated, functioning to gain individual leaders’ loyalty and fuse cash into the developing market economy. Treaties also often included guarantees for hunting and fishing rights on and off lands that were not ceded to the United States.18 Despite this acknowledgment of non-​European food systems, economic and cultural provisions that were oriented at cultural assimilation and the creation of a market economy, tore into Indigenous people’s ways of life. Furthermore, the Trade and Intercourse laws (1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834) placed economic relations with Indigenous Peoples within the purview of domestic policy. As Prucha writes, the United States was “obsessed”, principally with “changing the cultures of the Indian from communally to individually based system of property ownership and from hunting or mixed economies to yeomanry.19” At roughly the same historical moment, land prices at the close of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century prohibited most settlers to acquire title, leading many Euro-​Americans to push the frontier west and become squatters. The Land Ordinance of 1785 laid the institutional groundwork for such dynamics. Specifically, the legislation sought to measure the newly acquired lands that had been negotiated away from Britain and taken from Indigenous people so that parcels could be created and sold to finance the nascent, cash-​strapped US government. A problem soon emerged, as settlers were found lacking the financial means to purchase lands directly from the government. Still needing finances, the US government sold territory to land companies, railroad enterprises, and mining firms.20 Some colonies, such as Massachusetts and Virginia, formed land companies with territorial claims to the West.21 This dynamic of selling property to companies, which would later sell it to the few settlers who could afford it, or corporations, set the basic parameters for domestic land transfer policy. Over the course of the nineteenth century, about 871.2 million acres left the public domain and became privatized.22 Meanwhile, the movement of cash-​poor settlers pushed Indigenous people West, often resulting in conflicts. Addressing violence prompted the US government to pass pre-​emption legislation at various times in the nineteenth century. Through these laws, legislators regularized squatters’ holdings at the expense of Indigenous people’s land claims.23

26  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy The Homestead Act showcases many of the problems concerning transfer as they existed in the nineteenth century. Passed in 1862, the Act promised settlers access to 160 acres, which they could own after improving the land for ten years and paying a variety of fees. These fees –​$18 initially, which as of 2022 would total over $600 –​proved challenging for settlers.24 Fraud, also, ran rampant as some used violence to acquire lots, often illegally taking multiple parcels. Around half of the titles claimed by families came decades after the legislation was passed in 1862, proving that original occupants failed to retain their holdings.25 Overall, underwriting this haphazard, piecemeal manner of privatizing and distributing land is a reoccurring problem concerning state power and political power. Prucha, in discussing treating specifically, calls the system that came to exist between US authorities and Indigenous people as a “political anomaly.26” The anomalous nature of this relationship appears when considering how nation-​states usually are the entities that treat with one another, with legitimate representatives consenting over provisions. Indigenous people, however, never formed states with centralized, hierarchical modes of governance over territorial boundaries. Concerning political power and legitimacy, Indigenous people maintained distinct modes of authority, even allying with European and Euro-​American powers in war, while inhabiting spaces that US elites negotiated for and acquired in constructing territorial control. Still, the US government placed organized political communities under the authority of another political power without ending the former’s existence. US and European authorities, despite this recognition, unilaterally excluded Indigenous people from holding rights, subjecting them to periodic violence and perpetual juridical uncertainty.27 This problem concerning legitimate political control over territory is found in how the US dealt with Indigenous people at times as if they were political authorities, and at other times, as if they were not. Subsequently, US authorities may appeal to treaties and negotiation, which have the trappings of discussion and agreement, and therefore, legitimacy. Meanwhile, Indigenous leaders can show that the documents were agreed upon under duress, and therefore without their consent. Who, or what legitimately can transfer, as well as acquire or access property, therefore, always carries doubt. This problem festered after Congress’ passing of the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871. In this Act, the US Congress unilaterally decided to end treating with Indigenous people. Never reconciling competing claims concerning territorial authority and governance, the US government continued to decollectivize the remaining communal holdings of Indigenous people. The 1887 Dawes Act, which was followed by the 1898 Curtis Act for the Chickasaw, Cherokee, Mvskoke, Choctaw, and Seminole in what became the state of Oklahoma, saw to complete the privatization of Indigenous territory. Communal arrangements were ended unilaterally by US officials who sought to survey, map, and privatize land to create 160-​acre parcels. Throughout this process, racism functioned to rationalize dispossession and develop private property. Specifically, treaties promoted a sedentary,

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  27 individualized style of farming that encapsulated a settler colonial view of agriculture that took a white male property ownership as the ideal.28 The system of blood quantum exemplifies this racialized ideal. At the time of passing the Dawes and Curtis Acts, who would receive land, as well as a series of restrictions concerning use and sale, required that tribes enroll their members. At the time of enrollment, how much, or the percent “Indian” that an individual was, inversely correlated to the restrictions that were placed on the ability to sell or rent allotments. Concretely, individuals who were classified as “full blood,” had to wait longer to sell their land than individuals with less Indigenous ancestry.29 These restrictions provided time for enrolled tribal members to “learn” how to farm. Basically, the less European the person was, the more they needed training on how to be a “good” farmer. Dynamics during the US–​Mexican war highlights the racial dimension in the context of territorial acquisition with respect to non-​Indigenous people of color, as “expansionist Americans had to construe Mexicans as constituting an inferior race to justify taking their land.30” The nature of land transfer initiatives concerning former slaves after the US Civil War parallel the racist, illegitimate dealings that concerned Indigenous people. The short lifespan of the Southern Homestead Act, which was passed in 1866 as an extension of the original 1862 legislation, focused on former slaves who were not citizens in 1862. In terms of land transfer, the 1866 law intended to provide 80 acres –​not 160, which had been the amount for Euro-​Americans –​to former slaves who sought property in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Another initiative included the Freedman Bureau’s mission (the United States Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands), which was established in 1865 to assist former slaves acquire property, as well as other forms of relief. An additional property transfer initiative came in 1867, when the South Carolina Land Commission was created with the purpose of purchasing land for redistribution.31 These land redistribution initiatives dissipated as Southern landowners retook power in the former Confederate states and the push to extend voting rights to former slaves displaced economic concerns. Meanwhile, white violence and inadequate resources led to the repeal of the Southern Homestead Act in 1876. Not without any effect, approximately 5,735 farms were created for the estimated 4 million former slaves.32 Later, the Land Commission in South Carolina fell apart in the mid-​1880s due to mismanagement.33 Despite poor execution and lack of political will across these efforts, thousands of Black farmers gained access to farmland.34 Concerning the Indigenous people who acquired property, title fractionation further contributed to dispossession. Essentially, when titles become fractionated, many people, some living, some dead, have legal right to a property. Without clearing the title, or rather, sorting out who owns what, the land has limited use. For instance, an individual may claim part of the property, but not have the ability to either use the land as collateral or sell it. Fractionation emerged as a problem as Indigenous people resisted allotment by refusing

28  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy to participate.35 Regardless, the US government provided Indigenous people private holdings. Moreover, without the state being considered a legitimate entity to facilitate transfer, recipients often died without knowing that they owned land. Heirs of heirs subsequently received land, leading to dozens, even hundreds of people laying claim. Amid such confusion, people of European descent took or accessed the property fraudulently, sometimes convincing heirs to cede their claims. Overall, allotment decimated Indigenous peoples’ territorial bases. According to the Indian Land Tenure Foundation, Indigenous holdings went from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million 1934.36

The New Deal and Mixed Results in Addressing Enduring Problems in State Authority Important changes in terms of land transfer took place in the twentieth century, especially concerning how racism had factored into policy. Some initiatives benefited small-​scale producers in general, also, however briefly, working in favor of BIPOC communities. Still, policy design and implementation failed to address the enduring problem of creating a state-​sanctioned, legitimate land transfer mechanism. Problems concerning land transfer were compounded, particularly in the Plains states, by the Dust Bowl environmental disaster in the 1920s. Basically, an increase in planting on poor quality acreage during a period of unusually high rainfall, which a drought brought to an unabrupt end in the early 1920s, generated twin economic and environmental shocks to the US food and farm system. According to some estimates, approximately 2.5 million people left their homes in the affected areas.37 Meanwhile, farm incomes, which were high in the immediate aftermath of World War I, fell. Bankruptcy filings for 1920–​ 1929 jumped 332.2% when compared to 1910–​1919. The single year high for bankruptcies came in 1925, when 7,872 farmers filed. In that same year, the overall rate was 12.2 per 10,000 farms out of a total of 6.37 million farms.38 By 1929, which is often referenced as the first year of the Great Depression, a veritable breakdown of the US agricultural system was unfolding. In response, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 was passed through Congress with bipartisan support. Commodity pricing (more the focus in Chapter 3), conservation policy (discussed in Chapter 4), as well as critical initiatives pertaining to land policy, were revolutionized by the law. Even though votes in favor of the legislation split the parties, with the Republicans in the minority in the House of Representative (98 as opposed to 315), 39 voted in favor of the bill. The Senate then passed the bill, 64 to 20, with 48 Democrats, 14 Republicans, and 1 Farmer-​Laborite and 1 Progressive voting in favor. Bipartisan agreement, in no small part, developed from the concerted lobbying actions of farmer organizations.39 Such lobbying took place on the campaign trail, with scientists and leaders from civil society actively pursuing Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s attention in 1932. The Hoover administration (1929–​1933) chose not to work closely with Congress on legislation, opting

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  29 to provide opportunities for cooperatives to market their product.40 Staying aloof from legislators made a crisis of the problems in the agricultural system that Roosevelt saw to address. The AAA fundamentally altered state-​society relations within the US agrarian system, including with respect to land policy. In his study of the Farm Bill, Coppess quotes Harold Breimeyer, a former USDA economist, who noted how the AAA “erased for all time the rural-​agrarian heritage of a circumscribed role for government … replacing it with ‘an urban-​industrial commercial conceptualization and policy design.41’ ” Institutionally, the AAA coordinated through the Secretary of Agriculture the federal government with local committees. These county level committees from around the country were established by farmers who would participate in the AAA’s programs. Gerstle et al. note that the New Deal state’s legitimacy, besides coming out of bipartisan support, was based in a shared faith in expert, scientific knowledge that joined state and society actors in a hierarchical fashion.42 The New Deal state created financial authorities with considerable power concerning land access. For instance, the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act and the Farm Credit Act became law in 1933. Whereas the former legislation provided emergency debt relief to farmers to keep them on the land, the latter law created 12 banks for purchases, another 12 for short-​and intermediate-​ term acquisitions, and an additional 12 to finance cooperatives. These three sets of banks were placed under the direction of a central cooperative bank, which was established to assist the others if they lent in excess beyond their means.43 President Roosevelt placed other credit organizations of the time under the supervision of a new agency, the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), which was created with Executive Order No. 6084 in 1933. Amid such institutional changes, the Farm Security Administration (FSA) became crucial with respect to land transfer. Other financial agencies dealt primarily with landowning farmers, not with people who sought to acquire land. Before the FSA, the Resettlement Administration devised policies to counter rural displacement and poverty in the countryside. Decree 7027 from 1935 mandated the creation of the Resettlement Administration, granting the agency the power to expropriate and redistribute land to prospective farmers.44 According to its mission, the Resettlement Administration oversaw the Greenbelt Communities, which were cooperative living arrangements for unemployed people.45 In these public settlements, families lived in separate houses without ownership or title that they could not sell or rent. Besides housing, the settlements featured cooperative supermarkets, gas stations, and bars. Three Greenbelt towns were created by the Resettlement Agency, as most of its efforts went to maintaining relief camps. In 1937, the Resettlement Administration became the FSA, which expanded the prior agency’s efforts concerning land access. Reasons for this change came from some unintended effects of implementing New Deal farm policy, as well as popular pressure. Concerning the former, the AAA introduced income support measures from which property owners benefited if

30  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy they cut production. Sharecroppers and tenant farmers –​groups who did not own their land outright and lived on the property of others –​were concomitantly placed in a precarious position.46 More precisely, calls to produce less and reduce the acreage in production to improve incomes allowed large landowners in the South to either mechanize and/​or evict farmers who worked on their property. Sharecroppers and tenants, especially African Americans who outnumbered white landless farmers, were among those driven away. What was good farm policy for small landholders who used hired labor either sporadically or not at all, turned into another means to dispossess marginalized people who had insecure access to land.47 The Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU) emerged in response. Having officially formed in 1934 –​one year after the AAA became law –​ the STFU reached its peak membership in 1936 when it counted on about 25,000 people.48 Its demands included land redistribution and the development of cooperatives. The STFU is best known for organizing rural people across racial lines in ways that outpaced earlier efforts, such as the Populists.49 Over time, the organization struggled to amass enough resources to pay dues, which also exacerbated internal tensions.50 After becoming the National Agricultural Workers Union, the movement ended in the 1960s. Besides working across racial divisions, the STFU made contributions in terms of legislation, promoting an innovative policy-​ making vision concerning land transfer. Frank Tannenbaum, who researched agrarian reform efforts in Mexico, crafted some of these initiatives. One document he authored in 1934, “A Program to Develop a New System of Rural Tenure,” created an $300 million endowment for the FSA to purchase and then redistribute land where “the landlord function was not serving an adequate social purpose.”51 While active in pushing the Roosevelt administration to address the conditions of agrarian poverty in the South, at the center of the STFU’s innovative legislative proposals was the “New Homestead Act.” This proposal called for the nationalization of all farmlands except for operations owned by people with less than 160 acres.52 While this proposal would not become law, what resulted, with the assistance of allies such as Wallace and Tannenbaum, was the Bankhead–​Jones Farm Tenant Act in 1937. This legislation established loans for farmers to acquire land, as well as county-​level commissions to decide which land was eligible for redistribution and who would receive it. The legislation established the USDA as a vehicle for transferring property from willing sellers to potential buyers. As a “lender of last resort,” the Act made the USDA subsidize credit to landless people, targeting tenants, sharecroppers, and laborers who lacked resources. If a new property owner would default on a loan, or simply quit, then the land would return to the USDA and become eligible for another. Additionally, the legislation included provisions to incentivize investment in infrastructure, specifically roads and schools. That provision stipulates that infrastructural spending would target

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  31 counties where land had been redistributed, with the amount depending on farm productivity.53 Following World War II, these innovative land transfer policies were undone. Pressure from the real estate industry in the 1950s forced the privatization of the Greenbelt Communities. The Bankhead–​Jones Act legislation managed to function for a time to transfer land, especially for marginalized people. Geisler notes that this legislation, as well as other FSA projects, led to the redistribution of 2 million acres in over 200 areas in the 1930s and 1940s. Critics claim that such results were meager given the scale of the economic problems that characterized the Great Depression era, while others note that such achievements are exceptional given that no other policy initiative in the twentieth century redistributed so much land to so many people.54 Seen as a threat to the white landed elites in the South, especially for enfranchising landless people of color, the FSA became the subject of Congressional investigation in the 1940s. In 1946, the Farmers’ Home Administration Act replaced the FSA, turning the USDA’s focus to farmers who had land, and not to landless people.55 The mixed experience of the FSA, for BIPOC farmers and rural people, was mirrored in other policy initiatives. Positively for Indigenous people, allotment officially ended in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act, otherwise known as the Indian New Deal. Besides the lobbying efforts of John Collier, who was a Euro-​American advocate, Indigenous leaders had for years pressured the federal government to stop incentivizing privatization and recognize collective land rights.56 The IRA promoted the formation of limited, local self-​government with provisions for economic development and education that Congress would fund. The IRA remains central to Indigenous struggles for land and self-​ determination into the twenty-​first century. First, the IRA set the basis for federal recognition. To gain such recognition, the IRA forces Indigenous people to constitute tribes that feature governments and written constitutions akin to the political organization of the United States, i.e., with a President, legislature, and so on. This requirement, as such, fails to respect non-​Euro-​ American structures of authority.57 Despite this shortcoming, the IRA provided a means for Indigenous people to assert a national identity and seek recognition. The policy of termination in the 1950s ended this experiment. Launched during the Truman administration, termination sought to end the tribal governance systems that had been recognized in the 1930s, as well as send Indigenous people who were living on their ancestral lands to urban areas.58 Mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s, led by organizations such as the American Indian Movement, succeeded in pressuring the federal government to end termination and promote an alternative rooted in self-​determination. The movement, with well-​publicized events such as the occupation of Alcatraz and the conflict with federal authorities on the Pine Ridge Reservation in

32  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy 1973, pressured President Nixon to sign the Indian Self-​Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 93–​638). Effectively ending Termination, the Act ushered in a period where grants and contracts would bridge the US government and federally recognized tribes. Since the 1970s, this legislation has provided means for tribes to reconstitute language systems and form land trusts.59 Territorial authority remains a point of contention, despite these legislative changes. For instance, cases of homicide and assault, no matter if they involve tribal members, evoke US federal –​not tribal –​jurisdiction. Hunting and fishing rights remain disputed, as varying by region, some tribes have sought and been guaranteed these rights while others have not. That Indigenous people could exercise such rights –​on and off reservation –​often appeared in treaties from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Twentieth century interactions with the state authority, principally in terms of land policy, differed for African Americans. In the face of piecemeal attempts of the federal government to redistribute land to former slaves during and after the Civil War, by the 1920s, close to a million Black farmers existed throughout the United States. African American producers with land access, even if they worked in exploitative institutions such as sharecropping or tenant farming, was about 15% of all farmers.60 African American land loss, which saw the US’ Black population in a few decades go from a predominately rural to urban group, begins in the early twentieth century. In the Great Migration of the first couple decades of the twentieth century, extrajudicial violence, as well as mechanization, prompted millions to leave agriculture. Often, Black farmers left their land for white landowners to take, that is, if either other family members could not care for it or other arrangements were not made.61 Besides the exception that was the Bankhead–​Jones Act, more common efforts were led by the USDA to systematically discriminate against African American farmers who sought to remain in the South. Daniel, in his study concerning land loss, documents such discrimination against Black farmers in the form of providing loans late, or by offering inadequate extension services. Evidence that such discrimination led to land loss is found in noting how Black producers quit farming at a disproportionate rate when compared to their Euro-​American counterparts.62 As such, not only were legitimate land transfer mechanisms not developed in the twentieth century, but the experience of African American producers reveals how racism continued to dispossess some people more than others.

Problems Concerning Land Transfer and Crisis during the Neoliberal Period Increases in land concentration, rising urbanization, and growing inequality –​ not in 2022, but in 1973 –​prompted a group of policy makers, activists, and academics to meet in San Francisco. Over 400 people met in the West Coast city to inaugurate the first (and only) National Conference on Land Reform.

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  33 Van Sant notes that the coalition, “developed a critique of the way that increasing land concentration by corporate and absentee owners exacerbated both economic inequality and environmental destruction.63” Despite its ambitious start, as well as the publication of a book on land reform, the group disbanded soon after. Many of the factors threatening land access that caught the attention of those who met in San Francisco in 1973 have worsened since. Specifically, we continue to witness the drive for short-​term profits from real estate investments taking land out of food production for housing, as farmland falls increasingly into the hands of fewer owners. Rising farmland values tend to make access next to impossible for beginners. At the root of such patterns is the enduring problem concerning legitimate state authority and property, namely, how a patchwork of policies provides no clear mode of transferring land to future farmers. Most policies, especially during times of neoliberal reform, contribute to land transfer problems instead of confronting them. Some may doubt that issues pertaining to land transfer exist in the United States, noting how most farms are owned by families. According to the USDA, family farms –​defined as when the majority of the business is owned by an operator and individuals related to that person64 –​account for 98% of operations and 87% of production.65 Corporations and cooperatives make up the rest. Moreover, over 94% of land in the country is owned by family farms.66 Also, foreign farmland ownership, which despite rising over the last two decades, is at just 2.2% of total arable land.67 Rising inequality in terms of ownership leads us to question if family farm ownership is an answer to problems concerning land transfer. For instance, indices of inequality in land ownership are roughly the same when comparing Brazil with the United States, as the former country has a GINI coefficient of 0.81 –​and is widely recognized for extensive inequality –​and the latter, 0.78, as of 2014.68 In writing on trends (see Figure 1.1), In 1987, more than half (57 percent) of all U.S. cropland was operated by midsize farms that had between 100 and 999 acres of cropland, while 15 percent was operated by large farms with at least 2,000 acres. Over the next 25 years, cropland shifted away from midsize and toward larger operations. By 2012, farms with 100-​999 acres held 36 percent of cropland, the same share as that held by large farms. 69 A slightly larger historical view of trends shows similar dynamics. Moreover, the percentage of harvested cropland farmed by mid-​size operations as seen in the graph –​namely, those with between 100 and 500 acres, fell from close to 45% in 1969 to 16% in 2017. Basically, fewer farms have come to own, control, and access more land over time. While mainly families own the land, how much they claim and control is increasing. Meanwhile, land values have nearly doubled in value from 2005 to 2019, and from 2020 to 2021, jumped 7%.70 Despite President Trump’s trade war with

34  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1969

1974

1978

1982 0 - 100

1987

1992

1997

100 - 500

2002

2007

2012

2017

500 -1000

Farm Size by Acreage

Figure 1.1 Percent of Harvested Cropland Acres by Farm Size, 1969–​2017. This graph shows over time a trend whereby fewer and larger farms harvest cropland over time. Graph assembled by the author. Data from the United States Agricultural Census, available here https://​agcen​sus.libr​ary.corn​ell.edu/​

China, which may lead some to expect a fall in value as agricultural exports fell, land values from 2018 to 2020 only dropped in five states –​Montana, Iowa, Minnesota, Georgia, and Washington. Purchases, for instance, by pension funds such as Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA), have been linked to the expansion of large-​scale operations that specialize in export agriculture around the world. In the United States, as well as in South America, Europe, and Australia, the non-​profit financial services firm controls close to two million acres of farmland.71 Following suit, European Countries such as the Netherlands, as well as China, have spent billions to acquire millions of acres in the United States.72 While just over 2% of farmland is owned by foreign entities, that percentage is increasing over time and driving up land costs. Besides concentration, housing developments increasingly take land out of agriculture. From 1992 to 2012, over 31 million acres left food production for housing, with millions more being dedicated for future subdivisions and real estate in the subsequent years.73 Urban sprawl, specifically in the form of low-​density housing, is a matter of concern. Such developments place a single-​family house on 1 to 5 acres of what was once productive, or vacant land.74 The size and number of such dwellings increased since the COVID-​19 pandemic began in 2020.75 Of further concern is the fact that farmers are aging, reaching an average age of 57.5 years according to the 2017 agricultural census.76 Furthermore, as farmers leave the profession, families hold onto land even if they stop working in agriculture. According to the USDA, close to 40% of farms are ran by retired people, with 10% of all operations earning no income. Of those retired operators, 75% are enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  35 (CRP) –​what farmers refer to as “set-​aside.”77 In other words, people who do not farm access conservation policy as a source of income. CRP, initially, was part of the Soil Bank program that was introduced in the 1956 Farm Bill. Another part, the Acreage Reserve Program (ARP), paid farmers to reduce the production of the six basic crops –​wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, rice, and peanuts –​for a year. CRP offered farmers 3-​to-​10-​year contracts, paying them to replace production agriculture with conservation practices such as reforestation. CRP and ARP were phased out in the 1960s due political disagreements.78 The 1985 Farm Bill brought CRP back with extended contract provisions –​ten years or more. Revised CRP provisions take land out of production that is in danger of erosion. Despite its sound logic, that older people retain land and seek CRP payments reveals that maintaining holdings is financially critical for retirees and aging farmers.79 Aging farmers who are not finding replacements is a problem that is taking on crisis proportions. Concretely, approximately 70% of arable land will change hands from 2020 to 2040 mainly through wills, trusts, and contracts.80 More conservative estimates place that figure at 40% –​still approximating half of total farmland –​or about 370 million acres.81 The crux of the matter is that concerning the next generation of farmers, new entrants rely on ad hoc arrangements instead of well-​planned policies. It is true that trusts may offer experiences to beginning farmers and mitigate the risks of starting up.82 The problem is that setting up a trust requires someone to first own land. Meanwhile, wills and contracts often tend to connect family members to land, not necessarily farmers who are dedicated to food production. Local, small-​scale efforts to assist people gain land to farm have been developed. For instance, Minnesota’s Land Stewardship Project connects retiring farmers with beginners who need land, while also offering a course on farming. While innovative, the program remains primarily focused on the upper Midwest.83 The California bill –​AB 986, Agricultural land: Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers, or the “REEAL Act” –​is a legislative proposal to subsidize BIPOC people who want to become farmers. Not only regional, but the initiative does not connect aging, potentially retiring farmers, to the next generation. California farmers, in fact, are slightly older than the national average.84 Government efforts at redistribution minimally assist beginning farmers, helping more people who already own land. The principal agencies that are involved in financing operations are the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and the Farm Credit System (FCS). The latter, which provides loans for beginning farmers, had provided $12 billion to 87,000 borrowers and guaranteed $16 billion for another 39,000 people as of 2021. These figures constitute 3% of loans concerning land deals. The FCA constitutes over 43% of real estate and non-​real estate lending. This system dedicates resources to farmers to acquire more land and/​or implement. Similarly, private, commercial banks work with people who have a past in production agriculture. These banks control 40% of farm loans.85

36  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy Neoliberalizing the farm financial system, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, weakened efforts at creating legitimate land transfer policies. The 1970s commodity boom saw a rise in incomes, as well as indebtedness as farmers expanded their operations. Liberalization at this time allowed government entities to increase the size of their loans and the number.86 When prices fell in the 1980s, farmers struggled to service their debts, leading to an increase in defaults. With bipartisan support, the 1987 Agricultural Credit Act merged key lending institutions within the FCS and allowed the expansion of the private sector into farm financing, increasing from approximately 20% in 1960 to over 40% in 2021.87 Political stalemate, as well as retaining a short-​term perspective concerning Farm Bill objectives, has kept the land question largely off the legislative agenda. As much is seen in debates over the nutrition title of the Farm Bill, which for years has pitted politicians against one another along party lines.88 Months of debate over cuts in 2018, which is a common neoliberal trope, characterize discussions that led to a negotiated, short-​term compromise.89 The 1996, 2008, and 2014 Farm Bill debates tended to feature the same dynamics.90 Overall, while spending has fallen minimally over time, increases are seen in the event of sharp economic downturns –​in 2008 and 2020.91 Essentially, politicians dedicate time on energy with little effect on the nutrition expenses that change more in reaction to events than popular sentiment or pressure. Such a focus on nutrition at the expense of other, pressing matters exists in a feedback loop that neoliberal policy and rhetoric engenders. Meanwhile, historical patterns of land loss continue among farmers of color. Fractionated titles, for instance, remain a concern for Indigenous who live on reservations.92 Even in the event of individuals knowing that they are legal owners, their holdings often feature government restrictions that place specific barriers on use and access.93 Additionally, through the practice of quiet titling,94 companies and individuals claim land where it is unclear who is the owner. If no one claims the property after filing in a county court, then title is granted to the entity that filed the claim. Various courts cases as well as certain high-​profile disputes, for instance, involving Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s interest in acquiring property in Hawai’i, show that quiet titling is a threat to Indigenous land.95 Not only for Indigenous people, FSA loans have been criticized for not reaching farmers of color to the same extent as Euro-​Americans.96 Lawsuits have sought to address land loss in BIPOC communities. For instance, in Pigford v. Glickman (1999), Black farmers won a class-​action lawsuit against the USDA for discriminating against African American landholders in the 1980s and 1990s. From the lawsuit, approximately $1 billion has been paid to African American farmers. While tied to land loss, the settlement did not stipulate that payments had to be used for agricultural purposes. Similar cases include Keepseagle v. Vilsack (2010) and Cobell v. Salazar (2009). The latter case awarding Indigenous farmers indemnities, provided resources for tribes to remedy fractionated holdings. In the former,

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  37 besides distributing resources to individuals, a fund was created to provide technical training to Indigenous farmers. The lawsuits represent critical steps in addressing the central role that racism had in constituting the US agricultural land base. Still, pressures from other forces, for instance, real estate, as well as large-​scale producers, place BIPOC holdings under continued stress.

Conclusion –​Evolving Property Relations Amid Ongoing Legitimacy Concerns This chapter highlights the problem that the lack of a legitimate land transfer policy poses for the US agrarian system. As I argue, the root of the problem is found in the racist, colonial system of treating with Indigenous people that laid the framework for the subsequent creation of a partial, illegitimate mode of transferring property. At various times, policies have arisen to address the matter of land transfer, for instance, with Bankhead–​Jones Act in 1937. While the Act did not live up to its potential in terms of results, the legislation provided an innovative manner of inclusively providing land for new farmers, while also investing in infrastructure. This chapter ends with a discussion of how political divisions and neoliberal reforms have stymied the development of a long-​term vision and policy with respect to land transfer. Meanwhile, problems have compounded over time, from the expansion of real estate purchases of farmland, to increases in land concentration and value. Policy makers’ legislative actions on land transfer dedicate resources to FSA loans, which pale in comparison to what private commercial banks and other government entities offer to farmers who want to grow their operations. Overall, the lack of a legitimate means to transfer property has taken on crisis proportions, mainly as land leaves food production, new farmers struggle to access property, and retired farmers hesitate to relinquish their holdings for financial concerns.

Notes 1 Macpherson, Crawford Brough. “Introduction.” In Macpherson, Crawford Brough, ed. Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978, 4. 2 Blomley, Nicholas. “The Territory of Property.” Progress in Human Geography 40, no. 5 (2016): 593–​609. 3 Weber, Max. Weber: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Vintage, 1990; Bruyneel, Kevin. The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of US–​Indigenous Relations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. 4 Elden, Stuart. “Land, Terrain, Territory.” Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 6 (2010): 799–​817. 5 Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

38  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy 6 Ribot, Jesse C., and Nancy Lee Peluso. “A Theory of Access.” Rural Sociology 68, no. 2 (2003): 153–​181. 7 Habermas, Crisis, 36. 8 Habermas, Crisis, 65, 135. 9 Anghie, Antony. “The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2006): 739–​753. 10 Belmessous, Saliha. “The Paradox of an Empire by Treaty.” In ed. Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600–​1900. Edited by Salhia Belmessous. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 11 Belmessous, Paradox, 12–​14. 12 See Article 5 of the Treaty, found here: https://​ava​lon.law.yale.edu/​18th_​cent​ury/​ sp1​795.asp. Accessed 7/​11/​2022 13 See Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent, found here: https://​ava​lon.law.yale.edu/​ 19th_​cent​ury/​ghent.asp. Accessed 7/​11/​2022. 14 Kinnaird, Lawrence, Francisco Blache, and Navarro Blache. “Spanish Treaties with Indian Tribes.” The Western Historical Quarterly 10, no. 1 (1979): 39–​48; on the US’ promise to respect Spanish treaties, see Article 6 of the Louisana Purchase Treaty: https://​ava​lon.law.yale.edu/​19th_​cent​ury/​lou​is1.asp 15 See Article 3 from the Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to the United States of America, found here: https://​ava​lon.law.yale.edu/​19th_​cent​ury/​treat​ ywi.asp 16 See Article 9 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; February 2, 1848, found here: https://​ava​lon.law.yale.edu/​19th_​cent​ury/​guadh​ida.asp 17 Article 1, section 8 grants Congress the power “To Regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 18 Goodman, ed. “Protecting Habitat for Off-​ Reservation Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right.” Environmental Law. 30 (2000). pp. 279–​362 19 Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, 10. 20 Opie, John. The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 21 Shaw, and Julius L. Goebel. Early American Land Companies: Their Influence on Corporate Development. Baltimore: Beard Books, 2000. 22 Anderson, Gary M., and Dolores T. Martin. “The Public Domain and Nineteenth Century Transfer Policy.” Cato Journal. 6 (1986): 905. 23 Opie, Law, 53–​55. 24 For information on the fees, see “The Homestead Act of 1862,” The National Park Service. Available here, www.nps.gov/​artic​les/​the-​homest​ead-​act.htm 25 Hoefle, Scott. “Beyond Cold War Pipedreams: What the West Was Not.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 30, no. 2 (2003): 95–​123. 26 Prucha, Anomaly, 1–​14. 27 I take this point from Mamdani’s work on colonialism in Africa. See, Mamdani, Mahmood. Citizen and Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018: 15–​19. 28 Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. “Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of US Race and Gender Formation.” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity no. 1 (2015): 52–​72.

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  39 29 Otis, Delos Sacket. The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, (1971) 2014. 30 Guardino, Peter. The Dead March: A History of the Mexican-​American War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017. 31 Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-​ 1877. New York: Harper Collins, 2002. 32 Edwards, Richard. “African Americans and the Southern Homestead Act.” Great Plains Quarterly 39, no. 2 (2019): 103–​129. 33 Fierce, Milfred C. “Black Struggle for Land during Reconstruction.” The Black Scholar 5, no. 5 (1974): 13–​18. 34 Reynolds, Bruce J. Black Farmers in America, 1865–​ 2000: The Pursuit of Independent Farming and the Role of Cooperatives. USDA. 2003. 35 Debo, Angie. The Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek Indians. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941. 36 For these figures, see https://​iltf.org/​land-​iss​ues/​hist​ory/​ 37 Ganzel, Bill. Dust Bowl Descent. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. 38 Stam, Jerome M., and Bruce L. Dixon. Farmer Bankruptcies and Farm Exits in the United States, 1899-​2002. No. 1474-​2016-​120805. 2004. 39 Gregory, Clifford V. “The American Farm Bureau Federation and the AAA.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 179, no. 1 (1935): 152–​157. 40 Fausold, Martin L. “President Hoover’s Farm Policies 1929–​1933.” Agricultural History 51, no. 2 (1977): 362–​377. 41 Coppess, Jonathan. The Fault Lines of Farm Policy: A Legislative and Political History of the Farm Bill. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018. p. 12. 42 Gerstle, Gary, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Alice O’Connor, eds. Beyond the New Deal Order: US Politics from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019. 43 History of the Farm Credit Association, Farm Credit Association. www.fca.gov/​ about/​hist​ory-​of-​fca. 44 Executive Order 7027 Establishing the Resettlement Administration, The American Presidency Project. www.pre​side​ncy.ucsb.edu/​docume​nts/​execut​ive-​ order-​7027-​estab​lish​ing-​the-​reset​tlem​ent-​adm​inis​trat​ion 45 McFarland, John R. “The Administration of the New Deal Greenbelt Towns.” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 32, no. 4 (1966): 217–​225. 46 The former provided a certain amount of their production to the landowner in exchange for having the ability to reside on the latter’s property. Tenants had a similar relationship, but instead of offering an exchange in kind, they provided cash payment. 47 For details, see c­hapter 1 in Ferguson, Robert Hunt. Remaking the Rural South: Interracialism, Christian Socialism, and Cooperative Farming in Jim Crow Mississippi. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018. 48 For figures on movement membership, see www.gwu.edu/​~erpap​ers/​tea​chin​ger/​ gloss​ary/​south​ern-​ten​ant-​farm​ers-​union.cfm 49 Gaither, Gerald H. Blacks and the Populist Movement: Ballots and Bigotry in the New South. Tuscaloosa: University Alabama Press, 2005. 50 Grubbs, Donald H. Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenent Farmers’ Union and the New Deal. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1971, pp. 163–​168.

40  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy 51 Olsson, Tore C. “Sharecroppers and Campesinos: The American South, Mexico, and the Transnational Politics of Land Reform in the Radical 1930s.” The Journal of Southern History 81, no. 3 (2015): 631. 52 Geisler, Charles C., and Frank J. Popper. Land Reform, American Style. Lanham: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984, 20. 53 Full text of the Bankhead–​Jones Act can be found here, www.fs.fed.us/​gra​ssla​nds/​ docume​nts/​pri​mer/​App​_​G_​B​ankh​ead-​Jones_​Act.pdf 54 Geisler, Land Reform, 23. 55 Coppess, Jonathan. “Reviewing the History and Development of USDA Farm Loans, Part 2: 1937 to 1946.” Farmdoc Daily (11): 36, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-​Champaign, March 11, 2021. 56 Deloria, Vine, and Clifford M. Lytle. The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998, 67. 57 Estes, Nick. Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock versus the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance. New York: Verso, 2019. 58 Walch, Michael C. “Terminating the Indian Termination Policy.” Stanford Law Review (1983): 1181–​1215. See also ­chapters 1 and 3 of Deloria Vine. Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969. 59 Strommer, Geoffrey D., and Stephen D. Osborne. “The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-​governance under the Indian Self-​Determination and Education Assistance Act.” American Indian Law Review (2014): 1–​75. 60 Reynolds, Black Farmers. 61 Gilbert, Jess Carr, Gwen Sharp, and M. Sindy Felin. “The Decline (and Revival?) of Black Farmers and Rural Landowners: A Review of the Research Literature.” (2001). 62 Daniel, Pete. Dispossession: Discrimination against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil Rights. Durham: UNC Press Books, 2013. 63 Van Sant, Levi. “Land Reform and the Green New Deal.” Dissent 66, no. 4 (2019): 64–​70. 64 Whitt, Christine, Jessica E. Todd, and James M. MacDonald. America’s Diverse Family Farms: 2020 Edition. USDA. 2020. 65 Whitt, Todd, MacDonald, Diverse Farms, 4. 66 Whitt, Todd, MacDonald, Diverse Farms, 5. 67 Barnes, Tricia, Mary Estep, Veronica Gray, Cassandra Goings-​Colwell, Catherine Feather, and Phil Sronce. Farm Service Agency. “Foreign Holdings of U.S. Agricultural Land throughout December 31, 2020.” USDA. 2020. 68 GRAIN Hungry for land dataset, May 2014. For the report and commentary, see https://​grain.org/​en/​arti​cle/​4952-​hun​gry-​for-​land 69 MacDonald, James M. and Robert A. Hoppe. “Examining Consolidation in US Agriculture.” Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America, USDA. No. 1490-​2020-​636 (2018). 70 USDA. “Land Values: 2021 Summary.” USDA 2021. 71 Nuveen-​TIAA. “Farmland Sustainability Report.” Available at www.tiaa.org/​pub​ lic/​pdf/​farmland​_​sus​tain​abil​ity_​repo​rt_​2​018.pdf; For critiques, see “Get TIAA out of Farms Now,” ActionAid. Available at www.actio​naid​usa.org/​tak​eact​ion/​ tiaa-​farml​and-​deals. 72 Barnes et al., Foreign Holdings, 214.

The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy  41 73 American Farmland Trust. “Farms Under Threat: the State of America’s Farmland.” May 9, 2018. 74 Brody, Samuel. “The Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences of Sprawling Development Patterns in the United States.” Nature Education Knowledge. 4 (5): 2. 2013. 75 Kane, Joseph, Mona Tong, Jenny Scheutz. “Pandemic-​Fueled Suburban Growth Doesn’t Mean We Should Abandon Climate Resiliency.” Brookings Institute. April 12, 2022. 76 USDA. “2017 US Census of Agriculture Highlights.” 77 Whitt, Todd, MacDonald, Diverse Farms, 2. 78 Coppess, J. and C. Laingen. “Mapping the Farm Bill: Reviewing the CRP; Law, Land & History.” Farmdoc Daily (12):39, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-​ Champaign, March 24, 2022. 79 Mishra, Ashok K., Ron L. Durst, and Hisham S. El-​Osta. How Do US Farmers Plan for Retirement?. USDA No. 1490-​2016-​127836. 2005. 80 Editor. “70 Percent of Farmland to Change Hands in Next 20 Years.” American Ag Network. October 31, 2018. 81 American Farmland Trust. Farms Under Threat 2040: Choosing an Abundant Future. 2022. 82 Thapar, Neil. “An Enormous Land Transition Is Underway. Here’s How to Make it Just.” February 24, 2020. Civil Eats. 83 Their efforts include posting available land offerings from willing sellers or renters, found here https://​lan​dste​ward​ship​proj​ect.org/​more​farm​ers/​seekingfarm​erss​eeki​ ngla​ndcl​eari​ngho​use 84 California farmers average at 60 years old. See the report here, www.hcn.org/​iss​ ues/​48.3/​a-​dry-​fut​ure-​wei​ghs-​heavy-​on-​cal​ifor​nia-​agri​cult​ure 85 Monke, Jim. “Agricultural Credit: Institutions and Issues.” CRS Reports. April 21, 2021. 86 Hill, Julie Andersen. “Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm Credit System.” Wisconsin Law Review. 2010. 87 Monke, Agricultural Credit, 3. 88 Some reporting over the years on this issue include, Doering Christopher. “House Passes Farm Bill; Strips out Food-​Stamp Program. July 11, 2013 USA Today; Wilde Parke. “The Nutrition Title’s Long, Sometimes Strained, but not yet Broken, Marriage with the Farm Bill.” Choices 31, no. 4 (2016): 1–​5. Coppess Jonathan and Todd Kuethe. “Farm Bill, 2018 –​‘Extreme Partisanship and Polarization’ Aren’t Helping.” Ag Fax May 25, 2018. 89 Abbot, Chuck. “Trump Signs 2018 Farm Bill.” Successful Farming. December 12, 2018. 90 Coalition on Human Needs. “House and Senate Committees Back Farm Bills with Significant cuts to SNAP. Available here, www.chn.org/​artic​les/​chn-​house-​ and-​sen​ate-​agri​cult​ure-​com​mitt​ees-​back-​farm-​bills-​with-​sign​ific​ant-​cuts-​to-​ snap;” Rosenbaum, Dottie. “Food Stamps and the Cuts That The Agriculture Committees Must Make. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 5, 2005; McGreal Chris. “Democrats Fail to Remove Cuts to Food Stamps from Farm Bill. July 11, 2012. The Guardian. 91 Center on Policy and Budget Priorities, Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). June 9, 2022.

42  The Crisis Tendency in Land Policy 92 Indian Land Tenure Foundation. “Land Tenure Issues.” https://​iltf.org/​land-​iss​ ues/​iss​ues/​ 93 On restricted land, see www.law.corn​ell.edu/​usc​ode/​text/​25/​2216. For a discussion, see www.min​neap​olis​fed.org/​indian​coun​try/​resour​ces/​tri​bal-​lead​ers-​handb​ook-​ on-​homeow​ners​hip/​nav​igat​ing-​land-​iss​ues 94 A description of quiet titling can be found here, www.law.corn​ell.edu/​wex/​qui​et_​t​ itle​_​act​ion 95 Weise, Elizabeth. “Mark Zuckerberg Drops Suits to Force Sale of Hawaiian Lands. USA TODAY January 27, 2017. 96 Monke, Agricultural Credit, 7.

2 The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy

Contradictory Tendency –​An Aging, Landless Immigrant Workforce is not Being Replaced as People Exit the Profession. Repeat Policy Failures, including in the Areas of Immigration and Labor, Endanger Farmworkers who are Necessary to the Continued Operation of the US Food and Farm System.

There’s More than Cows in Dairyland Dairy farming most likely comes to mind when thinking of agriculture in the Upper Midwestern state of Wisconsin. One may imagine red barns and tall silos dotting the landscape, with herds of black and white cows –​known as Holsteins –​grazing in the background. Some farmer in bib overalls is also probably conjured up somewhere in this scenario, perhaps driving a tractor, or walking in their fields. The Wisconsin state quarter grants credibility to these thoughts as it features representations of a cow’s head and a block of cheese. Such a stereotyped depiction, while accurate in certain ways, glosses over much of the state’s complicated past with respect to workers. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bond Pickle Company hired migrant workers in their pickle processing facilities. During those years, thousands of workers from Texas and California traveled north for seasonal work in the factories, as well as to farms to harvest potatoes, lettuce, carrots, onions, cucumbers, peppers, and sugar beets. Hearing of Cesar Chavez’s unionization efforts with the United Farm Workers (UFW) in California in the 1960s, many of these workers decided to strike to demand better pay and work conditions. This mobilization, as well as an increase in housing regulations, prompted farmers not to recognize unions, but to mechanize. That cucumbers are harvested with machines and not with workers in the twenty-​first century, in no small way, is due to these changes.1 This snapshot of Wisconsin history reveals problems that remain concerning the precarious place of labor, not only in the state, but in the US agrarian system overall. For starters, no federal statute guarantees agricultural workers the right to collective bargaining. Ten states recognize this right, DOI: 10.4324/9781003330066-3

44  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy but typically with considerable restrictions. In Louisiana and New York, for example, strikes are prohibited.2 Meanwhile, the percent of unionized farmworkers in California –​where Chavez’ UFW emerged –​is statistically zero as of 2022.3 Additionally, approximately 1/​2 of farmworkers lack legal status to work and reside in the United States. As a result, a majority of farmworkers do not enjoy rights that most citizens take for granted, such voting, or having a trial by jury.4 The constant threat of deportation makes raising complaints at the workplace difficult. To make matters worse, with the average national pay for individuals around $15,000 to $17,000 a year, farm work is some of the worst-​compensated labor in the United States.5 This, in an occupation known for its dangerous conditions, and where employers tend not to offer health insurance.6 The need for better pay and work conditions, which workers in the 1960s demanded, remains an issue into the twenty-​first century. In this chapter, I address the place of labor in the US agrarian system, continuing to apply the theoretical framework laid out by Habermas concerning crisis. Furthermore, I pinpoint historical dynamics concerning how labor has been simultaneously excluded and included in US agriculture. Whereas inclusion has taken place through coercing and/​or hiring people, exclusion occurs through racializing a particular, non-​citizen group. As I detail, racializing a migrant agricultural workforce creates a problematic, crisis-​prone way to control and exploit labor for profit. Far from a new development, these qualities became constitutive of how agricultural labor exists within the US agrarian system during colonial slavery. Entering the Post-​Cold War period, what has changed is how farmworkers have no replacements. For this reason, in the twenty-​first century, policies concerning labor relations have developed crisis tendencies, mainly because policy makers fail to develop long-​term, sustainable plans. This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I analyze the place of labor relations in discussions of crisis, focusing on orthodox Marxist accounts and then Habermas. This section foregrounds how extra-​economic forces, such as racism, regularly become incorporated into the dynamics of capitalist production. The second section makes this theoretical discussion concrete in exploring the development of labor relations in the twentieth century, foregrounding how problems with respect to measurement hide a desire for elite control over a precarious labor force. The third section explains the origins of permanent precarity in agricultural labor, beginning with colonial slavery. I then document the evolution of the US agrarian system’s problematic dependence on a racialized –​as well as permanently precarious –​migrant workforce. The last section explores how undocumented workers, while critical to the operation of the system in the twenty-​first century, are not finding replacements. I conclude by discussing how labor-​ saving technological changes are unlikely to approach the scale required to replace the two to three million aging, landless farmworkers who are increasingly leaving the food and farm system.

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  45

Labor and Race in Crisis Theory Habermas’ rendition of crisis comes out of the orthodox Marxist tradition, yet differs with respect to how labor is understood. According to the latter rendition, the capitalist incentive for profitmaking leads property owners to decrease what they pay their workers as they sell their products at competitive prices with others in the industry. Problems emerge if products do not leave store shelves because consumers, who are workers, have less money to spend. In the continued attempt to profit, owners either continue to cut workers’ pay, or lay them off to lower the costs of production. Both decisions make problems worse for everyone, as fewer consumers exist, and those that do, have less money at their disposal.7 The orthodox Marxist rendering of crisis is economic, with the interests of workers to make more money contradicting owners who want to pay less. Labor remains key for Habermas’ thought on crisis, but differently. Habermas envisions the existence of labor within advanced capitalist states as having sufficient power, through unions ideally, in negotiating with business owners and state officials. This makes problems with respect to labor primarily about administration. Moreover, as states work closely with business and invest in education, labor exists as a “collective natural commodity.8” As much is clarified in his discussion of advanced –​as opposed to liberal –​ capitalist society. Concerning the former, he writes, “…the contradiction of socialized production for particular ends thereby directly takes on a political form –​naturally not that of political class warfare.9” That labor is socialized, or exists as a “collective commodity,” entails the extensive public expense in training workers, from elementary school through university. Problems that become crisis tendencies “particularize” labor, meaning that instead of recognizing the public essence of work, officials or owners exploit it for their own narrow purposes. Racism functions as one way that labor is particularized in advanced capitalist societies. As Marx explains, workers “freely” sell their labor because no other options exist for them to earn a living.10 Accordingly, the capital/​ labor relationship is asymmetrical, with property owners retaining to ability to set the terms for workers. Power, in this way, structures the relationship, introducing a non-​economic element into how capitalist relations reproduce themselves. Fraser builds from this insight, noting how racism, as an extra-​ economic factor, has perennially functioned to assist capitalism function.11 Specifically, racism in institutional and non-​ institutional settings grants capitalists the capacity to extract surplus profits. For example, owners may divide workers along racial lines, limiting the latter’s ability to join forces and demand improved wages. Similarly, if people of one race have lower standards of living when compared to another group who live elsewhere, then owners may exploit this difference when recruiting workers. Marx and Fraser add to Habermas’ discussion, particularly in how extra-​ economic elements generate and perpetuate structural inequalities with

46  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy respect to labor relations. Habermas notes how the place of labor has changed moving from the nineteenth into the twentieth century, or rather, from liberal capitalist to advanced capitalist societies. Noting how the state participates in training workers, as well as recognizing the potential power of unions, draws our attention to the socialization of labor, which extra-​economic elements –​ such as racism –​function to “particularize” what has become public. Concerning agricultural labor specifically, which the next section lays out in detail, US history reveals the intersection of economic and extra-​economic forces that compel people to work. These forces include how racism and immigration policy have particularized farm work. Moreover, these extra-​ economic elements render invisible the place of farm labor within the overall US agrarian system. For this reason, throughout the history of US agriculture, labor has always occupied an ambiguous place. Critical to this omission was the existence within the system of a small-​scale, land-​owning proprietor cultural ideal. If labor existed, then it would be incidental, not permanent. The reality has been another, which at key points in the development of US agriculture, has developed into crisis situations.

The (Non-​)Constitution of Agricultural Labor and the Persistent Problem of Control The US Agricultural Census provides an extraordinary amount of data in detail. From the acreage of operations to the kinds of animals on farms, the United States government since the early decades of the twentieth century has been collecting information with precision on most facets of the agricultural system. For instance, in 1910, there were ten ostriches on farms in California. Yet, when it comes to hired labor, the information from government publications has been neither complete, nor clear. One issue is what –​or better, who –​counts as a farmworker. Turning to the 1910 agricultural census is revealing, not only given that this year was chosen as the baseline for calculating parity pricing metrics that would become central to the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, but also because this moment marks the historical highpoint with respect to the number of farms that existed in the United States. Specifically, 6,361,502 million farms were reported to exist in 1910. In terms of analyzing who operated these farms, the Census mentions owners and tenants. This latter category is further subdivided into share tenants, share-​cash tenants, and cash tenants. Racial categories also appear, with 5,440,619 farmers listed as white and 920,883 producers labeled “colored farmers.” Of the white farmers, 1,676,558 were tenants. There were 241,221 farmers of color who owned their operations, as the rest were tenants.12 The characterization within the Census of tenant farmer and sharecropper highlights the ambiguous representation of farm labor in government publications. One reason is that neither tenants nor sharecroppers owned their land outright. This gave government officials reason to pause when classifying

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  47 the nature of tenant and sharecropper operations. As noted in a review of Census reporting, the greatest difficulties in making a classification by tenure results from the sharecropper system. Briefly, the question involved is whether the sharecropper should be considered merely a type of laborer or a farm operator. In reality, croppers have some of the characteristics of both laborers and tenants.13 Despite this confusion, sharecroppers and tenants were counted as “operators” in the official figures. Still, it stands to reason that in many instances tenants or sharecroppers were not counted among the ranks of operators. Part of the reason is that Census data came from surveys done by individuals, called enumerators, who went to the countryside to document qualities of operations such as the acreage planted, total farm values, and improvements.14 Such indicators were likely held by operators who owned their land outright, rather than workers or others who accessed land in precarious ways. Despite the ambiguity concerning sharecroppers and tenant farmers, hired laborers explicitly appear in chapter eight of the 1910 publication within “expenditures.” According to the Census, 2,922,279 farms, or 45.9% of the total number of operations, spent over $651,111,000 to pay farmworkers. While expenses were documented, “no attempt was made to ascertain the number of people hired.15” The reason for not counting workers was their irregularity, or rather, “in many cases, farmers hire labor only for a few days or weeks during the year, and it would be impossible to determine the true number employed for the year.” Turning to state reports, particularly California, we find details on farm values, crops, and land –​in addition to the number of ostriches. Labor appears in the “select farm expenses” section near the end. The report notes that 3/​5 of the state’s operations, or 55,397 farms, hired workers, spending nearly $50 million on wages and lodging. Other government publications claim that there were 14 million agricultural workers on the 6 million or so farms in 1910.16 This figure also includes farm owners and their children, which when taken out, leave somewhere between 2 and 3 million hired people. To count the number of people who were hired to work in agriculture yearly from 1910 to 1950, statisticians “extrapolated” figures from past Census data and “seasonal pattern data.17” Overall, unlike the precise figures that we find concerning acreage and animals, for the number of people who were hired to work on farms, there is no such set of data. This lack of precision concerning how to count farm labor continued throughout the twentieth century. The 1959 Agricultural Census reported that 1,584,153 people were hired to work on farms. This Census also included figures from the 1930s and 1940s, reporting that 1,645,602 workers were hired in 1935, increasing to 3,175,575 in 1939, then dropping to 748,341 in 1945 before increasing to 1,577,746 in 1950 and 2,729,650 in 1954.18 The 1964

48  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy Census contradicts these counts, dedicating a special section to farm labor. In the special report, the USDA casts doubt on past and present efforts to count farmworkers, as well as where they worked and what they were paid. The way labor is contracted, technological changes, seasonality, as well as the Post-​World War II rapid move of millions out of the countryside, made providing accurate counts, according to the report, “difficult.” To address this accounting problem, the USDA commissioned two special surveys in 1965. One survey finds that “the total persons doing farmwork in 1965–​1966 varied from 4.6 million to more than 8 million, and the number of hired persons varied from 750,000 to 3,300,000.19” Without special surveys, subsequent Censuses returned to farmers self-​ reporting who they hired. The 1974 Census provided a separate section on the number of hired laborers by the number of days that they worked. In 1978, farms self-​reported that 5,615,519 people were hired. Seemingly an anomaly, the Census qualifies not only this figure, but most of its reporting for that year, noting that estimates were used extensively. In 1987, the USDA did not count farmworkers at all.20 The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), which appears for the first time in 1991, contains detailed information on farmworker demographics and income, as well as the social services that they access.21 The Department of Labor –​not the USDA –​conducts the periodic study that appears every five years. Despite this effort to adequately document farmworkers and their realities, the NAWS generates its findings based on regional samples. Other issues include the omission of people who work in animal agriculture, for example, on dairy farms.22 Focusing on the myriad ways that the US government counted farmworkers throughout the twentieth century is revealing. One issue is how farm labor is seen primarily through the lens of the landowner. That labor is often recognized as an expense, highlights how workers are mainly viewed as an input. Still, somewhat paradoxically, more care is spent counting other inputs that have costs, for example, land and animals. It remains odd that we know how many ostriches were on farms in California in 1910, but not the number of people who were hired to tend to them. To better understand the meaning of these statistical irregularities, we need to place the discussion of farm labor in a greater historical context. Carey McWilliams, who wrote one of the first exposés on agricultural workers in the United States, sheds light on labor relations with a focus on California. His work, Factories in the Fields, provides a history of agricultural labor until 1939, when the book appeared. Starting in the nineteenth century, McWilliams documents how the nature of farm labor was determined by large-​scale property owners. As he explains, from 1882, when the first Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, until about 1930, the history of farm labor in California has revolved around the cleverly manipulated exploitation, by large growers, of a number of

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  49 suppressed racial minority groups which were imported to work in the fields.23 Critical to McWilliams’ analysis is how racism blended with immigration. He argues that throughout US history, there has been a planned, strategic effort to bring people of color into the United States to work in agriculture. Central to this strategy is not only finding cheap labor, as it is to control a significant group of people who are culturally and/​or racially distinct from citizens. In illustrating why such elements are key, continuing with California, McWilliams notes how over the course of the nineteenth century, Chinese, then Japanese, Indian, Mexican, and Filipino people faced brutal, dehumanizing work conditions in the fields. McWilliams notes that in 1909, there were approximately 30,000 Japanese farm laborers. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, he notes that Chinese migrants were the principal farmworkers, at nearly 90% of the total, with absolute numbers somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000.24 Concerning Chinese labor, people who left their home country to escape war and poverty were first recruited to work on railroads and in goldmines in the mid-​nineteenth century before moving onto the fields. Chinese migrants entered agriculture as civil society groups mobilized to protect urban employment for white citizens. One result was to push Chinese non-​citizens out of the cities and into rural areas, providing landowners with a group in need of employment and who had been disparaged socially. As Martin puts it, “the path to industrial security lay in the recruitment of a workforce whose estrangement from the economic and social mainstream was so profound and unalterable as to render it captive economically.”25 Passing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 closed the border to further migrants from China. The mobilization of Anti-​Chinese sentiment continued after the 1882 Act was passed, despite large-​scale farmers who sought workers. Riots in the 1880s and 1890s, against the backdrop of the Panic of 1893, drove California’s population against Chinese migrants. Meanwhile, the need for workers remained, which led owners to recruit Japanese migrants at the end of the nineteenth century.26 This subsequent group of migrant laborers, as soon as they started to save money and purchase land, saw legislation passed that prohibited their ability to acquire property with the California Alien Land Law of 1913. One motive with this legislation was to keep workers property-​less, and therefore more susceptible to the control of landowners.27 While the specific population changed from the Chinese to the Japanese, what remained the same was the strategic use of a distinct group of people for agricultural work. Considering US agrarian history–​through this brief elaboration of California agriculture –​reveals the persistent problem that turns into a contradictory tendency periodically with respect to labor, namely, how the food and farm system depends for its operation on a labor force that is perpetually precarious. Economically, there is the relationship between what landowners can afford and who is available to work. Farmers balance the price of technological

50  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy investment with the risk that such a change brings, which is a cause of concern for owners given the food and farm system’s relative lack of profitability when compared to other sectors of the economy.28 Racializing non-​citizens creates a workforce that exists in a liminal space with respect to political and economic authorities. With the state threatening migrants into submission, landowners minimize risk by having access to a compliant labor force. Pay is low, not only for the overall low profitability of the farm economy, but because there is little competition for employment. Problems worsen as workers age, leave the profession if they acquire citizenship, find employment elsewhere, or cannot physically perform their jobs. This dynamic of dependence conflicts with the ideal of the self-​sufficient family farmer. This is nowhere clearer than in the image found in the works of Thomas Jefferson, which has come to assume a critical place in how US agriculture was and often remains represented. In his letter to John Jay, in 1785, Jefferson wrote that We have now lands enough to employ an infinite number of people in their cultivation. Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds. As long therefore as they can find employment in this line, I would not convert them into mariners, artisans or anything else.29 Some believe this comment connects farming with national security.30 Others have noted how Jefferson’s ideal functioned to rewrite the past, depicting agrarian relations as primary grounded on creating individual, relatively autonomous family-​scale operations.31

Slavery and the Origins of Permanently Precarious Labor in US Agriculture Jefferson’s ideal clearly contrasts with reality, especially of his time, with respect to slavery. Focusing on the emergence of slavery highlights the problematic, crisis-​prone place of labor in US agriculture that farmworkers in the nineteenth century and after have had to endure. One difference, however, appears in terms of measurement. The reason was that counting slaves was a matter of political concern. The 3/​5 Compromise, which was made between Northern and Southern states at the time of the drafting of the US Constitution of 1787, counted slaves as 3/​5 of a person in a state’s total population. By virtue of this negotiation, the number of state electors to the House of Representatives was increased from states that allowed slavery, as was the amount of taxes that these states paid.32 Indigenous people were excluded from the count. Still, the labor of Indigenous people was integral to the development of the US agrarian system. For instance, the fur trade relied on Indigenous people to hunt and trap

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  51 fur-​bearing animals, such as beaver, which ended up in the hats of European elites. Multinational companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries paid Indigenous people for their labor, introducing the exchange economy into settler/​Indigenous relations. The introduction of the cash economy indebted Indigenous people, which facilitated US expansion as financial liabilities to traders were relieved in exchange for land cessions.33 Given the political and economic interests connected to counting slaves, each state provided figures every ten years for the Census. From 1790 to 1860, owners self-​reported who worked for them to Census field agents.34 With respect to numbers, the slave population in the United States numbered 3,952,838 the year before the outbreak of the Civil War in 1860. In the Southern states, slaves were over 1/​3 of the total population.35 Estimates place the total number of slaves from the time of the arrival of the first slave ship to the colonies, in 1619, through the end of the Civil War in 1865, at around 10 million people.36 Racializing, as well as depoliticizing this workforce, took decades to develop. State power proved critical in this regard, coming to the United States in the adaptation of slave codes that the British had implemented in its Barbados colony to control its imported African labor force in the 1660s.37 In the Caribbean colony, these rules provided regulations concerning the movement of slaves, specifically, on spelling out the appropriate documentation that was needed if they were to leave a plantation, as well as how runaways should be treated if caught. The code simultaneously included agricultural laborers economically, while at the same time politically excluding them. As the Code states, Whereas the plantations and estates of this island cannot be fully managed… without the labor and service of great numbers of slave and negroes that are of Barbarous, Wild, and Savage Natures, as such renders them wholly unqualified to be governed by the Laws, Customs, and Practices of our Nations: It therefore becoming absolutely necessary, that such other Constitutions, Laws, and Orders should be in this land framed and enacted for the good Regulating and Ordering of them.38 Central is the need for the labor of a certain group that is represented as incapable of self-​governance. Laws are therefore needed to control workers, as this group is dangerous, or “wild.” Such details on including the labor of slaves while denying them political representation reappear virtually verbatim in various state laws subsequently.39 Further racializing this inclusion by exclusion came upon quelling popular mobilizations that sought to demand changes in labor relations. Bacon’s Rebellion, which took place in the Virginia colony in 1676, featured men and women of African, as well as European descent, take up arms. Reasons for the conflict that resulted in the death of hundreds have been cited as resistance to the wealthy landowning elites’ system of taxation, as well as the political

52  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy disorganization of the colonial administration.40 Concerning race relations, divisions began to appear before the conflict. Specifically, in 1662, it became law in Virginia that a child who was born to a slave mother would become a slave. In 1669, enslaved Africans were legally considered property. The rebellion hastened the racialization of slavery that the Barbados Codes had enacted, not cause it. Other laws were passed in 1705, including the legal sanctioning of a special plantation police force, which other states in the South copied as Virginia became the leader in developing the system of slave regulation.41 Meanwhile, with land cessions and technological change, European and later Euro-​American large-​scale landowners drove the slave economy West. British land grants –​the headright system –​provided elites with large extensions of territory prior to the formation of the US state. While intended as a labor-​saving technology, the invention of the cotton gin shortly after the US declared its political independence allowed for landowners to expand and plant more cotton.42 Europeans migrated to the region at the time when the US broke from Great Britain, first becoming involved in staple crops, then experimenting in and developing the cotton industry.43 US citizens would follow, importing slaves to drain swamp land, clear brush, and prepare land for planting and cultivation. The number of slaves in the South grew in response to the labor needs of the cotton industry. During the 1830s in Mississippi, the slave population increased by nearly 200%, increasing from 65,659 to 195,211.44 On the eve of the US Civil War, there were over 430,000 slaves in Mississippi, which was approximately 55% of the state’s total population. Political, not economic problems exacerbated problems in labor policy on the eve of the Civil War. In fact, the number of slaves was increasing in the United States, as employing them was cheaper than hiring workers.45 Still, for most of the eighteenth century, politicians made compromises, whether in terms of the conditions to admit new states, as well as how to deal with runaway slaves, to assuage persistent social and elite polarization.46 The election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, of the newly founded Republican party that was aligned with Northern industrial interests and free homesteading, was perceived by Southern elites and politicians as a threat to the slave economy. What made control over slaves precarious came from without, not from within the institution. The Confederacy’s loss of the Civil War and the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1865 ended slavery, creating an opening to address the enduring problem of agriculture depending on a precarious workforce. General Sherman’s Special Field Order 15 was to provide 40 acres of farmland in the American Southeast –​particularly in South Carolina and Florida –​to African Americans who fought for the Union army.47 In part, the Order was inspired by developments on the Sea Islands off the coast of South Carolina, where slaveholders abandoned their lands during the war and freedman subsequently established farms.48 Also, the Freedman’s Bureau (the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands) was established by Congress following the war to place freedmen onto abandoned or seized

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  53 land throughout the former Confederacy. The 1866 Southern Homestead Act, which extended the 1862 law of the same name, but that had only benefitted people of Euro-​ American descent, opened public land for sale to former slaves and white people who supported the Union during the war.49 African Americans also gained the right to vote with the passing of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, extending political rights and the promise of self-​governance.50 This moment proved brief. Lands that had been promised to freed slaves, in many cases, were returned to previous owners in areas such as the Sea Islands.51 Jim Crow-​era legislation passed in the 1870s disenfranchised former slaves. Still, Reconstruction-​era efforts created ventures in economic self-​ reliance, cooperative formation, and education development that would persist.52 By 1910, close to a million Black farmers existed throughout the United States. The number of African American producers with access to land, even if they worked in exploitative institutions such as sharecropping or tenant farming, was about 15% of all operators.53 In terms of labor relations within the US agricultural system more generally, the Reconstruction period generated a compromise of sorts, namely, with the creation of sharecropping. Laws in the pre-​Civil War South prohibited slaves from owning property, as well as legally marry one another. With emancipation, retaining control over family dynamics and possessions became priorities for emancipated African Americans. Meanwhile, owners of large estates still sought labor, especially as they were reconstituted after President Johnson forsook land redistribution to enfranchise former slaves. Created in this context, sharecropping functioned by granting limited autonomy to former slaves with respect to familial, religious, and economic activities. African Americans were still denied political rights as white economic and political elites exploited their labor. Still, continued threats of extrajudicial, white vigilant violence, as well as the draw of growing industrial employment in the North in the early twentieth century, drew sharecroppers away from rural areas, mixing precarity and the desire for control once again into agricultural labor relations. New Deal laws that were passed in the 1930s kept agricultural labor precarious, even strengthening the capacity for elite control. The National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA, otherwise known as the Wagner Act) became law in 1935, as did the Social Security Act in the same year. In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was passed and signed into law. The NLRA granted workers the right to collective bargaining. The Social Security Act created a pension system for elderly Americans and unemployment insurance. The FLSA sets the minimum wage, rules for overtime pay, and standards concerning child labor. Agricultural laborers, as well as others, such as domestic workers, were explicitly written out of these pieces of New Deal labor legislation. Excluding specific classes of laborers came as the result of the Roosevelt administration’s effort to forge compromise with Southern legislators.54 These exclusions

54  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy allowed landowners to subject Black sharecroppers and tenants to the plantation system, even though the language in these laws makes no mention of race. Reforms have been made over time, most notably in 1966, when farmworkers were extended the right to receive the minimum wage.55 Still, workers who are paid on a piece-​rate basis –​where laborers are compensated for how much they pick –​remain exempt. States have attempted to regulate piece-​rate work to benefit workers, yet wage theft and reporting problems continue into the twenty-​first century.56 The Bracero program (1942–​1964) is yet another instance of how policies created a precarious agricultural labor force fashioned for elite control. With the pretext of need, landowners pushed legislators to create a special guestworker program as men left rural areas to fight in World War II. By executive order in 1942, President Roosevelt created what at the time was called the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement. According to the agreement, the Mexican government, USDA, and landowners coordinated the transportation and housing of farmworkers who came to the United States.57 The program in 1951 became Public Law 78. Despite its proponents claiming it had no effect on the wages paid to domestic farmworkers, amid mobilization by groups such as the United Farmworkers, legislators canceled the Bracero program in 1964. Over the entirety of the program’s existence, 4,646,199 workers came to the United States, with the peak year being 1956 when 445,197 people came North for work.58 The specifics of the Bracero program show similarities when compared with the dynamics we have seen in agricultural labor in other moments in US history. For instance, the original 1942 decree makes clear that a certain group –​Mexicans –​exist as laborers within the US food and farm system. Their position within the system, namely, as agricultural workers under the direct control of landowners, is specified by the prohibition from serving in the military and working in other occupations. Braceros, additionally, were easy to segregate for the temporary nature of the work and that they were non-​citizens. The program revealed the power of the landowners with respect to the US government, which saw the latter’s capacity to control laborers rise and fall over the course of the program.59 The Mexican government’s role in the program, meanwhile, was minimal as it only assured the workers’ health upon arrival, as well as maintain a savings account for them upon their return. One reason for the Mexican government’s compliance was that sending workers alleviated poverty in depressed areas of the country.60 Public Law 78, which formally regularized the program in 1951, established an uncertain time horizon for the workers. According to the law, “the workers recruited under this title who are not citizens… of the United States shall be admitted to the United States subject to the immigration laws for such time and under such conditions as may be specified by the Attorney General.61” In a sense, the workers were permanently temporary, subject both to the discretion of landowners and the US government. The pretext of a labor shortage allowed landowners to capture a foreign-​ born agricultural labor force,

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  55 showing continuity with past modes of acquiring farmworkers. Subjecting the workers to precarious time horizons provided an additional layer of control, giving government officials and farmers more power. Furthermore, workers were regularly abused, from having their wages stolen, to being provided inadequate housing.62 A certain level of dehumanization came with the program, which photos of workers being deloused and inspected at the border display. Further problems in the program included bureaucratic hurdles, which farmers decided to overcome by hiring undocumented people who crossed the border without permission. Border security became an issue because particular states, for instance, Texas, were not part of the original places where Braceros were allowed to work.63 As such, people without legal authorization came North over the course of the Bracero program.64 To the benefit of the owners, they could turn to undocumented workers in the event of either not having adequate numbers, or not wanting to pay what Braceros wanted.

Partisan Stalemate and Neoliberal Reforms Turn Problems into Crisis Tendencies Edward R Murrow’s classic exposé –​Harvest of Shame –​premiered on Thanksgiving night in 1960 to a nation-​wide audience on CBS. As families were enjoying their meals, they heard from Florida farmworkers about their experiences following the migrant trail up the US’ Eastern coastline to pick fruits and vegetables. Beginning around 1920, the trail snakes from Florida to New York.65 The workers who appeared in Murrow’s account –​mainly African American and white –​told how they received starvation-​level wages. In addition to hearing about their experiences, viewers saw images of the workers’ dilapidated living conditions.66 Whereas the migrant trail continues to exist, beginning in the 1970s, the demographics of the workers began to change. Specifically, people from Haiti, as well as from Mexico, began to appear. This demographic change, especially as it occurred in a short period of time, drew the attention of some. At a labor symposium in 1989 at Florida International University, one researcher noted that “in only 20 to 25 years, the ethnic and national origin of the farm labor force in Florida was nearly totally changed. This unusual phenomenon is unparalleled in my experience in modern times except in periods of war.67” Neoliberal reforms and changes in immigration policy drove this demographic change. The Bracero program, which ended in 1964, was a planned effort where state and economic elites orchestrated the supply and control of agricultural labor. No law or program replaced the Bracero program. The reason, in part, was due to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA). This law, while praised for removing racist, discriminatory quotas from US migration policy, placed limitations on who could arrive to the United States from the Western Hemisphere. The 1965 law also put in place the system of family reunification, which led relatives –​many from neighboring Latin American countries –​to migrate to the United States. This element,

56  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy unintentionally, contributed to the already-​existing pattern of unauthorized migration that had begun before the 1970s. Particularly, the INA capped the number of visas for non-​immediate relatives of migrant families who already were legally residing in the United States.68 Meanwhile, the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 accelerated the flow of people going North, especially as families in rural Mexico found it difficult to compete with the influx of US exports.69 As a result, Mexicans crossed the border in numbers that exceeded their country’s quota stipulations. Before, the Bracero program had featured, however controlled, a stable flow of agricultural laborers. Without the program and as economic changes in the 1990s disrupted the Mexican economy, the number of unauthorized migrants ballooned. In the process, Mexican farmers became farmworkers in the US agrarian system, with millions of entrants arriving yearly until the financial crisis of 2007/​2008. The only visa program for agricultural labor, the H-​2A program, expanded dramatically over the last 20 years, increasing from 16,011 in 1997, to 257,898 in 2021.70 While the program appears within the 1952 Immigration and Nationalization Act, the Reagan administration’s immigration reforms from 1986 created a special class of temporary migrants to work in agriculture.71 To qualify for this program, employers must petition that a worker come to the United States for seasonal –​not year round –​work. Additionally, the employer must demonstrate that US workers are unavailable and that wages for citizen workers will not be adversely affected by migrant labor. Government oversight of the program is lax, as the application simply makes the employer state that they will not pay more than is regionally appropriate. Moreover, studies detail how workers are regularly subjected to wage theft, discrimination, sexual assault, and health and safety code violations.72 Workers often have no recourse to complain as they do not want to risk their relationships with employers and lack union protection. The reality is that most farm labor is undocumented and outside the visa system. Numbers vary, as according to one USDA source, there has been a steep decline in hired farm labor, from 2.3 million in 1950 to just over 1 million in 2000. Advocacy groups place the figure much higher, somewhere between two to three million people.73 Estimates claim that approximately 50% of workers lack legal authorization to work and reside in the United States.74 In California, that figure is reported at 75% of all farmworkers.75 According to the 2017 Census, there were approximately 2.4 million farmworkers in the US employed on over 513,000 farms.76 The top five states where farmworkers are employed include California (377,593), Washington (228,588), Texas (143,763), Florida (96, 247), and Oregon (86, 240).77 Migrant labor also places a central role in many Midwestern states, such as Iowa (73,257), Wisconsin (72,425), and Minnesota (70,695). The Labor Services Center (LSC), which is a non-​profit that provides grants for civil legal assistance to low-​income Americans, reports similar figures. This organization places the number of farmworkers at 2,785,784. By state, their numbers

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  57 are virtually the same as what is reported in the Census. The exception is California, which according to their study, hosts 633,978 workers.78 Such numbers vary due to the different methodologies, where LSC works with an estimate generated from a composite of studies, while the US Agricultural Census relies on farmer self-​reporting. The NAWS offers more detail. First, even though most farmworkers lack land (only 2% report land as an asset), the vast majority report being “settled” (81%).79 To settle does not mean having citizenship, as just 29% of farmworkers are citizens (21% are permanent residents, as over 50% lack legal authorization to live and work in the United States). “Settled” entails a variety of qualities, including the amount of time residing in the United States (75% of farmworkers report living more than ten years in the country), as well as retaining a continuous relationship with their employer (the overall average employer and farmworker relationship was seven years in length).80 Also, “settled” does not mean that laborers reside in one place, or live in a single home throughout the year, as the NAWS counts workers who travel nationally, as well as regionally, respectively referred to as “follow-​the-​crop” (27%) and “shuttle” workers (21%). In general, over half of farmworkers report working in agriculture for more than ten years. Furthermore, 83% of the agricultural labor force are Latino.81 In certain ways, accounting for the number of farmworkers has improved over time. In no small part, this is due to the increase in organizations that promote farmworker rights, as well as the effect of the UFW’s mobilization in the 1960s. Still, the NAWS is an estimate based on random samples, while Agricultural Census figures depend on farmers self-​ reporting. Moreover, farmers have an incentive to underreport the number of workers they hire, for fear of government reprisal. Similarly, workers may hide their status, or be hard to locate. Despite the perennial accounting issue concerning farm labor, problems concerning the precarious nature of agricultural labor have worsened over time. First, overall, the average time that undocumented people live in the United States averages 15 years as of 2019, with farmworkers included.82 It is true that immigrants tend to be younger and have larger families than native-​born citizens; it is also the case that migration has slowed to a crawl after 2008, with the average age of farmworkers increasing from 35 to 41.83 Meanwhile, the average life expectancy of a farmworker is 49 years.84 Basically, the farmworkers who currently live in the United States are getting older, with no group appearing ready to replace them. Additionally, that millions of undocumented migrants live in the United States may be an open secret, it is not the case that they are immune from political persecution and the threat of deportation. According to US law, anyone who arrives to the country without a legal visa, is subject to deportation.85 The Clinton administration passed legislation that required people who arrive without legal authorization to leave the United States and remain abroad for ten years before attempting to fix their immigration status.86 Moreover,

58  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy reform legislation that would provide work permits for migrants to enter the system has been debated at various times (most notably in 2007 and 2013), but without any change. Concerning this problem concerning agricultural labor, partisan divisions impede significant change. Former President Trump seized on the issue of immigration, not only with rhetoric, but with policy changes that aggravated the problem. By directive, the Trump administration eased the procedures for arresting and deporting migrants, which generated an increase in apprehensions during his time in office until COVID-​19 hit.87 While apprehensions increased, deportations did not rebound the Obama-​era levels. Still, the rise in arrests increased the number of immigration court proceedings, which could lead to removal at some point.88 Democrats have also failed to address the issue of immigration reform substantively, which directly involves agricultural labor. President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) from 2012 granted work permits to the children of undocumented parents without addressing the young people’s or their parents’ legal status. The use of the executive order to pass DACA, furthermore, revealed the failure of the parties to work together in creating meaningful policy change. Early gestures during the Biden Presidency concerning immigration reform have also gone nowhere, as the threat of deportation looms over undocumented workers, rural workers included.89 Undocumented workers are not new to the US agrarian system; what makes their presence problematic entering the 2020s is the increased partisan polarization over policies that could address their status, the increase in their age, and the lack of options to replace them. Neoliberal free trade policies created the context that drove migrants into the US agrarian system and partisan gridlock leaves them subject to removal, even turning them into political pawns periodically. Such developments turn into a crisis tendency the US agricultural system’s persistent problem of depending on the economic output of a precarious labor force. Some may claim mechanization will address the labor crisis in US agriculture. Dairy farms, for instance, increasingly adopt robotic milkers as dairy farm workers not only do not qualify for visas, but are increasingly in short supply. Still, as of 2020, just 1% of dairy farms have adopted this technology.90 Additionally, while technological changes impact labor on a farm, they are just as likely to shuffle labor relations on an operation than to eradicate work all together.91 Another issue to consider is how technological investments require resources, which most likely will require significant government expenditure. Making such expenses will entail creating special, innovative programs, as well as political parties working together on a common vision. The other factor to consider with respect to technology is that the moments of significant, labor-​saving changes in the food and farm system have been exceedingly rare. Of note is the post-​World War II period in agriculture. Especially from 1950 to 1980, the number of farms in the US fell precipitously as production increased. Not only the increase in mechanization through the

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  59 purchase of tractors, but also the adoption of chemicals in food production explain this change. Critical when reflecting on this period is its uniqueness, as the technological changes that generated this shift in labor relations came on the heels of a world war. For instance, farmers showed reticence to apply chemicals before the conflict, yet extensive funding in biological warfare and its effects on plants showed that some herbicides –​2,4-​D, for instance –​could kill some plants and not others.92 Public demonstrations after the war, farm extension agents, and agricultural publications helped convince farmers that chemicals would increase yields without damaging crops.93 Furthermore, the sudden, abrupt labor shortage, as well as the increase in food demand for the war effort, propelled farmers to adopt tractors quickly and on a large scale.94 Overall, technological change is not the only force that affects labor relations in agriculture. Just as relevant, as well as dominant, has been the use of a racialized, migrant workforce. The creation of the system’s structural dependence on a precarious labor force predates the US’ political independence from Great Britain. Therefore, as technological booms cannot be ruled out, they cannot be relied upon to make wide-​sweeping changes.

Conclusion: From Slaves to Undocumented Workers In this chapter, I explore how farmworkers in the US agrarian system have been made permanently precarious, with their economic output sought, yet their political rights denied. Critical to the development of this permanently precarious workforce has been dynamics to racialize migrants, which creates a workforce that can be controlled. While a persistent reality in the US agricultural system, partisan divisions and neoliberal reforms aggravate challenges concerning labor procurement, turning a problem into a crisis as aging workers in the twenty-​first century find no one to replace them. Habermas sees labor relations primarily as an administrative matter. Negotiations between state elites and businesses, in advanced capitalist states, ought to overcome problems when they emerge. Problems are thought to emerge when particular, partisan interests dictate its supply. In this way, similar to issues concerning land transfer, racism regularly creates problems as governmental and economic elites’ desire for control comes at the expense of the public good.

Notes 1 Gordon, Scott. “A Midcentury Turning Point for Migrant Farmworkers in Wisconsin.” Wiscontext. October 18, 2018. 2 States such as Wisconsin do not prohibit farmworkers from organizing into unions, but nothing legally grants workers the right to negotiate with their employers over wages or work conditions. For a complete list of state-​by-​state laws on farmworker rights, see www.farmwo​rker​just​ice.org/​gene​ral-​map/​

60  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy 3 Montalvo, Melissa and Nigel Duara. “In Familiar Refrain, United Farm Workers Grapples with How to Grow.” CalMatters. January 18, 2022. 4 New American Economy. “Immigration and Agriculture.” August 16, 2021. 5 National Farm Worker Ministry. “Low Wages.” Accessed at https://​nfwm.org/​ farm-​work​ers/​farm-​wor​ker-​iss​ues/​low-​wages/​ 6 Smiley-​ Jewell, Suzette, “Bleak Outlook for California Farmworker Health Coverage Prospects.” February 17, 2017. UC-​ Davis, Western Center for Agricultural Health and Safety. 7 Sweezy, Paul M. Theory of Capital Development. New York: NYU Press, (1942) 2018. 8 Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, (2005) 1973, 56. 9 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 40. 10 Karl Marx. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1 Moscow: Progress Publishers 2015 (1867), 119–​26. 11 Fraser, Nancy. “Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to Michael Dawson.” Critical Historical Studies 3, no. 1 (2016): 163–​178. 12 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1910 Agricultural Census: Chapter 1, “Farms and Farm Property.” USDA, 1910, 28. 13 United States Bureau of the Census and Social Science Research Council. Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–​1945: A Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of the United States. US Government Printing Office, 1949. 14 United States Bureau of the Census and Social Science Research Council. Historical Statistics, 74. 15 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1910 Agricultural Census, “Chapter 7 Livestock Products and Domestic Animals Sold or Slaughtered on Farms,” 560. 16 USDA. “Farm Labor: Number of Farms and Workers by Decade, US.” Accessed at www.nass.usda.gov/​Char​ts_​a​nd_​M​aps/​Far​m_​La​bor/​fl_​fr​mwk.php 17 United States Bureau of the Census and Social Science Research Council, Historical Statistics, 1949. 18 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1959 Agricultural Census. “Chapter 4: Farm Labor, Use of Fertilizer, Farm Expenditures and Cash Rent,” 233. 19 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1964 Agricultural Census. “Volume 3, Part 2: Farm Labor, 7.” 20 Similar to 1910 Census, farm labor appears as an expense. Reading the Census, as well as the appendix, provide no explanation as to why an actual of workers was not done between 1982 and 1987. The full text for the Census can be found here, https://​agcen​sus.libr​ary.corn​ell.edu/​censu​s_​pa​rts/​1987-​uni​ted-​sta​tes/​ 21 National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS) can be found on the Department of Labor website, here www.dol.gov/​agenc​ies/​eta/​natio​nal-​agric​ultu​ral-​work​ers-​ sur​vey/​resea​rch 22 National Center for Farmworker Health, Data from the 2017–​2018 National Agricultural Workers Survey, October 2021. 23 McWilliams, Carey. Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, 104. 24 McWilliams, Factories, 66–​80. 25 Martin, Philip L. Promise Unfulfilled: Unions, Immigration and the Farm Workers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 27.

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  61 26 Higgs, Robert. “Landless by Law: Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture to 1941.” The Journal of Economic History 38, no. 1 (1978): 205–​225. 27 Kandil, Caitlin Yoshiko. “How 1800s Racism Birthed Chinatown, Japantown and other Ethnic Enclaves.” NBC News. May 13, 2019. 28 Gallardo, R. Karina, and Johannes Sauer. “Adoption of Labor-​ Saving Technologies in Agriculture.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 10, no. 1 (2018): 185–​206. 29 Jefferson, Thomas. “The Letters of Thomas Jefferson, To John Jay Paris, Aug. 23, 1785.” Available at https://​ava​lon.law.yale.edu/​18th_​cent​ury/​let32.asp 30 Phillips, James. “American Agrarianism’s Answers to the Nation’s (In) Securities.” Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 9 (2009): 343. 31 Appleby, Joyce. “Commercial Farming and the “Agrarian Myth” in the Early Republic.” The Journal of American History 68, no. 4 (1982): 833–​849. 32 Nittle, Nadra Kareem. “The History of the 3/​5 Compromise.” October 30, 2020. ThoughtCo. 33 Brophy, Susan Dianne. “Reciprocity as Dispossession: A Dialectical Materialist Analysis of the Fur Trade.” Settler Colonial Studies 9, no. 3 (2019): 301–​319. 34 Schor, Paul. Counting Americans: How the US Census Classified the Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 35 Statistics on Slavery, available here, https://​facu​lty.weber.edu/​kmac​kay/​statis​tics​_​ on_​slav​ery.htm 36 Hacker, J. David. “From ‘20. and Odd’ to 10 Million: The Growth of the Slave Population in the United States.” Slavery & Abolition 41, no. 4 (2020): 840–​855. 37 Rugemer, Edward B. “The Development of Mastery and Race in the Comprehensive Slave Codes of the Greater Caribbean during the Seventeenth Century.” William & Mary Quarterly 70, no. 3 (2013): 429–​458. 38 Full Text of the Code can be found here, http://​pry​an2.kings​facu​lty.ca/​pryan/​ass​ ets/​File/​Barba​dos%20Sl​ave%20C​ode%201​688%20(repea​led%20the%201​661%20c​ ode).pdf 39 For South Carolina’s Code, see http://​ins​ide.sfuhs.org/​dept/​hist​ory/​US_​His​ tory​_​rea​der/​Chapt​er1/​174​0Sla​veCo​des.pdf. For codes around the country, see Middleton, Stephen. “Repressive Legislation: Slave Codes, Northern Black Laws, and Southern Black Codes.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History. 2020. 40 Billings, Warren M. “The Causes of Bacon’s Rebellion: Some Suggestions.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 78, no. 4 (1970): 409–​435; Tarter, Brent. “Bacon’s Rebellion, the Grievances of the People, and the Political Culture of Seventeenth-​Century Virginia.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 119, no. 1 (2011): 3. 41 Middleton, Repressive Legislation. 42 Lakwete, Angela. Inventing the Cotton Gin: Machine and Myth in Antebellum America. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005. 43 Libby, Slavery and Frontier, 31. 44 For these figures, see www.mshis​tory​now.mdah.ms.gov/​artic​les/​395/​ant​ebel​lum-​ miss​issi​ppi 45 Rönnbäck, Klas. “Were Slaves Cheap Laborers? A Comparative Study of Labor Costs in the Antebellum US South.” Labor History 62, no. 5–​6 (2021): 721–​741. 46 Kelly, Martin. “What Were the Top Four Causes of the Civil War?” ThoughtCo. July 21, 2020.

62  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy 47 The order can be found here, www.freed​men.umd.edu/​sfo15.htm 48 Fierce, Milfred C. “Black Struggle for Land during Reconstruction.” The Black Scholar, no. 5 (1974): 13–​18. 49 Hoffnagle, Warren. “The Southern Homestead Act: Its Origins and Operation.” The Historian 32, no. 4 (1970): 612–​629. 50 Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution: 1863–​ 1877. New York: Harper Press, 1988. 51 Fierce, Black Struggle, 14. 52 Nembhard, Jessica Gordon. “Cooperative Ownership in the Struggle for African American Econmic Empowerment.” Humanity & Society 28, no. 3 (2004): 298–​ 321; White, Monica. Freedom Farmers: Agricultural Resistance and the Black Freedom Movement. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2018. 53 Reynolds, Bruce J. Black Farmers in America, 1865–​ 2000: The Pursuit of Independent Farming and the Role of Cooperatives. No. 1502-​2016-​130760. 2003. 54 Linder, Marc. “Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal.” Texas Law Review 65 (1986): 1335; Perea, Juan F. “The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act.” Ohio State Law Journal. 72 (2011): 95. 55 Kocin, Susan. “Basic Provisions of the 1966 FLSA Amendments.” Monthly Labor Review (1967): 1–​4. 56 Department of Labor. “Fact Sheet #12: Agricultural Employers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).” January 2020. Available at www.dol.gov/​agenc​ies/​ whd/​fact-​she​ets/​12-​flsa-​agri​cult​ure 57 The full text of the agreement can be found here, www.farm​work​ers.org/​bpacc​ ord.html 58 Martin, Phillip. “Mexican Braceros and US Farm Workers.” July 10, 2020. Wilson Center. 59 Cohen, Deborah. Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011. 60 Creagan James F. “Public Law 78: A Tangle of Domestic and International Relations.” Journal of Inter-​American Studies 7, no. 4 (1965): 541–​556. 61 Full text of the law can be found here, www.govi​nfo.gov/​cont​ent/​pkg/​STAT​UTE-​ 65/​pdf/​STAT​UTE-​65-​Pg119.pdf 62 Longely, Robert. “The Bracero Program: When the U.S. Looked to Mexico for Labor.” May 9, 2021. ThoughtCo. 63 Scruggs, Otey M. “Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942–​1947.” Pacific Historical Review 32, no. 3 (1963): 251–​264. 64 Martin, Mexican Braceros. 65 Sellers, Sean, and Greg Asbed. “The History and Evolution of Forced Labor in Florida Agriculture.” Race/​Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 5, no. 1 (2011): 29–​49. 66 The complete video can be found here, www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​yJTV​F_​dy​a7E 67 Wilson, Margaret Gibbons. “Florida’s Labor History Symposium (November 18, 1989). Proceedings.” (1991). 68 American Immigration Council. “How the Immigration System Works.” September 14, 2021. Available here, www.ame​rica​nimm​igra​tion​coun​cil.org/​resea​ rch/​how-​uni​ted-​sta​tes-​immi​grat​ion-​sys​tem-​works

The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy  63 69 Wainer, Andrew. “Development and Migration in Rural Mexico.” Briefing Paper 11 (2011): 1–​16 70 Numbers for non-​immigrant Visa holders can he found here: https://​tra​vel.state. gov/​cont​ent/​tra​vel/​en/​legal/​visa-​law0/​visa-​sta​tist​ics/​nonim​migr​ant-​visa-​sta​tist​ ics.html 71 Yale-​Loehr, Stephen. “Foreign Farm Workers in the US: The Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.” NYU Review of Law & Social Change 15 (1986): 333. 72 On these issues, see Farmworker Justice. “No Way to Treat a Guest.” 2012 and Centro de Derechos del Migrante, “Ripe for Reform,” 2020. The reports can be found here www.farmwo​rker​just​ice.org/​resou​rce/​no-​way-​to-​treat-​a-​guest-​why-​ the-​h-​2a-​agric​ultu​ral-​visa-​prog​ram-​fails-​u-​s-​and-​fore​ign-​work​ers; https://​cdm​igra​ nte.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2020/​04/​Ripe-​for-​Ref​orm.pdf. 73 Groups include Farmworker Justice, the National Center for Farmworker Health, and the National Farm Worker Ministry. 74 For USDA figures, see USDA. “Farm Labor.” Compare these figures with the National Agricultural Workers Survey, available here: https://​glob​almi​grat​ion.ucda​ vis.edu/​sites/​g/​files/​dgvnsk​821/​files/​inl​ine-​files/​naw​s_​re​sear​ch_​r​epor​t_​13​jan2​019.pdf 75 Farmworker Family. “The State of Farmworkers in California.” Available here, https://​farmw​orke​rfam​ily.org/​info​rmat​ion 76 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2017 US Agricultural Census. USDA 2017. 77 USDA, 2017 Agricultural Census. 78 On their methodology, see www.lsc.gov/​about-​lsc/​matt​ers-​comm​ent/​agric​ultu​ral-​ wor​ker-​pop​ulat​ion-​estima​tes 79 Hernandez, Trish, and Susan Gabbard. “Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 2015–​2016: A Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Farmworkers.” Department of Labor. Research Report No. 13. (2019): 1–​84 80 Six in ten farmworkers stated that they had been with their current employer for fewer than 5 years (58%). 81 Hernandez and Gabbard, NAWS. 82 Krogstad, Jens, Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn. “5 Facts about Illegal Immigration.” Pew Research Center. June 12, 2019. 83 Hertz, Thomas. “US Hired Farm Workforce Is Aging.” Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America 2019, no. 1490-​ 2020-​710 (2019). 84 National Farm Worker Ministry, “Farm Worker Health Concerns.” April 21, 2009. 85 Exact language on removal can be found in the US legal code, found here www. law.corn​ell.edu/​usc​ode/​text/​8/​1227 86 On this 1996 immigration law, see www.vox.com/​2016/​4/​28/​11515​132/​iir​ira-​clin​ ton-​immi​grat​ion 87 Gramlich, John. “How Border Apprehensions, ICE Arrests and Deportations Have Changed under Trump.” Pew Research Center. March 2nd, 2020. 88 Quarterly backlog on immigration court proceedings can be found here, https://​ trac.syr.edu/​immi​grat​ion/​repo​rts/​675/​ 89 Krogstad, Jens Manuel and Ana Gonzalez-​ Barrera. “Key Facts about U.S. Immigration Policies and Biden’s Proposed Changes. Pew Research Center. January 11, 2022.

64  The Crisis Tendency in Labor Policy 90 PBS News Hour. “How Robots Can Help Give Struggling Dairy Farmers a Boost —​If They Can Afford Them.” January 3, 2022. 91 Gallardo and Sauer, Adopting Labor-​Saving Technology, 2018. 92 Peterson, Gale E. “The Discovery and Development of 2, 4-​D.” Agricultural History 41, no. 3 (1967): 243–​254. 93 Granzel, Bill. “Herbicides –​2,4-​D & Its Cousins.” Living Farm History. Available here, https://​living​hist​oryf​arm.org/​farm​ingi​nthe​40s/​pests​_​03.html 94 Rasmussen, Wayne D. “The Mechanization of Agriculture.” Scientific American 247, no. 3 (1982): 76–​89.

3 The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy

Crisis Tendency –​That the Prices of Agricultural Products Regularly Fall Below their Cost of Production Makes Farming an Occupation without the Financial Conditions to Reproduce itself. Ensuing Overproduction and Speculation, as well as Concentration, Imperil the Chances for New Farmers to Begin and Remain in the Profession.

Things Change as They Stay the Same “Cost of production, plus a little profit” is what I remember my grandfather telling me. He did not coin the slogan, as other members of the National Farmers Organization (NFO) created and popularized it during their mobilizations in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, farmers around the country, including my grandfather, engaged in various forms of direct action. Dairy farmers, for instance, dumped their milk in city streets rather than sell it to processors. Cattle ranchers and hog producers blocked delivery trucks from entering processing facilities, disrupting regional supply chains. Some reverted to more drastic measures such as shooting to kill their animals rather than sending them to market. Strategically, these actions meant to cut supply to prop up commodity prices. After showing their power, the NFO hoped to bring buyers to the negotiating table and ink favorable contracts for its members. In deploying extreme tactics, farmers wanted to make the public aware that they were struggling to make ends meet.1 The results of the NFO’s actions from this period are mixed. Farmers managed to organize in multiple states and draw attention to market issues. Yet, again recalling my grandfather’s stories, some farmers managed to secure a contract at one processing facility, only to see that plant sold to another company that decided to not honor the previous agreement. Members then grew illusioned, accepting whatever prices they were offered. There is also the case of Oren Staley, the charismatic leader of the NFO, who found himself at the center of court cases that drained the organization’s finances. While the NFO remains active into the twenty-​first century, it has not engaged in the kind of direct-​action mobilization seen at the time of the group’s emergence. DOI: 10.4324/9781003330066-4

66  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy Recalling the NFO’s efforts shows how some issues have remained the same over time, while in key aspects, have changed considerably. For instance, farmers decades later still demand, at a minimum, a cost of production price for their products. Some even call for parity pricing policies, or rather, a set of programs to ensure not only that they “break even” financially, but are remunerated sufficiently to cover the expenses of farm and non-​farm consumables such as clothes and healthcare (a more detailed discussion of parity appears later in this chapter). Farmers, also, could still appeal to extensive price support policies in the 1950s. By the 1980s and into the 1990s, government intervention into commodity markets had become minimal. Furthermore, the NFO was active when exports and imports were marginal factors in determining farm income. Times have changed, as the active farming population has fallen from over five to just over two million since the 1950s, and commodity markets within the US agrarian system increasingly have become internationalized. This chapter features three sections that correspond to broad historical periods. In the first, I describe the constitution of agrarian commodity markets in the United States, tying this discussion to Habermas’ thought on crisis. I then analyze how the problems of overproduction and speculation periodically give rise to contradictory tendencies. The second section highlights the post-​World War II era. This period, which follows a discussion of New Deal-​era policies, documents how contradictory tendencies were kept at bay thanks to domestic policies and propitious international conditions. The third section details not only the 1980s farm crisis, but also how a string of neoliberal reforms provoked a significant change in the US agrarian system. These reforms exacerbated the problems of overproduction and speculation, generating concentrated markets that limit the chances for new farmers to remain in the profession. Meanwhile, policy attempts have proven inadequate, as decision makers work within feedback loops that exacerbate problems instead of attempting to make systemic change.

Habermas on Agricultural Commodity Markets and Their Contradictory Tendencies Advanced capitalist states, according to Habermas, have the means to prevent economic crises. For instance, bureaucracies can monitor and adjust market conduct, addressing problems that may arise when buying and selling goods. Governments ought to oversee the conduct of markets in advanced capitalist states, guaranteeing that contracts made between actors are kept, as well as fair. Product shortages and breakdowns, accordingly, are due more to differences that stymie the work of administrators and politicians than businesses lacking the ability to make enough things to meet people’s needs.2 Concerning agricultural commodities, numerous issues standout from this brief discussion. First, money, as a medium of exchange, is not always present in farm economies. Take for instance planting and harvesting some crop –​the

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  67 owner, in this case, the farmer, may purchase seed, and then work the land, harvest the crop, and then feed their cattle (if they have any) without paying themselves or family members. Of course, on operations with hired laborers, the situation differs. Especially as the twentieth century progressed, money became increasingly constitutive of agrarian relations as operations increased in size. Regardless, even in the first decades of the twenty-​first century, urban workers’ livelihoods were more premised on money than rural producers. Or rather, the farmer remains a kind of worker, working without pay. In a sense, this is what “being your own boss” means, as it also opens the door to self-​ exploitation. As such, agricultural production has the potential to absorb costs and escape market relations in ways that urban, industrial systems lack. These qualities of agrarian markets do not complicate Habermas’ discussion, as much as highlight factors that function to mitigate problems that may take on crisis proportions. Historicizing agricultural markets reveals the dynamics of such problems, for instance, concerning overproduction, price volatility, and speculation. To illustrate, the prices that tobacco growers received for their production in the 1600s and 1700s fluctuated to the detriment of some farmers.3 Farmers took advantage of high prices, ramping up production. Overproduction resulted, producing an abrupt fall in prices. Especially small-​scale producers, in this context, struggled to shoulder this downturn and exited the profession. As such, overproduction illustrates a problem that may become a crisis tendency within markets –​rising prices leads individuals to increase sales to take advantage of favorable economic conditions at one time, later leading to price declines that imperil the financial future of producers. The historical example of the Mississippi Company (Compagnie du Mississippi) illustrates the related, problematic tendency in markets concerning speculation. A French firm active in trading with and settling European settlers in the seventeenth century, people purchased shares as interest increased in the colonial venture. Problems emerged as the company sold too many shares than what the French government could honor. The company folded in 1719 when shareowners tried to sell but could not find buyers.4 With speculation, as this case shows, the purchase and resale of some financial good or service increases the value of some product, generating incentives for people to buy and sell in ways unrelated to the good’s availability. If people sell en masse, then the market collapses, and the problem becomes a crisis. For Euro-​American settler farmers throughout the mid to late nineteenth century, agricultural markets featured a mix of subsistence and commercial practices. Commercial relations dominated when farm families lived near coasts and large cities, as more subsistence methods were practiced further inland. Not to divorce commercial from subsistence techniques, operations existed as “composites.5” Additionally, identification with family was privileged over the individual, with European ethnic enclaves regionalizing markets.6 The plantation system existed similarly, despite differences in terms of racial hierarchies, scale, and property-​owning relations, with owners

68  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy encouraging self-​sufficiency of food provision and lodging to minimize costs and control slaves.7 The structure of farming composite economies, as well as the frontier, mitigated the development of crisis tendencies. US agriculture had commercial dynamics that entailed periodic price volatility, as values of exports and land fluctuated. The subsistence side of operations offered a means for families and plantations to endure and persist. Additionally, the frontier functioned as a “escape valve” not only for economically distressed farmers, but also for younger people and others who accessed land when values were too high or when farms were foreclosed upon.8 The federal government also became more involved in agricultural markets in the nineteenth century. Specifically, the government provided education opportunities and technical assistance in efforts such as the Morrill Act, while also providing land access through policies such as the Homestead Act and pre-​emption acts that legalized the irregular holdings of squatters.9 The Civil War in the 1860s disrupted commodity markets, particularly with respect to labor and cotton exports. Sharecroppers and tenant farmers –​many of whom were the four million or so slaves who were freed by the Thirteenth Amendment –​were integral to the return of cotton production after the conflict ended. These operators existed within the market dynamics of the crop lien system, purchasing a variety of necessities and implement on credit, then having to sell their produce for an amount regularly below what was needed to cover their expenses.10 As such, the advance of this system diminished the subsistence side of pre-​Civil War era farming composite economy. In the decades after the Civil War, Euro-​American settlers and their descendants became subject to the crop lien system in increasing numbers as frontier squatting ended and the threat of foreclosure increased the number of farmers under the control of banks, large landowners, and/​or merchants.11 Also, during the late nineteenth century, railroad companies bonded the country spatially and inserted farmers into international markets.12 Hahn notes railroad construction, which was halted during the Civil War, began anew in the 1870s and accelerated into the 1880s.13 As railroads deepened the place of US agriculture within international commodity markets, the prices that farmers received for their produce became more prone to fluctuation than before. Furthermore, large landowners began increasingly to fence off their land from others, ending the common grazing areas that small-​scale farmers used instead of purchasing feed.14 Overall, farm economies that were relatively removed from market forces at around the time of the Civil War, afterward, became increasingly premised on exchange relations. Price volatility, while not new, became more pronounced and integral to the lived realities of farmers in the US agrarian system at the dawn of the twentieth century. One period of positive upswing –​for farmers –​took place from 1900 to 1914, which is often dubbed the “golden age of agriculture.” As Lake mentions, the number of farmers and rate of agriculture production plateaued, while commodity prices rising as domestic demand increased more

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  69 than supply.15 This time, along with an increase in demand that World War I (1914–​1918) generated, placed farmer income on par with what urban laborers received in terms of purchasing power. Problems emerged as rising commodity prices led some farmers to make risky investments on machinery and land.16 Overproduction resulted, leading prices for agricultural goods to fall over the course of the 1920s. Absentee landowners took advantage of the market downturn, speculating in land investments. These speculative investments drove grain production onto lands of poor-​quality during periods of unusually high rain fall, notably in the Great Plains states. Followed by an extensive drought, this mix of factors led to the Dust Bowl of the 1920s.17 Over the course of the 1920s, some decision makers saw to increase exports to resolve agrarian problems, particularly through the repeated attempts to pass the McNary–​ Haugen Farm Relief Bill. Partisan divisions impeded politicians from coming together on this legislation, as Democrats favored production-​improving, pro-​business initiatives. Republicans, in the McNary–​ Haugen Bill, saw addressing agrarian crisis with government intervention to control supply, limit imports, and favor exports. Caught up among partisan differences concerning proposals, the bill was vetoed in 1924, 1926, 1927, and 192818 –​as the country’s agrarian problems compounded. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 was passed within 100 days after Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office to address the market problems that had reached crisis proportions. Votes in favor of the AAA split the parties, with even as the Republicans in the minority (315 to 98 in the House), 39 supported the bill. Still, the parties overcame differences to forge a solution to critical problems in the US agrarian system. Critical to this change was the popular disfavor with the outgoing Republican administration, with President Hoover as its head (1928–​1932). Additionally, the Democrats’ wide sweeping gains in the House of Representatives and Senate represented a political realignment, as New Deal policies generate positive public support in the elections multiple times after 1932.19 In terms of policy, the AAA established a partial parity pricing system.20 The 1900–​1914 period of agricultural prosperity was considered the standard against which to target prices for farmers, as this moment placed farmer incomes on par –​or equal to –​people in urban, non-​farm professions. Besides seeking to stabilize incomes, an additional goal with parity policy is to balance rural and urban populations by providing the financial means for people to live comfortably regardless of profession and geography. The calculation of parity prices includes non-​farm expenses such as healthcare, clothing, household utility payments.21 In this way, rural and urban economies are conceived of as complementary. Contrary to subsidies, which take the form of cash payments that are distributed according to minimum prices that often are unrelated to production, parity policy instruments stabilize incomes by coordinating supply and demand. On the farm side of calculation, various facets of agricultural production were documented in coordinating supply and demand, including the

70  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy cost of inputs, the prices that farmers received from their sales, the amount of land that was used by rural cultivators, and the crops that were planted. Concretely, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was established to intervene in agricultural markets by providing loans and payments, as well as purchase and store product in amounts at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture. Non-​recourse loans were instituted to facilitate acquisitions, allowing farmers to sell their product on the market or forfeit it to the government if prices fell below targets. The loan was an amount that had been agreed upon by the farmer and the government, with the crop serving as collateral. Obversely, the CCC released goods on the market when prices were high, causing drops and limiting speculation. Overall, parity policy intends to blunt the potential contradictory tendencies that overproduction and speculation create within capitalist markets.

Keeping Contradictory Tendencies at Bay as the Agribusiness Ideal Gains Ground In the 1930s and 1940s, government policy and agriculture became more intertwined than ever before in the United States. Such developments, according to Habermas, is constitutive of markets in advanced capitalist society. Meanwhile, a cultural representation with concomitant political and economic elements was beginning to gain traction within the US agrarian system –​the farmer as a businessperson. More accurately, a businessman,22 this ideal gained popularity after World War II. As portrayed in the book, Farmer in a Business Suit, which was published in 1957, the US agricultural system had developed from one based on homesteaders and subsistence farmers, to another that was characterized by “agribusiness.” This ideal saw to fashion agriculture into a system for the large-​scale supply of raw materials for industrial needs. “The laboratories, the factories, the chemistry and technology that were producing the myriad of new supplies used every day by the American farmer,” Davis and Hinshaw write in describing the general contours of agribusiness, “changed his agriculture into something that extended far beyond the farm’s boundary fences.23” The people who wrote Farmer in a Business Suit –​John Herbert Davis and Kenneth Hinshaw –​were actively involved in farm policy. Davis is especially critical, as he was Assistant Secretary of Agriculture during the Eisenhower administration, and the person who coined the term “agribusiness.” More than the text itself, the book captures broad developments in the US agrarian system. Between 1945 and 1960, the number of tractors nearly doubled, from 2.4 to 4.7 million, as an increase in the use of chemicals increased production.24 Part of these technological changes resulted from World War II, which led to the transformation of war-​time chemical and manufacturing innovation into farm technologies. The war also made farmers into soldiers, decreasing the availability of labor for agriculture.

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  71 The agribusiness ideal, as represented in Farmer in the Business Suit, promoted norms that were supposed to characterize US agriculture of the twentieth century. Agribusiness was depicted as the most advanced stage in agrarian history, where the family farm “takes the place of the old homesteader… as his horsepower is bred in factories and his stock is fed by white-​ frocked scientists in the laboratories that produce those fabulous substances known as antibiotics and hormones.25” This way of farming, as opposed to more subsistence-​oriented modes, is “new,” “modern,” and indicative of “progress.” In depicting the progressive nature of these ideals, the book is based on the inter-​generational evolution of a fictionalized family –​the Yeomans –​who navigate changes in US agriculture that took place from the 1600s through the 1950s. For the historical discussions within the book, there is nothing about slavery, with Indigenous people referenced in passing as part of some long-​ ago past. The book’s conclusion features a young Yeoman family member deliberating over which area in the agricultural sciences to pursue in college, as his father describes working at a farm implement dealer. In their conversation, government is posed against “the agribusiness idea,” with the latter held up as the driver of progress. “Back in the old days,” the father tells his son, you produced your own supplies… today we have agribusiness –​a compound of farming and business that supply farms and process and distribute products. Farming must stand shoulder to shoulder with related business. In other words, we put the farmer in a business suit.26 The idea is that government is not the source of change, but agribusiness, as increases in production and adopting new technology drives the development of positive changes within the US agrarian system. Farmer in a Business Suit hit store shelves as government price support programs were challenged. Parity had been established in the 1930s, yet individual farm groups pressured President Eisenhower in the 1954 Farm Bill to relax domestic support policies.27 Liberalization did not entail repeal –​parity support went from assuring 90% of prices, to 82% –​which meant farmers still enjoyed considerably government support. The intention, with reducing support, was to provide farmers with more latitude to do what they wanted with their product. Such changes divided farmers. Differences emerged between farmer groups throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with organizations such as the NFO demanding a return to full parity. Corn producers, to the contrary, sought to leave parity behind. In 1958, the latter succeeded in doing so, managing to persuade politicians to accept a Farm Bill where the floor for parity prices dropped from 82% to 65%. Across the board, parity supports were relaxed in favor of voluntary participation in programs that sought to limit the amount of acreage in production.28

72  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy The proposal to improve commodity prices by promoting exports also gained traction due to the increase in demand from the Soviet Union in the 1970s and a devaluation of the dollar, which together caused prices to rise and improve farm incomes. The price bubble burst, as prices for products, such as wheat, fell in the mid-​1970s when South American countries entered the market, US farmers overproduced, and global consumption declined.29 Meanwhile, the oil crisis caused the cost of inputs to rise, and as parity pricing policy had been gradually dismantled, government support was not at the same level as seen in the 1930s, 1940s, or even the 1950s.30 One policy development that went contrary to the expansion of the agribusiness ideal at this time was the Farmer-​Owned Reserve (FOR) system. The lack of reserves that resulted from the uptick in US grain exports led urban consumer groups and ranchers to join forces, as the former became worried about domestic food supply, and the latter, about feeding their livestock. This alliance, along with the Secretary of Agriculture of the time –​Bob Bergland –​ who was a wheat farmer, pushed Congress to introduce FOR as part of the 1977 Farm Bill.31 The program, which worked with producers of wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, and rice from 1977 to 1996, featured a series of financial instruments. In terms of details, farmers signed a three-​or five-​year agreement with the CCC, during which they agreed to keep their product off the market. When the market price dropped below a level set by the USDA, farmers received a nonrecourse commodity loan with deferred interest and storage cost reimbursement. This latter payment served to build farmer-​ controlled infrastructure, such as grain bins.32 The program was weakened in 1981 and 1990, eventually ending in 1996, when corn and wheat prices were high.33 The FOR is noteworthy for a variety of reasons. First, it brought different groups together to address the negative effects of overproduction. Yet, similar to corn producers pushing to relax New Deal policy instruments in the 1950s, large-​scale producers and processors interested in increasing exports pressured the government to weaken the program almost as soon as it came into existence.34 Advocates of the program note that for the brief time it existed, the FOR mollified the negative effects of low prices.35 Still, debts remained a problem and farm bankruptcies continued into the 1980s. FOR helped, but the program was dismantled as neoliberal reform become prioritized. The contradictory dynamics of overproduction were briefly, however ineffectually, suppressed. A further, macro-​economic fact to note from the Post-​World War II era in the development of the US agrarian system is how more farmers left the profession than during either the Great Depression or after 1980 (see Figure 3.1). Central to this development is that non-​ farm, non-​ agricultural incomes steadily increased at this time, essentially doubling from 1950 to 1970.36 Farm income saw ebbs and flows during this time, while urban professions saw a consistent increase. This point is key, as urban areas drew people from the

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  73 7000000

600

6000000

500

5000000

400

4000000

300

3000000

200

2000000

100

1000000 0

1940 1945 1950 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1978 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 Number of Farms

0

Average Farm Size by Acreage

Figure 3.1 Change in Number of Farms and Average Size by Acreage, 1940–​2017. This graph documents the decline in the number of farmers in the United States, from 1940 to 2017. Graph made by the author. Data from the United States Agricultural Census, available here https://​agcen​sus.libr​ary.corn​ell.edu/​

countryside with higher pay. Meanwhile, farmers could still turn to government support, but in ever diminishing amounts. Overall, the New Deal policies in the decades immediately following World War II recast markets, managing to keep speculation and overproduction at bay. In a sense, whereas subsistence norms played key roles before the New Deal, the government assumed a privileged role for farmers in the twentieth century. Parity pricing support policies, while key, were gradually dismantled as different farmer interest groups turned to exports and production increases. Meanwhile, the agribusiness ideal buttressed the persistent relaxation of governmental support.

Neoliberal Reforms and the Aggravation of Crisis Tendencies in Markets The 1980s witnessed a significant increase in farm bankruptcies when compared to prior decades. In fact, the rate of bankruptcy per 10,000 farmers matched Great Depression levels.37 Bankruptcies increased at this time because farmers invested in more land and new machinery in the 1970s, yet when prices fell, they could not make their loan payments and defaulted.38 Dubbed “the 1980s farm crisis,” movies told of the farmers’ struggles, as Presidential candidates, such as Jessie Jackson, made a point to hear from producers on the campaign trail.39 In the face of widespread economic distress, politicians championed short-​ term policy fixes. For instance, 1981 Farm Bill delinked dairy price supports from parity, and then in 1985, offered dairy farmers the option to “terminate” their herds, or rather, send their cows to slaughter instead of continuing to

74  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy milk them, as price supports for other crops were also reduced.40 Besides these efforts targeting dairy, the 1985 Farm Bill made a contradictory move. Specifically, legislators increased direct payments for farmers as they cut target prices for nonrecourse loan payments.41 The former policy tool is short term in nature, mainly as ad hoc payments are provided to producers who experience a market downturn at a particular point in time. Moreover, increasing payments instead of working through the CCC cut public reserves, therefore limiting the government’s abilities to release product on the market to address boom period speculation. Price policy deregulation continued in the 1990 Farm Bill, as the 1996 legislation –​known as the “Freedom to Farm Act” –​eliminating altogether the connections of particular commodities with deficiency payments and acreage reduction.42 Such policy changes were part of structural changes taking place globally in accordance with neoliberal reforms. In general, these reforms were not so much about deregulation, as re-​regulation, with institutions becoming more oriented around protecting private property, curtailing state power, and encouraging production without limit.43 Much has been written about these changes internationally, focusing on the expansion of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)44 and also change in the Global South.45 Less has been documented in the United States, particularly with respect to agricultural policy.46 The pro-​ market, re-​ regulatory imperative began with the Tokyo round of negotiations (1973–​1979) of the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs, which preceded the Uruguay round (1986–​1994) that led to the formation of the WTO in 1994.47 Prior to Tokyo, trade negotiations focused on tariff policy, leaving internal support policies concerning agriculture to individual governments. With the Tokyo Round, this changes, as ending and/​or reducing domestic agricultural income and price support policy became part of international trade negotiations between countries. Promoting exports and reducing domestic governmental interventions into markets, which are central macro-​economic features of neoliberal policy, became increasingly part of agricultural policy in the United States and other countries. Going into the Tokyo round, US trade policy was already changing, principally with granting fast-​track approval authority to the President and the appearance of advisory committees for international agreements. The US Trade Act of 1974 created these initiatives, which were initially temporary, but have been reapproved with new appointees since. Concerning the committees, the change was intended to bring “public” and “private” interests together to make deals with other countries.48 Who ended up at the table in the 1970s were not small-​scale family farmers, but commodity groups that were appointed and that sought to promote exports. Among these groups were Blue Diamond Growers, Florida Mutual, the Florida Tomato Exchange, National Milk Producers Federation, the National Dairy Export Council, and the Ranchers/​ Cattlemen Legal Fund.49

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  75 Becoming central in the 1970s, export incentives have remained part of initiatives across Democrat and Republican administrations. For instance, the Agricultural Trade Promotion Program, which emerges in 2018, grants eligible organizations –​food processors and not farmers directly –​access to resources to improve marketing practices, attend conferences, and conduct research to increase the sale of US products abroad. Another example is the Trump administration’s revision of the Clinton-​era North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which is now the United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement (USMCA). The USMCA continued its predecessor’s focus on cutting tariffs to promote trade across borders, targeting Canadian import protections on US exports.50 Decades of pushing for exports bore fruit (food pun intended). Exports increased from $40 billion in sales in 1990 to over $135 billion in 2019.51 The peak year was 2014, when over $150 billion of US agricultural exports were sold abroad. Over time, exports have increased as a part of farmer incomes. In 1954, the passage of Public Law 480 (the Food for Peace Program) made food aid part of distributing surplus production abroad. At that time, approximately $3.75 billion was allocated for food aid, which was on par with what was generated from exports.52 Since then, there has been a consistent rise in the share of farm income that comes from exports, rising from 12.5% in 1970 to 30.6% in 1980, declining to 19.4% in 1984 before increasing once again to over 30% by the mid-​1990s.53 While grains, such as wheat, soy, and corn make up much of what is sold abroad, exports also include substantial amounts of milk powder, cotton, poultry, and beef. Meanwhile, imports have kept pace with rising exports. According to the USDA, from 1999 to 2017, the amount the United States spent on food imports rose 300% (from $43.1 Billion in 1999 to $136.2 Billion in 2017).54 In 2018, approximately 50% of fruits and vegetables that are sold on grocery store shelves in the United States now originate from other countries.55 Neoliberal, re-​regulatory reforms has made the US agrarian system increasingly internationalized. Despite such reforms, farmers’ economic returns have not improved. For instance, USDA figures show that median farm income remained stagnant with no increases from 2014 to 2019, as some operations lost money in 2017 and 2018.56 Before this, within two years of decoupling programs from market dynamics with the Freedom to Farm Act in 1996 and promoting direct payments to producers in times of economic distress, the government reintroduced deficiency payments in the form of counter-​cyclical payments (CCP). CCP, emerging with the 2002 Farm Bill, lasted as part of policy until the 2014 Farm Bill nixed the program.57 Whereas somewhat contrary to neoliberal principles, its focus on individual crops instead of incomes limited its effectiveness. The program, moreover, set the target prices for commodities below what would be required to generate prices to keep people in agriculture. For example, in the 2002 Farm Bill, the price for a bushel of corn was set at $2.70. In 2014, when the program was eliminated, the price was $3.70. The parity price for corn, respectively, was $6.55 and $13.30.58

76  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy 140

120

100

80

60

40

20

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

0

Wheat

Cotton

Hogs

Rice

Tobacco

Milk

Corn

Soy

Figure 3.2  Commodity Prices Received as Percent of Parity Price for Basic Commodities, 1970–​2021. This graph shows the decline in the percent of the parity price that farmers have received for select commodities from 1970 to 2021. Graph assembled by the author. Data from National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS), USDA. Available here, https://​usda.libr​ary.corn​ell.edu/​conc​ern/​publi​cati​ons/​c821gj​76b

Tracing changes over time in what farmers have received as a percent of parity prices better illustrates the failure of export promotion as the way to address economic problems in agriculture. From 1970 to 2021, the prices that farmers received as a percentage of the parity price, on average, went from 62% to 29% (see Figure 3.2).59 Two exceptions are worth noting in the graph. The first, particularly concerning wheat, was due to droughts in various countries around the world limiting supply and commodity speculators who purchased product to take advantage.60 Another improvement is seen in 2020. This bump arose from the greater ad hoc cash payments made to farmers in response to the supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-​19 pandemic lockdowns. As explaining the reasons for these punctual price increases shows, the real tendency is for prices to fall. Also during this period, we see the steady decline of the farming percentage of total farm income, from 37% to 17%. In 1960, that percentage was 47%. Attention to parity pricing reveals deteriorating terms of trade, not between the Global South and North, but across farm and non-​farm economies. Due to this shift, 72% of operations in 2019 reported requiring non-​farm earned income to remain in operation.61 In terms of yields, across

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  77 commodities, farmers have increased production exponentially since the 1960s.62 Accordingly, price volatility is regularly seen across crops, including corn, wheat, soy, and dairy. Such fluctuations generate, as proven in the pre-​ New Deal era, overproduction. One other metric that displays problems concerning farm revenue is what producers receive from each dollar that consumers spend on food. According to the USDA, the real price that farmers received as a percent of the total food dollar was 16% in 2020, with the remainder going to processing, advertising, transportation, and other off-​farm activities. While displaying a one cent increase from 2019, farmers have experienced a steady decline from 18.4% in 1993 to 15.8% in 2008.63 Put succinctly, margins are tilted toward non-​farmers in the agrarian system, with the tendency for the farmer’s portion of food sales to shrink. Income stagnation and worsening margins have characterized farm economies for years. Despite this reality, export promotion –​a favorite in the neoliberal tool kit –​has been the favored policy option among decision makers since the 1970s. Meanwhile, officials fashion programs to specific groups and populations. Counting the individual sections of the Farm Bills from 1981 to 2018 show an increase from 2,113 to 4,036, with the total length of the bill growing from 146 pages to 530.64 With this expansion comes greater detail, as well as attention to specific groups. The conservation title is particularly telling, as the 1981 Farm Bill features general programs for all producers. More specialized programs appear in the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills. For instance, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) is introduced, which dedicates resources to small-​scale producers who practice conservation. Similarly, the research title of the Farm Bill includes a separate section on sustainability in 1990. The Sustainable Agriculture, Research, and Extension (SARE) program begins at this time, which awards grants to farmers who develop initiatives to combine profitability with environmental stewardship.65 The 1990 Farm Bill is also the first time we find the category of “socially disadvantaged farmers” (i.e., the 2501 program, known as such for the number that it is assigned in the legislation), which dedicates resources to people who have faced racial and/​or ethnic discrimination historically. Eligible groups include African Americans, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Asians, Hispanics, and Pacific Islanders. In 2014, veterans were included. In this program, resources are dedicated to universities, non-​profits, and tribal governments.66 These changes may appear as signs of government intervention, and therefore, the opposite of neoliberal reform. While part of the story, focusing on groups in isolation reveals another quality of neoliberal reform –​what Peck and Tickell call “roll-​out neoliberalism.” Specifically, using policy to support particular groups and create individual entrepreneurs functions to mollify the negative effects of deregulatory, more macro-​economic policies.67 The Brazilian sociologist, Evelina Dagnino, notes how such changes constitute a “perverse confluence,” namely, as policies that appear to “empower” people actually leave economic hierarchies intact.68

78  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy Exploring total outlays in the Farm Bill reveals dynamics constitutive of “roll-​out” neoliberalism. For instance, the conservation title of the Farm Bill –​of which EQIP is part –​has never constituted over 2% of what farmers receive in terms of income support.69 After experiencing a doubling of resources from 1996 to 2011, from $3 billion to $6, outlays have plateaued as of 2022.70 Nutrition receives the mammoth share of allocations –​upwards of 75% –​as increases in crop insurance, which were 7% of total allocations in 2018, outpace resources dedicated to conservation.71 Meanwhile, the 2501 program has seen its allocation oscillate between $6 and $15 million per year since its inauguration.72 While true that Farm Bill resources are dedicated to small-​scale farmers, including BIPOC producers, they are marginal when compared to the damage that has been done by decades of repealing price policy supports. The Chicago School’s vision of how to enforce Anti-​Trust law, known as the “consumer welfare standard,” has compounded problems concerning markets and farmer income by facilitating an increase in corporate concentration. This more laissez-​faire standard when compared to the previous, structural approach to Anti-​Trust enforcement,73 originated in the 1970s to simplify regulation. Basically, corporate actions, whether in terms of mergers, or pricing practices, are considered permissible if they lower the prices that consumers pay for some good or service. Since its embrace by government officials in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Anti-​Trust law enforcement has declined precipitously.74 Meanwhile, according to the Open Markets Institute, over the last three decades the four largest poultry firms have went from holding 35% to 51% of total market share, while in beef packing, that figure went from 25% to 85%, and in hogs, 33% to 66%.75 The dairy industry, in 2017, saw its four largest cooperatives controlling over 53% of all raw milk.76 That the country’s largest cooperative –​Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) –​bought the principal milk processor, Dean Foods in 2020, shows concentration in the form of vertical integration.77 Corn and soybean seed dealers have also become more concentrated at this time, as on the retail end, Walmart, Kroger, Target, and Safeway, as of 2012, receive nearly 54% of all money spent by consumers.78 Hendrickson et al. argue that when four firms control 45% of a certain market, then industries likely engage in anti-​competitive practices that hurt the economic welfare of farmers, workers, and consumers.79 Such practices include price fixing, exclusive dealing and contracting among firms, and sharing markets. Workers suffer, especially when they are not unionized, as firms collude to dictate wages and poorly standardize work conditions across an industry. Overall, neoliberal reforms have taken power away from government, placing it in the hands of large-​scale, private-​sector actors. Examples such as JBS, which through its global subsidiaries move meat around the world, and Cargill, with its worldwide network of grain distribution, participate in transnational commodity networks whereby they foresee price changes

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  79 and speculate on potential changes.80 Without parity policies stocking well-​ managed reserves, corporations engage in speculation with little opposition. When financial problems arise in such concentrated markets, policy makers regularly turn to their arsenal of short-​ term fixes, such as cash payments, which had become central to food system policy since the 1980s. For instance, supply chain instability and price volatility due to the abrupt change in consumption patterns during the coronavirus pandemic took the meager gains that farmers were beginning to receive in the early months of 2020. Not only did farmers earn less in 2020 when compared to 2019, but 40% of their income came from government payments.81 Cash payments were also distributed to compensate losses that had been incurred from the retaliatory tariffs that Mexico, Canada, and China placed on US agricultural products in 2018 and 2019 as a result of the Trump administration’s trade wars. Even with these payments, farm income remained stagnant throughout 2019.82 Overall, neoliberalism has generated a system sensitive to shocks, which is reliant on ad hoc government support. Direct payments, as emergency relief, exist in a policy feedback loop as decision makers turn to them without encountering debate or resistance. Digging into the figures on small-​scale farmers brings into focus problems that the concentrated US food and farm system has in reproducing itself. First, small-​scale farmers –​including off-​farm operations, retirees, and those with low incomes –​are considered financially at risk by the USDA.83 Low sales, small operator farms are the most at risk, with over 77% having profit margins that show limited to no profitability. 69% of all farms experienced financial problems in 2015, routinely spending more than what they earn.84 Furthermore, small-​scale farmers tend to be newer to agriculture than larger-​ scale operators, supplement their income with off-​farm resources, and access less land.85 The USDA classifies beginning farmers as working an operation for under ten years. Despite the challenges, according to the 2017 Agricultural Census, there has been an increase in the number of beginning farmers –​ going from 652,820 in 2007, falling to 522,058 in 2012, before increasing to 674,940 in 2017. Yet, while farmers with under five years of experience have increased since 2012, those with between five to ten years on the land have decreased during that time.86 Such figures indicate that younger, small-​scale farmers enter the profession, but do not remain. Facing such difficult financial futures, farmers decide to contract with buyers that provide inputs such as seeds and equipment in exchange for an agreed upon price. Concretely, contract farming accounts for approximately 33% of all agriculture production in the United States, with small-​scale operators accounting for just over 50% of these operations. Most poultry producers –​90% –​are under contract.87 Still, as beginning farmers continue to exit the profession and revenue stagnates, such attempts to secure financial stability do not keep people in farming. Furthermore, small-​scale farmers are told how to farm, with little independence on marketing and production decisions that could improve resiliency.

80  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy Promising initiatives for small-​scale operators and new entrants include experiences in community supported agriculture (CSAs) and direct marketing (selling directly to restaurants, hospitals, and groceries). The former practice features farmers agreeing to sell consumers certain food items at a particular price, usually at regular intervals. According to the 2015 Local Food Marketing Practices Survey, approximately 167,000 farms engage in direct sales. Of those operations, 7,398 engage in CSAs, while the most prevalent form of direct sales to consumers took the form of on-​farm stores (44% of sales, or 51,422 farms).88 Farmers who sell at farmers markets count for 23% direct sales, and approximately 35% of all farmers who engage consumers directly. The 2017 Agricultural Census notes similar figures, with just over 130,000 farms engaging in direct sales to consumers and 28,958 selling to retailors, businesses, and other institutions.89 2017 figures, moreover, show a relationship between the size of an operation and the tendency that a farmer sells direct. Specifically, of the 159,015 farms that direct market, 101,443 are under 50 acres in size. Also, larger operations (above 260 acres) count for $4.9 billion of the total $9 billion in direct retail sales. Farmers with over 2,000 acres accounted for over $2.4 billion in sales. Sales to consumers was more balanced, as farmers with under 50 acres represented over $747 million of revenue out of the total $2.8 billion.90 While innovative, only 7% of operations engage in direct sales. Also, figures show that concentration operates in this area of the agrarian system as well, as larger operations occupy a significant share of the market. Moreover, most farmers engaged in direct sales –​77% –​have been in agriculture for over ten years, revealing that farmers opt to engage in direct sales either to transition to new forms of farming or complement more conventional methods. New farmers work according to such methods, but people with more experience dominate. Partisan divisions and stalemate have impeded confronting concentration and the lack of resilience in the US food system. Urban, more leftist forces have tended to focus on consumer and nutrition policy, in the form of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Republicans have tried on various occasions to cut the provision, whereas Democrats, intended to keep or expand it.91 As such, we find feedback loops with politicians representing certain constituencies and not bridging gaps to address the deep-​ seated problems in the agrarian system pertaining to markets. Similar dynamics characterize trade policy. In what may seem to contradict polarization, both parties since the 1980s have favored policies that would support exports. The Trump administration challenged this position, opposing free trade by placing tariffs on Chinese imports.92 Yet, the decision to support US dairy exports into Canadian markets through the USMCA showed the administration’s desire to continue to see trade as a solution to

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  81 problems in markets while seeking to deliver a win to one of its constituencies –​farmers. Meanwhile, Democrats were not only silent on this point in the revised NAFTA, but enforced its provisions once President Biden took office.93 As such, both parties fail to move beyond promoting exports when considering how to address market problems in the US agrarian system. Furthermore, as Democrats have forfeited political ground to the right with rural voters, Republicans have filed the gap. Yet, Republicans lack a domestic agenda on how to support agricultural markets in a way besides ad hoc payments and export promotion. Little competition between parties generates a policy area void of innovation. As such, bipartisan differences on agricultural markets produce short-​ term, after-​ the-​ fact responses to breakdowns. Meanwhile, existing policies either fail to confront consolidation or contribute to it, allowing the problems of overproduction and speculation to reach crisis proportions that endanger the reproduction of the food and farm system.

Conclusion: Contradictory Tendencies, New and Old This chapter charts the evolution of contradictory tendencies in US agrarian markets. Problems concerning markets have regularly been present, principally in overproduction and speculation. Exports in the nineteenth century made money an integral part of agrarian markets, with the plantation system and the composite settler farm mitigating the transformation of problems into crisis tendencies with their respective subsistence technologies. Still, breakdowns did occur, especially in the form of the Civil War. Subsequently, public policy became more central to the US agrarian system, especially at the time of the Great Depression when agrarian inputs and outputs were circulated more in the exchange economy. Neoliberal reforms have turned problems into crisis tendencies, despite New Deal policies existing as a countervailing force for decades. Showing how the contradictory tendencies have been exacerbated in the twenty-​first century highlights the paradoxical truth of the agribusiness ideal. That cultural representation of the US farmer’s goals, with its gendered and racialized components, sought to place the rural cultivator above and beyond government intervention. This cultural notion painted a positive picture of a market where fewer farmers would participate. The problem is that markets with fewer profitable enterprises invite disruptions and breakdown. They also provoke abuses of power, particularly as inequality expands, and powerful entities dominate small-​scale players. External shocks, such as experienced from the COVID-​19 pandemic, triggered government intervention –​which contradict not only the economics of agribusiness, but its culture as well. Meanwhile, policy makers, with neoliberal precepts, deploy piecemeal, ad hoc initiatives that routinely miss opportunities to engage in significant structural reforms.

82  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy

Notes 1 For a complete history of the NFO, see Muhm, Don. NFO, A Farm Belt Rebel. Petersham: Lone Oak Press, 2000. 2 Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, (2005) 1973. 3 Pereira, Alfredo M. “Boom and Bust Hypothesis in the Colonial Chesapeake Economy: Empirical Evidence for the Period 1676–​1713.” Economics Letters 37, no. 3 (1991): 235–​242. 4 Neal, Larry. “ I am Not Master of Events”: the Speculations of John law and Lord Londonderry in the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. 5 Bushman, Richard Lyman. “Markets and Composite Farms in Early America.” The William and Mary Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1998): 351–​374. 6 Henretta, James A. “Families and Farms: Mentalité in Pre-​Industrial America.” The William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History (1978): 3–​32. 7 Post, Charles. “The American Road to Capitalism.” New Left Review 133 (1982). 8 Mooney, Patrick H., and Theo J. Majka. Farmers’ and Farmworkers’ Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 9 Opie, John. The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 10 Mooney, Farmers, 80. 11 Goodwyn, Populist Moment; Chang, David A. The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832–​1929. Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. 12 Postel, Charles. The Populist Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 13 Hahn, Steven Howard. The Roots of Southern Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. 14 Greer, Allen. “Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America,” The American Historical Review, Volume 117, Issue 2, April 2012, 365–​386. 15 Lake, David A. “Export, Die, or Subsidize: The International Political Economy of American Agriculture, 1875–​1940.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 1 (1989): 81–​105. 16 Henderson, Jason, Brent Gloy, and Michael Boehlje. “Agriculture’s Boom-​Bust Cycles: Is This Time Different?.” Economic Review-​ Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2011): 83. 17 Prices, Market, Jonathan Coppess, Brenna Ellison, A. Bryan Endres, Jason Franken, Kelly Golish, Todd Hubbs et al. “The Conservation Question, Part 2: Lessons Written in Dust.” 18 Kelley, Darwin N. “The McNary-​Haugen Bills, 1924–​1928: An Attempt to Make the Tariff Effective for Farm Products.” Agricultural History 14, no. 4 (1940): 170–​180. 19 Kantor, Shawn, Price V. Fishback, and John Joseph Wallis. “Did the New Deal Solidify the 1932 Democratic Realignment?.” Explorations in Economic History 50, no. 4 (2013): 620–​633. 20 The system was partial because import controls were outside of the AAA, appearing in the Smoot–​Hawley Act of 1930. These controls ended in 1934 when Roosevelt set up the precursor of the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in the Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934.

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  83 21 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). National Agricultural Statistics Service. “Chapter Four. Parity Prices, Parity Ratio, and Feed Price Ratios.” Available at www.nass.usda.gov/​Surv​eys/​Guide_​to_​N​ASS_​Surv​eys/​Pri​ ces/​Chap​ter%20F​our%20Par​ity%20and%20F​eed%20Pr​ice%20Rat​ios%20v10.pdf 22 Anderson, J. L. “ ‘You’re a Bigger Man’: Technology and Agrarian Masculinity in Postwar America.” Agricultural History 94, no. 1 (2020): 1–​23. 23 Davis, John Herbert, and Kenneth Hinshaw. “Farmer in a Business Suit.” New York: Simon and Shuster (1957), 190. 24 Dimitri, Carolyn, Anne Effland, and Neilson C. Conklin. The 20th Century Transformation of US Agriculture and Farm Policy. 2005. 25 Davis and Hinshaw, Farmer, x. 26 Davis and Hinshaw, Farmer, 240. 27 Coppess, Jonathan. “Reviewing Farm Bill History: The Agricultural Act of 1954.” Farmdocdaily 7 (2017): 1–​4. 28 For a discussion of acreage limitation policies in each Farm Bill in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, see Outlaw, Joe L., and Steven L. Klose. “Supply management.” The 2002 Farm Bill: Policy Options and Consequences (2002); and Rasmussen, Wayne David, Gladys L. Baker, and James S. Ward. A Short History of Agricultural Adjustment, 1933–​75. No. 391. US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1976. 29 Peters, May, Suchada V. Langley, and Paul C. Westcott. Agricultural Commodity Price Spikes in the 1970s and 1990s: Valuable Lessons for Today. USDA-​ ERS, 2009. 30 Paarlberg, Don. Issues Raised by the 1973 Farm Bill. University of Minnesota-​ Twin Cities, Ag Research. 1973. 31 Stucker and Behm. “A Guide to Understanding the 1977 Food and Agricultural Legislation.” USDA, and King, Seth, “But the Impact of a National Grain Reserve on Farmers as well as Consumers is Far from Certain.” New York Times July 31, 1977. 32 Grain could be taken out of the reserve when it reached a certain price, called the release price. The reserve kept by the CCC –​thee government-​owned option –​ also functioned with loans and release prices. Yet, in the FOR, the release price was lower than the CCC release price. The FOR loan rate, also, was higher than the CCC rate. At a higher rate, but lower release price, farmers were incentivized to participate in the FOR instead of the CCC for the flexibility that the former program offered. 33 Vocke, Gary. “Wheat: Background and Issues for Farm Legislation.” (2001). Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​webd​ocs/​outlo​oks/​39637/​50738_​whs0​701-​ 01.pdf ?v=​442.9 34 Murphy, Sophia. “Strategic Grain Reserves in an Era of Volatility.” Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (2009): 1–​16. 35 Hart, Chad E., and Bruce A. Babcock. Time for a New Farmer-​ Owned Reserve?. 2000. 36 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. “A Guide to the Historical Trends in Income Inequality.” January 13, 2020. 37 Stam, Jerome M., and Bruce L. Dixon. Farmer Bankruptcies and Farm Exits in the United States, 1899–​2002. No. 1474-​2016-​120805. 2004. 38 Barnett, Barry J. “The US Farm Financial Crisis of the 1980s.” Agricultural History 74, no. 2 (2000): 366–​380.

84  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy 39 Dudley, Kathryn Marie. Debt and Dispossession: Farm Loss in America’s Heartland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 40 Glaser, Lewrene K. “Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985. Agricultural Information Bulletin Number 498.” (1986). 41 DeLave, Joseph W. “Save the Small Farm –​The 1985 Farm Bill Is Not the Answer.” Journal of Legislation. 13 (1986): 247. 42 Alston, Julian M., and Daniel A. Sumner. “Perspectives on Farm Policy Reform.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2007): 1–​19. 43 Standing, Guy. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury, 2011. 44 A positive account can be found here, Bhagwati, Jagdish. “After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO.” International Affairs 77, no. 1 (2001): 15–​29. More critical views can be found here, Dunkley, Graham. The Free Trade Adventure: the WTO, the Uruguay Round and Globalism: a Critique. London: Zed Books, 2000, and on agriculture, Rosset, Peter. Food is Different: Why We Must get the WTO out of Agriculture. London: Zed Books, 2006. 45 On Latin America, see Weyland, Kurt. “Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record.” Latin American Politics and Society 46, no. 1 (2004): 135–​157 and Huber, Evelyne, and Fred Solt. “Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism.” Latin American Research Review 39, no. 3 (2004): 150–​164. For Africa, a critical, postcolonial take is found in Mbembe, Achille. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 46 Journals such as Journal of Rural Studies and the Journal of Agrarian Change feature such work often, especially of movements that challenge neoliberalism in principle and action. I am referring to a lack of attention to changes in policies with respect to the governance of agricultural markets. 47 Rayner, Anthony J., K. A. Ingersent, and R. C. Hine. “Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: An Assessment.” The Economic Journal 103, no. 421 (1993): 1513–​1527. 48 A history of the committees can be found here, https://​leg​acy.trade.gov/​itac/​hist​ ory.asp. Full text of the 1974 law can be found here, www.govi​nfo.gov/​app/​col​lect​ ion/​usc​ode/​2011/​titl​e19/​chapte​r12 49 Each of these groups and their positions on free trade at the time of the Tokyo Round are detailed here, US International Trade Commission. “The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, US–​Israel FTA, US–​Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the US Economy.” August, publication (Washington, DC: US International Trade Commission, August). See also Trade and Environment Policy Issues, note (2003). 50 On the USMCA in terms of policy changes, see the United States Trade Representative (USTR) fact sheet, available here https://​ustr.gov/​trade-​agr​eeme​ nts/​free-​trade-​agr​eeme​nts/​uni​ted-​sta​tes-​mex​ico-​can​ada-​agreem​ent/​fact-​she​ets/​ mar​ket-​acc​ess-​and-​dairy-​outco​mes 51 “Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Trade.” May 2022. Available here, see www.ers. usda.gov/​top​ics/​intern​atio​nal-​mark​ets-​us-​trade/​us-​agric​ultu​ral-​trade/​outl​ook-​ for-​us-​agric​ultu​ral-​trade/​ 52 For a comparison on such figures, showing the near equivalence in terms of cash value of aid and exports for the 1950s, see https://​fas.org/​sgp/​crs/​misc/​R41​072.pdf and www.ers.usda.gov/​amber-​waves/​2004/​febru​ary/​in-​the-​long-​run/​ 53 Galdiner, Walt. “The Importance of Agriculture Exports to U.S. Trade and the Farm Economy.” FCA Economic Report, September 9, 2015.

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  85 54 Polhemus, Mike. “U.S. Food and Beverage Imports Since 1999.” The Statistics Blog, May 31, 2019. 55 Karp, David. “Most of America’s Fruit Is Now Imported. Is That a Bad Thing?” New York Times. March 13, 2018. 56 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Highlights from the February 2020 Farm Income Forecast.” Available here, www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​farm-​econ​ omy/​farm-​sec​tor-​inc​ome-​finan​ces/​hig​hlig​hts-​from-​the-​farm-​inc​ome-​forec​ast/​ 57 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Agricultural Act of 2014: Highlights and Implications.” Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​agric​ultu​ral-​ act-​of-​2014-​hig​hlig​hts-​and-​impli​cati​ons/​crop-​commod​ity-​progr​ams/​. 58 These figures can be accessed here, https://​usda.libr​ary.corn​ell.edu/​conc​ern/​publi​ cati​ons/​c821gj​76b?loc​ale=​en 59 We can see this particularly if we take what are called the “basic commodities” –​ wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk –​which appear in the Farm Bill. 60 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. “Continued Price Instability Questions Reliance on Global Food Markets.” Chapter 3 from the World Disasters Report 2011: Focus on Hunger and Malnutrition. January 1, 2011. 61 Giri, Anil K., Dipak Subedi, Jessica E. Todd, Carrie Litkowski, and Christine Whitt. “Off-​Farm Income a Major Component of Total Income for Most Farm Households in 2019.” Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America 2021, no. 1490-​2021-​1312 (2021). 62 Njuki, Eric. “A Look at Agricultural Productivity Growth in the United States, 1948–​2017.” Resource and Rural Economics Division, Economic Research Service in Research and Science, July 29, 2021. 63 Figures as of July, 2022, can be found here, www.ers.usda.gov/​data-​produ​cts/​food-​ dol​lar-​ser​ies/​docume​ntat​ion.aspx. For a historical approach, as well as discussion of methodology, see Canning, Patrick. A Revised and Expanded Food Dollar Series: A Better Understanding of our Food Costs. No. 1477-​2017-​4009. 2011. 64 For the Farm Bills, see www.govtr​ack.us/​congr​ess/​bills/​97/​s884/​text and www. congr​ess.gov/​bill/​115th-​congr​ess/​house-​bill/​2/​text. 65 SARE-​ USDA. “What Is Sustainable Agriculture: A SARE Sampler of Agricultural Practices.” Available here, www.sare.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​What-​ is-​Sust​aina​ble-​Agri​cult​ure.pdf 66 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Office of Partnership and Public Engagement. Farming Opportunities and Outreach Grant Program. Available here, www.usda.gov/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​docume​nts/​2501-​factsh​eet-​ 2022.pdf 67 Peck, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. “Neoliberalizing Space.” Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 380–​404. 68 Dagnino, Evelina. “Citizenship: A Perverse Confluence.” Development in Practice 17, no. 4–​5 (2007): 549–​556. 69 Coppess, J. “The Conservation Question,Part 1: An Introduction.” Farmdoc Daily (9): 195, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-​Champaign, October 17, 2019. 70 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018: Highlights and Implications, Conservation.” August 20, 2019. 71 Monke, Jim. “Budget Issues That Shaped the 2018 Farm Bill.” Congressional Research Service (2019).

86  The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy 72 National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition. “Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers (Section 2501).” Available at https://​sus​tain​able​agri​cult​ure.net/​publi​cati​ons/​gras​sroo​tsgu​ide/​farm​ing-​opport​ unit​ies/​socia​lly-​disadv​anta​ged-​farm​ers-​prog​ram/​ 73 Khan, Lina. “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox.” Yale Law Journal No. 126 (2017). 74 On the decline of enforcement, see Yale School of Management. “Antitrust Enforcement Data.” 2019. Available at som.yale.edu/​ faculty-​ research-​ centers/​ centers-​initiatives/​thurman-​arnold-​project-​at-​yale/​antitrust-​enforcement-​data-​ 0. For the integration of neoliberal precepts into Anti-​Trust law, see Maurice Strucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the Anti-​ Trust Movement.” 2017. 75 Claire Kelloway and Sarah Miller. Food and Power: Addressing Monopolization in America’s Food System. Open Markets Institute. 2019 76 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Marketing Operations of Dairy Cooperatives.” 2017 77 Kaberline, Brian. “DFA Completes $433M Acquisition, with Feds’ Blessing.” Kansas City Business Journal. May 4, 2020. Department of Justice. “Justice Department Requires Divestitures as Dean Foods Sells Fluid Milk Processing Plants to DFA out of Bankruptcy.” May 1, 2020. 78 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Retail Trends.” Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​food-​mark​ets-​pri​ces/​retail​ing-​whol​esal​ing/​ret​ail-​tre​nds/​ 79 Hendrickson, Mary, Philip H. Howard, and Douglas Constance. “Power, Food and Agriculture: Implications for Farmers, Consumers and Communities.” Division of Applied Social Sciences Working Paper, University of Missouri College of Agriculture, Food & Natural Resource, The Bichler and Nitzan Archives, Toronto, https://​philho​ward​net.files.wordpr​ess.com/​2017/​11/​hend​rick​son-​how​ard-​consta​ nce-​2017-​final-​work​ing-​paper-​nov-​1.pdf' (2017). 80 Salerno, Tania. “Cargill’s Corporate Growth in Times of Crises: How Agro-​ commodity Traders Are Increasing Profits in the Midst of Volatility.” Agriculture and Human Values 34, no. 1 (2017): 211–​222. 81 Strickler, Jordan. “Government Payouts to Make Up 36% Of Farm Income. Forbes. June 10, 2020. 82 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Farm Sector Forecast.” Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​farm-​econ​omy/​farm-​sec​tor-​inc​ome-​finan​ ces/​farm-​sec​tor-​inc​ome-​forec​ast/​ 83 Nigel Key. “Larger Farms and Younger Farmers are More Vulnerable to Risk.” October 22, 2019. 84 Hoppe, Robert. Profit Margin Increases with Farm Ssize. No. 1490-​2016-​128470. USDA-​ERS 2015. 85 Ahearn, Mary Clare, and Doris J. Newton. “Beginning Farmers and Ranchers.” Economic Information Bulletin 53 (2009). 86 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “New and Beginning Farmers.” Available here, www.nass.usda.gov/​Publi​cati​ons/​Hig​hlig​hts/​2020/​cen​ sus-​beginn​ing%20-​farm​ers.pdf 87 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Farmers’ Use of Marking and Production Contracts.” www.ers.usda.gov/​webd​ocs/​publi​cati​ons/​40764/​18614​ _​aer​747a​_​1_​.pdf ?v=​41063 88 The results of the survey can be found here, www.nass.usda.gov/​Publi​cati​ons/​Hig​ hlig​hts/​2016/​LocalFoodsMa​rket​ingP​ract​ices​_​Hig​hlig​hts.pdf

The Crisis Tendency in Market Policy  87 89 2017 Agricultural Census, specifically pages 101 and 102. 90 2017 Agricultural Census, specifically pages 101 and 102. 91 Bourdeau, Catherine. “House Farm Bill Passes with Controversial Food Stamp Changes.” Politico. June 21, 2018. 92 CNBC, “Farmers Are Hurting, but They Still Support Trump and His Trade War —​for Now.” May 19, 2019. 93 United States Trade Representative. “What They Are Saying: United States Prevails in USMCA Dispute on Canadian Dairy Restrictions.” January 4, 2022. The government’s press release on the dispute and reporting can be found here, https://​ustr.gov/​about-​us/​pol​icy-​offi​ces/​press-​off​i ce/​press-​relea​ses/​2022/​janu​ary/​ what-​they-​are-​say​ing-​uni​ted-​sta​tes-​preva​ils-​usmca-​disp​ute-​canad​ian-​dairy-​restr​ icti​ons

4 The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy

Crisis Tendency –​Repeat Policy Failures to Address Climate Change Make Farming Increasingly Unpracticable. The Ongoing Degradation of Nature and an Increase in the Occurrence, as well as Magnitude of Extreme Weather Events, Endanger Inputs that are Necessary for the Future of US Agriculture.

Watching the Tornadoes Go By I was standing outside our home with my mom, dad, a neighborhood friend, and our dog. It was a hot, sticky July summer day, and we had just returned from walking the midway at the county fair. While we thought of retreating inside for some air conditioning, a tornado in the distance caught our attention. The approaching storm did not scare us away. In fact, it is a family tradition that when a tornado is spotted, we go outside to see where it passes. This custom did not arise from some risk-​seeking fancy. The reality is that tornado viewing has quite practical roots. As the story goes, it was my great grandfather who first made his family watch storms, telling them something like, “if the tornado takes out the farm, then it may as well take the family with it.” Over the years, I became familiar with how periodic storms create significant problems. From wrangling with insurance companies over claims to displacing people after their homes are blown to bits, extreme weather events uproot as many trees as they do lives. For this reason, I was particularly shocked to read about how 349 tornadoes swept through the southeastern United States from April 25th to the 28th, 2011, claiming over 300 lives and injuring another 2,775. Over $12 billion in total damages were reported.1 This string of tornadoes was so severe that it received a name –​the 2011 Super Outbreak. Whereas improvements in reporting mechanisms allow scientists to track storms with greater precision than 50 years ago, overall increases in temperature are also correlated to an increased likelihood of tornado formation.2 Not just are more extreme weather events taking place, but they are getting worse, as seen in the 2011 Super Outbreak. Besides more tornadoes, floods have also increased in number and intensity throughout the United States.3 DOI: 10.4324/9781003330066-5

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  89 In this chapter, I connect such events to climate change, as well as to crisis tendencies that are unfolding in the US food and farm system. Agriculture is central, both as a cause and an effect. Or rather, food production uses fossil fuels, which contributes to climate change, while at the same time becoming subject to the increasingly unpredictable effects of volatile weather patterns. Still, what has made climate change turn from a problem into a crisis for the operation of US agriculture has been partisan division and political gridlock. Concerning policy, politicians have done little either to stem climate change or to address its effects. The reason is not that climate change has been recently documented. That releasing carbon dioxide into the Earth’s atmosphere leads to rising temperatures has been known since the nineteenth century. Scientists during the twentieth century concluded by the 1980s that human action was primarily the cause behind the steady rise in the Earth’s temperature that had been occurring since the 1950s.4 Regardless, from Representative Inhofe’s defiant display of a snowball in 2015 on the Senate floor –​which was supposed to reveal that temperatures were not rising –​to former President Trump’s denigrating climate science as “fake science,” US politics has become home to influential leaders resisting to address climate change. Democrats are not free from blame, even as despite recognizing the problem-​turned crisis, they have not managed to find ways to bridge divides. This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I place Habermas’ theory of crisis in conversation with his work on communicative action and democracy. In this section, I challenge criticisms that his framework does not apply to environmental issues. The second section is an application of Habermas’ discourse theory of democracy, particularly with respect to the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other significant environmental legislation that was passed in the 1970s. The third, and last section, details how the consensus surrounding environmental policy –​ however imperfect, particularly with respect to including BIPOC communities in the 1970s –​broke down in the 1980s and 1990s. This section illustrates how partisan gridlock, amid the increasing intensity of problems due to climate change, has impeded policy development.

Environmental Issues –​Including Climate Change –​in Habermas’ Theory of Crisis Habermas, in Legitimation Crisis, directly broached the subject of climate change. As he notes, “if economic growth is necessarily coupled to increasing consumption of energy… then the increasing consumption of energy must result, in the long run, in a rise in global temperature.5” Habermas continues, mentioning that there is “one absolute limitation on growth… namely, the limit on the environment’s ability to absorb heat through energy consumption.6” What is strange in recognizing this “absolute limit to growth,” is how the theme does not reappear in a substantive way elsewhere in Legitimation Crisis. It stands to reason that Habermas believed that changes in technology

90  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy or policy would emerge to address this environmental problem. For instance, in Between Facts and Norms, he calls attention to environmental matters such as species extinction and pollution in the context of public policy discussions.7 Environmental problems in Habermas’ later works arise as issues like any other that actors in civil society and government may resolve. For what could be considered a certain ambivalence, some question if Habermas’ thought is suited for addressing environmental problems. Concerning his earlier work, Gunderson recognizes in Science and Technology as Ideology (1970) and Knowledge and Human Interests (1971) a break with First Generation Frankfurt School theorists. In targeting Adorno and Horkheimer, as well as Marcuse, Habermas criticized as “mystical” their shared condemnation of the human desire to control nature.8 These theorists, according to Habermas, went too far in linking the rise of fascism to human attempts to instrumentalize nature. Essentially, he believed that appropriating nature for human needs is required for self-​preservation and social advancement. For this reason, some critics take Habermas’ version of Critical Theory as anthropocentric, and therefore unfit for engaging debates in environmental ethics.9 These critiques are based on Habermas’ theorization of the public sphere. At its most basic, the public sphere is an idealized set of practices where people communicate with one another without threats. In such a space, people willingly change their minds, as well as persuade others, to build consensus. Preconceived opinions on issues are relaxed to understand the positions of others and deliberate. Accordingly, communication becomes intersubjective, as people recognize one another when reaching a common goal. Some of Habermas’ earlier work locates empirical cases of the public sphere in seventeenth-​century French salons.10 Regardless of its actual existence, the public sphere is a set of rules, or procedures, that can exist anywhere, among any group of people. As such, the theory of the public sphere functions to criticize existing communicative practices for silencing some at the expense of others. Part of this critique concerns the use of instrumental reason –​using people as a means for some end –​which runs contrary to the open, idealized communication practices that the public sphere ought to embody. In this way, Habermas’ thought fits into the Critical Theory tradition; emancipation is possible through working toward engendering communication and mutual understanding among people with different views.11 Communication practices that characterize the public sphere may involve institutions, bridging civil society with the state. Habermas makes this point as he elaborates his discourse theory of democracy. In his discourse theory, Habermas notes how opinions from civil society actors become “influence,” and then “communicative power,” as preferences become policy when people vote into power politicians who are tasked with representing the public’s will.12 Forming the public will through communicating preferences to representatives, ought to embody the inter-​subjective dynamics articulated in

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  91 Habermas’ thought on the public sphere. As a standard, Habermas’ discourse theory of democracy provides a way to judge the dynamics of policy making and civic engagement. Critics of Habermas’ thought on democratic practice are many and well known. To name a few, Fraser faults him for omitting exclusionary gender relationships in his historical work.13 Others believe Habermas’ privileging of consensus diminishes dissent, while also minimizing non-​linguistic, aesthetic modes of engagement.14 As has been attributed to Foucault, Habermas’ commitment to enlightenment principles, namely, that facilitating free and open dialogue will improve social relations, is thought to come at the expense of missing the reality of how power dynamics function.15 Habermas’ critics highlight and help refine central elements in his thought more than refute it. For instance, that dissent is downplayed is not entirely true; discussions of movements appear in his early and late work, particularly with respect to the New Social Movements (NSM).16 Without entering conceptual debates on the nature of NSM,17 Habermas’s offers a way to conceive of movements and how they influence policy makers within advanced capitalist states. The next section of this c­ hapter –​with a focus on the creation of the EPA and the Clean Air Act of 1970 –​offers such an application of Habermas’ thought. Furthermore, the concern with power is methodological. Habermas does not ignore power relations as much as develop a framework for analyzing the potential for inter-​subjective communication to take place. In terms of environmental politics, some have used Habermas’ approach to analyze the potential for developing participatory policy dynamics and inter-​ species communication. Dryzek, for example, calls for actors to reflect on their interests and the role of institutions to resolve tensions that exist in environmental governance. Reflection potentially bridges gaps between experts and the public, maintains diverse viewpoints while striving for consensus, and improves policy making.18 Dryzek’s earlier work notes how administrative and economic pressures need not function as debilitating forces on environmental policy making. Despite the threat of authorities circumventing open and free communication, politicians and activists ought to remain committed to the existence of a public sphere that is autonomous from instrumentalizing economic and administrative imperatives. Elsewhere, advocating for “environmental mediation,” Dryzek applies the principles of communicative action to the possible settling of policy disputes concerning water quality, air pollution, and mining.19 Besides studies on procedure, Hendlin and Ott note the possibility of inter-​species communication. In highlighting the use and interpretation of signs, as well as of gestures, humans and non-​humans share a common universe of meaning.20 For instance, the regularity, as well as intensity of their interactions gives rise to feelings of respect and empathy. What separates humans from non-​humans is the use of linguistic propositions. The point is that Habermas’ framework is not necessarily so anthropocentric; communication is possible across the human/​non-​human divide, which expands our understanding of who, or what, can influence the policy-​making

92  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy process concerning environmental problems. With respect to agriculture, non-​ human agents –​animals, plants, as well as perhaps the air –​communicate with people. Smog, for example, affects our breathing and ability to see. Also, people can perceive change over time and form opinions on what is taking place around them with the intention to influence policy makers. Accordingly, the environment exists neither as an inert object nor as something merely used for gain. On policy making specifically, Dryzek highlights the role of reflexivity and how preferences can be channeled from civil society actors into government. Furthermore, that we see intractable differences, especially in debating climate change, is due to the collective inability to bridge viewpoints. We are reminded that as a “public scientific controversy,” the debate concerning climate change, “is thus not [about] scientific consensus per se; instead, public decisions are enacted through democratic means concerning the prudence of science-​based policy in which the public feels a vested interest.21” As explored in section three, neoliberal capitalism has stymied the public’s ability to reflect on the prudence of climate science by narrowing policy makers’ focus. Meanwhile, the divisive discourse of climate change denial and delay feeds into regional and partisan loyalties, which in turn generates deadlock.

Consensus Building Practices in Environmental Policy Formation The early 1970s saw an explosion in environmental policy creation. For instance, the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970, the Clean Water Act in 1972, Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, or Ocean Dumping Act, also in 1972, and the Endangered Species Act in 1973. In 1970, 20 million people –​approximately 10% of the US’ total population –​celebrated the first Earth Day in public spaces around the country.22 Also that year, President Nixon created the EPA. Two years later, William D. Ruckelshaus, who was the first Administrator of the agency, ordered the cancelation of Federal Registrations of products with Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). DDT, which had been heralded a “miracle” chemical a couple decades before in agricultural and commercial use, was banned.23 The Clean Air Act of 1970, specifically, is credited with generating significant environmental benefits. For instance, according to the EPA and research from the Census Bureau, Federal Highway Commission, and Bureau of Economic Analysis, between 1980 and 2021, as gross domestic product increased 187%, vehicle miles traveled by 111%, energy consumption by 25%, and the US population by 46%, total emissions of six principal air pollutants –​carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen oxides, ground-​level ozone, particle pollution (often referred to as particulate matter), and sulfur oxides –​ dropped by 73%.24 Critical to this change was the Clean Air Act’s enforcement measures, which include a combination of federal standards and state-​level reporting requirements, as well as allowing civil society actors and government officials to file suits against alleged polluters.

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  93 The USDA –​not the EPA –​is the principal institution in charge of agriculture. Still, to focus on the formation of the EPA, as well as laws that fall primarily within that agency’s purview, is relevant for an analysis of the US food and farm system. First, many of the US agricultural system’s critical inputs, for instance, water and air, are regulated by the agency. Specific issues subject to EPA oversight on farms include waste disposal on large-​scale operations, labeling of chemicals, and engine emissions.25 Moreover, the use of pesticides, which is central to EPA’s mission, was once regulated by the USDA. How such a change took place, as one institution relented power to another, reveals a dynamic that is instructive for discussing climate change policy. The 1970s upsurge in environmental policy creation was not spontaneous. President Nixon did not conjure the EPA out of nothing. In terms of roles, the EPA resulted from transferring functions from other, already-​existing agencies, as well as consolidating previously separate organizations. Specifically, the EPA took on the oversight and control of water quality, research on pesticide use, national air pollution monitoring, and the regulation of radiation, among other functions. Institutions from which these roles were taken included the Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Atomic Energy Commission. At the same time, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was established within the Department of Commerce. Similar to the EPA, NOAA came from merging distinct functions from previously independent state institutions. Such changes may strike some as odd, especially as officials with vested interests in established institutions tend to consider other agencies as rivals, even threats.26 While the EPA and NOAA were created by executive order (respectively, Reorganization Orders 3 and 4), the Clean Air Act of 1970 was passed through Congress. Not only did the Act pass, but with a 73-​0 unanimous roll call vote in the Senate (27 abstentions) and 375 to 1 (53 abstentions) in the House of Representatives. Similar to the EPA, this legislation has a history. In 1955, the Air Pollution Control Act was passed, which was followed by the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Air Quality Act of 1967. Whereas the 1955 act focused on providing funds for research, the 1963 and 1967 legislation were distinct in attempting to control pollution.27 Concerning these latter laws, enforcement remained with the states, leading to inconsistent application.28 The impetus for such significant environmental policy change is found in how social, economic, and political dynamics intersected after World War II. First, Post-​World War II economic growth generated an increase in overall consumption patterns, as well as income.29 Economic expansion also placed unforeseen stress on the environment, appearing in the form of smog in cities such as Los Angeles in the early 1950s, as well as in the degradation of public spaces such as national parks.30 Aesthetically, as well as through noxious smells, the environment sent signals that raised concerns among the public. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, which was published in 1962, continued to communicate such sentiments throughout society. From connecting

94  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy pesticide exposure to rising rates of cancer, as well as bird deaths, Carson’s book focuses on the harm caused by synthetic pesticides, especially DDT, on animals, waterways, and humans. Furthermore, Carson used her skills as a former researcher for the Fish and Wildlife Service to translate scientific knowledge to the public in an accessible, relatable way. Specifically, her work was first published as a serial in the New Yorker. Carson also promoted the work in interviews on news programs.31 Until she succumbed to cancer in 1964, Carson routinely publicly called out chemical companies that produced pesticides.32 In reaction, chemical companies sued her, as well as attempted to defame her character by calling her a “spinster” and “communist.”33 Far from immediately generating consensus, such opposition displayed the divisions that existed concerning Carson’s views. Regardless, key leaders began to champion Silent Spring’s message, including social movements. Certain intellectuals, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, as well as suburban women’s groups, began to demand government action with respect to the environment in the 1960s. The engagement of suburban, white middle-​class women resulted from the harm that Carson described in their neighborhoods and surrounding areas.34 Younger, more radical student groups who were affiliated with the New Left also became involved, but later and not to the same extent as their white suburban allies. People of color remained distant, if not alienated throughout the mobilizations. Some criticisms have noted that the mainly white-​, middle-​ class-​ led emergent environmental movement failed to acknowledge the experiences of communities of color.35 As noted by the Arab American activist who helped organize Earth Day events, Gary Nabhan, lead organizers at the time lacked the language and ability to engage people of color.36 Evolving out from the principally white-​led conservation movement, environmentalism in the 60s struggled to build bridges with the parallel struggles for Black power and Indigenous rights. Still, Nabhan’s discussion highlights how the movement did not shut out people of color as much start from a problematic starting point. Politicians increasingly took notice of the growing movement. In the same year as Silent Spring was published, President Kennedy convened the White House Conference on Conservation and created the “Land Conservation Fund.” Kennedy announced these plans within a special message to the US Congress, on March 1, 1962, with an expressed need for concerted, governmental action on environmental problems.37 Environmental priorities were expanded and subsequently incorporated into President Johnson’s plans for the Great Society. In what has been called “New Conservation,” Johnson oversaw the passing of the Wilderness Act of 1964, the allocation of 35 new areas for parks, and the creation of nine taskforces that were charged with addressing environmental problems. Whereas his Presidency was overshadowed by his efforts to confront poverty and the Vietnam War, between 1963 and 1968, Johnson signed into law approximately 300 environmental measures, more than the preceding 187 years combined.38

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  95 Other political champions on environmental policy emerged at this time, including Edmund Muskie and Gaylord Nelson. Muskie publicly presented environmental problems as critical social issues, first in the 1950s when running to serve as the governor of Maine. Following his time as governor, Muskie became one of Maine’s two senators and served on the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution that regularly held hearings on air and water pollution.39 In addition to crafting the 1963 Clean Air Act, Muskie was the author of the Solid Waste Disposal Act in 1965, and a leader in passing the Clean Air Act amendments in 1967 and 1970.40 Nelson began environmental advocacy first as Wisconsin’s governor in the 1950s. When governor, Nelson’s efforts included creating the Outdoor Recreation Action Program.41 While US Senator, Nelson was the first to introduce bills to ban the use of DDT, mandate fuel efficiency standards in cars, control strip-​mining, and prohibit the use of Agent Orange.42 In 1963, Nelson wrote a letter to President Kennedy to advise on environmental policy. Nelson’s advice, including a recognition of Carson’s book as an effective tool, intended to get President Kennedy “to shake people, organizations and legislators hard enough to gain strong support for a comprehensive national, state and local long-​range plan for our resources.43” Unsatisfied with the slow progress of his Congressional colleagues, Nelson searched out new tactics, such as teach-​ins, to communicate the need for policy change and mobilize people. Other civil society actors also became part of the movement. Connecting the use of the toxic, defoliate chemical Agent Orange to a war that was losing popularity, helped galvanize public support among anti-​war activists.44 In this way, the public’s feeling of having a vested interest in environmental issues was triggered. Meanwhile, Ralph Nader, who had earned a positive public reputation by challenging General Motors, also began forwarding environmental causes in the late 1960s. In 1968, Nader and his group of law student activists –​known as “Nader’s Raiders” –​began investigating the impact environmental issues on the public. Their study –​Vanishing Air –​focused on the need for more government regulation and the corporate abuse of power. Strategically, the report was published in 1970 around the time of the first Earth Day.45 These actors, in different ways, effectively communicated their preferences to policy makers. One example of such bridge building across the state-​society divide is found in the number of young people who left the streets for the offices of the EPA. Zealous, activist-​minded people staffed the agency in its early years, combining governmental power with values and ambition.46 How President Nixon came to support environmental policy displays another way that society and government were bridged. While the former President was not an environmentalist by any stretch of the imagination, he was concerned with his political career. Specifically, Nixon endorsed positions out of fear for Senator Muskie’s growing influence,47 believing environmentalism more of a fad than a movement with staying power.48 Nixon also believed that the EPA would follow the government’s lead, mainly from the Council on

96  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy Environmental Quality (CEQ). As the Council was to provide accounting of the federal government’s major environment projects, and Nixon was tasked with appointing its members, the President believed that he could control the EPA through the CEQ. Misreading the institutional relationship, the relative autonomy between the CEQ and EPA left enough lateral for officials in the latter to work independently. Regardless, Nixon’s qualified embrace of environmentalism shows a cautious adaptation of his political leanings to accord with the public’s preferences. Business leaders also were moved to support environment policy change. While opposition in the early 1960s was fierce, seen particularly in how groups denounced Carson’s work, business interests gradually acquiesced to an increase in government intervention later. Particularly with the creation of the EPA, business leaders adopted the position that the new agency was not an expansion of the federal government, as much as an organizational reshuffling.49 Part of the reason for this change in perspective was that Nixon tasked Robert Ash, President of the Defense Contractor, Litton Industries, to design the nascent federal environmental agency. Ash used his business experience to communicate to others in the private sector how the agency would simplify business–​government relations, winning them over in the process.50 The mandated installation of the catalytic converter into automobiles illustrates one additional, however imperfect case of consensus building in environmental politics. In general, catalytic converters make less toxic the environmentally damaging gases that cars emit. While the technology for this exhaust system device had been initially developed in the early twentieth century, the 1970 Clean Air Act’s call to cut emissions pressed legislators to act. Businesses at first resisted, waiting to see if Congress would soften its position.51 Yet, as Dauvergne notes, “the regulatory changes created incentives for automakers to research, design, and market cars with better environmental technologies, as some firms have seen potential competitive advantages in them, the advances themselves have lowered resistance to the new rules.52” Business interests, instead of viewing regulation as a barrier, through the catalytic converter, understood the change as an opportunity. Accordingly, companies began to compete over who could create the most environment-​friendly automobile. The public became interested as well, particularly in wanting to purchase smaller automobiles that were fuel efficient. While not pleasing everyone, namely, some in the EPA who sought more stringent pollution requirements, the introduction of the catalytic converter exemplifies a way that business, economic, and public interests evolved to find common ground while still retaining certain instrumental motives. The creation of the EPA, as well as the passing of critical pieces of environmental legislation, displayed a process over time of consensus making. The first Earth Day took place with around 20 million participants, assembling in places such as college campuses and parks, to protest, listen to music, and write letters to congress people. These gatherings neither happened

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  97 spontaneously, nor were unexpected. Building to that point, senators held hearings, while intellectuals and researchers, such as Rachel Carson, wrote books and defended their arguments publicly. The women’s and the anti-​ war movements pushed environmental demands, albeit for different motives. Business interests frequently resisted any kind of government regulation. Even the private sector accepted the adoption of the catalytic converter, as well as the EPA’s existence. Finding common ground on environmental policy did not emerge after people came together to speak with one another. Habermas’ theory of communicative action, with his discussion of the public sphere, may lead us to think of such caricatures. Still, we can speak of consensus because different actors, many who were not in agreement in the early 1960s, came to recognize one another in some way and see their mutual benefit from cooperating. Even President Nixon became involved, never to the extent as, say, Senator Muskie, but enough so that the Republican worked in environmental policy with others. Overall, this moment shows in terms of policy how different actors can build consensus, while at the same time remaining distinct.

Neoliberalism and Dissensus in the Failure to Confront Climate Change The consensus that was forged around environmental policy in the early 1970s did not last. Disagreement is not necessarily a problem in policy creation, as arguing can lead some to learn and change. To the contrary, taking hold in discussions pertaining to the environment in the latter half of the 1970s and through the 1980s is a form of dissensus that blocks communication. There are multiple reasons for this change, including the extension of instrumentalizing, economic logics into the area of environmental policy. Additionally, regional, partisan divisions removed environmental politics from public debate, stymying the development of an adequate response to the dangers posed by climate change to the US agrarian system. To fault economic logics –​particularly in the form of neoliberalism –​for contributing to policy failures does not mean that they were absent from environmental policy debates in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, Ruckelhaus promoted the use of economic studies and assessments to hold polluters accountable.53 The discipline of environmental economics starts years before the EPA came into existence, with researchers calculating the costs and benefits of pollution in places around the country. From the time of the EPA’s emergence, some debates centered on not only the cost of regulation, but if the environment could be monetarized at all. Connected to this philosophical discussion on the nature of regulation was whether applying and enforcing uniform standards ought to be the norm, or whether market solutions, which tend not to be coercive, were better. The former position was held by some environmentalists, many of whom supported the EPA at the time of its creation and who were connected to social movements. Within the EPA, Ruckelshaus held somewhat

98  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy of an ambivalent position. Businesses, while acquiescing to the creation of EPA, viewed regulation with skepticism for potentially incurring costs. Neoliberal economic thought changed this debate on the place of economics in environmental policy. The use of microeconomic industry reports is one example. “Microeconomic industry studies,” as Halverson notes, “perpetuated a common error in undercounting or ignoring the likely benefits from increasing environmental protection —​such as new jobs generated by the pollution control industry or added efficiency through the closure and absorption of inefficient firms.54” In this style of analysis, the economy is represented as primarily composed on individual, competing firms. Milton Friedman, one of the lead figures in the Chicago School of Neoliberal thought, made such principles central to his understanding of economics.55 Accordingly, instead of taking a macro-​level approach that focuses on dynamics at the industry level, or throughout the country across different enterprises, EPA officials studied the potential effects of regulation on particular businesses. This privileging of “micro-​foundations” views the economy as made up of individual firms that calculate risks, with the government representing a barrier to productivity. Additionally, the EPA increasingly placed market-​oriented practices into regulation, distancing the government from adopting and enforcing uniform standards. Two changes are pertinent in this regard –​the introduction of “offsets” and “bubbling.” These shifts first appear in the Ford administration, which Carter continued. Part of the motive behind these changes was that states struggled to comply with the stipulations of the Clean Air Act. Businesses, as well, were raising concerns over the cost of compliance. As a result, regulators searched for flexible means to enforce the law. Concerning offsets, companies that hoped to expand and construct new facilities, were allowed to do so if they reduced emissions at a previously constructed installation. The idea was first proposed by the EPA’s Region IX office, which covered California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Hawaii. With “bubbling,” companies were allowed to select an area where their firms operated, choosing where and how to reduce emissions within that space. The EPA set standards for the area, and if the businesses met that limit, then they would be considered as in compliance.56 Both policy innovations empower businesses. The introduction of the catalytic converter also did, as businesses competed with one another to produce a device that would reduce emissions to accord with regulations. Yet, what is key with the case of mandating the use of the catalytic converter is how introducing and developing the new technology came about more as a compromise than a business-​driven solution. In terms of offsets and bubbling, these innovations came from businesses instrumentally seeking profit as government officials struggled to enforce the law. Neoliberal economic principles continued to enter environmental policy discussions in the 1980s, particularly during the Reagan administration. One driving force was the growing influence of free trade think tanks, namely, the Heritage, Cato, and Koch foundations, which regularly gained access to

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  99 officials.57 Their approach to regulation was not reform, but removal. That government was the problem, not the solution, was a mantra that Reagan promoted on the campaign trail, as well as a dominant ideological perspective within his administration. This ideological view became personified in Anne Gorsuch, who was appointed as the administrator of the EPA. In terms of dismantling the agency, Reagan, with Gorsuch taking the lead, tried to weaken pollution standards across industries, slashing the EPA budget.58 These efforts were met with bipartisan resistance. Perhaps unintentionally, Reagan’s drive to deregulate pushed both parties further to embrace market solutions to environmental problems as a way to compromise. Or rather, with the credible threat that some Republicans and their pro-​business allies would undo environmental regulations, allowing flexibility appeared as a prudent compromise. In the 1980s and 1990s, we find a full-​fledged embrace of cap-​and-​trade policy. This policy, derived from its predecessor, “bubbling,” appears in the effort to deal with acid rain in the early 1990s. Acid rain, in the 1980s and 1990s, was linked to the destruction of forests and the contamination of lakes, resulting in massive fish kills. The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments limited sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions –​the principal pollutants that contribute to acid rain. Companies, in the event of cutting more than what was allowed, received EPA-​certified credits to sell to firms that were out of compliance. Subsequent Democrat and Republican administrations continued the acid rain cap-​and-​trade program. Reductions in SO2 and NOX have been observed since the 1990s, as have the incidences of acid rain. Still, it is unclear if cap-​and-​trade policy incentives, or the introduction of the catalytic converter in the 1970s, are primarily responsible.59 Another question is if technological remedies that reduced acid rain –​such as introducing scrubbers within coal-​burning plants or switching to cleaner burning fuels –​would have been adopted without the market-​driven program. Meanwhile, one troubling factor with the acid rain cap-​and-​trade program is how geographic reductions have been uneven geographically. Specifically, companies have reduced emissions in certain areas, and not in others where contamination continues, and where levels of premature mortality have risen.60 The introduction of cap-​ and-​ trade, furthermore, coincides with the embrace of a risk management approach to environmental governance. Another divergence from pushing enforcement through applying uniform standards, risk management accepts a problem as given, devising ways to mitigate its effects. Such a method represents a short-​term way to approach social problems and public policy. Moreover, the concept of risk management is emblematic of neoliberal reform, especially in the latter’s emphasis on individuality and embrace of privatization. In terms of agriculture policy specifically, risk management appears in crop insurance. The program began in the New Deal, serving as part of the government’s set of farm policies, along with parity pricing initiatives.

100  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy Given its emergence at this time, some believe that the program escaped neoliberalization.61 What complicates this depiction of crop insurance is the introduction of public–​private partnerships into the policy, mainly in the 1980 Farm Bill. Such partnerships, as David Harvey has analyzed with respect to urban development projects, involve the state, or rather, the taxpayer, taking on the risk as private sector companies profit.62 In these arrangements, the state offers businesses financial support if losses are experienced. With respect to crop insurance, this occurs with the state subsidizing farmer premium payments. The program expanded significantly during the neoliberal era. Somewhat marginal before the 1980 reform, as of 2018, the crop insurance program has become the second-​largest outlay within the Farm Bill.63 Moreover, whereas the partial privatization of crop insurance takes place in 1980s, it is the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reauthorization Act of 1994 that triggered the real increase in participation. The reason is that the government made eligibility for accessing direct payments and federal disaster assistance contingent on having crop insurance.64 Since the expansion of crop insurance in the early 1990s, there have been no serious reforms to the program despite a series of noted issues. For instance, not only do most subsidies enter the pockets of the largest operators,65 but crop insurance is also linked to the inefficient use of resources such as water.66 Furthermore, the producers of commodity crops, such as corn and wheat, tend to purchase the bulk of insurance.67 Part of the reason is that inter-​row planting, as well as more diversified forms of growing different kinds of crops, are difficult to measure and therefore harder to insure. The program also encourages farmers to plant in risky places, prompting some to repeat failures instead of adapting.68 This raises the question if the program counts as a form of insurance at all, as crop insurance involves speculative, not absolute risk.69 For instance, if farmers access crop insurance to plant in places that they know will usually flood when it rains, then the risk they take is calculated. Obversely, an absolute risk –​which standard forms of insurance cover –​exists if a flood would endanger places where a farmer always plants, or their house. Far from a mitigating measure to confront the negative effects of climate change, the current design of crop insurance, in some ways, makes them worse. How climate change affects growing patterns will lead to further resources dedicated to crop insurance. Forecasts as to where crops will grow, such as corn, show significant geographic changes in the next few decades.70 Other research sees corn, soy, and wheat yields falling, which will cause prices to rise, and therefore, a rise in taxpayer-​backed crop insurance premium payments.71 In dairy, excessive heat is linked to a decrease in milk production, which similarly could trigger insurance payments.72 Some note that increases in crop insurance payments are already taking place, with loses of $27 billion having been insured over the last 20 years due to climate change.73 Regardless, politicians remain committed to crop insurance, despite its questionable impact and flawed manner of distribution.

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  101 Meanwhile, US agriculture has become a primary source for greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). According to the EPA, agriculture accounts for 11% of emissions.74 Actual emissions are higher, if farms are not viewed as isolated units, but part of the larger food system that includes firms involved in processing and trucks that transport commodities. At such a systemic level, some believe that the food and farm system’s share is somewhere around 30%.75 Overall, agricultural inputs are increasingly threatened by climate change, which presents direct challenges to the reproduction of US agriculture. Take water for instance. Directly, climate change affects supplies through altering the water cycle, as rising temperatures lead to higher levels of evaporation. Also, groundwater sources, such as aquifers, account for 51% of drinking water in the United States and approximately half of the water used for irrigation (surface water accounts for the rest).76 The amount of water used in irrigation rose steadily from 1950 to 1980 before plateauing.77 Even as use has plateaued, the aquifers from which they extract are not being replenished. This problem is national –​64% of wells across the country report a decline in water levels over the last two decades.78 Furthermore, 22% of groundwater sources –​including aquifers –​report contamination.79 Surface water sources are worse, with over 50% of rivers and lakes in the United States considered “impaired” and therefore too polluted for humans and animals.80 A critical contributor to contamination is agriculture runoff, which is known as a “nonsource point of pollution.” Another threat comes from the use of natural gas to pump water out of the ground. Especially with respect to irrigation in the Midwest –​in states such as Nebraska and Kansas –​pumps use this climate change-​inducing fossil fuel extensively.81 Pesticides represent one of the principal sources of GHG emissions within agriculture. For example, pesticide use in US agriculture grew exponentially from 1960 to 1980 before stabilizing since 2008.82 Fossil fuels are expended in the production of pesticides and herbicides.83 Similarly, nitrous dioxide (NO2), which is a critical greenhouse gas and found in fertilizers, is released into the atmosphere when used in excess and not taken up by crops. Additionally, enteric fermentation, or rather, how cows, sheep, pigs, and goats emit methane in the process of digestion, is the second leading agricultural catalyst driving climate change, with manure management listed as third.84 Whereas every animal operation disposes of manure, confined animal feeding operations must deal with and store waste in large, often toxic amounts. As much is part of establishing “manure lagoons,” which are large, outdoor pits for animal excrement. Central to this development is how concentration has increased in agriculture, with fewer farms producing more food since World War II.85 Since 1990, while agriculture’s share of GHG emissions has risen –​from 551.9 MMT (metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) to 594.7 –​manure management has seen the largest increase, from 34.8 MMT, to 59.6.86 Ruminants may not be the problem, as much as the kind –​and scale –​ of operation where they live.

102  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy As agriculture’s share of GHG emissions rise, partisan divisions along regional, geographical lines, became more pronounced in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The PBS Documentary, Climate of Doubt, notes how particular Republican incumbents lost their primaries, in part, due to groups that made climate skepticism a critical issue. The politicization of climate change policy, however, began years earlier. Regional attitudinal differences, mainly in the Western and Southern United States, as well as individual political entrepreneurs within the Republican Party, began to articulate this position in the 1970s.87 The change coincides with the dwindling presence of Democrats holding political office in regions such as the South.88 Meanwhile, neoliberal reforms joined pro-​business with anti-​environmental sentiments.89 As a result, the issue of working to address climate change became associated with the Democrats, taking the form of a positive feedback loop among party leaders and their constituents. Conversely, interests in the fossil fuel industry allied with Republicans to oppose policies that would confront climate change. Certain farmer groups, such as the Farm Bureau, connected freedom to the use of fossil fuels.90 Outside of agriculture, climate science was represented as a threat to American values and ways of life.91 Especially in the 1990s, actors on the right championed a rhetoric based on denying the validity of climate science. Overtime, their discourse changes, moving from denial to delay.92 Critical to this change was how corporations such as ExxonMobil invested into right-​wing think tanks, such as the Global Climate Coalition, to spread doubt as to whether human activity contributed to climate change. Within the rhetoric concerning delay, human activity is believed to have contributed to climate change. Yet, proponents hold that too much damage has been done to change course, and that only corporations have enough power to act meaningfully.93 Across rhetorical shifts, policy makers are considered impotent, if not irrelevant. Groups on the left wavered or became divided while rightwing actors formed coalitions to question climate change and its effects. For instance, in harkening back to a uniform standard approach when confronting climate change, the Clinton administration pushed for a BTU (British Thermal Unit) tax in 1993. As part of the administration’s first budget proposal, the tax would have been placed on particular fuel sources, namely, coal, oil, natural gas, ethanol, and methanol. Renewables, such as solar, were exempt. While championed by Vice President Al Gore, as well as various environmental groups, bipartisan opposition in the Senate backed by farmer and manufacturer lobbyists stopped the tax idea from advancing.94 Shifting course, Clinton embraced a cap-​and-​trade approach in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. An international initiative based on the same logic as the acid rain program, the Protocol had Global North countries set target GHG emission restrictions, while also establishing a market to buy and sell carbon credits if a government cut more than what was targeted. Even with the market imperative, this initiative failed to pass in the Senate due to opposition from Republicans and fossil fuel interests.95

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  103 The Bush administration continued the policy stalemate with respect to confronting climate change. Publicly expressing climate science skepticism, Bush hosted a 15-​country conference of the largest GHG emitters in 2007. Met with doubts as to his administration’s sincerity in dealing with the issue, in part due to allegations of tampering with scientific documents dealing with the scale of the problem,96 the Bush government gave businesses latitude concerning the use of fossil fuels.97 Policy stalemate remained the norm concerning climate change through the Obama and Trump administrations. Similar to the early years of the Clinton administration in terms of ambition, the Obama government hoped to pass a cap-​and-​trade bill –​the American Clean Energy and Security Act –​ in 2009. The proposal, akin to the Kyoto Protocol in terms of design, went nowhere as Democrats from states rich in fossil fuels refused to endorse the legislation after it passed the House.98 Opposition from legislators to confront climate change remained throughout Obama’s term, which prompted him to issue executive orders.99 Without becoming law, the subsequent Trump administration had no problem in ending many Obama-​era orders.100 The back and forth that took place surrounding the Keystone Pipeline, with Obama halting its construction, then Trump, overturning his predecessor’s order, illustrates a high-​ profile instance of partisan division leading to no policy change concerning climate change. Carbon markets, without a cap or mandated reduction, provide polluters still more leeway and opportunities to generate inequalities in the name of “carbon neutrality.” Working with the concept of off-​sets, banks pay producers to sequester carbon according to certain practices, with credits that may subsequently be sold to others. Private banks, globally, have been becoming involved in the trade, as the Biden administration is developing proposals that also embrace this market-​based solution. The Growing Climate Solutions Act of 2021, in this way, features a state-​sanctioned manner whereby farmers gain accreditation concerning reforestation, energy generation, wetland restoration, among other practices.101 Criticisms of such policy designs come up against the uneven distribution of pollution that offsetting allows, as well as the possibility of large-​scale, financial actors entering and dominating the market.102

Conclusion: California and the Crisis of Reproduction The crisis tendency concerning climate change is placed in sharp relief through noting the central place of California agriculture in the US agricultural system. For instance, California’s farms account for 99% of artichokes, walnuts, grapes, and raisins, as well as 97% of kiwis and plums, 95% of celery and garlic, 90% of broccoli, 89% of cauliflower, 71% of spinach, 70% of lettuce, and 69% of carrots that are harvested in the United States.103 Over a third of the country’s vegetables and two-​thirds of the country’s fruits and nuts are grown in California. The state leads the country in cash farm receipts,

104  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy accounting for over 13% of the nation’s total agricultural value.104 California agriculture, meanwhile, is ravaged by wildfires and water shortages. At the time of this writing, some have discussed piping water from the Mississippi river into the state for the people, as well as for farms. California agriculture, which decades of consolidation have made central to the US agrarian system, is now in peril due to the adverse effects of climate change. This chapter does not provide a way to deal with the challenges faced by Californian agriculture (more on that is in the conclusion). Instead, I lay out how climate change inaction has developed. Moreover, the chapter articulates, following a Habermasian framework, how civil society actors and politicians managed in the 1970s to work together and confront environmental problems in meaningful ways. Posing the moment of consensus, albeit qualified with respect to involving people of color, the subsequent period of dissensus illustrates why climate change failed to be addressed. The focus in the latter part of the chapter, additionally, illustrates how agriculture specifically is threatened. From water contamination to changing dynamics in crop production, climate change threatens inputs that are central to agriculture, making food production increasingly difficult. Critical to this ongoing nature of this crisis is communication, that is, failures to bridge groups in society, as well as politicians in government. Overall, the climate crisis is not simply about water, soil, and air, but about politicians failing to address problems. Habermas’ framework allows for problems to exist as no system is immune from them. Crisis enters discussions in terms of politics, or rather, that groups fail to address problems, allowing them to fester. Neoliberal reform, meanwhile, has made problems worse by providing short-​term, micro-​level solutions. The conclusion attempts to stake ways to challenge ongoing troubling political dynamics with respect to environmental policy, as well as in other policy areas.

Notes 1 Erdman, Jonathan. “The April 2011 Super Outbreak: 16 Things We’ll Never Forget.” April 27, 2022. The Weather Channel. 2 Horton, Jake and Esme Stallard. “US Tornadoes: Is Climate Change to Blame?” December 13, 2021. BBC; Figures on tornadoes can be found at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website, www.ncei.noaa.gov/​ acc​ess/​mon​itor​ing/​mont​hly-​rep​ort/​tornad​oes/​202​113 3 Wing, Oliver, Carolyn Kousky, Jeremy Porter, and Paul Bates. “New Flood Maps Show US Damage Rising 26% in Next 30 Years Due to Climate Change Alone, and the Inequity Is Stark.” January 31, 2022. The Conversation; EPA. “Climate Change Indicators: Coastal Flooding.” www.epa.gov/​clim​ate-​ind​icat​ors/​clim​ate-​cha​nge-​ ind​icat​ors-​coas​tal-​flood​ing 4 The Guardian. “When Did We Discover Man-​Made Climate Change.” March 2, 2011. 5 Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, (2005) 1973, 41. 6 Habermas, Legitimation, 42.

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  105 7 Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. New York: John Wiley, 1996, 381. 8 Gunderson, Ryan. “Habermas in Environmental Thought: Anthropocentric Kantian or Forefather of Ecological Democracy?.” Sociological Inquiry 84, no. 4 (2014): 626–​653. 9 Brulle, Robert J. “Habermas and Green Political Thought: Two Roads Converging.” Environmental Politics 11, no. 4 (2002): 1–​20. 10 Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: MIT press, 1991. 11 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, xli. 12 Habermas, Jürgen. “Three Normative Models of Democracy: Liberal, Republican, Procedural.” In Questioning Ethics, pp. 145–​154. London: Routledge, 2002. 13 Fraser, Nancy. “What’s Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender.” New German Critique 35 (1985): 97–​131. 14 Benhabib, Seyla. “The Embattled Public Sphere: Hannah Arendt, Juergen Habermas and Beyond.” Theoria 44, no. 90 (1997): 1–​24. 15 King, Matthew. “Clarifying the Foucault—​ Habermas Debate: Morality, Ethics, and Normative Foundations’.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, no. 3 (2009): 287–​314. 16 Habermas, Jürgen. Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 17 Pichardo, Nelson A. “New Social Movements: A Critical Review.” Annual Review of Sociology (1997): 411–​430. 18 Dryzek, John S., and Jonathan Pickering. “Deliberation as a Catalyst for Reflexive Environmental Governance.” Ecological Economics 131 (2017): 353–​360. 19 Dryzek, John. “Designs for Environmental Discourse Revisited: A Greener Administrative State?.” In Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State (2nd ed). Peterborough: Broadview, 2004, 10. 20 Hendlin, Yogi Hale, and Konrad Ott. “Habermas on Nature: A Postnormal Reading Between Moral Intuitions and Theoretical Restrictiveness.” Environmental Ethics 38, no. 2 (2016): 202–​203. 21 Crick, Nathan, and Joseph Gabriel. “The Conduit Between Lifeworld and System: Habermas and the Rhetoric of Public Scientific Controversies.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 40, no. 3 (2010), 203. 22 Library of Congress. “Today in History, April 22nd.” Available at www.loc.gov/​ item/​today-​in-​hist​ory/​april-​22/​ 23 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “DDT Ban Takes Effect.” Press Release, December 31, 1973. Available at https://​arch​ive.epa.gov/​epa/​about​epa/​ddt-​ban-​ takes-​eff​ect.html 24 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “Air Quality –​National Summary.” Available at www.epa.gov/​air-​tre​nds/​air-​qual​ity-​natio​nal-​summ​ary 25 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “Laws and Regulations that Apply to Your Agricultural Operation by Farm Activity.” Available at www.epa.gov/​ agri​cult​ure/​laws-​and-​regu​lati​ons-​apply-​your-​agric​ultu​ral-​operat​ion-​farm-​activ​ ity#Live​stoc​kPou​ltry​Aqua​cult​ure 26 Moe, Terry M. “Vested Interests and Political Institutions.” Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015): 277–​318. 27 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “Evolution of the Clean Air Act.” Available at www.epa.gov/​clean-​air-​act-​overv​iew/​evolut​ion-​clean-​air-​act

106  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy 28 Halvorson, Charles. Valuing Clean Air: The EPA and the Economics of Environmental Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 20–​28. 29 Vonyó, Tamás. “Post-​ war Reconstruction and the Golden Age of Economic Growth.” European Review of Economic History 12, no. 2 (2008): 221–​241. 30 Kline, Benjamin. First Along the River: A Brief History of the US Environmental Movement. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022, 73–​84. 31 NRDC. “The Story of Silent Spring.” Available at www.nrdc.org/​stor​ies/​story-​sil​ ent-​spr​ing 32 McKie, Robin. “Rachel Carson and the Legacy of Silent Spring.” May 26, 2012. The Guardian. 33 Souder, William. On a Farther Shore: The Life and Legacy of Rachel Carson. New York: Broadway Books, 2012. 34 Rome, Adam. “ ‘Give Earth a Chance’: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties.” The Journal of American History 90, no. 2 (2003): 525–​554. 35 Bullard, Robert D. Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality. Oxford: Routledge, 2018. 36 Nabhan, Gary Paul. “Earth Day at 50: Its Early Role in Sowing Social Justice.” April 22, 2020. Whole Terrain: A Journal of Reflective Environmental Practice. 37 The American Presidency Project. “Special Message to the Congress on Conservation. (John F Kennedy).” March 1, 1962. Available at www.pre​side​ncy. ucsb.edu/​docume​nts/​spec​ial-​mess​age-​the-​congr​ess-​conse​rvat​ion 38 Melosi, Martin V. “Environmental Policy.” In A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd Edited by Mitchell Lerner. Hoboken: Wiley-​ Blackwell. 2012: 187–​210 39 Goldstein, Joel K. “Edmund S. Muskie: The Environmental Leader and Champion.” Me. L. Rev. 67 (2014): 226. 40 Blomquist, Robert F. “Nature’s Statesman: The Enduring Environmental Law Legacy of Edmund S. Muskie of Maine.” William & Mary Law and Policy Review. 24 (2000): 233. 41 Jones, Clayton R. “Gaylord Nelson, Father of Earth Day: Bridging the Gap from Conservation to Environmentalism.” PhD diss., 2009. 42 Rome, Adam. “The Genius of Earth Day,” Environmental History 15 (April 2010): 194–​205. 43 Nelson, Gaylord, Susan M. Campbell, and Paul A. Wozniak. Beyond Earth Day: Fulfilling the Promise. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002. 44 Lewis, Jack. “The Birth of the EPA.” EPA Journal.11, No 9. 1985: 6–​12 45 The Pop History Dig. “Nader’s Raiders: 1969–​1974.” Available at https://​pophis​ tory​dig.com/​top​ics/​nad​ers-​raid​ers-​1968-​1974/​ 46 The Guardian. “The Origins of the EPA.” Washington DC: EPA Historical Publication. Spring, 1992. 47 Rinde, Mei. “Richard Nixon and the Rise of American Environmentalism.” June 2, 2017. Distillations. 48 Williams, Dennis C. The Guardian: EPA’s Formative Years, 1970–​ 1973. US Environmental Protection Agency, 1993, 19. 49 Halverson, Valuing Clean Air, 45. 50 Ash, Robert. “Memorandum for the President: Federal Organization for Environmental Protection.” April 29, 1970. 51 Williams, EPA’s Formative Years, 19.

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  107 52 Dauvergne, Peter. The Shadows of Consumption: Consequences for the Global Environment. Cambridge: MIT press, 2010, 45. 53 Halverson, Valuing Clean Air, 53. 54 Halverson, Valuing Clean Air, 81. 55 See ­ chapters 1 and 2 from Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 56 Halverson, Valuing Clean Air, 113–​121. 57 Rosner, David. “Climate Denial and a (Hopeful) Lesson from History.” The Milbank Quarterly 96, no. 3 (2018): 430. 58 Little, Amanda. “A Look Back at Reagan’s Environmental Record.” June 11, 2004. The Grist. 59 Rastogi, Nina Shen. “Whatever Happened to Acid Rain.” August 18, 2009. Slate. com. 60 Chan, H. Ron, B. Andrew Chupp, Maureen L. Cropper, and Nicholas Z. Muller. The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Allowances: What Have We Learned from the Grand Policy Experiment?. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 2015: 1–​43. 61 Hamilton, Shane. “Crop Insurance and The New Deal Roots of Agricultural Financialization in the United States.” Enterprise & Society 21, no. 3 (2020): 648–​680. 62 Harvey, David. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism.” Geografiska Annaler. Human Geography 71, no. 1 (1989): 3–​17. 63 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Farm Bill Spending.” Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​farm-​econ​omy/​farm-​commod​ity-​pol​icy/​ farm-​bill-​spend​ing/​ 64 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Crop Insurance at a Glance.” Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​farm-​practi​ces-​man​agem​ent/​risk-​man​agem​ ent/​crop-​insura​nce-​at-​a-​gla​nce/​ 65 Smith, Vincent H., Joseph W. Glauber, and Barry K. Goodwin. “Time to Reform the US Federal Agricultural Insurance Program.” (2017). 66 Fullerton, Don, Julian Reif, Megan Konair, Tatyana Deryuniga. “Crop Insurance May be Good for Farmers, but Always for the Environment.” June 28, 2018. The Conversation. 67 Motamed, Mesbah, Ashley Hungerford, Stephanie Rosch, Erik O’Donoghue, Matthew MacLachlan, Gregory Astill, Jerry Cessna, and Joseph Cooper. “Federal Risk Management Tools for Agricultural Producers: An Overview.” (2018). 68 McKenzie, Jessie. “What’s if We Eliminated Crop Insurance Altogether?” September 19, 2019. The Counter. 69 Dolan, Ed. The Strange Economics of Crop Insurance. May 15, 2018. Niskanen Center. 70 Gray, Ellen. “Global Climate Change Impact on Crops Expected Within 10 Years, NASA Study Finds.” November 2, 2021. NASA. 71 Union of Concerned Scientists. “Climate Change and Agriculture: A Perfect Storm for the Twenty First Century.” March 20, 2019. Union of Concerned Scientists. 72 Key, Nigel, Stacy Sneeringer, and David Marquardt. “Climate Change, Heat Stress, and US Dairy Production.” USDA-​ERS Economic Research Report 175 (2014).

108  The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy 73 Garthwaite, Josie. “Global Warming Increased U.S. Crop Insurance Losses by $27 billion in 27 years, Stanford Study Finds.” August 4, 2021. Stanford News. 74 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Available here, www.epa.gov/​ghgem​issi​ons/​sour​ces-​gre​enho​use-​gas-​ emissi​ons 75 Lehner, Peter H., and Nathan A. Rosenberg. “The Climate Crisis and Agriculture.” Environmental Law Reporter. 52 (2022): 10096. 76 The Groundwater Foundation. “Get Informed.” Available here, www.grou​ndwa​ter. org/​get-​infor​med/​bas​ics/​grou​ndwa​ter.html; USDA “Irrigation and Groundwater Use.” Available here, www.ers.usda.gov/​top​ics/​farm-​practi​ces-​man​agem​ent/​irr​igat​ ion-​water-​use/​ 77 Bajwa, Rajinder, William Crosswhite, John Hostetler, and Olivia W Wright. “Agricultural Irrigation and Water Use.” USDA. 78 James, Ian and Steve Reilly. “Pumped Beyond limits, Many U.S. Aquifers in Decline.” December 10, 2015. The Desert Sun. 79 United States Geological Survey (USGS). “Water Quality in Principal Aquifers of the United States 1991–​2010.” 80 Kelderman, Keene, Ari Phillips, Tom Pelton, Eric Schaeffer, Paul MacGillis-​ Falcon, and Courtney Bernhardt. “The Clean Water Act at 50.” The Environment Integrity Project. 81 Lauffenburger, Zachary H., Jason J. Gurdak, Chris Hobza, Duane Woodward, and Cassandra Wolf. “Irrigated Agriculture and Future Climate Change Effects on Groundwater Recharge, Northern High Plains Aquifer, USA.” Agricultural Water Management 204 (2018): 69–​80. 82 Jorge Fernandez-​Cornejo, Craig Osteen, Richard Nehring, and Seth J. Wechsler. “Pesticide Use Peaked in 1981, Then Trended Downward, Driven by Technological Changes.” 83 Demeneix, Barbara A. “How Fossil Fuel-​Derived Pesticides and Plastics Harm Health, Biodiversity, and the Climate.” The Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology 8, no. 6 (2020): 462–​464. 84 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (2022) Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–​2020. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 430-​R-​22-​003. Available at www.epa.gov/​ghgem​issi​ons/​draft-​invent​ory-​us-​ gre​enho​use-​gas-​emissi​ons-​and-​sinks-​1990-​2020. 85 Lilliston, Ben. “Latest Agriculture Emissions Data Show Rise of Factory Farms.” March 26, 2019. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. 86 EPA, Inventory, 52. 87 Shipan, Charles R., and William R. Lowry. “Environmental Policy and Party Divergence in Congress.” Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2001): 245–​263. 88 Henderson, Nia-​Malika. “The White Southern Democrat is a Dying Species.” November 5, 2014. Washington Post. 89 Antonio, Robert J., and Robert J. Brulle. “The Unbearable Lightness of Politics: Climate Change Denial and Political Polarization.” The Sociological Quarterly 52, no. 2 (2011): 195–​202. 90 Banerjee, Neela, Gerogina Gustin, John H, Cushman Jr. “The Farm Bureau: Big Oil’s Unnoticed Ally Fighting Climate Science and Policy.” December 21, 2018. InsideClimateNews. 91 Klein, Naomi. “Capitalism v the Climate.” November 9, 2011. The Nation.

The Crisis Tendency in Environmental Policy  109 92 Roper, Juliet, Shiv Ganesh, and Theodore E. Zorn. “Doubt, Delay, and Discourse: Skeptics’ Strategies to Politicize Climate Change.” Science Communication 38, no. 6 (2016): 776–​799. 93 Supran, Geoffrey, and Naomi Oreskes. “Rhetoric and Frame Analysis of ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Communications.” One Earth 4, no. 5 (2021): 696–​719. 94 Erlandson, Dawn. “The BTU Tax Experience: What Happened and Why It Happened.” Pace Environmental Law Review. 12 (1994): 173. 95 Brulle, Robert. “30 Years Ago Global Warming Became Front-​Page News –​ and Both Republicans and Democrats Took it Seriously.” June 19, 2018. The Conversation. 96 Revkin, Andrew. “Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports.” June 8, 2005. New York Times. 97 Harris, Paul G. “Beyond Bush: Environmental Politics and Prospects for US Climate Policy.” Energy Policy 37, no. 3 (2009): 966–​971. 98 Brewer, Paul R. “Polarisation in the USA: Climate Change, Party Politics, and Public opinion in the Obama Era.” European Political Science 11, no. 1 (2012): 7–​17. 99 Freeman, Jody. “Climate and Energy Policy in the Obama Administration.” Pace Environmental Law Review. 30 (2012: 375–​390. 100 Popovich, Nadia. Livia Albeck-​Ripka, and Kendra Pierre-​Louis. “The Trump Administration Rolled Back More Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List.” January 20, 2021. New York Times. 101 Full text of the legislation can be found here, www.congr​ess.gov/​bill/​117th-​congr​ ess/​sen​ate-​bill/​1251 102 Greenleaf, Maron. “California Polluters May Soon Buy Carbon Offsets.” October 1 2019. Salon.com. 103 Palmer, Brian. “If We Didn’t Have California, What Would We Eat.” July 13, 2013. Slate.com. 104 For information on California’s agriculture, see www.cdfa.ca.gov/​sta​tist​ics/​

Conclusion Pathways for Reform

Hope for the Future or More of the Same? As of Fall 2022, the Biden administration has dedicated significant resources to addressing problems in the US agrarian system. From the passing of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in August of 2022, which includes nearly 20 billion in funding for sustainable agriculture, to strengthening competition policy through investing in meat processing infrastructure, the federal government is spending millions of dollars with the expressed interest to make the food and farm system more resilient.1 Furthermore, nearly three billion dollars have been devoted to developing “climate smart commodities and rural projects,” with federal authorities working directly with local governments, tribal communities, cooperatives, as well as other entities, to implement market-​driven, climate change mitigation initiatives. The broad-​based participation in this latter effort, especially with the inclusion of Indigenous people, could be considered a step toward addressing historical injustices. Similarly, a provision within the IRA concerning debt relief stipulates conditions to forgive the debts of farmers who have experienced discrimination. Meanwhile, the Farm Workforce Modernization Act, which would grant work permits with the chance of permanent residency for farmworkers and their immediate family members, is working through both houses of Congress at the time of this writing. The COVID-​ 19 pandemic triggered the creation of many of these initiatives. The unsustainable nature of farm labor, as explored in this book, existed before the pandemic. Yet, as the illness raged in 2020 and after, reporting brought renewed attention to the additional suffering that workers in the fields and factories endured. The stress placed on supply chains, seen when farmers dumped their milk, or food processors euthanized hogs and chickens, exposed markets as wasteful, if not irrational, in their operation. Some administration officials –​including Biden’s Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack –​are even tying these problems to the decades of corporate concentration that lax Anti-​Trust law enforcement allowed to develop.2 Still, such moves that address the crisis in US agriculture have taken place against the backdrop of protracted partisan polarization. The IRA, DOI: 10.4324/9781003330066-6

Conclusion  111 for instance, was passed due to a special legislative process known as reconciliation. Specifically, this legislative shortcut allows the party with a simple majority in the Senate to pass bills instead of finding compromise and building widespread support. Whereas the Farm Workforce Modernization Act has support, its detractors –​including some farmworker organizations –​find fault with the bill’s E-​Verify program and proposed expansion of the flawed H-2A program. It is uncertain that this bill will pass the Senate, especially as the reconciliation process cannot be used on non-​budgetary initiatives. Moreover, investing in new business ventures to strengthen competition is one thing, but reforming the rules that markets operate by is something else. Put otherwise, new funding may facilitate the construction of additional meat processing establishments, yet the ability for small-​scale upstarts to compete in terms of prices with large-​scale corporations such as Tyson and JBS is doubtful. That the Department of Justice tried unsuccessfully on three occasions to convict chicken processing firm executives of price fixing, shows the continued influence that corporations maintain in the US agricultural system, as well as the need to revise the regulatory tools that government officials have at their disposal.3 It is unclear that without revising the rules for mergers, as well as the standards according to which investigations into anti-​competitive practices can be launched, if the neoliberal policies and ideas that have contributed to generating an inefficient, concentrated food and farm system that is in crisis, will be adequately challenged.

Contributions to Studies of Crisis and Agrarian Politics This book connects the developments that have been initiated by the Biden administration, as well as the impact of the COVID-​19 pandemic, with many of the US agrarian system’s enduring problems. Reading such problems in light of how I adapt Habermas’ work on crisis, focuses our attention on to political dynamics. Or rather, instead of locating crisis within economic conditions or normative concerns, I ground my analysis in the problems that policy makers have had in resolving empirically demonstrable, ongoing problems. I locate such problems in four areas, namely, with respect to policies concerning the governance of land, labor, markets, and the environment. The critical problem across each chapter is how short-​sighted policy remedies, or inaction, endanger the future operation of the US food and farm system. Concomitantly, neoliberal reforms provide many of these inadequate remedies, while also aggravating deep-​seated problems in the agrarian system concerning economic inequality, racism, and corporate concentration. Overall, serious doubts persist as to who will be the next generation of farmers and workers. Climate change policy, or rather, the lack thereof, places the US’ water supply and much of the country’s livestock and crops in a precarious position. There is no mechanism to transfer land to people who will grow food, as spaces increasingly leave agriculture, destined to become the next subdivision.

112 Conclusion Besides offering a novel way to conceive of crisis, my argument highlights dynamics in particular areas within the agrarian system. This attention to detail is a contribution to agrarian studies, providing parameters through which to track the development of problems over time. Focusing on historical change, particularly with respect to policy, documents past solutions that have been met with varied levels of success. Not to bemoan the past entirely, some initiatives such as the Bankhead–​Jones Act of 1937, offer lessons for potential future action. The partial parity pricing system that was part of New Deal policy, likewise, is worth reconsidering with respect to strengthening incomes.4 That climate change presents itself as an intractable problem should be counterposed to the early 1970s, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created, and the Clean Water Act was passed. Such changes were not spontaneous, taking place one day to the next. Instead, as deploying Habermas’ framework also highlights, driving change in policy takes years of concerted communication and mobilization to build consensus. In the four policy areas that I analyze in this book, I discuss problems that are persistent, if not chronic within the US agrarian system. Such matters include the presence of racism, particularly in land access and labor, which existed prior to the political formation of the United States. For example, the treaty system that originated in European negotiations with Indigenous people, ushered in dynamics of land governance with a core problem concerning state authority. Efforts have sought to address this problem, including legislative changes in the 1930s with the Indian Reorganization Act, as well as re-​recognizing tribal authority in the 1970s through the Indian Self-​ Determination and Education Assistance Act. Still, land title fractionation continues the long, historical process of dispossession into the twenty-​first century, threatening the land base of many Indigenous people. Labor policy has similarly featured persistent, exclusionary racialized hierarchies. The policy area’s connection with immigration law adds a critical international dimension to consider. The problem at the heart of labor policy, mainly, is how landowners regularly seek a stable, yet controllable workforce. Structural conditions within the industry, such as low profit margins, push employers in such a direction. Over time, this search has created an agrarian system that is structurally dependent on a permanently precarious group. What has made this problem acute since the 1990s is that no new group of people is readily available for work. Remaining workers increasingly age out of the profession or are arrested according to outdated immigration laws. Automation and expanding visa programs may seem like solutions. The issue with automation, if we take the past as prologue, is that it has tended to occur sporadically. The significant drop in farmers that we see through the introduction of labor-​saving technologies, such as with pesticides and tractors after World War II, was exceptional. The H-2A program, meanwhile, is not at the scale needed to replace the workers who are in demand. Chronic problems also characterize policies concerning markets and the environment. Concerning the former, speculation and overproduction have

Conclusion  113 readily plagued farmers. Historically, many rural communities, according to particular subsistence technologies that I discuss in Chapter 3, managed to survive market downturns. Yet, the increased penetration of market relations into the US agrarian system at around the turn of the twentieth century exposed many to increased economic precarity, prompting the subsequent development of New Deal-​era policies to stabilize farm incomes. The resulting partial parity pricing system meant to address problems related to overproduction and price volatility. These problems reappeared in the 1970s and 1980s as parity was thoroughly weakened, and policy makers embraced issuing ad hoc cash payments and promoting exports in terms of preferred policy instruments. Environmental problems, as I discuss in Chapter 4, appear within ongoing debates concerning climate change. This chapter’s argument is situated around a comparison of different time periods, namely, the 1960s through the early 1970s, and the 1980s until the present. This former period leads up to the first Earth Day celebration, and the passing of legislation that has had a significant impact on the environment. Not a perfect illustration of consensus building, as BIPOC communities that advocate for Environmental Justice show how the changes made in the 1970s were incomplete. Still, that such debates take place within the context of Environmentalism show the capacity for the movement to become more inclusive. As I also explain in the chapter, climate change was not addressed in the 1990s, or after, due to an increase in partisan polarization that neoliberal reforms aggravated. Specifically, geographic political divisions along with short-​term, micro-​level policy changes, left the macro-​level challenge that is climate change go unaddressed. Over the course of making my argument throughout this book, the state appears as a vehicle for change. In this way, it is at once an instrument, as well as a system of rules through which people can change themselves and the policies that affect them. Following Habermas in this regard, there is a belief that the state within advanced capitalist societies has the potential to improve the lives of the people who live within its borders. Such a perspective may strike some as odd, especially with respect to how the US government has repeatedly discriminated against BIPOC communities. Coterminous with the creation of the United States was a racist system of territorial dispossession, examined in the first chapter, which lingers. Moreover, international dynamics have increasingly become central to agrarian politics over time. Chapter 3, on markets for instance, documents how the percentage of farmer income derived from exports has increased over time. Rather than focusing on the state, perhaps more attention should be placed on international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the Food and Agriculture Organization in the United Nations (UN) when thinking about agrarian crisis and ways to enact reforms. Afterall, climate change is also a global challenge, as greenhouse gas emissions do not stop at state borders. In response, my argument does not eschew international reforms and institutions, as much as highlight the remaining, persistent authority of

114 Conclusion the state in agrarian politics and policy. Especially in the United States, the Farm Bill remains a central force that influences incomes. Pricing policies, as well as funding for grants and crop insurance, directly impact the likelihood of people remaining in farming or who ponder entering the profession. Farmworkers, even though the majority are migrants, enter a national system that has been created for centuries to extract their labor and deny them political rights. Such a system does not appear in the US’ neighbors, namely, neither in Canada nor in Mexico. Undocumented agricultural workers are present in various European countries, yet the number of seasonal migrants who have work visas significantly outnumber their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic.5 As such, farm labor in the United States is stamped with peculiar institutional dynamics. Concerning climate change, similarly, the dynamics of partisan polarization do not exist in the same way in other countries. The United States has outpaced other countries, in international surveys, concerning the number of people who deny human activity as a catalyst driving climate change,6 while globally, country by country views on the severity of the phenomenon also show variation.7

Pathways for Reform While certain policy proposals could address the crisis in the US food and farm system without dealing with partisan gridlock and political differences, they will most likely struggle to advance. The IRA has been heralded for taking on climate change. Still, whereas new spending is critical, how institutions operate within the US food and farm system require reexamination. Conducting such a reexamination, which I propose in this section by way of conclusion, is neither rooted in force nor in taking absolutist positions. Protests, for instance, are public disruptions that exist within a larger network of communication practices meant to transmit ideas and promote change. To stake an absolutist position on political conflict, viewing interactions with groups or people in zero-​sum terms, adds rigidity to a process that requires experimentation. The evolution of conflict allows for groups to change themselves and one another. For these reasons, as I elaborate in what follows, certain communication strategies must envelope potential policy and institutional changes. Staying true to the Habermasian framework, a purely strategic approach is insufficient. Or rather, mobilizing beyond strategic interaction –​a form of instrumental reason –​entails people potentially changing their positions through engaging others who believe different things. Instrumental reason, to the contrary, means using others, whether humans, animals, or objects, to serve one’s preconceived motives. The odds that people will come together face-​to-​ face to hash out differences are unlikely. Regardless, the mobilizations during the 1960s that led to critical institutional and legislative changes concerning environmental policy display how people can change positions over time and find common political ground without sitting down with one another.

Conclusion  115 One area where there is potential for such communication work exists with respect to competition policy, particularly Anti-​Trust reform. First, there are already changes afoot, with the Biden administration appointing officials into key positions in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission who are interested in challenging corporate power.8 Not merely a leftist demand, currents within the Republican party have sought to target corporate elites for corrupting politicians and institutions. Fox News’ Tucker Carlson, far from a darling for leftists, penned his 2018 book –​Ship of Fools: How a Selfish Ruling Class Is Bringing America to the Brink of Revolution –​with the goal to point out how political and economic elites, as well as members of the Republicans and Democrats, forward policies to their own, narrow benefit.9 It is also worth noting that questioning elite power has a long history in US politics. In the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, noted the strong desire for Americans to be equal (not obtuse to the reality of slavery, he did note this institution’s corrosive effects on US society). Decades later, the Populists mobilized farmers and launched a successful third-​party effort, motivated by widespread skepticism on the merits of having a few railroad companies dominate transportation networks and unregulated banks control credit.10 Likewise, Justice Louis D Brandeis, who served on the US Supreme Court from 1916 to 1939, saw concentrated economic and political power as anathema to the practice of free speech and the American political process overall.11 Reform initiatives involve two tracks: one that focuses on the actual laws that exist, and another, dealing with the standards that officials and lawyers use when building cases. Concerning the former, specific bills, such as Amy Klobuchar’s The Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act, would make enforcing Anti-​Trust laws easier. Concretely, the bill would dedicate more resources for officials to document and verify cases of price fixing and collusion, create new institutions for corporate oversight, and update merger guidelines. Essentially, the legislation seeks to change existing rules within the agrarian system, making legislation adequate to twenty-​first century economic dynamics. This bill, or something like it, could play a critical role in working with the widespread skepticism that exists in American society on corporate power and influence. US Anti-​Trust legislation is odd given its potential power to set rules for appropriate market conduct according to nebulous normative criteria. Basically, to claim that some form of exchange is “unfair,” or even to promote competition, requires a basis outside of prima facie illegal conduct. Similarly, the Sherman Act provides no criteria for judging what constitutes “restraining trade.” Such moral claims within the Anti-​Trust legislation constitute, at least partially, the basis upon which food, farm, and labor groups make their appeals. Opponents take a different tact, seeing the benefit accruing for consumers when food is cheap and readily available. This search for principles led justices to create what they call the “rule of reason.” According to this standard, there are “per se” illegal practices, like

116 Conclusion price fixing, which can be ruled criminal. Then, there are other activities that involve industry-​specific, more contextual knowledge. These other occurrences involve this idea of the “rule of reason,” which means evaluating the history, nature, and context of some practice to determine if it has an anti-​competitive effect.12 The issue, as discussed in Chapter 3, is how the overly narrow “consumer welfare standard” has become the benchmark used by officials when considering anti-​competitive conduct. Changing this standard, to include worker rights, as well as to expand what consumer welfare means beyond simply what they pay at the cash register, is needed.13 One direction, as some have proposed, is to recast markets in terms of “public interest.” According to this vision, people are views as not only consumers, but as collectives, such as workers.14 Evaluating the potential effects of firm conduct, in this regard, is not set on narrowly hypothesized, individual preferences –​something that the neoliberal consumer welfare standard promotes –​but on groups as they exist in society, in their complexity. Adapting standards in this way could lead agribusiness mergers to be undone in the name of supporting farmers and workers, similar to what happened in the paradigmatic case of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v United States (1911) that saw John D Rockefeller’s Standard Oil broken up. In this way, the Dean Foods/​Dairy Farmers of America acquisition could be reversed, as well as the Bayer/​Monsanto merger. Companies that are broken up can be regulated with additional governmental assistance, with officials as well as cooperating farmer and labor organizations working on the dynamics of transition and what new entities emerge. Such details would appear in consent decrees.15 Still, how corporations may change, becoming part of the solution instead of solely being considered part of the problem, should be entertained. As much was seen in the creation of the EPA, as well as in the development and adoption of the catalytic converter. Yvon Chouinard, the founder of Patagonia, turned his $3 billion corporation into a non-​profit and trust designed to address the climate crisis.16 Such corporate initiatives differ from other cases, such as those led by ExxonMobil, to delay action on climate. Specifically, Chouinard risked his company’s existence on the potential for future change. Exxon, obversely, seeks to keep the status quo and minimize change. In line with this thinking, some have expressed curiosity in using the existing logistic capacities of companies, such as Amazon, to meet human needs instead of exploiting workers.17 Corporations, as such, cannot be ruled out from working with movements and politicians on creating changes to confront the US’ agrarian crisis. But activists, as well as the firms themselves, must entertain the idea of making significant changes and accommodations. A similar opportunity concerning mobilization and communication exists with improving farm incomes, principally through what some call supply management. Parity pricing policy, which appears in partial form during the New Deal era, sought to place farmers on par with what non-​farm, urban workers.

Conclusion  117 Across rural and urban areas, farmers and workers would earn sufficient incomes that would allow them to live comfortably in their geographic region of choice, increasing their abilities to purchase things from one another. For farmers specifically, calculations for parity prices included not only inputs that may be purchased to farm, but also non-​farm expenses such as clothes and healthcare. Countries such as Canada have supply management systems for some of their agricultural industries, including dairy, poultry, and eggs. The former, however, has been partially deregulated by successful US-​led efforts in the WTO. Concerning communication, it is crucial to further publicize the nature of supply management. Pricing in general is a notorious issue concerning farm policy, with such discussions of “farm gate” matters failing to resonate with non-​farmers. The asset-​rich nature of agriculture, from tractors to buildings, makes farmers appear wealthy. Furthermore, that dairy farmers are paid for every 100 pounds of milk that they produce, and not by the gallon, strikes consumers as odd. Similarly, bread is bought by the loaf, not by the bushel of wheat that the farmer harvests. Also concerning language, consumers may confuse a policy that deals with improving farm incomes with taxpayer-​ backed subsidies. Direct payments, as discussed in this book, is an example of this kind of subsidy. The ideal form of the Canadian system of supply management shows better policy. Their system features key actors within a certain industry –​ farmers through representation on marketing boards and representatives of food processors, as well as officials from government –​who meet periodically to negotiate who will produce what, and how much. Quota, or market share, is allocated per producer. Competition still exists, but within the context of these regular meetings where producers and processors hash out terms. On subsidies particularly, this system does not depend on ad hoc, taxpayer support because incomes are determined in negotiations. Critics of supply management argue that the system rewards inefficiency, resulting in warehouses of product sitting idle and spoiling. Critics also rhetorically hold up the free market as an ideal, viewing periodic negotiations between farmers, processors, and government as an unnecessary form of intervention. The reality is that since the 1980s, surplus control has shifted to private actors, not just food processors, but also implement and seed dealers. This transition away from national government empowers corporations, allowing them to situate themselves at key points in the food system from where they can control product through supply and demand.18 Such an arrangement generates its own forms of inefficiency, including problems with waste and the lack of resiliency in the face of shocks.19 Supply management, also, allows for democratic engagement across an industry –​introducing a form of control at odds with how corporations decide to move product and influence prices. A few things work in favor of the promotion of such policy, particularly in the Post-​Trump United States. Regardless of one’s opinion of him, the former

118 Conclusion President shed light on the damaging effects of free trade policies on rural communities. In taking action to block free trade initiatives, Trump did not appoint judges to the WTO’s appellate court.20 Biden, as of Fall 2022, has followed the Trump administration in this regard, which makes inoperative the Dispute Settlement Mechanism within the international organization. To state clearer the significance of this change, the WTO exists, essentially, as a space for states to meet and negotiate how to lower tariffs and reduce trade barriers. If some state finds another’s trade policies detrimental, then they can file a claim with the WTO. Yet, without judges, the institution’s court system cannot operate. This frees states to make domestic policy choices without fear of other states crying foul. Overall, much of the language surrounding the notion of supply management could change. Emphasizing how the system is not about taxpayer subsidies, for instance, is crucial. Furthermore, better management of the food and farm system is needed, which the wasteful destruction of produce put on display during the initial months of the COVID-​19 pandemic. The idealized free market, according to its advocates, functions through competitors responding to changing prices. COVID-​19 disruptions put on display that the current agrarian system, coming upon decades of neoliberal, free market-​ inspired reforms, does not work in this way. Furthermore, with minimum wages increasing across the country, resulting from cost-​of-​living increases and political movements demanding change, it makes sense that farmers also should seek economic changes to improve their situation. In effect, politics exist prior to the game of supply and demand that we think plays out at the grocery store. Consumers can be encouraged to purchase this or that brand, with this or that label, but at that point in the food chain, the most relevant decisions concerning pricing have already been made. Behind the shelves, most of what takes place concerning supply is determined by consolidating cooperatives or corporations that specialize in the production, or the transport of commodities. Such entities have little concern for farm income, as long as product reaches the market. In the event of disruption or crisis, emergency direct payments keep markets intact without seriously addressing the deeper problem. Currently, companies must shoulder too little share of the negative effects of market disruptions, which instead fall on farmers, taxpayers, and workers. Promoting supply management and reforming competition policy entails improving market conditions now and into the future. Part of this effort, besides revising institutions, involves providing incentives for people to enter farming –​addressing the problem of how to replace the aging, retiring population of farmers who are currently on the land. With respect to this matter, concretely with respect to who could become farmers, farmworkers stand particularly well-​positioned. As documented in the National Agricultural Workers Survey, workers, while mobile, stay for extended periods with the same employer and remain regionally based. As landowners age, it would make sense for some farmworkers to replace them.

Conclusion  119 A few legislative moves are required to make such a change effective. First, there is the ever-​divisive issue of immigration reform. Farm labor, as it exists structurally in the food and farm system, is reliant on non-​citizens. Acquiring property in the United States is far simpler for citizens than non-​citizens in terms of financing. To confront these matters, legislation that regulates immigration policy could take the form of the Farm Bill, namely, as commodity price and conservation policy is enacted every five years, so should determinations of the number of people who come to the United States and their country origin. Such revamping ought to include visas, residency requirements, and ways to establish citizenship. A simple look at migrant waves historically shows that external events, whether its political instability, wars, or economic crisis, prompt people to leave sporadically. The best way to deal with such shocks is to build into US immigration law a certain kind of flexibility that leads policy makers to revisit policy on a regular basis. This idea may appeal to staunch opponents of immigration reform, mainly because instead of proposing some massive, “one and done” reform package, moments for debate and change reappear at regular periods. An additional element of immigration reform would feature a legal mechanism of transfer from aging owners to workers. The Bankhead–​Jones Act provides something of a template, which appears as well as in the Justice for Black Farmers Act that Senator Booker has championed.21 Essentially, the state establishes a means of negotiated transfer between eligible partners, subsidizing additional loans for those that acquire property if needed. Sellers receive a price that would allow them to retire. Not merely to exchange resources, as found in the Bankhead–​Jones Act, land redistribution can also be paired with infrastructure development. This somewhat ingenious policy design potentially creates a fortuitous cycle; more investment in what helps new farmers comes with more farmers entering the industry. Such developments would result in additional tax revenue for further infrastructure needs. To initiate the process, pilot projects would be needed, with willing volunteers. Current initiatives, for instance, the Climate Smart Agriculture grant plan that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) distributed in August of 2022, distributed financing on this basis. Moreover, farmworkers, while they are aging, are still younger than the average farmer. In the short term, this institutional change would provide a sizeable group of new farmers. Over the long term, working according to the logic of the Bankhead–​Jones Act, infrastructural investments would make rural areas economically viable and potential places where others would want to live. Multiple other ways exist to connect people with land. For instance, along with public policies and training, college-​age youth could farm in exchange for student debt relief, as well as African American urban gardeners who want to relocate to lands that family members lost in the past. Such groups could partner with farmers who over time transition ownership. Still, in terms of the most feasible option for generating a new group of small-​scale producers, farmworkers are the most eligible candidates.

120 Conclusion The farm labor workforce has been permanently precarious, not only for its intimate connection to immigration policy, but also to racism. Policy-​wise, racism has functioned to politically disenfranchise workers while allowing landowners to extract surplus profits. This was critical to the maintenance of slavery, remaining so in the post Cold War period when undocumented workers remain locked out of the political process for lacking citizenship rights. Still, perhaps no more divisive issue in US politics exists as race; coded language around “law and order” has functioned as the basis for political campaigns for decades. The most current manifestation of this was how protests after the killing of George Floyd in 2020 were mirrored by calls for supporting the police. Lawsuits that blocked the section of the Biden Administration’s COVID stimulus package dedicated to Black farmer debt relief show the difficulties in recognizing the US’s racist past. Meanwhile, avoiding race relations in agriculture runs the risk of reinforcing inequalities in land ownership and income. New Deal era reforms, for all the innovative policies that they generated, were woven within the Jim Crow system. Black landowners suffered the consequences of this union, losing their land at disproportionate rates when compared to white farmers. The white power structure permeated the US agrarian system, even within the local county offices that the Agricultural Adjustment Act made a critical part of the US rural landscape. Some legislative efforts have begun to address racism in agriculture. Within the USDA, for example, an equity commission has an oversight role with respect to the development and performance of agricultural policy.22 A Biden-​ era creation, the extent of this new agency’s capacity is uncertain. Future administrations, moreover, may simply end it. The IRA contains a stipulation on debt relief for people who have experienced discrimination, regardless of race. Whether or not resources reach BIPOC farmers in need is also unclear at the time of this writing. Racism, so woven into the fabric of US society, as well as the country’s agrarian system, requires attention at many levels. Various coalitions, for instance, the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC) and the Rural Coalition (RC) represent critical examples of organizations that foreground inter-​racial alliance building. These nationwide organizations intentionally bring people together, across race as well as occupation (e.g., farmers and farmworkers), in annual meetings. Both umbrella organizations, as members of the international coalition, La Via Campesina (The Peasant’s Way, or LVC) also demand food sovereignty. Food sovereignty, according to the movements, includes land redistribution, natural resource conservation, and support for small-​scale farming. Revisions and development of the demand, additionally, foreground the experiences and needs of BIPOC communities.23 At the interpersonal and inter-​ organizational levels, such umbrella organizations play a critical role in confronting the problems that racism –​ especially with respect to state authority –​has created in the US food and farm system. These movements, by creating actual spaces, do not merely pay lip service to racial hierarchies, but place people in situations for learning.

Conclusion  121 Not every member group features racially diverse membership bases; periodic meetings, in this way, allow organizations to exchange information and become acquainted with one another’s needs. Moreover, commitments to policy changes provide examples of concerted efforts to promote racial equity legislatively. Examples include advocating for debt relief for BIPOC farmers.24 Standing with Indigenous-​led movements against pipeline construction, as well, illustrates how to engender diversity while creating unity.25 Such practices illustrate Habermasian-style movement communication; protest relays information on the needs of different communities to build consensus and seek political change. In leadership positions and policy demands, concretizing inter-​ racial alliances entails the presence of representatives of different groups of people. In a system dominated by white men –​in land ownership and labor control, as detailed throughout this book –​organizations that seek real change must present voices of historically marginalized BIPOC people. Even with good intentions, speaking for BIPOC people reproduces hierarchies instead of confronting them. As such, “speaking for” instead of “speaking with” adds to the legitimacy crisis that exists in US agriculture. One concrete place where inter-​racial movement building and consensus-​ creating communication practices are put on display is in discussions of the Farm Bill. Whereas the bill is signed into law every five years, for months prior to its passing, movements deliberate over their priorities and how to communicate them effectively to policy makers. The legislation’s various sections, or titles, provide opportunities for organizations to place their demands. At the same time, the bill’s many sections could function to the detriment of organizations, namely, in what was described in Chapter 3 as “roll-​out neoliberalism” or a “perverse confluence” between democratic aspirations and economic change. Concretely, groups invest significant resources into developing Farm Bill goals, while large-​scale actors, with greater access to politicians, exert their will with ease due to their greater control of resources. Still, in terms of the legislation’s relevance for the US food and farm system, movements have no choice but to work on the Farm Bill. They also have the chance to make real change. Concerning process, organizations stand to build power by working together, creating relationships and new allies. Perhaps through accessing resources in the Farm Bill, or in other spaces, coalition building assists organizations to increase their strength. Meanwhile, programs that concretely benefit small-​scale farmers exist throughout the legislation, for instance, in the conservation title. Especially as many new farmers are limited in terms of resources, this section of the legislation is key for future producers. That their focus is on conservation, additionally, speaks to problems in markets as well as the environment. The special section on BIPOC farmers is an opening that could see expansion in the future. Another section on rural development features funding for cooperatives and infrastructure development. In short, to ignore the Farm Bill only comes to the detriment of movements interested in reforming the food and farm system.

122 Conclusion In terms of addressing the climate crisis, the Farm Bill’s conservation title specifically holds significant promise. Specifically, advancing agroecological production –​a mode of low-​input farming that eschews chemicals, is adapted to local conditions, and highlights decentralized modes of knowledge exchange –​could come into this discussion.26 Or rather, certain outlays for Commodity Credit Corporation spending and contracts could be dedicated to producers who farm according to methods such as agroecology. Until now, farmer and farmworker groups have been pushing and advocating for this mode of production as principally one that challenges the capital-​intensive form that dominates much of the US agrarian system. By including some way to ensure the purchase of agroecological products would involve the government, while also guaranteeing a market that could help persuade conventional farmers to transition. Outside of the Farm Bill, BIPOC movements and their allies have found some success in addressing deep-​seated problems in the US agrarian system through the courts. The two rounds of Pigford v Glickman, for instance, resulted in the largest civil rights settlement in terms of cash payments in US history. Not only member groups of the RC and NFFC that feature African American members were in support, for instance, the Southern Federation of Cooperatives, but so were organizations without predominately Black membership. Viewing cash payments as critical, yet insufficient to address the history of racism in the US agricultural system, members and leaders in both organizations continue to work in coalition to support Black farmers and seek redistributive justice.27 Similarly, cash payments are limited in their effectiveness when considering the historical injustices that Indigenous people have experienced in the creation and expansion of the US agrarian system. As Sheryl Lightfoot has documented in her work on settler state apologies, acknowledging historical injustices rank from low to high in terms of method of delivery and content.28 The least meaningful, content-​ less apology, according to Lightfoot, was given by President Obama in 2009. Tacking on an apology to Indigenous people at the end of a defense appropriations bill, neither presented with ceremony, nor with any kind of redistribution of resources, this recognition of past wrongdoing pales in comparison to the New Zealand government’s redistribution of public lands, promise to no further wrongdoing, and acceptance of responsibility. Just as central, this example of apology making is part of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. While not binding in its decisions, the 1975 Act sanctioned the creation of a permanent committee of Māori and settler descendants to investigate historical injustices and propose potential remedies to the New Zealand government. Furthermore, the Act’s authority draws its legitimacy from the 1840 treaty of the same name. The potential for such practices of apology-​making to address deep-​seated problems with state authority and legitimacy, with respect to BIPOC communities, cannot be underestimated. Real apologies at once show strength,

Conclusion  123 as well as point to new directions moving forward. What happened in New Zealand did not result in the Māori people seceding from the country, but instead, opened conversations among Indigenous people, the government, and the descendants of settlers. Facing past injustices instead of merely speaking about them, with this latter action taking place in the US context, attempts to create spaces where people recognize one another when building consensus and seeking change. In terms of strength, such recognition acknowledges and respects the resilience of BIPOC communities, as well as state authorities in their willingness to work together. Furthermore, the practice of apology making does not close the process of healing. A first step in the process of attempting to live together with mutual recognition, verbal acknowledgment with a redistribution of resources for BIPOC communities to manage allows for debate and consensus-​making. That the process is tied to past treaties, as well, adds legitimacy. Specifically, the parties to treaties ought to see one another as political equals, despite material inequality and cultural differences. In this way, while treaties in the Euro-​American world have too often been state-​sanctioned tools for territorial dispossession, the case of New Zealand –​which has a political history similar to that of the United States –​shows the potential for reforming the treating process.

Past and Future My grandfather used to say that he did not like going to casinos. When I asked why, he said, “I am a farmer, I gamble every day!” Myself, living on the farm, I learned what he meant over time. For instance, after planting our corn in the Spring, we “bet” on rain coming at least once a week. There was a significant amount of risk in this practice, especially as this wager is made constantly over the multiple months it takes corn to grow. Dangers were ever-​ present, for example, if it rained too much, especially in the couple weeks after planting, then all the seed would be drowned out. If it rained too little, then nothing would grow. After planting, we spent hours driving around the area, checking how our neighbor’s fields were performing. That multiple families also planted corn allowed us to compare our efforts. If corn was knee high by July 4th is a common “metric” used to indicate that everything was fine, as we evaluated our efforts and others in our community. Getting seed into the ground and caring for it till harvest time –​not just for corn, but whatever you grow –​is one thing. Other matters emerge in the marketplace. More players enter the “farm casino” at this point, with more potential threats to a farmer’s ability to control becoming factors. The food processors that buy what you grow, for instance, may not offer prices that cover expenses. Going the farmers market, direct sales approach, may resolve this problem by allowing producers to regain control. Still, relationships with consumers need to be cultivated. Their changing preferences, as well, must be considered. Through it all, there are also government regulations and

124 Conclusion inspectors. For dairy farmers, a bad inspection may result in lowering the grade of milk, which in turn lowers its price on the market. This reflection, like the various others on my family’s experience with agriculture that appear in this book, highlights critical aspects of the past development and future of the US agrarian system. In a way, embedded in the dynamics of policies concerning markets, conservation policy, as well as movement organizing, my past offers a grounded perspective on what has happened and what could happen in the food and farm system. Still, my rendering is partial; the stories that I have neither come from the perspective of a Black farmer, nor from someone on a reservation. Members of my family struggled to form cooperatives, attempting to secure more power for themselves and our community. That they did so without involving BIPOC allies illustrates the limitations of their approach. Moving forward into the twenty-​ first century, and the dynamics of movement alliances have advanced. More work remains, especially as deep-​ seated historical injustices remain at the center of the US agrarian system. This book, in focusing on critical problems that have taken on crisis proportions, intends to play some role in ongoing political debates and processes of alliance formation. As a form of communication, the work seeks to show how problems are shared across different communities, while impacting people differently. With past examples at our service, hope exists for groups to communicate with one another and legislators to improve a food and farm system that everyone participates in. The COVID-​19 pandemic brought to most everyone’s attention the crisis in the US food and farm system. People became aware of critical agricultural problems as farmers destroyed their produce and workers suffered intolerable conditions in the fields. Many, as a result, were made to reflect on our shared responsibility to one another in the system. Everyone eats, but not everyone grows food or works on a farm. To deal with our system’s various problems, improving how we relate with one another, working across differences and promoting consensus, can generate real, legitimate policy change. The need to make significant change is real, motivating us for our own well-​being and for those who will come after us. How individuals, movements, and policy makers engage one another to generate legitimate relationships instead of exploitative, hierarchical ones, depends on us. Despite our challenges, I bet on us and our abilities to provide real answers to this latest crisis that exists in our agricultural system.

Notes 1 National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition. “Inflation Reduction Act of 2022: A Deep Dive on an Historic Investment in Climate and Conservation Agriculture.” August 19, 2022. 2 For one example, see the Press Release, “Statement from Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack Recognizing One Year of the Biden Administration Competition Council.” July 11, 2022.

Conclusion  125 3 Thomas, Patrick. “Justice Department Fails for Third Time to Convict Chicken Executives in Price-​Fixing Trial.” July 8, 2022. Wall Street Journal. 4 On this point, see the Disparity to Parity Project, led by the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC), available here https://​dispar​ityt​opar​ity.org/​ 5 Palumbo, Letissia and Alessandra Corrado. “Are Agri-​ food Workers Only Exploited in Southern Europe? Case Studies on Migrant Labour in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.” (2020). 6 Fagan, Moira and Christine Fuang. “A Look at How People Around the World View Climate Change. April 18, 2019. Pew Research Center. 7 New York Times. “The Road to the Paris Climate Deal.” December 15, 2015. 8 Pahnke, Anthony. “Neo-​ Brandeisians and Marxists Unite!: Reevaluating the Nature of Power and Markets in Competition Policy.” New Political Science (2022): 1–​16. 9 Carlson, Tucker. Ship of Fools: How a Selfish Ruling Class Is Bringing America to the Brink of Revolution. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018. 10 Postel, Charles. The Populist Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 11 For a series of reprinted articles that express this sentiment, see Brandeis, Louis D. Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It. New York: Cosimo, Inc., [1913] 2009. 12 Carrier, Michael A. “The Four-​Step Rule of Reason.” Antitrust 33 (2018): 50. 13 Khan, Lina. “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox.” Yale Law Journal. 126 (2017). 14 Hafiz, Hiba. “Labor Antitrust’s Paradox.” University of Chicago Law Review. 87 (2020). 15 Hafiz, Hiba. “Rethinking Breakups.” Duke Law Review Journal. 71 (2021): 1491–​1603 16 Gelles, David. “Billionaire No More: Patagonia Founder Gives Away the Company.” September 14, 2022. New York Times. 17 Phillips, Leigh, and Michal Rozworski. The People’s Republic of Walmart: How the World’s Biggest Corporations are Laying the Foundation for Socialism. New York: Verso Books, 2019. 18 Hout, Thomas M., Michael E. Porter, and Eileen Rudden. How Global Companies Win Out. Graduate School of Business Administration. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1982. 19 On waste, see “The Economics of Food and Corporate Consolidation.” September 18, 2019. Food Print. 20 Johnson, Keith. “How Trump May Finally Kill the WTO.” December 9, 2019. Foreign Policy. 21 Office of Corey Booker. “Booker, Warren, Gillibrand Announce Comprehensive Bill to Address the History of Discrimination in Federal Agricultural Policy. November 19, 2020. 22 USDA. “Advancing Equity at the USDA.” For more information, seewww.usda. gov/​equ​ity-​com​miss​ion 23 For a presentation of the general meaning of food sovereignty, see “Food Sovereignty.” La Via Campesina. January 13, 2003. A further elaboration can be found in the Declaration of Nyéléni, February 27, 2007, found here https://​nyel​ eni.org/​IMG/​pdf/​Decl​Nyel​eni-​en.pdf 24 Goodman, Jim. “Commentary: Stand Together to Defend Debt Relief for Black Farmers.” June 14, 2022. Daily Yonder. 25 Coppola, Jason. “Lakota Lead Native Americans, Ranchers and Farmers in Fight Against Dakota Access Pipeline.” August 13, 2016. Truthout.

126 Conclusion 26 Wezel, Alexander, Stéphane Bellon, Thierry Doré, Charles Francis, Dominique Vallod, and Christophe David. “Agroecology as a Science, a Movement and a Practice. A review.” Agronomy for Sustainable Development 29, no. 4 (2009): 503–​515. 27 See “A Hearing to Review the State of Black Farmers in the US.” Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives. March 25, 2021. Full transcription of the hearing can be found here, www.congr​ess.gov/​event/​117th-​ congr​ess/​house-​event/​LC67​546/​text?s=​1&r=​61 28 Lightfoot, Sheryl. “Settler-​State Apologies to Indigenous Peoples: A Normative Framework and Comparative Assessment.” Journal of the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association 2, no. 1 (2015): 15–​39.

Select Bibliography

American Farmland Trust, Farms Under Threat 2040: Choosing an Abundant Future. 2022. Anghie, Antony. “The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2006): 739–​753. Badger, Emily. “How the Rural–​ Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault Line.” New York Times May 21, 2019. Barnett, Barry J. “The US Farm Financial Crisis of the 1980s.” Agricultural History 74, no. 2 (2000): 366–​380. Blomley, Nicholas. “The Territory of Property.” Progress in Human Geography 40, no. 5 (2016): 593–​609. Brophy, Susan Dianne. “Reciprocity as Dispossession: A Dialectical Materialist Analysis of the Fur Trade.” Settler Colonial Studies 9, no. 3 (2019): 301–​319. Brulle, Robert. “30 Years Ago Global Warming Became Front-​Page News –​and Both Republicans and Democrats Took It Seriously.” June 19, 2018. The Conversation. Chang, David A. The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832–​1929. Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Cohen, Deborah. Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011. Coppess, Jonathan. The Fault Lines of Farm Policy: A Legislative and Political History of the Farm Bill. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018. Daniel, Pete. Dispossession: Discrimination against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil Rights. Durham: UNC Press Books, 2013. Davis, John Herbert, and Kenneth Hinshaw. Farmer in a Business Suit. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1957, 190. Debo, Angie. The Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek Indians. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941. Deloria, Vine. Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969. Deloria, Vine, and Clifford M. Lytle. The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998. Demeneix, Barbara A. “How Fossil Fuel-​ Derived Pesticides and Plastics Harm Health, Biodiversity, and the Climate.” The Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology 8, no. 6 (2020): 462–​464. Department of Labor. “Fact Sheet #12: Agricultural Employers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).” January 2020. Available at www.dol.gov/​agenc​ies/​whd/​ fact-​she​ets/​12-​flsa-​agri​cult​ure

128  Select Bibliography Dimitri, Carolyn, Anne Effland, and Neilson C. Conklin. The 20th Century Transformation of US Agriculture and Farm Policy. USDA Report. 2005. Dryzek, John S., and Jonathan Pickering. “Deliberation as a Catalyst for Reflexive Environmental Governance.” Ecological Economics 131 (2017): 353–​360. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “DDT Ban Takes Effect.” Press Release, December 31, 1973. Available at https://​arch​ive.epa.gov/​epa/​about​epa/​ddt-​ban-​ takes-​eff​ect.html Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). “Evolution of the Clean Air Act.” Available at www.epa.gov/​clean-​air-​act-​overv​iew/​evolut​ion-​clean-​air-​act Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-​2020. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 430-​R-​22-​003, 2022. Available at www.epa.gov/​ghgem​issi​ons/​draft-​invent​ory-​us-​gre​enho​use-​gas-​ emissi​ons-​and-​sinks-​1990-​2020. Erdman, Jonathan. “The April 2011 Super Outbreak: 16 Things We’ll Never Forget.” April 27, 2022. The Weather Channel. Estes, Nick. Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock versus the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance. New York: Verso, 2019. Farmworker Justice. “No Way to Treat a Guest.” 2012 and Centro de Derechos del Migrante, “Ripe for Reform,” 2020. Fierce, Milfred C. “Black Struggle for Land during Reconstruction.” The Black Scholar, no. 5 (1974): 13–​18. Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–​1877. New York: Harper Collins, 2002. Fraser, Nancy. “Legitimation Crisis? On the Political Contradictions of Financialized Capitalism.” Critical Historical Studies, no. 2 (2015): 157–​189. Fraser, Nancy. “Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to Michael Dawson.” Critical Historical Studies 3, no. 1 (2016): 163–​178. Friedmann, Harriet, and Philip McMichael. “The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologia Ruralis 29, no. 2 (1989): 93–​117. Galdiner, Walt. “The Importance of Agriculture Exports to U.S. Trade and the Farm Economy.” FCA Economic Report, September 9, 2015. Geisler, Charles C., and Frank J. Popper. Land Reform, American Style. Lanham: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984. Gerstle, Gary, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Alice O’Connor, eds. Beyond the New Deal Order: US Politics from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019. Gilbert, Jess Carr, Gwen Sharp, and M. Sindy Felin. “The Decline (and Revival?) of Black Farmers and Rural Landowners: A Review of the Research Literature.” (2001) Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. “Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of US Race and Gender Formation.” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity no. 1 (2015): 52–​72. Goodman, Ed. “Protecting Habitat for Off-​Reservation Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right.” Environmental Law. 30 (2000): 279–​362. Goodman, Jim. “Commentary: Stand Together to Defend Debt Relief for Black Farmers.” June 14, 2022. Daily Yonder. Gordon, Scott. “A Midcentury Turning Point for Migrant Farmworkers in Wisconsin.” Wiscontext. October 18, 2018.

Select Bibliography 129 Graddy-​ Lovelace, Garrett, and Adam Diamond. “From Supply Management to Agricultural Subsidies—​and Back Again? The US Farm Bill & Agrarian (in) Viability.” Journal of Rural Studies 50 (2017): 70–​83. Habermas, Jürgen. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: MIT press, 1991. Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. New York: John Wiley, 1996. Hafiz, Hiba. “Rethinking Breakups.” Duke Law Review Journal. 71 (2021): 1491–​1603. Hahn, Steven Howard. The Roots of Southern Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. Halvorson, Charles. Valuing Clean Air: The EPA and the Economics of Environmental Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Harvey, David. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism.” Geografiska Annaler. Human Geography 71, no. 1 (1989): 3–​17. Henderson, Nia-​ Malika. “The White Southern Democrat Is a Dying Species.” November 5, 2014. Washington Post. Hendrickson, Mary, Philip H. Howard, and Douglas Constance. “Power, Food and Agriculture: Implications for Farmers, Consumers and Communities.” Division of Applied Social Sciences Working Paper, University of Missouri College of Agriculture, Food & Natural Resource, The Bichler and Nitzan Archives, Toronto, https://​philho​ward​net.files.wordpr​ess.com/​2017/​11/​hend​rick​son-​how​ard-​consta​ nce-​2017-​final-​work​ing-​paper-​nov-​1.pdf (November 1, 2017). Henretta, James A. “Families and Farms: Mentalité in Pre-​Industrial America.” The William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History 35, no.1 (1978): 3–​32. Hertz, Thomas. “US Hired Farm Workforce Is Aging.” Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America 2019, no. 1490-​2020-​ 710 (2019). www.ers.usda.gov/​amber-​waves/​2019/​may/​us-​hired-​farm-​workfo​ rce-​is-​aging/​ Hoefle, Scott. “Beyond Cold War Pipedreams: What the West Was Not.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 30, no. 2 (2003): 95–​123. Hoppe, Robert. “Profit Margins Increase with Farm Size.” USDA-​ ERS 2015. www.ers.usda.gov/ ​ a mber- ​ waves/ ​ 2 015/ ​ j anu ​ a ryf ​ ebru ​ a ry/ ​ p ro ​ f it- ​ m ar​ g in- ​ i ncrea​ ses-​with-​farm-​size/​ Ikerd, John E. Crisis and Opportunity: Sustainability in American Agriculture. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Indian Land Tenure Foundation. “Land Tenure Issues.” https://​iltf.org/​land-​iss​ues/​ iss​ues/​ Kantor, Shawn, Price V. Fishback, and John Joseph Wallis. “Did the New Deal Solidify the 1932 Democratic Realignment?.” Explorations in Economic History 50, no. 4 (2013): 620–​633. Kelderman, Keene, Ari Phillips, Tom Pelton, Eric Schaeffer, Paul MacGillis-​Falcon, and Courtney Bernhardt. “The Clean Water Act at 50.” The Environment Integrity Project. March 17, 2022, 1–​73. Kelley, Darwin N. “The McNary-​Haugen Bills, 1924–​1928: An Attempt to Make the Tariff Effective for Farm Products.” Agricultural History 14, no. 4 (1940): 170–​180.

130  Select Bibliography Kelloway, Claire and Sarah Miller. Food and Power: Addressing Monopolization in America’s Food System. Washington DC: Open Markets Institute. 2019. Krogstad, Jens Manuel and Ana Gonzalez-​Barrera. “Key Facts about U.S. Immigration Policies and Biden’s Proposed Changes.” Pew Research Center. January 11, 2022. www.pewr​esea​rch.org/​fact-​tank/​2022/​01/​11/​key-​facts-​about-​u-​s-​immi​grat​ion-​polic​ ies-​and-​bid​ens-​propo​sed-​chan​ges/​ Lake, David A. “Export, Die, or Subsidize: The International Political Economy of American Agriculture, 1875–​1940.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 1 (1989): 81–​105. Lehner, Peter H., and Nathan A. Rosenberg. “The Climate Crisis and Agriculture.” Environmental Law Reporter 52 (2022): 10096. Lightfoot, Sheryl. “Settler-​ State Apologies to Indigenous Peoples: A Normative Framework and Comparative Assessment.” Journal of the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association 2, no. 1 (2015): 15–​39. Little, Amanda. A Look Back at Reagan’s Environmental Record. June 11, 2004. Seattle: The Grist. Longely, Robert. “The Bracero Program: When the U.S. Looked to Mexico for Labor.” May 9, 2021. ThoughtCo. MacDonald, James M. and Robert A. Hoppe. “Examining Consolidation in US Agriculture.” Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America, USDA. No. 1490-​2020-​636 (2018). Macpherson, Crawford Brough, “Introduction.” In Macpherson, Crawford Brough, ed. Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. Martin, Phillip. “Mexican Braceros and US Farm Workers.” July 10, 2020. Wilson Center. McMichael, Philip. “A Food Regime Analysis of the ‘World Food Crisis’.” Agriculture and Human Values 26, no. 4 (2009): 281–​295. McWilliams, Carey. Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Monke, Jim. “Budget Issues that Shaped the 2018 Farm Bill.” Congressional Research Service (2019): 1–​39. Mooney, Patrick H., and Theo J. Majka. Farmers’ and Farmworkers’ Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. Muhm, Don. NFO, A Farm Belt Rebel. Petersham: Lone Oak Press, 2000. Murphy, Sophia. “Strategic Grain Reserves in an Era of Volatility.” Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (2009): 1–​16. Nabhan, Gary Paul. “Earth Day at 50: Its Early Role in Sowing Social Justice.” April 22, 2020. Whole Terrain: A Journal of Reflective Environmental Practice. www. whole​terr​ain.com/​earth-​day-​at-​50-​its-​early-​role-​in-​sow​ing-​soc​ial-​just​ice/​ National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition. “Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers (Section 2501).” Available at https://​sus​tain​able​agri​cult​ure.net/​publi​cati​ons/​gras​sroo​tsgu​ide/​farm​ing-​opport​ unit​ies/​socia​lly-​disadv​anta​ged-​farm​ers-​prog​ram/​ Nembhard, Jessica Gordon. “Cooperative Ownership in the Struggle for African American Econmic Empowerment.” Humanity & Society 28, no. 3 (2004): 298–​321. Olsson, Tore C. “Sharecroppers and Campesinos: The American South, Mexico, and the Transnational Politics of Land Reform in the Radical 1930s.” The Journal of Southern History 81, no. 3 (2015): 607–​646

Select Bibliography 131 Otis, Delos Sacket. The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, (1971) 2014. PBS News Hour. “How Robots Can Help Give Struggling Dairy Farmers a Boost —​ If They Can Afford Them.” January 3, 2022. Peck, Jaime., and Adam Tickell. “Neoliberalizing Space,” 2002. Antipode 34, 380–​404. Perez, Maria. “Wisconsin’s Dairy Industry Would Collapse without the Work of Latino Immigrants—​Many of Them Undocumented.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 12, 2019. Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Polhemus, Mike. “U.S. Food and Beverage Imports Since 1999.” The Statistics Blog, May 31, 2019. Postel, Charles. The Populist Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Reynolds, Bruce J. Black Farmers in America, 1865–​2000: The Pursuit of Independent Farming and the Role of Cooperatives. No. 1502-​2016-​130760. 2003. Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism, Revised and Updated Third Edition: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Durham: UNC press Books, 2020. Rönnbäck, Klas. “Were Slaves Cheap Laborers? A Comparative Study of Labor Costs in the Antebellum US South.” Labor History 62, no. 5–​6 (2021): 721–​741. Rosset, Peter. Food Is Different: Why We Must Get the WTO Out of Agriculture. London: Zed Books, 2006. Salerno, Tania. “Cargill’s Corporate Growth in Times of Crises: How Agro-​ Commodity Traders are Increasing Profits in the Midst of Volatility.” Agriculture and Human Values 34, no. 1 (2017): 211–​222. Strickler, Jordan. “Government Payouts to Make Up 36% of Farm Income. Forbes. June 10, 2020. Tarter, Brent. “Bacon’s Rebellion, the Grievances of the People, and the Political Culture of Seventeenth-​Century Virginia.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 119, no. 1 (2011): 2–​41 Thomas, Patrick. “Justice Department Fails for Third Time to Convict Chicken Executives in Price-​Fixing Trial.” July 8, 2022. Wall Street Journal. Union of Concerned Scientists. “Climate Change and Agriculture: A Perfect Storm for the Twenty First Century.” March 20, 2019. Union of Concerned Scientists. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1910 Agricultural Census: Chapter 1, “Farms and Farm Property.” USDA, 1910. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1959 Agricultural Census. “Chapter 4: Farm Labor, Use of Fertilizer, Farm Expenditures and Cash Rent.” United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1964 Agricultural Census. “Volume 3, Part 2: Farm Labor.” United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2017 US Agricultural Census. USDA 2017. USDA. “New and Beginning Farmers.” Available here, www.nass.usda.gov/​Publi​cati​ ons/​Hig​hlig​hts/​2020/​cen​sus-​beginn​ing%20-​farm​ers.pdf United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). “Farm Labor: Number of Farms and Workers by Decade, US.” Accessed at www.nass.usda.gov/​Char​ts_​a​nd_​M​aps/​ Far​m_​La​bor/​fl_​fr​mwk.php Van Sant, Levi. “Land Reform and the Green New Deal.” Dissent 66, no. 4 (2019): 64–​70.

132  Select Bibliography Vocke, Gary. “Wheat: Background and Issues for Farm Legislation.” (2001). Available at www.ers.usda.gov/​webd​ocs/​outlo​oks/​39637/​50738_​whs0​701-​01.pdf ?v=​442.9 Weise, Elizabeth. “Mark Zuckerberg Drops Suits to Force Sale of Hawaiian Lands. USA TODAY January 27, 2017. White, Monica. Freedom Farmers: Agricultural Resistance and the Black Freedom Movement. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2018. Whitt, Christine, Jessica E. Todd, and James M. MacDonald. America’s Diverse Family Farms: 2020 Edition. USDA. 2020. Williams, Dennis C. The Guardian: EPA’s Formative Years, 1970–​ 1973. US Environmental Protection Agency, 1993. Wilson, Margaret Gibbons. “Florida’s Labor History Symposium (November 18, 1989). Proceedings.” (1991). Wing, Oliver, Carolyn Kousky, Jeremy Porter, and Paul Bates. “New Flood Maps Show US Damage Rising 26% in Next 30 Years Due to Climate Change Alone, and the Inequity Is Stark.” January 31, 2022. Yaffe-​Bellany, David and Michael Corkery. “Dumped Milk, Smashed Eggs, Plowed Vegetables: Food Waste of the Pandemic.” New York Times, April 11, 2020.

Index

AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Act) 13, 28, 62, 69, 120 acid rain 99, 102 agribusiness 3, 70–​3, 81, 116 AIM (American Indian Movement) 31 Anti-​Trust Law 5, 10, 13, 16, 78, 110, 115 anti-​war movement 97 ARP (Acreage Reserve Program) 35 Ash, Robert 96 automation 112 Bacon’s Rebellion 51 Bankhead-​Jones Farm Tenant Act 30–​2, 37, 112, 119 Biden, Joseph (Joe) (administration) 5, 58, 103, 115, 118, 120; and IRA (Inflation Reduction Act) 110–​11; and USMCA 81 BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color): and communities 12, 16, 28, 36, 89, 113, 120, 123; farmers 31, 35, 37, 78, 120–​2 Bracero Program 54–​6 Brandeis, Louis D 115 Bush, George Walker (administration) 103 CAFOs (confined animal feeding operations) 101 California Agriculture 6, 35, 48–​9, 56; and consolidation 103–​4 Carson, Rachel 93–​7 Cargill 78 catalytic converters 96–​9, 116 CCC (Commodity Credit Corporation) 70–​4 CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality) 96

Cesar, Chavez 43–​4 Chinese Exclusion Act 48–​9 Civil War, U.S. 2, 22, 27, 51–​3, 68, 81 Clean Air Act 91–​9 Clean Water Act 92, 112 climate change 5, 12–​14, 88–​9, 110, 112–​14; and agriculture 100–​4; and Habermas 92–​3, 97 Clinton, William (Bill) (administration) 57, 102–​3 Cobell v. Salazar 36 competition policy see Anti-​Trust Law consumer welfare standard see Anti-​ Trust law corporate consolidation 2, 5, 14, 16, 81 COVID-​19 pandemic 1–​6, 34, 58, 76, 81, 110–​11, 118, 120, 124 crisis (definition) 7–​14 crop insurance 5, 11, 17, 78, 99–​100, 114 CRP (Conservation Reserve Program) 34–​5 Dawes Act/​Curtis Act 26–​7 DDT 92, 94–​5 Democratic Party 11–​12, 15, 28, 58, 69, 80–​1, 89, 102–​3, 115 de Toqueville, Alexis 115 direct sales: CSA (community supported agriculture) 80; farmers markets 80 DOJ (Department of Justice) 78, 111, 115 Dust Bowl 6, 14, 28, 69 EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) 16, 89, 112 EQIP (Environmental Quality Incentives Program) 77–​8 ExxonMobil 102, 116

134 Index Farm Bill 5, 11, 13, 100, 114, 119, 121–​2; and land policy 29, 35–​6; and market policy 71–​5 Farm Security Administration (FSA) 29 FCA (Farm Credit Administration) 29 feedback loops 9, 12, 36, 66, 79, 80, 102 financialization 11, 35–​6 Florida agriculture 55 FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) 53 food sovereignty 120 foreign land acquisition 34 FOR (Farmer-Owned Reserve) 72 Freedman Bureau’s mission (the United States Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands) 27, 53 FTC (Federal Trade Commission) 78, 115 GATT (General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs) 74 GCC (Global Climate Coalition) 102 GHGs (greenhouse gases) 101, 113 Gore, Al 102 Great Depression 6, 11, 13, 28, 31, 72–​3, 81 Greenbelt Communities 29, 31 Growing Climate Solutions Act 103 Habermas, Jürgen: Between Facts and Norms 90; and Knowledge and Human Interests 90; Legitimation Crisis 7–​10, 13, 22–​3, 44–​6, 66–​7, 70, 102–​4; and public sphere 90–​1, 97; and Science and Technology as Ideology 90 H-​2A Visas 56, 111–​12 INA (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965) 55 Indian Reorganization Act (Indian New Deal) 31, 112 Indigenous people 5, 14–​15, 31–​2, 36–​7, 50, 71, 94, 110, 121–​2; and Cherokee people 24–​6; and Chickasaw people 24, 26; Choctaw people 24, 26; and Mvskoke (Creek) people 24, 26; and Seminole people 24, 26; and treaties 22–​7, 112 J.B.S SA (JBS) 78, 111 Jefferson, Thomas 4, 50 Johnson, Lyndon Baines. (administration) 94

Keepseagle v. Vilsack 36 Kennedy, John F. (administration) 94–​5 Kyoto Protocol 102–​3 land access 12, 29, 32–​3 Muskie, Edmund 95–​7 Nader, Ralph 95 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 56, 75 NAWS (National Agricultural Workers Survey) 48, 57 NCLR (National Conference on Land Reform) 32 Nelson, Gaylord 95 neoliberalism: ideas 2, 10–​12, 75, 81, 111, 116, 121; policy reforms 2, 10–​12, 36, 58, 72–​5, 77–​8, 102–​4, 111, 113, 118 new deal 28–​31, 53, 66–​9, 72–​3, 77, 81, 99, 112–​13, 116, 120 NFFC (National Family Farm Coalition) 120–​2 NFO (National Farmers Organization) 65 Nixon, Richard (administration) 92–​7 NLRA)/​Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) 53 NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 93 Obama, Barack (administration) 58, 103 parity pricing 46, 66, 69–​76, 79, 99, 112–​13, 116–​17 path dependency see feedback loops Pigford v. Glickman 36, 122 Populists 30, 115 Reagan, Ronald (administration) 56, 98–​9 RC (rural coalition) 120 Republican Party 11–​12, 15, 28, 52, 69, 75, 80–​1, 97–​102, 115 Resettlement Administration 29 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (administration) 13, 28–​30, 53–​4, 69 sharecroppers and tenant farmers 13, 30–​2, 46–​7, 53–​4, 68 Social Security Act 53 Soil Bank 35

Index  135 sovereignty 22–​3 STFU (Southern Tenant Farmers Union) 30 suburbanization, housing developments 21, 33–​4 SARE (Sustainable Agriculture Research and Extension) 77 SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) 36, 78, 80

UFW (United Farm Workers) 43–​4, 57 USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) 3, 14, 16, 119–​20; and labor policy 48, 54; and land policy 29–​34, 36; and market policy 72, 75, 77, 79, 93 USMCA (United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement) 75, 80

Tannenbaum, Frank 30 Termination (policy) 31–​2 Tokyo Round of Negotiations 74 treaties 23–​8, 122–​3 Trump, Donald (administration) 11–​13, 15, 33, 58, 75, 78–​80, 89, 103, 118 Tyson Foods 111

Wallace, Henry 30 Wisconsin Agriculture 11, 43 women’s movement 94, 97 World War I 28, 69 World War II 8, 11, 54, 70, 101, 112 WTO (World Trade Organization) 13, 74, 113, 117–​18