Africa in Global Power Play : Debates, Challenges and Potential Reforms 9781905068623

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Africa in Global Power Play Debates, Challenges and Potential Reforms

Published by Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd P.O. Box 43418 London SE11 4XZ http://www.adonis-abbey.com Email: [email protected]

First Edition, September 2007 Copyright 2007 © Bhekinkosi Moyo British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 9781905068616 (HB) 9781905068623 (PB) The moral right of the author has been asserted All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted at any time or by any means without the prior permission of the publisher.

Printed and bound in Great Britain

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Africa in Global Power Play Debates, Challenges and Potential Reforms

Edited by Bhekinkosi Moyo

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Table of Contents Abbreviations

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Acknowledgements

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Preface

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…………………………………………………………………………….. Introduction Africa in Global Power Play Bhekinkosi Moyo 15 ……………………………………………………………………………….. PART I: AFRICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ………………………………………………………………………………... Chapter 1 Africa in Global Economic and Political Power Relations Bhekinkosi Moyo 30 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 2 Resource Extraction and African Underdevelopment Patrick Bond 47 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 3 The ‘Insurrection’ of Subjugated Knowledge: Towards an emerging ‘Post Western’ Asymmetric Africa Nhamo Samasuwo 75 …………………………………………………………………………………. Chapter 4 In Whose Debt? Debt Cancellation and Democracy in Africa Steven Friedman 87 ……………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 5 Africa’s Debt and the Politics of Aid Barbara Kalima-Phiri 95 …………………………………………………………………………………

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Content

Chapter 6 The Commission for Africa Report: Turning Big Ideas into Action Fletcher Tembo 107 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 7 The Commission for Africa Report: Sanctimonious Word-Mongering and Hypocrisy Revisited Ann Talbot 127 ……………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 8 The Commission for Africa and Africa’s Potential to be a Major Global Power Waldron H. Giles 145 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 9 Africa’s Global Futures Nigel Gibson 160 …………………………………………………………………………………. Chapter 10 Reforming World Trade, Aid and the Security System Cedric de Coning 176 ………………………………………………………………………………….. PART II: FOREIGN RELATIONS AND REGIONAL ISSUES ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 11 Uncertain Hegemon: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in Africa Laurie Nathan 187 ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 12 South Africa’s Leadership Role in the Great Lakes: Burundi and the DRC David Monyae 200 ………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 13 Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS Issaka K. Souaré 220 …………………………………………………………………………………..

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Chapter 14 The Territory is Cameroon but the People are Nigerians: Resolving the Bakassi Peninsula Conflict Kenneth Omeje 234 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 15 The Moods of a Bitter Nation: Understanding Zimbabwe’s Politics (1980-2005) Norman Mlambo 252 ……………………………………………………………………………….. PART III: MIGRATION, THE DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA’S POSITION IN WORLD AFFAIRS ……………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 16 Africa’s Dual Brain Drain: Skilled Migration and Terminal Brain Drain Amadu Kaba 273 ……………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 17 The African Union’s Diaspora Strategy: Mobilising a Constituency for Africa in the U.S Melvin P. Foote 288 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 18 Why Africa is not Israel in Today’s African-American Thinking Rudolph Lewis 298 ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 19 Immigration and Government Failures in the 21st Century in Africa Cage Banseka 312 ………………………………………………………………………………… PART IV: HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE ………………………………………………………………………………… Chapter 20 Political Violence and Terrorism in a Global Context Marcel Kitissou 325 …………………………………………………………………………………

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Chapter 21 African AIDS and Human Rights Raymond Downing 341 ………………………………………………………………………………… Notes on Contributors 348 …………………………………………………………………….………………… About the journal, African Renaissance 356 ………………………………………………………………………………………. Index 357

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Abbreviations AAUC ACCORD ACHAP ACOTA ADB AEC AFM AFRODAD AISA AMIB AMIS ANC APF APRM ASEAN AU BBC BNC BWIs CCJP CDF CEMAU CEN-SAD CFA CFA CISDL CJTF-HOA COMESA CNN COSATU CPS CRC CSO

African American Unity Caucus African Centre for Conflict Resolution of Disputes African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance African Development Bank African Economic Community Apostolic Faith Mission African Forum and Network on Debt and Development Africa Institute of South Africa African Union Mission in Burundi African Mission in the Sudan African National Congress Africa Partnership Forum African Peer Review Mechanism Association of South East Asian Nations African Union British Broadcasting Cooperation Bi-National Commission Breton Woods Institutions Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Commander of Defence Forces Central Economic and Monetary Union Community of Sahel-Saharan States Constituency for Africa Commission for Africa Centre for International Sustainable Development Law Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Cable News Network Congress of South African Trade Unions Centre for Policy Studies Convention on the Rights of the Child Civil Society Organisation viii

Abbreviations

DAC DPSA DFA DFID DPKO DRC DTI ECCAS ECOMOG ECOSOC ECOWAS EEC EMIS EPAS EU FDI FWACC G-4 G-8 GATT GDP GMO GNI GNP GPOI GRJ HIPC IBSA ICD ICJ IDASA IDC IFF IGAD IGOs IJR IMF IOC

Development Assistance Committee Department of Public Service Administration Department of Foreign Affairs Department for International Development Department of Peace Keeping Operations Democratic Republic of Congo Department of Trade and Industry Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group Economic and Social Council Economic Community of West African States European Economic Community Education Management Information Systems Economic Partnership Agreements European Union Foreign Direct Investment Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce Group of 4 Group of 8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Genetically Modified Organism Gross National Income Gross National Product Global Peace Operations Initiative Guta Ra Jehova Highly Indebted Poor Countries India-Brazil and South Africa Inter-Congolese Dialogue International Court of Justice Institute for Democracy in South Africa Independent Development Cooperation International Finance Facility Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Inter-Governmental Organisations Institute for Justice and Reconciliation International Monetary Fund Indian Ocean Commission ix

Abbreviations

JCC MCA MDC MDGs MDRI MONUC NAACP NAFTA NAM NCA NEPAD NGO NJ OAU ODA OECD OPEC PRSPs PSI RAPID RDJTF RECs SABC SACU SADC SAMSA SAPES SAPs SCAPO SCNC SDECE SDI SECC STATS-SA TNOCs TSI

Joint Ceasefire Commission Millennium Challenge Account Movement for Democratic Change Millennium Development Goals Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative United Nations Mission in the Congo National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People North American Free Trade Agreement Non-Aligned Movement National Constitutional Assembly New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non Governmental Organisation New Jersey Organisation for African Unity Overseas Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation of Petroleum Countries Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Pan Sahel Initiative Research and Policy in Development Programme Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Regional Economic Communities South African Broadcasting Cooperation Southern Africa Customs Union Southern Africa Development Community South African Maritime Safety Authority Southern Africa Political Economy Series Structural Adjustment Programmes Southern Cameroon People’s Organisation Southern Cameroon National Council Service de Documentation et de Contre Espionnage Spatial Development Initiative Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee Statistics South Africa Transnational Oil Companies Trans-Saharan Initiative x

Abbreviations

UCT UCC UEMOA UK UKZN UMA UN UNDP UNECA UNICEF UNISA UNO UNOB UNSC UNWESP US USEEUCOM USSR WABA WART WAWA WAWU WAYU WFP WHO WTO ZAOGA ZANU PF ZAPU PF ZCC ZCTU ZDF ZUD

University of Cape Town United Church of Christ Union Economique et Monetaire’ out-Africaine United Kingdom University of KwaZulu Natal Arab Maghreb Union United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa United Nations Institute for Children’s Educational Fund University of South Africa University of New Orleans United Nations Operation in Burundi United Nations Security Council United Nations World Economic Status and Prospects United States US-European Command Union of Socialist Soviet Republic West African Banks Association West African Road Transporters West African Women’ s Association West African Workers Union West African Youth Union World Food Programme World Health Organisation World Trade Organisation Zimbabwe Assemblies of God of Africa Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union Patriotic Front Zion City Church Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions Zimbabwe Defence Forces Zimbabwe Union of Democrats

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Acknowledgements The production of this book would not have been possible without the active participation of the contributors. Each and every one of them worked tirelessly to see their chapters through. I want to extend my sincere appreciation to everyone who contributed to this book in one form or another. It is not an easy task to coordinate and then edit a volume from different ideological standpoints and geographical locations, unless there is a strong political will among the participants. I was fortunate that all contributors made timely submissions and were passionate about their work. During the compilation and editing of this book, I got invaluable support in many ways from many people. It is not possible to mention everyone; however I want to make special thanks to a few that played significant roles. First, I want to thank my family (Vanessa and sons), without whose support the book would not have seen the light of the day. My family sacrificed the pleasures of a resident father and went on as if I was a visiting ‘dad’ in my own house. This book is therefore a dedication to them and to all who supported the project from the beginning to its completion. I want also to extend my gratitude to Jideofor Adibe (Editor and Publisher of African Renaissance) who, after reading my article on ‘Africa and the World: 2004-2005’ suggested that I take on the task of editing a volume of articles on ‘Africa in Global Power Play’, many of which had already been published in the various volumes of the African Renaissance journal in the period 2004-2006. By the time the book went to print, some chapters especially those on the Commission for Africa had been overtaken by events. However their importance lies in the fact that they provide the historical background to what became the year of Africa and through these chapters, we are able to continually monitor the pledges and commitments of the G.8 Summits. While working on this manuscript, I came across a 2006 article on ‘The 21st Century scramble for Africa’ by Margaret Lee in the Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24 (3):303-330. The article captured the theme of the book in more ways than one. I am thankful to Professor Margaret Lee and Professor Roger Southall (Managing Editor of the journal) for allowing me to reprint the article in this book. However due to factors beyond my control I had to withdraw the article. I xii

Acknowledgements

suggest strongly that readers get a copy of the article for it places a number of arguments in this book into context. In the same manner I also want to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Patrick Bond of the University of KwaZulu Natal’s Centre for Civil Society and Katherine Burton of the Centre for Political Ecology for granting permission to reprint Professor Bond;s article on ‘resource extraction and African underdevelopment’, originally published in Capitalism Nature Socialism 17 (2): 5-25, 2006). Both Lee and Bond’s articles are a must read for all who are interested in Africa’s position in the contemporary world order. The two articles complement each other: while Lee talks about the depletion of Africa’s resources as a ‘scramble’, Bond refers to the same phenomenon as ‘looting’. Institutions play critical roles in the production of knowledge and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) did just that. The bulk of the work on the book was done at IDASA. I want to thank in particular, Paul Graham for not only allowing me space to grow but also for his strong dedication to and passion for democracy-building in the African continent. At TrustAfrica, where the final edit was done, my colleague, Jeanne Elone went through the manuscript meticulously. I am thankful for her proof-reading and editorial skills. There are many friends and colleagues who played important roles during this period; my prayers are with ‘YOU’ at all times. Above all, I thank GOD ALMIGHTY for his PATIENCE and GUIDANCE. B.M: Dakar, June 2007

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Preface In October 1415, a gift from the ruler of the Kingdom of Malindi arrived at the Ming Emperor’s court in Nanching. The giraffe caused a sensation. It was but one manifestation of the re-establishment of contacts between humans long separated from their original roots on the African continent. In 1428, for example, the emperor of Ethiopia proposed an alliance with Alphonso of Aragon to include a marriage of their children and the exchange of artisanal skills. Unfortunately these early contacts were quickly menaced by more hostile and exploitative relations and Africa found herself submerged by the race for territory and resources. Despite the diversity of the continent, Africans continue to seek a common future and a role on the globe mediated by African institutions of a continental and regional nature. But as the countries of Africa attempt to forge democratic societies which will enable them to establish peace and prosperity and to overcome the trials of the recent past, the world in which they do this is changing. Global uncertainties, market constraints, international obligations and transnational institutions, forces and mores make the challenge either for individual countries or for the continent as a whole more critical and more difficult. This publication is an attempt to understand the new terrain in which the struggle for self-government, for people’s power has to take place. For better or worse, Africa’s destiny has never been capable of achievement in isolation. Indeed, having populated the world, it is inevitable that it should be the place in which the world’s challenges have to be resolved – inequality, poverty, disease, identity, violence, reconciliation, dependency, freedom. Fortunately Africa’s greatest wealth has always been not her natural resources, substantial as those are, but her people and their capacity for wisdom, community and solidarity. They will all be needed if the countries of Africa are to become good societies rather than private playthings. As an institute committed to building democratic societies in Africa, we are glad that this book is available to help us understand how best to do this in the new world of the 21st century. ____________ Paul Graham, Executive Director: Institute for Democracy in South Africa xiv

INTRODUCTION

AFRICA IN GLOBAL POWER PLAY Bhekinkosi MOYO Africa’s position in the current international ‘calculus of power’ presents the continent with the opportunity and the leverage to emerge as a potentially important and decisive actor. This will depend, however, on Africa’s means of engagement with new actors on the continent. The continent’s global economic, political, social and cultural position in the world is a subject that has attracted the attention and “pens” of many scholars and researchers in the past decades. With the economic rise of China and to a lesser extent, that of India, the attention has increased and Africa’s relation with external forces has become a cause for concern. This book is therefore one of many contributions to that debate. It is certainly not the first or the only collection of articles on Africa’s position in the world within the last two or three decades. There is voluminous literature on Africa’s engagement with global powers (Schoeman 2000; Herbst 1996; Mlambo 2004; Lee; 2006; Munene 2005; Stephan et al, 2006; Botha 1982; Helleiner 1985; Hovet 1963: Mayall 1971; Adedeji 1993; Calvocoress 1985; Mowoe 1986; Rivkin 1962; Munro 1976; Bruntrup 2006; Engel &Olsen 2005; Harrison 2004; Gibert 2004; Haberson & Rothchild 2000; Mshomba 2000 and Ihonvbere 2000). The book is nevertheless unique in the sense that it is a collection from different hemispheres and professions, covering a diverse set of themes through which Africa’s relations with the world are analysed. The book looks at Africa’s position in the world through different prisms (migration, human rights, economics, politics, culture, foreign relations and health). More importantly is the fact that many of these chapters were published previously in the various issues of the African Renaissance Journal, (published in London by Adonis and Abbey Ltd) between 2004 and 2006. Authors revised and updated their chapters in line with the theme of the book: ‘Africa in the global game of power relations’. Some of the chapters especially on the Blair Commission for 15

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Africa have been overtaken by events in the sense that the Commission itself is now probably ‘dead and buried’ with the end of Tony Blair’s term of presidency. However, the importance of the chapters lies in their historical location of the commission and the evolving nature of the G.8. The book also includes a reprint of Patrick Bond’s article on ‘Resource Extraction and African Underdevelopment’ which was first published in Capitalism Nature Socialism, Volume 17, Number 2, June 2006 and reappeared as a longer version of the argument in Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation, London, Zed Books, 2006. Another article that we intended reprinting in the book is Margaret Lee’s ‘Scramble for Africa’ which can be obtained from the Journal of Contemporary African Studies (Volume 24, Number 3, September 2006). Three more new chapters were solicited. Africa in Global Power Relations Africa occupies a peculiar position in global relations, particularly in the fields of politics, economics, culture and even social interactions. In the new world order that is characterised by global power shifts, Africa finds herself in many ways having to contend with the stark realities of inevitable interactions and continuous contradictions as well as complex tensions between the continent and the rest of the world. Prior to the early 21st Century, it was imperialism, colonization and globalization that marginalised Africans and their economies. Today, globalization has added new elements to its destructive machinery. In the early 21st Century, Africa is ‘caught up in the latest version of globalization’ (Munene 2005:123); that manifests itself in the US’ unilateral approach and its concomitant fight against global terrorism; the rise of China and India; the undemocratic nature of the United Nations’ Security Council; the hyper-powerful financial institutions and their neo-liberal agenda; unjust trade regimes and the crises of debt. These are just but tips of icebergs. Africa confronts many obstacles in attempting to integrate its peoples, goods and services into the global economy. In the political arena, Africa is continually bombarded with the latest versions of democracy, good governance, human rights and the rule of law. Very few of these initiatives are home-grown; indeed even the latest and fashionable development projects; such as, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) are normally accused of 16

Introduction

having been crafted in the West and modelled against neo-liberal policies of the international financial institutions. In addition, Africa’s cultures and traditions have been subsumed by the latest notion and practice of modernity, technology and cyberspace. Very little exists of African identities. These are the realities that confront Africa in the 21st Century and yet Africa has become the ‘pawn in the hands of the socalled great powers, as it was during the Cold War… (Lee 2006)’. The New Scramble for Africa A new scramble for Africa in the 21st Century is on the rise (Lee 2006; Dawood 2005; Abramovici 2004; Watts 2006). Margaret Lee’s article; The 21st Century Scramble for Africa (2006) explores and summarizes the different dimensions, tenets, and motives behind the renewed interest in Africa, particularly by external forces, the US., European Union and China. Lee describes the new scramble for Africa as bi-faceted. The one is that which views Africa as a ‘basket case’ that needs to be ‘saved’; the other sees Africa as a source of raw materials and minerals. In other words, there is a humanitarian (saving) face and an exploitative (capitalist) one. The imperialist face is driven by ‘an aggressive consumer capitalism that destroys and exploits everything in its path, including people, in the name of capital accumulation or profit making (p.303)’. Lee calls this face, ‘Naked Imperialism’. In her view, external actors make no pretence or apology that their involvement in Africa is purely self-interested and use all means to gain access to Africa’s markets. There is no doubt that Africa is one of the ‘richest continents in the world’; endowed with ‘oil, natural gas, uranium, coal, gold, diamonds, copper, iron, chrome, lead, zinc (ibid)’; among many other minerals and raw materials. This kind of scramble for Africa’s wealth was neatly described by Daniel and Lutchman (2006) in their article ‘South Africa in Africa: Scrambling for Energy’. The authors argued that although: Africa is gaining centre stage in South Africa’s unfolding energy strategy; South Africa is however finding out that there are other energy hungry powers scrambling for Africa’s power resources (p.485).

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As these writers rightly observe, ‘this competition is just but one of the many emerging changes and shifts to the political economy of the continent (ibid)’. Having withdrawn interest in Africa in the 1990s up to the early 2000s, Western nations left the space open for South Africa to occupy. According to Daniel and Lutchman: The Western withdrawal from Africa coincided with South Africa’s post-1990 ‘discovery’ of the African market…what this meant was that for the best part of the decade 1994-2004 not only was South Africa the ‘new kid on the block’ in the African market place, it was also frequently ‘the only show in town’ (2006:492).

Daniel and Lutchman continue to argue that in the last years, however, the West as well as the East’s interest in Africa have been revitalised. In their view: Under the impact of global and globalizing forces, the door to the African economy was flung open in the 1990s but often it was only the South Africans that entered. However…this has changed and South Africa is increasingly finding itself having to share its place at the table with two big players in the form of the US and China; and two important regional actors in the form of India and Brazil. What these countries have in common-is their growing focus on Africa’s energy and mineral resources, amongst which the first prize is oil (ibid).

South Africa is therefore not the only interested party or investor in the continent. A significant number of non-African actors have ‘sprinted’ to Africa. This scramble for Africa’s oil and other raw materials is also discussed elsewhere (Abramovici 2004; Watts 2006; Le Pere 2007). Abramovici for example wrote in Le Monde diplomatique (July 2004) that: The United States is turning its diplomatic and military attention to Africa, not just to the continent’s oil and natural gas supplies but to its metal and industrial diamond resources. It is quietly establishing military training and equipment links with a number of countries to secure future supply lines.

According to Abramovici, Washington has realised that it is dependent on raw materials from Africa (ibid) and as a result the US has a two-pronged strategy in Africa; the first being ‘unlimited access 18

Introduction

to the key markets, energy and other strategic resources; and the second is the military securing of communication lines, particularly to facilitate the transportation of raw materials to the US. Most major energy providers are also battling it out on African oil fields (Dawood 2005). According to Watts (2006) a recent report in the Financial Times (March 1, 2006) ‘IHS Energy-one of the largest oil industry consulting company, expects African oil production, especially along the Atlantic littoral, to attract “huge exploration investment” contributing over 30 percent of world liquid hydrocarbon production by 2010’. The US and multinational companies’ interest in Africa will certainly grow in the years to come. What is even more interesting is that the US’ interest in Africa is not only confined to oil and other minerals; it is also geared towards ‘keeping China (for oil business) and Islamic terror at bay’. Hence according to Watts, Africa is the “new frontier” in the fight against revolutionary Islam. Africa’s geo-political importance has also seen Chinese officials making safari tours to Africa. The recent one was in early January 2007 by the Chinese President; Hu Jintao. This occurred just some months after the first ever China-Africa Summit in Beijing towards the end of 2006. China’s interest in Africa has also raised questions such as; has China’s long history with Africa that was based on common interest and the fight against imperialism given way to a mercantilist predator and a capitalist China (see Le Pere 2007; Moyo 2006)? Undoubtedly, China is a fast growing economic power and internationally, China is asserting its presence. According to Dawood (2005) ‘China’s demand for oil is projected to reach 12.8 million bpd, which will impact significantly on world oil trends.’ A number of works are being produced on China-Africa relations. Margaret Lee (2006) describes in detail the relationship between China and Africa in terms of oil, timber and other mineral resources, investments, trade and armaments (p.319-324). This introduction therefore serves only as a pointer to these issues rather than a substantive discussion of them. However what is particularly interesting about China’s presence in Africa is that African leaders and other analysts are convinced that China presents a unique opportunity for African countries to alter and shift power relations between the North and South (see Samasuwo, in this volume). African states have embarked on ‘Look East’ policies consciously in the hope that China will come to the table as a

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development partner. To illustrate the significance of China in the present ordering of the world, Stephan et al (2006) argued: In 2006, China is breaking not just the rules but the global mould. And the poor countries of the world and especially Africa, those countries who were often trapped in the Twilight zone of being exporters of commodities, are cheering…China is making the likes of Africa economically relevant again; it has restored Africa’s comparative advantage in the classical sense, a comparative advantage that can also be profitable. The result? Since 2001, Africa’s GDP has been expanding faster than world GDP. FDI is flowing in far greater quantities to Africa… (p.181).

They further state that: Without the advent of the new China and the economic rise of the populous Asia at large, it is difficult to see how Africa could have escaped the economic graveyard of commoditization…in the 21st Century; Asia is throwing Africa a lifeline. How wisely Africa uses this Oriental lifeline over the next two decades will determine whether it can yet escape that marginalised destiny towards which so many Afro-pessimists still feel it is marching (ibid, p.182).

China is therefore seen in many circles, as ‘a friend of Africa’. The same applies to India whose presence in the continent is also gradually increasing in the various sectors of the economy and in politics. In line with the view that sees China as an ally in liberating Africa from its development conundrum is the other face of the scramble for Africa; the one that perhaps dominated the headlines and put Africa on the ‘conscience’ radar of the international community. As noted earlier, this is what Lee (2006) calls the ‘Saving Africa’ face. Again, both the West and China are involved in this campaign to “help” Africa address its economic and political challenges. According to Lee: The Saving Africa orientation is primarily motivated by competition among the Western Powers and China to be the one perceived to be the most committed to decreasing Africa’s marginalisation within the world economy (p.303).

This is done through increasing development aid which manifests itself in many programmes and initiatives (ibid). These include the UN 20

Introduction

Millennium Declaration, the G8, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Commission for Africa, among many others. The Commission for Africa was perhaps the closest to a “Marshal Plan” for Africa; hence it took centre stage in many international platforms. The Commission’s report is thoroughly discussed in this book. Most discussions on the report show that the preparations and the activities leading to the launch of the report and the subsequent holding of the G8 summit in Gleneagles under the chairmanship of Britain, relegated Africa to the margins as an object of Western sympathy instead of a ‘player’ in the international arena (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). According to Lee (2006) and several other contributors in this book, the ‘Saving Africa’ orientation has lost its appeal and has instead given way to the ‘Imperialist Face’ of the scramble for Africa. And as Ann Talbot also argues in her chapter, Lee (2006) concluded that: It does appear that Saving Africa was a convenient disguise to mask the real intentions of the Western powers to have continued access to the markets and natural resources of Africa (p.310).

It is perhaps in the continent itself that interest in African affairs has not declined. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, the drive towards harmonisation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the on-going debate on the Union Government, various structures and programmes of the African Union and the new ‘repentance’ by civil society organisations to work constructively with the state (notable shift from a confrontational approach) are just but few manifestations of the drive to restore Africa’s position in the world. There are many other positive developments taking place in Africa. More often, these developments are not ‘showcased’ in ways that present Africa as a significant player in global power relations. Paul Wolfowitz, former president of the World Bank, for example, remarked in 2006, quoting the Gallup Survey, that Africans are the most hopeful people in the world. According to this survey, ‘Africans are the most hopeful while Europeans are the most prosperous but less hopeful’. This is an important asset for the African continent. As Nigel Gibson argues in this book, Africa’s population is its greatest asset. This optimism stems from Africa’s economic performance and political stability in recent years. For example, ‘since 1995, 15 countries 21

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excluding those with oil resources had a median growth rate of 5.3% (Wolfowitz 2006; UNWESP 2006)’. There have also been improvements in other fields such as primary health, access to education and infrastructure development among others. The AU Heads of State and Government Summit in Addis (January 2007) made equally bold steps and adopted the much awaited Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Wolfowitz’s remarks that ‘Africa is not just about poverty, famine, diseases…It is also a land of stock exchanges, skyscrapers…’ ought to be taken seriously by those who have an interest in the continent. And as Schoeman (2000) argued, Africa has two faces; prosperous but also full of challenges. Some of these challenges include poverty, HIV/AIDS, Malaria, unemployment, unfair trade and conflicts. For example, ‘between 1981 and 2002, the number of people trapped in poverty nearly doubled from 164 million to 303 million. By 2015, this number is projected to rise to 336 million (Wolfowitz 2006)’. Africa’s increasingly strategic position in the global arena forces it to contend with the realities of this new world order. However as the discussion above demonstrates, Africa has the leverage to determine the methodological approach as well as the rules of engagement in its international relations. Indeed, Munene argues that ‘African nations should decide what is acceptable to them and reject that which is detrimental to their interests’ (Munene 2006:123). The fact that Africa is once again a focus of interest is not a new phenomenon. Perhaps what is needed this time is Africa’s determination never again to emerge a loser in its relations with external actors. Indeed Harry Stephan, Michael Power, Angus Hervey and Raymond Fonseca (2006) argue in their recent book; The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A view from the South: [After] the fall of the Soviet Union, weak African states lost their autonomy as they could no longer play one super power off against the other. The re-emergence of a multi-polar system, however, will once again allow African states to bargain for better terms of trade among the competing powers. The process is infact beginning to emerge. Strategically, the U.S has seen fit to create a new naval base off the West African coast, as it moves its oil dependency from the Gulf to emerging African wells. At the same time, Russia has become the second largest exporter of energy resources…China is creating strategic alliances with oil rich states in the Far East and

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Introduction

Africa…Africa’s rich endowment in resources has led to a Chinese courtship; the magnitude of which was probably last seen during the days of the Cold War, albeit at the time mainly for ideological and political rather than economic reasons. This renewed interest in Africa undoubtedly changes the rules of the game once more but it remains to be seen whether Africa can take full advantage in order to create sustainable and lasting benefits (p.10).

Chapters in this book address this very question: will Africa take advantage of the new Scramble for its resources, space and attention and craft new rules of engagement that will see Africa emerge as a global player? Viewpoints are as varied as the contributors but the overriding theme is concern over Africa’s development trajectory and the position that Africa occupies in global power relations. Structure of the book The book has four broad sections. The first section looks specifically at Africa’s position in international political economy. Chapters address issues of aid, trade, the new scramble for Africa, the extraction industry and the underdevelopment of Africa, the reform of international institutions, globalisation and the various initiatives that have been designed to “save Africa” to borrow from Lee’s characterization of the new interest in Africa. The section begins with a chapter on Africa in global economic and political power relations. This chapter, in a way is a “snapshot” of the issues confronting Africa’s position in the global economy. It argues that Africa continues to be marginalised despite improved economic growth rates. This section also includes a discussion on the reform of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. Other chapters that look at these institutions are those by de Coning, Samasuwo and Gibson. There is also a discussion on China’s presence on the continent and the implications thereof for development (Samasuwo, Moyo and Talbot). The discussion on the new interest in Africa’s natural resources and markets includes reprint of Bond’s discussion on ‘resource extraction and the underdevelopment of Africa”. Friedman and Kalima-Phiri focus on debt cancellation. They both argue that debt cancellation is necessary for African development. However, both are concerned that most of these processes are not 23

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citizen based. Friedman, for example, argues that there is a case for debt write-offs given the fact that most of these debts were incurred by states without the consent of their citizens. And Kalima-Phiri traces the African debt crises arguing that most of what Africa repays to the West is enough to address Africa’s development challenges. Kalima-Phiri further delves into the politics of aid, arguing that aid normally works in favour of donor countries. The discussion on aid is linked to the theme in chapters by Tembo, Talbot and Giles. The three look at the Commission for Africa and its implications for Africa’s position in the world. Tembo, for example, argues that if the Commission’s report does not address issues of leadership, is not kept alive and credible, it risks failing to turn its big ideas into action. There is a possibility that it may be relegated to history archives. As the book went to print, one could conclusively argue that the report had been relegated already to the ‘dustbins of history’. Talbot is of the view that the Commission for Africa report as well as the hype that accompanied the G8 summit in Gleneagles, the live 8 and other campaigns were nothing but a ‘gimmick’ for political mileage and a marketing strategy for multinational companies. The second section of this book focuses on foreign relations and regional issues. In particular, two chapters look at South Africa’s “Africa policy” and the remaining three discuss regional challenges and potential action plans in West Africa and Southern Africa: Zimbabwe, in particular. The discussions on South Africa show that since 1994, the country has become Africa’s engine for economic growth and the ‘face’ of Africa in international affairs. Nathan argues that South Africa has developed a coherent Africa policy even though at times its policy looks contradictory. A discussion of South’s Africa’s policy in a book of this nature is not only necessary but appropriate. South Africa competes with other investors in Africa and her Africa policy sets the country apart from other investors in the continent. South Africa seeks to develop the continent as Monyae’s chapter shows, for example, in Burundi and the DRC. Monyae’s chapter traces South Africa’s leadership role in the Great Lakes Region and details the various development programmes that South Africa has implemented in Burundi and the DRC. Regional integration is also put in the spotlight. Souare discusses ECOWAS’ challenges and successes as well as its impact on the region’s development. Kenneth Omeje is particularly 24

Introduction

interested in the conflict that has ensued for many years between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. He argues that even though the conflict has been resolved legally by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this has not addressed issues of identity, citizenship, nationhood and other socio-cultural factors. Hence the title of his chapter: ‘The territory is Cameroon’s but the people are Nigerians’. When this introduction was written, Zimbabwe was undergoing a serious economic and political crisis. Africa and the rest of the world had been drawn rightly or wrongly into resolving the crisis. The US, EU and UK had imposed targeted sanctions on ZANU PF officials hoping to resolve the crisis. However as of 2007, these sanctions had not delivered the expected and desired results. South Africa on the other hand was put under pressure to take a radical and some would say a “principled” position on Zimbabwe. South Africa’s position has been that Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and Zimbabweans should solve their own problems. Norman Mlambo looks at the history of the crisis in his article called “the moods of a bitter nation”. Nigerians in Cameroon are in today’s definitions and characterization immigrants (or living in Diaspora). This is the discussion in section three which focuses exclusively on migration, development and implications for Africa’s position in the world. Banseka looks at factors that lead to many Africans moving to Western nations. He argues that the failure to govern properly is a major catalyst in migration. Of course this is very much linked to economic opportunities which are not available in many African states. And because there are many Africans now living abroad, Melvin Foote looks at the strategies that the African Union can use in order to mobilise resources and build constituencies in the Diaspora. In a fascinating essay, Rudolph Lewis, looks at the mindset of AfricanAmericans towards Africa. He argues that unlike the Jewish community in the U.S. and in Europe, whose love for Israel is unsurpassed, African-Americans do not have the same passion for Africa. Instead there are serious myths and suspicions between Africans and African-Americans that persistently keep them apart. The unfortunate dimensions of migration are outlined by Amadu Kaba who discusses the dual brain drain as a result of migration and HIV/AIDS.

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The discussion on migration and HIV/AIDS is linked to the last section’s themes: human rights, HIV/AIDS, political violence and terrorism. All these chapters address the question of Africa’s position in the world. They point to challenges and opportunities in Africa’s relationship with global powers. However these chapters also offer optimism that Africa can turn the tide and emerge as a decisive player in global power relations, if and only if, the continent takes charge of the ‘rules of engagement’ and determines its own priorities. Whether it is land reform, public health, economic relations or political partnerships, Africa’s test now is how to handle and manage the new scramble for Africa. References Abromovici, P. 2004. ‘United States: The New Scramble for Africa’. Le Monde diplomatique, July 8-9. Paris. Adedeji, A. 1993. Africa within the World: Beyond dispossession and dependence. London: Zed Books. Botha, R.F. 1982. The Development of Africa and the Role of outside Powers. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. Bruntrup, M. 2006. Africa, Regional Cooperation and the World Market: Socio-Economic Strategies in times of global trade regimes. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Calvocoress, P. 1985. Independent Africa and the World. London: Longman. Council on Foreign Relations. 2006. ‘2005 Was the Year for Africa, But We Missed the Point’. In More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic US Approach Toward Africa. New York: Council on Foreign Relations: 40-54. Daniel, J. & Lutchman, J. 2006. ‘South Africa in Africa: Scrambling for Energy’. In Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., & Lutchman, J. (eds.) State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006. Cape Town: Human Science Research Council: 484-509. Dawood, A. 2005. ‘New Scramble for Africa’. Al-Jazeerah, July 21. Engel, U. & Olsen, G.R. 2005. Africa and the North: Between globalisation and marginalisation. London: Routledge. Gilbert, E. 2004. Africa in World History: From prehistory to the present. Upper Saddle River: N.J: Pearson Educational.

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Haberson, J.W. & Rothchild, D. 2000. Africa in World Politics. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. Harrisson, G. 2004. The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States. London: Routledge. Helleiner, G.K. 1985. Africa and the IMF. Washington, D.C: IMF. Hetbst, J. 1996. ‘Africa and the International Economy’. In Mills, G. & Handley, A. (eds.) From Isolation to Integration? Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. Hovet, T. 1963. Africa in the United Nations. London: Faber. Ihonvbere, J.O. 2000. Africa and the New World Order. New York: Peter Lang. Lee, M.C. 2006. ‘The 21st Century Scramble for Africa’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies: 24 (3): 303-330. Le Pere, G. 2007 (ed.). China in Africa: Mercantilist Predator, or Partner in Development? Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue/South African Institute of International Affairs. Mayall, J. 1971. Africa: The Cold War and After. London: Elek. Mlambo, N. 2004. ‘Africa and World Bodies.’ In Hugo, P. & Maloka, E. (eds.) State of Africa: 2003-2004. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Mowoe, I.J. 1986. Africa and the West: The Legacies of Empire. New York: Greenwood Press. Moyo, B. 2006. ‘China in Africa: An Asset or Threat?’ Inside AISA, April-May. Mshomba, R.E. 2000. Africa in the Global Economy. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Munene, M. 2005. ‘Africa and Shifting Global Power Relationships’. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs: 29 (2): 117-124. Munro, J. F. 1976. Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960. Dent. Rivkin, A. 1962. Africa and the West: Elements of the free World Policy. London: Thames and Hudson. Schoeman, M. 2000. ‘Africa and the World’. South African Journal of International Affairs: 7 (1). Stephan, H. et al. 2006. The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South. Cape Town: Renaissance Press. Watts, M. 2006. ‘Empire of Oil: Capitalist Dispossession and the Scramble for Africa’. Monthly Review: 58 (4), September.

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Wolfowitz, P. 2006. ‘Africa’s Role in an Inclusive Global Economy’. Remarks at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (Tokyo): May, 29. UNWESP. 2006. World Economic Situation and Prospects. New York: United Nations.

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PART I AFRICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

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CHAPTER 1

AFRICA IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER RELATIONS Bhekinkosi MOYO Introduction Perhaps in more than any other period in history, in 2005, the world turned its attention to Africa. Africa’s economy had performed well and continues to do so in 2006/7 period, particularly vis-à-vis macroeconomic and structural reforms. According to the 2006 United Nations World Economic Status and Prospects Report, Africa is economically and politically stable (UNWESP 2006). The operationalisation of the African Peer Review Mechanism in Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritius, Ghana and South Africa as well as the accession of 27 countries in total to the APRM is a step towards a well governed continent. The adoption of the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in January 2007 by the AU Heads of State and Government was a watershed event for Africa and its peoples. Peaceful elections in many African countries and in particular, in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 signalled the deepening and consolidation of democratic culture and politics. Furthermore, under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, fourteen countries were approved for debt cancellation and others will follow as soon as they fulfil the requirements. This chapter departs from Maxi Schoeman’s observation that, ‘there are two ways of looking at Africa in global power relations. The one is to look back and bemoan Africa’s failures, challenges and weaknesses; the other is to list Africa’s achievements and celebrate them’ (Schoeman 2000). While aware of the many challenges that Africa still confronts in the global power play, this chapter is a celebration of Africa’s efforts and achievements. The chapter is also a contextualization of Africa’s position in the world within particular historical moments. During the Cold War, for instance, Africa was an important “attraction” for the superpowers. The United States of 30

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America and the Soviet Union vied for Africa as a means of spreading their respective ideologies: democracy for the US and communism for the USSR. In many ways, Africa’s significance only lay on its availability as a vehicle for the “contestation of these ideologies”. It is from this historical context that Africa’s position and marginalisation in global power relations should thus be understood. Take for example, the United Nations, which was established as a platform for collective action on issues of international security and peace. In its early years, and today most importantly, the UN represents a strategic venue for African countries to advocate for their concerns with a united voice, or what is normally called “common position”. Despite this, the UN has never treated Africa as an equal with other regions. Africa is marginalised; the continent still does not have permanent representation in the Security Council. Africa’s treatment is even more undemocratic when it comes to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation. Be that as it may, there has been some renewed focus on Africa. In the past five years, Africa been significantly featured in the G8 and UN summits. African countries have also taken advantage of South-South relations, notably, through the G-77 plus China, Non Aligned Movement and India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) in addressing issues of trade, aid and development. Indeed Africa has also taken cognizance of China and India’s emerging economic status and made a conscious decision to “look East”. The recent China-Africa Forum Summit in Beijing in 2006 displayed the seriousness with which Africa and China are strengthening their ties. China-Africa relations have become even more relevant as the ‘shift occurs from American perspectives to Asian conceptions of democracy, development, human rights and the rule of law’ (Economist 2006). Africa in international politics The end of the Cold War provides a starting point from which to analyse Africa’s marginalisation in world politics. According to Jeffrey Herbst, this is due partly to the fact that great powers viewed Africa as an ‘extension of their strategic economic interests.’(Herbst 1996) He argues that, ‘the US and the Soviet linked their support for Africa’s political and economic development to their global competition.’ But 31

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when the Cold War ended, so did the superpowers’ interest in Africa. Africa’s marginal position in international politics is nowhere defined more clearly than in the United Nations. Africa and the United Nations In post-colonial, independent Africa, the UN is an important and strategic institution. Akinrinade (1998) maintains that ‘most African countries have used the UN to achieve their foreign policy objectives’. The UN has, for the most part, provided a platform for African states to pursue their interests. Further the UN has also given Africans the opportunity to lobby for collective agendas particularly in areas of shared interest, values and principles. The UN has been active in Africa for many years now to address Africa’s problems (Mlambo 2004). For the most part, the UN has been active in peacekeeping, in the horn of Africa and Central Africa. It has also acted as the main multilateral platform in development, security and human rights issues. The Millennium Declaration’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are benchmarks that African countries use to measure progress on development. Despite all this, however, Africa remains marginalized in representation, decision-making and priority setting. The failure to reform the Security Council to date is a manifestation of Africa’s marginalisation in the UN system. Although the reform agenda dates back to 1945, it was only in the 1960s that developing countries demanded representation in the various bodies of the UN. This pressure resulted in the expansion of the Security Council to fifteen (15) members and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to fifty-four (54). Due to space constraints, this chapter does not deal with the literature on the UN reform prior to 2005. Instead, the chapter, in particular, this section, focuses primarily on the recent debate that was initiated by Kofi Annan through processes such as; the “Cardoso Panel”, the “Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change”, the “Millennium Project” and “In Larger Freedom”. The debate on the reform of the UN took centre stage in the various summits of the African Union (AU). The AU contributed by developing its own position called, “Ezulwini Consensus”. The consensus positioned itself on several issues, including, the expansion of the Security Council, the strengthening of the General Assembly, the 32

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transformation of the Human Rights Commission; the establishment of a Peace Building Commission; the creation of a Democracy Fund; and ways of improving the effectiveness of the Secretariat. The AU position fed into the UN Summit Outcome document that made a number of commitments. Some of them included, development, combating terrorism, peace keeping and peace building, responsibility to protect, human rights, democracy and rule of law, management reform, protection of the environment, humanitarian assistance, international public health and updating the UN Charter. African heads of State and Government expressed their concern that collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could be exploited by great powers. Zimbabwe’s President; Robert Mugabe, for example, said at the UN General Assembly: A reformed United Nations should be one that plays a key role in coordinating developmental issues… should not be one filled with vague concepts that provide an opportunity for those states that seek to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Concepts such as ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ need carefully scrutiny in order to test the motives of their proponents. (President Robert Mugabe, 2005)

Other African presidents, in particular, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, also criticized the Summit for failing to pronounce on non-proliferation, disarmament and the expansion of the Security Council. In truth we have not made the decisive progress we thought we would make with regard to the critical issue of the reform of the United Nations. We have therefore had no choice but to postpone to a later date the decisions we should have made…our approach to the challenge to commit and deploy the necessary resources for the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals has been halfhearted, timid and tepid. (President Thabo Mbeki, 2005)

Although the above shows that African leaders continue to play considerable roles in the UN and contribute to the debate around reforming the UN, Africa’s position in global power relations remains 33

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marginal. In the Security Council, for example, African countries that serve as non-permanent members exert very little influence. Real power rests with the Permanent Five (US, China, UK, France and Russia). Although there is widespread consensus that the ‘Council’s composition should be more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of geo-political realities’; Africa has not yet been granted permanent representation. The current state of the Security Council led the AU to demand the following: Full representation of Africa in the Security Council means: (i) not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto; (ii) five nonpermanent seats’ (AU/Ezulwini Consensus 2005).

In October 2005, the AU decided in an Extra-Ordinary Meeting of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa to test the Ezulwini Consensus in a special vote in the United Nations General Assembly (Dlamini-Zuma 2005). The AU position is a shift from the 1997 OAU Harare Declaration that emphasised rotation (Maloka and Moyo 2005a). The position demands permanent seats and the veto. According to Roshdy, it is ‘nothing but Harare minus the rotation’ (Roshdy 2005). The AU position generated two dominant schools of thought, meaning those that were pronounced the loudest. The first school argued that the AU position was based on principle and therefore it was appropriate for Africa to take a hard-line position on the veto. This school argued that this was necessary to address the continent’s 60 years of oppression. According to this view, it was pragmatic and tactical for Africa not to accept a formula that would not deliver fullveto power to Africa’s representation. The Institute for Global Dialogue in South Africa, particularly through researchers Ikome and Samasuwo, questioned the logic of compromising Africa’s position before diplomatic negotiations had begun. (Ikome and Samasuwo 2005) The two scholars quoted a Benin official saying, ‘we have no apologies to make. We are seeking to remedy an injustice and you do not remedy it by compromising.’ Ikome & Samasuwo maintained that: In reaching an early compromise...the continent was actually giving away more than it would have gained…making too many

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compromises at the early stages…would only have weakened the AU’s bargaining position. (Ikome and Samasuwo 2005)

The second school argued that the AU’s hard-line stance contributed to Africans ‘shooting themselves in the foot.’ Maloka and Moyo, for example, argued that although the position was based on principle, it was nevertheless not practical as a strategy. The two maintained that: Although Africa’s common position is well intended…it is a strategic error; for it misses the only chance that would strengthen the persuasion of the UN to expand the Security Council… the decision reflects concerns and interests of a geopolitical nature rather than the strengths and interests of Africa. (Maloka and Moyo 2005b)

This school’s argument was shared by many others including South Africa’s ambassador to the United Nations. Addressing delegates at the Institute for Global Dialogue conference on the United Nations, Ambassador Kumalo questioned the logic of Africa’s position. On the debate on the restructuring of the Security Council, Africa has decided to be the only continent to take a regional approach to this matter. The question then becomes whether Africa’s strategic decision to bind itself to a regional position is indeed in the best interests of the continent. Whilst it is true that Africa’s quest for absolute equality in the Council is indeed a principled position, the question remains whether it is realistic as a strategy.(Ambassador Kumalo, 2005)

This chapter contends that the two perspectives should be harmonised. It is important to uphold the principle of developing a common African approach to global issues. However, the preoccupation with the reform and expansion of UN Security Council need not overshadow broader institutional and doctrinal reforms. Because of the nature of the Security Council enlargement proposal, the AU position should have been (or should be) and can still be crafted in a way that enables interested and capable African countries to adopt individual positions without having to be seen as ‘breaking ranks.’ This way, countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt that were held captive by the AU had they wanted to negotiate with the Group of Four (G-4), can find their own way into the powerful Council. As a result of the AU’s intransigent demand for veto power and the 35

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obstinate resistance by the Permanent Five, the international interest of expanding the Security Council was compromised. In early 2007, the Security Council had still not been enlarged and there was no indication that it would be reformed soon. With Kofi Annan having left office, the momentum is likely to be lost. It remains to be seen how the new Secretary General will deal with the issue of Africa’s marginalisation in the UN, particularly in the Security Council. Africa and the Financial Institutions The World Bank and the IMF’s influences are felt more sharply in Africa than anywhere else in the world. Ever since the 1980s, the two premier financial institutions have been seen as complementing each other. On their establishment, however, their mandates were specific and different. It was only in the 1980s that the two expanded their scope of operations. In 1944, the bank financed long-term investment in member countries while the IMF provided short-term loans to overcome short-term balance of payment deficits (Ismi 2004). The US has always determined the direction of the two institutions. Hence Ismi argues that the ‘two are controlled by one dollar-one vote rather than one country one vote.’ The US’ voting share is 17.16% in the IMF and 16.41% in the World Bank (Ismi 2004). The US also appoints the President of the Bank. One of the latest appointments was that of Paul Wolfowitz, a former defence specialist and an architect of the war in Iraq. As Ismi shows, the US is the only country that enjoys permanent status among the Bank’s directors. This control has drawn the criticism that the US uses the two institutions for its foreign policy interests. When the US appointed Wolfowitz as the Bank’s President in 2005, there were concerns that he was strategically placed to promote US interests in Africa and the Arab world (Moyo 2005). Stein further illustrates the marginalisation of Africa in the governance of these institutions. He shows that in mid 1947, there were only two African countries among the 40 members of the Bank. In the 1960s and 1970s, the number of African countries increased comprising 35% of the total membership; however, their combined votes only represented 8.6%, while developed countries controlled almost 2/3 of the voting power (Stein 2004). Despite the under-representation of African states and their limited influence, these two institutions are critical in Africa: they determine how fast or slow African economies 36

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grow. For example, in the 1980s, their engagement with Africa was fairly positive. Mlambo (2004) argues that debt financing, exchange rate stabilisation and the provision of low interest loans to African governments were some of the positive aspects of this relationship. The oil crisis of the 1970s and 1980s severely undermined African economies, terms of trade deteriorated for the continent and African countries failed to recover. The IMF then provided assistance so that these countries could repay their debts and resuscitate their economies, thus, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were introduced as conditionalities for aid. In the early 1990s, 28 countries in Africa had standing agreements with the IMF (Herbst 1996). Mlambo argues that by the year 2000, financial institutions had provided concessional loans to more than 24 Sub Saharan countries. He argues that the major instruments used to engage Africa included the International Development Agency, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the Extended Fund Facility and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (Mlambo 2004). SAPs spoilt these positive engagements. SAPs associated the Fund and the World Bank with forced devaluation leading to the freefall of domestic currencies; forced privatisation of enterprises; lower purchasing power of the majority of the population; plummeting living standards; unemployment and retrenchments. In Ismi’s words, the two institutions ‘have forced Third World countries to open up their economies to the western penetration and increase exports of primary goods to wealthy nations.’ This has ‘increased profits for western multinational companies and subjugated Africans to low levels of poverty and marginalisation… the debt crisis of the 1980s gave Washington the opportunity to blast open and fully subordinate Third World economies (Ismi 2004).’ Africa and the G8 The G8 has its origins in the first meeting of finance ministers and governors of France, Germany, Japan, UK and US in the UK in 1967 (Jycox 1986). Since then the Group has included Italy, Canada and Russia. More recently, the European Union also attends the meetings. The last G8 meeting in Russia, was the 32nd. African leaders have been invited to take part on some of these meetings, for example in Kananaskis, Evian, Sea Island, Gleneagles and Russia. The Kananaskis Summit adopted an Africa Plan of Action to support NEPAD. The 37

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focus on Africa stemmed from other international initiatives such as the Millennium Declaration that had a section on Africa’s special needs. The pinnacle however was the 2005 G.8 Summit in Gleneagles, where the world leaders committed themselves to working with Africa on a number of fronts. The Summit promised 100% debt cancellation to an initial group of 14 countries in Sub Saharan Africa. Fourteen countries satisfied the criteria laid down by IMF and the World Bank under HIPC initiative. Another nine countries would also have their debts cancelled. The Summit also committed an extra $25 billion annually for Africa by the year 2010 (Financial Mail 2006). Most of these commitments reflect views in Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa that emphasised governance, capacity and infrastructure development. Nothing much however came out of the last G8 meeting in Russia. And the commitments of the G8 Summit in Gleneagles are still to be implemented. Africa and China If there is a discussion point in today’s international relations and notions of global power play, it has to be the rise of China. China’s emerging economic status is a threat not only to African countries but to established empires like the US. Its presence in Africa has raised the question whether it is an opportunity or a threat. China’s Africa Policy, unveiled in January 2006, portrays China as a natural ally to the African continent. The seriousness and vigour with which African leaders have welcomed the Chinese attest to the fact that they (African leaders) view China as a friend rather than an enemy. The recent China-Africa Summit in Beijing in 2006 was attended by almost all African Heads of State and Government. Further, China’s policy towards Africa emphasises multilateral cooperation, investments, trade, common development, solidarity and equality. This was given a boost at the China-Africa Summit, when China pledged billions of dollars to facilitate development in Africa. However, a critical look at China’s rise and renewed relations with countries such as Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Gabon, Algeria and Equatorial Guinea reveals China’s blatant self interest. China is a populous country and its emerging status as a leader in the global economy means that China will depend on and therefore needs raw materials 38

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such as oil and minerals. Hence Taylor’s view of Africa as, ‘a significant source of oil and minerals for China’s industrial expansion (Taylor 2005).’ Although China-Africa relations are traceable to colonial times (Guijin 2004); it is the contemporary global positions and relations between Africa and China that raise the question whether the two are engaging in a mutually beneficial relationship. China and Africa use the China-Africa Cooperation Forum to reach agreements on diplomacy, trade and investment relations. Africa, however, is the least developed and its economy is lagging behind that of other continents. China, on the other hand, is the fastest growing economy in the world. The Economist Magazine estimates that in 2026, China will be the strongest economy, surpassing that of the US. This raises the question, what kind of relations would exist between two unequal forces? Is the relationship not likely to be that between a “horse and its rider?” Wilson somewhat argues along the same lines, that: Not all African countries share a similar relationship with China. We are dealing with more than 50 African countries, each quite different from the others, and each with different relations with China; we are tracking and evaluating half a dozen critical foreign policy issues; from petroleum to foreign aid… (Wilson 2005).

It is indeed a reality that China has developed ties with certain countries based on its national interests. For example, China’s relations with South Africa and Nigeria are based on these countries’ strong economies and oil respectively. China has also cultivated relations with Sudan, Chad, Algeria, Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea due to their massive oil reserves. And countries such as Zimbabwe have developed a “Looking East” policy in order to access aid with “no strings attached.” The different categories of countries that China is doing business with reveal the self-serving nature of China’s presence in Africa and the countries concerned (Taylor 2005). It may therefore be true that during the Cold War, African countries viewed China as ‘one of their own’ based on China’s provision of medical doctors; hosting of African students and building of infrastructure. Today however, it is China’s quest for energy and other raw materials that drives its interest in Africa.

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As global demand for energy continues to rise, major players like the US, European Union, and Japan are facing a new competitor in the race to secure long term energy supplies: China. (Pan 2006)

Pan also argues that China’s foreign policy is based on the need to secure resources in order to sustain its economic development. He says that in the ‘first ten months of 2005, China invested a total of $175 million in African countries, particularly in oil exploration projects and infrastructure (ibid).’ China also bought 50% of Sudan’s oil exports; which account for 5% of China’s oil needs (ibid). In addition, there are allegations that China has been providing military equipment to militia in countries such as Sudan in exchange for oil. This is linked to Taylor’s criticism that China’s interests in Africa are based more on trade and investment, than ‘the principles that underpin the relation between Africa and the West.’ This is why China’s insistence that its policy is based on ‘non-interference in state sovereignty and freedom from hegemony appeals to most of African leaders.’ Taylor is convinced that China is in Africa to expand its trade. He says: It seems doubtful whether a more accommodating Chinese trade policy could help Africa, given that for most African countries, the greatest barrier to trade is the fact that they just do not have much to sell to China, apart from raw materials, whereas China exports the full gamut of manufactured goods and is rapidly overtaking Africa’s traditional European suppliers. (Taylor 2005)

Indeed, China has benefited in this relationship more than Africa. Pan shows that ‘Sino-African trade grew by 700% during the 1990s. And from 2002 to 2003, trade between China and Africa doubled to $18.5 billion. In 2005, it jumped to $32.17 billion’ (Pan 2006). This was due to increased oil from Sudan and other African nations, which China has signed trade agreements with. Wilson also shows that ‘China’s high demand for oil means that it imports 800 million barrels a year’ (Wilson 2005). In 2004, China paid about $10 billion for oil to oilproducing countries. China’s interest also lies in minerals. Wilson argues that China is the world’s largest user of copper and has invested $170 million in Zambian copper and other minerals (ibid). While it is clear that in the area of trade and economic development, China benefits most in Sino-Africa relations; in the 40

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political arena, Africa stands to benefit from these relations especially when it comes to multilateral forums. China is also likely to benefit as a member of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement especially in getting votes at the United Nations. Wilson is of the view that China provides unconditional aid in return for votes. For example China has cancelled debt worth $10 billion since 2000 for African countries (ibid). Indeed, like any other nation state, China is in Africa for its own interests. And there is a group of African countries that view China as their friend. These are in serious need for aid, which if given by the West would have strings such as practice of good governance, observance of the rule of law and building of democratic institutions attached. And because most of these countries have defied this, China is the alternative. Africa in the global economy In terms of global trade, Africa has lagged behind other regions since the end of the Cold War. Africa’s share of global trade fell from 6% in the 1980s to only 2% in 2005 (Economist 2006). There has been a decline since the 1960s of Africa’s per capita incomes and growth rates. Agricultural growths have been poor since the 1970s. The ‘debt burden has put pressure on the economy resulting in declining standards in the social sectors such as health, education and environment’ (ibid). Political conflicts continue in most parts of Africa, particularly in Darfur. Despite these concerns, economists predict that Africa’s economic growth will remain between 4 and 5% in 2006/7. Economists predict also that the price of commodities, for example, coffee, sugar and minerals will remain healthy in 2006/7 (ibid). According to the Economist, world oil prices will have different impacts. Those regions and countries that produce oil will benefit greatly while oil importers will suffer accordingly (Economist 2006). In 2006, the IMF predicted that high oil prices and rising crude oil production would boost economic growth. And the United Nations’ 2006 World Economic Situation and Prospects report argued that the world economic growth slowed in 2005 from its strong expansion in 2004. But in 2006, the world economic growth increased moderately at the rate of 3%. Although the US remained the main engine of growth, China, India and other developing countries were on the rise. The report argued that economic growth was not expected to recover from its fall in 2005 41

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especially in developed countries; in the US, growth was expected at 3.1% while in Japan it was to grow at the rate of 2.1% (UNWESP 2006). In developing countries, ‘economic growth was generally above the world average. Economic growth in developing countries was expected at the rate of 5.6%. And African economies were expected to grow at the rate of 5%.’ The report noted that Africa’s real GDP was estimated to have grown by 5.1% in 2005. And in Sub Saharan Africa, economic growth, excluding Nigeria and South Africa, averaged 5% in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, it remained at the same level. And most countries in the region achieved GDP growth rates of between 3% and 7% (ibid). South Africa’s economy grew by 5% in 2005 raising questions about the strength of the Rand. In February 2006, for example, Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka cautioned that the Rand had appreciated to undesirable levels. According to the UNWESP report, Africa ‘maintained its economic performance due to favourable conditions in agriculture, progress in macroeconomic and structural reform including the unification of foreign exchange markets and better public expenditure and financial management.’ However it is also a fact that some countries in Africa did not perform well in the past years, for example, Zimbabwe (ibid). Africa and trade Trade, debt cancellation and access to markets have set the stage for Africa’s engagement with the WTO, whose purpose is to liberalise international trade in order to discourage regional trade agreements. Regional trade agreements are based on preferential treatment among partners at the exclusion of others (Africa Report 2005). Although the WTO was only established in 1995 through the Marrakech Agreement, its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided a platform for Africa to negotiate on issues of trade. Formed in 1945, the GATT ‘regulated the manner in which national foreign trade policies were conducted to avoid a situation reminiscent of the 1930s where states tried to obtain economic advantage by restricting imports and dumping subsidised goods on other states’ markets’ (Draper and Khumalo 2005). Of all rounds, Doha created opportunities for Africa. Doha focused on fairer trade, agricultural reform, non-agricultural market access, and 42

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interpretation of WTO rules. These negotiations aimed at lowering barriers to trade globally with a special focus on developing countries, which have historically maintained that the multilateral trading system is unfair and unfavourable towards them. From Doha, these negotiations have been continually conducted on an annual basis. In 2003, trade ministers met in Cancun, Mexico to discuss agriculture, industrial goods, and trade in services and customs codes. The negotiations collapsed on the fourth day due to the failure to agree on farm subsidies and access to markets. Cancun presents the first time that developing countries resisted US, EU and other developed nations’ agenda. The G-20, in particular, India, China, Brazil and South Africa played leading roles in this process. At the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, modest results were achieved. Contrary to popular opinion and expectations, results were somewhat positive. There was a commitment to complete the Doha Work Programme and conclude the Doha Round of negotiations in 2006, although this has not happened. In fact, the negotiations collapsed in mid 2006. Another positive development was the deadline set for the elimination of agricultural export subsidies by 2013. According to UNWESP, this agreement ‘represents a substantial systematic advance by bringing agricultural trade further under the umbrella of general multilateral trade rules, which prohibit the use of export subsidies’ (UNWESP 2006). The third milestone to come out of the Hong Kong meeting was a limited ‘development package’ for Least Developed Countries. The package includes the permanent granting of duty free and quota free market access by both developed and developing countries. Another commitment made was that developed countries would eliminate all export subsidies for cotton in 2006 (WTO 2005). Conclusion Africa’s relation with the world in the fields of politics and economics has mainly been that of marginalisation. At the UN, Africa is still not represented at the Security Council, even though most of the security issues concern Africa. The World Bank and the IMF have through structural adjustment programmes ‘de-developed’ Africa and slowed economic growth. The results are devastating for Africa. Most countries have lost control of the economy and their sovereignty has 43

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been weakened. The multilateral trade system is still unfavourable to African economies and the Doha Round of Negotiations was not completed in 2006. However, not all is gloom and doom. The year 2005 was probably the best in the history of Africa’s quest for development. There was increased attention to Africa’s needs at both international and local levels. A number of initiatives were developed to address the development challenges that face Africa. Some of these included the Tony Blair Commission for Africa, the G8 commitment to write off debts for HIPCs and provide more aid in return for good governance and rule of law, as well as the UN Summit Outcome document that had a special section on Africa. Africa’s economic performance was also promising in 2005 and 2006 at a growth rate of more than 5%. This trend is expected to continue in 2007. Politically, there were signs of relative stability, a condition for economic development. South-South Cooperation was also given much impetus, with South Africa playing a leading role, as the Chair of the G.77 plus China in 2006. China’s rise heralded threats as well as opportunities for African countries. A number of countries in Africa have built relations with China on political and economic fronts. And likewise, China has begun investing in Africa especially in infrastructural projects. The flipside however is that there are concerns that China’s move towards Africa is purely “self-serving” and is based on economic profits. References Akirinade, S. 1998. ‘Africa and the United Nations’ (in S Akirinade, S & Sesay, A (eds) Africa in the Post-Cold War International System. Pinter: Virginia. Africa Report. 2005. Africa Survey: How the Continent measures up. 1: Quarterly, May. AU/Ezulwini Consensus. 2005 The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: Ext/Ex.CL/2 (VII), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 7-8 March. Dlamini-Zuma, N. 2005. Briefing on Outcomes of the African Union Extraordinary Summit regarding the United Nations Security Council. Pretoria: November, 1.

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Draper, P & Khumalo, N. 2005. Towards a fairer WTO for Africa. France-South Africa Symposium 2005: unpublished paper. (The) Economist. 2006. The World in 2006. London: Economist. Financial Mail.2005. South Africa in 2006: Your Essential Guide to the Year ahead. Johannesburg: Johnnic Publishing Media Services. Guijin, L. 2004. China-Africa Relations: Equality, Cooperation and Mutual Development. Paper presented at a Seminar on Sino-African Relations, organized by the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria: 9 November. Herbst, J. 1996. ‘Africa and the International Economy’ (in Mills, G & Handley, A (eds) From Isolation to Integration? Johannesburg: SAIA. Ikome, F & Samasuwo, N. 2005. From Addis to New York: Africa and the challenge of negotiating the complexities of UN reform. IGD Conference on South Africa’s Foreign Policy and the African Agenda on UN reform, Burgers Park Hotel, Pretoria: September, 8. Ismi, A. 2004. Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa. Halifax Initiative Coalition. [Online] Available at www.halifaxinitiative.org. Kumalo, D. 2005. Statement by Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo at the Conference on the UN at 60: Towards a new agenda? University of Pretoria, Pretoria: October, 27. Jycox, E.V.K. 1986. ‘Africa: Development Challenges and the World Bank’s responses’ Finance and Development. Maloka, E & Moyo, B. 2005a ‘Walking A tightrope: UN Reform, South Africa and Africa’, FOCUS, 40 (4), Quarterly Maloka, E & Moyo, B. 2005b. Briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs. Parliament, Cape Town: August, 26. Mbeki, T. 2005. Statement by President Thabo Mbeki to the High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly. New York: 15 September. Mlambo, N. 2004. ‘Africa and World bodies’ (in Hugo, P & Maloka, E. (eds) State of Africa: 2003-2004. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Moyo, B. 2005 ‘Wolfowitz at the top of the World Bank: Can he Change Africa for the Better?’ Inside AISA. no.2, April/May, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Mugabe, R. 2005. Address to the High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly. New York: 14 September.

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Pan, E. 2006. ‘China, Africa and Oil’ New York Times. [Online] Available at www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_011806.html?_r=1&oref=slogi n (2/13/2006). Roshdy, A. 2005. Why the Security Council could not be reformed? IGD Conference, UN @60. University of Pretoria, Pretoria: October, 2728. Schoeman, M. 2000. ‘Africa and the world’, South African Journal of International Affairs. 7 (1). Stein, H. 2004. The World Bank and the IMF in Africa: Strategy and Routine in the Generation of a failed Agenda. Michigan: University of Michigan. Taylor, I. 2005. ‘China-Africa: Who is using whom?’ The Africa Report: Africa Survey 2005. How the Continent Measures up. Quarterly no.1. Wilson, E.J. 2005. China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for US Policy, Testimony before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Human Rights and International Operations. Washington DC: July, 28. WTO. 2005. Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration. Hong Kong: December, 18. UNWESP. 2006. World Economic Situation and Prospects. New York: United Nations.

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CHAPTER 2

RESOURCE EXTRACTION AND AFRICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT Patrick BOND1

Introduction: Looting Africa Unequal trade and investment relationships are nothing new for Africa, although in recent months the world’s attention has been drawn to the continent’s plight as never before. However, in contrast to the neo-orthodox strategy implied by some high-profile anti-poverty campaigners, Africa’s deepening integration into the world economy has typically generated not wealth but the outflow of wealth. There is new evidence available to demonstrate this conclusively, just as the current global-scale fusion of neoliberalism and neoconservatism consolidates. In fact, the deeper power relations that keep Africa down (and, simultaneously, African elites shored up) should have been obvious to the world during 2005. It was a year in which numerous events were lined up to ostensibly help liberate Africa from poverty and powerlessness, to provide relief from crushing debt loads, to double aid and to establish a ‘development round’ of trade: • The mobilization of NGO-driven citizens campaigns like Britain’s Make Poverty History and the Johannesburg-based Global Call to Action Against Poverty (throughout 2005); • Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa (February); • The main creditor countries’ debt relief proposal (June);

1 ‘Resource Extraction and African Underdevelopment’ was originally published in Capitalism Nature Socialism. Volume 17: Issue 2, 2006 and is reproduced here by kind permission of The Center for Political Ecology, Copyright The Center for Political Ecology 2006 www.cnsjournal.org. A longer version of the argument appeared under the title Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (London: Zed Books 2006). My greatest appreciation goes to Joel Kovel for support during political struggles at the University of KwaZuluNatal in early 2006, and for extremely helpful editorial advice.

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• A tour of Africa by the new World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz (June); • The G8 Gleneagles debt and aid commitments (July); • The Live 8 consciouness-raising concerts (July); • The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals review (September); • The return to Nigeria of monies looted by Sani Abacha and deposited in Swiss bank accounts (September); • The IMF/World Bank annual meeting addressing debt and Third World ‘voice’ (September); • A large debt relief package for Nigeria (October); and • The deal done at the World Trade Organization’s ministerial summit in Hong Kong (December).

These all revealed global-elite hypocrisy and power relations which remained impervious to advocacy, solidarity and democratization. At best, partial critiques of imperial power emerged amidst the cacophony of all-white rock concerts and political grandstanding. At worst, polite public discourse tactfully avoided capital’s blustering violence, from Nigeria’s oil-soaked Delta to northeastern Congo’s gold mines to Botswana’s diamond finds to Sudan’s killing fields. Most of the London charity NGO strategies ensured that core issue areas – debt, aid, trade and investment – would be addressed in only the most superficial ways. The 2005 events also revealed the limits of celebrity-chasing tactics aimed at intra-elite persuasion rather than pressure. Tragically, the actual conditions faced by most people on the continent continued to deteriorate. Today, Africa is still getting progressively poorer, with per capita incomes in many countries below those of the 1950s-60s era of independence. If we consider even the most banal measure of poverty, most Sub-Saharan African countries suffered an increase in the percentage of people with income of less than $1/day during the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank itself concedes (World Bank 2006; Reddy 2006). Women are the main victims of systemic poverty and inequality, whether in productive circuits of capital (increasingly subject to sweatshop conditions) or in the ‘sphere of reproduction’ of households and labour markets, where much primitive accumulation occurs through unequal gender power relations. There are many ways, Dzodzi Tsikata and Joanna Kerr have shown, that markets and mainstream economic policy ‘perpetuate women’s subordination (Tsikata and Kerr 2002).’ 48

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In particular, the denial of Africans’ access to food, medicines, energy and even water is a common reflection of neoliberal dominance in social policy, as people who are surplus to capitalism’s labour power requirements find that they had better fend for themselves - or simply die. Even in relatively prosperous South Africa, an early death for millions – disproportionately women - was the outcome of state and employer reaction to the AIDS epidemic, with cost-benefit analyses demonstrating to the state and capital that keeping most of the country’s five to six million HIV-positive people alive through patented medicines cost more than the people were ‘worth’.2 The decimated social wage is one indicator of Africa’s amplified underdevelopment in recent years. In the pages that follow, however, we focus on the material processes of Africa’s underdevelopment via trade and extractive-oriented investment, largely through the depletion of natural resources. This is an area of research that has already helped catalyse the ecological debt and reparations movement, and that has sufficient intellectual standing to be the basis of a recent World Bank study, Where is the Wealth of Nations? (A similar critique could be levelled against financial processes, showing how the June 2005 G7 Finance Ministers’ debt relief deal perpetuates rather than ends debt peonage (Capps 2005; Bond 2006.) The story is not new, of course. We can never afford ourselves the luxury of forgetting the historical legacy of a continent looted: trade by force dating back centuries; slavery that uprooted around 12 million Africans; land grabs; vicious taxation schemes; precious metals spirited away; the appropriation of antiquities to the British Museum and other trophy rooms; the 19th century emergence of racist ideologies to justify colonialism; the 1884-85 carve-up of Africa into dysfunctional territories in a Berlin negotiating room; the construction of settlercolonial and extractive-colonial systems – of which apartheid, the German occupation of Namibia, the Portuguese colonies and King . In the case of the vast Johannesburg/London conglomerate Anglo American Corporation, the cut-off for saving workers in 2001 was 12%. The lowest-paid 88% of employees were more cheaply dismissed once unable to work, with replacements found amongst South Africa’s 42% unemployed reserve army of labour, according to an internal study reported by the Financial Times. For more, see Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), Afterword to the 2nd edition. 2

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Leopold’s Belgian Congo were perhaps only the most blatant – often based upon tearing black migrant workers from rural areas (leaving women vastly increased responsibilities as a consequence); Cold War battlegrounds - proxies for US/USSR conflicts – filled with millions of corpses; the post-Cold War terrain of unipolar power; other wars catalysed by mineral searches and offshoot violence such as witnessed in blood diamonds and other precious metals and minerals such as coltan (the cellphone ingredient found in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo); poacher-stripped swathes of East, Central and Southern Africa now devoid of rhinos and elephants whose ivory became ornamental material or aphrodisiac in the Middle East and East Asia; societies used as guinea pigs in the latest corporate pharmaceutical test; and the list could continue. As is also abundantly clear, Africa also suffers from systemic cultural and ideological misrepresentation by the North. International mass media images of Africans were nearly uniformly negative during the recent period. It was from West Africa that the neoconservative, neoMalthusian writer Robert Kaplan described for his frightened US audience a future defined in terms of ‘disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels’ (Kaplan 1994). As the ‘dark continent’, Africa has typically been painted with broad-brush strokes, as a place of heathen and uncivilized people, as savage and superstitious, as tribalistic and nepotistic. David Wiley has shown how western media coverage is crisis driven, based upon parachute journalism, amplified by an entertainment media which ‘perpetuates negative images of helpless primitives, happy-go-lucky buffoons, evil pagans. The media glorify colonialism/European intervention. Currently, Africa is represented as a place of endemic violence and brutal but ignorant dictators.’ Add to this the ‘animalization of Africa via legion of nature shows on Africa that present Africa as being devoid of humans’, enhanced by an ‘advertising industry that has built and exploited (and thereby perpetuated) simplistic stereotypes of Africa’. 3 Thus it was disgusting but logical, perhaps, that African people were settled into a theme village at an Austrian zoo in June 2005, their huts placed next to 3.

http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/curriculum/lm1/1/lm1_teachers.html.

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monkey cages in scenes reminiscent of 19th century exhibitions. In an explanatory letter, zoo director Barbara Jantschke denied that this was ‘a mistake’ because ‘I think the Augsburg zoo is exactly the right place to communicate an atmosphere of the exotic (Hawley 2005)’. The picture is not entirely negative, for there has been a slight upturn in the terms of trade for African countries thanks to higher commodity prices associated with East Asian demand. But this should not disguise the profoundly unequal and unfair system of export-led growth, which has impoverished Africans in many ways. Ironically, the World Bank’s ecological economists have conceded as much in their calculations of natural resource depletion: petroleum, other subsoil mineral assets, timber resources, nontimber forest resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland. As we explore below, the Bank calculates that much of Africa is poorer not wealthier. However, trade liberalization’s damage is not limited to the primary product export drive with all its adverse implications. In addition, African elites have lifted protective tariffs excessively rapidly, leading to the premature deaths of infant industries and manufacturing jobs, as well as a decline in state customs revenue. As a result, according to Christian Aid, ‘Trade liberalization has cost Sub-Saharan Africa $272 billion over the past 20 years… Overall, local producers are selling less than they were before trade was liberalized (Christian Aid 2005).’ Deconstructing African countries according to whether there was rapid or slow trade liberalization from 1987-99, Christian Aid found a close correlation between trade openness and worsening poverty. One reason was falling commodity prices during the 1980s-90s. Commodity export dependency and falling terms of trade The most important myth of neoliberal economics is that production for export inexorably creates prosperity. In reality, ‘unequal exchange’ in trade – including the rising African trade deficit with South Africa – is another route for the extraction of superprofits from Africa. The continent’s share of world trade declined over the past quarter century, but the volume of exports increased. ‘Marginalization’ of Africa occurred, hence, not because of insufficient integration, but because other areas of the world - especially East Asia - moved to the export of manufactured goods, while Africa’s industrial potential declined thanks to excessive deregulation associated with structural adjustment. 51

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Overall, primary exports of natural resources accounted for nearly 80% of African exports in 2000, compared to 31% for all developing countries and 16% for the advanced capitalist economies. According to the UN Conference on Trade in Development, in 2003, a dozen African countries were dependent upon a single commodity for exports, including crude petroleum (Angola 92%, Congo 57%, Gabon 70%, Nigeria 96% and Equatorial Guinea 91%); copper (Zambia 52%); diamonds (Botswana 91%); coffee (Burundi 76%, Ethiopia 62%, Uganda 83%), tobacco (Malawi 59%) and uranium [Niger 59%] (Oxfam 2005). Excluding South Africa, the vast majority (63%) of Sub-Saharan exports in recent years have been petroleum-related, largely from Nigeria, Angola and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea. The next largest category of exports from the subcontinent (and not including South Africa) is food and live animals [17%] (Commission for Africa 2005). The problems associated with primary product export dependence are not only high levels of price volatility and downward price trends for many natural resources. In addition, especially for minerals, production is highly capital-intensive, offers low incentives for educational investments, and provides a greater danger of intervention by parasitical rentiers. More than two-thirds of Africa’s trade is with developed countries, although beginning in 1990, China’s share rose from 2% to 9%, in the process attracting growing controversy over geopolitics (because from Sudan to Zimbabwe to Angola, Chinese loans and investments propped up corrupt regimes) and deindustrialization. The Chinese threat to African industry is profound, with Nigeria losing 350,000 jobs directly (and 1.5 million indirectly) due to Chinese competition from 2000-05. Lesotho’s garment industry collapsed when the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act benefits evaporated in 2005 once China joined the WTO (Chiahemen 2005). But the main damage remains the long-term decline in primary product price trends. As Michael Barrett Brown explains: ‘The value added in making up manufactured goods has been greatly increased compared with the raw material required; synthetics continue to replace natural products in textiles, shoes and rubber goods; and the elasticity of demand for agricultural products (the proportion of extra incomes spent on food and beverages) has been steadily falling.’ Notwithstanding the 2002-05 price increases – especially oil, rubber and copper thanks to Chinese import demand – the value of coffee, tea and cotton exports many African countries rely upon continues to stagnate or fall. Falling 52

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prices for most cash crops pushed Africa’s agricultural export value down from $15 billion in 1987 to $13 billion in 2000 notwithstanding greater volumes of exports (Barratt-Brown 2004; Barratt-Brown and Tiffen 1992). Table 1: Commodity price declines, 1980-2001 Product, Unit Cafe (Robusta) cents/kg Cocoa cents/kg Groundnut oil dollars/ton Palm oil dollars/ton Soya dollars/ton Sugar cents/kg Cotton cents/kg Copper dollars/ton Lead cents/kg

1980

411.70 330.50 1090.10 740.90 376.00 80.17 261.70 2770.00 115.00 Source: Touissant, E. (2005), Your Money Haymarket Books, p.157.

1990 118.20 126.70 963.70 289.90 246.80 27.67 181.90 2661.00 81.10 or Your Life,

2001 63.30 111.40 709.20 297.80 204.20 19.90 110.30 1645.00 49.60 Chicago,

In historical terms, the prices of primary commodities (other than fuels) have risen and fallen according to a deeper rhythm. Exporters of primary commodities, for example, fared particularly badly when financiers were most powerful. The cycle for an exporting country typically begins with falling commodity prices, then leads to rising foreign debt, dramatic increases in interest rates, a desperate intensification of exports which lowers prices yet further, and bankruptcy. Using 1970 as a base index year of 100, from 1900 to 1915, the prices of commodities rose from 130 to 190, and then fell dramatically to 90 in 1919. From a low point of 85 in 1930, as the Great Depression began, the commodity price index rose mainly during World War II to 135, as demand for raw materials proved strong and shipping problems created supply-side problems. Prices fell during the subsequent globalization process until 1968 (to 95 on the index), but soared to 142 at the peak of a commodity boom in 1973 when oil and minerals – especially gold – temporarily soared. The subsequent fall in commodity prices took the index down steadily, well below 40 by the late 1990s (Leon and Soto 1997:350).

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Commodity prices were extremely volatile in key sectors affecting Africa. Gold rose from $35/ounce in 1971 to $850/ounce in 1981 but then crashed to as low as $250 by the late 1990s. The 2002-05 minor boom in some commodity prices reflected strong Chinese import demand and the East Asian recovery from the 1997-98 depression in four key countries; from a very low base in early 2002, the prices of agricultural products rose 80% and metals/minerals doubled. Perhaps most spectacularly, the rise of the oil price from $11/barrel to $70/barrel from 1998-2005 meant that price volatility did indeed assist a few countries. But the soaring price of energy came at the expense of most of Africa, which imports oil. A related problem is the northern agricultural subsidy system, which is worth several hundred billion dollars a year, whether for domestic market stabilization (in an earlier era) or export promotion. Overproductive European, US and Japanese agro-industrial corporations producers find African markets in the form of dumped grains and foodstuffs. Rarely examined, however, are the differential impacts of subsidies, especially when associated with glutted global agricultural markets. This is a general problem associated with exportled growth, but is particularly acute in the farming sector because of uneven access to state subsidies. In addition to the lopsided playing field created by northern subsidies, the Third world has seen its productive potential drastically reduced as trade liberalization has decimated many local industries, including domestic farming. In the process, as Branco Milanovic notes, rapid trade-related integration caused growing social inequality (Milanovic 2002). Those who benefited most include the import/export firms, transport/shipping companies, plantations and large-scale commercial farmers, the mining sector, financiers (who gain greater security than in the case of produce designed for the domestic market), consumers of imported goods, and politicians and bureaucrats who are tapped into the commercial/financial circuits. Agricultural subsidies are merely one aspect of growing rural inequality. Farm subsidies today mainly reflect agro-corporate campaign contributions and the importance of rural voting blocs in advanced capitalist countries. (In the 1930s, the first generation of US farm subsidies instead reflected the dangers of agricultural overproduction to society and ecology, for the ‘dust bowl’

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phenomenon in the Midwest emerged when many family farmers simply left their failing lands fallow after markets were glutted.) The power of the agro-corporate lobby is substantial and getting stronger. The UN Development Programme found that agricultural subsidies had risen 15% between the late 1980s and 2004, from $243 billion to $279 billion (a figure Vandana Shiva considers a vast underestimate), with Japan (56%) relatively most subsidy-intensive in relation to the total value of agricultural production, compared to the EU (33%) and US [18%] (UNDP 2005:129). Unlike earlier periods when farming was smaller-scale and atomized, advanced capitalist countries’ agricultural subsidies today overwhelmingly benefit large agro-corporate producers. Subsidies in the EU’s fifteen major countries are even more unequally distributed than the US, with beneficiaries in Britain including Queen Elizbeth II ($1.31 million), Prince Charles ($480,000) and Britain’s richest man, the Duke of Westminster [$1.13 million] (Sharma 2005a).4 Studies of the Gini coefficients of northern agriculture subsidy recipients, as reported by the UNDP, confirm that large farming corporations benefit far more than do small farmers. In 2001, the EU 15’s Gini coefficient was 78 and the US coefficient was 67, both far higher than income distribution in the world’s most unequal countries. (UNDP 2005:130). Were political power relations to change, a massive redirection of subsidies to small, lower-income, family farmers in the North would be more equitable and could have the effect of moving agricultural production towards more organic (and less petroleum-intensive) farming. A detailed debate regularly occurs over whether subsidies are ‘trade-distorting’. If they represent export subsidies or price supports, these subsidies belong in what the WTO terms an ‘Amber Box’, targeted for elimination. Export subsidies of $7.5 billion in 1995 were reduced, as a result, to $3 billion by 2001. Formerly trade-distorting subsidies were reformed by the EU, with the new aim of limiting 4. Devinder Sharma, ‘Farm Subsidies: The Report Card’, ZNet commentary, 27 November 2005. Sharma argues that in response, ‘Developing countries should ask for: agricultural subsidies to be classified under two categories: one which benefits small farmers and the remaining which goes to agri-business companies and the big farmers/landowners; and since less than 20% of the $1 billion farm subsidy being doled out every day genuinely benefit small farmers, the remaining 80% subsidies need to be outright scrapped before proceeding any further on agriculture negotiations.’

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production of crops (farmers are paid to simply leave land fallow), and are hence ‘Green Box’: not subject to cuts. The US government proposed that the large counter-cyclical payments it makes to US cotton producers when the price declines should not be considered amber, even though the WTO itself agreed with Brazilian complaints that the subsidies still distort trade by increasing US output and lowering world prices. Generally, the complexity associated with the subsidy regimes reflects Northern capacity to maintain their subsidies but continually dress them up in new language (Sharma 2005b). What impact would the removal of northern agricultural subsidies have in Africa? Explicit agro-export subsidies, which account for less than 1% of the total and are mainly provided by the EU, will finally cease in 2013, thanks to concessions at the Hong Kong WTO summit. (Implicit EU export subsidies worth 55 billion euros will continue, however.) This reform aside, the most important debate is over whether substantive reductions would genuinely benefit African peasants. One problem is that power relations prevailing in the world agricultural markets allow huge cartels to handle shipping and distribution, and they usually gain the first round of benefits when prices change. A second problem is that local land ownership patterns typically emphasise plantation-based export agriculture, with the danger that further cash crop incentives will crowd out land used for food cropping by peasants. No reliable studies exist to make definitive statements. There are, indeed, African heads of state in food-importing countries who advocate continuing EU agricultural subsidies for a third reason, because lower crop prices reduces their own costs of feeding their citizenry. In sum, two crucial questions associated with subsidies and agricultural exports are typically elided by neoliberal economists and other pro-trade campaigners: which forces in Northern societies benefit from subsidies that promote export-orientation, in both the short- and long-term?; and, which forces in Southern societies would win and lose in the event exports are lifted? Furthermore, the crucial strategic question is whether self-reliant development strategies – which were the necessary (if insufficient) condition for most industrialization in the past – can be applied if low-income exporting countries remain mired in the commodity trap. The same points must be raised again below with respect to Africa’s mineral exports, where depletion of nonrenewable 56

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resources drains the wealth of future generations. But a final reflection of trade-related power relations was also unveiled in Hong Kong, as India and Brazil structurally shifted their location from an alliance with 110 Third World countries, to the core of the ‘Five Interested Parties’ (joining the US, EU and Australia) which cut the final deal (Bello 2005). Investment, production and exploitation In recent years, Africa has not been overwhelmed by interest from foreign corporate suitors. During the early 1970s, roughly a third of all FDI to the Third World went to Sub-Saharan African countries, especially apartheid South Africa. By the 1990s, that statistic had dropped to 5%. Aside from oil field exploitation, the only other substantive foreign investments over the last decade were in South Africa, for the partial privatization of the state telecommunications agency and for the expansion of automotive-sector branch plant activity within global assembly lines. These inflows were by far offset by South Africa’s own outflows of foreign direct investment, in the forms of relocation of the largest Johannesburg corporations’ financial headquarters to London, which in turn distorted the Africa FDI data, not to mention the repatriation of dividends/profits, payments of patent/royalty fees to transnational corporations. One of the most careful analysts of foreign corporate domination of African economies, UN Research Institute for Social Development director Thandika Mkandawire, recently studied African economies’ ‘maladjustment’ and concluded, ‘Little FDI has gone into the manufacturing industry. As for investment in mining, it is not drawn to African countries by macroeconomic policy changes, as is often suggested, but by the prospects of better world prices, changes in attitudes towards national ownership and sector specific incentives.’ Moreover, 14% of FDI was ‘driven by acquisitions facilitated by the increased pace of privatization to buy up existing plants that are being sold, usually under “fire sale” conditions.’ What little new manufacturing investment occurred was typically ‘for expansion of existing capacities, especially in industries enjoying natural monopolies (e.g. beverages, cement, furniture). Such expansion may have been stimulated by the spurt of growth that caused much euphoria and that is now fading away (Mkandawire 2005:6).

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The critique of foreign investors in Africa must now extend beyond the EU, US and Japan, to China. For example, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and two other large Chinese oil firms are active in seventeen African countries. One is Sudan where $2 billion of oil investments are underway notwithstanding the Darfur genocide, responsible already for of 5% of China’s import requirements, along with Chinese-financed development of a homegrown Sudanese military capacity [Arms sales to Robert Mugabe are also dubious] (Schiller 2005). FDI and resource depletion Mining houses have been central to looting Africa for at least a century and a half, and the depletion of minerals and other nonrenewable natural resources have had extremely negative consequences. The oil sector-the most brazen case, with its profit and dividend outflows often lubricated by corruption-illustrates this clearly. As demonstrated by the Open Society-backed campaign, ‘Publish what you Pay’, elites in Africa’s oil producing countries - Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan - are amongst the world’s least transparent.5 In Nigeria, demands by the Ogoni people relate not only to the massive destruction of their Delta habitat, but also to the looting of their natural wealth by Big Oil (Olukoya 2001). Diverse forces in society have moved away from considering oil merely a matter of private property, to be negotiated between corporations and governments, as was the case during much of the 20th century. Instead, these forces now treat oil as part of a general ‘commons’ of a national society’s natural resource base (Caffentzis 2004). From a September 2005 conference in Johannesburg organized by the South African NGO groundWork, delegates petitioned the World Petroleum Congress: At every point in the fossil fuel production chain where your members ‘add value’ and make profit, ordinary people, workers and their environments are assaulted and impoverished. Where oil is drilled, pumped, processed and used, in Africa as elsewhere, ecological systems have been trashed, peoples’ livelihoods have been destroyed and their democratic aspirations and their rights and cultures trampled.6 5 6

. www.opensociety.org . www.groundwork.org.za

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In a remarkable essay, ‘Seeing like an oil company,’ anthropologist James Ferguson argues that ‘capital “hops” over “unusable Africa,” alighting only in mineral-rich enclaves that are starkly disconnected from their national societies. The result is not the formation of standardized national grids, but the emergence of huge areas of the continent that are effectively “off the grid.”‘ In the process, there emerges ‘a frightening sort of political–economic model for regions that combine mineral wealth with political intractability,’ ranging from African oil zones to occupied Iraq. The model includes protection of capital by ‘private military companies’ (in Baghdad, Blackwater, Erinys and Global Risk Strategies), and protection of the ‘Big Man’ leader (Paul Bremer, John Negroponte) ‘not by his own national army but, instead, by hired guns’ (Ferguson 2005:381). The bottom line is enhanced profit for international capital and despotism for the citizenry. Remarkably, this latest stage in the disintegration wrought by capital is being registered within that center of accumulation, the World Bank, which has begun to measure some of its costs. This opens upon a potentially fruitful phase of environmental accounting in which the depletion of natural resources plus associated negative externalities – such as the social devastation caused by mining operations – can now begin to be taken seriously as a way of envisioning a global commons. That entails at least a rough accounting of the costs associated with tearing resources from the ground, forests and fisheries, even as we continue to recognize that many aspects of valuation – human life’s worth, indigenous people’s traditions and culture, aesthetics of the natural environment – are impossible to quantify. Accounting for nature With its 2005 study, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, the World Bank has begun to address the question of resource depletion, using the methodology of correcting bias in GDP wealth accounting (World Bank 2005). Not surprisingly, this is nowhere near as expansive as parallel efforts by groups such as San Francisco-based Redefining Progress.7 There, statisticians subtract from GDP the cost of crime and family . www.redefiningprogess.org.

7

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breakdown; add household and volunteer work; correct for income distribution (rewarding equality); subtract resource depletion; subtract pollution; subtract long-term environmental damage (climate change, nuclear waste generation); add opportunities for increased leisure time; factor in lifespan of consumer durables and public infrastructure; and subtract vulnerability upon foreign assets. Using this approach and accounting for natural resource depletion, pollution and the other factors that, in the aggregate, comprise the onset of the era marked by neoliberalism, globalisation and the ecological crisis, Redefining Progress finds that global welfare began declining in absolute terms during the mid-1970s (see Figure 1). Indeed, as Michael Goldman brilliantly demonstrates, the Bank’s ‘green neoliberal project’ fuses ‘neocolonial conservationist ideas of enclosure and preservation and neoliberal notions of market value and optimal resource allocation.’ It does so in order to make ‘particular natures and natural resource-dependent communities legible, accountable and available to foreign investors… by introducing new cultural and scientific logics for interpreting qualities of the state’s territory’ (Goldman 2005:184). Despite this overarching function, the Bank’s tentative approach to valuation of depleted natural resources is a step forward in recognizing that extractive investments may not contribute to net welfare, and indeed may cause national savings and wealth to actually shrink, along with their better known qualitative manifestations.

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Figure 2: Global GDP versus a genuine progress indicator, 19502003

Source: www.redefiningprogress.org The Bank’s first-cut method subtracts from the existing rate of savings factors such as fixed capital depreciation, depletion of natural resources and pollution, but then adds investments in education (defined as annual expenditure). The result, in most African countries dependent upon primary products, is a net negative rate of national savings to Gross National Income (GNI). These effects are made to appear less severe by a number of methodological dodges. Thus, in making estimates about the decline in a country’s wealth due to energy, mineral or forest-related depletion, the World Bank adopts a minimalist definition based upon international pricing (not potential future values when scarcity becomes a more crucial factor, especially in the oil industry). Moreover, the Bank does not fully calculate damages done to the local environment, to workers’ health/safety, and especially to women in communities around mines. And the Bank’s use of average – not marginal – cost resource rents also underestimates the depletion costs. In particular, the attempt to generate a ‘genuine savings’ calculation requires adjusting net national savings to account for resource depletion. The Bank suggests the following steps:

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From gross national saving the consumption of fixed capital is subtracted to give the traditional indicator of saving: net national savings. The value of damages from pollutants is subtracted. The pollutants carbon dioxide and particulate matter are included. The value of natural resource depletion is subtracted. Energy, metals and mineral and net forest depletion are included. Current operating expenditures on education are added to net national saving to adjust for investments in human capital (World Bank 2005).

Naturally, given oil extraction, the Middle East region (including North Africa) has the world’s most serious problem of net negative gross national income and savings under this methodology. But SubSaharan Africa is second worst, and for several years during the early 1990s witnessed net negative GNP for the continent once extraction of natural resources was factored in. Indeed, for every percentage point increase in a country’s extractive-resource dependency, that country’s potential GDP declines by 9% (as against the real GDP recorded), according to the Bank (Ibid:55). African countries with the combined highest resource dependence and lowest capital accumulation included Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo, Algeria and South Africa. In comparing the potential for capital accumulation – i.e., were resource rents not simply extracted (and exported) and resources depleted – on the one hand and, on the other, the actual measure of capital accumulation, Bank researchers discovered that, In many cases the differences are huge. Nigeria, a major oil exporter, could have had a year 2000 stock of produced capital five times higher than the actual stock. Moreover, if these investments had taken place, oil would play a much smaller role in the Nigerian economy today, with likely beneficial impacts on policies affecting other sectors of the economy (Ibid).

A more nuanced breakdown of a country’s estimated ‘tangible wealth’ is required to capture not just obvious oil-related depletion and rent outflows, but also other subsoil assets, timber resources, nontimber forest resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland. The ‘produced capital’ normally captured in GDP accounting is added to the tangible wealth. In the case of Ghana, shown in Table 2, that amounted to $2,022 per capita in 2000. The same year, the Gross National Saving of Ghana was $40 per capita and education spending 62

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was $7. These figures require downward adjustment to account for the consumption of fixed capital ($19), as well as the depletion of wealth in the form of stored energy ($0), minerals ($4) and net forest assets ($8). In Ghana, the adjusted net saving was $16 per capita in 2000. But given population growth of 1.7%, the country’s wealth actually shrunk by $18 per capita in 2000 (Ibid: 64-65). Table 2: Adjustment to Ghana’s 2000 savings rate based upon tangible wealth and resource depletion (per capita $) Tangible wealth

Adjusted net saving

Subsoil assets $65

Gross National Saving $40

Timber resources $290

Education expenditure $7

Nontimber forest resources $76

Consumption fixed capital $-19

Protected areas $7

Energy depletion $0

Cropland $855

Mineral depletion $-4

Pastureland $43

Net forest depletion $-8

Produced capital $686 Total tangible wealth $2022

Adjusted net saving $16

Population growth 1.7%

Change in wealth per capita $-18

Source: World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, pp.64-65. How much of this exploitation is based on transnational capital’s extractive power? In the case of Ghana, $12 of the $18 decline in 2000 could be attributed to minerals and forest-related depletions, a large proportion of which now leaves Ghana (Ibid). The largest indigenous (and black-owned) mining firm in Africa, Ashanti, was recently bought by AngloGold, so it is safe to assume that an increasing amount of Ghana’s wealth flows out of the country, leaving net negative per capita tangible wealth. Other mining houses active in Africa which once had their roots here – Lonrho, Anglo, DeBeers, Gencor/Billiton – are also now based off-shore. Ghana was an interesting example given that it has often played the role of World Bank poster child country. Other African countries whose economies are primary product dependent fare much worse, according to the Bank methodology. Gabon’s citizens lost $2,241 each 63

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in 2000, as oil companies rapidly depleted the country’s tangible wealth. The Republic of the Congo (-$727), Nigeria (-$210), Cameroon (-$152), Mauritania (-$147) and Cote d’Ivoire (-$100) are other African countries whose people lost at least $100 in tangible national wealth each in 2000 alone. (Angola would certainly rank high amongst these, were data available for the Bank’s analysis.) A few sparsely populated countries did benefit, according to the tangible wealth measure, including the Seychelles (+$904), Botswana (+$814) and Namibia (+$140), but the great majority of Africans saw their wealth depleted (Ibid) [See Table 3]

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Table 3: African countries’ adjusted national wealth and ‘savings gaps’, 2000

Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Chad Comoros Rep of Congo Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon The Gambia Ghana Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Níger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Seychelles South Africa Swaziland Togo Zambia Zimbabwe

Income per capita ($)

Population growth rate (%)

Adjusted net saving per capita ($)

Change in wealth per capita ($)

360 2925 230 97 548 1195 174 367 660 625 101 3370 305 255 343 245 162 221 382 3697 195 1820 166 297 233 449 7089 2837 1375 285 312 550

2.6 1.7 2.5 1.9 2.2 2.7 3.1 2.5 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.4 1.7 2.3 3.1 2.1 2.4 2.9 1.1 2.2 3.2 3.3 2.4 2.9 2.6 0.9 2.5 2.5 4.0 2.0 2.0

14 1021 15 -10 -8 43 -8 -17 -227 -5 -4 -1183 -5 16 40 9 -2 20 -30 645 15 392 -10 -97 14 31 1162 246 129 -20 -13 53

-42 814 -36 -37 -152 -81 -74 -73 -727 -100 -27 -2241 -45 -18 -11 -56 -29 -47 -147 514 -20 140 -83 -210 -60 -27 904 -2 8 -88 -63 -4

Source: World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, p.66. In part, minerals depletion and associated pollution costs are a function of expanded foreign direct investment. Even in South Africa, with a 150-year old organic mining-based bourgeoisie, mineral depletion today disproportionately benefits overseas mining houses (especially given that some of the largest Johannesburg firms relisted their primary 65

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share residences to London after 1994). In addition, CO2 emissions plus a great deal of other pollution (especially SO2) are largely the result of energy consumption by metals smelters owned by large multinational corporations (Mittal Steel, BHP Billiton and the Anglo group). Any assessment of FDI, especially in oil and resource rich countries, must henceforth take into account its contribution to the net negative impact on national wealth, including the depletion and degradation of the resource base. Ironically, given the source of leadership at the World Bank (Paul Wolfowitz of the US petro-military complex), the Bank’s new accounting of genuine savings is a helpful innovation. Taking the methodology forward in order to correct biases, and rigorously estimating an Africawide extraction measure in order to better account for the way extractive FDI generates net negative welfare/savings, remain as important exercises. There are many other modes of surplus and resource extraction through FDI, some of which involve straightforward swindling. For example, corporate failure to pay taxes and state failure to collect them is a point stressed by Lawrence Cockcroft of Transparency International: Most African countries operate some form of tax break for new investors, with varying degrees of generosity. In fact such incentive schemes are frequently deceptive in that the real deal is being done in spite of them and alongside them, with a key cabinet minister or official coming to an alternative arrangement which may well guarantee an offshore payment for the individual in question as well as a ‘tax holiday’ for the company concerned (Cockcroft 2001:2).

Official statistics have never properly picked up the durable problem of transfer pricing, whereby foreign investors misinvoice inputs drawn from abroad. Companies cheat Third World countries on tax revenues by artificially inflating their imported input prices so as to claim lower net income. It is only possible to guess the vast scale of the problem on the basis of case studies. The Oxford Institute of Energy Studies estimated that in 1994, 14% of the total value of exported oil ‘was not accounted for in national trade figures as a result of various forms of transfer pricing and smuggling’ (Ibid:2). According to a 1999 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development survey on income shifting as part of transfer pricing:

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Of the developing countries with sufficient evidence to make an assessment, 61% estimated that their own national transnational corporations (TNCs) were engaging in income shifting, and 70% deemed it a significant problem. The income-shifting behaviour of foreign-based TNCs was also appraised. 84% of the developing countries felt that the affiliates they hosted shifted income to their parent companies to avoid tax liabilities, and 87% viewed the problem as significant (UNCTD 1999:167).

Another kind of corporate financial transfer aimed at exploiting weak African countries is the fee that headquarters charge for patent and copyright fees on technology agreements. Such payments, according to Yash Tandon, are augmented by management and consultancy fees, as well as other Northern corporate support mechanisms that drain the Third World. For the year 2000, Tandon listed export revenue denied the South because of northern protectionism of more than $30 billion for non-agricultural products.8 Production, transport and the ecological debt Most of the systems of unequal exchange have been identified (aside from labour which is considered below), although the ecological implications have not been. In an indirect manner, such that victims are not aware of the process, Northern investors also exploit Africa in their consumption of the global commons, particularly the earth’s clean air. During the early 1990s, the idea of the North’s ecological debt to the South began gaining currency in Latin America thanks to NGOs, environmentalists and politicians (including Fidel Castro of Cuba and Virgilio Barco of Colombia). According to Joan Martinez-Alier, The notion of an ecological debt is not particularly radical. Think of the environmental liabilities incurred by firms (under the United States Superfund legislation), or of the engineering field called ‘restoration ecology’, or the proposals by the Swedish government in the early 1990s to calculate the country’s environmental debt. Ecologically unequal exchange is one of the reasons for the claim of the Ecological Debt. The second reason for this claim is the

8. http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/devthry/wellbeing/2000/tandon.htm

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disproportionate use of Environmental Space by the rich countries (Martinez-Alier 2003).9

In the first category, Martinez-Alier lists: • Unpaid costs of reproduction or maintenance or sustainable management of the renewable resources that have been exported; • actualized costs of the future lack of availability of destroyed natural resources; • compensation for, or the costs of reparation (unpaid) of the local damages produced by exports (for example, the sulphur dioxide of copper smelters, the mine tailings, the harms to health from flower exports, the pollution of water by mining), or the actualized value of irreversible damage; • (Unpaid) amount corresponding to the commercial use of information and knowledge on genetic resources, when they have been appropriated gratis (‘biopiracy’). For agricultural genetic resources, the basis for such a claim already exists under the FAO’s Farmers’ Rights. In the second, he cites ‘lack of payment for environmental services or for the disproportionate use of Environmental Space’: • (Unpaid) reparation costs or compensation for the impacts caused by imports of solid or liquid toxic waste; • (Unpaid) costs of free disposal of gas residues (carbon dioxide, CFCs, etc), assuming equal rights to sinks and reservoirs.

. Joan Martinez-Alier, ‘Marxism, Social Metabolism and Ecologically Unequal Exchange’, Paper presented at Lund University Conference on World Systems Theory and the Environment, 19-22 September 2003. Martinez-Alier elaborates with examples of ecological debt that are never factored into standard trade and investment regimes: ‘nutrients in exports including virtual water… the oil and minerals no longer available, the biodiversity destroyed. This is a difficult figure to compute, for several reasons. Figures on the reserves, estimation of the technological obsolence because of substitution, and a decision on the rate of discount are needed in the case of minerals or oil. For biodiversity, knowledge of what is being destroyed would be needed.’ Some of these cases are considered in the discussion above concerning depletion of natural resources. See also www.deudaecologica.org 9

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These aspects of ecological debt defy easy measurement. Each part of the ecological balance sheet is highly contested, and information is imperfect. As Martinez-Alier shows in other work, tropical rainforests used for wood exports have an extraordinary past we will never know and ongoing biodiversity whose destruction we cannot begin to value. However, he acknowledges, ‘although it is not possible to make an exact accounting, it is necessary to establish the principal categories [of ecological debt] and certain orders of magnitude in order to stimulate discussion (Martinez-Alier 1998)’. The sums involved are potentially vast. Vandana Shiva and Tandon estimate that biopiracy of ‘wild seed varieties have contributed some $66 billion annually to the US economy.’10 Moreover, in the case of CO2 emissions, according to Martinez-Alier, ‘a total annual subsidy of $75 billion is forthcoming from South to North’.11 Excess use of the planet’s CO2 absorption capacity is merely one of the many ways that the South is being exploited by the North on the ecological front. Africans are most exploited in this regard because non-industrialized economics have not begun to utilize more than a small fraction of what should be due under any fair framework of global resource allocation. The amounts involved would easily cover debt repayments. A final way in which Africa’s wealth is depleted is via skilled labour migration. This problem has become important, even if it is slightly mitigated by the inflow of migrant remittance payments to families at home. Approximately 20,000 skilled workers leave Africa each year. The World Bank’s estimate of the share of Africa’s skilled workers with a tertiary education who emigrate is more than 15%, higher than any other region. It is true that remittances from both skilled and unskilled labour flow back to Africa as a result, and in some cases represent an important contribution to GDP. But as the World Bank concedes, there are extremely high transaction costs (sometimes 20%) imposed upon the small sums that are transferred by migrants. For this reason, a great deal of migration-related inflows to Africa have become informal in nature, via black market systems, and in turn, once

. http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/devthry/wellbeing/2000/tandon.htm 11. Martinez-Alier cites J.K. Parikh, ‘Joint Implementation and the North and South Cooperation for Climate Change,’ International Environmental Affairs, 7, 1, 1995. 10

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the flows reach their home destination, further problems often emerge (Bracking 2003:633). The progressive position on migration has always been to maintain support for the ‘globalization of people’ (while opposing the ‘globalization of capital’) and in the process to oppose border controls and arduous immigration restrictions, as well as all forms of xenophobia. In October 2005, North Africans were expelled from the Moroccan-Spanish border at Granada by lethal force, and the supposedly progressive Zapatero regime announced it would build the equivalent of Israel’s notorious apartheid wall at the border. It was, according to Slavoj Zizek, just another symptom of Fortress Europe: A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the EU passed almost unnoticed: a plan to establish an all-European border police force to secure the isolation of the Union territory, so as to prevent the influx of the immigrants. This is the truth of globalization: the construction of new walls safeguarding the prosperous Europe from a flood of immigrants… The segregation of the people is the reality of economic globalization. This new racism of the developed world is in a way much more brutal than the previous one. Its implicit legitimization is neither naturalist (the ‘natural’ superiority of the developed West) nor culturalist (we in the West also want to preserve our cultural identity). Rather, it’s an unabashed economic egotism - the fundamental divide is the one between those included into the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it (Zizek 2005).

According to Yash Tandon and the UN Development Programme, there is a substantial ‘loss of revenue on account of blockage on the free movement of people’, which they estimated to amount to at least $25 billion annually during the 1980s. But setting such numbers aside, it is also important to recognize an important basis for superexploitation within patriarchal power relations in migration and many other forms of North-South power. Since it is women who disproportionately remain, and women who are radically disempowered across Africa, this enables the manifold processes discussed above - debt/finance, trade, investment and labour migration – to be maintained at inordinately high rates of exploitation.

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Conclusion: From looting to liberation The looting of Africa dates back many centuries, and may be traced to the point at which value transfers began via appropriation of slave labour, antiquities, precious metals and raw materials. Unfair terms of trade were soon amplified by colonial and neocolonial relations. These processes often amounted to a kind of ongoing ‘primitive accumulation’, by which capital of Northern countries grew by virtue of looting Africa. This was not a once-off set of problems, solved by the 1950s-90s independence struggles. In recent decades, wealth extraction through imperialist relations has intensified, and some of the same kinds of primitive looting tactics are now once again evident. Moreover, key causes of Africa’s underdevelopment since the early 1980s can also be identified within the framework of neoliberal (free market) policies adopted nearly universally across the continent and indeed the world, in part thanks to the emergence of local allies of the North within African states. The mainstream impression – e.g., Tony Blair’s Africa Commission – is mistaken when citing what appears as a vast inflow of aid, for more than 60% - so-called ‘phantom aid’ - is redirected backwards to the donors or otherwise misses the mark in various ways. Instead of a sustainable level of debt service payments, as claimed by those supporting the elites’ limited debt relief schemes, Africa’s net financial accounts went negative during the 1990s. And although remittances from the African Diaspora now fund a limited amount of capital accumulation, capital flight is far greater. At more than $10 billion/year since the early 1970s, collectively, the citizens of Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, the DRC, Angola and Zambia have been especially vulnerable to the overseas drain of their national wealth. In addition to the lifting of exchange controls, a major factor during the late 1990s was financial deregulation. In South Africa, for example, financial liberalization included the relisting from Johannesburg to London of the primary share-issuing residence of the largest South African firms. In response, progressive African activists and allied intellectuals should be increasingly capable of building upon their citizenries’ profound skepticism of ruling elites. According to Afrobarometer polls and the World Values Survey, ‘Africans care about equity and public action to reduce poverty. They are less comfortable with wide wealth differentials, and have a strong commitment to political equality. 71

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About 75% of the respondents agree that African governments are doing too little for people trapped in poverty (Word Bank 2005b). The challenge will be to establish not only alternative conceptions of poverty and inequality so that the broader structural processes of accumulation by dispossession are clear - but also a different approach to public policy and politics. Those conceptions are not limited to a set of policy reforms (though such can be provided whenever necessary, drawing upon real experiences in history and across the contemporary world). Most importantly, the solution to the looting of Africa is to be found in the self-activity of progressive Africans themselves, in their campaigns and declarations, their struggles – sometimes victorious but still mainly frustrated – and their hunger for an Africa which can finally throw off the chains of an exploitative world economy and a power elite who treat the continent without respect References Barratt-Brown, M. 2004. ‘Africa’s Trade Today’, paper for the Review of African Political Economy and CODESRIA 30th Anniversary Conference. Wortley Hall: Sheffield, May, 27. Baratt-Brown, M & Tiffen, P. 1992. Short Changed: Africa and World Trade. London: Pluto Press. Bello, W. 2005. ‘The Meaning of Hong Kong: Brazil and India Join the Big Boys’ Club’, unpublished paper, Bangkok, Focus on the Global South. Bond, P. 2006. Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation. London: Zed Books. Bond, P. 2005. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal Press. Bracking, S. 2003. ‘Sending Money Home: Are Remittances Always Beneficial to Those Who Stay Behind?’ Journal of International Development, 15. Caffentzis, G. 2004. ‘The Petroleum Commons: Local, Islamic and Global’, The Progress Report, 2004, online at: http://www.progress.org/2004/water26.htm. Capps, G. 2005. ‘Redesigning the Debt Trap’, International Socialism, 107.

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Chiahemen, J. 2005. ‘Africa Fears “Tsunami” of Cheap Chinese Imports’, Reuters, December, 18. Christian Aid. 2005. ‘The Economics of Failure: The real Cost of “Free” Trade for Poor Countries’, briefing paper, online at: http://www.chrstianaid.org.uk/indepth/506liberalisation/Economics%2 0of%fa. Cockcroft, L. ‘Corruption as a Threat to Corporate Behavior and the Rule of Law’, Transparency International. Commission for Africa. 2005. Our Common Interest. London: Commission for Africa. Ferguson, J. 2005. ‘Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa’, American Anthropologist, 107 (3). Goldman, M. 2005. Imperial Nature. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hawley, C. 2005. ‘African Village Accused of Putting Humans on Display’, Spiegel Online, June 9: available at: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,359799,00html. Kaplan, R. 1994. ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly: 273. Leon, J & Soto, R. 1997. ‘Structural Breaks and Long Term Trends in Commodity Prices’, Journal of International Development: 9. Martinez-Alier, J. 2003. ‘Marxism, Social Metabolism and Ecologically Unequal Exchange’, paper presented at Lund University Conference on World Systems Theory and the Environment, September, 19-22. _________1998. ‘Ecological Debt-External Debt’, Quito, Accion Ecologica. Milanovic, B. 2002. ‘Can We Discern the Effect of Globalisation on Income Distribution? Evidence from Household Budget Surveys’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2876. Washington: World Bank. Mkandawire, T. 2005. ‘Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation’, Africa Development, 30 (1-2). Olukoya, S. 2001. ‘Environmental Justice from the Niger Delta to the World Conference Against Racism’, CorpWatch, August, 30, online at: http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id+18. Oxfam. 2005. ‘Africa and the Doha Round: Fighting to Keep Development Alive’, Oxfam Briefing Paper 80.

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Schiller, B. 2005. ‘The China Model of Development’, online at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracychina/china_development_3136.jsp, December, 20. Sharma, D. 2005a. ‘Farm Subsidies: The Report Card’, ZNet Commentary, November, 27. Touissant, E. 2005. Your Money or Your Life. Chicago: Haymarket Books. __________2005b. ‘Much Ado About Nothing’, ZNet Commentary, December, 24. Tsikata, D & Kerr, J. 2002. Demanding Dignity: Women Confronting Economic Reforms in Africa. Ottawa: The North-South Institute and Accra: Third World Network. UNCTD. 1999. Transfer Pricing. UNCTD. UNDP. 2005. Human Development Report 2005. UNDP. World Bank. 2006. World Development Report: Equity and Development. Washington: World Bank. World Bank. 2005. Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital in the 21st Century. Washington: World Bank. Zizek, S. 2005. ‘The Subject Supposed to Loot and Rape: Reality and Fantasy in New Orleans’, In These Times, October, 20.

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CHAPTER 3

THE ‘INSURRECTION OF SUBJUGATED KNOWLEDGE’: TOWARDS AN EMERGING ‘POSTWESTERN’ ASYMMETRIC AFRICA Nhamo SAMASUWO Introduction Most western analysis today on Africa tends to portray the continent as an object of international charity and an unwitting victim of external global exploitation (Lee 2006). The common perception is that the continent is poor, torn apart by conflict and too weak and divided to craft its own agenda on the global stage. Not surprisingly, the rise of China and India as major economic players on the continent has generated voluminous and often hysterical assessments of how much these ‘new players’ will wreak havoc on Africa’s fragile economic systems and ‘vacuum’ mineral resources such as oil and precious base metals through a rapid process of ‘re-colonisation’ of the continent. In particular, the debate on China’s role is largely framed in ‘scramble’ terms and thus, tends to portray Asia’s economic giant as the ‘new colonial threat’, while Africa is patronisingly framed as a ‘victim’ of the Asian giant’s suffocating embrace (Lee 2006: 303). This chapter tries to provide a more critical perspective on Africa’s external relations both at bilateral and multilateral levels. Thus, it examines the various subtle and open diplomatic ways in which Africa either as a collective bloc or as individual countries has been slowly accumulating tools of asymmetric power aimed at changing old exploitative relationships that have existed for the last 300 years with the West. It is argued that African countries have been cooperating and crafting new relations with various combinations of emerging ‘new global players’ or groupings of the South, in some cases with social movements in order to gain more leverage or bargaining power on the global stage. Thus, increasingly, a number of African countries, sometimes with the help of civil society or prompted by internal resistance against the International Monetary Fund’s Structural 75

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Adjustment Policies (SAPs) are starting to question the ‘received wisdom’ or prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy on economic thinking and political governance in general. In other words, Africa as a whole or parts of it are beginning to exhibit what Vandana Shiva, termed the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledge.’. Africa: the roots of the ‘un-West’ Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, two main factors have shaped global politics. Firstly, following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, a rampant North American brand of neo-liberal capitalism emerged to spread ruthlessly across the developing world via the process of globalization. Secondly, feeling emboldened and somewhat ideologically vindicated, the United States (US) quickly sought to permanently strengthen its position by building a new neo-liberal global order based on “American values.” The US did this by adopting a unilateralist approach to multilateralism based on its foreign and national security strategy (Bell 2006). By the turn of the century, the US had shifted from the ‘constructive engagement’ strategy of the Clinton era to aggressive unilateralism, and a commitment to maintain military supremacy over sea, land, air and space – or what its military planners termed ‘full spectrum dominance.’ Under George Bush Junior, the US showed greater preparedness to achieve its objectives through force if necessary. Rather than become vectors of unrivalled and permanent US global power, unbridled globalization and the US’ hegemonic exercise of power without responsibility have since had unintended consequences. Market fundamentalism has created massive global inequalities between the North and the South. Instead of its promise of prosperity, globalization has created what anti-globalization activists, among them, Patrick Bond have dubbed ‘global apartheid’ (Bond 2001). Such ‘global apartheid’ has severely weakened the ideological foundations upon which globalization rested (Abdelal and Segal 2007: 103-114). Thus, both factors have resulted in ‘blow-back’ or complexly knit forms of asymmetric defiance – military, diplomatic and economic – against the US and its allies by the rest of world. Coral Bell has aptly described this phenomenon as the ‘rise of the un-West’ involving ‘a revolutionary redistribution of (economic and diplomatic) power’ away from the West to the global South. 76

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Instructively, Bell makes the observation that while ‘the only aspect of this redistribution that most people have noticed is the rise of China, and maybe that of India’ the same phenomena has been very strongly evident ‘in other countries of Asia … Latin America, and even in a few countries in Africa’ (Bell 2006 - emphasis added; Kornegay 2006, 8-11). In the latter case, evidence of the ‘rise of the un-west’ or tendencies towards it can be found in the campaign to reform the current multilateral system which concentrates power in the hands of a few Western powers and marginalises poor countries. Furthermore, it can also be discerned from the new and multiple relations that the African continent is building in combination with other global partners in the South as a way of countering western economic and military hegemony. Africa and multilateral reform: building asymmetric power A long standing priority for post-independent Africa has been the reform of the multilateral system, with the United Nations (UN) at its centre. For example, a decade of UN summitry has seen Africa find common ground around a unified position on the reform of the UN Security Council called the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’. Although in principle, the AU is opposed to the notion of veto because of its undemocratic nature, the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ clearly insists on Africa’s right to two veto-wielding permanent seats on the UN-SC and five non-permanent seats (Ikome and Samasuwo 2005a). The AU argues that if other UN-SC members hold the veto then all new members should be entitled to it as well. After all, the veto remains the tipping point in the global calculus of power and joining the UN-SC without it would be tantamount to accepting ‘second class’ global citizenship. Such a position is based on the simple fact that reform is both a type of restorative historical justice for Africans who fought on the side of victorious allies during the Second World War just as it is a multilateral democratic imperative in an expanded 21st century UN. Besides, as the least developed continent and confronted by multiple security challenges, Africa almost singularly stands to benefit most from a stronger and reformed UN. However, Africa’s position is also supported by the fact that while it holds nearly one third of the UN’s entire membership, it unfairly remains the only continent without representation on the UN-SC 77

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(Ikome and Samasuwo 2005b). In fact, the continent’s determination to assert its position as an equal partner in global politics largely explains why it has earned itself the distinction of being the only grouping in the UN to hold and maintain a broadly unified position on the reform of the UN-SC. Even more interesting is the fact that Africa invests heavily in the power of numbers by consistently cooperating with other Southern-based groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 and China (G77 + China) to push its multilateral reform agenda forward. The way Africa manoeuvres its way around global issues in the UN contrasts with the common view that Africa is too weak and too divided to play any role at the global stage with skill or diplomatic dexterity. While the continent’s detractors argue that the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ represents an unrealistic attempt to grab ‘power at the top’ of global politics, it is interesting to note that Africa actually sees the reform of the world body as an inseparable imperative to the reform of the Breton Woods Institutions (BWIs) - the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organisation (WTO). Thus, Africa, together with the rest of the G77 and China has pushed for the UN to be placed at the centre of the global compact on development, including the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the shift away from state centric notions of military security to human security in global affairs. In doing so, Africa is deeply engaged in resisting subtle efforts by Northern countries to appropriate the UN management reform agenda in order to prevent the world body from making any future decisions on global economic matters. Developing country diplomats rightly suspect that under the guise of achieving greater UN management efficiency, rich countries are bent on imposing a familiar brand of structural adjustment-style reforms aimed at clearing the way for the Breton Woods triumvirate (IMF, WB and WTO), to drive the global economic agenda. The fear is that if the UN is rendered obsolete, developed countries will continue making all the rules while poor African countries among others, will have to obey (Samasuwo 2006). It should be remembered that the above developments are happening at a time when the power of the rich countries in the UN has been severely weakened by a bloc majority of the G77 and China. Suffice to say that both the IMF and World Bank remain non-transparent and undemocratic. In effect, they have 78

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functioned as the debt collecting agencies of their major shareholders the US and its allies in the Group of Eight (G8) countries. As minority share holders, African countries are acutely aware that they have for a long time, been left to subject themselves to the often humiliating conditions set by the IMF in exchange for loans. Coupled with this is the untenable internal division in the IMF between: (1) those countries which determine policies and shape its decisions, (its shareholders – rich countries), on the one hand, and (2) those against whom decisions, rules and policies of the fund have been ruthlessly applied (stakeholders – poor African countries). In recent years, such power imbalances have allowed some of the major shareholders in the North to use the fund as a punitive tool of their foreign policies to whip errant governments deviating from prevailing orthodoxy back into line. Seen in its global context, the case of Zimbabwe and its treatment at the hands of the Fund perhaps represents the most recent example of the politicized role the Fund has come to play not only in Africa but in other parts of the developing world as well. Moreover, the case of Zimbabwe actually reflects the IMF’s struggle to remain relevant in a global environment where an increasing number of member countries are choosing to tap into emerging, flexible, bilateral, and more importantly, non-western sources of financial support in order to cover their balance of payment support. For example, rather than subject themselves to IMF’s highly conditional support, some poor countries, including some in Africa, have started to leverage balance-of-payment support directly from parallel (bilateral or private) financial markets, with some notable degree of success. By deploying capital sourced from private institutions or utilising currency swapping arrangements alongside reciprocal bilateral loans from friendly third parties from the East, countries such as Zimbabwe have been able to clear arrears on IMF loans (Financial Mail, 12 August 2006). Yet on another level, African countries are also fed-up with failed trade talks in the Doha Round. In fact, whatever little faith they have left in the WTO continues to be undermined by the US and the European Union’s (EU) double standards and refusal to yield on the issue of subsidies and access to markets. Thus, not surprisingly and in the light of the trade deadlock, developing countries, including those in Africa are demonstrating a new preference for bilateral and regional trade agreements with Asian countries (Abdelal and Segal 2007: 106). 79

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More importantly, African countries are not only beginning to craft policies that depart from the prevailing free market orthodoxy and demanding greater policy autonomy, but they are also shifting away from emphasizing trade to broader questions of industrial development, diversification, strengthening manufacturing capacity and the redeployment of strong activist or developmental states (Mkandawire 2001). The reality is that Africa, along with the rest of the developing world has actually started looking for alternatives to western economic prescriptions. Even more interesting is the convergence of agendas between African civil society and African governments both on trade and debt cancellation issues. Africa tilting left Africa is clearly in search of alternatives outside western dictates. Unlike in the 1980s and early 1990s, today Africa can learn from and compare solitary lessons between countries which pointedly refused to take the IMF’s bitter economic medicine such as China and India which have economic records that speak for themselves; and ‘Washington Consensus’ diehards like Argentina and Indonesia that have paid dearly in social and economic terms and are now on the road to Damascus! (Stiglitz 2003: 21). Other countries from which critical lessons are being drawn by Africa include Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, and Turkey, just to mention a few. Thus, two regions to which African countries are bound to turn for lessons are Latin and South America and South East Asia. In South America, it is instructive to note that countries such as Argentina and Bolivia are relying on increasingly affluent and ‘benevolent’ neighbours like Venezuela to pay-off their debts to the IMF ahead of schedule. Much to the discomfort of the US, Venezuelan aid to its regional neighbours has often dwarfed western bilateral aid to countries in the same region (Mail & Guardian Online, 17 October 2006). Also, the region’s largest economy, Brazil has since turned its back on IMF tutelage and paid its multi-billion dollar loans in 2006. Elsewhere, countries such as Turkey and Indonesia announced in 2006 that they would also pay-off their debts ahead of schedule. Although the record of similar policy shifts in Africa is still mixed, already there is a notable trend by some countries such as Angola and Zimbabwe towards the adoption of ‘resource nationalism’ aimed at 80

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exercising greater domestic control over local natural resources. Such ‘resource nationalism’, first noticed in Venezuela and then more recently in Bolivia, has provided the financial resources from the buoyant world commodity prices for oil and minerals to kick-start a separate path of development funded independently of the IMF and the World Bank. Not surprisingly, Zimbabwe, Angola and Venezuela have increasingly used ‘resource nationalist diplomacy’ not only as a tool of foreign policy, but more importantly, as a lever for unlocking Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) not tied to the IMF’s ‘stamp of approval (Vickers 2006: 22-32). Although still recovering from Africa’s longest civil war, Angola surprised observers when it signalled its intention to move away from prescriptive economic reform programmes designed by the IMF in August 2005. A year later, in 2006 Angola announced that it was opting for ‘home-grown policies’ rather than ‘policy credibility’ associated with the IMF’s staff-monitored programmes (Reuters and AFP News, 15 August 2005). Looking East: Africa and the new physics of Chinese power The widespread failure of the hegemonic ‘Washington Consensus’ has led to the rise of a countervailing ‘Beijing Consensus’ and proliferation of ‘Look East’ policies across most of the developing world based on the Chinese model of development. Using the ‘electric power’ of China’s example, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ fits neatly ‘into the prevailing worries about globalization by offering another path, one where integration of global ideas is first rigorously gut checked against the demands of local suitability.’ Thus, according to Ramo: China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity.

The power of China’s ‘new physics of development and power’ lies not ‘on the tired rules of how many aircraft carriers she has or her per capita GDP’ but rests on a ‘process of building the greatest asymmetric superpower … that relies less on traditional tools of power projection’ (Ramo 2004: 2-3, 34 –emphasis added).

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To many poor and marginalised countries, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ offers hope especially in the light of the collapse of the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the breakdown of the WTO talks. Explaining why he was now looking towards China for inspiration in the light of frustration with US and EU trade double standards, President Lula of Brazil clearly laid down the choice faced by many countries when he said: ‘Either we believe in ourselves [like China] or we keep crying for the end of agricultural subsidies’ (Lula: 2004). Similarly, ‘many Africans are pushing for closer ties with China, fed up, as they are, with intrusive western conditionality and costly procedures for development projects’ (Wild and Mepham 2006: 2). In contrast to the west, China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and more importantly does not attach any conditions to its aid – other than the recognition of its ‘One China’ policy. Besides, many believe that China, alongside India have the potential to provide much-needed investment, support the production of generic drugs, and finally provide the answer to stalled trade talks by offering a market for both existing and new products from developing countries (Kaplinsky 2005: 1-7; Stephan et al 2006: 27-29). The current visible trend in Africa away from western economic tutelage can be attributed to the dynamism of China and India. Here too, ‘Look East’ policies have seen many African countries welcome Chinese investment with open arms. In particular, the counter-cyclical strategies adopted by these ‘Asian tigers’ during the financial crisis of the late 1990s have generated a lot of interest in policy circles on the continent. During that crisis, Asian countries adopted currency swapping mechanisms and accumulated foreign reserves as a form of insurance against future financial meltdowns. More crucially, the accumulated reserves enabled Asian countries to avoid begging for external help from the IMF (Weisbrot: 2005). The effectiveness of such Asian counter-cyclical initiatives has seen some African countries adopt reserve accumulation strategies as a matter of economic practice. For example, by building its foreign reserves from an estimated US$15.5 billion in 2005 to US$21.2 billion in 2006, South Africa has successfully resisted subtle overtures of loans from the IMF, despite efforts to co-opt its economic managers into the bureaucracy of the BWIs. Although most of what Nigeria paid back to the IMF in May 2006 was accumulated interest on its existing capital debt, the measure clearly seemed to be very much in line with 82

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strategies adopted by Brazil and Venezuela. Significantly, Russia which has accumulated reserves estimated at over US$300 billion in savings (at 2006 figures), has grown more assertive in global economic affairs. The above developments become significant when seen against the backdrop of growing fears about the ballooning US budget deficit which reached US$427 billion in 2005. It is reported that several emerging market economies are quietly rethinking using the dollar as their preferred store of foreign reserves and currency of choice. This factor partly explains the current rise in base metal prices globally. In 2006, it was reported that China, India and Venezuela expressed support for Iran’s secret plans to establish an international oil bourse where oil will be sold in Euros rather than US dollars. If true, such a move represents the single most direct threat to US economic power yet. Iran’s plan will change the 1940s agreement reached between the Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC) and the US to buy and sell oil only in US dollars. If this were to happen, a stampede would occur with countries switching sales of oil from US dollars. More importantly, the US economy would experience a serious decline along with a plummeting currency. In order to avoid this possibility, some observers point out, the US has put in place plans to attack Iran! (Samasuwo 2006a) Conclusion There is certainly evidence of the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledge’ on the African continent arising from a combination of its own bitter experience with western values and the dynamism of eastern political and economic ideas. Tired of being taken for granted, of empty promises and intrusive western conditionality, the continent is showing keenness to ‘make lecturing Africa history’ by carefully accumulating tools of asymmetric power projection to secure independence of action at the global stage. In particular, ‘the essential ideas of what is going on in China – innovation, asymmetry, a focus on equality, the exploration of new ideas of [global] citizenship are appealing to [poor African] nations that have ambitions for development and security but have seen hundreds of years of failure of development models that rely too much on developed nations for assistance’ (Ramo 2004: 60).

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Furthermore, Africa is not just learning lessons from Asia and Latin America, but is also deeply embedded in the process of reshaping multilateral institutions and strengthening groupings of the South such as the G77 and China and NAM in order to place both political and even military limits on US (and its ‘coalition of the willing’) allies’ control over the ‘global commons’. Thus, for Africa, ‘the clear moral of the last decade is that if you want freedom of action you must either be irrelevant to the US or have some kind of leverage to pry free the hand of US military might. [However], not everyone can be a superpower. Not everyone needs to be. The ‘Beijing Consensus’, a security revolution that is multilateral but also well-defended, at least offers the hope that every nation can be a power in its own right. Perhaps not powerful enough for domination, but at least strong enough for self-determination’ (Ramo 2004: 38 –emphasis added). In effect, what is emerging is a ‘post-western’ continent using asymmetric tools of power projection to become a shrewd negotiator or player at the global stage. Quite contrary to popular western analysis, the Africa referred to here is completely new and therefore, quite different from the reactive and conformist Africa of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War years! Selected References Abdelal, R. & Segal, A. 2007. ‘Has globalization passed its peak?’ Foreign Affairs, January-February: 103-114. Bell, C. 2006. ‘The rise of the un-West.’ Asia Times, March, 22. Bond, P. 2001. Against Global Apartheid, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. Financial Mail. 2006. August, 12. Gill, S. 1997. ‘Globalization, Democratization, and the Politics of Indifference’ in Mittelman, J. H. (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Ikome, F. & Samasuwo, N. W. 2005a. ‘UN Reform: Towards a More [In] Secure World?’ Global Insight, Issue No. 46: April. ____________ 2005b. ‘From Addis Ababa to New York: Africa and the challenge of negotiating the complexities of UN Reform’. Global Insight, September.

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Kaplinsky, R. 2005. ‘The impact of Asian Drivers on the Developing World’. Institute for Development Studies: University of Sussex, February. Kornegay, F. 2006. ‘IBSA: Towards a ‘Gondwanan’ strategic vision’. Synopsis, 8 (2): 8-11. Lee, M.C. 2006. ‘The 21st Century Scramble for Africa’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24 (3): 303-330. LULA.2004.(http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/marxism/2004 w05/msg00053.htm) Mail and Guardian Online. 2006. ‘Chavez bid for Security Council seat falters’. October, 17. Mkandawire, T. 2001. ‘Thinking about developmental states in Africa’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25. Mills, S. 2006. ‘Africa must act to check IMF’s voting power’. City Press, (South Africa), May, 7. New African. 2005. No. 441: June. Ramo, J. C. 2004. The Beijing Consensus. London: Foreign Policy Centre. Reuters & AFP News. 2005. ‘Angola sidesteps IMF reform programme.’ Business Day: August, 15. Samasuwo, N. W. 2005b. ‘The Global Financial Order unmasked’. Global Dialogue, 10 (3). _____________2006a. ‘Africa and the reform of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)’. African Renaissance, 3 (6). Stephan, H., Power, M. Hervey, A. F. & Fonseca, R. S. (eds.). 2006. The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South. Cape Town: Renaissance Press. Soederberg, S. 2004. The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture: Re-imposing neo-liberal domination in the Global South. London and New York: Zed Books. Stiglitz, J. 2003. The Roaring Nineties: Seeds of Self-Destruction. London: Allen Lane. North, D. C. ‘The Breton Woods Institutions: Governance without legitimacy?’ (www.g24.org/govwtleg.pdf). Weisbrot, M. 2005. ‘The IMF has lost its influence’. International Herald Tribune, September, 22. Wild, L. and Mepham, D. (eds.) 2006. The New Sinosphere: China in Africa. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

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Vickers, B. 2006. ‘Tilting left in Latin America: Towards a new Andean-Amazonian capitalism?’ Global Dialogue, 11 (1): 22-23; 32.

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CHAPTER 4

IN WHOSE DEBT? DEBT CANCELLATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA Steven FRIEDMAN Introduction The cancellation of African debt is a necessary condition for the continent’s growth and development. But it is hardly sufficient. If writing off debt is to trigger economic and social progress which benefits the poor, democratization is as essential as the elimination of debt. The announcement in 2005 by G-8 Finance ministers of their intention to cancel the debt of 14 African countries, with another nine possibly becoming eligible within the year, prompted inevitably heated debate between the economic ‘mainstream’, which welcomed the decision, and a range of leftwing and social justice movements who rejected it as a cosmetic exercise which maintains the North’s stranglehold on African economies. But, amid the heated polemic, both sides agree that writing off the debt would in itself open new possibilities for African growth and poverty reduction. This apparently automatic link between scrapping the debt and ensuring a platform for increased living standards for the continent’s people is, however, not as self-evident as the debate seems to assume. Sovereignty and Debt Lest these reservations be misunderstood, this is not an argument against debt cancellation. On the contrary, the logic behind writing off the debt is compelling. The stranglehold which substantial debt servicing commitments place on African states’ spending has been detailed repeatedly. And, even if former colonial powers accept no responsibility for Africa’s circumstances, there is a strong argument for debt cancellation on purely pragmatic grounds, since the revenues which Northern lenders receive from African and other poor countries 87

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is a relatively minor portion of their income. Clearly, if the cost to the borrower is slight and the benefit to the lender potentially immense, then the argument for debt cancellation is unassailable. But there is another, equally important, moral argument for a debt write-off. This derives from the legal concept of an “odious debt”. Proponents of this concept define odious debts as those debts ‘contracted against the interests of the population of a state, without its consent and with the full awareness of the creditor’ (CISDL 2003) and insist that they are morally and thus legally void. While social researchers may insist that determining whether a debt is in the interests of a population is a far more subjective exercise than lawyers tend to believe, it is possible to discover whether a debt was incurred by a state without the consent of its citizens (and, of course, whether the lender could realistically be expected to have known this). Using this narrower but more defensible definition, debts incurred by most African states clearly were odious because they were almost always the result of borrowings by governments who had no mandate to borrow on behalf of their citizens because they were not freely elected by them. And so writing off debt is not only a development imperative but an important acknowledgement of the principle that financial obligations incurred by unrepresentative rulers should not bind – and obstruct the life chances of - those over whom they ruled. A wider principle is at stake here, one which has more to do with political theory than development law. It is the question of how we understand sovereignty. The growth of international human rights activism has prompted an important debate on the relative importance of state sovereignty and the enforcement of rights. Against the traditional Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, it is increasingly argued that, where states violate rights or are incapable of protecting them, intervention by other states, multi-lateral organisations and international civil society is warranted (Annan 1999:49; Macdonald 1994: 210-225). The problem with this argument is that it leaves open the equally subjective question of who decides whether rights are violated and whether intervention is required – it can be used to justify invading Iraq as well as far less controversial responses such as humanitarian intervention in Darfur. It can be used to impose the will of one state on another or to support the right of citizens of a state to make their own choices. Democratic principle requires us to support the latter and to 88

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oppose the former, and so we need to address this question in a way which asserts the right of citizens to sovereignty over the territory in which they live as the supreme democratic value. We can do this by insisting that sovereignty rests not with states or governments but with citizens, so that intervention is permissible only where it can clearly be shown to strengthen the sovereignty of citizens by enhancing their ability to determine who governs and the content of public policy (Friedman 2005). In this understanding, a citizenry is sovereign not only if its state is sufficiently free from external control to take its own decisions but if citizens, where they feel moved to do so, are also able to shape what is decided by freely electing those who decide and by contributing to the debate which produces the decisions. The relationship to debt should be clear even if we have not yet made it explicit: if sovereignty rests with citizens rather than states, debts which were incurred on behalf of citizenries without their consent are ‘odious’ and therefore morally void. And in Africa, it is not difficult to demonstrate that debts were, in the main, incurred without the agreement of citizenries. To the extent that debt write-offs recognise that lenders should have been aware that they were advancing money to governments which lacked a mandate from their citizens and were therefore knowingly lending to regimes which had no right to contact debt on behalf of their citizens - or were negligent in not bothering to find out - they are an important step forward to an international order which defends the sovereignty of citizens rather than states, and penalises those who contract agreements with states without the consent of their citizens. The Democratic Dilemma One implication of this argument is that a minimum condition for a debt write-off should be the democratisation of the relevant country – if the moral problem is that debt was incurred by those who had no mandate to do so, it is not solved by according a ‘fresh start’ to governments who continue to lack a mandate. But this is not, of course, as straightforward as it was some years ago when the line between the minority of African democracies and the much bigger group of undemocratic regimes was far clearer. Now, most African governments are formally democratic in the sense that they hold regular elections in which a variety of political parties compete. But there is compelling 89

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evidence that many are ‘virtual democracies’ in which unrepresentative elites have learned how to remain in power while allowing opposition parties and elections (Joseph 1998). Determining which states have achieved sufficient citizen sovereignty to ensure that the resources freed by a debt write-off will be spent in ways decided by their citizenries is, therefore, hardly an exact science and may lead to justified claims of arbitrariness. The problem becomes far less intractable, however, when we approach the question as a practical rather than a normative one. We can do this by putting to one side the question of whether states are democratic enough to ‘deserve’ debt cancellation and looking instead at the conditions which would need to be satisfied if the money freed by debt write-offs is to be spent in ways which ensure growth and development. The question becomes not whether governments have met an abstract democratic standard, but whether public policy is designed and implemented in ways which make it likely that the debt cancellation decision will prompt development. The evidence suggests that this is directly linked to the extent to which citizens are able to exercise sovereignty over development decisions – whatever the nature of the political system. Voice and Development The degree to which citizens exercise sovereignty does not seem to have been the question which exercised the minds of the G-8 Finance Ministers who decided which states should be granted full debt relief. Even if we put aside as subjective the question of whether formal democracies really allow democratic politics, one of the 14 African countries which is benefiting is Uganda, whose ‘no-party’ system, whatever its merits or deficiencies, does not meet the democratic criteria used by G-8 countries. It seems plausible, therefore, to assume that the key criterion applied by the G-8 was not popular participation in government but compliance with particular policy recipes. This is hardly a startling observation: the debts are written off as a consequence of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which bases debt relief on ‘the satisfactory implementation of key policy reforms’ and ‘the maintenance of macroeconomic stability’ (IMF 2005). This, of course, implies that the debts have not been repaid not because they were incurred by governments who lacked a popular 90

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mandate but because appropriate policies were not pursued. It follows that all that is needed to ensure that the resources freed up by writing off debt will be used productively is to insist that debtors adopt the ‘correct’ policy package. This misreads the problem. Loans were mis-spent not because governments were unaware of the latest policy fashions but because the people on whose behalf the money was borrowed had no say in how it was spent. The point can be illustrated by drawing on South African development experience. While post-apartheid South Africa has spent far more on development than any other African country – according to the minister of finance, 57 per cent of government spending in 2000 was allocated to the poorest 40 per cent of the population (Manuel 2000) progress against poverty has been limited and uneven: the consensus among economists is that income poverty has increased since 1994. There is debate on whether the effect of increased access to services means that living standards have increased despite this (Leibbrandt et al, 2004). The evidence suggests that the chief reason for this poor success record is that policy repeatedly misreads the preferences and experiences of the poor. Either programmes ignore what poor people want– by, for example, seeking to provide mortgage finance to the poor who reject it because it is associated with losing one’s home – or they misread choices, by assuming (wrongly) that people who require electricity will no longer use coal – or they are unaware of crucial patterns of social and economic behaviour, such as the practice of using old age pensions as a buffer against poverty for family members of all ages (Tomlinson 1997; White 2000). In all these cases, copious research exists to show why policy fails to take into account grassroots realities. The fact that the research is often ignored is a consequence of a lack of voice for the poor, not failure to grasp the latest specialist policy consensus. There is, therefore, no guarantee that debt cancellation will make any difference – unless the people who are meant to benefit, the citizens of those countries whose debts are expunged, have attained their sovereignty sufficiently to influence development policy and its implementation. Debt cancellation would, therefore, stimulate pro-poor development only if citizens, and the poor in particular, are able to participate in development policy decisions and to influence their implementation in 91

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those countries which benefit. That may not be the case even in countries such as South Africa, which are not only formal democracies but in which freedom to speak, assemble and organise are broadly recognised. Empirical evidence that the current wave of African democratisation is not necessarily creating the conditions in which economic and development policy decisions are taken in response to vigorous public debate whose participants include the poor is provided by research into the formulation and implementation of anti-poverty policy in most of the states which belong to the Southern African Development Community (CPS 2003). It showed that, invariably, despite ritualised participation exercises, the key participants in development discussion are not African citizens but governments and donor agencies representing the countries whose finance ministers agreed on debt relief. This is particularly important because the HIPC initiative does purport to recognise the need for citizen voice in shaping anti-poverty policy. A crucial element in the process is, therefore, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Processes (PRSPs) which indebted countries must initiate if they want debt write-offs (IMF). PRSPs are meant to provide a platform for all key interests in society to discuss development and growth priorities. They were, however, found to be largely symbolic affairs, incapable of generating national poverty strategies which would reflect local preferences and win the support of key domestic interests. This should be no surprise. Poverty policy cannot accurately gauge local needs and win widespread support unless all voices are heard. Formal processes such as PRSPs, however, provide a voice only for those who are organised, often excluding those who need most to be heard. Appropriate policy also requires public debate on policy, open contest between competing views and workable political compromises. This requires free democratic politics, not formalised public participation techniques. Conclusion: Blaming the Victim? To the extent that G-8 countries and their donor agencies intervene in indebted countries to champion the latest development fashion rather than active democratic politics – and to substitute ritual ‘consultation’ exercises for the right to speak freely, to debate and to 92

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compromise, and to be heard by those in authority – they are, therefore, sowing the seeds of the next failure which they will, of course, blame on Africans who will be said to be unable to develop the continent even when their debts are cancelled. But if debt cancellation fails to kick-start pro-poor growth in Africa, it will not be because Africans cannot come up with workable programmes for growth and development. It will, rather, be because they have not yet had the opportunity to do so. Ironically, the responses which are meant to ensure that debt cancellation does trigger development may play a role in creating precisely the outcomes they are designed to avoid. The G8’s debt write-off will offer the promise of sustained growth only if it is accompanied by internal domestic political climates which ensure that the fresh start promised by writing off debts is made by African citizenries in open debate and political contest, not by the purveyors of fad and the local elites who prefer development fashion to the voices of their own people. Without this precondition, the prospect that debt cancellation will produce another failure for which grassroots Africans will be unjustly blamed is very real. References Annan, K. 1999. ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’ The Economist: October, 18-24. CISDL. 2003. Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine: Working Paper 11: Centre for International Sustainable Development Law: March [Online] Available at http://www.probeinternational.org/probeint/OdiousDebts/OdiousDebt s/index.html. Centre for Policy Studies. 2003. Analytical overview of the political economy of the civil society sector in Southern Africa with regard to the poverty reduction agenda. Commissioned Research Report. CPS: Johannesburg. Friedman, S. 2005. ‘The Forgotten Sovereign: citizens, states and foreign policy in the south’ (in Robertson, J & East, M.A (eds) Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War foreign policy-making structures and processes Abingdon, Routledge. IMF. 2005. Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Fact sheet. [Online] Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. 93

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Joseph, R. 1998. ʹAfrica, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closureʹ: Journal of Democracy: 9 (2). Lubbrandt, M., Poswell, L., Naidoo, P., Welch, M & Woolard, I. 2004. ‘Measuring changes in South African inequality and poverty using 1996 and 2001 census data’. In Taking Power in the Economy: Gains and Directions. Economic Transformation Audit 2004. Cape Town: IJR. Macdonalds, L. 1994. ‘Globalizing Civil Society: Interpreting International NGOs in Central America’ (in Swatuk, L & Shaw, T.M (eds.) The South at the End of the Twentieth Century: Rethinking the Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America. New York, St Martin’s Press, 210-225. Manuel, T. 2000. Budget Speech. February, 20. [Online] Available at www.finance.gov.za. Tomlison, M. 1997. Mortgage Bondage? Financial institutions and lowcost housing delivery. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. White, C. et al. 2000. The social determinants of energy use: synthesis report. Unpublished report submitted to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs: January.

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CHAPTER 5

AFRICA’S DEBT AND THE POLITICS OF AID Barbara KALIMA-PHIRI Introduction This chapter discusses the crisis of debt in Africa and how that crisis, together with the politics of aid poses a challenge to the overall development of the continent. Africa’s debt burden continues to have negative effects on the fight against poverty and diseases. The debt burden still remains one of the biggest obstacles to the continentʹs development. Development aid, which is intended to resolve in many ways the poverty-debt crisis, has limited success in Africa. A number of issues bordering on the politics of aid remain highly unresolved, for example, the lack of significant progress on reaching the 0.7 % target of the Gross National Product (GNP) of aid to developing countries; poor quality of aid vis-à-vis technical assistance; tied aid versus tied development; governance and economic conditionality. This has largely undermined Africa’s development processes. The game of allocation and use of aid continues to remain not only a political tool used by the donors to dominate the recipients of aid but also an economic one for capital accumulation. The chapter argues that as African governments continue to strengthen their relationship with the rest of the world, it is time they also took bold steps to explore more innovative ways of domestic resource mobilization to counter overdependence on external financing. This way, decisions regarding any developmental plan will be country owned and driven, thus promoting ownership and accountability of Africa’s development processes and making significant contributions to poverty eradication efforts. Africa and the debt crisis Today, Africa’s debt stock stands at a staggering US$300 billion. African countries spend almost $15 billion annually servicing debt. This is a diversion of resources from HIV/AIDS programmes,

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education and other important development needs. This burden remains one of the biggest obstacles to the continentʹs development. In 1970, Africaʹs proportion of the total debt was less than $11bn, not even half the total amount owed by poor nations today (Madslien 2005). By the late 1980s, the debt crisis was spiralling out of control. The soaring oil prices during the late 1970s sparked a global recession that hampered the demand for imports of commodities from the developing world. So while the oil exporting countries were raking it in, export incomes from producers of other commodities plummeted. Meanwhile, banks and governments in rich countries took the opportunity to give loans to poor countries, many of which were governed by dictators such as Mobuto Sese Seko of former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). When the debt burden grew, more loans were taken to service old ones - a practice that proved the old adage; that for every bad borrower there is a bad lender. By 2002, Africa’s debt had risen to well above $295bn as shown in the graph below. Figure 1: Africa’s Debts 1970 – 2002.

African countries find themselves trapped in precarious positions to an extent that they cannot fully service their debts. Although loans inject cash into indebted countries, none of them has sincerely 96

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prospered. According to the UNDP (2002), the government of Lesotho in 2002, spent twice as much on debt service as on health care, in a country where 68% of the population dies before the age of 40. In Zambia there were only seven (7) physicians for every 100,000 people, yet Zambia spent three times as much on debt repayments as on health care in 2003. Clearly, Africa has paid back approximately $550bn in principal and interest over the last three decades. Such repeated repayments should be stopped on the basis that such money could contribute to the health and education of African people, as well as facilitate the development and economic recovery and growth of Africa. Commenting on Nigeria’s debt crisis in 2000, President Obasanjo said: All that we had borrowed up to 1985 or 1986 was around $5 billion and we have paid about $16 billion, yet we are still being told that we owe about $28 billion. That $28 billion came about because of the injustice in the foreign creditorsʹ interest rates. If you ask me what is the worst thing in the world, I will say it is compound interest (Jubilee 2000 News Update, August 2000).

The African Institute for Applied Economics estimates that for every dollar Nigeria has borrowed, it will have paid five dollars more in 2020 (Smith 1994). Smith (1994) adds that the size of the debt trap can be controlled to claim all surplus production of a society, but if allowed to continue to grow the magic of compound interest dictates it is unsustainable. If Third World debt continues to compound at 20 percent per year, the $117 trillion debt will be reached in eighteen years and the $13.78 quadrillion debts in thirty-four years (1994:143). Politics of aid and Africa’s development A number of issues border on the politics of aid discussions, for example, the lack of significant progress on reaching the 0.7 % target of the GNP of aid to developing countries; poor quality of aid vis-à-vis technical assistance; tied aid versus tied development; governance and economic conditionality. This has largely undermined Africa’s development process. These issues are explained in turn:

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Why is target of 0.7 % of GNP not met? Many years ago, 37 to be precise, rich donor governments promised to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA (Official Development Assistance) at the United Nations General Assembly in 1970. ‘Although these targets and agendas have been set, year after year almost all rich nations constantly fail to reach their agreed obligations of the 0.7% targets’ (Shah 2006) as shown in figure 2 below. Instead ‘of 0.7%, the trend has been somewhat between 0.2% and 0.4%, some $100 billion short’ (Ibid). Figure 2: Aid as percentage of GNI Net ODA in 2004 as percent of GNI Country Aid amount by GNP Source: OECD, April 11, 2005. Norway

0.87

Luxembourg

0.85

Denmark

0.84

Sweden

0.77

Netherlands

0.74

Portugal

0.63

France

0.42

Belgium

0.41

Ireland

0.39

Switzerland

0.37

United Kingdom

0.36

Finland

0.35

Germany

0.28

Canada

0.26

Spain

0.26

Australia

0.25

Austria

0.24

Greece

0.23

New Zealand Japan United States Italy

0.23 0.19 0.16 0.15

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Recent fluctuations in foreign aid to Africa do not reflect the truth about rich countries’ generosity, or the lack of it. Measured as a proportion of gross national income (GNI), aid lags far behind the 0.7 percent target. In many cases, as Pekka Hirvonen (2005) from the Global Policy Forum summarizes: ƒ

ƒ ƒ ƒ

Aid is primarily designed to serve the strategic and economic interests of the donor countries; Or (aid is primarily designed) to benefit powerful domestic interest groups; Aid systems based on the interests of donors instead of the needs of recipients’ make development assistance inefficient; Too little aid reaches countries that most desperately need it; and, All too often, aid is wasted on overpriced goods and services from donor countries (Hirvonen 2005).

It must be noted, however that during the Cold War, a high amount of aid (though not near the 0.7% mark) was disbursed to African countries by super powers and their allies based on alignments with each superpower’s interests. Ironically, the ‘end of the Cold War’s reduced military budgets did not result in more aid towards developing countries. Instead, developing nations are in competition with other countries ‘in transition’ for scarce official assistance’ (South Centre 1999). As others have long criticized, increased aid during the Cold War had a geopolitical value for the donor countries (Shah 2006). In the post Cold War era, particularly after September 11, 2001, there has been another rise in aid just as in the Cold War period, this time to fight terrorism. Yet when the 0.7% of GNI promise for development aid was made in 1970, ‘official development assistance was to be understood as bilateral grants and loans on concessional terms, and official contributions to multilateral agencies’ (ibid). But, today, donors have put a lot of emphasis on broadening the interpretation of what constitutes development assistance. According to the South Centre, this interpretation bears little relationship to the need of the developing countries to develop their long-term development capital base. It denotes: ƒ ƒ

Debt relief as opposed to debt cancellation; Subsidies on exports to developing countries;

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ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

ƒ

Food aid which disposes off agricultural surpluses resulting from government subsidies; Provision of surplus commodities of little economic value; Payments for care and education of refugees in donor countries; Grants to NGOs and to domestic agencies to support emergency relief operations; and Technical co-operation grants which pay for the services of nationals of the donor countries.

Clearly, this denotes a strong sense that developing countries still have a long way to go in defining what their real needs are and they risk being trapped in a dependency syndrome mode which will continuously place them in a weaker position in the global arena. Aid as a foreign policy tool It must be understood that for most donors to meet their obligations for aid to the poorer countries, it is not only an issue of economic spending but also a political one. This is clear in how resources have been mobilised and allocated for spending. For example, the US recently increased its military budget by ‘almost $100 billion dollars’, and ‘Europe subsidizes its agriculture to the tune of $35-40 billion per year, even when it demands other nations to liberalize their markets to foreign competition.’ The ‘US also introduced a $190 billion dollar subsidy to its farms through the Farm Bill’ (Shah 2006). While ‘aid amounts to around $50 to 55 billion per year, poor countries pay close to $200 billion to the rich each year in form of debt servicing obligations, asymmetries and imbalances in the trading system or due to inappropriate liberalisation and privatisation measures imposed upon them by the international financial system’ (ibid). The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, noted that ‘this $200 billion is the sixth consecutive and largest ever transfer of funds to other countries made in 2002’ (Moya: 2003). He continued to say: Such funds should be moving from developed countries to developing countries, but these numbers tell us the opposite is happening.... Funds that should be promoting investment and growth in developing countries, or building schools and hospitals, or

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supporting other steps towards the Millennium Development Goals, are, instead, being transferred abroad (ibid).

In effect then, there is more aid channeled to rich countries than to poor ones. This phenomenon (aid flows from the south to the north) makes any increase in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) seem little in comparison. Shah (2006) argues that: With only very minimal cents in every dollar spent on overseas aid actually reaching the poorest countries, it is clear that aid flows are largely dictated by geo-strategic concerns rather than by efforts to reduce poverty.

Shah further argues that ‘aid is a foreign policy tool to aid the donor and not the recipient. It was established as a priority, the importance of influencing domestic policy in the recipient countries’ (Nelson 1997). One of the primary causes of poverty is to be found in the powerful nations that have formulated most of the trade and aid policies, that today encourage dependency on industrialized nations, provide sources of cheap labour and cheaper goods for populations abroad while increasing personal wealth and maintaining power over developing nations. Even Structural Adjustment policies and other lending and development schemes developed by the international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank, have done little to help poorer nations progress (Shah 2006). Instead of developing these countries, the adjustment policies have facilitated a continued culture of dependency on the major powers. The world’s most powerful and industrialised nations insist on restricting consumer buying power in Africa as a prerequisite for what are essentially maintenance loans; and they refuse to cancel debts completely to allow for these countries to start afresh in their development. Developed nations insist that African nations must adopt their prescribed market-led and driven policies as a way of boosting their economies, policies which have largely contributed to increased poverty, unemployment and inequality. Meanwhile, these same leaders forget that they easily agreed that West Germany must put $1 trillion into the former East Germany to simultaneously build industries, social infrastructure, and markets. And when the relatively poorer countries of Greece, Portugal, and Spain wanted to join the Common Market, these leaders ‘implemented 101

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a 15-year plan which included massive transfers of direct aid, designed to accelerate development, raise wages, regularize safety and environmental standards, and improve living conditions in poorer nations’ (Smith 1994:150). Emerging former colonies receive no such care for their economies to become viable, a deliberate ploy to keep them under their (developed nations’) control. Tied aid equals tied development Many donors apply aid conditions that tie recipients to purchasing products only from those donors. On the one hand, this seems a fair and balanced practice, because the donor gets something out of the relationship; however, on the other hand, this is destructive to poor countries that end up using their resources for expensive options, while these resources could otherwise have been used for other developmental needs. Essentially, this type of aid does not add value to recipients; instead, it obliges them to purchase exorbitant imports from the richer nations. In addition, the recipient has no control or decision-making power on how aid is used. This undermines the democratic right for recipient countries to choose the type of development paths that they want. Hence, even if a country wanted to invest part of the aid on poverty reduction, it fails to do so because that aid is tied to purchases abroad. For example, it would be cheaper to build a network of railway lines with local expertise and resources than to spend aid money on tied conditions such as foreign consultants, experts, architects and engineers (Deen 2004). Some of the strings attached to US aid for similar projects, would include the obligation to buy products such as Caterpillar and John Deere tractors as argued by Shah (2006). All this would make the project more expensive. Similarly, in the fight against HIV/AIDS, there are strings attached to the money that is being splashed on Africa to fight the pandemic. According to Njoki Njehu, for instance, Washington insisted that African countries that get US aid must purchase anti-AIDS drugs from the United States rather than buying cheaper generic products from South Africa, India or Brazil. The reality is that US drugs cost up to US $15,000 a year while generics cost only US $ 350 annually (Deen 2004). The 2000 Reality of Aid report claimed that, ‘71.6% of its (US) bilateral aid commitments were tied to the purchase of goods and

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services’. In other words, US aid was tied to its foreign policy objectives. Negotiations around climate change are an area where issues of aid conditionalities are evident. Powerful nations such as the US have been vocal against the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. The US and its allies have been able to exert influence on other countries to push for bilateral aid agreements that are tied to conditions (Centre for Science and Environment: 2002). Unlike bigger and richer nations, smaller and poorer countries do not have adequate aid to bribe and even threaten other countries in order to advance their interests. The use of muscles in political and economic arenas is not a new phenomenon. Powerful nations have always exerted their influence in various arenas. During the Gulf War in 1991, for example, many that ended up in the allied coalition were promised various concessions behind the scenes (what the media described as “diplomacy”). For example, Russia was offered massive IMF money. Even now, with the issue of the International Criminal Court, the US has been pressuring other nations on an individual basis to take its position. In such a context, aid would often be tied to political objectives and at times, it is very difficult to draw the line between when there are conditions and when no conditions are attached. Some conditions are ideologically driven. For example, the former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, once noted how European and North American farm subsidies ‘are crippling Africa’s chance to export its way out of poverty.’ While this criticism has also come from other commentators, Wolfensohn’s reference to ‘export’ presupposes that some forms of development assistance may be hinged on the condition that recipient nations should reform their economies according to particular ideological orientations. Structural Adjustment policies are examples of a particular ideological disposition: neoliberalism that has promoted export-oriented development. As noted earlier, SAPs have not reduced poverty and underdevelopment in Africa; instead they have had disastrous effects. Even their own masters: the World Bank and the IMF; have commented that these policies are not working. More often it is easy to understand why conditions might be attached to improving human rights, or democracy than to understand economic aid conditionalities from a particular ideological lens, as if to suggest that “one size fits all”.

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Some analysts claim that when donors are able to place stringent conditionalities or even hold leaders accountable, aid can improve governance. The trouble is that donors have a weak record of monitoring these leaders. Sometimes they disburse aid in exchange for an alliance, as the US did in the late 1970s with Somalia and Sudan. In fact, strategic bilateral aid can be linked to resources such as oil and diamonds, whose production is highly profitable, and requires minimal labor. In such countries, donor leverage is stronger than in resource-poor states. The above discussion reinforces the argument that aid does not help the recipient in substantive ways; rather it is in the interest of the donor. Conclusion In conclusion, it can be safely said that the multiplier effects of Africa’s debt crisis reflected by increased poverty, inequality, unemployment and spread of diseases are constantly being reinforced by the politics of aid. There is an urgent need for increased commitment by developed countries to meet their 0.7 % of GNP target of aid to developing countries. The quality and quantity of aid to developing countries should be improved and at the same time, the current donor-recipient relationship that allows a continuous flow of resources from the South to the North should be addressed; including the need to deal with issues of poor governance in developing countries and economic conditionality which have negatively contributed to African development. However, it must also be understood that it will no longer suffice to merely repeat that ODA targets should be fulfilled. What is required, in view of the policy trends in the North is a radical shift in resource flow from the North to the South. But more fundamentally, there is need for a comprehensive review of the approaches used by the international community and more serious attention on the question of financial flows in recipient countries. Recipient countries need to look closely at their developmental needs against the availability of local resources. The composition and sources of resource flows should be scrutinized through a public process that involves all stakeholders. There should be transparency on information regarding the quantity and terms on which the loans are made. Further, the allocation 104

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and use of aid must be made public and debated openly by the citizenry. African governments need to take bold strides to explore more innovative ways of domestic resource mobilisation to avoid depending exclusively on external financial support. This way, decisions regarding any developmental plan will be country owned and driven, promoting ownership and accountability of the development process and making significant contributions to poverty eradication efforts. References Centre for Science and Environment. 2002. ‘Pop of the World’. Equity Watch Magazine: Centre for Science and Environment. (Online) Available at http://www.sceindia.org/html/cmp/climate/ew/ew_oct25/pop.htm, accessed 12 February 2007. Deen, T. 2004. ‘Development: Tied Aid Strangling Nations, Says U.N’. (Online) Available at http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnes=24509, accessed 11 February 2007. Hirvonen, P. 2005. ‘Stingy Samaritans: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid fail to Help the Poor’. Global Policy Forum: http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/oda/2005/08stingysamar itans.htm, accessed 12 February 2007. Jubilee 2000 COALITION. ‘Leaders of Indebted Nations hold London Debt Summit’. (Online) Available at http://www.jubileeresearch.org/jubilee2000/news/london180800.html, accessed 12 February 2007. Madslien, J. 2005. ‘Debt Relief hopes bring out the Critics’. (Online) Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4619189.stm, accessed 11 February 2007. Moya. K.M. 2003. ‘Foreign Aid’. (Online) Available at http://www.moyak.com/researcher/resume/papers/foreign_aid.html, accessed 12 February 2007. Nelson, B.F. 1997. ‘International Affairs Budget: Framework for Assessing Relevance, Priority and Efficiency’. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office.

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OECD. 2005. Available at http://www.un.org/specialrep/ohrlls/News_flash2005/OECD%200DA%202004%20general.pdf, accessed 12 February 2007. Shah, A. 2006. ‘The US and Foreign Aid Assistance’. (Online) Available at http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/Usaid.asp, accessed 11 February 2007. Smith, J.W. 1994. The World’s Wasted Wealth 11. Sun City: Institute for Economic Democracy. South Centre. 1999. ‘Financing Development: Issues for a South Agenda’. (Online) Available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/financing/toc.htm, accessed 12 February 2007. UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report. UNDP.

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CHAPTER 6

THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA REPORT: TURNING BIG IDEAS INTO ACTION Fletcher TEMBO Introduction The 461 pages of the Commission for Africa Report contain big ideas and recommendations for a common agenda to enable Africa’s long overdue development progress. Historically, issues of contention on achieving this progress have been around what the new energy should be, where it would come from and how this energy should be expressed. The Commission for Africa’s ‘big-push’ approach attempted to resolve these issues. This chapter argues that the translation of these big ideas and recommendations into practice will be a mammoth task, unless certain elements of the report are addressed. These include the challenges of how these recommendations hold together, issues related to making the report credible and tackling selectivity problems as well as addressing leadership challenges. If this is not done, the report will soon be relegated to the archives as one of those ambitious projects that at best served Tony Blair’s political aims during the United Kingdom’s unique chairmanship of the G8 and presidency of the European Union in 2005. What distinguishes the 2005 Commission for Africa report from many other old and recent reports on Africa are the big ideas that purport to support Africa on the road to prosperity. These ideas focus primarily on improving governance, peace and security, investing in people, economic growth and poverty reduction, promoting fairer trade and providing more and better aid. The report embraces the new vigour by individuals, communities, governments and donor institutions as partners towards “our common interest”. A considerable number of people put aside their decades of disappointment as a result of broken promises and declarations on Africa and contributed to the report with renewed optimism. The detailed report reflects the diversity of issues and outlines new ideas for tackling them. Simon Maxwell, the director of a highly regarded UK based international development think tank, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 107

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rightly described the report as ‘exhilarating, exhausting and intriguing’ (Maxwell 2005). While this report is a feat in itself, its publication was but a first step ‘towards a prosperous Africa’. The challenge is to turn these big ideas and recommendations into concrete action in order to ensure tangible benefits for the poor in Africa. This chapter seeks to discuss these critical challenges and suggest ways for overcoming them. World Vision was attracted to the Commission for Africa consultation process because of the Commission’s emphasis on Africa taking lead in her own development, which was also phrased as “listening to Africa”. The Commission’s position reflected the World Vision’s belief in transformational development; ‘people-led development’. The new emphasis on Africa taking lead in her development is a paradigm shift from past initiatives on Africa. Since the Genoa Summit in 2001, G8 countries have switched to using the phrase ‘partnership with Africa’, and have begun referring to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as the voice of Africa. During its leadership of the G8 in 2003, France, making reference to NEPAD, said, ‘African countries have decided to collectively strengthen good governance of their countries in political and economic matters, and this action will attract more substantial flows of private and public capital’ (Sommet D’Evian 2003: 5). We must note however that reference to ‘countries’ meant governments and not necessarily, citizens. This however does not mean that all African leaders do not represent their citizens. Rather, this is meant to highlight the fact that the practice of governments’ engagement with their citizens is a daunting challenge that merits a separate discussion. From this perspective, the fact that the Commission for Africa initiative consulted with audiences beyond governments was a fundamental achievement. This approach means that the implementation of the report’s big ideas must accord far greater weight to Africa and her citizens than the G8 2002 Africa Action Plan, which was based on NEPAD. The G8 Plan involved only a selected few African leaders, especially those who were invited to the G. 8 summit. In other words, the call for action and accountability on the delivery of the Commission for Africa’s recommendations is now not just between G8 leaders and their African counterparts in NEPAD and the African Union; it extends to citizens who were consulted either directly by the Commission Secretariat and Commissioners, or indirectly through NGOs, including World Vision. 108

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The promise of the Commission for Africa was reinforced through several visits to Africa by commissioners, including Gordon Brown, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ralph Goodale, the Finance Minister for Canada, Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development, and Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister. These trips included visits to villages and meetings with civil society organisations, children, and ordinary men and women. In many ways, this demonstrated that it is not just leaders of Africa that matter - people including children, living in rural as well as in urban slums matter in the considerations of the G8 nations. All these visits sent a strong message beyond rhetoric. The immediate aftermath of the Commission for Africa report were voices from the African continent calling for tangible action. Hence, the Most Rev Donald Mtetemela in Tanzania for instance noted: Positive plans will be wasted if they do not reach and involve the poorest people in the continent’s remotest villages … They see clouds of good intention forming in the West, but they so often do not see any rain (Tearfund 2005)

It is from this premise that I identify and discuss the main challenges of turning the Commission for Africa’s big ideas into action. These challenges include the ability to drive donor and country policies so that they all address main causes of poverty or drive positive change (what I call the coherence challenge), keeping the report credible over time, dealing with selectivity problems and ensuring visionary leadership to make these recommendations deliver tangible results. One year and some months after the Commission for Africa report was produced, this chapter benefits from an analysis of how some of the recommendations have been taken forward. I focus on these issues from a development mindset; however, well aware that there could be other objectives for Blair’s involvement, implicit in his statements such as: Building stability in Africa would be to the Westʹs advantage, as we know that poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals.

The main section of the chapter begins with the important discussion of coherence, in terms of recommendations themselves and the policy decisions that they inform. This section is followed by short 109

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discussions on the problems of selectivity, keeping the report credible and leadership over the overall delivery on the report. I conclude the chapter with emphasis on the need for continued analysis of issues raised in the Commission for Africa report in the context of global, continental, regional and local challenges that militate against turning its ideas into practice, especially realising meaningful impact on the poor. The coherence challenge The actions proposed by the Commission constitute a coherent package for Africa. The problems they address are interlocking. They are vicious circles, which reinforce one another. They must be tackled together. To do that Africa requires a comprehensive ‘big push’ on many fronts at once. Partners must work together to implement this package with commitment, perseverance and speed, each focusing on how they can make the most effective contribution (Commission for Africa 2005: 13).

As a package of interlocking issues, the report makes clear that taking action on one part without tackling others will not help Africa. The report, however, does not state how coherence within the international system, often with different and politically motivated agendas, will be achieved. It is unlikely that attention will be given to these recommendations at the same time and with the same intensity. It is, therefore, important to explore relationships between several actions, so that we identify those areas where Africa needs urgent assistance. The G8 countries have a record of taking action only on issues that ‘require little coordination among G8 states, involve little obligation beyond the commitment of funds and produce ends that are both easily quantifiable and media friendly’ (Corlazzoli and Smith 2005: 2). The analysis of different recommendations and possible policy actions is critical in making the G8 and other rich nations act on both the issues of their natural choice and the less conspicuous but critically important issues that are in the report. Lobby groups, which concentrate on single issues without locating them in the big picture, could lead to the G8 making decisions that have disastrous long-term consequences for Africa.

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Policy-Practice Contradictions: Aid Quantity and Aid Quality From the grassroots communities in Zambia, for instance, increasing teachers’ salaries without a commitment to sustaining those salaries for a foreseeable future would be disastrous if foreign aid stopped and the country still has not developed its own ways of funding the education sector. Ministers of Finance in developing countries normally resist developing policies that are short-term because they have huge social and political costs. For example, speaking at a seminar jointly hosted by the UNDP and DFID, Dr. Donald Kaberuka, then Finance Minister for Rwanda, emphasised the critical need for long term predictable funding, especially in the form of grants (Republic of Rwanda 2005). Currently, standards on aid commitments, such as those agreed at the Paris High Level meeting; oblige rich countries to release their aid on schedule; however they do not set a minimum number of years for which aid should be committed to enable long term planning (OECD 2005). Thus, aid levels could increase but the patterns of its flow to African countries will remain uncertain, making it difficult for countries to commit budgets to their long-term plans to tackle poverty. With the ongoing lobby for more aid to achieve the MDGs, particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa, coming from the “Make Poverty History Campaign” that included NGOs, individuals and pressure from some of the G8 governments, including the UK and Canada - an increase in aid to 25 billion dollars, as recommended in the Commission for Africa report was promised at Gleneagles. From these commitments, the final Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Cooperation Directorate analysis shows that DAC members increased to 0.33% of their combined Gross National Income (GNI) by end of 2005, up from 0.24% in 2004 (OECD 2006a). The end of year 2005 figure is even higher than the figures projected mid-2005, as shown in Figure 1 below.

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Figure 1. DAC Membersʹ net ODA 1990 - 2004 and DAC Secretariat simulation of net ODA to 2006 and 2010 0.40 0.36

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Source: OECD-DAC Issue paper DCD (2005) 18 The OECD simulation of aid in Figure 1 above shows that aid is likely to increase from nearly US$80 billion in 2004 to nearly US$130 billion in 2010 and that half of it will go to Africa, raising it to over US$50 billion in 2010. This is within the Commission for Africa report’s recommendations. However at Gleneagles, the issue of where funds were to come from was left to individual governments, except for some endorsements of new financing initiatives such as the International Finance Facility (IFF), the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and global taxes. This lack of commitment on actual procedures for increasing aid by rich countries has already resulted in these countries wrongly recording implementation of their aid increase promises. Some have counted debt relief as an increase in aid, which distorts the picture of new aid to Africa. For instance, the recently produced DAC final ODA figures show that if the 2005 debt relief to Nigeria is removed, net ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in real terms fell by 1.2% (OECD 2006a). The figures drop even much lower when emergency relief and technical assistance are subtracted. The Commission for Africa report failed to clearly discuss the donors’ own domestic 112

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constituencies and legislative processes which lead to these aid interpretative calculations and the political economy of translating promises to reality by various donors. In this context, we find that although Gleneagles also established a timetable to achieve the 0.7% target agreed in 1970, these targets were set beyond 2010, which emanated from political leaders’ reading from their domestic challenges. For example, the EU put the target at 2015, the UK government at 2013, France at 2012 and Germany at 2015. These targets do not reflect the wealth creation capacity of these rich countries due to globalisation. For example, in 2004, for every $100 that the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries became richer (in total they became richer by $2,997 billion), only 32 cents on average was devoted to aid, which also included debt relief and reconstruction funding (Development Initiatives 2005). In other words, if aid policies and commitments in rich countries reflected their growth in wealth, aid to Africa would both increase faster and be of higher quality in terms of predictability. Aid predictability is one of the policy areas discussed here due to its contradictions with aid quantity, policy and practice. This is not addressed in the Commission for Africa report. Policy-Practice Contradictions: Aid and Debt Relief The Commission for Africa report recommends a 100% debt cancellation for poor countries in Sub Saharan Africa. This is an important recommendation given the stocks of debt that most African countries in this region accumulated (Commission for Africa 2005: 328). This debt stock has perpetually eroded any opportunity for governments to invest in their people and it has made them vulnerable to receiving poor aid, particularly in terms of donor conditionalities. The G8 Summit at Gleneagles agreed to a Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) providing 100% debt cancellation from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank (ADB). Of the 22 countries that qualified for MDRI, 17 are African countries. However, returning to the example of the Zambian village cited above, we find that because Zambia as a country qualified for MDRI, it is immediately recorded that the savings will lead to abolition of health fees and enable thousands of citizens to have access to free health (HM Government 2006). This might well be how the Zambian government 113

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put forward their MDRI negotiations with donors. However, the reality is that, first, savings are only possible if Zambia was repaying its debt and that was reflected in its budget. Where a particular country does not have the capacity to repay, additional funds would be required in order to invest differently for poverty reduction. Unfortunately, the Commission for Africa report does not push for this ‘new money’ debate and how it plays out for the different Heavily Indebted Poorest Countries (HIPCs) in Africa. As a result we find donors counting debt cancellation figures as part of new aid, resulting in sharp spikes for 2005/2006 and following years as reflected in Figure 1. If the graphs were to be based on the actual savings as a result of debt relief as well as new money injections into recipient country budgets, the picture would be different. Second, the MDRI is tied to the HIPC programme, which is based on the condition that countries satisfy World Bank and IMF negotiated reform programmes, including the ‘country owned’ poverty reduction strategies. This is a policy contradiction to the more aid agenda that is promoted on the MDGs banner. Sachs is right when he observes that whereas in political announcements, the international community has put forward bold MDGs, when it comes to translating them into action through specific plans, the poverty reduction strategies state them as vague aspirations and not operational targets (Sachs 2005). One can strongly suspect in this case that because the MDGs are championed by the UN while PRSPs are championed by the World Bank and IMF, the two cannot be expected to be quickly harmonised at country level unless there is such harmonisation at the top. Unlike Sachs who suggests oversight by the UN Secretary General through the United Nations Development Programme, ODI gives the option of a more radical shift of creating a single UN Development Fund (Burrall et al. 2006). Although, reference to the UN might appear a plausible solution to this incoherence problem, it is unlikely to work in practice. For instance, during my recent research on the PRS process in Zambia, I suggested that the donor harmonisation processes around the poverty reduction strategy should be UN-led, a proposal which received significant resistance from other donors. Third, if the MDRI was MDGs-based rather than put into the HIPC framework, countries like Liberia would be candidates for a shorter route to benefit from the initiative at a time when they need resources for post-war reconstruction. In the current framework, they have to go 114

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through the HIPC eligibility procedures. Thus, despite its heroic launch by the G8 and the International Finance Institutions, the MDRI is heavily donor controlled and continues to allow for damaging donor conditions as the basis for reaching out to poor people. The Commission for Africa report does not deal with this critical policy debate. This is a serious omission. Policy-Practice Contradictions: Aid and Domestic Revenue It is also important to explore how aid flows compare with resources from domestic revenues. On this issue, Asian and Latin American developing countries are doing better than Africa. At the moment, the average overseas aid proportion of African countries’ own Gross National Income (GNI) is at 6.2% and this will increase, especially with debt relief calculations being included in future overseas aid figures and new initiatives like the IFF and MCA (World Bank 2005). A coherent development action, however, is where G8 countries have policies that support African countries to ensure that the external aid proportion of the GNI will start to go down by 2015 or thereafter. Currently the G8 discussions and the World Bank/IMF calculations tend to give undue focus on the export-debt ratios as a measure of assurance that countries will not fall back in debts. This approach encourages debt repayments rather than building country capacities to reduce aid dependency in the long run. Interestingly, the Commission for Africa report has not highlighted this coherence issue but instead recommended a flat one third financing by African governments from domestic sources (Commission for Africa 2005: 302), while the rest should come from ODA. I argue strongly that unreasonable targets should not be set regarding how much African countries fund from their own sources. This is because some countries could start with a quarter or fifth of the required resources from domestic resources. In fact if providing a third of the required resources from domestic sources is set as a condition for obtaining external assistance, the poorest countries, that are already borrowing heavily from banks and accumulating un-repaid domestic debts, will only borrow more in order to obtain external assistance. Alternatively, they will impose higher levies on the consumer market or tariffs on exports and imports, thereby undermining drivers of

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growth, a problem the report has outlined in detail. I contend that the emphasis should be placed on the value of extra aid. This understanding would shape the choices that African countries make as to what form of aid they receive rather than the amount of aid per se. For example, heavily tied aid, even at high levels might not put countries on the correct path to ensuring their own growth, while lower levels of untied aid would do so. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness left the target on untying aid for rich countries to merely “continued progress”, when at the moment aid is heavily tied. Untying aid is another difficult policy issue for the G8 to deal with. Ultimately it restricts the opportunities for their own business and requires greater coordination to achieve consistency of good practice across the G8 as a group. It is not surprising therefore that this issue was avoided during the G8, 2005 Gleneagles meetings and also at the 2006 meetings in St. Petersburg, Russia. Policy-Practice Contradictions: Aid, Trade and Debt The Commission for Africa report articulates a number of trade issues but it does not deal with the issue of coherence on the delivery of recommendations. For instance, the report recommends the conclusion to the Doha trade round of ‘no later than 2006 to make an early difference to Africa and other developing countries’ (Commission for Africa 2005:289). However, its subsequent recommendations give later dates, for example, to end ‘trade-distorting’ agricultural support, which is very important to Africa, by 2010; and to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers by 2015. This introduces incoherence in the big-push strategy for Africa because ultimately, the ratio of aid to own resources will remain very high until these trade issues are addressed. The longer the ratio remains high, the more the dependency syndrome will be encouraged. The impasse in the trade talks in Hong Kong in December 2006 was indeed a failure for Africa in this regard. This failure is evident in the impact at community and family levels in Africa. This is evident in what has come out of voices of millions of people that took part in the 10 – 16 April, 2005 Global Week for Action on trade justice across the world. US subsidies on cotton, for instance, amount to 3.9 billion dollars, more than aid and debt relief to the cotton producing countries (UCTAD 2004). In other words, removal of subsidies would give West African farmers much more than aid, it 116

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would give them the dignity to earn from their own investment and increase their choices to invest for their children. This is an overdue policy action on the part of rich countries. Furthermore, the aid for trade debate in the Commission for Africa report has a focus on increasing transport networks and reducing barriers to entry into trade by the population. Investing in greater irrigation for increasing production is also important. However, the critical issues are on how to stabilise prices on agricultural commodities that Africa produces for the internal and international market so that there are appropriate triggers on the market. The current ‘trade facilitation’ issues within the WTO do not resolve price volatility issues. Instead, unpredictable market prices in Africa’s large portion of agricultural products, directly relate to the high debt overhang in many African countries. They affect the value of exports and hence the export to debt ratio which the IMF uses for recommending debt relief. The selectivity problem As discussed earlier, the Commission for Africa report’s recommendation on debt relief is a broad recommendation for those that need it to achieve MDGs. The February 2005, G7 Finance Ministers meeting in London endorsed commitments for 100% debt relief on bilateral debt and a case by case analysis approach to debt owed to multilateral institutions, subject to the World Bank/IMF analysis of debt sustainability. The result was the MDRI for countries that had reached completion point on their debt arrangements. This, however, also means that most countries are left out of the deal, not because of their need to ‘meet MDGs’ but because they do not fit within the HIPC framework. Regarding aid flows, the current allocation by region shows that Sub Saharan Africa receives more aid than the other parts of the world, as shown in Figure 2 below. The current situational analysis of poverty in this region makes it the main target for aid increases.

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Figure 2: Where DAC Aid Goes by Income Group and Region

Source: OECD DAC Development Cooperation Report 2005. On economic grounds, the allocation of aid in Sub Saharan Africa is contested based on parameters such as its capacity to absorb more aid and achieve sustainable development as well as its poverty-reduction efficiency in comparison to other regions, especially Asia. The allocation shown in Figure 2 above is a region-by-region and global allocation as opposed to a “poverty-reduction efficiency” approach (Anderson and Waddington 2006). It is evident that poverty reduction efficiency is never the only factor that determines how aid is allocated. The result is bias in aid allocation that comes neither from the level of poverty itself nor the ability of calculated amounts of aid meant to reduce it, which further complicates the selection criteria. At the bilateral level, for instance, political relations, type of governance indicators, security and other concerns other than good policy, easily come in, although not necessarily always by design. This influences the selection of countries that a particular donor or group of donors work with and the quality of influence that these countries have on the quality of aid from donors. As a result, there are ‘nearly orphaned’ countries with high poverty, benefiting from few donors while others have support from many donors. In such a situation, even the talk of aid effectiveness through mutual accountability between 118

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donors and recipient countries is undermined because the ‘nearly orphaned’ poor countries are afraid of losing even the little aid that comes their way. The Commission for Africa report does not give any guidance on these selectivity realities. Furthermore, the currently increasing bilateral aid from China and India to African countries is making this selection problem even more acute. This is especially true if traditional donors perceive China and India as competitors for their ‘niches’ in Africa, resembling the kind of a new “Scramble for Africa”. It is not known what criteria these new donors use to select countries. At the most, commentators point to China’s interests in countries that have natural resources and business links (Tjonneland 2006; Marks 2006). Ultimately, G8 Summits are the most unlikely mechanism for achieving well thought out policy and actions around these complex selectivity issues, where they are themselves implicated in terms of varied interests besides development. For instance, the G8 has the tendency to pick and choose African leaders when inviting them to meetings, which is suspect of being informed from the need to bring in potential trade partners. The ascendance of China and India has muddied the waters even more. There is currently a confusion around how China really works with individual countries in Africa, which has arisen in the way that China is penetrating from the language of ‘friendship, peace, cooperation and development (Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation 2006)’. This language mirrors that of the G8 and NEPAD but China is penetrating at individual government level in ways that are difficult to unravel both in terms of which African countries are taking up which deals and on what terms. It is very unclear, from an Africa-wide analysis, which country is getting how much of Chinese aid. In my view, the issue of selectivity as discussed, demands a stronger-Africa based framework so that African countries act together and for one another, which was not dealt with in the Commission for Africa report. To this end, the AU framework, through its vision and mission, is best placed. This will, however, require a specific Africa Union strategy, as an action point from the Commission for Africa report.

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Keeping the report credible Given that the report was developed by a Secretariat, it was free to develop questions and tasks that could challenge governments including the U.K that chaired it. A critical challenge for turning recommendations into action is determining who could take those actions that are pivotal to delivery, in line with the issues of coherence. The report ardently argues that governance is the main challenge for Africa to address in order to go forward. More importantly, according to World Vision recommendations, the report links governance with the voice of Africa on the international scene (World Vision 2004). However, the first credibility test for the report was the process of the appointment of the World Bank’s president. The recommendation that ‘appointment of the heads of international institutions should be decided upon by open competition which looks for the best candidate, rather than by traditions which limit appointments by nationality (Commission for Africa 2005: 369)’ failed to hold ground. Aside from any argument that would be made against Paul Wolfowitz, as an individual, the process was less convincing. Principles were compromised and in a situation like that, the delivery on the Commission for Africa’s other governance calls are also eroded. For instance, soon after the announcement of the World Bank’s new presidency, the E.U in its backing of Wolfowitz for the World Bank post added ‘We have to make sure that Europeans will be represented in a better way on the managing board of the bank’ (www.msnbc.com/id/7333925). The Reuters further reported France proposing the French head of the Paris Club to be Wolfowitz’s deputy. No consultation was conducted with developing countries. This is a clear indication that the development agenda in the Commission for Africa will continually face a challenge at the institutional governance level, both in Africa and at the international community level. Institutional issues such as increasing representation of Africa in the executive boards of the International Finance Institutions and the rules governing voting remain contentious. At the 2006 annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF, whereas voting powers of China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey were immediately increased, those of low income countries, to which most African countries belong, were left to a statement of principle that they need to be strengthened as well during the second round of reforms (IMF 2006b). As discussions on the 120

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reform of the governance of the World Bank starts, these IMF reforms will have implications on the credibility of the discussions and outcomes. The Commission for Africa report is not able to inform the credibility of these discussions and outcomes sufficiently. Leadership by Example In order to translate the Commission for Africa report ideas into action, the strongest message needs to come from the African Union, followed by greater coherence and alignment of UK policy with the report recommendations as chair of the Commission for Africa. This political capital should be translated into political muscle that influences the E.U and other G8 positions. Such an influence can only be effective if the UK government translated all the report recommendations into specific policy actions, from a leadership perspective. I do not expect that the independent monitoring unit proposed in the report (Commission for Africa 2005: 382), and implemented in the Africa Partnership Forum, will make a difference without leadership. A permanent representation of the AU at the G8 meetings, supported by an AU-based special unit for G8 meetings, could bring out coherent and more inclusive decisions from G8 meetings. This is better than identifying a distinguished figure from Africa to take these issues forward alongside another figure from the West, as proposed in the commission report. If not done so, undemocratic selection will continue. Leading by example implies laying out specific plans of action for recommendations and ideas in the Commission for Africa report. For example, on aid flows, it is not enough to put a target of 0.7% by 2013. The UK government needs to plan and even pass legislation on specific and year-by-year commitments till 2010, as shown in Figure 3 below and even plan to do better. This would tremendously increase pressure on other governments and improve aid predictability.

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Figure 3: Proposed long term trend in aid for the UK government

The long term trend in aid as a % GNI for the United Kingdom 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1

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It is also important that while developed country governments are translating the Commission for Africa recommendations into firm policy and actions, the AU/NEPAD should speedily identify what Africa will do in implementing the recommendations. This has often been the problem in the Africa-donor partnership because donor action plans easily come into place before Africa’s ‘home-grown’ action plans. 122

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For instance, the 2005 Africa Partnership Forum (APF) agreed to develop joint action plans that would harmonise AU/NEPAD’s plans with those of donors. The agreed action plans that are being monitored by the just established OECD-based APF Support Unit, however, are not based on broad-based consultations within Africa. This is especially in terms of how they move from the Commission for Africa recommendations to action. There is a need for the AU to facilitate greater ownership within Africa that goes beyond working with specialised experts in Agriculture, Health, Infrastructure and other fields. This is important within the current governance structure of the AU, national governments and other stakeholders where clearer downward accountability is needed for successful implementation of plans. Conclusion The chapter proposed a new way of thinking regarding the Commission for Africa report, especially in the context of the G8 decision-making practice and the African Union. The thinking is based on a methodological process of identifying priority areas where research and policy should focus so that appropriate evidence and pressure are put on government leaders. Understanding the politics of decision-making and negotiation around the big ideas in the Commission’s report is a critical part of any meaningful translation to practice. Hasty, uncalculated and uncoordinated actions will look like something is being done but be unproductive for Africa in the long term. The areas of coherence, report credibility, managing selectivity and leadership discussed here are just some of the main areas where this politics of decision-making and negotiation needs to be closely followed. This is also where civil society involvement is a crucial and necessary part of the mechanisms required to address the challenges of translating big ideas about Africa to action. The discussion has shown that civil society involvement should not only be on lobbying but working closely at analysing politics and how decision-making bodies both in the G8 and the African Union, and their associated advisory bodies such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) work. For instance, civil society organisations have a fundamental role in ensuring that these institutions work on the implementation of the 123

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already signed conventions on human rights, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC). Additionally, the Commission for Africa report put governance at the top of the new agenda for action. However, the state cannot be expected to improve governance on its own without rigorous and welltargeted actions from civil society. At the moment, for instance, although 27 countries have acceded to the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, which is meant to enable monitoring of progress on governance, the process will be slow unless there is domestic pressure from civil society and other non-state actors. Civil society in developed countries will have to put pressure on donors to deliver on their commitments in a comprehensive rather than piece meal manner. To this effect, the Africa Partnership Forum and other Africa-donor arrangements must include representation of civil society. This way, the Commission for Africa report will not be relegated to the archives of history just like other past initiatives. References Anderson, E. & Waddington, H. 2006. ‘Aid and the MDG target: How much is required and how should it be allocated?’ Working Paper 275. London: ODI Burall, S. & Maxwell, S. 2006. ‘Reforming the international aid architecture: options and ways forward.’ Working Paper 278. London: ODI. Commission for Africa. 2005. Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa. March. Corlazzoli, V. & Smith J. 2005. The G8 and Africa Interim Report: An Overview of the G8’s ongoing relationship with African Development, from Genoa Summit to the 2005 Gleneagles Summit’, CS Expanded Dialogue Unit, Toronto. [Online] Available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/csed/g8africa_050331.html, accessed on 18 December 2006 Development Initiatives. 2005. ‘Briefing on aid in 2004’, Brighton, Development Initiatives. [Online] Available at http://www.devinit.org/dagfigs2004brief2.pdf November 14, 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 2006. [Online] Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t280370.htm, December 20, 2006.

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IMF. 2006a. The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative: A Fact SheetSeptember 2006. Washington DC: IMF External Relations Department IMF. 2006b. Remarks by Rodrigo de Rato, Chairman of the Executive Board and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, to the Board of Governors of the IMF at the Joint Annual Discussion, 2006 Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. Singapore: September 19, [Online] Available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/091906.htm December 16, 2006 Marks, S. 2006. The Summit in Beijing’ Pambazuka News: Weekly Forum on Social Justice in Africa. Fahamu: [Online] Available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/ December 18, 2006. Maxwell, S. 2005. ‘Exhilarating, Exhausting, Intriguing: The Report of the Africa Commission’. Development Policy Review: 23(4), 483-492. OECD. 2005a. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, High Level Forum. Paris: Feb, 28 – March. [Online] Available at http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2005/7033_international_communit y_aid/paris_declaration.pdf, November 16, 2006 OECD. 2005b. Scaling Up for Results: Issues Paper DCD. Paris: OECD OECD. 2006a. Final ODA Data for 2005. [Online] Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/37790990.pdf December 18, 2006. OECD. 2006b. OECD DAC Development Cooperation Report 2005. Paris: OECD. HM Government. 2005. G8 Gleneagles 2005; Africa. London: FCO. ________________. 2006. G8 Gleneagles One Year On: Turning Talk into Action. London: DFID Republic of Rwanda. 2005. Statement for the Joint DFID/UNDP Conference: Millennium Development Goals Launching: Words into Action 2005. Lancaster House: London, 26th January. Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty: How Can We make it Happen in Our Lifetime? London: Penguin Books, Sommet D’Evian. 2003. France, a partner of NEPAD: an action plan for Africa. [Online] Available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/items/data/pdf/nepad_2003_en.pdf, accessed November 16, 2006 Tearfund. 2005. Africa Commission: Poorest people must benefit says Archbishop. [Online] Available at 125

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http://www.tearfund.org/News/Latest+news/Africa+Commission+Poor est+people+must+benefit+says+Archbishop.htm. Tjonneland, E. 2006. China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies. Bergen: CMI. [Online] Available at www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid=2438 December 18, 2006. UNCTAD. 2004. Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence. New York: UN. World Bank. 2005. Global Monitoring Report 2005: From Consensus to Momentum. Washington DC: World Bank. World Vision. 2004. African Voices on Africa’s Future: a call for action for the Commission for Africa. Milton Keynes: World Vision.

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CHAPTER 7

THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA REPORT: SANCTIMONIOUS WORD-MONGERING AND HYPOCRISY REVISITED Ann TALBOT Introduction In 2005, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair launched the Africa Commission Report. The Report was followed by all the fanfare of the Live 8 concerts and the G8 meeting at Gleneagles. Inward investment, trade and free market economics, spiced with a little bit of debt relief were supposed to be the recipe for African development. This chapter assesses the results of the Report, the G8 meeting as well as the Live 8 concerts. The chapter further surveys the current situation in Africa and concludes that not only have free market policies failed, but that they have deepened the relationship of colonial dependence between African countries and the major powers. The condition of the majority of the African population has deteriorated. Finally, the chapter offers an alternative perspective for Africa’s development. This alternative approach is based on working peoples and their democratic control of the means of production. “Africa Works” More recently, in a series of programmes called Africa Works, the BBC World Service has been broadcasting the good news about Africa. It has showcased cyber cafes in Conakry, market traders in Juba and hairdressers in Addis. The picture portrayed is that of business booming in Africa. The BBC’s optimism seems to be justified by record inflows of foreign direct investment and economic growth that have hit an 8 year high in Sub Saharan Africa. In this context, could Tony Blair’s Africa Commission Report, with its emphasis on investment and tradebased solutions to Africa’s development challenges, be spot on? A closer scrutiny of the figures and a critical look at the situation in Africa dispels the upbeat impression created by the BBC reports. For 127

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example, some 200 million people in Sub Saharan Africa face hunger, a 20 percent increase over the last ten years. It is estimated that by 2020, one fifth of the agricultural workforce in Southern Africa will have been claimed by HIV/AIDS. Nine out of ten Africans who need treatment for AIDS are still not receiving medication. The Sahel region, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo all face food emergencies. Conflicts still persist in many parts of Africa including Darfur. These wars, disasters, diseases and famine affect the lives of millions of Africans. Therefore any objective coverage of the news in Africa should of necessity also focus on these issues confronting the continent. There is a definite agenda behind the BBC reports on business success in Africa. In Africa there have always been enterprising traders who have used ingenious methods of self-help. This is not a new phenomenon: small business people have always coped with power cuts and dodged warring armies. What is new however is the fact that the BBC has suddenly wanted to interview them. The BBC’s Africa Works programme is an attempt to portray Africa to the outside world as a buoyant, business-friendly environment that welcomes foreign investment as was clearly articulated by BBC’s Africa Editor, Martin Plaut who told the Ghanaian Chronicle, that ‘nobody comes and puts money into a country for charity. When you are successful, investors will come (Coomson 2006)’. The BBC reports have a certain self-perpetuating character. The success of business in Africa becomes a big story as other media outlets reproduce the BBC coverage and interview BBC journalists. Rather than simply reporting events, the BBC has used its global authority as a news service to create a favourable climate for investment in Africa. The BBC Project is very much aligned to the Africa Commission’s inclination. This is evident in the Business Action for Africa, an offshoot of the Africa Commission which has declared publicly that ‘Africa deserves increasingly to be seen as a continent of opportunity (Business Action for Africa, 2005)’. However what we should be clear about is that these opportunities are not for the small traders featured in the BBC reports or the ordinary worker or small producer in town and country. These opportunities are for the giant transnational corporations that see Africa primarily as a source of raw materials, in particular minerals and oil. Blair’s Africa Commission may have failed in reducing poverty; however it has 128

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certainly succeeded in creating pro-business media hype. Foreign direct investment has increased and the economies of a number of Sub Saharan African countries have grown. This growth however has not improved the economic conditions of the citizens in these countries and the inward investment has not fundamentally transformed the skewed economic power relationship between Africa and the rest of the world. Nearly half a century after independence, African countries still occupy the position of colonies in the world market. The slight upturn in economic growth in the last few years has served only to deepen that relationship of dependence and subordination rather than reducing it. Hi-jacking the language of compassion Africa faces a new wave of colonialism. The Africa Commission Report is a subtle expression of that. The Report was sold to the public as a mechanism for ending poverty in Africa. It called for total debt cancellation, demanded that aid to Africa be doubled from $25 billion (£13 billion) to $50 billion, and that rich countries should drop their trade barriers. In turn, African countries were urged to make progress towards democracy, to tackle corruption and end armed conflicts on the continent. Presiding over its launch, Tony Blair declared piously that ‘it is an obscenity that should haunt our daily thoughts that four million children in Africa will die this year before their fifth birthday.’ Although the situation in Africa was “obscene”, equally so has been Blair’s policy towards Iraq, which has led to the deaths of more than 650,000 Iraqis, including children. It is worth noting that the Report did not offer a single credible solution to Africa’s impoverishment. Blair and the Africa Commission hijacked the language of compassion in cynical ways in order to boost the Labour Party’s vote in the May 2005 elections and increase the UK’s standing on the international stage. The dominant objective of the Africa Commission Report was to create the conditions for big business to take control of Africa’s natural resources. Chaired by Blair, the Africa Commission included Chancellor Gordon Brown and Hilary Benn from the UK government, as well as political figures from Africa such as Meles Zenawi, President of Ethiopia, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania and Michel Camdessus, former head of the International Monetary Fund. The Commission also included Bob Geldof, the rock musician who set up Live Aid and Band 129

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Aid and ran the Live 8 concerts later that year. Geldof’s presence was crucial in creating the illusion that the Commission was in some way independent of political influence. Sharing the platform with Blair at the Report’s launch, Geldof complained that it would cost the United States “nothing” (own emphasis) to end war, poverty and disease in Africa. When reporters asked Blair whether he agreed with this sentiment and would put pressure on President George W. Bush, he squirmed coyly, ’because I’m a politician in a suit,’ he said, giving one of his Princess Diana looks, ‘I wince at the occasional word, but actually what he said is what I really think.’ Blair’s genuflection to Geldof reflects the fact that charities now muster more support than all the UK political parties put together. The growing global gulf between the rich and poor has produced a mounting response in terms of charity and protest campaigns. The Africa Commission presented an opportunity for Blair to co-opt charitable and protest movements for his own political ends. By the time of the G8 summit at Gleneagles in July 2005, an entire propaganda machinery was in place under the banner of the ‘Make Poverty History Campaign’ and ‘Live 8’. While previous G8 summits had been characterised as scenes of mass protests, the Gleneagles demonstration was pro-government in all purposes. The Live 8/Make Poverty History campaign perpetrated ‘political fraud’ against all those genuinely interested in overcoming the terrible hardships and injustices affecting the poor of Africa (Socialist Equality Party 2005). Both Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown closely associated themselves with the campaign. Brown spoke at a charity event in Edinburgh the evening before the ‘Make Poverty History’ rally that was supposed to be putting pressure on him. In other words the Chancellor was lobbying himself. Blair gave an hour-long interview on MTV alongside Geldof and took questions from Destiny’s Child as part of the build-up to the concerts. By boosting the pitiful debt relief package agreed on by the G8 and hailing the proposals of Blair’s own Commission for Africa for aid and relief tied to free-market initiatives, the Make Poverty History/Live 8 campaign provided a much-needed mask of humanitarian concern to both Blair and Bush.

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Doing good the ‘Notting Hill’ way The Live 8 concerts were a multimillion-dollar propaganda campaign organized by individuals and organizations with close ties to the Labour government. The ten concerts cost £25 million (Hopkins 2005). About £1.6 million was paid to the Prince’s Trust to persuade that organization to cancel its Party in the Park. Performers were not paid, though those at the Philadelphia concert reportedly got gifts worth $3,000 including designer suits and Gibson guitars. More significant was the boost to music sales. Sir Paul McCartney’s performance of “Sergeant Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band” was on sale within hours. London record shops reported a 1,000 percent increase in sales for Pink Floyd CDs the next day. David Gilmour, Floyd’s lead guitarist, immediately announced that his share of royalties from increased sales would go to charity. Other artists followed suit. However, royalties paid to artists are just a small proportion of the profits made from sales by the record companies. And yet there have been no magnanimous gestures from record companies. The commercial considerations that lay behind the concerts can be seen from the fact that African musicians of considerable talent were relegated to a side event in Cornwall, because they did not appeal to the market, whose purpose the event was prepared for. CD sales represent a declining section of the market compared to sponsorship, broadcast rights and merchandising. Most of the costs of the event were recouped in this way, and it is here that much of the profit and relatively cheap and phenomenally lucrative publicity was made. Naked commercialism was evident in even the most ostensibly charitable aspects of the operation. White “Make Poverty History” wristbands have been one of the most visible emblems of the campaign. From the start, they were surrounded by controversy. It was reported that some of the wristbands were made in Chinese sweatshops. Journalist Stuart Hodkinson revealed in the Red Pepper magazine that some of the wristbands were being sold with the logos of companies that are accused of violating workers’ rights. This included fashion company Tommy Hilfiger, accused by Stephen Coats, Executive Director of the US/Labour Education in the Americas Project of being ‘at the bottom of the list in demonstrating refusal to accept responsibility for the way workers are treated.’ The wristbands were being sold at shops owned by Scottish millionaire Tom Hunter, who 131

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pledged £1 million to the Make Poverty History campaign (Hodkinson 2005). However, Hunter is a relatively small player compared to some of the corporate enterprises that were signed up. The backing that Live 8 won from media mogul Rupert Murdoch is just one indication that a massive business and political machine was set in motion. Murdoch’s British tabloid, the Sun gave the event enthusiastic support, although it is not a paper noted for its interest in Africa or liberal causes. It is, however, a key supporter of Blair. The Murdoch and Live 8 connections are close. Elisabeth Murdoch, Rupert Murdoch’s daughter, is married to Matthew Freud, one of the organizers. Freud runs a leading public relations company that is, according to the Financial Times, one of the most influential in the UK. It has the largest media and entertainment client list in the country, including famous actors and major companies such as AOL. Freud and his wife are also strongly connected to the Blair government. They sit on various government committees, and his company, Freud Communications, has organized events for both the government and the Labour Party (Sanghera 2001). Freud’s sister, Emma, is married to Richard Curtis, the writer/director/producer responsible for Love Actually, the Bridget Jones movies, Notting Hill, Mr. Bean and Four Weddings and a Funeral. His latest film, The Girl in the Café, is a love story set at a fictional G8 conference, and is supposed to show how ordinary people of conscience can persuade the political establishment to do ‘good’. He is among those who founded the charity Comic Relief in the wake of Live Aid. Curtis has been one of the main organizers of Live 8. He is said to be particularly close to Gordon Brown, who featured sympathetically as a barely disguised character in the G8 movie. Geldof’s production company, Ten Alps provided the two big screens in Hyde Park. The company is also closely associated with government. It owns 70 percent of Teachers TV, which makes programmes for the Department for Education and Skills. In 2004, Geldof’s company enjoyed a 400 percent increase in profits. Ten Alps is positioning itself to become one of the key independent television companies in Britain. The status that Live 8 has given Ten Alps can only enhance the company’s international exposure. Live 8 offered an unprecedented marketing opportunity to other companies. Nokia and Volvo were among corporate sponsors. Volvo spokesman, Soren

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Johansson said the event ‘fits with the DNA of the company’ and ‘appeals to people’s emotions (Chossudovsky 2005)’. AOL ran live video streaming, billing Live 8 as ‘the day music changed the world’. Live 8 may indeed have changed the world or at least that part of it that comes under the heading of advertising. The general opinion afterwards was that video streaming had proved its commercial value with the Live 8 concerts. Although some of the charities affiliated to Make Poverty History had expressed their alarm over the scandal surrounding the wristbands, the commercial orientation of the campaign was no secret. The Live 8 web site continued to offer a link to AOL’s music download service long after the event. The combination of high emotion, live music and modern technology proved to be a highly profitable commercial tool and offered Blair new ways of marketing his politics. An effusive Observer journalist said, ‘by first light today, a world majority will have offered Tony Blair a significant mandate for change (Townsend 2005)’. The Notting Hill glitterati certainly “did good” for Blair and for their own companies and clients. But how did Africa benefit from this hype and activities? World Trade Summit Blair designated 2005 as ‘The Year for Africa’. By the end of 2005, as world leaders gathered in Hong Kong for the World Trade Summit, Geldof preened himself on his success. ‘It seems,’ he wrote in the Guardian: That at last the original proposition I articulated 20 years ago, that to die of want in a world of surplus was not only intellectually absurd but morally repulsive, has been utterly agreed by a towering majority, and reluctantly accepted by the leaders of the rich world. That ultimately is what happened this year (Geldof 2005).

Hong Kong proved Geldof’s self-congratulatory remarks wrong. The World Trade Organization did not offer Africa any benefits and posed new economic dangers. The rich countries, particularly, the European Union and the USA agreed to remove their agricultural subsidies at some unspecified future date. This was something they

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were already legally committed to do anyway. However, they still have not begun to dismantle the subsidies. Despite these vague and insubstantial promises, Africa and other poor countries were obliged to open their markets to the rich industrialized countries. As Peter Hardstaff of the World Development Movement complained, ‘never has so much been promised to so many by so few and so little delivered (World Development Movement 2005)’. And Oxfam’s analysis of the WTO talks was that ’not only have they failed to deliver on their Doha promises, there are worrying signs that the round has lost its way and reverted to a traditional “might is right” negotiation in which the final outcome could do more harm than good for development (Oxfam 2005)’. The Make Poverty History campaign called on Europe’s trade commissioner Peter Mandelson to remove the white wrist band that had become part of the New Labour dress code during the summer and which he still wore at the Hong Kong negotiations. There was never any possibility that Hong Kong would produce a deal that would benefit Africa. But development actors, especially, charities are firmly wedded by ideological and financial ties to the agenda of the world’s most powerful governments. Development actors cannot give up the hope that the US and the EU will accede to pressure and begin to carry out their promises. Hence, they continue to look for every minor sign of a moral reawakening even when their efforts are humiliatingly rebuffed time and time again. Debt relief ‘fraud’ The idea that poor countries can trade their way out of poverty has become a key tenet of the aid industry. It is based on the fallacy that international regulations can make a fundamentally inequitable economic system fair, even to the weak and powerless. The WTO is a classic example in which all do not participate as equals. It is a forum in which great powers attempt to renegotiate the division of the world without, at present, resorting to arms. Poor countries, like those in Africa, may be given a seat at the table, but they do not have decision making powers. Nowhere is this more evident than in the action of the leading industrialized countries. At the UN World Summit in September 2005, the US agreed to Chancellor Gordon Brown’s proposal that 18 134

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countries be granted debt relief. The figure of $55 billion that was touted sounded very impressive but the rising price of oil has cancelled out any benefit for most African countries. Again, not every indebted country qualified for debt relief. Nigeria, for example, was not included in Brown’s IMF scheme despite the fact that half of its population lives on less than a dollar a day. Because of its income from oil, Nigeria cannot be classified as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). Nevertheless, Nigeria secured a separate deal. Under this deal Nigeria paid £7.2 billion ($12.4 billion) immediately to its creditors in the Paris Club. The biggest slice of this money – £4.5 billion – went to the UK. In return Britain cancelled £5 billion of Nigeria’s debt. Even this rather limited act of generosity vanishes like a mirage when we consider that Nigeria had already paid $18 billion on an original $17 billion debt. Its creditors, who are among the richest countries in the world, are claiming $30 billion in interest and penalties. The original debt was incurred under the succession of military dictatorships that the West kept in power during the Cold War. Nigeria’s population did not benefit from this money. What was not spent on arms was siphoned off into the bank accounts of corrupt Sandhurst-educated generals. For the poorer countries that qualified for debt-relief under the HIPC scheme, the cost has been high. All of them have had to meet stringent conditions that commit them to privatizing significant parts of their economies, cutting public spending, sacking public sector workers, imposing wage freezes, removing subsidies and opening their markets to imports. Zambia won debt relief after implementing such a programme under which its economy shrank by 1.7 per cent a year. The Zambian textile industry used to produce 3.5 thousand tons of clothing a year. However, since the market was opened up to imports under the IMF measures, it has collapsed and now produces only 500 tons. Agriculture has also regressed because small farmers can no longer afford seeds or fertilizer. Hunger is on the increase in what used to be one of the most developed countries in Sub Saharan Africa. An impression has been created that the UK cancelled the debts of poor countries, and yet it still holds £2 billion ($3.8 billion) of debt from poor countries that do not qualify for the HIPC scheme. Among them are Angola and Kenya. The total debt of poor countries stood at $412 billion at the end of 2005 (Jubilee Debt Campaign 2006). African countries owe $200 billion and spend $14 billion a year in servicing that debt. This is more than the $10 billion they receive each year in aid 135

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(Africa Action 2006). Debt may have receded from the world headlines but it is still a powerful factor shaping the economies of most African countries. Man-made disasters Debt and the Structural Adjustment Programmes have left African countries incapable of responding to food emergencies, especially those that swept across Africa in 2005/6. The crisis in the Sahel in mid-2005 was followed by food shortages in Southern Africa, later in that year. At the beginning of 2006, 11 million people faced food shortages in the Horn of Africa. The crisis stretched to Kenya where 3.5 million people were prone to hunger. According to Oxfam, 16 million people are at risk in ten (10) neglected and under-funded emergencies in Africa. A case in point is the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 71 per cent of the population is said to be malnourished. In northern Uganda, 48 per cent of children are stunted as a result of malnutrition. In Sub Saharan Africa, as a whole, 28 per cent of children are under-weight. UNICEF has called the chronic state of malnutrition in Africa the “silent emergency” (Oxfam 2006). The Famine Early Warning Net highlights three African countries - Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia – as being in need of urgent action with the highest priority. Chad and Zimbabwe are also identified as being in need of urgent action (Fews Net 2006). What is apparent about these food emergencies is that they are not famines in the accepted sense. They occur despite the fact that food supplies are available in the areas concerned. They are food shortages among people who are too poor to buy food. In Kenya, there is a food crisis among the pastoralists of the north-east and yet the harvest nationally was 15 per cent above average. A similar pattern emerged in Niger and Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe the availability of maize has improved, but few families can afford to buy it because of inflation and unemployment. Poverty, not lack of food, underlies the increasing number of food emergencies in Africa where the number of people surviving on less than a dollar a day has doubled since 1981. It is reckoned that 46 per cent of the population of Sub Saharan Africa is in this position (Oxfam 2006). These are man-made disasters. They are disasters that are being made worse by the failure of the rich and industrialized countries to provide sufficient emergency aid. The

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World Food Programme (WFP) reported in October 2006 that it has cut food assistance in Southern Africa because of a massive shortfall in aid. Some 4.3 million people depend on WFP food programmes in the region. The WFP has been forced to limit its work to those affected by HIV/AIDS, mother and child feeding centres and school feeding projects. Further cuts are likely. Emergency aid is vital, but long term assistance to small farmers would increase food security and provide the rural poor with an income. Although 70 per cent of the population live in rural areas and make a living from the land, aid for agriculture has consistently declined over the last decade. Between 1997 and 2001, lending for agriculture from the World Bank also declined by 30 per cent. Poverty has a cumulative effect from crisis to crisis. According to the WFP, millions of farmers in Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zambia are too poor to buy the seeds that would give them prospects of feeding themselves (WFP 2006). Pastoralists in Kenya and Niger have been forced to sell or eat their animals in order to survive and now have no means of restocking their herds. Poverty and malnutrition are closely linked to HIV/AIDS. An estimated 24.5 million people are living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. There are 2.7 million new infections every year (Avert 2006). Worst affected is Southern Africa where infection rates exceed 20 per cent. Average life expectancy in Africa is now 47 years. Without the impact of AIDS-related deaths it might have been 62 years. It is estimated that 12 million children have been orphaned as a result of AIDS and the number is set to grow. Such is the impact of AIDS that some commentators are using the term “new variant famine” to describe the combined effect of the disease, drought and cuts in government subsidies on the rural population. In many parts of Africa, farmers are too sick to work, young people die leaving the old to provide food and in many cases, orphans head household. Last year 2.3 million people died of AIDS-related diseases in subSaharan Africa. In the advanced industrial countries, the death rate has fallen as anti-retrovirals have been used. An effective use of drug therapy requires a high level of nutrition. But in Africa, no systematic attempt has yet been made to introduce large scale treatment programmes.

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The impact of climate change is also another issue to be taken cognizance of, in addition to the terrible toll taken by HIV/AIDS. Christian Aid suggests that 182 million could die in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the century as a result of diseases attributable to climate change (Christian Aid 2006). Climate change, for example, will cause malaria to spread to higher altitudes. It will lead to a greater risk of flooding and drought as weather become more extreme. The 2006 Nairobi Climate Change Summit was held in the midst of an unprecedented drought in East Africa. It was followed almost immediately by devastating rains that caused flooding, claiming hundreds of lives and made thousands homeless. Chronic poverty makes Africa less able to cope with climate change. Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is an expression of the semi-colonial position the continent still occupies in the world system. The same is true of the armed conflicts that are a major contributory factor to the spread of poverty and diseases. Africa’s wars reflect a long history of colonial oppression that has left a legacy of communal antagonisms and border disputes. During the Cold War, Africa became the scene of proxy wars between the Soviet Union and the West. With the dissolution of the USSR, the West cut the subsidies it had prepared to pay anti-Soviet dictators. Oil, China and the new colonialism More recently, oil has become the great prize. Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan account for about 48 per cent of foreign direct investment. Most of this goes into the oil and gas industry, although other minerals also took a share of inward investment in 2006 (Akosile 2006). The renewed interest in Africa, primarily as a source of raw materials, is largely responsible for the pressure put on African states to accept bilateral trade deals. Since the Cotonou Treaty of 2000, the European Union has insisted that African countries open their markets to European companies. The EU is currently negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which impose rules preventing African countries from regulating the activities of foreign investors and impede them from protecting their own national industries. Nowhere is the competition over Africa’s natural resources expressed more acutely than in the relationship between the West and 138

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China. China has developed a considerable presence in Africa. This has challenged the dominance of the old colonial powers. China’s investment in Africa has overtaken that of Britain and is just behind that of France and the USA (Walsh 2006). China has invested $4 billion in Nigerian oil refineries, power plants and agriculture in return for oil rights. In Angola, Chinese companies are rebuilding infrastructure that was destroyed by the civil war through a soft loan from Beijing. Angola is repaying the loan in oil (Economist, 2006). Some African officials argue that China offers a new model of development for poor countries because it succeeded in lifting millions of its peasants out of abject poverty. This however overlooks the terrible effect of the Great Leap Forward which resulted in the most disastrous peacetime famine in Chinese history. Again, the present condition of the Chinese countryside is not a shining example for Africa. The welfare provisions that were put in place after the famine have largely been withdrawn as China has increasingly restored capitalist market conditions. As a result the rural poor have trekked to the towns in a desperate search for work and are forced to live in slum conditions. Rather than offering an alternative to a semi-colonial relationship with the West, China’s involvement in Africa perpetuates a situation in which Africa is a producer of raw materials and a market for cheap manufactures. Even Victor N. Chibundu, a former Nigerian ambassador to China, who is now chairman of the Nigeria-China Friendship Association, based in Lagos, admits that, ‘they are selling; they are trading; they are not producing locally (Timberg 2006)’. For the African political elite, the arrival of China on the scene has proved to be a valuable means of retaining their own positions of privilege. But very little of the money flowing from Chinese contracts has filtered down to citizens. Most of it has gone to the pockets of the elite. China’s growing interest in Africa has introduced a new element into the mix. Africa has been drawn more closely into the geopolitical struggle between China and the West. China’s expanding economy has created a rising demand for raw materials. China has temporarily succeeded in getting access to African resources. This, however, is a situation that the West will not tolerate. Free market capitalism, whether Chinese style or under the tutelage of the World Bank and IMF does not offer a way forward for the people of Africa. The results of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the 139

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expanding famine provide a more accurate picture of the implications of this new phase of imperialist plunder than the glossy literature produced by the Africa Commission or the BBC’s tales of thriving businesses. To the extent that inward investment is increasing, and it is still small by world standards, it is about profit and not about raising living standards. In conclusion: what alternative? If we must conclude that the free market economic policies set out in the Africa Commission report have failed, what then is the alternative? Among the possibilities, the most obvious are the nationally managed economies of the type that many African governments established after independence and the charitable model of the NGOs. But how viable are these? The experience of the last 40 years demonstrates that nationalism does not offer a viable alternative. No one looking at Africa in 2006 can seriously doubt that the continent continued to be dominated by its former colonial masters after independence. The national movements that came to power throughout Africa from 1960 onwards failed to break the grip of London, Washington and Paris. The corruption that western governments now deplore in Africa is the inevitable result of the dependent political systems the colonial powers set up at independence. It is western companies that pay the bribes and western governments that allow off-shore tax havens to exist. The condition of Africa today is a testimony to the failure of the nationalist perspective that characterized the African political elite in the post-World War II period. Independent African states continued to be subordinate to a world market in which they supplied raw materials and profits were drained away to the major banks. During the Cold War, the West was prepared to allow minor social concessions and some national economic development. But the abiding legacy of that period is the mountain of debt that African countries incurred and are still paying. African governments once attempted to control capitalism by means of national regulations. They are now changing their legal systems to create a business friendly environment and offering tax breaks to investors. The wealthy elites who make up the governing class see which way the wind is blowing. They know that the only way they can hang on to their privileges is to make themselves useful to 140

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global capital. The fact that African politicians have made a collective pilgrimage to Beijing does not alter the nature of the world market. Chinese companies want the same conditions as American or European companies. They all have to operate on a global scale. Must we then trust the good graces of NGOs? They play a huge role in the economic and political life of many African countries. They handle much of the aid, and lobby governments, companies and international organizations on Africa’s behalf. Their economic data is, as this article demonstrates, vital in understanding economic trends in semi-colonial countries. But the charitable status of the NGOs does not mean that they offer an alternative non-capitalist perspective. The NGOs have signed up to the agenda of inward investment and free market economics. It was not so difficult for Geldof and Blair to turn charity into a vehicle for commercial marketing and political propaganda. The last two years have discredited charity as an alternative perspective for development. Perhaps what is even worse is that events like Live 8 have conditioned us to think of Africa as a basket case and blind us to the real alternatives which reside outside the sphere of capitalist economics. We are led to believe that Africa is a continent that for some unique reason is sliding backwards while the rest of the world is powering ahead. But Africa is not an inherently poor continent. It is rich in resources and millions of dollars are milked from it in the form of loan repayments and profits every year. The Nigerian government could pay $12.4 billion to its creditors out of its oil profits. That amount of money could have been spent on providing assistance for small farmers, free health care or education. It would have benefited millions of people rather than the shareholders of a few banks. Africa is also not unique when we look at the widening gulf of social inequality in supposedly prosperous countries. Africa reflects in the most extreme form, the increasing impoverishment of the majority of the population of the planet, while a tiny minority accrues wealth on an obscene scale. Just as climate change is an expression of a global phenomenon, so poverty, disease, war and famine in Africa are the result of the systemic failures of a worldwide system of political economy. The condition of Africa at the beginning of the twenty first century is a testimony, not to the failure of Africa, but to the failure of the global capitalist system that is run for the benefit of the semicriminal elite who own the major transnational companies and 141

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financial institutions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the only solution to Africa’s problems is to take the vast wealth that these companies control out of their hands and to bring it under the democratic control of the majority of the working population on a global scale. References Africa Action. 2006. [Online] Available at http://www.africaaction.org/campaign_new/debt.php [Accessed on 22 November 22, 2006] Akosile, A. 2006. ‘Africa: Continent Records $31 Billion FDI. This Day: November, 14. [Online] Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200611150211.html [Accessed on 22 November 22, 2006] Avert. 2006. http://www.avert.org/aidsinafrica.htm [Accessed on 22 November 22, 2006] Business Action for Africa. 2005. www.businessactionforafrica.org [Accessed on 22 November 22, 2006] Chossudovsky, M. 2005. ‘Live 8: corporate media bonanza: disinformation campaign and public relations stunt on behalf of the G8’. Global Research: July, 5. Christian Aid. 2006. ‘The climate of poverty: facts, fears and hope’. [Online] Available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/605caweek/caw06final.pdf [Accessed November 22, 2006] Coomson, J. 2006. ‘BBC to tell the success stories of African businesses’. Ghanaian Chronicle: November, 13. [Online] Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200611130982.html [Accessed November 22, 2006. (The) Economist. 2006. ‘Never too Late to Scramble’. The Economist: October. [Online] Available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=808 9719 [Accessed November 22, 2006] Fews Net. 2006. http://www.fews.net/[Accessed November 22, 2006] Geldof, B. 2005. ‘Geldof’s year’. Guardian: December, 28. [Online] Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/g8/story/0,,1674288,00.html [Accessed November 22, 2006] 142

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Hodkinson, S. 2005. ‘Make Poverty History in turmoil over new wristband scandal’. Red Pepper: June, 10. [Online] Available at [Accessed www.redpepper.org.uk/global/x-jun05-wristbands.htm November 22, 2006] Hopkins, N. 2005. ‘EMI wins battle for DVD rights to Live 8 concert’. Times: June, 27. [Online] Available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9071-1670400,00.html [Accessed November 22, 2006] Jubilee Debt Campaign. 2006. [Online] Available at http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=2647 [Accessed November 22, 2006] Oxfam. 2005. ‘What happened in Hong Kong?’ Oxfam Briefing paper. December. [Online] Available at http://www.oxfam.de/download/What_happened_in_Hong_Kong. pdf [Accessed November 22, 2006] ________. 2006. ‘Causing Hunger: an overview of the food crisis in Africa’. Oxfam Briefing Paper: July. [Online] [Available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bp91_africa_food_crisis.pdf/download[ Accessed November 22, 2006] Sanghera, S. 2001. Financial Times: December, 2. [Online] Available at http://specials.ft.com/creativebusiness/dec042001/FT35JKU2RUC.html [last updated January 15, 2002] [Accessed November 22, 2006] Socialist Equality Party. 2005. ‘Live 8: A political fraud on behalf of imperialism’. [Online] Available at www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jul2005/live-j01.shtml [Accessed November 22, 2006] Timberg, C. 2006. ‘In Africa, China Trade Brings Growth Unease’. Washington Post: June, 13. [Online] Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061201506.html [Accessed November 22, 2006] Townsend, M. 2005. ‘Inside story of the miracle show’. Observer: July, 3. [Online] Available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1520244,00.html [Accessed November 22, 2006] Walsh, C. 2006. ‘Is China the new colonial power in Africa?’ Observer: October, 29. [Online] Available at

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1934129,00.html [Accessed November 22, 2006] World Development Movement. 2005. Press Release: December 18. [Online] Available at http://www.wdm.org.uk/news/presrel/current/hkfinal.htm [Accessed November 22, 2006. World Food Programme. 2006. ‘Funding shortage edges millions of Southern Africans into food crisis’. Press Release: October, 25. [Online] Available at http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2273 [Accessed November 22, 2006]

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THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA AND AFRICA’S POTENTIAL TO BE A MAJOR GLOBAL POWER Waldron H. GILES Introduction The Commission for Africa was established in February 2004 by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Commission’s report was prepared for the G8 nations, chaired by Great Britain in 2005. The report was addressed to the leaders of the G8 and to the wider international community. It was also addressed to the people of Africa and the world as a whole. The measures proposed by the Commission constitute a coherent package to achieve a strong and prosperous Africa. The aim of the Commission was to take a fresh look at Africa’s past and present and the international community’s role in Africa’s development path. The 17 members of the Commission, nine from Africa, published their report ʺOur Common Interestʺ on 11 March 2005. The Commission was established to respond to positive changes on the continent, such as the new energy shown by the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The Commission also sought to seize the political and symbolic opportunity that 2005 presented for Africa. The year 2005 saw the United Kingdom chairing both the G8 and, in the second half of the year, the European Union. Tony Blair made Africa and Climate Change, the focus of both institutions. In September 2005, the United Nations convened the first major summit to review implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals knowing that despite progress in certain areas, the goals will not be met in Africa by the 2015 deadline unless there are new ideas and action. The year 2005 was the 20th anniversary of Live Aid and the 25th anniversary of the publication of the seminal Brandt Commission report “North-South”. The Commission was guided by five formal objectives. These are:

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1.

2.

3. 4.

5.

To generate new ideas and action for a strong and prosperous Africa, using the 2005 British presidencies of the G8 and the European Union as a platform; To support the best of existing work on Africa, in particular the New Partnership for Africaʹs Development (NEPAD) and the African Union, and help ensure this work achieves its goals; To help deliver implementation of existing international commitments towards Africa; To offer a fresh and positive perspective for Africa and its diverse cultures in the 21st century, which challenges unfair perceptions and helps deliver changes; and To understand and help fulfil African aspirations for the future by listening to Africans (Commission for Africa 2005).

The Commissioners comprised: ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom as the Chairperson of the Commission; Fola Adeola, Chairman of FATE foundation, Nigeria; K.Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Ghana; Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, United States; Hon. Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International Development, United Kingdom; Hon. Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, United Kingdom; Michel Camdessus, Africa Personal Représentative, France ; Bob Geldof, Musician and founder of Live Aid, Ireland; Hon. Ralph Goodale P.C., MP, Minister of Finance, Canada; Ji Peiding, NPC Standing Committee Member and Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, China; Dr. William S. Kalema, Chairman of the Board of the Uganda Investment Authority; Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance, South Africa; His Excellency Mr. Benjamin William Mkapa, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania; Linah K. Mohohlo, Governor, Bank of Botswana; Tidjane Thiam, Group Strategy and Development Director Aviva PLC, Côte D’Ivoire; Dr. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Under-Secretary-General & Executive Director of UN HABITAT, Tanzania; Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia

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A critical analysis of the Commission The Commission for Africa was well intentioned, political, and had all the words that attempted to answer the previous criticisms that have plagued earlier commissions on poverty and development in Africa. The clichés are there, i.e. Africans must have more say in the dispensing and allocation of funds, they must bear more responsibility in the future development of their vast and bountiful continent, they must curb the violence, disease, and corruption that have stymied the foreign investment that would like to participate in the Africa’s future growth. Since the Commission was well represented by Africans (nine out of seventeen), this would appear to lend credibility to the appeals made in the report. In the Commission’s appeal to the G8 nations, one telling quote that speaks volumes and forewarns all Africans and cynics is, ‘Too much of the history of the industrialized world’s involvement in Africa is a miserable history of broken promises.’ The Commission calls for some US$75 billion to be spent annually in order to halve the poverty within Africa by the year 2012. This amounts to a yearly per capita expenditure of 1.7 % of the African continental GDP. It is not a huge amount when presented in this way but represents almost a threefold increase in the current aid to Africa. Historically, most of the aid reaching Africa has generated meagre employment, which severely limits the efficacy of most western aid programmes. Additionally, most of the funds provided by the IMF and World Bank flow directly back to western nations, leaving the African nations with little but additional debt. The Commission gives meagre attention to generating growth via employment and increasing the production of African made goods. Ironically, one of the nations lauded by the Commission for growth was Senegal, which has an unemployment rate of 48%. Real growth emanates through job creation so that indigenous populations can spend locally, grow their local economy and their national GDP. In fact many developing nations in Latin America and the East are beginning to look at how aid has been retrogressive in stimulating growth with its concomitant destabilization of the local currency and economy. With a stated income growth goal of 4 - 5%, many of the countries that have been applauded by the Commission have had negative growth rates over the last several years; whereas China and India have had significant growth rates of 8-9.5 % with little external aid. With the level of the 147

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Commission proposed expenditures and the high population growth rates forecasted for Africa, this economic goal will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve considering the low level of this investment. The report consistently points to China and India as paradigms for growth and the reduction of poverty, and yet both of these nations have little in common with western nations in terms of their huge populations, the modes of governance and their approaches toward internal growth as a precursor to playing in the international trade arena. Both nations approached growth through putting their teaming populations to work in menial labour and local high skilled labour, primarily in agriculture. As the internal funds were generated through higher savings and investments, mechanization gradually replaced menial labour to accelerate the growth. The major key was to keep the masses of people employed so that they could increasingly participate in their economy, in spite of lower educational achievement and meagre personal assets. Both China and India used agriculture as a means of maintaining employment and a way to maintain selfsufficiency. Interestingly, the Commission provides little information on employment other than an extremely cursory look on infrastructural growth. While China and India were plodding along with their agricultural based economies, the West was busy mechanizing, moving people toward urbanization, and then moving them into suburbanization. African countries seem to be placing the cart before the horse by moving their people off the farms and creating massive unemployment within their fast growing urban centres. Urbanization fits quite well within the capitalist model of having captive audiences for the basic commodity, food, where very few companies, heavily capitalized, can feed masses with little or no competition, which leads to higher prices and lower employment. The model proposed by the Commission points toward external trade as the barometer for growth. The weakness of trade is that the value of currency is biased in favour of Western nation’s currencies resulting in exportation of commodities at values well below their fair market values, due to the inflation of the dollar or the Euro against their indigenous national currency. This inflation devalues the internal currency and ultimately hurts the African nations as they trade with one another in dollars and euros leading to negative African growth.

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Trading in euros and dollars makes intra-continental trading artificially expensive compared to imported western goods. African nations need to review their national policies; in particular, they must assess the advantages of the so-called Free Trade Agreements. They must constantly look for ways of increasing the value of their currency in order to obtain better values for the commodities they export to western nations. A simple calculation shows that the $75 billion a year which is the value of the Commission’s proposed aid is only 3.85 % of the annual value of oil that African nations export to the West using $60.00 per barrel as the cost of oil. By placing a depletion tax on all exported commodities payable in a currency that is not artificially inflated or hedged against arbitrary inflation would be a more secure approach toward financing African growth. An even stronger approach would be to have the oil purchased with their own currency. Further, since the oil revenues are now tied to the local currencies and compounded by a value added import policy; all Africans would benefit in the exportation of their commodities. This requires a uniform policy across the African Continent which is within the purview of the African Union. Considering the wealth of all exported African commodities, $75 billion dollars almost pales in insignificance to the revenues that could be raised through depletion taxation. The Commission does not promote a pro-African importation strategy which limits the goods imported to items that will add value to African production. Adding value in its simplest terms means a direct contribution of labour and capital in moving African commodities into the market place as finished goods. As an example, instead of simply mining copper ore, the ore is smelted, milled and extruded into wire, packaged and sold directly into African commercial and industrial markets, thus producing added growth over and above the relatively simple mining operation. In this example, not only is the labour of mining the ore a contributor to employment, but the smelting, milling, extrusion, packaging, retail, and wholesale merchandising contribute to the employment base, as well. With this approach, the products imported are the smelters, rolling mills, extrusion machines, among others, in order to feed the entire process of added or contributed value. In fact, the Chinese model can be exploited here where older versions of western technology are purchased which, in many cases, 149

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are treated as junk or written off. Outdated machinery can be purchased at fraction of their original cost, refurbished, in Africa and will perform adequately as the process of internal growth is initiated. In a specific example, the Chinese purchased and shipped to China an entire General Motors Pontiac plant that produced a four cylinder, rear engine driven automobile that had not done well on the US market. To General Motors, the entire factory was scrapped and had been written off as an expense of doing business and could not be sold to any of its US competitors. Rather than China importing American automobiles, they purchased the entire automobile plant and in the process employed thousands of their own citizens to manufacture their own automobiles. The Chinese now have added value to the iron ore and coal they were exporting as commodities and now produce consumers that can afford to purchase an automobile produced in China at a cost well below the imported value. In addition to factory workers; managers, scientists and engineers, human resource people are employed too. All their foreign trained citizens can now repatriate and contribute toward making their nation greater since they now have meaningful higher level roles in which to contribute. A lot of China’s technological advances are the result of repatriation. The Commission’s use of China and India as models for growth does not allow us to examine those things that did and didn’t work for these nations. We know that they progressed with very little external aid. For them, aid was not an important criterion. If not aid or foreign investment, what then was the important criterion that these two nations used in their startling path to growth? Let us explore their governance system. Both countries have large populations that are more than 4 times larger than the US or Europe. Africa by the year 2050 will be the most populous continent on the planet with some 1,941,000,000 people. Africa will outpace both India and China in terms of population. Both China and India have over 40-50 years of experience in governing large masses of people with outstanding success. Also, both have economies that are styled upon variations of socialist models and only lately have they ventured out in an apparent capitalistic mode. One can say that the socialist economic models brought them out of the mire of poorer economic growth and now they are ready to compete on a world stage with the Western nations and their capitalist underpinnings through market socialism. Yet, when we look toward the rest of the colored world we see socialist leanings 150

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beginning to prevail in South America and other parts of the Far East. It is a legitimate question to ask whether a capitalist model, as suggested by the Commission, is the appropriate economic model for Africa. Interestingly, Venezuela, a nation with large oil reserves has moved into the socialist camp and is threatening to free itself or has already freed itself from its ties with the IMF and World Bank. As we deal with the emerging new world order, one has to question the wisdom of taking on foreign aid both from the vantage of mortgaging one’s future and the real value received from such aid, if indeed the promises are kept. The type of governance for large masses of people has to be studied in considerable depth since the 21st century will be dominated by countries of over a billion people. The theoretical question for the 21st century is whether large societies can be run by individualists/capitalists who have higher overheads and low political cohesion. These are complex questions which should be examined logically in order to foster an effective form of successful governance for large populations. After all, there are significant differences in the Indian and Chinese models of governance and perhaps a hybrid is the most appropriate one for Africa. African nations and the African Union must analyze their future in view of the fact that they will have to feed more than twice the number of people by the year 2050. They should make definitive plans as to how they will meet this awesome responsibility. Viewing people as an asset is not a western philosophy, but since African nations have always been prolific, they must find new ways of turning their massive populations into viable assets. Two billion motivated minds can accomplish great wonders which are perceived and appreciated by visionary people and nations. Recognizing African people as the most precious commodity must lead to strategies that will ensure that people are gainfully employed and not subject to the vagaries of foreign economic systems. The question to be asked by every African nation when ‘accepting aid should be; is our nation being subjected to another version of colonialism?’ This naturally leads to another question, that is; does this aid help our nation meet its long term objectives and to what degree and if this aid does not develop in a timely fashion do we have a contingency plan to meet our national objectives nonetheless?

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The above critical examination of the Commission for Africa forms part of the framework for an investigation by the African Union to formulate continental policies around the intrinsic value of financial aid, value of currency, employment at all skill levels, as well as the areas covered by the Commission around health, security and education. The African continent will face the challenge of increasing poverty with or without the financial aid advocated by the Commission. Careful examinations must be made of other successful developing economies; other governance systems that have demonstrated their ability to sustain large numbers of people; the sacrifices imposed by lending nations to meet the aid requirements and other economic methods available to secure a better quality of life for all of Africa’s peoples. For people to value a nation they must be stakeholders and for Africans, like other people on the planet, the stakes are food, employment and land. Once these stakes are secure, others will fall directly into place. The African Union should take a hard look at the potentially divisive implications of the Commission’s proposal for foreign aid. The AU should look eastward for meaningful insights into continental governance since Africa’s painful colonial history is steeped with westward looks. This is an important implicit manoeuvre within the context of an African Renaissance. Global Power and the Commission for Africa Africa will certainly play a prominent role in global power as we move deeper into the 21st century. The 21st century is developing into a strong contrast to the 20th century with the end of colonialism, the waning of power in the West, and the shifting tides in both economic and military terms, led principally by China. The growth of the eastern powers combined with global growths in population will increase the demand for natural resources of which Africa has been uniquely blessed. Africa will be torn apart as both sides, East and West, ply for its natural riches. With this increasing demand, Africa will find itself in a position to demand goods and services in exchange for its natural products. Under such circumstances, the implementation of the recommendations in the Commission for Africa or any future commissions can only hamper Africa in its growth and strong bargaining position as the owner of these resources. In effect, Africa 152

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could find itself again exchanging hard goods for paper-thin promises with the result that the continent will regress during this pivotal 21st century. Africa will have her own needs as its population will reach close to 2 billion by mid century. Africa will need to present a united front to all of the global suitors who would woo her for her natural riches. The dowry will either be soft promises or so-called shot gun weddings where if the continent is weak and fragmented, the natural riches will leave African shores at the same cheap value that has been the continent’s history. To protect both its resources and its people will require a strong union built upon trust and common interests of its people. The foundation for such a union lies within the African Union which will be tested quite vigorously as the century matures. The socalled gift espoused by the Commission will subject Africans to increased debt which, in turn, will lead to large national burdens and velvet gloved attempts to take over the countries’ economies. The psychology of commissions is to assuage the guilt of colonialism/slavery and induce false hopes into the minds of the African recipients. If Africa would look inward to its inherent strengths as opposed to focusing on the propagandized elements of its weakness; it would never accept being subjected to the projected inferiority that is inherent within commissions. If Africa can establish a strong union, it should end this century as one of the major global powers, well ahead of the West and second or third to China. Three things that will propel Africa onto the global power stage will be its high population growth rate, its ability to govern its growing population through governments’ ability to communicate a common political vision, and Africa’s management of its vast natural wealth. In short, national power is governed by the following equation: National Power = NxPxE [where N=Population, P=National political will, and E=National resources]. This formulation of power has three major components, namely, population (N), resources (E); both of which can be rigorously determined. The third component, Political will (P), is amorphous and not readily measured directly but can be inferred by experiencing the people’s relationship to their government and its leaders. Since it can not be explicitly measured, it can be inferred and measured in a relative sense in making comparisons with other nations as they engage in the various global contests; whether it is economic growth, technology development or warfare. The rapid 153

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growth rates of China and India and vigorous strides that these nations have made within the last 20 years speaks to some high values of P, but this is only inferred by looking at the results produced. The ability of the Vietnamese people to withstand and emerge victorious from the onslaught of two major western powers, again, speaks to high values of their political will and inspired leadership. Indeed, warfare is the ultimate measure of power where all three elements must work in concert to conquer external threats. Power is deeper than standing armed forces and the concomitant resources expended in military hardware as exhibited both in Vietnam and Iraq. Political will is the cement that moulds the people and their resources into a well organized unit capable of playing a major role on the global power arena. Robert McNamara (1995) once said: We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values…

In looking at current Africa, one can readily appreciate the fact that two thirds of the major ingredients for being a major global power are in place. The quest and challenge remains for Africa to develop this illusive political will in order to fulfil its destined greatness. Perhaps anticipating the impact of large populations in the world stage, Henry Kissinger (1974) warned that: Depopulation should be the highest priority of foreign policy towards the third world, because the US economy will require large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially from less developed countries.

In the year 2050, the total African population, including that in the continent and the Diaspora will swell to 2.4 billion. This will displace the Chinese as the world’s most populated country. Rather than deprecate these unborn African souls as competition for the earth’s resources, Africa must look at these additions as a means to unfulfilled power. The source of global power resides in having larger populations as witnessed by the most powerful nations on the globe such as China, India and the US. In terms of global power ranking, the US is slightly ahead of India, even though India’s population is three times that of the US. However, India’s GDP places her in third place. The common misconception is that high populations are to be avoided but 154

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interestingly enough, most of the growth within the US has been afforded through immigration to feed its ever expanding markets, provide for the manpower needs of its armies and a source of cheap labour. High populations are an economic resource that possesses the uniqueness to feed its own internal growth through increased employment. Large populations are also advantageous against the tolls extracted through man-made and natural selection processes, and produce large armies to protect resources in the face of regime changes and natural resource thefts. High populations sponsor creativity to move the nation’s technology forward to efficiently exploit its resources, to provide expanding markets for its internal goods and services, and to manage and improve the national infrastructure. While the West is busy asking the developing world to control its birth rates; Africa must ask; whose best interest is served by Mr. Kissinger’s depopulation strategy. It is interesting that both Kissinger and Patrick Buchanan (2002) see disadvantages in large populations for developing countries. And many African leaders buy this subterfuge and continue to treat their citizens as drains on their society as opposed to treating them as their most valued resource; as consumers, tax payers, army recruits, and developers of their economies. In spite of its lower white birth rates, the US has kept its population highest among the western nations through a somewhat liberal immigration policy. This immigration policy fuelled both its internal economic development and maintenance of its armed forces. It is through immigration that the growth of the US’ retail, housing and cheap labour markets has been maintained. Immigrants performed the same role as slaves during the 19th century. In spite of the great melting pot theory, immigrants have a negative impact on a nation’s political will since they are culturally removed from the mainstay of the American economy, the middle class. Immigration does add to the national creativity but a strong political will requires some minimum form of homogeneity. The lower economic levels have always marched to a different drummer or had a different dream. Were not the darker hued dreamers of the 20th century the ones who weakened and in some cases destroyed the collective political will of western culture? Africa needs no immigration policy because her population (N) keeps increasing in spite of wars, pestilence and poverty. Similarly, the Chinese needed no immigration policy in their rise to superpower 155

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status, their most prized resource, its people (N), was melded through the political vision of Mao Tse Tung into a global manufacturing centre, with the technological prowess that will be unmatched, and an armed force which will be able to protect its enterprise from armed subjugation. China’s long march into the 21st century needed no ‘Commission for China’. Hence Mao Tse Tung (1958) said: In addition to the leadership of the Party, a decisive factor is our population of 600 million. More people mean a greater ferment of ideas, more enthusiasm and more energy. Never before have the masses of the people been so inspired, so militant and so daring as at present.

The challenge for the new African leaders will be to successfully govern their people to reclaim the riches that the continent holds deep within her bosom. Africa is blessed with the climate and water to grow and feed her children. African leaders will be put to the acid test as the competition for natural resources becomes more intense, the African population increases and power struggles between the East and the West around the unequal distribution of global resources, particularly oil heighten. Within the large population, there must exist some commonality of purpose to collectively move the nation in a positive direction. There must be a common vision that permeates through the entire nation where citizens work toward a common goal. Undoubtedly, the divisiveness perpetrated by previous colonial and the slave traumas has had a divisive effect on the ability of African peoples to develop this common vision. Common visions were prohibited and differences of any kind were exploited so as to make continental unity extremely difficult. The establishment of the various artificial national borders only serves to accentuate differences and exacerbates the possibility of developing a common Africa vision. African leaders must develop strategies that will reverse the oppressive systems of unemployment, hunger, disease, among others. The first place to begin is to limit the purchase of Western finished goods. These purchases continue to economically enslave and weaken Africans as opposed to strengthening their labour forces for infrastructural improvements. Indeed, the challenge for Africa during this century is to develop leaders of vision who will put the unification of the continent and

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motivation of its people in the forefront so as to occupy their rightful place on the world stage. The African Union (AU) Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world. I believe strongly and sincerely that with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human lives, the intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race, united under one federal government, will emerge not as just another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a Great Power whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good…Kwame Nkrumah (1961).

Kwame Nkrumah’s inspiring words state the ultimate goal for Africa in Global Power Play. Nkrumah adds another dimension to the aforementioned mathematical representation of power. His expression is more visionary and forms the basis for the African political will and expresses in terms that all Africans can, should and must understand. He directs the African people, world wide, with their leaders, to unite, in spite of the many false boundaries that divide and weaken them. Nkrumah invites Africans to unite under one federal government as the path to development. He moves past the mechanics of power to show the benefits that can accrue from a strong federation. This is even a mile further than the existing African Union. Nkrumah establishes the vision for the continent from which springs the collective political will. Unity with its concordant vision and collective political will becomes the only means to protect Africa’s own self interests and to prevent the ‘raping’ of the continent’s rich natural resources. This unity places natural resources at the feet of the African people so they may emerge as a Great Power. It is this federation that will protect smaller nation states such as Equatorial Guinea from being swallowed up by other nations or corporations hungry for cheap oil or other resources. The importance of unification becomes dramatically important if one looks at the power ranking matrix where the lower ranked power positions are over represented by most of the African nation states. Separately, African nations rank from a high of 27 to a low of 156 (Seychelles) and the average rank of all African nations is 99 out of 160 157

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(lower third). Nigeria, the most powerful African nation ranks 27th and is only 0.6% as powerful as the United States. It is for this reason that weaker small African states with large natural resources become ideal prospects for global predators. One of the major reasons behind the EU was an attempt to collectively strengthen their positions against US financial domination. The EU ranks second on the global power scale, behind China and ahead of the US and India. However, in future, the EU will be limited in maintaining its second spot due to its declining population and difficulties in establishing a common political will, primarily as a result of the many wars that were fought between the various EU members. If Africa can successfully unite; it will surpass the EU and become the second most powerful region on the globe by 2050. It is noteworthy to mention that declining populations are one of the deadly viruses spawned by capitalism. The inbred selfishness of capitalism leads to its self consumption. A strong united Africa under a federal government with its collective resources; unified political will and population would occupy third place, on the global power scale, slightly ahead of India and the US. The Unified continent of Africa would be 36% more powerful than the United States but roughly 1/3 of the power of current day China. As the old adage states, there is strength in unity. This heightened global rank of a unified Africa supports Nkrumah’s dream of a great Africa! L’Ouverture that enhances Africa’s bargaining position to extract the best possible global deal is the competition between China and the US for African resources, particularly oil. Can Africa take China’s and/or US interest and convert it into a value–added economy that will build a strong infrastructure and create a permanent employment structure for its people? And in the process can Africa make future ‘Commissions for Africa’ irrelevant? Conclusion Africa needs the vision that will harness, motivate and unify its peoples into a homogenous force that can develop and use its natural resources for the betterment of its sons and daughters. Only unselfish and inspired leadership will move her people toward higher employment levels, infrastructure improvements and consumers of 158

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African produced goods. The continent must invite its sons and daughters throughout the Diaspora; who are wasting their talents on the false alters of the West and encourage them to return and use their collective brain power and talents to make Nkrumah’s dream a reality. Only one ingredient; political will stands between Africa and its greatness as a major global power and Africa alone must develop this ingredient. Africa must heed its ancestors, not Commissions. References and Further Reading Commission for Africa. 2005. Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa. Penguin Press. Buchanan, P. 2002. The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization. St. Martins Press Giles, W.H. 2005. A New Song, Unpublished research results. ____________2005. Slavery and the American Economy. African Renaissance: 2(2). Kissinger, H. 1974. Implications of world wide population growth for US. security & overseas interests, National Security Memo 200. Mcnamara, R. 1995. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. Crown Press. Nkhrumah, K 1961. I speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology. Preager Press. Tse Tung, M. 1958. Introducing a Co-operative, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. VIII, Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project

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AFRICA’S GLOBAL FUTURES Nigel GIBSON Introduction: Africa and the misfortunes of globalization Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never… talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them … Look at them today swaying between atomic and spiritual disintegration (Fanon 1968).

It is now generally accepted in African studies that Africaʹs twentyodd year experience of structural adjustment policies based on a neoliberal agenda has been disastrous; that World Bank policies have not only “failed” but Africa has moved from “crisis” to “tragedy” (Shatz 2002). The raison d’être of structural adjustment was, from the World Bank’s point of view, Africaʹs poor economic performance. It laid the blame on African elites and on government patronage even though it is the African common people who paid the price for the Bank’s ideology, that good governance would follow structural adjustment. Even if the adage “free trade creating democratic polities” has now been dropped—or at least buried in World Bank documents (or transmogrified into the rhetoric of bureaucratic reform)—the idea remains an essential precept of policy. For Africa, the structural adjustment “cure” has been quite a bit worse than the “disease” that preceded it, especially for the majority of the people for whom delivery of basic services now comes at a price that they can no longer afford. Compared to the remarkable increase in the immediate independence phase, the period since 1980 has seen a stagnation or decline in the UN’s “human development index.” Africa’s engagement in world trade correlates with declining standards of life. Under the strictures of the World Bank’s policies, the promise of health, education and security, and the very morality of a people’s “welfare,ʺ with its roots in labour and anti-colonial struggles in Africa, can no longer be met. The idea of what constitutes economic performance is thus deeply ideological and contestable.

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While early critics of nationalist regimes pointed their fingers at the corrupt elites and argued for one or another form of direct and local democratic control (often informed by indigenous forms of democracy) over the newly independent nation’s resources and services, the key structural adjustment policy of privatization, despite the rhetoric, has not taken power away from these elites, though it has most definitely put basic resources, such as water and electricity, out of the reach of the common people. For example, once subsidized by “the state,” transport has been abandoned to privatisation, meaning that many working people cannot afford to get to work. Furthermore, privatisation has affected even the health of the population, augmenting and intensifying the decimating effects of malaria and HIV/AIDS. On the political front, the vaunted democratization, which came on the heels of the collapse of Communism in the early 1990s, has been (in the main) a disappointment, partly because it has been limited by the already existing neo-liberal policies. Rather than giving people a greater say in governance, “good governance” has meant that people’s lives and political life are dictated from outside, undermining any vestige of national independence. Furthermore, because women produce the bulk of the foodstuffs, the World Bank’s attempt to promote land commercialisation and displace women’s subsistence farming and “cooking pot economics” has been instrumental in the transformation of Africa from a food-surplus to a food-deficient continent. The reality of the majority of Africa’s people is thus in stark contrast to the illusions of global capital’s spectacular “goods.” For example, rather than a promise of ending hunger, Genetically Modified (GM) food is seen by many as the threat of further starvation as it is suggested that GM maize will have a long term destructive effect on local maize, making the country dependent on multinational maize seed in the future. Thus the designation of the effects of structural adjustment and globalization on Africa as a “holocaust” is not merely rhetorical (Akindele, Gidako and Olaopo 2002). And while the deterioration of the quality of life on the continent has been encouraged by home-grown economies of plunder, a concomitant and perhaps greatest plunder has been the debt and debt servicing of IMF/World Bank loans. Since 1982 Africa’s debt service ratios have risen more rapidly than any other continent. Today more than twenty African countries have a per capita income less than that in 1975, and life expectancy in many countries is less than forty years 161

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(2002 figures for Mozambique, Botswana, and Zambia are 31.3, 32.3 and 35.2 respectively). It is not surprising that in this context, malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS rates are the highest in the world, as are infant mortality and malnutrition. The picture is depressing, but also ironically well known. The horrendous human costs of the “African tragedy” are no longer limited to UNDP reports and scholarly journals. The harrowing statistics have become part of the standard media reports. In a way this is typical journalist stuff which frames the continent as “hopeless” and “diseased” (Economist 2000). Africa remains entrapped by metaphor. I use the word “remains” because the discourse of “primitive,” “deviant,” “depraved,” “dysfunctional” and so on -- “the indigenous unthinkable disaster,” as Joseph Conrad put it in The Heart of Darkness – “remains” the naturalized imagery of the social and economic effects of European colonialism revamped for today’s postcolonial Africa. While human “reality” is and is not something other than the “tragic” and homogenizing statistics, it is worth remembering that the World Bank sets the agenda and employs its intellectuals, as well as controlling nearly all the data coming out of Africa. As Lance Taylor has argued, the World Bank’s research and publication efforts are a multi-billion dollar ’ideological marketing operation disguised as research (Taylor 1997)’. To be sure there is grinding poverty and debilitating sickness, but by repeatedly representing Africa in such a way, are we not likely to fall into the same epistemological trap of banal empiricism mediated by globalization’s Malthusianism? The world system; capitalism—a world market and system of value production has been international and strongly inegalitarian since its birth, when the industrial revolution in the North was bound up with the extirpation and exploitation of Black bodies from Africa. From its birth, capitalism has been a globalizing system, and political power has been employed to gain advantages, exploit inequalities and crush competition. The terms of trade have always been underpinned by military power. Thus capitalism’s birth, which corresponded with the triangular trade between Africa, the Americas and Europe, was a very unequal exchange of unequals that still characterizes trade between Africa and the North in this late globalised stage. Africa, in other words, has become “marginal” and “marginalized” partly through its centrality and integrality to the birth and development of 162

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modern capitalism. European colonial penetration, the slave trade and colonial rule, have indeed shaped modern Africa but African reaction and resistance to it also created modern Europe. Taking a large step back from the positivistic assumptions of much of contemporary globalization that remains within the pre-modern (tradition)- modern dichotomy, we should remember that the development of the plantation economy in the Americas was predicted almost on a zerosum game and as Walter Rodney famously put it, ‘the development of America meant the underdevelopment of Africa’. Indeed, contemporary globalization is simply the latest form of capitalist penetration into Africa. Centred on structural adjustment, privatisation and liberalisation, World Bank and IMF policies from the late 1970 on have played a role in further “opening up” the continent, enclosing the commons12, and bringing very little, if not negative benefit to Africa’s producers and consumers by capitalist forces. Critics add that contemporary globalization is simply the newest form of colonisation and slavery, with African nations’ indebtedness becoming once again, a justification for colonisation. Structural adjustment is not humanly viable The function of a social structure is to set up institutions to serve man’s needs. A society that drives its members to desperate solutions is a non-viable society, a society to be replaced (Frantz Fanon). If Africa is marginal to the rest of the world that is as it should be. The problem is not, as often imagined, Africaʹs marginality to the rest of the world but the marginalization of Africans in the development of Africa (Claude Ake).

When speaking of “development” and Africa we should not only wonder what needs to be done for Africa to develop but also raise the epistemological question that turns the issue on its head. The problem is not so much Africa but the term “development” understood both in reality and in its world of illusions. This is certainly the moral position of many of the World’s radical anti-structural adjustment and anti12

The “enclosure of the commons” refers to England especially in the period before the English Civil War of the 1640s. The commons were the areas of land that a whole village would use. Enclosing that land—in other words “privatizing” it—became an important lever to dispossess the common people.

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globalization youths who, critical of “Western” materialism, embrace subsistence and reject, not only global capital’s consumerist culture with its sweat-shop production model, but also the forced poisoning of many of the world’s poor with insecticides, pesticides and GM foods. In other words globalizationʹs myths and its Disney images—not only gourmet multiculturalism but also McDonalds and satellite TV—are only affordable to an elite few in Africa, while the reality for most people is casual labour and unemployment, and illness and uncertainty. That is, insofar as Africans can see what global capitalism sells—i.e., a global consumer culture and self-reflective hi-tech images, the experience for the majority is frustrating, and the reality of globalization miserable and incoherent. The image of globalization as a ‘cure-all’ to the world’s problems is unrealistic, because in reality it has produced nothing but poverty and degradation for the majority of the world’s people. Capitalist globalization, and concomitantly neo-liberal structural adjustment, is thus not humanly viable. What is called the “African crisis” is also a result of aid organizations’ agendas and their construction of statistics and narratives of disaster. Ideology promoted by structural adjustment has also been helped by television representations of the African refugee qua human detritus. Structural adjustment has helped to promote and reinvigorate the colonial gaze qua inhuman other. To shift this perspective to a wholly different point, that is, to consider the human dimension and not simply Africa’s “suffering humanity,” requires more than new camera angles. Certainly “Africa” is in crisis but the facts that are rolled out about Africa in the media are far from neutral. New ground is required to promote “facts” inter-subjectively. Notwithstanding Michael Hardt and Tony Negriʹs thesis that “Empire” has no territorial centre, globalization is a “Northern” perspective with G8 nations as its core power brokers. We should also note the shift in “globalization” over the past few years, partly in response to the growing anti-globalization movements to the rising importance of US military power in the world’s economic affairs. In addition, we should also recognize the forces countering “empire” and differentiate between the multiple processes we understand as globalization and the new global consciousness “from below” manifested by the exploited, gathering together to resist structural adjustment and “corporate globalization.” The relationship between globalization and the movements against it is a dialectical one with 164

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each impinging on the other. Responding to the pressure of critics, the debate about the process of globalization over the past decade has become more ideological, making newly relevant – even within the strictures of the “Washington Consensus”, discussions about global futures. Paradoxically there are, despite the US military hegemony and the “war on terror,” openings for contending ideas. For instance, Hardt and Negri imagine that, ‘the political task is not simply to resist these processes [of globalization] but to reorganize them and redirect them towards new ends (Hardt and Negri 2000)’. One conception of the “new ends” is a “new humanism” and the vision of new and different ways of life is embedded in many of the common struggles against structural adjustment and globalization. While it is important politically and critically to make the point that the majority of Africaʹs population is significantly worse off than it was twenty-five years ago as a result of structural adjustment policies and debt repayment, it is also important to take the focus away from the politicians and the World Bank and reconsider the actions of the common people as a source of new humanist scenarios. Such reconsideration would allow us to rethink not only of what “successful” globalization would look like (the ground of which is set by the discourse of pro- or anti-“Americanization”) but also the idea of what constitutes “the global.” Certainly if the problem is not Africa, then it is the failure of globalization in Africa that opens up different multifaceted vistas on globalization from the bottom up. This idea of a “new global consciousness” is refreshing after the pessimism of globalization theory which views resistance to structural adjustment as either pointless or as already spectralized as commodity consumed on the TV screen. If Africa is marginalized and is not fully part of the global media machine, how much is it part of a global consciousness defined by that machine? In other words, is global consciousness defined as such in as far as it has become a “media event?” Indeed the very idea of a global consciousness, thought through multiple perspectives, haunts the fragmented post-modern world in the form of a global narrative about human liberation from staggering poverty. In capitalist globalization terms, “the global” is the world’s financial institutions, and Africa is decidedly marginal: a subordinate local place of little agency and selfdetermination. Yet, from a counter-hegemonic standpoint, it is precisely from the marginalized local that a new global consciousness 165

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is emerging. But it is not a linear process. Terisa Turner and Leigh Brownhill, for example, make the point that the women protesters against the war in Iraq, were inspired by Nigerian women who had threatened Chevron, Texaco and Shell with nakedness. The “local” lifeand-death meaning of baring the vagina was not lost on the global “bare-all” protesters who developed the nudity message in the world’s first global protest theatre. In other worlds, women became leaders of the direct action to shut down oil company facilities on the Niger Delta because oil companies destroyed much of the basis for subsistence. In this movement, born of exclusion, women did not demand to be included in (corporate) globalization and might not identify themselves as part of the antiglobalization movement. Rather they wanted to return to what they consider the “sweet life” that existed before it and against it. What needs to be kept in mind is the non-linearity of the process that links (and reinvents) the “present” to the “sweet life” before. The “local” sites of struggle in South Africa, for example, have robust anti-apartheid histories of linking the workplace and “civic” struggles around issues of human necessities such as the right to water, electricity, housing and food. Indeed Africa might be marginalized in terms of global capital investment but these struggles of “the poors” are battles for survival that also have global reverberations; they are part of a global condition which can be understood by people around the world. Africans don’t see themselves as marginalized, and here I am not talking about the “cosmopolitan” or anti-globalization elites. Across the continent, many African urban youth, for example, look both locally and globally for sources of culture and identity and help create the often unofficial, “illegal,” mythical, and hybrid sources for new cultures. But at the same time globalization has also helped create through the concentration and centralization of capital, new collective responses and new sensibilities toward alternatives especially in terms of subsistence economies and ecological perspectives of “the poors“ (Desai 2002). This has been in part necessitated by capitalismʹs process of creating workers, through the commodification of labour that is in many parts of Africa, at the same time, defined by its unemployability as well as the commodification of land. Primitive accumulation is a constant process of “enclosure” of what was previously held in common. Yet at the same time, in the face of food crisis in Africa, 166

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ordinary people continue to take local initiatives toward producing food, which include cultivating unenclosed, marginal or vacant plots. Land re-appropriations also indicate the potency and legitimacy of land seizure and the right to land. If in the dominant worldview Africa is marginal, then among emergent anti-globalization worldviews, Africa is central to the vision of a human alternative and to the emergent connections being made between social movements globally. Claude Akeʹs (1997) prescription that marginalization is ‘what Africa needs’ draws the best from what he calls ‘African traditions’ of local democracy and conflict resolution, and has at its core, an agricultural strategy with a smallholder and subsistence focus. This focus also has at its base a feminist dimension. As Ake knew, the majority of Africa’s subsistence farmers are women, and many practice alternative “life-centered” political economies. Like the idea of “the poors” as a positive, critical and creative identity, this “subsistence perspective” (Thomsen and Mies 2000) represents a substantial revision of our understanding of global capitalism, putting land at the centre and women’s subsistence work as an alternative to structural adjustment. It promotes a moral economy that proposes a new way of life. It implicitly suggests the possibility of moral “leadership,” emerging from the struggle that challenges and ultimately dismisses established leaders and begins to rethink the very notion of what constitutes political leadership and that there should be no separation between “leaders” and community movement. In other words, the struggle for basic services, to turn on electricity or to stop environmental destruction, is beginning to engender truly democratic and transparent practices that emerge from the bottom up. Nation, State and the continuing problematic of a principled leadership The tragedy of the African revolutions began so soon after revolution had succeeded because leaders were so weighed down with consciousness of technological backwardness (Raya Dunayevskaya).

What would an “honest”, transparent, democratic, anti-elitist and critically engaged, namely principled leadership look like? From the point of view of structural adjustment, which prioritizes privatization, the idea of “good governance” is quite different socially, morally, 167

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politically and economically to that envisioned by Africa’s multitude. Indeed it exists, quite literally, but on quite a different philosophical ground. This problem was identified by some political theorists who, in the post-independence period, hoped that a new type of leadership could emanate from the dialogue between the masses and intellectuals: a “grounding,” as Walter Rodney put it, with the people’s way of knowing. Rather than a technical solution, the “building” of the nation was judged in human terms, in terms of praxis, but this was a minority position in the politics of nation building. Let us return to what Frantz Fanon considered “the pitfalls of national consciousness” to reproblematize the amalgam of national liberation. Often with hindsight, many postcolonial critics have argued that anti-colonial nationalist movements were simply products of European colonization, or at least inheritors of Western ideologies of modernisation. On the other hand, the anti-colonial movements were varied enough in form, content and politics (and often anti-capitalist in rhetoric and vision) to problematize, or at least contextualize, such general propositions. Though it has been argued that independence in Africa was predicated on the needs of capital, and the nation-state was a form imposed by the imperial powers (Davidson 1992), gaining their independence after World War II, these states continue to be subordinate and dependant on the international finance institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. The nation-state form of political organization was not particularly well established in the post (or neo) colonial period but neither was it homogenous. Rather, calls for nation building had to negotiate a number of contradictory interests and legacies without the capacity to do so. The colonial legacy was not in the least bit democratic. Despite the rhetoric of the imperial institutions, such as law courts and parliaments, European colonialism provided no basis for a working democratic postcolonial state. The idea of importing “Western democratic institutions” into the post-colony was thus inherently flawed, eliding all forms of indigenous democratic practices. The dialectics of national liberation meant that one had to at least differentiate, as Fanon did, between the “senility” and “hucksterism” of “bourgeois” nationalism and the “pitfalls” of national consciousness. The latter point underlining how nation building was so cut-through by class that even the most enlightened leaders (socialist in name or not) would not be able to escape its logic. In South Africa, for example, 168

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it has become clear not only how crucial “the state” was in controlling the transition out of apartheid but also how important the “selflimiting” role of the liberation organization (the ANC) and its ideology was in disciplining social movements as well as imposing its own “home-grown” structural adjustment (Gibson 2001). It is then somewhat ironic that the “nation-state,” as a form of political power, is an anathema to contemporary globalization theory, which sees states declining, weakened by world markets, increasingly unable to rule over a given territory. This deterritorialization of capital means that “the state” cannot own or control the economy as it once did and yet “the state” has been absolutely crucial to the implementation of structural adjustment. Organizations like the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF on one hand, and major corporations on the other, are more important than individual governments. In theory “deterritorialization,” namely the separation of global capitalist production from place, means a different accounting of economic geography insofar as the globalization of space (and one could think of the idea of capitalist modernization) does not take place through agencies of nationalism and colonialism and often is not mediated by political institutions at all. The elective affinity of the nation-state as an institutional basis for “modernization”, which played an important part of post-war development theory (including projects praised by radicals such as Nyerere’s Ujaama) has now been abandoned. Development theory now excludes the state; open markets rather than import substitution are preferred. Experiences in Africa once again reinforce and problematise the theory of deterritorialization as they do the notion of the declining importance of nation-states, for states still play a crucial disciplinary role. Additionally, though African nation-states in the postindependence period had little capacity and were often nation-states in name only, political power has remained markedly bound by national borders. And despite the hopes of the earlier Pan-Africanists to transcend the nation and despite the “failure” of nationalism to develop it, the discourse of African politics has remained national. In other words the postcolonial nation remains a legacy of colonial rule with powers like Nigeria and South Africa, backed by global institutions, playing dominant regional military and economic roles (e.g., in the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community). 169

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On the other hand experiences from Africa continue to confound the premise of neo-liberal modernization, and critical scholars are not only critical of the “tradition/modernity” binary that girded modernization theory but have begun to deconstruct the idea of modernity precisely in the frame of African experience (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Gaonkar 2001). While some might wonder whether Africa, on the ground ever had the infrastructural benefits of modernity, the point here is the new way that the study of Africa has helped problematise the reigning master concepts in the social sciences such as “the state,” “civil society” and “development.” Analyses of policy failures in Africa and by extension the limitation of the World Bank’s “good governance” initiative have often concentrated on the weaknesses of “the state” rather than on the inefficiency and incapacity of leadership, namely its autonomy to institute real socioeconomic transformation. This argument has found a new lease on life in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). For some the argument is visionary in its demand for ethical leaders who can remain in touch with the common people, charismatic leaders who can inspire and also learn from local knowledge, and democratic leaders who are responsive and responsible to the people’s needs. Indeed NEPAD is presented as Africa’s answer. Yet it is a topdown approach, and despite all the good will, it does not attempt to undercut the reality nor undermine the ideology of structural adjustment. In fact it reinforces the idea that there is “no alternative.” Thus, despite all the good will in the world, one wonders about the material basis and the structural reconfiguration of society that would keep such an “honest leadership” honest (Gibson 2003). This is especially a conundrum when NEPAD’s aims are, like those of the World Bank, centered on attracting a larger share of global capital, which, by its very nature, is not only drawn to higher returns but is also highly undemocratic. In other words NEPAD’s goals are constructed in the context of a global corporate culture that insists on transparency but also advocates the loosening of regulation even though it often refuses to abide by rules of transparency. In short, what is being claimed when power is described as transparent is far from obvious. Heralded as an assertion of Africa’s commitment to take charge of its own affairs, many have criticized the NEPAD initiatives as an 170

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uncritical handmaiden of capitalist globalization. This puts a question mark over whether it is simply the re-run of the threadbare morality of the postcolonial national elite which takes charge of nothing, instead shoring up global capitalism’s interests. Certainly if the idea of deterritorialization has uncoupled the idea of the nation from capitalist development, we should uncouple the latter from “democracy,” for global capitalism is, as we have seen, inherently undemocratic. Resistance to utility privatization and consequentially to multinational capital in South Africa, for example, begs the question of women’s leadership: for women are at the forefront of the struggle of “the poors,” pitting the ANC, which speaks the language of “legality,” against the people who are literally cut-off from water and electricity supplies. The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) which developed in response to “commercialisation” and the disconnection of services represents the kind of mass organizations that develop from below. But could this type of organization be a forum for new forms of leadership vis-à-vis a “vision” of an alternative post-apartheid South Africa? Or are they single issue movements, easily co-opted when gains have been won? In the new logic of inclusion which has seen the demobilization of movements critical of the ANC, can these new massbased organizations constitute counter-hegemonic movements or is the ANC (organizationally and ideologically) too powerful? In other words, asking the same question again, can they represent themselves and also develop alternative (social, political and economic) philosophical “programmes”? Or do they erupt spontaneously around an issue and die off just as quickly, thus remaining significant and effective only insofar as they are spontaneous, single issue campaigns that gain access to the state? The organization of these struggles around issues of subsistence have histories dating back to the struggle against colonialism but were often sidelined during the immediate independence period, usually through a gendered class process of cooption and exclusion. In South Africa the irony is that it is the very anti-apartheid “community” leaders who, now speaking the language of private property and profit, are under attack by “the poors.” This new reality brings up an important issue. During the 1980s it was not difficult for organizations to purport to represent “the community” in the discourse of the antiapartheid struggle. Today it is necessary to problematize the idea of “the community” and to subject it to ruthless criticism alongside such 171

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watchwords of the anti-apartheid movement such as “nation” and “civil society.” The very language used to discuss the movements needs to be scrutinized. As many postcolonial critics have pointed out, African independence was often articulated as a movement against colonial “emasculation” in which women played a supportive, if not also “traditional,” role. But the terms indicate how the nationalist project was also a “male deal.” In this “gendered class” concept of the nation, girding as it does the continuation of “rural despotism (Mamdani 1996),” women have provided the bulk of the rural labour. Women’s actions at the forefront of defending communities from starvation and against political oppression, for example, fighting for electricity in Soweto, for land in Kenya, against environmental destruction and the big oil companies in the Niger Delta are challenging national governments and the very nature of the politics of social struggles itself. It is not simply that national leaders have tended to line their own pockets with a share of the nation’s wealth, but that the idea of “leadership” needs to be turned upside down and thought anew. Conclusion: Thinking the unthinkable: Leaving Europe, leaving globalization This was what Fanon was thinking in the conclusion of The Wretched of the Earth. He said that if we wanted to turn Africa into the new Europe then we should have left that to the Europeans, but if we want humanity to advance, then Africans alone would have to do that. His advice seems all the more real after 40 years of “failures” on the continent and twenty disastrous years of structural adjustment to make Africa more like capitalist Europe. Forget Europe, forget America, the task is not for Africans to take over the management of structural adjustment but to ’reconsider the question of mankind’, as Fanon put it. Following Albert O. Hirschman’s classic work, Exit, voice, and loyalty; responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states we should consider “exit” not simply as strategic but as a political virtue. It is no longer, if it ever was, enough to protest Africa’s place in the world (which is why NEPAD appears as a warmed over “bourgeois nationalism” of an earlier period). Thought of in terms of a social movement rather than an individual tantrum (a typical appellation of a politician who does not play by the rules of the game), exit is not in fact 172

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passive. In fact it might well be the only way to reconfigure the context and undercut the rules of world economics and world politics. In contrast to the rational language of “voice”, exit appears, not as selfdestructive negativity and desperation, but rather, opens up a new range of possibilities and liberates thought from the contingency demanded by debt servicing and structural adjustment. Over forty years ago, Fanon railed against those who wanted to turn Africa into another Europe. He argued not only against nationalists who implored the masses to work harder for the sake of the “nation,” for “unity” and “development,” for “output” and the “leader.” Fanon argued that these leaders treated the people like a herd of animals, and wanted nothing from them other than more work. The nationalist parties, socialist, Africanist or humanist in name, brooked no dissent. In the degeneration that was bound to follow, Fanon argued, ethnicity would take the place of national identity and the army would take the place of the government. Sadly Fanon was too often proved right. For him all these fetishes, all these crutches that led to a stasis in thinking—the leader, the nation, the party, the army, the revolution, and so on had to be broken. Rather than worrying about the withdrawal of capital and ‘output in the post-independence society’, Fanon writes, ’it is a very concrete question of not dragging [people] toward mutilation, of not imposing upon the brain rhythms which very quickly obliterate and wreck it (Fanon 1968)’. Not worrying about capital flight is a revolutionary conception in today’s world. For it is the withdrawal of capital that is the stick used to discipline Africa’s governments. But Fanon understood that not worrying about the withdrawal of capital meant “leaving Europe” and all its trappings. Leaving Europe means abandoning the vicious, economic authoritarianism of neo-liberal capitalism. Leaving Europe (and of course its most radical and powerful advocate, the United States of America) means to leave the world of structural adjustment and global capitalism. In other words it does not mean leaving the world but a certain Eurocentric conception of Africa and of the world that has expunged not only Africa but the majority of the world’s people from it. For Fanon, leaving Europe meant getting beyond the empty anti-colonialist nationalist and empty pan-Africanist rhetoric and giving content to the proposal. In fact, leaving Europe meant rejoining with the world, and articulating an anti-globalization world humanist vision. Today, the 173

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issue could be reframed as “leaving globalization” and “returning” instead to Africa’s human dimension judged on the basis of the conditions of life and work. It could lead to a crisis, instability and political violence fermented by local elites and supported by international business. South Africa represents a compelling case because, despite the size of the national bourgeoisie and the power of international interests, the truth is that ten years of “liberation” has brought no economic improvement for the majority of people. The poor have become poorer and the rich richer. “Economic apartheid” has taken the place of official apartheid. However, space is starting to be opened up, forced open by social movements around basic necessities including HIV/AIDS treatments. For the continent as a whole, leaving globalization, that is abandoning the world capitalist market, debt repayment, structural adjustment, neo-liberal privatization; abandoning oil, and other mineral extractions, abandoning diamonds and so on, would translate into a massive improvement in the standard of life for the vast majority of Africans. This is virtually unthinkable but it should be seriously entertained. It would begin an ecological renewal and the possibility of a return to Africa’s self-sufficiency in food production. Thinking in these terms would mean seriously confronting the colonial legacy of territorial fragmentation and financial dependence and reconceptualising truly continental and pan-African approaches. This idea of exit does not mean the end of exchange but the end of unequal exchange. Africa has always been involved in international and transnational markets. It does not mean a forced march back to the land, but rather a rethinking of urban/rural relations, a study of human needs and environmental sustainability. It means re-examining, as Fanon put it forty years ago, the soil and mineral resources but also, and most importantly “humanizing work”. If the first period of independence in the 1960s was a failure so well predicted by Fanon, what would make a second attempt any better? The intervening years between now and then have almost proved him right; that national consciousness goes nowhere without a humanist programme, without an open mind and without space for critical discourse about decentralized governance.

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References Akindele, S.T, Gidako, S. & Olaopo, O. 2002. Globalisation: Its Implications and Consequences for Africa. Globalization: 2(1). Ake, C. 1997. Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Comaroff, J & Comaroff, J. (Eds). 1993. Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Davidson, B. 1992. The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. New York: Times Books. Desai, A. 2002. We Are the Poors: Community struggles in postapartheid South Africa. New York: Monthly Review. (The) Economist. 2000. ‘Hopeless Continent’ in the Economist: May 12-19. London. Gaonkar. (Ed.). 2001. Alternative Modernities. North Carolina: Duke University Press. Gibson N. 2003. Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination. Oxford: Polity Press. Hardt, M. & Negri, A. 2000. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hirschman, A. 2006. Exit, voice, and loyalty; responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge: Harvard U.P. Fanon, F. 1968. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove. Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Shatz, S. 2002. “Structural Adjustment,” in Bond, G. & Gibson, N. (Eds.) Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus Boulder Co.: Westview Press. Taylor, L. 1997. ‘Editorial: The revival of the liberal creed: The IMF and the World Bank in a Globalized Economy’. World Development. 25, 145-52. Thomsen, V. B & Mies, M. 2000. The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Globalized Economy. London: Zed Press. Turner, T. & Brownhill, L. 2004. ‘Why Women are at War With Chevron: Nigerian subsistence struggles against the international oil industry’, Journal of Asian and African Studies: 39 (1-2), 63-93.

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REFORMING WORLD TRADE, AID AND THE SECURITY SYSTEM Cedric de CONING Introduction Few would disagree that terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation are major threats to international peace and security in the 21st century. This consensus, however, disappears when attention is turned to the causes of terrorism and non-proliferation or the methodology to prevent and manage these threats. While some analysts blame cultural backwardness, religion or politics, others argue that terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation are linked to poverty, chronic underdevelopment and the marginalisation of those on the periphery of the world system. The security debate has created a common space within which we have started to discuss the health of our global trade, aid and security system. So while terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation are clearly the primary issue for some, many voices are articulating the fact that security is not necessarily the most important issue on the agenda for the majority of the people on this planet. Thus, while G8 citizens on the one hand are afraid of terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation, the majority of the people in the world, on the other hand are more concerned about poverty, education and development. South African President Thabo Mbeki, during his annual statement at the UN General Assembly in 2004, pointed out that while the rich believed that terrorism was the principal threat and challenge to humanity, for the majority of people on the planet it is, in fact, poverty and underdevelopment (Quintal 2004). Although Mbeki is one of the most prominent voices for an alternative interpretation of priorities for the world system in the 21st century, he is not just a lone voice. At the 2004 annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank, argued that although there was a need to deal with immediate terrorist threats, more 176

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important was the need not to lose sight of the longer-term security issue that confronts the world. The greatest potential source of instability on the planet today, Wolfensohn stated, is poverty, and the hopelessness and despair that it brings to so many in the world. He pointed out that in the world of six billion people; one billion have 80 percent of the world’s GDP, while the other five billion share the remaining 20 percent. One billion people have no access to clean water, over 100 million children never get the chance to go to school, and more than 40 million people in developing countries are HIV positive, with little hope of receiving treatment. He went on to argue that over the next three decades more than two billion people will be added to the planet’s population, 97 percent of them in the poorer nations. And too many will grow up in poverty and disillusionment with a world that they will view as inequitable and unjust. Many people living on the periphery of the global system have lost hope of ever catching up with those benefiting from globalization (Wolfensohn 2004). Wolfensohn and Mbeki are not arguing that underdevelopment and marginalisation are the only causes of terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. Terrorism can never be justified on political, philosophical, ideological, racial, religious or ethnic grounds. At the same time, it can not be ignored that there is a correlation between conditions of extreme poverty, injustice, hopelessness, marginalisation, political oppression and the likelihood that people may take up terrorism as a means to protest their fate, especially when all peaceful avenues of political opposition are blocked (Bjørgo 2003). Such a correlation seems to be evident for terrorism. However in nuclear nonproliferation, marginalisation seems to be an increasing factor as states such as Iran and North Korea appear to resort to nuclear arms as a safeguard against perceived Northern aggression. In practice this correlation has been widely accepted, and as a result the linking of development and security issues has become mainstream policy in the North. Policy statements by the United States, several European countries and the European Union (EU), argue that aid is expected to contribute to counter-terrorism and security (Macrae & Harmer 2004). Even the guardian of development policy, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has indicated that its definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) will be expanded into the security domain (OECD 2004).

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Terrorism and Development: Implications on civilians Thus far, the linkages between the war on terror and development have served the former more than the latter, and this has had a detrimental effect on many other, equally if not more deserving, developmental and humanitarian needs. In a report entitled Beyond the Headlines: an agenda to protect civilians in neglected conflicts, Oxfam argues that the focus on international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction since 9/11 has left civilians trapped in the worldʹs forgotten conflicts more vulnerable than before (OXFAM 2003). The report points out that the suffering caused by conflict and underdevelopment outweighs that of terrorism. Thirteen million people live as refugees, the vast majority of them hosted by developing countries across Africa and Asia. Another 23 million live as internally displaced people within their own country. In Burundi, some 300,000 people have been killed over the past decade. In neighbouring DRC, an estimated 3 million people have died during the last decade; while in Rwanda 40 percent of the population was killed or displaced in 1994. The civil war in Sudan has claimed the lives of more than two million people and has caused the greatest displacement of people in Africa. The current crisis in Darfur adds to this legacy with more than a million refugees and internally displaced persons and estimates of up to 75,000 deaths to date (OCHA 2004). The Oxfam report points out that the international communityʹs focus on terrorism has resulted in aid flowing to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, in the process neglecting the plight of civilians caught up in less strategic conflicts such as Liberia and Burundi. In most cases these conflicts have caused much more death and destruction than terrorism. The report further argues that the focus on terrorism has resulted in donor governments diverting humanitarian aid away from the people who most need their assistance. This has undermined the independence and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Oxfam’s core argument is that the international response to humanitarian crises should be determined by need, not by strategic interests such as the war on terror. Fighting terrorism by targeting trouble spots with aid is not the solution. Rather it is a symptomatic and reactive response, and as it redirects aid to insecure trouble spots it is in effect potentially adding 178

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insecurity by removing aid from other crises that are not yet threatening to Western interests. In its present form, the approach does little more than reward terrorism with aid. Aid and global imbalances If the North is serious about addressing the root causes or the correlation between terrorism, poverty and underdevelopment it should do more than link its development policies to its security concerns. The North needs to address the underlying global inequalities in the world system that, left unchecked, will continue to threaten its stability. Addressing these global inequalities would not only be morally just, but would also serve the interests of the North, because failing to do so will continue to cause internal tension and insecurity. If not halted or re-directed, it will generate a shift in the current configuration of the world system, away from a system that favours the North. The South has a major stake in addressing global structural inequalities, but it is also in its interest to address immediate terrorist and nuclear threats. Kofi Annan points out that a major terrorist attack in the North can devastate the world economy, which in turn will plunge millions of people in the South back into extreme poverty (Annan 2004). The world is now at a historic junction where there is a significant confluence of interests between the centre and the periphery of the world system. It is in the interest of both the North and the South to enter into a partnership that is aimed at fundamentally altering the inequalities in the present world system. In many ways the aid agenda has taken the lead in this process in the form of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were adopted at the Millennium Summit in 2000 (UN 2000). The MDGs consist of eight goals that are targeted to be met by 2015: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. By formulating clear goals and timeframes, the MDGs campaign has created a strategic initiative around which states, from both the North and South, can rally their socio-development policies and programmes. The North-South 179

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partnership is especially critical if the MDGs are to be achieved. Various initiatives are underway to enhance this cooperation. Thus far, however, both North and South have been unable to generate the political will and determination necessary to achieve the MDGs by 2015. While the first seven goals focus on the needs of the right holders, the eighth is about improving how aid or Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) can be delivered and coordinated. In February 2003, 28 developing countries, including 13 from Africa, and 49 donor organisations, including the African Development Bank (ADB) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), endorsed the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization. The Declaration specified four main principles of harmonization, namely that; 1. Recipient countries should coordinate development assistance; 2. Donors should align their aid with recipient countries’ priorities and systems; 3. Donors must streamline aid delivery; and 4. Donors should adopt policies, procedures and incentives that foster harmonisation.

Similarly, a renewed call for increased coherence was made at the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Mexico where the Monterrey Consensus was adopted. And in 2006, the UN Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence was released, calling for greater coordination; harmonization and pooling of UN resources, especially at the country level (UN 2006). At the end of the day, however, the success of the MDGs will largely be a factor of the investment the North is willing to make in addressing global inequality, as well as the commitment the South is willing to make in good governance and capacity building. Indications are that unless the international community radically increases its investment in development assistance, by at least $50 billion for Africa alone, the MDGs will not be met by 2015. Professor Jeffrey Sachs of the UN Millennium Project argues that it has been clear for a long time that there has not been enough aid to actually make a difference in Africa (Sachs 2005). And UN Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator Mark Malloch-Brown emphasized this point at a forum discussing Africa’s development challenges in October 2004 when he said: ‘We do not need new ideas or new resolutions – we need 180

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to make interventions on a sustainable level and deliver aid on a sufficient scale.’ However, governments of the North are unlikely to significantly increase the percentage of their GDP committed to ODA, till that time that they are convinced the South can absorb the increased assistance for the common good. In the mean-time they are entertaining short-term security-focused policies aimed at responding to issues that generate news, and thus drive democratic politics, rather than invest in the future. Debt Relief and the transformation of global inequalities Closely linked to ODA is the issue of debt relief. It is obvious that most countries on the periphery will, under present conditions, never be in a position to repay their foreign debts. It does not make sense to increase aid on the one hand whilst on the other, continuing to demand interest payments that further contribute to the net outflow of capital to the North. The freezing of debt of the countries affected by the Tsunami disaster and the work of Tony Blair’s Commission on Africa have resulted in a renewed focus on the debt relief debate (CFA 2005). The United Kingdom has spearheaded a G8 debt relief mechanism that offers the initial freezing, and eventual cancellation, of foreign debt provided that the countries affected demonstrate that the funds released as a result are directed towards the achievement of the MDGs. Ahead of the G8 Summit hosted by the United Kingdom in 2005, the G8 Finance Ministers agreed to write off the $40 billion debt owed by 18, mainly African countries, and a further 9 countries were going to benefit from the same relief package 12-18 months later(www.bbc.co.uk, 12 June 2005). A further eleven countries would be eligible if they met targets for good governance and corruption. Although widely welcomed, debt cancellation needs to be integrated with a broader package of system-wide reforms, before it can have sustainable returns whose cumulative effects can be clearly observed. Trade and global imbalances If the North therefore is serious about addressing global inequalities it would have to go beyond the developmental approach. If we want to create an equal world, we will have to address the structural causes of global inequality and that requires reforming the 181

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global political and economic system. It means transforming the world trade system and removing the structural inequalities that are built into the current trade regime, which protects developed economies and exposes developing economies, resulting in the net outflow of capital from the developing to the developed world. We need a rules-based multilateral trading system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, the WTO, in its present form, does not adequately protect developing countries against the abuse of developed markets. The South needs the WTO to facilitate equitable market access and to stimulate its economic development. In the context of collectively addressing the uneven balance of power in the world trade system, the Doha Round of trade talks, and the emergence of the new role of the G20 after the collapsed Cancun talks hold promise for the WTO and international financial cooperation. However, global institutions like the WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that are at present in many instances the very instruments of inequality in the global system, will need to be reformed if they are to become vehicles through which to address the structural inequalities underlying the global trade system. UN Security Council Reform Lastly, a programme of this nature would require the reform of the United Nations Security Council, not only on the basis of the value of contributions (adding Germany and Japan), as many currently suggest, but on the basis of an equitable geographic representation of both the developed and the developing world in the Council. Ramesh Thakur points out that if the Security Council were to have another five permanent members, four are clear-cut: Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. The fifth would likely be Egypt, Nigeria or South Africa (Thakur 2004). Some are also arguing for a formula that would ensure Arab and Muslim representation. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Egyptian foreign minister, argues that Muslims and Arabs have the right ‘to be represented in the council on an equal basis with the representatives of other cultures and civilizations (IHT 2004)’. The report commissioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to assess threats, challenges and change facing humanity was published in December 2004 (UN 2004). The report recommended sweeping reforms of the United Nations, including the expansion of the Security Council from 15 to 24 members. 182

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The Secretary-General followed this up with his own report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, within which he largely echoed the recommendation for Security Council reform made by his High Level Panel (UN 2005). But the UN Member States failed to grasp the opportunity offered by the 2005 World Summit, and no changes have been made to date regarding the membership of the Security Council. What is important is that the composition of the Security Council reflects the realities of the 21st century. Although many aspects of our international system have become truly global, it is still too early to seriously consider a system not based upon the State. At the same time, we have progressed too far in the fields of individual human rights, international humanitarian law and the universal acceptance of democratic principles to continue to accept that in international relations sovereign might is right. Universally accepted human rights that are essential for the individual and binding on the State can no longer be overlooked in the world system. People intuitively extend their understanding of democracy, fair treatment and justice to the world system, and are disillusioned when they observe world leaders acting with impunity in ways that would be illegal and unethical at the national level. Increasingly, the relations between international actors will be judged by the same standards of fairness and equity that applies to individuals and legal persons in state systems. The Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, articulated this demand for a more rule-based and democratic international order at the UN General Assembly in 2004 when he said: ‘there will be neither security nor stability in the world until a more just democratic order is established (IHT 2004)’. The campaign by the South for a more democratic and equitable international order is going to be another important driving force in the reform of the world system. Conclusion Despite the reform initiatives highlighted above, it is unlikely that the international community will gather, in the short-to-medium term, the collective political will to undertake reforms at the pace and intensity required to seriously alter the underlying structural inequalities that give rise to global insecurities such as international terrorism. There are powerful vested interests, in both the North and 183

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South, that are pathologically focused on short-term benefits, immediate consumption, shareholder interest, staying in power at all costs and immediate security threats, rather than the long-term health of the world trade, aid and security system, even if they are equally affected by the insecurities they help to sustain. Regardless of the tempo, the overall trend appears to favour increasing roles for equality and fairness in the functioning of the world aid, trade and security system. As this process gains momentum, meaningful North-South cooperation, for instance in the G20, should be encouraged. Such cooperation will assist with balancing the push for change and the pull for stability in a delicate dance that should result in a steady rate of change that is slow enough to introduce an element of predictability for the markets and yet fast enough to sustain hope for a better future for the world’s marginalised millions. For it is only once we have started to address poverty, injustice and political oppression that we would have, in Thakur’s words, drained the swamps of international terrorism. References Annan, K. 2004. ‘A Way Forward on Global Security’. International Herald Tribune: December, 3. Bjorgo, T. 2003. Root Causes of Terrorism: Findings from an International Expert Meeting in Oslo. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Commission for Africa. 2005. “Our Common Interest”, Report of the Commission for Africa. London: Penguin Books. IHT. 2004. ‘Leaders seek change at United Nations’. International Herald Tribune: September, 27. Macrae, J. & Harmer, A. 2004. Beyond the Continuum: An Overview of the Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crisis. Humanitarian Policy Group Research Briefing, Number 16: July. OECD. 2004 Aid Ministers Note: Rise in Aid Volume and Push for Aid Reform and New Approach to Security-Development Linkages. OECD/DAC. OCHA. 2004. Mid-Year Review of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2004 for Sudan. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): June, 15. Oxfam. 2003. Beyond the Headlines: An Agenda to Protect Civilians in Neglected Conflicts. Oxfam: September, 16. 184

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Quintal, A. 2004. ‘Mbeki Sees the Awful Truth: The UN is but a Charade.’ The Sunday Independent: September, 26. Sachs, J. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York: Penguin Group. Thakur, R. 2004. A Refitted Security Council. The Japan Times: August, 29. United Nations. 2000. We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. Report of the Secretary-General to the 54th Session of the General Assembly, A/54/2000. 27. New York: United Nations. _________2004. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations. __________2005. In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York: United Nations. ____________2006. Delivering as One. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence. New York: United Nations. Wolfensohn, J.D. 2004. ‘Ending Poverty is the Key to Stability.’ International Herald Tribune: 30 September.

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PART II

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND

REGIONAL ISSUES

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UNCERTAIN HEGEMON: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA Laurie NATHAN Introduction During Nelson Mandela’s presidency, between 1994 and 1999, foreign diplomats noted wryly and South African commentators complained loudly that Pretoria did not have a coherent foreign policy. There were several reasons for the ad hoc and often haphazard approach. The new government was preoccupied with the domestic imperatives of national reconciliation and the transformation of state departments. The Foreign Affairs Minister, then, Alfred Nzo, was lacking in dynamism and vision. The apartheid-era officials who still dominated the Department of Foreign Affairs were also dazzled by the light of democracy and the high international expectations of South Africa. Moreover, these officials repudiated the need for a comprehensive and systematic foreign policy. At a conference in Johannesburg in 1998, I heard one of them insist that ‘whereas defence policy was like an ocean liner that should not change direction quickly and frequently, foreign policy was like a windsurfer that should be able to turn on its axis as the wind changed’. Some analysts maintain that foreign policy under President Mbeki has continued to lack coherence. By contrast, I argue that over the past five years, Pretoria has forged an entirely coherent foreign policy. This is both a consequence of the general consolidation of government and a result of Mbeki’s orientation and ambitions as a foreign policy president. Nevertheless, there have been several significant contradictions, some of which have undermined the country’s credibility and at times overshadowed its achievements. This chapter outlines the main themes of South African foreign policy, with a particular focus on Africa and African security, and then identifies and attempts to explain the major contradictions.

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Policy coherence According to the Strategic Plan published by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2004, the principles that underpin South Africa’s foreign policy include commitments to the promotion of human rights and democracy; justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations; international peace and internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for resolving conflict; promoting the interests of Africa in world affairs; and economic development through regional and international co-operation in an interdependent and globalised world (DFA 2004). The Department’s priorities include the realisation of the African Renaissance by promoting the objectives of the African Union (AU) and its economic and social development programme, NEPAD; regional integration in Southern Africa; the promotion of international peace and security; and the promotion of sustainable development and an equitable global system. Given the political distance between 1994 and 2004, it is striking that these priorities and principles are virtually identical to those formulated by the African National Congress (ANC) when it came into power (ANC 1994). Critics who view South Africa’s foreign policy as essentially realist and as limited to the advancement of national interests are mistaken. While the policy is necessarily intended to further domestic interests, it also embraces an ambitious continental and global agenda that has idealist, internationalist and emancipatory tendencies. This orientation derives from and is framed by the liberation struggle, South Africa’s position in Africa, the nature and content of its negotiated settlement, and Mbeki’s ideological convictions and critical analysis of the global political economy. In international affairs Mbeki is as much an ideologue as a pragmatist. His outlook is rooted in three paradigms: democratic; Africanist; and anti-imperialist. The Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms, which include, a visceral anger at historical and contemporary manifestations of imperialism and racism, are seldom if ever in conflict with each other. But both are occasionally in conflict with the democratic paradigm; in these cases, as discussed later, it is usually the democratic position that gives way.

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I outline below five of the well-developed themes of South Africa’s foreign policy: Africa and an Africanist spirit; democracy; respect for human rights, and other aspects of good governance; a holistic understanding of security; a pacific approach to conflict resolution; and multilateralism. Other recurring themes, which are not considered because of space constraints, include gender equity and the empowerment of African women; South–South co-operation and solidarity; the adoption by African countries of a neo-liberal economic agenda in order to make them more competitive and attract foreign investment; the pressing need to reform the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international institutions in order to address global imbalances in wealth and power; and the eradication of underdevelopment and poverty in Africa and elsewhere in the South. Africa’s recovery is unambiguously the foreign policy priority of government and of the President, who projects an image that is simultaneously cosmopolitan and African as he seeks to lead that recovery and champion the cause of the continent in international forums. Mbeki’s Africanist perspective, spanning politics, social relations, culture and history, has the rhetorical and inspirational appeal of Steve Biko’s exhortations. The clarion call is the African Renaissance, the emergence of the continent from ‘a long period of darkness and fear into one of light and a dream fulfilled’, in which ‘through our persistent efforts we have redefined ourselves into something other than a place of suffering, a place of wars, a place of oppression, a place of hunger, disease, ignorance and backwardness’, and ‘succeeded to create a new world of peace, democracy, development and prosperity (Mbeki 2001)’. It is no longer tenable to claim that Mbeki’s idea of an African Renaissance is high on sentiment and low on substance. He has been instrumental in crafting and driving the AU and NEPAD, fleshing out their visions with elaborate policies, programmes and structures. A normative commitment to democracy and respect for human rights was the essence if not the totality of President Mandela’s foreign policy. Mbeki has retained this emphasis, placing democratic governance at the heart of the AU and NEPAD, although he often couches the argument in analytical and strategic terms. The basic logic of NEPAD, for example, is that there will be no economic development on the continent in the absence of stability, and no stability in the absence of democracy. 189

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Mbeki, like Mandela, has not only promoted democratic principles but has also criticised one-party states, military dictators and corrupt elites in Africa that have looted national wealth and condemned their people to poverty. Such criticism remains rare among African presidents and would have been unthinkable in previous decades. Since 1994, the government has replaced the militarist security project of the apartheid regime with a holistic approach to security. The armed forces are no longer the favoured policy instrument and are no longer involved in state decision-making. The primary threats to security are not military and cannot be dealt with by military means. At the global level the overarching problem is the power imbalance between the North and the South and the perpetuation of inequality by dominant states; the fundamental causes of insecurity and instability in Africa are bad governance and underdevelopment; and the primary threats to the security of South Africans are poverty, unemployment and crime. The security of people is the paramount concern and is by definition multidimensional: ‘security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being (South Africa 1996)’. Pretoria is convinced that pacific forms of conflict resolution are the most viable methods for achieving durable peace and stability in the context of civil wars and other crises on the continent. This position stems from the success of South Africa’s negotiated settlement and from Mbeki’s personal style of politics. Mbeki prefers the art of persuasion, and negotiations that he can direct, to the blunt and unpredictable use of force. Mediation and facilitation of dialogue have become an arena of continuous and energetic engagement, most prominently in the cases of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan and Liberia. There is no blanket rejection of the use of force. Rather, force is viewed as a limited tool, applicable only in exceptional situations, and then chiefly in order to provide space for state diplomacy and intra-state negotiations. The government strongly favours peacekeeping over peace enforcement and insists that external military deployments must have the approval of the UN Security Council. Ironically, this pacific foreign policy has been a source of tension in Southern Africa. In the 1990s the 190

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efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to set up a viable security regime failed because member states were polarised around incompatible pacific and militarist approaches. One camp, led by South Africa and supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, wanted a common security regime whose primary basis for multilateral co-operation and peacemaking would be political rather than military (Brammer 1999:21). The other camp, led by Zimbabwe and supported by Angola and Namibia, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised military co-operation and responses to conflict (Tapfumaneyi 1999:23). In 1999 a Zimbabwean defence official claimed that Pretoria’s opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking was the major reason for the impasse around the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (ibid). The war that commenced in the DRC in 1998 revealed the strategic import of this division, as the pacific group promoted a diplomatic solution while Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola deployed troops in support of the late President Kabila. The DRC imbroglio damaged relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, crippled the Organ and gave rise to the notion of two SADCs. Multilateralism is both a primary goal and a primary strategy of South Africa’s foreign policy. It is consistent with the country’s negotiated settlement and pluralist politics and with the emphasis in African state politics on unity and solidarity. Accordingly, and given the history of apartheid destabilisation, South Africa is acutely sensitive to being perceived by other African countries as a bully. Mbeki is determined to build effective multilateral institutions on the continent in collaboration with strategic partners like Nigeria. The AU is the principal vehicle for multifaceted co-operation and NEPAD is intended to secure international partners and strengthen Africa’s voice in global forums. More generally, South Africa promotes multilateralism in the international system as the best means of maintaining global order, addressing global problems, mitigating the domination and unilateralism of powerful states, and empowering weaker countries. The five themes summarized above are mutually consistent and supportive. They have many conceptual and programmatic linkages, reinforcing the cohesion of South African foreign policy. As discussed below, however, the commitment to multilateralism in Africa is sometimes substantially at odds with the commitment to democracy 191

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and respect for human rights. Paradoxically, multilateralism, which is intended in part to overcome South Africa’s constraints of limited capacity and influence, is itself a significant constraint in the pursuit of its objectives. Contradictions and inconsistencies Although South Africa is fully involved in SADC, it has not driven the integration project as many observers expected it to do in light of its strength in the region. In the mid-1990s officials from SADC states complained that Pretoria devoted less attention to its relations in Southern Africa than elsewhere. Since then, perceptions of neglect have persisted. Pretoria has a coherent vision of common security but it does not have a comprehensive strategy, and its defence and foreign affairs staff often arrive at regional meetings without a ministerial directive. Mbeki champions integration and institution-building at the continental level but devotes comparatively little attention to these processes at the regional level. This apparent neglect is attributable to a number of factors. South Africa is a developing country with a relatively small economy, a host of domestic challenges and limited capacity to contribute to external development. Pretoria might therefore believe that it has more to gain from economic and development co-operation with industrialised countries than from similar co-operation with its neighbours. In addition, South Africa is constrained by the deep political divisions among SADC member states that inhibit collective action and consensus on common policies. The government is extremely wary of being assertive in this situation because of regional fears of domination, heightened by Pretoria’s policy of destabilisation in the 1980s. The legacy of apartheid and liberation politics has created a balance of power based more on history than on size and resources, enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence. Nevertheless, South Africa’s cautiousness has become a substitute for strategy and leadership, resulting in inertia, and appears incongruous when juxtaposed with Mbeki’s continental profile and leadership. The most prominent inconsistency between South Africa’s actions and its declared commitment to democracy and respect for human rights has been its policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in response to state repression and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. The greatest problem is that 192

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the policy, which has included a clumsy mediation effort, has not in fact been quiet. On the contrary, it has entailed many expressions of support for President Mugabe and Zanu-PF. Mbeki has endorsed their efforts to tackle the colonial legacy of inequitable land ownership without questioning the illegal and violent manner in which this was done. The South African President argues that his detractors are deluded if they believe that Zimbabwe’s leaders will meekly obey what he tells them. Yet his audiences are not limited to the Zimbabwean government. They include important domestic, continental and international constituencies that have been sorely disappointed. Mbeki’s critics include the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and his stance has damaged his own credibility and that of NEPAD internationally. Mbeki’s position on Zimbabwe flows in part from the constraints of regional politics. SADC generally refrains from critical comment and diplomatic engagement in intra-state conflict, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. States are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardize trade and functional cooperation, and governments that are not fully democratic are hardly likely to condemn their neighbours that engage in undemocratic practices. They are also determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture militates against public criticism of each other. The imperative of solidarity is greatest when foreign powers raise concerns that are perceived as reflecting an imperialist agenda. These dynamics have been evident in extremis in the case of Zimbabwe. Here, far from remaining silent, SADC has repeatedly expressed solidarity with Harare and trivialized human rights concerns. Mondli Makhanya, editor of The Sunday Times in South Africa, captures eloquently the fatal impediment to a consistently progressive response from SADC: SADC’s main problem is that it has not established its own platform of good governance on which to base peer judgements. In most countries in the region, democracy and respect for human rights play second fiddle to the comfort and power cravings of leaders. Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos is a ruthless despot presiding over a ruling elite of kleptocrats. Namibia’s Sam Nujoma manipulated the constitution to ensure he secured a third term of office and has strong-armed opponents and the media. Swaziland’s King Mswati dislikes

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democracy even more than Mugabe does and comes close to the Zimbabwean leader in his lack of tolerance for dissent. Many other leaders in the region are either unelected or treat elections and the countries’ democratic institutions as necessary irritations. With democrats like these, how could the world and Zimbabwe’s people expect the regional body to take the lead in disciplining Mugabe? (Makhanya 2002)

Breaking ranks in these circumstances can lead to serious vilification. When Mbeki issued mild criticisms of Mugabe in late 2001, the state-owned newspaper in Harare, the Herald, claimed that he had betrayed Zanu-PF and joined the ‘neo-colonialist plot’ to overthrow it. When Mbeki raised concerns about arrangements for the presidential election in early 2002, the Herald accused him of ‘removing his gloves for a bare-knuckled fight with Zimbabwe’ and of mobilising SADC states to ‘justify a regional and international onslaught’ against the country. Pretoria was also strongly influenced by its experience in 1995 when President Mandela called for sanctions to be imposed on the dictatorial regime in Nigeria and was soundly rebuffed by other African leaders and the OAU. In 2001 a senior member of the ANC justified the ‘quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe by arguing that South Africa would not repeat Mandela’s ‘terrible mistake’ when he acted as a ‘bully’ against the Nigerian dictatorship and ‘everyone stood aside and we were isolated (Kindra 2001)’. The fear of isolation and the constraints of solidarity do not constitute the whole picture, however. Pretoria could have mitigated these problems by backing the Commonwealth’s continued suspension of Zimbabwe in 2003, which was agreed to by Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and other African states. Instead, Pretoria led the SADC grouping that opposed the suspension. Mbeki’s comments here and elsewhere on Zimbabwe were situated squarely within his Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms, which proved incompatible with his support for democracy. Further, Pretoria appears to believe that the Zimbabwean opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, would not constitute a viable government, and that the preferable solution to the Zimbabwe crisis lies in a reformed Zanu-PF or a government of national unity. South Africa’s position on Zimbabwe is also inconsistent with its emphasis on human security, appearing throughout to be more concerned with regime security than with the rights and dignity of the Zimbabwean people. 194

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Another dramatic contradiction has been Mbeki’s denialist position on HIV/AIDS, condemned by Archbishop Ndungane and others as a ‘crime against humanity’. In terms of fatalities and destructive social and economic impact, the pandemic is the most significant security problem at the domestic, regional and continental levels. It demands the massive effort and large-scale mobilisation of resources that are typically afforded to grave security threats. Mbeki’s stance has nowhere been satisfactorily explained, but it might be explicable in terms of the ideological paradigms referred to above. In addition to supporting a dissident scientific view, he has argued his case on ideological grounds, portraying pharmaceutical companies, sections of the scientific community and the international campaign against HIV/AIDS as racist and imperialist (Forest and Streek 2004; Dawes 2004). On this issue too, the President’s judgement has undermined his international credibility and South African diplomacy (The Economist 2001). South Africa’s controversial arms acquisition programme, which entailed the purchase of warships and aircraft at a cost estimated at R30 billion (US$5.2 billion) in 1998, is at odds with the holistic approach to security, the pacific foreign policy and the absence of any remotely foreseeable military threat. Cabinet ministers contend that opponents of the programme are wrong to cast the issue as one of ‘guns versus butter’ since the country needs both guns and butter. They miss the point, of course. The term ‘guns versus butter’ refers to economic opportunity costs, so that public funds spent on weaponry could otherwise have been spent on health and social services. The exorbitant expenditure deviates from the government’s pledge to contain military spending, enunciated in the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review of 1998. A number of factors account for the acquisition programme. At the parliamentary level, the defence force was able to convince politicians across the board that major weapons systems were fast becoming obsolete. Many parliamentarians supported the force design proposed by the military for the additional reason that they lacked the technical expertise to consider alternative models. At cabinet level, the then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, was an unabashed hawk; other ministers were captivated by the arms sellers’ promises of offsets amounting to R111 billion and the creation of 65,000 jobs; and the government appeared to believe that even if diplomacy were 195

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preferable to force, the retention of strong armed forces would add weight to its peacemaking endeavours in Africa. Never far from the surface was the realpolitik association of state, sovereignty and military power. It is also possible that the executive, like parliament, deferred to military planners because it did not have the expertise to evaluate their proposals properly (Wrigley 2003). The military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho in September 1998 was demonstrably inconsistent with Pretoria’s preference for pacific forms of conflict resolution. The deployment met with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army, and eight South African soldiers and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days. Anarchy and public demonstrations against the intervention ensued, leading to the virtual sacking of the capital city, Maseru. The operation was riddled with strategic and tactical errors and was widely viewed as a military and political disaster. The intervention can be explained by the following factors: a coup seemed imminent when a group of junior officers deposed and imprisoned the commander and other senior members of the Lesotho Defence Force; the previous coup in Lesotho had led to the killing of the deputy prime minister; the OAU had recently taken a strong stand against coups; and South African military assistance had been formally requested by the head of a lawful government. It may also have been relevant that the decision to deploy troops was taken by Acting President Buthelezi while President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki were abroad, although Pretoria subsequently insisted that Buthelezi had consulted them. In any event, the intervention was clearly anomalous and not indicative of South Africa’s foreign posture. Troop deployments in the DRC and Burundi, by contrast, are primarily peacekeeping missions and have the approval of the UN Security Council. The one major inconsistency with respect to the government’s emphasis on Africa and an Africanist ethos occurs at the domestic level. There is widespread xenophobia in South Africa, targeted mainly at people from other African countries. The government does little to discourage the xenophobia and little to support African refugees. Its immigration laws are very tough and they are stacked against Africans rather than against job-seekers from the North. The treatment of African refugees and asylum seekers is shamefully reminiscent of the apartheid era (Kanuma 2002; South African Press Association 2004). 196

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The economic rationale for the government’s position, relating to the high level of unemployment, is not an adequate explanation. Tanzania, which is vastly poorer than South Africa, has housed tens of thousands of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda for decades. It is unclear why South African leaders who were given sanctuary by neighbouring states at great cost during the liberation struggle do not make greater effort to offer reciprocal support. South Africa’s export of conventional armaments has been its foreign activity least consistent with stated policy. The cabinet resists transparency and parliamentary oversight, draws a spurious distinction between ‘sensitive’ and ‘nonsensitive’ military products, and reneges repeatedly on its promise to avoid arms transfers to countries that systematically violate or suppress human rights. In the period 2000–01, the recipients of South African military equipment included China, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Human Rights Watch 2000; DD 2000). Ministers claim that the exports stimulate employment, generate foreign revenue and help to maintain the viability of the domestic defence industry. Yet these persistent deviations from policy suggest a cynical disregard for human rights. Conclusion Pretoria’s foreign policy has given rise to an extensive body of critical work by South African academics. This work does not always distinguish between policies that are truly incoherent and those that are coherent but not adhered to consistently. Nor does it always take account of the complexities of international affairs, distinguishing between the failures that are attributable to government and those that are due to factors beyond its control. In this chapter I have argued that South Africa has a coherent foreign policy, but that a number of striking inconsistencies have damaged its international standing and undermined its stated foreign policy objectives. The problem may well lie more in the realm of strategy than that of policy. There appears to be greater clarity on goals than on the best means of achieving them. Notwithstanding its title, the Strategic Plan of the Department of Foreign Affairs does not grapple with the tensions and dilemmas that lie at the heart of strategy and loom large in the wideranging and ambitious foreign policy of a country with limited capacity and influence. There are especially strong tensions between 197

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multilateralism in Africa and a commitment to democracy, and between securing Western support for NEPAD and seeking to transform international power relations. These tensions do not render the relevant objectives invalid or the foreign policy incoherent, but they do require much sophistication, finesse and focus at the strategic level. References ANC. 1994. Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic SouthAfrica.[online]Available: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign.html. Brammer, H. 1999. ‘In search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism for Southern Africa’. Global Dialogue, 4 (2): 21-22. Dawes, N. 2004. Mbeki’s New Race Tirade. Mail & Guardian: October, 22. Forest, D. & Streek, B. 2001. Mbeki in bizarre Aids outburst. Mail & Guardian: October, 26. Human Rights Watch. 2000. Report, 12 (5a): October. Kanuma, S. 2002. ‘The Long Wait for Freedom’. Mail & Guardian: March, 22. Kindra, J. 2001. ‘We won’t make the Same Mistake with Zim’. Mail & Guardian: March, 2. Makhanya, M. 2002. ‘Mugabe Will Not be Swayed by the Police Coaxing of Despotic Peers’. Sunday Times: January, 20. Mbeki, T. 2001. Address to the Joint Sitting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on the New Parternership for Africa’s Development. Cape Town: October 31. South Africa, DFA. 2004. Strategic Plan, 2003-2005. [online]: Available: http://www.dfa.gov.za South Africa. 1996. White Paper on Defence. South Africa, DD. 2000. South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms, 2000-2001. [Online] Available: http://www.mil.za/SecretaryforDefence/Frame/Frame.htm. South African Press Association. 2004. Government Criticised for Treatment of Detained Foreigners. Mail & Guardian: November, 2. Tapfumaneyi, A. W.. 1999. ‘Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa: A View from Zimbabwe’. Global Dialogue, 4 (2): 23-26.

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(The) Economist. 2003. ‘Deadly Meddling: Thabo Mbeki shows no Sign of Giving up his Misguided Views on AIDS’. The Economist: November, 1. WrigleyY, C. 2003. The South African Deal: A Case Study in the Arms Trade. London: Campaign Against the Arms Trade.

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CHAPTER 12

SOUTH AFRICA’S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: BURUNDI AND THE DRC David MONYAE Introduction The Great Lakes region is often described as a ‘trouble spot’ or a ‘flash point’. In the four decades since political independence, the region has experienced genocide, civil wars, coups, counter-coups, mal-governance, plunder and population upheavals; both forced and voluntary. However, it is only recently, that the region has drawn attention from both regional and international actors who are now involved in the mediations, negotiations and peace peacekeeping efforts aimed at addressing these multiple crises. This chapter reviews the role of international actors in the conflict resolution processes, focusing in particular on South Africa’s role in the Great Lakes region. Among many critical questions, this chapter seeks to address; why the Great Lakes; who are the major players and what have been their strategies to resolve the conflict? Is South Africa making any progress as a mediator in Burundi and in the DRC, and what implications does this role have for its foreign policy framework? South Africa: An African Peacemaker Pretoria has made great strides to shed the paternalistic foreign policy tendencies of the apartheid regime. There has been significant transformation in South Africa’s Africa policy since 1994. There has been a shift from a unilaterally oriented policy to a more Africacentered one, dedicated to multilateral engagements. This vision underpins the project of an African Renaissance and the objectives of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); which is premised on the assumption that ‘peace - and the “good governance” that allows and promotes it, is a fundamental requisite for the attraction of investment, domestic and foreign, that Africa needs 200

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(Southall 2006:23)’. The promotion of democracy and development in Africa are South Africa’s core goals and yet these goals are not possible without peace and security. This is expressed clearly in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 2005-2008 Strategic Plan, which asserts that: ‘our vision is of an African continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, and united and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable (DFA 2005-2008: 18; Curtis 2006: 159)’. Pretoria is also aware that the achievement of these objectives depends on multilateral partnerships with African and developing countries, through regional cooperation and the strengthening of multilateral structures such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (Monyae 2006). Kagwanja argues that South Africa has adopted a “soft power” approach, ‘through the instruments of persuasion, mediation, negotiation and peer pressure (2006: 29)’. In tackling continental challenges such as conflict and the reconstruction of societies South Africa has stood in good stead vis-àvis its aspirations of continental leadership. This growing activism on continental issues, coupled with its continental weight and experience of its own “miraculous” transition has seen South Africa taking a central role in continental initiatives of conflict resolution, peace building and peacekeeping. Consequently, various South African actors are involved in mediation efforts across the continent including; the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Sudan and Comoros. South Africa’s military has also become one of the world’s fastest growing within the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions, particularly in Africa (Monyae 2006). The Great Lakes Crisis Multilateralism sums up South Africa’s strategy of engagement and management of the Great Lakes Crisis. The promotion of constitutionalism through mediation has been central to Pretoria’s strategy in dealing with situations in the DRC and Burundi. According to Curtis, this is ’to get everyone around the same table to compromise and agree on inclusive transitional political arrangements as part of a peace agreement (2006:159)’. This approach has not been without criticism, and is often perceived as indecisiveness on the part of South Africa. For Landsberg and Masiza, many African states have been critical of Pretoria for being quick in seizing economic opportunities 201

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presented by African markets, but reluctant when confronted with political and strategic challenges on the continent (Landsberg and Masiza 1996: 5). In light of these perceptions, how does one explain South Africa’s ever-increasing role in the continent’s crisis management processes and in the Great Lakes region? Ngoma argues that South Africa’s involvement in continental issues is automatically assumed due to its superior economic, industrial and military capacity (2004:7). Furthermore, South Africa’s political transition has led to Pretoria ‘being singled out by western powers and other African states as a candidate to enforce peace where there is none: western powers believe South Africa is best placed to play the role of firemen in central and southern Africa (Landsberg and Masiza 1996: 5)’. The United States has also identified South Africa as the primary candidate for burden shift in its post-Somalia foreign policy. Diplomatic pressure is not the only rationale that has influenced South Africa’s response. There is a realisation that the security crisis in the Great Lakes region has the potential of turning into another Rwanda, whose consequences, might include ‘spilling over into regional battles, generating hundreds of thousands of refugees, shattering states, and prompting economic dislocation, ethnic cleansing, and lawlessness (ibid: 5)’. As a result, ‘South Africa cannot assume that these consequences will remain far from its borders. It will have to accept greater responsibility for restoring stability in Africa (ibid: 6-7)’. Burundi’s Road to Peace and Democracy: Arusha Accords Burundi was plunged into civil war in October 1993, following the assassination of its first democratically elected president, Melchoir Ndandaye. The conflict in Burundi is rooted in politics of identity, as Ndandaye had been the country’s first Hutu to serve as head of state following years of political dominance by the Tutsi minority (Southall 2006: 105-6). Since then, Burundi has been the centre of conflict resolution processes. African leadership played a central role in brokering peace in Burundi, notably through the efforts of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa; who laid the foundations for peace and democracy in the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2002. The death of 202

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Nyerere in October 1999 presented an opportunity for a new mediator ‘who could rise above the suspicions of the different participants (ibid: 113)’. Nyerere was accused by some of the parties as lacking the necessary neutrality because of his regional connections and longstanding relations with certain Burundian politicians. Nelson Mandela, who had recently stepped down as the president of South Africa took over as mediator in Burundi’s peace process. For South Africa, Mandela’s appointment was an indication of the world’s confidence in its aptitude to settle the region’s conflicts. South Africa’s role as a principal actor in Burundi presented it with the perfect opportunity to implement its continental diplomacy policy, premised on Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance. Mbeki saw an inextricable link between the continent’s development prospects and the achievement of continental peace and security. On this basis, Mbeki stated that, ‘South Africa would do everything to assist Mandela in bringing an end to the conflict in Burundi (Ajulu, 2007: 82)’. Mandela’s appointment was welcomed by all the key stakeholders in the process, with the exception of Hutu rebel groups. The latter rejected Mandela’s appointment on the grounds that South Africa was supplying military assistance to the government of Burundi. However, Mandela’s acceptance of the role can be attributed to many factors. Chief amongst these, Southall suggests, was the fact that, not only was he a ‘regional outsider, he was also famed as a reconciler of opposites, as demonstrated by his key role in negotiating the South African settlement (1990–1994) (Southall 2006: 113)’. South Africa’s experience of overcoming apartheid, provided important lessons, and the Burundi government saw South Africa as a much needed source of economic assistance. Both South Africa and Burundi had vested interests in making the process a success. To the surprise of many Burundians, Mandela took a more heavy-handed approach toward the involved parties and was blunt in openly criticizing the different factions for squabbling in the face of a humanitarian crisis. Addressing the Burundian delegates, Mandela said ‘Why do you allow yourselves to be regarded as leaders without talent, leaders without a vision? The fact that women, children and the aged are being slaughtered every day is an indictment against all of you (Curtis 2006 in Federico& Fusaro 2006)’. Mandela gained the respect of Burundians for his even-handedness, which legitimized the peace process in their eyes. Mandela was also insistent, borrowing from South Africa’s experience, that there was a need for renewed 203

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efforts to re-engage and include the marginalized rebel groups in the ongoing peace process. He argued that lack of participation and agreement on their part would obscure the cease-fire (Southall 2006: 113). This inclusive strategy resulted in early talks with both the Conseil National pour la Défence de la Démocratie – Force pour la Défense de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD) and Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL), and paved the way for future talks between Pierre Buyoya and the rebel groups. However, Mandela’s efforts yielded no immediate success, as the rebel groups’ “constant prevarications” proved to be a major delaying factor. As a consequence, Mandela, working against time, resolved to continue the negotiations in their absence. The latter’s efforts did not prove futile however, as his determination to include the excluded rebels in the peace process greatly enhanced the legitimacy of the subsequent Accord, and weakened the standing of the rebels internationally (Southall 2006: 113-14). While cautious in borrowing too much from South Africa’s experience, Mandela introduced the notion of “sufficient consensus”, a strategy that was utilized during negotiations in South Africa. In the event of stalemate, “sufficient consensus” entailed engaging with the major parties (FRODEBU, UPRONA and the military) in order to reach a consensus ‘then presenting the agreement to the smaller parties as a fait accompli(Ajulu 2007: 83)’ and thus depriving the latter the ability to block progress in committees. Mandela was also more prepared to analyze the Burundian conflict along ethnic lines. He was openly critical of the Tutsi minority elite’s power domination and as such maintained that, as long as the minority dominates politically, economically, and militarily, there can be no peace (ibid: 82). Furthermore, using his international stature Mandela stressed the importance of involving the international community in the peace process at a conference held in Paris in December 2000. Using the “carrot and stick” strategy, he placed a particular emphasis on the need and importance of international financial assistance for addressing the country’s humanitarian and development needs, and also to impress upon Burundian delegations the prospects for a better future (ibid: 83). In yet another bid to accelerate the negotiations, Mandela imposed a deadline of 28 August 2000 for signing the Arusha agreement, albeit tactics devised by various groups (notably the Tutsi hardliners), so as to stall the process. On the set date, only 13 of the 19 delegates acceded to the Accord at a ceremony attended by regional heads of states, 204

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General Secretary of the then Organization of African Union (OAU), South Africa’s Deputy President; Jacob Zuma and US President Bill Clinton. As expected, the six parties that did not partake were the Tutsi-dominated ones. However, after being subjected to enormous regional pressure and condemnation from Mandela, they submitted and added their signatures at a summit in Nairobi on 20 September. The Accord provided for a 30-months power-sharing period, but many of the details of a transitional constitution were not decided until it had been signed. After a series of negotiations, an agreement was reached that Buyoya, would act as the interim president for 18 months from 1 November 2002, with Domitien Ndayizeye of FRODEBU serving as vice-president and then succeeding him on 1 May 2003 (Southall 2006: 115). Following the signing of the Accord, Mandela sought to secure a ceasefire while preparing the ground for the establishment of the transitional government. It was during this period that the South African government took a more active role in the Burundian peace process. Mandela had enjoyed the full cooperation of Pretoria, although he had played the role in his personal capacity. Yet, Pretoria was soon to take a central position in the Burundian peace process. South Africa’s first major involvement came in October 2001, when President Thabo Mbeki announced that the country would deploy two of its battalions (1 500 troops) to Burundi, as part of the international military force (Southall 2006:115). This gesture was significant in that, no other African country had either the capacity or willingness to undertake this key role [Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana had all declined to participate in the absence of a ceasefire] (ibid). Pretoria’s official engagement in Burundi was well calculated. Mbeki saw the peace process as a key component to the achievement of a peace in the DRC, which South Africa was also party to. The establishment of a lasting peace in Burundi and the neutralization of its domestic politics would go a long way in the establishment of security for the entire Great Lakes region. The first South African troops arrived in Bujumbura in November 2001. Their mandate was to provide protection for returning political exiles that were to take part in the transitional government, as provided for in the Accords. With such a limited mandate, South Africa could not play a major peacekeeping role, yet it’s presence was critical in maintaining stability. One of the stipulations of the Accord was that the South African contingent would be reinforced by troops from 205

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Ethiopia and Mozambique, forming the core of the African Union’s Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which in time would assume responsibility for preserving peace between the army and the militias, and oversee the restructuring of the military (ibid: 116). Mandela stepped down in 2001 and the then Deputy President Jacob Zuma took over as the new facilitator. Upon taking over, Zuma was faced with, according to Ajulu, three daunting tasks, namely: (1) ensuring that the Arusha agreements were implemented; (2) ensuring that the rebels signed an agreement to join the transitional government; and (3) securing a permanent cease-fire (Ajulu 2007: 88). Furthermore, Zuma was tasked with ensuring that the transition did not collapse. Together, with regional leaders, who had regained their prominence in the process, following the departure of Mandela ‘whose international stature had dominated the process and unintentionally sidelined them (ibid: 88)’, Zuma shared no illusions about the signing of the Accord. Zuma and regional leaders were very conscious that the process would not lead to any miracles; it would merely lay the foundations of the real work ahead. They were also aware of the importance of bringing the rebel groups to the negotiating table. What followed is best captured by Southall who states that, ‘the subsequent peace process was one of bewildering complexity characterized by broken promises, violated ceasefires and continuing war between the rebel groups and the transitional government, which continued to bring untold misery to the population (Southall 2006: 116)’. A pressing task for Zuma was to address the failure of the rebel groups to join the peace process. Conscious of the complex task at hand and regional dynamics, Zuma used Yoweri Museveni and Benjamin Mkapa’s influence to hold talks and put much needed pressure on the rebels in order to fast track the process. These attempts were not in vain. The talks with Buyoya laid the foundation for future engagement between the predominantly Hutu rebel groups and the government (Ajulu 2007: 88). Further, Zuma and President Omar Bongo of Gabon took the initiative to identify key players within the rebel groups. This was aimed at establishing further avenues of engagement and dialogue with other influential actors within these groups. Subsequently, two meetings in January and April 2001 were held with Bongo as a facilitator between the CNDD-FDD and the transitional government.

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The aims were to outline the agenda for negotiations, which was further discussed at the summit in Pretoria in October 2001 (ibid: 85). These efforts, however, were complicated by divisions amongst the rebels themselves. For instance, a dissident faction led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza, in a summit held in Pretoria in October 2002, rejected the Original CNDD-FDD, led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, claiming that they were the legitimate CNDD-FDD. Further, they argued that, they could only conclude a peace deal with the army, as they perceived it to be the “power behind the transitional government”. Then there was the major faction of the FNL under Agathon Rwasa, comprising of various religious elements. This group was the most stubborn and highly opposed to being part of the agreement. It believed strongly that the Tutsi dominated the transitional government and accused those Hutu parties that had joined the government of being sell-outs. It also argued that it would only negotiate with the Burundian army. As a result, the government was left with no choice but to go ahead and sign a ceasefire in September 2002 with Ndayikengurukiye (CNDD-FDD) and Mugabarabona (FNL), leaving out Rwasa’s FNL and Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD. These remained at war with Bujumbura for over two years after the ceasefire had been reached. It is for these very reasons that Pretoria and regional leaders insisted on the urgency of the implementation of the transitional process in Burundi (Southall 2006: 117). The transition period from Buyoya, who had been in power since November 2002, to Ndayizeye was not a smooth one. Instead it was clouded by fears that the army would intervene to prevent the scheduled transfer of power. Pressure was also placed on Buyoya by, amongst others South Africa, regional heads of states, the AU, UN and the US, to ignore calls by those in the military and elsewhere to retain his position. This uncertainty resulted in an increase in the levels of violence around the country, particularly by FNL. In response Buyoya made a public announcement that he would step down. And Ndayizeye ascended to the presidency as scheduled. On 27 January 2003 a meeting was held in Pretoria, in which the team of mediators was successful in coaxing the Burundian government and the three rebel groups into signing a memorandum of understanding and establishing a Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC). Crucially, they also agreed on the deployment of an AU peacekeeping force. The series of negotiations facilitated by Zuma and Mbeki in 207

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Pretoria culminated in a momentous victory on the 8th of October 2003 when the government and the CNDD-FDD agreed to implement the ceasefire of December 2002 and also signed the Pretoria protocol on Political, Defense and Security power sharing in Burundi. A new constitution has since been drafted by Burundian politicians with the help of the Presidents of South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda. The new constitution includes constitutional quotas for both ethnic and gender representation. Initially, there were disagreements over the text of the constitution, which in turn delayed the constitutional referendum that was mandated by the Arusha Agreement. However, the referendum was finally held on February 28, 2005, and Burundians across the country voted overwhelmingly in favour of the new constitution. Communal legislative and presidential elections were held later in the year. South Africa: Post-conflict Stabilization and Nation-building in Burundi Burundi has been ravaged by years of conflict. Although the country has scored a resounding victory in holding what were deemed to be “free and fair” elections in 2005, elections, whilst necessary are not sufficient in themselves to solve the country’s problems. A historical perspective into Burundian history reveals that elections were held on three different occasions (1961, 1965, 1993), and each time they were followed by unrest, which Marc Manirakiza attributes to the fact that ‘most of the political actors were not mature enough to accept the democratic culture (Manirakiza 2002: 47)’. It is against this backdrop, that the international community, which played a pivotal role in brokering a peace in Burundi, continues playing a central role in the post-transition period. South Africa’s continued presence in Burundi is of paramount importance in guarding against possible failure of the newly elected government and any destabilization attempts by negative forces within the region. This too highlights the importance of Pretoria’s concurrent peace project in the DRC, as continued violence in this neighbouring country poses a threat to Burundian peace and security, and thus exposes it to the possibilities of backsliding. It is therefore paramount that the crisis in the DRC is resolved if sustainable peace is to be realized in the Great Lakes region. In recognition of the fragility of the peace, South Africa 208

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continues to play a leading role in the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was recapped as the United Nations Operations in Burundi (UNOB), with 1,511 SANDF members. South Africa’s presence has been vital in sustaining the peace in Burundi, and which has led to the return of stability in 95% of the country. The significance of a continued role by Pretoria emanates from its past experience, as the latter was also a transitional state not so long ago, and its democracy is still fragile. South Africa can therefore provide critical lessons for its Burundian counterparts on how to manage the various aspects of transition and those of a fledgling democracy. Critical to this is the process of reconciliation, economic recovery and post-conflict reconstruction. Based on its own experience of political transition and subsequent nation-building, South Africa has advanced the issue of national reconciliation between the disaffected groups as one that requires urgent attention; since, sustainable peace and the achievement of social justice for the Burundian masses will only come about through tolerance, unity and a commitment to a better future, which is consistent with the Arusha Agreement. Manirakiza is of the view that the project of reconciliation is not an impossible one when taking into consideration the fact that, historically, the Burundian problem is largely political and economic (Manirakiza 2002: 47). One of the mechanisms identified for the purposes of national reconciliation is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, progress in setting up the commission has been slow. Commissioners were only nominated in early January 2004, and the institution has been described as still being in the “embryonic stage”. Furthermore, the commission does not yet have a mandate, and consequently it is unclear as to how it might address competing claims for both justice and reconciliation (Jooma 2005: 9). It is against this backdrop that the South African government has come up with a comprehensive reconstruction programme that is in line with the Arusha Peace Accords and has since made fundamental strides in pursuit of these objectives. The first major step in this regard, has been the establishment of bilateral cooperation between Pretoria and Bujumbura. This follows a series of talks that led to the signing of a Joint Cooperation Agreement. The latter Agreement would make provisions for: Mutual Protection of Investments; Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Economic Cooperation; Agreement on 209

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Enhancement of Capacity; Agreement on Defence and Police Cooperation; MOU on Judicial Cooperation; and Review of the Agreement of Civil Aviation signed in 1992 (DPSA 2006). The security sector presents a key challenge for the Burundian government; since reconstruction projects and much desired economic development are riding on the maintenance of peace and stability in the country. As such the transformation and capacitating of the police is seen as a matter of urgency. To this end, South Africa has offered to share information on issues of doctrine and policy with its Burundian counterparts with the aims of setting up a new police force (ibid). Pretoria has also committed itself to trilateral cooperation with Burundi and Belgium with the aims of developing projects to revamp and capacitate Burundi’s government sector, as enshrined in the Arusha Accords. The following areas of involvement have been identified for cooperation between the three governments: organizational development, institution building and training in development and strategic planning as well as policy formulation (ibid). South Africa has also committed itself to providing training in the following areas: good governance and anti corruption; training of trainers; monitoring and evaluation; human resource management; HIV/AIDS training for managers; and gender training. DPSA has also made a commitment; in conjunction with Statistics South Africa (STATS SA) to conduct a Census of the Burundian public service and to assist in setting up an E-data base governance system to manage records and archives in Burundi. South Africa’s engagement in the country’s different projects is aimed at economic development and at equipping Burundi with the resources needed to become self-sufficient and independent from external aid, including South Africa’s (ibid). Through the Independent Development Cooperation (IDC), South Africa has produced a strategic framework for accelerating economic growth and poverty reduction. The IDC is in the process of evaluating the viability of three projects identified by the government of Burundi that include the Verundi glass manufacturing project, development of a port and cement project (ibid). A number of challenges remain and need to be addressed if economic growth and development are to be achieved. There is a need to bolster secondary sectors and strengthen the tourism industry. South Africa has offered assistance in the development of an investment code in Burundi, which aims to increase the revenue base for government. 210

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Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A step towards peace and democracy for the DRC? The crisis in the DRC dates back to the rebellion of 1996, which led to the ousting of President Mobutu Sese Seko from his 32-year authoritarian regime. Ironically, Laurent-Desire Kabila, who succeeded Mobutu, was dealt a similar fate only two years into office. On August 2, 1998, Banyamulenge leaders, who had brought Kabila to power, launched a rebellion against him. They accused him of authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism and tribalism. These developments led to an unprecedented interstate conflict involving eight African states: Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Libya (Mangu 2003:160). International efforts by the SADC, AU and UN to settle the Congolese conflict culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the holding of the InterCongolese Dialogue (ICD), which concluded with the adoption of the Global Agreement and an interim constitution for the DRC (ibid). South Africa became involved in the process in 2002, when the ICD resumed in Sun City, South Africa from February to April 2002. By this time, there were 360 delegates participating in the process, which included the DRC government, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-National (RCD-N), Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie- Liberation Movement (RCDML), the Mai-Mai (Congolese militia), unarmed political opposition, and civil society representatives. As a “constant diplomatic presence”, and a principal mediator, in the DRC peace process, Pretoria’s earlier reluctance was because it did not want to be drawn into further military intervention following its disastrous intervention in Lesotho in 1998. Mandela, who was then the chairman of SADC was against the use force in the DRC, instead, he advocated for dialogue and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. His stance put him at loggerheads with then chairman of the SADC Organ, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who was determined to defend Kabila’s regime with military force (Malan and Boshoff 2002). South Africa’s caution on the SADC’s use of force can be best understood from a historical perspective. Patrick Lekota, the country’s Minister of Defence, referring to the SADC defence pact, argued that such a pact ‘provides guidelines 211

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to protect legitimate governments in the region from foreign armed forces’. He did not envisage South Africa ‘behaving like a bull in a China shop rushing as the Old South Africa Defence Force did (Ngoma 2004: 6)’. South Africa’s insistence on diplomatic solutions for the Congo created major tensions amongst SADC leaders, who criticized South Africa of being ‘rather removed from the region; a region that not only sweated but also bled for it prior to 1994 (ibid)’. It is on these bases that South Africa’s latest involvement and subsequent prominence as a peace broker in the DRC is viewed with great suspicion. There is a view that Pretoria is paving its way for deeper penetration by its mining companies and other corporations. The idea that South Africa may be driven by real politik, as opposed to its moral imperative cannot be dismissed all together. Pretoria would indeed benefit from a more stable and secure DRC. As pointed out by Dlamini (2001), the DRC is an important trading partner for South Africa and vice versa. He states that, 25% of the DRC’s imports come from South Africa, while the latter receives 9% of the DRC’s exports, thus making it the third biggest importer of DRC products after the Benelux countries and the US (Dlamini 2001: 68). South Africa’s intervention in the DRC, however, must be seen in the context of Mbeki’s wider vision of an African Renaissance, that of ending Africa’s violent conflicts and the promotion of good governance in order to achieve economic growth and sustainable development. The geopolitical ramifications of the DRC conflict also have significant implications for durable peace and security, not only in the Great Lakes region but also in Southern Africa. South Africa cannot afford to take a backseat in the hope that the central African leadership will deal with it, as there are no guarantees that this conflict may not have a domino effect throughout the continent. Pursuant to the Lusaka Agreement, the ICD resumed in Sun City, revived by Joseph Kabila who had ascended to power following his father’s death. Guided by Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana, and mediator of the Congo crisis, 37 resolutions were adopted. However, no agreement was reached on the issue of the establishment of a consensual political dispensation for the country during the transitional period. This created tensions and delayed the negotiations by seven days. To break the deadlock, the Congolese parties and Masire requested Mbeki to assist. South Africa had an 212

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interest in the success of the dialogue. Through various tactics of international pressure and skilful negotiations, Mbeki was able to put the negotiations back on track. It was suggested that provisions should be made during the transition for the establishment of autonomous institutions such as the Constitutional Court, Human Rights Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, National Electoral Commission, and High Authority of the Media (Mangu 2003: 165). On Masire’s recommendation, a follow-up committee was set up to continue negotiations on the formation of the transitional government of national unity. Subsequently, a meeting was held in Sun City on 22 April 2002 to set up the Alliance for the Defence of the Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD). According to its constitutive act, the main aim of the Alliance was ‘to undertake anything possible to bring the DRC government and the MLC back to the negotiating table to achieve an inclusive and consensual agreement on the transitional government (ibid)’. Mangu argues that ‘there was no alternative to the ICD, whatever form it took. An inclusive and sincere political dialogue resulting in power-sharing based on a constitutional act that protects and promotes human rights remained the best way to address the crisis of constitutionalism and democracy in the DRC (ibid)’. This initiative was supplemented by pressure from the Congolese people and international community within SADC, the AU and the UN. An amended Mbeki plan for power-sharing during the transitional period was later presented to the Congolese parties in August 2002. The plan provided for a presidency; consisting of President Joseph Kabila (PPDR), and four Vice-Presidents from different groups and factions; Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (PPRD), Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-G) and Z’Ahidi Ngoma (civilian opposition). Ministerial portfolios were divided proportionally between the armed groups, the unarmed opposition, civil society and the Mai-Mai. The plan also made provisions for a bicameral Parliament (National Assembly and Senate), an independent judiciary and other democratic institutions. The plan was accepted by the DRC government and endorsed by the RCD, MLC and the political opposition, subject to some amendments. At the same time, diplomatic attempts were made for the withdrawal of foreign forces. This led to the landmark agreement between Rwanda and the DRC in July 2002. In September 2002, Uganda and Rwanda reached a similar agreement, establishing a 100-day timetable for the withdrawal of Uganda’s forces 213

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and the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Committee in northeastern DRC. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also reached bilateral agreements with the DRC government calling for troop withdrawal in October 2002 (Baregu 2006:68). On December 17, 2002, the global and inclusive peace agreement was signed by all Congolese parties in Pretoria. The Agreement consisted of eight parts. The foremost concern was the cessation of hostilities. The parties renewed their commitment to ceasing hostilities and seeking a peaceful and fair solution to the crisis. The parties also agreed to commit themselves to forming a national, restructured and integrated army in line with a resolution adopted during the ICD on April 10, 2002. All parties agreed to combine their efforts in the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on the withdrawal of foreign troops, the disarmament of the armed groups and militia, and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. They also committed themselves to taking the necessary measures to ensure the security of the population and the transitional leaders. On 2 April 2003, the Congolese parties adopted a draft constitution for the transition, in line with the Pretoria agreement. Article 204, of the constitution, provided that it would enter into force ‘on its promulgation by the President of the Republic within the three clear days that follow its adoption (ibid)’. Accordingly, President Joseph Kabila promulgated the transitional constitution on April 4, 2003. On the 7th of April, Kabila was sworn in as president for the transitional period. The transitional government was inaugurated in May 2003 to govern for two years. The country’s first elections since 1965 were scheduled for March 2005, but were delayed till 2006, which saw Joseph Kabila emerge as the country’s first elected president. South Africa and State Reconstruction in the DRC The situation in the DRC after the signing of a ceasefire remained tenuous. The transition remained susceptible to collapse, largely due to “spoiler elements” that were acting as deterrence to a successful peace implementation. These included; ‘state collapse, the existence of more than two belligerent groups, the presence of armed combatants that numbered over 50,000 soldiers, the presence of hostile neighbouring states or regional networks and the existence of disposable natural 214

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resources (Kisangani 2006: 117)’. Further many ordinary citizens have become dependent on the war economy. The ongoing insecurity in the DRC therefore poses a threat to the established peace accords, but also for the peace and stability of the entire Great Lakes region. Reconstruction therefore becomes a critical task for the future peace and prosperity of the DRC, and efforts to date have achieved some major successes. Reconstruction efforts have been multi-pronged, involving a multiplicity of international players and different projects. At the top of the agenda have been the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, repatriation and resettlement; and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes by the MONUC and the UNDP respectively. By March 2005 MONUC had disarmed 9,012 combatants (DFA 2006). However, more still needs to be done in this regard, so as to ensure that all combatants are disarmed and reintegrated into Congolese society. Within the SADC context, South Africa has been instrumental, in collaboration with the DRC and Belgian governments to create a new Congolese army. Beyond conflict resolution efforts, Pretoria has forged new partnerships with Kinshasa through the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC). The latter came into being after the signing of a General Co-operation Agreement on January 14, 2004, in Kinshasa, which aimed at promoting political, economic and social cooperation between the two governments. In accordance with the General Cooperation Agreement, sectoral commissions, namely, Politics and Governance, Defence and Security, Humanitarian and Social Affairs, and Finance, Economy and Infrastructure, were established with technical committees (ibid). These developments have since yielded a number of successes in the advancement of national reconstruction for the Congo. During the third Session of the BNC, three agreements were signed: the Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Maritime Transport, Agreement on Decentralization and the Memorandum of Understanding on Education Co-operation. The Agreement between the Department of Transport (DOT), SA and the Transport and Communication bureau, DRC has led to a number of contributions by the South African ministry, which include: a commitment by the DOT to assist its counterpart in the rehabilitation of five airports in the Congo that were to provide linkages and access to remote areas during the elections (these included amongst others, Lubumbashi and Ndjili International Airports). 215

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A substantial donation to the value of R7 million was pledged by the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA), towards repairs for nine vessels and three barges that are to be used for improvement of mobility and access through the Congo River. Spoornet has agreed to transfer ownership of 100 passenger coaches to the Congolese rail agency, La Sociale Nationale des Chemins De Fer Du Congo (SNCC) by March 2006 and also committed to provide the latter with spares to the value of R 2.5 million (ibid). The MOU on decentralization which was signed by Ministers Sydney Mufamadi (SA) and Theophile Mbemba (DRC) identified the following areas of cooperation between the two ministries: the development of an organic law dealing with decentralised Administrative Entities and support with capacity building and setting up of appropriate organizations, equipment, information technology systems and infrastructure. The aims of this project are to assist in the reformation of systems of governing institutions and the promotion of good leadership in the DRC (ibid). The signing of the MOU by the Ministries of Education (SA) and Higher Education (DRC) has led to several initiatives by South African institutions. The University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) has made progress in the establishment of partnerships with the University of Lubumbashi and the University of Liege in Belgium. The University of South Africa (UNISA) and the Education Foundation Trust have also expressed interest in developing relations with the DRC and are considering possibilities of establishing education centres in the DRC. The latter, in cooperation with the Education Ministry, will develop an Education Management Information Systems (EMIS), support training and research to facilitate policy development, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation through the use of EMIS (ibid). Other achievements include the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) initiative of capacity-building for the DRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation which has been underway since April 2005. The aims of this project are to reform the ministry, provide diplomatic training for senior diplomats and administrators, and develop information and communication systems. The DPSA was also instrumental in setting up a public service census project in the DRC. Progress has been made with the conducting and timely completion of the Kinshasa census of public servants. An initial head count of all ministries with the exception of EPSP and ESU, Health and Research 216

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has been completed and data is currently being transferred onto the database. The second headcount, where biometrical information will be captured is currently underway. The second phase of the census— provincial—began at the end of May 2005 and census forms for the Bandundu and Bas-Congo provinces are currently being captured. The census for the other eight remaining provinces is also scheduled to take place very shortly, as census forms and sorting have already begun (ibid). The DPSA has also been involved in the development of the Anticorruption project. The latter is made up of two sub-projects; equipping the DRC’s Observatory for Professional Ethics to roll out the Code of Conduct for public officials; and a tri-lateral memorandum of understanding has been signed by South Africa, the DRC and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to facilitate the establishment of an anticorruption framework for the DRC (ibid). Pretoria has also made significant strides in the establishment of economic programmes in the DRC, which emanate from the Agreement of Economic Co-operation entered into by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the DRC’s Ministry of Industry; Small and Medium Enterprises. The two governments have also agreed to set up a Regional Spatial Development Initiative Programme (SDI) in the DRC, which is targeted at the promotion of large-scale infrastructure development and sectoral economic investment projects. One of the most momentous projects to come out of SDI is the Bas Congo Scoping Study. The significance of this SDI rests on the fact that the Inga Hydroelectric project is currently Africa’s and possibly the world’s largest hydro-electric power project. This has thus led to the current projects aimed at the rehabilitation of Inga I and Inga II and the development of Inga III, which together stand to generate power capacity to the excess of 40 000 megawatts (ibid). A sub-committee has also been established to promote joint mining ventures between South African and Congolese companies. A number of possible projects have been identified by both parties, such as the mining of copper, cobalt, zinc and lead, amongst others. The DRC government has also asked South Africa to assist (both financially and technically) in the promotion of the country’s new mining legislation, supporting the development of the Mining Cadastre and supporting the DRC in mining environment issues. Also in the energy sector, a MOU has been signed between the DRC’s SENEL and Eskom. This 217

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partnership will facilitate the Kimbanseke Electrification project, which is aimed at connecting 10 000 new customers at 10MW and is estimated to cost approximately US$ 14 million (ibid). Conclusion South Africa’s mediation, negotiation, peace–building and peacekeeping efforts in Burundi and the DRC have enhanced its leadership position in Africa and abroad. The challenge for South Africa going forward will be to maintain equilibrium between its Africa stabilizing agenda and its economic interests. Perhaps the newly acquired two years non-permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will enable South Africa to further lobby the international community to support its Africa agenda and promote sustainable peace, security and economic growth on the continent. As Mbeki closes his Presidential chapter in 2009, it is important for South Africa to maintain its significant involvement in African affairs. References Ajulu, C. 2007. South Africa’s Africa Involvement in Burundi Peace process. Johannesburg. Witwatersrand (MA Thesis). Baregu, M. 2006. ‘Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict’ (in Khadiagala, G.M (ed) Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Curtis, D. 2006. ‘The South African Approach to Peace building in the Great Lakes Region”, (in Federico, V & Furaso, C (eds) Constitutionalism and Democratic Transitions: Lessons from South Africa. Florenze University Press. DFA (South Africa). 2006. Document: April. DPSA. 2006. Document: June, 14. Kisangani, E.F. 2006. ‘Legacies of the War Economy: Economic Challenges for Post conflict Reconstruction’ in The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Dlamini, K. 2001. ‘Assessing South Africa’s Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution’ South African Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

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Jooma, M.B. 2005. ‘We can’t eat the constitution’ Transformation and the socio economic reconstruction of Burundi’, Institute for Security Studies Paper 106: May. Kagwanja, P. 2006. ‘Power and Peace: South Africa and the refurbishing of Africa’s multilateral capacity for peacemaking’ (in Southall, R (ed) South Africaʹs role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Landsberg, C & Masiza, Z. 1996. ‘The benevolent giant: Can South Africa contain the Great Lakes crisis?’ International Relations Series, Policy: Issues and Actors: 9 (8) Landsberg, C & Monyae, D. 2007. ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Carving a Global Niche’ in South African Journal of International Affairs, Forthcoming. Malan, M. & Boshoff, H. 2002. ‘A 90-day plan to bring peace to the DRC? An analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002’. Institute for Security Studies Paper 6: September. Mangu, A.M.B.2003. ‘From War to Peace: The Democratic Republic of Congo in Transition’. South African Journal of International Affairs: 10 (2). Manirakiza, M. 2002. ‘Nation-Building in Burundi: History and its Impacts on the Future’ in Conflict Trends. Durban: ACCORD). Monyae, D.2006. ‘South Africa in Africa: Promoting Constitutionalism in Southern Africa, 1994-2004’ (in Federico, V & Furaso, C (eds).Constitutionalism and Democratic Transitions: Lessons from South Africa. Firenze University Press. Ngoma, N. 2004. ‘Hawks, Doves or Penguins?’ Institute for Security Studies (88): April. Southall, R. 2006. ‘A long prelude to peace: South African involvement in ending Burundi’s war’. (in Southall, R (ed).South Africaʹs role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

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CHAPTER 13

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ECOWAS Issaka K. SOUARÉ Introduction Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, there has been a wide recognition that there is an interconnection between politics and economics in world affairs, especially regarding the safeguarding of international peace and security. Western European countries that suffered the most from the War emphasised the need to create welfare states. Developing strong economies became the guiding principle of all the post-War European leaders in their respective countries. The end of colonialism in Africa and the urgent need by newly independent states for social and economic development led most of the new African leaders to realise the interconnectedness of politics and economics. Yet, the micro-states that these leaders had inherited from colonialism meant that many African states were too small to be economically viable and were in no position to transform the political into economic independence (Asante 2004:51). Of all the development theories, “regional integration” became the most courted approach; which was pioneered by Western European nations through the formation, as early as 1957, of the European Economic Community (EEC). The move towards economic regionalism or regional integration around the world accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s. The most notable is the European Economic Community and by the late 1990s, almost all the world’s regions had become incorporated into one sort of regional integration or multilateral trade agreements. West Africa was arguably the first region in Africa to embrace this approach as a strategy for economic development. This chapter is largely adapted from two articles I published in the journal, African Renaissance, in mid-2005 and early 2006. The first was a reflective and retrospective study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as it celebrated its 30th anniversary (Souaré 2005a). The 220

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second was a critical analysis of the African Union and the array of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, looking at their potential role in breaking down the colonial demarcations and artificial borders on the continent (Souaré 2006a). This chapter focuses specifically on ECOWAS within the broader context of regional integration in Africa. As of the end of 2006, ECOWAS had fifteen members (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). Defining regional integration A definitive and universal theorisation of the phenomenon or the concept of regional integration is almost unattainable, and in any case not envisioned in this chapter due to the different drives that lead different regions or groups of states to come closer and integrate their economies. Daniel Bach, one of the most prominent African scholars on the subject matter, defines “regionalism” as the implementation of a programme and the definition of a strategy, associating it with “institutional building”. He defines “regionalisation” as ‘processes that may or may not be related to the emergence of institutional structures and patterns of transaction (Bach 2004: 70)’. Bourenane defines it as ‘a voluntary pooling of resources for a common purpose by two or more sets of partners belonging to different states (1997:50)’. And Ali El-Agraa identifies five types of regional integration based on different stages of integration. These phases are: (1) the creation of a free trade area, when members eliminate all or most trade restrictions against each other’s goods; (2) the creation of a customs union, whereby member states adopt, in addition to the measures of the free trade area, common external tariffs vis-à-vis non members; (3) common market, which transcends the customs union to free movement of the factors of production (i.e. workers, goods, services and capital); (4) economic union, which is the highest form of economic integration, incorporating the previous stages of integration and extending to the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policy amongst the member states; and finally, (5) political union, which is the most advanced form of all integration projects, transcending economic integration to supranational decisionmaking between the member states. It is argued that the European Union (EU), which has almost achieved the fourth level of these 221

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phases, is ultimately heading for political union (El-Agraa 1994 cited in Gilpin 2001:343). Africa and the drive for regional integration Given the competitive nature of the global market; countries need to be economically strong to be able to withstand the pressure of globalisation. Any country that is not economically strong runs the risk of being marginalised. Even strong economies fear the risks posed by globalisation. The most common strategy that countries have adopted to withstand the negative repercussions of globalization or to gain the most from it has been regional integration (Gilpin 1987:13; 2001: 394– 401). Apart from the EU, other examples of regional groupings include the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Most economies in Africa, when taken individually are too small to sustain this fierce and merciless competition in the world economy. Most African countries are economically too poor in comparison to countries of the EU, ASEAN and NAFTA. If these relatively strong economies saw the need to integrate their economies in order to compete fairly and advantageously on the global market, so should the poor economies of Africa. Fortunately, this has been part of African leaders’ thinking. Since the dawn of independence, there have been many attempts for economic and political integration by many African countries. The Ghana-Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) Trade Agreement of 1962 and the African Common Market linking Algeria, Egypt (then the United Arab Republic with Syria), Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco are just few examples of the early drive to regional integration (ECA 2004:27). The 1991 Abuja Treaty is perhaps the most far-reaching and the boldest attempt at economic integration in Africa in recent times. The Treaty sought to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) through six stages culminating in a [Pan-] African Common Market using Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as building blocks. A decade later, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was adopted as the main catalyst for Africa’s economic redemption and uplifting. The need for regional integration is articulated by article 94 of NEPAD which makes it clear that the conditions of the world economy ‘point to the need for African countries to pool their resources 222

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and enhance regional development and economic integration on the continent, in order to improve international competitiveness’. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) also makes the ‘integration of African economies’ one of its main objectives. At the end of 2006, there were seven RECs in Africa, considered as the building blocs of the African Economic Community. There were also seven more limited economic communities or Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs), making the total number of RECs in Africa, fourteen (14). This shows the determination by Africans to overcome artificial borders and to build strong economies. However, it also indicates that there may be a problem regarding Africa’s vision and strategy. It is in this context that the Constitutive Act of the African Union set for itself the task of ‘coordinating and harmonising the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union.’ The problem of “multiple allegiances” for the RECs is what the chapter considers below. The State of Regional Integration in Africa In geo-political terms, Africa is divided into five natural regions: West; East; North; South and Centre. But as pointed out above, there were seven RECs at the end of 2006 and seven IGOs with regional dimensions. In West Africa, alongside the ECOWAS, encompassing all the 15 countries of the sub-region, there is the Union économique et monétaire oust-africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union — UEMOA), consisting of eight ECOWAS member states—all Frenchspeaking with strong links to Paris. Although not very active due to political factors, a third IGO in the region is the Mano River Union, consisting of three ECOWAS member states (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone). In East Africa, there is the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), whose seven member states come from the Horn of Africa and the northern part of East Africa. There is also the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL —of its French acronym), consisting of three members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) which consists of eleven members across Central Africa. Still in Central Africa, there is the Communauté économique et monétaire des Etats d’Afrique centrale (Central African Economic and Monetary Union —CEMAC), the identical 223

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equivalent of UEMOA in West Africa, comprising six French-speaking ECCAS countries. The East Africa Community (EAC) is not in reality purely East African, but made up of COMESA members: Kenya and Uganda and a SADC member, Tanzania. In Southern Africa, there is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose fourteen members consist of all Southern Africa. But there are also two other economic communities: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), consisting of five members of SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), made up of four members of Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Réunion (which is still, strangely, a French dependency). The 20 countries that make up its membership include all East African countries except Tanzania and seven countries of Southern Africa. In North Africa, there is the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), consisting of the six North African countries (except Egypt) with close links to the Arab League. But it has been stagnant since 1995 for political discords between its member states, particularly between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara (Amazirh 2005). There is also the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) whose 18 member states transcend four geographical regions, feeding its ranks from all the five regions of the continent except East Africa, with countries such as Libya (N. Africa), Mali (W. Africa), Chad (C. Africa) and Swaziland (S. Africa) very active in it. This was the state of regional integration in Africa as it stood at the end of 2006. Most of these RECs had sophisticated treaties and protocols guiding their work which are quite similar, if not identical, to those of other groupings on the continent. Most of them had wellfunctioning secretariats and they conducted frequent meetings at the summit, ministerial and technical levels (ECA 2004:30). Moreover, each of them had short-term and long-term goals ranging from customs unions (e.g. CEN-SAD and SACU) to full economic unions (e.g. SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, UMA, CPGGL, UEMOA) and cooperation on diplomacy, environment and trade (e.g. IOC). Given that some of these RECs transcend geographic regions, there is a tendency for some countries to have multiple memberships in the RECs. As shown by the Economic Commission for Africa’s comprehensive report about regional integration in Africa, of the 54 (53 AU members + Morocco) African countries, 26 are members of two 224

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RECs and 20 are members of three. One country (the Democratic Republic of Congo) belongs to four RECs. Only six countries (Algeria & Mauritania (UMA only), Malawi & Mozambique (SADC only) and ECCAS member Sao Tomé & Principe) maintain membership in just one Regional Economic Community (ECA 2004:40) ECOWAS and Regional Integration in West Africa ECOWAS’ formation The treaty establishing ECOWAS was signed on 28 May 1975 in Lagos by 16 countries that make up West Africa. However, Mauritania withdrew its membership in December 2000. The signing of this treaty was the culmination of a series of high level meetings initiated by a Lagos-Lomé axis. It was an idea that had occurred in 1972 to two young military heads of state in the region, General Yakubu Gowan of Nigeria and Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo. The first idea had nonetheless been launched at the eighth Annual Meeting of the InterAfrican Public Administration (an annual meeting of senior African mandarins) seminar held in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, in November 1969. This was through a landmark presentation by Professor Adebayo Adedeji (Adedeji 2004:26). The primary aim of this sub-regional organisation was to achieve collective self-sufficiency through the integration of the 16 countries of the region into an economic bloc with a single market organised around an economic and monetary union. This initiative was the result of the realisation that owing to the “smallness” of most of the countries of the region, taken individually, they would be far less competitive in a world environment marked by the existence of large trade blocs (ECOWAS 2000). At the ordinary summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Niamey, Niger, in January 2006, it was decided that ECOWAS Executive Secretariat be transformed into a Commission. This decision was finalised at the Organisation’s 30th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government in June of the same year. This means the transformation of the ECOWAS Secretariat into a nine-member Commission comprising a President, a Vice President and seven Commissioners, a structure that was to become operational in January 2007. It is hoped that this will enable the deepening and acceleration of the integration process. In order not to 225

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make it a mere cosmetic surgery, it is envisaged that this transformation would also entail the enhancement of the supranational powers of the organisation and the adoption of a new legal regime (ECOWAS Press Release, 14 June 2006). ECOWAS can therefore be compared as far as the driving rationale and ideals of its “Founding Fathers” are concerned; to the European integration project (Asante 2003). But three decades on, has ECOWAS achieved the ambitions of its Founding Fathers? Has West Africa been truly integrated? Have the peoples of the region reaped the fruit of their region’s integration in terms of the betterment of their living conditions? Where has ECOWAS succeeded and where has it failed? These are some of the questions that the chapter attempts to answer. ECOWAS’ Achievements Since becoming operational in March 1977, ECOWAS has made some impressive achievements in different domains, including in areas that were not envisioned by its Founding Fathers. For example, ECOWAS established the necessary functional structures of the institutions of the community such as the monetary and fiscal control institute (WAMI), ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the community parliament. In addition, ECOWAS has encouraged the formation of a number of affiliated civil society organisations or associations. These include the West African Youth Union (WAYU), the West African Women’s Association (WAWA), the West African Workers’ Union (WAWU), the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce (FWACC), the West African Banks Association (WABA) and the West African Road Transporters (WART) (Bundu 1997:33). A new Parliament was inaugurated in November 2006 at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. The newly 115 sworn-in parliamentarians from fourteen member states will serve a four-year term, till 2010. The parliamentarians are expected to conclude the processes that would facilitate the election of members by direct universal suffrage to the Community Parliament, thus allowing the Parliament to have a true region-wide representational status (ECOWAS Press Release, 13 November 2006). Since the mid-1990s, ECOWAS has made available to its citizens a community passport for intra-regional travel. A measure aimed at ensuring free movement of persons, the ECOWAS passport allows 226

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ECOWAS nationals to travel within the region without a visa. This saves them time and contributes to the consolidation of the spirit of community between citizens of the different countries of the region. Moreover, in order to facilitate intra-regional business, ECOWAS introduced, in 1998, an ECOWAS travellers’ cheque. The area where ECOWAS has registered its most impressive achievements is in conflict resolution and peace-making in the region. This was not anticipated at the time of the creation of ECOWAS, at least, the recent impact. In the face of almost chronic political instability, characterised by civil wars, secessionist movements and military coups d’état, leaders of ECOWAS member states have found themselves forced to adopt a new mandate and take on a new but challenging and daunting task —that of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS adopted a non-aggression protocol in 1978. Three years later, in 1981, they signed a defence assistance protocol. In 1990, the ECOWAS Cease-fire and Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was set up, which had a legal mandate to intervene in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire. And in December 1999, ECOWAS leaders adopted a “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security”, which provides a clear strategy for ECOWAS’ mediation and peacekeeping efforts in the future (Adebajo 2002:30-40; Souaré 2006b: 181190). Despite some deficiencies, ECOWAS’ military intervention to save lives in these countries, especially in Liberia, which was its maiden project, was in general successful and impressive, given the limited resources available and the complexity of these conflicts. ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia for peace-keeping and later for peace enforcement purposes won it the recognition and acclaim of more than one observer. For example, in a desperate search for legal justifications for NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without UN sanctions, some international lawyers and Western politicians pointed at the ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia without prior UN authorisation as legal (Cassesse 1999).

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ECOWAS’ Challenges ECOWAS still has a number of challenges to overcome. In a number of areas, ECOWAS has been a disappointment. Three decades on, the projects of “collective self-sufficiency” and “single market” envisaged by the Founding Fathers are far from being achieved. The lack of self-sufficiency in the region is noticeable even with regard to some of the most basic human needs, such as food and other primary necessities. Rice is arguably the main staple food in the region. Yet, up to the time this chapter was finished, almost all West African countries relied on food imports, sometimes from countries such as Vietnam that were not long ago at the same level of development as West Africa. Clearly, this is a paradoxical situation in a region blessed with fertile soil conducive for easy and smooth agricultural production and a large workforce in agriculture. In the area of market integration, despite all the fine treaties, conventions and mechanisms, especially the Trade Liberalisation Scheme launched in 1990, trade restrictions still exist. Goods continue to be subjected to undue control, which contributes to an unreasonable increase of the cost of transactions and final cost of goods. This constitutes a major obstacle to market integration in the region. By mid2003, the level of intra-regional trade struggled to exceed a paltry 11 per cent of total external trade (Asante 2003). This clearly flies in the face of those who moan about trade protectionism of Northern countries. Although there has been some progress in the transport and telecommunications sector, more still needs to be done. For road travellers, “the curse of borders” still beats the recommendations of ECOWAS’ scheme of free movement of goods, capital and persons (Gberie 2004). And for air travellers, owing mainly to lack of local ownership of travel means and the mediocre volume of intra-regional trade, but also because of the poor purchasing power of the ordinary West African, a resident of Conakry wanting to fly to Abuja or a resident of Niamey aiming for the international airport of Praia in Cape Verde may find it easier to fly to Paris, London or Lisbon and get a connecting flight there for his/her West African destination than wait for a direct flight from the West African capital of his/her residence. Mobile or cellular telephones have reached the region in an impressive way, even deep into some remote areas in farming villages. 228

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However, getting through to the other line on a reliable basis is quite a different story, even within the same country. There are exceptions; some countries enjoy functioning and reliable telecommunications lines. Moreover, a region-wide single currency was proposed as early as the late 1980s and a Consultative Forum was finally established in 1992 to formalise meetings between central bank governors and ministers of planning and finance across the region. The single currency was to be officially launched in the year 2000, starting first with a second monetary zone, alongside the CFA zone, with an ultimate objective of merging the two zones together by the year 2005 (Bundu 1997:36). However, by the time this chapter was completed, this second monetary zone proposed between the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone was yet to take off, owing to the failure of most of these states to meet the necessary convergence criteria. It must also be noted that the existence of the CFA zone, controlled and backed by the French treasury, benefiting from generous technical assistance from the European Commission, has in many regards contributed to this state of affairs (Asante 2004:60-61; Bach 2004:79). Such are ECOWAS’ achievements in delivering on its set goals. It is a mixed record between success and disappointment, but a record that permits optimism for the future. In order to transform this optimism into reality, a number of questions have to be posed and answered, both theoretically and practically by the politicians on the ground. It must be asked: why has the pace of ECOWAS’ successes been so slow and timid? Why has it failed to achieve most of the goals envisioned in its founding treaty? What have been the most determining factors behind this? What is the way forward? Diagnosis of the Problems and an Agenda for Future Actions Analysing ECOWAS; Abass Bundu, former ECOWAS Executive Secretary, identifies seven main issues that contributed to its failure to achieve some of its set goals. These are; (1) the absence of an integration and development culture in the individual countries; (2) the priority accorded to nation-building in the years following independence rather than collective regional development initiatives; (3) differences in ideology and approach; (4) the fear of Nigeria’s domination; (5) the burden of certain institutional and economic 229

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structures inherited from colonialism; (6) the economic crises that plagued the region from the early 1980s; and (7) political instability (Bundu 1997:29). These points cover most of the problems facing ECOWAS, many of which are also true for other RECs. Some of these points, however, are more like symptoms or results of others rather than independent factors in their own right. For example, the differences in ideology and approach as well as the burden of certain institutional and economic structures can be due to lack of self-esteem and confidence in the ability of Africans to come up with their own ways of doing things without any foreign assistance. But it is true that the two points cause problems. One can rightly argue that the existence of the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), assembling only French-speaking countries in the region alongside and with the same aims as the ECOWAS but relying on a strong foreign partner reinforces this point. As noted already, the most unifying factor of member states of both UEMOA and CEMAC is the CFA Franc. This currency is governed from Paris and has been, since 2002, pegged to the Euro. Before this, the French treasury set its exchange rate and could devaluate it at will, as it did in January 1994, when it devaluated the currency by literally half its value without consultation with any African leader let alone the African peoples affected (Glaser & Smith 2005). And now, changes affecting the nature, scope, and membership of the franc zone require prior approval by the European Council, acting on the advice of the European Central Bank and the European Commission in Brussels (Bach 2004:79). Yet, this very CFA franc is one of the main obstacles in the creation of a region-wide single currency in West Africa. The economic crisis that plagued the region is mainly a consequence of economic mismanagement and corruption, coupled with lack of political will to implement the community’s agreed projects and abide by its macro and microeconomic rules. The so-called fear of Nigeria’s domination has been dealt with extensively elsewhere (Souaré 2005b). Briefly, though, this is due to an intoxication campaign —that unfortunately receives an echo with some leaders and ordinary people in the region— by some foreign actors —France in particular— trying to divide the West African family in order to advance their own neo-colonial ambitions. To address this fear, Nigerian leaders need to 230

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quench these fears —ungrounded as they are. To do this, good governance and mature and responsible management of the enormous economic resources of the country for the sole benefit of the ordinary Nigerian should be their sole ambition. A democratic and prosperous Nigeria is more reassuring than a Nigeria reputed for corruption, mismanagement and autocratic rule. There is no denying that political instability has had a profoundly negative impact on the ability of both individual countries as well as ECOWAS to concentrate on their development projects (Souaré 2006b:136-142). With good governance and real application by individual member states of the recommendations contained in the aforementioned ECOWAS’ protocol relating to conflict management, the threat of political instability should be greatly reduced if not eradicated. As for the other factors, African leaders and citizens alike must bear in mind that no outsider can, nor will help them develop. Although Africa is not yet at a stage where it can compete with other regional trading blocs such as the EU, it is a fact that in this globalised world, the success of one region will more or less reduce the opportunities available to others. In other words, relying on other trading groupings for funding in order to be in a position to challenge them in the future is just not sensible. In fact, this is the whole meaning of the concept of protectionism. Perhaps the portrayal of China and India nowadays in some Western countries as potential threats to their welfare or at least absolute advantage in certain sectors is a clear evidence of this point. The failure of the different member states to engage the region’s 250 million citizens with the different projects of regional integration is another major problem to be overcome. This is why the plan for members of the ECOWAS parliament to be elected by direct universal suffrage, should it materialise, is a welcomed proposal. Conclusion In the final analysis therefore, it is clear from the above discussion that African countries are genuinely desirous to transform their countries and the continent from a region of eternal dependency to one of prosperity, enjoying respect and playing their rightful role in the global society. Having recognised their relative handicaps, regional economic integration has thus been, and rightly so, ECOWAS’ most 231

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favoured strategy for economic transformation. But the analysis above shows that despite the considerable efforts that have been put into regional integration, mainly by those working at the secretariats of the different institutions, regional integration has so far produced few concrete results. Application of the different regional and continental protocols, conventions and projects, which is the responsibility of the individual states, should be given priority. Yet this hangs to a large extent on political will. It is through regional integration that Africa can take her rightful place in the world community and have a say on international matters. References African Union. 2000. Constitutive Act. Lomé: Togo. ____________. 2001. New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Lusaka: Zambia. Adebajo, A. 2002. Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Adedeji, A. 2004. ‘ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey’ (in Adebajo, A & Rachid, I (eds.), West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Trouble Region. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Amazirh, A. 2005. ‘ce que le Maghreb gagnerait à s’unir,’ Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent. no. 2338, 30 October – 5 November. Asante, S. K. B. 2003. ‘ECOWAS at 28: between standstill and progress’. West Africa, no. 4377, 26 May – 1st June. __________ 2004. ‘The Travails of Integration’ (in Adebajo, A & Rachid, I (eds.), West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Bach, D. C. 2004. ‘The Dilemmas of Regionalization’ West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Borenane, N. 1997. ‘Theoretical and Strategic Approaches’, in Lavergne, R (ed.), Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective. Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press. Bundu, A.1997. ‘ECOWAS and the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa’ in Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multi Dimensional Perspective. Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press.

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Cassesse, A. 1999. ‘Ex iniuria ius oriture: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ European Journal of International Law: Vo. 10. Economic Commission for Africa. 2004. Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. Addis Ababa: ECA Publications. ECOWAS. 2000. Silver Jubilee Anniversary (1975-2000): Achievements and Prospects. Abuja: ECOWAS Secretariat. _________ 2006. ‘Regional leaders finalise transformation of ECOWAS Secretariat into Commission’. Press Release: no. 67/2006, June, 14. __________ 2006. ‘Chambas Hopes for a New West Africa As Second ECOWAS Parliament Is Inaugurated in Abuja”. Press Release: no. 111/2006, November, 13. El-Agraa, A. M. 1994.The Economics of the European Community. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Gberie, L. 2005. ‘ECOWAS: The curse of borders’. Africa Week: Special Print Edition, February. Gilpin, R. 2001.Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. _________1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Glaser, A & SMITH, S. 2005. Comment la France a perdu l’Afrique. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Souare’, I.K. 2005a. ‘Thirty Years of ECOWAS and Regional Integration in West Africa — (1975-2005): A Retrospective Look and Suggestions for the Future’. African Renaissance: 2 (4): 65 – 73. __________2005b. ‘Is Nigeria a Regional Hegemony To Be Feared?’ African Renaissance: 2 (2): 58 – 67. ___________2006a. ‘African Union and Regional Economic Communities in Africa —Minimizing Multiple Allegiances and Rationalizing Partnership’. African Renaissance: 3(1): 8 – 16. ____________2006b. Civil Wars and Coups d’Etat in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America.

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CHAPTER 14

THE TERRITORY IS CAMEROON’S BUT THE PEOPLE ARE NIGERIANS: RESOLVING THE BAKASSIPENINSULA CONFLICT Kenneth OMEJE Introduction The territory is Cameroon’s but the people are Nigerians. This paradox epitomises the contradictions at the heart of the disputed Bakassi peninsula, which has brought Nigeria and Cameroon to the brinks of war in the past. Most writers on the Bakassi peninsula have simply awarded the disputed territory either to Cameroon or to Nigeria. The famous International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision of October 2002 followed a similar simplistic paradigm. This chapter upholds the ICJ Verdict that the Bakassi peninsula is legally speaking, Cameroonian territory; however the chapter argues further that it is a paradox that the bulk of the inhabitants of this territory are Nigerian people. The persistent contradiction between geographical space and historical people underlying the Bakassi dispute, a contradiction which the traditional ICJ legalistic framework is least designed and least equipped to solve, is to a large extent, a colonial creation. Post-colonial policies and actions of the state parties to the dispute have, however, had an aggravating impact on the conflict. A “complex territorial and nationality emergency” such as the foregoing, requires an extra-legal and proactive remedy. Following the judgement delivered by the ICJ, also known as the World Court, on 10 October 2002 awarding sovereignty over the disputed peninsula to Cameroon, the conflict over ownership of the oilrich peninsula has taken a new twist. To many informed observers, the ICJ verdict did not come as a surprise. There is little or no doubt that by the prevailing norms and principles of international treaty laws, Cameroon has a more consistent and justifiable case to claim sovereignty over the disputed territory. Similarly, Nigeria’s inconsistent attitude and double-standards over the disputed territory both before and after the ICJ judgement is not a surprise to many given 234

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the frequency of regime change and policy discontinuities that have characterised post-independence Nigeria. It is indeed remarkable and this has clear implications for the conflict. In terms of political economy, both Nigeria and Cameroon can be characterised as “prebendal or rentier states”, where the dominant hegemonic classes depend on the state and its rental largesse (taxes, royalties, rents and returns of equity holdings on multinational extractive investments) to acquire the necessary economic base to reproduce their societal dominance (Lewis 1996; Omeje 2004). The rentier elites in the two countries have a marked ethno-cultural and, in the special case of Nigeria, ethno-military, bias. Onshore and offshore oil rents expected from the disputed peninsula are therefore of great importance to both states and their rentier elites. It is rather surprising that the dispute over Bakassi has been so much about space and territoriality as though the territorial space in question is uninhabited. This is apparently because of the huge oil discoveries in the area. There has been very little concern for the rights, aspirations and well-being of over 250,000 impoverished inhabitants of the peninsula. Whereas, the disputant states are more concerned with sovereignty over space and territory primarily for the purpose of natural resource exploitation, the people of Bakassi tend to be more concerned about ethno-cultural and national identity and solidarity, citizenship, as well as nationality and livelihood rights (notably fishing). But beyond the concern of the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments with the subject of territoriality, an issue, which could be more readily resolved through existing bilateral and multilateral channels of negotiation, the main conundrum of the Bakassi conflict and an aspect that has scarcely featured in the roundtables; is how to reconcile the subsumed contradictions between sovereignty and nationality, statehood and citizenship, geography and people. Even the ICJ verdict does not significantly appreciate and address these contradictions, which have their roots in colonial anomalies. Commenting on such colonial anomalies and the contradictory spaces they subsume, Mbembe has aptly observed that most of the international boundary disputes in Africa have their origin ‘not in the desire to make an ethno-cultural space coincide with the space of the state, but rather in the struggle to control resources considered to be vital (1999:9)’. In other words, the problems are usually caused or 235

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heightened by the tendency of the state governing elites and politicians to stretch the territorial space of the state, often by hiding under the pretext of correcting colonial anomalies to include vital or strategic resources across the borderland areas as a means to shore up the state’s revenue base and ipso facto the distributive largesse at the disposal of the hegemonic prebendal elites. The real test of sustainable peace in the contested peninsula lies in resolving the contradictions subsumed by the colonial anomalies, which have been dangerously politicised and aggravated by the actions of the post-colonial political leaders of both countries. Regrettably, the existing “road-map to peace” (i.e. the ICJ verdict and the nexus of recent conciliatory measures) pursued by the state parties and the external arbitrators’ offers no dependable remedies in this respect. Colonial History and Background to the Conflict The Bakassi peninsula covers a land mass of about 665 square kilometres and is located along the Gulf of Guinea, forming a part of the southerly borderland between Nigerian and Cameroon. The two countries share a 1,600 kilometre-long border area that stretches from Lake Chad in the north to the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic coast. The Bakassi people are predominantly Efik and in pre-colonial time formed part of the old Calabar kingdom. Based on a treaty signed between the Chiefs of Calabar and the British colonial authorities on 10 September 1884, the old Calabar kingdom was brought under the British Protectorate, which was later integrated with other “protected” kingdoms, empire, chiefdoms and territories to form the British colony of Nigeria (Okoli 1978). As was characteristic of many colonial treaties, the borders of the old Calabar kingdom and the entire eastern frontier of Nigeria acquired by the British crown were not clearly delineated or demarcated from the neighbouring colony of Cameroon, originally acquired and ruled by Germany. However, following a series of colonial treaties, notably the Anglo-German treaties of 11 March 1913 signed in London and that of 12 April of the same year signed in Obokun, Britain formally ceded Bakassi to the Germany government, citing “administrative convenience” as the main reason (Omeje 1994; Asobie 2003). This was broadly in line with colonial pragmatism because the peninsula was then seen as a relatively unproductive 236

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swampy forest with a treacherous terrain. It had little or nothing to offer to a cash-crop-driven imperial regime like the British Crown that had very thin administrative personnel on the ground. Consequently, signing out Bakassi to the Germans was politically expedient and had a diplomatic advantage as this was considered essential for settling Nigeria’s controversial international boundary with German Cameroon in an amicable and more proactive way. Defeated in World War I by the allied forces, Germany was forced to relinquish its colonial territories based on the Versailles treaty and Cameroon was split between Britain and France in 1922 under the League of Nations Mandate system. In the aftermath of World War II, the British-administered western part of Cameroon and Frenchadministered eastern Cameroon were placed under the United Nations Trusteeship Council. For administrative convenience, Britain subsumed the northern part of British Cameroon as it was called under the colonial regional government of Northern Nigeria and annexed the southern part to the Eastern Nigeria regional government. In effect, there was no real boundary between Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria during the British Mandate and Trust era when Anglophone Cameroon was administered as an integral part of Nigeria (Konings 2005:277). French Cameroon, on the other hand, was kept administratively and politically distinct by France. Hence, the border between Nigeria and Francophone Cameroon, which was hardly a disputable border, was the effective boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon for much of the imperial era. The integration of Anglophone Cameroon to the Nigerian federation by the British colonial authority encouraged unimpeded circulation of people across the borderlands of old German Cameroon and Nigeria. This resulted in large-scale migration of people from the densely populated south-eastern tribes of Nigeria, especially the Igbo and Ibibio, to Anglophone Cameroon in search of the colonial white collar jobs and for trading purposes (Ngoh 2001). Given the head-start advantage in western education and the exuberant forms of ethnocultural unionism and solidarity of the Nigerian migrant communities in Anglophone Cameroon, the host communities increasingly shared a visible sense of economic and socio-cultural domination vis-à-vis their more powerful migrant populations. With Igbos as the largest, most visible and apparently most successful migrant population, a significant syndrome of “Igbophobia” emerged in Southern British 237

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Cameroon, a scare compounded by the fact that Southern British Cameroon was, to a considerable extent, developmentally neglected by the Eastern Nigeria regional government dominated by the Igbos (Amezee 1990). Politicised and magnified by local politicians, Southern British Cameroon was dramatically depicted as “a colony within a colony”, a portrayal that essentially made the nationalist decolonisation struggle in the region have more of an anti-Nigerian than an anti-colonial character (Konings 2005:278). At the eve of political independence in the late 1950s, there was a major concern over the future statuses of British Cameroon and French Cameroon. The concern and anxiety were somewhat reinforced when France announced an earlier independence timetable that started with self-government in 1957 and terminated with full sovereignty on 1 January 1960 for its administered part of Cameroon. Similarly, Britain promulgated a transition programme for Nigeria’s independence scheduled for 1 October 1960. Nationalist politicians and leaders from Anglophone Cameroon were inspired by the prospects of political independence to make contrasting political demands about their future. Opinions were sharply divided amongst activists. “Unionists” predominantly from the Southern British Cameroon and who had significant support from nationalist politicians in French Cameroon advocated a re-unification of British and French Cameroon under the pre-World War I German Cameroon boundaries, while “conservatives” who were mostly from the northern region of British Cameroon preferred a future political association of British Cameroon with Nigeria (Omeje 1994). Only a negligible minority of the nationalists favoured the detachment of British Cameroon from Nigeria to form a separate sovereign state. A significant section of Nigerian politicians supported the cause of the conservatives who advocated union of British Cameroon with Nigeria. A special UN Visiting Mission in 1958 to assess the situation recommended that a plebiscite be held in the perceptibly more divided southern region of British Cameroon to determine the people’s inclination and that Northern British Cameroon could be allowed to continue its union with Northern Nigeria. Strong protests from opinion leaders in the northern region of British Cameroon later forced the UN to organise two separate plebiscites for both the south and north of British Cameroon (Ngoh 2001). The plebiscites were held in February 1961. As expected, a vast majority of the people of Northern British 238

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Cameroon voted for union with Nigeria while a significant majority of people of the southern part voted for union with the French Cameroon already granted independence as the Republic of Cameroon. Although majority of the registered voters in Southern British Cameroon (65.95%) voted for union with the Republic of Cameroon, some on the Nigerian side of the contemporary border dispute have argued that the people of Bakassi voted overwhelmingly for union with Nigeria (Asobie 2003). It has been similarly argued that the people of Chamba in Northern British Cameroon voted overwhelmingly in favour of union with Cameroon. However, whether these claims are factual or not is immaterial because like in liberal democratic elections, plebiscites and referenda are usually decided on the basis of the wishes of the majority regardless of any strong reservations among sections of the minority. But almost invariably, it is the suppressed misgivings of the latter that ultimately crystallise into an obstructive force capable of menacing majoritarian interest and security. Similarly, critics like Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) have argued that the black and white options of “union with Nigeria” or “reunification with French Cameroon” put forward in the plebiscite were too restrictive, insisting that most voters in Southern British Cameroon would probably have more favourably considered a third option of either separate statehood or continued trusteeship. While Nigeria accepted the result of the plebiscites in both northern and southern British Cameroon, the Cameroonian authorities accepted only the result of the plebiscite in the south, further committing itself to an irredentist foreign policy of achieving a greater Cameroon project based on the pre-World War I boundaries (Ngoh 1996). The Cameroon government blamed the British colonial authorities for the unfavourable results of the plebiscite in northern British Cameroon, arguing that Britain administered its own part of Cameroon in a manner that encouraged union with Nigeria as opposed to reunification with French Cameroon. Having said that, the implementation of the results of the UN authorised plebiscites not only created the first real border between Anglophone Cameroon (and by corollary the post-independent Republic of Cameroon) and Nigeria, but more significantly, created new structures of political competition, exclusion and domination. The large number of Nigerian migrant populations in various towns of Southern British Cameroon were immediately relegated to a minority 239

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immigrant community, often blackmailed and vilified on account of historical animosities and also victimised and persecuted as NigeriaCameroon relations deteriorated. Accounting for about a quarter of the state’s population and land mass, the whole of Anglophone Cameroon on the other hand progressively evolved as a restive minority, especially as the state gravitated more into ethnic oligarchy, patronclientelism, divide-and-rule, and prebendal corruption. The Nigerian migrant community in the Anglophone region in effect became a minority within a minority. Presently, there are about 3.5 million Nigerians (representing about 18 per cent of the population) residing in Cameroon and most of them are constantly harassed by Cameroonian gendarmes for lack of appropriate immigration documents (Ofege 2004). Post-colonial Boundary Politics and the Bakassi Question Clearly, by accepting the result of the 1961 plebiscite, the young post-independence government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in Nigeria endorsed the transfer of the Bakassi Peninsula which fell to the southern part of former British Cameroon - to the Republic of Cameroon. Two related foreign policy initiatives of the Balewa government also buttressed this endorsement. The first was Nigeria’s declaration at independence of its commitment to the international law principle of uti possidetis juris, pledging to respect the existing international boundaries of the country as drawn by and inherited from the colonial authorities (Omeje 1994; Asobie 2003). This international law principle later became an important cornerstone of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was formed three years later in 1963. The OAU (now known as the African Union - AU) considered it expedient to preserve the inherited colonial boundaries of the African states, however arbitrary and artificial they could have been, as a means to minimise conflicts among states. The second policy element was the diplomatic note, accompanied by a map, dispatched to the government of Cameroon by Nigeria in 1962, accepting the results of the plebiscites (Asobie 2003). The 1962 map determined by Nigeria clearly delimited the southern part of Nigeria’s eastern boundary through the bank of River Akpa Yafe, in effect returning to the 1913 Anglo-German border agreement and placing Bakassi and the Rio-delRey estuary on the Cameroonian side of the border. 240

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As a matter of fact, the real territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon in the aftermath of political independence, especially during the first decade of self-rule was the unsettled issue of former Northern British Cameroon merged with Nigeria following the 1961 plebiscites and which the Cameroonian authorities were determined to sever. At the official political level, the Bakassi peninsula and the entire southern border area between the two countries were deemed a settled matter, despite the fact that the vast majority of the Bakassi indigenes were ethnic Efik who regarded themselves as Nigerians and had a nexus of age-old consanguinal and ethnocultural ties throughout the Efikdominated Calabar area of south-eastern Nigeria. The discovery of crude oil in the Bakassi Peninsula in 1967 was the real snowball that upped the ante, with the result that from 1970 onwards the hitherto unattractive and neglected peninsula became the major bone of contention. The ethnocultural identity and affiliation of the local population with kinfolks across the Nigerian border practically complicated the matter. In 1971 when Nigeria had just emerged from the devastating 30 months Biafra civil war (1967-1970), the military government of General Yakubu Gowon, re-opened the issue of ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula under the pretext that the lives and properties of Nigerians living in the territory needed to be protected (Omeje 1994). As a result, a bilateral Permanent Consultative Committee was established by the two countries to delineate their common boundaries and develop a general framework for technical, socio-cultural, economic and security cooperation between the two countries. This bilateral channel culminated in a series of agreements and protocols between Nigeria and Cameroon between 1971 and 1975, especially as it concerned fishing and oil prospecting rights in the disputed territory. In two major agreements signed in April 1971 and June 1975 in Yaoundé and Maroua, Cameroon respectively by General Gowon of Nigeria and the Cameroonian leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, both sides agreed inter alia: to delimit the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon from the point where the relevant colonial treaty ended, down the Calabar and Cross River estuaries and out to the sea to a point south of Bakassi, thereby re-confirming Cameroon’s ownership of the disputed peninsula; that the Nigerian populations of the disputed territory were free to pursue their legitimate occupations without molestation, provided they were law-abiding (NISC 2002; DTI 241

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2002). It is widely believed that General Gowon was partly inspired by Cameroon’s vital support to Nigeria during the Biafra war to formally cede the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon based on the Yaoundé II agreement and the Maroua Declaration, two legal instruments that delimited the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria and also recognised Cameroonian sovereignty over Bakassi. None of these treaties were, however, ratified by the Nigerian government. In fact, General Murtala Mohammed who overthrew Gowon in a palace coup to emerge as Nigerian head of state five weeks after the promulgation of the Maroua Declaration immediately repudiated the Declaration and blamed Gowon for signing away Nigeria’s territory to Cameroon (Konings 2005:291). But the truth of the matter is that Gowon simply acted on the basis of the stark legal evidence. Subsequent Nigerian leaders from 1976 onwards have tended to ignore the preceding treaties and legal facts of the case and have largely enforced Nigeria’s claim over Bakassi through regular military surveillance and de facto occupation. Most of the disputed territory has been administered as a local government area under the Cross River State government of Nigeria for many years. Consequently, nearly all the developmental infrastructures, such as schools, hospitals and roads in Bakassi have been provided by the Nigerian authorities (Ofege 2004). Cross-border patrol between the Nigerian military and the Cameroonian gendarme in the disputed territory have on many occasions resulted in mutual hostilities and infringement of the local populations, in particular, over fishing and property rights. Both sides have over the years demanded taxes from the inhabitants, but the latter have too often hesitated to make payment to the Cameroonian authorities. Cameroonian gendarmes are reportedly infuriated by this defiance and have invariably responded to the situation through the use of intermittent coercion (Ofege 2004). Beyond security surveillance and activities related to resource extraction (taxes inclusive) in the aftermath of the scramble for oil, the Cameroonian authorities have not made any serious efforts to extend their administrative and governmental reach to the Bakassi Peninsula, ostensibly because of the understanding that the peninsula is populated by Nigerian tribes and settlers who neither recognise the sovereignty of Cameroon over their homeland nor owe political allegiance to Yaoundé (Akinjide 2002; Mbuh 2004). 242

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On different occasions in 1981, 1991 and 1994, mounting hostilities and military confrontations between the two countries nearly degenerated into a war over Bakassi. The most volatile episode was the May 1981 clashes in which Cameroonian gendarmes killed five Nigerian soldiers at the disputed territory. This led to tremendous domestic pressure on the Nigerian President, Shehu Shagari, to go to war with Cameroon. The Nigerian House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the President to launch military reprisal against Cameroon. President Shagari ultimately resisted the pressure by opting for bilateral diplomacy. Cameroon took its longstanding boundary dispute with Nigeria to the ICJ on 29 March 1994 after Nigerian troops had effectively occupied most of the disputed peninsula. The ICJ Verdict, Crude Oil Prospects and the Nationality Complex After eight years of adjudication, the ICJ delivered its judgement on 10 October 2002, deciding inter alia that sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula rests with Cameroon and consequently that Nigeria should withdraw its troops from the territory and transfer administrative authority to Cameroon. The ICJ principally based its decision on the validity of the Anglo-Germany agreement of 1913 and the fact that post-independence Nigerian governments had earlier recognised Cameroon’s sovereignty over Bakassi (Omeje 2004; Konings 2005). As expected, Cameroon was quick to accept the ICJ verdict while the Nigerian government has been mostly ambivalent, initially rejecting the judgement and at other times issuing conditions under which it will agree to hand over the territory to Cameroon. Nonetheless, Nigeria committed itself to non-aggression and to exploring diplomatic channels of resolving the dispute. The ICJ also delivered judgement on other controversial border areas between Nigeria and Cameroon, from the Lake Chad area to the upland settlements of Sapeo, Tipsan, Lip, Mberogo, Turu, Bourha Ouango and Nyaminyami. Each party ultimately gained and lost significant territories in the ICJ ruling but the Bakassi peninsula overshadows every other decision of the World Court and raises more problematic concerns primarily because the territory is rich in oil. At the request of Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan inaugurated a Mixed Commission in November 2002 to assist the two parties in 243

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implementing the ICJ’s decisions and exploring the most effective ways of addressing their common border and security issues (IRIN 2004). A considerable number of land boundary areas and inland water territories have exchanged hands between the two parties since the ICJ judgement. Between 2002 and 2005, Nigeria, for the most part, remained ambivalent on handing over the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon and this affected the 15 September 2004 deadline agreed with UN mediators for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops and administrative machinery from the peninsula, which was repeatedly postponed. The Obasanjo regime reneged on the handover date, arguing that the demarcation of the maritime boundary must first be sorted out for the handover discussion to be meaningful (IRIN 2004). Moreover, Nigeria’s National Assembly has called for a referendum on the subject arguing that any handover of the peninsula to Cameroon without giving the Bakassi people an opportunity to vote on the matter would be unconstitutional (IRIN 2004). Meanwhile, a special subcommittee of the Mixed Commission has been set up to consider the maritime boundary issue widely believed to be central to offshore oil prospecting. There is no doubt that oil is at the heart of Nigeria’s obduracy to relinquish its claim over Bakassi peninsula. The increasing volatility of the Gulf region since the first Gulf war, aggravated by the post-9/11 US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has compelled the international oil economy to intensify the search for alternative sources of oil supply to the major oil importing economies of the west. This has given centre stage to the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Mexico in the widening oil prospecting bids of oil multinationals (otherwise known as petrobusiness), which, in turn, entails expanded petro-accumulation through oil rents, taxes and royalties for the host states and their prebendal elites. More than 21 oil wells capable of producing over 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day were already discovered in the Nigerian controlled part of the Bakassi peninsula before the ICJ judgement (Davies 2004). With a de facto occupation of most of the disputed territory, Nigeria has granted oil prospecting licences to four major western transnational oil companies (TNOCs), namely two US companies – ExxonMobil and Baker Hughes, the Swiss-owned Addax Petroleum, as well as the French TotalFinaElf. At least two local Nigerian oil firms, Moni Pulo and Oriental Energy have significant operational interests in the 244

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disputed region. Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer with an average daily output of over two million barrels and a proven reserve of about 25 billion barrels. Nigerian government sources have repeatedly emphasised that the ICJ ruling does not affect the already issued oil licences and the derivative activities authorised in the disputed territory (Omeje 2004). Cameroon, on the other hand, has a fledgling oil industry, which has witnessed unstable and declining production trends in the past quinquennium. Average daily production in recent years is about 74,000 barrels, albeit the 2004 average was 94,000 barrels (IRIN 2004). Cameroon has in recent years been drilling oil offshore the Rio-del-Rey Basin of the Bakassi peninsula through western TNOCs like TotalFinaElf, Shell and ExxonMobil. The Cameroon-controlled part of the disputed territory holds crude oil reserves of about 330 million barrels. The stakes are definitely high and this underscores the desperation observed on both sides. Scarcely have both parties paused to consider the sentiments, wishes and aspirations of the Bakassi people whose ancestral territory is the subject of dispute. Ostensibly, the recent call for a referendum proposed by the Nigerian legislature, though legitimate, tends to be borne out of opportunism rather than a genuine concern for the rights of the Bakassi people. After all, the previous Nigerian governments that consistently recognised Cameroon’s sovereignty over the peninsula before oil became a huge factor did not give any qualms about the rights, wishes and well-being of the Bakassi people. Evidently, the dominant opinion among the people of Bakassi indicates that they strongly favour a Nigerian identity and nationality. In the aftermath of the ICJ decision, the paramount chiefs and leaders of Bakassi sought and obtained an injunction from an Abuja high court restraining the Nigerian government from transferring their homeland to Cameroon (Omeje 2004; Konings 2005). Given its quasi-military character and at the backdrop of the superior decision of the World Court, it is not expected that the Nigerian government would be constrained by the Abuja high court decision. Hence, in a recent and rather bewildering diplomatic settlement brokered in June 2006 between Nigeria and Cameroon by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria agreed to hand over Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon to resolve the tense situation (Daily Champion 2006). 245

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President Obasanjo pledged to effect the hand over of the peninsula to Cameroon within 60 days in which he was expected to pull out Nigerian troops and dismantle Nigerian governance structures in the territory. It does not seem that there was any other driving force behind the recent New York peace settlement beyond the predilection of top UN diplomats and peacemakers to uphold the ICJ verdict. The recent diplomatic settlement spearheaded by Kofi Annan, with the express buy-in of the Nigerian President, lacks the support of Nigerian lawmakers and Bakassi people who have all repudiated the peace deal (Daily Champion 2006, Vanguard 2006). Previously, the Bakassi leaders had threatened to seek unilateral independence if Nigeria renounces sovereignty over the territory (NM 2002). Conscious of their enormous oil wealth and the contemporary struggles of the oilbearing communities in the adjacent Niger Delta region, the Bakassi people are likely to be more assertive now (compared to the 1960s) about their nationality and their development-related expectations from both the state and petro-business. Hence, solutions derived essentially from a legal framework such as the recent decision of the World Court might not ultimately provide the needed remedy for the Bakassi dispute. Conclusion: The Way Forward There are complex territorial and nationality disputes that do not necessarily require the traditional legalistic decision of the ICJ and at any rate can hardly be solved if one is handed down. Kashmir, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, Gibraltar are some typical examples. The Bakassi Peninsula is clearly another example in the list of the world’s complex territorial and nationality emergencies. The critical problem which none of the influential actors and peacemakers in the Bakassi dispute have seemed to address is the people’s legitimate concern for identity, citizenship and nationality which clearly contradicts the well-established legal case of Cameroonian sovereignty over the territory. The 1913 Anglo-German treaty that ceded Bakassi to German Cameroon, though valid in international law, was a blatant act of imperial indiscretion, which given the complex nature of the problem it has perpetuated calls for an extra-legal remedy. Similarly, the post-colonial agreements between Nigeria and Cameroon, which reinforced the dubious colonial 246

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transaction, despite also being valid in law, are to say the least, an act of naivety on the part of the leaders of the two countries. Even though both states are blighted by devastating domestic frictions, Cameroon seems indeed more politically disadvantaged than Nigeria with regard to acquiring (or in the case of Nigeria, losing) the Bakassi Peninsula. It does not seem that beyond obsession with the prospects of earning additional oil revenues, the Cameroonian authorities appreciate the strong aversion of the Bakassi people to Cameroonisation, the uphill nature of the project, as well as the real strategic danger and threats it presents. In his submission to the ICJ, Akinjide (2002) succinctly framed the threats in the following puzzle: “why should Cameroon want a large group of Nigerians who feel very strongly about their nationality and ties to Nigeria? It seems to me that Cameroon would only be storing up trouble for herself with the people of Bakassi if she were to succeed in her claims”. Already, there is considerable discord between the Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon, a discord that threatened to tear the country apart in the aftermath of the state-masterminded colossal electoral frauds of 1992 and 1997, culminating in deepening politics of exclusion, resistance and repression, especially in the Anglophone provinces. Under the aegis of such Anglophone civil groups like the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) and the Southern Cameroon People’s Organization (SCAPO), the people of Southern Cameroon have increasingly protested their domination by the Francophone side, as well as the elimination of the federal structure of the country and its replacement with a dictatorial unitary arrangement by President Paul Biya. In 1999, SCNC made a unilateral declaration of independence in which it proclaimed Southern British Cameroon as the Republic of Ambazonia. The case for independence has been taken by the Anglophone separatist movements to the international community, including the UN, albeit without any serious outcome (Konings 2005). These separatist groups have repeatedly expressed their objection to the ICJ’s verdict and Nigeria’s transfer of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, favouring a future transfer of the territory to the Republic of Ambazonia when Southern British Cameroon achieves full sovereignty from the Republic of Cameroon (Mbuh 2004). Meanwhile, Cameroonian authorities have continued to clamp down on the separatist forces without much success. Transferring Bakassi peninsula 247

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to Cameroon would in all probability exacerbate the friction between the Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon, including the separatist campaign championed by sections of the minority Anglophone population in the deeply polarised republic. Even though President Obasanjo of Nigeria has pledged to a withdrawal of his government’s security forces and administrative machinery from Bakassi Peninsula and hand over of the territory to Cameroon in line with the ICJ verdict during the recent New York peace settlement in June 2006, it is significant to note that the two countries are yet to reach any agreement on the demarcation of their maritime boundary and this process will be crucial for deciding control over the vast oil-rich offshore waters. The Nigerian government completed the withdrawal of its troops from the disputed Peninsula in August 2006 and has also commenced the evacuation of its willing nationals from the Bakassi peninsula for resettlement in Akpabuyo Local Government Area of Cross River State (This Day 2006). Thousands of Nigerians stranded and long-persecuted in different parts of Cameroon (not necessarily indigenes of the Bakassi peninsula) have taken advantage of the Nigerian government Bakassi repatriation scheme to migrate to the Bakassi peninsula for soft-landing in Nigeria as Bakassi returnees (UN News Service 2006; This Day 2006). While the repatriation plan is ongoing, the resettlement component of the Nigerian government repatriation scheme is in a state of chaos as government has not yet been able to provide accommodation and compensation for evacuees and the unfulfilled promise is discouraging many potential evacuees from accepting the government voluntary repatriation plan (This Day 2006). It is still too early to ascertain how many actual indigenes of the disputed peninsula would be prepared for government-assisted repatriation and resettlement in Nigeria. Nigeria’s pull out from the onshore territory does not solve the problem of offshore space and resources, let alone the more explosive question of nationality, citizenship, and ethno-cultural integrity for the people of the peninsula. A more proactive solution to the contradictions of geographical space and historical people in the disputed peninsula is the negotiation of a form of joint sovereignty for the area, outlining the duties, responsibilities and obligations of both state parties, as well as a precise structure for harnessing ecological resources and sharing of accruable revenues. In 2001, Nigeria settled a maritime dispute over offshore waters with the island state of Sao 248

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Tome and Principe by reaching an agreement to jointly exploit the area in question, with Nigeria taking 60 percent of any oil revenues generated and Sao Tome 40 percent (Isaac 2004). This type of flexible arrangement could be explored for Bakassi with the provision that the share of resources to be disposed by state parties should be directly tied to the quantum of developmental obligations and responsibilities they should undertake in the disputed territory. The enormous onshore and offshore oil resources in Bakassi should not be a source of anxiety but an opportunity for development to the local inhabitants. In terms of nationality and citizenship, the joint sovereignty regime should be able to offer to the people dual nationality with limited administrative autonomy under joint governmental commission. References Akinjide, R.A. 2002. ‘Why Bakassi Belongs to Nigeria’. Address presented at the International Court of Justice at the Hague on the Bakassi Case. March. (Online) Available at http://www.dawodu.com/akinjid2.htm. Website Assessed in October 2004. Amazee, V. B. 1990. ‘The ‘Igbo Scare’ in the British Cameroon’s: 1945-61’. Journal of African History: 31: 281-293. Asobie, A.2003. ‘Conflict Between Nigeria and Bakassi: Political Context and Contending Principles’. Vanguard: June, 6. (Online) Available http://www.vanguardngr.com/article/2002/politics/p206062003.htm l. Daily Champion. 2006. ‘Nigeria: Country to Hand Over Bakassi’. Daily Champion: June, 13. http://www.champion-newspapers.com/. Website accessed on 16 June 2006. Davies, W. 2004. Oil and Gas Investment in Nigeria. London: CWC Group Limited. DTI. 2002. ‘The Maroua Declaration (1 June 1975).’ Delimitation Treaties Infobase, March, 13. (Online) Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILE S/TREATIES/CMR-NGA1975MD.PDF. Website accessed in October 2004.

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Irin. 2004. ‘Cameroon-Nigeria: Nigeria Delays Handing Over Bakassi Peninsula.’ ________13 September. http://www.irinnews.org. Website accessed in October 2004. ISAAC, A. 2004. ‘Cameroon – Nigeria: Entente Cordiale.’ (Online) Available at http://www.postwatchmagazine.com/files/bakassi_petroleum_polit ics.pdf. Website accessed on 20 August 2005. Konings, P. 2005. ‘The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary: Opportunities and Conflicts’. African Affairs: 104/415: 275-301. Konings, P & Nyamjoh, F.B. 2003. Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Lewis, P. 1996. ‘From Prebendalism to Predation: the Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria’. The Journal of Modern African Studies: 34 (1) Mbembe, A.1999. ‘At the Edge of the World: Territoriality and Sovereignty in Africa’. CODESRIA Bulletin: 3-4: 4-16. Mbuh, M. 2004. ‘The Bakassi Peninsula Dispute’. (Online) Available at http://www.postwatchmagazine.com/files/bakassi_notes.pdf. Website accessed on 20 August 2005. Ngoh, V. J. 1996. History of Cameroon Since 1800. Limbe: Presbook Inc. ___________2001. Southern Cameroons, 1922-1961: A Constitutional History. Aldershot: Ashgate. NISC. 2002. ‘Nigeria’s Reaction to the Judgement of the International Court of Justice at the Hague’. Nigeria Information Service Centre (NISC). November, 7. (Online) Available at http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/110802_1.shtml. Website accessed in October 2004. NM. 2002. ‘Encyclopaedia: Bakassi Peninsula’. Nation Master. (Online) Available at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Bakassi-Peninsula. Ofege, N A. N. 2004. ‘Oil Politics around the Bakassi Peninsula.’ (Online) Available at http://www.postwatchmagazine.com/files/bakassi_petroleum_polit ics.pdf. Website accessed on 20 August 2005.

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Okoli, E. F. 1980. Institutional Structure and Conflict in Nigeria. Lanhan: University Press of America Inc. Omeje, K.1994. ‘Nigeria/Cameroon Border Disputes: Who owns the Bakassi? Peninsula?’ Newsletter of the International Civilian Peacekeeping and Peace building Programme, publication of the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Fall: 7-11. ____________2004. ‘The Smouldering Conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula: Is Sustainable Peace in Sight?’ African Renaissance: 1 (3): 5866. This Day. 2006. ‘Nigeria: Bakassi - FG Evacuates Stranded Nigerians’. This Day: August. 24. (Online) Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200608240080.html. Website accessed on 26 August 2006. UN News Service. 2006. ‘Nigeria: Nigeria Withdraws Troops from Border Area With Cameroon as Part of UN-Sponsored Pact’. UN News Service: August, 11. (Online) Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200608120001.html. Website accessed on 26 August 2006. Vanguard. 2006. ‘Nigeria: Bakassi Residents Grieve Over Handover’. Vanguard: June, 13. (Online) Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200606140053.html. Website accessed on 16 June 2006.

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CHAPTER 15

THE MOODS OF A BITTER NATION: UNDERSTANDING ZIMBABWE’S POLITICS (1980-2005) Norman MLAMBO Introduction Since the year 2000, Zimbabwe has been facing enormous problems of a political, economic and social nature, which collectively constitute what has been called the ‘Zimbabwean crisis’. The major issues include governance, economic meltdown, a disputed land reform process, drought and hunger, the HIV and AIDS pandemic, an exodus of professionals and a determination for regime change by some superpowers. There are those who work tirelessly to try and resolve some of Zimbabwe’s problems, however, there are also others who work hard to accentuate the crisis in order to gain political mileage. There is no general consensus as to what exactly constitutes the Zimbabwean crisis, how it started and how to resolve it. Each stakeholder emphasizes the explanation which would further their own interests at any given time. Most of those who get involved pull in different directions; there is no common purpose even in the international community and no common national agenda internally. It seems that the main reason for this lack of common purpose is the acute polarization of Zimbabwean politics that perpetuates moods of bitterness among Zimbabweans, and by extension, lack of agreement by the international community on how to handle the Zimbabwean crisis. Political Violence during the Struggle A major cause of bitterness among Zimbabweans is the history of violence associated with political processes. Political violence in Zimbabwe is historically rooted in the brutality of the struggle for liberation (Martin and Johnson 1981). After independence in 1980, there was no social or legal process to deal with the trauma suffered during the struggle, and therefore the bitterness and mutual suspicions 252

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continued. There was no process to deal with the perpetrators and the victims of the many petrol bombs that maimed hundreds of people in the townships in the 1960s and 1970s. No one dealt with the massacre of peasants in the rural areas by surrogate armies such as Pfumo Revanhu at the end of the 1970s. No one was called to account for the thousands of people who lost limbs from landmines laid by both the guerrillas and the Rhodesian Security Forces, some of which are still killing people up to today (Rupiya 1998). In the optimism (Mlambo 2003) of a new democratic dispensation, there was no accounting for the thousands of school children who perished on their way to join liberation movements in neighbouring countries. Many of these children were killed by Ian Smith’s security forces as they attempted to cross the border. No one was questioned on the massacres of refugees by the Smith regime at refugee camps in Mozambique and in Zambia (Illif 2004). The struggle for liberation was bitter and radical; horrible things happened during that time, but there was no social process to deal with it after independence. Both Zimbabweans and the international community were in a hurry to declare the success of democracy over minority white rule, and did not stop to deal effectively with the past. However, the ugly past continued to affect the new Zimbabwe. There was no war crimes tribunal, no prosecutions for human rights violations, no truth and reconciliation process and no adequate compensation for victims on both sides of the struggle. The Matabeleland crisis and other political problems in the 1980s and 1990s After independence, the most disturbing acts of political violence were witnessed during the Matabeleland crisis in 1980 to 1987 (Legal Resource Foundation and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 1997). That conflict had ethnic roots in the sense that the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), to which the dissident elements claimed allegiance, was a party based in Matabeleland and the Midlands, dominated by Ndebele speaking Zimbabweans. So that, when government forces; mostly Shona speaking, cracked down on the dissidents, they were perceived to have used excessive force. Dissident activity included the kidnapping and murder of tourists, the burning down of churches and the murder of priests, and general terrorism. 253

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And yet, the governmentʹs resolve to stop those dissident activities was internationally interpreted as an attempt to silence political opposition and to exterminate the Ndebele speaking people. That interpretation alone had its own destabilizing effects which increased the bitterness of the Ndebele section of the population and fuelled political polarization between the Shona and Ndebele. The situation was temporarily ameliorated by a 1987 Unity Accord between the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front ZANU (PF) and (PF) ZAPU which, although it stopped the physical violence, did not remove the mutual ethnic suspicions. These suspicions still exist today and some individuals, groups and organizations are still working hard to reopen those painful political wounds. Also, in the 1980s the late veteran politician, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and his ZANU (Ndonga) party were associated with dissident groups operating in Chipinge South. Sithole founded the ruling party, ZANU, when he broke away from ZAPU in 1963. Yet, when he led another breakaway from that party in 1978, he was denounced as a traitor. In the 1990s, his party was also accused of plotting to assassinate President Mugabe. Sithole died in the year 2000 whilst awaiting sentence, and, even though every Zimbabwean recognizes that he started the armed phase of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, Sithole’s remains were not buried at Hero’s Acre which is the country’s ultimate symbol of honour for those who played a major role in the struggle. In other parts of the country, political violence has been experienced at almost all election campaign periods. This has involved youths mainly from ZANU (PF) clashing with other youths from opposition political parties. In some of these clashes, there has been loss of lives, injuries and destruction of property. In the 1990 election campaign, there were gun battles in the city of Gweru where an opposition candidate, Patrick Kombayi, was gunned down by state security agents. However, the most violent election period was the run up to the June 2000 Parliamentary elections. The violence was linked to the land question and to the draft constitution which was rejected in the referendum of February 2000. During the campaign leading to the June 2000 elections, more than 30 people are reported to have died, many were injured and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed (Mafundikwa 2000).

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The Military Factor At one time, a frightening scenario was the possibility of what the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) might do if there was widespread political violence caused either by opposition sponsored mass action or by a war veteran sponsored civil war. The assumption in opposition circles has been that the ZDF are a professional force and they will support any new president who comes to power. On the other hand, because the current joint Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (CDF), General Constantine Chiwenga, the Commander of the Army, General Philip Sibanda, the Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Perence Shiri, the Commander of Prison Services, Brigadier Zimonte and the Police Commissioner, Augustine Chihuri are themselves liberation war veterans, the War Veterans Association have reason to believe that the security forces will be on their side in case of an uprising. This is more so in the light of the declarations by the retired joint Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General Vitalis Zvinavashe who is also a liberation war veteran, that the defence force will not salute anyone who seeks to compromise Zimbabwe’s independence (Quintana 2002), and that the job of president of the country is a straight jacket into which aspiring politicians have to fit. However, in Africa, defence forces are known to harbour political ambitions of their own. There have been military coups and counter coups in many African countries. In many cases these were triggered by situations where civilians had failed to resolve the countryʹs problems or where political parties had become so polarised that there was no hope of a civilian negotiated political settlement. In Zimbabwe, there is no need to put the defence forces to the test with the hope that they will side with one political party or the other. The security forces might not side with any political party and they might decide to create a military government. Of course there will be protests and sanctions by the international community and civil society. But some military regimes are known to have withstood such international and local pressures. Also, if such a military regime strikes a deal with any superpower as the Pakistani military government under General Musharaf did with the United States of America, then that would really put Zimbabweʹs democratic experiment in cold storage. Therefore, when some people deliberately provoke the armed forces as seen in

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some sections of the media, people have to think of the possible unwarranted consequences of involving the military in politics. Reports of alleged coup plots to remove President Robert Mugabe date back to 2001 (Talbot and Slaughter 2001). It appears as if the MDC bought into the idea during the 2002 Presidential elections when Morgan Tsvangirai called on Mugabe to go peacefully or else be removed by force. This advocacy for violence culminated in the unsuccessful June 2003 mass uprising which the MDC dubbed “the final push” on Mugabe (Irinnews 5 June 2003). These efforts coincided with warnings of a “democratic revolution” made by a shadowy military group based in the United Kingdom (Zimbabwe Freedom Movement 13 Nov. 2003). However, even as the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, felt unfairly persecuted by the British media for shaking Mugabe’s hand in public (This Day 29 Sept. 2004), the British government has, at least in public, repeatedly rejected calls for military intervention in Zimbabwe (Phiri 2004). Looking at recent developments in the region and on the continent, SADC and the African Union are not likely to support the violent overthrow even of a controversial leader such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. Whilst democratic forces the world over including in Africa, are calling for an end to dictatorships, the same forces are also calling for an end to the violent overthrow of governments (Walker 2004). A military coup in Zimbabwe is likely to be extremely devastating to the SADC region. Political Parties As evidenced by the number of political parties that have taken part in elections since 1980, Zimbabwe is both de jure and de facto not a one party state. Zimbabwean politics is however dominated by a monolithic ruling party, ZANU (PF). This party is first and foremost a liberation movement. Secondly, it is a coalition between the original ZANU (PF) led by Robert Mugabe and (PF) ZAPU led by the late Joshua Nkomo. This coalition was achieved in 1987 after a Unity Accord that ended the Matabeleland uprising. The Unity Accord has been hailed as the unifying force between the Shona and the Ndebele people. However, that unity has also been criticized for disbanding (PF) ZAPU which, activists say was swallowed up by Mugabe’s ZANU (PF). As a result, there have been a number of attempts to resuscitate 256

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the old (PF) ZAPU and to continue to sustain a Matabeleland based political party with the name ZAPU (Siziba 1999). When ZANU (PF) half-heartedly attempted to create a one party state in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, it failed. It tried to practice socialism in the country; that also failed. It lost the support of the urban voters in the 2000 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential elections, but still enjoys the support of the rural voters (News 24.com 01 April 2005). In the March 2005 general elections and in more recent elections, some urban constituencies have started supporting ZANU (PF) again. But, the party has in the past been accused of using violence and intimidation tactics. Nevertheless, the party continues to enjoy the support of the War Veterans Association and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, even though these have also been accused of intimidating the population. Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is the most successful opposition in Zimbabwean politics so far (Maroleng 2004). In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the MDC gained 57 seats compared with ZANU (PF)’s 62, putting them on what supporters called “an almost 50/50” situation with ZANU (PF). There are not too many opposition parties in Africa, or in other parts of the world for that matter, that can claim such an achievement. The MDC is a party that evolved from the workers movement led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). It is therefore supposed to be a labour based party and as such, most of its supporters are urban based. However, the party aligned itself with white farmers who paid for its election campaign in June 2000. The party also received a lot of funding from the British Government and from international organizations. Because of their funding base, the MDC has been perceived as a Western puppet; a sell-out party. The party did not help its own image when it campaigned for economic and other sanctions against Zimbabwe, which the United States and the European Union acted upon (Mullaly 2004). These sanctions especially on petroleum products have hurt all Zimbabweans badly, and the image that the MDC thrives on the suffering of Zimbabweans is difficult to erase. However, the dynamics in the MDC are surely set to change with the split of the party and the coming onto the political arena of Arthur Mutambara whose following and leadership still have to be tested in future parliamentary and presidential elections.

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Of the smaller parties, the most prominent was the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) of the 1990s (Laakso 2003). The party was led by Edgar Tekere, the former Secretary General of ZANU (PF) who broke ranks with Mugabe when he observed that, ‘democracy in Zimbabwe was in the intensive care unit’. ZUM seriously challenged Mugabe in the presidential elections of 1990, but unfortunately the party did not follow up that momentum and did not seriously campaign in subsequent elections. The other significant small party is the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, (ZUD). This is the party that was led by Margaret Dongo, a former ZANU (PF) member of parliament and a former freedom fighter. In the 1990s, she championed the cause of former freedom fighters who had been neglected by ZANU (PF). But, when she formed ZUD, she did not include other war veterans in her party ranks. As a result, the most prominent war veterans campaigned against her. She also refused to join Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC coalition when it was formed. There are other small parties and independent players that always come up during elections, but these have never really challenged the major political players (The Insider June 1992, July 2003). The NCA and the Constitutional Debate Zimbabwean civil society has for a long time been dominated by Lovemore Madhuku; who claims that his National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) is a coalition of all civil society groups in the country (www.nca.org.zw). Also, Madhuku has received so much money from donors that he has been able to fund the activities of a number of civil society organizations. The NCA itself continues to call for a new constitution before any political change in Zimbabwe. However, this fixation on the constitution has tended to block any other political options. So that, rather than being an asset, Lovemore Madhuku’s influence on Zimbabwean civil society groups is sometimes seen as an obstacle to political dialogue in Zimbabwe. That there is need for a ʺhome grownʺ Zimbabwean constitution is no longer an issue for debate. The fact was generally accepted in the run up to the February 2000 Constitutional Referendum (Sachikonye 2004). Unfortunately, the issue of the new constitution was overtaken by political developments. Instead of using the opportunity, the effort and the momentum for constitutional reform, both ZANU (PF) and the 258

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MDC decided to use the issue to gain political mileage. And, it must be admitted that ironically both parties succeeded in gaining political strength on the basis of the negative results of the 2000 constitutional referendum. The MDC won a record number of opposition seats in parliament in the June 2000 elections (57 MDC, 62 ZANU (PF)) as a result of the momentum created by the campaign for a NO vote. On the other hand, ZANU (PF) regained popularity in the rural constituencies by including a land clause in the proposed constitution and managed to hold on to power. But all that political mileage was gained at the expense of the constitutional reform process that all had agreed was necessary. Religious Groups The most significant contribution by religious groups to the Zimbabwean debate so far is the 2006 publication, The Zimbabwe We Want: Towards a National Vision for Zimbabwe. Although the document has stirred a lot of debate within Zimbabwe, it is still not clear how far its authors are willing to go to engage with the issues raised in the document. Historically, a number of religious groups have involved themselves on the Zimbabwean political scene. However, the religious community has so far failed to reconcile the conflicting parties. One problem is historical. During the liberation war, some church leaders ended up on the side of the minority and racist Smith regime. Such was the fate of the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. So much so that, when religious groups such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace speak about atrocities in Matabeleland, some people label them as yesterday’s sell-outs. And yet, there have been some well meaning religious leaders such as the trio of Patrick Mutume, Trevor Manhanga and Sebastian Bakare who have been trying to bring the MDC and the Zimbabwean Government to dialogue. So far they have not been given the respect that their efforts deserve. The religious atmosphere has been polluted more by people like Archbishop Pius Ncube who speak with such contempt for the government that they leave no room for a church sponsored reconciliation process. Instead, Ncube has called for a violent uprising (Ecumenical News International 28 March 2005) and has even prayed to God for Mugabe’s death. In August 2005, the Anglican Church even 259

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decided to put its Harare Bishop Nolbert Kunonga on trial, to answer political charges based on allegations by political activists aligned to the MDC. Fortunately the Church appointed Malawian judge, James Kalaile, refused to hear the case (Zvayi 29 August 2005). Another mistake by the church has been the call for sanctions against Zimbabwe, a call led by Roman Catholic bishops (Zim Online 14 August 2004). This has reduced the availability of food, medicines and petroleum products, starving the Zimbabwean masses in the process. In Africa, hunger seldom triggers democratic uprisings. Often, hunger drives Africans back to the land (Lee and Colvard 2003) where they can practice survival of the fittest tactics. No wonder why a 2004 international political survey (AfroBarometer 18 August 2004) found that 60 percent of Zimbabweans had lost interest in political change between 1999 and 2004; they were too busy trying to survive under sanctions. The Roman Catholic bishops certainly got the sanctions issue on Zimbabwe wrong and this disqualifies them from playing the role of peace broker. In any case, the majority of Zimbabwean Christians are not Catholics; most follow the emerging Pentecostal churches such as the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA), Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM), Johanne Masowe, Guta ra Jehovha (GRJ), Zion City Church (ZCC), and the United Church of Christ (UCC). There are also a lot of Methodist and Anglican Church followers, and very few of them are in favour of sanctions against Zimbabwe (Media 24 Africa Service 23 Jan. 2004). The Media as Weapons of Mass Deception The media is not simply observing and recording events as they unfold in Zimbabwe; the media is a player in the Zimbabwean crisis (Media Monitoring Project 2000). The state controlled media has done all it can to rubbish the opposition, the international community and all dissenting voices. On the other hand, the private media and sections of the international media including the South African media have laboured to present Mugabe as the devil incarnate. The situation is so bad that on any significant event that happens in Zimbabwe, one can closely forecast what the main news providers would say. Added to that is the alleged harassment and torture of journalists by state security agents in Zimbabwe and the fabrication of stories by the 260

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private and international media. It is clear that the media has become the psychological warfare department of the Zimbabwean crisis. The media in Zimbabwe is polarized and divided along the same political fault lines that separate Zimbabwean society. Every media organization in Zimbabwe is either pro Mugabe or anti Mugabe. There is no neutral ground despite the many pretensions by some that they are independent, and this includes regional and international media organizations especially the South African media. Every activity in Zimbabwe is interpreted by the “independent” media as a Mugabe activity, as if the 12 million ordinary men, women children and the aged of Zimbabwe have no individual existence of their own. To most Zimbabweans however, what has been going on since the year 2000 is not simply the manipulation of a people by an aged dictator, Robert Mugabe. The Zimbabwean crisis depicts the bitter moods of a nation, and these moods are fuelled by acute political polarization. All media organizations have a duty to report both sides of the political divide as accurately and as objectively as possible without becoming weapons of mass deception. And yet, in Zimbabwe, the government controlled media reports only the good things about ZANU (PF), and only the ugly side of the MDC. On the other hand, the independent media presents a Zimbabwe in which everything including rivers, mountains, trees, and animals all live and die for Robert Mugabe. So much so that, even the Zimbabwean side of the Victoria Falls is now being excluded from South African media presentations of regional attractions, and yet the Zimbabwean side of the Victoria Falls is still as beautiful as it was when David Livingston claimed to have “discovered” it centuries ago. And, there are many such beautiful places and people in Zimbabwe which have nothing to do with Robert Mugabe. But, in the eyes of the “independent” media, these do not exist anymore. Even Zimbabwean art has been reduced to pro Mugabe or anti Mugabe art. When Thomas Mapfumo, the veteran musician produced his politically charged “Mamvemve” song (which means a nation in tatters), which sent Mapfumo into self imposed exile, and Last Chiangwa (Tambaoga) responded with equally politically charged “Blair Toilet” lyrics, the media pressurized another music guru, Oliver Mtukudzi to declare that his song “Kuchembera” (which means old age), was an anti Mugabe song even though the musician explained that the song was about any and all the aged people in Zimbabwe (Eyre 12 July 2005). 261

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Zimbabweans and the world at large are not being told the true Zimbabwean story by both the local and the so called independent international media. The true Zimbabwean story lies somewhere between the torture of journalists Mark Chavhunduka and Ray Choto (Brinkley 2002) and Basildon Peta’s fictitious murder victims (Peta 24 April 2002), between the international agencies predictions of pending famine and mass starvation and the Zimbabwe government’s forecast of future bumper harvests, between the “horrors” of Operation Murambatsvina and the hopes of Operation Garikai (Tibaijuka 2005), between Mugabe begging for a loan on his knees (De-genarationx.net 24 July 2005) and the International Monetary Fund nudging the South African government to offer Mugabe an unsolicited loan, and then subsequently blocking actual payment of the same (Independent online 26 August 2005). The International Community The Zimbabwean crisis has affected and has been influenced by a number of regional and international countries and organizations to such an extent that the crisis has ceased to be a domestic issue. Zimbabwe has become an international and multilateral issue. For example, one of the reasons advanced by Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC for not accepting the results of the 2000 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential elections was that the international community did not pronounce those elections as having been free and fair. Recently, Zimbabwean sport, especially cricket has been under pressure (Cricinfo 21 August 2005) mainly because of the campaign to have Zimbabwe banned from playing test cricket, a campaign championed by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The cricket crisis has also been aggravated by allegations of racism leading to 15 white players holding the Zimbabwe Cricket Union to ransom for a whole year. Even when the International Cricket Council ruled that Zimbabwe would maintain its test cricket status, the international media and regular cricket advertisers ignored the triangular series played in Zimbabwe in August 2005 between New Zealand, India and Zimbabwe (Pak Tribune 29 August 2005). The thorny issue of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth (The Age 14 Dec. 2003) is already an international issue which threatened to split the Commonwealth on racial lines. The 262

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major cause of the Zimbabwean crisis, land reform, already involves the British government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Commonwealth and the African Union. The country’s economic crisis has been aggravated by economic sanctions by the European Union (EU), the US, the rest of the donor community, the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, the international community, rather than being simple observers, are actual players, who have even initiated moves that have impacted on the Zimbabwean situation, in most cases negatively. For example, some Nordic countries like Denmark have already closed their embassies in Zimbabwe and have stopped economic cooperation and aid even to non-governmental organizations. Even international gay organizations took an anti Mugabe stance with Peter Tatchell, a British national, on the front line (BBC News 06 March 2001). The British government has been at the centre of the Zimbabwean land question for over one hundred years, and yet, the former British ambassador to Zimbabwe (Sir Brian Donnelly) was the most outspoken member of the diplomatic community especially on Zimbabwe’s land reform. His statements greatly shaped British, EU, Australian and American policy on Zimbabwe. He was obviously not a neutral player, and yet his voice was very influential not only to the British audience, but to most of the western world. It is also not clear why, at a time when Tony Blair and his Commission for Africa and the G8 were campaigning for debt cancellation for poor African countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) chose precisely that moment to demand that Zimbabwe pay up it’s debt of close to US$300 million, knowing very well that such payment, like the Shakespearian Shylock’s demand for a “pound of flesh”, would most certainly bleed Zimbabwe’s economy to death? Ironically, when Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, managed to pay off that debt, it was the IMF which was left stunned and lost all leverage that the institution thought it had over Robert Mugabe. This galvanized Zimbabwe to pursue a vigorous and fruitful “look east policy” (Irin News 29 July 2005). Elections and Violence Since 2000 The biggest problem in the general elections of June 2000 and the presidential elections of 2002 was political violence. Most of that 263

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violence was a spill-over from the violent land occupations that started after the rejection of a proposed new constitution in February 2000. The war veterans were on the war path, and so were the government sponsored youth brigades, the so called Border Gezi. But, even these did not have a monopoly of violence; white farmers were violently resisting land invasions. For example, in Odzi, near Mutare, a white farmer drove a truck over a black settler, killing him, in full view of other black settlers. He was arrested and sent to prison. The MDC was also on the war path, from its youth wing to members of parliament right up to the leader Morgan Tsvangirai himself. One MDC Member of Parliament, Learnmore Jongwe, was so violent that he stabbed his own wife 28 times with a kitchen knife during that period. The wife died on her way to hospital and Jongwe himself committed suicide while awaiting trial. Later, another MDC member of parliament, Roy Bennet, violently assaulted two cabinet ministers during a bitter debate in parliament and was imprisoned for one year. Between 2000 and 2003, the MDC as a party also thought that they could remove ZANU (PF) from power by force. After loosing the parliamentary elections in June 2000, Morgan Tsvangirai made a public speech to the effect that if Mugabe does not step down peacefully, the MDC would remove him violently. This call was strengthened by European and American references to a Milosevic style mass action to remove Mugabe. Indeed, the MDC mobilised several attempted civil disobedience mass protests in the major cities throughout Zimbabwe, but they were all brutally thwarted by Zimbabwean security forces. The most publicized of these MDC mass action initiatives was held in June 2003 and was dubbed, “the final push.” In the mean time, Morgan Tsvangirai himself was negotiating with a Canadian based former Israeli secret agent to assassinate Robert Mugabe. The plot fell apart when the agent, Ari Ben Menashe, decided to become a double agent and also work for ZANU (PF) to smear Morgan Tsvangirai. This history of violent politics was the reason why some observers say the parliamentary elections of June 2000 and the presidential election of February 2002 were not free and fair. During the run up to the 2002 presidential election, Zimbabwean politics were so polarized that whatever the result of that election, there was not likely to be durable peace in the country. If the opposition MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had won the presidential 264

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election, some people were threatening civil war. This was said by many ZANU (PF) activists and some sections of the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association. Some senior government officials also said that they would rather go back to the bush to wage another guerrilla war if Morgan Tsvangirai sells Zimbabwe back to the British and returns land to the white farmers. The 2005 Elections The most positive aspect of Zimbabwe’s March 2005 parliamentary elections was the fact that there was no political violence at all, unlike in the 2002 presidential elections and the 2000 parliamentary elections. However, human rights groups in Zimbabwe, South Africa and some western countries, led by Amnesty International, decided to ignore that fact and to fan the discourse of violence in Zimbabwe (Amnesty International 2005). After the elections, instead of encouraging a positive way forward, they shifted their focus onto manufactured “evidence” of vote rigging, trying to incite violent protest against the results, even when the leadership of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) said they preferred not to challenge the election results (Timberg 2005). This call for a violent uprising led some MDC youths who were not in touch with reality to start violent protests in Harare the day after the announcement of results, fortunately, they were quickly neutralized by the police (The Herald 04 April 2005). Those who were in Zimbabwe on the day of the elections and who watched the counting of the votes and the public announcement of the results in the three days following the election said that the election was peaceful, credible and reflected the will of the Zimbabwean people. This was said by among others, observers from 14 SADC countries, from the South African parliament and from the African Union. On the issue of equal access to the public broadcaster, the Zimbabwean government opened up the airwaves for campaigns to all political parties and even dismissed the much hated Jonathan Moyo from the Ministry of Information and from ZANU (PF) (Nyago 14 Jan. 2005). Of course, there are those who argue against the SADC pronouncement of a free and fair poll and maintain that the SADC guidelines were not met. This is clearly a case of outsiders who mourn louder than the bereaved. 265

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One contentious issue was that Zimbabwe’s voters roll contained dead people, the so called “ghost voters”. The voters roll was compiled in 2002, based on the national census of that year, and it was subsequently digitalized and updated up to 28 February 2005 (FreeZim Support Group 27 Feb. 2005). Obviously, people continued to die after that date, and they needed to be removed from the voters roll. And, in these days of HIV and AIDS the numbers are many. On the other hand, some people turned 18 years, the legal age of adulthood in Zimbabwe, and became eligible to vote during that period. So that, any registered voter who died, and whose death was not reported to the election authorities, continued to be on the voters roll until the next census, and anybody who turned 18 years during that period who did not register to vote, was therefore not on the voters roll until the next census. But, as South Africa’s Minister of Labour who was tasselled by journalists on this issue explained, “dead people do not vote”. In any case, it is not only people who were going to vote for ZANU (PF) who died, even some potential MDC voters also died during that period but were not removed from the voters roll, and these could also be described as “ghost voters”. Another hot issue was that of the exclusion of expatriate votes. The allegation was that by excluding expatriate votes, close to 3 million voters in the Diaspora were disenfranchised. The explanation by Zimbabwe’s Independent Electoral Commission was that the Zimbabwean system is constituency based, and it would be difficult to distribute millions of votes cast outside the country into their proper constituencies. Also, due to the travel restrictions imposed on some candidates by western governments, it would have been impossible for candidates to campaign in the Diaspora. But, those who could come back home to vote were encouraged to do so. A good number of Zimbabweans especially from the SADC region went to Zimbabwe and voted. South Africa’s television channel (SABC 3) followed some of these expatriates from Johannesburg to some rural areas in Zimbabwe and confirmed that indeed, expatriates were free to and did vote in their constituencies (SABC 3 19 April 2005). However, a number of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora could neither go home to vote nor could they have been able to vote even if the ballot were brought to them. This is because a large number of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora have applied for asylum and some are already holding refugee status and have new identity documents. Some have forged 266

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documents and others have voluntarily changed their citizenship. In the United Kingdom for example, many Zimbabweans are on the run from immigration authorities ever since the British government started deporting failed Zimbabwean asylum seekers. Only the foolish ones would have exposed themselves to deportation by showing up at a Zimbabwean polling station anywhere in the UK. This was demonstrated by the fact that despite the noise about a mock expatriate vote in South Africa and the UK, the numbers that cast the mock vote did not reach even ten thousand in both countries. What happened to the 3 million potential voters who were constantly being mentioned by the media? In any case, who said that all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora would have voted for the MDC? Conclusion To genuine peace lovers, the March 31st 2005 elections in Zimbabwe should have been a ‘dream come true’. Religious organizations who had mobilized numerous prayers for peace in Zimbabwe were jubilant. With the exception of the Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, Pius Ncube, who prayed for Mugabe to die, most Zimbabwean church leaders commended the Zimbabwean population for a peaceful political process (The Christian Post 02 March 2005). Even the traditionally anti-Mugabe Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) hailed the improved political climate in Zimbabwe (The Herald 02 April 2005). Morgan Tsvangirai himself expressed satisfaction that the level of political violence was very much reduced. And yet, the miracle was missed by the loudest international democracy and human rights watchers. Instead of campaigning for peace, Amnesty International and other suspect organizations were busy fomenting regional unrest by organizing endless protests throughout South Africa with the politically ambitious Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (newzimbabwe.com 04 Nov. 2004). The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, welcomed Zimbabwe’s peaceful elections (UN News Service 04 April 2005), and yet, the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice labelled Zimbabwe an outpost of tyranny (The Sydney Morning Herald 19 January 2005), while the British press demonized Jack Straw and Prince Charles for shaking hands with Robert Mugabe (Milno 2005). But, the 267

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same countries and many democracy and human rights activists hailed elections in Afghanistan and in Iraq that took place under military occupation with bombs exploding everywhere (literally) and dozens of people being killed during the voting days. In Iraq, it was argued that even though the elections were not perfect, they were an important step forward. In Zimbabwe on the other hand, observers from South Africa and from SADC were at pains to convince the so-called guardians of international democracy that even though they were not perfect, the Zimbabwean elections were an important step towards peaceful political activity. References Afrobarometer 2004. ‘Media Briefing’ August, 18. www.afrobarometer.org Amnesty International. 2005. ‘An assessment of human rights violations in the run-up to the March 2005 parliamentary elections’. http://www.mdczimbabwe.org/Violence/amnestyreport2005.htm BBC News. 2001. ‘Tatchell defends Mugabe arrest’. March, 6. Brinkely, J. 2002. ‘Zimbabwe and the Politics of Torture’. Special Report No. 92: United Washington DC: States Institute of Peace. Available online at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr92.html Cricinfo. 2005. ‘British Ministers Call on ICC to Ban Zimbabwe’. August, 21. Available online at: http://contestusa.cricinfo.com/england/content/story/216683.html?wrapperty=print De-Generationx.net. 2005. ‘Mugabe begs China’. July, 24. Available online at http://www.de-generationx.net/node/338 Ecumenical News International. 2005. ‘Zimbabwe Catholic Archbishop enrages ruling party with uprising call’. March, 28. Available online at http://www.eni.ch/articles/display.shtml?05-0208 Eyre, B. 2005. ‘Two Different Musical Takes on Politics in Zimbabwe’. July, 12. Available online at, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4750457 FreeZim. 2005. ‘Voters Roll Audit: Preliminary roll – 2005 General Elections’ February, 27. Available at http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/0503222freezim.asp?se ctor=ELEC 268

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Illif, A. R. 2004. Arresting Impunity: Towards a Transitional Justice Paradigm for Zimbabwe. Unpublished, BA Honours Dissertation, Hovard College: March 2004. Independent Online. 2005. ‘SA offered Zimbabwe a loan, Zim minister says’. August, 26. Irin-News. 2005. ‘Zimbabwe: Look East Policy staves off collapse with grants and deals’. July, 29. Available online at http://www.irinews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48359 accessed 26 September 2006. __________2003. ‘Zimbabwe: Focus on the MDC’s final push’. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Irinnews. Johannesburg: June, 5. Available at http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=34558 Laasko, L. ‘Opposition Politics in Independent Zimbabwe’. African Studies Quarterly: Online Journal for African Studies, available at, http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/vi2a6.htm Legal Resource Foundation, Catholic Commission for Justice and Kagoro, B. 2003. ‘The Opposition and Civil Society’. The Insider: July. Lee, M. C. & Colvard, K (Eds), Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Mafundikwa, E. 2000. ‘Churches Call for Inquiry into Zimbabwe’s Pre-election Violence’. Christianity Today Magazine: Available on line at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2000/128/55.0.html Maroleng, C. 2004. Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change: Briefing Notes. Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria. Martin, D & Johnson. P. 1981. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War. London: Faber and Faber. Media24. 2004. ‘Zim churches in ‘conspiracy’. Jan, 23. http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/Features/0,2-1137_1473029,00.html Media Monitoring Project. 2000. Election 2000: The Media War. Harare: MMP. Milino, C. 2005. ‘Charles in new PR disaster for shaking hands with Mugabe’. April, 9. Available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?c_id=2&ObjectID=10119570 Mlambo, A. 2003. ‘The Ambiguities of Independence, Zimbabwe 1980 – 1990’. (In, LEE, Margaret, C & Colvard, K, (Eds), Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa: 57 - 95. 269

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Mullay, L. 2002. The EU and Zimbabwe: Too Little Too Late? European Security Review. Brussels: ISS. NCA. ‘What is the NCA?’ Available at http://www.nca.org.zw News24. 2005. ‘Zimbabwe: Rural votes will clinch it’. News 24.com: April, 01. New Zimbabwe.com. 2004. ‘Amnesty leads Zimbabwe border blockade’. November, 4. Available at http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/protest15.11855.html Nyago, K. 2005. ‘Mugabe Wise to Drop Prof. Moyo’. The Monitor: January, 14. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200501130733.html Park Tribune. 2005. ‘Regular cricket advertisers ignore Zimbabwe series’. August, 29. Peace. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report of the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980 – 1989. Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. Peta, B. 2002. ‘Mother Beheaded in Front of Daughters’. Independent: April, 24. Available online at http://www.africancrisis.org/ZZZ/ZZZ_0547.ASP Phiri, G. 2004. ‘UK rules out military intervention in Zim’. The Zimbabwe Independent: July, 9. Available at http://www.theindependent.co.zw/news/2004/July/Friday9/983.html Quintana, M. 2002. How Loyal is Zimbabwe’s Army? BBC News: January, 10. Available on line at, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/world/africa/1754063.stm Rupiya, M. 1998. Landmines in Zimbabwe: A Deadly Legacy. Harare: SAPES Books. SABC 3. 2005. Special Assignment: April, 19. Sachikonye, L. 2004. ‘Constitutionalism, the Electoral System and Challenges for Governance and Stability in Zimbabwe’. African Journal on Conflict Resolution: 4(2). Talbot, C & Slaughter, B. 2001. ‘Alleged coup plot in Zimbabwe’. World Socialist Website: June, 1. Available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jun2001/zim-j01_prn.shtml Tibaijuka, A K. 2005. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issued in Zimbabwe. July, 18.

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Timberg. C. 2005. ‘Opposition leader won’t fight results of Zimbabwe election.’ The Washington Post: April, 4. Available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin The Age. 2003. ‘Zimbabwe formalizes Commonwealth withdrawal’. December, 14. Available online at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/13/1071125714239/html The Christian Post: 2005. ‘Zimbabwe Church leaders Applause Peaceful Atmosphere’. Available at http://www.christianpost.com/article/africa/351/section/zimbabwe. The Herald. 2005. ‘CCJP hails improved political climate’. April, 2. _________2005. ‘MDC unleashes violence’. April, 4. The Insider. 1992. ‘New parties spring up but pose no threat to ZANU-PF’. The Insider: June The Sydney Morning Herald. 2005. ‘Rice’s new axis: ‘outposts of tyranny’. January, 19. Available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/Global-Terrorism/Outposts-the-newaxis-Rice-fingers-US This Day. 2004. ‘TV cameras capture Straw’s gaffe with Mugabe. This Day: Johannesburg September, 29. UN News Service. 2005. ‘Noting peaceful Zimbabwe poll, Anan calls for constructive dialogue by all parties’. April, 4. Available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=13863 Walker, K. 2004. ‘African states no longer the putsch – over they once were’. Sunday Times: March, 14. Zimbabwe Freedom Movement. 2003. ‘Mugabe warned: Step down or be removed by force’ ZFM website: November, 13. Available at http://www.petertatchell.net/international/zfmlaunch.htm Zimonline.2004. ‘Catholic Bishops: Impose smart sanctions against Zimbabwe’s rulers’. August, 14. http://www.zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=9903 Siziba, N. 1999. ‘Succeeding Father Zimbabwe’. The Zimbabwe Mirror: July, 16. Zvayi, C. 2005. ‘Kunonga: On Trial for His Country’. The Herald: August, 29. Available online at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200508290955.html

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PART III

MIGRATION, THE DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA’S POSITION IN WORLD AFFAIRS

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CHAPTER 16

AFRICA’S DUAL BRAIN DRAIN: SKILLED MIGRATION AND TERMINAL (HIV/AIDS) BRAIN DRAIN Amadu KABA Introduction Africa is confronting a major development problem in the beginning of the twenty-first century, which I refer to as “Africa’s Dual Brain Drain.” The first part of the dual brain drain is the massive migration of Africa’s educated and economic elites to the West or other parts of the world. I call this, “Africa’s Skilled Migration Brain Drain.” The second part of Africa’s dual brain drain is the massive deaths of Africans in countries or parts of the continent where not only high proportions of people can at least read and write, have high school or college diploma, but also have stronger or active economies. I call this, “Africa’s Terminal (HIV/AIDS) Brain Drain.” These two major problems confronting Africa are hindering its active role in global power relations. Africa’s Migration Brain Drain Since the 1990s, hundreds and thousands of educated Africans have emigrated to Western Europe and North America in search of better paying jobs, leaving the continent of an estimated 911 million people (as of July 2006) without the adequate human resources needed for any real chance of economic development. In a speech at the ‘Pan African Conference on the Brain Drain’ in Elsah, Illinois, on October 24, 2003, the renowned Nigerian-born American computer scientist, Philip Emeagwali, claimed that: ‘For ten million African-born emigrants, the world over ʹhomeʹ is synonymous with the United States, Britain or other countries outside of Africa... Ten million Africans now constitute an invisible nation that resides outside Africa.’ Versi argues that an estimated five million African entrepreneurs and professionals are 273

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living in the Diaspora and that 40% of African professionals and higher level managers are residing outside the continent (2003:11). And Khan claims that: Between 1960 and 1975 an estimated 27,000 highly qualified Africans left the continent for the West… This number increased to approximately 40,000 between 1975 and 1984, and then almost doubled by 1987, representing 30% of the highly skilled manpower stock. Africa lost 60,000 professionals (doctors, university lecturers, engineers, etc) between 1985 and 1990… (2003:1).

Sautman goes further to say that: By 2005, 300,000-500,000 including 30,000 doctoral degree holders had left [Africa] and 20,000 more emigrate each year to the U.S. or Europe (2006: 32).

It is further noted that ‘for every 100 [African] professionals sent overseas for training between 1982 and 1997, 35 failed to return’ (Education Today 2006-2007: 5). According to Docquier and Marfouk, in 2000, 31.4% of African immigrants outside their countries had received tertiary education, while the proportion in Africa was only 3.6 percent (Docquier and Marfouk 2004:.22). Carrington (1999) points out that the migration rates to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries of highly educated individuals from Ghana was ’…a dramatic 26 percent; for South Africa, it is more than 8 percent; for Egypt, the Brain drain includes 2.5 percent of such individuals emigrating to the United States and another 5 percent emigrating to other OECD countries (Carrington 1999:169)’. Africa’s Brain Drain to the United States The United States has the largest number of educated Africans who live and work in Western nations. According to the US Census Bureau, as of 2002, there were over 1 million African immigrants residing in the United States (American Community Survey Profile 2002, 2003). In the year 2000, there were 290,400 foreign-born blacks, with at least a bachelor’s degree in the United States (National Science Foundation 2004: 176). As a group, despite their relatively small population, proportionally, the 700,000 African immigrants in the United States as 274

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of March 2000, were not only more highly educated than their compatriots in Africa, but they also had become one of the most highly educated groups within the entire United States, at a time when the people of Africa are at the bottom of the literacy ladder of the world. According to a 2001 US Census Bureau report, 94.9% of these African immigrants aged 25 and over have at least a high school diploma, compared with 87% of the American population. Furthermore, the proportion of the 700,000 Africans in the United States aged 25 and over with at least a bachelor’s degree was 49.3%, substantially higher than the average for the general population of 25.6%, and other foreign born populations in the country such as Asians (44.9%) (Profile of the Foreign-Born 2001: 37). Most government agencies, educational institutions, hospitals and businesses in Africa are understaffed. This has an impact on Africa’s development. Africa’s Terminal (HIV/AIDS) Brain Drain Throughout history, regions and continents of the world have had their share of the massive spread of deadly diseases, which have caused the deaths of millions of people. For example, in the 14th century, the Black Death struck Europe and killed an estimated 50 million people or 60% of the total population (Benedictow 2005: 42). In the 16th century, smallpox killed an estimated 18 million Native Americans in North America alone (Leslie 1989: 1245). In the early 20th century, flu killed tens of millions of people in Asia, the Americas, Australia and Europe (Webster 2001: 1773). It now appears that Africa is experiencing its share of such diseases and epidemics in the 21st century – HIV/AIDS. There is a major difference between many of the diseases killing Africans and HIV/AIDS. While other diseases, such as Malaria, can at least be cured if one can afford the cost of medications, there is still no cure for HIV/AIDS. The death in early January 2005 of the son of former South African President Nelson Mandela, Makgatho (aged 54), was an excellent example of the destructive force of HIV/AIDS. Former President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda also lost both his son and daughter-in-law to AIDS. Had the children of these two former presidents been infected with illnesses such as malaria or tuberculosis, there is a strong possibility that their families and friends would have spent any amount of money to save their lives. The HIV/AIDS figures 275

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in Africa are extremely high. According to a December 2006 study published jointly by the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health Organization (WHO), of the estimated 39.5 million people worldwide living with the disease, subSaharan Africa accounts for 24.7 million (63%). While the HIV adult prevalence rate for the world (for those aged 15 to 49) was 1.0% during 2006, it was 6.0% for sub-Saharan Africa. Of the estimated 2.9 million AIDS deaths worldwide, 2.1 million (72%) were in sub-Saharan Africa (AIDS epidemic update 2006: 2-3). It is worth noting that although Africa is the continent worst hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic; because it is a vast continent, there are significant to substantial variations in the level of infections by regions and by countries. By utilizing the classification of the five regions (Eastern, Western, Middle, Northern and Southern Africa) of Africa by the United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, I compiled 1999 HIV/AIDS data from the 2001 CIA World Fact book. After compiling and calculating the data for all of Africa and the regions, I found that, while the estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rate (for adults age 15 to 49) for all of Africa in 1999 was 8.8%, it was 10.18% for Eastern Africa, 5.40% for Middle Africa, 0.2% for Northern Africa, 3.5% for Western Africa, and 24.82% for Southern Africa. Of the estimated 2,204,200 Africans who died in 1999 of HIV/AIDS, Eastern Africa accounted for 1,219,970 (55%), 463,410 (21%) for Western Africa, 315,100 (14.3%) for Southern Africa, 205,720 (9.3%) for Middle Africa, and no figures were provided for Northern Africa. By 2002, AIDS had killed an estimated 20.4 million people in Africa (Binswanger 2003:152). A study by Asamoah-Odei, Calleja and Boerma (2004) of the HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the five regions of Africa, and that of Gow (2002) also showed similar results. This chapter argues that some countries or regions in Africa with high proportions of people who can read and write, with high numbers of people with high school or college diplomas, and with strong or active economies, are also experiencing the most severe cases of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Compared with other regions of Africa, Southern Africa has higher levels of education and the regionʹs economy is the strongest on the continent. There are significant variations, if one examines literacy rates for the five regions. For example, using the classification of the United Nations Population Division of the regions of Africa, I compiled 1995 literacy rates figures from the 2001 CIA 276

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World Fact book and found significant differences. According to that data, in 1995, 60.48% (69.82% for males and 51.36% for females) of Africans aged 15 and over on the continent could read and write: 76.1% for Southern Africa, 66.5% for Middle Africa, 61.5% for East Africa, 57.6% for North Africa, and 40.7% for West Africa. In 2006, North Africa and East Africa had the two highest rates of average life expectancy at birth, 71.04 years (69.1 years for males and 73.1 years for females) and 52.96 years (51.5 years for males and 54.44 years for females) respectively; 52.84 years (51.1 years for males and 54.61 years for females) for West Africa; 50.72 years (49.6 years for males and 51.87 years for females) for Middle Africa; and a big decline for Southern Africa due to HIV/AIDS, 37.38 years (37.9 years for males and 37 years for females). In 2006, Southern Africa had the highest average death rate in Africa (25.76 deaths per 1,000 people); 14.74 deaths per 1,000 in Middle Africa; 14.24 deaths per 1,000 in West Africa; 13.72 deaths per 1,000 in East Africa; and 5.50 deaths per 1,000 in North Africa (CIA World Fact book 2006). South Africa: Africa’s Strongest Economy in Danger of Losing Hard Earned Economic Gains South Africa is the most technologically, economically and educationally advanced country in Africa. It is also the country in Africa that is investing substantially in other African countries. Stetar (2000) points out that in Africa, South African universities account for about 60% of all Research and Development (R&D) expenditures and about 28% of all R&D scientists and engineers. Furthermore, South African Universities publish approximately 44% more articles in the sciences than their counter-parts in Egypt, which ranked second (p.28). In 2001, an estimated 85.6% of South Africans aged 15 and over could read and write; 23.2 percentage points higher than the average for subSaharan Africa. The combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio in 2000-2001 for South Africa was 78%, 34 percentage points higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 44 percent (UNDP Human Development Report 2003: 239-240). Dorrington et al. (2004) point out that of the 701,000 total deaths in South Africa in 2004, AIDS related death was 311,000 (44.4%).Of the total number of 1,126,000 orphans in 2004, 626,000 (56%) were AIDS orphans. More than 1.2 million people in South Africa have already 277

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died as a result of AIDS and just over 5 million are infected and 500,000 are sick with AIDS. As a result of the high rate of deaths of South Africans, predictions of increasing enrolments in secondary schools and colleges and universities have not happened. For example, there was a prediction that the number of secondary school graduates would increase from 89,000 in 1994 to 130,000 in 1998, but that prediction figure declined from 89,000 in 1994 to 69,000 in 1998. In higher education, in 1995, the total enrolment in universities and technikons was 569,000. By June 1999, it declined to 564,000 (Gilleland and Merisotis 2000: 36). However, by 2003, there were 717,793 students enrolled in higher education institutions in South Africa (UNESCO 2006). Moreover, even with unexpected low enrolments in colleges and universities, South Africa ’has spent $1 billion educating health workers who migrate abroad (Dugger 2004: A-1)’. South African Investments in Africa In terms of trade and economic development, South Africa today is a big investor in Africa. Since 1994, South Africa has become one of the largest investors on the African continent (Singh 2004: 1920). My research shows that although South Africa is not a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), over half of these countries conduct more trade with South Africa than they do among themselves. Swarns (2002) claims that South Africa accounts for 40% Africa’s economy. South Africa is the country that receives the highest amount of foreign investments in Africa. South Africaʹs total export of goods and services in 2002 was estimated at $31.8 billion. Its estimated total import during that same year was $26.6 billion (New York Times Almanac2004: 663). Swarns adds that by the beginning of 2002, South African businesses were running Cameroon’s railroad and were scheduled to run that of Madagascar. South African businesses were managing power plants in Mali and Zambia and brewing local beers in Mozambique and Ghana. South African businesses were providers of cell phone service in Nigeria, Uganda and Cameroon. They also operated banks and supermarkets in Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya (2002: A1). South Africa has contributed substantially to the gradual peace and stability on the continent. As Singh notes: ’the relative peace currently prevailing in conflict-riddled countries, such as Liberia, Burundi, and 278

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the Democratic Republic of Congo, has been attributed, in part, to the presence of about 2,800 South African peacekeepers in these and other African hotspots (2004:1920)’. Singh argues, however, that the high rate of HIV/AIDS in the South African military might disrupt their efforts in contributing to peace and stability on the continent, because the South African government does not send HIV/AIDS positive soldiers for peacekeeping operations. According to Singh, 17-22% of South Africa’s defence force is infected with the HIV/AIDS virus (2004:1920). This affects not only South Africa, but the entire continent. These examples reveal that if the government of South Africa and that countryʹs businesses do not respond quickly to provide treatment for the millions infected with HIV/AIDS and implement educational programmes that will help reduce the HIV prevalence rates, South Africa risks losing most of the gains it has made since 1994. The African continent will also be directly affected since most countries depend significantly on South Africa for trade and investments. However, according to Willan, the South African government and other health and AIDS organizations agreed on a plan to provide treatment for 200,000 infected South Africans by March 2005 (2004:116). The challenge for the South African government and businesses is that they tend to be restricted by international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and credit rating institutions in terms of annual government spending. For example, in the fiscal year 2002/2003, government revenues in South Africa were $22.6 billion, and government expenditures were $24.7 billion. That means that the government ran a deficit of $2.1 billion (New York Times Almanac 2004: 663). The cost of providing treatment for HIV/AIDS patients in South Africa is estimated to rise to 1.7% of the country’s GNP by 2015 (Willan 2004:113). If the government of South Africa was to decide to spend an extra $2 billion annually just on HIV/AIDS, the country would risk losing points on its credit rating, which would result in foreign investors taking out their investments from the country. For example, according to the 2000 UNDP report, South Africaʹs credit rating in 1999 was BB+ (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000). The governmentʹs goal is not to allow that rating to slip and deficit spending would cause such a slip, thus limiting the level of spending on HIV/AIDS. Advocates for developing countries have argued that developed countries such as the US, Germany and France have been running large deficits, but they are not 279

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punished as severely as developing countries by financial institutions. Botswana: A Stable Nation Losing Its Talented People to HIV/AIDS Botswana is a big African nation in terms of geography (with an area of 600,370 sq km, slightly smaller than the state of Texas, USA), with a small population, 1.64 million (July 2006). Botswana is also one of the few countries in Africa that has established a relatively strong economy and an admired political stability (Ramiah and Reich 2005). Transparency International, an organization based in Berlin, Germany, annually ranks a selected number of countries in the world based on their level of corruption. In its 2002 report, 21 African countries were ranked. According to the report, 10 points is a perfect score (highly clean) and 0 is highly corrupt. When I added and divided the scores of the 21 African countries listed in the study, their average score was 3.3, but Botswana ranked 24 (over France, which was ranked 25, with a score of 6.3) and had a score of 6.4; and South Africa and Tunisia each scored 4.8 (Transparency International Corruption: 2002). Yet that peaceful nation is now being devastated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Botswanaʹs HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in 2003 was 37.4% (HIV Prevalence 2004). By the beginning of 2005, an estimated 300,000 people were infected with the HIV virus in Botswana (Ramiah and Reich 2005: 545). Botswana’s life expectancy in 2004 was estimated at 40 years each for males and females (WHO 2006). Botswana and the international community are making serous efforts to deal with its HIV/AIDS epidemic. Ramiah and Reich note that Botswana’s advantage in fighting the AIDS crisis is partly due to its ’relatively well-developed health care system’ and its ’political stability and leadership in HIV/AIDS have attracted multiple donors (2005:546)’. The Merck as well as the Bill and Melinda Gates foundations have each made financial commitments of $50 million. The government of Botswana has also established a five-year partnership called the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) to fight the disease. As of September 2004, 21,431 people were on governmentsponsored treatment in Botswana (Ramia and Reich 2005: 545). It is very important for the international community to join the people of Botswana to defeat this disease, because it is among a limited number of African countries with relatively high numbers of people who can read and write. For example, as of 2001, while 62.4% of people in Africa 280

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aged 15 and over could read and write, it was 78.1% for Botswana. Also, while the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio in 2000-2001 for sub-Saharan Africa was 44%, it was 80% for Botswana (UNDP Human Development Report 2003:239-240). As of 2004, there were 13,221 students enrolled in tertiary education institutions in Botswana (UNESCO 2006). This is a very important development gain that must be preserved. Nigeria: A Talented Nation Threatened by HIV/AIDS Nigeria; Africaʹs most populous nation has produced a substantial number of educated people scattered all across the world. Nigeriaʹs economy is not as strong as that of Botswana and South Africa. However, it is one of the countries that has produced many talented individuals. This is due largely to its size. Karen MacGregor reported on college enrolments in Nigeria in the Guardian (UK) on July 12, 1993: During civilian governments, universities had generally flourished: student numbers increased from 1,256 in 1960/61 to 60,000 in 1980 … the number of universities rose from one at independence in 1960 to 22; publishing outlets flowered, and Nigeria became one of the intellectual powerhouses in Africa (MacGregor 1993).

By 2004, there were 1.3 million people enrolled in tertiary institutions in Nigeria (UNESCO 2006). In 2001, an estimated 65.4% of Nigerians aged 15 and over could read and write. This is a high proportion because of Nigeria’s huge population. This is higher than the 62.4% average for sub-Saharan Africa. The combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio in 2000-2001 for Nigeria was 45%, one percent higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 44 percent (UNDP Human Development Report 2003: 240). Although the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate (5.4% in 2003) in Nigeria is significantly lower than the average for Africa (7.6%) (HIV Prevalence 2004), the large population of the country makes it very important that the spread of the disease be reduced. As of 2001, the estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Nigeria was 3.5 million (New York Times Almanac 2004: 485). Unlike South Africa and Botswana, however, Nigeria does not have the resources to fight HIV/AIDS. For example, the estimated government revenues in Nigeria in 2000 were only $3.4 billion, and the government’s expenditure for that year was only $3.6 billion, extremely 281

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low for a country with such a large population (New York Times Almanac 2004: 633). For comparative purposes, the city government of Washington, D.C, with 572,059 people as of 2000 (The World Almanac 2002:369) had a budget of $4.686 billion in 2000, $1.086 billion more than Nigeriaʹs total expenditures (FY 2001 Proposed Operating Budget 2001:8). Nigeria is not a major exporting nation. Although Nigeria is second only to South Africa in terms of total exports of goods and services; in 2002, total export was $17.3 billion, primarily from crude oil. Import in 2002 was estimated at $13.6 billion (New York Times Almanac2004: 633). These figures are low for a populous nation. Nigerians abroad and the international community need to work with the government to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Kenya: At Risk of Losing a Large Educated Class to HIV/AIDS Kenya, like Nigeria has produced a relatively large number of educated citizens, scattered across Africa, the West and the world. In July 2006, Kenya’s estimated population was 34.7 million. Kenya has managed to produce high numbers of educated citizens because, like the nation of Ghana, there appears to have been an uninterrupted sequence of formal educational attainment. Kenya has not experienced any civil wars since independence. In 2001, 83.3% of Kenyans aged 15 and over could read and write. This was 20.9% higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa. The combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio in 2000-2001 for Kenya was 52%, eight percent higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP Human Development Report 2003: 240). Kenya has at least 100,000 students enrolled in colleges and universities in Kenya and abroad (Siringi 2000). As of 2004, there were 74,402 students enrolled in tertiary education institutions in Kenya (UNESCO 2006). Of the 37,724 African students enrolled in higher education institutions in the US in the 2001/2002 academic year, Kenyan students comprised 7,097 (18.8%) (International Students by Place 2002). David Aduda writes of Kenya’s teachers: In some countries, only a handful of teachers were trained, which had a significant impact on the quality of teaching and learning process. In Guinea Bissau, for instance, only 28 per cent of the teachers were trained. In about 13 other countries, at least 20 per cent of the teachers were

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untrained. ... For Kenya, though, the situation is clearly different since the bulk of teachers are trained. In fact, the country now has a surplus of trained teachers, which under clear arrangement, could take up appointments outside the borders (Aduda 2002).

Kenya risks losing this achievement due to high levels of HIV/AIDS infections. According to Hanefeld, Kenya has HIV infection rate of 14% of the population (2002:89). Wax (2003) adds that Kenya, a nation of 31 million, ’has yet to find an effective strategy for preventing the [HIV/AIDS] disease or for treating those who contract it. And AIDS continues to kill entire villages, to wipe out generations (Wax 2003: A01)’. Kenya has one of the largest numbers (1.2 million) AIDS orphans in Africa (A fresh wind 2003). The Daily Nation (Kenya), reported in 2000 that an estimated 100 members of the University of Nairobi fraternity die of AIDS each year, including teaching and non-teaching staff, and that 15% of the estimated 100,000 college students in Kenya and foreign colleges and universities could die before starting their jobs unless sexual trends are reversed (Siringi 2000). Zimbabwe: A Once Promising Nation; now Seriously Impacted by HIV/AIDS Although the United Nations Population Divisionʹs classification of the regions of Africa placed Zimbabwe in East Africa, Zimbabwe with a population of 12.2 million people shares land border with Botswana and South Africa. Like South Africa and Botswana, Zimbabwe has been severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Zimbabwe in 2003 was estimated at 24.6 percent (HIV Prevalence 2004). In 2001, it was estimated that 2.3 million people were living with HIV/AIDS. The disease killed about 200,000 people in that country in 2001 (New York Times Almanac2004:485) and left 780,000 children orphaned (Wilson 2003:157). As of 2004, the life expectancy in Zimbabwe was 37 years for males and 34 years for females (WHO 2006). The concern now is that Zimbabwe is one of the countries in Africa where citizens have a relatively high level of education. For example, as of 2001, 89.3% of Zimbabweans aged 15 and over could read and write, 26.9% higher than the average in sub-Saharan Africa. The combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio in 2000-2001 for Zimbabwe was 59%, 15% higher than the average for sub-Saharan 283

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Africa (UNDP Human Development Report 2003:.240). As of 2003, there were 55,689 students enrolled in higher education institutions in Zimbabwe (UNESCO 2006). For a long time, Zimbabwe was one of the most economically successful countries in Africa. Indeed, in the mid-1990s Zimbabwe was regarded as ʹan advanced developing country.ʹ Compared to other African nations, Zimbabweʹs economy was productive and growing. However, since the late 1990s, there has been continuous economic and political instability that has seriously damaged the economy and Zimbabweʹs standing in the international community. Since 1999, Zimbabweʹs GDP has declined by 25 percent. Even with its declining economy, as of 2002, Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP was estimated at $2,400, higher than the average of African nations (New York Times Almanac2004: 696). Unlike Botswana and South Africa, Zimbabwe is experiencing major problems in dealing with its HIV/AIDS crisis. This is due in part to the numerous economic and other sanctions imposed on the country by the United States government and the European Union. Zimbabwe needs help from political leaders and the international community in order to reduce the impact of the HIV/AIDS. Conclusion Examples above show that Africa is experiencing a dual brain drain in the beginning of the 21st century. One could at least argue that the migration brain drain might be temporary and examples show that those abroad tend to send remittances home to their families and friends. An increasing number of educated Africans abroad tend to return home to retire, start up new businesses or participate in politics once there is real economic, social and political stability. The terminal brain drain, on the other hand, takes the lives of Africans forever, after so much scarce resources have been spent to educate them. The dual brain drain, therefore, is sapping away most of the development gains in the continent. References Aduda, D. 2002. ’Declining enrolment causes alarm.’ Daily Nation (Kenya): April 15. Monday, Retrieved on April 15, 2002 from 284

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http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/Supplements/bb/2204 2002/story4.htm AIDS Epidemic Update. 2006. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) World Health Organization (WHO). American Community Survey Profile. 2002- 2003. United States Census Bureau. Retrieved on April 21, 2004 from http://www.census.gov/acs/www/products/Profiles/Single/2002/ACS/T abular/010/01000U. Asamoah, O, Emil, C, Jesus, M.G & Boerma, J.T. 2004. ‘HIV prevalence and trends in sub-Saharan Africa: no decline and larger sub regional differences’. The Lancet: 364, (9428): 35-40. Benedictow, O.J. 2005. ’The Black Death: The Greatest Catastrophe Ever.’ History Today: 55: (3):42-47. Binswanger, H.P. 2003. ’Willingness to pay for AIDS treatment: myths and realities.’ The Lancet: 362, (9390): 1152-1153 Carrignton, W.J. 1999. ’International migration and the brain drain.’ The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies: 24 (2): 163171. Central Intelligence Agency. 2001. World Fact book. Washington, D.C: Office of Public Affairs. _________________________2006. World Fact book. Washington, D.C: Office of Public Affairs. 2006. Docquier, F & Marfouk, A. 2004. ‘Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers (1990-2000) – Release 1.0.’ Washington, D.C: World Bank. Dorrignton, R, Bradshaw, D., Johnston, L., & Budlender, D. 2004. The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa, National indicators for 2004. Cape Town: Center for Actuarial Research, South African Medical Research Council and Actuarial Society of South Africa. Dugger, C. W. 2004. ’An Exodus of African Nurses Puts Infants and the ill in Peril.’ New York Times: July 12 .FY 2001. Proposed Operating Budget: Overview 2001. Government of the city of Washington, District of Columbia. Retrieved from http://www.dc.gov./mayor/budget_2001/index.shtm. Gilleland, D.S. & Merisotis, J. P. 2000. ‘Funding South African higher education: Steering mechanisms to meet national goals.’ Institute for Higher Education Policy. Washington, D.C. Gow, J. 2002. ‘The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa: Implications for US. policy.’ Health Affairs: 21 (3): 57. 285

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Hanefeld, J. 2002. ‘Patent rights vs. patient rights: intellectual property, pharmaceutical companies and access to treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.’ Feminist Review: 72: 8492. International Studies by Place of Origin. 2002. Institute of International Education. Retrieved on April 23, 2004 from http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=25185. Khan, F. 2003. ‘Population: African Union Courts Africans in the Diaspora.’ Global Information Network. Education Today. 2007 Today, the Newsletter of UNESCO’s Education Sector. ‘From brain drain to brain gain’ No 18: 4-7. Leslie, R. 1989. ‘Disease and Death in the New World.’ Science, 246 (4935):1245-1247. Macgregor, K. 1993. ‘Academic Repression: The Nigerian brain Drain’. The Guardian: July 12. National Science Foundation. 2004. ‘Women, Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering’. Arlington, VA. NSF 04-317. The New York Times. 2004. New York: Penguin Group. Okwemba, A. 2003. ‘Flight of nurses raises concern: Ministry now worried over the brain drain’. Daily Nation (Kenya), June 2. Retrieved on June 4, 2003 from http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/Supplements/horizon /06022003/story3 0120032.htm. Ramiah, I & Reich, M.R. 2005. ’Public-Private Partnerships and Antiretroviral Drugs for HIV/AIDS: Lessons from Botswana.’ Health Affairs: 24 (2):545-551. Sautman, B.V. 2006. ‘Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa.’ Working Paper. Center on China’s Transnational Relations http://www.cctr.ust.hk/ Singh, J.A. 2004. ‘Why AIDS in South Africa threatens stability and economic growth in other parts of Africa.’ The Lancet: 364, (9449):19191920 Siringi, S. 2000. ‘VC says over 100 members die each year.’ Daily Nation (Kenya), September 10. Retrieved on May 1, 2004 from http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/10092000/News25.ht ml. __________2001. ‘Kenya government promises to increase doctor’s salaries to curb brain drain’. The Lancet: 358 (9278): 307. 286

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Stetar, J. 2000. ‘Tensions between globalization and nationalism in higher education: Implications for quality assurance efforts.’ South African Journal of Higher Education: 14 (2): 28. Swarns, R.L. 2002. ‘Awe and Unease as South Africa Stretches Out.’ New York Times. Transparency International. 2002. Index Retrieved on April 24, 2004 from http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/dnld/cpi2002. pressreleas e.en.pdf. UNDP. 2000. Human development report. New York: Oxford University Press. ____________2003. Human development report. New York: Oxford University Press. UNESCO. 2006. ‘Table 15: Enrolments by broad field of education in tertiary education.’ Retrieved on November 21, 2006 from http://stats.uis.unesco.org/TableViewer/tableview.aspx. Versi, A. 2003. ‘Bring home the best and brightest.’ African Business: Issue 286:11. Wax, E. 2003. ‘In another Break with Past, Kenyans See Hope on AIDS.’ Washington Post: May 21. Webster, R.G. 2001. ‘A molecular whodunit’. Science: 293 (5536): 1173-1775. Willan, S. 2004. ‘Briefing: Recent Changes in the South African Government’s HIV/AIDS Policy and its Implementation.’ African Affairs: 103 (410):109-117. Wilson, J.F. 2003. ‘Building African AIDS Care from the Ground up.’ Annals of Internal Medicine: 139 (2): 157-160. The World Almanac and Book of Fact. 2002. New York: World Almanac Education Group. WHO. 2006. The African Regional Health Report. Published by WHO. Retrieved November 2, 2006 from http://www.wo.int./bulletin/africanhealth/en/index.html.

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CHAPTER 17

THE AFRICAN UNION’S DIASPORA STRATEGY: MOBILISING A CONSTITUENCY FOR AFRICA IN THE U.S. Melvin P. FOOTE Introduction At the inaugural African Union (AU) Summit in Maputo in 2002, the AU announced a “historic” decision to formally include Africans living in the Diaspora as the Sixth Region of the AU’s organizational structure. The decision to include the Diaspora is in part, recognition that today perhaps as many Africans as those in the continent reside abroad. The decision also dramatically expands the reach of Africa into the power corridors of Washington, New York, London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo and elsewhere. Over the years Africans in the Diaspora have formed potent networks in cities where they live in North and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, Asia and elsewhere around the globe. Africans in the Diaspora have also begun to wield extraordinary political, cultural and economic power, which if properly cultivated, can leverage technology and improve health conditions while reducing poverty in Africa. Since announcing this decision, a myriad of ideas have flowed from all corners of the world on how best to define the Diaspora and to organize their participation in ways that would support sustainable development and economic progress on the continent. While the goal must be to actively include “all” Africans in the Diaspora in the AU’s global campaign -- even with the availability of today’s advanced information technology – the reality is that the dispersion still, is far too great, and the cultural divide (language and circumstances) far too deep. This suggests that strategies based on geographic regions and on phased and prioritized approaches are the most appropriate for the implementation of a Diaspora inclusion process.

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Mobilizing the Diaspora in the United States: From an economic and political standpoint, the African Diaspora in the United States merits special consideration and prioritization from the AU. With nearly 40 million African-Americans and another three million Africans who have migrated to the US over the past 25 years, blacks in the US constitute the wealthiest, healthiest, best educated and most politically connected group of Africans found anywhere in the world. From the point of their arrival in the United States as slaves, African-Americans have always sought ways of reaching back to Africa. The history extends back hundreds of years and is expressed in the names of some of our most endearing institutions, such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Formed in 1816 in Philadelphia, the AME Church was a direct response to the fact that AfricanAmericans were not allowed to worship with the white members of St. George’s Methodist Church, also in Philadelphia. The identification with Africa was therefore clear. The most famous of the “Back to Africa” movements was led by Marcus Garvey. Born in Jamaica, in 1887, Garvey came to Harlem, New York in 1916. Shortly after his arrival, Garvey established a political and economic movement, embodied in his Universal Negro Improvement Association, that sought to free, unite and uplift all people of African descent worldwide. His plans also focused on collective economic development, which included the establishment of the Black Star Line shipping company. In 1919, W.E.B. Dubois convened the First Pan African Congress in Paris. The Congress was attended by 57 delegates from more than 15 countries. The resolution from this conference demanded international protections and rights with regard to land, capital, labour, education and governance for Africans and people of African descent. These efforts have given way to modern-day efforts by leaders such as the late Dr. Leon H. Sullivan, whose “Sullivan Principles” provided a framework for US business to disinvest in the apartheid government in South Africa. Rev. Sullivan later convened African/African-American Summits which took thousands of African-Americans out to Africa to dialogue and establish links with their counterparts on the continent. Randall Robinson and the catalytic efforts of TransAfrica to end apartheid in South Africa are legendary. Then there is C. Payne Lucas, 289

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the Founder of the African-American relief and development organization Africare, which has now provided more than $800 million dollars in assistance in Africa. The Constituency for Africa, (CFA), a 16-year-old Washington, D.C, based education and advocacy group, has as its core mission the education and mobilization of Americans to care about Africa. CFA is one of many organizations that have an important role to play, and is especially focused on galvanizing the African-American community – the natural constituency – to play a more active and strategic role in formulating US policy towards Africa. In this regard, CFA organizes town hall meetings, African business round-tables and other educational forums in cities and towns around the United States, to raise awareness and improve understanding about the critical issues affecting Africa and her citizens. African-Americans in the US Congress, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), have a particularly important role to play in this process. As elected officials, they have the mandate from the people to help shape and define the US national interest. The CBC has adopted a new theme, “The Voice for Global Understanding,” and is uniquely positioned to seize the role as the leading voice to mobilize support in the United States for Africa, particularly with African-Americans. To be successful, the CBC must effectively communicate and sell a comprehensive and practical agenda for Africa to their US constituencies. This agenda must be in line with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and conducted in full consultation with the African Union and the African Diplomatic Corps in Washington. This road is not without obstacles. These include lack of human and financial resources to support constituency-building efforts and the negative slant on Africa’s problems as reported by the US media. These and other factors have contributed to a sense of hopelessness. And yet the argument must still be made as to why the hopes and dreams of African-Americans are interwoven with the hopes and dreams of Africans and those in the Diaspora. AU Strategy for reaching out to the Constituency for Africa in the US As mentioned earlier, there are four distinct groups of Africans that make up the African Diaspora in the United States. There are African290

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Americans, whose ancestors reached the shores of America in the belly of slave ships beginning in the 1600s. There are also Africans (neodiasporans) who began migrating to the United States in the 1970s, seeking economic opportunities, freedom from oppressive dictatorship and to attend American colleges and universities. These Africans largely arrived here from Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia and other countries around the continent. There are also Africans who came to the United States after World War II, from countries in the Caribbean region like Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti. Many of these Africans came in search of education opportunities and for training in professional schools. A final group of Africans in the United States are the children of Africans from the continent and from the Caribbean. Many of these new generation Africans, either have never been to their parents’ homelands or have spent little time there. They largely identify with the culture and folkways of the United States, although they remain somewhat alienated from the African-American community. Throughout the years, there has been very limited contact between these four groups of Africans in the United States: African-Americans, neo-diasporans, Africans from the Caribbean and next generation Africans. Over decades, the various African groups have become balkanized in many respects and have come to view the others with suspicion and distrust. The groups have developed separately in ways that make them view life in America through very different prisms. Having said this, any effective organizing strategy, will need to take into account the different perspectives of each group, which will require tailored approaches. There is a need for much more serious research and understanding in this area, in order to expand on promising efforts being made to bridge the gaps among Africans of all walks of life in the United States. The effort to unite and promote understanding among the Diaspora in the United States, should on principle be encouraged by the AU, resourced and even expanded on over the course of time. The long-term goal must be “one” Africa constituency in the United States. Since the historic decision in Maputo, approaches made by the AU seem to have focused on organizations, groups and individuals with programmatic capabilities in support of Africa and African issues as the starting point. Unfortunately, none of the groups that have been engaged thus far have any real political constituency base, nor are they 291

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in a position to “make” decisions that would influence US policy towards Africa. US advocacy and constituency-building groups vary greatly in terms of style and substance. To fully understand capabilities and outreach, it would be advisable for the African Union to take some time to conduct some intensive research and do some analysis of these organizations and what they actually do. The complex nature of US politics is also an important factor in understanding the groups that try to exert some level of influence. Some of these groups have demonstrated certain levels of capacity to “influence” policies through their access, advocacy and lobbying – but as non-profit 501 C-3 organizations, none of them are capable of effectively organizing the US Diaspora in support of the AU initiative. One of the major weaknesses of US based education and advocacy groups that advocate for Africa, has always been their over dependence and reliance on funding sources which by and large support a “status-quo” in US-Africa relations. This means that funds for African-American advocacy organizations and groups would be in short supply; reporting requirements would be strict and overbearing; and programme initiatives would be weak and in many cases, severely compromised. Those groups that forgo such funding sources are generally not sustainable, lack credibility or access with policy-makers, and really have little impact beyond stoking the emotions of their few ardent supporters. At the same time, African countries who have used poverty as their rationale for not funding African-American advocacy groups and organizations, have opted to place great sums of money and resources in the hands of white lobbyist, who routinely make claims of “super” connections with the White House and the Congress, and claim “magical” capabilities for changing US policies. One of the highest priorities of the AU in the effort to build a support base in the US and in the Diaspora, must be to correct this distorted policy among the countries of Africa. This policy not only resulted in dismal performances by African countries in the US but also serves to create a barrier for a well-financed mechanism for improving cooperation between Africans and African-Americans. If the truth be said, “none” of the lobby groups which have been the beneficiaries of well financed Africa-US relations, have used any of these funds from African countries to improve ties betweens Africans and African-Americans on any level. 292

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First Phase in Mobilizing the African-American Constituency To build support in the African-American community, the AU should seek initially to build support among genuine AfricanAmerican leaders. African-Americans are organized through a number of institutions, including churches and other faith-based institutions, through civil society institutions such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League; through political organizations like the Congressional Black Caucus, the National Black Caucus of State Legislators and the National Black Mayors Association; through African American sororities and fraternities; through social organizations like the Links, Jack and Jill of America, the National Council of Negro Women, and the Shriners; and through business groups such as the National Black Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Black Market Developers. What are the next steps towards building a constituency for Africa in the United States? I would propose that the African Union, in partnership with the African-American Unity Caucus (AAUC), a Washington, D.C. based network of leaders of Africa-focused organizations and groups, consider inviting 40 to 50 recognized African-American leaders to South Africa for a two-day briefing and strategy session on NEPAD and the African Union’s Diaspora initiative. I propose that President Alpha Konare, the Chairperson of the AU and former South African President, Nelson Mandela, who is well known and respected by the African-American community, extend the invitation jointly. Key African-American media experts would accompany the delegation, as would select NGO leaders, from the African-American Unity Caucus (AAUC) network, to promote cooperation and coordination and the sharing of information. Such a visit would help to launch the African constituencybuilding effort in the United States. While the mission would certainly enlighten African-American leaders about the AU, NEPAD and the effort to build support in the Diaspora, it would also help build synergies among these leaders, who would return to the US with a clear understanding of where we fit in and of what is expected of us. The visit would not go unnoticed among policy-makers in the administration and the Congress, and would clearly spur new thinking on US policy towards Africa. Major press events could be organized in 293

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Washington, New York and in other large cities across the United States, to discuss the mission, the Diaspora initiative and opportunities to move forward. A second stage of phase one could be the organizing of a series of Town Hall Meetings on Africa across the United States, which the CFA could organize in partnership with the African Union in the districts of the Members of the Congressional Black Caucus. CFA has pioneered the Town Hall Meeting process and has organized more than 50 of these events in cities and towns across the United States with great success. These meetings utilize the skills and talents of African ambassadors, experts on trade, HIV/AIDS and African conflicts, who go to cities to dialogue with citizens about these critically important issues. Organizing for the Diaspora can be a major focal point for the New Town Hall Meetings on Africa Series, with participants immediately linked to the AU’s web-site. Town Hall Meetings can also be organized at the annual national meetings of civil society organizations. For example, more than 10,000 people regularly attend the NAACP convention each summer. In 1998 CFA organized a Town Hall Meeting at the NAACP Convention in Atlanta, which featured African ambassadors, administration officials, and NGO leaders. First Phase in Mobilizing the Neo-Diaspora Constituency Neo-diasporans or Africans who were born on the continent or in the Caribbean must be addressed differently from African-Americans. This group, especially Africans recently arriving from the continent, now account for hundreds of millions of dollars, which now flow from the US to Africa in the form of remittances. Neo-diasporans tend also to be highly educated, with thousands having achieved medical, legal and other professional degrees and many others having achieved master’s level or doctoral training. The rise of Barak Obama, an Illinois State Legislator as the winner of the US Senate seat in Illinois could be an inspiration to neo-diasporans. Obama, who has a Kenyan father was the keynote speaker at the Democratic National Convention in Boston in 2004, and was treated like a rock star on his visit to the African continent earlier this year. He is currently running in the 2008 presidential elections, and if elected would be the first Black, African president of any nation outside of Africa.

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One of the challenges in building a base of support with neodiasporans is that continentally born Africans tend to cling to their ethnic and national heritage. On the one hand the strength of the African family continues to provide a nurturing environment for survival in the US. On the other hand, because they are not politically unified, neo-diasporans tend to have very limited impact on the US political processes. Nigerians move with other Nigerians; Ethiopians are interested in Ethiopian affairs and Liberians seek solace and understanding from other Liberians. Rare are there Africans with panAfrican perspectives and Africans who fight for continental progress on a general basis. In many cities African national associations and societies are on the rise: Ghanaian Associations; Ethiopian Associations; Trinidadian Associations, and so on. Hopefully, these groups can become part of a greater African association in support of the AU. There are several steps that the AU could consider in its efforts to mobilize support from the neo-diasporan community in the United States. The AU may consider establishing a counsel of prominent African and Caribbean descendents to provide input and oversee this effort. Counsel members should be drawn from cities and towns across the country, representing the full diversity of the continent and the Caribbean. The AU could also consider organizing regional conferences of neo-diasporans to foster Pan-African unity and to plan and layout organizing strategies. Universities like UCLA in Los Angeles, Columbia University in New York and Florida A & M University in Tallahassee, Florida; all have strong Africa-focused programmes and would likely welcome an invitation to host such meetings. Consolidating the Gains In 1991 the Constituency for Africa approached the Congressional Black Caucus about organizing a series of forums during the CBC’s Annual Legislative Conference, which takes place in September of each year. The Annual Legislative Conference brings together a broad cross-section of African-American leadership to caucus and dialogue on a range of topics concerning the African-American community. Unfortunately, at that time the only opportunity during the CBC to discuss African issues was at the Foreign Affairs Braintrust, which was 295

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poorly promoted and thus poorly attended. CFA agreed to work to build up the audience for the Braintrust, and to help structure the programme. In addition to working on the Foreign Affairs Braintrust, each year CFA began to add workshops, round-tables, receptions and strategy sessions, which were named after the late Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown, who died in a tragic airline plane crash in 1995 in Yugoslavia. The Ronald H. Brown African Affairs Series has now emerged as potent opportunity to dialogue with black leadership on Africa and African Affairs. In 2002 and 2003, Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, former Secretary General of NEPAD Secretariat in South Africa participated in the Ron Brown Series as a vehicle for informing the African American community about the NEPAD initiative. Other speakers over the years have included Kofi Annan, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, actor Danny Glover, former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, former First Lady, Senator Hillary Clinton, basketball star, Dikembe Mutombo, and the late Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Leader, John Garang. In 2002 CFA also fostered the launch of a new organization, the African-American Unity Caucus, as a forum for African-Americans and Africans who lead Africa-focused organizations and groups in Washington, to meet and strategize together. More than 30 organizations are now represented within AAUC and a lot of progress is being made in building a united front. The African Union should give some serious consideration to strategically partnering with the CFA and the AAUC to organize and host the Ron Brown Series each year. Such a partnership could provide a critical opportunity for the AU to bring together the US constituency, to share information, understanding and to dialogue. It can also provide a useful platform where African-Americans and neo-diasporic Africans can come together to learn more about each others perspectives and to strengthen the bridge of common heritage and struggle. Conclusion The African Union is to be applauded on the historic decision to reach out to the African Diaspora as a formal part of the Union’s structure. This decision, if properly implemented, can result in a global constituency of more than one billion people, with similar goals, 296

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dreams and aspirations. Certainly including Africans in the Diaspora into the formal structure of the African Union, is truly an idea whose time has come.

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WHY AFRICA IS NOT ISRAEL IN TODAY’S AFRICANAMERICAN THINKING Rudolph LEWIS Introduction Israel and Africa are today interesting spots for American Jews and African-Americans respectively. While Zionist sentiments by AfricanAmericans toward Africa declined radically in the 1990s, the sentiments have risen, though in a secular form as part of geo-politics, for Israel among American Jews and even among right-wing evangelical Protestants. This shift in African sentiments is welldocumented in African-American history. Historically, the shift toward Africa rose out of despair and hopelessness; and the shift away from Africa occurred as a result of improved standards for AfricanAmericans within the United States. Thus it can be stated categorically that pro-African sentiments were probably stronger during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s when anti-colonial movements in Africa coincided with the civil rights and Black Power struggles in America. Pan-African sentiments, which have their origins in the Americas, flourished during this period. However, post-colonial and post-civil rights realities altered this positive regard for Africa. The problem however with comparing African-Americans’ sentiments for Africa with that of the American Jews for Israel is that analogies are by nature imaginative and they seldom represent practical realities, especially when comparing people and their relationships. American and European Jews are largely the same people with the Israelis even though they differ in language. They are largely middle-class, cosmopolitan, and literate. The ability of American Jews to exert political pressure within the United States with regard to Israel is much more substantial than that of AfricanAmericans with regard to Africa. Moreover, Israel has been at the critical center of geo-politics for over half a century. Israel was not only important in stemming the rolling tide of Communism but was also 298

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important in the efforts of the West to control trade routes in the Middle East and its access to Mid-East oil reserves. In short, Israel is a strategic pawn for Western domination of the Middle East. This scenario has no comparison with regard to Africans and African-Americans though biologically and to a superficial degree culturally similar. Unlike Jews in the Diaspora and Israelis, African peoples and African-Americans do not share a vital religious and racial mythology and a sense of “we the people” with a common past and a common destiny. There is much Western guilt regarding the attempted extermination of the Jewish people that has no parallel in EuroAmerican relationships with African peoples. Moreover, so much has happened to African-Americans between the capture of their African ancestors, the Middle Passage and their created world in the United States. Our histories are varied. Most of all, we suffer from ignorance of each other; of our differences and our assets. In the real world, we are more competitors than comrades for scarce resources. We are both rising from poverty and oppressive environments created by governments of the West. We are still suffering from inadequate education and bad communication systems. For our relationships to develop further, this lack of connecting and stimulating systems for redress of differences and goals must be heightened. Only then will centuries of hurtful myths be undermined and a way forward made for a more intimate cooperative spirit to develop. This process of reconciliation and education must be guided and led by writers, artists, and professionals in both hemispheres rather than heads of states. Historical Background in the Americas We, Africans of the Diaspora, are a people born in the hands of Western oppressors and violators of liberty. We have a dual negative heritage—the Atlantic slave trade as well as the violation of the West’s own marker of humanity, namely, human rights. Ours was a poor bargain. Black people in the Americas have endured racial oppression and terror for three centuries. Black Africans everywhere are still alleged to be materially backward, considered restrained, incapable of right thinking, and lacking the right religion. African-Americans were cut off for centuries from Africa. These African peoples of the West

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underwent extreme de-culturalization, especially in what became the United States. The distinction of tribe and clan were obliterated by slave owners; for in their eyes we were all one, that is, black. But there was also the breeding of slaves for the market; “wives” and women were chosen on the whim of the master. What were peoples of the Yoruba, Akan, Mande, Fulani, Angola, Congo, Madagascar, Senegambia became one people—the American Negro. Though there are some survivals that deeply influence our New World culture, we are a people who know very little about tribes, clans, and their rituals and practices; all of which set us apart from much of African cultural life and yet provide grounds for a mutual understanding and broad cooperation. We, African-Americans, came into conscious existence with the rise of Toussaint L’Ouverture and the nation of Haiti, around the turn of the 19th century. The Haitian Revolution provided a guide and a sense of mission for New World Africans. But there are always severe repercussions even with the most successful of revolutions. The entire West turned against this government of blacks and brought them to heel. Gunboat terrorism has been the response of both France and the United States to Haitian independence for over a century. Although Haitians supported freedom movements throughout the world, they are now among the most despised, impoverished, and brutalized people in the Americas. Haiti has become a whipping post for France and US foreign policies, even to this very hour. Probably the most African of all the peoples in the Americas, African states, many with great wealth, have done little to reach out and support Haitian independence, security, and development, though Haitian professionals have migrated to Africa to assist in its development. Of all the African Heads of State and Government, only President Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa gave special significance to the celebration of Haiti’s 200th anniversary, in his address entitled, ‘African Diaspora in the 21st century.’ South Africa also hosted the Haiti’s ousted president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Obligations of assistance must be mutual if true friendships are to develop fruitfully.

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African-Americans as a Distinct People African-Americans are a relatively new people, belonging to the modern era that is barely two centuries old. Although their cultural consciousness coalesced during the slavery period in the early 1800s; mainly through songs, tales, and speech especially among the Negroes of the South, their national consciousness developed primarily in the twentieth century. This process gained impetus by mass migrations away from the South to other states in order to escape racial oppression. This process was further popularized by such books as Alain Locke’s The New Negro: An Interpretation (1925). In contrast, the unbroken ancient heritages of most African peoples can be traced back thousands of years. These heritages of African peoples were carried over intact into their recently developed nation states and developing nationalisms. The different historical and cultural orientations make for a different sensibility and outlook. Important, though, is the need to respect and understand these different historical moments for both Africans and African-Americans. For over two centuries, we, African-Americans, have sustained a folk spirit, with an African underbelly, that developed primarily in the rural agrarian societies of the southern states, where slave labour generated capital in the production of tobacco, cotton, and sugar, but also in timber and mining. This folk spirit manifests itself in animal tales (Bruh Rabbit and Bruh Fox) or updated ones about Monkey and Buzzard as in the story “Straighten Up and Fly Right,” which can be found in Toni Cade Bambara’s Tales and Stories for Black Folks (132-133). But there are also the human tales, like High John the Conqueror, Shine, and Stagolee (or Stagger Lee). Such stories have found their way into our modern poetry, music, and scholarship (Note, Harvard University Press publishing Cecil Brown’s dissertation as a book, Stagolee Shot Billy, in 2003). This folk spirit manifested itself in song and instrumental music. Though primarily an oral people before the abolition of slavery, we were also a people of the Book. Our Anglo-Christianity then was overwhelmingly Protestant and evangelical in mood and tone. These Christian slaves developed the spirituals, which retell biblical stories in songs as inspirational material for survival in order to endure the cruelty and brutality of everyday life. After the Civil War, in 1871, the Jubilee Singers of Fisk University of Nashville, Tennessee toured the 301

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United States and Europe singing renditions of these Negro slave creations. Some of the songs included such titles as ʺDown By The Riverside,ʺ ʺDe Gospel Train,ʺ ʺWere You There,ʺ ʺRockinʹ Jerusalem,ʺ ʺNobody Knows the Trouble I See,ʺ ʺHeʹs Got the Whole World In His Hands,ʺ ʺIʹm Got A Home In-A Dat Rock.ʺ Europe marvelled and many classical composers, like Anton Dvorak, concluded that these melodies formed the foundation for any original American music. This music gradually developed into what is now called gospel music, which has had a global impact, including South African religious singers. The great Mahalia Jackson, now deceased, is known internationally. The freed Negro of the South developed more secular forms, like blues and ragtime. Jazz music, a much more sophisticated Negro creation, is constantly being reenergized by the blues, which can be found everywhere on all the continents. There is also dance, where we might find a heavy African influence. Most of the popular dances of the twentieth century have their origins among the Negro folk, including the Charleston and the Lindy Hop. Africans and African-Americans, along with their Native American counterparts, were all ushered into the modern era by Christian missionaries. This missionary religion attempted to supplant the beliefs and practices that former slaves had carried over from Africa. Our intellectual history nevertheless began in the missionary schools where we developed our first formal understanding of racial difference and “blackness.” Missionary education taught us quickly that education, did not trump the colour of the skin. Almost all present-day American black colleges and universities began as denominational schools that were established especially for “freedmen” at the conclusion of the Civil War (1865). In these seminary-like schools, we African-Americans in large numbers came in contact for the first time with literary Western culture. We read Latin and Greek and Shakespeare, absorbed all prejudices of the West and kept ourselves updated with their sciences and discoveries. We learnt too well that God organized the world according to a hierarchy of racial types with distinct traits and gifts. This learning was one of those paradoxical discoveries we embraced and embroidered, and it is one under which we are still struggling to free our minds and spirit. But African-American life has for centuries been at crossroads. Our bloodlines are mixed with those of Native Americans and European 302

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peoples, as well as the various ethnic groups of West, Central, and East Africa. Then there are the literary influences. The Hebrew Bible and the New Testament have been particularly great resources for the development of our distinctive racial myths and a sense of “we the people” with a peculiar destiny. There is a leitmotif throughout our thinking that likens us to the Biblical Hebrews in their Egyptian and Roman oppression. Among us, every child born was traditionally, a potential prophet like Moses. Nathaniel Turner was a “Moses.” Harriet Tubman, Booker T. Washington, Marcus M. Garvey and Martin Luther King, Jr. were all a type of Moses in our spiritual myths. Our imaginative lives have been filled by race and the ramifications of racial oppression; rather than by ancient tribal and clan traditions. Among US black intellectuals, the ancient “black empires” of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Ghana have been inspirational because of their past influences on the development of world cultures and civilizations. With these literary discoveries, we were encouraged. These histories provided us with tools for an intellectual battle against the most vicious attacks on our humanity as black people. Coming into prominence in the 1830s and 1840s, minstrelsy and black-face comedy—dehumanizing white entertainment in which black life is parodied and reduced to nonsense—became more or less permanent features of American culture and will, seemingly, continue for some time to have their sting. In a sense we are caught, if not trapped, as Houston Baker suggests in Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance (1987) between the minstrel mask and the African mask (58-69). Emigration & Pan-African Sentiments By the early 19th-century, African Americans had joined missionary and civilizing movements to redeem pagan and Islaminfluenced black Africa. One of our most prominent and intellectual missionaries was the Episcopalian priest Alexander Crummell (18191898), who wanted a black Christian republic in Liberia. We carried with us to Africa, as missionaries, all our cultural contradictions and all the Anglo-American prejudices of class, race, gender and religion. The African was the “Other” that had to be civilized and brought into the modern world. The Western Black thought he could do a much better job than the European and with greater sympathy - for his mission was to redeem Africa and to be a light unto his heathen brothers. 303

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Through emigration movements and schemes from the 1840s onward, African identity became significant to us. Looking for an alternative to Liberia, Martin R. Delany (1812-1885), a Negro abolitionist writer and later an officer in the Union Army, explored the Niger Delta region and reported his findings to the British. The Niger Delta was ripe for cotton production. Africa rather than the Southern United States could be used as a British source for cotton. American slave labour was no longer necessary to satisfy the British textile industry. On the heels of Delany’s scheme to undermine slavery in the Southern States came the American Civil War. Delany became an officer in the Union Army; and, with the abolition of slavery and the attempted reconstruction of the South, Delany abandoned his African emigration scheme. Except for a minor interest in Liberia by persons like Alexander Crummell, African-American interest in Africa waned after the American Civil War. Reconstruction (1865-1875) fully occupied the interest of African-American leaders, like Martin Delany. But the Reconstruction period was a failure and Southern racists reassembled their power and the Negro was disenfranchised. The Ku Klux Klan and mob power rose to dominate political and social life in the South on the withdrawal of federal troops stationed in the South to protect the freed slaves. Again emigration schemes rose once more as a means to escape oppression, this time mob terror and Jim Crow legislation. Some recommended emigration to western states like Kansas. But there were others who again looked to Africa as an escape from oppression. Bishop Henry McNeil Turner (1834-1915), a prominent Bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, participated in the Civil War as chaplain and in Reconstruction as a director of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Georgia. When Reconstruction went sour, Bishop Turner advocated African emigration. He travelled extensively in Africa: Zambezi Country, Transvaal, Pretoria, Rhodesia, Basutoland, Matabele, Watal, Kaffraria, Cape Colony, and West Africa (Life and Times 147). According to M.M. Ponton, Turner ‘heard the voice of his people welcoming him back home, in that Macedonian cry, Come over and help us! (Life and Times 77)’. For Turner, the road was clear for the building of an African civilization, led by the Negroes of the United States. ‘Bishop Turner hungered and thirsted more for political power and civil authority than he did for ecclesiastical control, Ponton concluded (Life and Times 77)’. 304

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Our imperial and religious view of Africa concretized itself most widely in the 1920 Convention in Harlem organized by Marcus M. Garvey (1887-1940), a Jamaican, whom the conventioneers from Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean elected “President of Africa.” In some measure, Garvey’s vision of Africa, though well meaning, was heavily influenced by a fantasized vision of Africa. Garvey’s rhetoric and his distribution of The Negro World, nevertheless, developed broadly for the first time, a black internationalist perspective and a new opportunity for cooperation among Africans everywhere. For African-Americans, W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963), Harvard’s first black PhD (1896) was the scholar and intellectual of the 20th century who displaced the dominance of the Christian missionary spirit in our African concerns. He provided us with “new eyes.” His Berlin training taught him that the German peoples’ folk spirit and culture provided a foundation for classical German art, music, and literature. He saw the impact of African sculpture and Negro “spirituals” on modern European artistic productions. In 1903, he published The Souls of Black Folk, in which he argued that the gifts of America’s black folk had intrinsic worth: our songs, music, art, dance, religion (a species of African mask), if rightfully developed, could alter the destiny of the world. In 1905 Du Bois and others created the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the first mass protest organization that propagandized an appreciation of African folk culture and the defence of African independence against European militarism. As editor of its organ, Crisis, Du Bois wove a masterful fabric of art, literature, and politics that influenced millions. In 1919, Du Bois was the chief organizer of the first Pan-African Congress, also organizing and attending meetings of the Congress in 1921, 1923 and 1927. Throughout the 1930s and afterward, Ethiopia and Liberia remained important in that they provided opportunities for black men in vital roles on the international stage. With its royalty, Ethiopia, more than Liberia, appealed to our preferred romantic view of Africa. While Ethiopia was far away; Liberia was far too close. Capitalized by Southern slaveholders primarily, the black planter colony of Liberia was never popular among the African-American masses or their leaders. Neither was Liberia fully supported by US foreign policies. The thousands of African-Americans who immigrated to Liberia in the 305

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19th century were isolated. They were substantially cut off from their brothers back in the States, their mother country, unlike other planter colonies that had a continuing stream of new blood. In a sense, Liberia was made for tragedy, for its African-American leaders looked “‘backward” rather than sinking down and coalescing with the native populations in an egalitarian spirit. In a way, Liberia’s failure is also an African-American failure in our relationship with Africa and Africans. Liberia’s failure to be inclusive came to a head in the coup of the 1980s that brought Sgt. Samuel Doe to power. After massacring segments of the Americo-Liberian leadership, President Doe was invited to the Ronald Reagan White House. Thereafter Liberia’s peoples suffered over two decades of brutal and devastating civil war, which was led in part by Charles Taylor, who later seized the reigns of government. There is hope that, Liberia, with the first female president in Africa, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, will shape its future along a new national identity and promote investment that will provide sustainable development for all its citizens. In the 1930s, especially after the Italian insurgency led by Mussolini’s racist propaganda, modern Ethiopia and Emperor Haile Selassie were lionized throughout Black America. There was a massive effort in defence of Ethiopia. Organizations were formed, monies were collected, and volunteers were enlisted to fight the fascists. Newspapers like the Pittsburgh Courier sent reporters to cover the war, and one Courier writer, George S. Schuyler (1895-1977), serialized favourable fictional stories, like “Revolt in Ethiopia: A Tale of Black Insurrection Against Italian Imperialism” and “The Ethiopian Murder Mystery: A Story of Love and International Intrigue.” These stories were recently collected and edited by the Garvey scholar Robert A. Hill. African-American masses enthusiastically gave their support in defence of Ethiopian integrity. However with the death of Emperor Selassie, our romantic interest in Ethiopia also waned and died. The Post-Colonial Period Overall, African-Americans’ political romance with Africa and its people declined, radically, after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and after the 100 days of genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The end of white colonial oppression in Africa also ended collaboration across the Atlantic. Instead of news about struggles against white oppression, the 306

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predominant images that began to come out of Africa were very stark realities of internecine warfare. This situation undermined the hope and good feelings that African-Americans had toward Africa when its leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) and Sékou Touré (19221984) were engaged in liberation struggles. There was already a tendency in the Western media to portray modern Africa negatively: for example, Tarzan, the National Geographic and other arguments of cultural, social and political primitivism. But it all became worse, for in these new images, the source of the injury was pictured as not having a Western source but rather from African themselves. For many African-Americans, the massive crises of Black Africa, like that of Haiti, seem insoluble. Most Africans have yet to enjoy the benefits of modern living and modern technology. Free public education for all is still unavailable in Africa, even in oil rich countries. In the post-colonial, post-Mandela era, in addition to genocide in Rwanda, millions are terrorized and starved in Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo and Zimbabwe. The major African images on American TV today are emaciated black babies, piteous refugees, hacked bodies and white bones of mass slaughter. The majority of African-Americans have become rather tepid and timid about Africa and its peoples. They do not see Africans as great and magnanimous people that they imagined them to be. However, despite this downward spiral and the negative racialist programming, many middle-class African-Americans, through their own resources, have developed an expanding cultural sensibility about Africa and a taste for things “African”—art, music, clothes, food, religion, and dance. Such cultural exchanges continue to revitalize African-American culture, which in some ways dominates American popular culture. In academia, African-Americans continue to travel to Africa, to countries like Ghana and Senegal, primarily, but also Nigeria and South Africa. Ghana offers dual citizenship for African-Americans. Ghana is also through its “Joseph Project” developing a tourism market among this class of African-Americans. Overall, however, vital historical, cultural, and economic ties to African nations or corporations like those between American Jews and Israelis remain a dream. Africa is not a second home for most African-Americans, although cults of African Zionists still exist among us in cities like Chicago and New York.

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Present Economic Realities Outside the academy, labour-workplace competition stimulates considerable friction. Most immigrants, including Africans, on arriving tend to adopt the white American view of Black Americans as lazy, ignorant, and violent. They live in different zip codes and go to separate churches. This lack of social contact and intimacy among heavily exploited ethnic groups provides fertile ground for vicious kinds of ignorance. While summer ethnic festivals are helpful, we remain largely unfamiliar and unsympathetic towards each other’s struggles, hopes, and dreams. Capital, manufacturing, and communication technologies are concentrated outside African and African-American societies. The new international competition is fierce and the African masses—both at home and abroad—suffer. Whether it is oil, tin, copper or nickel— needed for the new technologies—those who dig or mine these resources do not profit from their work, while a few African middlemen and western capitalists rake in billions from African labour and natural resources. We of the Americas are no longer isolated, however, by time and space, from Africa and the rest of the world. In this post-colonial, postKing era, our “economic subjectivity” remains bound in EuroAmerican chains of dependency. We are all now caught up in the global network in which a third of the world’s citizens lives on two dollars or less a day. We all live on a planet in which three top billionaires swamp the combined wealth of 600 million people. We both now suffer from great excesses and tensions. Despite these shortcomings, the machinations of global capital, operating through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, restricting investments in needed services for the human development, have shoved Africans and African-Americans into each other’s arms. In conflict with the other’s interests, we are all now in the same un-sea-worthy economic boat of globalism, which provides opportunities for friendship and collaboration as well as perils. In this new market of unskilled work wages steadily decline. This new globalism has thus generated a universal uneasiness among AfricanAmericans. Unlike American Jews, African-Americans are not overwhelmingly middle-class in their standard of living. A third of African-Americans 308

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live in poverty in the richest country in the world. Jobs in auto, steel, textiles and other industries that raised many African-Americans into the middle-class have moved away from American cities like Detroit and Baltimore to Japan and China and other Asian countries, resulting in high under-employment and unemployment rates. The service economy has expanded with low wages and benefits. In Baltimore, Johns Hopkins—its hospital, university and other auxiliaries—have replaced Bethlehem Steel as the city’s largest employer. Too often, capital restricted and focused, dislodges and disperses the masses. African-Americans now find themselves in competition with the poor of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. In general, they feel besieged by immigrants and political refugees from across the globe—Mexico, the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia, as well as Africa. They all undermine stable and increasing wages, not only in urban centres but also in rural areas where low wages are ubiquitous. We are all now suffering from low wages, inadequate health care and nutrition, poor education and technical training. All these events have occurred during a period that has cut funding for urban services. In addition, African-Americans, in the last twenty years, have suffered an increasing criminalization of its population and the loss of the electoral ballot. With the undermining of economic and political security and advancement within the United States, international racial consciousness and sympathy have been exacerbated among the masses. Among the newly rich African-Americans—athletes and other entertainers—more weight is placed on defending their privileges as Americans rather than developing a Pan-African identity. They are consumers of the present rather than investors in an African-American future. Certainly they have little interest in African development. As Du Bois pointed out, ‘oppressed peoples cannot liberate themselves, alone. The masses need a conscientious Talented Tenth or a Talented Fifth’—writers, artists, publishers, and other educated professionals— willing to speak for and make severe sacrifices on behalf of their people. Africans need more vital cooperative relationships and coordinated activities to address the negative impact of international capital and media concerns.

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Conclusion Too often we, African peoples, remain servants and sycophants of Western culture, capital, and political management. We see ourselves mostly through the critical lens of FOX News and the BBC. Words, images, and deeds shape our vision and bring things to life or destroy progress and hope. We who stand apart from the masses must generate better journalists and better propagandists with fresh ideas and approaches on reaching greater numbers of our peoples. There is much work before us in need of urgent attention. Our cultural and political exchanges must be deepened as well as extended. The new communication technologies offer possibilities for a new age of enlightenment in which understanding, cooperation and collaboration can be fostered. We need a cyber technology that is operative in Third World and other oppressed environments lacking electronic and communication services. There are ten million AfricanAmericans online, a situation which provides a unique opportunity for Africans at home and abroad. African intellectuals must develop new mechanisms, fresh perspectives and cooperative outreach platforms that will inform our people about what is going on and how the tide can be turned favourably for Black Progress internationally. References Baker, H. 1987. Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Bambara, T.C. 1971. Tales and Stories for Black Folks. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. Brown, C. 2003. Stagolee Shot Billy. Boston: Harvard University Press Delany, M.R. 1861. Official Report of the Niger River Valley Exploring Party. New York and London. Du Bois, W. E. B. 1903. The Souls of Black Folk. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co. Locke, A. 1925. The New Negro, An Interpretation New York: Albert and Charles Boni. Ponton, M.M. 1917. The Life and Times of Bishop Henry M. Turner. Atlanta: A. B. Caldwell.

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Schuyler, G.S. 1995. Ethiopian Stories. University Press.

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CHAPTER 19

IMMIGRATION AND GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY IN AFRICA Cage BANSEKA Introduction What African countries have lacked during most of their history as independent states are leaders who are unifiers, chiefs in the true sense, who bind wounds, hold everything and everyone together, mobilise and motivate their people, pursue a policy of inclusion rather than exclusion and are seen by one and all to be of the highest integrity and beyond suspicion (Adedeji, 1999:41).

In the 21st century many Africans are choosing to escape from their countries. Questions are also being asked about the capability of African states to practice good governance, manage resources effectively, design appropriate policy frameworks and function efficiently. Can states in Africa exhibit a predictable, open and enlightened policy making process through a professional system and ethos for the public good? In turn, can African masses rely on their governments to provide them with freedom and the right to personal development? These questions sound like another stigmatisation of Africa. But many young people are convinced that development in their countries is not concerned with enhancing their lives and their freedom. These young people want lives that are richer and unfettered, which allow them to be full social beings and to interact with and influence the affairs of their countries. They do not want to spend time fighting for survival. Could their situation be an explanation for the migration to the West? The migration phenomenon is linked to the nature of the state in Africa, in particular, economic, political, social and governance patterns. But is the recent trend of unrelenting emigration from Africa a result of the failure of the states to fulfil the aspirations of the young people, or is it adventurism on the part of those who choose to leave? If 312

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the economic and political realities in their home countries were different, would these young people choose to emigrate? There are many views on this subject. Most compelling, however, is the fact that young people prefer to face the unknown, to brave the life threatening journeys through the high seas and estrangement at their final destination. Hence many commentators have explained their movements as a result of the economic and political malaise of the African continent and their personal ambition. This chapter critically examines the present argument which suggests that weaknesses and failures on the part of states in Africa are an impetus for massive departures. The chapter questions why states allow people to leave for refuge abroad, where they tell odious stories, true or imagined, that further betray and expose African states to international ridicule? It is worth noting that illegal immigration is not peculiar to Africans, but in this case it further strengthens prejudices against the continent. Western countries are also ambivalent about migration, often overwhelmed by the large numbers of illegal immigrants occupying their national space. Western countries are putting in place a common policy aimed at stopping this tide. Bad Governance and emigration Like elsewhere in the world since the beginning of the contemporary state system, it is accepted in Africa as an axiom that the state should provide the predominant, if not exclusive set of rules of the political game that instil a sense of national consciousness and belonging in each society. These rules involve much more than broad constitutional principles; they include the written and unwritten laws, regulations and decrees, providing security, justice and freedom for citizens (Migdal 1988:14). African leaders have rhetorically assumed such roles and have tended to make them vague. In 21st Century Africa, the inability of some state leaders to achieve inclusive governance and integrate their people in decision making is very striking. The social policies that are supposed to mobilise the public into national consciousness and to provide them with a reason to cherish their countries have remained weak. Institutions that link the mass population with political actors are equally weak and in some cases non-existent. Furthermore, states are not linked to the people

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through social formations or ties of loyalty and commitment. The present mass migrations towards the West confirm these weaknesses. The philosophy of statehood in Africa African governments are seeking to maintain the effectiveness of the state and to diminish its fragility by giving more authority to those in power. It cannot be denied that some leaders are responsible for weak economies that lack both capital and human resources. These leaders are also responsible for the widespread poverty, ignorance and disease, as well as for the lack of cohesion among political entities. In order to change the status quo, African leaders have to convert general demands into binding decisions that would ensure output and cement the ground for future support of effective political and economic systems. Equally important is the task of creating national standards that would combine sub-cultures, needs and circumstances. Many years after independence, some Africans are still waiting for their leaders to reshape their societies, eliminate the old parochial fissures and replace them with a nation that prioritises general welfare. Young people are still waiting for their states to steer up the way to unprecedented levels of prosperity and new heights of human development through macro and micro-level social and economic policies. The desire among these people is that states should somehow achieve all the good trappings of a progressive economic, social and political welfare. This is an enormous challenge for political leaders. Political leadership in Africa often starts off on a feverish pitch of optimistic excitement, eloquence about great plans and good leadership. Politicians paint the glories and prosperity of their countries with very attractive colours to cheering audiences, who are made to believe that there is something inherently magical in economic and political advancement. They promise to employ various strategies and techniques to meet the problems that are ahead of them. However, these techniques are often replete with dilemmas that lead to a poor take-off. Such leaders soon realise that they need practical techniques to set the machineries of development moving. They need a systematic and coordinated body of technocrats who would espouse sound ideas and concepts about human development. Some African countries have made substantial progress in this domain, but many more have failed.

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Reality versus Rhetoric African leaders adopt ideologies that show a preoccupation with their particular problems and a similar concern for politically, economically and socially accepted solutions (Damachi 1976:2). Prior to the attainment of political office, leaders imagine they will become formidable presences even in the far reaches of their societies; that they will greatly affect the course of social and economic change, maintain territorial unity and provide new sources for employment. However, it has become clear that a promise is different from performance and that philosophies are easier to enunciate than to put in practice. Their proclamation of good principles has in most cases not become a pledge of good intentions. Many African leaders have found it exceedingly difficult to bring about the intended changes, which now seem beyond the grasp of most of them. The accentuated urge for emigration has exposed the residue of mistrust that is lingering in many countries. Most leaders are failing to espouse a radical change of thought and to use state power as an institution of control and as a tool to solve the problems they face. For the emigrants, and for many more, the state has merely become an institution through which the minority ruling elite oppresses and exploits the masses, and not, as it should be, a forum that seeks to reconcile the conflicting interests of all members of the state, while finding solutions to the problems which they all face as members of one community. Many leaders lack the tenacity to seek much more than the preservation of their personal privileges. Some people are now convinced that many politicians do not have any genuine desire to see their own political systems survive, and do not seek to provide the systems with a capacity for continued and effective performance. Many are also convinced that their states have lost effectiveness and are ultimately degenerating into anarchy, oblivion and defeat, resulting in political violence and protracted social conflicts which end up putting people on the run. At the time of writing this chapter, there was turbulence in Cote D’Ivoire, massive government initiated killings in the Darfur region of the Sudan, turmoil in Somalia, factional fighting in Burundi and Uganda, police harassment of civilians in Ethiopia, and a military stand-off between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In these countries leaders have shown an inability to convert civilian demands into outputs. 315

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Such failures are blamed on the government’s inability to introduce effective relationships between the state, the economy and society. It has become conventional wisdom that politicians and the search for power are at the heart of economic and political underdevelopment. This is the reason why people are escaping to the West, where they presume that politics is at the heart of an effective pursuit of economic development. They believe that politics engenders a shared vision of the future; it builds coalitions of interest, attracts talented people to the public service and encourages them to work for the betterment of the entire nation. They are convinced that politics in the West promotes mediation of conflicts, political stability and economic development. Some African ruling elites also espouse this idea, but unfortunately this often remains at the level of exhortations rather than a genuine realisation. Hence some leaders, backed by the military have been whipping up tribal sentiments, either to divert attention from the major issues or to prevent opposition forces within the pro-democracy movements. Furthermore, many African politicians have become the vanguard of the cult of ostentation. Politicians with any sort of achievement and those with new material possessions are inclined to exhibitionism. Those who have made money through political office have a weakness for conspicuous consumption. They spend money on luxurious goods, often imported. Those who have received higher education indulge in pompous oratory and in the ostentatious display of educational attainments. Both forms of this exhibition of the symbols of power, in the opinion of the exhibitionists are the profits of public office. Education and money, factors that are supposed to aid in development and progress, instead produce a form of ostentation that contributes to the corrosion of trust, leading to the antagonism and psychological molestation of the common man and setting a trend of hatred and envy between the leaders and their people. Returnees from the West also indulge in the same cult of ostentation. They drive fancy cars, spend money recklessly and leave the impression that this money is easy to come by in the West. Their onlookers watch them with admiration and gushing enthusiasm, and at the earliest opportunity will also seek their way to the source of these riches. These people easily become vulnerable to thugs who trade in illegal immigration. They promise their clientele paradise in the West. Some of them sell off their property, load themselves and their families 316

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with debts, but end up in refugee camps in the West where they are treated like sub-humans and subjected to untold psychological and physical duress, before they are finally repatriated. Some Africans who have succeeded to stay legally in Europe have made some impressive personal progress, but the bulk does not always enjoy access to social welfare as they often imagine. They often live in ghettoes, form sub-groups and cultures that are not readily accepted by their hosts. In many countries they are not seen as contributors, but as exploiters of the social welfare system. They are discriminated against on these grounds and on the basis of their colour. Some of them lose the value of associational life, are not fully integrated, become alienated and generally exposed to many odds that they previously would not have imagined. Why the persistence to try? Governance and politics in Africa are more concerned with the questions of how to survive (who gets what, when and how?) than how to manage the affairs of the state in a way that benefits the entire citizenry. The few answers that have been suggested by the politics of the continent are unsatisfactory, especially for those who are at the receiving end of politics, and who eventually develop the feeling that they have no other choice than to move to the West. Authoritarian regimes in most of the countries of the sub-continent are typified by stagnation and social decay, dilapidated infrastructure, run-down housing, poor agricultural production and declining life expectancies. Safe for a few countries, leaders seem to be doing little or nothing to restructure the distorted, dependent and underdeveloped structures of the sub-continent’s social formation. Little is being done to empower people, to strengthen and reconstitute national allegiance to the state, and to challenge the cultural bastardisation to which globalisation is subjecting the continent. Many leaders continue to confuse the establishment of violent structures with the strengthening of the state. They often confuse the harassment of the opposition elements, the asphyxiation of civil society, political thugery and criminal looting of the country’s resources with power. Put simply, bad governance and ideological bareness are precipitating the emigration of those who are still in the position to do so. Some of those who remain behind might be forced into opportunism, decadence, 317

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irresponsible behaviour and frustrations of various sorts. They might become largely unproductive, a situation that constrains development and engenders a vicious cycle. In this sense, a class of the so-called elites, who are running African states, but remain incapable of reversing this trend, are mortgaging the futures of our young people. African students who gain valuable education in Western institutions no longer seek to return to serve their own countries. Upon arrival in the West many embark on the search for naturalisation or other means to stay permanently in their host countries. In many cases they abandon their educational pursuits. Naturalisation for them is already an achievement. It is an assurance of security that their home countries have failed to give them. Through this process Africa’s brains are being drained while our leaders stand by idly and watch. Western countries are attracting talented people and intellectuals from other parts of the world to make up for their aging and less productive populations, and yet these governments are still ambivalent about immigration. They institute official schemes for attracting talents, though in general purporting to be against illegal immigration. Their policies attract talented people who can contribute to their development goals, but discourage those merely seeking to benefit from their opulent economic and social systems. In Europe there is now the search for a common immigration policy in the background of the overwhelming influx of immigrants from Africa and elsewhere. These immigrants leave behind them a continent whose landscape is dotted with unfinished projects, crumbling infrastructure, convoluted bureaucracy, capricious government policies, large scale mismanagement, waste and political adventurism and the manipulation of political power. An accentuating number of funerals accruing from the HIV infection have inspired awe and put many in chagrin. All these have somewhat subverted the possibilities for stability, peace and development, thus making many African states typical examples of blown opportunities, distorted dreams, an illustration of the chaos theory, and typical examples of gangster politics (Akeya 1997:346). The personalities of some African leaders still form intriguing patterns and models for research into the African mentality and idiosyncrasies. These images, though at times distorted, go to form the caricature of the African in the minds of foreigners, who begin to see the entire region as one inhabited by people of low mental

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capacity, incapable of ruling themselves. The list that is written of African leadership woes goes on endlessly. Many feel that some governments in the continent attempt to impose a framework of order with a greater propensity for breakdown than for survival. Many states have become fragile, and in many instances, prove quite unable to tackle the conflicts which arise within or among them. Sometimes the state, as in the Sudan, may break apart beneath the pressure of its own mismanagement and many parts of the country begin to demand or fight for autonomy. In this sense the state is no longer the solution to the problem or the provider of security, but part of the problem itself. The fact that the rulers of these weak and artificial states become aware of the feebleness of the instrument on which they have to rely, makes them more determined to suppress any form of opposition that may stand in their way. It is by this logic that the Sudanese government, for example, has become the primary instrument of violence directed against its own people. Such state violence and failure are vividly illuminated in the number of Sudanese civilians seeking refuge elsewhere or displaced internally. These are mesmerised people for whom their own state has so utterly failed to provide the basic necessities for human existence that they prefer or are forced to leave their own homes for the unknown but almost always wretched existence beyond the frontiers of their own state. In Sub-Saharan Africa, inefficiency and exploitation are less dramatic phenomena than state violence. The extractive role of the state and the degree to which it extorts revenues from the common man in order to provide benefits to a privileged group of government employees or loyalists and clients is very much more evident than its efforts to achieve a better life for all. Unlike in the industrial capitalist states where one of the functions of the government is to divert resources from producers to consumers, and from those with more to those with less, African governments more often than not, do the transfer in the opposite direction. Resources are transferred from those with little political influence to those with more political influence. In this way African leadership makes itself distinct from others through its self-enrichment. It is interesting to note that some leaders in Africa, having destroyed the foundations of their societies, having greatly alienated much of the populace, and having mortgaged the futures of their respective economies have begun singing the same song: ‘increase 319

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foreign aid, cancel our debts, and please do not marginalize us (Akeya 1997:352)’. In spite of the notoriety of this chorus, some of the debts have been forgiven, and foreign aid increased through the network of NGOs, the leaders have done very little to improve their relations with civil society or to create new national orders different from those inherited from the neo-colonial relations of power, production and exchange. They spend hundreds and millions of dollars to convene meetings and to sign economic and political agreements about which hardly anything is heard thereafter. Most leaders have become experts at producing well-worded documents, all designed to give the impression that they are willing to embrace a new commitment to overcome poverty. Most of these documents remain paper tigers, with little or no practical underpinnings. In the continent, inefficiency, exploitation and deprivation are all expressed, not only through neo-patrimonial patterns of social relationships, but most evidently through corruption, which simultaneously benefits those with more political influence, while at the same time distorting the application of any decent or universalistic criteria for governing a state or allocating its resources and benefits. African governments sometimes present the external economy, and especially multinational companies, as exploitative forces to their own domestic economy. These companies, however, often act as the mechanism through which the same governing elites extract a surplus from the economy, and a channel through which they establish clientelist relationships with the external world. Where states are efficient and accountable, the role of such trans-national companies ceases to be a problem; many of them employ locals who otherwise will be tempted to depart to the West. Some Western governments also collaborate with corrupt African regimes as long as this serves their economic or political agenda. Such states close their eyes to massive human rights abuses and gangster politics and concentrate on the exploitation of those resources that sustain their home industries or increase their domestic fortunes. They allow looters of public funds from the developing world to bank illgotten money and to invest in their countries. The proceeds from such transactions foster the development which becomes the envy of some Africans, who eventually seek to emigrate to the West.

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Conclusion There might be some truism in the claim that the recent mass attempts by Africans to emigrate to the West have been induced by the world-wide-web and the television stations that bring images of Western luxury and general opulence even to the remotest parts of the world. However, the underlying causes for emigration are more complex than these simplistic interpretations. It is true that deep-seated social and economic failures underlie some of the problems faced by African states, but it is also accurate to say that these problems themselves are in key respects political ones, for which political solutions must be found before there will be any chance of improving the social and economic structures that can improve livelihoods and keep people at home. A political community’s existence can only be founded on an adequate convergence of the interests of the various groups making up the community and on a sense of common destiny and mutual obligations. Furthermore, heterogeneity in African communities renders a common political life difficult, and one of the greatest errors of some contemporary leaders has been to presume that they can command homogeneity into existence by fiat. Political life, after all, is a matter of communication, that is, administrative communication, exchange of opinions and influences. In the African sub-continent, this essential function is rendered very difficult by cultural and linguistic pluralism, considerable differences in the degree of adaptation to modern culture and widening economic and social standards. The rich ruling elites are increasingly becoming less accountable for what they do. Accountability in this sense would imply the acceptance of universal values of honesty and efficiency and the creation of more effective institutions that would be capable of achieving goals such as economic development, popular legitimacy and better relations between states and civil society. One of the greatest tragedies of contemporary Africa is the fact that many of the states that seemed to be in a position to build effective institutions on the basis of shared and integrative values failed to do so. Mineral rich Democratic Republic of Congo, oil rich Nigeria and fertile Uganda are some of the most striking examples. In these cases, the most evident source of the problem, expressed in the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism has been the refusal of the

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ruling elites to accept the decline of their power and privilege. They have shown readiness to resort to repression to protect themselves. It should equally be noted that civil wars, prolonged strife among communities, western induced state exploitation and military dictatorship have also greatly contributed to negative development in some African countries. People who think that effective political order is not forthcoming end up leaving for places where they feel there is hope for skilful, people-centered and honest governments. Furthermore, standards that some politicians try to set during their electoral campaigns are often too unrealistic. When finally, they come to power, and with the depths of the problems to be solved becoming apparent, it becomes more and more difficult to sustain the image of what they thought would be their political conduct. They end up becoming what Migdal has described as ‘wind-up toys lumbering single-mindedly through the various stages of development’ (Migdal 1988:5). Even by modest standards, many states have faltered badly in building the capacities to improve the situation of their societies in positive ways. Their failure to cultivate a national and unitary feeling among the citizens and their limited success in implementing their own legislation have ultimately affected the very coherence and character of the states themselves and led to widespread disillusionment and emigration among the people. In some countries and in the so-called century of hope, the future still looks grim. Formerly optimistic planners are turning to despair, and a new cynicism has crept into the scholarship on African development. There is minimal participation by state leaders in the maintenance of economic ties between internal and external groups. This suggests that there is limited penetration of society by the national centres of authority. State-society relations seem to be worsening. The ongoing crises in the Sudan and Ethiopia are proving to be a common pattern for grave suspicion and resistance to state designs by minorities and vulnerable groups that view government policies as a threat to their survival. Development analysts suggest that the only solution to the problem of emigration is an amelioration of the economic and social conditions in the countries from where the immigrants are coming. While it might be odd to argue against this view, there is need to see the role of politics in the process as well. If governments remain clientelist, corrupt and inefficient; if they fail to share the limited resources; if countries are mismanaged; the populace will be alienated. 322

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Improving the economic situation of badly governed countries might be good, but failing to correct political wrongdoing will leave many of the problems that cause emigration unsolved. References Adedeji, A. 1999. Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance. London: Zed Books. Akeya, A.1997. Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability, Development and Democratization. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. Damachi, U. G. 1976. Leadership Ideology in Africa. New York: Praeger Publishers. Migdal, J. S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. New Jersey: Princeton University press.

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PART IV

HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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CHAPTER 20

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT Marcel KITISSOU Introduction Social and political problems in Africa are not inherently African. They are human problems. However, they have particular acuity in Africa because of a combination of other weaknesses, the most important one being that of governance. When African problems are addressed through violence, this is a sign of political weakness and not that of strength for the players involved. This also displays limits of imagination (Kitissou 2003). Romeo Dallaire who served as UN Force Commander in Rwanda, wrote in 2003 about the 1994 genocide that ‘since then, much has been written, debated, argued and filmed on the subject of Rwanda, yet it is my feeling that this recent catastrophe is being forgotten and its lessons submerged in ignorance and apathy. The genocide in Rwanda was a failure of humanity and that could easily happen again (Dallaire 2003: XVIII)’. It looks like one has to find a key and break a code to unlock the path to a better African future. The global context that informs African political violence is embedded in global history and in the global environment; at the intersection of time and space. Political violence and terrorism are as old as human societies. In the context of Africa, Western legacy is an important component of the African triple heritage along with Islam and Africa’s own tradition. To explain how violence is embedded in Western culture that was transmitted to Africa through education and political praxis, this chapter addresses the culture of violence in Greek and Roman civilizations. Lessons from the Past: The De-humanization of Humanity Ancient Greece gave us the concept of democracy. Ancient Rome, with its technological prowess showed the importance of reason. 325

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Mathematical “reason” applied to social interactions implied moderation and left a strong legal system. The Westphalian state system came from Europe. None of the above, however, was immune to terrorism and political violence. In 356 BC, Erostratus burnt the temple of Ephesus, one of the wonders of the ancient world. By that act, he wanted to be remembered forever. Allegedly, Alexander the Great was born the same day. Both of them entered history through acts of violence. When, during the Peloponnesian War, representatives of Athens went to meet their counterparts in the island-sate of Melos in 416 BC, they decreed: We recommend that you should try to get what is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept (Thucydides 1986: 401-402).

In their mind, this was derived from the law of nature: Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way (Thucydides 1986: 404-405).

Meleans, then challenged the Athenians’ power by waging guerrilla warfare. In the end, Melos was completely destroyed by the Athenians, the male population killed and the women and children sold into slavery. The Greek poet, Hesiod (c. 8th century BC), at the beginning of Greek history, described in The Works and Days the power relationship between the hawk and the nightingale: This is what the hawk said when he caught a nightingale with spangled neck in his claws and carried her high among the clouds. She spitted on the claw hooks, was wailing pitifully but the hawk, in his masterful manner, gave her an answer: ‘what is the matter with you? Why scream? Your master has you. You shall go wherever I

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take you, for all your singing. If I like, I can let you go. If I like, I can eat you for dinner. He is a fool who tries to match his strength with the stronger. He will lose the battle, and with the shame will he be hurt also!’ So spoke the hawk, the bird who flies so fast on his long wings.

Hesiod was not preaching violence. He was concerned about the growing trend of violence and injustice among humans. The relationship between the hawk and the nightingale resembles in many ways the place of contemporary Africa in global power play. Melesigenes, nicknamed Homeros, “the companion”, was one of the earliest Greek educators and poets (Bernard 1999: 349). His Iliad was not a lesson of strategy, but the expression of a social ideology, a world of violence and fight of individuals for survival; a world of brutality full with the obsession of virility. The enemy is admired as well as the heroes. In the Odyssey, Ulysses eliminated his rivals in ways emulating a Friday night horror movie. In the course of his adventure, he lost some of his companions. Significant among others, was the taste of the Cyclops Polyphemus for his men made into a ʺcomboʺ meal of barbecued and boiled. According to André Bernard, over each period of three years, the Greeks spent more than two years at war and were never at a peace for more than ten consecutive years (Bernard 1999). In a way, teaching Greek history ends up in the de-humanization of the humanities: Herodotus was the historian of the Medic Wars (499478 BC); Thucydides, the historian of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC); Plutarch and Arrian, the historians of the expeditions of Alexander the Great (336-323) and Polybe, the historian of the Roman imperialism (Bernard 1999). Roman conquests are well known. Maybe less known is the power struggle between Roman statesman Cicero and his rival Catilina. Catilina had connection with Africa. He served as Proprietor governor of Africa in 67-66 BC and allegedly used that position to enrich himself, extorting large amount of money for personal wealth. His damaged reputation put an end to his political ambitions in Rome. At the time, social conditions in provinces were ripe for civil war. Catilina, exploiting the situation, was a leading plotter, today one would say terrorist. Cicero seized the occasion to manipulate public opinion and create fear in the population in order to strengthen his personal grip on power.

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Europe inherited the Greco-roman civilization. Its past twenty centuries of history is equally full of political violence. For example, in the 16th century, Europe had known only ten years of peace; in the 17th century, four years; in the 18th century, sixteen years of peace. From 1500 to 1800, in three hundred years, Europe had known two hundred and seventy years of war, i.e., a new one every three years. Austria and Sweden, in those three centuries, had known a war every three years; Spain, every four years; Poland and Russia every five years. Europe, however, is not unique in this instance. In terms of peace, the non-Western world has not done better. For example, China, whose influence is fast growing in Africa, has enjoyed only two centuries of peace in twenty five centuries of history. During its first six centuries, China had known only seventeen years without war (Delmas 1995). From this, its looks like political violence is a natural tendency of human societies and that neither law nor technology have been effective in changing that destructive tendency. Gaston Bouthoul and René Carrère even compared war to festivity as human need and behaviour in their book, Le Défi de la guerre – The Challenge of War (Bouthoul & Carrère 1976). The West is now offering a model of peace. However, to borrow an expression from Philippe Delmas, it is cemented by war to the last stone. The desire for peace has never eliminated the existence of war. When negotiated peace ends a conflict, parties can picture in their imagination a common future. Otherwise one war only sets the stage for the next war. The last century, the bloodiest of all, was a good example. Twentieth Century: ‘The Bloodiest of Them All’ World War I caused the death of between nine million and 10 million people. World War II killed 59 million. Sixteen conflicts killed more than 1 million and six claimed half a million to a million lives. In total, 167 to 188 million people died in the 20th century as result of organized violence, ‘as many as one in every 22 deaths in that period’ (Fergusson 2006)’. Particularly since 1945, 196 small wars (or ʺlow intensity conflictsʺ) have caused 30 million causalities; three quarters of them being civilians. For two generations, only 10% of humanity has lived in peace (Delmas 1995).

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Africa has never displayed the willingness nor developed the capacity to project military forces abroad. It has served, on the contrary as stake for foreign competitors or surrogate terrain for proxy wars and rivalries, whose stakes are situated somewhere else generally considered more important; as a launching pad to protect sea-lanes and project forces somewhere else; and a supplier of strategic resources (Foltz & Bienen 1985). It is uncommon to find African conflicts with no extra-continental connections and vice versa. Most of current African conflicts are within national territories. Instability does not attract investments. At the same time, areas well integrated in the global economy are more stable. In the 21st century, the number of conflicts has actually diminished. Conflicts tend to concentrate in areas marginalized in the world economy. Failed states and failing states are victims of the tendency to resolve issues through violence. Africa is a good candidate and persisting African conflicts are symptomatic of the continent’s economic marginalization. However, wars between neighbours combined with modern techniques can cause a high level of lethality. The 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ongoing genocide in Darfur, Sudan are telling examples. Coping with Reality Since the decade following the Vietnam War, the world has been full of terrorist acts. It is tempting to say that Vietnam was the first defeat of a superpower, the US. However, it was more a political defeat than a military one. Parties and interested observers learned different lessons. In particular the strategy of the weak seemed to have worked against the strong. The Athenians’ pronouncement of 416 BC did not hold true. The period following the Vietnam War saw a wave of political violence, intensification of liberation movements and military interventions from major and minor powers. In the context of Africa, in 1975, Cuba intervened in Angola in support of the MPLA that took power following the collapse of Portugal’s colonial empire. In July 1976, a special commando force of West-Germany Grenzschutz (G.S.G. 9) freed German nationals held hostage by a group of terrorists and hijackers at the airport of Mogadishu, Somalia. Rebels of the Gendarmes Katangais, coming from Angola, invaded the province of Shaba (Congo-Zaire) through Zambia in 1977. They were defeated by Moroccan troops backed by France 329

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which gave logistical support to the Moroccan operation. In 1978, the same rebel group entering Shaba from Angola, again through Zambia, occupied Kolwezi, the capital city of Shaba and, two days later, began to massacre westerners. The French, followed by the Belgians, intervened in two simultaneous but separate counter-attacks. The Belgian goal was to save Belgian nationals. The French had an additional purpose: saving the regime of Mobutu. Earlier the same year, in February 1978, an Egyptian anti-terror commando raided a hijacked plane at the Cypriot airport of Larnaka to free Egyptian nationals. In September 1979, with the Operation Barracuda, French troops, coached by their Service de Documentation et de Contre Espionage (S.D.E.C.E.), the French counter-espionage services, overthrew Emperor Bokassa I de Berengo de Bobangui, today’s Central African Republic, and installed in power his cousin Dr. David Dacko (the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 followed a similar pattern of regime change and the same line of justification, i.e., an appeal from local authorities). The story of Bokassa in Central Africa shows the inherent fragility of most African regimes even when their leaders claim to be “strongmen” and a caricature of postcolonial politics. The operation was to free this unfortunate country from its ‘Emperor’ and to prevent the Libyans from taking over a position at the Center of Africa. The Strategic thinking of Qaddafi was to occupy Chad, then the ‘Centrafrican’ Empire situated just below. Thus, he would be in a strategic area, the equivalent of the plateau of Pratzen according to which Napoleon conceived of the maneuver of the battle of Austerlitz. Such a victory would be exploited in the direction of either the Gulf of Guinea or the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, hence helping communist Ethiopia and completing the control of a large part of Africa (Ockrent & de Marenches 1986). Obviously, Operation Barracuda was a translation of France’s strategic calculations in Africa much more than its humanitarian concerns. The French concerns were actually more than about Qaddafi: Economically, France’s post-war recovery and future prosperity were seen to heavily depend on access to Africa’s rich natural resources and to its ready market for French exports. Given its geographical proximity, Africa and the Mediterranean would continue to rank behind only Europe and the United States as areas of French strategic

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thinking, which reasons that Africa represented the most likely route for a Soviet military challenge to European security (Moose 1985: 60).

On April 25, 1980, in a televised statement, US President Jimmy Carter disclosed the cancellation of ‘a carefully planned operation, which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages who have been held captive there since 4 November 1979 (Schweisfurth 1980: 169)’. The combined menace of the Islamic revolution in Iran and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led President Carter to declare that the Middle East’s oil is for the US a matter of national security and that it would be defended by any means necessary including military force. Then, he created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). President Reagan, three years later, transformed the RDJTF into the Central Command, encompassing the “central region” between Europe and Asia. It covers 25 mostly Muslim countries in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the Caspian Sea and Southeast Asia, including unstable countries such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen (Klare 2004: 1-2). In theory and practice, the militarization of access to oil resources, the increasing interest of the US in African oil and the chronic instability of the region led to a sort of Africa version of the Carter Doctrine. President George W. Bush has established structures for direct US military interventions in Africa not only to fight terrorism but also to protect American oil interests. Countries on which the US increasingly depends for its oil supplies are either unstable or have populations, at least in part, hostile to US interests: therefore access to oil and military policy go hand in hand. In 1982, Great Britain defeated Argentina in the Falkland Island. France allowed the UK to use its military facilities in Senegal on its way to Argentina, thus demonstrating the importance of the Africa “Plateau de Pratzen” defined as follows: Since the end of the formal colonial empire, the French strategy has been to maintain control over the African ‘Plateau de Pratzen’, a rectangle whose angles include Tangier and Tunis in the North, and Douala and Dakar in the South. This space is the synthesis of Western, Arabic and traditional African religions. Countries can use the space to control the western basin of the Mediterranean and the narrowest part of the Atlantic Ocean, between Africa and South America. In the

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hypothesis of a conventional Third World War, within the first three days, around 800 war ships would concentrate in front of Dakar (Kitissou 2007: 279).

In 1983, US marines intervened in the troubled island of Grenada principally to deny Cuba the use of the island as a transit point on the way to Angola, and, by the same token, to deny Libya the use of the island as a launching pad to help revolutionary movements in Latin America. The US State Department said: And while in peacetime it [new airport in construction in Grenada] would have been used for tourism, the runway also would have facilitated Cuban air support for its 40-50,000 personnel in Africa, and Libyan and Soviet bloc flights to Central America. Had the Point Sabines airport been operational in April 1983, for example, the Libyan airplanes detained in Brazil while clandestinely ferrying a cargo of military supplies to Nicaragua could have carried out their mission by refuelling in Grenada (U.S. Department of State & Department of Defense 1983:5).

Also noticeable was the presence, at that time, of French, Italian and American troops in Lebanon. The Lebanese civil war sparked migration to sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s, reinforcing the growth of Islam on the continent. That same year, of the US invasion of Grenada, 1983, “Operation Manta”, brought the French back to Chad; US President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative programme amidst the Euromissiles controversy and the trouble in Nicaragua. That year, Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union the evil Empire. Leonid Brezhnev replied by calling Reagan the most dangerous cowboy in the world. That intensified the West-East competition on the continent. In 1986, French troops were sent to Lomé, Togo to cope with troubles caused by elements that had come, allegedly, from the neighbouring country of Ghana. In the first half of the 1980s, the Cold War was at its height; so was the role of Africa as a surrogate terrain for the East-West competition, a battlefield for outside forces, and a platform used for achieving goals situated in other places around the world. If terrorism consists of attacking innocent victims in order to send a message to a distant enemy, Africa, because of its structural weaknesses, is a perfect candidate for that role of medium. The accumulation of such events 332

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with high visibility in the decade following the end of the Vietnam War and beyond suggests a number of questions, particularly regarding terrorism in Africa. Is terrorism more prevalent and the society more dangerous today than in the past? How can a distinction be made between an act of war, an act of terror and criminal behaviour? What is the connection between home-grown terrorism and international terrorism? What are the different categories of terrorism, from nonstate actors to state-implemented, supported or sponsored violent acts such as 1994’s Rwanda and today’s Darfur? What should the response(s) be to terrorism in Africa? Dealing with Imagination A recent speech by a well-respected British historian, Eric Hosbawn, at a colloquium on November 13, 2004 suggests that we promote a new conception of history by rebuilding a front for reason (Hosbawn 2004). Maybe a study of the situation in the Horn of Africa, i.e., Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, where the menace of or actual acts of terrorism seem to be prevalent, will help us better understand the nature of terrorism in Africa and address some of the questions above. In September 1991, in an attempt to define the emerging international order, the first President George H. Bush predicted that the competition between East-West would be replaced by a struggle between the North and the South. That prediction practically materialized ten years later after September 11, 2001 when terrorists struck the US homeland (United States Institute of Peace 2004). Because of that, and also because we now live in a unipolar world order, it is obvious that the only remaining superpower, the US, felt it had to spearhead the fight against global terrorism. And one more time, Africa finds itself a surrogate terrain for this struggle. For more than a decade now, the Horn of Africa has been a source of major concern, for US officials, as it appears to be a potential source of global terrorism. For example, the National Islamic Front seized power in Sudan in 1989. It then undertook to build an Islamic state and to house radical groups from around the world. In the mid-1990s, Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was thriving in that country and began to operate from that safe heaven, particularly in the greater Horn of Africa. In 1993, Mogadishu witnessed the killing of 18 American 333

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soldiers. Some analysts attributed the attack to Islamic terrorists. In 1998, US embassies were bombed in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-esSalaam, Tanzania. Over 200 people were killed and more than 4,000 injured. In October 2000, in Yemen, off the east coast of Africa, the U.S.S. Cole was struck in a terrorist attack. The ship lost 17 sailors. Attacks reportedly perpetrated by Al Qaeda terrorists in November 2002 in Mombassa involved the bombing of a hotel and an attempt to down an Israeli airliner with a shoulder-held surface-to-air missile launcher. The response to regional terrorism from the United States, notwithstanding the cruise missile attack on Sudan, was limited. It was only after September 11, 2001 that the greater Horn of Africa came under the US’ intense scrutiny. This led the US to rebuild its military strength in the Horn and beyond. A brief history of the US military presence in Africa is in order. US Military presence in Africa In the 1960s, the US phased out its military bases in North Africa. However, the competition with the Soviet bloc was rekindled after the Cuban intervention in Angola in the mid-1970s. By the end of the decade (1978), the US gave logistical support to France during the French intervention in the former Republic of Zaire not only to save the regime of Mobutu but also as part of the politics of containment of communist influence in Africa. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration put in place the ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative). Some battalions were trained in Nigeria and Senegal for peacekeeping operations. However, the landscape completely changed after September 11, 2001. As a consequence, the US created in 2002 a combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). That force is around 2,000 troops strong. Initially it was based offshore and later in Djibouti. Its tasks include joint military exercise with local military forces and a range of civil-military operations such as hospital and school renovation. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million, 15month Eastern Africa Counter-terrorism initiative, expanding counterterrorism efforts with Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The Sahel region is covered by the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a department of State programme, but implemented by the Department of Defense and civilian contractors. The Initiative is 334

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designed to assist Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad in border protection. The PSI became the Trans-Saharan Initiative (TSI) in 2004. It was expanded to include Algeria and Nigeria along with Senegal and Tunisia in addition to Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. A Global Peace Operation Initiative was announced and called for ‘$660 million over the next five years to train, equip and provide logistical support to forces in nations willing to participate in peace operations (Washington Post April 19, 2004: 1A ,16A)’. By focusing on Africa, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme was building on a State Department’s programme that has provided training assistance since the 1990s, formerly known as ACRI (Africa Crisis Response Initiative). In 2006, ACOTA was replaced by the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). There are other strategic designs that include only parts of Africa such as the Broader Middle East initiative, stretching from Mauritania to Pakistan, with immediate military and political cooperation in counter-terrorism with countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Mauritania and Tunisia (Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent No. 2249, 2004: 17). There are not many talks about this initiative today. In general, the US seems to respond only to crises confronting its national interests and Africa seems to disappear from the Pentagon’s radar screen when the challenges to its primacy fade away from the African scene. However, structures currently being put in place seem to suggest long-term presence. Reinforcing that idea, are plans to establish half a dozen “low maintenance” bases at airports or remote camps, each one manned by up to 200 US troops. US emphasis on military means is overwhelming. Only the approach to South Africa seems to be more comprehensive. There, the emphasis is on the participation of indigenous troops. Consequently, public health is made part of strategic calculations. More precisely, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is becoming a “strategic” issue affecting security. In South Africa, HIV/AIDS is assumed to limit the number of troops that can be deployed at any one time. Hence, South Africa received US $2.2 billion from the US European Command (USEUCOM) for study, identification, education, prevention and treatment and follow-up on HIV/AIDS. ‘It may be the first holistic approach in the world’, said General Charles F. Wald, Deputy Commander of the US European Command. This special approach to South Africa may be seen, at the time of its announcement, in the context of US efforts at negotiating a 335

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free trade zone in Southern Africa in which South Africa may play the role of a regional pivotal state. If history is a good teacher, to be used to build a “front of reason”, we should re-examine the situation in the Horn of Africa more than one hundred years ago. Historian Mike Davis reconstructed the past causal link between climate, drought and famines on the one hand, and politics and imperial enterprises on the other. There were three big famines in the 19th century, with combined casualties estimated at 30 million, all forgotten: the drought and famine of 1876-1879 that affected Java, the Philippines, New Caledonia, Korea, Brazil, North China, Northern and Southern Africa; of 1886-1891 in India, Korea, Brazil, Russia and, more seriously, Ethiopia and Sudan with a probable loss of one third of the population in those two African countries; of 1896-1902 affecting the tropical area and the northern part of China. These droughts and famines were accompanied by epidemics of malaria, cholera and measles that disrupted traditional solidarities and delegitimized local political authorities. The combination of natural and social disasters made those areas candidates for imperial enterprise, colonization and what is known today as the Third World. European nations, Japan and the US moved in and fashioned the integration of affected regions into the world economy (an earlier version of globalization) to their advantage, while at the same time, consolidating their own democracy and economic growth at home. Among other things, Italy attacked Ethiopia following the country’s 1889-1891 famine while the British undermined the independence of the Zulu kingdom. During the Victorian era and the French revolution, class division (and income inequality) within given societies was a universal phenomenon. By the end of the 19th century, what was more noticeable was rather the inequality of wealth between nations. The “Third World” had emerged. However, resentments, grievances and revolts began to be directed against external powers throughout Africa, Asia and South America. Examples are numerous since the 1890s: the Boxer Rebellion in China, the Tonghak movement in Korea, the rise of nationalism in India, the war of the Canudos in Brazil and the many cases of resistance in Africa. The extremism of these movements is directly proportional to ecological and existential challenges (Davis, Le Monde Diplomatique April 2003).

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Because nationalistic movements were rooted in a combination of natural and political phenomena, ideologies of resistance tended to combine social, political, religious and even eschatological overtones. In Africa, in 1885, the British General Charles Gordon and his troops were slain by followers of Muhammad Ahmad (the Madhi) in Khartoum; in 1898, a war almost broke out between Britain and France at Fashoda, in southern Sudan; in the meantime, Ethiopia defeated the Italians at Adowa in 1896. A kind of repetition of this phenomenon took place in drought-prone and famine-ridden Somalia a century later when the US intervened in 1992-1993. There are five lessons to be drawn from that history: •

•

• •

•

Natural disasters such as drought leading to famines and epidemics represent great challenges for local governance and protections against outside appetite are weak. Resistance to foreign influence in those circumstances generates ideologies that combine political, religious and even eschatological overtones. The roots of local discontent cannot be dissociated from international terrorism. Terrorism is a technique not an ideology. Military means may be used to combat its immediate effects. However the ideology behind it can only be defeated through political action, development programmes and resolution of local grievances. Actions should be undertaken both within Africa and within dominating nations to revisit policies of deregulation and open market policies that disrupt local capacities and weaken local governance processes.

Darfur is a perfect example. External pressures on Khartoum to stop genocide are one thing. Still, they might not be enough if local conditions are not addressed. Julie Flint provided a good analysis in the Washington Post of November 19, 2006: To the North of Sheick Hilal’s encampment in the stony village of Aamo, the lush jizu desert pasture had bloomed for the first time in seven years, ending an 18-month famine that had taken 100,000 lives in the region. But to the south, as the pressure on resources increased, Baggara cattlemen and the settled farmers of the Fur tribe were barring the nomadsʹ migratory routes and erecting what the nomads called ‘wind fences’-enclosing nothing but wind- to prevent their herd

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from grazing on previously shared lands” (Flint, Washington Post, November 19, 2006: B1, B5).

Ethnic conflict is likely to break when groups feel weak and threatened rather than when they feel strong. As long as great powers, in their strategic calculations, focus on external interests, impose their own priorities over local issues and overlook local grievances, violent conflicts are likely to break out, resume or persist. What arises is a situation of interlocking conflicts with parallel agendas. And as long as grievances are addressed through violent means, one war may only set the stage for the next one. Negotiated peace creates collective imagination that can be jointly managed. The outcome of war, on the contrary, is unpredictable and shows the limits of imagination. As James fallows put it before the Iraq war started: It has become a cliché in popular writing about the natural world that small disturbances to complex systems have unpredictably large effects. The world of nations is perhaps not quite as intricate as the natural world, but it certainly holds the potential for great surprise. Merely itemizing the foreseeable effects of a war with Iraq suggests reverberations that would be felt for decades. If we can judge from past wars, the effects we can’t imagine when the fighting begins will prove to be the ones that matter the most.

Conclusion In the end, history does not begin with fact(s) but with problem(s). It is by understanding the problem(s) that one can find the meaning of fact(s). Problems can only be solved through discussions, collaboration and voluntary compliance with the collective consensus. Violence creates more enemies than it can suppress and “war” is a process of mutual imitation. Conflict resolution can cope with reality and negotiated peace can deal with imagining life after the war ends. The Rwanda Genocide was not only a failure of humanity; it was also a failure of imagination; as is the current situation in Darfur, Sudan. There is a lesson to be learned from Ancient Greeks and Rome.

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References Bernard, A. 1999. Guerres et violence dans la Grèce Antique. Paris: Hachette Literature. Bouthoul, G. & Carrere, R. 1976. Le Défi de la guerre. Paris: Collection S.U.P.. Dallaire, R. & Beardsley, B. 2003, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Vintage, Canada. Davis, M. 2003. Les famines coloniales, genocide oublié. Le Monde Diplomatique. Delmas, P. 1995. Le bel avenir de la guerre. Paris: Gallimard. Fallows, J. 2002. The 51st State. Atlantic Monthly: November. Ferguson, N. 2006. The Next War of World. Foreign Affairs: 85 (5): September/October . Flint, J. 2006. Where Do the Killers Come From. Washington Post: November 19. Foltz, W. J. & Bienen, H. S. 1985. Arms and the Africa: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press. Grenanda: A Preliminary Report (U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, December 1983) Hosbawn, E. 2004. Le pari de la raison: manifeste pour l’histoire, Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 609, December.. Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent. 2004. No. 2249, 2/15-21. Kitissou, M. 2003. Temptations of War and the Limits of Imagination, Africa Notes, September/October 2003, Institute for African Development: Cornell University. _________2007. Africa’s Security Dilemma: National Stability vs. World Security, in Security, Reconstruction and Reconciliation: When the Wars End, London: UCL Press. Klare, M. 2004. Blood and Oil: the Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum. New York: Metropolitan Books. Moose, E. G. 1985. ‘French Military Policy in Africa’ (in Foltz, W. J.& Bienen, S. H., Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations) New Haven: Yale University Press. Ockrent, O. & De Marenches, A. 1986. Dans le secret des princes, Paris: Stock.

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Schweisfurth, T.1980. Operation to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, German Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 23: Berlin: Dunker and Humblot. Thucydides. 1986. History of the Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin Books. United States Institute of Peace. 2004. Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: Special Report 113, January. Washington Post. 2004. Bush Plans Aid to Build Foreign Peace Forces. April, 19: 1A-16A.

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CHAPTER 21

AFRICAN AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS Raymond DOWNING

Introduction In the global power play, Africa is sometimes trampled on, but more often simply left out – except with regard to social, economic and military problems. It is in the context of these problems that Africa has a prominent role to play: as beneficiary of global humanitarian largess. The world wants to “take care” of Africa in the name of human rights, and current international attention regarding AIDS is a clear example. But do these initiatives always respect and enhance the human rights of Africans, or do they also trample on them? What is the connection between African AIDS and human rights? I would like to try to get at that connection by posing three questions and suggesting a qualified answer for each. I hope to broaden our awareness of African AIDS as well as of human rights. First, is it an abuse of human rights that there is more AIDS in Africa than in the rest of the world? I pose the question this way because I sense that, to some Africans, this is a critical question. Many have wondered whether the AIDS virus was originally created in a US military lab as a form of bio-warfare, and released unintentionally – or perhaps intentionally in Africa as a form of genocide. The 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Wangari Maathai, gave voice to some of these smouldering doubts a few years ago and was on the media hot seat for even raising the question. She was by no means the first to suggest this. We have been hearing questions like this in East Africa for over a decade. Sometimes the questions are as benign as ‘where do you think the virus came from?’ Years ago we used to shake off the question as unimportant. ‘What does it matter?’ we would respond. ‘The virus is there, and we need to address it.’

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What we did not understand then was that many Africans have felt a sense of blame when hearing scientists claim that the virus originated in Africa. The disease is a disaster in many African countries, yet it was first described in the United States. Why not assume that it originated there? So many other African oppressions – from the slave trade to colonial exploitation to Apartheid – had origins in North Atlantic countries. Why not AIDS? It is not foolish to ask this question. Yet the North Atlantic world still thinks the question is foolish. In December 2004, after Wangari Maathai received the Nobel Prize, she was interviewed on CNN. The reviewer raised the matter of her statements on AIDS, and she said her comments were taken out of context. But he was relentless and pursued the questioning: “There are so many rumours... It would be a simple thing and very important to say, ‘AIDS is a disease, condoms prevent it, and medicines can fight it,’ don’t worry about where it came from... it seems like a terrible mistake.” Instead of listening to her and asking why Africans were so suspicious; instead of picking the brain of this now world-famous environmentalist; instead of opening the discussion so we could all understand Africa better – this interviewer presented her with a canned summary of the Western dogma and asked her to sign her name to it. Did he respect her human right to have a position different from Western dogma? But what about those of us, Africans as well as Westerners, who are not focused on the origins question, but on the horrible reality of this AIDS epidemic, two thirds of which is borne by Africa? Why does Africa carry such a disproportionate large part? Putting aside suspicions of bio-warfare, is this epidemic a human rights abuse? My answer is a qualified “yes”, depending on how we understand this disease, or any disease. Now if AIDS is “just” a virus, transmitted in body fluids, preventable by blocking the transmission, treatable by ARVs which inhibit the replication of the virus, then it is hard to see this whole process as a human rights abuse. That, by the way, is the essence of the disease as we are taught in medical school: essentially a biological phenomenon. But my qualified “yes”, that AIDS is in the category of human rights abuse, stems from the assumption that no disease is “just” a biological phenomenon. Pasteur reportedly said ‘the terrain is as important as the germ’ – a view the public health discipline holds onto today even though the bio-medical disciplines sometimes forget. 342

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Diseases flourish in socio-political-environmental-economic settings. The setting of malaria is standing water where anopheles mosquitoes can breed; the setting of obesity and diabetes is where there is fast food, effortless transport and mind-numbing amusement. The setting of AIDS in Africa is poverty. Now admittedly poverty was not the setting of the first described outbreak of AIDS in the early 80’s, among men who had sex with men. This first description, in fact, led some to suggest that the “terrain” of AIDS was ‘multiple partners’ sex.’ It can be, but that description does not help us with African AIDS, unless we assume that multiple partners’ sex is far more common in Africa than in the rest of the world. In 2000, Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa, suggested that the root of African AIDS was poverty and probably the easiest way to illustrate this would be with a scenario rather than statistics. A man in South Africa goes to the mines to work. The mine is not near his home, and he is not allowed to bring his family with him; the sex he has is with prostitutes. Mining is very dangerous, and, though he has heard of AIDS, he does not think about the distant risks of the disease when he may die tomorrow in the mine. In the mean time his wife, back in the village, has the responsibility to feed her children and pay for their school fees. A man offers to help her out in exchange for sex. She doesn’t think about the distant risks of AIDS when her children are hungry today. In addition, she (or her husband, or the man she sleeps with) may have other untreated sexually transmitted diseases, a known “co-factor” in transmitting AIDS. Local medical care to treat these open sores may be unaffordable. The pieces of this scenario are, unfortunately, all too real across sub-Saharan Africa. But to simply describe the scenario is not enough. We must ask why. Why are some Africans still hungry when the world has enough food to feed everyone? Why is the most basic medical care not always available or affordable there, while we fine-tune HDL cholesterol levels with expensive drugs when coarse-tuning our diets and exercise patterns would accomplish the same thing? Why does the West give some relief aid to Africa while at the same time earning even more in interest from their loans? Some of these are clearly human rights issues and if African poverty is a human rights issue, then African AIDS is a human rights abuse.

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Second, is it an abuse of human rights that Western treatments for AIDS are not as available in Africa as in the West? This is the main question that I have heard when human rights and AIDS in Africa are discussed and it lends itself more directly to activism than does the question of African poverty. Antiretroviral drugs clearly work in prolonging the life of people with AIDS, so it seems intuitively wrong that we in the West should have ready access to these drugs, yet places where the AIDS burden is so much more do not have this access. And the barriers (such as cost) seem at first so identifiable: the drugs cost so much because they are still under patent, not because the raw materials are so expensive. It seems unjust for rich pharmaceutical companies to demand such a profit from people who are so poor. Let the drug companies make money from the cholesterol drugs; they have a human rights duty to lower the cost of ARVs for Africans. This, at least, has been the argument and it has been somewhat effective. Some pharmaceutical companies have made special arrangements to sell drugs at lower rates to some African countries. Of course the US has offered $15 billion for African AIDS over five years, half of it intended just for AIDS drugs. The activism to get ARVs to Africa has borne fruit; programmes are being set up across the continent. There is much more to be done, but at least we have started. That seems to be the conventional wisdom. While there is value in this line of reasoning, I think it is too narrow. I agree that it is a human rights abuse to deny Africa drugs that can have a major impact on diseases but I wonder whether we should be starting with AIDS drugs. Have we considered what is really involved in ARV programmes? Going to scale nationally with any chronic disease programme is a major undertaking, and one that we have not always done well with. I recently spent three years working with the US Indian Health Service on the Navajo Reservation in Arizona. The diabetic epidemic there is on a scale comparable to the AIDS epidemic in some African countries, with the major difference that, being Americans, Navajos have access to the latest health care advances and unlike most Americans, their health care and medications are completely free. Yet roughly half of the diabetics are completely uncontrolled. Despite state-of-the-art biomedical care, we do not seem to be making a dent in the epidemic. Clearly the control of 344

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diabetes requires far more than new pharmaceuticals. So does the control of the African AIDS epidemic. Have we thought through all that is involved in introducing life-long drugs to a people who do not have a cultural habit of taking medicines daily? We in the West have decided that AIDS is Africa’s biggest medical problem, and that they need ARV drugs. Few would deny that AIDS is a major problem, but not all Africans feel it should upstage all other health problems. A few years ago I heard a Ugandan doctor from the Ministry of Health give a talk on TB and AIDS at a Global Health Council annual meeting in Washington DC. He did a fine job, but just before he sat down, he said, ‘Our number one killer still remains malaria.’ He had been asked to discuss what we felt was most important; then at the end he quietly let us know what he thought was most important. While denying ARVs to Africa may be a human rights abuse, I think there might be a corollary to this: is it a human rights abuse to impose our understanding of Africa’s biggest problems on them? If it is a human rights abuse to withhold medicines, is it not also a human rights abuse not to seek out and listen to African perspectives on the disease? Is it a human rights abuse to run vertical ARV programmes without simultaneously attacking poverty? First, I want to be sure you understand what I mean by a vertical public health programme. Vertical programmes attack only one disease, but at every level. They are involved with government policy about that disease, obtaining the resources needed (often drugs), distributing them to clinics and hospitals, prescribing and monitoring them, and increasingly providing supervision or follow-up. A horizontal programme, on the other hand, is broader, but only at one level. Administrative support for a ministry of health, for example, would be horizontal; so would a village-based primary health care center. Traditional public health programmes, for example, malaria control in the 1950s and 60s, or most vaccination programmes have been vertical. In the 1970s and 80s, there was an active debate between the two approaches to health care, with the horizontal “primary health care” movement coming into prominence. Though the debate still exists, it seems that vertical programmes have been upstaging primary 345

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health care lately, with ARV programmes in the lead. What are some of the effects of this focused approach? The following stories, though admittedly anecdotal, point to a troubling effect of focusing on one disease. I recently heard a Kenyan physician describe the ARV programme he worked in, funded heavily by the US. He was rightly proud of the services he was able to offer, including home-based follow-up to encourage people to take their medicines, care for other conditions besides AIDS, and even food. The care was so extraordinary, he said, that patients are sometimes disappointed when their HIV tests are negative – because without HIV, they would not be eligible for the extraordinary services. I was troubled by this story, and mentioned it to a worker in a different AIDS programme. She said she had the same experience, and was a bit surprised because her programme only provided some help with school fees. Still troubled, I mentioned these stories to a group of Peace Corps workers in western Kenya. One of them told me a story of a man who had heard (incorrectly, it turns out) that the government would take complete care of people who had AIDS, so he had sex with a woman known to have AIDS in an attempt to get the virus. I suppose you could see these stories as examples of unhealthy dependency, of people who just want a “free ride”. But who would want to exchange a free ride for a death sentence? I think these stories illustrate the sense of hopelessness that poverty can produce, the willingness to do whatever it takes to get food and school fees today, because the immediate future looks bleak. We could suggest a similar explanation for why African women would choose to have “contractual sex” (and risk getting infected with AIDS) in exchange for food for their children as I mentioned earlier. If, after all, AIDS is as treatable as we claim, and the treatment package comes with “extras” such as food, basic medical care, and school fees, we can begin to see why a negative AIDS test could be a disappointment. Now there is clearly a double bind in these stories: we cannot simply “prescribe” ARVs and hope people can pay for them and will take them regularly. We know the importance of subsidized and supervised treatment, and of nutrition, in the treatment of AIDS, and we are right in putting these “extras” into the package. But the response to these “extras” in these stories shows that they are not really “extras”, they are essentials which are missing even in the lives of 346

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many who do not have AIDS. Our vertical programme exposes us to the larger human rights issue of poverty that we began with. So: is it a human rights abuse to run a vertical ARV programme without simultaneously addressing poverty? That will remain a question for as long as Africa remains only a beneficiary of humanitarian largess in the global power play.

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Notes on Contributors Cage Banseka is a Political Analyst with the African Union, and presently works with the African Union Mission in The Sudan (AMIS). He is also a lecturer in the Department of International Relations, specialising in peace and conflict research, at the University of Muenster, Germany. He is also affiliated to the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Protestant University for Central Africa, in Cameroon. He has published books and articles on the correlation between democratisation and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, and also on the development relationship between the expanding European Union and Africa, especially with regards to the role of the former in peace initiatives on the continent. His present research projects focus on regional/third party mediation, African Union peacekeeping and the phenomenon of government proxy fighting in Sub-Saharan Africa. Patrick Bond, a political economist, is Research Professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Development Studies, where he directs the Centre for Civil Society. He previously taught at the University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management, York University - Department of Political Science, the Yokohama National University - Department of Economics and the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health. During the early 90s he worked for various Johannesburg based NGOs and the University of Zimbabwe among others. Earlier, he studied economic geography at Johns Hopkins, finance at the University of Pennsylvania and economics at Swarthmore College. His recent authored and edited books include Climate Change, Carbon Trading and Civil Society (Rozenberg Publishers, 2007); The Accumulation of Capital in Southern Africa (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2007); Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (Zed Books and University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006), Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms (UKZN Press, 2006); Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (UKZN Press, 2005); Fanon’s Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Africa World Press, 2005); and Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance (Zed Books and University of Cape Town Press, 2003). He was born in Belfast, Northern Ireland in 1961.

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Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow at ACCORD and NUPI. He started his career in the South African Foreign Ministry and was posted abroad to the South African missions in Washington D.C. and Addis Ababa. He served with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor and with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Cedric holds an M.A. in Conflict Management and Peace Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is currently a DPhil candidate at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. Raymond Downing is Chair of the Family Medicine Programme at Moi University School of Medicine, Kenya. He is the author of As They See It: The Development of the African AIDS Discourse (Adonis & Abbey, 2005). His latest book, Suffering and Healing in America: An American Doctorʹs View from Outside, was released by Radcliffe Publishers (UK) in late 2006. Melvin P. Foote is the Founder, President and CEO of the Constituency for Africa, (CFA), a U.S- based network of organizations, groups and individuals committed to the progress and empowerment of Africa and African peoples worldwide. Melvin has played a leading role in building public and private support for Africa in the United States. He started out as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1973 to 1975. Later he served in Somalia from 1981-1984 as Africareʹs Country Representative and from 1984-1994, served in Africareʹs Washington headquarters as their Director of Constituency Development, where he pioneered the establishment of the Constituency for Africa. He is the recipient of many awards, including the Congressional Black Caucus 2001 and the Annual Legislative Conferenceʹs Diggs Award for Foreign Affairs, in recognition of his outstanding commitment and achievement on issues and concerns pertaining to Africa. He is also a highly demanded speaker on radio and television as well as a prolific writer of articles and editorials, which are featured in newspapers and magazines across the United States. Steven Friedman is Research Associate at the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Visiting Professor of Politics, Rhodes University. He is a political scientist specialized in the study of 349

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democracy, its preconditions and prospects. During the 1980s, Steven conducted a series of studies of the apartheid regime and its implications for a democratic future, anticipating the challenges of South Africa’s transition to democracy both before and after the elections of 1994. His current work focuses on the implications of inequality for democracy and feasible responses by new democracies to existing inequalities. He is the author of Building Tomorrow Today (1987), a study of the South African trade union movement and the implications of its growth for democracy. He is also the editor of The Long Journey (1993) and The Small Miracle (1995 with Doreen Atkinson), which presented the outcome of two research projects on the South African transition. His current research focus is on the role of citizen action in strengthening and sustaining democracy, with a particular focus on the activism of people living with HIV and AIDS. Nigel C. Gibson is an associate professor in the department of African and African-American Studies at Harvard University. He is also the director of the Honours Programme at Emerson College in Boston. His publications include, Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination (2003), Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus (with George C. Bond, 2002), Challenging Hegemony: Social movements and the quest for a new humanism in post-apartheid South Africa (2006) and Rethinking Fanon: the continuing legacy (1999). He is also the editor of the Journal of Asian and African Studies. Waldron H. Giles was born in Jersey City, NJ and is a graduate of Rutgers University and New York University with BS, MS, and Ph.D. degrees in Physical Chemistry. He worked as an Engineer, Engineering Manager, Project/Programme Manager, and General Manager for the General Electric Co. His responsibilities as a General Manager at General Electric included: the design, construction, and testing of oilwater separators, shipboard waste water treatment and waste oil recovery plants, process control designs for nuclear, chemical, and wastewater treatment plants; the design and construction of ballistic missiles and scientific exploration space vehicles. Dr. Giles was the General Manager for both the Pioneer Venus and Project Galileo spacecraft, which landed scientific instrumentation on the planets Venus and Jupiter. He has retired as the president of Mattes Electric Co., an Electrical Contracting and Telecommunications Company. Dr. 350

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Giles has been a management consultant for the City of Wilmington, Denver and Planned Education of Connecticut and New Jersey. Currently, Dr. Giles is the director of the Talented Tenth Development Consortium, which conducts research on the economic relationships between various geo-political events and their impact on Africans, their communities and Nations. To date, he has provided one of the best estimates on the slave labour played in making the United States a global power. He has also developed a global measurement system for the calculation of world power, which predicts that the African Union will be a dominant power at the end of the 21st century. Paul Graham is the Executive Director of IDASA. Trained as an adult education, Mr. Graham has been involved in election management, mitigation of political violence, civic education, and democracy support since he joined IDASA in 1988. Mr Graham is chair of the International Steering Committee of the Community of Democracies Nongovernmental Process and a member of the African Democracy Forum Management Committee. Amadu Jacky Kaba is an assistant professor at the Graduate Department of Public and Healthcare Administration at Seton Hall University in New Jersey, USA. Marcel Kitissou is Senior Visiting Research Scholar at the Centre for Global Studies at George Mason University. Dr Kitissou has also been associated with Cornell University as Visiting Fellow successively with the Peace Studies Programme and the Institute for African Development. Recently, he was Faculty Director of the Global Humanitarian Action and of the International Development programmes at George Mason University. He was Executive Director of the Africa Faith and Justice Network, a research and advocacy NGO based in Washington, DC. Prior to that position, he created and directed the PEACE Institute of the State University of New York at Oswego. Rudolph Lewis was raised by his grandparents William and Ella Lewis of Jarratt, Virginia — in the Village of Jerusalem. Along with Walter Lively, he helped to establish the Black Liberation Press. He spent several years (since 1969) as an organizer for Local 1199, the Health 351

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Care Workers Union. He graduated with a B.A (1978) and M.A. (1981) degrees in English. After graduation, he taught writing and literature at University of the District of Columbia and the University of Maryland. He taught writing at Northeast Louisiana University (NLU, 1983) and then at the University of New Orleans (UNO, 1984-1986). Together with Yusef Komunyakaa and Ahmose Zu-Bolton, he created and built the cultural center Copacetic on Piety Street. He wrote poems and essays that were published by The New Laurel Review. With poet Gillian Conoley, he also began his own rag, Crickets: Poems & Other Jazz, which lasted several issues. After the publication of his edited volume; I Am New Orleans & Other Poems by Marcus B. Christian in 1999, Lewis again returned to the village of Jerusalem where he collected the letters and stories of his grandmother Ella Lewis and began research on the Southampton Rebellion of 1831. He is an authority on Nathaniel Turner and New Orleans poet Marcus Christian. In November 2001, he founded the black arts and literary website ChickenBones: A Journal (www.nathanielturner.com), which he continues to edit. The journal has become one of the most popular African-American websites on the internet. It received over 2 million visitors in 2006. Norman Mlambo is Zimbabwean and heads the Peace and Security Research Unit at Africa Institute of South Africa based in Pretoria. Dr. Mlambo holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Cape Town in South Africa, and a B.A. (Honours) degree in Economic History from the University of Zimbabwe. Among his previous posts Dr. Mlambo was a Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe, a Research Fellow on the Peace and Security Research Programme of the Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust based in Harare, and Editor of the Daily Mirror, a privately owned newspaper in Harare. Dr. Mlambo is also a qualified helicopter pilot. He received his military aviation training in Romania and Canada. Prior to his academic career, he served as a helicopter pilot with the Zimbabwean Air Force rising to the rank of Squadron Leader. Dr. Norman Mlambo has published numerous papers on African development, defence, peace and security. David Merthold Macfallen Monyae was a lecturer at the department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg till August 2007. He is now a researcher and policy analyst in regional integration with the Development Bank of Southern 352

Notes on Contributors

Africa. He has vast experience in designing and implementing programmes aimed at strengthening African international relations in the academic, governmental and non-governmental spheres. His doctoral thesis is titled Learning to Lead: South Africa’s Leadership Role in Africa: The Case Studies of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and the Great Lakes Region Involvements 1994 – 2006 (unpublished). Bhekinkosi Moyo is Research Fellow at TrustAfrica, a new African foundation based in Dakar, Senegal. Prior to his current position, Dr. Moyo was a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. He has also worked for various institutions including The Africa Institute of South Africa and Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre. He is the editor of What About the Children: The Silent voices in Maintenance (2004) (with Debbie Budlender) which explores the contentious issues of poverty, abuse and the social security system in South Africa in the 21st Century. He has a keen interest in African development, democracy, civil society, philanthropy, popular participation, South-South relations, North-South relations, the new African agenda (new pan-Africanism), parliamentary democracy and global governance matters. He has a doctorate in political science from the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. Laurie Nathan is a Visiting Fellow with the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and a Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. He previously headed the Centre for Conflict Resolution at UCT and served on the Cameron Commission of Inquiry into Arms Trade (1994-1997). In 2006 he was appointed to serve on the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, established by the South African Minister for Intelligence. He has been a member of the Advisory Committee of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch and the Carter Centreʹs International Council for Conflict Resolution. He is co-editor with Jacky Cock of War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (1989). Kenneth Omeje is Research Fellow in the Africa Centre for Peace & Conflict Studies in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford UK. Dr Omeje was previously a Lecturer/Research Fellow in Politics and Development Studies at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and has held visiting research fellowship positions in various 353

Notes on Contributors

Universities in Europe and North America. His current research interests include extractive economies and conflict in the global South, post-conflict reconstruction and security in West Africa, and the crisis of postcoloniality in sub-Saharan Africa. He is the author of High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria (2006) Ashgate: Aldershot. He has published in various peer-review journals. Barbara Kalima-Phiri is an economist with extensive experience in international development. Formerly, head of the Pan African Think Tank organisation - African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), she has also worked on various research and policy papers on poverty reduction strategies, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), gender, debt and regional integration. She holds a Masters Degree in Economics from the University of Botswana. Nhamo W. Samasuwo is currently the Programme Director for multilateral issues at the Institute for Global Dialogue, a premier policy think-tank in South Africa. He holds a BA Honours degree in Economic History from the University of Zimbabwe and a Ph.D. in African Economic History from the University of Cape Town. He has lectured as a graduate tutor at the Universities of Zimbabwe, Cape Town and Pretoria, respectively. Dr. Samasuwo has received various recognitions including the Mellon Fellowship, several African Studies Awards, a Harry Oppenheimer Visiting Research Fellowship at Oxford University in the United Kingdom and a post-doctoral research fellowship at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Formerly, Chief Research Specialist and Acting Director for the Global Governance Programme at the Africa Institute of South Africa, Nhamo Samasuwo has published several articles covering a wide range of issues related to South Africa’s domestic and foreign policies. These include: UN reform, reform of international institutions, gender and the land question in South Africa, South Africa and the Millennium Development Goals and the role of civil society in governance, among others. Dr. Samasuwo’s main research interests include the comparative political economy of development, development strategies in Southern Africa, international relations and public policy in Southern Africa.

354

Notes on Contributors

Issaka K. Souaré is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada). A Contributing Editor to the journal, African Renaissance, he is the author of numerous publications relating to Africa, including Africa in the United Nations System, 1945-2005 (2006); Civil Wars and Coups d’État in West Africa (2006), the novel, Samassi (2004); and co-editor of Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State (2007). Ann Talbot is a PhD student at the University of Bolton in northern England and is a regular correspondent for the world socialist website. Fletcher Tembo has a PhD in the political economy of development and has recently joined the Overseas Development Institute, as a Research Fellow in the Research and Policy in Development Programme (RAPID). Tembo worked with World Vision in the UK for 5 years as Senior Economic Justice Adviser, and in Malawi for 7 years managing grassroots development programmes. He has played an active role in Northern and Southern CSO networks and initiatives, especially on research and lobbying bilateral donors and International Finance Institutions around aid effectiveness, accountability and poverty reduction strategies. He has also supported Southern CSOs in their efforts to effectively engage with their governments. His main research interests are civil society engagement and influencing propoor policy processes, including national budgets. He is author of Participation, Negotiation and Poverty: encountering the power of images: designing pro-poor development programmes (2003).

355

Index

About the journal, African Renaissance This is the fourth in a book series from African Renaissance, a multidisciplinary journal published since 2004. The journal, which is a cross between an academic periodical and any high-quality features publication, started as a bi-monthly, and became a quarterly in 2007 after 15 consecutive issues without missing a deadline, and after launching a book series earlier in the year. The book series augment the journal in its objectives of advancing both theoretical and empirical research, informing policies and practices and improving our understanding of the interplay of forces that shape the African condition. This volume was inspired by some of the articles on the theme published in the journal. We thank the the volume’s editor and contributors for re-working their original contributions to fit into the framework of this study. African Renaissance has emerged as one of the leading platforms for the analysis of the African condition, hopes and aspirations. The journal accepts papers that cover Africa as a whole, as well as those which focus on specific countries on the continent. For details of submission guidelines for the journal or the book series, please visit the website (www.adonis-abbey.com). Alternatively please email the journal’s editor, Dr Jideofor Adibe at: [email protected] For sales enquiries, please email: [email protected] Dr Jideofor Adibe Editor, African Renaissance

356

Index Amnesty International, 265, 267, 268 AngloGold, 63 Annan, Kofi, 32, 36, 88, 93, 100, 179, 182, 184, 243, 245, 246, 267, 296 Arab Maghreb Union, xi, 224 Archbishop Ndungane, 195 Arusha Agreement, 208, 209 Arusha Peace Accords, 209 Ashanti, 63 Association of South-East Asian Nations, 222

A Abacha, Sani, 48 Addax Petroleum, 244 Afghanistan, 178, 244, 268, 330, 331 Africa Commission Report, 127, 129 Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, 52 Africa Partnership Forum, viii, 121, 123, 124 Africa Peer Review Mechanism, 124 African AIDS, vii, 287, 341, 343, 344, 345, 349 African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, viii, 335 African Development Bank, viii, 113, 180 African Economic Community, viii, 222, 223 African Methodist Episcopal Church, 289, 304 African Mission in Burundi, 209 African National Congress, viii, 188 African Peer Review, viii, 30 African Renaissance, xii, 15, 85, 152, 159, 188, 189, 200, 203, 212, 220, 233, 251, 355 African Union, vi, viii, 21, 25, 32, 44, 108, 121, 123, 145, 146, 149, 151, 152, 153, 157, 188, 201, 205, 206, 221, 223, 232, 233, 240, 256, 263, 265, 286, 288, 290, 292, 293, 294, 296, 348, 351 Agreement on Enhancement of Capacity, 210 Ake, Claude, 163, 167, 175 Al Qaeda, 333 Alphonso of Aragon, xiv American Civil War., 304

B Bakassi, vi, 25, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251 Bakassi peninsula, 234, 236, 241, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248 BANSEKA, Cage, 312 Beijing Consensus, 81, 82, 84, 85 Benn, Hilary, 109, 129, 146 BHP Billiton, 66 Bin Laden, Osman, 333 Black Star Line, 289 Blair Commission for Africa, 16, 44 Bokassa, 330 Bond, Patrick, iv, xiii, 16, 23, 49, 72, 76, 84, 175, 348, 350 BOND, Patrick, 47 Botswana, 48, 52, 64, 65, 146, 162, 191, 194, 196, 212, 280, 281, 283, 284, 286, 354 Brandt Commission, 145 Breton Woods, viii, 78, 85 Brown, Chancello, 52, 53, 72, 109, 129, 130, 132, 146, 296, 301, 310 Brown, Chancellor, 130 Burundi, v, viii, xi, 24, 52, 65, 178, 190, 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203,

357

Index

205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 218, 219, 278, 315

D Darfur, 41, 58, 88, 128, 178, 315, 329, 333, 337, 338 de Coning, Cedric, v, 23, 349 DeBeers, 63 deindustrialization, 52 Democratic National Convention, 294 Democratic Republic of Congo, ix, 30, 96, 128, 136, 190, 201, 218, 219, 225, 279, 321 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 50 Development Assistance Committee, ix, 113 Doha Round, 43, 44, 73, 79, 182 Doha Round of Negotiations, 44 DOWNING, Raymond, 341 DRC, v, ix, 24, 71, 96, 178, 190, 191, 196, 200, 201, 205, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219

C Cameroon, vi, x, 25, 64, 65, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 278, 348 Cancun, 43, 182 Carter Doctrine, 331 Castro, Fidel, 67 Charter on Democracy, 22 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 30 China’s Africa Policy, 38 China-Africa Forum Summit, 31 China-Africa relations, 19, 31, 39 Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, 58 Christian Aid, 51, 73, 138, 142 Clinton, Bill, 76, 205, 296, 334 Cold War, 17, 23, 27, 30, 31, 39, 41, 44, 50, 76, 84, 93, 99, 135, 138, 140, 332 Commission for Africa, v, viii, xi, xii, 21, 24, 38, 47, 52, 73, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 130, 145, 146, 147, 152, 159, 180, 184, 224, 233, 263 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 224 Congress of South African Trade Unions, viii, 193, 267 Congressional Black Caucus, 290, 293, 294, 295, 349 Conrad, Joseph, 162 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 223 Convention on the Rights of a Child, 124 Côte d’Ivoire, 65, 190, 221, 227

E Ecological Debt, 67, 73 Economic and Social Council, ix, 32 Economic Partnership Agreements, 138 ECOWAS, v, ix, 24, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233 ECOWAS Cease-fire and Monitoring Group, 227 Elone, Jeanne, xiii Emeagwali, Philip, 273 Equatorial, 38, 39, 52, 58, 138, 157 Ethiopia, xiv, 44, 52, 65, 129, 136, 146, 201, 206, 291, 303, 305, 306, 307, 315, 322, 330, 333, 334, 336, 337, 349 European Economic Community, ix, 220

358

Index

European Union, ix, 17, 37, 40, 79, 107, 133, 138, 145, 146, 177, 221, 257, 263, 284, 348 Ezulwini Consensus, 32, 34, 44, 77, 78

Global Peace Operations Initiative, ix, 335 Global Policy Forum, 99, 105 Goldman, Michael, 60, 73 Gowon, Gowon, 241 Graham, Paul, xiii, xiv, 351 Great Depression, 53 Green Bombers, 264 Gulf of Guinea, 52, 236, 244, 330

F Falkland Island, 331 Fanon, Frantz, 160, 163, 168, 172, 173, 174, 175, 348, 350 Foote, Melvin, vi, 25, 349 FOOTE, Melvin, 288 FOX News, 310 Free Trade Agreements., 149 Freud Communications, 132 FRIEDMAN, Friedman, 87

H Heavily Indebted Poor Country, 135 Heavily Indebted Poorest Countries, 114 Herbst, Jeffrey, 15, 31, 37, 45 Highly Indebted Poor Countries, ix, 30, 37, 90 HIV/AIDS, viii, 22, 25, 26, 95, 102, 128, 137, 138, 139, 161, 162, 174, 179, 195, 210, 273, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 294, 335 Human Rights Commission, 33, 213 Hyde Park, 132

G G-20, 43 G-77, 31 G8, 21, 24, 31, 37, 38, 44, 48, 79, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 130, 132, 142, 145, 146, 147, 164, 176, 181, 263 Gallup Survey, 21 Garvey, Marcus M., 289, 303, 305, 306 Geldof, Bob, 129, 130, 132, 133, 141, 142, 146 General Agreement on Tariffs, ix, 42 General Co-operation Agreement, 215 Germany, 37, 98, 101, 113, 182, 236, 237, 243, 279, 280, 329, 348 Gibson, Nigel, v, 21, 23, 131, 169, 170, 175, 350 GIBSON, Nigel, 160 GILES, Waldron Giles, 145 Gleneagles, 21, 24, 37, 38, 48, 111, 112, 113, 116, 124, 125, 127, 130 Global Agreement, 211

I IDASA, ix, xiii, 349, 351 Igbo, 237, 249 Independent Development Cooperation, ix, 210 India, Brazil, South Africa, 31 Institute for Democracy in South Africa, ix, xiii, xiv, 349, 353 Institute for Global Dialogue, 27, 34, 35, 354 Inter-Congolese Dialogue, ix, 211 International Criminal Court, 103 International Finance Facility, ix, 112 International Monetary Fund, ix, 23, 31, 75, 78, 113, 125, 129, 182, 189, 262, 263, 308

359

Index

Iraq., 36, 59, 154

Mandela, Nelson, 187, 189, 190, 194, 196, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 211, 275, 293, 306, 307 Mao Tse Tung, 156 Mauritania, 62, 64, 65, 225, 335 Mauritius, 30, 65 Mbeki, Thabo, 33, 45, 176, 177, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203, 205, 207, 212, 213, 218, 300, 343 McDonalds, 164 Memorandum of Understanding, 209, 215 Milanovic, Branco, 54, 73 Millennium Challenge Account, x, 112 Millennium Development Goals, x, 21, 32, 33, 48, 78, 101, 125, 145, 179, 354 Mkandawire, Thandika, 57, 73, 80, 85 Mkapa, Benjamin, 129, 146, 206, 296 Mlambo, Norman, vi, 15, 25, 27, 32, 37, 42, 45, 253, 269, 352 MLAMBO, Norman, 252 Mogadishu, 329, 333 Monterrey Consensus, 180 MONYAE, David, 200 Movement for Democratic Change, x, 194, 257, 265, 269 MOYO, Bhekinkosi, 15, 30 Murdoch, Elisabeth, 132

J Jintao, Hu, 19 Johannesburg, 26, 27, 45, 47, 49, 57, 58, 65, 71, 93, 94, 187, 218, 266, 269, 271, 348, 352 Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa, viii, 334

K Kaba, Amadu, vi, 25, 351 KABA, Amadu, 273 Kabila, Joseph, 191, 211, 212, 213, 214 Kananaskis, 37 Kaplan, Robert, 50, 73 Kingdom of Malindi, xiv KITISSOU, Marcel, 325 Ku Klux Klan, 304

L Least Developed Countries, 43 Lee, Margaret Prof, xii, xiii, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 75, 85, 260, 269, 301 Lewis, Rudolph, 25, 250 LEWIS, Rudolph, 298 Liberia, 114, 178, 190, 221, 223, 227, 229, 232, 278, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307 Live 8, 48, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 142, 143

N Nairobi Climate Change Summit, 138 Namibia, 49, 64, 65, 137, 191, 193, 211, 214 NATHAN, Laurie, 187 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 293, 305 National Association of Black Market Developers, 293

M Maathai, Wangari, 341 Madagascar, 65, 278, 300 Make Poverty History, 47, 111, 130, 131, 133, 134, 143 Make Poverty History/Live 8 campaign, 130

360

Index

National Black Mayors Association, 293 National Power, 153 Ncube, Pius, 259, 267 NEPAD, x, 37, 108, 119, 122, 125, 145, 146, 170, 172, 188, 189, 191, 193, 198, 200, 222, 290, 293, 296 New Partnership for Africa’s Development, x, 16, 21, 108, 145, 170, 200, 222, 232, 348 Niger Delta, 73, 166, 172, 246, 304 Nigeria, 25, 35, 38, 39, 42, 48, 52, 58, 62, 64, 65, 71, 82, 97, 112, 135, 138, 139, 146, 158, 169, 182, 191, 194, 205, 221, 225, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 278, 281, 282, 291, 307, 321, 334, 335, 353 Nkrumah, Kwame, 157 Nkrumah, Nkrumah, 157, 158, 159, 307 Non Aligned Movement, 31 Non-Aligned Movement, x, 41, 78 North American Free Trade Agreement, x, 222 Nyerere, Julius, 169, 202, 203 Nzo, Alfred, 187

Organization of Petroleum Countries, 83 Oriental Energy, 244 Oriental lifeline, 20 Overseas Development Assistance, x, 101, 180 Overseas Development Institute, 107, 355 Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, 66

P Pakistan, 197, 335 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 116, 125 Peace Corps, 346, 349 Pink Floyd CDs, 131 Plaut, Martin, 128 Poor Countries Initiative, 30, 37 Poverty Reduction Strategy Processes, 92 Prince Charles, 55, 267 Princess Diana, 130

Q Queen Elizbeth II, 55

O

R

OAU Harare Declaration, 34 Obama, Barak, 294 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 97, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248 Official Development Assistance, 98, 177 OMEJE, Kenneth, 234 Operation Barracuda, 330 Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development, 274 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 177

Reagan, Ronald, 306, 331, 332 Redefining Progress, 59 Regional Economic Communities, x, 21, 221, 222, 223, 233 Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization, 180 Rwanda, 30, 65, 111, 125, 178, 197, 202, 208, 211, 213, 306, 307, 325, 333, 338, 339

S SAMASUWO, Nhamo, 75 Saudi Arabia, 197, 331

361

Index

Saving Africa, 20, 21 Shagari, Shehu, 243 Shiva, Vandana, 55, 69, 76 Sino-Africa relations, 40 Small and Medium Enterprises, 217 SOUARÉ, Issaka, 220 South Africa, v, viii, ix, x, xi, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 51, 52, 57, 62, 65, 71, 72, 82, 85, 91, 92, 102, 146, 166, 168, 169, 171, 174, 175, 182, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 274, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 293, 296, 300, 307, 335, 343, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354 South African Communist Party, 193 Southall, Prof Roger, xii, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 219 Southern Africa, viii, x, 24, 50, 93, 128, 136, 137, 188, 190, 192, 198, 212, 219, 224, 269, 276, 277, 278, 336, 348, 352, 353, 354 Southern African Development Community, 92, 169, 191, 201, 224 Structural Adjustment Programmes, x, 136 System-wide Coherence, 180, 185

Tony Blair’s Africa Commission, 71, 127 Transparency International, 66, 73, 280, 287 TrustAfrica, xiii, 353 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 209, 213 Tsunami disaster, 181 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 256, 257, 258, 262, 264, 265, 267

U Ujaama, 169 UN Conference on Trade in Development, 52 UN Millennium Declaration, 21 UN Millennium Project, 180 UN Security Council, 35, 77, 182, 190, 196, 214 UN Summit Outcome, 33, 44 United Nations, x, xi, 16, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 44, 46, 48, 66, 77, 98, 114, 145, 146, 182, 184, 185, 189, 201, 209, 218, 237, 263, 267, 276, 279, 283, 285, 355 United Nations’ Security Council, 16 University of KwaZulu, xi, xiii, 47, 49, 72, 216, 348, 349

V Vietnam, 154, 159, 228, 329, 333

T

W

Talbot, Ann, v, 21, 23, 24, 256, 270, 355 TALBOT, Ann, 127 Tandon, Yash, 67, 69, 70 Tanzania, 109, 129, 146, 191, 197, 202, 224, 278, 296, 334 TEMBO, Fletcher, 107 The Great Lakes region, 200 Third World economies, 37

W.E.B. Dubois, 289 Washington, 18, 27, 37, 46, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 102, 105, 125, 126, 140, 143, 165, 175, 268, 271, 282, 285, 287, 288, 290, 293, 294, 296, 303, 335, 337, 338, 339, 340, 345, 349, 351 Wolfensohn, James, 103, 176, 177, 185

362

Index

Z

Wolfowitz, Paul, 21, 22, 28, 36, 45, 48, 66, 120 World Bank, 21, 23, 27, 31, 36, 37, 38, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 73, 74, 78, 81, 101, 103, 113, 114, 115, 117, 120, 125, 126, 137, 139, 147, 151, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 168, 169, 170, 175, 176, 182, 263, 279, 285, 308, 348 World Development Movement, 134, 144 World Food Programme, xi, 137, 144 World Trade Organisation, xi, 23, 31, 78, 182 World Trade Organization, 48, 133, 189 World Trade Summit, 133 WTO rules, 43

Zambia, 52, 62, 65, 71, 97, 111, 113, 114, 135, 137, 162, 232, 253, 275, 278, 329 ZANU PF, xi, 25 Zanu-PF, 193, 194 Zimbabwe, vi, xi, 24, 25, 33, 39, 42, 52, 65, 79, 80, 136, 137, 191, 192, 193, 194, 197, 198, 211, 214, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 283, 284, 307, 348, 352, 353, 354 Zimbabwe Cricket Union, 262 Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, xi, 258 Zuma, Jacob, 34, 44, 205, 206, 207

363