African Studies in the Academy: The Cornucopia of Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa? 9789956762224, 9956762229

Table of contents :
ch. One Africa's Past and Present Predicaments: Reflections on African Studies in the 21st Century / Tapuwa R. Mubaya --
ch. Two The Coming-of-age of Super-Colonialism / Gertjan van Stam --
ch. Three African Indigenous Belief Systems on the Crossroads: The Tsikamutanda and Witchcraft-related Disputes in the 21st Century Zimbabwe / Fidelis P. T. Duri --
ch. Four Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Implication for Agriculture, Food Security and Poverty in Southern Africa / Marshall Madambura --
ch. Five Reinventing Nhimbe: The Deployment of Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Partnerships for Development / Conrad Chibango --
ch. Six Entrepreneurship, Social Capital and Community Development in Zimbabwe's Buhera District: A Faith-based Reflection / Chenjerai Muwaniki --
ch. Seven Zimbabwe Land I Tenure Impact on Development and Justice Delivery / Dube Edmore --
ch. Eight `The Tarnished Jewel?' Post-Independent Zimbabwe Tag Under the Reign of Robert Gabriel Mugabe / Nyasha Madzokere --
ch. Nine Climate Change, Gender and Development in Africa / Munyaradzi Mawere --
ch. Ten Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in Nigeria and the Question of Independence / Johnson O. Olaniyi --
ch. Eleven Oratio: A Framing of Knowledge in the Context of Technology and Academia / Gertjan van Stam.

Citation preview

TAPUWA RAYMOND MUBAYA is a Lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University

and a PhD candidate at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. Mubaya is author of 5 books and more than fourteen articles in internationally esteemed scholarly journals.

Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North West Region Cameroon

Edited by Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya

He is an author of more than 50 books and holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town.

AFRICAN STUDIES in the ACADEMY

MUNYARADZI MAWERE is currently professor at Great Zimbabwe University.

The Cornucopia of Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa?

For a long time, African Studies as a discipline has been spearheaded by academics and institutions in the Global North. This puts African Studies on the continent at a crossroads of making choices on whether such a discipline can be legitimately accepted as an epistemological discipline seeking objectivity and truth about Africa and the African peoples or a discipline meant to perpetuate the North’s hegemonic socio-economic, political and epistemic control over Africa. The compound question that immediately arises is: Who should produce what and which space should African Studies occupy in the academy both of the North and of the South? Confronted by such a question, one wonders whether the existence of African Studies Centres in the Global North academies open opportunities for critical thinking on Africa or it opens possibilities for the emergence of the same discipline in Africa as a fertile space for trans-disciplinary debate. While approaches critical for the development of African Studies are pervasive in African universities through fields such as cultural studies, social anthropology, history, sociology, indigenous knowledge studies and African philosophy, the discipline of African Studies though critical to Africa is rarely practised as such in the African academy and its future on the continent remains bleak. African Studies in the Academy is a testimony that if honestly and objectively practised, the crossroads position of African Studies as a discipline makes it a fertile ground for generating and testing new approaches critical for researching and understanding Africa. It also challenges Africa to seriously consider assuming its legitimate position to champion African Studies from within. These issues are at the heart of the present volume.

AFRICAN STUDIES in the ACADEMY

The Cornucopia of Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa? Edited by

Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya

African Studies in the Academy: The Cornucopia of Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa?

Edited by Munyaradzi Mawere & Tapuwa R. Mubaya

Langaa Research & Publishing CIG Mankon, Bamenda

Publisher: Langaa RPCIG Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North West Region Cameroon [email protected] www.langaa-rpcig.net

Distributed in and outside N. America by African Books Collective [email protected] www.africanbookscollective.com

ISBN-10: 9956-762-22-9 ISBN-13: 978-9956-762-22-4 © Munyaradzi Mawere & Tapuwa R. Mubaya 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical or electronic, including photocopying and recording, or be stored in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher

List of Contributors

Munyaradzi Mawere holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Professor Mawere also holds a Master’s Degree in Social Anthropology from UCT, a Master’s Degree in Development Studies, and Master’s Degree in Philosophy and B. A. (Hons) Degree in Philosophy from the University of Zimbabwe. He is currently Professor in the Department of Culture and Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. Before joining this university, Professor Mawere was a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe and at Universidade Pedagogica, Mozambique, where he has worked in different capacities as a Senior lecturer, Assistant Research Director, Postgraduate Co-ordinator and Associate Professor. He has an outstanding publishing record of more than one hundred and twenty pieces of work which include more than twenty-five books and over a hundred book chapters and papers in scholarly journals. Professor Mawere has published extensively on poverty and community development, knowledge studies, political anthropology, science and technology studies (STS), environment and agrarian issues, democracy and African states, coloniality, decoloniality and transformation, African philosophy and political systems, culture and heritage studies. Some of his bestselling books are: Humans, Other Beings and the Environment: Harurwa (Edible stinkbugs) and Environmental Conservation in South-eastern Zimbabwe (2015); Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Africa: A Search for Sustainable Democracy and Development, (2015); Culture, Indigenous Knowledge and Development in Africa: Reviving Interconnections for Sustainable Development (2014); Harnessing Cultural Capital for Sustainability: A Pan Africanist Perspective (2015); Divining the Future of Africa: Healing the Wounds, Restoring Dignity and Fostering Development, (2014); African Cultures, Memory and Space: Living the Past Presence in Zimbabwean Heritage (2014); African Philosophy and Thought Systems: A Search for a Culture and Philosophy of Belonging (2016); Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects (2016); Underdevelopment, Development and the Future of Africa (2017),

and Theorising Development in Africa: Towards Building an African Framework of Development (2017). Johnson O. Olaniyi holds a PhD Degree in Political Science from University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. He is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria where he has been teaching core courses in Political Science since 1992. His area of specialization is Political Theory/Comparative Politics with special bias in Electoral Studies. Dr. Olaniyi obtained his B.Sc. Hons and M.Sc. Degrees in Political Science from University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He has published extensively in reputable journals, contributed chapters in edited books and authored three books: Introduction to Contemporary Political Analysis; Foundations of Public Policy Analysis; and An Introduction to Constitutional Development in Nigeria which have all become reference points in Nigerian Universities. He is happily married and blessed with children. Fidelis Peter Thomas Duri is a lecturer in the Department of History and Development Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. He is a holder of a PhD in History from the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. He has published a number of books and articles which focus on environmental history, socio-cultural dynamics, subaltern struggles, African border studies and politics in Zimbabwe during the colonial and postcolonial periods. He has also reviewed and edited a number of scholarly books and articles and is also a member of the editorial boards of international journals such as the Zimbabwe Journal of Historical Studies and the International Journal of Developing Societies. Bankie Foster Bankie was born in Europe of African parenthood, a lawyer by training, with experience in diplomacy, the Academy and Youth matters. After 1972, Bankie resided in a number of African countries in West, South and North East Africa. From 1984 – 6, he served as Charge d’Affaires at the Ghana Embassy in Luanda, Angola with concurrent responsibility for Congo ( Brazzaville ), SWAPO, ANC and FRETLINE ( East Timor). In 1991, Bankie moved to Namibia where he worked in the

Transitional Planning Team (TPT) for the new University of Namibia (UNAM), as Personal and Executive Assistant to The Vice-Chancellor Designate, which University was established by law in 1992. Thereafter, Bankie served as Staff Development Officer for the new University, going on to the new Faculty of Law, as Researcher in the Human Rights and Documentation Centre. In 1996, Bankie joined the Secretariat of the Law Reform and Development Commission of The Ministry of Justice, serving as Researcher and acted as assistant to The Government Coordinator for Human Rights. Between 2000 and 2004, Bankie served as Head of Administration in The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS) in Cape Town, South Africa. Thereafter, he returned to Namibia. From 2006-8, Bankie worked in Juba, South Sudan in an administrative capacity towards the establishment and in the Kush Institution, in the Office of the President of South Sudan. He then worked for five years at the National Youth Council of Namibia (NYCN) as acting Secretary to its Board and Sub-Committees, trained Youth on Pan-Africanism in the Youth Leadership Development Programme (YDLP). Since 2015, Bankie is the Director of the Pan-African Institute for the Study of African Society (PAISAS) Trust, in Windhoek, Namibia. Tapuwa Raymond Mubaya is a Lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University and a PhD candidate at Tilburg University, Netherlands. Before joining Great Zimbabwe University, Mr. Mubaya worked for National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) for eight years as the Curator of Archaeology and Head of the Great Zimbabwe Monument Conservation Centre. Currently he is heading the Department of Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. Mr Mubaya holds a Master of Arts Degree in Heritage Studies from the University of Zimbabwe. He is also a member of the Association of Southern African Professional Archaeologists (ASAPA) and the Zimbabwe Association of Professional Archaeologists and related Disciplines (ZAPAD. His current research interests are focussed on heritage management and conservation, cultural tourism and museums. Mubaya has written and published fourteen articles in internationally esteemed scholarly journals and is the co-editor/author of the books: African Cultures,

Memory and Space: Living the Past Presence in Zimbabwean Heritage (2014) and Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects (2016); and co-author of African Philosophy and Thought Systems: A Search for a Culture and Philosophy of Belonging (2016). Gertjan van Stam is a Research Fellow at the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) of Zimbabwe. He holds an MTech (cum laude) from Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in South Africa and is at the verge of completing his PhD with Tilburg University. Gertjan and his family lived in the rural areas of Zimbabwe and Zambia for over 13 years. His broad academic interests focus on the nexus of society and technology in the so-called periphery with the goal to identify and inspire local talent and engender local capacity for communityled activities. Conrad Chibango is a lecturer of religious studies in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. He is interested in analysing religious and social policies and practices in contemporary developing societies. His work is mainly shaped by his particular interest in the interaction between religion and development as well as between religion and law. He is a PhD holder in Canon Law with the Pontifical Urban University, Rome and a master of Development Studies with the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He attained a BA Honours in Religious Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. Outside his academic activities, Conrad Chibango is a member of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) where he is actively involved in promoting social justice in grassroots communities. Bernard Pindukai Humbe is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo. Bernard Humbe is a PhD candidate with the University of Free State. He is a subscribed member of African Consortium of Law and Religion. His areas of research interest include: Symbolism of Animals in African Indigenous Religion, Onomastics, Traditional

Law and Social Development, Religion and Entrepreneurship, Religion and Social Transformation, and Religion and Power. Chenjerai Muwaniki is a Lecturer in Adult and Continuing Education at Great Zimbabwe University. He is currently studying for a PHD in Adult Education at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Mr. Muwaniki’s research interests are in Vocational Education and Training, Entrepreneurship, Financial literacy and emerging issues in Adult Education. Ephraim Matanda is a lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University, Munhumutapa School of Commerce, Department of Banking and Finance, Masvingo, Zimbabwe. He has been with the University for the past 8 years, teaching courses at both under and post graduate levels in Banking and Finance programmes. He is well published with six books, three book chapters and nine referred journals. His most recent publications are a refereed paper entitled ‘Micro Finance Sector in Zimbabwe: An Appraisal of the Socio-Economic Performance of the Sector in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe in the Dollarisation Era’ (2017) and a book accepted for publication by Cambridge Scholars publishers, with the title, Modern Financial Investment Management (2017). Nyasha Madzokere is a lecturer of Biblical Hebrew and Old Testament in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies in Simon Muzenda School of Arts, Culture and Heritage at Great Zimbabwe University. He has been with the University for past 9 years. He is a PhD candidate at the University of Botswana. He has published widely on the Bible and its contextual relevance to Zimbabwe. His most recent publication reads: “Let My People Go!’’ A Contextual Reading of the Book of Exodus in Light of Political and Economic Crisis in Post-independent Zimbabwe. Edmore Dube holds a Masters in Religious Studies (1995) and a DPhil in Christian-Muslim Dialogue (2003) from the University of Zimbabwe. He is currently a lecturer in Biblical and Islamic Studies with the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies (Great Zimbabwe University). He has passion for religion and ethics, particularly how religious institutions can impact positively on

public health, business and human rights. He has special concern for the interrogation of theological positions with the intention of envisioning a better world order informed by interreligious dialogue. Of great concern to me is the radicalisation of religion and politics resulting in polarisation, deprivation and armed conflicts. Marshal Madambura holds two Master’s Degrees in Development Studies (from Great Zimbabwe University, GZU) and Peace and Governance (from Africa University). He also holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Zimbabwe and a Graduate Diploma in Education from Great Zimbabwe University. His current placement is with the Family AIDS Caring Trust (FACT) Zimbabwe as a Project officer. Madambura also worked as a secondary teacher in Zimbabwe for several years before joining Family AIDS Caring Trust. In his current placement, Madambura has been working with rural people in areas to do with HIV/AIDS and other development projects for the past seven years and this has given him a broad base from which to approach many topics on education, gender and development. His current research interests are in the areas of Education, Gender studies, Peace and conflict studies, and development issues.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Africa’s Past and Present Predicaments: Reflections on African Studies in the 21st Century……………………….. 1 Munyaradzi Mawere & Tapuwa R. Mubaya Chapter Two: The Coming-of-age of Super-Colonialism………………………………………… 13 Gertjan van Stam Chapter Three: African Indigenous Belief Systems on the Crossroads: The Tsikamutanda and Witchcraft-related Disputes in the 21st Century Zimbabwe…………….……. 41 Fidelis P. T. Duri Chapter Four: Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Implication for Agriculture, Food Security and Poverty in Southern Africa………………………….……………… 79 Munyaradzi Mawere & Marshall Madambura Chapter Five: Reinventing Nhimbe : The Deployment of Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Partnerships for Development…………………………………….…….. 91 Conrad Chibango Chapter Six: Entrepreneurship, Social Capital and Community Development in Zimbabwe’s Buhera District: A Faith-based Reflection………………. 119 Bernard Pindukai Humbe & Chenjerai Muwaniki

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Chapter Seven: Zimbabwe Land Tenure Impact on Development and Justice Delivery………………………………………. 137 Dube Edmore Chapter Eight: ‘The Tarnished Jewel?’ Post- Independent Zimbabwe Tag Under the Reign of Robert Gabriel Mugabe……………………..159 Ephraim Matanda & Nyasha Madzokere Chapter Nine: Climate Change, Gender and Development in Africa……………………… 185 Marshal Madambura & Munyaradzi Mawere Chapter Ten: Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in Nigeria and the Question of Independence……………………………….. 211 Johnson O. Olaniyi Chapter Eleven: Oratio: A Framing of Knowledge in the Context of Technology and Academia……………………………….. 251 Munyaradzi Mawere & Gertjan van Stam Chapter Twelve: Africa, the Diasporan Community and Super-Colonialism…….…… 265 Bankie F. Bankie & Munyaradzi Mawere

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Chapter One Africa’s Past and Present Predicaments: Reflections on African Studies in the 21st Century Munyaradzi Mawere & Tapuwa R. Mubaya

“African studies is never worth the name so long directed and studied from the viewpoint of the Global North” (Mawere, 2017)

Introduction Mamadou Koulibaly, Ivorian Professor of Economics and author of the book, “The Servitude of the Colonial Pact,” in an informative interview with the New African Magazine in 2013, sheds light on the economic devastation caused to the African member states of the French Community of Africa (CFA) zone through their continued link to the French currency – the Franc – in the past and today to the euro. He, thus, revealed: Under the ‘solidarity’ independence pact, former French colonies (CFA countries), the 14 African states are obliged to put 65 percent of their foreign currency reserves into the French Treasury, plus another 20 percent for financial liabilities. This means these 14 African countries only ever have access to 15 percent of their own money! If they need more they have to borrow their own money from the French at commercial rates (Herald, 31 March 2017). He further notes that: France has the first right to buy or reject any natural resources found in the land of the Francophone countries. So, even if the African countries can get better prices elsewhere, they cannot sell to anybody until France says it does not need the resources. In the award of government contracts, French companies must be considered first; only after that can these countries look elsewhere. It does not matter if the CFA countries can obtain better value for money elsewhere (Ibid).

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What Koulibaly reveals above is only a drop in the ocean pertaining to the way(s) in which the Global North continues to impoverish and maintain a taut grip on the former African colonies, siphoning the continent’s rich resources. This is what Mawere and van Stam call “super-colonialism” (Mawere & van Stam, 2016). The question that remain lingering and boggling the minds of many critical scholars and researchers on Africa is whether the civilisation purported to have been brought by the former colonial “masters” in the form of roads and rails, among other things was indubitably and genuinely meant to facilitate the development of Africa and the African people. Were not these developments meant to facilitate the full exploitation and easy transportation of Africa’s vast resources out of the continent? Isn’t it for the same reason that scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank and George James audaciously and respectively argue that Europe and the Americas are largely responsible for the impoverishment and underdevelopment of Africa and indeed for stealing away Africa’s legacy? Isn’t it for the same reason that Walter Rodney intrepidly penned down his How Europe Underdeveloped Africa? Isn’t it for the same reason that Munyaradzi Mawere recently penned down his “Divining the Future of Africa...?” Whatever the answers to all these questions might be, the truth remains unconcealed, at least now on, that over the years Africa has lost more than a priceless legacy in terms of both physical and intellectual properties. Unfortunately, the plundering and pillaging of Africa’s intellectual and economic heritage continue to balloon, more often at an even alarming rate. To cover up this messy, a lot more about the realities of Africa has been swept under carpet by those Global North organisations and institutions that tendentiously sponsor and harbour Centres of African Studies. One begins to wonder whether their choice to house African Studies Centres is out of generosity or in fact is out of the demon of super-colonialism with which the north continues with its project to control the African other! Whether true or false, the reality remains that the truth about Africa and its relations with the outside world is so far crooked and entangled in a panorama of ding dongs. It needs straightening to avoid any further unequal encounter of Africa and the north. 2

Yet, judging from Africa’s past and present experiences, the future of the continent remains difficult not only to imagine, but to determine. This is chiefly because the known recorded history of Africa’s past and present is deeply mangled in suspicious ambivalences and historical vagaries which are replete with unilateral and categorically authoritative loud voices of people outside the ideological and epistemic purview of the African worldview. Sadly, the biased, unbalanced and unquestioned narratives of Africa authored by some of the early European missionaries, hunters, traders and mineral explorers some of whom never received any reasonable tutelage in research and scholarship, are erroneously authenticated and continue to be used as the basis of understanding and studying Africa. The establishment of African Studies Centres in Europe and the Americas was believed by many as a commitment to re-research and re-write Africa. It was mistakenly viewed as a gesture towards re-painting the African continent with a ‘white’ brush, especially that for a long time Africa had suffered misinterpretation, misrepresentation and above all the unfair caricaturing of its humanity. Alas! The agenda for the establishment of African Studies Centres in the North remains a mystery mired with controversies of epic proportions. This is on account of the misleading and sometimes damaging reports that continue to be peddled against Africa and the peoples of Africa. In 2000, for example, the Economist Magazine of the United States of America had as its main headline “Africa – A Hopeless Continent”. One reads from the tone of the headline that the image of Africa is at stake. It is an image marooned in daylight, forlornly by some people with nefarious agendas; some who have never dared to honestly and earnestly research Africa and the African peoples besides their plotting against the latter. Lamentably, this unfortunate state of affairs which has historically reduced Africa to a mere object to be studied and interpreted according to Western tastes and standards, lingers on permeatively and resiliently. While during the colonial episode, the colonial powers employed military force, sadistic policies and deceitful strategies to subjugate the peoples of Africa, today the song continues but in a different tune. It is no longer a war against one another using deadly weaponry and atomic bombardments. It is now 3

a game played high in the sky: a game of theory and models. You use the models and theories uncritically you destroy your own people, including yourself. Or shall we say, it is now a game played under carpet with hot pricking goal posts smeared in gold? An attempt to touch the posts means double destruction: you are prickled and burnt at the same time. Judging from the past and present experiences of Africa and the African people, it could be one reason why after the demise of colonialism on the continent, the Global North was so interested and keen to establish African Studies Centres as a way of “catching” Africa at the level of the intellect and theoretical crafting. This is so clear if one is to question why these centres were not established in Africa if at all they were intended to benefit the people of Africa. Why this poor logic for people who teach others that: “if you do not want to continue giving fish to Peter, just teach him how to fish?” One wonders whether the logic of establishing African Studies Centres in the Global North instead of the Global South is not akin to the logic of wanting to train a swimmer out of water. How can one learn to swim out of water? If the same logic is applied on the credibility and genuinity of African Studies Centres in the north, one wonders how foreigners can claim expertise to teach a culture to the producers and owners of the culture. Isn’t this akin to a human being wanting to teach a snake how to bite? By the same absurdity, the so-called pre-colonial history of the African people has been put on the limelight by people outside the spheres and confines of African cultures and ideologies. So is African Studies today! This indeed raises eyebrows on the credibility of the information provided considering the political past of Africa and the continued asymmetrical relationship between Africa and the North. In light of the above observations and questioning, we advance the argument that as long as the study of Africa is spearheaded and led by the North, the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Africa will continue to take its toll. In fact, just like the story of the hunt narrated from the positionality of the hunter and not of the hunted, the story of Africa will continue being narrated from the perspective of the North. We argue that any study on and of Africa which attempts to rely on the fallacious Euro-American written records on Africa as its basis of understanding the latter is bound to 4

fall short of the logic of epistemic justice. Using the allegory of the patient and the doctor, Africa is like a patient being forced to take medication that cures the Western ailment instead of taking the right medication for its own ailment. Taking the right medicine is peremptory and obligatory given that each medication heals specific complications. The disease that Africa and the Global South in general are suffering from is different from the one that the Global North is suffering from. Why then are the two prescribed the same medication? Why Africa is being prescribed to use the Western models and theories which in fact are context-based in terms of their efficacy and relevance? This is the current predicament of Africa and the crux of its socio-economic and epistemic development quandaries. It is out of this realisation that we, together with all luminary contributors to this impeccable volume, thought it a timely and wise idea to rethink and reflect on the past and present condition of African Studies while projecting into the remote future of Africa as a whole. The book is a clarion call for the recognition of Africa on the global stage and for a transformative approach to both the study and understanding of Africa and the peoples of Africa. What African Studies is and is not The concept of African Studies has become quite familiar in the academy in the recent past few years. However, it appears little is known as far as African Studies as an academic discipline is or should be, or what it studies and indeed the scope of issues it covers. It is, therefore, important in a volume such as the present to clarify issues surrounding this increasingly popular but controversial discipline. Generally speaking, African Studies is the study of Africa, most especially its societies and cultures. This in a way is opposed to Paulin Hountondji’s (2009) understanding of African Studies as a field of study that refers to the whole range of disciplines that take Africa as a subject of study. While we agree with Hountondji to the point that African Studies takes Africa as its subject of study, we differ with him on the point that it includes all disciplines that treat Africa as a subject of study. We think such is a more generalised understanding of 5

African Studies which would make even disciplines which focus on Africa’s geography, geology and zoology qualify as African Studies. We, thus, underline that African Studies focuses more on the societal values and cultures of the African peoples. This makes disciplines such as cultural studies, social anthropology, philosophy, history, politics, economy, development, demography, sociology, ethnology, indigenous languages, and religion, qualify as typically African Studies. We further advance that the key focus of African Studies with regards to African societies and cultures is the ability of the discipline to interrogate objectively the epistemological approaches, methods, models and theories in all the aforementioned fields of study using critical lens that put African ways of knowing at the centre and not the margins. More often, people who specialise in such studies and approaches are known as Africanists. Unfortunately, African Studies, when established started on a sad note, with most of the centres established outside the African continent. Notable among these centres are: Institute of African Studies at Carleton University (Canada), Institute of African Studies at University of Bayreuth (Germany), Institute of African Studies at University of Leipzig (Germany), Centro de Estudos Africanos at University of Porto (Portugal), Institute of African Studies at Leiden University (Netherlands), Centre for African Studies at Dalarna University (Sweden), Centre for African Studies at University of Cambridge (United Kingdom), Centre of West African Studies at Birmingham University (United Kingdom), African Studies Centre at Michigan State University (U.S.A), Centre for African Studies at University of Florida (U.S.A), Centre for African Studies at Howard University (U.S.A), Centre for African Studies at University of Basel (Switzerland), among others. On the continent of Africa, only two centres have been established with viability namely, Centre for African Studies at the University of Cape Town (South Africa), Institute of African Research and Studies at the University of Cairo (Egypt), and Centre for African Studies at University of Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). One would wonder why so many centres focusing on Africa as their subject of study are so many outside Africa than they are within the continent! Would this reality help us achieving an objective understanding of Africa? 6

Basing on the past experiences and suffering of Africa and the African peoples, especially through Arab slave trade, trans-Atlantic slave, and colonialism, we remain sceptical that African Studies championed by people other than Africans themselves would yield epistemological goods. We in fact argue that such African Studies is not really African Studies or at least should be treated with great caution and suspicion. This should be true if we are to reiteratedly consider the fact that African Studies, when it started, was exceptionalised and exoticised (Mamdani, 1996) instead of being deexoticised and contextualised. The latter is the effort being demonstrated by many of the chapters that constitute this volume, whose main objective is to put Africa’s communities at the centre of African politics, culture, social life and the academy. The journey through the book Van Stam’s well-thought and enriching chapter two grapples with the questions, “what is contemporary colonialism and what is the constitution of colonialism from an African, historical and positional embedded perspective?” Basing on his vast hands-on experience that he acquired through the many years of interaction with mainly rural people in Zambia and Zimbabwe since 1987, van Stam audaciously advances the argument that besides enriching herself through plundering, ransacking and exploiting the African peoples and other parts of the world in the past, the Global North continues to expatriate African resources in a more intrusive and nerve racking way, coined as Super-colonialism by Mawere and van Stam (2016a). In a must read chapter three, Fidelis Duri examines the proliferation of the tsikamutandas (a group of self-proclaimed unregistered male prophets and traditional healers) in Zimbabwe’s politically-torn and crisis-ridden rural areas. The chapter demonstrates how such practices have become fiercely contested landscapes by various stakeholders. The chapter further argues that witchcraft beliefs are increasingly being threatened by African impostors who manipulate and instrumentalise them in order to eke livelihoods in times of socio-economic hardships. Duri notes with regret that the authenticity of some African indigenous beliefs and 7

related practices pertaining to witchcraft have become compromised by opportunism in times of crisis as tensions rise during struggles over increasingly shrinking resources while some self-proclaimed traditional healers capitalise on such dispensations to engage in extortionist tendencies in an effort to salvage sustenance. In chapter four, Munyaradzi Mawere and Marshal Madambura critically examine the intricate relationship which exists between poverty, climate change and environmental degradation in Southern Africa. The duo singled Southern Africa basing on the pretext that it is currently facing numerous challenges which are largely as a result of the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation. Mawere and Madambura further note that Africa is likely to be affected most by climate change as compared with the other regions of the world as its adaptive capacity to deal with the negative consequences of climate change is highly compromised due to poverty and economies that are highly climate dependent. In view of this, Mawere and Madambura suggest possible mitigating measures to counter the perceived and real effects of climate change in Africa. Chapter five by Conrad Chibango focuses on development partnerships in the context of culture and development. Using a qualitative Zimbabwean case study of nhimbe (a Shona traditional practice whereby an individual family brews beer and invites neighbours in the village to assist it in performing a particular task), Chibango argues that effective development partnerships are those which are modelled after the cultural values of the society. In line with this argument, the chapter posits that Zimbabwe should adopt a nhimbe model of development partnerships whose values can assist the country in addressing some of its political and economic ills. Besides providing solutions to fighting poverty, Chibango opines that this indigenous model of development can promote political stability, ownership of development initiatives and equal partnership. More so, the chapter advances the argument that by adopting nhimbe as a model of its development partnerships, Zimbabwe would see the need to unite and rise above its current internal political squabbles and exert its energy on matters that promote nation-building.

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In chapter six, Bernard Pindukai Humbe and Chenjerai Muwaniki submit that entrepreneurship in rustic communities such as Buhera which are mainly bedevilled by economic problems is influenced by social networks based on African tradition and religion. This is grounded on the idea that religious beliefs and social connections among entrepreneurs encourage the development of an entrepreneurial mindset. Using the Zion Apostolic Church’s (ZAC) entrepreneurs in Buhera District the twosome demonstrated that religion can be used as an epoxy of socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe at micro level through employment creation which ultimately improves the standards of living of rural communities. Chapter seven by Edmore Dube explores how land has been utilised as a tool for advancing certain political agendas at strategic times in the literary history of Zimbabwe. As such, land has been perceived as a source of conflict in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe. As that may, the various colonial and postcolonial land tenures known to date have fallen short of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) in respect of the peasantry normally at the reverse end of the beneficiation continuum. Thus, Dube recommends consensus as the most positive way of harnessing holistic energy for wholesome development. In chapter eight, Ephraim Matanda and Nyasha Madzokere examine the post-independent Zimbabwe experience that culminated into the ‘tarnished jewel’ status of a once prosperous and promising emerging nation. Firstly, the chapter analyses the country’s policy on health which sounded a promising dream which turned a nightmare. Secondly, the chapter assesses the education sector to show that it has drastically deteriorated from ‘glory to gloom’. Thirdly, the chapter assesses the country’s policy on land redistribution which instead of boosting food security has dwindled food production. Fourthly, the chapter evaluates the economy of Zimbabwe which in 1980 was in its economic ‘boom’ but now in its economic ‘doom’. Fifthly, the chapter examines the politics of Zimbabwe which fits the emblem, ‘political turbulence’. Sixthly, the chapter interrogates religion in Zimbabwe which has been infected by the bacteria tagged, ‘religio-social erosion’. Seventhly, the chapter examines the housing crisis in the country from 1980 till now. 9

Eighthly, the chapter discusses the unemployment nightmare in the country since independence. Last but not least, the chapter examines the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe in the post-independent era. In chapter nine Marshal Madambura and Munyaradzi Mawere argue that women in Africa are not only vulnerable to climate change but are also agents of change in both mitigation and adaptation and by so doing hindering development. The chapter further argues that African women rely heavily on the environment since they are responsible for securing water, food and fuel for cooking and heating. In order to uphold sustainable development, women hold more of indigenous knowledge in adaptation and mitigation of climate change than men because of their experience with farming and gardening. In light of this, Madambura and Mawere stress the importance of gender-sensitive strategies in responding to the environmental and development challenges caused by climate change. Chapter ten by Johnson O. Olaniyi, analyse the extent to which Election Management Bodies (EMB) in Africa, in general, and Nigeria in particular, have served as unbiased umpires during electoral processes. The chapter further examines the nexus between constitutionalism and the independence of Nigeria’s current EMBIndependent National Electoral Commission (INEC) over the years as well as to appraise the challenges confronting INEC in its quest to manage elections in an unbiased manner. Olaniyi argues that before any election can be adjudged as being a credible one, the election officials and electoral officers who are the master players of the game must not act under the influence of any of the electoral stakeholders particularly, the political executives. In chapter eleven, Munyaradzi Mawere and Gertjan van Stam introduce the African virtue episteme labelled as oratio, which is explained as part of a framework for African meaning making. The chapter then interrogates the suitability of ‘foreign-bred’ and foreign technologies imported in many African development contexts especially where technological artefacts are dismembered from their embodied meaning. Basing on that interrogation, the chapter argues that meaning in African cosmology and epistemology is best established through interactions in the local communities. Thus, for 10

Mawere and van Stam, there is a clear need, in African contexts, for generating the further understanding of the meaning and subsequent effects of academic knowledge if at all knowledge is to be produced symmetrically and for the benefit of all. Chapter twelve by Bankie and Mawere argue that PanAfricanism, that is, the movement for unity of Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora, is a reaction against the subjugation of African communities. The chapter further advances the argument that PanAfricanism today should seek to neutralise the poignant stance of the Global North that is determined to cause a more nerve-wrecking form of colonialism or what has come to be understood as supercolonialism. Bankie and Mawere urge that as a movement of unity, Pan-Africanism should not only focus on the need to neutralise the nefarious whims of the Global North expressed through supercolonialism. Instead, it should go a step further to advance and concretise Pan-African unity and the integration of the Diasporan Community and Africa at large on the basis of equality, equal rights, justice and equal voting.

References Hountondji, P. J. 2009. Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies, RCCS Annual Review. Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, University of Cambridge: Cambridge. Nyathi, J. 2017. Why hang Helen Zille? Herald: Features, Opinions and Anaylsis, Harare, Zimbabwe. Ramose, M. B. 2002. ‘African Renaissance: A Northbound gaze,’ In: Coetzee, P. H. and Roux, A.P.J. (Eds), The African Philosophy Reader, London: Routledge. Tilley, H. 2011. Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

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Chapter Two The Coming-Of-Age of Super-Colonialism Gertjan van Stam

Introduction It is typical that the biography of a hunt narrates stories from the positionality of the hunter. The academy was specifically set up to bolster the imperial enterprise and colonial exploits (Grosfoguel, 2010; 2013), and has been steadily producing stories about conquest from, and for, the perspectives beneficial to the powerful. Together with colonial institutes of education and religion, the academy has been involved in epistemicide of African positionalities (Mazrui, 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a). Cities and areas located in contemporary England, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and The Netherlands, for example, have grown out of the centuries of exploits from Africa and other parts of the world. For more than half a millennium, business empires and colonial powers from Europe and subsequently other countries in the now-called Global North have ransacked places outside of their areas for selfish gain (Mawere & van Stam, 2016a). Statutes of mostly Europeans that waged colonial wars and built Imperia are on display in prominent public spaces surrounding the seats of power in Amsterdam, Cordoba, London, Rome, Venice and other places (Vanvugt, 2016). For instance, enshrined in culture, traditional songs in The Netherlands continue to venerate the exploits of many of these ‘heroes’ of the past, ignoring their cruel deeds in hinter years. Congruent with the extended case method described by Michael Burawoy (2009), and in an effort to recognise common threads in African society, this chapter is based upon my endeavouring to live with theory, in theory and for theory while interacting with my interlocutors in a lived-life in (rural) Southern Africa. ‘Living with theory’, Burawoy (2013) argues, takes away the separation between the participant and the observer, inspiring critical assessment of the 13

conquest of existing theory and allowing for the conception of society in alternative understandings. My interlocutors, many residing in (deep) rural areas in Zimbabwe and Zambia, could be regarded as those that are labelled as the subaltern. However, in my observations, interactions and experiences, they are not sub-altern! Of course, they do relate, do speak and are intelligent, relational and rational people. Being informed by my embodied experiences and interactions, searching for African virtue epistemologies, this chapter grapples with the question “what is contemporary colonialism and what is the constitution of colonialism from an African, historical and positional embedded perspective?” In this chapter, I argue that normative views and definitions of colonialism are framed in an epistemic understanding foreign to Africa. From an African perspective, colonialism never came to an end. No, colonialism did not only stop: it did grow! The myopic definitions from a coloniser’s positionality At the moment of independence of African countries, formal colonialism is said to have ceased. The notion that ‘colonialism has passed’ and ‘we did enter a new, post-colonial era’ is typical in a dominant narrative, told by colonisers. It is argued that we only (have to) deal with the residues of colonialism. These remnants are labelled with vivid prefixes, as in neo-colonialism and modo-colonialism. Their contemporary constitutions are being investigated in the academic discourse of post-colonial studies. It is as if, after independence, the colonial clock was reset to ‘zero’, as if a new period commenced where colonialism is gone: the start of a new dispensation. However, based upon my transdisciplinary extended case studies in both social and natural sciences, I deduce that the dominant views on colonial history and its contemporary derivatives remain encapsulated in the prerogatives of the colonisers, or the ‘hunters’ if you may. Much academic discourse and its current definitions of colonialism seem applicable to the experiences of the colonisers only. That dominant and dominating outlook, of course, obscures other perspectives. It especially overshadows and, therefore, disempowers 14

the views and contributions from the colonised. However, this does not mean that views from these sub-alternised episteme do not exist! Gayatri Spivak (1988) argues that it is difficult – even impossible – to know what lies outside of one’s perceptions. This finding seems to have turned into an excuse for the ignorance of those in seats of geo-political, military, and/or technological power. Such a stance is unsustainable in today’s shrinking and globalising world. Ubiquitous communications and air-travel continue to grow the opportunities to interact across worlds, including interacting with the so-called subaltern, allowing for encounters across cultures, episteme, and worldviews. In the contemporary world, where, since 2017, over half of the world population is linked through the internet (A4AI, 2017), therefore, ignorance links in with the arrogance of power, purposely for the increasing reign of the (knowledge) Empire. This arrogance is sustained by a Euronarcistic, self-referencing academia that disempowers Africa, furthering its self-accrediting theories, sustaining the dominance of techno-powers in the Global North (for example, in mobile networks, see van Stam, 2016). Understanding, I argue, in a hyper-connected world is less about the ‘ability to know’ but more about the ‘willingness to know’, as the latter needs the addressing of paradigm clashes in the views of societies and universes (Mawere & van Stam, 2015; Nyamnjoh, 2017). A continuation of the Global North’s dominance in the setting of academic definitions and technical standards is thus a conscious choice made by the powerful for the benefit of the powerful. Academic integrity necessitates the assessment of empirical evidence from all perspectives, even if academy itself struggles to come to terms with its colonial past and how it continues – through epistemological inequalities and even epistemic racism– to perform in the present (Nyamnjoh, 2016). Inequalities in academic funding and of scientific acclamation are witnessed in disparities in the funding for academics and education investments in the Global North and the Global South. Although the legislative scaffolding of racial segregation might be gradually being removed, the colonially inspired academic institutionalisations – the buildings that the scaffolding was for – have remained upright. In the meantime,

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scaffolding for new inequalities are being put up, for example, in the form of contract research for corporate business by universities. Colonialism and its prefixes The definitions of colonialism are many. It is conventionally understood as being the policy or practice of acquiring either full or partial political control over another country through the establishment of settlements in it while exploiting it economically. Or, as Nelson Maldonado-Torres puts it “colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation” (2007: 243). Colonisers endeavour to exercise control over land, people and thought by structuring a society per the needs of foreign command and by the exercise of non-indigenous power. Colonialism results in the creation of what is known as the colony, mostly framed in a Westphalian understanding of nation states, being directly or indirectly controlled by colonisers. In its practice, colonialism introduces overlaying institutions by turning colonial thought patterns into systems (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a; Curtis, 2016). Colonialism is commonly understood to have stopped when the last settlers packed their bags and the ‘now independent’ colonies hoisted up their national-state-flags. When conferring with academics in Europe, I am regularly told, in no uncertain terms, “Let’s stop talking about colonialism. That era is behind us. We must move in present-day colonies, like Porto-Rico, the narrative insis on!” Events that ‘the last vestiges of colonialism’ have disappeared (Goldstein, 2016). However, many peoples I meet almost daily in African rural areas narrate that the imperial oppression emanating from ‘the global centre’– contemporarily morphed into the Global North – of the ‘periphery’ – morphed in the Global South – is a real and present matter. The plunder, pillage and expatriation of Africa’s resources to the Global North did never cease (Mawere & van Stam, 2016a). The remnants of a colonialism that supposedly expired are being studied in the academic discipline of post-colonial studies. Postcolonialism is understood as a continuation of the use of persisting power relationships and mutual dependencies that were created by 16

the-colonialism-of-the-past (Loomba, 2005). The academic discourse of these effects focuses on the contemporary human consequences of external political control and economic exploitation of the indigenous peoples and their lands. It seeks to critically question and address, in varying ways, the injustices planted and perpetuated by the hegemonic process of a historical colonialism. The continued influence of former colonial powers in the countries they controlled is specifically labelled as ‘neo-colonialism’. Neo-colonialism refers to situations where forces of former colonial countries are being reproduced by contemporary means. Post-colonialism set in a Western epistemology and ideology As alluded above, the normative views and definitions of colonialism appear framed in a Western interpretation only. The dominant narratives regard the wars of independence and the handing over powers as the end of the colonial project and, therefore, colonialism. However, the institutes established during settler colonialism continue to recreate the imperial and colonial practices they were set up to sustain (Mawere & van Stam, 2016b). Further, Ramón Grosfoguel (2008) argues that contemporary knowledge imperialism of a Eurocentric academy equals to epistemic racism. As with all other forms of racism, by dominating the ways of validating and defining knowledge, epistemic racism gives (often unconsciously) a supremacist Eurocentric academic world many benefits. The ensuing paradigm clashes (Mawere & van Stam, 2015) are apparent in many fields, among them, for instance in Information and Communication Technologies (van Greunen & van Stam, 2014). In 1974, already, Michael Burawoy struggled with the conventional definitions of colonialism. He showed how definitions of (various forms of) colonialism at the time were ambiguous, sometimes incorrect due to policy changes, or linked into dominant ideologies of the time. Using the case of South Africa, he draws special attention to how colonialism can be dormant in superstructures in society. As shown in this chapter so far, the definitions of ‘colonialism’ came from a Western positionality and framing of thought. In this thinking, it is natural that prefixes like post-, neo- and modo- can be 17

appended to the word ‘colonialism’ to indicate new or emerging practices in a lingering aftermath of colonialism. Such a framing implicitly agrees with the belief that the colonial era did end. In that sense, even the definition of concepts like coloniality and decolonisation should be scrutinised in the reflection of such an arrangement. Literature, mostly foreign to an African epistemological positionality, harbours influential ideologies and ideas, among which are the earlier mentioned post-colonial and neo-colonial. Postcolonial theories endeavour to discern meaning through a conceptual reorientation towards the perspectives of pieces of knowledge, as well as needs, at they are developed outside the West. Among the proponents of post-colonialism are Edward Said, Frantz Fanon and Gayatri Spivak, and others. Post-colonialism appeared as a discussion in the West in the late 1980s. It is positioned as analysis, explanation and response to the cultural, social and political legacies of colonialism. Such colonialism is understood to be the result of a history of mercantile trade and plunder, including slavery, from the 1500s, integration into world capitalism (since 1800), and is linked in with colonies and colonial investments in the early 1900s. After the 1st and 2nd world wars, the ‘third world’ was invented by an oriental academic caucus, and the patronising and bifurcating ‘development narrative’ was introduced. Since the so-called ‘end of colonialism’, ‘formal freedom’ has been declared and sovereign equality was announced by the ‘international community’, for instance, congregated in the United Nations. Within the academic discourse of post-colonialism, continuity of inequality and dependencies are, however, still acknowledged. From this acknowledgement, theories are pursued to develop a set of principles and perspectives. In its activist stance, post-colonial studies seek to intervene, to force its contributions to influence the power structures of the West as well as the non-west and to change the ways in which people think and behave. Post-colonialism seeks to espouse subaltern cultures and knowledge which have historically been considered of little value but which it regards as repositories of culture and counter-knowledge. Post-colonialism projects an agency on the ‘previously colonised’ areas to set its own pace and direction, 18

in a post-colonial era. Post-colonialism recognises there are still ‘echoes of colonialism’ around, as (super-)structures put in place during colonial times are still in use. Post-colonialism seeks to talk about human consequences of external political control and economic exploitation of the indigenous peoples and their lands. It aims to critically question and address, in varying ways, the injustices planted by the hegemonic process of colonialism. As embedded in the view that colonialism did end and colonised countries graduated into post-colonial times, neo-colonialism is said to remain inherent, directly or otherwise. Subsequently, words with prefixes, like recolonisation (as a description of as the work of IMF) or anticolonialism come into play. Post-colonial theories are influenced by schools of thought in feminism, and post-structuralism. Edward Said is proposed as having written seminal literature in post-colonialism, unearthing (ongoing) orientalism, although he did link his work with post-colonialism himself. Said was an urban Palestinian, living in the USA, and his work shows, among others, that the pictures and stories of ‘the Orient’ (in this case, primarily the Middle East) says more of what the West is than what the Middle East is. In the same way, I argue that current definitions of colonialism say more of those who set the definitions than describe the reality of the lived-life experiences of the objects/subjects of those affected, the colonised. When contemplating how imperialistic systems are known to continue up to this day, I studied how orientalism, imperialism and colonialism appear to be intertwined. With orientalism continuing, and imperialism continuing, colonialism could be expected to be continuing too. However, with the denial of an ongoing colonialism, how to recognise it in the current world? Margaret Kohn (2012) allows for some leeway. She defines colonialism more, as “a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people another.” This definition takes out the link of colonialism with actions by nation-states, which is better adapted to realities in a globalising world. When regarding orientalism, imperialism and colonialism as closely related and more or less sequential, the continuation of colonialism becomes rationally palpable. When orientalism defines ‘the other’ and imperialism seeks to indoctrinate 19

‘the other’ by using any means of trade, and with colonialism being seen in its ruthless manners of subjugation of ‘the other’, colonialism can be seen as unwavering in current times. In the assessment of the terms ‘orientalism, imperialism and colonialism’, three handmaiden I label as the Terrible Three, a critical analysis shows that its definitions were, indeed, set by Western thinkers and have been subsequently taken over by African authors. In general, scientific literature seems to breath a relieve that (criminal) colonialism is over. Artwell Nhemachena (2016), however, in his writing consistently puts the prefix ‘neo-’ in the word neocolonialism in brackets. This putting of the prefix neo in scarecrows can be regarded as indicating the existence of two perspectives: ‘neocolonialism’ from the Western one, and ‘colonialism’ from the African one. In this way, Nhemachena seems to seek a bridging in the interpretation of colonialism, allowing for a different understanding, depending on the positionality of the reader. The existence of an (ongoing) colonialism can also be deduced from Munyaradzi Mawere and Nhemachena’s (2016) writing that states decidedly: “neo-colonialism [is] another form of colonialism which is possibly worse than the one that Africa experienced in the 19th century” (p. 3). Contemporary ongoing colonialism Thus, did colonialism and colonisation really end when the colonialists packed their bags? From the empirical world in subSaharan Africa and a growing contemporary literature base from African soil by authors like Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Francis Nyamnjoh, and Munyaradzi Mawere, and in the works by Reuel Khoza, John Mbiti, Cornel du Toit and many others, I deduce a continuing coloniality and many indications of an ongoing colonial practices. In daily practice in an African place, I witness colonialism in an everpresent duresses in sub-Saharan Africa. When considering the end of colonialism, would it not be the colonised that provide the evidence of such a demise? Does the hunting stop when the hunter unilateral declares the hunt to have

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ended? What is the value of the word of a hunter claiming to have stopped hunting? Should his/her deeds speak for themselves? Currently, the former colonisers seem unrepentant. They can be watched actively safeguarding their interests. In our study on the expatriation of resources from Africa, Munyaradzi Mawere and I (2016) gave an overview of ongoing ring-fencing and mind-blowing displacement of African resources to foreign lands. And, these practices seem to keep growing perhaps at a more alarming rate. In current times, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) empower new means of control, for instance, in human trafficking (see van Reisen & Mawere, 2017), while electronic data-crunching algorithms could be recognised as upcoming contemporary tools of subjugation and domination, and, subsequently, colonialism. African nations-states –itself a colonial concept from outside of Africa and with borders set by non-Africans in Northern Europe– were declared sovereign, and the African colonies to exist. However, I concur with Ndlovu-Gatseni (2013b) and in fact insist that colonialism did not end at independence of African nation-states. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that political independence – and, therefore, meaningful sovereignty – was compromised in Africa because of an enduring colonialism through a reformed Euro-American empire and coloniality. Mawere and I (2016b) phrased it as follows: “Possibly, [colonialism] had a hiccup directly after ‘independence’. However, in our view, this was just a time of ‘resetting’, where all parties had to get ‘around’ the new hurdles” (p. 59). Colonialism did not end, it just morphed to go around present-day hurdles. Handel Wright (2002) states plainly that “Africa has a long history of being both romanticised in various pan-Africanist discourses and vilified in racist and colonialist discourses” (p. 1) and “[African] voices have been appropriated in the West” (p. 2). In a wave of publications, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a-d) shows how the long history of colonial practice has not been shed in the relative few years since independence. He makes a case for how the idea that with the exodus of colonial administrators, colonialism ceased should be labelled as a myth. Boldly, he and some others show how colonialism continues in the present (for instance, Dastile & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2011; Mignolo, 2000). 21

Munyaradzi Mawere (2014) and Artwell Nhemachena (2016) note the hypocrisy and cover up in the discourse on colonialism and conquest. In his ‘Western hegemony and the conquest of Africa: Imperial hypocrisy and the invasion of the African cultures’, Mawere, for example, avers that “colonialism has always had perennial bearing on the African people’s lives and worldviews” (p. 25).This resonates with Nhemachena’s contention that “[Western] theorists were careful to emphasise textual, cultural, political and social deconstruction in the peripheries, to the virtual exclusion of deconstructing economies. After independence in many post-colonies, economies remained in Western hands” (p. 29). Although the manifestations of colonialism have been adapted, in practice little changed: an elite in control continues to expatriate African resources to benefactors outside of the continent. There are many cases, for example, in fishing, logging, mining, land, ICT services, the military, and other areas. Therefore, to get full attention on the continuation – and ever-morphing and growing – colonial practices, I adhere to the word super-colonialism. The Age of Super-Colonialism Super-colonialism, argued Munyaradzi Mawere and I (2016a), is a form of colonialism that can be regarded as more intrusive than the colonialism experienced in the 19thand 20thcenturies. In this section, I expand on this notion. When colonialism is understood to be engrossed with the strive of political control over other areas, super-colonialism is an extension to that strive. Super-colonialism aims also for socio-economic subjugation. This is aided by economism where established politics has yielded to the belief that economic dimensions are best to explain human behaviours in a society. Further, it is helped by the myopic belief that all people unrelentingly desire a rising level of material living standards. Super-colonialism negates, among others, the memories framed in cultural heritage or African virtue epistemologies, like Ubuntu. In super-colonialism, there are the old and new colonising agents and associations. They both perpetuate, reproduce, and invent colonial power relations. These can be, but are not limited to geo22

political strong countries, international corporate businesses and international organisations through technical assistance. Such colonising continues to be all-invasive. Super-colonialism combines the facilities of digital means of communications and ever-increasing air-transport networks and rope in technologies, global finance networks and aid, international treaties and other international legal frameworks, and more, to exercise its devious powers and vexations over disenfranchised peoples. Super-colonialism strives on epistimicide and racism that is entrenched in an Eurocentric academy, severely limiting the room for alternative discourse in a world infested by information poverty (Graham et al., 2014) and disempowers research for, and the contemplation of expressions of African modalities (Mawere & van Stam, 2016b; Nyamnjoh, 2017). The long established (colonial) networks of knowledge production espouse their particular and located forms of social, economical, technical and cultural behaviour, frameworks and infrastructures, and define what is considered ‘valid’ and ‘true’. Dominant descriptive languages, representation methods, forms of ethics, and more, restrict what is considered permissible, aiming at sustaining a colonial hegemony. Alternative views on realities, societies, or worldviews, like those emerging from African philosophy, are kept off the agendas of global interactions. This disrespect for, and drowning out of, the African voice is, therefore, a wilful act of super-colonialism. As a case study of super-colonialism, I analysed the current methods of 5G technology development (van Stam, 2016).Its development involves a relatively small group of operators and manufacturers whom, in practice, dictate the kind of mobile communication network technologies that are being developed. By supporting the production and contribution of inputs from Europe, North America and Asia only, its engineering systems are Westerncentric, and its systems and services support functionalities that facilitate (Western) philosophy, behaviour and circumstances only. There is a complete neglect of potential African inputs. The current 5G processes and their implications are a continuation of imperialistic practice, albeit one with hardly a bridgehead in Africa and is, in practice, a colonial meddling that mediates action in the 23

African society in a manner that is foreign to its cultures and contexts. This extended form of colonialism shows how international corporate businesses are colonising. International business, therefore, colonises complementary, of in collusion, to the countries that are known to have continued their meddling in African affairs, among which are the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, and others. Technology embodies the intent of its designers and they are mostly based in the Global North. Therefore, most technologies fixate colonial power relations into physical structures, enshrining colonial practices and making disruptions of its colonising agency very difficult. African engineering exists, but are neither recognised nor valued (Mawere & van Stam, 2016b). Super-colonialism demands assimilation and Westernisation. As recent as 1999, Manuel Castell wrote: “Most of Africa is being left in a technological apartheid” (p. 3) and little has changed since then. The suppression and disempowering of African inputs in technology development is an act of super-colonialism. In the current information-based global systems, Information and Communication Technologies and its peripheral equipment are the contemporary versions of the roads and boats of yesteryears. However, basic building blocks of Information and Communication Technologies, such as leading Microsoft’s Windows operating systems, do not perform well in Southern Africa (Johnson & van Stam, 2016). Contemporary technologies do not align with African realities, experiences, perceptions and human intents. The lack of attention for these obvious shortcomings is another sign of supercolonialism. The coming of Age of Super-colonialism Super-colonialism is a result of the maturation of control over local histories, the crafty use of legacy systems and existing frameworks put in place by the colonial project. Of course, some forms of colonialism diminish while others rise. Although readily denied, the ongoing geo-political effects of all-invading ideologies like neo-liberal systems and community disempowering capitalistic framings cannot be underestimated. 24

My interlocutors in Southern Africa and I are daily confronted with the realities of super-colonial meddling. There are many forms of colonial behaviour and their vexations are varied. As early colonial intrusion mainly focused on control of the physicality of a person in time and place, current super-colonialism invades everywhere. This is clearly evidenced in the data-gathering capabilities of mobile phone networks and the equipment linked to telecommunication networks. New examples of colonisation are most evident in cyber-space. For instance, most of the information that Africans transmit through electronic connections land (first) with the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States of America. Business in America could act earlier than the intended recipient of the message can access or process information. Facebook or Google harvest mindboggling amounts of information. By combining multiple data sources, both have potentially more opportunities to process data from Africa than any African institute. One can assume that the outcome of such a study of African data translates directly in business models fuelling super-colonial interventions. Other forms of super-colonialism attack the notions of sovereignty, where, for instance, the responsibilities of the nation state is shifting from ‘authority over a territory’ to ‘responsibility to protect’ (Whyte, 2016). This leaves the colonising Westphalian legacy that conceptualised the nation state untouched and expands it with the potential for excuses for colonial intervention under the disguise of bringing ‘protection’. The plunder of resources and labour from the African continent has reached astronomical levels (Mawere & van Stam, 2016a). For instance, one British Pound send to Africa in aid contrasts with six British Pounds being expatriated to the United Kingdom from aidreceiving countries (Sharples et al., 2014). British mining companies own a combined value of over 1,000blnin resources in Africa (Curtis, 2016). Expropriations are facilitated by powerful (electronic) means of production and the transfer of funds. The digital revolution and growth of air travel has put Africa ‘next door’; Africa can be reached by the push of a button or an overnight flight. An electronic networking aided super-colonial business has emerged (van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 25

As mentioned above, as with all other forms of racism, epistemic racism brings many benefits to the powerful. However, increased antagonism and the subsequent calls for decolonialisation of systems and institutes, especially pregnant in South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2016), reveals a super-colonialism doing its work. Discussions of social justice are full of objectifying statements. In a globalising world, there is a growing and ever more complex myriad of power issues at play, playing in the hands of powerful super-colonisers. The issues of super-colonialism are charged, not only in Africa. For instance, even at the European continent, the case of Greece’s recent political and economic history has shown colonial practices to have become mainstream (Varoufakis, 2016). Possibly, the exploitation of the working class (as Marx saw it) can be seen as ‘colonisation’, certainly of the mind. This colonisation, Maree Pardy (2013) shows, is sustained by the constituting forces of the framings provided for by the declarations of rights, gender, etc. By their sheer existence, Western views paradoxically reify the very issues they try to address. This might be an issue for debate in the West, but proofs to be a double edged sword in Africa; Much of the Western based – supposedly transnational – vernacular involved in these declarations are inviting interventions in the non-West as the practices and dichotomies it amplifies are mainly perceived to exist, conform an orientalist fashion, in the non-West. The presuppositions are set in the Western values and the context approached as in Western liberal ones and are implicit in its enunciations. Super-colonially positioned, Western views are proposed as normative and non-negotiable, becoming constitutive of colonial action. Cognisants of super-colonialism, what are further indications of the coming-of-age of super-colonialism? This is a (non-exhaustive) listing of forms of colonialism as I recognise their agency in my daily experiences in (rural) Africa: x Economic Colonialism , where the language and structures of ‘development’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘free trade’ are an extension of long-term colonial conquest. Wrapped in narratives of economic globalisation the Western industrial system pushes into the farthest corners of the planet, “attempting to absorb every local, regional and 26

national economy into a single centrally managed world economy based on ever increasing trade” (Norberg-Hodge, 2006: 100). As a result, mining assets in Africa continue to accrue to colonial agents, listed on stock exchanges elsewhere (Curtis, 2016; Das & Rose, 2014; Guldbrandsen, 2013). x Knowledge Colonialism , where ideologies are packed and served in a Western-centric academia (Mbembe, 2015; Mazrui, 2003) and where particular knowledge intensive institutes like education and health are locked up within the systems set colonially. For instance, Cambridge exams are pursued as international standards of education, and the comparisons of university degrees are set in accords situated in the West (Washington/Bologna). In health care, practices from Western places are regarded as the only manner of approaching such a care (Langen, 2010). x Political Colonialism , where concepts of ‘good governance’ and ‘political structures’ devised in the Global North are imposed in international relationships, for example, by insisting on textual evidence (van Stam, 2013), and policed by international institutes that cause judgment on behalf of colonial agents. x Religious Colonialism , where foreign formulations of religion and its theologies are forced upon churches elsewhere as the ‘true dogma’ (du Toit, 2000; Roest, 2016). x Technological Colonialism , especially facilitated by ICT, where local, national or regional social network services are doomed before large corporate juggernauts like Facebook and Google, no matter how hard local users fight (Sun &Hart-Davidson, 2014:3539). The metaphor of a ‘global village’ – a modernist myth – is part of electronic colonisation by denying that technology embeds culture and therefore its meaning is diverse (Zembylas & Vrasidas, 2005). The active levelling of cultural differences and national boundaries is a tool of colonialism. The enforcement of colonial techno-scientific systems (Dourish & Mainwaring, 2012) fragments societies through

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digital publication (Bidwell, 2016) while harvesting any information from the context benefits colonial agents (see Lafrance, 2016). Of course, such colonialisms are entangled in “The Terrible Three”– where colonialism cohabitates with orientalism and imperialism. Super-colonialism is inextricably linked with its imperial and oriental handmaidens. In contemporary times, the emerging of world spanning and ubiquitous Information and Communication Technologies have particularly accelerated super-colonialism and ushered in the coming-of-age of super-colonialism. Towards a Counter Narrative From long term and continuous interactions with my interlocutors in (rural) Africa since 1987, I here deduce a local understanding of colonialism. This understanding is not in line with conventional descriptions as they are set outside of Africa. The reality of a multi-epistemological Africa necessitates the scrutiny of hegemonies as how they negate the multiplicity of meaning, also for ‘colonialism’. The meaning of colonialism, therefore, does depend on the context and positionality of those interacting with the notion. The presence of a different understanding is apparent when contemplating the question of esteemed African authors like Munyaradzi Mawere and Artwell Nhemachena (2016) who dispute “whether the decolonising process that is purported to have started in the 1960s has been taking place honestly and in earnest.” This Chapter focuses on arguing about the continuity of colonialism in current times. Ineke Buskens and Mirjam van Reisen (2016) argue that local agency can only be truly empowered in a situation of epistemic sovereignty. Therefore, it remains remarkable that there is little exploration of the local understanding of colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, an ongoing regurgitation of dominant teachings drones out alternative voices and discordant views. The ensuing indoctrination of Africa with Western views perpetuates coloniality and therefore, in itself, continues to realise and sustain the ongoing practice of subjugation (Fanon, 1967). The questioning of, and theorising on, an understanding of 28

colonialism outside of the West is opportune as the false constructions and misrepresentations of Africa and the African people link in with an extant definition of colonialism (Mawere, 2015). The term colonialism is, thus, smirked by many understandings that vary depending on one’s positionality. What would be an African understanding of the colonial practice resulting in dispossession, enslavement and exploitation? I am a long-time resident of Southern Africa, lived in Zambia, Apr-2003 till Nov-2012, and Zimbabwe, Mar-2000 till Mar 2003, and since Dec-2012. My grounding is epistemically focused on the context of the rural and urban African communities in Zambia and Zimbabwe. In this environment, I live life aligned with the Macha Works! (van Oortmerssen & van Stam, 2010) and International Development (Bets et al., 2013) models. I engage in participatory action research, interacting with the narratives on colonialism. In their stories, I am told about African ancestors who have been dealing with oppression from the time of slavery (Shahadah, 2005). Stories narrate about family members taken to far-away lands, about white persons arriving on horseback declaring one version or the other of the claim “this land is mine” (Matewa, 2010), and about dayto-day struggles to survive, constrained by behaviour, rules and regulations set by outsiders: contemporary powers in far-away places. Given what I read and experienced, the academic definitions of colonialisms appear remote. The relegation of colonialisation to historical practice is flawed. I miss the contents informed by epistemologies located in the Global South. I pursued to theorise my observations in an empiric world, living in theory. Through ongoing conversations, interacting in the processes of conceptualisation, it occurred to me that colonialism, in African epistemology, is not approached as a concept but seen as a lived practice in everyday life. My interlocutors showed me a three-step and reiterative colonial process of (1) condemnation, (2) brainwashing, and (3) conditionality. This process is reiterating, constituting, and circular as can be seen in figure 1 below.

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Figure 1, the colonial loop. The colonial loop gives indication of an African and embodied view of colonialism that depicts a constituting process that involves consecutive phases of judgement, mimicry and shackling. This colonialism started right at the first encounters of the West and Africa. It never ceased. Due to persistent and power imbalances and epistemic incredulity, colonialism sets the main framing of foreign interactions with and within Africa. Through the constant encircling of the colonial loop, colonialism has always been active and vibrant. In other words, colonialism continues to describe the relationship between the Global North and the Global South today. In the following subsections, I delve into the three main parts of the colonial loop.

Condemnation In view of the racist ideologies embedded in the Western perspectives of colonialism (Césaire, 2000; Fanon, 1967), the understanding of condemnation does resonate with the harbingers of white-privilege (cf. Fox, 2012). Therefore, the anti-thesis of white30

privilege, boiling down to the denying of an epistemic sovereignty by people of colour, are constitutive of a blame game of the black other (Nhemachena, 2016). Condemnation emerges from the white-privileged assessment of the ability to exercise white-privileges within the definitions set by a capitalist, white, patriarchy (New African Men, 2014). White privileges are undeserved and go mostly unnoticed or unrecognised in the conscious actions of the privileged. When non-white privilege bearers are seen not to exercise such agencies as these are (unconsciously) available for white-privilege bearers, the latter quickly blame the first as being incapable and inhumane. In the condemnation-phase, my interlocutors related, one is told: “You are just an African, you are not good enough, you are always ‘not there yet’.” This ‘not being good enough’ is apparent to many Africans from the outset and becomes part of an assessment of anything that happens. Africans are considered ‘guilty’ unless proven otherwise. African, in this sense, is embodied by the skin complexion of the body, and in relation to the geographical place, ‘from Africa’. In this respect, condemnation is a general notion, linked to attributes and not based upon actions. The general experience of being condemned causes trauma by its suffocation, going without the formulation of, or openness to, alternatives. Such condemnation is ever-present. Proof of nonguiltiness, of course, must be vetted by parties that are part of the hegemony. In the arena of contempt, opposition is countered by comments like ‘grow up’ and ‘get over it’. Artwell Nhemachena (2016) shows how the labelling of ‘animism’ is one of the tools of condemnation. Another example is the prefix ab, in labelling of people groups like aboriginals. Condemnation is rife and implicit in master narratives like ‘Africa failing’ and reports ‘about development in Africa’, in the economic growth belief system, and the appearance of Africa at the bottom of most public rankings. The inherent and underlying nature of condemnation is masked by moral hypocrisy. African literature, written by the courageous, shows a litany of condemnations. For example, Bitange Ndemo (2014) demonstrates how “literacy and numeracy [were] introduced as a superior 31

intervention over “primitive” African oral tradition. Many of those who became literate began to despise and discard African knowledge” (p. 8).

Brainwashing In the brainwashing aspects of colonialism, ‘the condemned’ are exposed to an unrelenting story of foreign superiority (cf. Fanon, 1967). Subsequently, to be able to become acceptable, the condemned are encouraged to be saved by training, to invite and allow for technical assistance, etc. The purpose is to ‘become like the successful’, with success being wholesome assimilation conform (mostly) Western role models. Further, there is a full negation, and active discouragement, of local expressions of success, nor recognition of how unsuitable schema, language and meanings are being fed. Ha-Joon Chang Chang (2010), a development economics expert, recognises that the story around the free market economy represents a brainwashing event due to relentless repetition. This brainwashing has resulted in myths and prejudices dominating common understanding of how the (economic) world works.

Conditionality The phase of conditionality depicts an analogy to the ‘carrot and stick’. It is the practice of conditional love: “If you do this, you get that”. Without agreeing with the conditions set by the powers-thatbe, access to resource will be disallowed, even in one’s local environment. Not only will resources be withheld, one will become vulnerable for being unseated with one’s position being filled by a ‘compliant persons’. The main tool of oppression is the mediation of the access to resources. Westerners are perceived to govern all accesses to substantial resources. To be allowed access to resources necessitate alignment and agreeing to the condemnation of African life, and showing good results in aligning with the (extant) narrative. Without agreeing to the proposed non-fact that a non-African life is better than African life, and showing accomplishment of having assimilated

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such life (for instance, by demonstrating an degree), access to resources are being withheld. Conclusion This chapter paints a picture of a colonialism that never ceased. Although the discourse of, for instance, post-colonialism implies that colonialism discontinued, with the counter reset to ‘zero’ at the departure of settler colonialist and the hoisting of flags, here I insist that colonialism did not end at independence of African nationstates. Super-Colonialism is the scaled up practice of colonialism, where the strive for political control is extended with aims for socioeconomic subjugation. Contemporary superstructures enshrine the age-of-super-colonialism, where corporate businesses dominate in a global economy striving on inequalities, an Eurocentric academia overrules non-Western episteme, where international institutional governance systems exercise control through agenda-setting technical assistance, where fear inspiring narratives call for securisation by Western military interventions, and where the flooding of the world with Western ICTs – expatriating data from every corner of the world for Western processing - are just among the few indications of contemporary super-colonial activities. With the coming-of-age of super-colonialism, there is no ‘next thing’. In a world system infested with colonialisms, it is not prudent to have a ‘next thing’ as it would be prone to enhance supercolonialism. Instead, there is a need for ‘a new thing’. Countering super-colonialism from the local, African epistemes is could be such a new approach. This chapter contributes in this path by providing the locally understood framework of colonialism, when Africans know it as a lived practice in everyday life. This embodied practice involves a three-step and reiterative process of (1) condemnation, (2) brainwashing, and (3) conditionality.

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Chapter Three African Indigenous Belief Systems on the Crossroads: The T sikamutanda and Witchcraft-Related Disputes in the 21st Century Zimbabwe Fidelis Peter Thomas Duri Introduction During the beginning of the new millennium, as Zimbabwe was engulfed in a debilitating socio-economic crisis characterised, among other things, by severe droughts, running away unemployment levels, grinding poverty, unprecedented health ailments and high mortality rates, there emerged a group of self-proclaimed male prophets and traditional healers known as the tsikamutanda (plural: tsikamutandas) (Moyana, 29 January 2017). Most of them operate in the rural areas countrywide and are in the age group ranging from the late teens into the twenties (Moyana, 29 January 2017). One common feature of the tsikamutandas is that they are neither registered as prophets nor traditional leaders as required by the Zimbabwe Traditional Medical Practitioners Council Act, Chapter 79 (Zimbabwe Government, 1981). Basing on this law, it means that tsikamutandas’ operations are illegal (Chronicle, 10 July 2012; Sunday Mail, 11 December 2016; Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 30 January 2017). As socio-economic hardships besieged Zimbabwe from the year 2000, some sections of the population, including many tsikamutandas, attributed most of the prevailing ‘misfortunes’ to witchcraft. The tsikamutandas claim to offer solutions by employing African indigenous knowledge systems such as witch hunting where they could identify witches, exorcise evil spirits and cleanse both the perpetrators and victims of witchcraft. Among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, tsikamutanda literally means ‘to step on the wooden log,’ a nickname they earned after the magic sticks they use to identify witches. In addition, tsikamutandas claim to have powers to shield 41

people from evil spirits and future misfortunes by suppressing witchcraft (Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012). This chapter examines the proliferation of the tsikamutandas in politically-torn and crisis-ridden Zimbabwe during the 21st century in the context of discourses of African indigenous belief systems and related practices in general and witchcraft in particular. The chapter demonstrates how such beliefs and practices have become fiercely contested landscapes in times of crisis when the authenticity of some traditional healers has been questioned by various stakeholders. Broadly, the chapter argues that witchcraft beliefs are far from being an archaic tradition that has disappeared with the challenges of westernisation and globalisation. In actual fact, witchcraft beliefs have survived the test of time even with a bang though they are increasingly being threatened by African impostors who manipulate and instrumentalise them in order to eke livelihoods in times of socio-economic hardships. In particular, as Ashforth (2005) and Niehaus, Mohlala and Shokaneo (2001) also noted, the chapter contends that witchcraft discourses tend to become socially important in times of crisis, when a broad range of misfortunes are blamed on them. Regrettably, the authenticity of some African indigenous beliefs and related practices pertaining to witchcraft become compromised by opportunism in times of crisis as tensions rise during struggles over increasingly shrinking resources while some self-proclaimed traditional healers capitalise on such dispensations to engage in extortionist tendencies in an effort to salvage sustenance. Theoretical framework The discussion and conclusions in this chapter are largely informed by both psychological and sociological theories of witchcraft. Psychological theories generally view witchcraft as an unsubstantiated imagination. In his study of the Azande people of the present Democratic Republic of Congo, Evans-Pritchard (1937), for example, demonstrates how witchcraft constitutes an ideational dynamic. He argues that people have the tendency to present presumptions as logical explanations for unfortunate events. Kluckhohn (1944) developed the psychological theory of witchcraft 42

further. Basing his arguments on the Navaho, the Native American people of the south-western United States, he posits that the institution of witchcraft serves as a channel for expressing emotions and desires. By attributing misfortunes to the work of witches, the Navaho absolved themselves from blame. Thus, whenever people are experiencing stressful conditions, witches become scapegoats. Kapferer (2003) also expresses similar sentiments by suggesting that beliefs and practices associated with witchcraft and the occult may have far-reaching implications. They are usually imaginative and divorced from everyday reason. Psychological theories are very relevant to the discussion of the dynamics of witchcraft accusations and the activities of the tsikamutandas in crisis-ridden Zimbabwe during the new millennium. As shall be noted later in this chapter, witchcraft accusations, most of which were unsubstantiated, escalated among ordinary Zimbabweans as socio-economic hardships worsened. During the process, some people worst-hit by the crisis seek peace of mind by accusing those who are relatively wealthy, and those with whom they are not on good terms, of witchcraft. In addition, most tsikamutandas capitalise on some presumptive discourses of witchcraft to stamp their authority on downtrodden Zimbabweans, most of whom they extort after conducting witch-hunting and cleansing rituals. From the 1960s, sociological theories of conflict also inspired the analysis of witchcraft. Marwick (1965), for example, argues that witchcraft accusations are manifestations of problematic social relations that are not susceptible to judicial processes. Among the Chewa of Zambia, Marwick notes that accusations of witchcraft often occurred when the matrilineages grew beyond the size that local resources could sustain. As a result, people from the same matrilineage usually fought over inheritance and the limited resources that were available locally. During the 1970s, neo-Marxists developed the sociological theory further by articulating the instrumentality of witchcraft accusations in political and economic struggles. Steadman (1985), for instance, asserts that among the Hewa of Papua New Guinea, witchcraft accusations and the killing of witches were part of the struggles for resources. By executing people who threatened to 43

outcompete them in the struggle for resources, the witch hunters safeguarded their material interests by instilling fear into their contemporary and future rivals. As the discussion in this chapter demonstrates, the sociological perspectives largely explain the manner in which discourses of witchcraft shaped and continue to shape social relations during the Zimbabwean crisis. Firstly, as socio-economic hardships worsened during the onset of the new millennium, there was an upsurge in witchcraft accusations as some sections of the population, particularly the marginalised, sought to elbow out each other during contestations over increasingly shrinking resources. The tsikamutandas, most of who are unemployed youths and also wallowing in poverty, always capitalise on the situation by masquerading as witch-hunters and exorcists in an effort to earn livelihoods from the fees they charge for their ‘services.’ In this way, sociological theories also help to explain the ambivalent relationship between the self-proclaimed healers and the ordinary people. The ambivalence lies in that, while the tsikamutandas always purport to be saviours, they largely survive by instrumentalising witchcraft beliefs as a resource which they utilise to exploit the very people they claim to be serving. African witchcraft beliefs since the pre-colonial period Since some Zimbabweans, including many tsikamutandas, attribute many of their socio-economic hardships during the new millennium to witchcraft, it is prudent to start by defining this institution and briefly examine indigenous African beliefs around it since the pre-colonial period. For many African societies since the pre-colonial period, the belief in witchcraft “constitutes part of the traditional religion” while the practice of witch-hunting has always been “a form of traditional religious expression” (Igwe, 30 August 2011: 1). Witchcraft is the use of magic and charms or any other substances such as toxins to cause illness, injury, death or other misfortunes to a person (Chavunduka, 1980; Golooba-Mutebi, 2005; Mawere, 2011a). Evans-Pritchard (1937), a British anthropologist, 44

distinguished between ‘witchcraft’ and ‘sorcery’ by their technique. He defined the former as the innate, inherited ability to cause misfortune or death. To many pre-colonial African societies, witchcraft involved the unconscious use of magical and psychic powers. By contrast, sorcery is largely viewed as the performance of rituals, the uttering of spells, and the manipulation of organic substances such as herbs, with the conscious intent of causing harm. Unlike in the case of witchcraft, as Evans-Pritchard (1937) notes, a person can learn to practise sorcery. Thus, a witch is “born into his/her position and harms by means of psychic powers” while a sorcerer is “not born into his/her position and uses material substances such as medicines and charms” (Ball, 1994: 6). In this chapter, the term ‘witch’ is used in the broader sense to refer to sorcerers, witches and wizards. This is because, in most African societies, there is no clear distinction between witchcraft and sorcery since both are viewed as representations of evil (Bourdillon, 1998; Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012; Tatira, 2014). In many African societies, the belief in witchcraft has remained pervasive into the post-colonial period. In Nigeria, for example, many people believe that witches can use magical powers to transform themselves into animals or insects such as cats, ants, rats, bats and butterflies in order to inflict harm on others without being noticed (Igwe, 19 August 2011). In Gambia, it is commonly believed that witches can change into owls at night (Ibid). Many Senegalese believe that witches reside inside the pawpaw fruit which they also use as a nocturnal operational base (Ibid). In Malawi, it is commonly held that witches fly at night in magic aeroplanes while in Burkina Faso, many people believe that they devour human flesh and suck people’s blood (Ibid). In countries such as Tanzania, Burundi and Nigeria, albinos are often accused of witchcraft on grounds that their skin can be used to make harmful magical concoctions (Igwe, 30 August 2011). In post-colonial Zimbabwe, as in many other parts of Africa and beyond, the belief in witchcraft has persisted despite the influence of modern education, science and technology (Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012). According to the Pew Research Centre Survey of 2010, Zimbabwe ranks 15th in Africa in terms of witchcraft beliefs 45

behind such countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia and Rwanda (Majaka, 4 December 2016). The Shona term for a witch, wizard or sorcerer is muroyi, plural varoyi (Tatira, 2014), while the Ndebele equivalents are umthakathi and abathakathi respectively (Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012). The Shona generally regard a muroyi as “anyone who is hard-hearted or who has evil intention, or an antisocial being” who can, among other means, use spiritual power to harm others (Tatira, 2014: 114). Among the Ndebele and Shona people of Zimbabwe, as in many other African societies, a broad range of misfortunes were, and are still, sometimes linked to the work of witches (Bucher, 1980; Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012; Essein, 2010; Rodlach, 2006; Mawere 2011a). These include failure to bear children, bad harvests, mysterious deaths of people and livestock, and diseases, particularly those that Western medicine fails to explain or cure. The Shona also believe that witches use animals such as hyenas, owls, ant bears and snakes on nocturnal errands to harm other people. Even some lightning strikes are believed to be orchestrated by witches (Mawere, 2011a). Witches are also believed to eat human flesh, for which they can open up graves to get it, which they also use to harm people or as ‘medicine’ to seek unfair advantage over others in activities such as gambling, agriculture and retail business (Bourdillon, 1998; Mawere, 2011a). In some cases, the relatively wealthy people are believed to have attained such status through the use of magic (Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012). Since pre-colonial times, the Shona and Ndebele people have also used the term ‘witchcraft’ in a broader sense to refer to various forms of evil and anti-social behaviour (Howman, 1948; Thorpe, 1991; Nhemachena, 2014). Thus, muroyi can be used to swear at someone who is greedy, selfish, jealous, bullish, unpopular, or who uses foul language (Bourdillon, 1998). In addition, people who are accused of violating taboos are sometimes referred to as varoyi (Ibid). During the pre-colonial period, the belief in witchcraft was sometimes viewed in a positive sense given some constructive roles it played to ensure societal order and harmony in many African communities (Tatira, 2014). George Kandiero, the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA) Director 46

General, stated in December 2016 that genuine witch-hunters helped to eradicate cases of witchcraft in African societies (Majaka, 4 December 2016). Witch-hunting and cleansing rituals were held frequently in many pre-colonial African societies “to ensure that witches do not terrorise people and that their powers are kept under control” (Igwe, 30 August 2011: 1). Geschiere (1988) contends that witchcraft beliefs reduced social differentiation in societies as some individuals avoided accumulating or displaying wealth for fear of being bewitched or being accused of witchcraft. In this way, witchcraft accusation and witch-hunting fostered cohesion within communities by reducing socio-economic inequalities (Offiong, 1991). In addition, Marwick (1965) opines that these practices instilled social discipline as some people avoided antisocial behaviour for fear of being accused of witchcraft. Bourdillon (1998: 192) highlights some of the social benefits derived from the belief in witchcraft: The belief in witchcraft has an influence on attention to good manners and etiquette. No one would want to show the unlikeable characteristics associated with a witch…Witchcraft beliefs act as a deterrent to crime. A man may be afraid of picking up objects found lying around in case they have been bewitched; this applies particularly to wandering domestic animals which may have been involved in an exorcism bringing evil and calamity to anyone who took possession of them. The fear of being bewitched encourages good relations within a community, and fear of revenge or protective medicines makes crime against members of the community seem dangerous even when detection is escaped. Also a reluctance to wander late at night for fear of being suspected of witchcraft or, worse, for fear of meeting a witch on her nocturnal escapades, minimises the possibility of petty theft and like crimes.

In addition, as Tatira (2014: 115) notes, “witchcraft belief as a scapegoat to life challenges has been used by many Shona people to cope with…life challenges… Though the belief has a disadvantage of lack of self-accountability, it helps in that the person’s self-esteem remains high.” 47

In many African communities since the pre-colonial period, witches were regarded as “social deviants” and “traitors to the social solidarity of the community” (Ball, 1994: 1). In actual fact, the belief in witchcraft constitutes a demonology, an “idea of treason against the kin group itself” and “an attack on the very basis of the social structure, which makes witch activity such a heinous offence” (Hammond-Tooke, 1974:337). Consequently, the punishment for practising witchcraft was, and still is, generally severe and violent. As Igwe (30 August 2011: 1) notes, “Witches and sorcerers are the most hated people in their community. Even to this day, there are places and occasions when they are beaten to death by the rest of the people.” Among the Nguni, Tsonga and Sotho, for example, death has always been the common penalty (Hammond-Tooke, 1974). In Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, many children accused of witchcraft are flogged, killed, abandoned or chased away from their homes (Igwe, 30 August 2011). In Malawi, women accused of witchcraft, even on the basis of hearsay, are often harassed and tortured (Ibid). In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, women facing the same accusations are sometimes beaten up and killed (Ibid). After being accused of witchcraft, some African women fled their homes to seek protection in refugee camps for fear of reprisals from their local communities (Ibid). In August 2011, for example, such refugee camps existed in Burkina Faso and northern Ghana (Ibid). It was in view of such extra-judicial penalties meted out on people accused of witchcraft that colonial and post-colonial governments enacted various pieces of legislation to contain the situation. In colonial Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), for example, the Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1893 did not recognise the existence of witchcraft. The Act made it a criminal offence for someone to accuse anyone of witchcraft (Southern Rhodesia Government, 1939). Upon attaining independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government acknowledged the existence of supernatural powers but outlawed the use of magic to cause harm on others (Majaka, 4 December 2016). In 2006, the Zimbabwean government amended the colonial Witchcraft Suppression Act and enacted the Witchcraft Suppression Act, Chapter 9:19, that made witchcraft a criminal offence as long as there 48

was evidence to that effect (Zimbabwe Government, 2006). In particular, Section 5 of the 2006 Act outlawed the practice of witchcraft as follows: Any person who employs or solicits any other person (a) to name or indicate any other person as a wizard or witch; or (b) to name or indicate by means of witchcraft or by application of any of the tests mentioned in the paragraph (b) of Section 8 or by the use of any nonnatural means any person as the perpetrator of any alleged crime or other act complained of or (c) to advise him or any other person how, by means of witchcraft or by any non-natural means whatsoever, the perpetrator of any alleged or other act complained of may be discovered; shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars or, in default of payment to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months (Zimbabwe Government, 2006: Chapter 5).

The revised Act, however, criminalises any accusations of witchcraft that are not backed up by evidence (Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012; Sunday Mail, 11 December 2016). This was reinforced by the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Chapter 9:23 which reiterated that it was an offence to accuse someone of witchcraft. Section 99 (1) of this Act specifically criminalises groundless accusations of witchcraft (Nyamayaro, 7 December 2016; Saunyama, 30 January 2017). Soon after independence, the Zimbabwean government also ordered that all traditional healers in the country be registered as members of lawfully-constituted associations which would monitor and regulate their operations (Zimbabwe Government, 1981). As a result, the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA) was formed in 1981 (Chavunduka, 1994; Muguti, 2016). In 2004, ZINATHA had a countrywide membership of 55 000 traditional healers (Muguti, 2016). The government went on to constitute the Traditional Medical Practitioners Council (TMPC), an organ of the Ministry of Health and Child Care, under which associations of traditional healers were to be registered (Zimbabwe Government, 1981; Bulawayo 24 News, 13 November 2016; 49

Mutembedzo, 6 June 2015). By June 2015, member associations registered with the TMPC included ZINATHA, International Traditional Healers Association (ITHA), Zimbabwe Traditional Healers Association (ZTHA) and the Zimbabwe National Practitioners Association (ZNPA) (Ibid). Despite these government provisions, there was an upsurge in witchcraft accusations and witch-hunts in many communities since the onset of the new millennium as Zimbabwe was engulfed in an unprecedented socio-economic crisis. The tsikamutandas were also actively involved in the societal discord as they played leading roles in witchcraft accusations and witch-hunts after which they claimed to remedy the situation by conducting rituals during which they cleansed both the alleged perpetrators and victims of witchcraft. The next section examines the upsurge in witchcraft accusations in the context of the Zimbabwean crisis during the new millennium with a view to account for the proliferation of the tsikamutandas during the same period. The Zimbabwean crisis and the upsurge of witchcraft accusations From the year 2000, Zimbabwe began to experience unprecedented socio-economic challenges which severely eroded the livelihoods of the ordinary people. The hardships were brought about by industrial closures, skyrocketing unemployment, hyperinflation, shortage of basic commodities, starvation, the collapse of the health sector and extreme poverty. These problems were aggravated by ecological disasters in the form of persistent droughts (Duri, 2016). As the crisis raged on during the new millennium, conflicts often arose within many communities as some people attributed their plight to witchcraft. In this process of scapegoating, witchcraft accusations were often traded. What triggered off the crisis in 2000 was the decision by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front Party (ZANU-PF) to confiscate commercial farms owned by the ‘whites’ and redistribute them to the ‘black’ majority (Meredith, 2002). Lamentably, most of the ‘new’ farmers were largely inexperienced 50

and under-funded to engage in productive commercial agriculture (Duri, 2016). Consequently, more than 50% of the seized farms were either unclaimed or in a state of neglect in 2005 (Richardson, 2005). By February 2004, contrary to claims by scholars such as Cousins (21 May 2010), Moyo and Yeros (2005) and Scoones et al (2010) that agricultural production increased from the year 2000 as a result of the Land Reform Programme, the country’s agricultural output had nosedived by 75% and severe food shortages became the order of the day (Cross, 4 February 2004). In addition, many former farm workers lost their jobs as most of the ‘new’ farmers had no capital to employ them (Richardson, 2005). To exacerbate the situation, Zimbabwe became an unattractive destination for most investors. Deindustrialisation set in as many companies closed. By the year 2001, more than 700 companies had shut down (Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003). Consequently, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to over 80% by mid-2005 (Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe, 30 June-6 July 2005). In August 2013, the unemployment rate was estimated at 95% (My Zimbabwe News, 25 August 2013). As a result of the farm seizures, Zimbabwe was isolated from the greater part of the international community. Investor flight, company closures, deindustrialisation and drastic cuts in donor funding, among other things, resulted in the shrinking of the Zimbabwean economy by 5% in the year 2000, 8% in 2001, 12% in 2002 and around 18% in 2003 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). The country became bankrupt and the government fuelled hyperinflation by printing paper money. In March 2007, for example, Zimbabwe’s inflation rate of 1 700% was the highest in the world (Reuters Alert, 20 March 2007). In November 2008, inflation spiralled to 79.6 billion per cent, second only to Hungary in 1946 (Fuller, 2012). In December 2008, the inflation rate was estimated at 500 billion per cent (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 13 July 2014). Persistent droughts worsened the plight of most ordinary Zimbabweans. The 2001-2002 drought, for example, significantly contributed towards the 60% drastic fall in commercial maize production during the period 2000-2003 (Richardson, 2005). As the ecological disasters persisted during the first decade of the new 51

millennium, the government was forced to declare 2007 a drought year after crops had dried up in most parts of the country (Reuters Alert, 20 March 2007). As most of the country’s socio-economic sectors collapsed, so did the government’s health delivery system. Among other things, international isolation, government bankruptcy, hyperinflation, foreign currency shortages, waning investor confidence, deindustrialisation, unemployment, droughts, chronic food shortages and profound poverty compromised the health of many citizens in the face of threats from chronic ailments such as HIV/AIDS (Mawere, 2011b, Muguti, 2016; Nakato, 2013). Severe food shortages resulting from inexorable droughts and the collapse of the commercial agricultural sector, for example, famished the majority of the population. The country’s isolation from the greater part of the international community, foreign currency shortages and government bankruptcy made it very difficult to import drugs and medical equipment. Medical costs skyrocketed beyond the reach of most citizens, owing to spiralling unemployment rates and hyperinflation (Mawere, 2011b; Muguti, 2016). The ordinary people were the worst hit as they increasingly ran out of disposable incomes to afford medical expenses that had become exorbitant, owing to the scarcity of drugs and the flight of critical health personnel (Muguti, 2016). Consequently, Zimbabwe’s life-expectancy rate stood at 44 years for men and 43 years for women in year 2006 (World Health Organisation, 2008). By the year 2008, the life-expectancy rate had plummeted from a male-female average of 61 years in the 1990s to 37 years for men and 34 years for women (Kevany et al, 2012). Health-related mortality rates were also alarmingly high. In the year 2010, for instance, 3 800 maternal deaths were recorded countrywide (Mbanje, 5 June 2015). In the year 2012, Zimbabwe’s maternal mortality rate of 1100 per 10 000 was the highest in the world (Kevany et al, 2012). A year later, in 2013, an estimated 960 Zimbabwean women out of 100 000 died while giving birth. By comparison, the maternal mortality rates were 90 per 100 000 live births in 1980 and 253 per 100 000 live births in 1994 (Newsday, 27 January 2015). The findings of the Zimbabwe Demographic Survey, 52

published in the year 2014, noted that the country’s infant mortality rate of 57 per 1 000 live births was one of the highest in the world. The survey also showed that 84 children out of every 1 000 were unlikely to reach the age of five (Newsday, 27 January 2015). These statistics illustrate how the collapse of Zimbabwe’s mainstream healthcare system resulted in very low life-expectancy rates and high death rates. As the Zimbabwean crisis persisted during the new millennium, there was an escalation of scapegoating through witchcraft accusations in many communities countrywide. As Ball (1994: 11) notes: “Changes in the social, political and economic arenas can result in the fierce hunting out of traitors or witches or scapegoats, as a means of overcoming uncertainty and restoring order.” These sentiments are echoed by Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba (2012: 164): “when something goes wrong in the welfare of the individual or his family, in most cases, he will suspect that someone has used evil magic, sorcery or witchcraft against him or his household, animals and fields.” As shortages of basic commodities worsened, societal tension heightened as famished citizens sought to outcompete each other in order to obtain scarce resources. Some individuals or families that had a history of conflicts and jealousies between them often traded witchcraft accusations during which they blamed each other for their misfortunes (Chireshe, Chireshe and Shumba, 2012). These developments illustrate that witch-hunts and accusations become common “in the context of a society competing for scarce resources and riddled with potential points of conflict” (Ritchken, 1989: 14). As Golooba-Mutebi (2005: 939) also observed in post-Apartheid South Africa, suspicions and accusations of witchcraft can be triggered by socio-economic challenges. He argues: Social and economic differentiation, now firmly entrenched in rural South Africa, provides fertile ground for suspicion and accusation. Wide socio-economic disparities cause social tensions, when the well-to-do fail to fulfil the expectations of poorer neighbours and kin for support. Tensions may lead to suspicion which often erupts into open accusation of witchcraft. The better-off

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accuse the poorer of bewitching them, while the latter accuse the former of having prospered through witchcraft. Similarly, as Nyamnjoh (2001) noted in Cameroon, socioeconomic challenges such as unemployment and chronic poverty enriched witchcraft discourses within communities as jobless youths blamed witches for their plight while the relatively well-off were envied. As the government’s health delivery system collapsed, some ordinary Zimbabweans even attributed the spread of HIV/AIDS to witchcraft (Rodlach, 2006). Most hardships such as unemployment and high death rates were, and are still, sometimes blamed on the work of witchcraft. This confirms Bourdillon’s (1998: 173) observations on the indigenous belief systems of many African societies such as the Shona: “The Shona very often explain disease and misfortune in terms of witchcraft. Witchcraft can explain all types of misfortune, from minor ailments to conflict with an employer or losing one’s job, and many Shona believe that death is always due to witchcraft.” Thus, witchcraft accusations have been most widespread in many African societies, particularly during times of misfortune even during the post-colonial era. It is within the context of the Zimbabwean crisis since the onset of the 21st century that the upsurge in witchcraft accusations countrywide should be understood. As will be demonstrated later on in this chapter, these severe socio-economic hardships resulted in some Zimbabweans trading witchcraft accusations. In actual fact, some individuals and communities actually invited and continue to invite the tsikamutandas to solve their prevailing challenges, some of which they blame on acts of witchcraft perpetrated by their family members and neighbours. To this end, the tsikamutandas, most of who are also reeling from the effects of the socio-economic crisis, capitalise on the situation by instrumentalising witchcraft in order to earn a living.

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The proliferation of the tsikamutandas in the 21st century Zimbabwe It is in this crisis-ridden dispensation characterised by societal tension and witchcraft accusations, among other things, that the tsikamutandas become more visible and claim to restore normalcy through witch-hunts and cleansing rituals. During their witchhunting and cleansing rituals, most tsikamutandas generally use similar paraphernalia. They usually put on white garments with a red lining (Moyana, 29 January 2017). For most of them, their witch-hunting and exorcising equipment includes bottles of water (Ufumeli and Matenga, 14 March 2015) and knobkerries, supposedly containing spiritual powers (Charumbira, 28 February 2016). In Chief Nemhare’s area in the Buhera District, during late December 2016, for instance, the tsikamutandas used “a knobkerrie…which weighs 10 kilogrammes…that they call network booster…and it can tell the problems and evil things happening in the village. It works after a person holds it and can tell the evil things that the person has” (Masvingo Mirror, 20 December 2016: 1). The strategies of the tsikamutandas operating across the country are also similar in a number of ways. Most of them usually order that villagers congregate at the home of a local traditional leader where they demand confessions from those with extra-terrestrial powers and objects for use in witchcraft. They normally lead those accused of witchcraft to their homesteads (Moyana, 29 January 2017). Upon arrival at the homestead, each witch-hunter usually places a knobkerrie, encircled by knives stuck into the ground, close to the entrance of the hut or house to be exorcised of evil spirits. The witchhunters would then cover the entrance into the room with a white cloth after which they get inside to conduct the ritual while the homeowners and other villagers wait outside (Charumbira, 28 February 2016). They would then come out with a broad range of objects allegedly used to bewitch others such as goblins, snakes and charms (Moyana, 29 January 2017). The objects are then displayed at the public gathering for everyone in the locality to see (Masvingo Mirror, 20 December 2016). Some goblins which they claim to have discovered 55

in the homes of alleged witches consist of small kudu horns wrapped around with red strings. The needles that are stuck around the horns are often given as the reason for the mysterious deaths that besieged the family concerned. The tsikamutandas would then burn the goblin in front of the crowd. This would be followed by a cleansing ceremony during which an unknown object is planted at the entrance and centre of the homestead. During the ritual proceedings to exorcise ‘evil’ spirits and detect witches, most of them fall into a trance and chant. In the closing stages of the ceremonies, the selfproclaimed healers usually assure the family members that their misfortunes have come to an end (Moyana, 29 January 2017). Soon after the proceedings, the tsikamutandas demand payment for their services from those they had ‘cleansed.’ They are known for demanding cash and various commodities for their services depending on the magnitude of the case they had purportedly handled. Their charges usually include plates, cutlery, chickens, goats, cattle and cash (Ufumeli and Matenga, 14 March 2015). In December 2016, the average charge for their services per family was usually one herd of cattle or an equivalent of five goats (Masvingo Mirror, 20 December 2016). By January 2017, the tsikamutandas had become notorious for demanding exorbitant payments from people for the removal of goblins and snakes allegedly planted by witches in their homes (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 30 January 2017). Given the severe socio-economic crisis that gripped Zimbabwe from the year 2000, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that most tsikamutandas are a young generation of unemployed impostors and extortionists who manipulate indigenous beliefs and practices to earn a living. Their shenanigans, such as the planting of objects associated with witchcraft in the homes of alleged witches, attest to this. As Isis Mwale, a Zimbabwean economist, cited by Majaka (4 December 2016) noted in November 2016, the upsurge in tsikamutanda activities was largely the result of socio-economic hardships prevailing in the country which prompted some unemployed and poverty-stricken, but innovative, youth to generate income under the guise of witch-hunting. This demonstrates how some age-old indigenous cultural institutions, most of which were, and are still, associated with the older generation as custodians, can 56

increasingly become abused and consequently contested landscapes as some members of the young generation seek to instrumentalise them in an effort to survive in harsh socio-economic dispensations. There is overwhelming evidence that many tsikamutandas improvise witchcraft paraphernalia which they go on to place into the homesteads of people they later on accuse of witchcraft after which they demand payment for detection and cleansing. Two cases involving Morris Mbofana, a 24-year-old tsikamutanda, in March 2010 illustrate this point. In both cases, the witch-hunter was caught redhanded by the police with two fake goblins concealed in the blankets in which he was sleeping. The goblins were similar to those he had previously ‘unearthed’ from two homesteads (Herald, 22 March 2010). What this means is that, the witch hunter had improvised several goblins with the intention of planting them into the homes of people he would later on accuse of witchcraft. He would then charge the affected families for flushing out the goblins and cleansing their homes of evil spirits. In the first incident, Mbofana approached Fatima Tauro at her homestead at Mimosa Farm near the town of Banket. He introduced himself as a traditional healer who had come to exorcise her house of goblins. Fatima agreed that her house be cleansed at a fee of US$7 and three chickens. Mbofana reportedly removed a hairy object with beads from the stomach of Fatima’s daughter and another from a clay pot and informed her that both objects were goblins. Mbofana advised that another major cleansing ritual had to be conducted at a cost of one ox. He went on to demand an additional two goats that he had seen in Fatima’s pen. He threatened to cause her serious harm if she failed to pay (Herald, 22 March 2010). In the second incident, on 5 March 2010, Mbofana confronted Miriam Chiringidza and told her that his father’s family was being tormented by evil spirits. He expressed his intention to exorcise the evil spirits at a fee of US$23. Charingidza’s father was reluctant to pay but his daughters made contributions and gave Mbofana the money. Mbofana then went into the house alone and came out with a hairy object which he claimed to have discovered. The object, which he said was a goblin, was similar to the one he had removed in the first incident at Tauro’s homestead. He then demanded additional 57

payment in the form of two blankets, two kilograms of flour, four kilograms of sugar, two bars of laundry soap and two 750-millilitre bottles of cooking oil. He reportedly threatened them with harm if they did not pay him (Herald, 22 March 2010). The fact that the goblins that had allegedly been ‘unearthed’ were later found by the police concealed in the blankets in which Mbofana was sleeping clearly demonstrates that he had improvised them in order to produce them as evidence for witchcraft. On 29 October 2015, two tsikamutanda brothers from Chinhoyi District were caught red-handed while planting a live snake at an Inyati Mine homestead near the town of Rusape “in an attempt to hood-wink the family which had hired them to conduct a cleansing ceremony” (Kadzura, 28 November 2015: 1). On the day in question, the two brothers, Senator Tendaupenyu, aged 28 years, and Tinashe Tendaupenyu, aged 22 years, went to Enia Kundishora’s homestead near Inyati Mine masquerading as traditional healers. They told Enia that her family was haunted by evil spirits which they wanted to cleanse after which she would give them an ox as payment. The two brothers ordered Enia to sprinkle some traditional medicine in all the other houses while they entered the bedroom for the cleansing ritual. Tenson Chibanda, Enia’s son, peeped through the bedroom window and discovered Tinashe planting a bag on top of the wardrobe. Tenson entered the bedroom and opened the bag to find out its contents and discovered a live brown snake seven centimetres long. The villagers who had gathered at the homestead killed the snake and apprehended the self-proclaimed prophets. During the subsequent interrogations, Tinashe confessed that he was not a genuine traditional healer. A report was made to the police and the two were arrested and charged under Section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act which criminalises fraud and another charge of engaging in practices associated with witchcraft (Kadzura, 28 November 2015). In another revealing incident on 7 June 2016, three tsikamutandas were arrested in the Gweru City Centre after they were found with a live puff adder while on their way to a witch-hunting ceremony in the Shurugwi District. The snake was discovered in the bag of one of the tsikamutandas when the police conducted a search. The three were 58

Tinei Ndanga, aged 25 years; Tapiwa Pfunye, a 32-year-old man; and Vengesai Gomera, whose age was not mentioned (Chronicle, 8 June 2016). This incident exposed some of the shenanigans of tsikamutandas. It is most likely that they were intending to plant the snake at some people’s homesteads after which they would accuse them of witchcraft. They would then conduct ‘cleansing ceremonies’ and demand payment. There is also abundant evidence to show that upon arrival in a relatively new area, most tsikamutandas firstly befriend some local inhabitants from whom they obtain information about families that were in turmoil as a result of internal conflicts and other socioeconomic tribulations. They would then approach these families at a later date to conduct witch-hunts and cleansing rituals after which they demand payment. Thus, in January 2017, a Headman from the Chibila area of Binga District labelled tsikamutandas as conmen: We have lost a lot of livestock at the hands of these thieves who rob poor and vulnerable communities of their only source of livelihood. We have learnt how they deceive people by gathering information of peculiar families mostly at drinking places from unsuspecting imbibers whom they buy lots of beer (Moyana, 29 January 2017: 1).

The deceitful nature of many tsikamutandas is also illustrated by the fact that they are very itinerant and rarely operate in their home areas. As Chakanyuka (26 June 2016: 1), a Sunday News journalist, noted, one aspect that makes the general public to question the authenticity of tsikamutandas is that most of them operate far away from their home villages. He argued: These infamous witch sniffers traverse the length and breadth of the country on their witch-hunt, flushing out goblins, sorcerers and voodoo among villagers. Interestingly or rather ironically, a tsikamutanda hardly, if ever, conducts rituals in his home area. Criticism of the witch-hunters and their acts has thus often been premised on this observation… If these witch-hunters are genuine, then why do they often, if not always, take their acts everywhere else but their home

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areas? Is it that there is more evil elsewhere and not among their kith and kin? Sceptics may quiz. Could these chaps be genuine witchhunters but without honour in their own towns, or they are blatant crooks crafty enough to take their act away from their kin for fear of being exposed?

In late June 2016, for example, Chakanyuka (26 June 2016) established that none of the 15 tsikamutandas that were camped at Ntabazinduna in Matabeleland North Province came from the locality. In actual fact, some of them had come all the way from distant areas such as Gokwe and Mberengwa in the Midlands Province, and Mutoko and Marondera in the Mashonaland East Province. Similarly, in December 2016, “more than 10 tsikamutandas…swarmed Wards 11 and 12 around Bhidhiri Village under Chief Nemhare in Buhera (District)…The magicians are reportedly coming from Guruve, Mount Darwin, Binga and Masvingo, and they claim to remove goblins, crocodiles, snakes…and any other form of witchcraft” (Masvingo Mirror, 20 December 2016: 1). Most tsikamutandas, therefore, operate in areas outside their provinces. In this case, most of the tsikamutandas who converged in the Buhera District of Manicaland Province had come from Guruve and Mount Darwin in Mashonaland Central Province, Binga in Matabeleland North Province and Masvingo in the Masvingo Province. The sincerity of some tsikamutandas as genuine traditional healers also becomes questionable if one considers that some of them are philanderers in disguise. Being young men whose age group ranges between the late teens into the twenties, as noted earlier in this chapter, a considerable number of these self-proclaimed healers earn a bad reputation for their gynophilic disposition. In 2014, Ngwenya, a tsikamutanda ‘prophet’ from Sikomena Village in the Binga District, for example, allegedly instructed women in the area to strip naked for him to remove evil charms from their bodies and conduct cleansing rituals. His method of exorcism involved “inserting his hand into their private parts in order to remove the charms. It is alleged that some ‘brave’ ones underwent the ritual after being threatened with

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intense torment from the charms to the extent of losing their husbands” (Moyana, 29 January 2017: 1). In January 2017, Muzarabani, a tsikamutanda operating in the Ziburawa Village in Mberengwa District demanded that the Ndawana family surrenders Varaidzo, their 22-year-old daughter, as payment for the ritual services he had rendered. Monica Ndawana, Varaidzo’s mother, labelled Muzarabani a con artiste, saying: After performing a cleansing ceremony at my homestead, I offered him two goats but he declined the offer saying that his ancestors wanted my daughter to be his wife. He claimed to have been dreaming about her for more than two years. I doubt his legitimacy; he seems to be cashing in on people’s desperation. He is taking advantage of the fact that I am a widow and that there’s no male person to fight for me. I might be a woman but I will never let anybody take advantage of my children (Bulawayo Metro, 27 January 2017: 1).

Monica Ndawana reported the case to Chief Mposi but Muzarabani absconded the court hearing. Instead, he reportedly fled to his rural home in the Gokwe District (Bulawayo Metro, 27 January 2017). These two incidents are quite revealing about the manner in which some traditional beliefs and practices are abused and manipulated by some self-proclaimed male healers as a smokescreen for their flirtations with women and girls. The exorbitant fees charged by the tsikamutandas for their services reinforce the contention that, most of them are poverty-stricken youths who seek to eke sustenance by manipulating indigenous beliefs on witchcraft. It is therefore not surprising, as Nyamayaro (7 December 2016) observed, that the major victims of witchcraft accusations by the tsikamutandas are the relatively wealthy people, particularly the elderly with large herds of livestock, followed by some villagers who are good farmers. This is a deliberate ploy to extort villagers of their possessions after conducting cleansing ceremonies. In February 2016, for example, some villagers and teachers in the Mayo area of Manicaland Province questioned the authenticity of the tsikamutandas as genuine traditional healers given that most of them surfaced during times of socio-economic 61

hardships such as droughts. They argued that since most youths in the country were not formally employed, they generated income from market gardening and during severe droughts, many of them were condemned to poverty resulting in them improvising an array of shenanigans such as witch-hunting in order to salvage sustenance (Charumbira, 28 February 2016). As a teacher at Nyahondo Primary School noted, most witch-hunters never showed up when people were expecting good harvests: “They only come during droughts. Gaurani (another traditional healer) came when there was a drought, while another tsikamutanda came several years ago when there was drought” (Charumbira, 28 February 2016: 1). The extortionist tendencies of the self-proclaimed healers are further demonstrated by the fact that some of them often use force and threats to induce payment. A few examples are given below to illustrate these observations. In late November 2016, a selfproclaimed witch-hunter humiliated elderly people in Maanhu Village under Chief Marange in Manicaland Province by accusing them of possessing live snakes for purposes of witchcraft. The tsikamutanda is alleged to have conducted cleansing rituals on those he had accused of witchcraft after which he charged many cattle. He threatened them with unspecified action if they failed to pay (Nyamayaro, 7 December 2016). A few days later, in Headman Chikuku’s area, again under Chief Marange, the same tsikamutanda demanded three cattle, six goats and US$90 from a villager he had conducted a cleansing ritual after accusing him of witchcraft. He warned the villager that mysterious happenings would haunt him if he failed to pay. The villager reported the matter to the police leading to the arrest of the tsikamutanda. In a similar case a few days later, a witchcraft-accused person at Whilton Farm in the Odzi area of Manicaland Province was charged two cattle and two goats and after a cleansing ceremony but soon afterwards, the tsikamutanda demanded five more beasts and four more goats. The villager refused and reported the case to the police (Nyamayaro, 7 December 2016). In March 2017, similar concerns were also expressed by Chief Nyangazonke of Kezi District in Matabeleland South Province who condemned tsikamutandas as “self-proclaimed witch-hunters” who were causing “havoc in his area

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as they (were) allegedly demanding livestock from villagers whom they accuse of practising witchcraft” (Chronicle, 16 March 2017: 1). The desperation of most tsikamutandas to earn livelihoods is also shown by the fact that they often force some villagers to admit to charges of witchcraft. In addition, they also coerce the general community to attend their rituals. As Charlene Chekenya, an official of Stand Foundation, a Zimbabwean human rights organisation, stated: “Because of the challenging economic crisis in Zimbabwe, bogus enterprising men have been arising at alarming rates in the name of the common tsikamutandas in rural areas and prophets in the urban areas” (Saunyama, 30 January 2017: 1). In mid-November 2014, in the Jambezi and Labangwe villages of Hwange District in Matabeleland North Province, Jabulani Nyoni, a 19-year-old tsikamutanda, led a group of six elderly men masquerading as witch-hunters in a reign of terror during which they kidnapped and terrorised villagers (Moyana, 29 January 2017). The six other men were Bernard Muchelwana, aged 76 years; Mathew Muti ,73 years; Philip Ncube, 69 years; Govias Ncube, 59 years; Tadius Phindani Ncube, 59 years; and Professor Nyoni Chipegwa, 45 years (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 March 2015). They reportedly accused some local villagers of being witches after which they force-marched them to a shrine where they claimed they would cleanse them of evil spirits that had made them to become witches or wizards. Reports from the community indicated that during the purported cleansing rituals, the group “would shave the villagers’ hair, cut them with razor blades and stick needles that were allegedly unsterilised into their arms” after which they demanded livestock as payment (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 March 2015: 1). On 21 November 2014, for example, Jabulani and his six accomplices allegedly went to the homestead of Jonas Mudenda, a 75-year-old villager and accused him of being a wizard that had killed several people in the locality. Jabulani is reported to have forced Mudenda and his wife to surrender a shirt and undergarments, which he said would be used during the ritual to exorcise evils spirits. He went on to forcibly shave Mudenda, cut his forehead with a razor blade and put herbs into the cuts. He then demanded a goat as payment for conducting the ritual. After a while, he allegedly hiked 63

the ritual charge to two goats and a chicken, which he took by force (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 March 2015). In December 2014, Jabulani allegedly dispatched his accomplices to Mathias Sikanguwe’s homestead in Zhulandangariro Village where they kidnapped the villager and force-marched him to Jabulani’s shrine. Jabulani accused Sikanguwe of being used by witches to harm people at night and ordered that a ritual be conducted to cleanse him. The villagers then reported Jabulani and his accomplices to the police leading to their arrest (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 March 2015. The assailants were brought before the Victoria Falls Magistrates’ Court in March 2015 facing charges of kidnapping and unlawful detention. Jabulani was also charged separately for accusing someone of witchcraft (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 March 2015). In May 2016, Philip Zizhou, another tsikamutanda, also caused a reign of terror in the Mt Darwin District where he allegedly forced villagers to attend his cleansing rituals. During March and April of 2016, he extracted a herd of 195 cattle from the local villagers as payment for his ‘services’ (Sunday Mail, 11 December 2016). Having accumulated many cattle from villagers as payment for their services, the tsikamutandas sold them cheaply to local butcheries. In October 2016, for example, they sold each beast for about US$100 at a time when the average price for one animal was US$400 (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 October 2016). In another violent incident during mid-January 2017, Blessing Bako, a 28-year-old tsikamutanda from Chigasa Village under Chief Ruzani in the Wedza District of Mashonaland East Province, approached Faith Tavherwa, an 82-year-old woman from Tavherwa Village in the same district, at her home and accused her of witchcraft. When she refuted the allegations, Bako flogged her all over her body with a whip and demanded that she confesses. As the whole community watched, Bako ordered Tavherwa to kneel down after which he drenched her with cold war. As a result of the assault, Tavherwa sustained serious injuries on her thighs, head, eyes and back. She was rescued from further assault by other villagers who reported the matter to the police. At the Marondera Magistrates’ Court, Bako was sentenced to two years in prison for the offence (Saunyama, 30 January 2017). Despite the jail sentence, Tavherwa 64

expressed concern at the societal discord and the general disrespect towards elders that was being caused by the tsikamutandas, most of who belonged to the young generation, saying, “The damage has already been done. This is indeed a curse. How can a young man call me a witch and flog me like a kid?” (Saunyama, 30 January 2017: 1). In addition to bifurcating some local communities along generational lines, this incident illustrates some gender dynamics to the conflict. As Marjory Svisva, a Zimbabwean gender activist, quoted by Saunyama (30 January 2017: 1), notes about the emotional and physical humiliation which some women endure as a result of tsikamutanda activities: Women should not be abused at all costs. It is the elderly women who take care of their grandchildren after their parents die of HIVrelated ailments, which they are not accepting and then blame the elderly women for bewitching them. It is a pity that lack of knowledge of legislation is affecting the women especially in the rural areas. For instance, the Witchcraft Suppression Act has not been repealed and yet most women, especially, in rural areas are still being victimised. There is need for protection of the vulnerable women. The law needs to be translated into local languages and also educational campaigns on women’s rights at law should be carried out. I urge women to resist to part with the little they have, for example, livestock to bogus witch hunters.

In many cases, innocent women accused of witchcraft often agree to pay fines to the tsikamutandas “for the sake of appeasing the community” and out of “fear of being ostracised by society” (Saunyama, 30 January 2017: 1). Thus, in January 2017, Charlene Chekenya, a Zimbabwean human rights activist, urged that the prevailing socio-cultural constraints that infringe upon the rights of women be criminalised and that the women themselves be educated on their entitlement in society. She argued: It is vital that the social and cultural constructs that suppress women in rural communities be broken through information programmes that involve community leaders constituting of the

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headmen, chiefs and relevant stakeholders. Women in rural areas have no clear understanding of their rights and the variable support structures that are available in their favour. For example, accusing someone of witchcraft by the tsikamutanda is a defamation of character that should be reported. Additionally, manipulating women into paying fines for crimes that are not within the laws of the country is itself an unlawful activity. Community leaders in rural communities should not allow traditional, religious or cultural practices to be forced on individuals who are not interested, it should be free will and, hence, tsikamutandas have no right to manipulate women (Saunyama, 30 January 2017: 1).

In March 2017, a villager from Kezi District in Matabeleland South Province also complained to the Chronicle (16 March 2017: 1) about the extortionist tendencies of the tsikamutanda: “We are being forced to attend the tsikamutanda witch-hunting ceremonies...I lost two cattle while my neighbour lost his biggest ox and two donkeys after we were accused of possessing goblins.” All these examples are quite illustrative of the extortionist tendencies of many tsikamutandas. These developments, however, are not surprising given the magnitude of the Zimbabwean crisis discussed earlier on in this chapter. Instead of remedying the plight of the majority of ordinary Zimbabweans, the tsikamutandas themselves become opportunists who manipulate indigenous beliefs in witchcraft in an attempt to earn livelihoods in a harsh socioeconomic environment. This confirms Igwe’s (22 July 2012: 1) observation that in times of debilitating crises, witch-sniffers become “entrepreneurs (who) have found a market niche in witch belief and are busy exploiting it at the expense of the rights and dignity of (others).” Societal discord as a result of tsikamutanda activities Given the overwhelming evidence explored earlier on in this chapter that most tsikamutandas are opportunists who abuse and manipulate indigenous cultural beliefs to salvage livelihoods in a harsh socio-economic environment, it is not surprising that their 66

operations cause societal discord in many communities. Despite their self-proclaimed status as genuine prophets and traditional healers who claim to be on an ‘altruistic’ mission to solve the prevailing socio-economic hardships, most of which they blame on witchcraft, many tsikamutanda activities actually exacerbate disharmony in several communities. Witch-hunts and witchcraft accusations destabilise social relations within communities in various ways. Among other things, they fuel suspicions and mistrust leading to societal tension and hatred. In addition, those accused of practising witchcraft are often demonised and ostracised by their communities. As Golooba-Mutebi (2005) rightly noted, some anti-witchcraft activities heighten suspicions and erode inter-personal trust within communities. These developments negatively affect the social fabric by compromising dynamics to do with social connectedness, social capital and intracommunity relations. The activities of the tsikamutandas sometimes cause serious conflicts within families after some members who do not subscribe to some indigenous cultural beliefs and refuse to attend witchhunting and cleansing ceremonies are accused of witchcraft by their kin. On 7 December 2015, in the Marongero Village under Chief Nemangwe in the Gokwe District, for example, four Makomo brothers named Cuthbert (aged 40 years), Jona (29 years), George (27 years) and Gezai (24 years) ordered Cabinet, their cousin, to accompany them to a witch-hunter who had camped in their area to consult on the causes of misfortunes that had besieged their family. Cabinet refused after which the four brothers assaulted him and force-marched him to the witch-hunter’s base at Marongero Village where they detained him for four days (Tsuro, 15 December 2015). It becomes quite apparent that many tsikamutandas’ activities leave “a trail of wars” in many rural communities (Moyana, 29 January 2017: 1). Many villagers from various parts of Zimbabwe accuse tsikamutandas of “sowing seeds of hatred” within families and communities (Moyana, 29 January 2017: 1). In January 2017, for instance, Mathias Mwinde, a villager from the Binga District,

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castigated tsikamutandas for creating an atmosphere of animosity and antagonism within local communities: I don’t believe in any of these prophets as they come to exploit innocent people and plant seeds of division and hatred in families. I recall that at one point one man came here and told us that our women were not ours alone as they had charms inserted into their bodies without their knowledge. Our village head refused to listen to our calls to turn away the prophet after being sweet-talked but soon realised his blunder when Ngwenya (the prophet) declared that he would have to remove the charms by inserting his hand into the women’s private parts (Moyana, 29 January 2017: 1).

Some traditional leaders also condemn the tsikamutandas as dubious practitioners who selfishly sacrifice the peace of many families and communities in order to accumulate personal wealth. In October 2016, Chief Gampu from Matabeleland North Province expressed concern at the upsurge in conflicts within communities in the area as a result of witch-hunting activities conducted by the tsikamutandas: “Besides swindling people, they are creating hatred among villagers, resulting in violence. Villagers have reported to me that they are tired of these people and they don’t want to see them anymore” (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 October 2016: 1). These sentiments were immediately echoed by Cain Mathema, the then Matabeleland North Provincial Affairs Minister, who said, I have said this before and I will continue to say it; these people only bring disharmony into our communities. In my view, they should be totally banned from society, but then, our society tends to believe that all black people are witches and wizards. This is Rhodesian sociopsychological education among blacks to hate themselves and each other and it should come to an end (Bulawayo 24 News, 29 October 2016: 1).

These sentiments were reiterated in early November 2016 by Fortune Charumbira, the President of the Chiefs Council of Zimbabwe, who stated that tsikamutandas were a danger to the society 68

causing havoc across the country through their dubious witchhunting exercises (Bulawayo 24 News, 3 November 2016). In March 2017, Chief Nyangazonke of Kezi District in Matabeleland South Province also complained that tsikamutandas were brewing disharmony in his area: I really wonder why people continue to tolerate this form of daylight robbery. The problem is that during the day in meetings we agree that witch hunters are not welcome. However, some influential locals and opinion leaders sometimes go nicodemously to invite these tsikamutanda who come and camp in our midst and end up giving us problems. These people only bring disharmony into our communities (Chronicle, 16 March 2017: 1).

The Zimbabwean government intervened to restore order. On 6 December 2013, Senior Assistant Commissioner Charity Charamba, the Chief Police Spokesperson, announced that law enforcement agents were being dispatched to various rural areas across the country to stop the activities of the tsikamutandas: It is now business unusual, we are arresting those fraudsters, villagers should come and report without fear. Anti-stock-theft police have been dispatched in rural areas and I can confirm that they have already commenced their operations. Anyone who lost his or her livestock to these criminals should report to the police immediately. The practices of tsikamutandas are illegal and nobody should be coerced into taking part. All tsikamutandas’ activities are daylight extortion and stock-theft, which need to be exposed. The public needs to be made aware of their rights to refuse to partake in the cleansing ceremonies. Most traditional leaders have been informed that by forcing people to participate, they are robbing them of their rights and breaking the law as well (Sunday Mail, 11 December 2016: 1). In early November 2016, David Parirenyatwa, the Health and Child Care Minister directed the TMPC to play an active role in combatting the prevalence of witch-hunting activities in the country (Bulawayo 24 News, 13 November 2016). On 28 November 2016, the Zimbabwean government officially outlawed witch-hunting activities 69

by unregistered persons, most of whom were the tsikamutandas (Majaka, 4 December 2016). On 29 November 2016, Christopher Mushohwe, the Minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, warned that the government criminalised the witch-hunting operations of the tsikamutandas: Cabinet noted with much regret and concern that a significant part of traditional leaders embracing chiefs, headmen and village heads are by commission or omission condoning this evil, primitive, extortionist and illegal practice that is condemned by our national laws. Furthermore, the unscrupulous perpetrators and accomplices of witchhunting have misrepresented to communities claiming that they had been permitted by the Government authorities to carry out the illegal activity. The Minister of Rural Development, Promotion and Preservation of Culture and Heritage, Honourable Abednico Ncube, has been directed to work closely with law-enforcement agencies and traditional leaders to ensure that the repugnant extortionist practice of witch-hunting is immediately brought to an end countrywide (Chronicle, 30 November 2016: 1).

During the first week of December 2016, teams of police officers were again deployed to the country’s 10 provinces to curtail the operations of self-proclaimed witch-hunters (Sunday Mail, 11 December 2016). In January 2017, the Zimbabwean government reiterated that the operations of tsikamutandas were illegal and urged traditional leaders and the police to deal with them decisively. In particular, the government tasked the Ministry of Rural Development, Promotion and Preservation of National Culture and Heritage to work hand in hand with the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) to stop their operations and restore order and sanity in various parts of the country (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 30 January 2017). Cain Mathema, the Minister of State for Provincial Affairs in Matabeleland North, also added weight to the government’s position regarding the tsikamutandas, whom he described as thieves and peace-destroyers who caused unnecessary hardships for rural communities:

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These so-called witch-hunters should be banned. They are thieves who cause untold misery to communities, specifically targeting elderly people who they accuse of witchcraft because of their old age. What they are doing is wrong. They cause divisions at family and community levels because of their lies (Moyana, 29 January 2017: 1).

This section of the chapter has illuminated how, in their purported attempts to restore societal harmony through eradicating witchcraft, the tsikamutandas themselves become sorcerers who manipulate traditions through a broad range of extortionist shenanigans in order to eke livelihoods during times of gnawing socio-economic challenges characterised by unprecedented unemployment, ecological disasters, chronic poverty and health problems of epidemic proportions, among other things. In addition, it has been demonstrated that some of their operations, such as witch-hunts and witchcraft accusations, constitute “a social poison” and “a silent killer” (Igwe, 19 August 2011: 1) that fuel societal disorder by “inciting hatred in the name of witchcraft” (Igwe, 22 July 2012: 1). It is against this background that concerns against tsikamutanda activities are raised by various stakeholders such as ordinary villagers, traditional leaders and the government. In particular, the condemnation of the tsikamutandas by a considerable number of traditional leaders, some of the most notable custodians of indigenous cultural values, add weight to the contention that the tsikamutandas are neither genuine traditional healers nor prophets. The failure by the tsikamutandas to regularise their operations by registering with associations that represent traditional healers as required by Zimbabwean law also lends credence to this contention. Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated how some African indigenous cultural beliefs are on the crossroads in the 21st century world. By focusing on the activities of the tsikamutandas in Zimbabwe during the contemporary period of the new millennium, the chapter has illustrated that while witchcraft is a manifestation of evil and antisocial behaviour (Bucher, 1980), witch-hunting and witchcraft 71

accusations constitute one of the major causes of societal conflicts. In addition, the chapter has illuminated that even though some indigenous beliefs of the past regarding the institution of witchcraft were primarily intended to ensure societal order, they have been creatively manipulated in the present by some opportunists such as the tsikamutandas as they seek to eke sustenance during times of debilitating socio-economic crises. The chapter has shown that witchcraft suspicions and accusations tend to escalate in times of socio-economic tribulations during which fierce intra-community struggles emerge over increasingly shrinking resources. This is the predicament of significant sections of the Zimbabwean population since the year 2000. Many tsikamutandas are both victims and agents in the context of the Zimbabwean crisis. As victims of socio-economic hardships such as unemployment, persistent droughts and food shortages, this chapter has articulated how some of them become agents who seek livelihoods by capitalising on the dire situation in a number of ways. Among other things, they capitalise on the rise in cases of witchcraft suspicion in some communities that emanate from the ever-rising social differentiation and societal tensions during the crisis. In such circumstances, witch-hunting and ritual cleansing, often accompanied by various shenanigans and fabrications, become vital means of generating income. Thus, while considerable scholarly research has been devoted to examining the impact of exotic influences such as Christianity, westernisation, urbanisation and globalisation on African indigenous cultural beliefs and practices, this chapter marks a significant shift by focusing on how some African opportunists sometimes manipulate and reformulate these institutions in order to salvage livelihoods during times of crises.

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Chapter Four Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Implication for Agriculture, Food Security and Poverty in Southern Africa Munyaradzi Mawere & Marshall Madambura Introduction Southern Africa is presently facing numerous challenges, some of which are due to the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation which have repeatedly been regarded as some of many major security threats facing Africa. It is against this backdrop that climate change, along with environmental degradation, has frequently featured as one of the agenda items on many policymaking forums. Climate change is predicted to affect Southern Africa more than any other region in the world due to its geographical position and unpredictable rainfall patterns. As Hellmuth et al (2007) notes, an estimated 70% of sub-Saharan Africans rely on rain-fed agriculture. Reliance on seasonal rainfall for agriculture makes Southern Africa more vulnerable to food insecurity and the negative effects of climate change. This is true considering that 57% of African people live in countries where more than half of the workforce was engaged in agriculture in 2010 (AFDB 2011). This means that adverse climate change effects will always result in loss of agricultural output as well as loss of jobs for those who work in the agriculture sector. Since climate change also affects water sources, this has a negative effect on agriculture given that plants and animals rely on water for their survival. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forecast that by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change (AFDB, 2011). It is further projected that agricultural production in many African countries will be severely compromised since it is forecasted that by 2020 yields from rain-fed agriculture could be 79

reduced by up to 50% leading to severe food shortages (Ibid). Furthermore, the livelihoods of many Southern African people are likely to be affected by climate change as their crops are sensitive to temperature fluctuations, as is currently predicted. Average annual temperatures have risen by about 0.5°C over the course of the 20th century with some countries like Rwanda experiencing temperature increase of 0.7°C over the same period (Ibid). As Dixon (1990) and Mawere (2011) concur, some of the impacts of climate change, among others, include reduction in fresh water, erratic rain season, and crop withering heat waves, increased food prices, drought and flooding which all have a negative impact on agriculture and food security. The effects of climatic change are likely to intensify poverty in many countries of the world. Unfortunately, Africa is likely to be affected most if compared with other regions of the world. This is so because Africa’s adaptive capacity to deal with the adverse effects of climate change is very low. The Institute for Security Studies (2012) notes that Africa’s capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change is highly compromised due to poverty and economies that are highly climate dependent. This lack of adaptive capacity impoverishes the people. As people become poorer, they naturally tend to overuse the natural resources, thus, destroying resources faster due to lack of other means of survival thereby negatively affecting the environment. Thus, climate change poses severe threats to natural resources, agricultural productivity and food security thereby exacerbating poverty in Africa. Important to note, however, is the fact that the effects of climate change have also resulted in the adaptation means of utilisation of irrigations, water harvesting methods and innovative thinking. Climatic change, thus, on a different note ushered in some positive changes in agriculture through mitigation methods such as innovations, modern farm mechanisation, new research developments, new education and new ideas in agriculture such as sustainable agriculture. This makes it difficult to generalise the effects of climate change as always associated with adversity and negativity. In view of this observation, this chapter critically examines the linkages between climate change, environmental degradation, agriculture and poverty in Southern Africa. The chapter also suggests 80

possible mitigating measures to counter the perceived and real effects of climate change in Africa. Dynamics of climate change Southern Africa is one of the regions which are affected by climate change with its effects manifesting through greater incidences of tropical cyclones heat waves and cold waves, droughts, global warming and dry spells leading to droughts as well as intense rainfall which sometimes leads to floods. The term ‘climate change’ was recommended by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) to encompass all forms of climate variability on time-scales longer than 10 years, whether the cause was natural or anthropogenic (Mawere, 2011). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) posits that the term climate change refers to a change of climate which is directly or indirectly caused by human activities that alter the composition of the global atmosphere and which are observed over comparable time periods (Bernard, 2016). Globally, the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions caused by human activities increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004 (IPCC007). The emissions of carbon dioxide grew by about 80% and it is likely that the rising global temperature seen since the mid-19th century has been caused by human activities (Amcern, 2011). Seinfeld and Pandis (2012) also point out that those human activities that seek to use fossil fuels that emit carbon dioxide to the atmosphere causing global climate changes is the main driver of global warming and climate change .This resonates with Chambwera and Stage’s (2010) observation that climate change is brought about as a result of carbon emissions and anthropogenic carbon emissions which are a key driver to temperature and precipitation alterations. The effects of climate change have far-reaching consequences to rainfall pattern. It is predicted that precipitation will decrease by up to 30-40% in most parts of southern Africa by 2080-2099 and temperatures are also expected to increase by 3-7° C by the same period (IPCC, 2007). This means that climate change causes shift of supposed weather conditions as a result of pollution from various anthropoid actions and also pollution from natural events such as volcanic eruptions 81

which release sulphur dioxide. These climatic changes have also led to an increased outbreak of pests and diseases which affect agricultural productivity as well as food security in Southern Africa. The interplay of climate change, agriculture and poverty in Southern Africa Poverty remains one of the drivers of climate change as poor people mainly depend on agriculture among other primary industry activities. Poverty level is very high in most Southern African rural areas and according to FAO (2003), over 60 per cent of the Southern African population depend mainly on natural resources. In addition, almost half of the sub-Saharan Africa’s population live on less than one dollar a day, face the challenges of declining income per capita (1980 to 2000) and have the worst health condition planet (Ibid). High dependence on natural resources in Southern Africa has resulted in deforestation which is on the high, currently pegged at 0.78 per cent annually (Ibid). Deforestation along with other anthropogenic activities is likely to worsen due to frequent droughts and other negative effects of climate change. The effects of climate change in sub-Saharan Africa has caused a number of people to experience food crisis and, thus, increasing the number of people living in extreme poverty (Corbett 2005). During drought spells, poor people are prompted to scavenge more intensively, seeking out organic fuels, wildlife and edible plant products for both selling and consumption. This scavenging aggravates deforestation and damage watersheds and soil and this has seen Africa losing 52 million hectares of forests between 1990 and 2000 (FAO, 2003). Climate change has greatly contributed to rural poverty by paralysing rural farming which is the main economic activity in rural areas through triggering floods, drought, pests and diseases and loss of fresh water bodies. Loss of land productivity leads to low agricultural output. Climate change, thus, aggravates the challenges faced by the agriculture sector, negatively affecting both crop and livestock systems. It is assumed that the increasing population will exert demand on the resources that can no longer support human life. This resonates with the Malthusian prediction that the earth 82

would not be able to support its growing population by the turn of the twenty-first millennium (Alexei and Keith, 2005). The connection between climate change and agriculture is a two-way phenomenon where climatic changes are affected by agricultural activities and also affect the same. The adverse connection between climate change and agriculture consequently affect food security situation in Southern Africa – the most affected of all regions – resulting in poverty if necessary mitigatory steps are not seriously considered. The impact of climate change, according to Richard et al (2004), is being felt all over the world differently, depending on the geographical location of the country. These changes in climate are producing devastating and destructive weather events that are impacting negatively on both the living and non-living things (Odeku, 2013) including agricultural production. Climate change affects agriculture in a number of ways which include changes in average temperatures, rainfall, and climate extremes (e.g. heat waves), changes in pests and diseases, changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide ozone concentrations, changes in nutritional quality of some foods and changes in sea level. The resultant effects of climate change include the loss of land productivity, deforestation, desertification, land degradation and soil erosion which in turn may result in substantial decrease in crop yields and upsurge poverty (Hoffman, 2013; Black, 1990; Gbetibouo and Hassan, 2005). More so, scientific evidence confirm the influence of climate change in bringing about changes on hydrological systems and in terrestrial ecosystems in most Southern African countries (Thompson, 2010). Thus, it is essential to strive to understand the link between agriculture and climate change as well as some strategies which can be utilised in mitigating the impact of climate change especially in Southern Africa where agriculture is the main source of livelihood. The effects of climate change are threatening agriculture, the backbone of many Southern Africa economies such as Zimbabwe and it is predicted that rain-fed cereals (wheat, maize, rice) production will have decreased by 12% (net loss) by 2080, with great regional variations (IPCC, 2007). From the above, it can undoubtedly be noted that climate change is a threat to sustainable agriculture which 83

is the backbone of Southern Africa’s economy, food production and poverty alleviation. Furthermore, climate change brings presents a threat to the control of pests and diseases invasion which affect crops due warmer conditions which are caused by climate change. It is estimated that between 10% and 16% of the world’s crops are lost due to disease outbreaks (Morelle, 2013), most of which are aggravated or directly caused by insects. Many weeds, pests and fungi which affect plants thrive under warmer temperatures, wetter climates and increased carbon dioxide levels, resulting in more problems of trying to control these pests in Southern Africa. Higher temperatures mainly due to global warming will mean that more pests are likely to survive the winter (or cold) season in the region. This will lengthen the survival period of the pests and also widening the geographical coverage of their attack in the Southern Africa region, hence leading to more attacks of crops over a long period. In other words climate change is expected to increase the range or ‘invasion niche’ of many pests and weed species. According to Adger et al. (2003), the world’s poorest countries that have contributed least to the emission of greenhouse gases GHGs are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Posner and Sunstein, 2010). Geographically, they are also located in some of the most vulnerable regions of the world with low capacities to mitigate or adapt to these changes (Smit and Wandle, 2006). With regard to the living organisms in Southern Africa, erratic changes in the climate are inducing poverty and affecting the livelihoods of the developing countries especially the rural areas, making them to be more vulnerable. According to Michael et al (2007), the impact of climate change is higher in agricultural sector yet it is the main source of survival in rural areas in Africa. By agriculture here, we mean the systematic raising of useful plants and livestock under the management of man (Rimando, 2004). Similarly but in a different semantic, Rubenstein (2003), understands agriculture as the deliberate effort to modify a portion of the earth’s surface through the cultivation of crops and the raising of livestock for subsistence or economic gain. The absence of alternative livelihood opportunities has resulted in environmental degradation and resource depletion through agricultural and other such anthropogenic activities. Thus, in 84

trying to adapt to the effects of climate change, poverty can result in poor people changing their agricultural practices which in turn results in environmental degradation and the speeding up of poverty cycles. Scarcity of resources due to changes in climate has led to stiff competition on finite resources, which in turn leads to environmental degradation, cultivation of wetlands and stream bank. Globally, agriculture contributes a significant share of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission, 17% directly through agricultural activities through veld fires caused by farmers during land clearance, that is causing climate change (OECD, 2015). Cultivation of wetlands and stream bank and wetland cultivation may cause unproductive invasive alien species to grow on land if the farmers do not take steps to clear them. Climate change has triggered frequent drought in Zimbabwe, therefore, crop failure have resulted in continuous decrease of crop production over the years. Zimbabwe used to experience drought once in ten years. It, for example, experienced historic drought in 1982-1983, 1992-1993 and 2002-2003 farming seasons. However, since 2008 drought has become more frequent and in fact an annual experience in some areas such as Masvingo and Matabeleland provinces of Zimbabwe. From January to March 2013-2014, about 2, 2million (25% of rural population) experienced food shortages in Zimbabwe. (www. m.wfp.org/countries/Zimbabwe/publications/droughts). This leaves the rural people drought stuck in abject poverty since they do not have other economic activities to sustain their lives. There is need to find proper approaches of adaptation in order to contain agricultural losses as a way of alleviating poverty. Climate change has resulted in increased frequency and magnitude of tropical cyclones in Africa and other developing countries. When tropical cyclones frequently occur, they cause serious land degradation through soil erosion which leaves the soil infertile to carry out sustainable agriculture. Tropical cyclones also result in heavy downpours causing flooding which results in the destruction of crops in vast areas, soil water logging, anaerobic conditions and stunted plant growth. The continuing effects of climate change on environment degradation, agriculture and food security require the fullest possible understanding and particular mitigation policies to 85

lessen poverty in Southern Africa. Typical examples are the aggressive and destructive torrential rainfalls, for example, Cyclone Chadza which affected Malawi, Madagascar and Mozambique in 2015 and consequently led to the destruction of the ecosystem and the displacement of 75 000 people (15 000) households and destruction of crops and belongings in Malawi (www.ipsnews.net). Recently, in 2017, Cyclone Denio swept through Mozambique and the southern part of Zimbabwe as well as some parts of Botswana, causing a trail of destruction to both crops and property, not to talk of human and animal lives. There is much debate on the global change in tropical cyclone frequency and intensity under a warming climate change. Climate modelling studies contributing to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) suggest tropical cyclones may become more intense in the future with stronger winds and heavier precipitation (Meehl et al. 2007). Although many studies focus on the adverse effects tropical cyclones, they can also bring benefits. Tropical cyclones can also help replenish water supplies to inland regions. In 2017, cyclone Dineo, which devastated agriculture in some parts of Zimbabwe, is also cherished for having contributed significantly to the replenishing of water sources like dams which supply water in towns and cities in Zimbabwe and Botswana. The changes in climate are likely to increase the frequency as well as intensify of tropical cyclones which in no doubt will aggravate environmental degradation. Climate change in Southern Africa: Possible mitigation measures Having discussed the implication of climate change and environmental degradation on agriculture and poverty in Southern Africa, it is important to note that there are both positive and negative interaction between climate change, agriculture and poverty. In order to avert the negative impacts of climate change on agriculture and food security in Southern Africa, steps should be taken to mitigate these effects. The effects of climate change which subsequently result in environmental degradation and low agricultural outputs prompt the need to address these effects given 86

the dependency on agriculture in Southern Africa. Mitigation of climate change challenges calls for a complex set of strategies and the commitment of Southern African national governments in order to reverse the negative effects on agriculture. This section critically discusses the measures which can be taken in order to mitigate the impact of climate change on agriculture. The adverse effects of climate change have resulted in the need for ways to reduce carbon emissions. They have also prompted the need for calls for practical interventions through the provision of suitable innovative methods which include the development of irrigation infrastructure, improvement of soil fertility, improved climate change friendly seeds, water conservation, revitalisation of extension services and improvements in weather forecasting, among others. All these strategies have a direct positive impact on agricultural productivity and income flows to the rural poor, thus, promoting Sustainable Development Goals and economic growth. However, these strategies vary from place to place and from time to time depending on the circumstances of the area in question. To start with, the improvement of weather forecasts is a fundamental strategy in mitigating the effects of climate change risks so as to improve agricultural productivity and ensure food security. Most of the agriculture activities and production in Africa depend on seasonal rains. In view of this realisation, it is essential for national governments in Southern Africa to assist in better prediction of short, medium, and long-term weather conditions at both national and regional levels. The meteorological departments in Southern Africa are supposed to deal with uncertainties that farmers face with respect to the unpredictability of weather in Africa, including when and what to plant. Improving weather predictions requires strengthening the ability to scrutinise regional and national weather programmes as well as fostering greater collaboration between states in the region and even beyond (Mahdhin, 2004). Scientific evidence indicates that drier areas will become drier; droughts will be more frequent and wetter areas becoming more flooded if current climate trends continue unabated (Thurlow, 1999). Water and agriculture are intertwined, thus, there is great need to improve hydrological data monitoring, collection, and dissemination systems at national and 87

regional levels (Ibid). The hydrological data is useful in the prediction of the possible future rainfall patterns for agricultural purposes since agriculture depends on water. A complementary point to consider is the possibility of having massively available weather related insurance programmes for small holder farmers to help them deal with droughts, floods, and breakout of pests and diseases. With climate change becoming a global threat to food security, farming methods which are climate change friendly like conservation tillage/farming as well as small grains which are more drought resistant are now being promoted in Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, as well as by development agents like CARITAS. Conservation tillage is a practice that can be promoted in various forms to increase agricultural productivity. It requires little or no soil disturbance and has many production and resource conservation advantages. The advantage of conservation tillage, for example, is that farmers can plant crops soon after the first rains thereby gaining a longer growing season. Crop residues left on the ground form mulch that slows rainwater runoff and reduces erosion, improving soil organic matter content and water infiltration and retention (Subramanian, 1979). More importantly, conservation tillage involves researchers and extension agents working together with farmers and other agents to develop locally adapted conservation agriculture techniques. In an effort to deal with some negative effects of climate change such as deforestation, land degradation and loss of soil fertility, some positive innovations like food-for-work programmes are utilised to mitigate the negative impacts of environmental degradation in rural agricultural communities located in extremely environmentally degraded areas. This strategy of food-for-work is being embraced in Zimbabwe with the intention of prioritising eco-conservation reclamation works as an innovative way of dealing with land degradation and food shortages (Timmer, 2005). Reclamation of severely degraded watersheds for agricultural purposes helps in increasing productive land and can help in improving food security. These food-for-work programmes are helping in providing temporary employment during famines to the most of food-insecure

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rural populations in Zimbabwe where people are compensated with food items after doing some work. More so, the need to mitigate climate change has led to the promotion of intensive agriculture in Southern African countries and this has an implication of promoting natural resource conservation (Dorward, 2005). It has also resulted in the promotion of conservation farming in Zimbabwe’s rural areas which has seen high yields in small portions of land through the assistance of NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) like CARE international and extension workers. If taken seriously, this will directly contribute to the mitigation of climate change, poverty reduction and improved food security. To add, the other major way of mitigating and to reverse the effects of climate change is to switch from the use of fossil fuels to renewable energy sources which are more efficient. It has been scientifically noted that fossil fuels contribute in releasing a lot of carbon gases which causes climate change through global warming which in turn affect agriculture. Petroleum, natural gas and coal which are non-renewable energy sources release a lot of carbon dioxide which promote global warming in the atmosphere. Introduction of hydro-electric power stations and geo-thermal power station in replacing thermal power stations will help in reducing air pollution (or release of greenhouse gases). However, the switching has been slow because hydro power stations such as Kariba (in Zimbabwe) are very expensive to set up and geo-thermal power is not reliable. There is, therefore, need for policy formulation and implementation of the use of climate change friendly sources of energy to address the negative impacts. There is also need to eliminate the emission of greenhouse gases by substituting practices that emit a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions with practices that have a lower carbon footprint. The industrial greening concept reduces the impact of the industry on the environment. Relocation of people from cyclone prone areas to areas that have less risk of being affected by tropical cyclones can be ideal as a way of reducing rural poverty in countries with high frequency of cyclones like Madagascar and Mozambique. Poverty, worsened by climate change has resulted in overutilization of natural resources and 89

consequently resulting in the problem of desertification. However, migrating people to more suitable areas which can be productively be used for agriculture can help to address this problem. Rural people in these Mozambique and Madagascar mainly rely on agriculture; therefore, relocating people to areas with less risk of disasters is plausible. Once the relocation is completed, the affected nations are likely to spend less on food aid and focus more on development (www.ipsnews.net). Climatic changes and high inter- and intra-seasonal rainfall unpredictability leads to increased possibility of crop failures in most Southern African countries and Zimbabwe in particular due to El Niño conditions (Duflo, 2006). However, on a positive side, this leads to investment in irrigation infrastructure which helps to enhance agricultural output and food security as has been seen in some formerly drought stricken areas, for example, irrigation schemes in Nyanyadzi and Birchenough Bridge in Zimbabwe. However, in Africa, less than 5% of farmland is still irrigated and the average fertilizer application remains at less than 10 kg/hectare (Thurlow, 1999). Absence of investment on irrigation infrastructure in Southern Africa has resulted in dependence on rain-fed agriculture by smallholder subsistence farmers for food production. It is plausible to argue that water harvesting does not only ensure food security but is also useful for other domestic purposes like washing, cooking and drinking. In order to avert the effects of droughts caused by climate change, there is need for the construction of irrigation infrastructure to ensure greater use of groundwater including the distribution of low-cost treadle pumps and drip-irrigation kits (Peacock, 2004). Investing in on water harvesting innovations and the development of small-scale irrigation methods can help to increase agricultural productivity, income, and household food security. There is need to adopt on-farm irrigation systems, such as sprinkler systems, trickle irrigation, introduction of piped distributions systems for surface irrigation, and the use of treadle pumps (Ibid). Such investments will bridge the dry-season food and income deficits thereby contributing significantly to reducing poverty and food insecurity.

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Climate change has resulted in a pervasive problem of soil degradation and infertility, therefore soil fertility improvement is another strategy needed to enhance agricultural production and consequently improve food security. Farmers in Southern Africa should develop and utilise technologies that promote and slow down desertification and other forms of environmental degradation. To deal with the various conditions and circumstances of small holder farmers, a wide range of soil fertility management innovations and approaches is needed. Therefore the farmers in Southern Africa whose land has been degraded should utilise proven technologies and innovations, both indigenous and international, to replenish soil fertility ranging from primary use of organic inputs for the poorest to combinations of organic and inorganic fertilizers. Although climate change has been viewed negatively due to its adverse impacts, it has also resulted in some positive innovations as mitigating measures. With most of the poor people living in rural areas and depending on agriculture as a means for their livelihoods, policies which promote sustainable agriculture should be crafted as a way of improving climate change adaptation. It is fortunate that so far climate change has positively prompted policies that promote access to new technologies which are environmentally friendly to agriculture and rural development (Kydd, 2002). The integration of varieties like cowpeas in the mixed crop-and-livestock production systems of northern Nigeria has helped produce more food on less land with fewer resources and this can be useful in Southern Africa if it the region is to succeed the war against poverty and food insecurity (Sanchez, 2005). In an effort to improve agricultural production and food security to mitigate the impact of droughts caused by climate change in Southern Africa, there is also need for comprehensive and sustainable agricultural methods which are adaptive to the changes in climate. For example, former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in July 2004 highlighted what he called “Africa’s 21st Century Green Revolution” for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. He called for special attention to farming systems in areas largely disconnected from functioning markets (Djurfedlt, 2004). With climate change being a reality in 91

Southern Africa and indeed globally, it is imperative to build connections and mutual trust among actors in the market chain in order to guarantee food security. In order to curb the effects of climate change there is a prerequisite to increase agricultural productivity by improving inputs delivery systems and affordability. Proper input delivery systems can help to improve access to fertilizers, seeds, simple farm equipment, crop protection chemicals, and veterinary supplies. Thus, governments need to participate more actively in private input sector development. For example in Rwanda, the government has been facilitating easier access to foreign exchange with affordable interest rates after realising that these are important stimuli for fertilizer importers (Kydd, 2002). The poor transport systems and other unfavourable economic policies in Africa, however, have worsened over the past years, and this is likely to compromise efforts as those by Rwandan government. As climate change continues to affect food security and poverty alleviation efforts, it is vital to maintain momentum in research as well as improving favourable technologies which are adaptive to changes in climate (Ibid). The provision of improved seed and planting materials, for example, undoubtedly improves crop productivity. In Zimbabwe, there is continuous improvement of crop seeds to make sure that they are climate change friendly. Seed-Co, a company which is responsible for producing seed in Zimbabwe, has recently developed four hybrid seeds namely Nzou, Shumba, Tsoko and Mbizi which suit the Zimbabwe’s changing climate and attain highest possible yields even with low rainfall amounts. Given the adverse effects of climate change in reducing agricultural productivity through drought spells and cyclonic conditions, it therefore, becomes a prerequisite to allocate more funds and time for research and development in crop and animal production. Furthermore, agricultural technologies are rapidly changing and farmers need to be made aware of appropriate technologies and innovations that suit the changes in climate. With this obtaining reality taking toll, there is need for the government through its Agricultural Extension Officers to persuade farmers to adopt new practices. These officers are better placed in working with farmers 92

mainly because they have access to agricultural research outputs besides having received proper training that can be executed to the benefit of the farmer. Lamentably, agricultural extension in Africa is poor and has declined in many countries due to several factors such as retrenchments after the structural adjustment programmes, HIV/AIDS, Ebola virus, conflicts, and civil wars. Thus, revitalisation of extension systems and input distribution systems will go a long way to improve agricultural productivity and growth (Duflo, 2006). However, it has to be done simultaneously with the use of other complementary inputs such as fertilizer, water supply, and pest and disease control. In countries where this combination has been adopted such as India and China, yields have improved enormously. In Southern Africa, more attention will need to be given to small grains and grain legumes such as cowpeas and pigeon peas that provide protein for the family and fodder for livestock and help to improve soil nitrogen content and control pests and diseases if used within crop rotations (Polak, 2007). Improving livestock productivity is also essential as livestock and livelihoods are closely related because livestock strengthen both nutrition and income security. With climate change affecting agricultural production in most Southern African countries, some long-term agricultural development should be adequately funded to keep abreast with developments in science and social dynamics (Kydd, 2002). Indigenous knowledge and innovation should be nurtured rather than totally abandoned in favour of some inappropriate foreign technologies. There must also be active exchange of experiences and ideas that can be facilitated by proper documentation of data and information dissemination. Transfer of knowledge from other regions, such as Asia and Latin America to Africa is also important. So is triangulation and linkages of activities: forging strategic alliances at national and regional levels and new public and private partnerships is essential to increase agricultural productivity and counter the adverse effects of climate change. Thus, the negative impacts of climate change also calls for the government and other stakeholders to conduct some educational awareness and exchange of ideas on new innovations and technological expertise in order to increase information and market intelligence to farmers in Africa. 93

There is a global consensus that transforming and changing the fortunes of African agriculture requires stakeholders to work together in order to mitigate the effects of climate change with a view to increase the agricultural production. Southern African governments and leaders also need policy reforms that shun corruption, incompetence and which empower communities in hunger hotspot areas which are worsened by climate change (Birthal, 2005). Southern African governments and leaders must step up efforts to provide targeted input subsidies to assist poor farmers who cannot afford to buy agricultural inputs. Policy interventions are thus needed to encourage small holder farmers to increase the yields of their traditional crops, as well as modern varieties which are climate change friendly. Fertilizer subsidies can decrease the many climate change risks like loss of soil fertility through land degradation that resource-poor farmers experience, and therefore can play an important role in increasing food production. For example, the effects of food security can be rapid, as demonstrated by Malawi’s input subsidy programme and by the Millennium Villages Project (Sanchez, 2005). These subsidy programmes limit the losses that farmers experience during times of droughts or flooding which result in poor harvesting. Environmental degradation and climate change challenges prompt the need for a complex set of strategies to address climate change challenges, and this is essential given Africa’s significant dependence on agriculture (Institute for Security studies, 2012). With the mounting poverty levels and frequent droughts in Africa due to climate change, investing in agriculture is viewed as one of the undisputable ways to reducing poverty and increasing food security. In order to ensure vibrant sustainable agriculture, a plethora of measures are needed including committed and sincere leadership so as to ensure food security. Climate change has given rise to the attention of national governments and other international players involved in the agriculture and food security sectors in Southern Africa. Failure to mitigate climate change challenges by Southern African states has detrimental effects of food insecurity and high dependence on food aid. Thus, it is imperative to mitigate the effects of natural disasters and environmental degradation to ensure 94

agricultural productivity and rural development of the African nations. Conclusion The chapter examined the link between climate change and environmental degradation as well as the implication for agriculture, food security and poverty in Southern Africa. It has been noted that a strong relationship exists between poverty, climate change and environmental degradation which in turn have an implication to agriculture and food security for the rural poor peasant farmers in Southern Africa whose livelihoods and survival are anchored on cultivating land for food crops. The causation is, thus, bi-directional in the sense that climatic change causes people in most countries in Southern Africa to depend on natural resources owing to poverty and lack of other sources of livelihoods thereby causing environmental degradation due to over-utilisation of natural resources which as well leads to decreased agricultural production and food security. Floods and droughts result in decreased agricultural production which also consequently leads to poverty. On the other side, climate change, through its strains and stresses, causes new methods of adaptation which lead to development of new methods of farming such as conservation farming and irrigation methods of farming. This makes climate change paradoxical such that in order to address the interaction between climate change and agricultural activities, there is need for a complex set of strategies and this is essential given that Africa is oftenly affected by climate change while at the same time largely depend on agriculture.

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Chapter Five Reinventing N himbe : The Deployment of Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Partnerships for Development Conrad Chibango Introduction Sustainable Development Goal 17 emphasises the need for strengthening the means of implementation and revitalising the global partnership for sustainable development. The goal pays particular attention to developing counties with the view of promoting equitable development (Vaggi, 2015). This chapter focuses on development partnerships in the context of culture and development. Using a qualitative Zimbabwean case study of nhimbe, a Shona traditional practice whereby an individual family brewed beer and invited neighbours in the village to assist it in performing a particular task, this chapter argues that effective development partnerships are those which are modelled after the cultural values of the society. In line with this argument, the chapter posits that Zimbabwe should adopt a nhimbe model of development partnerships. This is an indigenous model whose values can assist Zimbabwe to address some of its political and economic ills. In particular, values derived from the nhimbe practice can provide solutions to fighting poverty, while promoting political stability, ownership of development initiatives and equal partnership. The data leading to the build-up of this chapter was collected through semistructured interviews, newspapers and desktop review. Linking culture and development After visiting a Chinese stand during the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, Mangenda Tshibangu, the chief-editor of a Congolese daily newspaper concluded that China’s future was firmly rooted in its 99

past. According to him, China was “…constructing the future but making reference to the past which has been very well preserved so that each Chinese could understand their history that dates back several years…” (China Remains Best Model for Africa’s Development, 2010). Josh Weinstein (2011) considered China’s model of development to have lifted many of its people out of poverty, making its economy the second-largest in the world. China stands as one good example of a country whose successful development policies are rooted in its culture. By proposing nhimbe as a model for development partnerships, this chapter postulates that developing countries can, like China, benefit from designing development initiatives that are in tandem with their cultures. This approach is informed by the recent development thinking on the relationship between culture and development. Early theories of development viewed cultures of poor countries as irrelevant to the development process, a view which sharply differs with recent development thinking. In particular, modernisation theories maintained that cultures of poor countries should be replaced with modernity, a Western culture linked with notions of capitalism and economic growth. In other words, they considered modernity as synonymous with development (Roxborough, 1988). Rostow’s five stages of development in which the traditional society was supposed to be replaced through a series of changes leading to the final stage called high mass consumption (the epitome of development), is one good example of the modernisation theory (Rostow, 1960). These theories led to disenchantment after they had failed to fulfil their promises of development (Escobar, 2000). Appadurai (2004), for instance, argued that it was the failure to reconcile culture and development that led to unsuccessful development efforts in the developing world. For him, culture was indispensable because it was in it that ideas of the past and future were nurtured and embedded. Escobar (1995) went to the extreme as he claimed that the so-called development was a process that further impoverished the third world countries through human control and domination. However, Pieterse (cited in Rapley, 2004: 353) recognised the danger of throwing away the baby with the bathwater

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as he argued that evident fruits of development such as the increase in life expectancy in the Third World could not be ignored. Nonetheless, contemporary thinking in development circles gives culture a special place in development and this is also evident from its understanding of the term development. It is viewed as a broad term referring to the objective and desirable living standards characterised by rising incomes that translate into improved health, nutrition, education and personal autonomy (Rapley, 2004). The aspect of personal autonomy derives from Amartya Sen’s understanding that development is more than economic growth as it is also a process that boosts people’s capacities and broadens their options (Sen, 1999). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2004) recognised that culture was one of the essential factors necessary for developing people’s capacities. Earlier on, the 1982 Mondiacult Conference (cited in Marana 2010: 5) had had defined culture as “…that which offers the context, values, subjectivity, attitudes and skills on which the development process must take place.” In contrast to their earlier view that culture was a set of static values and practices (UNDP Human Development Report, 2004: 89), anthropologists now consider culture as constantly recreated as people question, adapt and redefine their values and practices when faced with new situations (Marana, 2010). According to UNESCO, culture contributes to development in both constitutive and instrumental ways (Cano and Caucino, 2013). In its constitutive role, culture is understood to be development itself. Leaving room for people to live according to their respective cultures is an essential part of human development because it means people are free to choose their identity without losing the respect of others or being excluded from other choices (UNDP, 2004). Its instrumental role is best summed up by the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (n.d.): Development interventions that are responsive to the cultural context and the particularities of a place and community, and advance a human-centred approach to development, are most effective, and likely to yield sustainable, inclusive and equitable outcomes. In line with this view, Hawkes (2001) argued that culture was the fourth pillar of development, which governments should seriously 101

consider in the policymaking process. The other three pillars of development include social, environmental and economic frameworks. However, Hawkes (2001) lamented that many governments tended to side-line the cultural framework. For him, this was unfortunate because no policy could be effective unless it was grounded in systems and institutions able to facilitate its implementation. Hawkes also observed that even though governments were gradually acknowledging the importance of culture in promoting development, they were doing very little to include it as a framework for policymaking (Hawkes 2001). It is in this context that the nhimbe practice is considered as a cultural framework for creating development partnerships. Contextualising n himbe in development partnerships Goal 17 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) indicates the extent to which forging partnership is almost indispensable for promoting sustainable development. As discussed above, these partnerships will not be effective if they ignore the cultural setup of the concerned parties. The term partnership is not new in the development discourse. It became a buzzword in the development discourse even prior to the introduction of the in 2015. While development aid in the early 1990s emphasised conditionality, partnership became the catchword in development circles in the mid1990s and has since remained a central theme in development (The Department for International Development, 1997; World Bank, 1999; NEPAD, 2001; Bond and Dor, 2003). Since its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has engaged in both bilateral and multilateral relations for furthering development in the country. However, it has had its own ups and downs regarding these partnerships. In 2002, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations on the grounds of human rights abuses. In 2003, President Robert Mugabe declared that Zimbabwe had withdrawn its membership from the Commonwealth countries, which he described as an ‘evil organisation’ (Morris, 2009). Mugabe’s decision to drag the country out of this partnership was met with regret by civil society and opposition parties (Coleman, 2004). In June 102

2003, Zimbabwe’s IMF voting rights were suspended due to its alleged failure to “sufficiently strengthen cooperation with the IMF in areas of policy implementation and payments,” (Nyambabvu, 2010). However, Zimbabwe managed to clear its IMF debt of US$107.9 million in 2016, making it eligible for financial aid. Zimbabwe’s effort to settle its relations with bodies such as IMF indicates the extent to which development partnerships are important for meeting the country’s needs. In one of his 2016 midterm fiscal review statements, the Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa emphasised that addressing foreign debt was crucial for the success of the country’s economic development programmes (Ndlovu, 2016). When its political relations with some Western countries became sour, Zimbabwe decided to cast its net wide by wooing more development partners through its ‘Look East Policy’ (Zimbabwe Standard, 15/02/2015). The concern here, however, is not to determine the appropriateness of Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ or ‘Look West’ policy, but the extent to which this Southern African country stands to gain if its development partnerships are based on a cultural framework. Hence; the nhimbe model proposal. There is ample evidence pointing to the efficacy of the nhimbe practice in the Shona traditional culture. Nhimbe (or ilima, in Ndebele) was a system whereby an individual family brewed beer and invited neighbours in the village to assist it in performing a particular task (Samkange and Samkange, 1980: 80). Identifying the task to be done or agenda setting, as Madziva (n.d.) called it, was a prerogative, not of the village guests but of the host family (Chinoda, 13/01/2015). Food security was the main purpose of this practice (Tavuyanago et al, 2010) as villagers were usually invited to speed up the harvesting process so that crops would not be lost to birds and animals (Pfidza, 3/11/2015). Tilling, weeding, harvesting, thatching of huts and fencing of homesteads were some of the tasks carried out during nhimbe (Bhila 1982; Ncube 2014; Tavuyanago et al, 2010). Nhimbe was also an occasion to share experiences and ideas as people sat down and drank the nhimbe beer (Madziva, n.d.). It was also a forum for reprimanding men who mistreated their wives and this was done in such a way that no one got offended (Mugabe, 6/11/2014). The host family was not a mere passive receiver but was also expected to feed 103

the guests by way of preparing beer and food, a responsibility which called for unity and collaboration from members of the host family (Ncube, 6/11/2014). This was also a way of offsetting dependency, while the pooling of various resources and skills depicted division of both labour among the villagers (Madziva, n.d.). Resources brought to nhimbe included carts and ox-drawn ploughs, oxen and whatever was viewed as necessary (Changamire, 5/03/2015). There are various values embedded in this traditional practice that can help in shaping Zimbabwe’s approach to partnerships for development. Some of these values include unity, equality and ownership. Kajese (1987) and Madziva (n.d.) maintained that partnership between Non-Governmental Organisations from western countries and their counterparts in developing countries should mirror the idea of a nhimbe. However, the argument presented here is that there is little evidence to suggest that Zimbabwe has effectively tapped onto this rich cultural resource. As a nhimbe host and other countries as its nhimbe guests, what should Zimbabwe do in order to realise positive gains from its development partnerships? Using the three nhimbe-derived values stated above (namely, unity, ownership and equal partnership), the sections below consider how Zimbabwe can benefit from adopting this model. It is argued that a united Zimbabwe shall be in a position to solve its current political crisis which has put the national economy on the back foot. The notion of ownership opens space for dialogue among all the stakeholders of the society, civil society included. This will, in turn, ensure that national development agendas are a result of a broad and genuine national consensus. The notion of ownership also guards against the imposition of policies by foreign countries. The nhimbe value of equal partnerships challenges members or countries to treat each other as equal partners irrespective of their various cultural, social, economic, racial and geographical backgrounds.

P olitical stability as a pre-requisite for partnerships Political instability in Zimbabwe has often diverted development partners from focusing on critical development issues as energy is solely exerted on conflict resolution. One of the lessons that we draw from the nhimbe practice is that unity and co-operation within the 104

family was a pre-requisite for the occasion to materialise (Ncube, 6/11/2014). It was impossible to host a nhimbe when there was infighting in the family. Tasks such as the brewing of beer, preparation food for the guests and fetching of the generally scarce water would only be possible to carry out when there was unity and co-operation within the family. Besides, people would not turn up for nhimbe if the host family was at war. Instead, they would focus on solving the dispute, even if it meant leaving the crops to perish in the fields. The current Zimbabwean society represents a family within a globalised village that can benefit through both regional and global partnerships. From a nhimbe perspective, the Southern African country would need to be united and stay focused as a country if it has to reap positive gains from its regional and international partnerships for development. Thus; unity and cooperation within the society is a pre-requisite for an effective partnership for development – a new form of nhimbe. However, this unity and cooperation seems to be elusive to the current Zimbabwean society due to political instability, which, in turn, derails the establishment and accomplishment of progressive development policies in the country. This political instability is characterised by continuous violence during elections as well as factional feuds triggered by power and succession struggles (The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 2013; Hixon, 2015; Ward, 2015; Raftopoulos, 2013). Since 2000, elections in Zimbabwe have always been controversial and associated with violence, intimidation and allegations of fraud (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Zimbabwe, 2013: 18). The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Zimbabwe (CCJP) described the 2008 post-elections violence as “systematic and synchronised.” At the centre were several players including local leaders (who identified political opponents in their areas), war veterans (who designed the form of violence to be employed) and the energetic youth executed the violence in return for alcohol, cash and drugs. This experience of violence was kept alive in people’s minds through constant rehearsals and promises of further violence if people made independent political choices in future elections. Subjugation, which was interpreted as peace, prevailed in the so-called 2013 ‘peaceful elections.’ 105

According to the CCJP, at the background of a culture of violence is the country’s history of conflict and violence that stretches way before independence and that has not been adequately addressed. Lack of counselling of violence offenders and victims as well as lack of compensation of those that remained hurt constitutes a lot of unfinished business in the area of peace and reconciliation in the country. This applies to offenders and victims in the liberation war, Gukurahundi (the Fifth Brigade-related violence in Matabeleland in the 1980s whereby about 20000 people were killed) Murambatsvina, 2008 political violence, among others. Such an environment of political violence does not only reduce people’s confidence and freedom when it comes to making political choices (CCJP, Zimbabwe, 2013: 24-25) but it also increases political instability in the country. Such an environment of political violence is inconsistent with the nhimbe hypothesis. In a situation of such political instability, Government cannot properly manage to carry out the nationbuilding process, which requires a broad consultation with the general citizenry, civil society, private sector and political parties included. It is only in an environment of peace and unity that a comprehensive development agenda can be arrived at. Recently, ugly power struggles within political parties have also greatly contributed to political instability in the country, lessening the chances of building effective development partnerships at both local and international levels. The Movement of Democratic Party led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) experienced power struggles that further weakened it after it lost the 2013 parliamentary and presidential elections to the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). This saw a further splitting of the opposition party as the former MDC-T Secretary General, Tendai Biti parted ways with Morgan Tsvangirai, forming his own political party called the Movement of Democratic Change – Renewal (MDC-Renewal), which he later on transformed into People’s Democratic Party (Zulu and Mudadigwa, 2015). Before this transformation, his political party had already experienced divisions leading to the creation of an Elton Mangoma-led party called the Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (Chidza, 2015). All these power struggles, including the earlier divisions that led to the splitting of the 106

original MDC into MDC-T and MDC-Welshman Ncube, have negatively impacted on the political stability of Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, ZANU PF has also experienced ugly infightings since the First Lady, Grace Mugabe entered politics. Her arrival at the political scene saw events that led to the ousting of the then VicePresident, Joice Mujuru, out of office and later on out of the ZANU PF party (Baker, 2014). Many who were viewed as aligned to the Mujuru faction lost both their political posts and party membership. Over 140 party members perceived to be aligned to Mujuru were suspended (Hixon, 2015). While this was, at first, understood to be a fight between the two old rival factions, namely that of Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa, with the latter becoming victorious when he was appointed the new vice-president, it still remains unclear who exactly is poised to become the country’s leader after Robert Mugabe. According to Ward (2015), this lack of a clear succession plan on the part of Robert Mugabe could mean more political instability. The former Vice-President Joice Mujuru has since launched a new political party called Zimbabwe People First, fuelling insecurity within the ruling party. A political analyst, Masunugure (Kwaramba & Tafirenyika, 2015), warned that Mujuru “…should be prepared for the worst because these are some of the occupational hazards for a Zimbabwean politician.” All this demonstrates the extent to which the political boat of Zimbabwe has been and continues to be fiercely rocked. In terms of both local and international partnerships, Zimbabwe has virtually nothing to gain as it wastes its energy on infightings and violence. The situation of political instability in the country is unfavourable for reaping positive gains from its partnerships as both regional and international partners would logically be forced to focus only on ensuring that the country achieves stability. Hixon (2015), for instance, called for the intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the country in order put a stop to Zimbabwe’s volatile political atmosphere. Besides, in such an environment, it would be impossible to come up with a national development agenda which the various stakeholders within the country would subscribe to. Put differently, no national nhimbe would be possible. A clearly defined and country-pertinent development 107

agenda is only foreseeable in an environment where unity and cooperation prevail. The current situation of infighting within both the ruling and opposition parties in Zimbabwe derails any meaningful development agenda as energy is spent on power struggles, leaving both regional and international partners without option but to zeroin on conflict resolution. Hence; no nhimbe is possible in a conflictridden society. Ownership of development initiatives In a development partnership modelled after nhimbe, the role of agenda setting is reserved to the country in need of assistance. The model does not give room to more economically powerful countries to dictate the agenda on poor countries. It calls for developing countries to identify and design their development agenda, while their development partners come in with their respective resources to assist in carrying out the already identified needs. However, consultation cannot be ruled out but it is distinguished from imposition, as experienced during the IMF and World Bank during the time of the Structural Adjustment Programmes. The idea of ownership of development initiatives resonates with the idea of policy-based lending propounded by Abegaz (2005). His approach, which he also called synthetic model since it is a synthesis of regional aid by European Union and the concessional loans by the International Development Association, states that developing countries should be assisted to come up with their own policies. Abegaz acknowledged that poor political institutions had led to continuous policy failure in Africa and that it also implied that these institutions should be improved in order to ensure aid effectiveness. This approach is based on the assumption that economic performance is a result of capability and opportunity. Capability is understood to be determined by the quality of policies while development aid provides an opportunity. Development aid is then viewed to be effective only when it is aligned to priorities of recipient countries, that is, when these countries claim ownership of development policies (Ibid). The World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (1999) also emphasised the need for 108

developing countries to ensure that development agendas are locally generated in order to ensure the local ownership of development programmes. This thinking is in line with the nhimbe perspective whereby the host family has the prerogative of identifying the task to be carried out by the nhimbe guests. While various forums have emphasised the effectiveness of local ownership, experience seems to suggest that more powerful members within the partnership tend to dictate the terms. A case in point is the way in which the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) promoted by the World Bank, were conducted. A research by Patrick Bond and George Dor (2003) showed that national ownership of these programmes was often compromised. Several civil society organisations in Africa complained that they were barely consulted by their governments and that the latter often reported what they thought the World Bank to hear. The Malawi Economic Justice Network complained that the PRSP process was secretive and not open and it feared that by failing to take the civil society on board, the national ownership of the PRSP was compromised (Bond and Dor, 2003: 16). In Tanzania, the Feminist Activism Coalition lamented that the participation of citizens in the PRSP process was marginal and yet this was a process that people had hoped would bring about a real public engagement leading to well-broadly debated public policies (Bond and Dor, 2003: 17). In Zimbabwe, the Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), a policy which is meant to economically empower the country’s indigenous people (Chapter 14:33, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act: Act 14/2007), is also another example of policies enacted without a broad consultation. Though enacted in 2007, by 2014, its appropriateness was still hotly debated in various sectors of the society (Financial Gazette, 15 January, 2014). This is a sign that ZimAsset was not broadly debated before its adoption and this diminished ownership. When society does not identify itself with a particular given policy, then the implementation of that policy becomes a problem. The nhimbe perspective of ownership, whereby the owners of the project are given space to make their own contribution, can be of great value in promoting sustainable

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development, not only Zimbabwe but in the African region as a whole. Equal partnership The provision of beer and food to the nhimbe guests shows that the host is not totally dependent. As in any partnership, one is expected to bring something to the table. A nhimbe project is successful due to the trust, cooperation and respect for each other’s ideas. The reverse situation whereby some party or parties consider themselves superior to the other party would be viewed as counterproductive to the desired development outcomes (Madziva n.d). Such was the case with the Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by IMF and the World Bank to many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. There was hardly any sincere consultation with the leaders of these developing countries. Indeed, these institutions were also influenced by the early Eurocentric development theories which assumed developing countries as incapable of offering any constructive ideas in relation to development. The Ethiopian president, Miles Zenawi, was justified when he lamented at an Economic Commission on Africa meeting: “While we will not be at the high table of the IMF, we should be at least in the room where decisions are made” (Business Day, 2 June 2003). The negative impacts of the Structural Adjustment Programmes on African countries (Logie and Woodroffe 1993; Mkandawire, 1998) were largely a result of an unequal partnership between the Bretton Woods Institutions and African countries. By analogy, both the IMF and the World Bank constitute a particular kind of nhimbe whereby the global village puts resources together in order to fight against poverty and ensure economic stability across the globe. However, these institutions are structured in such a way that poor countries can hardly influence decisions. Since the founding of the Bretton Wood Institutions, the United States of America has held the largest voting shares. In 2015, its shares were estimated at 17.5% at the IMF and 16.1% at the World Bank (Babb and Kentikenilis, Forthcoming). Other countries with large shares include France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 110

The rest of the countries across the globe form constituencies such that the total representation reaches 24. The African continent is underrepresented as it is bundled into only two constituencies (the Anglophone and the Francophone). Regardless of the immense size of the Francophone constituency (25 countries), it holds only 1.99% voting shares (Truman 2006: 213). Because poor countries have no voice at the IMF table, it is not surprising that some policies are simply imposed on them. In the nhimbe partnership model, such pitfalls are unforeseeable because all members are viewed as equal, regardless of what one brings to the table. As it stands, there is no nhimbe in the IMF and the World Bank because these institutions do not entertain the value of equal partnership. This idea of equal partnership is already upheld (at least de-jure) in many existing partnerships for development between Africa and the developed world. Upon his visit to Algeria in 2012, François Hollande, the French head of State stated that the two countries were “…both driven by the same desire to build an equal partnership tuned towards development and youth,” (Algeria Press Service, 7 September, 2015). At a conference on EU-Africa Partnership for development and security held in Belgium in 2010, the idea of equal partnership was also emphasised by the conference chairperson, André Flahaut. He called for a genuinely “equal partnership” between the EU and Africa, both at government level and between individuals and local communities (Europa.net, 2010). However, there are fears that such partnership may only be rhetoric. President Jacob Zuma of South Africa boycotted the 2014 EU-Africa Summit on trade in Brussels in order to express solidarity with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe who had also refused to attend because his wife had been denied a visa. Zuma (cited in Ighobor, 2014) stated that “…time must pass wherein we are looked at as subjects; we are told who must come and who must not come”. While European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso emphasised that Europe preferred to deal with African countries as equal partners, Christoph Hasselbach, an editor of the Deutsche Welle, maintained that in reality, only South Africa could be considered as the equal partner (Ighobor, 2014). The 2014 summit ended without any agreement reached. While the West may find it difficult to practically operate on an equal111

partnership basis with poor countries, the nhimbe partnership model does not seem to have any problem with the equality issue. In the nhimbe model, members are treated as equals regardless of their different skills and capabilities. While, equality is a value embedded in the nhimbe practice, it is often overshadowed when it comes to gender relations within Zimbabwe. The girl-child, for instance, still remains disadvantaged in terms of equal opportunities for employment and access to economic resources such as land. Many widows are left landless following the death of their spouses (Pankhurst 1988). Even though government has put several legal measures such as the affirmative action policy in place and the Labour Relations Act of 1985 in order to address gender inequality problem (Mazingi and Kamidza, 334), this remains inadequate as long as the underlying traditional prejudices against women are not addressed (Economic Commission for Africa Southern Africa, 2003). In this context, the value of equality found in the nhimbe practice can, nevertheless, be one way to inspire Zimbabwe to find ways of improving gender equality as per Goal 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (Vaggi 2015). A situation whereby gender inequality continues to exist would not be ideal for forging local partnerships. Development partnerships based on the nhimbe practice leave no room for a superior-inferior relationship as partners are viewed as equal. This equality is also presumed among the guests themselves regardless of their various differences ranging from capacity to ethnic differences. Some may bring a span of oxen while others may simply bring hoes. It is an occasion whereby equipment, ideas and many other resources are pooled together in order to complete a defined task. It is in this regard that one who turns up for the occasion is respected for one’s unique contribution. Hence; a development partnership modelled after nhimbe demands equal partnership. Conclusion Goal 17 of the Sustainable Development Goals underlines the importance of global partnership in view of fighting underdevelopment in poor countries. This chapter has focused on 112

the nature of development partnerships. It has been anchored on the assumption that culture is both an instrument and end of development, a position adopted at the 1982 Mondiacult Conference and which dismisses the erroneous Eurocentric view that development could only occur when poor countries divested themselves of their indigenous cultures and embraced the Western culture of modernity. As many other countries, Zimbabwe is rich with various indigenous knowledge systems and nhimbe is only one of them. The chapter has argued that by adopting nhimbe as a model of its development partnerships, Zimbabwe would see the need to unite and rise above its current internal political squabbles and exert its energy on matters that promote nation-building. Unity, as a prerequisite for nhimbe, is critical for a country to arrive at development policies that are a result of a broad consultation with the citizenry. A stable political environment would also attract the country’s development partners as focus is placed more on realising the country’s development agenda than on conflict resolution. The nhimbe model would also demand that Zimbabwe ensures that its development initiatives are locally owned. A nhimbe-based development partnership would also call for all members concerned to be considered as equal, regardless of their various political or economic backgrounds. The chapter also presents the nhimbe model as a challenge to partnerships whereby unequal treatment of members in relation to voting and decision making is not an exception but the norm.

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Chapter Six Entrepreneurship, Social Capital and Community Development in Zimbabwe’s Buhera District: A Faith-based Reflection Bernard Pindukai Humbe & Chenjerai Muwaniki Introduction Zimbabwe has, over the past two decades and a half, been experiencing economic crisis of epic proportion. It is, however, the country’s rural areas which are hit hardest by this problem. To this end, the submission of this chapter seeks to demonstrate that, entrepreneurship in rustic communities is influenced by social networks based on African tradition and religion. Increasing ties with the social resources provides access to resources and entrepreneurial opportunities. This is grounded on the idea that, religious beliefs and social connections among entrepreneurs encourage the development of an entrepreneurial mindset. Broadly speaking, the area under study, Buhera District, is one of Manicaland Province’s seven districts, in Zimbabwe. It is predominantly a rural district which falls within agro-ecological region five characterised by low annual rainfall and high temperatures. Hence, it is unsuitable for crop production and resultantly, most households are food insecure (Humbe and Mawere, 2016). The research was principally carried out using ethnography. Though there is lack of homogeneity among scholars on the definition of ethnography, we are persuaded to adopt Brewer’s definition as cited by Asare (2003:35) because of its suitability in the context of this research. Brewer posits that it is ‘the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by means of methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities’. Focus was paid on Zion Apostolic Church’s (ZAC) entrepreneurs in Buhera District. As the chapter unfolds, examples of business activities done by ZAC members depict religion as epoxy of socio-economic transformation 119

in Zimbabwe at micro level. When studying social innovation brought by ZAC’s entrepreneurs, the researchers participated, both overtly and covertly, in the daily lives of the people of Buhera for ten years. We observed the business activities of ZAC members and also listened to what the believers and non-believers say about the transformation brought by ZAC at micro level. Religion facilitates social network which increases both the opportunities and the probability of success in entrepreneurship, for people within networks, tend to help each other. Guided by the principles of their faith, adherents of ZAC envisage a more-ambitious and impactful economic strategy which has contributed towards social development in rustic communities. Conceptualising entrepreneurship and social capital The term entrepreneurship has been used in several fields of study including economics, sociology, politics and development hence it has been difficult have consensus on what exactly it means (Mokaya, Namusonge & Sikalieh, 2012:129). The origin of the concept of entrepreneurship is often associated with the works of Richard Cantillon and Jean Baptiste Say. Say, an economist, posits that an entrepreneur is the one who transfers economic resources from a sector with lower productivity into another one with higher productivity and better outcome (Dees, Haas & Haas, 1998). Say’s view is buttressed by Drucker (1985) who argues that, an entrepreneur is one who exploits opportunities brought about by change. In Drucker’s line of thinking, we understand an entrepreneur as an individual who is productive and he or she takes advantage of opportunities that bring about in business. An important theory of entrepreneurship which was applied in this study was suggested by a sociologist Burt’s (1995) network theory which states that entrepreneurial opportunities are often found in a person’s connections or networks. These networks are important in two main ways; firstly because they can lead to significant opportunities and resources and also because the network itself is a resource that is important in entrepreneurship (Dorin & Alexandru, 2014). The idea of networks can be realised in the affiliation of 120

entrepreneurship and religion in a relative manner since the relationship is subject to the economic situation and social setting. In this study which pays particular attention to an African church in Zimbabwe, it is the faith of the members which drives entrepreneurial decisions. According to Daly & Silver (2008: 543), social capital refers to actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. In other words, social capital involves relations of trust and reciprocity inherent in social networks (Halpern, 2005). There is no doubt that social capital can act as a catalyst for entrepreneurship. In a rural business environment as shall be enunciated later, trust and reciprocity are stimulated by the faith of business stakeholders. Church gatherings create good networks for entrepreneurs, through interactions with members of similar faith (Shumba, 2015). Zimbabwe’s socio-economic crisis The government of Zimbabwe upon independence in 1980 was committed to development. This is evidenced by massive expansion in education, health, housing, agricultural and industrial infrastructure. To that end the newly independent government’s development efforts received praises on the continent and beyond (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambira, & Martens, 2011; Vurayai & Muwaniki, 2016). The country was even christened as the ‘bread basket of Africa’. This growth, however, was short-lived as from 1990 onwards the country slumped down and eventually was in an economic crisis which has deep rooted origins in its macro- and micro- economic and fiscal policy blunders that have plummeted the country into a deep economic crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010; Serven & Solimano, 1993). The early 1990s were characterised by economic decline due to the adoption of the infamous Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) due to pressures for economic liberalisation pushed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Kanyenze et.al, 2011; Okolocha, 2012). ESAP had negative effects 121

on the provision of education and TVET in Zimbabwe. These included substantial cuts in expenditure on education, infrastructure degradation and brain drain (Kanyenze et.al, 2011; Nyazema 2010). Participation in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the payment of gratuities to veterans of the Second Chimurenga and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) are other factors often associated with the economic decline in Zimbabwe (Mabhena, 2010; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004). The Zimbabwean economy took a significant slump after the disputed 2008 General Elections as a result of the imposition of sanctions on the country. This led to hyperinflation that had not been experienced in any other country without open warfare (Gukurume, 2015). According to Gono (2008), former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, was understood as a “Casino Economy”. This was related to the unpredictability nature of business, which could either bring returns or losses to both corporate and individuals. Five years later, The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2013) acknowledged that Zimbabwe had experienced deteriorating economic and social environment since 2000 which led to the decline in Gross Domestic Product by about 50% in 2008. Adoption of the multicurrency system in 2009 brought some relief to the ailing economy but still the economy did not significantly improve due to structural and institutional shortcomings in the economy (Zimunya & Gwara, 2013: 190). The structural and institutional shortcomings in this context were; overvaluing the United States Dollar and corruption in both public and private sectors. Though Zimbabwe has adopted a multicurrency economic system, the national economy is depressed. In 2005 unemployment rate was estimated to be 95% http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/zimbawe. But the government’s policy of indigenisation has resulted in many Zimbabweans joining the informal sector. In Zimbabwe, the unemployment rate measures the number of people actively looking for job as a percentage of the labour force www.tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/unemployment-rate. The informal sector’s employment rate leapt from 84% recorded in 2011 to 94.5% recorded in 2016, statics released by the Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (Zimstat) have revealed: 122

https://www.southerneye.co.zw/2015/06/09/informal-sector-employs-mostyouths. Challenges in the Zimbabwean economy have major negative implications on entrepreneurship and the survival of small businesses especially those in the rural areas. Religious landscape We observed that the indigenous people in Buhera are deeply religious, adhering to two dominant religious traditions thriving side by side in their lives, namely African Indigenous Religion (AIR) and African Christianity. What we refer to as African Christianity in this work, are African Initiated churches (AICs). The acronym AICs is interpreted differently by various scholars who contributed their works African Christianity. For Chitando (2005:85), AICs may stand for “African Independent Churches, African Indigenous Churches, African Initiated Churches or African Initiatives in Christianity”. These are churches founded in Africa, by Africans to worship in African ways and to meet African needs as Africans themselves feel them (Turner 1979:92). Most AICs wear distinctive costumes, mainly white robes, and it is for this reason that they are mainly called “white garment churches”. They often observe Fridays, Sabbath, as well Sunday. Their dietary laws are based on Old Testament. Preaching in AICs is characterised by storytelling rather than sermons, and worship incorporates dreams, healing, trances and a high degree of lay participation. AICs do not forsake the spiritual customs passed on by their ancestors and they believe that God was already present in Africa before the Europeans arrived and that African worship is better than that of missionaries. They represent a thoroughly Africanised version of Christianity (Ndlovu 2014:169). Having said this, Turner (1979:49-50) concluded that “a bewildering variety of names” has been used for AICs. These, according to Turner (1979), include syncretists, sects, prophet cults, Zionists, separatists sects, Proto-nationalist, protest movements, independent, Pentecost or spirit churches. AICs offer a veritable means of anchor and stability and a pathway to meaningful social existence. Among other reasons, AICs emerged primarily against religious, economic, political and social 123

discrimination against Africans. Therefore AICs nursed the ambition of constructing “Zion”, a land of freedom, a home free from oppression and subjugation (Chitando, 2005:85). Many of the churches have “Zion” as part of their official names. This is also the case with Zion Apostolic Church (ZAC), whose brief historical background with South African origins is presented in subsequent paragraphs. Nowhere in Africa were AICs more plentiful than in South Africa, especially around 1920s (Hastings, 1979). Perhaps this can be attributed to the religio-political situation of the day which was anchored on Dutch Calvinism and apartheid. The majority of the AICs in South Africa were Zionists. These churches attracted the poor African people in towns and had strong rural roots. Therefore, they had a direct response to the traditional needs of the people, and maximised aspects of the Christian tradition which belonged more to the early church (Hastings, 1979). The vast multiplicity of Zionism, originally emanating from “Zion City, Illinois”, but expanding and altering phenomenally in and after the 1920s under the leadership of men like Daniel Nkonyane and Paolo Mabilitso, was without doubt the central force within South African independence(Hastings, 1979:76). In 1925, Ignatius Lekganyane set up a Zion Christian church near Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal. The immediate effect of Transvaal Zionism was that it became the springboard for a quick leap to the north. Rhodesian workers at Pietersburg and on the Rand soon joined it, among them David Masuka and Samuel Mutendi. These two men were to become leading prophets and bishops in their own country (Hastings, 1979:76). They returned to preach in south eastern Rhodesia, at first in collaboration but then later became autonomous. The districts of Rhodesia around Fort Victoria became from this time fertile soil for the emergence of a multitude of “Zionist” churches. David Masuka became the first Zionist Preacher in Rhodesia and head of the Zion Apostolic church in South Africa. He died in 1950 and was succeeded by his son of the same name (Hastings, 1979:76). The church’s headquarters is in Bikita. In Buhera, it is led by one of the founder’s his sons, Bishop Ebisha Mariko Masuka and is the one who brought it from Bikita. Characteristically, the church is self124

financed and self-governed. These tenets influence the development of an entrepreneurial ideology among members of the church. Sources of financial capital and entrepreneurial activities ZAC members, form savings clubs which are only open exclusively to members of the church. These savings clubs also known as micro-credit clubs have proved their value in Buhera as one of the major sources of capital for small businesses. Church members organise themselves into groups helping each other by making social money available for entrepreneurship in their own environment. They make monthly subscriptions towards their revolving funds and members are encouraged to borrow the money which is returned with a 10 percent interest on their next meeting day. This is called fushai. Another significant source of capital for ZAC entrepreneurs is alluvial mining activities. The church encourages its members to engage in mining of diamond and gold to raise funds for their substance and business purposes. Micro-credit revolving funds boost financial resources of those who are in small business activities like catering, cross border trading, retailing, tuck shops, airtime vending, vegetable and fruit vending. From their savings, we witnessed an improvement in their buying power from the money which they spend on Market Days at Tapedzwa and Mutiusinazita every first Mondays and Tuesdays of the month respectively. Migrant workers in South Africa ( Majonijoni) This chapter mentions real cases illustrating entrepreneurial initiatives, individuals and groups from Buhera. From the research we discovered that real entrepreneurial activities were started by Obias the son of Ebisha Masuka Munyuki, Bishop of ZAC in Buhera who has been. Though Obias is not nationally popular, he is well known in Buhera communities under Chief Chamutsa and Chief Nyashanu. He was educated at Chabata Primary and Secondary Schools. After Ordinary level he started working as a herdboy in Gokwe, and later his employer initiated him in tilling business in 125

South Africa. Obias came back home and recruited his ZAC church mates and some other community members to work in South Africa. After opening his own Small and Medium business in tilling, building, retailing, and transport, Obias helped ZAC migrant workers members initiating business opportunities in South Africa as well as in Buhera communities of Chamutsa and Nyashanu. Migrant workers in South Africa (M ajonijoni) Educationally, the majority of the ZAC migrant workers in South Africa did not complete Ordinary Level. It is, therefore, not surprising to say that in South Africa they are full-time engaged in the informal sector business where there are no particular formal qualifications required. Sibanda and Maposa (2014:219), illuminate that, in post-colonial Zimbabwe, the informal sector has been regarded as a force of economic change and notably dominated by unemployed people who utilise their creativity to have a livelihood. The ZAC migrant workers copy skills to run their small businesses from seasoned entrepreneurs. These skills include purchasing and selling of goods, human resource management and stock taking. We noted that part of the ZAC migrant workers’ spirituality is working hard in generating financial resources and then come back home to develop their communities’ infrastructure. For the entrepreneurs, this is to develop a Zion in Buhera through improving the district’s social amenities. Commensuration of their spirituality and economic wellbeing is aptly put across by Sibanda and Maposa (2014:219): In fact, it must be realised that the informal sector is one of the avenues through which AICs have accumulated a lot of wealth and influence in society over the years in Zimbabwe. The sector is vital for two crucial reasons. First, the informal sector is a spring board for revealing the extent to which the ethic of labour in AICs can be realized and evaluated. Second, this sector is a platform on which a theology of reconstruction can be tested and discovered under the auspices of an economic engagement within the AICs in Zimbabwe. Most of ZAC South African based members’ economic status positively changed especially during the Zimbabwean crisis. They became popularly known as majonijoni in their communities. They 126

controlled most of the business enterprises in Chamutsa communities of Buhera. Their entrepreneurial success stories persuaded a lot of people to convert to this church. Obias and his legion constructed a big flamboyant church building at Nzinzima Mountain as a way of showing gratitude for the blessings they have received from God. The magnanimous donations Obias has made towards the development of the church and the community at large has resulted in outsiders calling ZAC “the church of Obias”. During Easter Festivals ZAC entrepreneurs give food handouts, clothes and money to the vulnerable members of the society like widows and orphans. ZAC entrepreneurs with a positive self-image are basically satisfied to be the type of people they are. This self-faith is even important especially when serious setbacks and failure occur in their day to day business ventures. Their faith makes them loyal to their church and its teachings, so they work hard to support it. Reflecting on the manner in which ZAC members carry out their entrepreneurial activities, it can be said that they are propagating social innovation ‘from below’. This is reinforced by Sherief (2008) who argues that the economic goals of an entrepreneur and the social goals of rural development are more strongly interlinked. For this reason entrepreneurship in rural areas is usually community based, has strong extended family linkages and a relatively large impact on a rural community. Communities are influenced by entrepreneurs and the subsequent actions create transformation of relationships, markets and the entire economy. The ZAC migrant workers necessitated the establishment and growth of cross border trade business in Buhera. To avoid loses in their business endeavours, the church’s prophets and leaders sanctified passports of the cross border traders with (holy water) known as muteuro (Mukonyora,1993:254; in Maposa and Sibanda, 2014: 220).Women constitute the majority of cross border traders, and they import wares for sale such electrical gadgets (fridges, stoves, cell phones and televisions), clothes, blankets and consumables. These commodities are regarded by the rural populace to be of good quality, and they pay fair prices when buying. In some instance the cross border traders allow their buyers to have a payment plan for 127

the purchased goods. This has created employment for women who run a good number of flea markets in Buhera. These entrepreneurs facilitated generation of foreign currency and importation of food stuffs which helped people sustain their hunger during Zimbabwe economic crisis period. Chiyadzwa Diamond At the peak of economic meltdown in Zimbabwe, digging of diamonds in Chiyadzwa started. The Chiyadzwa diamond rush began in March 2006. During the initial stages, mining was free for all (bvupfuwe) with police only serving to maintain law and order not interfering with the diamond mining. Chiyadzwa diamonds came one year after Operation Murambatsvina, therefore, the diamond rush was led largely by the jobless and homeless, the majority of whom were direct victims of Operation Murambatsvina (archive.kubatana.net/.../crd). People from Buhera also flocked the Chiyadzwa diamond fields en masse maybe among other reasons because Buhera and Marange share the same border. The ZAC members based in South Africa knew how precious these stones were so they encouraged their members to participate in digging either as individuals or as groups (syndicates). The diamond miners of ZAC preferred working in syndicates to individuals depending on trust, relationship, bravery, strength and area of origin. In their various groups, their collective strength enabled them to work hard getting more diamond gems. They shared equally whatever money they got from the sales. ZAC migrant workers offered reasonable prices for the stones from their fellow churchmates compared to barter trade in commodities such as bread, soft drinks, cigarettes, and clothes. This is because they had been conscientised of the importance of these stones by those who were already in diamond dealing in South Africa. They traded in diamond in the following ways: as individuals, as groups (syndicates), and as agents of South African buyers. The diamond trading was fairly done for there were no cases of cheating on the part of the ZAC buyers. By the time the government put a ban on diamond dealing, the ZAC members had gainfully benefited from the precious stones. 128

Retailing The following are the categories of entrepreneurs who run shops in Buhera: those who left cities because of Operation Murambatsvina of 2005, those who successfully got money out of diamond trading, those who abandoned South Africa due to xenophobia, those who are still working in South Africa and lastly Cross Border traders. At Birchenough Bridge Growth Point and Business Centres like Chitambo, are shops run by ZAC members. They have established new business centres like Tapedzwa and Tanyiswa. These shops sell groceries, car parts and hardware goods. A hive of business activities take place at the backyard of individual shops which include welding, carpentry, dressing making, motor mechanics, motor tyre maintenance, illegal fuel selling, hair salon and barber shops. From our findings, there is reduction in rural urban migration in Buhera due to employment opportunities which are created in the retail sector. These ZAC business enterprises have generated revenue for the country through payment of corporate tax. Thus in Shirief’s (2008) submission, entrepreneurial orientation in rural areas is based on stimulating local entrepreneurial talent and subsequent growth of indigenous companies. This in turn would create jobs and add economic value to a region. There are several tuck-shops established by members of ZAC in Buhera. From the research, we noted that, there are tuck-shops and a grinding mill in every village of Chamutsa chiefdom. Members bring the stuff to sell in their tuck-shops from South Africa except for groceries and liquor which can be quickly accessed at Birchenough Bridge. The ZAC work ethic is part and parcel of Buhera’s economic activities. It is a manifest extension of their mission which thrives on self-reliance. Through self-reliance whether it is South Africa or in Buhera, these entrepreneurs have become empowered in all spheres of their lives which has become a source of liberation and spiritual gratification (Sibanda and Maposa, 2014: 220). Transport services The road which links Murambinda and Birchenough Bridge with its corrugations, is one of the worst rural roads in Zimbabwe. Most 129

transport operators have abandoned it leaving the communities stranded. As a response to the crisis, Obias and other ZAC members, introduced lorries, minibuses and pick-up vehicles to transport passengers from Birchenough Bridge to Muzokomba Business Centre. More importantly, is easy transportation of patients from local clinics like Mutiusinazita, Chabata, Chapanduka and Gunura to hospitals like Murambinda Birchenough Bridge, Chipinge and Mutare for medical services. This has also served a long way in reducing maternal mortality deaths. Obias also took the initiative to maintain the Birchenough Murambinda road which is always in a bad state. Social responsibility of ZAC entrepreneurs As they realise that their businesses are growing, ZAC business people have done a lot to help their communities. Some of the Munyuki family members have an obligation of transporting school children to their respective learning institutions every morning. This initiative came after the realization that children from Gori, Tapedzwa and Marambeukama villages walk a total distance of around 20 kilometres to and from school. In addition, ZAC members have a scheme of paying school fees for orphans who are failing to raise funds for their education. This has helped in reducing number of drop outs in Buhera. There are a lot of social entertainment activities funded by members of the ZAC and one of them is sport, particularly soccer. More than twenty teams actively participate in various tournaments organized and sponsored by local business people, members of ZAC included. It was noted that the majority of these players are the rural unemployed populace. In tournaments, teams are given money for participation, and then larger shares go to the winning teams. This helps in managing idleness and laziness in various Buhera communities. Also, the soccer games have promoted oneness among villagers in different wards. It was observed that each time tournaments are held at Chitambo Business Centre, there are teams and their supporters from ward 27, 28 and 29. The games have united people from across the political divide especially ZAPU PF and MDC-T supporters who had been hostile to each other in 2008. 130

These activities are meant to draw people from their residential places to a one common place where there is selling of wares. The gatherings helped reducing anti-social activities such as theft, robbery, murder and promiscuity. There is a close bond between the church, entrepreneurship and social life. This brings to totality the African life which sees no distinction between religion and other spheres of life. Snags in ZAC entrepreneurship There are notable challenges associated with entrepreneurship propelled by the faith ZAC members. The church membership lack educational qualifications in business administration. There are some entrepreneurs whose businesses are making loses, but because of religious conviction, the owners would tend to use more religious arguments in their decision for entrepreneurship, even when the decisions have a negative influence on their commercial interests. Lack of professional skills in business administration among ZAC has fuelled mismanagement of their business funds. Apparently, from what we observed during research, this is one of the leading causes of economic crises in rural communities of Buhera. This can be well elaborated by Nyawo, Goredema & King’s (2012: 11) analysis of poverty exacerbation and economic despair in Chiyadzwa and surrounding areas during the Diamond era. They trio argues that those who participated in the mining of diamond are now broke simply because the money that came from Chiyadzwa was liquid and quick. In light of this problem, ZAC entrepreneurs need some professional business skills to run their businesses. In agreement with Petrin (1994), women entrepreneurs, as this research demonstrated with micro-credit groups, tend to work more in teams. They are less self-centred and personal ego to them is less important than success of the business idea they are pursuing. However, it should be stressed that women in Buhera encounter many constraints when trying to take part in the socio-economic transformation process. The gender issue in ZAC is usually a much stronger hindering factor to potential female entrepreneurs whose self-esteem and managerial skills are low. In a family set up, married women participate in day to day business of their retail shops, but 131

these shops are solely owned by men. Sometimes they are not consulted when men make decisions of their family business trajectories. Therefore, special programmes of assistance (technical and financial) to overcome these constraints should be developed and designed by the church to meet the needs of rural women in order to enable them to take an active part in entrepreneurial restructuring of their communities, to start to develop their own ventures, to expand their already existing businesses, or to function as social entrepreneurs since their number today is still below the potential one (Petrin, 1994). Also operating in groups has barred some ZAC members from being innovative. Sometimes the rural market requires them to independent financiers. So the spirit of competition is weak because of over reliance on their business groups. Conclusion The chapter had in mind, a faith-based reflection of entrepreneurship, social capital and development in Zimbabwe’s Buhera District. We found out that, there is an increasing connectedness between ZAC individuals as they carry out their entrepreneurial activities. This connection enhances the spread of business information and sharing of recourses within the social network. According to Heijboer (2013), when being embedded in a network of continuing social relations, it is easier to be successful, which makes the decision for entrepreneurship easier. As was demonstrated in this chapter, entrepreneurship is stimulated by social connections of religion which have provided platform for mobilisation of financial resources. In Buhera, ZAC entrepreneurial talent is visible in indigenous businesses especially at shopping centres. Subsequently, there is employment creation which has helped in improvement of standards of living in the communities of Chamutsa and Nyashanu chiefdoms. Hammond and Prahalad (2003) have forcefully argued that, “if we stop thinking of the poor as victims or as a burden and start recognising them as resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers, a whole new world of opportunity will open up”. Social responsibility is witnessed 132

in sporting activities and this has contained prevalence of anti-social activities such as theft, murder and promiscuity.

References Asare, K. 2013. Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity in Video films: Audience Reception and Appropriation in Ghana and the UK, A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in World Christianity, The University of Edinburgh. Burt, R. 1995. Structural Holes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chitando, E. 2005. “Naming the Phenomena”: The Challenge of African Independent Churches in Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae Church History Society of Southern Africa, Vol 31, no 1. Daly, M., & Silver, H. 2008. Social exclusion and social capital: A comparison and critique, Theory and Society, 37, 537–566. Dees, J.G., Haas, M. & Haas, P. 1998. The Meaning of “Social Entrepreneurship”, Kauffman Centre for Entrepreneurial Leadership and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, October 1998, pp. 1-6. Dorin, C. & Alexandru, G. S. 2014. Dynamics of the entrepreneurship concept: Literature review, The Annals of the University of Oradea. Gono, G. 2008. Zimbabwe’s casino economy: Extraordinary measures for extraordinary challenges, Harare: ZPH Publishers. Halpern, D. 2005. Social capital, Policy Press, Cambridge. Hammond, A., & Prahalad, C.K., 2003. Whats works: Serving the Poor, Profitably, White World Resources Institute, http://pubs.wri.org.pubs_content_print.cfm. Hastings A. 1979. A History of the African Church, 1950-1975, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heijboer, A. 2013. The Relation between Entrepreneurship and Religion, Differences in entrepreneurship participation among religions, Master Thesis, Erasmus Universiteit. Humbe, B. P. & Mawere, M. 2016. Intra and Inter-party Violence in Africa: Narratives and Reflections from Zimbabwe, In: Mawere, M. & Marongwe, N. (Eds), Myths of Peace & Democracy? Towards 133

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(Eds) Multiplying in the Spirit, African Initiated Churches In Zimbabwe, Nürnberg: University Of Bamberg Press. Turner, H. W. 1979. Religious innovation in Africa, Boston: G K Hall. Vurayai, S., & Muwaniki, C. 2016. Zimbabwe’s economic crises and the state of proffessionalism among rural secondary school teachers. Dzimbabwe Journal of Multidisciplinary Research, 1(1): 64-74. Zimunya, C.T & Gwara, J. 2013. Pentecostalism, Prophets and the Distressing Zimbabwean Milieu Prophets, Profits and the Bible in Zimbabwe, Nürnberg: University Of Bamberg Press Internet Sources http://www.ve.org.za/index.php/VE/article/view/285/808accessed 06/04/2016. archive.kubatana.net/.../crdaccessed 10/04/2016. (ifair.eu) accessed 11/04/2016. www.tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/unemployment-rateaccessed 29/03/2017. http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/zimbawe accessed 30/03/2017. https://www.southerneye.co.zw/2015/06/09/informal-sectoremploys-most-youthsaccessed 30/03/2017.

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Chapter Seven Zimbabwe Land Tenure Impact on Development and Justice Delivery Edmore Dube Introduction Land is inter-connected with the intricacies of human, animal and plant life as well as the spiritual and atmospheric realms. It is the spiritual home of the ancestors (whose ubiquitous habitats include land) making it the reservoir of intangible heritage; the source of chiefly spiritual and political authority as the visible guardian of the land. Economic wealth is inevitably buried beneath its surface, emanates from it or is carried on it. Land is, therefore, an invaluable resource whose positive exploitation leads to wholesome development. Justice requires those in power to ensure equitable access to the resource, in the absence of which the balancing institutions should take corrective measures. The pre-colonial Ndebele-Shona resort to corrective justice was disturbed at the close of the nineteenth century by the combined church-fortune seeker dishonest and manipulation for ideological ends. The discovery of mineral wealth in South Africa set the precedence for the collusion of fortune seekers and missionaries in Matabeleland for the rich South Africa Rand (the British terminology for new land full of gold) was thought to stretch to Zimbabwe. The dream for the Eldorado (Portuguese for new land full of gold) brought Rhodes and his associates to the land beyond the Limpopo. The Rudd Concession (1888), ‘an agreement intended as an exclusive prospecting license’ and mediated by members of the Christian clergy, turned out to be a façade for the annexation of the Zimbabwean land. Rhodes exposed his dishonest by setting up an armed contingent to take over the land of Zimbabwe in 1890. The church remained true to the ‘union’ by providing chaplaincy for the 137

Pioneer Column for which it was rewarded generously with large tracts of land. Banana (1996) calls the church a ‘land baron’ with no option but to contribute to the resolution of the crisis created by land seizures. The principle of ‘winner takes all’ was particularly crippling for the Ndebele-Shona economy. The annexation of land and expropriation of ‘royal herd’ dealt a sharp blow to the economic development of the indigenes. Once settled, the colonial authorities defined justice in terms of obedience to a law deliberately promoting ‘White only’ interests, and skewed in favour of ‘Black’ dispossession and emasculation. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 consolidated precious land seizures, squeezing locals into semi-arid sandy Reserves, where animal wealth was meticulously controlled by the Land Husbandry Act (1951). The Land Tenure Act (1969) further impoverished Blacks in a kind of ‘apartheid’ commonly referred to as ‘separate development’. The pent up anger resulted in the Second Chimurenga/Umuvukela2 (liberation struggle) complemented by massive land restitution exercises twenty years later. At independence in 1980, the government religiously committed itself to the ‘willingseller willing-buyer clause’ of the Lancaster House Agreement (1979) which gave birth to Zimbabwe, though it was not sufficiently resourced for that. After twenty years of agonisingly slow pace of land acquisition and redistribution to Blacks the indigenes took to ‘spontaneous’ countrywide land occupations with the tacit approval of the state. This ‘fast-track’ land reform programme like its colonial predecessors (Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and Land Tenure Act of 1969), had no compensation impacting negatively on its security of tenure as it remained fluid seventeen years on. Development was further stalled by lack of credit lines due to the problems of the ‘lease type’ of land tenure as opposed to the bank preferred ‘title deed type’. These land tenures were complicated by the concept of ‘mighty is right’, with those in power dictating the terms, taking the lion’s share, and disregarding any ‘voices of reason’ with impunity. Both land distribution and re-distribution have been sources of disharmony leading to a society divided on both racial and ethnic lines. The exclusive/selective land development model 138

preferred at various stages of land tenure in Zimbabwe has generally retarded development as it has led to contested forms of justice. The chapter intends to demonstrate that the colonial and postcolonial land reforms were flawed because of manipulation by those in power. Such manipulation impinged on justice and development, due to skewed access to resources including development capital. The approach is to juxtapose the coveted pre-colonial model of trusteeship with the colonial and post-colonial exclusive individual ownership and lease types. Each model is evaluated with respect to how balancing/corrective institutions or lack thereof impacted on justice and development. The idea is to show that holistic development is impossible without strong ‘balancing institutions’ able to stand up to political leadership on behalf of the voiceless. As shall become apparent, the church was a major let down. To begin with the chapter lays down the concept of development as proposed by this research. Development World Development Indicators or Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), imply that there are some adopted standards of human progression accepted/acknowledged the world over. The SDGs are aimed at the eradication of causes that negate them, which in our case are white-black land tenure systems fraught with a lot of irregularities as we shall soon discover in the subsequent sections on land tenures. These dual land tenure systems have juxtaposed two opposites with the lop-side being our concern for it runs in the face of the SDGs which state categorically: “No poverty; zero hunger; good health and well-being; quality education; gender equality; clean water and sanitation; affordable and clean energy; productive employment and economic growth; industry, innovation, and infrastructure; reduced inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; responsible consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life on land; peace, justice, and strong institutions and partnership for global development”. It is further observed that without deliberate provision of resources to all sectors of the community there is bound to be fragility, conflict, and violence. The various land tenures have particularly reserved capital 139

for the elite and the keen supporters in the game largely fostered by the White-Black racial dichotomy. Of particular interest on the list are “strong institutions” which would mediate any abuse of power. In the pre-colonial states there were territorial sprits (mhondoro) who as the guardians of the land would stand up to state authority to redress the wrongs (Schoffeleers 1979). This is why the spirit medium Mbuya Nehanda and Mukwati, the priest of Mwari (God) took leading roles to redeem the land from the usurping Whites. Development first of all represented harmony between the dead and the living within a defended homeland in which every person irrespective of status had rights protected by the spiritual realm, the overseer of the land. With the coming of Christianity, and colonialism with its secularisation the traditional means for addressing justice have been weakened, with the result that those in power now often go unchallenged. Feeble attempts by opposition groups do not amount to the authority once welded by the territorial spirits whose authority lay in their guardianship of the land. Mapfuva (2014) and de Villiers (2003) below deal with restitutive justice as a basis for development in former colonies. Justice Mupfuvi (2014: 9) notes that people have attachment to the land because of its “psycho-spiritual significance as the abode of ancestors and other natural resources”. In this case, justice dictates that where indigenous people have been forced off their ancestral land there is need to return to, live on and manage their ancestral lands. This kind of justice suits countries where colonists forced people off their land including Australia, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In such cases “land reform is generally accepted to mean restitution, redistribution and/or confirmation of rights in land to the benefit of the poor or dispossessed” (de Villiers 2003: 1). Restitution or redistribution of land empowers the indigenous people in their development agenda, since decongestion of communal lands gives them more space for development. If the state would go further and offer title deeds, as was the case with white-to-white policies, then the indigenous people would be able to access funds from banking institutions. Such capital would enable them to reverse the 140

disadvantages of the colonial era whose onset is outlined in the next section. Colonisation of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe was colonised as part of the general partition of Africa following the 1884-5 Berlin Conference which parcelled out the land of Africa to competing European interests like pieces of cake at a party without any regard to the owners of land (Kepel-Jones, 1993). The aim of the conference was actually to forestall conflict among European powers as they ravenously competed for stakes in Africa. This meeting was exclusively European though it was about Africa, which is justice upside down, for Zimbabweans in particular believe that it is imprudent to reach a consensus about someone not present (kugwakavirikugwanomukadziwousipo/It is fighting twice to fight with an absentee’s wife). What gave the impetus to the Zimbabwean case was the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886 and the subsequent British rivalry with Boers (The British Empire: Rhodesia). Because Cecil John Rhodes, a powerful British diamond magnate had missed out on the Rand, his combined love for British supremacy and fortunes led to intriguing land and mineral manoeuvres to exploit Zimbabwean wealth. It was his dream not only to multiply his personal wealth but also to spread British rule from Cape (where he eventually became premier) to Cairo. Rhodes used money and cajoling to whip up British administrative institutions in Southern Africa into line. He was able to get the support of the British high commissioner to South Africa, Sir Hercules Robinson, and the administrator of Bechuanaland, Sir Sydney Shipperd and his deputy, John Smith Moffat who were both ordained priests as well as other members of the clergy (Truschel 2015). The trust thrust upon missionaries by the British imperial authority became the most lethal weapon at Rhodes’ disposal. Moffat, a former member of the London Missionary Society (LMS), then representing British interests at Lobengula’s capital Bulawayo (as deputy administrator of Bechuanaland), and Charles Helm the interpreter of the Rudd Concession, were both respected members of the clergy who combined efforts to cheat Lobengula into signing 141

the Rudd Concession with exclusive mineral rights, instead of being a ‘balancing institution’. Charles Helm, the chief missionary in the country and interpreter of the negotiations, personally endorsed the document indicating that everything had been clearly and properly explained to Lobengula. While Rhodes managed to get exclusive mineral rights from Lobengula for a paltry fee, it was his ability through the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to buy off the Lippert Concession (1889) with exclusive land rights that ultimately carried the day, because the combination of the two formed a complete takeover. This outcome meant annexation of land with all its attributes. This package was attractive to mercenary fortune seekers who numbered nearly 200 despite Rudd’s promise of no more than ten white prospectors. Lobengula was not amused because he had given mining concessions before (Kepel-Jones 1993:76). The fortune seekers known as the Pioneer Column were attracted by the reward of mine concessions and large tracts of land amounting to 3000 acres utilised or unutilised. Thus, the initial principle of selective land tenure was laid outside Zimbabwe with the owners of the land oblivious of the intrigue. That was despite the Company Charter’s specification that the land belonged to the indigenous people and any land policy should encompass negotiations with local chiefs. Armed with the Charter the BSAC ignored the clause and went on to recruit volunteers with a preconceived formula of sharing the land, one of the best in Africa (The British Empire: Rhodesia; Chinamasa 2001:13). The company made effective use of the fact that the Crown had granted it “the right to exercise the powers of government, including the granting of land and the promotion of immigration” (Kepel-Jones 1993: 76) though those powers were to be exercised in liaison with local chiefs. John Mackenzie, a former member of the LMS teamed up with hunter, Fredreck C. Selous in mapping out a route that skirted Bulawayo from Bechuanaland, to avoid clashes with Ndebele regiments. The volunteers were further cushioned by the continued missionary support as chaplains of the occupation force, which in itself was a sufficient witness to the ‘legality and morality’ of the undertaking. Zvobgo (1996) argues that the missionaries, after receiving their land rewards for the job well done, remained 142

consultants of Starr Jameson, the leader of the Pioneer Column, who took cue from the missionaries to deal a fatal blow on the Ndebele once and for all in the 1893-4 Anglo-Ndebele war. This war completed the colonisation of Zimbabwe, for Lobengula and the Ndebele resistance were finally eradicated. The BSAC established an ad hoc committee [loot committee] led by Thomas Meikles to deal with the royal herd. Any livestock deemed to belong to the vanquished leader was taken and shared amongst the crown, the BSAC and the settlers using the principle of ‘winner takes all’. Land and farming (animal husbandry) were used here as weapons to weaken the adversary and strengthen the support base in a racial war. It was clearly a political tool to cultivate support in an uncertain environment (Chinamasa 2001: 1). In this manner with the creation of the state after the Anglo-Ndebele (1893-4) and the First Chimurenga/Umvukela (1896-7) wars, the whites institutionalised the land problem (Chitiyo 2001: 3). Whites legislated for the systematic removal of indigenes from their land, placing them in more barren areas loathed by whites. Competition for fertile land was thwarted by laws created by only one of the interested parties. In this way land tenure became a source of conflict. Land tenure as a source of conflict (1890-2016) The foregoing demonstrates that land [tenure] in the absence of balancing institutions to counter state authority and the colluding missionaries has been a source of conflict; a coveted political tool meant for the keen and kith including close political allies. As the subsequent sections will demonstrate, this remained true throughout the literary history of Zimbabwe. Of particular interest are that the ‘written legal’ documents which have been the most sardonic pieces of minority collusion authorising the use of land for political manipulation at strategic times in the nation’s history, making land property that could be bought and sold rather than territory to be defended. Pre-colonial Zimbabwe had the mhondoro institution operating through spirit mediums and priests of Mwari (God). These traditional officials reminded chiefs and kings to share the land resources in a just manner as their offices were vicarious to Mwari 143

and his mhondoro, the real guardians of the land, whose wrath state officials dreaded. Each household received a new piece of land for shifting cultivation once the old one was exhausted (Mupfuvi 2014: 30). Every household had a good chance of getting enough food from virgin lands, and for Maslow once one’s basic needs are met one can move towards self-actualisation through positive competition with others. In case of land appropriation by an external force the mediums and priests led the community in uprisings to reverse that process. This institution is today personified in medium Mbuya Nehanda and Mwari priest, Mkwati, who incited the ShonaNdebele to rise against British land usurpers in the First Chimurenga/Umvukela (1896-7). As discussed below, the colonial and post colonial land reforms have been sources of conflict as they fell short of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) in respect of the peasantry due to lack of balancing institutions. Pre-colonial Land Tenure In the pre-colonial era, the Shona-Ndebele communities used communal or customary land tenure systems in liaison with the mhondoro as discussed above. It was colonialism which brought with it individual or private land tenure. The Shona-Ndebele customary law did not have clauses for the sale of land because the chief or king was only a vicarious owner, making the Rudd and Lippert concessions fraudulent. The British government of Lord Salisbury tried to set aside the Rudd Concession precisely on the basis that even the king had no right to sell the land (Chitiyo 2001: 43). No one person could dispose of what the community as a whole was entitled to. The English Privy Council which examined the said concession/agreement decided that it was fraudulent and, therefore, illegal. Its basis was that for the Africans, land belonged to the dead, the living and the unborn, and therefore the living could not decide will nil to deprive the other two groups. Land was not a marketable asset but a secure shelter for nurturing families (FAO 2006). Even the Queen in her wisdom was shocked by the agreement and wrote to Lobengula, “A king gives a stranger an ox, not his whole herd of cattle otherwise what would other strangers have to eat?” 144

(Hansungule 2000: 327). For that reason, the Company Charter directed that land be re-negotiated with each chief the company came into contact with and not be assumed that it was a done deal on the basis of the Rudd Concession. Shona-Ndebele peasants enjoyed communal rights to land in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, enjoying the pieces of land they received from the chief who held the land in trust (Mupfuvi 2014: 30). Land was a source of being, a commonwealth whose possession was liberating (Lang 1985). This is because life emanates from, flourishes and ends on the earth, hence the term mwana wevhu/umtwana womuhlabati (child of the soil), the pillar of Shona-Ndebele cosmology. For that reason it remains a source of social security to date and even those who migrate to towns keep their pieces of land in the rural areas to fall on in times of trouble or retirement (Utete et al 2003). And yet, when the settlers came to Zimbabwe, they saw land as a productive asset providing security for investment, forgetting that it was other people’s birth right in which their umbilical codes and ancestral remains were interred forming the basis of ownership. They set aside the traditional balancing institution and appropriated every notable pre-colonial innovation including the Great Zimbabwe. Land Tenure during Colonial Period (1890-1979) Once settled in Salisbury [Harare] it became clear that the mines of King Solomon envisaged as part of the Eldorado did not exist, and to offset that the company started selling off land claims. Arrighi (1966:35) maintains that the BSAC’s overestimation of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources finally dropped after 1905. The BSAC had no other right to land apart from the fact that it ranked its fire power superior to that of the indigenous Shona people and comforted itself with the principle of ‘might is right’. The Rudd and Lippert concessions had no direct relationship with the Shona chiefs and had been superseded by the Company Charter (1889) which empowered local chiefs to participate in new land deals. But the chiefs were oblivious of their right granted to them by the ‘written’ charter and there were no balancing institutions to enforce the relevant clause. The church whose moral right to fairness was respected in London proved 145

partisan as a balancing institution, allowing the BSAC to use the Charter selectively. The various land tenures adopted by colonists from 1890 were clearly skewed in favour of Whites. The Whites gradually made use of the legislature which was to symbolize future race relations. In 1898 the BASC authorised the use of force to put blacks into ‘native reserves’. This was reinforced by the 1899 Order in Council. After the disposed black populations were settled on marginalised drought prone agro-climate zones of the country, “the settler government directed huge resources, that is, inputs, education, extension and markets towards white settler farmers” (Chinamasa 2001: 15; Musiiwa 2000: 3). But the settlers farmers who emerged as the most powerful and authoritative voice of the 1920s were still not satisfied and the land tensions remained, reaching fever heat in the middle of that decade forcing the new Responsible Government to appoint the Morris Carter Land Commission (1925) to neutralize the tensions. The recommendations of the commission resulted in the Land Apportionment Act (1930) which excluded blacks from private land ownership, but instead expropriated land to Whites to consolidate the government political power base. The Land Apportionment Act (1930) divided the land resources into two non-competing racial groups (Arrighi, 1966:41) resulting in inverse economic progression. The Act divided land into European and African sectors for separate development (Kramer 1998: 84), with African land communally owned and white land individually owned. Corporate development was not possible because Europeans had nothing to learn from the indigenous people who were still in the feudal stage, while they had passed through the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Any attempt would be like mixing oil with water. Eika Kramer notes that the feudal Africans were shoved into the ‘reserves’ which represented worn out and over-stocked lands. The native commissioner for Shurugwi [Selukwe] aptly observed, “Selukwe Reserve, pure sand veld throughout, is far too small for the natives settled therein” (NAZ, S1007/7). The request for more land by chief Nhema of Shurugwi was replaced by Alvod’s centralisation scheme which noted the native farming methods were wasteful and could only be improved by centralisation which would also ease collection of taxes 146

and reduce tax evasion. Such a blue print favoured the Whites as the governing authorities keen to maximise on tax collection, which inversely reduced Black capital for land development. This division of land was construed to ensure constant supply of labour for white enterprises so that their fortunes might grow at the expense of the Black economy, for the Blacks used to shifting cultivation were allocated permanent pieces of land in the drought prone infertile soils which were quickly exhausted. The other pull factor to the white farms (their erstwhile fertile lands) and the mines was the non-negotiable hut tax imposed by the coloniser. Worse still the unskilled labourers on the farms were further disadvantaged by the Native Registration Act (1936) which ruled that wages should be commensurate with human resources specialization determined by the racist employer, which amounted to exploitation of the indigenes. The indigenous population that remained on the designated land could be turned into peasant tenant-labourers who had no other resort to freedom as long as they were on the farms whose owners did not recognize their skills. They were “squatters on white lands” (Moyo 1990: 203) which was contestable justice. Enterprising natives of the reserves or Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) were further irked by the discriminatory market prices with regards the Maize Control Act (1931). Worse still, good infrastructure was concentrated in white areas. Such racially skewed land tenure was a denial of human rights/justice (Chinamasa 2001: 9). The Land Husbandry Act (1951) was bent on destocking the land to its carrying capacity to avoid environmental degradation. The contradiction that accompanied it was that Whites continued to alienate more land from the Blacks which meant a continuous flow of people into the already overcrowded reserves. It also meant a further cut on individual livestock to accommodate the new comers. The major concentration of destocking was on cattle, the symbol of wealth for Africans, which was provocative on the part of the colonial authorities. Land and cattle were important in Shona rituals, and the colonial authorities disturbed the close relationship between land, cattle, traditional religion and locals (Mupfuvi 2014: 9). A household was limited to five head of cattle with any extras been forcibly struck off the register. As a result 1 126 366 were deposed of 147

between 1946 and 1979, with instances where police confiscated cattle of those who resisted without compensation (Chitiyo 2001: 6). To thwart any resistance the act further empowered the Native Affairs Department to literally allocate pieces of land to individuals, thus expropriating the powers of the chief who held the land in trust for the community. White-Black land conflict stimulated African nationalism for conflict over resources results in strong collective action (Mupfuvi 2014: 9). From 1957 the pent up anger among the Africans resulted in the formation of such nationalist movements as the African National Congress, National Democratic Party and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) whose point of reference was the Land Husbandry Act (1951) in order to maximize on the resentments of indigenous people (African Nationalist leaders in Rhodesia). Things got worse with the victory of the party of the hardliners in 1963. The Rhodesian Front which represented the interests of white farmers was seized with an unstoppable momentum to acquire more land, further squeezing the indigenes into the impoverished Tribal Trust Lands. This resulted in the Land Tenure Act (No. 55) (1969) in which the minority tenure rights were protected by the constitution to forestall any legal challenge. White farmers were able to freely acquire “or purchase large tracts of land; easy access to financial resources (i.e. credit); provision of the basic agricultural research programmes and infrastructure development; and regulated agricultural sector, controlled prices and subsidies” (Chinamasa 2001: 23, Made 2000: 35). Whites took almost 50% of the land making “their pick of the land” in areas endowed with good rainfall and good soils (Palmer R. 1990: 163, de Villiers 2003: 5). Such a land tenure system was meant to expand the economic and political dominance of Whites. The German Development Institute (1977) estimated that 75% of land in the hands of whites should be redeemed to decongest the TTLs (de Villiers 2003: 6). Land Tenure in Post-colonial Period (1980-2017) The Lancaster House Constitution which ushered the independence of Zimbabwe included close 16 which cemented racial 148

inequalities by guaranteeing white farmers property rights for ten years. It indicated that land could only be acquired through willingseller willing-buyer basis in which case the seller would be paid in the currency of his choice deposited in the country of his choice. Even derelict land which for that purpose could be acquired for resettlement had to be paid for in the same manner at market value. Attempts by the masses to occupy commercial farms in the 1980s were thwarted by government. According to Chinamasa (2001: 33) attempts at land seizures in Matabeleland coincided with Gukurahundi (political unrest and massacres) (1982-87) resulting in violent removals to destroy the power base of the opposition PF ZAPU. As a matter of principle, accepting clause 16 at Lancaster was a great capitulation, for peasants wanted change while Whites preferred the status quo. Land reform was therefore the most pressing issue confronting the new nation (Palmer 1977: 246), with Mozambique deserted by white farmers at independence leading to poverty and unemployment serving as a stern warning (de Villiers 2003: 8). This left the white farmers as protected species with the result that by 1990 only 52 000 families had been settled representing only 32% of the projected 162 000 households. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation study (1986) recommended integration of resettlement with land upgrading and training, but by 1989 Zimbabwe still had no clear policy on land reform (Bratton 1990: 277). The rise of Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989) rekindled land as the political rallying point. The Land Acquisition Act (1985) noted that all land for sale was to be offered to the state first before it could be offered on the open market. Derelict land could be compulsorily acquired for the decongestion of the reserves (now called communal lands). This land redistribution was seen as a “restoration of a human right in accordance with international law” (Chinamasa 2001: 3). The Land Acquisition Act (1992) noted that the government was going to pay only for the improvements on the land based on the assessment of a government department whose assessment was 800% at tangent with that of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) (Moyo 2004: 4). Joseph Made (2000: 22) regrets that the government failed to institute land tax which would have forced the white farmers to sell off excess 149

land. The former farm workers, especially those subject minorities, residing on the farms were the greatest losers for they were driven off the land with the instructions to go back to their countries even though they might know only of Zimbabwe (Muzondidya 2007). The white farmers, United Kingdom, NGOs and churches saw the post1990 land reform policy as bereft of human rights. The radicalisation of the land policy was seen as related to the waning political fortunes of the ruling ZANU PF party. Having been on the farms for nearly a century, the European farmers had developed technical skills to efficiently run their enterprises even though this was often coupled with short changing the workers, salary wise. These were not skills to be ignored even by an unfriendly government, a war time adversary. For instance, at independence 6000 commercial farmers controlled 42% of the land of Zimbabwe, producing 80% which formed 90% of the marketed produce and employed 30% of the labour force (de Villiers 2003: 6). Between 1980 and 1999 agriculture contributed 40% of the exports, 18% of the GDP and employed 30% of the labour force. It formed nearly 60% of the industrial base and about 50% of the GDP depended directly or indirectly on agriculture (Moyo 2004: 1). Even independent of the Lancaster House land clause, it was pragmatic for the ZANU PF government to gradually address the status quo in order not to negatively affect foreign earnings. Once land redistribution lost steam ‘as a policy issue,’ there emerged a new class with more interest in acquiring land for itself rather than giving it to the peasants (Grant and McCarthy 1993: 34). Three hundred of these including ten cabinet ministers joined the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) giving it more weight and bargaining power. With the landless gradually becoming restless and the political base shaky, the government progressively accused the farmers and those producing agricultural inputs of profiteering for political reasons. The government forced farmers to lower their prices at the expense of inputs rise (Moyo 2004: 13). Twenty years into majority rule, the ZANU PF government found itself faced with three competing forces namely: a melting economy, a formidable opposition in the name of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and land hunger. After losing the 150

constitutional Referendum of February 2000 in which it sought to have the people approve land acquisition with the responsibility for compensation in the hands of the erstwhile colonial power, Britain, the government found its powerbase precarious. To reclaim its foothold the government resorted to violence letting loose the reserve force (war veterans), supporters and other security agents onto white owned farms and opposition strongholds. The War Veterans under ChenjeraiHunzvi effectively became “the military wing of ZANU PF in the war against commercial farmers” and the MDC and anybody with reservations about the move was attacked (Chinamasa 2001: 35). This subsequently resulted in legislation which created a framework for what came to be popularly known as ‘fast track’ land reform. It was called ‘fast track’ because of the swiftness and wide coverage accompanying it. This massive land restitution resulted in small, medium and large scale farms being allocated to ZANU PF heavy weights, securocrats and supporters (Moyo 2004, Palmer 1990:170- 175). For their part war veterans were promised 20% of resettlement space despite the fact that they numbered no more than thirty five thousand in a population of twelve million. The civilians expressed displeasure with the decision in respect of the fact the war veterans had already been compensated (Chitiyo 2001: 13). Makumbe (1999: 15) notes that “the elites have made effective use of the Lancaster house Agreement to feather their own nests”. Moyo (2004: 1) notes that “a significant drop in agricultural production and food availability in particular, and in economic activity in general have accompanied this change”. The April 2000 constitutional amendment to acquire land without compensation was seen by some as a violation of private property and equal protection before the law (Chinamasa 2001: 5). This was especially because the government refused a funded land reform process offered by foreign governments, NGOs, and the United Nations preferring the current process in order to thwart political opposition (Chinamasa 2001: 28). ZANU PF 2000 election manifesto was “Land is the economy, economy is land”. The manifesto was a revival of the liberation struggle primacy of land as the epitome of success. The theme fired ZANU PF supporters to drive out whites from their farms as a way of repossessing the means of production by the indigenes. 151

Expropriation of land can be financially cheaper but can impinge on democracy, economic development and stability if abused (de Villiers 2003: 3). The new farmers did not have their own stocks of equipment and the highly inflationary environment did not allow them to acquire new equipment. By 2000 the CFU was estimated to have 24 000 tillage units and the District Development Fund (DDF) set to take over tillage at this point had only 789 tractors of which 47% were non-runners. This was worsened by the fact that 40% of the new farmers had no single animal for draught power (Moyo 2004: 20). The most valid assumption at this moment was that they could render the most coveted political support. This worked against food security. There was policy deficiency on the protection of endangered species as well as forests by the new farmers especially those into tobacco farming. There was also uncontrolled gold panning in the occupied areas and there were no inceptives for the protection of the environment. According to Chinamasa (2001: 1), land has continued to exude contested relations economically, socially and politically since the nineteenth century. To date, it remains a tool for political manipulation at strategic intervals, though one cannot rule out genuine demand for land as it was one of the main reasons for the liberation struggle (Chung 2007). In an agro-based economy like Zimbabwe, land is an economic resource connected to human dignity and therefore individuals dance to the tune whenever it is dangled in their favour by those in power. Land hunger has been successfully used by ZANU PF to rejuvenate political appeal in the face of the MDC. They have successfully done this through ‘primitive accumulation’ in which the military, police and prison operations have been rewarded handsomely through both land and its mineral wealth (Moore and Mawowa, 2010). Jambanja (violence) has been used as a tool for the exclusion of the majority from a share of the national wealth (Moore, 2005). Jambanja is not only an ‘exclusionary’ but a ‘disciplinary’ device too (Sachikonye 2005: 12). Like its predecessor, the ZANU PF government has worked without a balancing institution; but unlike its predecessor whose undisputable power eventually rested with the party of farmers, the current party and government has one centre of power vested in the 152

hands of one person, the President. No controlling power can stand up to him for he even has legislative powers and is immune to prosecution. This has particularly become prominent in the secessionist mantra for political control since 2013. Land as a political tool Land was manipulated as political tool which negated both justice and development since 1890. As the white farmers formed the bastion of colonial authority they were sardonically allocated more and more land despite Africans clamouring for a share in light of continued deprivation. The party of farmers, Rhodesia Front, would rather face international isolation as a consequence of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965) rather than give in to the African grievances on land and development. As a corollary, when the white farmers and their kin and kith bowed their heads in defeat in 1980 they were told by the then Prime Minister, Robert Gabriel Mugabe: “The wrongs of the past must stand forgiven and forgotten” (Raftopoulos 2005: x), only to have those wrongs re-ignited when the ruling party’s political fortunes plummeted. Both the colonial and post-colonial governments left no room for a balancing institution once political pressure mounted on them with land as the centre or pivot. Written land codes have been partisan. The Rudd-Lippert concessions were the harbingers of all colonial legislations favouring whites only. The Lancaster House Agreement (1979) which ended the Second Chimurenga/Umvukela 2 had a prohibitive clause 16 which perpetuated skewed development while squeezing the other side. The post-independence Land Acquisition Acts that sought to correct the imbalance were clearly ‘Black affirmative acts’ which grew in their intensity in that direction resulting in the amendment of the constitution in April 2000. To its credit ZANU PF final managed to have its view of the land close inserted in the 2013 constitution laying to rest any hope of a balanced dialogue on the issue leading to a consensus on the justness of the land law and the manner in which it can be maximized to improve wholesome development. The lease type of land ownership has continued to attract no major funding. 153

Instead the title deed type afforded whites during the colonial era attracted a lot of capital from the financial institutions leading to a great boom among settlers. If the independence government had done the same for medium scale black farmers such a move would have unlocked funding and led to indigenous development. As it is the new land policy like its colonial predecessor (1890-1979) has not been a panacea for black empowerment. Consequently blacks remain poor and struggling - arguably worse off strugglers than their colonial counterparts. Land policy has had an incipient slur towards violence. Blacks were violently removed from their better endowed lands by the colonial administrations. Some blacks resisted such removals leading to protracted violence. In that regard the Tangwena people stand out prominently. The land occupations in the 1980s attracted a lot of force, particularly in Matabeleland where ZANU PF squared up with PF ZAPU. Yet with ZANU PF losing the referendum in 2000 it resorted to the violent implantations of its supporters on the white farms whose owners were given summary notices to unconditionally leave their farms to the ‘new owners’ with all equipment intact. Those who resisted were harmed, sometimes mortality. The best lands endowed with fertility and lavish modern equipment tended to fall into the hands of the political elite. Even then, without credit lines because of the lease type of the current land tenure, development generally plummeted, with the result that most productive lands of the colonial era have become derelict. Zimbabwe, ‘the bread basket of Southern Africa’ has become a perennial importer of food ever since the ejection of white farmers beginning 2000. The land tenure in Zimbabwe has had unfortunate losers. Colonial policy has disadvantaged Africans, both indigenes and subject minorities, especially from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The latest land tenure has further disadvantaged the subject minorities who forfeited both their lowly paid jobs on the farms and chances to be resettled on their former labouring farms. These have generally become paupers, losing the little income that they had through labouring on the farms. For them the current land tenure has been a regression, an antithesis of their expectations.

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Justice and development associated with land tenure have, therefore, always been contested, for land tenure has always been interested leaving losers with justification to lambast it. This is so because “in general a nation cannot be an individual or a select group of individuals and communities that define history… to the exclusion of a significant portion of individuals, families, communities and ethnicities” (ZCBC, EFZ & ZCC, 2006: 16). For there to be justice and development, the land tenure codes must subscribe to the ‘common good.’ This “common good is the sum total of all those conditions of social living – i.e. economic, political, social, cultural and technological…which make it possible…to fully achieve their natural potential…” (ZCBC, EFZ & ZCC, 2006: 22). In this case the ‘fast track’ land tenure cannot be the ‘last word’ on land tenure because of its exuberance towards intolerance and exclusion (Sachikonye 2005). Since the current exclusionary land tenure has led to food insecurity and increased importation in a nation suffering from liquidity crunch, Sachikonye’s projection may not be farfetched. Conclusion This chapter concludes that balancing institutions only pertained to pre-colonial land tenure and from then on land tenure became a serious source of conflict with no resort for those on the lop-side. The ‘written law’ has been deliberatively crafted as an exclusionary and disciplinary tool for those on the other side of the political line or not well connected with the ruling elite. Land has, therefore, been used for political manipulation at strategic times in Zimbabwe’s history, making land property that could be bought and sold rather than territory to be defended. The various colonial and post-colonial land tenures known to date have fallen short of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) in respect of the peasantry normally at the reverse end of the beneficiation continuum. Consensus is recommended as the most positive way of harnessing holistic energy for wholesome development. To achieve consensus there is need for strong, independent and professional balancing institutions.

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References Arrighi, G. 1966. “The Political Economy of Rhodesia,” New Left Review 39, pp 34-65. Banana, C. S. 1996. Politics of Repression and Resistance: Face to Face with Combat Theology, Gweru: Mambo Press. Bertus de Villiers, 2003. Land reform: Issues and challenges: A comparative overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Bratton, M. 1990. “Ten years after: Land redistribution in Zimbabwe: 1980-1990”, In: R. L. Prosterman, M. N. Temple and T. M. Hanstad, Agrarian reform and grassroots development: Ten case studies, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cary R. and Mitchell D. 1951. African Nationalist leaders in Rhodesia: Appendix VII the Land husbandry Act (1951). Chinamasa, M. G. 2001. “The human right to land in Zimbabwe: The legal and extra-legal Resettlement Processes”, Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements of the Degree of LLM: Human rights and Democratisation in Africa, Faculty of Law Makerere University Uganda. Chitiyo T. K. 2001. ‘Land violence and compensation,’ . Chung, F. 2007. Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe, The Nordic Africa Institute: Weaver Press. Grant, L. and McCarthy, J. 1993. African experiences in rural land reform: Focus on Kenya, Zimbabwe and Namibia, Report 4 Urban Foundation. Hansungule, M. 2000. “Who Owns Land in Zimbabwe? In Africa?”), International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 7, Kluwer Law International pp.305-340. Keppel-Jones, A. 1993. Rhodes and Rhodesia: The white Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884 – 1902, Ontario: McGill-Queens University Press. Kramer, E. 1998. “A clash of Economies: Early Centralisation Efforts in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1929-1935”, Zambezia, xxv (i):8397.

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Made, J. M. 1998.”Agrarian Reform and Peasant’s Organisations”, Zimbabwe Post independence Public Administration, Management Policy Issues & Constraints, Harare. Makumbe, J. W. 1999. The political dimension of the land reform process in Zimbabwe, Harare: University of Zimbabwe. Masiiwa, M. 2000. Land Reform in Zimbabwe Views and Recommendations, Harare: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Moore, D. S. 2005. Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe, Harare: Weaver Press. Moore, D. and Mawowa S. 2010. “Mbimbos, Zvipamuzis and ‘primitive accumulation’ in Zimbabwe’s violent mineral economy,” in Padayachee V. (Ed), The Political Economy of Africa, London: Routledge. Moyo, S. 2004. A Review of Zimbabwean Agricultural Sector following the Implementation of the Land Reform: Overall Impacts of Fast Track Land Reform Programme, AIAS, monograph, Harare: African Institute of for Agrarian Studies. Muzondidya, J. 2007. “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 33 (2):325-341. Palmer, R. 1977. Land and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia, Berkeley: University California Press. Palmer, R. 1990. “Land reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990”, in African Affairs 89 (355), pp.163-181. Raftopoulos, B. 2005. “Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe,” in Raftopoulos B. and Savage T. (Eds) Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, Harare: Weaver Press, pp. viii-xxii. Sachikonye, L. M. 2005. “The Promised Land: From expropriation to reconciliation and Jambanja”, In: B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (Eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, Harare: Weaver Press, pp.1-18. Schoffeleers, J. M. (Ed). 1979. Guardians of the Land: Essays on Central African Territorial Cults, Gweru: Mambo Press. Truschel, W. L. 2015. “Rudd Concession 1888”. www.WorldHistory.Biz.

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Utete, C. M. B. et al. 2003. Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee: Main Report, 1, Harare: Government Printers. ZCBC, EFZ & ZCC, 2006. The Zimbabwe We Want: Towards the National Vision for Zimbabwe, Harare: Print Works. Zvobgo, C. J. M. 1996. A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 18901939, Gweru: Mambo Press. Government Publications NAZ, SRG1/INT4, Annual Report of Agriculturalist, 1928. NAZ, S1007/7, Miscellaneous, Selukwe Reserve, NC, Selukwe .to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 3/2/31.

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Chapter Eight ‘The Tarnished Jewel?’ Post- Independent Zimbabwe Tag under the Reign of Robert Gabriel Mugabe Ephraim Matanda & Nyasha Madzokere Introduction The Zimbabwean dollar first came into being in 1980-the year our country got its independence from its colonial power, Great Britain, and substituted its predecessor, the Rhodesian dollar at equal value. At the time of its introduction, the Zimbabwe dollar was worth more than the United States dollar with the Zimbabwe dollar valued at 0.68 to the United States dollar. It was against this backdrop coupled with euphoria of independence that the late highly honourable statesman, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania warned his ally, Robert Mugabe, at his inauguration as the new Prime Minister of Zimbabwe on the 18th of April, 1980 at Rufaro Stadium in Harare, “You have inherited the jewel in Africa, but never tarnish it” (Good, 2002; Madzokere & Matanda, 2015; Madzokere, 2017). A chronicle of the events that characterised the post-independent Zimbabwe depicts a doom-cum gloomy picture of the rhetoric envisaged inheritance as was prophetically purported at independence by Julius Mwalimu Nyerere at the birth of the Zimbabwean nation. Over the years, the ‘jewel’ was getting ruined mainly due to political instability, policy inconsistencies, economic meltdown, health hazards, dilapidated infrastructure, cultural and religious erosion, crippled and constrained education system, a chaotichaphazard-violent and politically motivated Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) coupled with massive mismanagement of resources which saw the economy gradually moving away from the jewel dispensation to a tarnished status. However, literature in existence on the research area at hand depicts two formidable schools of thought pertaining to the appropriate designation of Zimbabwe in 159

the post-independent era, namely the progressive and retrogressive. It was against this background that the present chapter sought to examine the post-independent Zimbabwe experience that culminated into the ‘tarnished jewel’ status of a once prosperous and promising emerging nation. Firstly, the chapter analyses the country’s policy on health which sounded a promising dream but which turned a nightmare. Secondly, the chapter assesses the education sector to show that it has drastically deteriorated from ‘glory to gloom’. Thirdly, the chapter assesses the country’s policy on land redistribution which instead of boosting food security has dwindled food production. Fourthly, the chapter evaluates the economy of Zimbabwe which in 1980 was in its economic ‘boom’ but now in its economic ‘doom’. Fifthly, the chapter examines the politics of Zimbabwe which fits the emblem, ‘political turbulence’. Sixthly, the chapter interrogates religion in Zimbabwe which has been infected by the bacteria tagged, ‘religio-social erosion’. Seventhly, the chapter examines the housing crisis in the country from 1980 till now. Eighthly, the chapter discusses the unemployment nightmare in the country since independence. Last but not least, the chapter examines the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe in the post-independent era. Health for All Policy by the Year 2000 The World Health Organisation (WHO, 1981) argues that the country had targeted health for all by the year 2000. The health sector before the attainment of independence in 1980 was poorly funded and had very few distant clinics and hospitals nationwide with at least one health centre per communal area. Most of the people in rural areas had to walk an average of about 15km to get to a health centre for services when need arose whilst there were very few health centres in towns. At the attainment of independence, the number of health centres increased and generally people had to walk at least 10km to get to a health centre. On this note, credit should be accorded to massive health funding that was availed by the former colonisers-Great Britain together with additional funding from the European Union (E.U) and the rest of the world. The Policy to have ‘health for all people by the year 2000’ was immensely pursued 160

between 1980 and 1989 when the government was still following the socialist ideology of development, led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China (Madzokere & Matanda,2015; Matanda & Madzokere, 2015). However, when the socialist ideology collapsed in 1989/90 after its defeat by capitalism led by United States of America (USA) and Great Britain, the health ideology adopted in 1980 tumbled. The country in 1990/1991 adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was a capitalist ideology that saw health facilities becoming very expensive and unaffordable by the majority of the citizens. For a detailed analysis of the consequences of ESAP check Matanda and Madzokere (2015). This development led to most vulnerable citizens falling victims to pandemics such as HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, cancer and water-borne diseases. According to Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZIMSTATS, 2005/06), HIV and AIDS saw the number of child/female-headed households in urban areas and rural areas shoot from 23% to 29% and 39% to 43% respectively between 1996 and 1999.This was enough testimony that the ‘health for all Policy by the year 2000’ had turned out to be a nightmare. The Zimbabwean Education System The pre-independence education in Rhodesia was a bottle-neck education system mainly between 1960 and 1980 which saw only children from well-to-do families getting into the secondary school sector after a rigorous primary education. The system operated as a two-tier education system made up of the F1 and F2 secondary school sector. A discriminatory selection for the F1 (academic) system was used, with children in a number of primary schools writing a series of vetting examinations to qualify for entry into the system .Only those children who were very strong in English Language and Mathematics in particular proceeded to the F1 education system, was purely academic. Those who had bias towards practical subjects were fed into the F2 secondary education system (ZIMSTATS, 2005/6). However, places were very limited in secondary schools, year in year out and hence the name ‘bottle-neck 161

education’. This education system was totally colonial, discriminatory and biased in nature. The Zimbabwean government at independence in 1980 advocated for ‘free education and education for all’ regardless of people’s race and ethnic origin (Matanda & Madzokere, 2015; Madzokere & Matanda, 2015).This was a welcome development and the country’s education was massively boosted. Therefore, through funding by Great Britain, E.U and multi-lateral institutions such as United Nations and United Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF), upper tops (rural-day secondary schools) were built nation-wide mainly between 1980 and 1990. These rural-day secondary schools saw most children above schoolgoing age being accorded an opportunity to access both primary and secondary education. The government went a step further to provide science, agriculture and home economics equipment to these ruralday secondary schools nationwide. This development also led to massive secondary school teacher-training programmes which saw the construction of quite a number of secondary school teachers’ training colleges. Initially, these upper tops were manned mainly by qualified primary trained school teachers together with some Ordinary Level certificate holders, referred to as temporary teachers. However, the majority of the temporary teachers employed by the government did not hold the minimum five subjects needed to constitute a complete Ordinary Level certificate. The major weaknesses of this education policy were that the pioneer products of such a development included very high failure rates, massive expenditures of resources on the part of both the government and parents. This quantitative approach to education compromised the quality of the product which has had long term effects on the growth and development of the economy. The concept of ‘education for all’ was also manifested through massive investment in tertiary education which led to the establishment of at least a polytechnic college per province by the year 2000. Before independence in 1980, the country had a single state university namely-the University of Zimbabwe. By the year 2000, the government had established five more state universities, a development that also attracted private players such as Africa University (AU), Solusi University (SU) and of late Catholic 162

University of Zimbabwe (CUZ), Reformed Church University (RCU) and Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University (ZEGU). The government has taken the policy further to the extent that at least one state university should be established per province. As the tertiary education sector was greatly expanding, the industry and commerce sector of the economy was folding at an incredible rate, a scenario that created massive unemployment in the country. This is the time when ‘certificates are losing glory’ hence the caption, ‘glory to gloom’ better explains the post-independent education system (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). The end result of such an economic meltdown was a serious ‘brain-drain’ which saw an exodus of skilled and specialized personnel living the country for greener pastures in the SADC region and beyond. Breeding and Fast-tracking Food Crisis The pre-independence food production was massive as early as 1970. The land allocation for agriculture activities had 555 493 square km under large scale and 5579 square km under small scale farming. This followed the division of the country into five farming regions according to the nature of the agriculture activity that best suited the geographical area in question .Regions 1,2 and 3 were mainly for crop production while regions 4 and 5 were reserved for animal husbandry. The land allocation for agriculture increased from 55 493 to 664 884 square km by 1979. At independence in 1980, commercial agriculture occupied 574 832 down from 590 595 square km mainly due to the Resettlement of small scale farmers (ZIMSTATS, 2005/6). The country was given the Food Security portfolio in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, and hence Zimbabwe came to be known as the ‘bread basket’ of Southern Africa because of its capacity to produce food for itself and other SADCC countries. The government at attainment of independence in 1980 massively funded the agriculture sector and resettled small-scale farmers with the hope of industrialising it, so that in its growth strategy it was going to pull other economic sectors alongside it. However, the poor resettlement programme pursued by the government saw large scale agriculture decrease further down to 163

494 981 square km while small scale agriculture dropped from 74 289 in 1975 to 70 409 square km in 1990 (Ibid). This post-independence land re-distribution affected commercial crop production in regions 1, 2 and 3 as well as cattle ranching in regions 4 and 5. This development culminated into reduced exportation of agriculture products such as tobacco(green leaf) ,cotton, sugar, fruits, tea and beef which used to be the country’s ‘cash cows’. On the other hand, agriculture funding rose from $59.55 million in 1970 through $164.075 million in 1980 to $3 414.611 million in 1995 and $8 866.303 million in 1999 but production was retrogressive, following an undulating curve especially between 1970 and 1980, rising in 1985 and falling gradually again from 1770kg per hectare in 1990 to 1087 kg per hectare by 1999 (ZIMSTATS, 2005/6). The factors attributable to this dwindling pattern of production included: lack of expertise and capacity building, excessive droughts experienced in 1982, 1987, 1992 compounded by some floods in certain seasons. The year 2000’s chaotic Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) generally called Jambanja (Sachikonye, 2003, Sachikonye, 2005) coupled with the absence of the Rule of Law on the land (lawlessness) saw the war veterans and associates violently displaced the productive white commercial farmers strongly backed by the government. The majority of the displaced white commercial farmers left the country for neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Zambia where they are performing wonders in food production. The bread basket nation has now turned into a bread case, what a nightmare! The FTLRP of 2000 was then followed by 2007-08 economic meltdown which totally crippled and paralysed the whole economy, hence in Allan Paton’s language Zimbabweans are crying for their ‘beloved country’ (Paton, 1948). The situation in the country during this dire, turbulent and politically volatile period culminated into serious starvation of the masses, massive displacements, deaths mainly due to malnutrition and politically motivated violence. Paradoxically, the Government of Zimbabwe is following up on the same commercial farmers in countries such as Zambia and Mozambique that they violently removed from the farms to buy grain for feeding the nation.

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From Economic Boom to Economic Doom Before independence in 1980, the country’s economy had a good network system, stable currency, good foreign policy, high employment levels, and well-regulated property rights as well as a reliable source of foreign currency from exports of estate plantation products and commodities such as tea, coffee, citrus fruits, sugar, tobacco (green leaf), cotton and maize (Good, 2002) Foreign currency was also generated from minerals and beef which were sold to United Kingdom and other European Union (EU) countries (ZIMSTATS, 2005/6). At the attainment of independence in 1980, the Rhodesian dollar was replaced by the new Zimbabwean dollar on a one-to-one basis, a new currency that traded at 68cents to the US dollar and was only second to the British pound in value the worldover, as noted in our introduction. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) accorded Zimbabwe the region’s Food Security Portfolio as it had the capacity to produce food for its own consumption as well as excess for neighbouring countries in the region. The country operated on the basis of five agricultural regions such that Regions 1, 2 and 3, mainly with alluvial soils which were reserved for crop and fruit production and Regions 4 and 5 were for cattle ranching (Ibid). This land allocation guaranteed the country a reliable source of foreign currency for economic growth and development from sales of beef, fruits, cotton, tobacco and agricultural commodities such as tea, coffee and sugar developed countries, as earlier on alluded to. The period 1980-90 saw the government pursuing a socialist ideology of development that was led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China as once noted above. The areas that were targeted for initial development included the national road network, clinics and hospitals, schools, dams and irrigation schemes, tourism and hospitality industry, industry and commerce sector as well as instituting critical government parastatals. The funding of the above economic factors was by the Eastern Block led by Russia, China and Western countries such as former colonial master Great Britain, and EU, USA and foreign direct investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) transnational corporations (TNCs). Before 165

long thereafter, socialism was defeated by capitalism in 1989/90 and the country had no option except to reverse back to capitalism (the case of neo-capitalism). Hence, in 1990/91 the government dumped the socialist ideology and adopted neo-capitalism in the form of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), followed by Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Structural Transformation (ZIMPREST).The major parameters on which these programmes were premised were market and trade liberalisation, rationalisation of the civil service and enhancing protection and preservation of property rights (ownership of the means of production), among other things (Ibid). The programmes were funded by African Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by MNCs (multinational corporations) and TNCs (transnational corporations), domestic financers, foreign aid and credit lines from bilateral and multilateral relationships (Matanda & Madzokere, 2015). The government instead of putting the financial resources attained into good use, engaged in corruption, nepotism, misallocation of resources, self-enrichment of leaders and theft by conversion, as well as ballooning government expenditures through buying ministers and senior government employees luxury cars, hefty salaries and regular travels abroad at the expense of funding the programmes that were intended to take the economy a leap forward. The impact of such government actions on the economy was in the form of high cost of living among the general populace in the form of high school and tertiary tuition fees, unaffordable health facilities, disease pandemics-HIV & AIDS, cholera, typhoid and skyrocketing general price levels in the economy (Ibid). The Food Security Portfolio accorded the country at independence became a nightmare. The industries crowded out of the country in the period 1994-1999, fuel shortages became a serious cause for concern and the black/parallel market emerged leading to nose-diving of the formal financial sector. The situation was made more compounded when in November, 1997, the government was forced by the war veterans to pay them a compensation gratuities for services rendered before 1980 to liberate the country (Ibid). The government ended up making a once-off payment of $50 000 and $2 000 each month for each of the beneficiaries. Genuine and ‘bogus’ 166

war veterans gobbled the nation of such huge amounts of money to the total ruin of the country’s economy a scenario which saw the Boka Merchant Bank exiting the market after it had been directed to finance the gratuities hoping to be reimbursed later. In the period 2000-2008, the economy of the once jewel nation went through turbulent times. The precipitating factor was the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme (FTLRP) which saw the war veterans invade white commercial farmers. This is generally referred to as Hondo yeMinda/Third Chimurenga or Jambanja (Sachikonye, 2005). It was designated so because of the violent nature of the programme which displaced most of these white commercial farmers. Most displaced farmers sought refuge in the neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique. Ironically, we are currently buying (importing) food from these two countries which were once relying on Zimbabwe for food during the ‘glory times’ of 1980s. The financial sector tumbled astronomically and saw a number of banks close down (surrender their licences) or be placed under curatorship, by the Central Bank in the period (RBZ, MPS, 2012). The banks failed to meet minimum capital requirements and the labour market became over-flooded with skilled and specialised personnel from local poly-technical colleges and universities. The political landscape saw most vulnerable people die of starvation, kwashiorkor, and other mal-nutrition related diseases in the period 2007/8. Some perished because of political victimisation and violence especially before, during and after elections. Zimbabwe held a series of violent and flawed elections from years 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and the most recent 2013. People were massacred mercilessly to render the country a ‘wounded’ society typical of Gukurahundi in 1981-7 (Todd, ibid; Coltart, ibid). The political violence, hate speech, tyranny and cruelty were very detrimental to a once ‘beloved country’ to render it a typically polarized state (Paton, ibid). The state of economy collapsed-roads, clinics, hospitals and schools failed to operate totally implying signs of a typically ‘crippled and dilapidated’ society. Those residing in cosmopolitan cities (urban dwellers) could not access water, food, and electricity and health facilities nor sent their children to crèches, schools, colleges or universities. Everything was beyond the reach of many citizens so many resorted to travel by 167

night to Musina, the border town of Republic of South Africa to buy foodstuffs hence Zimbabwe lost most of its skilled and specialized workforce to the neighbouring countries in particular (Botswana now a ‘beggar’ in another country. Brain-drain became rampant and the economy lost most of its skilled workforce to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana and even abroad to countries such as United Kingdom and United States of America- a scenario which may take generations to correct. Political Turbulence Before the attainment of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was ruled by the European colonial race headed by Ian Douglas Smith of the Rhodesian Front Party. The Zimbabwean nationalists initially formed Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo (Father Zimbabwe) of the Ndebele clan (Msipa, 2015). Some years later a splinter group was formed by the Shona clan which then formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under the leadership of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole in 1963.The splinter group then undertook an uprising against the Smith regime so as to liberate their motherland from colonial rule. This uprising was called “Second Chimurenga” and was massively supported by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China and other African countries such as Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique. Another Shona splinter group which came to be known as ZANU Patriotic Front (PF) was formed in 1975 led by Robert Mugabe. This group was an offshoot from ZANU and the remainder was renamed ZANU-Ndonga and remained under the leadership of Rev Ndabaningi Sithole. Because of the pressure from various angles, Smith then called for a general election in early 1979 and his party-the Rhodesia Front (RF) contested against the United African National Congress (UANC) headed by Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa. The UANC won the election and hence Bishop Muzorewa became the new Prime Minister of the newly named country, Zimbabwe Rhodesia (Msipa, 2015). The three major parties on the land namely ZAPU, ZANUPF and ZANU-Ndonga which did not participate in the early 1979 election because of disgruntlement of the union between UANC & 168

RF kept their fighting stance on against the new regime. This led to the calling of the December 1979 Lancaster House meeting in United Kingdom chaired by the colonial masters. The main parties namely RF, UANC, ZAPU, ZANU-PF and ZANU-Ndonga were represented at this meeting which came up with the Lancaster House Constitution for the nation. A new election was called on the 27th March, 1980 which was supervised by United Nations and was won by Robert Gabriel Mugabe of ZANU-PF who became the executive Prime Minister supported by a ceremonial President in the person of Reverend Canaan Sodindo Banana (Msipa, 2015). The nation welcomed the political transition with a lot of ululation and jubilation which however was short-lived because of political blunders which followed (Madzokere, 2017). The period 1981-7 saw the Mugabe regime committing some series of political disasters namely Gukurahundi, advocating for One-Party state, chewing the leadership code, massive amendment of the Lancaster House Constitution and creating executive powers for the President. Immediately after independence in 1980, there were some great political disturbances due to Gukurahundi (the rain that washes away the chaff) which led to the massacre of more than twenty thousand civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands regions by the Fifth Brigade trained by the notorious North Korean soldiers under the instruction of the Mugabe regime (Msipa, 2015, Todd, 2007, Madzokere, 2017). There are two schools of thought to this development which are: the pro & anti-Mugabe. The pro-Mugabe school argues that the Gukurahundi was instituted to quell the dissidents who were mercilessly killing the civilians in the Matabeleland region. The same school has it that the Joshua Nkomo camp planted some ammunition on the farm in Matobo in 1982 in order to topple Mugabe from power. The antiMugabe school argues that Gukurahundi was instituted by the Mugabe regime as a political strategic move to totally silence Joshua Nkomo and his party-ZAPU which was at this time the strongest opposition on the land. This way then Mugabe was alleged to have killed innocent civilians for political survival but used the dissident argument as a scapegoat measure (Madzokere, 2017). This was how the concept of One-Party State was born thereby destroying ZAPU; ZANU-PF would continue to declare the country a One-Party State. 169

However, the above concept was resisted by the dissenting voices both from inside and outside the ZANU-PF party. An insider worth to mention in this study is the fearless Eddison Mudadirwa Jonas Zvobgo who strongly opposed his own colleague Robert Mugabe. This was immediately followed by massive amendments to the Constitution which gave rise to chewing of the leadership code, the according of executive powers to the President (Mugabe) and abolishment of the post of Prime Minister (Madzokere, ibid). On the 22nd December, 1987 ZAPU was forced into a Unity Accord with ZANU-PF and the new nomenclature of the united party was ZANU-PF. This development therefore marked the total demise of ZAPU and total dominance of ZANU-PF. The above political disasters created a lot of polarization and instability in the country which had negative long term effects on the social, economic and political development of the nation hence the caption, ‘tarnished jewel’ (Madzokere, 2017). The period 1988-2008 marked a continuation of the political mess of the jewel as a result of the recurrent disasters. These included the enactment of repressive pieces of legislation such as: Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) which meant to infringe the rights and freedoms of the citizens. There was a persistent mushrooming of political parties as a counter measure to the ZANU-PF concept of One-Party State and the enactment of suppressive laws which saw parties like Zimbabwe Unity Movement(ZUM) led by Edgar ‘Twoboy’ Tekere and National Democratic Party (NDP) led by Dr Magoche being born. The efforts of these political parties were complemented by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) led by its President Mr Gibson Sibanda and its Secretary General, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai through calling for some ‘sit-ins’, ‘stay-aways’, demonstrations and street marches by workers nationwide (Madzokere, 2017). In addition to worsening the political situation of the country, the Mugabe regime sent troops to the troubled Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 which were funded by the domestic fiscus while citizens were living in conditions of abject poverty and fell victims to pandemics such as dysentery, diarrhoea, tuberculosis, cholera and HIV & AIDS. 170

Some urban dwellers were made worse off by retrenchments due to harsh economic conditions which were prevailing as of then coupled with the politically motivated demolition of the housing units in cities and growth points under an operation tagged Murambatsvina (Sibanda et.al,2008). The war veterans also demanded gratuities for participation in the liberation struggle and were paid a lump-sum of $50 000 each and an additional $2 000 per month which funds did not come from the national budget (Tofa, 2010). The ZCTU after series of confrontations with the Mugabe regime ended up forming a political party in February, 1999 in Harare which came to be known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by its President-Mr Morgan Tsvangirai. The party was formally launched in September 1999 in Masvingo and worked with ZCTU and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to convince people to vote ‘NO’ in the Referendum for a new Draft Constitution in the year 2000 which had been drafted by the government through a Commission. After rejection of the Draft Constitution, it was alleged that the Mugabe regime survived the new political dispensation by rigging elections through the assistance of war veterans, police, army, Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the green uniformed militias (generally called Border Gezi) in the years 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008.The 29 March, 2008 the harmonised elections saw MDC party led by Morgan Tsvangirai win the majority of the 210 Parliamentary seats contested but the Presidential poll was stolen (Madzokere, 2017). The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) then declared that there was no winner and hence called for a re-run of the poll within three months from the date of announcement of the result. In the post-2008 election era, people were mercilessly killed in the name of politics which led to the formation of the Government of National Unity-GNU after the sham 27 June, 2008 Presidential Run-off. This election was contested by Robert Mugabe against himself after Morgan Tsvangirai had withdrawn citing worst political violence against the electorate. The political turmoil landscape was closed by the alleged ‘Nikuved’ harmonized elections of 31 July, 2013 which saw Mugabe at 89 being declared the winner. This political development marked total erosion of the marginal gains that had been attained by the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the period 2009-2013 171

hence Zimbabwe remained in designation a ‘tarnished jewel’ (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). The Religio-Social Erosion The socio-religious scenario of the pre-independent, independent and post-independent era in Zimbabwe was characterised by a quagmire similar to those observed on the health, education, food, economic and political variables above. The period before the attainment of independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 saw the missionaries with their western religion called Christianity arriving in 1890 in Southern Rhodesia. It is argued that Christianity was meant to be used to suppress the religion of the indigenous Africans called African Traditional Religion (Ray, 1976). The suppression was possible because when these missionaries came to preach their religion armed with a Bible to the Zimbabweans they were working in cohorts with the white colonialists who were armed with a gun. This way then the Bible and a gun conquered Southern Rhodesia not only religiously but also economically, politically and socially. The missionaries and the imperialists were working hand in glove to politically, socially, economically and religiously oppress the indigenous people in Zimbabwe. For the missionaries and their counterparts in the mission of colonialism, the indigenous people were religion-less. Their religion was fetish, ancestor-worship, animistic, backward, witchcraft-oriented, inferior, evil and polytheistic in nature (Bourdillon, 1990). The missionaries used derogatory language to describe African Traditional Religion (ATR) but this created a religious crisis. They believed that the indigenous people were supposed to do away with their traditional practices and beliefs before embracing Christianity. This scenario saw a tug of war between these two contesting religions-Christianity and African Traditional Religion (ATR). Some of the indigenous people resisted but others later grudgingly accepted Christianity. However, for many this was the gradual eradication of ATR and the paving way for Christianity to dominate the religious sphere of Zimbabwe. The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia also meant the colonization of the culture of the indigenous people hence a religious 172

crisis was bred. This meant not only cultural domination but political domination as well. The missionaries were supposed to preach the gospel to the people for conversion but this also meant that through the abuse of the Bible white dominance was championed. This way religion was used as ‘an opiate of the people’ (Villa Vicencio, 1989).It legitimated political tyranny, oppression, discrimination, segregation and racism. There was no fine line between missionary Christianity and colonialism for both perpetuated the colonial ideology which was suppressive to political, social, religious and economic freedom. The post-independent era saw the church taking an ambivalent role as observed by Madzokere (2013) who identified two parallel schools of thought on the role of the Church in post-colonial Zimbabwe. For him, there are the pro-state and anti-state schools respectively. These schools play opposing roles in the religio-social sphere of the country. Chitando & Togarasei (2009) shared the same sentiments with Madzokere (2013) on the subject of debate. For them, the Church was lacking unity in addressing the political crisis that befell the nation after the shocking defeat of Robert Mugabe by Morgan Tsvangirai in the Presidential election of 31March, 2008 which gave rise to the deadly Presidential Run-off election of 27 June, 2013.The Church was divided in such a way that there arose on one hand the ‘party-affiliated pastors’ and on another ‘non- partisan’ ones (Chitando, 2005). The Church was facing a crisis of disunity which saw the other wing supporting the perpetrators of violence whilst the other condemning the violence. The Church was taking an ambivalent role in such a crisis that gripped the nation. National Housing Dilemma The physical characteristics and access to basic household facilities were important in assessing the general welfare and socioeconomic conditions of a country’s population. Before the attainment of independence in 1980, there was massive rural-urban migration as school leavers and men who were getting married sought employment in towns and cities, a development that created serious housing shortages (ZIMSTATS, 2005/6). The government undertook the construction of low-income housing units which were 173

put in place to benefit such accommodation seeking people. At independence in 1980, the housing waiting list across the country’s towns and cities meant a lot to the new government led by the then Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe. Between 1980 and 1995, there were a number of dubious housing schemes that were instituted by individuals and government wings which were politically motivated. The majority of such housing schemes instead of meeting their mandate of providing housing to the needy masses fleeced them of their hard earned cash and never saw them acquire any such stands and houses for example Obadiah Musindo’s Destiny for Africa Network, December 12 and Zimbabwe Government Employees’ Union (ZIGEU) check (southerneye.co.zw-2014). The situation went unabated even though the government knew of such bogus housing schemes. In the period 1996 to 2008, the housing environment in both rural and urban centres continued to be in a deplorable state due to economic meltdown (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). This above development was manifested in the form of lack of toilets by most rural households and waste from industries in towns and cities into rivers leading to environmental and water pollution, coupled with failure to collect refuse in growth points, towns and cities making most of the centres smelly and producing a pungent odour and habitat for flies and worms to the detriment of the people’s health and environment. The situation was worse in rural areas as compared to cosmopolitan centres as most people used the same water sources with livestock and wild animals. Most of the water used in rural households came from contaminated rivers, unprotected and protected wells. It was a shame to note that eightyseven percent of rural households lived on unprotected water mostly fetched directly from dirty rivers (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). In the post 2000 era, most households in growth points, towns and cities survived with no water running in tapes and or had boreholes sunk in their suburbs to alleviate their situation. An estimated seventyeight percent urban households did not access treated water while about ninety-one percent of the rural dwellers also did not, rendering such citizens vulnerable to attacks by water-borne diseases such as cholera, dysentery, diarrhoea and typhoid (ZIMSTATS, 2005/6). The housing dilemma was aggravated by the government Operation 174

nicknamed Murambatsvina/Zimbabwe tsunami (Operation Restore Order) as once alluded to (Sibanda et.al 2008). The socio-economic status of a nation was measured by ownership of housing units, means of transportation, agriculture land, mining and manufacturing space as well as farm animals(livestock) hence a country that does not enable its citizens to access the above measures of socio-economic status cannot talk of growth towards sustainable development. Unemployment Quagmire The pre- independent era saw almost all men in the labour-force age limit of 16-65 years leaving rural areas for urban centres and white commercial farms to seek for employment. The rate of employment in the country was very high although the wages were pathetic .This was due to the colonial hegemony which was characterised by racial discrimination, segregation, suppression, domination and oppression of the indigenous people by the colonial masters, a scenario that was muted by Cecil John Rhodes in the 1890s right through to the Ian Douglas Smith regime. In 1980, all indigenous citizens ululated and jubilated hoping the attainment of independence symbolized the total burial of the colonial system and birth of the freedom and liberation of the African race (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). There was massive drive towards industrialization of the economy which saw the establishment of factories and industries by both public and private sectors. The public sector was characterized by public organizations such as Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company (RISCO), Cold Storage Commission (CSC), LONRHO, and Gatooma Textiles. On the other hand, the private sector was dominated by international private players such as Bata Shoe Company, Rio-Tinto, Delta Group of Companies, British American Tobacco (BAT) and AngloAmerican Corporation (ZIMSTATS, 2009). These were large entities that employed people in their numbers and therefore there was no unemployment to talk about in the economy. The Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe at his installation in 1980 had assured the nation that his government was going to be guided by the concepts of socialism and reconciliation for the country’s growth and development. With these remarks the former colonial masters and 175

the people at large looked forward for an accommodative and progressive Zimbabwean society. The ululation and jubilation euphoria was short-lived for the glory moments of independence were quickly overshadowed by the gloomy moments that followed suit (Madzokere, 2017). The period 1980-90 was characterized by a paradigm shift from the promises made by the Prime Minister at his inauguration to pursue an anti-Western rhetoric stance which was detrimental to growth and development of the nation. The worst move by the government was to amend certain sections of the Lancaster House Constitution in such a way that it allowed the high ranking authorities to amass wealth. This development created antagonism between the government of the day and the majority of former colonial masters who were the major investors in agriculture and industry. The period 1991-2000 was the most dramatic one in the history of independent Zimbabwe which saw high levels of unemployment in both public and private sectors of the economy. The adoption of the capitalist ideology in 1991 after the collapse of socialism in 1989-90, saw the government take up the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015, Matanda & Madzokere, 2015). One of the major tenets of ESAP was to reduce the government wage bill and the overall government expenditure and hence retrenchments were brought up by the government. This was also the same time that the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme (FTRLP) was resuscitated and it massively impacted on the employment level in the economy. Some of the white commercial farmers were harassed, tortured and maimed as a way of forcibly driving them away from their farms (Sachikonye, 2005). The indigenous people who were employed as menial labourers by such white commercial farmers were seriously affected socially, economically, physically and politically and had no option except to pack their bags back to their rural communities. The government owned parastatals such as Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO),CSC, Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO),National Railways Zimbabwe (NRZ) and Grain Marketing Board (GMB) were made to operate at a loss for political mileage which gave rise to liquidity challenges and total collapse of their operations. The indigenous people who were 176

employed in these public entities like those who were employed in white owned farms faced the same predicament of unemployment that automatically led to urban-rural migration. By the year 2007-08, the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe had risen to eighty-five percent and of late it has hovered above ninety percent (Madzokere, 2017). Human Rights Violations The period 1890-1980 was mainly characterized by worst human rights abuses of the indigenous people by the white colonizers. The major forms of human rights abuses were racism, segregation, suppression, discrimination, oppression, and torture and corvee kind of employment (Sachikonye, 2003). The human rights abuses took various dimensions which included: social, political, economic and religious. Socially, the indigenous people were clustered in marginalized zones especially regions 4 and 5 where the maize plant could hardly reach the height of an average man. These regions suited very well cattle ranching business hence in this respect the indigenous people were socially marginalized and so were forced to settle in impoverished and secluded areas such as Gwai and Shangani reserves. The colonial masters (the British) were privileged to allocate themselves prime and fertile land mainly in regions 1, 2 and 3 which was very suitable for productive agriculture and therefore the colonial masters were socially advantaged (Sachikonye, 2005). Politically, the indigenous people were governed by the colonizers and were made to behave in accordance with foreign pieces of dictates and precepts which were alien to African norms, values, standards, customs, traditions and beliefs. The people were deprived of their political rights while the white masters were privileged to enjoy their own rights away from their country of origin. This way the indigenous people were politically suppressed and oppressed. Economically, the citizens’ labour power was exploited by the colonial masters and the output of such labour was enjoyed by people other than themselves. The British built themselves empires and wealth on foreign soil at the expense of both local, human and natural resource endowments which they repatriated back to their country of origin, Great Britain (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). The domestic economy and its native 177

citizens were economically crippled and were made to operate on a very poorly developed infrastructure despite having a rich resource endowment base hence the indigenous people were economically deprived and abused. The song by the late celebrated Zimbabwean artist (Simon ‘Chopper’ Chimbetu, 1988) entitled, ‘Kuipa Chete Kumeso Nokuti Ndachembera Nourombo’ which translates to mean, ‘I look shrugged and aged because of impoverishment’, summarises it all. On the religious front, the indigenous people were made to embrace a foreign religion at the expense of their traditional religion and beliefs. For the colonial white masters, the African Religion was fetish, satanic, backward, witchcraft-oriented, ancestor venerated and polytheistic (worship of many deities) in nature (Bourdillon, 1990). The colonial masters and their foreign religion used derogatory rhetoric to describe the African Religion and in this dimension the indigenous people’s Traditional Religion was undermined. The major weakness of the imposition of the Western Religion by the colonial masters on the Africans was the eradication of African Religion and Culture hence the indigenous people suffered from religious domination (Ray 1976). The indigenous people had highest hopes that post-independent era would address the human rights abuses that characterized the pre-independent era namely: social, political, economic, religious and cultural. However, the post-independent African government, instead of curbing the above human rights abuses, made the situation more horrible and unbearable for its own indigenous people than before. By 1985 the country’s infrastructure and development strategy were shot down by the civil war in Matabeleland and Midlands regions that claimed about twenty thousand lives known as Gukurahundi (Coltart, 2016). Such a politically motivated disaster was very detrimental to the political, social, economic and religious fabric of the nation. This remains a haunting and traumatic documentary in the political history of Zimbabwe. Because of this, the country is totally failing to bring home healing and reconciliation. The civil war in question was brought to an end after the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December, 1987 between ZANU-PF and PF –ZAPU but the damage on the land and the living standards of the citizenry was great (Todd, 2007). 178

On the social front, the indigenous people were optimistic that they would be relocated from the marginalized and impoverished areas to the prime and fertile regions suitable for agrarian production. However this expectation turned out to be a nightmare for most of the poor peasant Zimbabwean populace. The prime land which was grabbed from the white commercial farmers through the FTLRP was shared among the high ranking political elites who now own multiple farms which are massively under-utilized. The short, medium and long term consequences of the FTLRP manifested themselves in the form of starvation, hunger, vulnerability to diseases, poverty and after deaths respectively (Sachikonye,2003; Sachikonye, 2005). The social human rights abuses of the indigenous Zimbabweans reached unprecedented levels, which were worse than what they were during the colonial era. The political scenario at the attainment of independence was anticipated to bring peace, harmony and tranquillity to all Zimbabweans irrespective of their race, origin and nationality. However, shortly after 1980, the government under the directive of Robert Mugabe championed the Gukurahundi (the rain that washes away the chaff) in which more than twenty thousand civilians mainly in Matabeleland and Midlands regions were innocently butchered by the joint operation of the Fifth Brigade which was trained by the North Koreans (Madzokere, 2017). In 2005, the government masterminded Murambatsvina in cities, towns and growth points in which housing units and properties were demolished by the uniformed forces and the war veterans. The urban civilian population was left homeless purely because they were suspected of being supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai instead of the ruling party. The period 2007-08 was characterized by serious political violence before, during and after the Harmonized March and June 2008 Runoff elections in which many people were massacred, maimed, tortured and displaced (Madzokere & Matanda, 2015). Economically, most Zimbabweans are unemployed, living in abject poverty and financial doldrums in which most households are operated on less than US$1 a day. The majority of both urban and rural households are failing to fend for their children and cannot provide them with education, clothing, food and shelter just to mention a few. The 179

economic status of ordinary Zimbabweans has been compromised seriously as compared to what it was before attainment of independence in 1980.On the religious front, there was liberalisation of religion which allowed all Zimbabweans to exercise freedom of worship. There was mushrooming of church denominations from both mainline and African initiated and let alone African Traditional Religion (ATR).The danger however of the liberalisation of religion was that people replaced the worshipping of God with the gold spelling that is the abuse of church congregations’ contributions by church leaders and founders who unscrupulously convert them to their personal wealth (Madzokere forthcoming). Conclusion The prophetic words uttered by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere (the former President of Tanzania) in 1980 on the birth of Zimbabwe, were not taken heed of by the Government of Zimbabwe leading the nation to becoming a failed state therefore a ‘tarnished jewel’. The failure of the nation over the past three and half decades of independence was manifested in the form of a collapsed infrastructure system, ailing health and education systems, a ruined political, industrial and economic sector, a violent and partisan agrarian reform system as well as a deliberately eroded religio-social system. Had the Government of Zimbabwe since the attainment of independence from Great Britain in 1980 taken heed of Julius Nyerere’s prophetic words alluded to earlier on, the country could have taken giant strides towards the preservation of the ‘jewel’ status. The country could also have gone a step forward towards the attainment of sustainable development and/or even the rejuvenation of the status to greater heights, political stability, sound and wellmaintained infrastructure systems, growing and affordable national housing schemes, well-funded, accessible and manageable health and education systems, a non-discriminatory, democratic and nonpartisan agrarian and economic development process as well as a morally upright socio-cum religious integral society. The study therefore recommends that the Government of Zimbabwe should adopt an all-inclusive, accommodative and non-partisan-cum 180

tolerant development path if it were to reclaim its ‘jewel status’ of the independence time and use it to grow the economy towards sustainable development levels to match the developed nations.

References Bourdillon, M. 1990. Religion and Society: A Text for Africa, Mambo Press; Gweru. Chimbetu, S. 1988. ‘Kuipa chete kumeso nokuti ndachembera nourombo’-’I am shrugged and aged because of impoverishment’ (song) Chitando, E.2005. ‘In the Beginning was the Land’: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in Zimbabwe. Africa 75 (2): 221-238. Chitando, E and Togarasei, L.2010. ‘June 2008, Verse 27’: The Church and the 2008 Zimbabwean Political Crisis. African Identities, Volume 8 (2): 151-162. Coltart, D. 2016. The Struggle Continues: 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe, Jacana; Auckland Park Good, K. 2002. ‘Dealing with Despotism: The People and the Presidents’ in Melber, H (ed) Zimbabwe’s Presidential Elections 2002: Evidence, Lessons and Implications. Discussion Paper 14 Uppsala: Nodiska Afrikauniversitet. Madzokere, N. The Selected Contemporary Pentecostal Prophets and Social justice: An Investigation in light of Micah, a biblical prophet. PhD Thesis (forthcoming). _________ 2017. Let My People Go!” A Contextual Reading of the Book of Exodus in Light of Political and Economic Crisis in Post-independent Zimbabwe, In: Mawere, M (Ed).Underdevelopment, Development and the Future of Africa, Langaa Research and Publishing: Bamenda. __________2013. “Woe is me if I do not preach the Gospel! (1 Corinthians 9:16)”: Re-reading Paul’s Message to the Corinthians in light of Zimbabwe Crisis. JIARM, Volume 6(1): 481-492. Matanda, E. & Madzokere, N. 2015. ‘The Role of Global Finance in fostering Growth and Development of Emerging Economies: A

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case of Zimbabwe in Amutabi, M.N(ed). Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: Opportunities and Prospects, Word Press; Kenya. Madzokere, N & Matanda, E.2015. ‘A Progressive or Failed State?’ A Critique of the Economic Status of Zimbabwe since Independence in Amutabi, M.N(ed). Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: Opportunities and Prospects. Word press; Kenya. Msipa, G. C. 2015. In Pursuit of Freedom and Justice: A Memoir. Weaver; Harare. Paton, A. 1948. Cry, the Beloved Country; Johannesburg, South Africa. Ray, B.1976. African Religions: Symbol, Ritual and Community. PrenticeHall; Englewood Cliffs: Sachikonye, L. M. 2003. Land Reform for Poverty Reduction? Social Exclusion and Farm Workers in Zimbabwe, Manchester University: London. ________________ 2005.Land, Policy and Poverty Reduction and Public Action in Zimbabwe, The Hague, Netherlands. Sibanda, F et.al, 2008. ‘Hawks and Doves’: The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina on Johane Marange Apostolic Church in Zimbabwe, Exchange 37 (2008): 68-85. Todd, J. G. 2007. Through the Darkness: A Life in Zimbabwe. Struik Publishers; Cape Town: Tofa, E. 2012. The Bible and the Quest for Democracy and Democratization in Africa: The Zimbabwe Experience, In: Kuegler, J. and Gunda, M. R. (Eds). The Bible and Politics in Africa (BIAS 7), University of Bamberg; Bamberg: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Monetary Policy Statements (MPS, 2009-2013). Southern Eye Newspaper, ‘Cowdary Park Sitting on Time Bomb’ (http//www.southerneye.co.zw, 2014) accessed on 22.03.2017 at 1545hours. United Nations Development Programme Reports (UNDP, 2006-2013). Villa-Vicencio, C.1989. “Have the Chickens Come Home to Roost?” in Religion and Oppression: The Misuses of Religion for Social, Political and Economic Subjugation in Eastern and Southern Africa, Symposium Proceedings; Edicessa.

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Chapter Nine Climate Change, Gender and Development in Africa Marshal Madambura & Munyaradzi Mawere Introduction Climate change is presently one of the topmost environmental and development challenges faced by Africa and the world at large. It is in view of this realisation that the former United Nations SecretaryGeneral, Ban Ki-moon, declared 2015 as the year of global action on climate change. Yet, although climate change has been adapted in the international agenda, some scholars such as Zukang (2008) argue that it is already too late to fully stop climate change, given its scale, magnitude and the momentum it is currently assuming. According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Africa is likely to be the most vulnerable continents to climate change due to a compound of factors including its geographical location and poverty situation. This is however paradoxical. The paradox is that while Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change, it has the least responsibility in its contribution to climate change when compared to all other global regions. The International Panel on Climate Change forecasts that in Africa, by the year 2020, 75 to 250 million people will be exposed to increased water stress as a result of climate change and the reduction in food security. Agricultural productivity and increased water stress and resultant health risks are also among the development challenges likely to be faced in Africa due to climate change (Parry et al. 2007). Furthermore, in some African countries, yields from rain fed agriculture could be reduced by half. This compromises agricultural production, food security, exacerbates malnutrition and stifle development. By 2080, an increase of 5% to 8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected (Ibid). Other developmental damaging effects of climate which can be suffered due to climate change include natural disasters like landslides, floods, droughts and gradual dilapidation of the 185

environment. Vulnerable and impoverished population, whose livelihoods are hinged on the environment, consequently have potentially higher vulnerability. In Africa, men and women are, however, impacted differently by climate change due to their differentiated roles. According to Boyd (2014), some feminist scholars maintain that patriarchal structures are predominantly responsible for development challenges as well as the inability to adapt and mitigate climate change. These feminist scholars further argue that the debate on climate change is also dominated by men thereby limiting discussions about climate change to masculine principles (Tuana, 2013). Research by CARE International in the sub-Saharan Africa has revealed that when women are in control of the family income, it is likely to be spent more in human development than when men are in control of the same resource (CARE, 2010). More so, women and girls face social, economic and political barriers that limit their coping capacity and development opportunities. These disparities are a result of imbalanced social positions of women within the family and community which are further exacerbated by the effects of climate thereby negatively affecting development as well as means of subsistence due to constrained food, water and energy supply (African Development Bank, 2009). Women are predominantly involved in subsistence agriculture for the major reason that they are the ones responsible for the survival and health keeping of children. FAO studies have confirmed that women are the mainstay of agricultural sectors, the farm labour force and day-to-day family subsistence (Viatteditto. 2009). This means that women mostly suffer the impact of climate change. The condition of women is worsened by the fact that in Africa, women are more likely than men to be engaged in activities characterised by low earnings and productivity and a lack of security and benefits—either as own-account workers or as contributing family workers. Most agricultural jobs are insecure because they are rarely formal-sector jobs with contracts and benefits. According to the UNDESA (2010), an estimated 84% of women in sub-Saharan Africa, compared with 71% of men, have such jobs. In Northern Africa, informal or self-employment is less predominant and has a 186

high percentage of women (53%) as men (28%) having informal and self-employed status (UN DESA 2010). In view of all these observations, this chapter argues that women in Africa are not only vulnerable to climate change but are also agents of change in both mitigation and adaptation. The chapter further argues that African women rely heavily on the environment since they are responsible for securing water, food and fuel for cooking and heating. In order to uphold sustainable development, women generally hold more of indigenous knowledge in adaptation and mitigation of climate change than men because of their experience with farming and gardening. On this note, the chapter stresses the importance of gender-sensitive strategies in responding to the environmental and development challenges caused by climate change. Climate change in context The impact of climate change and environmental systems has become one of the most pressing international development issues in the recent years. Climate change is a complex phenomenon and consequently, a very difficult concept not only to define but also to deal with. Bernard (2016) gives a general definition of climate change as the alteration of the statistical properties of a climate system and such a change can be temporary or permanent, and can also occur regionally or globally. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change define climate change as a change of climate which is directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (Ibid). Thus, as can be seen from the interpretations provided above, climate change can be generally understood as a long term shift in weather patterns in a specific region or globally. The questions that continue to boggle and linger in our minds are “is the shift in weather patterns a reality in Africa? If yes, what exactly causes the shift in weather patterns?” In view of these questions, it worth noting that the existence of climate change and the evidence based questions on whether the world is experiencing an above 187

normal increase in global warming has been highly contested. According to scientific experts in the field of climatology, climate change is caused by both natural and human activities that have resulted in an increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, including carbon dioxide, water vapour, methane ozone, and nitrous oxide. Climatic changes impacts on weather patterns, increasing the frequency and intensity of floods, droughts, and extreme weather conditions (UNFCCC, 2007). As a global scale process, climate change is assumed to be gender impartial (Demeritt, 2001; Bradshaw, 2014). However, what remains clear especially with reference to Africa is the point that climate change has caused more harm to the vulnerable populations and marginalised groups like women, children, the elderly, and the impoverished who have less access and control over essential resources in rural areas resulting in chronic poverty. The geographical concentration of chronic poverty overlaps with climate change vulnerability. Africa and Asia are considered the two continents most vulnerable to climate change, with sub-Saharan Africa having the highest levels of chronic poverty in the world, and South Asia containing the majority of the world’s chronically poor people (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2008; Djurfedlt, et al. 2004). Climate change has exacerbated the existing vulnerabilities of women, poor people, thus, placing additional strain on livelihoods and coping strategies. Multiple stresses related to HIV/AIDS, Ebola virus, land degradation, trends in economic globalisation, and exposure to violent conflict aggravate exposure to climate risks and affect the capacity of women and poor people to adapt (Adger et al. 2007). In Africa, it is clear that climate change and poverty are interlinked in complex and mutually reinforcing ways. Climate change: Why considering gender? The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2011) placed women’s activities in food production, community management, natural resources and biodiversity management, education of children and family care place at the centre of development. This has been motivated by the understanding that 188

gender inequality and climate change are inseparably linked and are recognised as vital to women’s development. Climate change tends to exacerbate the existing gender inequalities with women in particular facing tremendous impacts (AFDB, 2009). Despite the supposed gender objectivity of climate change as a global process, it is not gender neutral as it affects women and men differently, therefore, a threat to sustainable development. By gender, we mean the socially and culturally prescribed roles and values that are ascribed to girls and boys, women and men in different societies and contexts across the world. This is contrasted with biological sex. Biological sex is generally referred to as fixed while gender roles and relations are changeable or modifiable (UNICEF, December 2011). Much of the policy literature notes that women are more adversely affected by climate change (Macgregor, 2010; Bradshaw, 2014). Women are the collectors of fuel and water for their families and users of energy to prepare food. In developing countries, they engage substantially in agricultural production, both paid and unpaid. Specific gender based inequalities contribute towards the disproportionate exposure and vulnerability of women to the effects of climate change. According to the African Development Bank Group (2009), gender inequality can be worsened by climate change while at the same time climate change can cause inequality and therefore gender mainstreaming should be taken as an important factor which should be given special attention when conducting activities to mitigate climate change to ensure sustainability of projects. In many patriarchal societies of Africa as is the case with the Global North in general, women are still widely marginalised and hold a minority of decision making positions in most public and private institutions, including those dealing with climate change. Their unique role in productive, reproductive and community management activities makes their involvement imperative for any climate change effort. According to the UNDESA (2010) a survey of environmental ministries in different countries conducted in 2006 showed that women made up to 41% of the ministries’ staff but only 27% held managerial positions. It is important to note that climate change, on the other hand, can impede the progress towards gender equality by exacerbating poverty, discrimination and directly affecting 189

gender defined livelihoods. According to the UNDP (2007), gender inequality can hamper the effectiveness of climate change responses while the latter can as well impede the progress towards gender equality. This calls for gender mainstreaming in development and mitigation policies. Men dominate all levels of climate change debate from the science to policy, from the local to the global level. This clearly shows that all national and global actors must be fully committed to the integration of gender in to the existing systems so as to address the strategic needs of women. There is a need for a radical transformation of interpersonal relations between women and men “so that women have a greater power over their own lives and men have less power over women’s lives” (Kabeer, 1990: 8). According to UNDP (2009), women play a particularly significant role in ensuring a family’s food security. However, Eschborn (2010) argues that women often do not have much to say in family or community decisions taken and are therefore unable to diversify cultivation. This resonates with Rodenberg’s (2010) argument that climate change intensifies the existing economic and social gender disparities. It is usually women who are responsible for collecting water and fuel for the household. Therefore, the scarcity of these resources as worsened by climate change increases women’s work load and poverty. Women’s roles increase leaving them with no time for income generating activities, education, training or participation in decisionmaking processes. Worse still, as observed by IUCN (2009) and Eschborn (2010), women have extensive knowledge about their natural surroundings, and are at the fore front in the conservation and selection of seeds of different crops, but this is usually not acknowledged. According to Harding and Hintikka (1983), the first significant collection of articles on feminist epistemology appeared in the early 1980s thereby leading to a critique of masculinity constructions of knowledge and gender neutrality (Bradshaw, 2014). Feminist scholars argue that climate change has been noted as being a highly ‘masculinised’ concept (Israel and Sachs, 2013; Bradshaw, 2014). Whereas both men and women understand transformations in climate change to be occurring, Bradshaw (2014) argues that the 190

analysis of climate records and the seasonal variations records indicates that men focus on implications for farming production issues, while women are concerned with the wider impacts on the health of the family. A number of studies highlight that women are more likely to acknowledge ecological problems and risks, express higher level of concern and engage in activities beneficial to the environment (Goldsmith, et al. 2013; Bradshaw, 2014), such that even as a global process, climate change may be understood and responded by men and women. Therefore, failure to consider women means that only part of the impact of climate change would be known. The role of women in climate change mitigation and adaptation measures should not be underestimated as women have decision making powers both at family and community level with regard to agriculture. Increased knowledge of women on new and more resistant crops could increase agricultural production, food security, marketing of surpluses and ultimately to a sources of income. According to the IUCN/UNDP/GGCA (2009), women worldwide are also involved in natural resource and forest conservation. The care of forests coupled with reforestation and afforestation for which women are largely responsible, helps to avoid the emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Therefore, women contribute directly to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Given their significant role in mitigation and adaptation efforts, it is imperative that women be involved in the relevant measures of combating climate change (Friedman, 1992; Griffen, 1989). This has always been called for in most African countries where poverty, unemployment and inequality are on the rise. Research has shown that women in patriarchal societies live in extreme poverty and form the front and centre of the subsistent small scale farming in developing countries like Zimbabwe. Women play a significant role in the economic, social cultural and political well-being of household and community but gender based inequality constrain the agricultural growth, poverty reduction and development efforts. Women have been left out in terms of access and control of productive resources, support services, distribution of benefits and decision-making processes. The active participation and involvement 191

of women even those in rural communities during planning, budgeting, implementing and monitoring of various interventions addressing the impacts of climate change allow for sustainable development. Yet, during the 2009 United Nation Conference on Environment and Development, men were the majority. Moreover, women as a group may experience “double disempowerment” both as members of poor households and within the household by virtue of their gender (Friedman, 1992; Griffen, 1989). In the fight against climate change, gender should be considered in agriculture and rural development due to the contribution of men and women to development. Climate change affects the lives and livelihoods of families and communities in Africa and the impact varies from region to region. Males and females are affected differently because of the inequalities that exist between them which are caused by gender roles in society and the resulting levels of vulnerability. The 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) prompted the protection of the rights and dignity and needs of women. Thus, a transformed partnership based on gender equality is a condition for a people-centred sustainable development in addressing climatic change problems. However, a review of protocols, treaties and action shows that international processes have not considered gender into account to develop climate change policy (Skutsch, 2002; Villagrassa, 2002; Bradshaw, 2014). By involving both women and men and drawing on their gender based experiences in the communities, climate change responses can be more effective and sustainable. For these reasons, decision makers and development partners at all levels need to integrate gender perspectives into the planning, financing and implementation of climate change responses at all levels across related sectors. The promotion of gender equality helps to address the negative effects of climate change which are causing extreme poverty and environmental degradation in most rural areas. Women in rural areas heavily depend on the environment but they are mostly less represented in climate change decision-making processes. The principle of shared power and responsibility should be established between women and men at 192

home, in the workplace and in the wider national and international communities as clearly articulated in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Millennium Development Goals, and the Beijing Platform for Action (Thurlow, et al. 2007). Effects of climate change in Africa Climate change is currently one of the most serious threats to sustainable development and is likely to continue influencing development trends in the future. Adverse impacts of climate change have already been observed on natural resources, food security, human health, economic activity and physical infrastructure (IISD 2007). In the past, Zimbabwe experienced droughts once in every ten years, that is, 1982-1983, 1992-1993 and 2002-2003 farming seasons. Nevertheless, as of now, drought has become a common phenomenon affecting the country without any distinct pattern and formula. According to the former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki moon, Africa, Asia and Latin America could see a decline of between 20 % and 40 % in potential agricultural productivity if temperatures rise more than 2 degrees Celsius, while sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be hardest hit from global warming as its agriculture is entirely rain-fed (www.devex.com- accessed on 22 November 2009). Scientific experts ascertained that climate change is caused by human activities resulting in creation of greenhouse gases emissions, cutting down forests, burning fossil fuels and industrial production, increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Climatic changes increase the frequency and intensity of floods, droughts, and extreme weather conditions (UNFCCC. 2007). Climate change, therefore, poses a great threat to livelihoods across the globe and therefore requires a multi sectoral and holistic approach to come up with effective and sustainable policies to mitigate its impacts that are felt nationally, regionally and globally (Djurfedlt, et al. 2004). The agricultural sector which is dominated by women in many parts of Africa is known to be one of the most vulnerable economic sector due to the impacts of climate change and most hard hit by the droughts with sub-Saharan Africa having the highest levels of chronic 193

poverty in the world, and South Asia containing the majority of the world’s chronically poor people (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2008) The impacts on crop production relate to human and natural activities that include temperature changes, frequency of droughts, floods and volcanic eruptions are being observed on food, water and desertification. Coupled with HIV/AIDS and exposure to violent conflict the impacts are severely felt by the marginalized group of people who find it difficult to adapt to the situation. This contributes to the vicious poverty cycle, proving difficult to break unless concrete strategic plans promoting gender equality, social, economic and political concerns are addressed. Coping mechanisms have been adapted but would not be sufficient in the near future. The Nexus between gender, development and climate change In Africa and other continents, environmental degradation and overexploitation of natural resources have dramatically impacted on families’ livelihoods and subsistence. Differentiated power relations between men and women as well as the unequal access to and control over assets mean that men and women do not have the same adaptive capacity. Instead, women are characterised by distinct vulnerability and exposure to risk (AFDB, 2009). The concern for equal wealth distribution has led to the awareness that women constitute to a large portion of the poorest of the poor while still providing almost all the family basic needs. This saw the rise of women movements on development issues and supportive organisational development in United Nations. Feminist theorists and women’s movement practitioners have advocated for paradigms and frameworks on women and development problems, which among others include gender and development as well as women and environment in an effort to promote greater fairness and input of women in development. Development is about making life better for everyone through change processes that are intended on improving human life through improved delivery of basic necessities (Adesina, 2010; Peet and Hartwick, 2009). Though basic needs are not easy to define because what is considered basic by one may be a luxury to another person, 194

some authorities attempted to define needs as adequate food, appropriate shelter, clothing and adequate and safe water as the key basic needs to human survival. Hedger et al ( 2008) posit that sufficient food to maintain good health; a safe, healthy place in which to live; affordable services available to everyone; and being treated with dignity and respect occupy a central place in the work are elements of development. Dudley Seers quoted in Todaro (2003) defines development using three factors namely poverty, unemployment and inequality. He argues that if these three things decrease in a country then there is development. Hence, from these definitions it can be argued that development has to encompass the improvement of human livelihoods, economic factors, political environment, and socio-cultural aspects. On the same note, we argue that development should be understood as a multi-dimensional process that involves having a positive change in economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental spheres. In other words it involves the betterment of every aspect of country. It is vital to note that development is a value laden concept. The concept of development is complex depending on one’s point of view. It can be looked at as both a concept and a process. The complexity of development has headed to various sceptics to argue that development is a sociopolitical term to generate equality, end poverty and bring peaceful relations among societies. Accordingly, development has diverse implications depending on social actors’ point of view. Women play a significant role in the economic, social cultural and political well-being of household and community but gender based inequality constrain the agricultural growth and poverty reduction. Women have been left out in terms of access and control of productive resources, support services, distribution of benefits and decision-making processes. The active participation and involvement of the women even those in rural communities during planning, budgeting, implementing and monitoring of various interventions addressing the impacts of climate change allow for sustainable development. During the 2009 United Nation Conference on Environment and Development men were the majority Moreover, women as a group may experience “double disempowerment” both as a member of poor households and within the household by virtue 195

of their gender (Friedman, 1992; Griffen, 1989; Bradshaw, 2014). In the fight against climate change gender should be considered in agriculture and rural development due to the contribution of men and women to development. Research has shown that women live in extreme poverty and form the front and centre of the subsistent small scale farming in developing countries like Zimbabwe. Diversification in socio and economic livelihoods initiatives that are non-farming is essential especially in rural areas to address the needs and interest of the majority and having comparative advantage when dealing with the impacts of climatic changes. Due to climatic changes there has been rapid decrease in income, increased costs of living. For better agricultural activities there is need for abundant fresh water in rivers, streams, dams and underground water sources that can be harnessed for irrigation purposes at household level. Market plays a pivotal role in the well-being of the small scale farmers. This assists to either scale up production or diversify in some cases. In Southern Africa, the Lesotho Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry Programme successfully promoted Machobane farming, an indigenous concept that incorporates cash cropping and elements of sustainable farming systems that include recycling of organic materials and synergies between intercrops and relay crops. (START. 2007) Agricultural markets in the region are liberalized with most products being sold in raw form with minimum transformation. Challenges being faced to date include price fluctuation, poor road network, communication, rigid environmental policies. Coupled with these challenges farmers fail to strike a balance and move on. There is need to increase rural industrialisation and access to the world market. The government must provide financial credit and enterprise development support services, funding technical support to capacitate rural people through educational information, technical skills, agricultural extension services and improved health care and treatment. These include building and expanding of growth centred poles aimed at encouraging off farming activities. The sustainable livelihoods approach is a very useful tool for understanding the socio-economic traits of vulnerability of climate risk. There is limited utilisation of agricultural activities due to limited 196

appropriate technological development and inadequate resources. The major challenge is high cost technology and poor commitment by people and government to invest in irrigation. There is need to consider weather related insurance programs for smallholder farmers to help them deal with droughts, floods, and breakout of pests and diseases. Land is a basic resource for agricultural development that requires optimal use. The land tenure system promoted proper utilisation and protection of the land with great need of policies that reduce overgrazing, destruction of forest cover, uncontrollable disposal of domestic and industrial waste that result in erosion, siltation, pollution and destruction of aquatic ecosystem. Improving weather forecasting is a fundamental strategy to adapt to climate changes and increase agricultural productivity, livestock, forestry and non-farming activities in order to increase food security, cope and adapt to climate changes. Gender differentiated impacts of Climate change Although rural women and men play complementary roles in farming activities, agriculturalists observe that women tend to play a greater role in natural resource management and ensuring nutrition in the household. In Africa, according to the AFDP, women often grow process, manage, and market food and other natural resources. They are also responsible for raising small livestock, managing vegetable gardens and, as already noted, provisioning of fuel and water. It is estimated that in sub Saharan Africa, women are responsible for 80% of food production (AFDP). According to the UN Women (2011), case studies suggest that lack of survival skills such as swimming, climbing trees among others, contribute to a greater death rate of women compared with men in hurricanes and floods. Moreover, women often care for children, the sick and elderly, and may place themselves at higher risk to do so. The UN Women (2011) also asserts that women are more often found in structurally weak buildings at higher risk of collapse due to mudslides and other related hazards, since they are prone to

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congregate compared with men in places of lower social value such as market stalls and shanties. Thus, the debate on climate change is not only dominated by men but also primarily shaped in ‘masculine’ principles, which limits discussions about climate change to a perspective that focuses on technical solutions. We argue that promoting gender equality is a prerequisite in order to address the challenges of climate change. This is important considering that climate change discourses currently hide subjectivity, subjugation and power relations that actually condition climate change policy and science. In fact, in practice men have dominated in all levels of climate change debate from the science to policy, from the local to the global level. This has led to a phenomenon that terms ‘epistemic injustice, patriarchal, capitalism and subsequently the continuity of power for those who are powerful today (Katoomba Group, 2008). Women play a significant role in the economic, social cultural and political well-being of household and community but gender based inequality constrain the agricultural growth and poverty reduction. During natural disasters most of which exacerbate climate change, male unemployment rises and men become unemployed, women’s responsibilities increase because they must secure and manage income and resources on top of feeding the family and caring for children and the elderly (see Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009). Despite efforts to create opportunities for wider participation, many have observed that Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) processes are unlikely to be equally accessible or open to all sections of a community including climate change (Hinton, 1995; Mosse, 1993; Richards, 1995). In the fight against climate change gender should be considered in agriculture and rural development due to the contribution of men and women to development. Women bear the responsibilities of caring for the children, gardening, cooking and fetching firewood. As forest become more depleted due to deforestation and effects of climate change, women have to travel for longer distance to fetch firewood leaving farming activities like planting and weeding to suffer (Malvern Mupandawana: Manica Post 31 July-6August 2015). In many African countries men and women tend to have responsibility of growing different crops. 198

Technological change for women’s food crops many translate into better nutrition and well- being for women and children and technological change for men cash crop (Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 1997). There is need for shared power and responsibility between women and men at home, in the workplace as clearly indicated in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action. Addressing the interventions

Climate

Change

problem:

Possible

According to the United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008, gender inequalities intersect with climate change risks and vulnerabilities (UNDP Human Development Report, 2007). Women have historic disadvantage of limited access to resources, restricted rights and limited in decision making them highly vulnerable to climate change. Climate change is likely to magnify existing patterns of gender inequality. Therefore, there is need for timeous policy formulation and implementation by governments in order to mitigate the negative effects of climate change which is resulting in rural poverty. These include setting up of community organizations and local committees to respond to climatic changes and this will promote gender mainstreaming and active participation by local people. Emphasis must be put on community based adaptation approaches to climate change in their development projects, particularly in drought-prone rural areas. For example in Bangladesh, women are more involved in disaster response decision-making, through local committees and community organisations established by the government and NonGovernmental Organizations (IFAD, 2008). As part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change‘s National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), Bangladesh published a Poverty Reduction Strategy paper in 2005 that incorporated gender mainstreaming into its climate change adaptation plan. Thus, timeous policy formulation and implementation is another strategy which can

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be done successfully in order to prevent the negative effects of climate change. There are manifold intervention policies that can be implemented to address challenges which are caused by climate change. One of the possible strategies in addressing climate change is to ensure the active participation of the local rural people in the programming process when addressing climate change. The active involvement will ensure initiatives that surely respond to the needs, priorities, opportunities and constraints identified by the vulnerable population. Vulnerability assessment build on the local knowledge will ensure sustainability of project activities since the beneficiaries will be actively included in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects. According to Sahelian Areas Development Fund Programme (SADEFP) in Mali, local people should not be considered beneficiaries, but rather stakeholders responsible for the initiation, implementation and management of project activities (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009). Participatory approaches employed in areas such as the Sahel have highlighted linkages between human vulnerability and climate variability, due to the prevalence of serious drought in the area. Active participation and responsibility of participants is best upheld if decisions are taken by the communities themselves. Thus, one can safely argue that championing active participation of the beneficiaries will ensure sustainable development in addressing climate change problem. Additionally, there is need to diversify both socio and economic livelihoods activities in rural areas including non-farm income generation (Hauselmann, 2003). Due to climatic changes there has been lack of financial capital and saleable asserts compounded by lack of social support, skills gender inequalities, rapid decrease in income and increased costs of living resulting in vicious cycle of poverty. Governments must invest in the water and sanitation and energy sectors to develop infrastructure that can adapt to climate variability. As FAO (2010) rightly noted, development policies should be related to adaptation, such as promoting water harvesting techniques at the household level. The government must provide financial credit and enterprise development support services, funding technical support to capacitate rural people through educational information, technical 200

skills, agricultural extension services and improved health care and treatment. These include building and expanding of growth centred poles aimed at encouraging off farming activities. The sustainable livelihoods approach is a very useful tool for understanding the socio-economic traits of vulnerability of climate risk. This is very vital step for climatic adaption process. For example, in Sudan the Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project, focuses on strengths, vulnerabilities and livelihood strategies that can effectively increase the capacity to cope with and adapt to climate related impacts (cf. Uitto & Shaw, 2006). This project has led to increased incomes and access to basic social services such as clean water supply, education and health. This clearly articulate that there is need to balance between agriculture, livestock and forestry and non-farming activities in order to cope with and adapt to climate changes. Governments and other stakeholders can assist the vulnerable people by disbursing small grants and soft loans for them to start small to medium enterprise business; irrigation schemes machinations in order to cope with the climate change. This can be supported by promoting the small grain in order to rapidly increase production. South African government support households affected by the changing climate through social grants (IFAD, 2008). These grants include pensions, disability payments, and child support. Thus it is plausible to argue that diversifying both socio and economic livelihoods activities in rural areas will reduce the detrimental effects of climate change. Furthermore, tackling climate change problems requires a determined effort to maintain momentum in research, optimise promising technologies, and validate all providing visibility and demonstrate practicability. In depth and evidence based analysis of women and men’s roles in sectors impacted by, and their strategies for coping with climate change should also be conducted. This can provide a solid basis and programmes developed to address and combat climate change impacts (Kydd, 2002).It must be an on-going process that should be adequately funded to keep abreast of developments in science and technology and social dynamics that science must endeavour to satisfy (Ibid). Endogenous knowledge and 201

innovation should be nurtured rather than totally abandoned for some discarded and inappropriate foreign technologies. A growing number of NGOs has also becoming involved in Zimbabwe’s Climate Change Working Group, a leading civil society network. This clearly stipulates that investing in climate change research based mainly on experience of local knowledge is important to address climate change challenges. More so, there is need for triangulation and linkages of activities between the government and non-state actors in order to mitigate adapt and tackle the effects of climate change through education. Education on climate change should be initiated at primary schools to create awareness at an early age and help people prepare. That will be preparations for the future understanding the influence of development interventions on adaptive capacity at local up to national level. There is also need to ensure that mitigation and adaptation efforts also address sources of gender-based vulnerability gender inequality and poverty in addressing climate change issues. People at grassroots level should also be included in researches. This is to say that development partners need to reassess the scale and scope of their interventions, using information and knowledge they have for evidence-based decision-making, and for effective building of adaptive capacity as a continuous process of learning, change and innovation. The involvement of both men and women in the use of advanced technologies for adaptation and promoting community-based natural resource management is another key method to adapt to climate change. There is need for adaptation, from the fields of agriculture, natural resource management, water conservation and management, and fisheries. This encompasses technologies for adaptations encompass hard technologies, such as drought resistant crop varieties, rapoko, millet, seawalls and irrigation technologies, and soft technologies, such as crop rotation patterns (Adger, 2007). These techniques will substantially contribute to reverse the degradation of the productive capacity of the land thus reducing farmers’ vulnerability to climate change effects. Sensitization activities include farmer-to-farmer visits, targeted especially at women, who are 202

considered major agents of change (START, 2007). For example, in Burkina Faso Community Investment Programme for Agricultural Fertility (PICOFA) it improved seed varieties and disseminated, associated with training in soil management techniques, such as appropriate sowing density to optimise plant growing. Incomegenerating activities, including seed production, are being supported, especially for women (Shea butter, soap-making). This is done to reduce reliance on vulnerable agricultural sectors and to ensure all year-round cash availability (UNFCCC, 2007). This clearly shows that using technologies for adaptation and for promoting community-based natural resource management is another method to adapt to climate change. Improvement on weather forecasts is one of the most fundamental strategies to adapt to climate changes and increase agricultural productivity and food security. Most of the agriculture in Africa is rain-fed, hence, there is need for better prediction of short, medium and long-term weather conditions at both national and regional levels. There are many uncertainties that farmers face with respect to the unpredictability of weather in Africa, including when and what to plant. There is mounting scientific evidence indicating that if current climate trends continue, drier areas will become drier and droughts more frequent and wetter areas will become more flooded (Thurlow, 2007). Improving weather predictions requires strengthening the surveillance ability of regional and national weather programs and fostering greater collaboration between states in the region and beyond (Hazel et al, 2001). Water and food security are intertwined, thus there is great need to improve hydrological data monitoring, collection, and dissemination systems at national and regional level (Thurlow, 2007). A complementary point to consider is the possibility of having massively available weather related insurance programs for smallholder farmers to help them deal with droughts, floods, and breakout of pests and diseases. Thus it is plausible to conclude that improving weather forecasts is one of the most fundamental strategies to adapt to climate changes and increase agricultural productivity and food security. In order to avert the climate change challenges, there is need to incorporate gender perspectives into national and international 203

climate change finance mechanisms and strategies in order to effectively address both women and men’s needs and priorities, ensure the full and meaningful participation of women and achieve gender equitable outcomes. Thus, climate change actions need to be based on consultation with women, build and incorporate their skills and knowledge, and provide opportunities for improving health, education and livelihoods. Additional funding for adaptation and mitigation should be provided by multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donors. In 2009, UNFCCC parties met in Copenhagen, where the goal was to agree on a new global treaty for the postKyoto-Protocol period beyond 2012 (Hauselmann, 2003). Transfer of knowledge from other regions, such as Asia and Latin America to Africa is also important. So triangulation and linkages of activities; forging strategic alliances at national, regional and global levels and new public and private partnerships is essential to adapt and mitigate climate change. African governments and leaders must step up efforts on policy formulation and implementation to mitigate negative effects of climate changes. There is global consensus that adapting and mitigating climate change effects requires working together to increase the agricultural production of food-insecure farmers, enabling consistence policy reforms in the African countries that shun corruption, despotism and incompetence and empowering communities in hunger hotspot areas (Kerr et al, 1999). Policy interventions are thus needed to encourage smallholder farmers to increase the yields of their traditional crops, as well as modern varieties. It is also one way to assist many homes ravaged by civil unrest, HIV/AIDS pandemic and Ebola virus in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia. For example the effects of food security can be rapid, as demonstrated by Malawi’s input subsidy program and by the Millennium Villages Project (Sanchez, 2005). To this end, cross-country collaboration among developing nations can add tremendous value to this process, especially in the transfer of technologies and development. However, non-state actors have increasingly come under attack from various scholars and critics for viewing rural people as beneficiaries and not as stakeholders responsible for the initiation, 204

implementation and management of project activities. It is imperative to highlight that there is need for the grass root people to also actively cooperate positively, to practice transparent and accountability, prudent, honest, and ensure active participation as women mostly participate and men occupying the periphery role. Besides, there is need for the developed countries to compensate financially and provide technical support to capture carbon and storage, renewable energy, and geo-engineering. The developed countries must also slow the flow, re-absorb greenhouse gas emissions. This will have a positive impact on mitigating and adapting the climate change detrimental effects. Use of advanced technologies for adaptation and promoting community-based natural resource management is essential. To adapt to climate change it is vital to venture in to drought resistant crop varieties like rapoko, millet, seawalls and irrigation technologies, and soft technologies, such as crop rotation patterns (Adger, 2007). The techniques contribute to reverse the degradation of the productive capacity of the land thus reducing farmers’ vulnerability to climate change effects. There is need to promote gender equality in designing and implementing humanitarian and development interventions to increase the vulnerable communities’ adaptive capacity. Gender inequalities are very rife within the discourses of negotiations over climate change for example in 2009 at United Nation Conference on Environment and Development where men were the majority. To add on a study conducted by the University of Oxford in cooperation with the Nielsen Company found that 18 of the 22 ‘most influential spokespeople on climate change were male (Katoomba Group, 2007). Female spokespeople were neither politicians nor scientists and their direct connection to climate change is therefore doubtful (Adger, 2007). To address the impacts of climate change there is need to promote small grain varieties and disseminate quality information on soil management and better grain storage techniques. Combination of different strategies must be implemented in order to avoid further devastation if we are to protect our planet from the most severe predicted effects of climate change. There is need for integration and linkages of activities and services by the government 205

and non-state actors to mitigate adapt and tackle the effects of climate change through education. There is a need to provide education and creating awareness to school children and communities thereby building resilience and coping mechanisms, have ownership and be able to manage program on climate change at local and national level after donor funding. The use of indigenous tradition knowledge is necessary during the decision making process, designing interventions and building capacity for adaptation. Education is a designed tool and a necessity to address issues of climate change while strengthening communities, government and non-governmental organizations synergies. Conclusion This chapter highlighted the overlap between gender, development and climate change. It also highlights a number of mutual concerns principally to the masculination of knowledge on climate change and environmental degradation. The chapter also notes the importance of including women in climate change issues since they constitute the majority. However, it is clear from the discussion in this chapter that the need for further research to show how men and women are affected by climate change differently makes climate change not only a gendered issue but also an issue that merit deserves serious attention. It calls for an approach that considers both women and men’s needs, knowledge, insights and skills in adapting and mitigating climate change and environmental degradation.

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Adger, W.N., Agrawala, S., Mirza, M.M.Q., Conde, C., O’Brien K., Pulhin J., Pulwarty, R., Smit B. & Takahashi K. 2007. Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity, 717743. Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change (AIACC). 2006. Climate change vulnerability and adaptation in the livestock sector of Mongolia. Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology, Ulaanbaatar, and International START Secretariat: Washington, DC. African Development Bank Group, 2009a. Bank Group Climate Risk Management and Adaptation Strategy (CRMA), Revised Version. African Development Bank Group: Tunis. Bernard, A. 2016. Climate Change-Meaning, Implications, Suggested Solutions. www.jp.onkyo.com//as2htm. Binswanger-Mkhize, H.P. 2009. Challenges and opportunities for African agriculture and food security: High food prices, climate change, population growth, and HIV and AIDS. Paper prepared for the FAO HighLevel Expert Forum: How to Feed the World in 2050: Rome. Boyd, E., 2009. The Noel Kempff Project in Bolivia: Gender, Power, and Decision-Making in Climate Mitigation. Climate Change and Gender Justice. Terry, G. and Sweetman, C. (Eds) Practical Action Publishing: Warwickshire. Bradshaw, S. 2014.Gender and Environment Change in the Development World. IIED: London. http://pubs.iied.org/10716 IIED. Bradshaw, T. K. 2000. Complex Development Projects: Collaboration, Comprehensive Programs and Community Coalitions in Complex Society. Community Development Journal, 35(2), 133-145. CARE, 2010. Adaptation, Gender and Women’s Empowerment, CARE International Climate Change Brief. Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2008. The Chronic Poverty Report 2008-09: Escaping Poverty Traps. Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester: UK. Djurfedlt, G. et al. 2004. African Food Crisis—The Relevance of Asian Models. SIDA: Stockholm. Eicher, C.K., 1995. Zimbabwe’s maize-based green revolution: preconditions for replications. WorldDev. 23: 805–818.

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Kydd, J. et al. 2002. Agricultural development and pro-poor economic growth in sub-Sahara Africa: potential and policy. ADU Working Paper 02/04. Imperial College. Wye. Kurukulasuriya, P. and R. Mendelsohn. 2008. A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on African cropland. African Journal of Agriculture and Resource Economics 2 (2008): 1-23. Parry, M. L., Canziani, O. F., Palutikof, J. P., Linden, P. J. and Hansoneds, C. E. 2007.Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment, Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. START. 2007. Assessment of impacts and adaptations to climate change (AIACC): Final report, International Development Research Centre (IDRC): Ontario. Sanchez, P. A. 2005. Cutting world hunger in half, Science 307: 357–359. Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M. Averyt, K.B., Tignor, M. and H.L. Miller (Eds.). 2007a. Summary for Policymakers, In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate, IPCC: University Press: Cambridge. Thurlow, J. 2007. Rural investment to accelerate growth and poverty reduction in Kenya. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00723. International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington DC. Todaro, M.2003.Economic Development in the Third World, Longman Press: New York. Tuana, N. 2013.Gendering Climate Knowledge for Justice: Catalysing a New Research Agenda. Alston, M. and Whittenbury, K. (Eds). Research, Action and Policy: Addressing the Gendered Impacts of Climate change, Dordrecht: Springer. Uitto, J., and R. Shaw. 2006. Adaptation to changing climate: Promoting community-based approaches to developing countries, Sansai 1: 93-108. UNFCCC. 2007a. Synthesis of on-going and planned adaptation research and adaptation research needs identified in submissions by Parties and relevant organisations, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/12, report dated 24 October 2007. FCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA): Bonn.

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UNFCCC. 2007b. Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, United Nations Convention on Climate Change secretariat: Bonn. UNDESA. 2010. Millennium Development Goals: Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, Progress Chart 2010’.United Nations Statistics Division. UN: New York. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Report, 2011. ‘Applying a Gender Lens to Science, Technology and Innovation’, Current Studies on Science, Technology and Innovation, 5th ed., Geneva. UN Women. 2011. Facts & Figures on Gender &Climate Change: Global Gender and Climate Alliance, UN Women: New York. Viatte, G., Graaf, J.D., Demeke, M., Takahatake, T. & Arce, M. R. 2009. Responding to the food crisis: synthesis of medium-term measures proposed in inter-agency assessments,’ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Rome. (www.devex.com-). Zukang, S. 2008. Statement by Sha Zukang, Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs’, in ECOSOC Special Event on Achieving the MDGs and Coping with the Challenges of Climate Change” 2 May2008, UN Office of the Under-Secretary-General ECOSOC: New York.

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Chapter Ten Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in Nigeria and the Question of Independence Johnson O. Olaniyi Introduction Election Management Bodies (EMBs) perform the crucial function of serving as the umpire in the electoral process of any state. In view of this important role, EMBs are ideally expected to be neutral and independent from any of the electoral stakeholders – political executives, legislators, political parties, electorate, judiciary, political party agents and election observers to mention but a few. In any liberal democracy, the constitution and electoral laws of a state usually guarantee the independence of its Election Management Body (EMB). This is true of many African states of which Nigeria is not an exemption. Beginning from 1958 when the first EMBElectoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) – was established, all the legal instruments that have set up other EMBs have defined them as independent institutions. Even during the aborted Nigeria’s Third Republic which started with the ‘creation’ of two political parties on October 7, 1989 and got truncated on November 17, 1993 when the country experienced another military coup the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) which was then the country’s EMB, was professed an independent body at creation. Despite the fact that various EMBs in the country have had independence conferred on them at the point of their establishment, experiences have revealed that over the years, this status has been mortgaged by different external interests. The development had subjected them to not being seen as unbiased umpires during the course of performing their statutory responsibilities. In fact, the same legal instruments that established them have served as a cog in the wheel of their progress in actualizing their independent status. This

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was because their independence was not fully protected by them (laws). The general objective of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which EMBs in Africa, in general, and Nigeria in particular, have served as unbiased umpires during electoral processes. Other specific objectives include: (i) to examine the nexus between constitutionalism and the independence of Nigeria’s current EMBIndependent National Electoral Commission (INEC) over the years; (ii)to examine how INEC had practicalised its independence during electoral processes in the Fourth Republic; and (iii) to appraise the challenges confronting INEC in its quest to manage elections in an unbiased manner. The chapter study adopts historical-cum-comparative method as its research instrument. The activities of EMBs in Nigeria over the years were reviewed while the legal instruments that established them were compared to ascertain their independence status. The chapter is divided into the following sections; introduction, conceptual clarifications, brief history of EMBs in Nigeria, INEC and the question of independence, and conclusion. Conceptual Clarifications This section of the chapter examines the literature definition of EMB and its coterminous –Electoral Commission. It also discusses the statutory responsibilities of INEC as a federal body or institution of government in Nigeria. What is Election Management Body or Electoral Commission? Election Management Body (EMB) and Electoral Commission are two concepts that are usually used interchangeably by psephologists (the group of political scientists who study elections and voting behaviour, scientifically) in particular and political scientists in general. Election management is concerned with the manner in which election officials and electoral bodies control their political environment to conduct elections that can be adjudged as being 212

‘free’, ‘fair’ and ‘credible’. The implication of this assertion is that it is not enough for all necessary resources or logistics to be made available to the EMB in a country but what is more important is how it manages them to achieve a credible election result. Election management usually manifest in various forms. It may also differ from one political system to the other. However, despite the differences, the International Foundation for Election System (IFES) (2007:1) argues that: “one of the keynotes in election administration is that the elections are managed in a consistent manner”. It further posits that election management process requires: Skills both in administration of the operational aspects of the election and in the management of a political process that frequently unfolds in a highly charged environment filled with suspicion and mistrust and in which political actors often take uncompromising and sometimes contradictory positions (IFES, 2007:1).

The above provision advanced by IFES (2007) reveals the importance of election management especially in developing states in general, and plural societies such as Nigeria. According to Guess and Gueorguieva (2010: 621) Election management consists of a plethora of activities such as registering voters, providing voters information, ballot design, distributing and processing of ballots, securing and reporting results and hearing and resolving election disputes. All the above activities identified by Guess and Gueorguieva (2010) as connoting election management are very crucial to the success of any electoral process. Apart from the aspect of ‘hearing and resolving election disputes’ which is usually handled by the judiciary, all other areas highlighted by Guess and Gueorguieva as constituting election management can only be translated into reality by an EMB. For instance, voter registration represents the foundation of any electoral process. It is the responsibility of the EMB to organise and ensure the registration of prospective voters in an election. Therefore, when a registration officer registers some voters by proxy or allows multiple registration, it gives room for 213

multiple voting on the Election Day, especially when voting is done manually. The activities of an EMB identified by Guess and Gueorguieva (2010) are usually carried out by different categories of personnel always involved in the electoral process. For instance, in Nigeria, examples include: the Chairman of the INEC, National Commissioners of INEC, Resident Electoral Commissioners (who head INEC at the State level) and Electoral Officers (Eos) (who oversees the affairs of INEC at the Local Government level). Others include: ‘The Returning Officers at various levels (Ward, Local Government, Federal, and State) who have the responsibility to collate and announce the results of elections) Presiding Officers (Pos) (who man different polling units) Poll Clerks (PCs) (who verify the authenticity of the claims of a voter) and Orderlies (who see to the orderliness of voters in the Polling Units). Perhaps it was in view of the important role played by the different categories of personnel in the electoral process that made Dorby and Persse (2006:83) to posit that: Election management are the activities of personnel of an electoral commission aimed at achieving its objective of organising and conducting a credible election. It also focuses its attention on how the various resources are marshalled in a cohesive manner to achieve the objective of the EMB.

What Dorby and Persse’s (2006) position portends is the emphasis on the important role played by the different categories of electoral officers who occupy strategic positions in an electoral commission. This chapter is of the view that the success of any EMB depends to a large extent on the credibility of the system and how each ‘election manager’ discharges his/her responsibility towards the enthronement of a credible election. This is the focus of the ‘Centre for Democracy and Election Management (CDEM) based in the United States of America. (http//www.iamericanedu/ cdem’about/index.cfm).As the case with any organisation, there exists super-ordinate subordinate relationship in any EMB. The super-ordinate belongs to the management cadre while the 214

subordinate (staff) essentially implement policies formulated by the super-ordinate. The implication of this is that in order to guarantee maximum result in election management, there exist a hierarchical structure in an EMB. In the case of INEC, there exists a hierarchical structure between the management of the Commission (Chairman and National Electoral Commissioners) who formulates policies and other cadres of Electoral Officers (Eos) (Resident Electoral Commissioners and others) who execute those policies. These different sets of electoral personnel must work collaboratively to ensure the achievement of the main objective of the Commission. This is what Chandler and Plano (1988) explain as ‘participative management’. According to them, ‘participative management’ is “a process by which workers are brought into organizational decisionmaking processes to varying degrees, primarily on matters that directly affect them” (Chandler and Plano, 1988:150). In essence, ‘participative management’ stresses cooperation as opposed to disharmony. Therefore, every category of election official must be carried along during the course of implementing any election – related decision. The foregoing provides background knowledge of what an EMB is. Election management as reviewed in this chapter connotes the totality of the efforts of individuals saddled with the responsibility of organising and conducting credible elections in a state at any point in time. In line with this position, Ujo (2000:28) defines an EMB as; “the administrative agency, responsible for the conduct of election”. This definition will form the basis of our discussion in this chapter because it focuses on the main task of an electoral commission, which is, ‘conduct of election’. Though they perform similar functions across the continent, EMBs are known by different names. In the case of Nigeria, successive governments while establishing ‘new’ EMBs during transitional periods have had cause to give the bodies new names. Currently, the country’s EMB is the ‘Independent National Electoral Commission’ (INEC) established in August, 1998 during the transitional period that ushered in the Fourth Republic effective from May 1999. In Ghana, EMB is known as the ‘Electoral Commission of Ghana’ while in Tanzania, it is known as the ‘Tanzania National 215

Electoral Commission. In Kenya, EMB is known as ‘Kenya Electoral Commission’ while in South Africa the body is called ‘Electoral Commission of South Africa’. In the case of Zimbabwe, the arrangement is a little bit different. The Electoral Act, 2005, Chapter 2(13) established three bodies with the mandate of organizing and conducting elections in the country. They are: ‘Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’ (ZEC) ‘Electoral Supervisory Commission’ (ESC) and ‘Electoral Tribunal’. According to Ndoro (2005:74) the three EMBs “constituted a tripartite system” and “each of them is involved in different ways at different levels in the country’s electoral process”. In Nigeria there is a separate EMB which conducts elections into Local Government Councils. Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution empowers state governments to establish ‘State Independent Electoral Commissions’ (SIECs). Therefore, while the Constitution empowers the country’s EMB- INEC- to conduct elections into the offices of the country’s President, Vice-President, National Assembly (the country’s legislative arm) Governors and State Houses of Assemblies, SIECs’ power as defined in the constitution, is limited to the organization and conduct of Local Government Polls. Ujo (2012:122) while explaining the nexus between EMB and democratic process, posits that: Election Management Bodies occupy a strategic position in the electoral process and by implication are decisive for the success of democratic system of government. Since they are charged with responsibility of organizing elections, their omission or commission could make or mar elections. No doubt, the aim of any election management body is to organise credible elections in which all stakeholders and observers will be satisfied with the outcome.

This chapter argues that for an EMB to perform its crucial function of organising and conducting credible polls in any democratic process, it must be independent of all the electoral stakeholders. Electoral Commission which is coterminous with EMB has also attracted different definitions. One of such definitions was given by Oyebode (2006). He explained Electoral Commission thus: “A body 216

of individuals saddled with the responsibility of overseeing the organisation and conduct of elections in a democratic society”. EMBs usually take two different forms. They are: i). Temporary Election Management Bodies; and ii). Permanent Election Management Bodies (Ujo, 2000:33).

According to Ujo (2000:33) temporary EMBs depicts a situation whereby EMBs are “established when an election is due and dissolved as soon as the election is over”. Example of an African country that operates temporary EMB as given by Ujo is: Malawi. Similarly, the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) which was the first EMB to be established in Nigeria in 1958 was a temporary one. The body was constituted in August 1958 and got disbanded in December 1959 at the conclusion of its assignment. With regard to ‘permanent EMBs’, “members of such bodies enjoy conditions of service similar to other permanent public servants in areas of appointment, promotion, compensation, benefits, etc.” (Ujo, 2000:33-34). Because of the advantages it has over temporary EMBs (for example, its permanent nature will instil confidence in the minds of its personnel) many African countries currently operate ‘permanent EMBs’. Their examples include: Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Nigeria adopted the system fully in 1989 with the promulgation of Decree No. 8 and No. 37 of 1989 (an amendment of Decree No. 23 of 1987). The Decree made the country’s EMB at that time (National Electoral Commission- NEC) – a public service guaranteeing a pensionable employment for the Commission’s staff. This was further given a legal impetus by the Section 1 (a and b) of the Electoral Act 2006 (As amended in 2010) which states that INEC as established by Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a body, corporate with perpetual succession; and may sue and be sued in its corporate name.

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Functions of Election Management Bodies EMBs usually perform crucial functions in the electoral dispensation of any nation. Chirambo (2008:67) lends credence to this assertion when he posits that: Electoral Commissions lie at the heart of a state democracy, lending credibility and integrity to the democratic process by ensuring that the rules are applied fairly and that to the extent possible, the majority of the citizens participated freely in making policy choices.

The functions performed by EMBs usually take various forms but despite their variations, there appears to be areas of similarities in their statutory responsibilities across political systems. The functions usually reflect in the enabling Acts that established them. For instance, the Electoral Act 2005 of Zimbabwe empowers the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to “administer and supervise elections and referendums” (Electoral Act 2005, quoted in Ndoro, 2005:77). It further empowers it to “direct and control voter registration, to compile voter’s rolls and conduct voter education, and safeguard ballot, papers and election materials”. But apart from these responsibilities, other functions common with all EMBs are those of ‘constituency delineation’, ‘determining voting procedures’; and ‘deciding election schedules’. These and several other functions of EMBs are expressed in the functions of INEC as contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 15 of the Third Schedule of the Constitution provides that the Commission shall have power to: (a) Organise, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of State, and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and House of Assembly of each State of the Federation; (b) register political parties in accordance with provisions of this constitution and an Act of the National Assembly; (c) monitor the organisation and operation of the political parties, including their finances;

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(d) arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties, and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information; (e) arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this constitution; (f) monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties; (g) ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers take and subscribe the oath of office prescribed by law; (h) delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner; and (i) carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.

In addition to the functions conferred on it by the 1999 Constitution, Section 2 of the Electoral Act, 2006 (as amended in 2010) provides that INEC shall have power to: (a) conduct voter and civic education; (b) promote knowledge of sound democratic election processes; and (c) conduct any referendum required to be conducted pursuant to the provision of the 1999 Constitution or any other law or Act of the National Assembly (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999:1076-1077).

A look at the various functions or powers of EMBs reviewed in some political systems, above, reveals that the success of any electoral commission in any electoral dispensation depends to a large extent on how it is able to discharge its statutory responsibilities impartially. In order to guarantee this, an EMB must operate in a conducive environment. What determines conducive environment is its independence. That is, freedom from external control while exercising its powers.

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A synopsis of the history of EMBs in Nigeria The development of electoral process in Nigeria is linked to elective principle and emergence of legislative councils as contained in the Clifford Constitution of 1922. This is in tandem with the contribution of Duverger (1955) to the discourse on the origins of ‘modern political parties’ who explains an “externally created political party” as a political party that emerges “outside the legislature and invariably involves some challenge to the ruling groups and a demand for representation (Ibid). In any liberal democracy, the EMB has the responsibility to organise and conduct credible polls that will help entrench an enduring democratic institution. This advantage eluded Nigeria when the country was under colonial rule till the tail end of foreign rule in the country. All the elections conducted in 1923, 1923, 1933, 1938, 1947, 1952 and 1954 in the country were by European Officials and not EMBs. However, the adoption of the motion for independence which was passed in 1956 coupled with the outcome of the ‘London Constitutional Conference of 1958’ changed the electoral history of the country. Also, there was increased agitation for reforms in the country before its independence (Ojiako, 1981). The dividends of pressures for reforms in the country’s electoral process manifested in some of the decisions arrived at during the 1958 London Constitutional Conference, held in London, between September 29 and October 27, 1958. The Conference, attended by one hundred and six (106) persons, variously classified as ‘delegates’, ‘advisers’ and ‘officials’ took far-reaching decisions on the future of ‘electoral arrangements’ in the country among other things (Ibid). For instance, it resolved that the Chairman and members of the Federal Electoral Commission should, after independence be appointed by the Governor-General in his discretion after consultation with the Prime Minister (Ibid: 64). This was what gave credence to the first EMB in the country Electoral Commission of Nigeria’ (ECN). ECN came into being through the promulgation of ‘Order-inCouncil, L.N of 1958; The ‘Order’ provided for the appointment of an ‘Electoral Commission by his Excellency Governor –General, “from amongst persons of neutral views”. The “Order’ was further 220

strengthened by the “Elections (House of Representatives) Regulative, 1958” which defined the task of the Commission as being “the general supervision of the preparation of a Register of Electors and conduct of an election” (Kurfi, 1983:7). One striking feature about the ECN which was constituted by the then Governor-General of the Federation on August 7, 1958 was that it had an expatriate, Mr. R.E. Wraith, O.B.E as its Chairman. Perhaps, what was responsible for this arrangement was that the colonial government needed someone they could trust by way of managing the election in a way that will make their trusted fellows to succeed them. It had four other members who represented different sections of the country. These members operated on part time basis; The ‘Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), the second EMB in the electoral history of Nigeria, was constituted by the administration of Sir Tafawa Balewa on May 1, 1964. It replaced ECN which was dissolved in 1960 shortly after the country attained independence. It was the first EMB to be headed by a Nigerian, Mr. Ayo E. Esua, addressed as “Chief Electoral Commissioners and Chairman”. It had five (5) other Commissioners who represented each territory (region) of the federation. These were; North, East, West, Mid-West and Lagos (Federal Capital Territory) (Kurfi, 1983; Ojiako, 1981)

FEC had the responsibility to organise and conduct the 1964 general elections. Towards this end, it was also mandated to divide the country into as “many single member constituencies as there were members in the House of Representatives” (Ojiako, 1981: 55) It was further empowered to review the boundaries of the Constituencies at interval of not less than eight (8) and not more than ten (10) years, and might alter the Constituencies as it saw fit. The third EMB in the electoral history of Nigeria was the ‘Federal Electoral Commission’ (FEDECO). It was established by the Military administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo. Its predecessor FEC was out-lawed following a Military Coup de tat in January, 1966. FEDECO was established under Decree No.41 of 1976. The Decree was promulgated as the “Federal Electoral Commission Decree No. 41”. The Decree took effect from October 221

22, 1976 although FEDECO was inaugurated on November 15, 1976. Chief Michael Ani was named as its Chairman and he operated in that capacity till 1980 when Justice Victor Ovie-Whiskey succeeded him. FEDECO later drew her ‘Enabling Act’ from the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It also had as members, commissioner from each of the nineteen (19) States of the Federation. In addition to this, it had four commissioners (all women) who served as federal representatives. The foregoing showed that in all, FEDECO had twenty four (24) members. Section 140 (1) of the Constitution listed FEDECO as one of the ‘Federal Executive Bodies’ in the Federation. FEDECO was given the responsibility to conduct the transitional elections of 1979 that ushered in the Second Republic (Kurfi, 1983). It also conducted the 1983 general elections before its dissolution caused by a military coup on December 31, 1983. The functions of FEDECO were contained in Section 6 of the Third Schedule, Part I of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. They included among others: (a) To organise, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President the Governor and Deputy Governor of a State and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each of the States of the Federation. (b) to arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties and to publish and report on such examination and audit for public information (c) to arrange for the registration of persons qualified to vote and for the maintenance and revision of the register of voters; and (d) to ensure that the register of voters is prepared and maintained in such form as to facilitate its use for the purpose of elections to local government councils (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979).

For the first time in the nation’s electoral history the country’s EMB- FEDECO – had structures at both State and Local Government levels. Each State office of FEDECO was headed by Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) while each Local 222

Government Office of the Commission had Electoral Officer as the head. While the REC discharged his/her responsibility on behalf of the Chairman of the Commission, EO did same on behalf of the REC. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was the fourth EMB in the electoral history of Nigeria. It was the body that organised and conducted all the elections held during the aborted Third Republic. It was headed by two different personalities during the Republic lasted. They were; Professor Eme Awa (August 1987-February 1989) and Professor Humphrey Nwosu (March 1980- August 1993) (Olaniyi, 2012). NEC came into being with the promulgation of Decree No. 23 of 1987. It was inaugurated by the administration of General I.B. Babangida on August 27, 1987. The organisational structures of NEC did not differ markedly from the organogram of FEDECO except for the fact that it was made a permanent body with its workers enjoying pensionable appointments. With regard to its functions, paragraph 17 of the Third schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1989 retained majority of the functions of FEDECO as contained in the 1979 Constitution. However, it enlarged the responsibilities of NEC because of the political developments in the country then (for example, the emergence of two government- created political parties). The new responsibilities of NEC as enshrined in the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, included: (a) To organise, conduct and supervise elections to the offices of the president (and other political office holders as contained in the 1979 constitution); (b) to provide guidelines rule and regulations for the emergence, recognition and registration of the two political parties; (c) to monitor the organisation and operations of the two political parties including their financing; (d) to arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the political parties and to publish a report on such examinations and audit for public information;

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(e) to arrange for the registration of persons qualified to vote and for the maintenance and revision of the register of voters; (f) to delegate any of its powers to any State Electoral Commissioner; (g) to carry out such other functions as might be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly; (h) to appoint, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over its staff, as might be prescribed by Act of the National Assembly; and (i) to ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers, take and subscribe to the Oaths of Office prescribed by Law (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1989).

The National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) was the fifth EMB in the annals of the electoral history of Nigeria. The dissolution of NEC on the eve of the ‘palace coup’ that brought General Sani Abacha to power on November 17, 1993 paved the way for NECON. NECON was established in January 1994 by the administration of General Sani Abacha via promulgation of Decree No.3 of 1994. Section 4 of the Decree gave the functions of the EMB as including the following: (a) Organising, conducting and supervising all elections and matters pertaining to all elections; (b) the division of the areas into constituencies for the purpose of conducting elections; (c) registration of voters, the registration of political parties; (d) supervising and monitoring the activities of political parties; (e) determining the number of centres in the country; and (f) carrying out such other functions that may be assigned to it from time to time by the Head of State or the Provisional Ruling Council (Federal Military Government, 1994).

The organisational structure of NECON as stipulated by the Decree that established it was similar to that of the moribund NEC. Its first Chairman appointed by the then Head of State, General Sani Abacha, was Chief Summer Dagogo – Jack. Under his leadership, 224

NECON organized and conducted Local Government Council Polls on ‘zero-party’ basis in March, 1996. It also conducted elections on party basis into different levels of elective offices in the country between 1997 and 1998. However, none of the institutions was inaugurated till the truncation of the regime of General Abacha caused by his death. The coming into power of General Abdulsalam Abubakar after the death of General Abacha marked another watershed in the nation’s electoral history. More importantly, NECON was outlawed and all the elections it conducted during the transition programmes of General Abacha were cancelled. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) took its (NECON) place. INEC thus became the sixth EMB to be established in Nigeria. INEC was established by the administration of General Abubakar Abdulsalam under Decree No. 17 of August 11, 1998 with the primary responsibility of organising and conducting the transitional elections that ushered in the Fourth Republic which began in May 1999. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which came into force on May 5, 1999 later served as the ‘Enabling Act’ of the INEC. Section 153 (f) of the Constitution lists INEC as one of the Federal Executive Bodies. This was later complemented by the ‘Electoral Act, 2006’ (as amended in 2010). Section 1 of the Act provides that “the Independent National Electoral Commission as established by Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and may sue and be sued in its corporate name”. That was the first time any of the country’s EMB would be given such a powerful legal impetus. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria adopted a decentralized form of EMB. Apart from INEC having structures at all levels of government, Sections 197 and 3 of Part II of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution established State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs) which have the responsibility to organise and conduct elections into Local Government Councils. This was unlike the previous arrangement whereby the country’s EMB organised and conducted all elections (Olaniyi, 2012). 225

INEC retained the organisational structure of NECON while its powers were as earlier enumerated in this chapter. But it should be noted that Nigeria’s EMB had identity problem before the Forth Republic. This was because each ‘new’ regime branded it differently although with slight modification in its functions (Olaniyi, 2014). Nigeria’s EMB and the question of Independence Independence connotes a state of having the freedom of taking actions or saying something without undue interference from any quarters. Consequently, it is a form of freedom. When independence is granted to an individual or an institution to discharge a responsibility what that translates to is ‘freedom’; Fromm (1941) differentiated ‘freedom to’ from ‘freedom from’. According to him ‘freedom to’ means a privilege given to an individual or agency to enjoy certain rights without any hindrance. On the other hand, he posits that ‘freedom from’ connotes escape from bondage, for example when a colonised territory is granted independence. Fromm argues that ‘freedom to’ is more important and more rewarding than ‘freedom from’ because it is possible for an individual to be freed from bondage without necessarily enjoying the freedom of independent action-taking. This is the experience of most African States in the hands of their former colonial masters. The EMB performs the crucial function of organising and conducting elections that will be devoid of prejudices. Therefore, it occupies a sensitive position in the electoral process. As seen in the various powers /functions of the different EMBs highlighted in this chapter, the task of EMB cuts across the three stages of electoral process in any liberal democracy. These are: pre-election matters, election matters and post-election matters. Electoral stakeholders usually look unto the EMB for justice. But before this can be actualised, the EMB must not only be seen as an impartial umpire but its activities must prove it to be so. The foregoing explains why more often than not, the ‘Enabling Act’ that establishes an EMB in Nigeria usually define it as an ‘independent institution’. In fact, the moment the activities of an EMB are enmeshed in partiality, any election organised and conducted by it will not meet the credibility 226

criterion. In essence, an EMB which is desirous of conducting credible polls must not be tied to the apron strings of any of the electoral stakeholders especially the political executives. This is what Kurfi (1983) and Ujo (2000) referred to as integrity of election. According to Ujo (2000:4-5), the integrity of an election’ refers to ‘the ability of a management body of election to operate without any interference that threatens to impair its independence and functional autonomy in organising elections.” Kurfi (1983:238) also stresses the importance of the independence of an EMB when he posits that “some means to ensure that adjudication of the merits of cases arising under the electoral law is outside the government of the day, so as to avoid suspicion of interference of rulers”. Dundas (1994) identifies the independence of an EMB as one of the conditions of transparency of election. Kurfi (1983:238) also considers it as one of the essentials of free and fair election. To achieve this Dugard and Dundas (1998:6) (cited in Ujo 2000:5) posited that an EMB “must have a legally enforceable mandate and well defined jurisdiction, composition and term as well as being fully empowered regarding the performance of its functions”. For instance, the Electoral Act, 2005 of Zimbabwe that established the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) defines the body as “an independent authority, to administer and supervise elections and referendums” (Ndoro, 2005:77). The foregoing explains why Ujo (2012:122) posits that EMBs “occupy a strategic position in the electoral process and by implication are decisive for the success of democratic system of government”. According to him what should form the major concern of any EMB is to aim at conducting a ‘free and fair election’. This is a way of demonstrating its independence. Explaining the imperativeness of the independence of an EMB in an electoral process, Ujo (Ibid) posits that: The argument is that an independent, impartial, transparent, effective and efficient electoral management body is a pre-requisite for the institutionalisation of a viable democratic political system. The variables which determine a credible election management body are independence, transparency and impartiality.

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Ujo (Ibid) thereafter explains what an independent EMB means. According to him, “the concept of independence implies that an election management body should not be under the influence of any government, political party or organised groups”. This independence should take its root from the legal framework that establishes an EMB, well defined jurisdiction and functions. Also serving as the rubric for assessing the independence of an EMB are how it is funded (whether it enjoys financial autonomy or not) how its membership is constituted (who has constitutional right to appoint Electoral officers?) and whether it has the authority to make regulations on its functions. All these will form the basis for assessing the independence of Nigeria’s EMBs with particular emphasis on the INEC which is the current EMB in the country. As posited earlier in this chapter, apart from the 1959 general elections, all the other elections conducted by the Colonial Government were managed by European officials. The 1959 polls were therefore the first elections to be managed by an EMB in the country. Since the focus of this work is on the independence of EMBs in the country, elections conducted by European officials in the country before 1959 shall not be assessed. The independence of EMBs in Nigeria shall be assessed in this chapter under the following parameters; (i) The Enabling Acts that established them; (ii) their composition; (iii) their powers/ functions; and (iv) their funding;

As stated earlier in this chapter, the methodology to be adopted in the analysis of the independence of EMBs in Nigeria over the years, shall be comparative method. Enabling Acts/ Composition The imperativeness of Enabling Acts that established EMBs is seen in the fact that they define their organisational structures, powers and the nature of their relationships with other electoral 228

stakeholders, among others. But of importance to this study are the inter-relationships that exist between the EMBs and other electoral stakeholders. One of the ideals of democracy is ‘separation of powers’. The principle provides that each organ of government should be given the freedom of performing its statutory responsibilities although it gives room for checks and balances’ (a situation whereby an organ/ institution of government performs’ a watchdog function on the other Ujo, 2000). EMB is an institution of government. As earlier posited in this chapter, it performs the crucial function of providing the enabling environment for the emergence of a new set of elites during any electoral process. This explains why it must be seen by all other electoral stakeholders as an impartial umpire. To guarantee this, each law that establishes it usually help instils the confidence of electoral stakeholders and the, civil society in it by defining it as an ‘independent body’. This has been the case in Nigeria most often since the era of election management by EMBs began in 1958. As will be revealed in this chapter, more worrisome is the fact that practically all the EMBs that have operated in the country had failed this litmus test. In line with this position, Yinka Odumakin, the publicity secretary of Afenifere (a Yoruba ethnic group socio-cultural association of Nigeria) considers lack of independence of Electoral Commission as the bane of Nigeria’s electoral process. He posits that “any follower of electoral process in Nigeria would easily know that the greatest bane of free and fair election in Nigeria has been the absence of a fair umpire not tied to the apron strings of the incumbent” (The Punch, April 24, 2006:10). In a similar vein, Ketefe (2005: 3) argued in favour of the independence of EMB in Nigeria by asserting that “perhaps the most serious indictment of our democratic culture is the suspected collusion of a sitting government with the electoral commission, which ideally should be a disinterested and an unbiased umpire”. The inability of some governments to detach themselves from the activities of their country’s electoral commissions had precipitated post-election crisis in some countries in the recent past. Examples are found in how the activities of Kenya Electoral Commission) (KEC) were hijacked by the political executives in 229

2007. The December 27, 2007 presidential election in Kenya was contested by ten candidates. The main contenders however, were the then incumbent President, Mwai Kibaki, the candidate of “Party of National Unity (PNU) who has been in power since 2002; and Raila, Odinga of the ‘Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) who was the main opposition candidate. The incumbent president, Kibaki was declared the winner, of the poll by the Kenya’s EMB, Kenya Electoral Commission (KEC). The electoral commission was however, accused of falsification of the election result in favour of the incumbent President, Kibaki. This precipitated nation-wide crisis in which about 1,400 lives were lost (Wikileaks, 4 December, 2010). The ‘Enabling Act’ that established the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) in 1958 was the ‘Nigeria Electoral Provisions Orderin-Council, 1958’. The Act provided for the appointment of an Electoral Commission by His Excellency the Governor –General ‘from among persons of neutral views’. What this provision portends is that members of the ECN should be individuals who do not have political party affiliation or ethnic loyalty. This was necessary then because Nigeria was balkanised on ethnic ground. Two of the three major political parties that operated in the country then, Action Group (AG) and Northern People’s Congress (NPC) were founded on ethnic ground and operated in that line. The third major political party in the country then was ‘National Council of Nigerian Citizens’ formerly National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC). It had a ‘fair’ national outlook at its inception in 1944 but later got reduced to a political party projecting the image of the people of Eastern Nigeria. This scenario perhaps justified the action of the colonial government to appoint technocrats as the members of the Commission. But where the independence of the EMB was doubtful was the power of the Colonial Government to constitute its membership. Therefore, by appointing an expatriate to head the EMB the Colonial Government could not insulate itself from the allegation of bias levelled it against it by some political actors then (for example, AG’s national leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo). The Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) was established by the administration of Sir Tafawa Balewa, the then Prime Minister of Nigeria on May 1, 1964 with the responsibility of conducting the 230

1967 Federal Election. The Commission drew its legal impetus from the ‘Republican Constitution of Nigeria, 1963. The constitution equally defined the FEC as an independent body. However, what rubbished the provision was that members of the EMB were appointed by the administration of Sir Tafawa Balewa as the representatives of their various Regions (North, East, West and MidWest). This mistake truncated the then nascent democracy because each of them took a different position on the Federal election conducted by the EMB in 1964. The representatives of the East and Mid-West (Mr. Aniegolu and Mr. Akenzua respectively) on the Commission condemned the outcomes of the election and resigned their appointments while the election result was applauded by the representatives of the North and West. The loyalty of the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. E.E. Esua, was nonetheless to the Federal Government. For instance, in some parts of West and the entire East where elections were boycotted the EMB declared the candidates of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) (one of the two alliances that contested the election, the other bloc being United Progressive Grand Alliance –UPGA) which was the bloc the ruling party-NPCbelonged to, as being duely elected. For instance, according to Ojiako (1981:203) he (Esua) admitted in an emergency broadcast aired on December 22, 1964 that there has been validly nominated contestants “and yet names of candidates have been announced as returned unopposed”. Although he appealed to all those unauthorized to make announcements on behalf of the Commission to desist from doing so. This chapter is of the view that he only played a lip service. This was because he was only acting the script of the Federal Government that appointed him. The experiences of the First Republic made the 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to define in clearer terms, the independence of the EMBs of the second, aborted Third and Fourth Republics, although their efforts contained some contradictions. Section 140(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 listed ‘Federal Electoral Commission’ (FEDECO) as one of the Federal Executive Bodies in the Federation. The implication of this was that FEDECO was attached to the office of 231

the President (political executive) and therefore, not an independent institution as Section 145 (1) of the Constitution Professes. The Section provides that: “In exercising its powers to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons… the Federal Electoral Commission shall not be subjected to the direction or control of any other authority or person” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979). What also makes the independence of FEDECO a mere rhetory was that Section 141(1) of the constitution empowered the President (although in consultation with the ‘Council of State – a body made up of the serving President, all former Presidents, Heads of State, retired Chief Justices and serving Chief Justice of the Federation) and subject to the confirmation of Senate) to appoint the Chairman and members of the Commission. Although the second Chairman of the Commission, Justice Victor Ovie-Whiskey, appointed by President Shehu Shagari in 1980 could be argued not to be a known political figure in the country, his appointment must have been influenced by certain interests known to him and the President. In fact, the President would not have made the mistake of appointing someone he could not trust as the chairman of the Commission. More so, he would be seeking second term in office in 1983. Furthermore, other members of the Commission appointed by the President at different times were known political figures in the country. The foregoing explains why the 1983 general elections organised and conducted by FEDECO were marred by electoral malpractices which triggered –off political crises in some parts of the country. FEDECO was then seen as colluding with the ruling party- National Party of Nigeria (NPN) - to rig elections in some states. A case in point was Ondo State where FEDECO declared Mr. Akin Omoboriowo of National Party of Nigeria (NPN) the winner of the gubernatorial election at the face of massive rigging. It was the Election Tribunal that eventually reversed the purported victory by declaring Chief Adekunle Ajasin of the Unity Party of Nigeria (NPN) the winner of the election (Jinadu, 2009:12). The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was established by the administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida through the promulgation of Decree No.23 of 1987. NEC was later given a 232

legal impetus by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1989. The constitution operated concurrently with Decrees in the aborted Third Republic. In essence, Nigeria practiced diarchy then. This was because, at a point in time, the administration had elected National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) at the centre, elected executive and legislature at the State level and elected Local Government Councils. It was only the executive at the federal level that was not elected. All the elections in the aborted Third Republic were managed by NEC which then operated in a Military environment. Section 151 of the 1989 constitution lists NEC as one of the ‘Federal Executive Bodies’ in Nigeria. As experienced in the Second Republic the implication of this provision was that the EMB was put directly under the control of Head of State, this time around, a military helmsman. Consequently, the type of freedom it enjoyed would be lower (and was lower) than that of FEDECO which operated in a pure democratic setting. Section 152 of the Constitution empowers the President to appoint the Chairman and members of NEC. But unlike what obtained in the Second Republic when the President could only make such appointments with the ratification of the Senate and the advice of the Council of State, the President was not expected to get the consent of the Council of State or ratification of the Senate before such appointments were made. This gave the picture of what later transpired in the Republic. NEC was used by the ‘Armed Forces Ruling Council’ (ARFC) (the ruling junta in the country then) to scuttle the almost concluded transition programmes of the administration of the (Military) President, Babangida (he used to be addressed as President Babangida then). In fact, the independence status conferred on NEC by the Section 156(1) of the Constitution can be argued to be a mere routine. This was because the EMB was not allowed to operate in that spirit. For instance, when the ban on partisan politics was lifted in 1987, thirteen political associations sought registration from NEC as political parties. (Ibrahim 1993: 5472) After the screening exercise, NEC recommended six political associations for registration as political parties, namely; Peoples Solidarity Party (PSP) Nigeria National Congress (NNC) Peoples 233

Front of Nigeria (PFN) Liberal Convention (LC) and Nigerian Labour Party (NLP) (Onwudiegwu, 1993:25-26). The assignment to register the associations as political parties was however, hijacked from NEC by the AFRC. The ruling junta found none of the six political associations worthy of registration as political parties thus jettisoning the efforts of NEC which used a number of criteria to screen and make their recommendations. The AFRC was of the view that none of the recommended six associations met the criteria laid down in the guidelines for the formation of political parties. Furthermore, according to Onwudiegwu (1993:26) “more importantly the AFRC noted that all the associations had their umbilical cords rooted in the banned political parties of the First and Second Republics”. Based on this development, the AFRC announced the creation of two political parties – Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) – on October 7, 1989. These were the two political parties that operated in the aborted Third Republic in the country. The most striking issue in the aborted Third Republic that confirmed the lack of independence of NEC was the annulment of June 12, 1993 Presidential election not by NEC or Judiciary but by the AFRC. The election was, before its truncation adjudged to be ‘free and fair’ not only by domestic observers but the international community as well. It has also produced a president –elect in person of Chief M.K.O. Abiola the Presidential Candidate of the SDP (Nwosu, 2008:307). In his account of the annulled President election, the NEC Chairman, Professor Humphrey N. Nwosu provides this explanation: On my part, I state without any equivocation that NEC under my leadership conducted free and fair presidential election on June 12, 1993, hence the resultant outcome of the election was quite credible (Nwosu, 2008:308).

Nwosu (Ibid: 314-320) provided explanations on the positions of the different schools of thought on the annulment. According to him, it was the opposition of some members of AFRC to the held election that led to the annulment. The position of this chapter is however, 234

that the military hijacked the responsibility of NEC and/ or judiciary when the outcome of the election went the way they did not want. The experience of National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) established by the administration of General Sani Abacha in January 1994 was not totally different from that of NEC, the area of difference being that its activities were not guided by constitutional provisions. Series of Decrees were promulgated to dictate the operations of NECON. NECON had the reputation of holding elections into different strata of decision- making processes in Nigeria that were never inaugurated. Everything boiled down to the self – succession bid of late General Sani Abacha. This explained why the activities of NECON were shrouded in secrecy. Thus explaining why they usually escape the eagle eyes of political analysts. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which was established via Decree No. 17 of August 11, 1998 was given a legal impetus by the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. INEC is listed as one of the Federal Executive Bodies in Section 153 of the Constitution. In fact its legal impetus is akin to that of FEDECO as contained in the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 154 (1) of the Constitution empowers the President to appoint the Chairman and members of the EMBs. This raises the question of objectivity when such appointment is to be made by him or her. To address this problem, Section 154 (2) provides that he or she should reckon with the advice of the ‘Council of State’ while making such appointments. But since the body can only advise, its view may not be binding on the President. Another ‘check and balance’ put in place by the Constitution is Section 154(1) which requires that the appointment of the chairman and members must be confirmed by the Senate. Experiences have revealed that this provision has not been effective especially in situations where the President’s political party is in the majority in the Senate. For instance, notwithstanding the opposition to the appointment of another Northerner as the successor of Professor Attahiru Jega in June, 2015, President Muhammad succeeded in getting the ratification of Senate for the appointment of another Northerner, Professor Mahmud Yakubu as the Chairman of INEC. What made this possible is that his party, APC, has a simple 235

majority in the Senate which is the constitutional requirement for approving the appointment of INEC chairman. During the tenure of Professor Maurice Iwu as the INEC boss between 2005 and 2010, the EMB was enmeshed in allegations of unholy alliance between it and the political executives. In fact, the EMB under his watch had the reputation of conducting what many analysts including a product of the election (President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua) regarded as the worst election (2007 presidential election) in the electoral history of the country. For instance, commenting on the then lack of independence of the electoral commission, The Economist, posits that: The only people who seem happy with the charade are officials of the inept and craven Independent National Electoral commission (INEC) and those who appointed them in the ruling people’s Democratic Party (PDP). Umaru Yar’ Adua won an astonishing 70% of the vote; but few will accept the result as anything other than a fraud (cited in Iwu, 2008: 10).

Professor Maurice Iwu was first appointed a National Commissioner of INEC (INEC has twelve National Commissioners appointed by the President to represent the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria with each zone being represented by two Commissioners each by the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003 before his elevation to the office of the Chairman of the EMB in 2005 by the same regime. Worthy of note was the fact that right from 2003 when he was brought to the main stream of election management in the country electoral stakeholders (for example, Transition Monitoring Group- TMG) doubted his impartiality in conducting credible polls in Nigeria. The level of partisanship demonstrated by INEC during the 2007 electoral process in Nigeria was given attention by the TMG in its report on the 2007 elections. According to the election monitoring group: Instead of acting as an umpire the electoral body was preoccupied with disqualifying candidates that were perceived as strong opponents

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of the ruling PDP in their respective constituencies. Furthermore the Commission made itself party to the political squabbles between the President and the Vice-President acting as if it was under obligation to exclude the Vice-President at all cost (TMG, 2007: 49).

Another instance of the manifestation of lack of independence of INEC during the 2007 elections was the mixed reactions that greeted the movement of some Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) on March 29, 2007 which was less than two weeks to the commencement of the elections (The Punch, March 30, 2007: 8) The argument of the INEC in taking the action was to move the RECs concerned out of those states where they believed they have been too familiar with political executives and political parties leaders. However, members of opposition parties (Action Congress-AC- in particular) held a contrary view. They read political meaning to the action. They alleged that INEC only acted the script of its master (the President) and the movements were done to those states they believed they did not enjoy much popularity. Such RECs would only serve as an instrument of perpetrating electoral fraud (The Punch, March30, 2007: 8). INEC (2007) in its assessment of the degree of independence it enjoyed during the 2007 elections scores itself low and appreciated the fact that it (independence) was the key to the success of its future endeavours. It posits that: For the Commission to effectively deliver on its crucial national responsibility, it is of utmost importance that it is given complete freedom, in the matter of appointment, discipline and deployment of its staff including Resident Electoral Commissioners who actually conduct the elections across the states (INEC, 2007: 17-18).

The above report made by INEC on 2007 elections was an apparent indictment on its part that it did not enjoy much freedom while discharging its statutory responsibilities then. Perhaps this explained why the election was widely condemned by most opposition parties the (AC and ANPP in particular) and Election

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Observers (for example EUEOM and TMG) as being marred by electoral malpractices. INEC under the chairmanship of Professor Atthairu Jega had the reputation of organising two general elections, in the country. These were; 2011 and 2015. During the 2015 electoral process, the administration of Professor Jega asserted its independence in a number of ways. This was not however, unconnected to the disposition of the administration of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan towards enthroning a democratic culture in the country. A case in point was the introduction of ‘Card Readers’ which was introduced by INEC under the watch of Professor Attahiru Jega despite the opposition of the ruling political party, PDP. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) in its report on the 2015 general elections made public on 14th October, 2015, notes among other things that the election was remarkable in the sense that it was the first time an opposition political party would win election in a transitional election. This chapter is of the view that this was made possible with the introduction of Card Readers which checked electoral malpractices. Powers and functions All the Enabling Acts that established each of the six EMBs in Nigeria had so far, defined their powers and functions. Their ability to exercise power and discharge their responsibilities boil down to the issue of independence. This is because when the enabling environment is lacking, they will find it extremely difficult to exercise their powers and discharge their duties. The primary assignment of any EMB is to organise and conduct elections. This shows they have pre- election duty and election duty to perform. But in addition to this, they also perform postelection duty by way of referring litigations on election to tribunals or election courts. Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) (2003: vii) noted in its report on the 2003 general elections that; “elections are not necessarily about Election Day activities although it forms an important component. It encompasses activities before, during and after election”. Therefore, voter registration lays a good foundation 238

for any election. This responsibility is usually discharged by the EMB. But past experiences in Nigeria have revealed that more often than not, they are usually hijacked or bastardised by some desperate politicians. Section 15(e) Part I of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution, empowers INEC to “arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare and maintain revise the register of the voters for the purpose of any election under this constitution. Section 10 of the Electoral Act 2006 (as amended in 2010) also gives credence to this provision. Towards effective and efficient discharge of this responsibility, INEC in the Fourth Republic introduced a number of innovations as a way of running away from the influence of electoral stakeholders. For instance, the EMB introduced a new regime of Voter Registration based on an electronic platform finger print and biometric data of registered voters which has the dynamic feature to curtail such grievous loopholes as impersonation and multiple registrations. It should be noted that INEC had earlier adopted Direct Data Capture Machine for the voter registration which used ‘Optical Mark Recognition’ (OMR). The Electronic Voters Register as a component of the Electronic Voting System (SVS) was designed to minimize human impact in the electoral process. According to INEC (2007) the EVS also held out such other advantages of technology as greater accuracy and higher resilience in the management of complex tasks. Despite all the efforts put in place by INEC, electoral malpractices were not totally stamped out in the country but the fact remains that they have become ameliorated. And the old practice of politicians ‘forcing’ Registration Officers’ to get hundreds of Voters cards is gradually becoming a thing of the past. Worthy of note however, is that the ability of INEC to implement the policy of an Electronic Voters Register is an indication that it enjoyed freedom of independent decision because political actors who were used to the old system were indisposed to the innovation. One other important power possessed by INEC is the recruitment of Electoral Officers (EOs) especially ad hoc staff, for the purpose of election. Experiences have revealed that right from the inception of EMBs in Nigeria till now, they have not enjoyed 239

absolute freedom in this wise. Section 160 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes INEC to be prone to the influence of the political executives in the matter relating to the appointment or recruitment of election officials/electoral officers. The Section provides that INEC should require the approval of the President before it can regulate its procedures or appoint certain categories of election officials for the purpose of discharging its functions. Electoral stakeholders (members of the ruling political party in particular) always form the habit of loading the list of the ad hoc Eos with the card-carrying members of their political party or public servants who are sympathetic to their cause. In fact, there have been instances when a set of applicants underwent training as would-be Eos, only to have their names replaced on a day to the election by people who did not undergo any training on the management of elections. This nonetheless affected the productivity of such Eos as some of them were found not to be in position of filing Election Result forms correctly. Funding Funding is sacrosanct to the Independence of an EMB in particular and its activities in general. Since it is not an income generating institution it relies squarely on the state for its finances. Ordinarily, it should draw its finances from the ‘consolidated funds’ unattached to any of the apparatuses or organs of government in a state. But it becomes a problem when an EMB is attached to the office of the political executive of a country as the case in Nigeria. INEC, as earlier pointed out in this chapter is defined as a ‘Federal Executive Body’ by Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. What this portends is that it is attached to the presidency. Therefore, its level of independence when it comes to funding is shaky. In practical terms, when it prepares its annual budget or estimates for the organisation and conduct of any election it routes same through the political executive. It can only be invited by the National Assembly to come and defend such budgets or estimates when considered necessary. 240

Until the Fourth Republic, all the constitutions and electoral laws that governed the conduct of elections in Nigeria were silent on the independence of EMBs in the area of funding. Even the 1999 Constitution was equally guilty of this lacuna. It was the Electoral Act, 2006 (as amended in 2010) that first addressed independent funding by INEC for electoral activities. Section 3 of the Electoral Act, 2006 (as amended in 2010) provides for the establishment of the ‘Independent, National Electoral Commission funds. It states: 1. There is established for the Commission a fund to be known as Independent National Electoral Commission Fund. 2. There shall be paid into the Fund established under subsection (1) of this Section: (a) Such sums and payments available to the commission for carrying out its functions and purposes under the constitution and this Act and all other assets from time to time accruing to the Commission; (b) such sums as may, from time to time be credited to the Fund by way of interests from investments made from the fund; and (c) aids, grants that may from time to time accrue to the Commission in order to carry out its function. Disbursement from the fund shall be made in accordance with rules established by the Commission (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010).

Sections 4(1-2) an 5(a-e) of the Act also make provisions for the INEC to maintain separate fund to defray all expenditure incurred by it such as ‘cost of administration’; ‘reimbursement of members of any committee set up by the Commission’; payment of salaries, fees or other remuneration or allowances, and pensions, ‘maintenance of any property vested in the Commission’; and in connection with all or any of its functions under the Act. A look at the above cited provisions (3, 4 and 5 of the Electoral Act, 2006) will reveal that they confer absolute independent funding on the INEC. But the question that arises is; have they been implemented to the letter? The answer to this poser is no. The findings of this chapter reveal that their implementation have either been frustrated by the Federal Government through the Federal 241

Ministry of Finance or, the official, detailed; to give approvals to their expenditures This usually constitute a serious challenge to the financial independence of INEC. Section 6(1) of the Electoral Act 2006 (as amended in 2010) still attaches INEC to the Ministry of Finance. It provides that the EMB shall submit the estimate of its expenditure and income to the Ministry of Finance not later than 31 August in each financial year. Section 6(2) of the Act provides that INEC shall cause its accounts to be audited ‘as soon as possible’ after the end of each year by the ‘Auditor- General of the Federation’. The Ministry of Finance is an extension of the executive arm of government. Both its ‘political head’ (Minister) and executive head’ (Permanent Secretary) are the appointees of the President. In fact, any Minister in charge of the Ministry at any point in time is a card- carrying member of the ruling party. The Permanent Secretary is not apolitical neither. Before a civil servant can be appointed a Permanent Secretary’ in Nigeria, he or she must have been known in the political circle of the ruling political party. Therefore, the claim of neutrality of a civil servant appointed as a ‘Permanent Secretary’ in the country is deceitful. From the foregoing scenario it can be posited that the executive arm of government can use both the Ministry of Finance and the Auditor -General of the Federation to frustrate the independent funding of INEC to get a desired result in the electoral process at any point in time. For instance, there may be delay in approving the estimate of the INEC by the Ministry of Finance or piecemeal release of funds to the EMB. This was witnessed on a large scale during the 2003 and 2007 electoral processes in the country. Similarly, knowing fully well that there can be no new release of funds to the electoral commission without its previous financial year accounts being audited, Auditor- General of the Federation may collude with the political executives by delaying the auditing. This will turn the EMB to a beggar of a kind and be forced to approach the presidency for intervention. The latter may take undue advantage of this by luring the former (EMB) to its side. This none the less will affect the credibility of the election it will later conduct. Stressing the importance of independent funding to INEC, Onwusi (2005) argues that though the 1999 Constitution describes 242

INEC, as ‘Independent National Electoral Commission’, the independence is only on paper. He posits that: The fact that INEC depends on the presidency for its funding makes it dependent. Unless INEC is made to be financially independent all other traits of independence it purports to have are mere dependent. Since the presidency pays the pipe (INEC), it must dictate the tone and this was what happened in 2003 and will continue to happen unless the situation is changed (Onwusi, 2005: 20).

What is scary about the above position espoused by Onwusi (2005) is that in the absence of financial independence, all other forms of independence alluded to by INEC will be a ruse. For instance, when the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) approaches the governor of a state for his/ her assistance in the area of logistics for any impending election, he/ she will take advantage of the opportunity by doing more than what the REC had requested for. But he/ she will unsurprisingly, in return, give the list of his/ her party faithful to be appointed by the REC as ad hoc Electoral Officers (EOS). This set of EOs will later be used by the political executive (governor) to perpetrate electoral malpractices. Conclusion This chapter has addressed the challenge of the independence of EMBs in Africa with insights from Nigeria. The chapter has established the fact that before any election can be adjudged as being a credible one, the election officials and electoral officers who are the master players of the game must not act under the influence of any of the electoral stakeholders particularly, the political executives. This chapter begins with an introduction then conceptual clarifications, followed by a synopsis of the history of EMBs in Nigeria. Next was the examination of Nigeria’s EMB and the question of independence. The chapter ends with conclusion. The study makes the following findings:

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i). All the EMBs that have been established by post- independence successive governments in Nigeria have been confronted by the problem of independence. The chapter reveals that though the country’s constitutions at different points in time defined the country’s EMBs as independent, in practical term, they were not independent. In fact, the legal instruments that established various EMBs in Nigeria though defined them as independent bodies failed to proffer strategies on how their independence could be sustained. ii). The powers to constitute the membership of the country’s EMB in general and appoint its chairman in particular, bestowed on the president as contained in Section 154 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has made the body to be prone to the influence of the executive arm of government. iii). Section153 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that lists INEC as one of the ‘Federal Executive Bodies’ in Nigeria is tantamount to placing the electoral commission under the direct control of the presidency. iv). Section 3 of the 2006 Electoral Act (as amended in 2010) on the establishment of the ‘Independent National Electoral Commission Fund’ was discovered, during the course of this study, not to have been implemented to the letter. Because, hitherto, the budgets and finances of INEC still pass through the presidency, Ministry of Finance and National Assembly. This ‘due process’ have been unduly exploited by these institutions of government to score political points. Added to this is the fact that inadequate funding and delay in releasing budgetary allocations to the country’s EMB by the Government makes it to embark on ‘rescue mission’ by turning to state governments, local governments, and some agencies, for ‘bail- out’.

Following from the findings, the chapter makes the following recommendations to further guarantee the independence of Nigeria’s EMB. 1. Nigeria’s constitution and ‘Electoral Act’ should be overhauled to make the independence of INEC not a mere ‘paper work’ but a reality. Sanctions should be attached to the provisions relating to the independence of INEC in the constitution and Electoral Act. 244

This is necessary because the absence of such sanctions makes electoral stakeholders (political executive in particular) to desecrate the independence of INEC with impunity. 2. The process of making INEC a truly independent EMB in Nigeria should start with its removal from Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which lists it as one of the Federal Executive Bodies. This position is predicated on the fact that listing INEC as one of the ‘Federal Executive Bodies’ is tantamount to placing it under the direct control of political executives’. 3. The independence of INEC should be more guaranteed through a process that does not leave the composition or recomposition of the EMB to the President of Nigeria, acting on the advice of the Council of State and approval of the Senate. When both bodies are dominated by the members of the ruling party, they will become mere rubber stamp. Because all things being equal, they will not like to go against the interest of the President. On this note, the chapter calls for a more transparent process which anticipates a wider level of participation at the levels of citizens and professional associations like members of academia, bar, labour and journalism. This can be achieved through their participation in electoral debates, electoral workshops and submission of memoranda on electionrelated issues. In a similar vein, this chapter recommends that the scope of representation in INEC should be widened to include civil society, and professional associations such as labour unions, the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA) and the academic unions like ‘Academic Staff Union of Universities’ (ASUU). These are the bodies whose political neutrality can hardly be faulted. This study considers this imperative so as to neutralize the interest of political actors in the electoral process. 4. The repealing of Section 160 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that INEC should require the approval of the President before it can regulate its procedures or appoint certain categories of election officials. The repealing of the Section will further guarantee the independence of INEC because the body will have the freedom of determining those it can engage in electoral activities. 245

5. As regards the financial independence of INEC, in order to surmount the problem that relates to inadequate funding of INEC and deliberate late release of funds to it by the Central Bank and Federal Ministry of Finance so as to cow the EMB, this chapter recommends that INEC should be granted financial independence. This should be through a financial system that enables it to derive its funds from consolidated headings that is approved by the National Assembly. This is the practice in Ghana. This chapter argues that its budgets though can be scrutinised, should not suffer from excessive cut and administrative bottle- neck occasioned by the activities of the central Bank, Federal Ministry of Finance and the Due process Unit. This recommendation also addresses the issue of logistic. If INEC is well funded and timely funded too, it will have enough time to order for the election materials to be used in any election. Consequently, there will be prompt delivery of the materials by contractors. In fact, in view of the importance of funding to election, this study recommends that it should be treated like ‘Security Votes’ being enjoyed by the political executives (Governors, Local Government Chairmen and the President in particular) in the country. If adopted for action in the country, INEC will not need the clearance or approval of any agency or organ of government before spending from its approved funds. However, in order to guard against unwarranted or extravagant spending by the INEC, the body should continue to be made accountable to the Auditor-General of the Federation at the end of each financial year. It is the contention of this chapter that if the above recommendations are implemented for action by electoral policy makers in Nigeria, the independence of the country’s EMB will be better guaranteed. Failure to implement them will continue to expose INEC to undue interference from electoral stakeholders in the performance of its statutory responsibilities.

References Akinwumi, F. 2007. ‘My election not free and fair’. Saturday Tribune (Nigeria) June: 3. 246

Chandler, R.C and Plano, I.C. 1988. The Public Administration Dictionary. Santa Barbara California, Oxford England: ABCCLIO. Chirambo, K. 2008. ‘The impact of HIV/AIDS on the electoral processing,” In: Pretorius, J. (Ed). 2008. African politics beyond the third wave of democratization. Cape Town, South Africa: Juta and Co. Ltd.: 67. Dorby, K. and Persse, W.F. 2006. ‘Election Management in developing states’. Journal of Democratic Government. Volume 5:2. Dundas, C.W. (Ed.) 1998. Dimensions of free and fair elections. Framework, integrity, transparency attributes and monitoring. London: Commonwealth Secretariat: 6 Duverger, M. 1955. The study of politics. Great Britain: Thomas Y. Crowell Company Inc. Federal Military Government. 1994. ‘Decree No. 3, 1994; Establishment of National Electoral Commission of Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Government Press. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1979. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. Lagos: Federal Government Press. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1989. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos: NERDC Press. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Lagos: Federal Government Printers. Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010. Electoral Act (amended) 2010. Abuja: INEC. Fromm, E. 1941. Fear of Freedom. New York: Hold, Richard and Winston. Guess, G.M. and Gueorguieva, V. 2010. ‘Dysfunctional decentralization: Election management in theory and practice’. Ibrahim, O.F (1993) ‘Elections in the Transition’. In Adeniran, T. (ed.) Seven years of IBB, Volume Seven. The Transition. Lagos: The Daily Times of Nigeria Plc: 54-72. Independent National Electoral Commission. 2007. The official report on the 2007 general elections. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.

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Independent National Electoral Commission. 2015. The official report on the 2015 general elections. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission. International Foundation for Election System (IFES). 2007. ‘Political money and corruption’. Lagos: IFES. Iwu, M. 2008. ‘The April 2007 elections in Nigeria: What went right?’ A lecture delivered at the University of Ibadan Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, 15th April, 2008: 10. Jinadu, A.L. 2009. ‘Assessing democratic development in Nigeria, 1999-2007: Trends, problems, challenges and prospects’ in Jega, A.M; Wakili, H and Zango, I.M. eds. Consolidation of democracy in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects. Kano Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training: 12. Ketefe, K. 2015. ‘Towards a credible 2007 polls’. The Punch (Nigeria) August 2:3. Kurfi, A. 1983. The Nigerian General Elections: 1959 and 1979 and the aftermath. Lagos: Macmillan Nigerian Publishers Ltd. Ndoro, C. (2005). ‘The politics of the 2005 parliamentary elections’ (special issue on Zimbabwe’s 2005 general elections). 74-106. Nwosu, H. N. 2008. Laying the foundation for Nigeria’s democracy. Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria- Publishers Limited. Ojiako, J.O. 1981. Nigeria Yesterday, Today and ….? Onitsha: Africana Education Publishers Nigeria Ltd. Olaniyi, J.O. 2012. ‘Independent National Electoral Commission and the Management of elections in Nigeria’. An unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. Olaniyi, J.O. 2014. ‘An Analysis of election and its purposes in a political system: A review. Bayero Sociologist (A Journal of Sociological Studies). Vol. 1, No.5; 118-132 Onwudiegwu, C. 1993. ‘The early parties’ in Adeniran, T. ed Seven years of IBBVolume Seven: The Transition. Lagos: The Daily Times of Nigeria Plc 25-26. Onwusi, G. 2005. ‘Towards credible electoral process in Nigeria’. The Herald (Nigeria) July 29:20. Oyebode, F. C. 2006. Elections and election administration in Nigeria. Ibadan: SUNAD Publishers. 248

The Punch (Nigeria) April 24, 2006:10. The Punch (Nigeria) March 30, 2007:8. Transiting Monitoring Group 2007 An Election Programmed to fail; final report of the April 2007 general elections in Nigeria. Lagos: TMG. Transition Monitoring Group, 2003. Do the Votes Count? Final report of the 2003 general elections in Nigeria. Nigeria: Transition Monitoring Group: Nigeria. Ujo, A.A. 2000. Elections a guide for students and election managers. Kaduna: Joyce Graphic Printers & Publishers. Ujo, A.A. 2012. Understanding election in Nigeria: The First 50 years (19602010) Kaduna: Joyce Graphic printers & Publishers. Wikileaks, 2010 ‘We changed Kenya’s 2007 election results’ www.nation.co.ke. 4 December, 2010.

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Chapter Eleven Oratio: A Framing of Knowledge in the Context of Technology and Academia Munyaradzi Mawere & Gertjan Van Stam

“…because of the activities of the West, if it continues, [Africa] needs to build a crane to take out its cravas” (Mawere and van Stam, 2016)

Introduction In the development of technology, two major segregations have been pinpointed: divides and exclusions. For instance, in the development of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), the academic interdisciplinary activities in the so-called ICT for Development (ICT4D) environment has distinguished the digital divide and digital exclusion. The digital divide has been positioned as a dualistic segregation between the haves and haves-not. It is based on the philosophy of quantification, where those not-having are isolated from those having. In this view, the having or not-having is supposed to relate to the presence or non-presence of supporting infrastructures. The implication of this primarily cognitive, abstract, dualistic, quantitative and information based divide is that when (the materiality of) infrastructures are not present, it is proposed there is a need of ‘fixing’ and, thus, technical provisioning. This discussion has fuelled the searches for so-called appropriate technologies and academic studies on the embedding of technologies in a supposedly non-technology-having environment. Examples of such activities are ‘technology implementation studies’ or econometric business case discussions. An equally cognitive, abstract and information based segregation has been proposed as digital exclusion. Here the dualistic differentiation segregates along the qualitative lines of the usability of ICT infrastructures. The perspective of exclusion has yielded 251

academic works such as studies to understand the use of infrastructures, with research outcomes leading to proposals on how to use infrastructure, and studies on how to understand the parameters of (technical) exclusion of use. The narratives of divides and exclusions is sustained by economism and a belief that ‘innovation’ is needed to bring about (even leapfrog) into a ‘new dispensation’. In Africa, however, the need for innovation is not necessarily being echoed. As a case to point this obtaining reality, we propose the careful wording of the National Health Strategy (2017-2020) of Zimbabwe stating “[…] new innovative programmes such as e-health are implemented to enhance and not to disrupt what has been working so far” (MOHCW, 2016: 61). African engineering, we argued elsewhere, does not strive for innovation but does embark on gradual change through improvisations (Mawere and van Stam, 2016). Action (or agency) continuously improves on what exists so far. This does not allow for a ‘backwards reading of events’ or backward linkages, which Tim Ingold and Elizabeth Hallam (2007) described as the hallmark of innovation. As its content is linked to a physical presence, embodied knowledge does not look for innovation, but for improvisation through interpersonal interaction in community. This chapter introduces the African virtue episteme labelled by one of the authors as oratio. Oratio is part of a framework for African meaning making. Therefore, this chapter questions the suitability of “foreign-bred” and imported technologies in many African development contexts and the dismembering of technological artefacts from its embodied meaning. On this note, the chapter argues that meaning in African cosmology and knowledge is best established through interactions in the local communities. We, thus, advance that there is a clear need for generating the further understanding of the meaning and subsequent effects of academic knowledge, its technological deposits aided by academic interactions in African contexts.

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A missing link: Technology, Development and Embodied Knowledge As Kentaro Toyama proposed, “like a lever, technology amplifies people’s capacities in the direction of their intentions” (Toyama, 2015: 28). This technology’s ‘Law of Amplification’ dawned on Toyama in a manner that he describes as “a eureka moment” (ibid: 29). Toyama realised that the social capacity of people and institutions determines the outcome of the application of technologies. However, technology development in many communities of the Global South such as Africa is deeply associated with colonial legacies and academic works are of little use for practitioners in local communities (van Greunen and van Stam, 2014). Of course, African communities assess the value of technologies from African positionalities, cultures and value systems (and paradigm), which are not readily understood or appreciated by those designing or implementing the technological innovations using alien scales and the “all-size-fits-all” philosophy. Most of the technologies that find themselves in the Global South and indeed their services fail to align with African communities and local practitioners of development. There is, in fact, a mismatch between the intentions of community and the functionalities of technologies. Therefore, it is no wonder alien technologies in the African communities are not taken up, abandoned or left to fail. This is normally the case given that in Africa, knowledge is a result of embodied interactions, when it has been ‘talked about’. Embodied knowledge is part and parcel of reality in that it interacts with the lived world. When technology results from information processed in understanding, this implies that technology cannot exist apart from the lived environment. Also, knowledge does not live in a deconstructed or abstract reality where it is detached from the lived experiences of the people. The effects of information in African practice are well described in the various works of Francis Nyamnjoh. For instance, in his general theorisation on African media, Nyamnjoh (2005) argues from his case study of media in Cameroon, that the media not only reflects but also shapes African societies. He argues for responsible 253

behaviour aligned with Africa’s sociality, negotiability, conviviality and dynamic sense of community. Similarly, we argue that what is valid for the media is also valid for its technological carrier: information and communication technologies. This takes us to the “theory” of oratio. The Interconnectivity of Knowledge In oratio knowledge is embedded in the whole, in an embodied manner. In African philosophy, people in the lived realm regard the whole as constitutive of reality. Embodiment, of course, involves the presence of people. However, as Paul Dourish (2001) notes, embodiment does not necessarily focus on natural properties (of people, systems, technologies, or artefacts), but concentrates on human interactions, on how people (and their intentions amplifying technologies) contribute and engage in the wider context, in action in the lived world. In line with a phenomenological, dynamic understanding, in Africa, any part is a derivative of the whole. Although parts can have an attributed agency, the whole carries the values that mediate the culture. It is with this whole that oratio engages. Although partial revelations are possible, disembodied and abstract cognition, disconnected notions of reality (for instance, in models), anything that filters the whole, is of lesser value. In oratio, knowledge is embodied and its content – and, therefore, the potency of the information – depends on the time and place. And for each time and place, there are different ‘rules’ on how to engage with information, set in the local culture. Those rules depend on all aspects of the context and can involve (but are not limited to) who disseminates the knowledge, who is present when the knowledge is disseminated, what authorities are involved, and what oratory tools are used by both the transmitter and receiver. These aspects are relational, dialectical and constituting and, therefore, intrinsically part of the information and its transfer, at that time and place. In distinct contrast to intuitive (individual) knowledge, embodied knowledge is understood as being both intersubjective and ascribed to experiences and carriers. The carriers of knowledge are connected people, recognised in the community and authorised by its leaders to 254

handle the knowledge, in relationships. Carriers of knowledge are both human beings and non-human beings. In this chapter, however, we focus on knowledge in respect to its link to a human being. As a community-empowered representative, in their Ubuntu-guided behaviour, carriers of knowledge are responsible for the continuous validation of such (embodied) knowledge. This knowledge contrasts with an academic knowledge that is solely institutionalised and transmitted in non-embodied writings, published in foreign journals, and set in foreign languages. Without its embodiment in the (local) community (-of-practice) such academic knowledge is void in African practice (van Greunen and van Stam, 2014). All this leads to the understanding that oratio is closely linked to subjectivity, passion, authority, roles in the community, and how interactions can be performed to communicate (and embody) knowledge. These aspects are part and parcel of the backdrop against which knowledge is created, discussed, and disseminated, in situ. In the same way, language (the vehicle for the transfer of information) includes content from the context, especially from the person speaking. However, information is contained in the whole performance of conversation, which includes verbal and non-verbal communication, in which every gesture and every circumstance is part of the communication. In that sense, communicating in oratio has the potential to convey much more information than text: the whole context, including its history and cultural expressions, linking in with time and space. Oratio particularly reviews ‘who is present’ and assesses carefully who articulates what information, in which language, in which context, and in what manner. In short, oratio scrutinises what consciousnesses are being expressed. The embodiment of the information communicated in oratio allows the information to reside in the people present; therefore, knowledge is always becoming and impossible to ascertain or limit. Information emerges when called for, both in natural and cultural processes and circumstances. Therefore, the presence of knowledge is related to where the interactors – the humans carrying the knowledge – exist in time and place. Knowledge is, thus, interconnected, set in everyday life, full of mundane and scripted behaviour, in ‘normal’ and observable practice. 255

The perspective of oratio recognises that information is embedded in human thought and, thereby, incorporates rationality, reflexivity and relationality. To turn information into knowledge necessitates the involvement of all senses and of all community members present and incorporates all inputs related to the external environment (for instance, the seating arrangements) and to the internal state of a person (for instance, their demeanour and the strength of their relationships). When assessing in an oratiosensitised manner, there is specific regard for the dynamic flow of information and interactions from the outside (for instance, by letter) and from the inside (the assessment of one’s ability to do something, or the assessment of ‘the other’). Oratio demands sensitivity to personal histories – including family relationships – of each interlocutor. Further, oratio includes all stakeholders engagement with relevant authorities so as to understand the sequence and manner of communications. Interacting in Oratio In oratio, the certainty of knowledge can only be ascertained when its inherent relationalities are witnessed in engaged action. For example, in group encounters in rural Africa, each individual person present is expected to contribute to a certain topic to realise the presence of knowledge. However, if one participant does not speak or the content of one or more oral contribution(s) is equivocal, a certainty of knowledge is not realised. Therefore, oratio links in with the notion of relational ontology (Boudourides, 2009; Van Inwagen, 2011: Blake, 2013). These engaged actions are, necessarily, the actions of the people present. Helen Verran (2001:182) sees this in a predicating-designation – in which a linguistic declaration involves spatiotemporal particulars – which can be experienced (not judged) and, therefore, tacitly learnt or explored by participation, taking the whole into account. She invokes O’Shaughnessy’s (1998) concept of proprioception (perception governed by information about position and movement) as a sort of fifth sense. Assessing the contributions by feminism to social theories, Joan Wallach Scott (2005:213]

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concurs that “experience is at once always already an interpretation and something that needs to be interpreted”. In oratio, there are three typical interactions: (1) with the ongoing motion of life, encapsulated by a high degree of certainty of the constants that need to be considered (e.g., the rising and setting of the sun each day), (2) with realities as set in a cosmologic understanding of realities (e.g., with non-human entities, such as spiritual forces), and 3) with any type of human movement through space and time. These are the encounters in which knowledge is enacted. The latter might be more connected with acts of will, although even this notion is contentious in view of the communalself. In any case, oratio facilitates the recognition of, and interaction with, multiple perspectives. As oratio emphasises the collective formation of knowledge, it encompasses any interaction and attitude towards what is communicated in the social, political, discursive, and narrative realms. As all these are mutable when viewed from various paradigms (especially when regarding the ‘We’ and ‘It’ paradigms, see Chapter 12), then, in the analysis, aspects of hope and faith come into play. When faith is defined as “… the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1, KJV), then faith provides the agency for the handling and transfer of knowledge. Linking Information to Embodied Knowledge When information is contained in oratio, there is an ongoing connection with Ubuntu/unhu. To disembody information by taking the human carrier and what is being carried apart (for instance, in the process of textualisation) represents a significant action with relational consequences. Of course, when knowledge is decontextualised or deconstructed (e.g., by putting it in writing, see Van Stam (2013a)), the information becomes significantly different in nature and may be unfit for its purpose. In Africa, information exists when it is being interacted with, when it is being ‘talked about’ (ibid). Information is part and parcel of reality and interacts with the lived world. Information does not exist apart from the lived environment. Also, information does not 257

live in a deconstructed or abstract reality. The effects of information in African practice are well described in the various works of Francis Nyamnjoh. For instance, in his general theorisation on African media, Nyamnjoh (2005) argues from his case study of media in Cameroon, that the media not only reflects, but also shapes, African societies. He argues for responsible behaviour – here seen as oratio – aligned with Africa’s sociality, negotiability, conviviality and dynamic sense of community. The recognition of the manner of oratio has potential consequences for interactions facilitated by technology. For instance, oratio influences processes for the handling of resources; for example, the process of bringing a computer or equipment for an Internet network into a rural village involves many people and authorities, who all need to be interacted with in a manner and at the point where everyone is at (Kroczek et al., 2013). This process is highly guarded by the community and activities are careful planned, including how to move between places to ensure that any representation of (new) information and the growth of embodied knowledge are aligned (van Stam, 2013b). The dismembering of information from embodied knowledge, for instance, by putting the information on an electronic platform, is not yet set in many African communities. Electronic information is by its very nature easily copied, but the status of that information in conjunction with oratio is yet unclear. The lack of words to describe concepts (such as electronic information) in the vernacular languages spoken in rural Africa is a sign that the meaning of such concepts has not yet been fully embodied in the knowledge of the community. Words are linked to worldviews and culture (Verran, 2001), and lack of words in the vernacular may be evidence of a lack of connection between an intervention and a sub-Saharan community. The ramifications of transmitting information using electronic means and formats needs to be carefully reviewed within African communities that rely on oratio for the gatekeeping and management of embodied knowledge. There is ambiguity with the transmission of information electronically, as electronic information and its means of transmission are not intrinsically linked to the community. Electronic information can flow independently, without being explicitly 258

commanded by human actors, and can be transmitted quickly and widely. In this process, electronic information negates human gatekeeping processes, potentially disturbing any carefully-managed interaction process or positioning of relationships in view of (supercolonial) powers. As the facilities required to use electronic information have only entered Africa relatively recently, the significance and ramifications of the transfer of information into electronic data have not yet been settled, and the relationship between its transfer and embodied knowledge (production) is not yet clear. Digital information does not carry any information on its embedding in the community. Therefore, with regards to oratio, further research on the effect of imported technologies is warranted. The Dynamism of Knowledge In contemporary times, academic knowledge is generally regarded as ‘truth’, which comes about when the value of representations (like in data points, data sets, and methodologies) become ‘fixed’. This fixating, in turn, influences other times and places, not only changing, but also constituting, social constructs in a manner not intended by those who created it. Homeostating of information in numerical values has become a tool of (super)colonialism. Oratio does not sustain fixated knowledge. Oratio is dynamic in the way embodied information continuously constitutes realities. This can be seen in the positivistic analysis of a song being sung on different occasions in an African community. The singer can claim, in oratio, that ‘the content of the song is equal’, while an observer operating from outside oratio could conclude: ‘no, this is not equal, see some words are different’. Thus, although the meaning of the song remains the same (= the knowledge embodied in it), the deconstructed parts might (and most probably will) be different on different occasions.

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All Actions and Knowledge are Linked Coming from the perspective of oratio, in the African empirical world any enactment in time and space is meaningful. As all are connected, the one that communicates lets information interact with interlocutors all the time. Any movement is, therefore, significant: any presence in time in a location is relevant (for instance, providing information on the ‘why here’ and not ‘there’?). As everything interacts, action is set in time and place. Action continuously improvises on what exists so far. This does not allow for a ‘backwards reading of events’, which Tim Ingold and Elizabeth Hallam (2007) described as the hallmark of innovation. As its content is linked to a physical presence, embodied knowledge does not look for innovation, but for improvisation (van Stam, 2016a). Knowledge, as understood through ‘relatio’, cannot be instantiated from here to there. Through improvisation, involving generative, relational, and temporal actions, there is continuity in the relationality of knowledge to time and place. Referring back to Ingold and Hallam (2007), each interaction is in relation to the context, a creation as a point in time and space. Subsequently, the meaning of the interaction morphs into embodied knowledge, as a sort of cone, growing in width with meaning and space in time. All events and all embodied actions are, thus, meshed with all previous actions, and influence the future. The Non-Applicability of Certain (Western) Forms of Knowledge in Sub-Saharan Africa In the West, the rapid ‘professionalization’ of knowledge – which is developed in ‘ivory towers’, put in writing, handled by (academic) elites and fed to youth in higher education settings – has led to a growing disconnect within African settings. This knowledge – which is produced in management settings focused on achieving outcomes (instead of ‘engendering community’), with the crafty use of tools of development (software, computers, and so on), and embedded in the most updated versions of hardware and software – links knowledge to a context that is far removed from daily life in Africa. In rural 260

Africa, there is generally no (history of) Internet connectivity and no access to the latest hardware, software or programming languages. Thus, although particular knowledge does exist, as can be observed in the so-called ‘body of knowledge,’ this knowledge does not necessarily exist in an embodied knowledge format in Africa. Possibly, embodiment can be recognised when processed through conferences and meetings; however, those centres of production are invariably in the Global North (for example, van Stam, 2016b). Therefore, even if embodied knowledge exists in the centres of production, it does not exist in the same way as in African communities. Conclusion In this chapter, we provide insight into an oratio-perspective that is dynamic in nature and that does not allow well for static representations. We have argued that oratio, as understood from an African perspective, does not align with a Western construct where knowledge is written down, and, thus, regarded as universally valid, both in time and place. The Western knowledge system, in this regard, has a loop in which a social construct begets a technological construct. Oratio integrates interactions with experience. It positions ‘what is being told’ within a tangible and observable reality. Oratio pulls the communication into an environment embedded in moral norms, so that the strength and acceptability of the communication can be assessed. This assessment includes how it meshes in with the agenda, as set by community, in Ubuntu connecting with the ‘real world’ as it unfolds, linking in with a cosmologic existentiality. Oratio exposes the psyche of human beings towards information and knowledge in context and at the time of interaction. It grounds creative involvement and embodiment at the time of interaction, bringing to the fore all aspects of knowledge, including ideologies and any form of meaning-making, in and for embodiment and representation. Oratio ensures interaction, to align knowledge within the culture, civilisations and universes, as known and represented at the moment of interaction. Oratio allows for room for all ways of life 261

and knowledge traditions and for the inclusion of what is often labelled ‘traditional knowledge’. Oratio ensures communications are in tune with existing embodied knowledge, creativity and imagination, countering the regressive logics of exclusionary knowledge. Oratio ensures that embodied knowledge is embedded in conviviality, interconnection and interdependence and with all potential in the community.

References A4AI. 2017. 2017 Affordability Report, Washington: World Wide Web Foundation. Bidwell, N. J. 2016. Moving the Centre to Design Social Media in Rural Africa, AI & SOCIETY, Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Communication 31, 1: 51–77. Blake, T. 2013. Latour’s ‘Jamesian’ Empiricism (1): Relational Ontologies of the Theory-Ladenness of Experience, Agent Swarm, retrieved from https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2013/10/29/. Boudourides, M. 2009. The Relational Ontology of Social Network Theories, retrieved from http://www.nessiephilo.com/Files/moses_boudourides_the_relational_ontologyo f_social_network_theories.pdf. Dourish, Paul. 2001. Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction, kindle edition, Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. Ingold, Tim, and Elizabeth Hallam. 2007. “Creativity and Cultural Improvisation: An Introduction”, in Creativity and Cultural Improvisation, eds. Elizabeth Hallam and Tim Ingold. Oxford: Berg. Kroczek, Astrid, Fred Mweetwa, and Gertjan van Stam. 2013. “Stakeholder Theory and ICT in rural Macha, Zambia”, in 5th Annual International Conference on ICT for Africa (ICT4Africa), 20-23 Feb 2013, Harare, Zimbabwe, online. Mawere, Munyaradzi, and Gertjan van Stam. “Paradigm Clash, Imperial Methodological Epistemologies and Development in 262

Africa: Observations from Rural Zimbabwe and Zambia.” in Development, Governance, and Democracy: A Search for Sustainable Democracy and Development in Africa, edited by Munyaradzi Mawere and Tendai Mwanaka, pp. 193–211. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 2015. Mawere, Munyaradzi, and Gertjan van Stam. 2016. “African Engineering and the Quest for Sustainable Development: Levelling the Ground for All Players.”, in Theory, Knowledge, Development and Politics: What Role for the Academy in the Sustainability of Africa?, edited by Munyaradzi Mawere and Artwell Nhemachena, pp. 189–206. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG. MOHCW. 2016. The National Health Strategy for Zimbabwe, 20162020. Equity and Quality in Health: Leaving No One Behind, Harare: Government of Republic of Zimbabwe, 2016. Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2005. Africa’s Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging, New York: Zed Books. Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2017. Drinking from the Cosmic Gourd: How Amos Tutuola Can Change Our Minds, Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG. O’Shaughnessy, B. 1998. “Proprioception and the Body Image”, in The Body and the Self, eds. José Luis Bermúdez and Naomi Eilan, Bradford: Bradford Books, pp. 175–204. Scott, Joan Wallach. 2005. “The Evidence of Experience”, in G. M. Spiegel (Ed.), Practicing History. New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn (pp. 199–216). New York and London: Routledge. Toyama, Kentaro. 2015. Geek Heresy: Rescuing Social Change from the Cult of Technology, Kindle edition, New York: Public Affairs. van Greunen, D. & van Stam, G. 2014. “Review of an African Rural Internet Network and Related Academic Interventions.” The Journal of Community Informatics 10(2), online. Van Inwagen, P. 2011. Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies, Philosophical Perspectives 25 (Metaphysics): 389–405. Van Stam, Gertjan. 2013a. “Information and Knowledge Transfer in the Rural Community of Macha, Zambia”, The Journal of Community Informatics 9(1): online. 263

Van Stam, Gertjan. 2013b. A Strategy to Make ICT Accessible in Rural Zambia: A Case Study of Macha, Port Elizabeth: NMMU. van Stam, Gertjan. 2016a. “African Engineers and the Quest for Sustainable Development: Levelling the Ground for All Players.” in IEEE PES Power Africa, 28 June - 2 July 2016, Livingstone, Zambia. van Stam, Gertjan. 2016b. “Africa’s Non-Inclusion in Defining Fifth Generation Mobile Networks.” in Africomm 2016, 6-7 Dec 2016, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Verran, H. 2001. Science and African Logic, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

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Chapter Twelve Africa, the Diasporan Community and Super-Colonialism Bankie F. Bankie & Munyaradzi Mawere Introduction The movement for unity amongst Africans owes its origin to the slave trade. In the history of Africa, there have been two major phases of depopulation and partition of the African continent. The first was as a result of the enslavement of Africans over a millennium ago by Arabs. The second phase was the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. Unlike colonialism, which mainly siphoned out natural resources out of Africa, the aforementioned mainly siphoned out Africa’s human capital, which in fact is the most important resource that any country can boast of. This siphoning of human capital, which sometimes is described by others as human trafficking, continues today and has resulted in mainly children and females being forcibly taken out of Africa, as slaves, into Arabia. When the Arab Slave Trade started, many millions were affected. The Arab Slave Trade was a practice of human slavery by the Arabs mainly in Western Asia, North Africa, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. This trade occurred between the medieval period through early 21st century. Cohabitation with Arabs and procreation was not allowed. Men in general were castrated, which explains the absence of any sizeable African Diaspora in Arabia (Inalcik, 1979). The traces of African communities are not found. The few that exist, such as the ‘Marsh Africans’ found in Iraq are marginalised up to today and have been, in general, unable to obtain any significant social standing in Arabian society (Prah, 2005). The Western slave trade which developed from 1441 involving Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean was of a different cultural dimension from what had taken place earlier in Arabia, in the traffic of human beings (Ibid). The Western commodification of Africans 265

did not seek to sever from their roots those affected. A substantial African Diaspora exists today in the Americas, the Caribbean and to a lesser extent in Europe. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the descendants of the slaves were rounded up from time to time and sent back to Africa to places such as Sierra Leone, which was established by the British in 1787 for freed slaves (Ibid). Sierra Leone and Liberia, were in fact states created to accommodate freed slaves, whose relations with the indigenes and historical genesis were distorted. This movement gave birth to the issue of repatriation and ‘back to Africa’, endorsing the concept of an African Nation to which all of the African descent belongs as of right. In 1816, “White” Americans founded the American Colonisation Society (ACS) in the USA, whose main purpose was to finance and arrange for the removal of ‘freed Blacks’ to Liberia, which was established by the United States of America (USA) in West Africa (Ibid). In Europe today, Africans are again in forced migration from Africa towards settlement in Europe, in search of a ‘better life’ in another modernday slavery, with push and pull factors. Slavery in the Western hemisphere was abolished in 1807 as inhumane and immoral. In the USA, the African Americans undertook a struggle, which included a revolutionary armed phase, to attain civil and political rights, such that one of them, Barrack Obama, was elected President. However the civil rights movement is yet to be completed as it did not uproot the scourge of racism in the USA, which explains the ongoing low intensity confrontation between the Police and the African American community. Today, the White fascist para-military Klu-Klux Klan is allowed to operate in civil society in the southern USA. It is important to note that PanAfricanism emerged as a reaction to these realities in North America. That said, this chapter argues that Pan-Africanism, that is, the movement for unity of Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora, is a reaction against the subjugation of African communities. It emerged in particular in the United States, the Caribbean Islands and Europe and is today spreading within the global African community. The Pan-African Institute for the Study of African Society (PAISAS) in Namibia, for example, serves as a platform for the study of African society within the continent and in the diaspora. The chapter further 266

advances the argument that Pan-Africanism today should seek to neutralise the poignant stance of the Global North that is determined to cause a more nerve-wrecking form of colonialism or what has come to be understood as super-colonialism. We urge that as a movement of unity, Pan-Africanism should not only focus on the need to neutralise the nefarious whims of the Global North expressed through super-colonialism. Instead, it should go a step further to advance and concretise Pan-African unity and the integration of the Diasporan Community and Africa at large on the basis of equality, equal rights, justice and equal voting. The African Eastern Diaspora It has been stated that Africa had two major exposures to foreign physical exploitation. We underscore that Arabs came first, since they arrived in Africa in AD639-640 arriving through the Sinai, eventually occupying North Africa. This led to a situation described by Bankie (2013) in the book he co-edited entitled Pan-Africanism African Nationalism: Strengthening the unity of Africa and its Diasporas, in which he argues that the Arab hegemony and expansion via Arabisation and Islamisation, is actively involved in the armed conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) today, through the agency of militias such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It is therefore not surprising that back at ‘home’ in their ‘pays d’origine,’ Arabs were unable to create a society tolerant enough to permit the equality of all irrespective of where they came from. African descendants in places such as Iraq and Syria were oppressed and are virtually without rights even today. It was deliberate policy by the slave masters which ensured that those pressed into slavery were mainly women and children, who were marched across land from Africa to Arabia. Those males able to reach the Middle East were not allowed to procreate. To ensure that no procreation would take place, the African males were castrated to ensure that they would not co-habit with ‘Black’ slave women and in the process establish a nascent African community in Arabia. This has ensured that the African Community in the East remained largely inactive and oppressed by the Arabs. The voices of these Diasporan communities are yet to be heard. Their experiences are also yet to be 267

narrated, especially by those Africans who have and in fact continue to experience slavery outside their motherland. Yet, the Arab Slave Trade was not the only form of slavery instituted against the African people. Later on, African enslavement by the European people was introduced to Africa through the help of Arabian merchants. Prevalent was also African Slavery by Africans. In the ensuing section, we focus on African slavery by Africans. African slavery of Africans In a remarkable contribution to the book ‘Reflections on Arab-led slavery of Africans’ published by The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS) in Cape Town, South Africa, Dioulde Laya, Professor of Sociology at the University of Niamey in the Republic of Niger, shares his personal research on the history and sociology of the slavery of Africans by Africans in Africa (see Prah, 2005). Laya’s interest was to know and understand the characteristics of African slavery of Africans and to understand why human chattel slavery continues to this day in Africa. The period of Laya’s research focus spans some seven centuries ending at the end of the 18th century. He clearly notes that little is known about the origins of slavery in Africa and the so-called ‘indigenous African slavery’. This section of the chapter focuses on the Trans-Saharan slave trade in Senegal, Niger and Chad. The research by Laya reveals that the practice of capturing and selling people in Africa was established prior to the Islamic faith being embraced by the region. Initially, slaves were for domestic use. Later with the expansion of property ownership and intensified agricultural activity, slave masters established slave villages around their lands. Slave populations were incorporated into armies. Thus, by the end of the sixteenth century, slavery had become a fact of life in politics and society in general. Some two hundred years later, slavery had become a pillar of society. Focusing on slavery in Sudan, Laya notes that in times past, Sudan occupied a larger area than today (Prah, 2005). It included all of the French Empire in the Sahelian Area. In a report of AD891 268

there was a raid for slaves in Waddan in Sudan (Ibid). As Laya further narrates, the population were Muslims and slaves were taken to neighbouring Sudanese ethnic groups. These were commercial transactions devoid of military motives. Those involved appear to have been Arabs of Berber origin. According to Laya, this trafficking started before the Islamisation of the area. In a report of AD988, slaves were exported from the Maghreb to the Middle East. During this time, slaves were being imported from Europe into North Africa. The principality of Varegue in Russia established an empire based on the sale of slaves to the Muslim world, involving others such as the Bulgars from the area of present day Bulgaria (Ibid). As noted in the same report, by the mid-11th century the Russians controlled the slave trade into Europe. Between 1150 and 1230th century, the Muslim Middle East was being serviced by slaves from Sudan. In 1356, Ibn Battuta reported on the human sacrifice of Black slaves at Gobir, a Hausa state. Laya reminds us that any study of the Trans-Saharan slave trade must keep in mind the complex issue of the existence of “Black” communities amongst the nomadic Libyo-Berbers/ Berbers and the alternating relations of conflict and peace between “Blacks” and “White” communities. In this context, Whites are referred to as ‘Beydane’, meaning Moors, who are otherwise known as Berber and who are of light yellow complexion. Also, included as White are the Arabs. Concerning the number of slaves moved on the Trans-Saharan route, Laya quotes Hamit who is said to have totalled the number as follow: 7th century, the number of slaves totalled 100,000 8th century, the number of slaves totalled 200,000 9th century, the number of slaves totalled 400,000 10th century, the number of slaves totalled 500,000 11th century, the number of slaves totalled 500,000 (Ibid: 29).

More so, moved between 650 and 1100 were 2,190,000 slaves according to Lovejoy (1983:25) and Austen (1979:66). Black slaves destined to Qairawan and to the Middle East came mainly from Air, Kawar, Tibesti and Hausa. 269

Arab slavery of Africans Reports from one of the many Arabian markets namely Jeddah, which received slaves from ports on the African side of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, show the number of slaves sold from Africa. The reports indicate that in 1858, the number of slaves sold in this market was 2000. By 1881, “the number of slaves sold annually in Jeddah was between 4 000 and 5 000” (Pankhurst 1968: 125), rising to about 6 000 in 1888 (Austen 1979). For purposes of this chapter, more focus will be on the following areas: Mauritania, The Lake Nyasa region, The Red Sea, The Nile Basin, Sudan, Southern Europe, Asia and China. The choice for this focus is premised on the fact that the aforementioned areas were directly and deeply affected by the Arab slave trade. To be considered an Arab in this context required that the person be a member of an Arab ethic group and that the person be culturally an Arab. Mauritania In Mauritania, a West African country situated in the Afro-Arab borderlands between the Arab and African worlds, of some three million inhabitants, slavery is still actively practiced. The name Mauritania comes from the word Moor. The Moors are Berbers, who at one time controlled much of the Magreb in North Africa, as well as Southern Spain. The Berbers lived in Mauritania before the arrival of the Arabs. Historical, social, political and religious forces explain the continuous existence of slavery in modern day Mauritania. Approximately 40% of the population, which is structured on a caste system, belong to a category called Haratine (freed Blacks). Another category are abd (slaves). The difference between the two is cosmetic as the Haratine effectively remain in bondage. Every year Haratine are sold, rented, raped, castrated and exported to North African countries and the Gulf states by their ‘masters’. The Mauritanian state not only condones this system but perpetuates it. The Islamic faith, to which most Mauritanians belong, tolerates slavery. In theory Islam encourages the liberation of slaves, but the practice of Islam has permitted irregularities. Manual work being looked down upon in Mauritanian society creates conditions for the abuse of Haratine and 270

slaves. The laws in the country are sufficiently ambiguous that slavery is able to survive and international organizations which should actively oppose slavery, do little to stop it. According to Garba Diallo (2005), slave trade in Mauritania can be dated from the ninth century AD such that the Trans-Sahara Arab Berber slave trade in the Sahel Region preceded the European TransAtlantic slave trade by about half a century, outlasted it and exists to this day. Certain social features came with the invading AraboBerbers. For Diallo, out of bloody territorial expansion a racist social order was installed in the Sahel. Thus for him, the existence of the slave trade was accompanied by imperial territorial expansion, ethnic cleansing, economic exploitation, as well as cultural, linguistic, spiritual and environmental genocide across the Sahel by the invading Arabo-Berbers, creating a racist social order in the Sahel stretching from Noukchott in Mauritania to Port Sudan in Sudan on the Red Sea. As Diallo further elucidates, given the rapid demographic increase of the Haratine slave community and the diminishing numbers of the power elites that are the backbone of the political leadership of Mauritania, there is potential for imbalance with power shifting from the elite. It happens that the Arabised elites are light in complexion/”White”, whereas the majority of the African population in the country are Black. Below the Arabised power elite are the folk castes of artisans and craftsmen and at the bottom of the social hierarchy is the Haratine slave community, a Haratine being an ex-slave who has received his freedom (Ibid). According to local tradition, the warrior caste constitutes the armed branch of the nomadic community, while the religious caste takes care of spiritual needs. Physical work is considered taboo by the Bani Hassan warriors and the Zawaya ‘holy’ men and their women folk. Diallo clarifies that the middle class artisans, who are mainly Berbers, deal with arts, crafts, music and praise singing. Being poor, of relatively low social status and dependent on the upper class, the artisan community has hardly any slaves. Ownership of a slave represents social status. Slaves can be used to pay off debts. They can be sent to work for the pay of the master and otherwise deployed for monetary value. In the mounting conflict between the Arabo-Berber and the Black African 271

community of Fulani, Wolof, Soninke and Bambara, the Haratine slave communities are increasingly being used as a special slave militia unit of oppression (Ibid). More so, for the slave, everything in life revolves around the life and needs of the master. In Arabo-Berber culture, slavery is hereditary and permanent. Like domestic animals, the children of slaves follow their mother. Despite the enactment of three laws supposedly abolishing slavery, the practice continues unabated today. A major problem is that it is legal for a master to use his female slaves for sexual purposes at will. He is not obliged to recognize the children he begets with his slaves. The social set-up within the AraboBerber community and the high divorce rate encourages high levels of sexual interaction between masters and female slaves. This reality is felt to be God-given, making the master the father and the slave the loyal means of production. The slave children belong to the master. This state of affairs in Mauritania has been ignored by the African world. Here, note is taken of the misuse of Islam for criminal ends. With half the population being slaves, Diallo ascribes the reason for this large population of slaves in Mauritania as due to the massive and systematic reproduction of the slave population. Concubinage is widely practiced. The master becomes the slave owner of his own children. In the country the demographic reality has been deliberately distorted. To this end the White Arab Berbers are added to the Haratine as one Arab group, whilst history is denied, manipulated and distorted, as are the multicultural realities and the population figures of the country. Under these arrangements Black Africans in Mauritania make up less than 25% of the population. General support for the status quo in Mauritania comes from France, which found it vital to sustain the Arabo-Berber structure in Mauritania. In return, France received a near monopoly of Mauritanian minerals and marine resources. This made Mauritania indifferent to West African unity. However, Mauritania has not been accepted by Arab North Africa as an equal member. From posing as an African nationalist country supporting African liberation, unity and development, Mauritania then supported Arab nationalism, joining the Arab League pursuing an aggressive 272

Arabisation policy in the country – with massive ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab Black population in furtherance of Arab-Berber domination. The Arabic language was imposed on Black African children. The Army was Arabised and purged of its Black officers. Black African agricultural land along the Senegal Valley was expropriated through a racist land law and given to the Arabo-Berber segment with the active support of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) based in Washington, USA. In 1989 there was an explosion of inter-ethnic violence, leaving many dead. The war against the Black segment reached its height during the 1990 – 1991 Gulf War. By 1998 relations with Arabia were broken and full diplomatic relations established with Israel. In the face of all these developments Africa assumed the position of ‘hear no evil, see no evil, do no evil’, to assuage Arabia. In the past Negro-Africans sold fellow Africans into slavery in the Trans-Saharian trade. For the Negro-Africans in Mauritanian the main issue is the system of castes existing in their society. Those who have been ‘freed’ from slavery are subject to the caste system. The Arabo-Berbers are inhuman and maintain some 72% of the population under their domination (Diallo, 2005). Diallo insists on the important role played in reinforcing the continuation of slavery in Mauritania, by external factors related to Afro-Arab relations and third world realities. Added to which is the hypocritical attitude of African governments and their wishes for petrol dollars. Also the pre-existence of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and its heritage, is a factor influencing the continued practice of slavery in Mauritania. Diallo elaborates on the African Eastern Diaspora in the Arab world. Of the twenty two countries making up the Arab League each has a population of African descent. For example, in Yemen more than 50% of the population of Blacks are slaves. In Arabia although there are African descendants in each state – they have no political influence. Diallo ends his contribution with his views on reparations for the Arab enslavement of Africans, which he supports. He places responsibility for the situation in Mauritania on the invading AraboBerber groups since the ninth century AD, which originated from Arabia. He links Mauritania with Sudan, as two sides of one coin. As 273

Diallo insist, that the struggle will be hard and difficult, but justice is on the side of time and history. Lake Nyasa Region The Lake Nyasa region in present day Tanzania was the main source of slaves in East Africa. Eginald Mihanjo of the History Department, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, states in the book ‘Reflections on Arab-led slavery of Africans’ that between 70 and 90 per cent of the slaves in Zanzibar in the 1860 came from the ‘Kilwa route’ and that most of the slaves on this route were captured from the Lake Nyasa region, such that this trade had profound influence on the lives of the people in the area of Lake Nyasa. Unfortunately, the current generation in the area knows little to nothing about the earlier history of their area making the past slave trade period a forgotten subject in current Tanzanian historiography. This is aggravated by the fact that the Lake Nyasa slavery offers different aspects of the Arab practice of slavery deep inside East Africa. Slaves were taken from the Lake Nyasa area to the Indian Ocean as far back as the late eighteenth century. Mihanjo (2005) notes that the slave trade developed in the Lake Nyasa area owing to pressure from the Atlantic slavery and the needs of French plantations in the late eighteenth century. The slaves were moved to the sea by a relay system. Between 1840 and 1850 the trade intensified. The trade went on up to 1895, when colonial conquest was completed. Mihanjo states that by 1859 a full stream of slaves was flowing from Lake Nyasa to the coast, to Kilwa where they took dhows to Zanzibar. From 1859, a full stream of Nyasa people were harried and driven by slave traders (Ibid). As Mihango further asserts, by 1874 the effected numbers started to decline. The victims of this slave trade were small defenceless communities alongside Lake Nyasa. Many of these were fishing villages which were harried by stronger tribes from the other side of the lake, who took them and sold them as slaves. It is estimated that 252,000 slaves passed through Kilwa from the eastern shores of Lake Nyasa in present day Tanzania, between 1859 and 1874 (Ibid). The Lake Nyasa region provided most of the slaves that

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fed the Indian Ocean slave system. Slavery had been officially stopped around 1850. We urge that Mihanjo be commended on his Lake Nyasa research. He encourages others to deepen the knowledge he exposes. We push Mihanjo’s passion and encouragements further by insisting that Lake Nyasa was not the only place in Tanzania to suffer the ravages and atrocities of slave trade. Slaves from other parts of Tanzania later found themselves living in places such as Zanzibar speaking Kiswahili, which is a clear testimony that slavery was a threat to the peace and humanity of many people across Tanzania as elsewhere in Africa. Red Sea slave trade As observed by Mekuria Bulcha (2005), it is estimated that over seventeen million Africans were sold to the Middle East and Asia between the sixth and twentieth centuries. Although the Arab slave trade spanned a longer period of time than its Western counterpart and the captives exported accounted for a significant percentage of the global slave trade out of Africa, their fate has attracted little attention from researchers. The export of slaves from Africa to the Middle East and Asia continues to this day and lasted longer than their forced migration to the Americas and the Caribbean. Many more were affected by the Arab slave trade than the Caucasian driven slavery, which ran for a fixed period. There are fragmentary but extensive documents on the slave trade to the Middle East and Asia, but little work has been done with the documents, which have been scarcely examined by historians and social scientists. It has to be said that Arabia has shown little interest in the Arab enslavement of Africans. Reports from the African Union Commission (AUC) in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, state that Arabia is hostile to discussion of Arab slavery of Africans. For Arabia the subject is taboo, presumably due to the fear that information will be dug up, likely to cast Arabs in a bad light (Ibid). Previously, reports made on the Arab slave trade, owed their existence, not to the slave trade but to travellers recorded observations. Some recorded not only what they saw, but also the captives’ own narratives about themselves, their lands of origin and their feelings about their 275

captivity. These sources, according to Bulcha (Ibid), reveal a persistent yearning to return home. African slaves in Arabia were scattered and never attained the demographic density and organisational capacity of their counterparts in the Western hemisphere. Bulcha is clear in his contribution to the book ‘Reflections on Arab-led slavery of Africans’ that despite the different places of origin, they shared a common experience and a common consciousness. Estimates of slave exports from Ethiopia in the 19th century vary. Pankhurst (1968:84) reveals that 1,250,000 slaves were exported between 1800 and 1850. Ralph Austen (1974:449) quoted 474,520 for the same period. The number exported across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the late nineteenth century was large. The Red Sea trade was primarily a trade in children, the majority being girls between seven and fourteen. The ratio of female to male captives exported across the Red Sea was two to one (Pankhurst, 1968). As noted by Pankhurst and Austen, captives were marched from the interior to the coast, most often tied to each other. The death rate on this route march was high, ranging from 50 % to 60% (Ibid). There were many slave markets on the route from the interior to the ports on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. For centuries, slave trafficking was North East Africa’s most lucrative trade. Profits were estimated to be above 50%. The price of a slave in Arabia in the 1840s, was three times his price in Ethiopia. Estimates of the survival rate of castrated captives vary from one in three to one in ten. Castrated captives sold at higher prices in all markets. The slave market in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was one the largest slave markets in Arabia. Slaves could also be purchased in Mecca. Within Ethiopia itself Ethiopian kings owned thousands of slaves. Often they were used to supervise concubines and properties. It is reported today that slavery is practiced in the Christian provinces of northern Ethiopia and in neighbouring Islamic Sudan. The treatment of slaves was brutal and they were commodified and used as sex objects. Boys were trained in skills such as iron working while girls were placed in harems (Ibid). Other boys were castrated and made to serve their master’s households and property. Slaves were disbursed to places such as Egypt, Oman, Turkey and Yemen for pearl fishing, 276

dates and coffee production. The slaves used in the cotton fields of Egypt were Nubians. Slaves from Ethiopia were most often given some form of training before being put to work, especially those designated for military or domestic service. This was different to the slave conditions in America, where most was done by violence and pain. Whereas in the Arab system one drop of Arab blood made the slave an Arab – in the western system one drop of African blood made the person an African and thus excluded him/her from White society. In the Arab system, conversion to Islam and the mastering of Arabic could lead to integration into Arabic society. More so, the Arab system preferred “White” slaves (from Eastern Europe) (Austen, 1974). Next on the preference scale, came Ethiopians and last Black Africans. In Islamic law, a slave woman became free when she bore a child to her master. For her children birth from a freeborn father was a certificate to lineage. Once lineage was established paternally, the law also recognised equal rights of inheritance among children of the master, irrespective of the mothers’ status. For the slave mother her offspring’s social mobility secured social integration, even though she might not have achieved the status and respect accorded a native born woman. Although racism and colour prejudice played a part in Islamic societies it was not institutionalised in a system of racial slavery or colour casting nor was it a crucial factor in determining placement and mobility in class systems. Furthermore, in Islam slavery at the level of the individual was a state of limited duration. Consequently, linage on the father’s side, birth to Muslim parents or conversion to Islamic faith gave many men of African descent the opportunity to claim social status and to ascend to positions of power, particularly those who entered the services of their owners as soldiers or administrators. African slave troops were used by many states in the Middle-East and Indian sub-continent. Without networks and structures Africans in the Middle East and Asia remained ‘a disjointed Diaspora’. Persons of African descent are found in India, taken there from Africa as slaves. The environment in which they lived was in general, subject to autocratic rule, in which the organisation of minorities, such as those of African descent, were 277

discouraged. Unlike in the United States of America, where those of African descent formed themselves into a civil rights movement to obtain their civic rights as members of a constitutional democracy, no such pathway towards emancipation was found for African descendants in the Middle East and Asia. Their Diaspora, sometimes called the African Eastern Diaspora is barely conscious of its relatives, both in the Western Diaspora and in Africa. The African Union Commission (AUC) has proven unable or unwilling to assume its responsibilities for African nationals in the Diaspora, be they in Europe, the Middle East or in Africa. Despite its adoption in 2002, at its Heads of State Summit, of the Diaspora as its Sixth Region – the AUC failed to implement this resolution. Bulcha (2005) observes that although amongst the African descendants in the Middle East and Asia there was exhibited a persistent desire for repatriation, they did not embark on a large scale return to Africa movement, as happened in the Garveyist experience in the Western hemisphere, where the Diaspora undertook a revolutionary armed intervention into the affairs of the state lead by the Black Panther Party (BPP), which rebellion was put down by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counter insurgence operation called Cointelpro. The African Eastern Diaspora which extends as far as India is a disparate marginalised minority living at the lowest level of the social strata, with no relief in sight. Nile Basin, Sudan, Southern Europe, Asia and China The history of Arab-led slavery of Africans is buried under the mountains of time. It grew in earnest with the defeat by the Ottoman Empire of the Mamelukes in Egypt in 1517. Adwok Nyaba (2005), former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the Government of South Sudan, in the book entitled Reflections on Arabled slavery of Africans, traces the commodification and merchandisation of slavery and the subsequent trafficking in human cargo down the Nile to Egypt, Southern Europe and along the caravan routes through the desert and across the Red Sea to Arabia, Persia and further afield to China. This was at its most intense in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Nyaba goes on to note that statistical data 278

corroborated from several sources show that more than five million Africans might have been effected in one way or the other by Arab led slavery along the Nile, the Ethiopian Highlands and the forests of East, Central and Southern Africa. Most of these were yoked off and sold in Arabia, the Gulf, Persia, Egypt and North Sudan. Many died in time due to diseases and overcrowding during transport to slave markets while others died resisting captivity. Little is said about the trafficking of slaves from East African ports, across the Indian Ocean. This trade originates from the 7th century and the expansion of Islam. Documents establish that the trade has existed for 3500 years, with the Arabs taking out to Arabia men as well as women and children of both sexes to the Magreb and Egypt. Via the Red Sea African slaves from Central and East Africa were sent to the Sultans of the Gulf, Mesopotania and India – as well as China and Japan. African countries south of the Sahara need to own up to their responsibilities and speak out on Arab led slavery of Africans and Arab racism. Since these issues concern humanity enlightened Arabs and Africans can and should work together to stop African exploitation. Slavery is a crime against humanity. That is why all must condemn what goes on in Sudan today. Bulcha (2005:125) outlines some difference between Christian and Islamic societies in the treatment of slaves. In the American system, as regards religion, culture and literature, slave owners tried to deprive the slave of his language. This was considered crucial for the survival of an economic system based on slavery. The American system also sorts the destruction of Black marriage and the family unit. The US system sort to break the slaves will to resist, to keep the slave mentally weak but physically strong. Africans Americans were therefore forbidden to read and write and to talk like Whites. Bulcha quotes Walter Rodney’s (1975) observation that “the New World slave plantation society was the laboratory of modern racism” (p. 590). In contrast to the US system, Islamic slavery wanted the slave to partake of the knowledge and skills of the host society. Slaves were allowed significant roles in religion, arts, crafts, music, poetry, grammar and education. In Islam, economic gain did not rate highly in the order of human pursuits, rather “the advancement of the faith, 279

through scholarship and soldiering was considered a much more meritorious calling” (Segal 2001:107). American slavery was concerned with perpetuating bondage. Islamic slavery regarded manumission as a religious duty. The Islamic arrangement encouraged a continuing relationship after freedom between the former master and slave, with the freedman taking his former master’s name and fictive lineage, which became hereditary for his descendants. In the Islamic system, ex-slaves and their children could marry members of indigenous families. In the West, institutional racism banned marriage between Blacks and Whites. Mohammed Ali’s conquest, occupation and establishment of the Turko-Egyptian state ‘Turkiya’ in northern Sudan between 1824 and 1881 changed the balance of forces in Sudan in favour of the Arabs vis-à-vis the indigenous Black Africans. Before this the Africans had resisted the Arabs’ southward movement, but the arrival of Arabs ahead of the Turks with firearms made it easy for the Arabs to subdue this resistance. The Turkiya period witnessed an upsurge in slavery and slave raids against the Blacks in South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions at the hands of Arab tribesmen. Hitherto, these regions of Sudan had not been affected by Islamic and Arab penetration. Khartoum was the headquarters of the Turco-Egyptian authority. In addition to Africans, Khartoum housed Syrians, Greeks, Copts, Armenians and Turks. People originating in or around Khartoum pillaged for slaves in South Sudan. These raids carried on for approximately 100 years. These raids were carried out with great brutality by Arabs in Southern and Central Sudan. By 1881 it is estimated that some 15,000 riparian Arabs were involved in the South Sudan/Khartoum slave trade. Those like Zubier Rahama Mansour controlled slave catchment areas the size of present day Belgium. In Bongoland, for example, they carried off at will women, children and young men to sell into slavery. A conservative estimate is that 50,000 slaves per year were taken from various parts of South Sudan. The total estimated figure of slaves removed during the lifespan of the Turco-Egyptian state amounts to 3,500,000. This level of slave extraction had profound effects of depopulation in the areas where slaves were removed. 280

Thereafter in Sudan, within the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, no successive Arab led government stamped out slavery. The slavers continued to practice their traffic discreetly. In the current phase, after the large scale fighting restarted in 1983 slave raiding in the transition zone between the North and South restarted. However not seen in the current period are the former open slave markets and slave auctions. This resurgence of slavery has been documented by the United Nations Special Rapporteur. Nyaba (2005:154) calls on African intellectuals, political activists and academics to transform and politicise the discourse on slavery in both its historical and present day dimension. He calls for reparations and restitution. He notes that the traces of slave abuse were eradicated by castration of males and sterilisation of the female Black slaves to prevent reproduction. Nyaba raises serious questions based on slavery in Sudan, as to Arab commitment to Africa and Africans, noting that Arabs have relegated Africans to the lowest social levels in their interactions in the past and in the present. He questions why, more often than not, children of Black concubines call themselves Arabs, identifying themselves more with the Arabs, despising their Black half parents and are prone to seek lighter off spring via marriage to Arabs. On this note, Nyaba calls for public recognition and acceptance by Arabs of their role in slavery and the slave trade in the Nile Valley, TransRed Sea and Trans-Indian Ocean corridors. He proposes a public apology and the payment of reparations in monetary and other forms. Africans in China Li Anshan, professor of History and Director of the Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Peking University and Board member of the Pan-African Institute for the Study of African Society (PAISAS), availed two excellent papers on aspects of the African presence in China. The papers do not support the theory that Black people are indigenous to China. In his ‘African Diaspora in China: reality, research and reflection’, published in 2015 in The Journal of Pan-African Studies 7 (10), Anshan confirms that Chinese historians generally agree that African people 281

came to China during the Tang Dynasty (618 – 907 AD). He avers that archaeological discoveries would indicate that Africans were present in China at an earlier time. African objects dating from the fourteenth century BC could originate from the Islands near Indochina, from Indochina itself or from West Asia or East Africa. These Africans objects might be traced from Ethiopia and Alexandria in Egypt. Other explanations for the early presence of Africans in China could be that like other nationals they went to China for good fortune. Anshan concludes that there were Black people in early China of foreign origin or even of African origin. The presence of Black people increased during the Tang and Song dynasties (960 – 1279 AD). Black people were called ‘Kunlun’. From paintings, pottery figures and literature, the view today in China is that Kunlun (Black people) came either from South East Asia and were Negroid, or they were Negroid from Africa. Anshan further informs us that in the literature, Kunlun were either Black servants or slaves in China coming generally from Zanzibar, brought to China by Arabs, who had been involved in the traffic in slaves for ‘a long time’. Most likely these Africans were brought to China by the sea route between Dar es Salaam and China. Others, apart from Arabs trading in African slaves were Persians and Javanese. After the Trans-Atlantic enslavement of Africans had begun, Europeans brought Africans to China. The British and the French used them as servants in coastal China. During the Ming and Quing dynasties the Chinese prohibited the entrance of enslaved Africans, into China and the capture or use of Chinese as slaves by colonialists. In view of all these research findings, Anshan concludes that the more mingling of Africans and Chinese the better. Such will create challenges and opportunities. The African Western Diaspora In the Western hemisphere, the fortunes of slaves were different. The spirit of Republicanism as a global phenomenon is best illustrated by the experience of Haiti, which happened to adopt the first republican constitution in 1801 abolishing slavery. This took place on the Island when power had been taken in a rebellion by 282

Black people, former slaves, led by Toussaint L’Ouverture, who for a period ruled Haiti via a Constitution inspired by Republican values (Rodney, 1975). Here, one saw immediately African descendants in the Western hemisphere being able to introduce the Left option and lead the way in ending slavery, replacing it with embedded democratic values and norms. As Rodney further informs us, the West built its initial capital for its industrialisation on the backs of slavery, it did abolish slavery moving on to other more humane forms of super quick capital accumulation. Some countries took longer than others to ban the practice. In Arabia Africans are still being enslaved. Western enlightenment as regards civil rights cannot compare with Arab feudal practices in civil society as regards slavery. The African Eastern Diaspora will with time learn from its relatives in the Western hemisphere. It could not be otherwise as regards civil rights. Racism is deeply entrenched in the Arab world. It is cultural and structural. As noted there was nothing to be learnt by Africans from the experience of their lost relatives taken into slavery in Arabia. Although the subject of Pan-Africanism is better understood today than at any previous moment, its study has barely begun. There is still a lot desired to be done in terms of researching and writing Pan-Africanism. In the 1930s, the veteran African American scholar, W. E. B. Du Bois, saw ‘Problems of the Diasporan Black and Africans as part of the international struggle of oppressed people for freedom and justice’. Today, this would include Africans born and bred in Africa as well as those from the African Eastern Diaspora. Slavery in the Western hemisphere and its consequence As Lemelle (1992) notes, Pan-Africanism began when the Portuguese adventurer, Antam Goncalves, took twelve Africans from the African continent as slave labourers in 1441. Slave trade created one of the largest scale suffering and degradation of African people and their descendants to date. It is important to keep in mind that this forced migration, took its captives by force of arms from their domestic situation often with the collusion of fellow Africans, through the ‘Middle Passage’ via the Atlantic Ocean to ‘the New World’. Most of the captives had never seen the sea, let alone entered 283

a boat. The moment they entered the ship their lives entered a phase of catastrophe. Many did not make the sea crossing and died in transit or were thrown overboard. Whereas the Civil Rights movement in the United States of America produced a laissez faire Black President, Barrack Obama, he was unable to stop the killing, without just cause, by Police of Black citizens. Black Americans remain second class citizens in the country of their birth. This was manifest when Hurricane Katrina rendered homeless mainly Black Americans. Recalcitrant slaves, such as those from Koromantin in present day Ghana, were dropped off in the Caribbean Islands, rather than on the American continent. Once on American soil the ‘seasoning process’ began with psychology and brute force to ‘break’ the spirit of the slave, who was not to use his/her native language and was not to consort with slaves of the opposite sex. The African cultural heritage was to be abandoned. Pan-Africanists of the first generation as contemporary ones, believed that if the Africans could regain a sense of pride in their history and heritage they would fight for their freedom. Thus, the initial thrust of the movement was to restore Black people’s cultural identity by extolling the African past and its Kingdoms, such as Ghana and Songhai. Throughout the history of slavery in both North and South America, Africans fought to maintain their identity and dignity. Pan-Africanism is rooted in that struggle. Out of the cultural ideas associated with Pan-Africanism, a political movement emerged in the twentieth century. At different times it had different titles, such as African personality, African nationalism, Black nationalism, African socialism, Negritude and Black power. An overview of the development of Pan-Africanism as an idea, an ideology and a movement follows. In brief, the following ideas embrace PanAfricanism: Africans and persons of African origin recognise Africa as their homeland Solidarity among men and women of African descent Belief in a distinct ‘African personality’ Restoration of Africa’s history Pride in African cultural heritage

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Africa for Africans in church and state The hope for a glorious and united future Africa (see also Lemelle, 1992).

In the book Pan-Africanism for beginners, Lemelle has as one of his objective to date the use of the term “Pan-Africanism”, though with difficulties. He suggests that the term was probably used in North America for the first time in the 18th century. Lemelle rightly notes that slaves were in constant rebellion against their status and in constant search of escape from their misery. It was this denial of humanity which seems to have motivated those with education to form a movement to seek human rights for Africans. Another observation is that sometime after their arrival in North America, where they found the indigenous people harassed and genocided by the White population, those from Africa came to be called, not Africans, but those of ‘African descent’, which distinguished them from those born and bred in Africa. The politics of African slavery was developed in North America, which is not to say that events in Central and South America failed to influence North America. Marcus Garvey spent some time in Panama, returning from there to Jamaica. The movement from the English speaking Caribbean Islands into North America should not be underestimated. It is a matter of interest the number of persons who emerged in the leadership of the Afro-Americans, who originated from the English speaking Caribbean. The French, Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries of the Western hemisphere in which Africans are found, have contributed in unequal measure to humanity via struggle. The case of Haiti comes to mind. Such places form part of the African Western Diaspora, as does Cuba. In so far as the Africans in those places are members of the African Nation, their future is inextricably connected to Africa. The linkage of Africa with its Diasporas according to what history teaches us and the experiences of other peoples in the world, should be a relationship of equality based on mutual respect. This is even more so at a time when the African mainland, through the colonial experience, is divided and consequently enfeebled.

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The American slavery did permit in some limited circumstances for slaves to obtain their freedom. Both slaves and ‘freed Blacks’ considered repatriation as a lifetime option, to achieve self-respect. These were people such as Prince Hall (1735 – 1807) and Paul Cuffee (1759 – 1817). In 1816 White American ‘liberals’ founded the American Colonization Society (ACS) to finance and arrange for the removal of ‘freed Blacks’ to Liberia, in Africa. Those who returned to Africa under such sponsorship created the fiasco and failed repatriation experience that is Liberia today, ruled by an elite of the so-called ‘Americo Liberians’ in the role of masters of the indigenes. In is in view of such anticipated outcomes that the likes of Martin Delany and Frederick Douglass opposed emigration back to Africa. They noted that the USA had been built on Black blood and sweat, giving African descendants rights in the country of their birth. The issue of repatriation/emigration within Pan-Africanism is settled by the acknowledgement of the modern day reality of a world divided into Nations, be they Indian, European, African, American or Chinese. In the instance of the Africans, Kwesi Kwaa Prah’s (2006) chapter entitled ‘The African Nation’ notes that repatriation was re-affirmed as authoritative at the 8th Pan-African Congress (PAC) held at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in January 2014. Nationality rights on return are acknowledged, as is the right of return. Given the nature of the African Union Commission (AUC) these may remain objective rights for some time going forward. A number of cities in West Africa have Brazilian quarters, attesting to the return and settlement of Africans from Brazil. Lemelle (1992) by way of introduction to his book ‘PanAfricanism for beginners’ reminds us that the conditions which gave rise to Pan-African ideas were: The humiliation and exploitation of the African Diaspora Racism and White supremacist arguments about the inferiority of people of African descent As well as European and US imperialism in Africa!

The Western slave trade was axed on a triangular trade of rum and trinkets from New England in America, which were traded for 286

West African slaves and ivory, which were taken to the West Indies and traded for tobacco and molasses, which were carried to New England. By 1807 the British outlawed the slave trade. Due to the changed terms of trade, slavery had ceased to be of economic interest. Empires increasingly needed markets to dump cheap goods and raw materials to feed their growing industries. By 1834 slavery was outlawed by the British. Europeans were more interested in the development of plantations in Africa for palm kernels (for soap making), peanuts, coffee and tea. In North America, co-option was an internal challenge and a daily hazard for Black people, in a society which acknowledge the existence and right to operate in the South of the fascist militia called the Klu Klux Klan, an affront to civilised society. Back in Africa competing interest amongst the Europeans for colonies in Africa, to better exploit their agricultural and mineral potential lead to wars. The USA initially concentrated, according to its Monroe Doctrine, in spreading its influence in the Americas and the Caribbean. Educated persons such as James Africanus Beale Horton, James ‘Holy’ Johnson and Edward Blyden were part of a long tradition of exposure to the outside world. These were knowledgeable persons about slavery, but also conversant with the wider world of civil liberties and the so-called ‘enlightenment’ (Prah, 2006). They operated in the public space and were writers and public intellectuals. They were conduits for the Pan-African vision into and out of Africa. More and more such persons formed political views in Africa, as well as setting the pace in the African Diaspora in North America and Europe. With time some of these ideas were embourgeoisied in the African and African/American middle class milieu and became the subject of polite conversation and convention. In the struggle for Black civil rights in America there were civil society activists, writers, artists, Church and Islamic scholars. It would be true to say that these men and women were leaders in their communities and pace setters who were looked up to and expected to improve the lot of the community. The community, otherwise known as the ‘hood’, was but a minority in US society. The election of the first Black President failed to remove the stigma of race inequality, which remains deeply embedded in the fabric of US 287

society, despite the hard work and counter intelligence of persons such as Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois in the twentieth century. Their contributions remained unheralded by the Black President, manifesting the psychological scar that race continues to represent in the USA mosaic. Not all these strugglers were based in America. Amongst others there were persons such a Alexander Crummel (1819 – 1898), Henry Sylvester Williams ( 1869 - 1911 ), Francis Peregrino ( 1851 – 1919), W. E. B. Du Bois ( 1868 - 1963 ), Marcus Garvey ( 1887 – 1940 ), Amy Ashwood Garvey, Amy Jacques Garvey, Duse Mohammed Ali ( 1867 – 1944) and in the contemporary period the likes of Angela Davis and Prah – all were Pan-African internationalists – their work impacted other Africans and they played leadership roles in the global scene. Through the work of these and nameless others, a threshold of some dignity has been attained, but with no power. Part of that process was realised in the Pan-African Congresses, which ran from the beginning of the twentieth century up to the 8th Congress held in Johannesburg in 2014. These periodic meetings established a barometer of the struggle of those of African descent and Africans for human rights both in Africa and overseas. Looking back at the agendas of these meetings one can see that at their beginning Africans in general were considered a subset. As stated earlier, that categorisation has yet to disappear in the heartland of ‘human rights’. However, these were intellectual forums, not units of People’s Power. It was only at the 8th PAC in Johannesburg in 2014 that the reality of Arab racism was taken on board by Pan-Africanists for the first time, by an international gathering of Africans. And yet, as stated earlier, two states exist in African today, where slavery is still practiced and the AUC is quiet. Going through the list of respected and distinguished African American figures in the United States, such as the likes of Paul Robeson, one cannot help asking why were the likes of Ellington, Josephine Baker and Baldwin unable to achieve equality in their society. Possibly, they were nor revolutionary and active enough. The long list of artists and musicians who brightened the lives of millions around the globe failed to achieve genuine 288

respect in the land of their birth. This finds its starkest manifestation in the civil rights movement, which has been much lauded in the media, but the truth is that full civil rights were not attained in the USA by African Americans. The motion picture business made much of the events in the USA, but this was publicity not reality in actuality. When a physical impact was visibly in the making by the Black Panther Party (BPP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) resorted to dirty tricks to ensure that civil rights were frustrated on that occasion. Here, mention is made of strugglers such as Martin Luther King, Muhammed Ali, Malcolm X and many others incarcerated in prison, with others dead in urban battlefields. A first generation of inspirational African nationalists were emerging, some from colonial prisons, as the political leaders in newly ‘independent’ Africa such as Chiekh Anta Diop, Leopold Senghor, Franz Fanon, C.L.R James, George Padmore, Walter Rodney, Patrice Lumumba, Ben Bella, Lucio Lara, Julius Nyerere, Sam Nuyoma, Amilcar Cabral, Samora Machel, Chris Hani and Robert Mugabe. An early one of these, Kwame Nkrumah, warned that Independence was not the final solution and that ‘neocolonialism was but the last stage of imperialism’. Closing remarks This chapter has provided an overview of the main interactions Africa with the outside world, in a view to provide lessons on how and why imperialism have continued and indeed grown into what some scholars have come to call “super-colonialism”. We noted with concern that amongst those born outside Africa, only the Cubans en masse have expended their lives in the liberation of Africa. From other corners of the world outside Africa such as Europe, America, China and the Arabian world, most of what came out for Africa were at the cost of the African people. Clearly, the lesson is that Africa will be what Africans make of it. It is hoped that more and deeper reflections and insights will be inspired from this chapter on the continued spirit of imperialism through super-colonialism. We urge that those reflections should be accompanied by positive action that should yield real justice, permanent peace, and unity amongst communities 289

of the world. On this notes, we advise that Pan-Africanism should not lose base with the grass roots and become the terrain of theorists in arm chairs with no practice.

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TAPUWA RAYMOND MUBAYA is a Lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University

and a PhD candidate at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. Mubaya is author of 5 books and more than fourteen articles in internationally esteemed scholarly journals.

Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group P.O. Box 902 Mankon Bamenda North West Region Cameroon

Edited by Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya

He is an author of more than 50 books and holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town.

AFRICAN STUDIES in the ACADEMY

MUNYARADZI MAWERE is currently professor at Great Zimbabwe University.

The Cornucopia of Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa?

For a long time, African Studies as a discipline has been spearheaded by academics and institutions in the Global North. This puts African Studies on the continent at a crossroads of making choices on whether such a discipline can be legitimately accepted as an epistemological discipline seeking objectivity and truth about Africa and the African peoples or a discipline meant to perpetuate the North’s hegemonic socio-economic, political and epistemic control over Africa. The compound question that immediately arises is: Who should produce what and which space should African Studies occupy in the academy both of the North and of the South? Confronted by such a question, one wonders whether the existence of African Studies Centres in the Global North academies open opportunities for critical thinking on Africa or it opens possibilities for the emergence of the same discipline in Africa as a fertile space for trans-disciplinary debate. While approaches critical for the development of African Studies are pervasive in African universities through fields such as cultural studies, social anthropology, history, sociology, indigenous knowledge studies and African philosophy, the discipline of African Studies though critical to Africa is rarely practised as such in the African academy and its future on the continent remains bleak. African Studies in the Academy is a testimony that if honestly and objectively practised, the crossroads position of African Studies as a discipline makes it a fertile ground for generating and testing new approaches critical for researching and understanding Africa. It also challenges Africa to seriously consider assuming its legitimate position to champion African Studies from within. These issues are at the heart of the present volume.

AFRICAN STUDIES in the ACADEMY

The Cornucopia of Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa? Edited by

Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya