Africa in the Indian Ocean : Islands in Ebb and Flow [1 ed.] 9789004292499, 9789004291140

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Africa in the Indian Ocean

African Social Studies Series Editorial Board Preben Kaarsholm (Roskilde University) Carola Lentz (University of Mainz) John Lonsdale (University of Cambridge)

VOLUME 35

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/afss

Africa in the Indian Ocean Islands in Ebb and Flow By

Tor Sellström

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: View of lagoon and coastline, Nosy Be, Madagascar,© lkpro. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sellström, Tor.  Africa in the Indian Ocean : islands in ebb and flow / by Tor Sellström.   pages cm. -- (African social studies series ; v. 35)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-29114-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-29249-9 (e-book) 1. Islands of the Indian Ocean--History. 2. Islands of the Indian Ocean--Politics and government. 3. Islands of the Indian Ocean-Economic conditions. 4. Islands of the Indian Ocean--Social conditions. 5. Islands of the Indian Ocean-Foreign relations--Africa. 6. Africa--Foreign relations--Islands of the Indian Ocean. I. Title. II. Series: African social studies series ; v. 35.  DT468.S45 2015  969--dc23 2015007199

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1568–1203 isbn 978-90-04-29114-0 (paperback) isbn 978-90-04-29249-9 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

To Angela

∵

Contents Preface ix Acknowledgements xiv List of Maps xv List of Boxes xvi Reference Tables xvii List of Acronyms xix 1 Introduction: From Zanj to Maersk 1 2 Madagascar: Old Cultures, Contemporary Crises 49 3 Comoros: Legacies of Monsoon Trade and Un-Finished Independence 135 4 Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles: Creole Islands in Development 198 5 Mayotte and Chagos: Colonialism Continued 306 Bibliography/References 357 Name Index 373 Indian Ocean Place Names Index 377 Subject Index 380

Preface

Neglected No Longer

When Nelson Mandela in January 1995 as South Africa’s first democratically elected president paid a state visit to India, he recalled the historical role played in the two countries by Mahatma Gandhi.1 Underlining the links across the ocean, he suggested that “the natural urge of the facts of history and geography should broaden itself to include the concept of an Indian Ocean rim for socio-economic cooperation,” concluding that “[r]ecent changes in the international system demand that the countries of the Indian Ocean shall become a single platform.”2 With South Africa and India among the founding members, two years later an Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation was established. Strategically located in the middle of the ocean – roughly equidistant from Africa, the Middle East and India, and with Australia further to the east – the small African island state of Mauritius was chosen to host its secretariat. In the charter, the members of the new regional organization stated the reasons behind the initiative, declaring that they “with a sense of recovery of history” were [c]onscious of historical bonds created through millennia among peoples of the Indian Ocean […]; cognizant of economic transformation and speed of change the world over […]; realizing that the countries washed by the Indian Ocean in their diversity offer vast opportunities to enhance economic interaction; [and] convinced that the Indian Ocean rim by virtue of past shared experience and geo-economic linkages […] is poised for the creation of an effective association […].3

1 On past and present relations between South Africa and India across the Indian Ocean, see Isabel Hofmeyr and Michelle Williams (eds): South Africa and India: Shaping the Global South, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2011, which includes contributions on Gandhi. Gandhi worked as a lawyer in South Africa (Durban and Johannesburg) from 1893 to 1914. Joseph Lelyveld’s Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2011) narrates how his philosophy of non-violent resistance (satyagraha) was shaped in South Africa and put to the test in India. 2 Mandela quoted in Edward A. Alpers: The Indian Ocean in World History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p. 143. 3 ior-arc: ‘Charter of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation’, Port Louis, 3 March 1997.

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After the Second World War, the Indian Ocean had largely lost its former glory and was relegated to “a relative backwater.”4 In the beginning of the 21st century, however, the rise of India and China; their rapidly growing exchange with Africa; and the dominance of maritime trade have in addition to the petroleum and gas exports from the Middle East once more turned the ocean into a major global nexus.5 The sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean roughly carry two thirds of global oil shipments, around half of the container vessels and one third of the bulk cargo traffic. As a physical setting, a medium of transportation and a theater of naval presence, it is, as observed by Berlin, “neglected no longer.”6 Among others, Berlin has further argued that “no region is likely to play a crucial role as the Indian Ocean, due to its combination of oil, Islam and the likely rivalry between India and China.”7 According to Kaplan, a senior fellow at the United States Center for a New American Security in Washington, it is a critical arena for global domination and “the essential place to contemplate the future of us power.”8 As a result, there has emerged an expanding Indian Ocean security literature, ranging from maritime studies to sea-power and geo-strategy.9 It is primarily concerned with the leading and emerging nations’ military capabilities and projections, paying scant attention to the presence of weaker coastal and oceanic states. The ocean world is often reduced to a chessboard, where the big naval powers seemingly maneuver in a void and the regional stakeholders – with the notable exception of India – are absent or irrelevant. In 2010, Bremner 4 Lee Cordner: ‘Rethinking Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region’ in Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (jior), Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, p. 67. 5 By volume, more than 90% of world trade is conducted by sea and the share is growing. At the same time, technological innovations, containerization, supertankers and gargantuan container vessels have led to a remarkable concentration of the shipping industry. In 2011, the world economy rested on the activities of some 74,000 merchant ships, their owners, operators and crew (Geoffrey Till: Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Routledge, London and New York, 2013, pp. 8–9). 6 Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin: ‘Neglected No Longer: The Indian Ocean at the Forefront of World Geopolitics and Global Geostrategy’ in jior, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, pp. 26–51. 7 Donald L. Berlin: ‘Neglected No Longer: Strategic Rivalry in the Indian Ocean’ in Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2002, quoted in ibid. 8 Robert D. Kaplan: Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Random House, New York, 2010, p. xiv. 9 Among the international academic publications, the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region is particularly informative. The French publications Diplomatie and Défense et Sécurité Internationale (dsi) regularly contain articles on the Indian Ocean.

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noted that “the [Indian] ocean is no longer a sea, but [turned into] abstract parcels of exploitable territory to be tendered off to the highest bidder.”10 There is a need to fill this gap and, as stated by Kaarsholm and Sheriff, begin to “explore how systems of power and approaches to development have shaped the societies of the modern Indian Ocean rim in both the past and the present.”11 Four Indian Ocean states are members of the African Union. In this respect too, there is a conspicuous lacuna. Whereas works on Swahili culture, the East African slave trade and other subjects closely related to the Indian Ocean traditionally feature in the field of African studies, more often than not inquiries into contemporary African affairs only mention the Indian Ocean islands in passing, if at all.12 This is, in particular, the case in the Anglo-American literature. Although Madagascar is a potential regional power; Mauritius and Seychelles are economic success stories; Comoros’ conflicts involve the United Nations; Reunion13 is an integral part of France; Mayotte has been attached to the European Union; the British Indian Ocean Territory is still a colony; and the indigenous people of Chagos have been forcefully removed in favor of a us naval base, most works on Africa leave them out altogether.14 To quote but one example, in his Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, Dowden explicitly states that he does not cover Africa’s islands and archipelagos, arguing that Madagascar is “a world apart” and that the other islands too “are different.”15 Different and diverse, the islands of the western Indian Ocean are, nonetheless, part of Africa and the outcome of historical processes shared with the continent. As the pendulum of history swings back; the Indian Ocean is neglected no more; and the African Union develops an integrated maritime 10 11 12 13 14

15

Lindsay Bremner: ‘Folded Ocean’ (2010), Quoted in Pamila Gupta: ‘Monsoon Fever’ in Social Dynamics, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 2012, p. 524. Preben Kaarsholm and Abdul Sheriff: ‘Introduction’ (to a special issue on the Indian Ocean) in Social Dynamics, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 2012, p. 360. This is, as a rule, also the case with the Atlantic island republics of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Six out of the 54 African Union members – 11% – are island states. In the text, Reunion (La Réunion) is written without an accent. Martin Meredith’s The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town, 2005) makes no reference to the Indian Ocean nations. Out of a thousand pages, Guy Arnold’s monumental Africa: A Modern History (Atlantic Books, London, 2005) dedicates ten to the indian-oceanic states. Richard Dowden: Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, Portobello Books, London, 2008, p. 9. For a critique of what he describes as a “continent-bound stereotype” of Africa, see ‘The Island Factor’ in Edward A. Alpers (ed): East Africa and the Indian Ocean, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 2009, pp. 39–42.

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strategy, it is hoped that the following text will contribute towards a better understanding of the history and the current social, political and economic challenges faced by the African indian-oceanic countries and peoples, addressing a gap in the broader fields of both Indian Ocean and African studies.

Intentions, Sources and Structure

The book is not the outcome of original research, nor does it claim to break new theoretical ground. Mainly drawing on acknowledged scholarly work and with an inter-disciplinary approach, the principal objective is to offer an accessible overview of the African island states and territories in the western Indian Ocean. By empirically presenting developments, events and data and exploring the ebb and flow of the countries and territories in their setting of a changing ocean, the text is primarily intended as a general introduction for students of African affairs, as well as for non-academic practitioners in international organizations, the diplomatic service and the ngo sector with an interest in the Indian Ocean world. Scholars in specific areas of expertise may find the narrative wanting. It is, nevertheless, hoped that it will be useful also to students of history, political science, development studies, conflict resolution or international relations. While history and external contexts play prominent parts, the focus on Madagascar, Comoros, Reunion, Mauritius, Seychelles, Mayotte and Chagos is on contemporary domestic affairs, achievements and shortcomings, challenges and threats. As they form part of Africa, the profiles include their relations with the continent and, in particular, the African Union. In addition to monographs and edited volumes, the text relies on academic articles and papers, as well as on official documents and reports. Media accounts are used to illustrate recent events. Several boxes accompany the text for background information, additional explanation or contextualization. For the benefit of those unfamiliar with the colonial history of France, some of them summarize significant issues and events. To facilitate macro- and socioeconomic comparisons between the sovereign Indian Ocean nations, data in us Dollars from the World Bank, imf, undp and other international organizations refer to 2010–12. For Reunion and Mayotte – which are departments of France and do not appear in global indexes – the corresponding information is sourced from the French official statistical agency insee and given in Euros. References are recorded in footnotes, perhaps too strictly and excessively. However, in the cases of quotations and quantitative data, as well as where the views expressed may appear controversial, transparency requires that the

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sources are properly accounted for. Important works on various subject matters are further noted with a view to assist the interested reader. To frame the individual island presentations, the introduction outlines the physical environment, salient historical events and processes, contemporary challenges, external powers and regional organizations in the African part of the Indian Ocean. Written in a similar format, the following chapters on Madagascar, Comoros and the creole islands of Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles explore their history, demography and insular commonality. Above all, they focus on the islands’ post-colonial socio-political and economic developments and, therefore, also on their diversity. Finally, the concluding chapter discusses the situation with regard to Mayotte and Chagos, territories which in breach of international law respectively remain under French and Anglo-American administration. The narrative covers events until 2013. Where relevant, it goes further. In the case of Madagascar, it includes a preliminary assessment of the December 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections, which brought a formal end to the country’s prolonged constitutional crisis. Somali piracy is discussed in the opening chapter and again in the text on Seychelles. By 2013, the threat had dramatically decreased and some could argue that it has been given too much attention. While the situation has improved, it remains, however, that piracy has had profound effects on the island states and societies, Seychelles in particular, and that the international counter-piracy operations have led to growing militarization, as well as to the appearance of new external actors on the Indian Ocean stage. Selection, sequencing and presentation of facts, figures and ideas are never truly comprehensive or objective. As noted by Munslow on the writing of history, “knowledge [bears] the fingerprints of its interpreters.”16 That said, this book on the Indian Ocean nations and territories aims at providing a fair, updated and intelligible presentation of a little known region of Africa. 16

Alun Munslow: Deconstructing History, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, p. 8.

Acknowledgements As this book goes to the printer, I would like to express my appreciation to those who made it possible and supported me during the writing process. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency generously seconded me to the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, where Carin Norberg and her staff made me feel warmly welcome and Mats Utas encouraged me to turn various papers and ideas into a coherent manuscript. Among the many readers of the draft text, I am grateful to Preben Kaarsholm for his general comments and much indebted to Iain Walker and Peter Sand for their expertise on Comoros and Chagos. Although they remain anonymous, deep thanks go to the Brill reviewers for their insightful and constructive observations. At Brill in Leiden, Franca de Kort extended invaluable assistance. On the Indian Ocean islands, I have enjoyed the hospitality and services of a great number of institutions, organizations, officials, librarians and friends. I am especially grateful to the Hoareau and the Tambara families in Seychelles, who opened their homes and helped me in so many ways. Myrna Tambara has become a friend for life. In Sweden, my wife Angela Muvumba ungrudgingly spurred me on while struggling with her doctoral dissertation. With profound gratitude and in memory of unforgettable visits to the Indian Ocean, I dedicate this book to her. Knivsta/Uppsala, Sweden 15 October 2014

List of Maps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Western Indian Ocean 2 Shipping in the western Indian Ocean 5 Exclusive Economic Zones (eezs) 23 Extension of Somali piracy 2005–2011 29 Madagascar 50 Comoros 136 Reunion 200 Mauritius 224 Seychelles 262 Mayotte 310 British Indian Ocean Territory (Chagos) 337 Diego Garcia 352

List of Boxes Introduction: From Zanj to Maersk

Socotra, Lakshadweep and Maldives 3 Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 11 Somali piracy 28 Blue-water capability 35 The South African navy 41

Madagascar: Old Cultures, Contemporary Crises

Slavery and stigma 56 Code de l’indigénat 75 Communauté française and decolonization in French Africa 81 agoa, the Cotonou Agreement and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 125 Piracy off Madagascar 132 Rural violence 134

Comoros: Legacies of Monsoon Trade and Un-Finished Independence au Border Programme 141 Mozambique Island 151 Zanzibar and Mozambique 158 Denard and Françafrique 169

Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles: Creole Islands in Development A modern university 214 Agalega, Cargados Carajos and Tromelin 223 Dynastic families 237 Sustainability of tourism 252 Deportation and exile 270

Mayotte and Chagos: Colonialism Continued Searching for a us base 338

Reference Tables The following tables are for general comparisons, with figures referring to 2009–12. For updates, trends and sources, see the main text. Data for the French overseas departments of Mayotte and Reunion are not included in international tables by the undp, the World Bank and similar organizations. A) Physical

Land area (in km2) Population Density (per km2) eez (in km2) International tourists As % of population

com

mad

mau

may

reu

sey

1,644

587,000

2,040

374

2,512

457

754,000 20,700,000 1,300,000 459 35 637

213,000 840,000 570 334

91,000 199/448

164,000 1,225,000 2,000 260,000

1,285,000 930,000

63,000 4,000

315,000 60,000

1,336,000 210,000

0.3

71.5

1.9

7.1

231

1.3

In Seychelles, 99% of the population lives on the islands of Mahé, Praslin and La Digue, where the density is 448 inhabitants per km2. The category ‘international tourists’ does not include French citizens to Comoros, Mayotte or Reunion. The land area of the British Indian Ocean Territory (biot)/Chagos is 60 square kilometers and the exclusive economic zone (eez) 639,000 km2. There is no resident population in biot.

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reference tables

B) Socio-Economic com

mad

mau

may

reu

sey

gdp/capita (in usd)

740

427

7,577

0.64 44.8 0.429 169 35 31 133

0.44 76.5 0.483 151 21 35 118

0.38 2 0.737 80 3 1 43

17,700 Euros 0.39 50 0.881 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

11,249

Gini coefficient Poverty rate in % Human Dev:t Index hdi rank world hdi rank Africa iiag rank Africa cpi rank world

6,575 Euros 0.49 28 0.75 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

0.66 0.5 0.806 46 1 4 51

Data for Mayotte and Reunion are from the French statistical agency insee and in Euros. Poverty refers to the monetary rate of France, i.e. before social transfers. gdp/per capita in usd refer to 2010 and the Gini coefficients to 2009–12. Figures and ranks for the Human Development Index (hdi), the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (iiag) and the Corruption Perception Index (cpi) refer to 2012.

List of Acronyms afd French Development Agency AfDB African Development Bank africom United States Africa Command agoa African Growth and Opportunity Act (of United States) aim African Integrated Maritime Strategy akfm Party for Madagascar’s Independence amisom African Union Military Mission to Somalia amu African and Malagasy Union anc African National Congress (of South Africa) aprm African Peer Review Mechanism aps Africa Partnership Station (of United States) arema Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution asec Association of Comorian Apprentices and Students asf African Standby Force au African Union biot British Indian Ocean Territory bnp Federal Intelligence Service (of Germany) cam Muslim Committee of Action (of Mauritius) cenit  Independent National Electoral Commission for the Transition (of Madagascar) cfv Committee of Living Forces (of Madagascar) cgpcs Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia cia Central Intelligence Agency (of United States) coi Commission de l’Océan Indien comesa Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa cpi Corruption Perception Index crg Chagos Refugees Group dgse General Directorate for External Security (of France) dom Overseas Department (of France) eca Economic Commission for Africa echr European Court of Human Rights eec European Economic Community eez Exclusive Economic Zone epa Economic Partnership Agreement epz Export Processing Zone erdf European Regional Development Fund eu European Union

xx eu navfor fao fazsoi fco fd fdi ffkm fln fnj Fnu Foi fpr frelimo gcc gdp gggi gwf hat hdi hipc icc icg-m icrc ict idc ifb ifs iiag ilo imf imo insee ioc ions iora ior-arc iot iotc ipcc isa

list of acronyms European Union Naval Force Food and Agriculture Organization French Armed Forces in the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean Foreign and Commonwealth Office (of United Kingdom) Democratic Front (of Comoros) foreign direct investments Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar National Liberation Front (of Algeria) National Front for Justice (of Comoros) United National Front (of Comoros) Swedish Defense Research Agency Rodrigues Patriotic Front Mozambique Liberation Front Gulf Cooperation Council gross domestic product Global Gender Gap Index General Workers Federation (of Mauritius) High Authority of Transition (of Madagascar) Human Development Index Highly Indebted Poor Countries International Criminal Court International Contact Group on Madagascar International Committee of the Red Cross information and communications technology Islands Development Company Independent Forward Bloc (of Mauritius) international financial services Ibrahim Index of African Governance International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (of France) Indian Ocean Commission Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Indian Ocean Rim Association Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation Indian Ocean Tuna Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Seabed Authority

list of acronyms itlos lms mapar mdrm mfa mir mir mlp mmm mmp molinaco monima mpa mpa mpm mpr mr msm nam nato ndp nis oau oda oecd oif opr or padesm panama pasoco pcr pdm pmp pmsd pmxd ppm prsp ps psd

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea London Missionary Society Miaraka Amin’ny Prezidà Andry Rajoelina (of Madagascar) Democratic Movement for the Revival of Madagascar Multi-Fiber Arrangement Movement for the Independence of Reunion Rodrigues Independence Movement Mauritian Labour Party Mauritian Militant Movement Movement of Presidential Majority (of Comoros) National Liberation Movement of the Comoros National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar Marine Protected Area Popular Movement of Anjouan Mahorian Popular Movement Resistance Movement (of Seychelles) Rodrigues Movement Militant Socialist Movement (of Mauritius) Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Democratic Party (of Seychelles) National Intelligence Services (of South Africa) Organization of African Unity official development assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development International Organization of the Francophonie Organization of the People of Rodrigues Outermost Region (of the European Union) Party of Madagascar’s Disinherited Nationalist Party of Madagascar Socialist Party of Comoros Communist Party of Reunion Popular Democratic Movement (of Seychelles) Platform for a Presidential Majority (of Madagascar) Mauritian Social-Democratic Party Mauritian Party of Xavier Duval Martinican Progressive Party poverty reduction strategy paper Parti Seselwa (of Seychelles) Social Democratic Party (of Madagascar)

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xxii

list of acronyms

psm Mauritian Socialist Party rappicc Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Co-ordination Center rdpc Democratic Rally for the Comorian People rea Rezistans ek Alternativ (of Mauritius) renamo Mozambique National Resistance sadc Southern Africa Development Community scg Seychelles Coast Guard sdp Seychelles Democratic Party seypec Seychelles Petroleum Company sids Small Island Developing States siup Seychelles Islanders United Party slp Seychelles Liberal Party smb Seychelles Marketing Board snp Seychelles National Party sppf Seychelles People’s Progressive Front spup Seychelles People’s United Party stla Seychelles Taxpayers and Landowners Association taaf French Southern and Antarctic Lands tanu Tanganyika African National Union tfg Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia) tgv Tanora Malagasy Vonona (of Madagascar) tim Tiaka i Madigasikara (of Madagascar) tom Overseas Territory (of France) uae United Arab Emirates udc Democratic Union of Comoros udim Union in Defense of Mayotte’s Interests udm Mauritian Democratic Union uk United Kingdom un United Nations unclcs United Nations Commission for Limits of the Continental Shelf unclos United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea unctad United Nations Conference on Trade and Development undp United Nations Development Programme uneca United Nations Economic Commission for Africa unep United Nations Environment Programme unga United Nations General Assembly unodc United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime unsc United Nations Security Council us United States

list of acronyms vio voc vvs wb wef wfp wto

Vanilla Islands Organization Dutch East India Company Vy, Vato, Sakelika (of Madagascar) World Bank World Economic Forum World Food Programme World Trade Organization

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chapter 1

Introduction: From Zanj to Maersk

Monsoon Islands

After the Pacific and the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean is the world’s third largest expanse of water. Contrary to the others, it does not extend into the Arctic. Reaching from Africa in the west to Indonesia and Australia in the east, the shores of the Arabian Peninsula and Asia constitute its northern limits. Conventionally, the ocean is divided into a western and an eastern part, each with its own features. The internationally accepted division follows the 80th meridian east from the southern tip of India to the Antarctic region. East of this longitude, the Indian Ocean is deep and open, whereas the western part is comparatively shallow and – as was often overstated on early maps and nautical charts – characterized by a number of islands, archipelagos, shoals and underwater ridges. Endowed with rich coastal and pelagic fishing grounds, it attracts significant numbers of international trawlers and purse seiners in pursuit of shrimp and, above all, tuna. Seychelles is the regional hub, with one of the largest tuna canneries in the world and hosting the inter-governmental Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. All the African island nations and territories discussed below form part of the western Indian Ocean. Roughly covering an area between the Equator and the Tropic of Capricorn,1 the region is entirely tropical. Like the island world of the south Pacific, it evokes images of azure blue waters, palm-fringed lagoons and white beaches.2 Actively promoting themselves as holiday destinations, some of the island states – notably Mauritius and Seychelles – annually welcome hundreds of thousands of international tourists. Further south – beyond Madagascar and the northern limit of the Antarctic drift ice – the tropical waters give way to the Southern Ocean, a sub-polar world also dotted with isolated islands’.3 1 The Tropic of Capricorn passes through the southern part of Madagascar close to the western coastal town of Toliara. 2 In its preamble, the constitution of Seychelles portrays the nation as “one of the most beautiful countries in the world.” Colloquially, the inhabitants often refer to the islands as ‘Paradise’. 3 The islands in the Southern Ocean are the South African Marion and Prince Edward islands; the French Crozet group, Kerguelen archipelago and the twin islands of St. Paul and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004292499_002

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Map 1 

Western Indian Ocean

Amsterdam; as well as Australia’s Heard and McDonald islands. Together with the Adélie land on Antarctica and the Scattered Islands off Madagascar – which are discussed in the text – the islands held by France are administered as the overseas territory (tom) of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises/taaf). The islands in the Southern Ocean are among the most remote places on earth. For a presentation, see Iain Walker: The Complete Guide to the Southwest Indian Ocean: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion, Seychelles, Cornelius Books, Argelès sur Mer, 1993, pp. 575–85.

Introduction

3

Socotra, Lakshadweep and Maldives The island of Socotra and the archipelagos of Lakshadweep and Maldives are located in the western Indian Ocean, but form part of Asia. Situated some 250 kilometers east of the Horn of Africa and 380 kilometers south of the Arabian Peninsula, Socotra belongs to Yemen. The Lakshadweep – formerly known as the Laccadive Islands and situated between 200 and 400 kilometers off the southwestern Indian coast – constitute the smallest union territory of India. Further south, the independent Republic of the Maldives consists of a double chain of more than twenty atolls with around a thousand islands and islets. Located 400 kilometers south-west of India, it is the smallest Asian country in both population and land area. It is also the most low-lying nation in the world. As a small, independent island state, Maldives interacts closely with Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros. With the latter, it shares Sunni Islam as the official faith. For a detailed presentation of the geography of both the African and Asian islands of the western Indian Ocean, see Jean-Louis Guébourg: Petites Îles et Archipels de l’Océan Indien, Karthala, Paris, 2006.

Contrasting with the tranquility of tourism and human leisure are the dramatic geological origins of the maritime territories. While the giant island of Madagascar – the fourth largest on earth – and the main, inner islands of Seychelles – the world’s only mid-oceanic granitic outcrops – are the results of tectonic shifts and the disintegration of the southern Gondwana supercontinent some hundred million years ago, Comoros, Reunion, Mauritius and Rodrigues are all volcanic. The Karthala volcano on Grande Comore and Piton de la Fournaise on Reunion – both reaching around 2,500 meters above sea level – are still active. The low-lying Seychelles’ outer islands and the Chagos archipelago, on the other hand, are coralline, resting on underwater banks and, respectively, featuring the world’s largest raised reef (Aldabra) and its largest atoll structure (Great Chagos Bank). In a not too distant future, the economic importance of the western Indian Ocean may rest on the sea bed in the form of off-shore gas and petroleum exploitation, as well as the harvesting of ocean floor mineral nodules.4 While 4 In December 2013, the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources announced that Germany had applied for a license to have exclusive mining access for a minimum period of fifteen years to some 10,000 square kilometers of the ocean floor

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the island countries’ own exports and imports only represent a minute fraction of regional trade, in the meantime it is the giant supertankers and gargantuan container vessels such as the Maersk Triple E megaships on the communication lanes across the waters that are of global significance. As noted, considerable shares of the world’s oil, container and bulk cargo traffic transit via the Indian Ocean, primarily eastwards from the Middle East, but also in a northsouth direction on both sides of Madagascar, through the inner passage via the 1,600-kilometer long Mozambique Channel or past the Mascarenes (Reunion, Mauritius and Rodrigues) to the east.5 The oceanic maritime routes, often referred to as ‘highways of the sea’, cross the exclusive economic zones held by Seychelles, Comoros, Madagascar and Reunion, but also the zones declared by Britain and – above all – France. However, since there in the western Indian Ocean exists a number of overlapping and competing claims, the emerging exploration for oil (and mineral nodules), as well as the longer term, strategic control over the sea lines, constitute potential sources of conflict and considerable challenges for the weak independent Indian Ocean states. Finally, the physical feature that before the advent of steam power more than anything else shaped the western Indian Ocean world is its distinct weather system. The regular reversal of the monsoons – from mausim; the Arabic word for ‘season’ – has throughout history facilitated commercial exchange, cultural co-existence and migration across the ocean, linking East Africa to the Middle East, India and China.6 Ever since sailors ventured across s­ outh-east of Madagascar. Exploratory research had indicated large concentrations of gold, silver and various metals used in the production of computers, cell-phones, wind turbines and other high technology goods (‘Germany seeks permit to explore Madagascan sea bed for minerals’ in Mail and Guardian, 28 December 2013). Under the 1982 un Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Seabed Authority (isa) – based in Kingston, Jamaica – monitors all mineral-related activities beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. It also issues licenses for commercial exploration. 5 The Mozambique Channel is an important corridor for goods shipped from the Atlantic to East Africa and the Middle East, as well as for shipments of crude oil from the Persian Gulf that cannot transit via the Suez Canal. One third of the channel is claimed by France. 6 Historically, the trade that traversed the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea was sub-divided into three interlocking circuits, from west to east respectively dominated by Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism (Janet L. Abu-Lughod: Before European Hegemony: The World System a.d. 1250–1350, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1989, pp. 251–60). The western Indian Ocean circuits were bisected by the Indian peninsula, defining two sub-regions. Within each sub-region, a sailing cycle could be completed within a year, whereas the crossing from one to the other extended the voyage to more than a year. As a result, each sub-region developed its own characteristics (Abdul Sheriff: Dhow Cultures of the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, Commerce and Islam, Hurst & Company, London, 2010, p. 2).

Introduction

5

Source: Based on Ortalland and Pirat: Atlas Géopolitique des Espaces Maritimes: Frontières, Énergie, Transports, Piraterie, Peche et Environnement (Éditions Technip, Paris 2010)

Map 2 

Shipping in the western Indian Ocean

the open sea, the seasonal winds have carried them over the oceanic crescent, from India towards eastern Africa from November to March (winter monsoon) and in the opposite direction between April and September (summer monsoon). As summarized by Hall, “[f]or six months, they blow one way, then in the reverse direction during the other half of the year. […] The sea-captains of old might not understand why the monsoons happened […], [but] for them it was sufficient that the winds came on time, year in and year out, to fill their sails.”7 In their times of fury, however, the winds were feared. In the beginning of the 10th century, the Arab historian and geographer al-Masudi wrote that “I have sailed on many seas, but I do not know of one more dangerous than

7 Richard Hall: Empires of the Monsoon: A History of the Indian Ocean and its Invaders, Harper Collins Publishers, London, 1998, pp. xxi–xxii.

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that of Zanj,” the Arabic name given to the western Indian Ocean.8 Today, cyclones and tropical storms often cause considerable material damage and loss of lives in Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius, whereas the devastating effects are less pronounced in Comoros and rare on the main, inner islands of Seychelles, which are situated outside the cyclonic belt. At the same time, the rains carried by the winds are vital for agricultural production. Without them, the sugar plantations on the Mascarenes would not have been possible.

Muslim Merchants and a Chinese Admiral

With the important exception of the enigmatic, trans-oceanic crossings and subsequent settlement in Madagascar by Austronesian migrants from the 7th or 8th century ad (or considerably earlier) – “an astonishing chapter in the annals of ocean travel”9 – after the fall of the Roman empire it was Arab, Persian, Indian and Chinese seafarers who for more than a thousand years plied the Indian Ocean. Europeans only re-appeared with the Portuguese under Vasco da Gama in 1498. While the first permanent Portuguese settlement was set up at Goa on the west coast of India in 1510, after mastering the monsoons and – above all – as a consequence of the expansion of Islam, already by the 8th century merchants from Arabia, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf had established a string of trading posts along the opposite littoral in Africa, reaching as far south as present-day Mozambique and transforming the coastal Swahili culture.10 Linking East Africa to the Middle East and India, for centuries the western Indian Ocean – Bahr al-Zanj – was “a Muslim lake.”11 Arabic became the lingua franca and Islamic law provided a legal framework for the mercantile trade. Covering a distance of around 3,000 kilometers, from north to south the emerging Arab city states notably included Mogadishu (Somalia), Lamu, Malindi, Mombasa (Kenya), Zanzibar, Kilwa (Tanzania), Mozambique Island and Sofala (Mozambique). Construction in stone of mosques and houses

8 9 10

11

Ibid., p. 36. Arab writers used the term Zanj to refer both to the East African coast and to its inhabitants. It is the origin of the name of Zanzibar. Ibid., p. 24. Mark Horton and John Middleton: The Swahili: The Social Landscape of a Mercantile Society, Blackwell Publishers, Malden, 2000, pp. 47–71. The word ‘swahili’ is derived from sahil, meaning ‘coast’ or ‘shoreline’ in Arabic. Sheriff op. cit., pp. 239–61.

Introduction

7

began in the 10th century. Within direct reach of the monsoon from India, Mombasa grew into prominence as a major ‘stone town’. In the 12th century, it was surpassed by Kilwa, which controlled the gold trade from the African interior via Sofala. Ibn Battuta – perhaps the most prolific traveler of all times12 – visited Kilwa in 1331 and described it as “one of the most beautiful and well-constructed towns in the world.”13 In Kilwa, the main source of wealth was gold, but Arab and Swahili merchants along the coast traded a variety of African goods for cloth, beads, spices, porcelain and silk from the Middle East, India and China, ranging from ivory and rhino horn to mangrove poles and tortoise shell. The trade in slaves was important. During his visit to Kilwa, Battuta noted that the majority of the inhabitants were African, but also that the sultan “frequently [makes] raids into the Zanj country, attacks them and carries off booty.”14 Often in fierce competition, the trading Arab sultanates were never ruled as a single political entity. Typically located on off-shore islands and firmly oriented towards the ocean,15 neither did they aspire to physically occupy the African hinterland or impose the Muslim faith on the peoples of the interior. East Africa did not form part of the lands conquered by the Islamic armies. Indirectly, however, the slave trade contributed to the growth of Islam on the East African coast. According to sharia law, it was not permitted to take slaves from Muslim areas and Muslim believers should not enslave their fellows. 12

13 14

15

Of Berber descent, Ibn Battuta (1304–1369) was born in Tangier, Morocco. Trained in law, in 1325 he went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but continued traveling over the following decades. Some 50 years after Marco Polo (1254–1324), his marathon journey took him via North Africa and the Middle East to India, Indonesia and China. In 1331, he visited the Swahili coast of Africa. After returning to Morocco, he traveled through West Africa. In 1354, Battuta dictated his memoirs, entitled A Gift to Those Who Contemplate the Wonders of Cities and the Marvels of Traveling, more simply known as The Journey. Approximately covering three times as much ground as Polo, practically all the time Battuta traveled in a Muslim world. Quoted in Sheriff op. cit., p. 229. Ibid. From the beginning of the Islamic period, the capture and sale of slaves from Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and East Africa played a significant part in the mercantile exchange with the Middle East, India and China. In addition to slaves for domestic purposes, in the 9th century great numbers were brought to drain and desalinate the swamps of lower Mesopotamia near the town of Basra (Iraq). The wretched conditions provoked the great Zanj rebellion of 868, when slaves formed a substantial army, sacked Basra, laid waste to most of southern Iraq and threatened the survival of the caliphate in Baghdad. After fifteen years of fighting, the revolt was eventually put down in 883. On the slave trade in the Indian Ocean, see below. However, Mogadishu, Malindi and Sofala were situated on the mainland.

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For coastal communities conversion became “an insurance policy against enslavement and raiding by overseas merchants.”16 African converts were as a result incorporated – and over time assimilated – into socially stratified Swahili towns and settlements, ruled by small Arab elites. Although known to them, the Arabs did not include the uninhabited Mas­ carenes and Seychelles in their seaborne trading operations. Notably linked to Kilwa, the Comorian islands and northern Madagascar, however, played prominent parts. By the 12th century, Comoros had been firmly integrated into the mercantile network and was with the arrival of Hadramis from Yemen to develop into an important center of Islamic learning. Known as Antalaotra (‘People of the Sea’), Arab traders had at the same time established significant trading posts in northern Madagascar. As on the African coast, the Muslim societies included Arab elites, indigenous commoners who serviced the mercantile economy and domestic slaves. The early 15th century saw a relative decline of Islamic exchange with East Africa and a corresponding growth in trade with India. Above all, however, it witnessed the unprecedented appearance in the western Indian Ocean of the mighty Chinese treasure fleets. After centuries of predominantly indirect maritime trade through allies, from 1405 Emperor Yongle (Yung-Lo), the third ruler of the Ming dynasty, broke with isolationist traditions and embarked on gigantic naval expeditions into the ‘Western Seas’. Under the command of Zheng He,17 until 1433 seven such expeditions were carried out with the objectives of projecting China’s power, enforcing treaties and looking for export markets. The world had never seen similar armadas, composed of up to a hundred large junks – on average six times bigger than the caravels used by Columbus and Vasco da Gama – and carrying around 30,000 men, including doctors, scientists, interpreters, artisans and traders.18 From the fifth expedition in 1417, the Chinese floating cities turned west from India, visiting Mogadishu and Malindi on the African Swahili coast. As suddenly as they had appeared, from 1433, however, they vanished. After Emperor Yongle’s death in 1424, the mandarin bureaucrats put a stop to Zheng 16 17

18

Horton and Middleton op. cit., p. 51. Born in the province of Yunnan, Zheng He (originally Ma He; 1371–1433) was from a Muslim family. Both his grand-father and father had made pilgrimages to Mecca. As a young boy, he was captured by the Ming army, castrated and made a page to the prince Yongle. After studies at the Imperial Central College in the capital Nanjing, he was made Director of Palace Servants and later Admiral of the Western Seas. During his expeditions, Zheng He was accompanied by the interpreter and chronicler Ma Huan. Also a Muslim and fluent in Arabic, his accounts of the Indian Ocean world – The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores – constitute with those by Ibn Battuta a widely recognized primary source. Sheriff op. cit., pp. 292–98.

Introduction

9

He’s long-distance maritime expeditions, literally turning their backs on the sea. As observed by Hall, “the silken screens of Confucian authority closed around his reputation and the ‘Star Raft’ records were destroyed.”19 Six centuries later, official Chinese vessels returned to the waters outside Mogadishu and Malindi. With China depending on oil from the Middle East and raw materials from Africa, they represented the navy of the People’s Liberation Army and formed part of the international effort to secure the sea-lanes from Somalibased pirats. In China and elsewhere, the naval re-appearance in the western Indian Ocean was accompanied by writings and documentaries on the great Muslim eunuch admiral.20

Catholic Cannons and Capitalist Companies

Before 1500, the western Indian Ocean was a mare liberum, a free sea, where trade was not controlled by states and largely unrestricted. It changed dramatically with the arrival of the Portuguese. Denied overland access to the riches of the East and as part of the Catholic crusade against Islam, from the early 15th century they had explored the west coast of Africa in search of a maritime route to India. The search was crowned with success in 1498, when Vasco da Gama rounded the southern Cape, sailed into the Indian Ocean from the rear and with the help of an Indian pilot made the crossing from Malindi to Calicut (Koshikode) on the Malabar coast in the present Indian state of Kerala. Combining religious zeal with superior fire-power, in the wake of da Gama’s epic journey the Portuguese subsequently “behaved in an extraordinarily aggressive and combative manner, determined to trade ‘with advantage’ and to force their terms […] on others.”21 In a letter to King Manuel I, Afonso de Albuquerque, naval commander and governor of India, described the attack on Goa in 1510: Then I burnt the city and put everyone to the sword […]. No matter where we found them, we did not spare the life of a single Muslim. We filled the mosques with them and set them on fire […]. We found that 6,000 Muslim souls, male and female, were dead.22 19 20

21 22

Hall op. cit., p. 91. Zheng He’s fleet was known as the ‘Star Raft’. For example, the documentary drama Zheng He: China’s Greatest Naval Explorer, originally aired on National Geographic’s ‘Channel Asia’ in December 2005 and exclusively sponsored by the air carrier Cathay Pacific. Till op. cit., pp. 11–12. Quoted in Hall op. cit., p. 221.

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The towns along the African Swahili coast and in northern Madagascar were similarly bombarded, torched and looted. Within a decade of da Gama’s landing in Calicut, the Portuguese had occupied Sofala, sacked Kilwa and plundered Mombasa. In 1510, Goa was chosen as the capital of a new Estado da India (‘State of India’) covering the entire Indian Ocean. With a population of just over a million, Portugal, however, did not have the human resources to secure the length of the African coast. Instead, they built massive fortifications on Mozambique Island in the south and at Mombasa in the north, “like a pair of goal posts marking their maritime empire.”23 As the Arabs before them, they had further no ambition to colonize the African hinterland, but focused on controlling the ocean. The seaborne trade, particularly in pepper and other spices from India and the Far East, was declared a Portuguese monopoly and a system of licenses (cartazes) was imposed on all shipping. Unlicensed vessels were liable to be seized, plundered and sunk.24 The irruption of the Portuguese marked the end of free trade and the beginning of European supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Although hugely consequential, their dominance, however, was neither comprehensive nor lasting. Focusing on India and the Far East, they never established a foothold on Madagascar, Comoros or the Mascarene islands. By the middle of the 16th century, the indigenous monsoon trade had largely recovered. In addition, from the early 17th century the Portuguese encountered mounting European competition from the recently established English and Dutch East India companies, with a combined strength several times that of Portugal. In Hall’s words, while “Portuguese energies were still split between spice-trading and winning converts for Catholicism, [t]he Dutch and English were concerned with making profits. […] [T]he chartered companies were never burdened with the exalted principles on which the Estado da India was founded. Their responsibility was not to God, but to the shareholders.”25 Losing the political and economic command to the European competitors, eventually the Portuguese were also militarily defeated by their Muslim arch-enemies. In 1698 – exactly two centuries after da Gama’s voyage – Fort Jesus in Mombasa fell into the hands of Omani forces. All that was left for Portugal on the east coast of Africa was Mozambique Island and a number of secondary ports north and south of the fortified settlement.26 23 24 25 26

Alpers (2009) op. cit., p. 45. On Portugal in the Indian Ocean, see C.R. Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415– 1825, Hutchinson of London, London, 1969. Hall op. cit., pp. 292 and 328. In the interior Zambezi valley, Portugal nominally maintained large crown estates, known as prazos. From the mid-17th century, the Afro-Portuguese prazeros became progressively

Introduction

11

By that time, the European challengers had firmly established themselves on the spice route to Asia, occupying the main uninhabited islands and integrating the entire region into the world economy. First out was the English (later British) East India Company, established by royal charter in 1600. It was followed by the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East India Company/voc), formed two years later. Various initiatives were merged into a French company in 1664.27 Focusing on the lucrative trade in spices, the rival companies set up fortified trading posts, known as ‘factories’, on the coasts of India, the Indonesian islands and in China. As early as 1619, the Dutch voc established a base in Batavia (now Jakarta) on the island of Java, commanding the spice route and eclipsing its competitors.

Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie For more than one hundred years, the Dutch East India Company overshadowed its competitors. Described as the first multinational corporation, the voc was organized as a stock company, owned by Dutch merchants and based in Amsterdam. Much more than a mere trading operation, the Dutch government accorded the company rights to keep a military force; seize and colonize new lands; wage war against local peoples and European rivals; negotiate treaties; coin its own money; and set monopoly prices on its trade commodities. Having eliminated the Portuguese competition in the early 17th century, it launched a series of military campaigns and took control of the Indonesian islands and the lucrative spice trade. Towards the end of the century, the British East India Company emerged as a potent challenger, but it was only after the 1780 AngloDutch War that the power of the voc was broken. The company was dissolved in 1799. Since the launch in 1602, it had fitted out over 4,700 ships and employed almost a million Dutch and other Europeans to work in its fleet, army, factories and land holdings in Africa (Cape of Good Hope), the Indian Ocean (Mauritius, India and Ceylon/Sri Lanka) and East Asia (Indonesia and Japan).

27

independent. They controlled the inland trade and were actively involved in the capture and sale of Mozambican slaves to Zanzibar, Madagascar and the Mascarenes. Other European nations too formed East India companies. The Danish East India Com­ pany was established as early as 1616 and Denmark would over the following two centuries play a prominent role in the Indian Ocean. The small and distant Scandinavian country held colonial possessions in India, including the town of Tranquebar (Tharan­ gambadi) in the present-day state of Tamil Nadu, Serampore in West Bengal and the Nicobar Islands, now part of the union territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

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The enormous distances between Europe and Asia were taxing for both ships and crews, making it necessary to set up victualing posts for maintenance and supplies. Due to its natural harbors, fresh water and ebony forests, in 1638 the Dutch identified the unpopulated Mascarene island of Mauritius as a halfway station. Although a settlement was established on the island, from 1652 it lost importance to the new voc station at the Cape of Good Hope, where Cape Town was to become the ‘Tavern of the Seas’. After failing to establish a permanent foothold at Fort Dauphin on the south-eastern coast of Madagascar, in 1640 the French, meanwhile, claimed Mauritius’ equally uninhabited sister island of Reunion and formed a settlement there in 1665. The British, finally, did not set up a regional sub-station on the route to their factories in India. Preferring the inner passage through the Mozambique Channel, they instead developed diplomatic relations with the sultanates on Comoros – notably on the island of Anjouan; known as ‘Johanna’ – and procured supplies from them. As the Portuguese withdrew, by the end of the 17th century the western Indian Ocean world had been divided between the Dutch, the French and the British. In addition, from this point in time the struggles for dominance within Europe took on a global character, where political and economic developments in one part of the globe had repercussions elsewhere. In the process, the western Indian Ocean and its island territories became closely connected not only to Europe, but to Africa, the Americas and the Far East.28 More than anything, the introduction of large-scale agricultural plantations represented a dramatic change.

Pirates, Planters and Slaves

An early, extraordinary manifestation of the process of globalization was the appearance of European pirates. Expelled from the West Indies by the Brit­ ish  and Spanish navies, in the 1680s several hundred buccaneers – mainly English and French – moved their ships from the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean. Setting up bases in northern Madagascar and, in particular, on the island of Sainte Marie (Nosy Boraha) off the north-eastern coast, they were attracted by the riches of Muslim pilgrims sailing to and from Mecca, as well as by the European companies’ East Indiamen. Their weaponry and military skills turned the pirate fleet into a formidable force, not only around Madagascar and Comoros, but throughout the western Indian Ocean. Arab, Indian and European 28

See Eric R. Wolf: Europe and the People without History, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982.

Introduction

13

vessels were indiscriminately attacked and the booty was immense. By 1720, however, the European powers had started to strike back. As a combined result of successful counter-attacks by the British navy; heavier armament of the ships of the East India companies; and increased French presence in Reunion and Mauritius, the European freebooters were eventually driven out. A hundred years later, it was through large-scale plantations of cash crops such as coffee (Reunion), sugar (Mauritius and Reunion), vanilla and aromatic plants (Comoros) and coconuts (Seychelles), and the accompanying expansion of slave labor, that the Indian Ocean islands were firmly integrated into the global economy. The institution of slavery and the trading in slaves had long been prevalent throughout the Arab world. They played, as noted by Ibn Battuta, a prominent role in the Swahili sphere, including the Comorian archipelago and the north-western coast of Madagascar. The interior highland kingdoms of the Great Island were also built on bonded labor. Already in the beginning of the 18th century, slaves were shipped from Madagascar as far as the Americas. Among the European nations, it was the Dutch who first made extensive use of slaves in their Indian Ocean possessions.29 Above all, it was the French who relied on massive importation of Africans to develop their coffee and sugar plantations on the Mascarene islands of Reunion and Mauritius. Only during the four decades from 1767 to 1810, around 110,000 slaves were transported by France to the previously unpopulated islands. Over the longer period from the first French settlement in 1665 until abolition in 1848, the total number has been estimated to 364,000.30 Almost half of them came from Madagascar and a huge proportion from Mozambique.31 Ruled by a small elite of French planters (‘grands blancs’), as a result Reunion, Mauritius and subsequently Seychelles were turned into mid-oceanic parcels of Africa. While Madagascar under the Imerina kingdom in the 19th century transformed from being an exporter of bonded labor to a net importer,32 alongside indigenous labor the French plantations on the Comorian islands, finally, depended on African slaves. 29 30

31 32

According to a census taken in 1688, there were a total of around 70,000 slaves in the Dutch territories of the Cape, Ceylon and Indonesia (Alpers (2014) op. cit., p. 83). Henri Médard: ‘La Plus Ancienne et la Plus Récente des Traites: Panorama de la Traite et de l’Esclavage en Afrique Orientale et dans l’Océan Indien’ in Henri Médard, Marie-Laure Derat, Thomas Vernet and Marie Pierre Ballarin (eds): Traites et Esclavages en Afrique Orientale et dans l’Océan Indien, Karthala, Paris, 2013, p. 71. Solofo Randrianja and Stephen Ellis: Madagascar: A Short History, Hurst & Company, London, 2009, p. 117. Slaves constituted around 20% of the Malagasy population when slavery was abolished in 1896 (ibid., p. 157).

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Less documented than the transatlantic and the overland trans-Saharan trades, slaving in the Indian Ocean brought African captives to distant destinations in the Middle East, India and China, but also to the length of the East African coast, the Cape Colony, the islands and the Americas. Arab, Swahili and Comorian merchants dominated the trade, which often was underwritten by Indian moneylenders. Under Omani rule, Zanzibar became the main depot, market and exporter. While the transatlantic slave trade with around 12 million people shipped from Africa constitutes the single largest extra-continental forced migration in history and the number of slaves transported across the Sahara amounted to nearly 8 million, the Indian Ocean trade was, indeed, also significant. Albeit operating over a longer time span, it has been estimated that more than 4 million Africans were sold into slavery via the eastern route.33 Like Madagascar, many of the African societies that traded in slaves were also consumers of servile labor. On Madagascar itself, Comoros, the Mascarenes and Seychelles, a big proportion of the imported African slaves were – in addition to Malagasy – ethnic Makua, Makonde or Yao from the area which is today divided between northern Mozambique, Malawi and southern Tanzania. For  longer periods, imports of Makua-speakers from Mozambique were so dominant that African slaves in general became known as ‘Masombika’ or ‘Mojambika’ in Madagascar and ‘Makwa’ in Comoros.34 After the Napoleonic Wars and the 1814 Paris Treaty, Britain emerged as the leading power in the Indian Ocean, which from now on popularly was characterized as an ‘English lake’. In 1807, the British parliament outlawed the trade in slaves and in 1833 the institution of slavery was abolished. France followed suit in 1848. Although illegal commerce in African slaves continued and slavery 33

34

Pier M. Larson: History and Memory in the Age of Enslavement: Becoming Merina in Highland Madagascar, 1770–1822, Heinemann, Portsmouth; James Currey, Oxford; and David Philip, Cape Town, 2000, pp. 269–77. Linked to the transatlantic, trans-Saharan and Indian Ocean routes was the internal African slave trade, serving domestic markets. In magnitude, it was probably equal to or even greater than all three of the external movements combined (Ibid.). The Indian Ocean slave trade expanded considerably during the 19th century, when more than 2.5 million slaves were exported from the coasts of East Africa. Since this figure does not take into account the parallel overland routes or the number of captured who died or managed to flee before reaching the port of embarkation, Médard defines it as “the tip of the iceberg” (Médard in Médard et al. op. cit., p. 116). As early as the 17th century, African female slaves in Goa, India, were referred to as ‘mosses’ (Hall op. cit., p. 327). For a study on Makua descendants in western Madagascar, see Klara Boyer-Rossol: ‘Makua Life Histories’ in Alice Bellagamba, Sandra E. Greene and Martin A. Klein (eds): African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade, Volume 1: The Sources, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 466–80.

Introduction

15

only was banned in Madagascar in 1896 and on the Comorian islands in 1904,35 the effects of abolition on the labor-intensive plantation economies were potentially crippling. The British therefore introduced a system of indenture under which contracted laborers were brought from India to replace the freed African and Malagasy slaves. It was above all implemented in Mauritius. Although Reunion remained a French possession, the system was extended to the sister island too. Plantations, slavery and indenture shaped the societies of the African Indian Ocean islands. In combination with varying degrees of European colonial settlement and Indian and Chinese immigration, over the years each of them developed a distinct ethno-cultural identity. With a marginal settler population, the Malagasy society – from the outset sui generis and to a large extent shaped by its Austronesian past – is still stigmatized by the legacy of widespread domestic slavery. Comoros, similarly, never experienced a substantial European presence, but was both a slave economy and an active participant in the slave trade. As a result, the Comorian society emerged as a fusion between the Arab feudal elite, the indigenous population and African slaves. On the other hand, under French rule the older possession of Reunion attracted both planters and poor settlers from Europe. When slavery was abolished in 1848, there were 62,000 African slaves out of a total population of 103,000.36 Until the 1920s, around 118,000 Indians were as indentured laborers brought to the island. Together with Chinese and other Asian immigrants, the outcome was a very French, but at the same time multi-cultural melting pot. On the sister island of Mauritius, French slavery and British indenture created a different society. As in Reunion, at the time of abolition more than 60% of the population was of African descent. Between 1834 and 1912, however, no less than 453,000 Indians replaced the Afro-Malagasy slaves on the sugar plantations, completely transforming the demographic profile. From having an African majority in the 1830s, only two generations later the island was twothirds Indian. No country in the world outside India has a proportionally bigger Indian population and Mauritius is the only member state of the African Union (au) with an Indian majority. Wheras both Reunion and Mauritius are facing the political challenge of fully integrating marginalized Afro-Malagasy minorities – a social question 35

36

Slavery was outlawed on Mayotte in 1847, but only as late as 1891 on Anjouan, 1902 on Mohéli and 1904 on Grande Comore. On the impact of slavery and abolition in the Indian Ocean world, see Gwyn Campbell (ed): Abolition and Its Aftermath in the Indian Ocean, Africa and Asia, Routledge, London and New York, 2005. For the sources of data in this section, see the chapters below.

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known in French as malaise créole – Seychelles, finally, is the most creolized nation in the Indian Ocean.37 Settled by French planters and their slaves from Mauritius, by 1818 90% of the Seychellois were Afro-Malagasy. In contrast with Reunion and Mauritius, the freed slaves were not replaced by massive importation of indentured workers, but would with smaller additions of European, Indian and Chinese immigrants form the stock of a creole society with deep African roots.38

Steam and Cables

The 19th century was in the western Indian Ocean dominated by the consoli­ dation of British power in India, Anglo-French rivalry over Madagascar and European colonial occupation of East Africa. In 1884–85, the Berlin conference triggered a land-based ‘scramble for Africa’. It was “a topsy-turvy imperialism: sovereignty was not the result of conquests, instead sovereignty was handed out first and the conquests came later.”39 Immediately after the conference, Germany claimed mainland Tanganyika. Out-maneuvering the Omani sultan, in 1890 Zanzibar was turned into a British protectorate. In the main, the events marked the end of a thousand years of Swahili trade between the islands along the East African coast. In his novel By the Sea, the Zanzibari-born writer Abdulrazak Gurnah lets one of the main characters reflect on the dramatic change: New maps were made, complete maps, so that every inch was accounted for, and everyone now knew who they were, or at least who they belonged to. […] And so it came to pass that in time those scattered little towns by the sea along the African coast found themselves part of huge territories stretching for hundreds of miles into the interior, teeming with people they had thought beneath them, and who when the time came promptly returned the favor. Among the many deprivations inflicted on those 37 38

39

The Mauritian island of Rodrigues also has a distinct creole profile, as did the Chagos archipelago before the eviction of its inhabitants. In addition to the traditional Indian Ocean sega music, moutya is a popular genre of African origins in Seychelles. The local version in Reunion is maloya. The status of moutya and maloya in the two societies largely reflect different views on their African legacies. Whereas moutya traditionally has a national audience in Seychelles, in Reunion the French authorities for a long time viewed maloya as a subversive vehicle for creole political demands. It was banned until the early 1980s. Hall op. cit., p. 480. On the Berlin conference and European colonization, see Thomas Pakenham: The Scramble for Africa 1876–1912, George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991.

Introduction

17

towns by the sea was the prohibition of the musim trade. The last months of the year would no longer see crowds of sailing ships lying plank to plank in the harbor […] or the streets thronged with Somalis or Suri Arabs or Sindhis.40 In the distant Indian Ocean island world, however, the 19th century would in stark contrast break centuries of geographical isolation, connect the main centers to the outside world and bring the oceanic societies closer to one another. Behind these historic developments were the combined effects of steamships, the Suez Canal and the telegraph. The first crossing of the Indian Ocean by a steamship was made by the British vessel Enterprise, which in 1825 took almost four months from England to Calcutta (now Kolkata, India) via the Cape route around Africa. At the time, sailing ships were both faster and cheaper. Throughout the 19th century, most cargo and passengers were still moved by sail, such as the famed ‘tea clippers’ to India and China. Independent of the winds, steam-powered ships, however, would “sweep away patterns of travel dating back more than two thousand years.”41 As early as 1842, the first steam company, the British Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, made its appearance in the Indian Ocean, also using the southern route. Financed by British and French capital, after ten years of construction the Suez Canal was completed in 1869. According to the prominent Mauritian historian Auguste Toussaint, “[n]ext to da Gama’s discovery of the Cape route [it] was the most notable event in the history of the Indian Ocean.”42 The canal dramatically shortened the passage between Europe, East Africa and India, eventually consolidating the pre-eminence of steamships as well as expanding trade and transforming the ports of the Indian Ocean. As a result, regular maritime services were established by a number of European companies. In addition to the Peninsular and Oriental, the British India Steam Naviga­ tion Company, the French Messageries Maritimes and the German Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie carried passengers and mail. They not only serviced traditional port destinations such as Mombasa and Zanzibar, but directly and indirectly also Victoria (Seychelles), Dzaoudzi (Mayotte/Comoros), Tamatave (now Toamasina, Madagascar), Port des Galets/Saint-Denis (Reunion) and 40 41 42

Abdulrazak Gurnah: By the Sea, Bloomsbury, London, 2002, pp. 15–16. The novel was first published in 2001. Hall op. cit., p. 424. Auguste Toussaint: History of the Indian Ocean, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 210.

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Port Louis (Mauritius), where coaling stations and other necessary services offered new employment opportunities.43 Describing the impact on Victoria, the small capital of Seychelles, Johnstone writes that “[t]he port was a hub of activity, with American whalers, British navy ships, French mail steamers, Seychellois schooners and other vessels crowding the harbor.”44 Submarine telegraph cables further connected the Indian Ocean islands to the rest of the world. As early as 1893, Seychelles and Mauritius were linked to Zanzibar and in 1901 an extension was laid to the distant Mauritian dependency of Rodrigues on the main line from South Africa to Australia. A link between Mauritius and Reunion was opened in 1906. In the process, the most isolated indian-oceanic communities no longer depended on passing ships for international news and communications. At the same time, the transportation and communication revolution encouraged immigration and, in particular, the establishment of Indian and Chinese business ventures. By the early 20th century, therefore, the social profiles of the societies were largely formed and the islands increasingly linked to the colonial powers. Their different paths towards nationhood or departmental status will be discussed in the chapters below.

Zone of Peace and Economic Zones

As the first of the African Indian Ocean territories, Madagascar achieved political independence in 1960, followed by Mauritius in 1968, Comoros in 1975 and Seychelles in 1976. Born as sovereign states at the height of the Cold War, in addition to the domestic challenges of nation-building the new countries found themselves surrounded by huge oceanic expanses over which they exercised little or no authority. Whereas their own naval capabilities were minimal, the increasingly militarized Indian Ocean was exposed to geo-strategic rivalries between the world’s leading powers. Moreover, several islands formerly attached to the new nations remained under colonial rule and some were used for military purposes. The ocean, finally, was without clearly defined, internationally recognized maritime boundaries. Thus faced with a profoundly assymetric correlation of forces in their immediate neighborhood, on the global arena the African Indian Ocean states 43 44

In the 1880s, a journey between France (Marseille) and Reunion via Madagascar with Mes­ sageries Maritimes lasted 21 days. Denise Johnstone: Réveil Seychellois: Life in Seychelles 1770–1903, Calusa Bay Publications, Mahé, 2009, p. 80.

Introduction

19

engaged with the United Nations (un), the Non-Aligned Movement (nam), the Organization of African Unity (oau) and prominent regional powers to promote their oceanic interests. From the 1970s, the efforts focused on demilitarization and maritime jurisdiction. Two ground-breaking un resolutions should here be emphasized, namely the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1971, and the 1982 un Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos). After the Second World War, Britain’s post-Napoleonic supremacy in the Indian Ocean was replaced by that of the United States. Formerly ‘Muslim’, ‘Portuguese’ and ‘British’, the ocean became an ‘American lake’. In the mid-1960s, a review of British strategy further led the government in London to gradually withdraw from its principal military bases in South East Asia, a process which began in 1968 and became known as the ‘East of Suez’ policy.45 In the western Indian Ocean, it paved the way for the independence of Mauritius and Seychelles. As part of the policy, after secret negotiations with the us government the British, however, kept the Chagos archipelago and three of the Seychelles’ islands, in 1965 proclaiming a new colony – the British Indian Ocean Territory (biot) – and the following year making it available to the United States for military purposes. Although the move was in breach of un decolonization declarations and censured by the General Assembly, the inhabitants of Chagos were subsequently deported. By 1971, construction of the us naval base on Diego Garcia had started. The British retreat cemented the role of France as the main European military power in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the us-led Western alliance was increasingly challenged by the Soviet Union.46 From its distant Pacific Ocean base in Vladivostok,47 the Soviet navy made a first appearance in the ocean in 1968. With support facilities in Somalia (Berbera) and Yemen (Aden and Socotra), a Soviet Indian Ocean squadron subsequently established a permanent presence in the distant waters. In brief, “the United States and the ussr were expanding their rivalry over the entire region, deploying navy ships, submarines and nuclear weaponry […], searching for permanent military bases and facilities, interfering in internal and regional politics, securing 45

46 47

The popular expression ‘East of Suez’ is from the poem ‘Mandalay’ by Rudyard Kipling: “Ship me somewhere east of Suez, where the best is like the worst/Where there aren’t no Ten Commandments an’ a man can raise a thirst.” Raoul Delcorde: Le Jeu des Grandes Puissances dans l’Océan Indien, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1993. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Suez Canal was closed by Egypt until 1975. In spite of the enormous distance, it was easier for the Soviet navy to access the Indian Ocean from the Pacific than from the Black Sea.

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economic ties within their blocs […] and delivering a huge quantity of arms to their allies.”48 In view of the developments, Sri Lanka took the lead in proposing that the Indian Ocean should be turned into a demilitarized zone. The proposal was endorsed by the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries in Lusaka, Zambia, in September 1970. In December 1971, the un General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that the Indian Ocean “for all time” was designated as “a zone of peace.” In conformity with the resolution, the assembly further called upon “the great powers” to eliminat[e] from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, [as well as] nuclear weapons […], weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence […] conceived in the context of great power rivalry. In addition, the assembly resolved that [w]arships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland state of the Indian Ocean.49 Although no member state voted against the resolution,50 it did not arrest the process of militarization. While both the Western powers and the Soviet Union strongly denied that their presence contributed to increased insecurity – but, on the contrary, argued that it was a guarantee of stability – permanent peace and nuclear-free conditions in the Indian Ocean region were from the outset violated from within. As the un General Assembly was discussing the final text, India and Pakistan went to war over Bangladesh. Three years later – in May 1974 – India carried out its first nuclear weapon test explosion. Despite the setbacks and against the odds, the assembly, nevertheless, pursued the issue, in late 1972 establishing a special committee with the mandate to study the implications of the previous year’s declaration and prepare for a un conference on its implementation. The conference met with strong political opposition by the leading Western powers. It was subsequently postponed 48 49 50

Bouchard and Crumplin op. cit., p. 28. unga Resolution 2832 (XXVI): ‘Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’, 16 December 1971. The resolution was adopted with 61 votes in favor, 0 against and 55 abstentions. With the exception of China, all the permanent members of the un Security Council abstained.

Introduction

21

sine die, and – despite the departure of the Soviet navy – in 1989 the United States, Britain and France withdrew from the General Assembly committee. By that time, the us naval base on Diego Garcia was fully operational and the  French military installations on Reunion and Mayotte had been strengthened. Whereas the 1971 un Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace had no tangible results,51 the Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the other hand, did not only have a profound impact worldwide, but has been hugely consequential for the African Indian Ocean states. Characterized as a ‘constitution for the world’s oceans’,52 the convention transformed international ­maritime law, “arguably representing the greatest shift in property rights […] from an international regime […] to national jurisdiction […] of the twentieth century.”53 Negotiated over a period of ten years and concluded in 1982, unclos came into force in 1994. By 2012, most un member states had ratified the convention. It has also been signed by the European Union (eu), but – notably – not by the United States. Replacing outdated concepts such as the ‘cannon shot rule’ by clear spatial limits,54 the main provisions introduced by unclos were that coastal states have sovereignty over their territorial sea extending up to 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 kilometers) from the shoreline; that they have certain rights over a contiguous zone for up to another 12 miles; and that they have sovereign rights over the natural resources of an exclusive economic zone (eez) extending up to 200 miles (370 kilometers).55 With regard to the critical eez concept, the convention stipulates that coastal states have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 51

The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace remains on the un agenda and, formally, the special committee continues its mandate. Under the au Pelindaba Treaty, signed in 1996 and in effect from 2009, the African continent and the African Indian Ocean islands and territories – including the Chagos archipelago – constitute a nuclear weapon free area. 52 Stuart Kaye quoting ambassador Koh of Singapore in ‘Indian Ocean Maritime Claims’ in jior, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, p. 113. 53 ‘Editorial Essay: Research Agendas for the Indian Ocean Region’ in jior, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, pp. 12–13. 54 From the 17th century, a nation’s jurisdiction over its coastal waters was based on the estimated reach of land-based cannons, normally given as a league or three nautical miles. 55 Under unclos, with certain conditions coastal states also have the rights to their continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles (648 kilometers) from the baseline. Such areas, however, are not part of the eez.

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waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.56 In a situation where coastal baselines are less than 400 nautical miles apart and two or more eezs overlap, the states involved shall delineate the actual maritime boundaries. To settle disputes between parties to the convention, under unclos an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) was established in Hamburg, Germany. Dramatically reducing the open, non-regulated space, unclos changed the world’s oceans. In the western Indian Ocean, enormous extensions were declared as exclusive economic zones by the independent nations of Sey­ chelles (1.3 million square kilometers), Mauritius (1.3 million km2), Madagascar (1.2 million) and Comoros (163,500), but also by the United Kingdom around biot/Chagos (640,000) and France for Reunion (315,000), Tromelin (270,000), Mayotte (63,000) and the Scattered Islands (352,000). Over a short period of time, a total maritime area of 5.6 million square kilometers was claimed under the new international jurisdiction, out of which approximately 70% by the African Indian Ocean nations and 30% by Britain and France. While the eezs of the independent island states were non-controversial and from the outset internationally acknowledged as a matter of course, with the exception of the Reunion zone the British and French claims were strongly disputed, representing potential sources of conflict.57 Basing itself on the 1960 un decolonization declarations and supported by the au, Mauritius – which in its constitution includes the Chagos archipelago (explicitly mentioning Diego Garcia) – does not recognize British sovereignty over biot. In 2010, it submitted the issue to the itlos tribunal. Mauritius also claims the island of Tromelin, held by France.58 56

‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone, Article 56. 57 On eezs, demarcated and disputed maritime boundaries, claims and counter-claims in the western Indian Ocean, see Vivian Louis Forbes: ‘Indian Ocean Maritime Boundaries: Jurisdictional Dimensions and Cooperative Measures’ in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi (eds): Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean, South Asian Publishers, New Dehli, 2004, pp. 240–68, and Didier Ortolland and JeanPierre Pirat: Atlas Géopolitique des Espaces Maritimes: Frontières, Énergie, Transports, Piraterie, Pêche et Environnement, Editions Technip, Paris, 2010, pp. 113–25. 58 In June 2010, France and Mauritius reached an agreement on economic, scientific and environmental co-administration of Tromelin and the surrounding maritime area. Rati­ fication of the agreement was blocked by the French National Assembly in April 2013.

Introduction

Map 3 

23

Exclusive Economic Zones (eezs)

With overlapping territorial claims and in the absence of mutually agreed boundaries, the situation in the Mozambique Channel relating to the French possessions of Mayotte and the Scattered Islands is even more complex and potentially volatile. In Venkatshamy’s opinion, the boundary disputes in the strategic sea corridor “have the potential to develop into flashpoints […], especially when minerals and natural resources are discovered in areas of overlapping claims.”59 Under international law, Mayotte forms part of Comoros, whereas Madagascar with un and au support claims the islands of Glorioso, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India and Europa, which at independence were withheld by the French government. Despite the claims by the African Indian Ocean states, France, however, “implements […] national sovereignty over the islands it considers hers and their adjacent territorial sea, and also enforces French and European fishing rules, regulations and laws.”60 As a result, France not only monitors the maritime traffic along the two ‘petroleum highways’ 59 60

Krishnappa Venkatshamy: ‘The Indian Ocean Region in India’s Strategic Futures: Looking Out to 2030’ in jior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, p. 23. Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin: “‘Two Faces of France: ’France of the Indian Ocean‘/’France in the Indian Ocean” in jior, Vol. 7, No. 2, December 2011, p. 165.

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through the Mozambique Channel and east of Madagascar, but the Great Island finds itself in the extraordinary position of having the former colonial power as its immediate neighbor both to the west and to the east. Since Reunion and Mayotte are Outermost Regions of the European Union, it further means that the member of the Southern African Development Community (sadc) is sandwiched between eu territories. Nevertheless, for Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros the extensive exclusive economic zones represent unparalleled economic opportunities, not least with regard to pelagic fisheries. However, with the notable exception of Seychelles the expected dividends from the new marine territories have so far largely failed to materialize. With limited economic resources, no modern fishing fleets and lacking in skilled manpower, in particular the poorer nations of Madagascar and Comoros have not been able to take advantage of the opportunities offered.61 Inadequate coast guards and air surveillance capacity further reduce their abilities to police the eezs or monitor the marine resources. With a coastline of around 4,300 kilometers and an eez of 1.2 million km2, in this respect Madagascar faces huge governance challenges. As a result, unlicensed fishing by foreign vessels in Malagasy waters is endemic and the marine resources are increasingly threatened.

Rising Waters

There is, in general, a huge gap in the research on environmental security in the Indian Ocean.62 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) and most international experts agree that it is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world. The low-lying areas around the Bay of Bengal – notably in Bangladesh – are particularly exposed to rising sea levels. In the western part of the ocean, the archipelago of Maldives is slowly being inundated. The very existence of the nation is threatened. Albeit in a less dramatic way, Madagascar and the other African indian-oceanic countries and territories also face significant challenges. While volcanic activity constitutes a constant risk on Comoros and Reunion – in particular against the Comorian capital Moroni – and indirectly through the possibility of tsunamis in the region as a whole, the combined effect of global warming, environmental degradation and natural resource 61 62

During the first decades after independence, Mauritius gave less attention to fisheries than to other economic sectors. Timothy Doyle: ‘An Agenda for Environmental Security in the Indian Ocean Region’ in Rumley and Chaturvedi (eds) op. cit., p. 159.

Introduction

25

exploitation represents a serious medium to long-term threat to economic life and people on all the islands. From a macro-economic point of view, tourism and fisheries contribute substantially to the development of the Indian Ocean nations. Both sectors are highly dependent on marine and coastal resources.63 Mauritius and Seychelles, in particular, rely on the appeal of their beaches, waters and reefs to attract international tourists. The rise in sea temperatures and ocean levels – as well as storm surges, inundation and erosion – are a danger to these assets. In 2007, the ipcc projected that sea levels would increase between 0.2 and 0.6 meters by the year 2100. Other projections suggest higher elevations. Even under the more conservative scenario, the rise will have a profoundly destructive impact not only on the mainly uninhabited atolls in the Seychelles and Chagos archipelagos, but generally on the urban centers, harbors, airports, infrastructure and services on the coastal strips of Comoros, Mayotte, Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles, where the large majority of the populations live and work.64 Beaches, hotels and tourism facilities will be affected. In the case of Mauritius, a study commissioned by the government has indicated that 50% of the beaches could be lost by 2050.65 While the impact on commercial, pelagic fishing is yet to be determined, due to coastal degradation the effects on artisanal fisheries are significant. The Indian Ocean used to contain around 30% of the world’s coral reefs. As a result of global warming and coral bleaching, as well as of destructive fishing practices through the use of dynamite and coral mining for construction purposes, it is estimated that two thirds of the reefs have either been destroyed or are critically endangered.66 Pollution, finally, is a major concern, both in the form of solid and toxic waste deposited on the islands and debris from commercial

63

64

65 66

In the highlands of Madagascar, it is the effects of slash-and-burn agriculture, illegal logging, deforestation and erosion that threaten the unique flora and fauna and, thus, the country’s attraction as an eco-tourism destination. According to a study carried out by the University of Kalmar, Sweden, on behalf of the United Nations Environment Programme (unep), excluding Madagascar a majority of the populations on the African Indian Ocean islands lives at an altitude of no more than 2 meters above mean sea level (Payet R.A., Soogun, Ranaivoson, Payet R.J. and Ali Abdallah (eds): Indian Ocean Islands: Global International Waters Assessment, University of Kalmar, Kalmar/unep, Nairobi, 2004, p. 42). ‘La moitié des plages pourraient disparaître d’ici 2050’ in malango-actualité.fr, 9 July 2013. David Michel: ‘Environmental Pressures in the Indian Ocean’ in David Michel and Russel Sticklor (eds): Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, Stimson, Washington, 2012, p. 115.

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vessels transported by the ocean.67 Off-shore drilling for oil and gas, as well as mineral exploitation of the ocean floor, may aggravate the situation further. By themselves, Madagascar and the small Indian Ocean island states make virtually no contribution to the greenhouse gases that drive global warming. As underlined by Michel, the impacts of climate change “ignore administrative and jurisdictional borders.”68 Despite their own insignificant emissions, Mauritius and Seychelles, however, “stand in the vanguard on many fronts of climate policy and coastal management.”69 Mauritius has launched a ‘sustainable island’ initiative’, focusing on the development of wind and solar power, while Seychelles – with half of its land area under nature conservation already a world leading eco-nation – mainstreams climate policy into cross-cutting issues within a comprehensive national management plan. Finally, within the group of Small Island Developing States, Seychelles actively promotes global awareness regarding the potential and sustainability of an ocean-based ‘blue economy’.

Somali Sea Rovers

By 2009, the seaborne trade and the fishing and tourism industries of the Indian Ocean states had in the meantime come under growing threat by pirates based in Somalia, who extended their range of operations from the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea as far south as the Mozambique Channel. Piracy along the coast of Somalia appeared after the collapse of the Somali state and the outbreak of civil war in 1991. In reaction to illicit fishing by foreign fleets, dumping of toxic waste and the resulting depletion of the fish stocks, Somali fishermen, former coast guards and members of various armed groups proceeded to take international law into their own hands and exact financial tributes from foreign vessels.70 A pirate interviewed by Dua in 2011 summarized his experience as follows: 67

68 69 70

The study by the University of Kalmar/unep concluded that land-based and marinebased pollution represented the most severe environmental hazard on the islands (Payet R.A. et al. op. cit., pp. 43–49). Michel op. cit., p. 127. Ibid., p. 120. There is a significant literature on the origins and development of the Somali-based piracy, as well as on the international response. See, for example, Stig Hansen: Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Oslo, 2009; Bibi van Ginkel and Frans-Paul van der Putten (eds): The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and Boston, 2010; Robin Geiß and Anna Petrig: Piracy and

Introduction

27

I was a fisherman […]. One day a trawler cut our nets in the middle of the night when we were fishing not far from the coast. A few of us decided [that] enough was enough and we boarded the boat. […] We made [the captain] pay 1,000 us Dollars as a tax to fish in our waters. We went back to the village and told everyone about it. Soon the boys started getting on the fiber boats and chasing trawlers to get money from them. This is how we became pirates. After a while, we started going after bigger boats. As a fisherman I used to catch fish. [N]ow I catch a different kind of fish.71 What initially started as individual acts of retribution soon developed into large-scale, multi-million operations, or, as described in a joint study by the World Bank, the un Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc) and Interpol, from “an amateurs’ business” to “organized networks,” in addition to piracy including arms smuggling, human trafficking and other criminal activities.72 Within a decade, various Somali-based piracy groups had established themselves as a significant force in the critically important shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa, attacking hundreds of vessels, from small regional dhows to international fishing trawlers, large container ships and supertankers.73 Many of the ships and their crews were captured and taken to Somalia for ransom payment. Several of the seafarers were killed, injured or held hostage under extreme conditions. In June 2008, attacks on humanitarian aid shipments to Somalia and, generally, the damage to international shipping and trade led the un Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to declare the acts as a threat to international peace and security, unanimously adopting a resolution allowing for intervention in the territorial waters of Somalia in order to

71 72 73

Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011; Martin N. Murphy: Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa, Hurst & Company, London, 2011; and Karl Sörenson: ‘Wrong Hands on Deck? Combating Piracy and Building Maritime Security in Eastern Africa’, foi/Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, July 2011. Jatin Dua: ‘A Sea of Trade and a Sea of Fish: Piracy and Protection in the Western Indian Ocean’ in Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2013, p. 354. The World Bank: Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa, Washington, 2013, pp. 2–3. Not counting smaller, local vessels, it is estimated that 42,500 registered ships annually transit the area around the Horn of Africa, or more than 100 per day (un Institute for Training and Research (unitar): unosat Global Report on Maritime Piracy: A Geospatial Analysis 1995–2013, [Geneva], 2014, p. 30).

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“repress acts of piracy and armed robbery [by] all necessary means.”74 The decision resulted in a rare show of unity between countries either hostile to each other or otherwise wary of military cooperation. In a short period of time, naval units from eu member countries, the United States, Iran, India, Russia, China, Japan, Australia and many others were dispatched to the western Indian Ocean, which as a consequence was quickly

Somali piracy Piracy off the coast of Somalia remained a mainly coastal phenomenon until 2005, when it became rampant throughout the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. In July 2005, a ship carrying humanitarian aid from the World Food Programme to war-torn Somalia was hijacked. Some of the more spectacular piracy operations took place in 2008 and 2009, notably the seizure outside Somalia in September 2008 of the Ukrainian ship Faina, which carried more than 30 Russian-made tanks, grenade launchers and other military equipment; that of the Saudi supertanker Sirius Star in November 2008, hijacked off the coast of Kenya en route to the United States with crude oil worth around 100 million us Dollars; and the action in April 2009 against the us-flagged Maersk Alabama, bound for Mombasa, Kenya, with relief supplies. (The Hollywood production Captain Phillips (2013) is based on this event). In 2010, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 pirates operated from various bases along the Somali coast. In that year, they carried out 50 successful hijackings and held almost 1,200 seafarers hostage. In 2011, there were 317 attempted hijackings, but the number of successful attacks decreased to 31. In 2012, the corresponding figures were 89 and 15, respectively. At the peak of the piracy between 2008 and 2012, the World Bank estimated the costs to international trade to a staggering annual average of no less than 18 billion us Dollars due to cancellation of shipments, rerouting of ships, vessels lost, insurance premiums, security measures, ransom payments etc. Also according to the World Bank, from April 2005 until December 2012 shipping companies and other interested parties paid ransoms for ships and kidnapped crews amounting to a total of between 339 and 413 million us Dollars. The most lucrative year for the Somali pirates was 2011, when they received ransom payments of more than 150 musd. By early 2012, around 1,000 pirates had been captured.

74

unsc Resolution S/RES/1816: ‘Somalia’, 2 June 2008. Between 2008 and 2012, the Security Council adopted more than ten resolutions referring to the Somali-based piracy. In November 2012, the council renewed the authorization for armed international counterpiracy action until the end of 2013.

Introduction

29

internationalized and militarized.75 As piracy re-appeared from history, so did inter alia Arab actors from the Gulf, the Chinese navy and Russian warships. In the opinion of Lehr, counter-piracy operations presented non-regional actors with a motive to “learn how to operate and replenish squadrons at sea, far off their own bases, and to get familiar with the […] conditions in the Arabian Sea.”76 With the already ‘resident’ American, French and Indian forces, the Indian Ocean became a “testing ground of great power relations.”77 The developments represented a

Map 4  75

76 77

Extension of Somali piracy 2005–2011

Since 2008, over 30 nations have contributed navy vessels and personnel to the international counter-piracy effort, including all the Nordic countries (except Iceland), Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Malaysia, Romania, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine. A Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cgpcs) was set up in January 2009 as a forum for states, organizations and private maritime stakeholders with an interest in ending the piracy. Around 60 countries and major international organizations take part in the cgpcs, among them the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union, the International Maritime Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and several un agencies. Peter Lehr: ‘Piracy and Maritime Governance in the Indian Ocean’ in jior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, p. 116. Venkatshamy op. cit., p. 29.

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huge challenge for the small, independent island states, but also opportunities in terms of political attraction, military cooperation and economic assistance. Following the un Security Council resolution, three coordinated multinational naval forces were formed, eu’s ‘Atalanta’, the us-led ctf 151 and nato’s ‘Ocean Shield’. The largest – and at the same time the first ever naval eu operation – was the European Union Naval Force (eu navfor), launched in December 2008 and codenamed ‘Operation Atalanta’. It was preceded by an initiative by the French government, which in November 2007 had decided to send a mission to escort World Food Programme (wfp) ships to Somalia. Set up within the framework of the European Common Security and Defense Policy, the initial task of the eu counter-piracy operation was, similarly, to provide protection to shipments for the wfp and the au military mission in Somalia (amisom), as well as to merchant and fishing vessels in and around the Gulf of Aden. To carry out the mission, the participating naval forces were authorized to “employ the necessary means, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery.”78 Both the geographical area and the mandate of ‘Operation Atalanta’ were subsequently expanded. In June 2010, the European force was authorized to operate east towards Maldives and south to the Mozambique Channel, and in May 2012 it carried out a first raid on pirate bases on the Somali mainland.79 us counter-piracy operations, meanwhile, were initially conducted within the broader ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and its multinational naval component Combined Task Force 150 under the direction of the us navy’s fifth fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. In January 2009, however, the us government established Combined Force 151 with the sole mission to combat Somalibased piracy. In August 2009, finally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) replaced earlier anti-piracy initiatives with ‘Operation Ocean Shield’. In addition to the three multinational task forces, the deployment of the Chinese and Japanese navies was conspicuous and much publicized. Led by the destroyer Wuhan, one of the Chinese navy’s most sophisticated warships, a flotilla from the naval branch of the People’s Liberation Army consisting of 78 79

Quoted in Kees Homan and Susanne Kamerling: ‘Operational Challenges to Counterpiracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia’ in van Ginkel and van der Putten (eds) op. cit., p. 73. In July 2012, the eu launched a maritime capacity-building initiative, called eucap Nestor. With a regional mandate covering the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean, the objective of the civilian counter-piracy program is to strengthen maritime security and governance, including the participating countries’ police forces, coast guards and justice systems.

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a second destroyer and a supply ship carrying attack helicopters arrived in the Gulf of Aden in January 2009. With some 800 troops, it was not only contemporary China’s first trans-continental operational deployment, but also the first time since Zheng He’s maritime expeditions in the early 15th century that its navy returned to the western Indian Ocean. The Beijing government has subsequently maintained a naval presence in the area by assigning warships on a rotating basis. The Japanese government’s announcement to join the international counter-piracy effort – made at the same time as the Chinese navy arrived – was more controversial as the country’s constitution restricts its military forces to defensive actions only. Nevertheless, in March 2009 two destroyers from Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force started to conduct escort operations off the coast of Somalia.80 The size of the multinational and national forces has varied, but at the peak of the counter-piracy operations there were between 25 and 30 major vessels present at the same time. In the case of ‘Operation Atalanta’, some 2,000 military personnel were deployed on combatant and auxiliary ships, as well as on maritime control and reconnaissance aircraft. In comparison with other counter-piracy theaters in the world – notably in South-East Asia – the strength of the forces in the Indian Ocean has been significant, consisting of regular navy warships such as frigates, destroyers and submarines.81 In the context of the ocean’s militarization, the increasing use of armed private security companies is, finally, substantial. Fishing vessels from France and Spain, for example, regularly hire vessel protection detachments and us and British military contractors even offer the services of armed escort ships.82 As a combined effect of increased political stability in mainland Somalia; measures taken by the breakaway authorities in Puntland and Somaliland; military action by amisom; the international naval effort; and improved security practices by vessel owners and crews, incidents of piracy in the western Indian Ocean decreased significantly in 2012. While attempted and successful attacks, respectively, amounted to 317 and 31 in 2011, the following year saw a 80

81 82

Initially, Japanese counter-piracy forces were stationed at the us military base ‘Camp Lemonnier’ in Djibouti. In July 2011, the Marine Self-Defense Force opened a small Djibouti base of its own. Around 200 Japanese soldiers are stationed there. In addition to the us and Japanese bases, France has a major military station in Djibouti. P.V. Rao: ‘Indian Ocean Maritime Security Cooperation: The Employment of Navies and Other Maritime Forces’ in jior, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, pp. 132–33. Homan and Kamerling op. cit., pp. 80–82.

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total of 89 recorded attempts and 15 hijackings. In 2013, there were only 28 attacks and no successful takeover. The reduction was such that the un Institute for Training and Research (unitar) in a major study concluded that “one can claim that [the piracy attacks] have almost stopped.”83 Although the situation appeared to improve, as emphasized by the World Bank, unodc and Interpol, it remains, however, “extremely fragile, fluid and uncertain. […] [O]nly time will tell whether the progress can be sustained over the long term.”84

In the Middle of the Battlefield

In response to the international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, the Somali pirates fanned out across the Indian Ocean, extending their attacks as far east as the Lakshadweep and Maldives close to India and southwards to Comoros and Madagascar in south-eastern Africa. Operating far from Somalia; using captured fishing trawlers and similar vessels as motherships; and provided with arms and modern navigational aids by Somali backers, in the process piracy was turned into an exclusively criminal business undertaking. In pursuit of ransom money, the actions quickly grew more audacious, violent and indiscriminate. In addition to merchant ships in international waters, cruise ships, coastal cargo vessels and small fishing boats were attacked and hijacked well within the Indian Ocean states’ national maritime borders. Local fishermen were taken hostage and brought to Somalia, where the piracy warlords and their financiers demanded exorbitant amounts for their release. The first successful hijacking in the territorial waters of Seychelles took place in March 2009, when a local motor yacht used for diving charters was boarded by Somali pirates in the vicinity of the Aldabra atoll. The following month, an Italian cruise liner with more than 1,000 passengers managed to  fight off an attack 300 kilometers north of the main island of Mahé. In  October 2010, two Taiwanese fishing vessels were captured north of Madagascar and subsequently turned into mother-ships for further strikes in the area. Towards the end of the year, the attacks had reached the northern part of the Mozambique Channel, where a Mozambican fishing boat was taken over south-west of Comoros and a Comorian cargo cum passenger vessel in 83 84

unitar op. cit., p. 5. The World Bank: ‘Pirate Trails’ op. cit., p. 26.

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November disappeared on route from Moroni, Comoros, to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, only to emerge outside Antsiranana on the northern tip of Madagascar four months later. In December 2010, a Liberia-registered oil tanker and a Panama-flagged bulk carrier foiled attacks north of Mozambique’s port city of Beira. And in January 2011, a British luxury cruiser with 350 passengers on board evaded an attempted assault close to Nosy Be, Madagascar. With a huge exclusive economic zone, over a hundred islands and dependent on tourism and fishing, more than any other Indian Ocean nation Seychelles was critically exposed to the Somali-based piracy. In late 2010, it was estimated that its accumulated economic loss due to the criminal activities corresponded to 4% of gdp.85 As stated by the un Office on Drugs and Crime, the vast archipelagic country found itself “in the middle of the piracy battlefield.” Nevertheless, from the outset it firmly and forcefully responded to the threat, in 2012 leading unodc to affirm that “[n]o state has done more to combat piracy than Seychelles.” In the process, it assumed a pivotal international role, extended its foreign relations and broadened its military contacts. In reaction to the attacks, in early 2009 the Seychelles government authorized international fishing vessels to carry arms and amended the country’s penal code to allow for the prosecution of suspected pirates, including those captured by foreign naval forces. In September 2009, it signed an agreement with the eu under which ‘Operation Atalanta’ forces could hand them over to the Victoria government for trial and imprisonment. A first trial opened in mid-2010. In the meantime, the Seychelles coast guard assumed an increasingly active role. In March 2010, it carried out the first in a series of attack and rescue operations, freeing Seychellois fishermen and Iranian sailors held on a pirated vessel. The initiatives were taken in close cooperation with the international community and made possible through significant technical, financial and material assistance from a number of countries, notably the United Arab Emirates (uae), India and China. In 2010, the uae delivered several highspeed patrol boats and a surveillance radar system, as well as financed the construction of a new coast guard base on Mahé. The following year, India and China strengthened the Seychelles’ air force through the donation of surveillance planes. At the same time, Seychelles embarked on groundbreaking talks with the Transitional Federal Government (tfg) of Somalia and the non-recognized authorities of Puntland and Somaliland on the problem of imprisoned Somali pirates. They were crowned with success in 2011, when separate transfer 85

For the sources used in this section, see the text on Seychelles below.

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arrangements were concluded with the three Somali entities. In March 2012, a first group of seventeen convicted pirates were transferred from Seychelles to  Somaliland. Acknowledging its pivotal role as an Indian Ocean counterpiracy hub, in February 2012, finally, the British government agreed to finance a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Co-ordination Center (­r appicc) in Seychelles. With a mandate to gather evidence for prosecution of pirates, including evidence on financial flows and arms supplies, it opened in the capital Victoria in February 2013. Although less exposed than Seychelles, piracy emanating from Somalia emerged as a threat also to Mauritius. In December 2011, therefore, the Mauritian parliament passed a Piracy and Maritime Violence Act. Following the example of the legislation in Seychelles, it allowed for the trial and detention on the island of suspected pirates captured by international naval missions. Agreements to that effect were signed with the eu in 2011 and with Britain in 2012. In January 2013, a first group of Somali prisoners were handed over to the Mauritian authorities.

Military Powers: Old and New

If the response to the Somali-based piracy has been a growing international presence in the western Indian Ocean, it remains that the dominant individual powers are the United States, France and India, who possess ‘blue-water’ naval capabilities and military bases. While the United Kingdom no longer plays the role it did before the Second World War, China is rapidly emerging as a regional power. Most observers of geo-politics in the Indian Ocean focus their attention on the evolving triangular relationship between Washington (and Paris), New Delhi and Beijing. Others emphasize the rise of the East and its links to Africa. As noted by Gupta, different schools explore how Western powers want to protect their access to oil fields and energy resources, all the while controlling their shipping routes as well. At the same time, it is a place where burgeoning global powers (specifically, China and India) seek a strategy of marginalizing the West through the creation of new South-South corridors, and old peripheries are envisioned to become new centers, including Africa due to its valuable (and increasingly valued) minerals and markets.86 86

Gupta op. cit., pp. 523–24.

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Blue-water capability The term ‘blue-water navy’ is used to describe a military force which can operate across the high seas for a longer period of time and possesses expeditionary capabilities. It includes aircraft carriers and long-range submarines. A hallmark of a blue-water navy is the ability to replenish at sea. Maritime forces which mainly operate in a country’s territorial waters and do not have aircraft carriers and long-range submarines are usually described as ‘green-water navies’, or coastal ‘brown-water navies’. India and China have recently emerged as ‘bluewater navies’. India commissioned its first aircraft carrier already in 1987. A second carrier was launched in 2013. China’s first aircraft carrier – Liaoning; a re-modeled Soviet vessel – was commissioned in September 2012. India’s naval bases are on the sub-continent, but it manages listening posts on Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. China does not have any bases or permanent military installations in the western Indian Ocean.

For the purpose of this book, suffice it here to highlight some of the main features of the dominant and emerging external actors from a geo-political and security perspective. All five of them possess nuclear weapons and four of them are veto-wielding permanent members of the un Security Council, in every economic, political and military aspect completely dwarfing the small island nations. As a preamble, it should further be recalled that there is  no over-arching, regulatory security architecture covering the Indian Ocean.87  As the only superpower, the United States is by far the dominant extraregional actor in and around the Indian Ocean. Since the end of the Cold War, the us involvement has been constantly growing via ‘Operation Desert Storm’ in Kuwait (1991), ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan (2001), ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in Iraq (2003) and, in general, the ‘global war on terror’, which all to a large extent have been based on us naval power. As a result of the interventions in the northern rim and the focus on the entry and exit points to the ocean – as well as of the demise of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Soviet navy – in the main, however, Washington has downgraded its engagement in the western Indian Ocean island world. In a policy document on priorities for the 21st century, the 87

Secondary actors such as Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Australia are not included in this summary.

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us defense department noted in January 2012 that “[our] economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.” Reflecting the perceived threat from China, the analysis, nevertheless, concluded that “we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”88 Although the Indian Ocean was included in this pivot, the focus was on the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, where the main base of ‘Camp Lemonnier’ is located in Djibouti; the headquarters of the fifth fleet are in Bahrain; and the us in addition has a string of military installations in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Excluding personnel aboard naval ­vessels – which make up the bulk of the us forces in the Indian Ocean region – there are around 4,000 American soldiers stationed at the land bases.89 There are no us bases in eastern Africa south of Djibouti. The Indian Ocean island world, however, is where the critically important naval base of Diego Garcia is located. By far the biggest military base in the ocean and often described as a huge stationary aircraft carrier, it houses some 2,000 us navy and air force troops. According to the us military expert John Pike, it is “the base from which we control half of Africa and the southern side of Asia.” In addition, as part of the us Africa Command’s (africom) security cooperation program, the navy, marine corps and coast guard embrace the African coastal states and island nations within the African Partnership Station initiative, a sea-based node for joint training exercises and information exchange widely considered as the most ambitious in the region.90 Under bilateral military cooperation agreements, Washington, finally, has established a number of drone and surveillance facilities from Djibouti to Seychelles. Following its ‘East of Suez’ strategic retreat – initiated in 1968 and completed three years later – as a military power the United Kingdom plays a ­secondary role in the wider Indian Ocean region. Closely allied to the United States, it too focuses on the northern rim (and South-East Asia), where it ­presides over a “strategic array” of support facilities, including a naval command post in Bahrain.91 Nevertheless, as a residual footprint of its empire in 88

89 90 91

us Department of Defense: ‘Sustaining us Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, quoted in Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner: ‘Is the Indian Ocean a Region and Why Does It Matter for us National Security?’ Naval War College, Newport, April 2013, p. 17. Justin V. Hastings: ‘The Fractured Geopolitics of the United States in the Indian Ocean Region’ in jior, Vol. 7, No. 2, December 2011, p. 193. Sörenson op. cit., p. 43. James Rogers: ‘European (British and French) Geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific’ in jior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, p. 75.

Introduction

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the western Indian Ocean, at the same time the uk controversially maintains the Chagos archipelago as the colony of the British Indian Ocean Territory, proclaimed in 1965 “to enable Britain and the United States to convert [the] islands into [military] bases or staging posts”; dismembered from Mauritius; and “sanitized” of its original inhabitants. Next to the giant us base, the British maintain a small troop contingent on the island of Diego Garcia. In breach of un General Assembly declarations, the British hold over Chagos/biot is firmly rejected by Mauritius and censured by the African Union. France’s situation is different from that of the United Kingdom, its historical rival for regional supremacy. Together with the United States, it is the only other power with defined military bases in the western Indian Ocean. However, as Houbert observes, France “does not always and everywhere positively value togetherness with the usa [and] insists that [its regional] forces are independent of any military bloc.”92 With Reunion and Mayotte as integral parts of metropolitan France and ruling over a number of islands and islets in the Mozambique Channel and off Madagascar, the south-western portion of the ocean has been described as a “French private preserve.”93 France is de facto both an external power and a regional state. Bouchard and Crumplin differentiate between ‘a France in the Indian Ocean’ and ‘a France of the Indian Ocean’, where in the former concept the agenda and actions reflect the interests of the European nation, while the latter focuses on the French-held islands’ integration into the regional environment, notably with regard to recognition by and interaction with the independent island nations.94 This is a contentious balancing act. Although Reunion is not claimed by any other state, the sister department of Mayotte, as well as the Scattered Islands, are in contravention of the 1960 un Decolonization Declaration retained by France. With strong support from the au, Comoros demands the reintegration of Mayotte into the Comorian union, while Madagascar claims the islands in the Mozambique Channel. De jure, Mayotte and the Scattered Islands, as well as by extension their declared eezs, are under French occupation. This notwithstanding, both Reunion and Mayotte – with more than a million inhabitants and significant French military installations – have as Outermost Regions been attached to the European Union. Reunion primarily, but also Mayotte and the Scattered Islands, are central to France’s vocation as a maritime power and its strategic quest to remain 92 93 94

Jean Houbert: ‘The West in the Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean and India’ in Rumley and Chaturvedi (eds) op. cit., p. 71. Bouchard and Crumplin: ‘Two Faces of France’ op. cit., p. 170. Ibid., p. 162.

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globally relevant. Viewed as integral a part of France as Hawaii of the United States95 – with which it shares both physical, volcanic features and its role as a naval base – Reunion is the cornerstone of the French regional presence. As India and China move closer to Africa, France sees Reunion and the other Indian Ocean possessions as a conduit for projection in the opposite direction. In 2008, the French government’s white paper on defense and national security underlined that “[o]ur presence in the Indian Ocean could serve as a steppingstone to extending our presence and co-operation into Asia.”96 With bases in Djibouti, Abu Dhabi, Reunion and Mayotte and a combined permanent force of some 4,700 troops, France is by far the most powerful European actor in the Indian Ocean. In the south-western part, it is arguably the strongest overall. The military presence covers the areas that are most significant to its interests, but its naval projection reaches beyond the quadrilateral land-based system and extend over a combined exclusive economic zone of 2.5 million square kilometers claimed by France.97 With over 2,000 soldiers, the base in Djibouti is the biggest of the four, hosting an army contingent and a naval station. A force of around 700 is stationed at a new base in Abu Dhabi, which opened in 2009 and includes facilities for naval, air and terrestrial forces. The headquarters of the French armed forces in the southern zone of the Indian Ocean (fazsoi)98 are located at Saint-Denis, the capital of Reunion. They coordinate the defense base of Reunion-Mayotte, straddling either side of Madagascar. Excluding gendarmes, the joint base has around 2,000 military personnel from the army, navy and air force. With some 600 marines, the naval base at Port des Galets west of Saint-Denis is the third largest French military port after Toulon and Brest in metropolitan France. After Diego Garcia, it also constitutes the second largest navy deployment in the Indian Ocean. A detachment of the French Foreign Legion is based in Mayotte, which in addition houses one of the biggest satellite listening posts in the world. Finally, under bi- and multilateral security agreements with African coastal states and the island nations, France is actively involved in military training programs and joint exercises

95 96 97

98

Houbert in Rumley and Chaturvedi (eds) op. cit., p. 73. Quoted in Rogers op. cit., p. 71. This includes the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (taaf) with a combined eez of more than one and a half million km2. France claims the second largest eez area in the world, covering no less than 11 million km2. The largest area is claimed by the United States, totaling some 11.3 million. With 8.5 million km2, the eez of Australia is the third largest. In French, Forces armées dans la zone sud de l’Océan Indien (fazsoi).

Introduction

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throughout the western Indian Ocean. Despite the strained relations and the conflict over Mayotte, from 2010 the cooperation also includes Comoros. Although traditionally continental, India, of course, is far from an external power in the Indian Ocean context. The geographic position of India vis-à-vis the ocean – the world’s only region and oceanic expanse named after a single state – is often compared to that of Italy in the Mediterranean, only on a much bigger scale. The sub-continent of India divides the ocean into a western and an eastern part. Throughout history, there have been close contacts between India and Africa and – mainly as a consequence of the indenture system – a significant population of Indian origin lives on the Indian Ocean islands, particularly in Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles, but also in Madagascar and, to a lesser extent, Comoros. Unsurprisingly, the government in New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its own backyard, deeming it both natural and desirable that it essentially should be an ‘Ocean of India’. Published in 2004 and updated in 2009, India’s maritime doctrine echoes this opinion, emphasizing the country’s determination to “constitute the most important influence in the region as a whole.”99 To achieve this objective – and to contain a potential Chinese advance – India is rapidly developing its air force and naval ‘blue-water’ capability, expecting to add three nuclear-powered submarines and three aircraft carriers to its arsenal by 2015.100 Contrary to the United States and France, India does not have a permanent base in the Indian Ocean outside the sub-continent itself. Nevertheless, from a military point of view it plays a prominent role also in the western portion. Defense cooperation with Mauritius – which does not have a standing army – dates back to 1974. Under bilateral agreements with Seychelles and Mauritius, since 2003 the Indian navy also patrols their territorial waters. In addition to joint exercises, the cooperation includes technical and material assistance. Notably, the New Delhi government seconds senior security advisers to both Seychelles and Mauritius and has provided their coast guards with patrol vessels, helicopters and surveillance aircraft. In Seychelles and Mauritius, India also has access to listening posts. In July 2007, its radar surveillance system in the Indian Ocean was expanded through another station in northern Madagascar. In 2008, the Indian government took the important initiative to convene the first Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (ions) in New Delhi, a consultative forum for discussion and exchange between regional heads of navies and maritime agencies. Seeking to increase naval cooperation and maritime security in the wider Indian Ocean, the symposium was subsequently institutionalized, 99 Don Berlin: ‘The Rise of India and the Indian Ocean’ in jior, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2011, p. 2. 100 Alex Vines: ‘India’s Security Concerns in the Western Indian Ocean’ in Emma Mawdsley and Gerard McCann (eds): India in Africa: Changing Geographies of Power, Pambazuka Press, Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi and Oxford, 2011, p. 191.

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meeting in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in 2010 and in Cape Town, South Africa, in 2012. All the independent African Indian Ocean nations form part of the 35 ions members. It is at the same time worthy of note that whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and China have not been invited to join, in recognition of its regional status France took part from the beginning.101 As a result, Indian navy vessels have increasingly been making port of call at the French naval base in Reunion. Finally, as a consequence of its spiraling demand for Middle East oil and African raw materials, China too has appeared as an external power in the western Indian Ocean world. Historically inward-looking, in January 2009 it joined the international counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. Although the Chinese navy chose to remain outside the multinational forces, it was a significant show of force. Of all the major powers, China, nevertheless, has the most modest military presence. It has no permanent bases, defense installations or listening posts in the Indian Ocean. Many Western and Indian security analysts are keen to describe how the Beijing government is crafting ‘a string of pearls’ of naval stations stretching from Cambodia to Pakistan.102 As inter alia pointed out by Holslag and Baixas, to date, however, the port facilities accessed by China are not for military use, but for commercial purposes.103 Characterizing China as a “reluctant pretender,” in Holslag’s opinion it is “not very concerned and certainly not inclined to support a rapid naval development west of the Malacca Strait” in South East Asia.104 Through active diplomacy and economic assistance, in the meantime China has forged strong political relations with the independent Indian Ocean countries. In an unparalleled acknowledgement of the strategic role and location of Seychelles, in February 2007 Hu Jintao, president of the world’s most populous nation, notably paid an official visit to the indian-oceanic micro-state. Two years later, he similarly concluded a four-nation African tour in Mauritius, which has an influential Sino-Mauritian minority population.

101 In addition to a number of Middle East, African and Asian littoral countries – notably Pakistan – Australia and South Africa are ions members. 102 See, for example, Berlin: ‘The Rise of India’ op. cit.; Swaran Singh: ‘China’s Foreys into the Indian Ocean: Strategic Implications for India’ in jior, Vol. 7, No. 2, December 2011, pp. 235–48; and Ranjit Kumar: ‘Island Nations: High Stakes on High Seas’ in Africa Quarterly, August 2011–January 2012, pp. 112–17. 103 Jonathan Holslag: ‘The Reluctant Pretender: China’s Evolving Presence in the Indian Ocean’ in jior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, pp. 42–51; and Lionel Baixas: ‘Des Perles dans le Mandala?: La Chine Dispose-t-Elle de Points d’Appui dans l’Océan Indien?’ in Diplomatie, Les Grands Dossiers, No. 10, August-September 2012, pp. 60–61. 104 Holslag op. cit., p. 46.

Introduction



41

Complex Cooperation and Inter-IsIand Identity

Until recently and with few exceptions,105 mainland Africa and the pan-African organizations have been conspicuously absent from the Indian Ocean maritime arena. Whereas distant non-regional countries such as Bulgaria and Finland joined the international effort against the Somali-based piracy, no African naval force took part. Contradicting its vocation as a continental leader, post-apartheid South Africa – an Indian Ocean coastal nation with an upgraded, modern navy including three submarines and four frigates – chose to abstain, arguing that the threat was “beyond the boundaries of [its] national interest and capacity.”106

The South African navy South Africa is both an Atlantic and an Indian Ocean nation. The main naval station is based in Simon’s Town on the Atlantic Cape peninsula, with support stations in Port Elizabeth and Durban on the Indian Ocean coast. The South African navy was upgraded through the acquisition in 2004–05 of modern submarines and frigates and has around 6,000 uniformed members. Although by far the strongest force in sub-Saharan Africa and possessing the capability to project power in its territorial waters and into the adjoining ocean basins, South Africa, however, is not a significant naval power. Apart from regular patrols in the Mozambique Channel and assistance to Mozambique and Tanzania, its role in the western Indian Ocean has been modest. Nevertheless, due to its strategic location on the Cape route around Africa it is an influential member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the South African navy maintains close relations with inter alia its Australian, French and Indian counterparts. See Thean Potgieter: ‘South Africa and Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean’ in jior, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2011.

105 Kenya is upgrading its littoral ‘green-water capability’. With headquarters in Mombasa, the navy includes off-shore patrol and missile vessels and it cooperates closely in training programs with the us, British and French navies. As part of an au land offensive against al-Shabab forces, in September 2012 the Kenyan navy shelled the port of Kismayo in neighboring Somalia. 106 Francis A. Kornegay Jr.: ‘South Africa and sadc in the Indian Ocean Maritime Security Equation’ in jior, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2012, p. 72.

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As the Indian Ocean in a context of boundary disputes and lacking a security framework was rapidly militarized and internationalized – leading observers to conclude that “with more actors set to enter the already crowded maritime domain, adherence and interpretation of the international law of the seas will complicate in the coming decades”107 – the Somali piracy exposed what Kornegay has described as “the utter defenselessness of Africa in controlling its coastal waters.” In a study on South Africa and sadc in the Indian Ocean maritime equation, he emphasized that the Somali crisis revealed “Africa’s lack of maritime sovereignty in controlling its combined exclusive [economic] zone, underlining the dictum [that] ‘you don’t control what you don’t patrol’.”108 Thirty-eight of Africa’s 54 countries are either coastal (32) or island (6) states, including the continental giants Nigeria and South Africa. They represent 70% of the members of the African Union.109 Nevertheless, since the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, post-colonial Africa has “appear[ed] blind to the maritime domain’s importance to its development. More often than not it leaves others to profit from its vast adjoining oceans and rich resources.”110 Over 90% of Africa’s exports and imports are transported by sea, but African-owned ships only account for 1.2% of world shipping by ­number and 0.9% by gross tonnage.111 The continent boasts more than 100 established ports, half of which have the capacity to handle containers. Many, however, suffer from poor management, few can receive larger ships and no single African port ranks among the 70 most productive in the world. Illegal fishing, dumping of hazardous waste, smuggling and human trafficking are endemic. This notwithstanding, only five sub-Saharan countries have naval forces that may be defined as coast guards.112 South of the Sahara, there are in total no more than five frigate-sized warships, four of which are South African and one Nigerian.113 Only the South African navy has submarines. Against this background and in reaction to the piracy threat, the African Union eventually decided to commission the drafting of an integrated maritime 107 108 109 110

Venkatshamy op. cit., p. 36. Kornegay Jr. op. cit., p. 80. Including Western Sahara. Annette Leijenaar: ‘Africa Should Wake up to the Importance of an Integrated Maritime Strategy’, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, October 2012, p. 1. 111 au: ‘2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 aim Strategy)’, [Addis Ababa], 2012, p. 8. 112 Leijenaar op. cit., pp. 1 and 2. 113 As a comparison, in 2012 the United States had over 100 frigate-class navy vessels, China around 75, France 24, India 22 and the United Kingdom 19.

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action plan, known as the ‘2050 aim Strategy’. Stating that “the time has come for Africa to rethink how to manage her inland water ways, oceans and seas [in order to] foster increased wealth creation,” the decision was taken by the African heads of state and government at the au assembly meeting in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009. The strategy was adopted by the au summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2014, which in a marked policy turnabout further declared the period 2015–25 as the ‘Decade of African Seas and Oceans’, with the date of 25 July as an annual commemorative day.114 Acknowledging that its realization will take decades and “require the utmost political will of [the] member states,”115 the au 2050 aim strategy is both comprehensive and hugely ambitious. Practically starting from scratch, among many objectives it inter alia envisions the harmonization of national maritime laws; the establishment – “as appropriate and when permissible” – of a ­combined African exclusive maritime zone; the development of a naval component of the African standby force116; the formation of a continental body of chiefs of navies and coast guards; the adoption of a common fisheries policy; and a number of measures to arrest piracy, the dumping of toxic waste, ­smuggling and trafficking. With regard to illicit, unlicensed fishing in African waters  – estimated to cost sub-Saharan Africa a staggering one billion us Dollars a year – it states that “the au shall work towards seeking the appropriate level of compensation for the five decades of losses [incurred].”117 After half a century of disregard for the continent’s maritime challenges, the launch of the new au vision was a significant breakthrough for the Indian Ocean member states. History will tell to what extent the continental body and the traditionally inward-looking African states actually will pursue the aim strategy. In the meantime, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles will continue to defend their interests at the United Nations and in various international forums, as well as develop the economies and strengthen their position as countries with specific challenges and opportunities through ­inter-island cooperation.

114 au: ‘Decision on the Adoption and Implementation of the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 aim Strategy)’, Assembly/AU/16 (XXII), Add. 1, Addis Ababa, 30–31 January 2014. 115 au: ‘2050 aim Strategy’ op. cit., p. 32. 116 Composed by regional military brigades, the African standby force is scheduled to be operational in 2015. 117 au: ‘2050 aim Strategy’ op. cit., pp. 15–32. The maritime action plan further covers an ‘integrated marine tourism and leisure strategy for Africa’.

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By providing fundamental instruments of international law such as the 1960 Decolonization Declaration and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations offers the Indian Ocean states a critically important platform. Together with around 50 other island countries and territories in the Caribbean, the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles also form part of the group of Small Island Developing States (sids), first recognized at the un Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.118 Sharing similar challenges, in 1994 they adopted the Barbados program of action, which focuses on sustainable development, climate change, environmental degradation, threats to fisheries and other common issues due to insularity, such as limited domestic markets, dependence on international trade and high transportation costs. Most of the countries and territories are members of the Alliance of Small Island States, which acts on behalf of sids within the un system. The un General Assembly declared 2014 the ‘International Year of Small Island Developing States’. Seychelles is a particularly active member. In January 2014, it presented a draft ‘Blue Economy Declaration’ for submission to the third sids conference in Samoa later in the year.119 In the context of the United Nations, the importance of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (iotc) should also be noted. Mandated to manage tuna fisheries and stocks in the Indian Ocean, it is an inter-governmental organization established in 1993 by the un Food and Agriculture Organization. With an estimated annual value of between two and three billion us Dollars, the tuna resources in the wider Indian Ocean are the third largest in the world and make substantial contributions to the economies and food security in the region. In recognition of its role as the ‘tuna capital of the ocean’, the iotc secretariat is based in Victoria, Seychelles. Membership is in addition to coastal states open to states whose vessels are licensed to operate in the Indian Ocean, among them France, Britain, China and South Korea. The European Union is also a member. 118 The Atlantic African nations of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe form part of the sids grouping. On account of its size, Madagascar is not a sids country. 119 The draft ‘Blue Economy Declaration’ submitted by Seychelles to the sids conference in Samoa in September 2014 emphasized five spheres: (1) Fisheries and their vital role in providing food security and sustainable livelihoods; (2) Tourism as a source of decent employment and a contributor to poverty alleviation; (3) Oceans as a source of renewable energy from wind, wave, tidal, thermal and biomass sources; (4) Oceans as a source of hydrocarbon and mineral resources; and (5) Oceans as the primary medium of global trade through shipping and port facilities (‘The blue economy roadmap’ in Today in Seychelles, 28 January 2014).

Introduction

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In addition to the United Nations, the Indian Ocean states raise their specific concerns in a number of international organizations, notably the Organi­ sation Internationale de la Francophonie (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles) and the Commonwealth (Mauritius and Seychelles), as well as in the case of Comoros in the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.120 The regionally oriented Indian Ocean Rim Association (iora) could be added. Originally established in March 1997 as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (ior-arc) to promote economic and technical cooperation among the littoral and island nations,121 due to the enormous area covered and the heterogeneous membership it has, however, largely lost its regional character.122 Despite the visions of its founding fathers – among them Nelson Mandela – the achievements have also been modest. Focusing on trade and dominated by India, Australia and South Africa, the maritime concerns of the small island nations, as well as, in general, human development issues, have largely been relegated to the background.123 Nevertheless, for Mauritius, in particular, the iora membership has been of great significance.

120 The Union of Comoros is the southernmost member of the Arab League. Based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is “the collective voice of the Muslim world” and works to “safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony.” It is the largest international organization outside the United Nations. 121 In November 2013, the ior-arc changed its name to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (iora). 122 Christian Wagner: ‘The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (iorarc): The Futile Quest for Regionalism?’ in jior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, pp. 6–16. Stretching from South Africa to Australia via India, the organization represents a population of 2 billion people. There are 20 iora member countries. China, Egypt, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States are associated as ‘dialogue partners’. France’s application for full membership based on its sovereignty over Reunion was rejected due to ior-arc’s stipulation that only independent states of the region were eligible. In 2001, however, France was accepted as a ‘dialogue partner’. Madagascar is an original member. Seychelles withdrew in 2003, but re-joined in 2011. Comoros, finally, became a full member in October 2012. 123 In 2004, McPherson wrote: “As a participant in the numerous [preparatory] meetings, I must admit that I look on the present association with a sense of disappointment and, in my worst moments, see it as having been hijacked by faceless ‘economically rational’ trade bureaucrats determined to dehumanize rather than humanize any process of regional cooperation in their eagerness to avoid anything that might cut across other agendas” (Kenneth I. McPherson: ‘“There Once Was an Ugly Duckling…,” or, The Sad History of the Good Ship ior-arc’ in Rumley and Chaturvedi (eds) op. cit., p. 113).

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It was among the original founders, hosts the secretariat and benefits as a financial hub from its links with, above all, India and South Africa. Closer to home, the countries discussed in this book have formed their own, distinctly indian-oceanic organization for inter-island cooperation: the Indian Ocean Commission, with headquarters outside Port Louis, Mauritius. Launched in 1984 by Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, the commission – which uses French as its official language and is commonly referred to by its French acronym coi (Commission de l’Océan Indien) – was two years later enlarged to include not only Comoros, but also Reunion. Due to France’s sovereignty over the Mascarene island, the important regional initiative has not been without tensions or political complications. In the diplomatic words of Houbert, the French global vocation “is not always welcomed with the same enthusiasm by all the [island] states.”124 Although the inclusion of Reunion in the main has been non-conflictual and the disputed Scattered Islands – ­occupied by France, but claimed primarily by Madagascar – have been left out of the commission’s agenda, coi membership of the Comorian island of Mayotte would not only change the correlation of forces in France’s favor, but could undermine the regional project.125 Irrespective of the French dimension, for many years the structural, political and socio-economic diversity of the four independent coi states complicated the implementation of a balanced cooperative arrangement. In the Indian Ocean world, Madagascar is a huge country with a big population and a  significant mineral potential, while the small island nations of Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles have marginal domestic markets and no exploitable minerals. All four are highly dependent on imports and compete to a large extent for the same export markets. Trade between the islands is limited. In addition, Madagascar and Comoros face chronic political instability, while Mauritius and Seychelles score highly with regard to governance. Madagascar and Comoros, finally, are among the poorest nations in the world, whereas Mauritius is widely known for its ‘economic miracle’ and Seychelles leads in the African socio-economic rankings. 124 Houbert in Rumley and Chaturvedi (eds) op. cit., p. 73. 125 Despite widespread opposition in Comoros, Mayotte is increasingly invited by independent coi states to participate in regional cultural events. The French department also forms part of the Vanilla Islands Organization. Not surprisingly, France is pushing for Mayotte’s inclusion as a full coi member. When the commission in April 2014 convened for a foreign ministers’ meeting in Moroni, the French delegation included representatives from Mayotte. They were, however, barred from attending by the Comorian hosts (‘La dramatique attitude de Claudine Ledoux’ in mayotte.orange.fr., 18 April 2014).

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Although the commission received generous funding from France and the European Union and successfully implemented a number of programs with regard to fisheries, higher education, culture and the environment,126 by 2003 “the inequalities between the member states in terms of development strategies and levels,” as well as “the lack of strong political signals,” were such that the regional organization itself raised the question whether it “should be purely and simply abolished.”127 In a presentation of the commission, it pointed out that “these islands are not all on an equal footing, [but] in fact at various levels which are often, unfortunately, very far apart.”128 Over the following years, however, the commission managed to overcome the main structural and organizational obstacles, progressively asserting itself as a regional driving force. Emphasizing its political role and the Indian Ocean islanders’ common heritage, the commission acted as a mediator in the secessionist conflict in Comoros in 2007–08 and in the political crisis in Madagascar from 2009. While launching a new set of regional development programs – which inter alia focused on improved inter-island transportation and communications – it also took an active part in the counter-piracy effort.129 In 2011, the Indian Ocean Commission was as a regional organization accorded au observer status. When it in January 2014 celebrated its 30th anniversary in Victoria, Seychelles, it could look back on a bumpy, but eventually successful journey towards the establishment of a small indian-oceanic economic community with an own identity and sense of belonging. Finally, before turning to the individual African indian-oceanic countries and territories, the most recent regional initiative should be mentioned, namely the Vanilla Islands Organization, a concept born in 2010 for the collective marketing of the Indian Ocean nations as a tourism destination. Inspired by similar branding exercises in the Caribbean and elsewhere, it initially c­overed the coi members, as well as Mayotte. The Asian Indian Ocean nation of Maldives joined in 2013 and there are plans to extend membership also to Zanzibar. The main objectives are to promote the region to the world; educate global tourist operators on the diversity and complementarity of the islands; improve air connectivity with the targeted markets and between the members; 126 France contributes around 40% of the coi operating budget. The principal funders of the various programs are the European Union, the French Agency for Development and the African Development Bank. 127 coi/ioc: ‘The Indian Ocean Commission: Regional Solidarity in the Face of Globalization’ in The Courier acp-eu, No. 201, November–December 2003, p. 19. 128 Ibid., p. 18. 129 In June 2012, coi/ioc set up an anti-piracy unit in Victoria, Seychelles.

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establish package tours that involve visits to more than one island destination; and develop cruise ship itineraries. In addition to the traditional European markets, increased tourism from India, Russia and China is actively pursued. With funding from the European Union and driven by Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles, the initiative had a flying start. Under the presidency of Alain St.  Ange, minister of tourism and culture in Seychelles, the Vanilla Islands Organization was formally recognized as a full member by the un World Tourism Organization in September 2013.

chapter 2

Madagascar: Old Cultures, Contemporary Crises

Puzzles and Potential

Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world after Greenland, New Guinea and Borneo and a giant in the African part of the Indian Ocean. The country has been portrayed as “peculiar” and “enigmatic.”1 Indeed, in several respects the Great Island is out of the ordinary, often defying scholarly consensus. Not only is the history of human settlement in Madagascar shrouded in mystery, but to many observers Malagasy post-independence economics ­constitute a conundrum and contemporary politics a maze. Discussing the peopling of Madagascar, Randrianja and Ellis describe the settlement process  as “a  giant puzzle,”2 while Deschamps has called it “the world’s most ­pleasing  enigma.”3 Similarly, the island’s economic trajectory is depicted by Razafindrakoto, Roubaud and Wachsberger as a “true mystery,” characterized by “paradox,”4 whereas Jütersonke and Kartas present Malagasy socio-political life as a “complex brew.”5 Since independence in 1960, Madagascar has been the scene of political instability, economic decline and regional marginalization. The country has seen four presidents ousted from power, one impeached by parliament and one assassinated. It is one of the poorest in the world and has the lowest per capita income in the Indian Ocean. At the same time African, Asian and – above all – sui generis, as well as endowed with considerable natural resources, the ‘Red Island’,6 however, has the potential to play a prominent role in southern Africa and in the indian-oceanic world.

1 Øyvind Dahl: Merkverdige Madagaskar: Øya Mellom Øst og Vest, Spartacus Forlag, Oslo, 2008, and Sheriff op. cit., p. 197. 2 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 28. 3 Hubert Deschamps quoted in ibid. 4 Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud and Jean-Michel Wachsberger: ‘Institutions, Gouvernance et Croissance de Long Terme à Madagascar: L’Énigme et le Paradoxe’, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, Paris-Dauphine, April 2013, pp. 2–3. 5 Oliver Jütersonke and Moncef Kartas: ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (pcia): Madagascar’, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2010, pp. 13 and 17. 6 Due to its laterite soils and the royal red color of the Imerina kingdom.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004292499_003

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Map 5  Madagascar



The ‘Eighth Continent’

The official name ‘Republic of Madagascar’ (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara) – which has no particular meaning in the Malagasy language – derives from indirect descriptions by Marco Polo in his Marvels of the World, written at the close of the 13th century. Together with the Comorian archipelago, the Arabs called the land Al-Qamar (‘The moon’)7 and the Portuguese later knew it as Saint Lawrence (São Lourenço). In 1817, the British recognized Radama I of Imerina as ‘King of Madagascar’, giving the entire island the name first used by the Venetian explorer.8 Situated between 500 and 800 kilometers east of the African continent (Mozambique), the geological origins of Madagascar lie in the southern Gondwana supercontinent, which more than a hundred million years ago as a result of a tectonic shift disintegrated and gave rise to South America, Africa, 7 On the Koranic origin of Al-Qamar, see below on Comoros. 8 Traveling overland along the Silk Road to China in the 13th century, Marco Polo (1254–1324) never visited the Indian Ocean islands. His descriptions of the islands were based on Arab sources.

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Australia and Antarctica. Linked together, Madagascar and India were eventually detached from Africa, but whereas India broke away and continued to drift in a northeasterly direction, Madagascar stayed behind in its present location.9 With a land area of 587,000 square kilometers, it is a giant in the Indian Ocean world, stretching around 1,600 kilometers from north to south and at its widest part almost reaching 600 kilometers across.10 Around the island, Madagascar has in accordance with the un Convention on the Law of the Sea established an exclusive economic zone (eez) of slightly more than 1.2 million square kilometers. In the Mozambique Channel, it claims the Scattered Islands (Les Îles Éparses) of Glorioso, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India and Europa, which three months prior to independence were withheld by France. The Malagasy claims were in December 1979 backed by the un General Assembly and have repeatedly been supported by the Organization of African Unity/the African Union.11 Rising from a narrow plain, a steep escarpment runs along Madagascar’s hot and humid eastern coast. West of the ridge the landscape is dominated by a central plateau, ranging in altitude from 750 to 1,500 meters.12 The central highlands – home of the Merina and the location of the capital Antananarivo (in Malagasy, ‘Town of a Thousand’) – are the most densely populated and dominated by terraced, rice-growing valleys. Further to the west, the increasingly dry terrain gradually slopes down to the Mozambique Channel. The island’s southern part is arid, with deciduous forests, shrub-lands and deserts. Whereas the east coast for around 1,000 kilometers runs almost in a straight line, the west coast is broken by bays, inlets and small islands. Madagascar is primarily a farming and stock-raising nation. Paddy rice is the all dominant crop, grown by 70% of the population and covering between one third and one half of the cultivated land. Rice is by far also the basic food item. In fact, the annual rice consumption per capita is the highest in the world, 9 10 11

12

The granitic Inner Islands of Seychelles also trace their geological origins to the Gondwana supercontinent. In terms of land area, Madagascar ranks 22nd in Africa. The disputed sovereignty over the small coral island of Juan de Nova is, in particular, a potential source of conflict. It is located in a belt of oil and gas deposits in the Mozambique Channel which has attracted several major petroleum companies. Although claimed by Madagascar and located within the Malagasy eez, from 2008 the French government has issued offshore exploration permits for blocks around Juan de Nova. In April 2011, Madagascar re-submitted its claim to establish the outer territorial limits beyond 200 nautical miles to the un Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The two coral islands of Glorioso (Les Glorieuses) are also claimed by the Union of Comoros. The massifs of Tsaratanana (in the north), Ankaratra (center) and Andringitra (south) reach altitudes above 2,500 meters.

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exceeding that of the Asian countries. Due to sustained demographic growth, domestic production no longer meets the demand and Madagascar has become dependent on rice imports. In addition, the rice fields are often damaged by cyclones and floods. Vanilla, coffee and cloves have traditionally been the main cash crops. Until recently, Madagascar was the world’s largest producer of natural vanilla – grown in the north-east – but the position has been overtaken by Indonesia. Zebu cattle, finally, play a prominent role in the Malagasy culture. Generally regarded as a sign of wealth rather than as a source of income, the development of a commercial beef industry has, however, been modest. The island’s geological origins and its isolation have resulted in an abundance of plants and animals found nowhere else on the planet. Often referred to as the ‘eighth continent’ and characterized as a ‘biodiversity hot spot’, around 90% of all animals and plants are endemic. Although Madagascar does not have the mammals, primates and reptiles of continental Africa, it is, for example, the home of over fifty species of lemurs, widely popularized through the 2005 computer-animated movie Madagascar. The cat-like fossa carnivore is unique to Madagascar, as are two thirds of the world’s chameleon species. Like the fauna, the flora is diverse and highly indigenous, with hundreds of endemic palms and orchids, as well as six varieties of baobab trees. The unique fauna and flora are, however, critically endangered by human activity. As a result of demographic pressure and traditional slash-and-burn agriculture, Madagascar is faced with an acute challenge of deforestation and soil erosion. Around 100,000 hectares of the country’s forests are lost every year. Between 1990 and 2010, they shrank from eleven to nine million hectares.13 To this should be added illegal harvesting of protected forests, in particular of rosewood, which is highly prized in East Asia for furniture, musical instruments and carvings. Logging of precious timber and official complicity in the trading of rosewood – in particular to China – grew dramatically in the aftermath of the 2009 coup d’état as the government tried to offset the loss of international aid by taxing the illicit activity.14 Initially, it focused on the Masoala National Park in north-eastern Madagascar, the largest in the country. In 2009 alone, around 100,000 ebony and rosewood trees were felled, representing an export value of more than 200 million us Dollars.15 13

14 15

Bertelsmann Stiftung: ‘Madagascar Country Report 2012’, Bertelsmann Stiftung/bti, Gütersloh, 2012, p. 27. The annual rate of primary forest loss in Madagascar is 0.65%, or three times higher than that in Indonesia, which is often quoted as particularly exposed. Lyle Bastin: ‘Madagascar in Crisis’, Social Science Research Network, [no place], May 2013, p. 4. International Crisis Group (icg): ‘Madagascar: La Crise à un Tournant Critique?’ Rapport Afrique No. 166, Brussels, November 2010, p. 11 and Robert Draper: ‘The Pierced Heart of

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The Great Island, finally, is regularly exposed to devastating cyclones. In 2004, Cyclone Gafilo – the strongest ever to hit the island – left over 200,000 people homeless and caused damage estimated at a quarter of a billion us Dollars.

Population, Ethnicity and Stratification

There has been no comprehensive census in Madagascar since 1993. According to official surveys, the population reached 20.7 million in 2011, with a low density of 35 inhabitants per square kilometer.16 Around 80% of the Malagasy – some 16.5 million – were registered as rural dwellers.17 There are extreme disparities in living conditions between the urban and rural areas and the gap is increasing. Less than 4% of the rural population has access to electricity and only 14% to drinking water.18 Whereas the rate of poverty in the urban areas between 2005 and 2010 grew from 52 to 54.2%, the corresponding increase in the rural areas was from 73.5 to 82.2%. In 2010, the national poverty rate was a staggering 76.5%.19 It has since grown further. With an estimated population of 1.5 million, Antananarivo (under French rule Tananarive, or ‘Tana’ for short)20 in the north-central highlands is the ­capital of Madagascar. In addition to government offices, most industries – notably textile factories – are located there. The capital is linked by rail and road to the eastern coastal city of Toamasina (ex-Tamatave; approximately 250,000 inhabitants), by far the most important port in Madagascar. Other major urban centers are Antsirabe (200,000) and Fianarantsoa (175,000) in ­central Madagascar and the coastal towns of Antsiranana (ex-Diego Suarez; 100,000) on the northern tip, Mahajanga (ex-Majunga; 150,000) in the northwest, Toliara (ex-Tuléar; 100,000) in the south-west and Tôlanaro (ex-Fort Dauphin; 50,000) in the extreme south-east.

16 17 18 19 20

Madagascar’ in National Geographic, Washington, September 2010, p. 90. Reacting to the developments, in 2010 unesco placed Madagascar’s rain forests on its list of endangered world heritage sites. Institut National de la Statistique (instat): ‘Population et Démographie’, Antananarivo, January 2012. instat: ‘Enquête Périodique Auprès des Ménages: 2010’, Antananarivo, August 2011, p. 72. Noro Razafimandimby: ‘Développement Rural: Un Chemin Encore Long’ in Revue de l’Océan Indien, No. 317, September 2010, p. 26. instat: ‘Population et Démographie’ (2012). Malagasy versions of Madagascar’s main towns were introduced in the 1970s, but many still use the old French names, such as Diego Suarez for Antsiranana or Fort Dauphin for Tôlanaro. In the text, the capital is throughout referred to as Antananarivo.

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Today’s Malagasy are descendants of early migrants from both Asia and Africa, dominated by Austronesians from the distant islands of Indonesia. Whereas those of African origin mainly settled on the coasts, the Asians eventually found the interior highlands better suited to their needs. According to sources cited by Dahl, the ratio between Asian and African dna is around 4:1 among the population in the highlands and 2:1 in the coastal areas.21 Albeit not without violence or conflict, over time the immigrants to the isolated island adopted a common language, shared cultural customs and norms and developed a joint identity. Malagasy nationalism, however, was contrary to the French government’s colonial policy of divide and rule. Based on a so called politique des races (‘race politics’) designed by the first military governor, General Gallieni, from the conquest in 1895 France adopted a system of indirect rule and ethnic administration which was to have lasting effects during the colonial period and beyond. In order to curtail Malagasy nationalism and the resistance of the Merina – the largest population group – France introduced a general distinction between ‘highlanders’ and ‘coastal peoples’ (côtiers), a “crude bifurcation [that] was more ideological than scientific,”22 but which was to gain currency and has played a divisive role in post-independent Madagascar. In addition, as in other parts of Africa ethnographers and anthropologists assisted the colonial power in classifying the people into separate ‘ethnic’ groups. By identifying dialectal, cultural and socio-economic variations, eighteen such groups were established, among them the Merina, Betsileo and Bara in the interior, the Betsimisaraka along the east coast and the Sakalava and Makoa on the west coast.23 As noted by Randrianja and Ellis, they were, however, “the expression of a generalized political relationship rather than of the more tangible realities of daily life.”24 21 22

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Dahl citing Philippe Beaujard in op. cit., p. 45. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 159. The distinction between ‘highlanders’ and côtiers loosely rested on perceived origin and religious beliefs, where the first category was seen as ‘more Asian’ and Protestant and the second ‘more African’ and Catholic. In addition, several of the supposedly ‘ethnic’ groups were divided into sub-groups. Coastal Sakalava, for example, were classified as Vezo, whereas the Sakalava in the interior were designated as Masikoro. The name given to the Makoa – living in the same region on the west coast and speaking the same Malagasy dialect as the Sakalava – indicates roots among the Makua people in northern Mozambique, through migration or slavery. Without indicating the source of their data, various authors, encyclopedias and ‘fact sheets’ on Madagascar not only highlight the ‘ethnic’ groups, but also quantify them in size or numbers. Commonly, the Merina are said to represent around a quarter of the Malagasy population. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 223.

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Ethnicity is not considered a fault line in Madagascar.25 Hauge from the Norwegian Peace Research Institute in Oslo, for example, finds that “there has never been any clear-cut overlap between […] the ethnic divides and political discrimination,”26 whereas the German Bertelsmann Foundation notes that “there is no extensive division along ethno-territorial lines.”27 Jütersonke and Kartas from the Swiss Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding similarly conclude that “[t]here is no such thing as an ethnic identity conflict,” adding that “ethnicity was a category that simply did not exist in Madagascar until it was introduced by anthropologists, […] unable to make sense of the world without resorting to race classifications.”28 Instead, most observers share the view that contemporary Malagasy society is extraordinary hierarchical and that stratification rather than ethnicity defines identity. With roots in Madagascar’s Austronesian past, its feudal kingdoms and the widespread use of domestic slave labor, the age-old social orders of fotsy (‘whites’) and mainty (‘blacks’) are, in the first place, a reality. Although the terms do reflect physical appearances, originally they were “attempts to classify the type of power wielded by different social groups and to reach a balance between them.”29 Overlapping with these orders and constructed around kinship, land and territory, inherited identities derived from caste-like social categories are, secondly, conspicuous.30 Commonly referred to in the contemporary political debate, these ancient categories primarily include andriana (‘nobles’) and hova (‘commoners’), but also andevo (‘slaves’, or, rather, descendants of slaves). In Madagascar, where politics are highly personalized and atomized, struggles for power are within this differentiated social fabric governed by “all sorts of internal rivalries,” often reflecting a “[b]yzantine […] local feud” which may appear bewildering to the outsider.31 In 2011, there were a mind-boggling 354 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

On ethnicity in Madagascar, see Solofo Randrianja (ed): Madagascar: Ethnies et Ethnicité, codesria, Dakar, 2004. Wenche Hauge: ‘Madagascar between Peace and Conflict: Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management’ in Conflict, Security & Development, Issue 11:5, November 2011, p. 525. Bertelsmann Stiftung op. cit., p. 7. See also Razafindrakoto, Roubaud and Wachsberger op. cit., as well as surveys by Afrobarometer. Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 34 and 36. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 68. Patricia Rajeriarison and Sylvain Urfer: Madagascar, Éditions Foi & Justice, Antananarivo, 2010, p. 117. Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 13. The main contenders in the protracted post-2009 political crisis, Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, were both Merina. In addition,

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officially registered political parties in the country. A law which tightened the registration requirements was introduced the following year, but in 2013 the number was still a staggering 173.32

Slavery and stigma The subject of domestic slavery is largely taboo in Madagascar. It remains that human bondage historically was widespread; that domestic slavery was a basic institution; and that the Kingdom of Madagascar was built on slave labor. When the French decreed its abolition in 1896, there were some 400,000 domestic slaves in the country. Of a total population in Antananarivo of around 100,000, as many as 60,000 were slaves. Still today, the stigma of slave ancestry attached to a substantial number of Malagasy remains a challenge. Historically, slaves were captured on the island; during raids on the Comorian archipelago and the Mozambican coast; or procured from Arab and European traders. Due to their great numbers, slaves from the African east coast were known as ‘Masombika’, ‘Mojambikas’ or ‘Mozambiques’. In addition to the extensive use of domestic slaves, tens of thousands of Malagasy and Africans were over the centuries sold for export to the Middle East, the Americas and, above all, to the French plantations in Reunion and Mauritius. In December 2012, the un Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery highlighted the effects on the Malagasy society of “the deeply rooted discrimination based on caste.” After a fact-finding mission to the island, she made a call for the eradication of “the stigma that slave descendants experience,” noting that the Malagasy government had sufficient legislation in place, but that “the laws are not implemented or monitored.” In particular, she denounced the resulting prevalence of domestic servitude, child labor in mines and quarries, as well as under-age servile marriages (un Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: ‘Madagascar: Poverty and Impunity Have Increased Contemporary Forms of Slavery’, Press release, Geneva, 19 December 2012).

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both had been mayors of Antananarivo, the stage of the country’s elite and its political struggles, and both were businessmen without backgrounds in any particular Malagasy ideological party tradition. With regard to religious beliefs, however, Ravalomanana was an active, office-bearing Protestant and Rajoelina a Catholic. ‘Présidentielle malgache: Un scrutin pour rebattre les cartes’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 23 October 2013.

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Language, Religion and Minorities

Language, on the other hand, is a unifying factor. There are regional dialects of Malagasy, but they are mutually intelligible and the common tongue is a significant basis of cultural unity.33 In this respect too, Madagascar is exceptional among the larger African countries. Recognized as an official national ­language, Malagasy is also the only language in Africa that belongs to the Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) language family. Although with influences from both African languages and Arabic, as much as 90% of the Malagasy vocabulary is of Austronesian origin.34 It is most closely related to Manyaan, a language spoken in central Kalimantan in the Indonesian part of Borneo. Today’s ‘classical Malagasy’ is a product of mass media, education and government, based on the Merina dialect. Working for King Radama I, members of the London Missionary Society developed a written form of Malagasy – using the Latin alphabet – as early as the 1820s. It played an instrumental role in the  rapid development of literacy and education, as well as the spread of Christianity. In 1896, however, the colonial power decreed that education in French was obligatory, relegating Malagasy to an inferior position, particularly in official and academic circles. Although independent Madagascar adopted both Malagasy and French as official languages, and the vernacular was strongly promoted under President Ratsiraka’s policy of ‘malgachization’, this situation largely prevails. French is mainly used by the urban elite and the media, while the rural population communicates in Malagasy.35 With significant cultural influences from France and considered a francophone country, in 1970 Madagascar was a founding member of the community  of nations which later formed the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. Under Ratsiraka, however, it left the organization in 1977. Madagascar rejoined in 1989, but was suspended following the unconstitutional change of government in early 2009. During his presidency, Ravalomanana tried to turn English – a language known by only a few, ­predominantly young, urban Malagasy – into an official language. Government 33

34 35

On language and dialects in Madagascar, see Roger-Bruno Rabenilaina: ‘Origine et Caractère Unitaire de la Langue Malgache’ in Randrianja (ed) op. cit. pp. 25–77 and Solo Raharinjanahary: ‘Langue, Dialectes et Ethnies à Madagascar’ in ibid., pp. 137–70. Dahl op. cit., p. 49. In 2011, the national literacy rate was 71.4%. There are differences between urban and rural areas, as well as between men and women. However, the rate in the rural areas was as high as 67.8% and nationally 68% of the women above the age of 15 were registered as literate (instat: ‘Education: Taux d’Alphabétisation des Individus Âgés de 15 Ans et Plus’, Antananarivo, September 2011).

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institutions, public positions and initiatives were named in English, such as ‘Economic Development Board of Madagascar’, ‘chief of staff’ and ‘Madagascar Action Plan’. Through a constitutional referendum in 2007, English was even adopted as a third national language.36 In addition to ethnic composition and language, Madagascar’s distinctive features in the African indian-oceanic region stand out with regard to spiritual beliefs. In 2007, an estimated 48% of the population adhered to variations of a traditional Austronesian faith, which to a large extent has followers also among the Christian population.37 Prominent in this respect is famadihana, a reburial ceremony in which ancestors’ bones are removed from the family tomb, re-wrapped in new shrouds and feted with music and dancing. Due to the cult of ancestors, Madagascar has been described as the island “where the dead never die.”38 As a result of early British and French competition, the Christian churches are, however, strong, particularly in the main urban areas. Nationally, it is estimated that 45% of Madagascar’s population is Christian, more or less equally divided between Protestants and Catholics. The Protestant churches have more followers in the capital and the interior, where the London Missionary Society was established in 1820, whereas Catholicism is more widely spread in the coastal areas. The Christian churches have played an important political role. During the colonial period, it was the churches – in particular the Protestant – that formed nationalist leaders such as Jean Ralaimongo and Joseph Ravoahangy. In 1979, the Reformed, Lutheran and Anglican churches joined forces with the Catholics to form the ecumenical Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (ffkm),39 announcing that “the Church has the duty to seek the national interest and to speak its mind even when its words may be disagreeable.”40 ffkm promoted ‘the living forces of the nation’,41 a broad opposition movement which in 1992 ended the rule of Didier Ratsiraka and brought Albert Zafy to power. Similarly, during the political crisis in 2002, the council again turned against Ratsiraka and put its weight behind Marc Ravalomanana, himself 36

37 38 39 40 41

See Jean-Loup Vivier: Madagascar sous Ravalomanana: La Vie Politique Malgache depuis 2001, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2007, p. 101. Although adopted in 2007, the introduction of English as a third official language was broadly unpopular. Statistics in Dahl op. cit., p. 294. Øyvind Dahl: ‘Hvor de Døde Icke Dør: Om Likvendingsseremoniene på Madagaskar’ in Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon, Oslo, 1984. Fiombonan’ny Fiangonana Kristianina eto Madagasikara. Quoted in Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 197. ‘Forces vives de la nation’, later shortened to ‘Forces Vives’.

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vice-president of the largest Protestant denomination, the Reformed Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (fjkm).42 Around 7% of the population, or 1.5 million, is Muslim. The followers of Islam are mainly found among the Comorian minority in the north-west and the Karana business community of Indo-Pakistani descent.43 In the south of the island, where Islamized immigrants landed centuries ago, Muslim organizations without connections to the Comorian or Karana communities have undergone a revival, leading to the development of a heterodox, indigenous version of Islam.44 Few Malagasy Muslims go on pilgrimage to Mecca and there are only a small number of Koranic schools in the country. Comorians, French, Karana and Chinese constitute the most important minorities. In the absence of official statistics, their respective numbers are unknown. At the end of the 20th century, they amounted in total to less than 100,000 people, or a small fraction of around 0.5% of the country’s inhabitants.45 With recent arrivals from, in particular, China, the numbers have most likely increased. Historically, human settlement in the north-western corner took place via Comoros and Comorians have always represented a sizeable portion of the local population. Until the independence of Comoros in 1975, more than 70,000 lived in Madagascar, mainly in Majunga and on the island of Nosy Be. Many left after the massacres of 1976. Those who stay are often workers, fishermen, employed in the tourism industry or students.46 Despite France’s dominance, throughout the colonial period there were never more than 35,000 non-Malagasy French citizens in Madagascar.47 Many of them were poor settlers from Reunion. Today, the metropolitan French constitute the most powerful economic community. With a concentration in Antananarivo and surroundings, there are an estimated 650 French-owned companies in the country.48 French

42

43 44 45 46 47 48

Ravalomanana was elected vice-president of the fjkm in 2001 and re-elected to the position while in exile in South Africa in August 2012 (‘Marc Ravalomanana et Lala Rasendrahasina toujours en lice’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 23 August 2012). Although the ffkm actively sought a solution to the political stalemate from 2009, the impact was weakened by the fact that Ravalomanana was seen as partial. The Malagasy denomination Karana refers to the Koran, i.e. followers of Islam. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 205. Dahl op. cit., p. 260. Traditionally, Comorians have pursued studies in Majunga (Mahajanga). In 2007, the government of Ravalomanana expelled a number of Comorian students (ibid., p. 239). Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 168. Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 25.

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citizens also work in the education, health and tourism sectors or as representatives of French cultural organizations and ngos. The Indo-Pakistani Karana is a long-established minority, mainly with roots in the Gujarat region. Representing around 25,000 people, it is a wealthy and influential community, traditionally involved in wholesale and retail commerce, but increasingly also in industry, real estate, construction and tourism. A majority of the Malagasy Chinese, finally, are descendants of laborers brought from the Guangdong (Canton) region at the beginning of the 20th century for the construction of the railway between Tamatave and Antananarivo. The original community has been bolstered by recent arrivals from the People’s Republic of China, increasing its numbers to as many as 40,000. Like the Karana, the Chinese are typically dedicated to trade and retail business, but also have interests in industry, particularly in the textile sector. Non-indigenous minorities have on several occasions been exposed to public scapegoating and popular outbursts of xenophobia, including indiscriminate killings. In 1976, notably, prejudice and competition over scarce resources in Majunga culminated in riots which left some 2,000 Comorians dead and forced the evacuation of another 17,000.49 In an infamous ‘Operation Karana’, businesses and shops owned by the Indo-Pakistani community were ransacked and burned down in Antsirabe and Tuléar in 1987 and again in Antananarivo in 2012. Similarly, in the mid-1980s, the Sino-Malagasy were subject to ethnic violence. Contradicting the often quoted traditional Malagasy values of harmony and non-violence,50 these events reflect deep-rooted and widespread sentiments of “exclusive and intolerant nationalism” highlighted by many observers.51 The Malagasy political scientist and journalist Toavina Ralambomahay, for example, notes that “there have always been feelings against foreigners in Madagascar.”52 In the same way, the French Jesuit and writer Sylvain Urfer – after more than 30 years in the country expelled in 2007 – holds that “it is not exaggerated to say that there is no place for a foreigner in the Malagasy culture.”53 49 50

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Dahl op. cit., p. 239. Hasina and fihavanana. These cultural values are often emphasized in the literature on Madagascar. The history of the Great Island is, nevertheless, far from harmonious or peaceful. Rajeriarison and Urfer op. cit., p. 70. Toavina Ralambomahay: Madagascar dans une Crise Interminable, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2011, p. 22. Sylvain Urfer: ‘Madagascar et Ses Voisins: Le Grand Malentendu’ in Perspectives Économiques de La Réunion, No. 7, September 2011, p. 21, and Rajeriarison and Urfer op. cit., p. 84.

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In Urfer’s view, Malagasy of andriana and hova status alike “forcefully vindicate their difference from Africa.”54 Similarly, Ralambomahay states that “many deny their African belonging.”55 Combined with legacies from the slave-based economy and memories from the suppression of the 1947 uprising – in which France made extensive use of West African soldiers – the Malagasy political establishment, as well as the media, found it difficult to accept foreign mediation during the political crises in 2002 and from 2009 onwards, especially by the au and the Southern African Development Community.56

Settlement Enigmas

Although linguists, archaeologists and geneticists have established beyond doubt that Madagascar was settled by people from Austronesia and Africa, a host of crucial questions concerning the various waves of migration to the island remains to be unraveled. Before the arrival of the Europeans, there is a dearth of written documentation and other historical evidence, giving rise to an ongoing debate as to when the first permanent settlement was made; in what sequence subsequent migratory waves took place; why and how they were undertaken; by which routes; and whether Austronesians and Africans had mixed before they appeared on the shores of the island? Once in Madagascar, it is, similarly, clouded by a fog of uncertainty as to whether the Austronesians remained in contact with their area(s) of origin; if so, how and for which duration; as well as when, why and by which immigrant group the first permanent settlement of the interior highlands was made? That said, major pieces of the Malagasy settlement puzzle have been identified and may be summarized as follows57: 54 55 56

57

Urfer in ‘Madagascar et Ses Voisins’ op. cit., p. 21. Ralambomahay op. cit., p. 90. Ibid. See also Noro Razafimandimby: ‘Quiproquo et Discrimination’ in Revue de l’Océan Indien, No. 322, February 2011, p. 46. Ralambomahay asks whether Asian mediators would not have been more successful than the African (Ralambomahay op. cit., p. 91). As noted by Randrianja and Ellis in 2008, “[n]o doubt future discoveries will continue to produce surprises and will cause historians to revise their theories on the timing and exact manner of Madagascar’s settlement” (op. cit., p. 19). Recent archeological excavations in northern Madagascar indicate evidence of occupational sites with microlithic stone technologies dating to earlier than 2000 bc (Robert E. Dewar et al.: ‘Stone Tools and Foraging in Northern Madagascar Challenge Holocene Extinction Models’ in pnas (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences), Washington, Vol. 110, No. 31, July 2013).

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Evidence of human presence dating to the 5th century ad has been found on the northern tip of the Great Island. As opposed to transient landings by isolated parties, the first identifiable wave of permanent settlement, however, took place in the 7th or 8th century by Austronesians from the Indonesian archipelago, most probably from the island of Borneo. At the time, Indonesian seafarers had for centuries plied the Indian Ocean in an extensive trading network stretching from India to China,58 but it is not known what led the first migratory group on its journey to Madagascar, some 7,500 kilometers across the open sea or, as the crow flies, more than the distance between Cape Town and Cairo. The crossing has been described by Toussaint as “an extraordinary adventure […], unique in the annals of the ocean.”59 As the enormous distance mitigates the probability of a direct crossing, the most likely route was along the coasts of India, the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa and East Africa, finally reaching Madagascar via Comoros.60 Based on linguistic, socio-­ economic and cultural characteristics, there are compelling reasons to believe that this first wave of Austronesian settlement eclipsed all others. In competition with subsequent African settlers, the migrants from Asia not only ­managed to preserve, but to impose their language and culture.61 Demographics on the African mainland, meanwhile, were not static. Pushing back the frontiers of the Khoi and San populations, the Bantu expansion reached East Africa,62 and, roughly at the same time as the Austronesians, the first Africans arrived in Madagascar via Comoros. They brought the 58 59 60

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See, for example, Abu-Lughod op. cit., pp. 291–315. Toussaint op. cit., p. 10. The problem with the theory of a direct crossing is that almost the entire journey – until the island of Rodrigues – would have been done without access to fresh water. The theory of an indirect itinerary along the coasts, on the other hand, is not substantiated by archaeological or other evidence. The list of Austronesian traits, tools, artefacts etc. in the Malagasy population and culture is, indeed, long (see Dahl op. cit., p. 49). The affinity with the Manyaan language has been mentioned. To this could inter alia be added the outrigger canoe; the palanquin; the ­double-valved bellows for iron-making; the rectangular houses in north-south direction; dykes and hydraulic works; slash and burn agriculture; rice cultivation; yams, taro and bananas; ancestral tombs and re-burial ceremonies; gender relations; and, in general, social organization. Often lumped together as Khoisan, the Khoi (‘Khoekhoe’/’Hottentots’) and the San (‘Bushmen’) were the original inhabitants of southern Africa. Whereas the Khoi worked metals, raised cattle and primarily lived in the south-western parts, the San were hunters and gatherers and covered extensive areas also in the north-east. The eastern Bantu expansion towards the south had reached today’s Zimbabwe and northern Mozambique by the 5th century ad.

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­ ump-backed zebu cattle to the island – a prominent feature in Madagascar – h and mixed with the Austronesians. Eventually, they would be absorbed into the emerging Malagasy population.63 By the 9th century, the basic elements of a distinctive civilization were in place. Initially, the settlers clung to the coast – primarily on the northern tip – but some 200 years later the whole of the island had been occupied, albeit by small and scattered groups. Parallel to the settlement of Asians and Africans, from the 9th century Arab and Swahili traders started to appear in the north-west. Also in this regard, the Comorian archipelago served as a staging post. Swahili merchants set up trading stations and founded port towns.64 Known as Antalaotra (‘People of the Sea’), they built mosques and brought Islam to Madagascar. Between the 11th and the 15th centuries, the expansion of the Swahili world towards Comoros and Madagascar gained momentum. Finally, from the 12th or the 13th c­ entury – some four to five hundred years after the first Austronesians had arrived – a second, substantial immigration wave from the Indonesian archipelago began, this time by Islamized groups from the islands of Java and Sumatra who were familiar with Hindu cosmology and belief systems. For unknown reasons, a large portion of this addition to the Malagasy melting pot soon made its way from the east coast to the interior, where it slashed and burned the forests; built terraces, dykes, canals and other hydraulic works; expanded the culture of rice; and laid the basis for future kingdoms.

Armed Traders and Pirates

All groups that eventually came together and formed the Malagasy culture had arrived from across the ocean. Similarly, soon after the consolidation of the unique civilization, it was from the ocean that it would be attacked. In 1497, Portugal’s King Manuel I sent Vasco da Gama on a mission to India to establish a maritime trade route for spices such as cinnamon, cloves and pepper.65 In 63

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Some suggest that Austronesians and Africans had mixed on the east coast of Africa, before the arrival in Madagascar. Closely related to the theory of an indirect crossing, the suggestion is not supported by research findings. Among the Swahili settlements, Kingany on the west coast attracted dhows from Malindi, Mombasa, Kilwa and Sofala, bringing African and Arabian products in exchange for slaves and rice. As the first European, Vasco da Gama reached India (Calicut) by sea in 1498. To make the final crossing from Africa, in the Swahili port of Malindi (Kenya) he had to contract the services of an Indian pilot with knowledge of the monsoon. It is difficult to grasp the enormous profits to be made in the early spice trade. The Portuguese could lose a quarter

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1502, he sent da Gama back with more than a dozen heavily armed ships, telling the explorer that he hoped that he would find “kingdoms and new states with much riches [to be] wrested by force of arms from the hands of the barbarians.”66 When the Portuguese broke into the Indian Ocean in the early 16th century, they did so in an extraordinarily aggressive and combative way, using their superior military power and combining commercial interests with religious zeal. In the case of Madagascar, they ransacked their way through a string of Arab and Swahili trading posts on the west coast, including the port of Sada. Describing one such attack, Bulpin states that “[t]he Portuguese descended upon the place like vultures on a kill. It was completely destroyed.”67 Content with the crushing of the Swahili commercial network and with massive fortifications at both Mozambique Island and Mombasa (Kenya), the Portuguese, however, never established a foothold on the island. As Madagascar did not offer spices, ivory, gold or silver, they set their eyes directly on India and the Far East. Nor did the Dutch East India Company – which held Batavia (Jakarta) from 1619, Mauritius from 1638 and Cape Town from 1652 – find Madagascar attractive enough for the establishment of a permanent trading or victualing post.68 European interest was instead expressed by Britain and France. Initially, the British – who preferred the inner passage of the Mozambique Channel – ­utilized the Comorian islands, notably Anjouan,69 as a halfway station on their way to India, whereas the French – using the outer passage via the Mascarenes – made landfalls on the east coast of Madagascar. In 1643, France established a settlement named Fort Dauphin in the extreme south-east of the island. It was

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of their ships at sea, but still turn in a profit. According to Till, “a merchant could ship six cargoes of spices and lose five, yet still make a profit when the sixth was sold” (Till op. cit., p. 10. See also Boxer op. cit.). Here quoted in [Peter Miller]: ‘125 Years of Great Explorations: Adventures and Discoveries that Changed the World’, Special issue, National Geographic, Washington, 2013, p. 33. Thomas Victor Bulpin: Islands in a Forgotten Sea: A History of the Seychelles, Mauritius, Réunion and Madagascar, Protea Book House, Pretoria, 2010, p. 46 (Bulpin’s classic narrative was first published in 1958). In the late 16th century, a new post was established by Antalaotra traders on the north-west coast, close to present-day Mahajanga (ex-Majunga). Called Mazalagem Nova by the Portuguese, it grew into a cosmopolitan Swahili town, soon becoming Madagascar’s largest port for the export of slaves. The Dutch, however, bought slaves in Madagascar for their settlements in Mauritius and at the Cape of Good Hope. The Comorian island of Anjouan was called Johanna by the British (and, generally, by the Indian Ocean buccaneers).

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a failure from the start. The settlers staged a mutiny, and after devastating attacks by the local population Fort Dauphin was abandoned. Before leaving, the governor, Etienne de Flacourt,70 engraved a message in Latin on a stone slab: “You who pass by, read this and you will profit. Do not trust the natives. Farewell.”71 In the main, the warning was followed. From 1665, the French focused their attention on a new settlement on the Mascarene island of Bourbon (Reunion) – located some 700 kilometers east of Madagascar – and no other European power attempted to acquire a territorial base on the Great Island. During the following 150 years, the Malagasy remained their own, undisputed masters. This was, in particular, the case in the interior highlands, where few foreigners ventured and new kingdoms were built. On the coasts, visiting Arabs and resident Swahili were increasingly active in the trade in slaves and guns. For a short, but intense, period between 1685 and 1725, freebooting European buccaneers – not government officials, agents or settlers – dominated the scene. As noted by Bulpin, “there appeared […] a particularly gaudy set of characters […] [who] wrote into the history of mankind one of its most lurid chapters.”72 Chased from the Caribbean by the British and Spanish navies, in the mid1680s numerous pirates moved their ships to the Indian Ocean. Establishing bases at the northern tip of Madagascar and, in particular, on the island of Sainte Marie (today formally Nosy Boraha) off the north-eastern coast, their number has been estimated at between 400 and 830.73 Englishmen and French were in a majority, but other nationalities were also represented.74 Attracted both by the prospects of attacking Muslim pilgrims sailing to and from Mecca and European East Indiamen on the spice route, their military skills and superior weapons made them formidable. They soon emerged as a major element in the regional balance of power. The operations were not limited to the waters of Madagascar, Comoros or the Mascarenes, but covered practically the entire western Indian Ocean, where Arab, Indian and European vessels were indiscriminately attacked and the booty was immense.

70 71 72 73 74

In 1658, de Flacourt published Histoire de la Grande Isle Madagascar, the first account of the people, culture and life in the south-eastern part of the island. Quoted in Bulpin op. cit., p. 71. Ibid., p. 95. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 105. Among the more famous Indian Ocean pirates were the Englishmen John Avery (alias ‘Long John’ or ‘Long Ben’), Edward England and William Kidd, as well as the Frenchman Olivier Le Vasseur (alias ‘La Buse’).

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In the process, “a veritable market of the Jolly Roger” was formed in Madagascar.75 Traders from as far as North America turned up at the bases of the buccaneers, making their first appearance in the region. “Real shipping enterprises in piracy” were organized in New York, Boston and Philadelphia.76 The pirates even proclaimed an independent republic called Libertalia – a name reflecting their free, egalitarian outlook – with administrative departments, a code of laws and a lingua franca. By 1720, however, the European powers started in earnest to combat the freebooting rebels. Through a combination of strikes by the British navy, armament of the ships of the different East India companies and a stronger French presence in Reunion and Mauritius, they were over the following years dispersed and defeated.77

Kingdoms and Slaves

In the highlands and valleys of Madagascar’s interior, there had in the meantime emerged significant state formations of which the European powers had no knowledge. Mayeur, a French slave trader who in 1777 became the first European to explore the central parts, commented that “[t]he Europeans who visit the coast […] will find it difficult to believe that in the center of the island […] is a country hitherto unknown, in which […] there is more light, more industry, more active policy and where the arts are more advanced.”78 Subsequent travelers returned with accounts of extensive rice cultivation and cattle herding. The information was received with keen interest by the French in Reunion and – from 1810 – the British in Mauritius, who faced great challenges in supplying food to the sugar plantations on the islands. This, in turn, led to fierce competition and rivalry over Madagascar in the 19th century. Domestically, the century was marked by an expansion of the Imerina kingdom; a protracted struggle within the monarchy between forces of tradition and modernization; and a stop-go process of socio-economic development. 75 Toussaint op. cit., p. 145. 76 Ibid. 77 Before the Libertalia republic was dissolved, the pirates sent emissaries to ‘neutral’ European countries with appeals for protection and offers of shares of their booty. Sovereignty over the republic was also suggested. Separately, the Russian tsar, Peter the Great, and the Swedish king, Charles XII, were attracted by the proposals, formally conveying their acceptance (On Sweden and the pirate republic in Madagascar, see Lasse Berg: När Sverige Upptäckte Afrika, Rabén Prisma, Stockholm, 1997, pp. 61–70). 78 Quoted in Bulpin op. cit., p. 247.

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A number of smaller kingdoms had by the 17th century been formed in Madagascar, initiating a development towards unification and nation-­building. In this respect, the rise of a Sakalava dynasty with roots in the south-central part was “arguably the single most important political revolution.”79 Organized around a sacred monarch and economically based on cattle herding and slave trading, the Sakalava defeated neighboring kingdoms and extended their control over most of western and southern Madagascar. Ruthlessly exploiting the international demand for slaves,80 from the Antalaotra they traded Malagasy for arms and built a powerful military force. From around 1800, however, they were challenged by the rising Imerina kingdom in the central highlands, which similarly turned the demand for slaves – in particular for the French plantations in the Mascarenes81 – into an advantage and, eventually, became the dominant power. From a small area at Ambohimanga, at the end of the 18th century Andrianampoinimerina (‘The King at the Heart of Imerina’) – possibly the most famous of Madagascar’s kings – united the Merina, moved the capital to Antananarivo and declared as his sacred calling to have “the ocean as the border of his rice paddies.”82 When he died, the kingdom did not extend that far, but he had conquered the central highlands and laid the basis for further expansion under his son and successor, Radama I (1810–28). He, in turn, defeated the neighboring Betsileo to the south, the Menabe and Boina to the west, the Antankara to the north and the Betsimisaraka to the east, establishing the Merina as the masters over two thirds of the Great Island.83 Importantly, this included the ports of Majunga, Tamatave and Fort Dauphin. Only part of the Sakalava country in the west and southern Madagascar remained outside Merina control.

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Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 99. Malagasy slaves were exported as far as the Americas. Between 1719 and 1721, for example, around 1,400 were sold to the North American colony of Virginia (ibid., p. 104). Between 1767 and 1810, around 50,000 Malagasy slaves were exported to Reunion and Mauritius (ibid. p. 117). Whereas the exportion of slaves from Madagascar had long existed, with the rise of the Imerina kingdom the importion of slave labor to the island dramatically increased. Based on a huge servile labor force, in the process the kingdom entered into conflict with the demand for slaves on the coffee and sugar plantations in the Mascarenes. Quoted in Dahl op. cit., p. 86. Rapidly growing from a small territorial base, the rise of the Imerina kingdom bears ressemblance to that of the Zulu kingdom in South Africa, which took place at the same time. King Shaka Zulu and King Radama I both died in 1828.

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Anglo-Malagasy Alliance

The expansion of the Imerina kingdom coincided with an escalation of conflicting interests between Britain and France with regard to the trade in slaves and, eventually, with a dramatic shift in political, economic and military power in the western Indian Ocean. In 1802, the Napoleon government restored the institution of slavery in the French colonies, which in 1794 had been abolished by Revolutionary France. The decision was enthusiastically welcomed by the plantation owners in Reunion and Mauritius, who were eager to replenish their stock of Malagasy slaves. Only five years later, however, the British parliament outlawed the slave trade, and under the Paris Treaty – which in 1814 ended the Napoleonic Wars – France lost the islands to Britain. In control of the Cape Colony and of the Indian sub-continent, the British reigned supreme in the Indian Ocean.84 Opposed to a possible French resurgence in the region, they kept Mauritius. Since Reunion did not have a natural harbor and did not pose a naval threat, the British handed it back to France. With regard to Madagascar – which was not specifically mentioned in the Paris Treaty – they expressed their opposition to any European colonization plans. Keen to access vital food supplies and to end Malagasy slave exports, the victorious British at the same time courted the Imerina kingdom. In 1817, Robert Farquhar, the British governor of Mauritius, managed to reach a comprehensive agreement with Radama I, recognizing him as the ‘King of Madagascar’. Through the agreement, the Great Island was not only given its name, but under the prevailing post-Napoleonic international order de facto acknowledged as an independent nation. Although the French – pushed by the plantocracy and settler population in the “colonizing colony” of Reunion – had not given up its intentions, it marked the beginning of a period of significant British influence in Madagascar. Under the 1817 Anglo-Malagasy treaty – which was re-confirmed in 1820 – the two countries established an alliance based on mutual friendship and open trade. The trade in slaves from Madagascar was, however, banned. For the loss of income from slave exports, Radama I was granted a substantial annual subsidy, as well as military training and supplies. The British also undertook to train Malagasy in various capacities and to send teachers and artisans to Madagascar. The arrival in 1820 of representatives of the London Missionary Society (lms) was in this respect of particular consequence, spiritually as well as for the development of a wide range of professional skills. 84

Cape Town was occupied by the British in 1806 and formally ceded to Britain in 1814.

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Above all, British assistance in the formation of a modern, professional standing army and the diplomatic support provided by Britain, the world’s preeminent power, enabled Radama I to increase his military strength beyond anything previously seen. Bolstered by the British alliance, he embarked on a series of campaigns to subdue the remaining opposition to Imerina rule, notably against the Betsimisaraka in the east and the Sakalava in the west.85 In some of the campaigns, he was assisted by British warships. When he died in 1828, he had succeeded in conquering most of the island, crucially establishing armed garrisons in all the major ports except Diego Suarez in the extreme north and Tuléar in the south-west. In vast areas, however, the hold was precarious. The king’s modernization program was equally far-reaching.86 Although a demi-god himself, he saw Western education and training as a complement to the building of a modern army and an efficient, centralized bureaucracy. To this end, he not only welcomed Protestant lms missionaries, but also engaged directly in their work. Representatives of the London Missionary Society settled in Antananarivo in 1820 and opened their first schools the same year. A  major challenge was that written Malagasy used the Arabic alphabet. Radama I – who mastered the Arabic script, but also spoke and wrote French (and later English) – solved the problem by decreeing that Malagasy should be written in Latin characters, personally supervising and advising the lms missionaries in  formalizing the transcription of the national language.87 The orthography was finalized in 1823, and by 1836 the entire Bible was translated and printed. Radama I also promoted technical assistance. Via the lms, young Malagasy were sent to Britain or Mauritius for education. In Madagascar, many were trained in construction, carpentry, tannery and other skills.

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Descendants of European pirates and Malagasy women, in the 1780s the Betsimisaraka on the east coast embarked on maritime slave raids to Comoros and East Africa. Later joined by Sakalava from north-western Madagascar, they organized huge fleets of large outrigger canoes with as many as 15,000 men, wreaked havoc on the Comorian islands and northern Mozambique, captured slaves and sold them off to French traders for the sugar plantations in Reunion and Mauritius. On several occasions, the fleets seized and destroyed European ships in the Mozambique Channel. Eventually defeated by Radama I on land and by Portuguese and British naval forces at sea – as well as by the Omani navy off the coast of present-day Tanzania – the slave raids were brought to a halt by 1820 (Alpers (2009) op. cit., pp. 131–46 and Alpers (2014) op. cit., pp. 110–1). See Gwyn Campbell: An Economic History of Imperial Madagascar 1750–1895: The Rise and Fall of an Island Empire, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. The king decided that vowels should be written as in French and consonants as in English.

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However, the pace and extent of Radama I’s modernization drive proved too radical for the Merina traditionalists. Under his successor, Queen Ranavalona I (1828–61), there followed a sudden and drastic reversal of the open policies towards Christianity and foreign trade. Only four months after her accession to the throne, the queen nullified the Anglo-Malagasy treaties. In 1835, she banned Christianity altogether, initiating a period of severe persecution. In 1845, finally, trade with the outside world was suspended.88 Striving for economic autarky, the queen instead contracted a Frenchman, Jean Laborde, to establish industries for domestic production of the essential goods which Madagascar could no longer import. Based on forced labor, Laborde’s industrial complex soon delivered goods “ranging from guns and cannons to glass, rum and soap.”89 At the same time, the Malagasy trade in slaves flourished. Between 1821 and 1895, the estimated number of slaves imported from Mozambique and procured from Swahili traders amounted to a staggering 400,000, out of which perhaps a third was re-exported to the Mascarenes.90 Towards the end of Ranavalona I’s reign, there was a slow, but marked return to religious tolerance and openness towards the outside world. The ban on external trade was lifted in 1853. Foreign missionaries were re-admitted into the country three years later. The queen died in 1861, and was succeeded by King Radama II, who during a short reign applied an open-door, pro-European policy which, however, yet again provoked internal opposition and in 1863 led to his assassination. He was followed by three consecutive queens, Rasoherina (1863–68), Ranavalona II (1868–83) and Ranavalona III (1883–96). In succession, all three married the prime minister, Rainilaiarivony, who in reality held political power in Madagascar during the last three decades of pre-colonial rule. During his tenure as premier, the Great Island experienced a period of socio-economic transformation and development. With regard to foreign affairs, it tried to stay independent by playing the British against the French. Domestically, three events dominated Rainilaiarivony’s governance. Perhaps most importantly, in 1869 Ranavalona II and her premier cum husband embraced Protestant Christianity, not only expressing a leaning towards 88

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The only foreign vessels allowed in Madagascar’s waters were North American whalers and some us ships involved in the meat trade. For Reunion and Mauritius, the trade ban was a major setback. Once again, the islanders were forced to send their ships to the Cape Colony and elsewhere for vital food supplies. [P.W. Mutibwa and F.V. Esoavelomandroso]: ‘Madagascar 1800–80’ in J.F. Ade Ajayi (ed): General History of Africa, Vol. VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s, Special edition, unesco/New Africa Books, Glosderry, 2003, p. 169. Médard quoting Campbell in Médard et al. op. cit., p. 85.

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Britain in its struggle for influence with France, but through their baptism turning Christianity into the official state religion. According to Bulpin, “[n]ever before in its entire stormy history had Christianity received so sudden a demand as it did from this time on in Madagascar.”91 By 1880 – when Imerina had around a million inhabitants92 – there were an estimated 225,000 churchgoing Christians.93 Secondly, imported slaves – known as ‘Mozambiques’ – were emancipated in 1877. Although far from comprehensively implemented, the legislation was a huge reversal of traditional policies. Thirdly, in 1881 education became compulsory for children over seven years. Already the following year, around 150,000 Malagasy pupils were registered, a number which compared well with that of many European countries.94 In fact, towards the end of the 19th century, Madagascar had the most advanced school system in Africa, leading to a rapid growth in literacy. Based on Laborde’s contribution, industrial activities also increased. Construction and trade were booming. According to unesco’s General History of Africa, the Indian Ocean nation “was not poor and undeveloped, [but] quite capable of ruling itself.”95

French Encroachment and Conquest

The French, however, thought otherwise. Backed by a revanchist government faction in Paris, as well as by a conservative Catholic lobby, influential grands blancs in Reunion opposed the presence in Madagascar of the abolitionist British and the Protestant lms missionaries, calling for outright colonization by France. In their view, colonization of the Great Island would secure the supply of labor and food to Reunion, offer a solution to its increasingly acute problem of population growth and, in general, restore France’s – and ­ Reunion’s – position in the western Indian Ocean. As early as 1818 – four years after the Paris Treaty and only one year after the first Anglo-Malagasy agreement – the French repossessed the small island of 91 92 93

94 95

Bulpin op. cit., p. 368. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 136. Dahl op. cit., p. 102. Whereas the Catholic church primarily was active in the coastal areas influenced by France, Protestant missionaries other than those of the lms started to work in highland Madagascar. In 1867, the Lutheran Norwegian Missionary Society was established some 200 kilometers south of Antananarivo. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., pp. 148–9. [Mutibwa and Esoavelomandroso] op. cit., p. 175.

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Sainte Marie, the former pirates’ den off the north-eastern coast of Madagascar. The action set the tone for future French policies towards the ‘Red Island’. Whereas the British managed to build an alliance with the interior Imerina kingdom, France developed a strategy of insular ‘support points’ (‘points d’appui’), encircling Madagascar from adjacent islands and beachheads in the coastal areas.96 And where Britain used diplomacy, the French frequently applied military force. From their base in Reunion, in 1840 the French occupied the small, but strategic island of Nosy Be in north-western Madagascar. More importantly, in 1841 they purchased the Comorian island of Mayotte from the Islamized Sakalava ruler Andriantsoli, who in the 1820s had fled to the island from Radama I’s military campaigns. With a good natural harbor, Mayotte would from then on play a prominent role in France’s quest for naval power in the south-western part of the Indian Ocean and, ultimately, control over Madagascar. Through a policy of “quasi-continuous interventionism,” the French initially advanced their positions in the Comorian archipelago, extending their influence over Anjouan, Mohéli and Grande Comore.97 Joined with Mayotte, in 1886 they eventually became French protectorates. Although de facto recognizing the Kingdom of Madagascar, in parallel with the occupation of Sainte Marie, Nosy Be and the Comorian islands, France, in addition, established local alliances with a number of coastal Malagasy rulers who were either opposed to the Imerina kingdom or remained autonomous. During his short, pro-European reign, in 1862 Radama II also signed an agreement with the French. It was subsequently invalidated, but the continuous encroachment by France was a constant source of concern in Antananarivo. In this situation, the Malagasy government tried to mobilize British support. In early 1883, Ranavalona II sent a delegation to London with a letter to Queen Victoria, expressing the hope that Madagascar may be allowed to remain a kingdom, as God created it. For my land is not part of Europe, nor of Asia, nor of Africa, but an island of the sea, and if left in peace and undisturbed, it will continue to advance in all that is both good in commerce and civilization.98 By that time, however, geo-politics in the region had changed. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, British strategic interest in Madagascar waned. 96 97 98

Edmond Maestri: Les Îles du Sud-Ouest de l’Océan Indien et la France de 1815 à Nos Jours, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1994, p. 39. Ibid., pp. 44–6. Quoted in Bulpin op. cit., p. 390.

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As it became evident that Britain was not ready to go to war over the island, the French acted. In May 1883, a French naval squadron attacked the port cities of Majunga and Tamatave, starting the first Franco-Malagasy war. It continued for more than two years, until a peace treaty was signed in December 1885. Under the treaty, the Paris government appointed an official French resident representative to Antananarivo; occupied the northern area around the port of Diego Suarez; imposed a severe financial indemnity on the Malagasy government; and declared Madagascar a French protectorate. The status was ratified by the French parliament in March 1886. Queen Ranavalona III and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony did not recognize Madagascar’s status as a French protectorate. However, during the hostilities the consequential 1884–85 Berlin conference had been held, marking the beginning of the European ‘scramble for Africa’. This sealed the fate of independent Madagascar. The ultimate disillusion for the Malagasy came in August 1890, when Britain and France agreed on mutual spheres of influence in Africa and the British gave the French a free hand in the Great Island.99 Nevertheless, despite considerable political pressure and – as a consequence of the 1885 indemnity – economic hardship, the government in Antananarivo did not submit. Against this background, the French parliament voted by a large majority in favor of military action. In December 1894, an expeditionary force landed at Tamatave for the second, and final, FrancoMalagasy war. After a campaign that saw half of the 15,000 French soldiers perish – including large numbers of Senegalese and Algerians – in September 1895 Antananarivo was shelled and the war brought to an end. The following year – in August 1896 – Madagascar was formally declared a colony of France.100 As described by Randrianja and Ellis, “[f]or more or less the next three generations, Madagascar was remodeled in pursuit of a French dream of shaping the island and its people in conformity with French ideas and values.” From the outset, the colonial vision was “notable for its ambiguity, stuck between an aspiration to form active citizens and a need to organize compliant subjects.”101 99

In July 1890, Britain and Germany signed the Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty (also known as the Anglo-German agreement of 1890), whereby Germany gained the strategic North Sea  island of Heligoland and pledged not to interfere with British action towards the ­independent sultanate of Zanzibar. The following month, France recognized a British protectorate over Zanzibar in exchange for the recognition of a French protectorate over Madagascar. 100 Initially, France’s intention was to turn Madagascar into a protectorate, maintaining the Imerina kingdom and other local institutions. As a result of the resistance and the menalamba uprising, soon, however, it was decided to take full control of the country as a colony. 101 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., pp. 155 and 160.

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Politique des Races

Under General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, the first military governor (1896–1905), the French proceeded to dismantle the Imerina kingdom, break the British influence and impose an administrative system based on ethnic division and indirect rule. Designed by Gallieni, the system of governance was known as the politique des races. In rapid succession, Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony was exiled, leading Malagasy officials shot by firing squads and Queen Ranavalona deposed and sent to Algeria.102 Slavery was abolished in 1896, setting about half a million slaves – or as much as around 20% of the population – free.103 The Imerina monarchy was dissolved in February 1897 and the privileges of the aristocracy revoked in April. In his first decree in 1896, Gallieni declared the French language compulsory in the schools. Staunchly anti-British and anti-Protestant, he confiscated several properties owned by the London Missionary Society, paving the way for a Catholic expansion in the highlands. Where it suited their needs, the French maintained the feudal Imerina institutions. This was notably the case with regard to the system of forced labor, which was coupled with a heavy taxation regime. Subsequently brought together under the Code de l’indigénat, laws were passed which compelled all able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60 to provide unpaid labor to the state for fifty or more days a year.104 At the same time, all adult Malagasy were obliged to pay a head tax to the colonial government, as well as taxes for cattle and rice paddies. Large tracts of land were forcibly taken over by the state and distributed to French companies and settlers, largely poor immigrants from Reunion. In 1926, the state was declared the owner of all “vacant and ownerless land not developed, enclosed or granted by way of a concession,”105 a vague decree open to arbitrary interpretation and abuse. In the same year, labor legislation stipulated that conscripts not actually called up for military service were required to work on the colony’s public construction sites for a period of three years. Although condemned by the International Labor Organization, the French government kept the resented legislation until 1946.106 102 Rainilaiarivony and Ranavalona both died in exile in Algeria, the former prime minister in 1896 and the ex-queen in 1917. 103 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 157. About 60% of the freed slaves were in Imerina. 104 Ibid., p. 161. 105 Quoted in [M. Esoavelomandroso]: ‘Madagascar from 1880 to 1939’ in A. Adu Boahen (ed): General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935, Special ­edition, unesco/New Africa Books, Glosderry, 2003, p. 115. 106 Ibid., p. 114 and Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 161.

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Code de l’indigénat The Code de l’indigénat (‘Laws for indigenous peoples’) was the overall legal framework with which France ruled its colonies without having to extend the rights of metropolitan French to the colonized. First introduced in Algeria in 1865, it notably covered governance, the justice system, labor and taxation. The institution of forced labor (corvée) was particularly prominent. Most major projects carried out under French colonial rule in Africa were based on forced labor, including works on railways, roads and mines, but also on private land and in favor of companies, individuals and colonial officials. The Code de l’indigénat was only abolished in 1946, when French citizenship, eventually, was formally extended to the peoples in the colonies. Full voting representation and full French legal, labor and property rights were, however, never offered to all the colonial subjects.

The harsh imposition of taxes and forced labor formed part of the French government’s principle of self-financing for the colonies. In general, the economy of Madagascar was designed to produce a surplus and exports of agricultural products and raw materials to France, at the same time developing a domestic market for French manufactured goods. During the first decades of the colony, however, attempts at establishing a profitable plantation economy did not succeed.107 Nor did any significant mining or manufacturing development take place.108 Using both forced domestic and imported labor – particularly Chinese– the colonial authorities were more successful in developing Madagascar’s infrastructure. A railway connecting the port city of Tamatave with the capital Antananarivo was ready by 1913. Across the island, port facilities, roads and other means of communication were upgraded or constructed. General Gallieni replaced the Imerina kingdom and the autonomous Malagasy polities with a standardized, indirect administrative system based on a string of mini-protectorates and the recruitment and incorporation of local rulers. Central to the ethnic system was a re-balancing of power between the ‘highlanders’ and the ‘coastal populations’, a division construed to weaken 107 The huge concessions held by French import-export companies and private European coffee and tobacco estates were too few and too backward to play a decisive role in the economy (Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 184). 108 Meat was exported to Reunion and Mauritius. From the 1930s, the agricultural production did increase, notably of tobacco, coffee, vanilla and rice.

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the  former and strengthen the latter. Subsequently enshrined by ethnographers, it became the norm during the colonial period and beyond. Overnight, the colonial conquest drastically affected the Malagasy social fabric, caused the breakup of the traditional governance system and destroyed ancestral values and practices. Not surprisingly, it was from the outset widely resisted, prompting chaos, unrest and rebellion. The menalamba (‘red shawls’) uprising was particularly persistent.109 Breaking out in Imerina in November 1895 – two months after the fall of Antananarivo – and quickly spreading southwards, it was to last for more than three years. Composed of peasants, former soldiers and freed slaves, the insurgent bands generally turned against the French and other Europeans, as well as Christian missions and schools, defending Malagasy ancestral heritage and beliefs, including the restoration of the monarchy. Mobilizing up to 7,000 soldiers, General Gallieni eventually rooted out the rebels. In the meantime, as many as 100,000 Malagasy may have died from the violence.110 While smaller revolts towards the end of the century broke out on the west coast and in the south, in November 1904 another major uprising took place in the south-east. By 1905, however, the French conquest, occupation and unification of Madagascar were complete and Gallieni could leave the island.111

Political Awekening and the 1947 Uprising

Less than ten years after Gallieni’s departure, in July 1913 the first modern Malagasy nationalist organization was formed by students from the medical school in Antananarivo.112 With both Protestant and Catholic priests in the leadership and a following among the small, but growing urban middle class of clerks and office workers, the organization – known as Vy, Vato, Sakelika (vvs)113 – remained secret in order to avoid detection by the colonial authorities. It is 109 The uprising was called ‘of the red shawls’ as the rebels colored their garments with red soil in order not to be detected by the French. On the uprising, see Stephen Ellis: The Rising of the Red Shawls: A Revolt in Madagascar 1895–1899, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. 110 Stephen Ellis: ‘Colonial Conquest in Central Madagascar: Who Resisted What?’ in Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn and Klas van Walraven (eds): Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2003, p. 72. 111 In 1915 – during wwi – Gallieni was appointed Minister of War in France. 112 In this respect too, events in Madagascar resembled those in South Africa. In South Africa, the last traditionalist uprising was the 1906 Zulu rebellion under Bambatha. The first modern African nationalist organization was the South African Native National Congress/anc, formed in 1912. 113 In English, ‘Iron, Stone and Togetherness/Solidarity’.

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­estimated that it had a membership of 2,000 in the capital, the highland area and on the east coast.114 By 1915, however, vvs had been infiltrated by the police, and the following year 34 nationalists were sentenced to imprisonment and hard labor.115 Many more were dismissed from the civil service. During the First World War, yet another armed peasant uprising broke out in the area of Tuléar in the south-western part of the country.116 After the repression of the vvs secret society, it was, however, the return to Madagascar from the trenches in Europe of thousands of ex-servicemen that marked the beginning of a broad national movement. Around 40,000 Malagasy soldiers had taken part in the war.117 The veterans were convinced that they had served France in the same way as any Frenchman and demanded equal rights. In this, they were supported by a large number of Malagasy. Under the leadership of Jean Ralaimongo, who had spent most of his childhood as a slave before becoming a Protestant primary school teacher; a student in France; and a soldier in the Great War, they embarked on a political struggle of assimilation to obtain French citizenship.118 Although harassed and repeatedly imprisoned by the colonial authorities, Ralaimongo won the support of an influential group of Malagasy nationalists, including the former vvs founding member Joseph Ravoahangy.119 A number of French left-wing activists also rallied behind the cause for equal rights. Prominent among them was Paul Dussac, originally from Reunion and a member of the Malagasy branch of the Communist Party. In early 1929, they launched a petition demanding French citizenship and the abolition of the ‘native’ regime. In May, it was followed by vast processions in the capital, with thousands of demonstrators chanting rebellious slogans such as ‘Long live freedom and the right of assembly!’ and ‘Down with the native regime!’.120 As noted by Esoavelomandroso, these events “represented both the culmination of the struggle for equality and the starting point of the demands for independence.” They also marked the beginning of “real political militancy, in the 114 Dahl op. cit., p. 115. 115 Ibid. 116 The Sadiavahe peasant rebellion lasted from 1915 to 1917. 117 Dahl op. cit., p. 116. 118 As a child, Ralaimongo witnessed the murder of several family members by bandits. He himself was captured and held as a slave. Eventually freed, he began his education and later volunteered for service in the First World War. He partly joined the army in the hope of obtaining French citizenship, a goal which he never achieved. After the war, Ralaimongo initially stayed in France, where he befriended other anti-colonial leaders, among them notably Hi Chi Minh from Vietnam. He returned to Madagascar in 1921. 119 Both Ralaimongo and Ravoahangy were Protestants of Betsileo origin in the highlands. 120 [Esoavelomandroso] op. cit., p. 118.

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shape of propaganda campaigns, the creation of political cells and parties, and the emergence of a broad-based and varied press.”121 In the mid-1930s, fewer than 1,500 Malagasy had managed to obtain French citizenship.122 The low number alone changed the political objective of the nationalists, from assimilitation to national independence. From his banishment, Ravoahangy evoked in 1934 “the natural and inalienable right to form a free and independent nation,”123 a call which during and after the Second World War gained momentum. As in the Great War of 1914–18, no less than around 40,000 conscripted Malagasy took part in the Second World War.124 And as after the first conflict, soldiers returned to Madagascar with political demands, fusing elite nationalism with mass discontent. This development, in turn, was strengthened by “a major blow to the prestige of the French colonial government,”125 which at the outbreak of the war had sided with the pro-German Vichy regime. In May 1942, it suffered the indignity of a British invasion, followed by the installation of a caretaker governor aligned with the Free French forces of General de Gaulle.126 The British troops remained in Madagascar until 1946. During the interregnum, they allowed Malagasy nationalists a high degree of freedom of speech and movement. When Ralaimongo died in 1943, he was replaced by Ravoahangy as the undisputed leader of the Malagasy national movement. In November 1945, Ravoahangy was together with Joseph Raseta elected to the post-war French Constituent Assembly.127 In February 1946, the two assembly members formed the Democratic Movement for the Revival of Madagascar (Mouvement Démocratique pour la Rénovation Malgache/mdrm), the country’s first legally 121 Ibid. 122 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 166. 123 Quoted in [Esoavelomandroso] op. cit., p. 118. 124 Dahl op. cit., p. 116. 125 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 173. 126 Initially, the British imposed an economic blockade on Madagascar. Fearing the use of Madagascar’s ports by Japan, in May 1942 they despatched an expeditionary force to take control of the island. Contingents largely composed of East and South African troops landed at Diego Suarez and Majunga and made their way to Antananarivo. After a campaign of six months, the British forces deposed the pro-Vichy French colonial government. 127 In addition to the two Malagasy deputies, two seats for Madagascar were reserved for French citizens. In the Constituent Assembly, Ravoahangy and Raseta tabled a bill demanding that Madagascar should become a ‘free state’ within the French Union, with its own government, parliament, army and finances. The bill was seen as ‘anti-constitutional’ and lost during the dissolution of the assembly in May 1946. Together with other deputies from the French colonies, they, however, successfully campaigned against the Code de l’indigénat, which was abolished in April 1946.

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recognized political party. Although formally launched in Paris, the news of mdrm quickly spread to the island. By the end of 1946, it had a membership of around 200,000.128 Clandestine radical groups were at the same time set  up in Madagascar, notably the Nationalist Party (Parti Nationaliste Malgache/panama) and the Jiny secret society. All three political formations were involved in the popular uprising of 1947. Given the green light by the mdmr leaders, the rebellion was mainly fomented by underground members of panama and Jiny.129 The seminal Malagasy insurrection broke out simultaneously at several locations on the east coast on 30 March 1947, when French army barracks, government offices, settler farms and businesses were attacked. It was violent from the outset, with atrocities committed on both sides. Scores of women and children were killed. Initially, the rebel movement quickly gained terrain, cutting off the connection between Tamatave and Antananarivo and bringing a huge area from the east coast to the central highlands south of the capital under its control. Increasing the number of soldiers from 7,000 to 18,000 – of which many were Senegalese tirailleurs – from July 1947, however, the French authorities managed to turn the popular tide. With the help of civilian militias and unleashing a brutal counter-insurgency campaign, by mid-1948 they had crushed the increasingly disorganized and incoherent uprising. The nationalist leadership was at the same time neutralized. mdrm was dissolved in May 1947 and all other Malagasy political formations proscribed. Many middle-level and local leaders were executed and large numbers of mdrm members banished to isolated areas of the island. In October 1948, finally, Ravoahangy, Raseta and four others were convicted of high treason and sentenced to death. The sentences were subsequently commuted, but the two former French deputies – initially held in Comoros and later in Corsica – were only allowed back to Madagascar in July 1960, one month after independence, when they were greeted as national heroes. Figures for the total number of victims during the 1947–48 conflict vary, but could according to some estimates be close to 100,000.130 Thousands were displaced, over the following months succumbing to disease, famine and ­destitution. In a population of around four million, the insurrection and the 128 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 174. 129 On mdrm and the decision to launch the 1947 uprising, see Dahl op. cit., p. 119–20. 130 Michael Twaddle, Lucile Rabearimanana and Isaria N. Kimambo: ‘The Struggle for Political Sovereignty in Eastern Africa, 1945 to Independence’ in Ali A. Mazrui (ed): General History of Africa, Vol. VIII: Africa since 1935, Special edition, unesco/New Africa Books, Glosderry, 2003, p. 226. Dahl estimates the number of casualties to between 10,000 and 90,000 (Dahl op. cit., p. 119). Randrianja and Ellis mention “several tens of thousands” (Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 175).

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ruthless repression by the French left indelible marks. With the suppression of the menalamba resistance and the 1904–07 war of extermination by the German army against the Herero and Nama populations in South West Africa (Namibia), as a single event it stands out as particularly dark in the annals of European colonization in Africa. After the Second World War, it is alongside the crushing by the British of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in 1952–56 arguably the darkest. That Madagascar only ten years later was to experience a peaceful transition to nationhood was at the time far from a foregone conclusion.

Flag Independence, Francophily and First Republic

In July 1946 – before the uprising – a rival political organization to the nationalist mdrm had been formed, called the Party of Madagascar’s Disinherited (Parti des Déshérités de Madagascar/padesm). Drawing its members from the coastal middle class, descendants of slaves in the highlands and, in general, low status mainty, it was vigorously opposed to the mdrm leadership and its calls for independence, arguing that only the Merina would be the beneficiaries of a separation from France. Not surprisingly, the colonial authorities were quick to give padesm their blessing.131 Widely seen as collaborationist, padesm was from the beginning torn by internal strife. In December 1956, it led to a split and – with the support of sfio, the French section of the Socialist International132 – the launch in Majunga of the Social Democratic Party of Madagascar and Comoros (Parti Social Démocrate de Madagascar et des Comores/psdm), subsequently focusing on Malagasy affairs and abbreviated to psd.133 Led by Philibert Tsirinana, a Catholic school teacher from the northern part of the island, psd was the first political party to successfully break through the apathy and disillusion which followed on the brutal repression of the 1947 uprising. Contrary to mdrm, it did not advocate full national sovereignty for Madagascar, but what it termed ‘moderate independence’ in a union with France. Under the impact of the Malagasy uprising, the defeat in Indochina and the liberation war in Algeria, it had, in the meantime, become increasingly obvious 131 In the beginning of the 1947 uprising, members of padesm were often targeted by the rebels. 132 Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (sfio). At the time, sfio was leading the ruling government coalition in France. In 1969, sfio became the Socialist Party of France. 133 The Comorian islands were attached to Madagascar in 1912. In 1946, they were organized as a separate French overseas territory. However, the links between the archipelago and the west coast of Madagascar remained strong, particularly in Majunga, which had a significant Comorian minority population. Against this background, the new Malagasy party initially covered Comoros too.

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that the French colonial system was in urgent need of an overhaul. In June 1956, the National Assembly in Paris adopted a far-reaching Loi-cadre (Framework legislation), which marked a turning point in the relations between France and its dependencies. For the first time, certain powers were transferred to the colonies and universal suffrage to local assemblies was introduced. In Madagascar, this translated into a system of provincial assemblies and a national executive council under a governor appointed by France. Elections to the provincial bodies were held in April 1957. psd won a majority in Majunga and Tsiranana became the assembly president. At the same time, he was elected vice-president of the national executive council. In July 1958, Tsiranana occupied the presidency of the council, campaigning for a ‘Yes’ vote in the following constitutional referendum on the future relationship with France. Within the resulting Communauté française, a constituent assembly was formed and a new Malagasy constitution adopted. In May 1959, Tsiranana – ‘Father of the Independence’ – was elected president. During the following year, he entered into a series of bilateral cooperation agreements which further strengthened the links with France, but also paved the way for the status of a formally independent state. With Tsiranana at the helm, the Malagasy Republic (Repoblika Malagasy) was born on 26 June 1960.134

Communauté française and decolonization in French Africa Together with all the continental French territories in Africa except Algeria (1962) and Somaliland/Djibouti (1977), between 1958 and 1960 Madagascar graduated from being a member of the French Community to national independence. Against a backdrop of the war in Algeria, the decolonization process started with the collapse of the Fourth French Republic, the recall to power of General de Gaulle and the launch of the Fifth Republic under a new constitution. After an extensive journey by de Gaulle to Africa, in September 1958 a referendum was held throughout the French Union, offering the African territories to either become confederated with France as autonomous states within a new Communauté or opt for immediate independence. All the territories voted in favor of association with France, except Guinea, which under the leadership of Sékou Touré with more than 95% returned a massive ‘No’. Thus becoming the first French colony south of the Sahara to gain independence, Guinea’s break with France would come at the cost of immediate cessation of all French assistance.

134 Under the Second Republic, the Malagasy Republic was in 1975 re-named the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. After Ratsiraka, the name changed to the Republic of Madagascar.

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chapter 2 In Madagascar, 77.6% of the electorate voted ‘Yes’ to continued association with France, whereas the corresponding figure in Comoros was 97.3%. Although the African members did not form part of the French Republic and the new community represented a looser relationship with France than the French Union (Union française; 1946–58), the autonomous states remained closely linked to the former colonial power under a web of military, financial and cooperation agreements. Through a constitutional amendment, in June 1960 the African members were allowed to become politically independent, within or outside the Communauté. After Mali, later in the month Madagascar became independent as the Malagasy Republic. During the second half of 1960, all former French African colonies followed suit, sometimes with redrawn borders and under new names. As a consequence, the French government acknowledged that the Communauté française no longer was functional, although the relevant constitutional articles regarding the confederation were only formally abrogated in August 1995.

With his main support in the rural areas of Madagascar, Tsiranana skillfully maneuvered between the Merina elite and the côtiers. Although he was reelected in 1965 and 1972 and psd commanded a strong majority in parliament, due to the intimate bonds with France the First Republic (1960–72), nevertheless, represented a drawn out transition towards a break with the colonial heritage and comprehensive independence. Formally a sovereign republic, French was enshrined in Madagascar’s constitution as an official language; the education system was French; French consuls continued as members of the provincial assemblies; and France maintained its naval installations in Diego Suarez and its air base in Antananarivo. Last but not least, the French treasury held the country’s foreign exchange reserves.135 With regard to foreign policy, the Tsiranana government not only followed the course set by France, but surpassed the French government’s expectations. In the process, Madagascar often clashed with other recently independent African states, including the most conservative. President Tsiranana notably held that the war in Algeria was an internal French affair; supported Moïse Tshombe in Congo; refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China; and suggested the establishment of diplomatic links with apartheid South Africa. 135 After qualifying as a teacher, in 1946 Tsiranana went to Montpellier, France. He returned to Madagascar in 1950, teaching the theory of education in Antananarivo. In 1956, he was elected to the French National Assembly, a position he still held when psd was formed.

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Although later joining the oau,136 in 1961 he was behind the formation of the pro-French African and Malagasy Union (amu).137 Launched in Antananarivo, it aimed at closer cooperation between former French colonies, but soon became inactive and eventually went defunct in 1985.138 In combination with economic stagnation, galloping demographic growth and a general decline in living standards, Tsiranana’s deference to France was to provide the basis for increasing domestic opposition. It was primarily voiced by akfm and monima, two political parties with origins in the Independence Congress,139 a coalition which in 1958 unsuccessfully campaigned for a ‘No’ vote in the French Union referendum. The Party for Madagascar’s Independence (Antokon’ ny Kongresin’ ny Fahaleovantenan’ iMadagasikara/akfm) was formed in 1958. Demanding total, immediate independence for Madagascar and amnesty for all those who had been jailed or exiled in connection with the 1947 uprising, the nationalist party included socialist and Marxist members.140 From its creation, akfm was led by Reverend Richard Andriamanjato, a prominent Merina pastor of the prestigious Protestant church of the queen’s palace in Antananarivo. As several future national leaders, in 1959 he was elected mayor of the capital. Mainly supported by the small, urban middle class, intellectuals and workers – ­particularly in Antananarivo -; disadvantaged by the electoral system; and with internal divisions, akfm never grew strong enough to seriously challenge the ruling psd.141 In the first parliamentary elections in 1960, akfm got 13.1% of the votes against psd’s 62.9%.142 The National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (Mouvement National pour l’Independence de Madagascar/monima) was also launched in 1958. Led by Monja Jaona, a veteran of the 1947 uprising, its influence was restricted to the region of Tuléar. Although it tried to break out of its regional stronghold and become a third force between the conservative psd and the left-leaning akfm, it did not develop into a national political alternative.

136 Madagascar was among the oau founders in May 1963. 137 In French, Union Africaine et Malgache (uam). 138 In 1965, the amu was re-organized as the African and Malagasy Common Organization (Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache/ocam). 139 Delegation Permanente du Congrès de l’Independence (dpci), set up in May 1958. 140 The small Malagasy Communist Party was banned in 1947. On dpci, akfm and monima, see Ronald Segal: Political Africa: A Who’s Who of Personalities and Parties, Stevens & Sons, London, 1961, pp. 13 and 358–60. Cf. also Sidney Taylor (ed): The New Africans: A Guide to the Contemporary History of Emergent Africa and Its Leaders, Paul Hamlyn, London, 1967, pp. 252–65. 141 The electoral system was heavily biased in favor of the rural areas of Madagascar. 142 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 182.

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Nevertheless, due to its involvement in a major peasant uprising, monima did play a role in the downfall of the First Republic. In April 1971, the Tsiranana government’s heavy-handed methods of tax collection at a time of famine set off a peasant rebellion in the Tuléar region. The peasants attacked military and administrative centers in the area and called for arms. Such help never arrived and the revolt was quickly suppressed. The government’s brutal reaction resulted in as many as between 2,000 and 3,000 deaths.143 As monima claimed to have organized the rebellion, the party was dissolved. Jaona and hundreds of protesters were arrested and deported to the maximum security prison on the island of Nosy Lava off the north-west coast. Eventually, it was neither akfm nor monima that brought far-reaching political change to Madagascar, but students at the university in the capital and at high schools all over the country. Partly inspired by the Tuléar peasant rebellion, but above all by the May 1968 movement in France, in early 1972 students at the medical faculty in the capital went on strike in favor of better conditions. Originally organized by the akfm youth wing, the strike action quickly took on a spontaneous, non-violent character, spreading across the country. Soon gaining support from organized labor and unemployed youth,144 it spiraled out of control. In the process, the movement increasingly directed its frustrations at the Tsiranana government, denouncing, in particular, its close links with France and French cultural imperialism. The revolt escalated in early May 1972, when a seventeen-year old high school student died while in police custody. Overnight, the news galvanized the youth into further action, from Diego Suarez in the north to Fort Dauphin in the south. As in Tuléar one year earlier, the government’s response was harsh. Around 400 students were arrested and sent to the Nosy Lava prison island. On 13 May, finally, security forces used live ammunition against a ­protest march in Antananarivo, causing several deaths.145 Severely censured by the ecumenical church movement and politically ­isolated, President Tsiranana – who, ironically, in the presidential elections four months earlier had claimed a provocative 99.7% of the registered 143 Ibid., p. 185. 144 The students were inter alia supported by a new social movement known as zwam (Zatovo Western Andevo Malagasy), or the Malagasy Western Slave Youth. With origins in the capital’s lumpenproletariat and influenced by groups on the far left of the political spectrum, it was the first organization in Madagascar to be formed by descendants of slaves. “Devoted followers of the spaghetti westerns then popular in Antananarivo’s cinemas, they roamed the streets of the capital in cowboy hats” (ibid., p. 190). 145 The date of 13 May is since associated with the struggle for freedom. Many public squares and streets in Madagascar are named after the date.

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vote146 – bowed to the pressure. On 18 May 1972, the ‘Father of the Independence’ resigned, handing over power to the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, a former officer in the French army from the Merina nobility. The abrupt ending of the First Republic set a pattern for future political cycles in Madagascar, where periods of initial calm and stability regularly have been followed by extra-parliamentary mass action, popular rebellion and military arbitration. When Tsiranana resigned, “the whole [Malagasy] society was in search of a new mode of existence.”147 In the main, the search has never been successfully concluded, leading to repeated political crises and a series of constitutional blueprints and dispensations. Notably, the resignation also led to the direct involvement by the higher military echelons in the country’s political and ­economic life.

Military, ‘Malgachization’ and Second Republic

Invited to arbitrate the 1972 crisis by Tsiranana, General Ramanantsoa proceeded to dissolve parliament and govern with the help of a purely consultative body. The youth and the broad popular movement lost the initiative. Nevertheless, their calls for a definite break with France and a ‘second independence’ would from 1973 be observed in a most comprehensive manner. The architect behind the dramatic shift was the young captain Didier Ratsiraka, a côtier from the region of Tamatave, trained at the prestigious French naval academy in Brest and soon to be known as the ‘Red Admiral’. As foreign minister in Ramanantsoa’s cabinet of mostly technocrats,148 he repealed the military, economic and cultural agreements with France, in the process strengthening his popularity and paving the way for his own presidency and its policies of non-alignment and ‘malgachization’. Under Tsiranana, the French had expanded their naval base in Diego Suarez and the air base at Ivato outside Antananarivo, enjoying complete freedom of movement in Madagascar’s waters and airspace. It thus came as a shock when the Ramanantsoa government in 1973 terminated the military cooperation agreement and asked the French to leave. Strategically, the loss of the natural harbor and the significant installations in Diego Suarez – France’s largest 146 Dahl op. cit., p. 127. The official election result was an obvious reflection of Madagascar’s corrupt electoral system. 147 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 185. 148 The medical doctor Albert Zafy – also a future president (1993–96) – served as minister of health.

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naval  base in the Indian Ocean – was particularly painful. In the event, the naval force was moved to Reunion, but the natural conditions of the Mascarene island could not match those in Madagascar.149 For France, it was equally a huge setback when Madagascar in May 1973 withdrew from the Franc zone in search of increased economic and financial independence. Although the severing of the links with the former colonial power was broadly popular, soon, however, divisions started to appear within the military. Under threat from a faction of the armed forces, in January 1975 Ramanantsoa eventually dissolved his government and handed over power to the interior minister, Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava. Under circumstances that remain unclear, he, in turn, was assassinated in Antananarivo within less than a week.150 A caretaking military directorate was formed and all political parties were banned. Ratsiraka emerged as the leading figure in the directorate. Chosen by his peers, in June 1975 he was appointed president of Madagascar. In order to provide a legal basis for the position, in December Ratsiraka organized a referendum in which the electorate was asked to confirm him as head of state, approve a new constitution and a socialist, non-aligned political course, outlined in a Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution. No less than 96% of the voters agreed to the proposal.151 On 30 December 1975, Ratsiraka was installed as president of the re-named Democratic Republic of Madagascar with the socialist charter – popularly known as the ‘Red Book’ (Boky mena) – annexed to the new constitution. The Second Republic represented a radical break with Madagascar’s ­political and economic past. Under Ratsiraka, the country was governed by a Supreme Revolutionary Council, which approved legislation proposed by a People’s National Assembly. In December 1976, all political formations were required to join the president’s ruling Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Avant-garde 149 After Comoros’ declaration of independence in July 1975, the French, similarly, had to move the Foreign Legion base to Mayotte. 150 There were many suspects, among them the French Françafrique network (Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 192). As responsible for the repression of the 1971 peasant uprising in Tuléar, Ratsimandrava also had domestic enemies. In addition, as a descendant of a former slave family he was opposed by influential groups in the political and military elites. 151 In Madagascar, the incumbent president or ruling party characteristically register very high electoral scores. This is largely due to the combined weight and abuse of the government’s machinery, but as noted by Randrianja and Ellis also “a reflex of obedience deeply ingrained in the island’s peasantry” (Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 191). Discussing the Malagasy political culture, Rajeriarison and Urfer highlight the low probability of a substantial ‘No’ vote in a country where it is bad taste to express a contrary opinion (Rajeriarison and Urfer op. cit., p. 56).

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de la Révolution Malgache/arema) in a National Front for the Defence of the Revolution (nfdr). De facto tantamount to a one-party system, the members of the front had to endorse the principles and programs laid down in the ‘Red Book’. Political activity outside nfdr was curtailed. In the process, Tsiranana’s psd practically disappeared, whereas akfm and monima joined the front, but were pushed into the background by the all-dominant arema party.152 Culturally, the policy of ‘malgachization’ and a return to national roots was notably expressed through a reform of the education system. Almost overnight, Malagasy replaced French as the language of instruction and examination, from primary school to the university level. As there were not enough textbooks and literature in the vernacular, the reform led to a marked deterioration in the quality of public education. When the government in 1978 also tried to nationalize schools controlled by the Christian churches, it led to general protests and to the formation of the ecumenical Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (ffkm), which from 1979 was in consistent opposition to the Ratsiraka government. In addition to the break with France, foreign relations underwent a radical change, away from privileged links with the West to closer bonds with the East. The re-orientation began under General Ramanantsoa, but was consolidated by Ratsiraka. Already in October 1972, the military government established diplomatic links with the Soviet Union, followed one month later by the recognition of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Ratsiraka – as later President René of Seychelles – was particularly impressed by the achievements of North Korea. It was, however, the Soviet Union which to a large extent was to replace the traditional relations with France in the military and educational fields, becoming the primary source of equipment for the Malagasy armed forces – including MiG 21 jet fighter planes – and providing scholarships to hundreds of Malagasy students. Above all, the shift in foreign relations was expressed in a commitment to non-alignment and a re-engagement with Africa. Under Ratsiraka, Madagascar joined the Non-Aligned Movement, let the relations with amu lapse and played an increasingly active role within the oau, not least with regard to the  liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. The links with

152 arema was launched by Ratsiraka after his accession to power. In the 1983 and 1989 elections to the National People’s Assembly, vonjy, a breakaway from psd which had joined fndr, received around 10% of the votes. akfm and monima got even smaller shares. In the 1982 presidential elections, however, the veteran monima leader Monja Jaona was supported by a respectable 19.8% of the electorate.

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apartheid South Africa were cut off and support extended to the African National Congress (anc).153 Closer to home, in June 1976 Madagascar claimed the return of the islands of Glorioso, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India and Europa, situated in the Mozambique Channel and in breach of the 1960 un Decolonization Declaration occupied by France. Subsequently administered as the French Scattered Islands (Les Îles Éparses), Madagascar’s claim to sovereignty was supported by the oau and the un General Assembly. In December 1979, the assembly resolved with a large majority that France “without further delay” should initiate negotiations “for the reintegration of the […] islands, which were arbitrarily separated from Madagascar.”154 Similar calls have since been ignored by France. The new foreign policy set the great, strategically important island on a collision course with the West. Combined with the independence of Mozambique and growing Soviet influence in the former Portuguese colony on the African east coast,155 in the Cold War context Madagascar’s opening to the East was a  significant geo-political setback. In 1975, Britain closed its embassy in Antananarivo. The ties with the United States also strained when the Ratsiraka government decided to shut down nasa’s satellite tracking station outside the capital.156 An additional source of friction was that Madagascar strongly denounced the us military presence on the island of Diego Garcia, basing itself on the 1971 un General Assembly resolution which declared the Indian Ocean “a zone of peace […] free from nuclear weapons [and] great power […] bases.”157 With regard to economic policy, the stated objective of the Second Republic was to build a socialist Madagascar. A first wave of nationalizations took place in 1973, targeting the main French trading firms, banks, insurance companies and strategic industries. Bringing the armed forces into the economy, a National 153 In the 1980s, anc established a representation office and a radio station in Antananarivo. 154 unga Resolution A/34/91: ‘Question of the Islands of Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa and Bassas da India’, 12 December 1979. As Mauritius, Madagascar also claimed the island of Tromelin from France. 155 After the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal on 25 April 1974, a transitional government was set up in Mozambique. It was led by Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique’s Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique/frelimo). With Samora Machel as president, the independent People’s Republic of Mozambique was born on 25 June 1975. Chissano became the first minister for foreign affairs. 156 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (nasa). The tracking station had been constructed in 1963. 157 unga Resolution 2832 (XXVI): ‘Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’, 16 December 1971.

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Military Office for Strategic Industries was set up to manage the assets.158 As the state took over more activities, already by the end of 1976 it controlled two thirds of the economy, compared to 13% in 1974.159 Despite high world prices for coffee, the country’s main export product, state ownership, however, did not result in growing production and increased equality. On the contrary, coupled with negative effects from leaving the Franc zone it led to widespread bureaucracy, mismanagement and corruption. It also brought Madagascar’s high-ranking officers into an interlocking relationship with the economy, largely explaining their role in subsequent political crises. The peasantry and the urban working class were the supposed beneficiaries of Madagascar’s brand of state socialism, but became its main victims. Inefficient collection of agricultural crops, decreasing manufacturing output and shortages of consumer goods caused growing poverty and increasing gaps, particularly between the urban and the rural areas. By the early 1980s, per capita incomes in Madagascar had since the First Republic declined by some 20%.160 In the rural areas, the share of the population living off subsistence agriculture increased from around 80 to 92%.161 At the same time, the Ratsiraka government became more indebted. In 1979, the budget deficit was 18% of gdp. By 1982, it had reached 51.8%.162 By then, Madagascar’s decline had reached bottom and, as noted by Jütersonke and Kartas, the “socialist experiment had effectively come to an end.”163 Due to the mounting debt crisis, in 1981 Madagascar was forced into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The conditions of the loan facility and the structural adjustment program included a reduction in public expenditure, a devaluation of the Malagasy Franc and, in general, a liberalization of the economy. Whereas the shock treatment had ­little or no effect on the living standards of the urban and rural poor, the ­privatization of state assets had a far-reaching impact on Madagascar’s elite ­structure. As state monopolies and parastatal companies were replaced by privately owned businesses, French, Chinese and Karana entrepreneurs took the opportunity to extend their positions. Also Malagasy businessmen benefited from the dramatic turnaround, among them the future president Marc Ravalomanana, who with the help of a significant World Bank loan from 1982 transformed his family-based dairy company into a nationwide conglomerate. 158 Office Militaire National pour les Industries Stratégiques (omnis). 159 Dahl op. cit., p. 132. 160 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 197. 161 Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 25. 162 Ibid., p. 22. 163 Ibid.

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Essentially, however, the reform package was too small and the implementation too late. Throughout the 1980s, social life in Madagascar was characterized by ­insecurity, unrest and protests. Opposition politicians called for multi-party democracy and a change to the constitution. As the liberal reforms eventually produced some positive results, in the 1989 presidental elections Ratsiraka was confirmed by 63% of the voters, allowing him to embark on a third seven-year mandate. Nevertheless, “[n]o amount of vote-rigging could hide the fact that Ratsiraka’s authority was slipping away.”164 The election victory did not silence the increasingly vociferous opposition, which under the guidance of the Council of Christian Churches was organized as ‘the living forces of the nation’,165 popularly known as the Forces Vives. The opposition was further strengthened when the High Constitutional Court (hcc) in March 1990 ruled in favor of a multi-party system, ending ndfr’s position as the country’s only legal political entity.

Churches, Crises and Third Republic

In the wake of the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall and as part of the worldwide ­pro-democracy movement, a proliferation of opposition groups emerged in Madagascar. In 1990, around 80 political parties and associations set their ­different agendas aside, getting together in a council of the Forces Vives and electing Albert Zafy as their candidate to take over from President Ratsiraka. Together with the Christian churches, Zafy, a university professor in medicine, a côtier from Antsiranana (ex-Diego Suarez) and a former minister of health in General Ramanantsoa’s military government of 1972–75, would during the ­following, stormy period play a prominent role. Beginning in May 1991, daily demonstrations were organized by the Forces Vives in Antananarivo and other cities. Tens of thousands demanded Ratsiraka’s resignation and the holding of democratic elections. On 1 May, a general strike was declared. Almost without interruption, it was to last for eight months. Despite the massive popular expression of discontent, Ratsiraka, however, refused to resign, instead declaring a state of emergency. The Forces Vives, meanwhile, set up their own alternative national government, led by Zafy. Provincial governors were also appointed, with the result that Madagascar – as  once again ten years later; albeit then more ominously – by mid-1991 de facto  had two parallel administrations. The confrontation between the two 164 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 200. 165 In French, ‘forces vives de la nation’.

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culminated on 10 August 1991, when over half a million people marched to the presidential palace at Iavoloha, ten kilometers outside the capital. Reaching the palace, they were met by helicopter gunfire and grenades which left around 30 demonstrators dead.166 In the volatile situation created by Ratsiraka’s presidential guard, the Christian churches called for a non-violent solution and initiated a year-long mediation process. During this period, Madagascar was for all practical purposes at a standstill. The armed forces hesitated to intervene and normal state functions and economic activities ground to a halt. Behind the scenes, however, the ffkm ecumenical council successfully negotiated an agreement between Ratsiraka and the opposition, including a new constitutional dispensation. In August 1992, the electorate was eventually called to a referendum to approve or reject a constitution based on the principles of parliamentarism, primarily that the prime minister should be elected by a majority in the National Assembly and no longer be appointed by the president. In the referendum, 72.7% of the registered voters gave their approval. As the Republic of Madagascar, a Third Republic was born. In order to fully constitute the Third Republic and steer Madagascar away from the brink of political, economic and social meltdown, it remained to elect a head of state and members of the new National Assembly. Presidential elections were held in November 1992, among eight candidates notably pitting Ratsiraka against Zafy. As neither of them received the required absolute majority,167 a second round was organized in February 1993. This time around, Albert Zafy won a comfortable victory, receiving 66.7% of the votes. Legislative elections followed in June 1993. Out of the 138 contested seats, the Committee of Living Forces (Comité des Forces Vives/cfv) – now transformed into a political party – gained 45 and the parties supporting President Zafy a total of 75, or 54.3%.168 Despite its Christian baptism and the electoral majorities, Zafy’s presidency did not bring about the much needed political stability and economic recovery. From the very beginning, the Third Republic was plagued by a power struggle between the executive and the legislature, where the president opposed the National Assembly’s proposals for closer cooperation with the World Bank and the imf. In the space of three years, the government was reshuffled ten times and had three different prime ministers. Indiscipline, mismanagement 166 Dahl op. cit., p. 134. On a soundtrack from the event, President Ratsiraka was heard ordering his guards to fire on the crowd (Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 202). 167 In the first round of the presidential elections, Zafy received 45.2% and Ratsiraka 29.2% of the votes. 168 ‘African Elections Database (aed)/Elections in Madagascar’/africanelections.tripod.com.

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and corruption were rampant. In this situation, the World Bank suspended its program already in 1994, promptly followed by the imf and a number of bilateral donors.169 Zafy’s reply was to organize yet another referendum with a view to revoke the parliamentary principles enshrined in the 1992 constitution and strengthen the presidential powers. Elections to that effect were held in September 1995. With 63.6% of the votes, Zafy’s position prevailed.170 Once again the constitution was changed. The re-establishment of a strong executive presidency was a huge disappointment to the democratic movement in general and to the Christian ecumenical council in particular. In addition, the referendum did not bring the drawn out conflict between President Zafy and the National Assembly closer to a solution. Accusing him of interference in parliamentary affairs and, in general, abuse of power, less than a year later – in July 1996 – the assembly used its prerogative to impeach the head of state. The impeachment was backed by more than the required two thirds of the deputies and two months later upheld by the High Constitutional Court. Denouncing the verdict as ‘a constitutional coup d’état’, in September 1996 the man who had unified the diverse Forces Vives against Ratsiraka exited the presidency through the back door. Ingloriously, Albert Zafy became the first head of state in Africa to be impeached by parliament. Until new presidential elections were organized, Prime Minister Norbert Ratsirahonana served as caretaker, inter alia managing to restore the critical relations with the Bretton Woods institutions and the international donor community. No less than fifteen presidential candidates took part in the subsequent polls, held in November 1996. The leading contenders were Ratsiraka, who returned from self-imposed exile in France,171 and Zafy, who despite the impeachment was allowed to stand. A clearer evidence of the profound crisis in Madagascar’s political system could hardly be found. Notwithstanding the pro-democracy manifestations and the mass mobilization between 1990 and  1992, the increasingly frustrated electorate once again had to choose between  the Scylla of Ratsiraka and the Charybdis of Zafy. The novelty was 169 As part of the export-led growth strategy under the structural adjustment program of the World Bank and the imf, an Export Processing Zone (Zone Franche/epz) was launched in 1990. Attracting French, Mauritian and Chinese investors, the labor-intensive epz industries – particularly in textiles and clothing – expanded successfully in the 1990s (see below). 170 ‘aed/Elections in Madagascar’ op. cit. 171 From decidedly socialist and anti-France, over the years Ratsiraka grew increasingly liberal and pro-French, inter alia establishing close personal relations with President Jacques Chirac. Soon after his return to power, he bought an apartment in the fashionable Parisian suburb of Neuilly, where he settled after the defeat in 2002.

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that the former no longer advocated socialism and Malagasy nationalism, but ‘­humanism’ and a green, ecological policy course. With a voter turnout of 58%, the generalized frustration was expressed through a high degree of abstentions, particularly in the urban areas. This, in turn, was to the advantage of Ratsiraka. Whereas no candidate obtained an absolute majority in the first round of the elections, in the second round – held in December 1996 – the architect of the Second Republic narrowly prevailed over the founder of the Third, receiving 50.7% of the votes against Zafy’s 49.3%.172 Barring state socialism and ‘malgachization’, with Ratsiraka back at the helm and the ensuing spread of nepotism and clientelism Madagascar was essentially thrown back to the early 1970s. In the meantime, the economy had gone from bad to worse and the poverty rates had consistently grown. At the level of the country’s rent-seeking elite, however, the revolving door political culture stayed the same. If need be, this was inter alia confirmed when President Ratsiraka in March 1998 organized yet another constitutional referendum, not surprisingly in order to once again strengthen the presidential powers by allowing the head of state to dissolve the National Assembly and appoint the prime minister. Having learned Zafy’s lesson, in addition Ratsiraka asked the voters to eliminate the clause concerning impeachment. Through the mobilization of the government’s administrative machinery, the final reversal of the 1992 constitution’s parliamentarism was approved by a slim majority of 50.9% of the voters.173 For the people of Madagascar, the second presidency of Didier Ratsiraka amounted to a drawn out parenthesis, dominated by a spirit of ‘the more it changes, the more it stays the same’. In the May 1998 parliamentary elections, the president’s arema party only obtained 24.7% of the votes, but due to the skewed electoral system it secured 42% of the seats in the National Assembly.174 No political party, however, had a program which addressed the needs of the urban middle and working classes. As noted by Randrianja and Ellis, the parties were “[a]ll […] more or less devalued by corruption and nepotism.”175 172 ‘aed/Elections in Madagascar’ op. cit. Compared with the 1993 presidential elections, Ratsiraka’s share of the registered votes increased from 33.3% to 50.7%, whereas Zafy’s correspondingly shrunk from 66.7% to 49.3%. 173 Ibid. In February 1998, Zafy unsuccessfully led a parliamentary attempt to impeach Ratsiraka, accusing him of perjury, nepotism and violation of the constitution. In addition to the constitutional changes with regard to the executive and the legislature, the 1998 referendum approved a new administrative division of Madagascar into six provinces. Zafy was forcefully against the reform, threatening with secession of his home province Antsiranana. 174 Ibid. 175 Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 206.

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Increasingly despondent, large sections of the people turned away from politics, often seeking support from the Christian churches and new religious movements. For the Malagasy elite and the international donor community, Ratsiraka’s conversion to unrestrained economic liberalism was, on the other hand, “marginally more reassuring than the chaotic political opposition.”176 Albeit modest, there were also signs of macro-economic recovery. Above all, Ratsiraka’s hold of the government machinery was almost total. As new presidential polls were scheduled for 2001, he had, for example, appointed additional, loyal members to the constitutional court. Ratsiraka seemed to have every chance of re-election. Nevertheless, the contest and its aftermath turned into a dramatic cliffhanger, bringing independent Madagascar closer than ever to the brink of civil war. The presidential elections were to be held on 16 December 2001. In addition to the old adversaries Ratsiraka and Zafy, there were four less prominent candidates. One was the mayor of Antananarivo, Marc Ravalomanana. As a successful, self-made Merina businessman and a newcomer on the national political stage, he was not associated with the traditional elite or any political party. As mayor of the capital since 1999, he had a solid administrative record and a reputation of standing up to government interference. In addition, in his capacity as national vice-president of the powerful fjkm Protestant church, he enjoyed a high standing among Christians. With significant private financial resources at his disposal, he was in a position to carry out a modern, nationwide election campaign, mobilizing support not only from wide sections in the capital, but also in the rural areas and from the côtier populations. Making up for the lack of a political party, his followers set up a powerful Committee in Support of Marc Ravalomanana (kmmr). As support for Ravalomanana was spreading, so did hope for a radical break with the past. Compared with earlier presidential elections, the turnout at the polls in December 2001 was high, or 67.9%.177 Although several independent observers concluded that Ravalomanana had won an absolute majority, in January 2002 the Ratsiraka-controlled hcc ruled that no candidate had obtained the required 50% and that a second round of elections should be held, pitting the incumbent president against the challenger.178 Crying foul, in  Antananarivo Ravalomanana’s supporters promptly took to the streets, denouncing the Ratsiraka government and calling for a recount. Breaking out at the end of January, the rolling protests quickly escalated and were soon 176 Ibid., p. 205. 177 ‘aed/Elections in Madagascar’ op. cit. 178 With just over 5% of the votes, Zafy was far behind Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka.

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f­ollowed by a general strike. As the constitutional court opposed a recount and  hundreds of thousands celebrated Ravalomanana’s victory as a fait a­ ccompli, on 22 February 2002 he had himself sworn in as the new president of  Madagascar at a packed stadium in Antananarivo. Soon thereafter, he appointed Jacques Sylla, a former foreign minister in the Zafy government, as prime minister and proceeded to form a government. Ravalomanana’s auto-proclamation was denounced by France, the oau and other international partners. In this situation, Ratsiraka – the legally recognized head of state who had withdrawn to his home area of Toamasina (­ex-Tamatave) – declared martial law and instructed the military to enforce a curfew. As in 1991, however, the military commanders chose to observe developments from the barracks, deciding against an intervention. As noted by the retired Malagasy general Rakotomanga Mijoro in his study on the armed forces and the 2002 post-electoral crisis, torn between constitutional legality and popular legitimacy, la grande muette (‘the great silent one’) opted for the latter, in reality siding with Ravalomanana.179 With the exception of the capital area, the country’s provincial governors supported Ratsiraka. Characterizing Ravalomanana’s self-appointment as “insurrection,” in early March the leaders of the provinces of Antsiranana, Fianarantsoa, Majunga, Toamasina and Toliara reiterated the need for military action, decided to “regroup” and designated the port city of Toamasina as the new seat of government.180 A blockade was imposed on Antananarivo with a view to cut off vital supplies. In mid-March, it was followed up through a sabotage campaign in which several bridges were blown up. The number of human casualties was low, but by launching violent action Ratsiraka “declared war on his people and not on his rival, [thus] becoming the principal enemy.”181 By the  end of March 2002, Madagascar was split down the middle, with two presidents, two governments and two capitals. The danger of a civil war was imminent. In this situation, the oau intervened. Traditionally close to Ratsiraka and having denounced Ravalomanana’s auto-proclamation, the pan-African organization called the rivals to a meeting in Dakar, Senegal, on 18 April 2002. However, two days before the meeting the Supreme Court of Madagascar declared that Ratsiraka’s appointees to the High Constitutional Court had been illegally instated; that the court should be reformed; and that it should speedily carry out a recount of the December 2001 presidential votes. The critical 179 Rakotomanga Mijoro: Forces Armées Malgaches Face à la Crise 2002, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, pp. 53–59. 180 ‘Déclaration des cinq gouverneurs’, 4 March 2002, in Mijoro op. cit., pp. 163–64. 181 Ibid., p. 41.

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decision notwithstanding, under the chairmanship of its Secretary General, Amara Essy, and in the presence of four African heads of state – among them Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique182 – the oau brokered an agreement signed by Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana. According to the agreement, “a transitional government of national reconciliation” should be constituted and – in the event of a non-conclusive recount – “a popular referendum […] within a period of six months […] be organized with the assistance of the un, the oau, the European Union and the international community.” In addition, the signatories to the Dakar agreement committed themselves to “immediately […] put an end to the blowing up of bridges and to lift all barricades across the entire national territory.”183 The Ravalomanana camp saw the oau initiative as an attempt to save Ratsiraka, amounting to undue interference in internal Malagasy affairs. Calls were made for the withdrawal of Madagascar from the organization.184 In the final event, the Dakar agreement was of little consequence. Ten days later, the reformed High Constitutional Court announced the results of the recount of the votes cast in the first round of the presidential elections, according 51.5% to Ravalomanana and 35.9% to Ratsiraka. At long last, the challenger was declared the winner. On 6 May 2002, Ravalomanana was constitutionally installed as the new president of Madagascar. Still, the political crisis was far from over. With support from provincial côtier governors and ignoring the Dakar agreement, from his base in Toamasina on the east coast – which declared its independence from Madagascar – Ratsiraka continued his rearguard resistance, dynamiting pylons and bridges in order to keep Antananarivo isolated. Since the armed forces remained ­neutral, President Ravalomanana mobilized army reservists to dismantle the roadblocks to the capital and re-establish law and order.185 In the clashes that followed, some twenty people died.186 In early June, Ravalomanana and 182 The other two African presidents were Laurent Gbabgo of Ivory Coast and Mathieu Kérékou of Benin. As the personal representative of the un Secretary General, Ibrahim Fall also took part in the meeting. In 2009, Chissano returned to the Madagascar dossier as mediator on behalf of the au/sadc. 183 ‘Accord de Dakar I’ in Mijoro op. cit., pp. 167–68. 184 Ibid., p. 45. 185 In recognition of the armed forces’ refusal to intervene in the political crisis, President Ravalomanana subsequently appointed the army general Marcel Ranjeva minister of foreign affairs and Jules Mamizara, general of the gendarmerie, minister of defense. Several high-ranking officers were also installed as heads of provinces. 186 Although the crisis in 2002 had the characteristics of a low-intensity civil war, there were in total no more than a hundred fatalities (Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 208).

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Ratsiraka were once again called to Dakar by the oau with the view to find a way out of the crisis. Not surprisingly, the meeting – known as Dakar II – was non-productive, provoking further criticism of the pan-African body by Ravalomanana’s followers.187 Some days later, however, they had reason to welcome African intervention when the Tanzanian authorities intercepted an airplane with international mercenaries on their way from Paris to Ratsiraka in Toamasina.188 In the meantime, the military leadership which was still loyal to Ratsiraka had resigned, and on 26 June representatives from the United States, Britain, India, Mauritius and other countries demonstrated their governments’ recognition of Ravalomanana by officially taking part in Madagascar’s independence celebrations. While France and the oau were conspicuous by their absence, the us President, George Bush, sent a congratulatory message to his Malagasy counterpart.189 On 6 July 2002, finally, the ‘Admiral’ left Toamasina for Paris via Seychelles. He was in absentia sentenced to ten years imprisonment with hard labor in August 2003.190 After six complex and difficult months, by mid-July 2002 the post-electoral crisis in Madagascar was over. Civil war had been averted. For many, however, the underlying causes had not been addressed. Below the surface, they remained throughout Ravalomanana’s seven years at the presidency. To a large extent, the crisis of 2002 was a harbinger of the crisis in 2009. 187 According to Mijoro, “the demands and the proposals by the oau […] did not take sufficient account of the Malagasy identity” (Mijoro op. cit., p. 59). 188 Ibid., p. 47. 189 The French government recognized Ravalomanana as president on 4 July 2002. The oau, however, maintained that “the elections held in Madagascar on 16 December 2001 did not result in a constitutional and legally constituted government.” In a communiqué by the Central Organ of the oau Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, issued in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 21 June 2002, the pan-African organization still called for “the holding […] of free and fair elections [and] the setting up of transitional arrangements.” In the meantime, the oau resolved, “the seat of the Republic of  Madagascar should remain vacant” (oau: ‘Communiqué of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the oau Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at the Heads of State and Government’, Addis Ababa, 21 June 2002). As a result of the suspension, Madagascar did not attend the inaugural summit of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. It was re-admitted by the au summit in Maputo, Mozambique, in July 2003. The oau position during and after the 2002 crisis contributed to the widely held disregard for the au/sadc mediation efforts from 2009. Mijoro, for example, characterizes it as “insidious” (Mijoro op. cit., p. 125). 190 In December 2003, Ratsiraka was sentenced to another five years in prison for his role in the 2002 crisis.

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Ruling as a ceo

As a captain of industry, president and in exile, Marc Ravalomanana has been  a  dominant, but controversial actor on Madagascar’s political stage. Representing a break with the past, his rise to power has been described as “a  perfect illustration of the decay of Madagascar’s political class and the ­established parties.”191 In power, he was considerably more concerned with economic affairs – his own as well as those of the state and often both at the same time – than with structural transformation, democratic governance or the building of an egalitarian society. As he famously declared in an interview in 2007, “to run a country is like running a business.”192 Born in 1949 into a farming family in the village of Imerinkasinina not far from Antananarivo, Ravalomanana was the first civilian head of state of Merina descent in the history of Madagascar. His schooling further set him apart from previous Malagasy leaders, who all received part of their education in France. As a member of the Reformed Protestant fjkm church, he attended a Swedish missionary secondary school at Ambatomanga, but also studied in Lund, Sweden.193 He later underwent training in Denmark and Germany. To a large extent, his background and education explain a combination of nationalism with global visions and, from a Malagasy point of view, an uncharacteristic search for ideas outside the French sphere of influence.194 After completing his studies, Ravalomanana went into the family business of making and selling homemade yoghurt, a traditional artisanal product in the highlands. Gradually increasing the production, in 1982 – during the first privatization wave – he received a significant World Bank loan on favorable conditions. It was the start of a remarkable business career, eventually making Ravalomanana the richest individual in Madagascar. With the World Bank funds, he set up the Tiko (‘I love’ in Malagasy) dairy company, which after the impeachment of President Zafy in 1996 was granted a five-year tax holiday by the National Assembly. Although often harried by Ratsiraka’s administration,195 at the end of 191 192 193 194

Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 206. Quoted in Dahl op. cit., p. 147 and in Vivier op. cit., p. 103. Ravalomanana in conversations with the author, Durban, May–June 2010. As president, Ravalomanana was often criticized for not mastering the French language well enough. Similarly, the Malagasy elite and the French community were uncomfortable with his choice of American and European advisors and consultants, recruited from outside the traditional networks in France. 195 Under Ratsiraka’s administration, the Tiko/Magro group of companies was subject to constant monitoring by the authorities, rightly or wrongly penalized for breaking the fiscal laws and on several occasions physically attacked, in particular in Antsiranana and

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the 1990s Tiko had gained a quasi-monopoly in the dairy market, soon branching out into the production of cooking oil, fruit juices and other products. The wholesale and distribution company Malagasy Grossiste, or Magro, was set up in 1998, with warehouses across the country. After the privatization in 2003 of the parastatal agricultural corporation and the national trading board, they were incorporated under Tiko. Ravalomanana and his family also created a public works construction company. With Tiko as the mother company, a range of subsidiaries – such as Tiko Petroleum, Tiko Pharma and Tiko Air – were launched during his presidency. Last but not least, through the ownership of the radio and television company Malagasy Broadcasting System, as well as of several newspapers, the person known in his home area as ‘the little milkman’ became dominant also in the media and communications sector. As a result of the 2002 political crisis, Madagascar’s economy had – yet again – come to a standstill. In one year, real gdp plummeted by more than 15%.196 Nearly half a million lost their jobs. Once in power, the overriding priority for Ravalomanana was to arrest the economic collapse and put the country on a growth track. The formula chosen by the entrepreneur cum politician was public-private partnerships, a policy which not only benefited his own business empire, but had an immediate positive macro-economic impact. To begin with, an ambitious infrastructural reconstruction and development program was launched. Bridges were repaired, roads built and railways upgraded. International donors returned in force. In 2003, the government presented the World Bank with a poverty reduction strategy paper (prsp), called Madagascar Naturellement (‘Madagascar Naturally’), and in October 2004 the bank and the imf announced the cancellation of almost half of Madagascar’s debt. France, Germany, Britain and other bilateral creditors further wrote off significant amounts, with the result that the total external debt fell from a peak of 5 billion us Dollars in 2003 to 1.5 billion at the end of 2006.197 One year later, it was down to 17% of gdp. After joining sadc and introducing the Ariary as the national currency, in 2005 Madagascar became the first country to negotiate an agreement with the United States under its Millennium Challenge Account program, designed to promote democracy and market reforms. Concurrently, bilateral aid disbursements – notably by France – more than doubled between 2002 and 2005, and in 2006 and 2007 foreign investments witnessed an explosion, reaching more Toamasina (Vivier op. cit., pp. 27–30). After the coup d’état in 2009, many Tiko and Magro offices and stores were burnt down. 196 Razafindrakoto, Roubaud and Wachsberger op. cit., p. 3. 197 The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu): Madagascar: Country Profile 2008, London, 2008, p. 23.

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than one billion us Dollars.198 In 2006, finally, the government launched the  Madagascar Action Plan, a five-year blueprint replacing the prsp and  ­having the un Millennium Development Goals as overall objectives. Under Ravalomanana, Madagascar experienced unprecedented development. Between 2003 and 2007, real gdp growth averaged 6.2%.199 At the same time, poverty in the rural and urban areas continued to increase. Due to sustained demographic growth, prolonged economic mismanagement and repeated political crises, the average Malagasy citizen had experienced a constant fall in income since colonialism. In 2008, gdp per capita in Madagascar was around 70% of that at independence in 1960.200 Between 1970 and 2008, it dropped from 473 to 410 us Dollars.201 Under Ravalomanana, this translated in “a marked drop in the perceived extent of democracy.”202 From 2005, all indicators, including those with regard to freedom of expression, equality under the law, trust in the administration and level of democratic satisfaction, showed a negative trend.203 As an example, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for Madagascar doubled from 17 in 2002 to 34 in 2008.204 Brought to power by a broad popular movement, until 2008 Ravalomanana, nevertheless, completely dominated the Malagasy political arena. After the dissolution of the kmmr support committees, in 2002 he set up his own political party, called Tiako i Madagasikara (‘I Love Madagascar’/tim). As most parties in Madagascar, it was not based on a clear ideology or policy agenda, but built around the president’s personality. With headquarters at the Magro offices in Antananarivo, many senior tim representatives were Ravalomanana employees, working in his food and retailing conglomerate. Helped by the president’s high profile and a well-financed machinery, in the December 2002 National Assembly elections tim won 103 – or 64.4% – of the contested seats, whereas merely 3 went to Ratsiraka’s arema party. In September 2007, tim took no less than 82.7% of the seats. Ravalomanana, in the meantime, had won the December 2006 presidential elections by a wide margin, defeating thirteen opponents and receiving 54.8% of the registered votes.205 198 Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., pp. 28–29. Driven by oil exploration and new mining projects, the most significant investments came from the uk, Canada, Japan, South Korea and France. 199 eiu op. cit., p. 18. 200 Razafindrakoto, Roubaud and Wachsberger op. cit., p. 3. 201 Bertelsmann Stiftung op. cit., p. 6. 202 Ibid., p. 13. 203 Razafindrakoto, Roubaud and Wachsberger op. cit., p. 15. 204 Ralambomahay op. cit., p. 22. 205 ‘aed/Elections in Madagascar’ op. cit.

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Emboldened by his electoral victories, in April 2007 Ravalomanana organized a referendum to amend the 1992 constitution of the Third Republic. Designed to strengthen the powers of the presidency, the referendum was a reflection of the same trend towards centralization as earlier exhibited by Ratsiraka in 1975 and 1998 and by Zafy in 1995. In addition to adopt English as a third official language and to remove the term ‘secular state’ from the constitution, the voters were asked to extend the president’s authority to amend laws without parliamentary approval during a state of emergency and, above all, to redefine Madagascar’s administrative divisions. Instead of the six autonomous provinces introduced by Ratsiraka in 1998, there would be 22 regions. And in the place of elected provincial governors, the heads of region were to be appointed by the president. The referendum was controversial with regard to both form and content.206 As a consequence, the turnout was low, or 43.7% of the registered voters. Nevertheless, with 75.3% of the votes Ravalomanana’s proposals were approved by the electorate.207 Through the subsequent centralization of the presidential powers, the National Assembly and the cabinet were relegated into the background. In the case of parliament, no bills or even amendments were during the 2007–09 period coming from the legislature.208 The cabinet, at the same time, was progressively rendered more powerless and inactive as Ravalomanana strengthened the president’s office with experts and technicians, including prominent foreign consultants.209 Ministers were often appointed for their technical expertise and not as political leaders.210 In the process, the presidency became 206 The electorate was asked to reply ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question “Do you accept the constitutional review for the rapid and sustainable development of each region in order to raise Malagasy standards of living?” In a country with a high illiteracy rate and where it is culturally inappropriate to say ‘no’, it was hardly conceivable that the question would be rejected. In addition, only a brief outline of the constitutional amendments was before the referendum made available to the public. One of the amendments required that all presidential candidates must reside in Madagascar for a period of six months before submitting his or her candidature. Seen by observers as a means to pre-empt a possible surprise move by Ratsiraka, the clause was retained in the 2010 constitution of the Fourth Republic. President Ravalomanana was to regret the amendment. 207 ‘aed/Elections in Madagascar’ op. cit. 208 Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 49. 209 Among the foreign consultants was the us economist Jeffrey Sachs from Columbia University, author of The End of Poverty (2005) and a senior un advisor on the Millennium Development Goals. 210 Towards the end of Ravalomanana’s presidency, even ministerial positions were advertised. The post of a cabinet minister was thus reduced to one of a senior management employee.

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all dominant and “the more [it] invested in improving its capacities […], the more it weakened the other government institutions.”211 It also led to a widening gap between the president and the people. Increasingly accused of autocratic rule, budgetary misconduct and of mixing private interests with those of the state, by 2008 Ravalomanana was for the first time faced with an adverse, albeit heterogeneous, public opinion. With the ‘old guard’ exiled, disarmed or jailed,212 the political opposition was divided and in disarray. As so many times in the history of independent Madagascar, the initial, significant dissenting voice was instead raised from within the Christian church, in this instance by the Catholics. Breaking ranks with the ecumenical ffkm council – which during the 2002 crisis decisively had backed Ravalomanana – the Catholic church openly criticized the 2007 referendum. Furthermore, in July 2008 it informed the president that he as a Protestant would not be allowed to receive holy communion, a decision pregnant with political symbolism. The mounting opinion against Ravalomanana was to coalesce around Andry Rajoelina, a young entrepreneur and media personality, who in December 2007 as an independent was elected mayor of Antananarivo. With the backing of both dissatisfied businessmen and frustrated youth, he easily defeated the president’s tim candidate.213 Although strongly opposed by Ravalomanana, as mayor of the capital – by far Madagascar’s most important political center – Rajoelina provided the opposition with an institutional conduit. Due to his energy and determination known as ‘tgv’ – in French the short form for a high-speed train214 – his background and subsequent rise to power bore an uncanny resemblance to Ravalomanana’s own. 211 Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 50. 212 Didier Ratsiraka, the ousted president and leader of the arema party, was in exile in France. His predecessor, Albert Zafy, who did not recognize Ravalomanana as president and in 2002 had founded a political formation called the National Reconciliation Committee (Comité de Réconciliation Nationale/crn), had lost his former influence. Roland Ratsiraka, the nephew of the ‘Admiral’ who had emerged as a possible consensus leader, was first dismissed as mayor of Toamasina and in 2007 charged with corruption and given a suspended prison sentence. Similarly, Pety Rakotoniaina, mayor of Fianarantsoa and an unsuccessful candidate in the 2006 presidential elections, was in 2007 arrested on suspicion of corruption and later sentenced to five years imprisonment. 213 Jennifer Cole: Sex and Salvation: Imagining the Future in Madagascar, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010. In the local elections in Antananarivo, Rajoelina received 63% of the vote against the tim candidate’s 32%. 214 Train de Grande Vitesse (tgv).

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Like Ravalomanana, Rajoelina was of Merina descent, born into a Catholic middle-class Antananarivo family. After high school, he worked as a disc jockey, but intent on social ascent through business and – as he later stated – with Ravalomanana as “his model,”215 he set up a printing company and an advertising firm. Soon established as a young, successful businessman, he purchased the radio and television station Viva. In both advertising and broadcasting, Rajoelina competed and often clashed with Ravalomanana. Deciding to go into politics, as Ravalomanana before him he was elected mayor of the  capital, launching the political party Tanora malaGasy Vonona (‘Young Malagasies Determined’/tgv), with the same initials as in his nickname and, in particular, appealing to the youth. As Ravalomanana too, he eventually ­proclaimed himself president of Madagascar. Owing their prominence to ­private enterprise, the two highlanders and bitter rivals represented a radical shift in Malagasy politics, away from the dominance by non-Merina côtier ­politicians in the 20th century.

Coup d’État, Isolation and Fourth Republic

Three developments in late 2008 galvanized the anti-Ravalomanana opinion into action, hastening the demise of the president. In November, it was revealed that the government was negotiating an agreement with the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo for a 99-year lease on 1.3 million hectares of partly occupied and cultivated land for the production of biofuels, palm oil and maize. Land is sacred in the Malagasy culture and the news that the president was ready to sign away a significant part of the patrimony sent shockwaves throughout the country. The opposition grew with the revelation of another foreign agribusiness project, covering almost 500,000 hectares and led by the Indian company Varun International.216 Ravalomanana’s authority was further eroded when he 215 Rajoelina in an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, quoted in Cole op. cit., p. 181. 216 Sandra Evers, Perrine Burnod, Rivo Andrianirina Ratsialonana and André Teyssier: ‘Foreign Land Acquisitions in Madagascar: Competing Jurisdictions of Access Claims’ in Ton Dietz, Kjell Havnevik, Mayke Kaag and Terje Oestigaard (eds): African Engagements: Africa Negotiating an Emerging Multipolar World, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2011, pp. 110–32. In Malagasy culture, land is the portal to the ancestors, repository of identity and authentication of social status. Furthermore, “losing land to foreigners has an additional association with slavery and colonialism” (ibid., p. 128). Although the Daewoo and Varun deals were the most publicized, the Ravalomanana government was planning another 50 agrobusiness projects in the coastal regions, bringing the total area affected to nearly 3 million hectares.

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purchased a Boeing 737 presidential airplane for the amount of 60 million us Dollars. As the budgetary source for the procurement was unclear, it led the imf to enquiries and several donors to suspend their aid to Madagascar. In the end, however, it was the closure in mid-December 2008 of Rajoelina’s television station Viva that became a trigger to the subsequent crisis.217 As in 1991 and 2002, thousands of people in Antananarivo took their protests to the streets. Orchestrated by Rajoelina, the demonstrations led to clashes with the security forces.218 In late January 2009, two people were shot dead and dozens killed in a fire. Quickly spinning out of control, the protests turned violent. Public and private radio stations owned by the government and the president were burned down. Shops and businesses were looted, including Tiko and Magro.  Referring to Ravalomanana’s auto-proclamation of February 2002, on 31 January 2009 Rajoelina declared that he had taken control of the country. One week later, thousands of Rajoelina followers marched on the Ambohitsorohitra presidential palace, demanding Ravalomanana’s resignation. At the palace, the presidential guards opened fire, killing at least 30 p ­ eople. In turn, the action provoked a split in the Ravalomanana government as the defense minister announced her resignation. As in 2002, the armed forces initially remained neutral. In the midst of social unrest and turmoil, they, however, split. While pro-Ravalomanana demonstrators marched in the capital and Rajoelina took refuge at the French ambassador’s residence, in early March officers and soldiers from the army’s staff and administrative services, capsat,219 mutinied, siding with the opposition. Storming the army headquarters, they forced the chief of staff to stand down. On 16 March, the military took control of the presidential palace, the central bank and other government institutions. Faced with a coup d’état, the following day President Ravalomanana resigned. Before heading into exile in South Africa,220 he handed over power to

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This should be compared to the aggregate area of 2 million hectares under cultivation by Madagascar’s 2.5 million subsistence farmers (ibid., p. 114). In 2009, the Daewoo and Varun ventures were cancelled by the Rajoelina government. At the same time, Ravalomanana was in absentia sentenced to four years in prison for the procurement of the presidential jet, which was incorporated into the national carrier, Air Madagascar. The closure followed an interview with former president Ratsiraka, broadcast by Viva. As in 2002, many protesters did not emerge from any organized popular movement, but were actively recruited from the poor neighborhoods and peri-urban suburbs of Antananarivo in exchange for tee shirts, trinkets or small amounts of cash. Corps d’Armée des Personnels et des Services Administratives et Techniques. Initially, Ravalomanana and his family took refuge in Swaziland before moving to South Africa.

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a military directorate, which immediately passed it on to Rajoelina. He, in turn, dissolved the National Assembly and was with the blessing of the armed forces and backing by the constitutional court on 21 March 2009 installed as president of a High Authority of Transition (Haute Autorité de Transition/hat).221 Only 34 years old, he became the youngest head of state in Africa.222 ProRavalomanana protests continued over the following months, but by mid-year the new government was firmly in control. In August 2010, Ravalomanana was in absentia sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor for the killings of Rajoelina supporters by the presidential guard. From 2009, developments in Madagascar were completely dominated by the search for a solution to the political and constitutional quandary created by Rajoelina’s seizure of state power. He had been carried to the highest position by a diverse, but far from united, wave of anti-Ravalomanana opinions. Once in power, however, his lack of a rallying socio-economic vision for the Great Island, or even a coherent short-term program for the exigency of the situation, weakened the support. Censured by the international community and, as a result, with considerably reduced fiscal resources, the Rajoelina government was not in a position to deliver on its populist promises. Instead, it would over the following years be preoccupied with clinging to power, keeping opponents at bay, scapegoating foreign mediation and suppressing democratic freedoms.223 The coup d’état was condemned by the au, sadc and the international community. The au Peace and Security Council reacted by suspending Madagascar from the African Union. At its extraordinary summit of heads of state and government, held in Swaziland on 30 March 2009, the sadc leaders condemned in the strongest [of] terms the unconstitutional actions that have led to the illegal ousting of the democratically elected government and called for an immediate restoration of constitutional order; decided not to recognize Mr. Andry Rajoelina as president […] as his appointment did not only violate the constitution of Madagascar and democratic principles, but also violated the core principles and values of 221 Formally, all state institutions under Rajoelina were transitional. 222 According to the constitution of the Third Republic, the minimum age for a president of Madagascar was 40 years. The limit was lowered to 35 in the 2010 constitution of the Fourth Republic. 223 In October 2010, the international organization Reporters Without Borders estimated that around 80 radio stations had been closed by the Rajoelina government (‘Communiqué Reporters Sans Frontières’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 18 October 2010).

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the sadc Treaty, the African Union Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter; and urged […] Rajoelina to vacate the office of the president as a matter of urgency, […] paving [the] way for [the] unconditional reinstatement of President Marc Ravalomanana. In addition, the sadc summit resolved “with immediate effect […] to suspend Madagascar from all [its] institutions and organs until the return […] to constitutional normalcy.” In the event of non-compliance with the decisions taken, the Southern African heads of state, finally, “underscored that […] sadc in ­collaboration with the African Union and the United Nations shall consider other options.”224 sadc subsequently appointed Joaquim Chissano to negotiate a return to constitutionalism. As a former foreign minister (1975–86) and president (1986– 2005) of Mozambique, he was well acquainted with political developments in the neighboring Great Island. Surprisingly, in August 2009 he not only invited the two principal adversaries, Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, for talks in the Mozambican capital Maputo, but also the ex-presidents Zafy and Ratsiraka. In the complex Malagasy situation resulting from cyclical upheavals and constitutional crises since the early 1990s, each of them was deemed to represent a broad constituency, which with a French expression in Malagasy political parlance was known as a mouvance.225 From a democratic perspective, they were a motley crew.226 Three of them  had unconstitutionally been brought to the presidency and one had been impeached by parliament. Ratsiraka was ousted by both Zafy and Ravalomanana, who also sentenced him to hard labor. Zafy, in turn, never 224 sadc: ‘Communiqué from Extraordinary Summit of sadc Heads of State and Government’, Lozitha Royal Palace, Swaziland, 30 March 2009. 225 The expression mouvance is commonly used in Madagascar and Comoros, two polities that are characterized by extreme party atomization and personalization of political life. Broader than an ideological ‘movement’, a mouvance denotes an often unstable ­association of a large number of political parties and organizations orbiting a dominant personality. 226 In October 2013, a satirical, retrospective editorial in Madagascar Tribune characterized the four leaders as “a retired, half senile and blind freshwater admiral; a retired surgeon in bad company and out of touch; a former milkman clinging to his bucket and seeing himself as the navel of the world; and an uncultured dj, devoid of brainpower and with mafia tendencies” (Georges Rabehevitra: ‘Les coups de griffes du samedi 12 octobre’ in madagascar -tribune.com, 12 October 2013).

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r­ecognized Ravalomanana. The popular support enjoyed by the invited ­personalities and their mouvances was, in addition, far from established, in particular in the cases of the octonegarian Zafy and the septuagenarian Ratsiraka, who, furthermore, no longer lived in Madagascar. In sum, all four leaders invited by sadc had in their presidential ambitions shown little respect for constitutional principles and held each other in contempt. The chances of a sustainable understanding between them appeared slim. In Maputo, Chissano, nevertheless, managed to successfully broker an agreement. In August 2009, the four Malagasy leaders approved a power-sharing arrangement as a first transitional step towards the re-­establishment of a constitutional order. The agreement was confirmed in Addis Ababa in November 2009. However, already the following month Rajoelina reneged on his commitments, which in March 2010 led the au to impose targeted sanctions on him and a hundred of his closest followers. This marked the beginning of a protracted deadlock, with repeated initiatives for a solution taken by sadc on behalf of the au and the wider international community. In May 2010, a new round of talks involving Rajoelina and Ravalomanana took place in the South African capital Pretoria, but once again without a positive breakthrough. Amidst rumours of a military coup and as his support dwindled, Rajoelina submitted a calendar for a democratic return, with a constitutional referendum in August, parliamentary polls in September and presidential elections in November 2010. Also this process stalled, and as Ravalomanana in August 2010 in absentia was sentenced to life imprisonment, the door to further talks appeared terminally shut. When the Malagasy authorities in September organized a national conference on constitutional reform, it was boycotted by the three mouvances represented by Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy. By mid-2010, the situation in Madagascar had gone from bad to worse, with serious consequences both for the credibility of the au peace and security architecture and, in particular, the country’s economy. The imf had frozen its stabilization program in May 2009. The United States followed suit, closing the Millennium Challenge Account. In June 2010, the European Union suspended its development aid. Not only had Rajoelina’s defiance ground sadc’s mediation talks to a halt, but as foreign aid represented half of Madagascar’s budget, the withdrawal of all but humanitarian assistance took its toll. Combined with shrinking incomes from the tourism industry, thousands of people lost their jobs. Poverty in the country – already before the crisis among the poorest in the world – was on the increase, as was sentiments of contempt vis-à-vis the political elites of all the major parties and mouvances. Commenting on the ­difficulties faced by the workers, professor Raymond Ranjeva, a Malagasy

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consultant for the ilo, concluded that his country was “no longer affected by a crisis, but by a disease.”227 In July 2010, the au assembly expressed “concern at the continued impasse in the process aimed at restoring constitutional order […], due mainly to the refusal of the de facto authorities to cooperate with the au and [sadc] towards the implementation of the Maputo Agreements of 6 August 2009 and the Addis Ababa Additional Act of 6 November 2009.” While the assembly encouraged sadc’s mediator Chissano to intensify his consultations with the Malagasy parties, it also called for “renewed efforts to fully implement the targeted sanctions imposed by the [au Peace and Security Council].”228 Isolated abroad, in  this situation Rajoelina embarked on an indigenous, so called malgachomalgache, process towards a new national dispensation and international recognition. Central to the strategy was the adoption of a new constitution through a popular vote of support. The constitutional referendum was held on 17 November 2010. It was marred by serious breaches of democratic principles and surrounded by political insecurity. As was the case with the national conference in September, the referendum was boycotted by the supporters of Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy, as well as by civil society organizations such as the members of the Alliance des Organisations de la Société Civile (aosc). Although Rajoelina actively campaigned in favor of a ‘Yes’ vote, political rallies were, in addition, banned one week before the referendum. Prominent opposition politicians were arrested. On the actual day of the poll, there were widespread rumors of a military takeover as a group of officers mutinied outside the capital Antananarivo.229 To this should be added that Madagascar’s national electoral commission was deemed partisan towards the government and that instances of irregularities – such as pre-arranged ballots – were reported. Of arguably greater significance for the transparency of the referendum was that the voters were asked to accept or reject a complex constitutional text of which the implications were difficult to assess.230 As the messenger became more important than the 227 ‘Ce n’est plus une crise, c’est une maladie’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 8 October 2010. 228 au: ‘Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’, Assembly/AU/Dec. 294 (XV), Kampala, 27 July 2010. 229 The mutiny took place at the Ivato air base outside the capital (bani), where a group of young officers set up a military Committee of National Salvation. The base was stormed by Malagasy troops. Without bloodshed, around 30 mutineers were arrested. 230 After the referendum, the non-governmental National Commission for Election Obser­ vation (kmf-cnoe) reported that more than 4,000 people in a survey covering 4,750 – i.e. over 80% – said that they did not fully understand the constitutional text or the ­question asked in the referendum. The ngo characterized the observation exercise as

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­ essage, the referendum for or against a legal framework for a Fourth Republic m turned into a plebiscite to legitimize Rajoelina. Not surprisingly, the proposed constitution was tailor-made for the young president. In addition to allowing for an indefinite extension of the tenure of the transitional government, it lowered the eligibility age to run for president from 40 to 35 years and stipulated that all presidential candidates should have lived for at least six months in Madagascar prior to the date of elections. Whereas the lower minimum age paved the way for Rajoelina, the latter clause virtually barred Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka – respectively exiled in South Africa and in France and denied entry to Madagascar – from standing in presidential elections. In the referendum, 52.6% of the registered voters made use of their vote. No less than 4.8% of the ballots were either spoilt or blank. Out of the valid votes, 74.2% were in favor of the new constitution, with 25.8% against.231 Looking at the high proportion of ‘Yes’ votes, Rajoelina and his supporters viewed the outcome as a decisive victory and a solid basis for international recognition. In relation to registered voters, however, the constitutional proposal was only supported by 37.2%, or far from a majority of the adult Malagasy population. The referendum was not recognized by sadc, the au or any other international actor. Whereas the constitution of the Fourth Republic was promulgated on 11 December 2010, at its assembly in Addis Ababa in late January 2011 the African Union reiterated the “concern over the continued stalemate in the process of [a] return to [a] constitutional order in Madagascar,” ignoring the referendum and the launch of the Fourth Republic. At the same time, the pan-African organization renewed its “support for the initiatives and efforts deployed by sadc […] to achieve a consensual return to constitutional legality.”232 Despite continued efforts by Chissano’s mediation team, no end to the stand-off was in sight. When it was announced that the sadc leaders were to take a final stand on the situation at an extraordinary meeting scheduled for May 2011, Rajoelina launched a diplomatic offensive, visiting Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. During the visits, he emphasized the November 2010 constitutional referendum with a view to gain recognition. “the worst experience in twenty years” (‘C’est la pire des elections observées’ in madagascar-tribune. com, 24 November 2010). 231 ‘aed/Elections in Madagascar’ op. cit. 232 au: ‘Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’, Assembly/AU/Dec. 338 (XVI), Addis Ababa, 31 January 2011.

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Requesting a meeting with President Zuma of South Africa, he described how “the Malagasy people massively came to vote […] to adopt the Constitution for the Fourth Republic at 74.19%.”233 For the Malagasy people, sadc, the au and  the international community, however, the drama of Madagascar had by  then become more of a ‘neverendum’ than a question of a legitimizing referendum.234

Mediation and Breakthrough

The following act in the drama opened in mid-2011. In September, the Mozambican mediation team finally succeeded in having an amended roadmap signed by Rajoelina, Ravalomanana and Zafy, although not by Ratsiraka.235 As rumors of a sadc military invasion were spreading in Antananarivo,236 under the chairmanship of South Africa’s deputy foreign minister, Marius Fransman, one month later the stakeholders also formally agreed on an implementation framework. Although it did not address other significant issues, such as amnesty legislation, the return of Ravalomanana or the adoption of human rights instruments, it did identify dates and benchmarks for the ­establishment of a consensual, transitional state structure that could lead Madagascar out of the stalemate. While the stakeholders had a map, the road ahead was still bumpy. For the agreements reached in September-October to hold, it was of essence that strict neutrality was observed with regard to the Malagasy contenders. In December 233 Letter from Andry Rajoelina to Jacob Zuma, Antananarivo, 11 April 2011, published in madagascar-tribune.com, 3 May 2011. 234 For a summary of the mediation process and a discussion of the policies of the main sadc actors, see Dirk Kotzé: ‘The Responsibility to Implement: sadc’s Challenges as Mediator in Madagascar to Convert the Peace Deal into Implementation’, Thomas Ohlson Memorial Conference, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, Uppsala, April 2013. See also Lesley Connolly: ‘The Troubled Road to Peace: Reflections on the Complexities of Resolving the Political Impasse in Madagascar’, Policy and Practice Brief, No. 21, accord, Durban, February 2013. 235 In addition to Chissano, prominent Mozambicans in the mediation effort were Leonardo Simão, a former foreign minister, and the sadc Executive Secretary, Tomaz Salomão. 236 On 12 October 2011, the persistent rumors of military action by sadc forced Salomão to issue an open letter in which he explained that “sadc’s mission […] is not to invade Madagascar. Our role is simply to support the Malagasy people in a return to constitutional normalcy” (‘Tomaz Salomão: Bureau de liaison occupé par des civils’ in Midi Madagasikara, 13 October 2011).

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2011, however, President Sarkozy of France welcomed Rajoelina “as a friend” to the Élysée palace in Paris, not only recognizing him as a head of state, but undertaking to persuade the United States, the eu and, in general, the international community to lift the sanctions on Madagascar.237 Moreover, during his stay in France Rajoelina signed grant aid agreements of a total of 10 million Euros with the French Development Agency.238 France – Madagascar’s main  trading partner – had never hidden its preference for Rajoelina over Ravalomanana, but under the circumstances the openly partisan stance was denounced in the strongest of terms. Speaking on behalf of the sadc mediation team, Leonardo Simão concluded that “French interference in Malagasy affairs is tantamount to quasi-colonialism.”239 Reacting to the unilateral French initiative, the United States made it clear that it “continue[d] to view the de facto government in Madagascar as an illegitimate regime,” adding that it had “serious concerns about the steady deterioration in the rule of law.”240 At the same time, the outstanding questions relating to amnesty for Ravalomanana; his return to Madagascar; and whether he and Rajoelina could stand in the scheduled elections again brought the process to a standstill.241 Citing “the preservation of peace” as an overriding motive,242 from September 2011 the Malagasy authorities on several occasions denied Ravalomanana and his family entry to Madagascar.243 237 ‘Accueilli comme chef d’État par Sarkozy’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 8 December 2011. 238 Ibid. 239 Quoted in Thomas Deltombe: ‘La France, Acteur-Clé de la Crise Malgache’ in Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2012. 240 us Government: ‘us Position on the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note for Madagascar’, Washington, 21 February 2012. 241 These questions also applied to Ratsiraka, who, however, had not signed the sadc roadmap. 242 ‘Interdit d’entrée par un autre notam’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 16 September 2011. 243 In January 2012, a South African Airways’ flight with Ravalomanana on board was denied landing in Antananarivo. The following month, his wife, Lalao Ravalomanana, was stopped from going home on instructions by the Malagasy government. In July 2012, she managed to disembark in Antananarivo, but was immediately put on a flight to Bangkok, Thailand. The same treatment was not meted out to Didier Ratsiraka, who in November 2011 paid a short visit to Madagascar from his exile in France. Ratsiraka eventually returned in April 2013. Whereas his wife was allowed back in March, by October 2013 Marc Ravalomanana was still in exile in South Africa. In addition to the outstanding issue of his life sentence of August 2010 and a subsequent warrant for his arrest in Madagascar, it was alleged by the authorities that the Tiko company owed the Malagasy state around 100 million us Dollars in unpaid taxes (Connolly op. cit., p. 4). In South Africa, meanwhile, he was under investigation for the 2009 killings by the presidential guard (International Crisis Group: ‘Will Madagascar’s elections end the perennial crisis?’ in crisisgroupblogs.org, 12 November 2013).

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In July and August 2012, Rajoelina and Ravalomanana were on two occasions flown to Seychelles for secluded face-to-face meetings, hosted by President James Michel and chaired by the South African President Jacob Zuma.244 As also this effort came to naught, the mediators advanced a ‘nil-nil option’ excluding both protagonists from taking part in any electoral contest. When the Malagasy Independent National Electoral Commission for the Transition (cenit)245 in consultation with the United Nations in August announced the holding of presidential elections in May 2013, the ‘nil-nil option’ became official au/sadc policy. “In an exceptional example of unilaterally prescribing its requirements to the Malagasy parties,”246 in early December 2012 sadc not only reiterated its decision that Ravalomanana should be able to return without conditions, but also made it clear that “as a way forward towards resolving [the] crisis” both he and Rajoelina “should be persuaded not to stand in the forthcoming general elections.”247 Reacting to the declaration, on 10 December Ravalomanana announced that he would not submit his candidature. Eventually bowing to intense ­international pressure, in January 2013 Rajoelina too reluctantly stated that he would not stand. Mainly for technical reasons, the elections, in turn, were re-scheduled by cenit and the un to late July. In early 2013, people in Madagascar started to believe in an end to the constitutional and socio-economic crises which had opened with Rajoelina’s seizure of power. The drama, however, was not yet over. On 3 May, the Special Electoral Court (ces)248 published the list of presidential candidates. To general surprise, it included the names of Didier Ratsiraka, Andry Rajoelina and the former first lady Lalao Ravalomanana.249 The news caused consternation in sadc, at the au and among the international stakeholders. Meeting in Cape Town, one week later the sadc Troika on Politics, Defense and Security censured the Malagasy court and its clearance of “illegitimate candidatures.”250 244 At the time, President Michel held the presidency of the Indian Ocean Commission. President Zuma was the chairperson of the sadc Troika on Politics, Defense and Security. 245 Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendente pour la Transition (cenit). 246 Kotzé op. cit., p. 17. 247 sadc: ‘Communiqué from the Extraordinary Summit of sadc Heads of State and Government’, Dar es Salaam, 8 December 2012. 248 Cour Électorale Spéciale (ces). 249 Lalao Ravalomanana had no previous political record and was, obviously, a stand-in for her husband. 250 ‘La sadc demande le retrait des trois candidatures controversées’ in madagascartribune.com, 11 May 2013. The sadc Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation is responsible for peace and security matters among the fifteen Southern

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In late June, the matter was discussed at an enlarged high-level meeting in Addis Ababa between the au and the International Contact Group on Madagascar, including representatives of the five permanent member states of the un Security Council, the European Union, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the Indian Ocean Commission and the governments of Germany and Japan. The conclusions were unequivocal. The “illegal candidatures” of Ratsiraka, Rajoelina and Lalao Ravalomanana had to be annulled with immediate effect; the irregularly constituted ces had to be recomposed;251 and new dates had to be set for the presidential elections. In the case of noncompliance, the international community would not recognize the outcome of any Malagasy polls.252 Although Rajoelina – who had already reneged on his January ­commitment253 – defiantly declared that “we are not going to meet the delays [imposed by] the international community, but rather respond to the aspirations of the Malagasy people,”254 the massive condemnation could not be ignored. Barring a comprehensive military takeover, the process towards a constitutional dispensation had reached a point of no return. With un assistance, the Special Electoral Court was over the following weeks restructured and the presidential candidacies reviewed. On 21 August 2013, the recomposed court published the final list of vetted candidates. Reflecting the state of atomization of politics in Madagascar, it contained no less than 33 names, but not those of Ratsiraka, Rajoelina or Lalao Ravalomanana.255 The following day, cenit announced that the first round of the postponed presidential elections would take place on 25 October. Should no candidate receive the required absolute majority, there would be a run-off between the two leading contestants on 20 December 2013.

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African member states. Most of the work is coordinated by a so called ‘troika’, composed by the chairperson of the organ, the deputy chairperson and the former chairperson. The court had been unduly enlarged with Rajoelina appointees. au/icg-m: ‘Communiqué de la 7è réunion du gic-m le 26 juin 2013 à Addis Abéba’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 1 July 2013. Rajoelina’s candidacy was submitted to the ces after the deadline had expired. His explanation was that he did not intend to stand in the elections, but changed his mind when Lalao Ravalomanana’s name appeared on the list. ‘Andry Rajoelina n’y pense pas’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 13 August 2013. ‘Publication de la liste des candidats à la présidentielle’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 22 August 2013. Didier Ratsiraka and Lalao Ravalomanana were disqualified for not having resided in Madagascar during a period of six months prior to their submission. Andry Rajoelina’s candidacy had been submitted after the expiry of the stipulated deadline. Another five candidacies were also annulled.

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It was to be combined with legislative elections, whereas local polls only would be organized in mid-2014.256 After four years of trials and tribulations, the African Union could close the Madagascar dossier. In early September 2013, the Peace and Security Council welcomed “the positive development,” noting, in particular, “the crucial role” played by Rajoelina. As a consequence, the targeted sanctions on him and 108 of his colleagues imposed in 2010 were lifted with immediate effect. At the same time, Madagascar’s return to the pan-African organization was put on hold until after the elections and the installation of a new head of state.257 The electoral campaign itself was initially marred by a wave of bomb explosions in the capital,258 but progressed in a calm, albeit unfamiliar, atmosphere. Between them, Ratsiraka, Zafy, Ravalomanana and Rajoelina had ruled the country for 40 years. With all four out of the presidential race, a new chapter was opened. In a context characterized by a proliferation of untested political formations and marked regional differences, there was, however, no guarantee that a formal return to a constitutional order would address the root causes of the country’s chronic instability, fractured social fabric or economic decline.

Towards a Fifth Republic?

Most of the 33 presidential candidates were unknown to the electorate,259 as  were the extraordinary number of parties and independent hopefuls for the elections to the National Assembly. Soon, however, the race for the presidency turned into yet another contest between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. From his exile in South Africa, the former endorsed the candidacy of Jean Louis Robinson, a medical doctor who was not a tim member, but who had 256 ‘Premier tour le 25 octobre, second le 20 décembre’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 23 August 2013. 257 au Peace and Security Council: ‘Communiqué’ (PSR/PR/COMM/CCCXCIV), Addis Ababa, 5 September 2013. 258 A nationalist vigilante group calling itself the ‘Defenders of National Sovereignty’ (dns) was behind the bombings. dns claimed that they were carried out in protest against the international community and its “interference” in Malagasy internal affairs (Peter Kagwanja: ‘Why Madagascar’s coming ‘marionette election’ should worry East Africans’ in The East African, 23–29 November 2013). 259 According to a pre-election survey, 45% of the voters received T-shirts, caps or money from various parties, but only 22% of the voters recognized any of the presidential candidates (‘Observation des elections: Le groupe des experts suggère’ in madagascar-tribune. com, 31 October 2013).

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served as his minister of health. Although the tgv congress endorsed Edgar Razafindravahy – the high-profile mayor of Antananarivo and a successful businessman – Rajoelina himself called on his supporters to vote for Hery Rajaonarimampianina, a 55-year old Canadian-trained accountant of Merina descent, who since 2009 had been his finance and budget minister.260 While Robinson declared that he as president would appoint Lalao Ravalomanana as premier, Rajoelina did not hide his ambition of copying the example of Vladimir Putin of Russia, after a period as prime minister possibly returning to the presidency at the 2018 elections.261 Although international observers from the un, eu, au, sadc, oif and the Indian Ocean Commission subsequently endorsed the outcome of the elections, they were severely tarnished by widespread fraud and the exclusion of tens of thousands of voters without proper identity documents.262 Two polling stations were set on fire and at least one death was reported. Eventually, the electoral court decided to annul the results of the parliamentary elections in four constituencies.263 With respectively 21.2 and 15.9% in the first round of the presidential vote  on 25 October, Robinson and Rajaonarimampianina qualified for the run-off on 20 December 2013. In addition to the low scores obtained by the Ravalomanana and Rajoelina proxies, the polls were remarkable in many respects. Whereas 61.8% of the registered voters did participate – the lowest turn-out since 1996 – the share of blank and spoilt ballots was no less than 6.3%, or almost double the combined vote of the ten least fortunate candidates.264 There was no third force to challenge the Ravalomanana and Rajoelina mouvances and regionally Madagascar was as divided as ever, with Robinson dominating in Antananarivo and its surroundings and Rajaonarimampianina in the south and in the coastal areas. The pattern became even more pronounced in the second round run-off. Faced with the option of casting their votes for Robinson/Ravalomanana or

260 Throughout Rajoelina’s presidency (2009–13), Rajaonarimampianina managed to hold on to his post as finance minister, covering the questionable political and commercial practices of the ‘tgv boys’. 261 ‘Après-transition: Rajoelina lorgne la primature’ in lexpressmada.com, 2 October 2013. 262 The high incidence of electoral fraud was acknowledged by cenit (‘Vers un président élu par un quart de l’électorat’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 30 December 2013). 263 ‘La majorité des sièges au mapar, suivi de près par les indépendants’ in madagascartribune.com, 7 February 2014. There were a total of 151 constituencies. 264 15 out of the 33 presidential candidates obtained less than 1% of the popular vote each (‘Résultats provisoires rendu public par la cenit’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 9 November 2013).

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Rajaonarimampianina/Rajoelina, almost half of the registered voters – 49.3% – abstained. Over 4% of those who took part voted blank.265 The final results of the Malagasy presidential elections were announced in midJanuary 2014. According to ces, Rajaonarimampianina had received 53.5% of the valid votes and was declared the winner.266 Initially, the Ravalomanana camp denounced the outcome as a result of massive fraud and undue interference by the Rajoelina government, but in late January Robinson conceded defeat.267 Albeit merely supported by a quarter of the electorate and with a weak base in the capital, on 25 January 2014 Hery Rajaonarimampianina was sworn in as the constitutionally elected president of Madagascar. Characterized as “a sort of unidentified political object who has become president a little by chance,”268 in his inaugural address he emphasized the need for political reconciliation and rapid economic recovery. As the handover of presidential powers from Rajoelina to Rajaonarimampianina went smoothly and Madagascar was welcomed back into the community of nations by the au/sadc, the un, the World Bank, the imf and other international bodies, soon, however, the new president was challenged by a complex and bewildering parliamentary situation. After declaring the votes in four constituencies null and void, in early February 2014 the Special Electoral Court announced the official results from the legislative elections, held jointly with the presidential run-off. Out of 147  seats in the National Assembly, the Rajoelina supporters – forming the political platform Miaraka Amin’ny Prezidà Andry Rajoelina (‘Together with President Andry Rajoelina’/mapar) – had won 49, with 20 going to the ­mouvance Ravalomanana, 44 to independent candidates and 34 to various smaller political formations.269 Although mapar held a relative majority and claimed the premiership in a new government, in reality it was the independent members and the small political parties who could decide the course in the hung parliament. This was dramatically illustrated over the following weeks, when loyalties and political majorities shifted back and forth as corruption, bribes and vote-buying became rampant in the new National Assembly.270 265 ‘Beaucoup reste à faire’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 18 January 2014. 266 Ibid. 267 Robinson’s acknowledgement of the official result led to a split between him and the Ravalomanana camp. 268 ‘Hery Rajaonarimampianina, a new president in need of stronger allies’ in The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 28 January 2014. 269 ‘La majorité des sièges au mapar, suivi de près par les indépendants’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 7 February 2014. 270 The widespread use of bribes during the elections and the subsequent vote-buying in the National Assembly was strongly denounced by the caretaker prime minister, Jean Omer Bereziki (‘Beriziki deplore les pots-de-vin’ in lexpressmada.com, 22 February 2014).

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By mid-February, the minority Ravalomanana group had joined forces with a significant number of independents in a coalition called the Platform for a Presidential Majority (pmp),271 claiming an absolute parliamentary majority and the right to nominate a premier. From South Africa, Marc Ravalomanana at the same time expressed his support for President Rajaonarimampianina.272 As the latter reciprocated by leaving the door to the premiership open to both mapar and pmp, the developments culminated in a break between the president and Rajoelina, who accused his former finance minister and protégé of “betrayal” and declared that he no longer was available for the position as prime minister.273 In the course of a few days, the instability and castling in the National Assembly completely changed the Malagasy political landscape, turning opposition to support and friends into foes. In the process, the constitutional road towards the formation of a cabinet was paralyzed and the country yet again brought to the brink of a crisis. Politics in Madagascar appeared as byzantine as ever. By 31 March 2014 – more than three months after the presidential and p­arliamentary elections – the Great Island was still without an accountable  ­government. As macro-economic bankruptcy loomed, social services were  brought to a standstill and poverty further increased. Optimism gave way  to pessimism, and it became an open question whether President Rajaonarimampianina as so many of his predecessors would engineer another referendum to strengthen the presidential powers under a new constitutional dispensation or if the political stalemate as in 1991, 2002 and 2009 would set in motion a cycle of extra-parliamentary action towards an unconstitutional change of government. Eventually, in mid-April Roger Kolo was appointed prime minister. A septuagenarian côtier from south-western Madagascar, his candidacy had been forwarded by a majority bloc of pmp and independent parliamentarians. Without any previous political record, Kolo himself had registered for the presidential elections, but was disqualified for not residing in Madagascar. In fact, leaving for medical studies in France in the late 1970s, he had subsequently pursued a career as a radiologist in Geneva, Switzerland. He only returned to his native country for the 2013 election campaign. Unknown to both the people and the established political circles, in addition to his age and inexperience

271 Plateforme pour la Majorité Présidentielle (pmp). 272 ‘Appel à l’apaisement, à la solidarité et au soutien au premier dirigeant du pays’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 24 February 2014. 273 ‘Andry Rajoelina monte au créneau’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 22 February 2014; and ‘Clash entre Rajoelina et Rajaonarimampianina’ in lexpressmada.com, 22 February 2014.

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critics questioned his national credentials by highlighting that he held double  French-Malagasy citizenship and no longer mastered the Malagasy language. Nevertheless, whereas mapar denounced the appointment as ­ “unconstitutional,”274 without enthusiasm or protests the news was acknowledged by a population fatigued by political infighting and intrigue. One week later, a cabinet was formed. Composed of 31 ministers – out of which six women275 – it was a mix of new technocrats and old p ­ ol­iticians, including two dissidents from mapar and one representative from the Ravalomanana camp.276 Albeit untested, on paper the broad Rajaonarimampianina-Kolo ­government seemed to mark a break with Madagascar’s troubled past. At the same time, Malagasy commentators were critical of its diversity and political inexperience.277 In addition, mapar’s supporters ominously declared that they did not intend to “sit idly by,” but prepared for “a counter-attack.”278

Economic Crisis and Natural Resources

Independent Madagascar’s macro-economic trajectory has been described as “mysterious,” “enigmatic” and “paradoxical.”279 In several respects, at independence the ‘Red Island’ enjoyed better conditions for growth than many continental African countries. It was a centralized, unitary state with clearly defined territorial borders, abundant arable land and significant natural resources, notably with regard to mining and fisheries. In addition, in an African context Madagascar was ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogeneous and had 274 ‘Nomination du Premier Ministre: Pas conforme à la Constitution selon le mapar’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 16 April 2014. 275 Women were inter alia appointed to the prominent portfolios of foreign affairs (Lala Razafitrimo), justice (Noëline Ramanantenasoa) and higher education (Marie Monique Rasoazananera). General Jean Olivier Rakotozafy became minister of defense and Comptroller General Richard Randimbisoa minister of public security. Close to President Rajaonarimampianina, his former budget director, Jean Razafindravoinona, was promoted to the position as minister of finance. 276 Breaking ranks with Rajoelina, mapar’s Juan de Dieu Maharante and Johanita Ndahimananjara were, respectively, sworn in as minister of labor and minister of water affairs. Rolland Ravatomanga from the mouvance Ravalomanana became minister of agriculture. 277 ‘Ça ne sent pas la rose, sauf celle du bois’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 22 April 2014. 278 In French, ne pas rester les bras croisés (‘Premier Ministre: Écarté, mapar va lancer une contre-attaque’ in lexpressmada.com, 12 April 2014). 279 Razafindrakoto, Roubaud and Wachsberger op. cit., pp. 2 and 3.

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through the churches and the colonial state established a comparatively advanced education system, as well as an administrative apparatus which inter  alia included efficient tax collection. Manufacturing had been introduced already in the pre-colonial era. In spite of the comparative advantages, Madagascar, however, steadily fell behind the emerging African states. During the half century between 1960 and 2010, gdp per capita decreased by no less than a third, whereas that of Africa south of the Sahara – a region which hardly stood out as an economic success story – almost trebled.280 Observers of Malagasy affairs – including the African Development Bank, the  World Bank, the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – concur that the causes of the remarkable long-term economic decline since independence are indigenous. Political instability, mismanagement, corruption and outright “plunder” are often quoted.281 Irrespective of the ideological orientation and the economic policy of the government – nationalism, ‘malgachization’, socialism or liberalism – the outcome has been the same. Although limited and stagnant, due to the extreme hierarchy of the Malagasy society the economy produces enough wealth to satisfy the country’s small elite, mainly based in the capital and formed by influential andriana and hova families, landowners, military officers, traders and businessmen. “Incestuous”282 and “predatory,” at the apex of the social pyramid the members of the elite have not had the incentive to re-structure the economy, transform the existing  exploitative system or introduce redistributive reforms. Most strikingly, since 1990 – which elsewhere in the world was a watershed with regard to globalization and change – the structure of the country’s economy has remained frozen. In that year, the gdp shares of agriculture, mining and manufacturing were 28.6, 0.5 and 10.6%, respectively. In 2010, they still stood at 28.4, 0.6 and 11.1%.283 The recurrent political crises have turned the Malagasy economy into one of the weakest in the world. Per capita, the population is the poorest of the African Indian Ocean states. Overall gdp is comparable to that of its 280 281 282 283

Ibid., pp. 3 and 28. See, for example, Jütersonke and Kartas op. cit., p. 5. icg op. cit., p. 10. African Development Bank (AfDB), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), United Nations Development Programme (undp) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (uneca): African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources, August 2013/‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p.1/africaneconomicoutlook.org.

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continental African neighbor Mozambique, but smaller than that of its tiny Indian Ocean partner Mauritius, which on account of its economic strength furthermore has made significant inroads into Madagascar, particularly in the textile industry. In 2010, gdp per capita in Madagascar was a mere 427 us Dollars, or less than 60% of the corresponding figure for Comoros (740 usd). With regard to the creole nations of Mauritius and Seychelles, the gap was huge. In the same year, the average income in Mauritius (7,577 usd) was 17 times higher than in Madagascar. In the case of Seychelles (11,249 usd), it was 26 times higher.284 From macro- and socio-economic points of view, the years under Rajoelina and his finance minister Rajaonarimampianina (2009–13) were particularly damaging. Although poverty rates continued to increase under Ravalomanana (2002–09), at the national level there was, nevertheless, a resumption of economic growth. It came to an abrupt end in 2009–10, when the World Bank, the United States, the European Union and a number of bilateral donors reacted to the unconstitutional change of government by suspending development aid. As overseas development assistance represented around 40% of the national budget and some 75% of investments,285 the suspension led to a sharp decline in public programs and, in general, to severe effects on Madagascar’s economic and social performance. After a fall of around 10% in 2008–09, real gdp growth was 0.5% in 2010 and 1.6% in 2011. Per capita, however, the growth was negative, or minus 2.4% in 2010 and minus 1.3% in 2011.286 For the period 2009–12, the World Bank has estimated the cumulative costs of Madagascar’s political crisis to exceed 8 billion us Dollars.287 At the same time, around 336,000 jobs disappeared.288 The considerable losses would represent a mountain to climb for any government, but the return to a constitutional order should pave the way for a resumption of international assistance. In combination with a revival of the tourism sector and, above all, significant revenue from mining projects, the economy should – if the political conditions so allow – be in a position to recover and expand. 284 The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/gdp per Capita/Current usd’, Washington, 2012. 285 Bertelsmann Stiftung op. cit., p. 4. 286 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Overview’, p. 1. By 2013, income per capita had fallen back to its 2001 level. 287 The World Bank: ‘Madagascar: Measuring the Impact of the Political Crisis’, Washington, June 2013, p. 1. 288 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca: ‘Madagascar 2012’, p. 14.

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Madagascar’s balance of trade has for many years been negative, with the value of imports exceeding that of exports. The main trading partners are France, China and the United States. Traditionally, the island’s leading foreign exchange earners have been coffee, vanilla, cloves, prawns and industrial products from its Export Processing Zone (epz), in particular textiles and clothing. In 2012, epz products represented around 40% of the total export value. Due to rising international prices and global demand, in the same year cloves increased its share to more than 12%. The principal import items were petroleum products (23%), raw materials (18%), consumer goods (12.5%) and food (10%).289 Even if the gdp shares of agriculture, mining and manufacturing have remained static since 1990, within the sectors significant initiatives have been launched in favor of diversification and growth. This is notably the case with a number of huge mining projects, but also with the development of the Zone Franche. Mining, in particular, is expected to radically transform the Malagasy economy. Madagascar is rich in mineral resources, with a wide range of diverse and sizeable deposits all around the island. With the exception of moderate exports of chromite, graphite and semi-precious stones, until this century the country was slow to develop the potential. There was no significant extractive industry. Towards the end of the 1990s, it was instead unauthorized, casual laborers digging for sapphires at Ilakaka in the south who put Madagascar on the global mineral map, attracting gem traders from, in particular, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and China.290 Out of nowhere, Ilakaka mushroomed into a major center, according to estimates supplying more than a third of the world’s sapphires. In 2006 – during the presidency of Ravalomanana – the Canadian mining giant Rio Tinto started the construction of port facilities at Tôlanaro (ex-Fort Dauphin), located in the extreme south-east of the island, for the export of ilmenite, an iron-titanium oxide used as a base pigment in paint, paper and plastics. After investments of around one billion us Dollars, exports started in 2010. The mine is run by qit Madagascar Minerals (qmm), a joint venture between Rio Tinto and the Malagasy state, who own 80 and 20%, respectively. 289 Ibid./‘Madagascar/Macroeconomic Policy’, pp. 3–4. 290 Unauthorized mining of sapphires started in 1997 in the northern Ankarana nature reserve, causing severe ecological damage. Whereas the Ratsiraka government put a stop to the activities, new discoveries at Ilakaka in 1998 prompted a new influx of diggers, traders and foreign investors.

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Exports of ilmenite are expected to rapidly reach 750,000 tons per year, or as much as 10% of world production.291 The Tôlanaro project was soon followed by the even bigger Ambatovy nickel and cobalt operation east of Antananarivo. It is a joint venture between Sherritt International of Canada (40%), Sumitomo of Japan (27.5%), Korea Resources of South Korea (27.5%) and snc-Lavalin of Canada (5%), who together have invested around 5.5 billion us Dollars. Exports began in November 2012. As in the case of ilmenite, they are forecast to increase quickly, with annual sales of cobalt reaching 5,600 tons and of nickel 60,000 tons. If the plans are met, Madagascar would account for approximately 10% of the world production of cobalt and almost 5% of the output of nickel.292 In May 2010, finally, a Chinese consortium led by the state-owned Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation (WISCO/42%) and including the Guangdong Foreign Trade Group (38%) and the Hong Kong based Kam Hing International (20%) signed a contract of 100 million us Dollars with the Rajoelina government for the rights to explore iron deposits at Soalala close to Mahajanga on the north-western coast.293 The largest of its kind in Madagascar, it is expected to attract investments of a total of 8 billion us Dollars and to create no less than 100,000 jobs. Production should start in 2014. Together with a number of smaller projects to develop reserves of inter alia coal, uranium, gold, bauxite and diamonds, the Tôlanaro, Ambatovy and Soalala mining ventures – located in three different regions of the island – are destined to radically transform the Malagasy economy and society. From a minute gdp share of 0.6% in 2010, the mining sector is in the short- to mediumterm expected to represent as much as 30%.294 Even excluding the possible expansion of oil and gas production, in the light of Madagascar’s history of chronic instability such a scenario is bound to have far-reaching consequences also on political developments. Good management of natural resources is not Madagascar’s forte.295 The World Bank has in a study on the country’s governance emphasized that it is mired in a “natural resource curse,” stressing that 291 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resopurces’, pp. 1–5. 292 Ibid. 293 For the Rajoelina government, the 100 million usd contract with wisco represented around 15% of public expenditure in 2010. In addition to France, the Chinese government thus broke the international isolation of the unconstitutional Rajoelina regime. As noted in the text, so did Canadian, Japanese, South Korean and many other transnational corporations. 294 Bertelsmann Stiftung op. cit., p. 24. 295 Government involvement in the illicit export of rosewood is a case in point.

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tax revenues from the mining sector could “sharply change how revenues are distributed amongst the elites by rewarding highly those who control political  power.” In addition, the bank warned, they could “exacerbate social inequalities.”296 This also applies to the petroleum sector. The existence of oil and gas reserves in Madagascar has since long been confirmed, but the country is considered underexplored and underexploited. In 2012, petroleum products accounted for less than 7% of the export value, or just over half of that of cloves.297 Early explorations in the mid-20th century did not identify any commercially viable deposits. From the late 1990s, however, new exploration licenses were awarded, and by 2006 major transnational oil companies from  France, Canada, the United States, Britain, China, Norway and other countries were involved in both onshore and offshore drilling, focusing on promising reserves of heavy petroleum at Tsimiroro and oil sands at Bemolanga. Geological surveys in Madagascar form part of the ‘East Africa Span’ ­program, which also covers Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Comoros and Seychelles. The large onshore field of Tsimiroro, situated in the western part of the island, is operated by the us-based Malagasy company Madagascar Oil, set up in 2004. In March 2008, it realized the country’s first oil production ever. The potential of the field is significant. According to some estimates it could by 2015 reach a daily production of more than 100,000 barrels over a period of 35–40 years.298 The field of oil sands at Bemolanga, which is located north of  Tsimiroro, is operated by Total of France under a partnership agreement with Madagascar Oil. Although requiring multi-billion investments, it is even more promising, with a potential daily output of some 180,000 barrels over 30 years. Appraisal work was initiated in 2009 and commercial production is planned for 2018. While several companies were drilling for offshore deposits in the Mozambique Channel, onshore natural gas was in 2011 discovered by 296 Quoted in AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p. 4. The World Bank study is entitled ‘Madagascar: Revue de la Gouvernance et de l’Efficacité du Développement’, published in December 2010. As mining only represented a small share of the economy and large scale investments in the sector take years to yield returns, until recently the traditional Malagasy elite has not been overly interested in its potential. 297 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p. 2. 298 ‘Gisement pétrolier de Tsimiroro: Estimé à 1.7 milliards de barils’ in madagascar-tribune. com, 17 September 2011.

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the  Chinese Madagascar Southern Petroleum Company at Sakaraha in the south-western region of Toliara.299 Overall, the Malagasy economy is dominated by agriculture. In 2010, manufacturing only represented slightly more than one tenth of gdp. That said, serious efforts to establish an industrial sector have been made. As part of an export-led growth strategy under the imf/World Bank structural adjustment program, in 1990 an Export Processing Zone, or Zone Franche, was notably created. Inspired by the remarkably successful Mauritian epz model of the 1970s, it was designed to provide incentives for labor-intensive production of consumer goods for the international market. Rules on foreign exchange were relaxed and tax and duty exemptions granted companies which exported at least 95% of their output. In combination with low wages and trade preferences on the us and eu markets, also the Malagasy epz became a success, attracting foreign investors from, in particular, France, Mauritius and SouthEast Asia. Mainly located close to the capital Antananarivo and the port city of Toamasina, by the end of 2004 there were a total of around 180 epz companies in the country.300 As earlier in Mauritius, the Malagasy epz success story – one of the few of its kind in Africa – rested above all on a booming textile industry, which in Madagascar mainly used domestically produced cotton. The industry was heavily reliant on preferential access to both the United States and the European Union markets, extended to Madagascar under the us African Growth and Opportunity Act (agoa) and the Cotonou Agreement between the eu and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states. In 1990, there were only 10 garment producing firms in Madagascar. By 2004, the number had increased to 120, with a total employment of no less than 120,000 workers. It represented almost 10% of the workforce in the country’s formal economy and as much as 30% in the private sector.301 As early as 2001, clothing alone accounted for 90% of total epz production and its share of Madagascar’s exports had grown to around 50%. In that year, Madagascar became the number two clothing exporter in sub-Saharan Africa, behind its Indian Ocean neighbor Mauritius.302 299 ‘Madagascar: Du gaz naturel gicle à Sakaraha’ in lexpress.mu, 8 September 2011. 300 Jean-Pierre Cling, Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud: ‘Export Processing Zones in Madagascar: The Impact of the Dismantling of Clothing Quotas on Employment and Labour Standards’, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, Paris, May 2007, p. 3. 301 Ibid., p. 6 and Anna Andersson: ‘Made in Madagascar: The Impact of Rules of Origin on the Textile and Clothing Industry’, Department of Economics, University of Lund, Lund, 2009, pp. 13–14. 302 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud op. cit., p. 5 and Andersson op. cit., p. 16.

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a goa, the Cotonou Agreement and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement The African Growth and Opportunity Act (agoa) was approved by the us Congress in May 2000. It provides trade preferences for quota and duty-free entry into the United States for a number of African products, notably textile and apparel goods. There is no permanent association to agoa. On the basis of criteria such as political and labor rights and movement towards a marketbased economy, each year the us presidency evaluates the sub-Saharan countries and determines which of them should remain eligible. Madagascar was deemed non-eligible from January 2010. The Cotonou Agreement, on the other hand, is a treaty between the European Union and the acp countries. Replacing the original Lomé Convention of 1975, the Cotonou Agreement was signed in June 2000. Classified by the un as a Least Developed Country (ldc), from 1999 Madagascar benefited from tax-free access to the European market under the treaty’s ‘Everything-but-Arms’ (eba) initiative. Finally, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement – also known as the Multi-Fibre Agreement – was established by the us and the eu in 1974 to limit imports of textiles and clothing from, in particular, Asian low-cost sources of production. This was achieved by awarding specific quotas to different textile-exporting countries. In the process, Madagascar, Mauritius and other non-Asian producers gained an advantage. The mfa regime expired on 1 January 2005.

Over the following years, the Malagasy textile industry was severely hit by adverse domestic and international developments. As a result of the 2002 political crisis, employment plummeted by 60%, “in one fell swoop wiping out the huge progress made in previous years.”303 Exports of clothing were practically halved. Although employment and production bounced back in 2003–04, in 2005 exports once again almost ground to a halt as a consequence of the expiry of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and, thus, the end to Madagascar’s preferential quotas on the us and eu markets. Although the industry continued to show resilience, further recovery was suffocated by the 2009 coup d’état and the subsequent decision by the United States – the principal buyer of Malagasy textiles – to suspend the country from the critically important agoa facility. Exports to the usa fell from a high of more than 300 million us Dollars to less than 45 million in 2010.304 A large number of factories were forced to close, 303 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud op. cit., p. 7. 304 Bastin op. cit., p. 11.

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around 30,000 workers – many of them women – lost their jobs and output from the industry dropped by around 25%.305 Fisheries constitute another potentially important economic sector which remains largely undeveloped and at the same time is exposed to foreign exploitation. With a coastline of around 4,300 kilometers and an eez of 1.2 million km2, the Great Island has sizeable resources for both coastal and deep-sea fishing, activities which, in addition, have been relatively unaffected by the country’s political crises. Through French and Japanese assistance, coastal fishing and aquaculture have expanded considerably. Prawns and other shellfish have become an important source of revenue, accounting for 4.5% of total export earnings in 2011.306 As with other natural resources in Madagascar, also in this regard there are, however, great concerns about sustainability and environmental damage. Deep-sea fishing in the Malagasy eez is almost exclusively carried out by foreign fleets from, in particular, Spain, France and other eu countries, but also from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Russia. Their main sea harvest is tuna. Tuna fishing by European trawlers and purse seiners has since 1986 been regulated under agreements with the eu. From licensed catches of 10,000 tons per year, by 2012 the total eu quota had been raised to 13,300 tons.307 There was, however, no corresponding increase in payments to Madagascar. On the contrary, as the eu access fees during the same period decreased by 20%, the actual total annual income for the country dropped by almost 90%.308 This notwithstanding, in August 2009 – after the coup d’état – Madagascar and the 305 Ibid. and AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p. 2. See also Takahiro Fukunishi: ‘Political Crisis and Suspension of Duty-Free Access in Madagascar: Assessment of Impacts on the Garment Industry’, ide Discussion Paper No. 422, Institute of Developing Economies, Chiba, July 2013. Fukunishi argues that the us decision to suspend Madagascar from the agoa arrangement was more damaging to the textile industry than the 2009 political crisis itself. 306 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p. 3. 307 ‘Comment la pêche européenne lèse Madagascar’ in lexpress.mu, 8 November 2012. Madagascar’s quota for tuna is small compared to that of Seychelles. The fishing protocol between Seychelles and the eu for the six-year period 2014–19 makes provision for annual tuna catches of around 50,000 tons. 308 Ibid. More than half of the eu fish catches originates in non-eu waters. In the case of Madagascar, in 2012 the fee paid by the eu countries per ton of tuna was 130 Euros against a wholesale price of 1,800 Euros, or merely 7%. As a result of eu subsidies, the European private fishing companies only paid 35 of the 130 Euros.

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eu signed a new Economic Partnership Agreement, notably covering the fisheries sector and entering into force in January 2013. Even more exploitative arrangements were made with China, South Korea, Japan and other Asian countries. Illegal fishing in Malagasy waters has become increasingly problematic. According to a study by the University of British Columbia, Canada, half of the total deep-sea catches are not officially registered, causing Madagascar annual losses of several hundred million us Dollars.309 In common with neighboring Comoros and other poor coastal African countries, the Great Island has extremely limited capacities to monitor, patrol or police its vast maritime assets. With a woefully inadequate navy, in 2011 it only had six smaller patrol boats with a total force of around 350 coastguards to act against the poaching.310 In the meantime, Madagascar relies on security cooperation with India. Since 2006, the Indian navy regularly patrols the Mozambique Channel, and in July 2007 the government in New Delhi established India’s first listening post on foreign soil in northern Madagascar.311 International tourism, finally, has a great potential. With its unique geological formations, fauna and flora, the ‘Eighth Continent’ attracts, in particular, eco-tourists, but due to its pristine beaches and crystal waters it is also an important Indian Ocean leisure destination. The island of Nosy Be in north-western Madagascar is particularly popular among visitors from France and Italy.312 Traditionally, French citizens account for about two thirds of international arrivals, but many are Malagasy emigrants to France or residents of the French departments of Mayotte and Reunion.313 As in the other African Indian Ocean countries, the number of visitors from Russia and China is on the increase. 309 Ibid. and ‘Madagascar: Lutter contre la pêche illégale par satellite’ in malango-actualité.fr, 20 June 2011. Also ‘The eu underpays Madagascar for access to fish: ubc research’, University of British Columbia, Media release, 3 July 2012, publicaffairs.ubc.ca. 310 ‘Madagascar: Lutter contre la pêche illégale par satellite’ in malango-actualité.fr, 20 June 2011. 311 Vines op. cit., pp. 194–95. Under bilateral defense agreements, since 2003 the Indian navy also patrols the vast exclusive economic zones of Mauritius and Seychelles, east and north of Madagascar. 312 In October 2013, a gruesome attack on visiting tourists took place in Nosy Be. Accused by the local population of child trafficking, mutilation and organ sale, a Frenchman and a Malagasy citizen were publicly burnt alive on one of the popular beaches. The event had an immediate effect on Madagascar as a holiday destination. 313 In 2010, no less than 11% of all international tourists were French citizens from Reunion (‘Madagascar tourisme: Hausse de 16% en 2011’ in lexpress.mu, 17 November 2011). As an independent African country, Madagascar is in the unique position of having two French

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Contrary to fisheries, the tourism industry has been severely affected by the domestic political crises, above all the turmoil in 2009. Madagascar received 160,000 foreign visitors in 2000. In that year, tourism receipts amounted to 116 million us Dollars, making the industry the country’s second most important source of foreign currency earnings. After a marked drop in arrivals in 2002, there was a steady recovery under the Ravalomanana presidency. In 2008, the number grew to a record 375,000, but due to the subsequent political crisis it fell by over a half in 2009, only reaching a total of 163,000.314 Benefiting from the Indian Ocean countries’ promotion of the ‘Vanilla Islands’,315 the tourism sector has since registered a small revival. In 2010, the number of international visitors grew to 196,000 and according to preliminary figures it was almost 260,000 in 2012.316 In comparison with, above all, Mauritius and Seychelles, Madagascar, however, is lagging behind when it comes to international flight connections, general infrastructure and the standards of accommodation and services.

Socio-Economic Meltdown

In spite of comparative advantages at the time of independence and considerable natural resources, the Great Island of Madagascar has become one of the poorest countries in the world and the most impoverished among the African Indian Ocean island states. All international indicators show that the country has fallen behind and that it continues to do so. The extreme national poverty rate of 76.5% and the low per capita gdp of 427 us Dollars in 2010 have been mentioned. With regard to the composite Human Development Index, established by the un Development Program and measuring life expectancy, departments as its closest neighbors. Furthermore, both Mayotte and Reunion have significant populations of Malagasy descent. In Mayotte, several villages are dominated by Malagasy-speakers. 314 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p. 2. 315 The number of international tourists visiting Madagascar is considerably lower than that for Mauritius and Reunion, but higher than the number going to Seychelles. In 2011, more than 900,000 visited Mauritius and some 470,000 Reunion. In that year, Seychelles registered a number just below 200,000. In relation to the respective national populations, however, Seychelles is by far the number one African Indian Ocean destination, followed by Mauritius and Reunion and with Madagascar way behind. 316 ‘Pour promouvoir la destination Madagascar et les îles vanilles’ in madagascar-tribune. com, 16 May 2013.

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education and incomes, in 2012 Madagascar was placed in the category of countries with ‘low human development’. With an index of 0.483, it was ranked as 151 out of 186 nations in the world.317 In terms of overall governance, in the same year the Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranked the country in 35th place in Africa, down from 9th in 2000.318 Similarly, on the ease of doing business, in 2012 the World Bank ranked Madagascar 142nd out of 185 nations,319 while Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index with a score of 32 at the same time placed it as number 118.320 Madagascar’s stagnation has been particularly pronounced during the Rajoelina presidency, with serious social consequences as a result. In 2010, Madagascar had the dubious distinction of being the only African country with a stalling economy. Between 2000 and 2013, it plummeted through the iiag rankings, with regard to governance losing no less than 28 places and in respect of participation a staggering 43 positions among the 52 African countries assessed. In the case of social protection, the fall in the rankings was from 27th to 45th position.321 The negative trend accelerated from 2009. It is in this light not surprising that the African Development Bank, oecd, undp and the un Economic Commission for Africa in their 2013 African Economic Outlook concluded that “[t]he protracted political tension [in the country] has undermined the achievement of the [United Nations] Millennium Development Goals.”322 317 undp: Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, New York, 2013, p. 146. In 2012, the hdi for Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros was, respectively, 0.806, 0.737 and 0.429. With 0.955, Norway had the highest hdi in the world. 318 Mo Ibrahim Foundation: 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Summary, London, 2012, p. 3. In 2012, Mauritius was placed 1st, Seychelles 4th and Comoros 31st. 319 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ibrd)/The World Bank: Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Washington, 2013, p. 3. In 2012, Mauritius was placed as number 1 in Africa and 19th in the world. Seychelles was 74th and Comoros 158th. Singapore was leading the ranking. 320 Transparency International (ti): Corruption Perception Index 2012, Berlin, 2012, pp. 4–5. In 2012, Botswana was the least corrupt country in Africa, with a world ranking in 30th place. Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros occupied the positions as number 43, 51 and 133. Denmark was the country least affected by corruption. 321 Mo Ibrahim Foundation: ‘Madagascar’, London, October 2013 and ‘La gouvernance à Madagascar connaît la regression la plus importante du continent africain’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 16 October 2013. 322 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Madagascar/Overview’, p. 2. With regard to education, Madagascar has made significant efforts to reduce gender disparities. In 2010, the proportions of girls in primary and secondary school enrolment were 49.2% and 48.9%, respectively. In higher education, it was 47.2%. At the same time, women were clearly

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According to the World Bank, “[p]reliminary estimates suggest that, from 2008 to 2013, the proportion of the population living under the poverty line […] may have increased by more than 10 percentage points.”323 As earlier noted, indigence is higher in the rural than in the urban areas, but it has increased considerably also in the capital, the country’s major economic center. In 2011, a unicef study on vulnerability in Antananarivo found that one household out of three survived on less than half a us Dollar per day.324 As international aid was drying up after the 2009 coup d’état, significant consecutive cuts were made in respect of education and health.325 The education budget was reduced by 19% in 2010 and another 8% in 2011, whereas the government allocations to the health sector were slashed by no less than 43 and 14%, respectively.326 As a consequence, many primary schools and health care centers were forced to close. Trying to measure the impact of the crisis, in mid-2013 the World Bank estimated that the number of out-of-school children in Madagascar had grown by possibly more than 600,000. At the same time, it noted that acute child malnutrition in some areas had increased by over 50%.327 Moreover, mainly due to adverse weather conditions and locust invasions, the critically important rice harvest fell by 21% in 2013, seriously threatening under-represented in national public institutions and local administrations. According to the undp, the reasons were “the patriarchal nature of [Malagasy] society, […] discriminatory and stereotypical gender practices and […] the persistence of poverty” (Quoted in ibid./‘Madagascar/Social Context and Human Development’, p. 2). In 2012, Madagascar was ranked 58th among 135 countries in the world on the Global Gender Gap Index (gggi) established by the World Economic Forum. Iceland was ranked number 1. In 15th place overall, Lesotho was the highest ranked African country (World Economic Forum (wef): The Global Gender Gap Report 2012, Geneva, 2012, pp. 8–9). 323 The World Bank: ‘Measuring the Impact’ op. cit., p. 1. In October 2013, the resident World Bank representative in Antananarivo estimated that 92% of the Malagasy population survived on less than 2 us Dollars per day (‘Madagascar: Pas de reprise économique sans resolution de la crise politique’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 23 October 2013). 324 Richard R. Marcus: ‘Madagascar’ in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven (eds): Africa Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2011, Vol. 8, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2012, p. 472. 325 Significantly, the defense allocations were not exposed to similar cuts. 326 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca: ‘Madagascar 2012’, p. 16. 327 The World Bank: ‘Measuring the Impact’ op. cit, p. 1. In November 2010, unicef reported that 6.7 million Malagasy children did not have direct access to drinking water; that 6 million had stunned growth due to malnutrition; and that more than 25% of the children under 5 years of age suffered from severe chronic undernourishment (‘L’unicef publie des chiffres alarmants’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 26 November 2010).

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an estimated 9.6 million people – almost half of the national population – with starvation and prompting the un Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme to issue an appeal for emergency assistance.328 In addition to the looming food disaster, as a result of the breakdown of the health services in October 2013 the Swiss-based International Committee of the Red Cross and the Pasteur Institute issued a warning of a possible bubonic plague epidemic.329

Military and Politics

Most observers agree that Madagascar’s military play a critical role for a return to a lasting constitutional order. Since President Tsiranana’s resignation in 1972, the armed forces have been at the forefront of political and economic affairs. Except for Zafy’s short presidency (1993–96), between 1972 and 2002 they held political power for three decades. As noted by General Mijoro, as president even the former entrepreneur Ravalomanana “preferred to move with the military, rather than with the politicians.”330 Similarly, from the outset  Rajoelina relied heavily on the armed forces. Although independent Madagascar has not experienced civil war or large-scale military violence, it remains that the armed forces at every turn of its checkered history have been drawn into the void left by an ineffective political system. At independence in 1960, Madagascar inherited the French tripartite system of army, gendarmerie and police. According to the cooperation agreements signed as a condition for independence, France continued to guarantee the Great Island’s defense. From the beginning, the country’s own armed forces were neither designed nor equipped to defend the territory against external threats. Nevertheless, a rapidly growing officers’ corps – which at independence merely consisted of ten members; all of whom had previously been active in the French forces – became increasingly involved in the management of the state. The development culminated in 1972, when Tsiranana transferred political power to the armed forces. They, in turn, proceeded to nationalize the main economic assets, under Ratsiraka setting up a National Military Office for 328 ‘Insécurité alimentaire’ in madagascar-tribune.com, 10 October 2013. 329 ‘Madagascar bubonic plague warning’ in bbc News Africa, 10 October 2013. In 2012, there were 256 plague cases leading to 60 deaths in Madagascar, the highest recorded numbers in the world. 330 Mijoro op. cit., p. 129.

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Strategic Industries. In the process, high-ranking officers became not only responsible for the governance of the country, but also for a significant portion of its economy. From then onwards, they were to form an integral part of  Madagascar’s political and economic elite. As noted by Jütersonke and Kartas in a study aptly entitled Ethos of Exploitation, “the main rationale for a career in the military or gendarmerie [was] the pursuit of personal gain.”331 As it is not geared to militarily defend the country, Madagascar’s armed apparatus is small and obsolete, mainly equipped with old armaments obtained from the former Soviet Union, including some MiG-21 fighter aircraft. No major investments in arms or infrastructural upgrading have been made since the 1980s. In 2011, there were around 12,500 troops in the army, 8,000 in the paramilitary gendarmerie and 500 each in the navy and the air force.332 While the latter two are more imagined than real,333 it is the army and the gendarmerie that play a prominent role. With an expression borrowed from French military history, they are on account of their claimed impartiality known as la grande muette, or ‘the great silent one’.

Piracy off Madagascar As Madagascar is a huge, strategically located island with a long coastline and an extensive eez, the absence of a modern navy is both remarkable and a major handicap. To the problem of illegal fishing in Malagasy waters should be added the security threat represented by Somali pirates. Extending their operations southwards, in October 2010 the pirates made an appearance close to Madagascar when two Taiwanese fishing boats were captured in separate attacks and subsequently turned into mother-ships. In December 2010, a Mozambican fishing boat was captured in the northern Mozambique Channel, south-west of Comoros. Three months later, the surviving fishermen were

331 Oliver Jütersonke and Moncef Kartas: ‘Ethos of Exploitation: Insecurity and Predation in Madagascar’ in Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva: Small Arms Survey 2011, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 168. 332 Although the French forces stationed in Reunion and Mayotte are smaller, with regard to military capability they are incomparably stronger. As with the other African Indian Ocean states, France cooperates with Madagascar in the military field. In February 2013, for example, joint exercises were carried out by the Malagasy armed forces and fazsoi (French armed forces in the southern zone of the Indian Ocean). 333 Without a modern navy, it is ironic that the young frigate captain Didier Ratsiraka as head of state appointed himself admiral.

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rescued in an operation carried out by the Indian navy in the Arabian Sea. In January 2011, a failed attack was carried out north of Nosy Be, Madagascar, on the British-flagged luxury cruiser Spirit of Adventure with 350 passengers on board. The most spectacular incident involved the Comorian cargo vessel Aly Zoulfecar, which in early November 2010 was hijacked on route from Moroni, Comoros, to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Four months later, the engines broke down and the pirates were forced to look for help in Antsiranana at the northern tip of Madagascar. In cooperation with military from Comoros and Tanzania, the Malagasy authorities managed to take over the pirated vessel in late February 2011. In total, 14 Somali pirates were arrested. In the absence of a naval force, the operation was carried out by the Malagasy Ministry of Transport, which for the purpose rented a civilian vessel that ferried the soldiers and gendarmes responsible for the assault.

What makes the Malagasy armed forces stand out in an international perspective is not their striking force or defense capability, but the princely public funding received, as well as the abundance of higher officers. Despite the facts that Madagascar does not face an external threat; that the troop contingent is small and underpaid; and that there has not been any expensive arms procurement programs, government expenditure on defense regularly amounts to an astounding 5% of gdp. In 2011, the share was 5.1%, placing Madagascar on a par with countries at war or located in conflict zones.334 According to Mijoro – himself a retired general – the Great Island has “the most emblazoned army in the world,” with a number of high-ranking officers that bears “no relation whatsoever” to the soldiers on the ground.335 In 2003, there were no less than 200 generals,336 a hugely inflated amount by any comparison. Since then, the total number has grown further.337 With considerable stakes in the preservation of the existing order, in times of extra-parliamentary political contestation the armed forces have initially 334 us Central Intelligence Agency (cia): The World Factbook: ‘Country Comparison: Military Expenditures’, Washington, 2012, p. 1. Under President Ravalomanana, the share was equally high. In 2007, defense expenditure corresponded to 5.2% of gdp (eiu op. cit., p. 11). As comparisons, the gdp shares of Israel and Sudan were 7.4% and 4.2%, respectively. 335 Mijoro op. cit., p. 71. 336 Ibid., p. 141. 337 New generals are continuously appointed. In December 2010, for example, no less than 29 officers were promoted to the rank of general (Jütersonke and Kartas in ‘Small Arms’ op. cit., p. 188).

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remained in the background. Before the crisis spirals out of control and after striking a deal as an institution, they have, however, intervened as negotiators and, eventually, as arbitrators, but never with outright military force. Rather than alleged impartiality and professionalism, it is, paradoxically, the political and economic involvement that explains the stance taken by the military in independent Madagascar. Although it has saved the country from large-scale violence, it remains that the expensive, top-heavy and essentially redundant institution poses a significant structural challenge.338

Rural violence Many rural areas are severely affected by a low-scale war between the gendarmerie – the branch of the armed forces tasked with domestic law and order – and cattle rustlers, known in Malagasy as dahalo. Armed dahalo raids are a daily occurrence in many parts of the country, but most common in southern and western Madagascar. They are often associated with murder, rape and damage to property. Without civilian oversight and battling fire with fire, the gendarmes have been ruthless in their attempt to contain the rustling. Entire villages have been attacked and many innocent people killed. Huge parts of the country have been turned into no-go zones rouges (‘red zones’). By 2012, they covered as much as a third of the island. In October 2013, it was estimated that 650 dahalo bandits had been killed in that year alone, with an unknown number of dead villagers and gendarmes. In Madagascar and abroad, the violent developments have provoked strong reactions. In late 2012, Amnesty International accused the Malagasy security forces of “blind violent acts,” quoting examples where villages had been burnt down and calling for restraint in the war on the dahalo.

338 In addition, there is in Madagascar “a dizzying array of special units geared towards muscular interventions” (ibid., p. 181). As noted in the text, in periods of crisis it has been the presidential guards and similar forces – not the regular army – that has been involved in the killings of political demonstrators. After the events of 2009, President Rajoelina set up the Special Intervention Forces (Forces d’Intervention Spéciales/fis), which became prominent in the capital and were perceived as his private security arm.

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Comoros: Legacies of Monsoon Trade and Un-Finished Independence

French Shadows

The Comorian archipelago has historically served as a human bridge between mainland Africa and Madagascar, as well as an important hub in the commercial and religious networks of the western Indian Ocean, connecting the region with the Arab world. The heyday of the dramatically scenic islands was from the 16th to the late 18th centuries, when the slave trade – initially to the Middle East and later to the Mascarenes – provided the ruling elites with huge profits and Comoros emerged as a prominent center of Islamic learning. Colonized by France and as dependencies attached to Madagascar, in the 20th century the former sultanates were relegated to the periphery. At the same time, the dominance of Islam and the links with the Arab world continued. Today, the Union of the Comoros (Udzima wa Komori) is the only Muslim country in the African part of the Indian Ocean and Mayotte is unique in being a French department with a majority population of the Islamic faith. Comoros, in addition, is the only state to be a member of the African Union, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the Arab League,1 the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Indian Ocean Commission.2 Arabic, finally, is one of the three official languages. Isolated, poor and disjointed, from its independence in 1975 Comoros has experienced more than twenty successful and attempted coups d’états, de facto mercenary rule, separatism and the breakaway of Mayotte. The first ever peaceful, constitutional transfer of power took place in 2006. Already the following year, yet another separatist crisis prompted a military intervention by the au. Whereas both intra- and inter-island rivalries have been prominent throughout history – leading to the expression ‘the archipelago of the battling sultans’3 – directly and

1 The Union of Comoros is the southernmost member of the Arab League, being the only country entirely located in the southern hemisphere. 2 Comoros, however, is not a member of the Southern African Development Community (sadc). 3 In French, ‘l’archipel des sultans batailleurs’.

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Map 6  Comoros

indirectly it is, nevertheless, French colonial policies and contemporary geopolitical designs that have determined the course of the small island nation. This applies, above all, to the case of Mayotte, which is discussed in a separate chapter. In general, however, there can hardly be any meaningful appreciation of the challenges facing Comoros in isolation from the shadows cast by France. Together with its giant eastern neighbor, the Union of Comoros is one of the poorest countries on earth, mainly surviving on remittances by the emigrant diaspora and grants by the Arab Gulf countries. In contrast to Madagascar, it has no mineral resources, no modern infrastructure and no industrial base. Although Comoros is located at the northern entrance of the ‘western petroleum highway’ through the Mozambique Channel, every year several thousand international supertankers and container ships pass by without any tangible benefits accruing to the country. Similarly, within sight and at a low cost European and Asian trawlers and purse seiners ply the ocean for tuna and other oceanic fish beyond the reach of the Comorian artisanal fishermen. Barring the windfall of oil or gas discoveries, the economic outlook for the culturally rich, but politically unstable Indian Ocean nation remains bleak. Meanwhile, the lack of perspectives and planning stand out. In a candid assessment of the economy, the African Development Bank, the oecd, the undp

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and the un Economic Commission for Africa concluded in 2013 that “[w]ithout a strategic vision [Comoros] will be unable to [undertake] the […] modernization needed to boost growth and create jobs.”4

Volcanic Islands

Known by the Arabs as the ‘Islands of the Moon’,5 Grande Comore (Ngazidja in Shikomore), Mohéli (Mwali), Anjouan (Ndzuani, Ndzuwani or Nzwani) and Mayotte (Maore) are located at the northern end of the Mozambique Channel, more or less equidistant from mainland Africa and Madagascar.6 Grande Comore, the most westerly island, lies around 330 kilometers east of Pemba in Mozambique. The distance from Mayotte to Mahajanga in Madagascar is about 350 kilometers. As the crow flies, some 250 kilometers separate the capital Moroni on Grande Comore from Mamoudzou, the main urban center on Mayotte. Mohéli lies approximately 50 kilometers south of Grande Comore and Anjouan 85 kilometers in a south-easterly direction. Finally, the distance across the ocean from Anjouan to Mayotte – due to the tragedies of migration characterized as ‘the biggest marine graveyard in the world’7 – is 70 kilometers. 4 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Comoros/Thematic Analysis: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’, p. 2. With regard to economic planning, the report concludes that “[t]he [Comorian] planning commission (Commissariat Général au Plan) does not currently have the means to carry out th[e] mission for which it is responsible” (ibid.). There is, in general, a serious dearth of reliable statistical data on Comoros. In the late 1970s, the state archives were partly destroyed, first by Soilihi’s followers and later by Denard’s mercenaries. Repeated political crises have subsequently interrupted data collection and survey works. 5 From al-Qamar, ‘the moon’ in Arabic. Originally covering (northern) Madagascar too, there are various explanations for the designation. Focusing on the art of seafaring, the most likely is the use of the moon as a navigational guide. There is also a Koranic theory, referring to the 54th sura (chapter), known as Surat al-Qamar. It foreshadows the Day of Judgment, which will separate believers from disbelievers, or those going to Paradise from those destined to Hell. The Arab sailors did not know that the world was round and did not dare to venture far beyond the islands collectively called al-Qamar for fear of dropping off the terrestrial surface. At the Comorian islands, they reached a point where the monsoon ended. The designation al-Qamar, thus, was a warning. It could be noted that the Arabs never sailed beyond Madagascar and that no indications of Arab visitors have been found along the South African coast. 6 The French names are widely used and have been retained in this text. 7 In 2012, a report by the French Senate estimated that since 1995 a staggering number of between 7,000 and 10,000 people had died while attempting to reach Mayotte from Anjouan.

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Considerable stretches of open sea thus separate the Comorian islands. In addition to their local natural conditions, historically the distances have contributed to social, linguistic and cultural variations. The inter-island connections also remain rudimentary. Regular ferry services ground to a halt in 2005.8 Although too costly for the great majority of Comorians, air travel is as a result the most common means of inter-island communication. Due to the weak transport system, the African Development Bank noted in 2011 that “the principle of territorial continuity […] among the three islands is […] inoperative,” highlighting that “[t]he Comoros faces double insularity, internal and external.”9 Like the Mascarenes to the east of Madagascar (Reunion, Mauritius and Rodrigues), the Comorian archipelago is of volcanic origin, Mayotte being the oldest and most eroded of the four islands. Grande Comore is the youngest. It is dominated by the massive and still active Karthala volcano, which rises to no less than 2,361 meters above sea level.10 Situated on the western shore, Moroni climbs the slope of the volcano. At the summit, Karthala has formed one of the largest calderas in the world, with a diameter of about four kilometers. The volcano is notoriously active. Major eruptions took place in 1977 and 1991. After a period of quiet, in 2005 it erupted again, causing the evacuation of some 40,000 people. With the smaller, inactive La Grille, Karthala dominates every aspect of Grande Comore. There is a narrow coastal plain on the western side of the island, but the main features of the landscape are lava flows and volcanic soils. Not surprisingly, together with the rare coelacanth Karthala has become emblematic of Comoros.11 8

9 10 11

Fatouma Nassor Halifa: Le Séparatisme aux Comores: Enjeux Géopolitiques, Éditions Coelacanthe, Moissy-Cramayel, 2009, p. 22. In the absence of regular, seaworthy inter-island ferries, Comoros is often the scene of major disasters. In addition to the kwassa-kwassa deaths between Anjouan and Mayotte, in 1996, 2006 and 2011 scores of people drowned when faulty and overloaded vessels capsized in Comorian waters. In May 2013, it was announced that the Tanzania-based shipping company ‘Sea Star Services’ would re-launch regular interisland connections with modern passenger boats (‘Transport maritime: La sécurité est renforcée avec les deux bateaux de Sea Star Service’ in alwatwan.net, 21 May 2013). African Development Bank: ‘Union of the Comoros: Country Strategy Paper, 2011–2015’, Tunis, November 2011, p. 10. The equally active Piton de la Fournaise in Reunion reaches 2,631 meters above sea level. Living at considerable depths, the coelacanth is more closely related to reptiles and mammals than to the common ray-finned fish. A ‘missing link’ in the evolutionary chain, it is one of the most endangered animal species in the world. Believed extinct for 65 million years, in 1938 a coelacanth was caught off East London in South Africa. Since 1952, several have been found in Comorian waters, where it also was filmed in 1987. The national football team of Comoros is known as ‘The Coelacanths’.

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The Comorian islands are small, together merely representing a land area of 2,018 square kilometers, or less than that of Reunion or Mauritius.12 Excluding Mayotte, the area is 1,644 km2.13 Grande Comore is by far the biggest, with an extension of 1,019 km2. It roughly represents two thirds of the combined land surface. The area of Anjouan is 421 km2 and that of Mohéli only 204 km2. Between the islands, there are variations. Whereas Grande Comore due to its younger and less eroded volcanic formation lacks running water, Mohéli is well supplied and Anjouan has perennial streams. Approximately 72% of the population live in the rural areas and are dependent on subsistence farming of cassava, coconut and banana, as well as on artisanal fishing in the coastal villages. Small scale farmers also supply processing and marketing enterprises with vanilla, ylang-ylang, cloves and copra. Although varying across the islands, the incidence of poverty is markedly higher on Anjouan and, in general, in the rural areas, where electricity, plumbing and sanitation are virtually nonexistent. In 2004 – the latest year for which data is available – a comprehensive household survey found that 44.8% of the Comorian population lived below the national poverty line.14 In the absence of a proper census, in 2011 the total population was estimated at 754,000.15 The density and demographic pressures are high, in particular since a large proportion of the land is unsuitable for agricultural production. In the same year, the statistical figure was 460 inhabitants per square kilometer, but on the coastal plains the concentration was considerably higher. In combination with political unrest and widespread poverty, as a result tens of thousands of Comorians have left the islands, mainly for France, but also for Madagascar, Reunion, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya. In 2004, a World Bank study estimated that between 20 and 25% of the Comorians lived abroad, with up to 150,000 in France.16 In 2013, over 80,000 – considerably more than in

12 13

The respective land areas of Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles are 2,512, 1,860 and 457 km2. Detailed land surveys of the Comorian islands were carried out from 2010 to 2013 by the Bristol Conservation and Science Foundation (bcsf) in partnership with Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust. See bcsf and Durrell: ‘Land Cover Mapping of the Comoros Islands: Methods and Results’ (Lead author: Katie Green), Bristol Conservation and Science Foundation, [Bristol], February 2014. 14 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Comoros/Social Context and Human Devel­ opment’, p. 1. 15 un Data: ‘Country Profile Comoros’, data.un.org, p. 2. 16 Vincent da Cruz, Wolfgang Fengler and Adam Schwartzman: ‘Remittances to Comoros: Volume, Trends, Impact and Implications’, Africa Region Working Paper Series, No. 75, The World Bank, Washington, October 2004.

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the capital Moroni – were residents in the area of Marseille.17 Regularly, the remittances from the diaspora amount to between one fifth and one fourth of the gdp of Comoros, by far surpassing the amounts received as foreign direct investments and overseas development assistance.18 About half of the population lives on Grande Comore, where Moroni, the national capital, in 2011 had an estimated 54,000 inhabitants.19 It is the seat of the union government, parliament, parastatal companies, foreign representations and international organizations. Located at the foot of the Karthala volcano, Moroni has a small, but inadequate harbor, which is dominated by the 15th century Badjanani Friday mosque. The international airport of Comoros – the country’s main contact with the outside world – is situated north of the capital.20 Anjouan – the most densely populated and poverty-stricken of the Comorian islands – has around 40% of the national population. The principal urban center is the old town of Mutsamudu, which in 2011 had an estimated population of 30,000. Having the country’s only deep-water port and the largest container terminal, Mutsamudu (and thereby Anjouan) plays a critical role in the economy of Comoros, servicing the entire archipelago and maintaining a sea-link with Mayotte. The inhabitants on the small island of Mohéli, finally, represent slightly more than 5% of the national population. With around 20,000 residents, the island capital of Fomboni is, however, the country’s third largest urban center. Due to the non-recognized breakaway of Mayotte and chronic instability, for decades the independent island nation was seriously handicapped by the absence of properly demarcated maritime boundaries.21 In accordance with 17 18 19 20

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‘Comores-Marseille: Elisabeth Saïd vit sa double culture’ in comores-actualites.com, 11 June 2013. da Cruz, Fengler and Schwartzman op. cit. un Data op. cit., p. 2. The population of Moroni equals that of Mamoudzou, the main urban center of Mayotte. In 2013, there were no direct flights to Europe or any other major international destination. Instead, Moroni was inter alia linked to Nairobi (Kenya), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Antananarivo (Madagascar) and Saint-Denis (Reunion). In recent years, Grande Comore has experienced some of the worst international aviation catastrophes. In 1996, a hijacked Ethiopian Airlines plane crashed into the ocean at the northern end of the island, leaving more than 100 people dead. In 2009, a Yemenia flight approaching Moroni similarly plunged into the ocean, killing all but one of the 153 passengers, mostly Comorian residents in France. The paradox of being an island state without a defined sea border is discussed by the former Comorian foreign minister (1999–2005) Souf Mohamed El-Amine in Les Comores en Mouvement, Les Éditions De La Lune, Levallois-Perret, 2008, pp. 13–17.

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the 1982 un Convention on the Law of the Sea and as part of the au Border Programme, in 2011–12 the anomaly was rectified. After years of preparations and with expert assistance from Germany, in December 2011 the Union of Comoros, Mozambique and Tanzania concluded a series of agreements on the delimitation of their respective borders in the Mozambique Channel.22 Similar tripartite agreements were in February 2012 signed with Tanzania and Seychelles on the demarcation of the northern maritime boundaries.23 Following condemnations by the un General Assembly and the au regarding the French occupation of Mayotte, the agreements do not recognize France’s sovereignty over the maritime areas concerned.24

au Border Programme Since the founding of the oau in 1963, the pan-African organization has been seized with border issues. The oau Charter enshrined the principle of respecting the borders existing on achievement of national independence. Forty years later, it was estimated that less than a quarter of the continent’s borders had been demarcated. Against this background, in 2007 the au adopted a program to carry out an inventory – inclusive of maritime boundaries – and assist member states in initiating delimitation exercises. The overall objective is to “promote peace, security and stability through the structural prevention of conflicts” (au: ‘Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation Modalities as Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues’, Addis Ababa, 7 June 2007).

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‘Frontières maritimes entre les Comores, Mozambique et la Tanzanie: Un revers à la départementalisation decidée unilatéralement par la France de l’île comorienne de Mayotte’ in alwatwan.net, 7 December 2011. ‘Les Comores, les Seychelles et la Tanzanie: Accords sur la delimitation des frontières maritimes’ in alwatwan.net, 22 February 2012. In addition to the issue of Mayotte, it should be noted that Comoros – as well as Madagascar – lay claim to the two coral Glorioso Islands. Situated north-east of the Comorian archipelago, they form part of the French Scattered Islands. The bigger of the two has a land area of merely 5 km2, but the Glorioso eez is no less than 48,300 km2. France maintains a small military presence on the islands, with soldiers from the Foreign Legion base in Mayotte.

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At the signing ceremony in Maputo, Mozambique, in December 2011, the Comorian President Ikililou Dhoinine emphasized that “if need be, [these agreements] confirm the unity of my country, which is composed of the four islands of Mayotte, Anjouan, Mohéli and Grande Comore.”25 As in the case of Madagascar, with an exclusive economic zone of 163,500 km2 the Union of Comoros, however, does not have the capacity to secure its formal possession or monitor the large ocean expanse. A decision to establish a small coast guard was only taken in April 2010. It is not expected to be fully operational until 2014.26

Out of Africa and Arabia

In the main, the Comorians are descendants of Africans and Arabs. The first settlers were Bantu-speakers and Austronesians, who from the 7th century ad – before or at about the same time as in northern Madagascar – crossed paths and mixed on the islands.27 Whereas the Malagasy influence is still present in Mayotte28 – and influential Sakalava in the beginning of the 19th century settled there, as well as Merina leaders in Mohéli29 – it is, however, Arab immigrants and 25 26

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‘Frontières maritimes entre les Comores, Mozambique et la Tanzanie’ in alwatwan.net, 7 December 2011. ‘L’unité comorienne des garde-côtes: Une structure en gestation’ in alwatwan.net, 15 January 2013. Against a background of piracy threats in the Mozambique Channel, several countries contribute towards the setting up of a Comorian coast guard. Small naval vessels have been donated by the United States, China and Turkey. In addition, training and technical assistance are extended by France and Morocco. In early November 2010, the Comorian cargo vessel Aly Zoulfecar was captured by Somali pirates on route from Moroni to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The crew and passengers were only rescued four months later, when the pirated vessel was re-taken at Antsiranana in northern Madagascar. According to the theory of an indirect crossing by the Austronesians to Madagascar, they would have reached the Great Island via Comoros. From around 650 ad, Africans on the Mozambican coast entered into contact with the Indian Ocean trading system (Paul Sinclair and N. Thomas Håkansson: ‘The Swahili City-State Culture’ in Mogens Hansen (ed): A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, Copenhagen, 2000, pp. 463–82). Michael Pearson: The Indian Ocean, Routledge, Milton Park, 2003, p. 259. Old and new contacts with Madagascar are common in Mayotte. The Malagasy dialects of Kibushi, Kiantalautsi and Kisakalava dominate in several villages on the island. The Sakalava raids and the resulting turmoil in Comoros in the early 19th century led to realignments and new alliances. In 1828, Sultan Abdullah of Anjouan invited the Merina general Ramanataka to help him conquer Mohéli. After the conquest, Ramanataka and some 200 of his followers settled on the island, where they established a Merina chieftaincy.

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African slaves who more than others have contributed to the Comorian population profile, in particular on the main islands of Grande Comore and Anjouan. Without an African hinterland, the islands of Comoros are markedly Arab in character. Arab sailors visited the archipelago in pre-Islamic times and by the 12th century it had been integrated into the Swahili mercantile network along the East African coast, with merchants and men of religion coming from the Persian Gulf, South Arabia and the Red Sea.30 Over the following centuries, the expansion of the Swahili world towards Comoros (and north-western Madagascar) advanced. In the process, a number of prestigious Muslim clans moved to the islands. Comoros was notably connected to the leading Swahili city state of Kilwa on the southern coast of present-day Tanzania. Shirazi from the sultanate were among the first to settle there.31 In Comoros, they are associated with the establishment of ‘stone towns’ and the building of mosques. As on Lamu, Zanzibar, Kilwa and other Swahili islands along the East African coast, the Shirazi organized themselves into local sultanates, but did not seek to bring the archipelago under a common sovereignty. As a result, the Comorian islands housed several sultanates, often within close vicinity. On Grande Comore, the rival sultanates of Bambao and Itsandra on the west coast adjoined one another. At one stage, there were no less than twelve sultanates on Grande Comore. They all had a highly hierarchical social organization, with a small Arab merchant, landowning and religious elite ruling over indigenous farming communities and a population of slaves, mainly brought from Mozambique, but also from Madagascar. The Arab character was strengthened when a series of migrations from Hadramaut in what is today Yemen from the latter half of the 13th century spread to the East African Swahili world and subsequently reached Comoros. As in other parts along the Indian Ocean rim,32 the Hadrami would play eminent

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Following his defeat in Madagascar by Radama I, the Islamized Sakalava Andriantsoli withdrew to Mayotte, where he took over the sultanate. In 1841, he sold the island to France. The Comorian islands abound in legends about early contacts with the Arab world. At Ntsaoueni in north-western Grande Comore, for example, there is an old mosque dedicated to the memory of Mtswamwindza (565–672), who is celebrated as “the first pilgrim in history.” (The Prophet Muhammad died in 632). The settlement of the Shirazi may extend back to the 13th century, although most of them probably moved to Comoros after the sack of Kilwa by the Portuguese in 1505. The Hadrami have a long seafaring and trading tradition, which has seen them migrating all around the Indian Ocean, from East Africa to South East Asia. Walker observes that they “are genuinely proud of their diaspora and will […] tell you of their cousins in Zanzibar or Jakarta” (Iain Walker: ‘Comorians and Hadramis in the Western Indian Ocean: Diasporic Practices in a Comparative Context’ in Social Dynamics, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 2012, p. 448. On the Hadrami, see also Sheriff op. cit., pp. 264–72). Many Hadrami politicians,

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commercial and political roles. Above all, they provided intellectual and religious leadership, permanently establishing Sunni Islam of the Shafi’i school – whose center of learning is in Tarim, Hadramaut – on the Comorian islands. Through the Hadrami, Comoros became closely linked to Zanzibar and the Arabian Peninsula.33 Later migrations expanded the number of Hadrami preachers, teachers and judges, in the process according Comoros a prominent position as a center of Islamic learning. Of particular significance is that many Comorian Hadrami are sharifu, or seen as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Although the Comorian sultanates were based on servile labor and the Arab ruling elites for centuries acted as clearing agents for the slave trade – initially to Zanzibar and the Middle East and later to the Mascarenes34 – it was the introduction in the 19th century of plantation economies that radically transformed the demographic profile of the islands. African slaves were no longer bartered as trade items or kept for domestic purposes, but became a large and integral part of the Comorian society until abolition, which in the case of Anjouan only was formally declared in 1891 and in Grande Comore – the main island – as late as 1904.35 There are no reliable data on the size of the slave populations in Comoros, but one gauge of their demographic impact is derived from surveys carried out in Mayotte, indicating that in the mid-19th century between a third and a half of the inhabitants were slaves. Most of them were Makua from northern Mozambique.36 Blanchy gives a similar figure for Grande

33

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36

businessmen and scholars have reached prominent positions in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and East Timor. The Saudi bin Laden family originally came from Hadramaut. On the triangular relationship between Hadrami communities in Comoros, Zanzibar and Hadramaut, see Iain Walker: ‘Identity and Citizenship among the Comorians of Zanzibar, 1886–1963’ in Abdul Sheriff and Engseng Ho (eds): The Indian Ocean: Oceanic Connections and the Creation of New Societies, Hurst & Company, London, 2014, pp. 239–66. Comorians had been present in Zanzibar since the 18th century and were to occupy leading religious and public positions after the Omani Imam of Muscat, Seyyid Saïd, moved his administration there in 1832. Subsequently, the Omani sultanate of Zanzibar became closely involved in the turbulent developments in the Comorian archipelago, particularly in Mohéli. After the 1964 revolution, Zanzibar lost its position as the leading center of Islamic learning in East Africa to Comoros (Alpers (2009) op. cit., pp. 163–64). In the mid-19th century, a slave from Mozambique sold to the French represented four times the purchase price (Iain Walker: Comores: Guide Culturel, Komedit, Moroni, 2009, p. 44). Conseil Général de Mayotte: Memoires d’Esclavage aux Comores, Archives Départemen­ tales de Mayotte, 2010, p. 2. Despite formal abolition, slavery continued to be a reality well beyond 1904. Blanchy recounts that slaves were set free as late as in the 1950s (Sophie Blanchy: ‘L’Esclavage à Ngazidja (Comores): Approche Ethnohistorique’ in Médard et al. op. cit., p. 395). Alpers (2009) op. cit., pp. 154–59.

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Comore37 and Médard estimates that slaves represented around 40% of the total Comorian population towards the end of the century.38 As earlier in Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles, plantation capitalism and slavery changed the ethnic composition of Comoros. Whereas the formerly unin­ habited Mascarenes and Seychelles over time developed varying degrees of creolization, the Comorian society emerged through a fusion of Arab and African influences. Socio-economic and cultural elements from the two were held together by a shared Islamic faith. Of significance in this context is that no Christian missions – contrary to the situation in Madagascar – were established in Comores.39 In spite of dark memories from slavery and suppressed uprisings40 – and notwithstanding Ali Soilihi’s iconoclastic revolution in the late 1970s – Arab identity continues to be highly esteemed. As noted by Walker, “Comorians […] view Arab values (epitomized by Islam and notions of civilization) positively, whereas African values (characterized as paganism and barbarism) are seen as negative. This dichotomy is particularly pertinent in [Grande Comore].”41 In her study on separatism and geo-politics, Halifa similarly states that “the Comorians have maintained privileged relations with the Arabs and generally show prejudice towards the Africans and the Malagasy.”42 As in Madagascar, these attitudes are largely a legacy of the slave trade and extensive domestic slavery.43 Islam, Notables and the Great Wedding Most observers highlight the socio-cultural homogeneity of Comoros,44 with religion, language and customs as unifying factors. There are significant differences 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44

Blanchy in Médard et al. op. cit., p. 399. Médard in ibid., p. 89. Blanchy in ibid., p. 402. Major slave insurrections took place in Mayotte in 1847, Anjouan in 1889–91 and Mohéli in 1899–1902 (Conseil Général de Mayotte op. cit., p. 2). Iain Walker: ‘From Moroni to Mukalla: Hadhramis on the Island of Ngazidja (Comoros) and in the Hadhramhout’ in Journal des Africanistes, Vol. 72, No. 2, 2002, p. 113. Walker notes that “the disdain with which [the people of Grande Comore] speak of things African merely emphasizes the reverence with which the Arab world is viewed,” adding that “the word formerly used for Africans – washenzi – literally means ‘the uncivilized’” (ibid., p. 117). Halifa op. cit., p. 30. Blanchy in Médard et al. op. cit., p. 373. For example, Walker op. cit. (2002), p. 113 and Halifa op. cit., p. 16. Also Malyn Newitt: The Comoro Islands: Struggle against Dependency in the Indian Ocean, Westview Press, Boulder/Gower, London, 1984, p. 75. There are few citizens of European descent in the

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between the islands, and since independence in 1975 political separatism on both Anjouan and Mohéli has repeatedly threatened national unity. The centrifugal forces, however, are rather a consequence of the absence of a modern, economically viable state and French shadows than of ethnic, linguistic and cultural divisions. Between and within the islands, there are constant disputes over the equitable distribution of political power and economic resources. Post-independent developments have as a result led to an increasingly atomized political system, where individual notables – prominent personalities – play dominant roles and political parties, ideologies and class issues are relegated to the background.45 In Comoros, there is a proliferation of political party organizations. As in Madagascar, in times of electoral contest they usually form coalitions around leading candidates. The mouvances, however, are transient. After the elections, new political parties tend to be formed and new alliances created.46 There are few countries in the world where Islam holds such sway and has been so little changed by the forces of modernism as in Comoros. Overwhelmingly, the islanders are followers of Sunni Islam of the Shafi’i madhhab, or school of jurisprudence.47 In Comoros, the Muslim faith was superimposed by the Arabs on existing African and Austronesian/Malagasy belief systems. As a consequence, it incorporates significant elements of spiritualism and taboos. In addition, Sufism plays a prominent part in Comorian Islam, as does the particular significance accorded the Prophet Muhammad and, thus, the social role of the sharifu.48 For a long time considered as open and tolerant, the contemporary broadening of contacts with other Muslim countries is changing the religious landscape of Comoros. Comorians who work or study in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia or

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Union of Comoros. At an early stage, a small minority of Gujarati Indians established a successful retail trading community in the main urban centers. As followers of Shia Islam they are only marginally integrated into the society. With increasing economic links to the Gulf countries, a new group of Arab businessmen is appearing in Comoros. Under the 2008 Economic Citizenship Act, immigrants of Arab origin wishing to invest in the country are eligible for Comorian nationality. M’sa Ali Djamal: Luttes de Pouvoir aux Comores: Entre Notables Traditionnels, Notables Professionnalisés et Politiques Professionnels: Le Cas Azali, Les Éditions De La Lune, Levallois-Perret, 2006. See, for example, ‘Personnalisation des partis politiques comoriens, gagnés par une dictature interne’ in habarizacomores.com, 14 September 2013. In Sunni Islam, there are four recognized schools of jurisprudence. The Shafi’i madhhab is dominant in Egypt, Yemen, East Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia. Walker op. cit. (2009), pp. 25–30.

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Shia Iran often return with influences considered both religiously unacceptable and politically dangerous. Commenting on the developments, President Dhoinine underlined that “the wish by certain Comorians coming from different Arab countries to implement brutal changes to our religious and cus­tomary practices is fraught with danger.”49 As a result, in 2008 the national parliament passed an act on religious practice, which in January 2013 was promulgated by the president. In its first article, the act reiterates that “[i]n matters of religious practice [the Sunni doctrine of the Shafi’i school]50 is the official […] reference in the Union of Comoros.” It further states that any campaign, propaganda or customary or religious practice which does not conform to the doctrine [and is carried out] […] in any public place – by its nature causing social problems, affronting society’s cohesion and endangering national unity – will lead to imprisonment for [a period of] five months to one year and a fine of between 100,000 and 500,000 Comorian Francs.51 The highly controversial legislation was immediately enforced. Over the following weeks, a number of Shia followers were rounded up by the Comorian police, notably on Anjouan. After ten months in detention, the full sentence of one year’s imprisonment was handed down on one of the Shia leaders, causing suspicions of ulterior political motives.52 Except for the outrigger canoe, few traces of the Austronesian migration remain on the islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli. In contrast, the African, pre-Islamic heritage is strong, notably with regard to social organization. The Comorian society is matrilineal and uxorilocal, where property – including land – is passed down from mother to daughter and the husband moves in with the wife. Traditionally, boys are organized into ‘age 49 50 51

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‘Comores: Les sunnites, inquiets du prosélytisme chiite, en appellent au président’ in zinfos974.com, 13 November 2012. In French: la doctrine (Anquidat) Ahli Sunnat wal Djamaan sous couvert du rite (Mad-hab) Al Chaffy. ‘Réglementation générale des pratiques religieuses en Union des Comores’ in alwatwan. net, 11 January 2013. 100,000 Comorian Francs (kmf) corresponded to 270 us Dollars, a considerable amount for the average Comorian citizen. ‘Loi sur les pratiques religieuses: Plusieurs chiites arrêtés à Ndzuwani’ in alwatwan.net, 3 February 2013, and ‘Procès des chiites: Un an d’imprisonnement ferme contre le présumé chef du groupe’ in alwatwan.net, 5 December 2013. In the mounting political dispute between Dhoinine and ex-president Sambi, the latter – a Muslim theologian inter alia schooled in Iran – was accused of Shia sympathies.

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groups’, following a sequence of life-cycle events of which the most prestigious is the ‘great wedding’. In Walker’s opinion, “nothing is more Comorian than the great wedding.”53 Built on African customs and with the purpose to establish political control, the ceremony was originally devised to blend two seemingly incompatible social systems, on the one hand that of the immigrant patriarchal Arabs and on the other the indigenous matrilineal societies.54 It is in particular rooted on Grande Comore. “Long decried by the island’s religious leaders as contrary to Islamic principles of moderation,” the ‘great wedding’ is “hotly defended by upholders of the customary order.”55 Among the latter, it could be added, are many westernized Comorians in France and other countries.56 Much more than a religious marriage, the ‘great wedding’ is a rite de passage through which any Comorian male citizen who can cover the costs becomes a ‘complete man’, a notable who may enter the mosque through the main door, take part in public affairs, address meetings and take decisions. He will be accorded respect not only by his home village, but by the community at large. As a sign of his status, he will dress in the way of the old ruling elites. To achieve notabilité through the ‘great wedding’ – which may occur at a mature age – is, however, an extremely costly affair. In 2004, the World Bank estimated the expenses of the lavish ceremony to reach between 20,000 and 60,000 us Dollars, at the time representing 50 to 150 times the amount of the annual gdp per capita.57 Comorians, Newitt observed, “devote so much of their savings to [the event] that there is very little accumulated capital available for economic enterprises,” concluding that “the underdevelopment of the islands is due in large part to the competitiveness of the grand marriage.”58 In fact, more than half of the external remittances – or a staggering 10% of gdp – is annually dedicated to the non-productive and conspicuous consumption of the ‘great weddings’.59

53 54 55 56

57 58 59

Walker op. cit. (2009), p. 20. Ibid., pp. 17–19 and 22–25. Walker op. cit. (2002), p. 116. There are more than 500 Comorian associations in France. Most of them are so called ‘home town associations’ (associations de village), representing the interests of a particular community and raising significant resources for local projects and events, including the ‘great weddings’. da Cruz, Fengler and Schwartzman op. cit., p. 9. Newitt op. cit., p. 87. da Cruz, Fengler and Schwartzman op. cit., p. 9. The ceremony often leads to extended indebtedness.

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As in Madagascar, language contributes to cultural homogeneity. Together with Arabic and French, Comorian is an official language. Closely related to Kiswahili, Shikomore forms part of the African Sabaki group of languages. In the Union of Comoros, it has traditionally been written in the Arabic script. Each island has its own dialect – Shingazidja in Grande Comore, Shindzwani in Anjouan and Shimwali in Mohéli60 – and there are grammatical variations. The dialects, however, are mutually intelligible and constitute the national vernacular. A common orthography has been established, taking into account phonetic variations. Taught in the Koranic schools, as well as being a subject in the public education system, Arabic is a live, secondary language, and Comoros takes an active part in international forums for the preservation, development and promotion of the Arabic language.61 All Comorians receive a Koranic education. As a result, the literacy rate is high. In 2008, as much as 87% of the population could read and write.62 The country’s first upper secondary school, however, was only established in Moroni in 1959, after three quarters of a century of French rule. For higher education, Comorian students usually go to France, but also to Arab countries, French-speaking Africa and Madagascar. A small national university opened in the capital in 2004.

Swahili Trade and European Plantations

During the 14th and the 15th centuries, the Swahili mercantile economy along the East African coast was bifocal, dominated in the south by Kilwa (Tanzania) and in the north by Mombasa (Kenya). The Hadrami-ruled city state of Kilwa controlled the commerce in gold, ivory and slaves from Sofala in present-day central Mozambique,63 whereas Mombasa – the larger of the two – was the main center for the monsoon trade with Gujarat, India, bringing textiles, porcelain, cinnamon, cloves, pepper and other products from Asia. More or less 60 In Mayotte, the official language is French. The local Shikomore dialect is Shimaore. 61 ‘Conférence internationale sur la langue arabe à Moroni’ in alwatwan.net, 30 March 2012. 62 Direction Nationale de la Statistique: ‘Quelques Indicateurs Socio-Économiques’, Commissariat Général au Plan, Moroni, [no year]. 63 Kilwa, some 300 kilometers south of Zanzibar, marked the southernmost limit of direct crossings from Arabia with the seasonal monsoons. Beyond Kilwa, trade was conducted along the coast. The Portuguese sacked Kilwa in 1505, but withdrew in 1512. The important Swahili center never regained its former glory. Sofala was located immediately south of the present-day Mozambican port city of Beira. The gold came from the interior kingdoms of Mapungubwe (Limpopo, South Africa) and, above all, Monomotapa (Great Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe).

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equidistant from Sofala and Mombasa, Comoros took an active part in the profitable exchange. The trade system was severely disrupted in the beginning of the 16th century, when the Portuguese in the wake of Vasco da Gama’s voyage to India emerged as a maritime power. Less than ten years after da Gama’s landing in Calicut in 1498, they had occupied Sofala (1503), sacked Kilwa (1505) and plundered Mombasa (1505), subsequently turning against other Swahili centers in East Africa and the principal Antalaotra settlements in Madagascar.64 As Henriksen writes, “[n]ow by taps, now by blows, they hammered at their rivals until they were virtual masters of the Indian Ocean trade.”65 Without gold, ivory or spices, the Comorian islands were, however, spared Portuguese destruction. In contrast with a string of Swahili centers on the African coast – from Mozambique Island in the south to Mombasa in the north – Portugal never built fortifications or placed garrisons in Comoros. Like Mombasa’s rival Malindi (Kenya), instead the local sultanates managed to establish a modus operandi with the new dominant power, inserting Comoros in the Portuguese Indian Ocean maritime empire as a victualing station and a clearing house. Setting their eyes on the gold from Sofala and lacking the necessary human and financial resources to defend the central Swahili coast, the Portuguese established their East African center of operations on Mozambique Island, south of present-day Nacala. After taking Goa on the west coast of India in 1510, Portugal made it the capital of an Estado da Índia (‘State of India’), ruled by a viceroy and with suzerainty over Mozambique and the entire Indian Ocean.66 Albeit disrupted and, in principle, under Portuguese control, the Swahili trade, nevertheless, continued and the Comorian traders could as middlemen turn their geographical location into an advantage in the commerce between Madagascar, Africa, the Middle East and India. Between the Portuguese and the Muslim merchants “a politico-economic compromise had been imposed by circumstances” and “so long as no conflict of interest arose […], [the] Swahili towns remained independent.”67 In the case of Comoros, of particular importance was the growing trade in African and Malagasy slaves to the Arab world.

64 65 66 67

Zanzibar was looted by the Portuguese in 1503. Thomas H. Henriksen: Mozambique: A History, Rex Collings, London/David Philip, Cape Town, 1978, p. 23. Boxer op. cit., pp. 39–40. Mozambique only got its own, separate government in 1752. [A.I. Salim]: ‘East Africa: The Coast’ in B.A. Ogot (ed): General History of Africa, Vol. V: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, Special edition, unesco/New Africa Books, Glosderry, 2003, p. 373.

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Mozambique Island In early 1498, Vasco da Gama made a brief landing at the Swahili settlement on Mozambique Island, which the Portuguese named after a local Arab leader (Ali Musa Mbiki or Musa Al-Biki). The name was subsequently extended to the whole Portuguese territory in East Africa. In 1507, the Portuguese established a naval base on the island. The chapel of Nossa Senhora de Baluarte, considered the oldest standing European building in the southern hemisphere, was constructed in the 1520s, followed by the fortress of São Sebastião. Located in the northern Nampula province, Ilha de Moçambique – a unesco World Heritage Site – was the capital of Mozambique until 1898. The history of the area is intimately linked to the Swahili mercantile system, the expansion of Islam and the slave trade. Most of the slaves exported from Mozambique were Makua from the northern part of the country. The relations between the Nampula region and Comoros have been particularly close, not least with regard to Islamic learning and, in general, religious affairs. With the help of Comorian Islamic leaders, in the early 1970s the Portuguese government tried to drive a wedge between the local Muslim population and the secular frelimo national liberation movement.

Until the early 17th century and the appearance of the British, Dutch and French East India companies, the sultanates in the archipelago experienced an extended period of prosperity. Initially, the struggles for maritime supremacy in the Mozambique Channel between the Portuguese and the rival European nations had a positive economic effect on the islands, which supplied visiting ships with meat and other commodities. Inevitably, however, the European rivalry drew Comoros into a vortex of divisive intrigues, inter-island struggles and opposing alliances, eventually leading to the colonization by France. Towards the close of the 17th century, the good fortunes ended when freebooting buccaneers from the Caribbean moved to Madagascar and attacks on the Comorian islands became a common occurrence. When the British and the French by the mid-1720s defeated the rebel republic of Libertalia and drove the pirates out of the western Indian Ocean, in the process they also became deeply involved in Comoros. During the 18th and the 19th centuries, developments in the archipelago were increasingly dominated by the Anglo-French struggle for control over Madagascar and the demand for slaves in Reunion and Mauritius.

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After rounding the southern tip of Africa, the British and the French East Indiamen usually took different routes. Whereas the British preferred the inner passage through the Mozambique Channel, as a rule the French took the outer way via the Mascarenes. As a consequence, the British gained privileged access to the Comorian islands. Since Grande Comore did not have adequate harbors and fresh water, they primarily used the sheltered bay at Mutsamudu and established close relations with the rulers of Anjouan, which they called ‘Johanna’. Fomboni on Mohéli was another popular British port of call. After the Napoleonic Wars and the 1814 Paris Treaty, France – who had lost Mauritius to Britain – also took a keen interest in the Comorian islands. Focusing on Madagascar as the ultimate objective; in constant demand of slaves for the sugar plantations in Reunion; and pushed by the grands blancs on the Mascarene island, France implemented its strategy of insular ‘support points’. In 1841, the French managed to purchase Mayotte from the Islamized Sakalava ruler Andriantsoli. With the rock and the natural harbor at Dzaoudzi as a base, they subsequently turned their attention to the rest of the archipelago. As British and, above all, French private interests established large plantations on the islands, the French government carried out a policy characterized by Newitt as “neo-colonialism before colonialism had even arrived.”68 Progressively advancing its positions, France set up one ruler against the other, offered treaties of protection and intervened militarily. Initially, the French were opposed by both the British and the islands’ Arab merchant and religious elites. After the takeover of Mauritius, Britain’s geostrategic interest in Comoros, however, declined, although in the late 1840s it appointed a consul to Anjouan in order to counter the mounting French influence. “[M]arked by clan rivalry and the rapid passage of shadowy queens and sultans across the political stage,”69 at the same time the Arab leaders were not in a position to put up any effective resistance. For a brief period in the mid19th century, the Omani rulers of Zanzibar tried to intervene on their behalf. Although the red flag of the Zanzibari sultanate was an “important diplomatic badge for traders and slavers of all kinds,”70 Zanzibar itself, however, was the object of colonial design, eventually becoming a British protectorate in 1890. In Comoros, a number of sultans – nominally the trustees of the land – further granted Europeans immense agricultural concessions, in the process undermining their own traditional power. In the end, therefore, France could in 1886 with relative ease impose the status of protectorates on Grande Comore, 68 69 70

Newitt op. cit., p. 37. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., p. 24.

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Anjouan and Mohéli.71 In 1899, the French governor of Mayotte assumed responsibility for the Comorian protectorates, for the first time in history bringing all four islands under a single political authority. In 1908, France declared the archipelago a colony and in 1912 the islands were as dependencies annexed to Madagascar. By that time, most of the arable land had since long been taken over by privately owned plantations. Soon after a French administration was established on Mayotte, the land was divided into concessions, mainly for the cultivation of sugar cane. Two thirds were allotted to French planters from Reunion.72 As later would be the case on the other Comorian islands, the traditional elite was largely dispossessed and smallholders driven off the land. Feudal social and economic relations were replaced by those of plantation capitalism, including the widespread use of bonded labor.73 On Anjouan, where Britain had established a strong presence and the conditions for agriculture were the best in the archipelago, in the 1850s the British consul, William Sunley, was invited by the local sultan to establish sugar plantations. Employing slaves rented from the sultan, he was forced by London to resign as consul, but successfully laid the basis for the future Bambao Company.74 He soon took over other holdings on the island, as well as on Mohéli. Eventually, the Société Bambao was to control approximately half of the arable land on Anjouan. On Mohéli, the Frenchman Joseph Lambert, who had earlier been involved in similar deals in Madagascar, obtained in 1865 from Queen Fatima “all the land he wishe[d] to […] develop.”75 On Grande Comore, finally, in 1885 the French naturalist Léon Humblot obtained from Sultan Saïd Ali a concession that made him the virtual owner of the entire island. He established the Grande Comore Company,76 which in addition to timber from the slopes of Karthala specialized in the cultivation of coconuts, cloves, 71

72 73 74 75 76

The circumstances under which the Comorian sultanates fell under French sovereignty remain controversial. Mayotte was sold by a sultan from Madagascar; the last sultanate on Mohéli ended when the queen eloped with a French gendarme; and on Anjouan a puppet sultan installed by the plantation owners ceded powers he did not have. In the case of Grande Comore, the sultan of Bambao signed away the entire island without the consent of the other rulers. Formally, the sultanates were dissolved on Anjouan in 1909, on Grande Comore in 1910 and on Mohéli in 1912. Newitt op. cit., p. 27. Slavery was abolished in Mayotte in 1847. Société Colonial de Bambao (scb), formed by two Frenchmen in 1907. Lambert’s concession quoted in Newitt op. cit., p. 29. On Lambert’s death in 1873, his concession was taken over by Sunley. Société Anonyme de la Grande Comore (sagc).

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cinnamon, vanilla and aromatic plants such as ylang-ylang, brought by Humblot from South-East Asia. In 1938, the Bambao Company took over Humblot’s plantations. As a result, it owned 37% of the land on Anjouan, 15% of Mayotte, 22% of Mohéli and no less than 47% of Grande Comore.77 With regard to arable land, the proportions were much higher. Except for the plantations on Mayotte, where slavery in 1847 was replaced by contract labor, all the concession companies used slave labor. In this respect, Humblot’s Société de Grande Comore stood out. Until his death in 1914, Humblot ruled the island as a despot. Known as ‘the white sultan’, he had his own armed militia, his own judicial courts and even apprenticed the islanders’ children to his vast plantations. Against this background, it is far from surprising that the enslaved workers regularly rose in revolts until abolition finally was declared on Anjouan in 1891, Mohéli in 1902 and Grande Comore in 1904.78 Since the European plantocracy was in control of Comorian economic and political affairs, it is further no surprise that the French colonial authorities in Madagascar from 1912 paid scant attention to the population of the marginalized islands. Serious social protests on Grande Comore in 1915 did not change this attitude.

Between a Rock and a Free Space

Administered from Dzaoudzi on Mayotte as a small jurisdictional district – ‘a colony of a colony’ – the three and a half decades during which Comoros was attached to Madagascar were a period of stagnation and neglect. Newitt remarks that under French rule “little impression was made on a society dominated by a feudal Arab landowning class and by equally feudal plantation companies.” “[I]f France,” he continues, “had been prepared to spend lavishly on the military conquests [of Madagascar and Comoros], it was less willing to spend money on turning its soldiers’ swords into ploughshares,” concluding that a “dead hand” fell over the archipelago.79 At the outbreak of World War II, there were on the four Comorian islands scarcely a thousand pupils in government schools. Medical services were deficient. There were no public institutions, newspapers or radio services where politics could be debated. The colonial administration was to a large extent staffed by Malagasy-speaking civil servants who issued official notices in French 77 78 79

Newitt op. cit., p. 98. Conseil Général de Mayotte op. cit., p. 2. Newitt op. cit., pp. 39–40.

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or Malagasy, but not in Shikomore or Arabic. No industrial undertakings had been carried out. All that was done to create a modern infrastructure was the provision of bare essentials in the form of landing strips, piers and a few government buildings. As France’s other African possessions, after the war Comoros was to embark on a more promising road towards self-government. In November 1945, Saïd Mohamed Cheikh was elected to represent the archipelago in the French Constituent Assembly, joining forces with Joseph Ravoahangy and Joseph Raseta of Madagascar, Léon de Lépervanche and Raymond Vergès of Reunion and a number of prominent Caribbean and African political personalities, such as Aimé Césaire of Martinique, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Léopold Senghor of Senegal. A staunch supporter of General de Gaulle, over the next twenty-five years – known as the ‘Cheikhist period’ – he was to dominate Comorian politics.80 From the landowning nobility of Grande Comore, Cheikh had enjoyed a privileged education, qualifying as a medical doctor in Antananarivo, Madagascar, before entering into politics. In the French Constituent Assembly and subsequently as a deputy to the National Assembly, he argued for the detachment of Comoros from Madagascar. The objective was achieved in 1946, when the government in Paris declared the islands a separate overseas territory (Territoire d’Outre-mer/tom). At the same time, the Comorians became French subjects. Another significant goal was reached in 1956, when the French Loi-cadre introduced universal suffrage and made provision for the election of a Comorian territorial assembly. Each island became an administrative circumscription, jointly headed by a French prefect. In the 1958 referendum organized by the de Gaulle government throughout the French Union, Comoros – like Madagascar – voted against national independence, opting for continued relations with France within a Communauté française. Rallying behind Cheikh, no less than 97.3% of the electorate voted for the maintenance of the archipelago’s tom status. Three years later, a constitutional amendment provided for internal Comorian self-government. Whereas external affairs and matters of defense remained French prerogatives, 80

A political grouping known as the Green Party (Parti Vert) developed around Saïd Mohamed Cheikh. In opposition was the White Party (Parti Blanc), formed by followers of Saïd Ibrahim, son of the last sultan of Grande Comore. Although bitter rivalries at times characterized the relations between the two, both were pro-French, represented the nationalist elite and had their power base on Grande Comore. In 1954, Mohamed Cheikh was appointed to represent France and the French Union at the un General Assembly.

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the territorial assembly was promoted to a chamber of deputies, electing a president who presided over a governing council. Without a serious contender, in December 1961 Saïd Mohamed Cheikh became the first elected head of a local government of Comoros. With the notable exception of the situation in Mayotte, until Cheikh’s death in 1970 the archipelago was to enjoy a period of relative political stability and socio-economic development, in particular with regard to education, health and the upgrading of communications. Although they did not lead to any significant redistribution of wealth, in the 1950s and 1960s land reform measures also transferred some of the plantation companies’ possessions to subsistence farmers. From the mid-1960s, however, the Cheikh administration was increasingly challenged by both advocates of complete national independence and forces in favor of French departmentalization of Mayotte. Whereas calls of Mkolo nalawe! (‘Settler go home!’) were raised in Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli, in Mayotte people were chanting Maore farantsa! (‘Mayotte is French!’). At the same time Francophile and a nationalist, Cheikh tried to maneuver between the two camps, arguing that the archipelago did not have the requisite economic conditions for full independence and maintaining that it constituted an indivisible territorial entity. By deciding in 1958 to move the islands’ administrative center from Dzaoudzi to Moroni, as well as by allocating the bulk of the limited budgetary resources to Grande Comore, in the end, however, the local government under Cheikh deepened the divide vis-à-vis Mayotte. During the 1960s, the separatist Mahorian Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire Mahorais/mpm) turned increasingly militant, anti-Comorian and pro-French. When he visited Dzaoudzi in August 1966, Cheikh was received by stone-throwing demonstrators waving French flags. Mayotte had become a ‘no-go area’ for Grande Comorians. Deeply offended, Cheikh reacted by further squeezing the island’s financial resources, playing into the hands of the mpm separatists and their backers in France and Reunion, a bastion of French jingoism in the Indian Ocean. Four years after Cheikh’s death, the formerly pro-Gaullist Comorian archipelago was to experience the breakaway of Mayotte and embark on a confrontational course with France.81 Inspired by the independence movements in Africa, calls for complete national liberation, meanwhile, gathered strength. In the beginning, the demand was made by Comorians abroad, including a new generation of students in 81

In the 1965 French presidential elections, the Comorian leaders secured 99.4% of the poll in favor of de Gaulle, with a mere 0.6% to his socialist rival, François Mitterand.

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France. They also introduced socialist visions into the political debate. Echoed by the youth in the archipelago, the calls for independence were soon taken up by both the established and new political formations, including Saïd Mohamed Cheikh’s followers in the Democratic Union of Comoros (Union Démocratique des Comores/udc) and the opposition Democratic Rally for the Comorian People (Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Comorien/rdpc), led by Saïd Mohamed Djaffar.82 The first political formation to claim sovereignty for the four islands was the National Liberation Movement of the Comoros (Mouvement National de Libération des Comores/molinaco), formed in 1962 by Comorians living in Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Close to President Julius Nyerere’s Tanganyika African National Union (tanu) and other Southern African liberation movements represented in Dar es Salaam, it was ideologically guided by African socialism. Banned by the French authorities in Comoros, it initially focused on information regarding the situation on the islands. When the Organization of African Unity was founded in Addis Ababa in May 1963, subsequently setting up a Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa in Dar es Salaam,83 molinaco was included among the nationalist movements recognized by the pan-African organization. With oau assistance, it launched a campaign for the independence of Comoros which inter alia included the broadcasting of a daily radio program from the Tanzanian capital. Although it lacked a real base on the islands – and its supporters were harassed by the French – from the mid-1960s molinaco’s message reached a growing audience. Dramatic events across the Mozambique Channel added to the appeal. The fact that Zanzibar in December 1963 had been granted independence from Britain and that frelimo successfully advanced the liberation struggle in northern Mozambique – two areas with close connections to Comoros – was of great significance. molinaco energized Comorian students both at home and in France. Internationally too, its diplomacy for independence made an impact. Despite French protests, in August 1972 the un Decolonization Committee registered Comoros among the colonized territories which in accordance with the 1960 Decolonization Declaration should be granted sovereignty. When the molinaco leader Abdoubakar Boina in October 1974 was allowed back into the country, he was received in Moroni by an enthusiastic crowd of 2,000 people. One year later, he joined Ali Soilihi’s National Revolutionary Council. 82 83

From April 1973 until November 1975, Djaffar was a member of the French Senate. The committee was known as the ‘oau Liberation Committee’.

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Zanzibar and Mozambique Zanzibar became a two-edged example. The islands of Unguja and Pemba (Zanzibar) achieved independence from Britain under Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah in December 1963. Several Comorians held prominent positions in the sultanate and, generally, on the two islands. Seen as ‘Arabs’, they were targeted during the violent Zanzibari revolution of January 1964. Many were forced to leave. In November 1968, President Abeid Karume stated that Comorians were playing “a reactionary role” in Zanzibar, requesting them to take up Tanzanian citizenship. Closer to Karume’s main opponent, Abdulrahman Babu (who was of Comorian descent), asec, pasoco and others on the political left in Comoros were highly critical of the ethnic dimension of the Zanzibari revolution. Interviewed in 1977, Ali Soilihi stressed that “it is impossible to conduct a class struggle on the basis of discrimination between Arabs and Africans as is happening in Zanzibar” (Nakidine Mattoir: Les Comores de 1975 à 1990: Une Histoire Politique Mouvementée, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2004, p. 185). frelimo was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1962. Two years later, it launched the armed struggle, progressively taking control of large areas in northern Mozambique. The advances in the largely Muslim north were closely followed in Comoros.

In the archipelago itself, it was the political radicalization of students and, in general, the younger urban generation that marked a break with the existing order and placed the demand for national independence on the political agenda. Behind the change was the Association of Comorian Apprentices and Students (Association des Stagiaires et Étudiants des Comores/asec), an organization formed in France among the growing number of trainees and students sent there on scholarships for technical studies and higher education. Set up in 1966 to cater for the students’ educational and existential interests, asec was drawn into the politicized French student movement and the contemporary debates on colonialism, imperialism and socialism. Although most of the asec members were from privileged backgrounds, by 1970 the organization had formally embraced Marxism-Leninism, with Mao Zedong’s thought as the guiding ideology and Enver Hoxha’s Albania as an example to follow.84 84 On asec, see Ahmed Ouledi: L’Association des Stagiaires et Étudiants des Comores [asec]: Rêves et Illusions d’une Génération, Komedit, Moroni, 2012. The association soon became dogmatic and sectarian. During the French summer holidays, asec members were

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Under the slogan of ‘Conquering the Skies!’, the struggle against Comorian feudalism and French colonialism for a peasant-led revolution and a socialist order became central tenets of asec. Following a violent suppression of strikes and demonstrations at the lycée in Moroni in early 1968, some of asec’s leading members returned to the islands, where they formed the Socialist Party of Comoros (Parti Socialiste des Comores/pasoco). Soon becoming the preferred party of the younger generation, over the following years pasoco established branches in the main towns, mainly in Grande Comore, but also in Anjouan, Mohéli and Mayotte. Offering a ‘new culture’ to the youth, it turned against traditions such as the grand marriage; campaigned in favor of a land reform; and demanded an end to French colonialism. When the French overseas minister Bernard Stasi visited  Moroni in September 1973, largely as a result of pasoco’s mobilization he was met with a vigorous demonstration demanding immediate independence. Together with molinaco’s Boina, in August 1975 the pasoco leader Salim Hadji Himidi also joined Soilihi’s National Revolutionary Council.

French Duplicity and Unilateral Independence

When Saïd Mohamed Cheikh – the ‘Grand Ole’ Man’ of post-war Comorian politics – died in 1970, the demands for national sovereignty had not yet been embraced by the traditional political establishment. This was to change under his successors, Saïd Ibrahim (1970–72), Saïd Mohamed Djaffar (1972) and, above all, Ahmed Abdallah, who in December 1972 as the candidate of the Democratic Union won the local elections with a popular mandate to seek independence from France for a united Comorian nation. Since 1959 a member of the French Senate, Abdallah was a wealthy merchant from Anjouan who had made a fortune in the trade of vanilla and rice, respectively Comoros’ principal export and import products. He understood that unless a firmer attitude towards France was adopted, the ruling elites would lose power to the molinaco nationalists and/or the pasoco socialists. Developments in nearby Zanzibar were a warning example. Against this background, he initiated negotiations with the French government.



called upon to carry out ‘proletarian work’ in Comoros. Prominent militants visited China and Albania. After 1975, many were attracted to Pol Pot’s Cambodia. As students in France, some of them had established personal relations with future Khmer Rouge leaders.

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With solid credentials in Paris, in January 1973 Abdallah reached an agreement in principle with the French president, Georges Pompidou. As a united territorial entity, the Comorian archipelago was to be granted national independence within a period of five years. In June 1973, the agreement was formalized through a Joint Declaration by the French government and the Comorian authorities, subsequently endorsed by the French National Assembly. According to the declaration – which explicitly underlined “the unity of the archipelago”85 – the agreement should be submitted to a referendum in which the Comorian population could either confirm the road to independence or opt for continued attachment to France. Already then, however, there were serious doubts about the way forward. Whereas molinaco, pasoco and many others in Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli wanted to shorten the agreed timetable, in Mayotte the Mahorian Popular Movement was adamantly against any severance of the relations with France. After the death of Pompidou in April 1974, the mpm position was increasingly echoed by a number of influential Gaullist ‘barons’, among them Jacques Foccart, presidential chief of staff of African affairs, and Michel Debré, former prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and defense, and a leading conservative in Reunion. The referendum was organized by the French government in December 1974. No less than 93.3% of the registered voters took part in the poll, which resulted in a massive majority in favor of independence. An overwhelming 94.6% of the Comorians voted ‘Yes’ to national sovereignty, with only a small minority of 5.4% opting to remain attached to France.86 On Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli, there were a total of 148,859 votes in favor and a trifling number of 71 against, translating in a staggering 99.9% victory for the advocates of independence. On Mayotte, however, a majority of 8,091 (64.9%) preferred continued French rule, while 4,299 voters (34.5%) supported an independent course.87 Faced with the unambiguous verdict, the new French government under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing started to backtrack. Despite the fact that 95 out of 100 Comorians in polls held by the French authorities had expressed the wish to achieve national independence, attention was focused on the two thirds majority obtained by the ‘No’ vote on Mayotte, an island which represented less than 8% of the electorate. In a bizarre interpretation of the 85

Jean-Louis Guébourg: ‘L’Autonomie Interne, une Restauration de la Dignité Comorienne (1946–1975)’, Les Amis de l’Université, Moroni, [no year], p. 17. 86 ‘aed/Elections in the Comores’ op. cit. 87 Mattoir op. cit., p. 24.

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referendum, the opinion of 153,000 voters on the four islands carried less weight than that expressed by 8,000 on one of them. In the ensuing French debate, much emphasis was given to the ‘special relations’ with Mayotte, as well as to the strategic importance of a continued presence in the Mozambique Channel.88 A parliamentary delegation was sent to Comoros to assess the situation. Influenced by the Mahorian separatist movement, its report led to the suggestion that independence should be postponed until a new constitution could be accepted by each island in yet another referendum. Eventually, the “blatant delaying tactics”89 came to an end when the French National Assembly in breach of the 1973 agreement on 30 June 1975 decided that the votes cast in the referendum should not be considered in their totality, but separately, island by island.90 Ahmed Abdallah, the elected head of the local Comorian government, was present during the parliamentary deliberations in Paris. Humiliated and embittered, he returned to Moroni with his credibility at stake. Under huge popular pressure, on 6 July 1975 the Francophile merchant cum political leader declared “the immediate and unilateral independence of the archipelago of Comoros within its colonial borders, namely Mayotte, Mohéli, Anjouan and Grande Comore.”91 Over the following days, the Moroni chamber of deputies was transformed into a National Assembly, which elected Abdallah as the first head of an independent Comorian State (État Comorien). Within less than a month, however, Abdallah was toppled in a French-engineered coup d’état and had his first encounter with the mercenary leader Bob Denard. While the French gendarmerie and Foreign Legion were in control of Mayotte, the Comorian State remained as proclaimed. On 12 November 1975, it was recognized as a full member by the United Nations. In its unanimous resolution, the un General Assembly affirmed “the necessity of respecting the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro [a]rchipelago, composed of Anjouan, Grande Comore, Mayotte and Mohéli.”92 By that time, the French authorities were already preparing for a re-confirming vote on Mayotte.93 Two days before the poll, the matter was brought to the un .

88 Newitt op. cit., p. 58. 89 Ibid. 90 Mattoir op. cit., p. 40. 91 Hamidou Saïd Ali: Les Comores: Vers un Fédéralisme Concret, Edilivre, Paris, 2007, p. 25. 92 unga Resolution 3385 (XXX): ‘Admission of the Comoros to Membership in the United Nations’, 12 November 1975. 93 In defiance of the un position, France conducted the referendum on Mayotte on 8 February 1976. By then, scores of pro-independence supporters had been chased away from the island. According to the official results, 99.4% of the electorate voted in favor of

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Security Council, where France as a permanent member on 6 February 1976 raised its veto to block a draft resolution denouncing the move as “interference in the internal affairs of Comoros.”94 It was the first time that the French government stood alone in using the prerogative. In the process, Comoros also became the first African state with part of its territory under continued colonial rule. The French position was to have a deeply destabilizing and debilitating impact, primarily on political, economic and social developments in Comoros, but also in the wider region. Across the sea, neighboring Mozambique – which ten days before Abdallah’s proclamation achieved national independence from Portugal on 25 June 1975 – would, notably, become the target of South African and French mercenary support to the rebel forces of the Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana/renamo), channeled from Mayotte and, in the 1980s, directly from Comoros. The internal Comorian opposition to Abdallah – organized within a United National Front (Front National Uni/fnu) and with Ali Soihili as the leading figure – was responsible for the coup d’état of 3 August 1975. The coup makers appointed Saïd Mohamed Djaffar as head of government, but real power rested with Soilihi. In the beginning, they were assisted by French soldiers of fortune under Denard, who, in particular, was responsible for a military operation to capture Abdallah on his native island of Anjouan, where he had fled after the coup.95 In a dizzying sequence of events, soon, however, the tables were turned and Soilihi parted company with the mercenaries, broke off the remaining links with France and embarked on a thorough transformation of Comoros. The triggering factor was a failed, peaceful attempt by Soihili to assert Moroni’s authority and bring Mayotte back into the Comorian state, initiated in the wake of the un recognition. Landing at the airport in Dzaoudzi in mid-November 1975, Soilihi was met on the tarmac by mpm separatists who

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continued French rule. A second referendum on Mayotte – this time to define the status of the overseas territory – was held on 11 April 1976. An overwhelming 97.5% demanded acceptance as a full department of France. However, as only just over 20% of the registered voters took part in the poll, the outcome was far from indisputable (Newitt op. cit., pp. 59–60). In December 1976, Mayotte was declared a Collectivité Territoriale, a transitory status towards closer integration with France. unsc: Debate on Draft Resolution S/11967 ‘Situation in the Comoros’, 6 February 1976. The draft resolution was inter alia sponsored by Tanzania. Of the 15 Security Council members, 11 voted in favor (among them China, Russia, Sweden and Japan), with 3 countries abstaining (Italy, United Kingdom and United States). Abdallah was allowed to leave Comoros, subsequently settling in France.

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with the assistance of French gendarmes physically abused him and forced him to turn back.96 Until then seen as open to discussions with the French and the mpm leaders, Soilihi never overcame the disgrace. While separatist militants prior to the upcoming referendum proceeded to violently chase away non-native Mahorians from Mayotte – or, as put by Newitt, “purge the island of their opponents”97 – in early January 1976 Soilihi replaced Djaffar. During the next two and a half years, he led Comoros along an uncharted and increasingly coercive path, attacking the very foundations of the traditionalist Muslim society. The Soilihi regime and the even more repressive extreme opposite that in 1978 followed under Abdallah and his French mercenaries were to have far-reaching effects on the Comorian society for decades to come.

High-School Revolution

Soilihi was a Comorian politician of a new kind. Brought up in a rural area of Grande Comore, he studied agronomy, first in Antananarivo and in the 1960s in Paris.98 As many other Comorian students, during his time in France he became attracted to socialism and followed the Chinese revolution. After his return, he founded the Society for the Economic Development of Comoros.99 As an agronomist and with a rural background, he was, in particular, interested in the creation of farming co-operatives. In 1967, Soilihi was elected to the Comorian chamber of deputies, serving as a minister under Saïd Ibrahim between 1970 and 1972. Although he approached the islands’ challenges as an economist and advocated a radical restructuring of the feudal society, before the takeover in January 1976 he did not appear as a revolutionary leader. In fact, his socialist credentials were often criticized by the Marxists in asec and pasoco. In January 1976, France suspended all financial assistance and withdrew its technical personnel from Comoros. Overnight, the new nation was “without 96 97 98

99

Pierre Caminade: Comores-Mayotte: Une Histoire Néocoloniale, Agone, Marseille, 2010, p. 110. Also Oueledi op. cit., p. 109. Newitt op. cit., p. 59. Soilihi studied tropical agriculture at Nogent (Val-de-Marne) and was also attached to the well-known Institute of Economic and Social Development Studies (Institut d’Études du Développement Economique et Social/iedes) in Paris. Société du Développement Economique des Comores (sodec). Soihili became the director of sodec.

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any senior civil servants, without an army, without technicians, without teachers […], without doctors and, above all, without the finances that made up three quarters of the budget.”100 To fill the human resource gap, Soilihi called upon the secondary students, who in an unprecedented process under his leadership were invited to take over the rump administrative machinery in what has been called the Comorian état lycéen (‘high-school state’) or the ‘unbearded republic’.101 As the teachers left and the schools closed, Soilihi – at the time not yet 40 years old – mobilized the youth to spearhead a cultural, social and economic revolution. At one stage in early 1976, all sixteen members of the coordinating national popular committee – corresponding to the government – were students in their final year of secondary school.102 Initially, the Tanzanian People’s Defense Force contributed around 200 military to train a small Comorian army in replacement for the French gendarmes. Above all, Soilihi recruited urban and rural youth to form local militias. In campaigns similar to those by the Red Guards in China, they were deployed to break the hold of the conservative religious and political elites on the islands. Soilihi himself was a Muslim, but held that the Comorian people was sufficiently steeped in Islam to live according to its fundamental tenets without the superstructure of ulemas, muftis and marabouts, legal and religious scholars who he described as ‘unscientific’, ‘charlatans’ and ‘sorcerers’.103 Together with the traditional political leadership of the notables, the Muslim religious elite saw its power curtailed, often through acts of public humiliation by young militia members. The clampdown on feudal and religious institutions was accompanied by a series of modernizing decrees. The ‘great wedding’ and equally costly funeral ceremonies were abolished. Gender equality was promoted. Women and girls should no longer wear the traditional veil and were on an equal footing with men recruited into the army, police force and militias. In early 1977, Soilihi and his young supporters turned their attention to the administration of the state. Without budgetary resources to cover recurrent costs, practically the entire civil service was dismissed. Some 3,500 public 100 Newitt op. cit., p. 61. 101 The expression ‘high-school state’ was used by Jean-Claude Pomonti in the article ‘Comores: État lycéen’ in Le Monde, 6 August 1977. The ‘unbearded republic’ is the title of a novel published in 1985 by the Comorian author Mohamed Toihiri (La République des Imberbes, L’Harmattan, Paris). Fidel Castro, ‘Che’ Guevara and their colleagues in the 1959 Cuban revolution were known as ‘the bearded ones’, or barbudos in Spanish. 102 Mattoir op. cit., p. 70. Soilihi lowered the voting age to 15 years. 103 Ibid., pp. 62–63 and 90–94.

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employees had to leave their positions without any compensation or alternative jobs. In an outlandish act of breaking with the past, parts of the Comorian national archives were burnt. In April 1977, a new constitutional order was decreed. The preamble to the ‘fundamental law’ underlined Comoros’ “attachment to the authentic values of the Islamic religion, which inter alia includes the struggle against exploitation, ignorance and credulity.”104 At the same time, it introduced a separation between the state and religion by laying down that the four Comorian islands (including Mayotte) constituted “a democratic, secular and social republic.” The principal function of the state was to serve as “a tool for the manual workers to improve their living conditions” and that of the public administration to be “at the service and under the control of the manual workers.” The cost of the public service, the law stated, should be “kept at a minimum.” Whereas political organizations were banned, gender equality was underlined: “Equality of duties between men and women applies both to the civil and civic spheres, as well as to actual employment and the possibilities of promotion.” The constitution was submitted to the Comorian people in a referendum in October 1977. Although approved by a majority, only 56.6% voted in favor, reflecting widespread resentment to the secular, iconoclastic ‘highschool state’.105 As the central government machinery was disbanded and ministries were closed, the Soilihi government erected a pyramid of popular committees, from local village committees at the bottom to a national popular committee at the top. Modeled on the Chinese People’s Communes, the local committees were designed to become socio-economically self-sufficient. Headed by a Muslim khadic judge, they should serve as the basic unit for education, health services, security and food supplies. Priority was given to the construction of primary schools. In February 1978, a five-year economic plan was launched, focusing on land reform and food production. The cultivation of cash crops was maintained for export purposes, whereas costly imports of rice were to be substituted through the production of maize. Vacant land was distributed to landless peasants, but there was no wholesale expropriation of the huge tracts held by the Frenchowned concession companies. In the end, the intended agricultural import substitution did not materialize. The last treasury reserves were consumed in 1977 to evacuate and re-settle some 17,000 Comorians surviving xenophobic 104 ‘Loi Fondamentale du 23 Avril 1977’ in ibid., pp. 170–71. 105 ‘aed/Elections in the Comoros’ op. cit. On Comoros – as in Madagascar – referendums normally result in 90% or more of the votes in favor of the incumbent government’s proposal. In 1976–78, there were several attempts on Soihili’s life.

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massacres in Majunga on Madagascar.106 A couple of months later, a violent eruption of the Karthala volcano on Grande Comore resulted in considerable destruction of agricultural plantations and left 2,000 people homeless. Internationally isolated and bankrupt, Soilihi’s revolution ground to a halt.107 There was, simply, no administrative capacity or budgetary resources to drive the transformation forward. “Exports could not be moved and imports could not be paid for.”108 As severe food shortages started to appear – resulting in peasant uprisings on Anjouan and Mohéli – the young mapinduzi (revolutionaries) in Soilihi’s militias could no longer gang-press the population into unpaid public works. As a result, they increasingly resorted to violence and imprisonment of both political and religious opponents.109 The violence culminated in March 1978, when several local fishermen protesting the compulsory sale of their catch to the state were killed in the village of Ikoni south of Moroni. On 12 May 1978, the daring attempt at empowering the youth, the women and the peasant population, seriously challenging the power of the Comorian traditional establishment, came to an abrupt and pitiless end. For the second time in three years, mercenaries led by Bob Denard and backed by the French secret service landed in Grande Comore. In a reversal of the events of August 1975, the objective was to topple Ali Soilihi and re-instate Ahmed Abdallah. Two weeks later, Soihili was killed ‘while trying to escape’.110 Commenting on the coup, Newitt wrote that “it was one of the most cynical acts of international piracy of recent years. That it was not condemned more loudly was due to the fact that the state of […] Comoros was so obviously deplorable, while the 106 In December 1976, close to 2,000 Comorians were killed in xenophobic violence in Majunga on the western coast of Madagascar. The Soilihi government decided to evacuate as many of the targeted Comorians as possible. In early 1977, a total of 17,000 homeless, traumatized and often injured people were repatriated. 107 China was the first country to open an embassy in Moroni. When Mao Zedong died in September 1976, Soilihi declared a state of public mourning. Internationally aligned with China, under Soilihi Comoros did not establish warm relations with the Soviet bloc. This, in turn, partly explains why neither Madagascar under Didier Ratsiraka or Mozambique under Samora Machel grew close to the Indian Ocean nation. 108 Newitt op. cit., p. 63. 109 Among those imprisoned were the future Comorian president Mohamed Taki (1996–98) and the future grand mufti of Comoros, Saïd Mohamed Abdurahman (1978–90). 110 This was the official version of Soilihi’s death. According to a later statement by the Comorian interior and defense minister at the time, Abbas Djoussouf, Soilihi was “assassinated following a decision taken by a restricted council of ministers” (quoted in Mattoir op. cit., p. 112). Soilihi was also excommunicated through a fatwa by the grand mufti.

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isolation of the islands in global, African and regional politics had left it without any friends.”111

Mercenary Kingdom

Protected by resident mercenaries and a heavily armed presidential guard, Abdallah was to remain in power for a period of eleven years, longer than any other Comorian head of state. Eventually, he too was killed. Before that, he had restored the powers of the notables and the Muslim clergy; distributed the spoils among them like a “feudal cake”112; welcomed the French back; declared Comoros an Islamic state; imposed one-party rule; expanded his trading empire; given free rein to Denard’s ‘dogs of war’; and turned the archipelago into a base for the South African apartheid regime. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the ‘mercenary kingdom’ was suspended from the Organization of African Unity.113 Brought back to power by the same French interests – and mercenaries – that had removed him in 1975, Abdallah was to serve France dutifully. Although the breakaway of Mayotte was in breach of international law and the French action regularly was denounced by the oau and the un General Assembly, the issue was from 1978 toned down by the Comorian government itself. From a formal point of view, Mayotte still belonged to the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros, which after a constitutional referendum was proclaimed in October 1978.114 “[F]irmly tied to French apron strings,”115 in reality, however, Abdallah abandoned the Mahorian cause. Similarly, the federal principles of the 111 Malyn Newitt: ‘The Perils of Being a Microstate: São Tomé and the Comoros Islands since Independence’ in Helen M. Hintjens and Malyn D.D. Newitt (eds): The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands: The Importance of Being Small, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1992, p. 84. 112 Mattoir op. cit., p. 119. 113 In July 1977, the Organization of African Unity adopted the ‘oau Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa’. In the case of Comoros, it is ironic that the convention was signed by the African heads of state and government in Libreville, the capital of Gabon. Through the French, the first contacts between Ahmed Abdallah and Bob Denard were facilitated by Omar Bongo, the president of Gabon. After the coup d’état, Gabon played a prominent part in Denard’s sanctions-busting trade between South Africa and France. 114 The new Comorian constitution was approved by 99.3% of the voters (‘aed/Elections in the Comoros’ op. cit.) 115 Newitt op. cit., p. 69.

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constitution, which accorded Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli their own assemblies, budgets and executive powers, “never saw the light of day.”116 Instead, Abdallah centralized political power to himself and – in addition to Grande Comore – to his native island of Anjouan. Unopposed, in late October 1978 he won 100% of the votes in stage-managed presidential elections.117 Two months later, he banned all political parties for a period of twelve years. France’s return as Comoros’ de facto colonial power was confirmed in November 1978 through a series of defense and cooperation agreements. The Tanzanian instructors and Soilihi’s student militias were replaced by French officers setting up a Comorian army and a gendarmerie.118 More importantly, under the defense agreement “Comoros was included in [France’s] zone of responsibility in the Indian Ocean.”119 The French navy, army and air force could make full use of the facilities of the islands. As before independence, the bulk of the budgetary aid came from France, which together with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab countries also financed a number of infrastructural projects in road building, telecommunications, port expansion and air links. Economic recovery, however, was painfully slow. Under Abdallah, the Comorian economy finished the 1980s much as it had started ten years earlier, poor, underdeveloped and dependent. Corruption was widespread, and the president – who had invested part of his considerable wealth in the organization of the coup d’état – generally put his personal economic interests ahead of those of the nation. As the owner of Comoros’ largest trading firm in control of the exports of vanilla and the imports of rice, Abdallah rejected demands to turn the vanilla plantations into food producing farms. In the meantime, he made fortunes by selling imported rice and other staple products at monopoly prices.120 As concluded by Halifa, Abdallah’s “prime motivation was to perpetuate his business, using all the means to […] enrich himself, not to build a country.”121 The disregard for the establishment of an inclusive Comorian state – initiated under Soilihi and continued by Abdallah – did not only result in increasing poverty and social unrest, but in the proliferation of opposition 116 Saïd Ali op. cit., p. 28. 117 ‘aed/Elections in the Comoros’ op. cit. Out of close to 200,000 votes, a mere 104 were declared blank or invalid. 118 The French-trained military force was small and considerably weaker than the presidential guard. There were some 570 men in the army and 400 in the gendarmerie (Alain Deschamps: Les Comores d’Ahmed Abdallah: Mercenaires, Révolutionnaires et Cœlacanthe, Karthala, Paris, 2005, p. 116.) 119 Deschamps op. cit., pp. 77–78. 120 In the 1980s, rice imports represented around 50% of the Comorian export earnings. 121 Halifa op. cit., pp. 19–20.

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groups around various political personalities and, eventually, the development of separatism on Anjouan and Mohéli. France’s return to Comoros was, above all, conspicuous through the actions of the mercenary leader Bob Denard and his team of affreux (‘dreadful’). After the coup against Soilihi, the self-proclaimed ‘corsair of the French republic’122 – a veteran of the Katanga (Congo) wars and a number of covert armed operations in Africa – set up his base in Moroni and remained there throughout the 1980s. As underwriter of Abdallah’s reign; head of the presidential guard; an important business dealer; and a pivotal actor in the covert relations between apartheid South Africa and the Françafrique network, Denard was for ten years arguably the most powerful person in Comoros. The period is one of the darkest in post-colonial Africa. In Comoros, Denard is primarily known as the commander of Abdallah’s presidential guard.123 With no legal basis; answerable only to the president; and operating outside the chain of command of the Comorian armed forces, its functions were to protect the head of state, maintain law and order and

Denard and Françafrique Having served with the French armed forces and intelligence services in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s, Denard (also known as Gilbert Bourgeaud; 1929–2007) started his mercenary career in Katanga (Congo) in late 1961, fighting on the side of Moïse Tshombe’s secessionist forces. Remaining in Congo until the mid-1960s, he subsequently took part in conflicts in inter alia Angola, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Benin. Most of his actions were carried out with the tacit approval by the French government and secret services within the centralized Françafrique network, originally set up by President de Gaulle to defend French interests in the former African colonies. The covert operations are generally associated with Jacques Foccart (1913–1997), de Gaulle’s Africa advisor, éminence grise of French Africa policy and for three decades a confidant of a number of authoritarian African rulers. At the trial of Denard in 2006, several prominent Gaullist politicians spoke on his behalf.

122 In 1998, Denard published his memoirs under the title Corsaire de la République (Robert Laffont, Paris). 123 Garde Présidentielle (gp). In Comoros, Denard converted to Islam and took the name Saïd Mustapha M’Hadjou. He was widely known as ‘Colonel Bako’.

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gather political intelligence.124 Growing in strength from around 100 members in 1979 to 700 ten years later, most of the 30-odd officers were French citizens.125 Nevertheless, the funding of the contracts of the soldiers of fortune came from apartheid South Africa. According to Alain Deschamps, French ambassador to Comoros from 1983 to 1987, the South African military intelligence covered three quarters of the costs, with the remainder extended by the Pretoria ministry of foreign affairs.126 From the outset, Denard’s men were deployed to consolidate Abdallah’s position. Early in 1979, they started to round up Soihili supporters. Four former ministers disappeared and were allegedly executed. Another 300 followers were imprisoned without trial.127 As dissenting voices started to re-emerge, the repression increased. The president’s force rigged elections, broke up strikes, tortured prisoners and killed political opponents. When Comorian members of the presidential guard with links to the underground opposition in March 1985 staged a mutiny against their French superiors, the reaction was fierce. In addition to an unknown number of soldiers killed, around 20 military and 60 civilians were arrested. In the following trial, 17 were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor, among them the leader of the Democratic Front (Front Démocratique/fd), Mustapha Saïd Cheikh.128 In late 1987, an attempt was made to free the political prisoners. Three of those involved in the failed 124 Mattoir op. cit., p. 122. 125 The presidential guard also included a number of Belgian officers. 126 Deschamps op. cit., p. 77. Referring to Denard, Mattoir estimates that the South African financial contribution increased from 2 million Rands in 1979 to between 5 and 7 million in 1989 (Mattoir op. cit., p, 122). According to Deschamps, the annual contribution amounted to between 12 and 30 million French Francs (of which more than 2 million to Denard), or more than twice as much as the French military assistance to Comoros (Deschamps op. cit., p. 108). 127 Newitt op. cit., p. 67. 128 After the coup d’état in May 1978, molinaco members and Soilihi supporters who had fled the islands founded the opposition National Front for the Unification of ComorosComorian Union (Front National pour l’Unification des Comores-Union Comorienne/fnukunikom), based in Kenya. Comorian students in France decided at the same time to return to the archipelago and resist the regime. In 1982, former asec members launched the underground Democratic Front of Comoros. With branches on all the islands (including Mayotte), by 1985 the socialist organization had around 700 members and had managed to infiltrate the armed forces, including the presidential guard. It was fd supporters who staged the failed mutiny in March 1985. Although fd did not survive the repression that followed, other opponents to Abdallah’s rule – among them Mohamed Taki – went into exile to form new political groups (Ouledi op. cit., pp. 140–95).

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prison attack were tortured to death, leading to strong protests by Amnesty International.129 In parallel to his functions as a praetorian guard, Denard built a Comorian business empire.130 In Deschamps’ opinion, through the 1978 coup d’état he had become “a shareholder of a company that he very much intended to run at a profit.”131 After installing Abdallah, he was included as part owner of the president’s family company, Établissements Abdallah et Fils, the country’s largest foreign trade firm. Together with other resident mercenaries, Denard subsequently set up the meat trading company socovia and the private security firm sogecom.132 socovia enjoyed a monopoly on the Comorian market, but was, above all, responsible for sanctions-busting exports via Comoros of South African meat to France, Gabon and other destinations. sogecom inter alia covered the security of the South African tourist resorts at Itsandra and Mitsamihuli. The companies also served as covers for Denard’s international involvement with the apartheid military and secret services. With South African funds, finally, the mercenary leader procured a farm at Sangani in northern Grande Comore. For the period 1978–89, the total value of Denard’s business volume in Comoros has been estimated at 38 million Euros.133 Last, but not least, Comoros under Abdallah and Denard served for a period of ten years as a critical base and conduit for South African business interests, sanctions-busting and, above all, covert operations in southern Africa. After their takeover, Denard negotiated an agreement between Comoros and the apartheid regime, covering South African funding of the presidential guard in return for various facilities in the archipelago. In 1979, the South Africans set up a listening post on Grande Comore for intelligence gathering in the Indian Ocean and East Africa. Abdallah secretly visited Pretoria and Cape Town in April 1983, and both the South African foreign minister, Roloef ‘Pik’ Botha, and the defense minister, Magnus Malan, made frequent trips to Comoros.134 Through Denard’s networks and under the cover of his businesses, arms and logistical support were channeled to renamo in Mozambique, while the 129 Mattoir op. cit., pp. 134–35. The mutilated bodies were delivered to the families in plastic bags. 130 Deschamps op. cit., pp. 108–11; El-Amine op. cit., pp. 66–67; and Mattoir op. cit., pp. 122–23. 131 Deschamps op. cit., p. 99. 132 Société Comorienne des Viandes (socovia) and Société Générale Comorienne (sogecom). 133 Caminade op. cit., p. 115. 134 Deschamps inter alia mentions the visits to Comoros by Botha in December 1984 and by Malan in December 1986 (Deschamps op. cit., p. 109).

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movements of the African National Congress (anc) were being monitored.135 As a result, the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros became a clearing house for French and South African geo-political stratagems, shunned by its Indian Ocean neighbors Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles.136 Violence, Coups and Interventions As the 1980s drew to a close, Denard and his men had, nevertheless, become a diplomatic liability for the paymasters in Pretoria. In December 1988, South Africa agreed to a un-supervised independence plan for Namibia, and when F.W. de Klerk in September 1989 took over the presidency, preparations for the unbanning of the anc and the release of Nelson Mandela were initiated. The orientation away from apartheid towards international recognition was two months later advanced through the fall of the Berlin wall. In this situation, the South African and French governments reached an agreement with President Abdallah to terminate the relations with Denard, cancel the mercenaries’ contracts and incorporate the Comorian soldiers of the presidential guard into the regular army. When Abdallah on 26 November 1989 conveyed the decision to Denard and his two closest men at the president’s office close to the Beit-Salam residence in Moroni,137 the mercenaries lost their composure and shot him. Abdallah became the second Comorian president killed by Denard.138 135 In March 1988, Dulcie September, the anc chief representative to France, was assassinated in Paris. At the time, she was investigating the trafficking of arms between France and South Africa. Although the murder remains unsolved, there are strong indications that it was carried out by mercenaries from the Comorian presidential guard (El-Amine op. cit., pp. 67–68). 136 In January 1984, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles set up the Indian Ocean Commission. After French pressures, Comoros and Reunion/France joined the organization in 1986. 137 Denard was accompanied by the two Frenchmen Dominique Malacrino (‘Marquez’), commander of the presidential guard, and Jean-Paul Guerrier (‘Siam’), head of its intelligence branch. Malacrino and Guerrier returned to France in September 1990. They were arrested upon arrival, held in detention and released after six months. In September 1995, both of them took part in the coup against Saïd Mohamed Djohar. 138 On the assassination of Abdallah and the role of Denard, see Louis Vermay: Les Comores, Un Peuple Bafoué: Un Archipel aux Avatars Coloniaux, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2014. At the time, Vermay served as a French military advisor to the Comorian armed forces.

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Denard proceeded to deploy his men, taking control of the capital. Comorian gendarmes were killed and hundreds of people arrested. The South Africans immediately withdrew their support, and from bases in Reunion and Mayotte the French moved to militarily oust their mercenary countrymen. Denard, however, was not ready to give up. Insisting on a comprehensive severance package – including safe-conduct, judicial immunity and financial indemnity for himself and his men139 – he held out for almost three weeks until the conditions were met and he on 15 December 1989 eventually did surrender to a French force of 200 elite troops. Denard and around 20 of his soldiers of fortune were flown to South Africa and put under house arrest. He stayed there until 1993, when he returned to France, was put on trial and soon released.140 Before his surrender, Denard had installed Saïd Mohamed Djohar as Abdallah’s successor.141 A former head of the Supreme Court,142 Djohar is associated with the introduction of multi-party politics in Comoros, a novelty which in June 1992 was confirmed in a constitutional referendum. During his presidency (1990–95), there was, however, no democratic dividend or economic progress for the people on the islands. On the contrary, in the absence of a solid state structure and a democratic political culture, a proliferation of competing organizations undermined the stability associated with good governance and development. By 1991, there were well over twenty political parties, generally formed around as many notables and local fiefdoms. As observed by Newitt, Abdallah’s one-party rule had resulted in “[n]umerous powerless and fragmented little groups […] huddled around some prominent member of the old elite […]. None of them appeared to have any idea of a political future for themselves or the islands, except some day to occupy [Abdallah’s] shoes and enjoy in their turn the very limited spoils of office.”143 Constantly balancing various interests, during his six-year presidency Djohar – “a clever old man who want[ed] to please everybody”144 – appointed no less than eighteen government coalitions with a total of around two hundred cabinet ministers.145 139 On Denard’s conditions, see Deschamps op. cit., p. 169 and Mattoir op. cit., p. 143. 140 The trial focused on Denard’s role in the failed attempt to overthrow the government of Mathieu Kérékou in Benin in 1977, not the assassination of Abdallah. 141 After serving in an interim capacity, in March 1990 Djohar won the presidential elections. There were more voters than Comorians of voting age and the elections were generally considered fraudulent. 142 Djohar was an older half-brother of Ali Soihili. He did not, however, share Soilihi’s revolutionary views. 143 Newitt in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 88. 144 El-Amine op. cit., p. 72. 145 Deschamps op. cit., p. 173.

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The challenge of building a Comorian state was at the same time under permanent threat of armed invasions and military coups, involving both domestic and French interests. As early as August 1990 – less than a year after the mercenaries’ departure – an attempted landing on Grande Comore, led by one of Denard’s former colleagues and mounted from Mayotte, was discovered by the gendarmerie and aborted.146 In September 1992, a more serious situation developed when Comorian soldiers acting on behalf of former president Abdallah’s family and some of his closest associates mounted a military coup and took control of Moroni. Also this attempt failed and the coup makers were imprisoned. As former members of the presidential guard tried to set them free, clashes between the rebels and the forces loyal to Djohar resulted in a dozen deaths.147 In September 1995, President Djohar’s precarious rule ended in a spectacular and controversial fashion. At the head of a French mercenary force of around 30 veterans from Abdallah’s presidential guard, Denard landed his dinghies on Grande Comore; seized the capital; freed the 1992 coup makers; and took Djohar hostage. A ‘Military Committee of Transition’ was announced. While journalists based in Moroni reacted to the indifference of the local French military mission,148 the coup by Denard – his fourth in Comoros – caused an international outcry. Although the French government initially declared that “an intervention in Comoros was out of the question,”149 under the 1978 military cooperation agreement it eventually assembled 600 paratroopers and commandos, descended on Grande Comore and forced the mercenaries to surrender on 5 October. This time around, Denard and the members of his team were arrested and evacuated to France. In a remarkable breach of international law and protocol, the French at the same time exiled President Djohar to Reunion, leaving the field open for his main opponent, Mohamed Taki, seen as more amenable to French interests.150 146 The attempted landing was led by a Frenchman, Max Vieillard, later killed on Anjouan. The Djohar government accused the future president Mohamed Taki’s political party of being behind the operation. Around twenty party supporters were arrested. 147 Deschamps op. cit., p. 175. Among the injured was the head of the Comorian army, the future president Azali Assoumani. Nine of the rebels were sentenced to death. 148 It begs the question how Denard – at the time closely monitored by the French police and justice system – could organize the invasion without covert assistance. The operation involved the procurement of a transport vessel in Norway; the loading of arms in Holland; the assembly of the mercenary force in the Canary Islands; and a maritime journey around Africa of more than a month (Deschamps op. cit., p. 180). 149 Prime Minister Alain Juppé quoted in Deschamps op. cit., p. 177. 150 Djohar was only allowed to return to Comoros in January 1996. He did not take part in the subsequent presidential elections, held in March 1996 and won by Mohamed Taki.

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As Denard – at the time 66 years old – hardly could have organized the mercenary operation without considerable logistical support and always maintained that he as a French officer had acted on instructions from the Françafrique network, Caminade draws the conclusion that the events in SeptemberOctober 1995 were closely linked. Although Denard’s invasion appeared as a failure, the coup d’état was a French success.151 In this light, the subsequent acquittal of Denard for the killing of Abdallah in 1989 and the suspended sentence handed down for the 1995 operation amounted to an absolution by France of its own role in the Comorian drama.152

Secession and African Mediation

As Comoros under President Taki (1996–98) continued to suffer from deeprooted instability and the French government in January 1995 unilaterally introduced the so called ‘Balladur visa’ for Comorian citizens going to Mayotte, a decade of political separatism and secession was to follow on the fifteen years of mercenarism in the conflict-ridden Indian Ocean nation.153 In turn, the Anjouan crisis was to lead to the direct involvement by the oau/au in Comorian affairs. 151 Caminade op. cit., p. 124. 152 Ibid., p. 118. In May 1999, Denard was charged with the murder of President Abdallah, but acquitted due to ‘lack of evidence’. In June 2006, he was given a five-year suspended sentence for the 1995 invasion and coup d’état. He died in October 2007. After years of official silence, in February 2011 the former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard (1988–91) confirmed that Denard at the time of Abdallah’s death was working for the French government under the General Directorate of External Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure/dgse) (‘Comores: Bob Denard était bien en service commandé’ in malangoactualité.fr, 1 March 2011). 153 This said, the conflict-ridden archipelago would also in the new millennium endure a number of French mercenary plots, linked to Abdallah’s presidential guard and involving Comorian military and politicians. In December 2001, a group attempted a landing on Mohéli in a boat named ‘A Nice Day to Die’. In September 2003, a planned incursion by Philippe Verdon, a former member of Denard’s team, failed. As late as April 2013, a planned coup against President Dhoinine was uncovered, implicating rebel soldiers from Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (drc). It had allegedly been organized from France by Patrick Klein, who in the mid-1980s served in the presidential guard, and Mahamoud Ahmed Abdallah, one of the sons of the late president (‘Coup d’état aux Comores: Confirmation de l’implication d’un mercenaire français’ in comores-actualités. com, 28 April 2013 and ‘Manifestation contre la tentative de destabilisation: Un français, Patrick Klein, serait le “cerveau” de l’opération’ in alwatwan.net, 29 April 2013).

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The first secessionist crisis broke out on Anjouan – the island closest to Mayotte – in mid-1997, when fundi Abdallah Ibrahim, a septuagenarian Koranic teacher and leader of the Popular Movement of Anjouan (Mouvement Populaire Anjouanais/mpa),154 initially requested re-attachment to the former colonial power, France, and subsequently declared independence with that objective. Behind the move to secede from the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros were a number of structural and political factors. Since President Abdallah’s death, Anjouan had generally been neglected by the federal authorities in Moroni, who allocated most of the country’s meager resources to Grande Comore. At the same time, a sharp slump in the international prices of aromatic plants – the mainstay of Anjouan’s economy – resulted in decreasing incomes and growing poverty on the densely populated island, which already before was the poorest in the Comorian archipelago. In combination with salary arrears of up to ten months for civil servants, this led in March 1997 to a general strike, widespread unrest and repression. Four people were killed and hundreds detained. What finally triggered Ibrahim’s radical move, however, was President Taki’s decision to centralize even more power to the federal presidency, extend his presidential term and strip the individual islands of the right to elect their own governors. This was done through a constitutional review, which despite outspoken opposition was approved in a dubious referendum in October 1996.155 The amended constitution stipulated that “the governors [of the islands] will be appointed by decree of the President of the Republic,”156 a provision which both on Anjouan and Mohéli not only was resented by the urban political class, but also by wide segments of the rural population. The youth, in particular, perceived the dominance of Grande Comore as oppressive, questioned Anjouan’s future in a Comorian state and started to look to neighboring Mayotte as an alternative. Supported by Franco-Anjouanais residents and Mahorian political forces,157 by mid-1997 large demonstrations waving the French flag and appealing for association with France were held in the island capital of Mutsamudu, as well as in Domoni and many villages. 154 In addition to mpa, the Organization for the Independence of Anjouan (Organisation pour l’independence d’Anjouan/opia) strived for secession. 155 The constitutional referendum was held on 20 October 1996. There was no information on the number of registered voters or on the total of votes cast. According to the Comorian authorities, President Taki’s proposal was approved by 85% of the electorate (‘aed/ Elections in the Comoros’ op. cit.). 156 ‘Constitution of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros’, Article 72, Moroni, 30 October 1996. 157 On right-wing mobilization for the independence of Anjouan in Mayotte and France, see Caminade op. cit., pp. 134–58.

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On 3 August 1997, Abdallah Ibrahim unilaterally declared an independent State of Anjouan (État d’Anjouan), with himself as president and requesting reattachment to France. Mohéli also seceded.158 Whereas the smaller island of Mohéli within a couple of months quietly re-united with Grande Comore, Ibrahim’s decision was irrevocable. It not only provoked a failed invasion by the Comorian armed forces, but represented from the outset a considerable challenge for both France and the Organization of African Unity. Ibrahim’s request was widely supported in Mayotte, Reunion and metropolitan France. Following international condemnation of the occupation of Mayotte, Denard’s mercenary reign and the 1995 military operation in Comoros, the French government, nevertheless, was keen to manifest a break with its interventionism in the region. Thus, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin did not address the issue of attachment to France, but referred the matter of Anjouan’s independence to the oau Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim.159 As secession was in breach of the oau Charter and its commitment to territorial integrity, the pan-African body was also requested to intervene by President Taki. Over the following years, the actions by the federal authorities and the unyielding stand by Anjouan were to seriously call the oau’s capacity for peaceful conflict resolution into question. In mid-August 1997, the oau Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Manage­ ment and Resolution decided to deploy an observer mission to Comoros in preparation for a reconciliation conference with the opposing parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, already in early September the prospects of a diplomatic solution deteriorated considerably when Taki launched a military attack on Anjouan. The Comorian armed forces were easily repelled by the Anjouan military and militia. In this situation, the Moroni government declared a state of emergency and imposed economic sanctions on the rebel island. Despite shortages of food and medicines, the action strengthened the resolve of the Anjouanais government, which on 26 October organized a referendum, asking the population: “Do you want independence from the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros?” According to the Anjouan authorities, 99.9% answered in the affirmative. Four months later – on 15 February 1998 – another referendum adopted a constitution for the State of Anjouan, this time with the official backing of 99.5% of the electorate.160 Neither vote was recognized by the un, the oau or any other entity. 158 For a short period at the end of 1997, the Comorian islands of Grande Comore, Mohéli, Anjouan and Mayotte were governed as four separate entities. 159 The veteran Tanzanian diplomat, former minister of foreign affairs (1980–84) and prime minister (1984–85), was born in Pemba (Zanzibar). His mother was of Comorian descent. 160 ‘aed/Autonomous Island Elections in the Comoros/Elections in Anjouan’ op. cit. For the independence referendum on 26 October 1997, no information on the number of registered

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The following month, the Anjouan government declined to meet a broad, high-level oau reconciliation mission, composed of members from Burkina Faso, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Returning from the island, the Tanzanian foreign minister, Jakaya Kikwete, commented that “there is anarchy and chaos, and the situation is out of hand.”161 As President Taki called for a military intervention by the oau, splits in the Anjouan leadership between advocates of full independence and supporters of re-attachment to France had by then started to appear, soon leading to violent clashes between the two secessionist camps. Amidst mounting turmoil on Anjouan, in November 1998 the unexpected death of Mohamed Taki complicated the situation further.162 In April 1999, the oau, nevertheless, managed to assemble representatives of the Moroni government and the islands of Grande Comore, Mohéli and Anjouan to an interisland conference in Antananarivo, Madagascar, where an accord in principle was reached to replace the existing Comorian state with a ‘Union of the Comoros Islands’ and a rotating presidency among the three. In the end, the delegates from Anjouan did not sign the accord, which immediately led to anti-Anjouanais riots on Grande Comore, forcing more than a thousand people to abandon their homes. Order was restored on 30 April, when the head of the Comorian army, Colonel Assoumani Azali, seized power in a bloodless coup and dissolved all constitutional institutions. Although the military takeover was condemned by the oau, to general surprise Azali accepted the Antananarivo inter-island accord, over the following months establishing a dialogue with the separatists on Anjouan with a view to reach a non-violent settlement. On Anjouan, meanwhile, splits in the separatist movement also led to a military takeover when Lieutenant-Colonel Abderemane Saïd Abeid in mid-June 1999 formed a ‘government of national unity’. Still dominated by hardline secessionists, it rejected the Antananarivo accord and organized yet another referendum to confirm the independence of the island.163 The reaction by the oau was to impose sanctions and suspend all air and sea links. Although the embargo voters or on the total of votes cast was reported. For the constitutional referendum on 15 February 1998, the figures were, however, given. The voter turnout was 88%. 161 Kikwete quoted in Richard Cornwell: ‘Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean’ in African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1998, [p. 9]. 162 Officially, President Taki suffered a heart attack, but senior officials expressed doubts about the actual circumstances of his death. Tadjidine Ben Saïd Massounde, a former prime minister, was designated acting president. 163 The referendum was held on 23 January 2000, with a reported voter turnout of 90.3%. According to the Abeid government, 94.5% of the electorate supported independence (‘aed/Autonomous Island Elections in the Comoros/Elections in Anjouan’ op. cit.).

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had little practical effect due to Anjouan’s close relations with Mayotte, in the end, however, the stiffer measures paved the way for an understanding between the two pivotal military leaders, Azali and Abeid. In August 2000, they set aside the Antananarivo accord and signed a similar compact, providing for a new Comorian constitution with considerable powers for the individual islands.164 With post-apartheid South Africa as an active broker, on 17 February 2001, finally, the compact was formalized into a comprehensive framework agreement on national reconciliation and unity in Fomboni, the capital of Mohéli. Signed by representatives of the federal Moroni government, the island administrations, opposition parties and civil society, it was endorsed by the oau, the Francophonie and the eu. After three and a half years of secession, many lives lost and increased poverty throughout the archipelago, the breakaway of Anjouan had ended. The blueprint for a new constitutional dispensation – the Union of the Comoros – had been drawn.

A Fragile Union

The Fomboni agreement aimed at putting an end to inter-island rivalries and separatism by according Grande Comore, Mohéli and Anjouan extensive autonomy within a federal dispensation. Each island was to have its own president, legislature and financial independence, while the over-arching union government – as before based in Moroni on Grande Comore – should be responsible for foreign relations, defense and religious affairs. Importantly, the union president was on a rotating basis to be elected for a single, four-year term from candidates identified in primary elections on each island at a time, starting with Grande Comore in 2002 and followed by Anjouan in 2006 and Mohéli in 2010.165 On 23 December 2001, the constitutional proposal was submitted to the Comorian electorate. With a turnout of 75%, it was approved by 77%. Whereas 62.9% of the voters on Grande Comore welcomed the principle of increased powers to the island authorities, on Mohéli the corresponding figure was 82.5% and on Anjouan – where four out of five registered voters took part – no less than 95.3%.166 The referendum, thus, confirmed that insular 164 The agreement between Azali and Abeid was signed on neutral ground in Fomboni, Mohéli, on 26 August 2000. It was initially denounced by the oau on the grounds that it contravened the terms of the 1999 Antananarivo accord and that it was concluded by two unconstitutional, non-recognized coup leaders. 165 And, notably, according to the original schedule in Mayotte in 2014. 166 ‘aed/Comoros Detailed Election Results’ op. cit.

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autonomy enjoyed stronger support on Anjouan (and Mohéli) than on Grande Comore.167 The understanding reached in Fomboni was ‘an all-party framework agreement’, not a detailed text stipulating the content and principles of the proposed new dispensation. With international assistance and advice – notably from South Africa – they would be established and implemented over the following four years, until the installation of Ahmed Abdallah Sambi from Anjouan as the union president in May 2006. The complex process of setting up the new institutions; defining their mandates and responsibilities; establishing an equitable formula for resource allocation between the islands; reforming the security sector; and organizing elections at the federal, insular and municipal levels was carried forward under Assoumani Azali. Representing Grande Comore, Azali – who in 1999 had taken power in a military coup – was after controversial elections in April 2002 declared president.168 Throughout the process of constitutional devolution, Azali was to face stiff political opposition, protests and electoral boycotts, in particular on his home island. The fragility of the transition prompted several mediation efforts by the African Union and other international organizations, notably the oif, the Arab League and the Indian Ocean Commission. In early 2004, the au Peace and Security Council deployed an observer mission, including military personnel, to monitor and validate the scheduled elections to the three island assemblies, as well as to the federal parliament. It was one of the first peace supporting operations by the reformed pan-African organization.169 Although minor 167 Autonomous island referendums were held in March-April 2002. The results confirmed those registered in the December 2001 national referendum, with ‘Yes’ votes of 97.6% on Anjouan, 86.4% on Mohéli and 75.0% on Grande Comore. Overall, the Comorian voters returned an even more positive verdict on the federal proposal in the island referendums. 168 As the other candidates boycotted the second round of the presidential elections, Azali was unopposed. However, less than half of the registered voters – or as little as 39.1% – took part in the vote. Furthermore, on the grounds that the elections had not been free and fair, the National Electoral Commission (nec) declared the result invalid. Nevertheless, following the dissolution of the nec and the appointment of a new electoral body, Azali was declared the winner. 169 Comoros joined the au at its inaugural heads of state and government summit in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. The first au observer mission in Comoros (mioc) was led by South Africa, which also contributed most of the funding. In addition to civilian monitors from South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar and Tanzania, it included military observers from various African countries. After the peace support operations in Burundi (amib 2003) and Sudan (amis 2004), it was one of the first of the reformed au.

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disturbances and irregularities were noted on Anjouan, the elections in MarchApril 2004 were held in a calm atmosphere. Meeting in Addis Ababa, the council “express[ed] satisfaction at the smooth organization of the elections of the parliaments of the islands and of the union, commend[ing] the Comorian parties for th[eir] spirit of cooperation.”170 With international support, the archipelago entered a period of relative stability. Albeit cut off from Mayotte, after thirty years of conflict, mercenarism and separatism, Comoros – vilified as ‘the coup-coup islands’171 – had for the first time since independence in 1975 established democratically elected legislative bodies. With a certain degree of confidence, the Comorian people could look forward to a constitutional transfer of the union presidency, orderly island elections and improved conditions for socio-economic development. Monitored by a significant au observer mission,172 presidential elections were held in April-May 2006. In accordance with the Fomboni agreement, they were organized in two phases, where voters on Anjouan in primary elections first selected three candidates from the island, who subsequently contested nationwide polls. It was the first time the rotating formula was put to a test. As had been the case with the assembly elections in 2004, the electoral  campaign was generally calm and controlled. With 58% of the votes, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, a Muslim theologian, businessman and founder of the Islamist National Front for Justice (Front National por la Justice/fnj),173 was elected to the highest office. Although President Azali had supported another candidate, he honored the outcome and handed over the presidency to Sambi on 26 May 2006. It was the first peaceful transfer of power in the history of Comoros, setting an example for the local elections on the islands of Grande Comore, Mohéli and Anjouan. Only a year later, however, stability was once again broken by yet another crisis on Anjouan, where the incumbent island president, Colonel Mohamed Bacar, head of the gendarmerie and a leading pro-French separatist,174 defied the newly established constitutional order, refused to stand down and had 170 au Peace and Security Council: ‘Communiqué’ (psc/pr/comm/VI), Addis Ababa, 29 April 2004. 171 irin: ‘Comoros: Reforming “the coup-coup islands”’, irinnews.org, 25 February 2009. 172 The second au observer mission in Comoros (amisec) comprised around 460 military and police. 173 In his younger days, Sambi was a leading activist against President Abdallah. He pursued Islamic studies in Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. A sharif of Hadrami descent, he was born in Mutsamudu, Anjouan, and supported separatism on the island from 1997. 174 Bacar came to power through a military coup in Anjouan in 2001. In 2002, he was elected president of the island.

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himself re-confirmed in non-authorized elections. It was a serious challenge to both the laborious national re-unification process and to the au, which in May 2007 had organized a third electoral and security mission to oversee the island elections.175 Subsequent events mirrored those of the 1997 crisis. As Bacar blocked the African observers from entering Anjouan – and violent persecution of pro-union supporters spread throughout the island – the unilateral action prompted a determined reaction. With reference to its Constitutive Act; the principle of territorial integrity; and the right to intervene in a member state,176 in October 2007 the au imposed targeted sanctions on Bacar and more than a hundred of his supporters. As in 1997, a naval blockade was also declared. These measures, however, had little effect. Following a request by President Sambi – once an Anjouanais separatist himself – in February 2008 the au Peace and Security Council decided to deploy a military force. The decision was not unanimous. Whereas President Mbeki of South Africa argued that all diplomatic avenues had not been exhausted – subsequently leading to the withdrawal of the South African troops – President Kikwete of Tanzania pushed for a military option.177 Kikwete, who at the time was chairing the au, was inter alia supported by Libya and Sudan. Termed ‘Operation Democracy’, the au military intervention was the first of its kind. Eventually, Libya also decided against troop contribution. Nevertheless, a force of over 1,500 military from Comoros, Sudan and Tanzania was assembled.178 Libya and, notably, France, provided equipment and logistical support, primarily for air transport. The French participation was the only non-African contribution. It was to constitute a double-edged sword. The invasion of Anjouan took place on 25 March 2008. It met with little resistance from Bacar’s forces and caused few fatalities. Bacar himself managed to flee to Mayotte. Although France took part in the au peace-making operation, Bacar, however, was not brought back to Comoros to face justice, but taken to Reunion. A request by the Sambi government for Bacar’s extradition 175 The third au observer mission in Comoros (maes) included troops from Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania. 176 A key difference between the oau and the au is the “right […] to intervene in a member state […] in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (au: ‘Constitutive Act’, Article 4, Lomé, 11 July 2000). 177 The government of Tanzania was facing secessionist demands on the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar. By taking a strong, unequivocal position with regard to Anjouan, President Kikwete also sent a message to the Zanzibari opposition. 178 ‘Operation Democracy’ in Comoros was exceptional in that neither of the three major African countries usually involved in au peace-making operations – Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa – played a military role.

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was turned down by the French authorities. Causing an uproar in Comoros and among the Comorian diaspora in France, in July 2008 the French government instead facilitated the separatist leader’s exile to Benin in West Africa. In spite of France’s provocative finale, ‘Operation Democracy’, nevertheless, succeeded in bringing the Fomboni process back on track. Democratic and duly monitored elections for an island president took place on Anjouan in June 2008. Although the decision to use military force had been controversial, for the African Union the first ever armed intervention was at the same time “a breakthrough […] when it comes to planning and conducting peace operations.”179 As conceived under the Fomboni arrangement, stability came at a huge expense for the impoverished nation. With all the institutions in place, the administrative costs of the complex electoral system; one federal and three insular governments; four assemblies; and a growing bureaucracy consumed no less than 80% of central government revenue. Although the expenditure was unsustainable, any attempt at reforming the constitutional arrangement carried the risk of re-igniting the centrifugal, secessionist forces it was designed to contain. Nevertheless, in late 2008 President Sambi proposed a number of far-reaching changes, arguing that they would result in budgetary savings of between 10 and 15%. They included the downgrading of the three island presidents to governors; reduction of their powers; extension of Sambi’s presidency by one year; presidential powers to dissolve the legislature; and harmonization of the election calendar throughout the union. The proposed, centralizing reforms were strongly rejected by the political opposition, not least on Mohéli, the island next in turn to select a union president. President Sambi’s subsequent move to submit the proposed reform package to a referendum was further opposed by the constitutional court. Even so, after au-backed negotiations and an inter-Comorian dialogue process, the referendum was held in May 2009. Boycotted by the political opposition and with a low turnout of just over 50%, Sambi’s proposals were approved by 93.9% of the voters.180 Since the opposition rejected the one-year extension of President Sambi’s mandate, the au was yet again called upon to mediate.181 After drawn out 179 Emma Svensson: ‘The African Union’s Operations in the Comoros: maes and Operation Democracy’, foi/Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, September 2008, p. 23. 180 ‘aed/Elections in the Comoros’ op. cit. 181 Francisco Madeira, a senior diplomat from Mozambique, served as the au special envoy to Comoros between 1999 and 2010. The former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, was together with other Mozambicans responsible for the au/sadc mediation effort in Madagascar.

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negotiations, in June 2010 it was eventually agreed that Sambi should hand over the reins of the union government to his successor before 26 May 2011. Meanwhile, presidential elections were held in November-December 2010. Representing the island of Mohéli, with 60.9% of the vote in the second, nationwide round, Sambi’s preferred candidate, the incumbent Vice-President Ikililou Dhoinine, was declared the winner.182 Although the defeated candidates complained of fraud and rejected the outcome, international observers from inter alia the au, the Arab League and the Francophonie judged the elections generally free and fair. When Dhoinine in May 2011 replaced Sambi, it was the first time that a representative of Mohéli, the smallest and least populous of the Comorian islands, held the union presidency.

New Arab Money and Old French Military

Under the civilian, democratically constituted presidencies of Ahmed Abdallah Sambi and Ikililou Dhoinine, the Comorian nation re-joined the international community. During their presidencies, the domestic political scene continued to be characterized by a multitude of small political groupings, forming loose alliances around dominant personalities; persistent disagreements over the competencies of the different island authorities; and periodical outbreaks of strikes and social unrest, often as a result of non-payment of salaries to civil servants and other public sector employees.183 In spite of recurrent rumors of military disquiet and coup preparations, by 2012, however, Comoros “by and large […] seemed to have finally found a relatively harmonious and widely accepted balance between the many divergent interest groups.”184 There was no serious challenge to President Dhoinine’s ruling coalition, the Movement of Presidential Majority (Mouvement de la Majorité Présidentielle/mmp). After a long absence, in March 2013, however, ex-president Sambi returned to Comoros with an agenda that appeared to upset the political balance, criticizing his former protégé for excluding him and openly opposing 182 ‘aed/Elections in the Comoros’ op. cit. In contrast with Sambi, Dhoinine did not have a high political profile. Trained as a pharmacist in Guinea (Conakry), as Sambi’s deputy he had since 2006 been responsible for budgetary and financial affairs in the union government. 183 On several occasions, allied nations – among them Libya and Qatar – have stepped in to pay the government’s outstanding salary bills. 184 Rolf Hofmeier: ‘Comoros’ in Mehler, Melber and van Walraven (eds): Africa Yearbook 2012, op. cit. (2013), p. 302.

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the rotating presidential arrangement. Later in the year, Sambi declared himself firmly in opposition to the Dhoinine government, announcing that his objective was to re-conquer the presidency in 2016. In October 2013, he launched a new political party, called Juwa (‘The Sun’), through the merger of three existing pro-Sambi organizations.185 With significant popular support, notably on Anjouan, the political comeback by the ‘Ayatollah’ and his defiance of the Fomboni arrangement was bound to change the correlation of political forces in Comoros. Externally, the Sambi and Dhoinine presidencies have been marked by a consolidation of the links with China, but, above all, by a determined orientation towards Iran and the Arab world, in particular the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc). In spite of the oau/au contributions in solving the Anjouan crises of 1997–2001 and 2007–08, the Union of Comoros has not established closer bonds with the African nations south of the Sahara, nor with the pan-African organization as such. It is the only African Indian Ocean state which is not a member of the Southern African Development Community.186 In 1975, China was the first country to establish an embassy in Moroni, and at the time of independence Mao Zedong was an inspiration for many young Comorians. Nevertheless, in the case of Comoros China’s emergence as a giant on the African stage – which coincided with the birth of the union – has not translated in rapidly growing bilateral trade or significant investments. President Sambi paid a visit to Beijing soon after his installation in 2006 and China is often praised for its diplomatic support. Apart from smaller grants towards the building of schools, health clinics and a hospital on Anjouan,187 China’s economic profile, however, is less pronounced than that of Japan, which plays a major role in the fisheries sector. In pursuit of a new foreign policy, from the beginning President Sambi accorded priority to Iran, as well as to the countries in North Africa and the 185 ‘Politique: Investiture du nouveau parti comorien, “Juwa”’ in alwatwan.net, 31 October 2013. 186 Since 2006, Comoros, however, is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (comesa). As a result of ‘Operation Democracy’ and the African Union’s involvement, the Comorian armed forces also take part in the build-up of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (easbrig), with headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. easbrig is one of the regional brigades of the African Standby Force (asf), scheduled to achieve operational capability by 2015. With a small and under-equipped force, the military contribution by the Comorian National Army of Development (Armée Nationale de Développement/and) is marginal, but politically significant. 187 ‘La Chine va construire un hôpital à Anjouan’ in Albalad, 10 January 2011.

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Middle East. Often coupled with controversial statements and initiatives, the policy course was criticized by the political opposition in Comoros and seen as eccentric by many African states. At the height of the Darfur conflict, for example, Sambi proposed in March 2009 to the Arab League summit in Qatar that the Nobel Peace Prize should be awarded to the Sudanese president, Omar alBashir.188 Earlier in the month, the International Criminal Court had issued a warrant of arrest against al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At the un General Assembly in New York, in October 2010 the Comorian president supported King Mohammed VI of Morocco and his country’s claim over Western Sahara – called ‘Moroccan Sahara’ by Sambi – or the very issue that had caused Morocco’s withdrawal from the African Union.189 Subsequently reaffirmed, Sambi’s position appeared akin to that of France with regard to Mayotte and, thus, not only in breach of international law, but contrary to Comoros’ own interests. In early 2010, finally, he welcomed a contingent of about 50 soldiers from Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya to serve as his presidential guard in Moroni.190 As late as mid-March 2011 – as the un Security Council was discussing a no-fly zone over Libya – Sambi expressed his “unconditional support of Colonel Gadaffi.”191 With regard to Morocco, Sudan and Libya, Sambi’s stand could be explained by deliveries of weapons to the Comorian army during the second Anjouan conflict. In the case of Libya, the Gadaffi government had in August 2009 and April 2010, in addition, extended critical financial support to cover public sector salary arrears, both to civil servants and to the Comorian military. In respect of Iran, however, the close links established under President Sambi were widely interpreted as a reflection of the president’s personal ambitions. Nicknamed ‘Ayatollah’, Sambi had pursued Islamic studies in Iran. After his installation, he invited Iranian representatives to Comoros, and already in August 2006 the two countries signed cooperation agreements in the fields of agriculture, education and defense. In June 2008, soon after the Anjouan crisis, Sambi visited Teheran, and in February 2009 the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, led a strong delegation to Moroni. Four protocols on 188 ‘Comores: Les comoriens très preoccupés par la situation insurrectionnelle en Lybie’ in malango-actualité.fr, 25 February 2011. 189 ‘Visite M. Ouzzine à Moroni: Renforcer les relations entre les deux pays’ in alwatwan.net, 17 December 2010. The African Union recognizes the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (‘Western Sahara’) as a member. 190 ‘Comores: Départ imminent des militaires libyens’ in malango-actualité.fr, 15 March 2011. 191 Sambi quoted in ‘L’Union des Comores contre toute ingérence de forces étrangères en Libye’ in malango-actualité.fr, 16 March 2011.

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economic cooperation were signed during the state visit.192 Despite Sambi’s enthusiasm, however, the close relations with Iran were viewed with mixed feelings by the Sunni Muslim establishment in Comoros, fearing increased influence of the Shia faith. In the absence of tangible economic dividends from the cooperation with Iran – and as the forces of the Arab Spring were gathering in North Africa – towards the end of Sambi’s presidency Comoros increasingly turned to Kuwait, Qatar and other oil-rich member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The focus – strengthened under President Dhoinine – was in December 2008 evidenced through a controversial Economic Citizenship Program, granting Comorian citizenship to foreign nationals willing to invest in the islands. Under bilateral agreements, residents of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were, in particular, targeted. Although it did result in the establishment of large Kuwaiti companies and to significant state revenue, it also met with considerable political criticism by those arguing that the government was selling off the country to foreign interests. The orientation towards the gcc member states was cemented through visits by the prime minister of Kuwait in July 2009 and, above all, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, the Emir of Qatar, in April 2010.193 The main purpose of the visit by the Qatari leader was to discuss the outcome of an important investment and development conference on Comoros, held in Doha, Qatar, in March 2010, in cooperation with the Arab League and the Islamic Development Bank. Hailed by President Sambi as “the beginning of a new era,”194 the Doha conference resulted in financial pledges to various development projects of a total of 540 million us Dollars. One year later, the figure was adjusted upwards to 680 million.195 Apart from scholarship programs and a number of road building projects, by 2013, however, there were few signs that the pledges had turned into significant undertakings. Meanwhile, Comoros continues to be economically dependent on France with regard to development assistance, trade and remittances from the diaspora. France is by far the largest bilateral donor and the prime destination of 192 Hofmeier: ‘Comoros’ in Mehler, Melber and van Walraven (eds): Africa Yearbook 2009, op. cit. (2010), p. 304. 193 During his visit, the Qatari leader made a personal grant of 20 million Euros towards the outstanding civil service wage bill. 194 ‘Conférence de Doha: 540 millions de dollars pour les Comores’ in malango-actualité.fr, 11 March 2010. 195 ‘Conférence de presse: Commission arabe/Gouvernement comorien’ in alwatwan.net, 3 March 2011.

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the country’s exports.196 In addition, Comoros is a member of the Franc zone and the convertibility of the national currency, the Comorian Franc, is guaranteed by the French treasury.197 At the same time – and contrary to the situation in most of France’s former colonies in Africa – there is in Comoros no significant French business sector, nor a sizeable French resident community. Long and dark shadows complicate Comoros’ relations with France. Marked by duplicity at the time of independence, occupation of Mayotte, mercenary rule, separatism and a number of French-engineered coup d’états and political assassinations, they are characterized by skepticism and ambivalence. Until the advent of formal democracy in 2006 and the second Anjouan crisis of 2007–08, the isolated Indian Ocean nation experienced three decades of French sticks and very few carrots. Under presidents Sambi and Dhoinine, the Mahorian question, the ‘Balladur visa’ and the resulting humanitarian drama have dominated the Franco-Comorian relations. Albeit at a low level, bilateral French aid programs resumed in 2004. The following year, President Azali made an official visit to France. During the visit, it was agreed to re-launch a dialogue between the two countries, and in April 2005 a Franco-Comorian commission met for the first time since 1991. After the outbreak of the second Anjouan crisis, President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi also travelled to Paris, where he in September 2007 was received by President Sarkozy. Although the meeting focused on the events in Anjouan and the build-up towards the au ‘Operation Democracy’, it established a joint HighLevel Working Group (gthn) to facilitate the normalization of the bilateral relations.198 However, following France’s refusal to extradite the Anjouanais secessionist leader Mohamed Bacar in 2008 and its organization of the Mahorian referendum in March 2009, Comoros withdrew from the working group. In January 2011, the Sarkozy government announced the resumption of the joint forum, a declaration that was immediately denied by Sambi, who 196 In 2009, French overseas development assistance to Comoros amounted to 20.6 million us Dollars (musd). With 5.3 musd, Japan was the second largest bilateral donor. Among the multilateral aid partners, the European Union was dominant, accounting for disbursements of a total of 42.4 musd (AfDB ‘Country Strategy Paper’, op. cit., p. 38). Within the eu, France is a major contributor. With regard to foreign trade, in 2011 more than 43% of the Comorian exports went to France, which also procured over 20% of the imports. Around 30% of the imports were petroleum products from the United Arab Emirates (un Data op. cit., p. 6). 197 The value of the Comorian Franc is quoted on the basis of a fixed rate to the Euro and the Paris exchange market’s rates for other currencies. As a member of the Franc zone, Comoros does not have an independent monetary policy. 198 Groupe de Travail de Haut Niveau (gthn).

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made it clear that as long as France maintained the ‘Balladur visa’ there would be no further meetings.199 In reality, therefore, the working group was only functional for about a year. Under the new presidents of Comoros and France, respectively Ikililou Dhoinine and François Hollande, in June 2013 – after a break of five years – another attempt at an institutional dialogue was launched. During an official visit by Dhoinine to Paris, the two heads of state issued a ‘Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation’, which acknowledged that there since Comoros’ independence in 1975 existed a “disaccord”200 between the two countries, but affirmed that “the moment has now arrived to re-establish the close, historical bonds that unite them and give the bilateral relations a new impetus.”201 In order to “develop a strategic, exemplary and ambitious partnership which should cover all the dimensions of the relationship,” the parties decided to set up a bilateral High Council of Parity,202 replacing the defunct gthn and with a mandate to define concrete political, economic and social objectives for the period 2015–20. Although the declaration did not mention the issues of Mayotte, illegal immigration or the ‘Balladur visa’, it referred to “human dramas” and affirmed that France and Comoros together should “take all the appropriate steps necessary for [the establishment] of maritime security […] around the four islands.”203 According to President Dhoinine, the Paris declaration was the first step in a foreign policy process that was to “set the tone for the rest of [his] mandate.”204 It was, however, from the beginning called into question by the Comorian political class. Noting that Mayotte was kept out of the talks and that Hollande had reiterated that the island formed an integral part of France, the Moronibased quasi-official Comité Maore was particularly critical, denouncing the French president’s “arrogance” and “provocation” and characterizing his attitude 199 ‘Comores: Reprise des travaux du gthn’ in malango-actualité.fr, 20 January 2011, and ‘Comores: “Pas de reprise du gthn selon la partie comorienne”’ in malango-actualité.fr, 27 January 2011. 200 In French, différend. 201 ‘Déclaration de Paris sur l’Amitié et la Coopération entre la France et les Comores’, Paris, 21 June 2013. 202 Haut Conseil Paritaire (hcp). 203 ‘Déclaration de Paris sur l’Amitié et la Coopération entre la France et les Comores’, Paris, 21 June 2013. The declaration further stated that “France and Comoros intend to play a central role for the construction in the south-western Indian Ocean of a space of peace, security, law and democracy, justice and freedom, [and] development and prosperity.” 204 ‘Allocution du président Ikililou Dhoinine: Au nom de quoi et pour quels intérêts, la France continue-t-elle d’ignorer le droit international?’ in alwatwan.net, 6 July 2013.

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towards Dhoinine as “unacceptable humiliation.”205 The feelings were widely shared in Comoros. When the High Council of Parity in late November 2013 held its first working session behind closed doors in Paris, all the major Comorian opposition parties, as well as members of President Dhoinine’s own coalition, got together to reject the talks, seeing them as a stratagem by France to force Comoros to police migration and recognize French sovereignty over Mayotte.206 Whereas Comoros has been unable to prevent Mayotte’s integration into France, the ambivalence of the Franco-Comorian relations was underscored in September 2010, when the two countries decided to re-activate the 1978 military cooperation agreement concluded under President Ahmed Abdallah.207 The agreement had been suspended since 1999. The decision to re-launch the cooperation was made only three days after President Sambi delivered a particularly harsh criticism of France at the un General Assembly in New York.208 Although the announcement generally took the Comorians by surprise, under Dhoinine the military partnership has not only been maintained, but since 2011 it has inter alia resulted in regular training exercises in Comoros, led by French officers from the Foreign Legion in Mayotte and the fazsoi headquarters in Reunion.209 Soldiers from the Comorian armed forces have also been sent to Reunion for training purposes.210 At a juncture marked by Comoros’ orientation towards the Arab world, developments in the military field added another dimension to its foreign relations and, above all, to the conflict over Mayotte. 205 ‘Comores/Déclaration liminaire: Dénoncer l’humiliation’ in comores-actualités.com, 30 June 2013. 206 ‘Première réunion du Haut conseil paritaire Comores-France’ in malango-actualité.fr, 1 December 2013, and ‘La classe politique à la quasi-unanimité condamne la première rencontre du Haut conseil paritaire’ in lagazettedescomores.com, 6 December 2013. 207 ‘Comores: Réactivation des accords de défense entre la France et les Comores’ in malangoactualité.fr, 29 September 2010, and ‘Affaire des accords militaires avec la France’ in alwatwan.net, 4 October 2010. 208 Ibid. 209 ‘France-Comores: Partenariat de défense’ in La Tribune des Comores, 5–20 October 2011, and ‘Une troisième formation de la coopération militaire franco-comorienne’ in alwatwan.net, 15 April 2013. 210 Ibid. Despite the common occurence of military coups and notwithstanding repeated political interventions by the armed forces, the standing Comorian National Army of Development (and) is remarkably small, consisting of less than 1,000 military personnel. The gendarmerie has around 500 members. Comoros does not have an air force and the naval resources are very limited. A decision to set up a small coast guard was taken in 2010.

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Poverty, Perfumes and Prospects

From macro- and socio-economic points of view, Comoros is together with Madagascar lagging far behind the other Indian Ocean nations and territories. Although gdp per capita due to considerable financial transfers from the Comorian diaspora is bigger than that of Madagascar, without an industrial base; a shortage of arable land; no proven mineral resources211; and struggling with a huge trade deficit, the economic prospects for the marginalized Indian Ocean nation are uncertain. In 2013, a joint study by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the oecd, the undp and the Economic Commission for Africa noted that “the Comorian economy has not yet truly begun a structural change.” Comoros, it continued, “is highly unstable politically, it suffers from insufficient budgetary resources and the authorities lack a long-term strategic vision on sustainable development and optimal management of natural resources.”212 With regard to human development, the study found that “[i]t is difficult to judge the progress Comoros is making towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals [as] there are no monitoring mechanisms.”213 Nevertheless, due to a lack of investment in education and health, a separate study by the AfDB concluded in 2011 that “most of the [goals] are unlikely to be achieved by 2015.”214 Largely as a result of financial transfers, in 2010 gdp per capita in Comoros was as high as 740 us Dollars, or almost double that of Madagascar.215 However, measuring life expectancy and education in addition to incomes, in 2012 the undp only ranked the country as 169 out of 186 nations in the world, with an index of 0.429 trailing 18 places behind Madagascar in the hdi category of ‘low human development’.216 In respect of overall governance, in the same year the 211 Potentially, the Karthala and La Grille volcanoes offer enormous opportunities for geothermal energy production. 212 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Comoros/Overview’, p. 2. 213 Ibid./‘Social Context and Human Development’, p. 1. 214 AfDB ‘Country Strategy Paper’ op. cit., p. 8. As a result of Koranic education, nine out of ten Comorians read and write. In 2011, the net school enrolment rate was 77% and the ratio of girls to boys between 0.9 and 1. Health infrastructure has deteriorated. In 2011, diseases caused by malnutrition, as well as leprosy, were detected on Anjouan. 215 The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/gdp per Capita/Current usd’, Washington, 2012. For reasons of comparison, the year 2010 is used with regard to gdp per capita throughout the text. In that year, the figures for Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles were, respectively, 427; 7,577; and 11,249 us Dollars. (For Mayotte, the gdp per capita estimates refer to 2009). 216 undp: ‘hdr 2013’ op. cit., p. 146. Mauritius occupied rank number 80 and Seychelles number 46.

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Ibrahim Index ranked Comoros 31st in Africa, with a score of 48 being practically on a par with its giant Indian Ocean neighbor.217 On the ease of doing business, in 2012 the World Bank ranked Comoros 158 out of 185 nations,218 while Transparency International gave it a low cpi score of 28 and placed it as number 133 with regard to perceived corrupt practices.219 In the absence of reliable data, estimates of poverty rates vary. It is generally acknowledged that they are markedly higher on Anjouan and Mohéli than on Grande Comore. In 2004, a comprehensive household survey registered 44.8% of the population as living below the national poverty line,220 but developments since then indicate that the indigent share may have increased. In 2011, a country poverty assessment by the Islamic Development Bank found that “[a]ll inequality indicators register a clear increase in disparities.”221 Quoting government statistics, the study pointed out that the Gini coefficient for Comoros – a measure of income inequalities – increased from 0.44 in 1995 to 0.56 in 2004. By 2009, it was 0.64, an increase of 45% in a decade and a half.222 With regard to gender equality, women represent less than 15% of those in formal employment and around 30% of the civil service.223 However, despite an overwhelming male dominance in political and religious affairs, as owners of land and of the conjugal home women are traditionally prominent in the Comorian society. This was in 2013 reflected in a survey on women’s rights in 22 member states of the Arab League, which ranked Comoros as number one.224 Since independence in 1975, there has been no structural change in the Comorian economy. Whereas industrial activities are still at “a bare minimum,”225 agriculture represents 40% of gdp and provides about 80% of employment. 217 Mo Ibrahim Foundation: ‘iiag 2012’ op. cit., p. 3. With a score of 46, Madagascar was ranked 35th. Mauritius was number 1 and Seychelles number 4 in Africa. 218 ibrd/The World Bank: ‘Doing Business 2013’ op. cit., p. 3. 219 Transparency International: ‘Corruption Perception Index 2012’ op. cit., p. 4–5. 220 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Comoros/Social Context and Human Develop­ ment’, p. 1. 221 Islamic Development Bank/Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development: ‘The Union of the Comoros: Country Poverty Assessment’, Jeddah, March 2011, p. 10. 222 Ibid. 223 AfDB ‘Country Strategy Paper’ op. cit., p. 8. 224 ‘Egypt is worst Arab state for women, Comoros best: Survey’ in Reuters, 12 November 2013. The study was carried out by Thomson Reuters Foundation. It included Syria, which was suspended from the Arab League in 2011. Oman and Kuwait followed after Comoros. Egypt was the lowest ranked country. 225 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Thematic analysis: Structural transformation and natural resources’, p. 2. In 2010, manufacturing represented 5.2% of gdp. The sector

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The primary sector also accounts for the country’s limited export earnings, which almost exclusively are made up of sales of vanilla, cloves and ylangylang essence. Mainly grown on Anjouan, Comoros is the world’s top producer of ylang-ylang, which is derived from the flowers of the ylang-ylang tree, used in aromatherapy and perfumes and exported to France. The country also features among the leading exporters of vanilla and cloves. All three cash crops, however, suffer from low productivity, fluctuating world prices and competition from other producers, as well as from the manufacture of artificial flavors, fragrances and synthetic substitutes. In a context characterized by political instability and weakening global prices, this has in particular affected the production of vanilla, which decreased from 200 tons in 1990 to 30 tons in 2010.226 The combined export earnings from vanilla, cloves and ylang-ylang merely cover between 5 and 10% of the costs of imports. In addition to petroleum, construction materials and manufactured goods, Comoros imports practically all its food, including meat, rice and dairy products. In the 2000s, the gap between imports and exports was constantly widening, with the result that in 2007 the procurement of rice alone exceeded total export revenue.227 In combination with a growing public service wage bill – representing around 10% of gdp and 75% of central government expenditure – Comoros became increasingly dependent on borrowing, external grants and migrant remittances. By 2010, the country had accumulated an unsustainable public debt, representing 41.4% of gdp and more than 300% of the export value of goods and services.228 Since 2009, there are, nevertheless, signs of macro-economic recovery. The gross domestic product grew by 2.1% in 2010, 2.6 in 2011 and 2.7 in 2012.229 Behind the positive trend were a series of international engagements. In 2005, Comoros and the imf agreed on a far-reaching Staff Monitored Program (smp), which brought the country’s financial and economic operations under close surveillance by the fund. At the same time, Comoros undertook to privatize a number of key public utilities, notably the telecommunications’, water and electricity corporations, as well as to reform its customs services and

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228 229

primarily consists of smaller plants for the processing of vanilla and essential oils on Anjouan and a few factories supplying the domestic market. AfDB ‘Country Strategy Paper’ op. cit., p. 3. The world market price of vanilla tumbled from a peak of 450 us Dollars per kg in 2004 to less than 20 in 2010. Ernst and Young: ‘Doing Business in Comoros’, Kuwait, August 2009, p. 26. In 2007, the value of Comorian exports was 10.1 million Euros and that of imports 101.1 million. The rice bill was 11.9 million Euros. AfDB ‘Country Strategy Paper’ op. cit., p. 5. Ibid., p. 2 and AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Comoros/Overview’, p. 2.

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down-size the civil service. The smp program and the agreed reforms were severely affected by the Anjouan crisis of 2007–08, but in 2009 the imf agreed to an Extended Credit Facility, subsequently re-confirmed until January 2014. While there have been serious problems and delays regarding privatization of the public utilities, in 2009 the Sambi government presented a poverty reduction and growth strategy for the period 2009–14. Approved by the imf and the World Bank, it was the first economic policy statement of its kind in Comoros. In the same year, the cooperation with the imf paved the way for the return of the African Development Bank. In February 2009, it cancelled Comoros’ outstanding debts and extended a new credit of 20 million Euros to the country. In November 2009, the Paris Club of bilateral donors similarly agreed to write off 80% of all Comorian debts within its responsibility. Although these measures in the short term represented a significant relief, of critical importance in the medium to longer perspective was that Comoros in July 2010 reached the decision point set by the imf and the World Bank for the group of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and that it in December 2012 arrived at the completion point.230 This, in turn, translated in a drastic reduction of its multilateral debt stock and scheduled external debt service payments, in the process untying financial resources for investments and socio-economic development. Thus, over a period of 40 years the relief represented a reduction of 59% in Comoros’ future debt service, with a marked alleviation from 2020.231 Arab investments under the 2008 Economic Citizenship Program (ecp) and the 2010 donor conference in Doha, Qatar, contributed to improved economic performance. Although politically controversial and criticized by the African Development Bank for constituting “a major breach of the rules of economic transparency,”232 over the four-year period 2009–12 the ecp initiative by President Sambi resulted in government revenue of a total of 76.6 million us Dollars, outstripping the initial projections. In 2012 alone, the revenue was 33.4 230 The hipc initiative was launched by the imf and the World Bank in 1996. Targeting a group of 39 countries with high levels of poverty and debt – of which 33 in Africa south of the Sahara; among them Comoros and Madagascar – it provides debt relief and low-interest loans with the objective to reduce external debt payments to sustainable levels. The support is conditional on a range of economic management and performance targets, culminating in points of decision and completion. Comoros was among the last hipc countries to reach the threshold requirements. 231 Hofmeier ‘Comoros’ in Mehler, Melber and van Walraven (eds): Africa Yearbook 2012, op. cit. (2013), p. 305. 232 AfDB ‘Country Strategy Paper’ op. cit., p. 6.

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musd, representing as much as 5.6% of gdp.233 Although some of the pledges made at the Doha conference at the same time materialized in the form of road works and infrastructural development, in recent years, however, the significance of the traditional remittances from Comorians abroad continues to stand out. Comoros is together with Liberia and Lesotho a leading African recipient of diaspora transfers, overwhelmingly from France. In 2012, remittances of almost 150 million us Dollars represented as much as 22.5% of gdp,234 by far surpassing any other external financial source and keeping the country afloat. In fact, the amount was roughly twice that of the Comorian budget, four times that of overseas development assistance and six times that of foreign direct investments.235 Whereas the remittances are essential to counterbalance the huge, structural trade deficit and contribute significantly towards poverty reduction, they are, however, primarily transferred through unofficial, private channels. Only a small portion of the remitted funds are set aside for productive investments or savings. In 2004, a World Bank study estimated that between 70 and 90% of the transfers were spent on non-productive, conspicuous consumption, and that more than 50% – corresponding to an astounding 10% of gdp – were dedicated to expenditure in connection with the ‘great weddings’ alone.236 As more than 90% of the remittances are destined to the island of Grande Comore, they also exacerbate inequalities in the archipelago.237 As an insular Indian Ocean nation with an exclusive economic zone of 163,500 km2; picturesque towns and villages; pristine beaches; and striking landscapes, the fisheries and tourism sectors could contribute to the economy, 233 International Monetary Fund (imf): ‘Union of the Comoros’, Fifth Review under the Three-Year Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility, and Request for Modification of a Performance Criterion, Washington, 20 May 2013, p. 4. According to the governmentowned newspaper Al-Watwan, by October 2013 some 560 families, primarily from Kuwait and the Gulf countries, had procured Comorian passports and invested in the country (‘Revenue de la citoyenneté économique’ in alwatwan.net, 4 October 2013). Most prominent among the ‘new citizens’ was Bashar Kiwan, the owner of the Comoro Gulf Holding and Combined Group (cghcg), one of the largest construction companies in Kuwait. In Comoros, the group has invested in transports, tourism, fisheries and banking. 234 AfDB, oecd, undp and uneca op. cit./‘Comoros/Social Context and Human Development’, p. 1. 235 ‘Transferts financiers de la diaspora comorienne: Focus groups en France pour trouver des projets-porteurs’ in alwatwan.net, 17 June 2013. 236 da Cruz, Fengler and Schwartzman op. cit., pp. 8–9. 237 Ibid., p. 5. It is estimated that over 90% of the Comorians living in France come from Grande Comore.

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serving as vehicles for growth and employment. Their potential was highlighted in the 2009 growth strategy, but they remain hugely underexploited. Comoros does not have a commercial fishing fleet and there is no export of fish from the country. In the absence of cold storage and processing facilities, the local fishermen – commonly using simple outrigger canoes known as galawas – sell their catch directly on the market. Instead, it is European, Russian, Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese and South Korean vessels that carry out deepsea fishing. Initiated in 1987, the fishing arrangement with the European Union is the most important. Primarily benefiting operators from France, Spain and Portugal, a revised agreement covering the period until December 2013 was signed with the eu in April 2011.238 Under the agreement, 45 purse seiners and 25 surface long liners are licensed to catch up to 4,850 tons of mainly tuna per year.239 Although the number of European vessels was increased by almost 25% from the preceding agreement (2005–10), as in the case of Madagascar the financial contribution from the eu was, however, reduced, from 390.000 to the trifling amount of 315.000 Euros.240 The revenue to Comoros is divided between budget support and financial assistance to develop the local fishing industry. At the heyday of mercenary rule and apartheid influence, Comoros became an attractive destination for French and South African tourists. In the mid1980s, the South African chain Sun International notably built the luxury Galawa Beach Resort at Mitsamihuli on the northern tip of Grande Comore. From around 7,500 in 1990, the registered number of international tourists increased to 27,500 in 1998. As South Africans after the 1994 democratic elections were welcomed back to Mozambique, Mauritius and other Indian Ocean holiday spots, and Comoros due to political instability earned a negative reputation, the Galawa resort, however, went into decline and soon became derelict. By 2010, the number of international arrivals had fallen to 11,000, out of which 60% were by French citizens from Europe, Reunion and Mayotte.241 238 An evaluation of the previous protocol showed that “the added value from the European fishing activities had benefited the eu, but not Comoros.” There had been no local landings of fish and no Comorians had been hired aboard the European vessels (‘ep approves new Comoros fisheries deal’ in cfp Reform Watch, 7 April 2011). 239 Large quantities of the tuna caught in Comorian waters are processed in Seychelles. 240 ‘Comores: Nouvel accord de pêche entre l’Union Européenne et l’Union des Comores’ in malango-actualité.fr, 9 April 2011. 241 un Data op. cit., p. 5 and Ingy A. Shabaan, Yasmine H. Ramzy and Azza A. Sharabassy: ‘Tourism as a Tool for Economic Development in Poor Countries: The Case of Comoro Islands’, International Conference on Business, Economics and Accounting, Bangkok, March 2013, p. 10.

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Whereas more than half were diaspora Comorians on family visits, less than 20% indicated ‘leisure’ as their purpose of travel. In reality, thus, the number of international tourists was just over 2,000, or a minute fraction of the huge numbers going to Mauritius and Seychelles. It merely represented 1.5% of the number registered for Zanzibar, an Indian Ocean destination with which Comoros has a lot in common.242 Investors from the Gulf countries have shown interest in the tourism sector, but without direct air links to the major markets, inadequate infrastructure and no reliable inter-island connections, the short- to mid-term prospects for growth remain limited. In common with most coastal and insular Indian Ocean countries, Comoros, finally, is investing much hope in the discovery of offshore oil and gas. West of Grande Comore, the Comorian eez is adjacent to the significant deposits of the Mozambican Rovuma Basin and the prospects of a geological extension of the field are considered promising. In 2008, the Comorian government signed an agreement with the us-based gxt Technology Corporation for seismic data collection and processing. The Norwegian company tgs-nopec has also been involved in geo-scientific research.243 Based on their initial findings, in March 2012 Comoros awarded a first exploration license to the petroleum company Bahari Resources.244 Although a potential economic windfall was still a long way off,245 soon, however, disputes over the awarding of oil contracts broke out between different Comorian ministers and international corporations, leading to arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.246 The power struggle over oil could become problematic for future exploration, as well as potentially fraught with danger in the largely unregulated Mozambique Channel. 242 Serengeti Advisers and Acorn Tourism Consulting: ‘Zanzibar Destination Marketing Strategy: Final Report’, Dar es Salaam, November 2010, p. 5. 243 ‘Lancement de la prospection des hydrocarbures dans les eaux territoriales comoriennes’ in lexpress.mu, 8 May 2011, and ‘Gaz naturel et pétrole: Des prospections ont commencé dans les eaux comoriennes depuis jeudi’ in alwatwan.net, 9 May 2011. 244 ‘Les Comores délivrent leur première licence d’exploration’ in comores-web.com, 30 March 2012. Bahari Resources has its regional base in Mauritius. 245 Offshore drilling in the western Comorian eez is difficult and costly, with depths of between 2,000 and 2,500 meters. Should exploitable oil or gas deposits be confirmed, it is estimated that production only could start after 10 to 15 years, or by the mid-2020s at the earliest (‘Ministre Abdou Nassur Madi: Grande probabilité d’avoir un produit naturel’ in Al-watwan Magazine, No. 33, November 2013, pp. 10–11). 246 ‘Black gold could cause a bang’ in The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 1345, Paris, 30 November 2012.

chapter 4

Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles: Creole Islands in Development

Distant and Different

Situated east and north of Madagascar, on practically all accounts the French department of Reunion and the independent states of Mauritius and Seychelles differ from the countries discussed in the previous chapters. From the points of view of political stability, as well as of social and economic development, Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles not only stand out in the indian-oceanic region, but also vis-à-vis continental Africa. In their case, it is relevant to discuss causes of progress and peace, rather than of poverty and conflict. Albeit not without challenges, the demographically small island states – globally renowned as up-market tourist destinations – cluster at the top of African rankings regarding most development indicators, from gdp per capita and business environment to governance, education and health. In several respects they rank highly also in a global context. Historically too, the Mascarene islands of Reunion and Mauritius1 and the vast archipelago of Seychelles (as well as the Chagos islands) are exceptional in both the Indian Ocean region and in the wider African context. Although it is assumed that Arab sailors and other voyagers visited the islands, they remained uninhabited until the arrival of the European powers. Contrary to Comoros or Zanzibar, they are not off-shore parcels of mixed African and Arab civilizations and have no pre-colonial human history. As Houbert observes, “[d]istant Europe, rather than Asia or Africa, created this mid-oceanic world of islands precisely because of their location.”2 Strategically situated on the maritime spice route to India and the Far East, once placed on the European maps and until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Mauritius and Reunion were central to the quest for naval dominance in 1 In addition to smaller islets, Rodrigues Island – a semi-autonomous part of Mauritius – also belongs to the volcanic Mascarenes. Situated some 600 kilometers east of Mauritius, it is the easternmost populated land of Africa. The Mascarenes are named after the Portuguese seafarer Pedro de Mascarenhas, who visited the main islands in the early 16th century. 2 Jean Houbert: ‘The Mascareignes, the Seychelles and the Chagos, Islands with a French Connection: Security in a Decolonised Indian Ocean’ in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 93. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004292499_005

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the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the establishment of coconut, coffee and, above all, sugar plantations based on Malagasy and African slave labor formed the demographic and socio-political profile of the islands, over time giving them a creole character closer to that of the West Indies than to Africa. The subsequent introduction of indentured labor from India added another significant dimension to their ethno-cultural and political landscape. In an African context, finally, the continued presence of European colonial powers sets the sub-region apart. East of Seychelles, the United Kingdom still administers the British Indian Ocean Territory as a colony, whereas the overseas department of Reunion – situated between Madagascar and Mauritius – forms an integral part of France. As members of the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and other African organizations, in their regional relations the independent states of Mauritius and Seychelles have to take these realities into account. This is far from easy, nor without controversy. Through its possession of Reunion, France formally and directly exercises a major role in the African part of the Indian Ocean, a fact which is acknowledged by the neighboring independent states, but only reluctantly accepted by the au. In addition to the weight of its economic, military and cultural interests and influence, France is a full member of the Indian Ocean Commission, which uses French as its working language. Originally set up in 1984 by Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles to promote inter-island cooperation in various fields, two years later the Commission de l’Océan Indien was enlarged to include not only Comoros, but controversially also Reunion/France. In the process, France became a de facto state of the Indian Ocean.3 Contrary to other non-African state actors, France regards itself as a local power. Thus, the government in Paris approaches many issues in the western Indian Ocean “as part of its internal affairs, rather than as matters of external relations.”4 Reunion

A Dramatic Island

The solitary island of Reunion (La Réunion; formerly Île Bourbon), located some 700 kilometers east of Madagascar and 200 kilometers south-west of Mauritius, occupies a unique place in French colonial history. For almost a 3 Ibid., pp. 108–11. 4 Isabelle Saint-Mézard: ‘The French Strategic Vision of the Indian Ocean’ in jior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, p. 54.

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Map 7  Reunion

century – from the loss of Mauritius to the British in 1810 until the colonization of Madagascar in 1896 – it was France’s most treasured possession in the Indian Ocean. In addition, for more than six decades – from 1946 until 2011; when it was joined by Mayotte – it was France’s only overseas department in the region. With Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean and French Guiana in South America, Reunion belongs to the select group of France’s ‘Old Colonies’. As such, it has a long history which not only is closely intertwined with that of its neighbors Madagascar and Mauritius, but also has influenced the political debate in the distant metropolis, more than 10,000 kilometers away. With a surface area of 2,512 square kilometers, Reunion is slightly bigger than the sister island of Mauritius. Of younger geological origin, the island rises steeply from the ocean and is dominated by three vast volcanic calderas; the extinct Piton des Neiges (‘Peak of the Snows’) volcano, reaching 3,070 meters; and the still active Piton de la Fournaise (‘Peak of the Furnace’/2,631 meters). Under constant monitoring, the latter has erupted more than a hundred times since the first French settlement was established in the 1660s. The most recent major outbreak took place in April 2007, when the lava flow into the ocean reached 3 million cubic meters per day. In 2010, it erupted no less than three times.

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It is the scenic, dramatic interior that characterizes Reunion and attracts French and international tourists. In Bulpin’s view, “[i]n all the world there can be no other place as small as Reunion possessing a more spectacular concentration of scenery.”5 Historically too, it was the gorges, valleys and forested slopes of the volcanos that offered refuge to both runaway slaves and – later – poor whites, over time giving rise to scattered hamlets in the highlands.6 In 2010, unesco declared the striking landscape a World Heritage Site. It covers more than 40% of the island. In its competition with Mauritius for trade and tourism, Reunion’s geography is at the same time a handicap.7 Most importantly, contrary to Mauritius it lacks a natural harbor, which during the naval conflicts between Britain and France put it at a disadvantage and after the Napoleonic Wars in 1814 led the British to return Reunion to the French. A modern port has long since been constructed west of the capital Saint-Denis.8 However, Port Louis, the capital and main port of Mauritius, outperforms its Reunion rival. In addition, Reunion cannot offer beaches such as those in Mauritius (or Seychelles). Although the tourism sector is growing and the island is the second destination in the region, as a consequence it receives less than half the number of visitors going to Mauritius. The overwhelming majority are French citizens. As of March 2012, the total population of Reunion was estimated at 839,500, with a density of 334 inhabitants per square kilometer.9 Although the figure is much lower than that of Mauritius, due to the island’s limiting topography around 85% of the population is concentrated to a narrow coastal band, where the real density exceeds 800 inhabitants.10 Despite the fact that some 20% have emigrated to metropolitan France, the population of Reunion has almost doubled over three decades.11 In 2012, 40% were under 5 6

Bulpin op. cit., p. 384. Runaway slaves (marrons) were hunted as beasts: “On Bourbon, all marrons (male and female) were shot on sight. If there was any life left in the fallen victim, some warped, nonsensical idea of religion induced the hunters to baptize them. Their right hands were then cut off. Like the tails of vermin, these were taken to the government so that the hunters could claim the reward of a good live slave for every bad dead one” (ibid., pp. 172–73). 7 Like Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius – but not Seychelles – are situated within the cyclonic belt. From December to April, the islands are regularly exposed to thunderstorms and torrential rains, often with devastating effects on the sugar plantations. 8 The first modern port – Port des Galets – was built in the 1880s. 9 Jean-Pierre Sueur, Christian Cointat and Félix Desplan: ‘Rapport d’Information (La Réunion)’, Report No. 676, French Senate, Paris, 18 July 2012, pp. 57–58. 10 Ibid. 11 Jean-Yves Rochoux: ‘Une Autre Ouverture Sur le Monde pour La Réunion’ in Perspectives Économiques de la Réunion, No. 7, September 2011, pp. 9–19.

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the age of 25.12 Coupled with the challenge of unemployment, the issues of demographic growth and emigration have against this background consistently been high on the political agenda. Contrary to its French sister department of Mayotte, Reunion, however, does not experience any external migratory pressure. In 2012, only 7,300 – less than 1% of the population – were registered as foreign nationals, mainly from Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius.13 In 2010, the capital of Saint-Denis had a population of 145,000, occupying first place of all French overseas municipalities and number twenty in France. Other major urban centers are Saint-Paul on the west coast (103,000) and SaintPierre in the south (80,000). Unlike Mauritius, where the constitution subdivides the population into ethno-religious communities and the national censuses register the inhabitants according to language and religion, there is no official differentiation in Reunion. The French republican tradition rejects any such classification. In the department of Reunion, officially, everybody is French, the language is French and, although there is separation between the state and the church, Roman Catholicism enjoys a privileged position. This view was, in particular, upheld during the Debré era in the 1960s and 1970s. In reality, however, Reunion is an ethnically diverse, multi-cultural society in a process of steady creolization. In the absence of official statistics, it is estimated that around 50% of the population are of Afro-Malagasy, Indian or Chinese backgrounds. Whereas those of mixed origins represent some 20%, petits blancs constitute another 15%, metropolitan French 10% and the white elite of former plantation owners (grands blancs) 1%.14 Many of Indian descent are Christian, but the Tamil group is predominantly Hindu and those from Gujarat Muslim. The descendants of the Chinese indentured laborers are divided between the Christian and the Buddhist faiths. Although multi-culturalism characterizes the island and there are few examples of ethnic or religious tensions, socio-economically, however, the society is stratified. Closely associated with the grands blancs, the metropolitan French are typically business people, civil servants, magistrates, medical doctors or military,15 whereas those of Indian and Chinese descent predominantly are self-employed and involved in commerce and trade. A majority of the working class and the jobless are of Afro-Malagasy background.16 12 13 14 15 16

‘La population de l’île toujours plus nombreuse’ in clicanoo.re, 8 March 2013. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan op. cit., pp. 57–58. Laurent Médéa: Reunion: An Island in Search of an Identity, Unisa Press, Pretoria, 2010, pp. xv–xvi and 68. At any given time, there are close to 100,000 métropolitains in Reunion. Médéa, op. cit. pp. 56–59.

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Language contributes to non-conflictual coexistence and a common Réunionnaise identity. More than half of the population only speaks Creole, the lingua franca of the former African slaves and the Indian indentured workers, whereas one third is bilingual and less than 10% exclusively Frenchspeaking.17 No other French overseas department has a larger proportion of Creole speakers. After years of suppression and despite the fact that there is no established orthography, as a spoken language Creole is gaining recognition by the local authorities. Although French is the only official language, in 2009 two municipalities decided to allow both languages, an example which three years later was followed by the city authorities in the capital Saint-Denis and the towns of Saint-Paul and Saint-Joseph.18 Reunion is administered by an elected regional council, led by a president. The council’s main areas of responsibility include the management of social allowances, municipal infrastructure, local roads and school buildings. The state is represented by a prefect, appointed by the president of the republic. Under the French constitution, the préfet is “in charge of national interests, administrative checks and respect of the law.”19 In addition to representing the state vis-à-vis the local government, the prefect’s authority is thus wideranging, notably covering the coordination of police and gendarmerie forces, responses to crises situations and emergency defense actions.20

Plantations, Slaves and Indentured Labor

Reunion was occupied by France two centuries before Comoros and Madagascar. Claimed by the French crown in 1640, the first organized settlement was established by the French East India Company in 1665. The company had been founded the previous year to compete with the Dutch and British for the lucrative trade with India and the Far East and – at a time when both the 17 18

19 20

insee (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques): Économie de La Réunion, No. 137, Saint-Denis, December 2010, pp. 4–6. ‘Six communes bilingues dans le département’ in clicanoo.re, 10 February 2013. Reunion Creole exercises a growing influence on spoken French on the island. On language in Reunion, see Gudrun Ledegen: ‘Réalités et Paradoxes du Contact Créole-Français à La Réunion’ in Éliane Wolff and Michel Watin (eds): La Réunion: Une Société en Mutation, Economica/Anthropos, Paris, 2010, pp. 101–21. Article 72 of the Constitution of France. In 2010, Didier Robert of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire/ump) became president of the regional council. Jean-Luc Marx was appointed prefect in 2012.

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Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius were still under Dutch control – Reunion became an important supply station on the spice route. Its role was enhanced from 1715, when the Dutch had withdrawn from the Indian Ocean and France took control of the Mascarenes.21 Although Mauritius due to its natural harbors soon appeared as the jewel in the crown, initially Reunion played a significant role as provider of food and timber to the sister island. Above all, it was the successful introduction of coffee that changed the economic and demographic profile of the island. The exportation of coffee from Reunion grew from less than 20,000 pounds in 1725 to 2.5 million pounds in 1744, remaining the basis of the island’s economy for the next one hundred years.22 In turn, the remarkable development rested on slave labor. In 1708 – before the coffee boom – there were 208 slaves in Reunion. By 1736, the number had grown to 4,500 and forty years later to 23,000, mainly imported from Madagascar, Comoros and the African mainland.23 Between 1767 and 1810, around 110,000 slaves were shipped by the French to the Mascarenes. Almost half of them came from Madagascar.24 As was the case in Mauritius, in the process Reunion was ethnically and socio-economically divided between a small, wealthy plantocracy and a mass of creolized slaves, toiling under inhuman conditions. In fact, from 1685 the Code noir, or Black code, officially prohibited social contacts between Europeans and Africans and their descendants.25 In 1810, Britain defeated France in the Mascarenes and occupied Mauritius and Reunion. Ruling the Indian sub-continent; commanding the oceans; and having seized the Cape in 1806, the islands were of little strategic significance to the British. Whereas they kept Mauritius on account of its natural harbors, under the 1814 Paris Treaty they restored Reunion to France.26 Although the French rivalry in the Indian Ocean was halted, it did not, however, put an end to the presence of France. Britain was not interested in comprehensive, direct 21 22 23

24 25 26

The Dutch left Mauritius in 1710 and the first French settlement on the island was established in 1721. John Addison and K. Hazareesingh: A New History of Mauritius, Éditions de l’Océan Indien, Rose-Hill, 1989, p. 12. Yvan Combeau: ‘De Bourbon à La Réunion, L’Histoire d’Une Île (du XVIIe au XXe Siècle)’ in Tamatoa Bambridge, Jean-Pierre Doumengue, Bruno Ollivier, Jacky Simonin and Dominique Wolton (eds): La France et les Outre-Mers: L’Enjeu Multiculturel, Special edition, Revue Hermès, Nos. 32–33, cnrs Éditions, Paris, 2002, p. 92. Randrianja and Ellis op. cit., p. 117. Médéa op. cit., p. 33. The British also kept the islands of Seychelles, which until 1903 were administered from Port Louis.

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colonization. In Mauritius, therefore, it chose indirect rule, encouraging the French “creole merchants and ex-corsairs […] to recycle themselves into a sugar plantocracy.”27 The revenue from sugar would in turn finance a limited British administration and the troops garrisoned there. The French language and the Catholic faith were respected and very few British settled on the island. In Reunion, at the same time, the French administration and the slave-based economy continued as before. A major legacy of the brief British interlude in Reunion was the introduction of sugar cane. As in Mauritius, it soon became the all dominant crop, a position it still holds. By 1860, annual sugar exports from Reunion reached 70,000 tons, replacing coffee as the prime trade commodity. As in Mauritius too, the cultivation of sugar had dramatic demographic consequences. Most importantly, in 1848 slavery was abolished in France and its colonies. In Reunion, there were at the time 62,000 slaves out of a total population of 103,000.28 A big proportion of the freed slaves left the plantations and moved to the urban centers or to the highlands, where they often became subsistence farmers. As the sugar plantations required a large labor force, the slaves from Madagascar and East Africa were replaced by indentured labor from India and – later – China and South East Asia. When the indenture system ended in the 1920s, some 118,000 Indians – mainly from the northern part of the subcontinent – had been brought to Reunion.29 Supposedly free, they were bonded to the plantations under conditions similar to slavery. In addition, the expanding sugar plantations drove away many European smallholders from their plots, giving rise to an uprooted social class of petits blancs (‘poor whites’). According to Médéa, “[o]f the former European colonies Reunion is unique in having a poor white component.”30 The grands blancs, meanwhile, extended their wealth and power, calling on the French government to incorporate independent Madagascar as a provider of food and labor for the sugar plantations. Viewing Reunion as a ‘little France 27 28

29 30

Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 94. Combeau op. cit., p. 93. Slavery was abolished by the British in 1833 and the law entered into effect in Mauritius in 1835. In that year, there were in Mauritius 66,600 slaves in a total population of 101,500, or almost identical figures to those of Reunion thirteen years later (Amédée Nagapen: Histoire de la Colonie: Isle de France – Île Maurice 1721–1968, Éditions de l’Océan Indien, Rose-Hill, 2010, p. 80). Médéa op. cit., p. 36. Although Reunion was French, an agreement with the British in 1861 allowed the importation of Indian indentured laborers on similar terms to Mauritius. Ibid., p. 34. The ‘Boer’ (Afrikaner) population of South Africa also included a big proportion of poor whites (arme blankes). Afrikaans, the language of the Afrikaner (and the Colored population group) is a form of Dutch Creole.

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in the Indian Ocean’, in 1885, for example, the island authorities stated in an appeal to the Paris government that “Madagascar belongs to us. We ask you to once and for all occupy this land which is ours, our good [and] the good of all of France.”31 The calls by the ‘colonizing colony’32 were heeded by France, which through a military campaign in 1895 added Madagascar to its colonial possessions. This, however, did not lead to the expected prominence for Reunion. Shifting its strategic interests from the insular world to continental Africa and Madagascar, after the 1884–85 Berlin conference the French government relegated the island to the periphery of its concerns. Contrary to Comoros, however, Reunion was not turned into a Malagasy dependency, a possible scenario in the years before the First World War.

Overseas Department of France

After cycles of economic up- and downturns, Reunion was hard hit by the Second World War, when it was cut off from overseas markets.33 As stated in a report by the French Senate, “in 1945, […] Reunion [was] economically, physically and politically ruined. The economic situation was desperate. Sugar production, which amounted to 110,000 tons in 1940, [fell] to 13,000 tons in 1944. […] The population [was] in want of food [and] sanitation [was] deplorable.”34 Visiting the island after the war, a French journalist had “the impression of suddenly being transported back in time at least one century.”35 The inhabitants were deeply divided between an elite of grands blancs and those known in Creole as ti moun, “a rabble physically deficient through malnutrition; illiterate and economically dependent,” as described by one observer.36 The answer to the potentially explosive situation would be departmentalization. Calls for a special status within the French republic had been raised in Reunion – notably by the labor movement – already before the Second World 31 32 33

34 35

36

Quoted in Maestri op. cit., p. 104. Ibid., pp. 51–52 and Combeau op. cit., p. 94. As was the case in Madagascar, in the beginning of the war Reunion was under the authority of the collaborationist Vichy regime. The pro-Vichy government was ousted by the Free French forces after an amphibious landing and a popular uprising in November 1942. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan op. cit., pp. 15–16. Quoted in Yvan Combeau: ‘En Attendant le Social (1942–1958)’ in Prosper Ève (ed): Les Avancées Sociales à La Réunion (XVIIIe–XXIe Siècle), cresoi, Université de La Réunion, Saint-André, 2010, p. 134. André Scherer: La Réunion, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1980, quoted in ibid., p. 16.

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War, but it was in its aftermath that the political circumstances in France could turn them into a reality. In October-November 1945, elections to a Constituent Assembly were held in France and in the French overseas territories.37 The outcome was a victory for the political left, with 26% of the vote going to the Communists and 23% to the Socialists. Together, they held an absolute majority of the assembly seats. The two representatives from Reunion – Léon de Lépervanche and Raymond Vergès – were both elected on the Communist list. One of the elected assembly members was Aimé Césaire, prominent poet, author and politician from Martinique. A founder of the négritude movement in Francophone literature,38 Césaire was a strong proponent of colonial emancipation and autonomy within the French nation state. To him, decolonization was more a question of equality and self-determination than of sovereignty and formal independence, a view which was shared by his colleagues from Reunion. With the Communist Party at the zenith of its strength, they saw the birth of the post-war Fourth French Republic and the integration of Reunion into France as the most effective way to end the power of the grands blancs.39 Addressing the Constituent Assembly, de Lépervanche declared: “Since 1935, the slogan ‘Reunion: French department’ […] on the banners at the workers’ marches have proclaimed our compatriots’ confidence in the French democracy from which they [themselves] were held apart […]. We have to say that we do not know of any deep differences between our people and that of the metropolis. In fact, we do not have any problem of linguistic, cultural or national order.”40 Supported by de Lépervanche and Vergès, Césaire was the main drafter of the Constituent Assembly’s legal texts governing the future relations between France and the overseas territories. A seminal outcome was the Departmen­ talization Law, which in its Article 1 stated that “[t]he colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and French Guiana are elevated to French departments.”41 37

38

39 40 41

Out of a total of 586 members of the Constituent Assembly, 26 represented the French departments in Algeria, 4 the French population in Tunisia and 33 the French territories under the administration of the Ministry of the Colonies. The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in May 1946. In the elections to the second assembly – which was in session from June to October 1946 – the Communist Party and sfio together won 48% of the seats, but lost their absolute majority. Another prominent founder of the négritude movement, Léopold Senghor, future president of Senegal (1960–80), was in October 1945 also elected to the French Constituent Assembly. Twaddle, Rabearimanana and Kimambo op. cit., p. 246. Quoted in Sueur, Cointat and Desplan op. cit., p. 17. Ibid., p. 18.

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It was passed unopposed by the assembly on 19 March 1946. As one of the four ‘Old Colonies’, without a referendum or any other form of popular consultation Reunion became the first French overseas department (Département d’Outre-Mer/dom) in Sub-Saharan Africa and an integral part of France.42

Autonomy or Independence?

A decade later, when the winds of change were gathering over the African continent; independence for Madagascar was approaching; and the British were getting ready to leave Mauritius, the anomaly of what some have characterized as “intra-French decolonization” became obvious.43 Why, then, did the political left and the wider population in Reunion reject sovereignty and opt for integration with France? And why did the United Nations and, above all, subsequently the Organization of African Unity not censure France’s continued presence? While economic considerations undoubtedly were important to the people on the poverty-stricken island, a number of historical, political and ideological factors may address these questions. For France itself, which largely adjusted to the new realities in continental Africa by returning to its maritime policy, the financial burden of maintaining a de facto colony was minor in comparison with the geo-strategic advantages offered by an insular base. In the process, France would at last become the dominant European power in the western Indian Ocean. 42

43

As early as 1848, Algeria had been divided into three French departments (Alger, Oran and Constantine). On the relations between France and the doms, see Helen M. Hintjens: ‘France’s Love Children?: The French Overseas Departments’ in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., pp. 64–75. The expression ‘intra-French decolonization’ is, for example, used by Yvan Combeau in ‘Une Île Politique’ in Wolff and Watin (eds) op. cit., p. 17. Increasingly frustrated with the slow and ineffective implementation of the 1946 Departmentalization Law, Césaire eventually lost faith in ‘emancipation through assimilation’. Breaking with the Communist Party (pcf), in 1956 he argued that the problems of the overseas territories could not be solved by the French political left. In an open letter to the pcf secretary general, Maurice Thorez, he wrote that “the colonial question cannot be treated as a subsidiary part of some more important global matter. […] [T]he struggle of the colored peoples against racism […] is of a totally different nature from the struggle of the French workers against French capitalism and cannot in any case be considered as a part […] of that struggle” (Quoted in Helen M. Hintjens op. cit., p. 68). In 1958, Césaire launched the Martinican Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Martiniquais/ppm) with autonomy for the island as a major objective.

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At the same time, the constitutional status – contrary to the case of Mayotte half a century later – was not engineered by the French government, nor were the sugar barons its chief architects. Behind the integration into France was the local branch of the Communist Party, as well as the broader labor movement and, in general, the creole majority. As commented by Houbert, the ideological legacy from the French Revolution should here be recalled: “There is a long tradition in France of envisaging the end purpose of colonization as the creation of a Greater France through the gradual integration of the colonies in the metropolitan state. […] This tradition is as strong on the left as on the right of French politics, for they are both inheritors of the Jacobin tendency to equate political freedom with a centralized republic.”44 Secondly, the Departmentalization Law of March 1946 was not in breach of the un Charter, adopted in June 1945, which in its Article 73 called upon the colonial powers to “develop self-government [and] take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples.” Thirdly, from an ideological perspective the stand by Césaire and the French Constituent Assembly preceded the era of African decolonization, with the formation of national liberation movements and demands for comprehensive independence.45 A decade later, the concept of self-determination would as a matter of course imply self-rule and sovereignty. Thus, the un General Assembly Decolonization Declaration of December 1960 no longer requested the colonial powers to ‘develop self-government’ in the non-independent territories, but to immediately “transfer all powers [to them] without any conditions or reservations.” In the case of Reunion, it could further be argued that ‘national’ equaled ‘French’ since there at the time of occupation were no indigenous inhabitants. Finally, no nation claimed sovereignty over the island and it had not been dismembered from another territory, a course of action in breach of un principles subsequently taken by France with regard to Mayotte. As post-war France over the following years focused on the reconstruction of its society and economy, under the Fourth Republic (1946–58) the dividends expected in Reunion from the new departmental status were slow in materializing. The distant Indian Ocean island remained “an abandoned 44 45

Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 103. Although the African National Congress of South Africa (anc) had been founded as early as 1912, it was only in the 1950s that national liberation movements emerged in continental Africa. Of particular importance with regard to decolonization and national independence was the Bandung conference, held in Indonesia in April 1955. The oau Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa was set up in 1963 (and dissolved in 1994, after the fall of apartheid and the democratic elections in South Africa).

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department.”46 Against this background, the local Communists – who under the leadership of Paul Vergès, the son of Raymond,47 in 1959 formed the Communist Party of Reunion (Parti Communiste de La Réunion/pcr) – would increasingly demand autonomy for the island. As before, the demands did not envisage national independence, but decentralization and extended selfdetermination within the French constitutional dispensation. In fact, the party program stated that autonomy “should not be confused with the demand for an independence which neither corresponds to the historical conditions, nor to the present aspirations of our people.”48 pcr’s call for an autonomous status was forcefully confronted by the French government under President Charles de Gaulle and Prime Minister Michel Debré. In 1961, the party newspaper Témoignages was seized by the authorities for publishing articles claiming autonomy. At the same time, Paul Vergès was arrested for attacking the integrity of the state. Two years later, he was given a three months jail sentence by the French Court of State Security.49 In 1961–62, thirteen teachers and civil servants from the Communist Party were under the Ordonnance Debré50 on the same grounds dismissed from their jobs and sent to metropolitan France. The local authorities, similarly, castigated the call. In July 1962, the mayors of Reunion vigorously denounced “the odious campaign conducted by the local Communist press to promote the sacrilegious idea of autonomy for Reunion,” drawing a distinction vis-à-vis the former French colonies in Africa. In a resolution to the Paris government, they solemnly declared that the Réunionnais are French in stock, language and tradition. [T]hey cannot be treated in the same way as the peoples who France has recognized as independent since their race, language and customs are different from ours. “Condemning every attempt to separate Reunion from France,” the assembled heads of the local town councils censured “the principle of autonomy for being 46 47 48 49

50

Combeau in Wolff and Watin op. cit., p. 19. Paul Vergès’ was born in Thailand in 1925, where Raymond – a Réunionnais – at the time served as consul of France. Paul Vergès’ mother was Vietnamese. Quoted in ‘Autonomie pour La Réunion?’ in clicanoo.re, 1 January 2005. Court de Sûreté de l’État. Vergès did not serve the sentence. Instead, he went underground and spent no less than 28 months in hiding, mocking the French authorities and acquiring the status of a national hero among the working class and the poor people of Reunion. He was acquitted in 1966. The legislation known as Ordonnance Debré was introduced by Prime Minister Debré in 1960. Under the law, civil servants in the French overseas departments suspected of disturbing public order could be dismissed and recalled to metropolitan France.

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impossible to implement without bringing ruin to our island and that of independence as tantamount to complete suicide and treason.”51 Throughout the 1960s, pcr, however, pursued the campaign for autonomy.52 Making common cause with likeminded organizations in the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guiana, the campaign culminated in a ‘Convention for Autonomy’, held at Morne-Rouge in Martinique in August 1971. Fifteen political parties – including Césaire’s Martinican Progressive Party – trade union federations and aligned associations took part in the meeting, in which Paul Vergès played a leading role. In the final declaration, the participants denounced “a system of colonial relations which departmentalization tends to perpetuate,” emphasizing that the four ‘Old Colonies’ “constitute national entities.” They also adopted a political, economic and cultural programme, to be substantially financed by France in order “to make up for three centuries of colonization.”53 Viewed by many in metropolitan France as secessionists, Vergès and his Caribbean partners did not, however, demand outright sovereignty. Nevertheless, since the ideological distinction between ‘autonomy’ and ‘independence’ remained blurred, it eventually also caused internal dissent, in 1981 leading to the breakaway from pcr of a small, electorally insignificant Movement for the Independence of Reunion (Mouvement pour l’Indépendance de La Réunion/mir). As a result of the political repression under Debré, from the early 1960s the traditionally strong political left in Reunion was pushed into the background and the calls for autonomy largely silenced. Commenting on the situation in 1992, Houbert observed that “[t]he consensus on being part of France is solid, but the neurosis over the status of the island remains, lurking in the background of every election.”54 Worthy of note, finally, is that Africa has acknowledged the French presence in Reunion as a fait accompli. Naturally, Reunion is not recognized as a political entity by the African Union and does not participate in the panAfrican organization’s organs or deliberations. Apart from a one-off initiative in 1978 by the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi – when the oau Council of Ministers in a resolution surrounded by controversy “reaffirm[ed] the African identity of La Réunion and the right of its people to self-determination and 51 ‘Motion’ [of 26 July 1962], reproduced in Maestri op. cit., pp. 192–93. 52 On pcr, see Gilles Gauvin: ‘Le Parti Communiste de La Réunion (1946–2000)’ in Vingtième Siècle/Revue d’Histoire, No. 68, October-December 2000, pp. 73–94. 53 ‘Déclaration de la Convention pour l’Autonomie’, Morne-Rouge, Martinique, 18 August 1971. 54 Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 105.

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independence”55 – neither the oau nor the au have, however, censured France or raised the issue of Reunion’s status. This is in marked contrast to the situation with regard to the French department of Mayotte. Via the Indian Ocean Commission, indirectly Reunion/France also cooperates with the regional African communities, in particular with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (comesa) and sadc. Reunion, meanwhile, is tied closer to both France and the European Union. In 1982, the Indian Ocean island – which elects seven deputies to the French National Assembly and three members to the Senate56 – became one of France’s 26 regions. Politics and the local party system reflect those of France. Under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, it is an Outermost Region of eu, a concept developed from a proposal by Paul Vergès during his first period as a European mp (1979–89). As a consequence, Reunion is covered by eu law, the inhabitants are eu citizens and the island is part of the Euro zone.57 In turn, from political and economic viewpoints Reunion is largely isolated from its Indian Ocean neighbors. In 2010, a report from a local conference addressing this challenge noted with concern that “it is usually said that Reunion ‘turns its back on the ocean’, [but] it could be added that it also turns its back on the regional environment.”58

Economic Transformation

Through its calls for autonomy, the Communist Party was indirectly instrumental in the French government’s re-engagement with the island and the considerable development taking place under the Fifth Republic. Behind the transformation was Michel Debré, President de Gaulle’s prime minister from 1959 to 1962. Debré had no previous connection to Reunion when he in 1959 accompanied de Gaulle on a brief stopover to the island. Deeply troubled by the independence struggle in Algeria and the subsequent loss of the French possession 55 56

57 58

oau: ‘Resolution on La Reunion’ (cm/Res. 640 (XXXI)), Khartoum, 18 July 1978. In the official oau records, the resolution is marked as rejected. In the 2012 elections to the French National Assembly, the Socialist Party won 5 of the 7 seats. In the preceding presidential elections, the Socialist candidate François Hollande received 71.5% of the vote against 28.5% for the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy. Due to its location in a time zone to the east of Europe, Reunion was the first region to introduce the Euro as legal tender. Wilfrid Bertile, Gilbert Canabady-Moutien, Gilles Couapel, Abdéali Goulamaly, Yvan Mainix, François Mandroux and Bruno Millot: L’Insertion de La Réunion dans Son Environnement Régional, Océan Éditions, Saint-André, 2010, p. 9.

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in North Africa,59 he equated the quest by the Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale/fln) with the calls for autonomy by the Communist Party of Reunion. Determined to maintain Reunion firmly attached to France, after his premiership (1959–62) he returned to the island. In 1963, he successfully challenged Vergès in the parliamentary elections, winning a seat for Reunion in the French National Assembly.60 Although not a native of Reunion,61 Debré soon became the leader of the island’s conservatives, keeping his parliamentary seat for the next twenty-five years. Known as the most influential of the ‘Gaullist barons’, from this position and, above all, as French minister of economy and finance (1966–68), foreign affairs (1968–69) and defense (1969–73) Debré changed the course of the island. Combining repression of the Communist Party with state centralization, cultural assimilation and massive transfers of public funds for infrastructural and institutional development, as well as a gradual harmonization between France and Reunion of social legislation, under his watch, arguably, “the old colonial structure [was] more thoroughly demolished by départementalisation […] than in Mauritius and Seychelles by independence.”62 With regard to infrastructural development and the standard of hospitals, schools, roads, water and electricity, Reunion compares favorably with most industrialized societies. The university, airport and, in general, public services are the envy of its neighbors and, in general, of Africa, with the possible exception of South Africa. With a figure of 0.881, the Human Development Index (hdi) for Reunion is high. In 2005, this composite measure of life expectancy, education and income placed the island between Portugal and Hungary on the global hdi ranking.63 Critics, however, argue that “Reunion has become a French suburb in the tropics, with similar problems.”64 In his doctoral study on Réunionnaise identity, Médéa concludes that “[i]f decolonization is a radical transformation of 59 60 61 62 63

64

Algeria became independent in July 1962. At that time supported by the Socialist Party, Debré received 81% of the vote against Vergès’ 16%. A number of prominent French politicians were born in Reunion, among them Raymond Barre, prime minister 1976–81 and vice-president of the European Commission. Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 104. insee: Économie de La Réunion, No. 134, Saint-Denis, April 2009, pp. 32–36. According to insee, the corresponding indexes for the independent Indian Ocean states were: Seychelles 0.843, Mauritius 0.804, Comoros 0.561 and Madagascar 0.533. For Mayotte, the hdi has been estimated at approximately 0.75 (Michaël Goujon and François Hermet: ‘L’Indice de Développement Humain: Une Évaluation pour Mayotte’, Chamalières, January 2012, p. 9). Médéa op. cit., p. 152.

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A modern university The Université de La Réunion was fully established in 1982. It accommodates around 12,000 students in the three campuses of Saint-Denis, Saint-Pierre and Tampon. In Saint-Denis, the university houses an important Center for Research on the Societies of the Indian Ocean (Centre de Recherches sur les Sociétés de l’Océan Indien/cresoi), which in 2010 had 10 full-time researchers/lecturers, 30 associated researchers and 20 Ph.D. students. As an integral part of the French tertiary education system, the University of Reunion enjoys a highly privileged financial and academic situation when compared to its regional counterparts. As in other areas involving Reunion, the asymmetric relationship poses serious challenges for the Indian Ocean Commission in its efforts to promote an equitable development among its members. The small University of Comoros, for example, has very limited resources and the University of Seychelles was only set up in 2010, being more of a high school than a university proper.

the internal structure of society, leading to real independence, then departmentalization has strengthened the colonial situation in Reunion.”65 Similarly, the basic, economic structure of Reunion has not changed. Without mineral resources or a significant industrial base, sugar remains the prime commodity, accounting for 29% of the export revenue in 2010.66 More than 70% of the arable land is dedicated to the cultivation of sugar.67 Rum and tropical fruits, such as lychees, mangoes and pineapples, also contribute towards export earnings. Other agro-based commodities, such as geranium, vetiver and ylang-ylang oils – used for the production of aromatic essences and perfumes – no longer play a significant role. Although closely associated with the island, vanilla too has lost its historical importance.68 Instead, commercial 65 Ibid. 66 insee: Tableau Économique de La Réunion 2011 (ter 2011), Saint-Denis, 2011, p. 131. 67 Jean-Yves Rochoux: ‘Une Petite Économie Insulaire et Ses Paradoxes’ in Wolff and Watin (eds) op. cit., p. 40. 68 Historically, vanilla – the wold’s second most expensive spice after saffron – has been a major export commodity from Reunion. In 1841, Edmond Albius, a young slave, discovered that the vanilla plant could be hand-pollinated, a discovery which paved the way for commercial cultivation. Due to its high quality, vanilla from the island became known as ‘Bourbon vanilla’, after Île Bourbon. In 2010, Indonesia was the world’s leading vanilla producer, with Madagascar in second place.

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deep-sea fishing – particularly near Antarctica – is growing. After sugar, toothfish and spiny lobster constitute the most important export products. With more than 80% of the value added, the economy of Reunion has become predominantly service-based. In this context, the growth of tourism stands out. With less than 20,000 visitors per year in the mid-1970s, the island registered a record of 471,000 in 2011.69 In the process, the tourism sector has emerged as a leading source of revenue. As more than 80% of the visitors come from France – largely for family or business reasons – the scope for international growth is considerable.70 Merely employing around 7,000 people, its impact on the labor market has, nevertheless, been weak.71 Moreover, as a result of the economic downturn in France – as well as of a series of fatal shark attacks – the number of tourists decreased by over 5% in 2012.72 In 2010, the total value of goods exported from the island amounted to 281 million Euros. Although the figure was an all-time high, it only represented 6.6% of the combined value of imports, which reached 4.3 billion Euros.73 Reunion, therefore, has the consumption pattern of a developed country, but not the corresponding productive profile. The huge gap between exports and imports is partly covered by customs duties, taxes and incomes from tourism and other services, but above all through huge French budgetary transfers, as well as significant eu contributions. In the latter respect, Reunion occupies a privileged position among the French eu Outermost Regions. For the period 2007–13, the eu contributions amounted to 1.9 billion Euros – roughly 2,300 Euros per inhabitant – or more than the combined total allocated to French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique.74 The fact that Reunion is highly dependent on external funding explains why its development path – contrary to that of Mauritius – is not quoted as a model. As a consequence of the integration into France, the island, nevertheless, has a 69

70

71 72 73 74

In 2010, the number of international tourists to Mauritius was 935,000. Around 100,000 of the visitors were from Reunion. In 2005–06, the tourism industry in Reunion was severely affected by a large-scale chikungunya epidemic, infecting a quarter of the population and causing more than 250 deaths. Chikungunya is a tropical virus infection, transmitted by mosquitos. Excluding France, in 2011 less than 20,000 visitors came from Europe. Around 18,000 were Mauritian citizens and 21,000 non-Europeans (insee: Partenaires, No. 17, Saint Denis, June 2012, pp. 1–4). insee: Comptes Économiques Rapides pour l’Outre-Mer, No. 13, Saint-Denis, December 2012, p. 1. ‘La fréquentation touristique en berne’ in clicanoo.re, 25 September 2013. insee: ter 2011, p. 131. Metropolitan France is by far the most important trading partner. insee: Tableau Économique de La Réunion 2010 (ter 2010), Saint-Denis, 2010, pp. 32–33. The corresponding eu contributions to French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique were, respectively, 485, 745 and 620 million Euros.

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significant gross domestic product, which per inhabitant not only exceeds that of the independent countries in the Indian Ocean (and Mayotte), but of all the African nations barring Equatorial Guinea. With an index of 100 for the average gdp per capita of the 27 eu member states, in 2006 the corresponding figure for Reunion was 61.6.75 Between 1999 and 2009, the economy registered an annual growth of 3.9% – higher than that of France and the other French overseas departments76 – and, although the island was affected by the global crisis, in 2010 per capita gdp was as high as 17,700 Euros.77 At the same time, Reunion struggles with marked inequalities and structural challenges. In 2010, the domestic poverty rate amounted to a staggering 50%.78 In mid-2011, overall unemployment reached 29.5% and youth unemployment an almost unbelievable 59.8%, the highest rates in all of the French departments.79 According to local ngos, this was partly a consequence of preference by the public sector to employ metropolitan French rather than people born in Reunion.80 To a considerably larger degree fueled by funds from France (and the eu) than by productivity on the island, Reunion’s high hdi and gdp per capita scores are reflections of state subsidies, high salaries in the public sector and, above all, various social security schemes. Although at a lower level than in metropolitan France, a guaranteed minimum salary was introduced in 1951. By 1996, the minimum wage, the unemployment coverage and the family allocations in the form of pensions and child allowances, as well for schooling and housing, had been aligned with those in France. Other social benefits have since been instituted, covering around three quarters of the population and representing 30% of household incomes. In 2010, the total amount disbursed by the state towards social benefits reached 2.8 billion Euros, corresponding to an average of more than 3,300 Euros per inhabitant.81

Social Unrest

Comparatively prosperous from a statistical point of view, Reunion, nevertheless, is plagued by chronic social instability. In recent history, a serious outbreak 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

Ibid., p. 33. insee: Économie de La Réunion, No. 138, Saint-Denis, March 2012, p. 3. insee: ter 2011, p. 118–19. insee: Économie de La Réunion, No. 138, Saint-Denis, March 2012, p. 3. Ibid., pp. 8–9. ‘Dans la function publique, 51% des postes échappent aux Réunionnais’ in clicanoo.re, 16 May 2013. insee: Bilan Économique 2010, Saint-Denis, 2011, p. 7.

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of violence took place in February-March 1990, following the ban by the French authorities of a popular, unlicensed television station. The decision triggered a wave of protests, escalating into riots in the aptly named Chaudron suburb of the capital Saint-Denis.82 Resulting in the death of ten people and considerable physical damage, the riots resumed two weeks later when Prime Minister Michel Rocard visited the island. Although these protests happened more than two decades ago, high consumer prices, persistent poverty and continuously growing unemployment have from 2009 with increasing regularity provoked social unrest, strike action and violence. Reunion has not been spared the popular mobilization against la vie chère spreading throughout the French overseas departments. Secondly, strikes and industrial action have repeatedly brought the port and other crucial services to a standstill. More significantly, jobless youth have taken their demands to the streets, causing considerable disruption and violence. What politically has become known in the French overseas territories as la vie chère (‘the costly life’) will be revisited in the following chapter with regard to Mayotte, where it caused widespread protests and riots in OctoberNovember 2011. The expression sums up the reality that costs of basic commodities in the French dependencies exceed those in metropolitan France, and that overseas citizens with much weaker purchasing power have to pay considerably more for food, petrol and other essential goods. For 2010, it was estimated that prices of foodstuffs in the doms on average were between 20 and 40% higher than in France.83 In the case of Reunion, the figure was 36%.84 The high prices partly reflect additional transport costs to the distant island, but are, above all, due to the fact that the importation, distribution and re-sale to the public are controlled by a small number of French companies.85 After a mission to Reunion in March 2012, a delegation from the French Senate affirmed that “the big [distribution] groups, due to the [profit] margins applied, clearly appear as responsible for la vie chère,” concluding that “there is no real free competition in Reunion.”86 82 83 84 85

86

In French, chaudron means ‘boiling pot’. ‘Projet de Loi sur la Régulation Économique Outre-Mer: Discours du Ministre des Outremer, M. Victorin Lurel’, French Senate, Paris, 26 September 2012. ‘À la Réunion, se nourrir coûte 36% plus cher qu’en métropole’ in Le Figaro, 25 February 2012. In Reunion and the other French overseas departments, the maintenance of the octroi de mer contributes to high costs. It is an ancient tax imposed on all productive activities, including the importation of goods, and is an important source of revenue for the local authorities. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan op. cit., pp. 25 and 29.

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Beginning in February 2009 with strike action in Guadeloupe and Martinique, the following month the social protests against la vie chère reached Reunion. Coordinated by the trade unions in both the private and the public sector, as well as by the Communist Party and other formations on the political left, they were backed by a general strike. In Saint-Denis and Saint-Pierre, 35,000 demonstrators demanded lower commodity prices, higher social benefits and an increased minimum wage. Despite the organizers’ call for restraint, the peaceful protests turned into violence, with youth attacking supermarkets and other consumer society symbols, and subsequent retaliation by the police. Although there were no fatal casualties, fifteen policemen were injured in a pattern of unrest which would repeat itself in 2012.87 In February 2012, a new wave of protests was no longer limited to the main urban centers. Once again starting in Chaudron, the unrest quickly spread to the port area west of Saint-Denis and subsequently all around the island, affecting ten municipalities.88 It was particularly violent in Saint-Pierre and SaintLouis in the south. To quell the violence, reinforcements in the form of more than 300 gendarmes and special riot police were flown in from France. Around 160 youth were arrested.89 After reaching an agreement with the main distribution chains, the local government announced that the prices of petrol, gas and a number of basic food items were to be lowered.90 Although social calm momentarily was restored, in the main, however, the underlying socioeconomic issues were left unattended. In the report from its visit to the island in March 2012, the delegation from the French Senate acknowledged that the protest movement in Reunion had “revealed a context of important crisis, [as well as raised] fundamental questions regarding the development of the society and its positioning vis-à-vis the metropolis and the other overseas departments.”91 87

88 89 90 91

‘À la Réunion, des milliers de personnes manifest contre la vie chère’ in Le Monde, 5 March 2009, and ‘16 arrestations à la Réunion en marge de manifestations’ in Le Figaro, 10 March 2009. ‘La Réunion: 10 communes concernées par des violences’ in lexpress.mu, 24 February 2012. There are 24 municipalities (communes) in Reunion. ‘La Réunion: De nouveaux renforts de la gendarmerie attendus ce lundi?’ in lexpress.mu, 27 February 2012. ‘La Réunion: poursuites des violences urbaines malgré l’annonce d’une baisse de prix’ in lexpress.mu, 25 February 2012. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan op. cit., p. 22. Cf. also ‘La Réunion: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau modèle économique’ in lexpress.mu, 3 March 2012. In November 2012, the French government introduced legislation to curb monopolistic pricing and other factors behind the high costs of living in the overseas territories. Popularly known as the Loi Lurel, it had only marginal effects.

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Subsequent developments confirmed Reunion’s social instability. In September 2012, vital exports and imports were brought to a standstill for more than a week when dockworkers in the main container port went on strike.92 And in February 2013 – after a year in which the already inordinate unemployment rate grew by another 9.5%93 – the island was yet again the scene of violent riots as jobless, marginalized youth went on the rampage in the working class areas of Chaudron (Saint-Denis), Le Port, Saint-Benoît and SaintLouis. As the year before, reinforcements – starting with 60 mobile riot police – were quickly dispatched from France to restore law and order.94 Reacting in the same way as his conservative predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, the recently installed socialist President François Hollande also opted for manu militari.

Military Outpost in a Vast Ocean

France’s presence in the south-western part of the Indian Ocean is conspicuous through its military installations in Reunion. Of importance throughout history, they gained considerable strategic significance from 1973, when France was forced by the Malagasy government to abandon its naval base at Diego Suarez (Antsiranana) on the northern tip of the great island. Behind the military expansion in Reunion was Michel Debré, who served as defense minister from 1969 to 1973. The headquarters of the French armed forces in the southern zone of the Indian Ocean (fazsoi)95 are based in Saint-Denis. Since January 2011, they coordinate the Defense Base of Reunion-Mayotte. Excluding gendarmes, the joint defense base has around 2,000 military personnel. With the much smaller contingent in Mayotte – which notably includes an army detachment of the French Foreign Legion – Reunion constitutes the southern base of a French military quadrangle in the Indian Ocean, which in the north includes Djibouti and Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates).96 The responsibility of the four bases extends over a combined exclusive economic zone of 2.5 million square kilometers claimed by France. Units from the army, navy and air force, as well as from the gendarmerie, are based in Reunion. The major army component is a paratroop regiment of 92 93 94 95 96

A similar strike paralyzed the port in May 2013. ‘Hausse de 9.5% du chômage sur un an à La Réunion’ in linfo.re, 27 February 2013. ‘Emeutes à la Réunion: La France envoie du renfort’ in lexpress.mu, 22 February 2013. Forces armées dans la zone sud de l’Océan Indien. Information in this section is mainly from the official publication ‘Guide de Bienvenue aux fazsoi’ [no place; 2011]. With over 2,000 soldiers, the base in Djibouti is the biggest of the four.

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around 460 soldiers, stationed at Pierrefonds in the south and at La Saline in the west. The navy – with some 600 marines – is based at Port des Galets west of Saint-Denis and has at its disposal two surveillance frigates, three patrol vessels and a transport ship. It is the third largest French military port after Toulon and Brest in metropolitan France.97 The air force is located at Sainte-Marie, east of the capital. Around 280 military are attached to the base. Responsible for the maintenance of domestic law and order, the gendarmerie, finally, has just below 1,000 members, divided into four regular companies, one mountain unit and a mobile intervention force. As stated in the official fazsoi guide, its role is preventive, “but also repressive.”98 The overall objectives of the fazsoi forces include the affirmation of French sovereignty and the protection of French interests in the western and southern parts of the Indian Ocean; the surveillance of the exclusive economic zones claimed by France in the region; the struggle against piracy and illegal immigration, as well as international cooperation and training. In a crisis situation, they embrace direct military intervention and the evacuation of French citizens. With regard to cooperation and training, France is active throughout the region. It has signed bi- and multi-lateral security agreements with a number of African coastal and insular independent Indian Ocean states and regularly carries out joint military exercises with them. In October 2011, as but one example, the Reunion-based navy conducted a joint training operation with the South African and Mozambican navies in the Mozambique Channel. By far the most daunting challenge is the protection of French interests – including shipping, fishing and offshore oil and mineral exploration – throughout the immense indian-oceanic areas held by France, but mostly claimed by others. In addition to the exclusive economic zone of 315,000 km2 around Reunion, they encompass the eez of Mayotte (63,000 km2; claimed by Comoros), the eez of the Scattered Islands (352,000 km2; claimed by Madagascar and Comoros),99 the eez of the islet of Tromelin (270,000 km2; claimed by 97 98 99

Bertile, Canabady-Moutien et.al. op. cit., p. 45. fazsoi op. cit., p. 15. From north to south in the Mozambique Channel, the small Scattered Islands (Les Îles Éparses) consist of the coral island of Juan de Nova, the Bassas da India atoll and Europa. In addition, the Glorioso Islands are situated at the northwestern tip of Madagascar. Broken away by France prior to independence, the islands are claimed by Madagascar, Comoros and Mauritius. Since 2007, the Scattered Islands are together with the extreme southern Crozet and Kerguelen archipelagos and the islands of Saint Paul and Amsterdam – which are all located south of the drift ice limit – and the Antarctic territory of Adélie jointly administered as the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises/taaf).

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Mauritius)100 and the vast southern expanses around the Crozet and Kerguelen archipelagos, as well as the islands of Saint Paul and Amsterdam, with an eez of more than one and a half million square kilometers. Excluding the two fazsoi bases, France maintains a small permanent military presence on the Scattered Islands of Juan de Nova and Europa in the Mozambique Channel, as well as on the Glorioso Islands. In addition to the navy, the challenge of surveillance thus mainly falls on the huge satellite tracking station on Mayotte. With weak links to continental Africa and Asia; very French, but at the same time distinctly creole; as part of France (and Europe), Reunion occupies a special place in the Indian Ocean. It remains to be seen how France will tackle the department’s considerable structural challenges. In the meantime, the ‘Old Colony’ is central to France’s vocation as a maritime power and its strategic quest to remain globally relevant. Mauritius

Contrasting Siblings

Located some 200 kilometers north-east of Reunion, the equally solitary island of Mauritius (formerly Île de France) exhibits several similarities with the French department. Since first settled by Europeans, there has been a continuous sibling rivalry between the two Mascarene islands. That is still the case.101 There are, however, marked political, economic, social and cultural differences. Whereas Reunion is an integral part of France, Mauritius is a sovereign state. While the French island further survives on transfer payments from France and struggles with structural unemployment and social unrest, Mauritius has gained worldwide recognition for its homegrown economic development coupled with labor absorption and stability. Reunion, in addition, is an important military base, whereas Mauritius does not have a standing army. Roman 100 Tromelin is situated some 500 kilometers east of Madagascar and 600 kilometers north of Reunion. 101 Cooperating closely in various fields, spats between Reunion and Mauritius are not uncommon. The subject is often the economy, where Reunion sees itself as more developed and Mauritius stresses its national independence. In April 2011, for example, Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam of Mauritius decried Reunion as an “assisted nation,” dependent on “large amounts of money” from France. Albeit true, the statement provoked strong reactions in Reunion (‘“Nation assistée”: La formule de Ramgoolam à Arsenal provoque la colère à La Réunion’ in lexpress.mu, 4 April 2011).

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Catholicism is the predominant faith in Reunion, while Hinduism has more followers than Christian churches in Mauritius. And where volcanos and highlands attract international tourists to the French ‘Old Colony’, bigger numbers flock to the beaches of the former British possession. This said, together with Seychelles they share a common creole inheritance, manifest in language, food and, in general, popular culture such as séga music.

Mauritius and Dependencies

The American author Mark Twain visited Mauritius in April 1896. His comments that the island “was made first, and then heaven” and that “heaven was copied after Mauritius” are often quoted, not least by Mauritian tourism promoters.102 Of older geological origins than Reunion, Mauritius’ volcanic base is eroded and the landscape is characterized by rolling hills with sugar cane, secluded bays, natural harbors and wide beaches. On the south-western tip, the imposing cliff of Morne Brabant was used as a shelter by runaway slaves and has become a symbol for the population of Afro-Malagasy descent.103 Widely known for the extinct dodo bird,104 with a land area of 1,860 square kilometers Mauritius is slightly smaller than Reunion. Once the center of Britain’s vast Indian Ocean empire, which included Seychelles, Chagos and – albeit briefly (1810–14) – Reunion, the independent Republic of Mauritius consists of the island of Mauritius proper and a number 102 In 1895–96, Twain undertook a tour of the British empire, resulting in the non-fiction travelogue Following the Equator, inter alia known for its criticism of racism and imperialism. While he certainly was impressed by the splendid scenery in Mauritius, in reality the quote does not refer to Twain himself, but to his Mauritian interlocutors. The actual text is: “You get all sorts of information. From one citizen you gather the idea that Mauritius was made first, and then heaven; and that heaven was copied after Mauritius. Another one tells you that this is an exaggeration.” Disembarking in the capital Port Louis after visits to the South Pacific, Australia and India, Twain noted in his diary that the town had “the largest variety of nationalities and complexions we have encountered yet” (Mark Twain: Following the Equator, National Geographic Adventure Classics, Washington, 2005, pp. 388–89). 103 In 2008, the Morne Brabant cultural landscape was declared a unesco World Heritage Site. Further underlining its historical significance, the following year a unesco Slave Route Monument was inaugurated at the foot of the cliff by the Mauritian President, Anerood Jugnauth. 104 In the 17th century, the dodo was hunted for food by Dutch sailors and became extinct within a hundred years. Endemic (and emblematic) to Mauritius, the big, flightless bird was around one meter tall and weighed between ten and twenty kilos.

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of dependencies spread over a large area to the east and north of the island. The Mauritian constitution establishes that the country includes the distant islands, islets, shoals and banks of Rodrigues, Agalega, Cargados Carajos, Tromelin and Chagos (explicitly including Diego Garcia). The first three are both de jure and de facto integral parts of Mauritius, while the disputed territories of Tromelin and Chagos are under French and British control, respectively. The volcanic Mascarene island of Rodrigues is located some 600 kilometers east of Mauritius and has an extension of 108 km2. There are around 38,000 inhabitants on Rodrigues, which since 2002 enjoys a semi-autonomous status within the republic. The two coral islands of Agalega are situated 1,100 kilometers to the north and have a combined land area of around 25 km2. Cargados Carajos, also known as the Saint Brandon Rocks, is an archipelago with a number of islets and shoals situated around 500 kilometers to the north-east. Finally, the small island of Tromelin – – occupied by France, but since 2010 co-administered with Mauritius – lies 600 kilometers to the north-west, whereas the Chagos archipelago in the distant north before Mauritius’ independence was dismembered by the United Kingdom and turned into a new colony, the British Indian Ocean Territory. Including the dependencies – but excluding Chagos –

Agalega, Cargados Carajos and Tromelin The North and South Agalega Islands have a permanent population of around 300 inhabitants, who are mainly involved in the exploitation of coconut oil. A small number of Chagossians stay on Agalega. Since 2006, there have been media reports in both India and Mauritius about negotiations between the two countries concerning the lease of Agalega to India for tourism development and/or military purposes. On several occasions, the unconfirmed reports have led to strong anti-Indian reactions among the islanders, not least in April 2011 when an Indian company on behalf of the Mauritian government erected radar screens as part of the efforts to combat illegal fishing and piracy in the area. Fearing eviction similar to that of the Chagossians, the inhabitants were said to be in a state of “psychosis” and in Mauritius a non-governmental ‘Support Committee for Agalega’ was set up. The Cargados Carajos archipelago consists of around 15 islets on an extended reef. They have a small transient population of less than 100 people, mostly fishermen. The land area of Tromelin is just about one square kilometer, but around the islet the French government claims an eez of no less than 270,000 km2. France manages a meteorological station on Tromelin, which has a landing strip and is populated by a small number of scientists. After years of negotiations, in June

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2010 France and Mauritius reached an agreement on economic, scientific and environmental co-administration of the islet and the surrounding maritime area. Under the agreement, the two countries shall inter alia jointly issue fishing permits to vessels from third countries. News of the agreement between the European occupant and the Indian Ocean claimant was received with mixed feelings in the region, notably in Madagascar. The French government subsequently made it clear that “it is out of the question that France renounces its sovereignty over Tromelin, not only for principled reasons, but also because it could have an impact on other disputes concerning French overseas possessions, particularly the one with regard to Madagascar and the Scattered Islands.” In April 2013, the ratification of the agreement between France and Mauritius was blocked by the French National Assembly. Days later, the French overseas minister, Victorin Lurel, paid a ­surprise visit to the islet to “reaffirm the sovereignty of France.” Although Mauritius has not relinquished its claim, according to us diplomatic sources made public by WikiLeaks in 2011 the government in Port Louis initially found the negotiations with France over Tromelin considerably easier than those with the United Kingdom over Chagos.

Map 8  Mauritius

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the total land area of Mauritius is only 2,040 square kilometers. With close to 1.3 million km2, its oceanic exclusive economic zone is, however, immense.105 The presentation below focuses on the island of Mauritius, with additional comments on Rodrigues. The issue of Chagos, including the us military base on Diego Garcia, is discussed in the following chapter.

Ethnic Communities

In mid-2012, the total population of the Republic of Mauritius was 1.3 million, out of which over 97% lived on the main island. The population density is significant, amounting to no less than 672 persons per square kilometer or by far the highest in the Indian Ocean.106 As a result of economic development, education, vigorous family planning and, in general, successful social policies, the growth rate, however, has been brought down to 0.4% and is no ­longer seen in the Malthusian terms it was before independence. In a study on Mauritius, the British geographer Harold Brookfield concluded in 1957 that the island “could never be a viable state, less a state capable of absorbing the shock of so violent a crisis of man, land and capital.”107 And in a famous report to the British governor, James Meade, future Nobel laureate for economics, characterized in 1961  the demographic trends as “a truly terrifying prospect,” predicting that “disaster will ensue unless the [government] promptly take[s] the necessary, though in some cases unpopular, measures,” including emigration.108 Post-independence developments have proved such forecasts wrong. Around 40% of the population live in urban areas, with a concentration in the capital Port Louis (150,000 inhabitants) on the west coast and the adjacent centers of Beau Bassin/Rose-Hill (105,000), Quatre Bornes (95,000) and Vacoas/Phoenix (110,000). The Franco-Mauritian colonial town of Curepipe on the central plateau has a population of around 80,000 and Mahébourg, 105 The eez area of 1.3 million km2 excludes Tromelin as well as the Chagos archipelago. 106 Statistics Mauritius: ‘Population and Vital Statistics: Republic of Mauritius, January–June 2012’, Port Louis, 2012, p. 2. 107 H.C. Brookfield: Mauritius: Demographic Upsurge and Prospect (1957), quoted in Espelencia Marie Baptiste: How Citizens Are Produced and Ethnicity Is Maintained in Post-Colonial Mauritius, with Special Attention to the Creoles: An Anthropological Study, Edwin Mellon Press, Lewiston, 2013, p. 13. 108 J.E. Meade and Others: The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius, Routledge, London and New York, 2011, pp. 3 and 230. The report was first published by Methuen in 1961. Meade received the 1977 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

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the main port on the east coast, 15,000 inhabitants. The national currency is the Mauritian Rupee. The Mauritian constitution is exceptional in that it establishes that the population of Mauritius shall be regarded as including a Hindu ­community, a Muslim community and a Sino-Mauritian community; and  every person who does not appear, from his way of life, to belong to one or other of those three communities shall be regarded as belonging to the General Population, which shall itself be regarded as a fourth community.109 Pre-independent Mauritius was largely affected by ethnic tensions. Against this background, the rationale behind the constitutional provision was to create checks and balances to secure representation for all major population groups. In addition to 62 members elected in accordance with the ‘firstpast-the post’ system, the National Assembly therefore accommodates eight ‘best losers’ appointed from one or more of the communities which otherwise would not be represented.110 Although Mauritius since independence in 1968 with only one notable exception has been spared ethnic violence, in several respects the classification is, nevertheless, controversial.111 Primarily based on loose religious criteria, it contributes to both intraand inter-ethnic dilemmas, inter alia dividing the Indian population into two communities which themselves are both complex and diverse. In addition, the small group of Chinese origin – at the time estimated at around 3% of the population – is seen as a distinct community in its own right. Above all, the residual ‘general population’ group – supposedly made up of followers of Christian churches – lumps together the economic Franco-Mauritian elite and  the descendants of their former Afro-Malagasy slaves. In independent Mauritius, where the poorest population of African origin has become 109 Government of Mauritius: ‘Constitution of Mauritius, First Schedule, Article 3: Communities’. 110 All candidates must belong to one of the four communities. The constitution establishes that “[e]very candidate for election at any general election of members of the [National] Assembly shall declare […] which community he belongs to and that community shall be stated in a published notice of his nomination” (ibid.). 111 On the problem of community classification and national identity, see Nirmala Savrimuthu-Carta: La Construction Identitaire des Adolescents à l’Épreuve du Communau­ tarisme à l’Île Maurice, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012.

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increasingly marginalized – giving rise to a socio-ethnic challenge known as malaise créole112 – this is particularly divisive. According to the Mauritian political scientists Bunwaree and Kasenally, “the electoral system has triggered [a] crude ethnicization of political parties. […] Mauritian unity and a sense of ‘Mauritianness’ can only be achieved and truly  celebrated if the country succeeds in de-ethnicizing and de-racializing the  act.”113 Arguing that the community provision violates civil liberties and ­fundamental freedoms, in 2007 the political organization Rezistans ek Alternativ (rea) brought the matter to the attention of the un Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. In August 2012, the committee issued a statement in rea’s favor, urging the government of Mauritius to reconsider the electoral system.114 The collection of census data on ethnicity was discontinued in 1983. A rough estimate is that close to 70% of the population is of Indian background, around 25% Afro-Malagasy, 3–4% Chinese and 1–2% European.115 The Republic of Mauritius is the only member state of the African Union with an Indian

112 As with regard to the other population groups, generalizations are deceptive. Mauritians with an Afro-Malagasy background span a wide socio-economic spectrum, from the most disadvantaged and poorest Creole-speaking ti kreol to French-speaking members of the Franco-Mauritian middle, or upper middle, class. 113 Sheila Bunwaree and Roukaya Kasenally: Political Parties and Democracy in Mauritius, eisa Research Report No. 19, Johannesburg, 2005, pp. 16 and 33. 114 In the 2005 general elections, rea candidates refused to declare any community belonging. Barred from participating, the organization took the matter to the Supreme Court of Mauritius, which maintained that it was compulsory for all candidates to declare their community. After having an appeal rejected, rea submitted a complaint to the un Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Mauritius is a signatory. In October 2009, the un body rejected the counter arguments by the Mauritian government, ruling that the complaint was admissible. In August 2012, it issued a strong statement against the state of Mauritius, censuring the community system and requesting the Mauritian government to submit information on corrective measures within 180 days. In March 2014, the government eventually submitted a white paper proposing a constitutional amendment. Henceforth, it would no longer be mandatory for electoral candidates to declare a community belonging. In principle, the proposal was supported by all the major political parties and organizations. Introducing the white paper, Prime Minister Ramgoolam declared that “46 years after independence, the time has come to identify ourselves as Mauritians” (‘Ramgoolam: Le Best Loser System ne peut pas être conserve tel qu’il est’ in lexpress.mu, 20 March 2014). 115 The relative size of the population groups is based on data dating back to 1972.

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majority. Moreover, outside India no other country in the world has a proportionally bigger Indian population. The dominance of the Indo-Mauritian population group is reflected in the data on religious beliefs. In the 2011 census, 39% of the population registered as followers of Hinduism, with 11% adhering to other Indian faiths. To this should be added the significant Muslim population, which is overwhelmingly of Indian descent. Around 18% of the Mauritians embraced Islam. Christian denominations represented 30% of the population. Roman Catholicism was by far the most important Christian faith. Around 24% declared themselves as Catholics. As a reflection of the historically marginal British presence on the island, merely 2,600 inhabitants – corresponding to 0.2% – registered as followers of the Church of England. Finally, many Mauritians of Chinese background are Christians. Only 3,000 indicated diverse Chinese faiths as their religion and 2,100 Buddhism, together representing 0.4% of the population.116 All ethno-religious groups are socio-economically stratified and generalizations with regard to class and community are misleading. In general terms, the Indo-Mauritians are dominant in government, the civil service, financial services and liberal professions, although within the group there is a marked urban–rural divide. Many workers on the sugar estates are of Indian descent. No less conspicuous is the economic power held by the Franco-Mauritian elite, which not only owns most of the land under sugar cultivation,117 but also many of the country’s largest enterprises. Members of the Muslim population group are also important property owners and businessmen, whereas others are industrial or estate workers. The Sino-Mauritians, typically, own and operate commercial and mercantile ventures, from large companies to rural shops. As in Reunion, the Afro-Mauritians, finally, generally occupy the lowest and least secure rungs of the Mauritian social hierarchy as wage laborers, subsistence farmers or fishermen.118 Language is a unifying factor in the ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse nation. Whereas English is used by the state institutions and French dominates the newspapers and, in general, the media – and many Mauritians communicate in both languages – by far the most widely spoken tongue is Creole. In 2011, no less than 87% of the population registered Creole as the

116 Statistics Mauritius: ‘2011 Housing and Population Census: Volume II: Demographic and Fertility Characteristics’, Port Louis, 2012, p. 69. 117 Land ownership in Mauritius is one of the most concentrated in the world. It was only with the sugar reform package from 2005 that the sugar barons were forced to cede land, capital and liquidity. 118 Geographically, the population of Afro-Malagasy descent is concentrated to the mainly rural district of Rivière Noire (Black River) in south-western Mauritius.

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language usually spoken at home.119 Although not an official language as in Seychelles, Mauritian Creole (Kreol Morisien) enjoys a prominent position in the society, with a recognized orthography, grammar and dictionary, as well as a language academy, the Akademi Kreol Morisien.120 In January 2012, Creole was formally introduced into the Mauritian school system. Bhojpuri – originating in northern India – was according to the census the second most used vernacular, spoken by 5% of the population.121 French came in third place (4%), whereas English – the language of the colonial power from 1814 until 1968 – was merely used by 0.4%, behind Hindi (0.7%) and just ahead of Chinese dialects (0.2%).122

French Slavery and British Indenture

Mauritius – named after Prince Maurice of Nassau, member of the House of Orange and stathouder of Holland – was first occupied by the Dutch. At the height of its seaborne empire, in 1619 the Dutch East India Company established a base in Batavia (Jakarta) on the island of Java in today’s Indonesia. In need of a halfway station on the long spice route between the Netherlands and Batavia, the choice fell on the unpopulated Mascarene island of Mauritius due to its natural harbors, fresh water and ebony forests. A settlement under governor Adriaan van der Stel was organized in 1638.123 Only fourteen years later, the Dutch trading company set up a supply station at the Cape on the southern tip of Africa.124 With better conditions than Mauritius, Cape Town became the more important 119 Statistics Mauritius: ‘2011 Housing and Population Census’ op. cit., p. 87. 120 The difference between the linguistic term ‘Creole’ and the ethnic designation ‘creole’ used with regard to Afro-Malagasy descendants and, in general, to people with mixed background should be borne in mind. 121 Of those who registered Bhojpuri as the language usually spoken at home, no less than 95% lived in the rural areas. Once a common language among the indentured workers on the sugar estates, Bhojpuri is rapidly losing ground in contemporary Mauritius. On Indian languages (religions and cultures) in Mauritius, see Patrick Eisenlohr: Little India: Diaspora, Time and Ethnolinguistic Belonging in Hindu Mauritius, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2006. 122 Only 5,600 persons registered English as their home tongue. Small groups speak Indian languages such as Tamil, Telegu, Urdu and Marathi. On the Chinese population group, see Marina Carter and James Ng Foong Kwong: Abacus and Mah Jong: Sino-Mauritian Settlement and Economic Consolidation, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2009. 123 The family of van der Stel was to become renowned in South Africa. His son, Simon van der Stel, became commander and, in 1691, governor of the Dutch settlement at the Cape. The South African towns of Stellenbosch and Simonstown are named after him. 124 The Cape station did not suffer from cyclones and meat could be obtained from the indigenous Khoi population. From the late 17th century, the Dutch used the Cape as a place of

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station, and in 1710 the Dutch withdrew from the island. Their imprint would, however, be permanent. During their brief tenure, the Dutch managed to exterminate the dodo, deplete the ebony forests and introduce deer, monkeys and rats. They were also responsible for the introduction of sugar and slaves. The withdrawal of the Dutch left the island open for French occupation. As Île de France, Mauritius was claimed by France in 1715, and the first settlers from Reunion and France arrived in 1721–22. Under the administration of Mahé de Labourdonnais (1735–46),125 the colony was firmly established, eventually overshadowing that of Reunion. Already at the end of de Labourdonnais’ governorship, “the harbor was well-equipped and well-defended and the town [of Port Louis] a flourishing place with some fine buildings, a social life and the air of a capital in the making.”126 Under de Labourdonnais, the Mascarene administrative headquarters of the French East India Company were moved to the new island. Succeeding Pondicherry (now Puducherry) in south-eastern India, in 1789, finally, Port Louis was promoted to the capital of all French possessions in the Indian Ocean, which by then also included Seychelles. The original plan was to develop Bourbon – where coffee cultivation already was a thriving business – into an agricultural center and Île de France as the site of a commercial port and a strategic naval base. Sugar cane, however, grew in importance, and by 1786 there were ten sugar factories in Mauritius.127 As in Reunion, the plantations were based on slave labor, soon changing the demographic and socio-economic profile of the French settlement. Initially, slaves were brought from Madagascar – and for a short period from West Africa – but from the mid-18th century most slaves were imported from Mozambique. By the end of the century, there were some 50,000 slaves in Mauritius, mainly owned by an increasingly wealthy French plantocracy. With roots in feudal France, the sugar barons did not accept the abolition of slavery decreed by the French Revolution. When representatives of the revolutionary government in Paris arrived in Mauritius, they were simply turned back. exile for dissidents in Indonesia, resulting in the implantation of Islam and close connections between Cape Town and the Indian Ocean world. 125 Like many other employees of the East India Company, corsairs and sailors, de Labourdonnais (1699–1753) was originally from Brittany (Bretagne) in north-western France. He is one of the most prominent personalities in the history of the Indian Ocean. In addition to his direct involvement in the Mascarenes, he showed great interest in the islands to the north. It was one of his officers, Captain Picault, who first explored the islands, which were claimed by France in 1756, annexed to Mauritius and named Seychelles after Moreau de Séchelles, then France’s comptroller-general of finances. The main island – Mahé – was named after de Labourdonnais. 126 Addison and Hazareesingh op. cit., p. 14. 127 Ibid., p. 23.

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Mauritius remained largely in a semi-autonomous state until the British in the context of the Napoleonic Wars took control of the island. As early as 1761, William Pitt, later prime minister of Britain, stated that “as long as the French hold the Île de France, the British will never be masters of India.”128 This became increasingly apparent from 1780, when French corsairs, or privateers, based in Mauritius on behalf of France successfully started to attack British merchant vessels going to and from India.129 At the end of the century, nearly one hundred corsairs operated out of Port Louis, causing enormous damage to British trade.130 Although Britain had no long-term interest in administering the islands, the threat to the vital sea-lanes eventually forced the Royal Navy to launch a military campaign, and in 1810 the Mascarenes were brought under British control. With regard to Bourbon and Île de France, the terms of the subsequent 1814 Paris Treaty were most generous to France. Reunion was returned to French rule. Although Mauritius – which now reverted to its original Dutch name – was kept by the British, the Franco-Mauritian aristocracy was not only spared retribution for the corsair raids, but could keep its property, law, religion, language and, in general, way of life. In Mauritius, therefore, a rare hybrid was established, where de jure British political sovereignty rested upon de facto French – or more precisely Franco-Mauritian – socio-economic power. The “curious position,” Bulpin wrote in his study Islands in a Forgotten Sea, “gave its settlers a most tenacious and at times pathetic conservatism in their attachment to the political ideals and customs prevailing on the island at the time of its detachment from France.”131 Initially, the slave-based plantation economy was also left untouched. In 1833, however, the British parliament outlawed slavery. The Abolition Act met with strong opposition in Mauritius and did not enter into force on the island until two years later. In negotiations with the British government, the sugar barons, in the meantime, not only managed to receive substantial compensation 128 Quoted in Maestri op. cit., p. 26. 129 Whereas pirates act illegally for their own benefit, corsairs – also known as privateers – operated legally on behalf and for the benefit of a country, by virtue of an official wartime mandate. During the American War of Independence, France issued such mandates to shipowners and individuals, who turned their merchant vessels into armed ships of war against the British. The institution of privateering was then introduced in the Indian Ocean. See Denis Piat: Pirates and Corsairs in Mauritius, Christian le Comte, Mauritius, 2007. 130 Ibid., p. 50. The prizes – goods and ships alike – taken from the British were sold at public auctions in Port Louis. The proceeds were shared between the French authorities, the shipowners and the crews. A ‘Fund for the Disabled’ was set up to cater for the needs of wounded corsairs and of the dependants of sailors killed in action. Several of the corsairs – principal among them Robert Surcouf – became national heroes. 131 Bulpin op. cit., p. 237.

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for the property lost,132 but also convinced the authorities to introduce a mandatory ‘apprenticeship’ system under which the freed slaves for a period of four to five years were required to work as (under)paid laborers for their former masters. In turn, the system provided the British government and the plantocracy sufficient time to locate other sources of cheap labor. As the former Afro-Malagasy slaves abandoned the sugar estates altogether, moving to urban centers, fishing villages and unclaimed lands – or as far as Rodrigues – they were replaced by indentured workers from India, mainly from the northern part of the sub-continent. Indenture replaced slavery in many British possessions, but nowhere was it as massively applied as in Mauritius. Between 1834 and 1912, no less than 453,000 Indians were brought to the small island, representing one third of all indentured workers from India in the world.133 Over a span of two generations – from the early 1830s to the late 1870s – the population was completely transformed from around 80% Afro-Malagasy to over 60% Indian.134 The social conditions on the sugar estates were akin to slavery. The wages in Mauritius were the lowest of all the territories where indenture was introduced. By law, the Indian workers had to carry identification cards, their premises could be inspected by the police at any time and the treatment received was, in general, sub-human. Meanwhile, by 1860 the island was covered with sugar cane and the Franco-Mauritian elite exceedingly wealthy.

Democratization and Independence

From the 1880s to the 1930s, Mauritius experienced half a century of relative calm. Through a local council of government, the Franco-Mauritian oligarchy continued to advise the British government. With only around 12,000 people eligible to vote for the council, the Indo- and Afro-Mauritian population groups were hardly aware of its existence. Inspired by young Indians and FrancoAfricans returning from studies abroad, towards the end of the period protests 132 The recompense per slave was 50% higher than that awarded in the British West Indies (Hall op. cit., p. 377). 133 Médéa op. cit., p. 36. The indenture system was officially abolished in 1916. Under the system, 239,000 Indians were brought to British Guyana, representing 17% of the global figure. Natal, South Africa, received 152,000 (11%) and Trinidad 144,000 (10.5%). Although not a British colony, 118,000 Indians (9%) were sent to Reunion, where the system was in force until 1924. (See also Paul Younger: New Homelands: Hindu Communities in Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, South Africa, Fiji and East Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 134 Alpers (2014) op. cit., pp. 116–17.

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against the oppressive working conditions were, however, increasingly voiced. With the formation of the Mauritian Labour Party (mlp) in 1936, the protests were given guidance and organization.135 An important chapter in the history of the island was opened. Modeled on the British Labour Party and ideologically guided by democratic socialism, the Parti Travailliste would over the next three decades be at the forefront of the struggles for higher wages and, in general, workers’ rights, universal suffrage and, eventually, national independence. The first objective was partly achieved after a series of strikes on the sugar plantations and in the harbor of Port Louis in 1937–38 resulted in violent clashes with the police, leaving several workers dead or wounded. In May 1938, the British authorities recognized the organization of trade unions. In a matter of months, more than twenty unions were formed by sugar cutters and dock workers. As a second wave of strikes and violence hit the island in 1943, the authorities, however, made common cause with the sugar barons. A subsequent report to the House of Commons in London concluded that “[l]aws may be passed, administrative machinery may be erected, money may be spent and the situation may nevertheless remain unchanged. […] The situation [in Mauritius] as it exists today is the end product of an historical process which should be reckoned in generations.”136 In the aftermath of the Second World War, however, the situation did change. As the Labour Party formed government in Britain and the Indian National Congress – a significant source of inspiration for the downtrodden in Mauritius137 – steered India towards independence, the external context of the workers’ demands improved dramatically. In 1947, the government in London decided to amend the Mauritian constitutional dispensation of 1885, at the time the oldest in the British empire, extending the right to vote to anyone able to read and write in one of the nine languages then in use in Mauritius. In the process, the electorate increased from 2 to 38% of the population, for the first time including a significant number of Indo- and Afro-Mauritian workers. 135 The Labour Party was founded by Maurice Curé, a prominent member of the creole community. In Mauritius, the party name is generally shortened to PTr for Parti Travailliste. 136 Quoted in Addison and Hazareesingh op. cit., p. 89. 137 The struggle by the Indian National Congress (inc) for emancipation, universal suffrage and independence was closely followed in Mauritius. Several Mauritian political and trade union leaders had personal experiences from inc campaigns in India. In 1901, Mahatma Gandhi visited Mauritius on his way from South Africa to India, where he attended an inc meeting in Calcutta. He later recommended that a lawyer should be sent to the island to defend the cause of Indian immigrants. On Gandhi’s advice, Manilal Doctor practiced law in Mauritius from 1907 to 1911.

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In the elections to a local legislative council the following year, candidates for the Labour Party won 12 of the 19 seats contested, while only one seat went to the Franco-Mauritian oligarchy. With the support of twelve nominated and three official members, the latter, however, were still in political control. Although the 1948 elections resulted in a severe loss for the traditional elite, over the following years it would form its own party and prepare for a political comeback, raising the bogey of Hindu domination, propagating religious and cultural affinity with the Afro-Mauritian population, opposing further extension of the suffrage and advocating a special relationship with Britain à la France and Reunion. Largely against the backdrop of the partition of India, the formation of Pakistan and the war between the two countries, at the same time the Mauritian Muslim population group – which did not win any representation in 1948 – also set up its own political party. In Mauritius, therefore, democratization was from the beginning tainted with ethnicization. This was confirmed in the 1959 elections to the legislative council, now increased to forty elected members. In addition to the Labour Party, they were contested by the Franco-Mauritian-led Mauritian Social-Democratic Party (Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate/pmsd), the Muslim Committee of Action (Comité d’Action Musulmane/cam) and the Independent Forward Bloc (ifb), which stood for the revival of Indian culture and the consequent rejection of Western political systems. In the elections, mlp won 24 of the 40 seats, ifb 6, cam 5 and pmsd 3.138 Pushed by the Labour Party, the stage was being set for the final steps towards democracy, self-rule and, ultimately, political independence. A constitutional conference between the British and the Mauritian political parties was convened in London in 1961. As the pmsd representatives walked out of the talks, no concrete results were achieved. Another conference opened in 1965. During the proceedings, mlp – led by Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who in 1962 had been appointed chief minister and in 1964 premier of the Mauritian executive council – was joined by ifb and cam in demanding free, universal elections and independence, whereas pmsd put forward a scheme for a referendum and associated status with the United Kingdom. Eventually, the British government sided with the majority, but not without doubts and insisting on an electoral system that would ensure representation for the different population groups. The outcome was the above mentioned division into four communities. Although the British had rejected the Franco-Mauritian demand for a referendum, the following elections – held in August 1967 – were widely interpreted 138 Two seats went to independent candidates.

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as a verdict for or against independence. Going to the polls as the ‘Independence Party’, mlp, ifb and cam together won 39 seats, against 23 for pmsd.139 After allocation of the ‘best loser’ seats, with 43 out of 70 in the new assembly the Labour-led pro-independence alliance held an absolute majority. As individual parties, however, mlp only had one seat more than pmsd. The high proportion of votes polled by the latter was not only a reflection of fears of Indo-Mauritian domination, but also of the resentment of the Afro-Malagasy population group and, in general, a malaise créole. Developments in nearby Reunion also influenced the public opinion against political independence. Attached to France, the population in the sister island benefited from the French social security system and generous budget transfers from the metropolis. As a consequence, the standards of living in Reunion were higher than in Mauritius.140 After the elections, the Mauritian political climate became increasingly tense, in January 1968 culminating in two weeks of riots and ethnic clashes between, in particular, Muslims and Afro-Mauritians. At least twenty-five people were killed, hundreds injured and thousands driven from their homes. A state of emergency was declared and British troops had to be shipped from Singapore to restore law and order.141 It was against this somber background that Mauritius two months later – on 12 March 1968 – attained independence with Ramgoolam, the ‘Father of the Nation’, as prime minister. On the same date in 1992, finally, Mauritius became a republic, with an executive premier and a ceremonial president.142 139 The ‘Independence Party’ polled 55% of the votes. Among the alliance parties, Labour won 24 seats, ifb 11 and cam 4. 140 At the time, the example of Réunion départment attracted considerable interest also in Rodrigues and Seychelles. In his memoirs, James Mancham, the first president of the Republic of Seychelles, writes: “In fact, when I was advocating that Seychelles remain ‘integrated’ with the United Kingdom, that was because I saw the level of security and stability which the people of La Réunion were enjoying under the French flag – social benefits as high as anywhere in France, a strong currency and the privileges of travelling with a French passport” (James R. Mancham: Seychelles Global Citizen: The Autobiography of the Founding President of the Republic of Seychelles, Paragon House, St. Paul, 2009, p. 269). 141 Similar violence had broken out in May 1965, prompting the British governor to declare a state of emergency and calling for military reinforcements from Aden. 142 The first elected president of Mauritius under the 1992 republican dispensation was Cassam Uteem, a member of the Muslim community with a background in the Mauritian Militant Movement. After refusing to sign a controversial anti-terrorism bill into law, Uteem resigned from the presidency in February 2002.

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Consensus and Coalitions

Independent Mauritius stands out for its remarkable macro- and socioeconomic achievements, as well as for its stable democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. It is one of few members of the African Union which since independence have maintained a multi-party system and free elections.143 In 2012, it was ranked as high as number 18 on The Economist Intelligence Unit’s worldwide Democracy Index. It was the only African country in the category of ‘full democracies’, placed before the United States, Japan, France and Italy.144 Against this background, the political party scene is quite bewildering. Politics on the island have been characterized by seemingly endless cycles of shifting coalitions, splits, new formations and re-alignments.145 Over the years, electoral calculus and intrigues have, in addition, become part of the political landscape. Most of the main actors are guided by a socialist vision and many of the leading parties include ‘socialist’ and/or ‘militant’ in their names. In reality, however, there has been a pragmatic move away from class-based perspectives to a broad middle-of-the-road consensus, dominated by social-democratic political ideas and liberal economic policies. The course of events has led to a concentration of political power in the hands of a small number of dynastic IndoMauritian families, who, furthermore, are inter-connected through religion and caste. In this environment – largely a product of the electoral system – former adversaries readily become allies, and policies on the left and the right gravitate towards the center. Although domestic policy issues often give rise to controversy and heated arguments, with regard to the main macro-economic course and to foreign policy there is in Mauritius a remarkable degree of agreement. In 2008, Paul Bérenger, then leader of the opposition, underlined that there was 143 Mauritius shares this distinction with Botswana, which became independent in 1966. To these countries should be added the ‘latecomers’ Namibia and South Africa. 144 The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu): Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Standstill, London, 2013, pp. 3–4. The eiu index is based on the five categories of electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. In 2012, 165 independent states were assessed and placed within one of four types of regimes, namely full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes. Ranked as number 117 and 127, respectively, Madagascar and Comoros were both placed in the category of ‘authoritarian regimes’. As microstates were not assessed, Seychelles was not included in the index. Norway occupied the position as the most democratic country in the world. 145 See, for example, Jocelyn Chan Low: ‘Vie Politique et Élections Générales de 1948 à 2005’ in Jean-Michel Jauze (ed): L’Île Maurice Face à Ses Nouveaux Défis, L’Harmattan, Paris/ Université de La Réunion, Saint-Denis, 2008, pp. 65–76.

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Dynastic families Respectively linked to the Mauritian Labour Party and the Militant Socialist Movement, the Ramgoolam and Jugnauth families stand out. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, ‘Father of the Nation’ and responsible for the introduction of Mauritius’ far-reaching social security system, was prime minister from 1968 until 1982 and president from 1983 until his death in 1985. His son, Navinchandra (‘Navin’) Ramgoolam, held the premiership from 1995 to 2000. He returned as prime minister in 2005 and again in 2010. Sir Anerood Jugnauth, widely credited for Mauritius’ successful economic transformation, was prime minister from 1982 to 1995 and from 2000 to 2003. He served as president between 2003 and March 2012, when he criticized the government of Navin Ramgoolam and suddenly resigned (In July 2012, he was succeeded by Rajkeswur Purryag). Sir Anerood’s son, Pravind Jugnauth, was deputy prime minister from 2003 to 2005. In 2010, he became vice prime minister and minister of finance. Following allegations of corruption and bribery, in July 2011 he left the cabinet. Several other members of the Jugnauth family have held ministerial posts or high positions, among them Ashok Jugnauth (former minister of health) and Lall Jugnauth (ex-attorney general). Since independence, all but one of the Mauritian prime ministers (Paul Bérenger 2003–05) have been Hindu and all of them except one have come from the numerically small, mid-ranking Vaish caste. After a debate in the Mauritian media, in September 2010 Prime Minister Ramgoolam underlined the need to “change the mentality of appointing people to positions according to caste.”

“no ideological fracture” between the dominant parties.146 Two years later, Pravind Jugnauth, at the time minister of finance, similarly stated that “in terms of foreign policy there is no major difference between what the mmm says, what we say and what the Labour Party says.”147 Focusing on Mauritius’ three main political organizations – the Labour Party, the Mauritian Militant Movement and the Militant Socialist Movement – the

146 Quoted in Klaus-Peter Treydte: ‘Mauritius’ in Mehler, Melber and van Walraven (eds): Africa Yearbook (2008) op. cit. (2009), p. 450. 147 Quoted in Martin Welz: Integrating Africa: Decolonization’s Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union, Routledge, Milton Park and New York, 2013, p. 160.

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following overview summarizes the developments on the post-independence domestic political arena148: In 1968, the new nation faced towering challenges in the form of a stagnating economy, rapid population growth, widespread poverty and deep ethnoreligious divisions. The Labour-led coalition under Ramgoolam had been united on the question of independence, but was not necessarily in unison on other issues. Not surprisingly, therefore, within a year the ‘Independence Party’ alliance broke up and ifb left the government. Much more unexpected was that it in December 1969 was replaced by Labour’s historical opposite, pmsd of the French-speaking elite, which two years earlier had rejected independence and campaigned against Indo-Mauritian domination. Thus, a grand coalition between the Hindu-dominated mlp, the Muslim cam and the FrancoMauritian pmsd was formed.149 In turn, the alliance lasted for four years, until December 1973. At a crucial time in the history of the young nation, Ramgoolam’s ‘unholy alliance’ bridged the ethnic divide, introduced an important element of national unity and laid the basis for a mixed economy. At the same time, the coalition with pmsd was resented by large sections of the Labour Party’s main constituency in the working class and left a vacuum of opposition. It was filled by a new actor on the political arena, the Mauritian Militant Movement (Mouvement Militant Mauricien/mmm). Founded in September 1969, mmm was led by Paul Bérenger, a young Franco-Mauritian who had recently returned to Mauritius from studies in Europe. Inspired by the 1968 student movement and ideologically guided by Marxism, mmm formed a new trade union organization – the General Workers 148 mlp, mmm and msm are studied by Bunwaree and Kasenally in op. cit. In addition to the ‘big three’, there are an astonishing number of political organizations in Mauritius. In 2005, no less than 71 parties registered for the general elections. Some of the political organizations represent extremes on the ideological spectrum, such as the left Lalit Party (‘The Struggle’). Others express fundamentalist ethno-religious views, among them Voice of Hindu and the Muslim Hizbullah (‘Party of God’)/Mauritian Solidarity Front, which managed to win one parliamentary seat in 2010. In turn, the high number of alternatives may explain the low rate of abstentions. Regularly, 80–85% of the electorate cast their votes. 149 In the process, nearly half of the pmsd members broke away to form the Mauritian Democratic Union (Union Démocratique Mauricienne/udm). The leader of pmsd, Gaëtan Duval, known in Mauritius as ‘King Creole’, became foreign minister in Ramgoolam’s grand coalition government. In 1998, his son, Xavier-Luc Duval, founded his own party, the Mauritian Party of Xavier Duval (Parti Mauricien Xavier Duval/PMXD), which later re-joined pmsd. In August 2011, Xavier Duval succeeded Pravind Jugnauth as minister of finance in Navin Ramgoolam’s Labour-led coalition government.

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Federation (gwf) – and quickly gained a following among the youth, the creole dockworkers in Port Louis and the Indian laborers on the sugar plantations. The government’s initial reaction to these developments was to postpone the general elections, due in 1972. And when a wave of strikes broke out in early 1971, the Labour-led government passed a Public Order Act, banned political meetings, outlawed the gwf unions, declared a state of emergency and detained the mmm leadership. mmm’s popularity, however, was not broken. When general elections eventually were held in 1976, it became the single largest party with 40.1% of the votes and 30 out of the 62 elected seats. Its broad following was further underlined by the fact that it was the only party that had successful candidates from all the population groups, ironically barring Bérenger’s own group, the FrancoMauritians.150 Failing to win an absolute majority, mmm, nevertheless, was kept out of government by another coalition between mlp, cam and pmsd. In 1982, however, mmm made history when it in alliance with the Mauritian Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Mauricien/psm) managed to win all of the 60 contested parliamentary seats.151 Anerood Jugnauth, the president of mmm, became prime minister and Bérenger, the secretary general, minister of finance. After forming a government with psm, the Mauritian Militant Movement underwent an internal crisis and split in March 1983. As the dissidents under the leadership of Jugnauth formed the Militant Socialist Movement (Mouvement Socialiste Militant/msm), and Jugnauth with the backing of the Labour Party and pmsd stayed on as prime minister, mmm would never fully recover. Nevertheless, the party remained a significant force and returned to government in alliance with the Labour Party in 1995 and with msm in 2000. Since 2005, it serves as the main opposition in the National Assembly. The mmm leader, Paul Bérenger – who was deputy prime minister in 1995–97 and 2000–03 and prime minister from 2003 until 2005; the only Mauritian of French descent to hold this position – continues to play an important role. He too, however, has gravitated to the political center, in the process being accused of abandoning the working class and siding with the Franco-Mauritian elite. The third main party, the Militant Socialist Movement, was the dominant political force in Mauritius in the 1980s and the 1990s, a period characterized by unprecedented economic growth. Under Anerood Jugnauth, msm won 150 Broken down in ethnic terms and after allocation of four ‘best loser’ seats, mmm was represented by 17 Hindu members of parliament, 9 Creole, 7 Muslim and 1 Chinese (Addison and Hazareesingh op. cit., p. 114). 151 With 42 out of 62 elected seats, mmm gained an absolute majority in its own right. The two remaining mandates went to the Organization of the People of Rodrigues (opr).

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three consecutive general elections (1983, 1987 and 1991) and stayed in power until 1995, when it not only lost to a surprising alliance between the Labour Party and mmm, but did not manage to obtain even a single parliamentary seat. In partnership with mmm, it bounced back in the 2000 general elections and as Labour’s junior again in 2010. Elected president of Mauritius, in 2003 Jugnauth passed on the msm leadership to his son, Pravind Jugnauth. Benefiting from his father’s solid economic reputation – and on his recommendation – he was appointed minister of finance in 2010, but was forced to resign in July 2011 after allegations of bribery and corruption. At the same time, his ministerial msm colleagues also left the government. Always a major force, the Labour Party – ‘the Grand Ole’ Man’ of Mauritian politics – has from the mid-1990s, finally, re-emerged as the leading political party. Navin Ramgoolam, the son of Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, served as prime minister from 1995 until 2000, a position he regained in 2005. Reminiscent of his father’s 1969 ‘unholy alliance’ with the Franco-Mauritian elite, in the 2010 general elections mlp joined forces with pmsd (and msm), winning 41 of the 62 contested seats. With one notable exception, independent Mauritius has managed to avert outbreaks of serious ethnic violence. In February 1999, riots similar to those in January 1968 shook the island. The triggering factor was the detention and subsequent death in police custody of the popular seggae singer Joseph Topize, known as Kaya.152 Venting their anger and pent-up frustrations, young Afro-Mauritians took to the streets in Roche-Bois and other suburbs of the capital, attacking police stations, torching vehicles and looting businesses. The riots quickly acquired an ethnic dimension. Reacting to the attacks on Indo-Mauritian police and property, Hindu crowds burned creole neighborhoods in the small northern towns of Triolet and Goodlands. Law and order were eventually restored, but the riots left four people dead, economic damage estimated at 50 million us Dollars and deep scars in the 152 As many of Afro-Malagasy background in Mauritius (as well as in Reunion and Seychelles), Kaya was a Rastafarian. His music – seggae – is a popular Mascarene blend of West Indian reggae and traditional Indian Ocean sega. Most of his songs were in Creole and addressed issues of slavery, revolution and rights. In the song Zistwar revoltan (‘History is revolting’), for example, Kaya called for a re-writing of Mauritian history, denounced the marginalization of the Afro-Malagasy population and appealed for a new awareness: “Too many ruses, too much complicity/Our time to be slaves/For us it is the same/Out of the fire into the frying pan/When will we be aware?” Kaya was arrested in Port Louis for smoking marijuana. Three days later, he was found dead with a fractured skull in a cell at the central police headquarters.

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Mauritian social fabric.153 Although modest by international comparisons, the violence came as a shock to most Mauritians. For the government and the main political parties, it served as a dramatic reminder of the need to judiciously manage the island’s inter-ethnic relations.

From Doom to Miracle

Before and after independence in 1968, most observers gave Mauritius slim chances of success. In his report to the British authorities, Meade wrote in 1961 that [h]eavy population pressure must inevitably reduce real income per head below what it might otherwise be. That surely is bad enough in a community that is full of political conflict. But if in addition, in the absence of other remedies, it must lead either to unemployment (exacerbating the scramble for jobs between Indians and Creoles) or to even greater inequalities (stocking up still more the envy felt by the Indian and Creole underdog for the Franco-Mauritian top dog), the outlook for peaceful development is poor.154 And four years after independence, the Trinidadian-British author V.S. Naipaul – future Nobel laureate in literature – quipped after a visit to the island that “it was on Mauritius that the dodo forgot how to fly,” predicting that the Mauritians will be left with what they started with: an agricultural colony, created by empire in an empty island and always meant to be part of something larger, now given a thing called independence and set adrift, an abandoned imperial barracoon, incapable of economic or cultural autonomy.155

153 See Eisenlohr op. cit., Baptiste op. cit. and Rosabelle Boswell: Le Malaise Créole: Ethnic Identity in Mauritius, Berghahn Books, New York and Oxford, 2006. 154 Quoted in Arvind Subramanian: ‘The Mauritian Success Story and Its Lessons’, United Nations University (unu)/World Institute for Development Economics Research (wider), Research paper No. 2009/36, June 2009, p. 1. 155 V.S. Naipaul: The Overcrowded Barracoon and Other Articles (Andre Deutsch, London, 1972), here quoted in Arvind Subramanian: ‘Mauritius: A Case Study’ in Finance and Development, Vol. 38, No. 4, imf, Washington, December 2001, p. 1. During the slave trade, barracks used for the confinement of captured individuals awaiting shipment were called ‘barracoons’. Naipaul was awarded the Nobel prize in 2001.

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At the time of Meade’s study and Naipaul’s essay, the economy of Mauritius was agricultural and singularly mono-crop. Without mineral resources or manufacturing industries, geographically disadvantaged and with a limited domestic market, the island was as dependent on sugar production as it had been since the mid-19th century. Sugar and derivative products consistently accounted for almost 100% of the export earnings, sugar cultivation utilized around 90% of the arable land and sugar estates provided employment for some 70% of the work force. In the early 1970s, however, the young state embarked upon a steady, homegrown development path without par in Africa,156 soon progressing from a sugar-based monoculture to a diversified economy that included tourism, textiles, financial services and advanced technology. Between 1970 and 2009, real gdp growth in Mauritius averaged over 5% and gdp per capita increased more than tenfold.157 In 2010, per capita income amounted to 7,577 us Dollars.158 In the same year, the rate of unemployment – which in 1983 stood at 20% – was 7.8%.159 Whereas indigence in 1975 affected 40% of Mauritian households, by 2010 absolute poverty had fallen to 2%.160 In marked contrast to Reunion, there had further been a profound change in the sectoral composition of the economy. From the mid-1970s to 2010, the con156 Between 1980 and 2009, average gdp growth in Botswana was higher than in Mauritius (6.8% versus 5%). In the case of Botswana, however, the economic success is due to diamond extraction, whereas the sustained growth in Mauritius is the result of transformation, diversification and innovation. In addition, economic growth in Botswana has been considerably less inclusive than in Mauritius, where redistributive policies have resulted in poverty reduction and increased equality (For a comparative discussion of Botswana and Mauritius, see Arthur Silve: ‘Botswana et Maurice, Deux Miracles Africains: Profiter de Ses Rentes sans Hypothéquer Son Développement’ in Afrique Contemporaine, No. 242, 2012, pp. 29–44). 157 Ali Zafar: ‘Mauritius: An Economic Success Story’, The World Bank, Washington, January 2011, p. 3. 158 The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/gdp per Capita/Current usd’, Washington, 2012. In terms of gdp per capita, in 2010 Mauritius ranked 5th in Africa, behind Equatorial Guinea (oil), Seychelles (see below), Libya (oil) and Gabon (oil), but before South Africa. At the same time, per capita income in Mauritius was roughly 10 times higher than in Comoros and 17 times higher than in Madagascar. 159 In the early 1990s, the official unemployment rate was below 3%. As a consequence of the ‘triple economic shocks’ (see below), the rate increased to almost 10%, but it has since 2007 been stable at around 8%. 160 Mauritius does not have a national poverty line. On the basis of census and survey data, Statistics Mauritius estimated that less than 1% of the population in 2006–07 was living below the un poverty line of 1.25 us Dollars ppp (Purchasing Power Parity) per person and day. The proportion below 2 usd ppp was less than 1.5%.

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tribution to the overall economy by the primary sector (including sugar) declined from 23 to 6%, whereas the secondary sector (including manufacturing and construction) increased from around 23 to 28% and the tertiary sector (including tourism and financial services) grew from just over 50 to 66%.161 In the process, the ‘imperial barracoon’ was compared to the Asian ‘tigers’, widely known as an African ‘miracle’ and the envy of the developing world.162 What makes Mauritius stand out is that sustained growth has been coupled with decreasing income inequality and substantial improvements in human development. The Gini coefficient – a measure of income inequality where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 the opposite – declined from 0.46 in 1980 to 0.38 in 2008.163 Infant mortality dropped from 64 per 1000 in 1970 to 12.5 in 2010. As a result of free education, the gross enrolment ratio at the primary level was at the same time 100%.164 Last, but not least, growth and redistribution has been achieved during a prolonged, uninterrupted period of democracy, where alternating coalitions have held political power and rule of law and transparency have been maintained.165 With no armed forces, Mauritius, in addition, has been in the rare position of not having to budget for military expenditure. As a consequence, the erstwhile impoverished island has consistently climbed the ladders of various international rankings. With regard to human development, the undp hdi figure for Mauritius in 1980 was 0.551. By 2012, it 161 Zafar op. cit., p. 13 and 10. 162 In an article entitled ‘The Mauritius miracle, or how to make a big success of a small economy’, Joseph Stiglitz, the American 2001 Nobel prize winner for economics, argued in March 2011 – i.e. well after the onset of the global financial crisis – that “[m]any countries, not least the us, could learn from [Mauritius’] experience” (The Guardian, 7 March 2011). 163 Zafar op. cit., p. 13 and Milo Vandemoortele with Kate Bird: ‘Progress in Economic Conditions in Mauritius: Success against the Odds’, Overseas Development Institute (odi), London, December 2010, p. 1. African countries are among the most unequal in the world, with indexes for Seychelles, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa over 0.60. The Gini coefficient for the United States is around 0.40. Japan and the Scandinavian countries are the most equal, with figures around 0.25. 164 Eric Ng Ping Cheun: Alice in Dodoland: Looking to the Mauritian Economy, Pluriconseil, Pointe aux Sables, 2012, p. 193. In Mauritius, health services are free of charge at public hospitals. Primary and secondary education is also free, as is public transport for students and elderly. Basic staples, such as rice, flour and cooking gas, are subsidized by the government. 165 In addition to marked economic growth, Botswana is together with Mauritius one of the few African countries where democratic, multi-party elections have been held since independence. In the case of Botswana, however, the Botswana Democratic Party (bdp) has won all the elections and neither the opposition, nor the democratic system, has faced the challenge of a change of government.

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had increased to 0.737, placing the country in the category of those with ‘high human development’ and at the third place in Africa, behind Seychelles (0.806) and Libya (0.769). In the same year, the average indexes for the group of Small Island Developing States (sids) and for the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were, respectively, 0.530 and 0.475.166 In terms of overall governance, in 2012 the Ibrahim Index ranked Mauritius first in Africa, followed by Cape Verde and Botswana. Although Mauritius came second after Seychelles on iiag’s human development ranking of the African countries, in Southern Africa it was clearly the best performer, occupying either first or second place in the four sub-categories of safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development.167 On the ease of doing business in a country, the World Bank at the same time placed Mauritius as number 19 on its global ranking, before industrial and financial powerhouses such as Germany and Switzerland.168 With regard to gender equality, however, the island was far from a model society. Until 2000, less than 10% of the members of parliament were women. With one of the lowest rates among the sadc member states, Mauritius clearly fell short of the regional organization’s minimum target of 30%. By 2010, the rate had increased to 19%. The limited role played by women in Mauritian politics was inter alia highlighted by the South African constitutional expert Albie Sachs, who in a report on electoral reform in 2002 described the situation as “a grave democratic deficit,” concluding that the existing electoral system “will never do justice to the true role of women in [the Mauritian] society and will never enhance the empowerment of women.”169 The pervasive gender imbalance is reflected in the Global Gender Gap Index (gggi), which on an annual basis is established by the World Economic Forum. In 2012, Mauritius was merely ranked 98th among the 135 countries assessed. Furthermore, since 2007 it had lost 13 positions. Despite its significant gdp per capita and high

166 undp: ‘hdr 2013’ op. cit., pp. 144–51 and 25. 167 Mo Ibrahim Foundation: ‘iiag 2012’ op. cit., pp. 9, 16, 21 and 31. As the African Development Bank (AfDB), the iiag places Madagascar and Mauritius in Southern Africa and Comoros and Seychelles in East Africa. 168 ibrd/The World Bank: ‘Doing Business 2013’ op. cit., p. 3. 169 Quoted in Bunwaree and Kasenally op.cit., p. 29. Sach’s recommendations were not implemented. In late 2011, another international committee on electoral reform – led by the French professor Guy Carcasonne – similarly proposed a system which would promote a higher representation of women.

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hdi ranking, with regard to the gggi Mauritius was way behind Madagascar in 58th place.170

Three Pillars: Sugar, Textiles and Tourism

The Mauritian success story was initially built on the three pillars of sugar, textiles and tourism.171 The foundations were laid soon after independence by Prime Minister Ramgoolam’s grand coalition between the Labour Party and the Franco-Mauritian pmsd (1969–73), respectively representing labor and capital. The growth of these sectors from the mid-1970s was, in turn, the result of privileged access to international markets, propitious timing, a combination of free trade and protection, as well as a fair amount of good fortune. To carry out its policies, the government relied on strong public institutions and a professional civil service, according Mauritius a high degree of state capacity.172 The first pillar was sugar. Since the early 1950s, Britain had under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement granted Mauritius an export quota at preferential prices. The agreement was confirmed at independence in 1968, and after the United Kingdom’s membership it was underwritten by the European Economic Community (eec) through the 1976 Sugar Protocol of the Lomé Convention.173 Contrary to expert opinion, Mauritius, meanwhile, decided to increase its annual supply of raw sugar by 100,000 tons. As the world market price at the time of signing the Sugar Protocol was at a record level – and 170 wef op. cit., pp. 8–9. Comoros and Seychelles were not included in the assessment. Whereas many global indexes on gender equality tend to be tied to income levels, thereby giving an advantage to richer economies, the wef gggi is disassociated from the resource level, seeking to measure how equitably the available income, resources and opportunities are distributed between women and men. In 2012, 15 African countries ranked higher than Mauritius. 171 The designation ‘pillars’ is commonly used in Mauritius to describe its main economic sectors. 172 Most observers underline the role of Mauritius’ state institutions for its economic growth. In turn, Saylor traces the strong institutional capacity to the export-oriented coalition between the British colonial government and the Franco-Mauritian plantocracy (Ryan Saylor: ‘Probing the Historical Sources of the Mauritian Miracle: Sugar Exporters and State Building in Colonial Mauritius’ in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, No. 133, September 2012, pp. 465–78). 173 The Sugar Protocol was negotiated as a condition of uk membership of the eec to protect countries from which Britain traditionally imported sugar under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. First signed in February 1975 in Lomé, Togo, the Lomé Convention was a trade and aid agreement between the eec and 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (acp) countries.

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Mauritius, furthermore, managed to negotiate the largest quota of the sugarexporting acp countries – the decision had far-reaching consequences in the form of privileged economic returns. Between 1977 and 2000, Mauritian sugar imported by the eec/eu member countries carried a guaranteed price that on average was 90% higher than the prevailing international market price.174 The windfall was set aside by the state in favor of various social security schemes – particularly for civil servants and the elderly – and by the sugar barons as investment in the fledgling textile and tourism industries. At the time of independence, there had been calls for nationalization or heavy taxation of the sugar industry. Instead, the Labour-pmsd coalition nurtured it under a policy characterized as “optimal rent-sharing between the political and economic elites.”175 As noted by Subramanian, “Mauritius managed to avoid one of the major mistakes made in most of resource-rich Africa, namely of killing the cash cow.”176 Concurrently, the Ramgoolam government laid the basis for economic diversification, away from sugar dependency. Already in 1970, the legal framework for an Export Processing Zone was enacted, paving the way for a second pillar of the Mauritian economy. Inspired by the example of Taiwan and focusing on light manufacture – textile and clothing in particular – the Mauritian epz experience would become “a resounding success.”177 Without homegrown cotton or sheep farming, in the 1980s – a lost decade for most of Africa – the epz-based textile industry transformed the economy and the country at large. From a base of zero in 1971, three decades later it accounted for a fourth of gdp, a third of employment and two thirds of exports. By 1991, there were close to 600 epz enterprises, employing over 90,000 workers or more than twice as many as on the sugar plantations and estates.178 In the same year, Mauritius became the third largest garment exporter in the world.179 Several factors explain the spectacular development of the Mauritian textile sector. From the beginning there was close interaction with the sugar industry and much of the start-up capital – as well as technical and managerial expertise – came from the local, Franco-Mauritian-owned sugar companies. 174 Silve op. cit., p. 33–34 and Subramanian op. cit., p. 12. Mauritius annual sugar quota to the eec/eu was around 500,000 tons. 175 Subramanian op. cit. p. 21. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid., p. 14. 178 Ping Cheun op. cit., pp. 168 and 170. 179 Michel Dimou: ‘De la Zone Franche au District Textile: Chronique de la “Succes Story” de l’Industrialisation Mauricienne’ in Jauze (ed) op. cit., p. 195.

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What really triggered growth, however, were investments from Hong Kong. They, in turn, were to a significant extent brokered by business people from the Sino-Mauritian community. Facing rising labor costs, restrictive export quotas and uncertain prospects under future Chinese rule,180 from the early 1980s many Hong Kong entrepreneurs were offered Mauritian nationality and moved their capital and factories to the Indian Ocean island.181 Secondly, in 1982 Mauritius adhered to the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (mfa),182 giving the country preferential access to the us and eu markets and making its ‘cut, make and trim’ services part of several leading American and European clothing chains.183 As Mauritius – and not least the companies relocated from Hong Kong – benefited significantly from the mfa agreement, the design of the Mauritian epz, thirdly, was in itself conducive to growth and development. Unlike export processing zones in other countries, in Mauritius it did not refer to a specific geographical area, but was a legal entity providing certified companies with generous incentives, such as duty free import of raw materials, tax holidays, free repatriation of capital and flexible labor regulations.184 As the epz companies from the start were physically located throughout the island, their geographic dispersion ensured that concessions to foreign capital were diffused across the society, with positive spin-off effects for local communities.185 It is worthy of note that the Mauritian government rejected advice by the International Monetary Fund to reduce state subsidies and social services, such as free education. Committed to the building of a modern welfare state, it 180 In 1984, the United Kingdom agreed to transfer sovereignty over Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. The transfer took effect in 1997. 181 In the 1990s, more than 20% of foreign investments came from Hong Kong. On the role played by the Sino-Mauritian community for the economic links with Hong Kong (and China), see Carter and Foong Kwong op. cit. 182 The mfa arrangement was established by the us and the eu in 1974. It expired on 1 January 2005. 183 Mauritius does not grow cotton and there is no sheep farming on the island. The raw material for the textile and clothing industry is imported, mainly from Asia. Among the American and European brands serviced by Mauritius are Levi Strauss (us), Marks and Spencer (uk), Lacoste (France) and Woolworths (South Africa). 184 Percy S. Mistry and Nikhil Treebhoohun: The Export of Tradeable Services in Mauritius: A Commonwealth Case Study in Economic Transformation, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2009, p. 32. 185 Alistair Greig, Mark Turner and Paul D’Arcy: ‘The Fragility of Success: Repositioning Mauritian Development in the Twenty-First Century’ in Island Studies Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2011, pp. 161–62.

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was guided by the objective of job creation and social inclusion. In these regards too, the epz experience was highly successful. By 1991, the overall rate of national unemployment had been brought down to a mere 2.7%.186 At the same time, two thirds of the epz employees were female workers. Although legal minimum wages for women were fixed at lower levels than for men, the result was that Mauritian women were offered opportunities to loosen the restrictions of traditional patriarchal molds. In addition, the conditions of almost full employment meant that the living standards among the most marginalized, Afro-Malagasy descendants, also improved.187 To many around the world, Mauritius, finally, has become synonymous with its slogan of ‘sea, sun and sand’. Up-market tourism – the third pillar of the Mauritian economy – also took off in the 1980s, when the national carrier, Air Mauritius, increased the number of connections to Europe and made the distant island more accessible.188 From modest beginnings,189 by 1990 the number of international tourists in a year had reached 290,000. Ten years later, it was 660,000 and in 2010 no less than 930,000, mainly from France (including Reunion), United Kingdom and South Africa.190 With 27,000 workers, employment in the tourism sector at the same time surpassed both the sugar and the textile industries.191 In terms of gdp, in 2010 the share of sugar was below 2% and that of textiles around 5%, whereas tourism represented as much as 10%.192 Four decades after independence, Mauritius had been transformed from a rural to a diversified and increasingly service-oriented economy. At the beginning of the 21st century, the transformation was underlined by the spectacular growth of the fourth and fifth pillars, namely international financial services (ifs) and information and communications technology (ict). By 2010, the gdp shares of these new sectors were together bigger than that of sugar, textiles and tourism combined. 186 Ping Cheun op. cit., p. 174. 187 Greig, Turner and D’Arcy op. cit., pp. 161–63. 188 Air Mauritius is the fourth largest carrier in Sub-Saharan Africa. It only started long-range operations in 1977. Until then, the island was mainly serviced by Air France and British Airways. Targeting high income tourists, the Mauritian government deliberately chose to avoid chartered flights, relying instead on scheduled airlines. 189 At independence in 1968, only around 15,000 tourists visited Mauritius per year (Welz op. cit., p. 158). 190 Although showing a declining trend, the number of tourists from metropolitan France represents around 25% of the total. 191 Ping Cheun op. cit., pp. 168–69 and 172. In 2010, the total Mauritian labor force amounted to 603,300 people. 192 Ibid., Silve op. cit., p. 32 and Zafar op. cit., p. 12.

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Additional Pillars: ifs and ict

Progressively opening up the economy and looking for new international niches, in 1992 the msm-led coalition under Prime Minister Jugnauth adopted the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Act to induce foreign investors to use the island as a gateway into third markets. Once again, the timing was ideal. The Indian government had the previous year embarked upon a series of liberal reforms. They would become a great boon to the Mauritian offshore sector, which subsequently emerged as the principal conduit for foreign investments into India. In addition, after 1994 the democratic government of South Africa relocated many offshore activities from the British Channel Islands to Mauritius. Strategically located between Asia and Africa, Mauritius offered a number of advantages.193 Conceptually, the Mauritian international financial services’ industry was inspired by the epz experience, with the objectives of economic diversification; inward transfer of know-how; expansion of services beyond tourism; high-value employment creation; and, eventually, integration into the global economy.194 Mauritius’ most important attraction was its taxation treaties with third countries. The administration of global investment funds that benefited from tax reductions or exemptions under treaty arrangements would become the mainstay of the Mauritian ifs industry. Although Mauritius has negotiated such treaties with around 40 countries,195 by far the most consequential has been the 1982 India-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, which allows foreign investors to take advantage of exemptions from paying capital gains tax on investments in India. Ratified in 1985 and brought alive by the Mauritian offshore legislation of 1992, it had dramatic effects. Investment flows routed through Mauritius quickly became a significant driver of foreign portfolio capital into India, while the island itself gained new business and employment opportunities. Between 2000 and 2011, Mauritius accounted for no less than 42% of India’s foreign direct investment, amounting to a staggering total of 54 billion us Dollars.196 193 Due to its geographical position, via Mauritius it is possible to communicate between Europe/Africa and Asia during part of normal business hours. The fact that most Mauritians speak both English and French – and sometimes Hindi or Cantonese – is also important. 194 Mistry and Treebhoohun op. cit., p. 49. 195 As part of its ‘Africa Strategy’ (see below), in 2012–13 Mauritius signed double taxation agreements with Nigeria, Kenya and the Republic of Congo, at the same time preparing similar agreements with another five African countries. 196 Paul Adams: ‘Banking on a Good Location and the Law’ in Financial Times, Special report: Doing Business in Mauritius, 7 September 2012, p. 2. During the same period, fdi to India

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From 1992, Mauritius has been among the fastest growing offshore centers in the world. Around 25,000 international companies are registered in the country.197 In addition to the two dominant local banks, the Mauritius Commercial Bank and the State Bank of Mauritius, they are serviced by some 160 Mauritian management firms. By 2010, the ifs sector accounted for 12% of gdp and employed 15,000 people.198 Together with the ict industry, it paid nearly 25% of the government’s direct receipts in the form of corporate taxes.199 Information and communications technology – the second non-traditional sector and the fifth pillar of the Mauritian economy – has registered an even more impressive development. Made possible from 2002 through Mauritius’ connection to the South Africa Far East submarine optical fiber communications cable,200 the growth of the Mauritian ict sector – including business process outsourcing, call centers, software development and training – has according to a 2009 Commonwealth study been “remarkable […] for an industry that was almost invisible until around 2003–04.”201 During the following years, it registered an annual increase of more than 25%. By 2010, there were over 300 companies in the Mauritian ict industry, employing more than 12,000 people and accounting for 6.4% of gdp.202 Within less than a decade, Mauritius – which has the ambition of becoming a ‘data island’ and a ‘cyber hub’ – had become the leading ict country in Africa.203

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200 201 202 203

from Singapore amounted in total to 11.3 billion and from the United Kingdom to 6.2 billion usd (‘Inde: Les investissements passant par l’offshore mauricien dépassent les 50 milliards de dollars’ in lexpress.mu, 1 November 2010). Over 6,000 of the companies invest directly in India. Zafar op. cit., p. 12 and Adams op. cit. Adams op. cit. Along with other international ‘tax havens’, Mauritius has not been spared allegations of undue competition, money laundering and other negative practices. In 1998, notably, the country was listed in the report Harmful Tax Competition by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd). As the Mauritian government made the requested changes to the Offshore Business Activities Act, in 2000 the oecd removed the country from the list. The organization has since monitored Mauritius’ compliance and has conducted surveys to check adherence to its principles of international taxation (Mistry and Treebhoohun op. cit., pp. 54–5). In 2012, Mauritius ranked number 43 on Transparency International’s worldwide Corruption Perception Index (cpi), behind Botswana (30) and Cape Verde (39) among the African countries. In 2009 and 2012, respectively, Mauritius was connected to the Lower Indian Ocean Networks 1 and 2, considerably increasing its internet capacity. Mistry and Treebhoohun op. cit., p. 85. Ping Cheun op. cit., p. 167. Wilfrid Bertile: ‘Une Plaque Tournante entre l’Europe, l’Afrique et l’Asie?’ in Jauze (ed) (2008) op. cit., pp. 327–69.

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Shocks, Resilience and Concerns

Initially, the growth of the Mauritian economy was based on preferential agreements for its raw sugar and textile exports to the eu and the United States. With the launch in 1995 of the World Trade Organization (wto) and the subsequent liberalization of international trade, the privileged regimes were, however, dismantled. As the country transitioned from dependence on trade preferences to open competition in a global economy – and Mauritius at the same time was exposed to increasing costs for the importation of oil and food products – like Meade and Naipaul at the time of independence in the late 2000s many observers painted a gloomy picture, predicting an end to the ‘Mauritian miracle’.204 The external shocks to the economy were dramatic. The termination of the mfa regime on 1 January 2005 led to a contraction in value added of about 30% of the output of the epz-based companies, as well as a reduction of some 25,000 jobs,205 whereas the progressive phasing out of the eu Sugar Protocol, which begun in 2006, over the next two years resulted in a significant loss of export revenue, a decrease in production of close to 20% and the shedding of another 5,000 workers.206 In addition, the global financial crisis from 2008 and the subsequent Euro predicament had a combined negative impact on both the Mauritian tourism industry and the financial sectors. Tourist arrivals from the main European markets of France, Britain, Germany and Italy, for example, registered negative growths. Despite the combined shocks, the Mauritian economy proved resilient and managed to weather the adverse external conditions. With regard to textiles, the termination of the mfa regime forced a consolidation which made the industry slimmer, but more diverse. In 2011, it was the country’s biggest employer and accounted for half of the export earnings.207 After a comprehensive reform in 2005, the sugar industry was at the same time branching out into ethanol production and moving up the value chain by exporting refined, rather than raw, sugar.208 Similarly, the loss of European tourists was more than 204 Ibid., p. 317. 205 Zafar op. cit., p. 24. 206 Ibid., and Ping Cheun op. cit., p. 168. Following a wto ruling, the eu decided in 2005 to progressively lower the price of imported raw sugar from the acp countries to the world market level between 2006 and 2009. The new agreement with the eu, signed in 2009, still allows Mauritius to export sugar duty-free, but it does not guarantee the price or the volume. 207 Paul Adams: ‘Consolidation Leaves Sector Stronger’ in Financial Times, 7 September 2012, p. 5. 208 John Reed: ‘Display of Resilience against Tough Odds’ in ibid., p. 2. Mauritius is still the biggest exporter of sugar to Europe. Although the country’s transport system and most of its power stations rely on imports, the sugar cane industry supplies between 15 and 20%

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compensated for by the increase in arrivals from the emerging markets of India, Russia and China.209 As a result, the tourism sector registered consecutive record numbers in 2010, 2011 and 2012, when total arrivals reached 965,000.210 As both the ifs and the ict sectors continued to grow – and fisheries emerged as a potential sixth pillar211 – Subramanian, a former division chief at the imf’s

Sustainability of tourism The government’s stated objective is 2 million foreign tourists by 2015. However, concerns are increasingly expressed with regard to the ecological consequences and, in general, the sustainability of such numbers. The Mauritian constitution guarantees the citizens free access to the island’s beaches, but the right is progressively restricted by gated hotels and private properties. Integrated resort schemes, i.e. high-end resorts where foreigners are invited to purchase properties and receive Mauritian residence permits, are often located on the most valuable and attractive, but also the most vulnerable, coastal strips. The development of such ‘foreign enclaves’ are watched with mixed emotions by many Mauritians. Similar concerns are common in Seychelles too.

of Mauritius’ electricity. Mauritius is in this respect a pioneer. In 1957, it was the first country to produce electricity from bagasse, i.e. sugar biomass. During the Second World War, it was also the first country to replace petrol and diesel with ethanol. 209 The African Indian Ocean countries actively pursue the Indian, Russian and Chinese markets. Mauritius is the gateway. In 2012, the island received 55,000 tourists from India, 19,500 from Russia and 21,000 from China. With 60 million outbound tourists per year, China is the main target. In May 2011, the Mauritian government announced that visitors from China were no longer in need of a visa and two months later Air Mauritius launched its first direct flight to Shanghai. 210 ‘Arrivées touristiques: Nouveau record établi l’année dernière’ in lexpress.mu, 15 January 2011 and Statistics Mauritius: ‘International Travel and Tourism: Year 2012’, Port Louis, 2013. 211 With its ocean and port facilities, Mauritius has a great potential in fisheries. The government’s objective is to turn the island into a ‘seafood hub’ and the fishery sector into a sixth economic pillar. In the five-year period 2006–10, the sector registered an average annual growth of 11% (Ping Cheun op. cit., p. 166). It includes oceanic tuna fishing, fish processing, cold storage and small-scale aquaculture. Mauritius has an agreement with the eu and fishing fleets from many European and Asian countries operate within its jurisdiction. In common with the other African Indian Ocean countries, Mauritius is, in addition, involved in offshore oil exploration (‘Prospection pétrolière autour de Maurice par une firme base à Madagascar’ in lexpress.mu, 19 May 2011).

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Africa department, concluded that “the world can […] stop worrying about Mauritius, because it has demonstrated the ability to worry for itself.”212 Nevertheless, since 2009 overall real gdp growth has decreased to between 3 and 4% and the unemployment rate has steadied at just below 8%.213 Although the figures compare favorably with those of most developed and developing countries, the brake on Mauritius’ growth trajectory and the challenge of job security are causing concerns, particularly among the youth. Unease and tensions have been mounting. In early 2008, for example, violence broke out in the suburbs of Port Louis. As noted by Greig, Turner and D’Arcy, “despite the fact that social democracy and the welfare state remain the unchallenged political philosophy […], growing inequalities and the forces of market-led globalization undermine the egalitarian rhetoric of official discourse.”214 In the World Bank’s opinion, meanwhile, in late 2012 the economic outlook for Mauritius was “positive.”215

Mauritius in the World and Africa

Although Mauritius claims sovereignty over the French-held islet of Tromelin and is involved in a serious dispute with the United Kingdom concerning the Chagos archipelago, it maintains close links with the two former colonial powers. It is one of few countries that belong both to the Commonwealth and its French counterpart, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. In the case of Britain, the relations are a consequence of pre-independence political relations, social democratic inspiration, sugar exports and tourism. With regard to France, they are to a large extent the result of the French government’s active and multi-faceted diplomacy towards the island. Since independence in 1968,216 France is present in most areas. No other European country can match its involvement with Mauritius. French tourists 212 Subramanian op. cit., p. 22. 213 Ping Cheun op. cit., pp. 164 and 174. 214 Greig, Turner and D’Arcy op. cit., p. 166. There are, notably, marked inequalities between Mauritians and migrant workers from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and other Asian countries. In 2010, the Mauritian section of Amnesty International denounced the treatment of foreign workers, stating that the government lacked the political will to protect them from abuse (‘Hard labour’ in lexpress.mu, 15 October 2010). Since 2005, female unemployment has risen to three times that of male and women are estimated to earn less than half of men. 215 The World Bank: ‘Mauritius Overview’, Washington, November 2012, p. 2. 216 At independence, the Paris government was actively involved in bridge-building between the Franco-Mauritian plantocracy and the Indo-Mauritian political elite (Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 105).

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(including from Reunion) annually represent about a quarter of total international arrivals; over the period from 1990 to 2005, France accounted for no less than 41% of foreign direct investments; and in 2005–06 France’s share of official development assistance was 25%.217 In general, Mauritius – and to a large extent Seychelles – benefit from “advantages which France normally reserves for her ex-colonies.”218 In Houbert’s view, behind this “very special relationship” is a conscious effort by the Paris government to give the former British Indian Ocean states “a French flavor,” which is “so much the better for the status of Reunion. The more the islands are distinguished from Africa,” he adds, “the more secure is the French claim that Reunion does not fall under [the African Union] category of an integral part of Africa yet to be ‘liberated’.”219 France’s membership of the Indian Ocean Commission, headquartered in Mauritius, is in this context of particular significance. France’s influence is only surpassed by that of India. A majority of Mauritians have roots in ‘the great peninsula’, with which there according to Paul Bérenger are “umbilical” bonds.220 Many Hindu cultural holidays and events are celebrated as much on the island as in India itself, and the economic interaction is vigorous. In addition to Mauritius’ position as a privileged offshore base for capital flows into India, Indian fdi in the island economy is growing. In 2005, India became the biggest investor in Mauritius, focusing on textiles, pharmaceuticals and the ict sector.221 In 2010–11, the investments from India amounted to 431 million us Dollars, more than double the figure registered for Singapore.222 The close relations between the small Indian Ocean state and the Asian giant are conspicuous also in other fields, notably with regard to national security. Security cooperation between Mauritius and India began in 1974, when India donated a vessel for coastal surveillance and Indian defense officers were sent on secondment with the Mauritian coast guard. Under the cooperation agreement, the position of national security advisor to the Mauritian prime minister is traditionally filled by a citizen of India.223 Since 217 Bertile op. cit., pp. 330 and 332. With shares of 15.5 and 9.9% of fdi, South Africa and the uk were, respectively, the second and the third largest investors. French investments are inter alia significant in telecommunications, petroleum distribution, the textile industry, public works and tourism. Classified by the World Bank as an ‘upper middle income country’, oda flows to Mauritius decreased from 3.7 to 0.6% of gdp between 1990 and 1995 (ibid., p. 329). 218 Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 106. 219 Ibid., pp. 106 and 109. 220 Quoted in Welz op. cit., p. 164. 221 Bertile op. cit., p. 356. 222 ‘Relations bilatérales: Maurice est la destination préférée des investisseurs indiens’ in lexpress.mu, 8 September 2011. 223 ‘Singh nouveau security advisor’ in Agence de Presse de l’Océan Indien, 10 December 2010.

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2003, the Indian navy has, in addition, been patrolling the vast Mauritian exclusive economic zone.224 The Sino-Mauritian community played an active part when business people from Hong Kong established themselves on the island. In contemporary Mauritius, it is mainland China that assumes an increasingly important role. In his budget statement in November 2012, the Mauritian finance minister, Xavier Duval, described how “the West is struggling, the East is rising and Africa is awakening,” developments which in his view present Mauritius with promising opportunities as the country lies in “a golden triangle of growth, linking the Middle East, Asia and Africa.”225 China too sees Mauritius as a bridge between Asia and Africa and has accorded the island special attention within its wider Africa policy. President Hu Jintao visited Mauritius in February 2009. In addition to a number of infrastructural projects, China has notably launched the Mauritius Jinfei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone north of Port Louis. Modeled on China’s coastal manufacturing regions and conceived as a gateway into Africa, the ambitious industrial complex was originally inaugurated in 2006, but re-designed in 2009. According to plans, it should by 2014 attract investments of 730 million us Dollars and employ more than 30,000 people, producing agro-industrial goods, pharmaceuticals, electronic devices and consumer items for the African market. As a novel form of enclave capitalism and suffering serious delays, it has, however, caused controversy.226 Mauritian external relations are guided by economic interests, rather than by political or ideological considerations.227 In his study on African integration, 224 Vines op. cit., pp. 192–93. 225 Xavier Duval: ‘Rising to the Challenges of a World in Transition’, Budget Statement, Ministry of Finance, Port Louis, 9 November 2012, p. 3. 226 As a closed geographical unit, the Jinfei zone is markedly different from the earlier Mauritian epz concept. Originally launched as the Tianli Special Economic Zone, it has from the beginning been surrounded by controversy. Located in Riche-Terre north of Port Louis, resident farmers were evicted from the land in preparation for the project, provoking hunger strikes and unrest. In addition, the responsible Chinese company, Shanxi Tianli, did little to develop the site and it became locally known as ‘the ghost project’. It was re-launched in September 2009, after the Mauritian and Chinese governments agreed to remove Shanxi Tianli and replace it with Shanxi Jinfei Investment Corporation, made up of four Chinese investor groups. It should be operational by 2014, but as late as April 2012 “weeds had taken the place of the good projects announced” (‘Jin Fei, six ans après les débuts de travaux: Où sont passés les investisseurs chinois?’ in lexpress.mu, 10 April 2012. See also ‘Mauritius/China: Phantom Economic zones’ in Africa-Asia Confidential, Vol. 5, No. 8, June 2012, pp. 4–5). 227 The consensual character of Mauritian foreign policy has been noted. There is, furthermore, close interaction between the public and the private sectors. In addition to trade representatives of the state, as a rule all Mauritian delegations to international organizations include a private sector member.

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Welz makes the observation that “[i]t even appears as though Mauritius’ entire foreign policy focuses on trade and economy.”228 While this may be less pronounced with regard to its Indian Ocean neighbors, it is the case vis-à-vis mainland Africa. Mauritius is a member of the au, sadc and comesa.229 With the important exception of the issue of Chagos, at the au, however, the country plays a passive role. Prime Minister Ramgoolam rarely attends the continental body’s heads of state and government meetings; the government has shown lukewarm interest in the African Peer Review Mechanism (aprm); and it often allocates insufficient funds to enable the five Mauritian members to attend the sessions of the Pan-African Parliament.230 In spite of its relative economic strength, no significant au institution is located in Mauritius.231 Against this background, Welz not only draws the conclusion that “Mauritius is not committed to the au,” but that “it does not have much interest in the [organization].”232 What is more, drawing on empirical evidence and interviews with leading politicians, his assessment is that both from a Mauritian and an au perspective “it has become clear that Mauritius is still not seen as an African country.”233 In this context, he inter alia quotes a French-speaking African leader who in 1976 – when Mauritius hosted the oau summit – commented: “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas l’Afrique.”234 As mainland Africa becomes increasingly attractive in terms of both trade and investment, the Mauritian government, nevertheless, has launched its own ‘Africa strategy’. Outlined in Finance Minister Duval’s budget address in November 2012, it includes the sharing of Mauritius’ experience on democracy, governance and development; fast-tracking of regional integration; enlarged economic opportunities for its citizens; and acting as a catalyst for 228 Welz op. cit., p. 162. The official designation of the Mauritian foreign ministry is ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade’. 229 comesa was formed in 1994. It is a free trade area with 19 member states, stretching from Libya to Zimbabwe. The four independent African Indian Ocean countries of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles form part of the regional trading bloc. 230 Welz op. cit., pp. 161 and 166–72. Launched in 2003 under au/nepad (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), aprm is a voluntary, self-monitoring instrument to encourage conformity with regard to political and economic values, codes and standards among the au member states. Located in Midrand, South Africa, the Pan-African Parliament is the au legislative body, although only with advisory and consultative powers. 231 This said, in 1995 the Mauritian diplomat Vijay Makhan was elected oau Assistant Secretary General and later served as interim au Commissioner during the transition from the oau to the au. 232 Welz op. cit., pp. 166 and 170. 233 Ibid., p. 168. 234 Ibid. (‘It is magnificent, but it is not Africa’).

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investment.235 In Duval’s opinion, “[n]ever before has Mauritius been so dynamic and present on the [African] continent,” quoting as examples the removal of visa requirements for nationals from African countries; the signing of tax agreements; a scholarship scheme for 50 African students; and the government’s intention to appoint honorary consuls of Mauritius “in every major city on the continent.”236 Meanwhile, at the sub-regional level Mauritius continues to be actively involved in both sadc and comesa, particularly concerning trade liberali­ zation and economic integration. These organizations include member countries with significant Mauritian investments, such as Madagascar and Mozambique, where capital in particular has been channeled to the textile and sugar industries, respectively. In the case of Madagascar, the first Mauritian investments were made already in 1989. Less than ten years later, almost 80% of fdi in the Malagasy textile sector came from Mauritius.237 The smaller investments in Mozambique came later. Among the more important is the Mauritian majority participation in the Marromeu sugar estate on the Zambezi, which after the civil war re-launched its operations in 2001. By 2005, Mauritian fdi in the Southern Africa region amounted to 217 million us Dollars.238 With material interests at stake, Mauritius assumed a more political role. Albeit mainly behind the scenes, through the Indian Ocean Commission and sadc the Mauritian government took an active part in mediation and conflict resolution after the 2009 coup d’état and the subsequent crisis in Madagascar.239 As Mauritius does not have a standing army, its participation in regional peacemaking efforts has, obviously, been diplomatic, not military.240

Island of Peace

Mauritius is the only country in Africa which does not have a standing army. Consequently, there is no national military establishment or prominent uniformed social category. As a proportion of gdp, expenditure on defense 235 236 237 238

Duval op. cit., p. 13. Ibid., pp. 12 and 14. Dimou op. cit., p. 201. Bertile op. cit., p. 333. In addition to Madagascar and Mozambique, Reunion is a major recipient of Mauritian fdi. 239 Mauritius also took part in the oau mediation effort in Comoros after the secession of Anjouan in 1997. 240 The fact that Mauritius does not have an army and cannot contribute military personnel to au peace-keeping operations or form part of the continental au standby force partly explains the weak interaction with the African Union.

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and security is a mere 0.1%.241 In a continent long ridden by military conflicts, coups d’état and state violence, Mauritius, indeed, stands out as an exception. All police and security functions in the country are the responsibility of 10,000 active duty personnel under the command of the commissioner of police. The national police force has around 8,000 members. In addition, there is a special mobile force of 1,500 and a national coast guard of 500. Composed of police officers on lengthy rotations to the services, the mobile force and the coast guard are the only paramilitary units in Mauritius. The mobile force – extensively deployed for civic works; notably in the context of natural disasters – is organized as a ground infantry unit, with rifle, paramilitary and engineering companies. It also has a support unit of around 270 members trained in riot control. The coast guard, finally, is responsible for the surveillance of Mauritius’ territorial waters and for search-and-rescue operations. Based in the harbor of Port Louis, it has a number of patrol vessels, light aircraft and helicopters at its disposal. In late 2012, the government announced the procurement of rapid intervention boats for the coast guard.242 Under bilateral agreements, Mauritian police officers are trained in Britain, France and India. British and Indian advisers assist the mobile force and the coast guard. The us navy also provides training. Although less exposed than Seychelles, from early 2009 the challenge of piracy emanating from Somalia emerged as a threat also to Mauritius’ trade and its fishing and tourism industries. In December 2011, therefore, the Mauritian parliament passed a Piracy and Maritime Violence Act. Following the example of earlier anti-piracy legislation in Seychelles, the act allowed for the trial and detention in Mauritius of suspected pirates captured by international naval missions in the Indian Ocean. Agreements on the transfer of apprehended pirates were signed with the eu in 2011 and with the uk in 2012. In January 2013, a first group of twelve Somali prisoners was brought to the island.

Rodrigues: A Distant Dependency

Situated about 600 kilometers to the east, the distant and equally solitary island of Rodrigues is a semi-autonomous part of the Republic of Mauritius. It is the 241 The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/Military Expenditure’, Washington, 2013. As noted in the text on Madagascar, in 2011 the share of military expenditure in the country’s gdp was as high as 5.1%. 242 Duval op. cit., p. 46.

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easternmost populated land of Africa.243 Named after the Portuguese explorer Diego Rodriguez – who located it on a navigational chart in 1528 – the island has an area of 108 square kilometers. In common with Reunion and Mauritius, Rodrigues is of volcanic origin and forms part of the Mascarenes. The island is surrounded by an almost uninterrupted reef and has a lagoon twice its size. In July 2012, the estimated resident population was 38,100, of which less than 10,000 lived in the island’s capital, Port Mathurin, on the north coast. Since Rodrigues was situated off the spice route, few ships visited the island. In 1691, a group of French Huguenots took refuge there, but abandoned the island after two years. It was only with Mahé de Labourdonnais’ arrival in Mauritius in 1735 that a permanent settlement was established. Contrary to the situation in Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles, a plantation system was never introduced in Rodrigues, where an economy based on farming and cattleraising instead was developed to supply the other islands.244 Relying on slave labor from Madagascar and mainland Africa, from the beginning the island acquired a unique rural profile. The structure was maintained after the Napoleonic Wars and the 1814 Paris Treaty, as Britain gained control over Mauritius and its dependencies – notably Rodrigues and Seychelles – “in full property and sovereignty.”245 When the Abolition Act was implemented in Mauritius in 1835, many freed slaves made the perilous journey across the sea to Rodrigues, where they embarked on subsistence farming, further strengthening the island’s rustic nature. As very few Indian indentured workers were brought to Rodrigues, it also developed a distinct AfroMalagasy creole character. In fact, together with Seychelles – a country with which many Rodriguans feel affinity – Rodrigues is the most creole society in the Indian Ocean. In contrast with Mauritius, the population is, in addition, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, and although English is the official language, it is only spoken by a few. The all dominant vernacular is Rodriguan Creole. Under British rule, the function of Rodrigues was primarily to export fish, meat and vegetables to Mauritius. In turn, little was done to develop the island, which became known as the ‘Cinderella of the Indian Ocean’. In Bulpin’s words, “[i]t remained […] a grossly neglected place, left to the mercy of second-rate officials and a crowd of cutpurse traders, who made their living by buying up the island’s produce and livestock at low prices and shipping it across for most 243 In 1883, the eruption of the Indonesian volcano Krakatoa was heard in Rodrigues. 244 Rodrigues was also an exporter of giant tortoises, mainly used by ship crews for food. It is estimated that 200,000 tortoises were killed. By 1770, the endemic Rodriguan species had been extinct. In addition, this was the fate of its own flightless bird, the solitaire. 245 Quoted in Jean-Louis Guébourg: Les Seychelles, Karthala, Paris, 2004, p. 42.

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profitable resale in Mauritius.”246 Ignored by the authorities in Port Louis, the islanders developed a strong sense of non-identification with Mauritius, increasingly raising demands for autonomy.247 When they in the August 1967 elections for the first time were given the opportunity to vote, Rodriguans massively rallied behind the Franco-Mauritian-dominated Mauritian Social-Democratic Party against Ramgoolam’s Labour-led pro-independence alliance. After Mauritius’ independence in 1968, Rodriguan representatives continued to push for political autonomy. In late 1976, the demands were given institutional form through the formation of the Organization of the People of Rodrigues (Organisation du Peuple de Rodrigues/opr), founded by Serge Clair, a Catholic priest recently returned from studies in France. Although the party initially did not win representation in the National Assembly, in 1977 the Mauritian government partly recognized the Rodriguans’ concerns by forming a separate ministry for the island. In 1982, opr won the two parliamentary seats allocated to the constituency of Rodrigues. Since then, opr alone or together with the rival Rodrigues Movement (Mouvement Rodriguais/mr) has been represented at the national level.248 When Mauritius in March 1992 became a republic, an executive council for Rodrigues was created, headed by a chief commissioner and with twenty-one members appointed by the minister for Rodrigues. Administrative autonomy was from October 2002 granted under the Rodrigues Regional Assembly Act. The extent of the autonomous status and the future of the island remain hotly debated. Advocating self-determination, the Rodrigues Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique Rodriguais/fpr) broke away from mr, and in 2010 an outright proindependence party, the Rodrigues Independence Mouvement (Mouvman Indepandantis Rodriguais/mir), was launched. In the meantime, opr – p ­ ursuing a policy of working with the national government for the benefit of Rodrigues, but never entering into a formal alliance with Mauritian political parties – maintains the position as the leading political force. Its founder, Serge Clair, is the incumbent chief commissioner, and in the February 2012 regional elections the party won 46.8% of the votes, followed by mr (42.1%) and fpr (10.7%). mir, the recently launched pro-independence party, only got 0.5%.249 246 Bulpin op. cit., p. 419. 247 See also Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 108. 248 In the 1995, 2000 and 2005 general elections, opr won the two direct seats for Rodrigues, while two candidates from mr were appointed under the ‘best loser’ system. The outcome of the 2010 elections was the other way around. 249 Republic of Mauritius: ‘Rodrigues Regional Assembly Elections 2012’, Electoral Com­ missioner’s Office, Port Louis, 2012. Out of the 21 contested seats, opr won a majority of 11, while mr got 8 and fpr 2.

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Rodrigues remains considerably less developed than Mauritius, particularly with regard to infrastructure. A telephone system was, for example, only installed in 1989 and water provision is a major problem. Facing unemployment, many young Rodriguans have moved to Mauritius, Reunion, Australia and other destinations. All land is owned by the state, which rents out small  plots for farming. In the absence of epz companies and, in general, ­manufacture, the public service sector is dominant. Agriculture and fishing are  the  main economic activities, in 2011 employing over a third of the workforce.250 Since 1972, there are direct, daily flights between Mauritius and Rodrigues. As a result, the tourism industry is growing. The first modern hotels were built in the early 1990s. By 2011, the number of visitors had reached 50,000, out of which over 31,000 came from Mauritius and 16,500 from Reunion.251 Although the industry has a great potential, due to the fragility of the environment the local authorities have decided against an up-market development à la Mauritius, inter alia banning hotels on the beachfront and restricting constructions to one level and a maximum of 50 rooms. As a small, isolated and distant island, Rodrigues is not likely to appear on any international conflict map. It could, however, play a role in the struggles  for influence in the western Indian Ocean. Houbert comments that “[w]ere Mauritius to have a regime which sought to intervene in the internal politics of Reunion, France could easily retaliate in Rodrigues. […] If she was so  inclined, France could exacerbate [the] secessionist tendencies in the island.”252 Seychelles

Small and Large

Seychelles – which one year after Comoros was the last of the African Indian Ocean states to become independent – is both the smallest and the largest.

250 Republic of Mauritius: ‘Digest of Statistics on Rodrigues 2011’, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Port Louis, July 2012, p. 35. Exports from Rodrigues to Mauritius include cattle, meat, vegetables and fish, notably dried and frozen octopus. 251 Ibid., p. 25. The airport was expanded in 2002, allowing for bigger planes and direct flights also from Reunion. In 2011, the total number of European tourists was around 1,500. 252 Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 108.

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Map 9  Seychelles

It is by far the least populous, while its more than one hundred islands, islets, atolls and cays extend over an immense area north of Madagascar, just  south of the Equator. Victoria, the capital on Mahé island, is located around 1,300 kilometers from the coast of Somalia – the closest neighbor on the African ­ continent – 1,700 kilometers from Kenya and 1,800 from Mauritius. A former British colony (1903–76) and socialist one-party state (1977–91), the creole nation is a renowned up-market tourist destination and competes for first place in most African macro- and socio-economic rankings with Mauritius, of which it once was a distant and poor dependency (1814–1903). Closer to the Horn of Africa and the Middle East than any other African Indian Ocean state, it attracts considerable geo-strategic interests. Judiciously managing the troubled waters of foreign pirates, fishing fleets and naval forces, Seychelles, however, has turned exposure into an asset, in the process acquiring a voice in international affairs incommensurate with its minute population and limited resources.

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Unique Archipelago

Surrounded by an oceanic exclusive economic zone of more than 1.3 million square kilometers – slightly bigger than that of Mauritius and among the African countries second only to the eez of South Africa – the total land area of Seychelles is merely 457 km2. Depending on the definition of ‘island’ and barring recently added man-made reclamations,253 Seychelles consists of 115 islands, of which many are uninhabited atolls or sand cays on sea-level reefs. The islands and islets are divided between a core of 42 granitic Inner Islands254 and five archipelagos of 73 coralline Outer Islands (in Creole, Zil Elwannyen Sesel),255 made up of the Southern Coral, the Amirantes, the Alphonse, the Farquhar and the Aldabra groups. The distance between the main, granitic island of Mahé and the coralline Aldabra atoll is approximately 1,100 kilometers. Both the Inner and Outer Islands present unique geological, zoological and botanical features. Mahé (155 km2), Praslin (38 km2), Silhouette (20 km2), La Digue (10 km2) and the other Inner Islands are the only mid-oceanic islands of granite in the world. Their origins can be traced to the disintegration of the southern Gondwana supercontinent over a hundred million years ago.256 Of great beauty, these “paradisial land-specks”257 rest on the Seychelles Bank and rise steeply out of the ocean. The peak of Morne Seychelloise on Mahé, the highest in the country, reaches 905 meters above sea level. As a microcosmos, the granitic islands are home to a number of endemic plants, most famously Seychelles’ emblematic coco-de-mer palm, which only grows in the Vallée de 253 Several islands have been built or are under construction on the east cost of Mahé for purposes of tourism, housing or industrial development. Eden Island south of the capital Victoria is a joint venture between the government and a South African consortium set aside as an integrated resort scheme, whereas Aurore, Soleil, Du Port, Romainville and Perseverance have been reclaimed for domestic residences, offices and light industries. In 2010, the reclaimed islands represented a combined land area of 29 km2, or 6.3% of the national total. 254 Two of the Inner Islands – Denis and Bird – are coralline. 255 Translating as ‘The Distant Seychelles’ Islands’, Zil Elwannyen Sesel (earlier spellings Zil Eloigne Sesel and Zil Elwagne Sesel) is a name familiar to many philatelists around the world. 256 The drifting apart of Gondwana’s tectonic plates gave rise to the continents of South America, Africa, Australia and Antarctica. Eventually, Madagascar and India – to which the Seychelles Bank was attached – broke away from Africa and drifted northeast. Before India crashed into Asia (producing the Himalayas), the Seychelles Bank stayed behind and lodged in its current position. It thus constitutes an oceanic ‘microcontinent’. 257 Deryck Scarr: Seychelles Since 1770: History of a Slave and Post-Slavery Society, Hurst & Company, London, 2000, p. 2.

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Mai National Park on Praslin and on the adjacent islet of Curieuse.258 Several of the coralline Outer Islands are, similarly, spectacular and unique. Aldabra in the distant south-west – sometimes called the ‘Galapagos of the Indian Ocean’ – is the most renowned. It is the largest raised coral reef in the world. In addition to a diverse, abundant marine life and some of the largest seabird colonies, Aldabra is, notably, home to the world’s biggest population of giant land tortoises, numbering around 100,000.259 With 47% of its land area under nature conservation, Seychelles is a world leader.260 The country also has the distinction of having established the first marine park in the western Indian Ocean, Ste. Anne Marine National Park outside the capital Victoria, which was proclaimed in 1973. Around 140 km2 have been designated for the conservation of marine ecosystems. The Aldabra atoll and the Vallée de Mai on Praslin are both unesco World Heritage Sites and domestic environmental legislation is strict.261 Since 1993, the Seychellois have the legal right to a clean environment. At the same time, the law obliges them to protect it.

Creole People

According to the 2010 national census, the total population of Seychelles was 91,000 and the number of households a mere 25,000.262 The size of a smaller 258 The coco-de-mer palm grows to a height of 30 meters and its lifespan has been estimated to 800 years. Its Latin name (Cocus maldivica) comes from the fact that its curious nuts before the discovery of Seychelles occasionally were washed up on the shores of the Maldives, where a fertility cult was formed for their worship. For a long time, it was believed that the nuts came from an underwater plant. The palms are male and female. The males have a long fertilizing spadix, while the females produce a double nut of up to 20 kgs. The nut “has a startling similarity to a naked female pelvis with all components so complete that the resemblance is exact to the female form divine” (Bulpin op. cit., p. 178). The coco-de-mer is a national emblem of Seychelles, used inter alia as a stamp by the immigration authorities. 259 The Aldabra atoll (ca. 150 km2) consists of a ring of four islands surrounding a large, s­ hallow lagoon. Raised mushroom-shaped limestone platforms are characteristic of Aldabra, which apart from scientists at a research station is virtually untouched by humans. There are no airstrips or landing jetties. In the mid-1960s, plans by the us and British governments to build a military base on Aldabra provoked an outcry and were eventually shelved. 260 James A. Michel: ‘State of the Nation Address’, Government of Seychelles, Victoria, 25 February 2011, p. 1. 261 Conservation concerns played a significant role when the Seychelles’ government opted for up-market, rather than mass-based, tourism. 262 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Population and Housing Census 2010: Report’, Table  2.1, Victoria, April 2012, p. 8.

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European town, Seychelles is a microstate. With around 7% of the population of Mauritius and 10% of that of Reunion, it is by far the least populous of the creole islands. In fact, Seychelles not only has the smallest population in the Indian Ocean, but in the whole of Africa. The Atlantic island state of São Tomé and Príncipe is second, but has more than twice as many inhabitants. As only 22% of the population is below 15 years of age and the annual population growth is just above 1%, Seychelles will maintain its position for the foreseeable future.263 The population is concentrated to the three Inner Islands of Mahé (86.4%), Praslin (9.5%) and La Digue (3%).264 In 2010, there were only 758 people registered as residents on the 73 Outer Islands (0.8%), mainly involved in government services, tourism or fishing. Victoria, the capital, is the only urban center. Situated on the east coast of Mahé, it had 26,500 inhabitants, representing 29% of the national population. The international airport and the main harbor are in Victoria, which maintains a ferry service with Praslin and La Digue, respectively some 40 and 45 kilometers to the north-east. The Seychellois are of mixed origins, with roots in Africa, Madagascar, India, China and Europe. In the absence of statistical data, it has been estimated that descendants of the French landowners and the British colonial elite represent around 3%.265 Due to a high proportion of migrant workers, in 2010 as much as 8.6% of the registered resident population was non-Seychellois, principally of Indian nationality.266 Among those who stated their religious affiliation, the census recorded an overwhelming majority of Roman Catholics. Followers of the Catholic faith represented no less than 80% of the population, with Anglicans in second (6.4%) and Hindus (2.5%) in third place.267 With regard to 263 With the current growth rate, it will take around 65 years for Seychelles’ population to double in size. In 2012, the populations of the small European island states of Iceland and Malta were, respectively, 320,000 and 418,000. 264 Unless otherwise stated, in the following ‘Seychelles’ is understood as the three most populated islands. 265 In his study on Seychelles, published in 2004, Guébourg gives the following breakdown: Creole (including descendants of grands blancs) 89.1%, Indians 4.7%, Malagasy 3.1%, Chinese 1.6% and Europeans 1.5% (Guébourg op. cit., pp. 108–109). 266 Out of 7,800 foreign residents, 4,000 (51%) were from India (National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Census’ op. cit., Table 2.6, p. 26). Early immigrant Indian families play a prominent role in trade and construction, while more recent arrivals dominate as shop owners. Many of the latter are Tamil-speakers from south-eastern India. 267 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Census’ op. cit., Table 2.7, p. 29. As the Arab countries – the United Arab Emirates (uae) in particular – play an increasingly important role in Seychelles, it could be noted that only 1.7% of the respondents indicated Islam as their religious affiliation.

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language, 89.1% stated that Creole was the main language spoken at home, whereas 5.1% registered as English-speakers and 0.7% gave French as their domestic choice.268 In Seychelles, however, English and French are together with Creole official languages and a large proportion of the population is trilingual. Together with Haiti, Seychelles is the only country in the world which recognizes Creole as an official language. Seychellois Creole (Kreol Seselwa) is used in the work place and the education system. In 1986, the government established a Creole Institute (Lenstiti Kreol) to standardize the spelling and the grammar of the mother tongue. Through drama, literary presentations and workshops, the institute plays an important role in the week-long Kreol Festival, which each year in October is organized in Victoria – the ‘Creole Capital of the World’ – to celebrate various aspects of kiltir kreol (creole culture), such as language, art, music, dance and food. The festival not only attracts participants from the Indian Ocean region, but notably also from the Caribbean.269 In addition, Seychellois culture plays a prominent part in the annual International Carnival of Victoria, which in April draws participants and floats from various national carnivals around the world.270

Grands Blancs, Slaves and Coconuts

Although there are indications that Arab sailors visited the islands,271 it is the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama who is credited with the discovery of Seychelles, sighted during his second voyage to India in 1502. Over the following two centuries, British and French ships occasionally called on the distant lands, but as in so many other areas it was Mahé de Labourdonnais, the French governor of Île de France (Mauritius), who took a direct interest in their exploration and possible occupation by France. Expeditions were sent from

268 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Census’ op. cit., Table 8.1, p. 67. In 2011, the corresponding figures for Mauritius were 87% Creole, 0.4% English and 4% French. Whereas Creole is the all dominant language in both Mauritius and Seychelles, French has a stronger position in Mauritius and English in Seychelles. 269 To celebrate the Swahili culture, Zanzibar, similarly, hosts the annual ‘Festival of the Dhow Countries’. It coincides with the Zanzibar International Film Festival and is normally held in late June/early July. 270 In October 2013, the government of Seychelles and the regional council of Reunion jointly launched an International Creole Institute, based on Mahé (‘Signature de declaration envers la creation d’un Institut Créole International’ in nation.sc, 30 October 2013). 271 What may be Arab graves have been found on the Inner Island of Silhouette.

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Mauritius in 1742 and 1744, and in 1756 the French commander Corneille Nicolas Morphey placed a stone of possession on Mahé, annexed the islands to France and named them in compliment to the country’s comptroller of finance, Jean Moreau de Séchelles.272 The first settlement – administered from Mauritius – was set up on Mahé in 1770 with a view to establish spice gardens in competition with the Dutch East Indies. Although the initiative failed and Seychelles only remained under French rule for another four decades, during this period the beginnings of a plantation economy and the formation of a slave-based society emerged. By 1810, there were 317 whites, 135 free blacks and as many as 3,015 slaves on the islands.273 As in Reunion and Mauritius, the slaves were mainly imported from Madagascar and East Africa. They cleared the land for housing and cultivation and worked as fishermen, carpenters and domestic servants.274 During the Napoleonic Wars, French corsairs used the many islands, islets and bays for attacks on British ships. After a period of ‘suspended capitulation’, the islands eventually fell to the British, and under the 1814 Paris Treaty France formally ceded sovereignty to Britain. The British, however, did not have any interest in the islands other than to counter their utilization for future attacks. As in Mauritius, de facto socio-economic power was left in the hands of the Francophone grands blancs. A major British concern was to keep the islands from becoming a financial burden and the inhabitants received little attention and few services. As a result, Seychelles developed into “little more than a colonial backwater.”275 Neglected by Britain and administered from distant Mauritius, for almost a century the islands were relegated to the condition of a colony of a colony. And for another fifty years they were controlled by the landowning grands blancs. With roots, norms and values in feudal France before the 1789 revolution, as late as 1949 they were described by a British journalist as “insulated so long and by such vast distances from every liberal trend, every humanistic development, that their political attitude is almost medieval.”276 272 The spelling ‘Seychelles’ was introduced by the British from 1814. On the colonial history of Seychelles, see the three-volume study by William McAteer: Rivals in Eden (1742–1827); Hard Times in Paradise (1827–1919) and To Be a Nation (1920–1976). The comprehensive account was first published in 1991 by The Book Guild, Lewes, East Sussex. A revised edition was reprinted in 2008 by Pristine Books, Mahé. 273 Scarr op. cit., p. 27. 274 Despite the significance of slavery in Seychelles, there are few studies on the subject (Médard in Médard et al. op. cit., p. 60). 275 Liam Campling, Hansel Confiance and Marie-Therese Purvis: Social Policies in Seychelles, Commonwealth Secretariat and unrisd, London, 2011, p. 8. 276 Quoted in Scarr op. cit., p. 152.

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In the beginning, turtles were Seychelles’ most prized resource. Until the arrival of the British, they were the major export item. Cotton production picked up in the early 19th century. As production increased, so did the labor force. By 1818, the number of slaves had grown to 6,600, representing 90% of the population.277 However, the delayed abolition of slavery from 1835 and the expiry of the subsequent ‘apprenticeship’ system put an end to cotton production.278 As the freed slaves refused to take up their previous work and left the coastal plantations on the Inner Islands for the mountains or for the Outer Islands,279 the grands blancs shifted their attention to less labor-intensive coconut cultivation. Eventually, more than a quarter of the arable land was planted with coconut palms. By the early 1860s, coconut oil was the main export product and at the end of the 20th century copra – the dried coconut kernel – had become all dominant. It was to characterize the Seychellois colonial economy until the 1970s, consistently accounting for more than 70% of the total export value. In addition to coconuts, on the Inner Islands vanilla and cinnamon were increasingly produced, whereas guano – accumulated droppings of sea birds; used as manure – was ­harvested on the Outer Islands. As the expanding coconut plantations and the production of copra required more labor, the grands blancs requested permission from the authorities in Mauritius to replace the freed slaves with indentured workers from India. Initially, the request was denied. It was only in the 1860s that Indian laborers started to arrive, albeit on a much lesser scale than in Mauritius and Reunion.280 In the meantime, the growing demand for labor was partly met through the smuggling of African slaves, mainly procured in Zanzibar.281 While smuggling was organized behind the authorities’ back, soon, however, “a very fortuitous deliverance in the manner most acceptable to landowners”282 was made by the British authorities. 277 Johnstone op. cit., p. 38. 278 As in Mauritius, the British Abolition Act of 1833 was implemented from 1835. As in Mauritius too, slavery was initially replaced by an ‘apprenticeship’ system under which formally freed slaves had to work for their masters as paid laborers. In Seychelles, plantation slaves were apprenticed for six years and domestic slaves for four. 279 A contemporary observer noted: “They have frequently run away from the islands in boats of various sizes […] in which they have vainly hoped to reach their own country” (Quoted in Johnstone op. cit., p. 43). 280 Until 1916, Seychelles received a total of 6,300 indentured workers from India (Médéa op. cit., p. 36). 281 Some of the Outer Islands, notably the Amirantes archipelago, were used as a depot for slaves from Madagascar and Mozambique. They were subsequently smuggled into Reunion and Mauritius (see Scarr op. cit., pp. 41–47 and Johnstone op. cit., p. 38). 282 Scarr op. cit., p. 69.

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The trade in slaves had been banned by Britain in 1807. From the mid-19th century, the prohibition was enforced by the British navy in the western Indian Ocean through the capture of Arab slaving dhows. Slaves freed south of the Equator were normally taken to Seychelles, with those to the north going to the protectorate of Aden (Yemen).283 Between 1861 and 1872, more than 2,500 rescued Africans – mostly from Mozambique – were brought to Seychelles.284 Supposedly free, most of them were “as a new form of slavery”285 indentured to landowners as wage laborers in return for a premium to meet the government’s costs. The indenture was normally for five years. Albeit a welcome contribution to the Franco-Seychellois plantocracy, the fact that the British authorities had to appoint a Protector of Liberated Africans was an indication of the harsh working conditions. After their enforced indenture, many freed Africans joined former slaves as sharecroppers under the equally exploitative moitié system,286 allowing them to stay on plantation land in return for half their produce or half their labor. In addition to subsistence production, under the system creole farmers harvested cash crops for export, such as vanilla and cinnamon.

De-Linking from Britain

As Seychelles’ economy developed and stabilized, from the mid-19th century the remote island territory broke its geographical isolation and gained growing recognition by Britain. In 1860, a regular, monthly connection with the outside world was established, with steamships calling at Victoria – so named in honor of the British queen – on the route between Aden and Port Louis, Mauritius. In 1872, the British authorities granted Seychelles financial autonomy. Customs duties, which until then had been credited only to Mauritius, were now 283 African slaves freed by the British navy were also taken to South Africa. Between 1873 and 1877, some 550 Mozambicans – mostly Makua – were after registration in Zanzibar brought to Durban. Subsequently known as ‘Zanzibaris’, as in Seychelles they came under contract as indentured laborers. A majority of them were Muslims. Paradoxically, under the apartheid racial laws they were on account of their religion classified as ‘Other Asiatics’ and in 1961 forcefully removed to the Indian township of Chatsworth (see Preben Kaarsholm: ‘Diaspora or Transnational Citizens? Indian Ocean Networks and Changing Multiculturalisms in South Africa’ in Social Dynamics, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 2012, pp. 454–66). 284 Scarr op.cit., pp. 68–74. 285 Ibid., p. 69. 286 In English, moitié translates as ‘half’.

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collected by the local authorities, resulting in a significant rise in revenue. At the same time, the Seychelles Rupee was introduced. In the process, an increasing number of Indian and Chinese traders and business people were attracted to the islands, which in 1893 became connected to Zanzibar by a telegraphic cable link and no longer depended on passing ships for international news and communications. Ten years later – on 31 August 1903 – Seychelles, finally, became a colony on its own, with a total population of around 20,000 people. As noted by Scarr, it was, however, deeply divided between grands blancs “kept alert for every opportunity […] to assert the identity still most congenial to them, [that] of Frenchmen suffering under foreign rule,” and the British government, which “rarely ventured to do more than remonstrate with local oligarchs through the governor.”287 In London, the colony was, nevertheless, not entirely forgotten, coming to mind “whenever human obstacles to imperial policy elsewhere on the globe had to be exiled to a place where they could do no harm.”288 In common with other remote islands, Seychelles became a place of deportation.

Deportation and exile Seychelles was first used for banishment by Napoleon, who after an attempt on his life in 1800 deported around 70 Jacobins to the islands. Their presence was strongly resented and half of them were subsequently shipped to the Comorian island of Anjouan. It was the British, however, who turned the island of Mahé into a well-known island of exile. Beginning in 1877 with Sultan Abdullah of Perak (Malaysia), a great number of people deemed undesirable by the British government were for shorter or longer periods over the next 80 years sent there. During the 1899–1902 Anglo-Boer War in South Africa, over 1,000 Boer prisoners were interned in Seychelles. In 1900, the Ashanti King Prempeh from the Goald Coast (Ghana) began a banishment which was to last for 24 years, and in 1901 he was joined by two Ugandan kings, Mwanga of Buganda and Kabalega of Bunyoro. In 1919, followers of the Watch Tower Movement in Nyasaland (Malawi) arrived, and in 1922 Winston Churchill, then colonial secretary, proposed to send 500 to 5,000 Irish patriots to the islands. After World War I, the British government mainly used them for the banishment of Arab and Muslim

287 Scarr op. cit., pp. 106–07. 288 Ibid.

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leaders. In 1920, Sultan Mahmoud Ali Shirreh of Somaliland was sent to Mahé and the following year saw the arrival of ex-Sultan Seyyid Khalid bin Bargash of Zanzibar. Saad Zaghlul Pasha, future prime minister of Egypt (1924), was together with other nationalists banished in 1922; a group of Muslim leaders from Aden in 1933; and Palestinian freedom fighters in 1937. After World War II, deportees from Buganda and followers of the former mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, spent some time in Seychelles. The most prominent exile was also the last, Archbishop Makarios III, future president of Cyprus (1960–74), who stayed for a year in 1956–57.

Until the 1960s, politics in the colony were characterized by a protracted tugof-war between, on the one hand, the British authorities, cautiously trying to expand the tax base for social reforms and to introduce a semblance of democracy, and, on the other, the French-speaking elite, vigorously opposing taxation and pushing for representation on the local legislative council. In 1939, the latter set up the Seychelles Taxpayers and Landowners Association (stla), the first political organization on the islands.289 Representing a minority in control of around 90% of the land, it was characterized by the British governor as “the embodiment of every reactionary force in Seychelles.”290 When in 1948 elections of four of the twelve representatives on the legislative council were held for the first time,291 stla won all seats, an outcome which was to be repeated until popular parties were formed and – in 1967 – universal suffrage to a governing council eventually was introduced. As summed up by Scarr, “[e]ven Seychelles could not forever postpone their days of reckoning.”292 Two developments in the mid-1960s – one domestic and the other external – shaped the future of Seychelles. In 1963, stla issued a manifesto calling for independence. With the memory of slavery still alive, the creole population “became politicized overnight,” fearing that “the grands blancs want to enslave us all over again.”293 This, in turn, led to the formation of modern political 289 Initially, the organization was called the Seychelles Taxpayers Association, in French l’Association des Contribuables. It was also known as the Taxpayers and Planters Association. 290 Quoted in Scarr op. cit., p. 132. 291 Eight of the council members were appointed by the British authorities. Only around 2,000 property owners out of a population of 36,000 had the right to vote. 292 Scarr op. cit., p. 163. 293 The newspaper Le Seychellois 10 April 1963, quoted in ibid., p. 166.

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parties in 1963–64. First out was the short-lived Seychelles Islanders United Party (siup). In June 1964, it was followed by the Seychelles Democratic Party (sdp), which soon was challenged by the Seychelles People’s United Party (spup).294 Led by two young barristers recently returned from England, respectively James Mancham and France Albert René, the two opposing parties would dominate the political scene for decades to come.295 Both of them were also instrumental in the formation of competing trade unions. Secondly, at about the same time the British government started a strategic retreat from the Indian Ocean, giving priority instead to its partnership with the United States, establishing the British Indian Ocean Territory (biot) and granting independence to Mauritius. The consequences for Seychelles of the British ‘East of Suez’ policy were the building of a us satellite tracking station on Mahé in 1964 and the loss to biot of the Outer Islands of Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar in 1965, but also the prospects of democracy and nationhood. To prepare the neglected and by now increasingly poor islands for possible sovereignty, the government in London, eventually, allocated significant amounts as budget support and to capital projects, above all for the construction of an international airport, which was finalized in 1971.296 The deep socio-economic and cultural disparities notwithstanding, the road towards independence would be peaceful. Although the struggle for leadership between sdp and spup was acrimonious and there were strikes and labor 294 spup had been formed by René and some Seychellois friends in London in November 1962, but emerged in Seychelles in 1964. 295 Mancham and René both belonged to a new generation of Seychellois that was given opportunities to pursue higher studies in Europe. Mancham, born in 1939 and four years younger than René, was the son of a wealthy Victoria merchant of Chinese descent. He qualified as a barrister in London in 1961. During his studies in the uk, Mancham founded the Seychelles Students Union and was actively involved in official British circles with connections to the islands. He returned to Seychelles in 1963. René grew up on the Outer Island of Farquhar, where his French-speaking father was a plantation overseer. He left for studies in Switzerland (theology) and Britain (law) in 1954 and qualified as a barrister in London in 1957. After five years in Seychelles, he returned to London, where he studied economics and political science at the London School of Economics between 1962 and 1964. In London, René was closely involved with the Labour Party, the Movement for Colonial Freedom and African anti-colonial groups. 296 From 325,000 British Pounds in 1967, the budget support more than quintupled to over 1.8 million in 1971 (Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 13). The international airport, built on reclaimed land south of the capital, became operational in June 1971. It was formally opened by Queen Elizabeth II during an official visit in March 1972.

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unrest,297 Seychelles did not experience the kind of electoral violence and ethnic riots that had rocked Mauritius on its way to nationhood. Neither did the French-speaking elite embark on unilateral action in defense of its privileges. Instead, many members joined either of the two dominant parties. In one of many paradoxical twists of modern Seychellois history, largely due to the party’s independent, anti-British stand several representatives of the landowning families became prominent allies of René and spokespersons for the socialist spup. In 1967 – at a time when most African countries had gained their independence – the British government finally granted the vote to all adult Seychellois, expanding the electorate from 2,500 to around 18,000.298 Following a constitutional conference in London, three years later a ministerial form of government was established. Under the new dispensation, Seychelles became responsible for its own administration barring external affairs, internal security and the civil service. In 1970 too, national elections to a 15-member governing council were held under the Westminster ‘first-past-the-post’ single constituency system. With a voter participation of over 80%, Mancham’s sdp was the winner, taking 10 council seats against 5 for René’s spup. Proportionally, the difference was smaller, with 52.8% of the votes going to sdp and 44.1% to spup. Despite allegations of vote rigging and bribery, Mancham became chief minister and René leader of the opposition.299 New elections were held in 1974. In the meantime, spup had requested a reform of the electoral system and the delimitation of new constituencies. The demands were rejected by sdp, which in spite of a lower percentage than in 1970 (52.4%) won 13 seats. spup, which increased its proportion to 47.6%, got only 2.300 As noted by Campling, Confiance and Purvis in a un/Commonwealth study on Seychelles, “this obvious disparity would set the scene for spup’s legitimization of non-constitutional means to achieve power by force three years later.”301 297 In June 1966, for example, more than 2,000 public workers went on strike for higher wages. The response by the British governor was inter alia to request military reinforcements in the form of two navy frigates and marines from Aden. 298 In the following elections, sdp won 51.5% of the votes against spup’s 45.5. 299 Scarr comments that under Mancham “the stage was becoming set for Seychelles’ opening to the world of colossal undercover commissions and underhand deals, of millionaire middlemen, middle-aged playboys, film-stars, jet-set popsies and package tourists” (Scarr op. cit., p. 185). Among Mancham’s close friends was the Saudi Arabian millionaire, businessman and arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi, who used Seychelles “as a retreat” (Mancham op. cit., p. 107). 300 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 16. 301 Ibid.

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Ideologically, Mancham and René were deeply divided. Whereas the flamboyant chief minister and his sdp advocated integration with Britain rather than full independence, arguing that “[d]espite the history of benevolent neglect, we need the British link,”302 the austere opposition leader was staunchly dedicated to sovereignty. The pro-Western sdp had a liberal outlook and gave priority to tourism and the promotion of Seychelles as an international tax haven, while spup – which in January 1973 had been recognized by the oau as a national liberation movement – stood for a non-aligned foreign policy course and the building of a popularly based welfare state. And where sdp appealed to the people with the argument that independence from Britain “would result in famine,”303 spup reminded the creole population of its African roots and of the strength of self-determination.304 Despite the differences, the two leaders were, nevertheless, forced into a marriage of convenience. Integration with Britain à la Reunion and France as advocated by Mancham was not only in contravention of the 1960 un Decolonization Declaration, but also foreign to British colonial tradition. Determined to grant Seychelles full independence; recognizing the electoral strength of spup; and despite sdp’s opposition to power sharing, without a referendum or any kind of popular consultation in January 1976 the British government announced that Seychelles would become independent on 29 June. During the constitutional talks in London, it was further agreed that Seychelles was to become a republic; that the Outer Islands of Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar were to be returned to the new nation; and – not the least – that Mancham was to serve as the first president, with René as prime minister. Intended as a stabilizing formula in favor of national unity, the cohabitation lasted less than a year.

One-Party State

While President Mancham attended a Commonwealth conference in London, on 5 June 1977 around 200 young spup militants occupied the police armory, airport and radio in Victoria, declaring that a ‘Revolutionary Council’ had been 302 Mancham op. cit., p. 25. 303 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 14. 304 As an advocate of integration with Britain, Mancham was highly critical of the oau. René, on the other hand, actively promoted relations with Africa. One of spup’s organizers – Guy Sinon – was before independence based in East Africa, where there was a considerable Seychellois community.

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established and inviting France Albert René to form a new government.305 After the military intervention in Madagascar in 1972 and the coup d’état in Comoros in 1975, Seychelles became the third independent state in the African part of the Indian Ocean to experience a non-constitutional exit of the first head of state.306 Subsequently described as ‘peaceful’ and as an act of ‘national liberation’,307 the overthrow of Mancham marked the beginnings of fourteen years of one-party rule under René and spup, which in 1978 changed its name to the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (sppf). Its stated objectives were to “create a socialist state wherein all citizens, regardless of color, race, sex or creed, shall have equal opportunities and be afforded the basic needs of life in a modern society.”308 In quick succession, the constitution was suspended, the elected parliament dissolved and René installed as the young nation’s new president, for two years governing by decree until a new constitution entered into force in June 1979. Under the constitution, a People’s Assembly was established, with sppf as the sole legal party. In June 1979 too, presidential elections were held. Unopposed, René received 97.99% of the votes and accumulated the functions of executive president, commander-in-chief, secretary general of sppf and minister of finance.309 Equally unopposed, he was re-elected in 1984 and 1989.310 305 The attacks were led by Ogilvie Berlouis, who reportedly had smuggled firearms from Tanzania. In 1979, Berlouis became minister of defense. As many spup leaders in René’s inner circle – among them the minister of development, Maxime Ferrari, and the minister of foreign affairs, Jacques Hodoul – Berlouis subsequently went into opposition. In 1986, he attempted a military takeover. 306 For a brief period (1977–78), three of the four independent African Indian Ocean states were ruled by governments with a socialist, secular orientation and relying upon youth mobilization, i.e. the governments of Ali Soilih in Comoros, Didier Ratsiraka in Madagascar and France Albert René in Seychelles. In 1976, Paul Bérenger’s mmm became the biggest party in Mauritius, but was kept out of government. Over the years, a friendship developed between Ratsiraka and René. When Ratsiraka lost the 2002 elections and, eventually, had to leave Madagascar, he went to Seychelles before settling in France. 307 The overthrow of Mancham in June 1977 has been described as ‘bloodless’. Albeit few, there were, however, casualties, most notably that of the sdp supporter Davidson Chang Him. A brother of the Anglican bishop – and future Archbishop – French Chang Him, he was shot dead. 308 Quoted in Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., pp. 18–19. 309 The future vice-president (1996–2004) and president (2004-) of Seychelles, James Michel, became minister of education and information. A former teacher and trade union leader, Michel formed part of the inner circle that planned and carried out the coup in 1977. In 1984, he became deputy secretary general of sppf and ten years later secretary general. 310 By 1985, René was also prime minister and minister of finance, planning and foreign affairs, leading a cabinet of only five members.

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With assistance from Tanzania, in 1977 the government set up the Seychelles People’s Liberation Army and a militia. Four years later, the two were joined to form the Seychelles People’s Defense Forces (spdf). “The obsession with arms,” as commented by Houbert,311 soon led to significant increases in military expenditure and a huge burden on the budget. In this context, a proposed compulsory and paramilitary national youth service scheme stood out. Protests against the proposal by around 3,000 youth in 1979, however, resulted in a modified National Youth Service (nys). Inspired by a similar service in Cuba, a noncompulsory scheme was introduced in 1981. Aiming to “develop the whole person through community living and sharing,”312 the nys – which was phased out from 1994 – was a two-year residential schooling program following the ninth year of secondary education. As regards the economy, a centrally planned system was established. A far-reaching land reform – eventually breaking the power of the grand blanc landowning elite – was carried out, with nature reserves, state farms and co-operatives replacing the old plantations. By 1985, the latter two accounted for 40% of agricultural production.313 During the Second Republic, parastatal companies were, in addition, set up in every sector. Above all, in 1984 the Seychelles Marketing Board (smb) was formed. It was initially given the mandate to produce or import a limited range of products, including basic necessities such as rice, sugar, milk and cooking oil. Soon, however, it took over the role of monitoring and enforcing price controls and was, eventually, allocated the task of issuing all import and export permits.314 Controlling the importation and exportation of all goods in the country, the smb grew into a stifling, bureaucratic apparatus, with negative consequences for the economy. As early as 1986, signs of a future crisis were apparent. In the meantime, the ambitious and successful transformation of the Seychellois socio-economic landscape under the Second Republic rested on revenues from tourism and fisheries, two sectors which replaced the declining copra industry and soon became all dominant. As the contribution of copra to total foreign exchange earnings dropped from 16 to 2% between 1974 and 1985, signaling the terminal decline of the traditional product, the tourism and fishery industries – which before independence were but a blip on the foreign trade screen – both registered significant growth. In the case of tourism, the 311 Houbert in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 103. 312 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 50. 313 Ibid., p. 30. 314 The smb was headed by a council led by President René, who appointed all council members and also held a casting vote.

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opening of the international airport in 1971 had a profound effect. In 1975, more than 37,000 foreign tourists visited Seychelles. In 1990, the number surpassed 100,000, or more than the country’s total population. In the process, both the economy and the society of Seychelles underwent a “seismic shift.”315 With regard to fisheries, from the early 1980s the expansion of international tuna catches in Seychelles’ eez provided important economic benefits. Fishing agreements were inter alia signed with France, Spain and Japan. Through French assistance, the Conserveries de l’Océan Indien cannery was opened in Victoria in 1987, soon becoming a major employer and turning the Seychelles’ capital into the primary tuna port in the region.316 By 1994, the production of canned tuna reached 5,000 tons and five years later more than 30,000.317 In addition, under the Lomé Convention exports of tuna benefited from generous eu trade preferences. In a report on the colonial economy of Seychelles, the British economist J.W.F. Rowe described in 1959 how a large number of people lived “in conditions which can only be labeled with such adjectives as disgraceful, abominable [and] horrible.”318 It has been estimated that more than 70% of the Seychellois households at the time of independence were threatened with the specter of malnutrition.319 The situation changed dramatically during the Second Republic. Giving priority to education and, in general, human development, including housing, health, social protection and poverty reduction, under the René government the population registered remarkable improvements in the standards of living. Non-compulsory, formal primary education was only organized in Seychelles by the Catholic and Anglican churches from 1944. Secondary education came several years later. Under the motto of “education for all, education for life [and] education for personal and national development,”320 René’s spup/sppf government abolished private schools; introduced free and compulsory primary and 315 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 77. 316 In 1995, a joint venture between hj Heinz Seafood (60%) and the Seychelles government (40%) took over from the Conserveries de l’Océan Indien and established the Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd (iot). As one of the largest tuna canneries in the world – in 2005 supplying over 14% of the eu market – iot was bought by the us merchant bank Lehman Brothers in 2006. With Lehman’s demise during the 2008 financial crisis, the ownership was transferred to Thai Union Frozen, with brands such as ‘John West’ and ‘Chicken of the Sea’. 317 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op.cit., p. 37. 318 J.W.F. Rowe: The Economy of Seychelles and its Future Development (1959), quoted in ibid., p. 67. 319 Ibid., p. 20. 320 Ibid., p. 49.

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secondary education; embarked on an ambitious school-building program; and developed national curricula. Creole was adopted as medium of instruction during the first four years of primary school. The results were significant. Between 1971 and 1987, the literacy rate for 15 to 24 years old increased from 57 to 84%. By 2000, the rate was 98%. With emphasis on preventive care, family planning and children, the achievements in the health sector – coupled with a housing and sanitation program – were equally impressive. From 24.6 per thousand in 1980, the under-five mortality rate was brought down to 14.2 ten years later. Life expectancy, which stood at 65 years in 1971, reached 72 in 1994. By decree, in 1979 the government established a comprehensive, universal social security system with provisions for old age and retirement pensions, sickness and maternity leave, as well as invalidity, orphan and funeral contributions. To reduce the worst manifestations of indigence, an ‘allowance for the needy’ was also introduced. Together with the improvements in education, health and housing – including access to electricity and piped water – the combined effect was a radical reduction in poverty. In 1984, an estimated 31% of the Seychellois population lived below the national poverty line. By 1990, the number had fallen to 19%.321 Whereas the disadvantaged Seychellois population in less than a generation was to enjoy living standards on a par with many developed countries, at the same time the social reforms put a huge burden on the national economy. From 1977, expenditure on education and health represented over 5% of gdp and that of social transfers even more. In 1998, the gdp share of the social security schemes was as high as 6.2%.322 This, in turn, was a significant contributing factor to the government’s growing and unsustainable deficit, eventually leading to a public debt crisis in 2008.323

East against West

President René’s authoritarian one-party rule was not without internal and external enemies. Several attempts to topple the regime were organized in the 1980s, notably an aborted invasion by South African mercenaries in November 321 Ibid., p. 69. At the time, the national poverty line was set at 900 Seychelles Rupees per month. 322 Ibid., pp. 71 and 80. 323 The policies were also subject to abuse. One example was the District Beautification Scheme, introduced in 1998 to maintain, clean and embellish rural areas and district centers. Insufficiently monitored, it resulted in a creeping and costly increase of beneficiaries.

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1981. Despite the fact that power had been taken by unconstitutional means, these attempts, however, were in marked contrast to the international recognition granted not only by the socialist states, but also by the United States, Britain, France and other Western countries. As both the East and the West for geo-strategic and economic reasons courted the small island nation, the René government astutely followed a non-aligned path, playing them off against each other to maximize gains for Seychelles. While the Americans continued to operate the rent-paying satellite station at La Misère, arms and other supplies donated by the Soviet Union could be off-loaded in the Victoria harbor, less than ten kilometers away. From the beginning, President René marked a new course by welcoming Soviet naval vessels to Victoria and paying official visits to several Eastern countries.324 As early as April 1978, he went to China and North Korea. Whereas formal links were maintained with the Indian Ocean and the oau states, priority in foreign affairs were accorded prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement, in particular Algeria, Cuba, Tanzania and Yugoslavia. The Seychelles’ army was established with Tanzanian assistance, and from 1978 Seychelles – often described as ‘the Cuba of the Indian Ocean’ – embarked on a close and long-standing association with the Caribbean island, covering cooperation in agriculture, education, health and other sectors.325 Nevertheless, from an economic point of view it was the Western countries that constituted the mainstay of the Second Republic. Despite active protests against the coup d’état by James Mancham in London and Paris, they all maintained their relations. In his memoirs, Mancham – who as a young lawyer had assisted the Americans with legal advice concerning the satellite station and just before independence as chief minister had contracted the us Central Intelligence Agency (cia) to develop Seychelles’ security services326 – bitterly writes that “there I was, abandoned by the British, tricked by the French […] and forgotten by the Americans.”327 324 Until 1983, Seychelles allowed limited use of its naval facilities to warships of all nations provided that they were not carrying nuclear weapons. The British and the us governments would not agree to this condition, which effectively kept their naval forces away from the port of Victoria. The requirement was lifted in September 1983, but, theoretically, Seychelles continues to refuse port entry to ships with nuclear weapons. 325 The close relations between Seychelles and Cuba have been maintained after the demise of the Soviet Union. President Michel paid an official visit to Cuba in November 2009. In 2012, there were around 30 Cuban experts working in Seychelles, mainly as medical doctors, while a little more than 20 Seychellois pursued studies in Cuba. 326 Mancham op. cit., pp. 126–27. 327 Ibid., p. 159.

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Outside Africa, France was the first country to recognize the René government. One year after the coup, René visited Paris and signed a broad cooperation agreement.328 Together with British Airways, in 1977 Air France supported the launch of Air Seychelles, the national air carrier. In addition to an increasing number of tourists, French teachers and experts were received in Seychelles. In 1978 and 1979, the French government donated two tuna vessels and granted advantageous conditions for the procurement of another two, significantly assisting in the build-up of a domestic fishing fleet. Britain followed suit. In September 1978, President René paid an official visit to London. During the visit, the two governments entered into a cooperation agreement which covered several areas. The eastern Indian Ocean nation of Australia was also attracted to Seychelles. In July 1979, Prime Minister Fraser led a big delegation to Victoria, laying the basis for an assistance program and sustained bilateral relations. In the Cold War context, it was the nature of the United States’ presence which stood out. Following the closure of its satellite tracking station in Zanzibar by the Karume regime in early 1964, the us Air Force had under the British built a similar facility at La Misère on Mahé.329 Its military role was subsequently confirmed.330 Before independence, the station was regularly denounced by René and spup. Once in power, however, they adopted a pragmatic, utilitarian approach, letting the station stand and charging the us government an annual rent of 5 million Dollars.331 In addition, the more than 130 us personnel based at the station and the 200 Seychellois working there brought indirect benefits in the form of goods, services and salaries. Eventually, 328 In his autobiography, Mancham states that “there was sadly a high level of connivance within the plotters of the coup d’état of June 1977 and the French representative at Port Victoria at that time” (ibid., p. 269). Commenting on a failed mission to Paris after the coup, he notes: “What I did not know was that there was an important nucleus within the government which was tainted with duplicity and conspiracy and to whom the terms of Francophone and Francophile were incompatible with Anglophone and Anglophile. To them, my policy of integration had branded me as too close to the British. […] Nor did I realize at the time that they could be naïve enough to believe that the imposition of their language was far more important than the risk of throwing a democratic ally into the Soviet camp” (ibid., p. 156). 329 It was only in April 1967 that the exchange of notes between London and Washington on the ‘us Tracking and Telemetry Facilities in the Island of Mahé’ was presented to the uk parliament (McAteer: To Be a Nation op. cit., p. 262). Between 1963 and 1975, the United States also operated a satellite tracking facility outside Antananarivo in Madagascar. 330 The tracking station in Seychelles was an important complement to the us installations on Diego Garcia. 331 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 39.

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the facility was closed in 1996. By that time, the Soviet Union no longer existed. By then too, economic rather than military interests had attracted Americans to the islands. Through a joint venture, in 1995 the us company hj Heinz and the government of Seychelles established the Indian Ocean Tuna (iot) in Victoria, one of the largest tuna canneries in the world. Anti-imperialist rhetoric notwithstanding, throughout the Second Republic Western development assistance, fishing agreements, investments, tourism and trade dominated the economy of Seychelles. With Britain, France, Germany, the European Union and the United States as major contributors, during the initial, critical period of 1980–85 a total of 115 million us Dollars were extended as development assistance to the small Indian Ocean nation. Of this amount, no less than 84 million, or 73%, were given in the form of grants, a key factor in keeping the country’s debt burden at a relatively manageable level.332 In the same period, Western investments – primarily in the construction and tourism sectors – annually accounted for over 6% of gdp.333

Opposition and Mercenaries

After the June 1977 coup, the deposed head of state, James Mancham, remained in exile in England, while other members of his delegation returned to Seychelles. One of them was Gérard Hoareau, who launched the underground opposition Resistance Movement (Mouvement Pour la Résistance /mpr) with the objective to re-instate Mancham.334 In November 1979, Hoareau and a number of mpr followers were detained. After his release from prison the following year, Hoareau joined scores of Seychellois opposed to the one-party state and left the country. While most exiles settled in Britain, France, Kenya or Australia, he joined his family in South Africa, from where he stayed in contact with Mancham and planned an overthrow of the René government. Arguably more than anything else, it was the incursion by South African soldiers of fortune on 25 November 1981 that placed Seychelles in the headlines around the world. Reminiscent of the French mercenary Bob Denard’s repeated interventions in Comoros,335 the bizarre, potentially disastrous, raid was 332 Ibid., p. 27. As a combined result of high gdp per capita and its reputation as a loan defaulter, oda to Seychelles suffered a sharp reduction from 2000. 333 Ibid., p. 46. 334 At the time, Hoareau was director general of immigration and as a member of Seychelles’ national football team a well-known personality in the small country. 335 Denard and Hoare both served as mercenaries in Katanga under Moïse Tshombe.

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instigated by Hoareau and mpr with Mancham’s tacit support; organized by the South African apartheid regime; and led by the veteran mercenary leader ‘Mad Mike’ Hoare.336 The raid, however, failed in a spectacular manner. After landing at the international airport south of Victoria, Hoare and his 50-odd motley crew of armed international mercenaries – half of whom were South Africans – were detected by a customs officer.337 Panicking, they started a gunfight in which one mercenary was killed. Without a hint of the popular uprising predicted by mpr, as well as confronted by spdf and Tanzanian troops,338 Hoare’s men took over an incoming Air India plane and commandeered the pilots to fly them to Durban, South Africa. Within a few hours, the mercenary attack was over. The consequences, however, were far-reaching. The Seychelles’ government immediately brought the matter to the attention of the un Security Council, which in December 1981 decided to appoint a commission of inquiry “in order to investigate the origin, background and financing of the mercenary aggression.”339 After examining the commission report, on 28 May 1982 the council concluded that the attempted coup had been “prepared in and executed from South Africa,” condemning “the recruitment of mercenaries and the provision of facilities to them,” as well as “the illegal acts against the security and safety of civil aviation committed [by the aggressors].” In addition, it decided “to establish […] a special fund for the Republic of Seychelles, to be supplied by voluntary contributions, through which assistance should be channeled for economic reconstruction.”340 The rationale behind the fund was that Seychelles due to the aggression 336 Of Irish origin, Hoare settled in Durban, South Africa, after World War II. As a gunfor-hire, he led two separate mercenary groups in Katanga and eastern Congo in the early and mid-1960s. The character played by Richard Burton in the movie The Wild Geese was patterned on Hoare. 337 Arriving with a Royal Swazi flight via Comoros – at the time close to apartheid South Africa – the mercenaries posed as members of a beer-drinking tourist party. In their handbags, they carried dis-assembled submachine guns. Hoare and most of the mercenaries had passed customs when an official accidentally discovered an ak 47 in one of the bags. A week before, an advance party had arrived in Seychelles to prepare for the takeover. In addition to South Africans, the mercenaries were mainly from Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). The group also included British and American Congo veterans. 338 According to Scarr, “the head of the Mouvement Pour la Résistance in Victoria refused Hoare’s [phone] calls” (Scarr op. cit., p. 200). 339 unsc Resolution 496 (‘Complaint by Seychelles’), 15 December 1981. Representatives from Ireland, Japan and Panama constituted the commission of inquiry. 340 unsc Resolution 507 (‘Complaint by Seychelles’), 28 May 1982.

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experienced a marked downturn in tourist arrivals and revenue. The economic loss was estimated at around 18 million us Dollars.341 Indicative of South Africa’s involvement, the apartheid regime treated the returning mercenaries leniently. Eventually, they were charged with hijacking the Air India plane, but not for the attack on Seychelles.342 In November 1982, Hoare was sentenced to ten years in prison. He was released under a presidential amnesty in May 1985. In Seychelles, in the meantime, four of the six mercenaries who formed part of Hoare’s advance party and had been left behind on Mahé, were in June 1982 sentenced to death. Prominent among the captured was Martin Dolinchek, a member of South Africa’s National Intelligence Services (nis). Already in July 1983, however, they were pardoned by President René and deported to South Africa. Hoareau, the mpr leader, was not so lucky. In November 1985, he was gunned down in London. Although the assassin was never caught, not surprisingly fingers pointed in the direction of the René government.343 Another consequence of the mercenary raid was that the Tanzanian government sent military reinforcements to Seychelles. Initially, this met with resentment by Seychellois soldiers, who in 1982 staged a rebellion in favor of better working conditions. Whereas the mutiny was contained, in mid-1986 a considerably more serious threat to the government was set in motion by the minister of defense, Ogilvie Berlouis, who tried to unseat President René. Also this attempt failed. Berlouis, one of René’s closest companions and the leader of the spup youth that carried out the coup d’état in June 1977, was forced to leave the country.344 After the introduction of a multi-party system, he returned to form the small Seychelles Liberal Party (slp), which in the 1993 elections, ironically, supported Mancham’s Democratic Party.

Multi-Party Democracy

After the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, President René came under pressure by the West to introduce a democratic system and 341 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 22. 342 The apartheid government argued that the attack had been initiated from Swaziland, from where the mercenaries took off, not from South Africa. 343 It has been alleged that the British government was involved in Hoareau’s assassination (Guébourg op. cit., p. 93). 344 In Indian military circles, it is claimed that Indian intelligence and the dispatch of naval vessels to Seychelles were instrumental in averting the takeover planned by Berlouis. It has further been said that India’s assistance to President René “was the first demonstration of the Indian navy’s capability to influence political events throughout the Indian Ocean, far from the navy’s traditional area of operations in South Asia” (‘Operation flowers are blooming’ in defenceforumindia.com, 13 July 2012).

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open the economy. No longer in a position to play the East and the West off against each other, in December 1991 he announced that political parties other than the ruling sppf would be allowed. The first opposition party to register was the Parti Seselwa (Seychellois Party/ps), an internal underground organization led by the Anglican priest Wavel Ramkalawan. Political exiles of different backgrounds and persuasions were also welcomed back, which soon resulted in the emergence of a number of small, marginal parties.345 Above all, in April 1992 ex-President Mancham returned as the leader of the Democratic Party (dp) and a self-proclaimed ‘Apostle of National Reconciliation’.346 With sppf under René and dp under Mancham as the main political players, the stage was being set for a complicated eighteen-month transition period of constitution-making and elections monitored by Commonwealth observers. For the first time in independent Seychelles, in July 1992 the people went to the polls to freely cast their votes in multi-party elections. The purpose was to elect members of a commission mandated to draft a new constitution. With a voter turnout of over 85%,347 René’s ruling sppf was the clear winner, obtaining more than 58% of the votes. Mancham’s dp was second with 34% and Ramkalawan’s ps third with just over 4%. All 22 seats on the constitutional commission went to sppf and dp, the former taking 14 and the latter 8. A referendum to endorse the proposed new constitution was held in November 1992. To be adopted, the text required an approval by 60% of the voters. As it contained sections relating to social issues that were opposed by the powerful Roman Catholic Church, the popular verdict, however, was below the threshold.348 Only 54% voted in favor. A new draft, endorsed by both René and Mancham, was submitted to the electorate in a second referendum in June 1993. This time, the text was approved by 74%. With democratic support, Seychelles entered into a Third Republic under a constitution providing for a popularly elected executive president, a nominated cabinet and a National Assembly where two thirds of the members were elected directly and one third allocated seats on the basis of proportional representation. The constitution also contained a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, covering a set 345 In the 1992 constitutional elections, the National Alliance Party (nap) won 1.6% of the vote, Seychelles Movement for Democracy (smd) 0.8%, Seychelles National Party (snp) 0.6%, Seychelles Liberal Party (slp) 0.5% and Seychelles Christian Democratic Party (scdp) 0.1%. 346 Mancham op. cit., p. 197. 347 Voter participation in Seychelles is very high. In the 2006 presidential elections, the turnout was 89%. 348 There were other divisive issues, such as the electoral formula for a new National Assembly.

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of civil, political and socio-economic rights, including those to education, health and shelter. One month later – in July 1993 – the first democratic presidential and legislative elections were organized. Yet again, a majority of the voters supported the incumbent, President France Albert René, and the ruling sppf party, which in separate polls, respectively obtained close to 60 and 57%. In second place, Mancham and dp received around a third of the votes. In a reversal of the preindependence situation, René became president and Mancham leader of the opposition. The 1977 coup d’état and the authoritarian one-party regime notwithstanding, largely due to its successful social policies sppf not only survived the transition to a multi-party system, but obtained an absolute majority. In the new National Assembly, sppf held 27 seats against dp’s 5. Without postponements or incidents of violence, democratic, multiparty elections have since 1993 regularly been held in Seychelles. With no less than 67% of the votes, President René was re-elected in 1998 and again in 2001, when he obtained 54%. After twenty-seven years in power and three successful democratic elections, in April 2004 René handed over the reins of government to his long-running sppf companion, Vice-President James Michel.349 Michel, in turn, was confirmed as president in elections held in 2006 and 2011, on both occasions with over 50% of the popular vote. By the late 1990s, Mancham had in the meantime lost his position as leader of the opposition to Ramkalawan, who as candidate for the Seychelles National Party (snp) – based on the former Parti Seselwa – challenged René in the 2001 presidential elections, obtaining 45% of the votes.350 Standing against Michel, in 2006 Ramkalawan increased his share to 46%. In 2011, however, it fell to 41%. Voting in the elections to the National Assembly showed an almost identical outcome. In 1998, sppf received close to 62% of the votes, against 26% for the United Opposition (uo) and only 12% for dp. In 2002 and 2007, the ruling party got 54 and 56%, respectively, while the snp-dp opposition obtained shares of 46 and 44%. Due to the weight of the directly elected ‘first-past-the-post’ seats, sppf held a comfortable two thirds parliamentary majority. 349 René kept his position as chairperson of sppf. Michel had been appointed vice-president in 1996. 350 As candidate for the United Opposition, Ramkalawan had challenged René already in the 1998 presidential elections, obtaining 19.5% of the votes. Taking the country’s economic difficulties into account, the high percentage received by President René in 1993, 1998 and 2001 is remarkable. Similarly, the significant share of the overwhelmingly Catholic electorate going to the Anglican priest Ramkalawan in 2001, 2006 and 2011 is noteworthy.

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In 2011, the situation changed dramatically. Arguing that the presidential elections held in May were “seriously flawed” and describing them as “a sham” and an “affront to the democratic process,” Ramkalawan and two other candidates, Ralph Volcère of the New Democratic Party (ndp) and the independent Philippe Boullé, rejected the outcome.351 Subsequently withdrawing from the National Assembly, in August they called for a boycott of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The unexpected move provoked a split in snp and the launch of a new political formation – the Popular Democratic Movement (pdm) – by the former snp deputy secretary general David Pierre, who decided to contest the legislative elections. Organized in September-October 2011, the polls thus became a two-party race between the ruling Parti Lepep (People’s Party) and pdm.352 With a voter turnout of 74%, the result was a massive victory for Lepep, which obtained 89% of the votes and won all 25 directly elected seats. Accounting for 11% of the electorate, pdm was allocated 1 proportional seat. In the process, Pierre became leader of the one-member opposition and Ramkalawan and his party devoid of any parliamentary representation. With unfettered executive and legislative powers, as well as significant influence over the judiciary, until the next parliamentary elections – scheduled for 2016 – President Michel’s party is in total control of formal political proceedings in Seychelles. How this will affect snp’s traditional constituency and, in general, the opposition remains to be seen.353 Under the Third Republic, Seychelles has been politically divided between a socialist and a liberal bloc. Whereas the ruling party has had a solid following among the workers and the less advantaged in society, the opposition has mainly been supported by the middle class, criticizing the government for abuse of power, nepotism and poor economic management. Freedom of the press and independence of the 351 ‘Joint Statement by Presidential Candidates Wavel Ramkalawan, Philippe Boullé and Ralph Volcère on Campaign Violations and Illegitimacy of results’ in Alex Foulkes: Fear and Loathing in Paradise: An Exposé of Corruption, Nepotism and Greenwashing in the Seychelles, Alex Foulkes of Edinburgh, [Seychelles], 2012, pp. 69 and 70. Ramkalawan, Boullé and Volcère accused the ruling party of vote buying, the government of abusing state resources and the Electoral Commission of inability to stop abuses and violations. In the elections, Boullé got 1.7 and Volcère 1.5% of the votes. The proceedings were declared free and fair by four international observer groups, representing the Commonwealth, the Indian Ocean Commission, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie and the Southern African Development Community. 352 In June 2009, sppf changed its name to Parti Lepep (‘People’s Party’). 353 Ramkalawan was re-elected leader of snp in November 2011. Although of its own making, the party subsequently campaigned under the banner ‘One-party National Assembly is not democracy’.

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public service and the judiciary, as well as electoral reform, have been core opposition issues. Increasingly too, the issue of foreign ownership of land has become contentious. Although the Seychelles’ government traditionally has followed a policy of attracting affluent investors by offering them Seychellois citizenship and the possibility to buy prime properties, primarily on the uninhabited Outer Islands,354 by 2010 the sales of coastal land on Mahé and the other populated granitic islands to wealthy citizens from the Gulf countries caused resentment.355 The conspicuous properties of Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed, president of the United Arab Emirates and emir of Abu Dhabi, were in particular singled out by the opposition.356 At the time, over 6% of Seychelles’ territory had been sold to foreigners, including for the purposes of tourist resorts and hotel development.357 Acknowledging that there was a problem, in February 2013 President Michel announced a tightening of the legislation, stating in the National Assembly that “[f]oreigners will no longer be allowed to buy properties freehold,” but also adding that “they may be permitted a long-term nonrenewable lease of 70 years.”358 Although the transition to a democratic system coincided with a steadily deepening economic crisis, Seychelles did not experience outbreaks of social unrest or violence. Nevertheless, the relations between the two political blocs have often been antagonistic and their respective discourse confrontational. Boycotts of parliament or assembly debates have repeatedly been used by the opposition as a political means. In 2006, for example, snp withdrew its 354 In 1998, for example, Liliane Bettencourt, heiress of the French cosmetics manufacturer Oréal, bought the coralline islet of D’Arros in the Amirantes group. Following tax investigations in France, in 2010 the islet was sold to the Swiss-based marine conservation group Save Our Seas. 355 In 2011, an extreme, ultra-nationalist political formation, Mouvman Seselwa Rasin (msr/ Movement of True Seychellois), was due to its xenophobic positions barred from registering as a political party by the Supreme Court of Seychelles (‘Seychelles: Week-end politique mouvementé à un mois de la présidentielle’ in lexpress.mu, 15 April 2011). 356 Close to President Michel, in 2005 Sheik Khalifa notably acquired the land of the former us satellite tracking station on favorable conditions, using it for the construction of large luxury villas overlooking Victoria. The emir of Abu Dhabi also owns other properties on Mahé. Members of the Qatari and Saudi royal families too have acquired coastal land on the islands of Mahé and Praslin. 357 James A. Michel: ‘State of the Nation Address’, Government of Seychelles, Victoria, 25 February 2011, p. 8. 358 James A. Michel: ‘State of the Nation Address’, Government of Seychelles, Victoria, 19 February 2013, p. 10.

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members from the National Assembly in reaction to police brutality against a protest demonstration which left the party leader Ramkalawan and several of his followers injured.359 As snp no longer was in a position to state its views in the National Assembly or boycott its sessions, there were in late 2011 concerns that extraparliamentary action would become more frequent. However, under President Michel’s inclusive policies for a ‘New Seychelles’ (‘En Nouvo Sesel’), the political situation remained stable. Influential opposition members who had joined the government were given prominent cabinet posts, among them Joel Morgan, minister of home affairs and transport, as well as head of Seychelles’ high-level committee on piracy, and Alain St. Ange, minister of tourism and culture and president of the Vanilla Islands Organization. Adding to the stability was the spectacular return as a high-profile roving ambassador of the former political foe, ex-president James Mancham.360 Above all, the successful implementation of the government’s imf-monitored stabilization and liberalization program addressed most of the opposition’s core economic issues, taking the edge off its criticism. The firm and active counter-piracy stand from 2009 also strengthened President Michel’s position.

Debt, Tourism and Tuna

Together with Mauritius, Seychelles is often mentioned as an African economic success story. Although the per capita income is considerably higher and the social development indicators compare favorably with those of its Indian Ocean neighbor, the significantly smaller economy of Seychelles has 359 In October 2006, a special police unit broke up a demonstration by snp in Victoria, held in protest against the closure of the weekly newspaper Regar and the government’s de facto media monopoly. The editor of Regar was detained and its publisher among those injured. An independent commission subsequently concluded that the police had used excessive force and that the special unit should be dissolved and integrated into the defense force. In February 2008, the sppf government acknowledged liability for the injuries sustained by the demonstrators. 360 Mancham’s comeback in support of the Michel government is remarkable, not least in foreign affairs. In his earlier political life highly critical of Africa in general and of the oau in particular, in May 2013 he participated in the 50th anniversary celebrations of the African Union in Addis Ababa, positively commenting that “in unity Africa will move forward to a long awaited renaissance” (‘Africa’s time has come’ in nation.se, 29 May 2013). He also played a prominent part when the au chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in June 2013 paid an official visit to Seychelles.

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not, however, reached the degree of diversification that characterizes Mauritius. Nor has it experienced a similar consistent, sustained growth pattern. In the case of Seychelles, macro-economic development has had its ups and downs. During the first ten years of the Third Republic, it was going down. Largely due to heavy investments in education and health, as well as the government’s generous social welfare programs, towards the end of the oneparty period the Seychelles’ economy showed signs of unsustainable debt. Coupled with bureaucratic inefficiency, the culture of over-spending continued during the Third Republic. As a result, between 1993 and 2002 the national debt boomed from 90 to 200% of gdp. On a per capita basis, the economy was one of the most indebted in the world. By the early 2000s, “it had become clear that Seychelles was teetering on the edge of financial meltdown.”361 The response by the René government was a homegrown structural adjustment program, launched in mid-2003 and subsequently extended to include the privatization of parastatals – including the powerful and stifling smb -; the easing of foreign exchange controls; the reduction of trade tax; and a range of other liberalizing reforms.362 The initial effect was positive. The debt stabilized and the economy registered a surplus. In 2007, increased output by the main economic sectors resulted in an overall gdp growth of no less than 10.1%.363 In 2008, however, the dramatic rise in international oil and food prices – Seychelles’ two major import items – not only arrested the positive trend, but turned it into negative growth. In October 2008, eventually, the country defaulted on a foreign debt of 230 million us Dollars and was forced into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. Under the subsequent debt restructuring loan agreement, “the country was transformed overnight.”364 Accepting the tough conditions set by the imf, the sppf government embarked on an orthodox, liberal economic path, abandoning exchange controls altogether; floating the Seychelles Rupee; withdrawing state subsidies; retrenching public sector workers; and speeding up the sale of state assets. The result was “a remarkable turnaround of the country’s macro-economic performance.”365 361 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 41. 362 In addition, for financial reasons Seychelles suspended its membership of a number of regional and international organizations, among them sadc. 363 National Bureau of Statistics: Seychelles in Figures: 2012, Victoria, December 2012, p. 25. 364 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 98. The imf agreement covered a stand-by arrangement of 26 million and an extended fund facility of 31 million us Dollars. 365 African Development Bank (AfDB): ‘Seychelles: Country Strategy Paper 2011–2015’, Tunis, March 2011, p. 1.

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Despite the negative impact of piracy on the tourism and fisheries’ sectors – Seychelles’ two major foreign exchange earners – the economy managed to weather the global recession which also started in 2008. By the end of 2010, the debt restructuring was close to completion.366 In the same year, gdp registered a positive growth of 5.6%. In 2011, it was 5.0%.367 Commenting on the turnaround, the World Bank’s chief economist for Africa, Shantayanan Devarajan, concluded that “Seychelles represents an almost textbook case of having undertaken difficult, but correct, reforms, which worked and showed results.”368 With a population of only 91,000, Seychelles has a minute domestic market. Extremely import-dependent, the costs of production are high and the scope for manufacturing limited. The Seychelles’ economy, therefore, rests almost exclusively on international tourism and fisheries, in particular the canning and export of tuna. Tourism is the key sector and the leading foreign exchange earner. The industry employs around one quarter of the labor force and its contribution to gdp is also about 25%. Only two economies in the world – those of Macau, an administrative region of China, and Maldives – are more reliant on tourism.369 With its unique granitic islands, pristine atolls, crystalline waters and a stable, tropical climate outside the cyclonic belt, Seychelles is a prime up-market destination, focusing on top luxury hotel brands and high-yielding tourists. In 2013, the World Economic Forum ranked the country number one in the Indian Ocean region.370 The number of international tourists surpassed 100,000 in 1990. By 2010, it had increased to 175,000 and in 2011 the number reached 195,000.371 For the third consecutive year, the record was beaten in 2012, when 208,000 visitors came to the islands,372 contributing more than 300 million us Dollars in foreign earnings.373

366 In separate agreements with ten countries, bilateral debt was in 2010 either written off or rescheduled. The target set by the Seychelles government is to bring the foreign debt down to 50% of gdp by 2018. In 2012, it represented 80% (Pierre Laporte: ‘Budget speech’, Ministry of Finance, Trade and Investment, Victoria, 4 December 2012, p. 7). Finance minister Laporte has professional imf experience from working at the fund. 367 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Figures’ op. cit., p. 25. 368 ‘New book to record our economic reforms’ in nation.sc, 21 March 2013. 369 The World Bank Group: ‘Seychelles Tourism Sector Review: Sustaining Growth in a Successful Tourism Destination’, Washington, July 2013, p. 2. 370 ‘Seychelles outperforms Mauritius to be top in the region’ in nation.sc, 9 March 2013. 371 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Figures’ op. cit., p. 30. 372 ‘Seychelles welcomed record 208,034 visitors in 2012’ in nation.sc, 6 January 2013. 373 Laporte op. cit., p. 12.

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Over 70% of the tourists are traditionally from Europe, with France (including Reunion; around 20%), Italy (15%) and Germany (12%) as the leading markets. With improving flight connections, the number of visitors from formerly secondary markets such as South Africa, Russia, China and the United Arab Emirates is, however, steadily increasing. Together with the other Indian Ocean ‘Vanilla Islands’, Seychelles is actively targeting the Chinese market. As the second country in the region, in May 2013 it followed the example of Mauritius and entered into a visa waiver agreement with China.374 Fishing is the second most important sector, with tuna as the main catch and product. It is estimated that 25% of the tuna landed in the Indian Ocean by European fishing fleets is caught within the Seychelles’ eez and that as much as 80% is off-loaded or trans-shipped in Victoria.375 To Seychelles, the importance of the catches in the ‘blue economy’ – or in the ‘blue gold’, as it is also called – is twofold. Under agreements with the eu, Japan, South Korea and other countries, the government receives considerable revenues, while the foreign fishing fleets at the same time supply the iot cannery in Victoria with tuna for processing, canning and export. The agreement with the eu for the three-year period 2011–14 included an annual contribution to the Seychelles’ economy of 5.6 million Euros.376 Domestic canning of tuna is significant, both for the economy and for the society in general. The Indian Ocean Tuna cannery in Victoria is one of the largest in the world. With around 2,500 workers, it is by far the single most important employer in the country. The annual production of canned tuna is around 30,000 tons and the dominance of the product in the country’s exports is supreme. With sales of 240 million us Dollars in 2011, canned tuna represented no less than 91.8% of the total value of Seychelles’ exports. Fish meal was second, accounting for 2.8%.377 Leaving the important tourism industry aside, essentially Seychelles thus remains a mono-producer with an economy far from the diversification achieved by Mauritius.378 374 ‘Seychelles signs historic visa waiver agreement with China’ in nation.sc, 7 May 2013. With almost 200,000 visitors, in 2010 China became the largest source market in Maldives. 375 ‘Seychelles: Accord de pêche avec l’Union Européenne’ in malango-actualité.fr, 9 April 2011 and Anna Reitman: ‘Fishing: Ocean Harvest’ in The Guardian, Special report, 2 February 2012. 376 Ibid. In May 2013, Seychelles and the eu signed a new fishing protocol, valid for the sixyear period 2014–19.The agreement makes provision for annual tuna catches of around 50,000 tons by 40 European purse seiners. The financial contribution to Seychelles amounts to 30.7 million Euros (‘Union Européenne-Seychelles’ in nation.sc, 13 May 2013). 377 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Figures’ op. cit., pp. 20 and 26. Most of the canned tuna is exported to France, Britain and other eu countries. 378 The number of tourists is approaching the limit of what is considered ecologically sustainable. In the 1990s, the Seychelles government planned for a ceiling of international tourists

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Since independence, the Mancham, René and Michel governments have all taken various steps to develop an offshore, international financial services’ industry. For many years, the industry was, however, dormant and the permissive legislation abused for tax evasion, money laundering and other unintended purposes.379 In contrast with Mauritius, Seychelles does not have a strong ifs sector.380 Offshore initiatives with regard to petroleum have been more fruitful and the exploration for oil in the nation’s extensive exclusive economic zone appears promising. Established in the 1980s, the government-owned parastal Seychelles Petroleum Company (seypec) manages the trading in oil. In addition to supplying the domestic market, it operates the largest oil depot in the region. Located in the port of Victoria, it has a capacity of close to 200,000 cubic meters and is an important, strategic re-fuelling point for international shipping in the Indian Ocean. In 2011, the value of re-exports of petroleum products amounted to 210 million us Dollars, corresponding to 80% of domestic exports and representing as much as 45% of Seychelles’ total foreign sales.381 seypec also has a shipping branch. It owns a fleet of six oil tankers, of which five are chartered to international companies around the world and one offers offshore bunkering services in the Indian Ocean. There are, finally, high expectations in Seychelles that the country will produce its own oil. Seismic surveys in the western and southern parts of the Seychelles’ eez by several international oil companies have been encouraging.382 According to the Australian company whl Energy, which together with the uk-based Afren has been allocated acreage for exploration, there is within its licensed area the potential to produce 3.5 billion barrels of oil, surpassing the production capacity of most fields in the world.383 To promote and supervise the exploration, in 2012 the government set up the state-owned company 379

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at around 200,000 per year. Similarly, the amount of tuna caught is reaching a critical level, with signs of overfishing. After tightening the legislation, Seychelles was in September 2012 confirmed by the oecd as compliant with international standards on financial control and transparency (Laporte op. cit., p. 10). A major reason for the slow development of the ifs sector has been the problem of communications with the outside world. In May 2012, however, Seychelles (Mahé) was linked to the global it network through a submarine fibre-optic cable to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Figures’ op. cit., p. 26. Amoco, Texaco, Enterprise Oil and Fugro-Geoteam are among the international companies that have carried out seismic surveys in Seychelles’ eez. Ray Spencer: ‘Energy: The Case for Public Interest’ in The Guardian, Special report, 2 February 2012.

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PetroSeychelles. With assistance from the Commonwealth, imf and the World Bank, the first licensing round opened in June 2013 and it is expected that whl Energy and Afren will drill their first wells in 2014. One block has been set aside for a joint operation by PetroSeychelles and jogmec of Japan.384 In addition to oil and gas, the cooperation with Japan includes seabed mineral deposits. Only time will tell if Seychelles will become an oil producer and, if so, what consequences it will have on the economy, the society and the ecology. The government, meanwhile, has invested much effort in the review of the legal, fiscal and commercial terms for offshore petroleum exploration and production. To shield the economy from potential shocks and set aside possible revenues for future generations, it has, notably, consulted closely with Norway and drafted legislation modeled on the Norwegian sovereign oil fund.

Human Development

With or without oil, as a result of significant investments in education, health and, in general, social welfare, when it comes to human development Seychelles stands out, not only in the Indian Ocean, but in Africa and in the developing world at large. In 2010, the small, distant island nation at the Equator became the first African country to commit to the un Millennium Goals Plus, allowing it to set new ambitious targets. According to President Michel, beyond “a solid economy” and “order, peace and security” the government’s priorities continue to be “work for all, decent housing, education, health and development of the youth.”385 In 2010, Seychelles had a per capita income of no less than 11,249 us Dollars, placing the country as number two in Africa after oil-rich Equatorial Guinea.386 Although gdp per capita was 50% higher than in Mauritius, in terms of income distribution, however, Seychelles was less egalitarian than its Indian Ocean neighbor. Although absolute poverty has been eradicated, a small number of

384 In June 2013, President Michel, who also holds the portfolio for hydrocarbons in the Seychelles government, signed a preliminary agreement with Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (jogmec). 385 President James A. Michel: ‘State of the Nation Address’, Government of Seychelles, Victoria, 19 February 2013, pp. 2–3. 386 The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/gdp per Capita/Current usd’, Washington, 2012. gdp per capita of Seychelles was 15 times higher than that of Comoros and 26 times that of Madagascar.

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affluent residents make a significant impact on Seychelles’ macro-economic population data, translating into a high Gini coefficient of 0.66.387 This notwithstanding, with regard to human development Seychelles leaves all other African countries behind. Despite the debt crisis of 2008, the composite hdi figure for Seychelles consistently grew from 0.774 in 2000 to 0.799 in 2010. In 2012, the figure was 0.806, placing Seychelles as the only au member state in the undp category of countries with ‘very high human development’. It was the first African country ever to enter this select group. Ranked 46th in the world, the creole nation was placed between Argentina and Croatia, way ahead of the other independent African Indian Ocean countries of Mauritius (80th), Madagascar (151st) and Comoros (169th).388 In terms of governance, the 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranked Seychelles fourth in Africa, after Mauritius, Cape Verde and Botswana. As regards human development, Seychelles, however, was the clear leader, with Mauritius in second place.389 In addition to high scores for education and health,390 the welfare of the Seychellois is reflected in household statistics. In 2010, 69% of the households owned their place of residence; 97% had electricity and flush toilets; and 93% treated water. Ninety-five percent of the households had a television set and 90% a mobile phone.391 Seychelles also boasts a low unemployment rate. As a consequence of public sector retrenchments under the imf-monitored stabilization program, the rate increased from 1% in 2008 to 4.5% in 2009.392 Most of the workers laid off subsequently found jobs in the private sector, and by 2012 the unemployment 387 undp: ‘hdr 2013’ op. cit., p. 152. It is estimated that the upper 10% of the Seychelles population account for more than 60% of the national income. In 2008, the Gini coefficient for Mauritius was 0.38. 388 Ibid., p. 148. With Seychelles as the only African country in the category of ‘very high human development’, in 2012 there were merely two au member states in the subsequent category of ‘high human development’, namely Libya with an hdi figure of 0.769 and Mauritius with 0.737. Botswana was 119th overall in the global undp ranking, with a figure of 0.634; South Africa 121st with 0.629; and Equatorial Guinea – the African country with the highest gdp per capita – 136th with an index of 0.554. 389 Mo Ibrahim Foundation: ‘iiag 2012’ op. cit., pp. 3, 9 and 31. 390 In 2011, the infant mortality rate was 9.8 and life expectancy at birth 72.6 years (National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Figures’ op. cit., p. 10). 391 Ibid., p. 17. In 2011, 51% of the households were female headed and the average household had 3.7 members. 392 Republic of Seychelles: Decent Work Country Programme 2011–2015, Ministry of Education, Employment and Human Resources, Victoria, [no date], p. 2.

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rate had been pushed back to below 3%.393 In 2011, the private sector accounted for over 70% of the total workforce of nearly 50,000 people.394 The constitution of Seychelles promotes non-discrimination and guarantees equal rights and protection for men and women. The country has also signed and ratified the principal international conventions related to gender discrimination. As a result, Seychelles has achieved what the African Development Bank describes as “remarkable outcomes.”395 There is complete gender parity in primary and secondary education, although girls still have lower representation in scientific fields. Seychellois women’s participation at the local and the national decision-making levels is further significant and among the highest in the world. In 2006, women held 56% of district administrator posts and 41% of all government principal secretaries – the highest position in the civil service – were women.396 In 2010, 45% of private sector chief executive and middle management positions were occupied by women, while female representation in parliament was 44%.397 In other respects, ‘New Seychelles’ is lagging behind. Although the Michel government has made great efforts to revamp and modernize the business environment – and it climbed 29 places from the previous year – in the 2012 ranking on the ease of doing business the World Bank only placed the country in 74th place, far behind Mauritius in 19th position.398 With regard to freedom of the press, the legacy of the one-party state is, finally, still present. The government maintains a virtual monopoly on both broadcast and print media and has repeatedly used severe libel laws against opposition newspapers, notably the snp-aligned weekly Regar. On its worldwide press freedom index for 2011/12, the international organization Reporters Without Borders placed

393 ‘Employment up by 24% says minister’ in nation.sc, 17 May 2013. As in Mauritius, there are many expatriate workers in Seychelles, notably in the construction industry, the iot cannery and the big hotels. In 2009, the number of foreign workers was almost 11,000, roughly corresponding to as much as 25% of total employment (Republic of Seychelles: ‘Decent Work’ op. cit., p. 6). Most of the migrant laborers are from India, with smaller numbers from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, China and other countries. There are marked inequalities between them and the national workers. 394 National Bureau of Statistics: ‘Figures’ op. cit., p. 14. 395 AfDB: ‘Seychelles’ op. cit., p. 8. 396 Campling, Confiance and Purvis op. cit., p. 90. 397 AfDB: ‘Seychelles’ op. cit., p. 9 and undp: ‘hdr 2013’ op. cit., p. 156. 398 ibrd/The World Bank: ‘Doing Business 2013’ op. cit., p. 3. Seychelles was number 7 in Africa and only one spot behind Italy. In 2012, Seychelles was ranked 51st on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Mauritius was number 43.

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Seychelles as low as number 73 out of 179 countries, behind both Comoros (45) and Mauritius (54), but before Madagascar (84).399 Counter-Piracy With bases in war-torn Somalia, in mid-2008 armed pirates intensified their attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden. As the attacks became rampant and piracy a serious threat to international shipping, trade and security, the un Security Council adopted a series of resolutions which called on member states to suppress the activities. The response was a rare show of unity by the United States, Russia, India, China and other countries, who dispatched naval forces to the area. As part of the international effort, in December 2008 the European Union Naval Force (eu navfor) launched ‘Operation Atalanta’, its first naval operation ever. Initially, the anti-piracy campaign appeared successful in and around the Gulf of Aden. From early 2009, however, Somali pirates extended the area of attacks southwards in the Indian Ocean, in the case of Seychelles threatening seaborne transportation and the very foundations of the economy, tourism and fishing, as well as the conditions for oil exploration. The threat emerged at a sensitive moment in time, just after the government’s agreement with the imf and as the world’s financial markets dipped into turmoil. Over the following years, the struggle against piracy was to have a huge impact on the archipelagic country, according it a pivotal international role, extending its foreign relations and broadening its military network. More than any other nation in the region, Seychelles has been both directly and indirectly exposed to Somali piracy. And more than any other, it has firmly and forcefully responded to the threat. Pirate attacks and hijackings of private and commercially operated vessels broke to the fore in Seychelles’ waters in March-April 2009. In late March, a Seychellois tourist yacht was captured in the vicinity of the Aldabra atoll in the remote south-western corner of the country’s eez and one month later a failed attack on an Italian cruise liner with over 1,000 passengers on board was carried out 300 kilometers north of Mahé.400 As a consequence, the number of tourist 399 Reporters Without Borders: Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2011/12, Paris, 2012, pp. 1–5. In 2010, the National Assembly approved the Seychelles Media Commission Act, making provision for an independent media arbitration body. However, questions have been raised about its neutrality. 400 The Indian Ocean Explorer had ended a seasonal diving charter when it was captured close to Aldabra. The motor yacht and its Seychellois crew were taken to Somalia. The crew members were kept hostage under extreme conditions for three months (See Francis

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charters and international cruises decreased dramatically.401 At the same time, the attacks on trawlers and tuna seiners put the fishing industry at risk. As stated by the un Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc), Seychelles found itself “in the middle of the piracy battlefield.”402 Against this background, the government authorized international fishing vessels to carry arms for their protection and amended the country’s penal code to allow for the prosecution of suspected pirates – including those captured by foreign naval forces – under universal jurisdiction. In September 2009, the eu and Seychelles signed an agreement allowing naval forces operating under eu navfor to hand over detained pirates to the Victoria government for trial and imprisonment. With the assistance of unodc and the eu, Seychelles set up a specialized regional court and built a piracy incarceration unit at the Montagne Posée prison on Mahé.403 A first trial of eleven Somali pirates, captured by the French navy, opened in Victoria in mid2010. By that time, the Seychelles Coast Guard (scg) had also entered into action.404 As early as March 2010, it successfully carried out its first attack and rescue operation, freeing six Seychellois fishermen and twenty-one Iranian sailors held on a pirated vessel. Nine Somali pirates were detained.405 The Roucou: 88 Days in the Hands of Somali Pirates: The True Story of the Capture of the Indian Ocean Explorer, Calusa Bay Publications, Victoria, 2011). The Italian msc cruise ship Melody successfully used guns and fire hoses to fight off an attack in the open sea. 401 In 2010, only 20 international cruise ships made calls in Seychelles, down from 39 the previous year (The World Bank Group: ‘Seychelles Tourism Sector Review’ op. cit., p. 8). 402 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc): Counter Piracy Programme, Regional Office for Eastern Africa, Nairobi, December 2012, p. 3. 403 A first regional court for the prosecution of captured pirates was with unodc assistance set up in Kenya. In 2010, however, the Kenyan high court ruled that the country could only deal with offences carried out within the national territory. In turn, this judgement was in October 2012 overruled by Kenya’s court of appeal. A regional piracy court has also been established in Mauritius. 404 scg is the most important branch of the Seychelles People’s Defense Forces (spdf), which in addition comprise the Seychelles Air Force (saf) and land-based units such as an infantry battalion, military police and a Special Forces Unit (sfu). Although small in numbers, the spdf branches and personnel have as a result of a range of bilateral military cooperation agreements and multi-national exercises received first-class training. 405 Successful attack and rescue operations were subsequently carried out by scg in November 2010 and in April 2011. On the first occasion, seven Seychellois were freed and eleven Somalis arrested. In April 2011, four nationals were rescued and seven pirates captured. One of the Seychellois coast guards was a young woman (‘President shares joy over return of captured seven’ in nation.sc, 23 November 2010; ‘Coast guard rescues four Seychellois from pirates’ in nation.sc, 21 April 2011; ‘Rescued hostages say happy to be still in Seychelles’ in nation.sc, 25 April 2011; and ‘First woman in rescue mission victory for Seychelles’ in nation.sc, 25 April 2011).

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opening of the Victoria court and the scg operation signaled Seychelles’ resolve and ability to tackle the threat, placing the country at the forefront of international anti-piracy initiatives. Two years later, unodc affirmed that “[n]o state has done more to combat piracy than Seychelles.”406 The initiatives were carried out in close cooperation with the international community and made possible through significant technical, financial and material assistance. As the Seychelles’ government in late 2010 estimated the accumulated economic loss due to piracy to 4% of gdp,407 the European Union transferred 3 million Euros in budget support.408 Much bigger amounts were in the form of military assistance donated by the United Arab Emirates, India and China. In July 2010, Sheik Khalifa of the uae announced a gift of five high-speed patrol boats and a modern surveillance radar system, as well as the construction of a new naval base for the coast guard. Valued at 15 million us Dollars, the donation was extended at a critical moment. Doubling the capacity of the scg, the patrol boats were delivered in January 2011.409 Ten months later, the new, state-of-the-art coast guard base opened on the reclaimed Perseverance island north of Victoria.410 While Britain also supplied a patrol boat and surveillance equipment worth one million Dollars, in January 2011 the Indian government – which already had donated two vessels to the coast guard – agreed to significantly strengthen the Seychelles’ air force through the donation of a Dornier maritime surveillance aircraft, two helicopters and training under a package valued at 20 million us Dollars.411 In March 2011, finally, China announced the contribution of two Y12 planes to a value of 11 million us Dollars. Delivered three months later, the planes were mainly used by the parastatal Islands Development Company for inter-island communications and surveillance.412 406 unodc op. cit., p. 3. 407 ‘3rd eu-Africa summit in Libya’ in nation.sc, 3 December 2010. 408 ‘Euro 3m eu grant backs Seychelles’ role in fighting piracy’ in nation.sc, 17 December 2010. 409 ‘uae hands over patrol boats to fight piracy’ in nation.sc, 5 January 2011. 410 ‘Futuristic coast guard base inaugurated’ in nation.sc, 12 November 2011. 411 ‘India to ready local crew for armed plane’ in nation.sc, 7 January 2011, and ‘Les Seychelles aidées dans leur lutte contre la piraterie’ in malango-actualité.fr, 12 January 2011. While the Dornier was being assembled and the Seychellois crew underwent training, India put a similar plane at the disposal of Seychelles. The new saf Dornier was delivered in April 2013 (‘New military aircraft to boost maritime patrol’ in nation.sc, 29 April 2013). 412 ‘China gives Seychelles two planes worth [usd] 11m’ in nation.sc, 17 June 2011. The Islands Development Company (idc) is a commercial parastatal, responsible for the sustainable development of Seychelles’ Outer Islands, which are leased by the government to the idc for a period of 99 years.

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As one foreign navy after the other paid high-level visits to Victoria and the Seychelles’ government renewed or signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements with world powers such as the United States, Britain, France, China and India, as well as with the uae, Sri Lanka and other countries, it was also active on the international diplomatic stage. On the one hand, Seychelles embarked on groundbreaking, direct talks with the Transitional Federal Government (tfg) of Somalia and the non-recognized authorities of Puntland and Somaliland to find a solution to the problem of having an increasing number of imprisoned pirates under its care.413 On the other, it took a prominent part in a series of meetings and conferences to co-ordinate the international efforts against armed sea robbery. Facilitated by unodc, in February 2011 Seychelles hosted a first round of talks in Victoria on prisoner transfer arrangements with Somalia’s tfg and representatives of Puntland and Somaliland. The talks were promising, concluding with the signing of letters of intent, which at a meeting in Dubai, uae, in April were followed up through memoranda of understanding between Seychelles, Puntland and Somaliland. A separate agreement was negotiated with the tfg of Somalia. Under the agreements, unodc committed itself to the construction of proper prison facilities in the three parts of Somalia, which in turn would make it possible for Seychelles to transfer convicted Somali pirates to their homelands.414 The difficult diplomatic process entered a final stage in March 2012, when seventeen pirates were transferred from the Montagne Posée prison to a new facility in Hargeisa, Somaliland, where they were to complete their sentences of between 10 and 24 years.415 After the transfer, there were still close to a hundred Somali prisoners in Seychelles, representing around 20% of the country’s total prison population and a burden on its detention capacity. As captured pirates continued to be handed over to Seychelles for trial, in March 2013 a second round of transfers was carried out, this time to Bosaso, Puntland and involving another seventeen pirates.416 At the same time, Seychelles continued to be engaged with the international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (cgpcs) – representing 413 Situated on the tip of the Horn of Africa, Puntland declared its independence from Somalia in 1998. Somaliland, its western neighbor, had done so already in 1991. Although de facto states, the territories are not de jure recognized by the United Nations or the African Union. 414 ‘Seychelles finalises agreements on transfer of pirates to Puntland and Somaliland’ in nation.sc, 21 April 2011. 415 ‘17 pirates transferred to Somaliland’ in nation.sc, 30 March 2012. 416 ‘17 convicted pirates flown to Puntland’ in nation.sc, 6 March 2013.

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around sixty countries and organizations – and consistently raised the challenge of sea robbery, hijackings and the taking of hostages in international forums such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Indian Ocean Commission. In recognition of its pivotal role as an Indian Ocean counter-piracy hub, in February 2012 the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, signed an agreement with President Michel to establish a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Co-ordination Center (rappicc) in Victoria.417 Funded by Britain and initially led by a British director, it was officially opened in February 2013 with a mandate to gather evidence for prosecution of pirates, including intelligence on financial flows and arms’ supplies.418 With assistance from eu navfor, in parallel the renewed and reinforced Seychelles Coast Guard developed its capacity for evidence handling. A first joint exercise between eu naval forces and the scg to that effect took place in April 2013.419 In the context of counter-piracy and regional security, it should, last but not least, be noted that Seychelles works closely with the United States. In addition to cooperation with the us navy under its multilateral Africa Partnership Station program, in 2009 the us and Seychelles’ governments signed a Status of Forces Agreement.420 Initially clouded in secrecy, the scope of the agreement came to the fore in September 2011, when The Washington Post revealed that the us air force as part of the ‘global war on terror’ had established drone bases in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Seychelles.421 A fleet of unmanned Reaper aircraft – known as ‘hunter-killer drones’ – had been operating from the international airport south of Victoria since September 2009. Whereas us officials subsequently argued that the drones were unarmed and necessary for air surveillance of terrorist organizations in Somalia and Yemen, the Seychelles’ government stressed their counter-piracy role in the 417 ‘Seychelles [and] Britain partner to target financiers of piracy’ in nation.sc, 24 February 2012. 418 ‘New anti-piracy coordination centre opens’ in nation.sc, 26 February 2013. Other countries subsequently joined rappicc, among them Australia in June 2013 (‘Australia gives a boost to fight against piracy’ in nation.sc, 27 June 2013). 419 ‘Seychelles a “shining example” in the fight against piracy’ in nation.sc, 29 April 2013. 420 ‘Article on drones speculative says foreign affairs ministry’ in nation.sc, 22 September 2011. 421 Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller: ‘us Assembling Secret Drone Bases in Africa [and] Arabian Peninsula, Officials Say’ in The Washington Post, 21 September 2011. In 2013, us drones were in addition to the United States itself stationed in nine countries: Turkey, Afghanistan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Seychelles and Philippines (Michael Winiarski: ‘Bakom spakarna i usas drönarkrig’/‘Behind the levers of us drone wars’ in Dagens Nyheter, 15 July 2013).

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Indian Ocean. As international opinion against the deployment of drones gathered strength, in the case of Seychelles the controversial issue became acute when in separate accidents in December 2011 and April 2012 two drones crashed at the Victoria airport.422 Although there were no injuries involved, the mere fact that the crashes took place at Seychelles’ main gateway for arriving and departing international tourists highlighted the seriousness of the events. Shortly after the second crash, the us government announced that it would suspend further drone flights pending an investigation into the accidents.423 As the political situation improved in Somalia and the international antipiracy efforts became more efficient, in 2012 there was a marked decrease in the number of piracy attacks and hijackings. After a year in captivity, in November 2012 the remaining Seychellois hostages in Somalia – the elderly fishermen Rolly Tambara and Marc Songoire – were released.424 Although the positive trend was fragile, by 2013 the government and people of Seychelles could proudly look back on the difficult ‘piracy years’ between 2009 and 2012. Not only had the exposed economy of the small island nation survived, but in the process Seychelles had managed to mobilize significant international support, strengthened its defense capacity and, in general, emerged as an important actor on the regional stage.

On the Security Council?

As a micro-state, Seychelles does not have the human, financial or technical resources to maintain a diplomatic service commensurate with its wide and 422 ‘Seychelles: Un drone américain s’écrase sur l’aéroport de Mahé’ in lexpress.mu, 13 December 2011, and ‘Espionnage: Le Washington Post révèle plusieurs crashs de drone dans l’Océan Indien’ in lexpress.mu, 12 April 2012. 423 ‘us suspends Seychelles drone flights after crashes’ in reuters.com, 10 April 2012. 424 The case of Tambara and Songoire was particularly harrowing. Aged 69 and 63, the Seychellois fishermen were at the end of October 2011 hijacked by Somali pirates close to the island of Denis, some 90 kilometers north of Mahé, and taken to Somalia. The captors demanded ransoms for their release ranging from 2 to 20 million us Dollars. While the elderly hostages were being moved from place to place, the Seychelles’ government negotiated for their release, brought the case to the attention of the authorities of Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland and took it up in international forums. As the armed hijacking had taken place in national waters and was directed against artisanal fishermen in a small, private boat, the drama mobilized the public opinion in Seychelles. Appeals for their unconditional release were inter alia made by the eu commissioner on fisheries, Maria Damanaki, and the us secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. The ordeal of Tambara and Songoire lasted for twelve months. In early November 2012, they were eventually set free.

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varied international relations. In 2004, there were only two Seychelles’ embassies in the world. By 2012, the number had increased to twelve, while eight countries were represented at ambassadorial level in Victoria.425 Seychelles, nevertheless, pursues an active foreign policy in various areas. Due to the dominance of Britain, France and, in general, the eu countries with regard to trade, investment, tourism and fishing, relations with Europe are close. Under President Michel, there has, in addition, been a significant development of the links with India, China and, in particular, the United Arab Emirates. The relations between the governments in Victoria and New Delhi date back to the independence of Seychelles and have traditionally been strong in the military field. The two countries have established rules of engagement in the event that they are confronted by a common enemy and joint military exercises are since 2001 regularly held.426 From 1989, India supports the Seychelles Defense Academy.427 As in the case of Mauritius, the giant neighbor across the ocean also seconds security personnel to the government. The post of maritime security advisor to the spdf is traditionally held by an Indian naval officer.428 Since 2003, the Indian navy regularly patrols the Seychelles’ eez and routinely visits the islands.429 Relations with China were similarly established under the Second Republic. Seychelles and China signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2004.430 After a visit by the Chinese President Hu Jintao in February 2007 – the highest-ranking visitor ever to come to Seychelles – the relations boomed. Several Chinese firms obtained contracts for investment ventures and Chinese aid was inter alia allocated to housing projects and the construction of a new supreme court building.431 In June 2013, the second largest hospital in Seychelles – donated by China and built at Anse Royale on Mahé – was opened.432 Nevertheless, during the presidency of James Michel it is the close interaction with the oil-rich Arab member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council that stands 425 ‘Foreign affairs ministry opens doors to public’ in nation.sc, 14 December 2012. Most countries – among them the United States – cover Seychelles from their embassies in Port Louis, Mauritius, or Nairobi, Kenya. 426 ‘India to ready local crew for armed plane’ in nation.sc, 7 January 2011. 427 ‘India hails Seychelles anti-piracy efforts’ in nation.sc, 16 November 2011. 428 ‘More Indian ships to patrol our waters’ in nation.sc, 16 May 2012. 429 Vines op. cit., pp. 191–92 and 198. 430 ‘Chinese defense minister meets President Michel’ in nation.sc, 3 December 2011. 431 ‘Seychelles signs historic visa waiver agreement with China’ in nation.sc, 7 May 2013. 432 ‘Second largest hospital opens’ in nation.sc, 17 June 2013.

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out, in particular the role played by the uae.433 Emirates airlines, Etihad and Qatar Airways connect Victoria on a daily basis with Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha, largely servicing the European tourism markets. Sheik Khalifa, president of the uae and ruler of Abu Dhabi, maintains close personal connections with Seychelles. In addition to the substantial counter-piracy support extended to the Seychelles coast guard, he is behind multi-million donations in housing, wind power generation and medical clinics.434 In 2011, Seychelles and Abu Dhabi signed a letter of intent on sustainable development, and in June 2013 it was announced that the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council had been given the farreaching commission to develop a strategic plan for Seychelles and a master plan for Victoria.435 The presence of the gcc member Qatar has been less pronounced, but after an official visit to Doha by the Seychelles’ Vice-President Danny Faure in November 2011 Qatari investors – including the powerful Qatar Foundation – expressed interest in joint ventures in tourism, fisheries, oil and other sectors.436 With regard to its Indian Ocean neighbors, Seychelles is in addition to cultural cooperation actively involved in joint tourism initiatives under the ‘Vanilla Islands’ concept. Counter-piracy co-ordination, fishing and other activities related to the ‘blue economy’ are of prime importance. In June 2012, for example, the Indian Ocean Commission set up a specialized unit in Victoria to combat piracy. Under the African Union Border Programme, Seychelles has together with the Indian Ocean au member states also pursued the objective of demarcating maritime boundaries in accordance with the 1982 un Convention on the Law of the Sea. Following similar agreements between Comoros, Mozambique and Tanzania – signed in December 2011 – after several years of detailed preparations Seychelles, Comoros and Tanzania finalized delimitation agreements in February 2012.437 The following month, Seychelles and Mauritius agreed to jointly administer the Mascarene continental shelf, an oceanic area of no less than 400,000 square kilometers extending beyond their respective eezs. A submission to that effect had 433 Established in 1981, the gcc members are Saudi Arabia, Kuweit, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. 434 In April 2011, for example, the Sheik Khalifa Diagnostic Center at the main hospital in Victoria was inaugurated. The donation was valued at 10 million us Dollars (‘Seychelles gets state-of-the-art diagnostic complex’ in nation.sc, 26 April 2011). According to the oecd-dac database, in 2010 disbursements by the uae represented almost one third of total foreign aid to Seychelles. 435 ‘Abu Dhabi helps with designing strategic plan for Seychelles’ in nation.sc, 11 June 2013. 436 ‘Potential investors here to follow up on vp’s Qatar visit’ in nation.sc, 22 November 2012. 437 ‘Frontières maritimes: Accord signé entre l’Union des Comores, les Seychelles et la Tanzanie’ in lexpress.mu, 19 February 2012.

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been approved by the un Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in March 2011. Under unclos, the bilateral agreement between Seychelles and Mauritius notably covers possible oil and gas deposits.438 In the regional context, it should further be noted that the relations with France and the French overseas department of Reunion are strong. Already in 2001, the governments in Victoria and Paris demarcated the maritime boundary between Seychelles and the Glorioso Islands, held by France.439 The spdf and the French fazsoi forces – with headquarters in Reunion – carry out joint annual military exercises. In 2006, Seychelles and Reunion signed a comprehensive frame agreement, covering exchanges and cooperation in various fields,440 and in December 2010, November 2012 and June 2013 President Michel paid official visits to the French Indian Ocean island. As part of the René government’s economic austerity program, in 2003 Seychelles suspended its membership of the Southern African Development Community. It rejoined the organization in August 2008. While embarking on the imf-led debt restructuring, soon thereafter it had to focus its main international attention on the threat of piracy. Within sadc, Seychelles, nevertheless, managed to take an active part in the organization’s diplomatic efforts to solve the political crisis in Zimbabwe and, above all, to bring an end to the unfolding disaster in Madagascar following the coup d’état of March 2009. Holding the presidency of the Indian Ocean Commission, in late July 2012 President Michel hosted the first face-to-face meeting between the two Malagasy contenders, Andry Rajoelina and Marc Ravalomanana, on the isolated Outer Island of Desroches, some 230 kilometers from Mahé. The mediation effort was chaired by the South African President Jacob Zuma in his capacity as chairperson of the sadc Troika on Politics, Defense and Security. As the talks did not move the process forward, a second meeting was arranged on Mahé two weeks later. However, also this encounter failed to establish a common ground. Seychelles has always been close to Africa. Before independence, the future ruling party – the Seychelles People’s United Party – was recognized by the oau as a national liberation movement. In power, spup established a special relationship with Tanzania, not least in the military field, whereas many Seychellois who went into exile after the 1977 coup settled in Kenya. In its 438 A commission for the joint administration of the Mascarene continental shelf was set up by Seychelles and Mauritius in August 2012 (‘Maurice et les Seychelles réunis ce lundi pour la cogestion du plateau continental’ in lexpress.mu, 20 August 2012). 439 In the process, Seychelles controversially recognized French sovereignty over the two small islands, which are claimed by Madagascar and the Union of Comoros. 440 The agreement was extended in February 2012 (‘Seychelles: Signature d’un accord-cadre avec la Réunion’ in lexpress.mu, 21 February 2012).

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interaction with the African Union, the ‘New Seychelles’ under President Michel has, in particular, stressed the potential of the Indian Ocean and the ‘blue economy’ for Africa’s development. In his address to the 50th anniversary summit of the au in Addis Ababa in May 2013, Michel argued that: We cannot speak of transforming African ownership of the economy unless we are prepared to seriously look at our oceans. As an oceanic state, it is apparent to Seychelles that we have much to do to claim ownership of our ocean. The opportunities inherent in our seas belong to us and we must create frameworks to develop this potential. We must make our ocean safe. And we must be able to manage our oceans. To do this, we must be prepared to give more attention to the blue economy.441 Noting that the au summit “for the first time recognized the specificities of the small island developing states and the important role they play,” in an interview during the jubilee celebrations Michel positively added that “[i]n the past most African countries only looked at development on the mainland, but they now understand that the ocean with its natural resources can contribute greatly to the development of the African continent.”442 Albeit a micro-state with a minute population of just over 90,000 people, due to its geo-strategic location at the cross-roads of the world’s most important shipping lanes, but, first and foremost, to its ability to constructively take advantage of the position and weave a net of economic and military agreements with leading global powers, Seychelles – more commonly known as a distant tourist paradise – has earned itself a recognized role on the international political arena. Whereas Mauritius stands out for its economic achievements, Seychelles transcends on the diplomatic front. Against this background, it is neither surprising nor farfetched that President Michel in August 2012 announced Seychelles’ bid for a non-permanent seat on the un Security Council for the term 2017–18. If elected, the Victoria government will in particular pursue the three issues of maritime security as a condition for the development of a ‘blue economy’; peace and stability in the Indian Ocean; and decisive action against climate change.443 441 Quoted in ‘President Michel addresses au’s 50th anniversary summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ in nation.sc, 27 May 2013. 442 ‘au’s 50th anniversary summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Interview with President James Michel’ in nation.sc, 28 May 2013. Two weeks after the summit, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, chairperson of the au Commission, paid an official visit to Seychelles. 443 ‘Seychelles’ bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations’ security council’ in nation.sc, 29 November 2012.

chapter 5

Mayotte and Chagos: Colonialism Continued

Beyond the Headlines

Mayotte and Chagos, finally, are Indian Ocean territories which in contravention of the 1960 un Decolonization Declaration at the time of national independence were dismembered from Comoros by France and from Mauritius by the United Kingdom. Claimed by the Union of Comoros, Mayotte is a French overseas department. From January 2014, it is also an Outermost Region of the European Union. As the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Chagos archipelago is claimed by Mauritius, but administered from London. The largest island, Diego Garcia, is leased by the uk to the United States. It houses one of the biggest naval bases in the world. More than half a century after the adoption of the Decolonization Declaration, in the African part of the Indian Ocean there remain disputed islands under foreign rule, where colonial policies are still being pursued. Beyond the global headlines and little known to the public in the metropolitan home countries, Mayotte and Chagos have for decades been the scenes of human tragedies. Despite breaches of international law and abuse of human rights, there are, however, few signs that the voices of Comoros and Mauritius in the near future will prevail against France, the uk and the us, veto-wielding permanent members of the un Security Council. In this context, the diplomatic backing of the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and other international bodies has carried little weight. Since the indigenous population has been evicted from Chagos; the us base on Diego Garcia is a formidable deterrent; and Mauritius has no military forces, a conflict scenario is in the case of biot virtually non-existent. This is in contrast to the densely populated and endemically unstable Comorian archipelago, where the annexation of Mayotte by France and the opposition by the Union of Comoros in combination with significant economic and social factors constitute threats to a fragile peace. A conflict scenario has the potential of involving other states and interests in and around the Mozambique Channel and further afield.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004292499_006

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United Nations and Decolonization

As a background to the disputes regarding Mayotte and Chagos, it is relevant to briefly re-visit the un position on decolonization and the responsibility established for colonial powers under international law1: The right to national self-determination by all peoples was in 1941 included among the eight guiding principles for a post-war global order in the Atlantic Charter jointly issued by the us President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The un Charter – adopted in June 1945 – echoed this tenet by stating in its preamble and opening chapter, respectively, that the new world body was based on the belief in “equal rights […] of nations large and small,” as well as on “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Whereas the Trusteeship Council steered a number of African territories towards nationhood and independence, the role of the un for the elimination of colonialism was mainly indirect. In the case of Africa, it was supporting the anti-colonialist quest pursued by the Africans themselves. In turn, this policy was based on the un Charter and its Article 73, stating that [the] [m]embers of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost […] [their] well-being, and, to this end, […] develop self-government, […] take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and […] assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions. In the annals of African decolonization, the year 1960 – symbolically declared ‘Africa Year’ by the un – stands out. Following the independence of Sudan (1956) and Ghana (1957), during the year no less than seventeen former Belgian, British, French, German and Italian dependencies in Africa graduated to national sovereignty and un membership. In addition, on 14 December 1960 the un General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Popularly known as the

1 On the un Trusteeship Council, decolonization and national liberation in Africa, see Tor Sellström: ‘The Trusteeship Council’ in Adekeye Adebajo (ed): From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Scottsville, 2009, pp. 107–37.

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Decolonization Declaration, unga Resolution 1514 – adopted by 89 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions2 – established that [t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation; [a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development; [i]nadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence; [and] [i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories, or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. Of critical importance was that the un General Assembly rejected any initiative by the administering powers to break up or dismember a dependent territory prior to its independence. In this respect, the Decolonization Declaration emphasized that [a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the cases of Mayotte and Chagos, the root cause of the disputes lies in the breach of this dictum on pre-independence territorial integrity. While the story of the latter is one of British-American duplicity and secrecy, with regard to its Comorian department France has from the outset openly spurned all criticism of the unilateral decision to break it away from independent Comoros. Different French governments have for nearly four decades brushed aside a host of General Assembly resolutions on this matter, also vetoing any 2 Those abstaining were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, neither France, nor the uk or the us, voted against the resolution.

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binding decision in the Security Council. Visiting Mayotte on a short stopover in January 2010, President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that “I will never accept the questioning of our overseas territories as part of the French republic. […] I will not give anybody [or] any foreign power the right to decide who should be French and who should not. Mayotte is France […] and Mayotte will stay French.”3 Mayotte

Island of Perfumes

With the islands of Grande Comore, Mohéli and Anjouan – which together constitute the independent Union of Comoros – Mayotte forms part of the Comorian archipelago, situated in the northern end of the Mozambique Channel. Of volcanic origins like its sister islands, Mayotte is the oldest and easternmost of the four. The distance to the African mainland is some 500 kilometers, to Grande Comore 190 and to Madagascar 300. As the crow flies, 1,400 kilometers separate Mayotte from Reunion on the other side of the Great Island. Its closest neighbor is the Comorian island of Anjouan, located approximately 70 kilometers north-west of Mayotte. In addition to a number of islets, Mayotte consists of a main island, Grande Terre (or Maore in Shimaore), and a much smaller island, Petite Terre (or Pamandzi). Out of a total area of 374 square kilometers, Grande Terre represents 363 and Petite Terre merely 11 km2. Historically, it was the rock and the natural harbor at Dzaoudzi on Petite Terre – a ‘Gibraltar’ in the Mozambique Channel – that attracted the French. Today, the international airport is situated on Petite Terre, which inter alia also hosts the base of the French Foreign Legion. Located some three kilometers east of the main island, Dzaoudzi is linked to the administrative center of Mamoudzou on Grande Terre through a ferry service. In 2012, 57,300 people – 27% of the officially registered Mahorian population – lived in Mamoudzou. Of great natural beauty, Mayotte is known as ‘The Island of Perfumes’ (due to the cultivation of ylang-ylang and vanilla), as ‘The Island of the Lagoon’ (due to the reef and the coastal waters) and as ‘The Sea-Horse’ (due to its geographical shape). One of the longest coral reefs in the world surrounds Mayotte. The sheltered lagoon between the island and the reef – home to an abundant marine life – offers great potential for tourism. With few hotels and no direct 3 Présidence de la République: ‘Discours de M. le Président de la République’, Mamoudzou, Mayotte, 18 January 2010.

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Map 10  Mayotte

flights between Mayotte and Europe, the tourism industry, however, is in its infancy. In 2008, the total number of non-French tourists was a mere 3,600.4

A Diverse Population

Situated at the crossroads of several civilizations; coveted by Arab and European seafarers; and until the mid-1800s home to a slave-based economy,5 4 insee: Tableau Économique de Mayotte, Mamoudzou, 2010, p. 7. In the same year, the number of French nationals visiting Mayotte was 34,000, with 17,000 from metropolitan France and an equal number from Reunion. 5 Officially, the trade in slaves was abolished in Mayotte in 1841–42 and slavery five years later. The prohibition was largely a result of a major uprising in 1847. At the time, almost half of the population was made up of African slaves. The plantation slaves procured by the Europeans were principally from northern Mozambique. Slavery was abolished much earlier in Mayotte than in the other Comorian islands, where the institution only was prohibited in Anjouan in 1891, Mohéli in 1902 and Grande Comore in 1904 (Conseil Général de Mayotte op. cit., p. 2).

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Mayotte has a mixed and diverse population, reaching 212,600 in 2012.6 Due to a huge number of undocumented migrants – estimated at between 50 and 60,000 people7; mainly from Comoros – the actual population could be considerably bigger. Since 1985, the official number has more than trebled. Together with its French Indian Ocean sister department of Reunion, Mayotte is experiencing a serious demographic challenge. This explains why draconian – but ineffective – immigration laws were introduced in 1995. In fact, with 568 inhabitants per square kilometer, Mayotte was in 2012 the most densely populated department in France outside the Parisian region of Île de France.8 The population of Mayotte is young. In 2007, 54% of the Mahorians were below the age of 20. The corresponding figure for Reunion was 35%.9 Notable is further the high proportion of foreign nationals, representing more than 40% of the population. The overwhelming number was of Comorian nationality, with a small minority from Madagascar.10 Finally, the population from metropolitan France has been estimated at between 10 and 20,000, or 5 to 10% of the total. The métropolitains are primarily active in the civil service, the health sector, the tourism industry and commerce, or as professionals, teachers, police and military. The diversity of the Mahorian population is reflected in the number of languages and dialects spoken. Although French is the only official language, used in administration and education, a report by the French Senate estimated in 2012 that 60% of the inhabitants do not master it and that no less than 73% of school-age Mahorians have difficulty in reading French. Against this background, it is not surprising that half of the pupils leave school without any qualification.11 These figures alone place Mayotte in a unique position among France’s 101 departments. Arabic is taught in the Koranic schools, but in everyday life it is the indigenous languages Shimaore, Kibushi and Kiantalautsi that dominate. Shimaore, related to Kiswahili and influenced by Arabic and Makua from northern Mozambique, is the most widespread. It is a Mahorian variety of Shikomore, the language of the Comoros,12 whereas Kibushi and Kiantalautsi are Malagasy dialects.13 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

insee: Mayotte Infos, No. 61, Mamoudzou, November 2012, p. 1. Jean-Pierre Sueur, Christian Cointat and Félix Desplan: ‘Rapport d’Information (Mayotte)’, Report No. 675, French Senate, Paris, 18 July 2012, p. 75. In the Indian Ocean region, only Mauritius has a higher population density than Mayotte. insee: Tableau Économique, op.cit., pp. 30–31. Ibid., pp. 34–35. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (Report 675) op. cit., p. 72. The Shindzwani dialect of Shikomore is spoken on Anjouan. As the number of immigrants from Anjouan is growing, so is the use of Shindzwani. The Malagasy dialect Kisakalava is also spoken on Mayotte.

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The Role of Islam

Contrasting with the Mahorians’ ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity is the uniformity of their religious beliefs. As in the Union of Comoros, the Muslim faith is all dominant, followed by some 95% of the inhabitants. Mayotte is the only French department where Islam is the religion of the majority. Introduced by the Arabs, the Mahorian Sunni Islam of the Shafi’i school is largely influenced by African and Malagasy belief systems, such as spiritualism. Traditional Mahorian society is further matrilineal and uxorilocal, according the women an exceptional role when compared to the rest of the Muslim world. The women of Mayotte do not cover their faces, own the family house, manage their own accounts and play a prominent part in local politics. Islam permeates the life on the island. Traditionally, polygamy, child marriages and Koranic education are central tenets of the society. So is the authority of the kadhis, local Muslim judges acting as notaries, magistrates and mediators. In the transition towards becoming an integral part of secular France, the Mahorian society has to adapt to far-reaching changes. The longer term repercussions of this cultural revolution remain to be seen. In the meantime, it could be noted that polygamy was prohibited by the French government in 200314 and under-age marriages in 2010. Arguably of deeper consequence is that the traditional kadhic system was abolished in 2010, when the Muslim judges lost their judicial powers. Imposed secular legislation and historic religious tradition are, however, different realities. The 2012 French Senate report concluded that in Mayotte “individual right[s] attached to the Muslim religion [are] considered intangible and constituent of the identity.”15 Many Mahorians who have formally opted for the secular, republican system, the report noted, continue to live as before, notably entering into polygamous unions, registering them with a local Muslim judge and having recourse to kadhic authorities to solve domestic disputes.

A Dependent Economy

Mayotte has no exploitable mineral resources and the primary sector is minute. The production of traditional items such as ylang-ylang and vanilla has dwindled and come to a near standstill. In 2011, the combined export value of 14 15

The prohibition entered into effect on 1 January 2005. Polygamous unions contracted before 2003 were not affected. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (Report 675) op.cit., p. 28.

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these products was merely 71,000 Euros. With a value of 210,000 Euros, cultured fish was the most significant export.16 In the same year, Mayotte imported goods for a total of 384 million Euros, with food items alone representing no less than 92 million, or more than 300 times the value of domestic exports.17 The massive – and increasing – deficit was only partially covered through re-exports, customs duties and indirect taxes. As a consequence, the Mahorian economy stands or falls by French public transfer payments. In 2011, it was reported that France since the mid-1980s on average had contributed a massive 680 million Euros in annual subsidies.18 The paradoxical result is that Mayotte – with extremely limited foreign sales and without an export-oriented service sector – has a relatively big gross domestic product. For 2009, gdp per capita was estimated at 6,575 Euros. Albeit only one third of the corresponding amount for Reunion, it was twelve times higher than that of the Union of Comoros.19 It could be argued, however, that without the budgetary support from France the economy would be on a par with that of Comoros, despite the latter’s tumultuous post-independence history. As in the case of Reunion and the other French overseas possessions, the public transfers from France have “led to a cruel paradox, by which each of these territories gets poorer and poorer the more prosperous its inhabitants become.”20 A large part of the transfers goes to various social security schemes, such as health subsidies, child allowances and pensions in favor of the Mahorians who are French nationals. Introduced in parallel with the process of departmentalization, as earlier in Reunion the aim is to gradually reach the welfare levels of metropolitan France. In the case of guaranteed minimum wages, in 2010 the rate was 85% of that in France. As a result, between 1995 and 2005 the proportion of the Mahorian population below the poverty line decreased from 31 to 28%.21 At the same time, there are glaring disparities in living standards between the Mahorians in the formal sector, the population active in 16 As part of France, the Euro is the official currency in Mayotte. 17 Institut d’Émission des Départements d’Outre-Mer (iedom): Rapport Annuel 2011: Mayotte, Paris, 2012, pp. 52 and 55. 18 Benoit Hopquin and Laurent Canavate: ‘Modernity on the March’ in The Guardian Weekly, 22 April 2011. 19 iedom op. cit., p. 13. gdp estimates for Mayotte were for the first time produced in 2005 and the latest available figures refer to 2009. According to the French statistical agency insee, basic data on the Mahorian economy is still inadequate. In 2010, France’s gdp per capita was 29,730 Euros. 20 Fréderic Constant quoted by Helen M. Hintjens in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 65. 21 insee: Tableau Économique, op. cit., pp. 56–57. The poverty line is here defined as 60% of the median income.

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subsistence farming and the undocumented migrants, who are excluded from social security benefits. Each of the three categories roughly represents one third of the inhabitants. Within the modern sector there are big disparities, primarily between métropolitains and Mahorians and between those with and without jobs. In 2012, as an example, salaries paid to teachers from metropolitan France could be seven times higher than those received by their indigenous colleagues, a situation described in the French Senate report of the same year as “a potential source of social explosion.”22 The official unemployment rate was 26.4% in 2007.23 In reality, it may have been twice as high.24

La Vie Chère

As in the other French overseas departments and territories, high prices of imported commodities constitute a major challenge. In Mayotte, where practically everything is imported – including basic agricultural items such as lettuce and tomatoes25 – la vie chère (‘the costly life’) is a particularly acute problem. Due to a combination of high transport costs, customs duties and, above all, monopolistic pricing,26 the French official statistics agency insee estimated that prices of food products in the overseas territories in 2010 on average exceeded those in metropolitan France by between 20 and 40%.27 In Mayotte and the other doms, consumers with considerably weaker purchasing power than the metropolitan French often have to pay twice as much for the very same brand product made in France of, for example, yoghurt, cheese or chocolate powder. Characterized as “a flagrant injustice” by the French overseas minister Victorin Lurel,28 the high costs of living have led to social unrest in most of the overseas departments, starting with general strikes in Guadeloupe and Martinique in February 2009. In Mayotte’s case, the protests against la vie chère 22 23 24

Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (Report 675) op. cit., p. 74. insee: Tableau Économique, op. cit., pp. 50–51. In 2009, the number of formally employed (35,600) was lower than that of the unemployed and job-seeking (36,900) (iedom op. cit., p. 40). 25 ‘Fruits et légumes: Mayotte continue à importer de métropole…’ in malango-actualité.fr, 4 March 2011. 26 Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (Report 675) op.cit., pp. 59–64. 27 ‘Projet de Loi sur la Régulation Économique Outre-mer: Discours du Ministre des Outremer, M. Victorin Lurel’, French Senate, Paris, 26 September 2012. 28 Ibid.

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by the local trade unions and consumer associations brought the territory to a standstill in October-November 2011. After a peaceful start, the protests escalated into riots, with running battles between demonstrators and police. Widely supported by the local population, Mahorian youth stopped the ferry service between Dzaoudzi and Mamoudzou, tried to close down the international airport, raised roadblocks and attacked French-owned supermarkets and shops. Private vehicles were set on fire and métropolitains abused. Breaking out half a year after becoming an overseas department, the scale of the riots and the animosity towards French representatives and symbols were a reflection not only of the social complexities of the Mahorian society, but also of the frustrations associated with Mayotte’s recently gained status and the absence of tangible change. The new department’s baptism of fire was contained after six weeks, but subsequent strikes indicated that social conflict in Mayotte was far from over.29 As acknowledged in the French Senate report, “the challenges facing Mayotte have not disappeared with the official birth of the department.”30 The protests had a bearing on the 2012 parliamentary elections. Both members elected to the French National Assembly – Boinali Saïd (Diverse Left) and Ibrahim Aboubacar (Socialist Party) – played prominent roles in the campaign against la vie chère.31 In the presidential elections, however, the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy, received 51% of the Mahorian vote against 49% for the socialist candidate François Hollande.

A Strategic Vantage Point

Mayotte is an important link in the French military network in the Indian Ocean, which rests on bases in Djibouti, Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates), Reunion and Mayotte. Together, they cover the major international shipping 29

30 31

Demanding the same conditions as their colleagues in metropolitan France, in September 2012 the social security employees went on strike. By December 2012, the conflict had resulted in a crisis for the medical services, with a number of patients evacuated to Reunion and to France. After strikes by the teachers, in May 2013 the trade unions declared a general strike in favor of indexation of public sector salaries with those in France. The strike was accompanied with violent action. Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (675) op. cit., p. 13. Mayotte sends two members to the National Assembly and two members to the Senate. As a French department, it is administered by an elected general council, led by a president. The French state is represented by a prefect, appointed by the president of the republic.

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lanes and the vast exclusive economic zones claimed by France in the region. The zones extend over a total area of no less than 2.5 million square kilometers. The rock and the natural harbor at Dzaoudzi on Petite Terre have throughout history accorded great strategic importance to Mayotte. It increased considerably at the height of the Cold War in the early 1970s, when Egypt closed the Suez Canal (1967–75); the uk under the ‘East of Suez’ policy withdrew its military from the Indian Ocean (1968–71); the Soviet Union established an Indian Ocean squadron (1971); and the first international oil crisis broke out (1973). Most importantly, in 1973 the Malagasy government forced the French to leave the naval base at Diego Suarez (Antsiranana) on the northern tip of Madagascar. As noted by Newitt, faced with this loss France “was concerned to make sure that Mayotte […] remained […] in the bank as an asset for future realization.”32 Subsequent developments on the African mainland – notably the presence of the Soviet Union in independent Mozambique – strengthened this resolve. Thus, when Comoros in 1975 unilaterally declared its independence from France, the French held on to Mayotte. At the same time, they expanded the military base in Reunion and extended their control over the Scattered Islands further south in the Mozambique Channel and north and east of Madagascar. In 1976, a detachment of the French Foreign Legion was established on Petite Terre. Mayotte would from then on be used as a springboard for mercenaries and, in general, for the destabilization of independent Comoros. As the British withdrew and the us erected its naval base on Diego Garcia, the United States and France became the dominant maritime powers in the Indian Ocean. In the case of France, the presence is particularly prominent in the south-western part, where Reunion is the hub and Mayotte a key vantage point. Located in the Mozambique Channel – one of the main highways of international trade; primarily of supertankers from the Middle East – and equidistant from the African continent and the island of Madagascar, Mayotte offers unparalleled geo-strategic advantages. With the main base in Reunion, the one on Petite Terre constitute fazsoi, the French armed forces in the southern zone of the Indian Ocean. Since January 2011, they are administered as the Defense Base of Reunion-Mayotte, which is responsible for a total of 2,000 military from the army, navy and air force. There is no air force unit based on Mayotte. Instead, the main military element is the army detachment of the Foreign Legion,33 which is composed of around 260 soldiers. Whereas only a small contingent of some 40 marines is 32 33

Newitt in Hintjens and Newitt (eds) op. cit., p. 82. Détachement de la Légion Etrangère de Mayotte (dlem).

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attached to Mayotte and the naval fleet is limited to two coastal patrol vessels, it is the satellite listening post at the Dziani Dzaha crater on Petite Terre which gives the island its special place in France’s regional security network. Jointly run by the French General Directorate for External Security (dgse)34 and the German Federal Intelligence Service (bnd),35 it is one of the biggest in the world, with a capacity to cover vast areas of Africa and the Indian Ocean.36 It was completed in 1998 and has a staff of around 40 people. France’s efforts to contain illegal immigration to Mayotte are primarily the responsibility of the border police and the gendarmerie, which together have a staff of around 300. To this should be added a mobile squadron of some 100 gendarmes from France. To intercept the immigrants, they have four radar stations and six speedboats at their disposal. In case of a threat to public security – as during the crisis in October-November 2011 – reinforcements are dispatched from Reunion. In 2013, the two French Indian Ocean departments were in the process of tightening the cooperation through a joint rapid intervention force.

Untold Tragedies

By far the most controversial aspect of France’s hold of Mayotte is the ‘Balladur visa’. Introduced unilaterally in January 1995 by Prime Minister Édouard Balladur to curb unwanted immigration, it targets citizens of the Union of Comoros. Great numbers of Comorians leave the poverty-stricken islands for Mayotte in order to visit relatives or in search of greener pastures. This is above all the case with Anjouan, the most disadvantaged of the four islands; of a similar size and a slightly bigger population than those of Mayotte; and with a checkered past of pro-French secessionist movements. As a result of a decade of de facto own rule in the recent past (1997–2008),37 as well as of a lack of regular inter-island transports, many Anjouanais, furthermore, are divided in their loyalties towards Grande Comore and Mayotte.

34 35 36 37

Direction Génerale de la Sécurité Extérieure. Bundesnachrichtendienst. As the us, France has a number of satellite listening posts around the globe. One is in French Guiana, at the Kourou space center. For all practical purposes, Anjouan was beyond the control of the central authorities on Grande Comore from the unilateral declaration of independence in August 1997 until the au-led invasion in March 2008.

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Little known to the outside world, the visa requirement has had far-reaching consequences, provoking thousands of deaths, detentions and expulsions, as well as setting Comorians against each other and deepening the tensions in the conflict-prone archipelago. Day after day, never-ending human tragedies are played out as people risk their lives trying to reach Mayotte in overloaded, rickety kwassa-kwassa38 boats to see family members, place their children in school, visit a health center, sell products on the market or find an odd job.39 The waters between Anjouan and Mayotte have been described as ‘the biggest marine graveyard in the world’ and the Balladur visa as ‘legalized genocide’. The disasters bear a close resemblance to those occurring when African refugees and economic migrants try to reach the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa, Italy, in search of eu shelter and jobs. In the case of Mayotte, they take place in silence, far away from any international media coverage or public debate. Organized by Comorian traffickers, who charge an extraordinary amount of between 300 and 600 Euros for the crossing, the kwassa-kwassas may transport 30 people or more. The 70 kilometer long journey from Anjouan across the ocean may take up to 24 hours. To avoid detection by the radar stations on Mayotte, as a rule the boats approach the island during the night and in bad weather. If not intercepted by the speedboats of the French border police or gendarmerie, as a result many crash into the reef, where the passengers either drown or are picked up for detention. Dead bodies are regularly washed ashore on the beaches of western Mayotte. Those lucky enough to avoid death and detention join Mayotte’s huge illegal population. As people without papers, they constantly have to steer clear of the police and are often abused by unscrupulous Mahorian employers. For obvious reasons, there are no reliable statistics on the number of people who have died while attempting to reach Mayotte. According to estimates by the French Senate, in 2012 the total number amounted to between 7,000 and 10,000 since the Balladur visa was introduced in 1995, a staggering annual 38 39

Named after a popular Congolese dance rhythm, the meaning of kwassa-kwassa is ‘very shaky’. A fictionalized account of the Comorian migration drama is given by Feyçal (Ahmada Mmadi Boléro) in Mayotte, Un Silence Assourdissant (‘Mayotte, A deafening Silence’), Publibook, Paris, 2008. In 2014, Frédéric de Souza published the equally informative novel Mayotte, Des Poissons à Chair Humaine (‘Fish of Human Flesh’), Komedit, Moroni. The title refers to the fact that many Anjouanais and Mahorians refuse certain kinds of fish as they may have been feeding on kwassa-kwassa victims. A former French diplomat, de Souza inter alia served as consul to Anjouan, where he tried to ease the visa restrictions. In 2010, he was recalled from active service.

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average of 400 to 600, or more than one death per day.40 With regard to immigrants detained and sent back to Comoros, mainly by boat to Anjouan, the authorities do, however, publish detailed figures. In 1998, three years after the Balladur visa, they were 6,500 and reached 16,000 in 2008.41 Continuously growing, in 2011 the total number was 24,278, or close to 70 people per day.42 About 25% of the expelled were children. In 2008, the number of kwassakwassas intercepted at sea by the French authorities was 89. By 2011, it had almost trebled to 256, or on average five per week.43 The enormity of these figures becomes clearer when put into perspective. While Mayotte alone accounted for about half of all the expulsions carried out by France – in Europe as well as in the overseas territories – during the 10-year period ending in 2011 a total number equivalent to the entire Mahorian population had been expelled. In financial terms, between 50 and 70 million Euros are each year spent on the ‘struggle against illegal immigration’, or roughly three times more than France’s annual development aid to the Union of Comoros.44 Before being sent back, the detained migrants – men, women and children – are held under sub-human conditions at a transit center at Pamandzi on Petite Terre. Until December 2011, it did not have beds or mattresses. In general, the situation at the center has been described as “dramatic” and the conditions “degrading,”45 particularly for women and children. In 2011, no less than 25,501 detainees passed through the center. Parents picked up by the police on the island often manage to hide their children. The illegal orphans number between 4,000 and 8,000 and are concentrated to Mamoudzou, where almost 90% of the street-children are Comorians whose parents have been detained or expelled.46 To the authorities in Moroni, the Balladur visa is a national affront. The maintenance of the travel requirement is regularly denounced at the un, the au and in other international forums. Whether due to lack of will or capacity, however, few steps have been taken by the Comorian government to put a 40 Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (675) op.cit., p. 76. 41 Caminade op. cit., p. 80. 42 Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (675) op.cit., p. 77. 43 ‘1,039 kwassas interceptés depuis mai 2007’ in malango-actualité.fr, 27 October 2013. In 2012, the number of intercepted boats from Anjouan was 238. As the French border control became more efficient, the profit margins of the organizing traffickers decreased, resulting in even ricketier kwassa-kwassas, higher passenger costs and more deaths. 44 Sueur, Cointat and Desplan (675) op. cit., pp. 77 and 91. 45 Ibid., pp. 83 and 81. 46 Ibid., p. 87.

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stop to the trafficking of humans from secluded beaches on Anjouan. Moreover, the union government has been remarkably passive with regard to the huge numbers of Comorians that on a daily basis are ferried back by the French to the port of Mutsamudu, the capital of Anjouan. In mid-March 2011 – two weeks before Mayotte officially was to obtain the status of a French department – the Comorian government of President Sambi suddenly refused re-entry to people expelled from Mayotte without Comorian identity documents. The French government immediately retaliated by stopping the processing of visa applications by Comorians to metropolitan France, including for purposes of official travel. The deadlock lasted for two weeks, until an agreement was reached between the acting Comorian foreign minister and the French ambassador to the union. The agreement was a serious rebuff of the Comorian position. Not only did the union government revoke its decision on national id cards, but it also had to concede the power to verify the nationality of those expelled to the French authorities. The Moroni government further undertook to carry out every effort needed to stop the migration by kwassa-kwassas. In the meantime, the Balladur visa remained in force and, thus, the policy of the revolving door of death. Four days later, two ferry-boats reached Mutsamudu with a total of 394 Comorians expelled from Mayotte. For the migrants, it was back to normal in the marine graveyard.47

Historical Perspectives

During his visit in 2010, President Sarkozy stated: “My compatriots in Mayotte, you are French since 1841. That is for a longer time than Nice or Savoy. We should not and cannot forget that.”48 Although this often repeated statement does not tally with historical facts,49 Mayotte, nevertheless, is the Comorian 47

48 49

In August 2012 – one month after Mayotte became an eu Outermost Region – Alain Christnacht, special envoy on immigration to the newly elected French president, affirmed the validity of the Balladur visa. The position was confirmed by overseas minister Lurel in December 2012 (mayottehebdo.com, 18 December 2012). Présidence de la République op. cit. Nice and Savoy were annexed by France in 1860. Like all Comorians, the inhabitants of Mayotte became French citizens in 1946. In Mahorian history, the year 1841 and a supposed voluntary union with France have taken almost mythical proportions. Maestri comments: “[T]o transform a sale of a medieval kind into a conscious adherence […] is to create a myth with the principal objective to idealize Mayotte, to set it apart and to separate it from the rest of the Comorian archipelago” (Maestri op. cit., pp. 113–14).

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island with the longest and closest bonds to France, a relationship which in the early 1960s gave rise to a pro-French separatist movement. With weak links to the feudal elite in Grande Comore and seeing Reunion as a model, the FrancoMahorian political class started to claim a special association with Paris. The Napoleonic Wars ended the rivalry between Britain and France for naval control of the strategic Indian Ocean route to India and the Far East when the British took over Cape Town in 1806 and Mauritius (including Seychelles) in 1810. As there was no natural harbor in Reunion, they let the French remain. Aware that France was eying Madagascar, at the same time the British declared that the Great Island should stay free from foreign occupation. The French, however, did not give up their regional ambitions. With Reunion as a base, they first focused the attention on the Comorian archipelago and eventually – after the 1895 war of conquest – they could add Madagascar to their African colonial empire. Together with Reunion, Mayotte played an important part in the quest for French expansion in the Indian Ocean. When the French took control of the Comorian archipelago, the islands had experienced a period of devastating Sakalava raids and were characterized by deep inter- and intra-insular rivalries and turmoil. Mayotte was ruled by Andriantsoli, a Sakalava from north-western Madagascar who had withdrawn to the island following his defeat by the Imerina king Radama I in 1824. Seeking European support, in 1837 he offered Mayotte to Britain. However, the British governor of Mauritius declined the offer. Only three years later did Andriantsoli approach the French, who were quick to make a deal. Although a non-Mahorian, in 1841 Andriantsoli sold Mayotte to France in exchange for protection. With Mayotte secured, the French subsequently turned to Anjouan, Mohéli and Grande Comore, which became protectorates in 1886. On the islands, French companies took over large tracts of land for the cultivation of sugar and other cash crops. More than the others, Mayotte would “as a caricature illustrate the colonial system, where the metropolis molds the colony for its usage and not in its image.”50 As summarized by Bertile, “the [French] domination [was] exercised in all areas, politically, economically, socially and culturally. Through the integration of Mayotte into the monetary economy, the plantation system shook up […] the demographic and social structures.”51 Until the French conquest of Madagascar, Mayotte experienced a short, but privileged period. This changed in 1912, when the Comorian protectorates as dependencies were attached to Madagascar. In the shadow of the Great Island 50

Wilfrid Bertile: Mayotte à l’Heure de la Départementalisation, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012, p. 40. 51 Ibid.

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and with the status of a Malagasy province, the Comorian archipelago would over the following decades lose its former attraction to the French. At the same time, it became increasingly obvious that the demographic, cultural and religious differences between the Comorian islands and Madagascar set them apart. In 1946, therefore, the archipelago was organized as a separate French overseas territory, with a certain degree of self-rule and Dzaoudzi as the administrative center. In the process, the Comorians became French subjects. Through Dzaoudzi’s status as the capital of Comoros, Mayotte had since 1886 not only enjoyed a privileged relationship with France, but a range of direct and indirect benefits denied the other three islands. In 1958, however, the Comorian territorial assembly – dominated by members from Grande Comore and Anjouan – decided to transfer the capital and the administrative services to Moroni, a move which generally is associated with the birth of Mahorian separatism. Implemented in stages until 1966, the decision provoked strong reactions in Mayotte. In 1959, prominent Franco-Mahorian personalities led by Marcel Henry launched a Union in Defense of Mayotte’s Interests (Union pour la Défense des Interêts de Mayotte/udim), which in 1963 was transformed into a militant Mahorian Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire Mahorais/mpm). When the authorities in Moroni reacted by turning their attention further away from the island, anti-Comorian protests under the slogan Maore farantsa! (‘Mayotte is French!’) intensified. Calls for a close association with France were increasingly made. Energized by Zéïna Mdéré, women were often in the forefront of mpm’s separatist campaigns. Combined with France’s geo-strategic interests in Mayotte, the stage was being set for the events following the referendum in December 1974. Initially, however, it was not a foregone conclusion that the island would be dismembered from Comoros and steered by France towards departmentalization. In contrast with Reunion, Mayotte did not belong to the select group of French ‘Old Colonies’ which had been departmentalized after the Second World War. At the time of the un Decolonization Declaration, ‘emancipation through assimilation’ as advocated by Aimé Césaire in the French Constituent Assembly of 1945–46 was, in addition, no longer an internationally acceptable option. On the contrary, supported by the oau the National Liberation Movement of the Comoros (molinaco) had since 1963 campaigned for independence of the Comorian archipelago as an indivisible entity. The same demand was from 1968 raised by the Socialist Party of Comoros. And in August 1972, the un Decolonization Committee registered the territory on its list for self-determination and national sovereignty.52 52 The un Decolonization Committee – also known as the Committee of 24 – was set up in 1961 to monitor the implementation of the 1960 Decolonization Declaration.

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Above all, in June 1973 the French government and the Comorian authorities formally reached an agreement on independence for the archipelago, as well as on a timetable to reach the objective over a period of five years. Commenting on the Mahorian calls for an autonomous status and attachment to France, in October 1974 the recently elected President Valery Giscard d’Estaing summarized the French government’s position as follows: [The Comorian] population is homogeneous. [T]here is practically no settlement of French origin […]. Is it reasonable to imagine that one part of the archipelago becomes independent and that one island, irrespective of the sympathy one might feel for its inhabitants, maintains a different status? […] The Comoros constitute one unity [and] have always been one unity. [I]t is natural that their destiny is a common destiny […] We should not propose that the unity of what has always been a unique Comorian archipelago is broken.53 Two months later, the government in Paris reneged on this position.

Towards Departmentalization

In accordance with the 1973 agreement, in December 1974 the French government organized a referendum in which the Comorian population could opt for national independence or continued attachment to France. With a participation of 93.3% of the registered voters, an overwhelming majority of 94.6% voted in favor of independence. On the islands of Grande Comore, Mohéli and Anjouan practically all – or 99.9% – opted to break with France.54 On Mayotte, however, only one third (34.5%) supported independence, whereas a majority (64.9%) chose to remain under French administration.55 Faced with the popular verdict, the Paris government decided to interpret the referendum island by island, signaling that Mayotte should remain attached to France. The violation of the 1973 agreement was strongly condemned by the authorities in Moroni, which under Ahmed Abdallah on 6 July 1975 proceeded to unilaterally declare the independence of the State of Comoros (État 53 54 55

Quoted in El-Amine op. cit., pp. 35–36. Also Jean Martin: Histoire de Mayotte: Département Français, Les Indes Savantes, Paris, 2010, p. 134. On the three islands, merely 71 voters were in favor of French attachment. Mattoir op. cit., p. 24 and Caminade op. cit., p. 54. The voters on Mayotte represented less than 8% of the total number.

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Comorien), consisting of the four Comorian islands including Mayotte. Less than a month later – on 3 August 1975 – Abdallah was overthrown in the first of a series of French-engineered coup d’états. French development aid and technical assistance were withdrawn. Whereas Mayotte was to enjoy protection and financial support, from its very birth independent Comoros was exposed to French destabilization. As the French position was in breach of the 1960 General Assembly Decolonization Declaration, it was censured by the un. When the State of Comoros in November 1975 was admitted as a un member, the General Assembly reaffirmed the necessity of respecting the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro [a]rchipelago, composed of the islands of Anjouan, Grande Comore, Mayotte and Mohéli.56 France, however, did not budge, preparing instead a Mahorian referendum to re-confirm Mayotte’s allegiance. In this situation, in February 1976 five nonpermanent members submitted a draft resolution for the consideration of the un Security Council.57 In the vote on the draft text, eleven countries were in favor and three abstained.58 However, as France used its prerogative as a permanent council member to raise a veto, a binding resolution was not adopted. Defiantly, in both February and April 1976 the French government proceeded to arrange new referendums in Mayotte.59 Blocked by France in the Security Council, the matter was in October once again discussed in the un General Assembly. This time the assembly went considerably further than the previous year, condemning “the presence of France in Mayotte”; declaring the referendums “null and void”; characterizing them as “a violation of the sovereignty of the Comorian State and of its territorial integrity”; and stating that “the occupation by France of the Comorian island of Mayotte constitutes a flagrant encroachment.” At the same time, the assembly rejected “[a]ny other form of referendum or consultation which may hereafter be organized on Comorian territory in Mayotte by France,” as well as “[a]ny foreign legislation purporting to legalize any French colonial presence […] in Mayotte.” Instead, the assembly appealed to all un member states “to intervene, individually and 56 57 58 59

unga Resolution 3385 (XXX): ‘Admission of the Comoros to Membership in the United Nations’, 12 November 1975. unsc: Debate on Draft Resolution S/11967 ‘Situation in the Comoros’, 6 February 1976. Ibid. Italy, Britain and the us abstained. Referendums were held in Mayotte on 8 February and 11 April 1976.

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collectively, with the [g]overnment of France to persuade it to abandon once and for all its plan to detach the Comorian island of Mayotte from the Republic of the Comoros.”60 In December 1976, Mayotte was declared a Collectivité Territoriale, a transitory status towards closer integration with France. The process of integration was combined with support for mercenary interventions in Comoros, notably by the Françafrique network and Bob Denard. Over the following two decades, the developments prompted the un General Assembly to adopt some 20 resolutions against the occupation of Mayotte and the destabilization of Comoros. In 1994, for example, the assembly not only requested the French government to “honor the commitments entered into prior to the referendum on the selfdetermination of the Comoro [a]rchipelago of 22 December 1974 concerning respect for the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros,” but underlined that “a speedy solution of the problem is essential for the preservation of the peace and security […] in the region.”61 As before, the resolutions by the world body fell on deaf ears. In January 1995, Paris unilaterally introduced the Balladur visa, driving a seemingly intractable wedge between independent Comoros and French Mayotte. And in 2003 – following yet another Mahorian referendum in July 2000 – the status of the island was upgraded to that of a Collectivité Départementale.62

Integral Part of France

The latest round in the drawn out contest opened on 29 March 2009, when the French government again organized a popular consultation, this time to determine whether the Mahorian population would accept the status of a fullyfledged overseas department of France, similar to that of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion. The Communist Party was a leading political force when the four ‘Old Colonies’ in 1946 were granted dom status. With regard to Mayotte, however, the party was six decades later the only dissenting voice in the French National Assembly. In Mayotte itself, all major political parties and organizations supported the initiative, despite some opposition by Muslim representatives fearing the implications of becoming 60 61 62

unga Resolution A/31/4: ‘Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte’, 21 October 1976. unga Resolution A/RES/49/18: ‘Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte’, 28 November 1994. In the referendum in July 2000, 75.2% of the voters approved the proposal to declare Mayotte a Collectivité Départementale.

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part of secular France. However, for most Mahorians the expected socioeconomic benefits out-weighed religious and cultural considerations. The result of the poll was a vote in favor. In the referendum, there were 71,420 registered voters, out of which 61.4% made use of the vote and 38.6% abstained. Of the valid votes, no less than 95.2% were in favor, with a low ‘No’ vote of 4.8%. With regard to the registered voters, the ‘Yes’ vote won an absolute majority of 57.6%. Although there was a clear expression of support for turning Mayotte into a dom, the proportion of abstentions – approaching 40% – was, nevertheless, massive, in particular as the campaign had received considerable backing from the French government and from President Sarkozy himself. As noted by N’Tro in his study on the referendum and its implications, “the state had not been neutral in the election.”63 Not surprisingly, the African Union denounced the exercise. Meeting in Libya, the au assembly reaffirmed that “the territorial integrity of Africa cannot be legally affected by referendums conducted by foreign powers on an African territory.”64 Many observers and experts on international law also raised questions. Close to the local Mahorian authorities, N’Tro concluded that not only was the question put to the electorate unclear, but “the way [forward] […] totally unknown [to them].”65 Others challenged the facts that the referendum was organized by France, rather than by the un or another impartial body, and that the metropolitan population was not given the opportunity to take a stand for or against Mayotte becoming a French department.66 No validating thresholds were set for the number of voters participating or casting a ‘Yes’. In Mayotte itself, the estimated 50–60,000 illegal immigrants were excluded, whereas the resident métropolitains – including civil servants, police and military personnel – both campaigned and voted. It is in this context of relevance that the presence of non-nationals in other parts of the world has cast shadows over the legitimacy of constitutional referendums.67

63 64 65

66 67

Madi Abdou N’Tro: Mayotte le 101e Département Français: Et Après? L’Harmattan, Paris, 2011, p. 34. au: ‘Special Session of the Assembly of the Union on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa’ (SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/PLAN(I)), Tripoli, 31 August 2009. N’Tro op. cit., p. 33. The question put to the Mahorian voters was: “Do you approve of the transformation of Mayotte into a unique collectivity called ‘Department’ [as] laid down in Article 73 of the [French] Constitution […]?” The decision to hold a referendum was submitted to the French Senate and National Assembly, followed by a debate, but no vote. Neophytos G. Loizides: ‘Referendums in Peace Processes’, Queens University, Belfast/ International Studies Association, New York, 2009, p. 14.

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Following endorsements by the French Senate in October and the National Assembly in November 2010, Mayotte became France’s 101st department on 31 March 2011. At a time when schoolgirls wearing the hijab were being harassed and, in general, Islamophobia increased in metropolitan France, it became the only French department with a majority Muslim population. The last steps towards departmental status were accompanied by vigorous denunciations by the Comorian government, protest marches by Comorians in France and Mayotte, as well as a pronounced deterioration in the already tense relations between the authorities in Paris and Moroni. In Addis Ababa, the au “reaffirm[ed] [its] position on the sovereignty of the Union of the Comoros over the island of Mayotte.”68 And when Comoros, Mozambique and Tanzania in December 2011 signed agreements on the delimitation of their maritime borders in the Mozambique Channel – based on the 1982 un Convention on the Law of the Sea – no consideration was given to France’s territorial claims. Born at the onset of an economic downturn in France,69 the first three years of Mayotte département have been described as “gloomy” and “sombre.”70 Apart from minor construction projects, the Mahorians have not enjoyed the socio-economic dividends expected from the new status. On the contrary, as financial margins started to shrink and corruption took hold of the governing general council, companies laid off workers and unemployment increased. Tourism slowed down; domestic production approached a standstill; la vie chère persisted71; and strikes and social unrest became recurrent. Following the riots of October-November 2011, youth delinquency and violence turned the island into the number one French department not only with regard to lack of employment, but also to crime. By 2013, Mamoudzou had become the fourth most burgled town in France. Illegal immigration, meanwhile, continued unabated, with scores of kwassa-kwassa victims. To harmonize the departmental status with the rest of France, from January 2014 land and property taxes were, in addition, imposed. As summarized by a local journalist on the third anniversary of the departmentalization, Mayotte “remains in its cocoon, […] 68

69 70 71

au: ‘Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’, Assembly/AU/Dec. 338 (XVI), Addis Ababa, 31 January 2011. On the process leading to Mayotte’s departmentalization, see also Christophe Du Payrat: Pourquoi Avoir Fait de Mayotte le 101e Département Français? L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012. ‘3ème anniversaire d’une départementalisation poussive’ in mayotte.orange.fr, 4 April 2014. Intended to arrest rising consumer prices in the French overseas departments, the so called Loi Lurel of November 2012 was characterized in Mayotte as a “perfect fiasco” (ibid.).

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far from the republican heart [which has] other, metropolitan concerns. […] [Being] ‘French in a secondary zone’ has been and still is the general feeling.”72

Mayotte and the European Union

The Mahorian question has not only set Comoros and France apart, but also Africa and Europe, as well as, indirectly, the United Nations and the European Union. In October 2011, President Sarkozy formally requested the eu to admit Mayotte as an Outermost Region, and in July 2012 the European Council unanimously decided that the island should acquire that privileged status. In addition to its European member states, the eu consists of Outermost Regions (ors). Along with other rights and duties associated with eu membership, they are covered by eu law, with possible derogations on account of their particular situation.73 Based on a proposal by Paul Vergès, founder of the Communist Party of Reunion and European mp, the concept of outermost regions was in 1997 included in the eu Treaty of Amsterdam. At the time of the admission of Mayotte, there were eight ors, namely the four French overseas departments of Guadeloupe (Caribbean), Martinique (Caribbean), French Guiana (South America) and Reunion (Indian Ocean); the French overseas collectivity of Saint-Martin (Caribbean); the two Portuguese autonomous regions of Madeira (Atlantic) and the Azores (Atlantic); and the Spanish autonomous community of the Canary Islands (Atlantic). eu policy towards the geographically dispersed islands and the territory of French Guiana is based on a strategy paper issued in 2008 entitled The Outermost Regions: An Asset for Europe. In the paper, the European Commission states that the ors constitute “outposts of the European Union in the world”; that they “represent the vanguard of the eu position vis-à-vis other major economic blocs”; and that they confer a special dimension on the Union’s external activities and participate in the development of a true wider neighborhood policy through 72 73

‘3ème anniversaire d’une départementalisation poussive’ in mayotte.orange.fr, 4 April 2014. There are in addition some 25 eu Overseas Countries and Territories (octs) with an associate status. They are not part of the eu and not subject to eu law. In the Indian Ocean region, the British Indian Ocean Territory (biot) and the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (taaf) belong to this category.

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their geographical, cultural and historical links with other countries and peoples, particularly in Africa and the Americas. The Outermost Regions, the Commission explains, bring a considerable international maritime dimension to the European Union, resulting in enhanced legitimacy for its policy of sustainable codevelopment of the oceans […]. Located on shipping routes or straits, the ors occupy an important position for trade. They also play a role in maritime governance for the monitoring of coastal waters […] or in improving the security for transport […]. Moreover, the ors border on regions faced with developmental challenges, with which the eu cooperates in the areas of combating poverty, sustainable development, managing migratory flows and regional security. The ors can thus act as privileged partners with their neighboring third countries […].74 eu financial resources for the Outermost Regions are primarily made available through the European Regional Development Fund and four specialized facilities.75 For the period 2007–13, a total of 7.9 billion Euros was set aside for the ors. As a decision on Mayotte had to be taken by consensus among the eu members, it was preceded by intense lobbying for and against by France, the Union of Comoros and non-governmental organizations with interests in the Mahorian question. Before the vote, an ngo calling itself ‘The Enraged of Mayotte’76 addressed an open letter to the members of the European parliament warning that the eu should not back “French colonialism” and that the admission of the island as a European or would lead to “a dangerous balkanization of the Comorian archipelago [and to] a geo-political process of regional destabilization.”77 Nevertheless, on 11 July 2012 the European Council controversially agreed to France’s request and upgraded the status of Mayotte from an Overseas Territory 74

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eu/Communication from the Commission: ‘The Outermost Regions: An Asset for Europe’, COM/2008/0642 final, Brussels, 17 October 2008, p. 4. On the eu and Africa, see Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds): The eu and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2012. The European Social Fund (esf), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (eafrd), the European Fisheries Fund (eff) and posei (Programme of Options Specifically Relating to Remoteness and Insularity). Les Indignés de Mayotte. ‘Colonisation: Les Indignés de Mayotte s’opposent à la RUPéanisation de Mayotte’, bellaciao.fr, 2 July 2012.

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to that of an Outermost Region, with effect from 1 January 2014. In Comoros, the decision was seen as a travesty of international law, a misrepresentation of historical facts and, in general, ignorant of the complexities of the Mahorian issue. Announcing its decision, the council stated that the request by the French government reflects the choice by the inhabitants of Mayotte to draw progressively closer to mainland France [as] confirmed by the referendum of 29 March 2009, [and that] the structural, social and economic situation […] of Mayotte presents all the characteristics […] of an outermost region.78 The eu decision was thus in breach of the 1960 Decolonization Declaration, which rejected any initiative to dismember a territory prior to its independence as being against the un Charter. By explicitly referring to the French referendum and extending eu law to Mayotte, it also ran counter to the un General Assembly resolution of 21 October 1976. Through this resolution, the world body had rejected all French electoral consultations on the Comorian island, as well as “[a]ny foreign legislation purporting to legalize any French colonial presence in Mayotte.” That the new French department structurally, socially and economically should conform to eu’s criteria for an Outermost Region appears far-fetched. France’s presence is condemned by Comoros, the un, the au, the Arab League and other international actors; socially the island is facing extraordinary problems, with thousands of kwassa-kwassa victims, tens of thousands of illegal immigrants and protracted social unrest; and economically it only stays afloat through French budgetary support. Politically, the Mahorians’ genuine sense of affinity with France and Europe could also be questioned. In the 2009 dom referendum, almost 40% of the voters abstained. In the first round of the French presidential elections in April 2012 – one year after the island gained departmental status – more than 50% chose not to participate.79 In addition, with regard to eu’s policy on the ors as “privileged partners with their neighboring countries,” the Mahorian situation is, indeed, problematic. Addressing the un General Assembly in September 2012 – ironically just before the European Union was awarded the Nobel peace prize – President Dhoinine of Comoros warned that the French occupation was a threat to peace and stability. It is thus difficult to understand how the European countries who 78 79

European Council: ‘Decision of 11 July 2012 Amending the Status of Mayotte with regard to the European Union’ (2012/419/EU), Brussels, 11 July 2012. ‘Mayotte: La promesse tenue du département’ in Le Monde, 23 April 2012.

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at the un over the years regularly supported the Comorian claim over Mayotte in July 2012 could take an opposite stand under the eu. It is, finally, noteworthy that the eu members in the midst of a European crisis and serious concerns regarding the future of the Euro by consensus agreed to increase their financial commitments. Not surprisingly, in metropolitan France the taxpayers welcomed the fact that transfer payments to Mayotte would be shared with the eu members. The decision was also greeted with relief by overseas minister Lurel, who contrasted the fiscal needs of the new department to the general tightening of French public expenditure. In Mayotte itself, it produced great excitement as the local authorities realized that they from January 2014 could expect eu “financial manna” in the order of 400 million Euros or more.80 Eventually, the total eu allocation for the period 2014–20 was set at 305 million, or on average 43.5 million Euros a year.81

Boundaries and Conflicts

France’s colonization of Mayotte could potentially give rise to conflict in the Mozambique Channel and beyond, involving actors other than the governments in Paris and Moroni. This is also the case with regard to the adjacent Scattered Islands, particularly Juan de Nova. The maritime borders demarcated in 2011 between the Union of Comoros, Mozambique and Tanzania do not recognize any French presence, nor France’s claims to exclusive economic zones in the area. As part of the au Border Programme, the delimitation exercise was carried out in accordance with the un Convention on the Law of the Sea. Within the Mahorian eez, however, fleets from France, eu member states and other countries carry out deep sea fishing. Moreover, in 2011 it was announced that offshore exploration for oil and gas had been initiated around Mayotte. In March 2012, Comoros too 80

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‘Quand les fonds européens s’éloignent’ in malango-actualité.fr, 8 November 2012. For the periods 2000–07 and 2008–13, Mayotte had been allocated eu development aid of a total of around 47 million Euros. However, the absorption capacity was extremely low, or between 6 and 18%. Ironically, an evaluation carried out on behalf of the eu Commission attributed in 2011 the lack of absorption capacity to “turnover among French civil servants posted in Mayotte that prevent a follow-up of ec projects and their related procedures. […] [T]he French civil servants,” the evaluation concluded, “are all on short term contracts […] and do not master eu regulations and procedures” (eu Commission: ‘Regional Level Evaluation: Overseas Countries and Territories (oct)’, Final report, Volume II: Annexes, Brussels, 22 July 2011, p. 49). factcheckeu.org, 10 April 2014.

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awarded its first oil exploration license. In addition to hydrocarbons, it is expected that the ocean floor in the Mozambique Channel holds significant quantities of mineral nodules. In combination, the ingredients may form a volatile mix. The small coral island of Juan de Nova, situated 500 kilometers south of Mayotte and 150 kilometers west of Madagascar, illustrates the stakes – and potential conflicts – involved when maritime boundaries neither are recognized nor delimited beyond doubt and substantial strategic and commercial interests are at play, a situation which due to continued European claims is prevalent in the African part of the Indian Ocean: Until 1960, Juan de Nova was attached to the French colony of Madagascar. Prior to independence, it was, however, broken away by France.82 Since 1973, it is claimed by Madagascar with backing from the un and the oau/au. In a resolution on the Scattered Islands, in December 1979 the un General Assembly “call[ed] upon the [g]overnment of France to repeal the measures which infringe the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Madagascar” and invited France “to initiate negotiations without further delay […] for the reintegration of the […] islands, which were arbitrarily separated from Madagascar.”83 As one of the Scattered Islands, Juan de Nova forms part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (taaf). There is no permanent population on the island, which houses a meteorological station and is garrisoned by troops from Reunion. An airstrip can accommodate Transall military transport planes. Although the land area is merely 5 square kilometers, the island is surrounded by a huge exclusive economic zone of more than 60,000 km2, unilaterally declared by France in 1978.84 Together with the eezs of Mayotte and of the 82

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The decision to maintain the Scattered Islands under French sovereignty was made by decree on 1 April 1960, three months prior to the independence of Madagascar (26 June 1960). Behind the decision was President de Gaulle, who inter alia argued that “the islands and the islets may assume a real importance to us, notably with regard to our nuclear experiments” (Quoted in ‘Le candidat de Rajoelina veut se “battre” pour récupérer les Îles Éparses’ in malango-actualite.fr, 25 October 2013). unga Resolution A/34/91: ‘Question of the Islands of Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa and Bassas da India’, 12 December 1979. The action was censured by the oau. Meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, in July 1978, the oau Council of Ministers declared that “the Glorious Islands, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India and Europa geographically and historically belong to Africa,” demanding “the withdrawal from these islands of all foreign presence” (oau: ‘Resolution on the Glorious, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India and Europa islands,’ CM/Res. 642 (XXXI), Khartoum, 18 July 1978). The total eez area of the Scattered Islands claimed by France is 352,000 km2.

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northern Scattered Islands of Glorioso, as well as the eezs of the southern Bassas da India and Europa, France thus claims the central part of the Mozambique Channel, which on account of international supertankers is often called ‘the western petroleum highway’. The French claims, in fact, cover one third of the entire channel.85 In 1985 – three years after the adoption of the un Convention on the Law of the Sea – Madagascar established an eez boundary 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 kilometers, from its coastline. Only 150 kilometers west of Madagascar, Juan de Nova is well within the Malagasy zone and should have been returned by France. However, what the French government kept in 1960, it was not ready to give up in 1985. Juan de Nova and the immense eez attached to the minute island remained under French control despite the un Decolonization Declaration and unclos.86 With de facto overlapping eezs, de jure “no one is the owner of anything.”87 Nevertheless, in 2008 the French government started to issue offshore oil and gas exploration permits to international companies within blocks around Juan de Nova.88 The exploration area partly includes Malagasy waters.89 In addition to geo-political considerations vis-à-vis continental Africa and Madagascar, a major factor behind France’s uncompromising stand with regard to Mayotte and the Scattered Islands is that they are situated in, or are adjacent to, a belt of oil and gas deposits which has been compared to that of the North Sea. Stretching from the Mozambican gas fields of Pande, Temane and Buzi across the Mozambique Channel to the onshore Malagasy oil sites of Tsimiroro and Bemolanga, the promising belt has attracted several of the world’s major petroleum companies.90 The Juan de Nova eez lies in the middle of this belt, with that of Mayotte slightly to the north. When France in 2008 on questionable legal grounds demarcated concessions and started to issue exploration permits, a “battle for territory” between countries and companies was opened. In the words of 85 86 87 88 89 90

Christian Cointat: ‘Rapport d’Information (Îles Éparses)’, Report No. 299, French Senate, Paris, 17 February 2010, p. 20. In April 2011, the Malagasy government re-submitted the issue of Madagascar’s maritime boundaries to the un. Patrick Rakotomalala: ‘Juan de Nova, du Gaz dans l’Eau entre Madagascar et la France’, [no place], March 2012, p. 5. The first permit holders were Wessex Exploration (uk) and Global Petroleum (us). ‘Le candidat de Rajoelina veut se “battre” pour récupérer les Îles Éparses’ in malangoactualite.fr, 25 October 2013. Among them Anadarko (us), eni (Italy), ExxonMobil (us), Korea Gas (South Korea), Statoil (Norway) and Total (France).

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Rakotomalala, in the Mozambique Channel there is “a race against time […] and it is clear that once the installations for oil or gas production are in place, it will be more difficult to question the sovereignty of France.”91 Through its possession of Reunion, France is a de facto state of the Indian Ocean. Since 1986, it is a full member of the Indian Ocean Commission. Although France’s claims over Mayotte and the Scattered Islands are not recognized de jure by the regional independent states, the development of a common indian-oceanic community, nevertheless, increasingly includes Mayotte. The significant dispute between Comoros and France notwithstanding, no contemporary head of government in the region would today echo the words of the former – and otherwise rather Francophile – president of Seychelles, Albert René, who in 1979 emphasized that [t]he only people that should have the right to be present in the Indian Ocean are those from the region. […] I have said so before and I repeat that in my view [the] French presence is an anachronism that history sooner or later will eliminate.92 Three decades later, the common challenges and the forces towards interaction gravitate in the direction of cooperation rather than exclusion. Among many, two regional initiatives involving both Comoros and Mayotte may be quoted. In order to promote the Indian Ocean as an international tourist destination, in 2010 Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and Comoros together with Reunion launched the concept of ‘Vanilla Islands’. Mayotte was subsequently included.93 And in 2011, Seychelles welcomed a Mahorian athletic team to the 8th Indian Ocean Island Games. It was the first time that Mayotte participated in the regional ‘Olympics’.94 91 92

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Rakotomalala op. cit., p. 11. Quoted in Jean-Louis Guébourg: ‘Évolution Politique Récente des Seychelles: 25 Ans de Socialisme Non-Aligné’ in Jean-Michel Jauze (ed): Espaces, Sociétés et Environnements de l’Océan Indien, Université de la Réunion, Saint-Denis, 2003, pp. 116–17. In May 2013, the Asian Indian Ocean republic of Maldives also joined the Vanilla Islands Organization (‘L’ Association Îles Vanille passe à l’étape suivante’ in lexpress.mu, 28 May 2013). Maldives also takes part in the Indian Ocean Island Games. In 2011, the distribution of the medals largely reflected the level of development of the participating islands. Of a total of 188 gold medals, teams and individual athletes from Reunion won 58, from Seychelles 57 and from Mauritius 38. The remarkable achievement by the small host country, Seychelles, was underscored by the fact that it won most of the team competitions, including the men’s football tournament (‘Tableau des médailles’ in lexpress.mu, 15 August 2011).

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To the International Agenda?

The case of Chagos is discussed below. Although the original inhabitants were evicted, in exile the Chagossians have managed to organize an active and important human rights’ pressure group, which enjoys considerable international political support. This is in contrast to the Mahorian situation, where there despite a relatively big population is no similar advocacy organization and the issue of Mayotte primarily remains a bilateral concern between the Union of Comoros and France. Nevertheless, with increasing involvement by, in particular, the Gulf countries, it is likely that Comoros’ Arab and Muslim allies in the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation more actively than in the past will place the Mahorian issue on the international agenda. Hopefully, they could assist in finding a sustainable solution by 2015, when the next Comorian presidential elections are due. According to the rotating constitutional system of the Union of Comores, the head of state should then be chosen among candidates from Mayotte, a fact which may cause further friction in the FrancoComorian relations, as well as within the union itself.95 As underlined by the former Comorian foreign minister El-Amine, without a political settlement of the question of Mayotte there will be neither stability nor development in the archipelago as a whole.96 In the meantime, the au supports the sovereignty of the Union of Comoros. Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the oau and discussing “the struggle against colonialism and the right to self-determination of people still under colonial rule [in Africa],” in May 2013 the au summit of heads of state and government reiterated “[t]he reaffirmation of our call to end expeditiously the unlawful occupation of […] the Comorian island of Mayotte.”97 There was, however, no indication that France would heed the call. On the contrary, when President Dhoinine in June 2013 was received at the Élysée palace by François Hollande, the issue of Mayotte was kept out of the agenda. Although the Comorian migration drama was raised, there was no commitment by the French president to abrogate 95

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A campaign in favor of a Comorian president from Mayotte was launched in early 2013 (‘Un Mahorais president de l’Union des Comores’ in alwatwan.net, 14 February 2013). In September 2013, the Comorian constitutional court confirmed 26 May 2016 as the termination date of the union presidency of Ikililou Dhoinine. Presidential elections should be held in late 2015 or early 2016 (‘Après déliberation, la cour constitutionnelle a déclaré recevable la requête du parti Ridja’ in lagazettedescomores.com, 13 September 2013). El-Amine op. cit., pp. 41–58. au: ‘50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration’, Addis Ababa, 26 May 2013, p. 3.

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the Balladur visa.98 Addressing the media after the meeting, Hollande made it clear that Mayotte was as much part of France as Reunion or the metropolis itself.99 Not surprisingly, on his return to Moroni Dhoinine despondently asked: “In who’s name and for which interests does France continue to ignore international law?”100 Chagos

The Archipelago

Whereas the tale of Mayotte is that of French arrogance, the story of the Chagos archipelago is one of Anglo-American duplicity and falsity. Where France openly has defied the United Nations, Great Britain has behind the scenes and beyond public scrutiny together with the us not only re-colonized the islands, but turned the inhabitants into non-people. The study of Chagos by Jean Claude de l’Estrac, former foreign minister of Mauritius and from July 2012 secretary general of the Indian Ocean Commission, begins as follows: “It is a story of deceit, of lies and cowardice [and] perhaps even worse.”101 This applies, in particular, to the issues of sovereignty and the treatment of the Chagossians, but also to the scope and purpose of the naval base on Diego Garcia. The Chagos archipelago – formerly known as the ‘Oil Islands’ due to the production of coconut oil – consists of some 60 coral islands and islets. It is situated in the north-eastern corner of the African part of the Indian Ocean, some 1,800 kilometers east of Seychelles and 1,000 kilometers south of Maldives, approximately mid-way between the African continent and Indonesia. The archipelago contains the world’s largest coral atoll, the Great Chagos Bank, and the reef systems are considered among the healthiest. With a land area of 27 square kilometers, Diego Garcia is the biggest of the islands. It is also the most southerly. North of the Great Chagos Bank, Peros Banhos (13 km2) and Salomon Islands (5 km2) are prominent atolls. For reasons explained below, there are no inhabitants in Chagos. On Diego Garcia, however, around 4,000 military and civilians are stationed at the us 98 99

‘Rencontre Dhoinine-Hollande: Un gthn relooké’ in malango-actualité.fr, 23 June 2013. The subjects discussed during the meeting between Hollande and Dhoinine included formalities for a regular Franco-Comorian political dialogue and economic cooperation. A ‘Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation’ was signed by the two presidents. 100 ‘Allocution du président Ikililou Dhoinine: Au nom de quoi et pour quels intérêts, la France continue-t-elle d’ignorer le droit international?’ in alwatwan.net, 6 July 2013. 101 Jean Claude de l’Estrac: L’An Prochain à Diego Garcia…, Éditions Le Printemps, Mauritius, 2011, p. 15 (Author’s translation from French).

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Map 11 

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naval base, which imports all its supplies, food and other necessities. There are no industrial or agricultural activities on the islands. Commercial fishing used to provide an income for the British authorities, but no licenses have been issued since Chagos in 2010 was declared a ‘no-take’ marine reserve. The British Indian Ocean Territory was established in 1965. The new colony was “created specifically to enable Britain and the United States to convert several islands into bases or staging posts.”102 In addition to the Chagos archipelago, originally biot included the distant Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar Outer Islands of Seychelles. At the time, they were still of interest to the us as alternative sites for an Indian Ocean base. After choosing Diego Garcia, the three islands were returned to Seychelles at independence in 1976. Today, therefore, biot is made up of the Chagos. Around the islands, the British government has declared a vast eez of some 640,000 square kilometers, covering the ‘eastern petroleum highway’ to and from the Middle East. Practically all international shipping in the African part of the Indian Ocean thus passes through French declared eezs in the south-west and the British in the east. 102 McAteer: To Be a Nation op. cit., p. 256. The creation of biot had been planned secretly between London and Washington over a number of years. McAteer notes that “[n]either [the uk] Parliament nor the us Congress was aware of what their governments were doing” (ibid.).

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Searching for a us base In contravention of the 1960 un Decolonization Declaration and without consultation with the local legislative council in Victoria, in 1965 Britain unilaterally broke Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar away from Seychelles. Initially, the atoll of Aldabra was identified as a potential us military base. News of the plans leaked to the British media and created an outcry after a scientific expedition to the unique island was carried out in 1966. The following year, the British government shelved the plans. Aldabra is the largest raised coral reef and – after the Great Chagos Bank – the second largest corallic atoll in the world. Above all, it is the home to around 100,000 giant tortoises. In 1982, it was designated by unesco as a World Heritage Site. While the British government and the us navy from 1967 instead focused on Chagos and Diego Garcia, the us air force was still interested in the Seychelles’ islands. After the closure in 1964 of the us satellite tracking station in Zanzibar, a similar facility was established on Mahé, the main island of Seychelles. In early 1968, the us air force informed the British ministry of defense that it “would like to take another look at Farquhar Island to see if the lagoon could be dredged and enough land filled in for an airfield.” Eventually, Diego Garcia was the preferred option.

While the zones claimed by France are monitored from its military bases in Reunion and Mayotte, the formidable us bulwark of Diego Garcia – often described as a ‘stationary aircraft carrier’ – controls the British zone.

biot and Military Agreement

Administered from the French colony of Mauritius (Île de France), the Chagos islands were uninhabited until the 1780s, when Franco-Mauritian plantation owners started coconut cultivation on Diego Garcia and brought the first slaves from Africa. The slave-based system, mainly producing coconut oil and copra for the Mauritian market, was subsequently introduced on Peros Banhos, Salomon and other islands in the archipelago. The plantation system changed little when the British took possession of Mauritius in 1810 and was only marginally reformed when slavery was abolished in 1835. An important effect of abolition, however, was the introduction of indentured labor from, in particular, India, but later also China. Over the following one hundred years, the different population groups developed a distinct Chagossian identity, known as Zilois, communicating between the islands in a particular form of Chagossian Creole.

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In the early 1960s, the geo-political hegemony of the United Kingdom in the Indian Ocean was on the wane, leading to the ‘East of Suez’ policy and a gradual withdrawal from its major military bases in South East Asia. At the same time, the us defense department was busy identifying strategic island bases in the Indian Ocean.103 In February 1964, a secret meeting between British and us officials was held in London. In the talks, the latter declared their interest in the British Indian Ocean islands for the construction of a us naval communications facility. As information about the meeting leaked to the public, the issue was brought to the attention of the un Special Committee on Decolonization, which prepared a report to the un General Assembly. The assembly considered the issue in December 1965. Requesting the British government “to take no action which would dismember the territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity,” the un body noted “with deep concern” that any step taken by the administrating power to detach certain islands from the territory of Mauritius for the purpose of establishing a military base would be in contravention of the Declaration [on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples].104 By that time, the British government had in camera already detached the Chagos archipelago and the three Seychelles’ islands, bringing them together as a separate colony. It had also reached an agreement in principle with the us authorities on the establishment of a military base. One month earlier – on 8 November 1965 – biot had been established through an Order in Council, i.e. by royal prerogative and without any parliamentary scrutiny or debate: As from the date of this order: (a) The Chagos Archipelago, being islands which immediately before the date of this order were included in the Dependencies of Mauritius; and (b) The Farqu[h]ar Islands, the Aldabra Group and the Island of Desroches, being islands which […] were part of the colony of the Seychelles, shall together form a separate colony which shall be known as the British Indian Ocean Territory.105 103 On the concept of strategic islands and the story of Diego Garcia, see David Vine: Island of Shame: The Secret History of the us Military Base on Diego Garcia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009. 104 unga Resolution 2066 (XX): ‘Question of Mauritius’, 16 December 1965. 105 Quoted in Garth Abraham: ‘Paradise Claimed: Disputed Sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago’ in The South African Law Journal, Vol. 128, Part 1, 2011, pp. 64–65. In appendices to his study United States and Britain in Diego Garcia: The Future of a Controversial

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One year later, the British and us governments concluded the secret defense talks through an exchange of notes dated 30 December 1966. The agreement was only made public on 27 April 1967.106 It established that [t]he United States Government and the United Kingdom Government contemplate that the islands shall remain available to meet the possible defense needs of the two Governments for an indefinitely long period. Accordingly, after an initial period of fifty years, this Agreement shall continue in force for a further period of twenty years, unless, not more than two years before the end of the initial period, either Government shall have given notice of termination to the other, in which case this Agreement shall terminate two years from the date of such notice.107 In principle, the United States’ base agreement for Diego Garcia could thus come to an end by 30 December 2014.108 In the meantime, it could be noted that the financial side of the agreement between the landlord and the tenant was concealed through a discount of 14 million us Dollars on ‘Polaris’ nuclear missiles for the British navy.

Chagos Dismembered

In the 1960s, constitutional conferences on Mauritius’ independence were held in London between the British government and Mauritian political representatives. During the talks, it became apparent that the Mauritians were faced with a fait accompli and that the Chagos archipelago would not form part of independent Mauritius. In September 1965, the British premier, Harold Wilson, held a meeting with the Mauritian chief minister, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, at No. 10 Downing Street. According to the notes from the meeting, Wilson did not mince his words, reminding his guest that Base (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009), Peter H. Sand reproduces most of the British and us documents relating to Chagos. Giving more focus to ecological issues, the study was updated in a German edition in 2011, entitled Atoll Diego Garcia: Naturschutz zwischen Menschenrecht und Machtpolitik (Herbert Utz Verlag, Munich). It similarly contains a wealth of documents. 106 It was registered with the un by the United Kingdom in August 1967. 107 Quoted in Abraham op. cit., p. 65. 108 The agreement was renewed in 1999. Subsequent exchanges of letters between the uk and the us took place in 2001–04.

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there were a number of possibilities. The [chief minister] and his colleagues could return to Mauritius either with independence or without it. On the defense point, Diego Garcia could either be detached by Order in Council or with the agreement of the [chief minister] and his colleagues. The best solution of all might be independence and detachment by agreement, although [Wilson] could not of course commit the colonial secretary at this point.109 The British used both sticks and carrots to force the Mauritian representatives to realize the futility of any real opposition. There would not, they declared, be any independent nation of Mauritius including Chagos, and if the issue was left outside the talks the road to independence would be smoother.110 In recompense for the lost islands, the British would pay independent Mauritius an amount of 3 million Pounds. The Chagossians themselves were never consulted. Mauritius gained national independence in March 1968. The new nation did not recognize British sovereignty over biot, which it in official statements refers to as ‘the so called biot’. The amended Mauritian republican constitution, adopted in 1992, explicitly declares that the country “includes the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia.”111 Basing itself on the un General Assembly Resolutions 1514 of December 1960 (‘Decolonization Declaration’) and 2066 of December 1965, the country has repeatedly affirmed its claim over the islands, not least in numerous declarations upon signature, ratification or accession to international treaties. This stand has been continuously supported by the oau/au and the Non-Aligned Movement. In January 2011, for example, the au annual assembly reaffirmed that “the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia, forms an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Mauritius.”112 The stand was reiterated in May 2013, when the au summit of heads of state and government celebrated the 50th anniversary of the founding of the oau. In the final ‘Solemn Declaration’, the assembled African leaders reaffirmed “our call to end expeditiously the unlawful occupation of the Chagos archipelago.”113 109 ‘Record of a conversation between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the Premier of Mauritius, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, at No. 10 Downing Street at 10 a.m. on Thursday, September 23, 1965’ in Sand (2011) op. cit. p. 139. 110 See Thierry Ollivry: Diego Garcia: Enjeux Stratégiques, Diplomatiques et Humanitaires, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2008, pp, 57–102. 111 Government of Mauritius: ‘Constitution of Mauritius: Chapter XI, Article 111’. 112 au: ‘Resolution on Mauritius’, Assembly/AU/Res.1 (XVI), Addis Ababa, 31 January 2011. 113 au: ‘50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration’, Addis Ababa, 26 May 2013, p. 3.

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In December 1984, Mauritius declared an eez of 200 nautical miles around Chagos pursuant to the un Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted two years earlier, and in May 2009 the government in Port Louis submitted a preliminary claim to an extended continental shelf area some 270 kilometers beyond the southern part of the Chagos eez. Although rejected by the uk, the eez declared by Mauritius was in June 1989 recognized in the ‘Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of Mau­ritius on Fishing in Mauritian Waters’. When the United Kingdom in early 2010 announced unilateral plans for a marine protected area in biot, the Mauritian government reacted forcefully. The marine sanctuary entered into effect on 1 November, adding a new chapter to the long tale of non-transparent British actions with regard to Chagos. Reportedly “furious” with the “dishonesty” of the British foreign secretary, David Miliband,114 the Mauritian prime minister, Navin Ramgoolam, immediately declared that his government was bringing the issue to international arbitration. On 20 December 2010, Mauritius instigated legal proceedings against the uk under the un Convention on the Law of the Sea. A first hearing by the arbitral tribunal was held in January 2012. A decision on the merits of the case is only expected towards the end of 2014. On Africa’s behalf, the au also condemned the British initiative. In January 2011, the au annual assembly noted “with grave concern” that notwithstanding the oau/au Resolutions/Decisions [in the past] and the strong opposition expressed by the Republic of Mauritius, the United Kingdom has proceeded to establish a ‘marine protected area’ around the Chagos archipelago […], thereby further impending the exercise by the Republic of Mauritius of its sovereignty over the archipelago.115

Removal of the Chagossians

When the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to use the islands for military purposes, there were thriving Chagossian communities in the archipelago. To recognize the inhabitants any right of abode did not, however, form part of the plans. On the contrary, a joint uk-us scheme was designed to evict them and turn them into non-people in flagrant violation of the un Universal 114 ‘Chagos: Navin Ramgoolam accuse un ex-ministre britannique de malhonnêteté’ in lexpress.mu, 3 November 2010. 115 au: ‘Resolution on Mauritius’, Assembly/AU/Res. 1 (XVI), Addis Ababa, 31 January 2011.

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Declaration of Human Rights. At the time, there were almost 2,000 inhabitants on the islands, mainly on Diego Garcia, Peros Banhos and Salomon. The name Chagos comes from the Portuguese chagas, or ‘the wounds of Christ’. What the Chagossians have had to endure over almost half a century is truly of Biblical proportions. At the time of the evictions, the coconut production was increasing. On Diego Garcia alone, the daily harvest was 20% higher than that on Mahé, the largest of the Seychelles’ islands.116 The majority of the Chagossians – including the women – worked for the Seychelles-based company ChagosAgalega Ltd. and had small, but regular, salaries and pensions. Others were active in boat-building. Fish, poultry, pork and vegetables were staple foods. Housing was free and basic health care available. Schools were introduced in the 1950s. In the villages there were churches, cemeteries, roads and a handful of motor vehicles. After a visit to Diego Garcia, the British governor to Mauritius remarked in 1961 that the main village had the “look of a French coastal village miraculously transferred whole to this shore.”117 Although formally British, from the outset the Americans demanded “exclusive control” of the islands “without local inhabitants,” as communicated to the Foreign Office by the us embassy in London. In reply, the Foreign Office assured that “[t]here will be no indigenous population except seagulls.” “[S]ome few Tarzans or Man Fridays whose origins are obscure,” a British diplomat commented, “are hopefully being wished on to Mauritius.”118 Subsequent us documents made it clear that they wanted the Chagos archipelago “swept” and “sanitized.” When asked about the Chagossians, Admiral Zumwalt summarized in 1971 the us government’s position in three words: “Absolutely must go.”119 The British realized that removal of the permanent inhabitants would be in violation of Chapter XI of the un Charter. To conceal the eviction operations, the uk and us governments therefore created the fiction that the Chagossians were merely migrant workers from Mauritius and Seychelles, without any established connection to the islands. Denying them their birthright, the fabrication was over the following decades to cause untold suffering. The forced removals began in 1968, after the British authorities had bought out the Chagos-Agalega plantation company and restricted the quantity of

116 McAteer: To Be a Nation op. cit., p. 265. 117 Quoted in Vine op.cit., p. 3. 118 Quoted in Abraham op. cit., p. 67. 119 Quoted in Vine op. cit., pp. 78 and 111.

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medical and food supplies to the islands.120 Chagossians visiting Mauritius for hospitalization or other reasons were told that the company had closed. Barred from returning home, families were overnight divided over a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers. Soon thereafter, villagers on Diego Garcia were rounded up and forced to board cargo ships, primarily to Mauritius, but also to Seychelles, which was still under British rule.121 The us State Department, however, was not happy with the pace of the removals, communicating to the British in late 1970 that “[w]e hope that complete relocation can be accomplished by the end of July 1971, when aircraft begin using the airstrip and the tempo of construction activities reaches its full scale.”122 Eventually, the last inhabitants on Diego Garcia were deported in October 1971. Before leaving the island, British officials and us troops herded the Chagossians’ dogs into sealed sheds and gassed them. At that time, there remained around 370 people on Peros Banhos and Salomon. Although these outer Chagos islands are situated some 250 kilometers from Diego Garcia, their inhabitants were also forcefully removed. Like those from Diego Garcia, they had to leave most of their possessions behind. Arriving by cargo ship to Mauritius in May 1973, the last deportees refused to disembark, but had to give up after a week of resistance. The expulsion from Chagos was complete, the plantations closed and the villages emptied. International yachts, however, still enjoyed visits to the archipelago. “Welcome to biot,” a sign read. “Please keep the island[s] clean and avoid damage to buildings. Enjoy your stay.”123 When the Chagos archipelago was broken away from Mauritius, the United Kingdom violated international legal provisions laid down in the un Decolonization Declaration. In addition, the treatment of the Chagossians was in breach of the un Charter. As earlier noted, with regard to non-self-governing territories Article 73 establishes that “the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount” and obliges as “a sacred trust” the administering powers to “promote to the utmost […] [their] well-being.” For the Chagossians, nothing could be further from the truth. As early as 1971 – before the removals were completed – the uk commissioner of biot enacted an Immigration Ordinance which provided that no person was allowed to remain in the territory without a permit, effectively denying the islanders the right to return. 120 Most aspects of the removals from Chagos are discussed in Sandra J.T.M. Evers and Marry Kooy (eds): Eviction from the Chagos Islands: Displacement and Struggle for Identity Against Two World Powers, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2011. 121 In Seychelles, the Chagossians were initially dumped in a disused prison. 122 Quoted in Vine op. cit., p. 104. 123 Ibid., p. 15.

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“By reason of the absence of any permanent population,” the British government has further taken the position that it is not subject to the reporting obligations for non-self-governing territories under Article 73 of the un Charter. On the same grounds, it contends that its ratification of the 1966 un Covenants on Human Rights does not extend to biot, a view rejected by the un Human Rights Committee. Not surprisingly, the British colony has been referred to as “a human rights black hole.”124

Protests and Litigation

With no connections in Mauritius (or Seychelles), no jobs, less educated and without any official support, the Chagossians ended up squatting in the slums of Port Louis (Mauritius) and Victoria (Seychelles). They still occupy the lowest rung of these societies, struggling with poverty, discrimination, unemployment, drugs and ill health. In 2008, it was estimated that 750 of the 1,500 to 2,000 evicted islanders were alive. By then, the total number of Chagossians and their descendants was around 6,000, with 4,000 in Mauritius, 1,000 in the uk and 500 in Seychelles. Smaller groups had settled in Reunion and on the distant Mauritian Agalega islands, south of Seychelles. From the very beginning, the evicted and dispossessed Chagossians fought back, requesting compensation, recognition and the right to return. Whereas the government of Mauritius claims territorial sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, the islanders’ struggle focuses on basic human rights, including in the countries to which they were deported.125 Chagossian women have played a central role in the struggle. In 1972, at the height of the removal operations, the British paid Mauritius an amount of 650,000 Pounds to cover the costs of a Chagossian resettlement programme. However, the money was not used for the purpose by the Mauritian government. Only in 1978, after Chagossian women had protested continuously for several months in Port Louis, did it distribute the funds. Rampant inflation had in the meantime reduced their value. Moreover, many families – including all 124 Louise Moor and A.W. Brian Simpson: ‘Ghosts of Colonialism in the European Convention on Human Rights’ in British Yearbook of International Law 2005, Vol. 76, 2006, pp. 188 and 193. 125 On the conditions in Mauritius, see Laura Jeffery and David Vine: ‘Sorrow, Sadness and Impoverishment: The Lives of Chagossians in Mauritius’ in Evers and Kooy (eds): op. cit. pp. 83–102. In the same volume, David Vine discusses the conditions in Seychelles in his ‘Chagossians Twice Forgotten: Exile in the Seychelles’, pp. 105–24.

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the Chagossians in Seychelles – received no compensation at all. As living conditions continued to deteriorate, the women again took to the streets of the Mauritian capital, launching hunger strikes, facing police violence and going to jail. Culminating in 1980–81, the protests were actively supported by the opposition Mauritian Militant Movement and a coalition of local ngos under the rallying cry of Rann Nu Diego (‘Give Us Back Diego’).126 In 1997, the Chagossians gained acceptance as an indigenous people before the United Nations, but were still barred by the British from returning to their home islands. A glimmer of hope appeared in November 2000, when the Chagos Refugees Group (crg), the first genuinely Chagossian support organization, legally challenged the 1971 Immigration Ordinance in the English courts.127 Led by Olivier Bancoult, the crg won the case when the High Court ruled that the ordinance was unlawful and that Chagossians could return to biot – but not to Diego Garcia – without permits. Two years later, in May 2002, they were after three decades as a non-people further granted British passports, prompting many in the younger generation to leave Mauritius for the uk.128 The British government’s acceptance of the Chagossians’ right of abode was, however, short-lived. In June 2004, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw bypassed parliament and overturned the high court judgment through Orders in Council which ensured that full immigration controls over biot were reinstated and that the displaced Chagossians had no right to return. The new Constitution Order established that [w]hereas the [t]erritory was constituted and is set aside to be available for the defense purposes of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America, no person has the right to abode […]. Accordingly, no person is entitled to enter or be present in the [t]erritory except as authorized by or under this Order […].129 126 In today’s Mauritius, the left-wing political organization Lalit (‘The Struggle’) is particularly active in advocating the cause of the Chagossians. 127 The Chagos Refugees Group was created in 1983. In addition to the struggles for recognition and the right to return, crg strives to improve the social and economic conditions for the Chagossians in Mauritius and Seychelles. The head office is in Pointe aux Sables outside Port Louis, where the organization has established a training and resource center. 128 A big number of Chagossians settled in Crawley, West Sussex, where many have found jobs at Gatwick airport. 129 Quoted in Stephen Allen: ‘Responsibility and Redress: The Chagossian Litigation in the English Courts’ in Evers and Kooy (eds) op. cit., p. 136.

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The uk government claimed that the reversal was justified to honor the agreement with the us and that resettlement even of the outer Chagos islands would compromise the security of the Diego Garcia base in the ‘global war on terror’. Bancoult and the crg, however, did not give up. Applying for judicial review, in May 2006 the English Divisional High Court ruled in their favor, holding that the Orders in Council were unlawful. Soon thereafter, the Court of Appeal also dismissed the government’s stand, stating that the methods used to stop the Chagossians from returning constituted “an abuse of power.”130 Thus faced with defeat, the British government, however, petitioned the House of Lords – the highest court of appeal in the uk – which in October 2008 by three votes in favor and two against finally ruled that the 2004 Constitution Order was valid. Blocked by the British government, the Chagossians then turned to the European Court of Human Rights (echr) in Strasbourg, France, re-activating an application originally made after the 2004 Orders in Council. In the meantime, events in late 2010 seemed to strengthen the arguments in favor of the dispossessed. Confidential us diplomatic correspondence made public by WikiLeaks on 1 December – one month after the entry into force of the Chagos marine protected area – revealed that the main objective behind the sanctuary was to prevent the Chagossians from returning. Supported by a growing international opinion, the new evidence gave fresh impetus to a protracted struggle for basic human rights.131 However, in a ruling that surprised many observers and, above all, was a serious setback for the Chagossians, on 20 December 2012 a majority among the seven echr judges declared the islanders’ case inadmissible.132 Although noting that the heart of the applicants’ claims under the European Convention on Human Rights was “the callous and shameful treatment which they or their antecedents had suffered during their removal from the Chagos islands,” the court found that “[t]hese claims had […] been raised in the [uk] courts and settled, definitively.” “In that event,” the echr concluded, “it was not for the 130 Quoted in Abraham op. cit., p. 68, n. 22. 131 There are a number of advocacy groups for the Chagossian cause in the uk and elsewhere. In April 2011, Chagos International Support (cis) was launched. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the cis is an international platform for raising awareness of the forced deportations of the Chagossians and of their right to return. 132 The judges were from Albania, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Montenegro, Poland and the United Kingdom. During the early stages of the case, the presiding judge was the British former echr president Nicolas Bratza. The fact that seven European judges in 2012 could deny an African community from returning to its homeland in the Indian Ocean is remarkable.

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Court to undertake the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact and law.”133 The decision was final. Shortly thereafter, it was announced that the legal counselor of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office who led the case against the Chagossians had been awarded the title of Officer of the Order of the British Empire “for services to human rights and diplomacy.”134 Less surprising was that the us government also let the Chagossians down. By March 2012, the crg had mobilized 30,000 people to sign a petition to the White  House, demanding that “the United States should provide relief to the Chagossians in the form of resettlement to the outer Chagos islands, employment and compensation.”135 On 21 December 2012 – the day after the echr ruling – the us State Department tersely responded that the British government had “taken numerous steps to compensate [the] former inhabitants for the hardships they [had] endured.”136 Commenting that only 230 of around 1,900 applicants had received some form of monetary relief,137 Bancoult and the Chagos Refugees Group persisted. In reaction to the echr verdict and the us response, they declared that they would take their case to the un Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland, or to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands.138

Marine Protected Area

Without parliamentary approval, the biot Marine Protected Area (mpa) was constituted through an executive order issued by the British government. The proclamation of the mpa was issued on 1 April 2010. Covering an immense area of 640,000 square kilometers,139 it is not only the largest ‘no-take’ marine 133 echr: ‘Chagos Islanders’ Case Inadmissible’ (Chagos Islanders versus the United Kingdom/Application No. 35622/04), Press release, Strasbourg, 20 December 2012. 134 Quoted in ‘The Chagos Archipelago: Latest Developments’ in Environmental Policy and Law, Issue No. 43/1, 2013, p. 51. 135 The White House: ‘The us Government Must Redress Wrongs against the Chagossians’, Washington, 21 December 2012. The petition was submitted on 5 March 2012. 136 The White House: ‘Response to We the People Petition on Redressing Wrongs against the Chagossians’, Washington, 21 December 2012. 137 ‘Réponse des Chagossiens à Obama: Seulement 230 natifs ont été compensés’ in lexpress. mu, 26 December 2012. 138 ‘Chagos: d’autres recours juridiques attendus l’an prochain après l’échec de Strasbourg’ in lexpress.mu, 22 December 2012. 139 Originally, the proclaimed marine park area covered 544,000 km2. Citing a clerical error by its hydrographic office, in April 2012 the British government increased the area to 640,000 km2 (‘The Chagos Archipelago: Latest Developments’ op. cit., p. 50.)

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reserve in the world, but as a ‘Category 1’ sanctuary also governed by maximum restrictions with regard to presence of man, fishing and other human activities. It extends over the entire Chagos archipelago, with the significant exception of Diego Garcia,140 and is, in particular, meant to protect the Great Chagos Bank, the world’s biggest living coral structure and one of the richest marine eco-systems on the globe. Although no stakeholder questioned the need for protection of the unique environment, the unilateral initiative by the British government brought the issues of Chagos to the fore with unprecedented force.141 As earlier noted, in December 2010 the government of Mauritius instigated legal proceedings against the uk with regard to the sovereignty over the archipelago. At the same time, the Chagossians re-activated their case at the echr in favor of the right of abode. In addition, under uk law they challenged the legality of the mpa.142 In all cases, the documentation revealed by WikiLeaks was significant: In a memorandum dated 9 May 2009, the us embassy in London reported from a meeting on Chagos held with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (fco). After a comment that Mauritius “was primarily interested in the archipelago’s economic potential as a fishery,” the fco director for overseas territories, Colin Roberts, told the us diplomats that “establishing a marine park would, in effect, put paid to resettlement claims of the [Chagos] archipelago’s former residents.”143 Discussing the proposal, Roberts underlined that such a park “would in no way impinge on [us government] use of the biot, including Diego Garcia, for military purposes,” while at the same time there “would be no human footprint or Man Fridays on the […] uninhabited islands.” The British fco director further stated the opinion that “[w]e do not regret the removal of the population, since [it] was necessary for the biot to fulfill its strategic purpose.” Whereas the us representatives expressed concern that a marine park could be seen “as inherently inconsistent with the military use of Diego Garcia,” the two parties, however, agreed that the proposed reserve was 140 A three-mile zone around the Diego Garcia base is exempted from the mpa. It is the single most important source of environmental pollution. Recreational fishing by us personnel is permitted within the zone. 141 See Wendy Paratian: ‘The Complexities Surrounding the Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago’, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2011. 142 A ruling in the case ‘Chagos Refugees Group v. uk’ on the mpa was expected towards the end of 2014. 143 The us memorandum (‘hmg Floats Proposal for Marine Reserve Covering the Chagos Archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory)’) is reproduced in Sand (Herbert Utz/2011) op.cit., pp. 218–23.

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“the most effective long-term way to prevent any of the Chagos’ islands’ former inhabitants or their descendants from resettling in the biot.” The ulterior motive for the establishment of the mpa was to deny the Chagossians the right to return. To ‘greenwash’ the proposal, the uk government successfully mobilized support from a number of prominent international environmental ngos, led by the uk-based Chagos Environment Network with funding from the Pew Environment Group in the United States.144 That Mauritius claimed sovereignty over Chagos; that the Chagossians demanded the right of abode; or that the us naval base was a major pollutant did not seem to matter.145 However, as the Chagos’ case received growing international attention, the British position was increasingly criticized. At a meeting of the un Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) in Doha, Qatar, in April 2012, the Group of 77 and – notably – China issued a ministerial declaration, stating: We reaffirm the need to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty issues facing developing countries, including, among others, the disputes over Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, which was unlawfully excised from the territory of Mauritius in violation of international law and United Nations General Assembly resolution[s] 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965. Failure to resolve these decolonization and sovereignty issues would seriously damage and undermine the development and economic capacities and prospects of [the] developing countries.146 And at the iucn World Conservation Congress in Jeju, South Korea, in September 2012, the International Council of Environmental Law declared with regard to the marine park that “this case must be solved, not only in the interest of conservation, but [of] the people concerned.”147 144 Also Greenpeace International welcomed the mpa, which provoked strong criticism (see Sidney Holt: ‘Greenpeace should not choose green over peace’ in The Guardian, 17 May 2011). However, Kumi Naidoo, its executive director, clarified that “the marine reserve should be established without prejudice to the rights of the Chagossians” (E-mail from Kumi Naidoo to Sidney Holt, 8 May 2011). 145 During the construction of the airfield at the Diego Garcia base, a total of 4.6 million cubic meters of coral was dynamited, irreparably damaging the reef. In addition, it has been estimated that over one million gallons of jet fuel has leaked from the base into the ocean (Paratian op.cit., pp. 28–29). 146 Quoted in ‘The Chagos Archipelago: Latest Developments’ op. cit., p. 50. 147 Ibid.

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In Geneva, Switzerland, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis­ crimination concluded one month later that [t]he United Kingdom has acted, and continues to act, in violation of articles 2 and 5 of the [un] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, inter alia by preventing the exercise of the right to return of the former inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, as well as the right of entry of other Mauritian nationals.148

Diego Garcia

At the center of the political disputes and human tragedies related to the Chagos archipelago is the United States naval base on Diego Garcia, referred to by the Americans as ‘Footprint of Freedom’. In the beginning, its scope was deceitfully hidden. It remains “far more secretive than Guantánamo Bay.”149 When the us navy in 1970 submitted a budgetary request for the establishment of the base, it was presented to the members of the us Congress as an “austere communications facility.”150 However, since the start of the constructions in 1971 it has grown into a Pearl Harbor-size naval port at an estimated cost of over 3 billion us Dollars.151 As noted by Andrew S. Erickson of the us Naval War College and two of his colleagues: “The island [base] facilitates us power projection throughout the Indian Ocean littoral by multiple means: the prepositioning of army and marine corps brigade sets, long-range bomber operations, the replenishment of naval surface combatants and the strike and special operations capabilities of guided-missile submarines.”152 Diego Garcia is in the words of us military expert John Pike “the base from which we control half of Africa and the southern side of Asia.”153 148 uncerd: ‘Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention [on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]’, Geneva, 16 October 2012, p. 5. 149 Vine (2009) op. cit., p. 9. Off limits to media and international observers, such as the Red Cross, the only time journalists were allowed to Diego Garcia was in September 2007, when President George W. Bush made a brief stopover at the base. 150 Ibid., p. 8. 151 Peter H. Sand: ‘Marine Protected Areas’ off uk Overseas Territories: Comparing the South Orkneys Shelf and the Chagos Archipelago’ in The Geographical Journal, Royal Geographical Society, London, 2011, p. 4. 152 Andrew S. Erickson, Walter C. Ladwig III and Justin D. Mikolay: ‘Diego Garcia and the United States’ Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy’ in Asian Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2010, p. 215. 153 Quoted in Vine (2009) op. cit., p. 10.

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Situated south of the Great Chagos Bank, the atoll of Diego Garcia is shaped like a drawn out horseshoe, with a wide northern opening and a deep entrance channel leading into a large, protected lagoon. The lagoon serves as anchorage area for around 25 prepositioned cargo ships, or one third of the entire us Afloat Prepositioning Force.154 The us navy support harbor is also in the lagoon, which can accommodate all sizes of naval vessels, including aircraft carriers. One of the us navy’s two submarine tenders, serving as a floating shipyard to repair and supply submarines, is based at Diego Garcia. On the western side of the atoll, the world’s longest slipform-paved runway has been built on crushed coral, hosting a great number of B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers, as well as reconnaissance, cargo and other aircraft.155

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Diego Garcia

154 Erickson, Ladwig III and Mikolay op. cit., p. 223. The us military maintains tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, fuel, munitions and spare parts on the prepositioned ships, which provide a tremendous crisis-response capability. It enables both an army and a marine corps brigade to mobilize within 24 hours, position assets anywhere within the theater in a week and operate without additional support for up to 30 days. At the start of the first Gulf War, 18 prepositioned ships from Diego Garcia outfitted a 15,000-troop marine brigade with inter alia 123 M-60 battle tanks and a month worth of operational supplies. 155 Vine (2009) op. cit., p. 8. See also André Oraison: ‘Diego Garcia: “Forteresse du Monde Libre”’ in Diplomatie Hors-Série, No. 13, August-September 2010, pp. 64–70.

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By far the biggest military base in the Indian Ocean,156 Diego Garcia normally houses some 2,000 personnel from the us navy and air force. In addition to a similar number of civilian contractors and service staff, around 50 British soldiers are stationed on the island. As Diego Garcia forms part of biot and the United Kingdom formally is the sovereign power, the British are responsible for matters dealing with uk law, customs and order.157 The Diego Garcia base became fully operational in 1986. From the beginning, it was to play a prominent role in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, during the 1991 ‘Operation Desert Storm’, it was the only us naval base that launched offensive air operations against Iraq. During ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, initiated in 2001, B-52 bombers based at Diego Garcia accounted for 65% of all ordnance dropped on Afghanistan.158 Under the Bush administration, the us base also featured in the system of extraordinary rendition introduced in the ‘war on terror’, that is apprehension and extrajudicial transfer of a person from one country to another; coercive interrogation; and detention without protection in ‘legal black holes’. Although denied for more than six years, in February 2008 the British Foreign Secretary Miliband acknowledged in the House of Commons that “recent us investigations have now revealed two occasions, both in 2002, when [such renditions] in fact occurred.”159 There are, in addition, strong indications that nuclear arms are stored on Diego Garcia, although this too has been denied by the us and uk governments. History will give the true answer. In the meantime, it should be recalled that the un General Assembly in December 1971 declared the Indian Ocean a ‘zone of peace’ and that the African Union under the Pelindaba Treaty has established a continental nuclear weapon free area. In the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the un General Assembly called upon “the great powers” to

156 ‘Camp Lemonnier’ in Djibouti has become the foremost us military base in continental Africa. It will ultimately house around 2,500 soldiers on a permanent basis, including 300 members of a commando force. 157 The conditions for the us soldiers on Diego Garcia are, indeed, in stark contrast to those of the Chagossians in exile. In a presentation of ‘Camp Justice’, the main base area of ‘Footprint of Freedom’, it is stated: “This spectacular location […] holds elements of an adventure vacationer’s dream. There’s tropical windsurfing and fishing for 200-pound marlin. […] Playing the 9-hole golf course is free, and a hoot to do with no shoes on. [T]he sea is so warm [that] snorklers can wade in and play tourist with thousands of brilliantly colored tropical fish” (‘Diego Garcia “Camp Justice”’ in globalsecurity.org, 5 September 2010). 158 Erickson, Ladwig III and Mikolay op. cit., p. 224. 159 Quoted in Vine (2009) op. cit., p. 9.

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eliminat[e] from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, [as well as] nuclear weapons […], weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence.160 With regard to Africa, the quest for a nuclear free continent began at the first oau summit meeting in Cairo, Egypt, in 1964. Named after the site of South Africa’s main nuclear research center, the Pelindaba Treaty was signed in April 1996 and came into effect on 15 July 2009. It covers the continent of Africa, the au island states and all the islands considered by the au as part of Africa, explicitly mentioning the Chagos archipelago and Diego Garcia. The treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of the parties to the treaty, as well as the dumping of radioactive waste in Africa by treaty parties. Mauritius has ratified the Pelindaba Treaty and in 2001 the United Kingdom adhered to its attached protocols. However, neither the us nor the uk recognizes Diego Garcia as being s­ ubject to the treaty. In November 2010, the first au Conference of State Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was held in Addis Ababa. As a follow-up to the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, the conference established the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, with headquarters in South Africa. Mauritius was among the twelve member states elected to the commission. In that capacity, the Mauritian foreign minister, Arvin Boolell, announced that his government would request a nuclear inspection of Diego Garcia.161

Nobel Voices and Geo-Strategy

Prominent international intellectuals have added their voices to those who support Mauritius’ claim over the Chagos archipelago, the struggle of the Chagossians for the right to return and the closure of the Diego Garcia base. In an open letter to us President Barack Obama, the 2008 Franco-Mauritian Nobel prize laureate for literature, Jean-Marie G. Le Clézio, wrote in October 2009 that “the American troops have even refused the Chagossians to return to put flowers on their

160 unga Resolution 2832 (XXVI): ‘Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’, 16 December 1971. 161 ‘Chagos: Une inspection nucléaire sera réclamée sous le traité de Pelindaba annonce Boolell’ in lexpress.mu, 2 November 2010.

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ancestors’ graves,” pleading for a presidential intervention on their behalf.162 In May 2013, he characterized the December 2012 echr ruling as “a big shame and a denial of justice.”163 And in March 2011, Joseph Stiglitiz, the American recipient of the 2001 Nobel prize for economics, stated in an article on Mauritius that “the us should now do right by this peaceful and democratic country: recognize Mauritius’ rightful ownership of Diego Garcia, renegotiate the lease and redeem past sins by paying a fair amount for land that it has illegally occupied for decades.”164 Developments, however, indicate that the American military power in the Indian Ocean will be strengthened and that the Diego Garcia base will play an even more central role in the future. Unveiled in 2007, the us navy’s maritime strategy states that the navy will seek a sustained, forward presence in the western Pacific and in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, the 2008 us marine corps’ ‘Vision and Strategy’ review – covering the period until 2025 – concludes that the Indian Ocean will be a central theater of competition and conflict.165 With regard to Diego Garcia, expan­ sion plans for another 200 million us Dollars were revealed in October 2010.166 162 Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clézio: ‘Lavez l’injustice faite aux Chagossiens: Lettre au président Barack Obama’ in Le Monde, 18–19 October 2009. 163 J.M.G. Le Clézio: ‘Les îlois des Chagos contre le Royaume-Uni, suite et fin?’ in Libération, 16 May 2013. 164 Stiglitz op. cit. in The Guardian, 7 March 2011. 165 Kaplan op. cit., p. 9. 166 Paratian op. cit., p. 28 and Erickson, Ladwig III and Mikolay op. cit., p. 224.

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Chapters, Authored Reports, Articles and Papers

Abraham, Garth: ‘Paradise Claimed: Disputed Sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago’ in The South African Law Journal, Vol. 128, Part 1, 2011. Adams, Paul: ‘Banking on a Good Location and the Law’ in Financial Times, Special report: Doing Business in Mauritius, 7 September 2012a. Adams, Paul: ‘Consolidation Leaves Sector Stronger’ in Financial Times, Special Report: Doing Business in Mauritius, 7 September 2012b. Allen, Stephen: ‘Responsibility and Redress: The Chagossian Litigation in the English Courts’ in Evers and Kooy (eds) (2011). Andersson, Anna: ‘Made in Madagascar: The Impact of Rules of Origin on the Textile and Clothing Industry’, Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, 2009. Baixas, Lionel: ‘Des Perles dans le Mandala? La Chine Dispose-t-Elle de Points d’Appui dans l’Océan Indien?’ in Diplomatie, Les Grands Dossiers, No. 10, August–September 2012. Bastin, Lyle: ‘Madagascar in Crisis’, Social Sciences Research Network, [no place], May 2013. Berlin, Don: ‘The Rise of India and the Indian Ocean’ in Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (jior), Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2011. Berlin, Donald L.: ‘Neglected No Longer: Strategic Rivalry in the Indian Ocean’ in Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2002. Bertile, Wilfrid: ‘Une Plaque Tournante entre l’Europe, l’Afrique et l’Asie?’ in Jauze (ed) (2008). Blanchy, Sophie: ‘L’Esclavage à Ngazidja (Comores): Approche Ethnohistorique’ in Médard et al (eds) (2013). Bouchard, Christian and William Crumplin: ‘Neglected No Longer: The Indian Ocean at the Forefront of World Geopolitics and Global Geostrategy’ in jior, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010. Bouchard, Christian and William Crumplin: ‘Two Faces of France: ‘France of the Indian Ocean’/’France in the Indian Ocean” in jior, Vol. 7, No. 2, December 2011. Boyer-Rossol, Klara: ‘Makua Life Histories’ in Bellagamba, Greene and Klein (eds) (2013). Bunwaree, Sheila and Roukaya Kasenally: Political Parties and Democracy in Mauritius, eisa Research Report, No. 19, Johannesburg, 2005.

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Other Reports and Documents

Government communiqués, statements and reports, as well as resolutions by the au/oau, the eu and the un, are indicated in footnotes. So too are data from various national and international statistical agencies. In addition, the following reports, documents and sources have been particularly useful:

370

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371

The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu): Madagascar: Country Profile 2008, London, 2008. The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu): Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Standstill, London, 2013. The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/gdp per Capita/Current usd’, Washington, 2012. The World Bank: ‘Mauritius Overview’, Washington, November 2012. The World Bank: ‘World Development Indicators/Military Expenditure’, Washington, 2013. The World Bank: ‘Madagascar: Measuring the Impact of the Political Crisis’, Washington, June 2013. The World Bank: Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa, Washington, 2013. The World Bank Group: ‘Seychelles Tourism Sector Review: Sustaining Growth in a Successful Tourism Destination’, Washington, July 2013. Transparency International (ti): Corruption Perception Index 2012, Berlin, 2012. un Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (uncerd): ‘Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention [on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination], Geneva, 16 October 2012. un Data: ‘Country Profile Comoros’, data.un.org. un Development Programme (undp): Human Development Report 2013:  The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, New York, 2013. un Institute for Training and Research (unitar): unosat Global Report on Maritime Piracy: A Geospatial Analysis 1995–2013, [Geneva], 2014. un Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc): Counter Piracy Programme, Regional Office for Eastern Africa, Nairobi, December 2012. un Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (unohchr): ‘Madagascar: Poverty and Impunity Have Increased Contemporary Forms of Slavery’, Press release, Geneva, 19 December 2012. United States Central Intelligence Agency (cia): The World Factbook, Washington, 2012. World Economic Forum (wef): The Global Gender Gap Report 2012, Geneva, 2012.



Additional Sources

The following newsletters, newspapers and websites have been used for contemporary events: Africa-Asia Confidential Afrobarometer

372 Agence de Presse de l’Océan Indien Albalad Al-watwan Magazine alwatwan.net bellaciao.fr clicanoo.re comores-actualités.com comores-web.com defenceforumindia.com factcheckeu.org globalsecurity.org habarizacomores.com irinnews.org La Tribune des Comores lagazettedescomores.com lexpress.mu lexpressmada.com linfo.re madagascar-tribune.com Mail and Guardian malango-actualité.fr mayotte.orange.fr mayottehebdo.com Midi Madagasikara nation.sc The Indian Ocean Newsletter Today in Seychelles zinfos974.com

bibliography/references

Name Index Abdallah, Ahmed 159, 161, 166, 167n113, 190, 323 Abdallah, Mahamoud Ahmed 175n153 Abdullah of Perak 270 Abdullah, Sultan of Anjouan 142n29 Abdurahman, Saïd Mohamed 166n109 Abeid, Abderemane Saïd 158, 178, 179 Aboubacar, Ibrahim 315 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 186 al-Bashir, Omar 186 Albius, Edmond 214n68 al-Husseini, Amin 271 al-Masudi, Ali 5 Andriamanjato, Richard 83 Andrianampoinimerina 67 Andriantsoli 72, 143n29, 152, 321 Avery, John 65n74 Azali, Assoumani 178–181, 188 Babu, Abdulrahman 158 Bacar, Mohamed 181, 182, 188 Balladur, Édouard 317 Bambatha 76n112 Bancoult, Olivier 346–348 Barre, Raymond 213n61 Bérenger, Paul 236–239, 254, 275n306 Berlouis, Ogilvie 275n305, 283 Bettencourt, Liliane 287n354 bin Khalifa, Hamad 187 bin Laden 144n32 Boina, Abdoubakar 67, 157, 159 Bongo, Omar 167n113 Boolell, Arvin 354 Botha, ‘Pik’ 171 Boullé, Philippe 286, 286n351 Brookfield, Harold 225 Bush, George 97, 351n149, 353 Cameron, David 300 Carcasonne, Guy 244n169 Castro, Fidel 164n101 Césaire, Aimé 155, 169n122, 207, 208n43, 209, 211, 322 Chang Him, Davidson 275n307

Chang Him, French 275n307 Charles XII 66n77 Chissano, Joaquim 88n155, 96, 106–109, 110n235, 183n181 Christnacht, Alain 320n47 Churchill, Winston 270, 307 Clair, Serge 260 Clinton, Hillary 301n424 Columbus, Christopher 8 Curé, Maurice 233n135 da Gama, Vasco 6, 8–10, 17, 63, 64, 150, 151, 266 Damanaki, Maria 301n424 de Albuquerque, Afonso 9 Debré, Michel 160, 202, 210–213, 219 de Dieu Maharante, Juan 118n276 de Flacourt, Etienne 65 de Gaulle, Charles 78, 81, 155, 156n81, 169, 210, 212, 332n82 de Klerk, Frederik Willem 172 de l’Estrac, Jean Claude 336 de Lépervanche, Léon 155, 207 de Mascarenhas, Pedro 198n1 Denard, Bob 161, 162, 166, 167, 169–175 Dhoinine, Ikililou 142, 147, 185, 187–190, 330, 335, 336 Djaffar, Saïd Mohamed 157, 159, 162, 163 Djohar, Saïd Mohamed 173, 174 Djoussouf, Abbas 166n110 Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana 305n442 Doctor, Manilal 233n137 Dolinchek, Martin 283 Dussac, Paul 77 Duval, Gaëtan 238n149 Duval, Xavier-Luc 238n149, 255 Elizabeth II 272n296 England, Edward 65n74 Essy, Amara 96 Farquhar, Robert 68, 263, 272, 274, 337, 338 Fatima of Mohéli 153 Faure, Danny 303

374 Ferrari, Maxime 275n305 Foccart, Jacques 160, 169 Fransman, Marius 110 Fraser, Malcolm 280 Gaddafi, Muammar 186, 211 Gallieni, Joseph-Simon 54, 74–76 Gandhi, Mahatma ix, ixn1, 233n137 Gbabgo, Laurent 96n182 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 160, 323 Guerrier, Jean-Paul 172n137 Guevara, ‘Che’ 164n101 Gurnah, Abdulrazak 16 Henry, Marcel 322 Hi Chi Minh 77n118 Himidi, Salim Hadji 159 Hoareau, Gérard 281–283 Hoare, ‘Mike’ 281n335, 282, 283 Hodoul, Jacques 275n305 Hollande, François 189, 219, 315, 335, 336 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix 155 Hoxha, Enver 158 Hu Jintao 40, 255, 302 Humblot, Léon 153, 154 Ibn Battuta, Hajji 7, 7n12, 8n17, 13 Ibrahim, Abdallah 176, 177 Ibrahim, Saïd 155n80, 159, 163 Jaona, Monja 83, 84, 87n152 Jospin, Lionel 177 Jugnauth, Anerood 222n103, 237, 239 Jugnauth, Ashok 237 Jugnauth, Lall 237 Jugnauth, Pravind 237, 238n149, 240 Juppé, Alain 174n149 Kabalega of Bunyoro 270 Karume, Abeid 158, 280 Kérékou, Mathieu 96n182, 173n140 Khalid bin Bargash, Seyyid 271 Khalifa bin Zayed 187, 287, 298, 303 Khashoggi, Adnan 273n299 Kidd, William 65n74 Kikwete, Jakaya 178, 182 Kiwan, Bashar 195n233 Klein, Patrick 175n153 Kolo, Roger 117

Name Index Laborde, Jean 70, 71 Lambert, Joseph 153 Laporte, Pierre 290n366, 290n370, 292n379 Le Clézio, Jean-Marie 354 Le Vasseur, Olivier 65n74 Lurel, Victorin 224, 314, 331 Machel, Samora 88n155, 166n107 Madeira, Francisco 183n181 Mahéde Labourdonnais, BertrandFrançois 230, 230n125, 259, 266 Ma Huan 8n17 Makarios III 271 Makhan, Vijay 256n231 Malacrino, Dominique 172n137 Malan, Magnus 171 Mancham, James 235n140, 272–275, 279, 281–285, 288 Mandela, Nelson ix, 45, 172 Manuel I 9, 63 Mao Zedong 158, 166n107, 185 Marx, Jean-Luc 203n20 Massounde, Tadjidine Ben Saïd 178n162 Maurice of Nassau 229 Mayeur, Nicolas 66 Mbeki, Thabo 182 Mdéré, Zéïna 322 Meade, James 225, 241, 242, 251 Michel, James 112, 275n309, 285, 302 Miliband, David 342, 353 Mohammed VI 186 Moreau de Séchelles, Jean 230n125, 267 Morgan, Joel 288 Morphey, Corneille Nicolas 267 Mtswamwindza 143n30 Muhammad 143n30, 144, 146 Musa Mbiki, Ali 151 Mwanga of Buganda 270 Naidoo, Kumi 350n144 Naipaul, V.S. 241, 242, 251 Napoleon 68, 270 Ndahimananjara, Johanita 118n276 Nyerere, Julius 157 Obama, Barack 354 Peter the Great 66n77 Picault, Lazare 230n125

375

Name Index Pierre, David 286 Pitt, William 231 Polo, Marco 7n12, 50, 50n8 Pol Pot 159n84 Pompidou, Georges 160 Prempeh of Ghana 270 Purryag, Rajkeswur 237 Putin, Vladimir 115 Queen Victoria 72 Radama I 50, 57, 67–70, 72, 321 Radama II 70, 72 Rainilaiarivony 70, 73, 74 Rajaonarimampianina, Hery 115–118 Rajoelina, Andry 102–117, 129, 131, 134n338 Rakotozafy, Jean Olivier 118n275 Ralaimongo, Jean 58, 77, 78 Ramanantenasoa, Noëline 118 Ramanantsoa, Gabriel 85–87, 90 Ramanataka 142n29 Ramgoolam, Navin 238n149, 240, 342 Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur 234, 237, 340 Ramkalawan, Wavel 284–286, 288 Ranavalona I 70 Ranavalona II 70, 72, 73 Ranavalona III 70, 73 Randimbisoa, Richard 118n275 Raseta, Joseph 78, 79, 155 Rasoazananera, Marie Monique 118n275 Rasoherina 70 Ratsimandrava, Richard 86 Ratsirahonana, Norbert 92 Ratsiraka, Didier 85–98, 100, 101, 106–110, 112–114, 131, 132n333, 275n306 Ravalomanana, Lalao 112, 113, 115 Ravalomanana, Marc 89, 94–97, 98–102, 105–114 Ravatomanga, Rolland 118n276 Ravoahangy, Joseph 58, 77–79, 155 Razafindravahy, Edgar 115 Razafindravoinona, Jean 118n275 Razafitrimo, Lala 118n275 René, France Albert 272–275, 277–281, 283–285, 289, 334 Robert, Didier 203n20 Roberts, Colin 349 Robinson, Jean Louis 114–116 Rocard, Michel 175n152, 217

Rodriguez, Diego 259 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 307 Sachs, Albie 244 Sachs, Jeffrey 101n209 Saïd, Ali 153, 168n116 Saïd, Boinali 315 Saïd Cheikh, Mustapha 170 Saïd, Mohamed Cheikh 155, 156, 159 Saïd, Seyyid 144n33 Salim, Salim Ahmed 177 Sambi, Ahmed Abdallah 180–185, 187, 188, 190 Sarkozy, Nicolas 111, 188, 219, 315, 319, 320, 326, 328 Senghor, Léopold 155, 207n38 September, Dulcie 172n135 Shirreh, Mahmoud Ali 271 Simão, Leonardo 110n235, 111 Sinon, Guy 274n304 Soilihi, Ali 145, 157, 158, 166, 168, 169, 173n142 Songoire, Marc 301 St. Ange, Alain 48, 288 Stasi, Bernard 159 Stiglitz, Joseph 355n164 Straw, Jack 346 Sunley, William 153 Surcouf, Robert 231n130 Sylla, Jacques 95 Taki, Mohamed 166n109, 170n128, 174, 175, 177, 178, 178n162 Tambara, Rolly 301 Thorez, Maurice 208n43 Topize, Joseph (‘Kaya’) 240 Tshombe, Moïse 82, 169, 281n335 Tsirinana, Philibert 80–85 Twain, Mark 222 Uteem, Cassam 235n142 van der Stel, Adriaan 229 van der Stel, Simon 229n123 Verdon, Philippe 175n153 Vergès, Paul 210–212, 328 Vergès, Raymond 155, 207 Vieillard, Max 174n146 Volcère, Ralph 286

376 Wade, Abdulayde 96 Wilson, Harold 340, 341 Yongle 8 Zafy, Albert 90–94, 106–108, 110, 131 Zaghlul Pasha, Saad 271

Name Index Zheng He 8, 9n19, 31 Zulu, Shaka 67n83, 76n112, 307n1 Zuma, Jacob 110, 112, 304 Zumwalt, Elmo 343

Indian Ocean Place Names Index Adélie, taaf 2n3, 220n99 Aden, Yemen 19, 235n141, 269, 271, 273n297 Agalega, Mauritius 223–224, 343, 345 Aldabra, Seychelles 3, 32, 263, 264, 272, 274, 337–339 Alphonse, Seychelles 263 Ambatomanga, Madagascar 98 Ambatovy, Madagascar 122 Ambohimanga, Madagascar 67 Ambohitsorohitra, Madagascar 104 Amirantes, Seychelles 263, 268n281 Amsterdam, taaf 2n3, 11, 212, 221 Andringitra, Madagascar 51n12 Anjouan, Comoros 12, 64, 72, 137, 139, 140–197 passim, 317–324 passim Ankarana, Madagascar 121n290 Ankaratra, Madagascar 51n12 Anse Royale, Mahé 302 Antananarivo, Madagascar 51, 53, 67, 73, 75, 130 Antsirabe, Madagascar 53, 60 Antsiranana, Madagascar 33, 53, 90, 219, 316 Arabian Sea 4n6, 26, 28, 29, 32, 133 Aurore, Mahé 263n253 Bambao, Grande Comore 143, 153n71 Bassas da India, taaf 23, 51, 88, 220n99, 332n83, 332n84, 333 Beau Bassin, Mauritius 225 Beira, Mozambique 33, 149n63 Bemolanga, Madagascar 123, 333 Berbera, Somalia 19 Bird, Seychelles 263n254 Black River, Mauritius 228n118 Bosaso, Puntland 299 Bourbon (Reunion) 65, 199 Buzi, Mozambique 333 Calcutta, India 17, 233n137 Calicut, India 9, 10, 63n65, 150 Cargados Carajos, Mauritius 223–224 Chaudron, Reunion 217–219 Crozet, taaf 1n3, 220n99, 221 Curepipe, Mauritius 225 Curieuse, Seychelles 264

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 157, 158 D’Arros, Seychelles 287n354 Denis, Seychelles 263n254, 301n424 Desroches, Seychelles 272, 274, 304, 337–339 Diego Suarez, Madagascar 53n20, 69, 73, 78n126, 82, 84, 85, 219, 316 Domoni, Anjouan 176 Du Port, Mahé 263n253 Durban, South Africa 41, 269n283, 282 Dzaoudzi, Mayotte 17, 152, 154, 156, 162, 309, 315, 316, 322 Dziani Dzaha, Mayotte 317 East London, South Africa 138n11 Eden, Mahé 263n253, 267n272 Europa, taaf 23, 51, 88, 220n99, 221, 332n83, 332n84, 333 Farquhar, Seychelles 263, 272, 274, 337, 338 Fianarantsoa, Madagascar 53, 95, 102n212 Fomboni, Mohéli 140, 152, 179–181, 183, 185 Fort Dauphin, Madagascar 12, 53n20, 64, 65, 67, 84 Glorioso, taaf 23, 51, 88, 141n24, 220n99, 221, 304, 333 Goa, India 6, 9, 10, 14n34, 150 Goodlands, Mauritius 240 Grande Comore, Comoros 72, 137–140, 142–145 Grande Terre, Mayotte 309 Great Chagos Bank, biot 3, 336, 338, 349, 352 Gujarat, India 60, 149, 202 Gulf of Aden 26, 26n70, 27n70, 28, 30–32, 40, 296 Hadramaut, Yemen 143, 144 Hargeisa, Somaliland 299 Iavoloha, Madagascar 91 Ilakaka, Madagascar 121 Île de France (Mauritius) 221 Imerinkasinina, Madagascar 98 Inner Islands, Seychelles 3, 6, 51n9, 263, 265, 266n271, 268

378 Itsandra, Grande Comore 143, 171 Ivato, Madagascar 85, 108n229 Johanna (Anjouan) 12, 64n69, 152 Karthala, Grande Comore 3, 138, 140, 153, 166, 191n211 Kerala, India 9 Kerguelen, taaf 1n3, 220n99, 221 Kilwa, Tanzania 6–8, 10, 63n64, 143, 149, 150 Kingany, Madagascar 63n64 Kismayo, Somalia 41n105 Kolkata, India 17 Koshikode, India 9 La Digue, Seychelles 17, 263, 265 La Grille, Grande Comore 138, 191n211 Lakshadweep, India 3, 32 La Misère, Mahé 279, 280 Lamu, Kenya 6, 143 La Saline, Reunion 220 Le Port, Reunion 219 Mahajanga, Madagascar 53, 59, 64, 122, 137 Mahébourg, Mauritius 225 Mahé, Seychelles 230n125, 263, 265, 267, 270–272 Majunga, Madagascar 53, 59, 60, 67, 73, 81, 95, 166 Malindi, Kenya 6, 7n15, 8, 9, 150 Mamoudzou, Mayotte 137, 140n19, 309, 315, 319, 327 Maore (Mayotte) 137, 156, 309 Maputo, Mozambique 106–108, 142 Marion, South Africa 1n3 Masoala, Madagascar 52 Mazalagem Nova, Madagascar 64n67 Mitsamihuli, Grande Comore 171, 196 Mogadishu, Somalia 6, 7n15, 8, 9 Mohéli, Comoros 72, 137, 140–197 passim Mombasa, Kenya 6, 7, 10, 17, 28, 41n105, 64, 149, 150 Montagne Posée, Mahé 297, 299 Morne Brabant, Mauritius 222, 222n103 Morne Seychellois, Mahé 263 Moroni, Grande Comore 24, 33, 140–197 passim Mozambique Island, Mozambique 6, 10, 64, 150, 151

Indian Ocean Place Names Index Muscat, Oman 144 Mutsamudu, Anjouan 140, 152, 176, 320 Mwali (Mohéli), Comoros 137 Nacala, Mozambique 150 Nampula, Mozambique 151 Ndzuani (Anjouan), Comoros 137 Ndzuwani (Anjouan), Comoros 137, 147n52 Ngazidja (Grande Comore), Comoros 137, 144n35, 145n41 Nosy Be, Madagascar 33, 59, 72, 127, 133 Nosy Boraha, Madagascar 12, 65 Nosy Lava, Madagascar 84 Ntsaoueni, Grande Comore 143n30 Nzwani (Anjouan), Comoros 137 Outer Islands, Seychelles 3, 263–265, 268, 272, 274, 287, 298n412, 337 Pamandzi (Petite Terre), Mayotte 309 Pande, Mozambique 333 Pelindaba, South Africa 21n51, 353, 354 Pemba, Mozambique 137 Pemba, Zanzibar 158, 177n159 Peros Banhos, Chagos 336, 338, 343, 344 Perseverance, Mahé 263n253, 298 Persian Gulf 4n5, 6, 36, 143 Petite Terre, Mayotte 309, 316, 317, 319 Phoenix, Mauritius 225 Pierrefonds, Reunion 220 Piton de la Fournaise, Reunion 3, 138n10, 200 Piton des Neiges, Reunion 200 Pointe aux Sables, Mauritius 346n127 Pondicherry, India 230 Port des Galets, Reunion 17, 38, 201n8, 220 Port Elizabeth, South Africa 41 Port Louis, Mauritius 18, 46, 201, 222n102, 225, 230, 231, 255, 258 Port Mathurin, Rodrigues 259 Praslin, Seychelles 263–265 Prince Edward, South Africa 1n3 Puducherry, India 230 Puntland 31, 33, 299 Quatre Bornes, Mauritius 225 Red Sea 6, 143 Riche-Terre, Mauritius 255n226

379

Indian Ocean Place Names Index Roche-Bois, Mauritius 240 Romainville, Mahé 263n253 Rose-Hill, Mauritius 225 Rovuma, Mozambique 197 Sada, Madagascar 64 Saint-Benoît, Reunion 219 Saint Brandon, Mauritius 223 Saint-Denis, Reunion 17, 38, 201–203, 214, 217–220 Sainte Marie, Madagascar 12, 65, 72, 220 Sainte-Marie, Reunion 12 Saint-Joseph, Reunion 203 Saint-Louis, Reunion 218, 219 Saint-Paul, Reunion 202, 203 Saint Paul, taaf 220n99 Saint-Pierre, Reunion 202, 214, 218 Sakaraha, Madagascar 124, 124n299 Salomon, Chagos 336, 338, 343, 344 Sangani, Grande Comore 171 Serampore, India 11n27 Seychelles Bank 263 Silhouette, Seychelles 263, 266n271 Simon’s Town, South Africa 41 Soalala, Madagascar 122 Socotra, Yemen 3, 19 Sofala, Mozambique 6, 7, 7n15, 10, 63n64, 149, 150 Soleil, Mahé 263n253 Somaliland 31, 33, 34, 81, 271, 299

Southern Coral, Seychelles 263 Ste. Anne, Mahé 264 Tamatave, Madagascar 17, 53, 60, 67, 73, 75, 79, 85 Tampon, Reunion 214 Tananarive, Madagascar 53 Tarim, Yemen 144 Temane, Mozambique 333 Toamasina, Madagascar 17, 53, 95–97, 124 Tôlanaro, Madagascar 53, 121, 122 Toliara, Madagascar 1n1, 53, 95, 124 Tranquebar, India 11n27 Triolet, Mauritius 240 Tsaratanana, Madagascar 51n12 Tsimiroro, Madagascar 123, 333 Tuléar, Madagascar 53, 60, 69, 77, 83, 84, 86n150 Unguja, Zanzibar 158 Vacoas, Mauritius 225 Vallée de Mai, Praslin 264 Victoria, Seychelles 17, 18, 34, 262, 263n253, 264–266, 269, 277 Zambezi, Mozambique 10n26, 257 Zil Elwannyen Sesel (Outer Islands), Seychelles 263

Subject Index abolition 15, 56, 74, 144, 154, 231, 268, 338 Abu Dhabi 38, 40, 219, 287, 303, 315 Afghanistan 35, 353 African and Malagasy Union (amu) 83, 87 African Development Bank (AfDB) 119, passim African Growth and Opportunity Act (agoa) 124, 125 African Union (au) xi, xii, 15, passim Algeria 74, 75, 80–82, 208n42, 212, 279 al-Qamar 50, 137n5 Antalaotra 8, 63, 67, 150 Antarctica 51, 215 Arab League 45, 135, 180, 184, 186, 187, 192, 306, 330, 335 Arab trade 6–8, 63, 143–144, 266 Arabic 4, 6, 57, 69, 135, 149, 155, 311 Arabs 8, 10, 17, 50, 65, 137, 142, 145, 146, 148, 158, 312 aromatic plants 13, 154, 176 Atlantic Charter 307 au Border Programme 141, 331 au Maritime Strategy 43 au Operation Democracy 182, 183, 188 Australia 18, 28, 45, 280 Austronesian migrations 6, 61–63, 142 Bahr al-Zanj 6 Bahrain 30, 36 Balladur visa 175, 188, 189, 317–320, 325, 336 Bangladesh 20, 24 Bantu expansion 62 Batavia 11, 64, 229 Benin 169, 173n140, 183 Berlin conference 16, 73, 206 Betsimisaraka 54, 67, 69, 69n85 blue-water capability 34, 35, 39 border delimitation 88, 141, 327, 331–334 Borneo 49, 57, 62 boundary disputes 23, 42, 331–334 British East India Company 11 British Indian Ocean Territory (biot) 19, 22, 37, 199, 223, 272, 306, 328n73, 337–355 exclusive economic zone 22, 337, 342 marine protected area 348–351

British navy 14, 19, 269, 340 buccaneers 12, 65, 66, 151 Burkina Faso 178 Cairo 354 Canada 122, 123 Canton, China 60 Cape Colony 12, 14, 68 Cape Town 12, 41, 64, 68n84, 171, 229, 321 cartazes 10 Catholicism 10, 58, 202, 222, 228, 265 Chagos exclusive economic zone 22, 337, 342 forced removals 342–345 litigation 345–348 uk–us military agreement 338–340 Chagos Refugees Group (crg) 346–348 China x, 4, 8, passim military 40 Chinese expeditions 8, 9, 31 city states 6, 142n27, 143, 149 climate change 26, 44, 305 cloves 52, 63, 121, 139, 149, 153, 193 coconuts 13, 139, 153, 199, 223, 268, 336, 338, 343 Code de l’indigénat 74, 75 Code noir 204 coffee 13, 52, 89, 121, 199, 204, 205, 230 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (comesa) 185, 212, 256, 257 Commonwealth 45, 253, 293 Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 245 Communauté française 81, 82, 155 Comoros colonization 151–153 economic citizenship program 187, 194 economy 191–197 exclusive economic zone 142, 195, 197 fisheries 185, 195, 196n238 Fomboni agreement 179, 181, 183, 185 foreign relations 184–190 gender equality 165, 192 geography 137–139 great wedding 145–149, 164 high-school state 164

381

Subject Index human development 139n14, 191, 192n220 independence 160–162 industry 192 languages 149 mediation 175–179, 257n239 mercenaries 167–172 military 190 oil 197 plantations 149–154 population 139, 140, 143, 144, 145 presidential guard 167, 169–174, 175n153, 186 religion 145–147, 165 remittances 136, 140, 148, 187, 193, 195 sanctions-busting 171 secessionism 175–179, 181–183 settlement 142–144 slave trade 134, 144, 145, 151 slavery 144–145, 154 sultanates 135, 143, 144, 150, 153n71 tourism 195, 196n241, 197 copra 139, 268, 276, 338 Corruption Perception Index (cpi) 100, 129, 192, 250, 295 corsairs 231, 267 Cotonou Agreement 124, 125 counter-piracy xiii, 27–31, 288, 296–301, 303 Creole language 203, 228–229, 266 Cuba 279 dahalo 134 Dakar 95, 97 Danish East India Company 11n27 demilitarization 20–21, 353–354 Diego Garcia naval base 19, 21, 36, 336, 351–353 Djibouti 31n80, 36, 38, 81, 219, 300, 315 Dutch East India Company 10, 11, 64, 229 East of Suez policy 19, 36, 272, 316 Economic Commission for Africa (eca) 119, passim Equatorial Guinea 216, 293 Estado da India 10, 150 État d’Anjouan 177 Ethiopia 300 eu Outermost Region 24, 37, 212, 215, 306, 328–331

eu Sugar Protocol 251 eu Treaty of Amsterdam 212, 328 European Council 328, 329 European Court of Human Rights (echr) 347, 349, 355 European Union (eu) 21, 24, passim exclusive economic zones (eezs) 4, 21–24, passim factories 11 Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) 44, 131 Françafrique 169, 175, 325 France 2, 51, passim military 21, 37, 38, 174, 184–190, 219, 220, 315–317 Franco-Malagasy wars 73 French Constituent Assembly 78, 155, 207n38, 209, 322 French East India Company 151, 203, 230 French Foreign Legion 38, 219, 309, 316 French Guiana 200, 207, 215, 325, 328 French navy 168, 297 Gabon 167n113, 171 Germany 3n4, 16, 73n99, 99, 141, 244, 251, 281, 291, 317 Gini coefficient 192, 243, 294 Gondwana supercontinent 3, 50, 263 grands blancs 13, 71, 152, 202, 205–207, 266–269, 271 Guadeloupe 200, 207, 211, 215, 218, 314, 325, 328 Guangdong 60, 122 Guantánamo 351 Guinea 81 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 185, 187, 302, 303 Hadrami 8, 143, 144, 149 Hong Kong 122, 247, 255 Horn of Africa 27, 36, 62, 262 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (iiag) 129, 244, 294 Imerina 13, 50, 66–76 indenture 15, 16, 39, 199, 202–206, 229–232, 259, 268, 269, 338 India 1, 39, passim

382 Indian navy 39, 40, 127, 133, 255, 283n344, 302 Indian Ocean Commission/Commission de l’Océan Indien (ioc/coi) 46, 47, 135, 199, 212, 214, 254, 257, 303, 304, 334, 336 Indian Ocean Island Games 334 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (ions) 39–41 Indian Ocean Rim Association (iora) 45 Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (ior-arc) ix, 45 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (iotc) 1, 44 Indonesia 11, 52, 54, 229 International Court of Justice 348 International Criminal Court (icc) 186 International Labor Organization (Ilo) 74 International Monetary Fund (imf) 89, passim International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) 22, 342, 349 Iran 28, 147, 185–187 Iraq 35, 353 Islam x, 3, 6, 7, 9, 59, 63, 135, 144–149, 151, 164, 228, 312 Islamic Development Bank 187, 192 Italy 127, 236, 251, 291 Jakarta 11, 64, 229 Japan 11, 28, 31, 122, 126, 127, 185, 188n196, 277, 291, 293 Java 11, 63, 229 Juan de Nova exclusive economic zone 332 oil 51n11, 331–333 Karana 59, 60, 89 Katanga 169 Kenya 6, 41n105, 64, 80, 123, 139, 149, 150, 178, 297n403, 304 Khoi 62 Kuwait 35, 36, 168, 187 kwassa-kwassas 318–320, 327, 330 Lampedusa 318 Lesotho 195 Libertalia 66, 151 Libya 182, 184n183, 186 listening posts 35, 38–40, 127, 171, 279, 317

Subject Index Loi-cadre 81, 155 Lomé Convention 125, 245, 277 London Missionary Society (lms) 57, 58, 68, 69, 71, 74 Macau 290 Madagascar 1947 insurrection 79 biodiversity 52 colonization 71–73 economy 118–128 export processing zone 92n169, 121, 124 First Republic 80–85 fisheries 126–127 Fourth Republic 101n206, 103–110 geography 50–51 human development 128–131 independence 81 industry 124–126 language 57 mediation 91, 105–114 menalamba uprising 76 military 131–134 mining 121–123 nationalism 60–61 oil 123 politique des races 74–76 population 53–56 religion 58–59, 70–71 Second Republic 86 settlement 61–63 slave trade 66–68 slavery 56, 71 social orders 55 Third Republic 90, 91 tourism 127, 128 Majunga massacre 59, 166 Makonde 14 Makua 14, 54n23, 144, 151, 269n283, 311 Malacca Strait 40 Malawi 14, 270 Maldives 3, 24, 30, 32, 47, 290, 334n94 malgachization 57, 85–90, 93, 119 mare liberum 9 Martinique 200, 207, 211, 215, 218, 314, 325, 328 Mascarenes 4, 6, 8, 14, 64, 67, 70, 135, 198, 204, 231, 259 slave trade 14, 135, 144

383

Subject Index Mauritius economy 241–253 ethnic communities 225–229 exclusive economic zone 225 export processing zone 246, 255n226 fisheries 252n211 foreign relations 253–257 gender equality 244 geography 223–225 human development 243, 244 indenture 15, 39, 232 independence 235 industry 246–248 information and communications technology 249–250 international financial services 249 language 228–229 malaise créole 16, 227, 235, 240n152 military 257, 258 plantations 230, 231, 246 population 225, 228 religion 228 republic 235 settlement 229 slavery 230–232 sugar 230, 245, 251 textile industry 246–247 tourism 252 Mayotte departmentalization 156, 322–325 economy 312 exclusive economic zone 38, 142, 219, 220, 316, 331, 332 geography 309 human development 313–315 immigration 317–320 la vie chère 314 language 311 military 315–317 population 310–312 religion 312 social unrest 314, 327 tourism 310 Middle East 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 135, 186, 262 militarization 20, 28–31 military powers 19, 34–40, 64, 68, 355 Millennium Development Goals 100, 129, 191, 293

monsoon 4–6 Morocco 186 mouvances 106, 107, 115, 116, 146 Mozambique 4, 6, 10, passim Mozambique Channel 4, 12, 23, passim Multi-Fiber Arrangement (mfa) 125, 247 Namibia 80, 109, 172 Napoleonic Wars 14, 68, 152, 201, 231, 259, 267, 321 négritude 207 New Seychelles 288, 295, 305 Nigeria 42 Non-Aligned Movement (nam) 19, 87, 279, 341 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato)  30 Norway 123, 293 notables 145–149, 164, 167, 173 nuclear arms 19–21, 353–354 oau. See Organization of African Unity (oau) ocean floor minerals 3 oecd. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) Old Colonies of France 200, 322 Operation Atalanta 30, 31, 33, 296 Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 45, 57, 113, 135, 253 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) 119n283, passim Organization of African Unity (oau) 19, 42, passim Organization of Islamic Cooperation 45, 135, 306, 335 overseas department/Département d’OutreMer (dom) 200, 206–208, 211, 216–218, 304, 306, 314, 315, 325–328 overseas territory/Territoire d’Outre-Mer (tom)  2, 155, 322, 329 Pakistan 20, 40, 234 Paris Treaty of 1814 14, 68, 152, 204, 231, 259, 267 Pelindaba Treaty 353, 354 petroleum highways 23, 136, 333, 337 piracy xiii, 26–34, 63–66, 132, 258, 296–301, 303

384 plantations 13, 15, passim Portugal 9–10, 63, 150, 196 privateers 231 Protestantism 58, 59, 70, 71, 76 Qatar 36, 187, 194, 303 Reunion administration 212 autonomy 208–212 departmentalization 206–209 economy 204, 205, 213–216 exclusive economic zone xvii, 219, 220 fisheries 215 geography 200–201 human development 213 indenture 205 la vie chère 217 language 202, 203 military 219–221 plantations 203–206 population 201, 202 religion 202 settlement 203–205 slavery 204 social unrest 216–219 tourism 215 Rodrigues administration 260 economy 259, 261 geography 258 settlement 259 tourism 261 Russia 29, 48, 126, 127, 196, 252, 291, 296 Sakalava 54, 67, 69, 72, 142, 152, 321 San 62 Sao Tomé and Príncipe 265 Saudi Arabia 36, 146, 168 Scattered Islands 22, 23, 37, 46, 51, 88, 220n99, 221, 224, 316, 331 scramble for Africa 16, 73 Seychelles blue economy 44, 291, 305 coast guard 297, 300, 303 counter-piracy xiii, 296–301 coup d’état 274–275 economy 267–269, 277, 288–293 exclusive economic zone 263

Subject Index exiles 270–271 First Republic 274 fisheries 277, 291 foreign relations 299–305 geography 263 human development 277, 293–296 independence 271–274 language 266 mercenary invasion 281–283 military 276, 283, 298, 300 nature conservation 26, 264 oil 292 piracy 296–301 plantations 267, 268 population 264–266 religion 265 Second Republic 275 slavery 267–269 Third Republic 284 tourism 290–291 tuna 277, 291 sharifu 144, 146 Shia Islam 147 shipping lanes 4–5, 27, 305 Shirazi 143 Singapore 235, 254 slave trade 7, 14, 15, 68, 135, 144, 145, 151 slavery 13–15, 56, 68, 144n35, 145, 154, 205, 229–232, 268, 269, 310n5, 338 Small Island Developing States (sids) 26, 44, 244 Somalia 26–34, 262, 296–301 South Africa ix, 18, 41, passim South African navy 41 South Korea 44, 122, 126, 127, 291 Southern African Development Community (sadc) 24, 61, 105–106, 185, 199, 304 Soviet navy 19, 21, 35 Soviet Union 19, 20, 35, 87, 132, 279, 316 Spain 31, 126, 196, 277 spice route 11, 65, 198, 204, 229, 259 Sri Lanka 11, 20, 121, 299 steamships 17, 269 stone towns 7, 143 Sudan 182, 186, 307 Suez Canal 17, 72, 198, 316 sugar 6, 13, passim Sumatra 63 Sunni Islam 3, 144, 146, 312

385

Subject Index supertankers 4, 27, 28, 136, 316, 333 Swahili coast 8, 10, 150 Swahili trading posts 6, 64, 143 Taiwan 32, 126, 132, 196, 246 Tanganyika 16, 157 Tanzania 41, passim Tanzania People’s Defense Force 164, 276 telegraph 18, 270 territorial claims 4, 22–23, 51, 88, 253, 327, 331–334, 341 tirailleurs 79 Transparency International (ti) 100, 129, passim Tromelin 22, 220, 223, 253 un Charter 209, 307, 330, 343–345 un Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) 19, 21, 22, 51, 141, 303, 304, 327, 331, 333, 342 un Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) 350 un Decolonization Declaration 22, 37, 88, 274, 306–309, 322, 333, 338, 344 un Development Programme (undp) 119, passim un General Assembly (unga) 20, passim un Human Rights Committee 227, 345, 348 un Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc) 27, 32, 33, 297, 298 un Security Council (unsc) 27, passim un Trusteeship Council 307 unclos. See un Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) unctad. See un Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) undp. See un Development Programme (undp)

unga. See un General Assembly (unga) United Arab Emirates 33, 36, 40, 187, 219, 287, 291, 298, 302 United Kingdom 22, 36, passim military 36–37 United Nations 19, 44, passim United States x, 19, passim military 35–36, 351–355 unlicensed fishing 24, 43, 127 unodc. See un Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc) unsc. See un Security Council (unsc) us Africa Command 36 us navy 30, 36, 258, 300, 338, 351–355 vanilla 13, 52, 121, 139, 154, 168, 193, 214, 268, 269, 309, 312 Vanilla Islands Organization 47, 128, 288, 291, 303, 334 Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 11 war on terror 35, 300, 347, 353 Western Sahara 186 WikiLeaks 224, 347, 349 World Bank  27, 28, 32, passim World Economic Forum (wef) 244, 290 World Food Programme (wfp) 28, 30, 131 World Trade Organization (wto) 251 Yao 14 Yemen 3, 8, 19, 143, 269, 300 ylang-ylang 139, 154, 193, 214, 309, 312 Yugoslavia 279 Zanzibar 6, 14, passim Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty 73n99 Zilois 338 Zimbabwe 169, 178, 304 zone of peace 20–21, 88, 353–354