Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on China? [1st ed.] 9783030530389, 9783030530396

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xi
Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African Policy on China? (Philani Mthembu, Faith Mabera)....Pages 1-10
A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards China (Bob Wekesa)....Pages 11-29
Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement: Kagame and Overcoming the ‘One and the Many’ Paradigm (Francis A. Kornegay Jr.)....Pages 31-55
The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards China: A Decolonial Afrocentric Perspective (Siphamandla Zondi)....Pages 57-82
Pan-African Perspectives on International Relations—Africa and China (Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah)....Pages 83-105
The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa: Towards Enhancing African Agency? (Philani Mthembu)....Pages 107-133
China’s Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Agenda: Rationale, Trends and Implications (Faith Mabera)....Pages 135-161
Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement with China (Paul Zilungisele Tembe)....Pages 163-187
One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its Impact on an African Policy Towards China (Yu-Shan Wu)....Pages 189-213
The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model for the Future of Africa–China Relations? (John Kotsopoulos)....Pages 215-233
Back Matter ....Pages 235-240

Citation preview

Africa-China Cooperation Towards an African Policy on China? Edited by Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera

International Political Economy Series

Series Editor Timothy M. Shaw Emeritus Professor University of Massachusetts Boston Boston, MA, USA University of London London, UK

The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades. It has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on indebted Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable resource for scholars and researchers, the series examines a variety of capitalisms and connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies and sectors, debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities as the established trans-Atlantic North declines and ‘the rest’, especially the BRICS, rise.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/13996

Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera Editors

Africa-China Cooperation Towards an African Policy on China?

Editors Philani Mthembu Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA Pretoria, South Africa

Faith Mabera Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA Pretoria, South Africa

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic) International Political Economy Series ISBN 978-3-030-53038-9 ISBN 978-3-030-53039-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African Policy on China? Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards China Bob Wekesa Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement: Kagame and Overcoming the ‘One and the Many’ Paradigm Francis A. Kornegay Jr.

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The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards China: A Decolonial Afrocentric Perspective Siphamandla Zondi

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Pan-African Perspectives on International Relations—Africa and China Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah

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The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa: Towards Enhancing African Agency? Philani Mthembu China’s Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Agenda: Rationale, Trends and Implications Faith Mabera

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Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement with China Paul Zilungisele Tembe

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One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its Impact on an African Policy Towards China Yu-Shan Wu

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The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model for the Future of Africa–China Relations? John Kotsopoulos

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Index

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List of Contributors

Francis A. Kornegay Jr. Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa John Kotsopoulos Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa Faith Mabera Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa Philani Mthembu Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah Department of History, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China Paul Zilungisele Tembe Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, Pretoria, South Africa Bob Wekesa University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Yu-Shan Wu Africa-China Reporting Project, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Siphamandla Zondi Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, South Africa

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List of Figures

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2

China’s contribution to UNPKO (2007–2017) (Source United Nations peacekeeping, ‘contributions by country’, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contri butors) Assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping (Permanent UNSC members) (Source United Nations peacekeeping, ‘How we are funded’, Effective rates of assessment for peacekeeping operations, 1 January 2016–31 December 2018, UNGA A/70/331/Add.1, https://www.un.org/ en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/331/Add.1)

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List of Tables

Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 7.1 Table 8.1

Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic importance Ranking of African nation states based on their human development index (HDI) scores Material capabilities vs human development Official financial resources available to African countries from China China’s current peacekeeping deployments in Africa (June 2017) Forms of dualism as represented by Western and Chinese cultures

115 119 123 125 147 169

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CHAPTER 1

Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African Policy on China? Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera

Africa’s Engagement with External Powers Recent years have seen a greater focus on the African continent from external powers for various geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. While the continent has consistently been home to six or seven of the fastest growing economies in the world in the last two decades, it is also home to significant demographic and technological changes that promise to propel it towards greater strategic importance in global politics. Indeed the population of the continent is set to grow towards two billion people by the year 2050, making it central to some of the relocation of production centres taking place in the global economy. Various countries have stepped up their engagements with the continent through both bilateral relations and through the now fashionable ‘Africa summits’. China,

P. Mthembu (B) · F. Mabera Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] F. Mabera e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_1

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India, Turkey, Japan, the EU and South Korea are just some of the global actors courting the continent through Africa summits. The summits cover a range of issue areas from the economy, international politics, migration, climate change, development finance, peace and security, and enhancing cultural and people to people exchanges. This phenomenon has thus caused many on the continent to question their utility, and whether African counterparts have actively used the summits to advance their strategic interests and priorities. While focused on Africa’s relations with China, the following book is just as relevant for Africa’s engagement with other external powers in a changing geopolitical environment. The often simplistic view of China’s influence on the African continent often downplays the influence of the United States and European powers on the continent, which have maintained deep economic, political and cultural relations with African countries after the colonial period. In an evolving multipolar world order that is still taking shape, most African countries do not have the luxury of choosing which relations to have, instead relying on cooperation with countries in the global North and South (Mthembu 2020: 3). It is thus ultimately up to African countries and institutions to use their relations with the world to advance their development aspirations as captured in documents such as Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (AU Commission 2015). As a continent playing host to the largest number of individual countries, most of which are landlocked, the question of Africa’s relations with external powers will remain important in the years to come. While bilateral relations will remain a key element of Africa’s relations with external powers, it is important to reflect on the various possibilities available for engaging with external powers in order to enhance African priorities as agreed to by the various regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU). It is argued that African countries and panAfrican institutions could use the various Africa summits to coordinate their positions and development priorities in order to support regional continental and maritime interconnectivity projects on the continent, thus further catalysing regional interconnectivity and integration on the continent. The Africa summits should thus be used to enhance agreed upon priorities articulated by the regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU). The increased coordination would assist in enhancing African agency and build capacity for implementing regional

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infrastructure projects as seen through Agenda 2063 and the twelve flagship projects of the AU. The first mid-year coordination meeting of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities was held in July 2019 in Niger, in a move that aims to build greater cohesion and coordination across the continent (Mthembu 2020: 2). While the contributors to this publication do not advocate for any singular approach or policy to govern Africa’s engagement with external powers, they do agree on the utility of enhanced coordination between the individual nation-states, regional economic communities and the African Union when it comes to the continent’s relations with external powers in an evolving multipolar world order. They also agree that greater coordination will enhance Africa’s agency in global politics, ensuring that the various summits converge around the implementation of Africa’s outlined development priorities. Various authors do however disagree on the degree to which nation-states, regional economic communities or the African Union should take the lead. Indeed instead of embarking on a path towards an Africa wide policy or strategy, some would prefer to see common positions on specific issue areas or to rather see sub-regional strategies at the level of the regional economic communities. There is also an important debate about the role of larger African economies, and to what extent they should be leading efforts towards continental autonomy and better coordination. This is a healthy conversation, and one that should involve not only the scholarly community, but also include the various diplomatic tracks involved in Africa’s international relations.

Why the Rise of China Matters for Africa’s Changing Geopolitics The contemporary rise of China to assume a geopolitical position more in line with its strong historical role in global politics and the global economy is significant for the African continent given the exponential growth in Africa’s relations with China on all the various diplomatic tracks in recent decades. This is especially significant given the different manner in which China has established and deepened relations with its African counterparts, putting forward the mantra of win-win partnerships, mutual benefit and the respect for principles such as sovereignty and the non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries, which was welcomed on the continent (Mthembu 2018, 2020).

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At a time when much of the Western world looked at Africa through the lens of official development assistance (ODA), thus mostly relating to it through a donor–recipient type of relationship, the Chinese state was rolling out the red carpet for African leaders in the establishment of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing in the year 2000. This Forum was also clearly not just about development cooperation, but about cooperation at multilateral fora, peace and security, trade and investment, and about encouraging Chinese state and non-state enterprises to move beyond the border of China to seek trade and investment opportunities on the African continent in their efforts to become not only Chinese enterprises, but global enterprises. China thus saw various economic and political opportunities despite the known challenges that plagued the continent. The ascendance of China in Africa’s international relations thus forced Western countries to refocus their gaze on Africa since they immediately became worried about being displaced on the continent they had long dominated (Mthembu 2018, 2020). Indeed China’s growing role in Africa can be seen as an important factor in providing more options for African stakeholders in their engagements with external powers. Rather than replacing or displacing Africa’s relations with the West, it has arguably forced Western partners to think about ways in which they can also intensify their engagements with the continent through various economic and political tools. China’s prominence in global affairs and the extensive reach of its political and economic footprint reinforces its status as a global power in the international arena. At the core of global China is a comprehensive grand strategy that frames its economic, foreign policy and military strategies in pursuit of great power status, as well as the advancement of national interests across a range of strategic domains. China views Africa as a pivotal partner in the realisation of its grand strategy goals, in alignment with its peaceful rise and proclaimed orientation as a responsible power. A growing amount of scholarly analysis on China’s strategic thinking highlights the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centrepiece of China’s foreign policy, a transcontinental endeavour to enhance connectivity across Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The implementation of the BRI has seen the development of hard and soft infrastructure, expansion of investment and promotion of cross-cultural ties. Africa stands to benefit from the BRI given the glaring need for infrastructure development, development cooperation, increased trade and improved competitiveness across the continent. For China, Africa’s

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geostrategic importance translates into access to the continent’s vast natural resources and mineral wealth and harnessing opportunities for further projection of its soft power. China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative is set to connect over 65 countries at a cost of approximately $1 trillion, with the aim of improving the connectivity between China, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa in a process closely linked with the domestic changes in the Chinese economy. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the initiative is developing a vast network of railroads and shipping lanes between China and countries along the continental belt and maritime road (Mthembu 2020: 2). Robyn Xing, Morgan Stanley’s Chief China Economist argues that investments in belt and road countries will increase by 14 percent annually in the period 2019–2020, with the total investment amount likely to double to $1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027 (Xing 2018). While the onset of a global pandemic in the form of COVID-19 has certainly impacted these projections negatively, the medium to long term trajectory remains valid. Since inception in 2013, the BRI has continued to receive the support of a growing number of countries across the world, with China having already signed 174 cooperation documents with 126 countries and having now invested more than $90 billion (R1.3 trillion) in related projects. During his address at a BRI seminar at the Chinese Embassy, China’s former ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Lin Songtian, said the response to the Second BRI Forum in Beijing, which was attended by 5000 delegates, including 37 heads of state, guests from more than 150 countries and over 90 international organisations, showed that despite some reservations and scepticism towards the initiative, the confidence of the international community had been growing (Boje 2019). The Ambassador acknowledged that South Africa was the first African country to sign a BRI memorandum of understanding with China, and that China was committed to being its ‘most reliable and important cooperative partner’ in achieving socio-economic transformation and development (Boje 2019). Much of the funding for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) comes from policy lenders, whose lending decisions are responsive to the Chinese government’s geostrategic preferences. The more prominent policy banks include the likes of the China Development Bank and the Export–Import Bank of China (Exim Bank), which have committed over $1 trillion. There is also a Silk Road Fund, which holds $40 billion in investment funds and is supervised by China’s Central Bank. The Asia

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Infrastructure Investment Bank is also an important player and has a capital base of $100 billion. Additional funds can also be made available through China’s foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth fund, which hold $3.7 trillion and $220 billion, respectively (Nantulya 2019). This presents opportunities for African stakeholders, who can tap into the opportunities presented by the BRI and FOCAC in order to advance the continents strategic priorities. The BRI is also increasingly seen as a catalyst for African regional economic integration and competitiveness as seen in research funded by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which found that East Africa’s exports could increase by as much as $192 million annually if new BRI projects are used diligently (Nantulya 2019). Others caution against what has been referred to as debt trap diplomacy, warning Africans to not borrow from China lest their strategic assets be seized, with the case of the port in Sri Lanka often used as an example of what may happen to countries not able to pay their debts (Nantulya 2019). However, it is difficult to make that argument on a continent that is clearly in need of more infrastructure development and limited resources to fund this much-needed priority area. The World Bank estimates that Africa needs up to $170 billion in investment a year for 10 years to meet its infrastructure requirements. The African Development Bank has posited that if Africa positions itself well, it can source some of this from the BRI and channel it to the African Union’s infrastructure master plan, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) (Nantulya 2019). The FOCAC is the main multilateral forum for China–Africa relations. Since its establishment in 2000, FOCAC has driven strategic engagement between China and Africa on the basis of mutual trust, winwin cooperation, equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs. In spite of positive reviews of China–Africa cooperation over the years, the dynamics of the relationship have been the subject of a range of critiques, including oft-cited allegations of China’s neoimperialist designs, the lopsided nature of the relationship in favour of China and concerns of the impact of debt trap diplomacy in Africa which has exposed a number of countries to debt distress. Nonetheless, the evolution of institutionalised China–Africa engagement in the course of almost two decades warrants a critical analysis of the constellation of interests, ideas and strategies that continue to shape

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the trajectory of relations and the implications for the politics of cooperation. In an attempt to address a number of defining issues pertinent to China–Africa relations, this volume grapples specifically with the issue of agency, partly in response to the clarion call for enhanced African agency in the gamut of its strategic partnerships with a growing number of global actors. With the African Union Representative Office in Beijing now operational, the continent has added another important layer of coordination in Africa’s relations with China that will become of greater importance in years to come. The importance of this was made clear during the 8th China–Africa Think Tanks Forum in 2019 as part of the process of implementing the FOCAC Action Plan adopted in 2018. This is important given the July 2019 coordination meeting of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, a first of its kind and an important nod towards greater coordination efforts on the continent. The debate over the need for a more common and coordinated approach towards Africa’s international relations is thus as important as ever in a changing geopolitical landscape where the continent must safeguard its continental and sub-regional autonomy.

Chapter Outline Following the opening chapter of the volume, Bob Wekesa makes the case for a coherent African policy framework towards China based on the historical context of Africa–China relations and the asymmetrical nature of the partnership given Africa’s ambiguity and ambivalence since the onset of revamped engagement in the twenty-first century. It is suggested that Africa can enhance its agency in relations with China by following up on the strategic fit with existing continental policies such as the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and alignment of partnership initiatives with economic, security and developmental priorities. Francis Kornegay puts forward ‘the one and many’ paradigm in Africa’s external relations as a key enabler of its subordinate relations with external powers. In the context of a raft of institutional reforms under the guidance of the Kagame report, Kornegay argues for reorientation of the forces of continentalism and regionalism in favour of a proactive African FOCAC diplomacy while strengthening the ‘common position approach’ central to Africa’s engagement with an array of strategic partners. In Kornegay’s view, the regional economic communities of the AU have a

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central role to play in regionalising Sino-African diplomatic engagement while enhancing a distinct pan-African agency. Siphamandla Zondi draws on a decolonial perspective to analyse Africa–China cooperation, proposing the political idea of collective selfreliance and the political dialogue that underpins FOCAC as useful tools to shape the trajectory of Africa’s relations with China. By emphasising the strategic issues of convergence between China and Africa, including the push for global reforms, the focus on development, prioritisation of infrastructure development and cultural dialogue, African countries can ensure alignment with their development priorities at the national, regional and eventually build up to a continental common African position on cooperation with China. Kwesi Djapong Prah weighs the possibility of ‘national extinction’ of the African state against the background of asymmetrical China– Africa relations, considering how concepts such as national sovereignty, national self-interest and self-determination could define a re-imagined Africa–China partnership. He calls for a broad-based reconsideration of pan-African identity and the overhaul of political efforts focused on building pan-African unity. Reflecting on China’s development finance towards Africa, Philani Mthembu argues that the concessional and non-concessional finance offered by China to African countries, not only offers alternative financing pathways for development cooperation, but also opens up space for enhanced African agency in view of the new multipolarity in development cooperation. For Africa this would mean optimising the opportunities and shared benefits of the FOCAC framework in a coordinated manner and in alignment with continental development priorities. Faith Mabera contextualises China’s emerging profile as a peace and security actor in Africa, premised on pragmatic reorientation and reassessment of its strategic peace and security objectives, in line with its global power profile and aspirations. She asserts that China’s increased contribution to UN peacekeeping, both in terms of troop and financial contributions, and the establishment of the China–Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security within the FOCAC framework, are indicative of a deepening of Chinese engagement on the African peace and security landscape. The multi-tracked nature of China–Africa security cooperation presents opportunities for African states, RECs and the AU

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to harmonise their engagement strategies with China while leveraging the partnership in addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats. In calling for greater understanding of Chinese cultural concepts that inform daily life and practices, Paul Tembe maintains that improved African understanding of the roles of habitus in cultural practice, civilizational and cultural continuities could assist in eliminating blind spots in Africa–China relations, as well as enhancing strategic equality in Africa’s external partnerships with other external actors. Tembe cautions against formulating an African policy on China based on rhetorical perspectives such as the parallel narrative of anti-colonial struggles by the African and Chinese people and the Western-driven anti-China rhetoric, urging instead for a graduated differentiated but coherent regionalised strategy vis-à-vis China. Yu-Shan Wu explores how China’s public diplomacy, oriented towards building a positive image of China abroad and projecting its soft power, offers crucial insights into the complexity of crafting an African policy on China. She maintains that in view of the heterogeneity of African countries in terms of interests and identities, and the dual-track Chinese engagement at both bilateral and multilateral levels, a more pragmatic approach for the benefit of African agency would be the formulation of several common continental and regional positions on issues of common interest, rather than an overarching African policy on China. Finally, by contrasting China–Africa relations and EU–Africa relations, John Kotsopoulos presents how different conceptions of African agency have emerged within the ambit of the two cooperation models. He argues that the FOCAC framework has played out more as quasiinterregionalism with demonstrative preference for China’s bilateral engagement with African states. This is in stark difference to the EU– Africa partnership which privileges an AU lead-role as continental representative and chief negotiator, thereby allowing more room for African agency.

Future Research While the research and analysis contained in this volume is primarily focused on Africa’s relations with China, it should be seen more broadly as related to the continent’s broader engagement with external powers in an evolving international landscape. It should thus serve as a catalyst for

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further research and dialogue on Africa’s role in a changing geopolitical landscape, and how the continent can use its engagements with strategic partners to advance its development priorities. The volume should thus encourage other scholars to do more comparative studies on the various Africa summits, analysing what are the concrete deliverables and the different modalities of summit diplomacy best suited to advance African strategic interests. This will remain important at a time where the AU and regional economic communities are looking to increase their level of coordination. It is thus encouraging to see the publication of new scholarly work on Africa’s changing geopolitics such as Africa and the World: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics co-edited by Philani Mthembu and Francis Kornegay (2020). Unlike much of the literature, it places Africa squarely at the centre, looking at the changing geopolitical environment from an African vantage point. This volume also places Africa at the centre, seeking ways to advance the individual and collective agency of African state and non-state actors in their relations with an important strategic partner in the form of China.

References African Union Commission (AUC). 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want: A Shared Strategic Framework for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. Boje, V. 26 April 2019. ‘Belt and Road Initiative a Win-Win for Global Development’, https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/belt-and-roadinitiative-a-win-win-for-global-development-21976871, accessed 1 May 2019. Mthembu, P. 2018. China and India’s Development Cooperation in Africa: The Rise of Southern Powers. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Mthembu, P. 2020. China’s Belt & Road Initiative: How Can Africa Advance Its Strategic Priorities? MISTRA Working Paper [Available online], https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Chpt-6_fina lised-for-layout.pdf, accessed 27 January 2020. Nantulya, P. 22 March 2019. ‘Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt One Road Strategy’, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-afr ica-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/, accessed 3 May 2019. Xing, R. 14 March 2018. ‘Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road’, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/china-belt-and-road, accessed 1 May 2019.

CHAPTER 2

A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards China Bob Wekesa

Context Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Africa and China have intensified engagements, triggering an avalanche of perspectives on the implications of the relations for Africa, China and the world. Over this short period, commentators have taken stock of multiple discrepancies undergirding the relations. Trade and economic imbalances are largely in favour of China, notwithstanding the benefits accruing to Africa. China is more or less a homogenous entity (although not in perfect harmony) against Africa’s heterogeneity borne of its 55-nation nature not to mention internal variances. Soft power instruments and cultural flows largely commence in China and terminate in Africa rather than the other way round, cases in point being the establishment of Confucius Institutes, university scholarships, launching of media outlets, people-topeople exchanges, to mention but a few. By contrast, save for some muted South African soft power in China such as the presence of Brand South Africa in Beijing, state-led African soft power in China is largely absent.

B. Wekesa (B) University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_2

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On the global stage, China, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), largely sets the agenda with regards to Africa–China engagements with actors such as Western powers, the UN system and in such East Asian matters as the Republic of China (Taiwan), Tibet and the South China Sea. Indeed, one of Africa’s historically significant allies of China, the late Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, contemplated the various layers of asymmetry and concluded that Africa–China engagements were the “most unequal of equal relationships” (Alden and Large 2011: 30). This assertion is as true today as it was in the Africa-China relations of the 60s and 70s. The rather straightforward question that academics and policymakers and indeed African people should ask themselves is: why has the Africa– China relationship maintained a lopsided career over the last nearly two-decades of revamped engagement? Many thinkers have proffered responses of varying rationality to explain the slanted balance of power, among the more dubious ones being that China is a pernicious actor calculating to rip off Africa through a neo-imperial agenda. The current chapter argues that the asymmetry in the relations traversing political, economic and cultural spheres is a reflection of Africa’s lack of a coherent policy framework towards China while China is guided by a policy architecture that charts its highly successful strategy in and with Africa. Even in instances where aspects of an African policy towards China can be read in broader policies such as the Agenda 2063, Africa’s capacity for implementation is wanting. In both academic and popular narratives, one sees a preponderance of perspectives labelled as “China’s Africa policy” but very little on the reverse, namely, “Africa’s China policy”. If one searches for the keywords “Africa’s policy towards China” in online search engines, what comes up instead is, “China’s policy towards Africa”. The pole position of academic and intellectual analyzes focused on China’s policy towards Africa rather than the reverse merely reflects the fact that China not only has a policy framework for engagement with Africa, but is tangibly implementing the policy with Africa largely on the receiving end. Even the so-called “Look East” policy said to be practiced by African countries has been found to be nothing less that knee jerk sloganeering rather than a well thought set of policy objectives (Zhang Chun 2014: 22). As such, the imbalance in the relations stems from the fact that China knows and has planned for what it wants in the relations while Africa is beset by ambiguity and ambivalence.

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Devolving from the problem of multifaceted imbalances between Africa and China as emanating from a policy gap on the African end, a key pursuit of this chapter is to argue the case for an African policy framework towards China. However, at the outset, one must step back and pose the question: does Africa really need a policy framework towards China? As soon as this question is posed, the answer becomes affirmative. For, a negative answer would suggest that Africa is satisfied with a situation in which China sets out the terms of reference in an engagement often characterized as mutual. From the foreign policy analysis field, we learn that foreign policy is a goal-directed action aimed at achieving the interests of one state in another state in the international system. Thus, since China has a documented policy framework towards Africa, it is much more lucid on pursuing its interests in comparison to an Africa that has no policy framework towards China. A key point of contestation in debates about an African policy towards China is whether Africa needs a collective policy framework towards China or “whether individual African states should draw their independent China policy based on their own priorities”, a split in opinion that was on display at a recent symposium on the matter (Wits Africa China Reporting Project 2017). A short response, fleshed out in intervening sections of this chapter is that Africa needs, in fact, not just continentwide and country-level frameworks of engagement with China but also policies from its eight official Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (African Union Commission 2017: 128). In other words, the development of policy at the supra-continental level should not preclude similar initiatives at regional and national levels. Indeed, policy at the continental, regional and national levels can be developed in tandem, drawing on each other in a back and forth and mutually reinforcing way. This is the kind of agency that can inspire the beginnings of strategies that would help redress not only the Africa–China imbalance but indeed even out Africa’s relations with other residual and emerging powers. A caveat is worthwhile here. This chapter should not be seen as a call to war by Africa against China. Rather, it proceeds from a gap identified in the imbalanced nature of the relations to call for the filling of the gap with the ultimate goal of enhancing the beneficiation of both parties.

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African Agency and Agenda 2063 As a concept, African agency, is gaining traction as a means of advocating an Afro-centric approach to understanding and advocating African issues. In some quarters, it is seen by turns as a complimentary and successor concept to the ideas of Pan-Africanism and African renaissance that underpin intellectual discussions on and about Africa (for instance Murithi 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014: 21; Tieku 2014). Its key argument is that Africa is and should be an actor rather than being acted on in the international system (Brown and Harman 2013). It argues the case for African solutions for African problems away from Euro-centricity, Pax Americana or orientalism (Brown and Harman 2013; Murithi 2014). It seeks bottom-up rather than top-down, inside-out rather than outsidein approaches in opposition to the much-lamented ramming down the continent’s throat of policy interventions generated from developed and emerging economies. African agency hedges against the supposition that Africa is a peripheral region only dictated to by powerful global actors without a cause–effect response. Where African agency in global affairs has failed, the concept calls for proactivity; where African agency has succeeded it calls for enhancement, in other words, Afro-optimism rather than Afro-pessimism. In its conceptual and pragmatic definitions, African agency calls for “strategic actions” from an African viewpoint and can thus function as an African starting point in the development of an African policy framework towards China. Fortuitously, Africa has a policy framework internal to the continent, namely, the African Union’s Agenda 2063. While the agenda is not specific to China in its foreign policy dimensions, Agenda 2063 can serve as a starting point in fashioning engagements with China. Indeed the launch of the Agenda 2063 by African leaders in 2013 is demonstration of some form of African agency especially considering that it has been widely accepted as the continent’s blueprint for short, medium and long term prosperity. As such Africa ought not to start from scratch when formulating a policy framework towards China. While an African agency-based policy towards China would inform the policymaking and implementation “ground”, African agency, with Agenda 2063 at the centre can be leveraged to the analytical processes leading to the framework. African agency can provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that can be leveraged to placing African interests at the heart of the Africa– China engagements. In other words, as a continental roadmap, Agenda

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2063 constitutes African agency in the continent’s global developmental policy and practice arena to which any other plans are and should be subordinated and co-opted. It is a demonstration of agency that Africa has extracted as such benefits from China as; funding for projects as alternative to Western sources, numerous scholarships for African students, greater presence on the international stage where China has lobbied for African positions (for instance at the G20 and in the United Nations Security Council), Chinese peacekeeping forces in turbulent regions and others (on African agency, see Wekesa 2017: 149; Mohan and Lampert 2012: 109–110; Chege 2008: 19). The development of an African policy framework towards China would help enhance the power of agency building on the gains already made. For instance, the AU established a diplomatic mission in Beijing in 2018. It would be a great case of agency if there was a policy and strategy towards China that would guide the mission’s work. Having argued the case for African agency and the Agenda 2063 as the starting point in the development of an African policy framework towards China, the next step is to firstly consider the historical Africa–China dynamics that inform the relations, secondly, to analyze the key Chinese policy set up as a means of exploring African agency-based policy formulation pathways. A review of both China’s African policy and the FOCAC mechanism,1 which are the key sites of Chinese policy and indeed strategy towards Africa, is imperative if we are to develop a coherent African policy framework. However while China’s Africa policy is the “real” policy, FOCAC is much more established and elaborate as a strategy. I therefore briefly discuss China’s Africa policies of 2006 and 2015 before delving more into FOCAC. But first, the historical dimensions.

Historical Perspectives If nothing else, and at the expense of seeming reactionary, Africa needs a policy framework towards China because China has for a long time had frameworks guiding its engagement with Africa. China’s present policy framework draws immensely on history with the oft-cited aphorism being that China has a long memory. Because of the rapid expansion in Africa– China relations in the twenty-first century, it is often forgotten that the relations are not just historical but actually ancient. Trawling through the literature indicates that China has always had plans of engagement with Africa even though some of these plans may not have been captured in

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formal documents. China made contact with Africa in the Tang Dynasty (618–609) with further contacts made between the seventh and eleventh centuries BC. The most cited instance of contact is the Zheng He voyages to East Africa during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). One notices that apart from the Moroccan traveler/scholar Ibn Battuta’s travels to China around 1345 also during the Ming Dynasty (Chibundu 2000: 2; Li 2005: 60) the trajectory of contact has always been a case of China coming to Africa rather than the other way round. In modern times, China’s interest in Africa was kindled after the triumph of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 with founding father of modern China, Chairman Mao Zedong commissioning in 1961 studies on African history (Li 2005). Founding Chinese premier Zhou Enlai made the now-iconic visit to nine African countries between December 1963 and February 1964 and this was seen to have “consolidated” relations but more importantly, introduced China’s “five principles governing the development of relations with African countries” and “eight principles for economic aid and technical assistance to other countries” (Hanauer and Morris 2014: 19; Alden 2007: 10). The Chinese foreign policy enunciated by Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s is still very much in vogue, primed with succulent symbolism today as is reference to the Chinese voyages of the fifteenth century. Fast forward to the 1990s: when former Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited six African countries in 1996, he summoned rubrics of historical contacts as a means of resetting the relations, leading to the inauguration of FOCAC in 2000 (Alden 2007: 15; Fernando 2007: 369; African Union Commission 2010; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010: 4; Li et al. 2012: 13; Wekesa 2014). The key take away from these abbreviated historical tropes is that China had sufficient interests in Africa to fashion physical reach out to the continent while Africa—at least from the evidence that we have on record presently—was merely on the receiving end. Equally importantly as back up for the need for an African policy towards China, the historical contacts and ties have been recast anew as source of raison d’être for Africa–China relations but largely from the Chinese end towards Africa. Because the arc in the summoning or invoking of history (Alden 2007: 17–18; Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 63) for present purposes bends towards Africa from China, Africa has an opportunity to equally respond in its own interest with a coherent “going-towards-China” framework, drawing on its rich history.

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From an African agency starting point, the question can be posed: how can Africa summon its own history in fashioning a policy framework towards China? Just as Chinese leaders have in the past commissioned researches to unravel historical aspects of the relations, African leaders can also do so, at the supra-continental level (under the AU) as well as the national and RECs levels. Just as Chinese leaders and scholars have pointed out Chinese assistance to Africa, African leaders can also pinpoint instances in which the continent assisted China in one way or another, one among many examples being Africa’s diplomatic assistance in voting in the People’s Republic of China to replace Taiwan at the UN in 1971. Indeed, the vast tomes of material in African museums, universities, libraries, government repositories, parliamentary records and other places can be scoured in understanding African historical perspectives on China. China’s Africa Policy One to Two If the historical dimensions in support for the need for an African policy towards China may seem vague on account of being dated, bringing the discussion up to speed by looking at China’s Africa policy documents can persuade us on the need for an African policy framework towards China in the immediate. China announced its first Africa policy in 2006 and its second policy in 2015. Africa has had no policy towards China over this period giving rise to the view that the continent is lagging behind China for nearly two decades as of 2019, a case of failure of African agency. An overall observation is that China had a lot more to say to Africa in its 2015 policy than in its 2006 policy. The 2006 policy is just over 3000 words while the 2015 one is 8000-plus words. The new, 2015 policy is much more detailed and elaborate, so much so that it begins to lose a strict policy feel and reads like a strategy as it draws on and incorporates elements of the FOCAC declarations and action plans. The upshot is that China has a detailed plan towards Africa while Africa largely has none. This may in part explain why the FOCAC mechanism is indeed “a veritable extension of China’s Africa Policy” (Wekesa 2014: 66) rather than being a completely equal mechanism. China’s first policy coincided with the first FOCAC Summit in Beijing in October 2006 while the second policy coincided with the Johannesburg Summit of December 2015, roughly a decade in between. Notably,

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no major and overarching policy promulgations were made during the seventh FOCAC conference in 2018. Rather, the decisions of the 2015 policy were affirmed and an implantation scorecard issued. To understand the significance of the two policies, we need to consider the fact that both were announced at heads of state and government summits rather than at “ordinary” triennial ministers meetings or conferences. It would thus appear that a tradition has been established where China symbolically articulates its broad guiding principles towards Africa at “extraordinary” heads of state and government conclaves, i.e. FOCAC summits, rather than “ordinary” triennial ministerial FOCAC conferences. If this is the case, it can be speculated that the next China policy on Africa will be announced at the 2024 or 2027 conferences, which, again speculatively, are likely to be heads of state summits. African agency would demand that at that point in time, a firm African policy document would have been developed. The new, 2015 document articulates “China’s Africa policy under the new circumstances”, just as the 2006 paper also talked of “new circumstances”. In 2015, China had clearly learned certain facts about engaging with Africa over the previous fifteen years and concluded that relations required re-engineering. Yet new circumstances would also account for the changes in China, Africa and globally that motivated tinkering with the original policy. So what are these changes and “new circumstances”? It is important to understand that China has done introspection and strategized on what it wants from Africa and what it wants to do with Africa in the global system. For one, the Chinese economy had dramatically changed over the period as witness the slowdown in its economic growth rates from double to single digits. In another example, China’s engagements with the United States of America had become fraught with near Cold War rivalry. In all these and more, China was seeking alliance, perhaps even allegiance from Africa. By contrast, it is safe to conclude that Africa as a whole has not gone to the drawing board to explicitly formulate and structure what it needs from China in view of the many dynamics inside and outside the continent. It may be argued that individual African countries may have developed policies towards China, but even on this score evidence is scant beyond the bilateral agreements. What would Africa seek from China in view of the roll-out of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2019? While rhetorical statements framed as developing nation solidarity between China and Africa as well as China’s “five principles of peaceful

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co-existence” were captured in the 2006 policy, they are curiously absent in the 2015 document. While the first policy referred often to the “long history” of engagements, the second policy at best only alludes to this. Nonetheless, China’s charm offensive towards Africa is as palpable as ever. China and Africa are “good friends who stand together through thick and thin, good partners who share weal and woe, and good brothers who fully trust each other”. The new policy clarifies the values-laden rhetoric that has been the mainstay of its official communication towards Africa by explaining what is meant by “sincerity, practical results, affinity and good faith”. Still, discourse analysis can separate the tangible economic, political and cultural interests from the euphemism, in a manner to suggest that the chummy language is a means to an end. As I argue in the intervening section of this chapter, African agency in the formulation of an African policy towards China would have to pay close attention to the deployment of linguistic devices such as metaphors and catchphrases. After all, language is not value-neutral. The core of the 2015 policy lies in the elevation of Africa in China’s foreign policy pecking order. From the “new type of strategic partnership” status of 2006, relations were kicked a notch higher as “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership”. Like any other country China has foreign policy priorities. Some scholars have argued that Africa ranks very low in China’s global foreign policy calculations faring only better than Latin America (Yun Sun 2014: 15). Of foremost importance to China are the “big powers”, considered “key” to Chinese foreign policy; followed by nations in China’s periphery (East and Southeast Asia), considered “priority”; and then Africa and other regions considered the “foundation”, interpreted to mean that Africa poses little of a headache to Beijing’s global policy (Yun Sun 2014: 14). What does this loaded yet seemingly amorphous phase, “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership”, as captured in the 2015 policy document mean? To better appreciate the import of this phrase, we can recall former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s words at the launch of the Sino-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2004 (Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing 2014). By ‘comprehensive’, it means that the cooperation should be alldimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered. It covers economic, scientific, technological, political and cultural fields, contains both bilateral and

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multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments and nongovernmental groups. By ‘strategic’, it means that the cooperation should be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of China-EU relations. It transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is not subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to time. By ‘partnership’, it means that the cooperation should be equal-footed, mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavour to expand converging interests and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences on the minor ones.

Given that the relations were framed as “strategic” without being “comprehensive” in the 2006 policy, Africa–China observers would do well to consider ways in which “all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered” aspects will be implemented. One way to look at this question is to consider China’s designation of relations with African countries. Most African countries seem to fall either in the “partnership” and “strategic partnership” category while a few, such as Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, fall under “comprehensive strategic partnership”. This categorization seems based on the level of economic significance of an African country to China. The upshot is that Africa as a continent now has the same strategic value and status as the likes of Egypt, Kenya and South Africa, at least on paper. Although Africa has long been of strategic importance to China, the 2015 policy framing suggested that the relations would go a notch higher still and begin approaching the importance of the big powers (the United States and Europe) and South East Asia in China’s foreign policy. African policymakers would need to study China’s partnership with these powers to gain insights that can be adapted to the Africa–China relationship. The 2015 policy captured China’s “centenary goals”, i.e. the “Chinese Dream” and building a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021. Broadly, this is what China wants Africa to help it achieve. But in a win-win, mutually beneficial fashion, China would reciprocate and help Africa achieve its own long-term goals embedded in the AU’s Agenda 2063. The fact that the new policy takes cognizance of Agenda 2063 suggests that Chinese policymakers have taken careful note of it. An African policy framework towards China would have to be feature statements on how China can help Africa achieve its long term goal of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. It would have

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to link Chinese interests closely to Agenda 2063’s seven aspirations: sustainable growth, Pan-African integration, good governance, peace and security, African identity, people-centredness and global influence (African Union Commission 2015). Agenda 2063 is big on the integration of the continent politically and economically, advocating as it does, cross-border infrastructural development as a facilitator for the movement of people, goods and services. Despite the Agenda talking of achieving Africa’s goals with internally generated funding, the continent may look to China to leverage its policy proposals which include (as stated in the policy), “comparative advantages in development experience, applied technology, funds and market … [to address] backward infrastructure … inadequate professional and skilled personnel, [and to] translate its natural and human resources advantages and potential … speeding up industrialization and agricultural modernization”. All these are captured in Agenda 2063 and it is safe to say China realizes the importance of reinforcing the African policy, seeing Africa holistically while at the same time differentiating on a country basis; and thus the designation “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership”. Indeed China established a mission at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in 2015, and invited Africa to reciprocate, an offer that the AU seems not to have taken up. Yet it is important to remember that China is guided by its own interests in the face of the new circumstances, seeking to attain the two centenary goals and dealing with “new normal” economics. While the 2015 policy taps opportunities in Agenda 2063, there are instances where it somewhat diverges from it. A reading of the document indicates that continental integration with cross-border transport infrastructure at the top of the agenda, while China’s new policy seems to prioritize industrialization. It is notable that in the 2015 policy, industrialization is placed at the top of the section dealing with economic and trade matters. This prioritization speaks to China’s intent on moving some of its over-capacity manufacturing to Africa in the “new normal” circumstances. The policy speaks for itself: “China will make prioritizing support for Africa’s industrialization a key area and a main focus in its cooperation with Africa in the new era”. Although Agenda 2063 is bigger on cross-border infrastructure development than it is on industrialization, China’s 2015 policy places infrastructure development at the third tier of importance after agriculture and industrialization. This can be seen in the structure of the 2015 FOCAC

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document where agriculture comes first, followed by industrialization and then infrastructure. Space does not allow for a full-fledged discussion of the sectoral prioritization but I’m convinced that the ordering of these sectors is not accidental but based on priorities envisioned by the Chinese framers of the policy. In a manner of speaking, China has its eyes set on Africa’s industrialization while Africa has its eyes set on transport infrastructure development—at least based on prioritization in the AU’s Agenda 2063 and China’s Africa Policy 2015 as seen in the order in which they appear. If the AU is to draw on its Agenda 2063 strategy in developing a policy or engagement strategy towards China, it would perhaps have to negotiate for the centrality of infrastructure with linkages to industrialization, agriculture, trade and investment, human resource development, peace and security, etc. After all, these productive sectors are not mutually exclusive; as the Chinese saying goes, “if you want to get rich, build a road”. Having analyzed China’s Africa policy from an African agency perspective, the next step is to apply the same African agency analytical framework to FOCAC, which, as earlier explained, is both a policy mechanism as well as an implementation plan or strategy. The FOCAC Context In configuring an African policy framework towards China, probably the first point of consideration is its origins as a mechanism bringing together the continent and China (Wekesa 2014; Hanauer and Morris 2014: 20; Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 57). Wekesa (2014) traces the beginnings of FOCAC to President Jiang Zemin’s historic visit to Africa in 1996. Back up for Jiang’s 1996 visit as a marker for the movement towards the FOCAC era is provided by Li et al. (2012: 14). There have been counter positions on the creation of FOCAC: whether it was created at the request of Africans, if it was the result of Chinese competition with a similar Africa–US initiative or if it squarely is a Chinese creation (see Li et al. 2012: 30; 2012: 16). Specifically the Africa–China relations took shape from October 2000 when the inaugural FOCAC conference was held in Beijing. As of this writing, the mechanism has been in place for eighteen years. Coincidentally, at the time of the FOCAC launch, Africa’s new direction was at its embryonic stages with the AU being established in 2002 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). An African agency route to the mooting of an African policy framework

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towards China would have to appraise the performance of the AU visà-vis FOCAC as a means of introspection on the successes and failure, particularly of AU’s initiatives. In principle, two documents that speak to FOCAC as a policy mechanism are, the “declaration”, and the “plan of action”. These documents were released at FOCAC conferences, namely, 2000 Beijing, 2003 Addis Ababa, 2006 Beijing, 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh, 2012 Beijing, 2015 Johannesburg and 2018 Beijing. The FOCAC mechanism remains the fulcrum of the relations (Shelton and Paruk 2008: 2) although there is contestation as to whether the mechanism was the initiative or agency of Chinese or African actors (Wekesa 2014: 60). FOCAC documents are crafted in a language of altruism and pragmatism. However, an independent analysis reveals the underlying reasons informing its formation. For starters, FOCAC came into being in 2000 smack on the turn of the millennium. The term “globalization” (which is replete in FOCAC documents) was omnipresent at this point in time with some suggesting it was a replacement of the Cold War geopolitics. FOCAC can thus be seen as China’s (and secondarily Africa’s) response to the tectonic changes in the world—real and anticipated. If the inaugural FOCAC seemed to test the waters, the second event, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003 bore confidence in the emerging form and substance of the mechanism. The holding of the conference on the African continent went to demonstrate the joint ownership of FOCAC. In addition Addis Ababa is the seat of the African Union and thus holding the conference there was full of symbolism. By the time of the second FOCAC, the mechanism had established an action point development tradition that has become its hallmark. The 2006 FOCAC summit established a new tradition—that of the holding heads of state summits rather than ministerial meetings. This tradition was confirmed with the elevation of the FOCAC ministerial meeting in Johannesburg in 2015 to heads of state summit. Observers will have to wait and see if a tradition of holding heads of state summits after every decade is codified into FOCAC norms. Moreover, China pledge of $5 billion in loans established another trend in which monies allocated to Africa are doubled at subsequent conferences (thus, $10 billion in 2009, $20 billion in 2012 and $60 billion in 2015). This tradition seems to have been abandoned as the 2018 financial pledges remained at the 2015 levels ($60 billion) rather a doubling to $120 billion. An important point to note is that Agenda 2063 was captured in FOCAC VI. This is indeed

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an instance of African agency as it speaks to African actors ensuring that Chinese agenda embedded in FOCAC take cognizance of the continent’s developmental roadmap. While FOCAC is an overarching mechanism, its triennial cycle is nuanced on the Chinese end, at the operational levels, broken down into sub forums representing narrower interests that then interlock with African counterparts. Its structures and processes comprise the Chinese follow-up action committee, the line ministries (foreign affairs, commerce and finance), auxiliary ministries, government agencies, nongovernmental agencies among others (Li et al. 2012: 20–30). The above discussion is convincing enough about FOCAC being either a joint mechanism between Africa and China or being more a Chinese than African mechanism. African agency would demand that Africa creates its own independent policy framework towards China while not abandoning FOCAC. In the next section, I offer some initial suggestions on some of the pathways towards establishing an independent African policy towards China.

Pathways for African Policy Towards China As discussed earlier, African agency should guide the African policy towards China agenda. The key policy site for the development of an African policy towards China is the Agenda 2063 (African Union Commission 2015) and its offshoot documents, especially the “first tenyear implementation plan 2014-2023” (The African Union Commission 2015). The Agenda 2063 envisions a continent “representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (African Union Commission 2015: 1). In using the African policy architecture to develop an African policy towards China, the policy community need not start from scratch. China has reached agreements with African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) while at the same time entering specific agreements with individual nations (Li et al. 2012: 12; CCS 2010: 16; Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 59; Alden 2007: 32). An African policy framework should take cognizance of the duality of multilateral Pan-African engagements, relations at the RECs level and the national level. In so doing, the constitutive documents of the AU and the RECs such as their charter and overarching plans such as the Agenda 2063 can provide pathways for an African policy towards China. Notably, the AU was formally incorporated

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into the FOCAC mechanism at the Johannesburg summit and this is an instance of African agency that can be built on. Africa aspires to be “an equal participant in global affairs [and] multilateral institutions…” (African Union Commission 2015: 10). The theme of an Africa with a strong and united voice on the global stage is reflected in the ten-year implementation plan for the period 2014– 2023. Indeed, scholars have long taken cognizance of the multilateral and international politics dimension of the engagements (for instance Alden 2007: 27; Shelton and Paruk 2008; Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 52). In developing an African policy towards China, Africa should identify the priorities that can help it to raise its voice and participation in international affairs. An area in which Africa and China have expressed mutual agreement as seen in FOCAC documents is that Africa should have a permanent slot in the United Nations Security Council under the rubric of the reformation of the United Nations. To my mind this is a crucial aspiration that should be prioritized in the policy framework as it would help “correct the historical injustice of Africa not being represented on the Council by a permanent seat” (African Union Commission 2015: 10). This particular aspect could be crafted in the policy framework in such a way that China prioritizes the entry of Africa in the United Nations Security Council within a set period of time. Rather than being static, FOCAC is quite dynamic. In what could amount to Deng Xiaoping’s “cross the river while feeling the stones” aphorism, China experimented with FOCAC between its establishment in 2000 and sometime after the second FOCAC conference of 2003. Having gained confidence about FOCAC, the Chinese side organized the mega event that was FOCAC III in Beijing, an event that was converted from a mere conference to a summit. From afar, FOCAC may seem like a mechanism that came ready-made and one that has remained fixed. Closer examination reveals that it has been changing giving vent to anticipation of further changes going forward (Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 55; Li et al. 2012: 32; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010: 15). An African policy framework towards China would have to review and understand changes in the FOCAC set up and mechanisms as well as anticipate and influence future changes. For instance, Chinese leaders are currently focused on promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, a major geopolitical plan in which Africa features. Notably, the Belt and Road Initiative did not make it into FOCAC VI documents but featured at the 2018 conference. In Africa itself, the Agenda 2063 and its first ten-year plan as well as the

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report by President Paul Kagame (2017) on the proposed institutional reform of the AU speak to the kind of dynamism in Africa that should inform an African policy framework towards China. In developing an African policy towards China, African intellectuals and policymakers need to take stock of the “soft power” language deployed in FOCAC and respond appropriately. Where the language bears hallmarks of Chinese thinking, there would be a need for an African rhetoric based on the concepts of Pan-Africanism and African renaissance as used in the African Union’s constitutive documents including the Agenda 2063 document. Indeed, borrowing from the fact that FOCAC heavily draws on Chinese philosophy, history and foreign policy, an African policy framework towards China can equally draw on African thoughts such as African socialism and Ubuntuism. An authentic African language in the framing of an African policy towards China would indeed signal negotiation based on African and Chinese worldviews. What can be gained from Africa’s relations with supranational organizations such as UN to the benefit of FOCAC? For instance, how can the policy framework be constructed in such a way that Africa benefits from China’s involvement with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? What would be the guiding principles for Africa’s engagement with China in a multipolar world in which global powers such as the USA, EU, Japan and Russia remain hugely influential? How should Africa’s relations be configured in such a way that the continent’s proximity to China does not harm relations with emerging powers such as India, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea and others? Can China really help Africa to attain the longstanding clamour for a United Nations Security Council seat as well as a greater voice in the international sphere? All these inquisitions would guide the framing of the African policy towards China.

Conclusion In conclusion and to re-emphasize earlier points, the absence of an African policy speaks to the slanted nature of the relations, a fact that should inspire corrective action. Developing an African policy should however not be an emotional and reactive undertaking, but one that is deliberate and well thought. It would be important for a select team of African scholars and intellectuals to come together to spearhead this policy agenda before the next FOCAC conference. One of the major tasks of the proposed African policy development group would be to undertake a

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deep reflection on Africa–China engagements in the FOCAC era. This can be done via thoroughgoing longitudinal and comparative review of official documents, both African and Chinese. Some of the pertinent questions leading to the formulation of an African document on China can revolve around FOCAC: what is it in relation to Africa? What do we learn from its language? What do it’s continental versus country-level perspectives tell us? What impact does it have on Africa’s relations with other parts of the world?

Note 1. China’s Africa policiesand the FOCAC documents are available at www.foc ac.org.

References Africa Union Commission. 2010. China and Africa: Assessing the Relationship on the Eve of the Fourth Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC IV), The Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission, South African Institute of International Affairs. African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. African Union Commission. 2017. African Union Handbook 2017: A Guide for Those Working with and Within the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Alden, C. 2007. China in Africa, Zed Books, London/New York. Alden, C and Large, D. 2011. China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of Delivering Difference in Africa, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 20, no. 68, pp. 21–38. Brown, W and Harman, S. 2013. African Agency in International Politics, Routledge Studies on African Politics and International Relations, Routledge 2013, USA/Canada. Centre for Chinese Studies. 2010. Evaluating China’s FOCAC Commitments to Africa and Mapping the Way Ahead, A Report by the Centre for Chinese Studies Prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation, January 2010. Chege, M. (2008). Economic Relations Between Kenya and China, 1963– 2007. In Cook, J., (ed.), US and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects for Improving US-China-Africa Cooperation, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, pp. 12–33. Chibundu, V. N. 2000. Nigeria–China Relations (1960–1999), Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria.

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Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing. 2014. China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a Changing World, The Global Partnership Grid Series, ESPO Working Paper 8, June 2014. Fernando, S. 2007. Chronology of China–Africa Relations, China Report 2007, vol. 43, p. 363. Gazibo, M and Mbabia, O. 2012. Reordering International Affairs: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, vol. 1, no. l, Jan–Jun 2012, pp. 51–74. Hanauer, L and Morris, J. L. 2014. Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy, Rand Corporation. Li, A. 2005. African Studies in China in the Twentieth Century: A Historiographical Survey, African Studies Review, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 59–87. Li, A. 2015. African Diaspora in China: Reality, Research and Reflection, The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 7, no. 10, May 2015, pp. 10–43. Li, A. et al. 2012. FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Lightning Source Publishers. Mohan, G, and Lampert, B. 2012. Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa Relations, African Affairs, vol. 112, no. 446, pp. 92–110. Montoya, C. 2006. Do Events Matter? Critical Review of a Proposed Research Agenda, Working Paper, Centre for International Politics, Manchester University, Manchester, UK. Murithi, T. 2014. Introduction: The Evolution of Africa’s International Relations, in Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, Routledge, London, UK. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, J. S. 2014. Pan-Africanism and the International System. In Murithi, T., (ed.), Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, Routledge, London, UK, 21–29. Shelton, G, and Paruk, F. 2008. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: A Strategic Opportunity. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, South Africa. Tieku, K. T. 2014. Theoretical Approaches to Africa’s International Relations. In Murithi, T., (ed.), Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, Routledge, London, UK. Wekesa, B. 2014. Whose Event? Official Versus Journalistic Framing of the Fifth Forum on China Africa Cooperation, Journal of African Media Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 57–70. Wekesa, B. 2015. China’s Africa Policy: New Policy for New Circumstances, Wits Africa China Reporting Project. http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/2015/ 12/chinas-africa-policy-2015-new-policy-for-new-circumstances/. Wekesa, B. 2017. Chinese Media and Diplomacy in Africa: Theoretical pathways. In Batchelor, K and Zhang, X., (eds.), China’s Africa Relations, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 149–166.

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Wits Africa China Reporting Project. 2017. Report: Symposium—High Time for a Common Integrated African Policy on China, 20 July 2017, accessed September 3, 2017 at http://africachinareporting.co.za/2017/07/reportsymposium-high-time-for-a-common-integrated-african-policy-on-china-20july-2017/. Yun Sun. 2014. Africa in China’s Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Zhang Chun. 2014. China–Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China–Africa Relations? Occasional Paper 205, South African Institute of International Affairs.

CHAPTER 3

Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement: Kagame and Overcoming the ‘One and the Many’ Paradigm Francis A. Kornegay Jr.

Introduction At the beginning of 2017 The Conversation ran a short analysis on ‘How the African Union’s planned overhaul may affect its ties with China’, by Yu-Shan Wu1 (italics added). Her article referenced: The Imperative to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Report of the African Union, 29 January 2017 .2 Known less cumbersomely as ‘The Kagame Report’, Wu speculated on how the report’s recommendations would impact partnership summits like the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and Africa’s external relations more generally with a ‘less is more’ emphasis on divisions of labour in inter-African governance and diplomacy. The reforms, if implemented, carry potentially major implications for regionalizing continental diplomacy with Africa’s major development partners. In the process, this would

F. A. Kornegay Jr. (B) Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_3

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move Africa away from the ‘one and the many’ paradigm in its relations with external powers, not just China. This is the main theme of focus in this FOCAC chapter. However, a fitting caveat in The Conversation piece, ‘may affect’ was an appropriate caution; that is, given past history of unimplemented reform plans of action emanating from Addis.3 Speculation in this article on how these latest reform proposals will affect FOCAC will be revisited more fully later in this chapter. For now, the structural defects in Africa’s international relations are focused on in terms of the Kagame report’s findings as prelude to honing in on the specifically FOCAC dimension in as much as FOCAC reflects a much broader and more fundamental set of concerns extending beyond Africa–China relations. The Kagame report, emphasizing as it does much-needed institutional consolidation at continental and regional levels, provides the point of departure for updating a much earlier critique by this author of Sino-African asymmetries appearing in the 2008 Stellenbosch University Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) collection New Impulses From the South: China’s Engagement of Africa.4 This monograph was compiled and co-edited by Hanna Edinger with Hayley Herman and Johanna Jansson. Under the heading ‘Africa’s Strategic Diplomatic Engagement with China’ this author analysed the essentially unequally reactive African interaction with China.5 By honing in on FOCAC, this chapter updates the CCS contribution. It explores how, aspirationally, continentalism and regionalism illuminate the challenge of Africa arriving at ‘common positions’ as one aspect of the more fundamental challenge of pan-African agency. In this vein, it bears pointing out that ever since Chris Landsberg and this author penned ‘Engaging emerging powers: Africa’s search for a “common position”’, April 2009 in Politikon, much has changed while remaining the same.6 Indeed, this predicament defines the conundrum confronting the Kagame report. It addresses, at its heart, ‘the one and many’ paradigm in Africa’s external relations with development partners wherein FOCAC is emblematic in problematizing the China–Africa equation. As such, the challenge confronting ‘common positions’ can be approached as an aspect of more fundamental challenges confronting regional and continental integration as this relates to institutional consolidation—in other words, overcoming the OAU foundational legacy of institutionalizing the fragmenting Berlin partitioning of the continent. This is at the heart of concerns that motivated the Kagame report. Tabled

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at the beginning of 2017, this report is only the latest in a succession of such tomes on continental governance reform to have been tabled, only to have been left to gather dust. As such, its fate is awaited with baited breath! As for how this relates to emerging powers between 2009 and 2017, what obtains in terms of Sino-African relations via FOCAC, pretty much holds for other emerging powers as well. However, because of Beijing’s dominance relative to other external actors on the continent, developed and developing alike, the FOCAC relationship provides a fitting case-study in how a genuinely strategic diplomatic engagement with external powers has and continues to elude Africa. Why this is so speaks volumes on the debilitating impact of the continent’s fragmentation within a governing superstructure comprising the African Union (AU), regional economic communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), all virtually devoid of meaningful leverage over 55 heads-of-state jealously guarding their ‘national sovereignty’ in their own personal power interests. This chapter seeks to critically examine FOCAC as an unequal partnership between Africa and China based on how it reflects ‘the one and the many’ paradigm of Africa’s subordinate international relations with external powers. It is argued that overcoming this predicament towards the continent’s empowerment is contingent on advancing the very AU continentalism via its regional pillars, the RECs, and regional mechanisms as outlined in the Kagame report on institutional consolidation. This is where The Conversation brief is instructive on its implications for the FOCAC future. For Africa to mount strategic diplomatic engagement with China, a clearly delineated African strategic approach must be outlined not only in relation to China, but traditional and other emerging powers as well. However, with FOCAC as its focus, this treatise attempts to address Africa’s strategic strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis China and how these might inform a strategic diplomatic approach towards Beijing. One of the enduring aspects of the debate concerning China’s involvement in Africa has been Africa’s virtual invisibility as a proactive actor and the almost incidental manner in which the continent figures in this debate. It has been a discourse focused mainly on western concerns about Sino-African relations as reflecting the global rise of China. Mainstream media commentary and policy discourse on ‘China–Africa’ has invariably emphasized how China’s behaviour on the continent may or may not gain

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favour in the West. Consequently, there has been an obliviousness to the African voice regarding how opinion in the continent views Africa’s relations with China accompanied by critical appraisals of the Sino-African relationship in terms of how it serves or compromises Africa’s interests.

Restructuring the AU Multi-bilateral Partnership System To a large extent, the manner in which the China–Africa debate has been framed reflects as much, if not more on the seeming absence of strategically pro-active African diplomacy as it has on non-African perceptions. Here, one can venture this is a predicament embedded in Africa’s fragmented political map with all the disadvantages it imposes on Africa’s international relations in coherent continental governance terms; that is, the fact that in the European debate on how much ‘Europe’ in relation to European Union (EU) member states is optimum in carrying forward the EU’s agenda, the same applies to Africa and the AU—the fact that there simply is not nearly enough Africa viz-a-viz each of 55 sovereign independent AU member states to enable Africa to proactively overcome the continent’s reactive ‘one and the many’ asymmetry in its external relations with the world’s major powers. It is this predicament that the Kagame report is intended to redress in tandem with efforts aimed at enabling the AU to lessen dependency on the external financing of its operations. This latest continental blueprint and the extent to which it is implemented holds important implications in how Sino-African relations are conducted within the multibilateral framework of FOCAC; this is in as much as the aim of Kagame is to substantially redress the asymmetry in this framework by introducing more ‘Africa’ and less individual AU member state bilateralism in Sino-African equations. While FOCAC no longer remains outside the AU official partnership framework, the Kagame report would further elevate the role of the AU and it’s regional economic communities as the mediating institutional layer in the overall partnership system.7 All external actors, including China, would have to engage the continental African agenda via the RECs. Here, it is instructive to revisit the earlier critique of the SinoAfrican relationship by this author under the subheading, ‘Fashioning an AU Strategy: In search of African unity and unity of approach’.8

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This section served as the departure point for exploring AU–REC relations in navigating Sino-African relations. This was based on reporting on a conference jointly organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Consumer Unity Trust Society with the coordination and liaison manager of the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It emerged from these discussions that the AU had been directed by its Summit to play a bigger role in Africa’s relations with India, Brazil and Turkey besides China, although the Sino-African dimension was the conference focus.9 It was pointed out that a coordinating role for the AU would be in the interest of ‘not only African countries but also China’, and would provide for a ‘greater opportunity for a more focused and better organized engagement with China’,10 Of particular importance in light of the AU’s ninth summit’s ‘US of Africa’ decision in 2007 to strengthen and rationalize the REC pillars of the AU, was the continental body’s stated intent to ‘co-ordinate and guide Africa’s regional economic blocs and member states in coming up with a multilateral approach to doing business with the main emerging world powers’.11 This prospect posed a question: if such a joint AU–REC coordinating framework for engaging China and other emerging powers was to inform a new African diplomacy, how might such a framework be structured? Here, the article did not spell out such details as may have emerged from the conference. However, the fact that the conference involved FES as a major German donor was seen at the time as indicative of the EU’s concern about emerging power involvement in the continent rather than how Africa itself engages with already established developed Western powers like Germany. However, as the AU/DTI approach to coordinating Africa’s international economic relations was going to be crafted, it would have to address developed and developing world partners alike. Under the subheading ‘Regionalizing Sino-African diplomatic Engagement’ an illustrative architecture for coordinating multilateral engagement was suggested as a strategy that future African summits might adopt. This would call for FOCAC to be broken down into joint AU–REC summits with FOCAC along such lines as: AU/SADC-FOCAC; AU/ECOWASFOCAC; AU/EAC-FOCAC, etc. Alternatively, these might, in ‘bottomup’ fashion, serve as preparatory AU–REC consultations feeding into a smaller delegation of REC representivity at the FOCAC partnership summit level.12

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Hence, for example, a SADC-FOCAC forum (or an ECOWASFOCAC Forum, etc.) involving the facilitating coordination of the AU’s DTI might allow for sub-regional engagements with China at the REC level or as in preparatory prelude to the actual summit. In this manner, more regionally focused and relevant Sino-African economic relations would inform the FOCAC agenda.

Continental Regionalism in Limbo I: The Missing REC Pillar These could be capped off by periodic Africa-wide AU-FOCAC summits. The fact that the grand Beijing summit of FOCAC on 4 November 2006, with all of Africa’s leaders apparently did not feature a central coordinating role for the AU was seen as indicative of what has been lacking in terms of strategic equality between China and Africa. This principle mandates the central role that should be played by the AU in conjunction with the RECs involving all such summits. Whereas, at the time, the AU was side-lined from its rightful coordinating role, this arrangement allowed for non-AU member Morocco to participate in FOCAC. This concession essentially disrespected the AU in deference to Morocco. Rabat had withdrawn from the body over the unresolved issue of Western Sahara. Though this issue remains unresolved Morocco returned to the AU fold in 2017, thereby changing the circumstances marginalizing the AU in China’s FOCAC calculus. Yet Beijing rigidly mandates a ‘One China’ conditionality in all its diplomatic relations without exception. Moreover, joint AU–REC diplomacy towards China and other major powers, including the developed countries, would add a crucial dimension and incentive for the AU to begin, in earnest, the difficult and complicated but necessary rationalization of the multiplicity of RECs into the AU’s five regions. Africa was, at the time, already under pressure in this regard in terms of implementing the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) wherein the regional/sub-regional boundaries of such agreements needed to be delineated. At a July 2007 conference in Cape Town, then South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel warned that Africa had to be in the driver’s seat in determining such boundaries.13 Here was an excellent example of why AU/REC diplomacy regarding China and other major powers needed to factor in the EU and, at the time, and the G8 generally. For a regionally-based AU/REC strategy

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towards China would be immeasurably strengthened by the sort of boundary-setting rationalization called for by the EPAs as articulated by Manuel. Yet, is this fixation on rationalization over-complicating a predicament when the fundamental problem is continental and regional fragmentation caused by a multiplicity of ‘independent’ states whose leaders jealously guard their national-cum-elite ‘sovereignty’? Thus, is the challenge confronting the regionalizing of Africa’s international relations intrinsic to the inter-African political culture of the ‘heads-of-state club’ that still governs AU affairs. Moreover, the unresolved Morocco-Sahrawi Republic-Western Sahara conundrum introduces an even more fundamental challenge for the prospect of regionalizing African diplomacy towards China: the absence of a major functioning AU regional pillar, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Indeed, Rabat in apparent collusion with francophone states, seeks further to complicate AU regionalism by applying for Moroccan membership in Ecowas in a zero-sum diplomacy of AU de-recognition of the Sahrawi Republic and abandonment of the North African UMA as a pillar of the AU.14 Apart from an indictment of Morocco, this is as well an indictment of the failed pro-Sahrawi diplomacy of Algeria and South Africa in the absence of their linking Sahrawi independence to activating the Arab Maghreb Union; this is especially grievous at a time of North African Mediterranean crisis stemming from the post-Qaddafi destabilization of Libya. If the Kagame report is to be carried out in full, its implementation will have to involve a more aggressive diplomacy of resolving the MoroccoSahrawi stalemate in a manner that activates UMA irrespective of whether or not Morocco entry into Ecowas is confirmed (as this has been agreed to by this body ‘in principle’ pending deliberation over its implications). Given that Tanzania is a member of both SADC and the EAC while the Democratic Republic of Congo belongs to the Economic Community of Central African States as well as SADC, Morocco’s membership in Ecowas need not be allowed to rule out activating UMA; this should be integral to a package settlement of the Western Sahara tying Sahrawi selfdetermination to North African regional integration within the Kagame report institutional consolidation agenda involving RECs and ‘regional mechanisms’.15 It all comes down to a matter of political will and geopolitical imagination on the part of Africa’s leaders and political class.

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Continental Regionalism in Limbo II: SACU-SADC Closer to home for South Africa, the incoherent regionalism for the SADC–SACU nexus offers yet another example of dysfunction in need of resolving within the framework of the Kagame report. Moreover, this dual REC conundrum implicates South Africa’s capacity to lead as a major actor within the Southern African subcontinent and the continent at large; this is especially so in how it is able to interactively coordinate its different African and international agendas in a manner that advances the continental agenda. This will be elaborated on at more length later. Yet, in spite of obligatory references to strengthening regional integration in SADC in African National Congress (ANC) international relations discussion documents, the ruling party and government actually displays no real regional integration strategy which, in strategic terms, would seem logically to revolve around consultatively transforming the Southern African Customs Union as the basis for a wider SADC integration project. Here, the question that might be posed is whether or not Tshwane mandarins at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and/or at ANC headquarters at Luthuli House are even considering how the Kagame report fits or should fit within the ambit of its policy and strategy towards the continent and how this should manifest itself in external partnership terms such as in the case of FOCAC. In other words, within the framework of institutional consolidation as it would relate to regionalism, and regionalism’s implications for engaging external partnerships, there seems no indication that this continental agenda is being applied to integration strategy in southern Africa in regard to SACU as well as SADC. And yet, de facto, South Africa, within the SACU context, is already southern Africa given that more inhabitants originating and/or with roots of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland actually reside in South Africa than in these respective countries while benefiting from South Africa’s social services. South Africa, nevertheless, appears in no hurry to begin consultations to take SACU to the next level of a ‘regional integration community’. Were this to happen, SACU might serve as the fulcrum around which the accession of other members of SADC into an expanding supranational community based on the ‘variable speed’ principle could take place. To be sure, the stress would have to be on a consultative process with tradeoffs, especially within the SACU core of SADC where territorial issues may have a bearing on the fate of greater supranationalist integration.16

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Otherwise, such a process would imply the consolidationist institutional transformation of SACU a la Kagame from a ‘customs union’ into a politically integrated ‘community union’ of federated states of southern Africa.17 This should unfold on an accessions basis wherein another institutional reform in the spirit of Kagame could kick in: the transforming of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) from a vehicle without leverage into an instrument for leveraging supranational political integration by serving as the mechanism by which individual member states would apply for accession into an expanding regional political community on their own negotiated speed as is followed in the EU accession process. Within the context of Kagame, this would require the AU to regionalize the APRM for each of its REC pillars. But SACU-SADC institutional consolidation aside, how might SACU and SADC and member states relate to the type of regional delegation that should be sent to Beijing in next year’s FOCAC summit? Would this amount to continuing the same uni-bilateralism between the ‘One China’ and the multitude of African states as has been on offer to date? Has DIRCO (and Luthuli House) thought this through in terms of the implications that Kagame recommendations raises for the FOCAC partnership as laid out in The Conversation? Herein may lie the challenge confronting South Africa in how it dovetails its continental agenda with its partnership agenda not simply as these relate to FOCAC but in terms of its BRICS membership with China as well—and with Russia, Brazil and India, the latter pursuing its own ‘one and the many’ partnership paradigm via India–Africa summitry. More on this later. However, here it is useful to delve in more detail on how or whether FOCAC can and will accommodate the evolution of the AU and Africa’s international relations towards a more continentalist regionalism paradigm of strategic equality in partnership diplomacy. Obviously, this is contingent on how the African equation of FOCAC proactively addresses this challenge.

FOCAC Implications of Kagame In short, prospects of a more proactively strategic African FOCAC diplomacy in the continent’s relations with China may hinge on the extent that the AU and member states sort out intra-African contradictions in the AU’s regional pillars system—and in taking institutional consolidation in the direction of transforming regional economic communities

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into regional integration communities. As such, pan-African regionalism should be considered the corollary to arriving at pan-African continentalism; this should, in turn, solve the ‘common position’ challenge in Africa’s international relations. It will liberate Africa from its current neo-colonial ‘one and the many’ divide-and-rule relationship with all partners. This is where revisiting The Conversation analysis of Kagame implications for FOCAC may be instructive in how Africa can potentially equalize its end of the Sino-African equation. The 28th AU summit in Addis Ababa was seen as ‘markedly different’ from previous ones as it appeared to reflect a seriousness about finding ‘practical, lasting solutions to contemporary continental problems’ in a commitment to ‘deep reform’.18 Supported by a pan-African advisory team, this reform process commenced at the mid-2016 27th summit in Kigali resulting in recommendations described as ‘less is more’.19 Emphasizing the need for fewer ‘strategic priorities’ while addressing bureaucratic ‘bottlenecks’, the Kagame report calls for a ‘better division of labour between the AU and member states, regional economic organisations and continental organs and institutions’ as well as lessening AU dependency on external funding.20 Notably: in relation to Africa’s external relations – and in the interest of political and operational efficiency – it was recommended that partnership summits such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development convened by external parties should be reviewed ‘with a view to providing an effective framework’ for AU relations.21

Observing that external engagement in Africa, including partnership summits, is ‘mainly carried out at the country level’, thereby necessitating insurance that the African agenda ‘isn’t externally driven’, the report recommended that ‘a central body be created to map, monitor and implement projects’ while changing the terms of Africa’s ‘bilateral engagements’.22 How this would affect FOCAC: the report recommends that rather than partnership summits being attended by ‘a host of African leaders’, whereby at the sixth FOCAC meeting in South Africa, 48 heads-ofstate attended, ‘a much smaller delegation made up of the troika (the current, former and incoming AU chairs), the chairperson of the AU

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Commission and the chairperson of the regional economic communities’ engage the external partner.23 If carried out, this would radically transform Africa’s international relations, including Sino-African FOCAC terms of engagement: A handful of representatives meeting China on behalf of the continent is a commendable approach. For years commentators have been advocating for a more unified African voice in engaging external partners, who were at an advantage, as the African side scrambled to forge a common position. Arguably, more can be achieved with fewer voices and with greater consistency and continuity.24 (italics added)

How this would impact the FOCAC format was not clear: Will it replace the consultation with the African ambassadors in Beijing and host country of the forum ministerial or summit, who together with the Chinese forum secretariat have traditionally managed the forum process? If so, would this effectively create joint secretariat based in Addis Ababa? This might be a much more appropriate forum given that the city is also the seat of Africa’s key summits and meetings. Consultations with heads of state – or internal African canvassing of views on what Africa wants from China – would be much easier.25

Given the urgency of implementing this new format for FOCAC and other partnership summits, the question was posed as to whether this would be operational by 2018 when the seventh forum summit takes place in Beijing. Until more detail was forthcoming on how these Kagame report changes to partnership summits would kick in, it was suggested that ‘some outstanding nuances should be considered’: First is the symbolic use of summitry. Platforms like the forum are stages where actors showcase their identities, affiliations and role in the world. The symbolism of the long-standing China-Africa friendship, reflected by images of China’s President Xi Jinping brushing shoulders with several African heads of state at the sixth forum, could be potentially scrapped. Second are China’s bilateral relations with African states. Some nations hold a longer history of relations with China, than the AU. Summits also double up as a reason to make bilateral visits where an impressive laundry list of agreements are often signed. It remains to be seen how bilateral relations (the level at which forum agreements are actually implemented), will be affected by such a new arrangement.26

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Answering these questions should imply more greatly capacitated and empowered RECs and regional mechanisms as mediating institutions of subsidiarity with the AU system. This might, among other things, call for a more clearly resolved integration of the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in operationalizing a formed partnership summit system.

FOCAC and Revisiting the New Asia–Africa Strategic Partnership African diplomacy towards China via FOCAC needs, however, to factor in a broader strategic approach to Asia as a whole. Other major Asian actors such as Japan and its TICAD and India–Africa summitry also figured into the AU/DTI scope for coordinating Africa’s external partnership engagements when these were critiqued in 2008. Literally, nothing has changed. In this vein, as a corollary to the Kagame report’s implicit continental regionalism in its institutional consolidation agenda, FOCAC needs to be approached within the contours of a differentiated but coordinated African diplomacy towards all Asian partners. As indicated in the 2008 rendition of this subject, this needs to be explored in terms of which Asian actors may have a comparative advantage in given sectors of economic and developmental cooperation that optimally benefits Africa within the context of South–South cooperation. Here, it was pointed out in 2008 that it appeared that the New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) launched at the 50th anniversary of Bandung in 2005 had been overlooked as a diplomatic coordinating framework for forging relations between African and Asian RECs and major Asian economies. The Asia Africa Sub-Regional Organisation Conference (AASROC), after all, had been the mechanism established at Bandung to facilitate such a relationship, especially with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN—now the Asean Economic Community—must also contend with China’s ‘peaceful rise’ in Southeast Asia.27 Both India, through its India–NEPAD Fund and China’s FOCAC were, at the outset affiliated with this Afro-Asian strategic initiative which South Africa collaborated in setting up with Indonesia in preparation for Bandung at 50. It was suggested that a carefully calibrated and considered African diplomacy towards China should benefit immeasurably from Africa’s mobilization of its own resources—the leitmotif of Kagame recommendations in 2017. As such, it still holds that these should, at least half-way,

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match the resources of external actors like China. In this regard, it was pointed out at the time that the South Africa-Ghana launched Pan-African Infrastructural Development Fund (PAIDF) of NEPAD to the tune of a US$ 625 million involving pension fund investments was a welcomed sign.28 This came in the wake of China’s US$ 20 billion infrastructural development commitment for projects in Africa.29 The aim of PAIDF had been to raise a fund of US$ 1 billion from Africa’s own sources for NEPAD’s infrastructural development agenda. It was stressed that to the extent that Africa could leverage its own resources in such crucially strategic areas of developmental investment, this would bolster its diplomatic capacity to direct external investment in the continent in accordance with Africa’s agenda, now epitomized in Africa 2063. The strategic diplomatic aim would have to be to ensure that Chinese and other investments reinforced NEPAD’s blueprint for continental renewal. Time and space does not permit an update on these commitments cited in 2008. However, to some extent, by 2017, they have all either been taken over by events or incorporated and/or subsumed into a plethora of other initiatives. Neither the NAASP and its AASROC vehicle for coordinating Afro-Asian South–South cooperation have flourished in fulfilling their global South multilateral potential. These initiatives were essentially abandoned as Afro-Asian relations reverted to its uncoordinated multi-bilateral scramble among different Asian actors interacting with different African states in striking any number of deals that may or may not enhance Africa’s integrationist prospects. Treading over the same ground within the UN system is the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UN-OSAA) collaborating with the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in co-organizing consultations of the UN Monitoring Mechanism (UNMM) ‘to review commitments made toward Africa’s development’ by yet another acronym: ‘new and emerging development partners’ or NEDPs.30 The point is there exists a systemic matrix of uncoordinated and/or under-utilized (marginalized and/or forgotten) South multilateral mechanisms that FOCAC must or should be factored into rationalizing an AU-RECs institutional consolidation in charting partnership strategies. The endpoint of constructing such a pan-African ecosystem should be advancing African integration as the apex of the continent’s developmental agenda.

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FOCAC, otherwise, operates within the same uncoordinated pattern of developmental partnerships as has held for India–Africa summitry and Japan’s TICAD until Beijing rivals Delhi and Tokyo managed in November 2016 to launch the ambitious Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) based on a Vision Study with input from Indonesia.31 Indeed, AAGC reflects the aspirational vision that motivated NAASP-AAROC in the first place. But will UN-OSAA and ESCAP factor in this new IndoJapan initiative take up where the short-lived revival of the Bandung spirit was supposed to lead in facilitating Afro-Asian south-south interregionalism under the aegis of Kagame? Further, is there a possibility that implementing the Kagame Report might centrally address managing inter-Asian rivalries in developmental partnerships in Africa as reflected in AAGC’s emergence in the wake of FOCAC and its track-record?32 Is this on South Africa’s radar screen? Probably not. NAASP-AASROC was overtaken in Tshwane’s calculus by the BRICS to which South Africa acceded to as a member of the emerging big powers club in 2011, underlining its gravitation towards China and Russia in abandonment of the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Dialogue Forum (which was abandoned first by India and Brazil when they bandwagoned with Moscow and Beijing in launching the BRIC quartet in 2009, leaving South Africa out in the cold). This update begs a whole host of questions, not least: what is to be made of South African non-strategy as the continent’s leading urbanindustrial power now that its BRICS membership has introduced yet another new institutional investor onto the continental landscape? That is none other than the African Regional Centre of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) headquartered in Johannesburg while Tshwane has also joined China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which is gearing up to finance Beijing’s ‘Silk Route’ Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). This is already raising questions about where this leaves BRICS and its African regional NDB under South African management while Tshwane also turns its attention to chairing the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in its ‘blue economy’ quest—as well as the BRICS forum in 2018. Taken all together, these unprocessed developments beg even more questions about where South Africa is headed as it must find a way of coordinating and dovetailing these different but overlapping commitments while playing a leading role in FOCAC linked to the closeness of Sino-South African relations.

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Dovetailing South African Strategy: FOCAC-BRICS-IORA If implementing Kagame report recommendations can serve as the strategic focal point around which to discern coordinating synergies between FOCAC and other critical multilateral imperatives Africa as a whole and which, specifically, Tshwane must manage in 2018, namely BRICS and IORA as well as FOCAC, what might an optimal strategy look like for South Africa in terms of its African international relations calculus? This is no idle question given South Africa’s presumptive leadership in Africa in spite of its marked loss of momentum (along with that of Nigeria) in continental affairs. How or whether Tshwane performs up to and above standard in FOCAC, BRICS and IORA hinges on the quality of the intellectual and international public policy reflected in strategic imagination and statecraft execution. Here, South Africa’s weaknesses in governance—and governing architecture—mirror those of the rest of Africa generally and of the AU in not reflecting institutional capacities and coherence in coordinating any number of diverse but often overlapping demands and commitments. This predicament has been heightened over the past few years, looking into the near future, by political turmoil engulfing the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and extending into state institutions. While there are, for example, occasional concerns expressed about too much power concentrated in the Union Building presidency interacting with the party-state conundrum involving Luthuli House, this reference tends to focus on the presidency in the personal sense rather than in the institutional sense where a strong case can be made for power concentration. This is because, in institutional terms, South Africa can be considered a weak state to potentially fail emanating out of the institutional weakness of a presidency facing dual authority dilemmas linked to the ruling party with an overriding focus on the personality of a given president. Because of antipathies within the ANC regarding a ‘super ministry’ that emerged in the run-up to establishing the National Planning Commission associated with intra-party controversy over former finance minister Trevor Manuel under the Thabo Mbeki presidency, what emerged was a neutered entity mandated to produce a National Development Plan (NDP) that has struggled to gain leverage and traction with ministries and departments. And despite a clustering system that

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is supposed to facilitate synergies between related sectoral ministries, the cross-cutting nature of today’s challenges which calls for a more interactive relationship between ministries and departments does not exist. For example, the DIRCO white paper on South African diplomacy needs to be approached interactively with the Defence Review and both need to factor in how the country’s foreign and defence policies mutually inform economic diplomacy while consolidating the maritime sector in overcoming fragmentation over different ministries, departments and agencies. The Union Building and Luthuli House lack institutional capacities in the absence of a national security and development structure to serve as the apex centrepiece of a process riding herd over this fragmented terrain of confederated agencies defining the South African state.33 This predicament raises a whole host of questions and concerns regarding statecraft conception and execution in terms of grand strategy and how different strategic components fit within an interconnected domestic and international agenda. Regarding South Africa’s relations with China and how this resonates in Africa more broadly, where does FOCAC fit in grand strategy terms? How does or can FOCAC relate to the BRICS context of Sino-South African relations wherein Beijing and other members of BRICS expect Tshwane to chart a BRICS-Africa agenda and strategy for this grouping? Such considerations would imply FOCAC being subsumed under a South African BRICS agenda for the continent. Such presumption must now factor in the elevated continental and regional integration implications and expectations emanating out of the Kagame report. These in turn would or should be expected to inform the role of the African regional centre of the BRICS New Development Bank, especially in driving an infrastructural interconnectivity agenda given China’s already heavy commitment in this African developmental sector—and the heavy infrastructure directed India–Japan AAGC agenda. Yet, apart from the initial outreach innovated by President Jacob Zuma in hosting the 5th BRICS summit in Durban in 2013, a sustained BRICSAfrica dialogue as a means of informing a partnership agenda has not been evident.34 This implicates whether or not Tshwane’s approach to FOCAC is informed by a BRICS agenda. However, amid these concerns have been distractions emanating from political turmoil within the ANC. This has seen BRICS dragged into the country’s domestic politics in the most unedifying manner (inclusive of accusations that the West is out to destroy BRICS and that South Africa is being punished for having joined

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BRICS!), apparently affecting even how the African regional NDB centre should pursue its financing agenda. On this note, how will the African regional NDB centre navigate FOCAC initiatives on the one hand and/or AAGC initiatives on the other? After all, India is also a member of BRICS and given Beijing’s predominantly trans-Eurasian trajectory, AAGC may well keep the African regional NDB centre from being marginalized though this will also imply it’s coordinating with the AfDB in financing infrastructure and related initiatives. Otherwise, what does South Africa expect to gain from having joined China’s BRI-financing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which, for China, has to be considered priority over the BRICS-NDB? How does Tshwane expect South Africa and the rest of eastern and southern Africa to benefit from China’s continental-maritime ‘Silk Route’ grand strategy within Beijing’s trans-Eurasian integration calculus? Such considerations highlight the absence of follow-up on President Zuma’s 2013 African ‘regional outreach’ in establishing a consultative BRICS-Africa basis for deliberating on such possibilities. These considerations—or lack thereof—implicate FOCAC, its African members especially, on the urgency of a well-thought through thoroughly consulted and researched regional and continental integration strategy; it should be one that factors in where synergies may or may not exist with China’s BRI aims and how these relate to a BRICS agenda that must also factor in Russian, Indian and Brazilian agendas like India’s AAGC with Japan. In other words, in advancing continental-regionalism in defragmenting the African economy, where is the BRICS-FOCAC linkage? As if that was not enough to process, 2018 will also see South Africa chair an increasingly activated Indian Ocean Rim Association preoccupied with promoting an interregional ‘blue economy’. These prospects, however, are accompanied by a growing debate over the role of IORA within an emerging interregional Indian Ocean order backgrounded by complicating Indian concerns over China’s rapid emergence as a key major power and stakeholder in Indian Ocean affairs which New Delhi jealously sees as its sphere of influence. How is South Africa to navigate this IORA dimension which interconnects intimately with China’s trans-Eurasian ‘Silk Route’ calculus that, from Beijing’s perspective, links the eastern and southern African Indian Ocean littoral and extended hinterlands, including an increasingly security challenged Gulf of Aden-Red Sea corridor?

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Irrespective of India’s conflicted ambivalence over the future architecture of Indian Ocean interregionalism, Africa’s vulnerable continentalmaritime perimeter encompassing the Mediterranean as well as the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans mandates an Africa-centred ZPCSA-type multilateral system of peace and cooperation interconnectivity in relations with Europe, the Americas and Asia in its own ‘Island Africa’ security interest. South Africa’s geo-strategic agenda within BRICS should be to enlist the support of China, Russia, India and Brazil in advancing and promoting Africa’s continental sovereignty through the establishment of a Zone Peace and Cooperation system interlinked with the maritime security strategies of ECOWAS, SADC and the EAC which are inhabited by littorals and extended hinterlands contiguous with those of all BRICS members with the exception of Russia. Such a system might also reinforce the AU’s imperative of reconciling ‘New Scramble for Africa’ contradictions in navigating initiatives between rivals and their African agendas. For example, establishing an inclusive Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (PACINDO in Indonesian acronymic parlance) should enable the AU via its eastern and southern African littoral and hinterland states to harmonize and develop synergies between the China-Africa FOCAC and the India-Japan AAGC.35 As such, establishment of a consultative Zone of Peace and Cooperation Forum should be considered as a legacy initiative emanating from South Africa’s IORA chairmanship in tandem with its BRICS presidency. Such an agenda should, in turn, lend momentum to strengthening continental-regionalism along the eastern and southern African Indian Ocean littoral as a necessary strategic imperative in implementing the Kagame AU institutional consolidation mandate.

Conclusion Given that China is at the head of the queue in Africa’s partnership sweepstakes, how it relates to the requirements of Kagame can serve as a pace-setter in transforming Africa’s multi-bilateral predicament with major external partners. Regionalizing Sino-African diplomatic engagement within the framework of the Kagame report carries major implications for the FOCAC partnership. The aim at the African end of the partnership ledger should be to achieve some semblance of ‘strategic equality’ in the Sino-African equation beyond what could be perceived as a neo-tributarian subordinate status in a new Beijing driven Afro-Eurasian

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suborder. More broadly, a strategic level playing field should not just pertain to FOCAC but to Afro-Asian relations more generally within an emerging system of global South multilateralism. As such, FOCAC should be located within the broader AU developmental partnership framework underpinning the Kagame report’s emphasis on strengthening the RECs and regional mechanisms within the Africa 2063 vision. This will require the AU to revisit resuscitating the NAASP-AAROC framework, to some extent already implicit in the India–Japan AAGC initiative and its vision crafted in partnership with Indonesia; Indonesia partnered with South Africa in launching the NAASP-AASROC in tribute to Bandung. This brings us to considering the challenge of a coherent South African approach to FOCAC within a broader strategic context of fashioning a BRICS-African agenda that also relates to the IORA chairmanship it will assume (along with the BRICS presidency) in 2018 linked to a pan-African continental regionalist grand strategy. First, priorities that Tshwane must take on board in putting its own regional integration house in order within the spirit of the Kagame recommendations: An SA Continental-Regionalism Agenda • Call for an AU special summit on a continental strategy to accelerate the pace of regional integration on the continent, that includes: (1) operationalizing the Arab Maghreb Union as integral to resolving the Western Sahara stalemate by ensuring Sahrawi selfdetermination; (2) reviewing the status of Northeast Africa and its unresolved disputes within the context of considering options for a the future of an expanded East African Community and IGAD as its security arm; (3) developing a reconciliation integration scenario between SADC and SACU (see below); (4) reviewing the status of the DRC as the interregional integration nexus between SADC, EAC and ECCAS (See below); (5) the evolution of eastern and southern African regional integration communities (RICs) within a still fledgling ‘Cape to Cairo’ Tripartite Free Trade Area between Comesa-SADC-EAC. • Transformation of the Southern African Customs Union into a federated Southern African Community Union within a consultative SACU process that considers employing a ‘variable speed’ accession path to a regional integration community with a SACU-APRM as gatekeeping referee to negotiating an accession process that can extend beyond SACU into the rest of SADC.

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• Revisit stabilizing the DRC as a member of SADC that is also a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) while its Great Lakes region extends into the East African Community. Because of the centrality of DRC’s political geography as Africa’s heartland, there is need for a special AU integration summit to consider commencing a renegotiation of DRC as a multiregional federation of affiliation with SADC, ECCAS and EAC in which provinces encompassing and/or comprising these regions within DRC enjoy confederated autonomy in relation to the centre in Kinshasa. • The development of a continental-maritime Zone of Peace and Cooperation strategy for realizing Africa’s Exclusive Economic Zone continental sovereignty around its Mediterranean-South AtlanticIndian Ocean perimeter and extended littoral hinterland. An SA Integration Development Partnership Agenda • South Africa needs to consider the coordinated dovetailing its different but interrelated and complementary partnership and multilateral agendas like FOCAC and IORA into a comprehensive BRICS grand strategy linked to implementing Kagame report recommendations. • Within this context, rather than pursuing what amounts to perceived Sino-centric bias in its global South-cum emerging powers diplomacy, Tshwane should seek the resuscitation of the NAASP-AASROC as an instrument through which it and the AU can manage different Afro-Asian cooperation and partnership initiatives like China’s FOCAC and the India-Japan Asia-Africa Growth Corridor initiative. • South Africa needs to develop and integrate the financing priorities of the BRICS African regional NBD centre within an urgently needed coordinating framework factoring in Kagame reforms for managing all external partnerships with developed and emerging alike but especially for the latter such as FOCAC and AAGC. This might include engaging and partnering with existing continental and regional development financing institutions and mechanisms (like project preparation facilities) like the African Development Bank

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and Fund and the Comesa PTA Bank as well as non-African international finance institutions in carrying forward major development initiatives. • With specific reference to FOCAC within the context of a BRICSAfrica agenda, South Africa should promote the location of FOCAC within the AU-NEPAD development partnership framework complemented by the decentralized regionalization of FOCAC within the RECs.

Notes 1. Yu-Shan Wu, “How the African Union’s Planned Overhaul May Affect Its Ties with China,” The Conversation, February 23, 2017. Yu-Shan Wu is affiliated with the South African Institute of International Affairs. 2. Kagame, H.E. Paul. THE IMPERATIVE TO STRENGTHEN OUR UNION: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union. Addis Ababa, January 29, 2017, 16 pp. Report on the “Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union” Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII). Recalling “the outcomes of the Retreat of Heads of Statde and Government, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance held in Kigali, Rwanda on 16 July 2016, on the need to conduct a study on the institutional reform of the African Union (AU), decided “to entrust the preparation of the study to H.E. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda with a view to submitting a report on the proposed reforms and thus put in place a systerm of governance capable of addressing the challenges facing the Union. To this end, President Kagame may, in collaboration with the Commission, make use of any expertise of his choice to effectively carry out his mission.” 3. Especially the seminal High Level Audit Report on the African Union prepared under the chairmanship of former UN Economic Commission for Africa head and renown expert on African integration, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji in 2008, report commonly referred to as the Adedeji Report. 4. Hanna Edinger, Hayley Herman, Johanna Jansson. New Impulses from the South: China’s Engagement of Africa. Stellenbosch, Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, 2008, 83 pp. 5. Francis A. Kornegay, Jr. “Africa’s Strategic Diplomatic Engagement with China,” in: New Impulses From the South: China’s Engagement of Africa by Hanna Edinger, Hayley Herman and Johanna Jansson. Stellenbosch Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, pp. 3–12. 6. Francis A. Kornegay, Jr. and Chris Landsberg. “Engaging Emerging Powers: Africa’s Search for a ‘Common Position’,” in: Politikon (April 2009), 36(1), pp. 171–191.

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7. See: “Second China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit (4–5 December 2015): Africa and China Leaders Meet in South Africa,” Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA): www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/ events/2015/focac20151210.shtml. Discusses bilateral Mou between the AU and China. 8. F.A. Kornegay, Jr., op. cit., p. 9. 9. See: Conference proceeding report: A Changing Global Order: East African Perspectives, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Kenya, 76 pp. Based on workshop convened June 14–15, 2007 at Naivasha, Kenya. 10. Ibid., p. 10. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., p. 11. 13. “Africa: Continent ‘Must Rationalise on Trade Blocs’,” Business Day, July 5, 2007. Also see: “The EU and Regional Integration in Africa—A critical appraisal with special reference to the Economic Partnership Agreements Paper presented to the Panel on ‘Regional Co-operation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Between Collective Self-Reliance and Global Trade Regimes’,” by Henning Melber 25.29, Nordic Africa Institute: https://www.researchg ate.net/publication/242579855…. 14. “Ecowas agrees to admit Morocco to West African body,” BBC, July 5, 2017. This agreement, at the time of writing, is ‘in principle’ pending examination by Ecowas members of the implications of Moroccan membership. 15. See: Francis A. Kornegay, Jr. Morocco: Challenging AU Reform & Peacebuilding in Western Sahara. Washington, DC, May 12, 2017. Analysis from Africa Up Close, the Blog of the Wilson Center Africa Program. 16. For example, between Lesotho and Free State province, much of which the MaSotho lay historical claim. 17. See: “South Africa and the global South in critical perspective: 1994–2014,” by Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., in: South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2 by Lesley Masters, Siphamandla Zondi, JoAnsie van Wyk & Chris Landsberg, eds. Tshwane, Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, pp. 231–251. See especially the section on Ïntegrating the core: whither SACU-SADC in the SA global South equation?” One of the more prominent South African proponents of greater SACU integration as a path to SADC regional integration has been former Reserve Bank Governor Tito Mboweni who has also served as a crisis management and resolution envoy to Lesotho. The following reflect some of this background: “Tito urges regional integration,” fin25 Archives, http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Tito-urgesregional-integration-20090828; Mboweni talks of scrapping passports,” by Nomthandazo Nkambule, Swazi Observer, October 30, 2014; Tito Mboweni, “There Is a Way to Put Paid to Lesotho’s Political Crisis,”

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30.

31.

32.

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Lesotho News Facebook, February 17, 2015. Also: “Redrawing the Map of Southern Africa? A Critical Analysis of Arguments for the Unification of South Africa and Lesotho,” by Laurence Caromba, January 12, 2017: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2017.1278636. The Conversation, February 23, 2017, op. cit., p. 1. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid. Ibid. See: Francis A. Kornegay, Jr. Pax-Afroasiatica? Rrevisiting Bandung Amid A Changing World Order. Tshwane, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004, 73 pp. Volume 46 of IGD occasional paper series. “Signing ceremony of PAIDF in Sandhurst at Sandton, Johannesburg (South Africa),” Harith: http://www.harith.co.za/?/media/details/sig ning-ceremony-of-PAIDF-in-Sandhurst-at-Sandton-Johannesburg. Thembinkosi Gcoyi, “China-Africa: Commitment and Opportunity,” Daily Maverick, Johannesburg, December 7, 2015. See: “Stakeholders Consultations for the Review of the Implementation of the Commitments Made Toward Africa’s Development,” United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa announcing the Bangkok meeting that was held June 29–30, 2017 jointly with ECOSOC’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific: http://www.un.org/en/afr ica/osaa/events/2027/unmmconsultations.shtml. Titli Basu, “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,” The Diplomat, New Delhi, June 3, 2017. Outlining India and Japan’s approaches to Africa, separately and bilaterally. Also see press release by the Research and Information Systems (RIS), Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) of Indonesia and Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) on A Vision Statement—Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development. For an interesting analysis of the Sino-Indian rivalry motivating AAGC, see: “Following in China’s Footsteps, Modi Proposes ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’,” The Wire, 23/05/2017. http://thewire.in/139289/follow ing-in-china’s-footsteps-modi-proposes-asia-africa-growth-corridor…. See: “The institutional imperatives of a competitive terrain” in article, “South Africa and Emerging Powers,” by Francis A. Kornegay in South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 1 by Chris Landsberg & Jo-Ansie van Wyk. Africa Institute of South Africa, 2012, pp. 198–214.

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34. In the lead-up to South Africa hosting the BRICS summit in 2013, the tghen Sudanese ambassador to South Africa suggested that South Africa should consider organizing a BRICS-Africa council or forum as a mechaniam for factoring in Africa’s diversity within BRICS-Africa equations. 35. See: “Deciphering Oriental Mysteries of Silk, Pearls and Diamonds— Trios, Quartets and Quintets: Maritime Dimensions of India’s Strategic Dilemmas in the Changing Asian Power Balance,” by Francis A. Kornegay, Jr. in: India’s Approach to Asia: Strategy, Geopolitics and Responsibility by Namrata Goswami, ed. Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, Pentagon Press, 2016, pp. 320–340.

Bibliography Africa: ‘Continent Must Rationalise on Trade Blocs’. Business Day, July 2007. Basu, Titli. Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. The Diplomat, New Delhi, June 3, 2017. Edinger, Hanna, Hayley Herman, Johanna Jansson. New Impulses from the South: China’s Engagement of Africa. Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, 2008, 83 pp. Following in China’s Footsteps, Modi Proposes ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’. In: The Wire, May 23, 2017. http://thewire.in/139289/following-in-the-foo tsteps-of-china-modi-proposes-asia-africa-growth-corridor. Gcoyi, Thembinkosi. China-Africa: Commitment and Opportunity. In: Daily Maverick, Johannesburg, December 7, 2015. Kagame, H.E. Paul. The Imperative to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for Institutional Reform of the African Union. Addis Ababa, January 29, 2017, 16 pp. Kornegay, Jr., Francis A. Africa’s Strategic Diplomatic Engagement with China. In: New Impulses from the South: China’s Engagement of Africa. Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, 2008, pp. 3–12. Kornegay, Jr. Francis A. & Chris Landsberg. Engaging Emerging Powers: Africa’s Search for a ‘Common Position’. In: Politikon (April 2009), 36 (1), pp. 171– 191. Kornegay, Jr. Francis A. Pax-Afroasiatica? Revisiting Bandung Amid A Changing World Order. Tshwane: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004, 73 pp, Volume 46 (Occasional Paper Series). ———. South Africa and Emerging Powers. In: South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 1, by Chris Landsberg & Jo-Ansie van Wyk, eds. Tshwane: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2012, pp. 198–214.

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———. South Africa and the Global South in Critical Perspective: 1994–2014. In: South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2, by Lesley Masters & Siphamandla Zondi, Jo-Ansie van Wyk & Chris Landsberg, eds. Tshwane: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, pp. 231–251. Melber, Henning. The EU and Regional Integration in Africa—A critical appraisal with special reference to the Economic Partnership Agreements Paper presented to the Panel on ‘Regional Co-operation in SubSaharan Africa: Between Collective Self-Reliance and Global Trade Regimes. 25.29 Nordic Africa Institute. http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242 579855. Wu, Yu-Shan. How the African Union’s Planned Overhaul May Affect Its Ties with China. In: The Conversation, February 23, 2017.

CHAPTER 4

The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards China: A Decolonial Afrocentric Perspective Siphamandla Zondi

Introduction Relations between Africa and China have grown substantially since 2000. They have also grown in the range of policy issues on which there are agreements and the intensity of cohesion between Africa-China expected in order to deliver on these promises. They have been declared a strategic partnership designed to be mutually beneficial. Yet, in reality this partnership remains unequal in contribution and benefits and strategic only in the level of political involvement. How do we understand this and how does a new approach to managing relations, including through a new African common position or policy on China assist in changing this to the benefit of both sides? There are many reasons why the relations can be said to have reached a point where these relations will deliver on their promise or potential only if a clear convergence of strategic interests,

S. Zondi (B) Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_4

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visions, paradigms and goals is found in relation to the policy areas that will be the basis for the translation of the relations from mere cooperation to effective partnership for mutual benefits. This will require that in developing its policy on China, Africa and its countries will need to identify these areas of strategic convergence and work out how the continent might respond to them in order to ensure that relations grow and that they grow in a manner that advances Africa’s strategic imperatives in a practical and meaningful way. The proposed chapter will make the case for finding areas of convergence among strategic interests and aspirations for building a strong and mutually beneficial partnership as the basis for building a common African position and policy on China. It begins with an outline of the conceptual basis for this argument, drawing from critical global South thought and the political idea of collective self-reliance. On this, the chapter provides a concise but comprehensive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the “special relationship” since the late 1990s, ponders on ways of identifying points of convergence between the two sides as the basis for drawing implications for the idea of an African common policy towards China.

The Analysis of Africa–China Cooperation: Epistemic Plurality as a Just Starting Point Africa and China share their position in the global geopolitical environment. They are both broadly classified as belonging to a class of countries described as developing or global South. Although China has registered remarkable economic growth and development in the past three decades, enabling it to accelerate past a number of developed countries by broad economic measurements, it is still considered part of the global south by virtue of the fact that it still has a lot of poor people and shares the ideological outlook of the South. Of course, this shared geopolitical location is also an outcome of history of the modern world whose implication has been the construction of a geopolitical centre in North America and Western Europe (the West), marked by the concentration of decision-making, military and economic power. The making of this centre necessitated the invention of the periphery as the source of cheap labour, raw materials and as a consumer of the West’s products and produce. Thus, the South is a product of the making of the North. If not for the existence of the North as an epitome of domination and injustice, the existence of the South would not be a reality.

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The dominant epistemic lenses for interpreting international and diplomatic phenomena are not adequate for understanding the advances, gaps, challenges and weaknesses in this partnership. These lenses are characteristically designed and meant to use the Western experience and intellectual heritage to better understand the West, though these have been extended to the analysis of areas outside the West. This extension is not an innocent attempt to explore the utility of the lenses outside the West, but a conscious process of epistemic imperialism. It is a process of imposing on other areas a Eurocentric perspective based on the assumption that it is superior enough to interpret all experiences and of all peoples of the world. Seen from locations in the global South, this perspective is colonial in nature in that it is premised on the desire to homogenise perspectives so that through the spread of western lenses, there would be knowledge instead of knowledges. This is impossible to happen without destroying other knowledges, what is termed epistemicides, and epistemic injustice. Much injustice has been caused by the tendency to impose theories, conceptual frameworks and analytical tools meant to interpret the Western experience on matters outside the West. In this process, we have subjected the experiences of the South to questions the North poses. We have used the realities and conditions in the South in order to validate theoretical assumptions in the North, thus committing the very same mistake that governments in the South have by allowing the export of raw materials in order to raise cash with which to purchase finished products from the North. The subject of the changing role and position in Africa is interpreted through theoretical wisdom gleaned from the rise of Germany in the nineteenth century or the rise of Europe as a cohesive region after the Second World War. The role of China in Africa is subject to distortions arising from what we know about the role of major Western powers in Africa in the past centuries; as a result, China is expected to replicate the posture and mistakes of the Western powers. This explains the scepticism of the mainstream literature about China generally and its role in Africa in particular. The Western powers’ conception of power was and continues to be underpinned by the logic of domination and control, disdain and denigration of others; so the Chinese are expected to end up there too. So, this perspective is impervious to the implications of the actual experiences and realities in the South; it suffers what has been called epistemic deafness.

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Therefore, an important step towards an improved interpretation of the FOCAC experience is to consciously rebel against the urge to perpetuate Eurocentric negations of Others’ realities. It is to disobey the assumptions and conventions that perpetuate epistemic injustice including certain methodological prescripts. We therefore propose in this particular case to apply a decolonial perspective to unpack the FOCAC issue. By a decolonial perspective, we imply a method against method, a combative breathing against the suffocating effect of the hegemonic epistemology and its distorting discourses. In Combative Ontology, Archie Mafeje suggests that history and our conditions impose on us the need to respond.1 We didn’t put in place the epistemic perspective that suffocates us, forcing us into combat just to breathe again. The monologism of the imperial man that manifests in mono-narratives designed to place the geopolitical west at the centre of all knowledge creates the need for a struggle for epistemic pluralism.2 The omnipresence of the Manichean subject, the man that takes the position of being the only thinker in the evolution of modernity, forces us to shout “we too can think,” subalterns can speak. The transcendental presence of the imperial subject that maintains the age-old epistemicides forces us into a combat for resurrection; the demand to breathe is the most basic human right.

Africa: A Case of South–South Cooperation Since the Afro-Asia Solidarity Conference in Bandung in 1955, the countries of the south have given emphasis to south–south cooperation as a modality for enhancing their agency. They accepted that solidarity was inadequate without concrete cooperation in the areas of economic development, educational and scientific advancement. Therefore, no assessment of relations among countries is sufficient until it is established just how much of this has contributed to development among peoples represented by countries and regions involved in relations. This section is divided into two, the first focusing on the nature and character of political dialogue that underpins FOCAC as an example of South–South dialogue. The second focuses on the combination of economic and developmental issue, which we call interface on global development arising from the fact

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that a significant focus on FOCAC and generally Africa–China cooperation touches on matters of development in the global environment. The purpose is to break the cooperation into these two parts for a detailed reflection in order to be able to make definitive arguments about the extent to which this represents advances in South–South cooperation and in Africa’s pursuit of African agenda. FOCAC and Political Dialogue According to the declaration of the inaugural FOCAC held at ministerial level in 2000, FOCAC was established for, among other reasons, “an extensive exchange of views on international affairs and the state of relations between China and African countries.”3 It went to recognise that the dawn of the new century witnessed “serious destabilising factors in the world” including the “huge gap between the rich North and the poor South” and therefore adequate conditions for peace and development still did not exist. The two sides agreed that injustice and inequality were incompatible with the search for world peace and development, and that insecurity and violence threatened development for the south. They took a dim view of the process of globalisation, which they correctly saw as perpetuating inequality between the North and South, and within regions and countries. They recognised that Africa was the epicentre of these distortions, weaknesses and problems, leading to high levels of poverty, disease, violence and despair among Africans, a situation they agreed to end through cooperation and solidarity. They therefore committed themselves to work together towards overcoming the above-mentioned factors in the hope of bringing about peace and development in the world. This they saw as in keeping with the struggles waged to end colonialism and to bring about a liberated Africa and the world. The two sides committed to the ideal of a “new international political and economic order,” marked by democratisation of international relations and effective participation of developing countries in international decision-making processes. They agreed to also work towards disarmament and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, a subject that was prominent in the 1990s. The FOCAC therefore committed to a normative framework underpinned by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (later the Constitutive Act of the African Union), and China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as a guiding

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light to their efforts to bring about their shared vision. Key among these principles is the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts among states and within states, and a rejection of conflict and nuclear armament as a means of resolving disputes. On the latter, the commitment was to advocate for a commitment from nuclear states not to use their weapons while the process of disarmament is being discussed. They also committed to work to stop the illicit trade and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their destruction. In reality, African countries and China have cooperated in the Group of Seventy-Seven plus China (G77+China) to actively advocate some of these commitments. They have made it known to the world that these issues are important. They have also underlined a number of them actively in the UN General Assembly also. It so happens that most of these issues are shared with the rest of the global south in the UN system as well as the membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, giving them a much bigger platform in which to realise their shared goals. For instance, the ideal of a new international political and economic order is taking shape in the demands for reform of international governance in totality, from the UN to the Breton Woods Institutions. The intergovernmental discussions on these issues began before FOCAC and continue to this day. While there is a shared perspective on the nature of the world today and its fundamental challenges, there is a potential for diversity of views between African countries and China broadly on how to respond to the evolution of world affairs and this is the function of different geopolitical positioning in the changing world. China occupies a more prominent and powerful position in the changing international balance of power, having been thrust into the position to counter-balance the US on account of its remarkable economic resurgence, becoming the second biggest economy in the world after the US within a short time period. While both sides agree that there is a shift in the balance of power globally, one that favours in increasing measure the emerging powers and developing countries, China sees this as an opportunity for pragmatism while some in Africa see it as an opportunity to push for more and more reforms now. By pragmatism, China means a need for global powers— both established and emerging—to enter into a new dialogue about common approaches to handling the challenges of the world. China has called for “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21st century.”4 While this may provide opportunities for

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emerging powers to influence reforms at the global level that could accumulate into a serious transformation of the structure of global power and the nature of the world, there is also a possibility that this translates into emerging powers reinforcing the current world system. The agency of emerging powers is crucial for the change the world needs, but they can also become semi-periphery countries distinguished from the rest of the periphery by their tendency towards what is called sub-imperialism.5 Patrick Bond warns that without critical vigilance on the part of critical voices of civil society, emerging powers like BRICS may end up providing sub-imperial re-legitimation of neoliberalism.6 For instance, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and therefore has a lot more influence on discussions about the Council than it allows in respect of the reform of the Council. The demand by developing countries is to expand the veto-wielding permanent seats in the Council. China remains hamstrung by its fear that this might benefit Japan, its big rival in East Asia. Analyses show that though divided on the many grounds, the Permanent Five shared the reluctance to share their advantage and privilege, China included.7 A key basis of difference between African countries and China is that the latter sees the Security Council in its current form as a key to stabilising the world whereas many in the south see it as a form and source of instability. It therefore has been more enthusiastic on reform of working methods and preventing the tendency for the Council to creep into non-security matters than on the expansion of veto-wielding seats.8 At least, it has not shown the will to break with the reticent three (France, UK and US) in the Council on the reform question.9 African countries in FOCAC (except Morocco) broadly frame their positions in line with the Ezulwini Consensus, which foresees a more radical reform of the UN and its security council than China contemplates. It implies a commitment to end the very idea of a veto because it is a form of ingrained injustice that makes some members of the UN legally superior to others. China tends to see the veto as a part of the stabilising game, the counter-balancing act happening between the North and South in the Council. It is not inconceivable that for China, the veto enables it to protect the shared interests of the weak and developing world though it is sensitive to the fact that this group of countries did not elect or mandate it.

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African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus • Shared security challenges in the world: poverty, terrorism, crime, debt, environmental degradation … • Need for collective security: responsibility to protect, legal use of force, peacekeeping, peace building. • UN Reform necessary: (i) strengthen the UNGA, (ii) improve capacity of the Secretariat, (iii) strengthen the ECOSOC, strengthen Human Rights Commission (iv) Security Council Reform: principles —(i). Full African representation; (ii) unity of African purpose; (iii) towards a No Veto right. Proposals 2 permanent seats; 5 non-permanent seats. African Union selects African representatives (capacity & representativity). Source African Union. 2005. ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations,’ EX.CL(VII).

The African demand for the reconstitution of the Council is based on regional representation in the highest decision-making structure of the UN system. However, it clashes with China’s worry about Japan’s claim to membership also on this basis. The possibility of India and Japan as permanent members flanking it does cause concern for China’s national interests. It is very conceivable that under current conditions, Japan would use its power as a close ally of dominant western global powers to bolster the positions of the major Western states to the detriment of China in East Asia. Some African countries understand this, but the principle of regional representation is close to their own core national interests. They would most likely therefore support China’s claim to regional representation for East Asia ahead of Japan. Until that has been thoroughly discussed, though, we are not certain as to which way things might turn out. China is a pragmatist, but Africans do not have the patience to stomach long periods of continued injustice and unfairness any longer; they have nothing to lose in calling for a faster arrival at the basic fact: equitable distribution of decision-making power. China’s position paper says,

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Reforms should proceed gradually from tackling more manageable problems to thornier ones and be carried out in a way that will maintain and promote solidarity among members. For those proposals on which consensus has been reached, decision may be made promptly for their implementation; for important issues where division still exists, prudence, continued consultations and consensus-building are called for. It is undesirable to set a time limit or force a decision.10

Africa through the African Union Commission said that there was no time to waste; the adjustments spoken about were urgent. It expected the reforms to be agreed in 2005, making its posture different from that of the Chinese.11 On Global Development The general African outlook on the reform of international financial institutions, principally the West-dominated International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, is framed by their terrible experience with the Washington Consensus imposed through these bodies. There is hardly a country without evidence of the failures of the Bretton Woods Institutions’ experiments in Africa and the costs to human and economic development have been huge. The literature on the harm caused by these institutions globally and in Africa is large and detailed.12 Africa envisages a new multilateralism in totality, one in which reformed international financial institutions have fair and equitable representation of Africa in its decision-making, leadership, management and operational levels. On the other hand, China hopes for a more gradual improvement in the IMF and World Bank. “China is a strong supporter of the IMF,” stated a prominent Chinese scholar in a research paper on China’s views on the reform of the organisation. “When Japan proposed an Asian monetary fund,” the scholar explains, “China rejected the proposal for fear of weakening the IMF’s authority.” He went on to state categorically China’s preference of minor reforms as opposed to fundamental reforms other south countries are calling for by saying, “The Chinese see no reason why the IMF’s mandate should be fundamentally changed despite its recent failures in Asia and Latin America.”13 Of course, it has been shown that Africa has been a net loser in the concessions being made on the piecemeal reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions, on account of this being dominated by the interests of major

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industrialised powers including China whose negotiations are coloured by it being industrialised. Developing countries of middle- and low-income size in economic terms have a lot to lose from horse trading taking place among global powers over the future of international financial institutions. In this horse trading, China has focused on the internationalisation of its own currency, the Renmibi, to make it a reserve currency as well with the promise that it reduces dependence on the dollar-based fluctuations of exchange rates, but while benefits for China’s global trade and investment are clear, the benefits for the rest of the developing world including Africa are uncertain. The same can be said about the attempt to build Hong Kong-Shanghai into a strategic centre of global finance.14 Therefore, how China manages the inherent dangers of being part of injustice, both in maintaining broadly intact the underlying structure of power that underpins the Bretton Woods institutions and in focus on concessions that meets its national interests will determine whether it can be a champion of traditional South interests on the transformation of international finance. There has been a strong articulation of interests between the two sides in discussions over international development. This is the reason why there is a relatively strong, shared agenda for global development that is refined into a G77 agenda for development. This revolves around a set of principles that have been actively pursued in international negotiations, from the financing for development negotiations to development effectiveness forums to global development agenda tracks of negotiations. These include the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between the developed and developing countries in respect of shared challenges like climate change. This results in a shared demand for developed countries to increase their resource allocation and technology transfer to the fight against climate change and to assist developing countries adapt better to a changing climate. Though China is among leading carbon emitters, it locates itself among developing countries on the basis of its history and by making an undertaking to act boldly to reduce these emissions unlike developed countries that are reticent to commit in this area. China has committed to reduce its emissions per unit of the GDP by 60% by 2030, reduce carbon intensity by 40%; increase the share of non-fossil fuels to 20% by 2030. This led to critics saying, China had committed well beyond the responsibilities of a developing country that it is.15 China has been taking very bold decisions about greening its economy because it knows this is critical for its long-term development.

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China was the first country to be confirmed to have reached the global goals several years before the cut-off date. Its success in taking people out of poverty was unprecedented, while its advances in human development generally were also remarkable.16 African countries were the epicentre of failure in the MDG agenda with levels of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment remaining high right through the 15-year MDG period. So, as the world discussed what was achieved and what would be the next development agenda from 2015 to 2030, Africa’s condition was the reason for better action on this subject and China was a museum of lessons to be learned about turning the situation around. More importantly, the UNDP reports demonstrated that there is acceptance internationally that the direction of China’s development trajectory and its commitment to global public goods will significantly determine the international community’s experience of global development. In other words, the UNDP is saying that China will underwrite and undergird success or failure of development for the foreseeable future. The implications of this are huge for Africa, the least developed region of the world. It means that linkages between Africa and China will not be a matter for choosing but an imperative if Africa is to meet its developmental aspirations. This does not mean that Africa will receive everything from China, but that its proximity to what will be the pillar of global development is obviously crucial for Africa’s own development. Africa can draw lessons, not necessarily in the form of specific actions to be taken but also principles that have worked for China. Three crucial factors worked to China’s advantage: a development-oriented government that aligned national goals to MDGs, marshalled domestic resources to meet these goals including investment in social and physical infrastructure. The second is China’s successful economic expansion through gradual economic reforms that include ensuring even distribution of economic value generated. The third is China’s ability to harness its demographic, cultural and social context to ensure improved quality of life among the Chinese.17 How Africa will use the FOCAC in order to draw these and other lessons, and enlist the support of China in replicating its successes in Africa will depend on the strength of Africa’s collective leadership, the agency of its key institutions and the harnessing of bilateral relations with African countries individually. During the debates on the post-2015 development agenda, China aligned with Africa on six principles, namely:

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1. Poverty eradication and development promotion must continue to be the core of the future agenda; 2. The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” must be adhered to; 3. Diverse development models should be preserved; 4. The principle of coordinated and balanced development must be maintained in order to promote in a holistic and coordinated manner economic, social and environmental development; 5. The process must continue to be led by member states and work on the basis of consensus; 6. While upholding the principle of universality, full consideration must be given to differences among countries in terms of national condition, capacity, and development level.18 Africa developed a common position on the basis of the following six principles that are compatible with and actually overlap with those of China. They are as follows: 1. Structural transformation of the economy and inclusive growth; 2. People-centred development; 3. Predictable and adequate finance and partnerships; 4. Accelerated access to and development of science, technology and innovation; 5. Environmental sustainability, natural resources management and disaster risk management; and 6. Peace and security.19 The overriding principle of the negotiation process is that of common but differentiated responsibilities. This is a shared aspiration between the Chinese and the Africans; that the agenda would be inclusive, sustainable and based on commitments that are in proportion with capacities of countries involved. The substance of the agenda is obviously shared between the two sides. In the G77, African countries and China harmonise their perspectives on the whole global development agenda, from the support for the full implementation of the Millennium Development Goals to a set of principles guiding the development of the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 adopted in September 2015. The issues covered in this, range

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from health to education, gender to peace–conflict nexus, technology to economy. China capped this with a pledge to contribute US$2 billion towards a fund to help developing countries meet the goals set and the bulk of countries to benefit will most likely be African.20 The UN General Assembly reflects the shared perspectives on the future development agenda in the 2030 development agenda in the form of seventeen sustainable development goals adopted in September 2015. These relate to the need to reduce poverty and hunger, reduce inequality; and to improve services to the poor including water and sanitation. They also cover the issue of transforming the economy towards an inclusive and sustainable model of economic production and development driven by industrialisation and innovation. There is also focus on creating conditions for the realisation of these goals including peace and stability as well as effective development partnerships. The next challenge is to ensure full and honest implementation of this agenda, a process that will be complicated simply because there is a large number of countries involved, different levels of development and different levels of ambition and commitment. But certainly, while the contribution of the global north is a matter of historical justice and of obligations that come with disproportionate power, south–south cooperation is expected to play an even greater role than before in ending poverty and underdevelopment in the world. Bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation among countries of the south, big and small, will have a huge bearing on the outcomes of this agenda come 2030. China and other emerging powers have a major responsibility to deliver on the Bandung principles of collective selfreliance, endogenous development and solidarity. FOCAC is therefore an opportunity to enable the implementation of the 2030 development agenda. On Economic Relations According to the Economic Commission for Africa, trade between Africa and China dramatically increased in the 1990s and 2000s, reaching US$210 billion a year in 2014. Some 2500 Chinese companies are now operating in a variety of economic sectors in Africa, including retail and wholesale, construction, resources and manufacturing.21 Many reports on

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this tend to be distorted narratives informed more by fear and conjecture than analysis of realities on the ground. Literature on the realities suggests that the Chinese presence has diversified beyond the hunger for natural resources initially thought to be the main driver of Chinese investment. Now, Chinese businesses are in the construction and infrastructure, manufacturing and services industry. Initially thought to be driven by state-owned enterprises, the Chinese business expansion involves at least four categories: firms owned by the central government, firms owned by the provincial government, private firms incorporated in China and small firms owned by independent Chinese immigrants.22 The Chinese expansion has been driven by the tying together of aid and trade, with the Chinese donating infrastructure built at huge costs before taking up business opportunities in the local market. Strong political relations have also enabled the Chinese to outcompete others on many fronts. There are concerns in Africa about Chinese businesses, but these are no different to concerns about all foreign firms and big local firms. Many of the problems relate to the practices ingrained in global capitalist ethic all companies exhibit. There are negative impacts especially on Africa’s industrial development as a result of the model of economic relations where very little manufacturing and industrial capacity is left behind in Africa. Arguments are being made for China to provide African countries preferential access to its huge market in order to boost industrialisation.23 This is already happening in some cases. For instance, a Ghanaian minister reported to the media on the studies done by the Ghana Trade Promotion entity that Chinese investments had “brought in much-needed capital, technology transfer, creation of jobs, a competitive business environment, new markets, innovation, promotion of trade, etc.”24

Cultural Exchange Statistics

19 Chinese government’s cultural delegations to more than 40 African countries. 60 African delegations to China. 155 Chinese art troupes have performed in Africa and Chinese institutions have hosted 210 African art troupes performing in China. China has sent 45 art exhibitions to Africa and invited 19 African art exhibitions to China. Chinese cultural and artistic experts

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have paid 73 visits to Africa, while their African counterparts have paid 49 visits to China. China has provided nearly 500 regular or short-term training opportunities to African cultural and artistic personnel. Source Embassy of People’s Republic of China to South Africa, 2015.

Cooperation in agriculture takes a variety of forms including Chinese purchase of agricultural land in Africa for food production for both the local market and for markets abroad. In this regard, China acts like other external investors in this area, inviting African countries to think about it turns this into its own advantage by building agroprocessing facilities and using their trade relations throughout the world to boost their food exports. Another component of agricultural cooperation is the sharing of lessons, capacity building and training of African agents of agricultural renaissance including farmers, agricultural scientists and technicians. China sent scores of experts to conduct capacity building and support in Africa and trained many Africans in China in this area. Countries like Sudan and Malawi are said to have benefitted from this cooperation in specific ways; such as ventures into new areas of agriculture including enhanced small-scale farming.25 Cultural Cooperation Although not a prominent priority in the beginning, hardly mentioned in the FOCAC declaration of 2000, cultural linkages between Africa and China have become a major outcome of their cooperation. There are now over 62 inter-governmental agreements on cultural cooperation involving 45 African countries. Through these, over 200 cultural delegations and visits have been recorded and many more cultural and art events were held. There has also been cooperation in the areas of sports, news media, publishing and the training of art professionals. A major impetus for this came from the 2004 “Meet in Beijing and Africa Year,” which saw cultural artists and cultural industry professionals visit various parts of China to perform and exhibit their creations to large Chinese audiences. The following year, Chinese artists visited various African countries celebrating Africa–China relations. With each cultural festival,

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new Africa–China friendship schools were established to deepen cultural exchanges among young people.26 In June 2012, ministers of culture from Africa and China met to take the cultural relations a level further and adopted a new action plan.27 Under the Africa–China Cultural Exchange Programme, 70 new cultural agreements were signed among Chinese and African cultural organisations, providing for performances, exhibitions, capacity building, cultural heritage protection and preservation. Hotels and holiday establishments in China increasingly hire a number of African cultural groups and artists to provide performances on a long-term basis.

Implications for Africa’s Policy Position Towards China The African Union has not yet developed a common position on strategic international cooperation or partnerships generally, though a process of reviewing these partnerships began in 2012–2013. There is no common position on any one of those partnerships, though a broad set of shared principles can be found in relation to relations with the US because the relationship is governed by a formal legal instrument called the African Growth and Opportunities Act of the US Congress (AGOA). What exists is a general framework guiding dialogue between Africa and each of the external partners with which it has a formal or semi-formal dialogue. This is the case with Africa’s cooperation with China under the auspices of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The development of a common African position or policy towards China should be a product of careful deliberation on what has been learned in the past 18–20 years of experiment on a closer and special relationship between the two parties. Such a reflection must acknowledge huge strides that have been made in such areas as infrastructure investment, cultural cooperation and political dialogue. This relationship also gave birth to a comprehensive cooperation mechanism in the form of the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) whose value has been more in making bold decisions than in translating them into concrete action on the ground, partly because of fragmentation, weak governance systems and poor leadership for action on the African side, but because China has not done enough to ensure that its contributions support collective self-reliance within Africa by supporting through its investment the catalytic role of regional organisations.

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Therefore, the common position will effectively and consciously seek to avoid the mistakes made in the past two decades. It would include affirming the crucial role of strengthening regional governance on the African continent as an important basis for the continent’s ability to translate assistance it gets and its own plans into concrete change on the ground. This will help respond to the perennial problem of fragmentation, poor coordination and weak intra-African cooperation in relation to all these strategic interests it shares with Africa. There is a challenge of little incentives for African states to embrace regional integration stronger than at present because of unknown cost–benefit balance should they go bolder and deeper towards regional economic integration. The process towards a common position would also be designed to reinforce the successes registered in the past decade and to harness the potential that has all been demonstrated under the FOCAC. This includes the following areas: there are clear areas of agreement and convergence of strategic interests that constitute the proverbial glue between Africa and China, including the interest in global reforms, the focus on development (beyond growth straightjacket), commitment to infrastructure development, industrialisation and generating new value chains for economic development, agricultural transformation and food security, education and health governance, innovation and technology for development, environmental management and employment creation. It is much easier to identify these themes as among key points of convergence than to point out exactly how relations with China respond to them. Clearly, the continent will expect that the relationship must involve access to capital essential for the continent on its own to achieve progress in these policy areas. It must expect some transfer of crucial skills and expertise as the continent builds its self-reliance capacity. It must also expect that investments and contributions from China must contribute to building Africa’s long-term ability not to depend on any other country or continent, so it must involve institution, leadership and capacity building. The position would of necessity have to spell out the principles that should anchor this relationship, all of which are contained in the AU Constitutive Act, which is the current constitution on which African continental governance is based. These include sovereign equality of states; respect for national sovereignty; enhancing democratic governance and popular participation; accelerating regional and continental integration; promote peace, stability and security; encourage international cooperation; and anchor sustainable development. These principles must

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find expression not only as norms of what must be avoided, but as the guide to what must be achieved and under what conditions. Most of these principles are shared with China anyway especially those of development, peace, cooperation. But by virtue of power asymmetry between the two, these principles are yet to find expression in practice. As a result, there is a lot of concern that China wants to dominate Africa to advance its national interests, that it is seeking to decide for Africa what is good for it, that it might be a paternalistic friend. Therefore, the common position must aim to ensure a frank continuous dialogue among equals that leaves no edgy stone unturned. The common position would also draw from the FOCAC experience in relation to institutional mechanisms, implementation frameworks, monitoring and accountability mechanisms that must support any set of decisions or plans agreed between the two. FOCAC has suffered seriously from the lack of structured accountability, monitoring and evaluation of its grandiose decisions. Not enough provision was made for specification of responsibilities with respect to implementation of decisions and accountability between summits. Nothing gave impetus for the continental bodies or national structures in Africa to ensure decisions taken and commitments made are followed through by concrete action. The common position would have to explain roles and responsibilities, institutions and structures for ensuring the implementation of decisions and commitments. It would not just be the African Union given the limitations of its mandate as an executing agency with powers to give impetus to implementation of decisions relating to cross-country and shared areas of commitment. Neither are secretariats of regional bodies empowered for this purpose. Yet their coordinating role is crucial in ensuring that national governments do what they have promised. Finally, a major weakness of the FOCAC mechanism is the inadequate participation of non-state actors including those that many of the commitments made could not be fully implemented without their participation. For instance, decisions on private sector development required a continuous and structured engagement with organised private sector, just as decisions on sustainable development will not be of much effect without popular participation. Therefore, the African common position on China will have to include some specific guidelines on the inclusion and participation of the peoples of both sides, social formations like civil society organisations, labour unions, business formations and educational institutions.

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The broad policy towards China will have to arise from a careful balance between a combination of individual country positions towards China and their joint position in FOCAC. A careful deliberation on the national interests of African countries in relation to their relationship with China should yield a number of shared interests among African countries themselves to form the basis of this common policy position. It is much easier to build on existing express national interests and national decisions about China than to invest nice sounding and grandiose ideas from broad continental conversation. However well-crafted a common position may seem, if it does not emerge from a convergence of African national interests it will be nice to have that will not change how Africa responds to its co-emergence with the huge global economy in China. Some countries in Africa give precedent to that which is in their national plans and programmes over nice sounding things said at regional and continental gatherings, unless if the latter are so tailored as to align with national interests of most countries. If this firms up, it would suggest a just bottom-up orientation in the development of continental interests, agenda and policy positions. Among the weaknesses that appear when a close analysis of the cooperation is applied include the following: China is a major and growing global economic power on account of its high levels of industrialised growth in contrast to African economies whose unusual growth is driven by exports of raw materials and primary commodities highly vulnerable to the vagaries of fluctuating prices of primary commodities. Therefore, the two sides are economically very different and in fact, this positions China invariably in a relationship that is not just unequal but also exploitative in ways, of course, different from western big economies. It is different in the sense that exploitation is the function of unequal economic development rather than this mixed with hegemonic ideological designs. Secondly, China’s national interests clash with the continental ambitions for a better and transformed global economic and governance environment in order to enable poor countries to achieve equity and equality. This is because China’s national interests militate towards piecemeal reforms and concessions rather than massive and potentially disruptive transformation of everything, from international financial institutions to the UN Security Council. This divergence of strategic national/continental interests is significant because it determines whether there is cohesion at all on matters that are fundamental to African

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economic renaissance. Thirdly, the continent has not done well in developing a strong and strategic policy towards China, at least a common position that enables the many countries of unequal size to have certain bottom lines that underpin their individual and collective relations with China because this has a bearing on cohesion of interests at global level. The continent has moved on the basis of idealism, assuming China’s motives to be wholly good, virtuous and in Africa’s interests, thus undermining the fact that China’s core national interests that are not born out of their friendship with Africa, but out of core challenges and opportunities internally. Fourthly, there is very poor sense of strategic approach to agreements already reached and concessions arrived at in the Africa– China strategic partnership, partly as a function of weakness in the African governance architecture from the AU Commission which lacks instruments of planning, monitoring, evaluation and outcomes management to regional economic communities and national governments that have just not demonstrated their ability to draw optimum benefits for Africa from China’s goodwill. As a result, a lot of China’s goodwill depends on China and its institutions self-constraining for the good of Africa, which is not sustainable as a measure of cooperation.

Conclusion Relations between Africa and China have grown substantially since 2000. They have also grown in the range of policy issues on which there are agreements and the intensity of cohesion between Africa-China expected in order to deliver on these promises. They have been declared a strategic partnership designed to be mutually beneficial. Yet, in reality this partnership remains unequal in contribution and benefits and strategic only in the level of political involvement. It thus raises questions that structure the dialogue towards a common position on relations with China. One of them is whether we understand the exact nature of the unequal but cordial relationship with China and how does a new approach to managing them including a new African common position or policy on China assist in changing this to the benefit of both sides? There are many reasons why the relations can be said to have reached a point where these relations will deliver on their promise or potential only if a clear convergence of strategic interests, visions, paradigms and goals is found in relation to the policy areas that will be the basis for the

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translation of the relations from mere cooperation to effective partnership for mutual benefits. This will require that in developing its policy on China, Africa and its countries will need to identify these areas of strategic convergence and work out how the continent might respond to them in order to ensure that relations grow and that they grow in a manner that advances Africa’s strategic imperatives in a practical and meaningful way. The chapter sought to make the case for finding areas of convergence in relation to strategic interests and aspirations for building a strong and mutually beneficial partnership as the basis for building a common African position and policy on China. To do so, it outlined the conceptual basis for this argument by drawing from the global South idea of collective self-reliance, and used this to explain what fundamentally is weak about Africa–China relations, which includes the failure to invest significantly in altering the asymmetry of economic power between the continent and the rising global power. On this basis the chapter has proposed ways of identifying on the basis of the experiences of the past 17 years the proverbial glues that must firm up a strategic partnership between Africa and China. It has also pointed out major challenges and weaknesses in the cooperation between Africa and China.

Notes 1. Mafeje, A. 2011. ‘A Combative Ontology,’ in Devisch, R. and Nyamnjoh, F.B. (eds.), Postcolonial Turn: Imagining Anthropology and Africa, Bamenda and Leiden: Langaa, pp. 31–41. 2. This part borrows from Sylvia Wynter. See Bogues, Anthony. 2006. ‘The Human, Knowledge and the Word: Reflecting on Sylvia Wynter’, in Bogues, Anthony (ed.), After Man, Towards the Human: Critical Essays on Sylvia Wynter. Kingston/Miami: Ian Randle Publishers, pp. 315–338. 3. FOCAC. 2000. ‘Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/hywj/t15 7833.htm (accessed on 2 August 2015). 4. ‘Remarks by Ambassador Cui Tiankai at the 2013 China-US Policy Dialogue Luncheon’. Washington, DC. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, 14 June 2013. Available at http://us.china-embassy.org/eng/ dszl/dsjh/t1050515 (accessed on 4 November 2015). 5. For exposition of the concept of sub-imperialism, see Väyrynen, R. and Herrera, L. 1975. ‘Subimperialism: From Dependence to Subordination’, Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 5 (3): 165–77.

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6. Bond, P. 2013. ‘Sub-imperialism or Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘Deputy Sheriff’ Duty Within BRICS’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (2): 251–70. 7. Malik, J.M. 2005. ‘Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto’, World Policy Journal, 22 (1): 19–29. 8. Lei, X. 2014. ‘China as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council’, Security Council in Focus, New York: FES. Available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10740.pdf (accessed on 29 July 2015). 9. Dai, Y. and Xing, Y. 2007. ‘China Has Not Attempted to Softly Balance the US in the UN’, Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 3: 19–51. 10. People’s Republic of China, 2005. ‘Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms’. Available at http:// www.china.org.cn/english/government/131308.htm (accessed on 2 August 2015). 11. ‘Africa Is Keen to Enter UN Security Council’, 2 July 2005. Pana Press. Available at http://www-panapress.cms-france.net/Africa-is-keen-toenter-UN-Security-Council--12-568592-20-lang4-index.html (accessed on 2 August 2015). 12. See discussion in Kaplinsky, R. 2005. Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Cambridge: Polity Press, 220–29; Burbach, R. and Tarbell, J. 2005. Imperial Overstretch: George W Bush and the Hubris of Empire. London and New York: Zed Books 2004, 149–71. See also Havnevik, K.J. 1988. The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives. Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet; Adedeji, A. 1999. ‘Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa’, International Social Science Journal, 51 (162): 521–28. 13. Yongding, Y. undated. ‘IMF Reform: A Chinese View’. Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3870/28iie3870. pdf (accessed on 21 August 2015). 14. Shanghai Institutes for International Studies Working Group. 2009. The Reform of International Financial Institutions and China’s Policy Options. Available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ contents/products/fachpublikationen/XueLei_ReformIntFinancialSys tem_2009_01.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2015). 15. ‘China Climate Change Plan Unveiled’, 30 June 2015. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-33317451 (accessed on 22 August 2015).

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16. ‘China’s Success on Millennium Development Goals Provides an Example for Others to Follow for the Post-2015 development Agenda, Says New UNDP Report’, 17 February 2015. Available at http://www.undp.org/ content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/02/17/china-s-suc cess-on-millennium-development-goals-provides-an-example-for-othersto-follow-for-the-post-2015-development-agenda-says-new-undp-report0. html (accessed on 1 September 2015). 17. UNDP China. 2015. ‘China, The Millennium Development Goals, and the Post-2015 Development Agenda’. Available at http://www.undp. org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country% 20Reports/China/UNDP%20Discussion%20Paper_China%20MDGs_ FINAL_17%20Feb_RC.pdf (accessed on 1 September 2015). 18. ‘Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations at the Ministerial Dialogue of the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development’, 7 July 2014. Available at http://www.china-un.org/eng/dbtxx/ambliu/activities/t1172306.htm (accessed on 1 September 2015). 19. Zondi, S. 2014. On the Future Africa Wants: The Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Accord Policy and Practice Brief , No. 032, Durban: ACCORD. 20. Michelle Nichols. 2015. ‘China Pledges $2 Billion to Help Poor States Meet U.N. Goals’, Reuters World News, 26 September. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-china/china-ple dges-2-billion-to-help-poor-states-meet-u-n-goals-idUSKCN0RQ0HW20 150926 (accessed on 26 September 2015). 21. UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2015. ‘Africa & China: More FDI Needed to Boost Exchange’, 27 September. Available at http:// www.uneca.org/stories/africa-china-more-fdi-needed-boost-exchange (accessed on 2 August 2015). 22. Ajakaiye, O. and Kaplinski, R. 2009. ‘China in Africa: A Relationship in Transition’, European Journal of Development Research, 21: 479–84. 23. Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. 2008. ‘Do the Asian Drivers Undermine Export-oriented Industrialisation in SSA’, World Development Special Issue on Asian Drivers and their Impact on Developing Countries, 36 (2): 254–73. 24. ‘Interview: Ghana Calls for more Chinese Investment into Value Added Activities’, 17 July 2012. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ dwjbzjjhys/t952000.htm (accessed on 22 August 2015). 25. ‘China-Africa Agriculture Cooperation Forum Wraps up in Beijing’. China News. 12 August 2010. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/ ltda/dsjbzjhy/t725504.htm (accessed on 12 August 2015).

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26. See ‘FOCAC and China-Africa Relations’. Undated. Available at http:// www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgxss/gk/t942569.htm (accessed 1 September 2015). 27. ‘Cultural Exchanges: A Crucial Bond of Friendship’, December 2015. Available at http://www.bjreview.com/Special_Reports/2015/The_Sec ond_Summit_of_FOCAC/Ministers_Say/201511/t20151126_800043 387.html (accessed on 2 September 2015).

Select References ‘Africa Is Keen to Enter UN Security Council’, 2 July 2005. Pana Press. Available at http://www-panapress.cms-france.net/Africa-is-keen-toenter-UN-Security-Council–12-568592-20-lang4-index.html (accessed on 2 August 2015). ‘Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/hywj/t157833.htm (accessed on 2 August 2015). ‘China Climate Change Plan Unveiled’, 30 June 2015. Available at http:// www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-33317451 (accessed on 22 August 2015). ‘China-Africa Agriculture Cooperation Forum Wraps Up in Beijing’. China News, 12 August 2010. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dsj bzjhy/t725504.htm (accessed on 12 August 2015). ‘China’s Success on Millennium Development Goals Provides an Example for Others to Follow for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, Says New UNDP Report’, 17 February 2015. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/ undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/02/17/china-s-success-on-mil lennium-development-goals-provides-an-example-for-others-to-follow-forthe-post-2015-development-agenda-says-new-undp-report0.html (accessed on 1 September 2015). ‘Cultural Exchanges: A Crucial Bond of Friendship’, December 2015. Available at http://www.bjreview.com/Special_Reports/2015/The_Second_Summit_ of_FOCAC/Ministers_Say/201511/t20151126_800043387.html (accessed on 2 September 2015). ‘FOCAC and China-Africa Relations’. Undated. Available at http://www.chi nese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgxss/gk/t942569.htm (accessed on 1 September 2015). ‘Interview: Ghana Calls for More Chinese Investment into Value Added Activities’, 17 July 2012. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/ t952000.htm (accessed on 22 August 2015).

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‘Remarks by Ambassador Cui Tiankai at the 2013 China-US Policy Dialogue Luncheon’, Washington, DC. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, 14 June 2013. Available at http://us.china-embassy.org/eng/dszl/dsjh/t10 50515 (accessed on 4 November 2015). ‘Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations at the Ministerial Dialogue of the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development’, 7 July 2014. Available at http:// www.china-un.org/eng/dbtxx/ambliu/activities/t1172306.htm (accessed on 1 September 2015). Adedeji, A. 1999. ‘Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa’, International Social Science Journal, 51 (162), 521–28. Ajakaiye, O. and Kaplinski, R. 2009. ‘China in Africa: A Relationship in Transition’, European Journal of Development Research, 21: 479–84. Bond, P. 2013. ‘Sub-imperialism or Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘Deputy Sheriff’ Duty Within BRICS’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (2): 251– 70. Burbach, R. and Tarbell, J. 2005. Imperial Overstretch: George W Bush and the Hubris of Empire. London and New York: Zed Books 2004, 149–71. Dai, Y. and Xing, Y. 2007. ‘China Has Not Attempted to Softly Balance the US in the UN’, Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 3: 19–51. FOCAC. 2000. ‘Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/hywj/t157833.htm (accessed on 2 August 2015). Havnevik, K.J. 1988. The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives. Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet. Kaplinsky, R. 2005. Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Cambridge: Polity Press, 220–29. Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. 2008. ‘Do the Asian Drivers Undermine Exportoriented Industrialisation in SSA’, World Development Special Issue on Asian Drivers and Their Impact on Developing Countries 36 (2): 254–73. Le Pere, G. (ed.). 2007. China in Africa: Mercantilist Predator, or Partner in Development? Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue. Lei, X. 2014. ‘China as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council’, Security Council in Focus, New York: FES. Available at http://lib rary.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10740.pdf (accessed on 29 July 2015). Mafeje, A. 2011. ‘A Combative Ontology,’ in Devisch, R. and Nyamnjoh, F.B. (eds.), Postcolonial Turn: Imagining Anthropology and Africa. Bamenda and Leiden: Langaa, pp. 31–41. Malik, J.M. 2005. ‘Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto’, World Policy Journal, 22 (1): 19–29.

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People’s Republic of China, 2005. ‘Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms’. Available at http://www.china.org. cn/english/government/131308.htm (accessed on 2 August 2015). Schiere, R., Ndikumana, L. and Walkenhorst, P. (eds.). 2011. China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? Tunis: African Development Bank. Shelton, G. and Le Pere, G. 2007. China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Co-operation in a Global Era. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue. Sylvia Wynter. See Bogues, Anthony. 2006. ‘The Human, Knowledge and the Word: Reflecting on Sylvia Wynter’, in Anthony Bogues (ed.), After Man, Towards the Human: Critical Essays on Sylvia Wynter. Kingston and Miami: Ian Randle Publishers, pp. 315–38. UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2015. ‘Africa & China: More FDI Needed to Boost Exchange’, 27 September. Available at http://www.uneca.org/ stories/africa-china-more-fdi-needed-boost-exchange (accessed on 2 August 2015). UNDP China, 2015. ‘China, The Millennium Development Goals, and the Post-2015 Development Agenda’. Available at http://www.undp.org/ content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country%20Repo rts/China/UNDP%20Discussion%20Paper_China%20MDGs_FINAL_17% 20Feb_RC.pdf (accessed on 1 September 2015). Väyrynen, R. and Herrera, L. 1975. ‘Subimperialism: From Dependence to Subordination’, Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 5 (3): 165–77. Yongding, Y. undated. ‘IMF Reform: A Chinese View’. Available at http:// www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3870/28iie3870.pdf (21 August 2015). Zondi, S. 2014. On the Future Africa Wants: The Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Accord Policy and Practice Brief , No. 032. Durban: ACCORD.

CHAPTER 5

Pan-African Perspectives on International Relations—Africa and China Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah

Introduction Ideas and realities characterizing Nationality, National Sovereignty, and National Self-Interest continue to be the basis for debate, analysis, planning and action within international relations. Conventional platforms used to measure, sustain, augment, or dismantle these ideas and realities (multilateral institutions; transnational corporations; political, trade and military blocs and parties) have been the reasons billions of people have gone to war in recent history; the reasons people have fought to challenge authority, the balance of power, the meaning and value of Capital, and the sustainability of particular political, social and economic systems. For African peoples, whose majority reside on the African continent, but whose representation is spread across five continents, this era of hyper consumption and connectivity represents the most serious of societal challenges; namely, the possibility of “national extinction,” in cultural, political, and economic terms.1 For the Chinese, facing the ever-growing need to balance the distribution of wealth and economic opportunity,

K. D. L. S. Prah (B) Department of History, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_5

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and how the Chinese government chooses to validate its present socioeconomic prescriptions regarding market access and the consequences of its economic, political and cultural diplomacy create serious challenges as well. As a result, interactions between African states and China tend to reflect lob-sided realities in which one is the recipient and the other the donor, causing or exacerbating dependencies.2 This is despite the prevailing rhetoric on South-South Cooperation (SSC) and its proposed benefits. Indeed, some have argued that this represents typical processes of development, in which capital accesses and exploits new markets. Others have argued that these relations only entrench the exploitative nature of capitalist expansion, thus characterizing Africa–China relations as hegemonic. But on what grounds could “national extinction” become reality? What ways would Nationality, National Sovereignty, National SelfInterest and Self-Determination come to define how Africans interact with Chinese upon a structural and functional overhaul of an “African Nation”? In this chapter, these questions will be analysed within specific theoretical and empirical scope. By defining, highlighting and outlining the ideas, factors and realities behind “national extinction,” the paper seeks to explain the need and basis for a change of approach regarding how Africans understand and apply directives regarding their international relations, with China as the primary case study.

The Reality of Nationalism and National Extinction in Africa Over one hundred years ago (in 1888), Edward Wilmot Blyden, in his characteristic zeal, unknowingly began outlining the fortunes of a prenascent African nationalist project, by characterizing what he conceived to be the origins of the colonial enterprise in Africa. Blyden mused, The modern desire for more accurate knowledge of Africa is not a mere sentiment; it is the philanthropic impulse to lift up the millions of that continent to their proper position among the intellectual and moral forces of the world; but it is also the commercial desire to open that vast country to the enterprises of trade. Europe is overflowing with the material productions of its own genius. Important foreign markets, which formerly consumed these productions, are now closing against them. Africa seems to furnish the only large outlet, and the desire is to make the markets of

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the Soudan easily accessible to London, Manchester and Liverpool. The depressed factories of Lancashire are waiting to be inspired with new life and energy by the development of a new and inexhaustible trade with the millions of Central Africa; so that Africa, as frequently in the past, will have again to come to the rescue and contribute to the needs of Europe.3

What Blyden had foreseen, and what many of his contemporaries began understanding was the way in which colonies in Africa would become the center stage for international pillage by Euro-American capitalist interests. Notwithstanding the existing historical narratives of encounters, resistance, revolt, and revolution over the past 800 years,4 it became clear that despite the lack of structural form, and a clear ideological template to an African proto-nationalist agenda, the need for the formation of structured political spaces and ideas to articulate and implement resistance and development became a primary concern.5 But what constituted the “African Nation,” how this nation would manifest itself, and what its geographical outline would be, became one of the more enduring intellectual challenges of contemporary African thought. The sheer scope of theorization, debate, and critique that revolved around these issues forces one to first outline a theoretical framework within which to summarize these discourses and to assess particular, yet definitive moments that dictated or influenced the thrust and nature of nationalism in African spaces, and among African peoples. From these summaries, it is then possible to deduce the fragilities that exist within Africa’s national spaces, and to examine alternate avenues of national self-determination and progress. For the purposes of brevity, it is useful to build on Partha Chatterjee’s theoretical outline, as his analysis does well to treat definitions of the nation and the nation-state in their holistic, and heterogenous senses. For Chatterjee, while the mandate of the state is to provide general security and welfare for its resident population, citizens represent a “political society”; a “political society” whose conflict lies at the heart of modern politics in most of the world. It is the opposition between the universal ideal of civic nationalism, based on individual freedoms and equal rights irrespective of distinctions of religion, race, language, or culture, and the particular demands of cultural identity, which call for the differential treatment of particular groups on grounds of vulnerability or backwardness or historical injustice, or indeed for numerous other reasons. The opposition, I will argue, is symptomatic of

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the transition that occurred in modern politics in the course of the twentieth century from a conception of democratic politics grounded in the idea of popular sovereignty to one in which democratic politics is shaped by governmentality.6

For this political society, and for most people around the world, its connections with civil society and the state represent tenuous relationships that often breakdown in favor of mainly capitalist interests.7 Although citizens are supposed to be direct participants in democratic processes of planning, decision-making, and implementation with regard to their development, this is often reduced to abstract associations and actions.8 The result is the gradual bifurcation of the citizen and civil society, and ultimately the breakdown in the functioning of the State as their responsibilities to uphold national interest and sovereignty are eroded.9 Therefore, “the story of citizenship in the modern West moves from the institution of civic rights in civil society to political rights in the fully developed nation-state. Only then does one enter the relatively recent phase where “government from the social point of view” seems to take over. In countries of Asia and Africa, however, the chronological sequence is quite different. There the career of the modern state has been foreshortened.”10 This “foreshortening” that Chatterjee speaks of is quite literally the consequence of colonialism, and the super-imposition of a Western, theoretical notion of the nation-state in African political, social, and economic spaces.11 The postcolonial states of Africa, in Kwesi Kwaa Prah’s words, “are neither nations nor nation-states, they are simply states, neocolonial states. They are entities created, in most cases, within the last hundred years for administrative purposes, by the erstwhile colonial masters.”12 Therefore, although the independence era (1960–1970) ushered in the “birth” of the African state, and signified a powerful victory for the African liberation movements and their unsung heroines and heroes, these states ended up functioning as proxies for either Euro-American ideological and economic interests, or Russian and East-Asian propaganda platforms for their ideological and political struggles against Western Imperialism. This does not negate the fact that very serious attempts were made to maintain a Pan-Africanist slant to the nationalist project in Africa.13 In fact, “African nationalism and Pan-Africanism derive from the same social impulse, but are different historical, geographical, and contextual translations of the same impulse. One is not borne out of the

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other. They are divergent renderings in scale, history, and social size of the same Africanist cause. Tactically, both in theory and practice, they have evolved in response to changing realities, but the strategic goal is unchanging. Both sociopolitical expressions are modernist African (and include the African diaspora) reactions, counterpoints, to imperialism.”14 Nevertheless, aside from the social crises that the African neocolonial state had to contend with, it also generally produced and reproduced its national domestic and foreign policies and plans along Euro-American prescriptions, making it dependent on interests from major powers in Euro-American spaces.15 For example, between 1984–1990, so-called “Third World” countries, under the infamous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), transferred over 178 billion Dollars into EuroAmerican Banks, prompting Morris Miller, a Canadian former World Bank director to state that, “not since the conquistadors plundered Latin America has the world experienced such a flow in the direction we see today.”16 This trend did not change. Yash Tandon documents that between the 1990s and 2000s, the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose “controlling” constituents are primarily Euro-American, used to organize “training” workshops for African (and other “Third World”) trade negotiators to learn about the WTO rules and regulations.17 Ironically, between 2000–2011, more than twenty-two African states renewed International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans through Extended Credit Facilities (ECFs) or Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs), and a greater share of African states signed Free Trade Agreements and/or Economic Partnership Agreements with mainly Euro-American partners.18 Of course, none of these recycled dependencies gained traction without the assistance of what the Late Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽东) termed “Comprador Elite.”19 These elite, whose allegiances are ultimately to financial capitalism, set themselves up in the echelons of white-collar business, either to siphon off any gains that the state incurs, or to setup up cartels within government and privately, to ensure that they secure access to more capital, and are seen to be influential and relevant.20 Prah states that, …the African elite, in as far as its general mentality goes, is currently not positioned to facilitate the development and enhancement of a sufficiently autonomous, Africanist orientation which can lead towards sustained and culturally assertive development in Africa. The dominant tendency of the upper levels of the elite is to reproduce cultural copies of Western reality in Africa… it is possibly at the economic levels of production, distribution,

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exchange and consumption that the inanity of this class is most societally debilitating. The neo-colonial elite endeavours to replicate the tastes and consumption patterns of Western society, but neither has the means nor orientation to capitalize and produce like the Western Bourgeoisie.21

Furthermore, the well-documented cycle of coups in Africa from the late 1960s onward, came to represent the political and social rupture between the citizen and the state in Africa. Social science discourse flourished as it theorized, debated, and published widely on the ills of the “Third World” and the emerging African neocolonial state. All this served to entrench the status of political and economic dependency on multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), financial institutions such as the World Bank, and military powers such as the United States, France, Britain, and recently the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bloc. The totality of these neocolonial realities only spells out one prospect; namely, the invalidity of the African state and its various nationalisms, as well as its inability to secure and maintain the welfare of its citizens. Despite the various well-meaning development programs ushered in by new cooperative financial groups such as the Brazil/Russia/India/China/South Africa (BRICS) New Development Bank and African Development Bank (whose insurers, ironically’ are the World Bank and IMF), the debt crises,22 the political and cultural vacuum in which the African intelligentsia find themselves23 compel all concerned Africans to re-frame and re-establish the political society within which they exist, and to build a representative national space that compliments their development aspirations.

National Interest and the Politics of Diplomacy: China’s Challenges China’s meteoric rise to the status of an economic “superpower” is a well-documented phenomenon. David Harvey makes an interesting point in this regard. He notes that China did well to withstand what he called “shock therapy” instituted by the World Bank and IMF in the form of their privatization schemes, and uneven loan arrangements.24 Between 1990s and 2000s, Harvey notes that what the Chinese government termed “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was actually a state-manipulated market economy “that delivered spectacular economic growth (averaging close to 10 percent a year) and rising standards of

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living for a significant proportion of the population for more than twenty years. But the reforms also led to environmental degradation, social inequality, and eventually, something that looks uncomfortably like the reconstitution of capitalist class power.”25 In fact, since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 16th National Congress in 2002, in which the construction of a moderately prosperous society (小康 - xiaokang ) became the principle objective, social welfare institutions, domestic food security, middle-class income and investment opportunities, reform of healthcare and education systems all received careful attention from state lenders; fostering the spectacular growth of which Harvey describes. Therefore, “China’s GDP grew from 10.8 trillion yuan in 2001 to 47 trillion yuan in 2011, making it the world’s second largest economy.”26 By clearly demarcating sectors of the economy reserved for the stimulation of “growth” such as skills and production transfer from heavy industry to high tech industry; allowing financial capital more opportunity to be more “fluid”—Ecommerce; by further mechanizing agri-business and production; and by expanding transportation and communication networks, the Chinese government augmented its capacity to invest internationally. This plan of action was maintained, despite the financial crises in 2008, which sent the prices of food, oil, and other natural resources skyrocketing worldwide. In fact, as Nabudere noted that in 2008, “China announced a four trillion Yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package, the largest in the country’s history. China’s State Council unveiled it on November 9th, with a two-year time span. The stimulus was aimed at injecting funds into ten sectors, including health care, education, low-income housing, environmental protection and schemes to promote technological Innovation as well as transport and other infrastructure projects. The plan was also to be directed into reconstruction efforts in areas that had been struck by natural disasters, such as Sichuan province, which was devastated by a massive earthquake in May. The measures also included a loosening of credit policies and tax cuts. They also called for Reforms in the country’s value-added tax regime that would save industry 120 billion Yuan. Credit ceilings for commercial banks were to be abolished in the hope that this would result in channeling more capital to small enterprises, rural areas and unspecified ‘priority projects.’”27 Thus, as these reforms began to take shape, so did China’s need to seek more avenues to expand its economic and political reach. But in doing so, its

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well-documented economic expansion came at the cost of foregoing some of its more traditional approaches to the international political landscape. As China entrenched its influence and interests in Africa in the past decade, critics argued that it shifted the international dynamic of capitalist real politik, and placed China as the major political and economic power in this cycle of dependency. According to most of their arguments, although the staple diet of Euro-American donors and their development aid schemes might not have been entirely productive over the past seventy years, the invasive, financially unstable and unsustainable, and at times, illegal nature of Chinese investment, development aid and assistance was counter-productive to Africa’s various development agendas.28 In one such article, an argument is made that China’s no-strings-attached development aid schemes in exchange for strategic resources resulted in the propping up of rogue or illegitimate regimes in Africa. Despite the plethora of neoliberal analyses regarding the cost-benefit ratios of China’s investments and development “assistance” in Africa,29 evidence still pointed to a marked increase in correlations between rogue regimes, armed conflicts and Chinese influence in Africa. Apparently, “by giving recipient countries greater budgetary discretion, China’s aid bolsters incumbent regimes’ coercive capacity to repress any potential opposition at the expense of the prospect for power-sharing institutional reforms. Thus, this unconditional aid may deepen recipient countries’ existing sociopolitical cleavages and exacerbate incumbent rulers’ authoritarian tendency. China’s oil-driven loan-exemption agreement with South Sudan (2012), its elusive arms deals and later involvement in the highly controversial $5 billion oil-for-aid loan in Angola (2007) and the $9 billion mining and infrastructure aid partnership with the Democratic Republic of Congo (2008) are just a few notorious examples.”30 Ultimately, these arguments and perspectives did not, and do not undermine what is, overall, a constructive relationship between African states and China. They represent, at most, part of a polemical debate and discourse that indicates the growing unease of the Euro-American world, regarding the diminishing influence of their political and economic clout in the hitherto colonized/underdeveloped world/Third World/Least Developed Countries (LDCs).31 In reality, Steven Hess and Richard Aidoo note that Chinese activities and influence in Africa are multidimensional, incorporating a variety of institutions, corporations, and people.32 According to their research,

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Chinese SOEs, which receive ample support from the Chinese state, coordinate the completion of infrastructure projects promised by Beijing, extract natural resources and transport them back to the Chinese market, and sell competitively priced Chinese manufactures in African markets. Chinese workers, in turn, receive contracts from SOEs to work in both high and low skill positions in African states. Because these workers are paid much lower wages than their counterparts in advanced economies and often African laborers, Chinese SOEs can offer highly competitive bids on construction projects in various African states. This strategy… has generally worked well in helping Chinese firms to gain a foothold in African markets and also cultivated positive public approval towards China in most African societies….33

In lieu of these arguments and perspectives, one can surmise that African states and China diplomatically engage on various levels, and their exchanges indicate that their relationships are not too far removed from the ideological and political relationship they shared decades ago; namely, to act on their desires to see the reform of international trade regulations and systems, to gain better access, leverage, and value in the political decision-making processes at multilateral institutions such as the UN, and to serve as a counter-point to Western imperialism. But what does this mean, in terms of how these realities impact African states and their ability to maintain their foreign national interests? What is required of Africans to gain real value out of exchanges and interactions with the Chinese government and its citizens?

Africa and China---Charting a New Concept of the Nation-State It has been argued for quite some time now that the International Relations (IR) discipline is essentially Eurocentric in theory and practice. As Tandeka C. Nkiwane correctly notes, what is “typically understood as the “canon” of IR, realism, neorealism, liberalism, and to a lesser extent critical theory as derived from Marxism, are all Western constructs.”34 Nkiwane goes on to indicate that the policy lessons gained from the various experiments conducted on African soil in the name of development compels one to re-evaluate the theoretical assumptions that define and drive contemporary IR.35 Arturo Escobar, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, and Ramon Grosfoguel collectively take this inquiry further and suggest that the political and economic institutions within international

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matrices of power, as well as the processes and valuation of knowledge production in the world today suffer from an inherent coloniality, despite the myth that upon the abolition of colonial administrations worldwide, this amounted to decolonization.36 Nevertheless, the reality of IR is that its Eurocentric, neoliberal concern to maintain the stability of the world financial system and its corresponding institutions, as well as the balance of power in multilateral bodies that re-enforce the monopoly of financial capital and its proponents, faces its most serious problem; namely that “at the core of the crisis is the over extension of credit on a narrow material production base. This is in a situation in which money has become increasingly detached from its material base of a money commodity that can measure its value such as gold. But this is not just a monetary phenomenon. It has its roots in the ‘real economy’ of which it is part.”37 Thus, the problem manifests at both an empirical and epistemic level. Epistemically, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak posed an important question, namely, that “on the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education…, can the subaltern speak?”38 The question, at its epistemic core, reveals a more serious challenge. For the subaltern to speak, they have to construct their own scientific bases, and produce knowledge within frameworks that do not compliment or support imperialist law and education. This means that for any meaningful step toward unshackling the chains of the neocolonial political economy, an indigenous linguistic revival and usage must be at the center of development and progress.39 At an empirical level, Africa’s political economies need to wrestle with the dual challenge of maintaining economic growth and sustaining national sovereignty. On these two fronts, the current African state has failed. Ernest Wambia Dia Wamba thus notes that, Independent micro-states are closer to their former colonial States, than to their immediate contiguous neighbors, formerly colonized by other colonialist countries. The same situation holds within the realm of knowledge. Former colonized people know more the history and culture of their former colonising countries than those of their contiguous neighbors colonized by different colonialist countries. This has hardly changed…. Despite the sanctity of colonial borders, border conflicts have not been lacking, especially when a resource running across the borders is discovered…. We witness no creative political imagination, no proposals for joint ventures to

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exploit, common resources by mutual cooperation. No political ideas such as the formation of federation or confederation with a rotating leadership are contemplated since the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The spirit of colonial conquest has simply been internalized.40

In light of these concerned perspectives, the re-consideration of political efforts to assess the viability of a political body that represents Africans worldwide becomes paramount. Initiatives such as the PanAfrican Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), and the work conducted by the Liberation Movement Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1958 are important precedents. These initiatives sought to pool the resources and political will of the various liberation movements across Africa, as well as the economic capacities of supporting businesses, artisans, laborers, and civil servants, to build the framework for an African peoples’ unity. Political considerations of an African state that can deal on an equal footing with international powers such as China and Euro-American states can only materialize upon the re-examination of these initiatives.

Conclusion Due to the internal structure and function of the political economy in African States, dependencies are exacerbated, creating and re-creating neocolonial realities that foreshorten the life-span of the African state, and usher in its eventual extinction. The essentially temporary nature of the nationalist project in Africa has been described and understood as a permanent mechanism where society is controlled by legalizing and proselytizing the benefits of monopoly capital. This runs contrary to the language of emancipation and an African Peoples’ unity, in terms of disentangling itself from the Eurocentric discourse on modernity.41 It is in light of these challenges that a concerted, practical, and proactive focus on Pan-Africanist perspectives regarding the political unity of African peoples becomes imperative. The totality of these efforts will ensure that while nation-states such as China enjoy the fruits of their economic and political success, Africa can begin to plan and implement its development agendas with greater purpose and efficiency. Only then will Africans be able to tackle the systemic crises of capitalism, and begin charting its own path on how to reform or overhaul Capitalism’s epistemic template. Only with a

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concerted and grounded focus on building a political foundation can Africans begin to relate to the international in a way that is coordinated and coherent.

Notes 1. By ‘national extinction’, I mean the loss of cultural, political, economic identities and independence within a national space. The ever-increasing debt burdens, security crises and dependencies, social cleavages and political instabilities point to the reality of the political economy in Africa having created satellite states, and proxies for international powers and their real politik. For perspectives on these issues, see; Azikwe, Abayomi. Africa in Review 2016: Neo-Colonialism, Economic Sovereignty and the Imperatives of Socialist Development (Montreal; Center for Research on Globalization, Global Research, 3 January 2017), online at; https:// www.globalresearch.ca/africa-in-review-2016-neo-colonialism-economicsovereignty-and-the-imperatives-of-socialist-development/5566157 (Last accessed on; 15 November 2017): Price, Robert M. Neo-Colonialism and Ghana’s Economic Decline: A Critical Assessment (Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1984; pp. 163–193): Vengroff, Richard. Neocolonialism and Policy Outputs in Africa (Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1975; pp. 234–250). 2. Prah, Kwesi D.L.S & Gumede, Vusi (eds.). Africa-China Partnerships and Relations; African Perspectives. Trenton, New Jersey; Africa world Press, 2017. 3. Blyden, Edward W. Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race. Baltimore, Maryland; Black Classics Press, 1994; p. 43. 4. Van Sertima, Ivan. They Came Before Columbus; The African Presence in Ancient America. New York; Random House Trade, 2003; pp. 21–38, 52–72: Ogot, Bethwell A. (ed.). A General History of Africa; Volume 5— Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century. Paris; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1992; pp. 1–136. 5. Garvey, Marcus. Aims and Objects. New York; Press of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, 1924: In this pamphlet, under the sub-heading ‘To improve conditions of a Race’, it is stated that the “Universal Negro Improvement Association is an organization amongst Negroes that is seeking to improve the conditions of the race, with the view of establishing a Nation in Africa where negroes will be given the opportunity to develop by themselves, without creating the hatred and animosity that now exist in the countries of the white

5

6.

7. 8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

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race through Negroes rivaling them for the highest and best positions in government, politics, society and industry.” See this document online at: http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/maai3/segreg ation/text1/marcusgarvey.pdf (Accessed on 13 September 2017). For the original pamphlet, see: https://archive.org/details/AimsAndObjec tsOfMovementForSolutionOfNegroProblemsOutlined (Accessed on 12 September 2017): Also see Foner, Philip S (ed.). W.E.B Du Bois Speaks; Speeches and Addresses —1890–1919. New York; Pathfinder Press Inc., 1970; pp. 124–127, 272–275: Geiss, Imanuel. The Pan-African Movement. London; Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974; pp. 177–178. Chatterjee, Partha. The Politics of the Governed; Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. New York; Columbia University Press, 2004; p. 4. Harvey, David. The New Imperialism. Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press, 2003; pp. 89–93. Chatterjee, Partha (2004). Op. cit.; pp. 8–51: Also see, Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, UK; Verso, 2006; pp. 1–7: Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Manchester, UK; Manchester University Press, 1993; pp. 19–51. Ekeh, Peter P. Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement (Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1975; pp. 91–112). Chatterjee, Partha (2004). Op. cit.; p. 36. See Terence Ranger’s Chapter titled, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa,” in; Ranger, Terence & Vaughan, Olufemi (eds.). Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa. London; Palgrave Macmillan, 1993; pp. 62– 111: Also see Mahmood Mamdani’s speech titled, “Political Identity, Citizenship and Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Africa” online at; http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOP MENT/Resources/revisedMamdani.pdf (Last accessed on; 24 September 2017). Prah, Kwesi Kwaa. The African Nation; The State of the Nation. Cape Town; Center for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2006; p. 205: For further reading, see; Eze, Michael O. The Politics of History in Contemporary Africa. New York; Palgrave Macmillan, 2010: Hountondji, Paulin J. The Struggle for Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy in Africa. Athens, Ohio; Ohio University Press, 2002: Mafeje, Archie. Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa (Addis Ababa; DPMF Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference on Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa II), 1999: Ake, Claude. Democracy

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13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

and Development in Africa. Washington, DC; The Brookings Institution, 1996: Anyang’ Nyong’o, Peter (ed.). Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. London; Zed Books, 1988: Mudimbe, Valentin Y. The Invention of Africa; Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press, 1988. See extracts from Julius K. Nyerere’s speech delivered in Accra on the occasion of Ghana’s 40th independence anniversary celebrations, 6 March 1997, online at; http://newafricanmagazine.com/nyerere-without-unitythere-is-no-future-for-africa/ (Last accessed on; 24 September 2017): Also see, Wamba Dia Wamba, Ernest. A People’s Unification of Africa (Grahamstown, South Africa; Public lecture at Rhodes University, 27 May 2015), online at; https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/ content/uhuru/documents/Prof%20Wamba-dia-Wamba%20Public%20L ecture.pdf (Last accessed on; 24 September 2017). Prah, Kwesi Kwaa. Pan-African Concerns; Keeping Our Eyes on the Ball. Cape Town; Center for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2016; p. 60. Mkandawire, Thandika (ed.). African Intellectuals; Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development. Pretoria; UNISA Press, 2005; pp. 11–46: Mkandawire, Thandika & Soludo, Charles C. Our Continent, Our Future; African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment. Dakar; Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 1998; pp. 21–48: Nabudere, Dani W. Imperialism in East Africa—Volume One; Imperialism and Exploitation. London; Zed Press, 1981; pp. 82–89: Also see United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Industrializing Through Trade (Addis Ababa; UNECA Economic Report on Africa, 2015), see online at; http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/ pubs/2015era-uneca.pdf (Last accessed on; 23 September 2017). Bello, Walter., Cunningham, Shea., Brau, Bell. Devastation by Design (Covert Action Quarterly, Volume 47, Winter 1993–1994); p. 44: This article is online, at; https://archive.org/details/CovertActionQuarterly47 (Last accessed on; 19 September 2017): Also see, Ismi, Asad. Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa (Halifax Initiative Coalition, 2004); p. 9: This report is online, at; http://www.hal ifaxinitiative.org/updir/ImpoverishingAContinent.pdf (Last accessed on; 19 September 2017): Also see, Akonor, Kwame. Africa and IMF Conditionality; The Unevenness of Compliance, 1983–2000. New York; Routledge, 2006; pp. 83–106: Nabudere, Dani W. The IMF-World Bank’s Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Policies and the Uganda Economy, 1981–1989 (Leiden; African Studies Research Center, Research Reports No. 39, 1990); pp. 6–39. Tandon, Yash. Trade Is War; The West’s War Against the World. New York; OR Books, 2015; pp. 4, 15–17.

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18. International Monetary Fund. IMF Lending Arrangements as of April 30, 2011. See data report online, at; https://www.imf.org/external/np/ fin/tad/extarr11.aspx?memberKey1=ZZZZ&date1key=2011-04-30 (Last accessed on; 19 September 2017): Also see Yang, Yongzheng & Gupta, Sanjeev. Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa: Past Performance and the Way Forward (Washington, DC; IMF Working paper, 2005) online at; https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2005/RTA/rtaa.pdf (Last accessed on; 23 September 2017). 19. Quoted from; Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1999; pp. 116–118: Also see, Cabral, Amilcar. Unity and Struggle—Speeches and Writings. New York; Monthly Review Press, 1979; p. 129. 20. Mgbeoji, Ikechi. The Comprador Complex: Africa’s IPRs Elite, NeoColonialism and the Enduring Control of African IPRs Agenda by External Interests (Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 43, 2014), online at; http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/43? utm_source=digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca%2Folsrps%2F43&utm_ medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages (Last accessed on; 23 September 2017). 21. Prah (2006). Op. cit.; p. 114. 22. See Karen McVeigh’s article titled, “World Is Plundering Africa’s Wealth of ‘Billions of Dollars a Year” online at; https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/2017/may/24/world-is-plundering-africa-wealthbillions-of-dollars-a-year (Last accessed on; 20 September 2017): Also see Asha Speckman’s article titled, “SA among Top Borrowers in Africa in 2017” online at; https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/201702-28-sa-among-top-borrowers-in-africa-in-2017/ (Last accessed on; 20 September 2017). 23. wa Thiong’o, Ngugi. Moving the Center; The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms. London; James Currey, 1993: Also see, Hountondji, Paulin. Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies (National University of Benin, African Centre for Advanced Studies, RCCS Annual Review, No. 1, September, 2009). 24. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism. Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press, 2005; p. 122. 25. Ibid., p. 122. 26. See Chen Guangjin’s chapter titled, “Marching Toward a New Phase of Development: Building a Moderately Prosperous Society,” in; Li Peilin, Chen Guangjin, Zhang Yi et al. Chinese Research Perspectives on Society— Volume 2. Leiden; BRILL—Chinese Research Perspective on Society, 2015; pp. 3–4: Also see, Harvey, David (2005). Op. cit.; pp. 125–135.

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27. Nabudere, Dani W. The Global Political Economy and the Future of Africa (Johannesburg; Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Research, Keynote speech, 7 March 2011), online at; http://www.mistra.org.za/Media/Spe eches/Documents/3.%20THE%20GLOBAL%20POLITICAL%20ECON OMY%20AND%20THE%20FUTURE%20OF%20AFRICA.pdf (Last accessed on; 24 March 2017). 28. See Maggie Fick’s article titled, “Ghana Crackdown on Illegal Gold Mining Inflames Tensions with Beijing ” online at; https://www.ft.com/ content/cb032036-2a63-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c (Last accessed on; 24 September 2014): Also see, Ronald Musoke’s article titled, “Protests over Chinese Retailers,” online at; https://www.independent.co.ug/ana lysis-protests-chinese-retailers/ (Last accessed on; 22 September 2017): Chileshe, Chilufya. Chinese Debt, Aid and Trade: Opportunity or Threat for Zambia? (SAIIA Occasional Paper, No. 72, December 2010): Samy, Yiagadeesen. China’s Aid Policies in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges (The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 406, 2010; pp. 75–90): Woods, Ngaire. Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance (International Affairs, No. 84, 2008; pp. 1205–1221). 29. For examples of these types of analyses, see; Sun, Yun. China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? (Brookings East Asia Commentary, 7 February 2014) online at; https://www.brookings.edu/opi nions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/ (Last accessed on; 22 September 2017): Farah Thaler’s article titled, “China’s Foreign Aid to Africa”, online at; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/ 14/chinas-foreign-aid-to-africa/ (Last accessed on; 22 September 2017): Brautigam, Deborah. The Dragon’s Gift; The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press, 2012: Shinn, David H. & Eisenman, Joshua. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012: Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.). China into Africa; Trade, Aid, and Influence. Washington, DC; Brookings Institution Press, 2008: Taylor, Ian. China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London; Routledge, 2006: Tull, Denis M. China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences (Journal of African Studies, No. 44, Vol. 3, 2006; pp. 459–479). 30. Tseng, Huan-Kai & Krog, Ryan. No Strings Attached: Chinese Foreign Aid and Regime Stability in Resource-Rich Recipient Countries (Monograph; Department of Political Science, George Washington University, 2015); p. 11.

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31. Prah, Kwesi D.L.S. Ideology and Practice; Relations between China and Tanzania in Historical Perspective. Trenton, New Jersey; Africa World Press, 2016; pp. 124–133: Also see, Anshan, Li. China and Africa: Policy and Challenges (China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 2007; pp. 69–93): Jinyuan, Gao. China and Africa: The Development of Relations over Many Centuries (African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 331, April 1984; pp. 241–250). 32. Hess, Steven & Aidoo, Richard. Charting the Roots of Anti- Chinese Populism in Africa. New York; Springer, 2015; p. 9: Also see, Jiang, Wenran. Fuelling the Dragon: China’s Rise and Its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa (The China Quarterly, No. 199, China and Africa: Emerging Patterns in Globalization and Development, September 2009; pp. 585–609). 33. Hess, Steven & Aidoo, Richard (2015). Op. cit.; pp. 8–9. 34. Nkiwane, Tandeka C. Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse (International Political Science Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2001; pp. 279–290; p. 280). 35. Ibid., p. 288: Also see, Bilgin, Pinar. Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR? (Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008; pp. 5–23; pp. 6–10): Acharya, Armitav. The End of American World Order. Cambridge, UK; Polity Press, 2014; pp. 13–58. 36. See Escobar, Arturo. Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements (Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, After the Third World? 2004; pp. 207–230): Mignolo, Walter. The Darker Side of Western Modernity; Global Futures, Decolonial Options. London; Duke University Press, 2011: Quijano, Anibal & Ennis, Michael. Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America (Duke University Press; Nepantla–Views from South, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2000; pp. 533–580): Grosfoguel, Ramon. A Decolonial Approach to Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality (Department of Culture and Identity, Roskilde University; Kult 6, Special Issue, Epistemologies of Transformation—The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications, Winter 2006), online at; www. postkolonial.dk/artikler/kult_6/GROSFOGUEL.pdf (Last accessed on; 24 September 2017). 37. Nabudere, Dani W. (2011). Op. cit. 38. See Gayatri C. Spivak’s chapter titled, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in; Nelson, Cary & Grossberg, Lawrence (eds.). Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London: Macmillan, 1988; pp. 271–313. 39. See Prah, Kwesi Kwaa. No Country Can Make Progress on the Basis of a Borrowed Language (E-Learning Africa; Perspectives on ICT, Education and Development in Africa, 16 May 2013), online at; http://ela-newspo rtal.com/no-country-can-make-progress-on-the-basis-of-a-borrowed-lan guage/ (Last accessed on; 25 September 2017).

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40. Wamba Dia Wamba, Ernest. (2015). Op. cit.; pp. 6–7. 41. Prah, Kwesi D.L.S. (2016). Op. cit.; p. 137.

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Mkandawire, Thandika & Soludo, Charles C. Our Continent, Our Future; African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment. Dakar; Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 1998. Mudimbe, Valentin Y. The Invention of Africa; Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press, 1988. Nabudere, Dani W. Imperialism in East Africa—Volume One; Imperialism and Exploitation. London; Zed Press, 1981; pp. 82–89. Nelson, Cary & Grossberg, Lawrence (eds.). Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London; Macmillan, 1988. Ogot, Bethwell A. (ed.). A General History of Africa; Volume 5—Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century. Paris; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1992. Peilin, Li, Guangjin, Chen, Yi, Zhang et al. Chinese Research Perspectives on Society—Volume 2. Leiden; BRILL—Chinese Research Perspective on Society, 2015. Prah, Kwesi D.L.S. Ideology and Practice; Relations between China and Tanzania in Historical Perspective. Trenton, New Jersey; Africa World Press, 2016. Prah, Kwesi Kwaa. Pan-African Concerns; Keeping our Eyes on the Ball. Cape Town; Center for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2016. Prah, Kwesi Kwaa. The African Nation; The state of the Nation. Cape Town; Center for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2006. Prah, Kwesi D.L.S. & Gumede, Vusi (eds.). Africa-China Partnerships and Relations; African Perspectives. Trenton, New Jersey; Africa world Press, 2017. Ranger, Terence & Vaughan, Olufemi (eds.). Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa. London; Palgrave Macmillan, 1993. Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.). China into Africa; Trade, Aid, and Influence. Washington, DC; Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Shinn, David H. & Eisenman, Joshua. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. Tandon, Yash. Trade Is War; The West’s War Against the World. New York; OR Books, 2015. Taylor, Ian. China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London; Routledge, 2006. Van Sertima, Ivan. They Came Before Columbus; The African Presence in Ancient America. New York; Random House Trade, 2003. wa Thiong’o, Ngugi. Moving the Center; The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms. London; James Currey, 1993.

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CHAPTER 6

The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa: Towards Enhancing African Agency? Philani Mthembu

Introduction The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Johannesburg from 3–5 December 2015 was the first on African soil and coincided with the launch of China’s second Africa policy paper. It came in an important year, which had seen the hosting of the Financing for Development meeting in Addis Ababa, the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the United Nations General Assembly, the hosting of the Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Nairobi (for the first time in Africa), and the Conference of the Parties (COP21) held in Paris (Mthembu 2015). In all these meetings, African countries sought to enhance their agency and push for proposals such as an increased focus on the domestic mobilisation of resources and a channelling of foreign funds towards their industrialisation efforts. The most recent 2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing served to further consolidate the partnership and align much of its priorities towards

P. Mthembu (B) Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_6

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African agreed upon development objectives as contained in Agenda 2063 and efforts to operationalise the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The summit also pledged $60 billion in funding from 2018 to 2021, of which $10 billion would come from the private sector. While North–South cooperation would remain essential to the development prospects of African countries, South–South cooperation has continued to see a greater emphasis from policymakers. This has been evident prior and after the Second High-level United Nations Conference on South–South Cooperation (BAPA+40), which took place in March 2019 in Buenos Aires. The meeting has been followed by a variety of meetings in the global South and the North on the significance of BAPA+40 not only for South–South Cooperation, but also for Triangular Cooperation. Africa’s place in the global development landscape has largely been analysed from the perspective of donor country viewpoints, and recipient countries on the continent have been assumed to be inactive agents. African countries are thus largely portrayed as passive recipients on the receiving end of the largesse of donor countries. However, recent years have drawn a much closer focus on Africa’s agency in the development landscape as more actors enter the area of development finance, with China having taken a clear lead. The growing number of actors means that African countries have a wider diversity of development financiers than in the past, and this creates an opportunity for enhanced agency at the country and continental levels. Given the growing number of development actors from the global South, there is need for greater coordination in channelling external development finance partners towards projects with a broader regional impact. This requires each of the regional economic blocs on the continent to identify the most important subregional projects in infrastructure or manufacturing for Chinese development finance to be channelled towards. This does not mean that individual countries must not lobby for their own projects based on the national interest, but in order to align foreign funding with visions such as Agenda 2063 and other panAfrican goals, serious thinking, and action must be taken by African countries in channelling their external partners towards continental goals of closer regional integration. These initiatives, led at a subregional level by the regional economic communities (RECs), would ensure greater self-reliance and an enhanced agency in Africa’s international relations.

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The increased coordination would assist in enhancing African agency and build capacity for implementing regional infrastructure projects. In a nod towards this direction, the first mid-year coordination meeting of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) was held in July 2019 in Niger, in a move that aims to build greater cohesion and coordination across the continent. The AU Representative Office in Beijing is now also up and running, and should be able to assist in coordination efforts in the Chinese capital on sustainable projects that serve as catalysts for African development (Mthembu 2019). While a common African strategy or policy on China may not be feasible in contemporary times, this chapter argues for a more coordinated approach towards an issue area such as development finance. South Africa’s National Development Plan (2012) identifies the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) as a foreign policy and trade priority for South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. It is indeed central to contemporary efforts towards regional integration on the African continent, especially with intra-Africa trade lagging other regions of the world. It would benefit the region to coordinate on the financing of projects that enhance connectivity and integration on the continent. The following chapter intentionally uses the broader concept of development finance to refer to the whole range of developmental finance tools availed to African stakeholders by China. It thus refers to both concessional and non-concessional finance provided by Chinese state-owned entities. These sources of finance increase the variety of choices available to African stakeholders; however, it is entirely up to these very stakeholders on the African continent to use the resources availed by China in a manner that enhances self-reliance instead of entrenching dependency. Throughout the postcolonial era, African countries have struggled to graduate beyond foreign aid provided by largely Western donors. An important weakness in African agency thus involves the inability of countries and continental bodies to implement the various development plans and frameworks initiated and agreed to by African scholars, activists, and political leaders. With many African countries largely paying lip service to declarations of the African Union, it comes as no surprise that continental plans continue to lie dormant. The culture of dependency among AU member states demonstrates itself in the disproportionate amounts paid by external donors in sustaining African institutions such as the African Union and the various regional economic communities (RECs).

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The Kagame Report (2017: 5) on the reform of the AU institutions, states the following: It is not for the lack of ideas, visions, priorities, resources, or capabilities that the African Union has failed to keep pace with changing times. Nor can outsiders be blamed for the internal divisions that needlessly slow us down at times.

The report further states that while the AU Assembly has adopted more than 1500 resolutions, it is very difficult to determine how many have actually been implemented (Kagame 2017: 5). When it comes to actually funding the African Union, some of the other observations made in the Kagame report (2017: 15) are as follows: In 2014, the African Union’s budget was US$308 million, more than half of which was funded by donors. In 2015, it rose by 30 per cent to US$393 million, 63 per cent of which was funded by donors. In 2016, donors contributed 60 per cent of the US$417 million budget. In 2017, member states are expected to contribute 26 per cent of the proposed US$439 million budget, while donors are expected to contribute the remaining 74 per cent.

This certainly does not bode well for enhanced African agency. With the continent having gone through a recent period of rapid growth in GDP, one would have expected that some of those additional incomes would have been channelled towards the very institutions entrusted with leading integration efforts on the continent. It is perhaps necessary to quote further from the Kagame report in order to add additional emphasis to the reality of African institutions and countries being dependent on external financing from traditional donors in the West. The report notes the following (Kagame Report 2017: 15): The African Union’s programmes are 97 per cent funded by donors. By December 2016, only 25 out of 54 member states had paid their assessment for the financial year 2016 in full. Fourteen member states paid more than half their contribution and 15 have not made any payment.

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If African countries cannot fund their own institutions, then where will they get the resources to fund and implement regional integration projects? This chapter argues for a more direct focus on efforts to build greater levels of connectivity across the continent, especially in support of implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA). This would have to be through both hard infrastructure (roads, rail, power stations, ports infrastructure) and soft infrastructure (customs, regulations). While China has expanded its footprint in development finance across the African continent, the sums being provided are still not enough for all African countries to be competing for them on a bilateral level. In fora such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the chapter thus argues for African stakeholders to lobby for the funding of projects with a regional impact. This does not prohibit nation states across the continent from engaging with China on a bilateral level, however, in fora such as the country–continent fora exemplified by FOCAC, it is important for African subregions to identify projects seen to be important for their regions. Countries with greater material capabilities and those with higher human development indicators should also play an enabling leadership role within their subregions and on the continent to drive the goal of African integration and strategic autonomy. Given the difficulty of measuring a country’s potential agency, the following chapter uses two sets of indicators that measure power and development based on material capabilities and on human development. It is argued that countries possessing these in higher quantities have a higher potential to exercise influence over their peers and galvanise their respective regions towards a more focused engagement with external development finance partners towards projects with a regional impact. Countries that possess material capabilities in the form of demographic, industrial, and military resources will thus have a higher opportunity to use these in advancing their individual agency and the agency of their regional peers. Countries that also do well in terms of their human development indicators will also have a higher opportunity to advance individual and collective agency in Africa’s relations with external partners. Countries that possess both of these in higher quantities will likely fare even better in the shifting dynamics of global politics as they are able to use their material resources to the benefit of their citizens, whose influence will extend to their various regions.

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Power and Agency Among African Nation States While the two are not necessarily identical, this chapter uses the notion of power to understand the concept of agency. It is thus assumed that the more power a nation state possesses, the higher its ability to exercise agency in its international relations. However, it does not take a onedimensional approach to understanding the notion of power, and while it does use traditional notions of material capabilities, it also uses the notion of human development to understand the power and potential agency of African nation states. It is thus understood that while nation states may indeed possess the material capabilities to exercise influence over others, those capabilities are not automatically converted into actual influence. However, understanding the former does allow one to better understand the latter. Given that the notion of power is a highly contested concept in global politics, it is important to make use of indicators that can be applied across countries to assess the balance of power on the African continent. This is done by contrasting countries with high material capabilities with those displaying higher levels of human development. This contrast is important because countries with high material capabilities may not necessarily perform well in terms of human development, affecting their influence in their regions and beyond. It is also important because while countries with high levels of human development may not possess high material capabilities, they are able to build material capabilities through their human resources and exert influence by virtue of their example in terms of development indicators. In order to identify and rank African countries in their order of material capabilities, the chapter makes use of the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC). This index utilises both political and economic indicators to measure the material capabilities of nation states. It uses comparable data to assess the relative material capabilities of nation states within the international state system. This process allows one to evaluate the contemporary balance of power in terms of material capabilities on the African continent. It is assumed that countries with higher material capabilities are also regarded as being in a better position to exercise their agency, even though there are clear exceptions.

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Countries of strategic importance in terms of their material capabilities will then be contrasted with countries having higher scores in human development. In order to measure and rank countries in terms of their human development, one can make use of the human development index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), allowing one to construct a table of African nation states in their order of human development and to contrast them with those countries possessing high material capabilities. What Material Capabilities Tells Us About the Agency of African Nation States According to Version 4.0 of the National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data Documentation codebook (2010: 1), power is defined as ‘the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence’. It is also seen as ‘a function of many factors, among them the nation’s material capabilities. Power and material capabilities are not identical; but given their association it is essential that we try to define the latter in operational terms so as to understand the former’. As mentioned earlier, understanding how it is operationalised also allows one to better understand a country’s agency. Indeed, countries with material capabilities are assumed to have greater agency, even though there are exceptions. While some have criticised the CINC based on its primary focus on material indicators, it nonetheless captures an important aspect of power and uses three subcategories to measure national capabilities, namely demographic, industrial, and military strength. It is argued that these ‘reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that a nation could bring to bear in instances of militarized disputes (ibid.: 3)’. One should add here that these resources are not only available to be brought to bear in cases of militarised disputes, but also in times of peace. The three subcategories of national power are then operationalised through the use of six indicators. The demographic resources are operationalised through the size of a state’s overall population, together with its urban population. The industrial resources of a state are operationalised through its iron and steel production and its primary energy consumption. Lastly, its military capabilities are operationalised through a state’s military expenditure and the size of its military personnel (COW 2014).

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Once all of the six indicators have been measured and calculated, a concrete statistic is provided which quantifies the particular nation state’s material capability relative to the rest of the community of nation states. The final statistic for any given country is a number between zero and one, where one represents all of the world’s nation states capabilities combined. It is thus an attempt to capture in a quantitative and reliable manner the material national capabilities of all African nation states during the period of interest. The use of the data allowed one to rank all African countries based on their national capabilities. It is posited that their national capabilities should be more or less in line with their strategic importance. What is important to keep in mind is that the following table is a reflection of the material capabilities that these countries possess for enhancing their agency in global politics, but not all of them are necessarily able to exercise that agency (Table 6.1). An analysis of the rankings of African nation states from those of greater strategic importance in terms of their material capabilities to those of lower strategic importance shows the reliability of the indicators and operationalisation of the variable using the CINC quantitative score. Qualitative-based area specialists focusing on Africa may disagree with the exact order of the countries, but it is posited that they would also be largely in agreement with the countries which sit higher up and those which sit lower down the rankings. Few would question the inclusion of nation states such as Egypt, South Africa, or Nigeria, whereas the inclusion of Ethiopia also makes sense. Besides Ethiopia ranking highly on all the indicators used to operationalise this variable, one should also bear in mind that as the seat of the African Union (AU), it comes as no surprise to close observers of African politics. While the inclusion of Eritrea may come as a surprise to some, a closer examination shows that it is largely due to the high expenditure and focus on the military that it scores highly in terms of strategic importance and material capabilities. This attests to the traditional nature of measuring power that is embodied in this type of measurement.

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Table 6.1 Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic importance Country (2007)

CINC score (2007)

Egypt Nigeria South Africa Algeria

0.0097128 0.0077921 0.0063162 0.0052899

Morocco Congo, Democratic Republic Ethiopia Sudan Angola Eritrea Tanzania Kenya Libya Uganda Ivory Coast Ghana Mozambique Zimbabwe Cameroon Tunisia Zambia Madagascar Senegal Burkina Faso Rwanda Chad Burundi Somalia Malawi Mali Niger Guinea Sierra Leone Benin Congo Togo

Country (2012)

CINC score (2012)

0.0044709 0.0041745

Egypt Nigeria South Africa Congo, Democratic Republic Algeria Morocco

0.0098926 0.0090817 0.0069406 0.0047241 0.004188 0.003883

0.0038581 0.0030763 0.0024825 0.0022562 0.0019317 0.001777 0.0017627 0.0013199 0.0011732 0.0011087 0.0010318 0.0009938 0.0009505 0.0008221 0.0007486 0.000711 0.0006968 0.0006447 0.0005813 0.0005676 0.0005616 0.0005313 0.0005272 0.0005161 0.000505 0.0004583 0.000393 0.0003699 0.0003614 0.0002974

Ethiopia Sudan Angola Eritrea Tanzania Kenya South Sudan Uganda Ivory Coast Ghana Mozambique Cameroon Libya Tunisia Zimbabwe Madagascar Zambia Burkina Faso Senegal Somalia Rwanda Guinea Chad Mali Niger Malawi Burundi Congo Benin Togo

0.0038374 0.0029977 0.0024164 0.0022433 0.0021146 0.0017948 0.0017923 0.0015158 0.0013411 0.0012461 0.0012405 0.0012222 0.0010642 0.000965 0.0008802 0.0008653 0.000812 0.0007563 0.0007411 0.0006865 0.0006628 0.0006508 0.0006305 0.0006186 0.0005847 0.0005616 0.0004779 0.0004443 0.0004167 0.0003371

(continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Country (2007)

CINC score (2007)

Mauritania Liberia Central African Republic (CAR) Botswana

0.0002699 0.0002231 0.0002061

Sierra Leone Mauritania Liberia

0.0003226 0.0003091 0.0002708

0.0001868

0.0002262

Namibia Gabon Djibouti Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Lesotho Mauritius Swaziland Gambia Comoros Cape Verde Sao Tome and Principe Seychelles

0.0001794 0.0001527 0.0001498 0.0001317 0.0001087 0.0000976 0.0000618 0.0000571 0.0000505 0.0000239 0.0000221 0.00000595

Central African Republic (CAR) Namibia Gabon Botswana Djibouti Guinea-Bissau Gambia Lesotho Equatorial Guinea Swaziland Mauritius Comoros Cape Verde

0.00000377

Country (2012)

Sao Tome and Principe Seychelles

CINC score (2012)

0.0002004 0.000186 0.0001817 0.0001731 0.0001168 0.0001077 0.0000813 0.0000595 0.0000579 0.0000477 0.0000265 0.0000217 7.16E-06 0.00000357

Constructed by Philani Mthembu based on Correlates of War Project (2007 and 2012). Published in Changing Economic Balances and Integration in ‘Africa Rising’ (2017: 26–27)

Even before Nigeria officially overtook South Africa as the largest economy in Africa during 2014, it is clear that the CINC score had already put it above South Africa in terms of material capabilities. This further highlights the utility of this indicator. It should also come as no surprise that Egypt, a large country with a big population and strong modern military systems ranks number one. Given its historic and contemporary role in Africa and the Middle East, few could voice doubt on its strategic importance to the global political order. This is further reflected in the huge amount of military aid it has traditionally received from the United States for its role in the regions it occupies. Looking at the countries at the bottom of the table also makes it clear that indeed the CINC score was well placed to determine the material capabilities of African countries within the international state system. Indeed, no one would question why countries such as the Comoros,

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Sao Tome, Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Swaziland, and Lesotho appear towards the bottom of the table, thus reflecting that within the international state system they do not possess much material capabilities, influence, and agency in the traditional sense. To put it differently, these countries are less capable of resisting the influence of others and are often less capable of influencing other nation states. Their agency is thus quite limited, while the agency of countries closer to the top of the table is relatively higher. What Human Development Indicators Tell Us About the Agency of African Nation States It is important to contrast the material capabilities of nation states with their ability to improve their people’s lives. Indeed countries with positive indicators in terms of human development are usually more stable internally and have a level of influence brought on by the power of their development example. Used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to measure progress on human development, each country is given a score between zero and one based on their life expectancy, education, and the standard of living (UNDP 2013). Besides being a widely used and reliable indicator of development, an added advantage of the HDI is its universal coverage, which means that all African nation states under scrutiny are included within the observed period of interest. The thresholds established by the HDI divide countries into what is termed a human development category, with some countries considered to fall into the low human development category, some into the medium human development category, and some falling into the high human development category. All countries that fall into the low human development category are thus seen as countries with high humanitarian needs, whereas countries falling into the medium and high human development categories are not seen as countries with high humanitarian needs. Countries at the top of the table are thus those that have a higher human development score, while those at the bottom have lower human development scores and thus higher humanitarian needs. This type of indicator allows one to rank African countries based on their levels of development. It allows one to assume that countries with higher human development scores are able to exercise a greater degree of agency and influence over their peers. Indeed countries with higher human development scores are

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also more able to sustain themselves, moving away from a reliance on foreign donors, thus exercising a greater degree of agency. The following table captures the state of human development in Africa, comparing 2010 and 2015 (Table 6.2). It is clear that at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, one which saw the increasing use of concepts such as ‘Africa rising’ due to rapid economic growth, four countries, namely Libya, Mauritius, Tunisia, and Algeria fell into the ‘high human development’ category. These were followed by Gabon, Botswana, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, and Morocco to constitute the top ten countries in terms of human development at the time. In 2015, the Seychelles, Mauritius, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya were all considered to have high levels of human development, and were followed by the likes of Botswana, Gabon, Egypt, South Africa, and Cape Verde. These countries, because of their better performance in terms of human development possess the resources to exercise a greater level of agency. It is clear from the table that due to the conflict in Libya, the country had already fallen a few places in the five years between 2010 and 2015. It is thus clear that conflict and instability have an adverse impact on human development, and an adverse impact on a country’s agency. Contrasting Material Capabilities with Human Development The following table now contrasts African countries in terms of their material capabilities and in terms of their human development. Those countries that rank in the top fifteen in terms of both material capabilities and in terms of human development possess the highest levels of agency on the African continent and should be viewed as important in attempts by African regions to focus external finance towards projects with a regional impact. These are countries that possess material capabilities, but whose living standards are also relatively higher than their peers (Table 6.3). Among the top fifteen countries of strategic importance in terms of material capabilities, only Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Morocco fall into the top ten countries in terms of human development indicators. This illustrates that countries with material capabilities are not necessarily the same countries which score well in terms of human development. Indeed, while Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, and Eritrea all fall into the top ten countries in terms

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Table 6.2 Ranking of African nation states based on their human development index (HDI) scores Country (2010)

HDI value (2010)

Human development category

1. Libya

0.755

2. Mauritius

Country (2015)

HDI value (2015)

Human development category

High Human 1. Seychelles Development

0.782

0.701

High Human 2. Mauritius Development

0.781

3. Tunisia

0.683

High Human 3. Algeria Development

0.745

4. Algeria

0.677

High Human 4. Tunisia Development

0.725

5. Gabon

0.648

5. Libya

0.716

6. Botswana

0.633

6. Botswana

0.698

7. Egypt

0.62

7. Gabon

0.697

8. Namibia

0.606

8.. Egypt

0.691

9. South Africa

0.597

9. South Africa

0.666

10. Morocco

0.567

10. Cabo Verde

0.648

11. Equatorial Guinea

0.538

11. Morocco

0.647

12. Cape Verde

0.534

Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development

12. Namibia

0.640

High Human Development High Human Development High Human Development High Human Development High Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development

(continued)

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Table 6.2 (continued) Country (2010)

HDI value (2010)

Human development category

Country (2015)

HDI value (2015)

Human development category

13. Swaziland

0.498

13. Congo

0.592

14. Congo

0.489

14. Equatorial Guinea

0.592

15. Sao Tome and Principe

0.488

15. Ghana

0.579

16. Kenya

0.47

Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Low Human Development

16. Zambia

0.579

17. Ghana

0.467

Low Human Development

17. Sao Tome and Principe

0.574

18. Cameroon

0.46

Low Human Development

18. Kenya

0.555

19. Benin

0.435

19. Swaziland

0.541

20. Madagascar

0.435

20. Angola

0.533

21. Mauritania

0.433

21. Tanzania

0.531

22. Comoros

0.428

22. Nigeria

0.527

23. Togo

0.428

23. Cameroon

0.518

24. Lesotho

0.427

24. Zimbabwe

0.516

25. Nigeria

0.423

25. Mauritania

0.513

26. Uganda

0.422

26. Madagascar

0.512

27. Senegal

0.411

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

27. Rwanda

0.498

Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Medium Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

(continued)

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Table 6.2 (continued) Country (2010)

HDI value (2010)

Human development category

Country (2015)

HDI value (2015)

Human development category

28. Angola

0.403

28. Comoros

0.497

29. Djibouti

0.402

29. Lesotho

0.497

30. Tanzania

0.398

30. Senegal

0.494

31. Ivory Coast

0.397

31. Uganda

0.493

32. Zambia

0.395

32. Sudan

0.490

33. Gambia

0.39

33. Togo

0.487

34. Malawi

0.385

34. Benin

0.485

35. Rwanda

0.385

35. Malawi

0.476

36. Sudan

0.379

36. Côte d’Ivoire

0.474

37. Guinea

0.34

37. Djibouti

0.473

38. Ethiopia

0.328

38. Gambia

0.452

39. Sierra Leone

0.317

39. Ethiopia

0.448

40. Central African Republic 41. Mali

0.315

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

40. Mali

0.442

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

41. DRC

0.435

42. Burkina Faso

0.305

42. Liberia

0.427

43. Liberia

0.3

44. Chad

0.295

0.309

45. Guinea-Bissau 0.289

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

43. Guinea-Bissau 0.424 44. Eritrea

0.420

45. Sierra Leone

0.420

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

(continued)

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Table 6.2 (continued) Country (2010)

HDI value (2010)

Human development category

Country (2015)

HDI value (2015)

Human development category

46. Mozambique

0.284

46. Mozambique

0.418

47. Burundi

0.282

47. South Sudan

0.418

48. Niger

0.261

48. Guinea

0.414

49. DRC

0.239

49. Burundi

0.404

50. Zimbabwe

0.14

50. Burkina Faso

0.402

51. Eritrea

NA

51. Chad

0.396

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development

52. Seychelles

NA

52. Niger

0.353

Low Human Development

53. Somalia

NA

Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Low Human Development Other Countries or Territories Other Countries or Territories Other Countries or Territories

53. Central African Republic 54. Somalia

0.352

Low Human Development

NA

Other countries or territories

Constructed by Philani Mthembu based on human development index (2010 and 2015). Published in Changing Economic Balances and Integration in ‘Africa Rising’ (2017: 28)

of material capabilities, they are not doing as well in terms of human development indicators. What the above analysis has done is to assist in terms of highlighting which countries on the African continent are likely to exert a higher degree of influence and agency in relations with external powers such as China. Indeed countries that possess both material capabilities and higher development indicators are likely to be able to exercise a more independent foreign policy with foreign powers on the continent. However, it should also be made clear that countries falling higher up in terms of their material capabilities do possess a greater potential to exert influence if they are able to manage their material resources for the benefit of a greater portion of their societies. Countries that score higher on only their human development indicators are conversely also able to use their

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Table 6.3 Material capabilities vs human development Material capabilities (2012)

Human development (2015)

1. Egypt 2. Nigeria 3. South Africa 4. Congo, Democratic Republic 5. Algeria 6. Morocco 7. Ethiopia 8. Sudan 9. Angola 10. Eritrea 11. Tanzania 12. Kenya 13. South Sudan 14. Uganda 15. Ivory Coast 16. Ghana 17. Mozambique 18. Cameroon 19. Libya 20. Tunisia 21. Zimbabwe 22. Madagascar 23. Zambia 24. Burkina Faso 25. Senegal 26. Somalia 27. Rwanda 28. Guinea 29. Chad 30. Mali 31. Niger 32. Malawi 33. Burundi 34. Congo 35. Benin 36. Togo 37. Sierra Leone

1. Seychelles 2. Mauritius 3. Algeria 4. Tunisia 5. Libya 6. Botswana 7. Gabon 8. Egypt 9. South Africa 10. Cabo Verde 11. Morocco 12. Namibia 13. Congo 14. Equatorial Guinea 15. Ghana 16. Zambia 17. Sao Tome and Principe 18. Kenya 19. Swaziland 20. Angola 21. Tanzania 22. Nigeria 23. Cameroon 24. Zimbabwe 25. Mauritania 26. Madagascar 27. Rwanda 28. Comoros 29. Lesotho 30. Senegal 31. Uganda 32. Sudan 33. Togo 34. Benin 35. Malawi 36. Côte d’Ivoire 37. Djibouti

(continued)

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Table 6.3 (continued) Material capabilities (2012)

Human development (2015)

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

Mauritania Liberia Central African Republic (CAR) Namibia Gabon Botswana Djibouti Guinea-Bissau Gambia Lesotho Equatorial Guinea Swaziland Mauritius Comoros Cape Verde Sao Tome and Principe

54. Seychelles

Gambia Ethiopia Mali DRC Liberia Guinea-Bissau Eritrea Sierra Leone Mozambique South Sudan Guinea Burundi Burkina Faso Chad Niger Central African Republic 54. Somalia

Constructed by Philani Mthembu based on CINC 2012 and HDI 2015. Published in Changing Economic Balances and Integration in ‘Africa Rising’ (2017: 30–31)

greater gains to build up material capabilities in terms of economic, political, and military strength. The next section will provide an overview of China’s concessional and non-concessional finance.

An Overview of China’s Concessional and Non-concessional Finance China’s development cooperation forms part of a wider range of economic tools it leverages as it conducts its international diplomacy. Considered as official finance, it comes directly from the government’s budget, in contrast to private sources of finance or foreign direct investment (FDI). However, while it is considered as official finance, it is not the only form of official finance. China also gives loans at commercial rates, which at times offer slightly better terms to recipients than those provided by private institutions. They also provide export credits to assist mostly local companies in their operations abroad, and also

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provide buyers’ credits, which are often provided to foreign governments that seek to buy goods from China. These types of credits often explicitly promote the economic interests of countries issuing them and boost exports. The growing role of China as a source of development finance signifies an important shift in recent history as developed countries lose their monopoly on ideas regarding the role of the state, poverty reduction strategies, and economic growth. Concern among traditional donors over possible impacts of Southern powers on the existing aid architecture is captured by Richard Manning, then Chair of the OECD DAC. While presenting his concerns over the general aid system, he questioned the possible risks to recipient countries in the developing world; namely unsustainable debt, the postponement of domestic governance reforms due to a lack of conditionality, and government waste on unproductive investments (Manning 2006). Implicit under such concerns is the assumption that the manner in which the DAC organises its aid programmes represents best practice; standards that Southern powers should move closer towards. However, as Emma Mawdsley (2010: 363) argues, this assumption takes a very uncritical view of foreign aid practices from the DAC since the inception of development cooperation as a financing mechanism. Development finance from China towards African countries largely falls into two main categories: (a) development cooperation or concessional finance and (b) non-concessional or market-related finance. While this chapter includes both concessional and non-concessional finance as subcategories of development finance, it is important to distinguish the two, which are all too often lumped together in the literature. The following table distinguishes between the two (Table 6.4): Table 6.4 Official financial resources available to African countries from China

Concessional finance

Non-concessional finance

Interest-Free Loans Concessional and Low Interest Loans Grants Humanitarian assistance Volunteer Work

Commercial Lines of Credit (LoC) Commercial Export Credits Commercial Buyer’s Credits

Constructed by author

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The financing instruments in the above table were on full display in the most recent FOCAC summits, with China pledging to increase its funding towards the African continent through a combination of the financial tools at its discretion.

From FOCAC Pledges Towards Greater African Agency? The two most recent FOCAC summits arguably saw a greater degree of African agency than previous gatherings as African counterparts have sought to direct commitments towards areas such as industrialisation, support for economic infrastructure, and an expansion of various financial tools such as concessional and non-concessional finance. The two summits, Johannesburg being the first summit in Africa, and the most recent one in 2018 which consolidated some of the 2015 commitments, have been important to aligning China’s Africa strategy with the continent’s own development priorities. The 2015 FOCAC Summit During the 2015 FOCAC summit in South Africa, the first on African soil, China’s President Xi Jinping’s announcement of a 10 point plan for Africa’s development plan was accompanied by a massive US$60 billion to ensure its success (The Brics Post 2015). In reference to Africa’s industrialisation, China’s second Africa policy paper states that ‘China will make prioritizing support for Africa’s industrialization a key area and a main focus in its cooperation with Africa in the new era’ (China’s Second Africa Policy Paper 2015). This is partly operationalised through the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Promotion of China-Africa Cooperation in the Fields of Railway, Highway, Regional Aviation Networks and Industrialisation’, and through China setting up a China–Africa production capacity cooperation fund with an initial pledge of US$10 billion (The FOCAC Johannesburg Plan of Action 2016–2018). These pledges rely on the leadership of African states in order to ensure a wider regional impact. The infrastructure gap cannot be overstated, and these funds create an opportunity to not only fix national infrastructure gaps but to bridge regional infrastructure that facilitates subregional value chains and cross-border travel and trade.

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China’s second Africa policy, which informed much of the pledges under the FOCAC summit also makes mention of various tools to finance this ambitious agenda, including preferential loans, the China–Africa Development Fund, special loans for African small and medium-sized enterprises, the Africa Growing Together Fund, China–Africa industrial cooperation fund, and the BRICS’ New Development Bank. In addition, it states that least developed countries adhering to the One China policy would continue to be granted zero-tariff treatment for 97 per cent of taxable items in order to ensure the continued access of African commodities into the Chinese market (China’s Second Africa Policy Paper 2015). The action plan adopted in Johannesburg goes into more detail, with China offering US$35 billion of concessional loans and export credits, while pledging to expand the China–Africa Development Fund from US$5 billion to US$10 billion. In addition, China also committed to gradually expanding the Special Loans to Support Small and MediumSized Enterprises in Africa from US$1 billion to US$6 billion (The FOCAC Johannesburg Plan of Action 2016–2018). In the area of development cooperation, the policy paper states that ‘China’s assistance will be primarily used in the areas of human resources development, infrastructure, medical care and health, agriculture, food security, climate change response, desertification prevention and control, and wildlife and environmental protection, and for humanitarian purposes, with the aim to help African countries alleviate poverty, improve people’s livelihoods and build up capacity for independent development’, which is also echoed in the action plan adopted in Johannesburg (China’s Second Africa Policy Paper 2015). 20 billion Renminbi Yuan was allocated for setting up the China South–South Cooperation Fund to support other developing countries combat climate change. Finally, US$60 million of free military assistance was committed to help in boosting the meagre resources of the AU, which mostly relies on foreign donors such as the European Union (EU) and United States (US) to conduct its core operations. What was also significant about the 2015 FOCAC summit in South Africa was that African countries played a greater role in the drafting of the outcome document, thus aligning the pledges closer to African priority areas. However, South African stakeholders were still critical of the country’s ability to benefit from the various tools availed at FOCAC. There was thus disappointment at the ability of the state to draw up and present mutually beneficial projects to implement.

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The 2018 FOCAC Summit At the recent FOCAC summit China pledged US$60 billion for the period 2018 until 2021, exactly the same amount as the previous 2015 summit. Looking at the key 2015 and 2018 priorities in FOCAC, Agenda 2063 of the AU, and some of the regional agendas from Africa’s regional economic blocs shows a growing convergence of issue areas that are becoming essential in the relationship between Africa and China, and those are being shaped from the African continent. Yu-Shan Wu (2018) notes that the 7th Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting between China and African leaders in 2018 was the third FOCAC meeting to be held at summit level. Besides the 2015 Johannesburg summit level meeting, the 2006 Beijing meeting was also at summit level. The other FOCAC meetings in 2000, 2003, 2009, and 2012 were thus all held at ministerial level. The 2018 FOCAC summit had taken place in the midst of a looming trade war between the United States and China and a multilateral system in retreat. China’s President, Xi Jinping thus took the opportunity to raise China’s concerns over protectionism and rising unilateralism. China also used the occasion to include the United Nations (UN) at FOCAC, giving a platform to UN Secretary-General, António Guterres to address the gathering in a demonstration of China’s view of the UN and multilateralism as central to a rules-based order (Yu Shan Wu 2018). Whereas the Johannesburg FOCAC had emphasised China’s ten areas of cooperation within FOCAC, President Xi Jinping had used the 2018 summit to emphasise eight cooperation areas between 2018 and 2021, including: • • • • • • • •

An industrial promotion initiative An infrastructure connectivity initiative A trade facilitation initiative A green development initiative A capacity building initiative A health care initiative A people-to-people exchange initiative A peace and security initiative.

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These commitments would be further supported by 50,000 government scholarships and 50,000 training opportunities. China had also proposed giving 2000 young Africans the opportunity to visit China for exchanges (Yu Shan Wu 2018), thus strengthening the soft skills along with commitments to supporting the hard infrastructure. In furthering the people-to-people exchanges, China also committed to establishing an Institute of African Studies, upgrading the China–Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan, and organising 50 joint cultural, sports, and tourism events, and strengthening cooperation in media (Yu Shan Wu 2018). While president Xi Jinping mentioned a figure of $60 billion for the period 2018 to 2021, the Chinese state only seems to be putting $50 billion of its own money at stake, while encouraging Chinese companies to contribute the rest through their own investment projects. Deborah Brautigam (2018) breaks down the $60 billion as follows: • US$20 billion in new credit lines • US$15 billion in foreign aid: grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. • US$10 billion for a special fund for development financing • US$5 billion for a special fund for financing imports from Africa. Some of the observations made by Brautigam (2018) on the 2018 commitments include the observation that the total pledge of grants and loans, both concessional and non-concessional, declined from $40 billion in 2015 to $35 billion in 2018. The 2018 package was also more concessional than the 2015 package since China’s development cooperation (grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans) had increased to $15 billion, or $5 billion per annum between 2018 and 2021. The increase will likely be administered by the newly formed International Cooperation and Development Agency in China.

Conclusion and Recommendations More Actors, Greater Agency? Zimmerman and Smith (2011: 722) argue that ‘[w]hen the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were first agreed, the world appeared evenly divided; there were countries that had to achieve the goals themselves and others that had to help them do so. Ten years later, the line between

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“aid recipients” and “donors” ha[d] become blurry. The impressive rise of China, India, Brazil and many other emerging economies has been accompanied by an equally impressive growth in the development cooperation they provide to other countries’. Mohan and Power (2008: 27) refer to this phenomenon as a ‘new multipolarity in international development and growing sources of investment and aid outside of the Western axis’. While certainly not in a position to replace traditional donors in the OECD DAC, the emergence of China has certainly contributed to creating more options for African countries struggling to secure development finance to fund their domestic and regional aspirations. Former president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade (Financial Times 2008) states that ‘[w]ith direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has helped African nations build infrastructure projects in record time – bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, dams, legislative buildings, stadiums and airports. In many African nations, including Senegal, improvements in infrastructure have played important roles in stimulating economic growth’. Wade (ibid.) further argues that ‘[t]hese are improvements, moreover, that stay in Africa and raise the standards of living for millions of Africans, not just an elite few. In Senegal, a Chinese company cannot be awarded an infrastructure-related contract unless it has partnered with a Senegalese company. In practice, Chinese companies are not only investing in Senegal but transferring technology, training, and know-how to Senegal at the same time’. Similar statements have been made by Presidents Zuma (South Africa), Museveni (Uganda), Kagame (Rwanda), and their counterparts on the African continent, who see the rise of China and their development finance as a mechanism for enhancing Africa’s agency in global politics and in meeting development priorities. What is important to note here is that while China presents the most visible case of a Southern development partners expanding its sources of finance across the African continent, it is not the only one. Indeed countries such as Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and India have all been proactive in expanding their development finance mechanisms on the African continent. These sources of finance do not only bring much needed finance in Africa, but they also break the monopoly of ideas on development that was largely concentrated in the countries of the OECD DAC for many years. They bring with them new ideas on endogenous development

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paths. While some make mention of an emerging Beijing Consensus, in contrast to the widely referred to Washington Consensus, the reality is that no consensus exists on development. This in itself constitutes an important reality that must prompt African nation states and regions to devise strategies in line with their own unique histories, cultures, and socio-economic dynamics. It is through a deeper understanding of their own societies that sustainable paths to development can emerge, and this might be one of the most important lessons learned from the Chinese experience in poverty alleviation. In terms of the growing number of partnership summits with external powers, the Kagame report argues for a review of who should attend these summits. Instead of all countries participating to meet with a single head of state, the report argues that Africa should only be represented by the following (Kagame 2017: 13): • • • • •

Chairperson of the African Union Previous Chairperson of the Union Incoming Chairperson of the Union Chairperson of the African Union Commission Chairperson of the Regional Economic Communities.

While there is certainly no consensus on the proposals of the Kagame report, what they do speak to is the urgent need for greater coordination of African positions and engagement with external partners. This paper has also sought to find ways in which African countries can use their engagement with external partners to enhance their own agency. Given the reality that African countries have been rather weak in implementing their own regional plans, it was argued that countries possessing higher levels of agency must lead the efforts for closer coordination in their regions and channel external funding towards projects that enhance regional integration and connectivity across the continent. South Africa’s former Minister of Trade and Industry stated on the sidelines of FOCAC that everything ‘[…] they (Chinese) said they would do at Focac in 2012, they pretty well did, and more. There is a good record of delivery on what is agreed at these engagements. They are a pretty reliable partner and that is why something like FOCAC attracts so much attention from African countries’ (Maromo 2015). Wade (2008) echoes this sentiment in stating that ‘I achieved more in my one hour

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meeting with President Hu Jintao in an executive suite at my hotel in Berlin during the recent G8 meeting in Heiligendamm than I did during the entire, orchestrated meeting of world leaders at the summit – where African leaders were told little more than that G8 nations would respect existing commitments’. Given this reliability in turning pledges into attainable goals and then implementing them, it is imperative that African countries seize the opportunities presented by FOCAC and Chinese development finance in order to assist in meeting their individual and collective goals. However, this must be done in a coordinated manner to enhance intra-Africa cooperation and ensure that China’s interventions have spillover effects beyond individual nation states across the continent (Mthembu 2015). The chapter thus recommends the following: • It may be more manageable to have subregional entities such as the regional economic blocs leading the process of greater coordination. • Leading nation states in the subregions will have to lead the coordination efforts and lobbying development partners in Beijing. • The role of Africa’s own network of development financiers and programmes such as the African Development Bank and the Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) will play an important role as they have already conducted credible studies on the infrastructure deficit existing in specific subregions of the continent. • What is thus needed is not a reinvention of the wheel, but the political leadership to coordinate subregional partners around a set of clear priorities tabled towards China for funding in order to increase longer term regional integration and create more vibrant subregional economic activity on the continent.

References Brautigam, D. 2018. ‘China’s FOCAC Financial Package for Africa 2018: Four Facts’, September 3 [Available online]. http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/ 2018/09/chinas-focac-financial-package-for.html?spref=tw. China’s Second Africa Policy Paper (2015). Correlates of War Project (COW). 2010. National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0.

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Correlates of War Project (COW). 2014. Available at http://www.correlatesof war.org/. Accessed 31 January 2015. Kagame, Paul. 2017. The Imperative to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union, Assembly/AU/D ec.606 (XXVII), January 29. Malik, Khalid, et al. 2013. ‘The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World’, in Human Development Report. New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Manning, Richard. 2006. ‘Will Emerging Donors Change the Face of International Co-operation’, Development Policy Review, Vol. 24, No. 4. Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA). 2017. Changing Economic Balances and Integration in ‘Africa Rising’. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers. Maromo, J. 2015. ‘Raw Materials: Africa “Pushing to Curb Exports”, December 4 [Available online]. http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/raw-materials-afr ica-pushing-to-curb-exports-1.1955196. Mawdsley, Emma. 2010. ‘Non-DAC Donors and the Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid: The (in)Significance of India’s Development Cooperation with Kenya’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, July. Mohan, G., Power, M. 2008. ‘Africa, China, and the “New” Economic Geography of Development’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 30, No. 1. Mthembu, P. 2015. From Addis Ababa to Paris: Understanding the Complexities of a Negotiated Global Development Agenda, in Global Insight, Issue 118, September. Mthembu, P. 2019. ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative Offers Myriad Options for Africa’, September 18 [Available online]. https://igd.org.za/infocus/12072china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-offers-myriad-options-for-africa. National Planning Commission (2012). National Development Plan 2030: Our Future-Make It Work. Presidency. South Africa. The Brics Post, 2015. ‘China Announces US$60 Billion for African Development Plan,’ December 4 [Available online]. http://thebricspost.com/china-ann ounces-60-bn-for-african-development-plan/#.Vq3RyUBOet-. The FOCAC Johannesburg Plan of Action 2016–2018. Wade, A. 2008. ‘Time for the West to Practise What It Preaches’, in Financial Times, January 23 [Available online]. https://www.ft.com/content/5d3 47f88-c897-11dc-94a6-0000779fd2ac. Wu, Yu-Shan. 2018. ‘Highlights from FOCAC 2018’, September 5 [Available online]. https://africachinareporting.co.za/2018/09/highlights-from-focac2018/. Zimmermann, Felix, and Smith, Kimberly. 2011. ‘More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-Operation’, in Journal of International Development, Vol. 23.

CHAPTER 7

China’s Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Agenda: Rationale, Trends and Implications Faith Mabera

Introduction Recent years have seen increasing Chinese engagement in the African peace and security landscape. China’s engagement has been multifaceted including participation in peacekeeping missions, counter-piracy operations, rescue-and-relief operations and post-conflict reconstruction and development activities (Gill and Huang 2013, p. 145). Alongside its economic footprint in Africa, China has been expanding its security footprint in line with its Africa policy and broader foreign policy considerations. Since 2007, China has been the leading troop contribution country (TCC) to UN peacekeeping among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (see Fig. 7.1). It is also the second largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget shouldering 10.25% of peacekeeping costs (see Fig. 7.2). In a break from its tradition of sending non-combat personnel to UN peacekeeping

F. Mabera (B) Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_7

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China's troop contribuon to UN 3500

3045

3000

2630

2500 2000

2146

2136

1824

2039

1924

1869

2011

2012

2078

2181

2013

2014

2515

1500 1000 500 0 2007

2008

2009

2010

2015

2016

2017

China's troop contribuon to UN

Fig. 7.1 China’s contribution to UNPKO (2007–2017) (Source United Nations peacekeeping, ‘contributions by country’, https://peacekeeping.un.org/ en/troop-and-police-contributors)

Fig. 7.2 Assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping (Permanent UNSC members) (Source United Nations peacekeeping, ‘How we are funded’, Effective rates of assessment for peacekeeping operations, 1 January 2016–31 December 2018, UNGA A/70/331/Add.1, https://www.un.org/ en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol= A/70/331/Add.1)

Assessed contribuons to UNPKO 2016-2018 3.99% 10.24%

6.28% 28.43%

China

5.77%

France

UK

US

Russia

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missions such as medical staff, engineers and logistics units, in 2013 for the first time ever, China deployed 395 combat troops to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In addition to the medical and engineering units, the Chinese contingent consisted of a protection force of 170 soldiers attached to the UN regional headquarters in northern Mali (Van der Putten 2015, p. 9). The contribution by China to the UN mission in Mali was a milestone for its involvement its peacekeeping and served as an indication of the gradual expansion and deepening of China’s engagement in multilateral peacekeeping operations (Jian 2015, p. 33). Since the mid-1990s, China’s engagement in international peacekeeping has shifted from a position of minimalist involvement to one of more active engagement. China’s approach to UN peacekeeping in the 1970s was premised on ‘the principle of three no’s’—no voting, no financial contribution and no deployment (Sun 2017, p. 339). This oppositional stance can be attributed to China’s negative experiences during the ‘century of humiliation’, marked by Western and Japanese imperialism, which ended in 1949. Furthermore, China’s participation in the 1950–1953 Korean war in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fought under a US-led command conditioned China’s leaders to a sceptical view of UN peacekeeping (Ayenagbo et al. 2012, p. 24). Consequently, Beijing’s approach to peacekeeping has been predicated on the paramountcy of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states (Rogers 2007). In the aftermath of the Cold War, China’s hard-line stance began to soften as a result of increasing socialisation and interaction with the international community. According to Sun (2017, p. 338), the strategic ‘change of heart’ in China’s approach to UN peacekeeping indicated its shift from a ‘present cost-driven purchase’ model of participation in international institutions to a ‘future benefitdriven investment’ model of participation. This observation is affirmed by Wang (2013), who argues that the pragmatic reorientation and reassessment in Chinese policymaking circles has been underpinned by a dynamic grand strategy keen on ‘demonstrating global responsibilities, extending economic and diplomatic influence and obtaining military experience’. In retrospect, preparations were already underway from the 1980s for the attitudinal and policy changes in China’s global security engagement strategy. In 1981, China issued a statement of its ‘conditional support’ for UN peacekeeping and reactivated its financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. In 1984, China put forward Seven Principles

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on UN Peacekeeping1 and joined the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) in 2002 as further illustration of its policy shift in favour of active engagement in international peacekeeping (Matsuda 2016, p. 58). This chapter aims to analyse China’s evolving strategy pertinent to peace and security in Africa. While the bulk of the focus will be on China’s policy and contribution to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, related activities such as counter-piracy operations, disaster and humanitarian relief and international military training and exchanges will also be considered as composite elements of China’s engagement in peace and security. The ambit of this paper entails the strategic motivations, rationales and policies informing the seemingly upward trajectory of China’s involvement in peacekeeping. The prospects and challenges to China’s peacekeeping policy and praxis will also be discussed as well as relevant policy implications for China–Africa partnership in peace and security.

Understanding China’s Attitudinal and Policy Shift Towards UN Peacekeeping In unpacking the key factors behind the change in China’s attitude and policy towards peacekeeping, theoretical explanations have ranged from Constructivist considerations that emphasise the socialisation process to rationalist views that focus on the role of material power in shaping policy and strategy. From a Constructivist perspective, the continuous social interactions between states and international institutions over time lead to evolving social contexts which in turn influence states’ identities and interests (Jepperson et al. 1996, p. 35). Since the early 1990s, China has been keen on burnishing its image and reputation by undertaking a rapprochement with the international community especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. China’s increased participation in the UN coincided with the prevailing discourse on sovereignty as responsibility and the balance between state sovereignty and human rights concerns. A flexible approach to issues of sovereignty began gaining more traction among scholars and foreign policy elites in China leading to significant reorientation of China’s participation in multilateralism (Sun 2017, p. 340). In line with China’s emphasis on the projection of a positive image and demonstrating the profile of a responsible power, foreign policy rhetoric has also sought to position China as a contributor to global stability. In 2005, domestic and foreign affairs journal of the Chinese Communist

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Party (CCP), Liaowang, published an editorial that highlighted the ‘new face’ of China’s diplomacy aimed at active participation in international affairs and playing the role of a responsible power in pursuing its security and development interests. Similarly at a 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, a senior Chinese official averred that China’s growing participation in international peacekeeping ‘reflected China’s commitment to contribute to global security given the country’s important role within the international system and the fact that its security and development are closely linked to that of the rest of the world’ (Fiorenza 2007). According to Fung (2019, p. 512), China’s scaled participation in UN peacekeeping is also informed by three types of feedback mechanisms that enhance its multilateral activism through simple and complex learning processes. The first feedback mechanism is evident in the gradual upskilling of deployed Chinese peacekeepers when engaging inactive interoperability with foreign troops. The incremental experience gained alongside foreign troops promote positive feedback about the shared benefits of joint exercises and multilateral peacekeeping for Chinese troops. The second feedback mechanism makes use of ‘identifiable and quantifiable metrics of peacekeeping “success’’ which motivate Chinese contribution to peacekeeping’. Third, the praises of China’s successes in UN peacekeeping missions by senior UN officials not only bolster legitimacy for participation, but also affirm China’s commitment to playing a more prominent role in international peace and security affairs (Fung 2019, pp. 513–515). The shift in China’s foreign and security policy towards cooperative and harmonious engagement with the international community can also be linked to the logic of its dynamic grand strategy of ‘peaceful development’. As Buzan (2014, p. 385) points out, the functions of grand strategy are to serve as a coherent framework for foreign and security policy; to provide criteria for evaluation of foreign policy and security policy; to provide legitimacy and to project an image of country in international arena. The peaceful development policy framework draws from Deng Xiaoping’s vision from the 1980s with the goals of national unification, anti-hegemony and economic development. Close to four decades later, China’s grand strategy has retained its priorities of maintaining the CCP rule, maintaining high economic growth, ensuring domestic stability, defending China’s territorial integrity, increasing China’s relative power in a multipolar world and promoting the image of a benign actor in

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its international relations (Buzan 2014, p. 86). Consequently, the peaceful development framework has framed China’s public diplomacy with its message of ‘win-win, mutually beneficial and complementary economic and political relations with countries near and far’ (Ferchen 2016). In the latest version of its Defence White Paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era, released in July 2019, Beijing underscores its vision for a ‘Community with a Shared Future for Mankind’ at the centre of its defence policy. In this vein, China reiterates the defensive posture behind the modernisation and expansion of its military capabilities, the comprehensive implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on military strengthening and military reforms and its continuous adaptation to the evolving global context characterised by ‘increasing international strategic competition, hegemony, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflict and wars’ (State Council Information Office 2019). Diverging from ideational perspectives in understanding shifts in China’s identity, preferences and behaviour, the rationalist viewpoints frames China’s evolving international profile in terms of material power and national interests. For example, a cost–benefit analysis of China’s attitudinal change highlights a range of political, military and economic benefits that informed its foreign policy and security policy calculus. Politically, the benefits associated with China’s foreign policy reorientation include enhanced status and prestige by promoting a multilateral agenda and projecting a ‘responsible power’ image, increasing options in its promotion of the One China policy and the protection of overseas interests (Sun 2017, p. 346). Economically, China benefits from the maintenance of an external environment conducive to its economic development and militarily, China’s participation in peacekeeping allows it to professionalise its armed forces and improve capabilities and scope of activities (Gill and Huang 2009, p. 110). As Sun (2017, p. 340) asserts, although cost–benefit calculations may present a useful entry point to contextualising the evolution of China’s foreign policy, the nuances in its engagement are better understood as the product of ‘both a greater emphasis on benefit than on cost and a greater emphasis on the future than on the present’. A different rationalist interpretation, offensive realism, highlights China’s behaviour as a ‘power maximizer’ based on China’s articulation of the South China Sea as a core foreign policy priority and its rapid military modernisation and burgeoning military expenditure

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(Lim 2011, p. 304). Conversely, defensive realists point to security maximisation and the iron law of balance of power in China’s posture as an attempt to counterbalance US influence in the East Asian region while signalling its peaceful intentions to neighbours (Lim 2011, p. 307). Although both constructivist and rationalist viewpoints provide illuminating perspectives on China’s foreign policy behaviour, both prisms are faced with limitations in presenting the full picture of contours and nuances in China’s foreign policy. More preferable is a multifaceted approach to China’s foreign policy that goes beyond the ‘silo effect’ inherent in dominant paradigms and one that focuses on the crosslinkages across political, strategic, economic, normative and security factors engaged in a reciprocal and dynamic interaction (Gilpin as quoted in Ferchen 2016). The next section will critically discuss the rationales and motivations behind China’s evolving approach to the UN peacekeeping regime.

Key Factors Shaping China’s Approach to Peacekeeping: Rationales, Policy and Practice The facilitating factors behind China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping are linked to political, economic, security, institutional and normative rationales (Bellamy and Williams 2013, p. 18). Political rationales stem from China’s desire to enhance its image as a responsible power and to project a ‘more benign and harmonious image beyond its borders’ (Gill and Huang 2009, p. 12). Beijing’s policymakers see engagement in peacekeeping as a way of reducing tensions and conflicts in global hotspots effectively building on to China’s interest in promoting a conducive and stable environment for its development. Hence, playing a more constructive role in multilateral peacekeeping is implicitly beneficial to China’s national interests and its desire to contribute to global security (Gill and Huang 2009, p. 12). The importance that China accords to peacekeeping was clearly articulated in its 2004 White Paper on China’s National Defence asserting its consistent support for and active participation in UN peacekeeping, its affirmation of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and its support for reform of UN peacekeeping missions. China’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping should also be viewed in terms of the emphasis placed on military operations other than war (MOOTW) in China’s military strategy. Peacekeeping is envisaged as one of the military tasks that make up the PLA’s ‘new historic

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missions’ central to China’s national interests and its strategic role in advancing peaceful development and global security (Mulvenon 2009, p. 2). Moreover, China has asserted its strong preference for engagement in multilateral peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN in contrast to ‘illegitimate’ interventions carried out unilaterally or perceived to be advancing an agenda of foreign-imposed regime change (State Council Information Office 2015, VI). The concept of ‘responsible power’ has been a key tenet of China’s public diplomacy agenda. Chinese use of the term ‘responsible power’ serves as an umbrella message for a number of audiences—reframing itself as a legitimate power on its own terms; taking up the responsibility for international affairs alongside other UNSC members; reassuring neighbours of its benign posture and shaping Chinese public opinion of its assumed roles and duties in the international arena (Richardson 2011, p. 287). There are four aspects to the notion of responsible power from China’s perspective. One element is that China’s use of ‘responsible power’ is a way for it to proactively frame its role and approach to peacekeeping. This usage is consistent with an observation by the English School of international relations noting that great powers bear more responsibilities than other states in managing issues of international peace and security. Furthermore, great powers ‘are thought of by others to have the duty of modifying their policies in light of the managerial responsibilities they bear’ (Bull 2002, p. 196). A second aspect of China’s imaging as a responsible power is China’s self-designation as both a great power and a developing state. China’s preference for a neo-Westphalian conceptualisation of state sovereignty and its non-imperialist history in relations with Africa and other colonised regions enhance its identification with the developing world (Hirono and Lanteigne 2011, p. 248). ‘Responsible power’ is also part of China’s efforts to ‘update its critique of the existing international order’ in tandem with developments in world politics and its evolving international profile since its founding in 1949 (Richardson 2011, p. 289). Finally, China’s use of ‘responsible power’ presents an opportunity for it to engage in ‘constructive development’ of international politics on its own terms. For instance, its support for UN peacekeeping is an attempt to counter Western-led global interventionism by the US and Europe (Matsuda 2016, p. 64).

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From a normative standpoint, China’s participation in UN peacekeeping can be ascribed to its interest in influencing and shaping global norms, being a ‘norm-maker’ not just a ‘norm-taker’. China’s flexibility on state sovereignty and intervention particularly in relation to human rights protection is indicative of its accommodation of emerging international norms in international humanitarian laws and human rights law. For instance, between 2000 and 2001, China sent a number of observers to UN operations in Ethiopia (UNMEE), Bosnia (UNMIBH) and DRC (MONUC). Though limited in number, these deployments were significant as they signalled China’s evolving stance on multilateral interventions and looser interpretations of sovereignty among its foreign policy community (Carlson 2006, p. 232). The malleability of Chinese discourse on sovereignty and intervention has extended to the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P), which enjoins states to intervene in a state where there has been manifest failure to protect its population from mass atrocities. China’s approach to R2P, framed as ‘Responsible Protection: building a safer world’, underscores: the limited use of the military option except as a last resort; strict adherence to criteria in the implementation of R2P against consent of a sovereign state; the utilisation of non-military instruments and the prioritisation of the responsibility to rebuild alongside the responsibility to prevent and to react (Melgaard and Odgaard 2015, p. 26). The Chinese conceptualisation of R2P also acknowledges the role of regional organisations as gatekeepers of legitimate multilateral interventions as seen in its abstention during the 2011 UNSC debate on the adoption of Resolution 1973 which imposed a no-fly zone and authorised the NATO-led intervention in Libya. China has engaged in regular normative discourse on the development of R2P particularly on issues of accountability and implementation in ensuring primacy of the protection responsibilities of interveners (Liu and Zhang 2014, p. 420). With reference to the reform of UN peacekeeping, China maintains its adherence to traditional principles of peacekeeping—impartiality, nonuse of force (except in self-defence and in defence of mandates) and consent of parties concerned. In support of the recommendations of the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), China has advocated realistic and actionable peacekeeping mandates and alignment of peacekeeping operations with inclusive political processes. In China’s view, peacekeeping operations should be conceptualised as part of a broader integrated conflict management and resolution process

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including conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development (Haitao 2017). China’s position in debates over the reform of peace operations has also emphasised strict limitations to the use of force by peacekeepers. The sovereignty of the host country remains a persistent focus of China’s policy in view of its assertion that mandates aimed at protection of civilians should be addressed on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with country-specific considerations (UNSC 2007). While displaying higher degrees of flexibility in views of sovereignty and intervention, China’s cautious approach to coercive action in the name of implementing R2P and doctrinal development of robust peacekeeping points to its internalisation and acceptance of global norms for the benefit of the international community and China’s image as a good international citizen. However, in spite of the influence of the socialisation process in driving Chinese positioning, the ‘new learning’ that is taking place in China’s foreign policy reorientation has to take into account the ‘prism of older, more deeply entrenched and largely domestic normative constructs’ such as the memory of transgressions on Chinese sovereignty, and the argumentative discourse between foreign policy elite based in China and those in the West (Carlson 2006, p. 233). Institutional rationales have also played a part in shaping China’s profile as a TCC. According to the 2015 White Paper on China’s Military Strategy (Section VI), peacekeeping is one of the essential activities for the enhancement of the PLA’s capabilities and expertise. Participation in peacekeeping enables the PLA to gain operational experiences central to China’s efforts to modernise its armed forces and ensure a security guarantee for its peaceful development in a rapidly changing global security environment. In addition to combat experience, noncombat military experience gained from counter-piracy, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions are highly valued by China’s military and political leadership. Since 2004 when former President Hu Jintao called for greater participation in MOOTW, the ascendancy of peacekeeping in internal debates among China’s policy elites points to growing confidence in the country’s foreign policy making skills, its intention to catch up with the military experience of other powers such as the US, and the need to support peacekeeping based on consent and respect for sovereignty (Mohan 2015, p. 97). Given that a systematic approach to the peacekeeping enterprise is still nascent in Chinese policy circles, experts and scholars have called for the establishment of a ‘discipline of

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peacekeeping’ and the formalisation of a legislative framework governing overseas deployments (Wang 2012, p. 138; Zhang 2011). In practice, China has been developing peacekeeping training facilities pertinent to its policy shift in favour of active engagement in UN Peacekeeping. In 2009, the Ministry of National Defence Peacekeeping Centre was established in Beijing, Huairov district, following the establishment of the Civilian Police Training Centre in Lanfang City earlier in 2008. China has also been engaging in bilateral and multilateral peacekeeping training and exchanges with a number of countries including Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, France, Germany, India, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The PLA sees these joint military exercises as central to enhancing its expertise in combatting terrorism, separatism and extremism, improving regional security and building strong military ties with other countries (Gill and Huang 2009, p. 18). At the multilateral level, China participates in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). China has also hosted and organised a number of international seminars such as the UK–China seminar on UNPKO and seminars with Norway and Sweden which have facilitated lesson-sharing and exposure to insights from military experts and peer learning from training manuals and courses in other countries’ peacekeeping training programmes (Huang 2011, p. 263). The economic rationale posits that Chinese involvement in peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa, is linked to a strategic move to protect its interests and investments abroad. A closer examination of Chinese peacekeeping deployments in Africa reveals that economic motivations are not the sole consideration. While China has peacekeepers in countries such as Sudan, South Sudan and the DRC where it has significant commercial investments, China has also deployed peacekeepers to Mali where it does not have major commercial interests. Arguably, Beijing might consider its engagement in Mali as part of a broader imperative to promote stability in the Sahel and West Africa, where it does have significant investments (Huang 2017). Over time, China’s growing economic footprint in Africa has motivated its willingness to play a concomitant security role (Humphrey 2013).

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Having outlined the key motivating factors for China’s dynamic participation in UN peacekeeping, a crucial dimension of its contribution profile is the decision-making and bureaucratic structures relevant to peacekeeping deployments. The decision to contribute troops is a topdown political one made by senior officials in Beijing who may also consult experts and PLA officers. The Ministry of National Defence Office of Peacekeeping Affairs oversees the operational aspects of China’s peacekeeping. It also facilitates coordination and communication among various offices within and outside China, including military attachés at the Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN in New York. Military decision-making in China is inextricably linked to the political elite of the CPC. The Joint Staff Department identifies policy matters which are deliberated by senior officials in the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has the final word. The Central Military Commission and the Standing Committee of the Politburo are the final arbiters over special deployments such as missions in high-risk countries or countries that have no formal diplomatic relations with the PRC (Huang 2017). According to Sun (2017, p. 243), the ‘generational punctuation’ inherent in Chinese foreign policy making, which displays variations under different leaders, coupled with the insulation of decision-making structures from the public attest to the dominant role of CPC leadership and political calculus as one of the most crucial factors driving China’s contribution to peacekeeping. For example, in 2015, President XI Jinping pledged a ten-year, $1 billion China–UN peace and development fund for peacekeeping operations. China also committed 8000 troops towards the planned UN peacekeeping standby force and to taking up the lead in setting up a permanent peacekeeping police squad (Martina and Brunnstrom 2015).

China’s Contribution to African Peace and Security: Whither the Non-interference Policy? The distribution of Chinese peacekeeping personnel shows that Africa accounts for over 80% of its total contribution of 2515 uniformed personnel (see Table 7.1). As of June 2017, China had peacekeepers in UN peace operations in African countries of South Sudan, Mali, Sudan, DRC, Liberia and Western Sahara.

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Table 7.1 China’s current peacekeeping deployments in Africa (June 2017) UN peacekeeping operations

Contingent troops

Experts on mission

South Sudan (UNMISS) Mali (MINUSMA) Darfur (UNAMID) Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) Liberia (UNMIL) Western Sahara (MINURSO)

1029

4

Staff officers

Total

21

1061

395

8

403

225

9

234

3

234

1 –

142 12

218

13

– –

– 12

Police 7

141 –

2086 Source UN peacekeeping, country contributions by mission, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ contributors/2017/jun17_3.pdf

The main areas of China–Africa defence and security cooperation are outlined under the auspices of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China’s 2006 Africa policy sets the tone for cooperation on peace and security issues particularly in capacity building of African militaries and military-related technological exchanges. At the 2012 FOCAC 5th ministerial meeting, the China–Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security was launched, reaffirming ‘cooperation in policy coordination, capacity building, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation on the basis of equality and mutual respect to jointly maintain peace and stability in Africa’. The two sides also decided to strengthen the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism as an important platform for high-level exchanges and consultation on security issues (FOCAC 2012). At the AU level, in 2015, China pledged $60 million in free assistance to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and in support of AU peace support missions in Somalia and Sudan (Tiezzi 2015). The financial support from China extends to the subregional level where, for instance, in 2011 it signed an MoU with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for the provision of $100,000 for operational costs.

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In addition to peacekeeping, China’s security presence in Africa is manifest in its engagement in confronting non-traditional security threats. The Chinese Navy has been part of UN-authorised anti-piracy operation of the Somali coast since 2008 and is part of the regular patrols in the Gulf of Aden. The PLA has also been involved in humanitarian relief efforts. During the Ebola virus outbreak in Sierra Leone in 2014, China sent three medical teams to set up a treatment centre. China is also seeking to upgrade counterterrorism cooperation with African countries by providing security assistance and arms transfers to Nigeria and Cameroon in their operations against Boko Haram and supporting the AU mission against Al Shabaab in Somalia (Duchâtel et al. 2016, p. 4). More recently in July 2017, China launched a military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. Located at the strategic strait of Bab-al-Mandeb between the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, Djibouti is one of the busiest shipping lanes. It also serves as a key refuelling centre and maritime port for imports and exports into neighbouring Ethiopia (Venugopalan 2017). China views its Djibouti base as a ‘logistical support facility’ for its navy’s anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and as the first step in operationalising the protection of Chinese overseas interests. The base in Djibouti has to be contextualised within China’s One Belt One Road initiative, of which the Maritime Silk Road is a key part. The development is also reflective of China’s intention to transform into a maritime power through the operationalisation of concepts such as ‘the protection of overseas interest’ and ‘open seas protection’ including the security of strategic sea lines of communication and the protection of Chinese ships (Duchâtel et al. 2016, p. 4; State Council 2015, IV). Seen as a ‘pilot project’ on the diplomatic front, China was also involved in mediation efforts between the government and rebels in South Sudan between 2014 and August 2015 when the peace agreement was signed. Leveraging China’s extensive ties with the South Sudanese government, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and China’s Special Representative for African Affairs, Zhong Jianhua, attempted to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table along with Ethiopia, Sudan and IGAD. Although the Chinese initiative was unsuccessful, its efforts proved instrumental in reinvigorating IGAD’s momentum in the peace process and in setting up China’s role as a credible go-between in the negotiations over sanctions between South Sudan and the Troika of The US, UK and Norway. Furthermore, China’s limited experience in diplomacy over the South Sudan issue shaped the discourse in Beijing about its

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policy on non-interference and the future direction of ‘Chinese solutions’ in Africa premised on persuasion (as opposed to punishment), regional consent, flexible donations and economic leverage (International Crisis Group 2017, p. 17). Another controversial element of China’s security presence in Africa is its arms transfers to African countries. In 2016, China was the largest supplier of weapons to Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 22% of arms sales to the region (SIPRI 2017). In the past decade, the countries that have benefited significantly from the Chinese arms industry have included Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Alessi and Xu 2015). Chinese arms sales in Africa has attracted considerable criticism as a result of its arms exports to authoritarian states such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, its ‘catch all’ customers strategy aimed at both big and small African states and its policy of no human rights or democracy conditions on arms sales. Arms from China have been implicated in some of the continent’s most bloody and protracted conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, DRC and Darfur. Furthermore, there is a direct discrepancy between China’s declared support for the AU’s peace and security mechanisms and its participation in UN peacekeeping on one hand, and its potentially destabilising arms sales to fragile African countries on the other. Nevertheless, China is not the only major power supplying weapons to Africa but it will have to balance its geostrategic objectives such as the promotion of stability in Africa with its geoeconomic objectives and expanding commercial ties in Africa (Conteh-Morgan and Weeks 2016, p. 91). The emerging picture of China on the continent especially on peace and security affairs reinforces the perception that Beijing is gradually abandoning its policy of non-interference. As Verhoeven (2014, p. 65) observes, the intensification of ties between China and Africa has re-orientated China’s conceptualisation of the ‘sacred’ notion of noninterference and facilitated its transformed utility as a ‘tactical tool rather than a deeply held value’. In other words, while a disproportionate focus of research on China–Africa relations has been on how China has transformed Africa, little attention has been paid to how Africa is changing China’s actors and worldviews. China’s experiences in expanding its material interests across Africa as well as interactions with the rapidly evolving security environment in Africa ‘have altered Beijing’s own understanding of its international relations and notions of stability and intervention’ and its purview of Africa ‘as a site where opportunity and instability are

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inextricably linked’ (Verhoeven 2014, p. 65). More importantly, China’s softening stance on non-intervention does not automatically mean its convergence with Western visions of international order. Rather, as China continues to deepen its knowledge and experiences with African politics, it has embraced an approach of ‘creative involvement’ whereby it works both within and around the liberal international order in furthering its own interests (Verhoeven 2014, p. 67).

China’s Peace and Security Engagement in Africa: Trends, Prospects and Challenges Broadly, China’s security engagement in Africa is not new but the nature and scale of policy developments indicate elevation of its involvement to a new level (Large 2016). Spanning both traditional and non-traditional security issues, growing Chinese engagement has been labelled ‘constructive engagement’ focused on initiatives and solutions that prioritise cooperation and African ownership, demands, solutions and leadership (Yuyuan 2017). Beijing’s experience of the complex security landscape in Africa has edged China towards more evolved and flexible approaches and thinking towards African security management. This has meant embracing a proactive approach in balancing its economic interests with its expanding political and economic presence in Africa (Barton 2018). A relative newcomer to the African peace and security landscape, when compared to actors such as the EU and various Western countries, SinoAfrican peace and security cooperation remains a work in progress and will have to address various challenges to deepen its various initiatives. Such challenges include misunderstandings and suspicions about China’s involvement in African peace and security based on its misrepresentation as a threat or neocolonial power; mismatch between expectations of China’s role as actor and its capability to address various security challenges in African beneficiaries and competition from military initiatives such as the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Western-backed G5 Sahel force (Zhixiong 2018, p. 115). China’s peacekeeping policy and praxis is essential to multilateral peacekeeping for several reasons. First, as a permanent member of the UNSC and developing country, China’s growing participation in UN peacekeeping adds to the legitimacy and credibility of UN peace missions (Gill and Huang 2009, p. 27). Second, China’s contribution to peacekeeping has been conceptualised as a key component of South–South

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cooperation. For instance, China views peacekeeping as a part of an integrated conflict management and resolution process, which includes peacebuilding and PCRD. Beijing questions the feasibility of liberal peace model and its prioritisation of Western-style democracy, statebuilding and capitalist markets. In contrast to Western understandings of peacebuilding, the ‘Chinese peace’ draws on its own developmental experience of the 1980s and 1990s with an emphasis on the development-security nexus, the eradication of poverty, economic development and public participation (Zhao 2011, p. 353). Third, China’s contribution of force enabler units such as ground transport and helicopters are also crucial to the success of the missions. For example, in June 2017 China sent a helicopter to UNAMID to aid in tasks such as air patrol, transport of peacekeeping forces, evacuation of rescued personnel and air supplies (Xinhuanet 2017). Lastly, as a member of the Special Committee on UN peacekeeping operations and the UN working group for peacekeeping operations, China will continue to engage in peacekeeping discourse on important issues such as recruitment of personnel, logistics supports, training of peacekeepers and chains of command (Yizhong 2015, p. 22). Going forward, China will also have to deal with a number of challenges and restraining factors to its peacekeeping endeavours. One challenge is the tension between China’s non-interference policy and its flexible, nuanced approach to peacekeeping. Simply put, as China’s participation in peacekeeping grows, an open question is how it will reconcile its exposure to normative values enshrined in UN peacekeeping and its domestic policies on issues such as Taiwan and Tibet (Huang 2013, p. 268). A second challenge is how future casualties will impact China’s peacekeeping with fatalities in Mali and South Sudan bringing the total of casualties to 18 since China’s deployment in 1990. It remains to be seen how the Chinese public will react to future Chinese casualties in peace operations given that public surveys have shown that domestic audience cost is not a major constraint on China’s deployment of troops abroad (Sun 2017, p. 348). Operational challenges to Chinese peacekeepers include insufficient language and communication skills and limitations in reserve equipment and human resources (Matsuda 2016, p. 62). Experts have also pointed to the lack of a sufficient legal framework for Chinese engagement in peacekeeping operations. Inadequate legal provisions have an impact on mission effectiveness and interoperability and can be detrimental to the fulfilment of broader mission objectives (Garly 2015, p. 13).

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China’s evolving participation in UN peacekeeping raises interesting strategic-level questions about the nature and trajectory of its engagement in UN peacekeeping. For example, will China’s participation in peace operations lead to the strengthening of the current peacekeeping regime due to its internalisation of international norms of peacekeeping? Alternatively, is China likely to alter peacekeeping norms in line with its own normative preferences? It also remains to be seen whether China will increase its troop deployments or whether it will opt instead for behind the scenes tasks such as mandate design and financial contributions (Richardson 2011, p. 294). Regarding top posts at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), China has not occupied key decision-making and support posts in recent years. In spite of the appointment of Chinese senior level staff officers in UN missions in Western Sahara and Cyprus, China has demurred that the ratio of Chinese appointments to senior ranking posts at DPKO remains lower than that of other major powers. Nonetheless, UN officials have shown willingness to attend to China’s concerns in the DPKO while acknowledging China’s pivotal role as a TCC (Huang 2017). Another set of concerns pertains to the coordination and coherence between China’s initiatives in contribution to African peace and security and the bilateral activities of the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises and private firms in respect of the positive image that China wants to project on the continent. China has a great stake in ensuring its reputational security and that its diverse engagement in Africa does not run counter to its projection as a responsible power (Alden 2014, p. 3).

Towards an Enhanced Africa–China Security Partnership: Implications for African Agency and Policy Choices The security-development nexus that is at the heart of China’s concept of peaceful development resonates with elements of the AU’s security culture, primarily the emphasis on respect for sovereignty and the role of regional consent and adherence to traditional peacekeeping norms. When contrasted with the EU model to peace and security in Africa, some representatives of the AU Commission have voiced their preference for the Chinese model and its accompanying sense of independence from Europe.

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Put differently, increasing Chinese engagement has expanded the list of options for the AU in its quest for pragmatic solutions to the continent’s security challenges (Sicurelli 2013, p. 27). The multilateral framework and mechanisms underpinning China–AU security engagement also raise important questions around African agency its impact on the dynamics of FOCAC. According to de Bruijn et al. (2007, p. 18), there is ‘no agency without reflexivity’ and the indication of agency goes beyond customary behaviour such as ‘shaking hands’. African agency needs to emphasise capacity to shape structures and outcomes, and to challenge the purview of Africa as a passive space subject to intervention by external actors such as China. This agency is located not only at the state level but also at the individual level and within civil society (Mohan and Lampert 2012, p. 110). In this regard, the lack of a common, strategic African policy towards China, shaped around African interests and priorities, is a major impediment to the full realisation of African agency. Given that we cannot treat Africa as a homogenous unit given the variant security challenges in various contexts, if the range of African actors that will significantly determine the role and impact that external actors (such as the EU or China) have on building peace and security on the continent. African actors, including governments and civil society, must ensure that external assistance takes up a supplemental role guided by decisions of African policy makers. Regional organisations and civil society need to adopt a more cooperative approach to peace and security issues. This includes better-coordinated intra-African engagements as well as more coherent, synergised and transparent arrangements with external partners (Mears 2011, p. 99). Such cooperation could also include Africa–EU–China trilateral cooperation on thematic issues such as security sector reform in conflict-affected states; support for local initiatives such as combatting trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and improving the synergies between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the APSA (Mears 2011, p. 97). China’s shifting policy and actions regarding peace and security in Africa contain crucial policy implications for African countries. At the 2012 FOCAC Ministerial meeting, enhanced security cooperation was pin-pointed as a key priority area of China–Africa relations. Similarly, during the 2015 FOCAC Summit in Johannesburg, Chinese and African

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leaders committed to ‘implement the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, support the building of the collective security mechanism in Africa, and jointly manage non-traditional security issues and global challenges…’ (FOCAC 2015). Financially, in addition to the $60 million in grants to support operationalisation of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises, President Xi pledged an additional $100 million in military assistance to the AU (Zhang 2016). China–Africa security cooperation unfolds at bilateral, regional and continental levels. Bilaterally, there are prospects for African countries to strengthen peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities through human resource development programmes for military and security personnel as well as journalists, civil servants, engineers and other civilian specialists (Benabdallah 2016, p. 21). At the regional level, China has provided financial and logistical support to a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as IGAD and ECOWAS. The RECs can solicit increased Chinese support in the provision of force enablers such as light helicopters, ground transport and mine-clearing and sweeping technology (Huang 2013, p. 270). At the AU level, African states and the AU could push for targeted and specialised workshops on peace and security on the sidelines of the FOCAC meetings. The AU can also encourage the Chinese government to create an inter-agency working group to coordinate China’s engagement in African peacekeeping and other security issues. Such an initiative would involve the PLA, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in enhancing Chinese knowledge and conceptualisation of the security contexts in various conflict hotspots in Africa (Huang 2013, p. 270). Overall, for African states, RECs and the AU, there is a pressing need to harmonise the engagement strategy with China in order to leverage the strategic partnership with China in addressing traditional and nontraditional security threats. For instance, the AU could promote increased interaction and exchanges in soft skills and transfer of knowledge and technology relevant to African peace and security context (Debelo 2017, p. 2).

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Conclusion Peace and security is one of the fundamental pillars of China’s Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership with Africa. This is reflective of not only a growing economic and security Chinese footprint in Africa, but also an indication of China’s sophisticated approach to its profile as a global power with growing interests. Accordingly, participation in UN peacekeeping is a crucial component of China’s global security engagement strategy, premised on normative, strategic, institutional and political rationales. Since the mid-1990s, China’s engagement in international peacekeeping has shifted from a position of minimalist involvement to one of more active engagement, attesting to the influence of the normative socialisation process in the pragmatic reorientation of Beijing’s foreign policy. China’s evolving role in peacekeeping has also been linked to the geostrategic objective of ensuring an external environment conducive to its peaceful development and the projection of its image as a responsible power. The shifting geopolitics and complex security environment on the African continent have also tested the limits of Beijing’s long-standing principle of non-interference. China’s deployment to peacekeeping missions in the DRC, South Sudan and Mali, as well as its participation in counter-piracy operations and humanitarian assistance efforts prove that China is increasingly flexible in its approach towards sovereignty and intervention and the promotion of human rights in the international arena. At the same time, Chinese policymakers maintain a cautious approach in their contribution to normative development of norms such as R2P and PoC emphasising the primacy of sovereign and regional consent. China’s financial and logistical support to African peace and security initiatives under the framework of FOCAC has consistently demonstrated its commitment to mutually beneficial partnerships with African states, the AU and RECs. Nevertheless, it is imperative for African states and the AU to harmonise their engagement strategy with China in order to optimise the strategic partnership with China in addressing a myriad of security challenges. One way of doing this is through more focused and regular joint dialogues on African security matters involving the AU, RECs and China.

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Note 1. The Seven Principles articulated by Beijing are: (1) China supports UNPKO that are in line with the principles of the UN Charter, and recognises UNPKO as an effective means for the UN to maintain international peace and security. (2) UNPKO must be deployed at the request or with the consent of the country in question and the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the party must be strictly respected. (3) The state and the party in question should cooperate with UNPKO taking full advantage of the time and favourable conditions brought by the PKO to achieve a political solution to the problems. (4) Each PKO must have a clear mandate; no country or party should use PKO for its own private interests or to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. (5) Authorisation of PKO lies with the UN Security Council. With respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council, General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the UN should fulfil their responsibilities in accordance with the Charter. (6) The cost of PKO must be shared and borne in a fair and reasonable manner. The cost should be covered, in light of different situations, by way of assessment among member states, voluntary contributions or by the countries concerned. (7) To strengthen UNPKO, guiding principles and specific measures need to be adopted.

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CHAPTER 8

Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement with China Paul Zilungisele Tembe

Introduction During the 2018 summit on the China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing, China proposed to synergize the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the African Union’s Agenda 2063, UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goal and the development plans of African countries, and boost their industrialization process.1 The proposal revealed that China is way beyond the implementation of several China–Africa frameworks agreements and had now begun the process of synthesizing and advancing its Africa engagements into global strategy. What does such an observation reveal to us? It reveals that China–Africa cooperation and frameworks are intertwined with the grand plan witnessed in the new paradigm shift led by China. It also reveals that China–Africa cooperation goes beyond the relationship of these two parties to include launching and promotion of the African continent into the global stage. China–Africa cooperation seems to have by design or accident is set to usher a new mode of development for the African continent through spaces provided by the relationship of these

P. Z. Tembe (B) Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_8

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two parties. The space to rationalize and implement the Kagame Report, Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and the success to challenges to the CFA franc currency by the fourteen West and Central African nations seem to be all thanks to the successes and advances of China–Africa cooperation frameworks. It is imperative that Africa gets to understand China at a deeper level beyond those of trade and commerce if it is to continue to benefit from its cooperation and relations to China. What is the first step required for such an exercise? Initiatives regarding knowing and engaging China have to go beyond trade and commerce to include an understanding of cultural aspects that impact the rationale behind China–Africa cooperation from a Chinese perspective and beyond the needs of material necessities meant to drive development on the African continent. Understanding China through its culture would help frame understand presage the next move by China in order to complement it with proactive and constructive agency instead of the current reactive agency. Constructive agency takes a form of an informed engagement with the possibility of adding to the gains for both sides of the cooperation rather than the currently witnessed reactive agency that leaves Africa at a position of a passive consumer in the relationship. Reading China culturally with the aim to benefit China–Africa cooperation cannot be separated from the purposes of bilateral relations, FOCAC, BRICS, South–South cooperation, People to People Exchange Mechanism and the BRI. Although cultural matters may be regarded to be most in line with the People to People Exchange Mechanism, it is still imperative that mechanism is designed to link cultural understanding to the rest of China–Africa cooperation frameworks and implementation strategies. Secondly, understanding central and principal cultural tenets of Chinese culture will help understand the synergy of all China–Africa cooperation frameworks within the ambit of the BRI as a strategy for international relations by China. The BRI has been launched through principles that go beyond alliances of the past where strong economies of the world tended to establish frameworks based on cultural, ideology, belief system, and military alliances. The BRI as an all-inclusive framework for global economic strategy has tended to offset or confuse strategist on the African continent who assumed that alliances with China spells an opposition and turning ones back against the West. The fact that the BRI has its successes first in most European Union member states has

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left some wondering if the project is suitable for the development of the African continent. The principal Chinese cultural tenets of 内/外 (nei/wai) “inside/outside”; 公/私 (gong/si) “public/private”; 大/小 (da/xiao) “big/small” seem to play a central role in the formulation of principles meant for the implementation of the BRI. It is therefore imperative for Africa to understand the workings of the Chinese culture as answers on how principles and strategies of the BRI implementation are meant to benefit China and the rest of the world including the African continent. First, what are the principles that are meant for the implementation the BRI? The BRI implementation principles consist of the “Three Togethers” and “Five Connectivities” as proposed by President Xi Jinping. The “Three Togethers” consist the exercise of planning together, building together, and sharing together and the “Five Connectivities” are aimed at connecting policy, infrastructure, trade, finance, people to people exchange among member states so as to achieve win-win cooperation for common development and establish a community of a shared future for mankind. The urgency for Africa to understanding of Chinese culture in order to formulate feasible policies toward China may be discerned in the advances made by China at formulating instruments and structures that aim beyond mere rhetoric into practical engagements with tangible deliverables. If Africa aims to engage in constructive agency and avoid being reactive it needs to immerse itself in the knowledge of systems and frames of reference that inform China’s engagements on the continent and the world over. Understanding of frames of reference that inform engagements of China on the African continent and the world are to be found within the question; “how does Chinese culture and traditions impact its style of government and society?”

FOCAC VI and the Second China Policy Towards Africa The FOCAC VI summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2015 marked a paradigm shift which ushered in a new era of Africa–China relations. First, the summit made emphasis on the notion of people to people relations. Secondly, China’s second Africa Policy was presented during the summit. Both instances signaled a shift from the usual focus on solely hard aspects of the Africa–China relationship such as trade, infrastructure, and mineral resources. Emphasis on people to people relations

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highlighted the need for African and Chinese people to know and understand one another in order to safeguard the gains of the Africa–China relationship. Discernable in the FOCAC VI Action Plan (2016–2018) and China’s second Africa Policy documents are emphases on China and Africa common interests, with the latter’s expressed in terms of the Africa Agenda 2063.2 However, while deliberations of the FOCAC VI made emphasis on aspects of mutual respect and harmonious relationships it also revealed lack of agency from the African side of the relationship. The present study seeks to find a rationale and operational framework for the promotion of African agency within and beyond the China– Africa cooperation. The search focuses on how Africa can best draw a coherent roadmap—working in tandem, at collective continental and regional block levels—that will help draw maximum shared benefits from its relations with China. The search for African agency in regard to or toward formulation of a China policy ought not to be misunderstood as an assumption that there exists today a homogeneous Africa. The author is in favor of individual African countries drawing policies for bilateral relations with China then proceed to regional frameworks before considering a collective continental approach that will enable each national state to engage China policy based on their own individual country’s developmental priorities. Moreover, this study cautions against efforts at establishing an Africa policy toward China based on three customary China–Africa relations rhetorical strands: (i) The parallel narrative of anti-colonial struggles by the African and Chinese people; (ii) Attempts by the African elite to replicate China’s economic successes on the continent; (iii) The Westernmedia fueled anti-China rhetoric on the African continent. Instead, each African nation’s policy toward China ought to be preceded by a thorough understanding of China in terms of Chinese history, politics, society, technology, and economy. Two recent historical premises contextualize the debate whether each African nation should take an individual stance or countries should act collectively in formulating an Africa policy toward China. First, China’s foreign policy toward African nations is strongly premised on solidarities founded in the anti-colonial struggles in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, China seems to have adopted a similar approach of solidarity toward Africa during the post-1978 reform and rapid economic rise era. Current dynamics as manifested in the FOCAC and China’s second Africa Policy suggest that China–Africa relations

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continue to heavily rely on the spirit of solidarity. It may seem that the only China known to Africa is that perceived through lenses of anti-colonial struggles, solidarity, and as a post-independence alternative partner of the African people. How can Africa, then, gain knowledge on China beyond the romanticized solidarity? What are the cultural characteristics that may help Africa better understand a complex China that is rapidly taking the global centre stage in international affairs, trade, manufacturing, and innovation.

Outline The above introduction, which problematizes the FOCAC VI Action Plan (2016–2018) and China’s second Africa Policy documents leads into a brief outline on how African identities are treated within Chinese Cultural and Political realm. The section teases out foundations for China treating Africa as one homogeneous space. It claims that the type of duality found in the traditional Chinese language patterns informs China’s understanding as a complete whole. Such analysis may go a long way in answering whether traditional Chinese values still matter as a blueprint for rationalizing the current modern society and government. Contrary to other former colonized nation states whose identities are highly impacted by ruptures of colonialism, China seem to have maintained its civilizational continuities to this present day. The third section on ‘how can Africa enhance its knowledge of China’, consists the following subsections; the role of habitus in cultural practice, civilizational, and cultural continuities. The latter sub-section discusses the time tested Chinese traditional concept of the “Three Bonds.” The “Three Bonds” have served as the central doctrine for rationalizing relations within the Chinese private family setting and to further replicate as a rationale for relations between rulers and subjects. The fourth consists a section on the role of 成语 chengyu “four-character idioms” as a foundation for formulaic language that impacts and limits the type of practice within the Chinese cultural realm. The fifth and sixth sections are an outline of the two main traditional Chinese concepts that inform the citizens’ daily practice and relations. The concepts Mianzi and Guanxi have proven to be the mainstay of Chinese culture and identity performances to an extent that a lack of understanding of the two concepts stands to undermine whatever motives one has in the dealings with the Chinese citizens. The chapter ends with

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conclusions and recommendations to African stakeholders who wish to enhance their skills and benefits in the spaces provided by the Africa– China relations.

Treatment of African Identities Within Chinese Cultural and Political Realm There is substantial literature that criticizes China’s treatment of Africa as a homogeneous and ahistorical terra nullius (empty land).3 Majority of these works argue that such treatment of Africa results in a variety of cultural and political blind spots, which when combined amount to a string of fallacies.4 Some works even go to an extent of accusing China of deliberate malice arguing that, “China benefits from grouping Africa into one homogeneous bundle.”5 The present author argues that China in its treatment of the African continent as a homogeneous entity on the one hand and as an array of individual states on the other is a reflection on how China mirrors itself. China is a multi-diverse society which has since the Warring States Period (475–221 BC) applied a myriad of solutions in an effort to achieve homogeneity that the nation enjoys today.6 A study of China’s trajectory at ascertaining a united and homogeneous society reveals the primacy of “antipodal duality” or “antipodal structures” as the concept of the Chinese cultural realm at play. In brief “antipodal duality” refers to interplay of opposites that do not necessarily constitute a contradiction.7 Instead, antipodal structures manifest as a combination of opposing lexical units that when applied within the Chinese cultural realm the negative or undesirable strengthens the positive or desirable part. On realizing the existence of antipodal structures within the Chinese cultural realm Tembe observed that: The discovery of antipodal structures has provided a platform for showing that complementary dualism as represented in the manifestation of the yin/yang 阴/阳has a counterpart in ethical dualism responsible for structuring major expressions of traditional Chinese concepts which serve as a roadmap for individuals of the PRC.8

Tembe went on to explain that antipodal structures are represented by pairs of opposite lexical units as in shan/e 善/恶 (good/bad), gong/si 公/私 (public/private), nei/wai 内/外 (inside/outside), da/xaio 大/

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小(big/small) with the first unit in a pair being representative of that which is desirable and the other, standing for that which is undesirable in society. In accordance with the above analysis the use of Africa as a common handle when referring to various African nations reflects esteem rather than malice. In Chinese culture the use of positive/negative or desirable/undesirable consists a platform and a manner of perception, abstraction and rationalization.9 The role of antipodal structures as a cultural conceptual framework seem to go beyond mere understanding of every major phenomenon of the Chinese cultural realm to encompass expressions of identities and transferring of a whole value system of the habitus from one generation to the next.10 The above analysis seem to suggest that antipodal pairs nei/wai 内/外 (inside/outside), gong/si 公/私 (public/private), da/xaio 大/小 (big/small) may help us understand the interchangeability applied by China in addressing Africa as if it were one homogeneous entity on the one hand and on the other hand to spare no effort in understanding condition of each individual African nation.11 In summary, China uses the nomenclature Africa as an expression of cementing bilateral relations with individual African countries where outside, private, and small reflect the “undesirable” and inside, public, and big represents that which is ‘desirable’. Lagerwey uses the Table 8.1 explain “contradictory” and “noncontradictory” forms of dualism as represented by Western and Chinese cultures respectively.12 Lagerwey explains that: If, in the West everything on the left hand column is inferior to what is in the right, in China, it is a matter of priority and what we may call elementary “set theory”: that which is on the left is prior to that which is on the right, and encompasses it. Ultimately, in China likewise, patriarchy rules, and the male is regarded Table 8.1 Forms of dualism as represented by Western and Chinese cultures

Body Matter Letter Outer Ritual Space Female Constructed by author

Soul Spirit Spirit Inner Myth Time Male

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superior to female, but the route followed by the Chinese to get to that point of view is very different from the West: everything in the right hand column is inside its counterpart on the left.13 Such analysis dispels arguments that China uses the nomenclature Africa with an aim of malice or with an intent to demean the continent and its nations. The only blind spots revealed through analysis in this section are those of African scholars, observers, and analysts who rely solely on Western perspectives when studying China in Africa. It then becomes imperative that African scholars dig further into Chinese culture in order to understand China’s global and African trajectory. Beyond a search for strategies to formulate African policy on China a deeper inquiry into Chinese culture would further help Africa draw its own roadmap into the international arena while taking advantage of intimate China–Africa relations.

How Can Africa Enhance Its Knowledge of China? Studies that rely on culture for analysis of China have tended to take a back bench in the China–Africa scholarship. The present author argues that it is high time that China–Africa scholars immerse themselves in studies of the Chinese and African cultures. The emergence of subjects such “People to People Relations” require a deeper understanding of cultures of the people that consist China–Africa relations. The recent inauguration of “People to People Exchange Mechanism” in South Africa requires urgent studies that will help with policy making and planning of activities that stand to add value to China–Africa relations. A limited number of studies has emerged in the last five years or so that seek to compares the Chinese and African value systems and the impact of the increasing migrations from either side of the relationship.14 The following analysis aims at highlighting traditional Chinese cultural concepts that underlie daily practices in China, which impact on a private family setting to the type of governance applied in the running of the entire nation. Greater part of the present analysis of China and its value systems relies on the tradition of hermeneutics typical of cultural studies; it is not history but interpretation of history through discourse. The main thesis in the description of Chinese value system adheres to the notion of civilization continuities, replication of a traditional family values as a rationale, and a blueprint for the running of government and the state. The proposed framework for analysis of China has come under the following attacks: (i) certainly these archaic values have changed over time; (ii) given the

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impact of the West in China, even in the realm of culture to what extent is “every decision” influenced by an understanding of ancient Chinese culture?; lastly a simplistic version of the above two questions usually reads as “are these ancient values still in vogue in China”? Prior to answering the questions in the preceding paragraph, it is worth to note that the Chinese written word and imperial system of government that reigned over larger territories of South East Asia precedes the period of emergence of the period of enlightenment in the Western world.15 The emergence of the Western dominance encountered a formidable Chinese civilization with its own expansionist tendencies with a belief system that impacted on Japan, Vietnam, and Korea to mention just a few.16 Martin Jacques17 cites four simple reasons as to why Western based analogy fails to explain the China’s trajectory and its governance in both ancient and contemporary world.18 He points out that China is a civilizational-state and not a nation-state. He explains that such circumstances have made the people inclusive of the state rather than to view it is a mere tool for delivering their needs.19 The people understand the state as an extension of themselves.20 This analogy may draw support from two ancient Chinese folk sayings which go as follows: “A nation consists of everyone; a family is a small nation.”21 Another one is a dictum from Mencius which states that; “when there is order in the family, there is order in the state” and “All beneath Heaven is rooted in nation. Nation is rooted in family. And family is rooted in self.” Mencius.22 However, for such analysis to be valid still need an answer as to what agents are responsible for the reproduction and transmission of the cultural practices witnessed in China today. A brief answer may be found in the workings of the habitus as expounded by Bourdieu.23 Habitus and Cultural Practices Bourdieu argues that the habitus is the production, practice, and transmission of culture from one generation to the next and he defines the concept as follows: The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment … produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations…. [T]he practices produced by the habitus [are] the strategy-generating principle.24

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What are the individual components of the habitus that form the strategygenerating principle of society? The individual components of the habitus are language, local norms, and traditions including a particular environment upon which these practices are performed. The practice of the habitus as explained by Bourdieu is general and universal in as far as the production of local conceptual value systems is concerned. However, manifestation of the habitus in China seems to reveal characteristics not witnessed elsewhere. Several studies of Chinese culture conclude that Chinese culture tends to enjoy centuries of continuities that seem to have defied multiple historical ruptures. Scholars of Chinese culture have come to term these continuous repetitions of ancient customs, traditions and norms “cyclical practices of Chinese culture.”25 Ann Huss makes references to the genre of gushi xinbian (old tales retold) as an explanation to continuous repetitions witnessed in Chinese culture and concludes that in China, “eventually everything will be re-written.”26 China seem to have managed to conform modernities and foreign influences into the matrix of traditional Chinese cultural system. Arguments by aforementioned scholars tend to emphasize the role of the spoken and written as responsible for witnessed continuities in Chinese culture. How are the witnessed cyclical practices of the spoken and written word been sustained throughout Chinese history? Civilization and Cultural Continuities China has a multiple variety of classics that may be referred to as canonical texts and deemed responsible for sustaining the spoken and written word in that nation. However the Four Books and Five Classics became the main subject of mandatory study for Confucian scholars since the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. These four books consist of the The Mencius, The Analects of Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, and the Great Learning. All those who wished to become government officials needed to memorize all these works. In a family setting children are required to this day to memorize the Chinese characters of the sanzi jing 三字经 ‘Three Character Classic’ and baijiaxing 百家姓 ‘Hundred Family Surnames ’ before going on to school and learn about the rest of the classics. It is within these circumstances that China has managed to sustain a common set of a familial value system. Out of all the classics and books in Chinese history the 小径xiaojing, the “Classic of Filial Piety” is the most revered and most relied upon

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to sustain the foundational value system of China: the familial value system.27 The precepts of the “Three Bonds” and “Five Constants” consist the basic narrative of the Classic of Filial Piety. The “Three Bonds” emphasize the relations between a “ruler and the subject,” “husband and wife,” and “father and son”. The “Three Bonds” consist the foundational teachings on relations first within a private family setting that replicate into individual relations to the state. During imperial China “Three Bonds” consisted larger part of imperial examinations. The Chinese imperial examinations were a civil service examination system that was used for selecting individuals to serve in state bureaucracy.28 The system is still in place to this day in China, albeit in its new form as the “Civil Servant Exams.”29 In China today sitting for the “Civil Servant Exams” is a pre-requisite for accessing employment in any government department including the “State Owned Enterprise.” In conclusion how does the implementation of the “Civil Servant Exams” reflects cultural continuities? Beyond being a reflection of a continued ancient tradition of meritocracy, as a transparent system it promotes trust between the government and the public, a replication of the first rule of the “Three Bonds,” which outlines and establishes relations between a ruler and his subjects. The present author argues that it is within the context of continued and repetitive traditional cultural values that the anti-graft campaign of the past five years in China has become a resounding success in garnering legitimacy and appeal for the Communist Party of China from the greater populace and getting China noticeable to the ordinary people around the globe.

Chengyu “Four-Character Idioms” as a Foundation for Formulaic Language and Ethical Dualism Chengyu “four-character idioms” have been identified by a variety of studies as a foundation for formulaic language that serves sustain and transfer traditional Chinese values in all fields of practice from ancient to contemporary times.30 It is also worth noting that sixty percent of the “Civil Servant Exams” consist of chengyu “four-character idioms.”31 Candidates are tested on their knowledge of origins, interpretation, and everyday use of chengyu. Furthermore, an entire section of the “Civil Servant Exams” titled “logical assessment” consists of chengyu “fourcharacter idioms” and other types of idioms learned during childhood.32

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Studies by Hsia33 and Apter and Saich34 state that all Chinese paradigm shifts from imperial to contemporary times including the Maoist revolution and the opening up and reform all achieved success because they borrowed from ancient traditional tales and Chinese traditional language expressions, as represented in set-phrases, idioms, puns, proverbs, fables, sayings, four-character idioms, and couplets. The latest example that borrows from this tradition of ancient language traditions to articulate novel concepts of governance is the expression/maxim “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” The use and inclusion of the “Chinese Characteristics” to express the type of ideology in place is an encapsulation and owning of the notion of socialism as practiced today in China.35 The phrase “Chinese Characteristics” aims at establishing congruence between the ancient familial value system and contemporary Chinese consciousness.36 Complexity of the interplay between Chinese culture, language, customs and values, and its relations to the outside world is exasperated by scarcity of the aforementioned materials in the English language. Nall points out that limitation in studies of set-phrases such as chengyu “four-character idioms” in the English language tends to mystify so much needed knowledge on China by the outside world.37 Furthermore, Tembe has argued that limited attention may also reflect why chengyu “four-character idioms” are not approached on a “theoretical, scientific basis” in studies of Chinese culture.38 Nonetheless, there is a plethora of Chinese–English chengyu dictionaries, which are helpful in showing the distribution and uses of idioms in various fields of Chinese society.39 In consulting the Chinese–English chengyu dictionaries, it is apparent that Chinese idioms with ancient origins still hold a significant position in people’s daily lives and continue to serve as symbols of knowledge and scholarship in China.40 In summary as chengyu is used in everyday setting within it contains the cultural communal memory defying influences from the outside and conforming new ideas into the traditional cultural matrix that continues to serve as a conceptual framework to rationalize solutions for problems that the Chinese nation face. African stakeholders need to understand the workings of this particular Chinese cultural and linguistic phenomenon because reading a speech or any other work riddled with chengyu “fourcharacter idioms” as most of materials from China are even when translated into a foreign language, defeats any analysis based on Western analogy.

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Mianzi and Guanxi The previous sections seem to suggest that understanding of foundational concepts of Chinese culture would help eliminate present blind spots in Africa–China relations and add further benefits to already flourishing bilateral relations between China and majority of African nations. If the aforementioned concept of “antipodal dualism/structures” constitute the manner of perception, abstraction, and rationalization in Chinese society the concepts of mianzi 面子 (face) and guanxi 关系 (social networks) represent fields where cultural, symbolic, social, and economic capitals are produced, garnered, exchanged, and possible lost. The traditional Chinese concepts of Mianzi and Guanxi have been identified as central tools employed in negotiations and dealings in China since time immemorial. The two concepts apply from an individual level to include dealings between cultures and nations. Yutang observes that the Chinese concept of Mianzi “psychological face” “is not a face that can be washed or shaved, but a face that can be “granted” and “lost” and “fought for” and “presented as a gift”.” He concludes that Mianzi although abstract and intangible, is the most delicate standard by which Chinese social intercourse is regulated.41 It can be argued that China’s traditional concept of Mianzi “face” as being at the centre of China’s dealings with Africa and the world at large. Although referred to as “face,” Mianzi should be understood as an expression of “honour” in China’s dealings with foreign nationalities. There are several aspects of Mianzi, namely liu mianzi “granting face” by not allowing the other party to lose face. Gei Mianzi “giving someone or a group of people a chance to regain lost honor.” It is difficult to recover from a position of Shi Mianzi or diulian “losing face” or “losing honor” and it is therefore avoided by both parties at all costs.42 This is because the act of regaining Mianzi is generally costly for both the sponsor and recipient. It also entails a lifelong indebtedness on the side of the recipient who has been accepted back into cycle of “honor.” Such relationships are reflective in a decorum that consists of a slow, tedious but necessary dance to prevent recurring loss of Mianzi.43 Because of the centrality of Mianzi Africans ought to understand its workings and leverage it when negotiating with a variety of Chinese entities. Mianzi should then be considered one of primary variables in all attempts to understand and strategize dealings with China.44

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Guanxi Guanxi which refers to safeguarding to “safeguarding social networks and relationships,”45 is the second traditional concept worth understanding. Chinese people value and go to great extents to safeguard existing networks and social relationships. The concept of Guanxi carries great social and cultural currency. It is the vehicle for a “gift economy.” Furthermore, with the concept of Guanxi at play, it is difficult to determine where kin relationships end and those of extra-kin takeover.46 Guanxi consists of, and serves to cement, all types of relations from those of a traditional core family, schoolmates, comrades, and work colleagues all the way to the offspring of any circle of a given network and relationship. Given the fact that in China, all social networks and relationships start from a small group and grow into larger and looser types of bonding, a collective approach by Africa toward an African China policy would yield poor results. If Guanxi can be understood by using the analogy of the patterns of concentric circles that appear when a pebble is thrown into water. By the time one concentric circle reaches the outer edge of the pool, the networks, relations, and economic debt would have been highly reduced.47 This is because Guanxi thrives within an atmosphere of a heightened sense of gift economy.48 Africa would, then, draw more benefits if individual African nations were to approach China separately thereby rendering Guanxi networks and relations stronger at each turn with the possibility of higher gains at each encounter.

Manifestation of Mianzi and Guanxi in China–Africa Relations The 1971 African support for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) admission to the United Nations General Assembly may be regarded as a significant of the China–Africa relation.49 In accordance with traditional Chinese concepts, Africa helped China to regain Mianzi on the international arena; which translates to manifestation of both Liu Mianzi and Gei mianzi. The PRC regarded its admission to the United Nations as an end to a century long national isolation and “national humiliation.”50 The African gift of support to China helped the latter to regain its national dignity in the process incurring an immense debt to the former in accordance with the precepts of Guanxi. It may be argued that in the eyes of China, current China–Africa relations are in accordance with the precepts of Mianzi for safeguarding Guanxi through its heightened sense of gift economy.

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Advantages of Individual African Nations Drawing China Policies The two Chinese traditions argue against a united front as a strategy for formulating Africa’s China policy. Parallels can be drawn from the fact that African collective resolutions and strategies under the ambit of the African Union (AU) and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have arguably been taken lightly by the international community. Attempts at African unity are hampered by three main historical factors: (i) The majority of African nations and regions still carry Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone colonial identities, albeit symbolically at times. (ii) Natural resources are not uniformly distributed across the African continent yet all nations seek to have a front seat in the development of a united continent. (iii) African collective resolutions do not take into consideration individual nation’s domestic policies and developmental priorities. Instead, participatory stances are the preferred route meant to accommodate every African nation which results in weak solutions for problems facing individual nations and in turn the whole continent. On the other hand, the recent “Africa Rising” rhetoric—real or imagined—did not result from continental collective efforts but from coherent implementation of domestic policies as is the case of Rwanda, Mauritius, and Ethiopia.51 Under the circumstances, it is imperative for South Africa as the current co-chair of the FOCAC mechanism to be seen as acting as an independent sovereign state in its efforts to formulate a China policy. The agency of an individual sovereign state stands to challenge the notion that China is at the helm of the China–Africa relations.52 A number of factors reiterate basic arguments for an individual country approach: First, action by a single African state toward formulating a China policy stands to challenge the very “China-Africa” nomenclature which seems to presuppose a form of an unspoken collective on one side as represented by African nations converging around a single entity, with the Chinese nation on the other side. Secondly, each African nation has individual varying needs and priorities in relation to its developmental goals. Debatably, it would not be functional—mainly in economic and political terms—for South Africa to assume a Big-Brother role and attempt to speak on behalf of the continent in as far as formulating Africa’s China policy is concerned. Economically, while conditions in some African nations tend to requisite quick returns

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when dealing with China, South Africa has a latitude of playing a long term game. Politically, South Africa would lose credibility and leverage as a peace broker on the continent if it were perceived to bully its way into areas where it lacks knowledge and track record in comparison to nations like Tanzania and Ghana whose close relations with China span more than half a century.53 It would be much easier for South Africa to formulate a China policy based on its priorities as stipulated in the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) and other country-based frameworks that inform the nation’s developmental and transformative strategies. The 2010 World Cup held in South Africa and the hosting of the Cup of Africa Football (CAF) in 2013 stand as examples that benefit an entire region resulting in positive spillovers than those of collective efforts.

The Role of Regional Economic Communities Beyond the national strategies of individual African states, respective regional economic communities stand to gain from the members’ strong China policies. Such a strategy may in the long run galvanize the current sluggish inter-African trade. However, regional economic communities should not at any point precede the role of individual nation’s strategies for setting up a China Policy. Given the fact that South Africa is the current co-chair of FOCAC it may play a more significant role in positioning SADC in China–Africa frameworks. It would be an incalculable strategic mistake for South Africa to downplay its role in the region given, for example, its developed infrastructure and attractive financial institutions. South Africa’s membership to a variety of international frameworks and financial institutions should be reflected in its national and regional role when formulating a China policy. However, such a role by South Africa should not translate into collectivism. Instead, it should be regarded as a tool for other regional and continental parties to leverage upon when drawing up policies toward China.

Conclusions The present chapter began by reading into the FOCAC VI Action Plan (2016–2018) and China’s second Africa Policy documents in an effort to tease out spaces for a formulation of an African policy toward China.

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However, further reading into the resolutions of the two documents revealed lack of agency from African nations. The chapter then suggested that African lack of agency within the China–Africa frameworks was caused by the limited understanding of Chinese culture. It pointed that the need to understand Chinese culture stemmed from the fact that China tended to thrive in its civilizational and cultural continuities that have defied multiple historical ruptures. It concluded that Chinese civilizational and cultural continuities were sustained by a variety of agents still in place such as classical literature and traditional language expressions that serve as conceptual framework for rationalizing daily practices in China. As an example of Chinese cultural constructs at play in the China– Africa relations the study went on to briefly describe the role of antipodal duality/structures as concepts that provided China with the ability to treat Africa as a homogeneous space on the one hand and as separate national entities on the other. It further pointed the need to understand the apparent interplay between antipodal duality/structures with the two main concepts of Chinese value system namely; mianzi 面子 (face) and guanxi 关系 (social networks). Descriptions and analysis of the Chinese values system concepts revealed that Africa–China relations would immensely benefit if formulation of African China policy was left to the hands of individual African nations states. The above suggestion does not necessarily dismiss a united African China policy. Instead, it aims at a gradual formulation that will leverage on intimate bilateral relations to regional and continental strategies. Given diverse national and regional developmental strategies each national ought to play an empowering role toward a formulation of a unified continental African policy toward China. However, aforementioned processes should not take precedence to individual national strategies that may lead to stronger regional integration with the aim of enhancing African intratrade, freedom of movement, and eventually unity of the entire continent. An organic and gradual interaction between African states that fosters common interests may even lead to a stronger African policy toward China.

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Recommendations on an African Policy Framework Toward China • African China strategists would benefit from reading “Doing Business in China” literature and by participating in dialogs beyond bilateral relations with local and foreign China–Africa scholars.54 • African countries should form an advisory body consisting of Chinese Studies specialists—e.g., make use of African China graduates. • Strategies toward African China policy should be dictated by the priorities of local African economies. • Individual African nations should separately setup strategies and formulate China policies in accordance with their own developmental priorities before engaging regional and continental entities. • Formulation of African China policy should make deliberate efforts to distance itself from the centrality of current Africa–China frameworks. Such a move may stand a chance to help achieve a coherent, flexible, and workable policy that does not sound like a response to the needs of China. • South Africa as the co-chair of FOCAC mechanism has to find solutions beyond peripheries of Africa–China frameworks. The move is aimed at preventing a possible replication of the well-established China initiated framework such as the FOCAC. Solely relying on the platform provided by the FOCAC and other China–Africa frameworks may confine the intended policies to the very asymmetries of the new efforts aims to avert.

Notes 1. “Synergizing Agenda 2063 with the Belt and Road Initiative.” China Daily, August 22, 2019. 2. Tembe, Paul. “Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement with China.” Towards an African Policy on China. Global Dialogue. Vol. 16. 1 October 2017. 3. Ewert, Insa. “‘China in Africa’: A Reality Check.” http://www.youngc hinawatchers.com/china-in-africa-a-reality-check/ (Accessed on June 20, 2017). 4. Deng, Francis. “Ethnicity: An African Predicament.” U.S. Foreign Policy. Brookings, June 1, 1997. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ethnicityan-african-predicament/ (Accessed on July 5, 2017).

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5. Isaeva, Natalia. “WikiLeaks Reveals China’s Impure Intentions for Africa,” November 2013. https://borgenproject.org/wikileaks-reveals-chinas-imp ure-intentions-africa/ (Accessed on June 9, 2017). 6. Ebrey, Patricia Buckley, Walthall, Anne, Palais, and James B. (2006). Pre-Modern East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 7. Tembe, P. “Re-evaluating Political Performatives of the PRC: Maoist Discourse—The Historical Trajectory of the Laosanpian.” The Chinese University of Hong Kong, July 2013. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. cf. Lagerwey (2009). 10. See Bourdieu (1991) and Tembe (2013) above. 11. Zhimin, Chen and Junbo, Jian. “Chinese Provinces as Foreign Policy Actors in Africa.” South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), China in Africa Project Occasional Paper No. 22. January 2009 African perspectives. Global insights. 12. Lagerwey, John. (2009). Lagerwey, J. and Kalinowski, M. (1250 BC–220 AD), eds. (2009). Early Chinese Religion. Part. 1, Shang Through Han (1250 BC –220 AD). Leiden; Boston: Brill. 13. Ibid. 14. Metz, Thadeuz. (2015). “Values in China as Compared to Africa,” in The Rise a Decline and Rise of China: Searching for an Organising Philosophy in Search of Chinese Philosophy and Civilization. South Africa: Africa Press. Bodomo, Adams. “Africa-China Relations: Symmetry, Soft Power and South Africa.” China Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, Special Issue: Religious Studies in China (Fall 2009), pp. 169–178. 15. Spence, J. (1999). The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton. 16. Newton, Kevin. “Chinese Civilization’s Influence in East Asia: Korea & Japan.” Study.com. http://study.com/academy/lesson/chinese-civili zations-influence-in-east-asia-korea-japan.html (Accessed on November 6, 2017). Bader, Jeffrey. “China’s Role in East Asia: Now and the Future.” Brookings. On the Record, September 6, 2005. https://www. brookings.edu/on-the-record/chinas-role-in-east-asia-now-and-the-fut ure/ (Accessed on November 6, 2017). 17. Jacques, Martin. “Understanding Chinese Governance.” People’s Daily, March 3, 2015. http://www.martinjacques.com/articles/articles-geo politics-globalisation/understanding-chinese-governance/ (Accessed on October 28, 2017). 18. Martin Jacques analysis are valid as majority of Africa-China scholars and observers rely on Western analogy to discuss and study China. Africa– China studies has till recently lacked analysis that move away from Western analogy as is has produced its own cohort of sinologist. 19. Ibid.

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20. Ibid. 21. See Mencius in Legge, James. (1861). The Works of Mencius: The Chinese Classics, vol. 2. Reprinted (1895). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 22. Lau, D. C. (1970). Mencius. London: Penguin Books. 23. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by Nice, R. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice, trans. Nice, R. Cambridge. Bourdieu, P. and Thompson, B. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power [Ce que parler veut dire. English]. Cambridge: Polity Press. 24. Lizardo, O. (2009). The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu’s Habitus. University of Arizona. 25. Hall, David and Ames, Roger. (1995). Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture. State University of New York Press. 26. Huss, Ann. (2000). Old Tales Retold: Contemporary Chinese Fiction and the Classical Tradition. Columbia University. 27. Knapp, K. (2005). Selfless Offspring: Filial Children and Social Order in Medieval China. Honolulu: University of Hawa’i Press. 28. Ebrey, Patricia. (2010). The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 29. Tembe, Paul. (2013). “Re-evaluation of Maoist Discourse—The Trajectory of the Laosanpian.” Centre for China Studies. Chinese University of Hong Kong. 30. Chengyu “set phrases” are a type of traditional Chinese idiomatic expression, most of which consist of four characters. Chengyu were widely used in Classical Chinese and are still common in vernacular Chinese writing and in the spoken language today. According to the most stringent definition, there are about 5000 chengyu in the Chinese language, though some dictionaries list over 20,000. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Che ngyu (Accessed on November 16, 2017). 31. Tembe, Paul. 2013. “Re-evaluation of Maoist Discourse—The Trajectory of the Laosanpian.” Centre for China Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. 32. 2012 国家公务员录用考试专业教材. 33. Hsia, Tsi-an. (1961). Metaphor, Myth, Ritual and the People’s Commune. Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology; no. 7. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of International Studies, University of California. 34. Apter, David and Saich, Tony. (1994). Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 35. Foss, Sonja. (2009). Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration & Practice. 3rd ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

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36. Tembe, P. “Re-evaluating Political Performatives of the PRC: Maoist Discourse—The Historical Trajectory of the Laosanpian.” The Chinese University of Hong Kong. July 2013. 37. Nall, Timothy. (2009). “An Analysis of Chinese Four-Character Idioms Containing Numbers: Structsignificance.” Ball State University, Muncie, IN. 38. Tembe, P. “Re-evaluating Political Performatives of the PRC: Maoist Discourse—The Historical Trajectory of the Laosanpian.” The Chinese University of Hong Kong. July 2013. 39. Lai, T. C. (1972). trans. More Chinese Sayings. Kowloon, Hongkong: Swindon Book Co. (Brown et al. 1920; Lai 1972, p. 78; Morris 1981; Lip 1984; Longman English-Chinese Dictionary 1998; Lin and Leonard 2000; Shi et al. 2006; Moss 2006). 40. Each and every Chinese language dictionary contains an extensive section on Chengyu “four-character idioms.” 41. Yutang, Lin (1935). My Country and My People (Hardcover)|format = requires|url = (help). New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, pp. 199–200. See also: Carr, Michael. (1992). “Chinese “Face” in Japanese and English (Part 1).” The Review of Liberal Arts, Vol. 84, pp. 39–77. Carr, Michael. (1993). “Chinese ‘Face’ in Japanese and English (Part 2).” The Review of Liberal Arts, Vol. 85, pp. 69–101. Snow, E. 1941. Scorched Earth. London: Gollancz. Snow, E. 1941. Scorched Earth. London: Gollancz. Smith, H. (1894). Chinese Characteristics. Fleming H. Revell.|access-date = requires|url = (help). Lam Wai-ling. “The Concern of a Nation’s Face: Evidence in the Chinese Press Coverage of Sports.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, Vol. 33 (1993). ISSN 1991–7295. |access-date = requires|url = (help). 42. Chan, S. and Suizhou, E. L. (2007). “Civil Service Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Return to Cadre Personnel Management.” Public Administration Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 383–398. Huang, Y. and Bedford, O. 2009. “The Role of Cross-Cultural Factors in Integrative Conflict Resolution and Crisis Communication: The Hainan Incident.” The Chinese University of Hong Kong, HONG KONG. American Behavioral Scientist December 2009, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 565–578. 43. Tembe, P. “Re-evaluating Political Performatives of the PRC: Maoist Discourse—The Historical Trajectory of the Laosanpian.” The Chinese University of Hong Kong, July 2013. cf. Lansberg et al. 2009. Tradition & Adaptation in Chinese Family Enterprise. HSBC. 44. Chu, Leonard L. (1988). “Mass Communication Theory: A Chinese Perspective,” in Wimal Dissanayake, ed., Communication Theory: The Asian Perspective. Singapore: The Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre. Jennifer Eagleton. www.asian-emphasis.com/wir iting/CulturalKeywords.pdf.

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45. Hammond, Scott C. and Glenn, Lowell M. (2004). “The Ancient Practice of Chinese Social Networking: Guanxi and Social Network Theory.” E: CO Special Double Issue, Vol. 6, Nos. 1–2, pp. 24–31. 46. Baker, H. (1979). Chinese Family and Kinship. Macmillan: London, 1979. Che, W.-K. (1979). The Modern Chinese Family. R & E Research Associates. 47. Chen, Xiaoping, and Chen, Chaochen. (2004). “On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process Model of Guanxi Development.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 21, pp. 305–324. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Manufactured in The Netherlands. 48. Troilo, Michael and Zhang, Jun. (2012). “Guanxi and Entrepreneurship in Urban China.” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 315–331. Gold, Thomas, Douglas Guthrie, and David Wank. 2002. Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture and the Changing Nature of Guanxi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 49. The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-Up Committee of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. China–Africa 00: Facts About China, Africa and Relations Between the Two. 2015. Sinolingua. See literature on October 1971: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. 50. Kilpatrick, R. (20 October 2011). “National Humiliation in China.” eInternational Relations. Retrieved 15 November 2016. 51. Taylor, I. (2010). Africa Rising? BRICS—Diversifying Dependency. 2014. James Currey, Boydell and Brewer Limited. 52. Tembe, P. “Misconceptions and Omissions in the China-Africa Discourse” CCS Commentary. Centre for Chinese Studies. Stellenbosch University. Stellenbosch, South Africa. 6 July 2015. 53. Yu, T. (Aug., 1988). “Africa in Chinese Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 8, pp. 849–862. Yang, J. “Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice Under New Conditions BEIJING, Aug. 16 (Xinhua)—The Flagship Magazine of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Qiushi (Seeking Truth)” Monday, 19 August 2013. Retrieved 8 November 2016. 54. Zinzius, B. (2004). Doing Business in the New China: A Handbook and Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Liu, H. and Roos, L. U. (2006). “Managing Strategic Planning Paradigms in China.” Marketing Intelligence & Planning, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 432–445.

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Bibliography Annotated Chinese Proverbs (1979). 外文出版社 北京-Supplementary Readings for Elementary Chinese Readers. Foreign Languages Press. Annotated Chinese Proverbs (1982). Beijing Language Studies. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words. William James lectures. 2nd ed. Vol. 1955. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Boden, J. (2009). The Wall Behind China’ Open Door—Towards Efficient Intercultural Management in China. Belgium: Academic and Scientific Publishers. ———. (2010). Mindmapping China—Language, Discourse and Advertising in China. Brussels: Academic and Scientific Publishers. Bohannan, Paul. (1995). How Culture Works. New York: Free Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by Nice, R. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. (1990). The Logic of Practice, trans. Nice, R. Cambridge: Polity. Bourdieu, P. and Thompson, John B. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power [Ce que parlerveutdire. English]. Cambridge: Polity Press. Burke, K. (1969). The Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press. Burns, P. and Wang, X. (2010). Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Servants’ Behaviour. The China Quarterly, Vol. 201, pp. 58–78. Butler, J. (1997). Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York; London: Routledge. Chan, S. and Suizhou, E. L. (2007). Civil Service Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Return to Cadre Personnel Management. Public Administration Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 383–398. Che, W.-K. (1979). The Modern Chinese Family. Palo Alto, CA: R & E Research Associates. Chou, B. (2007). Does ‘Good Governance’ Matter? Civil Service Reform in China. International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 54–75. Chou, R. (August 9, 2010). Filial Piety by Contract? The Emergence, Implementation, and Implications of the “Family Support Agreement” in China. The Gerontologist, Vol. 0, No. 0, pp. 1–14. Retrieved from http://citeseerx. ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1033.4025&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Chuanhua, P. (2011). A New Discourse on Xunzi’s Philosophy of Language. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 193–216. Dirlik, A. (2012). Mao Zedong in Official Discourse and Historiography. China Perspectives, Vol. 2, pp. 17–27. Epoch Times —China Economist. (2015). “Government Jobs Become Hot in China” cited from Epoch Times 06/201.

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Fang, S. R., et al. (2009). The General Theory of the Law of Civil Servant System. Wuhan University Press. Hubei: China. Giskin, H. and Walsh, B. (2001). An Introduction to Chinese Culture Through Family. Albany: State University of New York Press. Guo, Y., Tian, J. comp. Yang, L., and Wang, Q. (2008). Keywords for Better Understanding China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Hillier, J. and Rooksby, E. (2005). Habitus: A Sense of Place. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ikels, C., ed. (2004). Filial Piety: Practice and Discourse in Contemporary East Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ji, Fengyun. (2004). Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao’s China. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Jonathan, Wilson and Brennan, Ross. (2010). Doing Business in China: Is the Importance of guanxi Diminishing? European Business Review, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 652–665. Knapp, K. (2005). Selfless Offspring: Filial Children and Social Order in Medieval China. Honolulu: University of Hawa’i Press. Lau, D. C. (1958). The Treatment of Opposites in ‘Tzuˇ ’ 老 子. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1/3, pp. 344–360. ———, trans. (1963). Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching. UK: Penguin Classics. Lee, D. (1978). Chinese Proverbs a Pragmatic and Sociolinguistic and Approach. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. Legge, James, trans. (1971). Confucian Analects: The Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean, translated, with Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, Copious Indexes, and Dictionary of All Characters. New York: Dover Publications. ———. (1985). The Sacred Books of China: The Text of Confucianism. Part 3, Sacred Books of the East. Vol. 27. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Li, Cao. (1957). Literary and Colloquial Terms in New Usage; Terms Topped by Numerals. Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology. no. 3. East Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies. Berkeley, CA: University of California. Li, G. and Lok, M. (trans.). (1995). A Glossary of Political Terms of the People’s Republic of Hong Kong. China: Chinese University Press. Lindsberg, et al. (2009). Tradition & Adaptation in Chinese Family Enterprise. HSBC. Lip, E. (1984). Chinese Proverbs and Sayings. Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd. ———. (1992). Chinese Numbers: Significance, Symbolism and Traditions. Singapore: Times Books International. Miranelli, M. (2009). Names and Reality in Mao Zedong’s Political Discourse on Intellectuals. Journal of Global Cultural Studies 5. Varia (Re) Inventing

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“Realities” in China. Retrieved on November, 2017 from http://transtexts. revues.org/index268.html. Myers, D. (1991). An Ethnolinguistic Analysis of Chinese Language Related to Business. The Union Institute. Pye, L. (1992). The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. SACS. (2010). State Administration of Civil Servants. Beijing. Schoenhals, M. (1992). Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. Spence, J. (1999). The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton. Stone, J. (2006). The Routledge Book of World of Proverbs. London; New York: Routledge. Wechsler, Howard J. (1985). Offerings of Jade and Silk: Ritual and Symbol in the Legitimation of the T’ang Dynasty. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wu, C.-H. P. (1992). Semantic-Based Synthesis of Chinese Idioms. Georgetown University.

CHAPTER 9

One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its Impact on an African Policy Towards China Yu-Shan Wu

Introduction When thinking about the China–Africa relationship, very different ideas and views on what it means, arises. The economic links are the longstanding and conventional narrative of relations—including China’s infrastructure engagement in Africa since the 1950s and the ever-growing trade links since the 2000s. While politically, it is the story of a longstanding historical friendship—and even images of African policymakers

Yu-Shan is a research associate at the Africa–China Reporting Project (ACRP), Department of Journalism, University of Witwatersrand. She previously undertook research on foreign policy issues at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), between 2010–2017. She completed her PhD (International Relations) at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria in 2019. Y.-S. Wu (B) Africa-China Reporting Project, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_9

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rubbing shoulders with their Chinese counterparts, as exemplified by the triennial Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Yet in reality the relationship between the two sides is constantly moving. State players and their interests are themselves impacted by changing circumstances. One important shift in the post-Cold War era is the rise of transnational forces (such as technology and non-state actors) that have expanded diplomatic links beyond state entities and even professional diplomats (Wiseman 1999: 36; Pynzari 2014: 135). Hence the contemporary global system—largely characterised as a negotiated order (Chin 2015)—necessitates state players to communicate and manage expectations, both internally and externally, more vigilantly than before. It is in this context for example that China has adopted public diplomacy—that is namely engaging with foreign publics—in order to promote its interests and demonstrate its intentions as a rising power. While China’s public diplomacy, which has taken flight in the last decade, is far from perfect, it does however provide a window into its contemporary interests and communication towards Africa. Moreover its experiences to date raises questions and points of interest for the continent as well, especially when considering the formulation of an African policy—or perhaps more fittingly, common position(s)—towards China. This chapter will thus explore the advent of public diplomacy, a global trend against which China–Africa links exist. It will also trace China’s particular public diplomacy experience on the continent. The potential and prospects for formulating an African approach towards China will then be explored—in particular are the potential linkages with China’s public diplomacy engagement. Furthermore are the lessons China’s experience outlines for Africa’s own public engagement, an important factor towards realising common understanding and developing African positions on important issues.

Situating Public Diplomacy The interest in influencing others is not new and is as old as diplomacy itself. For instance during imperial times, China’s tributary system—a set of institutional frameworks that outlined its external relations around the fourteenth to nineteenth century—preferred to adopt cultural persuasion over military force (Cranmer-Byng 1968: 166; Zhang and Buzan 2012: 20). However the significance of official communication with publics was

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only really elevated along the development of media instruments, such as the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century. Nevertheless Edmund Gullion officially coined public diplomacy later in 1965, in an effort to capture changes in global communication. He outlined public diplomacy as (Cull 2009: 19). …the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.

What is notable in this definition is that despite the changes in global diplomacy to date, public diplomacy still denotes the state (or government) as the primary actor. Subsequently, other scholars have included the purpose of public diplomacy as: to understand attitudes and cultures, influence public attitudes and opinions, mobilise action, as well as help build or manage relations (Melissen 2005: 8; Signitzer and Coombs 1992: 138). In turn a state’s interests or values are advanced. These aspects mentioned apply to China’s public diplomacy as well. Especially in its relations with Africa, where there is strong official support and participation in public engagement—who holds impetus to drive closer relations and understanding (Wu and Alden 2014) (While US cultural dissemination has a strong commercial drive [Holden 2013: 13]). Moreover the latter aspect mentioned on ‘building and managing relations’ is especially important for China in Africa, since people engagement and knowledge about one another’s societies remains limited (China is a newer player on the continent compared to traditional Western partners). Yet as a result of China’s rapidly increased economic presence—as Africa’s largest trading partner since 2009—it is also compelled to maintain the very links and interests established. Yet the study of contemporary public communication has predominantly been centred on the US experience, including the Cold War period and the Gulf War (1990–1991) where CNN’s 24-hour news cycle was born. It re-emerged again following the September 11, 2011 attacks, when global debate underscored that states had neglected the importance of political communication (Szondi 2008: 2). The impetus for

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public engagement has been further exacerbated by the rise of communication technology (namely the decreased cost of mobile handsets and increased social media platforms) and non-state actors (including civil society organisations like the Red Cross and even the private sector). It is this recognition that diplomacy no longer occurs merely behind closed doors that the former British ambassador, Tom Fletcher, explores statecraft in the digital age—or what he adequately calls ‘Naked Diplomacy’ (Fletcher 2016). Melissen (2005: 15) finds that countries ranging in affluence and size are increasingly responding to such changes; and recognising the importance of communication strategies. For illustration, while traditional state media players cut back their funds following the 2008 financial crisis, a range of alternative English language news players recognised the power of narrative ownership and accelerated their presence abroad. This included Russia Today, Qatar’s Al Jazeera and even China Central Television (CCTV)—renamed as China Global Television Network (CGTN) in late 2016. Of course international broadcasting (or mass media) are but one important public diplomacy channel and other instruments are also useful—like cultural and scientific exchanges of students, scholars, intellectuals and artists; participation in festivals and exhibitions; building and maintaining cultural centres (some of which teach languages); and establishing local friendship leagues or trade associations (Gilboa 2001: 4). It should also be emphasised that the particular choice and grading of instruments will depend on the actors and context involved. Unlike the overarching rules of traditional diplomacy, there are no set frameworks for public diplomacy, which respond to the particular interests and motivation of the state in question. Of course the motivation and manner in which emerging powers engage in public diplomacy, in order to achieve their respective interests, is an important area of enquiry. Furthermore what makes these newer voices similar is their shared interest in providing alternative perspectives and narratives, which challenge established third-party news players, across strategic regions of the world. (As will be discussed shortly, China’s role as an economic development partner as well as its assistance during the Ebola crisis also contributes to its somewhat positive ‘public’ image). At the same time public diplomacy is but one element of a larger toolkit available to states—that may also involve economic power or military strength—in order to help them achieve their interests.

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Case Study: China’s Public Diplomacy in Africa It is true that China’s interest in public diplomacy in Africa is nothing new, since it already established media links during the 1950s to 1970s (Wu 2016: 2). However its impulse today differs considerably from the nature of Cold War politics. Additionally China’s contemporary focus on image building—through instruments like media, arts, publishing, education and sports—is considered an integral part of its external relations, since it spends about $10 billion a year (as of 2015 estimates) on publicity abroad (Shambaugh 2015). Impetus There are two interlinked explanations for China’s current public facing engagements in Africa—one that is immediate to its ties with the continent and the other, part of a global process regarding China’s place in the world. First is the developing recognition that China–Africa relations need to expand from its high political and economic focus—that is more emphasis on links between publics. When China re-emerged from isolation post-1989, it found itself a pariah amongst Western partners, yet it gained more sympathetic support from the continent. Soon after, relations blossomed in the early 1990s, as Africa underwent economic reform programmes and China experienced its own domestic economic development, providing impetus to engage in closer ties (Taylor 2010: 22). As relations developed, it became increasingly structured, particularly through the advent of the FOCAC platform established in 2000. By the time the third FOCAC meeting took place in 2006, in Beijing, relations had intensified to the point that Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s largest foreign oil supplier (Alden 2007: 8). Yet relations at this point emphasised economic elements; while Africans not associated with the formal relationship, international media and other external partners to the continent, observed from the side-lines. At the same time concerns over the burgeoning ties elevated and characterised China’s engagement as ‘grabbing land, extracting resources and neo-colonialism in Africa’ (Chen 2013). Even the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, cautioned the continent from becoming merely a raw material supplier to China (Mail and Guardian 2006). There was a growing need for China to temper such concerns, particularly those emanating from the continent.

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A second impetus came from China’s domestic and international experience, as global criticism towards it mounted and brought considerable changes to its national image management abroad. China’s economic resilience was well noted following the 2008 financial crisis—which also provided it the opportunity and resources to further promote itself abroad, while other players pulled back—however the success also brought increased global attention towards it. More specifically was its hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, where global media and foreign activists sought to highlight China’s passive, non-interference stance and disregard for human rights violations in Sudan as well as Zimbabwe; moreover were the on-going ethnic conflicts occurring within China itself (Kornegay 2008: 3; Wu 2012). Despite China’s seeking to portray its rise in a positive light, the negative responses instigated reflection over the fact that foreign media had their own agenda and could not be relied upon to portray the ‘real’ China; and moreover, was the rising domestic debate on China’s own identity (Wu 2012: 9). In direct response China sent a special envoy to address the Darfur issue in Sudan and even began to communicate its stance on the issue in international media and press conferences. During December 2008 Li Changchun, the former propaganda chief for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), even stated that the Chinese media should strengthen their communication capacity both internally and abroad (Sun 2010: 54). By 2009 China had undertaken a global public diplomacy drive towards strategic regions of the world. For example, the later setting-up of CCTV broadcast centres in London, Moscow, Nairobi and Washington. It clearly recognised the need to communicate its own perspective to the world, as well as frame itself as non-threatening and responsible. FOCAC There is no coincidence that by 2009 at the fourth FOCAC held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt—there was stronger emphasis towards developing deeper cultural and people links between China and Africa. For instance, the proposal of a joint research and exchange programme that would provide a platform between Chinese and African think tanks and academics, in order to better cooperate on informing policies (Huynh 2012: 9; China 2009). Hence it was at this juncture that China began to emphasise relations with Africa away from solely the economic scope, in order to better fulfil its interests.

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By the 2012 FOCAC, platforms for people-to-people engagement had been established. For instance, the China-Africa Think Tank Forum (CATTF), institutionalised in 2011, which promotes knowledge exchange and a shared research agenda, between research institutes and scholars from both sides (April 2013: 45). Another example is the joint press exchange centre established in Beijing in 2012, created for African journalists visiting and reporting on China (Wu 2013: 5). Of course there was also the added presence of Chinese media outlets reporting on relations, from CCTV to China Daily’s Africa edition, which both launched in 2012. The purpose of establishing Chinese media presence in Africa—besides providing China’s view through content and programming—was to also increase actual coverage on the continent. There was explicit interest in expanding CCTV’s ‘English and Chinese broadcasts with footage from the continent to China, Africa and the rest of the world’ (Burning Splint 2011). The presentation of a more positive China–Africa link, as well as support for African stories in general, was welcome in contrast to the long-standing reporting on Africa as a destination of conflict, disease and poverty (Adekoya 2013; Lu 2017). Moreover CCTV’s relatively deep pockets allowed it to hire more local commentators, when presenting its reports and programmes (Marsh 2016: 67). At the same time no foreign engagement is static and other established players, such as CNN1 and BBC,2 have also introduced their own Africa-focussed reporting (in fact both the latter as well as CCTV, introduced their respective Africa programming in 2012). Likewise African voices are also challenging old narratives, such as the much-viewed 2009 TED Talk by Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, who warns against ‘the danger of a single story’. At the sixth FOCAC held in Johannesburg in late 2015, it was clear that China’s public diplomacy engagement was steadily expanding. The Johannesburg Action Plan outlined China’s pledge to offer 2000 scholarships at degree level, 40,000 vocational training opportunities and 1000 annual training opportunities for media professionals in China, as well as providing 200 annual visits to African scholars every year until the next FOCAC (Mthembu 2016: 4). Likewise China opted to draw on new developments in the relationship, to emphasise its goodwill. At the opening of the summit, President Xi Jinping made note of China’s assistance to Africa in combatting the 2014 Ebola outbreak, underlying ‘the bond of brotherhood between China and Africa in time of difficulty’

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(China 2015a). Moreover as China’s own economy underwent restructuring and global commodity prices fell, this particular FOCAC focussed less on China-Africa economic relations (that had been strongly affected3 ) and more on Africa’s industrialisation—including China’s assistance in transport infrastructure. As expected, developing people relations continued to receive attention at the seventh FOCAC, hosted in Beijing in September 2018. New elements included: China’s interest in establishing an Institute of African Studies, to upgrade the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan and the creation of a China–Africa media cooperation network. Furthermore more African culture centres were to be opened in China and vice versa, African education institutes were also encouraged to host Confucius Institutes and lastly, China welcomed Africa’s participation in Silk Road related exchanges. Initial Observations It is at this point that some reflections about China’s public diplomacy in Africa can be made. As the Ebola crisis and China’s support for African industrialisation show, the sources of China’s ‘soft’ influence branch beyond the traditional sources of values and culture. In fact a 2016 Afrobarometer survey found that even though the popularity of China’s development model fell behind the US, it was the most popular in terms of how its influence was being perceived on the continent (63% respondents); also, respondents felt that its development assistance was matching Africa’s needs (56% respondents) (Lekorwe, Chingwete, Okuru and Samson 2016). Of course Kurlantzick (2006: 1) stated more than a decade ago: China and its neighbo[u]rs enunciate a broader idea of soft power, the idea that soft power implies all elements outside of the security realm, including investment and aid.

At the same time the security realm could very well be included in China’s soft power toolbox—as its increased commitment to United Nations’ international peacekeeping in 2015 and pledged financial support towards African peace and security institutions, demonstrates (Rupiya 2017).

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Additionally the FOCAC platform itself is an important public diplomacy engagement, since official pronouncements and action plans on the relationship are made publicly available.4 The summits and ministerial meetings are also likened to ‘controlled events’, whose outcomes are predetermined for the world to witness (Wekesa 2014). In fact at the last FOCAC gathering, the UN was given a voice as Secretary General, António Guterres was invited to address the gathering. This reiterates the rhetoric that China, along with its BRI ambitions, a keen supporter of globalisation and multilateralism. Furthermore the FOCAC is no longer merely a bilateral interaction between China and the continent. Finally the platform and documentation provides an outline of the public diplomacy instruments at China’s disposal. For example the 2013–2015 Beijing Action Plan outlined six priority areas under people exchanges— that included: culture, education, press, publishing and media, exchanges between academia and think tanks and emphasis on athletes, women and youth (Li and Ronning 2013: 2). Yet formal processes do not necessarily capture all elements of China’s public diplomacy and further nuance should be considered in understanding its engagement in Africa. Another important component—that predates its 2009 ‘going global’ publicity strategy—is the Confucius Institutes set-up all over the world as important conduits between China and Africa, by bringing Chinese language and culture to locals’ doorsteps. The first institute on the continent was established in Nairobi University, Kenya in 2005 and a decade later, there was an estimated 42 institutes across 29 African countries (Sun 2015). (Notably more have been established by 2017.) Of course whether these institutes work in concert, across the continent, or become their own embedded entities (being hosted in local academic institutions), is an avenue for further exploration. There should be cognisance that China’s links to Africa still remain largely implemented at the bilateral level. For example China and South Africa co-hosted their own respective set of cultural events titled ‘the 2014 South Africa Year in China’, as well as ‘the 2015 China Year in South Africa’ (Graham 2015). Moreover a new ‘high-level’ people exchange platform, called the People-to-People Exchange Mechanism (PPEM), was launched in April 2017 in Pretoria, South Africa (although its scope is yet to be determined). The potential impact of nongovernmental initiatives, such as the role of Chinese firms, on China’s image should also be considered. For example when Chinese e-commerce Alibaba founder, Jack Ma, visited Kenya and Rwanda to seek business

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opportunities in July 2017, media reporting on his trip focussed equally on his pledged support for African entrepreneurs and youth, as well as wildlife conversation (KT Press 2017). It seems China too is reinforcing the notion that public diplomacy is no longer solely carried about by government officials.

Potential, Prospects and Challenges for an African Policy Towards China The main purpose of this section is introspective. It draws upon China’s public diplomacy experience in Africa in order to explore the ways that the continent could better connect its interests to China’s particular engagement. Moreover are the lessons that China’s experience provides for Africa’s own public diplomacy efforts. Finally this section will reemphasise the caution set out in the introduction, on the complexity of forming an African policy towards China. Instead as a highly heterogeneous continent, the most pragmatic approach would be to seek common positions—that are implementable—rather than a specific policy as an important starting point. Linking China’s Public Diplomacy and African Interests It is clear that China has the necessary will—along with the capacity and funds—to drive far-ranging publicity activities and such interests intersect with the continent, through platforms like the FOCAC. Still there is implication in the fact that China funds most of the peopleto-people projects, suggesting it holds a larger degree of autonomy in determining the nature and scope of such activities (Ampiah and Naidu 2008: 334). Meanwhile in contrast to China’s reach, is the financial trouble that saw the closing of the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s (SABC) bureaus—the country’s national public broadcaster—in strategic locations like Beijing, just two years after they had been opened (Kruger 2009). Building the foundation for public engagement first and foremost requires financial commitment and support, particularly from governments to kick-start the process. It is also worth interrogating how these links are structured, more specifically, China–Africa relations equate to one partner engaging bilaterally with more than fifty African states. Naturally forming a common African voice is more complex. This is notable in FOCAC side events

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that engage Chinese and African scholars and think tanks.5 It remains a challenge in tracking former African institutions and individuals who have attended such events, since participants change, according to host country invite lists, the individual institutions’ prerogative and the topic in focus. Hence there is less of an ‘institutional memory’ on whose attended, what was discussed and what has already been negotiated or declared by the African side, to date. More coordination and mapping of African institutions’ participation and collaborations with China could be made. (Still the question often reverts back to—who should be coordinating such efforts). More broadly, African states should be more aware of how China engages their neighbours. Ideally, they could share lessons on how to best negotiate with external players. Of course balancing China’s relative strength is the fact that Africans themselves are affecting, to a degree, the manner in which China can engage the continent. For example when President Xi undertook his first Africa tour in 2013, third-party media accused his delegation (that included businessmen) of buying ivory in Tanzania. This was later followed by media reports of Chinese citizen arrests for smuggling ivory in Kenya in 2014 (Kaigwa and Wu 2015). Parallel to these developments was online commentary about the illegal wildlife trade issue amongst Kenyan social media users, as well as national online petitions—particularly as wildlife tourism is an integral component of the country’s tourism (Kaigwa and Wu 2015). By May 2014 during his visit to Kenya, China’s Premier Li Keqiang pledged $10 million to support wildlife conservation in the country. This suggests China’s awareness of the potential reputational damage if it were to ignore the concerns emanating from African stakeholders. The issue remained an important component of side forums and civil society meetings in the lead-up to the sixth FOCAC in December 2015. Importantly, the issue was later inked into the FOCAC Action Plan (China 2015b): The African side highly appreciates that the Chinese government supports Africa in its efforts to protect wildlife resources. The two sides will strengthen cooperation in the area of wildlife protection, help African countries to improve the protection capabilities, build the capacity of environmental rangers, provide African countries with training opportunities on environmental and ecological conservation…

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This is not to say that African nations do not engage in their own public diplomacy drives—despite funding constraints. The editor of South Africa’s Ubuntu magazine, Clayson Monyela (2013: 10)—who happens to be a spokesperson at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)—explicitly pointed to former President Jacob Zuma’s call for ‘communication and marketing’ following the tragedy where South African soldiers died in the Central African Republic. There was a realisation that ‘…the minute you are elevated to a higher stature in international relations the brighter the spotlight on you’ (Monyela 2013: 10). Likewise the Burson-Marsteller Twiplomacy study (as of June 2016) revealed that African leaders are increasingly taking to Twitter to engage with social media users. In fact Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta was the most followed African leader in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017 (Lüfkens 2017). Moreover five African leaders made the top six most interactive policymakers on Twitter in the world that year, that included Paul Kagame (Rwanda president), Mapori Matata (DRC prime minister), Donald Tusk (the European Union Council president), Louise Mushikiwabo (Rwanda foreign minister) and Hanna Tetteh (Ghana foreign minister), respectively (Lüfkens 2017). Yet these examples reflect individual nations’ and leaders’ interests, not joint communication drives. Table representing the most followed African leaders on Twitter (as of mid-2016). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

@UKenyatta, Kenya president (1,444,730 m) @PaulKagame, Rwanda president (1,402,258 m) @PresidencyZA, South Africa presidency (678,249) @MBuhari, Nigeria president (531,563) @SAPresident, South Africa president (403,673) @StateHouseKenya, Kenya presidency (321,895) @NGRPresident, Nigeria president (245,051) @AMB_A_Mohammed, Kenya foreign minister (239,632) @JDMahama, Ghana president (217,470)

Source ‘Best connected African leaders on Twitter’, Bizcommunity, 2 June 2016, http:// www.bizcommunity.com/Article/410/669/145726.html

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The outstanding question is how are African public diplomacy interests seeking to co-brand and ensure respective publicity interests are advanced through China’s engagement. For instance, contrary to the notion that railway infrastructure in Africa is solely being built by China; Sanchez (2017) adds that the African side contributed about 45% of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. Hence more could be done to emphasise Africa’s ownership, achievements and role in these projects as well. Lessons for Africa’s Own Communication This paper has so far outlined China’s outreach towards Africa and explored some initial linkages on how continental partners could consider situating themselves within China’s drive. Another element to consider is some of the lessons China’s experience highlights for Africa’s own public diplomacy drive. There are two outstanding gaps in China’s communication links with the continent. Firstly while it is promoting narratives and images favourable to building relations, this does not necessarily equate with local views. There remain long-standing perceptions between both sides that impact public responses to new developments. This needs to be addressed from the bottom up. For example Paul Udoto (2012: 53) from the Kenya Wildlife Service remarked that Africa’s wildlife spectacle has been sustained by books, films and returning tourists, reinforcing the notion of a destination of abundant exotic wealth. Likewise, as in the case of South Africa, is a long-standing perception that Chinese goods are of inferior quality. This has been identified as a major challenge for Chinese businesses in Africa, including the brands that are nationally competitive back home (Xing and Li 2014). Secondly, despite the fact that China’s image draws from alternative forms of influence such as economic power, it is still required to find ways to engage with local values, language and culture. This is because a survey of perceptions in South Africa reveals that the public remains largely interested in China in economic terms and beyond that, emotive issues drive their knowledge on China (Alden and Wu 2016: 218–219). Such a news item in early 2017 included the smuggling of donkey hide from South Africa to China, a story that took place in the midst of a global discussion of China ‘fuelling’ the slaughter of donkeys in various markets, for medicinal purposes. Reporting in South Africa highlighted the criminal element of the trade. Indeed the story also necessitated Chinese officials to respond and distance the country from such criminal elements.

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Although illuminating both positive traits and challenges is necessary for relations to grow, the knowledge of locals on China and deeper public engagement is still lacking. China still faces ‘natural barriers’ (which includes understanding of local culture, language and religion) in its interactions with Africa (White and Alves 2006: 58). Likewise a South African official remarked in 2013 that the ‘venom between the two societies’ needed to be removed.6 This includes addressing the inherent biases that both sides may hold. For instance while China is offering scholarships to Africans, there have been concerns raised over whether Africans are even welcome to live and work in the country, beyond such organised programmes (De Wet 2015). These gaps highlight relevant lessons for African policymakers too. The continent should be engaging the Chinese public (as well as the growing Chinese diaspora in African nations) in order to reinforce and grow the strong political and economic ties. Moreover they too should promote the learning about China and more broadly Asia, a notable untapped region, whose engagement will likely increase with Africa. Indeed African studies, beyond bilateral links to China, are also beginning to grow within China itself (Li 2016). It is also important to note that some of China’s largest competitors in the world are building more nuanced understanding towards it. European and American universities and colleges are home to a notable list of Asia Studies courses and specifically China studies programmes (Eno 2012). Likewise is the Australian Centre on China in the World (CIW) that was established in 2010, this was a joint venture between the Australian National University and Australian Government, aimed at creating an interdisciplinary research institution to become a world-leading institution for Chinese Studies.7 Additionally like China in Africa, African policymakers are left with the challenge of engaging their own publics. Public diplomacy efforts directed inward are important in order to gain widespread support for high-level initiatives. This issue is particularly important for continental drives like the development initiative, African Agenda 2063 as well as the ACFTA. Without the participation of the private sector or civil society—and increasingly a youth demographic that has little recollection of historical China–Africa ties—the path towards building common African positions towards China (and other external partners) will remain amiss. Likewise a recent article titled ‘It’s time South Africa tuned into Africa’s views about its role on the continent’ highlights that perceptions towards South Africa

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itself, are at odds with its self-declared role on the continent (Schoeman, Kefale and Alden 2017). This suggests that communication could increase towards respective publics, as well as publics in the immediate region. Perhaps the deeper introspective question to ask is, beyond the calls for continental industrialisation and efficient transport links between African capitals, are African nations even ready for closer, physical integration with their neighbours? Likewise is Africa ready for ever-deepening links with China? The fact of the matter is different African governments share varying degrees of closeness and communication with their constituencies —and even different levels of embracing communication technologies. It is clear that more emphasis on bringing understanding between disparate societies is imperative; this includes engaging in difficult conversations about migration issues and xenophobia—before a truly African standing can be considered. To achieve this, more exchanges and platforms for discourse within the continent need to take place. As the public diplomacy literature and China case clearly reveal, public communication is largely a supplement to help a nation realise its national interests. The same can be said about respective African public diplomacy strategies. It begs the question whether they are better off utilising national branding and fostering relations for the benefit of individual states or, whether there are indeed areas of intersection, where joint promotion of interests are possible. Perhaps the latter aspect of building an image around joint interests would include the leading role of Regional Economic Communities and the African Union. Likewise African nations can learn from China and other emerging players on how to better take ownership of their own narratives—individually and collectively—in order to ensure that the continent is not reduced to a monolithic entity and destination. Finally, China’s experience also reveals positive lessons for African states on their external and intra-regional communication. Engagement strategies need to evolve along changing circumstances, as the examples of China’s response to the wildlife issue and the Ebola outbreak attests. The more static strategies are, the less relevant government relations with important domestic and external stakeholders become. Another lesson is that beyond viewing public diplomacy as a popularity contest, there are in fact unconventional sources of influence and nations need to experiment and explore what those elements—from historical narrative and unique attributes—are. Moreover are the many kinds of platforms that these attributes can be promoted on.

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Implications for a Common African Strategy Towards China As this book project seeks to interrogate the possibility of an African policy towards China, this chapter and the elements mentioned thus far, will help inform whether there is space for such a strategy. The public diplomacy instance reveals that China engages Africa as a continent as well as bilaterally—and is even able to evolve its engagement over time and context. There are also moving parts on the continent, since Africa is a compilation of unique identities and varying interests. It is for this reason that a pragmatic suggestion would be to formulate common continental (or regional) positions on issues of common interest, which is updated regularly, rather than drawing an overarching policy that could run the risk of disregarding nuances and differences. Efforts to formulate common African positions on specific issues have already taken place—and the lessons they offer are worth interrogation, beyond this chapter. For example, African countries have managed to identify their shared positions, through agreed principles of negotiation and a common set of interests, on issues at the multilateral level like climate change and UN reform (as encapsulated in the Ezulwini Consensus) (Zondi 2011: 4). Another example at the African Union (AU) level is the Common African Position (CAP), the continent’s narrative for what it would like to see included in the post-2015 development agenda, which was adopted in early 2014. The formulation of the position included consultations on six pillars8 or development goals that together, emphasised Africa’s priority for the eradication of poverty (Liberia 2015). Notably the CAP emphasised Africa’s own responsibility in its advancement. At the same time factors that impact the championing of common positions should be noted. The CAP instance highlights the importance of a shared institutional framework of norms, values as well as organisations— and actors that can champion and manage the process (this was led by the AU Commission and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) (Zondi 2014: 5). Still there is no agreement on how to achieve the development goals outlined, some are concerned that narrow metric targets do not bring about any real qualitative change (Zondi 2014: 6); while others view that there is simply no agreement on what the targets and milestones for achieving the pillars are (Hollander 2014). In any case, the success of such an African position depends on its ability to link to other negotiating structures in the Global South, especially those that are already gaining momentum (Zondi 2014: 6).

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The interest in formulating joint positions has not dissipated. In 2016 at the Africa Regional Meeting on Habitat III, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari called for a common African position on global issues, particularly on urbanisation, since African nations face similar challenges regarding security, inequality and urban settlements (Nigeria 2016). Certainly the continent has experience in formulating common positions, the specific challenge in this chapter case would be to amalgamate the shared and individual state interests, when engaging China. One recent development that may change the game is the drive to ‘deeply’ reform the AU, a process that began in mid-2016. The responsibility to come up with reform proposals was delegated to Rwandan President Paul Kagame and his pan-African task team, who drafted a report titled ‘The Imperative to Strengthen our Union’.9 The drive for reform proposals is in recognition that previous attempts were ineffective. Specifically linked to relations with external partners—besides the call to lessen the AU’s dependence on external funding—the report suggests that partnership summits convened by external parties (like the FOCAC), should be represented by a smaller delegation rather than all African states. This would include the current, former and incoming AU chairs, the AU Commission and the chairperson of the regional economic communities. This is a commendable approach that could potentially bring about a more unified African voice. However, no updates on this approach to partnership summits have taken place as of 2019. Only the AU is participating more deeply with the FOCAC than previously. While it appears more feasible to establish common positions rather than fixed policies, there remain impediments to achieving either. The challenges for a common African position towards external parties emanates from the continent itself and includes the issue of accountability, the lack of capacity and division between member states (Wu 2017). This division exists along many lines from the unique and differing experiences of North versus Southern Africa to consolidating different national interests. These different interests reinforce the favour of bilateral links with China rather than multilateral ties—and even at this level, there has disagreement over how China’s financial pledges (such as the $60 billion made available at the 2015 FOCAC) should be spent (Magistad 2017). Of course there are also varying degrees of historical relations with China, in comparison to the more recent AU and China linkages.

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As developments around the 2008 Olympics exhibited, China experienced a defining impetus to respond and provide its narrative to the world, particularly in the context of its rising global status. While in Africa, China had to learn to manage its own interests and had to eventually broaden its engagement beyond an economic lens. Perhaps the impetus for Africa to find a common voice is just over the horizon. The rigorous and challenging process of formulating common positions, could very well help build the necessary trust for an imagined common future between African nations. Apart from learning from previous attempts to drive common African positions, greater emphasis needs to be given to second-track processes (important conduits in relations), particularly continental drives that have built a foundation of understanding engagement towards China—even at the scoping or conceptual level. One example is the 2009 seminar titled ‘Taming the Dragon? Defining Africa’s Interests at the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation’ co-hosted by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in South Africa. The event produced a policy report10 and recommendations in the leadup to the fourth FOCAC in Egypt and provided ten recommendations related to economic cooperation, political relations, social development, international development as well as the role of China, FOCAC and the West in Africa (Adebajo and Fakier 2009). It is necessary to build on such initiatives—particularly as the content and impetus of relations have changed over time—and to learn from the impediments already identified. Moreover African institutions need to ensure that a repository of past events and discussions is created. As China’s activities expand on the continent, so it will be up to the continent to ensure that discussions and interests remain consolidated across platforms and activities—and as has been highlighted, this can no longer exist without the engagement with and support of, stakeholders outside formal discussions.

Conclusion This chapter has interrogated a relatively new area of China’s engagement in Africa that is public diplomacy. While this engagement is predominantly China driven, important lessons have been drawn for the thinking towards African positions on China. Formulating positions rather than policy has been selected here, in recognition of the moving parts that make up the relationship. In particular are the wide-ranging African

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states and interests that require a rigorous process to bring about closer agreement. It was highlighted that public diplomacy—as one element in a states toolkit for achieving its goals—is increasingly significant due to communication technologies and the rise of non-state actors. Notably the China-Africa relationship is not isolated from such trends too. The China experience, where it realised the need to emphasise its own narrative and perspectives following 2008 incidents and its advance away from purely economic emphasis, provides new thinking points for the continent; and in turn its own engagement with China. First China’s public diplomacy activities in Africa highlight its structural dominance, given that it funds and hence determines the agenda of most activities. While the African side is unable to match China’s capabilities, it can make sure there is more intra-communication and ‘institutional memory’ regarding the activities African participants engage in. (Often new participants attend exchanges and events with little knowledge of what was discussed or negotiated by former participants.) Of course the African side could engage more in the particular narratives that China draws upon when promoting the relationship, in order to ensure that it too, is promoted positively. At the same time it was noted that it is the very changes on the continent—including citizens voices, amplified by communication technology, on issues like illegal wildlife trade—and the growing interest in public engagement in selected African states have also affected how China engages. There is indeed potential in the use of communication technologies to counter physical barriers and emphasise the common interests of African nations (and civil society organisations), as well as bring African issues and concerns closer to the rest of the world—and vice versa. This is also a potential space for deeper political activism. At the same time social media is the product of how users utilise it and societies shape it—and there remain issues of access, varying degrees of political use and sometimes, even the amplification of differences rather than similarities, within and across nations (Kaigwa and Wu 2015). Of course this could change rapidly as citizens’ daily lives become increasingly integrated with technological advances. China’s public diplomacy experience in Africa has also sketched lessons for Africa’s own public engagement strategies. Both sides are still grappling with the long-standing respective public perceptions, which continue to impact relations. Moreover African nations’ communication towards China and other Asian partners remains minimal, as well as their

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efforts to learn more about the Asia region (in comparison to the China studies programmes available in places like the US or Australia). More urgently perhaps is the communication of African policymakers towards their own publics and the publics in their neighbourhood. Closer people engagement at the regional and continental level is necessary in order to gain widespread support—from civil society and even the private sector— towards realising common benefits and positions on pertinent issues. At the same time, the China case reminds that public engagement strategies cannot remains static and need to respond to new contexts. Moreover it is possible to draw on alternative and unique national attributes and history, as sources of image building (the popularity of China as a development partner, is a case in point). Finally the chapter drew on the pertinent question on the possibility of building a common African position towards China. It sought to explore examples where African positions on issues such as UN reform or the post-2015 development agenda were realised. Moreover it is the recent drive to deeply reform the AU, particularly on its negotiations with external partners. Indeed achieving positions are possible, however it is ensuring that commitment to such positions are lasting. What is needed is the building of trust between African states and regions. This starts through closer engagement between one another’s people. Furthermore is the practicality of interrogating, building from and including previous efforts in seeking common African positions towards China—specifically those at the public and second-track level. Only through the rigorous process of seeking and communicating about a common African position, where a shared future is imagined, no matter how much interests vary, can a policy towards China or any other partner be imagined.

Notes 1. Such as Inside Africa, African Voices and Marketplace Africa. 2. Such as Focus on Africa and even the Africa Today Podcast. 3. Media reports note that China-Africa trade fell by 38% and investment 40% during 2015. 4. See the FOCAC website: www.focac.org. 5. Some of which the author has attended during 2012–2015.

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6. Statement by a South African official at the South Africa–China Diplomatic Relations at 15 Years Ambassadorial Forum, hosted by AISA, DIRCO and the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Pretoria, 19 September 2013. 7. For more visit: Australian Centre on China in the World, http://ciw.anu. edu.au/about/. 8. They are: structural economic transformation and inclusive growth; science, technology and innovation; people-centred development; environmental sustainability; natural resources management and disaster risk management; peace and security and finally, finance and partnerships. 9. The report was released in early 2017 and can be found at: http:// www.gsdpp.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/ FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf. 10. For the full report visit: http://www.ccr.org.za/images/stories/Vol_32_ taming_the_dragon.pdf.

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Taylor, I. 2010. The forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC). Routledge: London and New York, NY. Udoto. P. 2012. ‘Wildlife as a lifeline to Kenya’s economy: Making memorable visitor experiences’, The George Wright Forum, 29(1): 51–58. Wekesa, B. 2014. ‘Whose event? Official versus journalistic framing of the fifth Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC V)’. Journal of African Media Studies, 6(1): 57–70. White, L and Alves, P. 2006. ‘China in Africa: A relationship of (Un) equals in the developing world’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 13(1): 55–62. Wiseman, G. 1999. “Polylateralism’ and new modes of global dialogue”. Reprinted in Jönsson, C. and Langhorne, R. (eds.): Diplomacy, 2004, Vol. III, Discussion Papers, No. 59, Leicester Diplomatic Studies, London: Sage: 36–57. Wu, Y. 2012. ‘The rise of China’s state-led media dynasty in Africa’, South African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper, 117. Wu, Y. 2013. ‘The role of public sentiment and social media in the evolving China-Africa relationship’, South African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper 134, January. Wu, Y and Alden, C. ‘BRICS’ public diplomacy and the nuances of Soft power’, South African Institute of International Affairs, 16 January 2014, http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/brics-public-diplomacy-andthe-nuances-of-soft-power, accessed: 20 January 2014. Wu, Y. 2016. ‘China’s media and public diplomacy approach in Africa: illustrations from South Africa’. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(1): 81–97. Wu, Y. 2017. ‘How the African union’s planned overhaul may affect its ties with China’. The Conversation, 23 February, https://theconversation.com/howthe-african-unions-planned-overhaul-may-affect-its-ties-with-china-73160, accessed: 23 February 2017. Xing, Z. and Li, J. 2014. ‘Connecting the dots in South Africa’. China Daily, Africa Weekly, 2–4 May. Zhang, Y. and Buzan, B. 2012. The tributary system as international society in theory and practice’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1): 12–16. Zondi. 2011. ‘Africa in multilateral negotiations: A critique of African common positions’ in Emerging Agents of Change? Africa and International Negotiations, Chatham House, Meeting Notes, 1 February: 4–5. Zondi, S. 2014. ‘On the future Africa wants: The common African position on the Post-2015 development agenda’. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Policy & Practice Brief, 32, September.

CHAPTER 10

The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model for the Future of Africa–China Relations? John Kotsopoulos

Introduction The trajectories of China and Europe in Africa differ profoundly. Europe’s history on the continent is a long and contested one, with a legacy that affects the continent to this day (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). China’s presence can also be traced back hundreds of years, but is less encumbered by history. Its engagement with the continent during the Cold War was a largely ideological one. In the twenty-first century, the prodigious deepening of relations with the continent has been driven more by economic motivations. The rise of China in Africa, coupled with Europe and the European Union’s already prominent position on the continent, has spawned a multitude of comparisons and contrasting interpretations. Many, at least from a Western perspective, have viewed the exponential growth of China’s trade and economic presence on the continent with suspicion (Fioramonti and Kimunguyi 2011). A persistent interpretation has been

J. Kotsopoulos (B) Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_10

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that China’s interest in the continent merely represents another “scramble for Africa” and the continent’s ample resources. Implied is that China is encroaching on Europe’s historic sphere of influence, obliging the West to stop taking the relationship with Africa for granted (White 2014). In contrast, another perspective sees China as representing the growth of new trade and political partnerships between actors from the Global South. By bolstering alternative relationships, the Global South—including Africa—extricates itself from dependence on its former colonisers. Chinese engagement on the continent has also taken a different form from the EU’s historically entrenched aid and trade approach. Chinese infrastructure investments, for instance, have unsettled conventional European thinking about aid and development on the continent (Grimm and Hackenesch 2017: 554). Despite these binary interpretations of China and the EU in Africa, some scholars and policymakers have recognised the complementarity of these two actors’ differing approaches to the continent (Wissenbach 2011). By 2007 discussions had begun about the “trilateralisation” of the EU–China–Africa relationship. This initiative, however, was met with suspicion within parts of the EU, most prominently the European Parliament, but also in China, where misgivings centred around what was perceived as an attempt to impose European leadership, norms and values on China’s foreign affairs (Carbone 2011: 215). Another notable characteristic of scholarship about the EU and China on the continent is the lack of attention on Africa’s agency. This gap has gained wider prominence as scholarship on African in international relations has grown (Brown 2012; Blaauw 2016; Harman and Brown 2013; Abrahamsen 2017; Cornelissen et al. 2012; Odoom and Andrews 2017). This paper will contribute to redressing the absence of understanding of Africa’s active role in its relationships with the EU and China. Much of the literature places the EU or China, or both, as the central subjects of the analysis and takes for granted the range of African responses within these partnerships. Little has been attributed to the cause and effect of a reciprocal partnership in which Africa is also a central, if weaker, actor. Such an approach is important in order to better understand how interregional partnerships such as that between the European Union (EU) and Africa are markedly changing. Where and how, for instance, does Africa assert itself in its relationships with China and the EU? What space exists within these two sets of asymmetrical relationships? Is there anything inherently different about either of the relationships that provides for

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different manifestations of African agency? And if so, can such a model be replicated elsewhere? The focus of this paper will be on the frameworks through which Africa interacts with China and the EU, respectively. The argument of the paper is that the architecture of the EU–Africa and EU–China relationships provides different openings for manifestations of African agency. Furthermore, and somewhat counter intuitively considering how China’s engagement is often posited as an indicator of the future and the continued growth of South–South relations (Vickers 2013), it is Africa’s interregional partnership with the EU which often provides more space for agency, mitigating some of the asymmetries between the two actors. This occurs because the EU–Africa relationship engages at the multilateral level through the AU, giving room to the AU to play a lead organisational role, but also obliging AU member states to act consistently in a more systematic manner. The comparable framework for Africa–China multilateral relations, FOCAC, remains largely a form of “quasi interregionalism” (Hänggi 2006: 42) and is in fact more bilateral in nature. In terms of a model for the trilateralisation of the EU–Africa–China relationship, the geopolitical currents which favour South–South relations, China’s predilection for bilateralism, and historical sensitivities from both China and Africa concerning European leadership, all conspire to limit the plausibility of a comprehensive pursuit of this specific channel of interregional interaction. That said, China’s still burgeoning and multifaceted investments in Africa, often in unstable areas, require protection. Sustainability and protection invariably mean an improvement in governance and stability—the same things that the EU also preaches. Here, new and more realistic shoots of cooperation could form. The paper will be organised as follows: the first section will delve into the dynamics of Africa–China relations, including a particular focus on the terms of multilateral (AU to China) engagement between the two sides. The following section will explore EU–Africa relations, with a particular focus on the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES). Mention will also be made of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the stress they have placed on elements of the EU–Africa multilateral relationship. An analytical section will follow outlining the utility of emulating some of the JAES in FOCAC, especially in the context of enhancing African agency and redressing the asymmetries of the relationship. This will be followed by a brief exploration of trilateral relations between Africa–China–EU.

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Africa–China Relations The relationship between Africa and China has been marked by rapid growth of trade since the early 2000s. This has come not only via China’s massive economic expansion and the resultant growth in its demand for resources, but also through the beginnings of an “African renaissance”, comprised of notable strides in economic growth as well as initiatives to improve regional integration and make strides in areas such as governance and democracy. This period has seen China move from a historically political actor in Africa—especially in the post-World War II period when Chinese engagement with the continent was driven by South–South solidarity and anti-colonialism—to an economic one, representing the largest single trade partner of many African states (Sun 2014: 6). Chinese economic engagement has manifested itself in particular ways. The caricature of China solely interested in Africa’s resources neglects the vast amount of infrastructure development and alternative financing models through which China conducts its business on the continent. These alternative methods, relative to the Western approach, have been enthusiastically embraced by many countries. As former Senegalese President Wade put it: China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronising post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organisations and non-governmental organisations. In fact, the Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa. (Wade 2008)

Chinese cooperation is also notably less about the European insistence on “shared values” between itself and Africa, but instead on “mutual respect” (Lirong 2011: 33). This, to some, might resonate better than aspiring to shared values in a historically asymmetrical relationship dominated by the Europeans. “I find the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former subjects” (Mogae Botswana in Carbone 2011: 207). Related is China’s historic emphasis on the principle of noninterference. This policy stems back to the 1950s and is part of the country’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. These principles include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (China 2017). The policy,

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which China still adheres to, was meant to engage countries in Asia as well as show solidarity with the decolonising states of Africa by placing emphasis on territorial sovereignty defined in “the most rigid and traditional Westphalian terms” (Iyasu 2013). Furthermore, while non-interference clearly stemmed from a political and security-related standpoint, the principle was easily extendable as a modus operandi for China’s trade and investment dealings in Africa (Iyasu 2013). The principle of non-interference corresponds with the African continent’s strong adherence to the principles of state sovereignty since independence (Grovogui 2002). This contrasts with the EU’s historically more meddlesome approach to its relationship with Africa, particularly through “conditionality”. The imposition of conditionality was channelled through the EU’s trade and aid relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), manifesting itself explicitly by the Lomé III Convention with respect to human rights, and soon after encompassing other areas such as the rule of law, good governance and supervision of EU financial assistance (Hurt 2003: 163–164). By contrast, China’s only ostensible condition on its relations with African countries is recognition of the “One China” policy. Beyond the political and into trade—the crux of China’s current relationship with the continent—the numbers emphatically reinforce the country’s prominence on the continent. Chinese trade with Africa has grown exponentially over the past 20 years. According to the IMF, in 1995 Western economies accounted for 90% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports. Today, China, Brazil and India account for more than 50% of that market, with China representing half of that figure (Chen and Nord 2017: 1). Similarly, by 2014 China was the single largest source of Sub-Saharan Africa’s imports (Chen and Nord 2017: 1). The dynamics of the trade relationship remain largely that of Africa exporting primary resources to China (70% of total exports) and China sending manufactured goods and machinery (>90%) (Chen and Nord 2017). Another important area of Chinese economic influence in Africa is in loans and financing. From 2000 to 2014, China extended almost $85 billion in loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises (Hwang et al. 2016). Most centred around three areas: infrastructure, mining and energy. More than 50% of these loans went to five countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 2015 FOCAC summit reinforced China’s commitment to expanding its lending in Africa, by promising to triple its financial pledges up to $60

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billion. The composition of these pledges was particularly noteworthy, with a shift from historically concessional loans to a mix of grants and zero-interest loans ($5 billion), commercial financing ($20 billion) and concessional loans ($35 billion) (Sun 2015). The 2018 FOCAC again pledged another $60 billion, though this time with 25% of commitments in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. This amounts to $5 billion a year and would place China as the third largest donor to Africa (after the USA and EU) (Prizzon 2018). Likewise, the rise of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—hardly mentioned at the 2015 summit but central to the 2018 summit—also heralds a phase of extensive Chinese investment on the continent. Notable in this exploration of China–Africa relations is their bilateral nature. While the regular FOCAC summits provide a highly visible opportunity for African heads of government and state to meet their Chinese equivalents collectively, the statistics show that China’s engagement is almost completely on a country to country basis. That said, the AU’s presence has progressively increased (Wu 2017). The AU became a full member of FOCAC in 2011, with its chairperson now present at FOCAC summits. The Chinese opened a permanent mission to the AU in 2015 and the AU reciprocated with the opening of its mission to China in 2018. An important symbol of the rising prominence of the relationship is the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, designed and built as a gift from China. Support for the work of the AU has been expressed in the various declarations attached to the most recent FOCAC summits. The form of support, however, while comparably more prominent at the last two summits (2015, 2018) remains arguably vague. The 2015 FOCAC Johannesburg Declaration confidently declared: “We [China-Africa] support strengthened South-South cooperation and are convinced that China-Africa cooperation is a model manifestation of this” (FOCAC 2015). Yet a comparison of the 2016–18 Johannesburg Action Plan with the 2019–21 Beijing Plan of Action reveals almost identically vague commitments to the AU. The former states: “The Chinese side will further support the capacity building of the African Union and sub-regional organizations in Africa in various forms, such as through human resources development” (FOCAC 2015). The latter summit declares: “China will continue to engage with the African Union and sub-regional organizations of Africa through various consultations and dialogues to strengthen communication over the economic development of Africa and its sub-regions and important regional issues. China

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will continue to support the capacity building of the African Union and Africa’s sub-regional organizations” (FOCAC 2018). This hardly represents a profound change in the three years between summits. Moves towards streamlining the way in which Africa engages with China (and other prominent partner countries like Japan) at a multilateral level have been initiated. Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s 2017 report on reforming the AU proposed several steps to improving African coherence in summits, especially where the AU plays less of a prominent organisational role. The report recommended that in “partnership summits convened by external parties” Africa should be represented by a troika of current, former and incoming AU chairpersons, plus the AU Commission chairperson and a chairperson of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). These summit interlocutors should be present rather than “all [African] countries” as has hitherto been the case (Kagame 2017b). This attempt to create a more coherent African voice vis-à-vis China is not unprecedented. Prior to the formalisation of FOCAC, some countries (including Ethiopia, Mauritius and Madagascar) had pushed for a joint group exchange with China (Grimm 2012b). The persistence of bilateral engagement over a type of “quasi interregionalism”—e.g. third country to regional organisation—has had some demonstrable consequences. One is the general lack of African state capacity to provide follow-up mechanisms for FOCAC commitments. According to Sven Grimm, only South Africa and Ethiopia have some institutional capacity for monitoring progress and planning ahead (Grimm 2012b). Such a shortcoming risks perpetuating the already asymmetric nature of the Africa–China relationship, especially since China is endowed with a comprehensive bureaucratic architecture designed for specifically around FOCAC follow-up. Indeed, “the African side appears to be mostly reactive to Chinese proposals, including draft Action Plans for the triennial FOCAC meetings” (Grimm 2012b). The African side has pushed for the institutionalisation of FOCAC in recent years (Li et al. 2012: 35). The changes envisioned in the Kagame report also include improved self-sufficiency for an African Union which in 2016 depended on donor funding for almost 75% of its budget and more than 90% of the AU Commission’s programming (Kagame 2017a: 13). Coupled with the ambition to address the lack of coordination and monitoring capacity of Africa vis-à-vis China, speculation is growing about what the future of FOCAC holds. Will the AU eventually usurp the role of

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the African ambassadors in Beijing, especially with its new mission there? What consequences will these changes have on the dynamics of a South– South but still asymmetrical relationship? Can the imbalance be mitigated by better coherence and less dependence from the African side? These questions form a timely link to the, ironically, renewed relevance of the EU–Africa relationship. While the historically unencumbered Chinese have “won” the ideational battle of winning hearts and minds (at least symbolically) in Africa, the EU model in fact posits plenty of “enabling factors” which exceed the limitations of FOCAC and correspond closely to the Kagame report’s aspirations for the rationalisation of Africa’s multilateral relationships. This idea of the EU–Africa partnership as a potential model for emulation promotes a new avenue for analysing the future of EU–Africa– China, as well as accounting for possible spaces for African agency in the continent’s relationship with China (Mohan and Lampert 2013). This approach also circumvents the now well-trodden analyses on the EU and China’s contrasting interests and fortunes on the continent (Mawdsley 2008; Ampiah and Naidu 2008; Le Pere 2007). Some interpretations of the EU in Africa present the EU as a normative power or enabler of African agency (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008). Others are highly critical of the EU’s self-styled force for good on the continent (Langan 2011). The remainder of this section seeks not to establish the moral position of the EU—despite so much of the Europe and China in Africa debate treading this line—but instead to demonstrate how the partnership facilitates a particular type of interaction.

EU–Africa Relations The focus in this section will start with the political framework of EU– Africa relations. However, analysis of EU–Africa relations cannot neglect the trade and aid dimension. The analysis will therefore also touch on the EPAs which, whatever their utility, have caused controversy and sullied some of the greater goodwill surrounding efforts to make the relationship a less asymmetrical one. It was not until the turn of the twenty-first century that attempts were made to establish a multilateral and explicitly political relationship outside the traditional EU–ACP framework. The first manifestation of this was the 2000 “Africa-Europe Summit” in Cairo. Attended by 40 heads of government and state, the summit reflected the perpetually

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contradictory nature of Europe and Africa’s centuries old relationship. On the one hand, Algeria’s President Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika praised the most “profound discussions” between the two sides since the 1960s (Menaker, 4 April 2000). The Nigerian President, Olesegun Obasanjo, added that the fates of Europe and Africa were “inseparable” (Menaker, 4 April 2000). On the other, many African leaders expressed concern about Europeans continuing to dictate the terms of the relationship, particularly with respect to the prioritisation of governance and democracy issues over development. Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi—in his first major appearance since his international rehabilitation—said, “stop looking at us as slaves…we need water pumps, not democracy” (Agence France Presse 2000). Lesotho Foreign Minister, Thomas Thabane: “Europeans must agree that the time has come when the relationship of master and dependent ends once and for all…It is time for Europeans to help us get out of this cycle of dependence” (Hassan, 5 April 2000). The summit format was less interregional in nature at that time, with the weakened Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its nadir (Kufuor 2005) and the 1999 Sirte Declaration already having signalled the intention to establish the African Union in its place. The primary output was the Cairo Declaration, a 15 page document identifying areas of mutual understanding and agreement regarding the economic, governance and development challenges facing Africa, as well as the obligations of the EU and the international community towards the continent (Cairo 2000). The main outputs of the first summit, the Cairo Declaration and the Cairo Plan of Action, gradually faded from attention. One scholar called it a symbolic agreement, lacking “teeth” and ill-defined in terms of its relationship with the major financial driver of the EU–African relationship, the Cotonou Agreement (Olsen 2006). A Portuguese Foreign Ministry official presents during the Declaration negotiations dubbed it “a Christmas tree agreement”, full of tempting ornaments but ultimately not much deliverable substance (EU official 8 (Portuguese Presidency), December 2010). Turbulent years followed, including the indefinite “postponement” of the EU–Africa summit in 2003 because of persistent tensions concerning the presence of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. The turning point was 2006, the same year of the launch of the first heads of government level FOCAC. The EU had presented its “EU Strategy for Africa” (European Commission, 12 October 2005), but in an emphatic show of African agency and resistance, the strategy was rejected.

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It was heavily criticised for not accounting well enough for African opinions (Sherriff and Kotsopoulos 2014). The EU’s reaction was interesting. It could have chosen to maintain its position—after all, actors such as China and the USA would probably not have accepted the actor their strategy was targeted at rejecting or endorsing it. Instead, at an EU–Africa troika ministerial meeting in late 2005, the two parties agreed to “transform [the 2005 strategy] into a joint Africa-EU Strategy” (Council of the European Union, 2 December 2005). The result was the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The JAES created the framework through which the EU and Africa conduct their relations (23 April 2007: 13). At the heart of the JAES framework is an enhanced political partnership with new onus on joint responsibility and ownership, affording both the AU and EU an opportunity to address differences and expand the scope of their cooperation into less traditional areas such as science and technology and information technology. The Strategy heralded the formalisation and regularisation of bureaucratic engagement between the EU and AU. This engagement comes at several levels, including the intergovernmental level, the EU to AU Commission level and a third level comprising other related entities such as the PanAfrican Parliament (PAP) and European Parliament (EP), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009). Another important milestone has been the change of the name of the triennial summit from “EU-Africa” to “African Union-European Union”. This “reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor that is becoming difficult to circumvent when engaging Africa” (Mattheis and Kotsopoulos 2017). It is also another tangible effort to ensure the elevation and prominence of the AU. The JAES has of course not been without growing pains. The aforementioned levels of engagement inevitably added layers of complexity to the relationship. The first review of the JAES indeed revealed issues with the “Troika format (as the main body for political guidance); the less than optimal levels of ownership and involvement of key players such as Member States and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and the insufficient link between the (technical) expert work of the JEGs with (political) decision-making processes” (Bossuyt and Sherriff 2010). Institutionalisation also had the unintended consequence of marginalising the political dimension of the relationship. The “results oriented approach” (General Secretariat of the Council 2014: 1) leaves less space for the sometimes intangible and slow outcomes of political discussion.

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The JAES negotiators had in fact envisioned political engagement as a central element of the framework. This was to be the opportunity, it was hoped, for the EU and Africa to begin to transcend the asymmetry and predictability of their relationship by engaging on political issues of common concern “beyond Africa” (23 April 2007: 23). While this type of engagement has taken place at the EU to AU level, it has been less evident at the official level where RECs and other bodies have been less engaged in the implementation of the JAES (Bossuyt and Sherriff 2010: 7). These challenges have precipitated a series of reforms, streamlining the many commitments. By the time of the latest summit in 2018, the priorities were listed as • Investing in people—education, science, technology and skills development; • Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance; • Migration and mobility; • Mobilising Investments for African structural sustainable transformation (AU–EU 2017: 4) On the trade and aid side of the relationship, the EPAs have been a receptacle for controversy and in many instances perpetuated negative and even neocolonial stereotypes of Europe in Africa (Langan 2018b). The EU’s drive to adhere to a 2007 WTO deadline for the end of the preferential tariff treatment waiver for products coming from the ACP caused various points of contention. For one, the EU imposed its own regional groupings in Africa for the purpose of creating reciprocal trade agreements. Admittedly, the pastiche of regional economic communities with overlapping members states posed challenges for coherent free trade negotiations. Still, the European imposition belied the spirit of “partnership” so touted in other frameworks of the broader EU–Africa relationship (including the JAES) and imposed new obstacles to regional economic integration (Krapohl and Van Huut 2019: 15). In addition, the push for reciprocal trade put into jeopardy tariff revenue generation—one of the primary revenue sources for many African states. The premature dismantling of tariff regimes, the argument goes, would in fact undermine nascent industries and sources of livelihood (Langan 2018a: 141–142).

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China–Africa and the EU Approach? Are then components of the EU–Africa relationship, warts and all, worthy of emulation in the case of Africa–China relations? The relative complexity of EU–Africa relations could in fact an advantage for both Africa and China at different levels. With respect to China’s interests and its ostensible aversion to the politicisation of its international relations, the JAES model could afford it with a controlled degree of political engagement wrapped safely within an institutional framework. This would be further insulated by the levels—intergovernmental, Commission and official— which feed into the JAES model. In the case of EU–Africa, much of the more overtly political dimension is “checked” via the intergovernmental process. And while the JAES seeks to eventually bring better mutual understanding to EU–Africa relations, summits at the intergovernmental level still afford leaders—particularly those in Europe less sensitive to the historical dimensions of the relationships or those in Africa willing to conjure up the past for their political ends—the chance to slow movement outside of the norm. This is useful for China as well, since African leaders at FOCAC have yet to make any overt criticisms, even in instances where African NGOs may have wanted a sterner message conveyed, such as concerning trade and dumping (Tran 2012). Furthermore, a mutual strategy like the JAES allows China to recognise and respond to the 2017 Kagame reform proposals for an enhanced presence for the AU in the continent’s partnerships with third countries. Already, the 2015 and 2018 FOCAC summits committed China to more support of the AU. This is on top of China’s grand gesture of fully financing and building a 200 million USD new headquarters for the AU in Addis Ababa. Giving the AU a lead role in conducting the institutional dimension of Africa’s side of the relationship would allow the continent to create an organ equivalent to China’s full time dedicated units for FOCAC. This obviously would begin to address a structural asymmetry within FOCAC. The AU presence is important, potentially, for Africa in that it allows for organisational coherence. With coherence also come improved opportunities for agency. Coordination and solidarity have always been negotiation strengths of weaker actors such as Africa vis-à-vis the EU (Zartman 1971). The AU also provides a degree of “symbolic power” and international visibility (Moolakkattu 2010: 152–153). This has been recognised by actors such as the EU who have embraced the AU’s

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functional and symbolic importance and, as a result, channelled funding and programming initiatives through it (e.g. African Peace and Security Architecture). Furthermore, emulating the JAES would result in the broadening of points of engagement between China and Africa. Increasing points of engagement, while potentially risking more strain on resources, also affords new opportunities for influence—and by extension agency. Africa gains a vehicle for proposing dialogue, consultation and further collaboration with China rather than playing a reactive role as some have characterised its current engagement in FOCAC (Grimm 2012a). Another, arguably more sensitive area for both China and Africa is the role of civil society and NGOs in the relationship. Although plenty of criticism has been levied towards China from African civil society (French 2014), it is questionable how much of this less sanguine dimension of the relationship makes its way into official discussions. FOCAC has organised civil society meetings on the margins of the larger summit, but even these have been criticised as demonstrating the distance between the purpose of Chinese and African civil societies (Yazini 2009). The EU–Africa partnership has also suffered from weaknesses in civil society engagement. Engagement between the AU and African civil society has been criticised for the lack of transparency concerning some of the civil society groups involved—a reflection of larger continental issues concerning the freedom of civil society. Other criticism has concerned overly influential Western presence in African NGOs (from funding to organisations being headquartered in Europe). However—and importantly—the JAES framework has institutionalised civil society exchange through the Africa–EU Civil Society Forum, which obliges the two sides to regularly before summits and which is organised through the AU’s African Economic Cultural and Social Council (ECOSOCC) and the European Civil Society Steering Group.

EU–China–Africa Finally, where do we place the EU–China–Africa relationship? What is its potential, especially in light of previous failed attempts to trilateralise the relationship? This section will explore the genesis of these first attempts and then proceed with exploring dimensions of EU–China cooperation which could be sustainable with respect to Africa.

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Although the FOCAC summits had begun in 2000, the first two were held at the ministerial level. It was the 2006 FOCAC summit, hosted in Beijing and attended by 35 African heads of government or state which emphatically signalled the elevation of Africa–China relations to hitherto unprecedented levels. This new prominence of China led many to interpret its presence on the continent as one directly threatening European interests. China was “winning” in Africa (Moorcraft 2007). So compelling was this narrative, that the EU’s subsequent actions in Africa were seen by many as motivated by China’s newfound prominence on the continent. Yet, such an easy caricature belied the complexity of decision-making and institutional change within an organisation as complex and multilayered as the EU. Carbone argues that the EU’s policy towards Africa in fact was driven by “institutional dynamics and the EU’s ambition to assert itself as a global actor” (Carbone 2011: 204). Moreover, Grimm and Hackenesch show that China’s presence in Africa differs by country, implying that there is no one coherent “threat” which could motivate EU action on the continent. Instead, different cases in different countries posit challenges but also influences and even complementarity of approaches between the EU and Africa (Grimm and Hackenesch 2017). As for the trilaterlisation of the relationship, at the 2006 EU–China summit, a commitment was made to create a “structured dialogue” on Africa (Joint Statement 2006). But the European Commission’s attempts at proposing a plan of action through a Communication to the European Parliament and Council entitled “The EU, Africa and China: Towards Trilateral Dialogue and Co-Operation” (European Commission 2008), were rebutted. Strong criticism came from the Parliament, which did not want what it perceived was a compromising of the EU’s commitment to human rights and democracy in Africa (Carbone 2011: 212–213). The Chinese side was also less than enthusiastic, with a sentiment that the EU was attempting to “socialise” the country into Western values that the EU would drive: “the current focus on coordinating approaches to aid policy – albeit selectively – does not do justice to the possibilities encapsulated in South-South cooperation” (Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009: 5). The end result was the quiet demise of further formal engagement on trilateralisation, even if in practice the relationship already contained trilateral elements (Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009: 5; Stahl 2014).

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Conclusion The way in which Africa interacts with the EU and China differs on many levels, even if the thematic areas of interaction—development, aid, political—are shared. Apart from the obvious difference between a multilateral institution such as the EU and a unitary one like China, there is also the way in which “Africa” manifests itself. Here, a comparison between the EU and China in Africa can be made vis-à-vis summitry. FOCAC is a decidedly bilateral process of engagement between Africa and China, with sporadic multilateral engagement from the African side towards China. The architecture of FOCAC, for instance, lacks a bureaucratised means of consistent engagement between the parties (Grimm 2012b). Where there are instances for African interregional coordination, they stem from Chinese infrastructure investments which touch regions, such as the East African rail initiative. That said, FOCAC has taken on a highly symbolic importance in Africa, treated in a different manner than the more wary, even if equally important, engagement between the EU and Africa. The paper has demonstrated that the bilateral approach and the structural nature of FOCAC preclude the type of collective input which could lend new opportunities for African agency in its relationship with China. After all, despite the dramatic growth of China–Africa relations, and burgeoning South–South relations globally, relations remain asymmetric. Despite tremendous strides, Africa remains the decidedly weaker party, as it is in its relations with the EU. It is here that the counter-intuitive argument of this paper applies. Despite an acceptance that Europe’s influence in Africa may be waning in relative terms, and in spite of an understanding that North–South relations come with historical baggage that cannot be neglected or downplayed (not least because of controversial initiatives like the EPAs), elements of the historic relationship are in fact still of interest. The JAES—for all its shortcomings and potential permutations in the yet unknown Post-Cotonou EU–Africa environment (Carbone 2018)— provides “space” for African agency, chiefly by elevating the role of the AU as the continent’s chief negotiator and representative. This elevation of the AU is also in accordance with the 2017 Kagame report on rationalising Africa’s partnerships and strengthening the AU. While emulating a model with a European dimension might not be de rigeur, the pragmatic case for taking the best of the EU–Africa partnership is compelling.

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Index

A Africa, 2–27, 32–54, 57–59, 61, 62, 65–79, 84–86, 88, 90, 92–97, 99, 107–109, 111, 114–116, 118, 123, 126–132, 135, 138, 142, 145, 147–150, 152–155, 163–170, 175–181, 184, 189–191, 193–207, 215–229 Africa-China, 7–9, 12–16, 20, 22, 27, 32, 57, 61, 71, 72, 76, 77, 84, 165, 166, 168, 175, 179–181, 217, 221, 226, 228 Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), 164 African agency, 2, 7–9, 14, 15, 17–19, 22, 24, 25, 109, 110, 126, 153, 166, 217, 222, 223, 229 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 18, 108, 111 African culture, 170, 196 African diaspora, 87 African diplomacy, 34, 35, 37, 42, 46

African leaders, 4, 14, 17, 40, 128, 132, 154, 200, 223, 226 African nation, 85, 112–114, 117, 130, 131, 164, 166, 169, 175–177, 179, 180, 200, 202, 203, 205–207 African National Congress (ANC), 38, 45, 46 African nationalism, 86 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 39, 49 African policy, 7, 9, 12–22, 24–26, 153, 170, 178–180, 190, 198, 204 African priorities, 2, 127 African renaissance, 14, 26, 218 African summits, 35 African Union (AU), 2, 3, 6–10, 14–17, 20–26, 31, 33–37, 39, 40, 42, 45, 48–52, 61, 65, 72, 74, 76, 109, 110, 114, 127, 128, 131, 147–149, 152, 154, 155,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation, International Political Economy Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6

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236

INDEX

163, 177, 203–205, 208, 217, 220, 221, 223–227, 229 Africa policy, 17, 107, 126, 127, 135, 147, 165–167, 178 Africa rising, 116, 118, 122, 124, 177 Africa’s China policy, 12, 177 Africa summits, 1, 2, 10 Afro-Asia Solidarity Conference, 60 Afro-optimism, 14 Afro-pessimism, 14 Agenda 2063, 3, 7, 12, 14, 15, 20–26, 108, 128, 163, 166, 202 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), 44, 46–50, 53 AU Constitutive Act, 73 AU summit, 40

B BAPA+40, 108 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 4–6, 25, 44, 47, 163–165, 180, 197, 220 Brand South Africa, 11 Brazil/Russia/India/China/South Africa (BRICS), 39, 44–50, 54, 63, 78, 88, 127, 164

C China, 1–27, 31–37, 39, 41–44, 46–48, 51–53, 57–59, 61–79, 84, 88–91, 93, 99, 107–109, 111, 122, 124–130, 132, 135–156, 163–184, 189–199, 201–209, 215–222, 224, 226–229 China-Africa, 6–9, 32–34, 41, 53, 79, 80, 126, 127, 129, 138, 147, 149, 153, 154, 163, 166, 170, 176–180, 184, 189, 190, 195, 196, 198, 202, 207, 208, 220, 229

China-Africa cooperation, 6, 126, 163, 164, 166, 220 China policy, 13, 18, 165, 166, 176–180 China’s Africa policy, 12, 15, 17, 18, 22, 27 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 89, 139, 194 Civilizational-state, 171 Civil Servant Exams, 173 Colonial, 2, 59, 84, 86, 92, 93, 95, 177 Combative Ontology, 60, 77 Communication, 19, 89, 146, 148, 151, 183, 190–192, 194, 200, 201, 203, 207, 220, 228 Communist Party of China (CPC), 16, 146, 173, 184 Confucius Institutes, 11, 196, 197 Constructive agency, 164, 165 Continental diplomacy, 31 Cotonou Agreement, 223 Cultural identity, 85, 167 Cultural system, 172 Culture, 37, 72, 99, 109, 131, 152, 164, 165, 167, 169–172, 174, 175, 179, 191, 196, 197, 201, 202 D Decolonial, 8, 60, 99 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 38, 39, 46, 200, 209 Dependency, 34, 40, 77, 84, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 109 Development, 2–6, 8, 10, 13–16, 21–24, 26, 31, 32, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 53, 58, 60, 61, 65–70, 72–75, 79, 84–86, 88, 90–93, 96, 99, 107–109, 111, 112, 117, 122, 126–132, 135, 139–144,

INDEX

146, 148, 150–152, 155, 163– 165, 177, 184, 191–193, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 204–206, 208, 209, 216, 218, 220, 223, 225, 229 Development cooperation, 4, 8, 124, 125, 127, 129, 130 Development finance, 2, 8, 108, 109, 111, 125, 130, 132 Diplomatic tracks, 3

E Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 36, 37, 52, 87, 217, 222, 225, 229 Emerging economies, 14, 130 Emerging powers, 13, 26, 32, 33, 35, 50, 51, 53, 62, 63, 69, 192 Epistemicides, 59, 60 Epistemic injustice, 59, 60 EU-Africa, 9, 217, 222–227, 229 Euro-American, 85–87, 90, 93 Eurocentric, 59, 60, 91, 93 Europe, 4, 5, 20, 34, 48, 58, 59, 142, 152, 215, 216, 222, 223, 225–227, 229 External partners, 41, 48, 72, 108, 111, 131, 153, 193, 202, 205, 208 External powers, 1–4, 7, 9, 32, 33, 122, 131 Ezulwini Consensus, 63, 204

F Foreign aid, 109, 125, 129 Foreign policy, 4, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 26, 87, 109, 122, 135, 138–141, 143, 144, 146, 155, 166, 180, 181, 184 Foreign powers, 122

237

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 4, 6–9, 15–17, 21–27, 31–36, 38–51, 60–63, 67, 69, 71–75, 77, 111, 126–128, 131, 132, 147, 153–155, 164, 166, 167, 177, 178, 180, 184, 190, 193–199, 205, 206, 208, 217, 220–223, 226, 227, 229 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, 17, 18, 23, 36, 39, 52, 107, 126–128, 153, 220, 226, 228

G Geoeconomic, 1, 149 Geopolitical, 1, 3, 7, 10, 25, 37, 58, 60, 62 Geopolitical environment, 2, 10, 58 Geopolitics, 10, 23, 155 Global economy, 1, 3, 75 Globalization, 23, 94, 99 Global North, 2, 69 Global politics, 1, 3, 111, 112, 114, 130 Global South, 43, 49, 50, 52, 58, 59, 62, 77, 108, 204, 216 Grand strategy, 4, 46, 47, 49, 50, 137, 139 Guanxi, 167, 175, 176, 179, 184

H Homogeneous, 166–169, 179 Human development, 67, 111–113, 117, 118, 122

I Imperialism, 59, 86, 87, 91, 137 Intercultural communications, 191 International relations (IR), 3, 4, 7, 32–34, 37–41, 45, 61, 83, 84,

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INDEX

91, 92, 108, 112, 140, 142, 149, 164, 200, 216, 226

J Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), 217, 224–227, 229

K Kagame report, 7, 31–34, 37, 38, 40–42, 44–46, 48–50, 110, 131, 164, 221, 222, 229

L Look East, 12

M Material capabilities, 111–114, 116–118, 122 Media, 11, 33, 70, 71, 129, 166, 191–195, 197–200, 207, 208 Media cooperation, 196 Mianzi, 167, 175, 176, 179 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 67, 68, 79, 129 Multipolarity, 8, 130 Multipolar world, 2, 3, 26, 139 Mutual benefit, 3, 58, 77, 218

N National interests, 4, 64, 66, 74–76, 86, 91, 108, 140–142, 203, 205 National Self-Interest, 8, 83, 84 National sovereignty, 8, 33, 73, 83, 84, 92 Nation-state, 3, 85, 86, 93, 111, 112, 114, 117, 132, 167, 171 Neo-colonial, 40, 86–88, 92, 93, 150, 225

New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP), 42–44, 49, 50 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 24, 42, 43, 51 Non-Aligned Movement, 62 Non-interference, 3, 6, 137, 149, 151, 155, 194, 218, 219 Normative power, 222 North-South cooperation, 108

O Official development assistance (ODA), 4 One and the many, 32–34, 39, 40 One Belt One Road initiative, 148 One China policy, 127, 140 Organisation of African Unity, 61

P Pan-Africanism, 14, 26, 86 Peace and security, 2, 4, 8, 21, 22, 68, 128, 135, 138, 139, 142, 147, 149, 150, 152–156, 196, 209 Peacekeeping, 8, 15, 135–152, 154, 155, 196 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 137, 141, 144–146, 148, 154 People to people, 2, 11, 128, 129, 164, 165, 170, 195, 197, 198 Political society, 85, 86, 88 Post-conflict reconstruction, 135, 144, 147 Power, 2, 4, 8, 12, 15, 20, 26, 33–36, 44, 45, 47, 54, 58, 59, 62–64, 66, 69, 74, 75, 77, 83, 87–90, 92–94, 111–114, 117, 130, 138–140, 142, 144, 148, 149, 152, 155, 181, 182, 190, 192, 201

INDEX

Public diplomacy, 9, 140, 142, 190–198, 200–204, 206, 207

R Regional Economic Communities (RECs), 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 13, 17, 24, 33–39, 41, 42, 49, 51, 76, 108, 109, 131, 154, 155, 178, 203, 205, 221, 224, 225 Regional economic integration, 6, 73, 225 Regional integration, 37, 38, 46, 49, 52, 73, 108, 109, 111, 131, 132, 179, 218 Regional integration community (RIC), 38, 40, 49 Regional interconnectivity, 2 Responsibility to protect (R2P), 143, 144, 155 Responsible power, 4, 138–142, 152, 155

S Security policy, 139, 140 Self-determination, 8, 37, 49, 84, 85 Self-reliance, 8, 52, 58, 69, 72, 73, 77, 108, 109 Self-sufficiency, 221 Silk Road, 5, 148, 196 Soft power, 5, 9, 11, 26, 196 Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 38, 39, 49, 52 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 36–39, 48–50, 52, 109, 178 Southern powers, 125 South-South cooperation (SSC), 42, 43, 60, 61, 69, 84, 108, 127, 151, 164, 220, 228 South-South relations, 217, 229

239

Sovereignty, 3, 6, 37, 48, 50, 86, 137, 138, 142–144, 152, 155, 156, 218, 219 State capacity, 221 Strategic autonomy, 111 Strategic partnerships, 7, 19, 20, 57, 76, 77, 154, 155 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), 87 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 26, 68, 69, 107, 163 T Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 40 Trade and investment, 4, 22, 66, 219 Triangular Cooperation, 108 Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), 49, 109 U United Nations General Assembly, 62, 69, 107, 176, 184 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 12, 15, 25, 26, 63, 75, 78, 135, 136, 142–144, 150, 156 United Nations (UN), 6, 8, 12, 17, 25, 26, 43, 44, 51, 53, 61–64, 78, 79, 88, 91, 94, 96, 108, 128, 135–139, 141–143, 145–147, 149–152, 155, 156, 163, 176, 196, 197, 204, 208 V Value chains, 73, 126 Value system, 169, 170, 172–174, 179 W Washington Consensus, 65, 131

240

INDEX

Western powers, 12, 35, 59 White paper, 46, 140, 141, 144

Win-win, 3, 6, 20, 140, 165