Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility 9781350188082, 9781350188112, 9781350188099

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Notes on Contributors
Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Responsibility: An Introduction Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe
1 Belief in Free Will Relates to Attributions of Intentionality and Judgments of Responsibility Oliver Genschow and Marcel Brass
2 The Blame Efficiency Hypothesis: An Evolutionary Framework to Resolve Rationalist and Intuitionist Theories of Moral Condemnation Cory J Clark
3 Mental State Control and Responsibility Corey Cusimano and Geoffrey P. Goodwin
4 “It Was All a Cruel Angel’s Thesis from the Start”: Folk Intuitions about Zygote Cases Do Not Support the Zygote Argument Florian Cova
5 Moral Responsibility without (Some Kinds of) Freedom Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
6 Folk Jurisprudence and Judgments about Free Will and Responsibility Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe
7 Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Experimental Philosophy Alfred R. Mele
8 Direct and Derivative Moral Responsibility: An Overlooked Distinction in Experimental Philosophy Pascale Willemsen
9 Victim Omissions: How Doing Nothing Affects Judgments of Cause and Blame Laura Niemi and Paul Henne
10 Free Will and Skilled Decision Theory Adam Feltz, Braden Tanner, Gwen Hoang, Jenna Holt and Asif Muhammad
Index

Citation preview

Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility

Advances in Experimental Philosophy Series Editor: James Beebe, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, USA Editorial Board: Joshua Knobe, Yale University, USA Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh, USA Thomas Nadelhoffer, College of Charleston, USA Eddy Nahmias, Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University, USA Jennifer Nagel, University of Toronto, Canada Joshua Alexander, Siena College, USA Empirical and experimental philosophy is generating tremendous excitement, producing unexpected results that are challenging traditional philosophical methods. Advances in Experimental Philosophy responds to this trend, bringing together some of the most exciting voices in the field to understand the approach and measure its impact in contemporary philosophy. The result is a series that captures past and present developments and anticipates future research directions. To provide in-depth examinations, each volume links experimental philosophy to a key philosophical area. They provide historical overviews alongside case studies, reviews of current problems and discussions of new directions. For upper-level undergraduates, postgraduates and professionals actively pursuing research in experimental philosophy these are essential resources. Titles in the series include: Advances in Experimental Epistemology, edited by James R. Beebe Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology, edited by Hagop Sarkissian and Jennifer Cole Wright Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology, edited by Jennifer Nado

Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics, edited by Florian Cova and Sébastien Réhault Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language, edited by Jussi Haukioja Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, edited by Andrew Aberdein and Matthew Inglis Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, edited by Justin Sytsma Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy, edited by Helen De Cruz and Ryan Nichols Experimental Metaphysics, edited by David Rose Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy, edited by Eugen Fischer and Mark Curtis Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility, edited by Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe

iv

Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility Edited by Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2022 Copyright © Thomas Nadelhoffer, Andrew Monroe and Contributors, 2022 Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editors of this work. Series design by Catherine Wood Cover image © Dieter Leistner / Gallerystock All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-3501-8808-2 ePDF: 978-1-3501-8809-9 eBook: 978-1-3501-8810-5 Series: Advances in Experimental Philosophy Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

Contents List of Figures and Tables  Notes on Contributors Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Responsibility: An Introduction  Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe 1 Belief in Free Will Relates to Attributions of Intentionality and Judgments of Responsibility  Oliver Genschow and Marcel Brass 2 The Blame Efficiency Hypothesis: An Evolutionary Framework to Resolve Rationalist and Intuitionist Theories of Moral Condemnation  Cory J Clark 3 Mental State Control and Responsibility  Corey Cusimano and Geoffrey P. Goodwin 4 “It Was All a Cruel Angel’s Thesis from the Start”: Folk Intuitions about Zygote Cases Do Not Support the Zygote Argument  Florian Cova 5 Moral Responsibility without (Some Kinds of) Freedom  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 6 Folk Jurisprudence and Judgments about Free Will and Responsibility  Thomas Nadelhoffer and Andrew Monroe 7 Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Experimental Philosophy  Alfred R. Mele 8 Direct and Derivative Moral Responsibility: An Overlooked Distinction in Experimental Philosophy  Pascale Willemsen 9 Victim Omissions: How Doing Nothing Affects Judgments of Cause and Blame  Laura Niemi and Paul Henne 10 Free Will and Skilled Decision Theory  Adam Feltz, Braden Tanner, Gwen Hoang, Jenna Holt and Asif Muhammad Index

viii xi

1 13

27 45 65 91 115 131 143 167 185 203

List of Figures and Tables Figures 3.1 Mean attributions of blameworthiness for immoral mental states (Cusimano & Goodwin, 2019, Study 4; error bars represent standard errors). (A) Attributions of blameworthiness across four kinds of immoral attitudes, averaged over all mental states. (B) Attributions of blameworthiness in the “dying mother” scenario separated by mental state type. Examples of bad attitudes are in the right-most column 3.2 Attributions of control for mundane involuntary behaviors (e.g., sneezing), mental states (light gray bars), and prototypical voluntary behaviors (e.g., speaking) 3.3 The relationship between judgments of control, blameworthiness, and responsibility. (A) The relationship between control and blameworthiness in Cusimano and Goodwin (2019) Study 4. See Figure 1 for average control ratings. (B) The relationship between control and responsibility ratings in Cusimano and Goodwin (2019) Study 1, based on average control judgments for emotions, desires, beliefs, and evaluations. See Figure 2 for average control ratings for these mental states 4.1 Deep Self scores as mediators of the effect of manipulation (Manipulation vs. Control and Modified vs. Control) in Study 1 4.2 Deep Self scores as mediators of the effect of manipulation (Manipulation vs. Normal) in follow-up to Study 2 4.3 Boxplots of Aggregate Responsibility Scores (ARS) in function of CONDITION and OUTCOME VALENCE for all three studies 8.1 Participant’s mean agreement with ability and blame questions in both conditions and vignettes. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 8.2 Percentages of people indicating that the agents were to blame although they had no control or because they had control in the Original condition 8.3 Participants’ mean agreement with ability and moral responsibility questions in both conditions and vignettes. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 8.4 Percentages of people indicating that the agents were to blame although they had no control or because they had control in the Original condition

52

55

57 79 85 88 153 155

156 157

List of Figures and Tables 8.5 Participants’ mean agreement with ability and moral responsibility questions in all three conditions. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 9.1 Mean agreement with the causal (A) and blame (B) statements in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Light grey points represent individual participant responses evenly jittered 9.2 Mean agreement with the causal (A) and blame (B) statements in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Light grey points represent individual participant responses evenly jittered 9.3 Mean agreement with the causal (A) and blame (B) statements in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Light grey points represent individual participant responses evenly jittered 9.4 Mean agreement with the causal (A) and blame (B) statements in Experiment 4. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Red diamonds represent means for each vignette. Light grey points represent individual participant responses evenly jittered 10.1 The Framework for Skilled Decision Making, taken from Cokely et al. (2018) 10.2 The hypothesized model for the understanding components of skilled decisions about free will 10.3 Path model representing the paths for the two groups. The first value represents the concrete standardized estimates, and the second value represents the abstract standardized estimate. ^ p