Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1: Approaching Real-World Complexity with Dialectical Thinking [2 ed.] 3031403312, 9783031403316

Table of contents :
Foreword
Preface
References
Acknowledgments
Introduction to the Monograph
Relationship of the Monograph to the Tradition of Systems Thinking
Bibliography
Contents
Abbreviations
Chapter 1: What Is Your Inquiring System?
The Intrinsic Fragility of “Thinking”
What Does It Mean, Then, to Think as an Adult?
The Path Not Often Taken
Three Inquiring Systems
Three Lines of Cognitive Development
Four Eras of Cognitive Development
This Book’s Central Tenets
Intermediate Summary
Empirical Evidence of Dialectical Thinking in Adults
Some Examples of Dialectical Thinking or Lack Thereof
Mary
Diagnosis
Helen
Diagnosis
Judy
Diagnosis
Practical Wisdom
Four Cognitive Transforms
From Practical Wisdom to Common Sense
Chapter Summary
Practice Reflections
Exercises (8 Instructions and 2 Questions)
Bibliography
Chapter 2: Modifications of Truth Over the Lifespan
Introduction
Three Competing Mental Processes
The Link Between Social-Emotional and Cognitive Development
Working Hypothesis
Example of a Higher Epistemic Position
Assumptions About Knowledge and Truth
Influence of Social-Emotional Maturity on Epistemic Position
The “Stage 2,” Instrumentalist Perspective on Knowledge
The Journey Toward Other-Dependence
First Inklings of Uncertainty, Kept Under Wraps
The Move Beyond Other-Dependence
The Murky Waters of Beginning Dialectics
The Onset of Post-formal Thinking
The Move to a Self-Authoring Position
A First Glimpse of Thought Forms
Three Kinds of Equilibrium
The Move to a Self-Aware Position
Interlude
A Meta-Systemic View of the Merger
Chapter Summary
Consequences for Coaching and Consulting Practice
Practice Reflections
Exercises
Bibliography
Chapter 3: Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use
Chapter Emphasis
Different Views of Dialectic
Three Models of Dialectic
The Four Moments of Dialectic
The Critical and Constructive Moments of Dialectic
Moments of Dialectic Represented by Classes of Thought Forms
Dialectical Versus Kantian Inquiring Systems
Equivalence of Moments of Dialectic in Bhaskar and Basseches
Transforms and the Moments of Dialectic
The Individual Moments of Dialectic
The Dialectic of Context
Thought Contexts
Context
The Dialectic of Process
The Dialectic of Relationship
The Moments as a Set of Relationships
Constitutive Relationships
Incomplete Descriptions
Relationship
The Dialectic of Transformational Systems
Transformational System
From Moments to Thought Forms
The Crucial Transition from the Second to the Third Order of Mental Complexity
Comments on the Table
Categorical Errors
Chapter Summary
Practice Reflections
Exercises
Bibliography
Chapter 4: How Well-Tempered Is Your Thought Clavier?
Introduction
Part A: The Context of Cognitive Development
Review of Cognitive Development
The Path Toward Dialectical Thinking
The Unity of Consciousness
A Concrete Example
Interpretation of the Example
Linking Logos and Mythos
Cognitive Development Occurs in Phases Not Stages
In Search of More Ample Mental Spaces
Cognitive Equilibrium
Assimilation and Accommodation Processes of Thinking
Two Models of Dialectics
What “Develops” in Cognitive Development?
Focus of Attention
How to Distinguish the Four Classes
Four Classes of Thought Forms
Thought Form Coordination
Critical Versus Constructive Thinking
Cognitive Coaching: Using Thought Forms as Mind Openers
Part B: A Phasic Theory of the Development of Dialectical Thinking
Complex Logical Thinking as a Precursor to Dialectical Thought
What Actually Triggers Dialectical Thinking
How Dialectical Thinking Develops Over the Human Lifespan
The Relevance of Phase 3
Example
The Coordination of Epistemic, Dialectical, and Organizational Capabilities
The World as Seen in Each of the Four Phases
The Phase 1 World
The Phase 2 World
The Phase 3 World
The Phase 4 World
The Openness and Uncertainty of Cognitive Development
An Important Distinction
The Four Phases Viewed in Terms of Accommodation and Assimilation
The Stratification of “Human Being”
Chapter Summary
Practice Reflections
Exercises
Bibliography
Chapter 5: A Process Model of Social-Emotional Development
Introduction
Social-Emotional and Cognitive Orders of Mental Complexity
Outline of Thought Development in Adults
The Cognitive Structure of Social-Emotional Shifts
The Stark Limitations of Developmental Stage Models
Comments on the Stage-Thought Form Alignment
The S-2 to S-3 Range
The S-3 to S-4 Range
The S-4 to S-5 Range
Relation of Post-autonomous Stages to Practical Wisdom
New Research Topics
Chapter Summary
Practice Reflections
Exercises (See Table 4.4)
Bibliography
Untitled
Glossary
Index

Citation preview

Otto Laske

Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1 Approaching Real-World Complexity with Dialectical Thinking Second Edition

Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1

Otto Laske

Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1 Approaching Real-World Complexity with Dialectical Thinking Second Edition

Otto Laske Interdevelopmental Institute (IDM) Gloucester, MA, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-40331-6    ISBN 978-3-031-40332-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3 1st edition: © Author, self-published 2008 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To the memory of my teachers who broke new intellectual ground: Th. W. Adorno, Roy Bhaskar, Elliott Jaques

Foreword

If you want to get to know someone and what has profoundly influenced them, I have found that asking them about the five best books they have ever read achieves that goal. Otto Laske’s three new books (particularly Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 3: The Manual of Dialectical Thought Forms) are among the five best books I have ever read. These books have profoundly influenced my life and research work. I am a researcher at an independent climate change think tank. I first heard about Laske’s books from an evolutionary theorist from Australia. I trusted his judgment because he was doing original and breakthrough work far ahead of his more established peers. Even though I have had training in logic and systems theory, it was not until I read Laske’s unique work on advanced dialectical thinking that the quality of my research analysis took a huge step forward. When applied to studying human capacity and cognitive development, Laske’s Dialectical Thought Form Framework (DTF) has been widely discussed, so I will not add more in those areas. DTF describes four modes (“moments”) of advanced dialectical thinking, each associated with seven thought forms, which creates 28 unique ways of seeing a situation, idea, or problem. While I cannot possibly illuminate the complexity of DTF in a Foreword, I can give you a good idea of what it does. I use DTF in my climate analysis work. I use it to produce reasonably accurate predictions for the consequence timeframes to allow better management of our climate change future. Before I outline my multi-step process for using Laske’s advanced DTF breakthroughs, it will be useful to share a metaphor to prepare you for what you are about to read. Imagine an individual with a good grasp of logic. This cognitive skill level would be comparable to seeing the world at a computer screen resolution of 420 dots per inch (DPI). If that same individual became proficient in systems theory, they would then begin to see their world at a computer screen resolution of about 1040 DPI. This higher resolution would increase their vision of relevant details by more than a double.

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Now imagine an individual proficient in logic and systems theory also becoming proficient in DTF. They would see relevant details at the computer screen resolution of 4,120 DPI. This individual would have an exponential advantage, and most people would agree that the more relevant detail one can see positions them to understand that situation significantly better than someone who cannot see that higher level of relevant detail. There is far more to the Laske DTF thinking and analysis breakthrough. My climate research and analysis process should help you see its potential and the many benefits for your life and work. To use Laske’s DTF breakthrough, the first thing I do is to get fully present. Next, I bury myself in the current climate research, about 20,000 pages, and make hundreds of notes. Even with DTF tools, there is no shortcut to the hard work of immersing yourself and learning the raw data. As I do that reading, my logical thinking left brain starts linking different areas of the climate information and generating some core analysis concepts. Because of my systems thinking background, I do not see the climate systems and subsystems as independent silos of data as most single specialty climate researchers do for areas such as oceans, atmosphere, soils, water vapor, sea ice, permafrost, etc. Rather, I see the climate systems and subsystems synergistically and cumulatively as interdependent, interconnected, and continually interacting. The previous analysis draws a new set of preliminary conclusions, predictions, and further questions. I am now at the DTF jumping-off point where the “magic” begins. I take my most developed level of conclusions, predictions, and questions and subject them to the 28 mind-opening questions of DTF. These questions cover 28 powerful and highly nuanced dialectical ways of seeing the information. Each mind-opening question and each new dialectical way of seeing opens up more new questions, and illuminates connections, omissions, and patterns I would never notice had I not subjected my conclusions, predictions, and questions to the rigors and reality testing of DTF’s 28 mind-opening questions. I experience a tremendous surge of new climate cognitions in this step of the process. I spot and eliminate false perceptions and conclusions quickly. I discover previously undisclosed or “invisible” absences and even misleading or incorrect facts emerge from the climate data and analysis. As great as the 28 mind-opener questioning process is, what happens next is an unparalleled new level of cognition that was previously unattainable using logic and systems thinking alone. The deeper potentials of the DTF processes are about to reveal themselves. At this point, I withdraw entirely from my intense immersion in the climate materials and the 28 mind-opening questions. I work on other projects. Then suddenly and unpredictably, I begin experiencing new climate data epiphanies, even chains of epiphanies. These right-brain climate epiphanies come randomly and often in quick succession as almost fully completed solutions or original ideas or questions. These wonderful DTF-inspired epiphanies can occur anywhere or

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anytime; while riding my mountain bike, showering, and even sleeping. And yes, they do wake me up. As these epiphanies occur, I scramble to note everything in these intense flashes of spontaneous insight. After a particularly critical and far-reaching climate epiphany, I re-test and expand it with another round of the 28 mind-opener questions yielding deeper verification and new insights. These insights regularly appear as new ideas and questions that would never have been explored had I not also engaged the critical right-brain elements of Laske’s advanced dialectical thinking process. Laske’s advanced DTF process opens and expands access to the right brain’s massive, underutilized bandwidth, which is ordinarily or minimally inaccessible within the focused fixed stare of left-brain logic and systems theory modes of thinking. Before DTF, I had never experienced such an abundance of profound insights, epiphanies, and original ideas and questions. Laske’s DTF work is truly indispensable for capturing the detailed evolution of moments of reality in transition. DTF captures rich contexts, complex relationships, and the process of moments in continual transformation. Without Laske’s advanced DTF tool, our climate change think tank could not have successfully influenced the climate change understanding of thousands of individuals, numerous environmental groups, and insurance companies worldwide that require accurate climate data and predictions to manage risk and loss. Laske’s advanced DTF has allowed our think tank to better see the many climate systems more as dynamically open systems in the making. It has also allowed us to discover what was absent from the past analysis of climate systems or interfered with the emergence of stable climate systems. DTF generates deep left and right brain integration, balancing, and original thinking, which is, unfortunately, rare today. Laske’s DTF work unlocks the unseen, what is and what is not, and even more importantly, what could be and what should be in ways one can hardly conceive until one has personally experienced DTF for themselves. Laske’s DTF is indispensable for anyone doing think tank research, general research, long-term corporate planning, corporate management, or critical analysis at intelligence agencies. It is equally indispensable for politicians who must make decisions in an increasingly complex world and for those that advise them. If Crick and Watson had understood DTF, they would have discovered DNA far sooner. If corporations like Google, Apple, and Microsoft had DTF-trained high-­ level staff, their global development would be considerably more advanced. Because of the DTF breakthrough, there is now a future where AI programmers and regulators who understand it can keep AI safe and exponentially increase its effectiveness, and where senior medical staff can use DTF to crack scores of previously unsolvable medical cases. Being proficient in DTF is not just for individuals. It is essential to humanity’s collective wellbeing, leadership, and humanity having a livable future. It is not unreasonable to imagine that someday anyone unskilled in DTF would not be

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allowed to hold positions of power where their bad decisions could cause widespread harm. Using DTF will empower you to stand out from your peers with exponentially enhanced problem-solving capabilities, and, as a bonus, you get to enjoy chains of epiphanies punctuated by original thinking that will quickly get noticed. It is well worth the investment of time and effort to deep-read Laske’s new books. But, becoming proficient in DTF will be real work. Look up every unknown word and foreign language idiom Laske uses. Laske’s concept-dense paragraphs are pregnant with essential nuances that can be unveiled only through careful and attentive thought and right-brained processing. Laske’s DTF brings much new hope for the future. DTF not only provides the structure for establishing meta-theories (as I do in my climate work); it also solves complex problems (as our climate think tank does in offering workable climate solutions.) Because of DTF’s advanced cognitive expanding power, it is not hard to envision more DTF users becoming motivated, highly effective agents working to resolve the global issues that beset humanity at this challenging point in history. There could be a future ahead of us where humanity’s DTF-enhanced grasp of the complexities of moment-to-moment reality will eventually facilitate the collective creation of a more equitable, safe, and just world for ALL. Laske’s DTF work facilitates and completes the critical last step in human cognitive development. It takes us from common sense, understanding, and reason to exponentially expanding practical wisdom. The long-term legacy of Laske’s work may be that it identifies practical and effective ways of overcoming the current limitations in human cognition through understanding and using DTF. Someday, in the not-too-distant future, universities that teach post-grad students the DTF tools will be widespread. In exploring DTF, I also learned much about human capacity and maturity levels, as well as a far more powerful tool for advanced dialectical analysis. If not for Laske’s DTF work, I also would have never been exposed to Roy Bhaskar’s dialectical Critical Realism. This exposure has dramatically expanded my understanding of the ultimate limits of certainty surrounding scientific methodology and its results. I am profoundly grateful for the work Laske has given the world by his development of the Dialectical Thought Form Framework. I sincerely hope that you also will soon experience chains of epiphanies on the issues most important to you. Climate Researcher at Job One for Humanity and The Universe Institute Laughlin, NV, USA

Lawrence Wollersheim

Preface

This monograph is a child of its time. It is a contribution to Dialectical Critical Realism and thus strongly influenced by Bhaskar (1993) but also by Adorno (1999). It is further informed by M. Archer’s (1995, 2003, and 2007), E. Jaques’ (1998), and I. McGilchrist’s work (2009). The monograph comprises three books all of which explain and model a form of complex thinking historically known as dialectical thinking. Such thinking is systemic. The monograph is geared toward understanding, as well as designing, open rather than closed systems. Informally, seeing the world as an open system – as we do in this monograph – means viewing it as in constant motion (Bhaskar’s Second Edge, 2E), constituted by intrinsic relationships (Bhaskar’s Third Level, 3L) and viewed from a meta-­systemic perspective from which it undergoes unceasing transformation (Bhaskar’s Fourth Dimension, 4D). These characteristics pertain to life. One might say, thus, that dialectical thinking aims to construct Life in Thought. In a time where mankind is succumbing to its self-created data world, dialectical thinking takes on the form of a rescue operation to save mankind from itself, more precisely, from its exclusively disembodied logical thinking in terms of which the world gleams in pure positivity since all traces of negativity have been unintentionally removed from it. By contrast, dialectical thinking explicates the notion that “reality” cannot be either described or acted upon while forgetting that it is, to speak with Bhaskar, pervaded by absences, or marked by negativity, and that human thinking therefore needs to learn to master “negative thinking” if not also “negative dialectic.” Overall, the monograph joins a genetic epistemology of – solver-centric – systems thinking to a phenomenology of work in real time, viewing “work” as a manifestation of Human Agency in the sense of M.  Archer. For this purpose, the monograph presents an epistemological equivalent of Bhaskar’s ontological dialectic, referred to as a “thought form dialectic,” and does so with a focus on the social sciences and organizations as in part constitutive cells of society. This entails putting into an epistemological perspective (and vocabulary) how individuals, groups, and teams “construct the world” for themselves in real time, influenced by a host of cultural and social constraints but in a way that is irreducible to them. xi

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By showing that and in what way dialectical systems thinking includes and transcends logical systems thinking, and demonstrating in what way it is an adult-­ developmental achievement, the author establishes a relationship between “thinking” and “work,” viewing work (not only organizational work) as a manifestation of human agency. Especially in Book 2, following E. Jaques, the author shows that both thinking and work share that they require what Hegel called the effort of the concept, that is, conceptual thinking able to transcend merely logical thinking. The adult-developmental processes by which logical thinking extends itself into dialectical thinking are the main topic of Books 1 and 3. In Book 2, the author applies what today is known about human cognitive development over the lifespan and the thought-form structure of mature thinking to an inquiry into human capability and its function in organizations and institutions. Addressing the sociological and epistemic relationship of Structure and Agency introduced into sociology by M.  Archer, Book 2 focuses on human agency as “work” as well as “reflexivity,” and empirically explores the mental space in which work in real time happens, referred to as individuals’ and teams’ internal workplace, with dramatic consequences for organizational consulting and human resources management. Joined to the practice of dialectical thinking throughout the monograph, the reader finds an exposition of theoretical distinctions and empirical findings of research in adult development over the human lifespan, especially cognitive development toward dialectics. The connection made between dialectics and development is not haphazard: the monograph views not only individual but social and cultural development as dialectical in the sense of Bhaskar’s Four Moments of Dialectic, explored in all three books. In this manner, the monograph extends and deepens the literature of Dialectical Critical Realism, introducing methods of dialectical systems analysis for such diverse professional domains as long-term strategic planning, government prediction, policymaking, critical-systems analysis, and educational reform. The broad differences between the monograph’s three books are the following: • Book 1, subtitled Approaching Real-World Complexity with Dialectical Thinking, has an epistemological focus. It joins Bhaskar’s ontological notion of the Four Moments of Dialectic to the epistemological one of dialectics emerging in the human mind as it transitions from Understanding to Reason viewed as phases of cognitive development. The book’s purpose is to present what is known today about human cognitive development over the human lifespan, a topic still obscured by the dominance of behavioral belief systems, especially but not only in business. (The last chapter of the book broadens its epistemological inquiry to social-emotional meaning-making, shown to be intrinsically linked to cognitive sense-making.) In this way, the book lays the theoretical foundation for Book 2 which explores the structure of the mental space in which Work happens in real time, with a focus on managing human resources. • Book 2, subtitled How to Measure and Boost Thought Maturity, adopts and critically deepens E.  Jaques’ notions of Capability and Work. Amplifying Jaques’

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pioneering distinctions and differentiations within the domain of human Capability from an adult-developmental perspective, the book investigates social agents’ internal dialogue about their work activities, to empirically explore the methods of mental processing they use to deliver work. Introducing the notion of agents’ internal workplace as well as methods for scrutinizing its developmental structure by way of qualitative interview methods, the author sheds light on the gap between behavioral and epistemic notions of work and work design and displays the consequences thereof for professionalism in human resources management and the development of work-supporting technologies. • Book 3, subtitled Manual of Dialectical Thought Forms, comprises the only existing set of tools for assessing individuals’, groups’, and teams’ present level of cognitive development toward dialectical thinking. This set of tools is what beginners in dialectical thinking and assessment need to master to become practitioners of dialectics. The book updates, refines, and expands the never published Manual of Dialectical Schemata put in place in 1981 by Michael Bopp, a student of Michael Basseches, thereby safeguarding the historical continuity of dialectics. It is a textbook for teaching and learning dialectical thinking and mastering its epistemology. The book presents a detailed description of four different modes (and “moments”) of dialectical thinking, each of which is associated with seven thought forms that together make up the author’s DTF (Dialectical Thought Form Framework). Examples, exercises, and practice reflections facilitate using the Manual. In general terms, this monograph presents systems thinking as the flowering of individuals’ emergent potential capability. It shows how this capability unfolds to full maturity of thought that lets them extend logical to dialectical thinking. In three intrinsically related books, the monograph guides the reader on his/her journey from Understanding to Reason (Bhaskar, 1993, 28–37), showing the latter to be the master and the former a mere emissary (McGilchrist, 2009). By delving into the epistemological intricacies of individuals’ internal workplace (Archer, 2003, 2007), the monograph presents dialectical systems thinking as an achievement of adulthood whose implicit potential for untrammeled thinking lets humans transcend the “data world” that mere Understanding (logical thinking) so easily gets stuck in. By so doing, the monograph escapes committing both the epistemic and ontic fallacies (Bhaskar) in terms of which the real world shows up as an irrealist “data world” to which to succumb is potentially fatal for Human Agency (Archer, 1995, 2003). Throughout three intrinsically related books, dialectical systems analysis unfolds itself as a critical discipline whose practitioners transcend positivistic views of the real world by uncovering the latter’s negativity, thereby laying bare the dialectics of Structure and Agency all thinking is framed by. The new discipline views the ways in which humans construct the world through language as fallacious if they cannot dialectically reflect upon their own thinking; as shoddy if they do not take the world’s negativity into account; and as risky to the extent that they are under the sway of epistemologically reductive models of the real

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world that are, intentionally or not, out of touch with what is empirically known today about the epistemic structure of individuals’ internal workplace. In sum, the reader is embarking on a journey into a genetic epistemology of dialectical systems thinking in the form of an inquiry into the cognitive-developmental structure of thinkers’ internal workplace by which they engage with structures of the real world in real time.

References Adorno, Th. W. (1978). Minima moralia. Verso. Adorno, Th. W. (1993). Hegel: Three studies. MIT Press. Adorno, Th. W. (1999). Negative dialectic. Continuum. [Negative Dialektik. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1966]. Adorno, Th. W. (2008). Lectures on negative dialectic: Fragments of a lecture course 1965/66. Polity. Adorno, Th. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., & Levinson, D. J. (1950). The authoritarian personality. Norton. Archer, M.  S. (1995). Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (1998). Culture and agency. Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (2003). Structure, agency and the internal conversation. Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (2007). Making our way through the world. Cambridge University Press. Bhaskar, R. (1979) [1989, 1998]. The possibility of naturalism. Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (2002). Reflections on MetaReality. Sage. Bhaskar, R. (2017). The order of naturally necessity. University College London Institute of Education. The Authors. Jaques, E. (1998). Requisite organization. Arlington, VA: Cason Hall & Co.; (2021 edition of Requisite Organization Publishing, https://www.amazon.com/Requisite-OrganizationComplete-Guide-2021/dp/1867418932?source=ps-sl-shoppingads-lpcontext&ref_=fplfs&psc =1&smid=ATVPDKIKX0DER) McGilchrist, I. (2009). The master and his emissary. Yale University Press. McGilchrist, I. (2019). Ways of attending. Routledge.

Acknowledgments

In a monograph of this scope and length, one can expect the author to have incurred many debts. The writing process was quite different from Mozart’s “I had the entire symphony in mind and just needed to write the notes.” The author feels in debt to his own life which permits him now to pull out the riches contained in this monograph. In my case, this past is my early engagement with the Frankfurt School between 1956 and 1966. In terms of my own cognitive development as an adult, what I absorbed of Hegelian dialectic from Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer over a decade became utterly foundational for my work in epistemology and the social sciences. My teachers’ emphasis on the importance of untrammeled thinking for an individual’s and society’s quality of life has remained unforgettable for me. A second piece central to this monograph is my never waning interest in dialectical ontology which, in 2006, brought me to Roy Bhaskar’s work, especially his revitalization of the craft of dialectic that is the cornerstone of Dialectical Critical Realism. Although Bhaskar does not draw a clear line between ontological and epistemological dialectics, I found him clearly re-asserting Michael Basseches’ distinction between four “classes of schemata” when, in 1993, he postulated his Four Moments of Dialectic. Although the alignment of moments of dialectic with classes of epistemological thought forms remains an open philosophical issue, in the perspective of this monograph it is evident that using thought forms without an awareness of their ontological referents (in the “real world”) only contributes to what Bhaskar refers to as epistemic and ontic fallacies. Human thought is always “about” something, and that “about” is the real world that exists independent of our thinking. A third piece central to this monograph is M. Archer’s work in social ontology and sociology, in particular her analysis of human Reflexivity as the basis of human Agency. While Archer’s research primarily bears on how different social groups reflect on their social and cultural condition to find realistic ways of taking action, as well as the different modes of reflexivity by which they do so, the present work is the first thorough investigation of the development of human Reflexivity over the human lifespan (often simply referred to as “cognitive adult development”), with a focus on the developmental and dialectical structure of transcribed external conversations with selected groups of social agents. xv

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The fourth piece central to this monograph is Michael Basseches’ pioneering empirical research into the phases of adult cognitive development (1978 to 1984). By transcribing and analyzing semi-structured interviews with college students, Basseches succinctly showed that cognitive development cannot be reduced to meaning-making (as R.  Kegan had tried to do), and that it happens in phases, not stages. Basseches further showed that cognitive development goes beyond that of purely logical thinking in that it moves to dialectical thinking. He analyzed his interviews in terms of what he called schemata (which in this monograph are called thought forms) which led him to distinguish different levels of “fluidity of thinking” as indicating degrees of thinking complexity. Finally, Basseches showed that, as expected, adult faculty was cognitively higher developed than its students, thereby indicating that dialectical thinking is an adult-developmental achievement. In this way, Basseches became the first researcher to put flesh on the notion that every individual has the potential to transcend logical toward dialectical thinking once the former is in place at around 25 years of age. Finally, Basseches implicitly pointed to a new topic of adult-development research, namely, that of the intrinsic relationship between social-emotional meaning-making and cognitive sense-making. A fifth, predominantly critical, piece important for absorbing this monograph is Robert Kegan’s work, in which he tries but fails to reduce human cognition to meaning-making (1982), a term which, following Basseches, I set in stark contrast to cognitive “sense-making.” While in this monograph sense-making is seen as synonymous with the Western philosophical tradition at large, the more limited term of “meaning-making,” culled from “object relations” theory, refers to individuals’ internal positioning toward self and others, a strand of development I refer to as social-emotional. Through 25 years of systematic developmental assessments, I have amply validated the distinction between the above two strands of adult development. My work has shown me that it is indeed in the interaction between social-emotional and cognitive development (which also engages the psychological dimension) that Homo sapiens’ consciousness develops to maturity. The fact that the vital distinction between meaning- and sense-making is still “news” in developmental theory shows me that the theory is stuck in a rut, unable to thematic a crucial nexus of human development over the lifespan. This monograph, then, is a synthesis of the five components named above which function as interrelated constituents of a whole. It captures more than a half-century of complex thinking by an international group of reflective practitioners, for the purpose of amplifying the tradition of systems thinking. Through this synthesis, it has become possible to renew the ancient tradition of complex, dialectical thinking. As the inclusion of Bhaskar’s work on dialectics (1993) indicates, I see this synthesis as an ontologically constellated, not a purely epistemological, one. This is so since “thinking,” which makes truth claims, by nature requires a referent denoting what it is “about,” and this referent is what we informally refer to as “the real world.” Without such a reference, we could not say what thinking is or is about, something Bhaskar refers to as the need for referential

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detachment. Importantly, dialectic does not stop short at referring to positive existences. It emphatically refers as well to what Bhaskar calls absences. In fact, the reference of thinking to absences (i.e., to that which is not, or not yet) is the actual root of dialectic since through such thinking agents bring about societal morphogenesis.

Introduction to the Monograph

This monograph addresses itself to reflective practitioners in think tanks, intelligence agencies, governments, and organizations responsible for comprehensive data gathering in the service of directing national policies and safeguarding international collaboration. Although the book’s topic, complex thinking, should be of interest to every human being, it is systems-level thinkers who will reap from its use the largest benefit. It is on the work of such thinkers that we rely, in whatever community we live. As community members, we count on residing in “livable” systems. Such systems are open systems that will close when the reflective practitioners addressed in this book fail to reach thought maturity. Humankind as well as its planet presently find themselves in a thoroughly dilemmatic situation which requires utmost perspicacity. However, adult cognitive development, in so far as it peaks in dialectical thinking, provides a tool that has a good chance to show itself commensurate with the dilemmas we are facing. The author hopes that the tools this monograph presents can make a difference between the situation we are in and its optimal resolution if there is one outside of Nightfall (Asimov, 1941). The most potent capability social agents possess is their Reflexivity, under-­ researched and most often referred to simply as “thinking.” Thinking appears in many forms, linguistic and non-linguistic. This monograph focuses on the expression of thinking in speech. It is trying to rescue left-hemisphere illusionism from its worst errors (McGilchrist, 2009). Importantly, speech includes “silent speech,” here called internal conversation (Archer, 2003, 2007). Through this interpretation, as a manifestation of Reflexivity, thinking is directly linked to Agency, the way humans make their way through the real world. To pursue its goal to renew dialectical thinking, the monograph makes a fundamental distinction between “what” and “how” people think, i.e., the content and the structure of human thinking voiced through speech. The notion pursued is that thinking is deeply “developmental,” in the sense that is the outcome of cognitive development over adults’ entire lifespan, rather than something simply given and uneventfully to be counted on.

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In this monograph, therefore, I view people’s thinking as determined by their Inquiring System, proposing that such systems are used by individuals at different levels of cognitive development. Inquiring Systems are evoked each time a person generates a movement-in-thought in real time. Such movements are causal factors in how the “real world” works (Bhaskar, 1979). Inquiring systems are embodied cultural systems that function in real time. They shape people’s deliberations about their practical, social, and cultural world concerns. Viewed instrumentally, as in this monograph, Inquiring Systems are sets of tools by way of which social agents respond to (and thus trigger) social and cultural antecedents, whether they are constraints or enablements that determine the fate of their projects.

 elationship of the Monograph to the Tradition R of Systems Thinking Outside of philosophy, “thinking” is not often made the topic of discussion. However, we live in dramatic times in which much seems to depend on how what we call “thinking” is enabled, taught, practiced, and thought about. It is the purpose of this monograph to make use of the substantial insights we have gained since 1975 into how “thinking” develops in Homo sapiens over his or her lifespan, especially in research on adult development over the human lifespan. It seems to the author that the ceaseless movements-in-thought by which we function as social and cultural agents are often taken for granted, and that complexity of thinking has become a non-issue. (This monograph shows otherwise.) In philosophy and cultural studies, this has led to what has been called “the cognitive fallacy” by which people assume that since everybody can “think,” everybody can also handle high degrees of complexity. In my experience as a developmental epistemologist and clinical and developmental psychologist, this is not the case, as substantiated in this monograph. While Reflexivity (in the sense of Archer) may be socially robust, I think of the strictly cognitive part of it as fragile, both in its lifelong development and its use. Cognitively, this capability is robust only in its logical foundations which, as McGilchrist has shown, is a very spurious and risky foundation indeed, at least in technological societies. I share his view. Logical thinking by itself will not save us from Asimov’s Nightfall (1941). From this book’s point of view, logical thinking, including logical systems thinking, is best used as a dialectical tool. By this I mean that logical thinking, the world’s most potent separator of what in the real world is linked and part of a larger whole, cannot stand on its own feet. Since one can link things, as Hegel said, only to the extent that one has previously separated them, logical thinking is indeed a mighty tool when contributing to seeing wholes as preceding their parts. What logical thinking needs, then, is to find its true home, which is dialectic. Even from the most elementary definition of dialectic – that it deals with opposites

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as being the same – it becomes clear that separating and linking things are relative terms that urgently need each other. We can honor this insight by saying that “separating is the first step toward linking, but separating is a dangerous thing to do when it is never followed by linking (or linking back).” These, then, are the considerations based in which this monograph sets out to renew the tradition of dialectic for the benefit of holistic systems-level thinking. The monograph entails a culture critique. In negative terms, it demonstrates the many absences, lacunes, and category errors that purely logical and algorithmic thinking are prone to, including the epistemic and ontic fallacies on account of which such thinking ends up looking at the world as a closed rather than an open system. At its most felicitous, the monograph bridges the gap between dialectical and systems thinking, a discipline explained at https://www.google.com/ search?client=firefox-­b-­1-­d&q=systems+thinking as follows: Systems thinking is a way of making sense of the complexity of the world by looking at it in terms of wholes and relationships rather than by splitting it down into its parts. It has been used as a way of exploring and developing effective action in complex contexts, enabling systems change.

As the reader will learn, dialectical systems thinking is different from conventional, purely logical systems thinking. In contrast to the description above, dialectical systems thinking both “looks at the real world in terms of wholes and relationships” AND “splits it down into its parts” at the same time, under the aspect of “negativity.” As the monograph’s Book 3 – Manual of Dialectical Thought Forms – shows, one can only “see” wholes to the extent that one “sees” parts since the two are entirely relational terms that co-enable each other and therefore cannot be left standing in their separation. Overall, the Manual follows Hegel’s dictum that one can link ele­ments or parts only to the extent that one has previously separated them. This entails holding both linking and separating in the same memory store in one’s movements-­in-­thought. The Manual adds to Hegel’s dictum the notion that wholes as well as parts are pervaded by absences or, to put it differently, are emergent rather than end-states (Bhaskar, 1993). It is the temporal simultaneity of separating and relating that constitutes the decisive difference between conventional (i.e., logical) and dialectical systems thinking. The importance of this monograph thus lies in that it shows that “the world” can never successfully be described in purely positive terms or as a closed system, nor in terms of outcomes or end-states. Rather, viewing the real world in system terms entails being aware that its “negative” dimensions – comprising what is not or not yet – trump its positive ones (Bhaskar, 1993). Another way of stating the tenor of the monograph is to speak of a “thermodynamic turn” in systems thinking as outlined by Gilbert Simondon (who applies thermodynamic concepts to the workings of the mind, 2020). Such a turn is critical of both atomistic or substantialist ontologies since they fail to grasp emergence and transformation. The reason is that they hypostatize an original substance or atom that then “develops” or “differentiates” without truly elucidating the process of

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emergence by way of which development and differentiation unfold in real time. In response to this failure, also found in conventional systems thinking, this monograph teaches processual and transformational thinking in opposition to end-state and identity thinking (Adorno, 1999). Dialectical systems analysis moves away from the notion of wholes as always already and forever in place. Instead, it focuses on open systems in the making, thus on what is absent from systems or interfering with the emergence of stable systems, such as systemic interactions and transformations of systems that are not presently materializing. Examples of such situations abound in the real world. For instance, present societies find themselves in a dilemma since they have not found ways to bring the exigencies of their economies in line with the ecological preconditions of these economies. This is the case because the “culture” of these societies is apparently deficient in, if not counter-productive to, bringing about an effective transformation of the predominant ways of thinking about their present dilemmas. Through this monograph, I wish to support not only scientists but also artists, policy makers, politicians, system analysts, prediction experts, corporate boards, and any global attempt to safeguard human flourishing. I am providing a methodology of epistemic dialectic called DTF (Dialectical Thought Form Framework) that my students and I have practiced at the Interdevelopmental Institute (IDM) for nearly 25 years. During this time, DTF has sufficiently matured to meet the highest professional standards, especially of deep thinking, communication across professional boundaries, systems-level analysis, open-system business modeling, and, due to its dialogical features, also team facilitation, developmental coaching, and mentoring. Important for the record is this: the methodology here presented is not simply “made up” or “invented.” Rather, it is based on thorough empirical research on adults’ cognitive development over the lifespan that started 45 years ago (1978). Using the DTF methodology is long overdue. The best way to use it is as a reasoned framework for understanding the structure of people’s “movements-in-thought,” the latter seen as the generators of what people think “about,” and noticing what is absent from their thoughts due to a lack of maturity of thought. This monograph is a child of its time. I close with the belief that if more people in the world were trained to the level of dialectical systemic thinking for managing, predicting, and analyzing complex systems, fewer mistakes in safeguarding human well-being would be made; problems would be resolved sooner, and the world would become a substantially healthier and better place for much more of humanity than is otherwise likely to be the case. Gloucester, MA, USA June 2023

Otto Laske

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Bibliography Archer, M.  S. (1995). Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (1998). Culture and agency. Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (2003). Structure, agency and the internal conversation. Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (2007). Making our way through the world. Cambridge University Press. Asimov, I. (& R.  Silverberg) (1941). Nightfall and other stories. https://www.amazon.com/ dp/0385081049?ref_=ast_author_ofdp Bhaskar, R. (1979) [1989, 1998]. The possibility of naturalism. Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (2002). Reflections on MetaReality. Sage. Bhaskar, R. (2017). The order of naturally necessity. University College London Institute of Education. The Authors. McGilchrist, I. (2009). The master and his emissary. Yale University Press. McGilchrist, I. (2019). Ways of attending. Routledge. Simondon, G. (2020). Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information. University of Minnesota

Contents

1

 What Is Your Inquiring System?����������������������������������������������������������     1 The Intrinsic Fragility of “Thinking”������������������������������������������������������     2 What Does It Mean, Then, to Think as an Adult? ����������������������������������     2 The Path Not Often Taken������������������������������������������������������������������������     3 Three Inquiring Systems��������������������������������������������������������������������������     4 Three Lines of Cognitive Development ��������������������������������������������������     6 Four Eras of Cognitive Development������������������������������������������������������     7 This Book’s Central Tenets����������������������������������������������������������������������     8 Intermediate Summary����������������������������������������������������������������������������    10 Empirical Evidence of Dialectical Thinking in Adults����������������������������    10 Some Examples of Dialectical Thinking or Lack Thereof����������������������    11 Mary����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    12 Helen����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    13 Judy������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    14 Practical Wisdom ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    15 Four Cognitive Transforms����������������������������������������������������������������������    16 From Practical Wisdom to Common Sense ��������������������������������������������    17 Chapter Summary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    19 Practice Reflections����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    20 Exercises (8 Instructions and 2 Questions)����������������������������������������������    20 Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    21

2

 Modifications of Truth Over the Lifespan ������������������������������������������    23 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    23 Three Competing Mental Processes��������������������������������������������������������    25 The Link Between Social-Emotional and Cognitive Development ��������    26 Working Hypothesis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    28 Example of a Higher Epistemic Position ������������������������������������������������    29 Assumptions About Knowledge and Truth����������������������������������������������    31 Influence of Social-Emotional Maturity on Epistemic Position��������������    32 The “Stage 2,” Instrumentalist Perspective on Knowledge����������������������    33 xxv

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The Journey Toward Other-Dependence��������������������������������������������������    33 First Inklings of Uncertainty, Kept Under Wraps������������������������������������    34 The Move Beyond Other-Dependence����������������������������������������������������    36 The Murky Waters of Beginning Dialectics��������������������������������������������    38 The Onset of Post-formal Thinking ��������������������������������������������������������    40 The Move to a Self-Authoring Position��������������������������������������������������    41 A First Glimpse of Thought Forms������������������������������������������������������    44 Three Kinds of Equilibrium ��������������������������������������������������������������������    45 The Move to a Self-Aware Position ��������������������������������������������������������    46 Interlude ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    47 A Meta-Systemic View of the Merger ����������������������������������������������������    51 Chapter Summary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    53 Consequences for Coaching and Consulting Practice ����������������������������    56 Practice Reflections����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    57 Exercises��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    58 Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    58 3

 Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use ������������������������������������    61 Chapter Emphasis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    61 Different Views of Dialectic��������������������������������������������������������������������    62 Three Models of Dialectic ����������������������������������������������������������������������    63 The Four Moments of Dialectic ��������������������������������������������������������������    64 The Critical and Constructive Moments of Dialectic������������������������������    66 Moments of Dialectic Represented by Classes of Thought Forms����������    67 Dialectical Versus Kantian Inquiring Systems����������������������������������������    71 Equivalence of Moments of Dialectic in Bhaskar and Basseches ����������    74 Transforms and the Moments of Dialectic����������������������������������������������    75 The Individual Moments of Dialectic������������������������������������������������������    77 The Dialectic of Context����������������������������������������������������������������������    77 Thought Contexts��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    79 The Dialectic of Process����������������������������������������������������������������������    80 The Dialectic of Relationship��������������������������������������������������������������    83 The Moments as a Set of Relationships��������������������������������������������������    84 Constitutive Relationships ����������������������������������������������������������������������    84 Incomplete Descriptions��������������������������������������������������������������������������    85 Relationship ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    87 The Dialectic of Transformational Systems����������������������������������������    87 Transformational System ��������������������������������������������������������������������    89 From Moments to Thought Forms ����������������������������������������������������������    90 The Crucial Transition from the Second to the Third Order of Mental Complexity������������������������������������������������������������������������������    90 Comments on the Table����������������������������������������������������������������������������    91 Categorical Errors������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    95 Chapter Summary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    96

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Practice Reflections����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    97 Exercises��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    97 Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    98 4

How Well-Tempered Is Your Thought Clavier?����������������������������������   101 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   101 Part A: The Context of Cognitive Development��������������������������������������   102 Review of Cognitive Development������������������������������������������������������   102 The Path Toward Dialectical Thinking������������������������������������������������   103 The Unity of Consciousness����������������������������������������������������������������   104 A Concrete Example����������������������������������������������������������������������������   107 Interpretation of the Example��������������������������������������������������������������   108 Linking Logos and Mythos������������������������������������������������������������������   109 Cognitive Development Occurs in Phases Not Stages������������������������   111 In Search of More Ample Mental Spaces��������������������������������������������   112 Cognitive Equilibrium��������������������������������������������������������������������������   113 Assimilation and Accommodation Processes of Thinking������������������   114 Two Models of Dialectics��������������������������������������������������������������������   116 What “Develops” in Cognitive Development?������������������������������������   117 Focus of Attention��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   118 How to Distinguish the Four Classes��������������������������������������������������   119 Four Classes of Thought Forms ����������������������������������������������������������   120 Thought Form Coordination����������������������������������������������������������������   122 Critical Versus Constructive Thinking ������������������������������������������������   123 Cognitive Coaching: Using Thought Forms as Mind Openers������������   125 Part B: A Phasic Theory of the Development of Dialectical Thinking��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   126 Complex Logical Thinking as a Precursor to Dialectical Thought������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   126 What Actually Triggers Dialectical Thinking��������������������������������������   127 How Dialectical Thinking Develops Over the Human Lifespan ��������   128 The Relevance of Phase 3��������������������������������������������������������������������   130 Example ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   132 The Coordination of Epistemic, Dialectical, and Organizational Capabilities������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   133 The World as Seen in Each of the Four Phases������������������������������������   134 The Openness and Uncertainty of Cognitive Development����������������   136 An Important Distinction ��������������������������������������������������������������������   138 The Four Phases Viewed in Terms of Accommodation and Assimilation ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   139 The Stratification of “Human Being”��������������������������������������������������   140 Chapter Summary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   141 Practice Reflections����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   143 Exercises��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   144 Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   144

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Contents

 Process Model of Social-Emotional Development ��������������������������   149 A Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   149 Social-Emotional and Cognitive Orders of Mental Complexity��������������   150 Outline of Thought Development in Adults��������������������������������������������   151 The Cognitive Structure of Social-Emotional Shifts ������������������������������   154 The Stark Limitations of Developmental Stage Models��������������������������   155 Comments on the Stage-Thought Form Alignment ��������������������������������   158 The S-2 to S-3 Range��������������������������������������������������������������������������   158 The S-3 to S-4 Range��������������������������������������������������������������������������   158 The S-4 to S-5 Range��������������������������������������������������������������������������   159 Relation of Post-autonomous Stages to Practical Wisdom����������������������   161 New Research Topics������������������������������������������������������������������������������   164 Chapter Summary������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   165 Practice Reflections����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   165 Exercises��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   166 Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   166

Glossary����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   171 Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   191

Abbreviations1

Context Mode of Thinking → DTF Cognitive development (sense-making), in contrast to ED The Four Modes of Dialectical Thinking (Context, Process, Relationship, and Transformation DCR Dialectical Critical Realism DTF Developmental Thought Form Framework DTFM Manual of Dialectical Thought Forms ED Social-emotional development (meaning-making), in contrast to CD FOR Frame of Reference (world view) IDM Interdevelopmental Institute LL Lower Left Quadrant (Wilber) LR Lower Right Quadrant (Wilber) MELD Bhaskar’s Four Moments of Dialectic (1M, 2E, 3L, 4D) NP Need-Press Questionnaire (also “psychological dimension”) – not Book 3 P Process Mode of Thinking → DTF R Relationship Mode of Thinking → DTF RCP Risk-Clarity-Potential Index (in social-emotional assessment) T Transformational Mode of Thinking → DTF −T Dysfunctional psychological traits (Jaques) TAO Thinking → Action → Outcome (Martin) TF(s) Thought Form(s) U-D-R Understanding → Dialectic → Reason progression (Bhaskar) C CD CPRT

 See also the Glossary in Book 1.

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Chapter 1

What Is Your Inquiring System?

One of the crucial questions regarding the future of humanity, on a planet whose existence today’s societies are putting in doubt through their ruthless exploitation of the planet’s resources, is “What is the trajectory of individual cognitive development seen as a whole, and can this trajectory give us any assurance that future generations, supported by society in their cognitive development, will be more creative and insightful in their actions on planet Earth?” To begin with, we need to move away from the abstract notion of “thinking” itself and realize that thinking is born and dies with every individual that appears on the planet. Thinking is an endowment of individuals, not a cultural handout. Although the capability of thinking is “unthinkable” without a culture that supports it, it is nevertheless up to every individual how far they foster their developmental resources for “how to think.” These resources are not under society’s but under individuals’ control. For one thing, rather than taking “thinking” as an activity for granted, we need to learn about the starting and endpoint of individual cognitive development, and the steps leading to that endpoint. We also need to understand the generative mechanisms based on which what we call “thinking” evolves over individuals’ lifetime, if only to create entry points for supportive pedagogical interventions in schools, universities, and organizations (where “thinking” itself is rarely ever taught). In this chapter, I address the question asked in the first paragraph by introducing new concepts that can assist us in understanding what that question is asking. Toward this goal, I will initially follow Churchman (1971) in his distinction of three different Inquiring Systems and will then introduce four eras of cognitive development, followed by some cogent examples of the importance of dialectical thinking in real life. With each of these eras, I associate four sets of dialectical tools that are characteristically used in each era.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Laske, Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3_1

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The Intrinsic Fragility of “Thinking” We “think” from the time we are born, but in a very confused and obfuscated way. For one thing, the neurological circuitry that enables us to think is not fully in place at first. Until the frontal lobes fully mature at around 25 years of age, we cannot think “straight,” that is, logically. Thinking is a fragile endowment, and billions of dollars are spent to put it on the right path in childhood and adolescence, often unsuccessfully. True, we also spent billions of dollars to keep thinking enslaved to belief and feeling, thus undeveloped and tucked in with authority, as the entertainment and advertisement budgets (and now also the election budgets) show. We are thus on a perilous journey when striving to make good on the notion of Homo sapiens. An additional burden on thinking derives from the tools we use, namely concepts. Far into adolescence, thinking and belief remain mixed because concepts are primarily used to justify existing beliefs, not to explore or question them. This has to do with our initially immature notions of knowledge and truth, which remain tied to perception. As Piaget showed, as long as we cannot disengage from our own perceptions, we are both social-emotionally and cognitively immature. In addition, thinking in concepts, tied as it is to language, has its own limits, especially when we “speak without thinking.” We retain a lifelong tendency to remain subject to our thinking, that is, not in control of it. This is not helped by the fact that thinking, when not critically scrutinized, tends to become an automatic process that controls us. It is only when we decide to reflect on our thinking in our internal conversations that we can think in an optimally circumspect way.

What Does It Mean, Then, to Think as an Adult? The answer to this question is an empirical one. It depends on the status of research in human cognition. Of course, there exists a stupendous record of human thinking, whether in texts of mythology and philosophy. When consulting Western philosophy in terms of theory of knowledge  – epistemology  – we find that it is closely linked with ontology, thus theories of what is real. The question of what is “good thinking” seems to be inseparably linked to that of Being. Thinking and Being are hard to separate because when we think we already presuppose what we think about, namely, Being. Since the European thirteenth century, philosophical thinking has increasingly drifted away from ontology. “I think, therefore I am,” introduced by Descartes, has been the central notion. This is a brave move that has gotten rid of a lot of ghosts, Aristotelian or other, but unfortunately not the ghosts in the human mind itself. We are now haunted by our own ghosts rather than something we once safely posited outside of ourselves as an absolute.

The Path Not Often Taken

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In a way, that is a worse situation because to untangle it we need our minds, and it is exactly our minds which are in a muddle, not only about themselves but about being, or what is REAL. The sciences are based on this muddle, which defines their limitation. Despite the achievement the sciences amount to, scientific knowledge does not understand itself all too well and tends to mistake controlling things for insight into them. That implies that scientific knowledge does not understand its own limitations. And it is these limitations that are in focus in this book (which is based on scientific knowledge). This is the paradox we are dealing with.

The Path Not Often Taken There is one interesting option for dealing with the muddle that is human thinking, and/or the muddle it is in, and that is to look at thinking methods that have been fashioned in Western philosophy to explain what is “real.” (To delve into Chinese and Asian dialecticism here is tempting (Nisbett, 2005), but let us stick with our intellectual Greek ancestors.) Speaking of “methods” of thinking, we put forward the notion that they are methods of Inquiry, and such methods are tools for those wanting to “know.” Among these methods, the one that for me stands out in terms of reputation and subtlety is dialectical thinking. It is the tradition that for Churchman gives rise to one of three adult inquiring systems. Dialectical thinking, often referred to as “systemic,” “integrative,” or “transformational” thinking, is the central topic of this book. It provides the grounding for what seems to be adults’ most advanced Inquiring System. The term “dialectic” is Greek. It derives from the verb dialeghestai or “talking through” which describes the inner dialogue between the two parts of the thinking ego, the one that asks questions and the one that answers them. As H. Ahrendt states (1971, 185): It is this duality of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks questions and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical and critical because it goes through this questioning and answering process, through the dialogue of dialegesthai … whereby we constantly raise the basic Socratic questions: What do you mean when you say … ? except that this legein, saying, is soundless and therefore so swift that its dialogical structure is somewhat difficult to detect.

The notions of an inner cognitive dialog at the speed of light, and of “splitting off” subject from object, are profound. They imply that whatever base concept, say A, you are focusing attention on is always already connected to other concepts which are different from it, or as Plato says its “other.” This entails that what is not the same as the base concept, or is absent from it (non-A), is needed to define and understand A fully due to the common ground of Consciousness all concepts share. When we split off A from non-A, we unite everything that is not A in a group by itself of others of A. These others of A form the conceptual environment, as well as the “thought form environment,” of A. For instance, we cannot understand “road”

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(as a base concept; A) if we don’t split it off from what uses road, such as “car” (as part of the group of non-As we need to understand A). The dialectic here is rooted in treating the non-As (together) as a negation of A, and a special kind of negation at that. The specificity of dialectical negation, in contrast to logical negation, lies in the fact that what is negated is not thrown away as ‘false’ but is preserved in a memory store for the sake of a more comprehensive understanding of what is being thought about. So, when we speak of a dialectical inquiring system, we are referring to a way of thinking and asking questions about the world in which antithetical elements – such as “road” and “car” – are needed to define each other. (A road that is not used by cars is not a road, but either a runway or a mall or some cemented strip in a landscape.) In short, the negation prevailing between road and car points to something they share, although it may take further explorations to find out what exactly that is, and how exactly the two concepts relate. In a dialectical Inquiring System, we suppose that, taking a “big picture” perspective, A (e.g., road) and its Other (non-A, e.g., car) have something in common, and that we need to explore this common ground. Whatever our distinctions exclude from the base concept, we are using it as a part of the base concept’s definition (which would be so much poorer if it permanently excluded what it is not). This entails that what you are focusing on in the base concept, whatever it is, would not exist if it were not linked to what we are excluding from it. For instance, to say that two things are “different” makes no sense if they are not in some way also the “same,” which is the basis of comparing them in the first place! To say that apples and pears are “different” makes sense only in assuming that they are both fruits. Here, the concept of “fruit” is bound to the broader totality in which they are embedded, and for that reason, they can be seen as being the same as well as different. We therefore say that apples and pears are related as fruits, but not in any other way. By pursuing their relationships as our base concept, we make the discovery that not only are they related; they are also both elements of a process of natural growth. We can then shift our attention to pursuing this growth process, and thereby can “think” about how they are grown, harvested, distributed, at risk of perishing, etc.

Three Inquiring Systems C.W.  Churchman (1971) cogently distinguished different ways people have of inquiring into what is “real” and “true” for them. He called these ways Inquiring Systems, and distinguished three different systems, named after precedents in the history of philosophy (Wood, 1990, 120–121): 1. Lockean 2. Kantian 3. Dialectical (Hegelian)

Three Inquiring Systems

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For Churchman, a relationship exists between an Inquiring System and the type of problems its user can tackle. In this context arises a most important pair of notions, that of well-structured versus ill-structured problems. Well-structured are those problems in which the variables entering into them are comprehensively known and thus can be “worked on” using formal logic. But formal logic, being a closed system, fails in trying to solve ill-structured problems. While most mathematical problems and a few real-world problems can be said to be well structured, most problems in the real world are ill structured. Not all of their elements are known or, if known, are related in such a way that unambiguous and valid answers to questions about the problem can be given. In the context of ill-­ structured problems, therefore, identical data may lead not only to different, but contradictory, conclusions. Churchman thought that the simplest inquiring system used by adults is the Lockean one, named after the seventeenth-century English philosopher. In this way of inquiry, we have before us an “experimental, consensual system” (Wood, 1990, 120): For a given problem, an empirical, inductive representation is constructed. From this representation a set of elementary, empirical judgments (sense data) are retained, and a network of increasingly more general “facts” is deduced. This type of problem is highly structured in terms of the parameters of statistical decision theory relevant to problem solution.

Many of the deductive, inferential tasks in paper-and-pencil tests of critical thinking are examples of tasks requiring a Lockean inquiring system. Churchman thought that “moderately” ill-structured problems could not be solved by using a Lockean inquiring system but needed what he called a Kantian system. The crucial issue in a Kantian Inquiring System (named after the eighteenth-­ century German philosopher) is “the degree of fit between the underlying theory and theoretical predictions with the data collected under presumptions of the theory” (Wood, 1990, 121). Kantian systems are multimodal (Wood, 1990, 120): [in that] … they adopt a number of coherent perspectives in dealing with an issue. These perspectives may adopt different terminology in describing the problem at hand but are not judged to be contradictory. The(se) inquiring systems are synthetic in that there are at least two alternate representations in which the problem can be constructed. These representations are complementary in nature.

In this case, the dilemma for the inquirer is “to determine which conceptualization best represents the problem situation” (Wood, 1990, 121). As an example, we can think of the problem of alcoholism in quite different ways. “Alcoholism is simultaneously a medical, a social, an inter-personal, and a societal problem, and solutions to a given fact of the alcoholism problem involve integration of several problem perspectives” (121). Clearly, many organizational problems addressed by managers and executives are of this type, in that no event, situation, or project occurring in an organization can be understood and dealt with by using a single perspective.

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However, Lockean and Kantian problem situations do not define the limits of what adult thinking is able to address. There exist many situations, in life and at work, where people develop essentially antithetical representations or theories. These representations are antithetical because they are built upon different or even conflicting assumptions. How to promote “leadership” is an example. Literally, hundreds of theories exist that claim to define and promote leadership. In this case, only a dialectical Inquiring System (named after the nineteenth-century German philosopher Hegel) is appropriate. As Wood (1990, 121) states: When the underlying theories or representations of a problem are essentially antithetical, Churchman characterizes this inquiring system as dialectical in nature. In this inquiring system, completely antithetical representations of the problem are constructed. … These antithetical representations are interesting in that they are capable of employing the same data in supporting their view. The conflict between these representations lies in the different assumptions of the opposing models. The intense debate between the conflicting representations is often a dispute over the “true” nature of the problem at hand.

A good example for a problem requiring a dialectical Inquiring System is “global warming.” Different formulations of the problem, making different, even contradictory, assumptions about its causes and consequences, are using the same data to reach entirely different conclusions and propose entirely different remedies. Such problems require an opposable mind (Martin, 2007b) that can hold on to antithetical ideas and conceptual models. In this book I am dealing with adults’ development of different inquiring systems over their lifespan, seeing them as related by a developmental logic. Thinking of them as generative mechanisms, I show that Lockean and Kantian inquiring systems are developmentally “earlier” than dialectical ones, and therefore may both become part of a dialectical inquiring system. As a consequence, certain problems in life and at work cannot only not be solved; they cannot even be posed at certain points in one’s thinking life. (“Tell me what your problem is, and I will tell you in what phase of cognitive development you make sense of the world.”)

Three Lines of Cognitive Development One way to understand cognitive complexity is by distinguishing different inquiring systems. A developmentally more adequate way is to distinguish different though interrelated dimensions of consciousness and ask about their – changing – relationships at different points of adult cognitive development. I will call these dimensions, respectively: 1. Logical 2. Epistemic 3. Dialectical

Four Eras of Cognitive Development

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According to research, logical thinking develops between ages 10 and 25, and is thus essentially mature in early adulthood (but not earlier). This kind of thinking permits us to “not mix things up,” by carefully distinguishing one thing from the other, using logical negation. Something that is different from A, or is “non-A,” is therefore considered “false” relative to A – a strong enough notion to keep it separate from A, and thereby dismiss anything other than A, although intrinsically related to A. As a result, we can establish an orderly world that is as neat as it is impoverished in terms of truth, most likely a world composed of objects to which attributes can be assigned about which we are left in the dark regarding their relationships to each other, and to what they may share. Epistemic thinking is a matter of the development of reflective judgment (King & Kitchener, 1994). It concerns thinking itself, more precisely, the degree of certainty of truth somebody assumes to exist in their discourse. The development of epistemic thinking (judgment) goes from total certainty (in childhood) to total uncertainty (in late adolescence and beyond). At the higher stages of epistemic cognition, “truth” becomes a matter of hypothesis formulation and testing. At the higher epistemic positions, logical thinking may prevail, but dialectical thinking is increasingly an option. In fact, dialectical thinking is practically “made for” dealing with high levels of uncertainty of truth and the ill-structured problems that abound in the world seen as a transformational system.

Four Eras of Cognitive Development Churchman’s three inquiring systems form a developmental sequence. Without being able to rely on perceptual observation as Common Sense would counsel, one cannot develop more powerful tools, such as logical and dialectical ones. As the reader will come to see, adult cognitive development comprises a “logical” progression from Common Sense to Practical Wisdom. Following R. Bhaskar (1993, 21), I refer to the steps in this progression as: • • • •

Common Sense (Locke) Understanding (Kant) Reason (Hegel) Practical Wisdom

As shown in the Fig. 1.1, each of these eras can be characterized by a particular inquiring system, or set of tools. Following Bhaskar further, I refer to the tools that progressively become available to consciousness as Transforms, to convey that they predictably “transform” the cognitive dimension of consciousness. Thus, what sets Churchman’s inquiring systems apart from each other is the tools each of them puts at the disposal of thinkers. In this perspective, the Lockean inquiring system is associated with Common Sense, the Kantian inquiring system with Understanding, and the dialectical inquiring system with Reason.

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Common Sense

Lockean inquiring System Formal logic: L-Transform

Understanding

Kantian Inquiring System

Illumination: I-Transform

DIALECTIC Remediation: R-Transform

Reason

Dialectical Inquiring System P-Transform

Practical Wisdom

Fig. 1.1  Four eras of adult cognitive development

The reader will have noticed that there is no set of tools, or Transform, associated with Common Sense. As Churchman said, the tools of Common Sense are “elementary empirical judgments from which more and more general facts are deduced” (Wood, 1990, 121). Any attempt to characterize this “deduction” already has recourse to the Kantian inquiring system (Understanding), although not in its full-­ fledged form. As indicated, the Kantian inquiring system uses the Logic (L-) Transform. The reader will have noticed further that the transition from the second era, Understanding, to the third era, Reason, seems to be complex. Here, not only a single Transform, but two different Transforms make their appearance: • Illumination Transform (I-Transform) • Remediation Transform (R-Transform) In a way to be explored further, these two sets of tools lead to a third transform, called P-Transform, comprising the tools used by “Practical Wisdom.”

This Book’s Central Tenets The book’s central tenet is that human thinking is initially characterized by the “pre-­ reflective reasonableness” of Common Sense, which tolerates contradictions because it does not know what to do with them. By acquiring the tools of formal

This Book’s Central Tenets

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logical thinking – a development researched by Piaget – people learn how to think consistently and become able to engage in scientific thinking, thus transitioning to a Kantian inquiring system. This system requires them to take contradictions seriously and make them explicit, namely, as signs of falsehood. It also settles them with the limitations of (Kant’s) “transcendental synthesis” where a stubbornly remaining residual of reality, called Ding an sich (Thing-in-itself), opposes all further attempts to “understand” reality by way of reflective judgment. Remarkably, logical thinking, the foundation of Kantian Inquiring Systems, is not the last word on adult cognitive development. In late adolescence (18–25 years of age), an overlap occurs between the evolution of formal logic – then approaching its end phase – and of dialectical logic – then just beginning to emerge. This overlap makes the period between 18 and 25 years of age to be of special importance for the development of adult thinking. It is a period of great confusion for the mind simply because two different kinds of logic “wage war” with each other: logical and dialectical thinking. For this very reason, the first phase of dialectical, or “post-formal,” thinking is difficult to separate from the last stage of “formal” logical thinking. The tension between the two logics becomes highly fruitful once an individual develops a grasp of preservative or “dialectical” negation. This grasp is the gateway to using a dialectical inquiring system (Reason). For some people, the tension between the Kantian and dialectical (Hegelian) inquiring systems and eras of cognitive development is resolved in favor of formal logic, with little development noticeable beyond it. For others, an extension into dialectical thinking occurs, to various degrees that can be assessed with the tools taught in this book. The reason for this is simple: lack of cognitive potential, or lack of the ability to transform it to applied capability (to speak with Jaques). Importantly, formal and dialectical logic do not exclude each other. To the contrary, dialectical logic requires formal logic thinking as its foundation. The difference between the two logics essentially lies in the way they treat contradiction – either as a taboo or as a hook on which to hang further discoveries. While Common Sense ignores contradictions and Understanding (formal logic) treats them as a sign of falsehood, Reason (dialectical logic) uses them as a god-send tool for practicing preservative negation. By using preservative negation, a thinker’s conceptual field is broadened and deepened at the same time. To learn dialectic means to learn to use preservative negation. The special treatment of contradictions in dialectics manifests in the type of negation it uses. Dialectical negation is preservative of what it negates, in the sense that dialectical thinking holds on to antitheses for further use in exploring base concepts. Because of this, dialectical logic always stays true to formal logic, only that it treats it as a subsidiary case, or a “,” of a larger mental process as the oscillations of consciousness require. Since dialectical thinking itself constitutes a transformational system, it can incorporate any closed system such as formal logic without difficulty. Closed systems easily dissolve in dialectical Inquiring Systems since these are themselves transformational.

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Intermediate Summary As should now be clear: the successive inquiring systems regard human cognitive development over the lifespan; they indicate different eras of thought maturity. As to the handling of contradictions, we encounter the entire range from ignoring them to using them in a “preservative” way: • Common Sense [Locke] blissfully ignores contradictions, not finding anything problematic in them, or else not knowing what to do about them if they are found. • Understanding [Kant] picks up the contradictions and puts two concepts contradicting each other squarely against one another, maintaining (rightfully) that something A cannot simultaneously be something other than A, or non-A. This shows that Understanding has a limited appreciation of negation. It excludes preservative negation that holds on to what is being negated, and then points beyond it to a synthesis (In all honesty, Kant not only used the term but also acknowledges dialectics, but in a carefully hedged way too complex to discuss here, see H. Ahrendt, 1971.). • Reason [Hegel] alone knows how to work expertly with contradictions. In fact, contradictions are its main nourishment. This is so since Reason assumes – rightfully – that there is common ground between A and non-A, a broader totality that they share, such that if we negate A and keep it in our memory store, we can begin to “see” the LINK between A and its associated non-A, which will propel our thinking to something beyond both A and non-A; let’s call it “A prime” (A′). It is this A’ – the “synthesis” of A and its non-As – that as dialectical thinkers we are interested in. Its use signals a phase of cognitive development that enables the thinker to conceive of a richer, more encompassing “reality” than mere actuality. In the process of assessment, probing for Reason in semi-structured interviews enables us to determine whether interlocutors are caught in the flatland of actuality, or can “think,” and to what degree they can do so.

Empirical Evidence of Dialectical Thinking in Adults Informed by the Western dialectical tradition since Plato, M. Basseches decided in 1977 that it was time to show that dialectical thinking was not some kind of philosophical relic, but that one could demonstrate empirically how adults develop dialectical thinking as a matter of course, and not as a special endowment. Adults do so because what they experience as “reality” does not follow the laws of formal logic, and it is reality, not formal logic they have to deal with in their lives. For this purpose, Basseches examined the history of dialectical thought since Plato and singled out 24 Thought Forms (he called them schemata) whose use could be empirically assessed in adolescents and adults. He then designed an interview in which he focused interviewees’ attention on a specific topic (base concept, e.g., “education”), and guided them in their thinking about this base concept. Finally, he

Some Examples of Dialectical Thinking or Lack Thereof

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transcribed the interviews and “scored” them in terms of the fluidity with which the 24 Thought Forms were used by interviewees. For anyone who knows the history of dialectics, this was a brilliant step to take, insufficiently acknowledged to this day. Basseches found what we would expect: that while adolescents were beginning to use a dialectical Inquiring System, they used dialectical thought forms tentatively and in an uncoordinated way, whereas adult faculty  – at least some members of faculty  – used them in increasingly consistent and coordinated ways. Basseches quantified his findings by counting the number of Thought Forms that had been used by an interviewee and weighed them from 1 to 3 according to the degree of elaboration (or depth of thinking) the interviewee had bestowed on them. Basseches then checked his own scoring by educating other raters, who came very close in their judgment to his own findings (thereby achieving “inter-rater reliability”). In this way, Basseches was able to establish a fluidity index that showed the degree of dialectical thinking of members of his sample. The index showed the extent to which late adolescents and adults are extending formal logical thinking into dialectical thinking. Basseches also showed that dialectical thinking is part and parcel of adult development, and in what way (Basseches, 1984). In this book, I demonstrate and teach a refined way of empirically assessing the phase of dialectical thinking development, through an interview of my own design geared to the world of work and informed by research by Basseches (1984) (See Book 2, Appendix 1). In my view, Basseches’ research amounts to a profound experiment. As a result of this experiment, “cognitive science” went empirical in a way comparable to Piaget’s interviewing of children, only that the target sample was one of adolescents and adults. In his work, Basseches left behind speculation on how dialectical thinking works and plainly showed who is using it, and to what extent people at different stages of adult development can be expected to use it. In so doing, he also provided means to distinguish more clearly between the social-emotional and cognitive development of adults, suggesting that to mix and merge both is not an optimal cognitive science procedure.

Some Examples of Dialectical Thinking or Lack Thereof While the notion of “dialectical thinking” may at first seem esoteric, such thinking and the lack thereof are deeply embedded in the daily life of adults. This fact gives a lie to the notion that thinking is “just thinking,” rather than being a determining force in how people live their lives, whether in joy or suffering. Below follow some pertinent examples of dialectical thinking or lack thereof, given by Basseches (2005, 47–63) that show how deep the knife of dialectical thinking can cut into the flesh of life. Mary, Helen, and Judy are all mothers of daughters. Each mother has held a set of values that have guided her efforts to raise her daughter. Now, the daughters have grown up and each of them is rejecting many of her mother’s values.

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1  What Is Your Inquiring System? Mary is very troubled. She sees only two possible interpretations. If her values are right, she has failed as a parent in not having successfully transmitted those value to her daughter. On the other hand, if her daughter’s values are right, the whole foundation of the way Mary has lived her life is wrong, and Mary neither deserves nor is likely to receive her daughter’s respect. Helen, however, is shrugging the matter off. She reasons that values are totally arbitrary and irrational anyway. All people have their own values and live their lives by them, and who’s to say which ones are right and which ones are wrong. The important thing is to respect others, even if they have different values. Judy begins to think about the matter by looking at the evolution of values in historical perspective. She reasons that human values change over the course of history as old values interact with changing environmental circumstances. People need values in order to decide how to act, but in acting according to their values they change the world, and the changed world in turn leads to the development of new values. Judy understands her daughter’s values as resulting from the interaction of the values Judy tried to share with her and the experiences of the world that her daughter has had but Judy herself never had. Judy says to herself: “Instead of assuming either that I am wrong or that my daughter is wrong, I can try to see what I can learn for my future life from her values borne of her experience. I can also see how she has learned from my values and transformed them to keep up with the times.”

In terms of this chapter, Mary, Helen, and Judy use different inquiring systems and therefore are in a different phase of their development of dialectical thinking. This development can be measured by evaluating how far they have transcended Lockean and Kantian inquiring systems according to which values, however derived, are either right or wrong. Based on Basseches work quoted above, let us examine the three thinkers above a little more closely.

Mary Mary is “troubled” since she thinks strictly along the lines of formal logic. Logic says that your values (A) are either right or wrong, compared to other values (non-­ A), simply because two different sets of values cannot be true at the same time, nor can they be considered the same. The Kantian inquiring system Mary is using has emotional consequences. According to it her truths are either true or false. There is no alternative. This not only holds for the present but for the past and future as well – there is no history or process either. If Mary’s values are right, in the eyes of her daughter she is kidding herself. If they are wrong, Mary has led a wrong life and deserves to be treated accordingly by her daughter. End of story. Diagnosis • Mary has no way of dealing with contradictions other than by blaming herself if they occur, or getting angry at others who seem to be right.

Some Examples of Dialectical Thinking or Lack Thereof

13

• If she were acting from Common Sense, Mary could simply disregard the contradiction she is experiencing between her own values and those of her daughter. However, she uses formal logic to think about her values, and this leads to pain. • Acting from her Understanding, Mary cannot see that there is a connection between her own and her daughter’s values since both fall into history. In Mary’s own life, values have changed, and it would be astonishing if the values she grew up with were still the same today. However, since Mary cannot think critically, or in terms of either processes or relationships, history does not enter her thinking. • Therefore, either Mary or her daughter is right, but not both (And having social-­ emotionally remained at stage 3, of other-dependence, Mary blames herself.).

Helen Helen is in a different developmental position. It is hard to tell exactly what her social-emotional status might be, but she surely is not a self-authoring person (who would honor herself more than to assume that people, herself included, act irrationally anyway). Either because of laziness or cynicism, she is shrugging the matter off, thereby foregoing an opportunity of learning from her daughter. She is regressing to Common Sense, where contradictions don’t exist. Her statement of “who is to say which values are right and which ones are wrong” shows her to have a very limited notion of culture and convention, not to speak of history. She does not think much beyond her own little personality. Espousing a self-authoring position, she concludes that one needs to respect others “even if they have different values.” She is paying lip-service to autonomy in a way that is not based on any kind of serious self-examination, probably around social-emotional stage S-3/4. Diagnosis • Helen acts from a position of Common Sense, or pre-reflective reasonableness, where there is nothing problematic to be found in contradictions. There is therefore no need for her to leave pre-reflective thought behind. She remains safe but suffers. • For Helen, everything is relative. You have as much of a right to your values as I, and there is nothing such as social convention that connects our values. We are each of us an isolated entity, living in different, unchanging worlds, and this pluralism suits us well as long as we “respect” each other – whatever that may amount to (probably just toleration). • Helen does not see that this pluralism is very contemptuous not only of her own but also others’ values.

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Judy It is different with Judy. She has moved beyond both Common Sense and logical Understanding, and is beginning to use a dialectical Inquiring System. She therefore not only has more emotional freedom but works in a larger mental space “liberated from,” but still adhering to, formal logic. This space is that of dialectical thinking. As Basseches rightfully says, she reasons that she is part of a history which unceasingly changes existing values in interaction with changes in the social (and possibly the physical) environment, a change from which new values constantly emerge. For this “reason,” Helen can see not only that her daughter has learned from her, but that she can learn from her daughter. She is deeply aware of relationships. Diagnosis • Helen sees the values she started out with (which she conveyed to her daughter) as something that was true (for her) at the time. • Accepting the primacy of change (one of the dialectical Thought Forms), Helen knows that values are always drifting toward their own reversal or negation. • Helen applies to her values of old a “preservative negation” in which these values keep their (relative) truth in comparison with her own current values. She uses a large memory store and thus works from a large time horizon. • Thinking in terms of Thought Forms of class process, Judy is critical toward her own values of old, since she realizes that times have changed, without in any way subtracting from the truth of her former values. (That is, she “preserves” her old values as true while negating them.) In particular, she sees herself and her daughter as part of an ongoing social process they are both encompassed by, rather than casting in cement one or the other value position. • This means that Judy holds a “big picture” of the social world, including her own life, in which she can place herself differently depending on what aspect of the social world she is looking at. She experiences herself as part of an organized whole, and the latter as having limits of stability, harmony, and durability. • Judy also realizes that values stand in a reciprocal relationship with the environment in which they are used. For her, one cannot define values out of context with the environment in which they are effective. • In short, Judy is aware of the many “other” aspects of her values, her former and her current ones, that need to be included as the non-As (opposites) of her base values if she wants to be reasonable. • As a result, Judy is open to her own transformation and that of her values. Nobody is wrong; it is only that history moves on and she herself as well. • She embraces opportunities for learning what a social environment in constant transformation has to offer her and her daughter. As this analysis shows, when discussing the nature of dialectical thinking, we are far from dealing with matters that are abstract or otherworldly. We are rather talking

Practical Wisdom

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about the complexity of the lives we lead, and of the history we are part of. We are moving in a constantly shifting reality where truth is not a given but has to be worked for by entertaining and testing hypotheses, seeing relationships, paying attention to processes, making an effort to see the big picture, and staying a la qui vive.

Practical Wisdom When introducing the eras of adult cognitive development, I named the era attained by adults last Practical Wisdom. Although this notion is not going to be a major topic of this book, I will sketch a few ramifications of what I take that term to mean in the present context. When investigating psychological models of Wisdom, typically two kinds of processes are focused on (Kramer, 2003, 131): 1. Insight 2. Awareness of the relativistic, uncertain, and paradoxical nature of human problems These, of course, are not distinct but inseparable characteristics of mature thinking. When we reflect on what might make it possible for human beings to become aware of the paradoxical nature of human problems, we are likely to come upon different causal hypotheses, as does D. Kramer (2003, 132): • Individuation, in the sense of overcoming conventional norms • Integration of private, subjective experience with externally defined conventional reality • Transcendence of self, allowing for the construction of meaning on a more universal level As Kramer says, “Each model includes a process of reflecting on the particulars of contextually embedded experience (meant) to gain insight into deeper or more encompassing human truths” (Kramer, 2003, 132). The reader familiar with Laske (2005, 2023a) will notice that the characterization of the processes proposed by Kramer, vague as it is, is more social-emotional than cognitive. This shows that, as a rule, developmental researchers to this day do not adequately distinguish between social-emotional and cognitive development and either reduce one to the other or merge them into one, which comes to the same. Not so in this book! From a cognitive perspective, “individuation,” “integration of …”, and “transcendence of self” are all dialectical notions that formal logical thinking can only pretend to grasp. In contrast to the highly social-emotionally weighted notion of wisdom of most developmental research, in this book I go off the beaten path, and refer to wisdom as an epistemic attitude that derives from the adoption of dialectical

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reasoning as a life practice. As a Stance, it is associated with dialectical tools. To adopt such a practice requires a particular stage of reflective judgment (epistemic position). The practice depends on how an individual understands the nature of knowledge and truth, and justifies beliefs in the face of uncertainty. As King and Kitchener helpfully elaborate (1994, 218), there are three components of wisdom that deserve attention: 1. Wisdom comes into play in the presence of the unavoidable, difficult problems that are inherent in the lives of adults. 2. Wisdom is an understanding of the fallibility of knowledge; it includes awareness that even with increasing experience and information, uncertainty, and doubt about what can be known, or is true, will remain. 3. Wisdom includes the ability to make astute decisions; it involves a willingness and ability to formulate sound judgments in the face of uncertainty. In my view, King and Kitchener’s characterizations all require dialectical thinking, especially in that they are directed not to actuality (“what is the case”) but reality (dialectical context). They require a large mental space (memory store) in which to use mental operations by which notions such as totality, common ground, transformation, unceasing process, etc. can be worked with. In short, wisdom has a cognitive core making a social-emotional appearance. This cognitive core is supported by the two dimensions of cognitive development I have called epistemic and dialectical. One must arrive at certain notions of truth and certainty of truth (thus epistemic position), and at dialectical discovery procedures (tools) before one can carry out, or is even open to, any of the processes proposed by Kramer, above. In this cognitive sense, Practical Wisdom can be characterized by attributes of dialectical thinking that has become second nature and is therefore effortless. Such thinking: • Is holistic by nature • Conceives of what is real as a living organism embedded in unceasing transformations • Acknowledges that what is not seen [absent] is “real” on a par with what exists • Makes explicit what is implicit and hidden in what is thought about • Aims to repair absences in the form of lacks, wants, and inadequacies

Four Cognitive Transforms We have seen so far that over their lifespan humans move through four eras of cognitive development, namely Common Sense, Understanding, Reason, and Practical Wisdom. The transition from one era to another is accomplished by special sets of tools, called Transforms.

From Practical Wisdom to Common Sense

Common Sense

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I-Transform

L-Transform

Dialectical Comment R-Transform

Understanding Dialectical Reason P-Transform Practical Wisdom

Fig. 1.2  The four eras of human cognitive development and their associated transforms. (Adapted from Bhaskar (1993, 21 & 29))

In Fig. 1.2, I identify four transforms: 1. The L- or logic transform by which the mind leaves behind the pre-reflective reasonableness of Common Sense which automatically dismisses contradictions, absences, and all signs of “negativity.” 2. The I- or illumination transform by which a base concept (e.g., “road”) is further illuminated as to its initially hidden implications and preconditions. 3. The R- or remediation transform by which the now illuminated aspects of a concept are pulled together into a new synthesis, where the concept’s illuminated aspects (non-As) are seen as necessary ingredients of a broader and deeper “understanding” of the initially used concept. 4. The P- or practical wisdom transform by which I- and R- transforms are turned into a compact, simple, and habituated form that seems effortless to use but is achieved only by a long-term practice of dialectical thinking. Jaques referred to the fusion of illumination and remediation as a “bifurcation and loosening process.” To distinguish the two, one might want to refer to the activity of illumination as “making dialectical comments,” and to the process of pulling together illuminated aspects of a concept as “dialectical reasoning,” respectively. As seen above, Practical Wisdom is a manifestation of Reason in which such reasoning is habitually practiced, even unconsciously.

From Practical Wisdom to Common Sense The reader will have noticed that in Fig. 1.2 the arrow from Practical Wisdom leads back to Common Sense. The arrow points to the nature of consciousness as a transformational system in which the “highest” and “lowest” levels are intrinsically linked. To understand this better, we can follow Chinese wisdom. Such wisdom says that in their lifespan development, people lose the innocence of Earlier Heaven,

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which they inhabit prior to being born, and only at an advanced age have a chance of regaining it, namely once they decide they can leave behind all the accomplishments of Later Heaven (adult life), so full of mundane trappings and possessions they have amassed throughout their life (Jarret, 1998). According to Chinese thinking, Earlier Heaven comprises the endowment each individual receives at birth, “the seed of heaven’s intent to provide an internal standard that may guide us through life” (Jarret, 1998, 5). As the individual matures social-emotionally as well as cognitively, the simplicity of Earlier Heaven – which is that of the Dao – gets lost and becomes sacrificed to ego-centric willfulness and estrangement. It is only when ego-centrism abates as a consequence of adult development that the gifts of Earlier Heaven are recognized and returned to, at least by those who have become “wise.” This mythological conception of human life is implicitly acknowledged as significant by Piaget’s and Freud’s research. These two giants of developmental science agree, in their peculiar way, that the crux of adult development lies in the gradual loss of ego-centrism over the lifespan, as depicted in Fig. 1.3. This loss is reflected in the increasingly more sophisticated transforms (thinking tools) individuals can command, not only in social-emotional and psychological ways, as typically taught, but in “thinking” as well. Figure 1.3 exemplifies an individual’s big Subject and the small Object at the beginning of life when Earlier Heaven has just been left behind. At birth the individual is total Subject, unable to reflect on itself as object, and thus without a concept of itself. As the downward arrows indicate, the individual’s adult “subjectivity” constantly diminishes over the lifespan so that, late in life, the individual has potentially shed most of its egocentrism in favor of a huge cosmic object. As a result, the individual is ready to return to Earlier Heaven, seeing himself as a tiny speck in a huge universe that will continue after his departure. Here, as in the Chinese precedent, whether or not the individual will be able to return to its source, Earlier Heaven, depends on the capability to shed the ego-centrism of Later Heaven.

Return to Earlier Heaven

Subject

S

O

Later Heaven

Fig. 1.3  Subject-object relation over the lifespan

Object

Chapter Summary

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This Chinese myth is well suited to convey what is meant in Fig.  1.2, where Practical Wisdom is shown to lead back to Common Sense. Common Sense, while logically and dialectically immature, is nevertheless tied to something deep we can call Earlier Heaven. For a person whose dialectical thinking pervades all emotion and action, the “effort of the concept” eventually ceases. Using illuminating and remedial thinking has become second nature. As Hegel saw, at this stage of cognitive development, everything is conceptualized in its most simple form, close to what is “real” (rather than only “actual”). The person is cleansed of the obfuscations of reflection with all its “buts.” In this simple form, the person’s life can be absorbed back into Earlier Heaven, something Hegel addressed as “absolute Spirit.” In strictly cognitive terms, then, the journey of adults leads from simplicity to simplicity on the path of dialectical comment (illumination) and remediation of absences. Earlier Heaven is only reached by those who go through the most intense effort of thinking and reflection in their life. While outwardly, this is the opposite of staying in Common Sense, from a broader perspective the opposites are ONE, since they are rooted in a larger Object, namely, the cosmos itself. Individual human consciousness, as part of the cosmos, reflects the ongoing movement that brought it into being, and is subject to the same laws of unfolding as the natural life of the Dao. It is here that learning to practice cognitive development tools goes alongside compassion with all levels (phases) of thinking, whatever the (developmental) “size of person” that emerges from cognitive assessment may be. Compassion is based on the notion that every individual is doing his or her best to reach the level of Reason, and that it is this “effort of the concept” in individuals (Hegel) that matters in cognitive development. Since thinking is far from being “just a thought,” but deeply cuts into the flesh of life, being able to assess an individual’s cognitive profile at a particular time point is a valuable tool for those who work as process consultants. As the examples of Mary, Helen, and Judy have shown, how people “think” determines how they “feel” and more generally who they “are” (at a particular point in time). People with either a limited or not fully realized ability to move from Understanding and Reason can be helped by those who are able to assess others’ phase of cognitive development.

Chapter Summary In this chapter, I have taken a wide-scoped view of cognitive development, asking about its endpoint. Only by conceptualizing the end-state of cognitive development can one truly measure the peaks and valleys of human achievement. First distinguishing, with Churchman (1971), between three different Inquiring Systems, I embedded these in the even larger view of four eras through which adult thinking develops. Pointing to dialectical thinking as the achievement of transcending formal-logical Understanding, I introduced some life examples to illustrate the impact of Reason on one’s quality of life.

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Finally, I showed that Practical Wisdom refers to an epistemic Stance associated with fully developed dialectical tools. It is a stance that lies beyond King and Kitchener’s “stage 7” of reflective judgment discussed in the next chapter. Practical Wisdom has a cognitive core that has social-emotional manifestations, not the other way around. It shows the extent to which dialectical thinking, inexplicit or explicit, has become part of a thinker’s daily life practice, and heals the estrangement from Earlier Heaven that is experienced in adulthood.

Practice Reflections • In which of the four eras of cognitive development do you think you presently live your life? • How, up to now, have you explained to yourself different degrees of cognitive maturity in your clients (and in yourself)? • Should it have occurred to you that more than formal logic is involved in thinking, how have you conceptualized the “extras” your client seemed to have or lack? • What do you practically do in your interventions to move clients from Common Sense to Understanding (which entails formal logical thinking)? • What do you do to move clients from Understanding to Reason? • How, in working with clients, has the difference made here between Understanding and Reason shown up in your practice with clients? • Give an example of how getting stuck in a Kantian Inquiring System hampers a person’s alternatives and social-emotional progress. • How would you coach Helen? • What do you propose high-school and college educators need to do to facilitate their students’ transition from Understanding to Reason? • What would a digital app look like that supports the transition of its users’ thinking from Understanding to Reason?

Exercises (8 Instructions and 2 Questions) 1. Ask yourself what Inquiring System (model of truth) you are using most of the time. 2. To familiarize yourself with splitting off concepts from each other, choose a particular issue (such as “my main problem today”), give it a distinctive name (X), and illuminate (differentiate) the base concept in terms of what it implies but does not spell out. 3. Look at your findings and group them all under being “other than the base concept” or Non-X (Other than X, e.g., for a “tree” all that is outside the tree but needs to be known to understand the tree fully).

Bibliography

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4. Then consider what remains of your chosen base concept if you declare the Non-Xs as absent in the sense of “non-existent.” 5. Noticing the impoverishment of the base concept, begin to link some of the Non-Xs back to the base concept in specific, detailed ways to show to yourself that the Non-Xs in question are no less real than the base concept. 6. Then look at the larger whole that emerges when thinking of the common ground shared by X and its non-Xs. 7. Ask yourself which of the non-Xs are required to define the base concept and which are not. 8. Leaving the less important non-Xs behind, use the remaining ones to redefine your base concept at a higher level where it becomes an element of a synthesis of illuminated elements. This is the remediation of the base concept. 9. In what sense does the Remediation (R-) Transform require input from the Illumination (I-) Transform? 10. What, in dialectic, is the outcome of remediation, and in what sense is this output a more differentiated and integrated form of the initial base concept? In the sequence of exercises no. 1 to 8, you have followed the natural tendency of your mind toward dialectical thinking. You have arrived at a deeper grasp of your initial base concept (e.g., “my main problem today”; or else “tree”). In fact, you have arrived at a deeper notion of consciousness and of what it entails to “think.” When this becomes part of your daily professional practice, you will find yourself gradually transitioning from Understanding to Reason, as outlined in this chapter.

Bibliography Ahrendt, H. (1971). The life of the mind. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers. Basseches, M. A. (1978). Beyond closed-system problem solving: A study of metasystemic aspects of mature thought. Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University. Ann Arbor: UMIO, #79/8210. Basseches, M. A. (1980). Dialectical schematas: A framework for the empirical study of the development of dialectical thinking. Human Development, 23, 400–421. Basseches, M. A. (1983). Dialectical thinking as a meta-systemic form of cognitive organization. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations. Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 216–238). Praeger. Basseches, M. A. (1984). Dialectical thinking and adult development. Ablex. Basseches, M.  A. (1989). Intellectual development: The development of dialectical thinking. In E. P. Maimon, B. F. Nodine, & F. W. O’Connor (Eds.), Thinking, reasoning and writing. Longman. Basseches, M. A. (2005). The development of dialectical thinking as an approach to integration. Integral Leadership Review, 1, 47–63. Bhaskar, R. (1979) [1989, 1998]. The possibility of naturalism. Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (2002). Reflections on MetaReality. Sage. Bhaskar, R. (2017). The order of naturally necessity. University College London Institute of Education. The Authors. Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (1991). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and leadership. Jossey Bass.

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Churchman, C. W. (1971). The design of inquiring systems: Basic concepts of systems and organization. Basic Books. Jaques, E., & Cason, C. (1994). Human Capability. Cason Hall & Co.. Jaques, E. (1998a). Requisite organization. Arlington: Cason Hall & Co.; (2021 edition of Requisite Organization Publishing, https://www.amazon.com/Requisite-­Organization-­Complete-­ Guide-­2 021/dp/1867418932?source=ps-­s l-­s hoppingads-­l pcontext&ref_=fplfs&psc= 1&smid=ATVPDKIKX0DER). Jaques, E. (1998b). Time-span handbook. Cason Hall & Co.. Jaques, E. (2002a). The life and behavior of living organisms. Praeger. Jaques, E. (2002b). A simple objective measure of size of roles in managerial systems. In Executive leadership certificate program course materials (pp. 1–20). Cason Hall & Co. Jarret, L. S. (1998). Nourishing destiny: The inner tradition of Chinese medicine. Spirit Path Press. King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective judgment. Jossey Bass. Kitchener, K. S. (1983). Cognition, metacognition, and epistemic cognition: A three-level model of cognitive processing. Human Development, 26, 222–232. Kitchener, K.  S. (2006). Development of reflective judgment in adulthood. In C.  Hoare (Ed.), Handbook of adult development and learning (pp. 73–98). Oxford University Press. Kramer, D.  A. (1990). Conceptualizing wisdom: The primacy of affect-cognition relations. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development. Cambridge University Press. Kramer, D. A. (2000). Wisdom as a classical source of human strength: Historical and developmental perspectives. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 83–101. Kramer, D. A. (2003). The ontogeny of wisdom in its variations. In J. Demick & C. Andreoletti (Eds.), Handbook of adult development. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Laske, O. (2005). Measuring hidden dimensions (vol. 1): The art and science of fully engaging adults. Medford: IDM Press. Available as a pdf in Section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/ publications/; republished 2023 by Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher, Lengerich, Germany, together with its German translation, entitled Potenziale im menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen. Cited as ‘Laske 2023a’ (English) and ‘Laske 2023b’ (German). Laske, O. (2023a). Measuring hidden dimensions: The art and science of fully engaging adults. Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher (forthcoming reprint). Laske, O. (2023b). Potenziale im menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen (German translation of 2023a by R. v. Leoprechting & Otto Laske). Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher. Laske, O. (2023c). Reshaping cognitive development as dialectic social practice via Bhaskar’s four moments of dialectic and Laske’s dialectical thought-form framework (DTF). In In metatheories of the 21st century. Routledge. Martin, R. (2007a). How successful leaders think. Harvard Business Review. Reprint R0706C. Martin, R. (2007b). Opposable minds. Harvard Business School Press. Nisbett, R. E. (2005). The geography of thought. Nicolas Brealey Publishing. Wood, P. K. (1990). Construct validity and theories of adult development: Testing for necessary but not sufficient relationships. In M. L. Commons, C. Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer, & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), Adult Development (Vol. 2). New York: Praeger.

Chapter 2

Modifications of Truth Over the Lifespan

At the top of your personal knowledge chain is your stance. It is your most broad-based knowledge domain in which you define who you are in your world and what you are trying to accomplish in it. Stance is how you see the world around you, but it’s also how you see yourself in the world. R. Martin, The Opposable Mind (2007b, 93)

Introduction In terms of a “broad-brush stroke,” this chapter is about as defined by Martin above. In my view, Martin’s stroke is a little too broad, as the reader knowledgeable about social-emotional development will realize. Stance is both a social-emotional and an epistemic issue. Under the latter aspect, it has to do with what you know about your own knowing, including its limits. Since aside from its informational content, knowledge is structurally about truth, stance is centrally a matter of how uncertain or certain truth is for you. According to research, that is a matter separate from social-emotional development, namely an issue of reflective judgment. Depending on the stage of reflective judgment you have reached, you are guided by different notions of “truth.” You also justify beliefs differently at different stages of reflective judgment. Jaques (1998a) spoke of judgment as being linked to discretion and as having to do with “bifurcation and loosening” processes of the mind. He thereby implied that judgment is a purely cognitive activity, taking the specific notion people have of “truth” for granted. In what follows, I am putting Jaques’ purely cognitive concept of judgment in doubt. I do so based on research by King and Kitchener (1994). While these authors rightfully point to logical thinking as the basis of judgment, in viewing judgment developmentally as occurring over seven “stages,” they imply that in addition to logic an additional dimension is involved that has to do with an individual’s view of what is “truth” and of how to attain it. They point out that in the earliest stage of judgment development, truth is seen as “given” rather than (increasingly) as “constructed,” and that the development of judgment has to do with the modifications the concept of “truth” undergoes over individuals’ lifespan.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Laske, Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3_2

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Accepting their research findings, below I show that the mental growth process King and Kitchener point to is neither purely cognitive nor social-emotional but rather forms a bridge between the two strands of adult development. For this reason, I speak of stages of reflective judgment as epistemic positions. I do so for several reasons, one of which is that, in my view, there are stages of reflective judgment that lie beyond what the standard research pioneered by King and Kitchener (1994) has shown. While for these authors the highest point of judgment development is their “stage 7,” I show in this book that from a dialectical-thinking viewpoint we can speak of Practical Wisdom as a higher epistemic position than they deal with. Specifically, I show instead that the highest epistemic position (equivalent to a “stage 8”) is reached when the notion of truth is not simply seen as “constructed” but as the outcome of using dialectical thought forms. This assertion stands in contrast to seeing the highest stage of judgment development as grounded in the logical “bifurcation and loosening” processes that Jaques and King and Kitchener have in mind. Due to this re-orientation, the central topic of this chapter is threefold: 1. The epistemic aspect of Stance as a function of social-emotional development. 2. Epistemic position (given rise to by social-emotional development) as a bridge between social-emotional and cognitive development, and as an enable of beginning dialectical thinking. 3. The hypothesis that Practical Wisdom, fusing logical and dialectical thinking, extends an individual’s judgment development beyond King and Kitchener’s “stage 7” and Jaques’ Fourth Order of Mental Processing (which remain wedded to purely logical thinking). As far removed from workaday concerns as our topic may seem to be, you will be astonished to learn how directly epistemic position determines everything you think, do, and feel, not only in your life but at work. That’s because your epistemic position (notion of how truth is attained) determines the scope of your internal conversations on which your communication with others is based. Your mostly unconscious assumptions as to what is “true” matter not only when you are asked to justify what for you is true, but also when you deliver work based on your internal conversations (see Book 2, Appendix 1). In both cases, you are acting from (epistemic) assumptions about truth you are not fully aware of. As an example of the impact of epistemic position on the way you deliver work, the practice of using digital tools comes to mind. Present-generation apps (e.g., https:// openai.com/blog/chatgpt/), however “conversational,” take for granted that the endpoint of judgment development is King and Kitchener’s “stage 7,” not, as I have proposed, “stage 8” in the sense of Practical Wisdom. As a result, the scope of – internal and external – conversations such apps enable you to have is epistemically quite limited.

Three Competing Mental Processes

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Three Competing Mental Processes One way to stop taking thinking for granted is to think about it developmentally. Once one does, all kinds of obstacles to thinking become apparent. For instance, there are other processes of “knowing” that thinking competes with, not to mention psychological and neuropsychological preconditions that must be in place for thinking to occur. Thinking also has to conquer the automatism our conscious mental processes are prone to be hampered by. This essentially pushes them back into the unconscious domain from which they emerged. Let us start with distinguishing two mental processes often mistaken for thinking: • Perception • Belief To develop our thinking, we need to be aware of this pitfall. As shown in Laske (2023), one of the highlights of turning from social-­emotional stage 1 to 2 is the ability to detach from one’s own perceptions or take them as object. This ability typically occurs around 8–9 years of age. At that time, the acquisition of transitional objects that grounds use of symbols (Winnicott, 1989, 43. 53f.) is already ancient history. The ability to detach from perceptions is another step away from egocentrism. Perception comes to the fore, for instance, when interviewing youngsters who typically have trouble, not so much with understanding, but focusing on, questions they are being asked. In their minds, perceptual processes interfere with focus of attention, thereby obstructing thinking proper. Here is an example (adapted from Lahey et al., 1988, 191): The interviewer has been asking the speaker to tell him about himself. After the speaker has mentioned some things he likes, the interviewer has asked for more details. The speaker then says: “He likes to eat. He likes to play Star Wars with Star War figures … 5 inches tall. They have guns and sometimes they have little pockets.” Interviewer: They’re made of cloth? “Yeah, plastic … stuff inside. Cloth, bloth, sloth.” Interviewer: Why are you saying that? “Rhymes with cloth. Sloth.” Interviewer: Sloth? “Yeah. Sloth/Cloth. Cold.”

What’s happening here is interference of a fragile thinking process by an internal mechanism in which imagination, perception, and belief are all mixed up together. The perception of alliteration (cloth–sloth) mixes with a perception-based urge to rhyme things, and acoustic suggestions – like the “o” sound – lead to further ramblings. For this reason, interview questions are hard to focus on for the speaker who

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is under the control of mental processes other than thinking proper. Sequential logic has not yet taken hold of him. As Lahey et al. (1988, 193–4) comment on this social-emotional stage 1(2): First, in his naming of the relationship between “sloth” and “cloth,” we see that he has some kind of perspective from which to consider what he was about in using the rhymes; [thus,] he is not completely embedded within the impulse of making rhyming sounds [as he would be in Stage 1; OL]. Second, however, we see that he is not wholly in charge of how he follows or doesn’t follow whatever impulse comes into his head. For him, the simple fact that cloth rhymes with sloth is enough of an answer, whereas if he were fully stage 2, we would expect his answer to take into account how he got from a to b, i.e., to acknowledge that he felt like making rhymes and decided to do so. … Finally, his spontaneous jump from one topic to the next without explanation suggests a not-fully-established differentiation of his and another’s point of view. What does … [this differentiation] require? At the most basic level, it involves the capacity to take one’s perspective and impulses as object [emphasis OL] so as to coordinate a single point of view, one which the interviewee knows is separate from that of the interviewer, and which it is his “job” to describe.

I introduced this lengthy quote to clarify several things: • Social-emotional and cognitive development are both separate and inseparably linked; together they form a transformational system of great subtlety and scope whose dynamic is a dialectical one. • For this reason, they are often simplified or reduced to each other in non-­ dialectical thinking, and are thus mixed up (as in Lahey et al., 1988, 193–4). • While social-emotional development is focused on value (practical reason), epistemic position is focused on truth (theoretical reason). • Social-emotional development lacks the wide scope of epistemic position which is not restricted to the social world but equally regards the physical world (cosmos). • Social-emotional level has no direct influence on cognitive development; its influence is indirect, filtered by its influence on epistemic position. • However, social-emotional stage and epistemic position together define Stance, a term addressing an individual’s relationship to both the social and physical worlds. • How exactly social-emotional development influences epistemic position is presently a theoretical no-man’s land, largely because insight into this topic requires a distinction between social-emotional and cognitive development in the first place.

 he Link Between Social-Emotional T and Cognitive Development The best empirical evidence we presently have about the link between social-­ emotional and cognitive development of adults is owed to King and Kitchener’s research on reflective judgment (1994). These authors provide evidence that the

The Link Between Social-Emotional and Cognitive Development

27

ability of reflective judgment – of reflecting on one’s judgments – develops over the lifespan, as does social-emotional meaning-making (Kegan, 1982). My take on their findings is that the development of complex thinking, in this monograph presented as dialectical thinking, presupposes that the thinker has reached a certain “stage of reflective judgment” (such as Stage 4) at which “truth” is no longer simply “given” for a person but is seen as having to be hypothesized and constructed. Reaching a sufficiently high stage of reflective judgment (such as King and Kitchener’s Stage 4, see below) is a precondition for acquiring dialectical thinking. For this reason, in what follows I speak of “stage of reflective judgment” (in the sense of King and Kitchener) as epistemic position. I do so, not to question that King and Kitchener’s “stages” are true stages, but rather to set the line of development they describe apart from social-emotional stages that otherwise one might be tempted to mix up with them. I also choose this term because more than “reflective judgment” – however crucial – seems to be involved. In my view, in both judging and knowing, we are dealing with the positioning of the self toward its “world,” which comes under the heading of knowledge (Greek “episteme”). In short, I am distinguishing between a person’s “epistemic position” (as to judgment) and “cognitive profile” (as to complexity of thinking). As seen in Fig. 2.1, we can speak of epistemic position as “bridging” the development of meaning-making (or social-emotional development) and that of sense-­ making (or cognitive development). What is not shown by the diagram is that it is natural language which permits consciousness to be constituted in the first place (Jaques, 2002a; Liebrucks, 1964–1965). Cognitive processes, ultimately dialectical, enhance epistemic position in a feedback loop, and this enhancement eventually impacts (in a way presently unknown) the social-emotional line of development. To summarize: epistemic position is both a pre-condition for developing dialectical thinking and a conduit for the influence of dialectical thinking on social-emotional development. In addition to being a bridge, epistemic position is also a filter working in the opposite direction, namely for social-emotional influences on cognitive development. This entails that it will depend on an individual’s epistemic position how far social-emotional resources – e.g., openness to experience based on debunking internalized others – are brought to bear on furthering the acuity and clarity of thought

Social-Emotional Stage

Epistemic Position

STANCE

Phase of Cognitive Development TOOLS

Fig. 2.1 The epistemic interrelatedness of social-emotional stage and phase of cognitive development

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in the direction of dialectical thinking. The lower an individual’s epistemic position, the less does meaning-making have an impact on making sense, and the less are preconditions for attaining dialectical thinking fulfilled. Figure 2.1 implies the following: 1. Social-emotional, epistemic, and cognitive development are dialectical s (not linear causes) of the unitary transformational system called Consciousness. 2. Social-emotional stage influences how the nature of truth is conceived of by an individual (epistemic position). 3. Epistemic position, in turn, determines the level of cognitive development in terms of tools, both in terms of formal logical and dialectical thinking. Until a specific epistemic position (King and Kitchener stage of reflective judgment 4) is reached, individuals cannot gain access to dialectical thinking. 4. A feedback loop between epistemic position and phase of cognitive development is in effect, in the sense that tools influence stance, and stance guides the acquisition and use of tools (see Book 2, Chap. 2). 5. Cognitive development as per the use of dialectical thought forms determines the nature and certainty of social-emotional shifts (See Part 1 Chap. 5).

Working Hypothesis How are we to understand the notion that epistemic position “mediates” between the two strands of adult development presently referred to as “social-emotional” and “cognitive”? If the way I make meaning of myself in the world influences my take on certainty of truth (epistemic position), then this “take” will determine the tools I am able to use at specific points of my cognitive development. This “take” will also determine whether my tools are exclusively or predominantly “logical” or “dialectical” in nature, something that social-emotional development per se has no sway over. It is only when my social-emotional meaning-making challenges itself to address more than issues of social value, namely certainty of truth (sometimes misconstrued as a social value), that we enter into the domain of cognitive development. For this reason, attempts to see social-emotional and cognitive development as directly related to each other – thus giving permission to reduce one to the other – are less than cogent. Consciousness is a transformational system based on the use of natural language, and the notion of one development determining the other, or being a “necessary or sufficient condition” for it (Kohlberg, 1990, 263f.; Tappan, 1990, 242), is mistaking consciousness for a closed system. Any attempt to treat developmental lines as mere “factors” influencing each other makes no dialectical sense. It only testifies to the absence of dialectical thinking. Given that social-emotional stage and epistemic position seem to be linked, we need a hypothesis as to what this link concretely looks like. Based on my experience with analyzing social-emotional stage and epistemic position as they manifest in semi-structured interviews, I propose the hypothesis depicted in Table 2.1.

Example of a Higher Epistemic Position

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Table 2.1  Relationship between social-emotional stage and epistemic position Social-emotional stage (Kegan) 1 2 3 4 5

Relationship of self (S) to other (O) S is merged with O S and O are opposites, with O sub-ordinate to S (and an instrument for S) S internalizes O, becoming defined by O S experiences itself as a system related to O which is a different, “other” system S knows to be incomplete without O, and is dialectically linked to O with which it shares common ground

Approximate epistemic position 1 2 3–4 5–6 6–7

As proposed, ways of meaning-making and assumptions about the nature of truth go hand in hand, in a way to be determined further by empirical research. Importantly for the development of cognition as “thinking,” the higher the social-emotional stage, the more “mature” is a person’s view of what can be known and what it entails to determine the truth of something. And the more developed a person’s view of truth (epistemic position), the more likely it is, as we shall see, that the branching within cognition from formal logical to dialectical thinking will occur in the person’s mind (see Fig. 2.6).

Example of a Higher Epistemic Position Returning briefly to the quote from Lahey, above, we might describe what it documents as “absence of epistemic position,” or “epistemic position 0.” Before a person can make an object of their impulses and perceptions, any notion of truth is out of reach, not only as an abstraction but even in concrete form, as a “right answer.” It is only when perceptions have become object, and can thus be detached from, that an individual can play the role of “truth seeker.” Only then can an individual become a partner in a dialogue such as an interview, or an “interviewee,” and can answer a query as quoted below (King & Kitchener, 1994, 49): Interviewer: On what do you base that point of view [that news reporting is an objective reporting of the facts]? Interviewee: Mostly, I hear it and believe it because I figure if it’s on the news, it’s got to be true or they wouldn’t put it on.

The underlying assumption here is that one knows by reading the newspapers, a kind of language-based observation. The interviewee stresses that knowledge exists absolutely and concretely; it is not understood as an abstraction. Knowledge can be obtained with certainty by direct observation [here, reading]. However, at the developmental time point referred to in the quote, thought is still married to perception and/or belief. These three mental capabilities – thought, belief, perception – have not been separated from each other. We are dealing with epistemic position 1.

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Let us for a moment assume that the speakers in the two quotes from Lahey et al. (1988) and King and Kitchener (1994), above, are the same individual. The question then arises: What has happened between the two timepoints at which we witnessed this individual’s way of thinking? It is here that Piaget’s findings, which concern the development of formal operations from childhood to late adolescence and early adulthood, come in. As seen in Table 2.2, formal logical thinking develops over four stages, identified in terms of the mental operations possible for an individual at a particular age. Such thinking develops from reflexes to impulses to concrete observations and finally to formal operations (i.e., “formal logic”). According to recent research, this development is not complete before age 30 (Ruder, 2008). Most likely, the first time the speaker was interviewed, he was at the pre-­ operational stage where impulses had begun to be checked, but where the individual had not succeeded in making an object of his own perceptions (age 2–7). Therefore, his thinking was not “objective” enough to distinguish between his own and the interviewer’s point of view. As a result, he could not play the role of “interviewee,” which requires focusing on, and answering, another party’s questions. Since then, however, the individual in question has moved from perception- and belief-based thinking (pre-reflective reasonableness or Common Sense) to some kind of observation-based Understanding that sounds like, or is close to, social-­ emotional stage 2 where impulses and perceptions are taken as object. Interviewee: Mostly, I hear it and believe it because I figure if it’s on the news, it’s got to be true or they wouldn’t put it on. This somewhat authoritarian view of truth (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950) is characteristic of epistemic positions 1–2. These positions chime well with a beginning move out of social-emotional stage 2 to a more “other-dependent” way of meaning-making. In the quote, “news reporting” is not yet an abstraction but more of a source of “right answers.” “Truth” is not differentiated from what authorities say is true. However, a first step out of Common Sense toward Understanding has been made in the second quote, above. To strengthen the hold on logic, it will be necessary to master “formal operations,” that is, operations of formal logic. As implied by Table 2.2  The development of formal operations following Piaget Stage Sensorimotor operations Pre-operational operations Concrete operations

Age Age 0–2

Descriptions Reflex base, coordination of reflexes, development of transitional objects Age 2–6 Determination by impulses from which one cannot detach; or 7 weak relationship to objects Ages 6 or 7 Concrete observations, multiple but not coordinated to 11 or 12 perceptions and viewpoints. Thinking “in objects” prepares logical thinking Formal operations Age 11 or Beginning of abstract thinking; use of theoretical constructs; 12 up to 25 great “spurt” toward logical thinking from age 18. (not all people reach this stage)

Assumptions About Knowledge and Truth

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Table 2.2, some people never reach the point of fully thinking at this level. They get stuck in concrete operations for much of their dealings with the world, and never advance beyond a mere inkling of dialectical thinking. (For this reason, it is easy to bypass dialectical thinking as cognitive science has largely done.)

Assumptions About Knowledge and Truth The notion of Truth is not just a philosophical nicety but is of fundamental importance in everyone’s daily functioning. It will not astonish the reader of Laske 2023 (2005), to learn that assumptions about knowledge and truth are strongly influenced by an individual’s social-emotional level: the smaller one’s [social-emotional and cognitive] object and therefore mental space, the less sophisticated is one’s notion of what is true. In most life issues, ill-structured as they are, adults know of many alternatives to what is said to be true that could be explored. Equally, when asked to justify their beliefs, individuals defining themselves by different subject-object relations have recourse to very different strategies. Questions like the following are asked by nearly everyone, if not always explicitly: • Is what I know certain, or just an opinion? • Among alternative answers to a problem that I am trying to resolve, which one is true? • How can I prove what I hold to be true? • Could a person holding an opposite point of view be right? • Why am I not understanding the problem I am settled with? • What are my options in this situation? • How can I justify my action to others? • How do I best show that my thinking on this matter is consistent and “logical” (the societal norm for being respected)? Answering any of these questions requires two related things: first, assumptions about truth and knowledge, and second, tools of some kind. Using the Greek term for knowledge, let us call assumptions about knowledge and truth epistemic assumptions. This book essentially deals with the tools that are, or become, available when certain epistemic positions are reached. As a first definition of “thinking,” we can thus conjecture [f stands for “is a function of”]:

“Thinking”  f  Epistemic position  Logical  Dialectical thinking tools 



where “*” indicates combination and “➔” progression. Throughout this book, I will focus on two interrelated sets of tools, namely, formal logical and post-formal or dialectical tools. As the term “post-formal” conveys, dialectical tools are those that

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“follow” formal logic tools in adult development. They are developmentally later, more integrated thinking tools grounded in formal logic tools but transcending the latter’s reach. The next two chapters will explore in more detail this cogent, testable hypothesis.

Influence of Social-Emotional Maturity on Epistemic Position To understand how social-emotional stage may determine epistemic position, let us briefly review some of the characteristics of social-emotional stages. In (Laske, 2005), I referred to them as shown below: • • • •

S-2, or instrumentalist S-3, or other-dependent S-4, or self-authoring S-5, or self-aware

For now, let me neglect the intermediate stages involved in moving from one of these stages to another. They do not alter the general picture. Since Piaget’s death in the early eighties, good research has been done both on epistemic position and post-formal thinking. Despite this, the mixing and merging of social-emotional and cognitive aspects of development has continued unabated, with a corresponding impoverishment of developmental teachings and consulting practices. In this book, I refer to the work by M. Basseches (1984), R. Bhaskar (1993), E. Jaques (1994), and King and Kitchener (1994). While Bhaskar has written about the micro- as well as the macro-structure of dialectical thinking (superbly extrapolated from Hegel), Basseches explored ways of empirically testing the strength of dialectical thinking in individuals. Jaques, while practicing but never acknowledging dialectical thinking, formulated a theory of organizational structure as a manifestation of levels of logical thinking. According to his theory, the higher Strata are “mental highways” (De Visch 2008) work on which presupposes dialectical thinking. Finally, King and Kitchener discerned seven stages of reflective judgment, here referred to as epistemic positions, without linking them to other lines of adult development (as done here). By reason of accrued evidence about epistemic knowledge to date, we can say that people’s ways of knowing and judging is initially based on the assumption that some authority knows the truth and therefore “knows best.” Under these epistemic conditions, knowledge is absolute and certain for people, although perhaps not universally agreed upon by all, or shared by all. This innocent – and simultaneously authoritarian  – stance is typically not a lasting one, however. As people proceed through life, their experience increasingly is that knowledge is anything but certain, and that it takes a conceptual effort to ascertain the truth. People discover that knowledge is context-dependent, largely hypothetical, in constant flux, and in its formulation dependent on different logics.

The Journey Toward Other-Dependence

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The “Stage 2,” Instrumentalist Perspective on Knowledge As long as you believe that your needs and desires are the standard of what is real, your best guess at what is “knowledge” would seem to be that what is true is what you see, or have observed, no matter what others may say. You thus live in your own small subjective world, and the fact that others do, too, is not troubling to you, as little as Common Sense is troubled by contradictions. According to the “two-world hypothesis” you hold, your ME easily overrides others, which are NOT-ME for you. The two-world hypothesis you now hold has become possible because you have become able to separate yourself from, and make an object of, your perceptions. You therefore begin to be able to distinguish belief and perception from thinking and are less fooled by appearances. As a result, you can now use your perceptions to correct – and justify – your conscious and unconscious beliefs. In this state of mind, you are acting from epistemic position 1. You consider knowledge to be certain, and you justify beliefs by pointing to what you see before you or believe to be true. Your use of the ME FIRST stance has two aspects: • First, in your relationship to knowledge, you use a perception-based Lockean, Inquiring System. • Second, in your relationship with others, you treat them as an instrument for gratifying your unconscious and conscious wishes and desires, including your need for safety. These two aspects are intrinsically linked. For lack of the development of your thinking, you just cannot “see” that others have their own thoughts and feelings. Consequently, it is easy for you to treat them as instruments for obtaining the gratification of your desires, which is part of the adolescent mindset. This position is, however, a difficult one to hold, and fragile, since there is so much you need to control in others and the world. However, you have little control over others since they are nothing but a “black box” for you.

The Journey Toward Other-Dependence Following a social forcing function that implies “we keep a special eye on you, so watch out,” most people move on from this position in four intermediate steps toward an other-dependent position (S-3) where a “one-world” hypothesis forcefully emerges. (“We are all in the same boat.”) As a result, the starkly narcissistic epistemic position 1 is gradually modified. What happens is that, increasingly, a consideration of physical and internalized others enters the individual’s mind. These “others” are initially indistinguishable from ME since they are internal to it (i.e., constructed by me). Gradually, however, individuals begin to discern that what they think of as “me” is not actually convergent with what others think of them, and that others’ thoughts differ from their own, potentially fundamentally.

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Individuals thus develop a theory of other minds, and the more they do so, the more of a grasp they develop on their own mind. (For this reason, we speak of social-­ emotional development.) In terms of Kegan’s stage theory, this process begins when an individual moves into social-emotional stage 2. In epistemic terms – with a view toward knowledge and truth – the person begins to adopt in herself a separation between what perception and belief tell her to be true, and what is considered as “the truth” by others. Social-emotional and epistemic position 2 thus coincide. What remains reassuring in this second epistemic position is that although wrong and right answers to questions seem to exist, there is somebody other than me who knows what is true. While what others hold as true may also be based on perception – rather than on thinking – your own perception as a standard of what is true no longer suffices. You increasingly seek social backing, maturing in your social-­ emotional meaning-making, and this process cannot but change your notion of truth. In this second epistemic position, truth remains a concrete instance or a right answer, rather than functioning as an abstraction. It is therefore not transferable from one domain to another. No comparisons can be made between them. As a result, generating true statements remains bound to what Piaget called concrete operations, where your mental process operates on things themselves, not propositions about them. Knowledge is embodied in observable instances. Nevertheless, truth may not be fully accessible to all or available, given that it is a function of social stratification, thus also the availability of cognitive tools. For these reasons, a dualistic theory of knowledge prevails in this position. This theory is based on two main principles: • Truth is represented by concrete instances. • To learn the (ultimate) truth, one must refer to authorities who know. In this epistemic position, you are readying yourself for defining yourself increasingly by others’ opinions and expectations. They become the guarantors of your self-identity. While you are still largely driven by your unconscious needs, you increasingly manage to subordinate them to what is socially expected of you. In terms of your truth seeking, “most issues are assumed to have a right answer” and beliefs can be justified “by correspondence with beliefs of an authority figure” (King & Kitchener, 1994, 14).

First Inklings of Uncertainty, Kept Under Wraps It is easy to imagine what the next epistemic position will be that people grow into. If knowledge and truth are certain but not always directly available, then they are “temporarily uncertain.” This is surely confusing, especially if you need to make decisions that depend on your knowing what is true. But you can assume that, while not available right now, the truth will manifest in the form of concrete data at a

First Inklings of Uncertainty, Kept Under Wraps

35

future point. In this way, you hold off the frightening notion that knowledge and truth might remain forever uncertain. As a result, in the third epistemic position, people are firmly married to a consensual Lockean Inquiring System. Based on this system, they inductively construct perception-based representations of things, and make judgments of different levels of generality depending on how much formal logic they can muster (Wood, 1990, 120). They think in terms of concrete systems that contain dimensions where certainty will emerge only gradually, at some future time. At this point, even authorities no longer have the right answers. Consequently, people can believe what they want. It’s all a matter of personal beliefs. Thus, differences of opinion result from not knowing answers with certainty but also because the link between evidence and belief is unclear (King & Kitchener, 1994, 14, 55). Consequently, a person making sense at this epistemic position will justify thoughts and actions based on his mere opinion. Overall, the move to the third epistemic position, while remaining bound to evidence in the form of concrete instances of events, situations, etc., leads to a loosening of the belief in the absolute certainty of knowledge and truth. At the same time, there is a move out of Common Sense (and thus the Lockean Inquiring System) to the extent that logical tools are beginning to hold sway over perceptions and beliefs. As with all developmental positions, the present one already contains the seed of its own demise (a tendency I will address in Chap. 6 in terms of preservative negation). As King and Kitchener state (1994, 57): As the person who holds Stage 3 assumptions meets increasingly diverse areas of uncertainty and diversity while concomitantly being asked for justification of beliefs, movement toward Stage 4 is encouraged.

For a better grasp of the matter, the above discussion is summarized in Table 2.3. The first three epistemic positions just outlined are summarized by the first three rows of the table, followed by subsequent epistemic positions to be discussed. Table 2.3 links epistemic positions annotated in column 2 to approximate social-­ emotional stages. Approximate physical age is conjectured following King and Kitchener’s findings (1994, 149). According to my hypothesis, reaching specific social-emotional stages seeds epistemic advances rather than directly determining them. What this means concretely remains to be established, but it for sure rules out linear, causal links. In the progression shown in the table, a crucial transition is that from epistemic position 3 to 4 leading from Common Sense to Understanding, that is, from a Lockean to a Kantian Inquiring System. However weakly, in a way difficult to distinguish from formal logical thought, individuals develop a first inkling of dialectical thinking (Basseches, 1984). The result first appears in a negative form, where nothing seems certain, “anything goes,” and anything can be proven true. We have reached the stage of sophistry, first discerned by Plato, although the resulting confusion is involuntary.

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Table 2.3  Epistemic positions in adulthood with link to ED scores Approximate social-emotional stage [conjectured Assumptions about knowledge and truth(epistemic age] positions) Absolute and certain; knowledge = belief. Knowledge S-1(2) to S-2/1 is a right answer [12 20 26 35 41?] thinking”) of opposites is considered and used to construct Phase 4 of dialectical thinking holistic perspectives Epistemic position [or stage of reflective judgment] 1 Common Sense (“pre-reflective”) 2

Ages are conjectured based on King and Kitchener’s empirical findings (1994, 149)

The Move Beyond Other-Dependence The movement to the fourth epistemic position is momentous since it represents the entry into thinking in abstractions (Piaget’s “beginning formal operations”). Wherever abstractions are present in a mind, dialectical thinking has become a possibility. The beginning use of abstractions is the main reason for speaking of a maturation of logical thinking at this developmental juncture. The abstractions used remain idiosyncratic to the knower. His/her thinking becomes “quasi-reflective” in the sense that “knowledge claims are … idiosyncratic to the individual” and thus always involve an element of ambiguity (King & Kitchener, 1994, 14–15). This ambiguity, however, makes abstractions available for “dialectical” use, where the mind consciously plays with contradictions rather than falling prey to them involuntarily. In the Loevinger research tradition (1976; Cook-Greuter 2020/1999; Kegan, 1982; Kegan & Lahey, 1994), it is habitual to interpret social-emotional stages as

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The Move Beyond Other-Dependence

indicating increasingly higher levels of cognitive development. When thinking in epistemic terms, however, this is unwarranted. There are several unfortunate consequences that result from reducing cognitive to social-emotional development: • The complexity of cognitive development is simplified since its epistemic, logical, and dialectical strands are reduced to a single dimension seen as the dominant one. • Simultaneously, the difference between logical and dialectical thinking is obliterated to the greater glory of social-emotional stage. • No reasonable explanation of the processes by which social-emotional shifts actually occur is and can be given. • Overall, the complexity of adult development is unnecessarily simplified and homogenized, and the hiddenness of stage in actual experience hidden further. As shown, it makes sense to align social-emotional stage with epistemic position, leaving logical and dialectical indicators out of the matter. The alignment proposed in Table 2.4 is hypothetical and awaits further research outcomes. As this table shows, increasing epistemic position makes possible more complex thinking about subject (S) and object (O), Me and Not-Me. The more uncertain I become of truth, the more uncertain I also become of being or having the truth myself, and the greater is my ability to forego identifying with authorities who pretend to represent truth for me. Consequently, the more I am also able to embrace what is “other than” (different from) me as my object and make myself into an object of my own reflection. As a result, we are witnessing a complex interweaving of epistemic, social-­ emotional, and purely cognitive strands, the latter diverging further into a logical and dialectical branch. We are dealing with a transformational system, that of consciousness, regarding which it is unfruitful to think in terms of “factors” and linear causes. Even leaving neuro-scientific issues out of the picture – which can never account for meta-psychological or epistemological issues such as consciousness poses anyway – we need to acknowledge that we’re dealing with a complex feedback system Table 2.4  Relationship between social-emotional stages and epistemic positions Social-emotional Stage Relationship of self (S) to other (O) 1 S is merged with O 2 S and O are opposites, with O sub-ordinate to S (and an instrument for S) 3 S internalizes O, becoming defined by O 4 S experiences itself as a system related to O which is a different, “other” system 5 S knows to be incomplete without O, and is dialectically linked to O with which it shares common ground

Approximate epistemic position 1 2 3–4 5–6 6–7

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that is in constant transformation. In this system, the social-emotional and epistemic strands mutually form each other’s shared common ground. Cognitive development is the beneficiary of their interaction, promoting social-emotional development in turn. This dynamic is beyond any linear causal explanation. It is, rather, a transformational thus dialectical one.

The Murky Waters of Beginning Dialectics Returning now to Table 2.3, excerpted below, we see that epistemic position 4, in its beginning use of abstractions, makes room for a very elementary kind of dialecticism. Embedded in this kind of thinking is an inkling that contradictions are not the simple falsehoods that formal logic wants to persuade us of but are rather potential mind openers for higher levels of thinking, and thus have a value beyond the confusion and ambiguity they initially instill. However, in what way this beginning awareness of the dialectical core of thinking is contemporary with the increasing social-emotional disambiguation of internalized others and the increasing internalization of conventions has so far remained a no-man’s land in cognitive research. Epistemic position [or stage of reflective judgment] 4 Understanding (“quasi-reflective”) Phase 1 of dialectical thinking

Assumptions about knowledge and truth Knowledge and truth are abstractions but idiosyncratic to the knower; characterized by ambiguity

Approximate social-­ emotional stage [and conjectured age] S-2/3 to S-3 [>20 26  10 35 20 26 35 41?]

[Excerpt of Table 2.3] Beyond merely acknowledging the uncertainty of knowledge and truth, Manager C takes greater risks in being in error. His “we” implies a knowledge of the limits of his own subjective views. He is fully aware of dealing with ill-structured problems, where one is settled with incomplete information, and he foresees investing a large effort in harnessing new data to new hypotheses. Overall, C’s view of his company’s situation is meta-systemic, in the sense that C is coordinating different systems-in-­ transformation. He strives to establish equilibrium between all the factors involved in the situation he describes.

Chapter Summary In this chapter, I have provided a link between social-emotional development and the epistemic dimension that has to do with how, over the lifespan, adults modify their notion of knowledge and certainty of truth. I have hypothesized and, to some extent, illustrated, how social-emotional positioning translates into adults’ view of the limits of knowledge, in particular the boundary between subject (Me) and object (Not-Me). Of course, the epistemic object, comprising anything that can be known, is substantially larger than the social-emotional world. It is shared by the sciences. When including epistemic position in the theory of adult development our view of mental growth becomes more differentiated and thus complex. The dialectics developmental theory then needs to deal with deepens. More precisely, we are dealing with a twofold dialectic: • The one separating as well as linking social-emotional and epistemic development • The one separating as well as linking logical and dialectical thinking In Fig.  2.6, these dialectics are encapsulated in the feedback loop between Stance, Tools, and Experience (Martin, 2007b).

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CONSCIOUSNESS

Social-emotional Epistemic

Cognitive Logical

STANCE

Dialectical

TOOLS EXPERIENCE

Fig. 2.6  The unity of human consciousness based on the dialectics of stance, tools, and experience

Once one distinguishes social-emotional from cognitive development, and within cognitive development distinguishes further between the epistemic, logical, and dialectical dimension of development, one needs to clarify the difference between these dimensions, and ultimately their relationship and common ground. At this point in time, cognitive science has not achieved this clarification. Consequently, we have to rely on the best guesses we can make using available theories and data. Given the unity of consciousness and the imperative to do justice to it in research, we are of course interested in finding the best answers possible to questions about how the different mental growth progressions in consciousness relate to, and align with, each other. In Fig.  2.6, we become aware that one and the same social-­ emotional profile can be associated with many different cognitive profiles, both in terms of epistemic position and degree of dialectical thinking. This fact shows that cognitive profiles are less generic than social-emotional ones, in the sense that they are more unique to a specific individual, although not as unique as is a behavioral assessment, however obtained. This difference in degree of abstraction from the concrete individual has to do with the fact that cognitive development is subject to influences of education, coaching, mentoring, as well as daily practice. You cannot practice your social-emotional stage or epistemic position, which simply “position” you in the adult-developmental landscape. In contrast to this rather passive positioning, however, you can practice your thinking, which ultimately is the source of your adult development. When acknowledging the dialectics of different lines of adult development, both in themselves and in relation to other lines, it is important to keep in mind that they represent different degrees of abstraction. Not all of them capture the concrete individual equally well, especially not as a human agent living in a causative relationship with the world (Bhaskar, 1993). This is illustrated in Fig. 2.7. The diagram shows a hierarchy of developmental assessment outcomes, with the most generic on top. It refers to the three perspectives on individuals taught and

Chapter Summary

55 Social-emotional nature (ED) Cognitive nature (CD) Concrete singularity of individual (NP)

Fig. 2.7  The concrete singularity of the human agent

practiced at the Interdevelopmental Institute: CD [cognitive development], ED [social-emotional development], and NP, which stands for “Need/Press,” a psychoanalytically based behavioral profile. The diagram conveys that any social-emotional score  – whether derived from Loevinger’s or Kegan’s or any other model  – is the most generic developmental score imaginable, and therefore says very little about the concrete individual to which it is assigned. In contrast to language tests such as the Sentence Completion Test (SCT), recorded semi-structured interviews used in CDF make visible the full personality of an individual, including his or her body language expressions. But even in this assessment approach, the social-emotional score remains epistemologically abstract since it applies to millions of people presently living at one and the same stage. The score is thus an empty shell into which one is tempted to pour arbitrary detail. By contrast, the cognitive score – in CDF pertaining to fluidity of dialectical thinking – is more highly tuned to a specific individual, although not as uniquely associated with him or her as are behavioral scores – e.g., psychoanalytic outcomes. Getting carried away with social-emotional scores, as has happened in the last 20 years, is surely a sign of developmental thinking in its infancy. In this context, Fig. 2.7 clarifies and demonstrates several things: • To understand the concrete individuality of a human agent, one needs to consider not only the developmental, but also the behavioral, dimension of human agency, by interpreting the latter in the context of the former (an art in itself). • The full “humanity” as well as predicament of a human agent can be theoretically captured by integrating scores of different levels of abstraction, as long as they are grounded in an assessment of adult development that triangulates social-­ emotional and cognitive scores (Bhaskar, 1993, 267). • Social-emotional scores alone, regardless of what cognitive meanings may be put on them by interpreters (who have their own cognitive cross to bear), are the most generic of all developmental scores, and therefore say very little about the concrete individual in question. • Cognitive scores that differentiate degrees of fluidity of dialectical thinking amount to a further differentiation of adult developmental research outcomes. As can be expected, cognitive assessment differs from social-emotional assessment both in method and focus. As shown in Part 3 of this book, cognitive growth can be measured in terms of the use an individual makes of dialectical thought

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forms in a one-hour “cognitive interview.” The interview renders a set of three scores, two of which implicitly point to the assessee’s epistemic position. The scores make possible a comparison showing whether an individual’s cognitive profile is within the expected range of the social-emotional one or not. It is an empirical question entirely what cognitive profile is associated with a particular social-emotional score (Laske, 1999). Importantly, both scores together define a framework for understanding an individual’s behavioral profile, whether deriving from the Enneagram, Need/Press or another assessment (Laske, 2008). By triangulating three independent assessments, holistic and comprehensive feedback to clients becomes possible, as exemplified by work with the Constructive-­ Developmental Framework that this book is based on. The reader will have understood, based on this chapter, that the decisive watershed in cognitive development is the ability in epistemic position 5 to use abstractions, and move onward toward the comparison and coordination of abstractions in epistemic position 6. This ability marks a decisive turn of the cognitive-­developmental journey from perception-based, subjective truth to a publicly negotiated truth based on rules of hypothesis formulation and testing. As I show in later chapters, it is in the illumination of base concepts, Jaques’ “loosening and bifurcation process,” that brings about the dialectical turn in the U-D-R movement of thinking. Once such thinking is applied to adult developmental research itself, and that research is carried out in the Third Order of Mental Complexity rather than the Second (as presently), another revolution in understanding the human agent is going to occur. This is so because if a methodology is not at the level of complexity of its subject matter, as is presently the case, the subject matter naturally suffers.

Consequences for Coaching and Consulting Practice Using the example of three managers, I have attempted to convey the flavor of the development of thinking from quasi-reflective (position 4) to epistemic position 6. I have implied that moving up in epistemic positions is not by definition coincident with developing dialectical thinking, only that the opportunities to engage with such thinking become more plentiful as higher epistemic positions are reached. In terms of process consulting, the potential divergence of social-emotional, epistemic, and cognitive positioning of an individual opens a large field of opportunity for what is referred to as “cognitive coaching/mentoring.” This term taken in its behavioral sense only refers to the use of formal logical devices and excludes dialectical thinking. By contrast, in this book the term cognitive coaching takes on a more comprehensive meaning. It refers to ways of assisting clients in leaving behind the straight jacket of logical thinking in the Second Order of Mental Processing and working toward a fluidity of thought form use that, while grounded in formal logic, suspends the logical identity principle and its highly limited concept of negation.

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Thinking in the Third Order Mental Processing (Jaques, 1998a) enables a thinker to gain holistic insight into the manifold transformations of living and organizational systems we are and live within. How far an individual can move into this Order where dialectical thinking prevails is a matter of his or current potential capability or fluidity of thought. This capability can be measured in terms of the Four Moments of Dialectic, the topic of the following chapter. While dialectical thinking is often viewed as a purely cognitive matter, it should be clear from this chapter that such thinking becomes possible only once a person reaches epistemic position 4. This is so since for a thinker to adopt dialectical thought forms requires that s(he) is on her way from Understanding to Reason, and thus understands that Truth is constructed, and never given. In addition to this epistemic precondition of dialectical thinking, it stands to reason, as shown in Table 2.1, that when (social-emotional) other-dependence prevails (or self-authoring is not reached), the likelihood of a need to use dialectical thought forms consistently is small. In short, it makes no sense to consider the capability of dialectical thinking out of context with an individual’s epistemic position (stage of reflective judgment) and social-emotional position (stage of meaning-making). After all, there is a single consciousness within which these strands of development cohere.

Practice Reflections • In your work as a process consultant, have you noticed that clarity of thinking is not always a matter of thinking “logically” but rather of being able to grasp the transformational complexity of reality in terms of dynamic systems? • In working with executives, how do you determine whether their thinking moves within the confines of a closed system or not? • How do you go about opening a Lockean Inquiring System to a Kantian or dialectical one? • Can you tell “pre-reflective” and “quasi-reflective” thinkers apart by epistemic position, and if so, how do you accomplish that? • Do you think that being able to assess clients’ epistemic position would help you get a clearer view of how to be of help to them? How so? • Do you think that if you could discern the thought forms a client is predominantly using, you could refine the cognitive coaching strategies you now use in your professional work? • What is your experience regarding the correspondence between epistemic and social-emotional position indicated in Table 5.1? • How would you structure a cognitive interview to discern epistemic position? • How would you structure a cognitive interview whose purpose it is to discern thought fluidity in the sense of dialectical thinking? • What for you is Practical Wisdom if it is not what I suggest, namely dialectical reasoning that has become second nature?

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Exercises 1. Listen to one of your clients and try to discern his or her epistemic position, by asking: “How would you justify this belief (or decision)?” 2. At what epistemic position does thinking begin to be distinguished from belief, as shown by how beliefs are justified? 3. In what way does social-emotional stage influence epistemic position? 4. How does an adult at an “other-dependent” social-emotional position such as S-3/4 most likely justify his or her beliefs? 5. What is the difference in justifying beliefs at epistemic positions 5 vs. 6? 6. What, according to this chapter, are the two aspects of Stance that need to be distinguished and how do they influence each other? 7. What is the gain in Understanding Manager B can be credited with compared to Manager A? 8. What is the gain in Reasoning Manager C shows compared to Manager B? 9. Why is it often difficult to determine with certainty whether somebody’s thinking has moved into Phase 1 of dialectical thinking? 10. What is the essence of the U-D-R movement into Reason, both from the point of view of cognitive development, and of learning to “think better.”

Bibliography Adorno, T. W. (1978). Minima moralia. Verso. Adorno, T. W. (1993). Hegel: Three studies. MIT Press. Adorno, T.  W. (1999). Negative dialectic. Continuum. [Negative Dialektik. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1966]. Adorno, T. W. (2008). Lectures on negative dialectic: Fragments of a lecture course 1965/66. Polity. Basseches, M. A. (1978). Beyond closed-system problem solving: A study of metasystemic aspects of mature thought (PhD dissertation). Harvard University. Ann Arbor, MI: UMIO, #79/8210. Basseches, M. A. (1980). Dialectical schematas: A framework for the empirical study of the development of dialectical thinking. Human Development, 23, 400–421. Basseches, M. A. (1983). Dialectical thinking as a meta-systemic form of cognitive organization. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations. Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 216–238). Praeger. Basseches, M. A. (1984). Dialectical thinking and adult development. Ablex. Basseches, M.  A. (1989). Intellectual development: The development of dialectical thinking. In E. P. Maimon, B. F. Nodine, & F. W. O’Connor (Eds.), Thinking, reasoning and writing. Longman. Basseches, M. A. (2005). The development of dialectical thinking as an approach to integration. Integral Leadership Review, 1, 47–63. Bhaskar, R. (1979, 1989, 1998). The possibility of naturalism. Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (2002). Reflections on METAREALITY. Sage Publications. Bhaskar, R. (2017). The order of naturally necessity. University College London Institute of Education. The Authors.

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Commons, M. L., & Bresette, L. M. (2006). Illuminating major creative scientific innovators with postformal stages. In C. Hoare (Ed.), Handbook of adult development and learning. Oxford University Press. Commons, M. L., & Richards, F. A. (1984). A general model of stage theory. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations (Vol. 1, pp. 120–140). Praeger. Commons, M.  L., Richards, F.  A., Kuhn, D., & D. (1982). Systematic and meta-systematic reasoning: A case for levels of reasoning beyond Piaget’s stage of formal operations. Child Development, 53, 1058–1068. Commons, M. L., Trudeau, E. J., Stein, S. A., Richards, F. A., & Krause, S. R. (1998). The existence of developmental stages as shown by the hierarchical complexity of tasks. Developmental Review, 10, 323–340. Cook-Greuter, S. (2010). Postautonomous ego development. Integral Publishers. De Visch, J. 2008. Managers’ mental highways: Introducing dialectical thinking in re-designing competence-based approaches. IDM Hidden Dimensions Newsletter, 4(5), See http://www. interdevelopmentals.org/ezine/2008-­10.html De Visch, J. (2010). The vertical dimension: Blueprint to align business and talent development. Connect&Transform Press. De Visch, J. (2017). Re-thinking. A powerful practice for complex times. www.connecttransform.be De Visch, J., & Laske, O. (2018). Dynamic collaboration, www.connecttransform.be De Visch, J., & Laske, O. (2020). Practices of dynamic collaboration. Springer. Fischer, K. W. (1980). A theory of cognitive development: The control and construction of hierarchies of skills. Psychological Review, 87, 477–531. Jaques, E. (1998a). Requisite organization. Cason Hall & Co.; (2021 edition of Requisite Organization Publishing, https://www.amazon.com/Requisite-­Organization-­Complete-­ Guide-­2021/dp/1867418932?source=ps-­sl-­shoppingads-­lpcontext&ref_=fplfs&psc=1&smid= ATVPDKIKX0DER). Jaques, E. (1998b). Time-span handbook. Cason Hall & Co. Jaques, E. (2002a). The life and behavior of living organisms. Praeger. Jaques, E. (2002b). A simple objective measure of size of roles in managerial systems. In M. A. Gloucester (Ed.), Executive leadership certificate program course materials (pp. 1–20). Cason Hall & Co. Jaques, E., & Cason, C. (1994). Human capability. Cason Hall & Co. Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self. Harvard University Press. Kegan, R., & Lahey, L. L. (1994). In over our head. Harvard University Press. Kegan, R., & Lahey, L. L. (2009). Immunity to change. Harvard University Press. Kegan, R., et al. (2016). An everyone culture. Harvard University Press. King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective judgment. Jossey Bass. Kitchener, K. S. (1983). Cognition, metacognition, and epistemic cognition: A three-level model of cognitive processing. Human Development, 26, 222–232. Kitchener, K.  S. (2006). Development of reflective judgment in adulthood. In C.  Hoare (Ed.), Handbook of adult development and learning (pp. 73–98). Oxford University Press. Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on moral development, Vol. 1: The philosophy of moral development. Harper & Row. Kohlberg, L. (1990). Which postformal levels are stages? In M.  L. Commons, C.  Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer, & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), Adult development (Vol. 2, pp. 263–268). Praeger. Lahey, L., Souvaine, E., Kegan, R., Goodman, R., & Felix, S. (1988). A guide to the subject-object interview: Its administration and interpretation. Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University. Laske, O. (1999). Transformative effects of coaching on executives’ professional agenda. PsyD Dissertation (2 vols.), Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology. Bell & Howell. (Order no. 9930438).

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Laske, O. (2005). Measuring hidden dimensions (vol. 1): The Art and science of fully engaging adults. Medford, IDM Press, available as a pdf in Section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/ publications/; republished 2023 by Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher, Lengerich, Germany, together with its German translation, entitled Potenziale im Menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen. Cited as ‘Laske 2023a’ (English) and ‘Laske 2023b’ (German). Laske, O. (2008). Measuring hidden dimensions (vol. 2): Foundations of requisite organization. IDM Press, available at Section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/ Liebrucks, B. (1949). Platons Entwicklung zur Dialektik. V. Klostermann. Liebrucks, B. (1964). Sprache und Bewusstsein (Vol. 1). Peter Lang. Liebrucks, B. (1965). Sprache und Bewusstsein (Vol. 2). Peter Lang. Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically. Information Age Publishing. Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development: Conceptions and theories. Jossey-Bass. Loevinger, J., Hy, L., & Bobbitt, K. (1998). Revision of the scoring manual. In J. Loevinger (Ed.), Technical foundations for measuring ego development: The Washington university sentence completion test (pp. 19–24). Lawrence Erlbaum. Martin, R. (2007a). How successful leaders think. Harvard Business Review. Reprint R0706C. Martin, R. (2007b). Opposable minds. Harvard Business School Press. Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. Basic Books. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. Basic Books. Piaget, J. (1964). Relation between affectivity and intelligence in the mental development of the child. Sorbonne. University Documentation Center. Piaget, J. (1970). Structuralism. Basic Books. Piaget, J. (1972). Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood. Human Development, 91, 133–141. Ruder, D. B. (2008). The teen brain: A work in progress. Harvard Magazine, 111(1), 8–10. Tappan, M. B. (1990). The development of justice reasoning during young adulthood: A three-­ dimensional model. In M. L. Commons, C. Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer, & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), Adult development: Models and methods in the study of adolescent and adult thought (Vol. 2, pp. 235–248). Praeger. Winnicott, D. W. (1989). D. W. Winnicott: Psycho-analytic explorations. (C. Winnicott, R. Shepard & M. Davis, Eds.). Harvard University Press. Wood, P. K. (1990). Construct validity and theories of adult development: Testing for necessary but not sufficient relationships. In M. L. Commons, C. Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer, & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), Adult development (Vol. 2). Praeger.

Chapter 3

Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use

Chapter Emphasis This chapter is in two parts. In the first, I outline the core ideas of dialectic and its moments, while in the second, I explore the dialectic inherent in each of the Four Moments. We have seen so far that the mental growth reflected in the higher epistemic positions provides a needed basis for leaving behind the closed-system perspective of formal logical thinking in the Second Order of Mental Complexity. Speaking of this perspective, we witnessed the difficulties Jaques encountered when trying to explain the cognitive development required for moving from one Stratum to another in purely logical terms. It became clear that the development of logical thinking alone cannot explain how someone might become able to carry Stratum V responsibility, which requires systemic thinking in the Third Order of Mental Complexity. Although Jaques masterfully moved issues such as “Work” and “Organization” from Common Sense to Understanding, in his theoretical work (in contrast to his practice) he did not enter the Third Order of Mental Complexity, which is one of dialectically grounded systems thinking. Although a genius, Jaques did not muster the methodological tools required for maintaining a truly open-system perspective characteristic of the Third Order of Mental Complexity. This chapter focuses on the structure of thinking in the Third Order of Mental Complexity (Jaques’s order C) viewed as the realm of Dialectics. I discuss four dimensions or “s of Dialectic” and outline the nature of each of them from the point of view of two different models of dialectic, that by Bhaskar (1993) and by Basseches (1984). I use the resources of the 2500-year-old dialectical tradition to lead the reader into the domain of transformational systems and meta-systemic thinking. I am helped in this endeavor by my studies at the Frankfurt School (1956–1966), especially with M. Horkheimer and Th. W. Adorno (1993, 1999), and my knowledge of the Western philosophical tradition generally. Of additional help has been © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Laske, Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3_3

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R.  Bhaskar’s Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (1993), in which he has critically re-evaluated and updated the Frankfurt School founded by my Frankfurt teachers. An exception to the neglect of dialectical thinking in contemporary cognitive research is M. Basseches’ work. Between 1978 and 1989, this genetic epistemologist and, later, clinical psychologist, empirically harnessed dialectical thinking to practical use by creating a “cognitive interview” and an associated methodology to evaluate it. The interview is focused on the degree of fluidity of dialectical thinking of adolescents and adults and is scored by way of the Dialectical Schema Framework (DS).

Different Views of Dialectic “Dialectic” is the collective name for discovery procedures lying dormant in every human mind. It is practiced not only in the Western tradition, but wherever humans think. However, it looks and feels different for people depending on the era of cognitive development they find themselves in, and consequently, the Inquiring System they are presently using: • From the point of view of Common Sense (first order of mental complexity), where contradictions are never noticed or, if so, tolerated with largesse, dialectic appears as a way of thinking by which notions such as “Whole,” “Balance,” and “Context” can be given more precise meaning, and hidden meanings can be unearthed. • From the point of view of Understanding (second order of mental complexity), where contradictions are falsehoods that cannot be tolerated, dialectic appears as the violation of eternal “laws of logic” and, positively, as a means for resolving certain inevitable paradoxes and contradictions of minds by people duly serving as administrators of closed systems (e.g., Kant). • From the point of view of Reason (third order of mental complexity), where contradictions are food for thought held within a large memory store and time horizon, dialectic is a necessary extension of formal logic that uses preservative negation to relieve thinkers of the limitations they have created for themselves (Preservative negation considers contradictions not as fatal or “false,” but as leading the way to thinking “outside the box.”). • From the point of Practical Wisdom (Fourth Order of Mental Complexity), where the three strands of cognitive development have merged and dialectical thinking has become second nature, dialectic is an indispensable tool for grasping what is real as a symbol of a much larger reality created by the mind, where the pains of Understanding have ceased together with the triumphs of dialectic. Here, the human mind in its maturity returns to its ancestral home, Earlier Heaven, in the form of a new kind of Common Sense that includes dialectic as a matter of course.

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As is apparent, these different views of dialectic are worlds apart, as would be expected based on differences in cognitive development over the lifespan. As little as people at social-emotional stage 2 talk to those at stage 5, Common Sense and Practical Wisdom are not on speaking terms, except that the latter “understands” and feels deep compassion for the former. Regrettably, most adult-developmental research today is still conducted in the Second Order of Mental Complexity and is thus not on a par with its subject matter. In practical terms, what is needed at this point is an introduction to dialectic itself. Such an introduction entails viewing critically the assumptions of both Common Sense and Understanding, and laying the conceptual groundwork for transcending them in a consistent manner. This chapter is thus a first step toward working with the Dialectical Thought Form Manual found in Book 3 of this monograph. The Manual explains in detail each of the dialectical thought forms on which thinking in the Third Order of Mental Complexity is based.

Three Models of Dialectic We can model dialectic in different ways. Each model bestows selective emphasis on one or more of the elements being modeled. In the case of dialectic, which has a complex historical tradition, three recent models stand out: 1. Adorno’s model (1999) 2. Basseches’ model (1984) 3. Bhaskar’s model (1993) Of these, only the second model is developmental, while the first and third models are not. They represent, however, dialectical thinking at its best. Adorno’s Negative Dialectics is foremost a critique of ontological as well as positivistic scientific thinking and is based on a close early twentieth century reading of G.W. Hegel (1770–1831). Basseches’ model is based on Piaget’s notions of the development of formal logical thinking. It carries Piaget’s inquiry into the genesis of human knowledge beyond early adulthood in the sense of genetic epistemology. The third model is grounded in an in-depth study of the dialectical tradition since Plato with a focus on G.W. Hegel, who brought it to a peak. Importantly, in all models, “thinking” is viewed as preceding, as well as determining, doing, but in a dialectically sophisticated way that equally focuses on action in the form of mental action. For readers of this monograph, Adorno’s work is most likely “over their head” but also not “practical enough” to matter since it does not answer the North American question What can you do with it? In Bhaskar’s model, emphasis falls on dialectic as a means of bringing to light what is hidden, fragmented, ideologically distorted, and ABSENT in the sense of “incomplete” and “unfulfilled.” Dialectic tends to be seen as a set of tools for discovering new freedoms for society, as well as deeper insights in natural and social science. In its reality-focused emphasis, this model is indebted to Marx’s dialectic and the Frankfurt School.

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In Basseches’ model, emphasis falls on the dialectic nature of development, both of thought and social construction of reality. Here, the awareness of process (unceasing change) and of the transformational nature of thought and reality leads to an emphasis on reaching an equilibrium either in thought or through action in the social world. This equilibrium is “realistic” in that it comprises awareness of many different facets of what is experienced as real. The last two models are fully complementary. They are bound together by the high value they place on human freedom, both freedom from shackles and freedom to venture out into a more transparent world. Both models see the world of organizations as constructed by thought, and therefore open to change. As a result, both models are also models of practical reason. This entails that they refuse to separate “fact” and “value,” and are critical of positivistic science. In practical terms, this means that they consider human agency as a primary constituent of reality and hold human reason responsible for the shape the world is in. In terms of methodology and procedures available for refining adults’ thinking, both models are based on a common understanding of what I will henceforth call the Four Moments of Dialectic.

The Four Moments of Dialectic Thinking in the third Order of Mental Complexity approaches knowledge and truth, thus “reality,” from four interrelated perspectives called Process (P), Context (C), Relationship (R), and Transformational System (T). These four perspectives can be rendered by four associated maxims: 1. Everything undergoes unceasing change (Process). 2. Everything comprises layers and is part of a bigger picture (Context). 3. Everything hangs together, sharing a common ground (Relationship). 4. Everything (closely considered) is a transformational system, combining aspects of Process, Context, and Relationship (Transformational System). These maxims point out that there are no “things,” only FORMS in the world. The fourth maxim presupposes the previous three. As Bhaskar states (1993, 9): Each level in this dialectic is preservative [of the others]. 4D (=Transformational System) presupposes 3L (=Relationship) presupposes 2E (Process) presupposes 1M (Context) [in this order, that is: C > P > R > T; comment by OL]

As a result, to think of reality exclusively in terms of process, or context, or relationship would be a simplification. We have arrived at a point where an important distinction needs to be made, viz., that between Bhaskar’s “ontological” and Basseches’ “epistemological” dialectic. The former is defined as structuring the “real world,” the latter as explicating how the ontological moments unfold in the human mind as an integral part of the “real world”.

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In this book, the hypothesis is made that the epistemological dialectic, comprising the four perspectives – P, C, R, and T – is intrinsically linked to Bhaskar’s ontological Four Moments, and that, consequently, these cognitive perspectives can be thought of as unfolding real-world dialectic in epistemic terms in human thought. This is surely a broad philosophical proposition, but one that, at this historical point in time, where research on the relationship of ontology to epistemology is still missing, constitutes a helpful hypothesis. I therefore follow it throughout this monograph. The figure depicts dialectical movement, both in the world and human thought, as a snake biting its own tail. While the T-moment presupposes the CPR moments, these “illuminative” moments are also an outflow of the transformational moment (T). Another way to put this is to say that T – in both its ontological and epistemological sense – presupposes CPR while at the same time unceasingly generating CPR. For this reason, we can say that T resides on a meta-level indicating the unceasing transformation that reality is embedded in. As Bhaskar (1993) puts it, the real world (as well as the human mind) is “pervaded by absences” (i.e., non-being), and this non-being, also referred to as negativity, is as real as what exists. Bhaskar emphatically speaks of negativity as being in the form of absences, of that which is either not or not yet there, which includes absences in the form of ills that humans encounter and counter as social and cultural agents through work. Bhaskar’s proposition thus requires highly systemic and holistic thinking about which much more is said below (see especially Book 3, the manual of dialectical thinking). Bhaskar’s proposition is not as far removed from experience as it sounds. If you want to understand a beehive, or any other living body, you can’t stop short at describing only its static structure or its environment (C). You also need to pay attention to the processes that bring the hive into being and make it vanish (P). Finally, without describing the relationship between the hive’s main components – the queen, the drones, and the worker bees – you have not fully described or understood the hive (R), not to mention that you have failed to describe it as a living system. It is a short step from viewing a beehive to considering the open system that is the social world, or an individual organization. The requirement of “requisite organization” (coordination) of the moments applies to all of reality, including social reality. How one views, and acts in, organizations and institutions remains opaque before all four dimensions represented and named by the Four Moments have been explored (Bolman & Deal, 1991). References to the Four Moments of Dialectic in the social world abound, e.g., in attempts to manage organizations, as expressed in the statements below: 1. Process: “We are focused on change management.” 2. Context: “We are focused on the “global economy.” 3. Relationship: “We cannot separate what happens in Tokyo from what happens in New York since they are part of the global financial network.” 4. Transformation: “We need to keep abreast of changes all over the world, whether demographic, political, financial, or other, see them in context, and understand their relationship.”

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These buzzwords take on transformational meaning only in the Third Order of Mental Complexity, the domain of Reason. The main difference between Understanding and Reason is that in the latter, a concerted effort is made to pull different perspectives together, rather than letting them stand by themselves, in isolation. Upon reaching the fifth epistemic position, we become conscious of using abstractions and are thus protected from mistaking the model we are using for the reality we are modeling. Beginning with the sixth position, upon entering the Third Order of Mental Complexity, we also know that the reality we are modeling will not open to models capturing only one out of the Four Moments of Dialectic.

The Critical and Constructive Moments of Dialectic In the light of Fig. 3.1, we can speak of “upper” and “lower” s of dialectic. They stand for different ways of viewing the world. The upper moments (Upper Left and Right) provide tools for “critical thinking,” while the lower moments (Lower Left and Right) provide tools by which to “construct” reality: These ways of thinking are complementary: one cannot be critical of something that has not been constructed, thus does not exist. To be thinking critically entails understanding that something exists either as the result of an ongoing process or of being in relationship with something other, outwardly different. In both cases, the fixity of what is thought about dissolves, either because one can derive it from the form it took in the past or because it is seen as inseparable from its other or opposite. For instance, to “criticize” a national government, we point to how that government has behaved in the past and say that it has changed for the worst. We are thinking in terms of dialectical process thought forms. Or else, we can compare one government to another national government, thereby thinking of it in terms of thought forms of relationship. Either we are approaching that government in terms of external relationships it maintains with other comparable governments or we see it in relationship to the people that makes a government what it is, as in a

Process [P]

Relationship [R]

Context [C]

Transformational System [T]

Fig. 3.1  The four moments of dialectic

Moments of Dialectic Represented by Classes of Thought Forms

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democracy. In both cases, we behave critically toward the government, thinking in terms of the two upper s (P, R). As noted, we cannot criticize what does not exist. There needs to be some context we can address, some “intransitive” reality independent of the knower (Bhaskar, 1993) that includes the aspect we are talking about. This something is “simply there” only if we hold a spectator view of knowledge, but not when we undertake thinking actions. For instance, we can think of the government as the context in which our political life takes place. The government consists of different “branches” or institutions or “parties,” and these stand in a certain relationship to each other. The different government institutions also form hierarchies, for instance, the courts. There is a Supreme Court, and there are federal courts, state courts, etc. As we describe the government and its branches, we are making use of the lower quadrants of dialectic. As long as we see what we describe largely as a static system, we remain restricted to Context thought forms. Only when we coordinate movements-in-thought in terms of the upper moments as well as Context can we fathom the nature of government as a system. A few formal characteristics of dialectical thinking will have become evident by now: 1. Dialectics is a discovery procedure used by Reason. 2. Dialectical thinking uses what is absent, missing, hidden, but can be named as a guide to finding out what something is, why is has been hidden, how to reveal it, where it comes from, what its environment is, what it is related to, and how it maintains its identity. 3. Dialectical thinking is generative in the sense that it constructs what is presently absent or lies in the dark but within one’s time horizon. 4. Dialectical thinking is modeling, not so much causal modeling which remains restricted to a single moment, but transformational modeling in which thought forms that are part of several s get coordinated. 5. Dialectical thinking transcends actuality (what factually “is”) in search of what is real in the sense of transformational systems. (Factuality is not Reality.)

 oments of Dialectic Represented by Classes M of Thought Forms From what we now understand about the Moments of Dialectic, it is an easy step to take to view them as classes of thought forms and thereby differentiate them further. Each of the moments of dialectic can be thought of as giving rise, in human consciousness, to a variable number of different thought forms that articulate the moments’ core meaning. A thought form, called “schema” by Basseches, is a highlevel concept that captures the essence of an idea expressed through speech. The thought form names the movement-in-­thought that can be thought to have generated the speech fragment.

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3  Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use CONSCIOUSNESS Class of Thought Form (Dialectical Moment) Individual Thought Form

Base concept [1] Concept 1

Concept 2

Base concept [2]

Base concept [n]

Concept [n]

(Speech) Content

Fig. 3.2  Structure versus content in dialectical thinking

Thought forms are forms like any other in that they undergo transformations, namely from one thought to another. They capture oscillations of consciousness that can be “summarized” or “commented upon” by higher-level concepts. Thinking based on thought forms can be viewed as setting up a network of concepts that is itself an organized whole (Gestalt). For this reason, a thought form is a high-level concept that can be expressed by many different lower-level concepts. See Fig. 3.2. What a two-dimensional diagram such as Fig. 3.2 cannot render is the fact that the concrete individual instance referred to by a dialectical concept is not being “subsumed” under more abstract concepts in the sense of formal logic. Rather, the concept “lives on” as an element of an ongoing dialectic of which it is a part, thereby doing justice to the fact that no single concept ever completely “exhausts” the richness of the content it refers to. This is spelled out by Adorno’s notion of “negative dialectics” (1999), which is imbued with systemic thinking safeguarding the richness of what exists as a concrete individual. An example, taken from a cognitive interview, should be helpful here: For a long time, I operated from the position that the real truth could be found, and people would embrace it once it was pointed out to them. I proceeded in terms of “me versus them.” But increasingly, I realized that I cannot save other people’s truth, and that they have to save their own. And this took me to a different take on things where I proceed more from a “me and them” point of view. I now take where people are in their own development more fully into account and honor the multiplicity of perspectives people develop. This has considerably lightened my burden. Because I no longer have to prove the truth to them, I conceive of my efforts as including them from the outset, weighing the evidence they bring to their views, and making allowances for whatever they might see that I for some reason cannot.

If one were to summarize this passage in terms of a thought form, rather than mere content, one could say “the speaker sees multiple perspectives as the best way

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to understand what is ‘true’ about something, including evidence from many different sources.” Emphasized is the need to assume an intellectual context that functions as a “bigger picture” in which single individual’s way of seeing the truth is embedded. We are dealing with a thought form of class context. Individuals holding multiple perspectives are part of that context. Another example might be: I tend to have very quick, visceral reactions to things, and coaching has helped me to step back and have a look at what’s before me, and not necessarily act so quickly. Because what happens when you react is that you lose track of connections, links, and relationships. Acting emotionally is like cutting the Gordian knot. So, I have become much more circumspect with things, more aware of what I am leaving out of consideration when just forging ahead. Rather than saying: “What you propose does not work for me,” I now ask: “Why does somebody think this way?” What is this opinion or decision linked to, and what may be the politics behind it? In short, I am making an effort of bringing what has been said or seen into relationship with my own goals and values, and so I end up with a much richer picture of what is going on. I now understand that my own opinions can’t really be separated from those of others because we are living in the same universe of discourse.

The second speaker’s statements clearly have a different emphasis. He is pointing to the relationships that exist between opinions, specifically to the limits of separation between them as belonging to the same universe of discourse. One could say the speaker sees that there are limits of separation between different opinions, thereby pointing to a common ground they all share. There is an inkling of that in the first quote, but too weak to see it as expressing a Relationship thought form. In the example of two thought forms, above, the first (“multiple perspectives”) falls into Context, while the second (“limits of separation”) falls into Relationship. The first is a “constructive,” the second a “critical” thought form. The examples demonstrate that one can go through a transcribed interview and “find” (infer, construct) thought forms that fall into one of the moments of dialectic, respectively. To do so requires two things: • To listen to people’s speech in terms of the Four Moments of Dialectic and their associated epistemic thought forms • To think of each of moments of dialectic as comprising different articulations of the same overarching “idea”  – namely, of Process, Content, Relationship, or System In terms of the second requirement, we can refer to a particular moment of dialectic as a class of thought forms, meaning that there is a limited number of ways in which each dialectical moment can be expressed in speech. Clearly, one can speak of Process in different ways, all of which might adhere to the same thought form. This is what is meant by saying that the thought form is a structure (or, dynamically, a form), and that the individual occurrence, event, or situation pointed to is “just content.” The main expertise to acquire for the sake of cognitive interviewing and scoring is thus, as in the social-emotional domain, one of separating out what is mere content and what is structure, where the latter is represented by thought forms belonging to one of the Four Moments.

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Another way of viewing the dialectical analysis of speech (and text) is to say that we are moving on a meta-level to what is said, modeling speech content – and thus worldly content – by the thought form that pervades the content and holds it together as a (meta-level) pattern of thought or form. Since, according to Fig. 3.1, the classes of thought forms refer to each other and presuppose the transformational moment, it clearly makes no sense to think of the different classes as “buckets containing a specific number of thought forms” – as if the s stood in a row each of them being represented by a bucket of thought patterns, and thus separated from each other. That is also the reason the identification of moments with classes of thought forms is not cogent. Moments of dialectic identity a higher level of thinking than the logical thought form classes representing them for practical use. Together, moments define the dialectics of human consciousness in its wholeness. By contrast, thought forms make up a finite selection from a much broader set of conceivable thought forms. The selection that occurs is a historical and pragmatic one. Its purpose is that of “analyzing” [interpreting] and “scoring” cognitive interviews and, more generally, making mind opening interventions. The identification of s of dialectic with classes of thought forms is thus a practical expedient, nothing more. In logical terms, we are thus looking at the following configuration (Fig. 3.3). Here again, the depicted hierarchy is a logical one. As a closed system, it does not satisfactorily convey the dynamics of the dialectic we are talking about which is found in the human mind itself, its unceasing oscillations between the Four Moments of Dialectic. Equating the moments of dialectic with classes of thought forms is misleading for another reason. In addition to the “epistemological” reason, above, the “ontological” reason is that the s structure the reality of which we are a part, not just the reality we happen to “think about.” In short, we are daily experiencing the s of dialectic as something that makes our experience of the world what it is. And although in logical thinking we do our utmost to separate and isolate the moments, we are ultimately totally unsuccessful in doing so. We are simply overtaken by the dynamics of the real. And the more “dialectical” we think, the closer we are to those dynamics, and the more “realistic” we are as thinkers (Bhaskar, 1993 speaks of Critical Realism.) As a result, when we say of an individual thought form – such as multiple perspectives or limits of separation  – that it is part of a particular class of thought forms, and thus of a particular moment of dialectic, we need to keep in mind that: Fig. 3.3  Hierarchy of the elements of dialectic

Moments of Dialectic Classes of Thought Forms Individual Thought Forms Concepts Representing Individual Thought Forms [Speech Content]

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1. All moments of dialectics are related to each other and form an organized whole. 2. The P, C, R s, taken by themselves, represent ingredients of the T-moment. 3. An interview passage may reference two or more s of dialectic simultaneously. 4. Scoring interviews based on moments of dialectic represented by classes of thought forms is a way of approximating as best one can the dialectical gist of a discourse excerpt, using logical distinction as a tool for revealing the implicit dialectic of a discourse fragment.

Dialectical Versus Kantian Inquiring Systems We have seen so far that thinking in terms of the s of dialectic is a way of being prepared for the world to change significantly and having the tools for anticipating and capturing such change. Since we are typically only taught “declarative” thinking, whether inductive or deductive, our notion of possibilities is severely restricted. Although learning to use abductive thinking is a step toward dialectic (C.S. Peirce et al., 1998), such thinking typically does not rise to the level of preservative negation of dialectic (although it potentially could). In its use of linear causal modeling, it does not deviate from declarative thinking. It is thus purely hypothetical, rather than partaking of the dialectics of reality itself. As R. Martin explains, stressing the provenance of this thinking from the Kantian Inquiring System (2007b, 146): In essence, abductive logic seeks the best explanation – that is, it attempts to create the best model – in response to novel or interesting data that doesn’t fit an extant model. Deductive and inductive logic might prove such a model true or untrue over time, but in the interim, abductive logic generates the best explanation of the data. That’s why I call the process of using abductive logic “generative reasoning.” This process inquires after what might be, and thus is modal in intent. It employs abductive logic to leap beyond the available data to generate a new model.

Dialectical thinking is quite different from this kind of generative reasoning. It does not concern thinking about what might be, but what IS in a more comprehensive sense than is typically implied by the term. As shown in Fig. 3.4, “what is” is the result of processes, past and ongoing, in which what exists is embedded. It is part of a larger context that frames it. Its elements are intrinsically and extrinsically related to each other since they share a common ground. For this reason, dialectical thinking does not speculate about what “might be,” but rather pays attention to what IS.  From a perspective including not only epistemological but ontological elements, therefore, I would distinguish two basic kinds of reasoning. As shown, two different kinds of thinking, “declarative” and “dialectical,” interact with each other to capture open transformational systems. While, in one sense, dialectical thinking is a world apart from both deductive and inductive thinking, it is nevertheless in communication with both since they can become moments of the dialectical inquiry process. In this way, the Kantian Inquiring System can become

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3  Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use REASONING

Declarative [Logical]

Deductive

Conjunctive (‘or’)

Dialectical [Inquisitive]

Inductive

Serial (‘if’)

Parallel (‘iff’)

Abductive (‘what if?’)

Closed Systems

Process

Context

Relationship

Transformation

Open, Transformational Systems

Fig. 3.4  Two basic kinds of reasoning

an ingredient of the dialectical one, serving as a tool for making distinctions without which defining relationships would be impossible. The creative role of abductive thinking in the dialectical process lies in gathering strands of deductive and inductive thinking into the realm of hypothesis formation, thereby opening the flood gates to dialectical inquiry. All modes of declarative thinking ultimately lend themselves to inclusion in a dialectical inquiring system. The decisive difference between the two modes is that between a focus on closed and open systems. Just as the Four Moments of Dialectic are all separate but inseparable elements of an overriding dynamic (Bhaskar, 1993, 392–393), so the various types of inductive thinking, when adopting illuminating thought forms of class Process, Context, and Relationship, ultimately feed thinking in terms of open, transformational, rather than closed, systems. The decisive turn occurs when it is understood that the neat distinctions between Process, Context, and Relationship made in declarative thinking ultimately drive thinking toward the dialectical dynamic they are meant to keep out. This is because consciousness is an organized whole. The distinctions made by logical thought are only possible because what they distinguish is intrinsically linked as different within a common ground synthesizing unity and diversity, the One and the Many. All concepts in use are elements of the overriding dynamic of consciousness, and this dynamic is a “dialectical” one in the sense that no concept stands alone but is part of an overriding network defined by intrinsic as well as extrinsic relationships, thus of a common ground shared by all concepts as concepts.

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The reader may ask himself on what grounds dialectic can be so powerful. The answer is that dialectic is what makes the world “go round” ontologically, and that human thinking is an attempt to catch up with the world as it unceasingly changes, something that is better understood in Asian than Western cultures (Nisbett, 2005). Since the moments of dialectic are the overriding reality, dialectical thinking can equally use deductive, inductive, and abductive procedures to form a picture of the world. Accordingly, thinking is realistic to the extent that it is dialectical. Overall, then, we can speak of dialectical thinking as the mainstay of thinking in the Third Order of Complexity. Such thinking: • Presupposes epistemic positions beyond position 4 where knowledge is ambiguous not on account of its complexity, but due to idiosyncratic knowledge claims • Can use deductive, abductive, and other formal logical tools in the service of discovering hidden dimensions of social and physical reality • Is highly sensitive to the unceasing change occurring in the real world, both in nature and society • Aims to view what is experienced as “real” in as broad as possible a context comprising multiple perspectives • Is keenly aware of relationships between what formal logical thought rigidly separates as isolated entities • Is tracking changes that occur as means of transforming existing systems in the direction of higher equilibria of the elements that compose the system What developmentally gets sorted out over the adult lifespan is the initially “bewildering” simultaneity of perspectives one can hold on things. These perspectives are shown to be separate but inseparable and become increasingly coordinated. Usually referred to as imagination, dialectical thinking is a trans-modal awareness of complexity in the world, held in check by constraints of formal logic. When these constraints have been recognized and mastered, adults develop the ability to escape them without strictly violating them, but rather canceling, including, and transcending them. This ability increases over the lifespan, as does the awareness that the many constructs of human thinking can never exhaust the richness of concrete instances of reality (say, of a flower) that we try to subsume under our concepts (say, “dahlia”). Mature human thought typically focuses attention on more than one moment of dialectic at the same time. How exactly attention is focused is not only an educational but also a cultural issue. For instance, it has been shown again and again, most recently through studies of blood flow through the thinking brain, that East Asian cultures emphasize interdependence and promote a holistic rather than analytical view of things (Nisbett, 2005, 176): There is a dialectical tradition of a kind that has held a place in Western thought since the time of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. … But Westerners tend not to be aware of the strength of their commitment to some logical principles that conflict directly with Asian dialecticism. These include the law of identity, which holds that a thing is itself and not some other thing, and the law of non-contradiction, which holds that a proposition can’t be both true and

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3  Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use false. The Western insistence on this pair of logical principles and the Eastern spirit of dialecticism are, on the surface at least, in direct opposition to each other.

“On the surface of it” is an important sub-clause since any opposition, as the one between Western and Asian thinking, is only a moment within a developed dialectical Inquiring System. While this can of course by hypostatized as an unyielding opposition by ideologists, the limits of separation between the two modes of thinking will ultimately become apparent to dialectical thinkers whether Asian or Western. However, at this moment in history, dialecticism remains, for Westerners, a counter-cultural expertise, not only in business schools but far beyond. It violates interpretative conventions absorbed through Aristotelian schooling, which focuses on declarative thinking and isolation, not integration, of thought-things.

 quivalence of Moments of Dialectic in Bhaskar E and Basseches It is relevant from a historical point of view to note that Basseches (1984) and Bhaskar (1993), without knowing of each other’s work, arrived at formulating Four Moments of Dialectic. The difference between these two writers lies in the fact that Bhaskar is an ontologist, and Basseches an epistemologist. The philosophical problems posed by the seeming equivalence of the two types of dialectic are beyond the scope of this monograph. For pragmatic reasons, here we will be content with assuming a nominal equivalence between the Four Moments of Dialectic, which is outlined below (Bhaskar, 1993, 392–93; Basseches, 1984, 74): • • • •

C: Bhaskar’s first (1 M) is Basseches’ Form (here, “Context,” C). P: Bhaskar’s second edge (2E) is Basseches’ Motion (here, “Process,” P). R: Bhaskar’s third level (3 L) is Basseches’ Relationship (here R). T: Bhaskar’s fourth dimension (4D) is Basseches’ Metaform (in this book “Transformational System,” T).

The sequence of moments, above, is deliberate. Without the existence of Context (“things real”), that is, the physical and social world, there would be no dialectic, no change, and no relationships. There would also be no change if reality as Context were without absences or gaps that “change” could rush into to fill them. Therefore, the moments of dialectic structurally follow each other in the sequence in which they function in transformational systems, namely:

C>P>R>T

The reason we put Context first is that it provides the “what” we think about and is always already presupposed when we open our mouth to speak “about” something. Without it, there would be nothing to think “about”. Epistemologically, it is also the easiest to grasp since everyone assumes the necessity of existence. The question of whether something exists is not considered an issue in formal logic either. In our culture, people naturally describe the world in terms of things rather

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than forms that transform, and for that reason they naturally lapse into Context, assuming that all that is needed to behave “logically” about the world. In epistemological terms, the term “Context” is not always optimal. This is so since what Context thought forms focus on is always of a structural nature, so that “Structure” would seem to be an equivalent term. Nevertheless, for the sake of maintaining a uniform nomenclature, in this monograph we will stay with the term “Context.”

Transforms and the Moments of Dialectic Before delving into the Four Moments of Dialectic themselves, I need to clarify the relationship of these moments to the four transforms introduced earlier. I described the Transforms as sets of tools whose use takes the developing mind from era of cognitive development to another, thus transforming individuals’ world view: • • • •

Common Sense to Understanding: Logic or L-Transform Understanding to Reason [1]: Illumination or I-Transform Understanding to Reason [2]: Remediation or R-Transform Reason to Practical Wisdom: P-Transform (Fig. 3.5)

As indicated, the L-Transform, comprising formal logic (including abductive logic), paves the way for a transition from Common Sense to Understanding, thus from the First to the Second Order of Mental Complexity. This Transform (set of tools) is inherently instable just because of its intrinsic rigidity originating in the principle of identity it follows. Both the I- and the R- Transform characterize the Third Order of Mental Complexity (Reason). The fourth transform of Practical Wisdom, only briefly described at the end of the book, provides an integration of all strands of cognitive development. The four transforms together comprise the totality of human thinking. In their sequence, they point to the endpoint of adults’

Common Sense L-Transform

I-Transform Dialectical Comment R-Transform

Understanding Dialectical Reason P-Transform Practical Wisdom

Fig. 3.5  The four eras of cognitive development and their transforms

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cognitive development. Without such an endpoint, it is impossible to appreciate and understand the steps along the way and the riskiness of the journey thinking undertakes. While “wisdom” is most often characterized by a mix of social-emotional and cognitive elements (with a muddled emphasis on the former), there is, I believe, good reason for conceiving of wisdom in purely cognitive terms. Wisdom comprises both Stance and Tools and cannot be reduced to either. From the perspective of this book, the hallmark of wisdom is the integration of epistemic, logical, and dialectic ways of thinking, not simply some social-emotional stance circumscribed by using vaguely cognitive concepts. Because of such integration, the fetters of formal logical thought are shed without forsaking logical thinking. Although not too much is known yet about the P-Transform, there is beginning empirical research that is promising despite its complete lack of constructivist dialectical thinking (Baltes & Staudinger, 1996). The reader now understands that the decisive cognitive watershed for adults – including for work in the sciences – is the transition from the Second to the Third Order of Mental Complexity. S(he) may wonder why this transition from Understanding to Reason relies on two different transforms rather than only one. This has to do with the nature of dialectic. In transcending and including formal logical and abductive thinking, the first dialectical step is to question the notion of “falsehood” (thus of logical negation), ingrained in us through conventional Western schooling. In adopting a notion of negation as something that relates what is negated to that which it is negated by or in reference to, further thought discoveries can be made that otherwise remain taboo or exists “unthinkable.” Making thought discoveries becomes possible when one abandons the spectator view of knowledge, which does not happen before reaching epistemic position 5. When this step is taken, the first move-in-thought is to turn to “critical” thinking in the sense of inquiring into the origin of something we are told exists and/or is true, as we do in using Process thought forms. Alternatively, we can inquire into what the relationship is between what exists or is thought to be true to something intrinsic to or inseparable from it, as we do in using Relationship thought forms. In both moves, we illuminate that which exists or is thought to be true through critical comments. A third tool for illuminating the reality we think about lies in inquiring more deeply into the nooks and crannies of what we address as the present situation or Context we find ourselves in and make observations about. Using Context thought forms, we can gain a clearer picture of causation, part and whole, stratification, and other aspects of what lies before us. Without illuminating Context by using Process and Relationship thought forms, thought cannot “remediate” the gaps and fissures that are hidden in Context, through which changes that fill these gaps and fissures unceasingly occur. Illumination and Remediation thus constitute a dialectical pair, much like antithesis and synthesis operating on the ground of a conceptual thesis rooted in Context. We are now ready to explore the Four Moments of Dialectic individually, one by one.

The Individual Moments of Dialectic

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The Individual Moments of Dialectic The Dialectic of Context The dialectic of Context is that of an intransitive world existing independently of human thought. Context includes the dialectic of the intellectual traditions and ideologies (including the sciences) humans have constructed in the course of history to understand themselves and the real world. Context superficially rests upon linear causality and generative mechanisms, and therefore feeds the illusion of things remaining the same over long time stretches. This illusion is honored in Context as long as Process and Relationship thought forms remain uncoordinated with it. Context is thus static since, taken by itself, it is cut loose from change. But being, at the same time, punctuated by absences, it always hints at shifts, reversals, and breakdown (Bhaskar, 1993). In terms of Context taken in isolation, a human body (or any other organic body for that matter) would seem a miracle since it withstands ceaseless and destructive change, keeping its shape and form as a functioning system over a relatively long time. The body is a form that relies on precise timing. All the clocks in the system are aligned with the body’s master clock that is triggered by light on the retina (Boston Globe 8-20-07, Section C, page 1): The master clock in the brain is now increasingly seen not only as the body’s only clock, but as the conductor of a seemingly limitless number of peripheral clocks, including those found in the heart, liver, lung, and retina cells. … When light enters the eye, it strikes the retina and is converted into electrical signals. The supra-chiasmatic nucleus (SCN) within the brain’s hypothalamus receives some of these signals via the optic nerve. … The visual signals continuously keep the SCN informed about the darkness or lightness of the environment. This information allows the SCN to synchronize a wide range of biological rhythms throughout the body that are linked to the cycle of day and night.

This empirical statement of the understanding describes a living system as if it were dead, simultaneously celebrating its aliveness. Language based on formal logic construes a picture that makes us believe that this system is “real.” However, the verity is that Process, Context, and Relationship are all involved in making the human body a living system, and this cannot be conveyed in terms of formal logic (or abductive logic for that matter), which by nature describe reality as a closed system. The dialectical verity by which the system lives vanishes in the linearity of language, so that what remains is a mere context, that is, an assemblage of entities that together form a functioning system. The system is closed since the negativity of the system, or the dynamics by which it maintains itself in unceasing transformation, by “falsifying” previous states, cannot be described in logical terms. Using this example, let’s embark on a more detailed study of the first moment of dialectic, called FORM by Basseches. (“Form” because in dialectical thinking there are no “things,” only “forms” in constant transformation.)

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Thought forms of class Context answer questions such as: 1. Of what kind is the system, structure, set of layers that holds the elements of an existence together and bestows on them the unity and relative stability we seem to observe (which, from the point of view of Process is like a mirage, and from the point of Relationship is a set of shifting relationships)? 2. How can this system be described in terms of notions like parts and whole, integrated structure or framework, stable form, or equilibrium? 3. How are multiple contexts embedded in the system (a question by which we step into the moment of Relationship)? Typical descriptions of living systems hide the fact that, like the human body with its many systems combined into one, contexts are typically stratified, as indicated in the quote above by terms such as “master clock” and “peripheral clocks.” In the assemblage, one therefore finds pervasive potential non-identity (Bhaskar, 1993, 231, 392). This non-identity is existentially intransitive, or independent of human thinking. Physical and social contexts are highly differentiated systems comprising causal powers and generative mechanisms humans are trying to “understand” through science. As Bhaskar says about Context (1993, 392): Its dialectics are characteristically of stratification and ground, but also of inversion and virtualization. Its meta-critiques turn on the isolation of the error of de-stratification.

In other words, what is real is stratified and, through changes it undergoes, can become “inverted” and “virtualized,” taking on new forms. The principal human error in thinking Context is to lose sight of its stratification. (Theories dealing with organizations as if they were machines run by machines called “markets” is a good example.) Another aspect that falls by the wayside when focusing on Context in isolation is developmental potential. In the quote above, verbs have been turned into passive voice (“light is converted into electrical signals …”), and processes thereby get subdued. What is more, everything falls into an infinite presence that leaves no place for the future or the past. However, there is no way to understand context without reference to both past and future. As Bhaskar says (1993, 142): I am going to argue that … the presence of the future is a perfectly kosher locution, but that it is always mediated by the presence of the past (up to the limit of the indefinite present).

When discussing Jaques’ notion of potential capability, we saw that it extends beyond the present into the past as origin. The past, being part of the present, makes possible the presence of the future in the present. For this reason, potential capability is the ground from which applied capability arises. In clinging to the dialectical of Context as something separate from the other moments, this aspect of emergence is kept under lock and key.

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Thought Contexts When we look at Context in an epistemological way, following Basseches (1984), we can say that it is best understood as an “organized and patterned whole” (Bopp & Basseches 1981, 62). “Dialectic” is then an organizing principle that describes movements in thought by which we “think” reality. One is dealing with a motion through forms that has temporarily been arrested for the purposes of inspection or repair. As Basseches formulates (1984, 75): Dialectical thinking presupposes both the orientation to motion and the orientation to form – reflected in the dialectical world outlook’s emphases on change and on wholeness, respectively. … A second group, of ‘form-oriented’ schemata [thought forms, OL], describes moves in thought which function (a) to direct the thinker’s attention to organized and patterned wholes (forms), and (b) to enable the thinker to recognize and describe such forms.

Basseches mentions three foci of thinking in terms of Context (1984, 107): 1. Location of an element or phenomenon within the whole(s) of which it is a part. 2. Description of a whole (system, form) in structural, functional, or equilibrational terms. 3. Assumption of contextual relativism, in which ideas and values are understood in the context of larger frames of reference and their structural properties (Bopp & Basseches, 1981, 69). In following this more highly thought-focused interpretation, we can apply the notion of Context to ideas as well as living systems, even the non-organic world at large. Ideas are always part of a larger frame of reference, whether they are part of a theoretical tradition, ideology, or mythology. These intellectual frameworks constitute the context of ideas. Below, I summarize the relevant aspects of the first moment (1 M) of dialectic, Context. I do so in terms of categories I will use for all s of dialectic (adapted from Bhaskar, 1993, 8–9; 391–393; Basseches, 1984, 74f): 1. Dialectical image 2. Figure 3. Ground 4. Relationship to system 5. Scope 6. Theme 7. Dialectics By “Dialectical image,” I mean a memorable image learners can attach to individual moments to remind themselves of the characteristics of a particular moment and the associated class of thought forms.

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Context • Dialectical image: “big picture” in the sense of a whole encompassing parts and built of layers. • Figure: what appears as a stable, well-balanced form. • Ground: unified by the category of differentiation that introduces variety and depth into what is real, making it alterable. • Relationship to System: pre-figuration of a system in a static form. • Scope: equilibrium of what exists. • Theme: multiplicity of entities and thoughts partaking in a common frame of reference. • Dialectics: parts of a whole shifting their balance, flow, stratification, and generative mechanisms.

The Dialectic of Process The dialectic of Process is that of a world of unceasing change and the presence of the past and the future in the present. In this world, the present unremittingly slides into the past, and the past re-emerges in the presence of the future. This world is one of negativity, in the sense of loss, pain, conflict, miscarriage, and absence. In terms of thought, it is the world of preservative negation where the existence and definition of something “A” is inseparable from what it is not (“non-A” or “other”). This dialectic is thus one of emergence of things and forms into reality from less developed, more restricted, forms, and one of decay of fully developed forms into oblivion, or renewal in a different form, with gain and loss inextricably intertwined. Bhaskar, for whom reality is punctuated by absence, states (1993, 392): 2E [Process] is unified by the category of absence, from which the whole circuit of 1M-4D links and relations [that is, C>P>R>T] can be derived. … Its dialectics are typically of process, transition, frontier and node, but also generally of opposition including reversal. Its meta=critics pivot on the isolation of the error of positivization [that is, arresting of motion, OL] …

Processes, thus change, could not occur if there were no absences they can fill – incomplete realities, lacks, gaps, desires. Therefore, this moment is in some sense the pivot around which all other moments turn. Process makes the world go ‘round that would otherwise freeze into Context. While Process is driven by negation, this negation is preservative of what it negates. As in the moments of dialectic generally, negation is not denial or falsehood, but the movement superseding what needs to cease. Process thus stands for birth and death alike. In the form of change, Process is the rule, not the exception. In a way different from Context, it illuminates the dialectical essence of the real, that is, its evanescence.

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In the world viewed from a Process perspective, conflict takes on a new face. It is seen as the interpenetration of opposites that define what is real. In the social context, this can appear in the form of war, breakdown, reversal, and the unexpected filling of different kinds of power vacuum. Historians are particularly attuned to understanding process, whether it appears as conflict between individuals or nations. As an example, McCullough writes in his book on Truman: One of Truman’s important but little noted first moves in the fateful last week of June (1950) had been to recall Averell Harriman from Europe, where he had been a kind of roving ambassador, and make him a special assistant to help with war emergency problems, and one of Harriman’s first moves in his new role was to press upon the President the need for congressional support for what he was doing in Korea. He urged Truman to call for a war resolution from Congress as soon as possible, while the country was still behind him. Dean Acheson, however, disagreed, insisting that such a resolution was unnecessary and unwise. The President, said Acheson, should rest on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. It was true that congressional approval would do no harm, but the process of obtaining it, Acheson thought, might do great harm. In the mounting anxiety over how things were going in Korea, the timing was wrong. Truman sided with Acheson, telling Harriman further that to appeal to Congress now would make it more difficult for future presidents to deal with emergencies.

The historian’s statement above dwells primarily on Process, putting the emphasis on the ongoing interaction of three politically powerful individuals who try to do “the right thing” in the turmoil of anxiety over great losses in human life on both sides of the political and military divide. There are several important implications that are only touched upon, not fully spelled out, by McCullough: • • • • • •

“Little noted first moves” may have tremendous implications. Processes create new roles for a person. Interactions are often based on disagreements. Timing is crucial and may be “wrong.” Proposed decisions are often antithetical to each other. The future is grounded in the past of the present and is part of the present.

These elements belong to the world of Process. In the present case, negativity plays out in terms of personal disagreement and military clashes. A process has been launched whose goal is to reach a solution, namely, a higher level of development of Korean statehood than it can presently claim. Clearly, the historian speaking could illuminate much further the hidden and apparent causes of the conflict, what is the essential antithetical force driving the conflict, the correlativity between actions on both sides of the conflict, and so forth. In so doing, using Process thought forms, he would remediate the absences  – the unknowns, invisibles, etc.  – that remain. A historian could also enlarge his topic and move to a different moment of dialectic, say Relationship, and conceivably could even venture into describing a transformational system called “cease-fire” or even “peace” that would be the outcome of the conflict he describes. In a more thought-oriented approach to Process as found in Basseches (1984), emphasis on Process entails moves-in-thought which are either unselfconscious or reflected upon. The emphasis in this case is on the fluidity of thought, and thought

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forms are used to draw attention to and describe processes of change. In all cases of change through process, what is at work is preservative negation, described by Basseches as follows (1984, 73): (The) thesis-antithesis-synthesis movement in thought  – describes a process in which thought moves from reflection upon one idea to reflection upon something which is apart from, left out of, contrary to, or excluded from the first idea [“absent” from it, as Bhaskar would say, OL], and then on to reflection upon a more inclusive idea which relates the original idea to that which was [initially] excluded from it.

Or else, a movement in thought may occur wherein generation of an alternative to something then leads to the formation of a relationship between the thing and its alternative. The movement described above can also manifest itself in the quest for knowledge when a particular “paradigm” clashes with an older one, or in the quest for self-­knowledge, as in the following interview excerpt (Basseches, 1984, 86): I structured the opinion of myself and made it fit with how the way I act is reflected off of other people. You know, essentially that is the only way you can ever find out what you are like anyway – to be with other people and to see how they take you. So you kind of have to take those fragments and those pieces that you get bounced off other people and you add them all up and see how they jive with how you feel about yourself and reassess things and you know, change the shape here and there a little bit, …. and eventually you get everything to fit into what you believe is a sort of an objective look at yourself.

This statement of an individual at social-emotional stage S-3 uses a Process thought form in a simple-minded way, namely that of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” (TF #2). Asserting her own identity as the thesis, the individual is driven beyond herself to the antithesis of others’ view of her. These others are an integral part of her self-understanding. “Getting everything to fit” into what she herself believes is the result of her using preservative negation of her original self-assertion. This initial assertion is not “false,” merely incomplete, and requires antithetical views of others, used by her to develop a higher-level “objective” self-assessment. Below, I summarize the relevant aspects of the second moment of dialectic, Process: • Dialectical image: emergence (from a void) • Figure: what is “not there” but is emerging through unceasing change • Ground: unified by the category of absence from which the whole circuit of the Four Moments derives • Relationship to System: always embedded in system • Scope: spanning negation, contradiction, critique • Theme: the presence of the past and future in the present; motion in thought and reality • Dialectics: process, transition, interaction, opposition (including reversal)

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The Dialectic of Relationship The dialectic of Relationship is one of figure and ground, of a totality comprising entities that mutually constitute each other, such that one makes the other what it is, and could not be without the other since it intrinsically relates to it. It is a world of reciprocity and limits of separation in which what is different is only different to the extent that it shares existence in the totality that embraces all partial entities. It is also the dialectic of what is seemingly single and isolated but is unmistakably based on what it excludes and cannot be isolated from the larger context to which it belongs, being part of a larger cohesive totality. Bhaskar states (1993, 392) [comments by OL]: The 3L [Relationship is] unified by the category of totality; it pinpoints the error of … the hypostization of thought. It encompasses such categories and themes as reflexivity, … holistic causality, internal relationality, and intra-activity [reciprocity], but also de-­ totalization [neglecting totality], alienation, split and split-off, illicit fusion and fission. … Its dialectics are of center and periphery, form and content, figure and ground, … retotalization in a unity-in-diversity. Its meta-critics pivot on the identification of de-totalization. There is a special affinity with 1M [Context] since totality is a structure.

Things are related, then, because they are elements of a totality (holon). This totality – e.g., the totality of all fruits – defines what they share – being fruits – and allows them to be different [within the totality]. This makes sense only since “different” elements share the common ground in which they differ, and without which they could not differ. In a world defined by totality, causality is holistic (not linear), and reciprocity prevails. This also applies to thoughts that cannot be separated either from each other or from reality, and isolated as “absolute” or “eternal,” or even “mine.” Any such separation amounts to “de-totalization,” the neglect of paying attention to what forms share. For this reason, the dialectic of Relationship links opposites such as center and periphery, form and content, figure and ground. It sees alienation and split as based on denying totality, thus interrelatedness due to sharing. The striving for unity-in-­ diversity is a central topic of this world since it “re-totalizes” what was “split off.” In thinking, this world is focused on pointing out signs of relativism, subjectivism, and pluralism, all of which forget or deny totality. The affinity of the moment of Relationship with that of Context entails that relationships are not just peripheral but define structures. I am related to you as a family member, and “family” is a structure that is constitutive of who I am. I can split off from family to protest it, but in so doing will retain the traces of what I split off from, or the structure that binds me to what I am protesting. Truly transcending family is possible only by acknowledging it, and forming a higher-level family that includes the original family religion.

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The Moments as a Set of Relationships The Moment of Relationship is of central importance not only for coordinating classes of thought forms but also individual thought forms. There is nothing dialectical about a single thought form per se. Rather, the term “dialectical” refers to an aspect of an organized whole. “Thinking dialectically” thus entails relating one thought form to another to understand transformational, living systems. Figure 3.6 is an attempt to convey the interrelatedness of the Four Moments. Considering what was said about Relationship above, the following characterizations are pertinent: • Relationship pervades all other moments since they form an organized totality. • Thinking in terms of a single dominating, amounts to de-totalization by which the richness of what exists gets lost. • The moments are “different” only to the extent that they are common ground or form an organized whole to which they contribute. • The inner arrows in Fig.  3.6 point to the intrinsic relationship between all moments. • The outer arrows in Fig. 3.6 point to the fact that the illuminative moments (C, P, R) presuppose the remediative and transformational moment, T. • Relationships will reach their optimal realization only in the transformational moment where all partial relationships are remediated; the same can be said of processes and contexts. • T thus embodies the totality referenced in R, the sharing by reason of which things and forms in the world are related to each other.

Constitutive Relationships When thinking in terms of the moment “Relationship,” the thinker either points to the existence of relationships, notes their importance, or describes them in detail, up to the point where they are seen as constitutive of something. An example for a constitutive relationship, one that makes you what you are (as a spouse or partner), is the relationship of marriage.

Process [P]

Relationship [R]

Context [C]

Transformational System [T]

Fig. 3.6  The four moments of dialectic

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While to the Understanding, marriage is an “institution,” in terms of Reason (Third Order of Mental Complexity) it is a relationship between two partners that places each in a role different from the self. At the same time, the notion of “marriage” defines the totality of the union from which the different roles emanate. Marriage is thus at bottom a transformational system. In the moment of Relationship, the relationships underlying this system are described and kept in the foreground of attention. In as far as I am “married to you,” I am in a different role than just by myself. I am a partner or spouse. Outside of this role, I am neither partner nor spouse. This role is not something I have created myself. I step into a pre-designed role. The relationship that defines the role logically precedes me. It is therefore a role defined by a constitutive relationship, in the sense that it makes me what I AM in relationship to you, who are my partner or spouse. Accordingly, leave-taking, separation, divorce, and death amount to de-­ totalization and thus create pain. Some unity, some small totality breaks down. Some reciprocity ends. Some alienation and split occur. This split cannot be frozen into an absolute. It occurs only because of the totality that was initially entered into and that has now broken down. In short, the split is part of the definition of “marriage” seen as a constitutive relationship. It is pre-ordained, although psychologically it may come as a surprise or shock.

Incomplete Descriptions One way to discern a nest of relationships intrinsically bound to a totality is to pay attention to the completeness of information. Incomplete information is “flat,” lacking the energy of relationship; it allows for alternatives that need to be explored. For example (Lahey et al., 1988, 344–345): A second kind of counter-argument or alternative hypothesis to our initial stage-3 one argues that our interpretation may be incomplete. The argument is that the interviewee’s statements may capture only one way that she structures the particular content because we haven’t given her a chance to show all her stuff. It’s this argument that can help us to hear the complexities of a person in transition, who by definition is using more than one structure in her meaning-making. … There are two points about transition and interviewing. For one, it is possible that the use of only one structure is apparent. A transitional self may not spontaneously demonstrate that a second structure is also operating until explicitly provided the opportunity. … Secondly, while a transitional self may construct all of her experience in a consistent way, … it is also possible that she constructs some material from the predominant structure only, … and other material with her other abilities as well. For both of these reasons we need to provide the interviewee with opportunities to demonstrate all her abilities.

In focus in this excerpt from Lahey’s Subject-Object Interview Handbook (1988) is how to assess the totality of a person’s social-emotional capability at the present time. Since the evolution from one full meaning system to the next full one involves

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four different combinations of two structures – say S-3 and S-4, as in 3(4), 3/4, 4/3, and 4(3) – it is not sufficient for assessing an individual in transition to a “higher stage,” to formulate only a single hypothesis (say S-3). Since in a social-emotional transition, an individual uses more than a single structure to make meaning of the world, we need to discern what related structure(s) might be involved in what she speaks about. Since the transition from one full meaning-making system to another – e.g., S-3 to S-4 – constitutes a totality (just as the individual herself), the elements of the transition, for instance, the four intermediate steps that lead from S-3 to S-4, are related to each other in a way to be discerned. In this case, the question is how they are related, that is, what specific intermediate stage is the most pertinent as center of gravity. Since an individual is a totality, she may construct her meanings in different but related ways. One part of her speech material may be constructed from one stage, other parts of her material from another. To find out the entire range of related ways of meaning-making, we need, as Lahey says, “to provide the interviewee with opportunities to demonstrate all – the totality of – her abilities.” In evaluating social-­ emotional interviews, we are dealing with a transformational totality that encompasses different but related ways of meaning-making. The individual concerned functions as the totality whose different dimensions we are trying to discern. These dimensions are separate but inseparable. To illuminate this totality, we focus on the moment “Relationship.” While the individual stages taken by themselves are abstract and “dead,” defining single contexts, their essence emerges in the multiplicity of stages spelled out in terms of Relationship. What, when taking the stages as stages, appears as a formal hierarchy reveals itself in living form once we relate the stages to each other. Below is an interview example of thinking in terms of Relationship: I think we need a better perspective on what is individuals’ right in a democracy. Our brand of democracy is just too individualistic to be exported elsewhere, or even to do much good in our own country. What on the surface is a different opinion, is often linked to opposing opinions grounded in the same (secret) assumption, only that it is interpreted differently in different cases. Take for instance the way we view criminal cases. We don’t typically approach them seeing the link that binds the crime to the environment in which it happened. I don’t mean to take away the responsibility of the individual. However, if we hope to ever reduce the crime rate, we can’t just follow this subjectivistic notion of responsibility. We need to acknowledge, rather, the responsibility of the larger community for making certain abuses less than worthwhile. We need to think “crime” in terms of community, not simply isolated individuals.

In this example, the speaker criticizes individualistic notions of democracy, in particular subjectivism, the notion that “everybody has a right to his opinion.” As stated, his notion violates the moment of Relationship because opinions are related to opposing opinions, and all opinions regarding a certain topic form a totality defined by the culture in which they occur. For this reason, the opinions are different from, or even opposed to, each other only because they are part of the same totality (e.g., culture).

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The speaker in the quote above critiques “de-totalization” by saying: • That isolating individuals or their opinions shortchanges the totality of which they are part • That opposing opinions are “opposed” only because they are part of the same cultural totality • That individualistic notions of “crime” are unhelpful, since a crime is typically enabled by the community it which it occurs, either by neglect or otherwise • That individualistic notions of responsibility weaken community Above, I have discussed examples of thinking focused on the Relationship moment. Drawing on both Basseches (1984, 114) and Bhaskar (1993, 392), we can distinguish the following main foci in working with thought forms comprised by this moment: • Assertion of the existence of relationships, the limits of separation, and the value of relatedness • Criticism of (unconnected) multiplicity, subjectivism, and pluralism • Criticism of de-totalization (neglect of totality anchored in the T-moment) • Description of a two-way (or multi-way) relationship • Assertion of internal and constitutive relationships We can summarize the main aspects of the moment of Relationship as shown below.

Relationship • Dialectical image: common ground (totality) • Figure: what is “not there” other than as held within a totality of (possibly oppositional) links and connections • Ground: unified by the category of totality, thus of holistic causality • Relationship to System: living core of any system • Scope: all parts of a whole, however split and split off; center to periphery • Theme: unity in diversity, internal relatedness, illicit separation and fission, fixation on unrelated (isolated) elements and multiples • Dialectics: reciprocal, intrinsic, based on constitutive relationship (logically preceding parts of a whole) and common ground

The Dialectic of Transformational Systems The dialectic of Transformational Systems is that of a “movement through forms” anchored in human agency. Since all things are forms, we are dealing with a movement that is naturally developmental, comprising growth as well as

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decay. This dialectic is the fullest expression of things real as well as imagined, appearing in static form in the guise of Context, forming the common ground (totality) in Relationship, and brimming with absences (potentials) due to process negativity. The dialectic of transformational systems is one of remediation, thus of healing rifts and absences. The Remediation Transform cleanses reality of all absences illuminated through C, P, and R thought forms. It subsumes within itself all Transforms of adult thinking except for the P-Transform, which embodies it and unites the epistemic, logical, and dialectical dimensions of human thought. In human thinking, it assumes its optimal form in Practical Wisdom. As holds for all moments of dialectic, we can view the T-moment in a more reality- or thought-oriented (ontological or epistemological) fashion. In both perspectives, the T-moment underlies physical and social (historical) perturbations and reversals. It primarily regards systems and their coordination, merger, and transformation. In the human sphere, where it is implicit in the other three moments, the T-moment deals with human agency (intentional causality) exerted by human mindbody agents who operate transformations through “history.” The T-Moment (Bhaskar’s 4D, fourth dimension, 1993, 393): is unified by the category of transformative praxis or agency. In the human sphere, it is implicit in the other three [that is, C, P, and R; OL]. Metacritically, it pinpoints two complementary kinds of … de-agentification – dualistic disembodiment and reductionist reification. There is a special affinity with 2E [Process], since agency is (intentional) causality which is absenting. … [4D = T dialectic is often]… the site of ideological and material struggles …

Since this moments seeds as well as absorbs the other three (C, P, and R), it most clearly expresses the ALIVENESS of the world, not only the human world. This aliveness is based, in part, on conflict leading to higher levels of development, but can equally lead to reversal and regression, depending on the specific context that processes and relationships operate in. From Bhaskar’s ontological perspective, thinking in terms of this moment critically focuses on avoiding two kinds of neglect of human agency: • Dualistic disembodiment, by which the concept of “intentional embodied causally efficacious agency” of human beings is negated (1993, 277) • Reductionist reification, whereby the human mind living “within a partially socialized nature in an un-socialized cosmos” is reduced to an atomistic entity instead of being acknowledged as a social (communal) agency (1993, 227) From a more thought-focused, epistemological, perspective (Basseches, 1984), tools included in the transformational moment put forms into a larger context. This context includes (Basseches, 1983, p. 122): • Relationships among forms (systems as forms) • Movement from one form to another (transformation) • Relationship of forms to the process of form-construction by human agents These topics require the integration of C, P, and R thought forms into the more highly meta-systemic way of thinking. Importantly, they also require discarding the rigid separation of “fact” and “value” since human agency does not accept such a

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distinction. Thought forms of moment T thus represent the highest level of thinking in the Third Order of Mental Complexity (Strata VII and VIII). An example of thinking in terms of transformational systems would be: Why do most mergers fail? The short answer is that they don’t deliver a system that is more inclusive and differentiated than the old one, just larger. And that amounts to a failure. Because you are merging not just two or more inert things but forms, living systems! So, to the extent that you don’t understand the inter-dependence of the systems you merge, you are dead in the water. And understanding that requires more than a reduction or saving of energy. It rather requires you to think through how the new structure you are creating will energize internal business processes (not just “clout” or “market share”). It’s more than social engineering that is required. You need to co-ordinate, redefine coordinates. Integration by reduction won’t work.

In this excerpt, the interviewee speaks about the process of coordinating systems by way of a merger. He points out that the merger of two companies is one of two living systems. Therefore, if their functioning and interaction are not thoroughly understood prior to the merger, the merger will most likely fail. What is required is a “thinking through” – or dialeghestai – of the processes ongoing in both systems, the relationship of these processes to each other, and an envisioning of the new context that is created by combining them. The reader may now ask in what way transformational thinking operates the “remediation,” or absenting, of absences. The notion here is that when you look at a single system, or two systems separately, you cannot see the missing links  – absences – that they embody. Or else, if you see what may be missing in a single system, you may not immediately see the “hooks” by which what is missing in one system can be remediated by linking it to another system. There is a void between two initially unrelated systems that must be filled, so to speak, by illuminating their potential coordination. This will take critical as well as constructive thinking on the part of those in charge of merging the systems. Given the crucial importance of human agency in transformational systems, what is often neglected in planning organizational mergers is the fact that human systems (which are by nature transformational) have unpredictable synergies. These synergies derive from the potential capability of their members. If this capability is represented in the corporate culture only in terms of some abstract closed system such as the Balanced Scorecard, a great number of missing links with the real world of human work remain in place that will come to haunt the organization. Where these absences – misalignments, erroneous selections, unforeseen feedback loops – are not recognized through dialectical thinking, the merger is likely to fail. I summarize the major aspects of thinking in terms of transformational systems below.

Transformational System • Dialectical image: “living” (transformational) system (e.g., a beehive) • Figure: what is in constant transformation seeking equilibrium, through mental growth, shift, sudden reversal, collapse, breakdown, pain

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Ground: unified by the social category of transformative praxis or agency Relationship to System: itself under constant transformation Scope: all of reality Theme: stability through developmental movement, attention to problems of coordination and change in a developmental direction, multiplicity of perspectives defining reality concretely, acknowledgement of human agency as intentional causality in the cosmos • Dialectics: special affinity with Process as social change • • • •

From Moments to Thought Forms We now know enough about the Four Moments of Dialectic to understand that they underlie the dynamics of the social and physical world and cannot be reduced to sets of human thought forms for “thinking about” reality. We also know that in the human mind they are represented by thought form tools called Transforms by which illumination and remediation of absences in thought and reality are accomplished. In particular, the Illumination Transform, which comprises Process, Context, and Relationship thought forms, is instrumental in inserting “dialectical comments” into thinking processes for the sake of illuminating thoughts so far “absent” from the process. As a result, the transformational Remediation Transform can come into play “to clean up the disk,” by closing the thought gaps found in consciousness. These thought gaps reveal themselves naturally when reflection is centered upon a particular base concept in search of other, related concepts that “can throw light on the matter” discussed. Clearly, the tools of the Illumination Transform are priceless for work with clients where challenging others’ thinking is of high value. In light of the vastness of consciousness and the relative brevity of human history, it will be evident to the reader that however many thought forms one might name and assemble – taken from the history of philosophy or human thinking at large – one will most likely end up with a restricted set of such forms, at least in terms of the unfathomable richness of the dialectical moments which signal the “depth” of reality.

 he Crucial Transition from the Second to the Third Order T of Mental Complexity It is part of the human condition that most humans (and the human sciences) remain confined to the Second Order of Mental Complexity, and only a minority progresses into the Third Order. This vantage point affords one a bird’s-eye view of the cognitive sciences as well. Just as in the social-emotional domain S-4 (Kegan’s

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“self-­authoring stage”) seems to be a crucial watershed for independent living and professional work, so in the cognitive domain the transition from formal logical thinking to dialectic in phase 1 of cognitive development is a crucial progression. The phases lead from incipient dialectical thought, making use of very few thought forms that lack coordination, to the ability of using an increasing number of thought forms and, what is more, coordinate them for the sake of thinking transformationally, beginning in phase 3. In this progression, the development into higher epistemic positions is an absolute precondition for dialectical thinking. As indicated previously, Stance and Tools are always in balance with each other. In first approaching the gist of each of the moments of dialectic, it is helpful to have access to a complete and comparative picture of what each of the moments stands for. Above, I have suggested to “size up” the moments in terms of the following categories: • • • •

Dialectical image – an image by which to remember the thrust of each moment Figure – that which initially stands out regarding each moment Ground – that which is hidden at first but substantially underlies the moment Relationship to System  – an indication of what each moment contributes to thinking reality in terms of transformational systems • Scope – the mental scope of each moment • Theme – the predominant topic articulated by each moment • Dialectics – the specific dynamic of each moment Of these categories, the image is easiest to remember since it is nothing more than a picture serving as a “flag” raised for our attention. Figure and Ground belong together showing that what stands out initially has deep moorings in the ground. System and Scope are related. We are always looking for how to thoroughly understand living systems which is what “reality” in the dialectical sense consists of. In this context, the scope tells us how far the dynamics of the moments extends in our mental space. For those thinking in narrative, Theme may be a helpful category by which to view the moments in one’s mental space. Finally, “dialectics” names the dynamic that inheres each moment. In Table  3.1, I summarize the characteristic aspects of each class of thought forms, in terms of the characterization of the Four Moments summarized above.

Comments on the Table Below, I briefly comment on each row of Table 3.1. Each row puts side by side the categories introduced above for each moment. Think of dialectical image as an intuitive shorthand by which to remember the Four Moments. The images – emergence, big picture, common ground, living system – serve as a tool for lifting one’s mind out of the lowland and flatland of the Second Order of Mental Complexity when working on any problem whatsoever.

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Table 3.1  Characteristics of the four classes of thought forms Aspects of dialectic Dialectical image

Figure

Context thought forms “Big picture” in the sense of a whole encompassing parts or strata What appears as a stable, well-­ balanced form

Ground

Unified by the category of differentiation that introduces variety and depth into what is real and making it alterable Relationship Pre-figuration of to system system in static form Scope Equilibrium of what exists

Theme

Dialectic

Process thought forms Emergence (from a void)

Relationship thought forms Common ground (totality)

Transformational thought form Living or transformational system (e.g., a beehive)

What is “not there” but is emerging through unceasing chance

What is not there other than as held within a totality of (possibly oppositional) links and connections Unified by the category of totality, thus holistic causality

What is in constant transformation seeking equilibrium, through mental growth, shift, sudden reversal, breakdown, pain

Living core of system

Itself under constant transformation

Unified by the category of absence from which all four moments derives

Always embedded in system Spanning negation, contradiction, critique

All parts of a whole, however split and split off; center to periphery Multiplicity of The presence of Unity in layers (strata) and the past and diversity, thoughts future; motion internal partaking in a in thought and relatedness, common frame of reality illicit separation, reference fixation on un-related elements and multiples Parts of a whole shifting their balance; stratification; generative mechanisms

Process, transition, interaction, opposition including reversal

Reciprocal, intrinsic, based on constitutive relationships (logically preceding parts of whole)

Unified by the social category of transformative praxis or agency

All of reality

Stability through developmental movement, attention to problems of coordination and change in a developmental direction, multiplicity of perspective, acknowledgement of human agency Special affinity with process and social change

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Comments on the Table

Aspects of dialectic Dialectical image

Process thought Context thought forms forms “Big picture” in the sense Emergence of a whole encompassing from a void parts or strata

Relationship thought forms Common ground (totality)

Transformational thought form Living or transformational system

[Excerpt of Table 3.1] Figure is what is in the foreground, the most obvious aspect. It helps answering the question: “What is the particular aspect – process, context, relationship, or system – I want to focus on, or else, my client is focusing on?” Aspects of dialectic Figure

Context thought forms What appears as a stable, well-­ balanced form

Process thought forms What is “not there” but is emerging through unceasing chance

Relationship thought forms What is not there other than as held within a totality of (possibly oppositional) links and connections

Transformational thought form What is in constant transformation seeking equilibrium, through mental growth, shift, sudden reversal, breakdown, pain

[Excerpt of Table 3.1] What is the Ground that holds the appearances (symptoms) of things real together? In terms of Process, what is the dynamics of the subject matter under discussion, and what is its history? What is the broader Context of the problem in its multidimensionality? Can we think of the problem, or solve it, by considering it in Relationship to all that is “going on” around and in it? Is there an implication of transformative human agency? Aspects of dialectic Context thought forms Ground Unified by the category of differentiation that introduces variety and depth into what is real, making it alterable

[Excerpt of Table 3.1]

Process thought forms Unified by the category of absence from which all four moments derive

Relationship thought forms Unified by the category of totality, thus holistic causality

Transformational thought form Unified by the social category of transformative praxis or agency

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How can we understand what we are focusing on in systemic terms? Can we describe what we are focusing on as a system, or something embedded in a process changing a system? What relationships hold the system together, and how are we going to account for ongoing, instantaneous transformations of the system? Aspects of dialectic Relationship to system

Context thought forms Pre-figuration of system in static form

Process thought forms Always embedded in system

Relationship thought forms Living core of system

Transformational thought form Itself under constant transformation

[Excerpt of Table 3.1] What is the scope of dialectical thinking? Are we focusing on the apparent balance and stability of what exists, or considering conflict and critique? Are we able to view things as a whole? Are we aware of the dialectic of the real that makes it transform from moment to moment (as we speak)? Are we limiting the scope of our thinking to mere figures without considering the ground they are rooted in? Aspects of dialectic Scope

Context thought forms Equilibrium of what exists

Process thought forms Spanning negation, contradiction, critique

Relationship thought forms All parts of a whole, however split and split off; center to periphery

Transformational thought form All of reality

[Excerpt of Table 3.1] What is the dialectical Theme that concerns us? Which of the moments of dialectic is primarily involved? Is it multiplicity of layers and strata within a common framework, presence of the past and future in the present, internal relatedness, or developmental movement toward a telos or higher level? Can this theme be separated from other themes, or need we broaden the theme to escape a narrow view of the dynamics we are witnessing?

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Categorical Errors

Aspects of Context thought dialectic forms Theme Multiplicity of layers (strata) and thoughts partaking in a common frame of reference

Process thought forms The presence of the past and future; motion in thought and reality

Relationship thought forms Unity in diversity, internal relatedness, illicit separation, fixation on un-related elements and multiples

Transformational thought form Stability through developmental movement, attention to problems of coordination and change in a developmental direction, multiplicity of perspective, acknowledgement of human agency

[Excerpt of Table 3.1] What is the internal movement or dialectics of reality viewed in terms of a specific class of thought forms? Are we looking at a static system held in balance by forces we can describe? Is there conflict or reversal? What crucial relationships underlie the present constellation of factors or elements we are focusing attention on? Are the system transformations we are considering elements of a process of social change, or do they also involve ecological (physical) factors human actions have an impact on? Aspects of dialectic Dialectics

Context thought forms Parts of a whole, shifting their balance; stratification; generative mechanisms

Process thought forms Process, transition, interaction, opposition including reversal

Relationship thought forms Reciprocal, intrinsic, based on constitutive relationships (logically preceding parts of whole)

Transformational thought form Special affinity with process and social change

[Excerpt of Table 3.1]

Categorical Errors While the categorical errors in formal logic all concern the violation of the excluded middle (identity clause) that leads to falsehood, categorical errors in dialectical thinking have to do with thinking too narrowly, not systemic enough, conceiving of things formalistically by way of reduction to frozen base concepts, etc. Each of the Four Moments has its own principal categorical errors, as seen below:

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Aspects of dialectic Main categorical error

3  Dialectic: A Framework for Its Practical Use Process thought Relationship Context thought forms forms thought forms De-differentiation Arresting of De-totalization (e.g., de-stratification) process

Transformational thought form Negation or neglect of human agency

[Excerpt of Table 3.1] When transitioning to the Third Order of Mental Complexity, we have to ask ourselves the following questions: 1. Are we simplifying the differentiated richness of reality? 2. Are we oblivious or neglectful of ongoing processes (including our own)? 3. Are we forgetting that isolated entities are part of a totality that makes them into what they are? 4. Are we equating living, transformational systems with closed systems, thereby obscuring their living quality?

Chapter Summary In this chapter, I have introduced a notion of dialectic based on both Basseches’ and Bhaskar’s model. I have defined the notion of Four Moments of Dialectic, the core conception of this book. In so doing, I have harnessed an ancient tradition of Western thinking long disavowed and discredited by formalistic thinking in its forms including science, suggesting with Adorno (1999) that untrammeled thought naturally tends toward dialectic. I have emphasized that the moments are “what runs the world,” not just thought things. I have also shown that they are not static entities but moments of an organized whole, and that they are therefore separate but inseparable in an emphatic sense. It should be clear from the table above that each moment, once represented in terms of thought forms, puts at our disposition novel ways of considering what to address as “reality.” The rows of the table shed light on what we chose to consider “a problem” in the first place. Problems are our construction, and our formulations may not truly capture the core of what is felt to be amiss. Perhaps we are viewing things from a single moment, forgetting that each has its own dialectic that binds it to other moments? Perhaps we need to reframe “the problem,” thereby enlarging the scope of factors that might account for it? Since all moments of dialectic are intrinsically related, prying them apart or getting stuck in one of them to the exclusion of the others meaning falling out of the dialectic of thought. We are then hypostatizing the Context moment, reducing it to a set of “data” that has nothing to do with the real world we started out exploring. This “world” then loses its equilibrium. We are using nothing but ­logical tools.

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Practice Reflections • If you think of your life in Process terms, that is, in terms of emergence, what comes to mind? • In what way does the distinction between Four Moments of Dialectic sharpen your sense of an individual’s thinking, including your own? • In your conversations, are you aware of the uses clients make of thought forms belonging to different classes? • If you think of the social world as being simultaneously constructed by humans and often impervious to change by humans, what does that tell you about the dynamics of transformation? • When you consider that a grasp of all Four Moments (in terms of classes of thought forms) is required for functioning on the higher organizational strata, how would you challenge leaders by using thought forms as mind openers? • What is your approach to dealing with the discrepancy, in clients, between their critical (P, R) and constructive (C, T) thinking? • What benefit would accrue for your coaching if you were to measure your client’s ability to use thought forms in the four classes in an equilibrated way? • How do you presently discern and measure the degree of fluidity of post-formal, systemic thinking in clients (“Gestalt” approaches will not do)? • If you consider that organizations are defined by two architectures, that of role accountability and individual capability, what do you think is the best way to work toward a match of the two architectures? • What thinking tools do executives need to bring about “requisite organization” in their company, specifically for having deeper insight into the HCA (Human Capability Architecture) representing human resources in the sense of levels of potential capability?

Exercises 1. Describe a beehive in terms of process, context, relationship, and transformational thought forms. What moment of dialectic do you find yourself stressing? 2. Describe how the hive’s organic subsystems  – queen, worker bees, drones  – interact from a systemic point of view. 3. All 30,000 to 50,000 bees of a hive are born and die each year, living 6 weeks on average (longer in the winter). Use the notion of s to describe how the hive maintains its identity through seasonal change by changing constantly. 4. Give an example for the losses caused by the simplification of the world when seen in terms of “change” as understood by the Logic Transform. 5. In what way is the Logic Transform a basis of dialectical thinking? 6. Why is epistemic position 4 a minimal precondition of dialectical thinking?

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7. What is meant by saying that a dialectical (Hegelian) inquiring system can subsume a Lockean or Kantian inquiring system? 8. What does the “ontological” notion of s (Bhaskar) contribute to our view of “reality”? 9. Can you think of some thought forms that would render the Process? 10. What constitutes the element of negativity in the Context moment of dialectic?

Bibliography Adorno, T. W. (1978). Minima moralia. Verso. Adorno, T. W. (1993). Hegel: Three studies. MIT Press. Adorno, T.  W. (1999). Negative dialectic. New  York: Continuum. [Negative Dialektik. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1966]. Adorno, T. W. (2008). Lectures on negative dialectic: Fragments of a lecture course 1965/66. Polity. Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, M. (1996). Interactive minds. Cambridge University Press. Basseches, M. A. (1978). Beyond closed-system problem solving: A study of metasystemic aspects of mature thought (PhD dissertation). Harvard University. Ann Arbor, MI: UMIO, #79/8210. Basseches, M. A. (1980). Dialectical schematas: A framework for the empirical study of the development of dialectical thinking. Human Development, 23, 400–421. Basseches, M. A. (1983). Dialectical thinking as a meta-systemic form of cognitive organization. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations. Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 216–238). Praeger. Basseches, M. A. (1984). Dialectical thinking and adult development. Ablex. Basseches, M.  A. (1989). Intellectual development: The development of dialectical thinking. In E. P. Maimon, B. F. Nodine, & F. W. O’Connor (Eds.), Thinking, reasoning and writing. Longman. Basseches, M. A. (2005). The development of dialectical thinking as an approach to integration. Integral Leadership Review, 1, 47–63. Bhaskar, R. (1979, 1989, 1998). The possibility of naturalism. Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (2002). Reflections on MetaReality. Sage Publications. Bhaskar, R. (2017). The order of naturally necessity. University College London Institute of Education. The Authors. Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (1991). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and leadership. Jossey Bass. Bopp, M., & Basseches, M. (1981). A coding manual for the dialectical schema framework (Unpublished dissertation). [Cited as BB.] Jaques, E. (1998a). Requisite organization. Cason Hall & Co.; 2021 edition of Requisite Organization Publishing, https://www.amazon.com/Requisite-­Organization-­Complete-­ Guide-­2021/dp/1867418932?source=ps-­sl-­shoppingads-­lpcontext&ref_=fplfs&psc=1&smid= ATVPDKIKX0DER). Jaques, E. (1998b). Time-span handbook. Cason Hall & Co. Jaques, E. (2002a). The life and behavior of living organisms. Praeger. Jaques, E. (2002b). A simple objective measure of size of roles in managerial systems. In M. A. Gloucester (Ed.), Executive leadership certificate program course materials (pp. 1–20). Cason Hall & Co. Jaques, E., & Cason, C. (1994). Human capability. Cason Hall & Co. Lahey, L., Souvaine, E., Kegan, R., Goodman, R., & Felix, S. (1988). A guide to the subject-object interview: Its administration and interpretation. Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University.

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Laske, O. (1966). On the dialectics of Plato and the early Hegel (doctoral dissertation). Laske, O. (1999). Transformative effects of coaching on executives’ professional agenda. PsyD Dissertation (2 vols.), Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology. Bell & Howell. (Order no. 9930438). Laske, O. (2005). Measuring Hidden Dimensions (vol. 1): The Art and Science of Fully Engaging Adults. IDM Press, available as a pdf in Section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/; republished 2023 by Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher, Lengerich, Germany, together with its German translation, entitled Potenziale im Menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen. Cited as ‘Laske 2023a’ (English) and ‘Laske 2023b’ (German). Laske, O. (2006). Leadership as something we are rather than have. Integral Leadership Review, VI(1). Laske, O. (2007). An integrated model of developmental coaching. In R. R. Kilburg & R. C. Diedrich (Eds.), The wisdom of coaching. APA. Laske, O. (2008). Measuring hidden dimensions (vol. 2): Foundations of requisite organization. IDM Press, available at Section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/ Laske, O. (2010a). [Editor] Erwachsenenentwicklung und Arbeitsfähigkeit: Beiträge zur Messung, Unterstützung, und Management von Humanpotential. (Adult development and capability: Contributions to measuring, supporting, and managing human capital). Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspsychologie. Pabst Science Publisher. Laske, O. (2010b). On the autonomy and influence of the cognitive line: Reflections on adult cognitive development peaking in dialectical thinking. Proceedings, integral theory conference, Pleasant Hills, CA. Laske, O. (2014). Reconocer, Despertar, y Medir el Potencial Humano, Spanish translation of volume 1 of Measuring Hidden Dimensions IDM Press & Ben Pensante, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, available as a pdf at https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/ Laske, O. (2015). Dialectical thinking for integral leaders: A primer. Integral Publishers. Laske, O. (2021a). CDF: A social-science framework for understanding human agency. CAD Lecture. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gZSrQXXZgM . Laske, O. (2021b). Dialektisch leben. Radio Evolve podcast found at https://radio-­evolve.de/ podcast/dialektisch-­leben/ Laske, O. (2022). The Osaka Interviews. https://interdevelopmentals.org/ the-­osaka-­interviews-­regarding-­cdf-­the-­constructive-­developmental-­framework/. Laske, O. (2023a). Measuring hidden dimensions: The art and science of fully engaging adults. Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher. Laske, O. (2023b). Potenziale im Menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen (German translation of 2023a by R. V. Leoprechting & Otto Laske). Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher. Laske, O. (2023c). Reshaping cognitive development as dialectic social practice via Bhaskar’s four moments of dialectic and Laske’s dialectical thought-form framework (DTF). In Metatheories of the 21st century. Routledge. Laske, O. (2023d). Advanced systems-level problem-solving. Book 1: Approaching Real-World Complexity with Dialectical Thinking. Book 2: A Cognitive Theory of Work. Book 3: Manual of Dialectical Thought Forms. Springer Nature. Martin, R. (2007a). How successful leaders think. Harvard Business Review. Reprint R0706C. Martin, R. (2007b). Opposable minds. Harvard Business School Press. Nisbett, R. E. (2005). The geography of thought. Nicolas Brealey Publishing. Peirce, C.  S., et  al. (1998). The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings 1983–1913. Indiana University Press.

Chapter 4

How Well-Tempered Is Your Thought Clavier?

Introduction This chapter will take us a step further toward an understanding of dialectic as the crowning achievement of adult thinking and a predictor of adult developmental outcome generally. Now that we have an inkling of epistemic preconditions as well as the s of dialectic, we are prepared to consider the logical necessity and mental energy that is behind the move from Understanding to Reason. Grasping the Understanding-Dialectic-Reason (U-D-R) movement of consciousness has an immediate impact on the practice of process consultation since it enables a process consultant to assess how well-tempered a client’s (student’s or patient’s) thought clavier might be. As the reader will increasingly understand, the transition from Understanding to Reason is a fundamental and at the same time entirely natural step. It is fundamental since it moves the thinker from the Second to the Third Order of Mental Complexity. It is natural because the potential to take this step is part and parcel of human consciousness. The transition has much to do with understanding the limits of one’s thinking. When you are aware of the limits of your thinking you have already transcended them. This insight prototypically played out in the history of European philosophy between 1770 and 1830 when Hegel and his colleagues developed an answer to the philosophy of Locke, Hume, and Kant. Almost 200 years later, we can see the “idealistic” limitations in Hegel’s attempt more clearly. At the same time, we can salvage what was highly valuable in his foray into dialectical thinking, as Adorno (1999) and Bhaskar (1993) have superbly done. There are several related topics we need to understand in greater depth at this point: 1. The development of dialectical thought in phases rather than stages. 2. The link between epistemic position and dialectical phase. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Laske, Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3_4

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3. Processes of accommodation and assimilation as the main force behind increasing fluidity of dialectical thinking. 4. The central notion of cognitive equilibrium. 5. The temporal overlap in early adulthood of the climax of formal-logical and the start of dialectical thinking. 6. The distinction between critical and constructive thinking in dialectical thought. 7. The difference between dialectic as a psychological process and an epistemological “ideal type” of adult thinking. 8. Logical antecedents of dialectical thought. 9. Subtle differences between the two models of dialectic introduced above. 10. The use of dialectical tools in opening minds and teaching “good thinking.”

Part A: The Context of Cognitive Development Review of Cognitive Development We saw in the previous chapter that the development of both logical and dialectical thinking is grounded in the development of reflective judgment (Archer’s Reflexivity), a development I referred to as a progression from lower to higher epistemic positions. We saw also that the development of logic tools peaks in early adulthood, typically reaching completion at around 25 years of age, at least in Western cultures. In the light of extant research in adult thinking, this entails that the “end spurt” toward mastering the Logic-Transform, starting in late adolescence, overlaps with incipient dialectical thinking. It is my hypothesis that the overlap referred to is based on the transition from epistemic position 4–5. Once using abstractions becomes fully conscious as it does in position 5, it becomes clear to the thinker that there is a difference between model (set of abstractions) and reality, and the latter cannot be identified with the former. Although the temptation of “hypostatizing” a model used in thinking as the reality to be modeled persists through life, from epistemic position 5 onward there exist more powerful safeguards against this quid pro quo. The temptation is particularly strong in the early phase of dialectical thinking when only a few and uncoordinated thought forms determine an individual’s thinking. As suggested in Fig. 4.1, the progression toward higher epistemic positions is the foundation of all cognitive development. As we saw, this foundation is linked to social-emotional development in the sense that only once impulses and perceptions are made into an object by an individual, can s(he) begin to recognize that no individual is a repository of truth. Alongside the socialized meaning-making that individuals become capable of, they also enter the path toward formal logical thinking. Subsequently, more adventurous discovery procedures, such as those embodied by dialectical thinking, can gradually be acquired (Fig. 4.2).

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Start

Finish

Understanding

Development of Logical Thinking (10-25 y) 4 stages [Piaget]

Reason

Development of Dialectical Thinking (18 years f.) 4 phases [Basseches] Epistemic Position Development of Reflective Judgment (6 years f.) 7 stages [epistemic positions]

Practical Wisdom Fig. 4.1  Overlap of epistemic, logical, and dialectical development over the lifespan

Social-Emotional Stage

Epistemic Position

STANCE

Phase of Cognitive Development TOOLS

Fig. 4.2  The relationship of social-emotional stage and phase of cognitive development

We can say, then, that social-emotional maturity manifests in the ability to position oneself cleansed of one’s immediate impulses and perceptions, thereby making space for higher epistemic positions that enable Understanding to come into its own. This can be a progression fraught with internal obstacles, since emotional and social forces determine epistemic stance as well as the use of thinking tools. For thinking to occur in its pure form, namely as dialectical reason, the mind needs to overcome enduring egocentricity. Adults need to overcome two related views: first, that knowledge and truth are certain, and second, that if they are not certain, everything is contextually relative. To overcome these subjectivistic hurdles, humans need dialectical thinking, however much they may defend against it.

The Path Toward Dialectical Thinking As shown in Fig.  4.3, each era of cognitive development  – Common Sense, Understanding, Reason, and Practical Wisdom – can be characterized by its peculiar Transforms (thinking tools). Each Transform presupposes a certain Stance. As Stance matures, Tools become more differentiated and “realistic,” and enrich

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I-Transform

Common Sense

Dialectical Comment

U-Transform

R-Transform Understanding P-Transform

Dialectical Reason

Practical Wisdom

Fig. 4.3  Five eras of cognitive development and their transforms

individuals’ experience in the world, simultaneously strengthened by that experience (Martin, 2007b). Among the tools available to the thinker, it is above all the Illumination or I-Transform that prepares the path toward dialectical Reason. To the extent that tools for making dialectical comments mature, the Remediation- or R-Transform comes into view, so that the world can be thought about in terms of transformational systems. This chapter leads us more deeply into transformational dialectical thinking by presenting: • An explication of the Four Moments of Dialectic by constructs called dialectical thought forms (TFs). • The grouping of thought forms into four logical classes in correspondence with the four moments of Dialectic. • Complex logical thinking (Western style) as a precondition of dialectical thinking. • Empirical evidence that dialectical thought forms emerge in adult minds in four distinct phases (Basseches, 1984). • The peculiar way the “world” is seen in each of the four phases.

The Unity of Consciousness In considering the transition from the Second to the Third Order of Mental Complexity (from logical to dialectical thinking), let us begin with the fact that we are dealing with a single unified consciousness, as shown in Fig. 4.4. The richness and adaptability of human consciousness itself testifies to the nature of transformational systems that dialectical thought is driven to explore. One way to view the transformations of consciousness in late adolescence and early adulthood is to think of them as ways by which consciousness creates different kinds of

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Consciousness

Classes of Thought Forms P

C

R

T

Individual Thought Forms Speech Flow

Concepts (Abstractions)

Formal Logic

Epistemic Position

Social-Emotional Stage Fig. 4.4  Flow of conceptual thought in a horizontal and vertical direction

equilibria. As shown in Chap. 3 of this book, these equilibria can be assessed through semi-structured cognitive interviews. The suggestion that epistemic position, as the cornerstone of developing cognitive stance and tools, is open to influence by social-emotional level rests on the notion that both entail subject-object relations, except that the epistemic object is broader than the social-emotional one which is restricted to the social world of Me/ Not-Me. In developing both kinds of relationship, one to the social world and one to the totality of what exists (“cosmos”), consciousness goes through the same dialectical motions. In each case we start from a predominating subject inducing egocentricity and move toward an increasingly larger object, either of social-­emotional meaning or cognitive sense-making. Given that the epistemic object of thought is more comprehensive than the social-­ emotional object, one might surmise that epistemic position grounds social-­ emotional development just as it grounds cognitive development. However, this hypothesis could only be explored if more were known about the process, not just the outcome, of social-emotional development, and this is presently not the case. Not only is there a lack of evidence in this regard, social-emotional theories have also done their best to obscure the relationship of the development of meaning-making to cognitive development, by collapsing the two into one undifferentiated dimension (Loevinger, 1976; Cook-Greuter, 1999; Kegan, 1982).

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Although it would be an interesting hypothesis to explore that social-emotional meaning-making has a direct influence on cognitive development, in this book I view these two lines of adult development as mediated by epistemic position, rather than linked directly. The main reason for this suggestion is that in my assessments using CDF I have not found convincing empirical evidence that social-emotional meaning-making has any kind of direct influence on cognitive development. The opposite, however, can be shown when triangulating cognitive and social-emotional assessments. In the next chapter, I explore the much more convincing (contrasting) hypothesis that cognitive development, in the sense of use of dialectical thought forms, underlies and defines the development of meaning-making. In the end, the hypotheses suggested in this book might turn out to be too simplistic. However, they are superior to notions of linear causality still prevailing in the literature (e.g., Hoare [editor], 2006a, b). They are also more differentiated than the (implicit or explicit) reduction of cognitive to social-emotional development permits now rampant. When following the suggestions detailed in Fig. 4.4, what first strikes the eye is the distinction between a horizontal movement sideways into formal logic and a vertical movement upward to full dialectical thinking relying on thought forms. The axis on which both movements initially proceed is the self-aware use of concepts (abstractions). Once self-awareness in the use of concepts reaches a certain level, or that use becomes “fully conscious,” a switch in the flow of consciousness occurs, to the effect that formal logical thinking becomes integrated into (rather than subordinated to) dialectical thinking. Formal logical thinking then becomes a tool for bringing the U-D-R movement of consciousness to completion by way of the Illumination Transform. This shift was first suggested by Churchman (1971) when he suggested that both Lockean and Kantian Inquiring Systems may become elements of a dialectical (Hegelian) Inquiring System. In what way this integration might account for the movement to higher social-emotional stages is presently a scientific no-man’s land. (It is, alas, not yet even seen as a problem in present cognitive research.) Figure 4.4 also makes a suggestion regarding the relationship of speech flow to epistemic and social-emotional position. It illustrates the notion that speech flow (and thus interviewing), not written speech, is the most authentic ground on which to explore sense-making and meaning-making alike. The notion in the figure is that concepts are elements of speech flow. In Western logical parlance, they stand in for “ideas of a class of objects” (Oxford Dictionary, 1911 f.). However, this Aristotelian notion of “concept” is superseded in dialectical thinking by the use of preservative negation through which dialecticism increasingly transforms concepts into transitional moments of a living organized whole, that of dialectic (Basseches 1984). When interviewing for evidence of dialectical thinking and scrutinizing speech flow accordingly, a decisive criterion is the way in which an individual uses the logical identity clause. There are two possibilities: 1. Either consciousness succumbs to the logical identity clause (according to which A=A), interpreting any non-A as a flat negation of A.

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2. Or consciousness employs preservative negation by which any non-A is interpreted as a particular defining aspect of A for the purpose of illuminating A further until full remediation of absences of A is attained. In the second case, explicating aspects of A serves the illumination of A rather than establishing a logical nexus of A with other concepts along the horizontal line of thinking. The shift to the vertical dimension of consciousness succeeds and thought continues in the vertical direction “upward” toward full dialectics. Thinking becomes increasingly able to acquire and use four different classes of thought forms: 1. *Process* [P] 2. *Context* [C] 3. *Relationship* [R] 4. *Transformational System* [T] where the first three classes comprise thought forms used in illuminating concepts (making dialectical comments), while thought forms of the fourth class constitute a meta-level of thinking, used in remediating absences previously illuminated at a meta-systemic level.

A Concrete Example For instance, in the cognitive interview excerpt below, a particular thought form called “self-transforming system” is used by the speaker to explain changes he has experienced in his recent way of thinking. In coming back from Europe, I was more uncertain about being able to separate my view of my capabilities from others’ view. And so, there is a degree of self-­ confidence involved in that. If you believe in yourself without being arrogant or cocky about it, you are, I believe, open to lots more possibilities than if you try to gauge your own value based on everybody’s feedback. Because the feedback could be right or wrong. So, in your core you have to believe in yourself and your ability to self-transform in your own peculiar way. And that has been true for me for the 30 years I have been working, since college. And for a couple of years, I lost that. But the coaching has made it clear to me that, considering my prior successes, I have always managed to come through with my identity, once I followed my own original rhythm rather than yielding to pressures from the outside. And I will say as well that the last 8 months of my European experience helped with this as well. Whether anybody else recognizes that or not, I did it, and if I could do it there, in Europe, I can probably do it somewhere else. In talking about professional changes that have taken place in recent times, the speaker clearly uses formal logical thinking (e.g., “Because the feedback can be right or wrong.”). However, his use of formal logic is embedded in a much more subtle mental process acknowledging that relying on others’ opinions about oneself is ultimately counterproductive. Rather, what is required in professional

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development is that “in your core you have to believe in yourself and your ability to self-­transform in your own peculiar way.” As many statements in this excerpt, the last one is not simply a logical inference. Rather, it is a statement based on a dialectical thought form by which the thinker captures a complex insight into himself as a system in transformation. Considered in terms of the four classes of thought forms (P, C, R, T), the speaker not only focuses on changes and processes. He implicitly ties processes to relationships, specifically between himself and others, and moreover is quite specific about the context – an overseas assignment from which he has returned – with an emphasis on the self-transformational nature of his own identity (“rhythm”). In his illumination of aspects of P, R, and C of the base concept “my core identity,” the speaker remediates the aspects illuminated by using thought forms of class P, C, and R, such as thought form 27. 27. Open, self-­ Focus: seeing systems as organisms that assimilate elements of their transforming systems environment and thereby accommodate to it, emerging with a more substantial, ceaselessly changing identity

The speaker constructs his own existential reality by drawing together opposing elements of experience into a group of non-As, seeing himself as “following my own original rhythm rather than yielding to pressures from the outside.” While he continues to make logical distinctions – “my own original rhythm” versus “yielding to pressures from the outside” – he focuses on his “ability to self-transform in your own peculiar way,” as any living system does. In scoring a cognitive interview, we credit such a speaker with being able to use a systemic thought form (specifically TF #27) referring to living, self-transforming systems, assigning a weight to the thought form based on the explicitness of its use (here, weak = 1).

Interpretation of the Example As is shown in Book 2, Appendix 1, the cognitive interview, a part of the Constructive-­ Developmental Framework (CDF), enables its user to determine a client’s degree of fluidity of dialectical thinking and, based thereupon, an overall Systemic Thinking Index (STI) that reflects the degree to which a thinker can balance thought forms in the four different classes of thought forms and, consequently, critical and constructive thinking (which is an indicator of the speaker’s current potential). The index indicates a thinker’s current potential (work) capability in the sense of Jaques (1998a), a finding that foreshadows his/her emergent potential capability 2–5 years ahead. In the case of the interviewee quoted above, whose Fluidity Index is 25 (%) (meaning 25% of the optimum possible in a cognitive interview), we consider him as presently making sense in Phase 2 of dialectical thinking. As we see in Table 4.1,

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Table 4.1  Alignment of epistemic position with phase of dialectical thinking Epistemic position 5 Phase 2 of Dialectical Thinking

Assumptions about knowledge and truth Abstract mapping skills make it possible to compare and contrast abstractions; compare across contexts; discuss issues of part and whole; there is no integrated (fully dialectical) view of truth

Approximate social-emotional stage S-3(4) to S-4(3)

Phase 2 of dialectical thinking implies not only a particular epistemic position but is also associated with a specific social-emotional stage prediction. The interviewee in question uses thought forms from the four classes (P, C, R, and T) in a highly unbalanced fashion, namely (Laske, 1999, 150):

 PCRT  0, 0, 50, 44  %  

The score indicates that his thinking is one-sidedly fixated on relationships (50%), not only between persons but between scenarios and situations as well. Therefore, he finds it easy to articulate transformational thought forms (44%), although in a very “hollow” way, in the sense that he cannot concretize the systems he easily talks about in terms of Process and Context details. As a result, he comes across as a visionary who does not know how to implement ideas. The holistic contexts he refers to, whether they lie in the past or future, are therefore not specific enough for taking action. This cognitive profile then gives the behavioral impression that the speaker is “highly emotional” and cannot be pinned down and trusted to take effective action. In truth, though, this behavioral interpretation may be wholly mistaken. The interviewee’s cognitive profile gives the impression that his constructive thinking is slightly less developed (0  +  44  =  44(%)) than his critical thinking (0 + 50 = 50(%)). However, in this case such a comparison is rather meaningless. There is no dialectical process or context thinking the interviewee can be credited with to begin with. As a result, a clash is notable in the interviewee’s thinking between closed systems grounded in formal logical thinking, where process and context are concerned, and a pseudo-dialectical thinking in terms of open, transformational systems rooted in high sensitivity to relationships between persons and things.

Linking Logos and Mythos In his book entitled Dialectical Thinking and Adult Development (1984), M. Basseches set forth a theoretical proposal, along with empirical findings, of how the development of dialectical thinking out of formal logical thinking may be empirically understood. Making use of Piaget’s central concepts, such as

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Table 4.2  The development of formal operations following Piaget Stage Sensorimotor operations Pre-operational operations Concrete operations

Age Age 0–2

Descriptions Reflex base, coordination of reflexes, development of transitional objects Age 2–6 Determination by impulses from which one cannot detach; or 7 weak relationship to objects Ages 6 or 7 Concrete observations, multiple but not coordinated to 11 or 12 perceptions and viewpoints. Thinking “in objects” prepares logical thinking Formal operations Age 11 or Beginning of abstract thinking; use of theoretical constructs; 12 up to 25 great “spurt” toward logical thinking from age 18. (Not all people reach this stage)

egocentrism, accommodation, assimilation, décalage, and others, Basseches defined a path along which thinking called dialectical emerges as a natural continuation of formal thought. To begin, let us review a few research essentials. Once language use sets in about 15 months after birth, overriding earlier senses of self, a verbal self is created at great loss to the infant’s multi-modal, imaginative world (Stern, 1985) as well as with great benefits for the infant’s becoming a member of a cultural community (Laske, 1999, 169 f) (Table 4.2). This development leads to the emergence of different logics, the crowning achievement of which is the increasing use of formal logical operations after age 10–11. The question thus arises as to what happens once this development has run its course in early adulthood. One can surmise that if cognitive development stopped at the completion of formal logical thinking, there would forever remain a gap between what Labouvie-Vief calls two modes of thinking, mythos and logos (1990, 43–62). As she sees it: Logos thinking encompasses all that can be stated in rational terms, all that appears the same to every mind, all that pertains to discursive thinking and objective truth. It is reflected in the idea that thinking can be mechanized, rendered perfectly precise, freed from subjectivity and error, and subjected to intersubjective agreement and uniformity. This is the form of thinking we variously call rational, analytical, conscious, abstract, and formal logic. The other mode is the one the Greeks called mythos. Mythos thinking relates to the concrete and the organic. It concerns the imagination – that which is private and not easily verified. Its powers of persuasion lie not in the outside and the “objective,” but in the inner world – in the emotions and sensibilities. There is a paradoxical relationship between these two modes. Their methods of ascertaining truth are vastly different and indeed antagonistic. Logos thinking is aimed at the removal of variation, at stability and reliability. Mythos thinking, on the other hand, seizes the novel and leaps out of the constraints of analytical precision. It disturbs control and stability that is logic’s ideal, but it is also an important source of innovation and creativity.

Considering the unity of human consciousness, it would be astonishing if there had not arisen a tradition attempting to build a bridge between the two aspects of mythos and logos. In Western culture, such a tradition is found in the history of dialectics that begins with Plato and reaches a peak in G.W.  Hegel whose Phenomenology of Spirit (1977, 1806) introduces the modern notion of dialectics.

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Hegel was a follower of Kant, and thus steeped in what today we would call “analytical philosophy.” In his own cognitive development, Hegel grew more and more wary of what Kant had defined as the limits of the Understanding. He undertook it to show that when pointing to the limits of Understanding, Kant had already (thereby) transcended them. In a statement characteristic of him, Hegel takes on the bridging of logos and mythos as a personal quest, saying (quoted by Bhaskar, 1993, xii): This struggle [between the infinite and the finite] is a conflict defined not by the indifference of the two sides in their distinction, but by their being bound together in one unity. I am not one of the fighters locked in battle, but both, and I am the struggle itself. I am fire and water …

In this “existentialist” statement, Hegel sees logos as representing the finite (modeled by Kant), and mythos as representing the infinite, in the sense of the mental space that is created when the limits of finite logical understanding are transcended. Hegel conveys that human thinking cannot stand indifferently vis-à-vis the two sides of the mind, since in their distinction, they are “bound together in one unity.” This lets him say, not just for himself, but for every thinking human being, “I am the struggle itself.” By this Hegel means that it takes conceptual effort (Anstrengung des Begriffs) to do justice to the human mind comprising both logos and mythos (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997). I am suggesting here with Hegel and Bhaskar that mythos and logos are not simply “two modes of thinking,” but are nurtured by the same stream that is human consciousness. This entails that the highest development of thinking in individuals leads to them becoming “fire and water,” in attempting to transcend the rigid limits of formal logic without falling into the abyss of mythos. This, clearly, can only be accomplished if formal logic is not left behind or “suspended” (as in irrational ideologies), but integrated into the fabric of trans-­logical, dialectical thought. Developmentally, one would therefore surmise that dialectical thinking springs from formal logical thinking, just as the latter springs from language (Liebrucks, 1964). And this is indeed what Basseches has shown in his 1984 study on dialectic and adult development (Basseches, 1984).

Cognitive Development Occurs in Phases Not Stages When we conceive of dialectical thinking as an attempt to transcend formal logic without leaving it behind, it becomes easier to understand that its main benefit is to create larger mental spaces in which new discoveries about the world and the mind can be made. This enlargement of the space in which to “work”  – according to Jaques, a “loosening and bifurcation process”  – would lend itself splendidly to attempts to understand development itself, since development in the sense of adult development is engaged in nothing but the enlargement of the space which human consciousness increasingly calls its own.

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If we consider that dialectical, just as logical, thinking is bound to the verbal self, this development can be predicted to strive to take back the fetters imposed on thinking by the linear sequencing of natural language, in which even the most convoluted developments are described – except for languages like Chinese – in a categorical, piecemeal fashion. In this sense, dialectic can also be viewed as the attempt to transcend the limits of language for the sake of capturing the incessant change and multi-modal characteristics we as infants, prior to using language, perceived in the real world. In short, dialectics is an attempt to recapture the richness of pre-­ linguistic senses of self – prior to the verbal self – within language itself. In this context, it will be persuasive to the reader that, while to speak of “stages” of reflective judgment and the development of logic seems to make perfect sense, the notion that dialectical thinking develops in stages sounds more dubious. For one thing, stages are discontinuous steps reached abruptly, by which a person’s world view is dramatically and holistically transformed. Such a stage view of development is not easily reconciled with the notion of incessant transformation as it occurs in the real world. It underscores the dramatic and organic result of transformations in the real world rather than the processes by which this result is achieved. When considering the process of adult cognitive development, it makes more sense to conceive of the transformations of consciousness undergoes as occurring in phases rather than stages. In a phasic approach to cognitive development, we are aware of the multitude of ways of reaching specific levels of dialectical thinking by gradual assimilation, rather than in terms of universal stages shared by all individuals in lock-step fashion as in the social-emotional domain (Jaques & Cason, 1994). A phasic approach stresses continuity over discontinuity (thus “learning”), in contrast to both the social-emotional and epistemic perspectives in which learning is somewhat incidental.

In Search of More Ample Mental Spaces We saw in the example of the three mothers whose different modes of thinking led them to conceive of the mother-daughter relationship very differently that dialectical thinking (represented by Judy) is focused on accepting and integrating unceasing change in all of its forms without disavowing the validity of the present or the past. While such change leads most people to the notion that everything is relative (“everything goes”), and to turning indifferent to what may be true, dialectical thinking saves us from throwing out the baby with the bathwater as happens in relativism. This is because dialectical thinking, as Hegel put it, steps into the conflict between something X and its Other not with indifference, but with the full realization that what is presently absent from X, and thus comprised by its Others, is “bound together in one unity.” This struggle [between the infinite and the finite] is a conflict defined not by the indifference of the two sides in their distinction, but by their being bound together in one unity.

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In terms of truth conceived of in formal logical terms, this pointing to Relationship as the common ground of opposites is a total scandal. As long as the early epistemic positions (1–3) ground logical thinking, there is no possibility of even grasping what the scandal is, let alone condoning it. However, when discussing epistemic development, we saw that at epistemic position 4, a shift occurs from the assumption that knowledge is certain to a position where it is experienced as uncertain, at least under “certain” circumstances. Consequently, beginning with epistemic position 5, adults increasingly grapple with the question of how to live with, and act in the context of, unceasing change, uncertainty, lack of knowledge, and limits of their own knowledge. They begin to grasp that not only acting in the world, but being in the world poses an ill-structured problem. This leads adults increasingly to understand that to find their bearing in the real world, they need to become active sense makers who generate their own hypotheses and test them for validity. One way of describing dialectical thinking, at least from the outside, then, is that it is a procedure for discovering new, larger mental spaces in which open, rather than closed, systems can become thematic. (Formal logic is a closed system.) Due to the absence of rigid syllogisms, adult thinking is potentially more subtle, rich, deep, and able to cope with conflict, paradox, absence, and change than is possible using formal logic. Concomitantly, engaging in dialectical thinking requires a new kind of risk taking, namely the willingness to be mistaken due to undue simplification of a complex world in unceasing transformation. From a dialectical perspective, the central “error” in thinking thus becomes one-sidedness, incompleteness, undue simplification, de-stratification, de-agentification – not logical falsehood. In other words, the error lies in not seeing the big picture and its unceasing transformation.

Cognitive Equilibrium It is ironic that Piaget’s research into the development of logical thinking should have led him to encapsulate the mind in a complex but closed system. This irony was not lost on M. Basseches when he wrote (1984, 9): Piaget’s theory has been of limited relevance for the study of adult development. The limits of Piagetian theory result from his opting for an overly formalistic description of mature thought, and therefore ignoring cognitive development after early adolescence.

Formalistic thinking is an accepted and excellent way of codifying research results. However, this codification comes at a high price because processes evaporate as a result. By reason of this, in the 1970s the followers of Piaget were looking for ways to take up his research enterprise without falling victim to the limits he had, like Kant, imposed on the enterprise. It seems to me that, as far as research into social-emotional development goes, Piaget’s followers have failed to this day.

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It is different with neo-Piagetian cognitive research, although only for selected parts of it. Among the concepts that made research into dialectical thinking possible is Piaget’s concept of equilibrium. As Basseches states (1984, 36): In genetic epistemology [as Piaget called his studies, meaning the genesis of ways of knowing], to understand the nature of a certain area of knowledge, one analyzes the form of equilibrium it provides and studies lower forms of equilibrium through which the existing equilibrium developed. Thus, from the genetic epistemological viewpoint, development refers specifically to constructing higher levels of equilibria.

Therefore, A change in human activity is defined as a development for Piagetians when and only when it involves a reorganization of activity in a more equilibrated way – when the person can maintain important perceptual and cognitive constancies while assimilating more variety. The Piagetian approach to the study of human development involves attempting to describe these kinds of changes.

In short, at whatever juncture in his or her life we encounter a person, we will find that the person has arrived at a certain equilibrium characterized by the interweaving and coordination of thought forms employed to understand life. If we can develop ways of measuring the person’s equilibrium, we can determine in what phase of dialectical thinking a person presently makes sense of the world. Basseches explains (1984, 36): In Piagetian theory, there are three key sets of ingredients in the construction of any new cognitive structure: (a) A person’s set of previously existing cognitive structures; (b) the objects and events encountered in the external world; and (c) “functional invariants of intelligence” (Piaget, 1972). The third set refers to the invariant activities of intelligence itself, organization and adaptation – the ways in which human intelligence in all its manifestations brings together old structures with new experiences to construct new structures.

In this constructivist model of the development of human thinking, therefore, “new cognitive structures are created out of the interaction of the functional invariants of intelligence – adaptation and organization – with sources of disequilibrium, either within people’s cognitive structures or between their cognitive structures and their environments” (Basseches, 1984, 40). In this context, adaptation is to be understood as the (dialectical) interplay of two component processes: assimilation and accommodation (Basseches, 1984, 36).

Assimilation and Accommodation Processes of Thinking Among the most fertile and far-reaching concepts of the Piagetian tradition are assimilation and accommodation. According to Piaget’s constructivist model (Basseches, 1984, 36–38): … we turn the objective outside world into subjective experience by assimilating it – that is, taking it in – using our existing cognitive structures.… At the same time that the experience is cognized by assimilating it to existing cognitive structures (recognizing its familiar features), it presents novel features to which the existing cognitive structures must accom-

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modate.… A dialectic occurs as individuals interact with the world. Existing structures shape the world into recognizable experience, and at the same time the world reshapes and modifies the existing cognitive structures. …In every case, whether the assimilation process exerts a major impact on the shape of the experience, or the experience exerts a major impact on the nature of the cognitive structures, or there is a relatively equal balance of assimilation and accommodation, something new has been constructed as a result of the dialectical interaction of cognizer [thinker, OL] and environment.

One can therefore say that individuals moving to higher and higher epistemic positions become self-aware, not in the least by becoming aware of their own cognitive processes. The movement to higher epistemic positions is reflected in the experience of the knower who increasingly thinks dialectically. This self-aware cognitive functioning constitutes an equilibrium between the knower and the world known. In this book, I refer to higher levels of cognitive equilibrium as Reason (in contrast to Understanding). Reason, as here understood, characterizes the Third Order of Mental Complexity. It is not simply a “faculty” but a measurable kind of cognitive equilibrium (see Book 2 Appendix 1). In the domain of Reason, we can speak of four kinds of equilibrium that are being fashioned (Basseches, 1984, 39–40): 1. Between the knower and the environment 2. Among component elements of a cognitive structure (such as the concepts held together by a particular thought form) 3. Between an aspect of the cognitive structure and the whole structure of which it is a part 4. Between a specific cognitive process and the self-aware use of thinking tools More compactly, one may speak of an equilibrium of Stance (Frame of Reference) and Tools (Martin 2007b, 93), as shown in Fig. 4.5. An equilibrium as described under (4), above, can be compared to a person’s social-emotional Center of Gravity, and can therefore be called a person’s cognitive CONSCIOUSNESS

STANCE

TOOLS

Epistemic Positions

Transforms

1 …7

Logic Transform Illumination Transform Remediation Transform Practical Wisdom Transform

Fig. 4.5  Equilibrium between stance and tools in cognitive development

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center of gravity. Since in contrast to social-emotional development, cognitive development is to a high degree open to influence by teaching and coaching, a person can be helped in reaching a higher level of cognitive equilibrium by using dialectical thought forms as mind openers. No such tools exist in the social-emotional domain, which is a different way of saying that all tools used in that domain are cognitive. As is shown in Appendix 1 of Book 2, we can describe a cognitive center of gravity with the same precision that we can describe its social-emotional equivalent. We do so by measuring the proportion of uses of individual thought forms from the four classes of Process, Context, Relationship, and Transformation, thereby obtaining a measure called the Cognitive Score. The cognitive center of gravity is closer, in form of description, to the social-emotional Risk-Clarity-Potential Index (RCP; Laske, 1999) than a simple stage description originated by Lahey et al. (1988). The difference between the two, in form, is that in the cognitive case the developmental risk (R) lies in the imbalance of thought form classes, while the Systems Thinking Index – the fourth component of the cognitive score – describes the person’s potential (P).

Two Models of Dialectics We saw in the preceding chapter that there exist at least two models of dialectic, one focused on absences, by Bhaskar (1993), and one focused on the structural equilibrium, by Basseches (1984). Adorno’s Negative Dialectic (1999; 1966) is a third model. In his model, the emphasis falls on the mandate of honoring the non-identity of objects of thought (see the Manual in Appendix A). Engaged in trying to understand cognitive development, at this point the attentive reader may say: Dear author! You have provided me with two different models of dialectic, one that sees dialectic as a set of procedures for establishing increasingly higher cognitive equilibria (Basseches), and another seeing it as a process in which reflection on a base concept gives rise to the discovery of what is absent from it – other than it – for the purpose of remediating these absences by joining them to the base concept at a higher level of insight (Bhaskar). – “How do these two models of dialectic fit together?”

The answer to the reader’s bewilderment is rather simple. What Bhaskar conceptually describes as preservative negation – negation that does not “destroy” but only “suspends” and “transcends” that which it negates – Basseches breaks down in minute detail into individual thought forms all of which imply, but do not always make explicit, preservative negation. What is more, Basseches’ four classes of thought forms are nearly synonymous, in their definition, with Bhaskar’s Four Moments of Dialectic (1993, 392–293). The link between the two models thus essentially lies in the special form of negation used in dialectics. This fact is somewhat obscured by the fact that Bhaskar emphasizes preservative negation as the central dialectical

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process, while Basseches points to the result of such thinking in the form of an individual’s cognitive equilibrium.

What “Develops” in Cognitive Development? In harmony with the two models of dialectic, I have so far taken two related views of what is “developing” in cognitive development: • Stance: higher-level cognitive equilibria, not only between mental operations but also between the thinker and the world (Basseches) • Tools: more realistic – since more differentiated – base concepts whose elements get “illuminated” by comments using dialectical thought forms (Bhaskar) The first aspect refers to a thinker’s Stance or positioning to self and world, the second to a thinker’s Tools. In both cases, what is involved can be called systemic thinking. When such thinking uses dialectical tools, we speak of meta-systemic thinking. The best way to think of Tools is to reflect upon the movements-in-thought involved in thinking. Within the unity of consciousness, movements that occur in our thoughts are wide-ranging and seemingly without bounds. However, movements-­ in-­thought form a universe of their own that is irreducible to Stance, viz., the autonomous mental space in which the “structure” of thinking is decided upon. When it comes to describing a dialectical mind set or stance, the following important assumptions made in dialectical thinking must be included: • What is factually the case is actual, not real, since what is actual is constructed (“made,” factum) by humans, whereas reality is full of hidden dimensions, and these get no hearing in factual descriptions. • There is unceasing change in the world, both in thought and reality (Process). • Everything is an element of a bigger picture, both in thought and reality (Context). • Isolated entities (individuals, things) are those that have artificially been cut off their moorings in a larger totality they share with each other (Relationship). • “Reality” is deep in that it is “punctuated by absences [what is not there or hidden]” (Bhaskar, 1993), and these absences need to be illuminated to remediate them. Dialectical thinking, then, has nothing to do with what “might be.” It is not a special kind of thinking as much as it is thinking that is aware of its embedding in the world and striving to reflect the depth of reality that can be experienced. In this sense, dialectical thinking is reflective, both in the sense of being based on higher levels of reflective judgment (epistemic position) and as reflecting the minute details of concrete instances in the world that natural language ultimately fails to render. Especially when it moves to the meta-systemic level when using transformational thought forms, dialectical thinking embodies a reflective skepticism against its own assuredness of being in control of the world.

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Another aspect of movements-in-thought is that consciousness is an open transformational system. In whatever way we may classify patterns of thought, or thought forms, we will find that they are ultimately bound to each other, even presuppose each other in a systemic way. In reference to the four classes of dialectical thought forms, it is apparent that nobody ever thinks in terms of one of the classes alone. Every thought, once further investigated by the thinker himself or an interpreter, will be found to oscillate between all Four Moments of Dialectic. Thought finds a definitive home only in the Transformational Moment where the coordination of thought forms occurs. The reconciliation of “thought” and “reality” only succeeds in s of transformation. For instance, a simple sentence such as “I am changing” asserts a contradiction: • That I am now different • That I am still the same (Me) In terms of formal logic alone, this is pure nonsense since one of the implications involved must be false. But the fact of the matter is that I am remaining the same exactly because I am unceasingly changing, and because changing is the only way for me to remain identical with myself. Thus, to grasp myself, I need to think of myself not only in terms of Process, but also in terms of the larger Context in which I am embedded and the relationships that abound once I stand away from myself as an isolated entity, and ask “where do I come from?” When I follow the oscillations of my thoughts, and I look at myself systemically, as a system undergoing constant transformation, my identity is owed to the change that constantly occurs. The change that occurs in me is the preservative negation of me and is the Process in which I find myself. For this reason, I am myself the struggle without ever defeating myself or being defeated by myself. My identity re-emerges from the change that I am subject to. This is so because I am embedded in a larger Context – the natural and social worlds – and these worlds are related to each other in a way that is not under my control. If I don’t want to get stuck in Actuality, looking at myself as an isolated entity or “individual,” I need to reflect on these worlds, inner and outer, to touch upon their transformational Reality.

Focus of Attention The dialectical stance described above brings up some important questions about adult thinking. If I am to think systemically, what mental processes are there for me to use? How can I direct my attention to what I am thinking about in such a way that I am able to delve into the intricacies of what is and is at hand? This is a matter of my Stance, my epistemic as well as social-emotional position which I do not control but am subject to. I only find whether I can take a dialectical stance when I am trying to do so. This involves revolutionizing my way of thinking. Once I can “turn my thinking around,” the tools to use are already at hand. They will be discussed below (see also the Manual in the Appendix).

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How to Distinguish the Four Classes When attempting to understand consciousness as an open transformational system, it is a helpful expedient to envision it as based on foci of attention such that its complexity lies in the paths of transition from one focus or thought form to another. This is a closed-system analogy that has limited validity but is nevertheless a useful way of grasping the aliveness of the system. Accordingly, we can then focus attention on the following aspects of reality: 1. Process [P] – how things emerge into being and vanish into non-being. 2. Context [C] – how things form stable configurations that appear as a stratified “big picture” seemingly able to withstand unceasing change. 3. Relationship [R]  – how awareness of limits of separation between different things leads to looking for the common ground they share, which puts into focus the differences we observe to exist. 4. Transformation (transformational system) [T]  – how we can contrast, coordinate, and integrate different, even opposing, systems by using thought forms from different classes (for instance, P+C, C+R, P+R+C, etc.) (Table 4.3). • When focusing on Process, the thinker is inquiring into how things came to be and will develop further in the future. S(he) sees things being in flux, wondering how they got to be what they are. • When focusing on Context, the thinker broadens what s(he) is talking about to a “bigger picture” so that the base concept focused on becomes an element of a larger constellation (conceptual network). Through this constellation, the many differentiations reconciled in Context, including through opposition, become apparent (Adorno 1999). • When focusing on Relationship, the thinker searches for what different or opposite things have in common, the totality they are part of, knowing that only in the shared totality of things can forms be “different” from each other. • When focusing on (Transformational) System, the thinker conceives of what exists as a living organic system. S(he) draws together thought forms from at least two different classes, thereby coming to think of what is being thought (or spoken) about as being at the same time at rest and in motion (P+C), by itself and in relationship to something else (C+R), or as being in unceasing transformation (C+P+R), externally and internally.

Table 4.3  The four classes of thought forms with their associated dialectical images

Class of thought form Process Context Relationship System

Dialectical image Emergence Big picture Common ground Living system

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Four Classes of Thought Forms We have spoken of transformational thinking and its dialectical tools. We have said that the Four Moments of Dialectic have both a “Stance” and a “Tools” aspect. We have referred to the tools as thought forms, that is, abstract patterns through which a multitude of thoughts can be expressed in new ways. In Table 4.4, I present the individual thought forms that reflect the Moments of Dialectic in the form of a table. Paradoxically, the table, as table, is a closed system trying to express a transformational one called Consciousness. The table is a limited, “logical” reflection of the Four Moments of Dialectic understood as ontological principles. In its present form, the table derives from Basseches’ writings (1978, 1984), the Dialectical Schemata Manual by Bopp and Basseches (1981), and my own elaborations. Each column of the table represents a particular class of thought forms, which in turn comprises seven instances or foci of attention a thinker can adopt. In contrast to Basseches’ original design, each class contains an identical number of thought forms (7). This equalization improves the evaluation of interviews, especially since all additional thought forms are elaborations of Basseches’ original set, and those left out (in class T) are subsumed within their original class. Each thought form is furthermore associated with so-called contrasts. Contrasts do not necessarily stand in logical opposition to the referenced thought form; they simply indicate “other” thought forms that should be closely considered as potential alternatives when scoring interviews or grasping the gist of what is said by a speaker. Despite the static form in which thought forms appear in the table, each of the classes named together form a dynamic open system such that each class represents a moment of a comprehensive dialectic. This fact makes one class inseparable from all other classes, in that the facet of reality it illuminates is inseparable from facets highlighted by other classes. In terms of the Four Moments, all thought form classes together form a transformational system whose s they are (Bhaskar, 1993). Their individual members, the thought forms, share deep constitutive relationships among each other. Depending on a person’s present phase of cognitive development, these relationships are either “not seen” or easy to grasp. In terms of individuals’ mental process, a thought focused on Process, for instance, can easily be re-directed to focusing on Relationship or even Context. As a result, when evaluating interviews for thought forms they articulate, one needs to decide, first, what class of thought forms is primarily involved and, second, what thought form within the class a speaker emphasizes. (It is entirely possible that two thought forms are being emphasized simultaneously, and this would be reflected in the evaluation of the interview. Equally, a thought form may be explicitly denied, and this denial would count as a use of the thought form in question.)

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Part A: The Context of Cognitive Development Table 4.4  Table of dialectical thought forms Process TFs 1. Unceasing motion, negativity Contrast: 22

Context TFsa 8. Contextualization of part(s) within a whole; emphasis on part Contrast: 10–13 2. Preservative 9. Equilibrium of a negation, inclusion whole; emphasis on of antithesis whole (non-A) Contrast: 10–13 Contrast: 27 3. Composition by 10. (Description of) interpenetrating structures, functions, opposites, layers of a system correlation Contrast: 8–9, 11–13 Contrast: 19–22

Relationship TFsb 15. Limits of separation. Focus on existence and value of relationship Contrast: 16–21 16. Value of bringing into relationship Contrast: 15, 17

17. Critique of reductionism and “de-totalized,” thus isolated, entities separated from their shared common ground Contrast: 18–21 4. Patterns of 11. (Emphasis on the) 18. Relatedness of interaction hierarchical nature of different value and Contrast: 2, 19–20 layers systems judgment systems comprise Contrast: 20 Contrast: 9 5. Practical, active 12. Stability of system 19. Structural aspects character of functioning of relationship knowledge Contrast: 9, 22 Contrast: 4, 15–17, Contrast: 23 20-21 6. Critique of 13. Intellectual 20. Patterns of arresting motion systems: frames of interaction in (reification) reference, traditions, relationships Contrast: 7, 28 ideologies Contrast: 4, 21 Contrast: 9, 28 7. Embedding in 14. Multiplicity of 21. Constitutive, process, movement contexts intrinsic relationships Contrast: 3–4, 6 (non-­ (logically prior to what transformational) they relate) Contrast: 25, 28 Contrast: 2–3, 15-20

Transformational (meta-systemic) TFsc 22. Limits of stability, harmony, durability (incl. quantitative into qualitative changes) Contrast: 3, 12, 23 23. Value of conflict leading in a developmental direction Contrast: 1, 22, 24 24. Value of developmental potential leading to higher levels of individual and social functioning Contrast: 1, 23 25. Evaluative comparison of systems in transformation Contrast: 10, 14, 26, 28 26. Process of coordinating systems Contrast: 15–16, 25 27. Open, self-­ transforming systems Contrast: 2, 22–24

28. Integration of multiple perspectives in order to define complex realities; critique of formalistic thinking Contrast: 2, 6, 16

Adapted from Basseches (1984, 74) a Thought Forms #8–9, #10–12 are closely linked b Thought Forms #15–16, 19–20 are closely linked c Thought Forms #23–25 entail valuations. Basseches’ original schemas #22–23 are subsumed under Thought Forms #22 and #28, respectively [Schema #22 regards qualitative change deriving from changes in quantity; schema #23 regards the interdependence of form and content.]

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Thought Form Coordination Even an adolescent person can use isolated dialectical thought forms. That is not what dialectics is about, though. No single thought form, or class of thought forms, defines dialectic. Rather, dialectics is the dynamic of consciousness itself, and can be linearly represented by the coordination of thought forms of the same or a different class. In light of this, Martin (2007b) is pointedly right by saying that any kind of innovative, “generative” thinking requires an “opposable” mind – that is, a mind that can play its own adversary and stay friends with itself at the same time, as Socrates first discovered (see also Ahrendt, 1971, 185). The coordination of thought forms becomes externally manifest in the way in which thoughts are elaborate. I can initially refer to a process and then become aware of the fact that there are two processes involved, which are inseparable. Whether this thought movement is ultimately to be scores in class Process or Relationship will depend on the strength in which one implication is expressed compared to another. Since language is linear and thought is not, thinking always struggles against the one-dimensional sequencing imposed on the mind by natural language as well as logic. This struggle is a dialeghestai or “talking through” by which an individual mind speaks to itself, posing a question and answering it in total silence and the speed of light succession. For this reason, the mind is, as Hegel was quoted to say above, always in a fight with itself: I am not one of the fighters locked in battle, but both, and I am the struggle itself. I am fire and water …

This struggle defines the nature of thought forms. They articulate moves-in-­ thought of a mind that is opposable and therefore wide open to what was previously left out or was left out of consideration. Dialectical discourse has to do with how a thinker moves from one thought to another being aware of absences that need remediation, or hidden dimensions that need to be made explicit. Basseches emphasizes what was stated above when he writes (1989, 166): The schemata [thought forms, OL] themselves are modes of directing attention to and describing motion, form, and relationship, and of relating these categories to each other. [Therefore] … the use of an individual schema cannot be equated with dialectical thinking. … What represents the development of a new level of equilibrium is the coordination of the schemata. It is this coordination that … logically presumes, builds upon, and transcends the abstract systematizing capacity that Piagetians conceptualize as formal operational thought [emphasis OL]. Thus the coordination of schemata into a dialectical organization can be said to be a postformal-operational development [i.e., one that follows achieving logical thinking, OL].

The close linkage between logical and dialectical thought could not be expressed more clearly. Without the systematizing capacity of formal logical thought, dialectic would be impossible. At the same time, by using the systematizing capacity of formal logic as a tool for opposing oneself in thought, dialectical thinking not only builds upon but also transcends thinking in terms of closed systems.

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Critical Versus Constructive Thinking When introducing the Four Moments of Dialectic, I distinguished between the upper, critical, and the lower, constructive, moments. People think critically when they inquire into processes and relationships between things, while when focusing on contexts, they construct configurations and scenarios, thinking constructively. Both kinds of thinking are needed to conceive of reality in terms of transformational systems (Fig. 4.6). We can speak of still another kind of equilibrium dialectical thinking establishes, namely that between critical (P, R) and constructive (C, T) thinking. How equilibrated an individual’s thought clavier is becomes apparent through cognitive interview and is specified by way of a Discrepancy Index. For the process consultant planning interventions based on empirical data, the finding about the proportion of critical versus constructive thinking in a client is of practical relevance. There is no way to reason realistically without at least a moderate equilibrium existing between critical and constructive thinking. As an example of this, let us briefly review the excerpt from Manager A’s little speech quoted earlier: When we bought Acme’s service business, it was clear that if we didn’t build efficiency into the combined network, we’d fail. Efficiency means reduced overall costs, more revenue from our customer base, and less work overlap [between the two operations, OL]. Now we can price our products more competitively, knowing we can continue to build our revenue stream through service contracts. And providing that service will keep us close to our customers for equipment lifecycle planning and utilization analyses, if we can keep our eyes focused on managing costs and delivering quality, the results will be there.

As the reader will agree, this passage is void of critical thinking, both in terms of Process and Relationship thought forms. Thinking in contextual thought forms is paramount. Even so, one finds no depth, mostly jargon. The passage consists of playing around with concepts which are never explained and concretized. At best one could credit the speaker with singling out a base concept, that of Efficiency, and

CRITICAL THINKING

PROCESS [P]

RELATIONSHIP [R]

CONSTRUCTIVE THINKING

CONTEXT [C]

Fig. 4.6  Two types of dialectical thinking

SYSTEMS/CONTEXTS IN TRANSFORMATION [T]

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grouping concepts around it as in a chess game. The speaker disjunctively constructs a scenario based on his beliefs about the merger, and that’s all. No true thinking occurs. The speaker’s use of “if” remains rhetorical, paying lip service to illumination. Therefore, the prediction for his or her Cognitive Score is not encouraging. Even if the speaker had used abductive thinking to do reverse engineering on the sequence of thinking ➔ actions ➔ outcomes [desired], or TAO (Martin, 2007b, 134), the prognosis of the speaker’s cognitive profile would not be much better. Such generative reasoning about “what might be” or “might have been” still retains a solipsistic flavor since it is thoroughly cut off from the world itself, and it is “world” that is in the center of dialectical thinking (Fig. 4.7). Both actions and outcomes are thought fabrications. As Jaques showed, actions, decisions, etc. are ineffable, and whatever is said about them is a story line that could go any which way. Outcomes even more than actions are deeply grounded in the complex social and physical context in which human actors are embedded, and cannot be linked to a single actor, constituted as they are by relationships preceding thought and action and remaining largely unknown to actors. Rather than focusing on what might be, dialectical thinking delves into the source of the TAO chain in the dynamics of consciousness itself. Discarding the spectator view of knowledge endemic in thinkers up to epistemic position 5, such thinking undertakes “thinking actions” that broaden the mental space into which social actions and their outcomes need to be placed. While true insight often emerges only by hindsight, there is always an opportunity to “premeditate” the reality of the world by using thought forms of class P, C, and/or R to illuminate expectable complexities. By establishing a specific focus of attention, thought forms serve as tools for concretizing a reflective stance in which the world gains in depth and complexity. The pivotal node from which such illumination starts is the actor’s own thinking action, not his experience or tools. In this context, let us compare what manager A has said about the merger to what his colleague, Manager B, is saying about it: Manager B: When we bought Acme’s service business, it was clear that one of the immediate advantages would be in building a more efficient network. By integrating product and service sales, we become a more complete operation, and customers will see us in a new light. However, we also become more vulnerable to a lack of integration until we can define that new business model and manage re-training and re-directing our sales force. Even then, perhaps customers may feel we’re not as focused on our huge new service operation as was Acme.

Fig. 4.7  The embedding of TAO in the world

Thinking



Actions



WORLD

Outcomes

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Aside from the parallel thinking about customers that comes into play here, what stands out in this excerpt is the speaker’s “however” and the “even then.” The first signals his transformational insight that the more complex a system, the more fragile it is (TF #22). The second, “even then,” posits limits to the realism of any new business model. A third important element is the time constraint felt to be in effect for defining a new business model, given that there is unceasing change in the marketplace. The new organizational whole that is envisioned by Manager B may still fall victim to a lack of understanding customers as an associated organizational subsystem, and coordination of the two systems may thus fail, despite retraining and re-directing the sales force (TF #26). Evidently, Manager B speaks from a higher epistemic position compared to Manager A. The truth he sees is less certain, and the mental space needed to capture it is therefore larger. The notion of unceasing change (TF #1) is implicit, if not also TF #7 (embeddedness in process). Moreover, Manager B sees a limit of separation between the company and its customers (TF #15), which leads to potential instability in the durability of the newly envisioned system (TF #22). If Manager B were appropriately probed in a cognitive interview, the thought forms implied in his speech would fully emerge and would lead to a higher Fluidity Index than Manager A can claim. Manager B’s cognitive profile is therefore of a different caliber.

Cognitive Coaching: Using Thought Forms as Mind Openers Analyzing the cognitive profile of an individual is one thing; to use thought forms to challenge others’ thinking is another. In fact, the latter use of dialectical thought forms, best rehearsed in administering and scoring cognitive interviews, is one of overriding importance in learning transformational thinking using dialectical tools. In consequence, what is now called cognitive coaching is only an anemic variant of what it could become if dialectical thinking were employed by coaches. Since Manager A’s cognitive profile is predominantly rooted in the use of Context thought forms because he mistakes conceptual models for reality, a dialectically schooled coach or consultant can use the tools of dialectic to make him rethink his base concepts from the point of view of Process and Relationship. This requires the coach to act upon the table of thought forms and translate thought forms into mind openers through questions (Book 2 Appendix 2). In dialectical coaching, concepts such as “efficiency,” “combined network,” “customer base,” “work overlap,” “revenue stream,” “service contracts,” “equipment life cycle planning,” and “utilization analysis”  – all these jewels of formal logical thinking – would have to be taken out of their casing and turned over and over by dialeghestai (wandering through words) together with a process consultant or coach who can think dialectically. One would then find that the conceptual network designed by Manager A is a barn full of causal models that lack realism because they are not transformational. Dialectical thinking would storm the barn, so to speak.

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 art B: A Phasic Theory of the Development P of Dialectical Thinking While the notion that one can always improve one’s thinking is widespread, the notion that the human mind naturally and inevitably expands its tool set based on reaching more advanced epistemic positions is news to most people. So long as we don’t think of the absolute peak human thinking can reach, we cannot appreciate the valleys through which the journey to the peak leads, either. In this section, I present a theory according to which dialectical thinking develops in phases, not stages. The term phase implies a continuous rather than discontinuous development. This is not to say that the different phases cannot be described in terms of the distinct frame of reference they give rise to in a person.

 omplex Logical Thinking as a Precursor C to Dialectical Thought Considering that dialectical thinking is a function of complex logical thinking, thus a way of using formal logic in adapting it to an advanced epistemic stance (or way of constructing “truth”), what can we say provokes dialectical thinking? Basseches states (1989, 169): Postformal dialectical thinking is specifically addressed to dealing with limits encountered in the effort to apply formal, systematic thought. These efforts are often encountered when two alternative formal systematic approaches to a problem yield different, incompatible outcomes or implications. To me, this suggests that a person with the capacity for coordinated dialectical thinking is likely to employ such thinking in areas where the individual’s knowledge is adequate to use multiple formal systems effectively, and to discover incompatible implications. But if the person lacks that knowledge [and I would add, the appropriate epistemic position, OL], dialectical thinking is much less likely.

Employing a thought form representative of class Context as an example, Basseches continues: (1989, 167): Schema 10 [TFs #10–11] for describing a whole as a form or system, is implicitly involved in imposing a formal operational model on a problem, and therefore I would expect this schema to appear contemporaneously with formal operational thought. The metaformal schemata build on schema 10, and therefore I would suspect them to appear subsequently to formal operational thought. But the other schemata [of class P, C, and R; OL] could indeed be seen as developments along a parallel path to the development of formal thought.

Basseches’ hypothesis corresponds to my experience in cognitive assessment, where I find that as long as coordination of thought forms has not become second nature for a thinker, formal logical notions and isolated dialectical thought forms of class P, C, and R appear alongside each other and are therefore difficult to separate out.

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What Actually Triggers Dialectical Thinking Another question one might ask is “what actually triggers dialectical thinking?” This is a psychological, not either an epistemological or developmental, question. The last two types of questions are treated as synonymous in this book: we are approaching thinking as “genetic epistemologists” in the sense of Piaget. This entails that we distinguish between dialectical thinking as a psychological process that can be empirically demonstrated by way of interviews and dialectical thinking as an ideal-type of mature adult thinking against which we measure developmental progressions (Basseches, 1984). The literature (including Basseches) suggests that dialectical thinking is triggered in individuals in a twofold way: 1. By moving into epistemic position 5, which is associated with the understanding of knowledge and truth as abstractions 2. By the ability to use formal logical thinking expertly in a particular domain The second factor presupposes the first. It enables a thinker who understands the world in terms of single formal systems to begin to “see” contradictions within a particular domain of discourse. This insight forces the thinker to “go beyond” the contradictions s(he) encounters. Once a thinker is at epistemic position 5, and is knowledgeable, or at least coachable, in a particular domain, the likelihood that s(he) will develop dialectical thinking for work in that domain is considerable. Basseches gives a pertinent example (1989, 169): I am so lacking in my knowledge of auto mechanics that if I were sitting alone in my car, which was having a problem, the chance is near nil that I would create a successful, postformal, dialectical analysis of the problem. On the other hand, if I am sitting there with two experienced mechanics, each of whom could explain his or her unique approach to the problem and its rationale so that I could understand it [a kind of “coaching,” OL], I might be able to enjoy dialectical analysis to formulate a way of dealing with their alternative solutions. This is a clear example of how situational factors can make a major difference in the use of dialectical thinking. To me, this kind of situational specificity is not at all inconsistent with the idea that dialectical thinking as an organized whole represents a form of equilibrium in thought [and, as I would add with Bhaskar (1993), of “remediation” of absences not previously accounted for, OL].

Concretely, if in listening to the two car-mechanics the thinker grasps that their respective approaches to the problem are based on two different formal systems (frames of reference or models) imposed on the issue, s(he) can argue on a level beyond contextual thought forms that describe the car (or parts of the car) simply as a static system. By employing critical thought forms of Process and Relationship, the thinker can become aware that there may be an issue of limits of separation between the two different logical systems imposed on the problem (thought form #15, Table 4.4), thereby entertaining a move-in-thought of type Relationship. In a further move-in-thought, the thinker, now aware of the incompleteness of the two opposing explanations of the problem (and of the problem at hand as being

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ill-structured), can illuminate the problem further, by delving into the processes that both contextual explanations are missing. S(he) can then begin to coordinate thought forms that override the initial “either-or” notions underlying the mechanics’ explanations, by seeing the car problem in terms of a system in transformation whose repair requires adopting multiple perspectives.

How Dialectical Thinking Develops Over the Human Lifespan As said, what provokes or triggers dialectical thinking is a question different from the one asking how it develops. The first question is one about how dialectical thinking first comes to be practically used, while the second is one about the way in which the use of thought forms gradually gains strength in adults generally. The distinction between the psychological and developmental process of dialectical thinking is somewhat analogous to Jaques’ distinction between applied and potential capability. How dialectical thinking develops is a strictly empirical question, first addressed by Riegel (1973) and, in more depth, by Basseches (1984). To answer this question, Basseches researched the use of dialectical thought forms by three different groups of adolescents and adults in a college setting. To elicit empirical evidence about phases of development in dialectical thinking, he developed a semi-structured interview whose basic structure is re-used with different interviewees. In addition, he put in place an early form of Table 4.4 to quantify assessment results in terms of what he called a Fluidity Index (see Book 2, Appendix 1). Basseches found, not surprisingly, that members of the three groups he engaged used each of the classes of thought forms, as well as individual thought forms in the four classes, but to a different extent, depending on their phase of cognitive development. While Process and Context Thought Forms were used by subjects early on, Relationship and Transformational Thought Forms only appeared in the later phases of their cognitive development. When examining in more detail the use-statistics of each thought form class in the three groups, Basseches was able to discern the following four phases (Benack & Basseches, 1989, 97): 1. Phase 1: Elementary Dialectical Ability: mixture of concrete, formal, and post-­ formal operations (classes P, C, T, with class C predominating and classes R and T minimally used). 2. Phase 2: Intermediate Dialectical Ability: formal and post-formal operations remain focused on class C; absence of class R. 3. Phase 3: Systemic Ability: beginning of thought form coordination by way of emphasizing classes R and T, manifesting in three clusters:

a. Critical thought forms (P, R). b. Constructive thought forms (C, T). c. Value-oriented (axiological) Thought Forms (R, T).

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4. Phase 4: Meta-Systemic Ability: emphasis on transformational systems (class T), where “meta-systemic” refers to the ability to join different systems into a comprehensive whole. In reference to Table 4.4, Basseches found that specific thought forms emerge at different points of the phasic progression of cognitive development, as follows (Benack and Basseches 1989, 97): • TFs emerging in Phase 1 are: #1–2, 5, 8-9, 10–12, 15, and 22. • TFs available in Phase 2 are #2, 13–14, and 22. • Phase 3 TFs are: #3–4, 6, 19–21, 28 (critical); #7, 23, 25, 26 (constructive), and #17–18, and 24 (value-oriented). • Phase 4 for the first time shows the use of thought form #27 (open, self-­ transforming system). The results of Basseches’ study can be re-stated in the form of a table (Table 4.5) that embeds his findings regarding developmental phases in the bigger picture of orders of mental complexity and epistemic positions (Benack & Basseches, 1989, 97). Benack and Basseches (1989; 96, 104) comment: The first two phases appear when elements of dialectical thinking are used but Schemata have not yet begun to be organized by the notion of dialectic [that is, they remain unrelated and uncoordinated, OL]. … The schemata of phase 1 capture fundamental, unelaborated notions of motion [Process], relationship, and form [Context] that are not necessarily post-­ formal; … [they] can coexist with formal and even concrete operations. In phase 2, the schemata [that appear] … seem to provide a bridge between formal and post-­ formal cognition.

Table 4.5  Four phases of the development of dialectical thinking delimited by the size of the Fluidity Index Second order of mental complexity Phase 1 (Fluidity 50 [Fluidity Index] as suggesting thinking organized similar to the ideal-type dialectical model [that is, Phase 4 of the model of dialectical thinking referenced in the table below, which describes individuals’ current potential capability in the sense of Jaques, OL].

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Table 4.8  Delimitation of dialectical phases by Fluidity Index Dialectical phase Phase 4 [meta-systemic] Phase 3 [systemic] Phase 2 [transitional] Phase 1 [elementary]

Cognitive fluidity [flexibility] > 50

Epistemic position [reflectiveness] 7

< 50

6

50 [meta-systemic] Phase 3 < 50 [systemic] Second order of mental complexity Phase 2 70 > 50  30  10 30 starting at S-4. Since consistent use of all 28 dialectical thought forms at clarity level 2 results in a total Fluidity Index of 56, individuals at and beyond S-5/4 can be expected to use the majority of thought forms they employ at that clarity level, and a lower number of thought forms at clarity levels 1 (weak) and 3 (strong), depending on the overall balance of their cognitive profile, which differs from individual to individual. As furthermore suggested in Table 5.3, Fourth Order individuals scoring above Kegan level S-5 would be able to reach Fluidity Indexes in the range of 70 and above. Since consistent use of all 28 thought forms at clarity level 3 entails a very high Fluidity level, Fourth Order individuals would be using the majority of thought forms they employ at that level, and only some thought forms at clarity level 2. How precisely the four classes of thought forms are balanced in an individual – as spelled out by the Systems Thinking Index (see Book 2) – is thereby not determined.

The Cognitive Structure of Social-Emotional Shifts It is an outcome of twentieth-century research in adult development since Piaget that we think of mental growth as occurring in two different domains: social-­ emotional and cognitive. Since the middle 1970s and early 1980s of the twentieth

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century (Loevinger, 1976; Kegan, 1982), the distinction between these domains has been upheld only nominally. Instead of separating these domains as clearly as possible (using, for instance, results from Basseches’ research), interpreters of stage systems have merged them by characterizing social-emotional stages in cognitive or “mixed” cognitive and emotional terms. This explains that whoever speaks of “thinking developmentally” today really means “thinking social-emotionally.” A look into the leadership literature, where barely anything about thinking is found, only confirms this. Thinking has become a dirty word. This being so, the author thinks that the time has come to call a spade a spade and decisively separate the two domains, if only to learn more about their intrinsic relatedness. This will not foreclose further exercises of formalistic thinking about one and the other domain, but it will raise a flag as to the cogency of doing so, both in research and consulting. As Hegel rightfully stated, only to the degree that A and non-A have been separated, can they be seen in their intrinsic relatedness. This is simply dialectical common sense. Without strictly separating the two domains, one cannot even begin to see more clearly how the two domains may relate to each other (Laske, 2008a).

The Stark Limitations of Developmental Stage Models Formulating social-emotional and epistemic stages as outcomes is one thing; making explicit the processes that explain the movement from one stage to another is something else entirely (Basseches, 1989, 1997a, b). To grasp the mental movement underlying developmental shifts, rather than just labeling it, one needs a process model of social-emotional development. Such a model cannot be a neuropsychological, physiological, or psychological one. The model should reflect the complexity and diversity of individual’s meaning-making. It should also explain the lack of access individuals have to their own meaning-making experience. The model must show how “the functional invariants of intelligence – adaptation and organization – operate in real people” (Basseches, 1989, 207) rather than ideal-typical mascots. Such a model is only beginning to be created. Since the 1970s when Loevinger first conceptualized social-emotional development, the underlying dialectical process of that development has been increasingly obscured. This has not been helped by Piaget’s choice to present developmental results in terms of formal logic although he himself was fully capable of dialectical thinking (an “old story” that also applies to the early and middle work of Jaques). When separating the two developmental dimensions, the mental growth processes manifesting in social-emotional form can be made transparent in terms of the Moments of Dialectic that ground them. These growth processes can then become visible in their true “messiness,” no longer obscured by the neatness of formalistic stage descriptions (Basseches, 1989, 207). The steps implied in social-emotional progressions are not steps of explicit knowing, although individuals increasingly reach an awareness of previous

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meaning-­making stages by hindsight (like Hegel said of philosophy in general). The steps are substantively implied in the sense of TF #21 [limits of stability, harmony, and durability], in that each stage harbors within itself the seeds of its own destruction. What is seen at work is preservative negation (TF #2), which describes the intrinsic dynamic of transformational systems. In short, the Moments of Dialectic form the ontological underpinnings of social-emotional development. It is the Moments that provide the constitutive relationship that binds social-emotional stages together as a system with its own teleology (TF #21 [constitutive relationship]; TF #27 [open, self-transforming system]). One way in which to fashion a process model of social-emotional development is to ask oneself what is epistemologically (rather than psychologically) required of a meaning maker poised to advance to a subsequent stage within a teleological system of stages. The logic of such a system is minimally based on preservative negation (TF #2), in the sense that Stage X is “suspended, included, and transcended” by its “other” (non-X) and thus transpires as an X’ [X prime]. However, this is only an illuminative process, not yet a remedial transformational description for which Context and Relationship thought forms are equally required. The activity involved is that of consciousness operating on a meta-level to formal-logical processes. Social scientists who practice formalistic thinking see only the trees in the forest. They end up obscuring the forest and abandoning the connected narrative about consciousness they set out to create. Their unit of analysis, the individual, is a flat formalistic and a-historical unit in the sense of TF #17 [reductionism in the form of subjectivism and pluralism], not a dialectical one (Adorno, 1999, 134 f.). Below, I detail the structure of mental growth from one social-emotional stage to another in terms of the Four Moments of Dialectic (P, C, R, T) and the associated thought forms they requisitely imply. The table spells out an ontological view of the dynamic of thought forms in Consciousness undergoing social-emotional growth. It represents a transformational system in the form of a closed system. The table indicates the unconscious moves-in-thought that Consciousness must make to reach a subsequent stage, regardless of whether the thought forms are already in conscious awareness or not. The notion is that these thought forms are potentially ready to appear in individual awareness and can therefore be used in interventions to bring the dialectical dynamic of consciousness to awareness. As the recurrence of thought forms, especially TF #2 (preservative negation), at more advanced social-emotional levels makes clear, mental growth implies a gradual deepening of an individual’s understanding of one and the same thought form. Using a specific thought form in early adulthood does not have the same cognitive depth that it obtains in later life. (This is reflected in the scoring procedure utilized in Book 2 Appendix 2, by distinguishing three clarity levels (weights) in evaluating the expression of thought forms in speech.) Due to being held in a constellation composed of different thought form classes, and to a larger number of thought forms held in one’s mental space, thought forms initially only weakly endorsed gain in clarity over the course of the lifespan. Compared to this growth process, the name of the thought form is a pure label signaling transformations at a deeper level of understanding of self and world.

The Stark Limitations of Developmental Stage Models

157

Table 5.4  The dialectical structure of social-emotional growth (repeat-occurrences of the same TF indicate a deepening of dialectical thinking) (For the table of thought forms, see Book 3) Social-emotional stages 2 2(3) 2/3 3/2 3(2) 3 3(4) 3/4 4/3 4(3) 4 4(5) 4/5 5/4 5(4) 5

P 2 5 2 2 2, 6 2 3 2–3 2, 6 2, 5 2, 6–7 2–3 1, 3–4, 6–7 1, 3–4, 6–7 1

Ca 8 9 14 8–9 10 10 11–12 9, 12, 14 8–14 8–14 8–14 8–14 8–14 8–14

R 15 16 15–16 16–17, 19 21 15–17 18

19 21 15, 17 17–18 20 21 21

T

22

22 23 24 22, 24–25 22–23, 26 24, 26 24, 27–28 27–28 27–28

The contextual thought forms TFs #10–11, not mentioned in the table, are ubiquitous in formal logical thinking

a

When inspecting Table 5.4, one notices an even spread of Process, Context and Relationship thought forms throughout lifespan development, with a massing of transformational thought forms in the stages beyond self-authoring (S-4). At first, only limits of stability of systems are felt (TF #22) due to the pervasive presence of TF #2 [preservative negation], the simple core of dialectics appearing in systemic form only in TF #28 [integration of multiple perspectives and critique of formalistic thinking]. The truth of TF #22 [limits of stability] does not “hit home” until TF #1 [unceasing change] is grasped in depth from social-emotional Stage S-5/4 onward. Only when becoming a system, as occurs at the self-authoring stage, do individuals find transformational thought forms indispensable to their own self-understanding. This understanding gradually expands to a more realistic assessment of the real world in which the individual is embedded. In this process, all previously acted upon thought forms undergo differentiation in the direction of greater clarity, helped by increasing coordination of thought forms. Importantly, the use of Context thought forms in the S-3 to S-4 range is fundamentally different from that in the social-emotional range beyond S-4, where Context thought forms are coordinated with those of Process (TF #1) and Transformation (#27–28). Until that coordination occurs, Context thought forms remain rather lifeless, especially since stratification (TF #11), thus depth, is not seen at all or not together with equilibrium (TF #9). As shown under Process, remarkable over the entire cognitive journey is the constitutive nature of TF #2 [preservative negation or step into a synthesis via an antithesis], which truly comes into its own only beyond S-4/5, most clearly in TF #28.

5  A Process Model of Social-Emotional Development

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Comments on the Stage-Thought Form Alignment The S-2 to S-3 Range Social-emotional stages 2 2(3) 2/3 3/2 3(2)

P 2 5 2 2 2, 6

C 8 9 14

R 15 16 15–16 16–17, 19 21

T

22

[Excerpt of Table 5.4] The absence of transformational thought forms in S-2 stems from the fact that the individual entertains a “two-world hypothesis” so that Me and Other are antithetical to each other without being seen in their relationship (antithesis). Therefore, no synthesis in the sense of preservative negation can occur. When stepping out of rigid self-centeredness in S-2(3), the self very gradually begins to become part of a larger whole (the social surround), although this larger whole remains largely unknown and is only vaguely felt or sensed and is not differentiated from the larger epistemic object of the real world. Insight into the limits of separation from others (TF #15) and, accordingly, the value of engaging in relationship with them (TF #17 [critique of pluralism and subjectivism]), are born of a dire need for safety and an increasing awareness of lack of control, rather than insight. In a further step (S-2/3), the experience of limits of separation is made for the first time (TF #15). The individual realizes that what seems to happen to her seemingly from the outside might actually be her own doing. This experience leads to a primitive kind of empathy. It is strengthened in the next step (S-3/2) where critique of the self as an isolated entity sets in (TF #17), but still within the confines of a need for better control of others. However, the structural aspects of Relationship are more consciously (and thus painfully) experienced. It is only when the espousal of belonging overtakes and defines the self (S-3(2)) that a weak inkling of the multiplicity of contexts the self is embedded in arises (TF #14). At the same time, there is a vague “knowing” of community or society as a set of constitutive relationships that pervade the self’s seemingly authentic emotions (TF #21 [constitutive relationship]).

The S-3 to S-4 Range Social-emotional stages 3 3(4)

P 2

C 8–9 10

R 15–17 18

T

(continued)

159

Comments on the Stage-Thought Form Alignment Social-emotional stages 3/4 4/3 4(3)

P 3 2–3 2, 6

C 10 11–12 9, 12, 14

R

19

T 22 23 24

[Excerpt of Table 5.4] Once the instrumentalist stance of “Me First” is shed (or at least kept in abeyance), the individual begins to “see” herself as part of a larger whole, although the structure of this whole – in ethical, political, and other terms – remains unclear (TF #9 [balance of whole]). The part-whole relationship, so important in Asian dialecticism (Nisbett, 2005), makes its first appearance. In S-3(4), a weak attempt of understanding the social environment begins (TF #10 [description of system]), but an understanding of its developmental or other stratification remains out of reach. Reduction to the isolated self is pervasive although it happens in the disguise of “we are all together in this” (TF #17 [critique of reductionism]). The “otherness” (estrangement) of authentic self and internalized others keeps on growing, however (TF #2). It is first contained by the notion that different value and judgment systems are related (TF #18), but the common ground such systems share is only vaguely perceived. In S-3/4, the individual is in conflict between two developmental structures acting on her (TF #3 [composition by interpenetrating opposites]) and is therefore “upset” by the limits of stability of “our” world (TF #22). However, she is not ready to acknowledge the value of conflict in a developmental direction (TF #24), which requires further mental growth (S-4(3)). Increasingly, the individual pays attention to the stability of functioning of her self-system (TF #12), very weakly in S-4/3 and in a more pronounced way in S-4(3). In so doing, she attains an increasingly better grasp of the synthesis of self and other in the sense of TF #2 (preservative negation). This synthesis is based on the separation of authentic self from internalized others, and these others can increasingly be recognized, included, and transcended. In S-4(3), the individual is given to strong espousal of a dynamics that will carry her into self-authoring (TF #6 [critique of arresting motion]). She is also able to focus on the multiplicity of contexts she is part of in a new way and is more highly aware of the structure of relationships to others (TF #19). Insight into the value of one’s own potential is now paramount (TF #24).

The S-4 to S-5 Range Once self-authoring is reached at S-4, there arises a deeper insight into the dialectics of context as a holon whose parts shift balance, are drawn into stratification, and exert their own peculiar generative mechanism. Control issues are paramount again

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(as previously in S-2), but they are now controlled by an inner system of values, however haphazardly assembled (TF #13 [implied intellectual systems, traditions, frames of reference, ideologies]). As the individual separates out of, and transcends, community as that which bestows identity on members of a culture or group, s(he) emphasizes independence (TF #8), but one that is contextualized within a larger social whole (TF #9 [equilibrium of whole]). Social-emotional stages 4 4(5) 4/5 5/4 5(4) 5

P 2, 5 2, 6–7 2–3 1, 3–4, 6–7 1, 3–4, 6–7 1

C* 8–14 8–14 8–14 8–14 8–14 8–14

R 21 15, 17 17–18 20 21 21

T 22, 24–25 22–23, 26 24, 26 24, 27–28 27–28 27–28

[Excerpt of Table 5.4] The self is therefore more highly aware of the system (institution) it embodies and can make an object of itself, describing itself in terms of its nature as well as structure (TF #10). What is more, the self can view itself as an ideological system on its own terms and recognize itself as representative of a tradition that differs from the frame of reference others define themselves by (TF #13). The self now knows that it cannot impose its own system and tradition on others but rather needs to respect the multiplicity of personalities and ideological contexts that exists (TF #14 [multiplicity of contexts]). By so internalizing Context thought forms in a new way, the individual prepares itself for leaving behind the cage of integrity it has found itself sitting in. The fort that was built is now inundated, as it were, by the stream of transformational thought forms that has been unleashed in moving to S-4(5). Limits of stability of self (TF#22), value of conflict leading in a developmental direction (TF #23), and value of developmental potential (TF #24) all become major topics of self-inquiry. Forced to compare herself to others in peer relationships, the individual for the first time fully realizes the limits of separation between self and others (TF #15). Emphasizing limits of stability and meaning-making conflict (TF #22–23), at S-4/5 s(he) begins to concern herself with the process of coordinating two or more systems in transformation, initially systems in the form of individuals like herself (TF #26). This is reinforced in S-5/4 by a first-time step into the domain of thought form TF #28, or negative dialectics (Adorno, 1999, 2008), in the light of which there is keen awareness of the limits of formalistic logical thinking, and a deep acknowledgement of the need to integrate multiple perspectives. This amounts to a form a construct awareness (Cook-Greuter, 1999) manifesting as an appreciation of the limits of language, a medium that breaks up the flow signaled by TF #1 [unceasing change] into manageable pieces. And while this break-up is no longer seen as rendering reality in depth, it is inevitably returned to because of social constraints.

Relation of Post-autonomous Stages to Practical Wisdom

161

All the extensions of Process TF #1, such as TF #3–4 [composition by opposites; patterns of interaction], TF #6–7 [critique of arresting motion and embedding in process], and TF #5 [active character of knowledge] now come into full play, and TF #2 is fully systematized into TF #28 for the first time, both in its positive [integration of perspectives] and its negative aspect [critique of formalism]. Beyond S-5(4), the part-whole dialectic of TFs #8 and #9 [part-whole interdependence] gradually becomes second nature. TF #1 achieves its ultimate realization, inclusive of the acknowledgement of death (TF #27 [open, self-transforming system]). The individual is now ready to step into the Fourth Order of Mental Complexity, or Practical Wisdom, by which the ultimate negativity of the Moments of Dialectic is acknowledged.

Relation of Post-autonomous Stages to Practical Wisdom As readers versed in research on social-emotional development and/or Volume 1 of Measuring Hidden Dimensions (Laske, 2005) will appreciate, the Fourth Order of Mental Complexity (Practical Wisdom) is highly commensurate with the higher post-autonomous stages outlined by S.  Cook-Greuter whose work is based on J. Loevinger’s pioneering research (1976, 1998). In her dissertation (1999, 185 f), Cook-Greuter gathered those “themes” that tend to come up for adults at higher social-emotional levels close to, and above, Kegan stage S-5 which she called (post-­ autonomous) content categories. We can consider these categories as templates of thought content (rather than thought structure) occurring at what she named the construct-aware (C9) and unitive stages (C10). In order to gauge the nature of these content templates, Cook-Greuter scrutinized texts by developmental theorists rather than administering cognitive interviews with individuals. In this way, she hoped to find out whether the themes of the content categories she found in scoring the (revised) Sentence Completion Test (Loevinger, 1976; Loevinger et al., 1998) could be identified in developmental research texts. Cook-Greuter gathered the following content categories (1999, 186) (Table 5.5). Of course, it is one thing to describe end results of the dialectic of social-­ emotional development in descriptive, formal-logic terms (that is, as a closed system), and another entirely to demonstrate the dialectical process that creates post-autonomous content within an individual’s consciousness. In the first case, there is no methodology for understanding the dialectical grounding of post-­ autonomous thought contents. In the second case, one has at least a chance to gain further insight into how social-emotional and cognitive development may be linked in consciousness. Here again, the difference is between the Second and the Third Order of Mental Complexity of the research in question. As readers of Cook-Greuter (1999) will acknowledge, her content categories are not only a heterogeneous mix of epistemic, logical, and dialectical aspects of cognition (even within categories); they also freely merge cognitive and social-emotional aspects of development and emphasize Stance over Tools -- something this author

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Table 5.5  Thematic scoring categories for identifying post-autonomous stages of social-emotional development Post-autonomous stage themes Construct-aware stage (C9) [Kegan stages 5/4 and 5(4)]a Complex matrix (not linear list); abstract, structural signs Evaluation of multi-layered intrapsychic and inter-personal dynamics Exploration and evaluation of habits of the mind; paradox; infinite regress; attention to process; attention to attention Reference to constructed nature of reality and language habit; definition and frames of reference Unitive stage (C10) [Kegan stages S-5 and beyond] Explicit gratitude for life and others in their whole complexity Acceptance of change, world and people as they are Non-trivial expression of universal connectedness Fundamental thoughts and feelings about human condition Unitive [holistic] ability, embracing polar opposites and multiple perspectives Cook-Greuter (1999, 153)

a

sees as a hindrance to gaining deeper insight into how the two best known lines of adult development actually relate to each other. As validated a method may be (as in Loevinger’s case), formalistic thinking is not thereby removed. It is rather reinforced thereby (Bhaskar, 1993, 258 f.; Adorno, 1999, 53 f.) From the vantage of the Constructive-Developmental Framework taught in this book, one would have to ask: what processes of dialectical thinking can be shown to underlie post-autonomous thought content? Interestingly, when comparing different developmental theorists in order to justify the selected categories, Cook-Greuter points out that Basseches’ interviews, meant to substantiate the use of dialectical thought forms, provided the most solid evidence of these contents (Cook-Greuter, 1999, 187): Both Kegan and Basseches had eight out of the nine categories represented, while Torbert described seven of them. Thus, the categories do seem to capture elements of post-­ autonomous behavior that are in evidence to others combing that territory. Basseches produced the most evidence overall. This seems understandable since his 24 detailed schemas are based on actual excerpts from interview material. As evaluation criteria, the schemas are conceptually closer to (SCT) scoring categories than the general personality descriptions offered by the other authors (Fowler, Koplowitz, Wilber, Alexander).

Of course, this does not astonish the author or the readers of this book who know Basseches’ work. Cook-Greuter elaborates (1999, 188): Overall, my categories seem to describe characteristics of insight that are generally recognized as indicative of advanced meaning-making by others who have thought deeply about the mature end of adult development.

As this quote makes clear, Cook-Greuter does not distinguish social-emotional meaning-making from cognitive sense-making. What is referenced is Stance, not Tools. The cognitive term “insight” is used to indicate both. I call this by now

163

Relation of Post-autonomous Stages to Practical Wisdom

historical mix-up the Loevinger Fallacy (no offense to Loevinger’s pioneering work intended). When we inspect the hypothetical thought form equivalents of Cook-Greuter’s themes, asking what dialectical thought process is required to generate them in the first place, we see a slightly higher proportion of transformational thought forms in content categories used at the (higher) unitive, compared to the construct-aware, stage, just as we would expect: Upon inspection of Table 5.6a, we find that while Process and Context thought forms retain their power in equal measure over both stages, dialectical thinking at the Unitive Stage is considerably stronger (R, T) (Table 5.6b). However approximate and hypothetical the alignment of content categories with epistemologically requisite thought forms may be, it speaks to the strong dialectical groundings of Cook-Greuter’s social-emotional content categories at post-­ autonomous levels. As Cook-Greuter formulates it (1999, 153): The strength of the Unitive self, as I perceive it, is its ability to relinquish the need for constantly identifying with questioning and deconstructing of whatever it has constructed. The Unitive self realizes that it is whole only to the degree that it keeps its boundaries open and fluid – more precisely so long as it does not classify and evaluate but is merely a witness to the process of continuous transformation and change. … When the self can take in whatever it has not yet embraced while it is, at the same time, not holding on to any version of what it was, is, or ought to be, then we can begin to speak of an ever-widening, all-embracing, non-personalized, fully interindividual, that is, a transpersonal, self.

Table 5.6a  Thought forms grounding post-autonomous scoring categories for identifying high stages of social-emotional development Post-autonomous stage Construct-aware stage (C9) [Kegan stages 5/4 and 5(4)]a Complex matrix (not linear list); abstract, structural signs Evaluation of multi-layered intrapsychic and inter-personal dynamics Exploration and evaluation of habits of the mind; paradox; infinite regress; attention to process; attention to attention Reference to constructed nature of reality and language habit; definition and frames of reference Unitive stage (C10) Explicit gratitude for life and others in their whole complexity Acceptance of change, world and people as they are Non-trivial expression of universal connectedness Fundamental thoughts and feelings about human condition Unitive [holistic] ability, embracing polar opposites and multiple perspectives a

 Cook-Greuter (1999, 153)

ID

Hypothetical thought form origins of theme

9v 9w

TF #10–12, 19 TF #11; 25

9x

TF #1–2, 4, 6–7; 13; 17;

9y

TF #5, 13; 22

10v TF #8–12; 27–28 10w 10x 10y 10z

TF #1, 6–7; 22–23 TF #15–17, 21 TF #1–2; 15; 22 TF #2; 28

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Table 5.6b  Proportional use of thought form classes on the two stages Post-autonomous stage Construct-aware stage proportion of thought form classes (C9) Unitive stage proportion of thought form classes (C10)

P 6 6

C 6 5

R 2 5

T 2 6

Here again, a social-emotional stage is characterized in cognitive terms without spelling out the actual mental process that grounds each of the stages, as well as the progression from one stage to another. As the terms chosen in the quote demonstrate, the focus of Cook-Greuter’s description of Practical Wisdom is a mix of social-emotional and epistemic aspects of what in this I call Stance. The dialectical tools needed to enact the Stance named are left implicit. This marriage of social-­ emotional and epistemic aspects of Stance is characteristic of the Integral School (which absorbed Cook-Greuter’s work) as a whole. My prediction is that future research will divorce this unhappy marriage by finding ways to link a particular stance to the dialectical tools associated with it, thereby explicating the processes adult development is based on.

New Research Topics This chapter has laid bare two forms of dialectic: 1. Dialectic 1: The implicit dialectic of social-emotional development, whether assessed in terms of Loevinger (ED1), Kegan (ED2), or some other commensurate methodology (EDn). 2. Dialectic 2: The explicit dialectic of cognitive development (CD). Having worked through many CDF assessments for over 20 years, it is evident to me that these two dialectics are different in form but inseparable in terms of substance. It would therefore be my hypothesis that dialectic 2 inheres dialectic 1. Linked as they are, these dialectics characterize the human being as a transformational system that seamlessly embodies both. Neither dialectic can stand on its own; it has autonomy not despite but because of its relationship to the other one. In terms of research, we have before us a huge research project whose cogent issues have not yet been formulated. In practical terms, these two dialectics’ relationship becomes clearer when practicing cognitive coaching, in the sense of engaging dialectical thought forms. I am speaking of the influence of Tools on Stance. Their relationship is asymmetric. No amount of social-emotional coaching aimed at changing Stance will per se increase thought complexity, and thus contribute to cognitive development, while working with dialectical thought forms in most cases leads to social-emotional advances.

Practice Reflections

165

Chapter Summary In this chapter, I have sketched a cognitive phenomenology of social-emotional development in the sense of Hegel (1806; 1977), Basseches (1984), and Bhaskar (1993). I have suggested that meaning-making development is a trajectory apart from, and simultaneously inseparable from, cognitive development. Describing the end result of the development of meaning-making, e.g., in terms of “stages,” is only the beginning: what is required is to explicate how these stages are reached in terms of individuals’ movements-in-thought. As this chapter demonstrates, by referencing the four classes of thought forms reflecting the Moments of Dialectic, one can with some precision outline the actual moves-in-thought that are required for social-emotional development to proceed from stage to stage. This is so since human consciousness is a single organized whole, an open transformational system that is dialectical at its core. Once developmental researchers practice dialectical thinking, empirical studies can begin to shed light on the intrinsic thought-form dynamics of mental growth.

Practice Reflections • How do you experience the tie-in between social-emotional and cognitive development over the lifespan? • Are you aware of some of your moves-in-thought, and if so, can you describe their social-emotional outcomes? • What thought forms predominantly come up when you think about your own social-emotional development? • When you compare your notion of “change” of a decade ago to your present use of this notion, what thought form differences do you notice? • In an encounter with a client, focus the client’s attention enough to be able to explore with her or him the implications of the core concept involved in your conversation, and illuminate for the client what you observe him or her “thinking.” • What would it mean to you to be able to approach your client as a transformational – “living” – system truly professionally: how much of the interlacing of social-emotional and cognitive adult development would you have to understand? • As a coach, how would you proceed to facilitate a move from Kegan Stage S-3/4 to 4/3? • How does using TF #22 [limits of stability] change your outlook on what is happening in your life? • What would you want to do if you learned through an assessment that your cognitive development is incommensurate with (high) your social-emotional one? • What would you want to do if you learned through an assessment that your social-emotional development is lower than your cognitive one?

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Exercises (See Table 4.4) 1. If your client is functioning within the social-emotional range below self-­ authoring, try to discern whether s(he) can handle TF #14 [multiplicity of contexts]. 2. If you find evidence that your client can handle TF #14, probe for her ability to also use TFs #22 [limits of stability] and #23 [value of conflict], however simplistically. 3. If your client is only just emerging into the S-3 (other-dependent) range, can you discern traces of using TF #21 [constitutive relationship]? How might you best probe for that thought form? 4. How holistic are context descriptions of clients functioning at the self-authoring level and beyond? Do they show a sense of mastering the part-whole dialectic (TFs #8–9 (emphasis on part and whole, respectively))? 5. In what raw form does TF #28 [integration of multiple perspectives; critique of formalism] first appear in clients you work with? First probe the positive aspect of this thought form (integration of multiple perspectives), then its critical aspect (critique of single perspectives as abstractions leading to formalistic thinking). 6. Let your client evaluate the interpersonal dynamics in her office. Probe whether she is aware of the hierarchical nature of accountability levels. Notice how they play out in conversations in the sense of TF #11 [hierarchical nature of context]. 7. Ask your client to pay attention to her own mental process when thinking in the sense of TF #2 [preservative negation] or focus on your conversation with her. What comes to light? 8. Probe to what extent your client has a grasp of the fact she is not “describing” reality, but is rather creating it by way of speech? 9. Probe for TF #13 [frames of reference] by asking your client to explain management decisions in her organization. 10. In life coaching, listen to your client’s presenting problem, analyze it in terms of thought forms, and formulate a hypothesis as to the phase of dialectical thinking your client is presently making sense in.

Bibliography Adorno, T. W. (1978). Minima moralia. Verso. Adorno, T. W. (1993). Hegel: Three studies. MIT Press. Adorno, T.  W. (1999). Negative dialectic. Continuum. [Negative Dialektik. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1966]. Adorno, T. W. (2008). Lectures on negative dialectic: Fragments of a lecture course 1965/66. Polity. Basseches, M. A. (1978). Beyond closed-system problem solving: A study of metasystemic aspects of mature thought. Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University. UMIO, #79/8210. Basseches, M. A. (1980). Dialectical schematas: A framework for the empirical study of the development of dialectical thinking. Human Development, 23, 400–421.

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Basseches, M. A. (1983). Dialectical thinking as a meta-systemic form of cognitive organization. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations. Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 216–238). Praeger. Basseches, M. A. (1984). Dialectical thinking and adult development. Ablex. Basseches, M.  A. (1989). Intellectual development: The development of dialectical thinking. In E. P. Maimon, B. F. Nodine, & F. W. O’Connor (Eds.), Thinking, reasoning and writing. Longman. Basseches, M. A. (1997a). A developmental perspective on psychotherapy process, psychotherapists’ expertise, and “meaning-making conflict” within therapeutic relationships. A two-part series. Journal of Adult Development 4(1), 17–34. Basseches, M. A. (1997b). A developmental perspective on psychotherapy process, psychotherapists’ expertise and “meaning-making conflict” within therapeutic relationships. Part II, Dialectical thinking and psychotherapeutic expertise: Implications for training. Basseches, M. A. (2005). The development of dialectical thinking as an approach to integration. Integral Leadership Review, 1, 47–63. Benack, S., & Basseches, M. A. (1989). Dialectical thinking and relativistic epistemology: Their relation in adult development. In M. L. Commons, J. D. Sinnott, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Adult development : Comparisons and applications of developmental models. Praeger. Bhaskar, R. (1979) [1989, 1998]. The possibility of naturalism. Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1993). Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (2002). Reflections on MetaReality. Sage. Bhaskar, R. (2017). The order of naturally necessity. University College London Institute of Education. Bopp, M., & Basseches, M. (1981). A coding manual for the dialectical schema framework. Unpublished dissertation. [Cited as BB.] Cook-Greuter, S. (2010) [1999]. Postautonomous ego development. Integral Publishers. Hegel, G. W. (1977; 1806). Phenomenology of spirit. Oxford University Press. Jaques, E., & Cason, C. (1994). Human Capability. Cason Hall & Co. Jaques, E. (1998a). Requisite organization. Arlington: Cason Hall & Co.; (2021 edition of Requisite Organization Publishing. https://www.amazon.com/Requisite-­Organization-­ Complete-­Guide-­2021/dp/1867418932?source=ps-­sl-­shoppingads-­lpcontext&ref_=fplfs&psc =1&smid=ATVPDKIKX0DER). Jaques, E. (1998b). Time-span handbook. Cason Hall & Co. Jaques, E. (2002a). The life and behavior of living organisms. Praeger. Jaques, E. (2002b). A simple objective measure of size of roles in managerial systems. In Executive leadership certificate program course materials (pp. 1–20). Cason Hall & Co. Kegan, R. (1982). The evolving self. Harvard University Press. Kegan, R., & Lahey, L. L. (1994). In over our head. Harvard University Press. Kegan, R., & Lahey, L. L. (2009). Immunity to change. Harvard University Press. Kegan, R., et al. (2016). An everyone culture. Harvard University Press. King, P.M., and K.S. Kitchener. (1994). Developing reflective judgment. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Koplowitz, H. (1990). Unitary consciousness and the highest development of mind: The relation between spiritual development and cognitive development. In M.  L. Commons, C.  Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer, & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), Adult development (Vol. 2). Praeger. Lahey, L., Souvaine, E., Kegan, R., Goodman, R., & Felix, S. (1988). A guide to the subject-object interview: Its administration and interpretation. Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University. Laske, O. (1966). On the dialectics of Plato and the early Hegel. Doctoral dissertation (German), Munich, Germany. Laske, O. (1999). Transformative effects of coaching on executives’ professional agenda. PsyD dissertation (2 vols.), Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology. Bell & Howell. (Order no. 9930438).

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Laske, O. (2005). Measuring hidden dimensions (vol. 1): The art and science of fully engaging adults. IDM Press. Available as a pdf in section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/; republished 2023 by Wolfgang Pabst science Publisher, Lengerich, Germany, together with its German translation, entitled Potenziale im Menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen. Cited as ‘Laske 2023a’ (English) and ‘Laske 2023b’ (German). Laske, O. (2006). Leadership as something we are rather than have. Integral Leadership Review, VI(1). Laske, O. (2007). An integrated model of developmental coaching. In R. R. Kilburg & R. C. Diedrich (Eds.), The wisdom of coaching. APA. Laske, O. (2008a). Measuring hidden dimensions (vol. 2): Foundations of requisite organization. IDM Press. Available at Section C of https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/ Laske, O. (2008b). What is your Inquiring System? Stand-alone cognitive assessment for use in coaching and consulting. Hidden Dimension Insights Newsletter, 4.5 (October) See http:// www.interdevelopmentals.org/ezine/2008-10.html Laske, O. (2008c). On the unity of behavioural and developmental perspectives in coaching. International. Coaching Psychology Review, 3.2 (July). Laske, O. (2008d). Mentoring a behavioral coach in thinking developmentally. International Review of Evidence Based Coaching and Mentoring, 6.2 (August). Laske, O. (2008e). Beyond the muddle: A new perspective on social-emotional development. Hidden Dimension Insights Newsletter, volume 4.1 (February-March). See http://www.interdevelopmentals.org/ezine/2008-01.html Laske, O. (2010a). [Editor] Erwachsenenentwicklung und Arbeitsfähigkeit: Beiträge zur Messung, Unterstützung, und Management von Humanpotential. (Adult development and capability: Contributions to measuring, supporting, and managing human capital). Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspsychologie. Lengerich, Germany: Pabst Science Publisher. Laske, O. (2010b). On the autonomy and influence of the cognitive line: Reflections on adult cognitive development peaking in dialectical thinking. In Proceedings, integral theory conference. Laske, O. (2014a). Reconocer, Despertar, y Medir el Potencial Humano, Spanish translation of volume 1 of Measuring hidden dimensions. IDM Press & Ben Pensante, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Available as a pdf at https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/ Laske, O. (2014b). 心の隠された領域の測定 成人以降の心の発達理論と測定手法. Japanese Translation (Yohei Kato) of volume 1 Of measuring hidden dimensions. IDM Press. Available as a pdf at https://interdevelopmentals.org/publications/ Laske, O. (2015). Dialectical thinking for integral leaders: A primer. Integral Publishers. Laske, O. (2021a). CDF: A social-science framework for understanding human agency. CAD Lecture. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gZSrQXXZgM Laske, O. (2021b). Dialektisch leben. Radio Evolve podcast found at https://radio-­evolve.de/ podcast/dialektisch-­leben/ Laske, O. (2022). The Osaka interviews. https://interdevelopmentals.org/the-­osaka-­interviewsregarding-­cdf-­the-­constructive-­developmental-­framework/ Laske, O. (2023a). Measuring hidden dimensions: The art and science of fully engaging adults. Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher (forthcoming reprint). Laske, O. (2023b). Potenziale im Menschen Erkennen, Wecken, und Messen (German translation of 2023a by R. v. Leoprechting & Otto Laske). Wolfgang Pabst Science Publisher. Laske, O (2023c). Reshaping cognitive development as dialectic social practice via Bhaskar’s four moments of dialectic and Laske’s dialectical thought-form framework (DTF). In Metatheories of the 21st century. Routledge. Laske, O. (2023d). Advanced systems-level problem-solving. Book 1: Approaching real-world complexity with dialectical thinking. Book 2: A cognitive theory of work. Book 3: Manual of dialectical thought forms. Springer. Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development: Conceptions and theories. Jossey-Bass. Loevinger, J., Hy, L., & Bobbitt, K. (1998). Revision of the scoring manual. In J. Loevinger (Ed.), Technical foundations for measuring ego development: The Washington university sentence completion test (pp. 19–24). Lawrence Erlbaum.

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Glossary

Absence(s)  An invisible aspect of ➔ reality that comes into view when mentally unhooking from what is actual (actuality) to grasp underlying structural determinants of the social and physical world that are hidden from view by formalistic ➔ thinking. Actuality  In contrast to ➔ Reality, the man-made data formations concocted by science – i.e., by socially mediated subjective consciousness – that disregard the ➔ Moments of Dialectic (which show up only as “side effects”). Architecture, Human Capability (HCA)  Human Resource intangibles rooted in the upper and lower left Wilber Moments, typically not assessed in organizations and thus remaining “hidden dimensions,” according to CDF, defined by the stratification of cognitive and social-emotional scores of individuals, teams, and organizational echelons. Architecture, Managerial Accountability (MAA)  The hierarchy of strata composed of different levels of ➔ work complexity in which people are held accountable for their actions by a supervisor. Architecture, organizational  The organized whole that emerges from fusing and balancing ➔ HCA and ➔ MAA, and thus comprises all four Wilber Moments, each of which in turn is rooted in the ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Assessment, cognitive  In contrast to behavioral and social-emotional assessment, a methodology for determining the thought form structure of an individual’s thinking at a particular point in time per semi-structured interview. Bit An interview fragment selected for cognitive scoring that together with other bits makes up the ➔ Thought Form Selection Sheet and ➔ Cognitive Behavior Graph. Capability, applied The part of an individual’s work capability that is already being applied to work assignments. Capability, (current) potential The part of an individual’s potential capability (“talent”) that is currently available for use in performance; in Jaques and CDF defined on cognitive grounds alone. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Laske, Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3

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Capability, (emergent) potential  The part of an individual’s potential capability (“talent”) that is emerging and is therefore currently not yet fully available for use in performance. Capability management The evidence-based management of human resources based on insight into individuals’ developmental profile (as a basis of managing performance). Capability Metric  A conceptual and visual representation of developmental and behavioral findings regarding a specific organizational group or echelon. The representation embodies a center line which specifies level of performance in terms of “being in the right place,” “performing below standard,” and “performing above standard.” Capacity Another term for ➔ capability [applied], which in CDF is determined by an individual’s Need/Press profile comprising self-conduct, task focus, and emotional intelligence data of an individual. Capacity is thought to be a function of ➔ Capability; gauged in CDF by a psychoanalytical questionnaire based on Henry Murray’s personality theory. Center of gravity, cognitive  In CDF, the ➔ Systems Thinking Index (STI), which indicates the degree to which an individual can coordinate thought forms from different classes that represent the ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Center of gravity, social-emotional In CDF, the ➔ [social-emotional] score whose associated ➔ RCP (risk-clarity-potential index) indicates oscillations of consciousness around a center of meaning-making, thus making specific ➔ developmental risk and ➔ developmental potential. Class(es) of thought forms  Four interrelated categories of thought forms presupposing each other, each of which represents one of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Cognitive behavior graph (CBG) A graphic representation of the sequence of thought forms used in an ➔ interview (cognitive), vertically divided in terms of thought form classes, and horizontally divided according to the ➔ Houses (Organizational, Self, Task). Cognitive load (of role)  The cognitive requirements of an organizational role; see ➔ work complexity [level]. Cognitive profile  A set of CDF scores detailing an individual’s ➔ Fluidity Index, ➔ Cognitive Score, ➔ Systems Thinking Index, and ➔ Discrepancy Index, more generally the fluidity, cognitive balance, and degree of systemic thinking of an individual, determined by ➔ interview [cognitive]. Cognitive score  A score of the form “[p, c, r; t(%)]” in which each letter corresponds to the percentage of thought form uses in one of the four classes of dialectical thought forms. The score indicates (im-)balance between uses of thought forms in different classes, thus an individual’s present cognitive ➔ equilibrium or lack thereof. Cognitive structure of organizations  The notion that organizational strata embody a generic ➔ cognitive profile indicating the dialectical thinking requirements (if any) of a particular level of ➔ work complexity.

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Common sense  The first of four ➔ eras of cognitive development that integrates the perceptions an individual generates regarding his/her social and physical environment including the human body. Complexity of mental processing  The complexity of ➔ thinking an individual applies in addressing the tasks assigned into his or her ➔ role. Concept, base  The central concept, explicit or implicit, an individual uses during a cognitive interview. If not spelled out, it is the interviewer’s task to articulate and test the base concept. Concept, dialectical  A concept or set of concepts used to articulate the ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Concept, formalistic Concepts formed by separating cognitive structure (“method”) from content, thus failing to address what remains non-­identical with, or outside of, the conceptual model used. See the Manual, TF #28 [critique of formalism]. Concrete universal  In contrast to reductions of complexity, the rendition, in language, of a subject matter in terms of all four ➔ Moments of Dialectic, with a recognition of the fact that the subject matter remains “beyond concepts” due to its ➔ non-identity with human thinking. Constructive Developmental Framework (CDF) A framework for triangulating assessment-derived (evidence-based) behavioral, cognitive, and social-emotional perspectives on an individual or group, for the purpose of capturing the concrete universal the individual represents, rather than reducing the individual to an abstraction as done in the social sciences. Constructivist perspective  Perspective based on the assumption that the social world is a construction of the human mind through language, and that therefore a speaker does not describe a ready-made world “out there,” but creates it before one’s very ears. Such a perspective requires dialectical, not formalistic, thinking. Content (vs. structure)  The informational content of human speech in contrast to the underlying logical, dialectical (thought form), or social-­emotional (stage) structure that is scored in developmental ➔ interviews. Context A class of thought forms focused on describing organized wholes. See also ➔ thought form. Coordination of thought forms  Fusing dialectical thought forms from different ➔ classes, either linking illuminative thought forms (P, C, R) with each other, or expanding them into a systemic, transformational thought form. Critical thinking  In the conventional sense, a way of thinking that asks questions about some subject matter not taking it, and itself, for granted. In a more precise, dialectical sense the use of ➔ Process and ➔ Relationship thought forms representing the upper two ➔ Moments of Dialectic. De-agentification A way of non-dialectical thinking that denies or obscures the fact that social reality (and even physical reality) is an outcome of human work and thinking. Description, incomplete  A commonsensical or logical description of things that is incomplete because it does not consider all four ➔ Moments of Dialectic or ➔ classes of thought forms.

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De-totalization A commonsensical or logical description of things that neglects to acknowledge the fact that things and events are part of an organized social or physical whole and therefore share common ground and are interrelated. Development  The notion that adults’ process of ➔ mental growth is a deeply historical process, both for individuals and entire populations. This is in contrast to maturation which is purely physical and physiological process pertaining to the human brain. (The brain itself is a product of human history.) Developmental feedback  Verbal feedback based on a developmental assessment of an individual’s ➔ cognitive (and social-emotional) profile, often for the sake of subsequent interventions such as coaching, consulting, or psychotherapy. Developmental hypothesis A statement or set of statements drawing inferences from developmental findings regarding an individual about the developmental grounding of behavioral symptoms (e.g., time management). Developmental interviewing  The art of administering semi-structured interviews for the purpose of eliciting valid cognitive and/or social-emotional data about an individual or group. See also ➔ interview. Developmental level  In general, the current level of dialectical thinking and/or the maturity of meaning-making of an individual. Developmental placenta The hypothesis that an individual’s behavioral ego is embedded in, and safeguarded by, the individual’s developmental potential which offers support in rectifying behavioral blind alleys. Developmental potential  The potential for further ➔ mental growth expressed by the social-emotional ➔ RCP or the cognitive ➔ Systems Thinking Index. The adult-developmental term for “talent.” Following Jaques, potential is either current (available) or emergent (not yet available) and fundamentally different from applied capability (➔ performance). Developmental profile  A generic term for the outcome of social-emotional or cognitive assessments in CDF. Developmental risk  Barrier to further ➔ mental growth articulated by the socialemotional ➔ RCP or the imbalance of thought form uses in different classes articulated by the ➔ Cognitive Score. DTF Framework  The dialectical thought form framework taught in this book, a Manual for which is found in the Appendix. Dialectic  The dynamics of living and real things and of consciousness that derives from the ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Dialectic, model of   A conception of dialectic that emphasizes a particular facet of dialectical thinking. Each such model has limitations. See also ➔ dialecticism (Asian). Dialectic, negative  Dialectic emphasizing the non-identity of human concepts and their real-world referents, taking into account the “over-reaching, open objectivity” of ➔ reality. Dialectic(s) of Context  Parts of a whole shifting their balance; stratification; generative mechanisms. Dialectic(s) of Process Process, transition, interaction, opposition (including reversal).

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Dialectic(s) of Relationship  Reciprocal, intrinsic, based on constitutive relationship (logically preceding parts of a whole) and shared, common ground. Dialectic(s) of Transformation  Movement in a developmental direction; special affinity with Process as human agency and social change. Dialectical structure (of development) The teleological tendency of developmental movement. Such movement is informed by conflict (antithesis) through which an older structure is replaced by a “higher,” i.e., more differentiated, holistically organized one without loss of an “older” structure which is transcended but preserved in an individual or social memory store. In the sense of ➔ negative dialectic, a movement that may be regressive rather than naturally progressive. (Dialectical movement is different from stage to stage, implying different thought forms.) Dialectical thinking See ➔ Thinking. Dialectical thought form(s)  Movements-in-thought that manifest the ➔ Moments of Dialectic in the human mind, and with due caution can be logically classified according to “classes.” See also ➔ focus of attention. Dialectical thought form framework (DTF) A part of the ➔ Constructive Developmental Framework that focuses on the cognitive development as an autonomous, irreducible line of adult development and can be seen as driving social-emotional development (➔ mental growth) from stage to stage. Dialecticism, Asian According to Nisbett (2005), the common-sense propensity of people influenced by Chinese culture to accept as determinative of reality the principles of change, contradiction, and holism. Dialecticism, Western  A philosophical tradition reaching from Plato to Hegel and the ➔ Frankfurt School that sees ➔ reality as being in constant transformation due to the pervasive presence of ➔ absences having an equal weight with what is present. Dimension of dialectical listening  One of the seven dimensions of thinking in terms of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic, exemplified in the context of administering semi-structured cognitive ➔ interviews. Discrepancy index  An index that makes explicit the proportion of critical to constructive ➔ thinking in an individual, computed by gauging his/her use of dialectical thought forms of different classes (P+R vs. C+T) in a cognitive interview. Discretion  A stance accompanying the exercise of reflective judgment in making choices in carrying out a task (Jaques, 1998a, 24 f.). In dialectical thinking used to discern the class of dialectical thought forms implied by or articulated by a speaker. Ego  Psychoanalytically, the source of rational behavior defended against by the Id (Need) and the Superego (ideal Press), and meant to keep a person safe and in touch with the social environment. In this book, the source of ➔ Capacity as distinguished from ➔ Capability which provides the ➔ developmental placenta for debugging the Ego over the long term (across time). Epistemic position A stance one can describe as a stage of reflective judgment (King and Kitchener, 1994); it reflects what an individual knows about limits of his/her knowledge and how, therefore, s(he) justifies beliefs. In the development

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of dialectical thinking, epistemic position is a central factor since it determines to what extent an individual is on his/her to a practice of dialectical thinking, which is left unresearched by King and Kitchener (1994). Epistemology  The academic term for theory of knowledge, also used by R. Kegan (1982) for describing ways of meaning-making. In regard to CDF, an autonomous discipline different from both psychology and ontology as well as behavioral research, focused on the question “What can I know and what, therefore, can I do?” Equilibrium, of cognitive profile  In CDF, the proportional use that is made of four classes of thought forms, as indicated by the ➔ Cognitive Score. Era(s) of cognitive development  Four periods of cognitive development over the lifespan, in this book referred to as Common Sense, Understanding, Reason, and Practical Wisdom. Eras follow each other but can overlap, as do Common Sense and Understanding as well as Understanding and Reason. Practical Wisdom is the culmination of an integration of logical Understanding and dialectical Reason. Fluidity The degree of flexibility achieved in using thought forms of different classes, as assessed by the CDF Fluidity ➔ Index. Focus of attention  A particular thought form that guides an individual’s momentary attention. Formal logical thinking  ➔ Thinking Formalistic thinking  ➔ Thinking Frame (s), mental  Following Bolman and Deal (1991), four interrelated perspectives on an organizational environment and culture: structural, political, human resource, and symbolic. Frame of Reference A person’s developmentally determined world view that is based on level of ➔ meaning-making and phase of ➔ sense-making (“thinking”). Frankfurt School The largest and most influential modern school of dialectical ➔ thinking that used its members’ expert understanding of Hegel’s work (1770–1831) to analyze twentieth-century social and cultural issues from a critical perspective, also making extensive use of findings by Marx and Freud. The school’s work is globally referred to as “Critical Theory.” Members of the school were: Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Friedrich Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, and Erich Fromm. The school did not practice developmental thinking; it conceptualized adult development foremost as a social and historical (rather than epistemological) process. In contrast to contemporary “developmental” research, its understanding of adult development was historical and focus on individual as social and cultural agents, and thus beyond the focus on subjective consciousness as in contemporary developmental research. Hierarchy See ➔ Architecture. House(s) A metaphor describing a person’s internal ➔ workplace in a way that is analogous to Wilber’s moments; the metaphor is closely linked to the use of dialectical thought forms.

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House, Organizational  One of three topics of the cognitive ➔ interview, focused on how the interviewee conceptualizes the environment in which his/her work is embedded. Structured based on Bolman and Deal (1991). House, Self  One of three topics of the CDF cognitive ➔ interview, focused on how the interviewee conceptualizes his/her own professional agenda, values, and career goals. Structured based on Haber’s theory of clinical supervision (1996). House, Task  One of three topics of the CDF cognitive ➔ interview, focused on how the interviewee conceptualizes his/her organizational responsibility and the roles – interpersonal, informational, and decisional – flowing from his/her function. Structured based on Mintzberg (1989). Human capability architecture (HCA) The developmentally stratified set of capabilities that shapes an organization; it needs to be balanced with the hierarchy of levels of organizational responsibility (➔ Stratum). Human Resource(s), intangible(s)  The invisible capability resources of individuals in the workforce, their ➔ developmental potential. Human Resources Management, evidence-based Management of human resources based on empirical evidence of workforce capabilities provided by adult-developmental assessment instruments such as CDF. Ideal-type  A conceptual model capable of guiding research and innovation; a standard against which to measure empirical actualities. Illumination  Awareness brought about by using Context, Process, and Relationship ➔ thought forms in the quest of discovering what’s missing in ➔ reality or a description of it. See also ➔ absence(s). Index, discrepancy  In CDF, an index specifying the discrepancy between an individual’s critical versus constructive thinking due to privileging process and relationship thought forms over contextual and transformational ➔ thought forms and vice versa. Index, fluidity  In CDF, an index specifying an individual’s present ability of using dialectical thought forms when probed in a cognitive ➔ interview. The index is computed based on the frequency and degree of explicitness of thought forms used across all classes. Fluidity ranges are thought to determine the level of ➔ work complexity an individual is capable of being held responsible for, given that work is the exercise of reflective judgment exercising thought forms. Index, systems thinking (STI) See ➔ systems thinking index. Inquiring system, dialectical (Hegelian)  A framework for asking questions that address systems as constituting open organized wholes that undergo unceasing transformation. The framework is based on the Platonic principle of heteron (Other) which is identical with itself only if it is not identical with itself. Inquiring system, Kantian  A framework for asking questions about closed (rather than open) systems in which formal logical thinking is used to assess, somewhat paradoxically, the degree of fit between a theory (set of theoretical predictions) and the data acquired based on the theory. Kant addressed the implied paradox by his notion of transcendental synthesis, which implies that there are a priori categories of the human mind that shape all empirical data. Kantian inquiries are

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restricted to questions about closed systems since they disregard the transformational nature of reality, as he himself was entirely aware of. Inquiring system, Lockean  A framework for constructing empirical questions and making empirical judgments through which increasingly more general “facts” can be derived, as used in the physical and social sciences in which “methodology” or “method” remains separate from subject matter. (The transcendental synthesis operative in such a system is never made explicit.) Intentio obliqua The oblique (indirect) way of thinking, based on the assumption that “reality” is not directly accessible (or “out there”) and therefore can be grasped only by way of thinking conceptually. Intentio recta The direct way of thinking that has persuaded itself that it can straightforwardly “reach” the reality it is striving to understand (and at risk of losing sight of itself). Internal conversation(s) The mental activity grounding individuals’ conscious deliberations about social and cultural concerns based on which their (➔) reflexivity leads them to decision-making and action. Internal conversations have a developmental (social-emotional, psychological, and cognitive) structure. Inter-rater reliability  The degree to which empirical assessment findings arrived at by different professionals coincide due to the consistency with which the individuals follow identical scoring procedures, and thus come to very similar if not identical conclusions about, and descriptions of, some subject matter. Interview, cognitive  In CDF, a one-hour semi-structured conversation meant to elicit evidence about an individual’s present ➔ thinking (➔ sense-making or ➔ [current potential] Capability). Interview, developmental  An interview whose purpose it is to elicit evidence of an individual’s present level of adult development; a conversation rather than a “test.” Interview questions  Two kinds of questions used in the CDF ➔ cognitive interview, namely guide and probe questions. The first kind introduces into each of the ➔ Three Houses, while the second kind gauges the level of the interviewee’s dialectical thinking, closely following the flow of the conversation. Interview, semi-structured  A conversation structured to permit eliciting evidence about levels of social-emotional or phases of cognitive adult development. Since the interview’s structure remains the same from case to case, resulting scores can be compared to each other. Interview, social-emotional In CDF, a one-hour semi-structured conversation meant to elicit evidence about an individual’s present level of ➔ meaning-making. Judgment, reflective  The ability to reflect upon one’s thinking and thinking activities, and to justify beliefs. For King and Kitchener (1994), the ability of making defensible judgments. For Jaques (1994), the foundation of any kind of “work.” Knowledge, epistemic  The knowledge (awareness) a person has about the limits of his/her knowledge and defensibility of his/her judgments. Knowledge claim  Claims to speaking the truth based on having insight into some subject matter.

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Kohlberg School A school of “neo-Piagtian” educators who tried to understand adult development from the angle of social-emotional meaning-making (mainly) and cognitive sense-making (peripherally), without clearly distinguishing the two or asking about their ideal-typical or empirical relationship. Except for Basseches, members of the school were not dialectical thinkers, nor did research on the development of dialectical thinking have consequences for their research. As a result, the school did not “see” that adult development is a deeply historical process (as the ➔ Frankfurt School maintained), rather than something one can read off the structure of the human brain using formal logical thinking. Leadership  The notion that groups and teams of people need a guiding force that can shape how collaboration is achieved in work pursued along diverse goal paths. Leadership practices According to Jaques (1998a), organizational practices imbued by the notion that work complexity is stratified and that one has the responsibility to “add value” at all levels below one’s own level of accountability. These practices are an integral part of management, not something beyond management. Learning, organizational  The ability of an entire organization to learn from its successes and failures by employing systemic thinking. Level of accountability  The level of responsibility that is commensurate with the level of work complexity at which one is stationed in one’s work. Level of cognitive development  A phase of thinking based on the maturation of formal logical thinking (in a person’s mid-twenties), thus a level of ➔ thinking in terms of ➔ Reason rather than mere ➔ Understanding. See also ➔ development. Level of (individual) capability  An individual’s level of sense-making as well as meaning-making. See also ➔ Capability. Level of work complexity See ➔ work complexity. Listening, developmental  Listening for the articulation, in speech, of stages of meaning-making. Listening, dialectic  The art of listening based on four ➔ classes of thought forms representing the four ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Loevinger Fallacy The way in which non-dialectically thinking developmental theorists (e.g., J. Loevinger) fill up the stage concept with meanings that are not strictly social-emotional but cognitive or spiritual, thereby mixing and merging social-emotional, spiritual, and cognitive development, and hiding their reductive thinking by making it sound holistic. Logic, abductive  A logic for the inventive construction of theories (C.S. Peirce) meant to capture data not explained by extant models. Logic, dialectic A logic for thinking that is aware of the controlling power of concepts, and therefore sets out to “save the phenomena” by doing justice to real-world complexities that lie outside of human concepts (Adorno, 1999). Dialectical thinking articulates the ➔ Moments of Dialectic, thus approaching the world as a ➔ transformational system. Logic, formal  A logic for “classifying” surface structure attributes of objects that together make up closed systems (actuality); such a logic lacks tools for captur-

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ing the common ground and process of emergence of the objects it constructs to decompose organized wholes. Management, Capability  A form of human resources management that takes into account the developmental potential, current and emergent, of members of the workforce by using appropriate tools such as ➔ Capability Metrics. Managerial accountability hierarchy (MAH) See ➔ Architecture. Meaning-making An unexplored social-emotional process that has so far only been classified in terms of different ➔ stages, without any insight into how human consciousness moves from one stage to another. Mental frame(s)  A perspective on organizational events, processes, and systems that determines action. Different mental frames have different salience as a function of specific organizational circumstances. Mental growth  In contrast to ➔ mental health, the dimension in which developmental ➔ potential discontinuously unfolds both cognitively and social-emotionally. Mental health  See also ➔ Capacity and [applied] ➔ Capability. Mental highway(s) A concept denoting patterns found in managers’ thinking depending on their ➔ level of accountability and ➔ work complexity. Mental process A hypothesis regarding the movements-in-thought that shape experiences, interpretations, judgments, and other thought things. Mental space  Mental space with regard to ➔ work, see ➔ House(s). Method, constellational (Adorno) A dialectical approach intended to avoid the separation of structure and content, thereby doing justice to what is and remains incommensurate with human concepts (despite all formal logical pretentions to the contrary). Method(s) of mental (or information) processing  A distinction between different ways of using formal logic, first distinguished by Jaques in terms of the four logical copulas as “conjunctive” (and), “disjunctive” (or), “serial/conditional” (if), and “parallel” (iff). Among these, parallel thinking comes closest to dialectical thinking since it moves from one ➔ focus of attention to another. Mind opener A ➔ thought form used for the purpose of opening one’s own or another person’s mind. Many different mind openers can be derived from a single thought form. Model of dialectic  A way of conceptually framing different points of emphasis in dialectical thinking, thus of privileging one perspective on dialectics over another. For instance, Adorno’s, Basseches’, Bhaskar’s, Hegel’s, Marx’s, and Plato’s models of dialectic are all slightly different but share a broad common ground: the reality of negativity (➔ absence) as the motor driving ➔ development. Moment(s) of Dialectic A notion introduced in Bhaskar (1993), here seen as associated with, and unfolding into, Basseches’ “classes of thought forms,” thus combining an ontological with an epistemological perspective on reality. The underlying notion is that the Moments “run the world” ontologically while human thinking is aiming (but never succeeding) to catch up with what they produce at any point in time. Moments of Dialectic do not adhere to the human tri-partition of past, present, and future either, and in this sense are “beyond history” and “beyond time.”

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Moves-in-thought  A mental process that captures the essence of a specific thought present in a person’s internal conversation and can be represented by a dialectical ➔ thought form or sequence of thought forms. Mythos  The storytelling, in contrast to the logical, faculty of the human mind that is holistic and sees meaning in diverse elements of history and society. Needs-Press Questionnaire (NP)  A set of psychoanalytically grounded questions derived from Henry Murray’s theory of personality by Morris Aderman. The questionnaire comprises 18 variables, 6 each referring to self-conduct, approach to tasks, and interpersonal perspective. In CDF, a measure of work ➔ Capacity interpreted in terms of ➔ Capability and ➔ developmental profile. Needs-Press Profile A set of Likert scale outcomes for each of the variables of the NP questionnaire describing the behavioral success factors and barriers to success of an individual irrespective of his/her developmental level or cognitive profile. Negation, logical (formalistic)  A process of dismissing as “false” whatever cannot be subsumed under an object’s or subject’s presumed fixed and “abstract” identity. Negation, preservative (determinative) A process of including as relevant or essential whatever is linked to an object’s or subject’s transformational identity. What is “preserved” (in a memory store) is the “negated” aspect of the base ➔ concept (rather than it being discarded as “false”). Negativity  A philosophical term for ➔ absence and ➔ non-identity, indicating that the antithesis of some thesis (conceptual or real) is making itself felt, in whatever form. Non-identity  That part of ➔ reality thought is trying to understand that does not easily (or at all) yield to human concepts imposed on subject matter. In terms of Kant, the irreducible “Ding an sich” (thing-in-itself) that does not yield to human concepts and therefore can only be approached by practical ➔ Reason (transformational agency built into Reason). Order of mental complexity  A particular way of thinking defined by the size of the ➔ mental space in which thinking occurs, which is either a closed or open ➔ system. Jaques distinguishes four orders. The first is based on ➔ formal logic entirely, whereas the second and third orders increasingly imply dialectical ➔ thinking. Phases 1 and 2 form the Second (Stratum I–IV), phases 3 and 4 the Third (Stratum V–VIII) order of mental complexity. In this book, the fourth order is conceptualized as ➔ Practical Wisdom. Order of mental processing (information processing)  Jaques’ classification of degrees of thought complexity that is focused on presence or lack of suffusion in natural language, as follows: – First order: animals and human infants – Second order: adults whose thinking remains within the realm of formal logic – Third order: adults capable of systemic (dialectical) thinking – Fourth order: genius (in this book: ➔ Practical Wisdom) Organization, requisite The balance of the Human Capability ➔ Hierarchy (HCH) with the Managerial Accountability ➔ Hierarchy (MAH) in terms of ➔

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Size of Person (HCH) and ➔ Size of Role (MAH), measured in terms of whether a member of the workforce is “at the right place in the organization,” having the Capability to be held accountable for pursuing the tasks assigned into his/ her role. Organization, strengths-based A notion introduced by Fleming and Asplund (2007) entailing that talents are deep-seated capabilities that take time to develop fully and should therefore be a priority in hiring and performance management. Other, dialectical  The notion (deriving from Plato’s heteron) that anything that exists is “shadowed,” as it were, by its negation in the sense of something to which it is linked and without which it cannot be understood or even defined. For the late Plato, a principle that is identical with itself only if it not ever identical with itself. Other(s), internalized  A hypothesis proposed by Lahey et al. (1988) referring to difficulties of a person who experiences the world in the range between Keganlevels S-3 and S-4 of meaning-making, to separate out the self from voices other than one’s authentic voice. Internalized others block one’s understanding of oneself, with immediate consequences for how one answers the question “What should I do and for whom?” Other, logical  Whatever is “false” since not part of a base concept’s closed and static identity. PEL Sequence  Epistemologically, the movement from thought forms “pointing to” to those “elaborating” and “linking” thoughts, which defines the dialectical attention span. Ontologically, an indication of all Moments of Dialectic forming a totality that encompasses movements-in-thought comprising all four thought form classes. Performance Work activity grounded in an individual’s presently [applied] ➔ Capability, which itself is grounded in [potential] ➔ capability. Performance, band  A notion introduced by Fleming and Asplund (2007) indicating the level of ➔ requisite organization of employee and customer relationships in a company, calibrated in terms of financial returns on the company’s operations. Performance, inscrutability of The fact that companies having no insight into (or ignoring) the Human Capability ➔ Hierarchy embedded in their corporate culture cannot understand human resource intangibles sufficiently to bring about significant advances in innovation and financial performance. Performance management  The flawed notion that performance can be managed without insight into the Human Capability ➔ Hierarchy that underlies the use of competences in the workplace. Phase(s) of dialectical thinking  – 1: a phase largely dominated by formal logical thinking despite the presence of a few unrelated dialectical, especially contextual, ➔ thought forms (Fluidity Index 10 < 30 corresponding to Strata III–IV)

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– 3: a phase characterized by beginning ➔ coordination of thought forms, brought to bear on critical (P, R), constructive (C, T) and value-oriented (R, T) thought forms (Fluidity Index >30 50 corresponding to Strata VII–VIII) Position, epistemic  One of the seven stages of reflective judgment elucidated by King and Kitchener (1994). K&K stages lack pertinence for understanding the development of dialectical thinking although they can roughly be aligned with phases of its development as done in this book, amplified by proposing higher epistemic positions than envisioned by King and Kitchener. Practical Wisdom  The last of four ➔ eras of adult cognitive development characterized by complete absorption of formal logical into dialectical thinking, leading to a new “commonsensical” simplicity of thinking; first conceptualized by Hegel. Cook-Greuter (1999) addressed social-­emotionally (in terms of stance) as “post-autonomous stage” without any regard to cognitive development, similar to the Baltes School, Berlin, Germany. Procedure, discovery A procedure based on using dialectical thought forms for explicating the ➔ negativity of any set of assumptions in terms of the four ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Process thought forms The seven thought forms that explicate the Process ➔ Moment of Dialectic. Process consultation A notion introduced by Edgar Schein from a perspective of ➔ Understanding, and deepened by Laske (2006) in terms of ➔ Reason as developmental process consultation (DPC) (equivalent to triple loop learning). A consulting activity based on insight into adult development in the form of coaching, management consulting, mediation, facilitation, psychotherapy, social work, law, and other human services professions. Professional Agenda  The conceptual assumptions made by an individual regarding his/her work in a role, with an emphasis on goals, professional values, and future career, considered in terms of dialectical ➔ thought forms. Professional Agenda Interview  Another term for [cognitive] ➔ interview in the sense of CDF. Profile  A summary description (“diagnosis”) of an individual’s behavioral, cognitive, social-emotional and mental-health status in an organizational workplace. See also ➔ developmental profile. Quadrants (Wilber) Four perspectives of ➔ Understanding (not ➔ Reason) thought to permit a comprehensive perspective on the social world and even the world at large, but essentially centered in the so-called Upper Left Moment. From the vantage point of CDF, each Wilber Quadrant has its own dialectic, explicable through the four classes of thought forms. The ➔ Moments of Dialectic thus inhere each Wilber Quadrant; their dialectical explication and use in integral thinking has been retarded and is therefore overdue.

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RCP  The social-emotional Risk-Clarity-Potential Index that indicates the strength of the ➔ center of gravity, compared to meaning-making occurring at lower or higher levels than the center. Reality (vs. actuality) The social and physical world seen from the vantage point of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic, that is, as “pervaded by absences” (Bhaskar), in acknowledgement of the negativity, gaps, and conflicts it encompasses. Reason  The third of four ➔ eras of adult cognitive development characterized by an increasing acquisition and coordination of dialectical thought forms, leading from the second to the third ➔ Order of Mental Complexity (or from conventional to post-conventional thinking). Kant made a distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” reason such that the latter has to make good for what the former cannot achieve. This was critiqued by Hegel as “Reflexionsphilosophie.” Reasoning, abductive  A form of ➔ Understanding (not ➔ Reason), which uses hypothesis formulation to craft innovative theories but clings to the formalistic notion of “data.” Martin (2007b) referred to as ➔ generative reasoning. Reasoning, dialectical  Thinking in terms of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic represented by four classes of thought forms. Reasoning, generative  R. Martin’s name for ➔ Understanding in the form of ➔ thinking (abductive). Reductionism  A procedure of formal logical thinking violating TF #17 by engaging with pluralism and subjectivism, thus neglecting Common Ground. Reflexivity  A process by which “a subject considering an object in relation to itself bends that object back upon itself to include the self as its own object” (adapted from M. Archer 2007, 72). In social ontology, reflexivity is seen as “mediating deliberately between the objective structural opportunities (of the social world) confronted by different groups and the nature of people’s subjectively defined concerns” (Archer 2007, 61). Reification  A way of formal logical thinking violating TF #6 by arresting motion, thus denying process and history, and ultimately human agency. Relationship, constitutive  A relationship that constitutes the elements it relates, outside of which they would not be what they are. Relationship thought forms The seven thought forms that explicate the Relationship ➔ Moment of Dialectic. Remediation  Awareness brought about by using transformational ➔ thought forms by which ➔ absences are remediated. Requisite organization (RO)  An organization of human resources that brings individuals’ potential ➔ capability into balance with the level of ➔ work complexity assigned into their roles. Regarding a single individual, the balance of his or her developmental profile especially regarding the equilibrium of cognitive and social-emotional scores. Role  A position in a social system defining pertinent responsibilities of the person “in” the role. Role complexity The ➔ complexity of mental processing required for pursuing tasks assigned into a role.

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Role, decisional According to Mintzberg (1989), a role played by an individual acting as an entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, or negotiator. Role, informational  According to Mintzberg (1989), a role played by an individual acting as a monitor, disseminator, and spokesman. Role, interpersonal  According to Mintzberg (1989), a role played by an individual acting as a figurehead, leader, or liaison. School, Frankfurt A school of social theory founded by M.  Horkheimer in the early thirties, which came to include Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and hesitatingly, Benjamin. The school became known for its scrutiny of Hegel’s work and the application of Hegel’s insights to issues of mid-twentieth century Western society and culture, focused on capitalism. School, Kohlberg A school researching facets of adult development over the lifespan founded by L.  Kohlberg in the early 1970s, which came to include Basseches, Commons, Fischer, Kegan, Noam and others. The school became known for its extension of Piaget’s work on children to adults for the purpose of better understanding lifespan mental growth; its insights were later embraced and generalized by Wilber, who linked the School to spiritual schools of Asia, leaving dialectical thinking out of account. Score, cognitive  In CDF, a numerical expression (in percent) of the balance of thought form uses made by an individual during a one-hour semi-­structured cognitive ➔ interview. Score, discrepancy  In CDF, a numerical expression of the proportion in which an individual has used critical versus constructive thinking during a one-hour semistructured ➔ interview. Score, fluidity In CDF, a numerical expression indicating the overall ability of an individual to use dialectical thought forms across all four ➔ classes of thought forms. Score, social-emotional  The most generic developmental assessment one can make of an individual, void of substance if not triangulated with other developmental scores. In CDF, the Lahey-Kegan score reflecting level of meaning-­making, refined by Laske’s Risk-Clarity-Potential Index (RCP) that makes explicit the proportional distribution of an individual’s meaning-making actions on levels below and above the ➔ center of gravity. Scoring decisions In CDF, decisions regarding the class of thought forms and individual thought forms that best render the conceptual essence of a particular move-in-thought (judgment, comment, or interpretation) during the cognitive ➔ interview. Self (vs. Role)  The sense- and meaning-making agency of an individual in contrast to the role “played” by the individual in a social environment and the ego as generator of behavior. Sense-making  In contrast to meaning-making, a set of mental operations that articulates real-world experiences in terms of logical and/or dialectical thought forms in order to answer the question “What can I do and what are my options?” In research of the last 30 years, adult sense-making as “thinking” has typically been

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denied its autonomous trajectory, and either rigidly separated from or merged with the development of ➔ meaning-making. Size of person See ➔ developmental level and fluidity index. Size of role  See level of ➔ work complexity. Skill(s), abstract systems (Fischer, 1980)  In terms of stance, ➔ epistemic position 6. In terms of tools, referring to the ability of integrating abstract mappings into closed systems, based on internalized categories of comparison and evaluation. Skill(s), abstract mapping (Fischer, 1980)  In terms of stance, ➔ epistemic position 5. In terms of tools, referring to the ability of relating two (or more) abstractions whose real-world referents are found in different domains of discourse. Space, mental An imaginary space encompassing ➔ moves-in-thought; also the space in which reflective ➔ judgment and ➔ discretion (“work”) are exercised. Spectator view of knowledge The epistemic stance that mistakes concepts for pieces of furniture to move around without taking ➔ thinking actions. Stage (of)  A step within a closed system that cannot be reached without passing through all “lower” rungs of the ladder, and which cannot be jumped over to get to “higher” rungs of the ladder either. Stage theory (social-emotional)  A formalistic theory of the steps by which emerge adults’ answers to the question of “What should I do and for whom?” The theory merely situates individuals in an imaginary mental landscape without delivering tools for understanding moves within the landscape. Despite the highly generic character of stage labels, the theory risks mistaking ➔ stage labels for the individual said to be “at” a particular stage. The theory is both unable and unmoved to explain the progression from stage to stage other than intuitively or mechanistically, instead of transformationally, by way of dialectical ➔ thought forms. Stage, unitive  In Cook-Greuter’s (1999) work, the most developed ➔ stance of ➔ Practical Wisdom based on which an individual is “construct-aware” (aware of the limits of natural language) and has left behind the need of constant de-construction of itself for the purpose of keeping its boundaries open and fluid, merely playing “witness to the process of continuous transformation and change.” Stance  In contrast to tools (logical or dialectical), the ➔ frame of reference adopted by a thinker. Always in balance with the tools accessible to the individual holding the stance. Strategy of dialectical listening An attentional strategy used in administering a cognitive interview (see Chap. 12). Strategy of elimination  An attentional strategy developed by Jaques for determining an individual’s method of information processing; in CDF, comprising elements of dialectical thinking. Stratum (Strata)  A managerial layer in ➔ MAA characterized by level of ➔ work complexity. System, closed  A system fully representable by concepts of formal logic. System, open See ➔ transformational system. System, transformational A slice of the real world viewed in terms of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic.

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Systemic thinking  A way of conceptualizing slices of the real world as forming organized wholes that unceasingly transform by reason of their emerging potential, guided by the constitutive relationships they embody. Systems thinking index (STI)  A numerical (formalistic) indicator of the degree of coordination of thought forms that an individual is presently capable of. See also ➔ [cognitive] center of gravity. Table of Questions about Thought Forms  In CDF, a table enumerating pertinent questions pointing to the conceptual essence of each of the ➔ thought forms in the ➔ Table of Thought Forms. Table of thought forms  A two-dimensional representation of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic as they become manifest in human consciousness. Talent  One of the many buzzwords of contemporary human resources management that lacks adult-developmental substance and no clear definition outside of adult developmental scores. Talent management  The behaviorist notion that one can “manage” talent without understanding its adult-developmental root in ➔ Capability. Task The organizational assignment to produce a specific output within certain time limits, “with allocated resources and methods within prescribed limits (policies, procedures, rules, regulations, etc.)” (Jaques, 1998a, Glossary). One should distinguish single and multiple tasks (Jaques, 1998b). Theory, decision  A theory of decision making, in particular about human resources, such as CDF. Thinking, abductive  See ➔ Reasoning. Thinking, across-time (rather than in-time)  The central mode of developmental thinking which focuses on the occurrence of changes from one time point to another outside of linear cause-effect relationships; seeing change as a manifestation of transformations of an organized whole (such as human consciousness). Thinking action  A mental action consciously taken, in contrast to adopting a spectator view of knowledge, that pushes concepts around like pieces of furniture. Thinking actions presuppose ➔ epistemic position 6 and are thus rare. Thinking, constructivist In the shallow sense, the adoption of a constructivist perspective using formal logical thinking. In the deep and correct sense, a way of thinking that articulates the ➔ Moments of Dialectic inherent in human consciousness. Thinking, dialectical Using formal logic as a tool for transcending formalistic ➔ thinking, by illuminating the ➔ absences pervading ➔ reality. See also ➔ Reason. Thinking, formal logical (formalistic)  A way of thinking in which adherence to the logical identity clause (principle of excluded middle) bereaves thinking of an awareness of negativity as acknowledged in preservative ➔ negation. Formalistic ➔ thinking separates structure and content of thinking, thus disregarding the conceptual depth of the real-world referent(s) the concept points to. Thinking, meta-systemic The ability to conceive of systems as aggregations (gatherings) of components in constant transformation.

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Thinking, post-formal (post-conventional) According to adult-­ developmental theory, the thinking that “follows” formal logical ➔ thinking, leading to “postconventional” perspectives on the real world. Thought form In ➔ Understanding and ➔ Reasoning, a ➔ focus of attention and/ or ➔ move-in-thought within a ➔ mental space. The unit of analysis used in scoring cognitive ➔ interviews. Thought form class See ➔ Class(es). Thought form contrast(s)  A thought form to be distinguished from one presently selected in scoring an ➔ interview fragment. Thought form selection (sheet)  A listing of scores assigned to subsequent interview fragments to which justifications reflecting the ➔ Table of Questions about Thought Forms have been attached. Thought forms, transformational The seven thought forms that explicate the transformational ➔ Moment of Dialectic. Thought forms as mind opener  Thought forms used as a generator of a variety of questions introducing alternative and/or multiple perspectives heretofore not in view. Time horizon  The degree of foresight that makes it possible for an individual to pursue tasks assigned into his/her role with a particular time span. Time horizon is the subjective correlate of the objective ➔ time span of a role, associated with different ➔ Strata. Time, horizontal  Another term for “in-time.” Time span  The longest span of time needed for accomplishing tasks assigned into a particular ➔ role that defines the ➔ work complexity of a role. Time, vertical  Another term for “across-time.” Tool(s)  In contrast to ➔ stance, actual cognitive instruments (operations, moves-inthought) by which sense-making is accomplished and meaning-making refined. Tools can be logical or dialectical. Transform(s)  A set of logical or dialectical tools by which the individual moves from one ➔ era of cognitive development to another, e.g., from Common Sense to Understanding. This book distinguishes four different sets of tools referred to as the L-[ogic], I-[llumination], R-[emediation], and P-[ractical Wisdom] transform. Transformational system(s) Systems that maintain their identity by constantly changing, based on their inherent ➔ negativity. See also ➔ absences, ➔ remediation. Transformational thinking  A mode of thinking in which coordination of thought forms (and thus perspectives) is the focus of attention. More broadly, thinking in terms of the ➔ Moments of Dialectic. Type of work  Different uses of reflective judgment that depend on different ➔ methods of information processing (in the sense of Jaques 1998a). U-D-R (movement) The movement, in thinking, from ➔ Understanding to ➔ Reason via ➔ Dialectic. Understanding  The second of four ➔ eras of cognitive development that is characterized by predominantly ➔ formal logic thinking. Understanding gradually

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adopts an increasing use of dialectical thought forms, thereby transmuting into ➔ Reason. The transition from Understanding to Reason defines the high drama of adult cognitive development. It was explored philosophically by Hegel in his critique of Kant. Value  A focus of attention inseparable from using dialectical thought forms; built into a dialectical stance toward reality, especially for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of organized wholes, the manifestation of developmental potential, and the avoidance of formalisms leading to conceptual triumphalism. Work  In Jaques’ definition (1994), the use of reflective ➔ judgment and ➔ discretion in the pursuit of goals within a limited time period (targeted completion time). Work band  In Jaques’ definition (1994), a differentiation of ➔ work capability in terms of an individual’s available cognitive resources. Work capability  In Jaques’ definition (1994), the ability to exercise reflective ➔ judgment and ➔ discretion in coping with obstacles to task completion. Work capacity  In CDF, another term for [applied] ➔ Capability. The term’s meaning comprises more than temperamental handicaps, namely a full psychoanalytic profile of an individual (in CDF provided by the ➔ Needs-Press Questionnaire). Work, cognitive theory of  A theory that sees work as a mental process requiring ➔ judgment and ➔ discretion; the theory analyzes ➔ work in terms of the mental operations required to bring tasks to completion as a function of the role into which they have been assigned. Work complexity  The notion that ➔ work, being a cognitive endeavor, is a stratified process comprising different levels of conceptual abstractions. At different ➔ strata, different levels of abstraction must be mastered (➔ size of role). Workplace, internal  The notion that ➔ work is internally constructed based on an individual’s ➔ Capability within a ➔ mental space.

Index

A Accommodation, 114–116, 139–140 Actuality, 118, 171 Assessment social-emotional, 55, 106, 171 Assimilation, 114–116, 139–140 Attention focus of, 25, 45, 52, 124, 175, 180, 188, 189

Constructivist perspective, 173 Content vs. structure, 68, 69, 173 Context thought forms, 67, 76, 125, 157, 160, 163 Coordination (of) thought forms, 46, 114, 118, 122, 126, 131, 134, 135, 152, 157, 183, 187, 188

B Bit, 171

D De-agentification, 88, 113 De-totalization, 83–85, 87 Developmental dimension, 155 level, 181, 186 placenta, 141, 175 potential, 78, 121, 153, 160, 172, 174, 177, 180, 189 risk, 116, 172 shift, 155 Dialectic model of, 138 of transformation, 88 Dialectical image, 91 listening, 47, 175, 186 thinking, 1, 3, 7, 9–12, 14, 16, 17, 19–21, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35–40, 42–45, 49, 53–58, 62, 63, 67, 71, 73, 76, 77, 89, 91, 94, 95, 97, 101–104, 106, 108, 109, 111–114, 117, 122–134, 136–144, 149–153, 155, 157, 162, 163, 165, 166, 172–175, 178–180, 182, 183, 185, 186

C Capability human, 177 Capacity, 172, 175, 180, 181 Center of gravity, 115, 144 Coaching cognitive, 56, 57, 125 Cognitive behavior graph, 172 development, 28, 38 load (of role), 172 profile, 172 Common ground, 119, 184 Common sense, 173 Complexity of mental processing, 184 Concept, 173 dialectical, 45, 68 Consciousness, 3, 28, 54, 104–107, 120, 156 Constructive-Developmental Framework (CDF), 173

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Laske, Advanced Systems-Level Problem Solving, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40332-3

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192 Dialectical (cont.) thought form, 11, 28, 44, 55–56, 63, 104, 106, 108, 116–118, 122, 125, 126, 128, 130, 134, 135, 139, 140, 142–144, 150, 152–154, 162, 172–177, 183–185, 189 Dialecticism, 175 Asian, 3, 73, 159 Dimension vertical, 107 Discrepancy Index, 123, 172 Discretion, 175 E Ego, 150, 175 Epistemology, 176 Era(s) of cognitive development, 176 H House Organizational, 177 Self, 177 Human Capability Hierarchy (HCH), 97, 171, 177, 181 I Ideal-type, 177 Illumination, 8, 21, 75, 76, 90, 104, 106, 133, 134, 144, 177 Index discrepancy, 123, 172 fluidity, 42, 43, 108, 125, 128–130, 138, 139, 144, 150–154, 172, 182, 183 systems thinking, 116, 154, 172, 174 Inquiring system, 3–10, 12, 72, 98, 151 Intentio obliqua, 178 recta, 178 Inter-rater reliability, 178 Interview, 85, 178, 183 Interviewee, 29, 30

Index L Leadership, 179 Logic formal, 179 M Management human resources, 177 Managerial accountability hierarchy (MAH), 171, 180, 181, 186 Meaning-making, 180 Mental highway(s), 180 Mental process, 180 Mental space, 180 Mind opener, 180 Move(s)-in-thought, 181 Mythos, 109–111, 181 N Negation, 96, 181 O Order of Mental Complexity, 181 Order of Mental Processing, 181 Organization, 61, 181, 182 Other, 4, 29, 33–34, 36–38, 112, 150, 177, 182 internalized, 182

J Judgment, 36, 38, 43, 137, 178 reflective, 36, 38, 43, 137

P Performance, 182 Position epistemic, 29–32, 36–38, 42, 43, 46, 48–50, 53, 109, 129, 134, 137, 139, 151, 154 Practical Wisdom, 7, 8, 15–20, 40, 57, 62, 63, 75, 88, 103, 140, 149–151, 153, 154, 161–164, 176, 181, 183, 186 Process thought form, 92–96 Process consultation, 183 Professional agenda, 183 Profile social-emotional, 54, 137

K Knowledge, 29, 31–34, 36, 38, 42, 46, 48–50, 53, 109, 178 Knowledge claim, 178

Q Quadrants of dialectic, 180 Wilber, 171

Index R Reality vs. actuality, 184 Reason, 7–10, 16, 17, 19–21, 36, 39, 40, 44, 46, 50, 58, 62, 66, 67, 75, 76, 85, 101, 103, 115, 140, 141, 150, 151, 176, 179, 181, 183, 184, 187–189 Reasoning dialectical, 16, 17, 57 Reductionism, 184 Reification, 184 Relationship constitutive, 84, 85, 87, 95, 120, 130, 135, 152, 153, 156, 158, 166, 175, 187 thought form, 92–96 Remediation, 8, 21, 75, 76, 88, 90, 104, 133, 184 Role, 182, 184, 185 accountability, 97 S School Frankfurt, xv, 61, 63, 139, 175, 176, 179 Kohlberg, 179 Score(s) cognitive, 172 Self vs. role, 29, 37, 41–47, 108, 150, 172, 177, 185 Sense-making, 105, 106, 149, 162, 176, 178, 179, 185, 188 Size (of) person, 19 role, 189 Skill(s) abstract mapping, 42, 44, 46 abstract systems, 46 Spectator view of knowledge, 52, 67, 76, 124, 136, 140, 187 Stage post-autonomous, 149, 161, 183 social-emotional, 13, 25–30, 32, 34–37, 54, 58, 63, 82, 106, 109, 138, 154–156, 164 Stage theory, 186 Stance vs. tools, 16, 20, 23, 24, 26, 46, 53, 54, 58, 76, 91, 103, 115, 117, 118, 120, 141, 143, 161, 162, 164, 186

193 Stratum (strata), 186 System(s) closed, 72 living, 119 transformational, 45, 52, 64, 74, 87–90, 107 Systems thinking index, 187 T Table of thought forms, 187 Talent management, 187 Thinking, 2, 3, 10–15, 25, 36, 38, 40–43, 46, 48–50, 53, 64, 68, 84, 103–104, 107–109, 114–116, 123–141, 151, 154, 155, 172, 174–176, 184, 187, 188 critical, 173 dialectical, 10–15, 36, 38, 42, 43, 46, 48–50, 53, 68, 103–104, 109, 123, 127–130, 134, 151, 154 transformational, 188 Time horizon, 188 Time span, 188 Type of work, 188 U U-D-R (movement), 188 Understanding, 7–10, 13, 14, 16, 19–21, 30, 35, 36, 38–40, 46, 48, 58, 61–63, 66, 75, 76, 85, 101, 103, 111, 115, 134, 140, 141, 150, 152, 176, 179, 183, 184, 188 V Value, 121, 189 W Work, 61, 151, 182, 189 band, 189 capability, 189 capacity, 189