Africa's Agrarian Crisis: The Roots of Famine 9781685852849

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables
Preface
PART 1 GENERAL PERSPECTIVES
1 • Africa's Agricultural Crisis: An Overview
2 • Food Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa
3 • The Regulation of Rural Markets in Africa
PART 2 CASE STUDIES
Introduction
4 • Neglecting the Poor: State Policy Toward the Smallholder in Kenya
5 • Politics and the Food Production Crisis in Tanzania
6 • The Political Economy of Agrarian Regression in Ghana
7 • Peasants and Rural Development in Liberia
8 • Food Deficits and Political Legitimacy: The Case of Morocco
PART 3 EXTERNALITIES
Introduction
9 • Rural Development and Economic Stabilization: Can They Be Attained Simultaneously ?
10 • Food Aid: Solution, Palliative, or Danger for Africa's Food Crisis'.'
African Agricultural Development: A Bibliography of Recent Works
Contributors
Development Institute
Index

Citation preview

AFRICA'S AGRARIAN CRISIS The Roots of Famine

• F O O D IN AFRICA SERIES •

Series Editor: Art Hansen Center for African Studies University of Florida Gainesville, Florida

• A f r i c a ' s Agrarian Crisis: T h e Roots of F a m i n e • Stephen K. Commins, Michael F. Lofchie, and Rhys Payne, editors

• Food in Sub-Saharan A f r i c a • Art Hansen Delia E. McMillan, editors

and

AFRICA'S AGRARIAN CRISIS The Roots of Famine

edited by Stephen K. Commins, Michael F. Lofchie, and Rhys Payne

L y n n e R i e n n e r P u b l i s h e r s , Inc. • B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o

Published in the United States of A m c r i c a by L y n n e R i e n n e r Publishers, Inc. 948 North Street, B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o 8 0 3 0 2 © 1986 by L y n n e R i e n n e r Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Main entry under title: A f r i c a ' s agrarian crisis. " A bibliography on A f r i c a n agriculture, Lynette R u m m e r " : p. Includes index. I. A g r i c u l t u r e — E c o n o m i c s a s p e c t s - — A f r i c a — C a s e studies. Africa—Economic conditions—1960Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 6 0 -

— C a s e studies.

— C a s e studies.

4 . Food s u p p l y —

A f r i c a — C a s e studies.

5. Food r e l i e f — A f r i c a — C a s e studies.

C o m m i n s , Stephen K.

II. L o f c h i e , M i c h a e l F.

HD2117.A345

1985

338.T096

85-18339

Distributed outside of North and S o u t h A m e r i c a and J a p a n by Pinter (Publishers) L t d , 25 Floral Street,

London W C 2 E 9 D S England. UK ISBN: 0-86187-591-5 Printed and b o u n d in the United States of A m e r i c a

I.

III. P a y n e , R h y s .

ISBN 0-931477-60-3

Frances

2.

3. A f r i c a —

To Kelly, Lynette, and Sharon

Contents • List of Tables •

ix

• Preface •

PART 1

xiii

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

1 • Africa's Agricultural Crisis: An Overview • Michael F. Lofchie 2 • Food Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa • Cheryl Christensen Lawrence Witucki

and

3 • The Regulation of Rural Markets in Africa • Robert H. Bates

PART 2

3

19 37

CASE STUDIES

• Introduction •

57

4 • Neglecting the Poor: State Policy Toward the Smallholder in Kenya • Stephen Peterson

59

5 • Politics and the Food Production Crisis in Tanzania • John Shao

84

6 • The Political Economy of Agrarian Regression in Ghana • Jon Kraus

103

7 • Peasants and Rural Development in Liberia • Stephen Commins

133

K.

8 • Food Deficits and Political Legitimacy: The Case of Morocco • Rhys Payne vii

153

viii

• CONTENTS

PART 3

EXTERNALITIES

• Introduction •

173

9 • Rural D e v e l o p m e n t and E c o n o m i c Stabilization: Can T h e y Be Attained Simultaneously ? • Biswapriya Scmyal 10 • Food Aid: Solution, Palliative, or Danger for A f r i c a ' s Food Crisis'.' • Raymond F. Hopkins

179

196

• African Agricultural D e v e l o p m e n t : A Bibliography of Recent W o r k s • Lvnette

Rummel

210

• Contributors

230

• D e v e l o p m e n t Institute

231

Tables 2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

Indices of Per Capita Agricultural Production in A f r i c a , by C o u n t r y , 1973-1982

21

Indices of Per Capita Food Production in Africa, by C o u n t r y , 1973-1982

22

Grain Supply Utilization f o r S u b - S a h a r a n African Countries with Serious Food Shortages

23

Production of Selected Agricultural C o m m o d i t i e s A f r i c a . 1969-1971, Annual 1980-1983

24

in

South

2.5

Africa: Selected E c o n o m i c Indicators, 1973-1982

24

2.6

Kenya: Selected Prices and Corn Production

31

2.7

Z a m b i a ' s Corn Producer Prices C o m p a r e d to C o n s u m e r Prices, 1970, 1974-1983

32

3.1

Nominal Protestation C o e f f i c i e n t s for Selected Export C r o p s

42

3.2

Nigerian Agricultural Exports

43

3.3

Production of Seed Cotton in Sudan

44

3.4

Index N u m b e r s of Agricultural Exports, Unit Value

45

3.5

Index N u m b e r s of Total Agricultural Exports, V o l u m e

45

3.6

Index N u m b e r s of Agricultural Exports, Total Value

45

3.7

Estimates of the Overevaluation of D o m e s t i c C u r r e n c i e s , 1979

46

ix

X • TABLES

3.8

Patterns of Market Intervention for Food C r o p s

47

3.9

Index N u m b e r s of Total Value of Food Imports

50

3 . 1 0 Average Annual G r o w t h Rates of Production, Area, and Yield of Cereals in D e v e l o p m e n t Market E c o n o m i e s , by R e g i o n , 19601975, 1960-1966, and 1967-1975

50

3.11 Index N u m b e r s of Per Capita Food Production

51

3 . 1 2 Total Grain C o n s u m p t i o n Per Capita

51

4.1

C h a n g e s in the Distribution of Income and C o n s u m p t i o n in Central Province, 1963-1974

63

4.2

Average Percent of Product Sales Realization, 1972-1978

70

4.3

Domestic Gross Producer Price as a Percentage of Domestic Border Price

70

4.4

Railway Freight Rates for M a j o r C o m m o d i t i e s : NairobiMombasa

70

N e w Agricultural Credit Issued by T y p e of Farmer: 1974/1975 to 1977/1978

74

Recurrent and D e v e l o p m e n t Expenditure on Main Services by the Central G o v e r n m e n t

78

Percentage Distribution by M a j o r Category of 1979-1983 Plan Allocations, Ministry of Agriculture

78

4.8

C r o p D e v e l o p m e n t : 1979-1983 Plan Allocations

79

5.1

External T r a d e in Maize: 1973-1982

85

5.2

Trends in the Production of Export C r o p s

87

5.3

Trends in Export C r o p Production

92

5.4

Net Imports of Principal Food Grains

93

5.5

Export C r o p Production

94

4.5

4.6

4.7

TABLES

6.1

• xi

National C o n s u m e r and Local Food Price Indexes, Rates of Inflation (official), and N o m i n a l and Real G o v e r n m e n t M i n i m u m Wages

105

6.2

Agricultural Production in G h a n a , 1970-1979

106

6.3

G h a n a G o v e r n m e n t Budgetary Expenditures

121

6.4

Food Versus C o c o a Prices

125

8.1

Moroccan Wheat Production and Imports, 1977-1982

154

9.1

Intended Impact of I M P Conditionalities

185

10.1

Cereals Food Aid

197

10.2

World Food Aid in Cereals by Main O b j e c t i v e s , 1975-1981/ 1982

198

Preface In O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 , one brief segment on national television made A f r i c a ' s famine dramatically visible for many Americans. Millions o f dollars poured into the offices o f private voluntary organizations involved in relief activities. Public pressure helped spur western governments to increase food aid and other relief efforts to affected countries. As with the Sahel and Ethiopian famines o f the early 1 9 7 0 s , the predominant perception equated famine with drought, or perhaps the ineptitude o f African governments. T h e contributors to this book point to a more complex interpretation o f the roots o f famine. T h e book had its origins in a lecture series coordinated by Stephen C o m m i n s and Michael L o f c h i e in the Spring Quarter o f 1983 at U C L A . T h e chapters by Kraus, Hopkins, B a t e s , Sanyal, and Christensen/Witucki are based on papers that were produced for these lectures; the rest were gathered later from other authors. Michael Lofchie's introductory essay sums up the collection. Support for research on African food problems has been generously provided to the African Studies Center since 1981 by agencies o f the Episcopal Church. Yearly grants have made it possible to sustain a variety o f programs oriented toward the causes o f and potential solutions to Africa's agrarian problems. T h e primary funding agency has been the Presiding Bishop's Fund for World R e l i e f , with additional grants from the Overseas Development O f f i c e and Hunger O f f i c e o f the Episcopal Church. Particular thanks go to T h e Rev. Canon S a m i r Habiby, executive director o f the Presiding B i s h o p ' s Fund; M r s . Nancy M a r v e l , administrative assistant for the Fund; Dr. Edward Holmes, Overseas Development O f f i c e ; M s . J a n e Watkins, Overseas Development O f f i c e ; and Dr. David Crean, Hunger Off i c e . Their consistent support for programs related to Africa's food deficits have made this volume and related research possible. We are also deeply grateful to the Getty Oil Company which, in a wonderfully philanthropic gesture, made a grant for this project to the African Studies Center. Our special thanks to Dr. Alan B u c k l e y who convinced his supervisors at that concern that African agriculture was worthy o f their attention and support. Additional thanks go to Deborah Norwood, administrative assistant at the Development Institute o f the Center, for her work in the preparation o f this volume. T h e Editors xiii

• PART 1 •

General Perspectives

-1. Africa's Agricultural Crisis: An Overview MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE

A

J . I n increasing number of African countries cannot feed themselves. In many, domestic food production is inadequate to supply even the minimal needs of growing populations, and earnings from exports are insufficient to permit enough food imports to make up the difference. As a result, starving children have become a universal symbol of deepening economic deterioration. As television documentaries portray a human tragedy of unutterable anguish, World Bank reports provide cold statistical confirmation of the underlying phenomenon, an agricultural breakdown that is now continent-wide and has taken on ever-deepening proportions. Many African countries have suffered a precipitous decline in per capita food production since the 1970s, and, as a result, Africa now imports approximately 10 million tons of grain per year, an amount roughly equivalent to the needs of its entire urban population. 1 With a population growth rate of approximately 3.5 percent per year (the highest in the developing world), Africa has been able to manage an increase in food production of only about 1.5 percent per year. In 1980, per capita food production was only about four-fifths of its 1970 level. Africa is the only one of the world's developing areas to have suffered such a decline and skyrocketing food imports during the past five years; this suggests that the problem of agrarian failure may be worsening. It is impossible to calculate the extent of chronic malnutrition and hungerrelated deaths with any precision because there are no continent-wide surveys: most estimates are based on rough calculations within individual countries. But the World Bank estimates that by the end of 1984 as much as 20 per cent of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa was receiving less than the minimum amount of food necessary to sustain health. If correct, this would mean that the total number of severely hungry or malnourished persons may now have reached 100 million. 2 Because export-oriented agriculture has also been subject to stagnating production, Africa does not produce a sufficient volume of agricultural exports to finance the purchase of minimal food requirements. The gross figures for export 3

4

• A F R I C A ' S A G R I C U L T U R A L CRISIS: AN O V E R V I E W

agriculture are at least as alarming as those for the food sector. By the e n d of the 1970s, Africa's marketed v o l u m e s of key agricultural exports were n o higher than they had been s o m e 2 0 years earlier. This resulted in a sharp drop in the continent's share of the world market f o r such vital c o m m o d i t i e s as c o f f e e , tea, cotton, b a n a n a s , and oilseeds. Today, it appears extremely unlikely that Africa will be able to recapture its f o r m e r share of the agricultural world market. There is no indication whatsoever of a significant reversal in production trends. As a result, f o o d aid, once considered a short-term response to m o m e n t a r y episodic events such as drought or political turbulence, has now taken on permanent status as the longterm moral imperative of the world's d o n o r nations. H u m a n starvation on an appalling scale is only the most visible and dramatic o u t c o m e of agrarian decline. A f r i c a has also b e c o m e a continent of convulsive social and political turbulence that functions as both cause and effect of the agricultural b r e a k d o w n . As a measure of its extreme instability, A f r i c a , though it has only about 10 percent of the world's total population, now accounts for at least 25 percent of its refugee population. Approximately 2 . 5 million Africans are r e f u g e e s , and this figure would be even higher if r e f u g e e s remaining within their o w n countries were included. There is a very real sense in which the h u m a n toll of agrarian b r e a k d o w n extends to the entire population of most African countries. African g o v e r n m e n t s , hard-pressed to find currency to sustain food imports, have often been compelled to cut back drastically on public services. T h e usual result of these cutbacks has been a drastic deterioration in the quality and availability of these services. In some countries, the educational and medical systems are so deprived of vital inputs that they function in n a m e only. In the political sphere, such e n d e m i c p h e n o m e n a as corruption and repression also appear to be a direct outgrowth of e c o n o m i c decline. Political leaders, intent on maintaining their status and material perquisites in a context of diminishing overall resources, have used any m e a n s available to d o so. Corruption in Africa also has its structural roots in the financial predicament of middle and upper class elites whose real incomes have been severely eroded by the inflationary process that has a c c o m p a n i e d agrarian stagnation. This is most apparent in African societies such as G h a n a , Tanzania, and U g a n d a , where the processes of e c o n o m i c decline are most a d v a n c e d . In these countries, a civil servant's monthly salary is often inadequate even to finance a f a m i l y ' s food requirements, let alone its other e x p e n s e s , and corruption b e c o m e s the only alternative to white collar destitution. But these countries are simply the most e x t r e m e e x a m p l e s of e c o n o m i c trends that are, in fact, continent-wide. Political instability is c o m p o u n d e d by the fact that corruption and repression inevitably give rise to a larger process of social and political demoralization. To this degree, Africa's agrarian collapse is at the basis of a widespread breakd o w n of political legitimacy and a loss of social trust. G o v e r n m e n t s that cannot provide an adequate supply of reasonably priced f o o d s t u f f s to their urban populations have experienced sharp increases in public opposition, manifested most

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

•

5

dramatically in the high incidence of f o o d riots in many capital cities. Political demonstrations triggered by food scarcity have occurred, for e x a m p l e , in Cairo, Tunis, Monrovia, L u s a k a , K h a r t o u m , and Nairobi. T h e collapse of at least two of these g o v e r n m e n t s , Liberia and S u d a n , was rooted partially in sudden price increases for food staples. T h e collapse of the imperial government of Ethiopia in 1974 also grew f r o m an agricultural crisis: the regime of E m p e r o r Haile Selassie lost both d o m e s t i c and international credibility because it could not resolve the problem of f o o d scarcity in drought-stricken regions. Although the widespread loss of public trust in African g o v e r n m e n t s is the o u t c o m e of a c o m p l e x assortment of political and e c o n o m i c factors, none has as direct a bearing on popular attitudes toward g o v e r n m e n t as the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of national political leaders in m a n a g i n g their c o u n t r y s ' food systems. T h e deterioration of the agricultural sector has had reverberations that extend to other important e c o n o m i c spheres such as industry and c o m m e r c e . Africa's industrial sector was built largely on the principle of import substitution and is thus almost wholly dependent upon the foreign e x c h a n g e earned by agricultural exports to finance the import of raw materials, capital g o o d s , and energy supplies. As agricultural export earnings have sunk, so has the availability of these essential industrial items. In countries that are most seriously a f f e c t e d , the industrial sector is now operating at approximately 25 percent capacity or less, and, given the numerous other pressures on foreign e x c h a n g e reserves, it appears that the rate of capacity utilization in industry will only drop further in the forseeable future. This creates a rapid increase in urban u n e m p l o y m e n t . In addition, the rapid proliferation of squatter settlements and peri-urban slums has been abetted by the massive influx of rural dwellers w h o are no longer able to sustain a livelihood in the countryside. As a result, Africa's cities are increasingly unable to provide e c o n o m i c opportunity for an economically displaced peasantry. With the decline of industrial activity, the rate of urban u n e m p l o y m e n t has shot upward, and u n e m p l o y m e n t rates of 4 0 percent or more are by no m e a n s u n c o m m o n . Even countries not so e c o n o m i cally distressed, already confront a situation in which the n u m b e r of school-leavers annually far e x c e e d s the n u m b e r of new j o b opportunities. In those countries where agricultural decline is more acute, annual j o b creation in the m o d e r n sector is a negative number. Such e c o n o m i c opportunities as are now available seem almost wholly c o n f i n e d to the informal sector w h e r e they provide barely enough inc o m e to sustain survival. T h u s , the inexorable decline of Africa's agricultural base has also produced a steady widening of the g a p between the poor and the wellto-do. Under these conditions, it is difficult to foresee any future other than a continued high incidence of military coups and other forms of political instability coupled with more serious manifestations of urban discontent such as food riots, political d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , and a n o m i c violence. There is little basis for o p t i m i s m that these trends can be reversed. M a j o r e c o n o m i c indicators point in the direction of a further worsening of the present situation. During the past decade or so, A f r i c a has b e c o m e one of the world's m a j o r debtor regions, a status that, in itself, seriously complicates the process of

6

• AFRICA'S AGRICULTURAL CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW

economic recovery because of the burden of debt repayment. A s late as 1974, the annual cost of debt repayment for the low-income countries of independent subSaharan Africa was less than $500 million. By 1984, that figure had climbed to almost $1.4 billion and was rising steadily. During this period, the average debt service ratio (debt repayments as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings from exports and services) for this group of countries increased from approximately 7 percent to more than 30 percent, and this figure will grow higher as borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) e x p a n d s . ' In the more serious cases, the debt service ratio is substantially higher, and for Sudan, Africa's most extreme example of debt problems, annual debt service actually exceeds total foreign exchange earnings. 4 Though unique, the predicament of Sudan may actually portend the future since other African countries have already had to reschedule their debt, and many have fallen far behind in their payments on foreign trade accounts. A large proportion of Africa's foreign exchange earnings are now allotted io non-productive economic purposes. Debt-servicing is high a m o n g these but others include the cost of imported food and consumer goods, and energy supplies for nonindustrial or nonagricultural purposes (e.g., gasoline for private automobiles). There is almost no prospect whatsoever that foreign capital inflows will compensate for Africa's inability to invest in itself. For although foreign aid has continued to flow to Africa in generous amounts, it is clear that the continent's economic decline has had a chilling effect on foreign private investment which, outside the Republic of South Africa, has diminished drastically during the past five years. Africa may now have b e c o m e a net exporter of capital. If the expatriation of capital by political elites interested in securing their personal resources abroad is added to other categories of capital outflow, the total could well exceed the net amount of capital entering the continent.

• CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS • Africa's economic decline has given rise to a burgeoning academic and professional literature that seeks to establish the causes and potential remedies for this decline. Much of this literature ranges along an intellectual continuum that can roughly be described as externalist-internalist in character. Such broad categorization inevitably involves an unfortunate element of oversimplification, since no serious author falls unambiguously into a single analytic position, and the particular mix of causal factors may vary considerably f r o m one country to the next. It does provide, however, a useful point of departure for establishing the enormous range of analytic opinion that currently exists. Broadly speaking, externalists are inclined to place primary emphasis on causal factors outside Africa and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of its political systems, while internalists place greater emphasis on the policy failures of African governments.

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

•

7

External Factors Among externalists, there is a tendency to assign primary responsibility for the crisis to salient features of the international economic system including the declining terms of trade for primary agricultural exporters. There is a general consensus among observers of Africa's present economic crisis that the continent has suffered badly because of adverse changes in the international terms of trade and that its current parlous state can be traced in large measure to the fact that the costs of the goods African countries need to import have risen far more rapidly than the price of exported commodities. The most recent research on Africa's terms of trade shows an especially sharp downward trend beginning in 1979. It assesses this decline in the following stark terms: Between 1980 and 1982, prices of nonoil primary commodities declined by 27 percent in current dollar terms. The loss of income due to deterioration in the t e n n s of trade was 1.2 percent of G D P for sub-Saharan Africa; middle-income oil importers suffered the biggest loss (3 percent of G D P ) . . and low-income countries a loss of 2 .4 percent of GDP. 5

This trend helps account for the critical scarcity of foreign exchange currently experienced by the overwhelming majority of African states. For some countries, the potential benefits of increased production have been completely eroded by decreasing prices for their products. Sudan, for example, was able to increase cotton production by about 50 percent in 1981 and 1982, but, due to a sharp drop in the world market price for this product, its foreign exchange position continued to deteriorate badly. World Bank economists now anticipate a continued fall in the terms of trade throughout the 1980s with price levels for Africa's key exports at least 15-25 percent lower than those that prevailed in the 1960s. 6 Price declines of this magnitude make it extremely difficult for governments to implement policy reforms, such as price increases, to improve production. An increase in domestic producer prices could result easily in enormous budget deficits if the world market price of that particular commodity were to drop further. Externalists believe that the critics of African governments generally fail to distinguish between poor pricing policies and the depressed price levels of primary agricultural commodities on world markets. They argue, as well, that the drop in foreign exchange reserves resulting from falling prices has constrained the implementation of infrastructure! improvements intended to facilitate increased exports. The scarcity of foreign exchange is compounded by another salient feature of the international economic system; namely, the markedly low demand elasticities for Africa's key agricultural commodities. World demand for such critically important agricultural exports as coffee and cocoa has been virtually static for the past decade or more and is generally expected to remain so for the remainder of this century. The World Bank's study of anticipated demand for Africa's principal agricultural exports over the next decade presents a particularly gloomy picture, suggesting that world consumption of the majority of these products will increase

8

• AFRICA S AGRICULTURAL CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW

by only about 3 percent or less for the foreseeable future. 7 For such critical commodities as c o f f e e , tea, and c o c o a , overproduction combined with sluggish demand growth could well result in a further downward trend of commodity prices, thus accentuating the already severe foreign exchange constraint. Of all Africa's agricultural exports, only palm oil is expected to benefit from a growth in international demand approaching 5 percent per year. Ironically, due to the collapse of Nigerian palm oil production, most of this increase in demand will probably be satisfied by non-African producers. These trends would appear to rule out almost entirely the feasibility of a development process based on the strategy of export-led growth. As agricultural exporters, African countries do not have the option of stimulating world demand for their products by cutting prices. In sharp contrast to world demand for industrial goods or manufactured consumer products, world consumption of Africa's most important agricultural commodities rises very sluggishly in response to falling prices. This means that African countries as a whole cannot compensate for low price levels by increasing the volume of agricultural goods they market. Although any given agricultural exporter could potentially expand its market share by lowering prices, its increased volume of exports would necessarily occur at the expense of other countries dealing in the same commodity. Export-led growth is not a development strategy available to African nations in general; it is a competitive market tactic available to individual producers. Recent adverse trends in the international terms of trade give every indication of being long-term in character. The downward pressure on price levels for African agricultural g o o d s has been further reenforced by the introduction of a number of synthetic products that substitute cheaply for natural items and, thereby, compete with them in the international marketplace: synthetic rubber for natural, soft drinks for c o f f e e and tea, artificial chocolate for c o c o a , non-caloric sweeteners for natural sugar, dacron and polyester fabric for cotton, etc. The impact of multinational corporations on Africa's agricultural trade is also a topic much deserving of further exploration. It s e e m s clear that the companies that buy and sell agricultural commodities in world markets are in a far stronger position to take advantage of the potential profitability of these products than the producer countries, and that their interest in profit maximization is also a significant factor exerting downward pressure on producer prices." The economic future of African countries will be a direct function of their earnings from agricultural exports. A s small nations with limited internal markets, they have almost no prospect of developing diversified and internally self-sufficient economic systems. The harsh reality of today's international economic system is such that there is almost no prospect whatsoever that their foreign earnings from agricultural exports will increase appreciably. Instead, there is far greater likelihood that the majority of countries will be compelled by circumstances beyond their control to make do with lower and lower levels of export revenues. African countries have also been buffeted by a host of other external shocks. These include, for e x a m p l e , the precipitous increase since 1973 in the price of pe-

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

•

9

troleum, an escalation that has drastically increased the cost of agricultural production since so many agricultural inputs are petroleum derivatives. A rapidly growing tendency toward administered protectionism by the world's advanced industrial societies also has been harmful. This policy discourages incipient efforts toward industrialization based on export-processing." Adding to the list of external factors that have suppressed African economic growth is the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar, which has created innumerable economic difficulties. It has severely compounded the difficulty of debt repayment, for example, since international loans are typically denominated in U.S. dollars and has contributed indirectly to the steep increases in petroleum costs since trade in this commodity is also conducted in U.S. dollars. Overvaluation has also increased the cost of a host of critically important consumer goods such as educational and medical supplies as well as vital agricultural and industrial inputs. This inventory of adverse international circumstances could be compounded still further by taking into account the effects of the current global recession and high interest rates on hard currencies. Economic recession in industrial nations, for example, has contributed directly to sluggish demand for Africa's agricultural exports. High interest rates have not only driven up production costs but put still further pressure on foreign exchange reserves by adding to the cost of loan repayments. The major point, however, seems well established and not in need of additional argument. Taken together, these external factors add up to a strong case that African countries have had to confront a deeply inhospitable international environment, one that would have created critical economic difficulties even under the best internal management conditions.

Internal Factors Authors who emphasize the internal sources of agricultural decay are inclined to attach greater importance to the economic policies pursued since independence by African states. Chief among these is the continent-wide tendency to control and suppress agricultural producer prices. Writing elsewhere, as well as in chapter 3 of this volume, Robert Bates has made this policy central to his analysis of Africa's agricultural crisis. In his classic study, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, for example, Bates notes that "the producers of cash crops for export . . . have been subject to a pricing policy that reduces the prices they receive to a level well below world market prices." 10 John C. de Wilde has commented as well on the extent to which African farmers have been burdened by governmental interventions in agricultural markets. The prices that farmers receive for their produce or that they pay for necessary production inputs and consumer goods have been significantly affected, not only by direct and deliberate price fixing but also indirectly by the cost and efficiency of parastatal organizations charged with the promotion of production, . . . by direct and indirect taxation of farm income, by differential exchange rates and by the maintenance of unrealistically high foreign

10

•

AFRICA S AGRICULTURAL CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW

e x c h a n g e r a t e s . I n c r e a s i n g l y , t o o , t h e i n f l a t i o n e n g e n d e r e d by g o v e r n m e n t d e f i c i t s . . . h a s i m p a i r e d the ability to m a i n t a i n a d e q u a t e f a r m p r i c e s in real t e r m s a n d c a u s e d s e r i o u s d e l a y s in p a y i n g f a r m e r s f o r their p r o d u c t s . "

Africa's agricultural crisis is continent-wide, but it occurs within individual countries and takes place on a country-by-country basis. Within any given A f r i c a n c o u n try, faltering agricultural production can be explained in large part by g o v e r n m e n t policies that significantly reduce the incentives to agricultural producers. T h e policy of price suppression is rooted in a variety of objectives including the desire to maintain a low-cost food supply for the cities and the belief that agricultural exports should generate an e c o n o m i c surplus adequate to finance the development of an industrial sector and the growth of important public services. It now seems clear that this policy has had e f f e c t s that are precisely the opposite f r o m those intended. It has b e c o m e a m a j o r factor in accounting for the stagnation of Africa's agricultural exports. The disincentive posed by low food prices has severely constrained the available supplies of marketed food staples. Indeed, suppression of agricultural producer prices may well be the single most important factor in accounting for the sharp decline of Africa's share of world trade in agricultural c o m modities relative to other developing areas and for the skyrocketing increase of food imports. A second m a j o r policy with adverse e f f e c t s on agricultural productivity has been the ubiquitous tendency toward currency o v e r v a l u a t i o n . i : T h e e f f e c t s of this policy have been more severe in Africa's a n g l o p h o n e countries whose currencies are not tied directly to that of a m a j o r European power, but it occurs even in the f r a n c o p h o n e nations whose currency is tied officially and directly to the French franc. Currency overvaluation operates as a hidden tax on the financial return to the producers of export goods and thus has precisely the same e f f e c t on agricultural exports as the suppression of producer prices. It also depresses the availability of marketed food staples for local c o n s u m p t i o n . By artificially c h e a p e n i n g the cost of importing f o o d s , it sets u p an unfair competition with domestic food producers. T h e broad impact of currency overvaluation is to subsidize the cost of living of urban c o n s u m e r s at the expense of rural dwellers. T h e widespread use of parastatal corporations also has had a substantial and deleterious e f f e c t on Africa's agricultural sector. Africa's parastatals are characterized almost e v e r y w h e r e by destructive levels of corruption, inefficiency, and m i s m a n a g e m e n t . In s o m e cases, the e x p e n s e s of the parastatal corporations are actually higher than their returns f r o m crop sales, leaving no margin w h a t s o e v e r with which to pay the producers. T h e result has been a consistent and growing tendency toward n o n p a y m e n t , late p a y m e n t , or partial p a y m e n t of f a r m e r s , a m a j o r disincentive in and of itself to the production of marketed agricultural surpluses. In a n u m b e r of African countries, agricultural parastatals also are given responsibility f o r the implementation of key agricultural services such as the provision of fertilizers and pesticides, and here, t o o , the record of parastatal p e r f o r m a n c e is, with rare exceptions, a u n i f o r m l y poor o n e . A p o o r choice of d e v e l o p m e n t strategies has also contributed to the present

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crisis. S o m e observers feel that the decision to pursue a policy of industrialization through import substitution, for example, may be held at least partially accountable for the continent's deteriorating agricultural performance. This policy has sapped away capital and other resources that might otherwise have gone into financing needed agricultural improvements. Michael Roemer, for example, has criticized import-substitution strategies in Africa because "they focus development efforts on industrialization although it is agriculture that remains the base of the economy and that employs the great majority of workers." 1 1 One of the factors that has undermined Africa's position in world agricultural trade has been its inability to respond flexibly to changing market conditions by introducing new, high demand crops or more productive varieties of old ones. This rigidity seems rooted largely in the scarcity of capital for agricultural reinvestment, and this scarcity is fundamentally the product of an industrial policy that is not oriented toward the generation of its own sources of foreign exchange. Industrialization by import substitution has also required high levels of tariff protection for the new industries, and this, in turn, has meant that Africa's farmers have been confronted with extremely high prices for consumer goods and for the agricultural inputs manufactured in the new industries. 1 4 Moreover, in many cases Africa's new industries have been marked by inefficient m a n a g e m e n t , and this has sometimes resulted in severe scarcities of essential agricultural inputs. Urban industries also affect agricultural performance by competing in the same labor markets; by bidding up the wage levels, they can contribute to a labor bottleneck in the countryside.

• THE DONOR IMPACT • In the broad dialogue between externalists and internalists, the impact of donor policies often is omitted, for the donor community operates in the interstices between the international economic system and the agricultural policies of host governments. The omission is regrettable since the international donor community is a vitally important actor in Africa's economic affairs, and donor policies often have an extremely significant effect on the process of African development. This is nowhere more conspicuous than in the rural sector where the influence of donor agencies is sometimes so strong that it can have a determinative effect on agricultural trends. It is clear that certain policies pursued by m e m b e r s of the donor community have played an important part in worsening Africa's agricultural crisis. Tempting as it has been to some to conceptualize the international dimension of development in Manichean terms that define the key actors in relation to good and evil, this viewpoint adds little to an understanding of the complexity of the African rural sector. Although it might be morally comforting to believe that the process of agricultural decline could be arrested by removing the villains from the scene, this view has little basis in political reality. In the real world of African development, the rural policies of donor-actors are generally well-intentioned, and

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• AFRICA'S A G R I C U L T U R A L CRISIS: AN O V E R V I E W

no small part of Africa's current tragedy lies in the fact that well-intentioned policies may generate unexpectedly negative effects. The discovery of workable solutions to Africa's agricultural crisis involves far more than a change of heart on the part of the donor agencies. The rural policies of Africa's international donor community can be viewed usefully in historical terms. They arise as a response to the problem of development as it is construed at a particular moment. The projects that are set in place by donoractors then quickly become an integral part of the rural landscape which is then transformed because of their presence. This injects an almost dialectical quality into the process of rural development. Thus, as donor policies trigger a process of rural transformation, the problem of rural development is altered and takes on a new configuration. The new set of conditions then calls for a different set of policies and programs. It may be useful to illustrate this highly abstract formulation by referring specifically to donor policies in postindependence Africa. This would help to place the question of donor policy in broader perspective and, thereby, illuminate the ever-changing nature of the interaction over time between donor agencies and the African milieu in which they operate. More specifically, it may help to show how donor policies that are intended to help promote rural development can become part of the problem of the agricultural sector. Although Africa's agricultural crisis has reached epochal proportions only during the last dozen or so years, its initial symptoms were clearly visible in the decade immediately following independence. Africa had become a net food importer as early as the 1960s, but, at that time, the problem was not identified as one of major structural weaknesses in the agricultural sector. Not only were Africa's key agricultural exports still enjoying a robust performance in the wake of the postKorean War commodities boom, but the volume of food imports was relatively low and did not pose a serious financial burden. Since grain prices on world markets were both cheap and stable, and since it was increasingly possible to obtain food assistance on concessional terms, the need for food imports appeared to be an easily manageable problem, one well within the financial capacity of the countries concerned. Even though the volume of food imports had doubled by the end of the decade, the most intensely debated questions about development did not focus on agriculture at all but rather on the best means of achieving urban industrial growth. From the standpoint of international donors interested in rural development, the critical problem was how to improve the productivity of the food-producing sector so that food imports would not continue to be a drain on financial reserves needed for industrialization. The principal constraint on this improvement as identified by these agencies was the absence of agronomic or technological development among peasant food-producers. In the economic argot of the era, food production was a "backward" sector. It is not at all difficult to understand why development experts adopted this point of view. Africa's colonial governments had generally pursued a set of agricultural policies that were designed to promote the production of exportable crops and that often did so at the expense of the food-producing regions. In many instances, export agriculture was assigned the best quality arable

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land, often on highly favorable terms, and was generously subsidized with physical infrastructure, extension services, and marketing assistance. Colonial governments also employed a variety of tax, trade, and labor policies to maximize the growth of the export sector. Food production, by contrast, had generally been neglected during the colonial era. In contrast with export agriculture, for example, the food-producing areas had been systematically deprived of vital inputs such as extension services or improved infrastructural facilities. Food staples were generally produced on smallscale peasant farms that had changed little, if at all, during colonialism. The dominant technology was the hand-held hoe, and even animal-drawn cultivation was relatively rare. Land tenure was typically communal in character, and this, too, was used by colonial administrations to constrain development since land that was held in this fashion was considered unacceptable as collateral for loans to finance farm improvements. Indeed, the very same policies that had contributed to the prosperity of the export farms were often the source of backwardness among foodproducing farmers. Producer prices for staple foods, for example, were set often at unrealistically low levels so that peasant food-growers would have to make their labor available in the export sector. As a result of these policies, the most conspicuous feature of African agriculture when independence occurred was the glaring discrepancy between the modernity of export agriculture and the almost completely undeveloped state of the food-growing regions. The challenge of rural development, as perceived by innumerable professional experts and academic observers, was to complete the diffusion of modern agricultural practices throughout the countryside so that food production could keep pace with rising national needs. The policy chosen to achieve this goal was the creation of large-scale farms that could demonstrate scientific agriculture and the beneficial cost/benefit equations associated with advanced agricultural practices. This strategy for rural development has generally been called the "project approach," and its hallmark characteristic is intensive research in such areas as new methods of husbandry, the development of new high yielding seed varieties, and the most economic methods of implementing these improvements at the level of the individual producer. 15 The operative idea underlying this strategy was that once peasant farmers had been made aware of the benefits to be derived from agricultural innovation, their traditional resistance to change would be overcome, and sweeping improvements in the process of food production would take place. The project approach did achieve a few dramatic successes. 16 But as a general policy, it not only failed by a wide margin to attain the ambitious goals its proponents had claimed, it may even have contributed measurably to a worsening of economic conditions in the countryside. It is clear, for example, that the project approach rested on a highly questionable assumption about the nature of the African peasantry; namely that peasant cultural conservatism was the principal obstacle to agrarian innovation. Today, observers of the African rural scene are virtually unanimous in their conviction that African peasants are not bound by cultural constraints; that they respond with alacrity to economic opportunity; and that when

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financial incentives are present, their production for the marketplace increases accordingly. T h e project approach failed to diffuse improved agricultural methods for reasons that had little, if anything, to do with peasant cultural proclivities for traditional agricultural methods. Basically, it did not address inherited systems o f producer pricing that left the vast majority o f farm families with only the most meager cash incomes. As a result o f these pricing systems, Africa's peasant farmers were simply in no position to take advantage o f higher cost agricultural methods. T h e only real beneficiaries were governmental elites who were in a position to invest in large-scale farms and to take advantage o f the opportunities for patronage and corruption that the projects made available. T h e project strategy not only failed to diffuse new methods o f production to the food-producing areas, it may even have contributed to the problem o f declining per capita food production. Food crops grown on heavily subsidized demonstration farms sometimes competed on the market with those grown by peasant producers, and this probably contributed to low price levels that drove marginal producers o f f the land. In addition, the demonstration projects were so expensive to maintain that, once donor support was withdrawn, African governments were almost invariably forced to abandon them, though not before some had expended invaluable personnel and financial resources in vain efforts to maintain donor goodwill by keeping the projects alive. B y the early 1970s, the African countryside was littered with the debris o f failed agricultural projects. T h e costs o f this policy, in financial and human terms, have never been fully calculated. But Africa's donor community in the aggregate must certainly have spent hundreds o f millions o f dollars on proj e c t s that had little realistic prospect o f success and in so doing, diverted comparable amounts o f scarce local resources into failed ventures. L a r g e - s c a l e , capital-intensive projects are also vulnerable to criticism on ecological grounds. There is serious concern about the environmental impact o f temperate zone agricultural technologies when these are transferred to tropical regions. S y s t e m s o f cultivation which require that large areas o f land be cleared o f their original cover o f forest and perennial grasses and which replace indigenous farming systems that involved mixed cropping and long fallow periods are highly destructive o f tropical ecosystems. T h e annual harvesting o f large areas o f land leaves the harvested acreage exposed to the elements during the off-season and, thereby, contributes directly to the degradation o f the soil base, making it progressively less suitable for agricultural purposes. This point was put most succinctly by Erik E c k h o l m in his study o f global environmental problems: [In the tropical regions] the soil is less a nutrient source than a mechanical support for plant life which constitutes an almost closed c y c l e o f growth and decay. When the land is stripped o f its dense cover, the soil temperature soars under the intense equatorial sun, hastening biological activity and the deterioration o f remaining organic matter. Torrential downpours, sometimes bringing six to eight inches o f rain in a single day, wash away the thin topsoil and leach the scant nutrients it holds downward, beyond the reach o f crop r o o t s . "

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This description of the human origins of desertification has direct relevance to vast regions of western Africa, where, it is now estimated, the Sahara Desert may be moving southward at a rate of several miles per year. Indications of the same problem can also be identified in eastern and southern Africa where such processes as soil erosion, nutrient-leaching, and laterization can be traced to the introduction of environmentally inappropriate cropping systems. There is also reason to believe that drought itself partly originates in changing patterns of human land use, particularly in areas where new forms of agricultural production have involved the massive stripping away of the earth's green cover. Despite its shortcomings, the project approach has remained extremely popular with the donor community, and even today it remains a cornerstone of donor strategy for developing the African countryside. The donor nations' reluctance to abandon the project orientation may be explained partially by the fact that it retains a certain amount of popularity among African governments that welcome the vast inpouring of resources it makes available and the opportunities for patronage it creates at the local level. The donors' preference for large projects may also reflect the bureaucratic character of some of the donor agencies. Like other large-scale governmental bureaucracies, the donor organizations are often committed by their budget cycles to the expenditure of very large sums of money within very short periods of time, and they therefore frequently find it administratively impractical to fund numerous small-scale projects. There is clearly a continuing belief among many donor experts that the principal reason for the failure of the project strategy lies not in its intrinsic unsuitability, but, rather, in the cultural and educational inadequacy of the African peasantry. It is clear that a decade of post-1974 famine development efforts based on the project model have done little, if anything, to prepare West Africa's agricultural systems for the effects of a period of climatic irregularity. Neither the innumerable large-scale projects that have been set in place nor the extensive programs of agricultural training and extension services that were developed to go along with them provided any cushioning whatsoever in the region's food producing capacity. As a result, when drought occurred, only massive programs of grain relief were able to limit the extent of human starvation. The famine of the 1980s is a watershed in the history of western approaches to African agricultural development. It has provided dramatic and incontrovertible evidence of the failure of the project approach. Indeed, if any single event could be said to have initiated a rethinking of the process of agrarian improvement and the possible contribution of western donors to that process, that event must surely be this famine. It also has altered substantially the present policy environment as it affects the African rural sector.

• CONCLUSION: THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN THE 1980s • The single most influential example of the new research has been the World Bank report entitled Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for

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Action, sometimes referred to as the "Berg Report" after its principal author, Professor Elliot Berg. This report represents a fundamental shift away from the project approach that dominated donor approaches to rural development throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It explicitly rejects the notion that improved agricultural productivity can be achieved through the diffusion of practices and techniques developed on large-scale, capital-intensive government farms. Whereas the project orientation was undergirded by a set of attitudes toward the African peasantry that bordered on the contemptuous, the Berg Report sees the African smallholder class in deeply admiring terms as the essential basis for any workable strategy of agricultural recovery. It states, for example, that "all the evidence points to the fact that smallholders are outstanding managers of their own resources—their land and capital, fertilizer and water."' 8 The Report is unqualified in its insistence that African farmers already possess the requisite knowledge and agronomic skills to achieve both greater food output and a larger volume of agricultural production for export. The most important feature of the Berg Report, however, is its unremitting antistatist position. Whereas the project orientation was based on the premise that African governments would have to play a major role in the dissemination of innovative agricultural practices, as well as in providing the proper climate for overall economic growth, the Berg Report is fundamentally committed to the proposition that the free market provides the most efficient stimulus to economic progress. Its analysis of the root causes of Africa's agricultural decline is decidedly internalist in character and its key arguments are strikingly similar, in many essential respects, to those of Robert Bates, noted above. The core argument, in a nutshell, is that African governments have pursued a set of policies that, taken cumulatively, represent a systematic bias against the agricultural sector. The effect of these policies has been to lower drastically the incentives for agricultural producers, and, thereby, to contribute directly to stagnating agricultural production, both of domestic food items and of export crops. The solution to Africa's agricultural conundrum is to constrain the role of the state as much as possible and to allow the free market to allocate resources and to set agricultural prices. The importance of the Berg Report lies not so much in its content as in its impact on Africa's donor community. Its intellectual influence has been astonishing and now extends far beyond the World Bank to encompass a very large proportion of the national and international donor organizations that operate within African countries. Within the brief space of a few years, nearly all of Africa's major donors have sought ways to introduce approaches to rural development that combine the project orientation with the forces of the free market and the potential for greater productivity of the individual peasant farmer. A large number of donor governments and agencies now insist that African governments shift their own policies to allow greater scope for market forces as a condition of further assistance. The donor community's heightened reliance on the market mechanism is nowhere clearer than in the conditionality practiced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF): it tends to insist that policy reforms of the sort advocated by Berg be implemented as a condition of financial assistance. Supporters of the IMF defend

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its c o n d i t i o n a l i t y on the basis that it is not a d e v e l o p m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n b u t , rather, a l e n d i n g institution w h o s e p r i n c i p a l interest is e c o n o m i c s t a b i l i z a t i o n . Its role as a p r o v i d e r of capital to l o w - i n c o m e A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s has t o d a y b e c o m e so g r e a t , h o w e v e r , that this d i s t i n c t i o n is d i f f i c u l t , if not i m p o s s i b l e , to s u s t a i n . T h e p o l i c y r e f o r m s it a t t a c h e s to its l o a n s h a v e a vital and direct b e a r i n g on the p a t t e r n s of d e v e l o p m e n t that are o c c u r r i n g in a n u m b e r of A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . O n e e x a m p l e of t h e I M F ' s i m p a c t is treated in detail in t h e final section of this v o l u m e , in B i s w a p r i y a S a n y a l ' s e s s a y " R u r a l D e v e l o p m e n t and E c o n o m i c Stabilization: C a n T h e y B e A t t a i n e d S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ? " . T h e r e w o u l d b e little v a l u e , t h e r e f o r e , in an e x t e n d e d recitation of S a n y a l ' s f i n d i n g s . S u f f i c e it to say here that the f r e e m a r k e t r e f o r m s insisted u p o n by the I M F did not g e n e r a l l y p r o d u c e t h e results i n t e n d e d ; the e v i d e n c e t e n d s to s h o w that the s o c i o e c o n o m i c c h a n g e s that took place were adverse to increased productivity on the part of smallholder farmers. I M F c o n d i t i o n a l i t y did not p r o m o t e an increase of national i n v e s t m e n t in a g r i c u l ture b u t , rather, led to a c o n t i n u a t i o n of past i n v e s t m e n t policies that had c o n c e n trated the nation's capital in t h e m i n i n g industry. N o r did i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of I M F r e f o r m s shift the internal t e r m s of trade b a c k t o w a r d the c o u n t r y s i d e and a g a i n s t the u r b a n areas. I n d e e d , S a n y a l ' s e v i d e n c e s h o w s u n m i s t a k a b l y that the m o r e distant s m a l l h o l d e r s w e r e in s u b s t a n t i a l l y p o o r e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s a f t e r t h e i m p l e m e n t a tion of t h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s t h a n they h a d b e e n previously. A l t h o u g h it m i g h t b e p r e m a t u r e to reach b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n s o n t h e basis of a single c a s e study, S a n y a l ' s essay s u g g e s t s strongly that the f r e e m a r k e t a p p r o a c h to A f r i c a n rural d e v e l o p m e n t merits m o r e i n t e n s i v e scrutiny b e f o r e its u n b r i d l e d i m p o s i t i o n on t h e A f r i c a n countryside. In m e d i c a l c i r c l e s , there is an a p h o r i s m to t h e e f f e c t that a d o c t o r w h o is not a b s o l u t e l y certain that the a v a i l a b l e c u r e s will i m p r o v e the patient o u g h t to r e f r a i n f r o m p r e s c r i b i n g any t r e a t m e n t w h a t s o e v e r . T h i s a d v i c e , h o w e v e r s o u n d in doctorpatient r e l a t i o n s , d o e s not s e e m at all realistic w h e n applied to t h e interactions b e t w e e n d o n o r and recipient n a t i o n s in A f r i c a . For t w e n t y - f i v e y e a r s , w e s t e r n a n d A f r i c a n n a t i o n s h a v e b e e n m u t u a l l y i n v o l v e d in a variety of aid r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s s e e m d e s t i n e d to c o n t i n u e in o n e f o r m or a n o t h e r for t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . O n t h e b a s i s of past p e r f o r m a n c e , h o w e v e r , there is little e v i d e n c e to s u g g e s t that t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s hold a n y significant p r o m i s e of h e l p i n g the c o n t i n e n t to s o l v e its a g r a r i a n crisis o r t h e a l l - p e r v a s i v e h u m a n starvation that this crisis entails. If f u t u r e aid p r o g r a m s c o n t r i b u t e as little to s o l v i n g A f r i c a ' s agricultural crisis as t h o s e that h a v e b e e n in p l a c e s i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e , then the p r o g nosis f o r A f r i c a ' s h u m a n f u t u r e is s o u n s p e a k a b l y d i m that it m a y b e a p p r o p r i a t e a f t e r all to c o n s i d e r t h e w i s d o m of t h e m e d i c a l m e t a p h o r .

• NOTES• 1. The figures here are taken from the World Bank report, Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,

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1984). See esp. pp. 1 - 3 , 9 - 1 4 , and 2 1 - 2 2 . 2. Ibid., p. 9. 3. Coping With External Debt in the 1980's (Washington, D C.: World Bank, 1985), pp. 6 - 7 . 4. Toward Sustained Development, p. 13. 5. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Report on Development Prospects and Programs (Washington, D . C . : World Bank, 1983), pp. 3 - 4 . 7. Coping With External Debt, p. 8. 8. For a full account of this issue, see Barbara Dinham and Colin Hines, Agribusiness in Africa (London: Earth Resources Research Ltd., 1983). Also, Mohamed S. Halfani and Jonathan Barker, "Agribusiness and Agrarian C h a n g e , " in Jonathan Barker, ed., The Politics of Agriculture inTropical Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), chapter 3. 9. For a full account, see The Political Structure of the New Protectionism (Washington, D . C . : World Bank StaffWorking Paper No. 471, 1981). 10. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1981), p. 28. 11. John C. de Wilde, Agriculture, Marketing and Pricing in Sub-Saharan Africa (Los Angeles: African Studies Center and Crossroads Press, 1984), p. 118. 12. For an excellent survey of the relationship between currency exchange rates and performance of the agricultural sector in Africa, see Delphin G. Rwegasira, "Exchange Rates and the Management of the External Sector," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 22 (September 1984), pp. 4 5 1 - 4 6 7 . 13. Michael Roemer, "Economic Development in Africa: Performance Since Independence, and a Strategy for the Future," in Daedalus (Spring 1982), p. 132. 14. For an excellent discussion of the burden of industrial policy on Africa's agricultural sector, see chapter 4 in Bates, Markets and States, pp. 62-77. 15. For a discussion of the project strategy, see de Wilde, Agriculture, Marketing and Pricing, pp. 1 - 3 . 16. The most widely cited of these is the case of hybrid maize in Kenya that during the late 1960s and early 1970s was widely adopted by peasant farmers and resulted in a production increase of between 50 and 100 per cent, enough to keep pace with that country's population increase for approximately a decade. 17. Erik P. Eckholm, Losing Ground; Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects (New York: Norton, 1976) p. 137. See also Antoon de Vos, Africa: The Devastated Continent (The Hague: Dr. W. Junk, 1975). 18. World Bank, Accelerated Development tion (Washington D . C . : IBRD, 1981), p. 35.

in Sub-Saharan

Africa: An Agenda for Ac-

•2. Food Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa CHERYL CHRISTENSEN LAWRENCE WITUCKI

s

W—9 ub-Saharan Africa faces serious food problems, manifested in declining per capita food and agricultural production, chronic malnutrition, rising food aid requirements, and a growing reliance on food imports. ' In 1983, the problems were dramatized by serious food emergencies in 23 countries throughout Africa. Basic weaknesses were exposed in the structure of the agricultural sector, the performance of official food marketing systems, infrastructure, and government policies. These weaknesses have been exacerbated by rising populations, economic and political crises, environmental "shocks," and by a severe global recession. Governments are now less able to ignore food problems and have generally responded by making food self-sufficiency a major national objective, in some cases formulating strategies for increased domestic production. However, few, if any, governments have additional resources available to implement these programs. Hard choices, domestically and internationally, are hence inevitable. This chapter surveys sub-Saharan Africa's food policies, with three major objectives. First, it provides a brief discussion of current African conditions, focusing on the impact of both the ongoing emergency and worsened world economic conditions on the food situation. Second, it highlights recent food policy changes, with special emphasis on eastern and southern Africa. Finally, it examines the implications of these current conditions and policy changes for the analysis of food policies in Africa.

• DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM • As of 1983, Africa faced a major food emergency. Some 23 countries in the continent were suffering from drought. Africa's 1983 cereal production was estimated at 62.4 million tons, the lowest since 1973, when drought was also pervasive. 2 However, a decade of weak production and rapid population growth left Africa in 19

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• FOOD POLICIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

a worse position in 1983 than in 1973. Both per capita food and agricultural production had declined, while most other regions of the world showed increases (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Hence, while Africa produced 4 percent of the world's cereals in 1973, with 9 . 4 percent of the world's population, in 1983 it produced about 3 . 9 percent of the world's grain, with 11 percent of the world's population. A s a result of weather conditions and structural problems, 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had unusually high cereal import requirements in 1983-1984 (Table 2 . 3 ) . 1 The 1983 food emergency differed from previous emergencies in several important ways. First, it was continent-wide, although some regions (like southern Africa where the drought was the worst in recorded history) were more severely affected than others. S e c o n d , trade patterns were severely disrupted in a distinctive fashion. South Africa, for instance, traditionally an important corn exporter, was a major importer in 1983. Since South Africa normally provided a significant proportion of sub-Saharan Africa's corn imports, supplies to other countries such as Zaire were affected. Zimbabwe, also a traditional exporter (but on a smaller scale), rationed corn to avoid imports. Within the southern Africa region, only Malawi (which largely escaped the drought) retained its export capacity. Third, worsening financial conditions meant many countries had only a weak capacity to purchase food for importation. Devaluations, often part of "structural adjustment prog r a m s , " made imports more expensive, while terms of trade, foreign exchange reserves, and borrowing capacity declined. Because the 1983 crisis was so serious and affected countries in different ways, it may be useful to distinguish the situation in several specific regions before returning to our central discussion.' 4

Southern Africa The most serious food problem occurred in southern Africa, where severe drought dramatically reduced production of grain and other crops. South Africa's 1983 corn crop was estimated at only 4 0 percent of normal. Other crops also declined (see Table 2 . 4 ) . B e e f production held steady in 1983 but only because of droughtinduced slaughter. Several smaller southern African countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland) also suffered severe production declines. The southern half of M o z a m b i q u e experienced total crop failure. Zambia's corn crop was d a m a g e d for the second year, and corn imports neared 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 tons. The drought resulted in record grain imports in 1983/1984 (see Table 2 . 3 ) . Corn imports were estimated at about 3 . 4 million tons. Swaziland, B o t s w a n a , and Lesotho met part of their corn requirements through purchases from South Africa. Corn stocks in early 1984 were very low in southern Africa, in contrast to the large stocks held by South Africa and Zimbabwe in early 1983. Rice imports were estimated at 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons with South Africa and Mozambique accounting for the major shares. Wheat import needs were also high, about 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons. The United States provided P.L. 4 8 0 wheat to several of these countries, including Z a m b i a ,

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