African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles: The Case of Kenya 9811983674, 9789811983672

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 Research Questions
1.3 Research Design
1.4 Data: Selection, Collection and Analysis
1.4.1 Selection
1.4.2 Data Collection Methods
1.4.3 Key Informant Interviews
1.4.4 Focus Group Discussions
1.4.5 Document Content Analysis
1.4.6 Participant Observation
1.5 Data Analysis
1.6 Structure of the Book
References
2 Aid Effectiveness, International Policy Transfer and Development and Post-Development Theory
2.1 The Historical Background of Aid and Aid Effectiveness
2.2 Reforms, Conditions and Aid Effectiveness
2.3 The Aid Effectiveness Principles and the Concept of Ownership
2.4 Aid Effectiveness Principles and Africa’s Agriculture Sector
2.5 Aid Effectiveness Principles And Non-DAC Donors
2.6 International Policy Transfer and Diffusion and Aid Effectiveness Principles
2.7 Theory of International Policy Diffusion
2.7.1 Coercion
2.7.2 Learning
2.7.3 Competition, Cooperative Interdependence and Symbolic Imitation
2.8 Other Mechanisms
2.9 Policy Diffusion and Situating Aid Effectiveness Principles
2.10 Aid Effectiveness Principles and Development and Post-Development Literature
References
3 Aid and Agriculture Sector in Kenya: A Focus on Major Stakeholders
3.1 Small-Scale Farmers: General Perspective
3.1.1 Small-Scale Farming as an Occupation and the Food Security Objective
3.1.2 Small-Scale Farmer Organisation and the Missing Farmer “Voice”
3.2 Overview of Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development
3.2.1 The Ministry’s National Office and Donor-Funded Programmes
3.2.2 County Offices and Donor-Funded Programmes
3.3 Non-governmental Organisations and Community-Based Organisations
3.4 The Private Sector
3.5 Conclusion
References
4 Aid Effectiveness and Kenya’s Agricultural Policy and Strategy-Making Processes
4.1 Agricultural Policy Initiation Processes
4.1.1 The Ministry Bureaucracy and the Politicians
4.1.2 Input of the Policy Experts
4.1.3 The Influence of NGOs, CBOs and Farmer Organisations
4.1.4 Influence of Donors
4.2 The Essentials of Agricultural Public Policy-Making Processes
4.3 The Agriculture Sector Strategy
4.4 Conclusion
References
5 Aid Effectiveness and Perspectives and Practices of Donors
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Donors and the Kenyan Government System
5.2.1 The Case of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
5.2.2 The Case of Germany’s GiZ
5.2.3 The Case of Multilateral Agencies
5.3 Donors Implementing Stand-Alone Projects with Government Partnership: The Case of Japan’s JICA
5.4 Implementing Programmes through NGOs: The Case of USAID
5.5 Donors Working with Private Sector “Trade and Economic Relationship”
5.6 Conclusion
References
6 The Aid Effectiveness Architecture and Kenya’s Agriculture Sector
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Gaps: Overall Aid Coordination
6.3 Aid Effectiveness Architecture Within the Kenyan Government
6.4 Spotlight on Coordination Efforts Among Donors
6.5 Donors and Government: The Fate of Joint Efforts in Sector Coordination
6.6 Effectiveness Structures: A Focus on Kenyan Government Agency
6.7 Conclusion
References
7 Overall Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

AFRICAN HISTORIES AND MODERNITIES

African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles The Case of Kenya Daniel Kipleel Borter · Nadeem Malik

African Histories and Modernities

Series Editors Toyin Falola, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA Matthew M. Heaton, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA

This book series serves as a scholarly forum on African contributions to and negotiations of diverse modernities over time and space, with a particular emphasis on historical developments. Specifically, it aims to refute the hegemonic conception of a singular modernity, Western in origin, spreading out to encompass the globe over the last several decades. Indeed, rather than reinforcing conceptual boundaries or parameters, the series instead looks to receive and respond to changing perspectives on an important but inherently nebulous idea, deliberately creating a space in which multiple modernities can interact, overlap, and conflict. While privileging works that emphasize historical change over time, the series will also feature scholarship that blurs the lines between the historical and the contemporary, recognizing the ways in which our changing understandings of modernity in the present have the capacity to affect the way we think about African and global histories. Editorial Board Akintunde Akinyemi, Literature, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA Malami Buba, African Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin, South Korea Emmanuel Mbah, History, CUNY, College of Staten Island, USA Insa Nolte, History, University of Birmingham, USA Shadrack Wanjala Nasong’o, International Studies, Rhodes College, USA Samuel Oloruntoba, Political Science, TMALI, University of South Africa, South Africa Bridget Teboh, History, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA

Daniel Kipleel Borter · Nadeem Malik

African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles The Case of Kenya

Daniel Kipleel Borter Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Nadeem Malik University of Melbourne Parkville, VIC, Australia

ISSN 2634-5773 ISSN 2634-5781 (electronic) African Histories and Modernities ISBN 978-981-19-8367-2 ISBN 978-981-19-8368-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: David Malan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgements

Many people have helped us in conducting the research and writing this book. First and foremost, we wish to recognise the role of the rural farming communities in Kenya for sharing their views on the issues discussed in the book. Without their unconditional support, this book could never have seen the light of the day. We thank the government officials, donor representatives, policy experts, and CBO and NGO representatives for their willingness, enthusiasm to participate and volunteer information for this research. We appreciate the Ministry of Agriculture and especially the State Department of Livestock at the headquarters and various field locations that were visited for their support for this work. No space will be enough to thank research respondents especially the focus groups that convened at Wote and Kathonzweni in Makueni, Molo, Bahati, Subukia, and Njoro in Nakuru and Matuga, Shimba Hills, Lukore and Kinango in Kwale. We are indebted to Dr. Lilian Kirimi of Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, without whom we could never navigated the direction of this research in a jumble of possibilities and the different ways and styles we could adopt in formulating our argument. Finally, we acknowledge various other individuals and officials for their enduring help accessing research respondents, including David Musyoki and Mr. Sila of Makueni, Francis Kangumo and Haji Mzee of Kwale and Matthew Mutuku and David Muthima of Nakuru, and Rosemary Mwanza of ASDSP among others. v

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 Research Questions 1.3 Research Design 1.4 Data: Selection, Collection and Analysis 1.4.1 Selection 1.4.2 Data Collection Methods 1.4.3 Key Informant Interviews 1.4.4 Focus Group Discussions 1.4.5 Document Content Analysis 1.4.6 Participant Observation 1.5 Data Analysis 1.6 Structure of the Book References

2

Aid Effectiveness, International Policy Transfer and Development and Post-Development Theory 2.1 The Historical Background of Aid and Aid Effectiveness 2.2 Reforms, Conditions and Aid Effectiveness 2.3 The Aid Effectiveness Principles and the Concept of Ownership 2.4 Aid Effectiveness Principles and Africa’s Agriculture Sector

1 6 15 18 20 20 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 27 33 34 37 42 47 vii

viii

CONTENTS

2.5 2.6

Aid Effectiveness Principles And Non-DAC Donors International Policy Transfer and Diffusion and Aid Effectiveness Principles 2.7 Theory of International Policy Diffusion 2.7.1 Coercion 2.7.2 Learning 2.7.3 Competition, Cooperative Interdependence and Symbolic Imitation 2.8 Other Mechanisms 2.9 Policy Diffusion and Situating Aid Effectiveness Principles 2.10 Aid Effectiveness Principles and Development and Post-Development Literature References 3

4

48 49 52 52 53 54 56 57 59 62

Aid and Agriculture Sector in Kenya: A Focus on Major Stakeholders 3.1 Small-Scale Farmers: General Perspective 3.1.1 Small-Scale Farming as an Occupation and the Food Security Objective 3.1.2 Small-Scale Farmer Organisation and the Missing Farmer “Voice” 3.2 Overview of Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development 3.2.1 The Ministry’s National Office and Donor-Funded Programmes 3.2.2 County Offices and Donor-Funded Programmes 3.3 Non-governmental Organisations and Community-Based Organisations 3.4 The Private Sector 3.5 Conclusion References

103 107 110 112

Aid Effectiveness and Kenya’s Agricultural Policy and Strategy-Making Processes 4.1 Agricultural Policy Initiation Processes 4.1.1 The Ministry Bureaucracy and the Politicians 4.1.2 Input of the Policy Experts

129 130 133 136

75 76 78 84 90 93 97

CONTENTS

The Influence of NGOs, CBOs and Farmer Organisations 4.1.4 Influence of Donors 4.2 The Essentials of Agricultural Public Policy-Making Processes 4.3 The Agriculture Sector Strategy 4.4 Conclusion References

ix

4.1.3

5

6

Aid Effectiveness and Perspectives and Practices of Donors 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Donors and the Kenyan Government System 5.2.1 The Case of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 5.2.2 The Case of Germany’s GiZ 5.2.3 The Case of Multilateral Agencies 5.3 Donors Implementing Stand-Alone Projects with Government Partnership: The Case of Japan’s JICA 5.4 Implementing Programmes through NGOs: The Case of USAID 5.5 Donors Working with Private Sector “Trade and Economic Relationship” 5.6 Conclusion References The Aid Effectiveness Architecture and Kenya’s Agriculture Sector 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Gaps: Overall Aid Coordination 6.3 Aid Effectiveness Architecture Within the Kenyan Government 6.4 Spotlight on Coordination Efforts Among Donors 6.5 Donors and Government: The Fate of Joint Efforts in Sector Coordination 6.6 Effectiveness Structures: A Focus on Kenyan Government Agency 6.7 Conclusion

138 142 151 153 159 163 181 181 183 183 186 188

193 198 202 208 211 223 223 226 230 233 235 239 242

x

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References

244

Overall Conclusion References

247 255

Index

257

Abbreviations

ABD ABSF ADB AEG AES AIE APSF ARD ASCU ASDS ASDSP ASPS AUD CAADP CAB CARD CBOs CCU CEC CIGs DAC DANIDA DASS DCG DFID DLP

Agriculture Business Development African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum African Development Bank Aid Effectiveness Group Aid Effectiveness Secretariat Authority to Incur Expenditure Agriculture Policy Support Facility Agriculture and Rural Development group Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit Agriculture Sector Development Strategy Agriculture Sector Development Support Programme Agriculture Sector Programme Support Australian Dollars Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme Central Agricultural Board Coalition of African Rice Development Community Based Organisations County Coordinating Unit County Executive in-Charge Common Interest Groups Development Assistance Committee Danish International Development Agency Decentralised Agriculture Support Structures Development Partners Coordination Group Department for International Development Director of Livestock Development xi

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

DoC DPF DRSLP DVS EAAPP ERS FADC FAO FIDA GCG GDP GIZ GMO GoK HAC HCDA HPI IDA IFAD IGAD II IMF INADES INGO IO JICA JICS JOCV KAPAP KAVES KENAFF KENFAP KFA KHCP KIPPRA KJAS KLA KLPA KWAP MALFD MAP MDGs MESPT

Drivers of Change Development Partners Forum Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme Director of Veterinary Services East African Agriculture Productivity Programme Economic Recovery Strategy Focal Area Development Committee Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations Finnish International Development Agency Government Coordination Group Gross Domestic Product German International Development Agency Genetically Modified Organisms Government of Kenya Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination group Horticultural Crops Development Authority Heifer Project International International Development Agency International Fund for Agriculture and Development Intergovernmental Agency for Development International Institution International Monetary Fund African Institute for Economic and Social Development International Non-governmental Organization International Organisation Japan International Cooperation Agency Japan International Cooperation System Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project Kenya Agriculture Value Chain Enterprises Kenya National Federation of Farmers Kenya Federation of Agricultural Producers Kenya Farmers Association Kenya Horticultural Competitive Project Kenya Institute of Public Policy and Research Analysis Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy Kenya Land Alliance Kenya Livestock Producers Association Kwale Agricultural Project Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development Makueni Agriculture Programme Millennium Development Goals Microenterprise Support Programme Trust

ABBREVIATIONS

MTEF MTIP NALEP NASEP NEPAD NIB NMK ODA OECD PALWECO PCU PD PRA PRSP PSI RPLRP SHDCP SIDA SRA TICAD USAID USD

xiii

Medium Term Expenditure Framework Medium Term Investment Plan National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme National Agriculture Sector Extension Programme New Partnership for African Development National Irrigation Board Njaa Marufuku Kenya Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Programme for Agriculture and Livelihoods in Western Communities Programme Coordinating Unit Paris Declaration Participatory Rural Appraisal Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Private Sector Investment Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Programme Small-Holder Dairy Commercialisation Programme Swedish International Development Agency Strategy for Revitalisation of Agriculture The International Conference on African Development United States Agency for International Development United States Dollar

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1

Map of Kenya with Nairobi, Nakuru, Makueni and Kwale shaded sites of field interviews Paris Declaration (PD) pyramid (OECD, 2005)

19 44

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Africa gained independence from colonial rule in the 1960s. The colonial powers like Belgium (in Congo), Portuguese (in Angola), French (West Africa) and British were highly exploitative. In the post-colonial period, African countries followed the colonial legacy and maintained highly extractive and exploitative political and economic institutions that failed to introduce broad-based development. The institutions of governance also remained exploitative and hindered developing citizens’ capabilities for economic development and stability (Acemoglu et al., 2001). The 1960s was the era of high modernisation, and foreign aid to developing countries was considered essential to modernise these societies. The main emphasis of aid was on economic growth and infrastructure development. Therefore, newly independent African countries prioritised such a development paradigm and received aid/investments in electric power plants, dams, roads and industries. Kalu (2018, 61) notes that the international community supported the newly independent states with grants, loans and other technical support. He further explains that: Along these lines, most foreign aid to Africa in the 1960s was geared towards supporting the implementation of the national development plans of that era. In addition to loans, African states also received foreign aid and technical support towards industrialisation and the implementation of national development plans designed to unleash economic growth in the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9_1

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countries. The multilateral financial institutions, most notably the World Bank, were an important channel for these forms of support. Bilateral support also came from advanced nations, including, in many cases, the countries’ former colonial administrators. (Kalu, 2018, 61)

From the 1960s till the early 1970s, the national development policies gained traction and were considered helpful for economic growth and development (Killick, 1983). Since African countries started from scratch, investments in agriculture, manufacturing and financial sectors such as banking, energy, aviation, railways, health, education and other social services were considered impressive, producing some results in economic growth (Killick, 1983). However, by the mid-1970s, it was realised that the national development policies did not provide the required results despite some economic growth. The poverty levels also increased, pointing to a kind of growth that was not inclusive. Therefore, the burden of responsibility fell on African governments. The World Bank considered that channelling development aid to African states through governments gave too much power to a few people within governments’ circles, leading to rent-seeking, leaving no space for private investors to contribute to economic growth and development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018). Thus, more role of the markets and financial liberalisation was emphasised. Such developments also accorded with the global movement in the 1970s and 1980s towards the free-market economic paradigm promoted by President Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Consequently, from the mid-1970s, the focus of Western foreign aid shifted from giving money to governments to pursue mega infrastructural and industrial projects to alleviating poverty through direct measures. The United Nations agencies started focusing on health and sanitation, education, immunisation and vaccination against deadly diseases in Africa. The foreign aid to health and social programmes produced some successes, especially in reducing infant mortality rates in African countries. However, despite these successes, African states failed to move towards a discernible path to progress and prosperity in the 1980s. Rather, news from Africa was dominated by hunger and misery, political crisis, military dictatorship, and dizzying levels of official corruption. (Kalu, 2018, 64)

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3

Consequently, donors criticised the African governments’ rent-seeking behaviour and inefficiency that, according to them, led to flawed economic policies and economic structures. The World Bank and the IMF became sceptical of governments’ design and implemented appropriate national development plans. By the 1980s, these international financial institutions’ conditional grants to restructure the economies of African societies came up with the structural adjustment programme (SAP) prescriptions such as privatisation, reduced subsidies on essential goods, downsizing government jobs, liberalising the financial sector and trade (Moser et al., 1997) SAP did not produce the required results and further increased poverty to miserable levels. However, the blame for the failure fell on the victims. The Bretton Woods Institutions blamed the African states for failing to implement the SAP reforms instead of considering the programme itself was flawed (Moser et al., 1997). The failure of SAP led to a new development paradigm in the 1990s, namely ‘good governance’ based on the neoliberal economic paradigm. The earlier ‘good government’ paradigm emphasised the government’s sole role in public policy-making and the provision of public goods. On the contrary, the ‘good governance’ paradigm introduced non-state actors such as civil society and the market having an equal say in public policy-making and providing public goods (Malik, 2016). So new actors were brought forth on the development scene. Though the earlier SAP policies found their way through the good governance paradigm, the world witnessed a remarkable rejection of the big plans and projects that characterised the high modernisation period. In place of hydroelectric engineering feats, geographically based industrial zones and political experiments in ‘third world welfare states’, many social policy initiatives and international development programmes tied to smaller, more efficient, face-to-face, culturally appropriate and voluntary civil societybased organisations have increased. This has spawned a sea of buzzwords, acronyms and theoretical assumptions such as social capital, capacity building, governance and accountability, empowerment, participatory development and non-governmental, community-based and third sector organisations (NGOs, CBOs). These new civil society approaches to international development assistance have become hegemonic and ubiquitous across all development industry sectors, from small grass-roots organisations to large multilateral donors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Malik, 2016). This experiment also did not produce good results (Malik & Rana, 2020).

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Consequently, the need for international donors to call for a review of the global aid system since 2000 became more pronounced. Such corrective actions resulted from disappointment from foreign aid emphasised by ‘scholars, policy-makers and practitioners’ (Brown, 2020). As mentioned above, the recipient countries were often blamed for the failure of aid effectiveness. However, Brown (2020, 1230) notes that: In the mid-1990s, a parallel vision of aid parallel vision of aid effectiveness began to evolve under the leadership of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development and, in particular, its Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), the main club of traditional Western donors. The most prominent result of this process, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, was ground-breaking. It recognised that recipient countries’ deficient institutions were partly to blame for a lack of effectiveness in the past. However, crucially, it also recognised that the disappointments and sometimes failures of past aid were not solely due to problems in recipient countries and that donors also needed to change how they worked. The Paris Declaration’s principles quickly constituted the overarching norm for 21st-century development cooperation.

Overall, there is considerable literature on how donors can help Africa’s growth and development by adopting procedures for improving aid effectiveness. It is argued that donors must reduce resource flows’ uncertainties and volatilities to aid African recipient countries. Shortfalls in aid disbursements relative to pledges create significant difficulties for recipient country governments in planning development projects and delivering vital services. It is also argued donors would be better served if they adopt the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which emphasises the need to allow recipient countries to define their development priorities and programmes. In contrast, donors assist in helping recipient countries achieve those priorities. This is a clear departure from the traditional top-down aid approach of the last decade. Moreover, with many African countries now possessing well-educated and well-trained civil servants, donors can be reassured that they are knowledgeable in their countries’ economic and political affairs and capable of implementing development aid projects and programmes. However, the existing studies on aid effectiveness have mainly focused on aid and its impact on the development of recipient countries. These studies have generally been concerned with whether aid works and

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INTRODUCTION

5

effectively achieves its objectives—however, this book focuses on the operational issues around the otherwise good policies governing aid. Thus, rather than analysing whether aid works, the book examines the implementation of aid policies. Consequently, the book contributes to the literature on aid effectiveness policies concerning Kenya, which generally relate to Africa in two ways. The first is by providing a comprehensive analysis of the Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (PEDC) implementation that combines the perspectives of development agencies, government officials and the ultimate beneficiaries (in this case, the small-scale farmers of Kenya). This is a strength that previous studies have not adequately addressed as most have based their analysis of the implementation of PD either on the perspective of donors (e.g. Armon, 2007; Brown, 2012; Knack, 2014; Molenaers & Nijs, 2011) or on the perspective of recipient governments (e.g. Booth, 2012; Hayman, 2009; Whitfield & Fraser, 2008). Brown’s (2012) and Molenaers and Nijs’ (2011) analyses are donor centred, whereas Whitfield and Fraser (2008), Booth (2012) and Hayman (2009) have analysed recipient weaknesses and strengths in isolation. Therefore, the existing literature lacks a balanced and simultaneous analysis of donor and recipient government perspectives. Secondly, by focusing on PEDC implementation in the agriculture sector, this book contributes to the literature that seldom highlights the separate role of ultimate beneficiaries (from that of the government) as necessary for making aid effectiveness policies work. The agriculture sector is particularly relevant in this kind of inquiry because agriculture plays a pivotal role in developing Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as the primary source of income, food, employment and effectiveness in reducing poverty. Thus, farmers as beneficiaries have a more central role in implementation. Providing a perspective of the implementation of PD based on farmers’ roles and experiences is, therefore, critical in analysing the effectiveness of donor-funded agricultural programmes— empirical evidence is rarely provided in the literature. So far, only a few theoretical studies, for example, Booth (2012) and (Cabral, 2008), have attempted to merely highlight the distinctions between the recipient governments and the poor people they represent and the need for this distinction to be factored in PD (and the subsequent PEDC); however, their studies do not capture the perspectives of small-scale farmers. This book contributes to this literature by capturing the actual

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perspectives of small-scale farmers and including this in the analysis of the implementation of aid effectiveness policies and PD in particular. Concerning Kenya and Africa in general, this book has important relevance as part of the literature on implementing aid effectiveness policies in agriculture. Although the agricultural sector is key in developing most African countries (that receive aid for these purposes), there is a shortage of literature on specific studies related to the implementation of PEDC in this sector. Rather than focusing on PEDC and its implementation, existing literature on aid and the African agriculture sector has mainly deliberated on issues such as the quantity of aid to the sector (Eicher, 2003), the impact of changes in donor priorities (Herdt, 2010) and the role of policy reforms (Dalgaard & Hansen, 2001; Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Hansen & Tarp, 2000). This book, therefore, has a theoretical value in contributing to knowledge specific to PEDC implementation in an African agricultural setting. It is important to mention here that though PEDC explicates five principles: ownership alignment, harmonisation, managing the results and mutual accountability, in actual implementation, especially in the case of Kenya, the first three principles of ownership alignment and harmonisation are more pronounced in practice. Therefore, our analysis, driven by fieldwork data, has a greater focus on the first three principles.

1.1

Background

The World Bank has supported over 43 agricultural-related projects and programmes in Kenya with a total commitment of about USD 1 billion. Most of these have been loans with some components of grants (WorldBank, 2020b). These projects have varied from integrated sector projects to support specific agricultural enterprises such as coffee, tea, sugar or livestock. Other multilateral institutions that have remained visible in supporting the sector over the years include the African Development Bank (ADB) and the International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD). On the bilateral front, top of the list is Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Netherlands government, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), Finnish International Development Agency (FIDA) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

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7

Over the years, these agencies, alongside the Kenyan government, have implemented policies that can make their aid efforts more effectively achieve desired objectives. These policies and the application of aid effectiveness principles in the agriculture sector in Kenya concern this book. Therefore, the book contributes to the policy debate regarding Kenya, which generally has broader relevance to the African region. The fieldwork that forms the bulk and the basis of this book benefited from different people who have lived to experience different eras of donor activity. Among them were serving and retired government officials and some individual farmers. On average, they remembered the past as having had more generous projects or programmes with lots of money, equipment, materials, training and scholarships. They observed that ‘it was much better than nowadays’. Although the past seemed to elicit such grand memories, there appeared to be no long-term impact or transformation. Most of those interviewed (especially the farmers) desired that things could return to “the way they were”. It seemed that recipients were either unaware or chose to ignore the fact that the donor programmes were not meant to run forever and that a key pillar to aid effort was the sustainability of the funded projects. Many farmers said they had not “been lucky” to benefit from these past projects and had hoped that “their turn” would come. All these were suggestive that there was a general lack of clear understanding of the scope and objectives of donor support. For representatives of donor agencies, the memory of past aid activities did not seem to resonate much except through reports which were also not readily available. This was understandable given that most of these representatives did not last that long in their postings. Furthermore, strategies and objectives of donor interventions would have evolved over the years rendering past activities of much less concern. Nevertheless, some donor representatives intimated that they had been to other African countries and regarded their experience as applicable to their current posting. This perspective was not isolated, as some agencies viewed African problems as similar and connected. This was demonstrated by an example showing that the World Bank and African Development Bank shifted their focus to regional programmes simultaneously implemented in several countries and require collaboration between them. This intro shows how development aid remains essential as part of the concerted efforts to fight poverty and improve human welfare. This fight is particularly relevant for most parts of Africa, where poverty levels are high, especially in rural areas. Many factors favour donors’ incline to fund

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agriculture in the drive to generate economic growth in these parts of the world. For one, the sector is the largest and is known to support much of the non-farm sectors by producing raw materials (Brzeska et al., 2012). It has also been argued that over two-thirds of those regarded as poor in Africa dwell in rural areas and are dependent on Agriculture, making the sector central to the fight against poverty (Thirtle et al., 2003). While Africa’s agricultural sector still relies significantly on aid, the debate on the broader topic of aid effectiveness, in general, is far from being resolved. Different empirical and theoretical studies have made conflicting conclusions concerning the aid and development nexus. Nevertheless, persistent doubts have been expressed regarding aid as a strategy for enabling developing nations to achieve their development targets (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Mavrotas, 2009; Moyo, 2009; Santiso, 2001). These concerns have been alive among significant donor nations, especially the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Their work developed policy guidelines intended to make aid more effective in tackling development challenges. The international conference on financing development held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002 marked the beginning of these efforts. Consequently, a High-Level Forum on Harmonisation was organised in Rome the following year, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness followed in 2005. Since then, Accra HighLevel Forum in 2008 and Busan High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness of 2011 also emerged. At Busan, a decision was made to change the forum to “Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation” (GPEDC) by 2012. Since then, there have been two high-level forums of GPEDC in Mexico (2014) and Nairobi (2016). In addition, a senior-level meeting on GPEDC was held in New York in 2019. The foundational principle which has persisted since is ‘ownership’— an implication that developing countries must be at the driving seat of their development by preparing policies and strategies aimed at achieving development results and by leading the process of deploying domestic and external resources in the implementation of these strategies (Booth, 2008). It marked a departure from the donor policies of the 1980s and 1990s, remembered for their emphasis on conditional aid disbursement (Santiso, 2001). The subsequent four principles of PD built on the first principle and were designed to increase the recipient’s discretion in managing the aid resources. The second principle, for example, required donors to commit and base their support on the partner country’s

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national development strategies. They also required them to link their funding to a framework derived from these strategies and required donors and partners to commit to working together in using country systems (OECD-DAC, 2009). The third principle aimed to rationalise aid delivery recognising the difficulties in aligning aid to partner country policies and systems. This included adopting common procedures for planning, managing and delivering aid and promoting transparency through sharing information (Renzio et al., 2005). The fourth principle focused on results, while the fifth aimed to promote mutual accountability between donors and recipient countries. The GPEDC continues in the same spirit and has outlined four principles that significantly depart from previous policies that emphasised fulfilling donor-dictated conditions and a step towards what some regard as genuine development partnerships (Santiso, 2001). Since these principles require considerable commitment from the donors and recipients, an assumption must exist that donors and recipients have sufficient goodwill to uphold the principles. However, several political economy theories suggest that donors and recipient governments have motivations for aid. These theories thus suggest the possibility of antagonism of interests between donors and recipients. This can also mean inconsistency with the spirit entailed in aid effectiveness principles. For example, there have been strong arguments that donors utilise aid to induce policy compliance in recipient countries, disputing the notion that aid is given to alleviate poverty (Mesquita & Smith, 2009). Others, e.g. Hopkins (2002), associate aid with the economic interests of powerful groups in the donor countries and the need for donors to maximise diplomatic, commercial or cultural interests. Some authors have argued that poor governance, including corruption, is rampant in many developing countries, making it hard for aid to achieve its objectives (Wenar, 2006). If these different motivations exist, they are likely to conflict with the values espoused by the aid effectiveness principles. Such a scenario raises curiosity about how the various players can be seen to be pushing for the said aid effectiveness agenda while pursuing each one their interests. In many aspects, the values espoused in PEDC and previously PD attempt to curtail strategic and commercial interests that donors may wish to attach to the aid they provide. Similar pressure is directed at recipients to be honest and clear about their own development interests and demonstrate that they can provide the required leadership to pursue the agreed development agenda. Therefore, this book finds itself

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in the middle of what looks like altruistic values of the aid effectiveness principles and the various interests that might exist among donors and recipients. It may not be within reach to define these interests. Still, it is essential to identify instances where the actions of the various players either aid or curtail the sound implementation of the aid effectiveness principles. With the setting of Kenya, this study limits itself to the agriculture sector. Thus, it seeks to document how PEDC finds its way into the bilateral and multilateral relationships between Kenya and its donors. As argued earlier, African countries, including Kenya, consider the Agriculture sector to occupy a special place in the economy. For Kenya in particular, agriculture contributes, directly and indirectly, a total of 51% to the GDP, employs about 60% of the country’s population and makes up an estimated 65% of total exports, according to the recent estimates available (GoK, 2020a). To highlight its importance, Kenya’s latest development blueprint, Vision 2030, identifies the agriculture sector as key to delivering the 10% annual economic growth rate envisaged (GoK, 2007). While the role of development aid in Kenya’s economy has generally declined over the years, its significance has remained afloat in the agriculture sector. On average, agriculture is ranked third in priority among donors after health and education (Development-Initiative, 2012). This can perhaps be attributed to the sector’s importance to the economy. In the Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP) between 2010 and 2018, Kenya’s development partners were expected to contribute KShs 77 billion to the agriculture sector, which translated to 31% of the sector development budget (GoK, 2010) compared to about KShs 3 billion in 2008 (Fan et al., 2009). Indeed, the commitments for the year 2016 were reported to have been USD 327 m which translates to about KShs 32.7 billion. This is significant because literature reports a decline in donor commitments towards Africa’s agriculture sector. Collier and Dollar (2002) and Ellis and Freeman (2005) attribute these diminishing allocations to donor scepticism following the poor response of the sector to donor funding. Kane and Eicher (2004) see this decline resulting from NGO pressure to broaden the aid agenda to be peoplecentred rather than sector-centred, where more funds are earmarked for social services such as education and health. Some authors now credit African Union’s New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) for initiating Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme

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(CAADP) which subsequently highlighted the need to invest in agriculture and thereby reviving support for the sector (Fan et al., 2009). Kenya appears to be on this path with donors remaining supportive of the sector. Small-scale farming enterprises dominate Kenya’s agriculture. This, on its own, presents an interesting perspective. This is because the engendering growth of the sector requires a transformation of numerous and incongruent small-scale agricultural enterprises. These small-scale holdings contrast in size, type of crop, or livestock kept literacy level of the household head and other variations that may occur on account of where they are situated geographically within the country. Furthermore, some view agricultural activities as largely private, with the sector’s performance depending on individual farmers (Cabral, 2008). This setup should have implications on how PECD can be implemented in the sector and indicate who should be involved and under what obligations. For example, at the negotiating table with donors, how well the sector’s interests are represented should be of utmost concern. Can the bureaucrats of the various ministries speak for the majority of the sector players who are small-scale farmers? Or rather, how well are the sector’s priorities reflected by the strategies these bureaucrats adopt during negotiations with donors? For example, Mosley and Suleiman (2007) have suggested that aid could be more effective if directed towards more pro-poor strategies and small-scale agriculture. Others have emphasised the importance of participatory planning and accountability (Brown et al., 1999; Poulton, 2010). These ideas sound good, yet they can be challenging to implement. One big challenge is the fragmentation and variation in the sector and the low capacity of small-scale farmers. This makes it challenging to obtain a solid and consistent voice that can adequately articulate issues of the sector. Others argue that most governments do not attach the deserved importance to participatory processes such as PRSPs and National Plans. Hence, doubt if these are given a chance to be valid expressions of policies that govern what the states and politicians do (Booth, 2005; Dijkstra, 2005). While PEDC is some form of “a guide” to the relationship between donors and recipients, they are also part of an evolving body of public policy ideas spreading worldwide. There is also a growing literature on international policy diffusion. For example, Dobbin et al. (2007) theorised that this happens in four ways: social construction, coercion, competition and learning. However, most literature dwells on how knowledge processes on policies or ideas developed and practised in one country

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are picked up and used in developing policies for another (Dolowitz et al., 2000). However, the PEDC is unique from other international policies as they are not explicitly owned and driven by a particular country or institution. Instead, they represent a consensus of some kind, ideals that are thought to make aid objectives more achievable if practised. Even studies focused on how norms diffuse in international organisations are inadequate in explaining how policies developed in the same way as the PEDC might find their way entrenched in specific contexts (Park, 2005). This book attempts to fill this gap by describing policy diffusion in circumstances where there are no lead countries and no specific established international organisation leading the process. Aid effectiveness principles, the predecessor to PEDC, originate from the 22-member Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperations and Development (OECD/DAC). They had been deliberating for years about donor and recipient country policies that could boost the impact of development aid (Brown, 2012). Unlike previous donor policies that varied from donor to donor and were sometimes laden with conditions, these were meant to bring some semblance of harmony in the way donors dealt with recipients. Indeed, some if not all donors have had challenges reconciling these principles with their internal policies. For example, according to Brown (2012), Canada, for a while, implemented its own “distinct, more narrow version” of the endorsed agenda and was reluctant to drop some conditions that were not in line with the strict interpretation of the Paris Declaration. Again most policy diffusion literature focuses on the unidirectional mode of policy transfer. This study will thus examine challenges for both recipients and donors in the processes of internalising these policies. Apart from examining the implementation of PEDC, this book also explores policy diffusion, specifically PEDC principles in the systems of Kenya and its donors and the challenges that impede or enhance compliance. This study’s main objective is to examine how the diffusion and application of PEDC occur among donors, the Kenya government as the recipient, farmers, NGOs and other key players in the agricultural sector and the challenges and opportunities that occur in the process. In this quest, one of the critical issues of interest is identifying the critical players in the agriculture sector and their roles in developing the sector. Next is to look at how the various stakeholders are engaging with PEDC and how these might be diffused into the agriculture sector system in Kenya.

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Finally, more critical is to examine the policy and practice implications presented by implementing PEDC in Kenya’s agriculture sector. In attempting to understand the diffusion processes of PEDC, this book relied on the information available about structures and activities that have been set in motion or instituted to enable this process. For this matter, the study sought the views and opinions of experts, government officials, small-scale farmers and donor representatives. We, therefore, examine forums that have brought together the government and donors, donors and other donors and different government departments/ministries to each other to improve the efficacy of aid. Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) of 2007–2012 is an example of a joint initiative between donors and the government of Kenya towards the realisation of PEDC. Unfortunately, this seems to be the only comprehensive document that donors and the Kenyan government ever came up with, as there have never been other updated versions. We nevertheless find it an essential item of analysis and is included in the deliberations of this book alongside several other related initiatives that have been undertaken in respect of PD implementation. For example, following KJAS, an Aid Effectiveness Desk was established at the Ministry of Finance to oversee its implementation on behalf of the government of Kenya. Within the agriculture sector, there were corresponding initiatives. These included establishing the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) and the Agriculture Sector Donor Group. We analyse these initiatives to understand how PD and later PEDC have evolved over the years. Concerning progress in implementing the PECD and the challenges and opportunities experienced, this book provides an extensive profile of the various stakeholders in the sector. In addition, policy-making processes within Kenya’s agriculture sector are discussed to identify points of agreement or departure from the values espoused by PEDC. Moreover, we have attempted to provide a balanced view of the activities and policies of individual donors. It is then compared with their commitments to PEDC and the aid effectiveness principles in general. The last research question is captured throughout the book as it unfolds. Since the agricultural sector mainly depends on the dominant small-scale production, issues that concern its performance are prioritised. The role of small-scale producers in policy-making, for example, is highlighted and, similarly, a more significant issue of participation. Another important theme is the state of organisation among farmers and the state of their ‘voice’ and ability to represent their interests. This is an important

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prerequisite for effective participation in policy formulation and negotiations for effective aid. Since it is often the business of bureaucrats from donor and recipient governments who determine programmes to be prioritised, it is incumbent to understand how different interests are represented. In pursuing these research questions, this book contributes to new knowledge in two ways. The first is by providing a comprehensive narrative that combines perspectives of development agencies, government officials and small-scale farmers in Kenya on the effectiveness of agricultural sector funding and aid effectiveness in particular. Existing literature on aid effectiveness and the agriculture sector in Africa has often focused on factors such as the quantity of aid to the sector (Eicher, 2003), the impact of changes in donor priorities (Herdt, 2010) and the role of policy reforms (Dalgaard & Hansen, 2001; Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Hansen & Tarp, 2000). However, these studies mainly relied on the macroeconomic outlook of countries involved with less perspective of specific sector players. With small-scale farmers being the dominant players in the agriculture sector, most programmes are often designed to address their challenges. However, they have limitations, such as the great diversity among them, limited education and lack of organisation, affecting their ability to influence public policies. Overall, gaps exist in the literature on small-scale farmers concerning implementing policies that aim to improve aid performance in agriculture. However, it is worth noting that, although often overlooked, smallscale farmers’ actions and day-to-day decisions drive the very essence and productivity of the agriculture sector. Therefore, theirs is a critical perspective independent of the government and donor representatives and should be included in building a better understanding of the agriculture sector. We also argue that connecting both farmers’ and the agricultural ministry officials’ views with those of agents of donors is an important way of developing a comprehensive understanding of the aid architecture in Kenya’s agriculture sector. Secondly, while the flow of policies has been extensively studied, most studies have concentrated on policy diffusion involving flows from one country to another in ways similar to learning from their example (see Dobbin et al., 2007; Simmons et al., 2006; Stone, 2012). Or they have focused on the diffusion of policies where particular international organisations use their expertise and experience to support countries adopt and

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implement new policies thought to be beneficial (see Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Kim, 2013; Park, 2005). However, aid effectiveness principles and PEDC, in particular, differ from these other policies because they emerge from agreements based on a loose framework of an international forum and lack the benefit of lessons from initial implementation elsewhere. Therefore, while the flow of other policies has the possibility of oversight from the source country or the established international organisation that drives them, the diffusion of PEDC largely depends on the interpretation of the countries implementing them. It must also be noted that the diffusion of these policies is dual as they simultaneously confer unique obligations to the recipients and the donors. Thus, each of them ought to fulfil their part to achieve the best possible results.

1.2

Research Questions

The main objective of this book is to examine how the diffusion and application of these principles occur among donors, the Kenya government as the recipient, farmers, NGOs and other key players in the agricultural sector and the challenges and opportunities that occur in the process. Specifically, the following research questions are of interest and are pursued in this research. (a) Who are the critical players in the agriculture sector and what are their roles in the development of the sector? (b) How do aid effectiveness principles as outlined by Paris declaration (PD) of 2005 and subsequent high-level forums diffuse into the agriculture sector system in Kenya? (c) What are the policy and practice implications presented by the nature of PD diffusion into the agriculture sector in Kenya? In attempting to provide an understanding of the diffusion processes of aid effectiveness principles, this study relies on the information available about structures and activities that have been set in motion or instituted to enable this process. To do this, we sought the views and opinions of experts, government officials, small-scale farmers and donor representatives. The research therefore examines forums that have brought together the government and donors, donors and other donors and different government departments/ministries to each other with the objective of

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improving the effectiveness of aid. Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) of 2007–2012 is an example of a joint initiative between donors and the government of Kenya towards realisation of the aid effectiveness principles. In this book, we deliberate on this initiative and a number of other related activities that have been undertaken in respect of PD implementation. So far, an Aid Effectiveness Desk has been established at the Ministry of Finance so as to oversee implementation on behalf of the government of Kenya. Within the agriculture sector, there have been corresponding initiatives. These include the establishment of Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) and the Agriculture Sector Donor Group. We provide an analysis of all these initiatives for a wholesome understanding of how the aid effectiveness principles are being internalised. With regard to progress in implementation of the principles and the challenges and opportunities that are available, this book provides an extensive profile of the various stakeholders in the sector. Policy-making processes within Kenya’s agriculture sector are discussed so as to identify points of agreement or departure from the values espoused by aid effectiveness principles. We also attempt to provide a balanced view of activities and policies of individual donors and compare these with their commitments to PD and the aid effectiveness principles in general. The last research question is captured throughout the book as it unfolds. Since the agricultural sector is identified as mainly dependent on the dominant small-scale production, issues that concern its performance are therefore given priority. The role of small-scale producers in policy-making, for example, is highlighted and the similarly bigger issue of their participation. Another important theme is that of the state of organisation among farmers and the state of their ‘voice’ and ability to represent their interests. This is suggested as an important prerequisite for effective participation in policy formulation as well as in negotiations for effective aid. Since it is often the business of bureaucrats from donor and recipient governments who determine programmes to be prioritised, it is incumbent to understand how different interests are represented. In pursuing these research questions, this thesis contributes to new knowledge in two ways. First is by providing a comprehensive narrative that combines perspectives of development agencies, government officials and small-scale farmers in Kenya on effectiveness of agricultural sector funding and aid effectiveness in particular. Existing literature on aid effectiveness and agriculture sector in Africa has often been focused on factors such as the quantity of aid to the sector (Eicher, 2003), the impact of changes in

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donor priorities (Herdt, 2010) and the role of policy reforms (Dalgaard & Hansen, 2001; Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Hansen & Tarp, 2000). These studies mostly relied on the macroeconomic outlook of countries involved with much less perspective of specific sector players. With small-scale farmers being the dominant players in agriculture sector, most programmes are often designed with an objective of addressing their challenges. Limitations they have such as the great diversity that exists among them, limited education and lack of organisation are bound to affect their ability to influence public policies. Despite these realities, there are gaps in literature on the position of small-scale farmers in relation to implementation of aid effectiveness principles. It is worthy to note that although often overlooked, small-scale farmers’ actions and day-to-day decisions are what actually drives the very essence and productivity of the agriculture sector. Theirs is therefore an important perspective independent from the viewpoint of the government and donor representatives and should be included in building a better understanding of the agriculture sector. Through this study, we argue that government ministry officials do not necessarily subscribe to a single dominant standpoint and that it is in the analysis of the actions, attitudes and views of the different cadres of ministry officials that we can gain a comprehensive and aggregate view of what constitutes government influence in the agriculture sector. We also argue that connecting both farmer and ministry officials’ views with those of agents of donors is an important way of developing a comprehensive understanding of the spread of aid effectiveness principles in Kenya’s agriculture sector. Secondly, while flow of policies has been extensively studied, most of the studies have concentrated on policy diffusion involving flows from one country to another in ways similar to learning from their example (see Dobbin et al., 2007; Simmons et al., 2006; Stone, 2012) or diffusion of policies where particular international organisations use their expertise and experience to support countries adopt and implement new policies thought to be beneficial (see Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Kim, 2013; Park, 2005). Aid effectiveness principles differ from these other policies because they emerge from agreements that are based on a loose framework of an international forum and lack the benefit of lessons from prior implementation elsewhere. Therefore, while flow of other policies has opportunities of oversight from the source country or the established international organisation that drives them, diffusion of aid effectiveness principles

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largely depends on the interpretation of the countries implementing them. It must also be noted that diffusion of aid effectiveness principles is dual in nature as they simultaneously confer unique obligations to the recipients and the donors. Thus, each of them ought to fulfil their part in order to achieve the best possible results.

1.3

Research Design

The main objective of this study as outlined in Sect. 1.2 required a research design that captures the perspectives of the major players in the agriculture sector in Kenya. Aid effectiveness as a topic can be sensitive because it is often mistaken for audit of performance and many project administrators would be weary of explaining the impact of their projects. It was noticed that some of the officials interviewed spoke with a lot of caution, ostensibly in a bid to prevent creating a bad name for their organisations. Others refused to be recorded for understandable reasons. Since a significant portion of the data required was to come from officials from various organisations, it was important to encourage them not to limit their views to the official position of their organisations. Sometimes it was helpful to follow up a question with a statement like ‘please share your candid opinion as well’, but it was also realised that there was need to pay attention to issues that were indirectly communicated or implied during conversations including body language. In line with this background, this research took on an interpretive approach as the philosophy to guide the data collection and analysis. The study thus relies more on participants’ views of the situation being studied. Our ontological assumption was that a multiple of realities exists and was a product by which social actors negotiated the meanings for actions and situations (Blaikie, 1991, 120). In other words, each individual constructs a reality out of his or her experience of a phenomenon of interest and that meanings are derived from people’s cognition and not in some objective reality that exists out there (Krauss, 2005). On epistemological front, the assumption was that knowledge is dependent on time and context (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). Knowledge was therefore to be generated through determination of meanings, motives and reasons among other subjective experiences that appreciate the contextual nature of local situations (Blaikie, 1991). That as researchers, we ought to interact with the subjects of the study and that research transforms both the respondents and the researchers

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(Krauss, 2005). This approach was very relevant to this study because it provided for deriving meaning from tacitly communicated information and symbolic knowledge captured through interactions with respondents. Respondents to this study were generally classified into four categories: donor representatives, government of Kenya representatives, small-scale farmers and agriculture sector experts. An ‘insider’ perspective or actororiented approach as argued by Harsh (2008) was therefore pursued in order to develop a wholesome understanding of aid and agriculture sector.

Fig. 1.1 Map of Kenya with Nairobi, Nakuru, Makueni and Kwale shaded sites of field interviews

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1.4

Data: Selection, Collection and Analysis 1.4.1

Selection

Kenya was suitable for this kind of study for various reasons. One reason is that aid to the agriculture sector has remained significant over the years, as stated earlier. The second reason has equally been belaboured in the previous discussion—that of the sector’s importance to the country’s economy and the number of people it supports. Finally, most key informant interviews were undertaken in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city, where the most national staff of different aid agencies have their offices. In addition, with a few exceptions, national coordinators of the donor-sponsored projects are also primarily stationed in Nairobi. In selecting data sources, all the major stakeholders in the agriculture sector were considered potential respondents with helpful information to support the objectives of this study. These include the providers of aid— among them bilateral and multilateral agencies and international NGOs. Among the multilateral agencies, information was sought from the World Bank, FAO, ADB and IFAD (three). Whenever it was difficult to fix an appointment with representatives of these organisations, we had to rely on interviews with coordinators of the programmes they sponsored. This did not compromise the quality of information because these officials had a good grasp of the inner workings of the sponsoring institutions and were also well versed in local issues. This information was backed up by various documents available on the websites of the concerned organisations. The next category of donors was bilateral agencies. The following bilateral agencies with significant investment in the Agriculture sector were picked as data sources: JICA, SIDA, FIDA, GIZ, USAID and DANIDA (six). All were interviewed except DANIDA, which declined the request to be interviewed. However, it advised there was relevant information on their website. Heifer Project International (HPI), HIVOS and INVADES are the three international NGOs whose representatives were interviewed. The Ministry of Agriculture is key as the host governmentimplementing agency through which most donor funds find their way to various programmes in the country. Thirty-one respondents from the ministry were interviewed—some from the ministry headquarters and the rest from Nakuru, Kwale and Makueni counties. In addition, one respondent from the Ministry of Finance (One) and two policy experts (two) from policy research institutions were also included. The policy research institutions included were the Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy

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and Development of Egerton University and the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research Analysis. Finally, to develop a deeper understanding of agricultural aid experience, it was essential to analyse at the farmers’ level. For this reason, 15 focus groups (with 171 participants on the whole) and 23 individual interviews of farmers and service providers were done in three counties. These were as follows: Nakuru, found in the former Rift Valley Province and situated in the central part of Kenya, Makueni County in the East and Kwale County on the coast. These counties were purposively chosen for maximising the learning of the issues of interest to this research (Boeije, 2010). All of them had a history of high activity in donor-funded agricultural programmes. In addition, the three counties are unique in their ethnic composition, climatic conditions and the history of their agriculture. Therefore, including the three was a strategy to ensure a complete picture of the research topic. Furthermore, collecting data at the farmer level invariably included seeking the views of essential service providers involved in the farming value chain, including input suppliers, agricultural produce marketing agents and financial service providers. 1.4.2

Data Collection Methods

The interpretive approach favours the use of qualitative methodological tools. These qualitative methods can overcome the limits imposed by the predetermined hypothesis that often dictates the form, quantity and scope of required data (Richards, 2005). Moreover, they were well suited to this research because of the critical importance of the diverse respondents involved, from representatives of donors and NGOs, government agents, agricultural service providers and individual farmers. The different vantage points presented by these respondents yielded different types of understanding and a diversity of perspectives critical for capturing a wholesome picture of the actual situation of aid and development in the agriculture sector in Kenya. The choice of qualitative methods implied collecting a large amount of descriptive data. It also required establishing a coherent approach to collecting and collating this data and the need for dynamism in handling issues peculiar to particular settings (Dudwick et al., 2006, 29). Qualitative interviewing was the primary method of collecting data and was carried out through individual interviews (key informants) or focus group discussions. These interviews proceeded through capturing

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the essential ‘everyday’ kind of descriptive information from respondents that would often be taken for granted. We assumed a deliberately open phenomenological approach to learning with my respondents, as suggested by Kvale (1996) while striving to avoid the influence of a predetermined hypothesis. Therefore, it was important for the respondents to feel at ease and establish a rapport with them for the interview to commence. In addition, we reinforced the fact that we were there to learn, and as genuine learners, we needed “…to know what they knew in the way they knew and to understand the meaning of their experience…(to be able) to explain things as they explained” (Spradley, 1979). Therefore, we used a semistructured questionnaire based on a sequence of the themes of interest to the study. We were also considerably flexible depending on how the interview followed up on specific issues the respondents had brought up (Kvale, 1996). Other methods used were documented in content analysis and participant observation. 1.4.3

Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews were carried out in line with Corbetta (2003, 275) as in-depth qualitative interviews with specific persons based on their privileged observational position. Thus, the respondents were selected considering their formal roles, enabling them to provide the information required in this study. In addition, the respondents’ willingness to share their knowledge impartially was considered (Tremblay, 1957). Accordingly, the following respondents were interviewed: ● Officials from the Ministry of Finance (who are in charge of agricultural aid issues). ● Officials of the Agricultural Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU). ● Representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture (including national Programme Coordinators of donor-sponsored agricultural programmes). ● Authorised representatives of key donor agencies in the agricultural sector; notably USAID, the Finland Embassy, the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands, the German International Agency for Development (GIZ), Swedish International Agency of Development (SIDA) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) were interviewed at the national level.

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Others in this category included the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB) and International Finance Agency for Development (IFAD). At the county level, local representatives of the various donor-supported programmes, key service providers, agricultural extension officers and local development workers were approached for interviews. In all cases, the principle of optimal selection was used to ensure that those chosen exceeded the knowledge of those not included as key informants (Pauwels & Hardyns, 2009). Key informants were first informed formally through email or phone and verbally requested to participate in the interview. Because of the lead researcher’s networks within the Ministry of Agriculture, securing appointments and interviews from the ministry officials was much more manageable. Some NGOs were also readily available to share their views. For bilateral agencies, some were equally receptive, but others did not acknowledge emails and even phone calls. We resorted to snowballing, which became very effective, as those we had already met could help obtain appointments with others, including some who had ignored prior requests. The interviews were carried out using a semi-structured interview schedule. 1.4.4

Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussions (FGDs) was utilised in capturing data from small-scale farmers in the field locations of Makueni, Kwale and Nakuru counties. Being an exploratory qualitative research tool entailed systematic and simultaneous interviews of several respondents to gain detailed knowledge about issues (Boateng, 2012; Sherrod et al., 2002). This method encouraged various responses that helped understand more significant differences in people’s perspectives and factors influencing their opinions or behaviour (Hennick, 2007). In this study, focus group discussions were particularly advantageous because they gave respondents more power to generate knowledge and information. The collective nature of focus group discussions empowered respondents and suited small-scale farmers. Some could not articulate their views easily but would often gain insight into issues while discussing with others in a safe environment (Corbetta, 2003, 276). It is worth noting here that many small-scale farmers included in this research were people who did not have much education. While they had a wealth of experience in the issues of our interest to this research, they would sometimes be limited in their

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ability to express this through language. The collective nature of FGDs was, therefore, beneficial. In line with dominant literature, we planned to have 8–12 individuals in each focus group (Wilkinson, 2004). Thus, participants in focus group meetings ranged from eight to 15. The average for each focus group was 10; the largest group was 15, with a minimum of eight. Generally, people selected for the same focus group were residents of an administrative division within one of the case areas. They had similar characteristics regarding the subject of the focus discussion (Lederman, 1990). The discussions were facilitated using a flexible guide. It was ensured that discussions moved forward to answer research questions while providing room for important incidental information during discussions, such as ongoing active social interaction (immediate reactions, extreme positions and agreement areas or disagreement) (Gaižauskaite, ˙ 2012). Researchers were aware of challenges that could arise, such as the ‘groupthink’ phenomenon and the tendency of some participants to dominate the sessions taking away the individuality and independent thinking expected of respondents (Boateng, 2012). Consequently, the facilitation of discussions was tempered in a manner that helped limit this while avoiding antagonising the participants. 1.4.5

Document Content Analysis

This was an important method for the study because of the wealth of knowledge accumulated over time in project documents, programme impact reports, various consultant reports and joint agreement documents between donor agencies and recipients. Therefore, assembling such documents for further analysis formed an essential part of the research process. 1.4.6

Participant Observation

The use of participant observation in this study was done in combination with individual interviews and focus group discussions. It was utilised to enable learning about people in their natural setting through observing and participating in their activities to understand the social world from the participant’s point of view (Kawulich, 2005). As a data collection method, participant observation is uniquely adapted to the distinctive character of human existence. Jorgensen (1989), for example, outlines conditions

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for which participant observation is viewed as an effective research tool, including that the research condition should be concerned with human meanings and interactions, hence the need to obtain information from the insider’s perspective. We found this an effective tool when interviewing individual farmers. We also visited their homes, where it was possible to observe some of their activities. Therefore, participant observation was used to develop an insider’s perspective regarding meanings and interactions. This method enabled the researchers to check for definitions of terms that participants used in interviews and observe events that informants were unable to or unwilling to share and countercheck for distortions and inaccuracies in the process of the interviews (Kawulich, 2005). The power relationship in this study’s development aid scenario is a good pointer that there could be a wealth of information not expressly available. It is this information that we hoped to generate through participant observation.

1.5

Data Analysis

Data analysis took the form of a reflexive activity that started immediately after data collection commenced. A tentative explanation of observations made in each interview or focus group discussion became helpful in shaping the next steps in data collection (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). During each interview, we took notes to help us pursue specific themes in interviews. This was important because, with each unfolding set of information obtained from respondents, it was important not to miss possibilities of connecting with what had already been learnt. In this way, subsequent lines of inquiry clarified the loose ends of information already obtained. In addition to taking notes, we endeavoured to audio record all interviews as long as the respondents did not object. These recordings were later transcribed and became helpful in later stages of analysis. Where recordings were not possible, researchers tried as much as possible to make the best notes and immediately afterwards transcribe them by typing them directly into a computer. Going back to the notes immediately after the interviews was vital as it made transcribing easier because the context and some of the issues that may have been missed in the notes were still fresh in memory. At the end of each day of interviews, all the notes captured were reviewed. Next was the data indexing to ensure that

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extracts of data pertinent to a particular theme were grouped (Bloor et al., 2001). Finally, on completing fieldwork and having transcribed all the data, the same process was repeated to ensure that all relevant themes were captured; wherever applicable, data unpicking was also done to avoid issues that might have been picked out of context (Caterall & Maclaran, 1997). Analysis continued through the indexed data in which various premises were identified and connections and relationships explored to obtain explanations as writing commenced. In writing itself, we speeches of some of the respondents have been quoted to reinforce the analysis. Most of these quoted speeches have been edited from their original transcripts to improve their readability and provide context for better understanding.

1.6

Structure of the Book

This chapter serves as an introduction to further discussion and analysis throughout the whole book. In this chapter, we have outlined the main objective of this study and have listed the main research questions. In addition, the research methodology has been expounded, including data collection and analysis. Chapter 2 analyses the debates concerning aid effectiveness and international policy transfer and contextualises these debates within development and post-development theory. Moreover, it outlines some theoretical arguments around aid and aid effectiveness principles and international and regional diffusion of policies. The chapter also provides background information on African agriculture and the challenges of rural poverty. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the leading players in Kenya’s agriculture sector, pivotal in implementing the aid-funded activities of the sector. Having dedicated the previous chapters to the details of PD, how it has become a central part of donor rhetoric, and the challenges affecting the state and policy-making, this chapter narrows into the practicalities of policy implementation. It details the views of diverse individuals relevant to the sector interviewed and analyses their understanding of the important issues surrounding the sector and operations of donor-funded programmes. The chapter also attempts to situate the power dynamics in the decision-making hierarchy among the different stakeholders and the broader lessons that this brings to understanding the diffusion of aid effectiveness principles. Finally, it is shown how the agency is expropriated

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and the influence of the context and structure on the abilities of different players in making feasible decisions for the sector. Chapter 4 goes into the policy-making processes within the agriculture sector in Kenya. It is identified that aid effectiveness principles emphasise the recipient country’s systems, policies and strategies. Countries are expected to chart their course so that development aid becomes part of what drives the aspirations of this course. Policy processes are essential in determining what systems ought to be in place and reflect the aspect of ‘ownership’ regarding how programmes are implemented. The country’s policies also greatly influence other central issues to aid effectiveness principles, such as harmonisation and coordination. Chapter 5 reflects on donor policies and perspectives and how these impinge on harmonisation and alignment principles of the Paris Declaration (PD). This chapter relies on interviews with donor representatives and brings the current trends in donor policies to the fore. Chapter 6 is an overview of the main stakeholders of Kenya’s donorsupported agriculture sector. Through interviews and existing data, we explore the roles of the various players and highlight their influence in the sector. The small-scale farming system’s challenges and opportunities are highlighted because most agricultural aid targets small-scale farmers. This chapter discusses the government’s role in coordinating the sector’s activities, especially the Ministry of Agriculture. Other essential players discussed include the private sector and NGOs. Chapter 7 is the conclusion, where a cohesive synthesis of the issues captured through the various chapters of this book is presented. The first part tackles the overall conclusion and perspectives, while the second summarises how the three research questions are addressed throughout the book. Finally, the last part is to situate the study vis-à-vis existing theory and literature and further mature reflections on the findings.

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Dijkstra, G. (2005). The PRSP approach and the illusion of improved aid effectiveness: lessons from Bolivia, Honduras And Nicaragua. Development Policy Review, 23, 443–464. Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007). The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, coercion, competition, or learning? Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 449–472. Dollar, D., & Easterly, W. (1999). The search for the key: Aid, investment and policies in Africa. Journal of African Economies, 8, 546–577. Dolowitz, D., Hulme, R., Nellis, M., & O’neal. (2000). Policy transfer and British social policy. Open University Press. Dudwick, N., Kuehnast, K., Jones, V. N., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Analyzing social capital in context: A guide to using qualitative methods and data. World Bank. Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where does the money go? Best and worst practices in foreign aid. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22, 29–52. Eicher, C. (2003). Flashback: Fifty years of donor aid to African agriculture. Michigan State University. Ellis, F., & Freeman, H. A. (2005). Comparative evidence from four African countries. In F. Ellis & H. A. Freeman (Eds.), Rural livelihoods and poverty reduction policies. Routledge. Fan, S., Omilola, B., & Lambert, M. (2009). Public spending for agriculture in Africa: Trends and composition (ReSAKSS Working Paper No. 28). Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS). Gaižauskaite, ˙ I. (2012). The use of focus group method in social work research. Social Work, 11. GoK. (2007). Kenya vision 2030. Government of Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National Development. GoK. (2010). Agricultural sector development strategy. Medium term investment plan 2010–2015. Nairobi: Republic of Kenya. Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2000). Policy Arena aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of International Development, 12, 375–398. Harsh, M. (2008). Living technology and development: Agricultural biotechnology and civil society in Kenya. University of Edinburgh. Hayman, R. (2009). From Rome to Accra via Kigali: ‘Aid Effectiveness’ in Rwanda. Development Policy Review, 27 , 581–599. Hennick. (2007). “Magic” tricks for new teachers. Instructor 36, 38, 40, 117. Herdt, R. W. (2010). Development aid and agriculture. Elsevier. Hopkins, R. (2002). Political economy of foreign aid. In F. Tarp (Ed.), Foreign aid and development: Lessons learnt and directions for the future. Routledge. Jorgensen, D. L. (1989). Participant observation: A methodology for human studies. Sage.

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Kalu, K., (2018). The structure of foreign aid to Africa since the 1960s. In Foreign aid and the future of Africa (pp. 59–82). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Kane, S., & Eicher, C. K. (2004). Foreign aid and the African farmer. Michigan, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. Kawulich, B. B. (2005). Participant observation as a data collection method. Forum Qualitative Social Research, 6, 43. Killick, T. (1983). Development planning in Africa: Experiences, weaknesses and prescriptions. Development Policy Review, 1(1), 47–76. Kim, D. (2013). International nongovernmental organizations and the global diffusion of national human rights institutions. International Organization, 67 , 505–539. Knack, S. (2014). Building or bypassing recipient country systems: Are donors defying the Paris declaration. The Journal of Development Studies, 50, 839– 854. Krauss, S. E. (2005). Research paradigms and meaning making: A primer. The Qualitative Report, 10, 758–770. Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Sage. Lederman, L. C. (1990). Assessing educational effectiveness: The focus group interview as a technique for data collection. Communication Education, 38, 117–127. Mackenzie, N., & Knipe, S. (2006). Research dilemmas: Paradigms, methods, and methodology. Issues in Educational Research, 16, 193–205. Malik, N. (2016). Analyzing good governance and decentralization in developing countries. Journal of Political Sciences and Public Affairs, 4(3), 209–220. Malik, N., & Rana, A. (2020). Civil society in Pakistan: An exclusive discourse of projectization. Dialectical Anthropology, 44(1), 41–56. Mavrotas, G. (2009). Introduction: Development aid—Theory, policies and performance. Review of Development Economics, 13, 373–381. Mesquita, B. B. D., & Smith, A. (2009). A political economy of aid. International Organization, 63, 309–340. Molenaers, N., & Nijs, L. (2011). Why the European commission fails to adhere to the principles of good donorship: The case of the governance incentive tranche. The European Journal of Development Research, 23, 409–425. Moser, G., Rorgers, S., & Van Til, R., Robin, K., & Lukonga, I. (1997). Experience with structural adjustment. International Monetary Fund. Mosley, P., & Suleiman, A. (2007). Aid, agriculture and poverty in developing countries. Review of Development Economics, 11, 139–158. Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. Penguin Books.

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OECD-DAC. (2009). The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness and the accra agenda for action. Organization For Economic Cooperation And Development. Park, S. (2005). norm diffusion within international organizations: A case study of the World Bank. Journal of International Relations and Development, 8, 111–141. Pauwels, L., & Hardyns, W. (2009). Measuring community (dis)organizational processes through key informant analysis. European Journal of Criminology, 6, 401. Poulton, C. (2010). Agricultural services and decentralisation in Kenya. Policy Brief 035. University of Sussex, Brighton: Future Agricultures. Renzio, P. D., Booth, D., Rogerson, A., & Curran, Z. (2005). Incentives for harmonisation and alignment in aid agencies (ODI Working Paper, No. 48). Overseas Development Institute. Richards, L. (2005). Handling qualitative data: A practical guide. Sage. Santiso, C. (2001). Good governance and aid effectiveness: The World Bank and conditionality. The Georgetown Public Policy Review, 7 , 1–22. Sherrod, L. R., Flanagan, C., & Youniss, J. (2002). Dimensions of citizenship and opportunities for youth development: The what, why, when, where, and who of citizenship development. Applied Developmental Science, 6, 264–272. Simmons, B. A., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2006). Introduction: The international diffusion of liberalism. International Organization, 60, 781–810. Spradley, J. P. (1979). The ethnographic interview. Holt, Rinehart And Winston. Stone, D. (2012). Transfer and translation of policy. Policy Studies, 33, 483–499. Thirtle, C., Lin, L., & Piesse, J. (2003). The impact of research led agricutural productivity growth on poverty reduction in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists. International Association of Agricultural Economists. Tremblay, M. A. (1957). The key informant technique: A non-ethnographic application. American Anthropologist, 59, 688–701. Wenar, L. (2006). Accountability in international development aid. Ethics & International Affairs, 20, 1–23. Whitfield, L., & Fraser, A. (2008). Negotiating aid. In L. Whitfield (Ed.), The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors. Oxford University Press. Wilkinson, S. (2004). Focus group research. In D. Silverman (Ed.), Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice. Sage. World-Bank. (2020a). The World Bank: Working for a world free of poverty [Online]. Washington. Available at: www.worldbank.org. Accessed 25 May 2020. World-Bank. (2020b). Understanding poverty. Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview#2

CHAPTER 2

Aid Effectiveness, International Policy Transfer and Development and Post-Development Theory

This chapter reflects on the broader development and post-development theories to help anchor analysis. In the first five sections, we explore the major issues that have shaped the dominant ideas around aid and aid effectiveness over the years. Institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are closely associated with aid, as are developed countries in their bilateral relationships with recipient (developing) countries. Moreover, donors’ intentions have often been the subject of debates in literature, in addition to issues such as the impact of aid and whether it is effective. Many discussions have also gone into strategies to make aid work better ostensibly because there are many examples where aid has failed to achieve its desired objectives. Consequently, ideas around reforming aid and conditions under which aid would work better have been subjects of scholarly preoccupation. Of particular interest to this study, however, is the emergence of the international activism on aid effectiveness which subsequently gave birth to aid effectiveness principles and what is now widely referred to as the Paris Declaration (frequently referred to as PD in this study). Although there is enormous scholarly work known collectively as Aid Effectiveness Literature (AEL), all of these have been preoccupied

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9_2

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with the subject of whether aid is effective or not (see Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2014; Easterly, 2003; Griffin & Enos, 1970; Moyo, 2009; Quibria, 2005; Sachs, 2005) and much less on the more important question of theorising on how to make aid work more effectively. Consequently, Paris Declaration, despite being in the limelight of development practitioners and the subject of international forums, has received much less in terms of scholarly inquiry. We highlight the available literature, including what specifically applies to the African agriculture sector. Literature and theory on international policy transfer/diffusion are scheduled next. In this, we reflect on mechanisms such as coercion learning, competition, cooperative interdependence and symbolic imitation, among others and attempt to situate aid effectiveness principles in the operations of these mechanisms. Finally, the last part is meant to situate PD on the broader development and post-development theory.

2.1 The Historical Background of Aid and Aid Effectiveness The history of development aid to developing countries is often associated with a speech made by President Harry Truman of the United States in 1949. In that speech, President Truman spoke of the ‘Point Four Programme’ in which he highlighted the need for the American people to intervene and improve the quality of life of poor people in different parts of the world (Easterly, 2010). Before this, America had led efforts to rebuild Europe after World War II. These efforts saw the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)—the two major multilateral agencies. The latter that followed, the ‘Point Four Programme’, became focused on a drive to alleviate poverty and stimulate development. Unfortunately, the misery and poverty that these efforts targeted have remained persistent to this day, as it is estimated that 1 billion people live in extreme poverty and deprivation under one dollar a day (Temple, 2010). Foreign aid has become institutionalised into Official Development Assistance (ODA) and is defined as funds transferred to governments at concessional rates, usually with a minimum grant element of 25% (Morrissey, 2001). Development aid is given to spur economic growth and raise per capita income. For this reason, the past six decades have seen developed countries advance over $2.3 trillion to less developed countries

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(Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). While most of this aid is targeted at development, Collier and Hoefler (2007) estimate that, on average, 11.4% of development aid leaks into military expenditure, going as high as 40% in some African countries. Through these years, the aid landscape has not remained the same. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the cold war in the 1990s, for example, significantly affected the dynamics of aid, leading to a downward trend in amounts of aid until 2002, when the UN held a conference on ‘Financing Development’ in Monterey (Mavrotas, 2009). During this conference, a consensus was reached regarding attaining Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 and the need to scale up aid to facilitate this realisation. Some credit this for the reported subsequent growth in aid and other changes such as an increase in the number of projects, a decrease in the average project size and a shift from the funding of production sectors to the social sectors (Frot & Santiso, 2009). An extensive collection of literature has focused on aid’s impact (Whitfield & Fraser, 2010). This ostensibly happened because of interest in establishing how effective aid has been in addressing its objectives because vast amounts of aid have since been given through the many years of development assistance (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). Indeed, development economists have accumulated extensive volumes of literature, now collectively known as Aid Effectiveness Literature (AEL), advancing different views on this subject. For example, earlier literature had focused on the impact of aid on domestic savings and investment, while the latter focused on the macroeconomic impact of aid on growth (Quibria, 2005). Two strands of literature emerged in both the earlier studies where aid was to augment domestic savings and investment and the later studies where aid is seen in terms of contributing to economic growth. One strand views aid as having a positive impact, while the other argues that aid has no impact or is deleterious. Griffin and Enos (1970) are often acknowledged as one of the earliest to report the zero or negative correlation between aid and domestic savings and growth. It argued that aid crowds out domestic savings and investment, leading to a decline. Others that have arrived at a similar conclusion based on regression models include Papanek (1973), Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2013). Mosley et al. (1992), for example, argue that aid fails to promote growth because of fungibility and the resultant leakage of aid into unproductive public consumption. Mosley is also known for raising the micro–macro paradox of aid, which is used to describe the failure of

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the positive micro-level impact of aid to be reflected at the macro-level (Mosley, 1986). The notion that aid can buy growth is theoretically and empirically viewed as shaky (Easterly, 2003). Others argue that aid flows undermine recipient country institutions and thus negatively impact on growth and development (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Devarajan et al., 2001). While aid can be used to develop quality civil service and strengthen policy and planning capacity, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) observe that aid can kill institutions because of the high transaction costs that accompany it, the tendency of aid to fragment central capacity for policy formation and donor competition for scarce staff. Indeed, donor projects sometimes offer immorally high salaries for their staff in comparison with what others of similar qualifications earn from other employers in similar capacities. This is a situation that kills morale and causes resentment from those who are left behind. Aid has also been observed to affect governance by creating a ‘moral hazard’, which is thought to occur when donor money excuses those in authority from not taking full responsibility for the status quo (Goldsmith, 2001). Despite the promise that governance can bring into the management and utilisation of aid, others argue that aid is ruinous to governance and that there is no relationship between good governance and aid effectiveness (Ovaska, 2003). The strand of literature that rejects the idea of associating aid with growth is quite dominant. Issues such as aid undermining political legitimacy in developing countries, aid exacerbating corruption and aid keeping corrupt leaders in power recur (Knack, 2012; Licht, 2010). Pedersen (1996) brings up the issue of aid and dependence, arguing that aid fails to strengthen local initiatives that guarantee sustainability. Others argue that aid fails to promote savings because of the tendency to substitute aid with that which was to be saved (Ghura et al., 1995; Reichel, 1995). Indeed, some analysts, e.g. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2013), claim positive aid effectiveness reports are influenced by ‘reluctance bias ’ where researchers selectively highlight favourable data at the expense of negative results and practise data polishing. They believe this is because of the convergence of interests in aid, a highly emotive issue. Few studies outrightly report that aid is effective. Among them are Hansen and Tarp (2000), who, in their study, established a ‘coherent and positive picture’ of the aid-growth link even in countries that have unfavourable policy environments. Likewise, Quibria (2005) reports that aid has generally worked and is effective, although its impact is subject

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to diminishing returns. Others in this school of thought are Minoiu and Reddy (2010) and Clemens et al. (2004), who observe that aid promotes long-run growth and its impact is significantly large and robust. Finally, Jeffrey Sachs (2005) is probably one of the most well-known economists who have recently dedicated a lot of his work to championing aid in recent years. He argues that poor people are trapped in poverty and can only break out of it if they can access external resources for investment. Although aid effectiveness literature remains helpful in providing ground for debating development aid, others have observed that it is a non-winnable debate because either side can quickly marshal compelling narratives to support their view (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Further, Howes (2011) argues that it is challenging to determine aid effectiveness on several grounds—one being hardships in establishing the counterfactual and the second being that there are different types of aid in different set-ups. In addition, real-life situations do not provide an opportunity to establish how a currently aid-receiving country would have performed if it did not receive aid. These reasons make both Banerjee and Duflo (2011) and Howes (2011) conclude that assessing aid effectiveness is probably not a helpful question to pursue but rather strategies to make aid more worthwhile and effective in achieving its objectives. Besides, most of the aid effectiveness literature treated aid as though it was some medical prescription that could fix the challenge of underdevelopment. Yet, many other factors are often at play in the aid relationship.

2.2

Reforms, Conditions and Aid Effectiveness

The second group of literature of interest to this study view aid as effective when certain conditions are prevalent. Perhaps the most influential among these is the World Bank Report “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why” (World-Bank, 1998), together with the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000), which formed the basis of the report. In their research, Burnside and Dollar found that aid is effective when countries pursue good economic policies. In the same light, Dollar and Easterly (1999) observed that aid combined with growth-enhancing policies created an environment for private investment and growth. Similarly, Javid and Qayyum (2011) have argued that foreign aid does have a positive impact on economic growth in Pakistan but only in situations where sound macroeconomic policies are in place. Thus, success in the fight against poverty needed a combination of policy reform and aid

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effectiveness (Collier & Dollar, 2002). In the strength of such findings, donors began requiring that recipients exercise a level of commitment to economic and social reforms for aid to continue flowing. Venda (2006), for example, reports that some donors became increasingly insistent on the policy of ‘selectivity’1 where performance and good governance became a prerequisite to aid. Though the argument that aid worked better if recipients practised good policies remains influential, several researchers have disputed its findings. Indeed, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) oppose selectivity rules and present results that show that aid spurs growth regardless of the policy environment. They consequently argue that the relationship between good policies and aid effectiveness is fragile. Similarly, Hudson and Mosley (2001) assert that there is little empirical evidence supporting aid’s effectiveness in an environment of sound policies. Alongside debates on how policy influences aid performance, certain themes related to aid effectiveness have come to the fore. One such theme is good governance which came to the fore in the 1990s after donors had witnessed the failure of competing aid interventions (Moyo, 2009). With rising levels of poverty, steady decline in economic growth and rampant corruption, the shift was directed at governance because it reflected the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Santiso (2001) has documented how governance came to occupy the centre of agenda and debate within the fraternity of International Finance Institutions (IFIs), often concerning aid effectiveness. In governance, the state’s capability in planning, allocating and managing resources is put under scrutiny. Other closely related issues include accountability and responsiveness of governments. Many developing countries have a governance crisis with inefficient or absent institutions (Wenar, 2006). As governance encompasses not only democratic institutions but also public goods offered by these institutions (Goldsmith, 2001), the weak rule of law, absence of accountability, tight control over information and high level of corruption have been advanced as some of the characteristics of poor governance (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004).

1 ‘Selectivity’ model is a concept based on Collier and Dollar (2002) which proposed that countries with poor policy regimes should receive less aid in line with World Bank’s 1998 Assessing Aid Report. The concept was further broadened by McGillivray (2003) who argued for the need to include contingencies such as political stability, democracy and structural vulnerability.

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Brautigam and Knack (2004) also postulate why countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa are poor in governance, including colonialism, which hindered the development of strong indigenous institutions, unsustainable debt and political instability. Closely linked to good governance is democracy. Well-established democratic regimes are associated with effective and efficient economic and social policies that protect property rights, ensure checks and balances, provide a mechanism for arbitrating disputes and have the ability to efficiently allocate resources (Santiso, 2001: 7). It is also in a democracy that many hopes of sorting out governance issues have been placed, e.g. eliminating corruption and economic cronyism while ensuring that there are more equitable and transparent economic policies in place. Indeed, a study by Kosack (2003) concludes that aid is effective when combined with democracy and ineffective or harmful in autocracy. Yet, not in all democracies is aid said to be effective. Wright and Winters (2010) observe that aid contributes to growth only in democracies with less personalised institutions. Similarly, others like Moyo (2009) have rejected the notion that democracy is key to economic development and instead argued that democracy at the early stages of development is irrelevant or even harmful because democratic regimes find it difficult to push through painful but beneficial legislation for fear of losing popularity. Keefer (2005) ties the lack of credible competitors to the tendency by regimes in younger democracies to be more corrupt, exhibit a low level of bureaucratic quality and generally pursue clientelist policies of over-providing target goods such as government jobs and under-providing non-target goods such as freedom of the press. Initial concerns about aid effectiveness led to the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on developing countries as conditions for aid disbursement. It had been felt then that the problem was not just capital shortage as had been diagnosed earlier, but those specific policy failures and SAPs were thus aimed at addressing these policy failures (Adams & O’Connell, 1999). The imposition of conditions appeared to mirror the Washington Consensus’ scepticism of the aims and capacities of the governments of developing countries and sought to limit government action while expanding the role of the market. Despite the imposition of SAPS, many aid-receiving countries continued to record dismal growth, especially in Africa, where growth has been unable to exceed the growth rate of its population, estimated at 3% annually (Lancaster, 1999). It has been argued that the failures that

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followed the imposition of SAPs were because conditions could not guarantee commitment to reform, with some NGOs suggesting that their use implies mistrust of developing countries’ governments to have the best interests of their countries’ populations (Temple, 2010: 4421). Others, e.g. Santiso (2001), Moyo (2009) and Kanbur (2000), judge aid conditionality as having failed to stimulate policy and institutional reforms in developing countries. Kanbur (2000), for example, argues that countries blatantly flouted them and that there was no effective deterrent when this happened (Kanbur, 2000). The perversive side of aid conditionality is also highlighted where it is seen as undermining the sovereignty of recipient countries (Santiso, 2001). Indeed, Lancaster (1999) points out that donors have a poor understanding of the societies or institutions for which they hope to create change. Lack of this understanding may cause them to impose wholesomely irrelevant conditions without respect to the value of local information. Yet others have opposed removal of all conditions in aid transactions, arguing that it is naïve given the history of accountability challenges and hence the proposal for new forms of conditionality that were tempered with some level of recipient autonomy (Temple, 2010). This view is also popular and in tandem with those who have observed that democratisation and good governance in recipient countries positively correlate with aid effectiveness (Kosack, 2003). The burden of aid effectiveness has not only been on the recipient countries. Actions and policies of donors have also been picked out as needing reform because they contribute to aid ineffectiveness. While the governance paradigm should be able to address the accountability of recipient countries’ authorities, the thinking here is that donors must also be accountable for aid that fails. The power wielded by donors means that their willingness to help is an entirely voluntary action for which they do not need to be accountable to the recipients. For this reason alone, the ability and capacity of poor people to effectively demand accountability from the rich for the failures associated with the aid they give become farfetched. Consequently, the rich often escape scrutiny for shortcomings such as insufficient or ineffective aid. Indeed, Wenar (2006) argues that the burden of accountability falls on the intermediate institutions that link the poor and the rich. These institutions include governments of donor countries, governments of recipient countries, international financial institutions and aid NGOs. While citizens of donor countries hold their governments accountable for the aid they give, Wenar (2006) observes

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that their interests are represented by different lobby groups such as farmers’ and shippers’ organisations whose demands may be purely inclined towards their own business interests and therefore not in any way related to poverty relief in a developing country. According to Killick (1991), donor country policies often aggravate developing countries’ terms of trade, debt servicing and access to world savings. Examples here include those policies that worsen the global economic environment for African countries, such as the invasion of Iraq. Others include protectionist policies that hinder African goods and services from entering rich countries, policies related to debt relief and donor procurement tying. Killick (1991) blames such policies and practices for ignoring recipients’ needs and instead promoting donor’s own foreign policy or commercial objectives, substantially reducing the quality and the real value of the aid offered. Within the aid agencies, including multilateral organisations, domestic and bureaucratic politics may constrain or drive their allocative policy (Lancaster 1999: 493). This means that decisions are made with little regard to what works in recipient countries. A more complex scenario is presented by international aid NGOs, which are run as non-profit-making entities and therefore not accountable for providing good projects. The powerlessness of recipients, be it the citizens or their representative governments, renders them incapable of questioning the poor performance of aid NGOs. This unequal relationship is also responsible for the failure of recipients to own and take responsibility for projects, as they may view them as undeserved gifts, and demanding greater accountability is inappropriate and synonymous with being rude and ungrateful. Donors are thus not exempt from ineffective aid. Wright and Winters (2010) observe that donors are keen on rewarding political contestation but not political inclusiveness. Yet, politics can be essential in determining the link between aid and growth. Donors have also been noted for allocating aid based on self-interest with little regard to the recipient country’s merit (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011), dictated by their own political and strategic considerations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). It is inescapable for donors to have their motives in an aid-giving relationship. These motives can influence aid effectiveness (Kilby & Dreher, 2010). According to Bearce and Tirone (2010), the more donors derive strategic benefits from giving specific aid, the less effective the aid is. Similarly, donor policies are also considered important determinants of whether recipients will experience faster growth, stagnation or cyclical growth (Dalgaard, 2008).

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Apart from policy issues touching on donors and recipients, there are those, e.g. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), who assert that the external and climatic environment also influences aid effectiveness—the worse the environment and the more vulnerable a recipient country is, the greater the effectiveness. The effectiveness of aid has also been assessed in terms of its type, with varying verdicts on which type is more effective than others (Clemens et al., 2004; Mavrotas, 2005; Ouattara, 2009). From the foregoing, a wide range of issues appears to be of concern for those researching strategies for making aid work better. However, the complexities can be overwhelming for anyone wishing to develop ideas on tackling the issue in isolation. For this reason, Riddell (2007) argues that development practitioners should focus more on aid’s contribution to the development goals of recipients rather than trying to make aid achieve short-term objectives. From this realisation, a more partnershipbased relationship between donors and recipients has increasingly become a more acceptable strategy for improving the efficacy of aid. In addition, recent calls to scale up aid have prompted renewed interest in the effectiveness agenda with concerns on whether additional aid can be effectively absorbed, the possibility of diminishing returns to aid and the volatility of aid inflows (Mavrotas, 2009: 374).

2.3

The Aid Effectiveness Principles and the Concept of Ownership

The dual responsibility for effective aid on donors and recipients appears to inform the OECD/ODA-driven initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of development aid starting with Rome in 2003. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the second and most significant of these meetings was in Paris in 2005, whose declaration became a major milestone in demand for greater effectiveness in development aid. The declaration identified important issues regarding aid effectiveness, including harmonisation of aid programmes among multiple aid actors, improving the predictability of aid and support for country systems (Rogerson, 2005). Previous definitions for development aid effectiveness had focused on the ability of aid to contribute to growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Dalgaard, 2008; Easterly, 2001). In a summary of how various aid effectiveness studies envisaged this relationship, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008: 4468) proposed three models. One is where aid first contributes to accumulation as savings/investment before supporting growth; the

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second is where aid contributes directly to the growth; and the last is where aid being subject to certain conditions such as a good policy environment is seen to contribute to growth. Although growth remains an important attribute that should be associated with the recipient’s utilisation of aid, the definition of aid effectiveness aligned to specific development goals has acquired greater relevance, especially with the adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness captures this spirit by granting priority to the recipient country’s development strategies, with aid being measured in terms of how well it is planned, managed and deployed to achieve desired development outcomes of the recipient country (Stern et al., 2008). In this general framework, it thus becomes vital that aid is used for the purpose it is given (Baliamoune-Lutz & Mavrotas, 2009), which is determined to a greater extent by the recipients. As an outcome, however, aid should be able to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and expansion of poor people’s freedoms (Mavrotas, 2009). The Paris Declaration (PD) principle of ownership is intertwined with the other significant principles of alignment and harmonisation that are key to this study, and various aspects of these are discussed throughout the book. The principle of alignment feeds into ownership because it requires that the donors align their aid to the recipient’s agenda and use the country’s systems to implement aid programmes. It has often been argued that recipients should establish reliable country systems and that the donors can utilise them in their quest to align aid (Rogerson, 2005). By requiring that donors use national development strategies, institutions and procedures, this principle is thus consistent in promoting the first principle of ownership. Indicators of alignment include improved coordination of support programmes, reduced parallel project implementation units and reduced incidence of tied aid (OECD-DAC, 2009). However, critics interpret the condition that a partner country should first develop reliable systems that adhere to good practices is in reality an attempt to make recipients align their plans to those of the donors (Bissio, 2008). Harmonisation is a donor-to-donor engagement aimed at easing aid management for the recipient by ensuring that donors share information, simplify procedures and establish common arrangements (OECD, 2005). The remaining two principles are primarily meant to support the first three principles, including management for results and mutual accountability (Fig. 2.1).

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Fig. 2.1 Paris Declaration (PD) pyramid (OECD, 2005)

Ownership envisages that the recipient country leads in developing its actionable development strategies. This is a radical change from previous aid policies based on conditionality regimes in which donors sought to influence policies in recipient countries in exchange for aid. Fraser and Whitfield (2009) document that this change of heart among donors began in the late 1990s and that donors recognised the futility of imposing reforms on an unwilling partner. In line with the ownership principle, aid should therefore be considered part of the funds that finance the national development strategy. The onus is on the recipient to take leadership of developing and implementing policies geared towards achieving the country’s development objectives. Nevertheless, this should be anchored in an operational development strategy allowing donors to align development assistance (OECD-DAC, 2009). While the concept of ownership is viewed favourably, Whitfield and Fraser (2010) argue that it lacks a clear analytical definition. This is because ownership can be defined in two ways. The first is where it is meant to give the recipient control over the development agenda for which aid should finance. The second is where the major donors promote the recipients ‘commitment’ and ‘own’ economic reforms. Commonly, the first definition is implied when the reality is that the development agenda the recipient identifies is often pre-shaped by the domineering concepts of reform pushed by the major donors. Even where the definition places the recipient country in control of the development agenda,

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others still find it problematic. Cabral (2008), for example, contends that government ownership should be differentiated from country ownership because, in some countries, government decisions do not reflect the desires of their citizens. Others, e.g. Booth (2012), argue that most developing countries’ ownership should be re-evaluated because their policies are not geared towards development but short-term political expedience. Booth’s idea of ‘nurturing’ or ‘developing’ recipient ownership (and using aid to achieve this objective) is reminiscent of manoeuvring recipients into owning development agenda not as their own home made ideas but as conceived by others. Furthermore, there is also the ‘realistic’ view that sees ownership as a concept under siege from the competing interests attached to aid. To understand this better, Faust and Messner (2007) describe it using a principal-agent perspective in which the donor country’s taxpayers and the average citizen target group of the recipient country are the principals. The agents are their respective governments and other institutions involved in aid administration. Accordingly, it is generally agreed that the interests of the principals converge on the concern for improving the socio-economic conditions of those targeted by the aid action. However, agents on either side are viewed as having their own interests incompatible with those of the principals. Arguments about the lack of compatible incentives are particularly relevant when analysing aid negotiation and implementation of resulting programmes. Buiter (2007), for example, has observed that those who speak on behalf of their country in aid negotiations are not often necessarily the ones responsible for the success of the aided programmes and who, in turn, may not be among those that the programme impacts upon. Consequently, those targeted by programmes may have contributed the least or nothing towards its design. It may also mean that the programme ends up serving the interests of ‘unrepresentative few’ at the expense of wider majority. One way the principal-agent disjoint could be scaled down is if wider participation is adopted in the process of developing a national development strategy. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) have been touted as one of how ownership of aid programmes could be enhanced. This is because the most important principle of PRSP is embodied in being country-driven and involving a broad base of participation (IMF & IDA, 1999). This would ensure that ownership does not only remain with high-level government officials but would also extend to the general population. Nevertheless, critics viewed the process as an extension of

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conditionality since donors pegged the release of aid on the condition that countries develop PRSP. Moreover, while emphasising rational planning, the process was also deemed as ignoring politics—an important aspect of ownership (Dijkstra, 2011). Besides, doubts have been raised about whether PRSP processes met the threshold of being genuinely representative and participatory. This arose from the fact that it was mostly countries with poor political leadership, weak institutions and bad policies that were forced to undertake PRSP processes as conditions for obtaining donor resources (Buiter, 2007). For this reason, Buiter (2007) questions the relationship between PRSP and stronger recipient ownership and doubts the relevance of ownership among developing countries seeking aid. Another important theme on ownership is whether a recipient country can exercise any power when being a recipient already destines them to a junior position in the aid relationship. Those who understand ownership as being in control of the aid agenda imply that the recipient countries engage politically in the aid effectiveness agenda by clearly communicating what they consider as priorities and demanding that donors align their aid to these priorities. Some, e.g. Bissio (2008), have expressed reservations about this practicality because of the asymmetries of power inherent in the aid relationship. In other words, can dependent recipients have the audacity to make stronger demands on their benefactors? And how do international processes such as Paris Declaration (PD) influence these negotiations? Bissio (2008) doubts if recipients can gain any leverage in negotiations by citing PD arguing that PD was not a contractual document. Thus, its value as a basis for giving strength to recipients in aid negotiations is questionable. Yet ownership can only be meaningful if recipient countries can stand their ground and reject aid that they deem inconsistent with their policies and strategies (Deutscher & Fyson, 2008). Although the power dynamics appear to dominate the literature on how aid is negotiated and are cited as hindering true partnership (Alesina & Dollar, 2000), some studies have shown that some recipients are more assertive than others when dealing with donors. Rogerson (2005), for example, documented that India and Pakistan have in the past taken the lead to assign donors specific roles for which the latter appear to have obliged. Concerning Africa, a study by Whitfield and Fraser (2010) revealed that Botswana, Ethiopia and Rwanda exhibited greater control over aid negotiations when compared with Zambia, Mozambique, Ghana, Mali and Tanzania. Indeed, Whitfield and Fraser (2010) developed a

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model of aid negotiation in which they argue that institutional, political, ideological and economic prior conditions determine the outcome of aid negotiation processes. This model is key in establishing the theoretical framework of this study.

2.4 Aid Effectiveness Principles and Africa’s Agriculture Sector African governments and other commentators often speak of agriculture as the ‘backbone’ of the economies they represent. Studies have shown how this sector is fundamental in strategies to tackle rural poverty (Brzeska et al., 2012; Thirtle et al., 2003). In the past decade, concerns have focused on increasing funding for the sector through initiatives such as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and getting agriculture back on the agenda (Eicher, 2003). Urban bias (Bezemer & Headey, 2008) and successful NGO campaigns to broaden the aid agenda into “people”-centred social services rather than sector-centred aid activities (Tollens, 2002) are some of the factors blamed for the declines in aid in the agriculture sector during these periods. Dominant literature on the aid and the agriculture sector has thus oscillated on issues of increasing support for the sector, with some studies even predicting how much investment the sector requires to achieve the desired growth (Fan et al., 2008). However, debates are less forthcoming on aid effectiveness principles and agriculture, unlike other sectors. In health, for example, Bartram and Cairncross (2010), Biesma et al. (2009) and Piva and Dodd (2009) have dwelt on issues connecting the implementation of Paris principles and health programmes. Paul et al. (2013) particularly share their findings on implementing aid effectiveness principles in Mali, and Bermingham et al. (2009) argue why aid effectiveness is key to the education sector. As observed by Rogerson (2005), a more compelling case for Paris Declaration is not its ability to improve the utilisation of aid but rather its potential to contribute to better governance for the recipient country, especially in the areas of fiscal discipline and expenditure choices. Since aid is only a tiny percentage of recipients’ development resources, PD’s better public decision-making apparatus is expected to be beneficial in utilising recipients’ other resources other than aid. With this enormous potential, PD frameworks must respond to the broader realities of implementing

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development programmes. In this regard, Cabral (2008) has pointed out that the PD in its present form is exclusively focused on aid relationships between countries. Accordingly, this becomes problematic, particularly for the agriculture sector, where the government role is minimal, main driver being the private enterprise.

2.5 Aid Effectiveness Principles And Non-DAC Donors As noted earlier, PD has mainly been the initiative of the DAC donors. However, the entry of new donors has attracted scrutiny from various researchers. Although it is acknowledged that not all of them are new, the new forms of development assistance are listed to include: non-DAC donors, climate finance, social impact investors, philanthropists, global funds and concessional flows (Greenhill et al., 2013). Of all these, the entry of non-DAC donors such as China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Korea and the United Arab Emirates, among others, has been of particular interest, with their entry being associated with unprecedented changes in the aid systems. Some of them have been in this business as far back as the 1960s (Manning, 2006), and so critically, their growing significance has brought them to the limelight. On the positive, some literature has welcomed them for introducing competitive pressure to the existing DAC donors (Woods, 2008), increasing the degree of choice and increasing aid flows among the recipients (Kragelund, 2008; Manning, 2006). Indeed, others have observed that their entry came at a critical point in history, especially for African countries, because they were increasingly getting marginalised due to globalisation (Edoho, 2011). Conversely, even a more extensive collection of equally persuasive literature is available. For example, Dreher et al. (2011) observe that their entry has complicated efforts to improve donor coordination, while Paulo and Reisen (2010) argue that they weaken the normative framework that governs development cooperation. Other complaints are that their actions lead to increased transaction costs for recipients (Kragelund, 2008) and that they are generally rogue and undermine development policy (Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007). However, some cannot distinguish the actions of the traditional donors from these new entrants. In their empirical research, Dreher et al. (2011), for example, argue that although new donors generally have less focus on poverty in their criteria of issuing aid, their other actions are no different from the old

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donors—they all disregard merit when it comes to corruption and use aid to promote commercial self-interest. While agreeing with this view, Tan-Mullins et al. (2010) argue that new and traditional donors only differ in the ideologies and governance practices they utilise in concealing self-interest. Irrespective of which standpoint is taken, it is clear that the non-DAC donors have become a challenge to the traditional donor development hegemony. Yet it has also been argued that non-DAC donors are unique from traditional donors, that they should be viewed as complementing DAC donors and that the best strategy is to seek opportunities for cooperation (Kragelund, 2011; Mawdsley, 2010). D. Bräutigam’s findings corroborate this uniqueness that a large portion of China’s aid does not fit the definition of overseas development assistance (Bräutigam, 2011), and therefore, there is a need to establish a new normative framework of soft law to govern it independent from the one used by DAC donors (Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Paulo & Reisen, 2010). Others have, however, observed that there is diversity among emerging donors, and diverse strategies may be necessary for engaging with them (Mawdsley, 2010; Sato et al., 2011). It will be interesting to follow up on any emerging donor issues in expounding on aid effectiveness principles and Kenya’s agriculture sector.

2.6 International Policy Transfer and Diffusion and Aid Effectiveness Principles Paris Declaration (PD) has been billed as marking an “unprecedented level of consensus among donors and recipients to resolve and reform aid” among both donors and recipients (Foresti et al., 2006). In scouting for literature, one realises that not much has been written on historical perspectives of processes leading to PD. However, the significance of PD has thrived based on the fact that many countries are associated with it. More than 100 representatives of countries and agencies and over 50 recipient countries are said to have elected to participate in the process. This makes it a truly global process to suit the description of Campbell and Teghtsoonian (2014) that it is part of “global governance” efforts. While it is well established that PD was an initiative of donors (and OECD-DAC), the collective action objectives it espouses make it take the form of a bipartisan process involving both the donors and recipients. Indeed, scrutiny reveals that both the donors and recipients have obligations that each has indicated that they are committed to. It is therefore

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incumbent upon the donor and the recipient to adjust their policies in order to accommodate the requirements of PD. A vast collection of literature now exists on policy transfer and diffusion. Stone (2012) estimates that this phenomenon has recently been stretching over the last two decades. The most enduring definition of policy transfer and diffusion is one by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), which they state as “the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system”. Dolowitz and Marsh’s work, like many others that have examined this topic, looked at it from the perspective of policies already operational in one setting being exported into a new setting. Hence rather than starting from scratch, policy-makers adopt strategies others have employed to address similar challenges (Sharman, 2010). Theorists have offered different perspectives on how to describe the phenomenon through which the policies spread from one setting to another. Stone (2012) for example, differentiates them as policy diffusion, policy transfer, policy convergence and policy translation, among others. They observe that policy diffusion occurs in situations where states sequentially adopt policy practices from pioneers of specific policy ideas in their proximity. This implies that there must be some contact between adopters and the originators of a particular policy. For this reason, Berry and Berry (1999) view policy diffusion processes as contagious and occurring through networks of communication among officials, neighbouring states sharing innovations and laggard states catching up from the pioneers, among others. According to Stone (2012), policy diffusion is critiqued for being more concerned about the condition of transfer rather than the exact content of what is adopted, thereby neglecting alteration processes during adoption. Policy transfer, unlike policy diffusion, is depicted as more concerned with the role of agency on the part of the adopters of a particular policy— to practice choice, interpret or modify policies to suit their circumstances. Countries may choose to adopt broad goals and objectives of a given policy and design their specific strategies of how to achieve this, or they may choose to replicate institutions, regulatory or judicial tools, personnel or ideas and ideologies (Stone, 2012).

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Policy convergence is defined as the tendency of policies to grow alike and identical across countries over time (Drezner, 2001; Holzinger & Knill, 2005). Structural forces such as industrialisation, globalisation and regionalisation have been identified as some of the factors responsible for policy convergence, hence diminishing the role of agency (Stone, 2012). Holzinger and Knill (2005) suggest conceptualising three indicators, namely degree, scope and direction of convergence. With processes such as globalisation and regionalisation, it is anticipated that pressure ensues that necessitates international harmonisation, increased regulatory competition and increased transnational communication. These have thus become the specific mechanisms through which convergence occurs (Holzinger & Knill, 2005). Another perspective of policy transfer that has been extensively discussed is policy translation (Freeman, 2009; Johnson & Hagström, 2005; Lendvai & Stubbs, 2007; Mukhtarov, 2014). The big idea about policy translation is that policies are not merely adopted wholesome from pioneers but that processes of policy learning take place, which may lead to mutation, divergence or hybridisation (Stone, 2012). Divergence, for example, can arise when the host has been able to pick up some negative lessons from applying the policies at their origin. It is argued that the complexity of contexts forces the mutability of ideas as they get unpackaged from their previous context and travel into the new setting (Johnson & Hagström, 2005; Mukhtarov, 2014). There is, therefore, indigenisation in the process of travel of ideas in which there is a modification of meaning, destabilisation of scale and increased contingency (Mukhtarov, 2014). Therefore, the concept of policy translation reinforces the role of agency in which policy-makers actively pick up lessons from applying policies elsewhere to develop what they feel will best suit their own situations. Despite the existence of these different concepts on how policies spread, the terminology of preference of dominant literature for describing and analysing the phenomenon of interdependence in policy choices is arguably policy diffusion. Although policy diffusion has been critiqued as implying that policy spread is mainly driven by structure and less through an agency, this notion is disputed as some of the mechanisms included in policy diffusions, such as learning and competition, are clearly in the agency domain.

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2.7

Theory of International Policy Diffusion

Although policy diffusion has attracted extensive academic interest, it is not clear if there is a consensus on what entails its theory. For example, Dobbin et al. (2007) and Braun and Gilardi (2006) have discussed the theory of policy diffusion. Dobbin et al. (2007) describe four mechanisms of global public policy diffusion: social construction, coercion, competition and learning. On their part, Braun and Gilardi (2006) include common norms, ‘taken for grantedness’ and symbolic imitation in addition to coercion and learning that are in Dobbin et al. (2007) theory. They also frame competition as ‘competitive and cooperative interdependence’. In social construction, the argument is on the ability of the global community to achieve broad consensus on such issues as appropriate social actors, societal goals and means by which to achieve these goals (Dobbin et al., 2007). Consensus may occur through following examples of others or experts’ arguments about a particular policy appropriateness. Some of the mechanisms are further explored herein. 2.7.1

Coercion

Coercion is often associated with the ability of powerful actors to impose costs and benefits on particular policy choices (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Powerful entities can do this through economic sanctions or trade restrictions. They can also undertake these actions directly or indirectly through other entities. Typical examples here would include situations where donors set certain policy requirements as conditions for the flow of aid. Countries may be indirectly coerced to implement policies that meet common expectations through institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations. World Bank is particularly infamous for forcing countries to implement fiscal austerity measures or risk stoppage of the flow of funds. There are other more subtle but highly effective forms of coercion that powerful entities can utilise to impose policy changes on the countries they target. In their analysis, Dobbin et al. (2007), for example, list policy leadership and the use of hegemonic ideas as some of the ways this happens. While policy leadership is used in situations where the leading entity’s actions influence others without intending so, hegemonic ideas, on the other hand, are recognised as more pervasive. They are described

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as dominant ideas that become rationalised and accepted for their theoretical justifications. They are not only endorsed by powerful actors but are also promoted by dominant policy experts representing research elites that have undue monopoly on international policy discussions (Dobbin et al., 2007; Krugman, 1995). This observation could be relevant to how aid effectiveness principles have come to occupy the mainstream agenda of international development policy—with influential policy research teams determining the agenda and the direction taken. The difference, however, is that in PD, the element of coercion does not only operate in one direction but requires changes from both the recipient and the donor. Therefore, although donors are the powerful actors and main sponsors of PD, the principles do not appear to be deliberately skewed in their favour. They too have to adjust their policies in view of their commitments to PD. Coercion as a form of policy transfer is viewed as not optimal (Shipan & Volden, 2008) and often results in policy inefficiency and dysfunction because of being unsuitable for local situations (Marsh & Sharman, 2009). One can also anticipate sabotage from aggrieved local actors. 2.7.2

Learning

Policy learning describes situations where policy-makers adopt policies from others based on observing the evidence from their application and implementation by those they are learning from. Hence, according to Elkins and Simmons (2005), learning occurs when policy-makers change their beliefs in the light of the experience of others. Thus, both policy failures and successes help policy-makers decide on choices of what will work best, with failures providing lessons on what not to do. As a voluntary act, learning enables a rational process of building up knowledge to enhance positive outcomes (Marsh & Sharman, 2009). Indeed, Shipan and Volden (2008) argue that policy learning can only occur if a policy has been tried elsewhere, contending that success in adoption will depend on either political or policy factors. Political success, in this case, is measured in terms of lack of repeals (acceptance), while policy success is generally measured in terms of its effectiveness (Shipan & Volden, 2008). These arguments appear to privilege agency over structure, although Marsh and Sharman (2009) support a multi-level theory of policy transfer based on Giddens’s theory of structuration (see Giddens, 1979). They argue that structures provide the context within which actors operate to constrain or

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facilitate their actions, while the agents’ actions lead to interpretation and change of structures. The Bayesian learning approach is dominant in policy diffusion/transfer literature. It is described as a process of revising prior beliefs by weighing them with practical experience (Meseguer, 2005). Thus, policy-makers update their beliefs as new information accumulates on other countries’ experiences implementing particular policies. Another approach to learning that has found its way into the mainstream discussion is the idea of social knowledge. This, according to Dobbin et al. (2007), entails generating information that commands consensus among key actors at a given time to warrant its use in guiding public policy design. As opposed to coercion, learning is considered because it leads to a more coherent transfer of ideas and practices and avoids the copying mistakes of unreflective transfer of foreign models (Stone, 2012). In the light of PD, it is clear that the broader ideas that inspire the principles have come into place because of years of experience in implementing aid programmes. However, it is not possible to claim that the implementation of PD itself among donors and recipients has benefited from learning from the experience of PD implementation elsewhere. Unlike the emphasis on devolved social learning that is based on the context in policy transfer/diffusion literature, the learning in PD appears to rely on centralised processes of lesson learning provided through PD evaluations (see, for example: Droop et al., 2008; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2008). 2.7.3

Competition, Cooperative Interdependence and Symbolic Imitation

Competition in policy diffusion is viewed as closely related to coercion, with the exception that the driving force is not the powerful actors but a country’s direct competitors (Dobbin et al., 2007). Braun and Gilardi (2006) describe it as the “prisoners dilemma”, where cooperation with others is preferred; there is always the internal push to adopt policies that make one stand much better than others. Hence, when a country makes specific policy choices, it creates externalities for other countries that are within the same competing space. The result is a “race to the bottom” (Marsh & Sharman, 2009) where each country tries to outwit others in attracting business by enacting policies that will attract domestic investment and make domestic goods competitive in the export market.

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Cooperative interdependence is an interesting notion discussed by Braun and Gilardi (2006) and Lazer (2001). Here, it is beneficial to have compatible policies with others. Therefore, policy-makers will seek to enact policies that others have chosen for international standardisation and efficient transactions across countries (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). The growing phenomenon of globalisation is a factor in enhancing both competition and cooperative interdependence making these mechanisms more likely today than it may have been possible in the past because of the increasing interconnectivity between countries. Most literature points to material payoffs as incentives for competition or cooperative interdependence mechanisms. Braun and Gilardi (2006) have argued that policy effectiveness rather than political incentives is the focus of policy-makers when enacting these policies. While the competition for material payoffs can be a major incentive, Simmons and Elkins (2004) contend that countries can also compete in implementing policies for ‘reputational’ payoffs. In this case, competition works almost like coercion with countries trying to be on top of implementing policies that reflect normative consensus so as not to lose reputation or legitimacy and thereby incur ‘intangible costs of non-conformity’ (Simmons & Elkins, 2004: 173). One can anticipate that reputational factors can be incentives for both donors and recipients in the implementation of aid effectiveness principles. This is especially so for mainstream donors who are already organised as a group and view themselves as upholding specific values. Symbolic imitation is a situation where policy-makers are driven into adapting policies to act in compliance with the dominant notion of the normative environment (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Countries can imitate others because they consider them as peers or because they regard them as high-status and prosperous countries that know what is best (Meseguer, 2005). Unlike competition or cooperative interdependence, the driving force here is not the effectiveness of the policies but the incentive of acting within the limits of what is considered appropriate politically, culturally or economically. An imitation is, therefore, a symbolic act in which policymakers’ intention is to project an image of modernity or credibility in their performance. Imitation is seen as temporal and is expected to have short-term effects compared to other mechanisms such as competition or learning, which are more likely to have longer-term effects (Shipan & Volden, 2008). These assertions arise from the fact that policy-makers do not need to

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make policy effectiveness considerations or weigh suitability options when imitating others other than following what is already predetermined as the appropriate actions. Therefore, while learning lessons persist throughout the implementation of the policies and can lead to amendments, imitation only focuses on how well the copying has been achieved. Copying policies in this manner is likely to have the same impact as coercion— where policies become dysfunctional and inefficient for lack of adequate indigenisation.

2.8

Other Mechanisms

Other mechanisms that have been proposed include constructivism— where social actors established through consensus socially construct what are to be legitimate ends and the corresponding means to achieve them (Dobbin et al., 2007). In international policy diffusion, the process of social construction happens in the mainstream, and others just pick up to be in line with acceptable standards. Others, e.g. Braun and Gilardi (2006), call it “Common Norms” as they come about due to repeated interactions in which actors define appropriate behaviour in particular contexts. In many ways, this mechanism is similar to symbolic imitation, as policies are adapted on the basis that they are perceived as established norms. As a result, policy-makers have little concern about whether those particular policies have any positive impact on their specific circumstances. Some of the policies that have spread in this manner include international conventions such as those on human rights. Some countries may sign up for these conventions because they are global norms without a deeper understanding of implementation or implications. Braun and Gilardi (2006) have also included a mechanism they call “taken for grantedness” to define practices that have become entrenched as the natural way of doing things in specific circumstances. Actors thus carry out activities in this ‘natural way’ without reflecting on their effectiveness. In the circumstances like these, alternatives are barely thought of or may be completely absent in the mind view of those making important decisions.

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Policy Diffusion and Situating Aid Effectiveness Principles

As shown through previous discussions, most literature on policy diffusion has focused on how policies and practices that have been viewed as successful elsewhere spread to new contexts. While mainstream diffusion literature definition of the spread of policies appears to narrow down to situations where policies practised and tested in one country are picked up for implementation in another country, there is also recognition that policies can originate from international organisations or institutions. International Organizations (IO) and International Institutions (II), for example, are credited for enabling the travel of norms and their influence on state-level actions, e.g. human rights (Kim, 2013), women’s rights (Zwingel, 2012) and sustainable environment (Park, 2005). Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2012) characterise the power wielded by the IO to enforce norm diffusion, including material-normative power and contestationintegration power. They define the normative-material power continuum as the IO’s ability to convince states of the appropriateness of particular international norms or their ability to provide incentives to states to adopt the norms through calculation of functional benefits (p. 543). Contestation, on the other hand, is their ability to contest and challenge the existing orders, while integration is the power to assimilate governments into the international systems (pp. 543–544). Power is therefore critical according to this literature; furthermore, it is also informative that many successful IOs/IIs derive their mandates from legitimate systems such as the UN, where most countries are members and thus have the capacity to provide forums for political dialogue and settings where states are socialised into the way of the international community (Checkel, 2014). In addition, success is also associated with working through the domestic politics of particular countries (Kelley, 2010). In line with this argument, it has been asserted that many successful IOs have units at the national level that are critical in driving their agenda; for example, most UN member countries have independent and permanent national human rights institutions to support their work (Kim, 2013). Others recognise the importance of processes that cut across the national and international realm like Zwingel (2012), who has highlighted a “transnational” perspective that recognises the importance of mechanisms that operate at transnational, national and local levels to augment the efficacy of IOs and

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IIs in the travel of norms. Invariably, International NGOs (INGOs) are also considered necessary in these processes (Kim, 2013). From the foregoing, the implementation of PD appears to fit better in those policies coordinated by international organisations rather than those that spread from country to country. PD is a construction of the international community driven by donor governments (mainly the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) and aid agencies as strategies for addressing ineffective aid. Indeed, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is frequently mentioned as the prime mover and the convenor of the forums instrumental for aid effectiveness principles (Bräutigam, 2011; Rogerson, 2005). Since it is an agency that brings together different countries, it can be regarded as an international organisation. Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that states use official international organisations for purposes of managing collective activities and enforcing international commitments. These functions are possible because these organisations are deemed to exercise a degree of autonomy and neutrality and therefore have the legitimacy of developing norms on behalf of the community of states and developing frameworks for their implementation as policies. Therefore, although there is no specific literature on how policy diffusion involving OECD takes place, OECD itself has indicated its mission as that of promoting policies aimed at improving the economic and social well-being of people around the world (OECD, 2015). This means that by its work on aid effectiveness principles, OECD would be undertaking the role other international organisations continue to play—generating and diffusing norms. This view implies that implementation of aid effectiveness principles can be considered part of the international spread of policies, institutions and ideas. However, even when considering the relevance of the IO/II diffusion literature to the implementation of PD, distinctions between the OECD process and that of typical IO or II must be acknowledged. First, the organisation and power of the IO/II over the issues and the countries involved, as envisaged in the diffusion literature, are far beyond what is apparent for OECD concerning PD and the donor/recipient countries. First, while Paris Declaration and the aid effectiveness movement are viewed as the brainchild of the OECD, OECD itself is a membership organisation exclusive to mainly the donors. It hence cannot claim mandate over recipients. Therefore, while the OECD appears to be responsible for organising the forums that bring together different entities

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(most of them not members of OECD) that end up ratifying PD-related resolutions, the forums themselves have no clear legitimate identity as an IO or an II other than being called “International High-Level Forum”. This can only mean some ambiguity on who truly owns and is accountable for the PD-related processes. Since IOs/IIs are expected to reproduce entities that undertake their functions at transnational, national and local levels (where applicable), according to Zwingel (2012), it means that weaknesses are subsequently reproduced at these various levels. Furthermore, in the case of the agriculture sector in Kenya, there is no known INGO that passionately pursues this agenda at the local level. In addition to organisational agency, theory and literature have also highlighted the importance of incentives/sanctions or normative pressure in aiding the diffusion of policies (Checkel, 2014; Kelley, 2010; Kelley & Simmons, 2013). This has been chiefly concerning policies whose implementation involves individual countries with the interests and incentives involved internal to that specific country. Unlike other policies, however, the successful application of PD requires synchronised implementation from the recipient and the donor (among other actors). It is thus subject to the complexity of interests and incentives of its diverse actors. In this study, it is of particular interest to describe how each of Kenya’s agriculture sector donors projects themselves concerning PD’s altruistic objectives of making aid resources work better for the sector and generally the universal values espoused by international commitments such as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. Analysis should be able to reveal situations where donors are publicly committed to PD but cannot fully embrace its provisions. This can be regarded as evidence of insufficient normative pressure on them to make good their commitments to PD. Similar scrutiny should be applied on the part of the Kenyan government’s agriculture sector ministry to check if there are sufficient incentives and the significance of such incentives/sanctions on compliance.

2.10 Aid Effectiveness Principles and Development and Post-Development Literature Although this study looks at the specifics of policies instituted to make aid work better, it is also important to reflect and relate this to the broader development and post-development literature. Does aid effectiveness principles, for example, address the concerns of dependency theorists

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such as Cardoso (1972) and Frank (1967)? They argued that the dominant development theory at the time only facilitated the flow of resources from the periphery (developing countries) to the core (developed states). Several scholars have made claims similar to those of dependency theorists concerning aid. Among these are Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and Devarajan et al. (2001), who have argued that development aid undermines recipient country institutions leaving them under the domination of the powerful core nations. In this way, aid remains a tool that sustains dependence by weakening local initiatives that would have guaranteed sustainability (Pedersen, 1996). It would be unseemly to conclude that dependency theorists would oppose aid for what it is (as a source of capital) but rather for how it was structured. Since their main concern is a system that perpetuates domination of the periphery to the advantage of the core, reforming aid in a way that grants greater power to the recipients could be the answer to this concern. It is hard to say whether this is possible given that the core (developed countries) and institutions under their influence (IMF, World Bank, IFAD) remain the main sources of development aid. There is therefore little in terms of motivation and coercive power to push these world powers to cede ground in favour of the ideals articulated by dependency theorists. The growth of alternative sources of development resources in what can be described as the semiperiphery countries including China, Brazil, India, Korea and Venezuela would perhaps present hope for the periphery to exercise greater freedom of choice. The world systems theory which builds on the dependency theory did anticipate the growth of these ‘semi-periphery’ countries. The theory, however, argues that these semi-periphery countries do not meet the threshold in terms of offering alternatives to the imbalances of dependency because they do not have control over finances and that control remained at the core so that a semi-periphery country could only rise at the expense of another periphery country or countries (Tausch, 2003). The work of Escobar (1994) is an addition to this postmodernist debate, perhaps in a more radical way, by questioning the concept of development, terming it as a historically produced discourse. Like dependency theory, his is a direct attack on the very foundations of modernism in which countries are thought of as progressing through similar stages of development and thus requiring a common path of development that others have followed. In making this argument, Escobar invokes Foucault’s dynamics of discourse and power in the representation of social

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reality. In summary, he argues the way development is conceived, imagined or thought to have already been predetermined by the Western discourse and that this is a form of domination. What is needed, therefore, according to Escobar, is a “transformation of the development regime of representation and articulation of alternatives” (p. 19). This argument appears to offer traction to concepts like participatory development and bottom-up planning and the central idea of ownership within the aid effectiveness principles but only in terms of what to prioritise and implement. However, his idea of deconstructing how development is conceived is far more profound. It would be difficult to adequately address the ownership principle within PD or other ideas that advocate for participatory planning. This is because these concepts are not immune to the prevailing worldview concretised by international institutions such as the World Bank and Western powers. As argued more recently by (Goldman, 2005), the World Bank and professionals from the North and South have been actively constructing a global agenda, which has been made natural, durable and legitimate through the existing structures and powers. This, in the postmodernist view, makes it difficult for any hopes of deconstruction, let alone a rise in alternative representation of development regime as conceived by Escobar and those who share the views of deconstruction of development. Another important thread in postmodernist theory is the view that states have a critical role in coordinating development. Critics have isolated this as one of the major weaknesses of postmodernism with claims that countries that have chosen this path have had disastrous consequences (Lehmann, 1997). Yet states retain a critical role in the domain of development aid, as both donors and recipients. Aid effectiveness principles as articulated by PD follow a similar framework, with states playing the leading role. Indeed, modalities of expanding the role of civil society do not appear to have gained much ground (Hyden, 2008). However, being state-led and its strong push for ownership of recipient countries may not be sufficient to assuage the concerns of postmodernists. The reason for this is the conclusion drawn by Goldman (2007) that the world system has already succeeded in influencing recipient countries’ conception of development agenda so that whatever they claim as their own is a product of Western influence. This is in addition to the fact that power asymmetry in the donor-recipient relationship naturally favours the donors, who can then choose to use this discretion to pursue their interests.

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Analysis should also be sensitive to other criticisms levelled at postmodernism (Lehmann, 1997). For example, it has also been argued that dependency theorists could not undertake sustained research to obtain cumulative results to firm up their theory. Here, Lehmann appears to suggest the success of a theory should be judged based on its achievements when implemented. Therefore, the failure associated with dependency theory experimentation is good enough information to help draw appropriate conclusions on its viability. Any claims that the theory suffered from the conspiracy of the world system would similarly be dismissed as a lame excuse for weakness. This ties nicely with the same author’s criticism of Escobar’s deconstruction theory, in which he argues that the theory was more obsessed with discourse analysis of the words of development agents and much less on their activities. What is more realistic for postmodernist critics is to accept that ideas are futile such as Samir Amin’s “de-linking” (Amin, 1987) in a globalising world. Instead, take time to judge development interventions for what they are worth rather than assuming that there is a hidden agenda of domination (Li, 2007).

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CHAPTER 3

Aid and Agriculture Sector in Kenya: A Focus on Major Stakeholders

This chapter provides an overview of the leading players in Kenya’s agriculture sector who are also pivotal in the implementation of the aidfunded activities of the sector. Having dedicated the previous chapters to the details of PD, how it has become a central part of donor rhetoric, and the challenges affecting the state and policy-making, this chapter narrows into the actual practicalities of policy implementation. It details the views of diverse individuals at the heart of the sector. It provides an analysis of their understanding of the important issues surrounding the sector and operations of donor-funded programmes in particular. The chapter also attempts to situate the power dynamics in the decision-making hierarchy among the different stakeholders and the broader lessons that this brings to understanding the diffusion of aid effectiveness principles. Of interest is to show how the agency is expropriated in the sector and the influence of context and structure on the abilities of different players in making feasible decisions for the sector. As in many African countries, small-scale farming dominates agricultural production in Kenya. Indeed, the agriculture sector in Kenya is said to provide an overall 60% of total employment in the country (GoK, 2010a). Most of these would be the small-scale farmers, self-employed in farming activities to obtain food and, where possible, generate income. Since they rely on the sector for their livelihood, they are probably © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9_3

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the most committed to the sector and the ones relied upon for the sector’s productivity. For this reason, they are also the obvious priority for targeting any aid-related strategies to improve the sector. For this reason, this chapter details the challenges and opportunities available to these small-scale farmers. Some of their views and experiences concerning the development of the sector and the role of aid are shared and analysed. This forms the first part of this chapter. It is followed by an analysis of the views and experiences of officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, the non-governmental organisations and the private sector and their role in the sector. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development activities reflect the overall government policy and efforts to support the development of agriculture in the country. The government achieves these objectives through establishing ministerial structures and deploying staff in various parts of the country. The second part of this chapter profiles the role of the ministry and its officers in advancing the government’s agenda for the sector and highlights how these have come to influence the traditional practices in agricultural production. Critical in implementing most donor-funded programmes, scrutiny of the field experiences and views of some of the ministry’s officials are important in promoting a better understanding of the impact of aid and aid policies. The rest of the chapter discusses the other important stakeholders, including the non-governmental organisations, private sector players and donor agencies.

3.1

Small-Scale Farmers: General Perspective

The potential existing in small-scale farming does not only make it a priority for investment but also makes small-scale farmers important stakeholders in the processes aimed at improving sector productivity. For this reason, the experiences and views of the small-scale farmers were key in this research. The government estimates that the agriculture sector employs 60% of Kenya’s population, with only 30% of these said to be in formal employment, i.e. working for large farm estates, government and non-governmental organisations and the private sector (GoK, 2010c). This, therefore, leaves a majority in informal employment, who would mostly be the small-scale farmers. History tells us that the present agricultural production systems featuring small-scale, medium-scale and large-scale farming systems can

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be traced to the European settlements during the colonial period, mostly between 1900 and 1953. During this period, the white settlers alienated land from indigenous people by mainly targeting the high potential areas later christened ‘white highlands’. The European Settlement Board, established in 1945, accelerated this exercise by providing the required finances so that by 1960 over 3.1 million hectares had been annexed and reserved for white settlers (Norton-Griffiths, 2010; Wamicha & Mwanje, 2000). This inevitably led to high population densities in the areas designated as ‘African reserves’, which meant that indigenous people hardly controlled any money economy as 80% of the marketed agricultural produce came from European farms, leaving Africans to survive by providing cheap labour to the white settlers mainly. To further consolidate the stranglehold of the Europeans on agriculture, Africans were not allowed to farm cash crops, and native livestock numbers were severely restricted. Increased Production of Crops Ordinance and Defence Regulation of 1942 is credited for creating provisions for guaranteed minimum returns and controlled marketing and thus the establishment of new institutions, e.g. Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), that could ensure that both the interests of the government and those of the settlers are mutually guaranteed (Wamicha & Mwanje, 2000, 20). Bates (2005, 23) also argues that these same institutions enhanced the productive capacity of white farmers as well as enabling them to achieve political power to defend their collective interests. Following the African revolt against this oppressive agricultural structure, the colonial government implemented the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 to intensify and develop African agriculture (Bates, 2005). The Swynnerton Plan remains an important milestone in the history of Kenya’s agriculture and is recognised as having represented the official government policy long after independence (Bradshaw, 1990). Perhaps the two most outstanding implications of the Swynnerton Plan were the privatisation of land and issuance of freehold titles to Africans, enabling them to acquire credit for land development and removal of restrictions on African farmers to cultivate export-bound crops (Bradshaw, 1990, 5). This marked the genesis of small-scale farming synonymous with areas formerly designated for Africans as large-scale farms effectively remained within the hands of the colonial settlers. Having these foundations laid and secured, the distribution of resources within the agricultural sector continued on the same trajectory after independence. Though some landless people became beneficiaries of the re-distribution of the former white

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highland farms, a significant number of these farms went into the hands of the emerging elites (Bradshaw, 1990), whose substantial land interests form what is now considered large- and medium-scale farming systems. Current estimates of land holding for medium-scale farmers is between 3–49 hectares (a hectare is about 2.5 acres), while large-scale farmers hold from 50 hectares and above compared to a range of 0.2–3 hectares for small-scale farmers. Despite these disparities in individual holding, aggregate total agricultural land under small-scale farming is far more extensive, and its production accounts for over 75% of agricultural produce (GoK, 2010a). In addition, the government considers land under a small-scale production system to bear the greatest potential for increasing productivity if farmers adopt improved inputs, practice safe use of pesticides and utilise farm machinery. The same cannot be said of medium- and large-scale farmers, who are known to be receptive to new technology, make high investments in inputs and marketing and employ better farm management practices (Okoth-Ogendo, 1981). There is also no hope of relying on the gains in large- and medium-scale farms because land inheritance patterns and population growth over the years continue to cause a decline in average land holding (GoK, 2010a). 3.1.1

Small-Scale Farming as an Occupation and the Food Security Objective

In this study, most small-scale farmers interviewed did not consider themselves ‘employed’. Though most of them had no other viable options to occupy themselves productively, those with other local non-farms jobs such as primary school teachers were thought to be doing much better. Indeed, securing non-farm employment opportunities was an important goal if it was within reach. One of those interviewed doubled up as a local medicine man. He still considered himself a good small-scale farmer but did not see engaging in farming as good enough to be a full-time occupation. Some were livestock traders, others shopkeepers, and others operated community-based organisations. Women had lesser non-farm employment opportunities; in any case, most of them were held up by domestic chores. The rural non-farm employment literature argues that push and pull factors are responsible for driving small-scale farmers into non-farm employment (Shreffler & Dodoo, 2009). These factors include the need to beat risk in agriculture through income diversification, the necessity to cope with short-term shocks such as drought

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and the lower risk or higher returns from non-farm activities. In the case of most of those interviewed, the issue of productivity of small-scale farming appeared to be the major reason to look elsewhere. Indeed, from the discussions, farming activities were mainly for farmers’ own subsistence. Gaining income from selling farm produce was only possible after households had secured their family food requirements. The food objective among small-scale farmers is the reason for the popularity of maize production in all the areas where this research was conducted. Makueni is part of Eastern Kenya with low and unreliable rainfall. This shortage in rainfall is a frequent cause of maize crop failure (Muui, 2013). Despite this known shortcoming in maize crop production, farmers look forward to the planting season to prepare land in anticipation of rains in early November. Farmers from Nakuru County admitted that maize production was not the most profitable farm enterprise. Still, they remained popular because it was a staple and provided assurances of food security. Women were especially categorical about this and were said to push for the reservation of reasonable portions of family land for maize production to guarantee household food supply. Though opinions were divided, Molo farmers in Nakuru, for example, claimed that short-season crops such as Irish potatoes and vegetables like cabbages and tomatoes could outperform maize in terms of profitability but that they were more risky enterprises. However, they were unanimous that dairy production was most profitable and would be an enterprise for many if the high initial investment costs were overcome. The dairy enterprise was also attractive in the other counties included in this study, even though each place had different challenges. For example, disease control and breeding services availability were farmers’ major concerns in Kwale. In contrast, the availability of feed resources was said to be a major challenge for Makueni farmers. While maize production remains the most popular crop, farmers— especially those in areas with unreliable rainfall—diversify their production to include various other crops as insurance for failure. In one focus group in Kiuuku village of Makueni, participants listed (in order of priority) that they all grew maize, green grams, pigeon peas, cowpeas, Dolichos beans, sorghum and finger millet on their small plots averaging 3 acres (about 1.2 hectares). Apart from these crops, they would also engage in indigenous cattle production, goat rearing and chicken production. While they understood the value of specialising, they said that risks attributed to weather conditions forced them to engage in diverse crop and livestock

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production enterprises. An agricultural extension worker operating within Kiuuku viewed crop farming as unreliable and stated that he was a livestock keeper as this was the most viable agricultural activity in the area. Being an agricultural officer hired to promote crop production, it was not clear if he was free to advise the local farmers on the profitability of livestock production and their need to adopt it as an enterprise of choice. In Nakuru, a member of one of the focus groups shared her frustration with maize crop farming. An acre of maize can yield at most 20 bags of 90kg maize, but we mainly only harvest about eight bags. To achieve a good yield, we have to clear the land, hire oxen to do the first and second ploughing, and dig farrows to allow for seed sowing. We then have to acquire certified seeds – a process which is bedevilled by challenges because some unscrupulous distributors often stock fake seeds. We also need to purchase fertilizer for two weeding rounds and wait for the crop to mature. Harvesting has its own costs, which become enormous when counted with all other expenses we incur throughout a cropping season. Unfortunately, when our maize is ready for the market, the prices are low. It is this one annual harvest that we depend on for household food, daily expenses, school fees, health expenses and all other needs. By approaching the following season, we have no savings to pay for certified seed and fertilizer.

Despite frustrations such as these, respondents did not consider abandoning maize production altogether and sought alternative ways of utilising their farms. They felt that there were simply no other better feasible options. Most dreaded the idea of purchasing maize as a food item, possibly because this exposed them to be under the mercy of the traders who could choose to make it too expensive. In most small-scale farmer households, discussions showed that it was ideal for keeping transactions that involved monetary expenses to the minimum and the best way to achieve this was through growing their food. Indeed, growing food for themselves was no longer only a family strategy of reducing food expenses, but it had become a social expectation, a norm for those who own plots of land. Expenses such as those for agricultural inputs, school fees and medical requirements were considered inescapable, and so ordinary rural farmers were forced to find ways of meeting these expenses. There were cases where some farmers reported supplying their agricultural products to schools to cover fees for their children, further reducing the need for cash in their daily transactions.

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The observations above represent the experiences of many small-scale farmers whose productive capacity is severely limited by their production scale. As a result, it is difficult to envisage how they can break out of the apparent poverty cycle, as described by one participant in a focus group at Sachang’wan in Nakuru: I am almost certain that the maize we harvest can cater for our food requirements for more than a half of the year if the maize crop does not fail. However, because we rely on this harvest to cater for all our other expenses, we can hardly estimate how long we can be food secure within a year. Moreover, all the competing demands on harvested crop makes it impossible to have surplus income from our farming activities for investment or expansion of our agricultural enterprise. We, therefore, go through the same cycle of production and harvest, praying that one time our expenses may reduce so we can have a chance to break out and make it in life.

In an analysis of the maize value chain, Kirimi et al. (2011) have asserted that maize marketing in Kenya faces a classic food price dilemma. This is a situation where there is pressure to keep prices of the commodity high to incentivise farmers. In contrast, similar pressure exists to keep the prices low to make maize accessible to poor consumers. As implied in the statement of the focus group conversation quoted above, growing maize does not guarantee that a household will be food secure for the whole year. Some will be lucky to secure their food needs for half of the year. Kirimi et al. (2011) corroborate this assertion as their research shows that 50% of the overall marketed maize surplus comes from 2% of the smallscale farmers. This, in essence, means that most small-scale farmers are either net buyers of food, produce only enough for food or have a tiny surplus for sale. Focus group members’ sentiments are also suggestive of them being caught up in poverty traps. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) argue that poverty traps exist if there are obstacles that prevent concerned individuals from turning income from one season into further investment. Interviews revealed that many farmers had to bear numerous risks and were never wholly controlled to plan their farming enterprise because of ever-changing circumstances. In one case, a farmer shared his experience of how his efforts had yielded him much harvest and income in one season, only to be disappointed by a total crop failure in the next season because of a rainfall shortage. Other debilitating factors frequently

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mentioned included crop and livestock diseases, rampancy of fake inputs, lack of marketing infrastructure and lack of a suitable regulatory framework. Lack of agricultural insurance to compensate for unforeseen losses and unavailability of credit are additional factors that hinder the expansion of operations by these small-scale farmers. For most of those interviewed, farming was not only physically demanding but also emotionally draining. They had to contend with constantly worrying about impending rainfall failure, the possibility that the inputs were fake and the likelihood of a new disease whose remedy was yet to be known. For example, a focus group in Molo, Nakuru feared that a maize disease that had wiped out their crop the previous year would recur and further impoverish them. There was also an emerging problem of crop and livestock theft blamed on widespread youth unemployment. Concerning the demographic characteristics of small-scale farmers, discussions showed that, on average, the number of younger people disinterested in farming was growing. For example, Molo and Bahati focus groups lamented that their young men were not interested in the labourintensive farming activities and that many were abusing drugs and alcohol. Mary MugureWaweru of Bahati in Nakuru observed: If you were going to be here till evening, you would see one of my sons coming home totally drunk. He comes asking for food and proceeds to sleep if he has no other nightly errands. In the morning, he wakes up and leaves again, possibly to the joints where he drinks with his mates. It is absurd if I remember that we spent money to educate him to the high school level. We do not know whom to blame since it was also our expectation that he would find a job after school. Now that there are no jobs, the only other option is for him to work on the family land. But this also does not make much sense – what can we give him at the end of the working day? It takes eight months for the maize to mature, and we hardly sell it because we store most of it for family food. It is tough to expect these younger people to have the patience to wait for months for a harvest and to be satisfied by the little returns from farming.

The concerns of Mrs. Waweru are common, especially in Central parts of Kenya, where many youths frustrated because of unemployment have resorted to alcoholism to drown their frustrations. According to some respondents, the education system in Kenya is partly to blame because it only prepares young people for white-collar jobs. Yet, according to Mrs. Waweru, it is also the expectation of parents that their children,

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once educated, should be able to get jobs elsewhere. While the education system is blamed, the prospect of an education system that prepares young people to return to their parents’ small plots may not be welcome. This is because most small-scale farmers feel that they are already utilising their plots to the maximum and that there can be no further additional value if their grown children were to join them in the running of the farms. However, young people’s disinterest in working in the family plots was not mistaken for a lack of interest in the land as property. Indeed, the land being the only valued family asset, conflicts are shared between parents and their grown-up children who seek a share of the family land or some level of control. In Kwale, for example, a young government administrator argued that one of the problems affecting agricultural production was that the youth had no control over land. He blamed local customs and religious beliefs that prohibited passing on of land to children before parents’ death. He said that while this custom allowed younger people access to land, it did not give them sufficient freedom to invest in it to the level of their liking. At around the time preceding this research, press reports of youth killing older people on the coast of Kenya pretext that they were involved in witchcraft were common (see Duell [2012] for one such reported incidence). Some of those interviewed in Kwale attributed the killings to competition for the land resources between the elderly farm owners and their children. It was said that in the face of unemployment, the children were targeting their parents so that they could take control of the family property. In one focus group discussion in Matuga near Kwale, the youth in the group complained of being marginalised in the development agenda. They pointed out that many agricultural programmes were biased in favour of the older people because they owned land, excluding the youth without land ownership. Land represents the most valuable property in most Kenyan households. It thus becomes difficult to understand whether those who practice farming do so out of genuine interest in the productive use of the land or because of a lack of choices for generating income. A sizeable proportion of those who appeared settled in the farming business were people whose age was above 50. Some of these were men who had retired from other jobs and devoted themselves to farming. One of those interviewed was Joseph Munyao, a 70-year-old retired teacher. He stated that it was only until he retired from his teaching job that his farming activities became profitable and meaningful. Joseph grows mangoes near Wote in Makueni County and has increased his crop to about 500 stems. Only he and his

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wife share the home and tend the farm as all his children are away working or in college. In Kiuuku village of Makueni, another retired teacher and political aspirant, Mr. Livingstone Wambua, has also chosen to concentrate his efforts in agriculture. He is enthusiastic that there is hope for food sufficiency in this dry part of the country if agriculture receives better attention. Oniango (2001) argued for the need to get men into agriculture based on her experiences of retired men who chose to take up agriculture and who, in her view, were successfully turning around agricultural productivity. Her findings agree with the observations of some of the experts interviewed in Makueni and Kwale. Their views were that agriculture significantly suffered because it did not receive appreciable attention from men. Furthermore, women’s input was disproportionately high as most men ventured into urban centres searching for jobs. What was needed, therefore, was to utilise the potential that lay in men’s labour, technical know-how and management capabilities. It must be recognised, however, that men who retire from good jobs to do farming will often have the advantage of having savings to inject into their farming activities, unlike other average small-scale farmers. Hence, their accumulated savings, better exposure and the possibility of more literacy would be an advantage. Furthermore, the impact of retirees is naturally transient and does not provide the long-term commitment required to ensure the successful growth of the sector. The gender challenge within agriculture in Kenya was noticeable as it was observed that women ran a significant number of farms. Thus, a good percentage of those interviewed were women managing their farms in place of absentee husbands. These absent men were either employed elsewhere or were away looking for employment. Despite being the most experienced in farming matters, most women participants appeared shy to express their views strongly, unlike men who were quick to voice their opinions even on matters they had little knowledge or experience of. 3.1.2

Small-Scale Farmer Organisation and the Missing Farmer “Voice”

The level of organisation among the small-scale farmers is another important aspect worth delving into. Both government and donor agencies have popularised the mobilisation of farmers into groups to ease service delivery and assist farmers in strengthening their position on issues such as

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market and input access. For example, the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP), which ended in 2012, devoted a significant part of its activities to mobilising farmers into what they called “Common Interest Groups” (CIGs). These common interest groups that Githaiga (2007) credit impacted agricultural productivity positively and improved farmer access to extension services. Access to extension services was a key argument given the declining numbers of government extension officers over the years. In the late 1990s, the government retrenched many of its frontline extension workers at the behest of the World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes. This was followed by a freeze on new employment, further aggravating staff shortages. NALEP, as a programme, therefore, found it easier to structure itself in a manner that would enable it to efficiently utilise the few workers available and decided to work with groups and not individual farmers. Since the formation of CIGs was an important output for NALEP (Cuellar et al., 2006), I sought to find out if these groups continued to exist. First, it was learned that these interest groups were formed along crop and livestock enterprises that the farmers engaged in. Because most small-scale farmers engaged in diverse enterprises, many of them had chosen to belong to more than one group. Thus, there was nothing special in belonging to a particular group. Another factor that reduced the potency of these groups was the seasonality of some enterprises. At the end of one season, a farmer may choose to move on to a different enterprise. However, one fundamental factor that made such groups not sustainable was the issue of ownership. Many of those I interviewed saw no purpose in continuing in the group as it had been formed at the behest of NALEP, and since NALEP was no more, it was time to move on. The formation of farmer groups pre-date NALEP and has had its share of successes and failures. The collapse of the cooperative movement in the 1990s is particularly remembered as a lost opportunity to strengthen farmers’ voices. In all the areas visited, farmers indicated that most of them were members of self-help groups. These are entities registered through the Ministry of Social Services. Some of them revealed that they were members of several different groups and had been attracted to join them because of perceived potential benefits. Groups make community entry easier as one only needs to speak to a group leader who then mobilises their members for a given activity. Though groups are rampant, their formation should not be construed to reflect the members’ desire

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to pursue their collective interests. Many groups are formed as opportunistic entities in response to potential funding from government, NGOs or other donor agencies. In other words, group formation was more in response to external push factors rather than farmers’ own initiatives. In some cases, the push to form a group was driven mainly by project officers, government officers or political leaders who nudged the people to form groups to be eligible for funding. According to Ministry of Agriculture officials in Makueni, programmes such as NjaaMarufuku supported by FAO triggered the formation of opportunistic groups. This is because of the grants it gave to groups upon such groups submitting their proposal on either a crop or livestock enterprise. In one public meeting that happened while the fieldwork for this book was ongoing, a local administrator was observed admonishing local youth for failing to take up the challenge of forming groups and applying for the government-administered youth fund. The youth fund and the women fund are finance schemes that avail interest-free loans to eligible persons and were a major electoral promise of the ruling Jubilee coalition in power in Kenya at the time of fieldwork for this study. For this reason, women and youth groups were more common and finding a ‘men’s group’ was hardly possible. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that farmer mobilisation is at best weak and mostly driven externally. Experience with farmers in Nakuru, Makueni and Kwale was that groups formed with an objective of general welfare faired much better than those purely set up for pursuing agricultural interests. However, finding active groups that operated beyond a village was also hardly possible. Consequently, vulnerable groups were not politically visible to be included in major policy discussions. Judging from the many challenges that small-scale farmers face, it would be ideal to have a substantial farmers’ voice initiated by farmers themselves. However, from focus group discussions, it was gathered that this was easier said than done. For some, engaging in farming was transitional and not a full-time occupation, as discussed earlier. To others, the risks in farming coupled with the small sizes of the land they controlled did not give them enough incentive to come out and vigorously participate in group activities. The challenge of different interests and concerns among the farmers complicates the farmers’ ‘voice’ concept. This is mainly because the Kenyan small-scale farmers are not homogeneous. They differ in terms of the sizes of their plots, the assets they own, their incomes and their

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crop and livestock enterprise interests. Gender and age are other earlier mentioned by DFID (2004) but were also observed in the field as reducing the ability of the rural poor to push for the same agenda. Some farmers interviewed were candid in their opposition to joining groups. They argued that since membership in groups was open to everyone, those who were less hardworking and least open to new ideas sabotaged the group’s good intentions so that, in the end, group objectives could hardly be realised. Following these assertions, feedback was sought from individual members and officials of two (2) farmer groups and gathered that mutual suspicion between officials and members was the most common problem that plagued groups. Although this was cited as the major cause of group failure, it did appear from the analysis that this was just a symptom of the existence of divergent and irreconcilable interests among group members. Scaling up from a small rural group to regional and national stature also requires the ability to navigate through established political and institutional settings that are hostile to such initiatives. Moreover, the small-scale farmers can hardly mobilise each other beyond the small rural groupings owing to their low education and meagre resources. Regarding this, Bratton (1990) argues that kinship boundaries and shortages of professional planning and resource mobilisation skills are responsible for hindering the growth of national farmer organisations that are genuinely member-based. Through discussions held at different levels, it was obvious that the government, NGOs and donor agencies were keen to have a collective farmers’ voice that could be relied upon to legitimise their programmes, policies and activities. However, most agreed that none was in existence that genuinely reflected the aspirations of small-scale farmers. This is quite unlike in the colonial years when the European farmers had a strong organisation in the name of the Kenya National Farmers Union. This organisation continued to represent mainly the interests of large-scale farmers post-independence. Still, it gradually weakened with changes in dynamics such as land ownership and average land sizes over the years. It is also probable that its relevance faded due to a lack of interest from the large-scale farmers who may have found other effective ways of representing their issues. In its efforts to become relevant to small-scale farmers, the organisation changed its name in 2003 to Kenya National Federation of Agriculture Producers and is now known as Kenya National

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Farmers Federation. Its website describes it as ‘a non-political, nonprofit making and democratic member-based umbrella organisation of all farmers in Kenya’ (KENAFF, 2014). It also claims to represent the interests of about 2 million farm families as their legitimate voice. Needless to go into detail, all the small-scale farmers I interacted with were unaware of the existence of this organisation, let alone its activities. A host of other organisations purport to represent small-scale farmers nationally. In essence are creations of a few elites and activists cashing in on demand for such organisations. Emphasis on groups has also had a different dimension related to the perceived marginalisation of certain groups among the rural poor. Women and youth are often classified in this category of disadvantaged groups because they are usually not in control of family resources and land in particular. For this reason, the Kenyan government, other development partners and NGOs have prioritised women and youth programs for funding. The common strategy has been to encourage them to form groups and write proposals of what they would like to engage in. These are then vetted and successful projects funded. Some mature men, not wanting to be left out of the benefits of being part of a youth or women group, affiliate with these groups. They would subsequently play nominal roles in the group, but in some groups, they may wield real power in the background. In a focus group in SubukiaNakuru, men lamented that they had become the forgotten group in development: Government, aid agencies and even non-governmental organizations do not support men’s groups. Most microfinance institutions target women. For example, there is a microfinance institution called Women Finance. As a man, I cannot seek support from such an organization because they cannot accept to support me. The government, on its part, disburses the Women Fund and the Youth Fund. All these are opportunities that exclude men.

While these arrangements seem to favour women, some argued that men were to blame for their failures to form stable groups. A woman focus group participant shared her view:

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For groups to stabilize, members must be patient to begin small and watch themselves grow. Unfortunately, our men are not patient with small things. They do not have time to learn from each other and are unwilling to be led. They are also often too busy to volunteer their time for group activities. When they join women groups, they often become sources of sabotage as they do not believe they can take a backseat and let others lead them.

In some of the areas visited, policies such as these appear to have contributed to the marginalisation of men in the rural economy. Most men who spent most of their youthful years in paid employment would often return to their farms as strangers. Conversely, their women would be deeply entrenched in the farm and village activities, including having established local solid networks and experience necessary for conducting meaningful business in the local setup. Such men would thus find it difficult to assert themselves and were bound to be highly dependent on their women in their quest to lead productive rural lives. Agriculture remains undoubtedly the engine that drives the rural economy. Nevertheless, not all people with access to land have the passion and commitment to utilise it productively. Focus group discussions in Makueni and Kwale revealed that many people had access to land but were unresponsive to better practices that would improve the productivity of their land. This group of people mostly earned their daily food requirements by providing cheap labour to other farms and seeking food relief. Some would lease out their farms to others for quick income. Focus group discussions in both places dwelt on this matter, and some members questioned the rationale with which the government and other agencies continued sinking enormous resources in interventions that target this group regarded as ‘very poor’. According to them, this group cannot appreciate and adopt meaningful new practices. One of the farmers interviewed in Mumbuni village of Makueni made the following observation: So many programmes claim to focus on the poorest of the poor. This is a sure way of failing even before you start. The poorest of the poor are people whose mindset is not aligned with hard work. They do not see this as rewarding; you can work out and earn enough to better your life. Their lives are about today, so the best they can think about is having enough food for the day. These people will not honour invitations to

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attend meetings to learn new farming methods. They would also disregard other social gatherings and refuse to participate in collective communal activities. They are only happy to receive relief food.

Though relief food is important to cushion peasants from severe food shortages, especially those living in marginal areas of Makueni and Kwale, it was also viewed as a disincentive that discouraged people from working hard to grow their food. The bigger picture, however, is in the inability of planners to see that the rural poor who rely on small pieces of land for their livelihoods are not a homogenous group. Their challenges vary and cannot be addressed through a single approach programme designed without this perspective. To sum up, the small-scale farmers have a strong claim on the agriculture sector in Kenya and are by all means the most important stakeholders of the sector. Interactions with them have shown that they have good knowledge of agricultural productivity and are capable of estimating profitability and making important decisions on what, when and how to engage in farming enterprises. However, through some of its reports (e.g. GoK, 2007, 2010a, 2011), the government projects them as slow or not receptive to new ideas that can help improve productivity. It is, however, evident that these farmers’ options are severely constrained by the risks afflicting them. Maize—a crop with low productivity in their estimation is, for example, a default crop for most of them owing to the lesser risks in its production and food security considerations. Many of them can recognise that they are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty and are aware of how it limits their choices. This is further complicated by the lack of a common platform that can help them ‘voice’ and influence decisions at a higher level. It is, therefore, upon others to interpret and make a policy decision in their stead. These, in effect, have a bearing on the country’s strategymaking processes, impact on the concept of ownership and implications on the implementation of aid effectiveness principles.

3.2

Overview of Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development is the most visible entity through which the Kenyan government participates in the activities of the agricultural sector in the country. In addition, three other

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ministries in the present government undertake some of the agriculture sector’s functions to a lesser degree. These include the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources, Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development and Ministry of Industrialisation and Enterprise Development. Previously, ten ministries were considered core to the sector’s business; hence, the reduction to four is significant and has perhaps also reduced the coordination challenges experienced prior to 2013. Indeed due to this high number of ministries involved in agriculture and rural development, Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) was established in 2005 as a secretariat to assist in coordinating the activities of sector ministries and other stakeholders involved in the implementation of the country’s vision on agriculture. ASCU continues to exist in the present dispensation, although at the time of this fieldwork, officials from the ministry interviewed stated that it was no longer as active as it used to be. Nevertheless, it is credited with developing the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), a policy and institutional framework that guides the national agriculture sector in Kenya. The ASDS is now variously implemented by the different organisations working in the agriculture sector; chief among them is the Swedish-supported Agriculture Sector Development Support Programme. We focus on the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development (mostly referred to hereafter as the Ministry of Agriculture) to understand the government as a stakeholder in the agriculture sector and its influence on farming activities. This is because the ministry is charged with policy oversight of the sector, has a significant presence in rural areas, and its officers have closer interaction with rural people in the provision and facilitation of extension services and implement a range of programmes both on behalf of the government and donors. The ministry has a cabinet secretary as the head, with three principal secretaries heading the three State Departments of Agriculture (mainly crops), Livestock and Fisheries. The three state departments were formerly independent ministries, each having its strategic documents. However, a single strategic document that covers the whole ministry is yet to be made public. Therefore, a reference is made to the strategic documents that predated the formation of the bigger ministry to come up with the ministry’s functions. In summary, the ministry is charged with formulating and implementing agricultural policies, developing and coordinating agricultural programmes and projects, providing agricultural extension services and

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research agenda-setting in the agriculture sector. Other functions include monitoring and managing food security and regulatory and quality control of inputs produced and products. Of all these functions, countybased officers identified the provision of extension services to improve agricultural productivity as their main function. Kenya is presently transitioning into a new constitution that was voted in at the 2010 referendum but whose implementation began after the elections of March 2013. In the previous constitution, the government was highly centralised with delegated representation at large administrative units called provinces (totalling eight nationally). Below were the districts (about 265 by 2010), then divisions, locations, sub-locations and villages. The new constitutions abolished provinces and established new distinct government units called counties (a total of 47). The former districts have since changed names to sub-counties below: wards (formerly divisions). The new county structure is silent on the possibility of having other government units below the ward. However, the national government has retained its administrative units at the division, sub-location and village. An important highlight of the new constitution is the devolution of powers formerly exercised at the national level to the counties. Agriculture functions are among those devolved to the county units, with the national government only retaining national policy-making functions. At the time of this research, the mechanisms through which the ministry worked at the local level largely remained intact. This is because the county governments inherited all the staff and the structures that previously worked for the national government in the county. However, there were signs that major changes were in the offing. Already, counties were in the process of establishing new organisational structures to oversee agricultural development. This measure would overhaul the power dynamics and management of the ministry of agriculture’s processes. To commence these changes, the counties had introduced the new positions of County Executive Committee (CEC) member (also known in some counties as ‘County Minister’) in charge of Agriculture and County Chief Officer of Agriculture. The CEC member of agriculture as part of the County Governor’s cabinet, while the chief officer worked under the CEC member in a role synonymous with that of a permanent secretary—taking charge of the technical issues of the department. Below were the officials inherited from the national government led by County Directors of the various agricultural departments. County Director’s position was a recent creation;

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most of those in these positions were formerly Provincial Directors, and others were senior bosses working in the districts. The departmental heads at the district changed titles to sub-county heads while the divisional officers became ward officers. In addition to these previously existing positions, the newly established Agriculture Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP), implemented by the ministry and sponsored by the Swedish government, has also established its structures in all 47 counties. These units, known as County Coordinating Units (CCUs), were answerable to the national government through the National Programme Coordinating Unit. The role of CCUs, as envisaged in ASDSP, is to help coordinate the sector activities in the county. Although officials inherited from the national government were dominant in terms of their numbers and had more experience, the new structure was intent on depriving them of power and influence and diminishing their role. County Directors, for example, confided that for the first time, they were no longer holders of Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIE) and their role reduced to that of occasionally providing advice as most decisions were now increasingly becoming the preserve of the Governor and/or the Members of the County Assembly. For most of the County Directors interviewed, this was a coup in which political expediency was gradually rendering professionalism redundant in the running of the agriculture sector. Regarding the presence of the national government’s ASDSP in the county, it was still unclear how its role would harmonise with that of the county agriculture department. In particular, the role of ASDSP’s CCUs had been identified as that of coordinating the sector activities in the county. This was going to be a source of conflict between national and country governments, given that the role of agriculture had been devolved to the county governments. Agriculture was, therefore, one of those domains that the county governments were eager to take complete control of. 3.2.1

The Ministry’s National Office and Donor-Funded Programmes

Concerning donor projects and programmes, the ministry is key in the implementation. Some donor projects/programmes are embedded within the ministry structure; hence the activities of such programmes or projects are regarded as part of the normal work plan of the ministries involved.

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Other programmes establish their coordinating units but with strong links with the ministry. These links may include oversight and provision of the human resource required in implementation. The ministry may also be at liberty to request such programmes to provide funds or logistics for its agenda occasionally. Other donors work through NGOs and try as much as possible to avoid channelling funds through the government. Nevertheless, it remains beneficial for such programmes to retain some working relationships with the ministry, especially at the community level, because of its strong network of skilled personnel working directly with farmers. From interviews with senior ministry officials at the national office, I gathered that they strongly preferred donor-funded programmes implemented through the ministry. To them, it did not matter whether the programmes or projects had their own coordinating units or worked directly through the established ministry structure. Premium was placed on the ability of such programmes to avail resources for certain activities for which the ministry could not gain funding from the Treasury. Apparently, some departments were better than others in attracting donor resources and would therefore be in control of more donor-funded programmes. While this was sometimes attributed to donor policies, some argued that the ability of senior departmental officials to network with donors and actively propose desirable projects favoured by these donors was critical. Indeed, some of those interviewed gave an example of a former permanent secretary whose tenure at the current State Department of Agriculture enjoyed an unmatched record in attracting donor projects. They argued that his powerful networking abilities were also evident from the fact that the State Department of Agriculture controlled several donor-funded livestock-based projects and programmes against the norm of having such programmes run by the State Department of Livestock. These manifestations of power are also associated with how much clout a department (through its top chief officer) has over the Treasury (Ministry of Finance) and the office of the President. For example, during the tenure of the said permanent secretary, it was claimed that part of his success was his close friendship and shared ethnicity with the then Head of the Public Service. Since most of the projects that came into being during that period were mainly funded through loans from World Bank, African Development Fund (ADB) and International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), patronage from higher offices in

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the Treasury and the office of the President would have been deemed necessary. Donor-funded programmes are therefore important in raising the profile of the ministry and can be a sign of good public relations not only between the ministry head and the donors but also with the higher powers within the government. Planning officials in the ministry saw donor-funded programmes as a godsend to cover for development expenditure (the monies the ministry obtained from the Treasury were said to be barely capable of meeting its recurrent expenditure). Donor funds also enhance the ministry officials’ visibility in the field, enable the ministry to invest in infrastructure such as the building of dams and or enable it to procure capital goods such as seeds for the farmers or even establish modern office blocks. This impact is a positive image of the ministry, and the expected beneficiary approval is an opportunity for senior government officials (sometimes accompanied by donor representatives) to make political capital out of their ‘good work’. Furthermore, officers attached to donor-funded programmes usually receive top-up salaries or, sometimes, forfeit their normal government salaries in lieu of much higher perks paid directly by the donor programmes. This, in addition to scholarships, per diems and allowances that officers receive to attend workshops, and field supervision, among other activities, make donor programmes very attractive. Indeed in some circumstances, donor programmes have become necessary for departments to function optimally. This is because it is almost a tradition for officers to expect allowances and per diems whenever they carry out routine departmental activities, especially away from their offices. In the absence of allowances, motivation for work among officers is at its lowest. Since these allowances, including other incidentals such as transport costs, are not adequately covered by the normal government budgetary allocation, donor programmes become handy. It is not uncommon, for example, for officers to arrange meetings and workshops far from their offices to be eligible for per diems. Because these per diems and allowances vary depending on the destination, others choose destinations that have higher rates. As argued by Nkamleu and Kamgnia (2014), per diems and allowances, in this case, are becoming incentives for extrinsic motivation and making it increasingly difficult for officers to be driven by the spirit of public good in their activities. The enormous resources and influence at the disposal of those in charge of donor-funded programmes within the ministry make their positions prestigious and influential. Therefore, it is rewarding for senior and

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junior officers to have good relations with these programme coordinators. Furthermore, unlike mainstream government funds with numerous bureaucratic restrictions pinned on vote heads with ceilings within which expenditure is allowable, those who manage donor-funded programmes have greater discretion on how to spend the money under their control. This freedom is unprecedented within the mainstream government, where processes of funds requisition are long and torturous, creating loopholes for corruption as those charged with authorising payments may need incentives to hasten the processes of funds requisition. The role of the ministry’s national office is diminished to the minimum in situations where the donors choose to work through NGOs. Apart from being unable to influence the activities of such programmes, the ministry headquarters remains largely uninformed of its activities. It was not possible, for example, to obtain any helpful information about the current work of USAID and DANIDA at Kilimo House, the headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture. Both agencies are active in agriculture but have mainly chosen to work through NGOs. The little information that the officials at the national office have is what they glean from reports of officers deployed in the various field locations. Human resource-wise, the Ministry of Agriculture has some of the most experienced and well-trained staff. Those in senior positions have worked in the sector for many years because progression to higher ranks highly depends on the service length. One of the Deputy Directors interviewed had worked in one of the state departments for 36 years. All the County Directors could speak to were also people with significant experience in the sector. All of them agreed that a shortage of funds was a major impediment that limited them from practising their knowledge and experience. For this reason, most of them intimated that they were forced to dedicate a lot of their energies in search of resources to fund some activities they considered core for their offices. This invariably brought them to lobby donors for programme support owing to the difficulties of seeking funding from the Treasury, where previous years’ allocations dictate budget ceilings. This rigid funding regime may imply that senior officials have less room to make strategic leadership decisions and remain under pressure to fundraise. From the foregoing, we argue that the ministry of agriculture’s national office has significant clout in influencing proposed programmes and projects that finally get implemented through donor funding.

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Although it appears that the personality of the top officials can be an additional factor, the real power emerges from the ministry office as the legitimate organ of the government with oversight authority over agriculture issues. Therefore, any entity (including donors) with intentions for the sector will find it procedural if not mandatory to involve or seek approval of the ministry in the design and implementation of such intentions. Yet, the ministry is often cash-strapped and lacks sufficient checks and balances from other institutions. This means that decisions may be prone to the vital interests that operate in the ministry or donor circles. Consequently, it is difficult for the ministry to exercise the power it has optimally to reflect well on the concept of ownership 3.2.2

County Offices and Donor-Funded Programmes

The Kenyan government was going through a constitutional transition at the time of this fieldwork. As a result, some government functions, including overseeing agricultural issues, were transferred to the newly devolved county units. This meant that the former regional officials that headed districts or provinces were taking up the policy roles formerly reserved for the national office. This also meant that the bulk of operational processes and decisions between donors and the government would be undertaken at the county level. The transition will therefore see donors working directly with counties, unlike in the previous dispensation where all decisions regarding bilateral and multilateral agreements were taken at the national level, with regional offices being roped in mainly for implementation purposes. An important aspect of this research was understanding how the county offices in charge of the agriculture sector operated and how their operations’ structure would influence the values espoused in aid effectiveness principles. Interactions with officials at the county level showed a reproduction of the hierarchical structure that existed at the national level. Generally, the top county officials (some interviewed in this study) were professionals with many years of experience working in the sector. Their status meant that they mostly worked in the big offices handling administrative issues, thus had less direct contact with small-scale farmers and relied more on officers further below in the hierarchy to be their contacts with the field. In this way, they could keep a tab on what goes on with only occasional direct contact with average farmers. They nevertheless commanded significant influence, both as representatives of

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the government and in their own right many having established their networks of influence. Having their goodwill in any outreach activities to farming communities (such as this research activity) was very useful. This is because they would task their field officers to make the necessary arrangements for meeting groups of farmers. In lengthy interviews, three County Directors expressed their strong and passionate views about donor funding for the sector. Like the senior officials at the national level, they also vouched for continued external support for the sector to enable it to realise its desired growth. They shared memories of donor-funded programmes, some of which they considered outstanding in approach and output. In Makueni and Kwale, for example, Makueni Agricultural Project (MAP) and Kwale Agricultural Project (KWAP) were remembered as exceptional donorfunded programmes. DANIDA funded both. For ministry personnel, the best thing about these projects was their ability to provide the needed resources in line with their agreed work plans. In addition, these projects were instrumental in building ministry offices and training officers and provided a wide range of capital goods for the farmers, including building dams and water pans and financing the establishment of market infrastructure. Projects such as these bring out nostalgic memories (now that there is no likelihood of similar projects and programmes recurring) for both officers and farming beneficiaries, not so much because of their effectiveness but more so the volumes of capital goods and abundance of liquid cash that they came with. These kinds of interventions are longed for, yet they, unfortunately, leave an unhealthy hangover when they come to an end. Senior officers at the county level preferred donor programmes that utilised the existing government structures in implementation and frowned upon those programmes that endeavoured to establish their own coordinating units. Their view was that donor-funded programmes’ objectives are similar to those of the ministry and therefore establishing separate implementation units was tantamount to duplication. They also argued that this arrangement undermined their leadership role since these programmes implemented their activities using junior officials of the ministry. A senior officer from Makueni shared her views: In my view, establishing a separate unit to implement a donor programme lacks efficient use of human resources. Moreover, it would often result in conflicts as these programmes’ activities are no different from what

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the departments are mandated to carry out. Moreover, when the existing government department implements a programme, you can be sure of continuity and sustainability because the departmental structure safeguards the gains at the end of the programme. On the other hand, as for Programmes with separate implementing units, you cannot be sure what happens at the end of the programme because the implementing units are wound up.

Their position on this is in line with the Paris Principles on using country systems to implement donor programmes. Their motivation, however, maybe something else—that of being in control of programme resources. Controlling programme resources is normally not possible where a separate coordinating unit is in place, as this means that the role is effectively in the hands of the coordinating unit. As stated earlier, the top officials at the national level do not seem to have any specific preference on this matter. It may be in their interest that donor-funded programmes establish separate coordination units. This way, new job opportunities may be created, where they can exercise their patronage. This lack of coherence in preferences between officials at the national office and top county officials are also replayed between the county managers and officers under them. Interviews with frontline extension workers (who report to the senior county officials) showed that most preferred working with projects with separate coordinating units. The reason was that they were sure of being treated well, especially regarding allowances due and that their work was better appreciated. They viewed donor-funded projects implemented through the ministry structure as being no different from the routine government programmes, therefore disadvantaging them from eligibility for special considerations such as allowances. Operating within the ministry structure also meant higher expectations of conduct and discipline. Those who managed the programme were also the people to report to as government workers. As for donor programmes implemented by NGOs, the national and senior officers at the county have come to accept them reluctantly as part of other players working towards the same goal. Since these NGOs work at the grassroots there presence is of greater notice to county officials than to the national officails. Therefore if there is any collaboration or rivalry, it is likely to be experienced firsthand in the devolved units. The ministry offices in the counties are also the first stops where explanations are sought whenever any misadventures that involve NGOs occur. The tension between the NGOs and concerned

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government departments is thus expected from their competing interests to provide solutions to local problems and their differences in the procedures of achieving their objectives. For frontline extension workers, however, these supremacy battles are not of their concern. Some NGOs were happy to engage the junior government officers to implement their programmes without seeking clearance from the county bosses. In this study, the frontline extension officers were instrumental in sharing their experiences of working directly with farmers and, in some instances, helped introduce the researcher to the farmers. Working many years in the same area gave them an edge regarding local solid networks and respect from community members. While interacting with them during the fieldwork, it was discerned that most of them had transformed their strong local networks and knowledge into a powerful resource to privately benefit from local NGO and donor project activities that operated independent from government departments. In one of the subcounties in Nakuru, one officer was frank and explained how working at the grassroots had made him experience power: As a junior officer, my salary is low, and I do not get to control the departmental budget. I nevertheless make use of my networks with local farmers to my advantage. I always seek to guide programmes and projects driven by non-governmental organizations and donors interested in working directly with farmers in my division. Most projects first make contact by approaching our office. Afterwards, they begin to deal directly with me. I, therefore, end up establishing close working relations with various donors who also pay me allowances every time I am out with them.

In one of the research areas visited, a frontline extension worker had a busy schedule for more than three weeks at the time of this interview because he was hosting two organizstions interested in various outreach programmes with local farmers. Because of low funding for the departmental government activities, opportunities such as these were highly welcome for frontline extension workers. The projects kept them busy and were also sources of additional income through daily allowances. After their initial contact with the county or sub-county agriculture office, none of these organisations appeared obliged to continue keeping these offices in the loop of what they were doing—to them, dealing directly with the frontline extension workers after the initial contact was sufficient. There was no need to go back, even in situations where their interventions and

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strategies were later changed. Apart from helping them avoid the official government bureaucracy, this strategy is also valuable for saving time—a beneficial asset since most projects have tight funds absorption timelines. The direct relationship between projects and frontline extension workers is thus mutually rewarding. When agencies utilise frontline extension workers in implementing their programmes without involving the upper hierarchies of the agricultural ministry, issues arise concerning sector coordination, especially if no adequate information is relayed to the relevant government office. Granted, the frontline extension workers may find it not attractive to share with their superiors all information about the activities they have been involved in with these other organisations. This is because it may expose the enormity of the time spent working for these agencies and the level of their gain (through allowances) that result from this relationship. In the extreme, they may also choose not to share information because they have discerned that the actions of the donor agency or NGO they work for are contrary to the government ministry’s acceptable standards of practice or policy. Though not widespread, these actions were suggestive that some NGOs and donor agencies, while pursuing space to operate, engaged in actions that bred corruption. For example, one officer explained how some shadowy organisations do not bother to seek official clearance from the ministry but engage and pay frontline extension staff to legitimise their presence among farming communities. Unlike other public servants such as teachers, Ministry of Agriculture officers working directly with peasants do not have strict time and place schedules for their official work. They can invariably change their workstations between their offices and farm visits, making it impossible to monitor whether one is an official engagement or not. This makes it easy for organisations with no presence in a given area to use the readily available and experienced government personnel to implement their objectives cheaply. To engage these officers in any daily activity, such as having them escort you to meet farmers, you will be required to pay them a ‘lunch’ of Kshs. 1,000, an equivalent of about AUD 12.5. If the activity requires them to spend the night away from their houses, you will be required to pay a per diem or a night-out allowance. This varies depending on the area visited and is meant to cover the officers’ lunch, dinner, breakfast and lodging expenses. The amounts are pretty generous and a major source of savings for poorly paid government officials. These allowances have thus

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become strong motivators for government workers to seek engagements with NGOs and donor programmes actively. Frontline extension workers also take advantage of the ‘demanddriven’ extension policy to reduce their expected workload and increase their availability to be engaged elsewhere. In ‘demand-driven’ extension, the agricultural officers are expected to await farmers to come to them with their problems before they act. In addition, before taking action, the officers may require the farmers to cover certain incidental costs such as transport or lunch. This is discouraging, and my field visits revealed that small-scale farmers rarely came out to demand services. They would only do so when they faced significant incidents of disease outbreaks or when they required reference to buy subsidised fertiliser. In policy matters, the County Directors are challenged to shift gears from being mainly policy implementers to occupying the driving seat in developing county policies for the sector. This is because policy-making in the previous constitutional dispensation was highly centralised so that most regional, departmental heads did not see themselves as being at the heart of policy-making. In this context, the County Director in Makueni stated the following when asked to explain how policy-making took place: I cannot figure out any policy I can claim to have helped develop. However, I can tell you that these processes have been top-down, and those at the County have always been policy implementers, not policymakers. We nevertheless look forward to the new County governments because there is a likelihood that policies will be genuinely participatory.

This top-down orientation in approach was not only evident in the way the ministry interacted with farmers but also in the ministry’s own internal working relations. Middle-level managers, for example, viewed the departmental structures they operated in with cynicism because these organisational edifices left them with little control over their calendar of activities. Honest work for some was periodical and often involved responding to emergencies and providing reports that were, according to one of them, “suddenly required urgently from above”. With the Ministry’s work plans affected by ‘insufficient funds,’ it is often more likely to make knee-jerk responses to issues that eventually result in responses like these from its lower cadres. In conclusion, officials of the ministry in charge of agriculture are, by nature of their posting, the ones who work most closely with small-scale

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farmers. The structure of the ministry is, however, highly hierarchical. Those in the frontline working directly with farmers hold junior positions and are far removed from the centre of policy-making occupied by top bureaucrats, who themselves have minimum contact with the realities of small-scale farming. In addition, there are senior county-based officials whose interests differ from the top ministry bureaucrats or the frontline workers. This, for example, means that while frontline workers have valuable knowledge and experience useful for policy, the system in place mainly values them as agents of top-down policies commissioned by top government officials. In addition to being hierarchical, the command structure in the ministry is not seamless, as evident from the conflicting interests between officials at various levels. With an apparent lack of clear guidelines on what role to play in programmes driven by other agencies, ministry officials often subordinate themselves to agents of donors and NGOs. They, in turn, use them to pursue their objectives. This is made not any less significant given that ministry officials consider themselves short of funds and therefore court donors to supplement their budgetary requirements. Furthermore, the failure of the political establishment to stamp their presence in the sector and actively represent the interests of the electorate while providing the necessary checks to the executive is another factor that adds to the lack of clear articulation of the country’s position on the sector.

3.3 Non-governmental Organisations and Community-Based Organisations Numerous non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations work directly with small-scale farmers in the agriculture sector in Kenya. However, since many rely on donors and donor agendas to remain in operation, it is uncertain that their activities would remain focused on the sector. Field interactions revealed that local NGOs and CBOs were particularly vulnerable to the shifts in donor priorities. The profile of agriculture and the productive sector, in general, has been diminishing over the years, and preference has gone to issues such as civic education, gender issues and health. Musyoki, a man who runs a local Community Based Organisation in Makueni, complained that even though he knew that the people he is working for would benefit better if he were to implement an agriculture and livelihoods programme, he could not do this

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because donors no longer prioritised it in their funding agenda. An official of the Wote Youth Development Organisation in Makueni also shared similar views acknowledging that it was easy to find support for environmental and health programmes than for typical agricultural projects. Kitise Rural Development Project is another successful CBO in Makueni that works with the local community, in particular, addressing the challenges of water and food shortages in the drier parts of the county. Officials of this CBO admitted that it was difficult for them to get donors to commit to supporting purely agricultural projects. Nevertheless, since they receive support (from a Dutch Christian NGO) to run their water and food security initiatives, they find ways of utilising this funding for their agricultural projects. Because of the more significant challenges in marginal areas, NGOs and active CBOs have a more substantial presence in these areas. Makueni and Kwale thus had many development organisations compared to Nakuru County. Harsh conditions in parts of these counties often lead to food and water crisis requiring outside support. In conditions that require relief interventions, the government usually teams up with organisations such as the Red Cross and World Food Programme to provide relief food. Other NGOs aim to lessen the need for relief and therefore support local initiatives for food self-sufficiency. In Makueni and Kwale, World Vision and Heifer Project International (HPI) actively supported such initiatives. Others were the German Agro-Action, Ukamba Christian Community Services, Kitise Rural Development Project, INADES, Plan International and Utooni Development Organization. One of the popular livelihood interventions carried out by NGOs is the provision of livestock in a programme popularised by one of the NGOs, HPI international, as ‘passing on the gift’. This entails donating productive female livestock to farmers, who are then expected to pass on the first offspring to those who did not benefit in the first round. Other livestock projects aim to upgrade the existing livestock to introduce more productive traits such as fast growth and higher milk yield. These are programmes that are by all means beneficial to farmers as most farmers are short of resources to invest in breeding stock. The challenges, however, are that such initiatives require large support structures and partnerships with other stakeholders. For example, a programme officer with HPI stated that the ‘passing on the gift’ livestock projects needed escalation of veterinary services as the livestock they introduced are often more vulnerable to diseases. In one incident, farmers lost all improved

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chicken donated by HPI because of failure to adhere to the stipulated vaccination programme. Occasionally such incidents occur when the relevant stakeholders are not adequately involved in a project but can also be a sign of poor collaboration and infighting between stakeholders. For crops, the NGOs have focused on supporting the introduction of drought-resistant crops, providing seeds and connecting farmers to the market. In Makueni, for example, Micro-Enterprise Support Programme Trust (MESPT) supports farmers’ access to the market for mangoes, French beans, and passion fruits. This same organisation works in Kwale pursuing similar objectives. Other important services provided by NGOs and other organisations are a duplication of the government’s services or should provide through its various ministries. Ministry of Agriculture, for example, has the mandate of training and providing extension services to farmers on sound agronomic and livestock husbandry practices and should be able to liaise with ministries in charge of commerce, enterprise development and international trade to assist farmers market their produce. Nevertheless, these have become the major opportunities through which non-governmental entities have found ways to legitimise their existence. For example, according to the Business Development Officer for MESPT, the government advocates for increased agricultural productivity, yet it shows little or no concern for the resulting farmer marketing issues. MESPT has therefore identified this gap and established itself to provide this service. Though most NGOs and CBOs interviewed suggested they had excellent relationships with the government, field interaction indicated some level of friction and suspicions between them. These were exacerbated by the fact that NGO projects appeared more attractive to farmers than government-run ones. Farmers said NGO projects were associated with capital benefits and fewer bureaucratic bottlenecks. At the same time, the government mainly provided advisory services and where capital goods were provided, the distribution processes were mired in corruption and unnecessary delays. The government’s subsidised seed distribution was an excellent example of bureaucracy bottlenecks and corruption. The project required that farmers first be vetted by the agriculture office and afterwards proceed to the National Cereals Board for further verification and permission to pay for the fertiliser. After showing proof of payment, the farmers would be advised on which day to collect the fertiliser. According to those interviewed, these processes were tedious and lengthy. It also

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involved considerable movement for some farmers as most cereal board depots are found in big administrative towns. The biggest frustration was that the depots would run out of fertiliser stocks quickly and in circumstances that raised suspicions that officials were hoarding and diverting the fertilisers for personal gain. Consequently, this delayed the onset of planting for those who relied on it, leading to poor harvest. Given that the fertilisers are subsidised to about 25%, the opportunity costs of getting it in time for the planting season are enormous. For NGO projects, the problem was that the size of the beneficiary farmers they identified was small. So the challenge was for one to be included in the list of beneficiaries. In some situations, circumstances dictated collaboration between NGOs and the government. This would occur mainly when the NGO does not have the human resource capacity to implement some of its programmes. Low funding for government programmes forced these collaborations to work as they became mutually beneficial. However, suspicions may persist because the relationship remains unequally in favour of the NGOs as they are the ones in control of funds. Indeed, there was evidence that NGOs preferred working closely with junior government officers because they had more discretion in their activities and avoided demands from senior officers to adhere to certain policies or other ad-hoc requirements. The relationship between various NGOs working in the exact location was more characterised by competing tendencies than collaborating. This was especially discernible in areas that had many NGOs and where each sought participation from the same pool of local people. Where these occurred, the protagonists would seek ways of outwitting others, e.g. providing freebies, allowances or food to potential participants. According to an official of the Kitise Rural Development Project, a clash in programmes spearheaded by different agencies impeded progress and hindered organisations from attaining their objectives. It was also noted that even in organisations working in different sub-sectors, their activities could negatively impact others. An example was the relationship between agencies supporting relief efforts and those that supported improved agricultural productivity. Those who supported agricultural productivity complained that availability of relief food discouraged hard work among farmers who would find it convenient to await relief food rather than toil. Being part of the civil society, NGOs and CBOs often play an important role in advancing democratisation and improved representation of people’s interests in decision-making and enhanced service provision. In

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areas with the greatest hardships such as the drier parts of Makueni for example, NGOs are more visible as providers of services—often eclipsing the government. In regard to aid effectiveness in Kenya in particular, Tomlinson (2011) argues that lack of adequate involvement of civil society in implementation of aid effectiveness principles is a set back to its success. Field interviews with government, CBO and NGO officials (including the observation made earlier in this chapter regarding CBOs and NGOs being forced to tune their projects in line with donor preferences) however show that the existence of an effective alternative force (beyond the government and donors) is undermined by their lack of financial independence. Therefore, although they can be good at representing interests of small-scale farmers because of their good knowledge of local issues, their need for survival forces them to prioritise the interests of those who fund them. These fights for survival are also manifested through rivalry among NGOs themselves and between them and government ministries as they each seek a role for themselves in the sector. All these undermine chances for a true sector position born of consensus between the different players. In some parts of the country, unhealthy rivalry was said to be responsible for popularity of populist projects that did not help build community capacity but scored well in terms of attracting beneficiaries and good reports for the sponsors.

3.4

The Private Sector

The term private sector here is used to describe individuals, groups or organisations that have invested in the non-farming agricultural enterprises for purposes of profit. Within the limit of this definition, it will include input and machinery suppliers, farm produce merchants/traders, banks and insurance companies among others. In the recent years, there has been a push for services that have been the domain of the public sector such as agricultural extension, livestock clinical services and artificial insemination to be provided for by the private sector. Because of the nature of their motivation, it is theoretically not difficult to get the private sector play their part adequately if they can be sure of making profit. The input suppliers interviewed indicated that the seasonality of agriculture affected the stability of their income and that they would experience periods when their businesses boom and others when they hardly made any sales. The planting season and during the rains were favourable times for suppliers of seed and fertiliser and those who deal in

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livestock drugs, respectively, because of higher incidences of diseases. As expected, many of them complained that provision of subsidised inputs by the government and other donor-funded projects undercuts them business-wise as they only get to sell to those who missed these low-priced inputs. However, they welcomed projects that purchased inputs locally for distribution to farmers because these provided effective demand for their products as farmers themselves had low purchasing power. Indeed, some “entrepreneurs” enjoyed patronage of donor government-funded programmes, which enabled them to obtain lucrative contracts to supply goods and or services to farmers in the project areas. Donor-funded programmes such as NjaaMarufuku Kenya (NMK) and Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project (KAPAP) seek to enhance the participation of private sector in provision of services that were hitherto either absent or mainly provided by the government. Both are run by the Ministry of Agriculture but sponsored by different donors. NjaaMarufuku Kenya is a food security initiative run by the government but sponsored by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UN’s Millennium Development Goals Centre. According to interviews with farmers and implementing officials, the project provides grants to fund farmer groups’ projects. Apart from catering for the inputs required, the grant also covers for services the farmers’ require such as training. This gives opportunity for various consultants to bid and provide this service. KAPAP is supported through a loan from the World Bank and according to the project website it aims at improving linkages between research, extension and farmer empowerment in addition to providing support for other stakeholder initiatives (KAPAP, 2014). In the field, KAPAP is known for its efforts to connect farmers with service providers. The farmers are first organised in line with the major enterprises they are involved in and the project then procures and pays for services that are needed for such special training on topical issues and consultancies and technical support in marketing of farmers’ produce. While it is in the interest of some donors including the World Bank to promote the private sector service delivery in agriculture, implementation and sustainability of this policy for small-scale farmers is difficult. This is because small-scale farmers hardly have enough resources to pay market prices of some of the services included. Since some of these services have been hitherto provided free through government agents, it would also be difficult to bring farmers to a point where they could appreciate that the value of the service was worth its cost. Projects such as KAPAP pay for

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these services on behalf of the farmers in the hope that farmers will experience the benefits and will therefore have the capacity and willingness to pay for the service on their own at the end of the project. Nevertheless, the procurement processes in donor and government funded projects of this nature do not reflect how private sector typically engages with consumers of their services. As attested by farmers and some ministry officials interviewed for this study, the fees that projects paid for contracted services were highly inflated beyond normal market prices. In addition, it was also observed that those who won such contracts were not the average business people that farmers dealt with frequently but well connected individuals who were not genuinely interested in the business other than to take advantage of the generous procurement deals. Aside from the influence of donor and government funded projects, the private sector was also been a spotlight for business people perceived as bend on gaining dishonestly from helpless farmers. In this category are what farmers call ‘brokers’ but also referred to as middlemen. Opinion is divided on whether the services offered by this group are essential for the growth of the sector or unnecessary burden. Though some farmers would call them ‘brokers’, their activities are rarely of typical brokers but rather traders who have good market information for various farm produce. With this knowledge, they approach farmers and negotiate for a price that would profit them when they finally sell the product to a market they have identified. Interviewed farmers felt that these traders connived to underpay them intentionally so as to make huge profits. They therefore longed for opportunity to directly access the market and cut of the middlemen from the chain. Many donor-funded programmes agree with this position and are working to reduce what they perceive as farmer exploitation. Some have focused on helping farmers get organised into groups so that they can market their produce collectively. Others e.g. MESPT have sought to connect farmers directly with exporters and consequently establish contract farming where farmers are guaranteed a minimum price for their produce. Those who view middlemen as essential argue that the market has dictated their presence. That while their pricing may be unfair; they are always available whenever farmers need to market their produce. It is usually difficult for farmers to access outside markets because of lack information and other logistical challenges. Approaching the market as a group may help to reduce overhead costs and make this possible. However, a number of obstacles make this difficult, e.g. diversity in the produce from individual farmers and lack of organisational capacity

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among farmers. A focus group in Kathonzweni understood these limitations and shared an example of poultry marketing group which failed because of lack of trust and poor leadership. To sum it up, the private sector in agriculture in Kenya continues to play an important role in helping farmers to market produce, distribution of inputs and provision of services. However, failures on the part of both donors and the government to properly manage the subsidies they issue to farmers occasionally interferes with their marketing strategies thereby affecting their growth and effectiveness. Even funded programmes aimed at enhancing private sector growth are equally disruptive, at least in the short run as demonstrated by the examples of projects such as KAPAP.

3.5

Conclusion

Small-scale farmers remain a bedrock for improved agricultural productivity in Kenya because they cumulatively hold the highest percentage of farmland as well as being responsible for three quarters of agricultural produce (GoK, 2010c). Any genuine efforts towards improving the sector should ideally seek to target the challenges that face this group of producers and incorporate their participation. From field experience, food security appeared to be the dominant objective in the activities of small-scale farmers. This was responsible in part to the farmer’s prioritisation of maize production. Government policy especially through its efforts to subsidise maize farming inputs has also contributed towards reinforcing maize as a major crop even in areas that are less suitable for its growing. The donor and government efforts towards mobilising farmers into groups have by no means been useful to farmers’ plight other than easing donor and government ability to implement their programmes. As a result, farmers have not been able to genuinely develop their own member organisations to enable them voice their issues and influence policy. Indeed some farmers interviewed viewed being hurdled into groups with cynicism but chose to cooperate on account of accessing the benefits that are on offer from donor and government programmes. Although a significant number of donor mission have made the ministry of agriculture an important partner through which their programmes are determined, findings have shown that the power vested on the ministry in situations like this is prone to abuse in two ways. One is the incidence where senior ministry officials act unilaterally to manipulate to their personal whims important ministry decisions regarding design

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and implementation of programmes and projects. This, can be attributed to shortcomings in the ministry’s institutional structure which we argue lacks sufficient accountability mechanisms towards other arms of government and farmers in particular. Secondly, findings also show that ministry officials perceive funding from government’s treasury as inadequate for their activities. They therefore find it necessary to approach donors to bridge resource gaps and this can become openings for compromises and liberty for liberty for donors to impose their own views in exchange of sponsorship of programmes or projects. In these two instances, it is observed that decisions become a preserve of a few government officials in cohorts with benefactor donors. Findings have also shown that some donors can still choose to run their own programmes with very little or no involvement of the ministry though often engaging junior ministry officials in implementation. Situations like these do not augur well with the need for better harmonisation and coordination of programmes and can also breed competition between government and donor programmes. Furthermore, ministry personnel involved in such arrangements become torn between serving the interests of the ministry and those of the donor. Therefore, though donors adopting a strategy of independence from the ministry can enjoy greater control of their programmes and possibly avoid ministry’s bureaucratic inconveniences there is a downside of undermining ministry structures. Sustainability of the gains from the programme also becomes jeopardised for lack of continuity and caretaker role that is guaranteed by working with ministry. These observations are also valid for NGO operations which are no different from bilateral/multilateral programmes except for being less obligated to work with government offices. The private sector on its part is one that has to contend with occasional market distortions that come about because of donor and government interventions such as subsidies. As for the small-scale farmers, land productivity remains a real challenge in addition to lack of credit facilities, disease incidences and poor markets among other constraints. All these work to disadvantage the farmers and contribute to many of them being trapped in cycles of poverty. This together with inability to form a strong member organisation greatly inhibits their ability to engage and advocate their own agenda when new programmes are introduced. In conclusion, this chapter has examined in detail the different stakeholders in the agriculture sector in Kenya. Analysis has shown gaps to

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the principle of ownership that emerges from skewed decision-making for donor-funded programmes and projects that favour views of few top government officials and agents of donors and to the disadvantage of other stakeholders, especially small-scale farmers. There is also a potential challenge to harmonisation principle as some donors and NGOs run their own projects with little or no involvement of the ministry. It is clear that farmers know nothing about PD and have little prospect at impacting on how it is implemented.

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CHAPTER 4

Aid Effectiveness and Kenya’s Agricultural Policy and Strategy-Making Processes

Aid effectiveness principles put considerable emphasis on the importance of the recipient country systems to chart their course so that development aid becomes part of what drives the aspirations of this course. Policy processes are important in determining what systems ought to be in place and reflect the aspect of ‘ownership’ depending on how the funded programmes are implemented. It is also important to state that harmonisation and coordination of aid, which are central to aid effectiveness principles, are issues that influence the country’s established policies. For this reason, this chapter is dedicated to examining the processes through which policy and comprehensive sector strategies are developed out of the national development plan. This chapter begins with an in-depth discussion of the different processes that lead to agricultural policy initiation. It builds on the issues around the aid effectiveness architecture discussed in the previous chapter. Through this, we try to explore the roles of different stakeholders and the impact of their contribution to the policy processes and the principles of aid effectiveness in particular. In investigating agriculture policy-making processes, there was a realisation that policy is not limited to the formal public policy processes that lead to policy documents, bills or acts of parliament but that there were other ways (e.g.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9_4

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senior government officials’ pronouncements or in the course of implementation of the donor-funded programme) in which policies came to be spelt out and implemented. This particular aspect of agriculture policy is discussed in detail in this section, highlighting how different players have come to influence the agriculture sector. Next is an analysis of the public policy-making processes where the focus is on the role played by small-scale farmers compared to other sector actors. Finally, we also discuss the making of the country’s Agriculture strategy. While the policy spells out the general guidelines for the sector, the strategy articulates the government’s specific commitments and objectives for the sector to be achieved within a stated period. In Kenya, the agricultural strategy has often been lifted out of the country’s prevailing development plan. It is perhaps the only other major development blueprint that must be developed to guide the country in meeting agriculture sector obligations in the National Development Plan. Again in this section, we seek to elucidate the structure of the process, the roles assumed by the various players, their actions’ impact and the ensuing power relations. The last part is a conclusion in which the implications of the findings are further discussed.

4.1

Agricultural Policy Initiation Processes

Kenya’s public policy-making processes are generally long and tedious (GoK, 2010a). For the agricultural policies, it is the responsibility of the government minister in charge of agriculture to coordinate and oversee the process. The expectation (at least in theory) is that the major players in the sector (e.g. farmers, farmer groups, input suppliers, NGOs, CBOs, among others) should be the ones to initiate policy dialogue in line with their interests and participate in drafting and validation processes. This participatory aspect has its challenges, as discussed later on in the findings of this chapter. However, before the policy is enacted and adopted for implementation, it has to be debated in parliament and passed. For this reason, it is also necessary that a policy process has the political capital to succeed. Analysis of the process also shows that it is necessary for those interested in pushing specific policies to be adopted to have the knowledge and capacity to bring their issues to the appropriate platform for inclusion in policy dialogue. This is an obvious disadvantage to those agriculture sector players with little education, little resources and not well organised through a membership organisation. All of these point to a process

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that can be daunting and that involves significant stakes. Yet interviews with the Ministry of Agriculture officials provided another narrative of this process, perhaps as initially intended to be a participatory pathway for the agricultural policy-making process. The following sub-section captures this narrative of an inclusive, participatory process and the realities on the ground. The other sub-sections narrow into the details of the influence of particular entities in the whole policy-making process. Although there is no written protocol on how agriculture policymaking processes are initiated, a widespread view among State Department of Agriculture officials (especially at county level) pointing to the Central Agriculture Board (CAB) was the right starting point. This view is generally meant to suggest that the process is bottom-up, in which the CAB branches at a level of a location (comprising several villages) under the coordination of ministry officials raise issues that ought to be forwarded for policy consideration at higher administrative levels. These issues are subsequently discussed at various levels, with those considered important finally filtering their way to the national level. The CAB seating at the National level would thus ultimately make the necessary policy proposals for adoption and implementation. Through field experience and interviews with various officials, it was clear that this intended policy initiation process was not in practice. Many factors made this problematic. One is that farmers and other key agriculture sector stakeholders do not have a credible organisational framework at the grass-roots level. Any semblance of organisation is in the form of self-help or common interest groups. Unfortunately, these are weak, disjointed and lack strong coordination. They also have fluid membership and generally lack resources to enable them to stand on their own. Government officials are therefore often forced to handpick people they feel can represent the various groups in CAB committees at various levels. Being volunteer roles with sporadic periods of substantive agenda, it is challenging to guarantee the long-term commitment of members to the objectives set out. Furthermore, another challenge is that such processes are meant to feed into a centralised policy-making system, and so hardly is it possible that any of the committees would bet on their views becoming influential to national policy. Besides, the realities of poverty and low literacy levels among rural small-scale farmers engender marginalisation that disempowers people to participate adequately in decision-making. While the need for participatory processes in decision-making is generally acknowledged, the practicalities of making these processes effective

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have not been adequately interrogated. For this reason, practitioners and organisations, e.g. the World Bank, have favoured processes that involve broader stakeholder participation, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers spearheaded through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The government of Kenya appears to have warmed up to this same idea when crafting the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) of 2003, which is described as having made considerations of stakeholders’ views, including small-scale farmers (MALF, 2014). However, some of the senior agricultural officials interviewed argued that it was difficult to expect ‘capacity-challenged’ small-scale farmers to authoritatively engage in the kind of “policy dialogue that meets the standards required” to make the processes successful. Although this may reflect officials’ prejudices, it is also a highlight of a system used in top-down policy development processes where sector officials and stakeholders have this inclination due to established long-term practice. Consequently, bottom-up processes such as those intended in the CAB provisions and others like PRSP would encounter obstacles because they envision a radical change to the established order in which ill-prepared farmers are suddenly expected to be at the forefront of policy-making instead of being traditional recipients of ready-made decisions. In the light of this, the abrupt stoppage of the PRSP process midway (Alila & Atieno, 2006) is an excellent example of the difficulties of expanding the role of the rural poor in decision-making. Generally, while participatory processes could be the only way intended beneficiaries (particularly the farmers) can own policy-making processes, the complexities of power and power relations make it difficult to achieve this objective. Thus, practicality of these groups and individuals being able to frame the agenda and outline the problems that ought to be addressed is farfetched. Besides, the government officials have the power and discretion of whom to invite as participants. Those interviewed also stated that officials predetermined the broad issues and that the act of consulting farmers was merely a formality. Since PD attaches great value to implementing country policies as an indicator of the ownership principle, scrutiny of the quality of the policy-making process is therefore important. While the lack of adequate inclusion of farmers in the process becomes an issue here, the dynamics brought in by other major players must be analysed. We, therefore, hence examine the leading players in initiating and influencing policy.

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The Ministry Bureaucracy and the Politicians

Despite the difficulties of originating the agricultural policy-making process in a genuinely democratic and participatory process, the Ministry of Agriculture strives to bring some level of grass-roots participation on board. Interviews with senior officials, for example, indicated that the ministry often initiated policy processes upon identifying broad issues in the sector that required policy articulation. An important incentive is that policy-making attracts potential funding agents, including donors and the Treasury. Departmental heads grappling with the shortage of funds are therefore inclined to take up policy-making tasks for, among other reasons, the potential of increasing the departmental funding portfolio. Policy-making is also attractive as it allows government departments to entrench themselves as essential players in the public space. As expected, the focus is on issues in which policy is either silent, absent or exists but needs revision. Specific issues for consideration in policy are arrived at in various ways. The first is through the internal mechanisms of the ministry. As a functional and self-perpetuating entity, the ministry is expected to appraise its role in the sector and government continuously. This, in essence, pushes officials to identify their unique niche and seek ways to remain relevant and continually justify the budget allocation they receive. The introduction of performance contracting at the beginning of 2004 (Alila & Atieno, 2006) has helped motivate departments to enhance their policy enactment initiatives because this has become one of the major deliverables in departmental performance. In performance contracting, ministries negotiate with the government on mutually agreeable performance obligations at the beginning of the year to be achieved at the close of that year. Targets can, for example, be that each department should initiate and achieve significant success in enacting at least one policy document before the end of the year. Other targets may include finalising previously started processes, including drafting cabinet memorandums and publishing sessional papers to facilitate parliamentary debate on particular issues. To do this, departments would often have ad hoc committees that would develop plausible areas for policy articulation. Apart from internal pressures, the government’s executive and legislative arms have opportunities to push departments to initiate policies. Top country leadership was cited as frequently being the source of directives that ultimately trigger policy actions. This happens, for example, when the

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government is scheduled to make important pronouncements regarding its performance, when the country was approaching a national day, or when the Head of State (or other senior officials) was to visit a particular part of the country. Memos exchanged between offices during such occasions commonly demand departmental briefs, which soon shape up into policy documents of sorts as officials are pressed to outline interventions for specific challenges they identify in their reports. These circumstances transform the otherwise departmental briefs (basically summarised documentation of the experiences of the various officers in the hierarchy of the departments) into authoritative documents with the potential of determining government policy. So, for example, if the brief’s contents were to find their way into a senior government official’s public statements, their adoption as policy decisions henceforth acquires certainty based on the high regard accorded to senior officials’ statements. In this way, policymaking is initiated passively, which appears unintentional. Yet, it could also be deliberate—i.e. departmental officials’ strategy to achieve their goals in an environment where they are starved of resources. Though policy-making is designed to be an objective process driven by a genuine desire to improve the sector’s working, there are some cases where the processes have been used to champion partisan professional interests among bureaucrats. There are incidents where, for example, departments use policy-making discretions to fight each other to maintain or expand their individual working space.1 According to those interviewed, the resulting rivalry was often expressed through parties failing to

1 An example here was a case of a fairly publicised departmental war that pitted the Department of Livestock Production Department (DLP) and the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) against each other. While both are closely related and are under the same State Department and Ministry, differences have often emerged with regard to each other’s mandate despite existence of a general schedule that details division of roles. In 2011, for instance, the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) published ‘Veterinary Surgeons and Veterinary Para-Professionals Act’ an issue that raised much controversy among sub-sector players including the DLP. The contention for DLP was that the Bill intended to usurp some of its roles and more specifically it had provisions that were intended to make livestock production professionals to be subordinate to the vets through establishment of a position called “animal resources secretary”. In the Act/Bill, the qualifications for the “animal resources secretary”. Opponents thus argued that this was a case of the misuse of departmental law making discretion to serve partisan interests with claims that DVS succeeded to push through this law because of its strong networks with legislators and being able to influence the office of the President.

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cooperate but also actively where one party blatantly sabotages another’s initiatives. Aside from bureaucracy, the patrimonial state in Kenya has also been associated with influencing agriculture policy-making (Mbua & Sarisar, 2013). Patrimonial influence is not only a preserve of the powerful presidency, as was argued then, but has extended into the hands of powerful politicians, civil society personalities and lobby groups. Issues that concern small-scale farmers, for example, sometimes find their way into policy consideration on account of influential individuals interested in making political capital out of it. This can be said about the local political representatives speaking on behalf of their electorate, deciding to pick on particular issues of interest and dramatising them in public forums to blackmail the government into action. Some respondents identified issues related to input availability and pricing as some of those commonly advanced in this way. Unfortunately, these initiatives were open to abuse as politicians sought to advance populist ideals instead of well-thought policy options. In many of these situations, local officials and community leaders shared accounts reminiscent of patron-client politics (as described, for example, by Hickey [2007] and Kitschelt and Wilkinson [2007]) in which local politicians engaged in populist activism to frustrate the implementation of government policies. For example, a local politician in Makueni lobbied and secured relief food for his constituents despite the Ministry of Agriculture’s advice that indicated that there was enough local produce. In such moves, the politicians use their connections with local administrators to falsify food production reports to create artificial shortages of food. Those affected are the hardworking local farmers who would be unable to obtain a market for their produce. Ministry of Agriculture officials saw this as undermining their role in promoting food production as part of a comprehensive strategy for ensuring sustainable food self-sufficiency. They viewed themselves as too weak to contest the positions taken by politicians, relying on these same politicians’ goodwill to gain local acceptance. With time, inertia sets as the ministry officials question their enthusiasm for ‘good policies’ in an environment where the local leadership does not value these ‘good policies’. Conversely, the government officials can also assume a laid-back attitude as they develop unfavourable social construction of the people they work with based on the attitude and actions of their political leaders.

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In summary, while the Ministry of Agriculture has a legitimate role in coordinating and overseeing policy processes, findings here show that this role gives them enormous power in initiating policy. Top officials have used this as an opportunity to pursue partisan interests of their own. We also observe politicians utilising patron-client politics to scuttle implementation of what would otherwise be regarded as good policies or intentions of the others working in the sector. Again, issues around the ownership principle in PD arise because of an unfair distribution of power in decision-making that, in this case, disproportionately favours positions of top bureaucrats and political elites. 4.1.2

Input of the Policy Experts

Policy research institutions with expertise in agriculture have risen to three in the past few years. They include Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) and Institute of Policy Analysis and Research. The relationship between these policy research institutions and the ministry is mutually beneficial. This is because the ministry does not have the research capacity and ability to quickly analyse situations on the ground as they unfold despite its extensive presence. Research institutions do not have the mandate of transforming the knowledge they generate into policy, so they will be keen to share it with the ministry for it to be productive. According to interviews with an official of Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, their ongoing research is based on a panel of rural farming households for which they have been collecting micro-economic survey data for the last several years. From these, they can provide helpful analytical reports on important issues affecting agricultural production, such as access to services, emerging challenges and opportunities and possible avenues for intervention. The institute is also keen on current issues. So it is therefore often engaged in quick surveys and analysis to be in a position to inform current debates on agricultural issues. Policy research institutions share their findings through conferences, workshops and breakfast meetings. Senior government officials are invited, including where need be the Members of Parliament. The findings can also be shared through policy briefs sent to the relevant government offices. On their part, the top ministry officials based at the ministry headquarters admitted that policy expert reports formed

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part of the wide range of information at their disposal that they could use to inform policy initiation processes. For this reason, it was generally acknowledged that there were more consultations between ministry officials and policy research institutions and a growing number of joint meetings and workshops. Despite this positive development, policy research institutions are conscious that their findings will not always be given priority in policy decisions despite merit. This is because some issues remain highly political and emotive, so those in power would instead handle them in a way that best suits their political interests. In these circumstances, those in power would seek solutions convenient to their political interests. At the time of this research, issues such as adopting genetically modified organisms (GMO) technology and providing subsidised fertiliser to small-scale farmers were of substantial political interest. In subsidising fertiliser for resource-poor farmers, the government was said to have ignored expert advice against its implementation (findings showed potential leakages and crowding out of the private sector). Politics and attached business interests were seen as the major causes of this, and at the time of this research, both national and county governments were busy distributing subsidised fertilisers. Policy research institutions are not the only sources of policy experts, though. There is a growing retinue of private consultants who thrive on policy-related contracts from various departments. The high stakes involved mean those who enjoy these opportunities have close networks with senior departmental officials. Some are retired ministry officials, while others are attached to various universities. In summary, the role of policy experts in informing policy overall is still embryonic, with the indications that their reports and expert advice are increasingly being acknowledged as part of the resources that departments draw on in making decisions. However, with power firmly in the hands of ministry bureaucrats and political elites, the impact of their input remains below par. Regarding PD and ownership principle, the role of policy experts would be to provide objective, unbiased information that is beneficial in promoting the interests of those targeted by donor projects. Failure to adequately utilise this resource may therefore mean that aspects of true ownership in the agriculture sector in Kenya are compromised.

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4.1.3

The Influence of NGOs, CBOs and Farmer Organisations

The local Non-Governmental Organizations and Community-Based Organizations are other potential groups that can suggest policy initiation. By far, however, the agriculture sector in Kenya has fewer and less vocal civil society groups compared to other sectors such as governance, health and environment. Agriculture does not seem to have advocacy issues that are attractive to donors and hence less attractive to influential civil society groups. Nevertheless, a few exceptions deserve mention here. One is the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) which describes itself as a not-for-profit, non-partisan umbrella network of civil society organisations committed to advocacy for the reform of policy and laws governing land in Kenya (KLA, 2014). It has been closely associated with the recently enacted National Land Policy. The second one is the African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum (ABSF) which describes itself as a non-political and non-sectarian association providing a platform for sharing, debating and understanding all issues about biotechnology in agriculture, health, industry and the environment (ABSF, 2014). As can be deduced, ABSF has been at the forefront of policy discussions related to the biosafety of genetically modified organisms (GMO) food in Kenya. Though the memberships of the two NGOs are Kenyan, some have viewed their formation and/or objectives as a reflection of external organisations’ interests. Norton-Griffiths (2010), for example, claims that during the preparation of the National Land Policy, the activities of the Kenya Land Alliance were a proxy to those of Action Aid, an international NGO based in South Africa and the main funding agency for KLA. Similarly, Harsh (2008) casts aspersions on the independence of ABSF as an organisation. He observes that the Rockefeller Foundation formed ABSF in the year 2000 and that it enjoyed the patronage of Monsanto: an American multinational chemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation. It is worth noting that although ABSF’s website acknowledges some of its partners, nowhere does it mention Monsanto as one of its partners due to the sensitivity that can arise from reports that the two have links. As a company, Monsanto has had its share of controversy concerning how they are aggressive in marketing its technology and protecting its market share (Pechlaner, 2012). Their support for ABSF can therefore be interpreted as part of a furtive mission to convince African governments to relax restrictions on GMO food. Hence, while these NGOs claim to be ‘non-partisan’ or ‘non-sectarian’, their activities reveal that the

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interests of those who fund them cannot be ignored. African NGO legitimacy and accountability have long been analysed (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Igloe & Kelsall, 2005; Nyangoro, 1993). The main concern is that NGOs do not have funds of their own that guarantee the independence of their work. Edwards and Hulme (1996), for example, ponder on whether the relationship between NGOs and their donors is too close for their comfort, while Michael (2004) sees the absence of power among African NGOs as a fact that undermines development. They are implying that, in fact, NGOs have become managers of donor resources instead of being in charge of local development process (Nyangoro, 1993). All these have led to the view that foreign aid has created a social group that relies on donor resources that have to be sustained through complying with the requirements and directives of donors (Hearn, 2007). It is worth noting that this literature concerned the impact of resources from northern governments and NGOs to the southern NGOs. As noted from the example of Monsanto, sources of donor funds are no longer a preserve of governments and NGOs. Multinational companies are making their in-roads, and their strong motivation for for-profits should indicate why they are investing in an NGO such as ABSF. Some have argued that truly-farmer membership organisations would be better than NGOs in advocating for farmer-friendly policies because NGOs tend to pursue partisan interests of those who fund them (DFID, 2004). However, during focus group discussions, it became apparent that there was no strong farmer membership organisations, at least those that could be regarded as having regional or national membership. Most of the farmers identified with self-help groups locally. Still, there were no mechanisms for these groups to federate with others to form bigger membership organisations beyond the village level. This was corroborated by other conversations with experts that agreed that the lack of a strong farmers’ voice was a major problem facing the sector. However, many national organisations claim farmer membership. Kenya National Farmers Federation (KENAFF) and Kenya Livestock Producers Association (KLPA) are examples of such organisations. Yet, none of the small-scale farmers interviewed for this study knew the significance of their existence. Instead, local self-help groups and marketing cooperatives such as those for milk and coffee were more relevant and impacted the rural farmers’ daily activities. Despite the lack of presence on the grass roots, KENAFF and KLPA were nevertheless significant players in

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agricultural policy-making. They were often invited as farmers’ representatives in policy forums that bring together all stakeholders in the sector. Bilateral and multilateral donors regard them as important links to the farming communities and would engage them extensively in programme implementation. At the time of this research, KENAFF was involved in what it called ‘convening Governor’s Round Table’, whose objective was promoting county-based agribusiness agendas. Most other organisations claiming to represent a particular segment of farmers were often outfits established by well-connected individuals (mostly middle class) with little or no stake from ordinary small-scale farmers. Lack of grass-roots base means that closely networked individuals fill top positions. Where applicable, elections are a smokescreen of stage-managed antics that produce the same line-up of officials every electoral cycle. The proliferation of these elitist organisations with diverse and fragmented roles is not wholly attributed to the activities of adventurous individuals with a passion for forming organisations. Indeed, it is often the government, donor agencies and NGOs working in the sector who are in dire need of a voice that can be claimed to belong to the farmers. Government agencies and donors know the credibility issues of the so-called national farmers’ organisations. Still, they are in a dilemma because they see no other options for legitimate farmer representation in their programmes. Some of them were hopeful that perhaps if they continued working with these organisations, it might help them grow into credible establishments. Concerning this, the representative of the Finnish Mission made the following observation: In most meetings, we have had with ASCU, the issue of lack of farmer representation has always been brought up. In Kenya, the farmer’s voice is feeble, just as in many parts of Africa. So we look at it and say, “but what can be done?” The only viable option is to build the existing organization’s capacity to be strong. That is why we have a new programme where we are working with KENAFF to capacitate part of their members… their Directors on human rights-based approach so that they can represent the voice of the farmers more.

These views genuinely reflect the dilemma among those who wish to include farmers’ views in programme decision-making. Their best bet would be to deal with an already formed, well-organised farmer outfit that derives its mandate from the broad spectrum of farming individuals. Unfortunately, here is a case where the existing farmer organisations do

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not possess these desirable and basic characteristics. These fundamental flaws in the organisational structure of outfits that claim to represent farmers can hardly be corrected through external interventions hence the helplessness of “but what can be done?” As stated in the interview, interventions within the purview of external agencies are limited to such issues as capacity building. In this sense, capacity building can be translated as providing technical backstopping and training. As much as these are useful to shower up farmer organisations, they can only be effective if the farmer organisations themselves have solid foundations and are unequivocally membership-based. Although the issues they represent may be of interest to small-scale farmers, it remains a fact that they cannot be their legitimate representatives because they have not been granted that mandate. This is a reality that both donors and the government grapple with in choosing to work with these existing organisations. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of interventions aimed at ‘strengthening’ the organisations, but what is clear is the need for such organisations to develop their own unique identity that fundamentally characterises those it claims to represent. Some experts urge that caution be exercised, so that external support does not distort member-focused development (Chirwa et al., 2005). The strength of a farmer’s organisation is thus reflected in the ability of its members to direct the organisational agenda in a bottom-up process (Dougnon et al., 2010). Agricultural policy-making processes are one of the important tasks for which farmer representation is required. For this reason, the ministry that coordinates this process must seek participation and endorsement from an array of existing farmer organisations despite the above mentioned challenges. Interviews with officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and donor agencies revealed that the ability to network and maintain a significant level of visibility raised the profile of farmer organisations and improved their likelihood of being included in policy processes. Officials of the farmer organisations found it absolutely essential to establish strong professional and personal friendships with key government officials to guarantee their recognition. This networking has helped some of them enjoy departmental patronage and gain benefits such as providing offices and grants to meet their basic logistical requirements. Because of this familiarity, their views are often not so divergent from those of the ministry’s bureaucrats.

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Furthermore, it is important to note that there is no caveat on the formation of farmer organisations. It is often at the discretion of government officers to decide which group they can work with. As argued by DFID (2004), the government and other agencies may least be bothered about the legitimacy (in terms of representation and grass-roots presence) of the organisations they choose to work with. Their major concern is to be seen to adhere to protocols that require them to include some form of farmer participation. As such, they do not expect to carry the burden of guaranteeing the quality of this participation. Furthermore, no framework obligates the ministry to work with particular farmer organisations or one with particular credentials. For this reason, it is unlikely for an organisation to be included in participation if such an organisation holds strong views that are incongruent with those of the establishment. The foregoing is indicative of the inability of NGOs and CBOs working in Kenya’s agriculture sector to objectively represent farmer interests because most of them tend to yield to their donors’ whims in exchange for funding favours. For their part, the existing national organisations that purport to represent farmer interests can also not discharge this role adequately for lack of grass-roots legitimacy. Considering that these organisations are part of what defines the agriculture sector, there being unable adequately discharge their roles and articulate the sector interests has implications on the overall sector ownership as defined by PD. 4.1.4

Influence of Donors

Both bilateral and multilateral donors are important as stakeholders in policy initiation in the agriculture sector. From interviews, it was perceived that donors achieved this in various ways. One is through providing sponsorship of the public policy-making process. Interviews with USAID and SIDA, for example, were particularly useful as we were able to discuss many policy processes that they have supported. USAID is also the major donor for Tegemeo, a policy research institution, and therefore, they indirectly influence or initiate policy discussions through funding policy research. The second way donors participate in initiating policies is by funding the implementation of projects and programmes. This is because each programme has its implementation framework that has certain implications on the policy, as will be discussed herein. Apart from programme or project implementation, some donors second their

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staff as technical assistants or advisors to programmes. Some analysts have suggested that these experts are instrumental in initiating and influencing policy (DFID, 2004). According to one Deputy Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, certain donors have supported particular sub-sectors in the country for a long time to the extent that it would be unseemly not to involve them in policy dialogue that involves those sectors: If you do anything that touches on dairy, how can you ignore the Dutch, who have been our major supporters or the Swedish? Do you know that the Swedish first helped us introduce artificial insemination in this country?

While policy-making is a core function of the Ministry of Agriculture, interviews with planning officials of the ministry revealed that the ministry and the departments under them were often unable to entirely fund the public policy processes internally through resources allocated to them by the Ministry of Finance. Some ministry officials blamed the Treasury for failing to honour their requests for adequate resources to cover their activities. At Treasury, an official I interviewed was adamant that the ministries understood the budgeting processes and the applicable budget ceilings. Accordingly, there was no way they could claim that they could not cater for policy-making if, indeed, policy-making was their number one priority. This position taken by Treasury is suggestive that ministries had other priorities that ranked more favourably than policy-making. This was thus reflected in the way they did their budgets. An official of the Ministry of Agriculture in the planning unit of one of the departments shared his views on this matter: Though the government knows that it has an obligation to formulate policies, in most cases, you find that there is no clear budget line dedicated to policy formulation. We have to rely on donors or projects… donor-funded projects. This is quite limiting because it restricts us from controlling the calendar of policy formulation. The Ministry can appoint a task force but cannot provide the required funds when it presents its work plan. Then, the Cabinet Secretary says, “who can we talk to provide these funds?” I can say that we seem not to be very committed to the task of policy-making.

The high number of policy processes that donors or donor-funded projects have funded is overwhelmingly in support of the view that ministries are half-hearted when it comes to funding policy processes using their internally allocated resources. It may be that the budgeting

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process does not provide ministries with a window for self-appraisal to determine whether they are aligning their funds to their priorities. It may also be a strategy taken by the ministry bureaucrats because of the Treasury-imposed budget ceilings that limit resource availability for activities that the ministries favour. In this line of thinking, the bureaucrats have determined that policy formulation (among other core activities) is attractive to external donors. Consequently, they deliberately exclude it in their internal budgeting process in anticipation that donors would take care of it. This scenario is almost similar to what has been described as aid ‘fungibility’. In aid fungibility, aid is diverted from being utilised for the donor’s intended purpose (O’brien & Ryan, 2001). The difference here is that the donor funds remain within the sector initially targeted but are subsequently used to finance activities the bureaucrats identify as attractive to donors. In this way, the bureaucrats can free up internal resources for other activities of their liking. As stated by the Deputy Director of Agriculture above, certain donors are associated with particular sub-sectors in Kenya. They are often proactive in supporting policy formulation in those sub-sectors. For example, the Japanese government through Japanese International Cooperation Agency is closely associated with rice development in Kenya. According to one of their officials, JICA has supported Kenya in developing a national rice development strategy—a blueprint that should see Kenya double its rice production by 2018. Various departmental annual reports identified DANIDA, USAID and GTZ as having provided funds during the preparation of the dairy development policy between 1990 and 2010. There were mixed responses on whether donors who fund particular policies also sought to unduly influence those policies. There was no denying, though, that where donors had particular interests, they were likely to pursue those interests but discretely so as not to raise attention to themselves. Three of the Deputy Directors interviewed at the ministry headquarters admitted that donors with certain interests usually roped in the assistance of key officials involved in the process to help in sneaking in the desired agenda. According to ministry officials, the most effective way donors participated in policy formulation was through sponsored projects and programmes. It should be stated here that the ministry’s documents identify not only agricultural policy formulation as a core mandate but also recognise unfavourable policy framework as a significant constraint. This means that policy reforms become core objectives for programmes seeking to improve sector productivity. In this quest, donor-supported

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development programmes are no exception and often have a component covering policy formulation. The IFAD (loan)-funded Small-Holder Dairy Commercialisation Project (SHDCP) of 2006–2012, for example, had five components. The fourth component was “Support to Policy and Institutions”, whose main objective was to ‘support policy and legislative development for the animal feeds sub-sector’. According to an official who headed the programme, they were able to initiate policy dialogue on issues that constrained the animal feeds industry, which led to the drafting of a policy document. Though the document is yet to be debated in parliament for adoption, this process is an important indicator of how donor-supported programmes have become big players in policy reforms. Discussions also revealed that flexibility in the design of donor-funded programmes allowed for the inclusion of support of policy processes even in situations where this had not been clearly stated as a critical objective. In cases where such adjustments were necessary, the Minister or the Permanent Secretary often issued directives or requests (depending on the level of their clout) to a particular donor programme within their ministry. Revisiting the issue of technical advisors, some past and present donorsupported programmes in the sector had technical advisors hired by the Embassy or the Mission representing the donor. For some programmes, these advisors become part of the Programme’s permanent staff, while in others, they are engaged as consultants who render a wide range of services whenever it is determined to be necessary. For example, the Swedish-supported Agriculture Sector Development Support Programme (ASDS) and its predecessor, National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP), have had Programme Advisors. In addition, ASDSP, for example, frequently engages ‘international’ consultants some of which have been from a particular Swedish registered consultancy group to provide technical guidance to the programme. While there is no evidence that these experts are detailed to advance specific interests, their collective contribution towards programme implementation should be substantive enough to represent a view different from locally generated ideas. Moreover, since policy issues are embedded in programme implementation, these experts’ contributions find their way into policy-making. Policy implications of donor-funded programmes are also evident during their implementation. These emanate from the general aspects of the implementation framework, the approach, the structures envisaged in implementation and the domineering rhetoric, vision and mission

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of the project. Each donor-funded programme, for example, establishes a governing board, often referred to as Project Steering Committee. Although this governing unit is described in programme policy documents, it is not articulated expressly in public policy. Hence, each programme envisages how to craft its governing unit. This unit brings together stakeholders thought to have an important role in implementing the programme and will often have a farmer representative. Its role is mainly to provide oversight and may meet quarterly. I gathered from those in these governing units that the programme invited them or their organisations nominated them to sit on these committees. However, most of them learned about the programme in the first meeting and therefore were not involved in its conception. Therefore, ministries seem to go along with programme policies and have not found the need to develop their own comprehensive policies on how donor-funded programmes ought to be governed. The programme approaches for this discussion cover aspects such as whether the programme provides free material goods and services, whether such goods and services are provided on a cost-sharing basis, and whether beneficiaries are paid allowances. For communities that are used to programmes that issue handouts, it becomes challenging for new programmes to penetrate if they do not have such provisions. In Makueni, for example, the ministry officials stated that they had difficulty implementing NALEP because MAP preceded it. MAP (a DANIDA programme) provided material goods such as livestock and machinery, built market infrastructure and provided vehicles and training for the community and officers. The domineering policy for NALEP (SIDA) was to undertake capacity building and did not provide any material or monetary benefits to the beneficiaries. MAP appealed to many as an ideal donor-funded programme making it difficult for new programmes that came after it and did not have its ‘good’ characteristics. In addition to these, other programmes gave farmers allowances to participate in their activities. While all these represented different ways that programmes (and their sponsors) chose to carry out their activities, these very strategies were responsible for entrenching certain expectations and preferences among the local farmers and those who worked in the sector. Programmes and projects have become hallmarks of setting trends increasingly institutionalised into usual standards of practice that can be interpreted as policy. Take, for example, the controversial question of whether farmers ought to be paid allowances for their participation

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in programme activities. The issue divides opinion among those interviewed, with some suggesting that it is best handled according to context and prevailing practicalities. According to one of the top officials at the Ministry of Agriculture: That is a problem in some instances where you have policies that are not acceptable across the board on how to conduct your affairs at the community level. Some believe largely in strengthening community capacities through the provision of skills and technologies and would frown on issuing handouts. Others believe that the goal is to fight poverty, and one of the reasons for poverty is a lack of cash, so they provide cash incentives. Each of these has merits and demerits. For example, you do not expect poor communities to implement newly introduced technologies without seed money; hence there is a need to practice a balance and not adopt a static way of doing things.

Weighing options is the pragmatic position of handling project and programme handouts. However, the handouts commonly given for participation in programmes and projects were rarely meant to be seed money. It was more of a motivation for those who attended and would be called a ‘lunch’ or ‘transport refund’. To some, this was tantamount to bribing participants. So there was a significant number among those interviewed who were opposed to cash incentives arguing that it promoted ‘dependence syndrome’ and that beneficiaries were likely to focus on the allowances and not the fundamental objectives of the programme. This position was attractive to many who wished to be viewed as progressive and knowledgeable in good development practice. It is a position that has been strengthened among Ministry of Agriculture officials over the years through the influence of proponents of participatory planning and development practice, e.g. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Those who oppose the use of cash incentives cite examples of past programmes or projects that used cash incentives but had failed to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, these examples were not conclusive enough to support this point, given that no authoritative study has profiled programme performance based on whether participants received cash incentives or not. Despite taking this position as the ideal, the same officials also held a simultaneous ‘practical’ position in which they supported payments and justified them based on the prevailing realities. For example, they would advise originators of new projects and programmes interested in working with farmers to budget for allowances to guarantee farmer

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participation, arguing that donor projects and programmes have made this inescapable norm. This was also experienced while organising focus group discussions with farmers for this study. Those who introduced research team to the various communities and assisted in planning the meetings advised that we should be prepared with what “was expected”, which meant catering for some allowances for the participants. The foregoing points to donor-funded projects and programmes as the originators of giving cash incentives to boost participation and competition among programmes may have further escalated the practice. In Makueni and Kwale, for example, a focus group participants could relate which programmes and projects were more generous than others. They could also point out incidents where community members hostility to particular projects was because they perceived them as not providing the expected incentives. This was happening despite the projects carrying out their objectives satisfactorily. The practice has become pervasive so that it is not only limited to donor-funded programmes. For example, in an interview with the County Executive in Charge (CEC) of Agriculture, Kwale County, it was learned that farmer allowances were an important consideration in the extensive training that the county was organising for its farmers. Accordingly, she stated, “We will give them something reasonable: not too little but not too high”. In this same county, junior officials interviewed blamed some previous donor-funded programmes for “teaching farmers to expect allowances” and making it difficult for new programmes to penetrate unless they also paid participants. Some donor-funded programmes also come out strongly to advocate for establishing institutional structures that are thought to improve operations in the agriculture sector. Usually, these structures are conceived and intended to outlive the programme. Two examples will suffice here. One is the County Coordinating Unit (CCU), established by the current SIDA-funded ASDSP. According to ASDSP programme documents, these units are responsible for coordinating all the agriculture sector programmes running in a county. During an interview, one of the architects of ASDSP argued that the unit was a solution to persistent sector coordination challenges experienced in the past. Therefore, it was expected that the same arrangement would remain in place even after the end of ASDSP. Unfortunately, county governments (which are now tasked to oversee agriculture function) have little stake in CCUs as they are meant to be answerable to Programme Coordinating Unit operating under the national government. It is therefore not clear how effective they

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will be. The other example is demonstrated through NALEP, another national programme that ended in 2012. NALEP envisioned its major activities as falling under four components, namely: (a) planning, monitoring and evaluation, (b) training, (c) collaboration and research, and (d) gender and poverty focus. However, one of its major activities was what was called institutional setting. Consequently, it established District Stakeholders’ Forum, Divisional Stakeholders’ Forum and Focal Area Development Committee (FADC) and was also involved in farmer mobilisation towards group formation. According to interviews with those elected as officials of these ‘institutions’, there was assurance that they would continue playing their role even after the project had ended. One of them narrated his experience: I was a Focal Area Development Committee (FADC) Chairman, and I remember that we received a lot of training. I can tell you right here that this place almost became our second home. We would come here twice or thrice a week, and we learnt a lot… lots of resources have been used for meetings and to train us. Finally, they brought us consultants, people who are highly distinguished and learned. These people came from Nairobi and were accompanied by the Permanent Secretary. They also taught us many things, including marketing and good agricultural practices. Afterwards, they told us they were leaving. Those people left till this day. We have not seen them again. Up to now, we still do not know the purpose of our training. We do not understand why the Ministry did not pick up from where it ended, yet its officials were always with us.

Donor-funded programmes are thus keen to advance certain ideas in the hope that they can be internalised, regarded as good practice and adopted in the policy. However, since most of them work through or utilise government officials in their implementation, the general public (and in this case, the farmers) always attribute these ideas to the government. Finally, the domineering rhetoric and concepts that donor-funded programmes adopt have also significantly influenced how things are done. After going through various programme documents and discussions with Ministry of Agriculture personnel, it was learned that donor-favoured concepts kept evolving with time. For current donor programmes (e.g. ASDSP of SIDA, Private Sector Development in Agriculture of GIZ and Programme for Agriculture and Livelihoods in Western Communities [PALWECO] of FIDA), the dominant concept is the ‘Value Chains’. Here, programmes and projects claim to provide specific interventions for

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each agricultural enterprise from the point of production until it reaches the market rather than offering support for a specific problem that cuts across agricultural enterprises. Interviews suggested that it is a concept that has had a lot of input from GIZ, where many other programmes sought expertise. When donors settle on such concepts, a lot of resources are channelled towards popularising them, and by default, those who work in the sector are expected to be up to date with the new concepts to remain relevant. For example, “Value Chain Experts” were at the time much sought after, prompting many individuals to seek training on the subject. A few years back, when “Farming as a Business” was a significant donor byword, most of those who worked in the sector sought training on entrepreneurship. These were the observations of a divisional extension officer in Wote, Makueni, regarding evolving donor rhetoric in the agriculture sector: After working in the field for many years, I understand the farmers’ problems and can address them. However, due to the influence of donor-funded projects, I am frequently forced to learn new concepts and catchphrases that I see as irrelevant to the farmers I deal with daily. This is because their problems are straightforward and require direct and unpretentious interventions. However, for donors, it seems that making the problems look complex and designing clever-looking concepts is what matters. For example, we have a project called ‘orphaned seeds’ and another called ‘traditional high-value indigenous crops’. These catchphrases used to refer to traditional crops will last for a season during which everyone will keep talking about them. Then suddenly, a different issue that captures the donor’s imagination will emerge and mark the beginning of a new cycle.

Due to the resources they wield, donors have therefore become a significant influence on procedural issues and the values that are increasingly determining actions of the sector. With all the past projects and programmes, one can hardly claim that any new policies introduced in the sector are significantly home-grown. Indeed, networks of donorfunded programmes seem keen to learn from each other and implement concepts that are regarded as compliant with the current trends in development practice. The dominance of these notions provides little room for purely local initiatives to gain credence and recognition. Concerning findings of the previous sub-sections, we, therefore, argue that top ministry officials, Kenyan political elites and donors dominate agriculture sector policy initiation processes because of the power and resources they wield.

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They achieve this at the expense and/or weakness of other players such as the farmers, the input suppliers, the NGOs, the CBOs and farmer associations.

4.2 The Essentials of Agricultural Public Policy-Making Processes In the previous section, the focus was on the roles of the different critical entities in influencing policy processes. This section will discuss the details of the current practice in formal agricultural public policy-making in Kenya. Of the various ways of enshrining guidelines for agriculture sector actors and processes, some require formal policy documents that may include the enactment of bills or even acts of parliament. This is often in cases where the intention is to spell out rules and regulations that govern particular processes or guidelines on how certain public services are to be structured. In this, the Ministry of Agriculture takes the lead, sometimes utilising its own internal mechanisms to identify issues that require policy attention. It is, however, also common that these issues can emanate from research findings of policy research institutions or can come from interest groups (e.g. farmers, NGOs or specific donors) lobby. The ministry can also seek to introduce or amend existing policies based on good practices elsewhere or be influenced by global changes. According to departmental officials, the standard procedure for the ministry after identifying broad policy issues requiring intervention is to appoint a task force to oversee the ensuing process. Taskforce members commonly include policy experts and representatives of various entities with stakes in the enacted policies. It is upon the task force to choose methods that best suit the assignment at hand, such as a desk study, field visits to collect data or foreign countries to learn and incorporate good practice and benchmarking, among others. The ministry also contracts consultants’ services to support the task force’s work, such as data collection and moderating planned dialogue processes, including stakeholder workshops. Traditionally, the ministry organises regional and national stakeholder workshops to refine further and validate the policy document to meet the constitutional requirements for public participation (Gitau et al., 2008), in processes like this. Later, the Minister initiates drafting of a cabinet memorandum to brief the cabinet and pave the way for parliamentary debate.

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Some shortcomings, however, undermine the integrity of this wellstructured policy-making process. One is that although public participation is incorporated, the criterion of determining the standards for this participation is not adequately prescribed. Besides, poor organisation and low-capacity plaguing stakeholders of the sector (mainly small-scale farmers) mean that the process does not satisfactorily benefit from quality public participation. Findings show that those participating in these processes are not the average small-scale farmers but mostly elitist and well-connected individuals. Some of them are officials of farmer organisations with no genuine grass-roots networks, while ministry officials simply handpick others for lack of clear election mechanisms. Secondly, policy-making processes in Kenya have generally been described as long and tedious (Gitau et al., 2008; Kibaara et al., 2008). Junior departmental officials interviewed noted that processes were gradually becoming commercialised with a growing focus on the lucrative contracts for consultancies and the hefty allowances for taskforce officials and public participants. With funding becoming one of the major constraints, policies that were likely to be prioritised for enactment had the eye of financial sponsors and not necessarily those desired by the majority of the stakeholders. Attaining a favourable outcome from the parliamentary debate was identified as one of the most challenging steps because of the costly lobbying required in addition to the erratic parliamentary calendar. Lobbying often involves organising retreats for members of parliament in what some may claim as efforts to ‘enhance ownership’ or ‘better understanding’ of the proposed policy. In reality (especially for issues that attracted solid commercial interests), this was a euphemism for rampant underhand activities, including bribery and coercion from powerful interest groups and individuals. This meant that the interests of the powerless/resource-poor in the sector were likely to be trampled upon as the powerful advanced their interests. Furthermore, the need to lobby for support, the requirement for resources to fund the process and the fact that involving a range of stakeholders was logistically demanding also meant that policy-making processes frequently experienced delays. It was learnt that many policymaking processes that had taken too long to complete so that by the time of their conclusion, their relevance had been overtaken by events. Lastly, public participation is also undermined by a lack of inclusivity, especially concerning language. Kenyan experts, including the ministry bureaucrats, mostly prefer using English when moderating public discussions despite

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the fact that most rural farming individuals have little understanding of English. Participation is also limited because officials often choose to hold participatory workshops in exotic hotels and venues that are not ordinary to average farming individuals. Therefore, the analysis of the formal processes of agricultural policy in Kenya continues to expose the disparities in power relations. While the Ministry of Agriculture legitimately coordinates the processes, the growing costs of successful policy-making means increased possibilities that policies would be inclined in favour of the interests of resource-rich entities. This has implications for the ownership concept of PD as it helps question how the agriculture sector policies reflect the interests of bona fide sector stakeholders.

4.3

The Agriculture Sector Strategy

While each department and government ministry has a mandate to develop their policies, the Kenyan government also needs to develop a comprehensive national policy document for the sector ministries and all other players in the sector, including farmers, input suppliers, NGOs and bilateral and multilateral agencies among others. The national policy document takes the form of a plan designed to guide public and private sector efforts in addressing major development challenges facing the agriculture sector for a given period. At the time of this research, the overall policy document was Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 2010–2020, preceded by Strategy to Revive Agriculture (SRA). Though other policy-making processes are important in determining the priority agenda for the sector, the agriculture sector strategy has a better focus because it sets collective sector objectives and timelines for their achievement and suggests how these can be achieved. Setting goals is perhaps one of its greatest strengths, as it provides the opportunity to measure the extent to which such goals have been achieved at the end of the period when the strategy is in operation. For example, the government claimed that SRA, the predecessor of ASDS, helped the country exceed its projected 3.1% agricultural growth to a high of 5.2% at the end of 2007 (GoK, 2010b). In line with the Paris Declaration, partner country strategy is also the main document relied upon in the concept of harmonisation as providing the recipient government priorities according to which donors should deliver aid. In the same breath, the government must show leadership by substantially investing in the implementation of

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the strategy and inviting others to fill up the gaps (in this case, the donors and the private sector). Developing a strategy is a concerted effort by various players in the sector. For ASDS in particular, Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) is said to have played a key role. Since the unit is in place with the support from the major donors (ODA), it can be assumed that their input was sought and incorporated in ASDS. Ministry officials conversant with policy processes intimated that this work is usually sub-contracted to experts who are expected to consult widely with agriculture sector players to develop a comprehensive document. Experts are often both sourced internally and internationally (evident in programmes such as ASDSP and ASCU). Whether each of these sources of expertise brings unique knowledge is debatable as there is always great dynamism in the ‘expert world’ and an enormous exchange of information. However, during individual interactions with them, there was hardly any instance that pointed to a major conflict in their view of the major issues of concern for the sector. There was also a semblance of consensus on desirable approaches to handling these issues, suggesting that the different groups had a common influence. In the words of Toomey (2011): ‘influenced by constantly evolving moods and shifts of development theory and practice of the day..’. Apart from the experts’ influence and that of donors, it is highly fashionable in the present era to ensure that the strategy considers Kenya’s current regional and international commitments. In this respect, for instance, ASDS is declared to be compliant with the provisions of the African Union’s CAADP and UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As for CAADP, for example, the qualification is that ASDS is responsive to the CAADP pillars. However, while it has its advantages, pressure to make the strategy responsive to these regional and international commitments can affect the originality of the document and blur the true expressions of the genuine stakeholders of the agriculture sector. For this reason, one can notice the awkwardness (in the absence of genuine local agency) of how ASDS drafters have been under pressure to include issues considered current in the international agenda, such as gender and climate change. Not that these issues are any less important in terms of priority, but that the approaches chosen to bring them up are somehow not structured suitable to the local context. However, as per expectation and from its content, it can be deduced that the strategy also relies on information provided by the prevailing

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bureaucratic establishment within the Ministry of Agriculture departments. This is because the document is largely a compilation of what the various departments consider essential in engendering beneficial change. It betrays the nature of departments as inward-looking and less inclined towards linkages that tie them together as a sector. Those who craft the strategy seem aware of this dichotomy between the sector departments and seem genuinely interested in instituting a structure that can bring a semblance of a well-coordinated sector. The establishment of the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) is one such well-meaning initiative. Yet, its existence is insufficient to reduce the sense of fragmentation seen in how the sector’s aspirations are communicated in the document. The division of the various chapters and sections is done based on the departmental structures in the ministry, and the sections that try to provide a bonding narrative are insufficient. On this basis, one perceives an inherent urgency in the departmental establishment to justify their existence and curve for themselves a space to operate from rather than an authentic desire to provide synergy for the common good of the sector. While the country’s agricultural strategy has the advantage of setting clear goals, the bulk of its content appears to reflect the thrust of the policy documents of the various departments in the sector. Thus, the strategy is not immune to some of the challenges that have already been observed as relating to the legitimacy of policy-making through the lens of small-scale farmers. Indeed, ASDS grapples with how to strengthen small-scale farmer organisations and their institutional capacities and places this task in the hands of the Kenya National Farmers Federation (KENAFF). Yet, from field experience, most farmers (at least all those interviewed in this study) do not know KENAFF and its operations. The lack of effective farmer institutions is, therefore, a matter that cannot be wished away in this manner. Given the high consideration elicited by a document such as this, it would be expected that the government should go an extra length to ensure that its content is internalised by most of the agriculture sector stakeholders. However, this seems not to be the case, as the interactions with various players in the sector showed that only senior officials in the Ministry of Agriculture departments and donor agency officials could demonstrate awareness of what the strategy entailed. Many of them could do this because they had been involved in developing the strategy. Others had been forced to learn about the strategy to demonstrate their competence and suitability for opportunities such as promotions when vacancies

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became available. Most middle-level ministry officials, on the other hand, were ignorant of its contents. While some were aware that a new strategy was in place, they could not tell what special features it bore in contrast to the past strategies. As a result, they carried on their daily chores the same way they have done before with no major shifts indicating that a new era was in place. The small-scale farmers interviewed were also unaware of the evolving government’s grand plans for the sector. They could only identify standalone services that they expected government offices to provide, such as extension services and fertiliser subsidy, which in all accounts was inadequate. Thus, they were ignorant of how such services, inadequate as they were, were part of a systematic vision that should achieve specific objectives. Many of those interviewed considered it naïve to rely on government leadership when managing and running their farming activities. They did listen to what the government officials had to say. Still, they were more aware that success in farming was a personal and competitive endeavour that could not be achieved by relying on blanket policies applicable to everyone. For some, being more successful than your neighbours was a welcome objective as it enhanced one’s chances of being more competitive in the open market. The government policies and strategies were not helpful as far as this state of affairs was concerned. Agriculture Sector Development Strategy, for example, outlined its vision as a ‘food secure and prosperous nation’ (GoK, 2010a), which invariably prioritised measures that enhance productivity. Consequently, the agriculture sector departments’ human resources are heavily production-oriented, just as research objectives are also geared towards enhancing production. Even with growing expertise in agribusiness and marketing, there are limits to small-scale farmers benefiting from these knowledge skills because of the nature of agricultural produce’s peculiarly inelastic demand. Improved productivity on its own is useful in ensuring that food is available. It also means that commodity prices plummet as dictated by market forces to the disadvantage of the producers. Through its various policies, the government cannot guarantee profitable prices for farm produce. The free-market forces are a farmer’s best bet despite being a haven of middlemen and brokers who are often accused of exploiting small-scale farmers. Agriculture Sector Development Strategy only provided broad guidelines. Hence, it had been determined that there was a need for a planning framework that would assist in formulating how best the strategy could be

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implemented by the various players. For this purpose, the wider sector had come up with Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP) tenable between 2010 and 2015. However, despite the existence of MTIP, the government chose to develop its framework, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which is utilised by government ministries as directed by the Ministry of Finance. This occasioned considerable confusion as MTIP resulted from an inclusive consultative process in which various groups, including the government, had invested significantly and, therefore, a more credible tool as a planning framework. Moreover, MTEF definition of the agriculture sector differed from that of MTIP, causing further disjoint. This state of ambiguity was a matter of concern, especially among donor representatives—problems such as these implied challenges in coordination within the government departments and poor consideration for processes. Related to this is the launch of the Agriculture Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP)—a programme that is said to be implementing ASDS. The Swedish government, through SIDA, is its main donor alongside the government of Kenya. Most donor representatives (except for the Swedish) interviewed explained that in their understanding, ASDSP had been conceived as a programme to welcome all donors (and other stakeholders) to play their role in the implementation of ASDS. This, of course, had not turned out to be the case. SIDA had firmly taken the lead in providing resources, with other donors shying away and instead continued running their independent programmes. According to one donor agency official, ‘SIDA had run away with the ASDS idea’ and that they had been left with no option but to look elsewhere. However, the likelihood that none of the donor agencies was fully agreeable to a joint programme is not said. Despite failing to achieve the original objective of ASDS, there seems to be a silent consensus among the bilateral donor agencies granting each of them the freedom to run independent projects and programmes as long as they are compatible with ASDS’s strategic thrusts or address some of its key targets. These strategic thrusts and targets are framed in a general way; hence, interested parties have a significant leeway in how they can structure their interventions. Naturally, this implies coordination, details of which will be discussed in the next chapter. The big question, however, is whether a strategy makes much difference in situations where the different stakeholders have the liberty to lift sections of it and commence their implementation. What does this state of affairs, for example, reflect on

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coordination and monitoring for results? Indeed, this severely dents the credibility of a strategy because it removes its most important strength of a focused and well-coordinated implementation. It also makes it difficult to attribute change or lack of it to particular actions or actors. More importantly, strategies can be interpreted variously in a manner convenient to whoever wishes to play a role to the extent that the original objective can be watered down. Another matter worth belabouring is the relationship between policies or strategies and donor-funded programmes or projects. I did establish from discussions with Ministry of Agriculture officials that apart from ASDS, many other policies and strategies had been developed with hindsight that programmes or projects should be implemented to facilitate their implementation. This was not just a matter of practice but a desirable undertaking. An example was a past programme, the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP), which was vital in implementing the National Agriculture Extension Policy (NAEP) and which was also spoken of as having supported the objectives of Strategy to Revive Agriculture (SRA). Nevertheless, not all policy documents successfully yield donor-funded programmes or projects. Others, such as the National Poultry Policy of 2010, were developed with anticipation that it would be actualised through a proposed programme known as Kenya National Poultry Improvement Programme. This did not work as it failed to attract the needed support from donors. Failure may have resulted from a lack of buy-in from mainstream donors and lack of support, and inadequate lobbying from powerful individuals in government and private sector. There is a palpable sense of advantage for departments to be in command of programmes and projects, which can be problematic. This is because departments may be driven to develop policies to justify donor-funded programmes or projects, not for their intrinsic value. The fact that some policies have a more favourably disposition in donor funding than others confirms that the donors covertly retain their powers of influencing the aid agenda. It is not difficult to figure out that these same donors actively support certain policy processes and are favourable to programmes and projects related to such policies. Matters are made more complicated when the bureaucracy’s eye is trained on attaining programme funding rather than achieving desirable change. While an implementation programme is desirable in focusing resources on achieving policy objectives, it is often taken for granted that it should take full responsibility for that policy implementation. This then gives

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liberty for other players/programmes from participating fully. This is challenging in various ways. Firstly, programmes and projects can rarely be comprehensive enough to address all the issues adequately on their own. Therefore, the support of others outside the programme is crucial. Secondly, it is typical for programmes and projects not to have the capacity to operate nationally as envisaged by the nationwide scope of policy/strategy objectives. It, therefore, becomes the role of others to fill in the gaps. Lastly, programmes designed to implement particular policies often establish their own coordinating structures for administration purposes. Since they are essentially part of the Ministry of Agriculture, it means that these new structures only increase the challenges of overall ministry coordination. In summary, the periodic release of agricultural sector strategy in Kenya is important as it helps set goals and timelines for actors in the sector, including outlining responsibilities of how goals should be achieved. It also shows how the agriculture sector, in general, is linked to Kenya’s overall development blueprint. The strength of the strategy is perhaps in the fact that contributing towards its development is meant to be from a broad audience that includes local and foreign experts, government officials, donor agencies and farmers, among others. In addition, special consideration is also made for compliance with regional and international commitments. Yet this aspect can also be its greatest undoing regarding the aid effectiveness principle of ownership—that is, the higher chances that a wider participation can dilute the true aspirations and intentions of those for whom the strategy is meant. But, again, this is also a function of power that means better prospects for those who wield resources and can use this to stamp their views.

4.4

Conclusion

This chapter has delved into how agricultural sector policy and strategymaking processes take place in Kenya and how this relates to applying aid effectiveness principles in the sector. The first principle of aid effectiveness is ownership, which stipulates that aid should be aligned to national development strategies and priorities, among other requirements. The country’s policy-making processes determine its priorities and, therefore, areas that require the deployment of aid. Since policies are statements of intent, this chapter highlights public policy-making processes and other

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ways to set important decisions, priorities and values within the agriculture sector. For example, programmes and projects are known to set trends, establish institutions and instil certain values that gradually become accepted as standard practice. Based on experience in the field, it is also argued that views of agricultural field officials in the form of briefs that they share with top ministry officials have similarly become important indirect ways of influencing significant decisions for the sector and hence ought to be recognised as part of the more comprehensive policy instruments. However, an important question for this chapter is to unravel how Kenya’s agriculture sector policy-making and strategy-making processes reflect the ownership concept in aid effectiveness principle. First, we need to discuss what is directly implied by the aid effectiveness principles: i.e. country ownership. Cabral (2008) argues that country ownership is often taken as recipient government ownership. Despite others, e.g. Booth (2012) questioning the wholesome faith in recipient governments because some lack “development-oriented political leadership”, the principle of ownership should essentially allow the recipient government a free hand on what they consider as priorities. As detailed in this chapter, different entities actively participate in setting Kenya’s agriculture sector priorities. From analysis, the role of the bureaucrats in the sector ministries is essentially that of initiating and coordinating policy-making processes. Although the processes appear to prioritise the views of genuine sector stakeholders (including farmers), experts contracted to do the actual drafting are often inclined to consider the views of donors, trending policy positions regionally and internationally, and the views of the ministry officials. We argue that the perennial budgeting deficit in policy-making and donor dependency to cover for these deficits gives leverage to donors who have the liberty to choose to pay attention to issues that interest them while overlooking those that are not in their strategic interest. The idea behind the ownership principle is that ‘home-grown’ programmes are more effective in reflecting the needs of different domestic constituencies and addressing specific local constraints (WorldBank, 1998). When donors are over-represented in policy-making, they risk these home-grown programmes. In the case of Kenya, the element of donors being coercive and imposing their will in policy is not perspicuous because of the political sensitivity of situations like these. Nevertheless, as suggested by some respondents, donors have various soft power strategies that can enable them to lobby their issues successfully without being

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seen as overbearing. Furthermore, donors who have been associated with specific sectors or sub-sectors for many years have established their reputations in those sectors and thus exercise power over the sector players so that their input cannot be resisted. This is reinforced by the fact that the key bureaucrats are people who have served in senior government positions for many years, forged profitable and close links with sector donors among other sector interest groups and are therefore more likely to give a favourable ear to the views of these players. All of these point to the reality that important decisions cannot be exclusively those of the government or purely home-grown. Government ownership is also contestable based on the occasional disinterest and disjoints in the bureaucratic set-up. As discussed, there are instances where a desire for self-preservation drives the actions of ministry bureaucrats at the centre of policy-making. Their disinterest in the core issues that touch on the success of the sector is revealed through policies and legislative initiatives they make that are aimed at expanding their roles without concise corresponding gains for the major stakeholders of the sector—the small-scale farmers. Though policy-making is recognised as their core function, this is not reflected strongly in sector ministry budgeting. With the Ministry of Finance’s budgetary limits, it would be expected that the sector ministries prioritise funding policy-making through internal resources and seek other ways of covering for other activities if they run out of resources. Instead, other activities fill up the priority list leaving policy-making inadequately covered and requiring support from donors. This anomaly appears to thrive in the disconnect between the sector ministries and the Ministry of Finance, whose major concern is administering the budget ceilings rather than facilitating the sector ministries to deliver on key objectives. Even after the sector players, including the sector ministries, jointly developed Medium Term Investment Plan to help implement Agriculture Sector Development Strategy, a parallel framework, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, was also developed for the same purpose, ostensibly under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance. These are issues that dent the country’s leadership and ownership of the decisions that govern the sector. Further, as discussed, formal policy processes are not the only avenues through which significant decisions are made in the sector. Indeed, according to government officials, a policy statement should be broad enough, so that context-specific constraints do not restrict its implementation. While this provides flexibility for sector players, it can also

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create major coordination challenges as the different entities implement what they can justify as corresponding to the policy’s requirements. Lack of proper coordination has opened the door to discourse determination and certain practices becoming entrenched without being cleared through legitimate policy-making processes. We have shared the example of donor programmes and project practices, such as paying allowances for participation. There is no established public policy on this matter, but the precedent of existing practice has set the trend that others are forced to follow. As rhetorically asked by Mosse (2004), this is perhaps a situation where instead of policy producing practice, it is a practice that is producing policy. These include development practitioners’ ideas when designing and implementing projects and programmes. Some are borrowed from other countries, but some are purely thoughts and theories that, at best, should be put through periods of experimentation rather than being promoted as proven knowledge. A number of examples show the tendency of obsession with ideas that appear big and attractive rather than real solutions to existing problems. Although public expenditure on agriculture remains significant, ignorance on the part of the intended beneficiaries (the small-scale farmers) implies inadequate scrutiny. Liberal policies have also contributed to diminishing public expectations regarding public expenditure. Discourses such as ‘demand-driven’ extension services within the public sector exacerbate this situation further. For this reason, we argue that farmers will, at best, remain partakers of the tokenism that follows the implementation of policy decisions (whether by government or donors), such as subsidised fertiliser programmes common at the time of the fieldwork. While policy and strategy making for the sector is key in setting objectives and stimulating productive action, this study also finds that due to a lack of solid coordination, interventions are fragmented and can thus be ineffective. Policy and strategy objectives are often set as broad, opening them up for varied interpretations from different entities and subsequent implementation of a variation of projects and programmes. Ministries run some of these, others by non-governmental organisations and others are directly under the supervision of donors. Consequently, coordination and harmonisation, the other pillars of aid effectiveness principles, are compromised. Although over 75% of agricultural production relies on small-scale farmers, this group of producers has little to say in the strategy and policymaking processes. We argue that many years of top-down approaches

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to decision-making, perceived lack of capacity to make substantive decisions and instability and transitory nature of small-scale farming as an occupation have perpetuated this situation. Also, many who remain in farming do so for lack of other opportunities or double up in other occupations such as small businesses to sustain themselves. Further, they are not homogenous as a group in terms of the size and the nature of the agricultural enterprise they engage in, making it challenging to build solidarity across the individual farmers. These all contribute to a situation where policy-making is captured by entities such as departmental bureaucrats, policy experts, consultants donor agencies and opportunistic groups masquerading as farmer representatives. In conclusion, we argue that there are loopholes in the concept of ownership of Kenya’s agriculture sector right at the point of policymaking in which there is disproportionate input from other players other than the core sector stakeholders. Though it may be difficult to expect a significant improvement in the minimalist role currently played by smallscale farmers, measures that stabilise farming as an occupation and reduce its transitory nature will help enhance the farmers’ voice. Furthermore, addressing the disconnect in bureaucratic set-up and ministry hierarchies will also help improve coordination. Nevertheless, there must be enhanced and empowered political representation of core stakeholders in policy-making to ensure a genuine expression of ownership for the sector.

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CHAPTER 5

Aid Effectiveness and Perspectives and Practices of Donors

5.1

Introduction

A major factor that distinguishes the Paris aid effectiveness principles and past donor-recipient initiatives is that the principles have a partnership perspective. This partnership aspect is entrenched in the clear commitments each party must undertake for the aid to be ‘effective’. Therefore, in the PD concept, partner country factors and commitments such as establishing good institutions and policies are as important as donors’ commitment to providing sustained aid that is harmonised and aligned to country policies and priorities (Copestake & Williams, 2014). Since most donors relevant to this study are OECD-DAC and associated with the processes that arrived at endorsing the aid effectiveness principles, expectations are that they strive for compliance to these commitments. The question, though, is whether there are sufficient incentives for compliance or whether there are aspects of aid effectiveness principles that conflict with their interests. While the PD perspective of aid effectiveness is a significant change from previous donor-recipient policies, the influence of the past policies cannot be overlooked. Indeed, as Brown (2012) observed, donors can make claims on the concept of effectiveness whenever they propose new

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9_5

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changes to their aid policies. In this case, their use of the concept would not necessarily be in line with the definition provided by Paris Declaration. Instead, it can be interpreted as describing what they consider ‘good policy’. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to highlight how different donors in Kenya’s agriculture sector have shaped their interventions and how their overall strategies and actions bear on PD, particularly on the three major principles: ownership, alignment and harmonisation. This chapter analyses how the various donors structured their interventions (e.g. whether they worked through NGOs, projects or programmes or government ministries) to develop a balanced view of what implications this has on the implementation of PD. The focus here is on the three interrelated PD principles of ownership, alignment and harmonisation because of their particular relevance to donor actions. On ownership, for example, perceptions of how the different donors support national development strategies and important policy processes are of interest. Under this principle, we also examine aspects of “control”—how much discretion Kenya as a recipient has over donors’ decisions in the sector. In this case, a stronger leadership role for the government would be more desirable. On alignment, analysis shifts to how well the designs of donors’ interventions fit in with the key elements of Kenya’s agriculture sector strategy. However, much less is expected from this alignment analysis because the different entities could legitimately choose different interpretations of the country’s development strategy. Lastly, the analysis on harmonisation examines the extent to which donors utilised the established government systems. Here, apart from using the country systems, donors have varying options to choose from—for example, some establish their mechanisms, others use the private sector or work through NGOs. In contrast, others select a hybrid arrangement that uses multiple mechanisms. Implications of the donors’ choices regarding the system of implementation are a significant part of the discussions in this chapter. One positive observation, in general, is that Kenya’s agriculture sector donors meet regularly every month. As discussed in the next chapter, these meetings mainly share information and experiences. However, they also strive (in their way) to interpret the country’s strategy and endeavour to design their programmes and projects to support the implementation of the strategy.

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Donors and the Kenyan Government System

Several donors (bilateral or multilateral) have tried to utilise the government systems in implementing the programmes they fund. The extent to which this is done varies between different donors. On one extreme end is the Swedish Government, through the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), one of Kenya’s strongest supporters of the agricultural sector in the past 50 years. Its activities can hardly be distinguished from those of the Ministry of Agriculture as its programmes are embedded and housed within the ministry. Others, e.g. the German (through GiZ) and Finland (FIDA) missions, have programme implementation units, which, although housed separately, have strong operational links with government departments. They often utilise government officials in implementing their field activities, and for GiZ in particular, some of their core programme staff are seconded by the government. 5.2.1

The Case of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)

The Swedish International Development Agency’s (SIDA) support for Kenya’s agriculture sector is perhaps the best example of a donor agency’s attempt to utilise the Kenyan Country system. Kenya has had a long bilateral relationship with Sweden, the two countries having a bilateral agreement in 1964, a year after Kenya’s independence. In the 1970s, SIDA supported the development of artificial insemination (AI) in Kenya, but the most significant Swedish legacy in Kenya was the National Soil and Water conservation Programme of the 1980s. Despite recording numerous successes, this programme also became the mother of modern Swedish agriculture programmes in Kenya as it bore the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP). According to the SIDA representative, NALEP was a sector-wide approach programme that sought to undertake community mobilisation, help farmers develop farmspecific action plans, strengthen the participation of the private sector and other stakeholders in agriculture and encourage liberalisation of the sector. NALEP was also considered the major driver for the National Agriculture Sector Extension Policy (NASCEP), which promoted the idea that the government should reduce its active role in the agriculture sector and only maintain its presence as a regulator.

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At the time of this research, NALEP had wound up, and the ministry in charge of agriculture through the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) had established a new sector blueprint: the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) and the implementing programme ASDSP. Although ASDSP was designed with an understanding that all donors would work together jointly in funding and ensuring the success of the programme, it is only Swedish through SIDA that had decisively adopted the programme and, in the process, catering for most of the funds required with the remaining percentage being provided by the Kenyan government. However, the various donor representatives interviewed argued that it was difficult to expect all the donors to join and support the new programme because of their varying programme cycles. It also appeared that there had not been an agreed framework of how all the donors would participate in the programme before its launch. Furthermore, with SIDA taking the lead from the start, other donors were not ready to take a secondary role in the programme. As for USAID, however, its representative was categorical that the US Congress policies did not allow their organisation to be involved in a joint programme as ASDSP required. In the many years of SIDA’s work in Kenya, their programmes strive to work within a policy or strategy that is in operation within Kenya’s agricultural sector at the time of programme implementation. This has been particularly true since 2000, when SIDA supported NALEP I, a programme designed to implement National Agriculture and Extension Policy (NAEP). Between 2006 and 2011, SIDA was again the leading development partner that supported NALEP II, a reform programme that operated in line with National Agriculture Sector Extension Policy (NASEP) implementation framework (GoK, 2011). Therefore, it is no surprise that SIDA warmed up to ASDSP, which, like other previous programmes it has supported in the past, is aimed at implementing a major strategy/policy in Kenya. The start of ASDSP was favourable to SIDA’s programming cycle, NALEP having come to an end, and there is a need to start a new programme. The commitment to deliver aid in this manner is in line with PD aid effectiveness principles that encourage programmatic delivery modalities of aid aimed at strengthening recipient country ownership of aid-funded programmes, reducing fragmentation transaction costs and increasing recipient country accountability (Renzio, 2006). In principle, SIDA’s resources, together with those provided for

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by the Kenyan government, are focused on the objectives of ASDS, implying unified action that is useful in ensuring efficiency. While SIDA’s approach is a major step forward in terms of commitment to programmatic delivery of aid as outlined by the Paris aid effectiveness principles, the inability to rope other donors into implementing ASDSP remains a major weakness. The ease with which SIDA took over the responsibility of funding this programme despite being initially mooted to be jointly funded indicates the difficulties in the practicality of some PD provisions. It is informative to note that one of the major components of ASDSP was outlined as ‘sector coordination’ (in addition to environment Management, resilience and social inclusion and value chain management) and intended to lead efforts to establish a framework for stakeholders, including agriculture sector donors to harmonise their activities. With ASDSP being largely associated with one donor, it will likely be challenging to achieve the objectives of this component. For one, donors appear satisfied to be part of ongoing donors group initiatives such as the Agriculture and Rural Development group, where the abiding principle has been to allow donors to support programmes of their choice and meet regularly to brief each other and resolve issues such as duplication or operational conflicts. Although ASDSP is run through a unit embedded within the Ministry of Agriculture, the Swedish maintain a robust physical presence within it, namely through the deployment of a programme advisor, a strong oversight role from the Embassy and routine engagement of international consultancy firm to provide technical advice to the programme from time to time. Furthermore, interviews with SIDA’s representative indicated that the embassy had lined up its additional activities whose objectives were to be realised through utilising the ASDSP programme as a rider. However, being the best example of a bilateral programme that has considered PD requirements, there is still evidence of the donor’s difficulties in entirely subordinating their agency to the Kenyan system. While it is hard to pin these actions on the self-interest motives of the donors (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011; Kilby & Dreher, 2010), it is clear that there is a sense of hesitation towards full compliance.

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5.2.2

The Case of Germany’s GiZ

The partnership between the German programmes (through GiZ) with the Kenyan government is visible in the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture seconds part of its staff. GiZ’s most recent programme was known as the Private Sector Development in Agriculture (PSDA) and worked mainly to promote private sector development in agriculture. According to programme documents, it aimed at achieving this through improving market access for small and medium agro-industrial entrepreneurs, establishing institutions that could provide needed services on a sustainable basis and providing support for the development of a conducive framework in terms of policy, legislation and social and economic conditions for those engaged in agricultural production (Will et al., 2008). A representative of GiZ counted the programme’s strength as Germans’ strong credentials in the value chain concept. Furthermore, maintaining some level of independence from the ministry may have been considered helpful in guaranteeing the desired flexibility for the programme to undertake its baseline and decide which value chains to focus on and which parts of the country to concentrate their efforts. Accordingly, for example, PSDA chose eight value chains of Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, mangoes and passion amongst the crops and beef, dairy goat, poultry and fish in livestock and fisheries. Nevertheless, overall, PSDA argued that their work supported the implementation of Kenya’s Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) by targeting eight value chains in four of the then eight provinces in Kenya (Hemmer et al., 2013). This was despite the fact that PSDA pre-existed ASDS. Therefore, its compliance with ASDS could only be possible if it went through revision mid-stream or if the provisions of ASDS were ambiguous in a way that could easily be accommodated within the objectives of the ongoing PSDA. At the time of this fieldwork, GIZ was anticipating launching a new 3-year programme. This happened when ASDSP (Kenya’s official sector blueprint) was already in its second year. It implied the clash between Kenya’s programming cycle and its donors. In these circumstances, the likely option for a donor was to study Kenya’s strategy, pick out attractive aspects, and commence a parallel implementation of their own. This presents challenges regarding coordinating the various interventions and the overall monitoring and evaluation.

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For this reason, it is not easy for programmes like these to fully comply with the country’s strategy and be in line with the provisions of PD, especially concerning the harmonisation principle. As indicated, the Programme (with likely advice from the German mission), for example, has to make independent decisions on which regions of the country to target programme implementation and which value chains to prioritise. With the government already implementing its programme, its input can only be nominal in these circumstances. How the donor channels programme funds is another important policy decision that has broader implications concerning how much control the recipient government has over the programme. In the case of PSDA, it was abundantly clear that the German government, through GIZ, funded the programme directly without channelling the funds through Kenya’s Treasury (Muthami, 2013). Unlike other programmes, PSDA did not require the Kenyan government to contribute some of the funds for its implementation. This, in a way, had its advantage as it removed the bureaucratic bottlenecks that could slow the disbursement of required resources and programme implementation. However, it also meant that the programme ran independently without requiring much direct oversight and control from the ministry. As stated by an evaluation report on PSDA, the M&E role reserved for the Ministry of Agriculture was limited to performance and activity monitoring, and little was done to streamline M&E information systems within government structures (Hemmer et al., 2013). With the minimal control from the Kenyan government, this mainly raises ownership issues, although also implying effects on the harmonisation principle. Despite PSDA activities not being fully integrated within the Ministry of Agriculture, the German mission continues to demonstrate considerable goodwill towards the effectiveness of its programmes. It is one of the active donors that continues to seek a well-coordinated agriculture sector in the country to address Kenya’s development challenges. At the time of this research, the German mission was the Chair of the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) donor group. In an interview, the official who chaired ARD on behalf of the German mission underscored this determination and stated that the donor group was pushing for an initiative that could bring together donors and the Kenyan government to ensure better coordination in sector activities. While ARD remained fairly active through monthly meetings, there were concerns about its “donoronly” membership which meant it was more of a club of equals and was

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thus in dire need of Kenyan government participation to strengthen its moral authority to provide the required leadership and guidance in sector initiatives. To sum up, although the German mission in Kenya has taken steps to involve the Kenyan government system in its programmes, it is argued that these efforts are not adequate to meet the PD threshold of recipient country ownership, alignment and alignment harmonisation. Incorporating seconded government officials within its ranks is insufficient to guarantee that programme implementation is harmonised with the government’s sector strategy. Exercising some level of independence from the Ministry of Agriculture seemed to give the programme flexibility in choosing which areas to focus. It also helped the mission carry on its activities despite its programme calendar not being in tandem with the Kenyan government’s. 5.2.3

The Case of Multilateral Agencies

The multilateral agencies that work in Kenya’s agriculture sector include the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD). According to the extensive interviews with officers in charge of ongoing or recently concluded programmes under their sponsorship, a large portion of the funds these institutions advanced to support Kenya’s agriculture sector were in the form of loans, only small parts being grants. Since the loans must be repaid (with interest), the funded programmes are mostly implemented through the existing government structures. The multilateral agencies rarely dealt directly with NGOs or CBOs, only when the funds involved were granted (NGOs and CBOs are generally not expected to take loans). At the time of this fieldwork, ADB had just concluded the Asal-based Livestock and Rural Livelihoods Support Project (ALLPRO), and IFAD was concluding the Small Holder Dairy Commercialisation Programme (SHDCP). World Bank, on its part, was supporting a number of programmes—East African Agricultural Productivity Programme (EAAPP), Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project (KAPAP) and was due to launch a new project: Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Programme (RPLRP). A similar undertaking financed by AfDB called The Drought Resilience, and Sustainable Livelihoods Program (DRSLP) has been running since 2013.

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Discussions with one of the key people in designing the soon-to-be World Bank-funded PRLP provided general principles that guided the initiation of multilateral agencies’ programmes in Kenya. The first step is to examine how new programs or projects they sponsor are initiated. The motivation for RPLRP and ADB’s DRSLP, for example, was the drought vulnerability in the horn of Africa affecting member countries of IGAD. Between 2003 and 2011, it had become more frequent than it had been in earlier years, causing more losses and damages, including loss of productive capacity. Therefore, the high-profile meetings convened, bringing together IGAD countries for discussions centred on initiatives that would help the countries to deliver services in the face of drought without resorting to emergency measures. According to the official interviewed, such a high-level, well-publicised, and politically sensitive initiative was bound to attract development agencies, including bilateral and multilateral agencies. As a result, the World Bank and ADB may have actively sought to do business with the Horn of Africa countries. Indeed in the account of a top official privy to the design of IFAD-funded SHDCP, it was IFAD’s own 2004 report on Kenya’s dairy sector that was used to negotiate later and establish SHDCP using a loan from IFAD. In this example, multilateral agencies appear to undertake their own studies to actively recruit potential countries into a project or programme financing arrangement. For this particular case, a representative of IFAD approached the then Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development and used the report to engage the officials to justify and establish the new programme. Situations exemplify how external agencies can capture decisionmaking while subordinating locally driven initiatives. In this case, the often under-funded ministry bureaucrats would most likely give the green light to financiers’ proposals without the inconvenience of subjecting the process to too lengthy but duly necessary scrutiny. The interviews with the SHDCP and RPRLP contact persons revealed that the need to stand up to the financiers and push for locally driven initiatives did not cross their minds as necessary. It was rather seen as likely to jeopardise chances of being financed. Officials also pointed out that multilateral agencies were reputable organisations that had earned their advisory role in the international community. This was despite the fact that other countries were insistent on controlling decisions on what needed to be funded. For example, a regional programme, RPRLP, was also being implemented in Ethiopia, where according to an interview of the RPRLP contact, “it

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was subjected to enormous scrutiny from the Ethiopian government which ensured that they included their input to the programme without worrying that it will delay implementation in all countries involved”. There were also claims that in their active recruitment of projects and programmes, agents of multilateral agencies were not diligent in seeking appropriate departments to propose projects. Instead, it was reported that they preferred to utilise their existing networks with senior officials thought to wield the necessary power and influence in favour of proposed projects or programmes. A senior official in the department of livestock production, for example, lamented that because of these relationships between multilateral agencies and specific officials in the State Department of Agriculture, many livestock-based loan-funded projects were administered through the Crops Department instead of the rightful Livestock Department. Do you know that the State Department of Agriculture (Crops) coordinates several loan-funded livestock-related projects, yet there is a State Department of Livestock? I can tell you that the reason is the strong personal connections that a former top official had with the World Bank.

In support of this assertion, a follow up established that two major livestock-related projects: the World Bank’s East African Agricultural Productivity Programme (EAAP) and ADB’s DRLSP, were both controlled and coordinated by the State Department of Agriculture (whose mandate is on crop-related functions) instead of the more relevant State Department of Livestock. From this observation, it was also evident that departmental bureaucrats were hard pressed to balance their interests and their moral obligations to restrict their actions within the domains of their public offices. In this case, a top government official was capable of stretching the advantage of personal networks with agents of donors to expand their departmental profile. Apart from an increased pool of resources, donorfunded programmes and projects are generally regarded as bestowing prestige and power to the heads of departments that implement such programmes. Generally, ministry officials were less bothered about whether a programme was funded through a loan or a grant. What mattered was that the programme availed resources in ways that gave departments greater discretionary power in terms of expenditure and

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activities they could accomplish. In essence, this meant that multilateral lenders found it easy to sell loans to the government through top ministry officials (who acted as agents for the country), as these officials were already eager and willing to vouch for any opportunity for a loan agreement. This impact included the proliferation of similar projects or programmes (e.g. the example of the already mentioned RPRLP and DRLSP funded by the World Bank and ADB, respectively) and the related fragmentation problem. Although positive reception for multilateral aid for the sector is guaranteed, these donors also invest generously in programme/project preparation covering expensive workshops that are lucrative opportunities for government officials and, therefore, a further motivation to support multilateral loans. In the preliminary activities in preparation for RPRLP, for example, key ministry officials were sponsored to attend several workshops outside the country. All of these were billed as part of the total costs of the programme. It is hardly possible that the government ministry officials can negotiate for sector development loans without these biases. Moreover, because loan repayment does not have any bearing on their personal liability, the need for more development loans is often positively appraised even when not needed. Multilateral agencies thus have a greater discretion, unlike ordinary banks who deal with clients who must consider how they would pay back their loans. Despite the ease with which multilateral programmes are negotiated, these donors insist on monitoring missions to ensure that the programmes they fund are on course (again at the recipient’s cost). Field experience showed that government officials in charge of the programmes due for monitoring made it a priority to impress the donor missions rather than adhere to their established performance criteria. For example, it was common for programme managers to instruct their field officers only to identify specific cases of success that can be paraded to the donor missions when they visit. Although aimed at ensuring progress, these monitoring missions indirectly strengthen the perception that multilateral agencies’ intentions at lending funds are altruistic and motivated by a genuine need to help the country and not the accompanying commercial benefits. While multilateral donors have no choice but to work through the established government systems, like other donors, their policies also appear to romanticise the private sector. The World Bank has been keen on pursuing a reduction of public sector participation in the agriculture sector by seeking to promote the private sector, particularly in providing

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extension services. Since the end of its major “train and visit” extension programme in the early 1990s, the World Bank progressively adopted the ideas around the Washington Consensus—the need to reduce the role of government and expand space for the private sector. For example, its current project, the Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project (KAPAP), whose major objective is to improve linkages in the agriculture sector (KAPAP, 2014), is well known in many parts of the country for procuring and paying for private sector services on behalf of farmers. These services were either non-available or were catered for through the public sector. The project undertakes this with the hope that the farmers and service providers will sustain effective demand and supply for the service in the future. Another important policy position that the multilateral agencies are increasingly adopting is the implementation of regional projects and programmes traversing different countries in the region. Programmes such as RPLRP and EAAPP (World Bank) and ADB’s DRSLP are examples where the two organisations seek to address regional agendas. Making this possible and whipping different countries into implementing programmes that are a motely of the different countries’ agenda indicates the power these multilateral agencies hold. However, it also shows that some of the programmes that get to be implemented may not truly reflect the sector strategies of the countries involved. Regarding PD, two issues emerge from the work of multilateral agencies. First, although these agencies strive to work through the government ministries and departments, the foregoing shows that they exercise greater leverage over government departments on decisions around the specific agenda to be funded. Acts such as commissioning their studies and using these to convince government departments to implement particular projects (for which they are ready to finance through loans) are part of this exercise of power. This generally does not reflect well on the ownership principle as it implies that these agencies have enormous clout over the agenda of associated programmes. Secondly, the multilateral agencies’ growing fascination with regional programmes and projects is related to this. While such programmes have their strengths (for example, countries learning from others’ strengths), they also have their downsides in that tuning them to suit the various countries involved may compromise some of the specifics of each country’s national development strategy. This would have an impact on alignment and harmonisation principles as per PD.

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5.3 Donors Implementing Stand-Alone Projects with Government Partnership: The Case of Japan’s JICA As a donor, the Japanese government has previously been described as being cautious and less trusting in providing aid in terms of budget support and maintaining the use of traditional projects (Hyden, 2008). This stance is apparent in Japanese support for the agricultural sector in Kenya. Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Nairobi was among the first donors to respond to my request for an interview. This was very encouraging—and even though the interview proceeded with a lot of caution, there was a frankness in tackling the issues that mattered to Japanese aid. The Japanese have worked in Kenya since 1974, participating in all major sectors with prominence in infrastructure, including roads, irrigation and cold storage. The cold storage facilities targeted have been those for fresh produce export. In addition, Japanese concessionary loans (1–1.5%) have been utilised in building Kenyan roads and establishing irrigation schemes. To highlight some policy positions of the Japanese in Kenya, the JICA representative was requested to provide a highlight of some of the projects that JICA runs in Kenya. One example of the project was a food security initiative that followed an appeal by the Kenyan government in the face of a dry spell that occasioned a widespread shortage of food. On accepting to provide support, JICA contracted a Japanese entity—Japan International Cooperation System (JICS), to procure the food from Malawi. JICS would then supply the food to a Kenyan government institution, the National Cereals and Produce Board, for distribution with the help of civil society groups. However, the objective of this same project changed in its second phase to providing inputs to vulnerable communities. To access this support, the Ministry of Agriculture in Kenya had to hire JICS again as an agent to import the inputs (mainly fertiliser) to be distributed by the ministry’s local agents. After this change, the project did not last long—it was stopped suddenly by what was said to be the Japanese government’s perception of corruption in the distribution of the inputs. A farm machinery project was then introduced to replace the one on inputs where the Japanese would provide farm machinery to be leased out to farmers and build up a revolving fund in this process. After consulting with the Japanese Embassy, the Kenyan government would utilise proceeds from the revolving fund.

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Other Japanese projects focus on technical cooperation, providing expertise and training in agriculture, mainly on rice-based and marketoriented production. The smallholder irrigation project is one of their key ongoing projects in Kenya, where they support farmer organisations to put in place smallholder irrigation facilities. In an interview, a JICA representative acknowledged that their projects take long because of the rigorous proposal preparation process. Often for any project to be initiated, it depends on reports by Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), who work all over the country. These reports are analysed, and experts are dispatched to gather more information to design a project with the potential for a Japanese project. As for the smallholder irrigation project, it was learned that the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture in the various targeted districts are involved in developing proposals. Like other donors, the Japanese were also interested in policy issues. Their interest was particularly around rice issues, concerning which they were driving an African continental initiative called Coalition of African Rice Development (CARD). In addition, they supported the National Rice Development Strategy in Kenya, aiming to double rice production by 2018. In terms of its dealings with other stakeholders in the sector and donors, in particular, JICA did participate in the technical committees of ASCU and was included in the strategy and policy-making committee. Despite this, JICA’s continued preference of working through standalone projects contravenes the spirit of ASCU, whose preference is programmatic delivery of aid with greater harmonisation and coordination. In particular, the JICA representative admitted that after Agriculture Sector Development Strategy was developed (ASDS), their organisation and other donors became apprehensive, especially with proposals that donors should channel their funds into a central kitty that Agriculture Sector Development Support Programme would then utilise in implementing ASDS. In addition, their view of a single national steering committee that brings together all donors was that it would be messy because of policy differences between them. Working in Kenya, according to JICA, has presented several challenges. A major one is what they describe as diverse beneficiary characteristics requiring a greater engagement with the communities involved. Yet this is difficult because genuine beneficiaries are difficult to reach with a group of ‘gate keepers’ posturing as farmer groups and organisations. They also view those who run most NGOs and CBOs as people making it a

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profession to gain from aid in terms of per diems, allowances and wages. In addition, organisations representing farmers and other civil groups are difficult to define at the national level because they do not have a grassroot presence. They were also confused about whether a support service to farmers should be considered a service to the public or private sectors. In this respect, they faced difficulties designing projects targeting individual farmers and often needed ways to bring them together. Yet, no legal framework within the government allowed recognition of such arrangements. JICA thus found it problematic that aid to the agriculture sector should be channelled through the ministry and not directly to the community that requires the particular support. The bottom line, however, is that JICA’s development work is tied to Japan’s regulations. Challenges related to the incompatibility of country systems to those in Japan were noted as contributing to significant bottlenecks in aid disbursement. The Kenyan revenue system, for example, ensures that all monies collected as revenue goes directly to the treasury. The Japanese, however, require that money collected from activities involving their aid should be held in a special account as a revolving fund and that JICA should be involved in decisions on its expenditure. These are matters that are not provided for by the Kenyan regulations. So it takes protracted negotiations in which the Kenyan government is forced to find ways of circumventing its own rules to be eligible for the Japanese funding. While remaining active in the aid effectiveness movement under OECD/DAC, the Japanese are also keen on providing their leadership on compelling development issues among developing countries. For this reason, JICA spearheads The International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which brings together heads of state of African countries alongside donor groups such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the UN and the World Bank, among others, in a conference every five years. The objective, according to JICA, is “to chart the way forward for development in Africa”. Initiatives such as these are not any different from many others, including those of the OECD through the International High-Level Forum responsible for PD-related initiatives, as they also have similar participants. Furthermore, Africa, through African Union, has initiatives such as NEPAD, which are platforms that bilateral and multilateral agencies can use to help address development needs more effectively. Therefore by championing its initiative on African development, Japan’s action reveals its deliberate and conscious desire to achieve some political and strategic interests. In terms of PD, however,

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this demonstrates the enormity of international initiatives that recipient countries must navigate as they grapple with the provisions of PD. The challenges of harmonisation and alignment become inevitable as countries try to find their footing in these different initiatives. From the preceding, it is clear that the Japanese development work in the agriculture sector in Kenya is focused on Japan’s competitive advantage in rice production. This is probably the greatest strength of their entire portfolio in Kenya. This focus has been reinforced through the engagement of the Japanese universities of Nagoya and Yamagata in strategic relationships with Kenyan universities and joint research with the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute. Through working with the National Irrigation Board and the Ministry of Agriculture, JICA has built expertise and developed a knowledge base for local persons in rice production. The design of these projects relies heavily on Japanese experts and the work of Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), which, although taking advantage of their expertise and experience, also undermines the ownership principle in PD. By running their aid programmes as projects, JICA can easily exercise control over the resultant activities and have better mechanisms to monitor progress using tools they deem suitable. Whenever things do not proceed as expected, JICA can then choose to withdraw its services. In an example mentioned earlier, they decided to end an input supply project because of alleged corruption. Actions such as these have several implications. First, addressing the partner country’s priorities is challenging because the development aid’s main agenda remains in the donor’s control. PD anticipates that the country’s strategy and priorities are aligned with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and subsequently reflected in the national budget (Rogerson, 2005). It can be difficult for the government to coordinate this adequately if every donor runs its projects and have its own M&E procedures that are not aligned with those of the host government. Secondly, holding tightly on to their set objectives means they leave little room for locally driven innovative ideas to thrive, thus stifling learning opportunities for local institutions to overcome their weaknesses. Finally, as illustrated in one of the examples, the act of withdrawing from a given project because of corruption is reminiscent of the era of conditionality where aid was used as a stick and a carrot to push recipients to comply with specific donor requirements. In essence, the Japanese experts and volunteers are at the core of JICA’s work in Kenya, implying that there

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could be significant issues concerning the sustainability of their work at the time of their exit. Thirdly, the ability to make a unilateral decision to end a project at any time of its lifetime makes Japanese aid in Kebear characteristically unpredictable. However, the impact of this unpredictability is generally ignored by most researchers because, being project aid, its fluctuation does not normally affect government expenditure and effectiveness in government spending. It is nevertheless disruptive for the intended beneficiaries, who are often made aware of an impending project. Indeed, most studies have highlighted aid unpredictability as a determinant of aid effectiveness but only in how it affects government expenditure. Celasun et al. (2008), for example, observe that unexpected shortfall in aid disbursement forces governments to cut investment expenditures suddenly and disproportionately, while windfalls can cause sudden growth in consumption. Therefore, while it has previously been estimated that only 45% of aid reaches the intended beneficiaries in time as per the established schedule (OECD-DAC, 2009), project aid funding seems to receive less attention on this matter as it is not normally administered through the mainstream government budget systems. To understand this better, a further explanation will be necessary. Whereas JICA implements a number of their projects through government institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) and National Irrigation Board (NIB), these government entities do not officially reflect JICA’s resources as part of their official total budget requirements. No JICA-related activities take any particular prominence in their work plans except to populate the list of activities for the organisations involved. This means that government systems may not be bothered to actively follow up and monitor activities implemented through JICA’s resources because these activities may fail to make it to the list of activities regarded as the core. Therefore, JICA should put in place a monitoring and evaluation system that should serve JICAs own interests rather than the interests of the Kenyan government. Without belabouring the point, ownership of such projects is therefore put into question even when the implementing agency is an entity of the Kenyan government.

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5.4 Implementing Programmes through NGOs: The Case of USAID One of the most revealing statements during an interview with a United States Agency for International Development representative was “the US congress policy does not allow ‘co-mingling’ of American money with that of other donors”. In other words, the American policy does not allow pooling their resources with those of other donors into a common basket to finance agreed development activities. Concerning whether the US can fund government ministries to implement development activities, my USAID contact was blunt that they also did not allow this. The reason for this was the mistrust stemming from perceived corruption within the Kenyan ministries. To buttress this point, USAID did fund some semi-autonomous government agencies such as Kenya Agricultural Research Institute and Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute of Policy Research “because these had systems that were compliant with American accountability requirements”. However, most US programmes in Kenya were designed and implemented by contracted American NGOs, indicating their verdict on Kenyan organisations and institutions. Despite this stance, Americans were active participants in the various forums that spearheaded sector coordination, including Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU) and the Agriculture and Rural Development donor group (ARD). The USAID representative affirmed that these forums were important for sector coordination as envisioned through ASCU and agreed that the donor group activities were important in reducing duplication and enhancing rationalisation. Nevertheless, it was challenging to reconcile this view with the fact that USAID designed its programmes and projects with very little involvement of legitimate local institutions and that their policies barred them from undertaking joint activities with other donors. To design a new programme, for example, USAID enlisted consultants who would then proceed with the task, and upon its completion, it is advertised for potential implementers to express interest. Those who win these implementation tenders are required to demonstrate experience and knowledge in US government systems. This requirement almost ensured that those who got to submit their expression of interest were American NGOs. Although they all go through technical evaluation committees, there is near certainty of the outcome long before it is completed. When interviewing the USAID representative, two NGOs—Sdifoca and Fintrac, were implementing USAID-funded projects

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in the agriculture sector. These NGOs can then sub-contract the work to their partners, including local NGOs. Fintrac is mainly associated with Kenya’s two major American-sponsored agricultural sector projects: Agricultural Value Chain Enterprises (KAVES) and Kenya Horticulture Competitiveness Project (KHCP). According to Fintrac’s website, KAVES is a food security project aimed at increasing the productivity and income of smallholder farmers in horticulture, dairy and staple crops. KHCP is said to be supporting the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies in horticultural products and improve efficiencies in the value chain and farmers’ ability to respond to market requirements (Fintrac, 2014). The USAID representative I interviewed argued that the Kenyan government system was ‘amorphous’ and beset by the ‘old problem of accountability and transparency. Further, there was also a view that the country ownership and country systems had ‘red ratings’. For these reasons, USAID claims to tackle the problem by establishing parallel systems of implementing its projects. However, this choice does not conform to PD provisions. Although it seeks to directly offer services to those in need, refusing to engage the “flawed” government system means that there are lost opportunities for empowerment and learning that could have otherwise been achieved. The irony is that it neither reflects the conditionality policies nor conforms to the PD resolutions on aid effectiveness principles. With conditionality, threats to cut off aid altogether would be used to force the government to comply with donor requirements. At the same time, PD, on the other hand, requires using partner country systems and obligating donors to support strengthening these in situations where they do not exist. While the US may have issues with Kenyan systems, Kenya has consistently updated its national development policy, alongside which there has also been a strategy for agricultural sector development. United States embassy and USAID, in particular, is well versed in these processes. According to interviews with representatives of the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU), US support and participation are often sought and granted. Indeed during interviews at USAID offices, it was learned that USAID participates in initiatives such as developing a sector-wide monitoring and evaluation system that would enable joint evaluations to fulfil some of the PD requirements for aid effectiveness and is supportive of ongoing donor mapping processes and sector-wide financial audit. With this level of awareness and participation, USAID generally does not seem to have major issues with Kenya. One clear thing,

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however, is that USAID insists on using US government financial systems in its projects and programmes. Kenyan financial and accounting systems would probably be incompatible with the US. Further, as alluded to in the interview with USAID contact, the Congress policy that the US should not co-sponsor projects or programmes with others may be the biggest hindrance preventing the US from using Kenyan systems. While it may be a matter of choice or policy for the US not to utilise Kenyan systems in implementing its programmes and projects, some policy experts interviewed (both local and expatriates) raised issues with Kenya’s agriculture strategy and how the Kenyan government oversees its implementation. For example, a foreign expert working in one of the Kenyan agriculture sector programmes for example argued that the strategy has broad objectives that make it possible for different players to interpret it in ways that suit their interests while claiming relevance to the strategy. Furthermore, as pointed out by one of the co-chairs of the Agriculture and Rural Development donor group, the Kenyan government does not actively provide guidelines to donors, so they are often at liberty to design and implement their own programmes. This, according to her, was in contrast to other neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda. Instead, they provided binding directives to donors on what programmes or projects they ought to implement. In comparison, therefore, Kenya has not adequately provided the effective leadership that is required over its development strategy and, in the process, created opportunities for donors such as USAID to carry on unabated in implementing programmes and projects using their systems and in ways that further undermines the coordinating authority of the Kenyan government. Moreover, Kenya is no longer rated as a less developed country and is thus less reliant on donors. It is therefore expected, as Rogerson (2005) argued, that it should be more assertive in her relationships with donors. This is, however, not the case. What is not clear is whether the government has chosen to ignore some donor activities because their overall contribution to the country’s budget is negligent. Fundamentally, however, and as argued by others, for example Bissio (2008), the aid relationship is a perfect embodiment of power asymmetry in favour of donors and creditors and initiatives such as PD has not been able to provide mechanisms that can address these power asymmetries. Therefore, even in situations where the recipient country operates from a seemingly advantageous position being a recipient of aid weakens their power status in comparison with the donor.

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Regarding aid effectiveness principles, the structuring of USAID’s programmes and projects can hardly be considered compliant with the PD requirements in several aspects. First, USAID’s actions favour US organisations in its procurement processes by working through NGOs and consultancy firms that have experience using US government systems. This practice would be tantamount to procurement tying and has been widely associated with ineffective aid and escalated costs (Aryeetey et al., 2003). For these reasons, there is consensus that procurement tying is harmful to recipient countries, which has prompted OECD/DAC to recommend that its members work on untying aid (Clay et al., 2009). In addition, a recent study by Knack and Smets (2013) associates procurement tying with aid fragmentation, arguing that it is more common in situations where a donor does not see themselves as a major shareholder in providing aid and is thus not under any obligation to maximise the impact of their aid. Interestingly, aid fragmentation was one of the issues raised by representatives of other donors when I asked them what they felt about American development work in Kenya. For example, one claimed that USAID supported over 114 implementers of its projects and programmes in the country and that there was considerable time and resources spent on training and other recurrent expenditure. Though there was no benefit of documentary evidence to this effect, from speaking to several individuals associated with USAID programmes in Kenya, I got the impression that USAID implemented numerous projects in different parts of the country and it was difficult for an individual associated with one US sponsored project to understand or even know the existence of other projects. In summary, USAID has occasionally supported some initiatives aimed at implementing aid effectiveness principles in the agriculture sector in Kenya, including support for ASCU and the processes leading to ASDS—both important as PD-related initiatives in Kenya’s agriculture sector. However, major aspects of USAID’s work are glaringly inconsistent with the provisions of the PD, including avoiding the use of country systems and favouring US NGOs in procuring programme implementation services, negating PD’s core values. Nevertheless, like other donors, USAID can get away with it by claiming (and even demonstrating) that their actions are motivated by their legitimate interpretation of Kenya’s agricultural sector development strategy (which, as argued

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by some experts, is structured in a way that allows multiple interpretations). Furthermore, PD processes in Kenya’s agriculture sector have not provided adequate structures and provisions of accountability capable of holding each of the leading players culpable for their actions in implementing PD. Although the agriculture sector donor group has the potential to take up this role and raise the accountability threshold through exerting peer pressure among donors, it is yet to demonstrate this as it currently only provides a forum for agriculture sector donors to share information. Ultimately, the Kenyan government’s weakness in providing strong leadership to guide donor actions also perpetuates a lack of PD compliance.

5.5

Donors Working with Private Sector “Trade and Economic Relationship”

Some critics of aid have argued that Africa needs increased opportunities in trade and not aid (Mahajan, 2009; Moyo, 2009). While such a view may be seen as radical, considering the magnitude of the aid system and its continued existence, other initiatives such as the Doha Development Round though less radical have a similar point—that the future of development is largely a factor of trade rather than aid. For Doha Development Round, however, aid is still necessary to support developing countries build their ability to trade. For example, Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) argue that developing countries require ongoing support for institutional capacity building essential for enterprise development. Similarly, Nielson (2006) calls on rich countries to support developing countries to address the difficulties ranging from infrastructure to internal political economy challenges because she views these as hindering developing countries from utilising trade as an engine for growth. Developing countries will find it challenging to enjoy trade benefits because the international trade regimes do not provide a level playing field. There are challenges such as lack of infrastructure, inefficient institutions, lack of knowledge on opportunities and inability to meet international standards. Others e.g. Moyo (2009) question the sincerity of the North in their quest of providing aid while failing to open up trading opportunities for the poor countries. Indeed, Moyo views aid as deleterious to enterprise in developing countries and argues that it entrenches dependence.

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Over the years, a section of agriculture sector donors in Kenya appears to have warmed up to seeking ideas around support for trade and generally the private sector. This move is seemingly in tandem with those who have argued that traditional development aid goes into the public sector and thus leads to growth in public expenditure, encourages corruption and negates fiscal discipline. A strong argument made by Chakravarti (2005), as reviewed by Morrissey (2006), is similar to the view taken by other aid critics and calls for initiatives that focus on and encourage the growth of the private sector specifically trade. Donors that have effected policy changes that reflect this view include the Kingdom of Netherlands and the government of Denmark through the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The Netherlands government has solid historical credentials as a development aid partner for Kenya in agriculture. However, there has been a gradual transition over the years from directly supporting the government to working through a network of NGOs and now a shift towards what they call “trade and economic relationship”. I was informed that the big reason for this is that Kenya is now a middle-income economy and does not need aid but trade. Further discussions revealed that previous support for government programmes and projects was stopped because of corruption in government. The idea now is to work directly with farmers and the private sector through several Dutch registered NGOS, SNV, Solidarida and HIVOS. This is probably the ideal strategy if a conscious decision is to do away with the development aid altogether. However, it is a path that has not been walked in. So it is bound to have a lot of issues concerning adjusting from the past donor-recipient relationship and the challenge of clearly defining what this new strategy entails. Basing their strategy on Holland’s achievement as the world’s second top exporter of food, the trade and economic relationship aims to help Dutch companies invest in Kenya’s agriculture sector, particularly in the flower sub-sector. The Dutch companies work with Kenyan farmers who grow roses and then export them to Europe, where auctioning is done and the proceeds distributed to the farmers. Despite these changes in their policy, the Dutch consider themselves to share in the government’s priorities. In addition to horticulture, they are also forging trade relationships in dairy and aquaculture, where the main objective is ‘economic diplomacy’ with no financial support involved. Other areas of cooperation are in research on potatoes and maize production, where the yields have declined. The extensive Dutch knowledge of

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potato production (number one exporter) is perhaps a strong point, and helping Kenyans import high-yielding seed varieties has provided a good start. Other horticultural and fruit products where Dutch companies have been involved include green bean production, avocado production and the production of chillies. All these have the market in Europe and therefore can fetch reasonable prices there. On dairy, Dutch support has been through SNV (a Dutch NGO), which facilitates market-led dairy programmes to resolve issues in the dairy sector and make the market more professional through the institution of quality standards. The Netherlands government also supports a Dutch finance consulting company known to undertake credit ratings for agriculture businesses in Kenya. The aim is to screen these companies and link them with banks. However, given the high-interest rates in Kenya (25% on average), these services are only helpful to farmers with premium markets such as those exporting their produce to Europe. Netherlands has also been running a programme called Private Sector Investment (PSI) which provides grants to Dutch companies/nationals that intend to invest in Kenya. The condition is to have a joint venture with a local entity and involve new technology, creating jobs and offering training for local people. The grant covers 50% of the total costs of the project. Other programmes include facilitating retired experts from the Netherlands to provide technical support to local companies, and funding Dutch companies to undertake demonstration projects, feasibility studies and market surveys. The Dutch strategy also mentions policy advocacy to address market failures, improve the regulatory framework and facilitate Dutch investments, support partnerships between the private sector, NGOs and Development partners, facilitate access to Dutch central Funds and monitor Dutch-funded NGOs such as HIVOS and SNV (Netherlands-Nairobi, 2012). Concerns such as these appear to inform the Dutch strategy in which trade is seen as the ultimate choice to spur development. First, by involving the Dutch investors, e.g. in the horticulture sector, it ensures that interest is only focused on viable projects that are profitable and make economic sense. This is rarely achievable when aid or public funding is involved because all these tend to mask inefficiencies and unsustainability in enterprises. Secondly, it is expected that the Dutch investors utilise knowledge of existing opportunities, their mastery of required standards and their networks to find lucrative markets for agricultural products in a manner that would normally not be possible for local farmers. Depending on the perfection of this arrangement, chances are

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that it may result in more sustainable growth in local agricultural enterprise than an agricultural sector that depends on aid or public funds. Finally, trade is viewed as stimulating efficient utilisation of a country’s resources and exposing politicians and bureaucrats to international trade and its know-how. According to Prof. Krueger (2011), this imposes discipline and promotes adopting policies that do not distort the allocation of resources and stifle growth. As my contact at the Dutch embassy acknowledged, one of the significant challenges to transitioning from development aid to a pure trade relationship is that it requires a drastic change in mindsets among the different players. Coming from a background where the Dutch government provided vast resources towards development programmes into an era where this is stopped completely can be disorienting for the many players involved. For example, embassy officials suddenly lose control of resources, and intermediary institutions such as government bureaucrats and NGO administrators are forced to adjust to new realities where their roles change and diminish significantly. These could be government officials, e.g. in the Ministry of Agriculture, who normally provide agricultural extension and advisory services to farmers. However, in the advent of highly specialised export-oriented crops, such as in the Dutch investment in the horticulture sector in Kenya, the role of these government officials is most likely taken over by private organisations specialised in the unique market requirements of this crop. Such changes are likely to elicit resistance and resentment, especially from those whose services are no longer required as before. Furthermore, another challenge may arise because other development partners have yet to adopt this shift. So it remains a unique strategy for a few bilateral agencies among the fellow donors club. This can be a significant obstacle in the push to popularise the new strategy among the different stakeholders. Besides the challenges, it is also important to state that despite the rhetoric, the Netherlands government still provides funds for certain activities in a manner that is reminiscent of development aid. Therefore, while trade remains at the centre of their approach, grants are still available through facilities such as the Private Sector Investment (PSI). The Dutch government also maintains funding for NGOs such as HIVOS and SNV, which by default become an extension of the Dutch development network in Kenya. They also support many scholarships in the agricultural training.

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Can these activities amount to market distortion? Or is it possible to interpret the preference of working through NGOs as mistrusting government institutions? These are some of the questions that may not be adequately answered. Nevertheless, another important factor that ought to be considered is that the Dutch ‘trade and economic diplomacy’ strategy is only applicable to established farmers with the capacity to meet the minimum production standards of production for quality and quantities required. The Dutch representative in Nairobi agreed that this limited the beneficiaries to farmers in the medium-sized holding range and above and those with better education because of the minimum scale of production requirements and capacity issues. This realisation informs other activities supported by the Netherlands government alongside local partners, e.g. their work with the Equity group targets farmers with medium-sized holdings to ensure that they are better equipped to boost productivity in the agriculture sector. Moving on to the Danish, their support for Kenya’s agriculture sector changed abruptly in 2010 despite an initial agreement with the Kenyan government signed in 2003 for long-term support that should have lasted 10–15 years (DANIDA, 2010). At the time, DANIDA was supporting Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS), running in four semiarid Districts in Eastern and Coastal Kenya. The programme had three components, namely Agriculture Policy Support Facility (APSF), Agriculture Business Development (ABD) and Decentralised Agricultural Support Structures (DASS). The programme was part of the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) and was implemented through the Kenyan government systems. The government officials I interviewed who were involved in its implementation rated the programme highly regarding the resources it provided and its management. Similarly, the evaluation report (DANIDA, 2010) considered the programme a success, stating that it achieved most of its component outputs and that its objectives and activities were still valid when the programme ended. The evaluation report thus regretted the failure of the Danida and/government of Kenya to renew and make it a long-term programme as had been planned. Unfortunately, the evaluation report did not explain why the Programme was not renewed. Nevertheless, the move not to renew the programme for an additional 5 or 10 years was suggestive as it targeted only the public sector-led components of the programme, i.e. APSF and DASS. On the other hand, the component that

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offered support for the private sector—ABD—was renewed and further strengthened and later transformed into Micro Enterprise Programme Support Trust (MEPST). By choosing to continue working through an entity outside the mainstream government system, the Danish signalled that they had misgivings with the system while remaining keen on a working relationship with the private sector. From the evaluation report, it is clear that this decision was not based on the perceived failure of the public sector-led components as the decision was made in 2007, three years before the end of the programme and before the evaluation report that also suggested that the public component of the programme was on the right course. In terms of aid effectiveness principles, this decision was effectively a setback to the PD requirements because it ended the components being implemented in line with the country systems that also utilised an established government strategy, i.e. Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS). It is unclear whether the private sector-focused MEPST has any relationship with any particular government policy or strategy, but since it is implemented by an organisation independent from the government structures, it can hardly be fitted into the normal coordination activities undertaken by the government ministries. This means that the government cannot contribute to its evaluation processes, and hence the government planning processes may not adequately capture the progress achieved through the activities of MEPST. My interviews with MEPST personnel were eager to show that their hard work enabled them to achieve their objectives and subsequent good standing with DANIDA, which continued to fund their activities. In the same vein, they considered DANIDA’s stoppage of the public sectorimplemented DASS a direct message of disapproval for unimpressive performance. Perceptions like these indicate the rivalry that may have existed between the public sector component and the private sector component of the programme in their heyday. In support of this view, the evaluation report pointed out that one of the major challenges of the programme was the difficulties in achieving synergies across the different components. However, public and private sector components held joint monthly meetings. One of the challenges for programmes such as these is that they are hypothetically designed with no similar previous programmes to learn from and hence much less benefit from lessons from elsewhere. The result is that there is hardly any opportunity to address

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challenges that arise midstream, such as was the case here. The coordination challenge could not have ended with the programme’s stoppage of the public sector-led component. This is because the overall coordination of development activities remains legitimately in the hands of the government. Irrespective of how well MEPST can undertake its activities, it is the government system that should be able to factor the resultant achievement into the overall development picture of the country. This way, the work of the donor is aptly captured by the county’s planning process, which then ensures better targeting of development activities. Therefore, the pre-existing poor relationship between MEPST and the government departments does not augur well with the successful coordination of the sector activities. Indeed, choosing what it considers the best practice and implementing programmes independently from the Kenyan government does not augur well with the aims and objectives of PD.

5.6

Conclusion

Kenya’s major agriculture sector donors are bilateral or multilateral agencies—mainly International Financial Institutions, including World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The bilateral agencies are mostly western European, USA and Japan. Although South-to-South aid driven mainly by China, India and Brazil has found its way into Kenya, it has not penetrated the agriculture sector. Therefore, other sectors such as infrastructure have a more comprehensive range of donors and perhaps experience a more competitive donor environment. All the bilateral sector donors are thus members of OECD, which have the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that debates and reviews their aid policies and implementation. To continue this fraternity within the agriculture sector in Kenya, these donors formed the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) donor group, where the major multilateral agencies are also members. This group is known to hold frequent meetings (usually monthly) to discuss their development activities in the sector. Despite being members of this forum and sharing many other common factors, they do not necessarily exercise similar policies in their aid activities in Kenya’s agriculture sector. Their application of aid effectiveness principles is particularly of interest to this chapter. One factor that appears to drive donor action and policy is a lack of trust in the government system and generally a desire to work with

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the private sector. This presents a big dilemma in compliance with aid effectiveness principles. This is because the aid effectiveness principles emphasise using country systems to administer aid. Through interviews, agents of some of the donors blamed the lack of trust in government for perceived corruption and inefficiency. The donor responses are, however, varied. In the extreme is the Netherlands government’s “trade and economic relationship” policy rather than a “development aid relationship” where it chooses to work directly with farmers to support them in trading their farm produce. This is a radical move considering that the Netherlands has previously heavily provided aid to the agriculture sector through the ministries in charge of agriculture. The US also works directly with farmer groups but through American NGOs. At the same time, the Danish abandoned their previous strategy of working through the Ministry of Agriculture, only retaining its work in the sector through an NGO known as MESPT. Others, e.g. Germany and the World Bank, work through the established government systems but with a strong focus on the private sector with their heavy hand lurking in the background to effectively control the programme agenda. Japan utilises the government system, working through projects in a style that also gives the donor enormous leverage in determining how funds are disbursed and what should be prioritised. The Swedish government is the only bilateral donor whose operations have a close semblance to the PD’s recommendations. They have elected to work within the framework of the current blueprint of Kenya’s agriculture sector, the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy. And although the programme they support established its PCU, this PCU, together with other implementing units under it, forms part of the Ministry of Agriculture and therefore has a major responsibility for driving the ministry’s vision. However, there are claims that their strong participation in implementing ASDSP (the programme that implements ASDS) could have prevented other donors from taking an active role in the programme as had been envisaged. One of the things that have not been addressed in the PD is that donor motives of recognition and publicity whenever they support a cause are fundamental in sustaining the giving. Putting resources where another donor is a front runner does not seem to be a realistic choice. For the US, mixing their resources with other donors is not acceptable.

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With all the major donors being members of DAC, the prime mover of PD, it would be expected that their policies should comply with the provisions of the PD. This does not seem to be the case, and several factors are proposed here as responsible for this. First, it is clear that for donor agents, aid has significant value beyond the welfare of the recipients. There is, in fact, an important aspect that makes it part and parcel of their domestic policy. As a result, their aid programming cycles are made to align with their home country’s budgeting cycles. This makes it difficult to synchronise with the Kenyan sector strategy cycles. Interviews with German and Finnish representatives demonstrated how difficult it was for these countries to respond in time to changes in Kenya’s strategy. For example, when a new strategy is in place, the donors are in their budget mid-cycle. Secondly, donors have their own mechanisms of identifying priorities, most often closely matching them to their domestic policy, importance to their trade or what they consider an area of their expertise. They may therefore give more weight to issues of lesser importance to Kenya’s strategy. Thirdly, donors do not see Kenya’s government systems as more legitimate than other institutions such as donors’ systems and non-governmental organisations. For US and Denmark, channelling funds through the Kenyan government bureaucracy is not an option to consider. Yet, they would rather replace their role with the NGOs and end up with a bureaucracy of their own with more significant legitimacy challenges regarding local development initiatives. Donors are aware of the absence of a strong lobby representing primary stakeholders in the agriculture sector. They can also perceive that the representation of primary stakeholders’ interests in the Kenyan government is weak. Although some of these facts suggest that donors are responsible for the observed weaknesses, it is upon Kenya to salvage the situation. Most importantly, therefore, what threatens the implementation of PD is the failure of the Kenyan government to take charge of its development agenda and firmly direct its development partners to comply and utilise the systems in place in their aid-related activities. More alarming is that development loans are not treated any differently from grants, further compromising their effectiveness.

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CHAPTER 6

The Aid Effectiveness Architecture and Kenya’s Agriculture Sector

6.1

Introduction

The desire to improve aid effectiveness architecture remains an important objective of the international community. This is because, despite contradictory views on whether aid is effective, many see the challenge in developing means of how aid can be made more effective (Howes, 2011). In this spirit, successive international high-level forums on aid effectiveness have been held since Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005—i.e. to take stock of what has already been achieved and to seek ways of accelerating progress. Consequently, forums such as Accra and Busan have since been held alongside other forums of lesser significance. For example, according to Burall et al. (2006), the harmonisation and alignment principles of the Paris Declaration have been debated with the view to improvement through additional features, for example, controlling the number of donors in each country, opening up DAC membership to non-OECD members and recipients taking lead in driving alignment and harmonisation processes. On the other hand, other writers such as Maxwell (2002) argued that aid architecture was a major problem and that aid itself should first be utilised in reforming the aid architecture. However, even as these debates go on, many are satisfied that the PD provisions and subsequent proposals

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brought to the table have most of the basics required to make development aid effective in addressing its objectives. However, aid effectiveness principles and PD, in particular, are broad guidelines that require implementation procedures (or the ‘how’). Therefore, while there is still room for strategy evolution, the hindsight of how well the already agreed upon strategies are being implemented should not be lost. It is this hindsight that this chapter concerns itself with—i.e. the steps that have been taken by various players in the name of pursuing the PD agenda within the agriculture sector in Kenya. In a policy brief, Kharas and Linn (2008) lamented the dismal progress in the PD as documented in reports shared at the Accra Agenda for action forum. Of particular concern was the poor percentage of actionable development strategies, the low number of frameworks developed to measure results, the low use of country systems and the lack of a comprehensive database of the work of emerging southern bilateral donors and other private donors. To make appreciable progress on these issues, partner countries and development/donor agents agreed to pursue certain prerequisites that would further the harmonisation and alignment requirements of the PD. Ownership is consistently the top agenda of PD, and so mechanisms that ensure partner countries are in control of their development agenda are crucial. Some aspects of these require the recipient to be more assertive, e.g. developing strategies. In contrast, others are meant to generally provide limits to donor actions to check on factors such as aid fragmentation, donor proliferation and aid volatility. According to Howes (2011), efforts to improve aid effectiveness should focus on improving recipient government performance, donor agency performance and donor-recipient interaction productivity. This three-tier conception of the structure of aid effectiveness strategies mirrors the specific mechanisms that have been instituted to implement PD in Kenya (herein referred to as aid effectiveness architecture). These mechanisms include (a) those that are meant to streamline actions within the Kenyan government, (b) those that are intended to improve the quality of donor actions and (c) those that are meant to improve interactions between donors and the Kenyan government. Some of the bodies that are currently in place include the aid effectiveness unit at Treasury, the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy, the Sector Working Groups, the aid effectiveness group (formerly the Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination Group), the Development Partners Coordination Group, the Development Partnership Group and Sector Working Groups (SWGs).

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Although several studies have been undertaken to measure the progress of the implementation of PD, none has specifically analysed these structures established to help implementation. Examples of such studies include a 2011 report by OECD, which concluded that Kenya had made limited progress, only achieving targets in two indicators out of 13. In addition, the report highlighted the importance of cooperation between the government and its development partners, stating that progress towards aid effectiveness relied on the level of input of both these entities (OECD, 2011). However, like many other reports, there is no analysis of the structures and the aid effectiveness architecture. Similarly, while New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), through its Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness, provides some insights on aid effectiveness structures in Kenya, it only discusses the status of implementation without going into the details on the success of each structure established (see Nepad, 2013). During the field research, a majority of research respondents were unaware of the existence of some PD-driven establishments because they operated at the level of top government officials (specifically Ministry of Finance/Treasury) and donor representatives. Leading in ignorance were the small-scale farmers who had no idea what PD was all about, let alone the existence of structures for its implementation. Middle-level government officials’ had limited awareness of Sector Working Groups, although they could not connect this with PD—a concept they were not adequately knowledgeable about. The Sector Working Memberships were exclusive to an elite group of people regarded as sector experts drawn from academia, research institutions, NGOs and government departments. Therefore, their work and identity was only visible through some of their work, such as the policy briefs they developed. At the sector level and on the donors’ side, the Agriculture and Rural Development Donor group (ARD) was pretty active and held its meetings monthly, having picked up this cue from the all-sector inclusive Development Partners Coordination Group (DCG), which also met every month bringing all the Kenyan donors together. The fact that bodies such as the Development Partnership Group, the aid effectiveness group and the sector-specific groups, e.g. ARD, are in place shows that aid effectiveness principles and the Paris Declaration have at least drawn the attention of top officials in government and the donor community. Although this is a positive sign, there is also a lack of awareness of PD at other levels within the

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Kenyan agriculture sector, as discussed in Chapter 3. The overall situation is therefore inconclusive, hence the need for a deeper analysis of coherence and harmony of the various efforts aimed at operationalising PD. This is why insight into the working of the established structures is necessary to provide an understanding of their operations with the objective of further illuminating PD implementation in the agriculture sector in Kenya.

6.2

Gaps: Overall Aid Coordination

Efforts to better coordinate aid in Kenya pre-date the 2005 Paris Declaration, with the World Bank playing a critical role in convening the Kenya Consultative Meeting Before 2003, these meetings were held in Paris (known as the “Paris Club”) and became a barometer for determining the relationship between Kenya and her donors. Most of that period was particularly tumultuous for the relationship between Kenya and her donors mainly because Kenya was deemed to have failed to comply with conditions for funding set by the World Bank and the IMF. The Consultative Group is mainly remembered for its ability to rally donors to force the Kenyan government to yield to reforms such as privatisation and the introduction of multi-party politics. During that period, O’brien and Ryan (2001) state: The influence of the donor community in Kenya was now so decisive that the Kenyan government not only succumbed and provided a detailed privatisation plan at the November 1991 Donor Consultative Meeting held in Paris, but most remarkably, it grudgingly yielded to the establishment of a multi-party system.

Although it became increasingly associated with the push for reforms, the Consultative Group was intended to provide the donors and the government an opportunity to consult on the country’s budget shortfalls and how the donors were to share this burden. Donors, however, took advantage of this to make it an opportunity to assure the government of failures to implement prescriptive reforms and observance of human rights. In 1994, for example, the group humiliated Kenya’s delegation led by a top cabinet minister by refusing to give him an audience and rejecting the government’s request to resume aid. After 2003 however, changes have been noted. First, after a 7-year break, the Consultative Meetings were moved from Paris to Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi. This was an indication that the donor attitude towards Kenya had changed because, by Kenya

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being the host, it was not unexpected that the visiting donor delegates would go soft in their desire to insist on stringent conditions in exchange for development resources support. The outcome was more than expected because, in addition to this, Kenya’s status in the meeting improved so that the Kenyan government began co-chairing the meeting alongside the World Bank at the 2003 Consultative Group meeting. In the years that followed, the leading daily newspaper commentaries expressed these changes by noting that there was less complaisant rush within the government circles around the period of the Consultative Group meeting as compared with earlier years when officials would jostle to please the donors. The meetings’ structure was now designed to portray some sense of dialogue between Kenya and the donors. In this environment, the donors pledged to rely more on government management and financing arrangements and increase their aid efforts in the area of programme support that relies more on the country systems (World Bank, 2005). This change reflected the new policy adopted by OECDDAC during their high-level meeting in Rome in 2003, where they agreed that Consultative Meetings shall be held in the recipient country and that the recipient country shall assume chairmanship and setting of the agenda (OECD-DAC, 2003). For in Kenya, these changes coincided with the exit of a regime led by President Moi, which had years of strained relations with donors. A new government was taking over and made of a coalition of former opposition parties. Happening at such a time, it worked well as a sign of approval for the incoming government. Overall, it also succeeded in dramatising the changes because of the sudden manner in which the changes were introduced—e.g. moving the venue to Kenya and granting Kenya the privilege of co-chairing the meetings. More than ten years later, some remain doubtful and question the genuineness of donors giving the Kenyan government a free hand in deciding how to utilise development funds. A policy analyst I interviewed argued that despite the rhetoric of change, donors remained imperious in how they dealt with Kenya. He observed that donor statements tended to patronise the government, focused on its shortcomings and in some cases had underlying warnings of consequences if it did not take appropriate action on issues they raised. In support of this view, one media report, for instance, quoted donors threatening to withdraw aid in the 2005 Consultative Group meeting because of perceived corruption (Mulama, 2005). With such an ability to forge solidarity, it is possible to see how Consultative Group meetings can easily work to the advantage of donors than

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to the interests of the Kenyan government. Unanimity among donors is possible because the donor representatives meet regularly and have ample opportunity to collectively work out what would be convenient to their individual interests. This solidarity did not transcend all matters as it seemed to work well when donors had joint issues to discuss with the government but showed signs of mistrust between themselves in other circumstances. In confidential discussions I had, donor representatives would mock other agencies’ policies on specific grounds, e.g. that there was too much fragmentation in their approach, or question their intentions, e.g. that a particular donor was seeking to ‘outshine others’. Although the mockery seemed to target the counterpart officials, these same donor representatives admitted that the way they structured their programmes depended on the domestic policies of their countries of origin. Hence, the representatives had a little central role in making important decisions. Therefore, while donor agencies appeared to read from the same script during Consultative Group meetings, they each pursued divergent strategies for implementing the programmes and projects they sponsored. At these critical times, each donor directly negotiated with the Kenyan government the details of what they intended to undertake in a forum to which other donors may not be a party. This negates the officially stated function of the Consultative Group meeting of ‘providing overall coordination’ (McCormick & Schmitz, 2011) because specific donor programmes and projects do not come up for discussion. Therefore, the Consultative Group meeting is advantageous to donors; it gives them solidarity and a common voice with which to face the Kenyan government (despite each of them having their own strategic interests). Meanwhile, the Kenyan government’s position (if any) can easily be drowned as a lone voice in the middle of a coherent voice of the donors at these meetings. The net effect of this is the weakening of the ability of the Kenyan government to whip donors to its desired agenda while also foregoing the benefits of full coordination among the donors as these same donors continue to pursue their programmes and projects. In line with these findings, it can be argued that donor solidarity at the Consultative Meeting is not for advancing coordination or any long-term objective beneficial to Kenya. The Development Partnership Forum (DPF) is another high-level outfit, just a notch below the Consultative Group that meets twice every year for policy dialogue involving Kenyan government ministers (now cabinet secretaries), ambassadors (for bilateral agencies) and country

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representatives (for multilateral agencies). This level of engagement is intended to handle high-level coordination issues, especially political ones. According to (AES-Kenya, 2014), the Development Partnership Forum is credited for pushing for the formation of the Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination group (HAC), which was later named the aid effectiveness group (AEG). It is this HAC and later AEG that has been the major force behind the practical aid effectiveness initiatives in Kenya, including the development of the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) of 2007–2012 (while it was still named HAC) intended to replace the individual donor strategies in Kenya (McCormick & Schmitz, 2011). However, even after its expiry in 2012, most of the government officials and donor representatives interviewed in this study still referred to KJAS as a document that guided donor and government engagement in a manner that suggested diminishing traction to the agenda of the aid effectiveness principles. Operations at DPF are not so different from Consultative Group. Although DPF brings together representatives of donors, the civil society and the government, the divide between donors on one end and the government on the other end remains visible. As is the case with Consultative Group meetings, donor representatives participate in DPF having an already united position on issues they feel are important to their work in Kenya and often point out issues for which the government should take steps to address and are not keen on confronting challenges in the harmonisation of their programmes. For example, following the 6th Development Partnership Forum in 2013, they issued a carefully worded joint statement that, among other demands, called on the government to amend a proposed law viewed as limiting democratic space because this could “restrict or even prevent the delivery of assistance in areas such as humanitarian aid, health, education, agriculture, implementation of the Constitution and other areas targeting marginalised groups ” (Development Partners, 2013). Thus, through a strategy of identifying shortcomings in government, it can be argued that donors use their solidarity in DPF deliberations as an opportunity to shift attention away from their deficits in implementing PD. However, on its part, the Kenyan government is either uninterested or incapable of making stronger demands in this respect—at least from an analysis of the proceedings at the forum. Often, the objective of the speeches made by the government appears to respond to the concerns raised by the donors and lack clear

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demands on donors to fulfil their obligations to PD. (for example, see a speech by the Deputy President at the 2013 DPF at http://www.deputy president.go.ke).

6.3 Aid Effectiveness Architecture Within the Kenyan Government The aid effectiveness secretariat established in 2010 at Kenya’s National Treasury office within the External Resources Department is one of the most significant outfits within the government dealing directly with aid effectiveness issues. According to interviews with an official coordinating the unit, it became a secretariat for the harmonisation, alignment and coordination (HAC) group. It continued to play this role when the HAC group changed its name to aid effectiveness group (AEG). Its role is to coordinate the implementation of Paris, Accra and Busan resolutions of the high-level forum on aid effectiveness. Through interviews with this contact person, I learned that the AES was a small unit within the External Resources Department run by two officers. As a secretariat for AEG, whose membership straddles the Kenyan government, civil society and donors, AES is expected to have strong links with these membership entities. Its establishment is described as “signalling a renewed partnership between the government of Kenya and her Development partners to make aid work better in Kenya” (AES-Kenya, 2014). It is therefore important to plan and organise various meetings on the implementation of aid effectiveness principles that involve the government and its development partners. As currently constituted and part of the National Treasury, it is difficult to see AES as a unit that is duly representative of the various players in the aid relationship, including the government, the development partners and the civil society. Its positioning makes it more of an appendage of a Kenyan government department. Therefore, one can anticipate how difficult it is to drive the AEG agenda, including tasks such as those achieved through KJAS. Even as a government unit, AES remains considerably weak regarding its ability to network through the various government ministries and departments. For example, none of the officials from the Ministry of Agriculture interviewed knew its role or existence. In the design of AES, provision was not made for mechanisms to extend its presence to all ministries and departments that implement donor-supported programmes. This aspect appears either

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neglected or found unnecessary. Yet, it would be helpful if there were a sound information flow between the implementing agencies and the organ tasked with coordinating the implementation of the PD. Ideally, for any unit to operate optimally, it should have representative units within the various government departments that oversee activities closely related to its mandate. During interviews, ministry officials quickly pointed out other parallels of this nature that exist within government departments. They wondered why the same strategy had not been used in the design of AES. Examples included HIV/AIDS coordinating units and units in charge of gender issues, established in most government ministries to help mainstream these issues. One respondent notably suggested that planning units in all ministries could have easily taken up the task of overseeing the implementation of aid effectiveness principles as its additional role if it had been found necessary because the unit already oversees project planning and monitoring in various ministries. With AES unable to replicate itself at the level of ministries and departments, it was no surprise that government ministry officials hardly knew of its existence, let alone its supposed role. Further discussions in this direction revealed other gaps that existed within government departments. While AES’s major concern would be to reinforce coordination of project and programme implementation, doubts were expressed about the capacity of the various departments to handle the ownership concept adequately because of the numerous units within departments in dire need of coordination. We were made aware, for example, that the chief finance officers who control the disbursement of funds and the departmental planners and economists have different chains of command. To further complicate matters, these positions differed from those of the project coordinators, who were also likely to be independent of the civil service—depending on the donor’s requirements. Therefore, even before harmonising various entities involved in agriculture sector projects and programmes, there already existed internal challenges within the ministries and government departments that were also in dire need for internal restructuring to enhance harmonisation. Weaknesses in aid effectiveness infrastructure within the Kenyan government are further evident in the Government Coordination Group (GCG) organisation. This entity’s role has been to coordinate aid effectiveness across different government ministries. According to (AESKenya, 2014), it comprises permanent secretaries (now cabinet/principal

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secretaries) from ministries that are implementing externally funded development projects. Its establishment is to strengthen ownership and participation of government officials in dialogue with donors. However, although its structure was agreed upon and a draft cabinet memo prepared in 2010, enquiries showed that the entity remained dormant and was yet to conduct any meaningful activities relating to its objectives. Furthermore, it was revealed that the cabinet had not formally approved the group, so the planned monthly meetings were yet to take place as envisaged. Although some officials blamed transitional issues following the 2013 national elections and changes in the constitution as reasons for the shortcomings observed in aid effectiveness infrastructure within the government, this did not adequately explain the fact that there was not much enthusiasm in setting up the preliminary structures that would ensure that GCG could run smoothly. Perhaps a more fundamental question was whether there existed any motivation for bureaucrats in government to put in place a working aid effectiveness framework that cuts across ministries. Following this lead in discussions with ministry officials, it was apparent that none saw the benefit that an inter-ministerial aid effectiveness framework could contribute to their departmental priorities and interests. Gaining donor funding was itself a top priority; however, there was no connection between the ability to get donor funding and active participation in forums such as GCG. Indeed, donor support to each ministry depended on donors’ priorities and the ability of the ministry officials to make a convincing case for support. Therefore, the idea of GCG would probably have worked much better if it also worked as a forum upon which different ministries and government departments lobbied for a share in donor funding. For this reason, higher inter-ministerial coordination activities were noted when multiple ministries existed in a given sector and if the donors for that sector had pushed for a sector-wide approach to delivering resources. This was the case between 2008 and 2013, when Kenya’s agriculture sector had ten ministries with roles overlapping one ministry to the other. It became necessary then to have an inter-ministerial coordination committee through which the sector ministries would negotiate how to structure programmes and projects that cut across the sector. The foregoing clearly shows that aid effectiveness infrastructure within the Kenyan government system has not received adequate enthusiasm and

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support. The establishment and the structuring of AES, for example, do not appear to emanate from a strong internal drive to achieve particular policy objectives other than the symbolism to show commitment to PD. Other initiatives such as GCG have also failed to gain traction, with ministry bureaucrats more interested in attracting donor-funded programmes into their departments rather than following up on PD provisions.

6.4

Spotlight on Coordination Efforts Among Donors

The Development Partners Coordination Group (DCG) is an effective organ that brings together donors within Kenya. Representatives of about 19 donor agencies are actively involved in DCG, which began regular monthly meetings in 2004. From its regular meetings and ability to rally donors together in addressing issues of their concern, it has also been able to mobilise its equivalents at the sector level to handle sectorrelated issues. Consequently, in the general agriculture sector, the donors formed Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) Donor Group, which also meets monthly to deliberate on donor concerns and aid coordination issues at the sector level. Interviews with some donor representatives showed that ARD had a membership of about 17. All of them are part of the OECD/DAC group, although only ten met regularly. Interviews also showed that through these meetings, the donor representatives were able to share information about their activities. Still, they could also sometimes use them as avenues for discovering opportunities for cooperation. Compared to what goes on between government ministries and departments, donors certainly appeared better organised and keen to portray some level of commitment at harmonising their activities per the Paris Declaration requirements. Key informants credited the rotational three-member committee that runs ARD as key in providing leadership and driving its agenda. However, during an interview with the then Chairperson of the ARD, it was apparent that goodwill from the donors alone was insufficient to guarantee progress in implementing PD, even among donors themselves. That there were limits to the outcomes of donor deliberations, and irrespective of how often they met, their actions were insufficient to replace the input of the Kenyan government and the owners of the agriculture sector. Conceding that each donor had their preferences on programmes and projects, the chairperson’s view was that

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the Kenyan government needed to weigh in strongly to guide donor interests and other factors such as duplication and fragmentation of development efforts do not derail the country’s strategic objectives. Most ARD members agreed that the peer mechanisms within ARD to self-regulate donor actions were insufficient because they lacked the legitimacy that was in the hands of the Kenyan government. In recognition of this challenge, the leadership of ARD was keen on establishing a forum that brought together the donors and the government in which the government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, assumed the leadership role. Contact had been initiated with the cabinet secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture for this engagement to proceed. It, however, remained unclear how successful this initiative would be, given the dominant view that the initiation of the engagement processes should have begun with the “owners” (in this case, the relevant Ministry of the Kenyan government) and not the donors. There were undertones even among the donor representatives and expatriate community to the effect that strong ‘donor-only’ forums created an exclusive “club of donors” that alienated other stakeholders and networks necessary for achieving development objectives. Most of the government officials approached on this matter agreed, observing that expatriates working for donor agencies had created their comfort zones that hindered enhanced interaction with local players in the sector’s interest. One officer’s comment was instructive: These donor experts are comfortable meeting on their own. I think they consider themselves to have a superior view of the situation at hand, or they do not have value for discussions with us.

In addition to exclusivity among donor agents, officers also mentioned that exclusive relationships occur between donor agents and specific government or NGO officials who may act as ‘gate-keepers’ as per their privileged positions. This was thought to limit healthy interaction that could help achieve comprehensive solutions to issues. On the other hand, others saw this as emanating from the premium value associated with the ability to develop a working relationship with donor agents, where those who make it are protectionists. Nevertheless, it must also be appreciated that the level of interaction is sometimes dictated on a needs basis and that the donor agencies may often choose to reach out to the senior

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officials, e.g. the cabinet secretaries, the principal secretaries and the directors, because these officials possessed the power to make decisions. In summary, however, and as further discussed in Chapter 5, other signals emanating from donor representatives (e.g. US) suggest that some donor agencies remain suspicious of the government systems which they see as not meeting their threshold on matters such as legitimacy competency and corruption. Meanwhile, regular meetings between donor agents are likely to remain intact but with little benefit to improvement in coordination and harmonisation of donor activities. In the absence of strong oversight, donors appear content to translate their commitments to provisions of aid effectiveness principles as regular meetings and sharing of information on what each of them is undertaking in the agriculture sector.

6.5 Donors and Government: The Fate of Joint Efforts in Sector Coordination The joint effort at coordination between donors and government is a work in progress. Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) is a significant milestone in this process because donors agreed to support Kenya’s Vision 2030 development strategy based on three pillars: encouraging economic growth, investing in people, strengthening institutions and improving institutions and improving governance (HAC, 2007). Although the original KJAS was revised in 2009 and was meant to expire by 2012, it appears to maintain its relevance after this report. For example, a postBusan report on Kenya makes mention of KJAS, indicating that efforts were underway to revise it. At the sector level, the government ministries and donors have been actively developing a coordination framework that can ease the design and implementation of development programmes. Forming the Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) in 2005 is one of the most significant efforts towards sector coordination in Agriculture. Its establishment was part of the resolutions contained in the Strategy for the Revitalisation of Agriculture (SRA), which sought a coordinated approach between the government, donors and the private sector in the running of the agriculture sector (Poulton & Kanyinga, 2013). In addition to coordinating the agriculture sector, ASCU sought to increase investment, establish a knowledge hub and pursue a joint evaluation framework for the sector players. After its formation, a period followed in which the government created numerous sector ministries. Therefore, in addition to providing a coordination framework between

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donors, government and the private sector, ASCU was also seen as a helpful entity in supporting coordination efforts between the different government ministries to reduce fragmentation challenges. The sector coordination mechanism that followed the formation of ASCU resulted in the establishment of various organs that functioned at different levels to oversee coordination. As shared by an ASCU representative, the highest governing organ is the national forum which meets every two to three years and brings together the top leadership of the country and the development partners to deliberate on the sector issues. In particular, it is often when the government publicises and rallies sector players to support a new sector strategy or an opportunity to highlight the progress of ongoing policy implementation. Below is the Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee (ICC) involving top ministry officials who work on shaping the overall sector policy and deliberating further on what the technical committees under them have come up with. The technical committees comprise departmental heads, representatives of development partners, private sector and NGO representatives, academics and other stakeholders to handle sector operational issues. In total, five thematic working groups (TWGs) were established below the technical committees as think tanks of private sector experts and government officials that provide helpful information and guidelines on specific topical issues in implementing agriculture sector strategy. In addition, ASCU credits itself for leading various legal policy reforms and achieving successes in helping over 30 sector programmes establish a synergistic relationship and designing Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS). Although the idea of ASCU was loaded with the greatest of intentions, at the time of this field research, the unit was not as active and strong an organisation as had been purposed. In an interview, one expert who was privy to ASCU activities observed that convening the ICC had become difficult because the permanent secretaries were too busy carrying out their mandates. As a result, there was generally little time to convene as a group. Although a revolving chairmanship had been proposed initially, this was not implemented, and therefore, ownership issues of ASCU processes cropped up as a challenge. Interviews, especially with officials of the ministry, affirmed that ASCU was not well-grounded within the government system. Its existence relied greatly on the goodwill of a few top ministry officials and the generosity and pressure from development partners. Indeed, a top planning official in the Ministry of Agriculture supported this view. This view was widely accepted within

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the ministry’s top hierarchy—that ASCU was a donor-driven organisation that lacked legitimacy within the government and that its functions were in competition with other legitimately established organs of the ministry. Contrariwise, the DAC-aligned sector donors remained the most incredible supporters of ASCU. This support was extended even by unenthusiastic donors about government-led processes. Being reliant on donors, ASCU, on its part, seemed unable to push donors to comply with their commitments on the aid effectiveness front. Similarly, since it did not have a strong grounding within government, it would be ambitious to have great expectations of ASCU’s ability to steer the government into good outcomes on the Paris Declaration. Apart from the murmurs within the Ministry of Agriculture, the central government’s actions also demonstrated ASCU’s shaky position. In one example (also a big concern for many donor representatives interviewed), the central government ignored the Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP)1 developed jointly between the ministry and donors through ASCU. Instead, it commissioned its own framework—the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which is now officially utilised by the government as a planning framework for the agriculture sector strategy. This outcome is a level of confusion and dismay, particularly among the donors in the agriculture sector. They agonised on whether it was worthwhile for them to continue using MTIP as a guide for their support for the sector after the government had pulled out of it (see footnote). During interviews, at least one of them questioned the quality of the processes that led to MTEF, which she saw as not having been thorough enough in terms of public participation. In addition, there was also mention that other additional frameworks existed, including Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP) and ASDS. This complicated matters further because each of 1 Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP) is a planning framework for the implementation of Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS). The plan outlines six pillars that the Kenyan government and its development partners should invest in, in order to actualise the objectives contained in the ASDS. Donor representatives and ministry of agriculture officials interviewed affirmed that this was the document that both donors and the Kenyan government (through Ministry of Agriculture) had endorsed to guide them share responsibility of supporting ASDS. However, it was claimed that instead of utilising MTIP to guide the government’s commitments towards ASDS, Kenya’s Treasury resorted to using Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)—an implementation framework the government developed on its own without the input of development partners. In a further compounding of this state of confusion officials interviewed indicated that two documents of MTIP existed (that is MTIP and MTIP II).

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these frameworks had its definition of the sector and thereby going against the objectives of coordination and fomenting fragmentation. Apart from the challenge of competing sector definitions, another issue reported at the time of fieldwork for this study was what was observed as the formation of multiple donor groups with sector-related objectives. The original Agriculture and Rural Development Group (ARD), driven through KJAS, considered itself the donor group in charge of the productive sector and pursued issues on agricultural value chain development while working closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries and Ministry of Cooperative Development. However, another donor group had recently been established and known as the “Private Sector and Trade” group mobilised through the efforts of a principal secretary in the Ministry of Industrialisation (who formerly worked as an agriculture secretary). An expatriate privy to this new donor group estimated that over 70% of private sector and trade donor group programmes were linked to agriculture. Participation in the new donor group was similar in terms of agencies represented (each agency possibly sending a different person to represent them). At the time of this research, the new donor group had identified seven (7) value chains to work on, all closely mirroring ARD’s activities and amounting to possible duplication of efforts. Another loose group of donors (led by the Swedish) was focused on the implementation of the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), a sector-wide programme based at the Ministry of Agriculture initiated through Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU). In retrospect, ASCU’s legitimacy problems can be traced to the occasions when the government is seen as undermining some of the ASCU-led processes. The dilemma is that ASCU is supposedly an established government agency, yet the reality is that its legitimacy is not immune to intrigues within government, formal or informal. Sector experts I interviewed pointed out that ASCU also suffered from the inability of its constituent organs to function fully and provide the expected direction for the sector. Some of the failures related to the practicability of the said organs—for example, some argued that it was difficult to expect Permanent Secretaries in charge of the different ministries to meet frequently as ICC when each of them had a full plate in terms of individual responsibilities for their ministries. Another argument was that not all ministries had an equal interest in all the issues in the domain of ASCU. Therefore,

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expecting consistent participation and a general sense of being at the core of the ASCU agenda was unrealistic. Consequently, it was said that only the three ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperatives found the need to meet more often. Other issues bordered on supremacy wars between personalities in the different ministries were exacerbated by the fact that ASCU was hosted by one of the ministries and therefore seen as an appendage of that ministry. Matters were made no less difficult by perceiving that ASCU’s existence seemed to rely on specific personalities’ incumbency in top government offices. For example, the 2013 change in government was said to have been particularly unfavourable to ASCU’s promoters in the civil service. Soon after the conclusion of the fieldwork reported in this study, ASCU’s prospects further nosedived when it became the subject of a court case and a judicial review pitting it against the Ministry of Agriculture (KenyaLaw, 2014; Musa, 2014). In this particular court case and review, ASCU was seeking to bar the Ministry from conducting an audit review of ASCU (a move that had led to the arrest of ASCU’s top management). It also sought to stop the ministry from taking over some of its roles. In light of these findings, it is pertinent that joint efforts between the government and donors are yet to stabilise. Although ASCU was initially intended to facilitate coordination of the various players in the sector, including donors and the government, recent developments, including the establishment of a new donor group relevant to the agriculture sector in addition to ARD and frequent changes affecting the structure of sector ministries hampers its effectiveness. Furthermore, the reported conflicts between the Ministry of Agriculture and ASCU will likely affect effective sector coordination.

6.6

Effectiveness Structures: A Focus on Kenyan Government Agency

From observations, the Kenyan-government-led aid effectiveness institutions and forums are much weaker and less active when compared to those established by donors. These weaknesses are exposed through failures to convene frequently, a lack of clear agenda and the fact that most of them do not exist beyond the Ministry of Finance, as reported by Nepad (2013). For example, although the Ministry of Agriculture implements numerous donor-funded programmes, the aid effectiveness unit at the Treasury is yet to extend its presence to the Ministry. Without a strong

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link, it is hard for the unit to influence decisions at the Ministry, where officials often engage directly with donors for possible collaboration. In addition, farmers and other beneficiaries are further removed to be aware of their existence and implementation. With the concept of ownership vesting greater power on recipients on matters of prioritising donor funds utilisation, it would be expected that recipient governments seize the opportunity and lead the processes of establishing the necessary structures for rapid implementation—especially so considering that aid in the past was based on donors dictating conditions. In this case, however, the weak arrangements signal a lack of a strong conscious drive from top officials to prioritise PD implementation. The inability for action to seamlessly permeate into every government department implementing donor-funded programmes or projects implies that the structures put in place retain their mechanistic nature as derived from the international system that drives the aid effectiveness policies. This suggests inadequate agency on the part of local initiatives to help internalise the concepts contained in PD and presents a problem because success in the diffusion of international policies has often been associated with processes of interpretation and gradual adjustment to suit the local context (Stone, 2012). Therefore, although the provisions of PD may be in the interest of the Kenyan government, being unable to take proactive steps of her own to enable implementation that is centred on Kenya has resulted in weak structures that lack reflective learning or normative mimicry. This situation has been associated with dysfunctional policy transfer (Sharman, 2010). As a consequence, Kenya does not exhibit the assertiveness expected of a country that makes its own development decisions (and one that bypassed the threshold of a low-income economy into a lower medium economy). This was evident not only from the analysis of views gathered from donor officials but was also directly stated by one head of a development cooperation agency. Analysis of Kenya government officials’ speeches during PD-related functions led to similar conclusions—Kenya was not providing strong leadership on the development agenda during her engagement with development partners. The view was consistent with what has been expressed elsewhere (see ROA, 2014). This lack of assertiveness has been observed as peculiar for some African countries yet not exclusive. As stated in chapter two, a study by Whitfield and Fraser (2010) shows that some African countries, including Botswana, Ethiopia and Rwanda, exhibit more significant control over

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aid negotiations when compared with Zambia, Mozambique, and Ghana, Mali and Tanzania. Ethiopia and Rwanda are poorer than Kenya, yet, even officials of donor agencies interviewed in this study acknowledged that the governments of these two African countries exercised greater control and oversight over bilateral and multilateral programmes. For Kenya, it may be necessary to recognise the impact of the historical factors associated with the agriculture sector concerning Kenya’s development partners. Unlike other sectors attracting newer donors, the agriculture sector remains dominated by traditional OECD-DAC donors. Being the current face of PD, these donors are also known for their unrelenting activism in the past that painted the country’s systems as incompetent and corrupt. Although successive regimes have since been in power, the significance of the past remains ingrained, and any regime in power is aware that when provoked, donors are capable of ganging up to berate the government on issues such as governance, corruption or general incompetence. While these system failures are bound to exist, donors have often insinuated them as why they cannot fully comply with PD provisions (OECD-DAC, 2012). Hence, chances for honest and frank engagement are slim because top bureaucrats desire to maintain cosy relations. Kenyan government officials would thus be wary of any moves perceived as too demanding (such as making strong demands on ownership) to upset the “good” relations. Secondly, the whole idea of PD in itself presents a dilemma of sorts for those who have experience in “negotiating” for projects with donors. While speaking to government officials with these credentials, their perspective was that of defining donors as holding different views from themselves. That success was marked by how one could tune their ideas to fit what the donors required. Perceptions that emphasised the special status of donors and the need to approach them carefully and skilfully were common. Hence, by being at the forefront of PD, which champions recipient ownership (‘recipient-like views as opposed to ‘donor-like views), the donors ‘steal the show’ and complicate the available options for government officials in terms of what body of ideas they are entitled to as agents for the recipient of aid at the negotiating table. It is more problematic when donors fail to back up these positions by action fully. For example, most donors (as discussed in Chapter 5) are yet to fully embrace the use of country systems- a fact that the government is fully aware of but is yet to bring it up with the donors meaningfully. In the

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meantime, since both sides have shortcomings to cover for, a status quo may be preferred where none of the parties deliberately go out of their way to implement PD. Lastly, it is widely accepted that the bureaucratic elite in Kenya has almost remained intact through several changes in the political leadership. This has not only provided stability to the systems in place but has also limited chances for transformative change.

6.7

Conclusion

Kenyan aid effectiveness infrastructure is weak—a fact readily observed through the analysis of the performance of the various organs established to implement PD. Donors seem enthusiastic to show that they are walking the aid effectiveness pathway by establishing active donor forums. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, these forums have been more successful as opportunities for donors to “talk at each other” rather than to dialogue and develop a seamless working relationship. In other words, the forums have become an “exclusive club” where the members retreat into the comfort of other expatriates. Consequently, regular interaction between donors is yet to yield such things as division of labour protocol, joint programming or resolutions to compel all donors to channel their aid through the country system. Therefore, some level of inaction is inconsistent with the donor agencies’ public image. For this reason, we argue that donors—who are themselves responsible for establishing PD—are under pressure to show their commitment to it for political reasons. In doing this, however, they are confronted by competing interests and factors. One is the strategic interests previously described as motivating donors to give aid (Gounder, 1994; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder et al., 1998; Younas, 2008; Youngs, 2004). Although donors in this study did not admit openly that their aid had strategic objectives, these could be gleaned from some of their policies and actions. For example, most donors chose to fund specific sub-sectors and not others. They were also more concerned about success being attributed to their actions rather than the overall output of aid. For this reason, joint programming was resisted, with donors shying off from, e.g. ASDSP, which was seen as being dominated by Sweden. In addition to strategic interests, many donors in the agriculture sector in Kenya were wary of channelling their aid through the established government system. Instead, they chose their ways of implementing projects and programmes. Although, again, the reasons for these were

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not explicit, some donor representatives mentioned corruption, among other system failures, as deterrents to fully trusting the government system. For donors to adopt “conditionality-like” policies in an era of PD appears as a contradiction of sorts because the cardinal principle of PD is the recognition of self-determination of recipient countries led by democratic regimes. However, with the increasing importance donors attach to the political economy analysis of recipient countries (OECDDAC, 2005a; Scott, 2007) this chapter demonstrates that these analytical reports have become instruments to validate donors’ disinterest in implementing aid effectiveness principles fully. One such report by Sundet and Moen (2009) views Kenya’s political context as unfavourable, claims that the country is a ‘fragile’ state and recommends that the government is not suitable as a partner to engage with in pursuit of full implementation of the PD processes. Scott (2007) has shown that most donor agencies engage in these analyses, e.g. Drivers for Change (UK), Governance Questionnaires (Germany) and Institutional Governance Review (World Bank) and that cooperation between donors is encouraged. On the Kenyan government side, the aid effectiveness mechanisms in place have a different kind of weakness. They have failed to permeate through the various departments involved with donor programmes, and as a result, knowledge about them is not widespread. Instead, their presence is limited to the Ministry of Finance (Treasury), and their operations are less visible than related activities among donor agents within the country. I suggest that this failure has come to be because of inadequate internal agency within Kenya to internalise PD concepts and domesticate them through interpretation. Internally, this cascades to either insufficient demand to push these processes forward or the existence of other competing interests. Another perspective to this is external, where analysis points to the weakness emerging from the fact that the PD processes rely on domineering strategic ideas proposed by its originators. These donors are also known to be the charioteers of modern hegemonic ideas. Although the concepts themselves are shaped to present the government as a superior partner- the recipient and “owner” of the funded development initiative, donors can utilise soft forms of coercion, among other covert strategies (Dobbin et al., 2007) to limit independent initiatives that could enrich her response to PD. In the end, it has also been demonstrated that turbulent historical relations between Kenya and her donors have not been helpful.

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Lastly, challenges to the diffusion of aid effectiveness principles into Kenya’s agriculture sector can also be analysed based on the incentives/sanctions or normative pressure that many authors have argued as driving compliance (Checkel, 2014; Kelley & Simmons, 2013). However, it is difficult to identify what would constitute incentives for PD implementation from both the donor and Kenya government agriculture ministry officials’ perspectives. Since PD is mainly based on norms associated with the concept of ownership, their implementation would therefore be largely dependent on normative pressure of shame and praise and appeals to reputational concerns of the parties. As from the foregoing, no substantive organisation independent from the donors and Kenyan government can play this role. Therefore, it is our submission that relying on the engagement forums between the Kenyan government and sector donors on their own is not adequate to induce compliance.

References Aes-Kenya. (2014). Aid effectiveness Kenya [Online]. The National Treasury. Burall, S., Maxwell, S., & Menocal, A. R. (2006). Reforming the international aid architecture: Options and ways forward, Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Checkel, J. T. (2014). Mechanisms, process and the study of international institutions. Process Tracing, 74. Development Partners. (2013). We advocate stronger ties for a thriving, secure and stable Kenya for all Kenyans. The Daily Nation. Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007). The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, coercion, competition, or learning? Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 449–472. Eicher, C. (2003). Flashback: Fifty years of donor aid to African agriculture. Michigan State University. HAC. (2007). Kenya joint assistance strategy. Improving aid effectiveness. Harmonization Alignment and Coordination (HAC) Donor Working Group. Howes, S. (2011). An overview of aid effectiveness determinants and strategies. Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper #1. Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra. Kelley, J., & Simmons, B. (2013). From scrutiny to shame: Social pressure in US anti-human trafficking policy. Georgetown University International Theory and Research Seminar. Kenya-Law (2014). Mussolini Kithome V Attorney General & Other (2014) eKLR. The National Council for Law Reporting.

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Kharas, H. J., & Linn, J. F. (2008). Better aid: Responding to gaps in effectiveness. Brookings Institution. Maizels, A., & Nissanke, M. K. (1984). Motivations for aid to developing countries. World Development, 12, 879–900. Maxwell, S. (2002). More aid? Yes-and use it to reshape aid architecture. ODI Opinions. McCormick, D., & Schmitz, H. (2011). Donor Proliferation and Co-ordination: Experiences of Kenya and Indonesia. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 46, 149–168. Mulama, J. (2005). Corruption Kenya: Donors threatening to stop funding. Inter Press Service News Agency. Musa, K. (2014). Agriculture CS Felix Koskei sued for abuse of public office. The Standard, 17/06/2014. NEPAD. (2013). Africa platform for development effectiveness. In APDEV (Ed.), Post Busan: Kenya’s experience. New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). O’Brien, F. S., & Ryan, T. C. (2001). Kenya. In S. Devarajan, D. Dollar, & T. HOLMGREN (Eds.), Aid and reforms in Africa. The World Bank. OECD. (2011). Kenya. Aid effectiveness 2011: Progress in the implementation of the Paris declaration volume II county chapters. OECD-DAC. OECD-DAC. (2003). Rome declaration on harmonisation. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD-DAC. (2005a). Lessons learned on the use of power and Drivers of Change analyses in development co-operation—Final Report. OECD – DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET). OECD-DAC. (2012). Aid effectiveness 2011: Progress in implementing the paris declaration country chapters. OECD. Poulton, C., & Kanyinga, K. (2013). The politics of revitalising agriculture in Kenya. University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. ROA. (2014). Democratic ownership and development effectiveness: Civil society perspectives on progress since Paris 2014. In Actionaid (Ed.), Kenya: Towards improving democratic ownership of development.http://www.realityofaid.org/ roa-profile/. The Reality of Aid Network. Schraeder, P. J., Hook, S. W., & Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows. World Politics, 50, 294–323. Scott, Z. (2007). Professional developments: Changing face of ‘Drivers of Change’. Public Administration and Development, 27 , 85–90. Sharman, J. C. (2010). Dysfunctional policy transfer in national tax blacklists. Governance, 23, 623–639. Stone, D. (2012). Transfer and translation of policy. Policy Studies, 33, 483–499.

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Sundet, G., & Moen, E. (2009). Political economy analysis of Kenya. Norweigian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). Whitfield, L., & Fraser, A. (2010). Negotiating aid: The structural conditions shaping the negotiating strategies of African governments. International Negotiation, 15, 341–366. World Bank. (2005). Consultative group meeting Nairobi, Kenya April 11–12, 2005 Summary Report. The World Bank. Younas, J. (2008). Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. European Journal of Political Economy, 24, 661–674. Youngs, R. (2004). Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s external identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42, 415–435.

CHAPTER 7

Overall Conclusion

This book forms part of the growing knowledge on the development challenges facing African countries, specifically Kenya. With its focus on the agriculture sector, this study revives the debate on the obstacles that hinder the rural poor from exercising power in the public decisions and policies affecting them. Aid effectiveness principles outlined by Paris Declaration constitute bold statements towards ensuring that development aid is receptive to poor people’s priorities and concerns. Paris Declaration is in itself a response to years of concerns raised through aid effectiveness literature that cast doubts on the impact of development aid. While many studies have been undertaken concerning aid and its impact on the development of recipient countries, fewer studies have gone into the prospects of specific policies aimed at making aid work better. This book thus finds its place in this realm where the concern is not on whether aid works but on the operational issues around the otherwise good policies governing aid. This has been achieved by analysing the diffusion of aid effectiveness into Kenya’s agriculture sector. In particular, this book contributes to the literature on aid effectiveness policies in two ways. The first is by providing a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of PD that combines perspectives of development agencies, government officials and the ultimate beneficiaries (in this case, the small-scale farmers of Kenya). This is a strength that has not been © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9_7

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adequately exploited by previous studies as most have based their analysis of the implementation of PD either on the perspective of donors (for example, Armon, 2007; Brown, 2012; Knack, 2014; Molenaers & Nijs, 2011) or on the perspective of recipient governments (for example, Booth, 2012; Hayman, 2009; Whitfield & Fraser, 2008). For example, Brown’s (2012) analysis is donor centred with a focus on Canadian aid’s response to PD and concludes that self-interest and securitisation are increasingly affecting compliance with PD. Molenaers and Nijs (2011), on the other hand, have analysed the introduction of new donor tools and their impact on PD, arguing that these new tools were being drawn away from PD. The others, including Booth (2012), Hayman (2009), and Whitfield and Fraser (2008), on the other hand, analyse recipient weaknesses and strengths in isolation. This existing literature is inadequate in providing a balanced and simultaneous analysis of donor and recipient government perspectives. Secondly, by focusing on PD implementation in the agriculture sector, this book contributes to the literature that highlights the separate role of ultimate beneficiaries (from that of the government) as necessary for making aid effectiveness policies work. The agriculture sector is particularly relevant in this kind of inquiry because farmers as beneficiaries have a more central role in implementation, unlike other sectors such as health, infrastructure or education, where implementation is mainly in the hands of the government. Providing a perspective of the implementation of PD based on farmers’ roles and experiences is therefore essential in analysing the effectiveness of donor-funded agricultural programmes. So far, only a few theoretical studies, for example, Booth (2012) and Cabral (2008), have attempted to highlight the distinctions between the recipient governments and the poor people they represent and the need for this distinction to be factored in PD. Therefore, this book contributes to this literature by capturing the actual perspectives of small-scale farmers and including them in the analysis of the implementation of aid effectiveness policies and PD in particular. Concerning Kenya and Africa in general, this book has significant relevance as part of the literature on implementing aid effectiveness policies in agriculture. Although the agricultural sector is key to the development of most African countries (that receive aid for these purposes), there is a shortage of literature on specific studies related to the implementation of PD in the sector. Sectors that have had greater focus are health (Biesma et al., 2009; Lawn & Kerber, 2006), education (Bermingham et al., 2009)

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and governance (McCormick & Schmitz, 2011). Rather than focusing on PD and its implementation, existing literature on aid and the African agriculture sector has mainly deliberated on issues such as the quantity of aid to the sector (Eicher, 2003), the impact of changes in donor priorities (Herdt, 2010) and the role of policy reforms (Dalgaard & Hansen, 2001; Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Hansen & Tarp, 2000). This study, therefore, has a theoretical value in contributing to knowledge specific to PD implementation in an African agricultural setting. Overall, the book explored aid effectiveness principles and the agriculture sector in Kenya. It mainly aimed at describing and examining the diffusion of aid effectiveness principles in line with the Paris Declaration (PD) of 2005 into the donor-supported activities within the agriculture sector. The five principles include ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results management and mutual accountability. This study was focused on the first three principles: ownership, alignment and harmonisation, as these are the core of PD, and the state of their implementation can be taken as a good reflection of the application of PD in general. This is because the other two principles of management for results and mutual accountability depend on how well ownership, harmonisation and alignment are being taken up. Mutual accountability, for example, is premised on a pre-established consensus and shared vision between the donors and the recipients on desired change (Eyben, 2008), a matter dependent on ownership and alignment processes. On management for results, others (for example, Alison Evans, 2010; Brown & Morton, 2008) have argued that a focus on results can fail to provide an overall picture of PD progress as different parties are often in a rush for quick short-term wins that can undermine the overall objective of PD. Regarding ownership, PD requires that aid is planned, managed and deployed in line with the recipient country’s actionable development strategies. This principle thus puts the responsibility on the recipient to strengthen its institutions and tackle issues such as corruption on top of developing a national development strategy. The other two principles of alignment and ownership are largely donors’ responsibilities as they require that donors align their aid to the national development strategies of the recipient and adopt simplified procedures, coordinate their activities and share information to avoid duplication. This study examined different actors and the processes and practices within the agriculture sector in Kenya to bring out the elements of implementing these principles.

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The research findings reveal that the power relations between the stakeholders within the agriculture sector in Kenya significantly impact the diffusion/implementation of PD within the sector. Reflecting on the roles of the leading players in the sector, including the government, farmers, donors, NGOs and input suppliers, among other agriculture sector stakeholders, it is the government and the donors who emerge as the leading agents in the implementation of PD. In terms of the actual running of the sector, however, three-quarters of farming activities are in the hands of small-scale farmers. As stated in Chapter 3, most programmes recognise this vital role of small-scale farming and therefore target improving productivity. However, although envisioned as important players in aid programming and having first-hand experience and knowledge of the issues that bedevil the sector, small-scale farmers’ diversity and lack of collective voice hamper their ability to influence policy discourse. This is exacerbated by a low level of education and poor capacity to network, diminishing their political capital and weakening their ability to lobby for their interests jointly. From how Kenya’s small-scale farming is structured and the diversity of those who engage in it, interventions are bound to face challenges in defining the genuine small-scale farmer representation and interests. For this reason, findings showed that most sector programmes focused on the poorest or the most vulnerable groups in the community and ended up addressing the broader poverty issues rather than the issues particular to small-scale farmer requirements. Patron-client relationship issues contribute to stifling farmer issues further as powerful intermediary groups and individuals emerge between farmers and programmes or policy interventions. These include the political elites who abuse their influential positions to undermine well-meaning policies to please a section of their electorate and thereby secure their political lifelines. Similarly, officials in government and other organisations also use their positions of power to play patronage and gain from their ability to connect beneficiaries to donor-funded projects or programmes. Therefore, although a few issues genuinely in the interest of small-scale farmers, such as availability and affordability of inputs, make it into the national agenda, the resulting interventions are hardly empowering, as they become business opportunities and a source of political capital for those who wield power. While the ministry drives the country’s agricultural policy and strategymaking processes, the disproportionate influence from the donors, sector

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experts and the need to be responsive to international and regional agendas (such as CAADP and MDGs) makes it difficult to make claims for genuine local ownership of policy processes. With indications that the agriculture ministry cannot prioritise and fund policy-making, donor influence limits for nurturing home-grown ideas will be challenging. Moreover, the ministry itself is hierarchical, with decision-makers at the top far removed from the real-life experiences of small-scale farmers. Other structural weaknesses make it possible for ministry officials to be part of parallel programmes run by NGOs and donors. This presents a weakness that requires the presence of structures that can provide checks and balances on the activities of the ministry bureaucracy. The issue is aggravated by the bureaucracy that eclipses the political establishment in decision-making involving the sector and hinders options for check and balance. Concerning aid decisions, in particular, the lack of a centralised aid policy has made it challenging to coordinate aid activities (leading to fragmentation) properly and has also hampered parliament’s role in providing the necessary oversight. In many ways, the power in aid relationships remains skewed in favour of donors. Non-governmental and community-based organisations, often viewed as championing small-scale farmer agendas, are inherently dependent on donors and thus need to prioritise donor interests for their survival. The need for survival can be at the expense of what the organisations have determined as a priority for the community they are working for. Survival may also mean unhealthy competition between different organisations that can affect the sustainability of programmes. Programmes and projects (often donor-funded) present additional avenues for setting trends, establishing institutions and instilling values and often succeed in shaping the motivations of the different actors in the sector and tilting the power dynamics in favour of donors and those who control resources. Concerning alignment, findings have shown that most donors are eager to accommodate Kenya’s agriculture sector strategy in their programmes. However, except for SIDA, most other bilateral agencies avoid using the country system and do this by interpreting the strategy, deciding on what aspects of the strategy to implement and making choices of the means of implementation. Multilateral agencies, on their part, although utilising the country systems in implementing their programmes, their programmes are less responsive to the country’s agenda and lean more towards their feasibility studies and regional issues. Consequently, there

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is inadequacy in both the use of country systems and alignment to the country agenda that renders the alignment principle superficial and ensures that donors continue retaining power that should otherwise be in the hands of the Kenyan government. Harmonisation faces similar challenges as donor-to-donor engagement has remained mainly at the level of sharing information and failing to transcend the realm of establishing common arrangements and simplifying procedures. In addition, the donors are not keen on processes that will diminish their identity and association with particular projects and programmes as intended by the harmonisation principle. The units established as part of the architecture of implementing PD have thus been unable to achieve much in transforming the trajectory of PD implementation and the relationships between the different players in the sector. Although the Kenyan government’s stature in the Consultative Group meetings appears to have improved, this is negated by the fact that donors have tendencies to gang up in ways repressing the expression of the ownership concept. Incidences such as donors agreeing on a common position ahead of the Consultative Group meeting undermine an open and trustworthy dialogue with the Kenyan government and signify a shortcoming in direct engagement. On its part, the PD structures within the Kenyan government are weak and not well known beyond the External Resource Department, where they are based. Significantly, there is a lack of representation of these structures in the line ministries that implement aid-funded programmes. Attempts by the government, for example, to establish a Government Coordination Group whose membership was meant to include cabinet secretaries of ministries with significant donor funds failed. These shortcomings suggest low interest or internal ownership of these initiatives within the government ministries. Ministry officials are therefore less inclined to apply mechanisms of learning and effective interpretation of PD to develop structures and implementation framework that suits the local context. Instead, departments appear focused on expanding their portfolio of donor-funded programmes with little motivation for PD initiatives as these are seen as having little or no relationship with the ability to attract donor funds. These circumstances point to the failure of PD to transform the conditionality-era relationship between the Kenyan government and its donors. In terms of joint efforts at coordination and implementation of PD, well-intentioned efforts such as Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU) have not been able to live up to

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their purposes and objectives. Fragmentation in approach is visible as the different parties try to dominate others or skew the collaborative processes for partisan purposes. From the foregoing, implementing aid effectiveness principles in Kenya’s agriculture sector can face considerable challenges. Most donors are yet to fully trust the Kenyan country systems and therefore maintain a significant representation of their own in the projects and programmes they sponsor. This leads to variance in the objectives of ownership, alignment and harmonisation principles of PD. Furthermore, the Kenyan government has not adequately taken up its role of providing the desired leadership, a crucial requirement for ownership. For this reason, concepts of aid effectiveness principles have failed to permeate through the hierarchies of the agriculture sector ministries. Furthermore, no policy guidelines that can be cascaded to the ministries’ departments expressly regarding aid effectiveness principles have been developed. In the prevailing circumstances, other stakeholders in the agriculture sector, including small-scale farmers who are the major beneficiaries of donorfunded programmes and projects, do not know these principles and neither can they relate to them as they are unable to pinpoint any significant changes in donor-funded programmes since PD came into effect. The below-par performance of donors collectively and individually in implementing PD is typical and emergent from the political and strategic nature of development aid as a foreign policy tool. Since the PD and ownership principle, in particular, seeks to bestow greater power on the recipient, donors’ ambivalence can be understood as part of their efforts at retaining power and protecting the political and strategic interests they attach to aid. With donors being initiators/signatories to PD, navigating through this is tricky because of the risk of being viewed as antagonistic to their commitments. Consequently, donors take advantage of their power to control resources and the weaknesses in the government’s response to shifting the responsibility of lack of compliance from themselves to the Kenyan government. For this reason, rhetoric that describes government systems as corrupt and untrustworthy is dominant and is what is relied upon by donors to justify themselves in closely managing their aid programmes and projects. Other PD-related reforms, such as joint programming and the use of country systems in reporting and monitoring programmes, face the same resistance. From these findings, we argue that donors exercise greater agency in dealing with aid effectiveness principles

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and therefore undertake to interpret and subject them to changes to suit their best interests. Understandably, a more robust government leadership would probably prevent donors from pursuing their political and strategic interests to focus on what the government has identified as sector priorities. As stated earlier, other African countries, such as Rwanda and Ethiopia, have scored in this area as they are said to exercise a firmer government leadership that enhances ownership (Fraser & Whitfield, 2009). However, aid to the agriculture sector (especially one dominated by small-scale farmers) presents complications as there are bound to be contentions between government ownership and farmers’/beneficiary ownership. Some donors can exploit these contentions by claiming to work directly with farmers and farmer groups. Furthermore, while the country’s weak response may be blamed on its institutions and other internal processes, these should not be viewed in isolation. Historical legacies, especially the years of aid conditionality, are particularly relevant in the case of Kenya. This is because it helped reinforce a culture of compliance to donor requirements within the bureaucratic regime rather than focusing on making aid work better. In conclusion, we argue that the diffusion of aid effectiveness principles into the agriculture sector in Kenya is at best symbolic imitation because the government’s strongest motivation is to be seen as having complied with PD requirements rather than a genuine need to reform and make aid work for the sector. For this reason, policy effectiveness considerations of PD are not met, and their impact is therefore insignificant. In a more general sense, PD has not been able to distinguish itself from other initiatives appearing under the guise of neoliberal reforms. The concept of ownership in PD remains a charade that does not measure up to its true meaning, at least as per the empirical results of this study. It is also fair to conclude that in its present form, it would be futile to expect favourable outcomes from implementing PD even if the settings were to be changed. This is because PD has not been able to address the challenge of power asymmetry—which remains firmly in favour of donors. From this study, for example, there is no evidence that PD can help foment such things as “bottom-up” policy-making, neither does it help improve mechanisms of developing authentic national development strategies. Briefly stated, the reality is far from what the rhetoric promises.

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References Alison Evans, O. (2010). Aid effectiveness post-2010–A think piece on ways forward. Institute of Development Studies. Armon, J. (2007). Aid, politics and development: A donor perspective. Development Policy Review, 25, 653–656. Bermingham, D., Christensen, O. R., & Mahn, T. C. (2009). Aid effectiveness in education: Why it matters. Prospects, 39, 129–145. Biesma, R. G., Brugha, R., Harmer, A., Walsh, A., Spicer, N., & Walt, G. (2009). The effects of global health initiatives on country health systems: A review of the evidence from HIV/AIDS control. Health policy and planning, 24, 239–252. Booth, D. (2012). Aid effectiveness: Bringing country ownership (and politics) back in. Conflict, Security & Development, 12, 537–558. Brown, S. (2012). Aid effectiveness and the framing of new canadian aid initiatives. In S. Brown (Ed.), Struggling for effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian foreign aid. McGill-Queen’s Press. Brown, S., & Morton, B. (2008). Reforming aid and development cooperation: Accra, Doha and beyond. The North-South Institute. Cabral, L. (2008). Accra 2008: The bumpy road to aid effectiveness in agriculture. Natural Resource Perspectives, Overseas Development Institute, 114. Dalgaard, C.-J., & Hansen, H. (2001). On aid, growth and good policies. Journal of Development Studies, 37 , 17–41. Dollar, D., & Easterly, W. (1999). The search for the key: Aid, investment and policies in Africa. Journal of African Economies, 8, 546–577. Eicher, C. (2003). Flashback: Fifty years of donor aid to African agriculture. Michigan State University. Eyben, R. (2008). Power, mutual accountability and responsibility in the practice of international aid: A relational approach (Working Paper Series 305). Institute of Development Studies. Fraser, A., & Whitfield, L. (2009). Understanding contemporary aid relationships. In L. Whitfield (Ed.), The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors. Oxford. Hansen, H., & Tarp, F. (2000). Policy arena aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of International Development, 12, 375–398. Hayman, R. (2009). From Rome to Accra via Kigali: ‘Aid Effectiveness’ in Rwanda. Development Policy Review, 27 , 581–599. Herdt, R. W. (2010). Development aid and agriculture. Elsevier. Knack, S. (2014). Building or bypassing recipient country systems: Are donors defying the Paris declaration. The Journal of Development Studies, 50, 839– 854. Lawn, J., & Kerber, K. (2006). Opportunities for Africas newborns: Practical data policy and programmatic support for newborn care in Africa.

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McCormick, D., & Schmitz, H. (2011). Donor proliferation and co-ordination: Experiences of Kenya and Indonesia. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 46, 149–168. Molenaers, N., & Nijs, L. (2011). Why the European commission fails to adhere to the principles of good donorship: The case of the governance incentive tranche. The European Journal of Development Research, 23, 409–425. Whitfield, L., & Fraser, A. (2008). Negotiating aid. In L. Whitfield (Ed.), The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donor. Oxford University Press.

Index

A Africa, gained independence in 1960s from colonial rule, 1 African Development Bank (ADB), 6, 7, 94, 188, 208 Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness, 225 agricultural sector Africa’s dependence on foreign aid, 8 role in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 agricultural sector in Kenya Agriculture Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU), 13, 16, 91, 154, 155, 199, 235, 238, 252 Agriculture Sector Donor Group, 13, 16 analysis of data, 25–26 and ownership concept, 163 contribution to GDP, 10 data collection, methodology of, 21–25 data selection, 20–21

Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (PEDC), 11–15 small-scale farming enterprises, dominance of, 11, 76 strategies adopted for, 153–159 agricultural sector in Kenya, public policy-making process in, 159–163 and government ownership, 161 donors influence, 142–151 essentials of, 151–153 NGOs, CBOs and farmers organisations influence, 138–142 role of Ministry of Agriculture and politicians, 133–136 shortcoming in, 152 Agriculture and Rural Development Donor group (ARD), 225 Agriculture Business Development (ABD), 206

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. K. Borter and N. Malik, African Experience in the Application of the Development Aid Effectiveness Principles, African Histories and Modernities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8368-9

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INDEX

Agriculture Policy Support Facility (APSF), 206 Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), 91, 153, 184, 186, 194, 236–238 Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS), 206 aid coordination in Kenya efforts among donors, 235 gaps in, 230 Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), 13, 16, 206, 229, 230, 239 aid effectiveness, 4, 8, 12, 14, 16 and agricultural sector of Africa, 47–48 and development and post-development, 57–62 and international policy transfer and diffusion, 49–51 and non-Development Assistance Committee donors, 48–49 and ownership concept, 42–47 architecture within Kenya government, 233 burden of, 40 conditions in, 37–42 dual responsibility on donors and receipients, 42 history of, 34–37 methods to improve, 226 principles of, 17, 42–47 reforms in, 37–42 aid effectiveness in Kenya focus on agencies and forums, 242 weakness of, 244 Aid Effectiveness Literature (AEL), 34, 35 Asal-based Livestock and Rural Livelihoods Support Project (ALLPRO), 188

B Busan High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness of 2011, 8 C Central Agriculture Board (CAB), 131 Common Interest Groups (CIGs), 85 Community Based Organisations (CBOs), 3, 130, 138–142 Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), 11, 47, 154 D Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), 6, 96, 98, 203 Decentralised Agricultural Support Structures (DASS), 206 dependency theory, 60 development aid in Kenya economy, role of, 11 Development Partners Coordination Group (DCG), 225 Development Partnership Forum (DPF), 228 divergence, 51 dominant development theory, 60 donors and Kenyan government system, 183, 208–210 and role of multilateral agencies, 188–192 country offices and donor funded programmes, 97–103 GiZ (Private Sector Development in Agriculture (PSDA)), Germany, 186–188 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 193–197 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 183–185

INDEX

trade and economic relationship with private sector, 202–208 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 96, 198–202 Drought Resilience, and Sustainable Livelihoods Program (DRSLP), 188 E East African Agricultural Productivity Programme (EAAPP), 188 Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) of 2003, 132 F Finnish International Development Agency (FIDA), 6 foreign aid, 1, 37 defined, 35 to Africa in 1960s, 2 to African countries, need to review aid by international donors, 4 foreign aid to African countries failure to achieve progress, 1–2 frame competition, 52 G genetically modified organisms (GMO) technology, 137 German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), 6 globalisation, 48, 51, 55 Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), 8, 9 H Harmonisation, Alignment and Coordination group (HAC), 229

259

Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA), 197 hybridisation, 51

I industrialisation, 1, 51 Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 136 International Finance Institutions (IFIs), 38 International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), 6, 20, 60, 94, 145, 188, 208 International Institutions (II), 57 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 3, 33, 34, 60 International Organizations (IO), 57

J Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), 194, 196 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 6

K Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project (KAPAP), 108, 110, 188, 192 Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), 77 Kenya Horticulture Competitiveness Project (KHCP), 199 Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), 136 Kenya National Federation of Agriculture Producers (known as Kenya National Farmers Federation (KENAFF)), 88 Kwale Agricultural Project (KWAP), 98

260

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M Makueni Agricultural Project (MAP), 98 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), 237 Medium Term Investment Plan (MTIP), 237 Micro Enterprise Programme Support Trust (MEPST), 207 Ministry of Agriculture, 21, 22, 27, 76, 133, 135, 143, 158, 196, 197, 209, 230, 234, 236, 238 donor projects and programmes of, 93–97 Livestock and Fisheries Development, 90–93 National Office, 93–97 Ministry of Cooperative Development, 238

N National Agriculture and Extension Policy (NAEP), 184 National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP), 85, 183 National Irrigation Board (NIB), 197 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 10, 225 NjaaMarufuku Kenya (NMK), 108

O Official Development Assistance (ODA), 34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 8, 58 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 4, 12

P Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness (2005), 4, 8, 12, 15, 27, 33, 44, 43–47, 47–48, 50, 61, 182, 224, 247–250, 252–254 Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (PEDC), 5–6 patron-client relationship, 250 policy convergence, 51 policy diffusion (theory of) and aid effectiveness principles, 57–59 and constructivism, 56 coercion, 52–53 occurence of, 50 policy learning, 54 policy transfer, 50 policy translation, 51 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 11, 46 R regionalisation, 51 Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Programme (RPLRP), 188 rent-seeking behaviour of African governments, 3 S selectivity model, 38 small-scale farming in Kenya, 110–112, 250 and assistance from private sector, 107–110 and objective of food security, 78–84 and role NGOs and CBOs, 103–107 as an occupation, 78–84

INDEX

farmers mobilisation by organisation to raise voice, 84–90 perspective of, 76–78 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 3 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 6, 183–185 Swynnerton Plan, 77

T Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development, 136 Thatcher, Margaret, 2 Truman, Harry, 34

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U United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 6 UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2015, 35, 251 W World Bank, 2, 3, 7, 60, 94, 188, 208 assistance to Kenya’s agricultural projects and programmes, 6 East African Agricultural Productivity Programme (EAAP), 190 Report Assessing Aid What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, 37