Agency, Freedom and Choice [1st ed.] 978-94-024-1613-8;978-94-024-1615-2

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xii
Introduction (Constanze Binder)....Pages 1-21
Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters (Constanze Binder)....Pages 23-42
Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed (Constanze Binder)....Pages 43-61
Plural Identities and Preference Formation (Constanze Binder)....Pages 63-84
Freedom Rankings and Freedom’s Agency Value (Constanze Binder)....Pages 85-104
Cultural Diversity and the Capability Approach (Constanze Binder)....Pages 105-127
Conclusion (Constanze Binder)....Pages 129-133
Back Matter ....Pages 135-159

Citation preview

Theory and Decision Library A: Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Constanze Binder

Agency, Freedom and Choice

Theory and Decision Library A: Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science Volume 53

Series Editors Julian Nida-Rümelin Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Berlin, Germany Martin Rechenauer Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany

This series deals with practical and social philosophy and also foundational issues in philosophy of science in general that rely on methods broadly based on rational choice. The emphasis in the Series A is on well-argued, thoroughly analytical and philosophical rather than advanced mathematical treatments that use methods from decision theory, game theory and social choice theory. Particular attention is paid to work in practical philosophy broadly conceived, the theory of rationality, issues in collective intentionality, and philosophy of science, especially interdisciplinary approaches to social sciences and economics. Assistant Editor: Martin Rechenauer (München) Editorial Board: Raymond Boudon (Paris), Mario Bunge (Montréal), Franz Dietrich (Paris & East Anglia), Stephan Hartmann (LMU Munich), Martin van Hees (Amsterdam), Isaac Levi (New York), Richard V. Mattessich (Vancouver), Bertrand Munier (Cachan), Olivier Roy (Bayreuth), Amartya K. Sen (Cambridge), Brian Skyrms (Irvine), Wolfgang Spohn (Konstanz), and Katie Steele (London School of Economics). More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6616

Constanze Binder

Agency, Freedom and Choice

123

Constanze Binder Erasmus Institute of Philosophy and Economics, Erasmus School of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland The Netherlands

ISSN 0921-3384 ISSN 2352-2119 (electronic) Theory and Decision Library A: ISBN 978-94-024-1613-8 ISBN 978-94-024-1615-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018964702 © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature B.V. The registered company address is: Van Godewijckstraat 30, 3311 GX Dordrecht, The Netherlands

To my parents, my sister, and my teachers, in gratitude.

Acknowledgements

The path of inquiry leading to this book, rough as it was at times, would not have been as rich, fascinating and inspiring if it were not for the great many people who crossed and shaped it. The journey to this book began while I was finishing my studies at Graz University. Nick Baigent sparked my first interest in social choice theory and formal work. I am deeply grateful to him for his continuous support, patient mentoring and friendship throughout the years. Most of the research contained in this book was conducted as part of the research programme Modelling Freedom: Formal Analysis and Normative Philosophy led by Martin van Hees at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Groningen. I am very grateful to Martin van Hees for his repeated and detailed comments on all the chapters of this volume and many inspiring discussions on the topic. Furthermore, I am grateful to my colleagues at the Faculty of Philosophy of Groningen University for their support and the very fruitful environment in which I was able to conduct this research. Without the inspiring research group meetings, whether the ‘Grundlegung’ meetings, the PCCP gatherings or the RIDE sessions and the many lunch and dinner discussions, this book would not be in your hands right now. I am particularly indebted to Han Thomas Adriaenssen, David Atkinson, René Boomkens, Igor Douven, Katherine Gardiner, Michel ter Hark, Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, Marli Huijer, Pauline Kleingeld, Barteld Kooi, Ulianov Montano, Baukje Prins, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Martine Prange, Bryan Renne, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Allard Tamminga and Judith Vega for their probing questions and inspiring comments during these sessions. Special gratitude is owed to the members of the Ethics Department. I could not have imagined a better place to conduct this research. I am particularly indebted to Matthew Braham, Boudewijn de Bruin, Beth Huffer, Frank Hindriks, Marc Pauly, Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Olivier Roy, Anke Schuster, Peter Timmerman and Martin van Hees. They not only commented extensively and patiently on my work but were always ready to ‘take off’ in pursuit of an idea or to engage in a pleasant argument. It was a pleasure and privilege to conduct part of the research for this book at the Economics Department of Osnabrück University. I am particularly indebted to Wulf Gaertner: the fascinating conversations I had with him inspired and shaped many of the ideas in this book. Moreover, I would like to thank Lars Schwettmann for the vii

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Acknowledgements

great discussions we had and his comments on a paper which was a predecessor of Chap. 6 in this volume. The book was completed at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I am particularly indebted to the members of the Erasmus School of Philosophy and the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE). The fascinating discussions with Ingrid Robeyns over the years and, in particular, during the time we were colleagues at Erasmus University were a major inspiration and motivation for large parts of the research contained in this volume. I am also indebted to Conrad Heilmann and Jack Vromen for their collegiality and support, as well as for the productive and inspiring atmosphere they created at the EIPE over the past years. Furthermore, I would like to thank Måns Abrahamson, Christiaan Broeckmann, Huub Brouwer, Manuel Buitenhuis, Christopher Clarke, Morten Fiebiger Byskov, Çaglar Dede, Erwin Dekker, Sam van Dijk, Patrick Delaere, Willem van der Dijl, James Grayot, Marli Huijer, Vaios Koliofotis, Sem de Maagt, Gijs van Oenen, Ilse Oosterlaken, Julian Reiss, Attilia Ruzzene, Maureen Sie, Daphne Truijens, Philippe VerreaultJulien, Tom Wells and Stefan Wintein for their organisational support and/or their probing and inspiring comments during our discussions on the topics covered in this volume. Special gratitude I owe to Ticia Herold, Evaline Bender, Marloes Westerveld and Lena Schots for their great administrative and managerial support in the past years. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Frank van der Duijn Schouten for all his advice and support. Importantly, I would also like to thank the entire EIPE community. Special gratitude goes out to past and current students of the Research Master in Philosophy and Economics who create through their enthusiasm, probing questions and great initiatives a uniquely inspiring and motivating research atmosphere which I was privileged to become part of in the years when this volume was being completed. The research contained in this book benefited greatly from a large number of conference, workshop and seminar presentations over the years. I would like to express my gratitude to the audiences at all these events for their very helpful comments and suggestions. In particular, I would like to mention two workshops whose participants encouraged me to pursue my work at a very early stage. The Cortona Colloquium on the capability approach and a workshop at the University of Galway in 2005 were crucial milestones in the early stages of my research. I am particularly grateful to Sabina Alkire, Enrica Chiappero, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Ingrid Robeyns for their advice, enthusiasm and encouragement to pursue the questions that started up the research for this book. And, too, I am very grateful to Christian List, Marc Pauly and Clemens Puppe for their detailed and encouraging comments on my Galway presentation. Moreover, I would like to thank Marlies Ahlert, Sabina Alkire, Antoinette Baujard, Walter Bossert, Luc Bovens, Richard Bradley, Burak Can, Ian Carter, Enrica Chiappero, Rutger Claassen, David Crocker, Franz Dietrich, Keith Dowding, Marcus Düwell, Ulle Endriss, Karin Enflo, Marc Fleurbaey, Anca Gheaus, Wade Hands, Lisa Herzog, Herrade Igersheim, Christian List, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Clemens Puppe, Ashley Piggins, Mozaffar Qizilbash, Martin Rechenauer, Ingrid Robeyns, Maurice Salles, Laura Valentini, John Weymark, Remzi Sanver, Kai

Acknowledgements

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Spiekermann, Harrie de Swart, Miriam Teschl, Johanna Thoma, Alex Voorhoeve, Andrew Walton and Yongsheng Xu for all the inspiring discussions and very helpful comments and suggestions throughout the years whenever I crossed their conference schedule. I am particularly indebted to Marc Fleurbaey and two anonymous referees for detailed comments on the article on which Chap. 4 is based, to Martin Rechenauer who provided comments on the entire final version of the manuscript and to Lucy Fleet and Karthika Menon for their patience during the publication process. My research at the University of Groningen formed part of the NWO-VICI programme ‘Modelling Freedom: Formal Analysis and Normative Philosophy’. I am grateful for the very generous setting in which I was able to conduct my research, made possible by the support of NWO. The work on this book also greatly benefited from research stays at the Centre for the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method of the London School of Economics, the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique, Lyon/St.-Etienne and the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research at the University of Salzburg. I am very grateful for the institutional support, the warm welcome and the conducive research atmosphere at all of these institutions, which greatly contributed to the research contained in this volume. The years during which this volume was completed came with ups as well as downs. I am very grateful to all the people who were at my side throughout these times. Thank you Diane Berger, Helga Moser, Joseph Gugganig, Bettina Wunder, Lia Peterseil, Leonhard Plank, Cornelia Staritz, Orly Kadosh, P. Hermann Imminger, C.PP.S., Andreas Lackner, Hanneke Jasper, Yke Reeder, Berber van Beck, Marc Pauly, Diana de Esch, Sarah Heilmann, Ayse Demirkan, Saskia Venegas Aernouts, Doris Hildebrand, Daniela Pamminger, Verena Eidenberger, Paul Friedrich, Karoly Toth, Jack Underwood and Anna Witte. Last, but certainly not the least, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my sister Tina, my parents and my grandparents, to whom this book is dedicated. Without their love, encouragement, prayers, unwavering support and constant optimism, this book would never have been completed.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Philosophical Literature on (Overall) Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Freedom Ranking Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Capability Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 4 7 12 16 19

2

Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Overall Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Desire Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Impossibility of Paternalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Non-specific Value Neglect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Agency and the Importance of Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 The Necessity of a Value-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 24 28 31 33 35 38 40 40

3

Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Freedom Ranking Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Diversity of Options and Freedom Rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Similarity Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Diversity Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Weitzman and a Restricted Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Diversity and Cardinality of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43 43 46 48 50 52 56 57 59 61

4

Plural Identities and Preference Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Agency, Plural Identities and Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Intra-personal Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Identity Formalised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 63 67 70 xi

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4.4 Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Transitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Acyclicity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Identity Dissonance and a Domain Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 75 77 78 81 82

5

Freedom Rankings and Freedom’s Agency Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 5.1 Freedom Rankings and the Value of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 5.2 Freedom Rankings Between Scylla and Charybdis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 5.3 Freedom’s Agency Value and Preference-Based Approaches . . . . . . . . 93 5.4 Identity and Procedural Reasonableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5.5 Desire Dependency and the Impossibility of Paternalism, Reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

6

Cultural Diversity and the Capability Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Capability Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Culture and the Construction of Capability Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Culture and the Ranking of Capability Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Norms and the Value of Functionings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Context Dependency of Valuable Functionings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 Limits of Capability- and Freedom-Rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

105 105 108 112 117 119 121 124 125

7

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Review of the Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

129 129 131 133

A Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 B Plural Identities and Preference Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 C Freedom Rankings and Freedom’s Agency Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract In this chapter the interest in freedom in general, and in freedom’s agency value in particular is motivated. For this purpose the three areas of the literature this book draws upon and contributes to are introduced: the literature on the conceptualization and the value of overall freedom in political philosophy, the axiomatic literature on freedom-rankings in welfare economics and the literature on the capability approach. This introductory chapter concludes with an outline of the book. Keywords Agency · Freedom · Preference formation · Freedom ranking · Diversity · Capability approach

Freedom matters. Its name serves to justify an abundance of different, sometimes conflicting theories and endeavours. Throughout the cold war capitalist and socialist systems were defended in the name of freedom. Nowadays, freedom figures at least as prominently in arguments defending and opposing the deregulation and liberalisation of markets, often referred to as neoliberalism.1 Similarly, in many of the numerous conflicts around the world freedom is employed to support the cause of (both) conflicting parties. Most striking are perhaps those cases in which the people who are supposed to be liberated oppose their ‘liberation’ in the name of freedom.2

1 For

a defence of capitalist systems in the name of freedom, see Hayek (1949) and Gray (1981). For a defence, and a criticism of market liberalisation in the name of freedom, see Shearmur (1992) and Felber (2008) respectively. 2 Another case, perhaps more familiar to the reader, is the war launched against terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. The operation officially aims at defending the freedoms of Western democracies. At the same time, on many banners of the millions of anti-war protesters hitting the street all around the globe opposing the military operations that aimed at increasing the freedom of these very protesters among others, one could read the word freedom. To give just one example, the ‘Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)’ wrote on their banner: ‘The US Government Wants War, the People of the US and the World want Peace, [. . . ] long live Peace, Freedom and Democracy’. © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_1

1

2

1 Introduction

The struggle of the Zapatistas, an indigenous movement in Chiapas (Mexico), is an illuminating example of such a puzzling case in which people oppose their ‘liberation’ in the name of freedom. It is the freedom to be different, the freedom to pursue their own way(s) of life, which is one of the main objectives of the Zapatistian struggle. One of the main obstacles to pursuing their own different path of development which they identify is, interestingly enough, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) aiming at fostering a free market between Canada, the United States of America and Mexico. One example, often raised by the Zapatistas to illustrate how the NAFTA agreement undermines and constrains their way of living, is the change in the Mexican regulation of property rights the NAFTA accession brought with it. The section of the Mexican constitution which enabled the collective ownership of land, an institution many indigenous communities are/were built upon, was abolished in the course of the Mexican NAFTA accession as an obstacle to the free purchase of land. Ever since 1994, the year of Mexico’s NAFTA accession, a low-intensity war has been going on in Chiapas, a war in which both conflicting parties struggle for their cause in the name of freedom. How is it possible that people battle and kill each other in the name of the very same ideal? How can it be that people oppose their own ‘liberation’ in the name of freedom? Could it be that the free market mechanism, contrary to the way it is often justified in theory and practice, does not always enhance people’s freedom? Is there a way to assess systems in terms of the effect they have on a person’s freedom? These questions stand at the very beginning of this book. One possible answer is that freedom does not only come with a force of attraction, which is hard to resist, but also with a vagueness which allows the flagging of quite different, indeed even opposing policies, in its name.3 Theoretical inquiry and a deeper understanding of a concept, I believe, can prevent a possible misuse of a term, freedom in this case, and the power which comes with it. One way to do so, the way pursued in this book, is to strive for a clearer understanding of what it is that respectively increases and diminishes freedom. If freedom matters, how can we make judgements as to whether one policy, political system or social arrangement serves its pursuit better than another? Is there a way to compare different social states in terms of the freedom that people enjoy in them? Attempts to answer these questions face at least two difficulties. The first difficulty is the abundance of different definitions and conceptions of freedom put forward in the literature. Depending on the conception one adopts, the answers to the above raised questions can vary considerably. If one defines freedom by the absence of physical human interference, for instance the commodification of drinking water may not affect the freedom of those who cannot afford it anymore, whereas this is the case if one allows a lack of (economic) means to constitute a

3 This vagueness surrounding the notion of freedom in political discourse does not necessarily mean

that the concept of freedom belongs to the class of essentially contested concepts (Gallie 1956). Whether freedom is indeed such a concept is a point of discussion within the literature (Day 1986) and does not affect the analysis in this book.

1 Introduction

3

constraint on a person’s freedom as well. Furthermore such different conceptions of freedom are often implicitly based on certain ideas as to why freedom is valuable, and why it should matter in the evaluation of social states. In this book I take a different approach. Instead of defending one particular conception of freedom and then assessing how different states can be compared in terms of freedom defined in this particular way, I inquire as to how freedom has to be conceptualised and states can be compared such that one value (widely attributed to freedom) is captured, namely the value freedom has in virtue of being a necessary condition for a person’s agency. The second difficulty lies in the fact that the theoretical analysis of freedom is scattered across disciplinary boundaries separating areas of inquiry, which all come with – sometimes very different – understandings of what the term refers to, with different perspectives, motivations, and problems addressed, as well as the different methodologies employed. Misunderstandings are bound to occur as soon as discussion and inter-action across these boundaries is attempted. Nevertheless, this book is written in the conviction that the possible complications such misunderstandings yield is outweighed by the extra insights which the different (disciplinary) perspectives and tools can provide in gaining a deeper understanding of a concept. For this purpose I cross the boundaries between three different areas of the literature on freedom: the philosophical literature on overall freedom, the formal freedom ranking literature and the literature on the capability approach. Each of these three areas is concerned with the question of how different situations can be compared in terms of the (overall) freedom they offer (to a person).4 They differ, though, with respect to the perspective they take on this problem. While the philosophical literature on (overall) freedom is mainly concerned with the conceptual analysis of (overall) freedom and its role in political theory, the formal framework employed in the freedom ranking literature is compatible with a wide range of possible conceptions of freedom, and explores the question how different (choice) situations can be ranked in terms of the freedom (of choice) they offer. The capability approach attributes a crucial role to freedom in the evaluation of human well-being and development, and strives to assess policies and institutions in terms of their impact on people’s freedom. In this book I shall draw on these three areas of the literature and show how they can mutually enrich an analysis of freedom’s agency value. For this purpose it is important, however, to be aware of the different roles these three areas have in the overall analysis. The philosophical literature on overall freedom serves to motivate my concern with freedom’s agency value, and provides the conceptual underpinning. The freedom ranking literature and the formal rigour of the axiomatic analysis employed there will serve to clarify not only the informational requirements 4 Within

the literature the distinction between rankings in terms of a person’s (amount of) freedom and the value of a person’s freedom is not always neat and clear-cut (for a discussion of this point, see Dowding and van Hees 2009). The discussion in this book does not rely on this distinction. It is based on the point that every freedom ranking should capture freedom’s agency value. Whether this coincides with the ‘amount of freedom’ a person enjoys is a different question.

4

1 Introduction

that affect freedom’s agency value, but also the possible problems and pitfalls attempts to capture freedom’s agency value might face. This will then serve to explore the way in which freedom’s agency value can be captured. In a last step the capability framework will provide ‘the link to the ground’ in a twofold way: First, it will serve to illustrate how the theoretical analysis undertaken in this book can deepen the understanding of freedom in practical policy advice and the evaluation of human well-being across different societies and cultures. Second, it will enable us to put some theoretical and formal assumptions to the test, and to see how far they are (still) in line with the problems they were originally supposed to address.

1.1 Philosophical Literature on (Overall) Freedom The philosophical literature on freedom is as large as it is old. A common division of the extensive body of literature is between questions of free will in metaphysics and ethics and those on freedom in political philosophy.5 The analysis of this book focuses on the notion of freedom in political philosophy, and touches upon the free will debate only in so far as it builds upon models of agency championed there. The following overview does not attempt to be complete, its aim is rather to localize the framework employed in this book within the landscape of the philosophical literature on freedom. The nature of freedom is the topic of discussion in a substantive part of the philosophical literature on freedom. The number of different conceptions of freedom within the literature is enormous (Gray 1991). One of the most prominent contemporary views (MacCallum 1967) is to see freedom as a triadic relation: it concerns a person X, who is free from (a set of constraints) Y to do or to be Z. A considerable share of the discussion on freedom within the philosophical literature is about the content of the three elements of the triadic formula. Can only persons be free to do something, or can a group of people be so as well? What is the nature of the relevant constraints and barriers that can render a person unfree? Some (Hayek 1960) argue, for instance, that only intentional human interference can render a person unfree, whereas others (Sen 1992) hold that natural forces or a lack of resources can constrain a person’s freedom as well. What is it that a person can be free or unfree to do or to be? Can a person only be free to do something, that is to perform certain actions, or can she also be free to be something? These are but a few examples of questions addressed within the literature on particular freedoms, which can be summarised as dealing with the question under which conditions a (group of) person(s) is indeed free to do or to be something. The concept of overall freedom on the other hand, did not enter the literature until recently. A person’s overall freedom is commonly taken to be composed in one way or another of all the particular (un)freedoms she enjoys (or lacks). 5 For

a comprehensive theory of freedom that analyses the role of agency as employed in the literature on free will and the importance of freedom in the political and social context, see Pettit (2001).

1.1 Philosophical Literature on (Overall) Freedom

5

The importance of the concept of overall freedom as such did not remain undisputed, though. Kymlicka argues, for instance, that the concept of overall freedom is unnecessary and confusing (Kymlicka 2002, 147). Unnecessary, because a recourse to overall freedom is not necessary to justify the importance of certain particular freedoms. Confusing, because it suggests that different particular freedoms all promote the same interest, whereas different particular freedoms promote different interests in different ways. In opposition to this a number of scholars have defended the importance of (the concept of) overall freedom on different grounds. Some (Carter 1999; Kramer 2003) take it to be necessary to make sense of principles prominent in liberal discourse, such as the greatest equal freedom of all, or the maximization of freedom within a society. Others (van Hees 2000) have demonstrated its merits for the (theoretical) analysis of (political) systems, such as the question how the overall freedom people enjoy influences the efficiency and stability of political processes. If one takes overall freedom to be of importance, for one reason or another, the question arises how it should be conceptualised, and how one can make judgements as to whether a person enjoys more or less freedom in a particular situation. Conceptions of overall freedom commonly start from a certain conception of particular freedoms, that is some stance as to which constraints are relevant, and what the ‘things’ a person can be free to do or to be are, in order to then ask how the particular freedoms a person enjoys (or lacks) compose a person’s overall freedom. Given such a conception of particular freedoms, the question then is how they ‘add up’ to her overall freedom. That is, what information about the particular freedoms a person enjoys or lacks is relevant for one’s conceptualisation and measurement of her overall freedom. Problem 1 A particularly contested question in this context is whether a valuebased or a value-neutral approach to overall freedom should be adopted. Given the broad and often rather loose way in which the terms value-based and value-neutral approaches to freedom are used in the literature, it is important to briefly discuss the different ways in which values can enter the analysis of overall freedom, before I move on to discuss how this problem will be addressed in this book. First, values can enter via the conception of particular freedoms, underlying one’s conception of overall freedom. The question then is whether values have any bearing on one’s judgement of whether a person is indeed free to do (or to be) something, that is, to enjoy a particular freedom. Value judgements can enter via all three elements of MacCallum’s triadic formula. They can enter via the properties the agent in question is required to possess in order to be free, such as a real self or some form of self mastery. Alternatively, values can enter via the set of constraints one considers to be relevant, say if only immorally imposed constraints can diminish a person’s freedom. Last but certainly not least, values can enter on the level of the ‘things’ a person can be free to do or to be. Is a person only free to do or to be something she desires or values? Or is she also free to do something she does not (currently) desire?

6

1 Introduction

Second, one can take the value of particular freedoms to be relevant in the assessment of a person’s overall freedom. That is to say that information about the value of the particular freedoms a person enjoys should enter one’s assessment of her overall freedom. A particular freedom of value, say ‘to cycle home’, will then be taken to ‘add more’ to one’s overall freedom than one without value, say ‘to hop home on one leg’ to employ an example invoked by Sen (1990a). Throughout this book I refer to value-based approaches to (overall) freedom along this second line and take an approach to overall freedom to be value-based if, and only if, information about the value of particular freedoms is taken into account in one’s assessment of a person’s overall freedom. It is important to note that this way, how values can enter one’s assessment of a person’s overall freedom is independent of the definition of particular freedoms underlying one’s conception of overall freedom. That is, a value-based approach to overall freedom can come with a conception of particular freedoms which does not make any reference to values (see e.g. Kramer 2003). These ways as to how value judgements can enter one’s conception of (overall) freedom have to be distinguished from the debate about the value of freedom. Why are particular freedoms, or overall freedoms, of value for a person or a society? There is an extensive literature on the value of particular freedoms, such as the value freedom of free speech has for self-realization (Redish 1982), or the value freedom of the press has because of the important role it plays in the avoidance of famines (Sen 1999b). Similarly Rawls (1981) defends some particular freedoms, or liberties as he calls them, for their crucial role in a person’s creation of a sense of the right and a sense of the good.6 The value of overall freedom on the other hand has played a prominent role in the debate as to whether the concept of overall freedom is important or not. Carter (1999), for instance, advances a striking argument for the importance of overall freedom (and the need to measure it) on the basis of what he calls the non-specific value of (overall) freedom, i.e., the value overall freedom possesses independently of what it allows a person to achieve. As Carter (1999, chap. 2) argues, many strands of the liberal tradition ascribe such a non-specific value to overall freedom, i.e., the value freedom has for human progress, or the value attributed to overall freedom in virtue of being a necessary condition for human agency. Such views about the value of freedom are of course not independent of its conceptualisation. A particular view of the conceptualisation of freedom will affect one’s position concerning its value. Similarly, an implicit or explicit idea of what the value of overall freedom consists in will affect one’s stance as to how overall freedom should be conceptualised. In this book (Chap. 2) I provide an argument for a value-based approach to overall freedom on the basis of arguments raised against value-based approaches.

6 The particular freedoms Rawls is defending are ‘specified by a list as follows: freedom of thought

and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law’ (Rawls 1981, 5).

1.2 Freedom Ranking Literature

7

More precisely, I show that arguments raised against certain variants of value-based approaches are implicitly or explicitly based on freedom’s agency value. Freedom’s agency value, however, can only be captured by a refined value-based approach.

1.2 Freedom Ranking Literature It was not until recently that freedom entered the research agenda of welfare economic analysis. The foundations of welfare economics, for a long time exclusively resting upon utilitarian pillars, were shaken above all by the work of Sen. Sen (1970, 1980, 1982/1997, 1985) forcefully points to the need to broaden the informational basis of welfare economic evaluations: not only should information about people’s utility levels play a role in the evaluation of social states, but also information about the freedom and rights they enjoy.7 This, however, requires us to address the question how different (social) states can be compared in terms of the freedom (of choice) they offer, an endeavor the freedom ranking literature is concerned with.8 In the framework employed in the freedom ranking literature (choice) situations are depicted by sets of alternatives from which the person, whose freedom is under assessment, can choose precisely one alternative. These alternatives can be interpreted in various ways. They can correspond to what in the philosophical literature is commonly referred to as particular freedoms. Alternatively, and the more common line of interpretation in the formal literature, they can reflect bundles of commodities, (bundles of) actions the person can perform or bundles of ‘doings and beings’, also called functionings.9 An axiomatic approach is employed to address the question how sets of alternatives, also called opportunity sets, can be ranked in terms of the freedom (of choice) they offer to a person. One advantage of the formal axiomatic framework thereby is that it allows the exploration of the mutual compatibility of conditions, or axioms, a freedom ranking is plausibly supposed to fulfil, and the implications they yield. One of the first rankings, the Simple Cardinality Ranking (Pattanaik and Xu 1990) is based solely on information about the number of alternatives available in a set: the more options a set contains the more freedom of choice it offers. Many, including the authors themselves, considered this ranking that equates a person’s

7 For a more detailed account of Sen’s contribution to welfare economics and economics in general,

see Arrow (1999) and Atkinson (1999). this book the main focus is on the axiomatic literature on freedom measurement. For a combination of the axiomatic literature on freedom rankings, empirical freedom measurement and their implications for welfare state policies, see Bavetta and Navarra (2012). 9 In contrast to the philosophical literature on freedom, however, the question under what conditions an alternative does indeed form part of a person’s opportunity set, that is which constraints have to be absent for a person to enjoy a particular freedom, is not addressed in the freedom ranking literature. The focus of inquiry is how given opportunity sets can be ranked in terms of the freedom (of choice) they offer to a person. 8 In

8

1 Introduction

freedom with the quantity of alternatives open to her to be counterintuitive. One possible reason for this counterintuitive result is that no information about the alternatives other than their number is taken to influence the freedom a person enjoys in a certain situation. In response, most contributions within the freedom ranking literature strive to account for additional information that is relevant to a person’s freedom. One can roughly distinguish two main areas. The first area explores how information about the differences between the options open for choice can be integrated in freedom rankings. The second focuses on ways in which information about the value of alternatives can be taken into account in the assessment of a person’s freedom (for a survey, see Dowding and van Hees 2009; Baujard 2007). A number of different approaches to account for information about the differences between the alternatives in a set have been proposed in the literature (Klemisch-Ahlert 1993; Pattanaik and Xu 2000; Rosenbaum 2000; Bavetta and Del Seta 2001). The common way to pursue this is to employ a given primitive, such as a similarity relation over the alternatives (Pattanaik and Xu 2000), or a distance function (Rosenbaum 2000) in order to incorporate information about the differences between alternatives into freedom rankings. Problem 2 One problem these approaches face, however, is that they fail to take into account both information about the number of alternatives available in an opportunity set and information about the degree of difference between the available alternatives. Some (Pattanaik and Xu 2000) succeed in accounting for the number of dissimilar alternatives, but fail to account for information about the possible different degree of difference between them. When it comes to assessing the diversity of choice offered by a party landscape, for instance, such approaches would take an electoral system consisting of a party of the extreme left and the Christian Democrats to offer as much diversity of choice as a system consisting of the Socialists and a party of the extreme left, despite the different degrees of difference between them. Others (Klemisch-Ahlert 1993; Rosenbaum 2000) succeed in accounting for the degree of difference between alternatives in a set, but fail to account for the number of alternatives the set contains. In this case the problem is the inverse one, a party landscape consisting solely of an extreme right and an extreme left party would be taken to offer as much diversity as one in which a number of center parties are up for election in addition to the two extremist camps. One hope that has been raised (Dowding and van Hees 2009) is that a (formal) solution to this problem can be found in the emerging literature on the measurement of biological diversity (Weitzman 1992; Nehring and Puppe 2002). One of the most famous measures of biological diversity was put forward by Weitzman (1992). His measure is based on the pairwise distances between alternatives, or species, in a set. One drawback of his measure is that it is only well defined if the binary distance function satisfies a very restrictive property. While this property enjoys a great deal of plausibility in the measurement of biological diversity, as Weitzman (1992) argues, the question is whether it is plausible in the context of freedom of choice. While in biological diversity measurement one can settle on the differences

1.2 Freedom Ranking Literature

9

in the genetic code between species, or, as Weitzman (1992) does, on the distance to their nearest common ancestor, the basis on which one might judge the differences between alternatives in a social setting is not so straightforward. Sugden (2003) points to a closely related difficulty, namely that every account of a difference between two alternatives is dependent on the description of the world which in turn is dependent on a judgement as to which differences are relevant and which ones are not. Given that rankings of sets in terms of diversity are commonly based upon the differences between the alternatives contained in the set, they are ultimately dependent on, and possibly vary with, judgements as to which differences matter. Problem 3 How can those differences between alternatives which are relevant for (freedom of) choice be identified? In this book (Chap. 3) I suggest one way how those differences that matter for a person’s choices, and thus to freedom’s agency value, can be revealed from preference information. As it turns out the two rules I introduce for this purpose allow us to shed some light on other existing problems in the diversity based freedom ranking literature: the discussed diversity function does not only allow gaining a deeper insight into how plausible Weitzman’s (1992) biological diversity measure is for a social setting, but enables as well accounting for both information about the degree of difference between alternatives in a set, as well as information about the number of those alternatives that differ in some minimally relevant way. To account for information about the value of the alternatives in freedom rankings is the focus of the second area of the freedom ranking literature.10 The intuition is that the value of alternatives available to a person influences the (value of the) freedom she enjoys. Put differently, not every extra alternative necessarily increases the freedom offered by an opportunity set (Sen 1993). Intuitively it seems strange to say that the addition of a dreadful alternative, say ‘being beheaded at dawn’, increases a person’s freedom when being added to her opportunity set. A considerable number of contributions (Pattanaik and Xu 1998; RomeroMedina 2001), often referred to as preference-based approaches to freedom, explore ways of accounting for this intuition by making use of preference information to identify the valuable alternatives in an opportunity set. The interpretation of preferences and the way they are formally incorporated in freedom rankings affect the value of freedom the respective ranking is supposed to capture. One reason to value freedom is that it (might) allow(s) a person to achieve a higher utility level. In this case what is relevant are the best alternatives a set can provide in terms of a person’s actual preferences. Sets are thus ranked in terms of the best elements they offer to a person. This view coincides with the indirect utility ranking where states are compared solely in terms of a person’s utility satisfaction. One extension of this framework is to explore the value freedom has for a person

10 For

a discussion of the freedom ranking literature and the value of freedom, see Pattanaik and Xu (2015).

10

1 Introduction

in case her future preferences are uncertain (Kreps 1979; Arrow 1995). If a person does not know yet which preferences she will have in the future, say whether she will fancy a vegetarian dish or whether she will prefer fish the next evening, a restaurant which offers more freedom in the form of a more extensive menu is of value for providing more flexibility and thus leading to a higher satisfaction of the preferences the person will actually turn out to have in the future. A considerable number of authors is interested in the value freedom has apart from its being a means to increase a person’s utility (in the future). This interest in freedom’s intrinsic value, as the importance of freedom beyond the value it has for a person’s utility satisfaction is often called in the freedom ranking literature, is not surprising. After all, the importance freedom has in the evaluation of social states independent of its effect on a person’s utility was one of the major motivations behind the freedom ranking literature (Pattanaik and Xu 1990). The question, however, is what conceptual relationship freedom’s intrinsic value has with a person’s preferences. Sen (1991, 1993, 2002) emphasizes the opportunity aspect of freedom as one aspect of freedom that is valuable independently and beyond the utility of a person. If one is interested in freedom as opportunity it seems rather straightforward that not every new alternative will increase it, but only those a person has reason to value in the light of her objectives and goals. Sen (1993) explores a number of ways as to how a person’s actual preferences can be incorporated to discern valuable from non-valuable alternatives in those freedom rankings meant to capture freedom’s opportunity value. In this endeavor Sen interprets preferences in a broad way; following Arrow (1951/1963) he takes a person’s preference to be ‘the ordering based on his or her values that determines and rationalizes his or her choices’ (Sen 1993, 528). Even though it is very common in economic theory to assume a person’s preferences to be given, it has been questioned (Pattanaik and Xu 1998; Sugden 2003) whether this assumption is indeed compatible with a concern with freedom or opportunity. The concept of freedom or opportunity is based upon the idea of a person being an autonomous agent capable of exercising his free will within the limits of his ‘physiological and psychological propensities’ (Sugden 2003, 789), capable of forming her preferences by deciding which goals and objectives should guide her choices and shape her life in accordance with them. As a result, various ways have been explored of going beyond a person’s given actual (or probable future) preferences (Jones and Sugden 1982; Pattanaik and Xu 1998; Romero-Medina 2001). A common way to do so is to make use of a reference set of preference orderings to identify the valuable alternatives that contribute to a person’s freedom. The reference set is usually taken to include all those preferences a person could have chosen to possess. Some (Pattanaik and Xu 1998) take these to be the preferences a person could reasonably hold in the agent’s circumstances, while others (Sugden 1998) pursue an empirical line and equate the preferences the person in question could possibly possess, with those actually held by people who share a set of relevant sociological characteristics with the person in question. What is common to all these contributions though is that they consider all those

1.2 Freedom Ranking Literature

11

alternatives to be valuable, and thus to increase the freedom offered by a person’s opportunity set, which are ranked highest, and thus would be chosen by at least one of the preference orderings a person can possibly or reasonably possess.11 What is assumed is that a person can reasonably or possibly hold one of the preferences included in the reference set, whereby these preference orderings reflect the ordering of the alternatives after she has brought her (possibly plural) objectives into terms with each other, that is the preferences the person might hold ‘all-thingsconsidered’. The process how a person forms her all-things-considered preferences underlying her choices from possibly conflicting motives and objectives, and the role freedom plays thereby is hardly addressed. If one is interested in the value freedom has to a person for reflecting upon and choosing her own goals, objectives, and reflecting upon the values and desires that move her to action, how far is it then accurate to make use of all-things-considered preferences to identify the valuable alternatives contained in a set? Under which conditions can a person actually bring her (possibly) conflicting motives and objectives into terms with each other in an all-things-considered preference relation? In this book (Chap. 4) I shall pursue a new way to ‘go beyond a person’s preferences’ in order to shed light on the role of freedom in the process of a person’s preference formation. Instead of making use of reasonable or possible allthings-considered preferences I go one level beyond and consider the formation of a person’s all-things-considered preference relation and the role freedom plays therein. For this purpose I shall draw on the literature on agency and explore the question how the view of a transitive all-things-considered preference relation representing a person’s choices, as commonly assumed in rational choice theory, relates to models of agency in the philosophy of action, where a person is commonly taken to reflect upon a plurality of (possibly conflicting) motives for action. Problem 4 Under which conditions can a person actually form a transitive allthings-considered preference relation, from a set of possibly conflicting motives? In order to address this problem I make use of a social choice framework and picture the process of a person’s preference formation as a person’s task to aggregate her various objectives, or as I shall refer to them her plural identity, into an all-thingsconsidered preference relation that guides her choices. I subsequently draw on the developed framework in order to identify those (not necessarily chosen) alternatives in an opportunity set, which contribute to freedom’s agency value, that is, to the process in which a person forms her all-things-considered preference relation from her plural identity.

11 The various ranking differ though with regards to the set of alternatives relative to which the best

alternatives are identified. Some take an alternative to be valuable if it is ranked at least as high as all alternatives in the same opportunity set (Pattanaik and Xu 1990), others do so if the alternative in question is best relative to all alternatives included in the two sets which are compared with each other (Puppe and Xu 2010), or relative to all alternatives in the universal set of alternatives (Romero-Medina 2001).

12

1 Introduction

Problem 5 How should the reference set of preference orderings be interpreted and how can it be delineated in order to capture the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation? In this book (Chap. 5) I show that whether existing preference-based approaches succeed to capture freedom’s agency value will (mainly) depend on the interpretation of the preferences invoked. As I argue, if the preferences in the reference set of preference orderings are interpreted along a substantive criterion of reasonableness, or along an empirical line the respective freedom ranking fails to account for the importance the availability of (possibly unchosen) alternatives in a set can have for a person’s preference formation, and thus fails to account for freedom’s agency value. I suggest a procedural criterion of reasonableness to identify the valuable alternatives on the basis of the objectives and values underlying a person’s preference formation. The resulting freedom ranking(s) succeed(s), as I argue, to capture the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation.

1.3 The Capability Approach The capability approach is a broad framework for conceptualising and evaluating human well-being, which gained increasing popularity in theory and practice within the last few decades. From a capability perspective, a person’s well-being should be assessed in terms of the freedom she enjoys to realise doings and beings she has reason to value. Pioneered by Sen (1980, 1985, 1992, 1999a), the capability framework developed out of criticism of existing theories and their (often implicit) assumptions as to what information matters in the evaluation of human well-being and social structures. The two most prominent theories nowadays, utilitarianism and the Rawlsian approach to justice, focus on utility information or (a person’s endowment with) primary goods, respectively. A brief exploration of the problems that occur if one focuses on utility or primary goods as the ‘currencies of justice’ is fruitful in understanding the foundations of the capability approach. Utilitarian approaches evaluate social states in terms of the utility of the people living in a society. A person’s utility is traditionally equated with her happiness, pleasure or her desire fulfillment.12 Among utilitarian approaches, a person’s state enters the evaluation of social structures (exclusively) by way of the person’s utility, that is her happiness or the extent to which she succeeds in satisfying her desires. One criticism of utilitarian accounts is that the exclusive focus on a person’s mental state, be that happiness or desire fulfillment, risks neglecting her actual physical con-

12 Contemporary

choice theory usually takes a person’s utility ‘as the numerical representation of a person’s choice’ (Sen 1999a, 67). For a critical discussion of the use of the ‘preference as choice view’ in welfare economic evaluations, see Sen (1973, 1985, chap. 3, 1999a, 67–70).

1.3 The Capability Approach

13

dition (Sen 1985, chap. 3).13 Due to adaptation phenomena, a person who is ‘ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfillment’ (Sen 1985, 21). Especially people suffering long-term hardship and in oppressive relationships adapt to the reality they face, draw happiness from the little they have and adapt their desires to what is within their reach. Due to such adaptation phenomena, the evaluation of a person’s state in terms of utility can lead to an ‘overestimation’ of her well-being that fails to reflect the actual hardships she faces. Approaches that focus on a person’s means to pursue (his conception of) wellbeing, such as primary goods, as advocated by Rawls (1971/1999), or a focus on the resource endowment of a person, as put forward by Ronald Dworkin (1981, 2000), face a different problem. They fail to account for people’s different abilities to convert means or resources into actual doings and beings (Sen 1990b, 1992, 1999a). A person who is pregnant or simply has a higher metabolic rate will need more nutrition (income) to be well-nourished than another person with a lower metabolic rate. Such neglect of human beings’ diversity in converting means into the ends they pursue (viz. the doings and beings a person can actually perform) can lead to the fact that equality in the realm of resources goes hand in hand with a sharp inequality in what a person can actually do or be. An equal distribution of resources among the members of a society can be associated with great inequalities among people in terms of what they can actually do and be, i.e. the life paths actually open to them.14 This hidden inequality is often reinforced by the fact that people who are poor in terms of resources or income are also those who possess certain characteristics, such as older age, disability or disease-proneness, which make it more difficult for them to convert the resources at their command into actual ‘doings and beings’, such as taking part in the life of the community (Sen 1990b, 116). A focus on (equality in the realm of) resources can therefore be accompanied by a sharp inequality among people with regard to what they can actually do and be in their lives. Thus the problems of existing theories can be summarised as follows. Focusing solely on a person’s utility achievement risks overestimating her actual state due to adaptation phenomena, and fails to account for a person’s freedom, whereas a focus 13 Another

prominent critique of (some) utilitarian approaches is their demand that social states be evaluated in terms of the sum total of utilities of all members of society, which leads to a neglect of distributional considerations. See Sen (1980). 14 For a more detailed discussion, which takes account of the differences between Rawlsian primary goods and Dworkin’s resources, see Sen (1984, chap. 13). For a reply to Sen’s criticism, see Rawls (2001, §51). Among other points, Rawls (2001, §51) points to the fact that primary goods allow for more flexibility (with regard to people’s different conversion rates) than Sen’s criticism assumes, since personal differences can be taken into account in a later legislative state, after the veil of ignorance has been lifted and more information is available. For a reply to an earlier piece by Rawls, where Rawls is making a similar point, see Sen (1990b, 117 fn. 18). Dworkin (1981, 2000, chap. 2, sect. 7.5) replies to the criticism raised by pointing to the broader use of the term resources in his theory, which also ‘include personal resources, such as health and physical capacity’ (Dworkin 2000, 300). Sen’s response to the reply can be found in Sen (1984, chap. 13.6).

14

1 Introduction

on resources fails to account for the different abilities people have to convert means into actual doings and beings. The capability framework allows the addressing of these problems by a twofold shift with regards to the information that matters in the evaluation of a person’s well-being. First, it focuses on the actual doings and beings, so-called functionings a person can perform, rather than the resources she needs to perform them, or the happiness or desire fulfillment such a performance yields. Functionings can range from very basic ones, such as ‘being well-nourished’, or ‘being literate’, up to more complex ones such as ‘having access to a community’. A person’s (actual) state can be described (and assessed) in terms of the functionings constituting it. Such a focus on what a person can actually do or be, rather than on the utility she derives from the resources available to her, thus enables one to take account of both: of her actual physical state, rather than the level of (possibly adapted) desire satisfaction, and of the possibly different abilities among people converting resources into doings and beings. Second, evaluation of human well-being with the capability approach allows shifting the focus from a person’s achievement to her freedom. A person’s freedom is reflected by her capability set, which includes all those bundles of functionings actually open to her. Freedom is important in the capability approach for at least three different reasons (Sen 1992, 40–42). Firstly, a focus on freedom instead of achievements allows an increase in the informational basis in the assessment of a person’s well-being. A case prominently invoked by Sen (1985, 201) illustrates this point. If we assess the well-being of an undernourished person it will make a crucial difference whether this person has deliberately chosen to fast or whether she is starving. However, to account for this difference one has to focus on the freedom the person enjoyed rather than on her achieved state of undernourishment. One has to assess whether there was no food available to her, in which case she is starving, or whether she deliberately rejected food intake for religious or political reasons. Secondly, the freedom to choose can be an important aspect of well-being itself. Think of two people, both working in a fast food restaurant. One of the two had the possibility of attending university, but preferred the income-providing job in the fast food restaurant, while the possibility of attending university was not open to the other person, for whom the job in the fast food restaurant was the only option available. If the fact that the job was deliberatively chosen in one case but not in the other affects the well-being of the two persons, one will have to focus on the options that have actually been open to them (rather than on their achieved state) to take this into account. Thirdly, a focus on freedom allows accounting for different conceptions of well-being people in a plural society may hold. Dependent on their conception of well-being, different people might ascribe different values to different bundles of

1.3 The Capability Approach

15

functionings. A focus on capability sets instead of the achieved functionings, thus leaves scope for a range of different conceptions of well-being and the resulting differences in the valuation of functionings.15 This focus on a person’s capability or freedom to realise valuable doings or beings, viz. bundles of functionings, constitute the characterising feature(s) of the capability framework. Otherwise, the capability framework is an incomplete framework which remains to be filled in (possibly) different ways, up to different levels of detail dependent on the problem it is supposed to address. No matter, though, whether it is employed in practical policy evaluation (Alkire 2002), whether it forms the basis of a global assessment of human development as in the annual UNDP reports, or it is further developed into a theory of justice (Nussbaum 2006), in all cases (at least) two questions will have to be answered. First, given the large number of doings and beings one can imagine, including ‘learning the telephone book by heart’ for instance, one has to identify those functionings which are relevant for the evaluation of a person’s well-being. One answer is that the (relative) value of functionings determines their relevance for evaluation. This leads to the question of how to identify the value of functionings. Two main answers can be found in the literature: Nussbaum (2000, 2006) has proposed a general list of valuable functionings inspired by an Aristotelian notion of human flourishing. She emphasizes that her list is universally applicable but has to be specified and extended in each particular setting. Contrary to that, Sen (1992) and many who work with the capability approach as an (incomplete) framework of evaluation, hold that the valuable functionings should be identified in a discussion and participation process among the people whose well-being is assessed. Second, once the value of functionings is identified, a crucial question then is how the value of functionings should be taken into account when comparing capability sets in terms of the freedom they offer to a person. The incompleteness of the framework, and especially the question as to how the valuable functionings should be identified has triggered much debate over whether the capability approach can indeed hold what it promises. Especially the question whether it can indeed account for human diversity in general, and for different notions of the good life in different cultures in particular has been questioned. To appreciate the importance of this issue it is important to be aware of the crucial role human diversity plays in the practical application of the approach, as in its theoretical motivation. The use of the capability approach as an evaluative tool for assessing human well-being and development on a global level as well

15 Sen

(1990b, 120) distinguishes between ‘inter-end variation’, referring to the variation of people’s ends, and ‘inter-individual-variation’, which refers to the varying abilities people have to convert resources into actual ‘doings and beings’. It is important to note that the Rawlsian theory of justice goes a long way to accommodate different ends, and varying conceptions of the good people in a plural society might strive for, as long as all ‘(permissible) conceptions of the good, however distinct their content and their related religious and philosophical doctrines, require for their advancement roughly the same primary goods’ (Rawls 1993/2005, 180).

16

1 Introduction

as across different persons, groups, societies and cultures, makes the possibility of accounting for human diversity in general and cultural diversity in particular of utmost importance on a practical level.16 In the theoretical motivation of the approach the role of human diversity is twofold. First, human diversity with regard to the different abilities among people to convert means (commodities) into ends (functionings), is one of the main motivations for the move from resources to the actual doings and beings a person can realize. Second, the move from achievement to freedom is inter alia motivated by a concern to take into account diversity on the level of values and different conceptions of the good life in a plural society. Is a focus on freedom sufficient, however, in order to account for differences in the notion of human well-being? The answer to this question will depend on the way the two open questions raised above are answered. That is, how the (possibly different) value of functionings, reflecting different notions of the good life, can be identified and how the value of the (bundles of) functionings available to a person is then taken into account in the ranking of capability sets, reflecting the freedom she enjoys to pursue valuable life paths. Problem 6 Can the capability approach account for cultural differences in the evaluation of human well-being? In this book (Chap. 6) I shall discuss how cultural differences can affect the specification of the capability framework in general, and the ranking of capability sets in particular. I shall draw on the freedom ranking literature to discuss this question. To remind the reader, the freedom ranking literature uses an axiomatic approach, to explore how sets of alternatives can be ranked in terms of the freedom of choice they offer to a person. One line of interpretation is to take the alternatives to be functioning bundles and the characterised rankings to be rankings of capability sets. I shall draw on the discussion about the value of alternatives in freedom rankings, in order to shed some light on possible problems in the ranking of capability sets. Moreover, I shall make use of the concrete interpretation of the capability framework, and its more extensive discussion as to how capability sets should be constructed, in order to shed some light on black spots within the freedom ranking literature. I show that existing freedom rankings cannot fully account for the role freedom plays within the capability approach: they fail to account for cases in which existing norms render the value of functionings dependent on the opportunity sets they form a part of.

1.4 Outline Within this book I shall address the raised problems and their relation to freedom’s agency value in the following way. In Chap. 2, I address Problem 1, that is, whether a value-based or a value-neutral approach to overall freedom should be 16 For

a survey of the use of the capability approach in practice, see Robeyns (2006). The most prominent examples of global assessment of development rooted in the capability approach are probably the annual human development reports issued by UNDP.

1.4 Outline

17

adopted. I shall argue that three arguments prominently raised against value-based conceptualisations of overall freedom are implicitly or explicitly based on the value overall freedom has in virtue of being a necessary condition for a person’s agency. More precisely, I discuss ‘the happy slave problem’, or a preference dependency of freedom more generally, as well as ‘the impossibility of paternalism’ as I call a conceptual problem which occurs if the value of particular freedoms is identified on the basis of some standard of value that is independent of the person in question, and ‘the non-specific value neglect’ as a problem of all value-based approaches (Carter 1999). Contrary to the way (some of) these problems have been employed in the literature so far, that is, to reject value-based approaches to overall freedom and motivate the move to a value-neutral approach to overall freedom, I shall argue that they actually support the case for a (refined) value-based approach. More precisely, they highlight the importance of freedom’s agency value, which, as I argue, can only be captured with a refined value-based approach. That is, an approach that accounts for the possible different importance of various particular freedoms in relation to the values and goals a person is deliberating on when making choices. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 contain the contributions the book makes to the formal literature. In Chap. 3 I turn to that part of the freedom ranking literature which is concerned with the importance of information about the diversity of the available alternatives for a person’s freedom of choice.17 In particular, I address the question to what extent the differences between options contribute to a person’s agency in virtue of allowing her to train her faculties of discrimination, reflection and judgement. While in the diversity-based freedom literature information about the differences between options is commonly taken as given, and attention is restricted to the question of how this information can be taken into account in freedom rankings, I go one step beyond and ask, addressing Problem 3, how those differences relevant for a person’s choices can be revealed from preference information. For this purpose I introduce two rules. The first derives a similarity relation over the alternatives from a given profile of weak orderings. The other rule is a diversity measure which, given any profile of weak orderings, assigns a diversity value to every (non-empty) subset of alternatives. As I demonstrate one of the discussed rules allows the bypassing of Problem 2, namely how both information about the degree of difference between options and the number of options available can be taken into account in freedom rankings. Moreover it allows the investigation of the plausibility of some diversity measures commonly employed in the measurement of biological diversity for freedom of choice. It turns out that the Weitzman measure coincides with the characterized diversity function if, and only if, one imposes a domain condition which can be interpreted as a (rather strong) requirement concerning the judgements about choice relevant differences across persons. In Chap. 4 I turn to a closer examination of the deliberation process preceding a person’s choices.18 In the freedom ranking literature, as in the rational choice

17 Chapter 18 Chapter

3 is based on Binder (2014b, 2017). 4 is based on Binder (2014a).

18

1 Introduction

literature more generally, a person’s choices are assumed to be represented by a transitive all-things-considered preference relation. That is, a person is assumed to have brought her possibly plural goals, values and desires into one transitive preference ordering which then guides her choices. In Chap. 4 I address Problem 4, and turn to the question under what conditions a person can indeed base her decisions on a set of plural values, or as I shall call it, on her plural identities. For this purpose I make use of a social choice framework and picture the task the person is facing as an intra-personal aggregation problem: a person has to derive his all-things-considered preferences from a profile of preference relations reflecting his plural identity. I show that if one allows the preference rankings reflecting a person’s various identity parts to be incomplete, provided a person’s aggregation procedure satisfies certain conditions, then one identity part strongly dominates. Furthermore, it turns out that even acyclic all-things-considered preferences become impossible as soon as one requires some minimal say of all identity parts the person might hold. In a last step I show that a domain restriction, reducing the conflicts within a person’s plural identity, leads to an escape from the highlighted impossibilities. In Chap. 5 I then turn to Problem 5 and to the question how the value of alternatives can be incorporated in freedom rankings in order to capture freedom’s agency value. For this purpose I investigate in a first step under what conditions (existing) preference-based approaches indeed face the problems of the valuebased approaches raised in Chap. 2, that is the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism. It turns out that this depends mainly on the interpretation of the preferences invoked. I argue that the preference-based freedom ranking literature is facing a Scylla and Charybdis kind of problem, since the two main lines of interpretation commonly adopted lead either to the problem of desire dependency or to the impossibility of paternalism, and thereby as argued in Chap. 2 fail to account for freedom’s agency value. In a second step, I propose one way in which the preferences used in freedom rankings can be interpreted and the valuable alternatives a set contains can be identified such that freedom’s agency value is captured. For this purpose I render the notion of freedom’s agency value more precise and take it to be the value freedom has for a person to reflect upon the priority she wants to give to her various identity parts at the moment of choice. I make use of an intersection approach as Sen (2002) has explored it in order to identify those alternatives relevant for a person’s agency, which are all those which are not dominated by some other alternative along all identity parts the person holds. The upshot of this chapter is that whether preference-based approaches can take account of freedom’s agency value depends on the interpretation of the preferences invoked and the way the reference set of preferences is delineated. If this is done on the basis of a person’s identity profile then freedom’s agency value can be taken into account. As it turns out, formally this approach coincides with the focus on best elements identified by a reference set of all-things-considered preference orderings if, and only if, the preferences reflecting a person’s plural identity are complete. In a last step, I turn to Problem 6 in Chap. 6 and explore whether the insights gained in this book can shed light on the question whether the capability framework

References

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can account for cultural diversity.19 After discussing possible cultural differences in the specification of the framework and the construction of capability sets, I turn to their ranking. For this purpose I draw on the freedom ranking literature and focus on one specific interpretation of freedom rankings, namely capability rankings. I show that existing approaches within the freedom ranking literature fail to account for cases which are crucial for the role freedom plays within the capability approach. More precisely by drawing on Sen’s work in rational choice theory I show that existing freedom rankings fail to account for cases in which norms render the value of functionings dependent on the opportunity sets they form a part of, which involve the violation of a consistency condition explicitly or implicitly assumed in existing contributions within the freedom ranking literature. Moreover they fail to account for cases which formed the basis of the very motivation to move to freedom in the evaluation of social states in the first place, namely the broadening of the informational basis in welfare (economic) evaluations. I take this finding as an indication of the formal limits of existing freedom rankings, including the approach put forward in Chap. 5, and shortly discuss how far a focus on refined alternatives, as discussed in other parts of the literature (Sen 1988), allows to account for the discussed cases. I conclude this book with a discussion of how the analysis of the agency value of an individual’s freedom (at a given point in time) relates to the agency value of the freedom a person enjoys in the society she is living in (over time).

References Alkire, Sabina. 2002. Valuing Freedoms. Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951/1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1995. A Note on Freedom and Flexibility. In Choice, Welfare and Development, a Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen, ed. K. Basu, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Kotaro Suzumura, 7–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1999. Amartya Sen’s Contributions to the Study of Social Welfare. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101: 163–172. Atkinson, Anthony B. 1999. The Contributions of Amartya Sen to Welfare Economics. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101: 173–190. Baujard, Antoinette. 2007. Conceptions of Freedom and Ranking Opportunity Sets. A Typology. Homo Oeconomicus 24: 231–254. Bavetta, Sebastianio, and Marco Del Seta. 2001. Constraints and the measurement of freedom of choice. Thoery and Decision 50: 213–238. Bavetta, Sebastiano, and Pietro Navarra. 2012. The Economics of Freedom; Theory, Measurement, and Policy Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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6 is based on Binder (2009).

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Binder, Constanze. 2009. Context dependency of valuable functionings: How culture affects the capability framework. In Debating global society: Reach and limits of the capability approach, ed. Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, 205–232. Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. Binder, Constanze. 2014a. Plural Identities and Preference Formation. Social Choice and Welfare 42: 959–976. Binder, Constanze. 2014b. Preferences and Similarity Between Alternatives. Rationality, Markets and Morals 5: 120–132. Binder, Constanze. 2017. A Measure of Choice-Relevant Diversity. Working Paper. Carter, Ian. 1999. A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Day, Patrick. 1986. Is the Concept of Freedom Essentially Contestable? Philosophy 61: 116–123. Dowding, Keith, and Martin van Hees. 2009. Freedom of Choice. In The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, ed. Paul Anand, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, 374–392. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, Ronald. 1981. What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 283–345. Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Felber, Christian. 2008. Neue Werte für die Wirtschaft, Eine Alternative zu Kommunismus und Kapitalismus. Wien: Deuticke. Gallie, Walter B. 1956. Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 167–198. Gray, John. 1981. Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice. Ethics 92: 73–84. Gray, Tim. 1991. Freedom, Issues in Political Philosophy. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International. Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1949. The Intellectuals and Socialism. The University of Chicago Law Review 16: 417–433. Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. van Hees, Martin. 2000. Legal Reductionsim and Freedom. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Jones, Peter, and Robert Sugden. 1982. Evaluating Choice. International Review of Law and Economics 2: 47–65. Klemisch-Ahlert, Marlies. 1993. Freedom of Choice. A Comparison of Different Rankings of Opportunity Sets. Social Choice and Welfare 10: 189–207. Kramer, Matthew M. 2003. The Quality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Kreps, David M. 1979. A Representation Theorem for “Preference for Flexibility”. Econometrica 47: 565–577. Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy, An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. MacCallum, Gerald G. Jr. 1967. Negative and Positive Freedom. The Philosophical Review 76: 312–334. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and human development the capabilities approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice, Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Nehring, Klaus, and Clemens Puppe. 2002. A Theory of Diversity. Econometrica 70: 1150–1198. Pattanaik Prasanta K., and Yongsheng Xu. 1990. On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56: 383–390. Pattanaik Prasanta K., and Yongsheng Xu. 1998. On Preference and Freedom. Theory and Decision 44: 173–198. Pattanaik Prasanta K., and Yongsheng Xu. 2000. On Diversity and Freedom of Choice. Mathematical Social Science 40: 123–130. Pattanaik Prasanta K., and Yongsheng Xu. 2015. Freedom and its Value. In The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Chap. 19, ed. I. Hiroshe, and J. Olson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, Philip. 2001. A Theory of Freedom; From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Puppe, Clemens, and Yongsheng Xu. 2010. Essential Alternatives and Freedom Rankings. Social Choice and Welfare 35: 669–685. Rawls, John. 1971/1999. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 1981. The Basic Liberties and Their Priority. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at The University of Michigan April 10, 1981. Rawls, John. 1993/2005. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness, a Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Redish, Martin H. 1982. The Value of Free Speech. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130: 591–645. Robeyns, Ingrid. 2006. The Capability Approach in Practice. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 351–376. Romero-Medina, Antonio. 2001. More on Preference and Freedom. Social Choice and Welfare 18: 179–191. Rosenbaum, Eckehard F. 2000. On Measuring Freedom. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12: 205– 227. Sen, Amartya K. 1970. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. The Journal of Political Economy 78: 152–157. Sen, Amartya K. 1973. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. Economica 40: 241–259. Sen, Amartya K. 1980. Equality of What? In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin, 195–220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reprinted in Contemporary Political Philosophy, An Anthology, ed. Robert E. Goodin, and Philip Pettit, 473–483. Oxford: Blackwell. Sen, Amartya K. 1982/1997. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell. Sen, Amartya K. 1984. Resources, Values and Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, Amartya K. 1988. Freedom of Choice, Concept and Content. European Economic Review 32: 269–294. Sen, Amartya K. 1990a. Welfare, Freedom and Social Choice: A Reply. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56: 451–486. Sen, Amartya K. 1990b. Justice: Means Versus Freedom. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19: 111– 121. Sen, Amartya K. 1991. Welfare, Preference and Freedom. Journal of Econometrics 50: 15–29. Sen, Amartya K. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1993. Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedom. Oxford Economic Papers 45: 519–541. Sen, Amartya K. 1999a. Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1999b. Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal of Democracy10: 3–17. Sen, Amartya K. 2002. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Shearmur, Jeremy. 1992. In Defence of Neoliberalism. Journal of Democracy 3: 75–81. Sugden, Robert 1998. The Metric of Opportunity. Economics and Philosophy 14: 307–337. Sugden, Robert. 2003. Opportunity as a Space of Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring It. Ethics 113: 783–809. Weitzman, Martin L. 1992. On Diversity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 363–405.

Chapter 2

Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

Abstract In this chapter I argue for the importance of freedom’s agency value and the need to adopt a refined value-based approach to freedom in order to capture it. I focus on the debate between proponents of a value-neutral approach to overall freedom (Carter, A Measure of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; van Hees, Legal Reductionsim and Freedom, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2000), and scholars who defend value-based approaches to overall freedom (Sen, J Econ 50:15–29, 1991; Oxf Econ Pap 45:519–541, 1993). In this debate value-neutral approaches are commonly motivated by a rejection of value-based approaches. I show that the most prominent arguments that reject a value-based approach to overall freedom in favour of a value-neutral one are implicitly or explicitly based on the importance of freedom’s agency value. More specifically, I examine three prominent arguments raised against value-based approaches: the problem of preference dependency in subjective value-based approaches, the impossibility of paternalism, a problem of objective value-based approaches, and the non-specific value neglect, a general shortcoming of value-based approaches to overall freedom raised by Carter (A measure of freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). In contrast to the way these problems are commonly employed in the literature, which is to motivate the rejection of value-based approaches and make the move to a value-neutral approach to overall freedom, I argue that these problems in fact make a case for a (refined) valuebased approach. More precisely, all of the three problems are, as I argue, implicitly or explicitly based on the failure of the respective value-based approach to take freedom’s agency value into account, that is the value freedom has for being a necessary condition of a person’s agency. As opposed to existing contributions Carter (A measure of freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) though, I argue that freedom’s agency value can only be captured by a (refined) value-based approach. This is an approach to overall freedom that takes account of the value of particular freedoms in terms of the various values and motives a person deliberates on before making choices. The chapter concludes with a more specific discussion of freedom’s agency value and how the availability of choice options can contribute to it. Keywords Freedom · Specific- · Non-specific value · Agency value of freedom · Desire dependency · Paternalism © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_2

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2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

2.1 Overall Freedom Over the last few decades, the question of how to measure a person’s overall freedom has become the subject of lively debate in both political philosophy and welfare economics. Overall freedom refers to the various particular freedoms or actions available to a person. Assuming one agrees on the circumstances under which one can say that a person is free to perform a given action, the question is how different sets of particular freedoms can be compared in terms of the overall freedom they offer a person. Does a person enjoy more freedom in a situation in which she can choose between three different schools compared to a situation in which she can choose between entering one particular school or undertaking an apprenticeship? Does the launch of a high-speed rail service increase overall freedom to a greater extent than a connection to the internet? Does the introduction of toll roads lead to a greater decrease in overall freedom compared to a cut in rail connections? Underlying the literature on overall freedom is an interest in the evaluation of social states and institutions in terms of the overall freedom they offer their members. Carter (1999, 4) and Kramer (2003, 8) for instance, motivate their analysis of overall freedom on the grounds that justice requires (at least partly) a certain distribution of overall freedom among the members of a society. Independently of the precise principle one endorses – that is whether justice requires, say, equal overall freedom for all or the maximisation of the sum of overall freedom – one would need a way to measure overall freedom if one were to examine different institutional arrangements in terms of justice.1 Van Hees (2000) is interested in the analysis of institutions in terms of the overall (legal) freedom they offer. He shows that if every person enjoys maximal legal freedom, then a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium exists in any political game. All of these contributions require the possibility of making judgements about degrees of overall freedom. Whether one is concerned with the analysis of social and political institutions in terms of justice, the existence of equilibria in political games or the incorporation of freedom in theoretical evaluations in political philosophy, welfare economic analysis or practical policy evaluation, what is required in all

1 The

importance of the concept of overall freedom has not remained undisputed, though. Ronald Dworkin (1977), for instance, questions the importance and intuitive plausibility of measures of overall freedom, or liberty as he calls it. He questions whether rights to particular liberties, such as freedom of speech, can be grounded on a right to liberty as such, which he then goes on to deny (Ronald Dworkin 1977, 269–271).

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cases is a way to compare different sets of particular freedoms in terms of the overall freedom they offer.2 One crucial issue here is what information is relevant when one tries to assess a person’s overall freedom. In this chapter I focus on the philosophical discussion of one question which has triggered some of the most intense debate: should information about the value of particular freedoms be taken into account in a measure of overall freedom? Should the value attributed to a particular freedom, say ‘freedom of religion’, matter when one is concerned with the question whether its availability affects a person’s overall freedom? Is a person ‘freer overall’ if he can move around without being restricted by traffic lights, in a country with a one-party system, than if he is living in a country with a variety of different parties from which he can choose on election day, but with traffic lights that restrict his movements?3 To put it more generally, should the value attributed to the particular freedoms, viz. the value of the alternatives in an opportunity set, be taken into account in the measurement of overall freedom? Approaches that answer this question affirmatively are commonly classified as value-based approaches. If the answer to the question is ‘no’ the approach in question is taken to belong to the value-neutral camp. Depending on how the value of alternatives or particular freedoms is identified, one can distinguish between a subjective and an objective line of value-based approaches (Kymlicka 2002, 145).4 Along a subjective line the value of an

2 The

various contributions differ, though, with respect to the question of which constraints are indeed relevant to the definition of a particular freedom. If one is concerned with a person’s legal freedom, as Van Hees (2000) is, for instance, ‘having access to the internet’ would form part of a person’s opportunity set if, and only if, it is not legally prohibited. Kramer (2003), who is interested in freedom in the socio-political realm, considers that a person’s ability to perform an action together with the absence of humanly imposed external constraints is necessary for a person to enjoy a particular freedom. Alternatively, if one is interested in a person’s (overall) freedom to achieve well-being from a capability perspective, along the lines set out by Sen (1985), then one might also take into account a person’s endowment with sufficient resources, together with her physical ability and the absence of environmental and social constraints. The main arguments put forward in this chapter remain valid under all possible accounts, as long as the constraints that define a person’s states of being do not have an impact on the person’s valuation of this freedom. This rules out cases in which a person prefers to exercise a freedom just because of the nature of the very constraints which entail she does not have that freedom: as, for instance, when a person prefers to read newspaper A to newspaper B only because the government prohibits the sale of newspaper A. Another important difference between the various contributions concerns the interpretation of particular freedoms. Carter (1999), for instance, focuses on an action interpretation, whereas Sen (1992) also allows the various particular freedoms, or functionings as he calls them, to refer to states of being. Kramer (2003) extends the scope even further to include additionally ‘undergoings’. For clarity I shall follow Sen and focus on a ‘doing or being’ interpretation. However, the argument I set out here is also valid under a broader or narrower definition of the relevant alternatives. 3 This example is a modified version of an example invoked by Taylor (1979). 4 Note that some parts of the literature discuss the importance of particular freedoms (Gray 1991; Kymlicka 2002) rather than their value. However the underlying issue is the same, namely whether the different importance of various particular freedoms, such as free traffic flow or freedom of worship, to use Taylor’s (1979) example, should influence our measurement of overall freedom.

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2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

alternative depends on the degree to which a person desires it or, formulated differently, on a person’s preferences (Gray 1991, 131). Loevinson (1977, 233), for instance, holds that if somebody is prevented from pursuing a certain course of action, his overall freedom, ceteris paribus, is curtailed. However, the decrease in the person’s overall freedom due to the interference will be greater the more the person desires the course of action that is restricted. Berlin (1969, 130) also takes this line, but amends it to take account not only of the importance of the particular freedom to the life plan of the respective person, but also a social criterion. That is, the value the ‘general sentiment of society’ puts on the particular freedom in question is also considered to be relevant. An objective line, on the other hand, exclusively identifies the value of particular freedoms on the basis of some standard, which is independent of the person concerned. There are different ways to do this. One possibility is to refer to a substantive account of what one has reason to value, as Gray (1991, 131) ascribes to Taylor (1979). Alternatively, one could invoke some perfectionist account of human well-being. One could, for instance, invoke Nussbaum’s list (2006, chap. 1, vii) of valuable particular freedoms based on an Aristotelian account of human flourishing, to identify the value of particular freedoms.5 Value-neutral approaches take the line that the increase in overall freedom yielded by an extra particular freedom is independent of the value ascribed to it. Note that this does not necessarily amount to saying that there is no difference in value between the various particular freedoms a person enjoys. All it says is that such differences do not affect the measurement of a person’s overall freedom. Most value-neutral approaches to overall freedom focus on the sheer quantity of action but vary as to the formula expressing how such actions should be ‘added up’ to get to a person’s overall freedom. Megone (1987, 618), for instance, suggests that the significance of particular freedoms can be reduced to a quantitative measure of the activities affected. The greater the number of activities a particular freedom opens up, the more it ‘adds’ to a person’s overall freedom. Steiner (1983, 74) suggests a formula that gives a person’s overall freedom as the ratio between the particular freedoms open to her divided by the total number of particular freedoms and unfreedoms.6 Carter (1999) develops Steiner’s formula further by proposing a

So one might say an alternative is valuable if, and only if, it is important and the crucial question to answer is how to identify the valuable or important alternatives. 5 It is important to note that Nussbaum does not aim at an approach to overall freedom, but strives to develop the capability approach further into a theory of justice. Indeed, she rejects the terminology of freedoms (Nussbaum 2003) and puts forward a list of capabilities meant to be a list of the ‘central requirements of a life with dignity’ (Nussbaum 2006, 75), which has to be guaranteed to all citizens if a society is to be just. Furthermore, she emphasises that her list is open-ended and has to be subject to revision in the light of critical discussion. These points are crucial when assessing whether her approach suffers the impossibility of paternalism, a problem discussed later on in this chapter. 6 Steiner (1983) notes that his formula could take account of the value assigned to different particular freedoms but rejects this line in the course of his argument.

2.1 Overall Freedom

27

detailed empirical approach to overall freedom. One of the characterising features of Carter’s measure, besides a detailed specification of how the counted actions should be described, is its focus on actions a person can perform in combination, so-called compossible actions. Overall freedom is equated with the ratio between the sum of all compossible actions a person can perform, and the overall number of compossible actions (viz. including those a person is prevented from performing).7 The motivation underlying an interest in overall freedom and the purpose of the exercise one engages in will have a crucial influence on the answer to the question whether to adopt a value-based or a value-neutral approach. If one is interested in the extent of the legal freedom offered by a given institution, and one subscribes to a neutral theory of the state, then the value a person assigns to some particular freedom is clearly less relevant than if one is interested in the relation between, say, a person’s overall freedom and her well-being. However, a number of more general arguments have been put forward as well.8 For instance, one type of argument appeals to the meaning one intuitively attaches to the concept of freedom. This type of argument is almost always used by defenders of a value-based approach. Sen (1990, 470), for instance, invokes the following two situations. In the first situation a person can choose between ‘travelling by a stiff tricycle’, ‘hopping on one leg’ or ‘rolling in dust’ and, in a second one, the person can choose between ‘an efficient bicycle’, ‘a smart car’ or ‘walking on two legs normally’. It seems intuitively clear, he argues, that the second case offers a person more freedom than the first. Value-neutral approaches to overall freedom, on the other hand, are commonly ‘justified’ in a negative way, i.e., by a critique and subsequent rejection of value-based approaches. In this chapter I provide an argument in favour of value-based approaches purely on the basis of the criticism raised against them. We shall see that it is not necessary to invoke intuitions about overall freedom, but that the assumptions underlying the criticism voiced against value-based approaches from a value-neutral stance themselves suffice to make a case for a value-based approach. For this purpose I consider three general arguments raised against value-based approaches in greater detail: the ‘desire dependency of freedom’, which points to a normative problem of the subjective value-based line; the ‘impossibility of paternalism’, which is a conceptual problem of the objective value-based line; and

7 A number of criticisms have been raised against the value-neutral measures put forward by Steiner

(1983) and Carter (1999). Sugden (2003) questions whether they are indeed value-neutral, given that every individuation of actions presupposes a certain choice as to how to split up the world and thereby a certain view and evaluation of the world in order to do so. (Van Hees 2000, 130) points to various other problems of Carter’s measure, such as the fact that it cannot take the diversity of the available actions into account. Other interesting criticisms have been raised by Kramer (2003). The argument in this chapter does not rely on the criticism raised against value-neutral approaches, though: I derive an argument for value-based approaches purely on the basis of the criticism voiced against them. 8 For a systematic discussion of semantic, normative and methodological criteria to structure a debate about different definitions of freedom, see Dowding and van Hees (2007, sect. 3).

28

2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

the ‘non-specific value neglect’, a methodological criticism raised against all valuebased approaches. I then argue that, instead of leading to their rejection, the three arguments in fact support the case for a value-based approach to overall freedom. More specifically, I show that the three criticisms of value-based approaches under consideration presuppose, implicitly or explicitly, the importance overall freedom has for a person’s agency. In contrast to proponents of a value-neutral approach (Carter 1999), though, I argue that this importance of overall freedom for a person’s agency, or as I call it, freedom’s agency value, cannot be captured if freedom’s measurement does not take account of the value of the particular freedoms open to that person. Henceforth I shall take a freedom ranking (or freedom measure) to capture freedom’s agency value if it ranks situations in which the agency value of a person’s (overall) freedom is higher above those situations in which freedom’s agency value is lower. To put it in lose terms, more of freedom’s agency value implies a higher score along such a freedom measure, whereas a higher score does not necessarily have to come with a higher agency value for a person’s freedom. The chapter is structured as follows. I discuss the three criticisms of valuebased approaches to overall freedom in greater detail in Sects. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. In Sect. 2.5 I argue that the criticisms discussed do not imply the adoption of a value-neutral approach to overall freedom. More precisely, I use an argument put forward by Kramer (2003) to show that an interest in freedom’s nonspecific value does not entail a value-neutral approach. In a second step I show that the problems of desire dependency and the impossibility of paternalism arise from a failure of the subjective and the objective line, respectively, to account for one specific instance of freedom’s non-specific value, namely freedom’s agency value. In Sect. 2.6 I then argue that an approach which strives to capture freedom’s agency value has to account for information about the values and goals which a person deliberates on when making choices.

2.2 Desire Dependencies One feature of value-based approaches which identify the valuable alternatives along a subjective line is that a person’s overall freedom depends indirectly on all factors that can influence and change the person’s preferences.9 Berlin (1969) famously indicated the problems to which such a preference dependency of a person’s overall freedom can lead. If degrees of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, I could increase freedom as effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them; I could render men (including myself) free by conditioning them into losing the original desires which I have decided not to satisfy. Berlin (1969, xxxviii)

9 In

this chapter I use the terms ‘desires’ and ‘preferences’ interchangeably.

2.2 Desire Dependencies

29

The problem is that, even though nothing changes in a person’s ‘objective circumstances’, viz. the particular freedoms which are actually open to her are the same, her overall freedom can nevertheless be increased or decreased by a change of her preferences. A person who enjoys the particular freedoms ‘to eat fruit’ and ‘attend games’, will have more overall freedom if she prefers eating fruit to any other meal or attending games to any other activity, than a person who would instead prefer a warm meal and to read a novel. The passage quoted above reveals that Berlin himself refers to two sources of preference change, an external one (‘I could render men free’) and an internal one (‘including myself’). In case of externally induced preference change, an outside party conditions a person into losing or adjusting her desires or preferences. This can be the tyrant invoked by Berlin (1969, 139), who extinguishes certain of his subjects’ desires. The tyrant could, for instance, affect the preferences of his subjects by propaganda. Similarly, it could also apply to more ‘subtle’ forms of manipulation, such as the selective provision of information. If biased media information leads people to ‘prefer’ security measures over the particular freedom ‘not to be detained without evidence’, the removal of the particular freedom ‘to walk around freely if no evidence is held against you’ will not decrease your overall freedom. Whatever the exact mechanics of the process, if a person no longer desires a certain option, it can be removed from (added to) that person’s opportunity set without decreasing (increasing) their overall freedom. The second source of preference change is internal. Two forms can be distinguished: a conscious and an unconscious one.10 A conscious internal change refers to a person’s intentionally changing her preferences through the conscious adoption of particular strategies of deliberation. Such deliberation can be triggered by various causes, such as new experiences, an encounter with other people who hold different world views, or by feasibility constraints.11 The problem intentional preference change creates for subjective value-based approaches, known as the inner citadel or happy slave problem, is that a person can influence, viz. increase or decrease her overall freedom, by intentionally changing her desires and preferences. This problem is commonly illustrated in terms of ‘the happy slave’, the slave who, because he has managed to enjoy his situation, is now said to be free. The happy slave is an example of a person’s intentional preference change triggered by the constraints he is facing. Christman (1991, 353) asks the question why such effects are counter-intuitive. Is it that a person can intentionally increase or decrease her freedom as such, or does the counter-intuitive flavour arise in cases where the (intentional) preference change was triggered by the very presence of the constraints? According to Christman the problem of the desire dependency of (overall) freedom is not due to the fact that

10 Strictly

speaking my definition allows for a third type, i.e., a conscious unintentional one, in which the person does not intentionally trigger a change in her preferences but is aware of it (whether she embraces it or not). For clarity’s sake, I do not consider this variant. 11 Elster (1983, 117) refers to the latter cases as ‘character planning’.

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2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

a person can influence her freedom by intentional preference change as such, but rather that the paradox arises ‘when there is a suspicion that the preference change resulted from the very presence of [. . . ] the restraint, [. . . ], causing the change in desire’ (Christman 1991, 353). Such a result may not always be counter-intuitive, however. If a person is ‘wise enough’ to abandon her desire to go to Mars, for instance, then it does not have the same counter-intuitive ring to it when one says the person increases her freedom.12 While there might be disagreement on whether an increase in a person’s overall freedom due to her intentionally changing her preferences is always problematic, the problematic nature is more obvious if the change is non-intentional and not something the agent is aware of. Unconscious preference change is related to a specific (psychological) phenomenon. A person’s evaluation of her situation triggers an unconscious causal process of desire extinction or preference adjustment to decrease cognitive dissonance. Within philosophy this phenomenon was famously analysed by Elster (1982, 1983) under the name of adaptive preferences.13 In the presence of long term hardships, deprivation or abusive relationships, people often adjust their desires and preferences, extinguishing those which are beyond their reach and, as Sen (1987, 46) puts it, ‘lack the courage to desire much’.14 If a deprived person lacks the option ‘to go to university’ and as a result stops desiring it, then the addition of this option to her opportunity set would not increase her (overall) freedom along a subjective line (since she does not desire it because of her preference adjustment). Here such an implication is clearly unacceptable. One can ask how far the problem of indoctrination or adaptive preferences prevails if one bases a subjective, value-based approach to overall freedom, not on a person’s actual preferences, but on all those present in the society in which he lives. We saw that Berlin admits this possibility when he refers to the general sentiment of society. As suggested by Sugden (1998), one could identify the value of alternatives on the basis of all those preferences held by persons with similar sociological characteristics to the agent in question. Does this constitute an escape

12 Of

course, what a wise choice amounts to might often not be obvious. Would one consider a person unwise, for instance, who fights all his life against the legal constraints he faces as a black person in a racist regime? 13 For a detailed discussion of adaptation phenomena and an argument that Elster’s definition fails to account for all of them, see Khader (2011). 14 The adaptive preference phenomenon is discussed frequently in criticisms of (some) welfarist approaches to evaluating human well-being. If a person’s welfare is equated with the satisfaction of her (actual) preferences, and welfarism is understood as a theory that demands the evaluation of a person’s well-being solely on the basis of her welfare, then the adaptive preference phenomenon can lead to a situation in which a person’s welfare is assessed as being higher than it would be before adaptation has occurred. For a more extensive elaboration of this critique of welfarist evaluation, see Elster (1982, 1983) and Sen (1987). Blackorby et al. (2005, 16) argue, however, that a restriction to well-informed and autonomously formed preferences in welfare (economic) analysis offers an escape from this problem. This points to the relevance of the analysis in this chapter of the relationship between a person’s overall freedom and her agency, a crucial element of the latter being the autonomous and reflective formation of her preferences.

2.3 The Impossibility of Paternalism

31

from the problems highlighted above? The answer to this question is negative if preference adaptation can be a group phenomenon. To illustrate this, consider a discriminated group whose members are not allowed to go to university, as a result of which their preferences have undergone an adaptation process, viz. they have stopped desiring to go to university. If a new policy which introduces free entry to universities for members of the group were then to be assessed in terms of the overall freedom measured by a value-based approach, the availability of the new option to enrol at universities in the opportunity set of the members of the respective group need not count as an increase in their freedom. If the sociological characteristics of the people whose preferences are used as input are the same as those possessed by the members of the discriminated group, the adaptive preference problem persists.15 To summarise, value-based approaches to overall freedom which identify the value of particular freedoms on the basis of the person’s desires or preferences run into the problem that external indoctrination, as well as preference adaptation internal to the person, can lead to an increase of the overall freedom a person enjoys.

2.3 The Impossibility of Paternalism One problem of objective approaches to overall freedom is a conceptual one, namely, it renders paternalism impossible. Paternalism is commonly defined in terms of the infringement of a person’s freedom motivated by an appeal to the person’s own good. That is, paternalism refers to (a) an act (of interference) of an agent X with the freedom of another person Y , which is (b) without the consent of Y , and (c) promotes the good of Y .16 Now, suppose we take freedom in clause (a) in the definition of paternalism to refer to overall freedom and adopt an objective value-based approach to overall freedom. This means that a particular freedom increases a person’s overall freedom only if it is considered to be valuable according to some standard, independent of a person’s own views. The standard could, for instance, be an objective list

15 An

important question is whether preferences are equally vulnerable to the problems discussed in case they are interpreted as a person’s goals or values rather than her desires. A person can reflect on and scrutinise the reasons she has for holding certain values, and this can indeed counter manipulation or adaptation processes. On the other hand, it might be easier to manipulate a person’s reasoning process (using selective information, for instance) than to ‘interfere’ with her desire formation. For an argument that valuation procedures are not less vulnerable to adaptation than desire-based accounts, see Nussbaum (1988, 175–176). For a discussion that touches on this point, see Anderson (1993). For an account of the structure of preferences in relation to reason, see von Wright (1972). 16 This definition is based on Gerald Dworkin (1972).

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2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

theory of well-being.17 Next, assume person X removes some particular freedom x from the opportunity set of person Y motivated by the promotion of Y ’s good or interests, where Y ’s good is defined along the lines of the objective theory under consideration, without the consent of Y . Thus clauses (b) and (c) of the definition of paternalism are satisfied. To see whether this is an instance of paternalism, consider clause (a) again. If interference is taken to mean that a person interferes with another person’s freedom if, and only if, he diminishes it, we do not then speak of interference if the freedom of a person is increased or is left untouched. Given that x is not considered to be valuable along the objective theory employed, the removal of it does not diminish Y ’s overall freedom.18 Hence X does not interfere with Y ’s overall freedom, and we do not face an act of paternalism since clause (a) in the definition above is not satisfied. In a sense these acts of paternalism are ‘defined away’.19 To illustrate, consider a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights on a case in which Sahin, a Turkish medical student, was prevented from attending lectures and taking examinations at her university because she was wearing a headscarf.20 In its reasoning the court appealed to the conflict between the virtue of gender equality and headscarves being a symbol of a religious dictate on women.21 This line of reasoning can lead to the conclusion that the particular freedom to wear a headscarf is not valuable for women. A removal of the option from a woman’s opportunity set would thus not count as an interference with her overall freedom along the lines of an objective value-based approach. So freedom is (by definition) not curtailed, and therefore it is not an act of paternalism. Of course the argument depends on the assumption that clause (a) is defined in terms of a person’s (overall) freedom. In his later work Gerald Dworkin (1988) adopts a definition of paternalism according to which a paternalistic act does not necessarily involve interference with a person’s freedom, but rather with a person’s

17 For

an introduction to objective list theories of human well-being, see Parfit (1984, app. I). For a thorough discussion of perfectionist theories of well-being, see Griffin (1986, chap. IV). 18 There is a special case in which the removal of a valuable option can never contribute to a person’s good, namely if the latter is judged in terms of a (perfectionist) theory of the good life which states that more choice, viz. a larger number of choice options, always contributes to the person’s own good. 19 Carter (2008, 64) makes a related, though different point in his criticism of republican theories of freedom. 20 The question whether women should be prohibited from wearing headscarves at public institutions assumed great prominence in public debate in various (European) countries. I refer to the debate only in so far as the prohibition of headscarves is based on an argument for the woman’s own good. For an illuminating discussion of rulings and related reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights on cases related to the ‘headscarf debate’, see Vakulenko (2008). 21 The European Court of Human Rights held that ‘the headscarf appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality’ (ECHR 2005, para 111).

2.4 The Non-specific Value Neglect

33

autonomy (Gerald Dworkin 1988, 122–123).22 Such an adjustment of the definition of paternalism may solve the problem – paternalism may become possible again. However, this redefinition nicely illustrates where the problematic flavour of the impossibility of paternalism comes from. Objective value-based approaches to freedom fail to capture the crucial role freedom is often taken to have for a person’s autonomy, that is to decide for herself what she ought to do or what she has reason to value, and act accordingly. The point is not whether the woman actually chooses the option ‘to wear headscarves in public’ but rather that the availability of this particular freedom allows her to decide for herself what she has reason to value and to shape her life accordingly.

2.4 The Non-specific Value Neglect Carter (1999) raises a different argument against value-based approaches to overall freedom, namely that they fail to take freedom’s non-specific value into account. The non-specific value of freedom is the value (overall) freedom has, independent of the value of the things it allows a person to do. Carter’s argument against valuebased approaches is embedded in a broader argument that aims to justify the interest in overall freedom and the need to measure it. To put his main argument into a nutshell: (overall) freedom has non-specific value, and we need a way to measure overall freedom in order to capture its non-specific value. Carter’s argument can be split into two parts. First, he argues that many liberal traditions do indeed assume that overall freedom has non-specific value. In a second step he argues that valuebased approaches to overall freedom fail to capture freedom’s non-specific value and are therefore not candidates for overall freedom measures. I shall not dispute his claim that freedom has non-specific value, nor shall I explore Carter’s own approach to overall freedom in greater detail at this point. What I am interested in is his argument that value-based approaches fail to capture freedom’s non-specific value. For this purpose I first explore the notion of freedom’s non-specific value in greater detail. Carter defines the notion of non-specific value in the following way: A phenomenon, x, has non-specific value (is valuable as such) if, and only if, the value of x cannot be described wholly in terms of a good brought about or contributed to by a specific instance of x or set of specific instances of x (1999, 34, italics added)

Applied to freedom, this means [. . . ] that the attribute “freedom” is non-specifically valuable is to say that its value cannot be described wholly in terms of the valuable phenomena other than freedom which are brought about by or partly constituted by certain specific freedoms, such as the freedom to leave one’s country or the freedom to practise Catholicism or the freedom to drive one’s car faster than 100 miles per hour (34).

22 Note

that Dworkin’s definition of paternalism is broader since he takes freedom, or liberty as he calls it, to be a necessary condition for autonomy (Gerald Dworkin 1988, 21). So every interference with a person’s freedom implies an interference with her autonomy.

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2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

Carter distinguishes between freedom’s non-specific intrinsic value and its nonspecific instrumental value.23 Freedom’s non-specific instrumental value is the value freedom has as a means to some other valuable phenomenon and is independent of how particular freedoms (constituting a person’s overall freedom) contribute to the valuable phenomenon in question (44–45). Carter (51) uses the example of money to illustrate this point. Money is usually valued as a means to obtain goods, satisfy desires and pursue one’s ends. However, given the uncertainty or even ignorance about one’s specific future desires and needs, viz. whether one would rather have a new TV set or the first edition of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, for instance, money has non-specific value, that is, value independent of the value of the specific things it allows one to purchase. One can value winning the lottery, even though one does not yet know how one would spend the money one might win. Similarly, overall freedom has non-specific instrumental value in so far as it is a means to satisfy future ends, which are unknown at the moment.24 It is freedom’s non-specific intrinsic value on which I focus in the remainder of this chapter. This, according to Carter, is the value overall freedom has in virtue of being a necessary condition or constitutive element of some valuable phenomenon. Carter (42) illustrates this form of freedom’s non-specific value by drawing on Hurka (1987). Consider two situations: in one, then different career options are available, including teacher, lawyer, politician, or accountant; in the other only the choice between two options, becoming a teacher or doing nothing is open to the person. The person prefers teaching to any other career path. Irrespective of the fact that his most preferred option, becoming a teacher, is available in both choice situations, he may prefer the wider option set to the narrower one. This is taken as an indication that (freedom of) choice has intrinsic value. Hurka, and Carter follows him, explains the preference for the larger set in terms of the value one places on one’s agency, on the possibility to make an impact on the world and to shape one’s life. The more often one can say ‘no’, the greater one’s agency, the more impact one has on the world when making choices and hence the more value there is in one’s situation (Carter 1999, 43). After having thus argued that freedom has non-specific value, Carter goes on to argue that all value-based approaches fail to capture it. He takes value-based approaches to ‘appeal to values other than freedom in order to attach weights to a person’s available actions, and that those weights should be seen as determining or at least in some way affecting the person’s degree of overall freedom’ (119). More

23 Carter

(Chap. 2) discusses two additional instances of freedom’s non-specific value: freedom’s unconditional value, a particular type of freedom’s intrinsic value, and freedom’s constitutive value, which as Van Hees (2000, chap. 8.2.) has argued is also a sub-type of freedom’s intrinsic value. 24 Another example of freedom’s non-specific instrumental value to which Carter (Chap. 2.4 a) points can be found in the liberal tradition following Hayek, where overall freedom is valued as a means to human progress. Due to human ignorance concerning the particular paths which lead to progress, overall freedom has non-specific value in an instrumental way by allowing people to try out ‘experiments of living’, some of which will prove fruitful as a means to human progress.

2.5 Agency and the Importance of Values

35

specifically, Carter rejects value-based approaches to overall freedom because they ‘reduce the value of having a certain measure of freedom to the values of the specific things one is free to do’ (127). Carter uses this claim to motivate the move to a value-neutral approach to overall freedom. He proposes an empirical or quantity of action approach, which is based on compossible actions, that is on all actions a person can perform in combination. A person’s overall freedom is then given by the ratio between the sum of compossible actions open to a person and the overall number of compossible actions (including those actions not open to the person) (Chap. 7).

2.5 Agency and the Importance of Values So far I have explored three criticisms raised against value-based approaches in the literature: desire dependency, the impossibility of paternalism and the neglect of freedom’s non-specific value. The question I take up in this section is whether these problems do indeed entail value-neutrality. Consider the third problem first. As we have seen in the preceding section, Carter (1999) justifies the move to a value-neutral approach on the basis of his criticism of value-based approaches for not taking freedom’s non-specific value into account. Kramer (2003) questions this point, though. More precisely, he questions whether qualitative aspects are indeed irrelevant to the measurement of a person’s overall freedom. He argues that while the question whether a person enjoys a particular freedom is independent of any value judgement, when measuring a person’s overall freedom one has to take qualitative attributes into account. More precisely, in line with Carter, he points out that overall freedom promotes certain ideals in a contentindependent way, such as human well-being or agency. In contrast to Carter, though, Kramer highlights that different particular freedoms may foster these ideals to a different extent. Two particular freedoms – to go to church or to go shopping on Sunday evening, say – can contribute differently to a person’s agency, depending on their value. One crucial point in Kramer’s argument (2003, 242) is the distinction between the value of doing x (possibly including the value of its consequences), and the value of enjoying the particular freedom-to-do-x (without necessarily exercising it). It is the difference between the value one derives from actually going to church and the value of the freedom to go to church.25 The fact that the definition of non-specific

25 To

be more precise, Kramer (2003, 243) makes a tripartite distinction between the non-specific, or, as he calls it, the content-independent value of the freedom to do x (such as the contribution the freedom to go to church makes to my agency), the specific or content dependent value of that freedom (that is, the value one assigns to be free to go to church), and the value of doing x (viz. the value of going to church). For the purpose of my argument the sufficient distinction is between the non-specific value of the freedom to do x, which I refer to as the value of enjoying the particular freedom to do x, and the value of doing x.

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2 Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters

value requires it to be independent of the things it allows a person to achieve, viz. the value of x, does not entail that it is independent of the value of the particular freedom-to-do-x. In short, Kramer’s (2003) argument shows that an interest in freedom’s nonspecific value does not entail the move to a value-neutral approach.26 Given this, we must be clear about how the availability of a particular freedom does indeed contribute to freedom’s non-specific value. In order to do this we need to know which kind of non-specific value we are trying to capture and how the availability of particular freedoms contributes to it. If we look at the other two problems discussed, viz. desire dependency and the impossibility of paternalism, we find that these point to the importance of one type of freedom’s non-specific value, namely freedom’s agency value. More precisely, we shall see that the root of both problems can be interpreted as a failure to capture how (not necessarily exercised) particular freedoms can contribute to a person’s agency. Moreover, a closer examination of the problems discussed will allow us to sharpen our understanding of the different ways the availability of particular freedoms can contribute to a person’s agency. Before I do so, however, I shall have to further specify the expressions I am employing. I take agency to refer to the capacity a person has to reflect upon (and possibly revise) the values, desires and goals motivating her actions, to form plans and to act on their basis. It refers to the capacity to perform an activity that is directed at a goal, where the person is usually taken to have adopted this goal in a process of overall assessment of the opportunities available to him. Freedom’s agency value is taken to be the value overall freedom has in virtue of being a necessary condition for a person’s agency. The availability of an alternative, or particular freedom, contributes to a person’s agency, and thereby to freedom’s agency value, if it fosters, or is even necessary to the exercise of one of these faculties constitutive for agency. Having clarified these terms, I can now proceed to examine the problems discussed more closely. Consider the impossibility of paternalism first. Independently of one’s stance on paternalistic actions, it seems problematic that cases of paternalism can no longer be identified. But why do we feel that way? The answer can be found in the importance we attribute to a person’s agency. The impossibility of paternalism occurs because the removal of an option which is not termed to be valuable along the objective standard invoked, i.e. ‘to wear a headscarf’ in the previous example, does not lead to a decrease of a person’s overall freedom. It fails to account for the importance the availability of the option ‘to wear a headscarf’ has for a person’s own values and consequently her agency to act upon these. This contribution can have a dual nature. First, the availability of the alternative and the choice open to her recognises her ability to make choices on her own. Independently of her final choice (and the way she makes it), the availability of the alternative has value in so far as it reflects the recognition of her agency. Second, the availability of the alternative allows her to

26 For

a more detailed account of Kramer’s argument, see Kramer (2003, chap. 5.2).

2.5 Agency and the Importance of Values

37

exercise her agency. The possibility of shaping one’s life through one’s own choices is part of what we mean when we speak about exercising one’s agency. Furthermore, the mere availability of an option may enable her to decide on her own what she has reason to value or ought to pursue; that is to reflect upon, possibly revise or reinforce the values she holds, and shape her life accordingly. In the case of adaptation, a process which, by assumption, would not have occurred had the alternative been present, the absence of the relevant alternative is the cause of the loss of a person’s agency. The person is no longer the source of her preferences, which are shaped by an unconscious process of adaptation or indoctrination ‘behind her back’. Her preferences and subsequently her choices are forced on her by the constrained circumstances in which she finds herself. Here the availability of a particular freedom can be seen as a requirement for a person’s agency, since, if the alternative were available to her, the causal process that forces a preference adaptation on her and thereby reduces, if not eliminates her agency, would not have occurred.27 The case of manipulation is somewhat more complicated. We saw that due to manipulated preferences the removal of an option will not lead to a decrease of a person’s freedom along a subjective value-based line, even though it would have done so had manipulation not occurred. However, in this case the availability of the option is not a guarantee that the person will not act on her manipulated preferences. This reflects the fact that the availability of options is not sufficient for agency, viz. a person might act on manipulated preferences even though other options are available. However, the availability of further options contributes to freedom’s agency value in so far as it encourages a process of reflection and deliberation which might run counter to indoctrination. As Hurka (1987, 365) notes, ‘people rarely deliberate about options they cannot choose’; very often it is the actual choice situation which calls for reflection, causing the person to think about the goals and values he wants to act on.28 So even though the availability of options is no guarantee that a person does indeed exercise her agency, viz. is not steered by external manipulating forces, it provides a protection against manipulation due to the fact that the availability of options fosters a person’s reflection and deliberation and thereby promotes her agency. To summarise, as Kramer (2003) has argued, an interest in freedom’s nonspecific value does not entail a value-neutral approach. However, in order to explore

27 Note

that the case in which a person changes her preferences intentionally in the light of constraint circumstances also reflects a certain infringement of her agency due to a lack of freedom. Even though the loss of agency is not as severe as in case of unconscious adaptation, since the person has triggered the process of preference change intentionally (or is at least embracingly aware of it), it was nevertheless triggered by the lack of overall freedom. 28 Note that Hurka (1987, 365) considers choice to be instrumentally valuable for this reflection process, using a Millian line of argument. ‘It exercises a high rational capacity, the capacity for discriminative valuing.’ For our argument it is not crucial whether we consider choice, or in our case overall freedom, as being of intrinsic or instrumental value to the process of reflection. What is crucial is that the value is non-specific.

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how far the value of particular freedoms can affect their contribution to the nonspecific value of (overall) freedom, we need to know which type of non-specific value we are actually concerned with. I have argued that the other two problems point precisely to the importance of one form of freedom’s non-specific value, namely freedom’s agency value. In the next section I provide a detailed justification for Kramer’s argument for the case of freedom’s agency value: if a measurement of overall freedom ought to be able to capture it, then one has to adopt a value-based approach to overall freedom.

2.6 The Necessity of a Value-Based Approach Thus what I am interested in is freedom’s agency value, referring to the value freedom has in virtue of being a necessary condition of a person’s agency. As we have seen in the previous section, the availability of a particular freedom can contribute to a person’s agency, and thereby to freedom’s agency value, in different ways. It can be a recognition of a person’s agency, it can allow a person to exercise her agency, it can be a requirement for agency, and it can promote agency. However, this does not yet answer our main question, which is whether one has to adopt a value-based approach to capture freedom’s agency value. I argue that all four of the ways a particular freedom can contribute to freedom’s agency value depend on a person’s system of values and goals. More precisely, on the system of values and goals a person deliberates about when making decisions. Various models as to how a person may arrive at a choice from a set of values or desires have been discussed in the literature. Some (Frankfurt 1971) use hierarchical models to illustrate the process in which a person brings the various desires or motives for her actions into a hierarchy which then guide her actions. Others (Watson 1973) employ a system of values the person is deliberating on before acting. Rather than discussing these different approaches in greater detail at this point, a topic I take up in Chap. 4 where I am concerned with the deliberation process preceding a person’s choice, I argue that the value of the options available to a person affect the degree to which she can indeed be said to be an agent along all of these approaches to agency. I do so in the context of the first two problems attributed to value-based approaches and the four different ways in which an alternative can contribute to freedom’s agency value.29 An alternative may be important when exercising one’s agency, that is, when making specific choices derived from one’s plans (Gerald Dworkin 1988, 80; Scanlon 1998, 252). One’s choices may reflect one’s values and judgements. But, clearly, whether one’s choices do indeed reflect one’s values depends not only on

29 Note

that this does not require the assumption that a person makes all her choices in a reflective way, nor does it impose any requirement on how such reflection takes place. All we are interested in is how overall freedom can contribute to this capacity, whether or not it is indeed exercised.

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the available alternatives but also on one’s values. If wearing red stockings does not reflect a particular value one has, whereas wearing a headscarf does, then surely the availability of either of the two options does not have the same effect on one’s agency. The importance of choice, and thereby the availability of alternatives as a recognition of the person’s agency, as discussed by Dworkin (1988, 80), is closely related to what Scanlon (1998, 253) calls the symbolic value of choice. According to Scanlon (1998, 253) in [. . . ] a situation in which people are normally expected to make choices of a certain sort themselves, individuals have reason to value the opportunity to make these choices because not having or not exercising this opportunity would be seen as reflecting a judgement (their own or someone else’s) that they are not competent or do not have the standing normally accorded an adult member of society.

However, as Scanlon points out, which choices have such symbolic value will depend on the society in which a person is living. Thus, whether the availability of an alternative, such as not to wear a headscarf, contributes to freedom’s agency value, by having such symbolic meaning, will depend on the value system of the person and of the society she is living in. Whether the availability of an alternative is a requirement for agency, viz. whether its absence can lead to an unconscious preference adaptation, will also depend on the system of values and goals the person holds. The non-availability of an alternative, say ‘to be beheaded at dawn’, which the person considers as utterly unappealing given her desires, values and goals, will in all likelihood not lead to a causal adaptation of her preferences, since no goals are frustrated in the first place. More generally, whether the non-availability of an alternative leads to causal preference adaptation will depend on the place the alternative has in the hierarchy of a person’s system of values and goals. The frustration of some more fundamental personal goals, such as nourishing one’s family, seems more severe than others, such as the goal to be the first person on Mars, and will thus lead to a more severe infringement of a person’s agency. Finally, the availability of an alternative can promote a person’s agency, due to the fact that it fosters and trains abilities which prevent manipulation from occurring. As (Mill 1859/1985, 122) famously argued: ‘The human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only in making a choice. [. . . ] The mental and moral, like the muscular powers are improved only by being used.’ But what will it depend on, whether a particular freedom contributes to the training of a person’s faculties? It seems straightforward that the contribution of a particular freedom to the training of a person’s moral powers will depend on the person’s (moral) values. It may, however, be less obvious in case of a person’s faculties of discrimination, which depend mainly on the differences between alternatives. As I shall explore in greater detail in Chap. 3, however, the question which differences between alternatives are relevant, and which ones are not, is in itself dependent on a certain evaluation of the world and therefore not free of value-judgements either.

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To summarise, all the four ways in which an alternative can contribute to a person’s agency value depend on the system of values and goals the person holds. Thus a measure of overall freedom that aims at expressing freedom’s agency value has to take the system of values and goals of the relevant person into account. In Chap. 5 we discuss a freedom ranking that avoids the problems introduced in this chapter and allows to account for the agency value of freedom.

2.7 Conclusion In this chapter I have argued for the importance of freedom’s agency value and the need to adopt a refined value-based approach to capture it. I did so by showing that problems usually employed to criticize value-based approaches, such as the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism are (implicitly) based on the importance of freedom’s agency value. Value-based approaches which suffer from these problems fail to capture freedom’s agency value. I argued that, even though some variants of value-based approaches are indeed vulnerable to the highlighted problems, this need not be so for all variants of value-based approaches. Yet the value-neutral approach was justified in terms of such an assumption. No matter whether the availability of an alternative is significant for the agency value of a person’s freedom in virtue of being a requirement for her agency, important for its recognition, or to exercise or promote it, in all cases the values or goals a person is deliberating on when making choices is relevant. Of course, this leaves us with the task of specifying such a value-based approach to overall freedom that indeed captures freedom’s agency value. Which information about available alternatives is relevant in order to capture their significance for freedom’s agency value along the lines identified in this chapter? I address this question in the subsequent chapters by drawing on the freedom ranking literature. There I discuss the information usually considered relevant in freedom rankings, that is preference information and information about the diversity of the available alternatives, in greater detail and explore how it relates to freedom’s agency value. In Chap. 3 I take up the question of how one can identify the differences between particular freedoms that are relevant to a person’s choices and the training of a person’s faculties of discrimination and judgement. In Chap. 4, I examine the conditions under which a person can indeed form an all-things considered preference from her system of values and goals before I examine in Chap. 5 how freedom can contribute to this process of deliberation and preference formation.

References Anderson, Elizabeth. 1993. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson. 2005. Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

References

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Carter, Ian. 1999. A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carter, Ian. 2008. How Are Power and Unfreedom Related? In Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. Laborde, Cecile, ` and John Maynor, 58–82. Oxford: Blackwell. Christman, John. 1991. Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom. Ethics 101: 343–359. Dowding, Keith, and Martin van Hees. 2007. Counterfactual Success and Negative Freedom. Economics and Philosophy 23: 141–162. Dworkin, Gerald. 1972. Paternalism. The Monist 56: 64–84. Dworkin, Gerald. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ECHR. 2005. Leyla S¸ ahin v Turkey, Judgement no. 44774/98, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-XI. http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action= html&documentId=789023&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table= F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 Elster, Jon. 1982. Sour Grapes – Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen, and Bernard Williams, 219–238. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes, Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry G. 1971. Freedom of the will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20. Gray, Tim. 1991. Freedom, Issues in Political Philosophy. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International. Griffin, James. 1986. Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Van Hees, Martin. 2000. Legal Reductionsim and Freedom. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Hurka, Thomas. 1987. Why Value Autonomy? Social Theory and Practice 13: 361–382. Khader, Serene. 2011. Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment. New York: Oxford University Press. Kramer, Matthew M. 2003. The Quality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy, An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Loevinson, Ernest. 1977. Liberty and the Redistribution of Property. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 226–239. Megone, Christopher. 1987. One Concept of Liberty. Political Studies 35: 611–622. Mill, John Stuart. 1859/1985. On Liberty. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1988. Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution. In Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, ed. Julia Annas, and Robert H. Grimm, 145–184. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2003. Capabilities as Fundamental Human Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice. Feminist Economics 9: 33–59. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice, Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Scanlon, Thomas M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Blackwell. Sen, Amartya K. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, Amartya K. 1990. Welfare, Freedom and Social Choice: A Reply. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56: 451–486. Sen, Amartya K. 1991. Welfare, Preference and Freedom. Journal of Econometrics 50: 15–29. Sen, Amartya K. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1993. Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedom. Oxford Economic Papers 45: 519–541. Steiner, Hillel. 1983. How Free: Computing Personal Liberty. In Of Liberty, ed. A. Phillips Griggiths, 73–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Sugden, Robert. 1998. The Metric of Opportunity. Economics and Philosophy 14: 307–337. Sugden, Robert. 2003. Opportunity as a Space of Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring it. Ethics 113: 783–809. Taylor, Charles. 1979. What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty? In The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan, 175–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Reprinted in Contemporary Political Philosophy, an Anthology, ed. Gooding, Robert, E. and Philip Pettit, 387–397, 1997. Oxford: Blackwell. Vakulenko, Anastasia. 2008. Islamic Dress in Human Rights Jurisprudence and the Surrounding Debate: A Critical Feminist Analysis. PhD-Dissertation, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom. von Wright, Georg H. 1972. The Logic of Preference Reconsidered. Theory and Decision 140: 140–169. Watson, Gary. 1973. Free Agency. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–220.

Chapter 3

Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed

Abstract In Chap. 2 I argued that the availability of particular freedoms contributes to the agency value of a person’s freedom in virtue of enabling a person to make significant choices. In this chapter I explore how the differences between alternative choice options can enhance the faculties constitutive for a person’s agency and therefore increase the agency value of a person’s freedom. Information about the differences between the alternatives open for choice is commonly considered to increase the significance of choice and thereby the freedom of choice a person enjoys. One class of contributions in the formal freedom ranking literature explores ways to incorporate information about the differences between alternatives available in a set: the more diverse the range of choice available to a person, the more significant it is and therefore the more freedom of choice she enjoys. A question which is hardly addressed in the formal literature, though, is which differences are relevant for the significance of a person’s choices. In this chapter I propose and analyse a way by which information about those differences among alternatives which matter to a person, and which are thus relevant for (significant) choice and freedom’s agency value, can be revealed from preference information. This chapter is based on Binder (Ration Mark Morals 5:120–132, 2014; A measure of choicerelevant diversity, Working Paper, 2017). Keywords Diversity · Decision theory · Choice-relevant difference · Diversity measure · Freedom ranking literature

3.1 The Freedom Ranking Literature As described in the introduction, the interest in freedom has witnessed a renaissance among (welfare) economists in recent decades. One of the first rankings put forward, the Simple Cardinality Ranking (Pattanaik and Xu 1990), ranks opportunity sets by the number of alternatives they contain: the more alternatives a set contains, the more freedom it offers. Many (including the authors themselves) were puzzled by this result, and started investigating how seemingly plausible axioms could yield (to use the authors’ own description of their result) this ‘rather naive and trivial © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_3

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rule for judging the degree of freedom of choice’ (Pattanaik and Xu 1990, 389). Especially puzzling was the fact that, along the Simple Cardinality Ranking, every alternative contributes in the same way to a person’s freedom, which seemed to be at odds with the intuitions commonly held about freedom. Which relevant information was missing in order to judge the possible different contribution various alternatives make to the freedom a set offers? The answer was to explore ways to take into account additional information relevant to a person’s freedom. Two lines of research subsequently evolved within the freedom ranking literature. One, which I discuss in greater detail in Chap. 5, explores ways to take account of information about the value or the eligibility of alternatives in freedom rankings. Along the second line – the one I focus on in this chapter – the objective is to incorporate information about the variety of choice offered by an opportunity set.1 The basic assumption is that a person’s overall freedom increases with the diversity of options available to her. Even though the relationship between a person’s freedom and the diversity of choice options available to her is hardly spelled out in the formal freedom ranking literature, one reason why diversity of choice options increases the freedom of a person is that it contributes to the significance and meaningfulness of the person’s choice. The importance of meaningful choice was prominently argued by Mill (1859/1985, 122): ‘[T]he human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only in making a choice. [. . . ] The mental and moral, like the muscular, powers are improved only by being used’. As the reader may recall, in Chap. 2 I argued that one way the availability of an alternative can contribute to the agency value of a person’s freedom is by allowing her to train her capacities of reflection and judgement, and thereby render her manipulation more difficult. How do differences between alternatives affect the development of these faculties? Will every particular freedom contribute equally to the training of these faculties? Is the difference in tax policy between two political parties equally significant as the different haircut of their leading candidates? Is a different year of bottling equally significant when it comes to two bottles of water as it is when applied to two bottles of wine? Or is a difference in the year a recording was made equally relevant when it comes to a Bob Dylan song or a Keith Jarret concert? What is the difference that is relevant to freedom of choice? 1 The diversity line and the value line constitute two relatively separate fields in the freedom ranking

literature. Commonly contributions focus either on the incorporation of value information or on the incorporation of diversity information. For a framework which takes account of both preference information and information about the similarity of alternatives, see Peragine and Romero-Medina (2006), Gustafsson (2010). Furthermore, note that some important contributions that focus on information other than the value or the diversity of options are omitted from this classification. Van Hees (1998), for instance, characterises freedom rankings which, in addition to the alternatives a person can actually choose, viz. the alternatives in her opportunity set, take account of information about the alternatives that are technologically feasible. This allows him to explore the conceptual relationship between a person’s freedom and technological development. Recently the question whether Carter’s spatio-temporal approach to the measurement of overall freedom can take proper account of diversity information received increasing critical attention (Shnayderman 2016).

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The answers to these questions will depend on the way the alternatives are described and the importance one attributes to their various characteristics, such as colour, mode of transport, and political stance. As Sugden (2003, 802) points out ‘we have [. . . ] to decide which real-world differences are significant and which are not’.2 The question immediately arises: significant for what? Sugden (2003, 801) states ‘[. . . ] that the answer must be in terms of choice-relevant differences, differences that are relevant from the viewpoint of someone who is choosing what to do.’ In the freedom ranking literature, information about the differences between options that matter for (freedom of) choice are usually taken as given. As I illustrate in greater detail in the following section, it is common to make use of a given similarity relation over the alternatives (Pattanaik and Xu 2000) or to use a given distance function (van Hees 2004), and then explore how this diversity information affects one’s freedom rankings.3 In this chapter I discuss the role of relevant differences between choice options for freedom’s agency value. I do so by drawing on suggestions how choice-relevant differences can be revealed from preference information (Binder 2014, 2017) and how relevant diversity can contribute to freedom’s agency value. More precisely, I show how both a binary similarity relation over the alternatives and a diversity measure can be derived from preference information. It is important to note that by doing so I make use of preferences in a way that differs from other preference-based approaches to freedom. As I shall discuss in greater detail in Chap. 5, preferences are commonly used in freedom rankings to incorporate information about the value of the available alternatives. In contrast to that, in this chapter I make use of another sort of information also contained in people’s preference orderings, namely the information about the differences they consider to be relevant for their choices. As it turns out, the results obtained not only constitute one way to reveal information about choice relevant differences between options; they also shed new light on existing problems in the freedom of choice literature: one is whether the structure of binary differences, which the Weitzman (1992) measure presupposes, is not only plausible in the measurement of biological diversity, but in the measurement of diversity in the social context as well. As I argue, the discussed results can be a first step to identify the differences that matter to a person’s agency value and shed new light on their formal structure that might differ from the measurement of other kind of diversity, such as biological diversity.

2 Arneson

(1985, 139) criticises action accounts of freedom on similar grounds. ‘[. . . ] variations on an act count as distinct only to the degree that the differences among the variations are judged significant by the acting person. The individuation of options is relative to what matters to us.’ 3 Nehring and Puppe (2002) make use of the weighted attributes of the options to identify the differences between them. They, however, take the weights as given.

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3.2 Diversity of Options and Freedom Rankings The diversity line in the freedom ranking literature deals with the question of how information about the variety of choice offered by an (opportunity) set can be taken into account in freedom rankings.4 The common way to approach this problem is to take the information about the differences between alternatives in a set as given primitives. The various approaches differ, though, with respect to what they take the given primitive to be. Some, Pattanaik and Xu (2000) for instance, use a similarity relation over the alternatives. The Simple Similarity-based Ranking they characterise is based on the (cardinality of) the smallest similarity-based partition of a set. The bigger this is, the more diversity the set offers. This enables them to distinguish similar from dissimilar pairs of alternatives. A set which offers a person the choice between a red train and a blue car would then be ranked higher in terms of freedom than a set consisting of a red car and a blue car only, since the number of smallest similaritybased partitions in the former is two ({{red train}, {blue car}}) whereas it is one in the latter ({{red car, blue car}}). A drawback of this approach is that it focuses solely on the cardinality of dissimilar options; it fails to take account of the degree of difference among them (van Hees 2004). To illustrate this, take the parties standing for election in a country, distinguished along a left-right scale. Suppose in one country (opportunity set) an extreme right-wing party, a moderate right-wing one, and a conservative party are standing for election. In a second country the extreme right competes for votes with the conservative camp and a party on the extreme left. Provided all parties are considered dissimilar to each other, the Simple Similarity-based Ranking would take the voters in country one to enjoy as much freedom of choice as those in country two; it only considers the number of dissimilar parties, but fails to account for the degree of difference between them. Others do try to take the different degree of (dis)similarity between alternatives in a set into account. For this purpose, Rosenbaum (2000), for instance, uses a distance function over the alternatives. He equates the freedom offered by a set with the maximal distance that exists between a pair of alternatives in it. This approach faces the inverse problem, though: it succeeds in taking the degree of diversity into account, but fails to consider the number of options a set contains. How plausible this is might depend on the problem under consideration. To take the party example again, a situation in which the extreme right competes with the extreme left for the electorate’s favour will offer the same degree of diversity as a situation in which, in addition to the two extreme camps, a centre party is up for election. Given these results, one important question is how to take into account both the information about the cardinality of alternatives in a set and the degree of distance between them. van Hees (2004) has pointed to various impossibilities that emerge as soon as one attempts to incorporate both considerations. Dowding and 4 For

a survey of the diversity literature, see Nehring and Puppe (2009).

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van Hees (2009, 380) raise the hope that an emerging literature concerned with the measurement of (biological) diversity (e.g. Nehring and Puppe 2002) could provide new insights into this problem. One of the most prominent contributions in the biological diversity literature is the Weitzman Measure (1992). Weitzman uses a given distance function over pairs of alternatives, to equate the marginal diversity an alternative adds to a set with the distance between the added alternative and the one in the set that is closest to it. He then proposes a diversity measure based on the sum of the marginal diversities of the alternatives in a set. However, one problem his measure faces is that it is unique only in very special cases, namely if the distance function over the alternatives is an ultrametric.5 As he argues (Weitzman 1992, 368) the structure of an ultrametric is quite plausible in the context of biological diversity. The information contained in an ultrametric can be represented by a rooted tree, which in turn can be interpreted as an evolutionary tree. The difference between two species can then be equated with the vertical distance back to their nearest common ancestor. How plausible, though, is such a structure in the context of freedom of choice? Nehring and Puppe (2009) take the limitation of the Weitzman Measure to reveal ‘a fundamental difficulty in the general program to construct appropriate diversity measures from binary dissimilarity information’ (Nehring and Puppe 2009, 301). They pioneered a more general multi-attribute approach to diversity (Nehring and Puppe 2002), which gives the diversity of a set in terms of the weighted sum of the attributes possessed by the elements in it. This more general framework allows them to explore the question of the conditions under which the diversity of a set can be identified on the basis of information about distances between pairs of alternatives, i.e. binary distances, alone.6 In this chapter I discuss a way to reveal information about the relevant differences between alternatives from preference information (Binder 2014, 2017). By doing so, I follow a suggestion first made by Dowding and van Hees (2009, 378). The main intuition underlying the approach discussed here is that a person has to perceive a relevant difference between two options in order to prefer one to the other. To

5 For

the definition of an ultrametric, see Footnote 13. and Puppe (2002) establish necessary and sufficient conditions the space of attributes has to satisfy for the diversity of a set to be given by a monotone function of the binary distances between the alternatives in the set. They find this to be the case if the set of relevant attributes satisfies a rather restrictive acyclicity condition (Nehring and Puppe 2002). Nehring and Puppe (2008) further develop the multi-attribute approach to diversity to shed new light on problems in the freedom ranking literature. They identify the extent of opportunity a set offers with the diversity of the alternatives it contains, where the diversity of alternatives is identified on the basis of the attributes they possess. They then inter alia explore how far one can get without the incorporation of value judgements (entering via the weights attached to the attributes of the alternatives) and conclude that the reach of such a purpose-neutral approach is rather limited. I take their result to be an indication of the importance of the endeavour underlying this chapter. Instead of avoiding value-judgements, this chapter starts from the assumption that any judgement about the differences between alternatives involves some (implicit) view as to which difference is relevant. In this chapter I discuss one way to reveal these relevant differences based on Binder (2014, 2017).

6 Nehring

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claim the converse – that indifference between two alternatives can be seen as an indicator for similarity – does not seem that straightforward. Indeed, it seems perfectly plausible for a person to be indifferent between two options which she nevertheless considers to be quite different. However, given the problem under consideration, this is not unduly worrying, since I am interested in the differences relevant to a person’s choices and subsequently relevant to freedom’s agency value an opportunity set offers to her. The main part of this chapter consists of the discussion of two functions. The first, the Diversity Revelation Rule (Binder 2014), assigns to each preference profile of weak orderings a similarity relation over the alternatives. The derived similarity relation ranks two alternatives as (dis)similar vis-à-vis each other if there is a minimal number p of preference orderings in the profile, which rank the two strictly against each other, viz. if the people holding the respective preferences perceive some relevant difference between the two alternatives. The second rule I discuss, the Diversity Measure (Binder 2017), is a diversity function, which assigns to each nonempty set of alternatives its diversity value. As is common in the cardinal diversity literature, it is based on a distance function between an alternative and a set of alternatives. In contrast to the existing literature, though, a ‘Quasi-extended Distance Function’ is defined not in terms of binary distances, but directly from the preference profile. As it turns out, the introduced Diversity Measure coincides with the Weitzman Measure in the case where one restricts the domain of preference profiles. The chapter is structured as follows. After introducing the definitions in Sect. 3.3, I introduce and discuss the Diversity Revelation Rule and the Diversity Measure in Sects. 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. In Sect. 3.6 I show that if the preference profile satisfies a certain condition, the Diversity Measure coincides with the Weitzman Measure (Weitzman 1992). Section 3.7 contains a brief discussion of how one of the introduced rules avoids the problem of combining information about the number of alternatives in a set and the degree of difference between them. I conclude the chapter by pointing out some limitations of the derived results and discuss the insights they provide about the relationship between choice relevant diversity and the agency value of freedom.

3.3 Definitions Let X be the universal non-empty set of alternatives, assumed to be finite. As stated in the introduction, the elements of X can be interpreted as bundles of actions or ‘doings and beings’, as well as commodity bundles. Z denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of X. Thus Z contains all opportunity sets which are supposed to be ranked in terms of freedom of choice. A preference over the alternatives is reflected by R, which is a binary relation on X, R ⊆ X × X. I and P denote its symmetric (for all x, y ∈ X, xIy if, and only if, xRy and yRx) and asymmetric (for all x, y ∈ X, xP y if, and only if, xRy and

3.3 Definitions

49

not (yRx)) parts, respectively. I interpret xRy as ‘alternative x is at least as good as alternative y’, xP y ‘alternative x is better than alternative y’, and xIy should be read as being ‘indifferent between alternative x and alternative y’. A preference relation can have the following properties. R is complete if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, xRy or yRx, reflexive if, and only if, for all x ∈ X, xRx, and transitive if, and only if, for all x, y, z ∈ X, xRy and yRz implies xRz.7 A preference relation R on X that is complete and transitive is called a weak ordering. The set of all weak orderings is denoted R. R M is the m-fold Cartesian product of R, where m ∈ N+ , and M = {1, . . . , m} henceforth. An element d in R M is thus a preference profile. This brings us to the interpretation of the preferences I invoke in this chapter. Different lines of interpretation can be taken in this respect, which have an impact on the interpretation of the derived results as well as on the plausibility of the way I make use of preferences. Firstly, the preferences in the profile can reflect the preferences of people in a community, society or country. This follows the intuition of Pattanaik and Xu (2000, 125), who emphasise that judgements about the dissimilarity between options depend on the (norms within the) respective society. Secondly, one can interpret the preferences contained in the profile as reflecting the various motives for action of one person. This interpretation makes the link between the diversity of options open to a person, and the agency value of her freedom more straightforward. In Chap. 4 I shall depict the process of reflection and deliberation preceding a person’s choices as one in which she derives her all-things-considered preference from her plural identity. Each part of her plural identity, say being an academic or being Dutch, comes with certain values, or more generally motives for action which induce a preference relation over the alternatives. To interpret the preferences contained in the profile as those representing the parts of a person’s plural identity would allow making the relationship between the difference between options, the significance of choice and a person’s agency more obvious: a difference between alternatives that matter with respect to (some of) a person’s plural identities can, along a Millian line, enable her to train her faculties of perception and judgement, and thereby increase the agency value of her freedom. Thirdly, one could focus on the differences which should matter and interpret the preference orderings as all those which some reasonable person might hold (rather than those which people actually hold). One can think of this third line in terms of Mill’s ‘competent judge’, who identifies all those, possibly subtle, differences which should matter for choice. All three lines of interpretations could be plausibly adopted for the formal framework developed in this chapter. In the following I adopt the first line and interpret the preferences I invoke to elicit diversity information as the preferences held by at least one of the members of the society in question. For clarity of exposition, I will use in all of my examples a particular set of alternatives, to wit, the different political parties some electorate can vote for.

7 Note

that completeness of R entails reflexivity of R.

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3.4 Similarity Relation One way to incorporate diversity information into subset rankings is to use a binary similarity relation S on X as a primitive (Bavetta and Del Seta 2001; Pattanaik and Xu 2000). S is a binary relation on X (S ⊆ X × X), to be interpreted as xSy, ‘x is similar to y’ and not (xSy), as ‘x is dissimilar to y’. S is symmetric if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, xSy implies ySx. S denotes the set of all symmetric binary relations S on X. Binder (2014) derives a symmetric similarity relation over the alternatives from a profile of weak orderings: Two alternatives are similar if, and only if, a sufficient number p, 1 ≤ p ≤ m, of persons are indifferent between the two, i.e. a sufficient number of people do not perceive a relevant difference between the two alternatives. For this purpose let for all x, y ∈ X, N(xIy) = #{i ∈ M | xIi y}. Definition 3.1 (Diversity Revelation Rule) Let f (·) be a mapping f : R M → S . f (·) is a Diversity Revelation Rule if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, there is some p ∈ M such that for all d ∈ R M , xSy if, and only if, N(xIy) ≥ p. Note that p can be different for different pairs of alternatives. One can imagine, for instance, that if it comes to the difference between two political parties, p would be set higher than in the case where one is concerned with the difference between the year of vintage between two fine wines. In the first case, it is in order to say that there is indeed a relevant difference between two political parties, and thus they contribute to the freedom of choice people enjoy in the respective party landscape, where one would require a larger number of people in the respective society to perceive a relevant difference between the two parties, whereas in case of two bottles of fine wine it might be enough if some relatively small number (p) of people do indeed perceive a relevant difference between the two sorts. To illustrate how the Diversity Revelation Rule works, take p = 2 for all pairs of alternatives, and the preferences as depicted in the following table (Table 3.1). We then get xSy, ySz and not (xSz). Condition 3.1 (Anonymity) f (·) is anonymous if, and only if, for any permutation φ(·) of M, and any d ∈ R M , f (R1 , . . . , Rm ) = f (Rφ(1) , . . . , Rφ(m) ).8 Anonymity rules out any ‘experts’ on diversity. We do not assume that some people are more competent than others in judging which difference between alternatives Table 3.1 Diversity revelation rule

8 To

simplify, we write f (R1 , . . . , RM ) instead of f ((R1 , . . . , RM )).

R1 z xy

R2 x zy

R3 xyz

3.4 Similarity Relation

51

(should) matter, but give equal consideration to the judgement of every person. Anonymity rules out, for instance, that the judgement of experts, say political scientists, have more weight than those of the ‘normal citizens’. Condition 3.2 (Monotonicity) f (·) is monotonic if, and only if, for all d, d  ∈ R M , for all x, y ∈ X, if [for all i ∈ M, xIi y implies xIi y] then [xSy implies xS  y]. Monotonicity rules out that the similarity relation between the two alternatives switches from similarity to dissimilarity, in case no person who was indifferent between the two alternatives has changed to a strict ranking. Condition 3.3 (Unanimity) f (·) is unanimous if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, [ for all i ∈ M, xPi y or yPi x] implies not (xSy) and [ for all i ∈ M, xIi y] implies xSy. Unanimity states that if every person ranks two alternatives strictly vis-à-vis each other (not necessarily in the same way), then there must be some relevant difference between the two, viz. they are dissimilar. Alternatively, if no person ranks two alternatives strictly against each other, then there is no relevant difference between the two, viz. the two are similar. Theorem 3.1 f (·) satisfies Anonymity, Monotonicity and Unanimity if, and only if, f (·) is a Diversity Revelation Rule. If one additionally requires the following Neutrality axiom to hold, the resulting Diversity Revelation Rule* requires p to be equal for all x, y ∈ X. Condition 3.4 (Neutrality) f (·) is neutral if, and only if, for all permutations θ (·) of X, all d ∈ R M , for all x, y ∈ X, [for all i ∈ M : xIi y if, and only if, θ (x)Ii θ (y)] implies [xSy if, and only if, θ (x)Sθ (y)]. Definition 3.2 (Diversity Revelation Rule*) Let f (·) be a mapping f : R M → S . We will call f (·) the Diversity Revelation Rule* if, and only if, there exists p ∈ M such that for all x, y ∈ X, for all d ∈ R M , xSy if, and only if, N(xIy) ≥ p. Theorem 3.2 f (·) satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality, Unanimity and Monotonicity if, and only if, f (·) is the Diversity Revelation Rule*. Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (Binder 2014) show that one can derive a reflexive and symmetric similarity relation on X from each profile of weak orderings. Moreover, it is easy to check that, if p = 1, S will be transitive too. However, in case p > 1, the similarity relation can be intransitive.9 The question of how to set p illustrates a problem pointed out above: binary similarity relations fail to account for the different degrees to which alternatives can

9 The

freedom ranking literature encompasses contributions that make use of transitive similarity relations (Bavetta and Del Seta 2001), as well as those that allow for intransitivity (Pattanaik and Xu 2000).

52 Table 3.2 The cardinality & degree of difference problem

3 Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed R1 x z y

R2 z xy

R3 y x z

be dissimilar to each other.10 To illustrate this for the Diversity Revelation Rule*, consider a Socialist party (x), a Green party (y) and a Christian Democratic party (z). Intuitively one might believe that all these parties are dissimilar to each other, but the difference between Socialists and Greens is less than the difference between the Christian Democrats and the Greens. However, both of these intuitions, that is that all parties are different, but the Greens are less so in comparison with the Socialists than they are in comparison with the Christian Democrats, cannot be accommodated if one makes use of binary similarity relations. This twist can nicely be illustrated by having a closer look at the question as to how to set p. Consider the profile as described in the table above (Table 3.2). If p equals 2 we see that with this profile a single party system consisting of Socialists alone ({x}) would offer less diversity than a situation in which the Greens were up for election as well ({x, y}); whereas the latter would offer the same variety of choice as a system in which the Socialists and the Christian Democrats are running for office ({x, z}), thereby failing to account for the greater degree of difference between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. If one were to set p equal to 1 then a system consisting of the Christian Democrats and the Socialists ({x, z}) would be taken to offer more diversity of choice to the voters than a system consisting of the Socialists and the Greens ({x, y}) does. In this case, however, the latter ({x, y}) would be taken to offer the same diversity as a single Socialist party system ({x}) does, failing to account for the fact that the Greens do enrich the diversity of the single Socialist party system (even though they might do so to a smaller degree than the Christian Democrats). Thus, no matter how one sets p, one will not be able to account for the possibly different degree of difference among the alternatives in a set.

3.5 Diversity Measure One way (Weitzman 1992; van Hees 2004) to incorporate information about the degree of difference into diversity measures is to use a cardinal distance function, which assigns to each pair of alternatives the distance between them

10 Bervoets

and Gravel (2007) have shown that a quaternary relation over pairs of alternatives can be used to compare the dissimilarity between pairs of alternatives. This allows taking account of different degrees of difference, but suffers from the inverse problem, namely that the number of alternatives cannot be taken into account.

3.5 Diversity Measure

53

(g : X × X → R).11 One way to do this is to use a binary distance function to specify an extended distance function D : X × Z → N, that is, to identify the distance between an alternative x and a set of alternatives A with some binary distance(s) between x and some element in A, such as the minimal distance or the maximal distance. D(x, A) can be interpreted (Nehring and Puppe 2002, 1163) as the marginal diversity x adds to A. The overall diversity a set offers is taken to be a function of the marginal diversities added up consecutively. To illustrate, consider three political parties again: Liberals (l), Conservatives (c) and Social Democrats (s). The difference between each pair of parties is then given by a binary distance function, say g(l, c) = 1, g(c, s) = 2, g(l, s) = 3. The extended distance function (D(l, {c, s})) (which equals 1, if taken to be the minimal distance) gives the marginal diversity a new party, in this case the Liberals, adds to an existing party system composed of the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. Weitzman (1992) equates the distance between an alternative and a set with the minimal distance, that is with the distance between the alternative and the element in the set which is closest to it.12 Definition 3.3 (Weitzman Measure) Given some d ∈ R M and some distance function g : X × X → R, the Weitzman Measure v ∗ (·) is a mapping v ∗ : Z → R, such that: for all x ∈ X : v ∗ ({x}) = 0 and for all A ∈ Z, #A > 1, and all x ∈ A, v ∗ (A) = v ∗ (A − {x}) + miny∈A g(x, y). One problem the Weitzman Measure faces is that, except for the case where the binary distance function g(·) is an ultrametric, the diversity value of a set will depend on the order in which the alternatives are joined together.13 To see this consider once again the example introduced above (which is not an ultrametric). If one wants to assess the diversity value of a set {l, c, s}, on the basis of the sum of their marginal distances in the way Weitzman proposes, then one can start with c, then ‘add’ s and after that l, what gives D(s, {c}) + D(l, {c, s}) = 2 + 1 = 3. However if one ‘starts’ with s and then adds l and c, one gets D(l, {s}) + D(c, {l, s}) = 3 + 1 = 4. Whether this is a severe restriction of the Weitzman Measure will depend on how plausible the structure of an ultrametric is in the concrete problem the measure is meant to address. As Weitzman (368–375) argues, if one is concerned with the measurement of biological diversity, as he is, ultrametric distances are very

11 g(·)

is commonly assumed to be a metric, which means it is assumed that g(·) satisfies the following properties: for all x, y, z ∈ X, (1)g(x, y) ≥ 0; (2) g(x, y) = 0 if, and only if, x = y; (3) g(x, y) = g(y, x); (4) g(x, z) ≤ g(x, y) + g(y, z). 12 van Hees (2004) also explores other ways by equating the extended distance function with the minimal, the maximal or the average distance between an alternative and a set. Note, however, that Weitzman and van Hees, despite their use of similar frameworks, engage in rather different endeavours. While Weitzman is concerned with the construction of a diversity measure, van Hees explores avenues as to how information about the degree of difference between options as well as information about their cardinality can be taken into account in freedom rankings. 13 An ultrametric is a metric satisfying, for all x, y, z ∈ X, g(x, z) ≤ max{g(x, y), g(y, z)}.

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3 Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed

plausible. The reason is that if one takes the difference between two species as the distance to their nearest common ancestor in an evolutionary tree, the resulting binary distance function will always be an ultrametric. The question arises though, whether the ultrametric structure is equally plausible if one is interested in the measurement of the diversity of choice options in the context of freedom rankings, as we are. I shall come back to this question in Sect. 3.6. Binder (2017) uses the idea underlying an extended distance function to identify the distance between an alternative and a set of alternatives. In contrast to existing contributions, though, a Quasi-extended Distance Function is defined directly from the preference profile of weak orderings and not in terms of a binary distance function (g(·)). It turns out that this move provides an escape from the problem that the diversity value depends on the order in which the alternatives are added up. To put it differently, the structure imposed by the profile of weak orderings renders the value of the Diversity Measure independent of the order in which the (marginal diversities of the) alternative(s) are added up. Definition 3.4 (Quasi-Extended Distance Function) Given some d ∈ R M , a Quasi-extended Distance Function is a function D : X × Z → N, such that for all x ∈ X, for all A ∈ Z, Q(x, A) = #{i ∈ M | for all y ∈ A, xPi y or yPi x}. Thus along a Quasi-extended Distance Function, the distance between a set and an alternative is equated with the number of people who rank it strictly vis-à-vis all other alternatives present in the set. In order to explore the properties of this Quasiextended Distance Function, I now introduce a binary distance function, which is derived from a preference profile as well. Definition 3.5 (Binary Distance Function) Given some d ∈ R M , a Binary Distance Function is the function gd : X × X → N such that for all x, y ∈ X, gd (x, y) = #{i ∈ M | xPi y or yPi x}. The Binary Distance Function states that the more people rank two alternatives strictly vis-à-vis each other, the greater the relevant difference between the two. The Binary Distance Function is a pseudo-metric, since it can be the case that gd (x, y) = 0 for x = y. Indeed it is a metric if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, x = y, there exists i ∈ M such that xPi y or yPi x. To clarify the understanding of the Quasi-extended Distance Function, which plays a crucial role in the Diversity Measure characterised in Binder (2017), I first discuss some of the properties commonly imposed on extended distance functions in the literature (Weitzman 1992; Nehring and Puppe 2002). Recall for this purpose that (Quasi-)extended Distance Functions are interpreted as depicting the marginal diversity that an alternative contributes to a set. 1. 2. 3. 4.

for all x, y ∈ X, D(x, {y}) = gd (x, y). for all A ∈ Z, x ∈ A implies D(x, A) = 0. for all A, B ∈ Z, B ⊆ A, for all x ∈ X − A, D(x, B) ≥ D(x, A). for all A ∈ Z, for all x ∈ X − A, D(x, A) ≥ min {gd (x, y) | y ∈ A}.

3.5 Diversity Measure

55

Table 3.3 Violation of condition iv

R1 x y z

R2 xy z

R3 yz x

Condition (i) reflects the intuition that the diversity an alternative adds to a singleton set exactly equals the binary distance between the two alternatives. According to condition (ii), the distance between an alternative which is already present in a set, and the set is zero. Thus the alternative does not add anything to the diversity the set offers. Condition (iii) demands that the distance between an alternative and a set cannot increase if the set is enlarged. Hence, the marginal diversity an alternative adds to a set cannot increase if the set is expanded. Condition (iv) demands that the distance between a set and an alternative is at least as large as the distance between it and the alternative in the set which is closest to it. Expressed in marginal-diversity terms, an alternative’s marginal diversity is as least as big as its distance to the element in the set which is closest to it. The Quasi-extended Distance Function satisfies conditions (i)–(iii), but violates condition (iv), since it can be the case that D(x, A) < gd (x, y), for all y ∈ A. The violation of condition (iv) does not seem to present a great worry, though. To illustrate, consider a party system again. Instead of taking differences along the classical right-left spectrum, think of it in terms of different policy (party) programmes. Say there is a Socialist (x), a Green (y) and Christian Democratic party (z), each with three different policy areas in their programmes: tax policy, migration policy and environmental policy. The Socialists favour a highly redistributive tax scheme, while the Greens want to tax emissions and the Christian Democrats want a tax system that favours the national product. Both the Socialists and the Greens want to foster migration, whereas the Christian Democrats want to close the borders. In environmental matters, both the Greens and the Christian Democrats want to preserve the environment, while the Socialists want to use the available funds to subsidise housing instead. The three preference orderings in the table above (Table 3.3) reflect the preferences of the (fairly small) electorate. In this case condition (iv) is violated, since the marginal diversity the Greens add to a party system consisting of the Socialists and the Christian Democrats (A = {x, z}), is less (Q(y, A) = 1) than the difference between the Greens and the Socialists (gd (x, y) = 2) and the Christian Democrats (gd (y, z) = 2), respectively. On the basis of the Quasi-extended Distance Function I now define a diversity measure. Definition 3.6 (Diversity Measure) Let v(·) be a mapping v : Z × D → N, where D ⊆ R M . We will call v(·) the Diversity Measure if, and only if, for all d ∈ R M , for all A ∈ Z, and any labelling x1 , . . . , xk (k = #A) of the elements of A,  v(A, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) =

0, if #A = 1. k i=2 Q(xi , {xj : j < i}), otherwise.

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3 Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed

As Binder (2017) shows, the Diversity Measure is indeed well defined, i.e. it does not suffer the problem that the diversity value is dependent on the order in which the elements are added up. Expressed differently, v(·) is invariant under transformations of the numbering of the alternatives in A. Proposition 3.1 For all D ⊆ R M and for all A ∈ Z, v(·) is well defined. In the following section we shall see that in special cases, namely if our domain of preference profiles is restricted in a certain way, the Diversity Measure coincides with the Weitzman (1992) measure.

3.6 Weitzman and a Restricted Domain In this section I illustrate that the Diversity Measure can serve to shed some light on the question whether the Weitzman Measure is a plausible candidate for the measurement of diversity in a social context (see Binder 2017). More precisely, I shall explore under which conditions the defined Diversity Measure coincides with the Weitzman Measure. For this purpose it is relevant to note that along the Quasi-extended Distance Function, the distance between an alternative (x) and a set (A) is either equal or smaller than the distance between the alternative and the element closest to it in the set (y). That is we have, for all A ∈ Z and for all x ∈ X, Q(x, A) ≤ gd (x, y), where gd (x, y) ≤ gd (x, z). The question I am asking now is under which (domain) conditions does the distance between an alternative and a set of alternatives given by the Quasi-extended Distance Function equal the minimal distance between the alternative and the element closest to it in the set, as in case of the Weizman measure (Weitzman 1992). For this purpose, assume the binary distance function g(·) in terms of which the Weitzman Measure is defined (Definition 3.3), is the Binary Distance Function gd (·) defined in terms of profiles of weak orderings, as introduced in Sect. 3.5 (Definition 3.5). Definition 3.7 (Weitzman Measure*) Given some d ∈ R M and some Binary Distance Function gd : X × X → N, the Weitzman Measure v ∗ (·) is a mapping v ∗ : Z → R, such that: For all x ∈ X : v ∗ ({x}) = 0 and for all A ∈ Z, #A > 1, and all x ∈ A, v ∗ (A) = v ∗ (A − {x}) + miny∈A gd (x, y). Condition 3.5 (Indifference Consistency) v(·) satisfies Indifference Consistency if, and only if, for all d ∈ D for all x, y, z ∈ X, for all i, j ∈ M, (xIi y and yIj z) implies (xIi z or xIj z). In Binder (2017) it is shown that Indifference Consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the Weitzman Measure*, defined in terms of binary distances derived from preference profiles (Definition 3.7), to coincide with the Diversity Measure (Definition 3.6). This result sheds some light on the question of how restrictive the structure required by the Weitzman Measure is in the case in which one is concerned with diversity in a social context. Indifference Consistency requires

3.7 Diversity and Cardinality of Alternatives

57

that if one person does not see a relevant difference between, say, two bottles of the same sort of wine, one bottled in 2006 (x) and the other bottled in 2005 (y), and another person does not consider the difference between the 2005 bottled wine (y) and a 2004 bottled wine (z) to be relevant, then one of the two should also consider the difference between vintage 2006 and 2004 to be irrelevant. Its plausibility will depend on the interpretation of the preferences invoked. If one interprets them as those preferences which some reasonable person may hold, then Indifference Consistency can be taken to reflect a (rather strong) consistency condition on judgements of relevant differences across reasonable persons. While this still has some intuitive plausibility, this is not the case if one interprets the preferences as all those which members in a society actually hold. It would basically require that if one person does not see a relevant difference between, say, the Socialists and the Greens (due to the fact that only social policy programmes matter to this person, and they happen to be the same between the Socialists and the Greens), and another person does not see a difference relevant to her choice between the Greens and the Christian Democrats (say because both favour the introduction of a carbon tax), then one of these two persons should judge the Socialists and the Christian Democrats not to be different in some relevant aspect either, despite the fact that they could have different social policy programmes (the aspect person one cares most about), and different carbon taxation plans (the concern of person two). Thus the structure of the binary differences between options that the Weitzman Measure requires in order to be well defined, does not enjoy the same intuitive appeal in a social context as it does in a biological one.

3.7 Diversity and Cardinality of Alternatives Thus far I have implicitly equated the measurement of diversity with the measurement of freedom of choice and have used the two terms interchangeably. Just how far is this accurate? A general answer to this question will depend on the conceptual relationship between freedom (of choice) and the diversity of options, a topic which would go beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead I want to discuss one aspect which is relevant as to whether a ranking of sets in terms of the diversity they offer, as given by the introduced Diversity Measure, would be plausible in order to capture the value of freedom we are interested in, namely freedom’s agency value. One point which is crucial in this respect (Dowding and van Hees 2009) is whether the introduced Diversity Measure succeeds in accounting, not only for the (degree of choice relevant) differences between the alternatives in a set, but also of the number of alternatives a set contains. The Diversity Measure takes account of the number of options which are ranked strictly vis-à-vis all other options in the same set by at least one preference ordering in the profile. Put differently, any option which is considered to be relevantly different from all other elements in the same set by at least one person will be taken to increase the freedom of choice offered by the respective set. Thus options which

58 Table 3.4 Diversity and cardinality

3 Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed R1 xz y

R2 yz x

are ranked by all persons as indifferent to some alternative already present in the set will not increase the freedom offered by the set. Therefore their number will not be counted. Note that this encompasses two cases. In one case, the respective option which is added to the set is ranked as indifferent to the same option, say y, (already present in a set) by all persons. In this case the fact that, according to the Diversity Measure x would not be taken into account in the resulting freedom ranking, does not seem too troublesome. After all, one could say that x is, in terms of choice-relevant differences, essentially ‘the same option’ as y. Take a can of Coke, where x simply has a different barcode to y. Provided everybody is indeed indifferent as between such two cans, then it does not seem counter-intuitive if the addition of a can with a new bar code does not increase the freedom of choice offered by a set.14 The second case arises if the added option is ranked as indifferent to different options already present in the set by all preference orderings in the profile. To illustrate this case, consider a party system again. Say the Social Democrats (x), the Christian Democrats (y) and the Greens (z) are up for election. Differently from the Christian Democrats, the Greens and the Social Democrats favour the relaxation of migration policy. Furthermore, both the Christian Democrats and the Greens want to introduce a carbon tax, which is opposed by the Social Democrats. Assume now that the people in the electorate have either one of the two preference orderings in the table above (Table 3.4). According to our framework this would lead to the conclusion that the Greens add nothing to the diversity of a party system in which the Social and Christian Democrats are present, viz. D(z, {x, y}) = 0. Thus the diversity of a party system with the Greens is the same as the diversity of a system without them (v({x, y, z}) = v({x, y})). Is this in line with our intuition? Even though each of the policies the Greens promote is already ‘on offer’ by some other party in the system, they nevertheless provide the voter with the possibility of voting for the combination of the two policies. If the Greens were not to run for election the voters would have to decide whether they consider the relaxation of migration policy to be more important than the introduction of a carbon tax, but they cannot vote for both (since they have to choose between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats). So one might argue that something is lost here, since the Greens increase the diversity of the party system by providing the option to vote for both policies jointly.

14 The

presence of alternatives, which differ only with regard to such irrelevant differences, can even constitute a burden on a person’s choices. For an argument as to how the increase in the number of choice options can diminish a person’s preference satisfaction, see van Loo (2010).

3.8 Conclusion

59

However, note that this is due to the preferences of the voters. If there is at least one voter who would care to vote for the combination of the two policies, this would be reflected in his preferences. He might then have the ranking zP yP x in the case in which he favours the combination of the two policies or yP xP z in the case in which he considers this same combination as counter-productive. In either case this would lead to D(z, {x, y}) > 0 and thus vD ({x, y, z}) > vD ({x, y}). So in case of the profile invoked above one can say that no voter cares about the combination of the two policies and thus the difference between the Greens and the other parties, which consists in the offer of a combination of the two policies, is not relevant to the voter’s freedom of choice. Thus there is no ‘market’ for the Greens in this electorate.15 Is a sub-set ranking based thus on the introduced measure plausible as a freedom ranking that captures freedom’s agency value? The answer is a conditional yes, since it accounts for both the degree of difference between alternatives as well as the number of those alternatives, which are choice-relevantly different in some minimal way. The options which are not counted, that is, do not add to a person’s overall freedom, are those for which no person perceives any choice-relevant difference, such as the Greens in the example above.16 Thus if one considers diversity-based set rankings to be plausible candidates as a freedom ranking only if it accounts for both, information about the number of available alternatives as well as information about the degree of difference between them, then the introduced Diversity Measure (Definition 3.6) is a plausible candidate as a freedom ranking since it succeeds in doing so.

3.8 Conclusion In this chapter I discussed two rules to reveal the choice-relevant difference between options from preference information. The first rule assigns to each profile of weak orderings a similarity relation, as employed as a primitive in freedom rankings. The second rule, the Diversity Measure, assigns to each set of alternatives a diversity value on the basis of some given profile of weak orderings. I have shown that the obtained result provides insights into how far the Weitzman Measure is a plausible candidate for the measurement of diversity in the context of freedom of choice. The discussed Diversity Measure coincides with the Weitzman Measure if, and only if, the underlying profile of weak orderings satisfies a rather restrictive condition. 15 Baujard

and Igersheim (2010) have employed a similar intuition to derive a reality-based notion of distance between different political candidates from empirical data on voters’ preferences in the 2007 French Presidential election. 16 Note that this does not necessarily hold for a Diversity Revelation Rule, as introduced in Sect. 3.4 of this chapter. In case p < M it can be the case that one person (or more) perceive a choicerelevant difference, which is not reflected by the Diversity Revelation Rule.

60

3 Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed

In the last step I illustrated that the Diversity Measure is suitable as a basis for freedom rankings, since it can account for both the degree of difference between options and the number of options which are choice-relevantly different in some minimal way. That is, at least some person perceives a difference which matters. However, the introduced rule comes with some limitations, which I now discuss briefly. Due to the ordinal preferences it is based upon, the introduced measure cannot account for the degree of difference between alternatives in case all people rank them strictly vis-à-vis each other. This is for instance the case if the alternatives possess an attribute that everybody prefers more to less of it. The options could be amounts of money for instance (provided everybody strictly prefers more money to less). Say a person won a prize and can choose between three amounts of money, $100, $60 or $50. As one would expect, all people prefer $100 to $60 to $50. However, in our framework the diversity of a set {50} would increase to the same extent if the option to get $60 is added to it as if the option to get $100 is added to it, thus we get v({50, 60}) = v({50, 100}). Thus in this case the Diversity Measure fails to account for the different degree of difference between the various amounts of money due to the ordinal preferences it is based upon. Last, but certainly not least, one point which might seem counterintuitive to some is that no importance is given to the ‘direction’ of a strict ordering over two alternatives. As soon as two alternatives are ranked strictly vis-à-vis each other, no matter in which direction, the person is taken to perceive a relevant difference between the two and as a result, both alternatives will increase a person’s freedom of choice. This might seem counterintuitive in the case in which we are concerned with options everybody ranks lowest, such as voting for a party which explicitly states that its programme is to abolish the democratic system and plans to introduce a dictatorship. If everybody in the electorate prefers, say, a conservative party strictly to this ‘antidemocracy party’, then according to the measures discussed in this chapter, the antidemocratic party would be considered relevantly different from the conservative camp, and as a result, it would increase the freedom of choice if it were open for election. While at first sight this seems counterintuitive – and even more so if we are concerned with options such as ‘being beheaded at dawn’ (Sen 1991, 24) – I believe this counterintuitive flavour does not arise due to some misconstrued relationship between diversity and freedom of choice, which was the topic of this chapter, but rather because of an intuition that the value one ascribes to the different alternatives available also matter in one’s assessment of a person’s freedom. As I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, there is another area of the freedom ranking literature which deals with exactly this question, which is how the value of the alternatives open for choice can be taken into account in freedom rankings. This is the topic of Chap. 5.

References

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References Arneson, Richard J. 1985. Freedom and Desire. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15: 425–440; Reprinted in Freedom, A Philosophical Anthology, ed. ICarter, Ian, Matthew H. Kramer, and Hillel Steiner, 138–147, 2006, Oxford: Blackwell. Baujard, Antoinette, and Herrade Igersheim. 2010. Framed-Field Experiments on Approval Voting in Political Contexts. Some Teachings. In Handbook on Approval Voting, ed. Remzi Sanver, and Jean-François Laslier, 357–395. Heidelberg: Springer. Bavetta, Sebastianio, and Marco Del Seta. 2001. Constraints and the Measurement of Freedom of Choice. Thoery and Decision 50: 213–238. Bervoets, Sebastian, and Nicolas Gravel. 2007. Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity: An Axiomatic Approach. Mathematical Social Sciences 53: 259–273. Binder, Constanze. 2014. Preferences and Similarity Between Alternatives. Rationality, Markets and Morals 5: 120–132. Binder, Constanze. 2017. A Measure of Choice-Relevant Diversity. Working Paper. Dowding, Keith, and Martin van Hees. 2009. Freedom of Choice. In The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, ed. Paul Anand, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, 374–392. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gustafsson, Johan E. 2010. Freedom of Choice and Expected Compromise. Social Choice and Welfare 35: 65–79. Hees, Martin van. 1998. On the Analysis of Negative Freedom. Theory and Decision 45: 175–197. Hees, Martin van. 2004. Freedom of Choice and Diversity of Options: Some Difficulties. Social Choice and Welfare 22: 253–266. Loo, Hanna van. 2010. More Freedom of Choice But Less preference Satisfaction in Parametric Situations. Rationality and Society 22: 237–252. Mill, John Stuart. 1859/1985. On Liberty, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Nehring, Klaus, and Clemens Puppe. 2002. A Theory of Diversity. Econometrica 70: 1150–1198. Nehring, Klaus, and Clemens Puppe. 2008. Diversity and the Metric of Opportunity. Mimeograph, October 5, 2008, University of Karlsruhe. Nehring, Klaus, and Clemens Puppe. 2009. Diversity. In The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, ed. Paul Anand, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, 298–322. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pattanaik Prasanta K. and Yongsheng Xu. 1990. On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56: 383–390. Pattanaik Prasanta K. and Yongsheng Xu. 2000. On Diversity and Freedom of Choice. Mathematical Social Science 40: 123–130. Peragine, Vito, and Antonio Romero-Medina. 2006. On preference, freedom and diversity. Social Choice and Welfare 27: 29–40. Rosenbaum, Eckehard F. 2000. On Measuring Freedom. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12: 205– 227. Sen, Amartya K. 1991. Welfare, Preference and Freedom. Journal of Econometrics 50: 15–29. Shnayderman, Ronen. 2016. Ian Carter’s Non-evaluative Theory of Freedom and Diversity: A Critique. Social Choice and Welfare 46: 39–55. Sugden, Robert. 2003. Opportunity as a Space of Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring it. Ethics 113: 783–809. Weitzman, Martin L. 1992. On Diversity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 363–405.

Chapter 4

Plural Identities and Preference Formation

Abstract In Chap. 2 I argued that an approach that aims to capture freedom’s agency value has to account for the value the availability of choice options has for a person’s deliberation about her values and goals before making decisions. Before addressing this question in greater detail in Chap. 5, I pose the question how this picture of a person reflecting upon a plurality of motives, as widely employed in the philosophy of action, relates to the assumption that a person’s (rational) choices can be represented by a transitive, all-things-considered preference over the alternatives, as is commonly assumed in rational choice theory and the freedom ranking literature. Under which conditions can a person indeed form a transitive, all-things-considered preference from a set of plural (possibly conflicting) values, or as I call it, from her plural identities? I make use of a social choice framework in order to explore this question and illustrate the task the person is facing as an intra-personal aggregation problem: a person has to derive his (transitive) all-thingsconsidered preference from a profile of preference relations reflecting his plural identity. This chapter is a slightly modified version of Binder (Soc Choice Welf 42:959–976, 2014). Keywords Preference formation · Intra-personal aggregation · Social choice · Consistency of choice · Identity dissonance · Plural identity

4.1 Agency, Plural Identities and Rational Choice Theory In rational choice theory a person is commonly taken to optimize a given preference ordering. Similar to the view I have adopted in Chap. 2, in most parts of the philosophical literature (on freedom) preferences are taken to reflect a person’s desires. Rational choice theory differs in that it encompasses different readings

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of what underlies a person’s preferences and thereby motivates her choices.1 The preferences could be taken to reflect a person’s pursuit of happiness or desire fulfillment.2 Another assumption, prominent throughout the history of economic theory, is that a person’s preferences reflect his self-interested or egoistic motives. Contemporary economic theory, however, has tended to adopt a more parsimonious stance, which does not rely on any assumptions as to the motives that guide a person’s behaviour. As Baigent (1995) points out, in most parts of standard economic theory nowadays, no substantive assumptions are made about the motivations underlying a person’s preference ranking. Whether it is the pursuit of self-interest or the concern for others, ‘[w]hat is being assumed is that agents who have multiple cares and concerns have resolved any conflicts into an “all-things-considered preference”’ (Baigent 1995, 92). Rationality, then, is usually taken to refer to formal rather than substantive aspects of a person’s all-things-considered preference. In particular, it is often taken to imply that those preferences are transitive.3 Transitivity states that if one prefers an alternative x to an alternative y, and y in turn to an alternative z, then one also prefers x vis-à-vis z. Thus if one prefers to go to the cinema above going to the theatre and going to the theatre above staying home, then for one’s preferences to be transitive, one has to prefer an evening in the cinema to spending it at home.4 Under what conditions can a person indeed derive a transitive all-things-considered preference from a plurality of (possibly conflicting) motives? This question is the topic of the present chapter. Rational choice theory, as its name suggests, focuses mainly on the rationality or consistency of a person’s actual choices, without discussing the processes of reflection and deliberation preceding these in greater detail. The literature on agency (Frankfurt 1971; Watson 1973; Bratman 2000; Velleman 1992) on the other hand, is mainly concerned with the processes of deliberation preceding a person’s choices. In the literature on agency various models to illustrate how a person can arrive at a choice from a set of values or desires have been proposed. In hierarchical models a person brings her various desires, as discussed by Frankfurt (1971), or more generally her various preferences, as explored by Sen (1977), into a meta-structure, which then guides her choices. A person might be a pacifist as well as a government official and decide that she always wants to give priority to the pacifist in her and therefore she ranks the pacifist preferences above those reflecting her job affiliation.

1 It

is important to be aware of the ‘double use’ of the concept of preference in economic analysis. Preferences are used ‘as the basis of welfare judgements’ or as descriptions of one’s choices (Sen 1973, 253). 2 For a discussion of pleasure or desire satisfaction accounts, see Griffin (1986). 3 In addition to transitivity, a person’s preferences are commonly required to be complete. In this chapter the focus is on transitivity. For an investigation of utility theory without the assumption that a person’s preferences are complete, see Aumann (1962). For studies of the formal connection between multi-objective decision making and completeness of a person’s preferences, see Ok (2002) and Dubra et al. (2004). 4 Strictly speaking this example illustrates a case of quasi-transitivity (rather than transitivity). In the framework I adopt in this chapter, which only allows for strict preferences, the two coincide.

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However, the reflection process preceding a person’s choice does not necessarily have to involve a meta-structure. In the model proposed by Watson (1973), for instance, a person reflects on a set of values that constitute her standpoint, where the priority assigned to the different values or goals a person holds might depend on the choice situation rather than on meta-values (or second order desires).5 A person who holds pacifist values and is a patriot, for instance, might assign priority to the former when she has to vote whether her country should attack another, but affords priority to the patriot in her when it comes to defending her community if under attack. Both Frankfurt’s hierarchical structure and Watson’s valuation system face the problem, though, of explaining what it is that renders the respective meta- or value-structure the agent’s own (Velleman 1992). Bratman (2000, 2001, 2007) has developed an intention based theory of agency which accounts for this problem by relating a person’s actions to her plans and commitments over time. In this book I do not discuss this difficulty as to what it is that renders the values and goals, which a person deliberates on, her own. Instead, I shall refer to a person’s values, ends and goals as to her identity without discussing its formation in greater detail.6 This interpretation indicates the possible social ties underlying a person’s motives, which will become relevant in later parts of this book. The values, practices and desires constituting a person’s motives can be (but do not have to be) shaped by the social surroundings in which she lives and the groups she identifies with. The concept of identity I use in this chapter and throughout this book is based on Sen (2006). It is built around two crucial assumptions: first, a person’s identity can be plural; and second, a person’s identity is (partly) subject to the person’s choices.7

5 The crucial points of disagreement between Frankfurt and Watson concern, inter alia, the status of

second-order desires: Frankfurt (1971) fails – according to Watson (1973, 218) – to explain what gives them the special status of being the person’s own desires. Furthermore, they disagree on whether agency is about formulating values over courses of actions (one might not have previously desired) or about an internal process in which the agent forms second-order desires over a set of given desires Watson (1973, 219). The stance on these points does not affect the argument presented here. What is relevant is that a person reflects on a set of values or desires in the process of choice. 6 This conception of a person’s identity and the problem addressed with it differs from the way the term is commonly employed in philosophy. The problem of identity over time is prominent in metaphysics. Which conditions have to be satisfied in order to say that a person or object at one point in time is the same as at a later point in time? Is a person who loses her memory in a car accident identical to the person she was before? Is a person after a heart transplant identical to the person before? The main question is whether one can establish criteria of personal identity. One can distinguish between physical and psychological criteria. Roughly speaking, the first demands the physical continuity over time of a person’s brain and/or body, whereas the latter requires the continuity of a person’s memory over time. For a collection of seminal contributions within the philosophical identity debate, see Noonan (1993). For a discussion of different criteria of personal identity, see Parfit (1984, chap. 10) and Raymond and Barresi (2003). For a survey of logical approaches to the metaphysical problem of identity, see Hawthorne (2003). 7 Strictly speaking, the case in which a person’s identity is ‘singular’ is a special case of the proposed framework.

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A person’s identity is plural in so far as she can have various affiliations.8 A person can not only be a Brazilian citizen, a mother and an academic, but also a vegetarian and a soccer fan, where each of these plural identity parts comes with a set of values, goals and practices. A person can make two types of choice with regard to her identity. First, she can choose how to prioritise her various – possibly conflicting – affiliations when making decisions. That is, when having to decide whether to spend the evening with her kids, go to a soccer match or work on her new book instead, she has to choose how to prioritise her various identity parts over each other. Second, she can (partly) choose to change the composition of her identity over time. She can choose to give up being an academic and become a novelist instead, or to move from soccer to baseball. In short, a person can choose how to prioritise her various identity parts over each other when making choices, as well as (partly) changing the composition of her identity parts over time.9 Even though the framework I develop here allows for such identity changes over time, my main focus is on how a person prioritises her plural identity parts at a given point in time.10 The central question of this chapter is now: assuming a person’s identity is reflected by a set of different, possibly conflicting values, how can a transitive all-things-considered preference be derived from this plural identity? The literature that addresses this question is fairly heterogeneous and comprises different approaches.11 One of these lines, the one I follow in this chapter, makes use of an axiomatic framework along the traditions of social choice theory, which is the study of aggregation problems, most commonly social aggregation problems.12 The problem is how to aggregate individual preferences, such as those of all citizens in a country or of a committee, into a social or collective preference, reflecting the will or social good of all. To do so, an axiomatic framework is employed to study 8 Strictly

speaking, the generality of the framework adopted here does not presuppose any view of the source of a person’s various identity parts. These can be related to her social surroundings and the groups she identifies with, but they do not have to be. What is important, though, is that I refer only to those identity parts with which the person herself identifies; I neglect the way external ascriptions can affect (and constrain) a person’s identity. For a discussion of this point, see Sen (2006, 6–8, 31). 9 Note that this does not mean that a person can choose any identity, but rather that there are some choices among alternative combinations of identities (Sen 2006, 38). 10 The sole way in which a change in a person’s identity over time enters the analysis in this chapter is via one of the conditions imposed on the process in which he derives his all-thingsconsidered preference from his plural identity. The monotonicity condition, which I introduce in Sect. 4.4, requires a certain continuity of the choices a person derives from her plural identity, in case the composition of her plural identity changes. For an analysis of a person’s plural identities, or multiple selves over time, see Heilmann (2008, sect. 4.3). 11 One of the classics in the analysis of decision making under the unresolved conflict of multiple objectives is Levi (1986). For a survey of the literature on multiple objectives decision making and a discussion of several different approaches, see Davis (2003), or Ellis (2006) on various approaches to the individual in economics in general and (rational) choice theory in particular. 12 For an introduction to social choice theory, see Gaertner (2006). For a survey of social choice theory, see Sen (1986a,b).

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the conditions such a process is supposed to fulfil. If one is interested in voting procedures, for instance, it would seem to be desirable that such a process is not dictated by one member of the collective but reflects the opinion of all. In its modern form, social choice theory dates back to Arrow’s (1951/1963) (im)possibility result, in which he shows that every aggregation procedure that satisfies a set of seemingly innocuous conditions, is dictatorial. Social choice theory subsequently developed into a separate area for the formal study of (mainly collective) aggregation problems. If, as I shall assume, the values underlying a person’s various identity parts can be described by preference relations over the alternatives, then the problem is identical to that of social choice theory: how to aggregate different orderings into one preference relation.

4.2 Intra-personal Aggregation The body of literature that uses a social choice framework to address intra-personal aggregation problems is rather limited. May (1954) questions utility theory due to a (possible) failure of a person’s (revealed) preferences to be transitive in the presence of multiple choice criteria. The (possible) absence of transitivity is taken up by Kelsey (1986), who shows that it relates closely to the question of whether a person’s various objectives are assumed to be comparable. He finds that a partial incomparability among an agent’s various objectives or criteria is sufficient to run into an Arrow-type impossibility. Arlegi and Teschl (2015) show that seemingly inconsistent choice behavior can be explained by the existence of a plurality of potentially conflicting motives. Without striving for transitivity (or completeness) in particular, Krause and Steedman (1986) discuss the merits of various aggregation procedures by which a person can derive her preferences from ‘multiple selves’. A slightly different perspective is adopted by Plott et al. (1975), who show that if objects of choice have certain characteristics, then transitivity of an individual’s preferences over the objects requires the dictate of one characteristic. Given these results one might ask whether Arrovian impossibilities are indeed all that problematic in an intra-personal setting. A number of arguments could be made as to why such impossibilities are not particularly troublesome in an intra-personal setting. First, one can question whether the conditions imposed on the aggregation process, even though plausible for a social procedure, are indeed sensible in the context of an intra-personal problem. Indeed, most contributions that make use of a social choice framework to address intra-personal aggregation problems, adopt Arrow’s conditions (1951/1963). However, the use of these conditions in an intrapersonal context has not remained undisputed. Hurley (1985), for instance, questions the plausibility of Arrow’s condition ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’ (which demands that the social ranking between any pair of alternatives is not affected by a change in the individual rankings of other alternatives), together with the condition of ‘Unrestricted Domain’ (which demands a social ranking to be assigned to all logically possible profiles

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of individual rankings). Both conditions, as Hurley argues, cannot be reconciled with supervenience of evaluative judgements on non-evaluative characteristics of alternatives (1985, 508 ff.). Supervenience demands that if two alternatives differ with respect to some evaluative characteristic, then they differ in some nonevaluative aspect as well (510). If the various criteria a person is deliberating on are given values, then ‘the supervenience of evaluative judgements on non-evaluative judgements prevents the criterial rankings of any given set of alternatives from varying at all’ (510). As a result, as Hurley argues, this conflicts with the Unrestricted Domain condition, and renders the condition of irrelevant alternatives vacuous.13 Even if one does not share Hurley’s view, and thus accepts Arrow’s conditions and with them the emergence of a dictator, one could argue that the presence of a dictator is less problematic in an intra-personal setting than it is in a social one. After all, it is the person herself who can decide which identity part should ‘dictate’ her choices. Indeed, meta-, or second-order preferences, prominently discussed in the literature on (moral) decision making (Sen 1974, 1977; Jeffrey 1974), can induce a lexicographic procedure, which is a dictatorial procedure. Second, it has been shown, most prominently by Sen (1970, 1997), that transitivity is too demanding if one is interested in the actual choices induced by an all-things-considered preference.14 What is required for a person to be able to make decisions (rationally), or, to put it in more technical terms, for her preference relation to induce a choice function, is the absence of cycles.15 Indeed, as is well known in the social choice literature (Sen 1970), the requirement that the (social) preference is acyclic instead of transitive provides an escape from the Arrovian impossibility. As the results of this chapter reveal, these two reasons why Arrow-type impossibilities do not seem all that problematic in an intra-personal setting loose their force as soon as one allows the preference relations reflecting a person’s various identity parts to be incomplete: Firstly, the Arrovian dictatorship turns into a stronger form of dictatorship, or the Strong Imposition of one identity part as I call it, which rules out lexicographic procedures as well. Secondly, it turns out that if one rules out such a strongly imposing identity part, by distributing decision making ‘power’ a bit more evenly among the various identity parts, then even the existence of an acyclic all-things-considered preference is ruled out. Before I move to a more detailed description of the results of this chapter though, a few words on incompleteness are required. Common to all the contributions discussed above is that each of the multiple objectives can be reflected by a complete ordering over the alternatives. The plausibility of this assumption depends crucially on the underlying interpretation. As we saw above, some of the contributions refer to different criteria, others 13 Hurley

(1985) shows furthermore that conditions necessary to lead to single profile impossibilities violate supervenience in a similar way. 14 Sen, however, as far as I know, never used this point as part of an argument that Arrow’s impossibility is less problematic in an intra-personal context. 15 Strictly speaking, acyclicity is sufficient but not necessary for a binary relation R on X to induce a choice function if R is complete. I shall return to this issue in Sect. 4.6.

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to different objectives or judgements, while yet others relate to different desires or values. It seems plausible to assume completeness in case one is concerned with orderings of objects according to their characteristics, whereas this can be questioned in case one is dealing with preference relations reflecting the ordering of actions or states of affairs in the light of some specific values. To illustrate, take two characteristics, colour and weight, and let the alternatives be physical objects. Most such objects can be ordered completely according to some measure of weight and along a colour chart, respectively. However, if one takes the preference relations to reflect the values and goals underlying a person’s various identity parts, then the completeness assumption seems questionable for at least two reasons.16 First, the ranking between some alternatives might be irrelevant for some identity parts. Consider say, pacifist values and take the alternatives to be actions or states of affairs. Pacifism yields a ranking of the alternatives ‘going to a peace demonstration’ vis-à-vis ‘staying home’, but not, say, of ‘going to the movie’ and ‘going to the theatre’. In this case, incompleteness reflects irrelevance, viz. it is irrelevant to the pacifist part of a person’s identity whether she goes to the theatre or to the movie. Second, refusing to rank two alternatives, one over the other, can be necessary, or as I will call it constitutive, for the identity part in question. One can consider it crucial for the identity of a mother that she does not rank or compare her children with each other.17 William Styron’s (1979) novel ‘Sophie’s Choice’ is an illustration of this point. Sophie, the principal character, is given the choice by a Nazi officer in Auschwitz, which of her two children to ‘send away’ and which one to rescue. If she does not choose one of her children, both will be ‘taken away’. It is the very fact that she is forced to choose between her children in this way that makes the situation so horrible: not comparing one’s children forms part of one’s identity as a parent.18 As the results obtained in this chapter show, allowing for incompleteness of the preference relations reflecting a person’s various identity parts can have far-reaching consequences. First, I show that the imposition of some intuitively plausible conditions on a person’s reflection process leads to the presence of a strong dictatorial dimension: one part of a person’s identity also imposes its incomplete parts on the resulting all-things-considered preference. Next, I investigate what happens if one rules out such a strictly imposing identity part by requiring some minimal symmetry of power among a person’s various identity parts. It turns out that, together with Unrestricted Domain, this even renders the existence of an acyclic (rather than transitive) all-things-considered preference impossible. Finally I explore domain restrictions as possible escape routes. It turns out that a reduction of conflict within a person’s identity, introduced by a domain restriction, is sufficient to escape the highlighted impossibility results. 16 For

an overview over different interpretations of incomparability and incommensurability, see Chang (1997). 17 Raz (1986, 347–348) raises a similar case when he argues that for many people it is inconsistent with their identity as parents to rank (compare) their child(ren) with sums of money. 18 Sen (1985, 2002, 2004) has contributed most extensively to the analysis of incompleteness of preferences in social and individual choice.

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4.3 Identity Formalised In the following I take the various identity parts of a person to be based on some values, goals and practices which induce a partial ordering over the alternatives, which I take to be actions or states of affairs. A person’s identity will then be characterised by a so-called identity profile, which consists of a finite number of possibly incomplete preference relations over the alternatives, each of which represents one part of the person’s identity. The problem he then faces is how to derive his all-things-considered preference from these orderings. To introduce the formal part of the framework: as in Chap. 3, X denotes a finite set of alternatives to be interpreted as states of affairs or actions, and R refers to a binary relation on X, R ⊆ X × X, where I and P denote its symmetric and asymmetric parts respectively. Furthermore, if R is incomplete with regard to some x, y ∈ X, I write xNy, i.e. for all x, y ∈ X, xNy if, and only if, neither xRy nor yRx holds.19 In addition to the properties introduced in Chap. 3, a binary relation R on X can have the following properties: it is reflexive if, and only if, for all x ∈ X, xRx; it is quasi-transitive if, and only if, for all x, y, z ∈ X, xP y and yP z implies xP z; acyclic if, and only if, for all x1 , x2 , . . . , xj , j being a finite positive integer, x1 P x2 , x2 P x3 , . . . ., xj −1 P xj implies not (xj P x1 ); and anti-symmetric if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, xRy and yRx implies x = y.20 A binary relation R on X, which is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive (but not necessarily complete) will be called a strict partial order, where Rs denotes the set of all strict partial orderings on X. Ra denotes the set of all reflexive, antisymmetric and acyclic (not necessarily complete) binary relations R on X. Note that Rs ⊆ Ra . Let M = {1, . . . , m}, and m ∈ N to be interpreted as the number of all identity parts a person may have. RsM denotes the m-fold Cartesian product of Rs . RsM contains all logically possible identity profiles a person might have. In the course of the analysis in this chapter I vary the identity profiles that I actually allow, which will be denoted by D ⊆ RsM . Thus an element d = (R1 , . . . , Rm ) of D will be interpreted as one specific identity profile of a person. The process by which a person then derives an all-things-considered preference, denoted by R (with I , P , and N denoting its symmetric, anti-symmetric and incomplete parts, respectively), from her identity profile is reflected by an Identity Aggregation Procedure. Definition 4.1 (Identity Aggregation Procedure) An Identity Aggregation Procedure is a function f : D → Ra , D ⊆ RsM .

that for all x, y ∈ X if xNy then yN x. that the usual definition of acyclicity, that is R on X is acyclic if, and only if, for all x1 , x2 , . . . , xj , j being a finite positive integer, x1 P x2 , x2 P x3 , . . . ., xj −1 P xj implies x1 Rxj , is equivalent to the definition adopted here if the preference relation is complete.

19 Note

20 Note

4.4 Conditions Table 4.1 Identity aggregation procedure

71 R1 R2 R3 [xy] [yz] y z x [xz]

f (·)

−−−−−−−−−→

R x y y y or x or z or... z z x

To illustrate, consider a man who is a Muslim, an ecologist and a vegetarian. His identity profile consists of three partial orderings, as illustrated in Table 4.1, one of which contains, say, the strict ranking of all non-pork meals (x, y) over pork dishes (z). Another one includes the ranking of organic food (y, z) over non-organic food (x), while a third includes a strict ranking of non-meat dishes (y) over any kind of meat (x, z).21

4.4 Conditions The crucial question now is, which conditions should an Identity Aggregation Procedure satisfy? One can imagine a multiplicity of ways in which a person can derive an all-things-considered preference from an identity profile. A person might always allocate absolute priority to one identity part in certain situations. She might try to act in congruence with as many parts as possible. Yet another possibility is to consider only the conflict-free parts. These are just a few of the many possibilities. Can one think of some minimal conditions any procedure should satisfy in order to claim that a person’s all-things-considered preference is indeed based on her identity? Or, to phrase it differently, can one establish the conditions an identity procedure of any person is reasonably supposed to fulfil? In the following I shall discuss a number of conditions an Identity Aggregation Procedure (and thereby a person’s deliberation process underlying it) should plausibly fulfil. Our first condition is Unrestricted Domain. Unrestricted Domain requires an Identity Aggregation Procedure to yield an all-things-considered preference for all logical possible profiles of partial orderings. Most of the contributions in the present literature impose an Unrestricted Domain assumption.22 In the present context there are a number of reasons to allow for a variety of preference profiles in the domain. One is that I am interested in conditions which the Identity Aggregation Procedure of any person is supposed to satisfy. Thus the procedure is supposed to work for different persons, who are characterised by different identity profiles. Another reason to allow for a variety of profiles within the domain is that our framework allows a person to decide about the composition of her identity profile and thereby to change her identity. This can be the case if a person changes her identity by 21 In

Table 4.1 any two alternatives x and y which are not ranked vis-à-vis each other are denoted by [xy]. 22 These differ, though, depending on the conditions imposed on the preference relations R on X.

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giving up ‘being a smoker’, for instance, or through the gradual development of some (identity) part, leading to a stepwise (partial) completion of the respective ordering. However, these reasons to allow for a number of different profiles do not necessarily entail that we should impose Unrestricted Domain, and thereby allow for all logically possible identity profiles. One reason for doing so, that is for allowing for all logically possible identity profiles by imposing an Unrestricted Domain condition, is that we do not want to make any implicit assumptions about which values come with a particular identity part, nor which preferences over actions these induce. Say whether a Catholic necessarily has to hold pacifist values, and in the case where he does whether such pacifist values require him to abstain from defending himself if under attack. Furthermore, we do not want to restrict the possible composition of a person’s identity by ruling out, for instance, that she can be an army general and a pacifist at the same time.23 One reason why the Unrestricted Domain condition could be objected to, though, is that it implicitly requires that each identity part can be reflected by all possible strict partial orderings over the alternatives. This would be counter-intuitive, if we were to describe each identity part and therefore each dimension in an identity profile, in specific terms, e.g. ‘being a Protestant’ or even ‘being a Methodist’. In this case Unrestricted Domain is not plausible, since the values and practices corresponding to each part will be specific and will therefore induce only a small variety of possible (strict) partial orderings over the alternatives. Alternatively, one can interpret the various dimensions as broader ‘identity fields’ such as ‘religious belief’ or ‘dietary habits’. In this case whether a person is a ‘Methodist’ or a ‘Buddhist’ will be reflected by two different (strict) partial orderings in the (same) identity field, i.e. religious belief. In this case each dimension of a profile can plausibly take a multiplicity of values and thereby induce a broad variety of strict partial orderings.24 I shall adopt this second, broader line of interpretation and impose the Unrestricted Domain condition.

23 There

are other substantive and methodological reasons to impose Universal Domain: one is that we are interested in conditions which the Identity Aggregation Procedure of any person is supposed to satisfy. Thus the procedure is supposed to work for different persons, who are characterized by different identity profiles. Another (methodological) reason relates to the question the framework aims to address, namely under which conditions a person can indeed derive a transitive/acyclic all-things-considered preference. In order to gain a clear understanding of the structure of the aggregation problem at hand (and possible problems in a person’s preference formation) it is fruitful to start with the most admissible case, in order to then step-wisely restrict it in the light of emerging impossibility results. 24 Note that the first, narrow line of interpretation would allow a person to be, say, a Buddhist and a Christian ‘simultaneously’, since both are reflected by different dimensions (partial orderings) in the identity profile. The second, broader line of interpretation precludes this though, since Christian and Buddhist are reflected as different partial orderings in one (the same) dimension (religious belief, say) in the identity profile.

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Condition 4.1 (Unrestricted Domain) f (·) satisfies Unrestricted Domain if, and only if, D = RsM . Our next condition reflects the fact that some values and thereby the rankings over some alternatives these values induce, are particularly important for a specific identity part. To present it, we first define what is required for a part of a person’s identity to be minimally decisive for some pair of alternatives. Definition 4.2 (Minimal Decisiveness) For all i ∈ M, for all x, y ∈ X, i is minimally decisive for {x, y} (or for x against y) if, and only if, for all d ∈ D: [xPi y and xNj y for all j = i], implies xP y, and [yPi x and xNj y for all j = i], implies yP x. Condition 4.2 (Minimal Identity Decisiveness) f (·) satisfies Minimal Identity Decisiveness if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X there exists i ∈ M such that i is minimally decisive for x against y. Minimal Identity Decisiveness requires for each pair of alternatives x and y, the existence of at least one identity dimension i such that if all dimensions other than i do not rank x and y, but i does, then the all-things-considered preference ranks the two alternatives in the same way as i. Take the strict preference for nonmeat products over meat products, which is essential for any person who considers herself to be a vegetarian. It seems plausible to require such crucial values to be reflected in any vegetarian’s all-things-considered preference. Minimal Identity Decisiveness is much weaker, though. It only states that this will be so if no other identity part ranks the two alternatives. Imagine a US-American vegetarian, who regularly faces a conflict at Thanksgiving when confronted with the turkey. Minimal Identity Decisiveness does not impose any assumption on how he should resolve this conflict among his various identity parts. All it demands is that his preference of vegetables over meat should be reflected in the all-things-considered preference if no other identity part – the patriot in him, in this case – ranks the two alternatives. A second point to be aware of is that Minimal Identity Decisiveness does not require that whenever some pair of alternatives is ranked solely by one identity part (and left incomplete by all the others), the respective ranking has to be reflected in the all-things-considered preference. All it demands is that for every pair of alternatives there is one identity part for which this is the case. One of our assumptions about a person’s identity, mentioned above, was that each person has a certain latitude in choosing which identities to subscribe to, viz. a choice over the composition of his identity profile. The following condition imposes some monotonicity requirements in case of such identity revisions. Condition 4.3 (Monotonicity) f (·) satisfies Monotonicity if, and only if, for all d, d  ∈ D, for all x, y ∈ X, if [ for all i ∈ M, (xPi y implies xPi y) and there does not exist j ∈ M such that (xNj y and yPj x)] then [xP y implies xP  y].

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One can think of Monotonicity in terms of a continuity condition which a person’s choices have to satisfy in case she changes her identity. The intuition is similar to one made in the philosophy of action. Bratman (2007), for instance, employs conditions of psychological connections and continuities, such as between a person’s intentions and their later execution, to develop an account of temporally extended agency (Bratman 2007, chap. 2).25 Monotonicity can be interpreted along these lines. It requires a person’s decisions, or the all-things-considered preference reflecting these, to ‘behave’ in consistent ways in case a person’s identity profile changes. Specifically, if a person subscribes to a new identity part and the corresponding ranking was already reflected in her all-things-considered preference before the revision; and in the case where a person abandons an identity part that was not reflected in her allthings-considered preference anyway. In both cases Monotonicity requires that the all-things-considered preference does not change after the identity revision.26 Imagine a Roman Catholic woman who never went to church on Sunday, even though the preference relation reflecting her Roman Catholic identity part would rank a visit to church strictly above all other activities on Sunday evening. Monotonicity then implies that she will not start going to church when she abandons Catholicism. An Identity Aggregation Procedure is said to be strongly imposed if one identity part exists that always completely determines the resulting all-things-considered preference. This goes so far that even if this strongly dictating part ‘remains silent’ with regard to the ranking of one pair of alternatives on which some other parts would have some say, the all-things-considered preference will nevertheless remain incomplete. Such cases of Strong Imposition not only run counter to our underlying question of how to derive an all-things-considered preference from a plural identity; they can be considered problematic as such, if one does not want one aspect of life to dictate all of its dimensions (Kelsey 1986, 80).27 Condition 4.4 (Strong Imposition) f (·) is strongly imposed if, and only if, there exists i ∈ M such that for all x, y ∈ X, xPi y implies xP y and xNi y implies xNy. Last but not least, the all-things-considered preference is required to be transitive. Condition 4.5 (All-things-considered Transitivity) f (·) satisfies All-thingsconsidered Transitivity if, and only if, its range is restricted to Rs .

25 It

is important to note, though, that unlike traditional psychological criteria of connectedness which are based on backward-looking memory (Parfit 1984, sect. 78), Bratman (2007, 29) and Parfit (1982, 2012) focus on forward-looking connections of a person’s plans and intentions. 26 Note that Monotonicity does not say anything about cases in which identity parts are added that are opposed to the previous all-things-considered preference, or in the case where a person gives up a part that ‘supported’ the former all-things-considered preference. 27 Kelsey (1986) discusses the counter-intuitive flavour of a weaker form of imposition in the case in which the various identity parts, or objectives as he calls them, are defined very narrowly.

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4.5 Transitivity It turns out that all Identity Aggregation Procedures that satisfy the introduced conditions are strongly imposed. Theorem 4.1 For m ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, every f (·) that satisfies All-thingsconsidered Transitivity, Unrestricted Domain, Minimal Identity Decisiveness, and Monotonicity is strongly imposed. Theorem 4.1 (Binder 2014) reveals the strong imposition of one dimension i. This dominance is stronger than that of an Arrovian dictator (Arrow 1951/1963) since additionally to imposing its strict (asymmetric) parts on the all-thingsconsidered preference, i also imposes its incomplete parts. It is interesting to have a closer look at the differences between Theorem 4.1 and Arrow’s result (Arrow 1951/1963). For this purpose it is useful to note that the employed framework of strict partial orderings is formally equivalent to a framework of quasi-transitive orderings (i.e. reflexive, complete and quasi-transitive preference relations on R), if the incompleteness relation N is replaced with the indifference relation I on X.28 If modified in this way, one can see that the conditions employed in this article are stronger than those used by Arrow. To be more precise, if modified in this way, Monotonicity entails Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternative and Monotonicity together with Minimal Identity Decisiveness entail the Weak Pareto condition. Furthermore, the domain of an Identity Aggregation Procedure is larger than the Arrovian domain: the domain of an Identity Aggregation Procedure is formally equivalent to a domain of profiles of quasi-transitive orderings which in turn contains the Arrovian domain. It can be shown that both the stronger conditions, as well as the enlargement of the domain are required to obtain the stronger form of dictatorship revealed in Theorem 4.1. To see this, note that a lexicographic procedure satisfies all of the introduced conditions and yields a transitive all-things-considered preference relation for all profiles of strict partial orderings with a transitive N relation.29 A lexicographic procedure is dictatorial in an Arrovian sense but not strongly imposed. Similarly, it can be shown that over a domain of profiles of quasi-transitive orderings, the Arrovian conditions lead to (strong) oligarchies if one requires the allthings-considered preference to be quasi-transitive.30 28 To

see the formal equivalence between profiles of quasi-transitive orderings and profiles of strict partial orderings, let for all x, y ∈ X, for all i ∈ M, [xNi y if, and only if, xIi y] and [yNi x if, and only if, yIi x]. Note that the relation N on X, as well as the relation I on X are symmetric and reflexive, but not transitive. If one reformulates the introduced conditions accordingly, the proofs of Theorems 4.1*–4.3* hold for the reformulated framework of quasi-transitive orderings. 29 The term ‘lexicographic procedure’ refers to the following aggregation procedure (based on Houy and Tadenuma (2009, 1771)), xP y if, and only if, (1) xP1 y or (2) xN1 y and xP2 y, or . . . , or (m) xN1 y, . . . , xNm−1 y and xPm y. The relation N on X is transitive if, and only if, for all x, y, z ∈ X, xNy and yN z implies xN z. 30 Contributions in the literature (Gibbard 1969; Weymark 1984) have shown that – over a domain of complete and transitive orderings – requiring the social ordering to be complete and quasi-

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To appreciate the implications of this result, recall that one argument that could be raised as to why Arrovian impossibilities are not all that troublesome in an intra-personal setting, is that an Arrovian dictatorship still allows for lexicographic procedures which are intuitively quite plausible in an intra-personal context. Of course, even an Arrovian impossibility would rule out more integrated ways of deriving one’s all-things-considered preference, such as majority rule or the Borda score. To illustrate, consider, for instance, a person who is a mother, an ecologist and an economist, and who wants to buy a car.31 On offer are a Volvo, a Toyota, a solar car and a sports utility vehicle. The Volvo scores very high on safety grounds and is therefore ranked highest by the mother in her. However, it is also the most expensive car, so it is ranked lowest by the economist in her. The ecologist in her prefers everything to the sports utility vehicle, given how much fuel it needs; here the clear preference is for the solar car. The mother in her, though, is concerned whether the solar prototype is actually safe enough. The Toyota, even though not ranked highest on any dimension, is scored reasonably well by all identity parts in her. One can imagine that if she wants to avoid the extremes she will choose the Toyota, which is ranked relatively highly by all of her identity parts (even though it is in fact not ranked highest by any of them).32 While such ways to bring one’s plural identity into terms are ruled out by an Arrovian dictator as well, the Strong Imposition of one identity part revealed by Theorem 4.1, is even more disturbing, as it equally rules out lexicographic procedures, in which a person derives her all-things-considered preference on the basis of a hierarchy over her various identity parts. Even though such a procedure is dictatorial in the Arrovian sense (1951/1963, 28), lexicographic procedures are commonly taken to have some appeal in the intra-personal context. They are widely regarded as a plausible way for people to bring various incomparable dimensions underlying their decisions into terms by prioritizing one over the other (Davis 2003; transitive leads to oligarchies. An oligarchy is a set of individuals whose (i) unanimous strict preference over any two alternative x over y, implies x to be socially preferred to y; and (ii) the members of the oligarchy have veto-power, i.e. if some member of the oligarchy strictly prefers x over y, this implies that it is not the case that y is socially preferred to x. Furthermore, results in the judgment aggregation literature (Gärdenfors 2006; Dietrich and List 2008) indicate the emergence of ‘strong oligarchies’ if one allows for a domain of possibly incomplete judgement sets (Dietrich and List 2008, 27). In a social choice framework, strong oligarchies can be defined as a set of individuals who do not only dictate their unanimously held strict preferences on the social preference, but also dictate incompleteness between any two alternatives x and y which are not ranked by all members of the strong oligarchy. It can be shown that a strengthening of the Arrovian conditions to those employed in this article will imply the strong oligarchy to be a singleton which is equivalent to strong imposition as defined in this article. 31 This example is a slightly modified version of an example invoked by Pettit (2001, 284). 32 This example is based (very crudely) on the Borda procedure. For a more precise, formal exposition, see Gaertner (2006, 92–98).

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Houy and Tadenuma 2009). Furthermore, a lexicographic procedure is one way for meta-preferences, as discussed by Sen (1977), to induce an all-things-considered preference. Thus the first argument that the Arrovian impossibility is not all that troublesome in an intra-personal setting loses its bite. While the existence of an ‘Arrovian dictator’ might not be all that problematic, since it still leaves room to aggregate one’s plural identity into an all-things-considered preference by employing a lexicographic procedure, this possibility is ruled out as soon as a strongly imposing identity part exists.

4.6 Acyclicity In this section I examine what happens if we distribute the ‘power’ of the various identity parts a bit more evenly, by slightly strengthening Minimal Identity Decisiveness to Identity Decisiveness. Condition 4.6 (Identity Decisiveness) f (·) satisfies Identity Decisiveness if, and only if, for all d ∈ D, all i ∈ M, and all x, y ∈ X: if [xPi y and xNj y for all j = i], then xP y. Unlike Minimal Identity Decisiveness, Identity Decisiveness demands that every identity part of a person has a say on the ranking between two alternatives if the other identity parts remain silent. Put differently, rather than demanding the existence of at least one identity part that is minimally decisive for any pair of alternatives, we now demand that every part of a person’s identity is minimally decisive for all pairs of alternatives. Identity Decisiveness appears to be rather plausible if incompleteness is taken to reflect irrelevance. After all, if the ranking between two alternatives, say to watch sports or the news on Saturday evening, is irrelevant to all identity parts except for one, namely the soccer fan, then it seems pretty plausible that a person forms her all-things-considered preference on the basis of the identity part that has a preference for one option rather than the other (even though this preference might not be overwhelmingly important). If, however, incompleteness is constitutive for some identity part of the person, then Identity Decisiveness might enjoy less plausibility. Say the person in the example above is a father who does not want to decide in favour of one of his kids (who wants to watch soccer) at the cost of the other (who wants to watch the news). In this case, Identity Decisiveness would require the soccer fan in him to switch to the sports channel (provided all other identity parts remain incomplete concerning the channel choice), despite the fact that this would favour one child over the other and thereby go against the father in him. It turns out that if one requires a person’s deliberation process to satisfy Identity Decisiveness, then Unrestricted Domain is sufficient to render even the existence of an acyclic all-things-considered preference impossible.

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Theorem 4.2 For m ≥ 2 and #X > 3, there is no f (·) that satisfies Unrestricted Domain and Identity Decisiveness. Theorem 4.2 (Binder 2014) is closely related to an example raised by Fishburn (1970), which shows that profiles of P - transitive preference orderings can lead to cycles if a pareto dominance condition is imposed.33 One point, which is especially worrying about Theorem 4.2, is that it takes the force out of the second argument raised against the problemacy of an Arrovian impossibility in an intra-personal context. One can drop all of the conditions imposed on a person’s deliberation process in the previous section, except for Identity Decisiveness and Unrestricted Domain, and even weaken one’s ambitions to an acyclic (instead of transitive) allthings-considered preference, yet one still faces an impossibility. The impossibility of even an acyclic all-things-considered preference seems even more worrying. To see this, recall that the second argument that could be made as to why an Arrovian impossibility is not that troublesome in an intra-personal setting is that it does not affect the possibility of making choices. As is well known in the social choice literature (Sen 1970), to weaken the transitivity requirement to acyclicity of the social ordering, in itself sufficient to make choices, enables an escape from the Arrovian impossibility. Similarly one could argue in an intrapersonal setting that what matters in the end is whether a person can make decisions on the basis of her plural identity. For her all-things-considered preference to induce choices, transitivity is not necessary, acyclicity would be sufficient. However, as Theorem 4.2 reveals, even acyclicity is ruled out as soon as one allows for incompleteness of the preferences in the identity profile. Thus the second argument as to why an Arrovian impossibility is not all that troublesome if one is concerned with intra-personal decision making also loses its bite. Indeed, the conflict between the plurality of a person’s identity and the rationality of her all-things-considered preference revealed by Theorem 4.2 is even more severe than the one revealed by Theorem 4.1. The absence of acyclicity reveals a possible tension not only between the plurality of a person’s identity and the consistency of her choices (reflected by the transitivity of the all-things-considered preference), but touches even on the mere possibility of choices, that is, the very existence of a choice function.

4.7 Identity Dissonance and a Domain Restriction In this section I explore a possible escape route, namely a relaxation of Unrestricted Domain. So far we have assumed that each identity part can be reflected by all

33 Fishburn (1970)

considers inter-personal aggregation problems over a domain of quasi-transitive preference profiles. The difference between Theorem 4.2 and his example (Fishburn 1970, 482) is that he illustrates the occurrence of cycles for m = 3 and #X = 3, whereas Theorem 4.2 of this article holds for m ≥ 2 and #X > 3. I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for making me aware of this point made by Fishburn.

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possible strict partial orderings. Indeed, in the light of the broad interpretation of the various identity fields we have adopted, and the intuition that deliberation requires some minimal antagonism between the values a person holds, this seems pretty plausible. After all, a ‘homogeneous identity’, based on values that all point in the same direction when it comes to action, does not pose much of a challenge for deliberation and might even come close to a singular identity. On the other hand, one can imagine that if the conflict within a person’s plural identity exceeds a certain level, then she becomes ‘paralysed’, unable to make consistent choices (illustrated by Theorem 4.1), or even any choices at all (illustrated by Theorem 4.2). One question, therefore, is where the borderline lies between these two extremes, that is, to allow for a certain degree of conflict but nevertheless to require some kind of overlap between a person’s various identities. To explore this question I consider all profiles that reflect a minimal overlap of the values underlying a person’s plural identity. Condition 4.7 (Value Overlap) Let Ri |{x,y,z} denote the restriction of binary relation Ri to the alternatives x, y and z. f satisfies Value Overlap if, and only if,  D = {d ∈ RsM | for all x, y, z ∈ X, i=m i=1 Ri |{x,y,z} = {(x, x), (y, y), (z, z)}}. It is interesting to note that to limit the conflict within a person’s identity by imposing condition Value Overlap, is in line with research in psychology. The term ‘identity dissonance’ refers to a state in which the conflict within a person’s (plural) identities exceeds a certain level, thereby adversely affecting her capacity to take decisions and to ‘function’ normally (Costello 2005).34 Value Overlap does indeed render a transitive all-things-considered preference possible. It can be shown that the domain generated by Value Overlap is contained in a domain, originally proposed by Fishburn (1970), over which simple majority rule yields a transitive all-things-considered preference.35,36

34 Costello

(2004, 2005) among others, has identified ‘identity dissonance’ as one possible reason for the persistent failure of affirmative action programmes in the classroom. This is mainly due to the fact that students, for whom the new professional identities at the relevant school are very new, or even stand in conflict with their other identity parts, need to spend much more time and energy on the resolution of internal conflicts, the monitoring of others and the understanding of the (implicit) rules that govern their new surroundings. Others (Thumma 1991) have explored the strategies people employ to resolve the value conflicts underlying their contradictory identities. 35 To be more precise, Fishburn (1970) is concerned with inter-personal aggregation problems and considers a sub-domain of profiles of quasi-transitive orderings. He shows that for his sub-domain simple majority rule yields a quasi-transitive social ordering. If indifference (I on X) between alternatives is replaced by incompleteness (N on X) in his definition, then it can be shown that Value Overlap is contained in his sub-domain (Definition A in Fishburn (1970, 484)), which in turn guarantees a transitive all-things-considered preference. 36 The condition Value Overlap in this article was inspired by Sen (1969) whose domain condition Value Restriction is sufficient for Majority Rule to generate quasi-transitive social preference orderings over a domain of profiles of weak orders. Pattanaik (1970) provides a generalization by establishing sufficient conditions for the class of binary, decisive, neutral, and non-negatively

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Value Overlap can be interpreted as imposing a limit on the conflict among a person’s plural identities in substantive terms. It requires all of a person’s values to agree upon the ranking of at least one pair of alternatives in every triple of alternatives. Given the possibly very different nature of a person’s various identity parts, this condition seems very demanding. It requires all identity parts, including a person’s religious identity for instance, to rank at least one pair in every triple, even if the respective alternatives, say three different sorts of wine, do not seem to be of any relevance for the respective identity part. Instead of requiring a substantive agreement among the values underlying a person’s plural identities, one can also limit the conflict among a person’s plural identities by demanding some minimal consistency across the preferences induced by the various identity parts. Condition 4.8 (Value Consistency) f (·) satisfies Value Consistency if, and only if, D = {d ∈ RsM | for all x, y, z ∈ X, for all i, j ∈ M, xPi y and yPj z implies that there exists k ∈ M such that xPk z}. Formally, it can be shown that the sub-domain generated by Value Overlap is contained in the one generated by Value Consistency.37 In terms of interpretation, Value Consistency does not require some minimal substantive agreement among a person’s various identity parts as Value Overlap does. Instead, it solely demands a minimal consistency between the rankings induced by different identity parts in case these values do apply to the same alternative. To illustrate, consider three different dishes: pork, chicken and vegetables. The condition Value Overlap would require all identity parts to rank at least two of these three alternatives in the same way, say all, including one’s religious and ecological self, to rank vegetables above pork. Value Consistency, however, only requires that if one identity part, say the vegetarian self, ranks vegetables above chicken and one’s religious identity part ranks chicken above pork, then some identity part has to rank vegetables above pork. Condition 4.9 (Imposition) f (·) is imposed if, and only if, there exists i ∈ M such that for all x, y ∈ X, xPi y implies xP y. Imposition is weaker than Strong Imposition in so far as the dictating part imposes solely its strict parts but not its incomplete parts, as it does in the case of Strong Imposition. Theorem 4.3 If Value Consistency is satisfied there is an Identity Aggregation Procedure that satisfies All-things-considered Transitivity, Identity Decisiveness and Monotonicity and is not imposed.

responsive social decision procedures to yield quasi-transitive social preferences over a domain of profiles of quasi-transitive individual preferences. It can be shown that the domain generated by Value Overlap is contained in Pattanaik’s domain condition VR* (Pattanaik 1970, 270). 37 Note, however, that Value Consistency is not contained in the sub-domain established by Fishburn (1970), nor in the sub-domain established by Pattanaik (1970).

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Theorem 4.3 (Binder 2014) shows that Value Consistency does indeed render transitive all-things-considered preference possible. One rule which allows bypassing the impossibilities highlighted in the previous sections is a modified version of Sen’s intersection approach (Sen 2002). It assigns a transitive all-things-considered preference to all identity profiles that satisfy the required Value Consistency among a person’s plural identities.

4.8 Conclusion We have seen that if one allows the preference relations reflecting the various parts of a person’s identity to be incomplete and strives for transitivity of the all-thingsconsidered preference, one faces a strongly dictatorial part of a person’s identity. Dictatorship becomes weaker, but is still present, if one restricts one’s ambitions to acyclicity. If one takes transitivity (acyclicity) of the all-things-considered preference to be inherent to a person’s rationality, the results can be interpreted as revealing a tension between rationality and the assumption of plural incomparable values or identities underlying a person’s choice. The final result illustrates an escape from the previously obtained impossibility results by reducing the level of conflict within a person’s identity. This suggests, and is further supported by the psychological literature on identity dissonance, that what is crucial for avoiding the tension between rationality and plural identities, is a minimal value overlap within a person’s identity. A special feature of the framework in use is that the preferences reflecting a person’s various identity parts are strict partial orderings, that is it allows for incompleteness but not for indifference. Two questions which beg to be asked in this respect are (1) whether one could not replace incompleteness with indifference, and (2) why not allow for indifference additionally to incompleteness. I shall take them up in turn. The reason why incompleteness cannot simply be replaced by indifference is that it has a different interpretation in the context of a person’s identity. As remarked in Sect. 4.2, it can be said to be constitutive to one’s identity not to be able to compare one’s children. An expression of indifference, however, is a comparison. To replace incompleteness with indifference would thus lead to an informational loss if one were to burden indifference additionally with the interpretation attributed to incompleteness.38 This additional interpretation which indifference allows for suggests the second question: why not consider a framework which allows for both incompleteness and indifference? This would indeed be possible, however, as can be checked under a slight modification of the axioms employed, (to account for

38 Recall that a second interpretation of incompleteness adopted in this chapter was incompleteness

as an irrelevance for a person’s identity part. This second interpretation, however, could plausibly be ‘taken over’ by indifference.

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indifference) this would not change anything about (the insights gained by) the obtained results. Thus it is not necessary to add indifference in order to make the points in this chapter. In Chap. 5 I make use of the insights gained in this chapter to address the question of how one can capture freedom’s agency value in freedom rankings. More precisely, I take freedom’s agency value to be the value freedom has in virtue of its allowing a person to form her preferences on the basis of her plural identity, and suggest one way to identify the value of alternatives in an opportunity set on the basis of a person’s identity profile.

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Griffin, James. 1986. Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hawthorne, John. 2003. Identity. In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. Michael J. Loux, and Dean W. Zimmerman, 99–130. New York: Oxford University Press. Heilmann, Conrad. 2008. A representation of time discounting. CPNSS working paper, vol. 4, no. 6. The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics, London, UK. Houy, Nicolas, and Koichi Tadenuma. 2009. Lexicographic Compositions of Multiple Criteria for Decision Making. Journal of Economic Theory 144: 1770–1782. Hurley, Susan L. 1985. Supervenience and the Possibility of Coherence. Mind 376: 501–525. Jeffrey, Richard C. 1974. Preference Among Preferences. The Journal of Philosophy 71: 377–391. Kelsey, David. 1986. Utility and the Individual: An Analysis of Internal Conflicts. Social Choice and Welfare 3: 77–87. Krause, Ulrich, and Ian Steedman. 1986. Goethe’s Faust, Arrow’s Possibility Theorem and the Individual Decision Taker. In The Multiple Self, ed. Jon Elster, 197–231. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levi, Isaac. 1986. Hard choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. May, Kenneth O. 1954. Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns. Econometrica 22: 1–13. Noonan, Harold. 1993. Identity. The International Research Library of Philosophy. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company. Ok, Efe K. 2002. Utility Representation on an Incomplete Preference Relation. Journal of Economic Theory 104: 429–449. Parfit, Derek. 1982. Personal Identity and Rationality. Synthese 53: 227–241. Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Parfit, Derek. 2012. We Are Not Human Beings. Philosophy 87: 5–28. Pattanaik, Prasanta K. 1970. On Social Choice with Quasi-Transitive Individual Preferences. Journal of Economic Theory 2: 267–215. Pettit, Philip. 2001. Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory. Noûs 35: 268–299. Plott, Charles R., James T. Little, and Robert P. Parks. 1975. Individual Choice When Objects Have “Ordinal” Properties. The Review of Economic Studies 42: 403–413. Raymond, Martin, and John Barresi, eds. 2003. Personal Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1969. Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions. Revue of Economic Studies 36: 381–393. Sen, Amartya K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Cambridge: Holden Day. Sen, Amartya K. 1973. Behaviour and the Concept of Preference. Economica 40: 241–259. Sen, Amartya K. 1974. Choice Ordering and Morality. In Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Körner. Oxford: Blackwell; Reprinted in Choice, Welfare and Measurement, ed. Amartya K. Sen, 74– 83, 1982. Oxford: Blackwell. Sen, Amartya K. 1977. Rational Fools. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317–344. Sen, Amartya K. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, Amartya K. 1986a. Foundations of Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue. In Foundations of Social Choice Theory, ed. Jon Elster, and Aanund Hylland, 213–248. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 1986b. Social Choice Theory. In Handbook of Mathematical Economics, ed. Kenneth J. Arrow, and Michael D. Intriligator, Vol 3, 1073–1181. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, Amartya K. 1997. Maximization and the Act of Choice. Econometrica 65: 745–779. Sen, Amartya K. 2002. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya K. 2004. Incompleteness and Reasoned Choice. Synthese 140: 43–59. Sen, Amartya K. 2006. Identity and Violence. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Styron, William. 1979. Sophie’s Choice. New York: Random House.

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Thumma, Scott. 1991. Negotiating a Religious Identity: The Case of the Gay Evangelical. Sociological Analysis 52: 333–347. Velleman, J. David. 1992. What Happens When Someone Acts? Mind 101: 461–481. Watson, Gary. 1973. Free Agency. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–220. Weymark, John. 1984. Arrow’s Theorem with Social Quasi-Orderings. Public Choice 42: 235–246.

Chapter 5

Freedom Rankings and Freedom’s Agency Value

Abstract In this chapter I turn to the question of how the value of alternatives can be incorporated in freedom rankings such that freedom’s agency value is captured. I do so in a two step approach. In the first step I identify the formal and interpretational conditions under which a freedom ranking suffers the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism. Given that the occurrence of these problems, as I have argued in Chap. 2, indicates a failure to take freedom’s agency value into account, this allows me to rule out approaches that fail to capture that value. The somewhat puzzling finding, however, is that nearly all existing freedom rankings fail to capture freedom’s agency value. That is, given a widely accepted (formal) condition, both ways to interpret the preferences invoked to identify the valuable alternatives in a set face either the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism. In the second step I suggest a way to capture freedom’s agency value. For this purpose I define freedom’s agency value more precisely, taking it to be the value freedom has in virtue of allowing a person to reflect and deliberate upon the relative priority of her plural identities at the moment of choice. I use a procedural criterion of ‘reasonableness’ to identify the valuable alternatives in a set on the basis of a person’s identity profile. It turns out that the same condition that -as it was shown in Chap. 4 – restricts the conflict among a person’s plural identities and allows for the transitivity of her all-things-considered preference, provides a way to account for the value the availability of options has for a person’s agency without suffering the problems of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism. Keywords Preference-based freedom ranking · Eligibility of alternatives · Procedural reasonableness · Agency value of freedom

5.1 Freedom Rankings and the Value of Alternatives The purpose of this section is to delineate the class of freedom rankings to which the argument in the subsequent section applies. To put the main upshot of the argument’s first step into a nutshell, if a widely accepted formal condition (called Irrelevant Expansion) is met, then the two main lines of interpretation of preferences within © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_5

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the freedom ranking literature face either the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism. Contributions within the freedom ranking literature which aim to incorporate information about alternatives into freedom rankings are often referred to as preference-based approaches to freedom, due to the common practice of using preference information to identify the valuable alternatives in an opportunity set. Depending on how the preferences are interpreted and the manner in which they are formally incorporated, one can distinguish a variety of ways in which preference information can be used in freedom rankings. The main focus in the freedom ranking literature is on the formal aspects, whereas little attention is paid to the implications that different interpretations of preferences can have for the resulting freedom ranking.1 While this is not surprising, given the main objective of the freedom ranking literature to explore formally the mutual compatibility of intuitively plausible conditions, it turns out to be problematic in an investigation as to whether freedom’s agency value can be captured in freedom rankings. As it turns out, whether freedom’s agency value can indeed be captured will mainly depend on the interpretation of the preferences invoked to identify the valuable alternatives in a set. Before moving to this interpretational point, however, it is necessary to delineate formally the class of freedom rankings the interpretational discussion thereafter refers to. Formally, as presented briefly in the introduction to this book, a common practice is to use a reference set of complete and transitive preference orderings over the alternatives to identify the valuable alternatives in a set. Some (Pattanaik and Xu 1998) take an alternative to be valuable if it is ranked at least as highly as all other alternatives in the same opportunity set by at least one preference ordering in the reference set.2 Others (Romero-Medina 2001) take all those alternatives to be valuable which are ranked at least as highly as all other alternatives in the universal set of alternatives. The freedom rankings these authors characterise usually focus on the number of valuable alternatives in an opportunity set: the more valuable alternatives a set contains, the more freedom it offers. An alternative approach makes use of an eligibility function rather than preferences to identify the valuable alternatives (Puppe 1996; van Hees 2010; Puppe and Xu 2010).3 The eligibility framework is more general than approaches in the 1 Notable

exceptions are the contributions by Sugden (1998, 2003) and Sen (2002), which I shall discuss later in this chapter in greater detail. 2 Pattanaik and Xu (1998) characterise two rankings. In the first, to which this description refers, they identify the valuable alternatives with reference to the same opportunity set. Along the second ranking as characterised by them, the valuable alternatives in an opportunity set are those to be identified in the context of the elements contained in the set with which it is compared. 3 The concept of (in)eligible alternatives in the context of the analysis of freedom was introduced by Benn and Weinstein (1971). See also Day (1977) and Sugden (1998). Jones and Sugden (1982, 86) were the first to suggest identifying the eligible choice options on the basis of preference information. In the present chapter I use the terms valuable and eligible alternatives interchangeably. Puppe (1996) and Puppe and Xu (2010) use the terminology essential alternatives instead of eligible alternatives.

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literature which make use of preference information: an eligibility function can be based on preference information but need not be. It can also be determined by, say, a perfectionist theory of human well-being, as in the case of the objective line to value-based approaches discussed in Chap. 2. Furthermore, and crucially for the present purpose, this generality allows us to delineate formally the class of freedom rankings to which the argument in the subsequent chapter applies. That is the class of freedom rankings which satisfies the condition of ‘Irrelevant Expansion’. As in Chap. 3, X denotes the universal non-empty finite set of alternatives, to be interpreted as particular freedoms, such as ‘wearing a headscarf’ or reading ‘independent newspapers’. Z and Z + denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X and the set of all subsets of X, respectively. Z thus contains all opportunity sets a person can possibly have. Linear orderings will be taken to be transitive, complete and anti-symmetric binary relations R on X. Furthermore,

denotes a reflexive and transitive binary relation defined over Z, with  and ∼ denoting its asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively. A B will then be interpreted as the opportunity set A offering ‘at least as much (of) freedom(’s agency value)’ as the opportunity set B. A  B as A ‘offering more (of) freedom(’s) agency value’ than B and A ∼ B, as A ‘offering as much (of) freedom(’s agency value)’ as B. An eligibility function is then defined as follows. Definition 5.1 (Eligibility Function) An Eligibility Function E(·) is a mapping from Z to Z + such that for all A ∈ Z, E(A) ⊆ A. One way in which preference information can elicit an eligibility function is to take all those alternatives in an opportunity set to be valuable or eligible, which are ranked at least as highly as all other alternatives (in the same opportunity set) by at least one preference ordering in the reference set of preferences. Formally this is expressed as follows. Definition 5.2 (Eligibility-Optimality) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . ., Rm ), for all A ∈ Z, Eo (A) = {x ∈ A | there exists Ri ∈ (R1 , . . . ., Rm ) such that for all y ∈ A, xRi y}. One way of using eligibility functions in freedom rankings (van Hees 2010) is to identify the eligible alternatives in each set separately. That is, the value of an alternative is identified relative to the other alternatives in the same opportunity set. Definition 5.3 (Simple Eligibility Rule) s is the Simple Eligibility Rule if, and only if, for all A, B ∈ Z, A s B if, and only if, #E(A) ≥ #E(B). The Simple Eligibility Rule allows for a multiplicity of ways to identify the valuable alternatives, as long as the eligibility function satisfies certain consistency

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Table 5.1 Eligibility function

R1 z x y

R2 z y x

-

Eo (·) Eo ({x, y, z}) = {z} Eo ({x, y}) = {x, y} Eo ({z}) = {z}

-

s and r {x, y} s {x, y, z} ∼s {z} {x, y, z} ∼r {z} r {x, y}

properties.4 If we assume Definition 5.2 holds, several of the preference-based freedom rankings that have been proposed can be seen as instances of the Simple Eligibility Rule.5 Alternatively, the eligibility function can be used in a slightly different way (van Hees 2010; Puppe and Xu 2010), namely to identify the valuable alternatives in a set A relative to the alternatives contained in the set it is compared to as well, thus relative to A and B. Definition 5.4 (Relative Eligibility Rule) r is the Relative Eligibility Rule if, and only if, for all A, B ∈ Z, A r B if, and only if, #E(A ∪ B) ∩ A ≥ #E(A ∪ B) ∩ B. To illustrate how a reference set of preferences can elicit an eligibility function, which then can be used to derive a freedom ranking either via the Simple or the Relative Eligibility Rule, consider the example in Table 5.1. The Simple Eligibility Rule can lead to counterintuitive cases though. To see this, take a closer look at our example above. Note that opportunity set {x, y} is taken to offer more freedom than opportunity set {x, y, z}, despite the fact that the former is a proper subset of the later.6 As can be checked in the table above, the Relative Eligibility Rule, characterised by van Hees (2010) and Puppe and Xu (2010), avoids such problems. In the following I do not go into the details of the characterizations offered of the Simple or the Relative Eligibility Rule (van Hees 2010; Puppe and Xu 2010). Instead I focus on one condition that both the class of Simple as well as Relative Eligibility Rules satisfy. Condition 5.1 (Irrelevant Expansion) satisfies Irrelevant Expansion if, and only if, for all A in Z and for all x in X − A, if x ∈ / E(A ∪ {x}), then A ∪ {x} ∼ A.

4 One of these consistency properties is the well-known condition α, which I shall discuss in greater

detail in the following chapter. can be shown that Pattanaik and Xu’s (1998) first rule is a special case of the Simple Eligibility Rule. The same holds for a ranking characterised by Romero-Medina (2001), if Definition 5.2 is slightly modified such that all those elements are eligible which, for some preference ordering in the reference set, are best elements in the universal set of alternatives (rather than within the same opportunity set). 6 This case illustrates the violation of an axiom widely accepted in the freedom ranking literature: the axiom of weak set dominance, which demands that every opportunity set offers at least as much freedom as one of its subsets. For a discussion of this axiom and stronger versions of it, see Sen (1991), Arrow (1995), and Gravel (1998) among others. 5 It

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The condition ‘Irrelevant Expansion’ (van Hees 2010, 697) is a condition imposed on freedom rankings. It is based on the intuition that non- valuable alternatives will not increase (decrease) the freedom offered by a set when they are added to (removed from) it. This axiom lies at the heart of many preference-based approaches to freedom (e.g. Pattanaik and Xu 1998; Romero-Medina 2001).7 It reflects the intuition, originally voiced against a pure cardinality approach to freedom, that not every alternative will increase the freedom offered by an opportunity set. It will not do so if it is not considered to be valuable. As I shall argue in the following section, however, freedom rankings satisfying Irrelevant Expansion are at risk of suffering either the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism depending on how the preferences (eliciting the eligibility function) are interpreted. Having thus set the formal stage, I shall now move to the interpretational prerequisites the argument in the following section requires. That is the interpretation of what lies behind the eligibility function, or how the preferences eliciting it can be interpreted. The preferences used can be interpreted in different ways. Sen (1991) explores how to incorporate a person’s actual preferences in freedom rankings. The use of a person’s actual preferences, however, has been questioned on the grounds that a person’s preferences are taken as given data (Jones and Sugden 1982, 59; Sugden 1998, 2003, 793; Arrow 1995) and thereby fail to capture an important aspect of freedom, namely the role freedom plays in the processes of preference formation. As Sugden (1998, 323) puts it, if we are interested in a person’s freedom (or opportunity as he calls it) because we take it to be crucial for the person’s autonomy or because the act of choosing tends to cultivate valuable human faculties, then [. . . ] we have to conceive of choice as autonomous act. That is we must work within a framework which leaves open what [. . . ] an individual actually chooses [. . . ] we cannot treat them [preferences] as given data: they must be understood as the product of a process of deliberation in which the agent decides what to choose.

However, a crucial question is how these potential preferences which a person might hold can be identified. Sugden (1998, 325–326) distinguishes two main lines for doing so. One, a line also adopted by Pattanaik and Xu (1998), is to invoke some substantive criterion of reasonableness or normality to identify all those preferences a person could (reasonably) hold. The second way is to follow an empirical line and make use of all those preferences which people with similar (sociological) characteristics to the agent in question do indeed hold. Additionally to these two lines identified by Sugden, a third line uses the preferences a person will hold with a certain degree of probability in the future (Arrow 1995; Kreps 1979). In these

7 The

axiom IDA-1 employed by Pattanaik and Xu (1998, 184), if expressed within the eligibility framework, turns out to be a strengthening of Irrelevant Expansion. In the case of Romero-Medina (2001), the axiom IMON (182) if expressed in the eligibility framework, together with condition α, a condition, which every preference induced eligibility function satisfies, as I discuss in Chap. 6, implies Irrelevant Expansion. Furthermore, the Independence of Non-essential Alternatives axiom, employed by Puppe and Xu (2010, 678), implies Irrelevant Expansion.

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frameworks a person is uncertain about her future preferences and values freedom for the flexibility it provides for maximising the preference she finally turns out to hold. As Sen (2002, sect. 20.12) argues, in such cases of uncertainty over future preferences or tastes, which alternative materialises depends not on volition or reflection, but on an event that is outside the chooser’s control. [. . . ] Autonomy is a very different problem of uncertainty, and a model of pure uncertainty would not be, I [Sen] would argue, a good basis of coming to grips with the demands of autonomy (Sen 2002, 618–619).8

While the focus on a person’s uncertain preferences might be crucial to capture the value freedom has in virtue of allowing more flexibility and thereby a greater satisfaction of one’s uncertain future preferences, I shall not consider that case in this chapter, where the main focus is on freedom’s agency value. Instead I focus on the first two lines of interpretation. That is: to invoke either some (substantive) criterion of reasonableness and take the preference orderings in the reference set to be those some reasonable person might hold; or to adopt an empirical approach and take all those preferences to be relevant which are held by some person sharing some (sociological) characteristics with the person whose freedom is under examination.

5.2 Freedom Rankings Between Scylla and Charybdis In the following I use the condition Irrelevant Expansion to explore the problems of desire dependency and the impossibility of paternalism. I argue that, if Irrelevant Expansion is satisfied, whether the resulting freedom ranking suffers from the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism will depend on what underlies the eligibility function, or how the preferences inducing it are interpreted. If the eligible alternatives are identified on the basis of preference information along the lines discussed in the previous section, then the freedom ranking literature finds itself in a Scylla and Charybdis situation. Both ways of interpreting the reference set of preference orderings that are plausible if one is concerned with freedom’s agency value face a problem.9 If one takes the preference orderings in the reference set as being identified in an empirical way, that is as all those preferences actually held by members of a certain community, then one risks an encounter with

8 Sen

(2002) mainly speaks about autonomy, rather than agency-freedom. The difference he draws between the two terms depends on whether a ‘first person’ perspective is adopted, as is the case when he speaks about agency freedom, or, as in the case of autonomy freedom, a ‘third person’ perspective is taken (Sen 2002, 679). 9 Recall that the interpretation of uncertain future preferences has been excluded on the grounds that it does not fit the intuition of a person being ‘agentive’ in the formation of her (future) preferences.

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the problem of desire dependency. If, on the other hand, one invokes a substantive notion of reasonableness to delineate the reference set of preference orderings, then one runs into the impossibility of paternalism. Consider first an empirical interpretation of the eligibility function. This means that if the eligibility function is induced from a reference set of preference orderings (cf. Definition 5.2), the preferences contained in it are interpreted as being held by all those people with a certain characteristic common to the agent in question. Assuming Definition 5.2 holds, one faces the problems related to desire dependency as discussed in Chap. 2. Suppose, because of adaptation or indoctrination, all people selected consider a social state s in which there is an active anti-terrorism policy to be more valuable than a social state w in which citizens have a right not to be detained without due process. By Irrelevant Expansion, the removal of w from a set which also includes s would not lead to a decrease of a person’s overall freedom, since w is not considered to be eligible. Or, along the same line of reasoning, the addition of the social state w would not lead to an increase of a person’s overall freedom if s is also present. While the risk of adaptation is the highest in the case of the indirect utility ordering, since only the person’s actual preferences are employed to identify the valuable alternatives in a set, the risk of encountering adaptation or manipulation phenomena decreases but does not vanish if the reference set of preference orderings is enlarged. Since, as I argued in Chap. 2, adaptation and manipulation can be group phenomena, a larger reference set of (actual) preference orderings might diminish the risk but will not preclude the occurrence of possible distortion by adaptation phenomena.10 Now consider the possibility that the eligibility function is based on some perfectionist account of what a person is supposed to prefer. Or, in the case where the eligibility function is induced by a reference set of preference orderings, suppose the reference set is identified on the basis of some substantive criterion of reasonableness. Thus, the reference set of preference orderings will include all the preferences a reasonable person could hold.11 Why does this line run into the impossibility of paternalism? To see this take up the headscarf example again. If it is taken to be unreasonable for women to prefer to wear a headscarf

10 Since dependency of a person’s preferences on her opportunity

set (reflecting her circumstances) is one of the defining features of adaptive preferences, one could argue that the adaptation problem can (by definition) not occur in the freedom ranking literature, where preference orderings do not vary with the different opportunity sets (for a notable exception, see Bavetta and Peragine 2006). A framework of refined or comprehensive outcomes can take account the menu-dependence of preferences over (normal/single) alternatives (see e.g. Sen 2002, 664–665), which might allow the identification of adaptive preferences. I discuss such a refined framework in greater detail in Chap. 6. For a more detailed discussion of adaptive preferences and a test to identify them, see Elster (1983). 11 Note that the fewer preference orderings the reference set contains, the more restrictive is the notion of reasonableness adopted.

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(h) rather than not to wear it (n), no preference ordering in the reference set will rank the option to wear a headscarf above the option not to wear it. By Irrelevant Expansion the removal of h from a woman’s opportunity set, which also contains n, will not lead to a decrease of her freedom. Therefore the removal will not lead to an interference with her freedom and does not constitute an act of paternalism.12 The severity of this problem will depend on the notion of reasonableness invoked. If one adopts a very narrow notion of reasonableness – suppose there is only one preference ordering a person can reasonably hold – then all options, except for the only one the person should ‘reasonably’ perform, could be removed without diminishing a person’s freedom. Alternatively, if one allows all logically possible preference orderings to be ‘reasonable’, and thus to form part of the reference set, then, as is well known, the resulting ranking would coincide with the Simple Cardinality Ordering (Pattanaik and Xu 1990). Opportunity sets would then be ranked in terms of the number of alternatives they contain, since all alternatives would be identified as valuable by some (logically) possible preference ordering. In this case the impossibility of paternalism would be resolved, but the entire idea of discriminating among the options according to their value would be rendered meaningless, too (since every alternative would be valuable). Especially if one is interested in capturing freedom’s agency value, as we are, this would lead to counterintuitive cases. The particular freedom to wear red stockings, for instance, would add as much to the agency value of a person’s freedom as the particular freedom to wear a headscarf, independent of the role the respective alternative has in relation to a person’s values or identities. To sum up, given the axiom of Irrelevant Expansion, (implicitly) satisfied by many existing freedom rankings, whether the respective freedom ranking suffers one of the problems highlighted in Chap. 2 will depend on the interpretation of the preference orderings invoked and the way the reference set is delineated. So far, the somewhat disturbing observation is that both lines of interpretation commonly adopted in the literature face a problem: if one identifies the preference orderings in the reference set on the basis of some substantive criterion of reasonableness one faces the impossibility of paternalism, whereas if one identifies the reference set on empirical grounds one cannot preclude the possibility that phenomena of indoctrination and manipulation will distort the assessment of a person’s freedom.

12 Note

that, as I argued in Chap. 2, the impossibility of paternalism also occurs in the case where the eligible elements are identified on the basis of some objective list theory of human well-being. One approach which can be read along such objective lines is ‘freedom as qua-maximising’, as discussed by Suppes (1987, 248–249). ‘Freedom as qua-maximising’ refers to cases in which one is interested solely ‘in a particular domain [. . . ] of freedom’ (Suppes 1987, 248) considered to be important, such as ‘civil liberties’ or economic choices.

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5.3 Freedom’s Agency Value and Preference-Based Approaches At the moment we are left with the somewhat puzzling observation that a very wide class of freedom rankings, namely those which satisfy the condition of Irrelevant Expansion, face a dilemma: if the reference set of preference orderings used to identify the valuable alternatives in a set is interpreted along an empirical line, or on the basis of some substantive standard of what being reasonable amounts to, then the preference-based approaches discussed here fail to capture freedom’s agency value. Is there still a way to use preferences in freedom rankings in such a way that the problems raised are avoided and freedom’s agency value is captured? Or does it mean that preference-based approaches (satisfying Irrelevant Expansion) cannot capture freedom’s agency value? Precisely this question, that is whether preference-based approaches can capture freedom’s agency value, or more generally freedom’s non-specific value is the topic of a debate between Carter (1996, 1999) and Sen (1996).13 Similar to his criticism of value-based approaches to freedom, as discussed in greater detail in Chap. 2, Carter (1996) criticises preference-based approaches on the ground that they fail to capture freedom’s non-specific value.14 Preference-based approaches, so Carter argues, cannot account for the value freedom has, independently of what it allows a person to achieve. In his reply to Carter’s critique, Sen (1996) emphasises the long reach of preference-based approaches, which he takes Carter to be underestimating. Preference-based approaches to freedom are by far ‘not confined to the “things” we end up getting’ (Sen 1996, 108), but can also account for the value of alternatives which are not actually chosen. Sen discusses a number of different cases, which can be captured by preference-based approaches to freedom.15 In all of these cases the availability of possibly unchosen options are relevant in the assessment of a person’s freedom. 13 Note

that freedom’s agency value is an instance of freedom’s non-specific value, as discussed by Carter (1999). 14 A second point of criticism Carter raises is that preference-based approaches are vulnerable to the happy slave problem (1996, 13). As I discussed in Chap. 2, the happy slave problem is a special instance of what I call the problem of desire dependency of overall freedom. In the previous section I argued that whether preference-based approaches are indeed vulnerable to the problem of desire dependency will depend on the imposition of Irrelevant Expansion and the way the preferences are interpreted. However, as I shall argue in the remainder of this chapter, this does not imply that preference-based approaches suffer from the problem of desire dependency in general, and the happy slave problem in particular. 15 Note that the particular cases of non-specific value raised by Sen (1996) have the objective to reject Carter’s point that preference-based approaches cannot account for freedom’s non-specific value in general. Sen’s criticism is successful if the cases raised by him are cases of non-specific value, and it they can be captured by preference-based approaches. This, however, would not imply that preference-based approaches can indeed capture all instances of non-specific value: a claim that is not up for discussion, nor easily verifiable without a more detailed description of freedom’s non-specific value.

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One case mentioned by Sen (1996) is especially relevant for the purpose of this chapter. It is the importance the availability of (possibly unchosen) alternatives can have for a person’s preference formation (109).16 Even though not actually chosen, an alternative might have been chosen if the person were to have had other preferences.17 To go beyond a person’s actual preferences and consider those she could have had is not only important because of the idea that it should be up to the person to decide on the importance of those preferences which finally guide her action relative to those she could have chosen to have, and not to the (possibly constraining) circumstances she is in, but also because a person should have the possibility of revising her preferences. Even if a person does not actually revise her preferences, ‘she may have reason enough to resent if others take her preferences as “given” – as a full reflection of her subjective attitude of what she “should choose to have”’ (Sen 2002, 618, emphasis in original).18 At first sight the findings of this chapter seem to cast doubts on Sen’s assertion that preference-based approaches can indeed account for the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation. After all, as I have argued so far, both ways to interpret and delineate the reference set of preferences in the literature fail to capture freedom’s agency value. Is there still a way open to delineate the reference set of preference orderings without facing either the problem of desire dependency or the impossibility of paternalism? One way discussed in greater detail by Sen (2002, 599) has not been explored yet: it is to go beyond a person’s (reasonable or actual) all-things-considered preferences. I shall explore this avenue by drawing on the framework I developed in Chap. 4, and take the process of preference formation to be the process in which a person forms her all-things-considered preference from her plural identity. This allows us to define freedom’s agency value somewhat more precisely, namely as the value freedom has in virtue of allowing a person

16 The

second reason why the availability of a not-necessarily-chosen option can be important in the assessment of a person’s freedom, is the fact that it can be crucial for the nature and thereby the value of another option that is available in the same opportunity set. Sen (1996), who refers to this case as the unchosen option opening up the freedom to reject, invokes the example of a starving and a fasting person to illustrate this point. In both cases the person ‘chooses’ the same option namely, not to eat. However, the crucial difference that distinguishes a fasting from a starving person is that the first one rejected the option to eat, whereas this option was not available for the latter. Thus, in this case the availability of the option to eat changes the nature of the not eating option, from starving to fasting. The difference between the two is precisely that in the latter the person has the freedom to reject the option to eat, whereas in the former she has not. This case will be crucial in the discussion of the formal limits of existing preference-based approaches to freedom in Chap. 6. 17 In other parts of his work Sen (2002, sect. 20.11) discusses in greater detail why, if one is interested in the relation between a person’s agency and the freedom of choice she enjoys, it can be important to go beyond a person’s actual preferences and consider multiple preferences she could have chosen to have. 18 The role freedom has with regard to the formation of a person’s preferences was also emphasised and discussed by Arrow (1995). Different from the path pursued in this chapter, Arrow (1995) adopts a framework in which a person is uncertain about her future preferences.

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to reflect upon the relative priority of her various identity parts in the moment of choice (represented by her all-things-considered preference). In the following section, I explore one possible way to identify the valuable alternatives in a set on the basis of a person’s identity profile by invoking a procedural criterion of reasonableness.

5.4 Identity and Procedural Reasonableness In this section I suggest one way in which freedom’s agency value can be captured in freedom rankings. For this purpose I take freedom’s agency value to be the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation, or the freedom a person enjoys to reflect on the relative priority of her various identity parts when deriving her allthings-considered preference guiding her choices. I do so by drawing on the identity model developed in Chap. 4, and show how it can serve to delineate the set of preference orderings a person (with a certain identity) can reasonably hold. Unlike the existing approaches, which adopt a substantive notion of reasonableness to identify the alternatives a reasonable person is supposed to value, I do not constrain the values or identity parts a person might hold. Instead, I use a procedural criterion of reasonableness to identify those alternatives which a person ‘has reason to value’ when forming her all-things-considered preferences. More precisely, I show how the eligible or valuable alternatives can be identified on the basis of a person’s plural identity. In Chap. 4 we saw that one way to guarantee the acyclicity of a person’s all-things-considered preference, in the case in which one allows for incomplete preferences reflecting the values underlying a person’s identity parts, is to restrict the conflict among her various identity parts by imposing a domain condition. The Modified Intersection Rule which allowed the escape in Chap. 4 was inspired by Intersection Quasi-orderings as explored by Sen (2002, chap. 22). It can be shown that the Modified Intersection Rule employed in Chap. 4 yields the Intersection Quasi-ordering* (see Definition 5.5) if the preferences in the identity profile are complete.19 For clarity of exposition I focus henceforth on cases where a person’s identity parts are reflected by complete orderings and make use of the Intersection Quasi-ordering*.20

19 To see this consider the following definition of Modified Intersection Preferences (yielded by the

Modified Intersection Rule used in the proof of Theorem 4.3 in Chap. 4 of this book). Given some profile (R1 , . . . , Rm ) of reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric (i.e. partial) orderings, define the Modified Intersection Preference R  as follows, for all x, y in X, xR  (R1 , . . . , Rm )y if, and only if, (a), x = y, or (b), there is no Ri in (R1 , . . . , Rm ) with yRi x and there is some j with xRj y. 20 If the condition Value Overlap, as introduced in Chap. 4, is satisfied, then incompleteness of the preferences reflecting a person’s identity parts can be used to identify the valuable alternatives in a set along the lines suggested in this section.

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Definition 5.5 (Intersection Quasi-ordering*21 ) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), R  (·) is the Intersection Quasi-ordering* if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, xR  (R1 , . . . , Rm )y if, and only if, for all Ri ∈ (R1 , . . . , Rm ), xRi y. R  can be (very) incomplete. As soon as there is some conflict within a person’s identity, viz. two identity parts rank two alternatives in the opposite way, then R  is incomplete. Only if all identity parts rank two alternatives in the same way, does R  do so too. This reflects the type of procedural reasonableness which the employed intersection rule requires a person’s preference formation to satisfy. What it demands is that if two alternatives are ranked in the same way by all identity parts, then this should be reflected in the derived all-things-considered preference. Such ‘unanimity’ among the rankings reflecting various identity parts can mean two things. Firstly, the values crucial to the respective identity parts (partly) overlap and therefore point in the same direction. Suppose, for example, one value is crucial for more identity parts, such as the value of ‘non-violence’ might be for a pacifist, an anarchist and a Catholic. Secondly, the fact that the ranking over a pair of alternatives coincides for all orderings in a person’s identity profile might not reflect an overlap in the values constitutive of the various identity parts, but rather the fact that (possibly quite) different values point in the same direction when it comes to ranking different alternatives. One may, for instance, rank organic products above non-organic ones, for both health and ecological reasons. I consider this ‘respect for unanimity’ underlying the Intersection Quasiordering* to describe a minimal requirement of procedural reasonableness, viz. a requirement that an all-things-considered preference be ‘reasonably derived’ from an identity profile. Once this minimal condition is met, different people will complete R  in different ways, depending on how they resolve conflicts among their identity parts. One can then identify the valuable or eligible alternatives in a set by using an approach put forward by Sen (1997, 763) to identify the maximal alternatives on the basis of partial orderings. An eligibility function could then be elicited in the following way. Definition 5.6 (Eligibility-Maximality) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), for all A ∈ Z, Em (A) = {x ∈ A | there is no y ∈ A such that yP  (R1 , . . . , Rm )x}. Along Definition 5.6 all those alternatives which are not unanimously dominated by some other available alternative in terms of all of a person’s identity parts are taken to be valuable. This brings out the different way I make use of the idea of

21 Strictly

speaking this is also a modified version of the Intersection Quasi-ordering proposed by Sen (2002, 672). Sen’s Intersection Quasi-ordering (Sen 2002, 672) is defined on a set of weak orderings, whereas the Intersection Quasi-ordering* I use in this section is defined on profiles of linear orderings.

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intersection.22 Instead of employing it to identify the ‘best options’ available in an opportunity set on the basis of a (possible or reasonable) all-things-considered preference, I use it to single out those alternatives that are dominated in terms of the values underlying the formation of a person’s all-things-considered preference. Thus, one could say the underlying idea is the reverse of counting those options which a person values as possible achievement (among the preferences she might possibly have): I focus on those alternatives which do not add to the value freedom has for a person’s reflection and deliberation due to the fact that they are dominated by all of her identity parts. Just how far is this approach formally different from the ‘best elements approach’ usually pursued in the literature, that is from an approach which equates the valuable alternatives with those which are ranked highest in terms of at least one transitive allthings-considered preference included in a reference set of preference orderings? In order to explore this question I shall identify all complete and transitive all-thingsconsidered preferences a person can ‘reasonably derive’ from her identity profile. That is all completions of R  , which are contained in the set C(R  ).23 Definition 5.7 (Reference Set of Preferences) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), a completion Rc of R  is defined as any transitive, antisymmetric and complete binary relation Rc on X such that R  (R1 , . . . , Rm ) ⊆ Rc . C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )) denotes the set containing all completions of R  (R1 , . . . , Rm ). All preference orderings contained in C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )) can be interpreted as the preferences a person can reasonably hold given her identity (profile) (R1 , . . . , Rm ). That is C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )), containing all transitive completions of the Intersection Quasi-ordering* (R  ), depicts the reference set of preference orderings as usually employed in the freedom ranking literature. The set of preference orderings obtained can then be used to identify those alternatives in a set which contribute to a person’s preference formation, as defined in Definition 5.8. That is, all those alternatives which could have been chosen if the person were to have prioritised her various identity parts in a different way are taken to contribute to freedom’s agency value.

22 Apart

from Foster’s (1993) intersection approach, Sen (2002) explores ways to make use of the idea of intersection in freedom rankings. Sen (2002, chap. 2.1) uses the partial ordering (obtained by intersection) in order to ‘check’ whether the element(s) in one set are at least as good as those in the set to which it is compared. He suggests that one way to rank sets vis-à-vis each other is to consider that a set A offers at least as much freedom as a set B if for every element x in B there is some element in A, which is at least as good as x (in terms of the partial ordering considered). The main difference between Sen’s (2002, chap. 2.1) intersection approach and the one discussed in this book is that the opportunity sets in the example above would not be ranked vis-à-vis each other since the options in the sets are not ranked vis-à-vis each other. 23 Note that people can differ in two respects in the framework adopted. First, they might have different identity profiles. Secondly, two persons can have the same identity profile but prioritise their various identity parts differently.

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Definition 5.8 (Eligibility-Preference Formation) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), for all A ∈ Z, E∗ (A) = {x ∈ A | there exists Rc ∈ C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )) such that for all y ∈ A, xRc y}. As it turns out, if a person’s identity profile consists of linear orderings, then the set of valuable alternatives identified on the basis of the incomplete Intersection Quasiordering* along Definition 5.6 coincides with the set of best elements identified along the set of transitive and complete completions delineated along Definition 5.8. Theorem 5.1 If (R1 , . . . , Rm ) is a profile of linear orderings then for all A ∈ Z, Em (A) = E∗ (A). Hence, if a person’s various identity parts are taken to induce linear orderings, then the way to take all those alternatives to be valuable which are not unanimously dominated by all of a person’s identity parts coincides with the set of best elements identified on the basis of all the all-things-considered preferences a person might hold given her plural identity. To illustrate this and the way the delineated set of valuable alternatives can be used to rank sets either via the Simple or the Relative Eligibility Rule, consider the following slightly modified example provided by Pattanaik and Xu (1998): a woman who is a pacifist and a feminist faces the three options of joining the army (x), not joining it (y), or spending ten years in a solitary cell (z). Her identity profile, the Intersection Quasi-ordering*, and the reference set of preference orderings she can reasonably hold are given in the following table (with [.] denoting incompleteness) (Table 5.2). Both the options to join the army and not to do so would increase the agency value of a person’s freedom due to the fact that their availability allows a person to reflect on the relative priority of her various identity parts, i.e. the pacifist and the feminist in her (Table 5.3). The option to spend ten years in a solitary cell is not taken to increase the agency value of a person’s freedom, since according to all identity parts it is clearly dominated by some other available option. Table 5.2 Intersection quasi-ordering* – reference set of preferences

R1 x y z

R2 y x z

-

R [xy] z

-

C(R ) x y y x z z

Table 5.3 Freedom rankings

Z A = {x, y, z} B = {x, y} C = {x, z}

-

E∗,m (·) E∗,m (A) = {x, y} E∗,m (B) = {x, y} E∗,m (C) = {x}

-

s / r A ∼s B s C A ∼r B r C

5.4 Identity and Procedural Reasonableness Table 5.4 Identity profile – reference set of preferences

R1 x y z

R2 z y x

99

-

R xNy xNz yNz

-

C(R ) xyz y z x ... zxy

Why, one might ask at this point, take the seemingly complicated ‘extra turns’ of intersection (and subsequent completion)? Why not identify the valuable alternatives directly from a person’s identity profile? To see the difference between the case where one would derive the eligible elements directly from an identity profile (along Definition 5.8) and the case where one employs the Intersection Quasi-ordering*, consider the following example. As Sen, whose example I am using here, puts it, [a] person with musical talent but who is not averse to affluence considers three options: becoming a full-time musician, which in that society will also yield very low income (x); doing a bit of music as a sideline with a primary job in another field that yields a moderately high salary (y); and becoming a full-time businessman who has no time for music but much affluence otherwise (z) (Sen 2002, 614).

Interpreted from the perspective I adopt in this book, assume the person has a musical (R1 ) and an economic identity part (R2 ), depicted in the table above (Table 5.4). Note that the intersection ranking is ‘completely incomplete’ and the reference set of preference orderings can contain all logically possible linear orderings over the three alternatives. Consider now the two opportunity sets A = {x, z} and B = {x, y, z}. If one were to derive the eligible elements directly from the identity profile (R1 , R2 ) along Definition 5.2, one would obtain the ranking A ∼s,r B by the Relative Eligibility Rule or by the Simple Eligibility Rule. If one invokes the intersection approach (either via Definition 5.2 or via Definition 5.6), though, then by the Relative Eligibility Rule (or the Simple Eligibility Rule) one gets B s,r A. Sen (2002, 614) makes use of this example to raise the question whether set A offers indeed as much agency freedom as set B. Or, to phrase it in the terminology of this book, does the freedom offered by A have the same agency value as the freedom provided by B? As Sen (2002, 615) argues, whether there is indeed something lost if y is removed from a person’s opportunity set will depend on the interpretation of the reference set of preferences invoked and the aspect of freedom one is interested in. If one is interested in freedom’s agency value, or agency freedom as Sen (2002, 615) calls it, then it seems that something is indeed lost when y is removed from an opportunity set. Looking at it from the perspective of a person who forms her preferences on the basis of her plural identity, this point becomes even more obvious. In the process of choice a person deliberates as to how to aggregate, or prioritise, her various identity parts vis-à-vis each other. It would seem rather restrictive to assume

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that a person solely reflects whether to go either ‘fully’ for the musician in her, or solely to strive for affluence but does not consider combining the two, a path which y would open up to her.24 To sum up, in this section I have explored how those alternatives which contribute to freedom’s agency value can be identified on the basis of a person’s identity profile by employing a criterion of procedural reasonableness. I took all those alternatives to contribute to a person’s preference formation, and thus to freedom’s agency value, which are not unanimously dominated by all identity parts. As it turned out, however, this way to identify the valuable alternatives coincides formally with the best element approach usually taken in the literature if a person’s identity profile consists of linear orderings. That is, it coincides with the approaches in the literature which employ a reference set of preference orderings, if these are interpreted as all those all-things-considered preferences a person can reasonably derive from her plural identity. The suggested approach(es) to identifying the valuable elements in a set on the basis of a person’s identity profile thus capture(s) the value freedom has to form her preferences (on the basis of her plural identity).

5.5 Desire Dependency and the Impossibility of Paternalism, Reconsidered It remains to be shown that the suggested approach to capturing freedom’s agency value on the basis of a person’s identity profile does indeed avoid the problem of desire dependency and the impossibility of paternalism. This is the topic of this section. Consider first the impossibility of paternalism. As discussed in Chap. 2, the impossibility of paternalism occurs if one identifies the value of particular freedoms on the basis of some objective standard independent of the person in question. The removal of a particular freedom diminishes a person’s overall freedom only if it is taken to be valuable according to the perfectionist theory invoked. Thus, if an alternative, which is termed non-valuable according to the perfectionist theory in use, is removed it will not lead to an infringement of her (overall) freedom and therefore does not count as an act of paternalism, irrespective of the person’s own valuation of the option removed.

24 The answer to the question whether y

does indeed add something to a person’s freedom illustrates the difference between the intersection approach explored in this chapter, and an approach put forward by Foster (1993). Foster asks whether, for every preference ordering in the reference set of preferences, there is some alternative x in the opportunity set A, which is ranked at least as high as every alternative in B. A set A is then ranked at least as high as an opportunity set B in terms of freedom if, and only if, for every preference ordering in the reference set there is some option x in A, which is ranked at least as high as every option in set B. According to Foster’s approach, y in the previous example does not add anything to a person’s freedom since, no matter which of the two orderings she finally turns out to have, y would be dominated by either x or z. Thus, along Foster’s line we get A ∼ B in the example above.

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101

Is the proposed approach vulnerable to this problem? The answer is negative since the value of alternatives is identified on the basis of the person’s own values and not according to some standard independent of the person in question. By way of illustration, consider the headscarf debate once again. Even if a person never actually chooses to wear a headscarf, its availability will contribute to the agency value of the person’s freedom as long as it is not dominated by another alternative available in terms of all identity parts. Turning now to the adaptation problem, is the approach explored vulnerable to that? The answer to this question will depend on the level at which adaptation is actually occurring. The crucial difference between the subjective, value-based line explored in Chap. 2 and the approach discussed in Sect. 5.5 of this chapter, is that the first uses a person’s actual, possibly adapted all-things-considered preferences to identify the value of alternatives, whereas the later makes use of the values and goals on the basis of which a person forms her actual preferences. If adaptation occurs on the level of a person’s all-things-considered preference due to the constrained circumstances she is in, as Elster’s (1983) definition has it, that is if it occurs during the process in which a person derives her actual preferences from the set of values and goals, then the proposed approach does not suffer from the adaptation problem. To see this consider the option ‘going to university’. One identity part of a person, say the one that may make her to want to become a physician, would clearly prefer this option above all others. However, the situation she is in does not allow her even to finish school because the economic situation of her parents requires her to help in the family’s fields instead. As time passes she stops aspiring to become a physician (and thus to go to university) and as a result prefers ‘working in the fields’ strictly above ‘going to university’ along her actual preferences. Thus, according to the subjective line, which uses the person’s actual or all-things-considered preferences to identify the value of alternatives in a set, the option of going to university would not be termed valuable and would therefore not increase the woman’s freedom if added to her opportunity set. According to the approach discussed, however, the option ‘going to university’ would increase the agency value of the woman’s freedom if it were added to the set, since it is ranked highest by at least one of her identity parts, despite the fact that it will not be ranked highest along the all-thingsconsidered preference she derives from her plural identity (due to the situation she is in). If, however, adaptation occurs at a higher level, i.e., at the level of the system of values, goals and desires itself, then the suggested approach cannot account for it. In the literature (Hechter et al. 1993) it is commonly assumed that the formation of a person’s values, desires and goals is (at least in part) shaped by the society she is living in. Thus it can be the case that the values underlying a person’s plural identity and thereby her preference formation are shaped or ‘adapted’ to the prevailing views in the society she is living in. A woman might be born into a society with very restrictive gender roles which are reflected in all the goals, desires and values she holds. In this case the availability of the alternative ‘going to university’ might not be termed valuable in terms of any of the goals, desires and values she holds, since

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these are (all) shaped by the society she is living in, where women are not meant to go to university. The availability of the alternative ‘going to university’ would therefore not contribute to the agency value of the woman’s freedom along the proposed approach. It might be more accurate to speak of restricted value formation rather than preference adaptation in such a case, since even though it might be a process the person is unaware of in both cases, in the present case it is an adaptation due to the restricted range of value systems she encounters in her society, rather than an adaptation due to her restricted set of choice options, which is considered in this book. To sum up, the discussed approach, in which the value of alternatives is identified on the basis of a person’s identity profile, does not suffer from the adaptation problem if adaptation occurs in the process by which a person derives her actual preferences from her plural identity. If, however, adaptation occurs on a higher level, that is on the level of values and goals underlying her various identity parts, then the present approach cannot account for it. As I shall discuss in the conclusion to this book, adaptation on a higher level, and its relationship to the agency value of the freedom a person enjoys in the society she is living in, can be explored by widening the perspective, from freedom’s agency value of an individual at a given point in time, which was the focus of this book, to the agency value of the freedom a person enjoys in a society to (partly) change her identity over time.

5.6 Conclusion In this chapter I inquired how the value of alternatives can be taken into account so as to capture freedom’s agency value. In a first step I showed that given a widely accepted axiom, the two main routes of interpretation of preferences within the freedom ranking literature, that is, using a substantive criterion of reasonableness or an empirical line to identify the reference set of preference orderings, run into the problem of desire dependency and the impossibility of paternalism, respectively. As I argued in Chap. 2, the occurrence of these problems indicates a failure to account for freedom’s agency value. In a second step I suggested one way to identify the relevant preferences in freedom rankings, such that freedom’s agency value is captured. For this purpose I took freedom’s agency value to refer to the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation. I made use of a procedural criterion of reasonableness to identify all those alternatives which contribute to a person’s reflection on how to prioritise her plural identities vis-à -vis each other when making choices. As I have argued, the suggested approach succeeds in avoiding the impossibility of paternalism as well as the problem of desire dependency in its original form. In a nutshell, if freedom’s agency value is equated with the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation, then, as I have argued, whether it can be captured or not will depend on the interpretation of the preferences invoked. I have

References

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shown one way this could be done, i.e., how the reference set of preferences can be identified such that freedom’s agency value is captured. This was mainly a matter of interpretation of the preferences invoked and left the formal framework largely untouched. In the following chapter, however, I shall point to cases (originally raised by Sen 1996 in a slightly different context) that lead us to the formal limits of existing preference-based approaches (including the one suggested in this chapter).

References Arrow, Kenneth J. 1995. A Note on Freedom and Flexibility. In Choice, Welfare and Development, a Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen, ed. K. Basu, Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Kotaro Suzumura, 7–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bavetta, Sebastianio, and Vitorocco Peragine. 2006. Measuring Autonomy Freedom. Social Choice and Welfare 26: 31–45. Benn, S.I., and W.L. Weinstein. 1971. Being Free to Act, and Being a Free Man. Mind 80: 194–211. Carter, Ian. 1996. The Concept of Freedom in the Work of Amartya Sen: An Alternative Analysis Consistent with Freedom’s Independent Value. Notizie di Politeia 43(4): 7–22. Carter, Ian. 1999. A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Day, John P. 1977. Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty. The American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 257–272. Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes, Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foster, James. 1993. Notes on Effective Freedom. Mimeograph, 14 Oct 1992, Vanderbilt University. Gravel, Nicolas. 1998. Ranking Opportunity Sets on the Basis of Their Freedom of Choice and Their Ability to Satisfy Preferences: A Difficulty. Social Choice and Welfare 15: 371–382. Hechter, Michael, Lynn Nagel, and Richard E. Michod. 1993. The Origin of Values. Piscataway: Aldine Transaction. Jones, Peter, and Robert Sugden. 1982. Evaluating Choice. International Review of Law and Economics 2: 47–65. Kreps, David M. 1979. A Representation Theorem for “Preference for Flexibility”. Econometrica 47: 565–577. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., and Yongsheng Xu. 1990. On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56: 383–390. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., and Yongsheng Xu. 1998. On Preference and Freedom. Theory and Decision 44: 173–198. Puppe, Clemens. 1996. An Axiomatic Approach to “Preference for Freedom of Choice”. Journal of Economic Theory 68: 174–199. Puppe, Clemens, and Yongsheng Xu. 2010. Essential Alternatives and Freedom Rankings. Social Choice and Welfare 35: 669–685. Romero-Medina, Antonio. 2001. More on Preference and Freedom. Social Choice and Welfare 18: 179–191. Sen, Amartya K. 1991. Welfare, Preference and Freedom. Journal of Econometrics 50: 15–29. Sen, Amartya K. 1996. Freedom, Capabilities and Public Action: A Response. Notizie di Politeia 12: 107–125. Sen, Amartya K. 1997. Maximization and the Act of Choice. Econometrica 65: 745–779. Sen, Amartya K. 2002. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sugden, Robert. 1998. The Metric of Opportunity. Economics and Philosophy 14: 307–337.

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Sugden, Robert. 2003. Opportunity as a Space of Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring it. Ethics 113: 783–809. Suppes, Patrick. 1987. Maximizing Freedom of Decision: An Axiomatic Analysis. In Arrow and the Foundations of Economic Policy, ed. George R. Feiwel, 243–254. New York: New York University Press. van Hees, Martin. 2010. The Specific Value of Freedom. Social Choice and Freedom 35: 687–703.

Chapter 6

Cultural Diversity and the Capability Approach

Abstract In this chapter I turn to one specific interpretation of the framework considered so far: the capability approach. By drawing on the analysis conducted in this book I shall discuss the question whether the capability approach can account for cultural diversity. In a first step, I explore how cultural differences may affect the construction of capability sets. In a second step, I turn to their ranking, and draw on discussions about the value of alternatives in freedom rankings in order to explore how different ways to identify valuable functionings can affect the extent to which capability rankings can account for differences in the conception of wellbeing across different cultures. In a last step, I draw on Sen’s contributions in rational choice theory in order to illustrate how certain norms can render the value of functionings dependent on the capability set of which they form a part. I illustrate that existing contributions fail to account for such cases of context-dependency, and propose a way to refine the framework such that they can be taken into account. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of freedom’s agency value in allowing the capability approach to find a delicate balance in the evaluation of well-being across different cultures: namely to avoid the problem of preference adaptation it was meant to address, without becoming paternalistic. This chapter is a modified version of Binder (Context dependency of valuable functionings: how culture affects the capability framework. In: Chiappero-Martinetti E (ed) Debating global society: reach and limits of the capability approach. Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Milan, pp 205–232, 2009). Keywords Capability approach · Culture · Norms · Agency · Context-dependency · Ranking of capability sets

6.1 The Capability Approach In recent years the capability approach has given rise to considerable discussion of the evaluation of individual well-being and social states. It serves as a guiding paradigm in a variety of endeavors, from poverty analysis, policy and project evaluation in different countries throughout the world, to the building blocks of a © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_6

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theory of justice (Nussbaum 2006).1 Given the broad scope of its application and the possible different conceptions of well-being among different persons, groups, societies and cultures, the question arises as to whether the capability approach is able to take account of such differences. To what extent can this framework, which is rather general, accommodate cultural differences? Can it be fruitfully applied in different cultural settings? Only a limited number of contributions address these questions explicitly.2 The role of human diversity in the transformation of goods into valuable doings and beings forms a distinguishing feature of the capability framework (Sen 1985b, 1992). However, one open question, especially when using the approach empirically, is how to account for the diversity of doings and beings that people might value. Sen (1993a, 48), who pioneered the approach, has pointed out that the incompleteness of the framework affords the necessary flexibility to accommodate possible disagreement on the importance of different components of well-being. Indeed, many parts of the framework are left open, such as the specification of the relevant (valuable) functionings that should enter a capability set, as well as the question of how capability sets can be ranked vis-à-vis each other. These lacunae make it possible to fill the blank spaces according to the purpose of the exercise and the concrete (cultural) context under consideration.3 In this light, the incompleteness of the framework seems to be an advantage if one is looking for a cross-cultural application of the capability approach. However, Sugden has pointed out the problem which this under-specification poses for the operationalisation of the approach (Sugden 1993). In particular, he has raised doubts about whether different views on the value of functionings can be accommodated (Sugden 1986). These two positions are not necessarily contradictory. Indeed, the very openness of the framework seems quite promising for taking cultural differences into account.4 However, whether this can indeed be achieved in practice will depend on the way the framework is actually filled in. This chapter has two main objectives. The first is to discuss how different interpretations of the formal framework can affect its operationalisation and thereby 1 See

Robeyns (2006) for a survey of applications of the capability approach. (1999) points to the discussion of human rights and culture. The Human Development Report 2004 (UNDP 2004) discusses the role of cultural liberty in development. Evans (2002) and Robeyns (2005a) point to the role of culture in the capability framework. The closely related but more specific discussion of a universal list of valuable functionings has received more attention in the literature (see inter alia Nussbaum (2000, 2006)). For a discussion of the identification of valuable functionings in theory and a way to do so in practice, see Alkire (2002). 3 Robeyns (2017) recently developed a modular view of the capability approach that allows to distinguish between the core shared by all of its variants and the choices one needs to make in order to specify the approach for different applications in different settings. 4 The capability approach is employed in a variety of different cultural settings. For an extension of the framework in order to employ the capability approach in developments ethics, see Crocker (2008). For a conceptualisation and assessment of legal frameworks to indigenous autonomy or quality of life assessments of the Maori ¯ people for instance, see Watene (2016) and Binder and Binder (2016) respectively. 2 Sen

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the cultural flexibility that it allows for. After discussing this in terms of the construction of capability sets, I go on to discuss their ranking. In doing so I draw on the freedom ranking literature, and the findings of earlier chapters of this book. Given the close connection of this matter to the ranking of capability sets, the freedom ranking framework is used to highlight how cultural differences may affect capability rankings. Apart from the discussion of existing results, I also take up the possible impact that norms can have on the ranking of capability sets. This coincides with the second objective of this chapter, which is to shed some light on a different view of how culture may influence the value of functionings, namely via norms. This is done by examining the consequences of Sen’s findings in his work on rational choice theory for the construction and ranking of capability sets. I illustrate how norms can lead to an interdependency between the value of functionings in a capability set, the aspiration being to highlight the resulting influence of norms on the evaluation of achieved bundles of functionings as well as on the ranking of capability sets, and therefore on the evaluation of (the freedom to achieve) wellbeing as a whole. Although the chapter’s primary focus is thus on the theoretical analysis of capability sets, the analysis is of the utmost importance for the practical application of the approach. To understand why, note that cultural differences can introduce some regularities that might be empirically discerned. Such regularities, once they are identified, can be helpful in the empirical application of the approach. Take, for instance, the importance that a given society ascribes to status. The importance of the functioning ‘enjoying status’ to a person’s well-being may differ depending on the group to which he belongs. Furthermore, the resources and features that allow a person to enjoy status might be different within various societies.5 An awareness of such differences may be helpful in the design of questionnaires or the choice of indicators when applying the capability approach.6 This chapter is set out as follows. Section 6.2 defines the terms that are crucial to the analysis, such as ‘culturally relevant places’ and discusses their role in the construction of capability sets. The main question is to what extent different interpretations of the formal framework can affect its operationalisation, and therefore the cultural flexibility it allows. After discussing this in terms of the construction of capability sets, Sect. 6.3 takes up possible cultural influences on their rankings. Existing results within the freedom-ranking literature are discussed

5 Trompenaars

and Hampden-Turner (1997, 230) draw an empirical distinction between achievement-oriented cultures, in which status is accorded on the basis of success in the workplace, for example, and ascription-oriented cultures in which status is accorded on the basis of certain personal characteristics, such as age. 6 Caution is necessary, though: the introduction of cultural regularities is not meant to diminish or even replace the important role of freedom. Freedom seems crucial from a cultural perspective, too: people might want to opt out, question certain traditional values and practices, or try something new. Thus the focus on freedom seems important not only in order to leave room for individual diversity within a culture, but also to accommodate cultural change as such. For a discussion of the multidimensional and dynamic aspects of identity and culture, see Sen (2006).

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in terms of their interpretation as capability rankings. In Sect. 6.4 I argue that cases of seemingly great importance for the evaluation of well-being are not covered by the results put forward thus far. The analysis of these cases is extended by drawing on Sen’s work in rational choice theory. It is shown that the presence of norms can cause the value of functionings to depend on the capability set of which they form a part. The implications of this finding for both the construction and ranking of capability sets are discussed in Sect. 6.5, where the consequences for a crosscultural application of the capability framework are highlighted and a possible refinement of the traditional framework is proposed. More specifically, it is argued there that if not sufficient importance is ascribed to freedom’s agency value in the evaluation of human well-being across different cultures, then it will either face a problem of preference adaptation or has to adopt a paternalistic route. In Sect. 6.6, I then conclude with a discussion of how important the excluded cases are for the freedom ranking literature in general, and for the question whether preference based freedom rankings can take account of freedom’s non-specific value in particular.

6.2 Culture and the Construction of Capability Sets In previous chapters the focus of analysis was on an individual level, now we shift perspective to a social level. We move from the plurality of identities within a person to the diversity of systems of values, practices and norms within a society and across different cultures. In the literature the term culture is used in many different ways (Tucker 1996). A very broad definition suffices for the purposes of this chapter: culture here is taken to refer to a common system of values, norms and practices. These might be shared on religious, historical or political grounds by groups of individuals, such as Buddhists, academics, indigenous peoples, social movements or youth gangs. Alternatively, one might employ the term culture to refer to a group of people who share the respective values, norms and practices. People belonging to and identifying with the respective group would then share one part of their plural identity, as discussed in Chap. 4. To be more precise, they would share a number of values and norms, which are constitutive for the respective identity part, with other people belonging to the same group (of Buddhists in this case). For reasons of clarity, the term culture is used here for both types; that is, ‘culture’ refers to a set of shared values, norms and practices as well as to the group of people who share them. In the following pages the term ‘culturally-relevant place’ will refer to all those parts within the capability framework in which differences in the above-mentioned cultural parameters may lead to different judgements of wellbeing, depending on how the framework is fleshed out. In order to discuss these possible culturally-relevant places, I will first present a broad description of the capability framework, based on Sen (1985b) and Robeyns (2005b).

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In the capability framework, a person’s state is reflected by bundles of doings and beings, called functionings. These functionings can range from very basic ones like being well nourished or being warm to more complex ones like being a member of a community or appearing in public without shame. All those bundles which are feasible for a person are included in her capability set, which reflects her freedom to lead one life or another. The starting point for the construction of a person’s capability set are the commodities and resources at her command. Out of the ‘basket’ of goods available to her, she can then choose one bundle of commodities. A commodity can have a number of features or characteristics. A ‘skirt’, for instance, has the characteristics of ‘a piece of linen’, ‘the color red’ or ‘size 38’. From these characteristics a person can then derive various ‘doings and beings’: her bundle of functionings.7 Which functionings can be derived from a certain quantity of goods can differ strongly among individuals and within different environmental and social contexts, depending on a range of personal (in this case physical), social and environmental conversion factors. Whether a person can transform say a skirt into the functioning ‘being clothed’ will depend on his body size (physical conversion factor); whether it can be used for ‘being warm’ will depend on the climate zone in which he lives (environmental conversion factor); whether men can derive the functioning ‘appearing in public without shame’ when wearing a skirt will depend on the prevailing social norms (social conversion factor). Given a person’s conversion factors, a variety of ways of converting his goods into functionings may be open to him. A person’s capability set is then the set of all bundles of functionings that he could realise, given his conversion factors and the commodities at his command. Thus a person’s capability set reflects the freedom he enjoys to choose among various life paths, reflected by combinations of doings and beings. From this set of feasible bundles of functionings he can then choose one bundle, which constitutes his state of being. From a capability perspective, a person’s achieved well-being can thus be conceptualised and evaluated in terms of his realized bundle of functionings, reflecting the various doings and beings which constitute his state, whereas a person’s freedom to achieve well-being is reflected by his capability set.8 Given the large number of doings and beings, the question arises, though, which of them are relevant for the evaluation of a person’s well-being. One important consideration when answering this question is the value assigned to

7 For

a more detailed discussion of this point and the roots of a characteristic view of commodities that dates back to Lancaster, see Sen (1984, chap.13). 8 It is important to note that the freedom reflected by a person’s capability set is relevant for at least two reasons. First, it reflects the real opportunities different people have to achieve well-being. While this aspect might be especially relevant in the evaluation of social states, the second reason refers to the importance freedom can have for a person’s well-being as such. The freedom to choose may itself be an important component of a person’s well-being. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Sen (1992, 40, 41).

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different functionings.9 The evaluation of a person’s well-being in a certain state will naturally be influenced by the value assigned to the doings and beings which make up this state. Subsequently, in the assessment of a person’s freedom to pursue different paths of well-being, the value assigned to the different bundles of doings and beings open to her is essential. In the formal capability framework (Sen 1985b), the value of functioning(s) is given by the person’s valuation function, a function that assigns a real value to each bundle of functionings. However, the question of what lies behind this evaluation function, and how the value of functionings should be identified is a topic of intensive discussion within the capability literature (Robeyns 2005b). One can roughly distinguish two main answers to this question: Nussbaum (2000, 2006) has proposed a general list of valuable functionings inspired by an Aristotelian notion of human flourishing. She emphasises that her list is universally applicable but has to be specified and extended in each particular setting. In contrast, Sen (1992, 2009) and many who work with the capability approach as an (incomplete) framework of evaluation (e.g. Alkire 2002), hold that the valuable functionings should be identified in discussion among the people whose well-being is assessed.10 Once the value of functionings is identified, the question is how it should be taken into account when ranking capability sets in terms of the freedom they offer to a person. Before I discuss how different ways to answer this question can affect the extent to which the capability approach can account for different conceptions of the good life within different societies and cultures, I briefly discuss how cultural differences can influence the construction of capability sets. There are various places where cultural considerations may enter the capability framework. First, the question of what is taken to be a ‘commodity’ may be answered differently in different cultural contexts. Suppose a rather narrow interpretation of ‘commodities’ is adopted, namely one where the term refers solely to goods traded on markets. In this case there may be differences as to what is taken to be a commodity in which culture. Social movements in Cochabamba, in common with many indigenous and ancient cultures, do not regard drinking water as a ‘tradable good’ (Salzman 2006), whereas in Western Europe this is certainly the case. Under a broader interpretation, ‘commodities’ may refer also to non-market goods and resources. This makes it possible to take account of goods to which no property rights are assigned, but which are of great importance to a person’s well-being, such as clean air. Furthermore, this broader interpretation would enlarge the scope of the capability approach to the evaluation of well-being within groups

9 Another

important consideration related to whether a functioning is relevant for evaluation can be the purpose of the evaluation exercise under consideration. In some cases one might focus on one specific aspect of well-being, such as health. 10 For an overview and discussion on different methods to identify the valuable functionings in practice, see Byskov (2018). For a discussion about the role of philosophy in this process, see Claassen (2011).

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and societies, such as Israeli kibbutz communities or indigenous subsistence societies in Chiapas, in which a large proportion of goods are produced outside the market.11 Secondly, there may be a cultural influence on the characteristics of the commodities themselves. Sen notes that a commodity’s characteristics are independent of the person possessing that commodity (Sen 1985b). One may expect, though, that the perception and importance ascribed to characteristics can vary within different cultural contexts. Take, for example, the dispute about a new airport built in Mexico City-Atenco a few years ago (Russell 2003). Land was offered as compensation to the farmers who were living on the site where the new airport was to be built. One of the grounds on which they refused the compensation was that the land they were living on forms an important part of their identity. A possible reason for this affirmation is that ‘being the land of one’s ancestors’ is seen as a characteristic of the commodity land, which enables an individual to derive the functioning ‘living in accordance with one’s history’ (Navarro 2002). Alternatively, it might be that a certain characteristic is perceived, but that no importance is attached to it. Take the number of holes in a pair of jeans. For many people, such holes do not form an (important) characteristic of the commodity jeans, yet within the context of (some Austrian) teenage groups it is an important characteristic that leads to the functioning of ‘being cool’. Another type of cultural influence may occur in cases where the characteristic is identified but its conversion into functionings is restricted by cultural factors. In some societies men are ‘not supposed to’ wear skirts. In such cases men will not be able to derive the functioning ‘being clothed’ simultaneously with the functioning ‘appearing in public without shame’ from the commodity skirt. Here, a prevailing norm restricts the set of feasible functionings open to an individual via social conversion factors. Alternatively, cultural practices can sometimes increase the scope of functionings which can be derived from certain characteristics of a commodity. One such example is the traditional knowledge regarding how to use certain plants for medicinal and other purposes. Consider the Neem tree, which grows in Asia. Those who are unfamiliar with traditional knowledge may derive only the possible functionings ‘building a hut out of its wood’ or ‘resting in its shade’, whereas in India the tree has been used for over 2,000 years to derive such diverse functionings as ‘applying contraception’, ‘lighting one’s house’ or ‘protecting one’s field from insects’ by utilizing the oil of its seeds (Schmutterer 1990; Shiva 2000).12 Thirdly, conceptions of well-being, and therefore the value ascribed to different functionings, may vary from person to person and across groups, societies and

11 For

a more general discussion of the capability approach as a framework to assess different economic systems in economic ethics, see Binder and Robeyns (2019). 12 The Neem tree is an important example of questions concerning the assignment of property rights over procedures and products that stem from traditional knowledge (Mathur 2003). From a capability perspective this might be interpreted as property rights assigned to conversion functions.

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cultures. This is most obvious when one is dealing with certain cultural functionings. People may value certain cultural practices as an important element of their wellbeing, and therefore as valuable components of their capability sets. ‘Reading one’s daily newspaper in a coffee house’ or ‘going weekly to the sauna’ are examples, as are ‘going to church every Sunday’ or ‘eating turkey at Thanksgiving’. Furthermore, and perhaps less obviously, the value ascribed to functionings which are not directly related to cultural practices may differ due to different values held in different cultures. It may be that in one group the functioning ‘spending time in nature’ is not considered to be an important component of well-being, whereas for another group it is essential. To sum up, we can identify three different places where cultural influence can be detected within the capability framework. First, whether the notion of a good differs among different cultures will depend on whether a narrow or broad interpretation of that good is adopted. The interpretation adopted will influence the set of goods or resources that are open to a person. Second, the perception and importance of the characteristics of a good may be culturally influenced. Furthermore, culturallyrelated social practices and norms will have a crucial influence on the conversion of characteristics into functionings, either restricting (via norms, for example) or enlarging (in the case of traditional knowledge, for instance) the possibilities open to a person to convert resources into actual doings and beings. Third, the value ascribed to functionings, and thereby the functionings that are considered relevant for evaluation and the relative weights attached to them, may differ within various cultural contexts. This relates directly to the question of the extent to which the valuation function may vary among different cultures.

6.3 Culture and the Ranking of Capability Sets An essential part of any application of the capability approach is the ranking of capability sets.13 To what extent are such rankings sensitive to cultural differences? For a discussion of this question I shall draw on the freedom ranking literature, and insights gained in earlier chapters of this book. To refresh the reader’s memory, opportunity sets are sets of feasible alternatives from which a person can choose exactly one element. The generality of the axiomatic framework allows various interpretations of the alternatives, that is they can be commodities, actions or bundles of functionings. Hence, in one interpretation, which is the one on which this chapter focuses, they are conceived as capability rankings, that is as rankings of sets of bundles of functionings. One of the main discussions in the current freedom ranking literature, which was also the topic of the preceding chapter, is whether and how the value of alternatives

13 For

cases in which it might be fruitful to assess a person’s achieved bundle of functionings in place of her capability set, see Robeyns (2006).

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should be taken into account when ranking opportunity sets. From a capability perspective it seems obvious that the value of functioning bundles present in a capability set plays a crucial role in their ranking.14 After all, the purpose is to rank capability sets in terms of a person’s freedom to achieve well-being. The question, therefore, is how to take account of the value of alternatives when the ranking of opportunity sets is interpreted as capability rankings. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is common in the freedom ranking literature to do this by making use of a reference set of preference orderings (Pattanaik and Xu 1998; Romero-Medina 2001; Sugden 1998).15 The number of alternatives that are ranked highest by at least one preference ordering in the reference set, called the maximal elements, determines the ranking of the set (Pattanaik and Xu 1998). The more maximal elements available in a set, the more freedom of choice it offers.16 In the following pages I shall discuss how the interpretation of the preferences employed, and the question which preferences should be included in the reference set, a topic I discussed in detail in the previous chapter, are relevant for the question whether freedom rankings, interpreted as the ranking of capability sets, can account for cultural diversity in the valuation of functionings. For this purpose a short recap of the various ways in which the preferences in the reference set can be interpreted is useful. One approach, put forward by Sugden (1998), is to state that all those preference orderings a person could possibly have should be taken into account, and thereby be part of the reference set. This leads to a further question, viz. what are all the preference orderings a person could possibly have? One might think that this would be the complete list of all preference orderings. This poses a problem, though, since within the framework of the reference sets proposed, it would render useless the whole idea of differentiating between alternatives according to their value: every alternative would be ranked as maximal by some preference ordering. This would then lead to a pure quantity measure of freedom in which opportunity sets are ranked by counting the elements within them. The more alternatives open for choice, the more freedom a person enjoys.17 One way to get around this difficulty is to state that only those preference orderings which a reasonable person could have in the agent’s situation should be part of a reference set (Pattanaik and Xu 1998). This may come close to considering relevant all those functionings which a person has reason to value. To illustrate, consider three (one-dimensional) functioning bundles: ‘eating meat’ (m), ‘eating vegetables’ (v), and ‘eating rotten apples’ (r). In the case in which 14 For

arguments in favor of taking the value of alternatives into account in freedom rankings, see Sen (1990, 1991). 15 Note that preference orderings can induce valuation functions as used in the capability framework outlined in Sect. 6.2. 16 Reference sets of preference orderings are used in various ways in the rankings proposed in the literature. The main discussion in this chapter is based on Pattanaik and Xu (1998). 17 This would coincide with the so-called ‘Simple Cardinality Ranking’ derived by Pattanaik and Xu (1990).

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the reference set includes all preference orderings over these alternatives, the set {m, v, r} would be ranked above the set {m, v}, since the former includes three and the latter two elements, all of which are ranked highest by at least one preference ordering in the reference set. In contrast, if one says that all the preference orderings a reasonable person may hold should be part of the reference set, one may question whether a reasonable person would indeed prefer a rotten apple over either vegetables or meat. Thus the reference set would include two (reasonable) preference orderings: 1: mP vP r and 2: vP mP r. A set {m, v, r} would then offer the same freedom as the set {m, v}, since r would not be ranked highest by any reasonable person and thereby does not increase the freedom offered by the set. The question arises, though, whether reasonable preferences can always be unambiguously identified. Can a general set of reasonable preference orderings be established? Or does the notion of what is considered reasonable, and therefore the reference set, vary within different social and cultural contexts? Is ‘eating dog meat’ considered reasonable in the Netherlands? Is ‘eating beef’ considered reasonable in India? Is ‘eating milk products’ considered reasonable in China? Various authors have raised the question of how to identify what is ‘reasonable’ (Barberà et al. 2004). The degree to which cultural differences can be accommodated will depend on the notion of ‘reasonableness’ that one has adopted. If one identifies valuable functionings on the basis of some substantive notion of reasonableness or a conception of the good life that is independent of the person in question, and takes only valuable functionings to increase the freedom offered by a person’s capability set, then a problem closely related to the impossibility of paternalism, as discussed in the previous chapters, can occur. It is important to note that the problem addressed here is not exactly the same as the one of the conceptual impossibility of paternalism. We are now concerned with the problem that the use of a substantive notion of reasonableness, which is independent of the person whose well-being is assessed, can lead to a justification or recommendation of policies which foster what people should value or the lives people should lead irrespective of whether they actually value them or not.18 To illustrate, change the alternative in the example above to ‘eating genetically modified apples’. If, for instance, one were to adopt a substantive notion of reasonableness along which the rejection of genetically modified food on the grounds that it crosses a sacred boundary of humans ‘playing god’ is not considered to be reasonable, then it would not be considered to be reasonable to prefer a ‘natural apple’ to a genetically modified one. In this case the addition of the functioning of ‘eating genetically non-modified apples’ would not increase the freedom offered by

18 In

the literature this problem is often referred to as the problem or objection from perfectionism. For a discussion about the distinction between the objection from perfectionism and from paternalism and an argument that the capability approach is vulnerable to the later, see Claassen (2014). For an argument that only a proper incorporation of freedom’s non-specific value into the capability approach would allow to remove all traces of paternalism, see Carter (2014).

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a capability set (provided genetically modified apples are available).19 As a result policies that foster the availability of non-genetically processed food would not be taken to increase a person’s well-being assessed by the capability approach. Special caution seems to be needed, therefore, when applying a substantive notion of ‘reasonableness’ to identify the valuable functionings in a set. It seems sensible to conjecture that the greater the detail with which the functionings are specified, the greater are the possible cultural differences regarding what a person has reason to value. On a general level there may be little disagreement that a person has reason to value the presence of the functioning ‘eating’, whereas on a more specific level there might be considerable cultural differences as to whether, say, ‘eating beef’ is reasonable. Another interpretation of the reference set of preferences that is proposed in the literature (Sugden 1998) may help to deal with possible problems arising from a substantive notion of ‘reasonableness’. One could state that all those preference orderings that are held by a member of a given society should be part of the reference set.20 The preference rankings would then reflect the values (shared or not) of the members of the specific society or group. Such an interpretation might enable one to capture the freedom to pursue different paths of well-being in a plural society. Change the ‘eating rotten apples’ to ‘eating fruit’ (f ) in the example above. If we are dealing with a vegetarian society, for example, the only prevailing preference orderings might be f P vP m and vPf P m. Therefore the addition of the alternative ‘eating meat’ would not increase the freedom offered by the capability set. However, as soon as there is just one meat eater among the members of this society, holding the preference ordering mPf P v for instance, the addition of the alternative ‘eating meat’ would increase the freedom offered by the set. In this way, possible culturallyspecific values ascribed to the alternatives could be taken into account without restricting the freedom of people living in a different culture. However, this line also comes with its own possible pitfalls. If only valuable functionings are taken to increase the freedom offered by a capability set, and the value of functionings is identified on the basis of a person’s or group’s actual preferences, then the adaptation problem can reoccur.21 A person raised in poverty who learnt to adapt her aspirations to her constrained circumstances might have stopped aspiring to paths seemingly closed to her, such as ‘going to university’ or ‘running for political office’.22 Similarly, in societies with very restrictive gender

19 This

example implicitly presupposes that there are no other reasons for the rejection of genetically modified food. 20 Instead of taking account of all the preference orderings that are held by at least one member, one might say that all those that are held by a minimal number of people in a society should be part of the reference set. 21 Note that this point depends on the condition Irrelevance Expansion identified in the previous chapter: non-valuable alternatives, or functionings in this case, do not increase the freedom offered by a (capability) set. 22 Schokkaert (2008), referring to Clark (2005), invoked a case in which people mentioned the functioning ‘drinking Coca Cola’ as a valuable functioning in order to illustrate the difficulty

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roles, women who have never come into touch with a different way of living than the one they were socialised into and witness in their surroundings, often cannot even imagine that matters could be different. Women in traditional indigenous societies in Chiapas (Mexico), for instance, report that before the Zapatista movement – a movement struggling for indigenous rights in Mexico – had led to an intensive discussion within indigenous communities about the rights of women, they would not even have imagined that a woman could have a say in matters such as how many children to bear, or to demand the same share of food as other family members (Rovira 1997).23 As argued in the preceding chapter, one possibility to avoid distortion by preference adaptation is to assign sufficient importance to a person’s own process of reflection and deliberation over the values and identities she holds. Indeed this is very much in line with one way to read Sen’s proposal as to how the valuable functionings should be identified. To recapitulate, Sen’s (1992, 1999, 2009) proposal is to identify the valuable functionings on the basis of reflection and a discussion among the people whose well-being is assessed. Throughout his writings Sen (e.g. 1992, 5; 1999, 18) emphasises that the relevant functionings are those a person ‘has reason to value’. While this has often been read in substantive terms (Sugden 2008), that is, as requiring the plugging in of some substantive notion of reasonableness on a theoretical level in order to identify those functionings a person has reason to value, a different reading is possible, a reading that avoids the adaptation problem. Namely that those functionings are valuable which a person deems to be valuable after a process of reflection and deliberation. The judgement as to what one has reason to value is not left to the theoretician but is the ‘outcome’ of a person’s own reflections and discussion with others. It is this process of reflection, deliberation and reasoning of the person herself, further enriched and deepened in discussions with others (who possibly hold quite different views of the good life) that can lead to a questioning, possibly a revision or a reinforcement of the person’s values and thereby provides safeguards against the adaptation problem. Take the example I invoked above once again. The Zapatistian women became aware of the restrictiveness of the traditional gender roles prevailing in their communities because of a process of joint reflection and discussion (Rovira 1997; Poniatowska 2002). Regardless of whether such a discussion process does

of identifying possibly adapted preferences in practical evaluation. However, it might not be straightforward to tell whether this is a case of adapted preferences, as Schokkaert (2008) took it to be, or whether it rather reflects a case in which the purchase of the commodity Coca Cola leads to other functionings, such as ‘being modern’. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Clark (2005) on whose analysis Schokkaert’s example was based. 23 These examples should not suggest that the occurrence of adaptation phenomena are restricted to less affluent societies. For instance, the absence of intact ecosystems and a natural environment can deprive members of more affluent societies of the possibility of experiencing the value of ‘intact nature’, or ‘non-processed food’, and how these can affect their well-being.

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indeed lead to unanimous agreement on what is valuable, it can lead to scrutiny of the reasons why people value something in the light of the argument of others. Thus, ascribing sufficient importance to faculties constitutive to a person’s agency, such as her ability to reason and to reflect upon her values and goals, is a promising avenue to avoid problems related to the identification of valuable functionings in a culturally diverse world.24 It enables one to walk the line between necessarily accepting the prevailing status quo in societies with (possibly) discriminative social structures, and the other extreme of ‘imposing’ a notion of well-being or the good life from ‘outside’. It is the person herself who questions and possibly revises her conception of well-being in reflection and discussion with others, and, as a possible consequence challenges and changes existing practices. A new avenue to discuss cultural influences on capability rankings is opened up by the more general way of incorporating information about the value of alternatives to freedom rankings discussed in the previous chapter, namely by making use of an eligibility function (Puppe 1996; van Hees 2010). An eligibility function assigns to every opportunity (capability) set the set of valuable (bundles of) functionings it contains. In this more general framework, possible cultural sensitivity enters via the eligibility function, and therefore the bundles of functionings which are considered to be valuable in a capability set. The question is to what extent cultural differences influence the eligibility function and therefore the functionings which are considered valuable. One way to look at this question is to examine the alternatives that are selected by the eligibility function. A second way is to discuss more generally the relation between the selected alternatives in different capability sets, by examining the properties of the eligibility function.

6.4 Norms and the Value of Functionings Among the various formal properties which may be imposed on the eligibility function, this section will discuss one in greater detail. Condition α, which is often called the ‘contraction consistency condition’, is one of the most important conditions in rational choice theory. Imposed on choice functions, it is usually used (along with other conditions) to examine the rationalizability of choice behavior. It requires that if an alternative x is chosen out of a set S, then it will be chosen out of every subset of S (in which x is present).

24 I use the term agency here as I employ it throughout this book, as referring to the faculty a person

has to reflect and deliberate upon her goals, values and desires and to act on them. Sen (1985a) uses the term in a related but slightly different way. He understands agency as the possibility of acting on broader goals than one’s actual well-being.

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When imposed on the eligibility function, its interpretation will change slightly. It then requires that if an alternative x is considered valuable (eligible) in a set S, it will continue to be valuable in any subset of S (in which x occurs). Given the context of the capability approach, is this a reasonable condition to impose on the eligibility function? At first, the answer to this question seems to be positive. Indeed, the preference-based freedom rankings discussed above fulfil this condition. The question arises, though, whether this is always the case. Are there cases of importance for the ranking of capability sets that are ruled out by condition α? In order to discuss this question we can draw on Sen’s critique of the internal consistency of individual choice behavior (Sen 1993b, 1995). In this critique Sen points to cases in which the standard conditions (including condition α) are violated. Although the background and motivation of Sen’s critique differ from the subject of this chapter, there are some important parallels. In particular, let us consider two cases raised by Sen (1993b) that seem particularly relevant from a capability perspective. First, consider the case in which the presence of a (possibly rejected) functioning bundle can influence the nature and subsequently the value of other functioning bundles present in a capability set.25 This case is illustrated by a prominent example in the literature (Sen 1988a, 1993b): a person who does not eat (n) may not have the option of eating (e) open for choice, hence (s)he is starving. But it might also be the case that the person has deliberately rejected the option of eating and decided to fast (choose n out of {n, e}) for religious or political reasons. It is hard to imagine that ‘starving’ is considered to be a valuable functioning, so in this case the eligibility function will violate condition α, since n (fasting) is valuable in any set in which e is also present, whereas n (starving) is not valuable in any subset from which e has been removed. Second, also norms can cause the value of one functioning to depend on the presence of other functionings in a capability set.26 Consider the (possible) norm within social movements to accept negotiation offers only if the option ‘to engage in peaceful protest’ is open too.27 In this case the functioning ‘to negotiate’ is only considered valuable in a situation in which the option ‘to engage in peaceful protest’ is also open for choice. If the ‘protest’ option is absent, due to police interference for example, the functioning ‘to negotiate’ will be considered unacceptable and therefore non-valuable. In this case the eligibility function will not satisfy condition α either. Given such violations of condition α, these cases are not covered by the results discussed in the freedom-ranking literature. In both cases the value of one functioning will depend on the presence of other functionings in the set. As I shall demonstrate in the next two sections, this ‘black spot’ has important implications

25 Sen

(1993b) refers to this case as ‘the freedom to reject’. (1993b) refers to this case as ‘positional choice’. 27 This example is inspired by Opp (2001), who discusses the role of norms in social protest in a slightly different form. 26 Sen

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for the capability framework and for the freedom ranking literature more generally. Before doing so I shall consider an alternative way to conceptualise these two cases from a capability perspective. Instead of saying that the value of one functioning depends on other functionings in the same set, one may define ‘starving’ and ‘fasting’ or ‘respecting the norms of one’s community’ as separate functionings.28 Whether ‘non-eating’ is defined as ‘starving’ or ‘fasting’ will then depend on whether the option ‘eating’ is available in the same capability set. So, if we take this second tack, there will be an interdependency of functioning bundles in a set, which, as discussed in the next section, will have implications for the capability framework. Note that the eligibility function will not, however, violate condition α in this case. To summarize, we have seen two possible cases in which the eligibility function may violate condition α. First, the case in which the presence of a functioning changes the nature and subsequently the value of other functionings present in the same set. Second, the case in which the absence of certain functionings renders a present functioning non-valuable due to a prevailing norm. In both cases the value of a functioning will depend on the other functionings present in a capability set. An alternative way to account for these cases would be to define ‘starving’ and ‘fasting’ or the respective norm as separate functionings. No matter which route one adopts, both will yield an interdependency, either of the value or of the presence of functionings in a capability set, which will have important implications for the capability framework.

6.5 Context Dependency of Valuable Functionings It has been argued that prevailing norms can cause the value of functionings to depend on other functionings in the same capability set. To what extent does this affect the evaluation of human well-being according to the capability approach? As discussed in Sects. 6.2 and 6.3, the value of functionings is crucial both for the evaluation of a person’s achieved functioning bundle and for the ranking of capability sets. Thus a crucial question seems to be whether the existing framework can account for this value- interdependency of functionings due to prevailing norms. In the (formal) capability framework, the value of a bundle of functionings is identified by means of a person’s valuation function. Given that the valuation function assigns a value to each functioning bundle independent of the capability

28 The

norm could be defined as the functioning ‘respecting the norms of one’s community’ or, depending on its enforcement mechanisms, it might be ‘living according to one’s principles’ if it is entirely internalized, ‘appearing in public without shame’ in case it is socially enforced, or ‘being a member of a community’ in case a violation of the norm leads to exclusion from the respective group. In the light of the example discussed, the presence of a bundle of functionings which includes both ‘negotiating’ and ‘respecting the norms of one’s community’ would then depend on the availability of the functioning ‘protesting’ in the same capability set.

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set to which it belongs, it will not account for the cases discussed, since the crucial feature of these cases is the dependency of the value of a functioning bundle on the capability set to which it belongs. If a functioning bundle includes the functioning ‘negotiating’, for instance, then in order to identify its value one will have to take into account whether the functioning bundle that includes the option ‘protesting’ is also present in the same capability set. A refinement of the framework, inspired by Sen’s writings on refined functionings (Sen 1988a, 2002), may help overcome this difficulty. A refined bundle of functionings gives additional information about the capability set of which it forms a part. It specifies not only the respective bundle of functionings, but also the capability set to which it belongs. A refined valuation function would then assign a real value to every refined bundle of functionings. Such a refined valuation function would allow one to ascribe different values to the option ‘negotiating’ depending on whether or not it leads to a violation of a prevailing norm, (viz. whether ‘protesting’ is available in the capability set or not). Furthermore, it would enable one to assign different values to a functioning bundle that includes the functioning ‘not eating’ depending on whether it reflects ‘starving’ or ‘fasting’. Thus a refined valuation function would make it possible to account for both cases in the evaluation of functioning bundles and subsequently also in the ranking of capability sets. What if one pursues the second tack mentioned in the preceding section, that is, to define ‘starving’ and ‘fasting’ or the respective norm as separate functionings? Would doing so make it possible to account for the cases discussed within the capability framework? Along this line the presence of a functioning in a capability set (e.g. ‘fasting’) will depend not only on the bundle of commodities a person chooses, and the way she converts them into doings and beings, but also on the other functionings available in her capability set (e.g. ‘eating’). These, however, will depend on the other bundles of commodities (and the ways to transform them into functionings) that were also open to a person. In the traditional capability framework (Sen 1985b), however, a person’s conversion functions, or utilization functions as Sen (1985b) calls them, are taken to assign a vector of functionings to each commodity vector. Hence, the vector (or bundle) of functionings depends solely on the chosen commodity vector and takes no account of information about (other non-chosen) commodities that are within reach of a person. Thus it will not be possible to distinguish cases in which enough food might be available to a person who, however, chooses not to avail herself of it, from those cases in which no food is available to her. A similar difficulty arises in the norm case. Consider another prominent example in the literature (Baigent and Gaertner 1996; Sen 1993b), which deals with the norm of politeness: ‘Never choose the uniquely largest piece on a plate’. Consider three pieces of cake x, y, z in descending order of size. If a person has plate {y, z} in front of her, the functioning bundle that includes both ‘eating y’ and ‘being polite’ will not be part of her capability set, since picking the largest piece y would lead to a violation of the norm. If she has plate {x, y, z} in front of her, though, the respective functioning bundle which enables her to ‘eat y’ and ‘be polite’ will

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indeed be present in her capability set, since y is no longer the largest piece. A conversion function that depends solely on a single commodity vector (in this case y) cannot account for such cases, since a person will derive two different functioning bundles from the same commodity y, depending on the plate from which it is chosen.29 A possible solution to this problem could be to refine the conversion function to take account not only of a specific commodity bundle, but also of the set of commodity bundles from which it was chosen. Such a refined conversion function would assign a bundle of functionings to each refined bundle of commodities, which specifies not only the chosen bundle but also the commodity basket from which it was chosen. This would allow to generate the functioning bundle that includes either ‘fasting’ or ‘starving’, depending on whether or not a person has sufficient food available. In the norm case, it could account for the plate from which a slice of cake is chosen. It would thereby be possible to identify whether or not a functioning bundle that includes both ‘picking a certain slice of cake’ and ‘being polite’ is present in the capability set. To summarize, given the important role of the value of functionings for the evaluation of single bundles of functionings and subsequently for the ranking of capability sets, the interdependency of the value of functionings in a capability set has important implications for the evaluation of (the freedom to achieve) wellbeing as a whole. While the traditional capability framework outlined in Sect. 6.2 cannot account for such value interdependency, a refinement in the form of a refined valuation function would make it possible to take into account the cases discussed. If one takes the alternative tack, defining ‘starving’ and ‘fasting’ or the respective norm as separate functionings, it is the presence of functioning bundles that is setdependent. In this case, a refinement of the conversion function would be a first step towards accounting for the cases discussed.

6.6 Limits of Capability- and Freedom-Rankings How troublesome is the fact that the discussed cases are not taken into account in existing capability rankings, and freedom rankings more generally? As I shall illustrate in the following, the highlighted cases of context dependency are not only crucial for the main question of this chapter, namely whether the capability framework can account for cultural differences, but also for the role freedom plays within the capability framework more generally. Moreover, the highlighted cases point to a black spot within the existing freedom ranking literature. A black spot, and one which should not be taken lightly if one is concerned with the question whether freedom rankings can account for (certain instances) of freedom’s agency value.

29 For

clarity of exposition I have omitted the step involving the characteristic function.

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First, to account for the highlighted context dependency of the value of functionings on the capability set of which they form a part, is important for the evaluation of human well-being in a plural society where conceptions of the good life may vary among its members. Different views as to what a good life amounts to can easily extend from the values a person holds and the functionings she considers to be valuable to the importance a person assigns to certain norms in social interaction. As discussed in the preceding sections, the existence of certain norms, such as never to choose the uniquely largest slice of cake from a plate, or never to accept negotiation offers if the possibility for peaceful protest was closed down, can render the value of some functionings, i.e. ‘to accept negotiation offers’, dependent on whether other functionings, such as ‘engaging in peaceful protest’, are present in the same capability set. Thus if one wants one’s evaluation of well-being to be sensitive to possibly different norms ranging within different cultures, then one has to account for the discussed cases of context dependency. Second, the discussed case of context dependency is crucial for one of the main roles freedom is taken to play within the capability framework, namely to broaden the informational basis in the evaluation of human well-being (Sen 1988b, 18). The focus on freedom, instead of on a person’s achievement, allows us to account for important additional information. Whether the ranking of capability sets, reflecting a person’s freedom, indeed succeeds in reflecting this additional information will depend on whether the discussed cases of context dependency can be taken into account. To see this consider the ‘starving/fasting’ case again. To know whether or not the option to eat has been available to an undernourished person will make a crucial difference to the evaluation of her well-being. It makes it possible to assess whether the person in question decided to fast, i.e. deliberatively rejected the option to eat, which is present in her capability set, or whether she had no choice but to starve, due to poverty for instance. In this case the assessment of her capability set (instead of her achieved state) will give the crucial extra information, which is whether the option to eat was open to her or not. Now I turn to the question whether the relevance of the discussed cases extends well beyond a capability interpretation of freedom rankings. As I shall point out in the following pages there are at least two reasons why the highlighted cases are of importance for the general freedom ranking literature as well. The first reason has to do with the motivation to explore freedom rankings in the first place, namely to broaden the informational basis of welfare economic judgements (Pattanaik and Xu 1990). Since Sen’s writings, and his forceful argument for the need to broaden the informational basis of welfare judgements, are not only fundamental to the capability approach, but also to the freedom ranking literature, it might not come as a surprise that this point is closely related to the point discussed in the preceding paragraph: in order to know whether a person is ‘starving’ or ‘fasting’, information that seems crucial in the evaluation of a person’s state (in welfare economic judgements), one has to know whether the person was free to eat or not in the first place. Thus if one of the reasons why information

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about freedom is considered to be important in welfare economic judgements, is to account for cases such as the ‘starving/fasting’ case, then freedom rankings aiming at this objective should account for them. The second reason why the discussed cases of context dependency are relevant for the freedom ranking literature is that they allow the shedding of new light on the question whether preference-based approaches to freedom rankings can indeed account for (all instances of) freedom’s non-specific value. To see this, note that the ‘starving/fasting’ example is one case in which the availability of a (possibly unchosen) alternative can contribute to freedom’s non-specific value as raised by Sen (1996) in his discussion with Carter.30 There, as discussed in greater detail in the preceding chapter, the question was whether freedom’s non-specific value can be captured by preference-based freedom rankings. Sen raised the ‘starving/fasting’ case as one example where the value of non-chosen alternatives is important to the assessment of a person’s freedom due to the fact that it opens up the freedom to reject. The availability of the option of eating opens up the possibility of fasting, which amounts to a deliberate rejection of the alternative of eating. This case, called by Sen (1996) the ‘freedom to reject’, is crucial not only for freedom’s non-specific value but for freedom’s agency value in particular. To recapitulate the argument so far: the possibility of rejection is one of the cases Carter (1999) used to illustrate the non-specific value freedom has for a person’s agency. He assigns equal importance to all rejected options, that is the more options can be rejected, the greater freedom’s non-specific value, and thus claims that freedom’s non-specific value can only be captured by a value-neutral approach. Opposed to this, I argued that a value-based approach to overall freedom is required to capture freedom’s agency value, since the importance of the rejected option will depend on a person’s values. However, this does not necessarily mean that freedom’s nonspecific value can be captured by preference-based approaches, which are a special class of value-based approaches. In the preceding chapter I discussed how far one particular instance of freedom’s non-specific value, namely freedom’s agency value, can be captured by preference-based approaches. It turned out that, if freedom’s agency value is equated with the value freedom has for a person’s preference formation, then it will depend on the interpretation of the preferences invoked whether or not it is indeed captured. There, the availability of (possibly unchosen) alternatives was crucial to allow a person to decide on the relative priority she assigns to her various identity parts when making choices. The case of the ‘freedom to reject’ as raised by Sen (1996), in which the mere availability of an option changes the nature and subsequently the value of another available option, is different though. It cannot be captured by the approach proposed in the preceding chapter, nor by other existing approaches in the freedom ranking literature, which implicitly or explicitly assume that the underlying value-structure satisfies the contraction consistency condition α. Indeed, given that Puppe and Xu (2010) have shown that if the valuable alternatives are identified on the basis of

30 See

Footnote 16, in Chap. 5.

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a reference set of preference orderings according to Sect. 5.2, as discussed in the preceding chapter, then condition α will always be satisfied. At first sight this casts serious doubt on whether preference-based approaches can indeed capture the case of the ‘freedom to reject’, as Sen (1996) claims. Does this mean, however, that preference-based approaches cannot account for (certain instances of) freedom’s non-specific value, perceived as the ‘freedom to reject’? The answer to this question is that existing preference-based approaches fail to capture this instance of freedom’s non-specific value. This does not imply, though, that preference-based approaches as such fail to capture it. As Sen (1988a,b, 1997, 2002, 665) has argued in other parts of his work, preferences can be defined over refined outcomes or functionings as well. Preferences over refined alternatives specify both the alternative which is chosen and the set from which it is chosen. This allows one to take the interdependencies of (the value of) alternatives in an opportunity set into account. Along the lines of such a refined approach, one can distinguish between cases in which the alternative ‘negotiating’ (n) leads to a violation of a prevailing norm, i.e. in the case where ‘protesting’ (p) is available in the set it is chosen from (n/{n, p}), or not (n/{n}). Similarly, it would enable one to distinguish between starving (ne/{ne}) or fasting (ne/{ne, e}), depending on whether or not the option to eat (e) has been available (and deliberatively rejected). This case has carried us to the (formal) limits of the approach to identify those alternatives that are crucial for the freedom a person enjoys to form her preferences on the basis of her identity profile. Indeed, it carries us to the limits of our discussion of existing preference-based approaches in general, which, as I have illustrated, are all built on a value structure satisfying condition α. While this shows that existing preference-based approaches cannot account for cases which are as crucial for freedom’s agency value as they are for the evaluation of human well-being along the capability approach, this does not entail that preference-based approaches as such fail to do so, since preferences can be defined over refined alternatives.

6.7 Conclusion The objective of this chapter was to use the analysis of freedom’s agency value developed in this book in order to explore the various ways in which cultural differences can affect the fleshing out of the capability framework. The initial discussion focused on the extent to which the interpretation of various parts of the framework, such as the narrow and broad interpretation of ‘goods’ in the construction of capability sets or the interpretation of the reference set of preferences in their rankings, can influence its cultural flexibility. Two cases were then discussed, in which the value of functionings depends on the capability set to which they belong. Given the motivation of this chapter, the norm case deserved particular attention. I illustrated how certain norms can lead to a set-dependency of the value of functionings. Given the important role played by the value of

References

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functionings in the capability framework, this finding will affect the evaluation of both achieved well-being, in terms of the achieved bundle of functionings, and the freedom to pursue well-being, as reflected by a person’s capability set. Whether the framework can account for such value interdependency of functionings will depend on the way the value of functioning bundles is identified. In the current framework (Sen 1985b), it will not be possible to take into account whether the value of a functioning bundle is ascribed independently of the set to which it belongs. I proposed a refinement of the capability framework along the lines of Sen’s concept of refined functionings as a possible way to accommodate the cases discussed. This is a valuation function defined over refined bundles of functionings, which makes it possible to identify the value of a functioning bundle in the context of the capability set to which it belongs. As I explained at the end, these cases of context dependency extend well beyond the topic of this chapter. They are not only relevant in order to account for certain norms in the evaluation of well-being across different cultures with the capability approach, but also to account for the role freedom plays in the capability approach, namely to broaden the informational basis in the evaluation of human well-being. Given that the freedom ranking literature started out with the very same objective, namely to broaden welfare economic judgements by taking information about a person’s freedom into account, it seems important to be aware that existing contributions fail to account for cases that seem important in this respect, such as Sen’s famous ‘starving/fasting’ case. Last but certainly not least, the case of context dependency illustrates possible formal limits within the existing freedom ranking literature to accounting for (certain instances of) freedom’s agency value.

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Chapter 7

Conclusion

Abstract In this book I have explored how opportunity sets can be compared in terms of freedom’s agency value. For this purpose I drew on three different areas of the literature: the philosophical literature on (overall) freedom provided the conceptual depth and motivation of the concern with freedom’s agency value. The freedom ranking literature and its axiomatic apparatus was employed to gain a clearer understanding of the conditions under which problems of value-based approaches might occur, and the informational requirements needed to compare states in terms of the agency value of freedom they offer to a person. Last but certainly not least, the capability framework provided the ‘link to the ground’. It enabled me to illustrate how the insights gained in this book can shed light on possible pitfalls related to the evaluation of well-being in a culturally diverse world, and to point to cases of high relevance in the evaluation of a person’s freedom across different societies and cultures which are not captured by existing contributions in the freedom ranking literature. Keywords Agency value of freedom · Deliberation · Value change · Plural society

7.1 Review of the Chapters In Chap. 2 I have shown that criticism raised against existing value-based approaches, more precisely the impossibility of paternalism and a distortion of one’s freedom measure by manipulation or adaptation, point to an instance of freedom’s non-specific value, highlighted by Carter (1999), that is, the importance overall freedom has for a person’s agency value. Unlike Carter, though, I have argued that a refined value-based approach is needed to capture freedom’s agency value. More precisely, one has to take account of the values and goals a person is deliberating on when assessing whether the availability of a particular freedom contributes to the agency value of overall freedom. Diversity information in freedom rankings was the topic of Chap. 3. More precisely the question was how differences between options which are relevant for © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_7

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choice can be derived from preference information. For this purpose I discussed two rules: one which assigns a similarity relation to each profile of weak orderings; the other – a diversity function – assigns a diversity value to each set of alternatives. It turned out that the introduced diversity function provides new insights into problems in the freedom ranking literature. First, it provides a solution to the problem of how to take account of information about the degree of choice relevant difference between alternatives in a set, as well as for information about the available alternatives in freedom rankings. Second, it enables us to explore the plausibility of using Weitzman’s biological diversity measure in a social context: the acceptance of the Weitzman measure in a social setting is dependent on the acceptance of a consistency condition on the judgements about choice relevant differences across persons. In Chap. 4 I then turned to preference information in freedom rankings. There I drew on a social choice framework to explore under which conditions the picture of a person reflecting on a set of goals and values yields transitive all-thingsconsidered preferences. Given a number of conditions imposed on this process of deliberation, I have shown that if one allows a person’s various identity parts to be reflected by incomplete orderings then one faces the strong dictate of one identity part. Furthermore, if one requires all of a person’s identity parts to have some minimal say in her decisions then even the formation of an acyclic all-thingsconsidered preference is rendered impossible. The restriction of conflict within a person’s plural identity, introduced by a domain condition, can lead to an escape from this impossibility. In Chap. 5, I turned to the question whether freedom’s agency value can be captured by existing preference-based approaches in the freedom ranking literature. We saw that whether preference-based approaches face the problems highlighted in Chap. 2 and thus fail to capture freedom’s agency value, will depend on the interpretation of the preference information invoked and the way the reference set of preference orderings is identified. If one does so on the basis of a notion of substantive reasonableness, one faces the impossibility of paternalism. Alternatively, if one identifies the preference orderings in the reference set on the basis of an empirical criterion, one cannot preclude adaptation and manipulation phenomena from distorting one’s freedom ranking. I proposed a way to identify the valuable alternatives in an opportunity set by invoking a criterion of procedural reasonableness and showed how the reference set of preference orderings can be derived from a person’s identity profile. In Chap. 6 I discussed how the obtained results can shed light on the question as to how cultural diversity enters the capability approach. In particular I discussed how cultural differences enter the specification of the theoretic capability framework and showed that the existence of norms can lead to a context-dependency of the value of functionings, involving a violation of the condition of contraction consistency. I discussed one way to take account of such cases, namely a refined valuation function (or conversion function, since norms can be taken to enter as constraints or as affecting the value of functionings).

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7.2 Open Questions The analysis of this book did not only leave a number of problems without answers but also raised new problems and questions along the way. Instead of repeating these, I would like to discuss ways in which the employed framework could be extended from a static to a dynamic perspective, and point to some interesting and challenging problems such an extension might raise. I focused on the agency value of a person’s freedom at a given point in time. More precisely I equated freedom’s agency value with the value freedom has for a person in reflecting upon the relative priority of her plural identity parts and act upon these. Such a static perspective takes the composition of a person’s plural identity as given and focuses on the value freedom has in reflecting upon the relative priority of these various identity parts at the moment of choice. This, however, neglects a person’s potential to question and (partly) change her (possibly inherited) identities over time. The extent to which a person’s identity parts are open to her own choices will crucially depend on her social and political surroundings. While in some societies it might be possible to change one’s religion or one’s nationality, in others it might be more difficult or even impossible. In order to capture this value freedom has in virtue of allowing a person to reflect upon her identity, and to reaffirm or to (partly) change it, requires the extension of the discussed framework into a dynamic perspective. If one wants to extend the framework to a dynamic perspective in order to capture the value freedom has to (partly) change the composition of one’s identity profile over time, then the basis on which the value of particular freedoms is identified has to be broadened: not only will the availability of those alternatives that play a role in a person’s deliberation about her actual identities increase freedom’s agency value, but also those that contribute to a possible questioning and revision of her identity over time. Think of an agnostic academic soccer fan. For him the alternative to go to church on Sunday evening, prime time for any soccer match, will not contribute much to the agency value of his freedom if it is conceived from a static perspective, since all of his identity parts prefer some other activity on Sunday evening, be it playing a soccer match, or continuing to write one’s new book. However, the possibility to go to church might be crucial in questioning and changing his identity over time, say to become a Roman Catholic. Such an extension raises an abundance of new questions, challenging problems and fascinating avenues. In the following I shall briefly discuss three of them. First, a problem closely related to the subject matter of this book reoccurs: how can one discern those alternatives that contribute to the agency value of a person’s freedom from those that do not? As soon as one adopts a dynamic perspective, a person’s actual identity profile gives little guidance in the search for the answer to this question, since the availability of those alternatives which allow a person to question and possibly change her inherited values over time are by definition unrelated to the identities she currently holds. After all, one could argue that all possible identity parts, and the rankings over the alternatives they induce are possible candidates for a person to hold in the future. This, however would imply that the availability

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of alternatives as ‘being beheaded at dawn’ would contribute equally to the value freedom has to change one’s identity over time as an alternative ‘converting to Buddhism’. Thus, if one considers such an implication to be counter-intuitive then one will have to suggest a way as to how those alternatives which, if available, contribute to question and possibly change one’s (possibly inherited) plural identity can be identified. Second, an extension of the proposed framework into a dynamic perspective might be a promising avenue to account for adaptation on a second level. To remind the reader, as discussed in Chap. 5, the approach to capturing freedom’s agency value based upon a person’s actual plural identity succeeds in accounting for adaptation on a first level, that is for adaptation processes that occur in the formation of a person’s all-things-considered preference due to the constraint circumstances she finds herself in. However, as pointed out in Chap. 5, adaptation can happen on a higher level as well, namely on the level of a person’s identities and values themselves. Inherited identities, values, (gender) roles and customs, as well as the potential to question, reaffirm or change them are strongly shaped by a person’s social surroundings. The diversity of world views, identities and values of the people she gets in touch with might be as important in the process in which she questions, reaffirms or possibly changes (parts) of her plural identity as are the alternatives open to her, such as the possibility to attend university, or to convert to Buddhism. Third, to extend the suggested framework into a dynamic perspective in such a way that adaptation on a second level could be captured, opens up an area of inquiry about the relationship between the agency value of a person’s freedom conceived in a dynamic perspective, and its relation to the plurality of a society the person is living in. A prominent stance in liberal traditions is to take freedom as meaning to foster the plurality of a society. However, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the relationship between the agency value of a person’s freedom and the plurality of a society has two sides: not only that the agency value of a person’s freedom contributes to a person’s agency and thereby increases the plurality of a society, but the plurality of a society can also enhance the agency value of a person’s freedom to question, reaffirm or change her (inherited) identities over time. Of course, a crucial question thereby is under which conditions the plurality of identities or world views within a society does indeed lead to an increase in the agency value of the freedom its members enjoy to question and partly revise their identities. If, for instance, there is no possibility to get to know people with other world views, to engage in open and critical discussion with them, then one can imagine that the existence of different cultures and ways of thinking within the same society does not necessarily lead to such a reflection process on the side of its members. Furthermore it might be difficult, if not impossible, to open up all particular freedoms to every member of the respective society, due to a lack of resources, for instance. Fascinating new insights might be the result of a deeper inquiry as to under which conditions an increase of the agency value of one person’s freedom does indeed entail an increase of the agency value of the freedom of other people (with possibly very different identities) living in the same society.

Reference

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Last but not least, the above sketched relationship between the plurality of a society and the agency value of the freedom of its members can lead to paradoxical new insights: the increase (decrease) of the agency value of one person’s freedom can lead to the increase (decrease) of the agency value of another person’s freedom. To illustrate this point allow me to take you back once more to Mexico, and to the Zapatistas. The Zapatistas, as briefly discussed in the introduction to this book, struggle for the freedom to pursue their own path of development. A symbol for the potential to pursue their traditional way of life is the possibility of owning land collectively, an institution many indigenous communities are built upon. Their struggle made very clear, however, that it is not about the conservation of an abstract tradition, but about choosing their own path of development, which requires the availability of (at least) both options, the traditional path and the ‘modern life path’. The availability of these alternatives, and the critical discussion with people who hold differing world views can lead to a questioning of both the traditional and the modern path: the Zapatista women started to question the traditional gender roles prevailing within their communities, and started to change them little by little. Similarly, the path of life pursued by the Zapatistas, such as their experience in the formation of (basic) democratic governments, can lead us, as Austrians, Europeans or human beings to question and reflect critically upon ‘our path of development’, and to revise and possibly change them too. Thus, under certain conditions it can be that (the agency value of) another person’s freedom can increase (the agency value of) one’s own freedom.

Reference Carter, Ian. 1999. A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix A

Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed

Let M = {1, . . . , m} and, for all x, y ∈ X, N(xIy) = #{i ∈ M | xIi y}. Definition A.1 (Diversity Revelation Rule) Let f (·) be a mapping f : R M → S . f (·) is a Diversity Revelation Rule if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, there is some p ∈ M such that for all d ∈ R M , xSy if, and only if, N(xIy) ≥ p. Condition A.1 (Anonymity) f (·) is anonymous if, and only if, for any permutation φ(·) of M, and any d ∈ R M , f (R1 , . . . , Rm ) = f (Rφ(1) , . . . , Rφ(m) ).1 Condition A.2 (Unanimity) f (·) is unanimous if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, [for all i ∈ M, xPi y or yPi x] implies not (xSy) and [ for all i ∈ M, xIi y] implies xSy. Condition A.3 (Monotonicity) f (·) is monotonic if, and only if, for all d, d  ∈ R M , for all x, y ∈ X, if [for all i ∈ M, xIi y implies xIi y] then [xSy implies xS  y]. Theorem A.1 f (·) satisfies Anonymity, Monotonicity and Unanimity if, and only if, f (·) is a Diversity Revelation Rule. Proof ⇐: Anonymity: By definition of a permutation φ : M → M, we have for all x, y ∈ X and for all d ∈ R M and all d  such that for any i, Ri = Rφ(i) , N(xIy) = N (xI  y). This entails, by definition of a Diversity Revelation Rule, xSy if, and only if, xS  y. Monotonicity: Take arbitrary d, d  ∈ R M , such that for some x, y ∈ X: for all i, xIy implies xIi y. Since N(xI  y) ≥ N(xIy), xSy implies xS  y. Unanimity: For all x, y ∈ X, if for all i ∈ M, xPi y or yPi x, then N(xIy) = 0. Since p ∈ M by definition of a Diversity Revelation Rule, it is not the case that xSy. For all x, y ∈ X, if for all i ∈ M, xIi y, then N(xIy) = m. By definition of a Diversity Revelation Rule this yields xSy.

1 To

simplify, we write f (R1 , . . . , RM ) instead of f ((R1 , . . . , RM )).

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⇒: Define R as the ordering in which for some x, y ∈ X, xP y and yI w for all w = x. Let R  be the ordering in which there is indifference all the way: vI  w for all v, w ∈ X. Now consider the following profile-sequence: d 0 = (R1 , . . . , . . . , . . . , Rm ) d 1 = (R1 , R2 , . . . , . . . , Rm ) d 2 = (R1 , R2 , R3 , . . . , Rm ) .. .  ) d m = (R1 , . . . , . . . , Rm Let t be the smallest element of M for which it is true that xS t−1 y does not hold but xS t y does. Such a t must exist since it follows from Unanimity that xS 0 y does not hold whereas xS m y does. We will show that t = p. ∗ ), such that N (xI ∗ y) = t First, we show that for any profile d ∗ = (R1∗ , . . . , Rm ∗ it must be true that xS y. Take a permutation φ(·) of M such that for all i, i is in the profile d t indifferent between x and y, if and only if, φ(i) is so in the profile d ∗ . If d φ(t) denotes the profile resulting from applying φ to the profile d t , we have by Anonymity xS φ(t) y. Since by construction N(xI ∗ y) = N (xI φ(t) y), Monotonicity subsequently implies xS ∗ y. Second, consider any profile d + such that N(xI + y) > t. Let T be a subset of t individuals who are indifferent between x and y in R + and define d ∗ as any profile in which for all i: xIi∗ y if, and only if, i ∈ T . By the first step we have xS ∗ y. Monotonicity subsequently implies xS + y. Third, to complete the proof it remains to be shown that for any profile ∗ ), t is the smallest integer for which it is true that N (xI ∗ y) ≥ t (R1∗ , . . . , Rm ∗ implies xS y. Suppose to the contrary that there is a profile d ∗ , such that xS ∗ y and N (xI ∗ y) = k < t. Consider a permutation φ of M such that for all i: xIi∗ y if, and only if, φ(i) ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By Anonymity, xS ∗ y implies xS φ(k) y, where d φ(k) is the profile resulting from applying φ to profile d ∗ . By Monotonicity, xS φ(k) y implies xS k y, contradicting the way the profiles d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . were defined.  Condition A.4 (Neutrality) f (·) is neutral if, and only if, for all permutations θ (·) of X, all d ∈ R M , for all x, y ∈ X, [for all i ∈ M : xIi y if, and only if, θ (x)Ii θ (y)] implies [xSy if, and only if, θ (x)Sθ (y)]. Definition A.2 (Diversity Revelation Rule*) Let f (·) be a mapping f : R M → S . We will call f (·) the Diversity Revelation Rule* if, and only if, there exists p ∈ M such that for all x, y ∈ X, for all d ∈ R M , xSy if, and only if, N(xIy) ≥ p. Theorem A.2 f (·) satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality, Unanimity and Monotonicity if, and only if, f (·) is the Diversity Revelation Rule*. Proof The result follows immediately from Theorem A.1 and from the definition of Neutrality.  Definition A.3 (Quasi-Extended Distance Function) Given some d ∈ R M , a Quasi-extended Distance Function is a function D : X × Z → N, such that for all x ∈ X, for all A ∈ Z, Q(x, A) = #{i ∈ M | for all y ∈ A, xPi y or yPi x}.

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Definition A.4 (Binary Distance Function) Given some d ∈ R M , a Binary Distance Function is the function gd : X × X → N such that for all x, y ∈ X, gd (x, y) = #{i ∈ M | xPi y or yPi x}. Definition A.5 (Diversity Measure) Let v(·) be a mapping v : Z ×D → N, where D ⊆ R M . We will call v(·) a Diversity Measure if, and only if, for all d ∈ R M , for all A ∈ Z, and any labelling x1 , . . . , xk (k = #A) of the elements of A,  0, if #A = 1. v(A, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) = k i=2 Q(xi , {xj : j < i}), otherwise. Proposition A.1 For all D ⊆ R M and for all A ∈ Z, v(·) is well defined. Proof For all i ∈ M, let P(Ri ) denote the partition induced by the symmetric part Ii of Ri . We show that, M (P) For all A ∈ Z and all d ∈ R , v(A, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) = m #{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A = ∅} i=1  − m. We do so by induction on the cardinality of A. Since m i=1 #{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A = ∅} − m does not refer to the labelling of the elements of A, (P) suffices to establish well-definedness of v.  Step 1: If = 1, then for all d ∈ R M , m i=1 #{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A = ∅} = m. #A m Hence, i=1 #{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A = ∅} − m = 0. Step 2: Assume (P) is true for all elements of Z with cardinality n. Let A ∈ Z have a cardinality of n + 1 and label each element of A so that we have A = {x1 , . . . , xn+1 }. By the induction hypothesis, v(A − {xn+1 }, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) = m 

#{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A − {xn+1 } = ∅} − m.

i=1

By definition of v(·), v(A, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) = v(A − {xn+1 }, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) + Q(xn+1 , A − {xn+1 }) and Q(xn+1 , A − {xn+1 }) = #{i ∈ M | for all y ∈ A − {xn+1 }, xn+1 Pi y or yPi xn+1 }.

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Hence, v(A, (R1 , . . . , Rm )) = m 

#{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A − {xn+1 } = ∅} − m+

i=1

#{i ∈ M | for all y ∈ A, xn+1 Pi y or yPi xn+1 } = m  i=1



#{Q ∈ P(Ri ) | Q ∩ A = ∅} − m.

Appendix B

Plural Identities and Preference Formation

Let Rs denote the set of all reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive (not necessarily complete) binary relations R on X, henceforth called the set of all strict partial orderings. Ra denotes the set of all reflexive, anti-symmetric and acyclic (not necessarily complete) binary relations R on X. RsM denotes the set of all m-tuples of strict partial orderings. Definition B.1 (Identity Aggregation Procedure) An Identity Aggregation Procedure (IAP) is a function f : D → Ra , D ⊆ RsM . Condition B.1 (Unrestricted Domain) f (·) satisfies Unrestricted Domain (UD) if, and only if, D = RsM . Definition B.2 (Minimal Decisiveness) For all i ∈ M, for all x ∈ X, i is minimally decisive for {x, y} (or for x against y) if, and only if, for all d ∈ D: [xPi y and xNj y for all j = i], implies xP y, and [yPi x and xNj y for all j = i], implies yP x. Condition B.2 (Minimal Identity Decisiveness) f (·) satisfies Minimal Identity Decisiveness (MID) if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X there exists i ∈ M such that i is minimally decisive for x against y. Condition B.3 (Monotonicity) f (·) satisfies Monotonicity (M) if, and only if, for all d, d  ∈ D, for all x, y ∈ X, if [ for all i ∈ M(xPi y implies xPi y) and there does not exist j ∈ M such that (xNj y and yPj x)] then [xP y implies xP  y]. Condition B.4 (Strong Imposition) f (·) is strongly imposed if, and only if, there exists i ∈ M such that for all x, y ∈ X, xPi y implies xP y and xNi y implies xNy. Condition B.5 (All-things-considered Transitivity) f (·) satisfies All-thingsconsidered Transitivity (TP) if, and only if, its range is restricted to Rs . Lemma B.1 Suppose f (·) satisfies conditions TP, UD, MID, and M. For m ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, for all x, y ∈ X, if for all i ∈ M, xNi y, then xNy. © Springer Nature B.V. 2019 C. Binder, Agency, Freedom and Choice, Theory and Decision Library A: 53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2

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Proof Suppose to the contrary, namely that TP, UD, MID, and M are satisfied, but there exists x, y ∈ X and d 1 ∈ D such that for all i ∈ M, xNi y and xP 1 y. Let z ∈ X − {x, y}. By MID there is some element of M that is minimally decisive for {y, z}. Say j is so, and consider a profile d 2 in which (a) for all i = j : xNi2 y, yNi2 z and xNi2 z (b) xNj2 y, yPj2 z and xNj2 z. By M we obtain xP 2 y, by MID yP 2 z, and by TP xP 2 z. By MID some k ∈ M is minimally decisive for {x, z}. Suppose j = k and consider a profile d 2 in which the following holds: (a) for all i = j, k: xNi2 y, yNi2 z and xNi2 z (b) xNj2 y, yPj2 z and xNj2 z (c) xNk2 y, yNk2 z and zPk2 x. By M we obtain xP 2 y, by MID yP 2 z, and zP 2 x, violating TP. Hence j = k and j is also minimally decisive for {x, z}. Consider a profile d 3 in which (a) for all i = j : xNi3 y, yNi3 z, xNi3 z (b) xNj3 y, yNj3 z, zPj3 x. By M we obtain xP 3 y, by MID zP 3 x, and by TP zP 3 y. By MID some l ∈ M is minimally decisive for {x, y}. Take a profile d 4 : (a) for all i = l: xNi4 y, yNi4 z, xNi4 z (b) yPl4 x, yNl4 z, xNl4 z. By MID we obtain yP 4 x, and by M, zP 3 y and xP 2 z, we derive zP 4 y, and xP 4 z, violating TP.   Theorem B.1 For m ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, every f (·) that satisfies TP, UD, MID, and M is strongly imposed. Proof (1) In the first step we prove that for any triple {x, y, z} there is some i ∈ M that is minimally decisive for all distinct a, b ∈ {x, y, z}. By MID for each pair of alternatives a, b ∈ {x, y, z}, there is some part of the person’s identity that is minimally decisive for it. Assume there is no identity part that is minimally decisive for at least two pairs in {x, y, z}. There must then be three different identity parts i, j and k, such that i is minimally decisive for x, y, j for y, z and k for x, z. Now consider a profile d satisfying: (a) (b) (c) (d)

xPi y and aNi b for all {a, b} = {x, y} yPj z and bNj c for all {a, b} = {y, z} zPk x and aNk c for all {a, b} = {x, z} aNl b for all a, b ∈ X and all l ∈ {i, j, k}.

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By UD, any such d is in the domain. By MID we get xP y, yP z and zP x, which violates TP. Hence, there is some i that is minimally decisive for at least two pairs in {x, y, z}. We now show that i is minimally decisive for all pairs in {x, y, z}. Without loss of generality, assume i is minimally decisive for the pairs {x, y} and {y, z}. Consider any profile d, such that: (a) xPi y, yPi z and xPi z (b) xNk y, yNk z and zNk x for all k = i. By MID we get xP y and yP z and thus by TP, xP z. In a similar way, we can construct a profile d  in which zPi x and xNj z for all j = i and in which zP  x. Hence, i is minimally decisive for {x, z}. (2) We next show that for any triple {x, y, z} if some i ∈ N is minimally decisive for all distinct a, b ∈ {x, y, z}, then for all profiles d, and all a, b ∈ {x, y, z}, aPi b implies aP b and aNi b implies aNb, that is, i is decisive for a against b. Let i be as defined and assume xPi y. We want to show that xP y. Take an arbitrary profile d in which xPi y. Let D be the set of all profiles d  satisfying: (a) xPi y, zPi y, xPi z (b) yPj x, yNj z xNj z for all j = i. By MID we get xP  z and zP  y and, by TP, xP  y for all d  ∈ D. Since xP  y, by M also xP y, which had to be shown. Next let d be an arbitrary profile in which xNi y. We now have to show that xNy. Assume to the contrary that it is not the case that xNy, say we have xP y. Let D be the set of all profiles d  satisfying: (a) xNi y, zNi y, zPi x (b) zNj x and zNj y, for all j = i. There must be some profile d  ∈ D such that the restriction of d  to {x, y} is exactly the same as it is in d. Since xP y, by M also xP  y. By MID we have zP  x, and thus by TP zP  y, contradicting Lemma B.1. (3) We show that if there is some i such that i is decisive for any pair over the triple {x,y,z}, then i is decisive for any pair of alternatives in X. Let i be as defined. We have to show that i is decisive for any v, w ∈ X. If {v, w} ⊆ {x, y, z}, we already have the desired result. Say v ∈ {x, y, z}. Consider the triple {v, x, y}. By step 1 some j is minimally decisive for each pair in {v, x, y}, and thus also for {x, y}. By step 2, at most one individual can be decisive for x and y, and therefore i = j and i is decisive for {v, y}. If w ∈ {v, x, y}, the result follows immediately. Let w ∈ {v, x, y}. By step 1 some j is minimally decisive for each pair in {v, w, y}. By step 2, at most one individual decisive for v and y and we have just shown this to be i. Hence, i is decisive for each pair in {v, w, y}, and thus in particular for {v, w}.  

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Condition B.6 (Identity Decisiveness) f (·) satisfies Identity Decisiveness (ID) if, and only if, for all d ∈ D, all i ∈ M, and all x, y ∈ X: if [xPi y and xNj y, for all j = i], then xP y. Theorem B.2 For m ≥ 2 and #X > 3, there is no f (·) that satisfies UD and ID. Proof Consider the set of profiles D satisfying for some distinct elements x, y, z, w of X: (a) xPi y, yNi z, zPi w, wNi x (b) xNj y, yPj z, zNj w, wPj x (c) for all k = i, j and all x, y ∈ X: xNk y. By UD, the class of profiles D is within our domain. By ID, one obtains xP y, yP z, zP w and wP x, violating acyclicity.   Condition B.7 (Imposition) f (·) is imposed if, and only if, there exists i ∈ M such that for all x, y ∈ X, xPi y implies xP y. Condition B.8 (Value Consistency) f (·) satisfies Value Consistency (VC) if, and only if, D = {d ∈ RsM | for all x, y, z ∈ X, for all i, j ∈ M, xPi y and yPj z implies that there exists k ∈ M such that xPk z}. Theorem B.3 If VC is satisfied there is an IAP that satisfies ID, M and TP and is not imposed. Proof An Identity Aggregation Procedure which satisfies the conditions is the ˆ Pˆ and Nˆ denote Modified Intersection Rule fˆ. It is defined as follows (where R, ˆ ˆ the relations R, P and N assigned by f ): For all x, y ∈ X, x Ry if, and only if, (a) x = y, or (b) for all i ∈ M, not yPi x and for some j ∈ M, xPj y. The proof that the modified intersection rule satisfies ID, M and is not imposed is straightforward. Therefore we only prove TP. Transitivity: We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists some x, y, z ∈ X such that x Pˆ y, y Pˆ z and not (x Pˆ z). By definition of the modified intersection rule, we have 1. For all i ∈ M, not (yPi x), not (zPi y); 2. there exists i, j ∈ M, such that xPi y and yPj z. By VC, xPi y and yPj z implies that there exists k ∈ M such that xPk z. Since, by assumption, not (x Pˆ z) there exists some l ∈ M such that zPl x. By VC, zPl x and xPi y imply that there exists m ∈ M such that zPm y, contradicting 1.  

Appendix C

Freedom Rankings and Freedom’s Agency Value

Definition C.1 (Intersection Quasi-ordering*) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), R  (·) is the Intersection Quasi-ordering* if, and only if, for all x, y ∈ X, xR  (R1 , . . . , Rm )y if, and only if, for all Ri ∈ (R1 , . . . , Rm ), xRi y. Definition C.2 (Reference Set of Preferences) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), a completion Rc of R  is defined as any transitive, antisymmetric and complete binary relation Rc on X such that R  (R1 , . . . , Rm ) ⊆ Rc . C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )) denotes the set containing all completions of R  (R1 , . . . , Rm ). Definition C.3 (Eligibility-Maximality) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), for all A ∈ Z, Em (A) = {x ∈ A | there is no y ∈ A such that yP  (R1 , . . . , Rm )x}. Definition C.4 (Eligibility-Preference Formation) Given some profile of linear orderings (R1 , . . . , Rm ), for all A ∈ Z, E∗ (A) = {x ∈ A | there exists Rc ∈ C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )) such that for all y ∈ A, xRc y}. Theorem C.1 If (R1 , . . . , Rm ) is a profile of linear orderings then for all A ∈ Z, Em (A) = E∗ (A). Proof Let (R1 , . . . , Rm ) be a profile of linear orderings and let A ∈ Z. Take some x ∈ E∗ (A). By definition of E∗ (A), there exists R c ∈ C(R  (R1 , . . . , Rm )) such that for all y ∈ A, xR c y. Since R ∗ ⊆ R c and since R c is linear, there is no y ∈ A (y = x) with yR  (R1 , . . . , Rm )x. Hence, x ∈ Em (A) and E∗ (A) ⊆ Em (A). Next take x ∈ Em (A). For all y ∈ A (y = x), we then have xR ∗ (R1 , . . . , Rm )y or xN ∗ (R1 , . . . , Rm )y. Hence, there must be at least one completion R c of R ∗ in which x is the unique top outcome. Thus x ∈ E∗ (A), and Em (A) ⊆ E∗ (A). 

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Index

A Action, 3, 4, 7, 11, 24–27, 34–36, 38, 45, 48, 49, 65, 69, 70, 72, 74, 79, 94, 112 Agency definition, 35, 4 value of freedom, 40, 129 Aggregation collective, 67 function, 69 intra-personal, 18, 67–69 Alkire, S., 15, 106, 110 Alternative/alternatives, 7–12, 16–18, 25, 26, 28, 30, 36–40, 43–60, 64, 66–75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85–102, 108, 111–119, 121, 123, 124, 130–133, 140, 141 Analysis conceptual, 3 Arneson, R., 45 Arrow, K., 7, 10, 75, 88, 89, 94 Atkinson, A., 7 Aumann, R., 64 Autonomy, 33, 89, 90, 106

B Baigent, N., 64, 120 Barresi, J., 65 Baujard, A., 8 Bavetta, S., 7, 8, 50, 51, 91 Binary difference, 45, 57 distance function, 8, 53, 54, 56, 137 similarity relation, 50 Blackorby, C., 30, 40 Bossert, W.

Bratman M., 64, 65, 74 Byskov, M., 110

C Capability approach, 3, 12–16, 26, 105–125, 130 framework, 3, 12, 14–16, 18, 105, 106, 108–110, 112, 113, 119–122, 124, 125, 130 list, 110 ranking, 19, 105, 107, 108, 112, 113, 117, 121 set, 14–16, 19, 105–122, 124, 125 Capitalism, 1 Cardinality, 7, 43, 44, 46, 48, 52, 53, 57–59, 89, 92, 113, 137 ordering/ranking, 7, 43, 92, 113 Carter, I., 5, 6, 17, 23–28, 32–35, 44, 93, 114, 123, 129 Characteristics, 10, 13, 30, 31, 44, 67–69, 89, 90, 107, 109, 111, 112 Chiapas, 2, 111, 116 Chiappero-Martinetti, E., 105 Choice, 3, 7–12, 16–19, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36–40, 43–50, 52, 54, 57–60, 63–69, 74, 76–79, 81, 86, 89, 92, 94, 95, 99, 102, 105–108, 113, 117, 118, 122, 123, 130, 131 behaviour, 117, 118 Choice-relevant difference, 17, 45, 57–59, 130 diversity, 43–60 Christman, J., 29, 30 Claassen, R., 110, 114

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154 Collective aggregation, 67 choice, 66 ownership, 2 preference, 66 Commodity bundle, 48, 121 characteristics of, 111 vector, 120, 121 Community, 13, 14, 49, 65, 90, 109, 119 Comparison, 52, 81 Completeness, 49, 64, 67–69, 75–78 Compossible action, 27, 35 Concept, 2–6, 10, 24, 27, 44, 57, 64, 65, 86, 125 Conditions all-things-considered transitivity, 74, 80 alpha, 117 anonymity, 50–51 consistency of choice, 118 dictatorship, 75 eligibility-maximality, 96–97 eligibility-optimality, 78 identity decisiveness, 77, 78 imposition, 142 indifference consistency, 56–57 minimal identity decisiveness, 73 monotonicity, 66 neutrality, 136 strong imposition, 68 unanimity, 51 unrestricted domain, 68, 72 value consistency, 80 value overlap, 79, 95 Conflict identity, 18 motives, 11, 64 values, 79 Consistency choice, of, 57, 64, 78, 130 property, 88 value, 80, 81 Constraints circumstances, 37, 94, 101, 115, 132 freedom, on, 4–7 Content-independent value, 35 Context dependency, 119–123, 125, 130 Continuity, 65, 66, 74 Contraction consistency, 117, 123, 130 Conversion factor, 109, 111 Costello, C., 79 Crocker, D., 106 Cross-cultural application, 106 Cultural context, 106, 110–112, 114

Index Cultural differences, 16, 19, 105–107, 112, 114, 115, 117, 121, 130 Cultural diversity, 16, 19, 105–124 Cultural functioning, 112

D Decision, 18, 38, 64, 66, 68, 76, 78–80, 130 procedure, 80 Decisiveness, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80 Degree choice, of, 57, 130 conflict, of, 79 distance, of, 46 diversity, of, 46 freedom, of, 44 Deliberation, 17, 29, 37, 38, 40, 49, 64, 71, 77–79, 89, 97, 116, 130, 131 Democracy, 1, 60 Democratic government, 133 party, 52, 55 Deneulin, S. Desire dependency, 18, 27–29, 35, 36, 40, 86, 89–91, 93, 94, 100–102 formation, 31 fulfillment, 12–14 satisfaction, 14, 64 Development studies, 72 Dictatorship, condition, 75 Difference alternatives, between, 8 choice-relevant, 17, 45, 57–59, 130 Disability, 13 Disagreement, 30, 65, 106, 115 Dissimilarity, 47, 49, 51, 52 alternatives, between, 51, 52 Dissonance, 30, 78–81 identity, 78–81 Distance function, 8, 45–48, 53–56, 136, 137 Diversity cardinality, and, 57–59 freedom, and, 9 function, 9, 17, 48, 130 measure, 8, 9, 17, 47, 48, 52–60, 130, 137 revelation rule, 48, 50–52, 59, 135, 136 value, 17, 48, 53, 54, 56, 130 Doings and beings, 7, 12–16, 48, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 120 Domain condition, 56, 68, 72, 79, 80, 95, 130 restriction, 18, 69, 78–81

Index

155

Dominance, 75, 78, 88 Dowding, K., 3, 8, 27, 46, 47, 57 Dworkin, G., 31–33, 38, 39 Dworkin, R., 13, 24

Functioning bundle of, 109, 110, 112, 119–121, 125 definition, 87, 91 refined, 120, 121, 124, 125, 130

E Election, 8, 25, 46, 52, 58–60 Eligibility, 44, 86–91, 96, 98, 99, 117–119 function, 86–91, 96, 117–119 Eligible alternatives, 86, 87, 90, 96 elements, 92, 99 Elster, J., 29, 30, 91, 101 Environment, 55, 116 Equality, 13, 32 Evaluation human well-being, of, 3, 12, 14, 15, 30 social states, of, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13, 19

G Gaertner, W., 66, 76, 120 Gärdenfors, 76 Gender inequality, 13 Gibbard, A., 75 Globalization, 15, 16 Government, 1, 25, 64, 133 Griffin, J., 32, 64 Group phenomena, 31 adaptation as group phenomena, 13, 30, 116 Gustafsson, J., 44

F Felber, C., 1 Fishburn, P., 78–80 Fleurbaey, M., viii Flourishing, 15, 26, 110 Formal axiomatic framework, 7 capability framework, 106 freedom ranking, 44 Framework freedom of, 3, 7 function, 15 options, 60 theory, 3, 12, 15, 66 Frankfurt, H., 38, 64, 65 Freedom agency value of, 3, 7, 9, 11, 16, 19, 23–40, 44, 45, 48, 49, 59, 82, 85–103, 123, 125, 129–133 independent value of, 35 intrinsic versus instrumental value, 34, 37 measurement, 5, 7, 25, 26, 28, 35, 38, 44, 57, 59 opportunity value, 10 overall versus specific, 3–6, 16, 17, 24–38, 40, 44, 53, 91, 93, 100, 123, 129 positive versus negative, 27 real freedom, 109, 110 specific versus non-specific value of, 6, 17, 28, 33–36, 38, 93, 108, 114, 124, 129 Freedom of choice, 3, 7–9, 16, 17, 34, 44–48, 50, 57–60, 113

H Happiness and desire fulfillment, 12–14, 63–64 and preference adaptation, 132 and utility, 12, 14 Hayek, F. A. von, 1, 4, 34 Headscarf debate, 32, 101 Health, 13, 96, 110 Hees, M. van, 3, 5, 8, 23–25, 27, 34, 44–47, 53, 57, 86–88, 95, 117 Heilmann, H.C.K., 66 Human agency, 6 Human development, 15, 16, 106 Human diversity, 15, 16, 106 Human faculties, 39, 44, 89 Human interference, 2, 4 Human rights, 32, 106 Hurka, T., 34, 37 Hurley, S., 67, 68

I Identity aggregation procedure, 70–72, 74, 75, 139, 142 Identity dissonance, 78–81 Incompleteness freedom-ranking, of, 15, 106 preference, of, 69, 78, 95 Inequality, 13 Interpersonal comparison, 79 Intersection quasi-ordering, 95, 96, 98, 143

156 J Judgement, 2, 5, 6, 9, 17, 24, 38–40, 44, 47, 49, 51, 57, 64, 68, 69, 76, 108, 116, 122, 125, 130 Justice, 12, 15, 24, 26, 34, 106 K Khader, S., 30 Klemisch-Ahlert, M., 8 Kramer, M., 5, 6, 24, 25, 27, 28, 35–38 Kreps, D., 10, 89 Kymlicka, W., 5, 25 L Lexicographic, 68, 75–77 Liberalism, 1 Liberty. see Freedom Linear orderings, 87, 96, 98–100, 143 Loevinson, E., 26 M Majority rule, 76, 79 Manipulation, 29, 31, 37, 39, 44, 91, 92, 129, 130 Market, 1, 2, 59, 110, 111 Maximisation, 24 Maximizing freedom, 5 MacCallum, 5 Mechanism, 2, 119 Menu-dependence, 91 Meta-preferences, 77 Meta-structure, 64 Meta-values, 65 Migration, 55, 58 Mill, J.S., 39, 44, 49 Minimal decisiveness, 73, 139 Minimal distance, 53, 56 Monotonicity, 51, 66, 73–75, 80, 135, 136, 139 Morality, 39, 44, 68 Moral preference, 39, 44 Motivation, 3, 10, 15, 16, 19, 27, 64, 122, 124 Motive, 11, 23, 38, 49, 64, 65, 67 action, for, 11, 49 Multi-attribute approach, 47 N Needs, 6, 7, 13, 14, 23, 24, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 76, 79, 87, 106, 122, 129 Nehring, K., 8, 45–47, 53, 54 Neoliberalism, 1 Neutrality, 51, 136

Index Non-chosen alternatives, 123 value of, 123 Non-market goods, 110 Non-specific value of freedom, 6, 33, 35, 36, 108, 123 Norm, 16, 49, 105–107, 109, 111, 112, 117–121, 124 Nussbaum, M., 15, 26, 31, 106

O Objective list theory, 92 Objectives of choice, 2 Objective value-based approach, 31, 32 Obstacles of choice, 2 Oligarchy, 76 Operationalisation of the capability approach, 106 Opportunity, 7–11, 16, 19, 25, 29–32, 39, 43, 44, 46–48, 82, 86–89, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 112, 113, 117, 130 Ordering, 10–12, 17, 18, 48–50, 54–60, 63, 67–72, 75, 78, 79, 81, 86–88, 90–100, 102, 113–115, 124, 130, 136, 139, 143 Ordinal preference, 60

P Pacifism, 69 Pareto-optimality, 24 Parfit, D., 32, 65, 74 Partial incomparability, 67 Partial order (or partial orderings), 70–72, 75, 79, 81, 95–97, 139 Participation, 15 Paternalism, 17, 18, 26–28, 31–33, 35, 36, 86, 89, 90, 92, 100–102, 114, 129 Pattanaik, P., 7–11, 43–45, 49, 50, 79, 80, 86, 88, 89, 92, 98, 113 Peragine, V., 44, 91 Perfectionism, 114 Perfectionist account, 26, 91 Pettit, P., 4, 76 Pleasure, 12, 64 Plural identity, 11, 18, 49, 66, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 94, 98–102, 130–132 Plural society, 14–16, 115, 122 Policy evaluation, 15, 24 Political institutions, 24 Political parties, 49, 50, 53 Political philosophy, 4, 24 Poverty, 105, 115, 122 Power, 2, 39, 44, 68, 76, 77

Index

157

Q Qizilbash, M., viii Quality of life, 106 Quasi-extended distance function, 54–56, 136 Quasi-ordering, 95, 96, 98, 99, 143 Quasi-transitive preference, 75, 78

Rational choice theory, 11, 19, 63–67, 107, 108, 117 Rationality, 64, 78, 81 Rationalizability, 117 Rawls, J., 6, 12, 13, 15, 34 Raz, J., 69 Reasonableness, 12, 89–92, 95–100, 102, 114–116, 130 Reasonable person, 49, 57, 90, 91, 95, 113, 114 Reasons, 5, 8–10, 12, 14, 26, 31, 33, 37, 39, 44, 54, 68, 71, 72, 79, 81, 94, 95, 109, 111, 113, 116–118, 122, 123 Reason to value, 9, 10, 12, 16, 33, 37, 39, 95, 113, 115, 116 Recognition, 36, 38–40 Redistribution of property, 55 Reference set of preference orderings, 10, 12, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97–100, 102, 113, 124, 140 Refined alternative, 19, 124 Refined functioning, 125 Refined valuation function, 120 Refined value-based approach, 7, 17, 23, 40 Reflection and deliberation, 116 Reflection process, 37, 65, 69, 132 Reflexive preference, 49, 75 Rejected functioning, 118 Rejected option, 123 Relation preference, 11, 18, 49, 67, 68, 70, 74 value, 17, 18, 48, 69 Relative eligibility rule, 88, 98, 99 Relevant difference, 17, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 57–60, 130 Representation theorem, 12 Resources, and capabilities, 4, 13–15, 25, 107, 109, 110, 112, 132 Respect, 3, 25, 46, 49, 57, 68, 81, 96, 97, 125 Responsibility, 8, 13 Revealed diversity information, 43–60 Rights cultural, 106 human, 32, 106 property, 2, 110, 111 women’s, 32, 46, 116 Robeyns, I., 106, 108, 110–112 Romero-Medina, A., 10, 11, 44, 86, 89, 113 Rosenbaum, E., 8, 46

R Ranking of capability set, 16, 107, 112–118, 120 Ranking of opportunity set, 43

S Satisfaction desires, of, 14, 64 preference, of, 56

Practical policy, 4, 15, 24 Preference acyclic, acyclicity, 78 adaptation (adaptive preference), 30, 31, 91 aggregation, 18, 66, 67, 71 all-things-considered, 11, 18, 40, 49, 64, 66, 68–70, 75–81, 94–98, 100, 101, 132 anti-symmetric, 70 asymmetric, 48, 70 change, 29, 30, 37 dependency, 17, 23, 28 for flexibility, 90 formation, 11, 12, 40, 63–82, 94, 95, 97, 100–102, 139–143 social, 11 for freedom, 12 incomplete, 70 ordering, 10–12, 18, 45, 48, 49, 55, 57, 58, 78, 79, 86–88, 90–95, 97–100, 102, 113–115, 124, 130 reference set of, 10, 12, 18, 86–88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97–100, 102, 103, 113, 115, 124, 130, 143 Preference-based approaches, 9, 12, 18, 86, 89, 93–95, 103, 123, 124, 130 Preference-based freedom ranking, 118, 123 Preference relation, 11, 18, 49, 63, 67–71, 74, 75, 81 Primary goods, 12, 13, 15 Principle, 5, 24, 32, 119 of choice, 69 Procedural reasonableness, 95–100, 130 Procedure, 18, 31, 67, 68, 70–72, 75–77, 80, 111, 139, 142 Property right, 2, 110, 111 Pseudo-metric, 54 Public reasoning, public debate, 32 Puppe, C., 8, 11, 45–47, 53, 54, 86, 88, 89, 117, 123

158 Scanlon, T., 38, 39 Schokkaert, E., 115, 116 Self-interest, 64 Self-interested or egoistic motives, 64 Self-realization, 6 Sen, A., 4, 6, 7, 10, 12–15, 19, 25, 27, 30, 60, 64–66, 68, 69, 77–79, 81, 86, 88–91, 93–97, 99, 106–111, 113, 116–118, 120, 122–125 Set capability, 14–16, 19, 106–122, 124, 125 choice, 7, 8, 11, 12 opportunity, 7–11, 25, 29–32, 34, 44, 46–48, 82, 86–89, 91, 92, 94, 97, 99–101, 124, 130 preference orderings, of, 18, 58, 86 Set-dependency of valuable functionings, 119 Significant choice, 44 Similarity-based partition, 46 Similarity-based ranking, 46 Similarity between alternatives, 46 Similarity relation, 8, 45, 46, 48, 50–52, 59, 130 Simple cardinality ranking (or simple cardinality ordering), 7, 43, 44, 113 Simple eligibility rule, 87, 88, 99 Simple majority rule, 79 Singleton set, 55 Society, 5, 6, 12–16, 19, 24, 26, 30, 39, 49, 50, 57, 99–101, 107, 108, 115, 122, 132, 133 Specific value neglect, 33 Specific value of freedom, 33 Steedman, 67 Steiner, H., 26 Subset ranking, 50, 59 Subsistence society, 111 Substantive reasonableness, 89–91 Sugden, R., 9, 10, 27, 30, 45, 86, 89, 106, 113, 115 Supervenience, 67, 68 Suppes, P., 92 Symmetric preference, 70 Symmetric similarity relation, 50, 51

T Taylor, C., 25, 26 Teschl, M., 67 Time, 1, 7, 19, 65, 66, 72, 79, 99, 101, 102, 112, 131, 132 identity over, 65, 66, 132 Traditional, 74, 107, 108, 110–112, 116, 120, 121, 133

Index Transformation, 106 goods into functionings, 109 Transitive completion, 97 ordering, 75, 79 preference, 86 similarity relation, 51 Transitivity, 51, 64, 67, 68, 74–78, 80, 81, 139, 142

U Ultrametric, 47, 53, 54 Unanimity, 51, 96, 135, 136 Unanimous agreement, 117 Uncertainty, 34, 90 Unfreedom, 26 Utilitarianism, 12 Utility, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 64, 67, 76, 91

V Valuable alternatives, 9–12, 28, 83, 86–89, 91, 93, 95, 98, 100, 115, 123, 130 Valuable functioning, 15, 106, 110, 114, 115, 118–121 Valuation function, 15, 106, 110, 114, 115, 118–121 procedure, 31 Value alternatives, of, 8, 9, 16, 82, 85–90, 93, 101, 102, 113, 124 based approach, 6, 17, 27, 28, 30–32, 38–40, 123, 129 freedom, of, 3, 6, 7, 9–12, 18, 23, 34, 90, 93, 94, 97, 100, 102, 123, 131 independent, 34 instrumental, 34, 37 intrinsic, 10, 34 judgement, 35 neutral approach, 5, 16, 17, 23, 27, 28, 35–37, 123 neutrality, 35 opportunity, of, 10 specific versus non-specific, 6, 28, 33–38, 93, 108, 114, 115, 123, 124, 129 structure, 65, 123, 124 Vegetarian, 10, 66, 73, 80, 115 Velleman, J., 64, 65

W Watene, K., 106 Watson, 38, 64, 65

Index Weighing, 34, 45, 47, 112 Weinstein, 86 Weitzman, M., 8, 9, 17, 45, 47, 48, 52–54, 56–57, 59, 130 Weitzman measure, 47, 48, 53, 56, 59, 130 Welfare, 7, 12, 19, 24, 30, 43, 64, 122, 123, 125 Welfare economic, 7, 12, 19, 24, 30, 122, 123, 125 Welfarism, 30 Welfarist evaluation, 30 Well-being, 3, 4, 12–16, 25, 30, 32, 35, 87, 92, 105–117, 119, 122, 124, 125 Well-informed preference, 30

159 Weymark, J., 75 Williams, K., 69 Wine, 44, 50, 57, 80 Worship, 25

X Xu, Y., 7–11, 43–46, 49–51, 86, 88, 89, 92, 98, 113, 122, 123

Z Zapatistas, 2, 133