Adivasis, Migrants and the State in India [1 ed.] 113856771X, 9781138567719

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Foreword • Virginius Xaxa
Preface
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction: migration, communities and conflicts over resources in India
1 Rights, dissent and conflict: migrants, state and citizenship in India
2 Creating a space for migrants: the idea and execution of the Dandakaranya Project in Adivasi region
3 Adivasis, Bengali migrants and the state: Explaining the differentiated marginality
4 Dispossession, discontent and conflict: interface between Adivasis and Bengali migrants
5 Competing communities: domination, marginalisation and political contestation
6 Adivasis, resource scarcity and the state: emergence of Naxalite politics
Conclusion
Appendix I: List of hill tribes of Koraput
Appendix II: Rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Umerkote and Malkangiri zones as of 31.10.1963
Appendix III: Card issued to Bengali migrants
References
Index

Citation preview

ADIVASIS, MIGRANTS AND THE STATE IN INDIA

This book looks at the contested relationship between Adivasis or the indigenous peoples, migrants and the state in India. It delves into the nature and dynamics of competition and resource conflicts between the Adivasis and the migrants. Drawing on the ground experiences of the Dandakaranya Project – when Bengali migrants from erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were rehabilitated in eastern and central India – the author traces the connection between resource scarcity and the emergence of Naxalite politics in the region in tandem with the key role played by the state. He critically examines the way in which conflicts between these groups emerged and interacted, were shaped and realised through acts and agencies of various kinds, as well as their socio-­economic, cultural and political implications. The book explores the contexts and reasons that have led to the dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation of Adivasis. Through rich empirical data, this book presents an in-­depth analysis of a contemporary crisis. It will be useful to scholars and researchers of political studies, South Asian politics, Conflict Studies political sociology, cultural studies, sociology and social anthropology. Jagannath Ambagudia is Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, and Chairperson, Unit for Research and Development, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Guwahati Campus, Assam, India. Previously, he taught at the Department of Political Science, Rajdhani College, University of Delhi; National Law School of India University, Bangalore, Karnataka; and ARSD College, University of Delhi. He has published several articles in peer-­reviewed journals and chapters in edited volumes on issues of Adivasi society, social exclusion and inclusion, development and deprivation, marginalisation, preferential treatment, distributive justice and community conflict.

‘This well-­researched and well-­written book addresses the seminal issue of rehabilitation of migrants that has confronted the Indian State since independence. Taking the example of the Dandakaranya Project, under which East Bengal migrants were rehabilitated in eastern India, it shows how this impacted on the Adivasis of the region, triggering competition and conflict between communities over access and control over scarce resources. The study provides an excellent exploration of the relationship between the state and migrants, how group conflicts emerge, their socio-­ economic and cultural repercussions, resulting in domination and political marginalisation of the Adivasis as also triggering Naxalite activity in Odisha. An excellent addition to Adivasi and migration studies, the book will provide a framework for future research on this continuing challenge.’ —Sudha Pai, Former National Fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi; Former Rector (Pro-­Vice Chancellor) and Professor, Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India ‘A much-­needed exposition of conflicts over resources between Bengali migrants and native Adivasis in central and eastern India, and the state’s role in further marginalising the Adivasis.’ —Alpa Shah, Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

ADIVASIS, MIGRANTS AND THE STATE IN INDIA

Jagannath Ambagudia

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Jagannath Ambagudia The right of Jagannath Ambagudia to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-­Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested for the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-­1-­138-­56771-­9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-­0-­429-­02619-­5 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

DEDICATED TO MY LATE PARENTS

CONTENTS

List of figuresix List of tablesx Foreword by Virginius Xaxaxii Prefacexvi Acknowledgementsxix List of abbreviationsxxi

Introduction: migration, communities and conflicts over resources in India

1

1 Rights, dissent and conflict: migrants, state and citizenship in India

16

2 Creating a space for migrants: the idea and execution of the Dandakaranya Project in Adivasi region

44

3 Adivasis, Bengali migrants and the state: Explaining the differentiated marginality

81

4 Dispossession, discontent and conflict: interface between Adivasis and Bengali migrants

106

5 Competing communities: domination, marginalisation and political contestation

157

vii

CONTENTS

6 Adivasis, resource scarcity and the state: emergence of Naxalite politics

196

Conclusion

225

Appendix I: List of hill tribes of Koraput239 Appendix II: Rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Umerkote and Malkangiri zones as of 31.10.1963243 Appendix III: Card issued to Bengali migrants245 References250 Index272

viii

FIGURES

3.1 Dandakaranya Project 4.1 The place where the Adivasis of Jamdara village take major decisions about their future course of actions 4.2 Shahid Sthambh built-­in memory of the Adivasis who lost their lives in Adivasi-Bengali migrants conflict in 2001 5.1 Ram Temple, Mariwada village, Malkangiri district, constructed with the financial help from an MLA 5.2 Durga Temple, Mariwada village, Malkangiri district, constructed with the financial help from an MLA

ix

83 142 143 175 176

TABLES

1.1 Migrants and asylum seekers in India 1.2 Month-­wise break-­up of migrant influx to West Bengal between 1953 and 1956 1.3 State-­wise break-­up of migrants (in thousands) 1.4 Trends of migrant influx in 1971 (in thousands) 1.5 Bangladeshi migrants in India as of 1 December 1971 2.1 ST and SC population of Odisha, 1951–­2011 2.2 Scheduled areas of Odisha 2.3 Number of ST and SC communities in Odisha 2.4 Literacy rate of Odisha, 1961–­2011 2.5 District-­wise ST population in descending order, Odisha, 2011 2.6 ST population of Koraput district, 1961–­91 (in %) 2.7 Parliamentary seat distribution among the social groups in Orissa, 1952–­67 2.8 Assembly seat distribution among the social groups in Orissa, 1952–­67 3.1 Namasudra population of Koraput district, 1961–­91 3.2 District-­wise Namasudra population of Odisha, 1961–­2001 3.3 Zone-­wise break-­up of the migrant exodus, 1965–­78 3.4 Zone-­wise break-­up of exodus from February to June 1978 4.1 Human development index for 30 districts of Odisha 4.2 Block-­wise population of Malkangiri district (2011 census) 4.3 Block-­wise population of Nabarangpur district (2011 census) 4.4 Block-­wise land utilisation pattern in Malkangiri district, 2010–­11 (area in hectares) x

24 25 25 26 27 58 59 60 61 62 66 72 73 86 87 89 89 109 110 111 112

T ables

4.5 Block-­wise land utilisation pattern in Nabarangpur district, 2010–­11 (area in hectares) 113 4.6 Source-­wise irrigation potential created in different blocks of Malkangiri district in 2010–­11 (area in hectares)115 4.7 Source-­wise irrigation potential created in different blocks of Nabarangpur district in 2010–­11 (area in hectares)116 4.8 Representation of Adivasis (Koyas) and Bengali migrants in government services in Malkangiri district in February 2001 129 4.9 Information sheet on Mouza: Jamdara under Raighar police station 141 4.10 Number of the Bangladeshi infiltrators in Umerkote tahasil149 4.11 Information of Bengali migrants purchased land/ encroached land in Umerkote tahasil other than DNK villages151 5.1 MLAs of Malkangiri and Chitrakonda constituencies, 1952–­2014 161 5.2 MLAs of Umerkote, Kodinga/Jharigam, Nabarangapur and Dabugam constituencies, 1952–­2014 163 5.3 Turnout of voters in Malkangiri and Chitrakonda assembly constituencies, 1974–­2014 (in %) 180 6.1 Number of landholdings among the STs, 1990–­91 to 198 2010–­11 (in thousands) 6.2 Poverty ratio in rural and urban India, 1983–­84, 1993–­94, 1999–­2000, 2004–­05, 2009–­10 and 2011–­12 199

xi

FOREWORD

Historically and traditionally, Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes, indigenous people) have been invariably associated with a distinct territory of their own where their lives were inseparable from land, forest and other resources. They considered their territory as their own, had complete autonomy over it and enjoyed their economic, political and cultural life. No doubt, they were socially, educationally and economically at a relatively less advanced stage of development and, hence, had a lower standard of life as compared to other societies. However, they did not suffer from deprivations, exploitations and domination as is the case in modern time. There was no question of a few deaths due to starvation and deprivation; if at all there were deaths due to calamities, people as a whole suffered. This has also been the case in Dandakaranya region of India with which this book is engaged. The Adivasis’ encounter with the outside world that had an adverse impact on them can be traced back to the advent of colonial rule. Adivasis were subjected to British rule through war, conquest and annexation. The consolidation of the colonial rule in Adivasi territory led to far-­reaching consequences. To begin with, they were brought under laws, rules and regulations that were alien to them. The extension of roads and railways were other features that the British introduced in Adivasi areas. This opened the floodgate for the movement of population, especially traders, merchants and land-­hungry peasants from outside into the Adivasi areas. These developments had an impact on Adivasis in two ways. Prior to colonisation, the Adivasis were the lords of the forests and land. Colonial administration snatched away their rights over forests that they used and vested upon itself. This had a far-­ reaching ramification over their economic, social and cultural lives. It is worthwhile to note that in Adivasi society, kinship, economy, polity, social and cultural spheres are intertwined and fused with each other, they are not autonomous. xii

F oreword

With the colonial state vesting upon itself the absolute rights over forests, unrestricted access that the Adivasis had over forests came to a halt. This had an impact on their material and social well-­being, leading to deterioration of the quality of life they lived. Adivasis made their livings either on hunting and food gathering or shifting cultivation or settled agriculture. Those who were dependent on hunting and food gathering and shifting cultivation were heavily dependent on forests. Even those who made their living as settled agriculturalists were dependent on forests for a large part of their food intake. More often than not, Adivasis made their living by combining one or more modes of livelihood. The coming of the outsiders led to the massive alienation of land from Adivasis to non-­Adivasis through such ways and means as fraud, deceit, forgery, indebtedness and so on. In this massive transfer of land, they were aided by laws, rules and regulations that the colonial administration had introduced. Adivasis had no tradition of reading, writing and record keeping; hence, under the legal and administrative arrangements, they had no proofs and evidence to make their claims. In short, Adivasi relationship to land and forests under the new regime came to be drastically altered, leading to restlessness in the Adivasi society. The landholding they held had substantially got truncated, and a large chunk of them were transformed into landless labourers, including bondedness and tenants in their own land. The result was a series of revolts and rebellions that they waged in different parts of the country and different phases in history. The centres of those revolts and rebellions were regions that are known today as Adivasi areas in Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat, among others. Interestingly, these are some of the regions which are the hotbed of extremist politics in India today. In fact, one of the chapters that the book concerns with is precisely the Naxalite politics in Adivasi areas of Odisha. Interestingly, these regions of Odisha witnessed a large number of revolts during the colonial period. Some of the leading revolts have been the Kond revolt of 1850, the Koya revolt of 1879 and 1880 and the Saura revolt of 1890 and 1940, among others. Adivasi revolts led the British to think of a new way of dealing with Adivasi population in British India. Most of these regions were the frontiers which were administratively differently demarcated and were known by different names such as non-­regulation areas, scheduled districts, excluded and partially excluded areas, Adivasi areas and so on. These areas, after a series of revolts, saw a different kind of administration which primarily aimed at protecting the Adivasis from the xiii

F oreword

outsiders and provide a space for governance in terms of their own traditional systems and practices. Notwithstanding such protective measures, Adivasis have constantly lost land and resources to outsiders. This continued as the market penetrated deeply into the Adivasi areas and the movement of the population from the plains to the Adivasi regions kept on moving. There were no restrictions in the population movement in Adivasi areas of Central India in the form of inner-­line regulation as is the case with many parts of Northeast India. It was this administrative arrangement that has largely enabled the Adivasis/ tribes from Northeast India to retain control over land, forests and other resources. On the eve of independence, two issues came to the fore in the Adivasi areas – the relative social and economic backwardness as evident in the standard of their social and economic lives and the loss of land and thereby movement of Adivasis from their own habitat/territory to other places near and far for work as labourers. It is in this backdrop that the national leadership tried to address problems of the Adivasis in post-­independent India. To address the issues of social and economic backwardness, the post-­independent Indian state introduced affirmative action programmes which ranged from reservation in politics, education and state employment to social and economic development through various kinds of development programmes. Alongside these provisions, there was also a provision of protection granted through special administration and control provided in areas generally known as the fifth schedule areas. The provision of administration and control aimed to protect Adivasis from land alienation from Adivasis to non-­Adivasis as well as exploitation of the Adivasi population through rules and regulations of the executive authority (governor) of the state. Notwithstanding such provisions, there has been inaction or violation of such constitutional provisions in the fifth schedule areas of different states. The initiative of the state to settle the displaced population of East Pakistan into scheduled areas of undivided Koraput district in Odisha was in a way violation of the protective framework of the Indian Constitution. The settlement was not in the interest of Adivasis of the region who as we know from colonial time onwards were increasingly getting marginalised and dispossessed. The settlement, therefore, was not in the spirit of good governance in the scheduled areas, which became evident as the years went by following the settlement of migrants in the area. There was large-­scale alienation of Adivasi land to non-­Adivasi settlers through various means and mechanisms. This paved the way for the overt and covert conflicts between communities xiv

F oreword

in the region. The conflicts are evident in various spheres of relationship between Adivasis and Bengali migrants. Some of the critical spheres of conflicts are the realms of politics and economy. Despite constitutional protection, Adivasis have not been able to take advantages of various facilities earmarked for their development; rather, facilities have been misappropriated by the migrants. This is not only reflected in taking advantage of developmental schemes but also evident in the realm of reservation such as the state employment and politics. Thus, the inability of Adivasis to compete with migrants has pushed them from everyday politics to the politics of movement and resistance. The book Adivasis, Migrants and the State in India looks into these pervasive issues that Adivasis in different parts of the country in general and Odisha in particular have been experiencing. Despite a large number of studies on Adivasis including movement and resistance, the study of such movement has not been systematically and empirically explored keeping in focus a concrete social reality. The book in reference precisely does this. Besides, providing an empirical account of various issues and dimensions of conflict between Adivasis and migrants, the book also raises larger theoretical issues of citizenship, exclusion and social justice. It blends micro and macro issues as well as facts and theories. The book enriches issues of engagement on the larger Adivasi question in India. Virginius Xaxa Professor of Eminence, Tezpur University, Assam, India

xv

PREFACE

In a pluralist country, different social groups have a distinct language, culture and tradition. These distinctiveness have become a source of power and privilege for some and a site of discrimination and marginalisation for others, thereby compelling them to a situation of powerlessness and dispossession. The distinct characteristics of Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes, indigenous people) and Dalits (Scheduled Castes, former untouchables) have become the ground for political marginalisation, economic deprivation and socio-­cultural discrimination in India. Dalits and Adivasis do not, however, face discrimination and marginalisation for the same reason. The institution of caste becomes the platform of discrimination for Dalits, assigned on the basis of ascribed identity unequal and hierarchical economic and civil rights. For the Adivasis, it is not the institution of caste, but they have been discriminated on the basis of their ethnic identity. The historical account of the Adivasi society confirms that discrimination and marginalisation as prevalent in modern society were alien to them. This is primarily because Adivasis had their own social, cultural, economic and political systems based on communitarian and egalitarian values. There was evident absence of discrimination in the Adivasi society which was based on freedom, independence, autonomy and self-­governance. The Adivasi communities were able to use, control and manage resources that were critical to their society. They did not have the provision of individual property and believed in collective ownership of resources which essentially distinguished the Adivasi society from the modern society based on the notion of private property, competition and contestation to control and access to resources. Due to the presence of stiff competition, the availability of resources became scarce over the period and provided the ground for the acceleration of further competition. As a consequence, competition, contestation and conflicts became integral xvi

P reface

parts of not only the non-­Adivasi society but also part of Adivasi society. Although the Adivasi regions have abundant natural resources, with time, they are experiencing more and more competition over resources. Such competitions are visible due to the growing role of the state, MNCs and the non-­Adivasis in appropriating resources of the Adivasi regions. The state deprived Adivasis’ access to resources in the name of revenue generation and development. The state declared certain areas as ‘reserved and protected forests’ and invariably restricted the access of Adivasis to forest resources which have been significant means of their livelihood. The state also facilitated MNCs for extracting resources from Adivasi areas, especially since the 1990s, which had a devastated impact on Adivasis. The state, both colonial and post-­colonial, has also opened the window for the movement of the population to Adivasi areas, which has invariably exerted pressure on scarcely available resources. So, the state, MNCs and non-­Adivasis have contributed to the scarcity of resources in the resource-­rich Adivasi region. Over the period, the state has remained involved in the entire process of distribution of resources and privileges. It changes the equation of distribution of resources, corresponding to the needs and demands of the larger society possibly by compromising with the communities such as the Adivasis, which are numerically insignificant to exert any concrete pressure. The numerical strength assumes a critical role in the whole process of influencing resource distribution in democratic politics. Due to their numerical insignificance, the Adivasis have been relegated to a position of powerlessness, which has greater ramifications over their dispossessed, deprived and marginalised situations. Such position of the Adivasis has enabled the state to take unilateral decision to rehabilitate the Bengali migrants from East Pakistan in the Adivasi region of eastern India. The highly educated and powerful non-­Adivasis of the coastal region of Odisha had a significant influence over the state’s decision-­making process in relation to the rehabilitation of the migrants. Due to the potential pressure on available resources and civic facilities, they did not allow the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in the coastal region, and eventually, the Adivasi-­ dominated area of South Odisha was chosen for rehabilitation in the late 1950s, albeit without consulting and taking the Adivasis into confidence. The rehabilitation of migrants into the Adivasi region further accentuated competition to gain control over and access to resources and contributed to their scarcity in availability. Different magnitudes and xvii

P reface

degrees of competition between communities are entangled with distribution of resources corresponding to their marginalisation, dispossession and deprivation. Scarcity of resources creates marginal communities. Marginality of Adivasi community, already confronting resource scarcity, is further compounded when migrants are thrust on the same area/region. Consequently, communities experience cohesion, competition, contradictions and conflicts in society. Within this backdrop, the book explores the nature and dynamics of competition and conflict over resources between the autochthonous communities (Adivasis) and Bengali migrants in eastern India. It deals with the patterns of resource distribution between communities and the role of resources in engendering conflicts between communities. It looks at the processes of the state’s negligence to its own citizens and its preference of the migrants over the native communities by granting similar rights. It examines the way in which migrants establish social, economic, cultural and political dominance over the native Adivasis. It addresses questions of why, where and when the resettlement of outsiders leads to conflicts with the native communities. It critically looks at the role of the state and Naxalites in Adivasi development and the emergence of Naxalite politics. This research is empirically grounded focusing on the multidimensional drivers of community conflict.

xviii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would not have been possible without overwhelming support, guidance, encouragement and valuable comments and criticisms from numerous individuals. The initial idea of the book emerged during the course of my Ph. D. However, it culminates ideas generated during my research on Adivasis for the last 15 years and interactions with a number of individuals over the period. It may not be possible for me to acknowledge each one of them individually, and most of the names remained silent in pages of this work, there are some individuals whose contributions immensely shaped my academic life. I take this opportunity to thank Prof. Pralay Kanungo for introducing me to the areas of community conflicts and guiding every stage of this work. The credit for much of my initial intellectual ideas goes to Prof. Sudha Pai, who helped to stimulate and situate my ideas on researching Adivasis and offered critical comments and suggestions on this book. I am extremely grateful to Prof. Virginius Xaxa for his encouragement and cooperation, which were not only confined to my student life but also extended during each and every academic endeavour. My academic interactions with Prof. Kanungo, Prof. Pai and Prof. Xaxa enabled me to learn how one should defend his position without being overtly polemical. Prof. Xaxa’s work on Adivasis influenced and enabled me to explore further in this area of research. Dr. Alpa Shah, Prof. Gurpreet Mahajan, Prof. Praveen Jha and late Prof. Biswamoy Pati helped me in various ways. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions to improve the readability of the book. Colleagues and friends of Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Guwahati Campus; Rajdhani College, University of Delhi; National Law School of India University, Bangalore and ARSD College, University of Delhi, helped me several ways during my stint in these institutions, through discussions, comments and criticisms on various chapters. I am also thankful to my post-­graduate students at the xix

A cknowledgements

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, and M. Phil. scholars of the Thematic Course, ‘Democracy, Rights and Tribes in India’, at TISS, Guwahati Campus, for raising questions on larger Adivasi issues and conflicts that enabled me to rethink on some of the ideas developed in the book. My profound gratitude is to the respondents of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha. The library staff of TISS, Guwahati Campus; Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; National Law School of India University, Bangalore; Central Research Library and Ratan Tata Library, University of Delhi; Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi; and Library of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Research and Training Institute, Bhubaneswar were extremely helpful. I would also like to thank Mr. Niranjan Behera, then Tahasildar and other staff of Tahasil office, Umerkote for their documentary support and assistance during the field study in Nabarangpur district. My deepest gratitude to my family members for their continuous support and encouragement. Special thanks to my cousin Rama Chandra Khilla, who was always there for me during the entire period of fieldwork. My wife, Sasmita, painstakingly read several drafts and was an excellent source of both criticism and encouragement. Without her kindness, love, patience and untiring support, this work would not have seen the light of the day. I would also like to thank Madhuparna Banerjee for copy editing the initial draft of the manuscript. Finally, many thanks to Antara Ray Chaudhury and the team of Routledge for their interest and support in bringing out this book. June 2018

xx

ABBREVIATIONS

AAPSU AASU AGMS AITUC AMPO AOBSZC

All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union All Assam Students’ Union Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha All India Trade Union Congress Andhra Madhya Pradesh Orissa (Odisha) Andhra-­Orissa (Odisha) Border Special Zonal Committee ASI Assistant Sub-­Inspector BDO Block Development Officer BJD Biju Janata Dal BJP Bharatiya Janata Party BPL Below Poverty Line CITU Centre for Indian Trade Union Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh CMAS CPI Communist Party of India CPI (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M-­L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-­Leninist) CRPF Central Reserve Police Force CSI Circle Sub-­Inspector CT Census Town DDA Dandakaranya Development Authority DLG Dalai Lama Government DNK Dandakaranya DRDA District Rural Development Agency DVF District Voluntary Force ECI Election Commission of India ENDLF Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front FIR First Information Report GDI Gender Development Index xxi

A bbreviations

GOAP GOI GOO GP GP* HDI HMS ICAs ICCPR IES IIC ILO IMDT INC INC (I) INTUC ITDA JD JNP JRY LIC LPG LTTE MHA MIL MLA MNCs MGNREGA MoU MPV MTA MV NAC NCST NDA NDC NEFA NGO NHRC NRC NSCN

Government of Arunachal Pradesh Government of India Government of Odisha/Orissa All India Gana Parishad Ganatantra Parishad Human Development Index Hindu Mazdoor Sangh Imperatively Coordinated Associations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Indian Education Service Inspector In-­Charge International Labour Organization Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal Act Indian National Congress Indian National Congress (Indira) Indian National Trade Union Congress Integrated Tribal Development Agency Janata Dal Janata Party Jawahar Rojagar Yojana Life Insurance Corporation Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Ministry of Home Affairs Mother Indian Language Member of Legislative Assembly Multinational Corporations Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act Memorandum of Understanding Malkangiri Potteru Village Ministry of Tribal Affairs Malkangiri Village Notified Area Council National Commission for Scheduled Tribes National Democratic Alliance National Development Council North East Frontier Agency Non-­Governmental Organisation National Human Rights Commission National Register of Citizens National Socialist Council of Nagaland xxii

A bbreviations

OAJC OAS OG OSATIP OSCC OUAT PDS PESA PMRD PMSY PRIs PVTGs PWG RGI RIs RoR SC SOG ST UN UNESCO UNHCR UNWGIP UPA URV USCRI UTC UV VKA VKP VLWs WGIP

Orissa (Odisha)–­Andhra Joint Committee Odisha Administrative Service Out Growth Orissa Scheduled Area Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulation Odisha State Co-­ordination Committee Odisha University of Agriculture and Technology Public Distribution System Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Prime Minister’s Rural Development Pradhan Mantri Sadak Yojana Panchayati Raj Institutions Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups People’s War Group Registrar General of India Revenue Inspectors Record of Right Scheduled Caste Special Operation Group Scheduled Tribe United Nations United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Population United Progressive Alliance Umerkote Raigharh Village US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Utkal Congress Umerkote Village Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad Village-­Level Workers Working Group on Indigenous Population

xxiii

INTRODUCTION Migration, communities and conflicts over resources in India

The presence of differences marks contemporary societies. In a multicultural society, different communities have attained various levels of social, economic, cultural and political developments. The recognition of differences and various stages of developments call for the redistribution of natural resources and state-­sponsored entitlements and privileges. This, in turn, has created a regime of competing communities by arguing that their group is more eligible for safeguard or deserving greater share in resources, entitlement and privileges than other communities. These competitions are widely driven by their respective interests and aversions, which generate a state of perpetual restlessness and contestation concerning resource distribution corresponding to their marginalisation, dispossession and deprivation. The gathering experiences over the period suggest that conflict is a ubiquitous and inherent part of human society. There is no society without some conflicts (Coser 1956, 1957; Dahrendorf 1958, 1959). Contemporary social sciences are grappled with various pertinent issues, such as migration, communities, conflicts and so on. These issues are drawing multidisciplinary perspectives by appearing in course curricula of various disciplines in institutions of higher learning across the globe. Scholars of social sciences, such as history, economics, sociology, anthropology, political science and so on emphasise their perspectives in studying these issues. They have been consistently engaged in the renewed debates on various themes of social science research, and they are growingly preoccupied with questions of migration, communities, conflicts and so on.

Migration The study of ‘migration’ in political science is of recent origin. The need for such study was due to the negligence of political dimension 1

I ntroduction

of migration by multidisciplinary studies, more specifically by sociologists, anthropologists and historians.1 The common understanding of migration is the process of population movement across state boundaries and thereby leading to the change of their usual place of inhabitation. Such movement takes place because of social, economic, political and religious reasons and involves a permanent or temporary change of usual residence. International Organization for Migration (2008: 496) defines migration as ‘a process by which non-­nationals move into a country for the process of settlement’. Generally, migration takes place from rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to urban and urban to rural. Spencer (2011: 6) pointed out that migration also occurs at two levels – national level, that is, population movement within a country, and international level, that is, population movement across international borders. Benhabib (2004: 136) emphasised that various causes and conditions of departure (emigration); actual first entry into a foreign country; civil, economic and cultural disruption for a shorter or longer period due to visitation, business and study; residency of a significant duration; and access to political citizenship or belonging to a political community are integral parts of migration. The study of migration raises some pertinent questions. Why do people migrate? What encourages or enables a particular kind of migration to continue? What are the effects of migration on the areas, communities or societies of destination? Factors motivating migration are complex and intertwined. They are (1) anti-­colonial wars and self-­determination movement; (2) international conflicts; (3) revolutions, coups and regime change; (4) ethnic, religious and communal conflicts; (5) creating and restructuring of state boundaries; and (6) population transfers. Muni and Baral (1996: 9–­24) portray three broad categories of population movement in South Asia. First, the breakdown of colonial rule and the rationalisation of some of the colonial legacies facilitated population movement (e. g. , the partition of India and Pakistan). Second, the consolidation of nation-­building process not only precipitated political, ethnic or religious conflicts but created such economic and environmental conditions that forced people to migrate within or outside their respective countries (Zolberg 1983: 24–­38; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989: 232–­45). For example, the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 facilitated the population flow from the erstwhile East Pakistan to India. Third, the developments outside the region facilitate the flow of extra-­regional migrants. The case of Tibetan and Tamil migrants can be demonstrated. The persistent Tibetan struggle for autonomy and the ruthless Chinese military action to suppress such struggles has 2

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facilitated migrant flows in South Asia. In Sri Lanka, the emergence of ethnic clashes and civil war in the 1980s generated Tamil migrants and compelled them to move to neighbouring countries (Chapter 4). Weiner (1996: 9–­10) emphasised that migration takes place due to inter-state wars, ethnic conflicts, non-­ethnic civil strife and flights from repressive, authoritarian and revolutionary regimes. The Coordinating Council for Human Rights in Bangladesh identifies six integrated reasons that are primarily responsible for the flow of Bangladeshis into India (Roy 2001: 180–­4): a strong tendency among the Hindu and Buddhist minorities to leave that country for India since 1947, impoverished economic conditions, commodification of women belonging to minority communities, removal of secularism from the original Bangladeshi Constitution of 1972, religious discrimination and socio-­political developments of the region. Village-­level studies concerning Bangladeshi migrants depict that migration does not always take place due to political reasons and religious violence, rather Bangladeshis are coming to India in search of better income and employment opportunities. Due to these reasons, a large number of migrants moved to the territory of India.

Community The concept of community is derived from the Latin words com (with, together) and unus (the number one or singularity). Thus, the idea of community is related to the search for belongingness. Community has a contemporary resonance in the current social and political situations, opening the way for searching for roots, identities and aspirations for belonging. Gusfield (1975: xvi) underlines that community has geographical and relational dimensions. The geographical dimension focuses on the areas or geographical places from which the migrants have come and settled. The relational dimension emphasises the construction of community on the basis of their feelings of bondedness and developing inter-­/intra-­community relationship. So, communities are key ingredients in the complex matrix of social organisation and individual’s self-­identity that characterises modern life (Little 2002: 7). Community can also be understood from a particular way of organising social relationships, a general (and desirable) quality of sociability, and mutual regard that summons to undertake collective endeavours (Somerville 2011: 1–­3). The social relationship is based on the notion that people relate to one another through cooperative interaction, involving a form of mutual trust, affinity and obligation. The quality of sociability is associated with the idea of mutual recognition 3

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of each community that exists. This reflects the ability to establish a sustained relationship based on mutual recognition and toleration of differences. The mutual regard emphasises common concerns of the community that reflect their collective endeavour to take actions. Communities2 are constructed on the basis of social, economic, cultural and political identities. The idea of community is based on the principle of inclusion and exclusion. It develops certain rules and regulations through which some individuals are excluded if they do not meet the required criteria. On the contrary, those individuals who possess the prescribed criteria are included in the boundary of a community. It is, however, tough to determine where a particular community begins and ends due to the multiplicity of communities and their complex and confused nature. The discussion on community evokes consideration of identity, commitment, processes of interaction such as communication and the handling of conflict and tensions between the individual and the larger world (Scherer 2001: 3). In short, community is experienced, felt and imagined as a collective entity or project.

Dynamics of conflict The study of conflict has become more prominent in social sciences because contemporary societies consisting of various communities of multiple interests are experiencing more and more competitions and crisis due to, among other things, a scarcity of resources. Besides academic interests, Mason and Muller (2007: 225) offer three reasons to study conflicts: first, we are negatively affected by them; second, we are, to some extent, co-­responsible for them through our consumption patterns; and third, humanitarian ‘solidarity’ motives may also play a role. Nature and contents of conflicts and the responses given to the event apparently form the element of community conflicts. Regardless of specific reasons for conflict, Scherer (2001) contends that certain inherent features of communities such as the tension between person and collectivity, between one community and another and between the personal development of the member and group advantage in terms of commitment, personal integration and emotional expression indicate that conflict is inevitable. There are certain guiding elements of conflict studies. Conflict studies focus on historical backdrop, context, issues, actors and timeline involved in the emergence of different conflicts. Conflict theories aim to provide systematic and scientific understandings of the nature and dynamics of conflict. Central concerns of conflict theories revolve around an unequal distribution of resources and power. Coser focuses 4

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on functions of conflict and contends that conflicts are ever present in human relations. He argues that conflict has dual roles of integration and disintegration of social structure (Coser 1956, 1957). Marxian theory of conflict looks at the class character of social conflict. It argues that the communities’ deprivation based on class dimension leads to the emergence of class consciousness and produces conflict and social change (Marx and Engels 1848). Dahrendorf (1958, 1959) argues that conflicts are the product of the authority structure. They occur in a society characterised by ICAs. ICAs are the structural determinants of conflict groups based on unequal authority and power relationships. For Dahrendorf, it is not the class dimension but, rather, the inequitable distribution of authority and power that leads to the emergence of quasi-­group, interest group and conflict groups and thereby engendering conflicts in the society. Within the resource relationship paradigm, communities engaged in conflicts due to their opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values and goals. The process of conflict begins with the construction of ideas that one community has affected or is about to affect the resource and power relationships negatively. Conflicts between communities occur in relation to social, economic, cultural and political resources. Competition to control over or access to these resources between various communities leads to the emergence of conflict in contemporary societies. Comparison of different groups in social, economic, cultural and political spheres would generate the feeling of ‘relative deprivation’ (Gurr 1970: 24)3 and thereby engender conflicts (Horowitz 1985: 141–­84). The issue of resources assumes critical dimension in a society where different communities have attained various stages of social, economic, cultural and political developments, and thereby, the gap between them continues to widen. In addition, outcomes of competitions to gain control over resources create inequalities between groups, and thereby generate conflicts. Weiner (1978: 7), however, argues that inequalities are necessary but not sufficient conditions for community conflicts, there must also be competition for attaining access to economic wealth, political power or social status. Conflicts and contentions are the hallmarks of human society. There are many sources of conflict in all democratic polities which are characterised by profound economic disparity, cultural diversity, subordination, marginalisation, deprivation and social exclusion. Plural societies enable the construction of community identities based on the notion of ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ and thereby sharpen their differences. Conflicts take place due to the diverse nature of societies and are the result of a failure of the modern welfare state to provide equal 5

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opportunities to all communities. The presence of weak state institutions can also be the source of community conflicts (David and Gagne 2006–­2007: 12–­16; Jacoby 2008: 142). Communities everywhere in the world compete for limited resources to ensure their livelihood and dignified lives. Such competition leads to the emergence of disagreements and conflicts concerning use and access to scarce resources. Different communities make competing claims concerning who should manage, use and benefit from scarce resources (Desloges 1997: 34). Community conflicts over resources are the result of disagreements and disputes over access to, control over and use of natural resources (Sidaway 2005). Disagreements and conflicts arise when the claimants to a particular resource, privilege and entitlement are many. Communities have also developed different cultural values, social norms and sanctions in reference to natural resources, and any attempt to disrupt such a relationship would invoke violent conflicts. Conflicts over resources also emerge due to political instability and economic uncertainty, which have become the recurring phenomena in the contemporary period. Such situation has wider implications on policy agenda related to resources. As a result, conflicts of interest have arisen in many contexts relating to the control and use of natural resources. Although the intensity and frequency differ from conflict to conflict corresponding to demands on scarce resources, conflicts are not only unavoidable but are also natural. Resource conflict raises some of the important questions: what are resource conflicts? Why do conflicts arise? Who are the different actors? Conflicts occur at various levels and involve multiple actors. Conflicts do not just occur between communities. They also occur within them. We must acknowledge that there is no single type of resource conflict. Resource conflicts refute that there is a single factor that is always responsible for conflicts. We can also rule out the possibility of the involvement of same actors in various types of conflicts. However, resource conflicts have different dynamics, multiple reasons and different actors that they influence over the period. These dynamics are the product of nature of relationships that communities have established with resources vis-­à-­vis other communities. Resource scarcity has various dimensions such as physical scarcity, geopolitical scarcity, socio-­economic scarcity and environmental scarcity (Libiszewski 1992–­1995: 5–­6). Physical scarcity indicates the limited availability of resources. Unequal distribution of resources on the surface is associated with geopolitical scarcity. It leads to the dependence of some countries on others. Socio-­economic scarcity underlines that there is an unequal distribution of power and property rights to 6

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provide natural resources between or within societies. The environmental degradation causes environmental scarcity. The irrational, unscientific and unsustainable use and management of resources would lead to environmental degradation. The idea of conflict being driven by resource scarcities is strongly associated with the environmental scarcity school advocated by Homer-­Dixon. He contends that environmental degradation leads to three types of conflicts, such as simple scarcity conflicts, group identity conflicts, and relative deprivation conflicts (Homer-­Dixon 1991: 104–­16; Homer-­Dixon 1999: 137–­47). Simple scarcity conflicts occur between states over scarce renewable resources that are essential for human survival. Group identity conflicts occur in multicultural societies or between states as a result of environmentally caused migration,4 where different ethnic or cultural groups are provoked by circumstances of deprivation and stress. Relative deprivation conflicts arise in polarised societies with weakly legitimated political institutions. They emerge in situations where social discontents are manufactured within a society due to economic impacts of environmental degradation. There are four broad categories of conflict over resources: centre – regional conflict, state versus community, company versus community and community versus community. The first three types of conflicts fall largely outside the scope of the present enquiry, and the book is confined only to inter-­community conflicts. Community conflicts over resources can be either direct or indirect. Direct conflicts occur in a face-­to-­face competition to control over resources. On the contrary, indirect conflicts take place in a situation where different levels of resource extractions would postulate various groups in social, economic, cultural and political environments. Community conflicts can also emerge due to the process of international migration, which not only exerts pressure on the national governments to redesign their immigration policy but also affects the pattern of distribution of resources between autochthonous communities and migrants. The natives perceive that when in competition, gains for migrants do mean losses for the natives including loss of local occupations (Weiner 1978). The rehabilitation of migrants also changes the demographic picture resulting from the ethnic composition of the region and has considerable implications when political rights are distributed on the basis of the ‘politics of number’. The rehabilitation of migrants exerts pressure on existing civic facilities and demands a share in social, economic and political resources and cultural space. The arrival of unwelcome competitors can lead to social, economic, cultural and political instabilities and engender 7

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conflict between the natives and migrants. Community conflicts, thus, emerge due to incompatibilities of claims to economic wealth, political power, social status and cultural values. Within this backdrop, given the scarce natural resources and limited state-­sponsored entitlements and benefits, it is inevitable that conflicts will emerge among different communities.

Community conflicts over resources in India The presence of natural resources has never been the source of community conflicts and they do not make conflict inevitable (Bannon and Collier 2003). However, the competition between communities to control over or access to these resources unleashes conflicts. Bannon and Collier (2003) explore the link between natural resources and conflicts at the global level. In recent times, conflicts over resources have been conspicuous in South Asia, in general, and India, in particular. Conflicts over resources are inevitable parts of Indian society. In India, various states such as Odisha,5 Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, Jharkhand, Kerala and so on are increasingly experiencing community conflicts over resources in the contemporary period. Guha and Gadgil (1989) provide a historical account of changing relationship among the state, forest resources and communities in colonial India. The increasing control over forest resources by the state provided the essential ground for the emergence of conflict during the colonial period. Adivasis wanted to use or access forest resources in their own way corresponding to their requirements. Their aspiration was, however, severely restricted due to the commercial values of resources, which the colonial state was contemplating for so long and thereby engendering conflicts. Baviskar (1995) examines the nature and dynamics of Adivasi conflicts over resources because of the implementation of development projects in Narmada Valley, which has not only displaced the Adivasis but has also denied them access to land and forest resources. Enarth et al. (2016) explore the dynamics of cooperation and conflicts in using and managing land, water, forest and fish resources within the broader framework of natural resources and poverty reduction in Indian states of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. Northeast India has succumbed to community conflicts over resources at regular intervals. The Adivasis and Bengali migrants of Tripura have established conflictual relations over resources (Debbarma 2009; Nongkynrih 2009: 35). The settlement of the latter has considerably changed the demographic profile of the Adivasi area, which is not only responsible for the considerable decline of the Adivasi 8

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population from 36.85 percent in 1951 to 28.44 percent in 19816 but also for the accentuation of the process of Adivasi land alienation. For instance, about 60 percent of Adivasi lands were alienated, sold in distress conditions as a consequence of unequal economic competition with Bengali migrants in some parts of South Tripura (Bhaumik 2009: 298). Ethnic and land conflicts between Naga and Kuki communities have become regular phenomena in Nagaland (Haokip 2013). The Adivasis of Meghalaya have been struggling to protect and promote their rights over resources (Nongkynrih 2009: 33–­7). In Assam, conflicts have occurred between the native communities and illegal Bangladeshi migrants to keep the former’s language and cultural identities intact and establish their control over resources (Weiner, Katzenstein and Rao 1981; Baruah 1999; Brass 2010; Jayal 2013). Arunachal Pradesh is experiencing conflicts over resources between the Adivasis and Chakma and Hajong migrants (Singh 2010, 2016). The Adivasis of Kerala have formed their own organisation, known as the AGMS, to protect and promote their rights (Steur 2014). The AGMS aims to fight for the restoration of Adivasi rights over land and forest resources. The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh are protesting against MNCs, which are indiscriminately involved in extracting resources of the Adivasi region. Adivasis of Jharkhand are engaged in a conflictual relationship with non-­Adivasis who have been increasingly involved in the commercialisation of forest and mining resources of the Adivasi area and thereby pushing them into a situation of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation. Adivasis of Madhya Pradesh have also launched stiff protests against land alienation by non-­Adivasis (Mander 2002). The recent history of the eastern Indian state of Odisha provides several cases of community conflicts over resources, particularly related to land and forest. Different parts of the state are experiencing more and more community conflicts over natural resources. The community conflict over resources in Narayanpatna block of Koraput district erupted in 2009 because of the exploitation and alienation of Adivasis from their land by the non-­Adivasis. Kandhamal district experienced community conflicts that revolved around a competition to gain control over and access to natural resources and state-­sponsored social benefits, rights and entitlements without completely disregarding the involvement of the right-­wing Hindu forces that apparently played a major role in transforming the resource conflict into communal conflict between the Kandhas (Adivasis) and the Panas (non-­Adivasis) (Ambagudia 2015). The rehabilitation of Bengali migrants from East Pakistan in Dandakaranya region of undivided Koraput district in the early 1960s 9

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has further added to the dynamics of community conflicts in Odisha. During the last decade, there have been major clashes between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts escalating the already simmering tensions between these communities. With increasing demands for accessing scarce natural resources and limited rights and privileges granted by the state, the number of conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Odisha is also on the increase and thereby facilitating feelings and expression of mistrust, division and resentment among these communities. Community conflicts are increasingly threatening peace in the region with the government remaining more or less a mute spectator. Within the larger context of community conflicts emerging from control over or access to resources, the book critically examines the manner(s) in which conflicts between groups emerge, are shaped and are realised through acts and agencies of various kinds with their socio-­economic and political implications. Based on multidisciplinary perspectives, the book aims to understand trajectories and dynamics of community conflicts between the native communities (Adivasis) and the outsiders (Bengali migrants) in eastern India, Odisha. Drawing on the data from the empirical study that was conducted in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts, the book provides an in-­depth analysis of contemporary experiences of Adivasis both at the individual and community levels in relation to the Bengali migrants in Odisha, as competitions for resources are also driven by self-­interest and community interests (McLaren and Johnson 2007). It explores the nature and patterns of interaction and the arenas of competition and conflicts such as social, economic, cultural, political and so on. It also examines the relationship of the state with the Adivasis and Bengali migrants and deals with responses of the state to conflicts between these communities. It also explores the link between resource scarcity and the emergence of Naxalite politics. The book aims to unravel unexplored dimensions of resource conflicts between Adivasis and Bengali migrants into wider conflict theory and policy discourse. The book broadens the scope of the debate on linkages between resources and contemporary community conflicts. Due to a scarcity of resources, the future of community relations is going to be considerably defined in term of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and ‘native’ versus ‘outsiders’. So, this book expands the scope for further research concerning contemporary reflections on the tensions between self and others, conflict, resistance and cooperation between different communities within the framework of resource paradigm. 10

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Sites of conflict The area in which the study of this book has been conducted is the eastern Indian state of Odisha. To gain insight into the research problem, Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha have been chosen for in-­depth analysis for two reasons. First, these are the most Adivasi-­ populated districts of Odisha. According to 2011 census, Malkangiri has the second-­highest Adivasi population (57.83 percent) in proportion to the district population, contributing to 3.69 percent of the state’s Adivasi population. Nabarangpur is the fourth highest Adivasi population (55.79 percent) in proportion to the district population, contributing to 7.10 percent of the state’s Adivasi population. Second, perhaps the major reason, Malkangiri and Nabarangpur were the only areas of the undivided Koraput district which the GOI selected for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in the late 1950s under the DNK Project. Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts are the hosts of 78,127 and 34,750 Bengali population, respectively (2001 Census). The case study is of great relevance because it provides more detailed empirical information on the changing relationship between communities concerning resources in Odisha. The Bengali migrants are strategically rehabilitated adjacent to Adivasi villages in these districts. Bengali villages are entitled with certain unique names which can be easily differentiated from others. Bengali villages located in Malkangiri and Potteru areas of Malkangiri district are known as MV and MPV, respectively. There are 132 MV and 81 MPV villages in Malkangiri district. The MPV villages were set up in 1975 to settle the displaced Bengali migrants in the wake of the implementation of the Potteru project that aimed to provide irrigation facility to the Bengali migrants (GOO not dated a: 80). Similarly, Bengali villages located in Umerkote and Raigharh zones of Nabarangpur district are known as UV and URV, respectively. During rehabilitation, 48 UV and URV villages (each of consisting 24 villages) were established (GOO not dated b: 59). For the purpose of the book, 16 adjacent villages from both districts have been randomly selected for gathering empirical evidence. Out of 16, eight each are Adivasi and Bengali villages. Jaduguda, Serapally, Mariweda and Koilipari are Adivasi villages and MV 84, MV 92, MPV 18-­B and MV 11 are Bengali villages of Malkangiri district. Khanda, Kutguda, Rengabhati and Jamadora are the Adivasi villages and UV 53, UV 8, URV 46 and URV 50 are the Bengali villages of Nabarangpur district. To understand the interplay and interactions between Adivasi and Bengali communities in social, economic, cultural and political spheres, neighbouring Adivasi and 11

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Bengali villages were selected because the interaction between them is more often than the villages located in distant places.

Structure of the book The introductory chapter drew the contours of the context. It defined terms such as migration, community and conflict. While drawing linkages between migration and community conflict, it explored the causes, continuation and effects of migration on the areas, communities or societies of destination. It also dealt with the reasons, types and actors of resource conflicts. Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the migrant problem in India and then turns to interrogate the issues involving migrants, state and citizenship in the post-­colonial period. The chapter seeks to understand the complex relationship between migrants and the Indian state within the context of citizenship rights. Two factors have complicated the issue of granting citizenship in India: initially Partition and, after independence, the increasing pressure of international migration into the country. This has made citizenship law an important part of the policy agenda as it has redefined the nature of citizenship rights and privileges. It analyses the process in which the Indian citizenship law, and the manner in which it has been implemented, has undergone a considerable change since independence in terms of extent, content and depth due to social and political changes in the country. It discusses the process in which the state has extended the realm of citizenship through which the non-­citizens (migrants) acquired citizenship rights and privileges in India. Chapter 2 begins with a discussion on understanding categories labelled as Tribe, Scheduled Tribe, Adivasis, Vanavasis and Indigenous People. It sets the context under which the Adivasi area of Dandakaranya region in eastern India was identified as the suitable site for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants from East Pakistan. It delves into the nature of Adivasi habitation and their socio-­economic and political conditions prior to the entry of Bengali migrants to erstwhile Koraput district of Dandakaranya region. The description of socio-­economic and political conditions is essential for understanding whether the rehabilitation of migrants in the region has further pushed the Adivasis into a situation of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation. Chapter 3 seeks to understand the changing relationship between the Adivasis, Bengali migrants and the state within the context of the rehabilitation project, that is, the DNK Project. It interrogates the process that the state adopted in facilitating Bengali migrants and marginalised 12

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the Adivasis in the name of common welfare. It deals with the genesis and functions of the DNK Project. While reading the implementing role of the state, it makes a comparative analysis of impacts of the DNK Project on Bengali migrants and Adivasis and addresses why and how the Bengali migrants had the edge over the Adivasis while accessing privileges under the project, and thereby leading to ‘differentiated marginality’. The situations of Bengali migrants and Adivasis have been discussed with the help of the data generated by the DDA in social, economic, cultural and educational spheres, as well as the provisions of employment under the project for both communities. This chapter underlines that although the DDA was given the mandate of rehabilitating the Bengali migrants, advancing the Adivasi interest and developing the region, it, however, functioned solely as a rehabilitation agency rather than a development agency. It considered the native Adivasi communities as the secondary social group competing for facilities and benefits extended to both Adivasis and Bengali migrants, which has become an annoyance for the former and an advantage for the latter. In short, the chapter interrogates the interventionist role of the state in the context of marginalisation of Adivasi communities due to the formulation and implementation of the DNK Project. Juxtaposing the two ethnic groups, Chapter 4 explores the nature of the day-­to-­day, as well as longue duree, interaction and interface between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants by taking note of their lived experiences. It draws on the range of empirical evidence gathered to provide an in-­depth analysis concerning contemporary Adivasi experiences of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation with social, economic and cultural aspects of marginalisation. Drawing on empirical evidence from Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha, Chapter 4 compares and contrasts the views of Adivasis and Bengali migrants in reference to wider social, economic and cultural contexts and explores dynamics of interaction between them. It also critically examines the role of the state that has enabled the Bengali migrants to become economically prosperous and culturally viable resulting in the economic and cultural marginalisation of the native Adivasis. It also delineates the nature and dynamics of the relationship between the native Adivasis and the Tamil migrants, who have been rehabilitated in Malkangiri district in the late 1990s, and explores the reason(s) why, unlike the Bengali migrants, there is no conflict between them. In short, it discusses issues, contexts, actors of community conflicts and methods of conflict resolution in India. Chapter 5 shifts the discussion to the political sphere by drawing empirical evidence gathered amongst Adivasis and Bengali migrants. It 13

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engages with different pertinent issues through which political contestations are conceived, mounted and contained. It seeks to understand the nature of the political interaction between Adivasis and Bengali migrants, which has become a ground for contestation and conflict. In doing so, it takes into account a wide range of issues of political relevance such as the level of political participation, the reasons for supporting political parties, the cost and benefit of participation, the nature of representation, the representation versus domination and so on. It traces the process through which Bengali migrants have emerged as a political community. It examines how the native Adivasis have been politically marginalised with the emergence of Bengali migrants as a political community and how that has led to the emergence of contestations and conflicts between them. It examines the patterns and strategies of mobilisation to galvanise widespread political support by the Adivasis and Bengali migrants through the prism of ethnic differences. In short, it focuses on how politics acts as a catalyst for conflicts between the native and migrant communities. Chapter 6 examines the changing relationship among Adivasis, resources and the state and unravels the emergence of Naxalite politics. The state has played a significant role in marginalising the Adivasis and accentuated competition between communities to control over or access to resources, where the Adivasis are always at the receiving end of the competition. The Naxalites are appropriating the helplessness of the Adivasis and galvanising their support by drawing an effective relationship between resource scarcity and dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation of Adivasis. It also examines whether such supports of Adivasis sustain from time to time. It attempts to unravel whether the state and the Naxalites have any role in unleashing and structuring community conflicts. It also critically examines the role of the state and the Naxalites in Adivasi development. The book concludes by providing a broader framework of comprehending community conflicts over resources. It also suggests certain modalities that can help developing cordial relationships between conflictual communities in India and attempts to provide a direction to future research on community conflicts.

Notes 1 Freeman maintains that scholars outside political science have largely neglected the political dimensions of migration. He also remarked that students of politics from their part have typically ignored immigration altogether (Freeman 2005: 111). Now, a large part of political science literature has been engaged with the study on migration; although the present

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study has different connotations, it has pertinent implications to the migration studies, especially in the context of various dimensions of interaction between migrants and local communities in India. 2 Broadly, there can be two main types of communities: native/homeland and immigrant. Native communities are long-­time occupants of a particular territory and, therefore, claim an exclusive as well as moral right to rule it. Their control over natural resources or the political aspirations behind such claims may also be depending on the numerical status of native communities and the type of the state in which they are located. On the contrary, immigrant communities are the product of population migration. Whether oppression induces such migrants in their home state or lures with better economic opportunities, these communities usually are ‘inclined’ to maintain their distinct collective identities and customs, in part because they are excluded by virtue of these differences from participation and membership in the host state. 3 The theory of ‘relative deprivation’ focuses on tensions between the actual state of communities and their achieved positions. Communities feel relatively deprived by drawing some experiences from the past and contextualise their position in the present in reference to other communities. 4 Environmentally caused migration takes place due to the degradation of the environment. 5 With the passing of the Orissa (Alteration of Name) Bill, 2010, the name of the state has changed from Orissa to Odisha with effect from 1 November 2011. In this book, however, Orissa is also used to refer to some of the acts/nomenclatures that were enacted/used before 2011. 6 According to the 2011 census, the Adivasis of Tripura constitute 31.1 percent of the total state population. The density of population of the state has increased from 305 in 2001 to 350 in 2011.

15

1 RIGHTS, DISSENT AND CONFLICT Migrants, state and citizenship in India

Immigration and citizenship have become subjects of serious debate in the social sciences. Debates and discussions have emerged in the context of growing population movements across state boundaries. Migration has significantly affected the nature and dynamics of citizenship, which is one of the main foundations of a nation-­state. The issue of citizenship, however, is more complex than it appears to be. The complexity is due to the contextual approaches followed by nation-­states in reference to a wider population movement across the globe. The liberal states are entitled to develop their own criteria in defining the citizenship status of individuals. As a consequence, states have defined and redefined their criteria to grant or deny citizenship to certain groups of people, who are categorised as refugees, migrants, aliens, outsiders and so on. The liberal democratic state defines the physical and cultural boundaries, practising the principles of exclusion and inclusion while granting citizenship rights. While some of the migrants are given citizenship rights by integrating them into the existing political institutions and legal frameworks, others are denied such rights. Due to the increasing role of the state in defining the citizenship status, Brubaker (1992: 23) considers its role as ‘a powerful instrument of social closure’. The established legal framework would define the future of citizenship, which is based on two categories of people: one, children of the native citizens and, two, the refugees, migrants, outsiders and so on. The second group demands/claims their citizenship status by different means, more often taking the legal course if they are denied citizenship even after fulfilling the prescribed criteria. The decision of the Supreme Court of India on 17 July 2012 (Day and Night News 2012) to examine the Bangladeshi migrants’ plea for citizenship indicates that the Indian state has not settled the issue of migration and citizenship. Due to the growing pressure of international 16

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migration, citizenship law has become a major concern in South Asia’s political agenda, in general, and India, in particular. The debates over migration and citizenship have become more intense because of the entry of different types of migrants into the Indian territory, and all of them have not been granted citizenship status. In migration/refugee studies, three aspects are important: (a) the definition of the term migrant and its scope, (b) the concept of ‘non-­refoulement’ and its scope and (c) the administrative-­judicial machinery to determine the status of migrants and the nature and quantum of assistance they require (Samaddar 2003: 23). Within this backdrop, this chapter interrogates the issues involving migrants, state and citizenship. It also provides the overview of the migrant situation in India. It attempts to understand the complex relationship between migrants and the Indian state. It delves into the process by which these non-­citizens acquire citizenship rights and the crucial role of the state.

Migration and citizenship Marshall (1952) examines the evolutionary process of citizenship in Europe in three different forms such as civil, political and social. Civil citizenship focuses on civil rights that are essential to individual freedom and were developed during the eighteenth century (French and American Revolutions). It includes the civil elements of citizenship such as individual liberty; the freedom of thought, speech and faith; the right to own property and conclude valid contracts; and the right to justice. These rights would be secured through state machinery – the court. Nineteenth-­century Europe witnessed the development of political citizenship emphasising on the right to vote, universal citizenship1 and political participation and representation. These rights would be ensured through regular elections to legislatures. Social citizenship, developed during the twentieth century, included a whole range of rights such as the right to basic support and income, welfare rights and so on. These rights would be ensured through the institution of the welfare state that includes a range of services such as educational opportunities, medical and welfare services, right to share a social heritage and live a civilised life as per the prevailing standards in society. Marshall (1952: 28) defined citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community’. This understanding has significant implications for migrants as it raises the issues of inclusion and exclusion. The principles of inclusion and exclusion are entrenched in political membership, where the state acts as the instrument of political integration for those who are integral parts of the community 17

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and, for outsiders, refugees, migrants and aliens, it practises exclusion if they fail to meet the prescribed standards of citizenship. Benhabib (2004: 121) argues that political membership is the leitmotif of accommodating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into the existing political system. Chimni (2005: 277) emphasises that political membership enables the state to draw a political boundary that maintains the distinction between members and outsiders. In contemporary liberal democratic states, political membership draws the contours of belongingness, rights, duties and participation in the political affairs of the state. Joppke (1999: 629) underlines that citizenship is not only a set of rights but also a mechanism that sharply demarcates the boundaries of states. The liberal democratic states continue to struggle to address the increasing pressure of international migration adequately. At times they are in a dilemma whether the state shall at all accommodate the migrants and, if accommodated, the nature of rights, duties and degree of political integration that they ought to be provided (Samaddar 2003: 23). Consequently, citizenship law has moved to the centre stage of the policy agenda by redefining not only the nature of citizenship rights and obligations but also addressing who should be allowed to possess these rights and responsibilities. The process of migration has redefined and reconfigured the notion of citizenship from three fundamental perspectives – extent (rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion), content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness or thinness) (Isin and Turner 2002: 2). The relationship between migration and citizenship in the contemporary world has been discussed by different scholars (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Kymlicka 1995, 2002). Burbeker (1992) increasingly recognises the role of the state in extending citizenship to the migrants and argues that political memberships are drawn according to different nationhood traditions. Soysal (1994) explores the relationship between guest workers and the state in post-­war Europe and links the migrants’ citizenship status with ‘post-­national membership’ (non-­ citizenship membership). The contextualisation of political, social and economic rights leads her to contend that the exclusionary political citizenship does not matter much in post-­war Europe. This is because by acquiring ‘post-­national membership’, the guest workers enjoyed social and economic rights as a part of universal human rights, without being political citizens. Kymlicka emphasises that extension of equal rights to the immigrants does not ensure their integration into the host country because of cultural differences. However, they are expected to integrate into 18

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the mainstream society and forget their own cultural characteristics. Kymlicka advocates differential rights for the immigrants and contended that since they are culturally different, they need to be provided with ‘accommodation rights’ (2002: 51),2 such as exemptions from certain laws that disadvantage them. He insists that granting them such rights would not isolate them but leads to their integration. So, he advocated cultural pluralism and stressed on the continued relevance of nationally bounded citizenship. In other words, according to him, national citizenship remains indispensable for immigrant integration (Kymlicka 2002: 317–­26). These three works (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Kymlicka 2002) entailed competing propositions of how citizenship laws of different countries have become a major concern of policy agenda and administered with respect to migrants. The relationship between migration and citizenship can be examined from liberal, utilitarian and communitarian perspectives (Gibney 1999: 171–­3). The liberal view argues against the restrictive policy of the state and contends that such restriction would lead to the growing violation of the individual rights and freedom of migrants. The utilitarian perspective acknowledges the need for equal consideration of all interests on moral grounds. Meanwhile, it anticipates the emergence of conflicts between the interests of migrants and the native citizens,3 and in a situation of conflicts, the priority should be given to the more fundamental interests over the less fundamental. So, while accommodating migrants, the state should consider both the benefits of migrants and the costs to be incurred by the native residents in the process (Gibney 1999: 171). Utilitarian view, however, does not favour the accommodation of migrants if they overburden the state in social, economic and political spheres. The communitarian perspective, on the contrary, underlines the role of cultural communities in shaping and reshaping the lives of individuals and advocates the restrictive policy of the state. It associates citizenship with community identity (Isin and Wood 1999: 20–­1). Hence, the identity of the native people lies in the history and culture of the land they inhabit. As per the communitarians, therefore, the responsibility of accommodating migrants is curbed by the fundamental rights of the indigenous people to protect and promote their national culture and a shared sense of ‘belonging’. So, communitarians are being charged as partial, as more concerned for the protection and promotion of the cultural rights of national citizens, paying little attention to the rights of ‘the other’ (Gibney 1999: 173). Against this backdrop, the chapter engages in the debate over the state, citizens and migrants in India. 19

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Who is a migrant? The increasing population movement at the international level has generated significant discourse on terms such as refugees, migrants, foreigners, asylum seekers and the like. The existing literature has, however, grapples with the concept of refugee. Generally speaking, refugees are those people who are essentially leaving their habitual area of residence involuntarily. They are those persons who cross the international border due to political violence, ethnic conflicts, religious prosecution or natural distress in their homeland. An urgent sense of insecurity is the major driving force behind such displacements, and it continues to govern thereafter. The restoration of normalcy would enable the refugees to return to their country, and the prevailing situation of insecurity would compel them to integrate into the host society. The United Nations Conventions on Refugees defined a refugee as any person who owing to well founded fear of being prosecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . . . (cited in Newland 1993: 81) This understanding underlines the humanitarian perspective toward refugees. However, it is quite clear that on simple humanitarian grounds, there are also others who have strong claims to protection, and it is, therefore, desirable to extend the category of refugees to include those who, although not victims of political, racial or religious prosecution, live in such appalling social and economic conditions that their lives are at serious risk. Gibney uses the inclusive notion of refugees to include those people requiring a new place of residence on either a permanent or a temporary basis. If they are forced to return to their country of origin, their physical security lies at stake (Gibney 1999: 170–­1). Shacknove has argued that refugee status should be extended to those who seek international protection because of their conflictual experiences and the failure of their respective government to protect their needs (Shacknove 1985: 282). Following this definition, only those who have sought asylum in another country and can convince the authorities that they, individually or as a group, face a threat to their lives are regarded as refugees. 20

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Indian notion of migrant During the initial phase of migration due to Partition, India extensively used the concept of the ‘displaced person’ than refugee or migrant. In 1948, during mass exodus in eastern India, the GOI defined a displaced person as ‘one who had entered India (who left or who was compelled to leave his home in East Pakistan on or after 15 October 1947) on account of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbances or on account of setting up of the two dominions of India and Pakistan’ (GOI 1967a: 107). In other words, the term displaced was categorically included with regard to those who were forced to leave East Pakistan only after India became independent and India and Pakistan were formed. Meanwhile, the displaced people were required to register themselves on or before 31 January 1949 to avail the relief and rehabilitation benefits extended to them by the GOI. To put it differently, ‘refugee status is a privilege or entitlement, giving those who qualify access to certain scarce resources or services outside their own country, such as admission into another country ahead of a long line of claimants, legal protection abroad, and often some material assistance from public or private assistance. (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989: 3) Since displaced person and refugee are not mutually exclusive terms, the GOI used them intermittently without making any distinction. In other words, depending on the availability of different types of resources, the terms were used accordingly. India used the term refugee as it was free from legal obligations because India was not a party to the 1951 Convention. The Indian state used the context-­specific understanding of refugee that suited its convenience (Dasgupta 2001: 98–­100). Thus, Dasgupta (2001: 100) argued that the term displaced is more suitable than refugee in the Indian context. The GOI was cautious at the time of the 1971 influx. In early May 1971, when a large number of displaced people arrived in India, the central government informed the West Bengal government that people coming from Bangladesh for shelter in India should not be called ‘refugees’ or ‘evacuees’ in the context of the prevailing social and political developments. The state government was told that the Centre was looking for an appropriate term and definition after examining international laws. However, finally, the state opted for the most commonly used term refugee. This is one more example of how the Indian state carried out its unique method of classification in accordance with its 21

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convenience. Hence, categories such as refugees, migrants, displaced persons and so on were produced discursively, mediated through the actions of officials located at the periphery of the nation (Roy 2013). Although the wider discourse on refugees continuously governs the international environment in the age of population movement, the book, however, uses the term migrant for two specific reasons. First, despite the growing international concern for using the term refugee, India made its reservation concerning the term and used other auxiliary term displaced people. The use of term refugee became more problematic in the context of the Bengali migrants who crossed the border at the time of Partition as they originated from the same geographical boundaries.4 Second, the term migrant expands the scope to include all people who leave their country for one or the other reasons in a different period than does the term refugee, indicating the origin of population movement in reference to a specific context. The term migrant is used in the book to refer to people who enter the Indian territory after the formation of two dominions, India and Pakistan, in the South Asian subcontinent.

Migrants and the state in India Since independence, India has received numerous people who have crossed the international border due to political violence and religious prosecution. There has been a large number of migrants from Tibet, Burma (now Myanmar), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. These migrant groups are different from one another on the grounds of causes, magnitude and characteristics. The common denominator about migrants is that they are vulnerable groups of foreigners forced to flee to another country in need of protection by another government. The Indian state had to respond to an extraordinary situation at a time when it hardly had any resources and experience in dealing with humanitarian emergencies, involving such a large number of people. This position of the Indian state has been justified primarily on humanitarian and moral grounds (UNHCR 2006: 94–­5; Ten 2005: 32). Right or charity After Independence, the migrants’ discourse in India began on the ground of ‘right’ versus ‘charity’ (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 146, Chatterji 2001). The migrants from 1947 to 1950 maintained that they had the right to relief and rehabilitation because they are the product of building of modern nation-­states which took place by partitioning India and Pakistan. Farmer (1974: 88) argues that accommodating Bengali migrants 22

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was a matter of necessity and not one of choice between one category of beneficiary over another. At the same time, the government thought that since the migrants came by fit and starts, they had the option of not coming to India and that, by extending relief and rehabilitation to them, it was doing a great charity. However, what makes a country obligated to accept migrants so as to provide justice rather than charity is the fact that the fundamental interest of migrants stands at a graver risk than the relatively small sacrifices that are to be made by the members of the host country. Of course, there is also a need to provide the migrants with resources and opportunities to achieve at least a minimum level of well-­ being that will enable them to function properly in their new home. Immigration and emigration have been the defining feature of most of the South Asian countries. But India has been more of a migrant-­ receiving than -­generating country due to its easy accessible borders, its socio-­cultural identities, economic opportunities and its being a democratic and soft state (Muni and Baral 1996: 7–­8). The number of migrated people varies. Since Partition, there has been a gross outward movement of about 2.5 million people (and in-­movement between 0.7 and 0.85 million) from East Bengal into India (Visaria 1969: 323–­4). Between 1946 and 1965, about 9 million people, especially Hindus and Sikhs, entered the Indian territory (Roy 2013: 3). But the GOI had not responded to the process of immigration in a planned manner and was engaged in relief work rather than their permanent rehabilitation. The reasons were twofold – one, since a great percentage of people came to West Bengal having left behind their land, they were likely to return to East Pakistan, and two, since the crisis had occurred suddenly, no one knew its exact dimension and the government could not take any responsibility. It was only in the early 1950s that the government recognised the necessity of making planned responses to the migrant crisis. Consequently, a fact-­finding committee5 was formed to conduct a survey regarding the status of migrants in West Bengal. The committee suggested for a long-­term solution to the migrant crisis by expressing the necessity of rehabilitating them on a permanent and viable basis. India is one of the most prominent migrant-­receiving countries in the world. India hosted about 411,000 migrants and asylum seekers by 31 December 2008. These migrants consist of as many as 110,000 Chinese, 25,000 Nepalese, 120,000 Sri Lankans, 100,000 migrants from Myanmar, about 30,000 from Afghanistan and 25,000 from Bhutan (Table 1.1). India also hosted a total of 35,900 Bangladeshi migrants by 31 December 2007. Similarly, India also hosted 435,900 and 420,400 migrants from different countries in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Table 1.1 also shows 23

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Table 1.1  Migrants and asylum seekers in India Source of migrants As on 31-­12-­2006 As on 31-­12-­2007 As on 31-­12-­2008 Migrants and asylum seekers China Nepal Sri Lanka Myanmar Bangladesh Afghanistan Bhutan Other New Asylum Seekers

435,900

420,400

411,000

110,000 100,000 99,600 50,000 35,000 30,000 10,000 900 17,900

110,000 50,000 102,000 75,000 35,900 31,200 15,000 1000 17,900

110,000 25,000 120,000 100,000 NA 30,000 25,000 1000 3,300

Source: USCRI (2007: 3, 67; 2008: 31, 92; 2009: 33). Note: NA = not available

that there is a decrease of migrants and asylum seekers in India since 2006. This is partly because of the initiative of India to push them back to their country of origin. Against this backdrop, the pertinent questions are, does the Indian state adopt a uniform approach to migrants from different countries? Does it treat all migrants equally irrespective of their country of origin? To put it differently, how does the Indian state treat the migrants coming from different countries? The analysis suggests that it treats the migrants differently by their nationality. For instance, India does not consider the Nepalese as migrants while others are simply termed as migrants. To suffix, Nepalese are free to move to the Indian territory and receive all kinds of facilities extended by the Indian welfare state.6

Bengali migrants in India After Independence, a large number of Bengali migrants, primarily from East Pakistan, entered the territory of India. Although the official estimation of the total number was kept at a staggering 2,517,504, in December 1952, the increase in the subsequent years was phenomenal. Table 1.2 shows the month-­wise break-­up of migrant influx to West Bengal between 1953 and 1956. The number of migrant influx kept increasing over the years (see Table 1.2). For instance, the total number of migrants who came to West Bengal was 60,647 in 1953,1,03,800 in 1954 increased to 2,09,573 in 1955 and was estimated at 1,79,410 by July 1956. 24

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Table 1.2 Month-­wise break-­up of migrants influx to West Bengal between 1953 and 1956 Month January February March April May June July August September October November December Total

1953

1954

1955

1956

5,248 5,961 7,507 6,900 6,032 4,798 5,026 4,147 3,223 4,379 3,212 4,214 60,647

4,077 5,710 5,821 6,002 6,656 6,354 6,208 8,127 10,644 10,352 11,073 22,776 103,800

15,674 22,848 26,503 15,070 18,190 21,146 22,957 13,813 9,371 13,757 11,535 18,709 209,573

17,011 42,360 15,167 18,039 34,657 24,734 27,442 –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ 179,410

Source: GOWB (1956: 17).

Table 1.3  State-­wise break-­up of migrants (in thousands) West Bengal Assam Tripura Bihar Uttar Pradesh Odisha (Orissa) Manipur Madhya Pradesh Andamans Total

316 487 374 67 16 12 02 01 04 1,279

Source: GOWB (1957: 1).

Table 1.3 indicates the state-­wise break-­up of the migrant flow. According to Table 1.3, it was 316,000 in West Bengal, 487,000 in Assam, 374,000 in Tripura, 67,000 in Bihar, 16,000 in Uttar Pradesh, 12,000 in Odisha, 2,000 in Manipur, 1,000 in Madhya Pradesh and 4,000 in the Andamans. Out of these states, Assam had received the highest number of migrants.

Bengali migrants in the 1970s Circumstances created an impending migrant influx into India in 1971 (UNHCR 2000: 60). The military repression in East Pakistan generated about a million migrants within a month, who entered the Indian 25

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territory. Table 1.4 indicates the daily average and monthly average of the migrant flow in 1971. The number of migrants was estimated at 9,899,000 between 10 April and December 1971. Table 1.4 illustrates that the month of May witnessed the highest number of migrant influx in India both in terms of the daily average as well as monthly average, which was estimated at 102,000 and 3,158,000, respectively. By the end of 1971, the total number of migrants reached a little less than 10 million. The migrants first entered the border states of West Bengal, Tripura and Assam. Such a high entry created not just a migrant problem but of their location because in some of the districts of the bordering states, they outnumbered the natives. The high concentration of migrants in India inevitably created striking problems for the host country. From the beginning, India was reluctant to receive the migrants and made it clear that in no circumstances it would integrate the migrants into the mainstream society. The 1971 situation was, however, radically different from conditions of the 1950s, which witnessed a one-­way flow; hence, the burden was entirely on India. But India defined the 1971 migrants from Bangladesh as a temporary group, assuming that they would eventually return. Therefore, the question of their rehabilitation or assimilation on a permanent basis did not arise. They were treated as foreign nationals right from the beginning, and this was made abundantly clear in the administrative instructions issued by the GOI for transit relief camps for migrants from East Bengal in 1971. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 contributed to the wide-­scale population movement in South Asia, thereby leading to the migrant crisis. During the onset of the crisis, India made it clear that the Table 1.4  Trends of migrant influx in 1971 (in thousands) Month

Daily average

Monthly average

April (10 to 30) May June July August September October November Backlog Total

57 102 68 26 34 27 14 8 –­ –­

1,221 3,158 2,056 797 1,055 804 425 217 16 9,899

Source: Saha (2001: 243, Annexure II).

26

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Table 1.5  Bangladeshi migrants in India as of 1 December 1971 State

No. of amps

Refugee camps

Refugees with host families

Total no. of refugees

West Bengal Tripura Meghalaya Assam Bihar Madhya Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Total

492 276 17 28 8 3 1 825

4,849,786 834,098 591,520 255,642 36,732 219,298 10,169 6,797,245

2,386,130 547,551 76,466 91,913 –­ –­ –­ 3,102,060

7,235,916 1,381,649 667,986 347,555 36,732 219,298 10,169 9,899,305

Source: UNHCR (2000: 65).

migrants are required to return to their country within a given period of six months. It considered the Bangladeshi migrants as ‘evacuees’ to emphasise their temporary status. According to Table 1.5, as on 1 December 1971, India received a significant number of migrants from East Pakistan. The larger question arises in this context is, why did Bengali migrants enter only India in such large numbers and not Burma, Bhutan or other adjacent countries? The probable explanation could be the similar ethnic and cultural identities between the two countries – Bangladesh and India, particularly the presence of a large number of Bengalis in the state of West Bengal (Chakrobarty, Gupta and Bandyopadhyay 1997: 268; Das 2001: 121). West Bengal received the highest Bengali migrants because of its physical and cultural proximity to East Pakistan. The other reason is based on the fact that India has a good record of accommodating Bengali migrants, who moved to India during the India–­Pakistan partition. Table 1.5 also reflects that West Bengal had received the highest number of migrants (7,235,916) and that Uttar Pradesh had received the lowest number of migrants (10,169).

From an unsettled past to a secure future: the process of citizenship in India Each country has enacted its own system of rules that govern the process of acquiring citizenship. Most of the countries, including India, base their citizenship laws on a combination of jus soli (conferral of citizenship to persons born in state’s territory, or soil) and jus sanguinis conferral of citizenship to persons with a citizen parent or parents, or blood). The process of obtaining citizenship has been defined 27

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in Articles 5 to 11 of the Indian Constitution. Legal provisions related to the acquisition of citizenship of India are contained in the Citizenship Act of 1955. This act deals with different sources of citizenship such as birth, descent, registration, naturalisation and incorporation of territory. The Constitution of India extends citizenship rights to those who have migrated to India from Pakistan in the wake of Partition. Accordingly, under Article 6, citizenship was extended to those (a) who or whose parents or grandparents were born in India as defined by the GOI Act, 1935, were migrants to independent India before 19 July 1948, and continued to ordinarily reside in India after such migration; (b) who migrated after 19 July 1948 but before the commencement of the Indian constitution and registered themselves as the citizens of India before the concerned authority; and (c) who having gone to Pakistan returned to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by the competent authority. Article 7, however, states that those who left India after 1 March 1947 to settle in the territory of Pakistan were not entitled to Indian citizenship under any of the preceding provisions (Rodrigues 2005: 212). India has also enacted other legal provisions to govern the migrants/ outsiders. The Foreigners Act, 1946, deals with matters of ‘entry of foreigners in India, their presence therein and their departure therefrom’. Paragraph 3(1) of the Foreigners Order 1948 regulates the entry of migrants and infiltrators by emphasising the fact that no foreigners should enter India without the permission of the competent authority. The Registration Act of 1939 deals with the registration of foreigners’ entry, duration of stay and their deportation from India. In addition, the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Passport Act, 1967 empower the government to impose certain regulations on the passport for entry into India, issue of passport and other travel documents to control departure from India of Indian citizens and, in some cases, of others as well. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2003 makes it mandatory for everyone, including migrant and asylum seekers, to procure a legal visa to enter Indian territory, and without such travel document, they are declared as illegal migrants. However, in many instances, migrants need to escape from a situation of conflict suddenly and do not get the opportunity to secure valid documents. Also, valid documents, such as the visa, are not granted for protection purpose. The amended provision of the Citizenship Act, 2003, hence, runs counter to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which underlines that persons in need of international protection shall not be punished for unlawful entry into another country (Goodwin-­Gill 2003: 186–­8). 28

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In 1979, India became a party to the ICCPR, 1966, which lay down the rights of both citizens and aliens. Article 2, Paragraph 1 ensures the rights of the covenant to ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. But India is yet to pass the domestic legislation to implement its obligations. What is also significant is that India has made certain reservations to Article 13 of the ICCPR dealing with certain rights of aliens.7 Though India is not a party to the 1951 UN Convention on the status of refugees at present,8 India supports the cardinal principle of international refugee law, non-­refoulement.9 It must be noted that India’s refusal to join the Refugee Convention of 1951 does not absolve it from the fundamental commitment to the humanitarian protection of migrants. Consequently, as on 31 December 2008, India has housed 120,000, 30,000, 25,000 and 100,000 migrants from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Myanmar, respectively (USCRI 2009: 33). As far as the migrants from Bangladesh are concerned, India has been a home to 35,000 migrants as on 31 December 2007 (USCRI 2008: 31, 92). The existing literature extensively deals with the relationship between migrants and the question of citizenship in India (Jayal 2013; Roy 2010; Roy 2013; Sadiq 2009; Zamindar 2007). As Partition created a large number of Bengali migrants, India adopted 26 July 1949 as the cut-­off date for granting citizenship rights to the Bengali migrants and, thus, aimed to control and discourage the immigration flows to India. The Bengali migrants, who came to India before 26 July 1949, automatically became Indian citizens (Weiner, Katzenstein and Rao 1981: 104).10 But this cut-­off date did not fulfil the objective as there was a continuous flow of migrants even after this date. The steady flow of migrants across the border raised concerns regarding India’ ability to maintain cultural, linguistic and religious identities, which led to the enactment of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950. The primary intention of the act was to discourage potential Bengali migrants from East Pakistan to enter India and expulsion of people from India who did not qualify under the provision of this act. The expulsion of the people caused much resentment in Pakistan, which eventually led to the signing of an agreement on 8 April 1950, between the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan, commonly known as the Liaquat–­Nehru Pact. This pact allowed returning and granting citizenship rights to those who have been deported from India till 31 December 1950 and conferred Indian citizenship on their return (Chadha 2005: 234). This pact was, however, seen as growingly 29

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discriminatory in nature as it is contended that the agreement was only meant for stopping Muslims even as it allowed Hindus to come to India (Chadha 2005: 234; Baruah 1999: 139–­40). To put it differently, those migrants who entered the Indian territory by 31 December 1950 did not demand citizenship status, and they were assured of citizenship by India. The status of citizenship is also extended to the migrants from East Pakistan under the agreement signed between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, on 19 March 1972, which is commonly known as Indira–­Mujib Pact. This agreement underlined that those Hindus who had migrated before 1971 could claim citizenship if they fulfilled the conditions laid down in Section 5 of the Citizenship Act of 1955, which required them to reside in India for at least seven years and one of their parents having been born in undivided India. Thus, those Bengali migrants who had entered India between 1950 and 1971 had, effectively under the constitution, attained citizenship even if they had not legally filled for it. The BJP launched citizenship drive, and consequently, a total of 2,500 Bangladeshi Hindu migrants were given citizenship during the post-­1985 and pre-­1990 (Patnaik not dated). This is one of the reasons why the Bengali migrants emerged as the prime supporters of the BJP in one of the migrant-­receiving states, Odisha (Barik 2006: 102). Minister of State for Home Affairs Mullapally Ramachandran informed the parliament that during 2010 to 2013, a total of 950 applications seeking Indian citizenship were received from Pakistani immigrants, out of which 915 were granted citizenship rights and about 106 Pakistani immigrants were granted Indian citizenship in 2013 (The New Indian Express 2013). These migrants have been accepted as citizens for all practical purposes (Datta 2013: 116).

Migration and layered citizenship The relationship between migration and citizenship raises some complex issues that are associated with ‘layered’ citizenship, where the national government is willing to bestow recognition but this is strongly resisted at the local level. The notion of ‘layered’ citizenship is associated with different issues considered by India while granting citizenship to the migrants residing in Odisha, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The contextualisation of these migrants is invariably linked to the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 that generated a large number of migrants. 30

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Inclusive citizenship in Odisha Due to the continuous influx of Bengali migrants to West Bengal and the state’s inability to accommodate them, the issue of migrant was considered as a national problem. At the conference of the Rehabilitation Ministers in 1956, the government decided to provide all support including citizenship rights to the Bengali migrants who would voluntarily accept the proposal for their rehabilitation in the Dandakaranya region of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 150). Those who agreed to accept the proposal adopted at the conference were given citizenship. The citizenship question of the Bengali migrants was considered somewhat differently and on urgent basis compared to other migrants in India. Special efforts were made to ensure that they get citizenship rights. The government under the Ministry of Supply and Rehabilitation, Department of Rehabilitation had formed a number of Estimates Committees over the period to evaluate the progress and give necessary recommendations concerning the overall rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants, including granting citizenship, in the Dandakaranya region of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979, 1980). The central government was closely monitoring the progress of granting citizenship to the Bengali migrants. Special drives were launched to collect applications from eligible Bengali migrants and arrangements were made to verify and issue citizenship certificates. The power to issue citizenship certificates was also delegated to the zonal administrators of the Dandakaranya Project of Malkangiri, Nabarangapur and Kondagaon zones of the Dandakaranya region by the state governments of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh. The zonal administrators made special efforts to visit each village inhabited by the Bengali migrants and expedite the grant of citizenship certificates. As a consequence, there was a considerable increase in the number of citizens belonging to Bengali migrants over the period. For instance, in its note of November 1978, the Department of Rehabilitation, the GOI, maintained that a total of 21,989 citizenship certificates were issued to the Bengali migrants (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 61). The number of citizens increased from 37,031 as on 31 October 1979 to 39,853 by 30 June 1980 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 35–­6). In addition, door-­to-­door enumeration was conducted during the intensive revision of electoral rolls, and all the eligible Bengali migrants were enrolled in the electoral roll as valid voters (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 37). In other words, the Bengali migrants of Odisha were assured of citizenship rights. As the proposal of rehabilitation outside 31

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West Bengal was reluctantly accepted by the lower-­caste Namasudra population, in addition to citizenship rights, they were also declared as the SC. Scheduling of Bengali migrants as SC significantly affected the demographic profile of the area, and the earlier ‘Adivasi reserved constituency’ was converted to ‘SC reserved constituency’ until the 2009 assembly election. This was seen as a threat to the political position of the Adivasis and contributed to the emergence of community conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali communities in Odisha. Although the Adivasis did not resist the relocation of Bengali migrants in the 1960s, however, they rose in opposition with the emergence of community conflicts in 2001 and demanded that due care must be taken while granting citizenship rights to the latter. These issues have been discussed in a greater detail inChapters 3, 4 and 5. Suspended citizenship in Assam The continuous flow of migrants to Assam after Independence invited stiff resistance from the people who were directly or indirectly affected by this process. The AASU was at the forefront to protest against illegal migration to Assam. This protest was primarily against the decision of the Indian government to admit and enfranchise foreigners (Baruah 1999: 115). The substantial increase of voters during the 1979 by-­ election in Mangaldai parliamentary constituency (which contains a large number of East Bengali migrants) brought the issue of illegal migrants to the centre stage, thereby triggering the demand for their expulsion. Meanwhile, the revision process was initiated and objections were raised against 70,000 electors, out of whom 45,000 were declared as foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Rules of 1964 (Roy and Singh 2009: 42). The protest was intensified between 1979 and 1985, described by Baruah as the phase of ‘Assam Movement’ (Baruah 1999: 115), against the foreigners or illegal migrants. They alleged that many non-­citizens are inappropriately enfranchised in the electoral list. The state-­wide protest against the illegal migrants affected the larger political scenario of the country where a significant number of parliamentary seats went unfulfilled (12 out of 14 seats during the 1979 election), electoral processes were boycotted, electoral violence increased, turnouts became low, and so on. This discontentment resulted in a political agreement in 1985 between the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the leaders of AASU, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta. These concerns of the electoral politics invited the GOI, the government of Assam and the leaders of the protest movement to the negotiation 32

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table that eventually led to the signing of the Assam Accord on 15 August 1985. This accord was enacted with the aim of extensively addressing the issue of ‘foreigners’ or ‘illegal migrants’. The issue of illegal migrants requires to be addressed within the context of constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards to protect, preserve and promote the socio-­cultural, linguistic and heritage of the Assamese people. To put it differently, the issue of migration and citizenship cannot be studied in isolation, and it has to be addressed within the larger framework of the socio-­cultural and linguistic identity of the Assamese people. The accord defined illegal migrants as those who infiltrated illegally after 24 December 1971. While addressing the question of foreigner/ illegal migrants, the accord classified them into three categories based on their entry. Focusing on the graded/layered citizenship and the date of their entry into Assam, the accord favoured the regularisation of Bengali migrants who entered Assam before 1 January 1966, including those names that appeared on the electoral rolls of the 1967 election. Those who came to Assam between 1966 and 1971 were to disfranchise or put under ‘suspended citizenship’ for a period of ten years, after which they were to be reinstated (Jayal 2013: 64; Baruah 1999: 139–­40). During the interim period, they were to receive all facilities except voting rights. Those who arrived in Assam after 24 March 1971 were to be categorised as illegal migrants and deported. The Citizenship Act of 1955 was amended in 1986 to meet the prescribed objectives of the accord, which apparently inserted a category of citizenship addressed exclusively to Assam (Roy 2010: 92–­121; Roy and Singh 2009: 39). In other words, the Indian parliament had amended and re-­amended the Citizenship Act of 1955 to deal with the issue of migration. Due to the inability of the Assam government to make a significant progress in implementing the main features of the Assam Accord, the illegal migrant influx continued, most of whom were Bengali Muslims (Sadiq 2009: 148; Datta 2013: 71). The question of illegal migration triggered the anti-­Muslim Bengalis’ protest when the governor of Assam, Lt. General (Retired) Srinivas Kumar Sinha, submitted a report on illegal migration into Assam to the president of India by underlining that the illegal migrants coming into Assam from Bangladesh were ‘almost exclusively Muslims’ (The Governor of Assam 1998; Jayal 2013: 66). Thus, the power of granting citizenship status was withdrawn from the district collector in an area of ‘Muslim’ migration in Assam (Jayal 2013: 79). At this point, Assamese Hindus, who had seen themselves earlier primarily in competition with Bengali Hindus for middle-­class jobs now articulated the 33

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broader fear of being overwhelmed numerically, politically and culturally by a massive migration influx (Weiner, Katzenstein and Rao 1981: 99). The Assamese Hindus now feared further competition from the Bengali Muslims. Consequently, the movement was launched demanding the expulsion of illegal migrants most of whom were Bengali Muslims (Brass 2010: 206–­9). The religious-­based figure of the 2011 census showed that there was a 7 percent increase in the Muslim population in Assam in comparison to the earlier census (Barooah 2014), and this was likely to trigger a fresh controversy over the status of Muslim migrants in Assam. The initiative to identify and deport illegal migrants from Assam is not a new phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, was enacted to deport illegal migrants. But the law was repealed in 1957. The increasing resistance and contestations to the citizenship status of the migrants in Assam compelled the Congress government at the centre to enact the IMDT Act, 1983 that empowered the tribunal to detect and expel illegal migrants. Despite the efforts of IMDT Act, not many migrants could be detected and deported. The IMDT Act continued to affect the determinants of citizenship in Assam till 2005 when the supreme court finally scrapped the act and considered the immigration from Bangladesh not only as illegal entry but also as an act of aggression (Roy 2010: 97; Roy 2016: 46; Roy and Singh 2009: 46). Unfortunately, the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 apparently made a distinction between the Hindu migrants and Muslim illegal aliens (Chadha 2005: 234; Baruah 1999: 139–­40).11 The right-­wing political party, the BJP, has revived this distinction during the course of the election campaigns over the period. During the party’s election campaign in Assam on 19 February 2006, the then BJP president Rajnath Singh said that Hindus coming from Pakistan and Bangladesh should not be treated as infiltrators (The Hindu 2006). Similarly, during the Assam state election campaigns in 2016, the prime minister of India, Narendra Modi, said that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Hindu migrants would be treated like any other India citizen. The BJP-­led NDA government has granted citizenship status to around 4,300 Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan and Afghanistan in one year as against the figure of 1,023 during the entire tenure of the Congress-­led UPA government (Dawn 2015). In practice, then, the Hindus were treated as migrants, whereas the Muslims as illegal migrants.12 However, the NDA government’s wish to grant citizenship to Hindu migrants can be linked to the longer history of Partition, which took place on the basis of two-­nation theory, that is, India for 34

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Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims. Although religion was the basis for division between India and Pakistan, India decided to follow secular ethos and values after Independence. The intention of the NDA government to grant citizenship only to the Hindu migrants, however, has belied the secular claims of the Indian state. The incidence of illegal migrants voting in the 1979 by-­election in Mangaldai parliamentary constituency raised the alarm, which compelled the ECI to prepare a subcategory of individuals on the voters’ list of Assam under scrutiny. The dubious voters were placed under the ‘D’ category in the voters’ list.13 Consequently, the ECI detected 370,000 ‘D’ voters in Assam, out of which 3,686 voters’ citizenship could not be proved (Bhattacharyya 2005). The ‘D’ category voters are unable to cast votes until their citizenship is authenticated through the help of valid documents, such as birth certificate or land deeds, which are easy to obtain.14 In 2014, the supreme court intervened to decide the case of illegal migrants in Assam, examining writ petitions filed by Assam Sanmilita Mahasangh, All Assam Ahom Association and others. These petitions were filed between 2009 to 2014. The two-­ judge bench passed judgement on 17 December 2014, directing the centre and the state of Assam to implement other provisions of the Assam Accord, 1985 such as updating the NRC. It also set a deadline to complete the process by January 2016, and the court itself monitored the streamlining process. However, the interim NRC report, which excluded a large number of people, has been published, and the publication of the final report is due by 31 December 2018. It is worthwhile to mention that the first NRC was prepared across the country based on the 1951 census. For the first time, the NRC has been revised, and that, too, only in Assam, complying with the mandate of the Assam Accord 1985. The revision was not based on the census data rather on the ‘legacy data’, that is, names that appeared on the NRC 1951 or any of the electoral rolls up to the midnight of 24 March 1971 (Roy 2016: 49).15 If any of these lists did not bear the ancestor’s name, alternative documents such as land and tenancy records, citizenship certificate, permanent residential certificate, refugee registration certificate, passport, LIC policy, government-­issued licence/certificate, government service/employment certificate, bank/ post office account, birth certificate, board/university education certificate and court record/processes were used for the purpose.16 These documents, however, needed to be issued up to the midnight of 24 March 1971. The NRC put the onus on people to prove their citizenship. In other words, a piece of paper or a document has come to define the notion of citizenship in India, which has been termed by 35

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Sadiq as ‘Paper Citizens’ (Sadiq 2009). In short, the citizenship question has been significantly defined and reconfigured in the context of the organised movement launched by the AASU movement, the Assam Accord, IMDT Act and judicial pronouncements. Struggling citizenship in Arunachal Pradesh The construction Kaptai Hydro Electric Project in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the early 1960s created a situation of insecurity, loss of land and livelihood, which led to the flow of the first wave of Buddhists17 from the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Assam, Mizoram and Tripura. Since Assam accommodated a large number of migrants generated by Partition and was not able to accommodate the Chakma and Hajong migrants, they were sent to the NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) for settlement (Das 2012: 17–­18; Roy 2010: 122). The other explanation is that in order to avoid much criticism on his ‘tribal policy’ of letting the Adivasis of NEFA develop in accordance with the genius and culture, the then prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, decided to settle them in NEFA. Nehru was also governed by the idea that in the case of war between India and China, Chakmas would take the Indian side as a gesture of generosity (Singh 2016: 50). The central government settled the Chakma and Hajong migrants in the remote sparsely populated NEFA at three designated camps – Lohit, Tirap (now Changlang) and Subansiri. Consequently, the government issued valid certificates confirming their legal entry into India to a total of 35,000 Chakma and Hajong migrants. Though the migrants were settled in Arunachal Pradesh in the early 1960s, their settlement became contentious only in 1987, when the NEFA got full statehood. Unlike the Bengali migrants in Odisha and Assam, the Chakma and Hajong migrants were not given Indian citizenship status because the state GOAP considered them as ‘foreigners’ who did not have the right to live in Arunachal Pradesh or become Indian citizens (Roy 2010: 175). The primary reason for such contestation was based on the belief that the political participation of the migrants as citizens would have repercussions in the demographic composition of the state as seen in the context of Odisha and Assam. Their struggle for citizenship rights emerged with the signing of the Indira – Mujib Pact and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1986, which emphasised that India would take all the responsibility of the migrants who entered before 25 March 1971. The acceptance of 25 March 1971 as the cut-­off date by the Assam Accord in 1985 for granting citizenship rights to East Pakistani migrants revived the 36

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issue of citizenship rights for the Chakmas and Hajongs in Arunachal Pradesh. They were settled in NEFA in the early 1960s and apparently wanted the same status. The demand for the citizenship rights of the Chakmas and Hajongs became stronger when the Tibetan people, who entered the state in 1959, got citizenship rights.18 Unlike the Bengali migrants of West Bengal, it seems that the Chakmas and Hajongs did not make a legitimate claim for citizenship rights on moral grounds, but they demanded on the basis of the cut-­off date accepted by the Assam Accord, 1985 and citizenship granted to Tibetan migrants. The central government expressed its commitment to grant citizenship rights to the migrants of Arunachal Pradesh on a number of occasions. For instance, on 23 September 1992, M. M. Jacob, union minister of state and parliamentary affairs, made it clear in the lok sabha that the Chakma and Hajong migrants were eligible for citizenship status under the Citizenship Act, 1955. Similarly, on 7 January 1993, he further clarified that the central government was firmly in favour of granting citizenship status under the Citizenship Act, 1955. Reiterating the similar position of the central government in July 1994, P. M. Sayeed, minister of state for home and parliamentary affairs, expressed the central government’s affirmation to confer citizenship rights to those Chakmas and Hajongs, who entered the Indian territory from the erstwhile East Pakistan before 25 March 1971 (Basu Ray Chaudhary 2003: 264). The issue of granting citizenship rights to the migrants is strongly contested by the AAPSU and the state government. The AAPSU issued a ‘quit Arunachal Pradesh’ notice to the Chakmas and Hajongs to leave the state by 30 September 1995 (Roy 2010: 124). It also launched a state-­wide agitation against the migrants and called for their social and economic boycott. The state government also supported this, for one reason or the other, by dismantling the basic social and economic infrastructure of the Chakma and Hajong settlements. The state government closed and burnt down schools that were established in these areas, thereby violating the human rights of the migrants (Basu Ray Chaudhary 2003: 260). The AAPSU and the state government raised issues concerning the continuous presence of Chakma and Hajong migrants under the provisions of Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, under which the state gets the ‘protected status’ that does not allow even people from states other than Arunachal Pradesh to reside permanently in the state. They, however, seemed to maintain silence regarding the implication of the 1873 Regulation on Tibetan migrants led by the religious leader Dalai Lama. 37

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The opposition to the migrants’ demand for citizenship led the NHRC to file a petition in the supreme court. In the context of this petition, on 9 January 1996, the apex court favoured the grant of ‘citizenship by registration’ under the condition of satisfying the requirements of Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Despite the order of the apex court to accept the application of the migrants for citizenship rights, the local officials (deputy collector) refused to accept their applications (Roy 2010: 130). The court further added that the state is bound to protect the life and liberty of the migrants. If it failed to do so, it would fail to perform its constitutional as well as statutory obligations. While the GOI was committed to the principle of granting citizenship to at least the second and third generations of Chakmas born in India, the Indian government had not made significant progress on this ground yet. More than 4,677 applications were submitted by the migrants between 1996 and 2006 for citizenship. On 3 March 2004, the ECI also ordered for the inclusion of 1,497 Chakmas and Hajongs, who were eligible to the qualifying date of 1 January 2003. However, there was no positive sign of granting citizenship rights to these migrants (Talukdar 2008). After a long wait, a tiny section (1.5 percent of the total Chakma population) was given citizenship rights (Singh 2016: 51). While delivering a judgement to the writ petition on 17 September 2015, the supreme court rejuvenated the migrant-­centric judgement and set the deadline for the central government, as well as the state governments, to do the needful within three months from the date of issuing the verdict. The state government, however, has followed the legal course of filing a review petition in the apex court and exploring some other available legal courses, which has been unnecessarily delaying the process (Singh 2016: 51). Although the Chakma and Hajong migrants of Assam, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal were granted citizenship status, they continue to languish as stateless in Arunachal Pradesh.19 The extension of citizenship to them will have significant implications for both the state and the migrants themselves. The state considers that the citizenship status accompanied by the permanent settlement of Chakma and Hajong migrants in Arunachal Pradesh would invariably run against the ‘protected status’ of the state and create overwhelming problems in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres. However, without being citizens, the Chakmas and Hajongs, on the other hand, will not be able to work in any government or reputed private firms (Singh 2010: 144; Singh 2016: 47). In short, their struggle for citizenship rights in Arunachal Pradesh continues. 38

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The issue of citizenship has been considered by both the central and the state governments quite differently, and they engaged with different sets of concern. The central government reflects its firm commitment to grant citizenship rights to the Chakma and Hajong migrants of Arunachal Pradesh under the Citizenship Act, 1955. On the contrary, the state government does not consider citizenship to be a major issue. The important issue for the state government is the permanent settlement of the migrants outside the state. The state does not oppose the granting of citizenship rights to the Chakma and Hajong migrants per se (Singh 2010: 144) but it necessarily considers that their permanent settlement in Arunachal Pradesh would not only dilute the credibility of the existing laws and safeguards explicitly applicable to the state (Singh 2010: 132) but also emerge as a threat to the identity and culture of the local people. The then chief minister, Gegong Aping, stated that the permanent settlement of the migrants would certainly make a significant demographic impact on the local people and invariably initiate the process of the loss of identity and culture of the indigenous Adivasi population (Singh 2010: 144). For instance, there has been a significant decline in the Adivasi population from 88.76 percent in 1961 to 68.8 percent in 2011 in the state. It also believed that the permanent settlement of the migrants will gradually lead to dispossession and marginalisation of the Adivasi communities, thereby disturbing the peace and harmony of the region by inviting stiff resistance and violent conflicts. He further pointed out that granting citizenship rights to the Chakmas and Hajongs could not be justified under the Indira–­Mujib Agreement of 1972, as it did not specifically mention about them and the provisions of this agreement cannot be applied to Arunachal Pradesh due to its ‘protected status’ which it has been enjoying since colonial times. In short, victimised by the politics of Partition and prosecuted and rejected at the hands of the Pakistani regime, the Chakma and Hajong migrants continue to languish in a state of statelessness in the absence of citizenship in India (Singh 2010: 250).

Conclusion The comparative analysis of the migration and citizenship questions in India shows that although the Bengali migrants of Odisha have been assured of citizenship rights in the parlance of their settlement outside West Bengal, that is not the case with the Bengali migrants of Assam and the Chakmas and Hajongs of Arunachal Pradesh. The migrants have been experiencing the notion of ‘suspended citizenship’, with the 39

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status of ‘D voters’ in Assam and ‘struggling citizenship’ in Arunachal Pradesh. A close analysis suggests that India has not adopted a standard/uniform approach to deal with migrants from across the globe. Due to the lack of such an approach, migrants have been treated differently on the basis of time and context of their movement, as well as their religious identity. Some migrants, such as the Hindu Bengali migrants from East Pakistan, have been granted citizenship rights but not the Chakma and Hajong migrants of Arunachal Pradesh. Although all migrants had received citizenship status, irrespective of their religious identity in Assam, at the initial stage (Jayal 2013: 63–­4), the current BJP-­led government is granting citizenship on the basis of their religious identity. There were demands for expulsion of foreigners from 1950 itself in the case of Assam; the amendment to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1955, however, was made only in 2003, which declared that all immigrants were illegal migrants. The religious composition of the migrants, especially the entry of illegal Bangladeshi Muslims (Bangladeshi infiltrators), had forced the Indian state to pass the act so late. Amidst tensions and conflicts emerging around the citizenship question, there has been a conflict between the ethnic notion of citizenship held by the state government especially by Arunachal Pradesh and the political idea of citizenship held by the central government (Singh 2010); there is conflict between the native inhabitants and new entrants whether they are migrants, asylum seekers or immigrants in different states of India. Currently, the Indian state is trying hard to meet the needs of native citizens, acknowledging the pressure generated by the considerable presence of migrants in India. The process of granting citizenship to migrants has generated different forms and degrees of resistance by the native communities because citizenship status would initiate the process of redistribution, recognition and representation (Isin and Wood 1999: 1–­24). Such a process has created tremendous pressure on the scarcely available resources in India and has gradually constructed the platform for various communities to access and compete for control over those resources. This kind of competition for accessing and managing resources generated community conflicts in India. Although the migrants in India are different in the context of their movement as well as religion, they have, however, suffered a lot from the local resistance to the political ideas of citizenship. The cases of Odisha, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh suggest that citizenship is a two-­pronged process, not just a privilege bestowed by the state but also contested by those who are recipients of it. So, in India, as against Soysal’s notion of post-­national membership, political membership appears to be important especially in the case 40

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of Arunachal Pradesh but not a sufficient condition to define citizenship. So, along with political citizenship, social and ethnic dimensions of citizenship are also important. These discourses and developments have reopened the question of who should be granted citizenship. In short, it is not only the visible text of the Indian constitution that always defines the notion of citizenship but also oppositional movements, judicial pronouncements, regional, religious and ethnic identities of the migrants and potential conflict with the native citizens that have increasingly affected the practice of citizenship in India.

Notes 1 Samaddar (1999: 22) challenges the concept of universal citizenship on the ground that citizenship criteria are state specific under which certain people can be included and others excluded. The states also define the degree of political integration and level of political participation. In this context, the idea of universal/cosmopolitan citizenship is merely a utopian idea. 2 Accommodation rights indicate the symbolic desire for recognition and redistribution of power and resources and substantive changes in the way institutions operate so as to better meet the needs of a particular group. 3 It is believed that migrants create conditions for destabilisation and disruption of political, economic and social systems in the host country. Destabilisation is also felt in the host country as a result of tensions and conflicts between the migrants and the local people. Such conflicts emerged from competition for scarcely available resources that have to be shared between the migrants and the local citizens in the areas of essential supplies and essential services, health, water, sanitation facilities, power and transport infrastructure and so on. The migrants also create problems of external security. This is particularly so when they actively pursue their armed and/or political struggle against the home state from their sanctuaries and bases in the host country, and they include in them what has been described as the ‘refugee warrior community’ (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989: 6). The protest of Tibetan migrants in New Delhi during the Olympic Torch in 2008 can be cited in this context. 4 The Bengali migrants are the product of the Partition between India and Pakistan. They belonged to the same geographical territory until 1947 when India and Pakistan were created as two dominions on the basis of two-­nation theory. 5 A fact-­finding committee comprised K. P. Mathrani, Joint Secretary to the GOI, Ministry of Rehabilitation; N. K. Ray Chaudhary, Additional Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of West Bengal; and S. P. Sen of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta. The mandate of the committee was to conduct a survey and assess the conditions in relief camps and rehabilitation colonies, in particular; the provisions for housing and gainful employment offered; vocational and technical training given to the displaced persons in West Bengal; and the results of various rehabilitation measures undertaken by the government (Das 2001: 118).

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6 Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between India and Nepal on 31 July 1950 states that ‘[t]he Government of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of other, the same privileges, in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and privileges of a similar nature’. 7 Article 13 of the ICCPR reads, ‘An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority’. 8 Several observers have argued that the reason for India’s refusal to sign the convention was that it was very Euro-­centric and India and the UNHCR viewed it as an instrument of cold war (Bhattacharjee 2008: 71–­2). 9 Non-­refoulement emphasises that refugees/migrants should not be compelled to return to any country where they are likely to face prosecution. To put it differently, the state should not reject, return or expel persons to territories where they would face prosecution and violence (UNHCR 2006: 94). 10 This was the day on which the Constitution of India was supposed to be adopted, but it finally came into force 26 January 1950. 11 Although the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 primarily intended to discourage potential Bengali migrants from entering India, it has been alleged that the state was engaged in discouraging the Muslim Bengali migrants only. 12 The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016, introduced by the BJP-­ led NDA government, also has a discriminatory provision related to the Hindu and Muslim illegal migrants. The government has proposed the changes in the nomenclature of illegal migrants. The bill considers the religious affiliation while extending citizenship status to the illegal migrants. As a consequence, the bill aims to grant citizenship to illegal Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The bill, however, does not include the Muslim illegal migrants. The bill has provoked resistance and protest in Assam because it is believed that once the bill becomes an act, it would affect and nullify the updated NRC. 13 The ECI put the letter D against the names of electors who could not prove their Indian citizenship during the extensive revision of electoral rolls in 1997. These electors were neither allowed to cast their votes nor contest elections. 14 Underlining the ease of availing documents necessary for inclusion in the electoral rolls, Sadiq cites an example that runs ‘18 years old Deb Kumar Biswas crossed over from Bangladesh to Garapota village in 2003. He obtained admission to a local school in Class IX and left it months later and obtained a certificate from the school attesting he was a student there. The certificate doubled as proof of his age and he (later) applied for a ration card’ (Sadiq 2011: 242). A ration card acts as a proof of identity for casting vote in elections in addition to availing government-­subsidised

42

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grains and welfare measures. To put differently, it reflects the orientation of migrants to accumulate proof of citizenship. 15 The Bangladesh independent war began on 25 March 1971. 16 http://nrcassam.nic.in/admissible_documents.html (accessed on 10 October 2016). 17 This is obvious that the settlement of the Buddhist Chakmas in the areas where the Buddhist Arunachalis inhabit would raise the religious dimension of the migrant rehabilitation in Arunachal Pradesh. It seems that due to their similar religious practices, the government decided to settle them in this specific area in order to avoid the possible contestation from the local people. With the emergence of dissent and conflict between the locals and the migrants in the contemporary period, it seems that this may be a reason for choosing a location, but the dominant principle that influenced the rehabilitation activities of the government during the early 1960s was the availability of land and forest resources and the low density of population. Arunachal Pradesh was one of the lowest population density states during that time and continues to be so even in the present day, where the 2011 census has recorded that there are less than 20 people per square kilometre in the state. 18 DLG, in principle, discourages the Tibetans to take up Indian citizenship as it would dilute their freedom struggle; they could lose their Tibetan cultural identity and tradition; this could lead to losing refugee status which might affect foreign funding, development aid and assistance from donors and sympathy for the Tibetan freedom struggle might diminish (Singh 2016: 46). Despite the opposition from the DLG, some Tibetan migrants, mostly from the second generation, have taken Indian citizenship to avail the facilities of passport and visas to go abroad (Kharat 2003: 304). 19 During the colonial period, Chakmas and Hajongs migrated to the Northeastern states of Mizoram, Meghalaya and Tripura, and as a result, they have been enjoying citizenship rights, as well as ST (Adivasi) status.

43

2 CREATING A SPACE FOR MIGRANTS The idea and execution of the Dandakaranya Project in Adivasi region Communities, with their characteristics in terms of language, culture, value, tradition and so on, need careful study. Little or no attention has been paid to the socio-­economic, cultural and political conditions of Adivasis during the colonial period. Apart from a few sporadic attempts made by the colonial government to collect data on Adivasis, not much had been done owing to difficulties in accessing these areas. This chapter begins with a discussion on categories differentiated as tribe, STs, Adivasis, vanvasis and so on. Thereafter, it discusses the Adivasi situation in contemporary times in Odisha, a state located in eastern India, in general, and in undivided Koraput district during pre-­ 1960s, in particular. It examines the nature of Adivasi habitation, their socio-­economic and political conditions before the entry of Bengali migrants to the area. The chapter addresses the question, why the state selected the Dandakarany region, in general, and the Koraput district of Odisha, in particular, as the prime site for the rehabilitation of the migrants?

Understanding the categories Tribes The conceptualisation of ‘tribe’ is extremely complex and ambivalent. The difficulty stems from the fact that different stakeholders, such as government officials, anthropologists and the Adivasis have developed their own understanding corresponding to their respective requirements. The colonial government neither defined the term nor explored their relationship with mainstream society. No single terminology dominated the colonial discourse on the concept of tribe. The census reports of 1901, 1911 and 1921 considered tribes as ‘Animist’, ‘Tribal Animists’ or ‘people following tribal religion’ and ‘Hill and Forest 44

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Tribes’, respectively. Similarly, the census reports of 1931 and 1941 and the Government of India Act, 1935 considered them as ‘Primitive Tribes’, ‘Tribes’ and ‘Backward Tribes’, respectively (Vermani 1990: 10; Ambagudia 2011: 34). The Constituent Assembly (1946–­49) also debated on the conceptualisation of a tribe. Prominent Adivasi representatives to the Constituent Assembly such as Jaipal Singh advocated the use of the term aboriginal people in place of tribes, referring them in relation to the land originally they inhabited before they were occupied by ‘outsiders’. He raised this issue in the Constituent Assembly, emphasising that Adivasis are the original inhabitants of the country. Though the subcommittee on the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) used the term aboriginal in the draft, the assembly, however, did not debate the politics of naming concerning the background of their habitation. But they were purely seen as the administrative category of identification and differentiation extending the benefits of the democratic welfare state, eventually enabling them to be equal citizens in post-­colonial India (Saksena 1981: 59), within the broader framework of differential citizenship (Young 1989: 258). Xaxa (2016) engages with the discussion on the formation of community identities, which are labelled as ‘Adivasi communities’, ‘tribal communities’, ‘indigenous people’ and so on. Bailey found it difficult to define the tribal people. He considered that ‘the distinction between tribal people and caste people has been a problem not only for sociologists, but it has rather been the concerns of administrators and the politicians’ (Bailey 1961: 7). He underlined four important issues that need to be addressed while understanding the tribal people, namely, their geographical isolation, distinctive language, different religious practices (animism) and economic backwardness. These concerns revolved around the nature and dynamics of their relationship with the caste people; the process of their absorption into a caste society; the criteria for defining tribal people; and the difference between a tribal society and a caste society (Bailey 1961: 7–­8). Bailey, however, contended that these indicators are inadequate to distinguish tribal society from caste society. Such difficulty further stems from observations that Farmer (1974) made while conducting fieldwork in different parts of India. He observed that ‘whether or not the tribal people recognised themselves as a caste, the administrative officials, drawn from caste society, considered each tribe as a caste assuming a lower place in a socially stratified society’ (Farmer 1974: 274). While addressing the issues concerning tribe–­ caste discourse in India, Bailey (1961) argued that caste and tribe are not different in all 45

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respects and that not all tribes differ from caste along the lines of geographical isolation, distinctive language, animism, autochthonous and economic backwardness. The morphological postulate is embedded in the process, what Srinivas (1977) calls the process of Sanskritisation through which the tribal groups originally fall outside Hinduism incrementally entered the Hindu fold by following the lifestyle of the larger Hindu society. For instance, the Gond tribe of Sambalpur in Odisha adopted a considerable degree of Hindu practices by relocating themselves within the larger framework of Hinduism, and the Gond zamindars1 wore the sacred thread. The process of Hinduisation, however, is not a voluntary process. Bose (1941) described the process of tribals’ attraction towards the dominant Hindu social organisation as ‘the Hindu method of tribal absorption’. While reading the 200 years’ history of conversion process among the Adivasis of Odisha (Orissa), Pati (2001: 4207) shows that during the nineteenth century, Hinduism launched a terror campaign and forced to convert or join the outcasts. For the Adivasis, therefore, entering the Hindu fold or adopting the Hindu practices is not a conscious choice rather the organised drive launched by the so-­called agents of Hinduism. Oommen (2011: 236) contended the process of Hinduisation as predominantly an attempt to place the tribes at the margin of the dominant Hindu society, maintaining the hierarchical relationship based on dominant values. With a bid to Hinduise the tribes, the dominant caste tried to deconstruct the idea of ‘multiple identities’ (Oommen 2011: 236) by developing the false belief that the process would lead to a total transformation of the tribal identity to Hinduism. Within this backdrop, the process of Sanskritisation advocated by Srinivas (1977) received less reverence from the sociologists and experts on tribal issues like Xaxa (2008), for whom the process of Hinduisation assumes greater significance than Sanskritisation in incorporating the tribes into the Hindu fold. Ghurye (1963) relentlessly advocated the assimilation of tribes into the larger Indian society. Ghurye maintained that ‘if, in the process, they were further marginalised, so be it’ (cited in Damodaran 2000). In doing so, Ghurye made a distinction between the tribes of Central and North-­East India and suggested two different paths to integrate them into the mainstream society. He contended for the cultural assimilation of the tribes of Central India through the process of Hinduisation. On the contrary, Ghurye argued for the political incorporation of tribes of North-­East India through strong administrative measures (Oommen 2011: 235, 239). He did not advocate the Hinduisation of tribes of North-­East India perhaps due to the substantial presence of 46

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Christianity among the Nagas, Mizos and Khasis and because some of the tribes or their sections were already integrated to the Hindu fold or had become Buddhist (Oommen 2011: 239). While strongly advocating the creation of a composite nation, Ghurye ruled out any distinction between the caste society and the tribes and considered the latter as ‘backward Hindus’ (Ghurye 1963: 19; Oommen 2011: 236). Bailey (1961: 14) appropriated the blurred distinction between a caste society and a tribal society and postulated a continuum rather than a discrete entity. Nineteenth-­century ethnographic understanding not only described the tribe as not only a part of a particular type of society based on kinship ties but also a particular stage of evolution (Beteille 1998: 187; Pati 2011: 2; Government of India [GOI] 2014a: 51). The former understanding defined tribes as a social group with a definite area, dialect, cultural homogeneity and unifying social organisation. The anthropological understanding of tribe also demonstrates the similar features of the tribes. These prescribed characteristics are, however, far from tenable in the contemporary period due to different stages of social, economic and political developments of various tribal communities in India. The existing literature argues that the problem in India, therefore, lies in the identification rather in the definition of tribes (Bailey 1961; Beteille 1986: 299). The evolution view of tribes considered them as a primitive society due to the lack of the traits of modern society and contemplated them as illiterate, uncivilised, non-­industrial, rural and so on (GOI 2014a: 51–­2). The sociological understanding of a tribe to a large extent emphasised that they form a separate entity that is fundamentally different from the caste Hindu society. Tribes continued to be distinct because they remained outside the Hindu civilisation (Beteille 1986: 316). But this does not mean to articulate that they were not part of the Hindu society. The British brought the tribals under a single political regime. Such administrative attempt of the British exposed the tribals to the larger society and thereby opened the window for exploitation of the tribes by the non-­tribes. As a consequence, the British followed the policy of isolation, and separate administrative arrangements were made to protect the tribals from the process of exploitation. In other words, although they were part of the dominant political system of South Asia, they continued to maintain their distinctiveness along the lines of their culture, language, tradition, lifestyle and so on. Although the caste society had already initiated the absorption of tribals into its ambit, not all of them were the victims of such process. The definite territories (homelands) and language of the tribals fundamentally 47

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differentiate them from other castes (Oommen 2011: 234). Notwithstanding, the tribes in India possess relatively distinct and unique socio-­economic, cultural and political entities. The existing literature considers tribe as a colonial construction (Mcmillan 2005: 111; Damodaran 2011; Das Gupta 2011) with due recognition of the role played by Western-­educated Indian elites in the formation of the tribe. The Indian elites appropriated the morphology of the colonial racial anthropology to justify the hierarchical relationship with the tribes and assert parity with upper-­class Europeans (Shah 2010: 14). The British constructed the notion of tribe primarily for administrative purpose referring to numerous desperate communities distinct from the Brahmin-­informed understanding of caste-­based South Asian reality. As a result, colonialism encountered a number of groups and communities that were previously known as nations, kingdoms and peoples and considered them as tribes (Kennedy 2013: 2–­3). Although the colonial attempt to the systematic study of the tribes was begun during the 1931 census (Beteille 1986), careful scheduling of tribes began only in 1936. The British initiated the process of scheduling to provide reservations to backward tribes in the provincial legislative assembly (where 24 out of 151 seats were reserved) under the mandate of the Government of India Act, 1935 (GOI Act 1935: 245). The notion of tribe is also considered as an abstraction and a distortion of social reality (McMillan 2005: 111). Thus, Beteille (1986) believed that tribe should be regarded as an idea rather than a concept because of the shifting reference point corresponding to different contexts and places. Shah (2010: 14) contended that tribe is a product of the mind of both colonial rulers and Indian elites. Historians argue that ‘tribals were not just a creation, based on the fantasies of colonial masters. They were very much a part of the South Asian reality at the time of India’s colonialism’ (Pati 2011: 3). There is, however, less disagreement concerning the fact that the term tribe is a politico-­administrative category (Mcmillan 2005: 111; Roy Burman 2009). Scheduled tribes The colonial discourse on tribes led to the emergence of two views advocated by two groups of colonial officials. One view projected the tribes as ‘troublemakers’ for the British, and the other view considered them as ‘impoverished and marginalised communities’ (Bates and Shah 2014: 9). The discourse continued unabated concerning which view shall have the precedence. However, after 1930, due to growing tribal 48

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political activism and increasing pressure from missionaries working among the tribes, the marginalised position of the tribals took precedence over the ‘troublemaker image’. Such a notion emphasised that there is a need to protect and promote tribal interests. The colonial government, therefore, realised that ensuring political representation of tribes would safeguard their interests. As a consequence, for the purpose of political representation, the colonial government prepared the list of scheduled communities in 1936 under the mandate of the GOI Act, 1935. So, it was the GOI Act that invented the concept of the ST (Bates and Shah 2014: 9). After Independence, groups and communities listed as tribes under the GOI Act, 1935 came to be reclassified as STs under the Indian Constitution (GOI 2014a: 24). The post-­colonial state-­appropriated tribes as STs primarily for administrative purposes to confer certain constitutional privileges and protection to a group of socially marginalised people. The original Indian Constitution neither defined nor laid down any criteria for specifying STs and empowered the state to prescribe certain criteria. Article 342(1) of the Indian Constitution, however, refers to STs as ‘the tribes or the tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribe or tribal communities, after the consultation with the Governor thereof, which the President may specify by public notification’. Such reference sometimes leads to confusion in classifying and identifying the tribal population for the purpose. The confusion appears because a particular tribe may be scheduled in one state and not so in another state. For instance, Konda Kapus is a group listed as STs in Andhra Pradesh but not in the neighbouring state, that is, Odisha (Galanter 1984).2 Thus, the first specification of STs concerning a particular state/union territory is by a notified order of the president, after consultation with governors concerned. The first presidential decree, The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950, promulgating the list of STs was declared on 6 September 1950. According to the order, an ST is one who is included in the schedule proclaimed through this decree. Once the list is declared, even the president has no power to modify it, and it can be amended only by an act of the parliament (Article 342[2]). The amendment to the list is essential to address the confusion and anomalies due to various nomenclatures in different parts of the country. As a result, the parliament has made a total of 272 modifications in the ST list in the form of addition and deletion after the 2001 census (GOI 2013: 120). The GOI set up a number of commissions and committees to define the criteria for the STs from time to time. In 1951, the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes proposed 49

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the standard elements to the definition of STs as ‘tribal origin, primitive way of life, remote habitation and general backwardness in all respects’. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs acknowledged the Constitution did not prescribe these criteria. However, they have been applied in India. These criteria are drawn from the 1931 Census, Kalekar Commission report (1955), Lokur Committee report (1965) and Chanda Committee report (1969) (cited in Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network 2008: 3). The criteria to define the STs as laid down by the Lokur Committee (1965) were primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact with the community at large and backwardness (Ambagudia 2011: 37; GOI 2014a: 25). Although some of these criteria are no longer relevant as they were in the 1960s, we still use these as defining features of STs. The continuation of these indicators apparently suggests that we do not acknowledge the changes that took place among the tribal communities of India and assume that they are static in nature. One must, however, admit that the tribal communities in post-­colonial India are experiencing changes with the impact of modern education and the process of modernisation. Verier Elwin, who once strongly advocated the isolation of tribal communities from the mainstream society, widely acknowledged that they cannot be kept as ‘museum specimens’ and advised for their integration (Vidyarthi and Rai 1985: 415; Ambagudia 2011: 39). The Cabinet Committee on Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Minorities in its meeting on 15 June 1999, approved a set of modalities for the inclusion and exclusion of STs. The committee emphasised that the cases favoured by the state government and RGI, along with their comments as well as any useful material/information furnished by the affected communities or by representations shall be forwarded to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for their opinion. The process of amending the legislation concerning the modification of the ST list shall be initiated only when the NCST,3 RGI and the state government favour changes (GOI not dated; Middleton 2013: 17). Adivasis As the tribes are known to be the original inhabitants of the country prior to the arrival of the Aryans, they can be considered as Adivasis. The term Adivasi is derived from two words: Adi, beginning or earliest time, and vasi, a resident of (World Bank 2011: 9). Although the state has not recognised the term Adivasi, many tribal communities in India 50

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employ this term as a political term of self-­reference (GOI 2014a: 25). The concept has drawn its references from a larger issue of people–­place relationship. Hardiman (1987: 13) speculated that the term Adivasi appeared to have originated in the Chhotanagpur region of Bihar in the 1930s. The term was popularised by the social worker A. V. Thakkar in the 1940s. It was used for the first time in reference to a political context with the setting up of the Adivasi Mahasabha (The Grand Council of Adivasis) in 1938. Thus, the Adivasi Mahasabha played a significant role in the construction of social categories. However, such origination of the term is far from tenable. It is believed that the Christian missionaries produced the term Adivasi (Shah 2010: 15). The Christian missionaries played a greater role in creating social consciousness by disseminating Western education and instilling a new system of values that generated awareness amongst tribes about the nature and degree of exploitation that the Adivasis endured during the colonial period. The Christian missionaries’ interests in the advancement of the Adivasis had the effect of creating a ‘backward’ social category (Bates and Shah 2014: 29), who deserved to be treated differently and provided welfare packages. Thus, the term was used to demand the establishment of equitable and just society as the Adivasis became conscious of the nature and dynamics of the exploitation they encountered from the Hindu castes. Adivasi activists instilled the belief that the Adivasis have the rights on land as they are the ‘sons of the soil’ (Weiner 1978). In the contemporary period, the term is widely applied to the discourse of people–­place relationship, especially in the context of Central India. It is believed that the Adivasi communities lived in richer lands of the north, but frequent incursions of more advanced and warlike people, mainly Aryans, forced them to move to isolated areas in forests and mountains (Das 1960: 81; GOI 1963: 21). Elwin offered a quite similar reason in the context of Adivasis of Odisha, where he underlined that the Adivasis of Koraput, especially the Sauras, believed that hilltops are the only thing that the Panos and Odiyas cannot steal from them.4 The continuous flow of the non-­ Adivasi people to the Adivasi areas generated different forms and magnitudes of exploitation, which acclimatised the Adivasi people to the hilltops. Although the term Adivasi is a self-­preferred term, it has not gained a similar attention from all tribal communities in India. This term has been increasingly used by the tribal communities of Central India to understand their relationship with the place and to grasp the nature and degree of exploitation and marginalisation caused by the Hindu castes. On the other hand, in North-­East India, especially in Assam, the term Adivasi refers to a category of people, who migrated 51

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to the area during the colonial period as indentured labour to work in the tea gardens of Assam. They are known as tea tribes. Although the tea tribes of Assam belong to the communities which are known as ‘Adivasis’ in the place of their origin and share the same history, they are not categorised as STs and thereby are deprived of the benefits of the entitlement policy. Similarly, the term of Adivasi has not been contemplated by every section of the society. Ghurye (1980: 29) vigorously opposed the consideration of tribes as Adivasis in the name of establishing harmony in society and the composite nation. The right-­wing Hindu organisations, such as the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangha and Sangh Parivar, among others, found it convenient to follow such writings and initiated the process of delegitimising the Adivasi identity (Philip 1999). They do not prefer the term Adivasis; rather, they recast Adivasis as vanvasis (forest dwellers). The right-­wing Hindu organisation prefers the term vanvasi because it distinguishes people not on the basis of their indigeneity but on their place of residence (Sundar 2012: 245). Philip (1999) alleged that denial of such status to the Adivasis is a deliberate policy of right-­wing Hindu organisations. They deny such status to the Adivasis primarily because they believe that granting such status would run counter to the critical component of their ideological project of Hindu Rashtra. These organisations contend that the Aryans who brought the Vedic civilisation to the country are the original inhabitants of the country. So, the claim of the Adivasi status would fundamentally challenge the consideration of the Aryans as the original inhabitants of the country that right-­wing Hindu organisations have been contemplating for so long (Philip 1999). However, interestingly, the Adivasis were also known as Paharis (hill dwellers), Adimjati (original communities), Janjati (folk people) and so on. To discourage potential protests by Adivasi organisations against such label, the Sangh Parivar has adopted its ambitious vanvasi project. To materialise such a project, in 1952, it established the VKP, the largest Sangh-­ affiliated body to work among the Adivasis. In due course, the Sangh Parivar established a number of organisations such as the VKA, Ekal Vidyalaya, Sewa Bharati, Vivekananda Kendra, Bharat Kalyan Pratisthan, Friends of Tribal Society, and so on in different parts of the country to work among the Adivasis. These organisations have initiated a number of developmental and welfare activities meant for the empowerment of the Adivasis in various parts of the country (Kanungo 2003b; Ambagudia 2015: 46). Thachil (2011, 2015) argues that the role of the Sangh Parivar as the non-­state service provider is embedded in the political mobilisation 52

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of the Adivasis that would help the BJP to gain electoral advantage over other political parties. The stated goal of the Sangh Parivar in the political sphere was to get the BJP into power and create a platform for the creation of a composite Hindu Rashtra. The social service provision has been seen as a strategy of the party of the privileged (BJP) to win over poor electorates in India. So, the much success of the BJP in the Central Indian Adivasi belt is the outcome of the welfare activities carried out by the right-­wing Hindu organisations (Jayal 2006: 113). However, the Sangh Parivar adopted strategies of welfare and developmental projects to check the rapid spread of Christianity among the Adivasis and bring the Christian Adivasis back to the Hindu fold. Sometimes, to build a composite Hindu Rashtra, the Sangh Parivar sporadically spread hatred towards minorities, leading to the emergence of communal violence in India. In this context, some of the Sangh organisations, such as Sewa Bharati, VKA and Ekal Vidyalayas, are labelled as Adivasi reconversion institutions rather than welfare organisations (Outlook 2002). Within this backdrop, it raises a serious doubt whether the Sangh Parivar had Adivasi development in mind at all. Indigenous people The discourse on naming the Adivasis regained the attention of the academia, policy makers and social activists in the 1980s and the 1990s. This discussion revolved around the issue of whether Adivasis could be considered as indigenous people. Although the ILO adopted the first international instrument, Convention 107 in 1957 to protect indigenous people from discrimination in the labour market (ILO 1957), the ‘Adivasis as Indigenous People of India’ was only debated in the wake of a number of international developments in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, a number of international events took place to address various issues and concerns of the indigenous people across the globe. These developments include: enactment of Convention 169 of the ILO (ILO 1989); adoption of the World Bank’s Operational Directives No. 4.20 on indigenous peoples in September 1991 (World Bank 1991); the formation of the UNWGIP of the UN Commission for Human Rights, especially the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples in 1993 (UN 2008), the declaration of 1993 as the International Year of Indigenous Peoples by the UN and the 1995–­2004 period as the UN Decade of Indigenous Peoples; and the decision to set a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples by the UN Human Rights Commission in April 2000. 53

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The issue of indigeneity has crafted scholarly attention across the globe (Beteille 1998; Karlsson 2003; Coates 2004; Sissons 2005; Xaxa 2008, 2016; Fernandes 2013). Although much has been written on indigenous people, there is a lack of consensus on its definition. Scholars such as Kuper (2003) question the credibility of the concept itself and argues that the term indigenous is theoretically problematic. The conceptualisation of indigenous people is based on two important determinants: people–­place relationship and nature of governance. The first criterion defines indigenous people as those who lived in the country to which they belonged during the pre-­colonial period or prior to the period a geographical region was conquered or colonised. The second criterion defines indigenous people on the basis of self-­governance of the Adivasis along the lines of their own social, economic and cultural institutions than by laws applicable to the rest of the society or the country at large (Xaxa 2016: 40). In the Indian context, it has even become more contentious when the concept of indigenous people comes to address the Adivasis. The conceptual discomfort of indigenous people has occurred both at the academic as well as administrative levels. The academic discomfort is influenced by the writings of Bailey (1961) and Ghurye (1963). As the term itself emerged to differentiate one category of people from the other, both scholars have ruled out any clear-­cut distinction between caste and tribe. Administrative discomfort emerged in response to various facilities associated with the concept. The concept first gained its international instrumental dimension by the enactment of the ILO Convention 107 in 1957, aiming to protect indigenous people. The convention made a distinction between tribal and indigenous people and advocated for their integration into the larger society. India took advantage of such provision as a part of making a composite nation by accentuating the process of nation-­building project and became a signatory of the convention. The contention, however, began with the adoption of Convention 169 by the ILO in 1989 that underlined the right to self-­determination of the indigenous people, and India is not a signatory to this convention. The administrative response to the denial of indigenous status is based on three aspects. First, the term tribe is an administrative category associated with entitlement policy and is not a historical category like that of the indigenous people (Xaxa 2016: 41). Second, during the discussion on Convention 169, Indian representatives emphasised on the non-­existence of tribe as a separate entity because of the acculturation process where tribes have been integrated into the larger society at various levels (Fernandes 2013: 382). Third, India considered the 54

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provision of self-­determination in Convention 169 as a threat to the nation-­building process. Such denial is perhaps because some of the tribes tried to misuse the provision of self-­determination and went ahead to demand the creation of an independent nation. For instance, while speaking at the 1993 session of the WGIP, Isak Chishi Swu, chairman of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (later changed to Nagalim), did not explicitly refer to the Nagas as indigenous people but spoke at length about the independent nation for the Nagas (Karlsson 2003: 409). Although the original intent of such provision was not to promote the disintegration of existing states,5 Swu increasingly emphasised the need for self-­determination in the form of establishing a sovereign nation-­state. Such a hard-­line position as Swu’s caused displeasure in other Adivasi representatives from India (Karlsson 2003: 409). The concept of indigeneity is debated on the ground of people–­ place relationship and the nature of their incompatible experiences within the Indian society. Although India was the signatory of the 1957 convention, the implication of indigeneity to the Indian Adivasis was brought to the public attention only in 1985 through a statement delivered jointly by Anti-­Slavery Society, a London-­based human rights organisation, and Lokayan, an Indian NGO (Karlsson 2003: 407). The statement emphasised that the term can be applied to India because the Adivasis are in contemporary context have been ‘reduced to a colonial situation and are dominated by a system of values and institutions maintained by the ruling groups of the country’. The statement advocated Adivasis to be considered as ‘indigenous people’ because of their experiences of ‘internal colonisation’ and incompatibilities with the dominant cultures, values, languages and traditions. It focused less on defining indigenous people along the line of original settlers. Contemporary discourse, however, appropriates the people–­ place relationship as one of the important ways of analysing the issue of indigeneity in India (Xaxa 2008, 2016). The status of Adivasis as indigenous people would certainly project themselves differently in global politics and enable them to pursue a new type of politics (Karlsson 2003: 404). Kuper (2003: 390) argues that the term indigenous people is used to seek ‘privileged rights’ over the other. However, he relentlessly opposed group rights on the basis of the politically constructed concept of indigenous people. Kenrick and Lewis (2004) vehemently criticised Kuper on the ground that while discussing indigenous peoples’ movement, he polemically ignored the particular historical context of marginalisation, discrimination, subjugation, deprivation and dispossession that the indigenous people had 55

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endured. The indigenous people are still denied the rights enjoyed by the people of the dominant society. They are encountering tremendous pressure for cultural assimilation and succumbed to the relentless process of dispossession of their rights on natural resources such as land, water and forest. The indigenous peoples’ movements aim to address these growing experiences of deprivation, marginalisation and dispossession. So, they are spearheading movements in different forms and at various levels to restore their rights to these resources. In this context, using the international term indigenous people would help to gain support at the international level and the local struggles might be taken seriously by the international community (Kenrick and Lewis 2004: 5). Although there is no official definition of indigenous people, the UNWGIP has adopted the working definition on the basis of four principles: (a) priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory; (b) voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; (c) self-­identification, as well as recognition by other groups and state authorities as a distinct collectivity; and (d) an experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist (Kenrick and Lewis 2004: 5). Although the use of the term indigenous people may draw international attention to the persistent struggle of the marginalised and deprived communities, its use at the local or regional level has been questioned increasingly (Barnard 2004: 19). Barnard advocates for the region-­specific term due to their different historical specificity. Beteille (1998: 190) argues that due to the continuous process of population movement across the state boundaries, it may not be appropriate to apply the term identically across the place of their locations. Granting indigenous status on the basis of people–­place relationship in one place may not work elsewhere. For instance, the claim of Adivasis of Central India for indigenous status may indeed be accommodated since they have lived in their present habitat since time memorial. However, the claim of the Adivasis (tea tribes) in Assam, who have been brought to the area from Jharkhand and Odisha as indentured labourers by the British during the nineteenth century, on similar grounds, may be questionable. Barnard (2004: 19) argues that land rights should not be granted to the people on the basis that they are the sons of the soil. Rather, they should be granted land rights because the land is already their land. To substantiate this position, Barnard cites Article 14 of the ILO Convention 169, which says that ‘rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall 56

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be recognised’ (ILO 1989). Barnard (2004: 19) further argues that the acceptable point about the classification of people as ‘indigenous’ is not that they pre-­dated other peoples but that they pre-­date state formations established to protect such other peoples. The Adivasis of India can be considered as indigenous people as they meet the criteria of being sons of the soil (Weiner 1978; Xaxa 2008; 2016); witnessing incompatible experiences in social, economic and political spheres; and existing before the formation of the state (Kennedy 2013: 2–­3) corresponding to their respective contexts. In this context, Xaxa (2008, 2016) emphasises that the applicability of indigenous people raises two pertinent issues: (a) whether groups designed as tribes have been natives of India and the non-­tribes as immigrants and (b) in case they were not natives if they settled prior to the arrival of the Aryans. Opponents argue that Adivasis can hardly make claims of being the natives of India on the basis of their present location, which has further being pushed by the dominant social group, the Aryans. So, while addressing the issues and concerns of indigeneity in the Indian context, three criteria need to be followed – one, the period of settlement of the Adivasis, which is more appropriate to the Central Indian context, and, two, the region-­specific criteria that is more relevant to the North-­East region of India. The second criterion is associated with the governance system of the tribals based on their language, culture, values, traditions and so on that distinguish them from the larger society. The third criterion reflects tribes’ considerable degree of marginalisation, exploitation, deprivation and dispossession vis-­à-­vis the larger dominant society, and this criterion can be equally applied to the whole of India. Although the contemporary discourse focuses on ST and indigenous people at the national and international levels, respectively, the book uses the term Adivasi for three reasons. First, the state-­appropriated term ST ardently articulates their identity as ‘Adivasis’ in the process of interaction and development of a contextual relationship with outsiders. The term Adivasi is a self-­preferred term that emerged in opposition to the state-­led process of dispossession and marginalisation (Prasad 2016: 308). The term has a close relationship with the idea of a unique culture and place. Second, the internationally acclaimed term indigenous people is widely interrogated in the context of India. And, third, the term Adivasi is seen as the synthesis of the global ‘indigenous’ and the parochial vanvasi or janjati (Chandra 2015). In this book, the term Adivasi is used to describe a set of people, who have distinct identities along the lines of language, culture, tradition, values, beliefs and practices that represent a considerable degree of deprivation and marginalisation and are different from the dominant society. 57

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Adivasi situation in Odisha According to the 2011 census, 22.85 percent of Odisha’s population are Adivasis. It is the house of 9.2 percent Adivasi population of the country and third in terms of Adivasi concentration, only next to Madhya Pradesh (14.69 percent) and Maharashtra (10.08 percent). The Adivasi communities living in the state range from small communities like Chenchu, Bonda, Juanga and Didayi to larger groups like Munda, Santhal, Kandha, Oraon, Saura and Bhuiyan. The Adivasis of Odisha present a complex diversity in cultural patterns, social set-­ups, language and so on. Out of 62 Adivasi communities of Odisha, the GOI identifies 13 Adivasis as PVTGs, earlier known as Primitive Tribal Groups. They are, Birhor, Bonda, Didayi, Dongria Kondh, Juang, Kharia, Kutia Kondh, Langia Saora, Lodha, Mankirdia, Paudi Bhuiyan, Saura and Chutia Bhunja. They live in Sambalpur, Koraput, Malkangiri, Kalahandi, Keonjhar, Sundergarh and Mayurbhanj districts. Each of these groups is small in number, has various levels of social and economic development and, generally, live in a remote habitat with poor administrative and infrastructure back up. They have been characterised by low levels of literacy, declining or stagnant population, pre-­agricultural level of technology and economic backwardness (Ota and Mohanty 2015: 304). However, these communities have similarities in terms of their dependence on nature for livelihood and offer puja to nature. In Odisha, out of 314 blocks, 118 blocks are considered as Adivasi blocks. Table 2.1 delineates the pattern of SC (Dalits) and Adivasi population in Odisha since 1951. The Adivasi population of Odisha was 20.26 percent in comparison to the SC population of 17.96 percent in 1951. Although there is a decline in SC population to 15.75 percent, Adivasi population, however, increased to 24.07 percent in 1961. From 1971 onwards, Adivasi population witnessed its decline while the number of SCs rose and fell several times. The decline of the Table 2.1  ST and SC population of Odisha, 1951–­2011 Census year

Total

STs (%)

SCs (%)

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

14,645,946 17,548,846 21,944,615 26,370,271 31,659,736 36,804,660 41,974,218

2,967,334 (20.26) 4,223,757 (24.07) 5,071,937 (23.11) 5,915,067 (22.43) 7,032,214 (22.21) 8,145,081 (22.13) 9,590,756 (22.85)

2,630,763 (17.96) 2,763,858 (15.75) 3,310,854 (15.09) 3,865,543 (14.66) 5,129,314 (16.20) 6,082,063 (16.53) 7,188,463 (17.13)

Source: GOO (2006b); Census of India (2001, 2011).

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Adivasi population from 1971 onwards can be attributed to the execution of the centrally sponsored DNK Project in Odisha. The DNK Project rehabilitated Bengali migrants in Odisha since 1960 (see Appendix II). The massive rehabilitation process of the Project contributed towards handing over Adivasi lands to non-­Adivasis, who, in most cases, were Bengali migrants.6 Unlike recently, where the alienation of Adivasi land to non-­Adivasi people is legally banned, the scenario of the 1950s and 1960s allowed the non-­Adivasi people to acquire Adivasi lands with due permission from the competent authority (Ambagudia 2010: 63). The legal means of ensuring the transfer of Adivasi lands to non-­Adivasis further contributed to the dispossession and deprivation of Adivasi communities in Odisha. Correspondingly, the process of dispossession and deprivation forced the vulnerable Adivasi communities to migrate to some of the neighbouring states like Andhra Pradesh in search for means of their livelihood. This could be another possible explanation for the declining of the Adivasi population in Odisha since 1971. However, the Adivasi population of Odisha increased from 22.13 percent to 22.85 percent between the 2001 and 2011 census. This can perhaps be explained as a result of the addition of other sub-­communities to the ST/Adivasi list (GOI 2013: 118).7 Table 2.2 shows that due to the widespread demographic picture of the Adivasi population, the fifth schedule to the Indian constitution Table 2.2  Scheduled areas of Odisha District

Tracts in scheduled areas

Area (sq km)

Balasore Gajapati Kalahandi

Niligiri block R. Udaigiri Th. Rampur block &   Langigarh block Kandhamal Tahasil &   Baliguda Tahasil Kendujhar Tahasil &   Champua Tahasil Whole district Whole district Whole district Whole district Whole district Kuchinda Tahasil Whole district Total % to the state total State total

223.6 2,498.80 323.80 999.70 2,017.60 5,628.10 9,921.40 1,585.40 8,534.00 6,115.30 10,416.60 5,135.30 7,584.70 2,367.30 9,921.40 69,613.80 44.70 155,707.00

Kandhamal Kendujhar Koraput Malkangiri Mayurbhanj Nabarangpur Rayagada Sambalpur Sundergarh Odisha

Source: Singh (2005: 290).

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declared 44.70 percent of the total land area of the state as scheduled areas.8 Out of 30 districts in Odisha, 12 districts have been declared as partially or entirely scheduled districts. The six districts of Balasore, Gajapati, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Kendujhar and Sambalpur are reported as partially Scheduled Areas and the remaining six districts such as Koraput, Malkangiri, Mayurbhanj, Nabarangpur, Rayagada and Sundergarh are declared as fully scheduled areas. The scheduled areas are designed to protect and promote the interests of the Adivasi communities. Table 2.3 shows the number of Adivasis and SCs in Odisha. In 1951, 42 communities were categorised as Adivasis in Odisha under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. Their number increased to 62 in 1961 with the implementation of recommendations of the Backward Classes Commission, 1956. This revision brought in several new groups into the orbit of various types of amenities and facilities designed exclusively for the Adivasis in Odisha. There is no change afterwards. The parliament of India has, however, modified the Adivasis/ ST list of Odisha and included some more sub-communities under this category. Similarly, the number of SC communities was 92 in 1951 and increased to 94 in 1961, decreasing to 93 in 1981 with no change in the number thereafter. Table 2.4 explores the level of literacy among the Adivasis and SCs. The literacy rate of Adivasis in 1961 was 7.36 percent when the total literacy rate was 21.66 percent and 11.57 percent for SCs. The 1971 data do not show an encouraging statistics in the case of Adivasis, although there is a marginal growth of literacy rate from 7.36 percent to 9.46 percent. When we compare across the census years, the percentage of Adivasi literacy has increased by more than seven times in six decades (7.36 in 1961 to 52.24 percent in 2011),

Table 2.3  Number of ST and SC communities in Odisha Census year

Number of STs

Number of SCs

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

42 62 62 62 62 62 62

92 94 (including Kuli of Sambalpur district) 94 (including Kuli of Sambalpur district) 93 93 93 93

Source: GOO (2006b).

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Table 2.4  Literacy rate of Odisha, 1961–­2011 Census year

Total

ST

SC

1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

21.66 26.18 34.23 49.09 63.08 72.87

7.36 9.46 13.96 22.31 37.37 52.24

11.57 15.61 22.41 36.78 55.53 69.02

Source: GOO (2006b); Census of India (2011).

which is certainly a pleasing statistics, especially when the total literacy rate had just tripled from 21.66 percent in 1961 to 72.87 percent in 2011. The increased literacy rate could be seen as the outcome of different affirmative policies to target the educational development of Adivasi communities in Odisha. Nonetheless, Table 2.4 also points out the enormous existing gap between Adivasis and non-­Adivasis in Odisha. The gap shall be understood as caused by the total exclusion of educational opportunities until relatively recently. Ironically, the two constitutionally identified scheduled groups of Odisha – SCs and STs – maintain disparity in ascending figures of 4.21, 5.70, 8.55, 14.47, 18.16 and 16.78 percent over the successive decades from 1961 to 2011. The reasons, among others, are the high incidence of poverty among the Adivasis and mismatch of school timings, which potentially discourage the tribal parents from sending their children to school at the cost of work. In short, substantial variation exists in literacy across the social groups in Odisha, and this gap is widening over the decades. Table 2.5 shows that Adivasis are distributed in all districts including those in the coastal belts. According to the 2011 census, the proportion of the Adivasi population to the total population of the district is highest in Mayurbhanj district (58.72 percent). Malkangiri district (one of the present study areas) had the highest Adivasi concentration among the districts in 1991 and 2001 census, with 58.54 and 57.42 percent, respectively. The proportion of Adivasis is the lowest in districts of Puri (0.36 percent), Kendrapada (0.66) and Jagatsinghpur (0.69). A total of 13 districts have a higher concentration of Adivasis than the state average of 22.85 percent, and the rest are below the state average. Just less 50 percent of the districts have a higher proportion of Adivasi people than the state average. The analysis of Adivasi situation shows that Adivasis such as Juang, Gadaba, Paraja, Banda, Koya and so on live in the compact area, while the Saura, Kandha, 61

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Table 2.5  District-­wise ST population in descending order, Odisha, 2011 Sl. no. District

Total

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

2,519,738 1,479,576 58.72 613,192 354,614 57.83 967,911 541,905 55.99 1,220,946 681,173 55.79 577,817 313,714 54.29 733,110 392,820 53.58 2,093,437 1,062,349 50.75 1,379,647 697,583 50.56 1,801,733 818,878 45.45 312,520 110,400 35.33 1,041,099 355,261 34.12 610,382 206,327 33.80 579,505 176,758 30.50 1,576,869 449,456 28.50 1,648,997 347,164 21.05 1,481,255 281,135 18.98 1,273,821 179,603 14.10 1,192,811 162,056 13.59 441,162 55,364 12.55 2,320,529 275,678 11.88 610,183 57,192 9.37 1,827,192 151,432 8.29 962,789 58,691 6.10 2,251,673 115,051 5.11 2,624,470 93,745 3.57 3,529,031 118,928 3.37 1,506,337 30,428 2.02 1,136,971 7,862 0.69 1,440,361 9,484 0.66 1,698,730 6,129 0.36

Mayurbhanj Malkangiri Rayagada Nabarangapur Gajapati Kandhamal Sundargarh Koraput Kendujhar Debagarh Sambalpur Nuapada Jharsuguda Kalahandi Balangir Bargarh Anugul Dhenkanal Baudh Baleshwar Subarnapur Jajapur Nayagarh Khordha Cuttack Ganjam Bhadrak Jagatsinghapur Kendrapara Puri

ST

% to the district population

Source: Census of India (2011).

Gond and Bhuiyan have a wide distribution in different districts. Any particular district is not confined to a particular Adivasi community (Bhatt and Bhargava 2006: 133–­52). More than one Adivasi community is living in every district. The distribution of Adivasi population among districts is considerably uneven. Let me now turn to the study area of undivided Koraput district. Koraput district provides the ideal case for the study of day-­to-­day interaction and interface between natives (Adivasis) and outsiders (Bengali migrants). Discussion of the Adivasi situation of Koraput district would provide the essential context for the identification of the area for migrant settlement. 62

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Introducing Koraput Koraput district is located in the southern part of Odisha. It was first constituted as a district on 1 April 1936, when the Odisha (Orissa) province came into existence. Before 1936, it was a part of the Visakhapatnam district in the Madras presidency. However, since 1936, it has been a part of Odisha province under the Bengal presidency, and later, of the state of Odisha. It comprised the greater part of the area formerly known as the Agency Tracts of Visakhapatnam. Due to the backwardness of the inhabitants, the Agency Tracts of Visakhapatnam were administered by the collector with a certain special power to his capacity as an agent of the governor, under the Ganjam and Visakhapatnam Act of 1839.9 The undivided Koraput district is located between 20°3ʹ and 17°50ʹ North latitude and 81°27ʹ and 84°1ʹ East longitude. On the extreme north, it shares the boundary with Kalahandi and Raipur districts, on the west with Bastar district, on the south with the districts of East Godavari and Visakhapatnam and the east with the districts of Srikakulam and Ganjam. The undivided Koraput district, being the largest district in the province of Odisha, consisted of a total area of 9,875 square miles (Bell 1945: 1). Demography The population of the Koraput district was 690,303 in 1891. There was a small increase of about 3,000 by 1901. The population was increased by 140,000 to 833,328 in 1911. There was a decline in the population to 805,583 in 1921 because of the influenza epidemic of 1919, which affected the district severely. There was, however, a dramatic increase in the demographic picture of the district during the decade of 1931 and 1941. In 1931, the population of Koraput district increased to 949,652. The population had increased by 18.77 percent, contributing to the total population of 1,127,901 in 1941 (Bell 1945: 56). The overall population density of Koraput district was 114 persons per square mile in 1941. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to mention that there was a significant growth of population in Jeypore, Nabarangpur and Malkangiri taluks of the Koraput district during this period.10 Three distinct but interrelated reasons are responsible for the steady growth of population in Koraput during this period: first, the conversion of wasteland to the plough in the area of Jeypore, Nabarangpur and Malkangiri taluks; second, the opening up of the Raipur–­Vizianagaram railway line to traffic in 1932; and, third, the movement of population from the neighbouring districts and states to the Koraput region. To put it differently, Koraput 63

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district has a long history of migration from the colonial period. The third reason bears the outline of the book, as it intends to study the issue of migration with a particular reference to Bengali migrants and their relation with the native Adivasi people. The issue of immigration and migration is not a recent phenomenon. Two district gazetteers indicated that immigration and migration are important features of the undivided Koraput district since its origin (Bell 1945: 56; Senapati and Sahu 1966: 80–­1). During the British rule, a large number of local people, mostly Adivasis, went to work in tea gardens of Assam, and most of them settled there.11 At the same time, with the advancement of modernisation and development, a large number of outsiders came and settled in Koraput district. While emigrants, in general, were Adivasis, and immigrants, by and large, were non-­Adivasis. The issue of immigration has become more complicated and contentious with the implementation of the DNK Project to settle the Bengali migrants from East Pakistan in Adivasi areas, which has been discussed inChapters 3, 4 and 5. Koraput: an Adivasi district The Adivasi issues in Odisha started gaining attention from the period of Ashoka. One of his rock edicts, which stands at a distance of 150 miles from Koraput, specially referred to the Pratyantavasinah, meaning the Adivasi population. The Great Emperor says, ‘The Tribal population will ask – how does the Emperor look upon us? Tell them that the Emperor looks upon them as he looks upon his own children and in their welfare lies the welfare of the Emperor and his children. The Emperor wishes them to adopt the path of Saddharma-­true civilisation’ (Mehtab 1957: 1). The concept of tribe was for the first time introduced to Koraput in 1917 by the government of the Madras presidency under the Agency Tracts Interests and Land Transfer Act, 1917 (Panigrahy 2008: 54). This act came into force on 14 August 1917, and all communities of Koraput were termed as ‘Hill Tribes’ under this act. The ‘Hill Tribes’ were defined as [a]nybody or class of persons residing in the agency tracts (that is, whole undivided Koraput district and agency tracts of Gajapati, Kandhamal and Ganjam districts of Orissa), not being a landholder (that is, Maharaja of Jeypore Zamindary) that may be notified for the purpose of the Act by the Provincial Government. (Behuria 1966: 253) 64

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The act considered all the non-­landlord as ‘Hill Tribe’, which constituted 83 percent of the district population (Bell 1945: 60). In independent India, the ‘Hill Tribes’ of Koraput district were divided into three categories – ST, SC and OBCs under the Constitution Order of 1950 (Panigrahy 2008: 54). Appendix I of this book demonstrates that the politics of ‘scheduling’ and ‘descheduling’ of communities has become the permanent feature of ‘Hill Tribes’ of Koraput district since the colonial period. This trend has been continued even in the contemporary period (Ambagudia 2011; GOI 2013: 118; GOI 2014a: 47). Several administrators and anthropologists studied different dynamics of ‘Hill Tribes’ and divided them accordingly. Bell (1945: 60) divided the whole Adivasis into three main classes. The first category of Adivasis is associated with the Dravidian family and represented by the Kandha, Paraja, Gond and Koya communities. The Sabara and Gadaba Adivasi communities epitomised the second category of people associated with the Munda or Kolarian race. The third group of people are represented by the Adivasis and castes whose origin and affinities are uncertain, and they have been living in the area for many centuries. The last category of people is represented by the Bhottods, Bhumias and the Mattiyas, whose names proclaim them to have sprung from the soil on which they live. The third category also included the Rana and Gauda communities who were believed to have migrated from the plain lands of Odisha. But after residing for many centuries, many of them adopted the lifestyles of the aborigines (Adivasis) and came to be classified as ‘backward tribes’. Unlike Bell, Verrier Elwin broadly divided the aborigines of Koraput into two distinct classes: the true highlanders and the aborigines from the plains. The true highlanders retained much of their own culture, language and tradition and lived a full and happy life on the hills. On the contrary, the aboriginals from the plains widely adopted the outlook and lifestyle of their more sophisticated neighbours. The comparative study of the true highlanders and the aboriginals from the plains suggests that the latter are poor, miserable and diseased (Guha 1996: 2378). They lost their standards, beauty and dignity, culture, values and traditions and are severely affected by the forces of modernisation. On the other hand, the highlanders were untouched by the outside world, and they were not radically affected by it, which enabled them to live in almost unfettered freedom. To put it differently, happiness, freedom, health and prosperity, dignity and beauty among people were important components of the life of the highlanders.12 Elwin also pointed out that the highlanders and the aboriginals from the plains were at different stages of development, and a considerable 65

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number of highlanders were remarkably prosperous than the aboriginals from the plains due to their hard work and labour. On the basis of socio-­economic development, Senapati and Sahu (1966: 97–­8) divided the Adivasis of Koraput into three categories. First, there are real primitive Adivasis who are isolated from non-­ Adivasi people and, in some cases, from other Adivasis. They lead a relatively isolated and antiquated mode of lifestyle to keep their core cultural values intact. This category can be represented by Koya Adivasis (Mohanty and Bailey 1984: 53). Second, there are the Adivasis in transition. These Adivasis have come nearer to the dominant larger society and have adopted the dominant culture, values, language and traditions in different degrees. Although they adopted the economic practices of the civilised society to a large degree, they still retained most of their social organisations and customs. Third, there are assimilated Adivasis who have been completely absorbed in Hindu society. They have become equivalent to one or the other of the established castes. They have adopted the lifestyles of the Hindus. They also practise the Hindu religion, although they have their own god in most cases. Table 2.6 demonstrates the trend of Adivasi population in Koraput district between 1961 and 1991. The demographic picture of Koraput district is deliberately projected till 1991 because in 1992 it got divided into four different districts – Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada and the post-­1991 population figure of the district may not meet the objective of this chapter. One of the aims of this chapter is to show how the process of migrant settlement in the Adivasi area of Koraput has affected the demographic picture of the district. A careful analysis of Table 2.6 indicates that there is a constant decline in the Adivasi population over the decades. One of the possible reasons for such decline is the government’s initiative to settle the migrants from East Pakistan in Koraput district, which has unambiguously changed the demographic picture of the region. Table 2.6  ST Population of Koraput district, 1961–­91 (in %) Census year

Odisha

Koraput

1961 1971 1981 1991

24.07 23.11 22.43 22.21

60.90 56.34 55.22 54.31

Source: GOO (2006b).

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Adivasi conditions prior to the entry of Bengali migrants The rationale for discussing the Adivasi conditions prior to the entry of Bengali migrants is necessarily to glimpse the idea about the socio-­ economic and political conditions of Adivasi communities in eastern India. The discussion on these conditions would necessarily enable us to compare the conditions of the Adivasi communities after the settlement of the Bengali migrants in the area, which is the thrust of the proceeding chapters. Social condition The social organisation of the Adivasis is based on many beliefs and faith, totem and taboo. They are not a homogenous category. They differ widely among themselves with regard to racial traits, language, social organisation, cultural pattern, and so on. They also exhibit an infinite degree of differentiation according to the level of absorption of the Hinduisation process. There are internal differentiations among the Adivasis along occupational lines as well. Adivasi communities of eastern India are at different stages of social development and have acquired various positions in the society. All of them do not enjoy a similar social position, and some of the Adivasis, such as the Amanatya, are believed to have enjoyed a higher position. They formerly acted as ministers of Adivasis (Sahu 1960: 106). The Raja of Nabarangpur in Koraput district of Odisha had a manager belonging to the Amanatya Adivasi named Durlabha Pradhani. The Adivasis of southern Odisha presented different patterns of social organisation. Elwin (1964: 177) described that the Kandhas are the most difficult, timid and suspicious of all the Odisha highlanders. Such nature of the Kandha community is due to their prolonged conflicts with the government over human sacrifice and infanticide. On the other hand, Bonda Adivasis are the most volatile in temperament. At times, a group of Bonda people invade villages in the plains and collect goats and hens, robbing the juice of palm and salap trees, but nobody dares to stop them. They do not seem to be very careful about their women and witchcraft, but the causes of Bonda murder are mainly property and prestige. Rice and ragi appear to be the staple food for many of the Adivasi communities in eastern India. Besides, they also collect mango, tamarind, roots, jackfruit and other fruits during the hot summer months for food. Wild vegetables, bamboo shoots and mushrooms are collected and eaten. Most of the Adivasi communities have also developed social 67

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differentiation along the line of food. They do not share the same dining among themselves. For instance, Bhumia Adivasis do not accept food from Kandhas, Bondas and so on. Similarly, the Amanatyas do not take food from Bhatras, Gonds and so on. The Amanatyas are so particular about their dining that after marriage, women are not allowed to take food even in the houses of Brahmins (Sahu 1960: 106). These restrictions are, however, being liberalised to a large extent in the contemporary period due to the impact of the modern educational system. The use of intoxication has been an integral part of the Adivasi society. Froerer (2010: 220–­55) thoroughly examined the use of local liquor by the Adivasi communities of Chhattisgarh. They introduce alcohol in different festivals, rituals, naming ceremonies, pujas, marriages and so on. They more often consume the country wine called salap and the wine distilled from the Mohua flower, rice and ragi. However, they also consume foreign liquor in present times. Within this perspective, Elwin (1954: 535) stated that ‘there must be dance and feast with plenty of liquor for everyone to get some pleasure out of the marriage event’. Sometimes, the community identity of the Adivasis in India is also defined along the line of liquor prepared from the Mohua flower (Hardiman 2003: 148). Liquor is also associated with the local medicinal and healing culture. In this context, comparing the health status of highlanders and plains aboriginals of Koraput and Ganjam areas of Odisha, Elwin pointed out that the highlanders, who consume liquor reasonably, are well equipped to stand up against malaria than the aboriginals of the plains.13 Drinking wine is so much a part of the social and religious life of the Adivasi society that, while introducing prohibition, the GOO excluded the districts with a large Adivasi concentration out of its purview (Dash 1997: 80). On the contrary, it can also be illustrated that their habit of intoxication profoundly contributes to the economic impoverishment of the Adivasis. On one hand, consumption of liquor has become a source of economic and social devastation for the Adivasis. On the contrary, selling alcohol has become one of the lucrative business options for the non-­Adivasis in different parts of the country. Bagchi (1999: 99) underlines that liquor trade has one of the important sources of transfer of Adivasi land to the non-­Adivasis in the southern part of Odisha. It has been alleged by the Adivasis of eastern India that due to Adivasis’ weakness for liquor, the non-­Adivasis intensify the sale of liquor in Adivasi areas. The selling of alcohol appears to be one of the pertinent reasons for the erosion of Adivasi rights over land and has led to community conflicts over resources in Adivasi India (Ambagudia 2015: 47–­50). 68

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The Adivasis of Odisha consider marriage as an important institution. They practise different forms of marriage such as winning of the bride by capture, purchase, service to the parents for three years, elopement, negotiation and by selection at the dhangadi basa or girls’ sleeping hut. The pattern of marriage by capture was fairly prevalent at one time, but the system gradually lost its earlier form of dominance in the marriage practices of Adivasis in eastern India, and such instances became sporadic (Elwin 1955: 55–­6). In the course of time, the system of negotiation has come to receive preference. The customary and legal procedures, provisions, ceremonial practices, and so on vary not so much from Adivasi to Adivasi but according to the degree of external influence to which the locality has been subjected in the Koraput district of Odisha (Senapati and Sahu 1966: 125–­7). The traditional Adivasi marriage consists of little more than a series of ceremonial visits of the bride and bridegroom to one another’s house, an extensive exchange of presents, a dance and feast (Senapati and Sahu 1966: 127). The institution of marriage also depends on the internal dynamics of the Adivasi society. The Adivasi communities of eastern India, especially the Koraput district, believe that having more than one wife is an indication of higher status (Singh 1995: 107). They, however, mistakenly believed that having more wives would result in producing more children, and, hence, that the economic burden would be shared via division of labour. Economic condition The economic life of the Adivasis of eastern India was primarily subsistence-­oriented. The arrival of Aryans brought a great deal of change in the economic life of the Adivasi people. Before the advent of the Aryans, the economic life of the Adivasis was based mostly on hunting, fishing and gathering of wild fruits and roots. Various Adivasi communities followed different types of economic activities during the colonial period, and it is very tough to find similar occupation among all the Adivasi communities. The Adivasi economy is characterised by isolation and primitive unproductive technology. They are substantially dependent on nature for raising crops. Due to their subsistence economic condition, the Adivasis were also economically exploited by traders and moneylenders. Although the legislation has been passed to protect the Adivasis from the moneylenders, it has a little success. Agriculture is an important source of their livelihood, but earnings from this are not able to meet all the requirements of Adivasi families in the Koraput district for the whole year. This is because agricultural 69

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practices of eastern India are primitive and far more backward than that practised in the plains of the adjacent districts of Visakhapatnam and Ganjam. In Koraput district of Odisha, the Adivasi communities such as Bonda, Koya, Didayi, Gadaba, Paroja, Lanjia Soura, Kandha, Kutia Kandha, Dongria Kandha, Parenga and so on practise shifting cultivation.14 During the colonial period, it was not the soil erosion, but the continuous and organised form of pushing the Adivasis further to the unconquered forest areas by the plainsmen compelled the Adivasis to practise shifting cultivation (Bell 1945: 104; Patnaik 1988: 3). Shifting cultivation also reduces the chances of land acquisition from the Adivasi communities as they have few or no irrigated paddy plots to be mortgaged or sold. The continuous flow of population from the plains to the hills exerted unusual pressure on the hill Adivasis and resources of their habitat. The shifting cultivation was so much part and parcel of the Adivasi economy that it seemed impossible to the Britishers to abolish it. The growing discontent among the Hill Adivasis concerning the restricted use of forest areas compelled the British to adopt a policy that allowed shifting cultivation in unreserved forest areas on payment basis (Bell 1945: 106; Guha and Gadgil 1989).15 Later on, they also waived the procedure of seeking permission for Adivasi people due to the lengthy process of passing the order. Although the Adivasis practise agriculture as the primary occupation, it is almost always supplemented by hunting and collectional economy in eastern India. The Adivasis collect forest produces such as tamarind, sal seeds, sabai grass, beedi leaves, lac, resin, canes, honey, wax, horns, brooms, nux-­vomica, cotton and medical plants. The introduction of private property has been new to the Adivasi communities of India (Bell 1945: 60–­1). Earlier, they practised community, rather than individual ownership of, property. The colonial administration exposed the Adivasis to the modern world, leading to exploitation, deprivation and marginalisation. The introduction of the money economy in Adivasi tracts, an extension of the agrarian frontier, the development of communication links, the migration and settlement of non-­Adivasis in Adivasi areas and the imposition of restrictions on the use of forest resources increasingly contributed to the economic marginalisation and deprivation of Adivasi communities. The introduction of such measures was not helpful for the Adivasis as they faced numerous challenges in adjusting to the changing socio-­economic situations. The agency administration provided expanding economic opportunities for non-­Adivasis, while for Adivasis, it caused economic deprivation and dispossession. The process of exploitation has continued in various forms since the colonial period. 70

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The rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants in the southern part of Odisha has added another dimension to the already-­existing exploitation process. Political condition The political structure of the Adivasis begins with the community or village. The head of every community or village or an area or a class exercises supreme power over his subjects, and he is the source and interpreter of all laws. In this context, Elwin says, There is a regular village hierarchy. Every village has its own chief who is its spokesperson and general organiser. In some tribes such as the Saoras, he has great authority; in others as among the Bondas, he is a mere figure head. (Elwin 1954: 2/10) The Sabar headman is known as Gomango; the Kondhs call him Samanto or Majhi; the Parojas call him Janni or Muduli; the Koyas call him as Pedda, Goantia or Naik and the Bhumias call him Naik. The office of headman is in most cases acquired hereditarily. In the case of the Dongria Kondhs, the son of a headman heads the community after his father. If a headman is not blessed with a son, his younger brother or, failing that, any other competent consanguine relative becomes his successor. Among the Bhumias, after the death of the head, his younger brother becomes his successor or, failing that, his son becomes the head. The democratic nature of Adivasi political organisation can be demonstrated by the fact that the Adivasi leader governs the community only when the majority or whole of the village backs him. Adivasi communities are empowered to enjoy legislative, executive and judicial powers. It stands for the safeguard of judicial rights and enforcement of the judicial obligation to people. Law and order are maintained by a few village elders in consultation with the adult male members who are uncodified in nature and maintain discipline. They categorically announce that the violation of any law is punishable. The Adivasis do not have any judicial institutions, but they have their panchayat system and village council of which the elders of the community are members. They try to settle all types of disputes within the village. A fine is levied on the party found guilty and is to be paid in money. Ironically, they spend the large share of the money collected as fine on intoxication as well as entertainment. The village council is 71

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also the ultimate arbiter of ensuring peace and justice, solving disputes and regulating social life by the enforcement of customary laws. If the village council fails to resolve the dispute, then they move to the panchayat. In case the dispute remains unresolved, the sarapanch forwards it to the police station, which is a rare situation amongst Adivasis. The Adivasis keep it as the last option for resolving disputes. While the village council settles matters concerned with individuals or families in a village, issues concerning two or more villages are similarly settled by calling a meeting of the elders of each concerned village. After a detailed and often heated discussion wherein everyone present has a right to participate, the contesting parties are given the benefits of a full hearing, and the case is almost always settled amicably. Table 2.7 shows the distribution of parliamentary seats among the social groups in Odisha between 1952 and 1967 general elections. Although the first phase of rehabilitation of Bengali migrants began in 1960 and 1963 in Nabarangpur and Malkangiri zones in the undivided Koraput district (Appendix II), this chapter extends up to the election of 1967 because this was the first election in Malkangiri zone during the post-­rehabilitation phase. At the initial stage, most of the migrants did not have citizenship status. According to Table 2.7, the 1952 general election was held in 16 parliamentary seats in Odisha, of which 13 were declared as general constituencies and three as Adivasi reserved constituencies. Out of 16, four constituencies were allocated to the southern region of Odisha consisting of four districts of Balangir, Kalahandi, Kandhamal and Koraput. Out of four seats, only one constituency (Rayagada-­Phulbani) was reserved for the Adivasis, and the rest were unreserved constituencies. The 1957 general election covered 14 parliamentary constituencies in Odisha with an allocation

Table 2.7 Parliamentary seat distribution among the social groups in Orissa, 1952–­67 Election

1951 1957 1962 1967

Orissa

South Orissa

Total

Gen

SC

ST

Total

Gen

SC

ST

16 14 20 20

13 12 12 12

0 0 4 3

3 2 4 5

4 2 5 5

3 2 2 2

0 0 1 1

1 0 2 2

Source: Compiled from GOI (1951b, 1961b, 1964). Note: South Orissa consists of Balangir, Kalahandi, Kandhamal and Koraput districts.

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of two seats to the Adivasis. Only two seats, both being unreserved constituencies, were allocated to South Odisha. It is worthwhile to mention that there were no SC reserved constituencies in Odisha during the 1952 and 1957 elections. However, Odisha had one SC reserved constituency during the 1962 and 1967 elections. This could perhaps be explained that the first phase of rehabilitation of Bengali migrants began in 1960 and that by 1962, some of them had already gained citizenship and SC status. As a result, the categorisation of Bengali migrants as SC invariably contributed to the numerical strength of the SC population of South Odisha and altered the seat distribution. Similarly, the 1962 general election covered 20 parliamentary constituencies in Odisha out of which 12 went to the general population and four each to SCs and Adivasis. Five seats were allocated to the southern part of Odisha, of which two seats (Koraput and Phulbani) were reserved for the Adivasis. During the 1967 general election, out of 20, 12, three and five constituencies were allocated to the general, SC and the Adivasis in Odisha, respectively. A total of five seats were allocated to South Odisha, of which two constituencies (Koraput and Nabarangpur) were reserved for the Adivasis. During the 1962 and 1967 elections, one seat was reserved for the SCs of South Odisha. Table 2.8 shows that out of 107 seats, a total of 22 constituencies were allocated to South Odisha during the assembly election in 1952. Out of 22, 16 and six constituencies were demarcated for the general and Adivasi communities of the state, respectively. A total of nine seats were assigned to the undivided Koraput district, out of which five and four seats were marked as general and Adivasi reserved constituencies, respectively. In 1957, out of a total of 101 constituencies in Odisha,

Table 2.8  Assembly seat distribution among the social groups in Orissa, 1952–­67 Election

1952 1957 1962 1967

Orissa

107 101 140 140

South Orissa

Koraput

Total

Gen

SC

ST

Total

Gen

SC

ST

22 21 33 33

16 9 15 14

0 6 6 5

6 6 12 14

9 9 12 12

5 6 5 2

0 2 2 0

4 1 5 10

Source: Compiled from GOI (1951b, 1961b, 1964). Note: South Orissa consists of Balangir, Kalahandi, Kandhamal and Koraput districts.

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21 constituencies were meant for South Odisha. Out of 21, nine seats went to the general population and six seats each to SC and Adivasi communities. In Koraput district, out of nine assigned constituencies, six, two and one constituencies were demarcated as general, SC and Adivasi seats, respectively. During the 1962 state election, out of 140, 33 seats were meant for South Odisha. Out of 33, 15, six and 12 seats were demarcated as general, SC and Adivasi constituencies, respectively. Similarly, out of 12 seats meant for Koraput district, five seats each went to general and Adivasi population and two to SCs. The 1967 election was held in 140 Assembly seats, out of which 33 seats were allocated to South Odisha. Out of 33, 14 seats each were assigned to the general population and Adivasis and five to the SCs. In Koraput district, out of 12, two and ten seats were allocated to the general and Adivasi communities, respectively. At the moment, the statistics appear to make a little sense about the political situation of the Adivasis in the eastern Indian state of Odisha, in general, and Koraput district, in particular. The analysis of these figures demonstrates that there was a considerable presence of Adivasis in the formal political institutions in 1951, 1962 and 1967 and the marginal presence of the SCs in the Assembly. These statistics will, however, help us analyse the changing pattern of political representation of the SC and Adivasis after the 1967 election. In short, as the following chapters show, the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in the Koraput district has changed the demographic picture of the area considerably and has affected the political representations of the Adivasis at various levels in eastern India. The analysis shows that the Adivasi communities were enjoying political privilege meant for them with relatively less competition prior to the arrival of Bengali migrants in eastern India.

Entry of the Bengali migrants in Adivasi region Bengali migrants are those who migrated to India during Partition due to religious prosecution and fear. With the Partition of India in 1947, more than four million Hindus left their home in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and came to India by December 1956. The largest number of migrants settled in West Bengal, and the rest entered the border states of Tripura, Manipur and Assam (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 1). The migrants of East Pakistan are broadly categorised into three groups. The first category included the upper-­caste, wealthy elite Hindus who migrated to India and settled in West Bengal. The second type of migrants consisted of rural middle-­class cultivators and artisans 74

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who also settled in West Bengal. The third category included those migrants who migrated to India during post-­June 1954 corresponding to periods of nervousness and tension in East Pakistan. These migrants comprised lower-­caste poor Hindus like the Namasudras, who were rejected by the West Bengal state.16 The choice of the migrants for settlement had always been the state of West Bengal because of their identical culture, values, language and tradition with the people living in the state. The Bengali migrants suffered different degrees and magnitudes of discrimination, prosecution and harassment during their stay in East Pakistan. They were denied the rights of citizenship and fundamental human rights. The discriminatory treatment in East Pakistan compelled them to explore alternative geographical location to lead a harmonious and peaceful social life (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 153). As a result, they entered the Indian state of West Bengal. Hence, the dislocated Bengali migrants from East Pakistan needed assistance, and the Indian state emerged as the primary facilitator of migrant rehabilitation. The problem of migrants and displaced persons has always been a major issue in West Bengal. The massive exodus of people to this state after Partition caused a heavy strain on the state’s infrastructure. The continuous flow of migrants from East Pakistan had considerably swollen the number of migrants in West Bengal, which exerted tremendous pressure on the social, economic and political conditions of the state. In 1954, the Committee of Ministers in New Delhi urged that the issue of migrant rehabilitation should be considered as a national problem since they are the product of the Partition, and each state should undertake the rehabilitation of a certain number of migrants. So, the committee decided to settle them in other states of the country, particularly the neighbouring states. While considering the resettlement of Bengali migrants outside West Bengal, the GOI acknowledged that about 70 percent of them belonged to agricultural families. The convenient form of rehabilitation would, therefore, be in the form of land offerings (GOI 1963: 2; Senapati and Sahu 1966: 430; Farmer 1974: 88; Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 1). The sparsely populated Dandakaranya region of Madhya Pradesh and Odisha was selected as the most suitable area for the speedy resettlement of migrants from East Pakistan.17 The Dandakaranya region is spread over the states of Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. In Odisha, Malkangiri and Umerkote subdivisions of the undivided Koraput district were identified as the place for the rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants. It was anticipated that the highly conscious people of coastal Odisha would 75

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resist the rehabilitation proposal in their area fearing that it would cause undue pressure on their scarce resources. The decision-­makers in Odisha have always been politicians and bureaucrats belonging to the dominant castes such as the Brahmins and the Karans of coastal Odisha (Bailey 1960a: 129). So, they decided that the area for rehabilitation needed to be located far from the state capital of Bhubaneswar. In Madhya Pradesh, Paralkote and Bastar were selected to rehabilitate the Bengali migrants. The Dandakaranya region of Andhra Pradesh was finally excluded from the project because of constant pressure from the state on the central government and possible conflicts between the Bengali migrants and local communities to get hold of the scarcely available resources. Consequently, the sphere of activities of the DNK Project was confined to the districts of Koraput in Odisha and Bastar in Madhya Pradesh (Dasgupta not dated: 2), covering a total area of 25,000 square miles. The Dandakaranya region was selected for various reasons. The region, spreading over 80,000 square miles with large tracts of forest land, offered sufficient area to claim more than 1,00,000 acres of land which was needed for the rehabilitation process. Dandakaranya region was known for its remoteness and inaccessibility. It was densely forested and thinly populated. The density of population of the Dandakaranya region was about 100 per square mile. This meant that there was much scope for resettlement and further increasing the density of population of the area by another 100 persons per square mile without adversely affecting the interests of the local population. The dynamics of migrant settlement outside West Bengal raises some of the compound questions. How do we look at the rehabilitation of migrants in the Dandakaranya region? Was it the case of voluntary movement of the Bengali migrants outside West Bengal? Or, does the movement demonstrate an act of compulsion played by the government? While answering these intricate questions, we need to understand the particular context. The opposition parties, mainly the communists, severely criticised the proposal of sending the migrants to Dandakaranya region. They viewed the government’s attempt as an attack on the ‘united aspiration and legitimate movement’ of the migrants, sabotaging their common socio-­economic interests (Elahi 1981: 223). The communists also argued that the migrants should be settled in an environment similar to that of their origin. At the conference of Rehabilitation Ministers in 1956, the government decided to extend all state supports to those migrants who would be willing to settle down outside West Bengal. On one hand, it was entirely on the Bengali migrants to move to the Dandakaranya area to 76

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get all kind of state facilities including political reservation of seats; on the other hand, the government put certain pressures on the migrants to settle in Dandakaranya region in the name of extending its welfare activities.18 Although the migrants did not show any great eagerness to settle in the Dandakaranya region, the choice was reluctantly adopted by the low-­caste agricultural migrants such as Namasudras, Kshatriyas and the Poundra Kshatriyas, who entered the Indian territories after June 1954 (Dasgupta not dated: 10). As they were put in different transitional camps in West Bengal and the government decided to close all the camps by 1959, this category of migrants wanted to have a relatively better and secured future by moving to the Dandakaranya region.19

Conclusion The British exposed the Adivasis to the larger society by bringing them under the same administrative system. The contact of the Adivasis with people from dominant society brought myriad new problems in the Adivasi lifeworld. The Adivasis were, therefore, now exposed to new ideas and experiences. The exposure to the outside world led to fundamental incompatibilities for the Adivasi communities, and it was evident that they would severely react to the new experience. The advent of British rule created new problems in the social, economic, religious and political lives of the Adivasi communities in eastern India. The initial integration approach of the British led to the process of exploitation of Adivasi communities in different forms and magnitude. The socio-­ economic and political conditions of native Adivasis of eastern India, before the arrival of Bengali migrants, indicate that the Adivasi communities had developed their own way of life, which was apparently different from other communities of the region. Meanwhile, it is also important to mention that although the Bengali migrants were not in the scene prior to 1963, there was a continuous flow of non-­Adivasis to the Adivasi areas who were not only involved in exploiting the Adivasis but also played a major role in the process of the gradual transfer of a huge amount of Adivasi land to the hands of non-­Adivasis, and thereby contributed to the process of marginalisation, deprivation and dispossession of Adivasis. The Adivasis have, therefore, suffered different kinds and magnitudes of discrimination, exploitation and dispossession during before 1963. The process of exploitation, marginalisation and dispossession has compounded with the decision of the government to rehabilitate the migrants from East Pakistan in Adivasi region. Consequently, the existing pattern of discrimination and exploitation in the Adivasi 77

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society since the colonial period has accentuated after independence, more specifically since the 1960s, with the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Adivasi-­dominated areas. As a consequence, such decisions provided the seeds for the emergence of community conflicts between Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in Odisha.

Notes 1 The process of land settlement during the colonial period led to the emergence of affluent section among the tribal communities. The process of colonialism transformed many tribal chiefs into zamindars. The emergence of sections like landlords and moneylenders sometimes led to exploitation and marginalisation amongst the Adivasi communities (Pati 2011: 10). Other historians equate the emergence of such section to the growth and expansion of market economy and differentiation in terms of wealth (Mahapatra 1980: 2–­3). However, it is important to mention that the exploitative nature of non-­Adivasis is more dangerous than the Adivasi exploiters as discussed in this book later. 2 The geographical identification of a tribe is justified under Article 341 (1) of the Indian constitution, which states that in order to get the benefits of being a member of an ST in the matter of public employment, the person claiming it should be a member of such tribe in relation to the particular area or state where he is residing and where he seeks employment. The then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, justified in this article that unregulated movement of people seeking employment in other area, where there is unemployment among local people, is bound to create tensions in that area. She further emphasised that mechanisms are required so that local people are not deprived of employment (Maheshwari 1977: 676). 3 The erstwhile National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes bifurcated in 2004 into two separate commissions: National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the NCST. All the cases related to the inclusion or exclusion of the STs will be initiated by the NCST with the support of the state government and the RGI. 4 Dr. Verrier Elwin’s Report on Tribals of Ganjam and Koraput, File No. 147, 1945, Elwin Papers, New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, p. 12. 5 While addressing the 2001 session of the WGIP, Chairperson Erica-­Irene Daes emphasised that the Working Group ‘has never been interested in dismembering states, or promoting conflict and divisions within states, but rather wishes to build better, more inclusive and democratic states’ (quoted in Karlsson 2003: 420, no 7). 6 The Bengali migrants are the product of the Partition of India. They entered the Indian state of West Bengal from East Pakistan. As the state had accommodated large number of migrants, the late entrants were shifted to the Dandakaranya region of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh under the DNK Project. 7 The Indian parliament has made 115 modifications in the form of additions as synonym/subgroup in the existing Entry of the ST/Adivasi list of Odisha after 2001 census (GOI 2013: 120).

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8 The term scheduled areas has been defined as ‘such areas as the President may by order declare to be scheduled areas under the Central Act’. The criteria for declaring any area as a scheduled area under the fifth schedule are the preponderance of Adivasi population; the compactness and reasonable size of the area; a viable administrative entity such as a district, block or taluk; and the economic backwardness of the area as compared to the neighbouring areas. 9 The Ganjam and Visakhapatnam Act, 1939 was enacted to address the widespread unrest in the Adivasi areas of the northern-­most districts of the then Madras presidency that had emerged due to oppression by the moneylenders and rapacious landlords. Accordingly, Adivasi areas in those districts were kept out of the purview of general laws and brought under the administration of the collector, who acted as an agent of the state government. The British also enacted the Agency Tracts Interests and Land Transfer Act in 1917 to protect the interests of the Adivasis. The act prevented the transfer of Adivasi land to the non-­Adivasis without prior permission of the agent of the government or any other prescribed officers (Bell 1945: 116; Rao, Deshingkar and Farrington 2006: 5401). 10 It has been observed that between 1921 and 1931, the population of Malkangiri taluk increased by 41.90 percent and the population of Nabarangpur taluk increased by 33.09 percent by 1941 (Bell 1945: 56). 11 Between 1936 and 1939, 9, 196 people migrated from Koraput to the tea gardens of Assam (Bell 1945: 56). The annual average was 3,522 between 1936–­37 and 1951–­52 (Senapati and Sahu 1966: 81). 12 Dr Verrier Elwin’s Report on Tribals of Ganjam and Koraput, File No. 147, 1945, Elwin Papers, New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, p. 3. 13 Dr Verrier Elwin’s Report on Tribals of Ganjam and Koraput, File No. 147, 1945, Elwin Papers, New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, p. 3. 14 Shifting cultivation may be defined as a type of cultivation characterised by rotation of fields rather than crops by alternating short period of cropping with long fallow periods and by clearing following slash and burn methods. The shifting cultivation is locally known as podu or donger cultivation and practised by Hill Adivasis. 15 The British charged an anna or two per acre to practise shifting cultivation. 16 West Bengal had already accommodated the first two batches of the Bengali migrants from East Pakistan, and there was a little surplus land to rehabilitate the third category of Bengali migrants within the already densely populated state. 17 The decision to identify the Dandakaranya region was originally suggested by the then advisor to the planning commission, Sri S. V. Ramamurthy, where, in a report in 1956, he had mentioned that the Dandakaranya area offers ideal facilities for large-­scale settlement and the region attracted the attention of the government. Consequently, he was the choice of the government to be appointed as the first chairman of the DDA, who held the office from 12 September 1958 to 31 August 1960. 18 The migrants, as a whole, were not interested to move to the Dandakaranya region. In some parts of the country, like Assam, the migrants fomented riots in December 1968 to potentially discourage the government initiative

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to rehabilitate the migrants in Dandakaranya region (Farmer 1974: 102). It is pertinent to emphasise here that Radhakanta Mandal, Shyambada Vaidya and Benode Kaviraj of Umerkote and Raighar resettlement zones of Odisha had sent a complaint to the chairman of the DDA, on 10 February 1964, describing the apathy of DDA officials by emphasising that they were treated as no better than beggars. They were subjected to all kinds of pressures to agree for rehabilitation in Dandakaranya. Additionally, there were threats by officials of stopping rations and doles and shutting down camps in an attempt to force them to go to Dandakaranya (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 154). 19 On 24 August 1956, while informing the assembly concerning the rehabilitation of migrants who arrived in the post-­1954 phase, Renuka Roy, the relief and rehabilitation minister (1952–­57), said that the state would provide no help to those migrants who are unwilling to go to Dandakaranya region. If they manage to settle down in the state on their own, and if they require help in the form of employment or business loan, the government would do its best to help them out provided that they do not want land, sites for house building and accommodation in camps.

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3 ADIVASIS, BENGALI MIGRANTS AND THE STATE Explaining the differentiated marginality

The need to highlight the significance of the changing relationship between the state and society has generated profound debate among anthropologists, historians and political scientists. The debate has been structured and restructured in specific contexts, and it is multidimensional in a sense that discussions focus on issues of social, economic, political and cultural significance. The romance of relationships set the ground to explore various paradoxes, which are embedded in the nature of Indian society in multiple ways. In this context, India can be regarded as a multicultural society, which consists of different groups of individuals, each differs from others along the lines of their social, economic, cultural, political and ethnic identities. One possible paradox is to explore the relationship between the state and different communities which are the constituent parts of society and are structured and restructured on the basis of their day-­to-­day interaction with the state and its apparatus. This chapter seeks to understand the changing relationship between the Adivasis, Bengali migrants and the state. It deals with the genesis and functions of the rehabilitation project, that is, the Dandakaranya Project, popularly known as the DNK Project. It also focuses on the concentration of the Bengali migrants in Adivasi district and explores the reasons for the high exodus process in the 1970s. It analyses the impact of DNK Project on Bengali migrants and Adivasis in a comparative perspective.

Genesis of the Dandakaranya Project The government approved the Dandakaranya area development proposal on 11 January 1957. A high-­ level committee called AMPO Committee was formed to report if the land was feasible for migrant rehabilitation.1 The NDC approved the proposal of the AMPO 81

A divasis , B engali migrants and the state

Committee in June 1957 and the Rehabilitation Committee of the Cabinet approved it in August 1957. The establishment of the DDA was approved by the Cabinet on 14 April 1958, and the DDA was set up by the resolution of the GOI on 12 September 1958 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 2). The DDA was primarily assigned to rehabilitate the migrants in Dandakaranya region, who migrated from Pakistan after Partition and were kept in various transitional camps in West Bengal. However, the Bengali migrants were rehabilitated in Paralkote zone of Madhya Pradesh and Umerkote and Malkangiri zones of present-­day Nabarangpur and Malkangiri districts of Odisha (Figure 3.1). The state juxtaposed two marginal ethnic communities: the Bengali migrants and Adivasis. It was committed to the rehabilitation of the dislocated Bengali migrants as well as the development of the marginalised and socially, economically, culturally and politically subjugated Adivasi communities of the DNK area. Within this perspective, the DNK Project had two main objectives – the speedy resettlement of displaced persons from East Pakistan and the integrated development of the area not only to facilitate the resettlement of displaced persons but also to promote the welfare of the local Adivasi population (GOI 1963: 6; DDA 1968: 1; Barik 2006: 96). The integrated development proposal was designed to eradicate malaria from the region; improve the means of communications by the construction of all-­weather roads and a railway; maintain a balanced utilisation of land including afforestation, soil conservation and reclamation; develop colonies with a balanced economy; evolve the most beneficial crop patterns appropriate to the quality of the soil, climate and irrigation facilities; develop horticulture; provide irrigation facilities; build up an extensive pisciculture; introduce new species and improve livestock; establish industries based on mineral and forest resources of the area; provide adequate medical, educational, technical and vocational training facilities; and provide adequate transport and marketing facilities (National Council of Applied Economic Research 1963: 5–­6; Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 20).

Composition of the Dandakaranya Development Authority The constitution of the DDA was approved by the Cabinet on 23 July 1958. To materialise the mandate of the ambitious DNK Project, the DDA consisted of a full-­time chairman; chief administrator of DNK Project; chief secretaries of governments of Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, West Bengal or their nominees; and representatives of the 82

Source: Dandakaranya Development Authority (DDA) 1968; adapted and redrawn by Kamal Azad. Note: Map not to scale

Figure 3.1  Dandakaranya Project

A divasis , B engali migrants and the state

Union Ministry of Home Affairs, Union Ministry of Works, Housing and Rehabilitation and the Union Ministry of Finance.

The Dandakaranya Project and its impact on the Bengali migrants The responsibility of rehabilitating the Bengali migrants was taken up by the DDA. As the Dandakaranya region was selected for a long-­term solution to the migrant problem, four zones were opened at Umerkote and Malkangiri in the erstwhile Koraput district, Odisha and Paralkote and Kondagaon in the Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh to accommodate the migrants. When the migrants entered West Bengal, a number of transitional camps were established for an interim period. A transit camp was also established in Mana, Madhya Pradesh, before they were sent to the identified area for their permanent settlement. Special trains were arranged to send them to Raipur. The Bengali migrants were taken to Mana transit camp from Raipur. To make the migrants acquainted with the dry land and hard work before they took the plough into full-­scale agriculture, they were introduced to worksite camps, where they worked on land reclamation, construction of roads and so on. The labour force of the Bengali migrants had been increasingly used from 1966 onwards. In 1970, migrants were put to manual reclamation as well as minor irrigation works and well-­sinking. As a result, up to June 1971, 3, 070 hectares of land were cleared manually (Farmer 1974: 157). From the worksite camps, they were finally taken to villages for permanent settlement, where normally 30 to 100 families were accommodated in each village (DDA 1968: 2).2 While selecting sites for the establishment of the Bengali villages, the DDA paid due attention to the availability of drinking water and the proximity of agricultural land. By 31 December 1959, a total of 830 families comprising 3,550 persons reached Dandakaranya from different relief camps of West Bengal and Bihar. By 31 October 1963, a total of 17,299 and 11,137 Bengali migrants were rehabilitated in the Dandakaranya region of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh, respectively (GOI 1963: Annexure-­I). After visiting the resettlement sites of the Dandakaranya region, the Rehabilitation Review Committee reported that by 1977, the DDA established a total of 224 villages for the relocation of the Bengali migrants. The state governments of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh set up 61 villages for the resettlement of Adivasis (DDA 1968: 2). The state government’s Rehabilitation Department acted as an agency for executing the rehabilitation work. The project undertook the task of 84

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construction of roads and bridges and of upgrading of existing old alignments. Other infrastructures such as hospitals, schools and so on were provided as per the requirements. Specific schemes such as Potteru Resettlement Scheme, Potteru Irrigation Project and so on in the Malkangiri zone were coordinated through special committees. The land reclamation drive began with the objective of providing land to both Bengali migrants and the Adivasis with an irrational and unjustifiable ratio of 75:25 of the total reclaimed land. Land reclamation was meticulously carried out after examining the suitability of the land for agricultural purpose. The DDA report of 1968 indicated that a total of 1,28,258 acres of forest land was cleared, out of which 1,11,460 acres have been utilised. Till 1971, 25 percent of the land of the total developed area was made available to about 3,000 local Adivasis, and the rest were given to the Bengali migrants (Farmer 1974: 56; Elahi 1981: 220). The reclaimed land distribution pattern depended on the location and nature of the land resources. Initially, seven acres of land including 0.5 acre for homestead and gardens were given to each Bengali family, and it was reduced to 6 acres with the introduction of terrace bonding in 1965. Because of considerable pressure on the land and to maintain parity in land distribution, the government decided to reduce the amount of land after 1971. In November 1977, the government decided to reduce the land allotted to migrants to 5, 4 and 3 acres in non-­irrigated, semi-­irrigated and perennially irrigated areas, respectively (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 52). They were given the option to either surrender the excess land or pay Rs 500 per acre towards the partial cost of land reclamation, where the actual land reclamation cost stands out to be Rs 850 per acre. Similarly, the non-­agricultural families who settled in villages were provided with an agricultural plot of two acres and homestead plot of 800 square yards. The non-­ agricultural families in urban and semi-­ urban areas received 800 square yards of land towards constructing houses (DDA 1968: 3–­4). The government decided to clear a good amount of forest resources to meet the land requirements (Fernandes, Menon and Viegas 1996). It is estimated that by 1965, about 2,70,000 acres of forest were cleared and rendered cultivable and that 75,000 migrant households were settled in over 184 villages. In the next eight years, about 9,000 households came to settle in Dandakaranya (Das 2001: 137). The former chairman of the DDA, S K Gupta, observed that ‘the emphasis of the DDA has hitherto been largely, if not exclusively, on agriculture’ (Gupta 1965: 15). As per 2001 census, there are 1,12,877 Bengali people in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha. Each 85

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agricultural Bengali family was granted loans of Rs 1,700, Rs 1,015 and Rs 150 for purposes of constructing a house, purchasing agricultural requirements and digging a well, respectively (DDA 1968: 3). The Bengali migrants were issued cards containing all details, such as the total number of family members and their relationship with the head of the family, the amount of land allotted, the amount and purpose of loan sanctioned and so on (see Appendix III). Considering the economic interest of the Bengali migrants, it was decided to confer the patta (entitlement) rights initially for 20 years, thereafter, the exclusive rights would be extended to them (Dasgupta not dated: 31).3 The reason behind granting the temporary rights over land was the assumption that exclusive rights would tempt them to sell their land and go back to West Bengal.

Bengali migrants in Koraput district Most of the Bengali migrants of the Koraput district are Namasudras. Table 3.1 shows the Namasudra population in Odisha and Koraput district from 1961 to 1991. The 2001 census is not reflected in the Table because, after the reorganisation of districts in 1992, the Bengali migrants automatically belonged to Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts. According to Table 3.1, their number was 7,900 and 4,060 in 1961 in Odisha and Koraput district, respectively. In 1971, the number increased by more than six times in Odisha out of which 84.58 percent lived in Koraput district. The growth rate of the Namasudra population is recorded little more than one-­and-­a-­half times during the decade from 1971 to 1981, out of which 87.24 percent inhabited in Koraput district. During 1981–­91, their number was increased by 2.41 percent (1,84,172), out of which 93.93 percent lived in Koraput district. Table 3.2 shows the district-­ wise concentration of Namasudra population from 1961 to 2001. The rationale behind the district-­wise analysis of Namasudra population is zeroed in on the broad objective Table 3.1  Namasudra population of Koraput district, 1961–­91 Census year

Odisha

Koraput (%)

1961 1971 1981 1991

7,900 49,796 76,316 184,172

4,060 (51.39) 42,120 (84.58) 66,581 (87.24) 173,000 (93.93)

Source: GOO (2006b: 124, 156, 188, 220).

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Table 3.2  District-­wise Namasudra population of Odisha, 1961–­2001 Sl. no. Name of the district 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

Balasore 3,129 5,879 6,043 6,484 9,542 (7.248) Bolangir NIL NIL 17 1 22 (0.016) Cuttack 294 650 2,055 2,114 202 (0.153) Dhenkanal 194 262 7 10 13 (0.009) Ganjam NIL NIL 7 130 20 (0.015) Kalahandi NIL NIL 63 68 115 (0.087) Kendujhar 11 NIL 7 96 19 (0.014) Koraput 4,060 42,120 66,581 173,000 1683 (1.27) Mayurbhanj 205 34 72 609 81 (0.061) Phulbani/Kandhamal NIL 4 5 1 13 (0.009) Puri 7 784 1,277 1,158 91 (0.069) Sambalpur NIL NIL 38 414 424 (0.322) Sundargarh NIL 63 144 87 157 (0.119) Anugul NA NA NA NA 84 (0.063) Bargarh NA NA NA NA 42 (0.013) Bhadrak NA NA NA NA 195 (0.148) Baudh NA NA NA NA NIL Debagarh NA NA NA NA 4 (0.003) Gajapati NA NA NA NA 9 (0.006) Jagatsinghpur NA NA NA NA 465 (0.353) Jajpur NA NA NA NA 35 (0.026) Jharsuguda NA NA NA NA 17 (0.012) Kendrapara NA NA NA NA 4,063 (3.086) Khordha NA NA NA NA 1,333 (1.012) Malkangiri NA NA NA NA 78,127 (59.346) Nuapada NA NA NA NA NIL Nabarangpur NA NA NA NA 34,750 (26.396) Nayagad NA NA NA NA NIL Rayagada NA NA NA NA 137 (0.104) Sonapur NA NA NA NA 2 (0.001) Odisha 7,900 49,796 76,316 184,172 131,645 (100.00)

Source: GOO (2006b: 124, 156, 188, 220); Bhatt and Bhargava (2006: 116–­17). Note: All the districts from sl. no. 14 onwards are created after 1992. Data in parentheses represent the percentage to the total Namasudra population of the state.

of the book, which looks at the relationship between the Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in Odisha. The Bengali migrants were concentrated in seven districts in 1961, eight districts in 1971, and 13 districts in 1981 and 1991 and spread to the newly organised districts in 2001 except Baudh, Nayagarh and Nuapada. Table 3.2 reflects that more than 85 percent of the Namasudra population in Odisha live in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts after the creation of 17 new districts in 1992. Besides, it is pertinent to point out that 87

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though Baleswar district was not the official site for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants; a substantive number of Namasudras can be found in the district. Their proportion to the total district population was 39.60, 11.80, 7.91, 3.52 and 7.24 percent in 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001, respectively. Balasore district had the second highest concentration of Namasudra population before the emergence of new districts in the 1990s, and the third highest, leaving behind even the present Koraput district, in 2001. West Bengal being geographically closer to Baleswar, it is believed that Namasudras might have migrated there from the Midnapur district of West Bengal. From 1991 to 2001, the number of Namasudras sharply decreased and most interestingly, only 1.27 percent of Namasudras are living in the Koraput district. It is important to mention here that the GOI identified only Malkangiri and Nabarangpur subdivisions as the suitable place for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Odisha through the DNK Project. The division of erstwhile Koraput district into four districts (Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangapur and Rayagada) in 1992 enabled them to move to the newly formed districts of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur. As a consequence, the present Koraput district was left with a trivial presence of Bengali migrants.

The Dandakaranya Project, Bengali migrants and desertion The DNK Project had faced the problem of distortion of rehabilitation sites by the Bengali families ever since its inception. By the late 1960s, the process of desertion of Bengali families had already begun. The desertion invariably questioned the credibility of DDA as the rehabilitation agency. In the 1970s, it was widely acknowledged that the official attempt to rehabilitate the Bengali migrants had failed considerably (Kudaisya 1995). The DDA was not able to discourage the potential flow of desertion. Consequently, the process of exodus began in the 1960s and became more intensive in the 1970s. Table 3.3 shows the Dandakaranya zone-­wise break-­up of the Bengali exodus from 1965 to 1978. Table 3.3 shows that the exodus process from the Dandakaranya Project area had been almost a regular feature since 1965. There were four mass exoduses of migrants that took place between 1965 and 1978. Their numbers were 1,039, 1,865, 3,465 and 14,388 in 1965, 1966, 1972 and 1978, respectively. But the desertions that took place in the past were insignificant as compared to the magnitude of the exodus that happened in 1978 where 14,388 families left Bengali 88

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villages. It is important to note that the 1978 exodus of migrants took place between February to June. During this period, a large number of Bengali families sold off their cattle and belongings to return to West Bengal. Table 3.4 shows the zone-­ wise break-­ up of the exodus from February–­June 1978. It reflects that there were uneven desertions of families in different Bengali villages. Table 3.4 indicates that the desertions of 1978 took place mostly from Malkangiri and Paralkote zones.

Table 3.3  Zone-­wise break-­up of the migrant exodus, 1965–­78 Year

No. of families deserted Zone details

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

1,039 1,865 581 77 169 501 103 3,465 242 149 236 71 209 14,388

Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote and Malkangiri Zones Umerkote, Malkangiri and Paralkote Zones Umerkote, Malkangiri and Paralkote Zones Umerkote, Malkangiri and Paralkote Zones Umerkote, Malkangiri and Paralkote Zones Umerkote, Malkangiri and Paralkote Zones Umerkote, Malkangiri and Paralkote Zones (10,329 Families + 4,059 families from Karmi Shibirs) Malkangiri and Parulkote Zones

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat (1979: 4); Kornel (2006: 215).

Table 3.4  Zone-­wise break-­up of exodus from February to June 1978 Zone

No. of families in position on 1-­2-­1978

Desertion from 1-­2-­1978 to  30-­6-­1978

Village Karmi Shibirs Total

Village Karmi Shibirs Total

Malkangiri 8,334 4,204 Umerkote 4,297 –­ Paralkote 7,631 370 Kondagaon 1,003 –­ Total 21,265 4,574

12,538 6,304 3,799 4,297 408 –­ 8,001 3,573 255 1,003 6 –­ 25,839 10,291 3,854

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat (1979: 5).

89

10,103 408 3,828 6 14,345

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Reasons for desertion After the mass exodus of Bengali families from the DNK area, soon a High Power Committee was formed by the GOI to examine the causes of mass desertion. Organised attempts were made by the two state governments of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh to stop desertion possibly but could not succeed. Social, economic, political and psychological factors were responsible for the exodus process of the Bengali migrants.

Social factors The composition of the migrant settlement partially contributes to the process of desertion. After the entry of the Bengali migrants in the Indian territory, they were kept in various transit camps across the country. The settlement process did not take care of the social capital that the migrants had prior to their dislocation from East Pakistan and thereby contributed to the process of social disarticulation. Although there was a conscious and organised effort to keep the existing family, caste and social groups intact as far as practicable (GOI 1963: 9) and several Bengali villages consisted wholly or mainly of a single caste, that is, the Namasudra (Farmer 1974: 265), the migrants from different regions such as Khulna, Faridpur, Barisal, Dhaka and so on were randomly picked up from the temporary camps to rehabilitate in a particular village which prevented them from developing a ‘we-­feeling’ among the migrants. The approach of the rehabilitation agency further dismantled the community structures and social organisations, the dispersal of informal and formal networks, local associations and so on. Dasgupta (not dated) predicted that had the migrants from a particular region been rehabilitated in the same village, it would have enabled them to develop their own organisation and society and eventually discouraged the exodus process. Explaining the mass desertion from Malkangiri and Paralkote zones, the DDA quoted that during June to July 1977, 5,836 and 1,171 families moved from Mana to Malkangiri and Paralkote zones, respectively. It appears that these families carried the nucleus of the movement for resettlement in Sunderbans which became active in the latter part of 1977. It is worthwhile to mention that the Mana camp witnessed regular visits of leaders of the Udbastu Unnayansil Samiti,4 who potentially generated the illusory hope among the Bengali families for their possible resettlement in West Bengal. It is significant to mention here that no families from Mana had been inducted into Umerkote and Kandagaon zones that experienced insignificant desertion. 90

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Different reports repeatedly cited that the lack of communication between the DDA and migrants accounted for the exodus process. The DDA faced difficulties at the higher echelons of the management such as the friction between Bengalis and non-­Bengalis, and between Odiyas and non-­Odiyas in the administration (Farmer 1974: 109), which to some extent, contributed to the lack of cooperation and coordination. The establishment of proper communication between these two could have possibly discouraged the mass desertion. Political factors The exodus process of the Bengali migrants in the 1970s can be computed to the political explanation too. This wave of desertion was led by those who still hoped that the Left Front Alliance in West Bengal, the champion of the migrant cause in the 1950s and 1960s, would welcome them back. A large number of migrants went back to West Bengal during 1978 at a time, when the Left government had returned to power. It seemed obvious that the migrants would expect their resettlement in West Bengal from the Left government (Dasgupta not dated: 6) because, during the settlement of migrants outside the state, the communists had launched a persistent campaign urging them not to settle outside the state but to take the path of agitation to demand settlement within West Bengal. The communists of West Bengal were at the forefront in leading the cause of migrants. They encouraged the migrants to occupy the public spaces and colonise lands in villages for settlement and launch a stiff resistance against the stopping of doles and closing down of camps by the government. The communist political leaders were well aware of the possibility of exploiting migrant discontent. As a consequence, the concentration of Bengali migrants and the continuous influx of migrants transformed the democratic picture of Calcutta (Kolkata) and had a tremendous effect on state politics in West Bengal. The migrants who constituted about one-­fourth of the total population of West Bengal voted for the Communist Party eventually (Kudaisya 1995). To put it differently, the communists acted as the vanguard of migrants in the politics of space for the settlement of migrants and in return, the latter extended their mass support to the communists, thereby enabling them to entrench themselves in the city of Calcutta. Economic factors The Ministry of Rehabilitation cited the reason of vested interests behind the massive desertion. The visit of West Bengal minister with 91

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Udbastu Unnayansila Samity leaders to Malkangiri zone in 1977 created an illusory hope among the migrants for their possible resettlement in West Bengal. The Samity organised a series of meetings in migrant villages and Karmi Shibirs, which potentially encouraged the process of desertion. All attempts of the government to discourage possible desertion failed substantially. The leadership of Udbastu Unnayansila Samity intensified the hope of about 14,388 families for better resettlement in the Sunderbans areas, whose appeal inter alia stated that migrants rehabilitated outside West Bengal are firmly determined to resettle in Sundarbans area of West Bengal (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 8). The Samity continued to instigate the desertion of migrants in the Dandakaranya region, and a resolution was passed at the 1975 conference held at Mana camp, which stated that the effective rehabilitation could only be possible in the Sundarbans area of West Bengal. The Samity had also raised the slogan ‘Let’s go to Sundarbans’ among the Bengali families. The failure to confer land ownership rights and economic rehabilitation for as long as two decades after land allotment had led to unrest and mass exodus of migrants (Bose 1983: 137–­82). The deserters had their own reasons or explanations. According to them, intimidation by local Adivasis under the instigation of local leaders, apathetic attitude of government officials, inhospitable and rocky tracts of land incapable of producing adequate crops and so on were the main reasons of desertions (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 6). In this context, Gupta (1965: 15) underlined that it is the quality rather than the quantity of land that drove the migrants to the process of desertion. The other reasons were a denial of patta and voting rights to the migrants. Das (2001: 138–­ 40) cited that the difficult geographical terrain and unproductive land, the lack of proper communication between Dandakaranya area and West Bengal, a scarcity of drinking water, the caste discrimination by the planners, a lack of alternative means of livelihood other than agriculture and the adversarial relationship with the local Adivasis were responsible for desertion. The DDA underlined that the hope of resettlement in the Sunderbans region coupled with complaints about the poor quality of land; drought during two successive years, harassment by the Adivasi people; indifference of the police, the local administration and the project management; and the inability to get adequate return for agricultural produce were responsible for desertion (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 12). Psychological factors Renuka Roy, the West Bengal State relief and rehabilitation minister, emphasised the psychological factor as one of the important reasons 92

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for the migrant exodus process (Roy 1956–­1967: 6). The unwillingness to go to culturally unfamiliar areas for settlement at the initial stage and the migrants’ attempts to return to West Bengal must be understood in terms of the state of mind of the migrants themselves. To put it differently, this attitude of the Bengali migrants can be linked with, what Kolers calls as the attachment approach.5 The government also maintained double standards while dealing with the issue of settling the migrants. For instance, while delivering a speech at a function organised by Dum Dum Rajerghat Rehabilitation and Welfare Board on 7 August 1955, Renuka Roy considered the migrants who arrived in the state prior to June 1954 as assets to the state since they extended cooperation with the state government in producing food (Roy 1955: 3–­4). The latecomers were, however, termed merely as an overburden to the state, and it was decided to send them to newly selected areas outside West Bengal. Pannalal Dasgupta, the leftist activist turned Gandhian, who visited the Dandakaranya region during the exodus process emphasised that the migrants never considered the Dandakaranya area as their own (Dasgupta not dated: 6). It was also observed that the Udbastu Unnayansil Samity exploited the psychological leaning of the migrants towards West Bengal while organising the desertion.

The Dandakaranya Project, Bengali migrants and their return The exodus process took place in the 1970s with the hope of resettling in West Bengal. The political situation in West Bengal was, however, hostile to their return. When the Communist Party, the so-­called champion of migrant problems in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, came to power in the 1970s, it simply took U-­turn. The return of the Bengali migrants from Dandakaranya region was considered as a potential liability that would fundamentally damage the economic prospects of the state and unnecessarily divert the scarce resources (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 158). The West Bengal government adopted every means, if necessary, the coercive means, to send them back to the Dandakaranya region. The bloody events at Marichjhapi, when returning migrants defied the government by establishing a settlement in a forest reserve in the Sundarbans, showed that the policy of the new ministry towards them was as stony-­hearted as that of its predecessors (Chatterji 2007: 137, footnote 98). The Bengali families were, therefore, forced to return to the Dandakaranya area. Coordination was made with the railways to provide special trains and special bogies to ensure 93

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smooth returns of the deserters (The Statesman 1978). Two points, such as Jeypore (Odisha) and Mandirhasaud (Madhya Pradesh), were established to receive the returnee to the Dandakaranya region. After their arrival, each family received a loan of Rs 900 towards purchasing bullocks, Rs 500 for initial agricultural inputs from bullocks to seeds and fertiliser, two quintals of rice worth not more than Rs 350 as a grant, a dole for 15 days costing not more than Rs 60 and a grant not exceeding Rs 25 for the construction of a kitchen (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 17). Out of the 14,388 deserted families (10,329 from Bengali villages and 4059 families awaiting resettlement in Karmi Shibirs) who had left the villages and Karmi Shibirs, 10,260 families (8,666 from Bengali villages and 1,594 families from Karmi Shibir) returned to their settlement sites by 31 October 1978 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 16). Their return can also be confirmed from the census data, where the number of Namasudras increased from 49,796 to 76,316 during the decade between 1971 and 1981 (Table 3.2). As the deserted families had sold off their belongings during the exodus process, they were assisted in their return to the rehabilitation sites. Some of their belongings, which were left behind, were also kept carefully by the innocent Adivasis, and they voluntarily returned those belongings to the Bengali migrants on their arrival (Dasgupta not dated: 18).

The Dandakaranya Project and its impact on the Adivasis Dandakaranya region has a high concentration of Adivasis. This region has been for many centuries the home of hundreds of thousands of Adivasis. Tracing the demographic picture of the Dandakaranya region, it is pertinent to underline that the Adivasi population constituted 61 percent of the total population of 11.67 lakh of Koraput and 72 percent of the population of 15.61 lakh of Bastar districts. The average of the Adivasi population in Dandakaranya was about 66 percent against the all-­India figure of 6.8 percent in the 1960s (DDA 1968: 4). Adivasi communities of the Dandakaranya region have developed their own culture and a way of life. They developed their own social structure, reflecting their day-­to-­day life. The intrusion of outsiders into the Adivasi area of Dandakaranya region had inevitably shaken the foundation of Adivasi society. Adivasi communities increasingly faced challenges on cultural and identity grounds. Apart from their cultural erosion and identity crisis, they were also exploited by the outsiders. The initial interaction of the Adivasi communities with the 94

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more sophisticated and culturally advanced outsiders tended to make the former less honest and truthful and more conscious of their ‘inferiority’. The reaction was defensive, attempting to drive the outsiders away, leading to ultimate detribalisation and the complete disappearance of the distinctive Adivasi culture (GOI 1963: 21). Given the nature of the Adivasi society, the DNK Project started with twofold objectives of resettlement of displaced persons and the promotion of interests of the local population particularly the Adivasi communities. It was also emphasised that the DNK Project would, of course, produce many changes of great magnitude in the life and economy of the people living in the vast area of Dandakaranya. The DDA was well aware of the nature and complexities of the Adivasi society. While carrying out the Adivasi development programmes, there was no attempt from the DDA to interfere in the lives and culture of the Adivasi communities. The tribal welfare departments of the concerned states were entrusted with the implementation of Adivasi welfare programmes in different spheres. Even the construction and layout of Adivasi villages set up for landless Adivasi people had been left to the agency of the state governments. Although most of the schemes were launched for the benefit of Bengali families in the area, they also benefitted the Adivasi communities (GOI 1960: 16; The Hindu 1976). Within the broader aim of Adivasi welfare, the Union Minister of Rehabilitation and Minority Affairs, Shri Mehr Chand Khanna, declared in the Lok Sabha on 3 March 1960, The tribals have been there from time immemorial. I am operating in their area. I want their good will and I also want that their interests should not only be protected but also advanced. So, for the tribals, another directive has been issued. (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1960: 4111) The minister further emphasised that the Adivasi organisation in the DDA were to be strengthened with people who knew the local language and the local conditions; a liaison to be established with the local Adivasi leaders so as to know about their feelings with regard to Adivasi welfare; medical outposts to be established in the Adivasi areas with a regular visit of the medical units; a water supply in Adivasi villages to be given utmost priority; immediate steps to be taken to create Adivasi group leaders who could work in the engineering section or on similar lines; and, last but not the least, 25 percent of the total area reclaimed were to be made available for allotment to the Adivasis (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1960: 4111–­12, emphasis added). 95

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The 21 January 1960 note of the chief administrator, DDA reflected the Adivasi welfare. It contained instructions as well as his principles for organising Adivasi welfare work under the project. It underlined the symbiotic relationship between the Adivasis and forest resources. It acknowledged the destruction of forest resources from Adivasi region in terms of clearing the ground for migrants’ settlement. However, the chief administrator also wrote, ‘We have to explain to them (Adivasis) that we are leaving adequate areas of Nishtari forests not only for their present needs but for future needs as well . . .’ (cited in Rao 1960: 37). Emphasising on the need to look after the tribals, the following activities for the welfare of the Adivasis were also listed: provide irrigation facilities, medical attention, market, etc. . . . to improve their cattle and other livestock. We shall put fish in the streams and tanks. We shall put all disused tanks and wells back into operation and shall dig new wells and make new bunds so as to improve water supply. We shall have big multipurpose farms in the area which will provide them with good seed and will help them in all possible ways. (cited in Rao 1960: 37–­8) The chief administrator further assured that the Dandakaranya Project would provide regular employment at good rates of wages. He continued: We should tell them that we have no intention of changing their way of life or of interfering with their social customs and that in fact we have much to learn from them because they are the old inhabitants of this area. (cited in Rao 1960: 38) Keeping the Adivasi welfare in mind, it was decided that 25 percent of the reclaimed land would be handed over to the state governments for the settlement of the landless Adivasi families. Consequently, DDA handed over 18,970 acres of land (including 1800 acres adjusted in Chandrapur area) to the state GOO by June 1967. A total of 11,557 acres of land were distributed among 1,836 Adivasi families inhabiting 45 villages. In the same vein, 5,665 acres of reclaimed land were handed over to the government of Madhya Pradesh by September 1967, out of which 5,180 acres were distributed among the 495 landless Adivasi families inhabiting 16 villages (DDA 1968: 5–­ 6). Similarly, out of 1,68,725 acres, 30,795 acres (18.25 percent) land 96

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were released for the Adivasi settlement, 1,28,382 acres (76.08 percent) land were utilised for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants by 30 June 1978, and the rest of the land was not released or remained unutilised (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 26). The DDA also extended financial support to the state governments for the settlement of Adivasi families. The DDA paid the state governments an outright grant of Rs 1300 for each family of these landless Adivasi people towards constructing a house, purchasing bullocks, seeds, manures and agricultural implements. Also, a grant of Rs 200 was paid for each family to enable it to subsist till the first crop was harvested; Rs 315 for contour bunding of 7 acres of reclaimed land and Rs 150 for homestead irrigation (GOI 1963: 22; Senapati and Sahu 1966: 438; Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 6). Thus, an amount of Rs 1,965 was paid for the settlement of each Adivasi family. Adivasi communities of Dandakaranya region also shared different facilities that were opened for the Bengali families in the areas of health, agriculture, animal husbandry, education and so on. The establishment of the DDA opened up employment opportunities for the Adivasi people, where 25 percent of the vacancies in Class IV posts in the DNK Project had been filled by the local Adivasi people (DDA 1968: 7), and the rest were filled up by the migrants and other people. It is also worthwhile to mention here that the Groups A and B posts in the DNK Project did not appear to have recruited any of the Adivasis (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 77), and this was because of the educational backwardness and non-­availability of suitable candidates from the Adivasi communities. Out of a total expenditure of Rs 28.56 crore incurred by the DDA up to March 1967, Rs 9.80 crore (34.31 percent) was spent on general development. The expenditure directly allocated to Adivasi welfare was Rs 4.66 crore (16.31 percent) as against Rs 14.05 crore (49.19 percent) for the Bengali migrants. The DDA, however, has functioned solely as a rehabilitation agency rather than as a development agency (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 83). Although the DDA claimed that the welfare of the Adivasis was important, it did not act as a catalyst for Adivasi development.

The Dandakaranya Project and Adivasi disadvantages The DDA carried out the mission of rehabilitation of the migrants at the expense of native Adivasis. The clearing of precious forests in the Dandakaranya region for the settlement of Bengali migrants eventually deprived the Adivasi communities of having access to forest 97

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resources. In due course, both the state and the migrants appeared to be the primary beneficiaries of the dense forest resources of Adivasi region. The settlement operations disturbed the ecological balance, shaking the age-­old relationship between Adivasi communities and forests. The DNK Project ignored the inherently contradictory nature of tribal and peasant outlooks. The peasant had a vested interest in the land while the tribal people regarded the forest as a common resource. The settlement operations encroached on tribal lands and succeeded in driving the tribals out. (Ahmad 1991: 73) The exploitative and dominating method of the modern society was alien to the Adivasi society. The rehabilitation of the migrants in the Dandakaranya region not only caused the degradation of the forest resources but also induced the displacement of Adivasi communities in the region. The detailed plans which were made for the DNK Project did not, however, take into account the ecological and cultural settings of the Adivasi communities who had for centuries lived in the region.6 While identifying the Dandakaranya region as the site for rehabilitation, the policy makers did not take the issues and concerns of the Adivasi communities into consideration; rather, they gave more emphasis on the availability of large areas. The planners proved to be wrong when they assumed that the settlement of the displaced agriculturalist families from East Pakistan would have a positive impact on the local Adivasi communities in the form of disseminating the knowledge of agriculture that would eventually help the Adivasis to improve their productivity. Farmer (1974) observed that it was the migrants who benefitted from the knowledge of the Adivasis. Farmer (1974: 217–­ 18) found the migrants observing the Adivasi agricultural technology, varieties of paddy and the Adivasis’ adoption strategies due to relative shortness of monsoon rains. Trained government officials assisted the Bengali migrants at every stage of agricultural production. The DNK Project, in fact, revealed the discrimination meted against the Adivasis. For instance, the Adivasis used to depend more on millet than on rice or wheat, but there had been hardly any research on the maximisation of production of millets, and no market facilities were created for its sale (Barik 2006: 98). Consequently, differential facilities extended by the DDA to both the communities led to income differentiation between these communities. For instance, a survey conducted in three Koya (Adivasi) villages in 1968 reflected that the average family income of 98

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a resettled family in 1966 was Rs 815 whereas the mean income of a Koya family was Rs 699 (Mohapatra 1969–­1970: 63). In contrast, research was done on the crops of the migrants. Consequently, the OUAT established ‘Maize Research Centre’ to educate the migrants on how to improve the maize cultivation. The government constituted an Agricultural Expert Committee to advise migrants to try varieties of paddy hitherto unknown to the DNK area (DDA 1968: 10). The DDA was mandated to encourage the migrants to abandon the traditional technology brought from an entirely different environment and adopt new technologies, which are more appropriate to the topographical situation of the Dandakaranya region. The DDA also constructed irrigation facilities for the benefits of migrants in the Dandakaranya region. The irrigation facility was extended to 20 percent of the land allocated to the migrants up to November 1978 with the construction of Baskal and Parolkote dams in Madhya Pradesh and Satiguda dam in Odisha. The Parolkote zone experienced a higher percentage (48.6 percent) of irrigation facilities; on the contrary, there was no irrigation facility in Potteru region of Malkangiri zone as the Potteru major irrigation project was only initiated in 1973. It was expected to cover 63.5 percent of the land distributed among the migrants. As the Dandakaranya region was suffering from inadequate access to markets, market facilities were created for the sale of maize crop by the Bengali migrants (Barik 2006: 98). As a result, the Dandakaranya region witnessed an increase of the average income per family of the migrants from Rs 424 in 1965 to Rs 1257 in 1966, and it was also estimated that the income would increase to 2000 in 1967 (DDA 1968, graph) and to more than Rs 2000 in 1971 (Farmer 1974: 188). The government, however, did not create any such facilities primarily meant for the Adivasi communities. The income from sources other than agricultural land differs from Bengali migrants to Adivasi communities. Besides other sources, fishing appeared to be one of the important subsidiary sources of income for the Bengali families. For the Adivasis, the collection of forest produces generated supplement income. The state-­established DDA adopted different approaches towards the Adivasis and migrants. The authority not only encouraged the latter to take up pisciculture but also created the necessary facilities required for its development. On the contrary, the state went ahead to destroy the major means of Adivasi income, that is, forest. The DDA ruthlessly destroyed the forest resources to meet the required amount of land for the settlement of migrants in the Dandakaranya region. Although land and forests are considered as the ‘twin pillars of the Adivasi economy as well as 99

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the source of their community identity’ (Ambagudia 2010), the state did not respect this symbiotic relationship. So, the approach of the state not only challenged their important means of livelihood but also initiated the process of cultural erosion of the Adivasi communities. The differential treatment of migrants and Adivasis contributed to the income gap and placed them at different levels of economic position in the society. The economic base provided by the state in the form of disproportionate land distribution between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants, and creating all necessary facilities required to increase the incomes of the latter had spillover effects over the period and appeared to govern the economic relationship between these two communities in the contemporary period. The Adivasi communities, the ‘sons of the soil’ of the Dandakaranya region, were allotted only 25 percent of the total reclaimed land, and the remaining 75 percent was given to the migrants. Each Adivasi family was given financial assistance in the form of an outright grant of Rs 2655 out of which Rs 600 was meant for common amenities. So, the financial assistance of Rs 1965 was paid to each Adivasi family; on the contrary, the Bengali migrants were assisted with an amount of Rs 2865 (including a house-­building loan of Rs 1700, and agricultural loan of Rs 1015 and an irrigation loan of Rs 150) per agricultural family and Rs 3510 (including house-­building loan of Rs 2000, a small trade loan of Rs 1000, an agricultural loan of Rs 300, maintenance grant of Rs 30–­ Rs 70 per month according to the size of the family for three months following the date of payment of small trade loan) per non-­agricultural family settled in a village and Rs 3710 (including house building loan of Rs 2000, business loan of Rs 1,000, additional business loan of Rs 500 in deserving cases and maintenance grant of Rs 30–­Rs 70 per month) according to the size of the family for three months following the date of the business loan advanced per non-­agricultural family residing in an urban and semi-­urban area (DDA 1968: 3–­6). In addition, the agricultural families were provided with maintenance subsidy for the first agricultural season at the full rate; for the second agricultural season, at half the rate; and for the third agricultural season, at one-­fourth the rate. Besides this, a subsidy was given for the off-­season of six months immediately following the first agricultural season. However, except the maintenance subsidy of Rs. 200, the Adivasis did not get any such subsidy during the second and third agricultural seasons and off-­season (DDA 1968: 6). The deserter families on their return were provided with Rs 500 per family for purchasing seeds, fertilisers, agricultural implements, and so on in kind; Rs 750 for purchasing a pair of bullocks; two quintals of rice costing not 100

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more than Rs 350 as a grant; 15 days’ dole costing not more than Rs 60 per family as a grant; and a grant not exceeding Rs 25 per family for construction of kitchen (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 17). The DNK Project provided all facilities essential for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants. It developed animal husbandry, dairy, poultry farming, pisciculture and several allied extensive services for the benefit of migrants. Each Bengali village had a tank, deep masonry wells, two to four tube wells, a head water tank, internal and approach roads and a community centre. The services of a Sewak (service provider) were available to a group of two to three villages, while a pharmacist was available to a somewhat larger group. Every Bengali village was within easy reach of a medical unit which provided free medical aids. In this context, Ahmad observes, The state policy . . . was clearly discriminatory against the tribals. . . . the new conflict engendered by this systematic intervention was both economic and psychological . . . the Authority’s functioning within the tribal fastness of Bastar and Koraput created conditions which favoured the disintegration of the tribal mode of economy. (Ahmad 1991: 74) There is considerable evidence to suggest that the policies of DDA ran counter to the established social, economic, cultural and political environment and disturbed the social milieu of the Adivasi communities. Ahmad further pointed out the incidence of substantial land alienation and depopulation of Adivasi villages, with about 30 percent decline in the Adivasi population (Ahmad 1991: 76). In addition, the DDA claimed that 25 percent of the vacancies in Class D posts of the DNK Project had been filled by the local Adivasis (DDA 1968: 7). The prescribed percentage of the Adivasi representation was, however, far from tenable. For instance, the Estimates Committee of the lok sabha pointed out that out of 2,851 positions, the representation of the Adivasis was only 37 (1.29 percent) in Class C posts. Similarly, out of 1,402 positions, the representation of the Adivasis was only 97 (6.91 percent) in Class D posts (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 77). In addition, the DDA was periodically asked to explore additional employment opportunities for the migrants (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 18). It was, however, not concerned about employment opportunities for the native Adivasi communities. Each Bengali village was also provided with a primary school, whereas the Adivasis were forced to walk down a long distance to learn 101

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the alphabets. As a result, the DDA established 53 primary schools and eight upper primary schools in Umerkote–­Raighar zone for the educational development of Bengali migrants. It also recruited 131 and 34 teachers in primary and upper-­primary schools, respectively (GOO not dated b: 289). The DNK Project proposed twin languages of Bengali and Odiya/Hindi as the medium of instruction in schools (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1979: 71; Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 113). Consequently, Bengali was used as the medium of instruction in the primary, middle and higher secondary schools up to 1968. The Bengali language as the medium of instruction led to the educational development of the Bengali migrants and further enhanced their advantage in obtaining employment in the state. Subsequently, the migrants came to dominate in high-­paying public jobs and middle-­class occupation. The language policy was reviewed by the DDA in September 1968, which recommended that Bengali should be the medium of instruction up to the fifth standard. In the middle and secondary standards, the medium of instruction was to be Odiya/Hindi in the respective states of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh, and Bengali was an option as a MIL. Odiya and Hindi were to be introduced as an additional subject at the third standard in schools in Odisha and Madhya Pradesh, respectively. On the contrary, the Adivasi languages were simply ignored. The twin language formula of the DNK Project contributed to the educational development of the migrants in the Dandakaranya region. According to the 1991 census, Adivasis and Bengali migrants have attained the literacy rate of 22.66 and 41.55 percent in undivided Koraput district, respectively. The introduction of Adivasi language as the medium of instruction would have been a boost to the educational development of the Adivasi communities. In Odisha, Adivasi children speak their dialect at home with parents and friends and have to learn the alphabet of the state language in which they are situated. The monolingual Adivasis face cognitive and communicative problems where educational institutions are in the major regional language. The modern educational system, based on the dominant language of the society, compels the Adivasi communities to learn the alphabets in an alien language. In this case, the educational advancement of the Adivasi communities is severely handicapped by the medium of instruction based on dominant languages. Xaxa (2008) also supports this view by stating that language is one of the most severe handicaps for the Adivasis to get the benefits of education/preferential policies as compared to even the other scheduled group such as the SCs. Xaxa posits the organic view of caste with the 102

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segmentary nature of Adivasi communities to explain why Adivasis suffer more in comparison with the SCs. The organic view of the caste says that Dalits/SCs were subjected to inhuman treatment by virtue of being outcasts but that at least they were integral to the mainstream society and shared a language, culture and tradition of the dominant society. On the other hand, the Adivasis lived in self-­contained communities with restricted commerce and thus suffered the disadvantage of isolation and did not share the language, tradition and culture of the dominant society (Xaxa 2008: 93–­4). The poor response of the Adivasi children to formal education and their higher rate of attrition, especially in the first few years of schooling relate to the language problem (Patnayak 1981: 43). Pannalal Dasgupta, member of planning, West Bengal, visited the DNK region during the high exodus process in the 1970s and realised that there were differences in terms of assistance and facilities to the Adivasis and migrants and that these differences could lead to contentions between the two communities (Dasgupta not dated: 29). The Indian state treated its own people as secondary beneficiaries of its developmental programmes. Neither the DDA nor the state government showed its commitment towards Adivasi welfare under the DNK Project. Between 1965 and 1990, the loss of forest was the highest (55 percent) in the Koraput district. In other districts, during this period, the loss was accounted between 10 and 42 percent. There is a considerable degree of forest degradation in the district. For instance, the forest areas of the district decreased from 7,000 square miles in 1901 to 5,404 square miles in 1981 (Rath 2002: 33). As a countermeasure, the GOO imposed a ban on commercial exploitation of forests in the Koraput district in 1990 (Sahu and Das 1997: 47). Unfortunately, the Forest Survey of India (1989) blamed the Adivasis to have damaged the forests of Koraput extensively through their practice of shifting cultivation (Forest Survey of India 1989: 11). This is probably because the area affected by shifting cultivation has increased from 5.79 square miles in 1936–­37 to 4,449.89 square miles in 1982 (Forest Survey of India 1989: 18). However, the survey mentioned the role of neither the state not the DDA in destroying the forest. It is worthwhile to mention here that the Forest Department of the DDA was primarily assigned with felling and extracting useful timber in advance of reclamation; it, however, did not conserve the forest (Farmer 1974: 108). The district saw an increasing rate of forest destruction over the period due to developmental projects, commercial exploitation by the Forest Department of the GOO, rehabilitation project of the DDA, increase in 103

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demand for timber/firewood due to increase in population and people taking advantage of the abolition of the strict administrative system of the former rule (Rath 2002: 33–­4). On the contrary, the Forest Survey of India (1989) was quick enough to drag the Adivasis into the process of the destruction of forests in the Dandakaranya region of Odisha. The Adivasi communities have their own problems, and the modern nation-­state does not look at them with sensitivity and seriousness. So, the Indian state has been more sensitive to the demand of communities defined in terms of religion and caste and has arguably been less receptive to claims made by Adivasi communities; in fact, it has been more invasive and predatory in its relationship towards the Adivasis (Jayal 1999: 231; Barik 2006: 98). This discriminatory treatment to the Adivasis by the DDA in terms of facilities and opportunities also contributed to developing their adversarial relationship with the Bengali migrants in the Dandakaranya region (Elahi 1981: 222; Das 2001: 140–­1; Barik 2006: 100).

Conclusion The DNK Project, which was the primary instrument for the rehabilitation of migrants, followed discriminatory practices against the Adivasi communities. It considered the native Adivasis as the secondary social group competing for the facilities and benefits extended to both Adivasis and Bengali migrants, which has become an annoyance for the former and an advantage for the latter. Consequently, the process of discrimination and exploitation in the Adivasi society since the colonial period has accentuated after independence, more precisely in the 1960s, with the rehabilitation of migrants in Adivasi regions. The disproportionate facilities promoted growing group disparity between the native and the outsiders. Although the DNK Project was committed to the development of the Namasudra Bengali community and the marginalised Adivasi communities, this project provided various assets to start with for the former and not for the latter. The deliberate policy of preference for the migrants has the spillover effect on the politics of group domination and thereby created the regime of ‘differentiated marginality’ in the contemporary period. Differential treatment develops the feeling of antipathy between various communities contributing to the emergence of group comparison. Horowitz (1985: 141–­228) underlines that differential group entitlement leading to group comparison can be one of the principal sources of conflict between communities. The discriminatory practices in extending group benefits have enabled the native communities to 104

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construct and reconstruct their social cohesion out of present circumstances and selected past experiences. The deliberate policies of group advantage for the Bengali migrants, as followed by the DDA, precipitate the clear visibility of community competition to gain control over or access to resources in the contemporary period. This competition creates inter-­group inequalities and generates the feeling of ‘relative deprivation’. The existing literature, therefore, suggests that such feelings could lead to the emergence of potential community conflicts (Gurr 1970, 2000).

Notes 1 The AMPO Committee was formed with the principal finance secretary as chairman and with the representatives of the Ministry of Finance, Rehabilitation, Agriculture and Home Affairs and the Planning Commission as members. 2 The composition of Bengali villages was to accommodate both the agriculturalists and non-­agriculturalists. The rehabilitation of non-­agriculturalist families was initiated to provide service to the agriculturalist families and it was estimated that 900 non-­agriculturalist families would be settled in the Dandakaranya area (Farmer 1974: 196) 3 It is important to mention here that before recommending for the grant of individual land rights, the DDA also experimented with group cultivation informally among the migrants of the Dandakaranya region. 4 The Udbastu Unnayansil Samity was formed in March 1973 to help the welfare of migrants kept in Mana camps. The Samity latter formed a malignant group to ensure the rehabilitation of migrants in Sunderbans area of West Bengal. 5 The attachment approach particularly underlines the link between the particular group or communities and geographical location and demand for distributive as well as redistributive justice (Kolers 2009: 100). In the context of the Bengali migrants in Odisha, it can be illustrated that although they were not attached with the territory of West Bengal, they were familiar with the Bengali language, culture and tradition, which encouraged them not to move out of West Bengal at the initial stage and their return from the socially, culturally and demographically unfamiliar places such as Dandakaranya at the later stage. 6 The then chairman of the DDA, S. K. Gupta, was concerned that the Bengali migrants should not swamp the Dandakaranya region. He urged both the West Bengal chief minister and the union rehabilitation minister to limit the proportion of migrants in relation to the Adivasi people and to stop sending further people to Dandakaranya (Dasgupta not dated: 15; Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 277, note 57).

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4 DISPOSSESSION, DISCONTENT AND CONFLICT Interface between Adivasis and Bengali migrants The exercise of violence cannot be avoided when conflicting interests are at stake. –­Sigmund Freud (1932; cited in Keane 2004: 89) To enter an age of ever-­increasing scarcity and downscaling is to enter an age of increased conflicts that contain a great potential for mass death and even genocide depending on the mechanisms by which scarcity is channelled to affect only certain groups and the mechanisms by which the conflict is resolved, managed or suppressed –­Dobkowski and Wallimann (1998: 14).

Crisis, challenges and contention have become the recurring theme in Indian society. Such a scenario has become more pronounced where communities are defined along the lines of ethnicity and constructed their identities along such line in association with competition to gain control over or access to resources. Crisis, challenges and contention also emerge in a society, where there is a precipitous decline of major political institutions. The inability of the political system to grapple with long-­term challenges bodes ill for the future of Indian society (Bardhan 2005: 169–­200; Kapur 2005: 36–­9, 87).1 This argument is based on the nature of cohesion, conflicts and contradictions within the Indian state. The social structure of a society and the nature of crises are essentially embedded in its historicity. The social formation of Indian society is the end product of the historical process. By maintaining this position, Oommen (2005: 15) points out five crucial dimensions which shape contentious issues and unleash crisis in contemporary Indian society. These issues are rural–­urban disparity, the deprivation of Adivasis, the lower castes and minority religious communities, the denial of linguistic identity 106

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to subaltern communities, the domination of state over market and civil society and the gradual disintegration of the joint family ethic. The crisis and challenges also emerge when a state creates the regime of ethnic deprivation due to uneven economic development, and the Adivasis are at the forefront to experience more and more such ethnic deprivation (Mohanty 2014). Such deprivation creates the platform for competition to control over or access to resources. Disagreement between communities regarding the use of resources creates the regime of dispossession, discontent and conflicts. This chapter focuses on the social and demographic settings of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha. Juxtaposing the two ethnic groups, that is, the Adivasis and Bengali migrants, it explores the arenas of competition and conflicts between them, particularly in social, economic and cultural spheres by taking note of their lived experiences in relation to conflicts both at the individual as well as community levels. The chapter further examines whether the state accentuates or reduces the conflicts between these two ethnic groups. In other words, what roles do the institutions of power and authority play in mediating, mitigating and escalating the conflicts between these ethnic communities?

Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts in context Malkangiri and Nabarangpur were agency tahasils in Visakhapatnam district, Madras (Francis 2002: 247, 249). Malkangiri and Nabarangpur were parts of Koraput district prior to 1992. Malkangiri was the fourth natural division and one of the five taluks of Koraput district in Odisha (Bell 1945: 4). Malkangiri and Nabarangpur were upgraded as the subdivisions of Koraput district in 1962 and 1941, respectively (Senapati and Sahu 1966: 5). On 2 October 1992, Malkangiri and Nabarangpur, carved out from Koraput district, came into existence as separate districts as per notification no. 49137/R dated 1 October 1992 of Odisha (Orissa) Government in Revenue Excise Department, Bhubaneswar. Malkangiri lies between 17˚45ʹ and 18˚40ʹ north latitude and 81˚10ʹ and 82˚ east longitude. Nabarangpur, however, is situated at 19°14ʹ latitude and 82°32ʹ longitude at an average elevation of 1,876 feet (572 m). Malkangiri shares its boundaries with Visakhapatnam and Khamam districts of Andhra Pradesh in the east and the south, respectively, Bastar district of Chhattisgarh in the west and Koraput district of Odisha in the north. Nabarangpur district shares its boundaries with Kalahandi district in the east, Koraput district in the south and 107

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Bastar and Raipur districts of Chhattisgarh in the west and north, respectively. Malkangiri is spread over 5,791 square kilometres, which consists of seven blocks and 108 gram panchayats. It has a total of 1,045 villages out of which 979 are inhabited villages, and the rest are uninhabited villages. Nabarangpur district is spread over 5,294.5 square kilometre, which consists of 10 blocks and 169 gram panchayats. It has a total of 885 villages. Malkangiri has the total population of 5,04,198, of which 2,89,538 (57.42 percent) are Adivasis and 107,654 (21.35 percent) are SCs. Nabarangpur has a total population of 1,025,766 out of which 5,64,480 (55.03 percent) are Adivasis and 1,44,654 (14.10 percent) are SCs. The composition of the SC population may be specially mentioned in reference to the broader objective of the book. Regarding SC population, the Bengali migrants (Namasudras), who have been declared as SCs in Odisha, have outnumbered the local SC population in Malkangiri district and have occupied the second position in terms of numerical strength in Nabarangpur district (2001 census). Although the SC population of Malkangiri is 21.35 percent of the total district population, Namasudra population constitute 72.57 percent of the total SC population of the district. Similarly, of the 14.10 percent of the SC population of Nabarangpur district, Namasudra population constitute 24.02 percent of the total SC population of the district. The population strength of the Bengali migrants has given in accordance with the 2001 census primarily because the Delimitation of Order of 2008, which came into force from 2009 elections, made the 2001 population as the criterion for demarcating reserved constituencies. The politics of number has much to do with the community conflict in Odisha, especially in the political sphere, and has been explored in detail in Chapter 5. Table 4.1 draws some selected data from the Human Development Report 2004. According to Table 4.1, 0.122, 0.497, 0.313, 0.491, 0.370 and 0.362 are the health index, income index, overall literacy rate index, education index, HDI value and GDI2 value of Malkangiri district, respectively. Nabarangpur district has values of 0.340, 0.453, 0.343, 0.516, 0.436, and 0.422 for the health index, income index, overall literacy rate index, education index, HDI value and GDI value, respectively. Malkangiri occupies the last rank (30th) in terms of education index, HDI and GDI among the 30 districts. As far as HDI and GDI ranks are concerned, Nabarangpur occupies the 26th and 25th positions, respectively, among 30 districts of Odisha. Malkangiri district occupies the 21st and 29th positions, respectively, in the context of income and health indexes, respectively. To suffix, based on the real per capita district domestic product at 1993–­94 prices, the value of the 108

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Table 4.1  Human development index for 30 districts of Odisha District

Health Income Overall Education HDI GDI HDI GDI index index literacy index value value rank rank rate index

Anugul Balangir Balasore Bargarh Bhadrak Baudh Cuttack Debagarh Dhenkanal Gajapati Ganjam Jagatsinghpur Jajpur Jharsuguda Kalahandi Kandhamal Kendrapara Kendujhar Khordha Koraput Malkangiri Mayurbhanj Nabarangpur Nayagarh Nuapada Puri Rayagada Sambalpur Sonepur Sundargarh Odisha

0.481 0.468 0.442 0.449 0.673 0.423 0.686 0.776 0.468 0.173 0.404 0.288 0.333 0.635 0.763 0.006 0.596 0.340 0.724 0.218 0.122 0.782 0.340 0.462 0.692 0.622 0.250 0.436 0.474 0.692 0.468

0.748 0.504 0.466 0.517 0.463 0.497 0.587 0.532 0.534 0.558 0.532 0.549 0.499 0.757 0.471 0.516 0.466 0.547 0.639 0.539 0.497 0.489 0.453 0.485 0.470 0.527 0.547 0.590 0.492 0.618 0.545

0.694 0.549 0.709 0.641 0.746 0.584 0.761 0.608 0.701 0.417 0.629 0.796 0.722 0.715 0.462 0.530 0.773 0.598 0.802 0.362 0.313 0.524 0.343 0.710 0.423 0.784 0.356 0.670 0.641 0.652 0.636

0.760 0.666 0.772 0.727 0.803 0.688 0.813 0.698 0.773 0.561 0.718 0.833 0.786 0.773 0.585 0.645 0.815 0.704 0.845 0.535 0.491 0.647 0.516 0.766 0.582 0.823 0.531 0.742 0.731 0.740 0.723

0.663 0.546 0.559 0.565 0.646 0.536 0.695 0.669 0.591 0.431 0.551 0.557 0.540 0.722 0.606 0.389 0.626 0.530 0.736 0.431 0.370 0.639 0.436 0.571 0.581 0.657 0.443 0.589 0.566 0.683 0.579

0.637 0.518 0.519 0.528 0.497 0.509 0.618 0.647 0.531 0.401 0.518 0.491 0.386 0.687 0.579 0.370 0.516 0.504 0.632 0.415 0.362 0.621 0.422 0.452 0.561 0.516 0.458 0.560 0.543 0.659 0.546

6 21 18 17 8 23 3 5 12 28 20 19 22 2 11 29 10 24 1 27 30 9 26 15 14 7 25 13 16 4

4 16 14 13 21 19 7 3 12 27 15 22 28 1 8 29 18 20 5 26 30 6 25 23 9 17 24 10 11 2

Source: GOO (2004: 194–­5, Table 8.1, 200, Table, 8.3). Note: Education index is a weighted average of overall literacy rate (two-­thirds weight) and combined gross enrolment ratio (one-­third weight). Given the different years to which the individual parameters pertain, the HDI values may be regarded as pertaining to around 2001. Names of Districts in bold represent the hosts of Bengali migrants.

real per capita income of Malkangiri is Rs 4436 (GOO 2004: 202–­3), which is ranked 21st among the 30 districts of Odisha. In short, Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts are well lagging behind the other districts of Odisha in different spheres. 109

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Table 4.2 deals with the block-­wise demographic profile of Malkangiri district. There is a high concentration of Adivasis (76.71 percent) in Kudumulugumma block and the lowest (40.29 percent) in Kalimela block. Barring Balimela and Malkangiri urban local bodies and Chitrakonda census town (CT), all the blocks have more than 50 percent Adivasis except the Kalimela block. The reason that it can be computed is due to the rural concentration of Adivasi population. On the contrary, Kalimela block has the highest (36.11 percent) and Khairput block has the lowest (7.27 percent) concentration of SC population. To put it differently, the concentration of both the SC and the Adivasi population has a greater implication to ‘the other’. For instance, Kalimela block has the highest concentration of SC population due to the settlement of Namasudra Bengali communities, and it has the lowest Adivasi population. Similarly, Kudumulugumma has the highest Adivasi population, but it has the second-­lowest concentration of the SC population in Malkangiri district. Table 4.3 provides the statistical figures of the block-­level population of Nabarangpur district. The Raighar block has the highest (65.59 percent) and the Chandahandi block has the lowest (35.14 percent) concentration of the Adivasi population. The Raighar block also has the highest (16.35 percent) concentration of the SC population, and the rehabilitation of Namasudra Bengalis has significantly contributed to the number. The Chandahandi block has the lowest (10.65 percent) concentration of SC population. Table 4.2  Block-­wise population of Malkangiri district (2011 census) Name

Total

ST

% ST

SC

% SC

Mathili Khairaput Kudumulguma Malkangiri Korkunda Podia Kalimela Malkangiri (NAC) Chitrakonda (CT) Balimela (NAC) Total

96,063 42,949 62,159 66,967 126,371 57,751 118,129 31,007 6,725 11,797 613,192

69,957 31,379 47,683 45,322 71,055 34,555 47,598 6,013 1,084 1,052 354,614

72.82 73.06 76.71 67.68 56.23 59.83 40.29 19.39 16.11 8.91 57.83

10,112 3,124 5,577 14,272 34,614 15,252 42,658 8,747 2,812 3,939 138,295

10.53 7.27 8.97 21.31 27.39 26.41 36.11 28.20 41.81 33.38 22.55

Source: Census of India (2011). Note: CT = census town; NAC = notified area council

110

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Table 4.3  Block-­wise population of Nabarangpur district (2011 census) Name

Total

ST

% ST

SC

% SC

Raighar Umarkote Chandahandi Jharigan Dabugan Paparahandi Kosagumuda Nabarangapur Nandahandi Tentulikhunti Raighar (CT) Umerkote (NAC) Papdahandi (CT) Nabarangpur (M + OG) Khatiguda (CT) Total

182,285 166,909 73,953 150,063 67,654 134,145 160,785 79,484 62,405 84,310 5,936 28,993 9,390 36,945 6,361 1,220,946

119,560 108,008 25,990 93,605 40,496 76,358 98,951 46,109 27,454 38,239 776 3,097 3,857 5,060 327 681,173

65.59 64.71 35.14 62.38 59.86 56.92 61.54 58.01 43.99 45.36 13.07 10.68 41.08 13.70 5.14 55.79

29,810 26,195 7,877 18,583 7,769 16,129 21,243 12,684 9,070 13,566 1,811 10,367 1,275 5,048 1,207 177,384

16.35 15.69 10.65 12.38 11.48 12.02 13.21 15.96 14.53 16.09 30.51 35.76 13.58 13.66 18.98 14.53

Source: Census of India (2011). Note: CT = census town; M = municipality; OG =out growth

Table 4.4 traces the land utilisation pattern in different blocks of Malkangiri district. Kalimela block has the highest forest area (30,603 hectares), and Malkangiri block has the least forest area (141,25 hectares). The largest amount of land in Korukonda block (7,622 hectares) has been used for non-­agricultural purposes, and Khairput has witnessed a smaller amount of land (1,638 hectares), which has been used for non-­agricultural purposes. Table 4.5 shows the land utilisation in different blocks of Nabarangpur district. Table 4.5 reflects that the Raighar block has the largest forest area (19,674 hectares), followed by the Umerkote block (7,798 hectares) and the Chandahandi has the smallest forest area (only 359 hectares). The Nabarangpur block has the most (4,140 hectares) and the Chandahandi block has the lowest (36 hectares) cultivable wasteland.3 The Kosagumuda block has the largest amount of land (4,583 hectares) which has been used for non-­ agricultural purposes, and the Nabarangpur block has the least amount of land (462 hectares) which has been directed for the same purpose. In the context of forest areas, it can be illustrated that the settlement of the Bengali migrants had been done in 111

3,285 1,638 7,622 2,039 3,326 3,519 4,054 328 25,761

14,318 15,619 1,299 7,500 954 495 2,720 135 43,040

1,829 3,754 24,342 1,964 338 5,578 5,540 4,178 28,310 3,613 1,527 16,063 3,615 516 15,623 2,370 1,754 23,315 8,659 5,725 11,712 210 117 1,133 27,800 17,909 126,076

Note: The estimate excludes urban area, revenue forest, forests, project protected area, hill blocks, villages submerged under river and sea. Names of blocks in bold represent the hosts of Bengali migrants

Source: GOO (2011a: 20–­1).

617 84 1588 982 53 706 747 201 4,978

2,317 2,728 4,167 2,901 2,191 3,771 2,730 26 20,831

Kalimela 30,603 Khairput 17,009 Korukonda 24,469 Kudumulugumma 25,068 Malkangiri 14,125 Mathili 26,487 Podia 18,732 Urban 77 Total 156,570

6 131 28 21 111 252 1 8 558

Permanent Cultivable Land put to non-­ Barren and Current Old Net area pasture and waste agricultural uses non-­cultivable fallows fallows shown other grazing land lands

Name of the block Forest area Land under misc. tree crops & groves not included in net area shown

Table 4.4  Block-­wise land utilisation pattern in Malkangiri district, 2010–­11 (area in hectares)

359 2,149 5,881 6,105 3,092 738 4,205 19,674 7,490 7,798 555 58,046

26 1,760 1,094 4,547 310 1,961 1,825 65 738 373 21 12,720

623 243 2,022 1,706 1,879 726 1,255 456 405 1,424 34 10,773

36 212 1,639 2,442 4,140 548 407 514 394 1,188 172 11,692

1,831 2,068 1,408 4,583 462 1,676 3,426 1,687 922 3,605 369 22,037

3,451 164 2,544 458 3,085 247 257 436 497 832 30 12,001

4,113 860 2,112 5,295 2,134 3,493 2,259 2,318 2,240 1,652 207 26,683

505 52 1,087 1,082 1,077 750 1,581 361 214 892 287 7,888

13,470 14,942 26,016 32,419 9,573 9,993 30,538 43,817 20,092 35,841 1,841 23,8542

Permanent Cultivable Land put to non-­ Barren and Current Old Net area pasture and waste agricultural uses non-cultivable fallows fallows shown land other grazing lands

Note: The estimate excludes urban area, reserved forests, protected forests, project area, hill blocks, villages submerged under river and sea. Names of blocks in bold represent the hosts of Bengali migrants.

Source: GOO (2011b: 21–­2).

Chandahandi Dabugaon Jharigaon Kosagumuda Nabarangpur Nandahandi Papadahandi Raighar Tentulikhunti Umerkote Urban Total

Name of the block Forest area Land under misc. tree crops & groves not included in net area shown

Table 4.5  Block-­wise land utilisation pattern in Nabarangpur district, 2010–­11 (area in hectares)

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those areas which have the largest amount of forest areas. Hence, it can be underlined that the Raighar and Umerkote blocks possess a large amount of forest areas and have hosted a maximum number of DNK villages in Nabarangpur district. Table 4.6 computes the irrigational facilities in different blocks of Malkangiri district in the context of both kharif and rabi cultivation. Table 4.6 shows that the largest amount of land (22,060 and 14,240 hectares) has been facilitated by the major or medium irrigation facilities in the Kalimela block during kharif and rabi cultivation, respectively. It is worthwhile to mention here that the Kalimela block has the highest concentration of SC population in Malkangiri district, and the Namasudra Bengali community contributed significantly to the population of the block. The Malkangiri, Korukonda and Podia blocks have also been benefitted by the major or medium irrigation facilities. It has been observed that the Malkangiri and Korukonda blocks have been benefited by the Satiguda medium irrigation project, whereas Kalimela and Podia blocks have been facilitated by the Potteru major irrigation project, which was initiated by the DNK Project in 1973 and completed by the GOO in 2006. These two irrigation projects were implemented by the GOI under the DNK Project primarily for the benefits of the Bengali migrants who have been rehabilitated in Malkangiri zone. On the other hand, it is reported that not even a single major or medium irrigation project has been set up by the government in the Khairput, Kudumulgumma and Mathili blocks. These are the only three blocks of Malkangiri district where the rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants has not taken place. To put it differently, the state took all the necessary steps to make the Bengali migrants economically viable and neglected its own people, that is, the native Adivasis. It seems to be quite apparent that had Bengali migrants not rehabilitated, the state would not have taken the steps for irrigation facilities even in the Kalimela, Korukonda, Malkangiri and Podia blocks. Table 4.7 figures out the irrigation facilities in different blocks of Nabarangpur district. Umerkote is the only block in Nabarangpur district which has witnessed major/medium irrigation projects, and in this case, the construction of the Bhaskal dam can be demonstrated. The major objective of Bhaskal dam was to facilitate the Bengali migrants who were rehabilitated in the Umerkote zone of Nabarangpur district. This dam facilitated 4,250 and 1,150 hectares of land during the kharif and rabi cultivation, respectively, by 2010–­11. In addition, 1,542 and 337 hectares of land were benefitted by the minor irrigation projects (flow and lift) during kharif and rabi cultivation, respectively, in the Umerkote block. Minor irrigation projects 114

22,060 0 13670 0 4,350 0 12,820 52,900

Kharif 680 570 1,890 1,550 300 850 540 6,380

Kharif

Flow

60 20 160 10 20 60 50 380

Rabi 1,230 340 1,090 90 630 1,030 250 4,660

Kharif

Lift

Minor irrigation projects (flow)

Note: Names of blocks in bold represent the hosts of Bengali migrants.

14,240 0 8,030 0 3,460 0 4,940 30,670

Rabi

Major/medium irrigation projects

Source: GOO (2011a: 25).

Kalimela Khairput Korukonda Kudumulgumma Malkangiri Mathili Podia Total

Blocks

850 220 920 70 540 560 190 3,350

Rabi 250 230 410 250 310 270 190 1,910

Kharif

260 230 330 250 320 290 190 1,870

Rabi

Other sources

24,220 1,140 17,060 1,890 5,590 2,150 13,800 65,850

Kharif

Total

Table 4.6  Source-­wise irrigation potential created in different blocks of Malkangiri district in 2010–­11 (area in hectares)

15,410 470 9,440 330 4,340 910 5,370 36,270

Rabi

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,250 4,250

Kharif 2,431 60 677 84 1,020 179 213 309 270 976 6,219

Kharif

Flow

96 2 123 12 120 40 92 187 22 105 799

Rabi 2,242 740 1,723 2,125 2,326 1,622 1,107 633 467 566 13,551

Kharif

Lift

Minor irrigation projects

Note: Names of blocks in bold represent the hosts of Bengali migrants.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,150 1,150

Rabi

Major/medium irrigation projects

Source: GOO (2011b: 26).

Chandahandi Dabugaon Jharigaon Kosagumuda Nabarangpur Nandahandi Papadahandi Raighar Tentulikhunti Umerkote Total

Blocks

2450 65 459 741 891 752 249 356 177 232 6,167

Rabi 1,070 1,047 1,241 3,012 1,155 1,300 1,496 2,493 1,214 1,225 15,253

Kharif 820 1,103 1,172 2,121 1,876 1,939 2,132 1,206 753 1,180 14,302

Rabi

Other sources

5,743 1,847 3,641 5,221 4,501 3,101 2,816 3,435 1,951 7,017 39,273

Kharif

Total

3,161 1,170 1,754 2,874 2,887 2,731 2,473 1,749 952 2,667 22,418

Rabi

Table 4.7  Source-­wise irrigation potential created in different blocks of Nabarangpur district in 2010–­11 (area in hectares)

D ispossession , discontent and conflict

(flow and lift) benefitted 2,400 and 582 hectares of land during kharif and rabi cultivation, respectively, in the Jharigaon block. In the same vein, the Raighar block has also been benefitted by the minor irrigation projects which have endorsed 942 and 543 hectares of land during kharif and rabi cultivation respectively. Kornel (2006: 188) emphasised that out of the total availability of water in the undivided Koraput district, the Bengali migrants of DNK Project villages are getting 55.78 percent of the irrigation water.

Issues in inter-­community relationship Different communities are constructed on the basis of caste, ethnicity, gender, religion and so on. They define their identities and draw boundaries on the basis of their distinctiveness. These identities are also referred to in the context of their day-­to-­day interaction with ‘the other communities’. Similarly, the Adivasis and Bengali migrants had their own community identities, and some of the important issues govern their relationships. Occupational background The Adivasi and Bengali communities of South Odisha are engaged in agriculture. The resettlement process of the DNK Project gave utmost importance to agriculture and agricultural communities among the Bengali migrants were rehabilitated by the DNK Project in Odisha. In addition to agricultural practices, the Bengali migrants are gradually exploring different alternative income-­generating sources, such as seasonal business, opening shops on the roadside, selling products in weekly markets and so on in which they have been succeeding to a large extent. Addressing the gender dimension of occupational background, due to their relatively better economic position, a large number of women in the Bengali communities were little or not interested in working in the agricultural field, although the visibility of Bengali women can also be seen in the field. They were engaged in other income-­generating works such as preparing bidi from kendu leaves at home. On the other hand, due to their subsistence economic position, the Adivasi women had no other option for generating income than working in their own agricultural field at times and in the lands of Bengali migrants as agricultural labourers most of the times. Land question The Adivasis and Bengali migrants possess an uneven amount of land. The striking difference between them is that while the Bengali migrants 117

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received lands from the centralised DNK Project, the Adivasis had primarily acquired land through inheritance, and recently, some of them were granted land under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, commonly known as Forest Rights Act. The landholding pattern among the Adivasis and Bengali migrants suggests that most of them belonged to the semi-­medium (2–­4 acre) category. The district-­wise comparison illustrates that the Adivasis of Malkangiri have the edge over their counterparts of Nabarangpur district. The interesting thing encountered during the field study was that although none of the Bengali respondents of Malkangiri district reported belonging to the large landholding category (>10 acres), one of the Bengali respondents of UV 53 in Nabarangpur district, however, claimed to have possessed 10 acres of land.4 He cited that the excess land over the caps of the DNK Project land allotment was possible through purchase. He, however, spurned to divulge from whom the land was purchased. As the Adivasis were in a relatively better position in terms of landholding and the contemporary scenario indicated a decreasing pattern of landholding, it may be speculated that the land was purchased from the Adivasis.5 During the field study, the Adivasis of South Odisha refuted the loss of land in the recent past. Although the Adivasis denied any loss of land, the ground reality emerged to speak a different story. The 2001 conflict between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants was in fact primarily revolved around the Adivasis’ attempt to reinstate their rights over land resources. In the wake of the conflict, the tahasil office, Umerkote, initiated the collection of information on the landholding pattern of the Bengali migrants. It was found that a large amount of land had been purchased/encroached on by Bengali migrants in Umerkote tahasil of Nabarangpur district (Table 4.11). Despite the existence of legislative measures prohibiting Adivasi land alienation, the existing literature, however, suggests that Adivasis in South Odisha are being cheated and alienated from their land (Bagchi 1999: 99; Ambagudia 2010). It was not surprising to note that Adivasi land also gradually passed into the hands of the migrants via sharecropping, where the land would be recorded in the name of Adivasis but the migrants continue to cultivate the land. The Bengali migrants were more reluctant to answer the question concerning sharecropping of Adivasi lands. Taking the pros and cons of the resource conflict between the Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district in 2001 into consideration, they were more cautious to respond to this question. With much reluctance, one of the female respondents of MPV 118

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18-­B of Malkangiri district, however, acknowledged that they were engaged in sharecropping of Adivasi land, although she refused to divulge the amount of land involved.6 Economic condition The comparative analysis shows that the Bengali migrants are in a better economic position than the Adivasis. The reasons are more intricate than they seem to be. No doubt, the landholding pattern of the Adivasis, owing to their ancestral properties, is better than the Bengali migrants; however, they survive on a bare subsistence economy. The empirical research indicated that the Adivasis have not been able to produce more from the agricultural land due to, among other reasons, their lack of proper knowledge about cultivation, use of latest technology, timely use of fertilisers, skills and so on. The Bengali migrants have their own explanation for the failure of Adivasis’ to receive good returns from agricultural land. It is common among the Bengali migrants to quickly stereotype the Adivasis as being lazy, spending a good amount of time in drinking and entertainment.7 They allege that the Adivasis do not think for tomorrow. It is important to mention here that the Adivasi society was not exposed to the material world and that the concept of ‘too much’ was unfamiliar to them. On the other hand, the Bengali migrants received all facilities and knowledge during their rehabilitation which contributed to their higher income. Research was done on the crops that can be grown by migrants, and the market facilities were provided for the sale of their crops. These facilities were, however, not provided for the Adivasis (Barik 2006: 98). The other important reason for income differentiation is that the Adivasis adopt only a single type of income-­generation scheme and the production of a single crop in a year, while Bengali migrants practise seasonal business along with production from the land. The Bengali migrants have been able to engage the land for the entire year by cultivating groundnuts and different vegetables such as brinjal, parwal, potato, tomato, cucumber, chilli, beans and so on, along with paddy in Odisha. This has contributed a lot towards their better income. Even in the market economy, the Adivasis were at a disadvantaged position in terms of bargaining capacity when compared to the Bengali migrants. Questions were framed in a distinct but interrelated framework for Adivasis and Bengali migrants to understand the comparative economic conditions since the arrival of the latter to the Dandakaranya region of Odisha. For the Adivasis, the question was constructed on the 119

D ispossession , discontent and conflict

impact of the arrival of Bengali migrants to the area under consideration. More specifically, how do the Adivasis consider their economic condition today? Similarly, the question was structured for Bengali migrants to compare their present economic condition with that of their arrival to the area. There is no difference of opinion among the Adivasis and Bengali migrants, and they acknowledged that their present economic conditions are better than the time of the arrival of the latter to the area. Adivasis and Bengali migrants computed different reasons for changes in their present economic situation. These arguments are subjective in nature as different respondents have their own way of interpreting the situation. While for some respondents like the 99-­year-­old Adivasi of Jaduguda (Malkangiri district), there is a link between the arrival of Bengali migrants and the economic condition of Adivasis in terms of learning about the process of agricultural production and utilisation of technologies and fertilisers;8 for others, such notion was far from acceptable. The notion of learning modern agricultural practises from the Bengali migrants has been strongly contested by scholars such as Farmer (1974: 217–­18), who underlined that it is the Bengali migrants who learnt a lot from the Adivasis concerning the use of agricultural technology, methods and types of crops to be cultivated in corroboration with topographical features. Although the Adivasis might have learnt from the Bengali migrants to some extent, it is not the arrival of Bengali migrants but the enactment and implementation of a series of welfare measures and income-­ generating schemes such as JRY, PMSY and MGNREGA, to mention a few, that contributed to their relatively better economic condition today. One of the Adivasi respondents underlined that their economic condition has improved not because of the arrival of the Bengali migrants to the area but because of the consequence of cultivation of land in proper ways.9 The Adivasis of Rengabhati and Jamdara villages (two Adivasi villages that experienced conflicts with the Bengali migrants in 2001) of Nabarangpur district underlined that their economic condition is becoming worse due to the indulgence of the Bengali migrants in exploiting the Adivasis in terms of grabbing their lands. To put it differently, a specific event can also orient the respondents to construct their views on a particular issue. On the other hand, the Bengali migrants drew a positive link between the economic conditions of the Adivasis and the arrival of the Bengali migrants. The 69-­year-­old Bengali migrant of UV 53 narrated the sorry state of affairs that existed before the arrival of the Bengali migrants. He pointed out that VLWs used to mortgage the 120

D ispossession , discontent and conflict

Adivasi lands were for just Rs 60 per acre. However, when the Bengali migrants mortgaged Adivasi lands, they paid Rs 300 per acre, and presently, it is Rs 2000 per acre per single crop and more than that for double crops.10 He further pointed out that the arrival of Bengali migrants to this area has not only contributed to the better economic condition of the Adivasis but also positively affected the dressing pattern of the Adivasi communities. Before their arrival, Adivasis wore languti (a small piece of cloth to cover genitals). The relief vehicles of DNK Project, which were regularly plying to evaluate the situation of the Bengali migrants, happened to distribute clothes to the half-­naked Adivasi people. Bengali migrants emphasised that they have a better economic position vis-­à-­vis the economic condition of the 1960s and 1970s due to their hard work, seasonal business and, to some extent, the impact of welfare measures. However, some of the Bengali respondents also contended that their economic condition is getting worse in the contemporary period due to increasing family size and fragmentation of land among the family members as the government had not reviewed the allotment of the land after the settlement on the basis of their family expansion. In short, the implementation of the DNK Project and the arrival of the Bengali migrants created hopes and despair for both the ethnic communities.

Inter-­community relationship Inter-­ community relationships between different ethnic groups are the product of their long-­standing interaction and interface with ‘the other’. The relationship has been defined and redefined within the broader framework of their everyday experiences with ‘the other’ in social, economic, cultural and political spheres. How do various communities define in terms of their social identity considering ‘the other’? What kind of economic relationship they establish towards each other, or does one community indulge in exploiting the ‘other’? Have these communities developed similar cultural values in everyday life? Or is there any notion of superiority or inferiority of culture associated with their practice? A single factor does not govern the interactions between Adivasis and Bengali migrants; rather, they are the product of a number of factors. Their relationship needs to be defined in the context of new forms of competition for prestige, power, position and resources as well as new forms of cooperation. This has become evident in social, economic and cultural spheres with the competition over resources. 121

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Nature of relationship The nature of the relationship between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants can be explored at two levels: one, individual level and, two, community level. Although the Adivasi society is defined less along the lines of autonomous individuals, Adivasis do experience different forms of relationships such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘cordial’, ‘not cordial’, ‘conflictual’ and so on at the individual level, and such relationships will have greater implications in society. At the same time, they also experience such relationships at the community level, with greater influence over individuals. The nature of the relationship described as ‘good’ and ‘cordial’ is experienced at the individual level. The relationships of ‘bad’, ‘not so cordial’ and ‘conflictual’ are more often experienced at the community level. The conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in 2001 and ongoing sporadic conflicts in South Odisha have considerably influenced their relationship at the community level, which is essentially described as ‘bad’, ‘not so cordial’ and ‘conflictual’. Differences between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants have eventually led to the absence of a cordial relationship. The conflictual, adversarial and the lack of cordial relationship are more prone to Nabarangpur district than Malkangiri because Nabarangpur district experienced conflict between these communities in 2001. The Adivasis alleged that the Bengali migrants are responsible for developing such a relationship due to their increasing involvement in grabbing the land resources of the Adivasis, thereby tucking them to a situation of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation. The nature of relationship between different communities is always situational or circumstances-­driven, and the prevailing circumstances enable them to establish different forms of relationship. Inter-­dining Empirical research indicates that there is a mixed response to ‘whether to accept the food cooked by the other’. Comparative analysis suggests that a substantial number of Adivasis have no objections to accepting food cooked by the Bengali migrants. This is, however, not the case with the Bengali migrants. The respondents who developed a negative attitude towards accepting food emphasised the importance of caste practices and cultural differences. They belonged to the group of less educated, illiterate and older generation. In this context, two cases from the field can be demonstrated. One from the Adivasis, where the 122

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99-­year-­old illiterate Adivasi of Jaduguda shows his non-­acceptance of food cooked by Bengali migrants due to their location at different layers of the caste ladder. Similarly, the food cooked by Adivasis is unacceptable to the ninth-­passed 65-­year-­old Bengali migrant of MV-­ 92, citing the instances of caste and cultural differences. Similar issues are also visible in Nabarangpur district of Odisha. The educated and young generation belonging to 20s and 30s have little or no objection to inter-­dinning. Three explanations can be offered to such orientation. First, the positive impact of modern education on Adivasi and Bengali communities, and its ability to bring changes in the society, although it is very difficult to acknowledge that such a process would lead to de-­casteisation of Indian society, has led to such a notion. Second, the relatively more interactions amongst the younger generations than their elders or parents helped in developing such views. Third, the easy access to eatable shops established by the Bengali communities has led to the construction of such a notion. The Bengali communities occupied the central contested space in the weekly market, locally known as haat. The Bengali migrants have also established bakery shops, small dhabas and restaurants on the main roadside. On the contrary, one could hardly find such shops set up by Adivasis. Marriage practices Adivasi and Bengali communities are located at different social strata in Indian society, having distinct social and cultural practices, which are particularly evident during marriages and become the main source of conflict in inter-­community marriages. Generally, the Adivasis of Odisha do not favour inter-­community marriages by emphasising that the Bengali migrants are money-­oriented/business-­oriented people and that after marriage, they might exploit their Adivasi in-­laws and even grab their lands. On the contrary, the Bengali migrants less seem to oppose inter-­community marriage practices. The probable reason is that marital relationships between members of these communities may improve their relationships. However, opposition to inter-­community marriage is more prone to the Adivasis, perhaps because they have a unique lifestyle and their involvement may lead to the process of detribalisation. The absence of the fundamentals of Adivasi society such as the notion of ‘too much’, material greed and the Adivasi worldview has essentially enabled them to develop dissent to inter-­ community marriage. 123

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A case of inter-­community marriage between Adivasis and Bengali migrants has been reported in Malkangiri district. One of the respondents cited that a Bengali of MV 27 tied the knot with the Koya Adivasi girl of Morkelguda and decided to live with his father-­in-­law at Morkelguda.11 By considering the splintering nature of DNK allotted land to the Bengali migrants due to the expansion of family size and community conflicts over land, one may argue that the Bengali men marry Adivasis women to grab land. There are, however, no data indicating how much land is being lost due to inter-­community marriages between Adivasis and Bengali communities. Although it is extremely difficult to explore the actual reasons for marriage that took place between the Bengali of MV 27 and Adivasi girl of Morkelguda, that is, whether it was based on love or his intention to grab land or both, this had, however, eventually led to the emergence of caste conflict between Adivasis and the Bengali migrants of Malkangiri district.12 The reason that played an important role in objecting inter-­community marriage is the ‘caste question’, where it has repeatedly been stated that both these communities belonged to different caste groups and had different caste and cultural practices.13 However, the feeling of inferiority among the marginalised communities arising from this difference had created continuous pressure to amplify the marriage ceremony, including issuing invitations to a large number of people, inviting Brahmins to officiate and organising a puja (Buckles et al. 2013: 194). Financial transaction Economy is one of the important arenas of competition and conflict between the vulnerable Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in Odisha. Economic interactions cannot be looked in isolation. It has wider implications as far as these communities are concerned. Interactions in economic sphere depend on the economic position of both communities and are also associated with the established economic institutions. Economic interactions between the Adivasi and Bengali communities can be studied in the way the established economic institutions such as banks function and the way they treat these two communities. The Adivasi and Bengali communities have developed community-­ intensive reasons to explain their economic relationship which are more complex and difficult in nature than they appear to be. It has been learned from the field that there is no standardised pattern of economic interactions between these communities. Due to their subsistence economic condition, the Adivasis approach the Bengali migrants 124

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for borrowing money. It is also worthwhile to underline that there is no fixed interest rate, as well as terms and conditions, to govern their monetary transactions. It depends on the Adivasi borrowers and Bengali moneylenders to decide the interest rate and terms and conditions of such transactions. In most cases, the interest rate and the terms and conditions are dictated by the Bengali moneylenders. The empirical research indicates that, in most cases, the interest rate of monetary transactions between these communities ranges from Rs 3 to Rs 5 per Rs 100 per month.14 Most Adivasis do not prefer to go to banks for availing loan facilities due to red-­tapism involved in sanctioning loans and a lack of required documents. Banks take a longer period in sanctioning loans and demand frequent visits, which are not preferred by the Adivasis. The other interrelated part is that if the individual is not influential or educated, the sanction of a loan even takes a longer period than it usually does. The other reason, probably the major one, is that since most of the Adivasis do not have the RoR on land in their own name, the process of sanctioning a loan becomes even more complex. Hence, for these reasons, the Adivasi communities have developed cynicism towards modern financial institutions and eventually approach the Bengali moneylenders, who operate on arbitrary terms. Adivasis take advance for various purposes such as festivals, marriages, grain purchase or to improve the condition of their dwellings.15 Non-­availability of an alternative source of income and lack of saving compelled them to turn towards an advance. The Bengali migrants would procure agricultural yields at low prices from the Adivasis during the harvest season and advance grain loans at a high rate of interest during the loan season. Owing to the crushing interest rates and the consequent inability of the Adivasis to pay off the dues, the Adivasi lands have gradually passed into the hands of the Bengali migrants. In most of the cases, the lands would be in the name of Adivasis; the Bengali migrants, however, continue to cultivate the lands till the Adivasis repay the loans. On the contrary, Bengali migrants prefer to approach the bank for a loan. As they are well educated, they manage to get a loan from the bank in quicker time than what it usually takes in the case of the less aware and vulnerable Adivasi communities. As all the Bengali migrants were granted land with patta, producing the RoR does not constitute a problem. They lend money to Adivasis, but if they are driven by circumstances at all, the Bengali migrants go to their Adivasi friend circle. During the field study, the Bengali respondents emphasised that they prefer to borrow money from the Adivasis without any 125

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interest and terms and conditions, which violates not only the market principle but also the basic principle of monetary transactions. Caste question The Indian practice of caste system is always associated with the notion of higher and lower status, purity and pollution and so on. These perceptions are deeply embedded in Adivasi as well as Bengali societies. Adivasis with little or no education and belonging to the older generation consider Bengali migrants as untouchables due to their different location in a socially stratified society. They consider the Bengalis as ‘dandka’16 (a derogatory term loosely reflecting people belonging to other category and probably lower strata). The young and educated Adivasis do not treat the Bengali migrants in the same way. However, Bengali migrants acknowledged that the Adivasis treat them equally. Unlike Bengali migrants, the Adivasi believe that the Bengali migrants do not treat them equally in social, economic and cultural spheres, which may affect the level of Adivasis’ self-­confidence. A long history of severe exploitation, discrimination and social exclusion has fragmented the community and deeply eroded the self-­confidence of the Adivasis (Buckles et al. 2013: 89). The question of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ is always embedded in the community relations in the caste-­ridden Indian society. There is a mixed response among the Adivasis concerning the relative status of the Bengali migrants. Three important reasons, among others, are responsible for considering the status of Bengali migrants as higher, lower and same with the Adivasis. The Bengalis are at the upper end vis-­à-­vis the Adivasis due to their economic and educational advancement. Social stratification is responsible for considering Bengali migrants as the lower strata of the caste-­ridden society. Due to the impact of modern education and welfare programmes, both these communities are on the same footing in the development ladder. On the contrary, a significant number of Bengali migrants consider that the Adivasis belong to a lower status. Educational backwardness, traditional agricultural practices, subsistence economic position, ignorance and so on enabled Bengali migrants to equate Adivasis with a lower status. They considered the Adivasis as inferior to them due to their propensity for drink and their food habits. Bengali migrants generally stereotype the Adivasi society as a primitive and drunken society, which is beyond redemption. Although they consider the Adivasis as economically backward people, they acknowledge the importance of Adivasis as a source of cheap labour and seek to rebuild 126

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the relationship of exploitation. However, an interesting thing that emerged during the field study was a graduated Bengali respondent’s consideration of the higher status of Adivasis due to political reservation and consequent better political position.17 The comparative analysis of the Adivasi and the Bengali perspectives suggests that these considerations have much to do with their subjective experiences developed as a result of their day-­to-­day interaction with ‘the other’ in different spheres of life. Marginalisation The history of Adivasis has been one of marginalisation, subjugation and discrimination. The issue of marginalisation cannot be studied in isolation. Questions arise: who was responsible for the marginalised position of the Adivasi communities? Were the Adivasis responsible for such a position? Was it the state that pushed the Adivasis to the dispossessed and marginalised position or the Bengali migrants? Sometimes the marginalised position of Adivasis arises due to their isolated position in society. But more often, this unfortunate state of affairs of the Adivasi communities occurs due to the increasing role of the state in alienating Adivasi lands in the name of development and allowing the MNCs to extract the natural resources of the Adivasi region (Mohanty 2014: 40,44; Ambagudia 2017: 155–­65). This has been supplemented by the involvement of the Bengali migrants in exploiting and marginalising the Adivasis. The Adivasis subscribed to the view that along with the state, the Bengali migrants are the major players in marginalising the Adivasi communities in South Odisha. They feel that the Bengali migrants are marginalising the Adivasis by taking away their land for cultivation. It is worthwhile to mention that as laws do not allow the transfer of Adivasi land to non-­Adivasis, a piece of land may remain with the Adivasis in name only and actually be cultivated by Bengali migrants, while the Adivasis work as labourers in their own land. The Adivasis remain at the lower receiving end in the market economy. Nature of grievances The Adivasis and Bengali migrants put allegations and counter-­ allegations against each other. The terms and conditions of the land relations between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants do not represent views from both sides and are primarily driven by the latter and are 127

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thereby discriminatory in nature. Whether in the case of sharecropping or moneylending, the terms and conditions are dictated by the Bengali migrants and the Adivasis are left with no option but to accept the dictates of the former due to their helplessness, illiteracy and ignorance. Due to their high level of awareness, Bengali migrants grab the maximum facilities available for both the communities and leave little for the Adivasi communities.18 While dealing with the moneylending process, as the interest rate varies from person to person, the rate of interest is decided by the migrants and not by both parties concerned. Sometimes, the Bengali migrants cultivate the Adivasi lands for more years than they had actually specified by oral/verbal terms and conditions. The Bengali migrants are also destroying forest resources which constitute the supplementary source of Adivasi income. The Bengali migrants allege that Adivasis take money from them to offer land for cultivation, but most of the time they do not keep their promise.19 Even without respecting the written as well as verbal terms and conditions, with the help of Adivasi organisations, they take their lands back from the Bengali migrants. The other nature of grievances that emerged during the discussion with Bengali migrants in the field is that nowadays Adivasis are encroaching grazing lands allotted to Bengali migrants under the centrally sponsored DNK Project. The other grievance that the Bengali migrants emphasised during the field study is political in nature. Unlike Malkangiri district where the Bengali migrants were contesting assembly elections prior to 2009, the presence of all the Adivasi reserved constituencies does not allow the Bengali migrants to contest the assembly elections. They are, however, enjoying the benefits of political reservation at the local level. The Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur established a positive relationship between political representation provided to the Adivasis and the enactment of welfare projects for their concerned communities in Odisha.

Marginalisation, tensions and conflicts Tensions and conflicts are integral parts of Indian society. Various communities in Odisha also engage in conflictual relationships in different spheres. The earlier analysis suggests that the relationship between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants is not always cordial rather it is adversarial since both of these ethnic communities have developed different feelings towards each other on social, economic and cultural grounds. In this context, it is essential to discuss conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in South Odisha. 128

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Adivasi and Bengali migrants in Malkangiri district Table 4.8 deals with the representation of the Koya Adivasis and Bengali migrants in government services in Malkangiri district by February 2001. The comparative analysis of the data suggests that except in excise supervision and police services, the Bengali migrants have represented themselves quite significantly and that the Adivasi communities are underrepresented. It underlines that the Adivasis have been able to represent themselves at the lower level of state echelons and not in the positions related to the decision-­making process. For instance, there is a lack of representation of Adivasis of Malkangiri in OAS, though the presence of the Bengali migrants is easily visible. However, the recruitment process of 2010 OAS has included a few representatives from the Adivasis of Malkangiri district. The other important fact that needs to be underlined is that the Bengali migrants more often try to grab available and better opportunities. In this context, the case of Nimai Chandra Sarkar, a Bengali migrant, can be demonstrated. He was an OAS officer. He also worked as senior clerk of the Sub-­Collector office and as head clerk of the DRDA and contested the 2004 assembly election successfully.20 During his tenure, he tried to establish a good

Table 4.8 Representation of Adivasis (Koyas) and Bengali migrants in government services in Malkangiri district in February 2001* Nature of services

Bengali migrants

Local Koya Adivasis

Advocates IAS OAS & allied Banking services (in Malkangiri) Police (sub-­inspector)

7 Nil 8 50%

Nil Nil Nil Nil

2

10 (CSI-­3; ASI-­1; Women-­1)

Nil Nil 200 above 1 3 15 Dominant

1® 2® 50 Nil Nil 2 Lack of presence

Excise superintendent government of India A Grade IES A Grade Schoolteacher Forest Department (ranger) Forester guards District administration Source: Kornel (2006: 208). * The figures are approximate ® One family

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relationship with the people, and eventually that led him to victory during the 2000 Assembly election (see Chapter 5). The decision of the government to clear a huge amount of forest to give land to the Bengali migrants has negatively affected the Adivasi way of life. Population increase in the area has put tremendous pressure on the traditional natural resources of the Adivasis. The well-­ skilled and technologically aware Bengali migrants have established their dominant position in the economic sphere with their timely use of technology in the agricultural field. This stands in stark contrast to the traditional pastoral-­cum-­agricultural economy of the Adivasis. The initiatives of the government to clear forest has dismantled the age-­old symbiotic relationship between Adivasis and forests and shrunk Adivasis’ access to forests. It has negatively contributed to the economic life of the Adivasi communities, leading to their economic marginalisation in Odisha. In the name of rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants, forest resources and land have been depleted. Adivasis are not only uprooted from the land and forest-­based resources, but they have also been denied using their knowledge base and related skills. The wastelands, which were previously used by the Adivasis for grazing their cattle, have been distributed among the Bengali migrants. Consequently, they have lost unrecorded lands which have long been used by them as they lack legal rights over it. This has adversely affected the livelihood opportunities for the Adivasi communities of the district. The Indian state had taken all the necessary steps to enable the Bengali migrants to become an economically viable community. The block-­ wise comparative analysis suggests that major and medium irrigation facilities have been created in those blocks where Bengali migrants have been rehabilitated. Blocks such as Mathili, Khairput and Kudumulgumma of Malkangiri district, and Chandahandi, Dabugaon, Kosagumuda, Nabarangpur, Nandahandi, Papadahandi and Tentulikhunti of Nabarangpur district, have not received the benefits of any major or even medium irrigation projects (Tables 4.6 and 4.7). The GOI had implemented two major/medium irrigation projects such as Satiguda and Potteru irrigation projects for the benefit of Bengali migrants who have been rehabilitated in the Malkangiri zone. Similarly, the Bhaskal dam was constructed to cater to the needs of the Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district. In addition, under the DNK Project, research was conducted for the maximum production of those crops which the Bengali migrants were engaged in and market facilities were created for these crops. There had been, however, hardly any research conducted on the maximum production of Adivasi-­oriented 130

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crops or market facilities were created for them (Barik 2006). The availability of irrigation facilities has enabled the Bengali migrants to practise double cropping that has brought a dramatic change in their economic life. In fact, the Indian state had provided all necessary facilities to the Bengali migrants for their economic viability and neglected the native Adivasis. Competition is not only confined to control over resources but also extended to access to different government facilities. Due to their educational development and awareness, the Bengali migrants enjoy a higher position in the ladder to access civic amenities. The Adivasis of Malkangiri blamed that the administration is less concern in addressing their issues and engaged in discriminatory practices, and more receptive towards the Bengali migrants. They cited the example of the distribution of mango and cashew plants by the government in 2009 primarily to the Bengali migrants of the Malkangiri district. By the time the Adivasis approached the concerned authority for plants after a few days, the distribution was already over, and the authority asked them to contact for plants the following year.21 This shows that the Bengali migrants have been an additional burden on the limited resources (Bannon and Collier 2003: 2) and that the state responds to their needs more effectively at the cost of the native Adivasi communities in Odisha. Kornel (2006: 204–­6), who claims to have worked with the DDA, analyses the exploiting/conflicting situation between the Adivasi communities and the Bengali migrants in Malkangiri district. Adivasi leaders have developed their own perspective to look at the reasons for exploitation and conflict. They underline that due to the sound economic position of the Bengali migrants and the marginalised economic position of the Adivasis, the former lure Adivasi girls to cinema and exhibition, which eventually leads to sexual exploitation. As both these communities are involved in pisciculture in rice fields, the Adivasi elders blame the Bengalis for stealing fish from their fields (Kornel 2006: 206). The other issue of concern for the Adivasi leaders is the intention of Bengali migrants to establish marital relationships with Adivasi land wealthy families. This issue has also been emphasised during the field study by one of the Bengali respondents of MPV 18-­B and is demonstrated in the case of the marriage between a Bengali boy and Adivasi girl of Rakhelguda, Korukonda block of Malkangiri district,22 although in reality, whether the driving force behind the marriage was to gain control over the Adivasi lands is debatable. The land issue has become more aggravated in recent years in South Odisha. It has, at times, generated simmering tensions between the 131

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Adivasis and the Bengali migrants. During December 1996 and January 1997, conflicts over land have been reported in Kumbharguda, Kichipalli, MV 22 and MV 31 of Korukonda block of Malkangiri district about the forcible cutting of paddy. The Adivasi communities in their day-­to-­day interaction with the Bengali migrants allege about unfair transactions concluded orally, which permanently dispossess their lands even in the case of mortgage or leases of temporary nature (Padhi 1999: 22–­3). This has created discontent among the Adivasi communities of Malkangiri district. Unlike Nabarangpur district, except some minor conflicts, Malkangiri district has not yet experienced any major violent conflict between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants over the land question due to the lack of effective Adivasi leadership. Adivasis have formed Adivasi sanghs (organisation) in different blocks of Malkangiri district to protect their rights over natural resources, especially land. With the help of these sanghs and movements, they have been able to restore Adivasi lands to some extent by adopting forceful means. One of the Bengali respondents questioned the credibility of the leadership of the Adivasi sangh itself.23 The Bengali migrants alleged that due to the impact of the Adivasi sangh, Adivasis are now reluctant to mortgage land to the Bengali migrants. They contended that if the Adivasis do not mortgage their land to the Bengali migrants, the Adivasis may not get sufficient food for the entire year as they do not have the requisite skill to produce more, and sometimes they do not cultivate, and their lands lie vacant.24 Land conflict is not only confined to the Bengali migrants and the Adivasi communities, but different blocks of Malkangiri district have also experienced land conflicts between the Adivasis and the non-­Adivasis. For instance, Mathili block of Malkangiri district experienced a bloody struggle between the Kandha Adivasis and the non-­Adivasis in 1999–­ 2000. The conflict emerged on the ownership pattern of land, where the non-­Adivasis (upper caste) felt the sense of relative deprivation. Tamil migrants from Sri Lanka Malkangiri is the host of not only Bengali migrants but also Tamil migrants. Tamil migrants belonging to EPRLF and ENDLF of Sri Lanka had arrived in Malkangiri and Satiguda areas of the erstwhile Koraput district on 10 March 1990 in two batches. In March 1990, a total of 881 Tamil families were rehabilitated in Malkangiri town (GOO not dated a: 80). They came to Malkangiri with a hope of returning to Sri Lanka when the war was over and peace restored. These migrants 132

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were rehabilitated in Malkangiri and Satiguda after being denied entry into South India by both the Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu governments (Chattopadhyaya 1994: 172). These state governments cited that they have already accommodated about 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils who had come in the wake of the July 1983 ethnic clashes. The other reason for such denial by these states was increasing militant activities in the state, and it was alleged that the militants draw their support base and recruit their cadre from the camps (Hans 1993: 30). Currently, there are around 300 Tamil migrants spread over 40 families living in the Malkangiri camp, and they are all supporters of the ENDLF, a former ally of the LTTE. They have adjusted to the socio-­ economic milieu of Malkangiri though memories of their homeland persist. The state government provided over 15 acres of land to the migrants for farming. The district administration provides 12 kilograms of subsidised rice and Rs 180 to each Tamil migrants per month (Mishra 2000), and this amount is provided by the government through the ITDA (Das 2000).25 In addition, they are also engaged in contract works, fruit vending and the driving of tractors for their livelihood. Different dynamics of the inter-­community relationship in Malkangiri demonstrates that despite their hostilities, the Adivasis/local and the Bengali migrants joined the frenzy against the Tamil migrants. They launched successive agitations against the rehabilitation of the Tamil migrants, generating hostile relationships among them (Hans 1993: 30; Kornel 2006: 188). In this case, the role of Adivasi communities is, however, debatable.26 The local people showed their disenchantment with the state because the government was successively choosing Malkangiri area as the potential site for the rehabilitation of different kinds of migrants. The rehabilitation of the Tamil migrants was seen in the same light as that of the Bengali migrants, but they were not defined in terms of ethnic lines. The initiative to launch agitations against the Tamil migrants was due to their cumulative experiences with the Bengali migrants where the natives felt that, like the Bengali migrants, the Tamil migrants would also indulge in controlling locally available natural resources, encroach on the more cultivable land and create tremendous pressure on the limited civic amenities available. The Bengali migrants supported this agitation because they perceived that there would be more competition to access the civic facilities along the migrant’s lines and that would lead to the emergence of robust contestation by the local communities against the migrants as a whole. Unlike the conflictual relationship between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants, there has been no evidence of conflicts between the 133

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Adivasis and Tamil migrants. The primary reason is the site of the location of the Tamil camp, which is situated in the heart of the Malkangiri town. On the other hand, sites for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants were chosen strategically in the sense that Bengali villages are situated adjacent to Adivasis villages, and they had greater access to the natural resources of Adivasi communities. The other reason for the absence of conflicts between the Adivasis and the Tamil migrants is that the Tamil migrants are not engaged in agricultural activities, which does not provide any scope to access to or control the Adivasi resources. They are mostly engaged in, as mentioned earlier, working as contractors, fruit vendors and drivers of tractors for their livelihood in Malkangiri. Reading community conflicts in Nabarangpur district Sometimes conflicts are a part of turf battle over valuable resources between different communities. Even in recent years, community conflicts have erupted with the encroachment of the cultivating and grazing lands of the Adivasi people by migrants in Odisha. There developed clashes of Adivasi and non-­Adivasi interests over resource distribution. This was a result of the apparent discriminatory model of land distribution and allocation of development facilities between the Adivasi and the Bengali migrants under the DNK Project. For instance, the project made the provision that 75 percent of the reclaimed area will be granted to the Bengali migrants, and 25 percent of the reclaimed area will be distributed among the Adivasis. Such notion of discrimination created resentment and disenchantment among the Adivasis. The failure of the DNK Project in granting equal amount of land to the native Adivasis enabled them to generate the sense of, what Gurr (1970) considered as, ‘relative deprivation’ and has led to the emergence of community conflicts in Nabarangpur district of Odisha.27 The discriminatory pattern of resource distribution has created the platform for sharpening their community identities along the line of ethnicity. Consequently, the feeling of migrants/outsiders still persists among the Adivasis in Odisha.28 The Adivasis considered that the state has been less concern to their problems and been more responsive towards the issues of migrants. This has led to socio-­economic and psychological conflicts between the two ethnic communities, leading to a process of pauperisation and marginalisation of the Adivasi communities in South Odisha. In this context, the Bengali migrants became the oppressors of the Adivasis, and this becomes another form of Adivasi exploitation (GOO not dated b: 16). 134

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The local natives have their own interpretations on the problems of migrants. They perceive that when in a competition, gains for the migrants do mean a loss for the natives, where the existing local occupations would lose through migration (Weiner 1978). The Adivasis of Nabarangpur district, speaking from an economic perspective, often describe the Bengali migrants as being ‘exploiting, money-­minded or dishonest’. Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district sometimes created social and economic costs for local communities. A large migrant influx imposed new demands on the local water and sanitation system and often health and education services, leading to shortage of drinking water, overloading of the sanitation system and overcrowding of schools and hospitals, all of which would lead to increasing environmental pollution and a diminution of health and educational well-­being (Weiner 1978: 353). The Bengali migrants have occupied the cultural and economic spaces that were earlier occupied by the Adivasi communities, causing community conflict. The loss of cultural space has resulted in alienation and deprivation. The success of the migrants in every sphere due to various reasons also posed a psychological threat to the Adivasi communities. The Adivasi communities of Odisha celebrate the raja festival, which is also known as ‘Basumata Puja’ (worship of the earth). During the days of celebration, agricultural activities remain suspended. By suspending agricultural activities during the raja festival, Adivasis believe in respecting the importance of land. On the contrary, it has been observed that the Bengali migrants do not suspend the agricultural activities during the celebration, and they continue to engage in agricultural work,29 which, according to the Adivasis, is showing disrespect towards the land. Thus, Barik (2006: 100) argues that the material culture of the Bengali migrants and the spiritual world of the Adivasi communities, thus, come into sharp conflict. Huntington (1996: 28) argues, ‘In this new world order . . . the most persuasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will . . . be . . . between peoples belonging to different cultural entities’. This is entirely demonstrated by the unending socio-­economic and psychological conflicts between the two ethnic groups in Odisha. Chapter 3 reflected on how the DNK Project adopted discriminatory practices towards the Adivasi communities of Odisha in terms of granting land and financial assistance. The existing government data and the empirical research demonstrated that, over the decades, the Bengali migrants have acquired sections of local land through encroachment (see Table 4.11) and mortgage.30 The continuous influx of Bengali infiltrators to this area turns the problem more complex. 135

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The Adivasis have become increasingly concerned about this acquisition and on the basis of their ‘sons of the soil’ status, thereby insisting that the lands rightfully belong to them. The articulation of rights is most pronounced among the educated Adivasi middle-­class (Pai 2008: 7; Xaxa 2008: 82–­3). With the emergence of the Adivasi educated middle class, the issue of culture, tradition, livelihood, even control over land and resources has become an integral part of identity articulation among the Adivasis communities (Xaxa 2012). The Adivasis of Nabarangpur district has been at the receiving end. It has repeatedly been encountered during the field study that Bengali migrants are forced to explore situations like encroaching forest or community lands, mortgaging Adivasi lands and so on, as, despite the expansion of their family size, the government has done nothing.31 However, the lands of the Bengali migrants have been divided into the context of their family expansion; furthermore, they have been able to buy lands from others as well.32 Their land scarcity has been compensated by offering business, jobs and similar other opportunities. The compensatory policies have enabled the Bengali migrants to become economically dominant in the district. It has been observed from the field that due to their better economic position, Bengali migrants have been able to purchase different home appliances such as refrigerator, air conditioner, television set and so on, which is not the case with the Adivasi communities due to their subsistence economic condition. Unlike their co-­migrants in Malkangiri district, the Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district have not been able to access political power at the state level and mostly remain confined to the local level. As a consequence, the Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district have been expressing their frustrations and trying to dominate in other spheres of life particularly in the economic sphere. During the field study, one of the Bengali migrants emphasised that some of the Bengali migrants have been taking advantage of the innocent and illiterate Adivasis.33 Hence, the Adivasis are increasingly placed in a position of marginalisation and exploitation, and there is a constant threat to their existing traditional rights over natural resources, position and social status and value system, thereby triggering strong resistance from the vulnerable Adivasi communities against the Bengali migrants. Adivasi issues and the emergence of the Dalit Samaj In 1998, Dalit Samaj (society)34 had emerged to deal with different problems and concerns of Adivasis in the Raighar area of Nabarangpur district.35 The main objective of the Dalit Samaj was to protect Adivasi 136

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rights over natural resources. Resource conflicts were sharpened and sometimes turned into violent conflicts. The Samaj was also involved in opposing activities that lead to the exploitation and marginalisation of the Adivasi communities. It was more active in creating awareness among the Adivasis for their rights. Consequently, the Adivasi communities, which were socially and economically oppressed, culturally subjugated and politically marginalised, began to assert themselves. The demand of the Dalit Samaj included, among other things, the immediate restoration of Adivasi lands which were in the possession of Bengali migrants; the immediate issue of patta to Adivasis who had been cultivating forest/government land for generations; the protection of forest and regeneration of forest on regained lands; the granting land to the landless; and the immediate scrapping of SC status granted to Bengali migrants.36 The Bengali migrants were also involved in counter-­mobilisation under the banner of ‘Bengali Samaj’. The Dalit Samaj succeeded in organising peaceful meetings and rallies to create awareness among the Adivasis regarding their rights. During the interview on 23 June 2009, Jagabandhu Majhi emphasised that the lack of organisation in the community was seen as an important cause, as well as an effect, of being heavily exploited by the Bengali migrants before the emergence of Dalit Samaj in Nabarangpur district. Therefore, the Adivasi communities of Nabarangpur district found a ray of hope with the formation of the Dalit Samaj. The Bengali migrants, however, believed that the establishment of the Dalit Samaj was generic to the conflict between Adivasis and Bengali migrants. Jamdara conflict During the revisit to the field in June–­July 2018, the then president (an Adivasi) of the Forest Protection Committee beautifully crafted the background that erupted violent conflicts in Jamdara village between the Bengali migrants and the Adivasis.37 He underlined that the violent community conflict over resources in Nabarangpur district was not an isolated phenomenon, and attributed to the simmering tensions between these two communities over resource question. The preliminary indication of such a relationship occurs in the period of the early 1960s when the central government initiated the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur region. At the initial stage, the Bengali migrants apparently tried to establish cordial relations with the local Adivasis through different means. Gradually, they turned towards the forest resources and started clearing the forests. However, such initiative of the Bengali migrants disrupted the cordial relation that the 137

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Bengali migrants had presumably established with the Adivasis. This provided the seed for conflicts over resources between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district. The Adivasis considered the initiatives of Bengali migrants clearing the forest as the beginning of altering their age-­old symbiotic relationship with forest resources. The Adivasis considered forest resources as one of the important means of their livelihood and one of the pillars of the Adivasi economy. The continuous involvement of Bengali migrants in clearing forests not only led to the reduction of forest produces of the area but also had an adverse impact on Adivasi customs.38 This is primarily because the Adivasis have the custom and tradition of collecting forest produces. As a result, the Adivasis took a stand to resist against this approach of the Bengali migrants towards forest resources. They emphasised that since the Bengali migrants received land under the DNK Project, they will not be allowed to use forests. The Bengali migrant, however, did not agree with such stand of the Adivasis. The disagreement between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants led to the emergence of community tensions in the area. As a result, the then collector of Nabarangpur district, Mrs. Usha Padhi, formed the Peace Committee with representatives from both sides. The committee took the decision that the cleared land shall be distributed, which was much contested by the Bengali migrants. The simmering tensions between Adivasis and Bengali migrants turned into violent in 2001. On 24 June 2001, bloody clashes took place for the first time between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants in connection with the land conflicts in Raighar area of Nabarangpur district. The Adivasis believed that the Bengali migrants initiated the process of community conflicts and attacked the Adivasis.39 This conflict emerged with the issue that the Bengali migrant had encroached a certain amount of land and the Adivasis believed that the encroached land was an Adivasi land which should come under their control. A Bengali migrant from Kumuli (URV 50) was cultivating the Adivasi land of Jamdara. When the Adivasi (Bansingh Gond) went to ask him to return to his land, a group of Bengali migrants attacked him, and he was thrashed to death. About 14 Adivasis were nearly murdered by the Bengali migrants and were taken to the hospital. Some of them lost their lives in the hospital. During that unfortunate incident, the Adivasis were not organised, but, on the contrary, Bengali migrants were organised with different kinds of weapons for various purposes including self-­protection as well as for attacking Adivasis, if necessary. It has also been observed that some of the Bengali migrants of Malkangiri also came to support their 138

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counterparts of Nabarangpur district during the 2001 conflicts.40 When the news spread, Adivasis from the nearby villages joined them. The Adivasis also got organised to retaliate the Bengali migrants, but the administration managed to control the mob. As retaliation, the organised Adivasis started destroying houses of the migrants and the administration was compelled to impose Section 144 to normalise the situation. The incident happened around 9.30 a.m. on 24 June 2001, Sunday. The Adivasis were used to go to the weekly Sunday market with various purposes, ranging from selling the collected forest produces to purchasing their weekly household rations. However, the Bengali migrants did not allow them to go to the weekly market and attacked the Adivasis. Although Jamdara village comes under the jurisdiction of Raighar police station, the Adivasis were not allowed to go to Raighar police station and file the case. However, the president of the Forest Protection Committee managed to travel to the IIC of Umerkote police station and reported the situation. The IIC communicated the incident to the Raighar police station, and both the parties were called in. Surprisingly, six members from the victim’s side (the Adivasis) were kept in the police station, and later they were sent to the judicial court. The jail terms of Adivasis ranged between 6 and 14 months. On the other hand, none of the Bengali migrants were sent to the court and jailed. One of the Adivasi respondents alleged that the Bengali migrants bribed the OIC of Raighar police station of about Rs 80,000 to not send them to the court.41 The court began proceedings. Advocates Tapan Debnath and Jadeswar Mohanty represented the Bengali migrants and the Adivasis, respectively. The Adivasis respondents alleged that they were booked in many cases even if they were not actually involved. Later, the Adivasis were released on bail,42 and Mr. Salim Pathan initiated the process of the bail because of his good relationship with the Adivasis. Although the BJD government withdrew some of the cases filed against the Adivasis (The Pioneer 2004; Chapter 5), the Adivasis still believed that most of the cases are pending. Unfortunately, the Adivasis are not aware even today about the number of cases charged against them and cases that are disposed of. During the process of hearings, all the allegedly involved people from both sides were required to attend the court, and this was not possible for all of them to attend the court on the same day. For the Adivasi respondents, this is perhaps one of the reasons for pending of so many cases. The situation was far from normal. On 10 July 2001, the Collector of Nabarangpur district called an all political party meeting. The 139

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leaders of the Dalit Samaj and the Bengali Samaj were also invited. In the meeting, the Adivasis and Bengali migrants were discouraged to take law in their hands in any situation. The administration sought cooperation to book the culprits involved in the incidence of 24 June 2001. It was also decided to look into the encroached lands and distribute eligible lands among the landless on a priority basis. The administration showed its commitment to maintain secrecy concerning the person giving information regarding the possession of illegal arms and people involved in the incidence. The Committee was also formed under the leadership of the senior Congress leader Habbibulha Khan, with an equal representation of ten members each from the Adivasi and Bengali communities. It was decided that the Umerkote Tahasildar and the BDO of Raighar assist the committee in carrying out its mandate. The mandate of the Committee was to initiate the process of confidence-­building measures among the two communities so that the propensity of conflicts would be arrested and resolved amicably (Patnaik not dated). But all these resolutions remained unimplemented. As a result, Adivasis organised a series of rallies and demonstrations in and around Raighar area. In their meeting on 17 October 2001 in Raighar, which was attended by about 25,000 Adivasis and Dalits (non-­migrants), Adivasis reiterated their old demands. They demanded the immediate arrest of all Bengali migrants involved in the murders of 24 June 2001. They insisted that the state must be vigilant towards the Bengali migrants and made the reasonable demand that the migrants must return the lands other than the legally allocated land under the DNK Project. They also firmly demanded that the landless Adivasis and native Dalits get an equal amount of land that was given to the Bengali migrants as per the DNK Project, that the Adivasis get patta on government lands which they have been cultivating for long, and that encroachers of Adivasi lands must be dealt with as per the law. As there is a continuous influx of infiltrators into the area, the state must take due care while granting citizenship status. It is worthwhile to mention here that the extension of preferential treatment to the Bengali migrants has become a cause of much resentment and bitterness among the Adivasis, as such facility has invariably affected the electoral politics of the area (see Chapter 5). The Adivasis also appealed for the Bengali migrants to peacefully hand over the illegal possession of Adivasi land (Patnaik not dated). The Adivasis continue to cultivate all lands (except around 12 acres) that experienced conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants. The 12 acres of land were cleared by the Bengali migrants, and the 140

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Table 4.9  Information sheet on Mouza: Jamdara under Raighar police station Total area of Umerkote tahasil Total agricultural land of tahasil Total area of the Mouza Abadi land (Patta land) Anabadi land

3,93,714.36 1,75,117.47 1415.81 acres 194.22 acres 1221.59 acres

Classification of Anabadi land (as per reservation proceedings) in Adivasi RoR Abadi Ajogya Anabadi 1028.36 acres Abadi Jogya Anabadi 65.80 acres Leased out to beneficiaries (–­) 52.51 acres Balance 13.29 acres Rakshita 133.11 acres Sarbasadharana 2.29 acres DDA RoR Abadi land Anabadi land Total

316.73 acres 110.12 acres 426.85 acres

Source: Tahasil Office, Umerkote, Nabarangpur district.

Adivasis tried to occupy but without success. This land is being declared as ‘disputed land’.43 Table 4.9 provides the basic information on Jamdara mouza. Jamdara village has a common designated place (Figure 4.1) where the Adivasis gather and take collective decisions on pertinent issues that affect their village and decide the future course of action. To commemorate the Adivasis who lost their lives in Adivasi-Bengali migrants conflict in 2001, they built Shahid Sthambh (martyr memorial) in Jamdara village (Figure 4.2), and every year, 24 June is celebrated as the Shahid Diwas (martyr day).44 Such observance reflects a sense of recognising the contribution of martyr towards restoring the Adivasi rights over resources and reinforces the cultural symbol of protest against dispossession and marginalisation of Adivasis. Rengabhati conflict The second bloody incident took place on 30 October 2001 in Rengabhati village of Raighar police station of Nabarangpur district. In this conflict, Kamin Roy (a Bengali migrant) apparently played a significant role in generating conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants. He was the husband of a panchayat sarapanch. He had grabbed the land, which belonged to an Adivasi, Samaru Gond. On 141

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Figure 4.1 The place where the Adivasis of Jamdara village take major decisions about their future course of actions Source: Photograph by the author during the field study.

29 October 2001, Samaru Gond, in the company of a group of villagers of Rengabhati entered the paddy field, which according to them belonged to Samaru Gond, and started cutting the crop. A group of armed migrants led by Kamin Roy brutally attacked the Adivasis, and the latter left the place to save their lives. The attack of the Bengali migrants apparently suggests that collective violence inflicted on the Adivasis was a well planned, strategised and organised attack. The innocent Adivasis, however, did not launch a counter-­attack on Bengali migrants. On the next day, the Adivasis again entered the same paddy field and started cutting the crop. On the second day, nobody from the migrants’ side was present. The Adivasis, however, witnessed that, suddenly, the armed police emerged from the other side of the paddy field. Without any words, the armed police spread tear gas, and within the next three minutes, they started firing. Consequently, three Adivasis lost their lives, and several others sustained bullet injuries. This was not the first and the last time that the state adopted such a drastic and discriminatory step 142

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Figure 4.2 Shahid Sthambh built-­in memory of the Adivasis who lost their lives in Adivasi-Bengali migrants conflict in 2001 Source: Photograph by the author during the field study.

against the Adivasis. On 16 December 2001, three Adivasis lost their lives in Kashipur firing. On 2 January 2006, the police killed 14 Adivasis while they were protesting against land alienation (Mohanty 2014: 46). With the help of the central government in the form of deploying 143

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CRPF, the state is well equipped to suppress the Adivasi movements violently. Whenever there are assertions to reinstate the rights of Adivasis over resources by launching a protest against the non-­Adivasis, as well as the state and MNCs, the state has suppressed such protests violently. Such orientation of the state reflects how it maintains indifferent attitudes towards various Adivasi issues. The state did not think of addressing the issue with sensitivity, and followed the violent means to address tensions and conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants. Instead of being a mediator of resolving conflicts, it further fuelled the simmering tensions and conflicts between Adivasis and Bengali migrants. Such orientation raises an apprehension towards the role of the state in addressing various Adivasi issues. In short, the state essentially questioned the credibility of means of conflict resolution such as mediation, negotiation and dialogue, among others, and believed in the politics of repression through violence. The police involved in self-­proclaimed justification of the Rengabhati incident and contended that it was necessary to prevent potential communal conflicts between Adivasis and the Bengali migrants. What is surprising is that the state machinery described this conflict along ethnic or communal lines. The reality, however, appears that the conflicts in Raighar area had nothing to do with a communal or ethnic clash. The main source of conflict was primarily related to control over one of the important pillars of the Adivasi economy, that is land (Patnaik not dated). The actual point of contention could have easily been solved by implementing the existing legislative measures designed to protect and promote the rights and interest of Adivasi communities in Odisha. Interestingly, the leader of these conflicts, Jagabandhu Majhi, was not present during any of these conflicts/firings,45 but he was arrested later as all allegedly destructive works were carried out under his leadership. The results of both the conflicts are that the case of Rengabhati was decided in favour of the Adivasis and the Jamdara case is still pending.46 When relative normalcy was restored in the Raighar area, police started the process of mass arrest based on FIRs of both parties. The Dalit Samaj did not stop opposing the activities of the Bengali migrants in one form or the other. Along with land issues, the Dalit Samaj also practised discrimination in the market in the form of occupying centrally located places.47 So it also opposed the Bengali migrants coming to the market.48 The members of the Dalit Samaj had already entered local politics. In 2002, the Dalit Samaj won three and ten Zilla Parishad and Samili member seats, respectively, and Bhanumati Majhi, a close associate of Jagabandhu Majhi, was elected as the 144

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block chairman/chairperson. The electoral victory of the Dalit Samaj changed its aims and objectives by giving much emphasis to different contracting works, where the Bengali migrants were hardly allowed to do these works. Subsequently, there was a fraction in the Samaj, and people like Bhanumati Majhi left the Dalit Samaj. The Dalit Samaj took advantage of the wider Adivasi support, and it persistently raised pertinent issues of the Adivasi communities. The Samaj had generated differences among various Adivasi villages and consequently, it reinforced conflicts between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district. The emergence of the land conflicts between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in 2009 in Kachrapara village of Umerkote block in Nabarangpur district demonstrates this position.49 Vanguard of Adivasi rights and community conflicts The simmering tensions take violent form with the emergence of leaders, who can effectively communicate the actual position of a community vis-­à-­vis other communities. Coser’s theory of social conflict (1956) underlines that conflicts may be more intensive and violence where collective concerns and goals are involved. Coser explains this phenomenon that people feel greater liberty in taking measures when they act on behalf of the community. People perceive and gain a greater degree of respectability when their activities are deviated from their personal goals and objectives and redirected towards the concerns of the community. There is a common understanding that the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants love to live in peace and cooperation. But their peace-­loving life has been growingly disturbed by the political interests of some leaders. Empirical research demonstrated that both community and political leaders play a significant role in disrupting the cordial relationship between the Adivasi and Bengali migrants in Odisha. Community leaders reinforce and widen the existing differences between groups. Without any reluctance, Bengali migrants underlined the role of Jagabandhu Majhi (Adivasi leader) in creating differences between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district.50 Within this context, the role of Jagabandhu Majhi, who was the kingpin of both these violent conflicts, needs to be critically analysed. It has been learned that, after being elected as president of the Pendarani College of Umerkote in 1998, Jagabandhu Majhi organised the Adivasis of the area under the banner of the Dalit Samaj. People believe that he was involved in creating differences between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants since his college days. In the early 2000s, 145

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he held a violent movement against Bengali migrants who were cultivating maize by taking lands on lease from the Adivasis of Umerkote. He organised agitation on behalf of the native Adivasis in the Raighar block against the Bengali migrants. The main demand was to restore the Adivasi lands from the Bengali migrants. Focusing on his political career, he had unsuccessfully contested the 2004 legislative assembly election as an independent candidate. In 2007, he was elected to the Zilla Parishad, and it is believed that he had mobilised the Bengali migrants during this period.51 Between 2004 and 2009, there was some understanding between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants, and the government had disposed of some of the cases levelled against the Adivasis. Jagabandhu Majhi again contested the 2009 assembly election but this time on a BJD ticket and won the election. After winning the election, he raised the Bengali issue at regular intervals. Such findings from the field coincide with the theoretical framework developed by Coser (1956), where some leaders intentionally sustain enmity or reinforce community differences due to social benefits of conflicts. Hence, he was cleverly analysing the political situation of the area in the context of the 2009 assembly election. It was eight o’clock in the evening on 23 June 2009 at the residence of Jagabandhu Majhi in Umerkote. Before the interview, while waiting, which was almost 45 minutes, it was observed that most of the people who came to meet him were the Bengali migrants. When he was asked about the relationship between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants of Umerkote area, he emphasised that there was a cordial relationship between these communities. Responding to a question of launching a protest against the Bengali migrants, he contended that Adivasis are not against all the Bengali migrants and, therefore, that resistance cannot be spearheaded against all Bengali migrants. Adivasis are against those Bengali migrants who are exploiting and marginalising them by grabbing Adivasi lands and forests. However, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between the two sets of Bengali migrants, those who are exploiting and marginalising the Adivasi communities and those who are not. In short, after winning the 2009 assembly election, he had redesigned his strategy to gain political support from both Adivasis and Bengali migrants. He has not organised any open protest against the Bengali migrants since the declaration of the election result. He had, however, extended internal support to the Dalit Samaj in raising Adivasi–­Bengali issues with regular intervals so that his political support from both these communities remains intact. The role of Jagabandhu Majhi as the vanguard of Adivasi rights and community conflict cannot be disputed. His initiatives of protecting 146

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Adivasi rights over land and forest resources cannot be equated to disturbing the cordial community relationship and social milieu of the region either. His initiatives can be seen as one step forward towards restoring the Adivasi rights over natural resources. Conflicts of differing degrees and natures concerning land and forests have become the defining features of the community relationship between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in South Odisha. In addition to the previously mentioned conflicts, there were also a number of other conflicts occurring between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in relation to land and forests. In this context, the cases of conflict at Jalakpura, Udaypur and Kacharapara, among others, of the Raighar block in Nabarangpur district can be understood. In all these cases, the cause of conflict was land encroachment. The conflict between the Adivasis of Kachrapara and the Bengali migrant of UV 1 took place during June 2009. The Bengali migrant of UV 1 was cultivating the encroached land along with the land allotted by the DNK Project, and the Adivasis emerged to oppose the cultivation of the encroached land. Soon after the emergence of this conflict, the sub-­collector along with the tahasildar and the RI rushed to the spot and temporarily settled the conflict by marking the land as ‘disputed land’. This kind of inter-­community conflicts over land and forest has been reported in different parts of the state. Intra-­community conflict Besides these inter-­community conflicts over land and forest, there are a number of cases reported stating the intra-­community conflicts. The conflict between the Gona village and Bharsundi Adivasi village of Raighar block during June 2009 can be put under this category. This conflict emerged with the forest land between the Adivasis of these villages. In this case, the Adivasis of Bharsundi were cultivating the forest land which falls under the Gona circle for the last ten years. Recently, Gona villagers realised the importance of forests and debarred the Bharsundi Adivasi villagers from cultivating the forest land. The case was referred to the Tahasildar, Raighar, but he failed to settle the conflict. Now, this case is pending with the forest department.

Response of the state Delivering justice is one of the important means of satisfying the parties concerned. It can only be able to attain if the process of delivering justice is based on neutrality. The question of neutrality is based on the 147

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notion that the party found guilty must be punished and that the rule of law must prevail. The emergence of the 2001 conflict between the Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants raises important queries about the role of the state: what was the nature of the state during the conflict? How did it perform its duties in resolving the conflicts between these two communities? Was it partial towards the Bengali migrants or Adivasi communities? The state was expected to represent the interest of both communities. Empirical research demonstrates that both communities were quick enough to evaluate the role of the state in reference to community conflicts that emerged in 2001. Allegations and counter-­allegations were made during the fieldwork. They were critical of the role of the state during conflicts and pointed out that the state was not neutral rather partial towards ‘the other’ while dealing with conflicts. The Adivasis of Jamdara and Rengabhati villages narrated their helplessness during the 2001 conflicts. They were hiding in forests to save their lives. The state machinery followed discriminatory approach towards the vulnerable Adivasi communities. The police dragged them out of houses and arrested. The Adivasis believed that the state machinery protected the perpetrators of violence. Those who believed that the state favoured the Bengali migrants, argued that due to their sound economic position, the Bengali migrants were able to influence the state machinery, and thereby the state was ruthless towards the Adivasis. Similarly, Bengali migrants alleged that the state was partial during the conflict and favoured the Adivasis. Empirical research suggests that both communities argued that the state was partial to ‘the other’ and that neither of them acknowledges that the state machinery was in favour of their own community during the conflicts. With the emergence of community conflicts between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district, the role of the state had been examined. The state was forced to evaluate the situation by changing its approach towards the conflictual situations in the district. Subsequently, the state initiated the process of identification,52 and detection and, ultimately, their expulsion from the state. Table 4.10 demonstrates the number of Bengali infiltrators identified in Umerkote tahasil. Table 4.10 reflects that 322 infiltrators were identified from 44 villages of Umerkote tahasil. The district administration had arranged to send them back to their place of origin, but after some time, most of them returned to Nabarangpur district, and some of them have already started shops in the DNK area of Umerkote.53 The Bengali migrants, however, had their own reason to contest the identification process. They largely contested the method of identification 148

Table 4.10  Number of the Bangladeshi infiltrators in Umerkote tahasil Sl. no.

Name of the RI circle

Name of the village

No. of infiltrators

1

2

3

4

1

Raighar

2

Total Bhamini

3

Total Debagam

4

Total Bakadabeda

5

Total Deobharandi

6

Total Jodenga

7

Total Sunabeda

8

Total Gona

9

Total Umerkote

1. Sonpur 2. Bharsundi (DNK) 3. Mohubhatta (Chattabeda-­I) 4. Sarguli (DNK) 5. Kumuli (DNK) 5 villages 1. Silati 2. Sankarada 3. Jamaranda 3 villages 1. Mohand (DNK) 2. Mohand (Tolla) 3. Gurusingha-­A Gurusingha-­B Gurusingha (Krishnanagar) Gurusingha (Dudrapara) 4. Kacharapara-­I 5. Kacharapara-­II 6. Dumarmund (DNK) 7. Udaypur (DNK) 8. Hatibena (DNK) 8 villages 1. Durla (DNK) 2. Kadabhatta (DNK) 2 villages 1. Kibekanga 2. Barchipara 2 villages 1. Jodjunga 2. Powerbella 3. Turudihi 4. Kacharapara 4 villages 1. Anchala (UV-­23) 2. Semala 2 villages 1. Kusumpur (DNK) 2. Chhatabeda-­II 2 villages 1. Umerkote 2. Gulibanda 3. Dongriguda 4. khanda 5. Khutuguda 6. Nuaguda

4 16 9 10 16 55 13 8 16 41 7 2 2 2 2 6 5 3 7 4 1 52 8 7 15 12 10 22 1 5 2 1 9 2 1 3 8 13 21 11 2 20 3 6 4 (Continued)

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Table 4.10 (Continued) Sl. no.

10

Name of the RI circle

Total Behead

Total Grand Total

Name of the village

No. of infiltrators

7. Badakumari 8. Adhikariguda 8 villages 1. Burja (UV-­5) 2. Kesharabeda 3. Pujariguda (UV-­9) 4. UV-­57 5. Sukigam 6. Swarnapuri (UV-­55) 7. UV-­56 8. Murtuma 8 villages 44 villages

7 18 71 13 1 1 1 5 3 8 1 33 322

Source: Tahasil Office, Umerkote, Nabarangpur district.

of the illegal migrants. They argued that the primary method of the identification process was to produce the card (Appendix III) issued to them by the competent authority. The cards were, however, issued in the 1960s, and most cards were either misplaced or presented in a damaged state. Hence, the failure of producing these cards categorised them as infiltrators. The government had not maintained any record regarding the cards issued to them, and no authority had been identified to add newborn family members or omit those who have died.54 Given the statistics available with the tahasil office at Umerkote, it can be illustrated that the Adivasis of Nabarangpur district are not demanding the restoration of lands in abstraction. They have the recent experiences of losing the land and Table 4.11 emerges to substantiate the case. Their persistent demand for the restoration of lands forced the administration to collect information on the landholding status of the Bengali migrants. Subsequently, it obtained information from the villages of Umerkote tahasil other than the DNK villages. Table 4.11 shows the amount of lands that the Bengali migrants have purchased and encroached in the villages other than the DNK villages. According to Table 4.11, the Bengali migrants have purchased a total of 337.55 acres of land in 27 villages of Umerkote tahasil.55 The available data show that the Bengali migrants have also encroached a total amount of 117.78 acres of revenue forest lands from 13 villages (Table 4.11). The state has also practised discrimination in relation to both the Adivasi communities and the Bengali migrants. The last land 150

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Table 4.11 Information of Bengali migrants purchased land/encroached land in Umerkote tahasil other than DNK villages Sl. Name of the no. village 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Extent of land Extent of land Extent of revenue forest purchased encroached land encroached

Duglahandi 8.72 Dorpaguda 19.76 Birisadi 5.00 Karlibeda 1.60 Benora 27.14 Saraguda 4.05 Dungriguda 32.68 Hirapur 11.31 Batibeda 8.83 Bandra Bandh 12.04 Umargam –­ Limaguda –­ Kurshi –­ Behead –­ Matgam 2.00 Andriguda 34.90 11.62 Taragam Parua 2.00 Raighar 51.54 Sinadapara 1.95 Khutugan 27.27 Nuapara 3.94 Dhodrapara 8.80 Ranipadar 5.40 Rengabhati 7.25 Karanapadar 3.17 Kundrapani 16.04 Jhunikipara 7.35 Rajaputi 4.00 Raghbeda 3.00 Antipara –­ Hiri –­ Kaudela –­ Simada –­ Timanpur 16.19 Total 337.55

–­ –­ 0.34 1.40 –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ 3.00 53.54 10.00 10.30 –­ –­ –­ 3.00 14.05 11.50 –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ 6.75 0.10 2.50 1.30 –­ 117.78

–­ –­ 0.34 1.40 –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ 3.00 53.54 10.00 10.30 –­ –­ –­ 3.00 14.05 11.50 –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ –­ 6.75 0.10 2.50 1.30 –­ 117.78

Source: Tahasil Office, Umerkote, Nabarangpur district.

settlement process concerning local communities had taken place in 1955 in Nabarangpur area (Behuria 1966), whereas the revised settlement process in the DNK villages was in operation in 1971,1983 and 1984. In 1980, the government initiated steps for winding up the 151

D ispossession , discontent and conflict

project, and in 1988, it was declared that the resettlement work in Odisha was complete (GOO not dated a: 246).

Conclusion The recent history of Odisha provides several cases of resource-­related conflicts, particularly related to land and forest. The ongoing conflicts between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants in Odisha perhaps constitute the burning examples of the day in the context of competition for entitlement and access to resources in Odisha. These conflicts are increasingly threatening peace in the Adivasi-­dominated area of Odisha with the government remaining more or less a mute spectator. The main intention of this chapter was to explore the changing relationship between the Adivasi communities and the Bengali migrants over the period. Their inter-­community relationship has undergone dramatic changes; of course, this has much to do with the time and context concerned. Adivasi communities did not react violently during the rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants because the competition over resources was not evident then in the same way as it is in contemporary times. The natural resources of the Adivasi communities have been exploited by the Bengali migrants in Odisha. One important reason for the adversarial relationship between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants is the competition over access to land resources as well as the civic amenities provided by the government. The state has enabled the Bengali migrants to become economically prosperous by providing different opportunities, and this has led to the economic marginalisation of the native Adivasis. The Adivasi communities of Odisha consider that a gain for the Bengali migrants is a loss for them. So they have reacted quite violently. The rising economic prosperity of the Bengali migrants has led to the growing economic exploitation of the Adivasis by the former. The rising economic prosperity of the Bengali migrants has led to the growing economic exploitation of the Adivasis by the former. This chapter shows how the Bengali migrants have moved from the status of migrants to exploiters of native Adivasi communities in social and economic spheres.

Notes 1 With the collapse of the democratic institutions and credible mechanisms of commitment, the ethnic composition in different regions may lead to the emergence of conflicts. Many political observers in India argue that there is a close relationship between the decline of mediating institutions and the rise of community conflicts, along with other decaying governance

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structure such as politicisation of bureaucracy and police and the growing nexus between politicians and criminals (Kohli 1990). Homer-­Dixon (1991: 111) also maintains a similar position and argues that social conflicts are more likely to occur in fragmented societies with weak legitimate political institutions. 2 GDI is a simple measure of gender disparity based on income, health and educational attainment parameters. The income, health and education indexes of male and female, respectively, in Malkangiri district are 0.571 and 410; 0.122 and 128; and 0.557 and 0.425, respectively (GOO 2004: 198–­200, Table 8.3). 3 Cultivable wasteland includes land available for cultivation, whether not taken up for cultivation or taken up for cultivation once but not cultivating during the current year and the last five years or more in succession for one reason or the other. 4 Interview with a 69-­year-­old-­Bengali migrant of UV 53 of Nabarangpur district on 18 June 2009. 5 The OSATIP Regulation, 1956, is one of the important legislations, which protects Adivasi interests over land. It, however, seems ineffective at least at the initial stage, as the law permitted transfer of patta land from AdiAdivasis after obtaining mandatory permission from the vasis to non-­ competent authority, but in such transactions, manipulation was high and innocent Adivasis often lost their land in dubious transfers. The Bengali migrant in reference was active in politics and that may have smoothened the process of obtaining mandatory permission from the competent authority. Sources indicated that a large amount of Adivasi lands in South Odisha had been sold illegally with open collusion of government officials (Ambagudia 2010: 62). The law was amended in 2002, which completely banned the transfer of patta land by the Adivasis to non-­Adivasis. The further amendment to the law made the provision that no Adivasi can transfer his land to a non-­Adivasi or even to another Adivasi if he possesses less than 2 acres of irrigated land or less than 5 acres of unirrigated land (Ambagudia 2010: 64). 6 Interview with one of the female respondents of MPV 18-­B of Malkangiri on 16 June 2010. 7 Interview with one of the Bengali migrants at Odisha Nivas, New Delhi, on 19 September 2012. 8 Interview with a 99-­year-­old Adivasi of Jaduguda, Malkangiri district, on 10 June 2010. 9 Interview with one of the Adivasis of Khutuguda of Nabarangpur district on 20 June 2009. 10 Interview with a 69-­year-­old Bengali migrant of UV 53, Nabarangpur district on 18 June 2009. 11 Interview with one of the Bengali respondents of MPV 18-­B of Malkangiri district on 16 June 2010. 12 Interview with one of the Adivasis of Mariwada of Malkangiri district on 16 June 2010. 13 In this context, the question was also asked with regard to the differences between Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants of Odisha. One of the prominent differences that emerged from the empirical study is different practices during the marriage ceremony, where it has been pointed out

153

D ispossession , discontent and conflict

that the Bengali migrants invite the Brahmins to do certain rituals and the Adivasis do not. 14 Interview with one of the Adivasis of Mariwada village of Malkangiri district on 16 June 2010. 15 It is important to note that these are not the only reasons why the Adivasis succumb to the hands of the Bengali migrants. The Adivasis not only take loans but also sometimes sell their lands to meet social obligations. The Adivasis are also increasingly influenced by modern lifestyles driven by the material world. They also sometimes sell lands to cope with the materially driven lifestyles. For instance, one of the Adivasi respondents of the Gona village, Nabarangpur district, disclosed that they recently sold a certain amount of land to purchase a two-­wheeler (as narrated in an interview on 21 June 2009). 16 Interview with a 99-­year-­old Adivasi of Jaduguda, Malkangiri district, on 10 June 2010. 17 Interview with one of the Bengali respondents of MPV 18-­B, Malkangiri district, on 16 June 2010. Furthermore, to clarify that while considering Adivasis as higher, he did not mean to say that Adivasis are occupying a higher position in all spheres of life. What he meant to emphasise was that the preferential consideration of the Indian state had helped the Adivasis to occupy a higher political position in comparison to Bengali migrants. 18 Interview with one of the Adivasis of Jaduguda, Malkangiri district, on 10 June 2010. 19 Interview with one of the Bengali migrants of UV 8, Nabarangpur district, on 19 June 2009. 20 Interview with Nimai Chandra Sarkar, at Odisha Nivas, New Delhi, on 19 September 2012. 21 Interview with Adivasis of Jaduguda on 10 June 2010. 22 Interview with one of the Bengali respondents of MPV-­ 18-­ B on 16 June 2010. 23 One of the Bengali migrants cited the example of Tarlakota Adivasi sangh, where he pointed out that it is not the Adivasis but the non-­Adivasis who are providing leadership to the Adivasis, and thereby, questioned the intention of the sangha, Interview with one of the Bengali migrants at Odisha Nivas, New Delhi, on 19 September 2012. 24 Interview with one of the Bengali migrants at Odisha Nivas, New Delhi, on 19 September 2012. 25 Assigning the responsibility to the ITDA for providing welfare measures to the Tamil migrants raises the discourse on ‘local/regional’ and ‘national’ levels of Adivasi development. Recently, it was realised that there is a need to establish specific agencies that can solely devote to the overall development of Adivasis in India. As a consequence, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs was bifurcated from the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment in 1999. Similarly, the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes was bifurcated from the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 2003. On the contrary, ITDA of Malkangiri is assigned with additional responsibilities, thereby not only diverting the much-­needed attention towards Adivasi development but also diluting the very purpose of the agency for which it was established. 26 It has been reported that the local youth organisation was engaged in distributing pamphlets updating the arrival of more Tamilians to Odisha (Chhotoray not dated).

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7 Interview with the then Tahasildar, Raighar, on 23 June 2009. 2 28 Interview with one of the Bengali migrants of UV 53, Nabarangpur district on 18 June 2009. 29 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 30 Interview with the then president of the Forest Protection Committee, an Adivasi of Jamdara village, Nabarangpur district on 1 July 2018. 31 Many Bengali respondents of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts repeatedly emphasised on this issue during the field study. 32 During the field study, one of the Bengali migrants claimed to have possessed ten acres of land, which goes beyond the land capping of the DNK Project, Interview with a 69-­year-­old-­Bengali migrant of UV 53 of Nabarangpur district on 18 June 2009. 33 Interview with one of the Bengali migrants of UV 53 of Nabarangpur district on 18 June 2009. 34 The membership of Dalit Samaj included both the Adivasis and local (indigenous) Dalits. Such composition of the Samaj highly contested the Dalit identity in the sense that it did not include those Dalits (especially outsiders such as the Bengali Namasudras) who appropriated the Dalit identity in the process of their rehabilitation. The local Dalit did not support the Bengali migrants during the conflict in 2001. They, however, supported the Adivasis in reinstating control over their resources. In this context, it appears that the specific social identity of Dalits, especially the appropriated identity in the process, is becoming less significant in the contemporary period. This does not mean to argue that such identities are unimportant; however, for the marginalised groups, the struggles for survival assume higher significance than their specific social identity. 35 Interview with Jagabandhu Majhi at his residence in Umerkote on 23 June 2009. He had provided leadership to the conflicts over resources between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district in 2001. 36 ‘The killing of Orissa’s marginalized must stop’, www.ambedkar.org/ News/Appeal.htm (accessed on 18 November 2016). 37 Interview with the then president of the Forest Protection Committee, an Adivasi of Jamdara village, Nabarangpur district on 1 July 2018. 38 Interview with the then president of the Forest Protection Committee, an Adivasi of Jamdara village, Nabarangpur district on 1 July 2018. 39 Interview with the then president of the Forest Protection Committee, an Adivasi of Jamdara village, Nabarangpur district on 1 July 2018. 40 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 41 Interview with the then president of the Forest Protection Committee, an Adivasi of Jamdara village, Nabarangpur district on 1 July 2018. 42 The Adivasis submitted land pattas as bonds to initiate the process of releasing them on bail. 43 Interview with the then president of the Forest Protection Committee, an Adivasi of Jamdara village, Nabarangpur district on 1 July 2018. 44 Interview with Jagabandhu Majhi at his residence in Umerkote on 23 June 2009. 45 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009.

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46 Interview with Jagabandhu Majhi at his residence in Umerkote on 23 June 2009. 47 Interview with Jagabandhu Majhi at his residence in Umerkote on 23 June 2009. 48 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 49 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 50 Interview with Tapan Devnath, an advocate, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. During the interview, he claimed to have dealt with a number of court cases related to conflicts over resources between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district. 51 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 52 The identification for the deportation of illegal migrants was made on the basis of the central government circular issued on 16 September 1997, which states that ‘[a]ny Bangladeshi found to have settled in the state after 16 December 1971, will be deported after due inquiry and issue of “Quit India” notice as per Foreigner Act, 1946. While those who have entered the state between 25 March 1971 and 16 December 1971, will be referred to the Government of India for a decision. The state government will not disturb any Bangladeshi, who had landed in India before 25 March 1971’. 53 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 54 Interview with Tapan Devnath, advocate, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. 55 It is important to mention that although there were legislative measures to prevent Adivasi land alienation, the laws, however, at the initial phase, allowed such transfer with prior permission from the competent authority.

156

5 COMPETING COMMUNITIES Domination, marginalisation and political contestation

Political competition, contestation and conflicts between communities of India are not an isolated phenomenon. Political institutions establish formal rules, regulations and policies that structure political and social interactions. Distinctive social characteristics of communities shape the nature and dynamics of social and political interaction. This distinctiveness has become a source of power and privilege for some and discrimination and marginalisation for others, thereby compelling the latter to a situation of powerlessness and dispossession. The higher caste Hindus fall in the first cohort, and the Adivasis can be easily located in the second category. The distinct characteristics of Adivasis based on their ethnic identity have become the ground for political marginalisation, economic deprivation and socio-­cultural discrimination. As a consequence, Adivasis have reacted to their indifferent situation in their own way within the established political system. The chapter deals with community conflicts over political resources between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Odisha. Within this framework, it examines the process how the rising political domination of the Bengali migrants has led to the political marginalisation of the Adivasis and how the politically marginalised position of the Adivasis has generated contestations and community conflicts between them. This chapter also analyses the pattern, strategies and impact of political mobilisation and the level of political participation of these two ethnic groups during elections. This chapter focuses on different pertinent issues through which political struggles are conceived, mounted and contained. In short, it focuses on how politics acts as a catalyst for community conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Odisha. The issues and contexts discussed in this chapter are, however, relevant for communities, migrants and politics at a wider scale.

157

C ompeting communities

Democracy and difference: the rationale of group representation Differences, recognition and accommodation are integral parts of democratic processes in the contemporary world. In a multicultural society like India, caste, ethnicity, gender and religion identities facilitate the process of drawing boundaries. Groups develop these boundaries to mark their distinct position in society and more often are drawn by the institution and administration for resource allocations (Horowitz 1985: 185–­228, Ambagudia 2011). By these community identities, different social groups experience the society as well as the state machinery differently. Community identity becomes the ground for inclusion or exclusion and thereby engendering social and political conflicts. The exclusion of the underprivileged and minority communities from the state organs or public decision-­making is indeed likely to create ethnic tensions or even community conflicts (Weller 2010: lx). Differential treatment based on ethnic identity creates circumstances by which the Adivasis experience exclusion and the process of marginalisation in social, economic and political spheres is precipitated. A representative democratic state like India ensures that all social groups have an equal voice in the political processes of the country, which is only possible by facilitating the symbiotic relationship between democracy, differences and accommodation. Different social groups should have an equal voice in the democracy as well as in the policy-­making processes. In this context, the notion of group representation occupies a significant place in a democratic system. In India, Adivasis are entitled to have their share in the state legislative assemblies and the parliament. However, Indian society is marked by inequality, deprivation and marginalisation; the idea of recognising differences and inclusiveness is far from accomplished, and the representation of the Adivasis has remained systematically marginalised. In the post-­independence period, the founders of the Indian Constitution had realised that unless these communities were given preferences, they would not be able to mark their presence. Community representation would ensure that they do not feel alienated or excluded from the political system. As these communities also contend that others would not be able to represent them in politics (Kymlicka 1995: 141), electoral reservation for the Adivasis seems to be justified in the context of persistent political exclusion and past discrimination perpetuating separate community identities (McMillan 2005: 5). The place of Adivasi communities in Indian politics reflects opportunities and constraints that are associated with its democracy (Held 158

C ompeting communities

1994: 58). Exclusion of Adivasis from the decision-­making process will perpetuate political and social inequality. Young (2000: 52–­4) emphasises that political outcomes, resulting from an exclusive procedure perpetrated by the dominant and wealthy classes, are illegitimate. In other words, the democratic state should ensure an equal representation of different social groups in the political sphere. Guided by this understanding, India introduced the quota system, whereby Adivasis are represented in positions of power. In practice, reservation of seats is the preferred method for political inclusion of the marginalised groups such as Adivasis in India (Bird 2014; Krook and Zetterberg 2014). Unlike the liberals who advocate individual, not group, rights (Thompson 1997: 787), Indian state introduced political reservation not to replace individual rights but as additional opportunities in the form of collective group rights to address centuries of discrimination, deprivation and marginalisation. The provision of group rights is enacted as an important means of ensuring their presence at different levels of the decision-­making process.

Regional politics in a comparative perspective: Malkangiri and Nabarangpur The development of Malkangiri politics goes back to the colonial period. During the British period, Malkangiri was a part of Nabarangpur lok sabha and Jeypore legislative assembly constituencies. Malkangiri continued to be so till 1952 (Pradhan 2007: 33), even though Odisha became the separate state on 1 April 1936 due to its distinct Oriya (Odiya) language. As a result of the delimitation process, Malkangiri emerged as the separate assembly constituency during the first election but continued to be part of the Nabarangpur lok sabha constituency. The newly developed Malkangiri assembly constituency did not witness much competition among the rival candidates during the first assembly election, and Laxman Gauda from the All Indian Ganatantra Parishad won the seat by a margin of 23.96 percent. Similarly, during the first state assembly election (1952–­ 57), Nabarangpur was the only assembly constituency in Nabarangpur district. The striking difference between Malkangiri and Nabarangpur electoral politics during this period was that the former was a single-­member constituency and the latter was a double-­member constituency. This practice continued to govern the electoral politics from 1952 to 1961. The Delimitation Commission had adopted distinct standards to declare a particular constituency as a single or double-­ member constituency. The commission was empowered to reserve the 159

C ompeting communities

single-­member constituency for the Adivasis if the Adivasi population within the constituency recorded more than half of the population. Where the Adivasis were substantial in number but less than a majority, the commission was supposed to declare it as a double-­member constituency. The double-­member constituency reserved one seat for the Adivasis and opened the other one to any candidate. In the double-­ member constituency, each voter had two votes but could not cast more than one vote for a single candidate (the system was known as block vote or distributive vote), and the constituency was twice as large as other constituencies.1 The practice of a double-­member constituency came to an end with the enactment of the Two-­Member Constituencies (Abolition) Act, 1961. The Act underlined that India should go with single-­member constituencies due to the size because there was much overlapping of Adivasi representatives in elections, where it was not even possible to differentiate the Adivasi candidates from others. This overlapping representation of the Adivasis was seen by the ECI as a threat to the political representation of non-­Adivasis (Mcmillan 2005: 195). Odisha was the first state to be affected by the decision of the abolition of the double-­member constituency in 1961. During the second general election in 1957, the ECI merged the Koraput and Nabarangpur lok sabha constituencies together and made the provisions for the double-­member constituency (GOI 1957). During this period, Madkami Guru was the MLA from Malkangiri constituency, who consistently demanded a separate lok sabha constituency for Nabarangpur. The MLAs of the two assembly constituencies of Nabarangpur district such as Radhakrishna Bishwasray (Umerkote, single-­member constituency) and Sadasiba Tripathy and Harijan Miru (Nabarangpur, double-­member constituency) also supported his demand (Pradhan 2007). Subsequently, Nabarangpur emerged as a separate lok sabha constituency in 1962 and continues to be so in present times. Considering the legislative assembly constituency, Malkangiri constituency was reserved for the Adivasis since the second assembly election (1957) due to their preponderance in the district, and the candidates from the Odisha Gana Parishad had contested successfully (GOI 1957: 112). In 1967, the Congress, for the first time, won the election from the Malkangiri constituency, and Gangadhar Madhi was elected as the MLA. He was elected twice from the constituency (1967,1971) on the Congress ticket (GOI 1967b: 162,1971: 163), and Malkangiri constituency was split into two constituencies in 1973, such as Malkangiri (reserved for Scheduled Castes, SCs/Dalits) and Chitrakonda (reserved for Adivasis). 160

C ompeting communities

Table 5.1 traces the social category and the party affiliation of the MLAs elected from the Malkangiri and the Chitrakonda assembly constituencies of Malkangiri district. It shows that the Malkangiri constituency was affected by a rotation of political reservation between the Adivasis and SCs. For instance, Malkangiri constituency was reserved for Adivasis from the second assembly election (1957) to the fifth assembly election (1971). The constituency was, however, reserved for SCs from the sixth assembly election (1974) to the 13th assembly election (2004), and this constituency spiralled for Adivasis again in 2009 due to the change in their population strength. Since its formation in 1974, the Chitrakonda assembly constituency did not experience any such rotation due to the persistent numerical superiority of the Adivasis in the constituency. Table 5.1  MLAs of Malkangiri and Chitrakonda constituencies, 1952–­2014 Election

Malkangiri constituency MLAs/caste/party

Chitrakonda constituency MLAs/caste/party

1st (1952–­57) 2nd (1957–­61) 3rd (1961–­67) 4th (1967–­71) 5th (1971–­73) 6th (1974–­77) 7th (1977–­80) 8th (1980–­85) 9th (1985–­90)

Laxman Gauda/GP Madkami Guru/ST/GP* Guru Nayak/ST/GP* Gangadhar Madhi/ST/INC Gangadhar Madhi/ST/INC Naka Kannaya/SC/UTC Naka Kannaya/SC/JNP Naka Laxmaya/SC/INC-­I Nadiyabasi Biswas/SC/ Independent Naka Kanaya/SC/JD Arabinda Dhali/SC/BJP Arabinda Dhali/SC/BJP

–­ –­ –­ –­ –­ Gangadhar Madhi/ST/INC Prahallad Dora/ST/JNP Gangadhar Madhi/ST/INC-­I Gangadhar Madhai/ST/ INC Prahallad Dora/ST/JD –­ Gangadhar Madhi/ST/INC

Arabinda Dhali/SC/BJP Nimai Chandra Sarkar/SC/ INC# Mukunda Sodi/ST/BJD Manas Madkami/ST/BJD

Mamta Madhi/ST/INC Prahallad Dora/ST/BJP

10th (1990–­95) By-­election (92) 11th (1995–­ 2000) 12th (2000–­04) 13th (2004–­09) 14th (2009–­14) 15th (2014–­)

Mamta Madhi/ST/INC Dambaru Sisa/ST/BJD

Source: Compiled from GOI (1951a, 1957, 1961a, 1967b, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2014b). Note: SC = scheduled caste; ST = scheduled tribe (Adivasi); GP = all India Gana Parishad; GP* = Ganatantra Parishad; INC = Indian National Congress; UTC = Utkal Congress; JNP = Janata Party; INC-­I = Indian National Congress (I); JD = Janata Dal # Due to miscommunication between the Congress leadership at the national and state levels, Nimai Chandra Sarkar was suspended from the Congress just before the election, although he retained the Congress symbol and fought the election with the symbol.

161

C ompeting communities

The Congress Party won the Malkangiri assembly constituency in 1967, 1971, 1980 and 2004 elections with 23.79, 31.59, 3.35 and 0.2 percent margins, respectively. Malkangiri constituency was initially the home of the All India Ganatantra Parishad, and later, other fractions also came into existence. The competition was between the Congress Party and other parties in all the elections in Chitrakonda constituency since its formation in 1974. The Congress Party won the Chitrakonda assembly constituency in 1974, 1980, 1985, 1995, 2000 and 2009 elections with margins of 5.06, 29.69, 17.16, 21.2, 27.8 and 0.31 percent, respectively. In short, barring a few elections, the Congress has either been a winning party or the close competitor in all the elections in both level Malkangiri and Chitrakonda constituencies.2 The constituency-­ comparative analysis of electoral politics suggests that the Congress has performed relatively better in the Adivasi-­reserved Chitrakonda assembly constituency than the Malkangiri assembly constituency. Table 5.2 reflects the social category and party affiliation of the MLAs who won the elections in the four assembly constituencies of Nabarangpur district. It shows that Nabarangpur had been a single constituency during the first election, which was carved into two constituencies (Umerkote and Nabarangpur) during the second assembly election. It was further carved into three assembly constituencies (Umerkote, Nabarangpur and Dabugaon) during the third assembly election and these constituencies were split again into four (Umerkote, Kodinga/Jharigaon, Nabarangpur and Dabugaon) during the fourth election and continue to be so until today. During the 1952 and 1957 assembly elections, Nabarangpur constituency was a double-­ member constituency, but during the first assembly election, one seat was reserved for the Adivasis. However, the same seat went to the SCs during the second assembly election. Nabarangpur constituency was reserved for the SCs during the third assembly election, and afterwards, it was converted into a general seat until the 2009 assembly election. This constituency is reserved for the Adivasis since 2009. The Umerkote constituency is reserved for the Adivasis since the fourth assembly elections, and so are the Kodinga/Jharigam and Dabugam assembly constituencies. All assembly constituencies of Nabarangpur district are reserved for Adivasis since 2009 election. Table 5.2 reflects that the Congress contested successfully during 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980, 1985, 1995 and 2000 elections in the Umerkote assembly constituency. As far as Kodinga/Jharigam assembly constituency is concerned, the Congress won all the elections except the elections of 1967, 1971, 1974, 1990, 2009 and 2014. The Nabarangpur assembly constituency was the home of the Congress, where 162

–­

Kodinga/Jharigam MLAs/ Nabarangapur MLAs/caste/ caste/party party

Dabugam MLAs/caste/party

Note: SC: scheduled caste; ST = scheduled tribe (Adivasi); GP = All India Gana Parishad; GP* = Ganatantra Parishad; INC = Indian National Congress; UTC = Utkal Congress; JNP = Janata Party; INC-­I = Indian National Congress (I); JD = Janata Dal

Source: Compiled from GOI (1951a, 1957, 1961a, 1967b, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2014b).

–­

Umerkote MLAs/caste/party

Sadasiba Tripathy/INC –­ Mudi Naiko/ST/INC –­ 2nd (1957–­61) Radhakrushna Biswas Ray/INC –­ Sadasiba Tripathy/INC Abdur Rahman/GP (bye) Harijan Miru/SC/INC Jagannath Tripathy/ INC (Bye) 3rd (1961–­67) Sadasiba Tripathy/INC Harijan Miru/SC/INC Jagannath Tripathy/INC –­ 4th (1967–­71) Rabi Singh Majhi/ST/INC Jhitru Naik/ST/Swatantra Sadasiba Tripathy/INC Dambaru Majhi/ST/Swatantra Party Party Rabi Singh Majhi/ST/Utkal Purna Chandra Mrigan/ Habibulla Khan/Swatantra Dambaru Majhi/ST/Swatantra 5th (1971–­73) Congress ST/Utkal Congress Party Party 6th (1974–­77) Rabi Singh Majhi/ST/ Utkal Sombaru Majhi/ST/Utkal Habibulla Khan/Swatantra Shyamghan Majhi/ST/Utkal Congress Congress Party Congress 7th (1977–­80) Rabi Singh Majhi/ST/Jantadal Dambaru Majhi/ST/INC Habibulla Khan/INC Shyamghan Majhi/ST/Jantadal 8th (1980–­85) Parama Pujari/ST/INC Dambaru Majhi/ST/INC-­I Habibulla Khan/INC Phulamani Santa/ST/INC-­I 9th (1985–­90) Parama Pujari/ST/INC Bhagabati Pujari/ST/INC Habibulla Khan/INC Dambaru Majhi ST/INC 10th (1990–­95) Gurubaru Majhi/ST/Jantadal Shyamghan Majhi/ST/ Habibulla Khan/INC Jadav Majhi/ST/Jantadal Jantadal 11th (1995–­2000) Parama Pujari/ST/INC Sadan Nayak/ST/INC Habibulla Khan/INC Jadav Majhi/ST/Jantadal 12th (2000–­04) Parama Pujari/ST/INC Sadan Nayak/ST/INC Habibulla Khan/INC Bhujbal Majhi/ST/INC 13th (2004–­09) Dharmu Gond/ST/BJP Sadan Nayak/ST/INC Habibulla Khan/INC Ramesh Chandra Majhi/ST/BJD 14th (2009–­14) Jagabandhu Majhi/ST/BJD Ramesh Chandra Manohar Randhari/ST/BJD Bhujbal Majhi/ST/INC Majhi/ST/BJD By-­Election Subash Gond/ST/BJD –­ –­ –­ 15th (2014–­ ) Subash Gond/ST/BJD Ramesh Chandra Manohar Randhari/ST/BJD Bhujbal Majhi/ST/INC Majhi/ST/BJD

1st (1952–­57)

Election

Table 5.2 MLAs of Umerkote, Kodinga/Jharigam, Nabarangapur and Dabugam constituencies, 1952–­2014

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it won all the elections except the elections of 1971, 1974, 2009 and 2014. The Congress also drew similar experiences from the Dabugam assembly constituency. The important point that needs to be emphasised is that in the 1971 and 1974 assembly elections, the Congress could not even win a single assembly seat in Nabarangpur district. The fraction of the Congress party and the ascendance of Utkal Congress under the leadership of Biju Patnaik appeared as one of the important reasons for such experiences.3 To put it differently, the desertion of the Patnaik fraction enormously weakened the Congress position leading to the formation of the United Front government (Swatantrata Party, Utkal Congress and Jharkhand Party) in 1977. The comparative analysis of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur politics shows that the Congress party has done well in terms of vote sharing as well as winning the seats in Nabarangpur district than in Malkangiri. While focusing on the political behaviour of the Adivasis from 1952 to 1957, Weiner and Field (1975: 78–­118) emphasised that voting in Adivasis constituencies tends to reflect the rise and fall of the Congress vote in Odisha. To widen its electoral base, the Congress had negotiated with the CPI (M) during the 1974 and 2004 elections. It is worthwhile to mention here that each and every party wants its candidates to contest seats, wherever there is a greater possibility of winning it. The seat negotiation during the 1974 election, however, developed disagreement between the Congress and the CPI regarding the Nimapara and Bhubaneswar constituencies where both parties had contested (Ray 1974: 2034). During the 2004 assembly election, it was believed that at least four to five assembly constituencies were affected by the Congress–­CPI (M) alliance at the centre and the Malkangiri assembly constituency was one of those. There was a lack of coordination between the central and the state Congress leadership during the 2004 assembly election, where state leadership had already issued the ticket for the Malkangiri assembly constituency, and this added to the decline of the Congress party in Odisha. Adivasi politics and the left The other important issue of electoral politics in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha is an inclination of the electorates towards the left. The existing literature claims that the Adivasis of these areas are increasingly supporting the activities of the Naxalites (GOI 2008b: 44; Mukherji 2010: 17; Ramachandran 2011b: 38) and that the issue needs to be deliberated and discussed in the context of the electoral outcome. The election data, however, suggest that the CPI has not been able 164

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to influence the voters much during different elections. For instance, various statistical reports of the ECI on the legislative assembly of Odisha confirm that the CPI had managed to secure 7.50, 7.48, 14.68 and 8.76 percent of votes in 1957, 1971, 2000 and 2004 assembly elections in the Malkangiri constituency. While in Chitrakonda constituency, the CPI got 11.04, 4.89 and 5.58 percent of votes in 1985, 1995 and 2000 assembly elections, respectively. The CPI, however, had contested only the 1957 election from the Nabarangpur assembly constituency and secured 6.72 percent of votes. None of the seats of South Odisha have gone to the CPI since Independence. The electoral outcomes of South Odisha do not convince that the Adivasis are moving closer to the Naxalites at least along the line of politics. The relationship between the Adivasi and the Naxalites has been dealt with in Chapter 6 extensively. The Congress System and Adivasi politics Kothari’s (1964: 1161–­73) thesis of ‘the Congress System’, developed during the first phase (1947–­77) of Indian party system, does not qualify in the context of Odisha, in general, and Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts, in particular. Although the Congress continued to be in power in Odisha and enjoyed the same in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts for quite some time, it was, however, far from exercising dominance. In this context, Yadav and Palshikar (2006: 79) underlined that the thesis was perhaps developed to describe the party system existing at the ‘national’ level more than to describe its (party system’s) regional dimensions. The rise and fall of the Congress in Odisha, in general, and Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts, in particular, can be demonstrated by the fact that the central government and the Congress leadership had succeeded in integrating the Adivasis of this region through a structural rearrangement of power rather than co-­opting Adivasi leaders into the national Congress Party (Weiner and Field 1975: 116). Yadav and Palshikar (2006) argue that although the Congress Party is considered as the ‘catch-­all’ party, it keeps the marginalised groups such as Adivasis away from positions of power. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to mention that Odisha had both Scheduled Caste and Adivasi chief ministers from the Congress Party but for short stint. Hemananda Biswal (SC) held the chief minister’s office twice: from 7 December 1989 to 5 March 1990, and from 6 December 1999 to 5 March 2000, while Giridhar Gomango (Adivasi) occupied the office from 17 March 1999 to 6 December 1999.4 Yadav and Palshikar (2006: 80) went on to further argue that the Congress Party maintains a trade-­off relationship with marginalised groups in the sense 165

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that the party would symbolically incorporate various social groups, but the party’s upper-­class upper-­caste leadership would be recognised as legitimate and representative of the masses. Caste politics in Odisha The political history of Odisha demonstrates that the upper castes such as the Brahmin, Karan, Kshatriya and Khandayat have always dominated the power structure and party leadership (Panigrahi 1998: 92; Mohanty 2014: 42; Manor 2015: 202; Sengupta 2015: 64). Bailey (1960b: 137–­77) argues that the majority of politicians and decision-­ makers in Odisha come mainly from two castes, the Brahmin and Karan, even though they form a small section of the total population. Because they were the first to take advantage of Western educational opportunities, they are wealthy and powerful, particularly in the coastal districts. The institutional design and the established system make it more difficult for the marginalised communities to rise to positions of power and prominence (Bailey 1960a: 129; Jayal 2006: 10; Deschouwer and Depauw 2014: 227–­38). Kanungo (2003a: 3294) emphasised that the substantial existence of obnoxious caste prejudices for centuries provided the scope for the dominant caste Hindus to control the lives of the subaltern lower castes. Since the political reservation applies to the lower houses of the parliament as well as state assemblies, it has not extended to the formation of cabinets. As a result, whether it is at the state level (Panigrahi 1998: 92) or the union level (Jayal 2006: 10), the Adivasis have never given proportionate representation in various ministries. Whenever they are given the ministerial berths, they have never travelled beyond the ministries/departments, such as the MTA at the union level and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development at the state level, that are specifically designed to address Adivasis issues. Some of the important portfolios, such as the revenue, home, rural developments and so on, have always been the monopoly of politicians belonging to upper castes. In other words, the system treats various social groups differently, and the marginalised groups such as the Adivasis are discriminated against due to their ethnic differences. Adivasis and political organisations It is also important to mention that the Adivasis are excluded from holding important positions not only at the institutional level but also at the party level (Mohanty and Mishra 1976: 241; Mohanty 1990: 322). Political organisations such as INTUC, HMS, AITUC, CITU and 166

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so on are dominated by upper-­caste people. What is most striking is that even after being ‘decasted’ and ‘declassed’ in the process, an autonomous Adivasi leadership did not emerge as an alternative to upper-­caste leadership. Bailey (1960a: 129) underlines that the Karans of Odisha, in general, and those of Cuttack, in particular, are clever enough and occupy important positions in the state. Because of their political skills, they dominate the administrative aspects of the Odiya society. The British colonial policies, which failed to arrest the trend of pauperisation, actually consolidated the process of higher caste supremacy like the Brahmin–­Karan domination in Odisha. Most zamindars were from these castes. In the urban centres, middle-­class opportunities were also monopolised by them. In other words, domination and marginalisation of the Adivasi people have a historical approach that continued from the colonial period in Odisha (Panigrahi 1998: 65–­103).

Issues in political context The nature and dynamics of political systems grapple with a number of issues. The relationship between individuals and communities on the one hand, and the political system, on the other hand, has been defined by issues that mostly affect the functioning of the political system directly or indirectly. Significant issues of political relevance govern the changing relationship between democracy and communities. Quality of participation The nature of political participation depends on the level of political awareness, the degree of involvement, the factors influencing voting during elections and so on. Different cultural, ethnic and economic factors influence the political behaviour of the individual. Communities’ participation in elections is linked to their proximity to the local constituencies, thereby ensuring that political parties and candidates are more concerned with the needs and problems of the local people. The degree of concern of political parties and candidates has a direct impact on the participation of communities in political processes. The ability of the political parties and candidates to mobilise the voters contributes to the active involvement of individuals and collective communities, in general, and the turnout of voters, in particular. Empirical research demonstrates that men more than women, and the educated than the uneducated people cast votes with little or no influence during elections. Men and educated voters feel that the elected representatives have efficaciously represented their political 167

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choices in Odisha to a large extent. They tend to feel that because education increases the ability of the individual to access political information. Individuals with a higher level of educational attainment are more likely to be interested in politics and desire for greater participation. Education contributes to the internal, as well as the external, efficacy of the voters. So, there is a positive correlation between education and quality of political participation.5 The comparative analysis shows that relatively higher percentages of the Bengali migrants are capable of making their own decisions than are the Adivasi communities. It has been observed during the field study that most of those who depended on family members were female respondents belonging to families of the Bengali migrants and Adivasis. Herrera and Martinelli (2006: 461) argue that such influences reduce the self to someone else. To quote them, ‘[m]ost people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else’s opinion, their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation’. The reason can be computed to the patriarchal nature of the Indian society. The voters also sometimes depend on caste/community leaders while deciding whom to elect (Shah 2008: 1–­31, Kothari 2010: 1–­26). In this context, the regional dimension shows that the Adivasis of Malkangiri depend less on community leaders than their counterpart in Nabarangpur district. This is because Malkangiri has failed to produce any significant leader to raise Adivasi issues in relation to non-­Adivasis effectively and has not witnessed any violent conflict between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in the area. On the contrary, Nabarangpur district produced Adivasi leaders like Jagabandhu Majhi, who persistently raised issues of Adivasi concern and played a significant role during the violent conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in 2001. On 24 September 2011, the Naxalites killed him while distributing land patta (legal entitlement) to Adivasis under the Forest Rights Act, 2006. Voters in the context The practice of democracy and the process of democratisation raise some fundamental questions – who participates, how do they participate and why do they participate? Democracy encourages inclusive participation. It empowers the masses by guaranteeing their participation and accommodates the political voices of the marginalised section such as the Adivasis, who traditionally had little say in the political process. People participate in political processes for a variety of reasons. A lack of participation primarily affects policy outcomes and does not benefit the concerned communities (Pande 2003; Chin and Prakash 168

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2011). The issue of discrimination, more often indirect in nature, essentially encourages participation. The discriminated communities believe that through participation, they would elect the candidate of their choice and expect that the winner will address issues of discrimination. Given the nature of diverse and underprivileged social groups, there are enough reasons to believe in Aristotle’s notion of distributive justice, which emphasises that ‘equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally’ (cited in Frank 2005: 78) and Young’s (1989: 250–­74) idea of differential citizenship. The other issue of political participation is related to the doctrine of democratic representativeness; that is, the democratic representativeness of the liberal state cannot coexist comfortably with instances of structural exclusion of entire groups from the state. For Weller (2010: lx), the discourse on political participation is mainly based on three important notions – an exclusion from the function of state fosters conflict, while shared ownership will strengthen it; a consideration of what it means to achieve real equality in all aspects of life including public life; and a reference to the philosophical underpinnings of the authority and legitimacy of the state. The Indian state adopted preferential policies based on proportionality for the historically marginalised communities to address these complex issues. During the field study in South Odisha, it has been observed that caste/ethnic affiliation still matters to both the Adivasi and Bengali communities to a considerable level in deciding whom to support in the election. The other factors that influence the political behaviour of the voters are religion, party affiliation, qualification of the candidate, donation to the village6 and so on. In reference to the donation to the village, it can be said that Adivasis still practise the chieftain system and different political parties/candidates donate to the village through the village head or the educated person of the village, and subsequently, they collectively decide whom to vote in the election. The comparative analysis of Adivasis and Bengali migrants suggests that the former has developed relatively stronger community feelings than the latter. The Adivasi communities of Odisha prefer to vote on the basis of their ascribed identities. This is because when members of a particular group identify strongly with that group, they develop a group consciousness and vote for their community members. The Adivasis feel that their lives are intrinsically tied to the other members of their social group and can decide whom to vote without any compulsion. The notion of ‘individual’ is almost absent in the case of taking decisions that would probably affect the community as a whole.7 However, whether the Adivasi communities vote by their 169

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group affiliation during the elections remains to be problematic in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts primarily because all assembly and parliamentary constituencies are reserved for Adivasis and the competitors belong only to this community. Community identities become important when the contestants belong to different social categories. The other interesting point drawn from the empirical research is that none of the respondents from both communities acknowledged the role of religion during elections except the 65-­year-­old Bengali respondent of MV-­92 of Malkangiri district.8 It is also important to underline that considering caste/tribe during elections is not the only factor that contributes towards strengthening community feelings. Merely belonging to a particular community/ caste does not awaken community consciousness; what is important is how much we are concerned about our own community. The Bengali migrants have also strengthened their community feelings. For instance, during the 2009 state assembly election, ETV Odiya reported that some of the Bengali migrants of Malkangiri showed their commitment to making Arabinda Dhali, the Bengali migrant, a winning candidate from the Jayadev Vihar constituency, Bhubaneswar.9 During the conflicts in 2001, some of the Bengali migrants of Malkangiri had also been there to support the Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur.10 Given the landscape of community consciousness of the Bengali migrants, the nature of Adivasi identity/Adivasi feeling needs to be critically contextualised. Even in the case of Adivasi communities, merely belonging to the ethnic community does not substantiate the position. In this context, the case of Narayanpatna block of Koraput district of South Odisha can be illustrated. In the wake of resource conflict between Adivasis and non-­Adivasis in Narayanpatna block, the CMAS, the organisation of the Adivasis, targeted not only the non-­ Adivasis but also the Adivasis who were opposing their activities. This suggests that the distinct ethnic identity and distinctions among the Adivasis are becoming less significant than their common subjugated, exploited and deprived position. This is not to argue that such identities are unimportant; people resort to collective action over issues that have high salience for them, and few issues have greater salience than caste, ethnicity and religion, such as the struggle of Adivasis for material survival in Odisha (Ambagudia 2015). Why do voters support political parties? Voters support political parties on different grounds such as leadership, community benefits as well as development as a whole. The 170

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dominant views that emerged from the field are that the voters tilt more towards the developmental tasks that the political parties performed. The voters more often evaluate the concerns of political parties towards their communities on a short-­term rather than long-­term basis and at a localised rather than state/national level. The present ruling party in Odisha, the BJD, is the most popular party among the Adivasis of South Odisha because they consider that the BJD is more concerned in addressing the issues and problems of the Adivasis, although the role of the BJD can be questioned in dealing with larger issues of Adivasi communities.11 The Adivasis’ support to the BJD can be substantiated by the belief that the BJD government freed a large number of Adivasis who were arrested and jailed during the conflicts between them and Bengali migrants in 2001 (The Pioneer 2004). The other intriguing factor that was encountered during the field study in Nabarangpur district is that they voted for BJD during the 2009 assembly election because the leader of the Dalit Samaj, Jagabandhu Majhi, had contested on the BJD ticket. During the field study, Jagabandhu Majhi, who had unsuccessfully contested the 2004 assembly election from the Umerkote constituency as an independent candidate, when asked about the reason for joining BJD, also commented on the positive relationship between the BJD and the benefits that the latter had provided to Adivasi communities.12 It was also observed during the field study that most of the Adivasi respondents of Nabarangpur district cast their vote to the BJD in the name of Dalit Samaj. For instance, when they were asked which political party they supported, their reply was Dalit Samaj and not the BJD. But it can be epitomised that they equated Dalit Samaj with BJD, as Jagabandhu Majhi had contested from this political party and they intended to support him. The research on political awareness of the Adivasis, however, constitutes the dominant theory of enquiry. The BJP is the preferred political party among the Bengali migrants. According to them, the BJP works for the Bengali communities. Although the BJD has established its domination in South Odisha, it is not preferred by the Bengali migrants. One of the possible reasons is that when the Malkangiri constituency was reserved for the SCs (2000 and 2004 elections),13 the BJD did not contest the election from this constituency (GOI 2000: 179; GOI 2004: 177). There was scope for the BJD to galvanise support from the Bengali migrants by contesting from the constituency, where migrants could have also attempted to secure political space on the basis of their party affiliation. On the other hand, the Bengali migrants considered the BJD as the party committed to the Adivasi issues and are determined to work against the 171

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migrants. Guha Thakurta and Raghuraman (2004: 250) underlined that the issue of deportation of Bengali infiltrators from Odisha engendered rift between the BJD and its then coalition partner the BJP. In the wake of the conflict between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in 2001, the Adivasis demanded the expulsion of the illegal Bengali migrants, and without losing the Adivasi support, the BJD initiated to deport the Bengali infiltrators from Odisha. The BJP opposed the BJD, although it is supportive of the deportation of Bengali infiltrators from Assam. In short, competing communities support those political parties which, they think, represent, protect and promote their interests and rights. Costs and benefits of participation Voters expect political parties to pursue at least four types of ­functions – pursue economic needs, attain satisfaction, strive for particular values and fulfil their subconsciousness and psychological needs (Sisadia 1999: 136). The costs and benefits of participation can be subjective, objective, tangible and intangible. The benefits of participation can be tangible for the participants if their representatives raise issues and concerns which they claim to have represented and pressurise the government to adopt certain welfare measures to address the problems of the concerned communities. It can be intangible in the sense that even without any physical or real benefits it can give the psychological satisfaction of participation; that is, participants belonging to the concerned social groups feel more represented by representing its own members in the ruling elite of the country. Existing literature, however, suggests that even within the voters it is tough to generalise that all of them feel represented and believe that the representatives will protect and promote the interests of electorates. For instance, Jensenius’s (2012) empirical research in two Indian states certifies this position. By supporting Mayawati, the Dalit women of Uttar Pradesh feel that they have been represented in the political scenario. However, the Dalit activists of Himachal Pradesh feel that voting for their own community members in elections had made no difference because the representatives follow the party lines and are only concerned about themselves and their families (Jensenius 2012: 379–­80). While analysing the relationship between the political representatives of the marginalised groups and their influence on public policies, it is important to mention that the political reservation for marginalised groups in India has produced elite groups within their respective communities. Although political rights have been extended to all, 172

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whether it is the case of Adivasis or Bengali migrants, it is evident fromTables 5.1 and 5.2 that the space provided by political reservation has been confined to some families only. Arabinda Dhali, the representative of the migrants, had engaged in discussion with the West Bengal chief minister to seek support for the cause of Bengali migrants in Odisha for the revival of their lost Bengali language. He was also critical of the decision of the BJD–­BJP coalition government in Odisha to deport the Bangladeshi infiltrators during 2001–­02. In this context, it has been alleged that he was fighting more for the cause of migrants than in the interest of the constituency he represented (Biswas 2008). For Adivasis, the individual legislators have gained prestige and status. The general understanding is that Adivasi representatives have done little for their communities. They have not been able to stall any bill or project that has the potential to adversely affect the Adivasis in India (Xaxa 2005: 119–­35). This is because of their marginal share in the parliament and the state legislatures; it is not statistically significant to influence decisions that are made on the basis of the majority. The representation of 47 Adivasi MPs in a House of 543 members at the centre and 34 Adivasi MLAs in a House of 147 members at the Odisha assembly are minuscule figures to influence the decision-­ making process. Besides, the lack of unity among the Adivasi political representatives due to their different ideological backgrounds and party lines further erode their efforts to work for the community (Pande 2003: 1137). Notwithstanding, we cannot rule out the effective role of the Adivasi representatives along with the political movements of Adivasis in the formulation of larger policies and programmes. The political reservation for Adivasis has a significant role to play in increasing the political consciousness and demand for the greater share not only in the political arena but also in employment, development benefits, and even greater control over natural resources. Although the role of the Adivasi legislators can be contested, the PESA Act, 1996 and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 are some of the recent important acts which could be credited to the joint venture of Adivasi legislators and political struggle of Adivasis for rights. Who represents ‘the community’? In a liberal democracy, any person can contest election for a seat in lok sabha or legislative assembly from any area. The electorates can exercise their political rights and decide whom to vote. Their political decision revolves around the question, ‘who can represent them/the community’? 173

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They elect the effective competitor who claims to represent the community’s interest. The decisions of the electorates are based on ‘who can speak for or on behalf of another’. Field experiences demonstrate that when choices are available, Adivasis do not endorse Bengali migrants as their political representatives and vice versa. This can perhaps be explained as the choice of legislators among them should reflect similar socio-­ economic characteristics of their respective community as a whole. This is because, as mentioned earlier, these ethnic communities have developed strong group consciousness, often cutting across kin, class and political loyalties. They evaluate most problems in terms of ‘we Adivasis’ or ‘we Bengalis’. This trait reflects the pattern of voting behaviour in Odisha. The recognition of community-­based identities is quintessential so that the representatives and those represented share the common aspect of socio-­economic and cultural life. Guided by this understanding, the Indian constitution has reserved certain electoral seats on the basis of the social identity of the marginalised groups and declared certain constituencies as reserved constituencies. While providing political reservations, it was believed that his or her own community members would be in a better position than other legislators to comprehend the problems faced by the Adivasi communities. As John Burnheim believes, ‘[o]ur interests are better protected when we are represented by those who share our experience and interests and that this similarity of condition is far better indicator than whether people might share our rather shaky opinions’ (cited in Phillips 2003: 2). James Mill also said that ‘[t]he benefits of the representative system are lost in all cases in which the interests of the choosing body are not the same with those of the community’ (cited in Jayal 2006: 6). The communities cast votes in favour of the rival candidate who represents the mirror of their preferences and interests that ideally translate communities’ will into governmental decisions. The translation of different choices into the aggregate outcome, however, remains problematic.14 The ‘reserved’15 nature of constituencies leads to further complexities and engenders difficulties in assuming whether supports in the electoral processes are based on political choices of the voters. In the field, the questions why Bengali migrants had voted for Adivasi candidates and why did Adivasis elect the Bengali migrants from the Malkangiri constituency before the election in 2009 in South Odisha were asked. Since South Odisha experiences a high number of reserved constituencies, these communities have no option but to vote for candidates of their choice available. In other words, when the seats are reserved for ‘the other community’, the Adivasis and Bengali migrants felt that the reserved seats constrained their political choices. 174

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Examining the political behaviour of the Adivasi communities of Malkangiri further, it can be observed that they could have voted for the local SC candidate during assembly elections in 2000 and 2004. As there was more than one competitor from the Bengali communities and the fragmentation of Bengali votes between Arabinda Dhali and Nimai Chandra Sarkar was apparent, the Adivasi voters were crucial for the candidate aspiring to win the election. In both elections, the competitions were between these two Bengali migrants.16 In this context, the party affiliation of the candidate is crucial in galvanising support. Ruling out the possibility that all Adivasis vote for Bengali migrants in an SC reserved constituency, what is also important along with party affiliation is the factor of donation to the village, where the candidates donate in cash and kind. For instance, Nimai Chandra Sarkar had promised during the 2004 assembly election and after winning the election, he extended financial support to the edifices of the Ram and Durga temples near Mariwada village of Malkangiri district (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).17 These two temples are located on both sides of the road. As evident from field experiences, at times, some of the

Figure 5.1 Ram Temple, Mariwada village, Malkangiri district, constructed with the financial help from an MLA Source: Photograph by the author during the field study.

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Figure 5.2 Durga Temple, Mariwada village, Malkangiri district, constructed with the financial help from an MLA Source: Photograph by the author during the field study.

Adivasi voters consider ‘donation to the village’ as the deciding factor in extending their support to a rival candidate. Representation versus domination In a democratic political system, different communities engage in a recursive relationship concerning the distribution of powers. Communities assert their collective rights and aspirations to have access to or control over political resources. To attain these objectives, they compete for power and influence. The outcome of the competition defines their relationship more often in terms of the dominant and the dominated communities corresponding to their social location in a power structure. Such a relationship has direct relevance to the ‘politics of representation’ versus ‘influential role’ in the decision-­making processes. The findings from the field suggest that Adivasis feel that the lack of representatives from their community in the public space as well as in the decision-­making processes has led to the domination of the Bengali migrants. The reason is computed to their lived 176

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experiences during the conflicts between them in 2001. Interestingly, some of the Bengali migrants, although marginal in number, do not see any connection between the lack of representation and domination. For them, the issue of representation and domination is a matter of psychological construction, and it entirely depends on the behaviour and attitude of one community towards ‘the other’. The relationship between the lack of representation and domination, however, cannot just be ruled out.18 It is also important to mention that domination does not always have a direct impact on ‘the other’ community. It will also have an indirect impact on ‘the other’ community. During the empirical research, Adivasi and Bengali migrants made allegations and counter-­allegations against each other. The Adivasis felt that the state machinery was partial during the 2001 conflict. Due to the lack of the presence of Adivasis at the police and administrative levels, the Adivasis alleged that Bengali migrants were able to influence the police and administration by luring the personnel. The Bengali migrants also developed similar feelings and believed that the lack of their community members at the police and administrative levels had led to favouritism towards the Adivasi communities during the conflict. The Bengali migrants felt the presence of their community members at the decision-­making level when Arabinda Dhali opposed the decision of the BJD–­BJP coalition government, primarily orchestrated by the BJD, to deport the illegal Bengali infiltrators from Odisha in 2001–­02 (Biswas 2008). The coalition partner, the BJD, however, did not reconsider its decision.

Emergence of Bengali migrants as a political community The rise of Bengali migrants as ‘a political community’ goes back to the period of the late 1950s when most of the lower-­caste Bengali migrants (Namasudras) reluctantly accepted the proposal of their rehabilitation outside West Bengal amidst protest and resistance. As a consequence, the state granted citizenship status and categorised them as SCs in Odisha.19 In Odisha, the state conferred SC status to all migrants rehabilitated in Umerkote zone of Nabarangpur district due to their Namasudra status (GOO not dated b: 17). However, most of the Bengali migrants, not all, rehabilitated in Malkangiri zone are categorised as SC (GOO not dated a: 80). Consequently, they received all opportunities/benefits which were primarily designed for Indian citizens, including political reservation. The extension of citizenship rights to Bengali migrants in the form of preferential treatment has, 177

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therefore, become the bone of contention in Odisha. In other words, as Shah (2010: 80) argues, the pattern of distribution of state resources forms the arena of inter-­community conflict. Barik (2006: 102) claims that the Bengali migrants could not become a part of the local political community. To substantiate this position, he cited two reasons: one, cultural differences between Adivasis and Bengali migrants and, two, the reservation of constituencies for SCs/ Adivasis. Both these reasons, however, can be contested strongly. It can be mentioned that, although cultural affiliation is necessary, it is not always essential to be a part of the local political community or political integration process. In a broader sense, political integration involves four dimensions – rights granted to the immigrants by the host society, identification of the immigrants with the host society, adoption of democratic norms and values by immigrants and political participation, mobilisation and representation (Martiniello 2006: 84). All these elements of political integration are visible in the context of Bengali migrants in India. Group consciousness adds a substantive understanding of elements of the local political community that would otherwise be absent. Regarding the reserved constituencies, Barik ultimately sidelined the SC status of the Bengali migrants, under which they have been contesting in the SC reserved constituencies. By extending the umbrella of national citizenship to the Bengali migrants, Benhabib (2004: 121–­36) argues, the Indian state had laid the ground to belong to a local political community. The data on the political representation of Bengali migrants suggest that they have become an integral part of the local political community through which they influence the political processes in Odisha. The SC status of Bengali migrants in Odisha provided a major breakthrough in their political life, which facilitated their emergence as a dominant political community. Thus, they get all benefits under the preferential treatment policy including that of contesting elections in any parliamentary or assembly constituency reserved for SCs in Odisha. The SC status was supplemented by the reorganisation of assembly constituencies in 1974, the year when the Malkangiri assembly constituency was carved into two assembly constituencies – Malkangiri (reserved for the SCs up to 2009) and Chitrakonda (reserved for the Adivasis). As a result, Bengali migrants contested in the SC reserved constituency in different elections and felt politically present in Malkangiri district. The political presence has been felt not only by those migrants who intended to contest elections under the SC status but also by voters belonging to the Bengali communities who can express 178

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their political views through their migrant representatives. The Indian democracy, thus, not only opened up new political opportunities for Bengali migrants but also created the ground for the emergence of political contestations between the Bengali migrants and Adivasis. The first political seed of the Bengali migrants emerged during the 1974 assembly election when the Adivasi-­reserved Malkangiri constituency was, for the first time since 1957, being reserved for SCs. Nadiabasi Biswas, the Bengali migrant belonging to the Namasudra community, contested the election on the Congress ticket against the local SC candidate, Naka Kannaya, of the UTC. Naka Kannaya defeated him with a huge margin of 34.98 percent. This defeat can perhaps be attributed to many possible reasons. First, the constituency was reserved for the SCs for the first time since Independence, and it was tough to develop a sound political strategy. Second, the task of the Dandakaranya Project was unfinished by now, and Bengali migrants were undergoing a tremendous mental pressure to adjust with the environment of their new location. It did not positively contribute to mobilising people and develop community consciousness. They needed some time to stabilise themselves and establish their political position through better tactics of mobilisation. Furthermore, in the 1970s, several Bengali migrants deserted Malkangiri zone and went to West Bengal. Third, perhaps the most important reason, during this period, the Congress did not perform well across the state due to the fraction of the party and the ascendance of the UTC. More than a decade after his defeat, Nadiabasi Biswas revived himself and contested the 1985 assembly election as an independent candidate, corroborating better electoral strategies. He defeated his rival competitor, Naka Kannaya of the JNP, by a margin of 3.2 percent valid votes. What does this electoral outcome suggest concerning the larger question of democracy, representation, mobilisation and participation? Can we then say that the Bengali migrant act more as a block or a formidable political force than others, per se, the native Adivasis and Dalits? These questions are more complex in nature and need further discussion and deliberation at a wider level. People believe that the credit of the victory of Biswas goes to the concerted and organised Bengali community because a large number of Bengali migrants came forward to support Biswas and rallied together with the slogan ‘Donate a Rupee and a Vote’ (Padhi and Baral 2001: 311). The politics in the 1980s, thus, witnessed new forms of migrants’ collective – political, social and cultural mobilisation. In other words, the vote bank of Bengali migrants played a significant role during the 1985 assembly election, and Nadiabasi Biswas won 179

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the election because of the collective Bengali votes.20 The migrant’s victory as an independent candidate shows the community’s ability to mobilise people along the ethnic line. It also depends on their relatively high levels of political awareness and political education, thereby contributing to a high turnout (Table 5.3). The demographic picture does not, however, indicates that Bengali migrants (Namasudra) have outnumbered the Adivasi21 and that their support can act as the stumbling block for other candidates. On the contrary, Adivasi communities have outnumbered the Bengali migrants in Malkangiri district, and hence, winning the election depends on the mobilising capacity of the individual candidate as well as the party. The electoral outcome also depends on the self/community awareness about political issues and exercise of political rights. The computing data on voter turnout shows that the Bengali migrants are more politically aware than Adivasi communities, hence leading to a higher turnout of voters in Bengali villages than Adivasis. The high turnout of voters in Bengali villages mainly depends on the structure of political opportunities present at a given time and in a given society. The data that have been computed in Table 5.3 demonstrate this fact. During the 1985 assembly election, there was a sudden increase in voter turnout from 28.01 in 1980 to 41.28 percent in 1985. Although it is difficult to build a concrete argument to articulate that the migrant’s contest in the 1985 assembly election was responsible for such a high turnout, it can be ascertained from Table 5.3 that the Adivasi reserved constituency of Chitrakonda has always witnessed a lower turnout of voters than the Malkangiri constituency. Table 5.3 Turnout of voters in Malkangiri and Chitrakonda assembly constituencies, 1974–­2014 (in %) Elections

Malkangiri

Chitrakonda

6th (1974–­77) 7th (1977–­80) 8th (1980–­85) 9th (1985–­90) 10th (1990–­95) 11th (1995–­2000) 12th (2000–­04) 13th (2004–­09) 14th (2009–­14) 15th (2014–­ )

43.62 19.89 28.01 41.28 49.94 71.43 54.94 66.81 50.26 74.35

20.84 14.97 19.53 25.91 33.36 63.99 45.56 58.99 51.25 69.71

Source: Compiled from GOI (1974, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2014b).

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There can be many reasons for this and can be examined in the context of different factors that influence political behaviour. Leighley (1995: 181–­209) identified four major influences on an individual’s decision to vote – institutional rules, social and demographic traits, psychological resources and mobilisation efforts of parties and their candidates. These factors are crucial in explaining the nature and dynamics of political participation of Adivasis. Socio-­economic, geographical, political and psychological factors are closely related to electoral participation and democratic commitment. In the context of American politics, Verba and Nie (1972) explored the relationship between socio-­economic variables and turnout of voters and argued that higher levels of income and education have profound implications for greater political participation. The economic/ income and educational level of Bengali migrants is higher than the Adivasi communities in Malkangiri district (GOO not dated a: 40). Miller et al. (1981: 494) underline that the availability of resources, therefore, enables different groups to engage in the political arena actively. Availability of resources, however, is necessary but not a sufficient factor in explaining individual differences in participation. Geographically, most of the Adivasi villages are located in remote areas with little communication facility. The Bengali villages were, on the contrary, provided with approach roads under the Dandakaranya Project (see Chapter 3). The Adivasi communities of Malkangiri district are politically more unorganised than the Bengali migrants and have little power of political articulation owing to their educational backwardness. It is abundantly clear that psychological factor becomes much more silent in determining the turnout of voters. The Adivasi communities have developed psychological apprehensions due to the significant presence of the Naxalites in the district, who have been consistently warning them to not participate in electoral politics (see Chapter 6). These factors, however, do not have much impact on Bengali migrants of Malkangiri district. The Adivasi communities are often disinterested in politics unless they are encouraged and allured by vote banks to participate in the electoral process. They tend to believe that the present socio-­political set-­up is hostile to them. So, Weiner and Field (1975: 89–­92) argue that Adivasi constituencies witness lower turnouts of voters than non-­Adivasi constituencies in Odisha. The effectiveness of Adivasis in shaping the contents of political decisions as well as their long-­term orientation for political efficacy, however, constitutes the dominant theory of inquiry. During the 1990 assembly election, another Bengali migrant, Arabinda Dhali, who came to Malkangiri with his parents in 1963,22 had 181

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contested from the BJP and lost to Naka Kannaya of Janta Dal by a margin of less than 5 percent. With this development, political analysts thought that the locals had been able to overthrow the political dominance of outsiders (Bengali migrant) in Odisha. But this political notion did not last long, and the political scenario of the district completely overturned with the death of Naka Kannaya on 2 April 1992. The demise of Naka Kannaya gave an extraordinary political space for the Bengali migrants. Arabinda Dhali of BJP grabbed the opportunity that came his way and emerged as the flourishing competitor in the 1992 assembly by-­election. Arabinda Dhali was re-­elected in the subsequent assembly elections of 1995 and 2000. Meanwhile, it is quintessential to mention here that the close competitor of Arabinda Dhali in the 2000 assembly election was another Bengali migrant, Nimai Chandra Sarkar of the Congress who lost the election by a margin of 8.17 percent. The victory of Dhali in 1995 assembly election was due to, among others, the political participation of Bengali migrants as a block, or the formation of formidable political force on the basis of community/caste consciousness. The victory of Arabinda Dhali in the 2000 assembly election cannot be justified on the ground of collective efforts and support of the community. It goes much beyond the communitarian analysis of electoral politics. It is not necessarily ‘caste’ or ‘community’ that made him victorious. There are sufficient indications that the 2000 assembly election witnessed a fractioned voting pattern of Bengali migrants because there was a close competition between two migrants, Arabinda Dhali of the BJP and Nimai Chandra Sarkar of the Congress. The victory of BJP in the 2000 assembly election was due to its association with the migrant identity, where the case of Hindu infiltrators was forwarded. The defeat of the Congress candidate in the election was partly due to the negative impact of the decision of the Congress government at the centre to settle Bengali migrants from West Bengal in a new environment, which was unfamiliar and underdeveloped in nature. Despite persistent protests by Bengali migrants against the decision, the central government had adopted the bold step to settle them in the Adivasi-­dominated Dandakaranya area. The growing political awareness and influencing capacity of the Bengali migrants were evident from the fact that none of the local SC or Adivasi representatives of Malkangiri district had ever occupied the ministerial berth. Arabinda Dhali was, however, the minister for textiles, handlooms and cooperation under the BJP–­BJD coalition government from 2000 to 2004. In the 2004 assembly election, Arabinda Dhali, who used to capture the seat since 1992 assembly by-­election drew blank and Nimai Chandra 182

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Sarkar registered a lead of 253 votes (0.2 percent) over Arabinda Dhali. There are many factors responsible for this victory. One of the important reasons is that though Nimai Chandra Sarkar was suspended from the party, he retained the Congress symbol and managed to grab the traditional Congress vote bank of the Malkangiri district.23 He had also been able to gain sympathy votes on the ground of expulsion from the Congress party. Nimai Chandra Sarkar claimed that his earlier positions at the offices of the sub-­collector and DRDA, Malkangiri helped in the victory.24 From this position, he helped Bengali migrants and others to get their work done easily, per se, to get the land patta without much trouble. What does this evidence suggest at the wider level? The Bengali migrants had not only benefitted from the political opportunities extended by the democratic state but also established their domination in other spheres by grabbing the available social and economic openings that came their way. The integration of Bengali migrants by extending citizenship rights and SC status led to a further redistribution of political resources between the Adivasis and the SCs, which was earlier seen primarily between the upper castes and the marginalised groups such as the Adivasis and SCs. The Bengali migrants of the Chitrakonda assembly constituency did not feel their political presence at the state level as, since its formation in 1974, it was reserved for the Adivasis. The electoral politics of Nabarangpur district emerges to tell a similar story. The Nabarangpur assembly constituency was reserved for the SCs during the 1957 and 1961 elections. The Bengali migrants of the Nabarangpur district had the opportunity to occupy the political space during the 1961 assembly election but not in the 1957 election due to the initiation of settlement programmes in Umerkote and Raighar areas of the Nabarangpur district.25 An intriguing fact can be drawn from Table 5.2. In 1957, the Umerkote assembly constituency was represented by Radhakrushna Biswasray, a Bengali, but he did not necessarily represent the sentiments of Bengali migrants.26 In other words, Bengali migrants required some time to establish themselves in the political arena; before they could mark their political presence, structural changes occurred, and all seats were reserved for the Adivasis except in Nabarangpur assembly constituency, which was an open constituency. Since the 2009 election, all four assembly constituencies are reserved for Adivasis due to a high concentration of Adivasi population. As a consequence, Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district have developed an indifferent attitude towards Adivasis communities.27 The Bengali migrants of Odisha are not lagging behind at the grassroots politics. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that they have 183

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grabbed all possible political opportunities in PRIs. All posts of sarapanch are reserved for Adivasis in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha. Some posts of panchayat samiti members are, however, reserved for SCs and the Bengali migrants of both districts are considered to be potential competitors. For instance, out of 108 seats of the panchayat samiti, 22 seats are reserved for the SCs in Malkangiri district. Out of 22 seats, the Bengali migrants occupied little more than 50 percent (12 seats, 54.54 percent) of the total seats in the 2007 election. On the contrary, Bengali migrants have not been able to grab much political space in Nabarangpur district, as they managed to get only one seat (5.26 percent) out of 19 seats reserved for SCs at the panchayat samiti level in the 2007 election.28 Out of 15 seats, three seats were reserved for the SCs and the Bengali migrants of Malkangiri district represented one and three representatives to the zilla parishad in 2002 and 2007, respectively (Pradhan 2007: 37–­9). In Nabarangpur district, out of 26, four seats were reserved for SCs, and the Bengali migrants did not occupy even a single post at the zilla parishad level in 2002 and 2007 elections.29 During the 2012 PRIs election, out of 19 SC seats, Bengali migrants (Namasudra) occupied two samiti member seats in Nabarangpur district.30 During 2017, PRIs election, out of 15 zilla parishad seats, three seats were reserved for the SCs out of which Bengali migrants (Namasudra) occupied two seats in Malkangiri district. Interestingly, out of three SC seats, two seats are located in high Bengali migrants concentration areas such as the Kalimela-­2 and Korukonda-­2 of Kalimela and Korukonda blocks of Malkangiri district, respectively (GOO 2017: 37). The third SC seat is located in Khairput block, where the Bengali migrants were not rehabilitated. Sulata Mandal (Bengali migrants, Namasudra) of the BJP is elected as the vice president of zilla parishad of Malkangiri district (GOO 2017: 70). In Nabarangpur district, out of 26 zilla parishad seats, four seats were reserved for the SCs and none of them went to the Bengali migrants (GOO 2017: 37). However, all these SC reserved seats of Nabarangpur districts were located in Kosagumuda and Papdahandi blocks which were not identified for the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants (Chapter 4, Table 4.5). The comparison between Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts suggests that the Bengali migrants of the Malkangiri district have a higher rate of success in the political sphere than their counterpart of Nabarangpur district, both at the state and local levels. The tussle over social, economic and political resources had already begun in Nabarangpur district between the native Adivasis and the Bengali migrants, and there were violent clashes in 2001. On the contrary, similar instances had not occurred in the Malkangiri district. 184

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Institutionalised marginality or dominated marginality Politics is often reduced to the simple question of who gets what. It is the competition for wealth, status and power. While these are goods that can be created, they must also be distributed in society. Societies are distinguished not by their struggle over valued goods but by the forms and intensities of struggle and the amounts and resources available for competition (Bienen 1985: 64). Therefore, in the case of migrants and local communities in Odisha, it is not inequalities but the scope for competition for control over or access to political power that generates conflict (Weiner 1978: 7). Such conflicts and challenges are fraught with far-­reaching consequences. So, competition or contestation implies a negation of domination characterised by the current form of power distribution (Prakash 1991: 145). Politics has become an important arena of competition and conflict in different parts of the country, and Odisha is not an exception. Within the broader framework of spirals of conflicts between the Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in Odisha, how does one rationally justify that the political success of Bengali migrants leads to the political marginalisation of the native Adivasis? Since the Adivasis and Bengali communities belong to different ethnic groups and are located at various levels of a caste-­ridden society, how does political conflict take place between them where group affiliations become the basis of resource allocations? Or how does one measure the implications of conflicts between the Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in the political sphere? Political conflicts between these communities cannot be studied in isolation. These conflicts have wider implications for social, economic and cultural spheres (see Chapter 4). Political conflicts need to be discussed along with social, economic and demographic factors. Politics or the ‘struggle for power’ is all about the ‘politics of number’ in India. These communities, indeed, belong to different ethnic and social strata of the society, but there is a need to acknowledge that the arrival of Bengali migrants has changed the ethnic composition of the areas and regions under consideration. The settlement of Bengali migrants in undivided Koraput district or the present-­day Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts has challenged the numerical superiority or dominance of the native Adivasis. Unlike Madhya Pradesh, where Bengali migrants are not granted SC status (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 110), they are categorised as SCs in Odisha. As a consequence, the state has granted them specific entitlements and rights with regard to education, job and politics. 185

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The Bengali migrants have certainly contributed to the substantive increase of the SC population in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha. For instance, by 18 October 1963, the total number of Bengali migrants under the DNK Project in the Malkangiri zone was 4609, and their number increased to 78,127 by 2001. The Namasudra (SC) population of Malkangiri district has now increased to 96,304 by 2011 (GOO not dated a: 39). Similarly, by 24 April 1963, 12,690 Bengali migrants were rehabilitated in Umerkote zone under the DNK Project, and the 2001 census shows that their number has now increased to 34,750 (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2). The Bengali migrants have, therefore, drastically changed the demographic picture of the area, and this demographic shift began to define the nature of reserved constituencies (Adivasi or SC) and has wider implications for the larger discourse on migration politics. As a result, the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Odisha has significantly affected the social, economic and political conditions of the Adivasis (GOO not dated a: 40; GOO not dated b: 16). The preferential considerations in India are based on the principle of ‘proportionality’, that is, in proportion to the total population. The political space that the native Adivasis had enjoyed earlier has now been occupied by SCs due to their numerical superiority, and the Bengali migrants are at the forefront. The seats reserved for the Adivasi communities both at the state assembly and the PRIs prior to the arrival of Bengali migrants are now reserved for SCs. This has completely altered the earlier power structure of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts of Odisha and contributed to the process of pauperisation and political marginalisation of Adivasis in South Odisha. In this context, the Bengali migrants have become oppressors of the Adivasis, and this has led to the emergence of another form of Adivasi exploitation and marginalisation, thereby leading to violent conflicts between the Adivasi communities and the Bengali migrants in Odisha. The existing power equation has become competitive. It would not be an exaggeration to mention that the restructure of constituencies extended political opportunities to Bengali migrants to get elected from the SC reserved constituency. As a consequence, they dominated the electoral scenario of Malkangiri from 1985 to 2004 assembly elections, except the 1990 assembly election that was won by Naka Kanaya, a local SC. The state enabled the Bengali migrants to become politically powerful and that led to the political marginalisation of native Adivasis, thereby leading to contestation and conflicts in the area (Ghosh 2002). The Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 2008, which came into effect from 2009, 186

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reconverted the Malkangiri assembly constituency into the Adivasi reserved constituency. The delimitation of constituencies enforced some of the Bengali migrants to contest from other parts of the state by changing their political affiliation. For instance, Arabinda Dhali was elected from Malkangiri constituency between 1992 and 2004 as a BJP candidate under the SC category, and with the declaration of Malkangiri constituency as reserved for Adivasis, he successfully contested from the SC-­reserved Jaydev Vihar constituency, Bhubaneswar, as a BJD candidate in 2009 election. Even he is uncertain about his affiliation to the BJD in the coming days.31 As long as the constituencies are reserved for the Adivasis, the Bengali migrants cannot contest from those constituencies. They, however, engage in alternative forms of political participation. Empirical research illustrates that political parties have rewarded the Bengali migrants economically in the form of offering shops to them under the PDS and contracting work from the block office. They have turned into what Bailey terms a ‘small time political broker’ (Bailey 1963: 49). Their leaders have joined major political parties like the BJP, which mobilised the Hindu migrants all over India, in general, and Odisha, in particular, to come to power. Barik (2006: 102) claims that the success of the party in the 1990s created scope for them to influence the political process in Odisha. In short, the political presence of the Bengali migrants has led to the existence of social, economic and political conflicts because the Adivasis have the feeling that the state, as appropriated by the Bengali migrants, has deprived them of the desired or accruing social benefits, rights and entitlement (Migdal 2001: 114, 128). In the course of struggles over scarce resources, the dominant groups always pull the state in their favour. There is, therefore, always a feeling of ‘relative deprivation’ (Gurr 1970) among the Adivasis, since they perceive the benefit of state resources as a ‘zero-­ sum game’. Migrants can be an additional burden on the limited political resources, and the dynamics of political scenario is disturbed with the arrival of unwelcome competitors. Adivasi resistance emerges under conditions of relative deprivation, that is, deprivation considered outrageous in comparison with the past or with the condition of Bengali migrants at present. The marginalisation and deprivation of Adivasis in Odisha have led to a series of ethnic, religious, socio-­economic and political conflicts which question the credibility of the state. Every struggle conveys that their socio-­economic, political and cultural marginalisation is within the same matrix of subjugation, marginalisation, oppression and exploitation. Adivasi communities emerge to resist 187

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Bengali migrants by feelings of power deprivation and believe that collective actions are the preferred means of addressing problems. So, the ongoing conflicts between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Odisha are directed towards capturing political space. Arabinda Dhali accepted that politics, which is the struggle for power, has led to tensions between Adivasis and Bengali migrants. To quote him, [t]he tension between Bengalis and tribals is because of politicking . . . You see, there are 30 percent Bengalis and 70 percent Adivasis in the Dandakaranya Project area . . . What else could cause a flare-­up between the two who have co-­existed peacefully for 40 years? (cited in Ghosh 2002) Unlike their counterparts of Malkangiri district, the Bengali migrants of Nabarangpur district are unable to mark their presence at state-­level politics, thereby expressing their frustration by trying to dominate in social, cultural and economic spheres (see Chapter 4). The Adivasis consider that by including the migrants in the scheduled group, the state had facilitated the Bengali migrants to become economically prosperous and politically powerful. So, the Adivasis have been vigorously contesting against the Bengali migrants and the power regime to ‘de-­schedule’ the Bengali migrants from the SC group. For instance, during the violent conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district in 2001 (see Chapter 4), they consistently insisted that the state should take due care while granting citizenship rights to Bengali migrants since there has been an influx into the area every year (Patnaik not dated). Subsequently, they claimed the expulsion of illegal Bengali migrants. It was in this context that political issue emerged as the focal point of conflict between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants in Odisha. The issue of Bangladeshi infiltrators also created controversies between the then coalition partners – the BJD and the BJP. Migrant problems emerged significantly in 2001 with the emergence of conflict between the Bengali migrants and Adivasi communities of Nabarangpur district. Adivasis perceived that the state government was not taking any significant step to evict illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators, and the BJD did not want to lose the support of the Adivasis. Subsequently, the hunt for ‘illegal’ Bangladeshis in Odisha was initiated, and 322 illegal infiltrators were identified from 44 villages of Umerkote tahasil in Nabarangpur district (see Table 4.10, Chapter 4). The then state 188

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welfare minister, Mangala Kisan, told the assembly that a total number of 2,854 infiltrators were identified in the districts of Sambalpur, Bhadrak, Jagatsinghpur, Malkangiri, Kendrapara and Nabarangpur, and 392 of them had been deported to Bangladesh with the help of the union government. The reason behind pushing the Bangladeshi illegal migrants back had much to do with the Indian notion of citizenship (Sen 2003: 611–­12). These developments caused a strain in the relationship between the BJD and the BJP. While the sections of the state’s BJP leaders took up cudgels on behalf of the Bengali migrants in Rayagada, the BJD, in turn, accused its coalition partner of maintaining double standards. BJD’s general secretary, Damodar Rout, pointed out that while the BJP had been agitating for the deportation of infiltrators from Assam and West Bengal, it was opposing their expulsion from Odisha. Political analysts saw the tensions between the two coalition partners as a consequence of the fact that while the BJP had a support base among the Bangladeshi Hindu migrants, the BJD had the support of the Adivasis who lived in the same area of South Odisha (Guha Thakurta and Raghuraman 2004: 250). Political and economic inequalities among communities are often significant and multidimensional, causing much resentment and even violent political protests. These group inequalities will, however, not translate themselves into conflict if there is a strong state which suppresses it. A new conflict would emerge if the state weakens, new sources of external support for conflict develop or leaders emerge who powerfully and vigorously communicate the actual inequalities to the members of the group (Stewart 2000: 252). Jagabandhu Majhi, who was also the BJD MLA, provided the much-­needed leadership to the violent conflict between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district. He was instrumental in carrying out the organised form of resistance by the Adivasi communities against the dominant position of Bengali migrants in 2001. It is believed that he had been the formidable force in developing a conflictual relationship between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district since his college days.32 However, due to lack of effective leadership and external support, Malkangiri district has not witnessed any major violent conflict between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants.

Conclusion Conflict is antithetical to democracy. Conflict and democracy, however, manage to coexist with each other (Chandhoke 2016: 26–­8). Although cultural and ethnic diversities reinforce community identities and 189

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probably lead to conflicts, democracy recognises and accommodates differences by ensuring distribution of powers through non-­violent means between people of different values and beliefs. However, sharing or distribution of power does not always go unchallenged, thereby leading to contestation and conflict between communities. Democracy has to deal with tensions that arise from inclusionary approaches and practices, as well as from recognition of ethnic differences. Karstedt (2006: 57) argues that recognition and encouragement of individual choice, autonomy and diversity, and, simultaneously, the effort to integrate these into the inclusionary project of democracy are at the core of the potential link between democracy and conflict. The accommodative framework of democracy leads to conflict, where one community challenges the domination of the other. This empirical research illustrates that the inclusive experience of Indian democracy, while accommodating Bengali migrants from East Pakistan, has caused violent conflicts in Odisha, where Adivasis perceive that the inclusion of Bengali migrants in the Indian democratic process enabled the latter to become politically dominant, leading to the political marginalisation of the former. So, the experience of an in-­depth democratisation process has opened up numerous points of dissent, new conflict of values and identities (Mehta 2003: 12; Reilly 2006: 812). Pero and Solomos (2010: 11) emphasise that political conflicts between communities cannot be understood without reference to context, policy practices, lived experiences, social relationships and views of politically engaged migrants and their interlocutors. The resistance and struggles of the Adivasis are against the political domination of Bengali migrants in the southern part of Odisha. The Adivasis perceive that their struggle and resistance will enable them to have a competitive political edge over other communities. In a situation of scarce political resources, the relationship between different communities is seen as a constant site of competition and contestation within the ‘relative deprivation’ framework. In addition, the Adivasis are also engaged in a struggle against the trade-­off relationship maintained by the state. The deprived position of the Adivasis is embedded in their systemic location. Adivasis consider the unjust systemic treatment as one of the possible explanations for their power disadvantage. Within this perspective, it is imperative to affirm that the inability to gain valued political resources of the Adivasis in Odisha is not a consequence of personal failings or the community’s failure but has much to do with the results from inequities in the decision-­making and reward distribution process. Banton (1997: 20–­53) argues that the differential treatment of communities by the state generates discrimination leading to inequality, disadvantage and marginalisation. Marginality is a source 190

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of powerlessness and results in subordination and resistance. The resentment expressed by democratic means in recent Indian politics is against discrimination (Kaviraj 1996: 128). Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants have remained in conflict over a span of time as they have continuously engaged in collective reflection, questioned existing practices and uncovered competing interests. The Adivasi communities have used the dominant position of Bengali migrants in social, economic, cultural and political spheres as the reference point for their protest and contestation. The conflict is essentially that of a competitive nature, whereby two communities find themselves locked in a battle over scarce political resources. In this context, the gain for Bengali migrants in the political domain has meant the loss for the Adivasis. Consequently, there is an assertion of Adivasi rights, and Adivasi communities have collectively launched an organised form of protest and resistance since individual’s interest cannot be separated from the group interest (Mclaren and Johnson 2007: 713–­15). In short, the Adivasi communities firmly believe that protest and resistance will put severe limits on the capacity of Bengali migrants to extract socio-­economic, cultural and political resources meant for the Adivasi communities of Odisha.

Notes 1 Double-­member constituency did not feature two independent contests, although each voter was given two votes which he or she was supposed to cast for two different candidates. The winner of the reserved seat was first declared. All other Adivasi candidates were eligible for the general seat, some of them were winning from time to time (Weiner and Field 1975: 87–­8). 2 The competition was between the Congress and the All India Gana Parishad in 1951 (GOI 1951a: 117) and between Congress and Ganatantra Parishad in 1957 and 1961 elections (GOI 1957: 112; GOI 1961a: 151). The 1967 election was between Congress and Swatantra Party. It was between Congress and its faction, Utkal Congress, in 1971 and 1974 elections (GOI 1971: 163; GOI 1974: 170); between Congress and Janata Party in 1977 (GOI 1977: 171); between Congress and Janata Party (Secular) in 1980 (GOI 1980: 170); between Congress and BJP in 2000 and 2004 (GOI 2000: 179; GOI 2004: 177); and between Congress and BJD in 2009 election (GOI 2009: 212). Similarly, in the case of the Chitrakonda constituency, it was between Congress and Swatantra Party in 1974; between Congress and Janata Party in 1977 and 1985; between Congress-­I and JP in 1980; between Congress and Janata Dal in 1990 and 1995; between Congress and independent candidate in 2000; between Congress and BJP in 2004; and between Congress and BJD in the 2009 election. Both constituencies experienced competition between Congress and BJP in the 2014 election (GOI 2014b).

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3 Biju Patnaik developed some irreconcilable differences with the Congress High Command with regard to party management. Consequently, he left the Congress party and formed the state party in the name of Utkal Congress, which became the principal competitor to Congress in 1971 and 1974 assembly elections. In 1977, Utkal Congress merged with Janata Party that had formed the government in 1977. 4 When the BJP government faced the confidence motion in the lok sabha on 17 April 1999, it failed short by a single vote. Despite being the chief minister of Odisha for a month, Giridhar Gomango was yet to resign from the parliament and with the whip of the party leader, he voted against the BJP. This brought down the elected government. 5 Sen (1999) examines the relationship between education and the capability of the individual. Education can be used as an important source of reflection, information, understanding and recognition of one’s right to exercise capacities in order to formulate the ‘valued beings and doings’. Education helps the individual to expand freedom through which he or she can participate in the electoral processes without any influence. Syal 30) emphasises that educational attainment of the voters (2012: 423–­ plays a significant role in influencing the individual’s political interests and political participation. Jensenius (2012: 375, 392) underlines that education can be one of the significant predictors of people’s response to politics across different specifications. Vaid (2009) argues that the rise in the educational level of Adivasis has contributed to the rise in their electoral participation. 6 Donation to the village appears to be the other dominant factor that influences the Adivasis during elections. This factor seems to be absent among the Bengali migrants. Offering money or material benefits to the village or community is one of the important strategies undertaken by candidates or political parties to influence the political behaviour of the individual or community. By doing so, candidates aim to control the aggregate turnout of the village or locality. This strategy is especially relevant when the givers offer material incentives to the entire village. This strategy is extremely effective in the case of Odisha, where voters are counted at the constituency level. The political parties/candidates aim to establish a trade-­off relationship with the voters (Schaffer and Schedler 2007: 17–­32). The selling-­up of electorates’ political choice, however, remains extremely problematic. The reason, among others, is the institutional design of the secret ballot, which limits the ability to control or monitor the political behaviour of the voters. 7 In Adivasi societies, political participation is closely associated with social characteristics of the community. The political behaviour of Adivasis is not very individual. In Adivasi/indigenous societies, people ‘are defined not as equal and autonomous individuals but rather as members of a group . . .’ (Donnelly 1990: 52). In India, Adivasi people are experiencing discrimination and marginalisation less as individuals and more as a member belonging to an Adivasi community. 8 Interview with one of the Bengali respondents of MV-­92, Malkangiri district, on 9 June 2010. He emphasised the role of religion in the election and pointed out that he prefers to vote for BJP on the basis of its Hindutva ideology.

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9 Arabinda Dhali had successfully contested from Malkangiri constituency during 1992 (by-­election), 1995 and 2000 elections and unsuccessfully contested in 2004. The conversion of the Malkangiri constituency from SC to Adivasi compelled him to contest in the SC reserved Jayadev Vihas constituency. 10 Interview with Satya Samal, editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote, Nabarangpur district, on 21 June 2009. 11 The role of the BJD in facilitating the process of mining and land alienation from Adivasi areas can be critically analysed. It has signed 42 memorandums of understanding with multinational corporations between 2002 to 2005. It will have wider implications for the livelihood of the Adivasis of Odisha (Ambagudia 2017: 155). 12 Interview with Jagabandhu Majhi at his residence in Umerkote, Nabarangpur district on 24 June 2009. He repeatedly cited BJD’s initiative to drop the charges levelled against the Adivasis in relation to the conflict between Adivasis and Bengali migrants in 2001. 13 Although the Malkangiri constituency was reserved for the SCs from 1974 to 2009, the BJD was formed on 26 December 1997. 14 This problem revolves around some of the pertinent questions that the Constituent Assembly faced during its sessions. These questions include, what does parliament represent? Does it represent preferences or interests or about individual, group or national interests? For details, see (Jha 2004: 4357–­60). As political parties today have fallen prey to the politics of caste, creed and community, they go beyond the national interest (Mohapatra and Bhattacharyya 1996: 160–­64). 15 In reserved constituencies, the seats are reserved in the sense that the candidates who stand for them must belong to those communities. The entire electorate, however, elects the candidate. 16 By securing 41,511 votes in the 2000 state assembly election, Arabinda Dhali of the BJP defeated Namai Chandra Sarkar of Congress, who managed to grab 35065 votes (GOI 2000: 179). Similarly, Nimai Chandra Sarkar secured a total of 57,713 in 2004 assembly election and defeated his close competitor Arabinda Dhali of BJP by a slender margin of 253 votes (0.20 percent of the total valid votes) (GOI 2004: 177). 17 Interview with one of the Adivasi respondents of Mariwada village in Malkangiri district on 16 June 2010. 18 The Bengali migrants of Raighar and Umerkote areas had bitter experiences during the tenure of the Dalit Samaj candidate as the block chairman from 2002 to 2007, when all kinds of government works/contracting works were given to the Adivasis, Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote on 21 June 2009. In this context, Bengali migrants felt that had happened due to the lack of the representation of their community members at the block level. 19 Most of the migrants resettled in the Dandakaranya region belong to Namasudra and Paundra Khetriya communities which are recognised as SCs in West Bengal but not so in Madhya Pradesh. In Odisha, only Namasudra community has been recognised as SCs (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1980: 110). 20 Interview with Nimai Chandra Sarkar at Odisha Nivas, New Delhi, on 19 September 2012.

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21 According to the 2011 census, Namasudra population constitute 15.70 percent of the total district population in Malkangiri district. On the other hand, the Adivasi constitute 57.83 percent of the total district population. 22 Interview with Arabinda Dhali at his official residence in Bhubaneswar on 16 April 2010. 23 It is important to mention that there was an alliance between the Congress and the CPI (M) at the centre which affected electoral politics in Malkangiri district. Without consulting the centre, the state Congress leadership had issued the Congress ticket to Nimai Chandra Sarkar and accordingly filed the nomination. Subsequently, there was pressure from the central Congress leadership to withdraw its candidate from the Malkangiri assembly constituency and extend its support to the CPI (M). Nimai Chandra Sarkar did not accept this proposal, and as a result, he was suspended from the Congress soon after the scrutiny of the nomination. Though he retained the Congress symbol, he contested independently. After winning the election, the Congress Party revoked the suspension order, Interview with Nimai Chandra Sarkar at Odisha Nivas, New Delhi, on 19 September 2012. 24 In 1990, he assumed the sub-­collector office as a senior clerk and became head clerk of the same office in 1992. 25 It is worthwhile to mention that the first resettlement programmes in Umerkote and Raighar areas were initiated on 21 January 1960 and 31 January 1961, respectively, which were much later of the 1957 assembly election (see Appendix II). 26 Chattopadhyaya draws the attention that there was a continuous flow of population from Bengal to Odisha and vice versa, and some of them resided in Odisha but were not necessarily categorised as SCs/Dalits. The case of Radhakrushna Biswasray cannot be equated to DNK Project’s initiative to classify Bengali migrants as SCs but has much to do with the population movement from Bengal to Odisha (Chattopadhyaya 1987: 287–­97). 27 During an interview on 19 June 2009, one of the Bengali respondents of UV 8, Nabarangpur district, pointed out that unlike their co-­migrants of Malkangiri district, they are deprived of political opportunities, although some arrangements have been made for them (SCs) at the panchayati raj institutions. He alleged that the state has taken all necessary steps and facilitated Adivasi communities of the district to occupy higher echelons of the political power structure. 28 www.orissa.gov.in/panchayat/sarapancha.htm (accessed on 25 September 2012). 29 www.orissa.gov.in/panchayat/memberzp.htm (accessed on 26 September 2012); www.orissapanchayat.gov.in/download/24%20Districtwise%20and %20Constituencywise%20list%20of%20Elected%20Z.P.Members%20 with%20reservation%20&%20party%20affiliation.pdf (accessed on 26 September 2012). 30 www.nabarangpurzp.odishapr.gov.in/hidden/-­/ asset_publisher/tMn 6waGjYWb6/content/list-­of-­samiti-­member-­elected-­during-­pris-­election-­ 2012-­in-­nabarangpur-­disirict/1090130 (accessed on 3 June 2018) 31 In an interview on 16 April 2010 at his official residence in Bhubaneswar, Arabinda Dhali talked about his journey from the BJP to the BJD as well

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as contesting from the Malkangiri to the Jayadev Vihar assembly constituency. Answering a question concerning the change of political affiliation, he relinquished himself to God. He articulated that his affiliation with BJP as well as BJD was the direction of God. If God directs him to join some other political parties in the near future, then he is ready to do so. Meanwhile, during the interview, he was unwilling to accept the hard reality, which seems to be the fact why he lost the assembly election in 2004 from BJP, which compelled him to join BJD. Similarly, the conversion of Malkangiri constituency into Adivasi reserved constituency in 2009 forced him to contest from the SC reserved Jayadev Vihar constituency in 2009. In other words, he was exploring different alternatives and opportunities which can enable him to become politically powerful. 32 Interview with the editor of the fortnight paper Jhatka, at his residence in Umerkote, Nabarangpur district on 21 June 2009.

195

6 ADIVASIS, RESOURCE SCARCITY AND THE STATE Emergence of Naxalite politics

Over the period, different actors interact with each other for various reasons. Some of these important actors are the state, the Naxalites and the Adivasis. In the course of their interactions, these parties struggle to structure the society in their own way. The state shows its commitment to reordering the society, where it can flourish and develop, ultimately aiming at becoming more powerful in the age of overwhelming challenges. The Naxalites are struggling to rebuild the society for a conducive environment that would help them to develop and expand their enduring insurgent base. Similarly, the Adivasis are engaged in spearheading overwhelming protests, resistance and movements against those forces that pose challenges to their lifeworld, threaten their cultures, language and traditions to lead a dignified life. Over the period, the Adivasis have launched a number of movements against the state that has tucked them into a position of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation in the name of development. In the same vein, in the name of protecting Adivasi rights and interests, the Naxalites are galvanising support, if necessary through the demonstrative use of violence, from the Adivasis to meet their broader objective of creating guerrilla zones and seizing state power. Although the Adivasi communities have developed cynicism and disenchantment towards the Naxalites, it is unlikely that they would openly protest against the Naxalites due to fear. In short, the Adivasis have generated discontent and cynicism towards the state and the Naxalites. The study of the changing relationship between the state, the Naxalites and Adivasis provides a formidable challenge to academics. This becomes further complicated due to the presence of blurred and incommensurable boundaries between the state and the Naxalites in reference to the Adivasi society in India. Within the paradigm of development, deprivation and marginalisation, issues of Adivasis, state and

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the Naxalites have been topics of much discussion in a wider spectrum. The World Bank (2011: 37–­82) argues that the low participation of the Adivasis in decision-­making and their alienation of land and forest resources are central to their deprived position. Shah (2010) engages with the experiences, manifestation and effects of the state on the everyday life of the Adivasis in the Indian state of Jharkhand, and contends that the Adivasis want to keep the state away. Mukherji (2012) argues that the growing dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation of Adivasis have paved the way for the emergence of Naxalite politics in India and reaffirmed faith in the Naxalites to protect and promote the rights of the Adivasis. The nature and dynamics of Naxalite politics have become more pronounced in the age of resource scarcity, especially in ‘red-­corridor’ areas. The existing literature, thus, mostly focuses either on the relationship between the state and the Adivasis or the Naxalites and the Adivasis as a discrete entity. Departing from these standpoints, the chapter argues that the binary debate of Adivasis versus the state or the Naxalites versus the Adivasis should not be the framework for understanding the increasing marginalisation and deprivation of Adivasis in contemporary India. The nature of Adivasi problems can be comprehended by examining the role of the Naxalites and the state in concert. Such problems become more acute and continue to remain unabated in the age of resource scarcity and skewed distribution of resources. This chapter explores the changing relationship among the state, the Naxalites and the Adivasis in the age of resource scarcity. First, the chapter looks at the relationship between the state and the Adivasis. Second, it examines the relationship between the Naxalites and the Adivasis. Third, it explores the interface between the state and the Naxalites and its ramifications on the Adivasis. Fourth, it focuses on the relationship among the state, the Naxalites and the MNCs and its implications on Adivasis. Based on empirical research from South Odisha, the chapter argues that the Adivasis are not extending their support voluntarily; rather, they are forced to do so. The state and the Naxalites are competing with each other to advance their own interests in the name of Adivasi development, thereby leading to marginalisation, deprivation and dispossession of the Adivasi communities. Such approaches of the state and the Naxalites towards the Adivasis have increased competition over resources between communities manifold in the contemporary period. In short, this chapter attempts to show how the scarcity and skewed distribution of resources has led to the emergence of Naxalite politics in India.

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Adivasis and the state According to the 2011 census, the Adivasi communities of India constitute 8.6 percent of the total population. More than half of the Adivasi population is concentrated in the states of Madhya Pradesh (14.69 percent), Chhattisgarh (7.5 percent), Jharkhand (8.29 percent), Andhra Pradesh (5.7 percent), Maharashtra (10.08 percent), Odisha (9.2 percent), Gujarat (8.55 percent) and Rajasthan (8.86 percent). The Adivasi population, however, is heavily concentrated in rural areas than in the urban areas, 89.97 percent and 10.03 percent, respectively. The 2011 census demonstrates that the Adivasis have attained the literacy rate of 58.96 percent in comparison to 72.99 percent of the total population (GOI 2013: 13). The Adivasis have experienced a high degree of the child and under-­5 mortality rate. For instance, the child and under-­5 mortality rate of Adivasis in India are 35.8 and 95.7 percent in comparison to 18.4 and 74.3 percent of the child and under-­5 mortality rate of the total population in 2005–­06 (GOI 2013: 30). The Adivasis are lagging behind other communities in terms of availing basic amenities such as housing conditions, the availability of drinking water, the sanitation facility, non-smoke fuel used, electricity, the communication facilities, the percentage of households having bank accounts and so on (GOI 2013: 68–­9). Table 6.1 demonstrates that the landholding size among the Adivasis in India is decreasing over the period. For instance, small, semi-­ medium, medium and large landholdings have decreased from 25.62, 16.44, 7.38 and 1.08 percent, respectively, in 2005–­ 06 to 23.99, 14.82, 6.32 and 0.96 percent, respectively, in 2010–­11. On the other hand, the marginal landholding size has increased from 49.48 percent in 2005–­06 to 53.9 percent in 2010–­11. Table 6.1 Number of landholdings among the STs, 1990–­91 to 2010–­11 (in thousands) Size groups

1990–­91

1995–­96

2000–­01

2005–­06

2010–­11

Marginal Small Semi-­medium Medium Large All size

3,763 2,087 1,694 943 183 8,670

4,376 2,336 1,778 898 135 9,523

4,429 2,411 1,653 783 128 9,404

5,118 2,650 1,700 763 112 10,343

6,464 2,877 1,777 758 115 11,993

Source: Rangacharyulu and Kanth (2017: 450).

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Table 6.2 shows that the poverty ratio among Adivasis is higher than the poverty ratio of the total population, indicating a high incidence of poverty among the Adivasis living in rural areas than those of the urban areas. During 2011–­12, the prevalence of poverty among the Adivasis was 45.3 and 24.1 percent in comparison to 22.7 and 15.4 percent among the non-­Adivasis and non-­SC populations in rural and urban areas, respectively. Turning to Odisha, the Adivasi population constitutes 22.85 percent of the state population. The poverty ratio among the Adivasis of Odisha was 75.6 and 63.5 percent in 2005–­06 and 2010–­11, respectively (Rangacharyulu and Kanth 2017: 456). During 2004–­05, the southern region of the state, has the highest degree of poverty ratio (82.8 percent) among the Adivasi communities (Sharma et al. 2009: 79). The southern districts of Koraput (50.56 percent), Malkangiri (57.83 percent), Nabarangpur (55.79 percent) and Rayagada (55.99 percent) contribute 23.72 percent of the total Adivasi population of the state (2011 census). They are at different levels of social, economic and educational developments. These districts are lagging behind others in terms of Adivasi literacy rate. For instance, the Adivasi communities of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada districts have attained 35.4, 35.2, 38.5 and 36.7 percent, respectively, which is far below the educational development figure of the Adivasi (52.2 percent), general (72.9 percent) and total literacy rate of the state (63.61 percent) (2011 census). An estimated 83.81, 81.88, 73.66 and 72.03 percent of families live below the poverty line in Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada districts of Odisha, respectively (GOO 2014: 354). Table 6.2 Poverty ratio in rural and urban India, 1983–­84, 1993–­94, 1999–­ 2000, 2004–­05, 2009–­10 and 2011–­12 Year

SC

ST

Others

Total

Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 1983–­84 1993–­94 1999–­2000 2004–­05 (revised estimates) 2009–­10 2011–­12

58.1 48.1 36.2 52.7

56.5 49.9 38.6 40.0

63.8 52.2 45.9 61.9

54.2 42.4 34.8 35.0

37.0 31.3 21.6 26.2

39.1 30.6 20.6 15.8

45.6 37.1 27.1 41.8

42.2 33.7 23.7 25.7

43.5 31.5

33.0 21.7

47.1 45.3

28.8 24.1

21.1 22.7

11.9 15.4

33.8 25.4

20.9 13.7

Source: Rangacharyulu and Kanth (2017: 455).

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Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada districts have occupied 27, 30, 26 and 25 positions concerning HDI in the ranking of 30 districts in Odisha (GOO 2004: 194–­5). These districts have less than 0.5 of the HDI values. The comparative study of 30 districts suggests that the four districts are lagging behind other districts in terms of HDI. To put it differently, the Adivasi communities of South Odisha are at dire social, economic and educational situation. Adivasi areas are endowed with abundant natural resources such as land, water, forest and so on. Nevertheless, as Ambagudia (2010) argues, the Adivasis are relegated to a situation of dispossession, marginalisation and deprivation. Different developmental projects have driven the Adivasis out of their habitat and posed serious challenges to important means of their livelihood such as land and forests. The hydro-­electric project was taken up in 1954 at Machhkund, Koraput district, which had displaced quite a large number of Adivasis (51 percent of the displaced families are Adivasis). The Balimela hydro-­project in Malkangiri district affected 1,113 Adivasi families. The operationalisation of 18 large schemes in Koraput district occupied 50,000 acres of land, depriving 10 percent of Adivasis of their livelihood (Ambagudia 2010: 62). Between 1951 and 1995, a total of 5,46,794 people have been displaced, and only 35.27 percent have been rehabilitated in Odisha (Skillshare International 2014: xxiv). Although the share of the Adivasi population is little less than 23 percent, more than 40 percent of the displaced families due to developmental projects in Odisha are Adivasis (GOI 2002: 466). The Adivasis of Odisha have experienced incremental alienation of their land due to imperfections of the credit market, construction of public and private projects on their lands, ignorance about their land rights, loopholes in the legislations preventing alienation of lands and the apathy of the government officials responsible for prevention of alienation of Adivasi lands and restoration of lands already alienated. (Skillshare International 2014: 45–­6) The state of Odisha has been experiencing a high degree of Adivasi land alienation, mostly, it seems, through unjustifiable means.1 By the end of December 1999, the districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada have succumbed to land alienation of 28,901.96, 3,156.31, 7,396.76 and 11,092.53 acres, respectively (GOO 2001). The loss of control over jal, jungle and jameen (water, forest and land) has alienated Adivasis from public schemes, affected 200

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their traditional food practices and forced them to migrate to cities to work under deplorable condition (World Bank 2011: 65). The Orissa (Odisha) Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy 2006 acknowledged that ‘[i]n spite of Government’s intention to bring development to the people, development interventions do at times create undesirable consequences’ (cited in World Bank 2011: 66). In other words, in the name of providing benefits of development, rights and entitlement, the state has established a predatory relationship with the Adivasis (Jayal 1999: 231) by legitimising its control over their resources (Xaxa 2005: 119–­35). So, there is a gradual shift from the welfare state to an interventionist state. Interventionist state intervenes for various purposes and all interventions may not be justified on welfare grounds. In addition, as previous chapters demonstrate, the state rehabilitated the migrants from East Pakistan in Adivasi areas of South Odisha, thereby further contributing to the scarcity of resources in Adivasi region. Over the period, the state attempts to redefine the relationship between the Adivasis and forest resources by introducing a number of legislative measures that invariably dilute the age-­old symbiotic relationship between the two. Since 1950s state governments of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha prioritised commercial interest over forest resources to generate revenue and invariably reduced the access of Adivasi communities. Such restrictions reached the maximum in the 1970s when these states declared a large chunk of forest areas as ‘protected forest reserves’ and state-­licenced contractors were given access to forest products. Such initiatives of states further reduced Adivasis’ access to forests and constrained the land that could be used for shifting cultivation (Ivey 2007: 91). Furthermore, despite the legislative measures to regulate the Adivasi land transactions, non-­Adivasi migrants acquired a significant amount of agricultural lands. Subsequently, many Adivasis were reduced to dispossession and marginalisation. The interventionist role of the state acutely marginalises the Adivasis. Besides the state, Bengali migrants rehabilitated by the state are also responsible for tucking the Adivasis further into a situation of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation. The rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in the Adivasi region has increased the competition to access and control over resources. While competition, the dominant Bengali migrants are significantly controlling natural resources, such as land and forests, and state-­sponsored entitlement and privileges by enjoying the status of SCs (Dalits). Therefore, it has led to the scarcity of resources further. As a consequence, the degree of marginalisation of Adivasis has increased manifold over the period. 201

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The changing relationship between the state and Adivasis has created a regime of marginalisation, deprivation and exploitation that has led to unrest among the Adivasis and created disenchantment towards the democratic state. The Adivasi resistance against the alienation of their rights over resources in Odisha forced the state to alter its strategies in dealing with Adivasi rights. For instance, with the emergence of conflict over land and forests in 2001, where the illegal Bengali migrants from Bangladesh had a greater role to play, the state altered its strategy by initiating the process of identification and deportation of such migrants from different districts of Odisha (see Chapter 4). Similarly, with the emergence of a land conflict between Adivasis and non-­Adivasis in Narayanpatna block of Koraput district, the government issued instructions to all the concerned authorities of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada districts to look into the detailed procedure of transfer of Adivasi land to the non-­Adivasis since 1956 (Ambagudia 2010: 64). The state took these initiatives to control the violence. Nevertheless, the Adivasis appear to believe that the government is controlled by people who will not take action unless they are forced to do so. To put it differently, the everyday resistance and struggles of the Adivasi communities have come to define the changing nature of the state (Haynes and Prakash 1991).

Emergence of Naxalite politics The Naxalites have invariably pinpointed the structural marginalisation and dispossession to garner increasing support from the marginalised groups, such as the Adivasis. The marginalisation of Adivasis and the scarcity of resources have provided essential grounds for the emergence of Naxalite politics. The availability of abundant resources and the enduring marginalisation due to skewed resource distribution where the state has a role to play led to the emergence of Naxalite politics. The Naxalite movement emerged in the Naxalbari areas of West Bengal in 1967 due to exploitative orientations of landlords towards the landless peasants. The localised land conflict between the Adivasi farmers and the local landlords led to the emergence of a peasant uprising in Naxalbari (Ivey 2007: 84; Gomes 2015: 97). The significance of Naxalbari is not what occurred there but the rate and degree of influence that the movement has in other parts of the country. The initial beginning of the Naxalites movement was confined to the states that experienced the presence of a number of landlords.2 Emerging from the Naxalbari area of West Bengal, it gradually spread over the states of Bihar and the Srikakulam area of 202

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Andhra Pradesh, which were highly marked by the presence of landlords. These landlords enjoyed the goodwills of the British and the latter gave the responsibility of collecting land revenue to the landlords that translated the de facto property rights over land. Subsequently, the landlords indulged in exploiting the marginalised communities like the Adivasis and established exploitative and oppressive socio-­ economic relationship (Gomes 2015: 99; Brass 2010: 325–­8). Such a resource relationship between the landlords and the marginalised groups unleashed perpetual conflicts in India. Land inequality not just merely indicates the skewed distribution of land but contributes to different stages of social and economic development of communities in an agrarian society, and the Adivasis are at the margins of the socio-­economic development. The feeling of ‘relative deprivation’ arising out of the benefits of development has compelled the Adivasis to participate in conflict or support the Naxalites (Gomes 2015: 103). The disadvantaged position of the Adivasis has provided the essential scope to extend their support to the Naxalites. In other words, skewed distribution of land, traditional land institutions, exclusion of Adivasis are critical for understanding resource conflicts in India (Gomes 2015: 97). The unequal distribution of resources has provided the base for the Naxalites to engage in enduring insurgent activities. The existing literature on the Naxalites suggests that the activities of the Naxalites have been rampant in the contemporary period. Answering to the unstarred question no 241 on 18 July 2017, the minister of state in the MHA, Hansraj Gangaram Ahir, stated that 106 districts of ten states are affected by the Naxalites,3 out of which 35 districts have been declared as worst affected districts. These districts constitute ‘red corridor’.4 However, while considering the several criteria including violence, the extent of Naxalite activity and movement/ presence of the Naxalites, the union government has redrawn the red corridor area and the new list effective from 1 April 2018 includes 90 districts spread over 11 states in India. The list also included eight new districts from the states of Kerala (Mallapuram, Wayanad and Palakkad), Madhya Pradesh (Mandla), Andhra Pradesh (West Godavari), Chhattisgarh (Kabirdham) and Odisha (Angul and Boudh) (Jain and Dash 2018). During the 1930s, Odisha experienced people’s protest against the oppression, exploitation and consequent marginalisation perpetrated by the moneylenders. The unfriendly state of affairs continued even after independence, which provided an excellent platform for the consolidation of communist forces in Odisha. Odisha’s tryst with the 203

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Naxal movement can be attributed to the spillover effect of the Telangana region of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh. With the influence of the armed peasant movement (1947–­51) of the Telangana region, people of Odisha launched movements under the vanguard of the CPI in different parts of the state. The communist cadres successfully mobilised people to protest against the exploitation of the moneylenders and marginalisation by forest officers and police personnel and created the much-­required space for the growth of the communist ideology in Odisha (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2010: 89). The discontinuation of the armed methods of the Telangana movement by one group of communist leadership in 1951 led to the formation of the Adivasi Sangh (organisation) in 1952 under the guidance of the CPI. Furthermore, the split of the CPI in 1964 heralded the emergence of CPI (M), where the architect of the Naxalite movement in Odisha, Nagbhushan Pattnaik and allies joined the CPI (M) and continued their revolutionary activities. The revolutionary activities were, however, not supported by the CPI (M) after the emergence of the Naxalbari movement in Naxalbari region of West Bengal in 1967. He was instructed to join electoral politics, which was not acceptable to him. As a consequence, Pattnaik and allies formed the OSCC and expressed their solidarity with Charu Majumdar’s All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, which later came to be known as Communist Party of India (Marxist-­Leninist). The OSCC was dissolved in 1969 as per the instruction of Charu Majumdar and the undivided Koraput and Ganjam districts of Odisha were affiliated to the Srikakulam regional committee. This decision of Charu Majumdar led to the formation of guerrilla zones in the border district of Odisha. The 1951–­96 period was primarily seen as the formative phase of the Naxalite movement in Odisha, which experienced a number of splits within the larger communist movement in India (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2010). The consolidation of the Naxalites in South Odisha, however, goes back to the period of the late 1980s. It was during 1989 that one-­armed battalion of the PWG under the leadership of K. Punam Chand moved into Motu, MV 79 and Kalimela regions of the undivided Koraput district (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2010: 95). This has much to do with the developments in the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh. The state of Andhra Pradesh adopted different strategies to contain the Naxalite problems. In Andhra Pradesh, the government introduced various social development policies in Srikakulam area to drive away the Adivasi support from the Naxalites. However, such policies were not extended to the Telangana region. The Naxalites leaders active 204

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in Srikakulam were killed. The leaders active in Telangana area were put behind the bar, and they were released from the jail at the end of martial law in 1977. Consequently, the presence of the Naxalites was wiped away from the state of Andhra Pradesh (Ivey 2007: 90). The Indian state has reinforced various socio-­economic development strategies in rural areas with the intention of containing Naxalite issues, and the MGNREGA and the PMRD Fellow Scheme can be demonstrated. The MGNREGA was launched in 2006 to create job opportunities and address the critical issues of livelihood security in rural areas by guaranteeing at least 100 days of employment to each rural household. The union government started the PMRD fellowship programme in 2011 to appoint young men and women to assist state officials in implementing rural development programmes in districts affected by the Naxalite activities (Kamra 2018). After significant setbacks to their armed struggles in Andhra Pradesh, the Naxalites decided to enter the Dandakaranya region constituting present-­day Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada. The high concentration of the Adivasi population, the rudimentary presence of the state and the vast forest areas spanning across the states of Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh became an advantage for the Naxalites that smoothly facilitated their movement (Mukherji 2012: 92). The original intent of such a move was building their base and later converted the base areas into guerrilla zones to attack and destroy symbols of state authority. The regional analysis suggests that the Naxalites soiled through the southern parts of Odisha to establish enduring base. At present, the Naxalites are operating in 19 districts such as Gajapati, Ganjam, Keonjhar, Koraput, Malkangiri, Mayurbhanj, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Sambalpur, Sundargarh, Nayagarh, Kandhamal, Deogarh, Jajpur, Dhenkanal, Kalahandi, Nuapada, Bargarh and Bolangir. Out of these, two districts, Koraput and Malkangiri, have been declared as the worst Naxalite-­affected districts in Odisha.5 Ruling out the possibility of the functioning of all Naxalite factions in the region, at present, three committees – the AOBSZC, the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee and the Orissa Rajya Committee that was formed by the erstwhile PWG (now CPI-­Maoist) in 2001 – are operating in the undivided Koraput district. These committees function under the direction and supervision of the OAJC. The Naxalites have formed dalams (guerrilla squads) for their operationalisation and those operating in Malkangiri region currently include the Kalimela dalam, the Motu dalam, the Jhanjavati dalam and the Korukunda dalam among others. The primary responsibilities of these 205

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dalams are to keep close eyes on the functioning of state machinery (especially the security personnel including the police) and the Adivasis within the broader framework of creating insurgent citizens in these areas and mobilising support from the masses. Due to the high presence of police, paramilitary forces and CRPF in the region, the leaders are not associated with a particular dalam for a longer period or permanently, and they are transferred cyclically to other dalams in different locations to escape from the security forces.

Adivasis and the Naxalites The changing relationship between the Adivasis and the Naxalites is more complex and ambivalent than it appears to be. This relationship raises some of the pertinent questions such as, what is the place of Adivasi problems on the agenda of the Naxalites? Do they at all address the problems of the Adivasis? Do the Adivasis support the Naxalites? If at all it is affirmative, do Adivasis extend voluntary support? Do the Naxalites empower the Adivasis? To put it differently, how have the Adivasis and the Naxalites shaped or reshaped their relationship over the period? The chapter addresses some of these questions in the context of South Odisha and the nature of negotiation done in the wake of abduction of the district collector of Malkangiri on 16 February 2011 and the Italian tour operator on 14 March 2012 by the Naxalites. The existing literature shows that the growing negligence of Adivasi issues by the state has enabled the Naxalites to secure support from the Adivasis (GOI 2008b: 44; Mukherji 2010: 17; Ramachandran 2011b: 38; Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012: 142; Kennedy 2015: 150; Kamra 2018). The poor people support the Naxalites because they feel that the Naxalites share their sense of injustice (Bhatia 2005: 1540; Ivey 2007: 86; Harriss 2011: 319) and help them to restore the alienated land (Upadhyaya 2014: 294).6 Nevertheless, Shah (2010: 53–­9) argues that the initial support of the Naxalites in rural Jharkhand essentially did not come from the poor Adivasis who wanted to keep the state away; in fact, the support came from the rural elite who wanted to sustain their hierarchical position in the village by appropriating state resources after the abolition of landlords in the 1950s. The Naxalites promised them better opportunities (than the existing sources, such as MLAs) to access these state resources. As it has been pointed out earlier that the Naxalites entered the Dandakaranya area due to the rudimentary presence of the state; they have been able to secure the Adivasi support in South Odisha since the late 206

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1980s. The general perception, however, is that the Naxalites might have struggled at the initial stage of their debut to garner the support of the poor Adivasis. The continuing exploitation of Adivasis by the forest officers and police personnel as well as the growing negligence of Adivasi problems by the state opened the opportunities for the Naxalites, who readily took up their cause and mounted aggression against the state. They have adopted the tactics of educating the masses to recognise the failure of the state in addressing vital issues of Adivasi society and convincing the masses to support their activities. The Naxalites have extended their support to develop insurgent consciousness among the Adivasi communities in Odisha, and the Adivasis have launched protests against the structured domination and legitimised institution, that is, the state. The Naxalites have, however, recently begun losing the support of the Adivasis for various reasons, which is explored in the following pages. Chakrabarty and Kujur (2010) suggest that the Naxalites have evolved as a potent political force mostly in Adivasi-­dominated part of Odisha. The election data, however, demonstrate that they have not been able to influence the voters much during elections. For instance, various statistical reports of the ECI confirmed that the CPI had managed to secure 14.68 and 8.76 percent of the votes in 2000 and 2004 assembly elections in the Malkangiri constituency, while in Chitrakonda constituency of the Malkangiri district, the CPI got 4.89 and 5.58 percent of the votes in 1995 and 2000 assembly elections, respectively. These figures of the electoral outcomes of Malkangiri district, which is considered as the red corridor, do not convince that the Adivasis are moving closer to the Naxalites. Even during the field research, mainly in Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts, it was found that the response to support the CPI was very marginal. It also became evident during the fieldwork that most of those who are considered to be the supporters of the Naxalites are not voluntarily extending their support to these forces rather they are forced to do so. On 1 October 2016, the Naxalites hijacked a boat meant for the public transport across the Chitrakonda reservoir of Malkangiri district to force the people of the cut-­off area of the reservoir to attend a meeting organised by the Naxalites at Jantri village to re-­strengthen their dwindling support base (Rao and Das 2016). The fear of violence created by this group is a possible reason the Adivasis succumbed to the extremist outfits. In other words, the Naxalites have been able to make inroads in Adivasi areas by using self-­proclaimed ‘good’ violence as a means of effectively silencing and weakening Adivasis’ dissent. 207

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It is not that all Adivasis support or oppose the Naxalites. During the fieldwork, some of the respondents said that they support because the Naxalites address wage discrimination and exploitation by contractors to a considerable level. He does not, however, support the violence that the Naxalites inflict. The possible inclination towards the Naxalites mainly comes from the newly educated Adivasi middle class and not necessarily from the older generation. This is because of the lack of employment opportunities, and nevertheless, the Naxalites target the young generation, if necessary, through the demonstrative use of, what they consider, ‘good’ violence (Roy 2012: 55) to recruit their cadres and materialise their insurgent mission in different parts of the country. The Naxalites mostly draw their cadres from the Adivasis, and it becomes easy for the former to get the support from the later because the Adivasis are being deprived of accessing their means of livelihood and relegated to the marginalised position. They target the agencies such as government forest officials, commercial forest contractors, and other non-­Adivasi business people and moneylenders whom the Naxalites think are responsible for the sorry state of affairs of the Adivasis in India (Ivey 2007: 91). It became evident from the empirical study that there is an inter-generational difference in supporting the Naxalites. It seems to be unrealistic to argue that the entire household supports the activities of the Naxalites. The Adivasi middle class is becoming mobilised by the Naxalites. Parents from the same household, however, prefer to be non-­responsive to the mobilisation process. It is noteworthy to mention that when the CPI does not contest the election, the Naxalites create terror among the people. During the 2009 assembly and parliamentary elections, the Naxalites in Malkangiri district had warned the people to boycott the electoral processes by scribbling out posters in different villages carrying the dire consequences. They made repeated attempts to create fear in the minds of the people and prevent them from exercising their democratic rights. The Naxalites went ahead to justify their position in the sense that no real changes on the ground can be possible through participation in the democratic process. Rejecting parliamentary democracy, the Naxalites wanted to secure the rights of the poor and marginalised through armed campaigns. Since the Adivasis have repeatedly sidelined their calls for the boycott of elections, the Naxalites try to stop popular participation by spreading terror among the voters. The Adivasi communities are psychologically apprehensive due to the significant presence of the Naxalites in these districts. In short, it is apparent that the Naxalites politically disempower the very people for whom they claim to fight.7 208

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There is a dwindling of Adivasi support to the Naxalites in Odisha. The turnout of voters during elections substantiates this position. The assembly constituencies of Malkangiri and Chitrakonda witnessed 66.81 and 58.99, and 50.26 and 51.25 percent of voter turnout in the 2004 and 2009 elections, respectively (Chapter 5, Table 5.3). The by-­election of the Nabarangpur assembly constituency in 2011 witnessed a turnout of more than 70 percent, far higher than the national average (Ramachandran 2011a). Similarly, the assembly constituencies of Malkangiri and Chitrakonda witnessed 74.35 and 69.71 percent voter turnout in 2014 election (Chapter 5, Table 5.3). Despite repeated calls of the Naxalites to boycott the elections, a large turnout of voters suggests the defiance of Adivasi communities towards the Naxalites in Odisha. It is also observed that a significant number of Adivasi children in the Naxalite stronghold district of Malkangiri were seen walking to schools defying the Naxalites’ bandh call. It is worthwhile to mention that never before have the Adivasis of Malkangiri district sent their children to schools during a Naxalite bandh (Deccan Herald 2011). The blowing up of the house of Arabinda Dhali, a Bengali migrant and then state minister, with explosives by the Naxalites on 2 December 2001 at Potteru village in Malkangiri district raised a significant speculative question about the relationship between the Adivasis and the Naxalites in Odisha. Was the attack on Arabinda Dhali’s house a strategy of Adivasis who approached the Naxalites to do for them? The attack assumes critical significance when one bears in mind the frequent occurrences of conflicts over resources between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Odisha (see Chapter 4). The immediate answer seems to be unrealistic, as it demands to examine the relationship between the Naxalites and the Adivasis in a broader perspective. The PWG claimed the attack considering as the PWG’s way of celebrating the first anniversary of the formation of the People’s Guerilla Army in December 2000. Although they attacked the house of the Bengali migrant, conflicts over resources between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants did not appear to be the reason for the confrontation. The dropped leaflet demonstrated the reason of attack: ‘We attacked Dhali’s house as he was instrumental in the deployment of the CRPF in Malkangiri to subdue our struggle against the oppression of the poor tribal people’ (cited in Chaudhuri 2002). From the leaflets, it is tough to specify whether the Adivasis manufactured the attack. However, it can be illustrated simply from the phrasing of the pamphlet that the approach was indeed not from the Adivasi communities. This raises larger questions: Are the 209

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Naxalites really concerned to address the problems of the Adivasis? Or do they carry on such insurgent activities for widening their base and for their benefit in the sense that the deployment of the CRPF will significantly regulate their rebellious activities? These questions need to be answered by contextualising other incidents in different parts of the state. During the 2009 election, the Naxalites brutally killed Somnath Madkami, an Adivasi candidate of the Samruddha Odisha Party for Malkangiri assembly seat in April. They murdered the former Zilla Parishad president of Malkangiri Nanda Kumar Kartami, an Adivasi, at Sikhpally of Malkangiri district in March 2009. The BJD Adivasi MLA Jagabandhu Majhi, a prominent Adivasi leader and instrumental in raising demands concerning the protection and restoration of Adivasis’ rights over resources, was killed by the Naxalites on 24 September 2011 while distributing forest land patta (entitlement) to the Adivasis under the Forest Rights Act 2006 in Gona village of Nabarangpur district. Similarly, there are a number of incidents concerning the killing of Adivasi leaders by the Naxalites both at the state as well as at the local levels in Odisha. The close analysis suggests that the Naxalites are mixing up their demands with the Adivasi issues. For instance, they kidnapped the Malkangiri Collector, R. Vineel Krishna and an Adivasi junior engineer, Pabitra Mohan Majhi on 16 February 2011 and negotiated with the state government through their chosen interlocutors G. Haragopal, Someswar Rao and Dandapani Mohanty to address Adivasi issues and the release of their central committee members. The Naxalites waged a contest through the process of negotiation to win their side. The negotiation process began with a set of demands placed by the interlocutors. These demands included (1) declaring Nookadora and Konda Reddy communities as Adivasis; (2) stopping the Polavaram project; (3) issuing of pattas to the Adivasis of Koraput, Malkangiri, Narayanpatna and Visakhapatnam areas; (4) construction of a canal from Kotapalli to Maneguda; (5) payment of compensation to the families of Tadangi Gangulu and Ratana Sirike, who died due to torture in the jail; and (6) release of central committee members, Sheela di and Padma due to their ill health (emphasis added). In addition to these two names, they went ahead to demand the release of Ashutosh Sen, Sriramulu Srinivasulu, Gana Nayak, Jeevan Bose, Ganti Prasadam, Sirisha, Eshwari, Sarita and Gokul (a truck driver). The other demands were related to the cancellation of mining leases and withdrawing MoUs with various MNCs (Haragopal 2011: 24). Even during 2012, they made similar demands, including the release of top 210

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Naxalite leaders in a trade-­off for two hostages, the BJD Adivasi MLA Jhina Hikaka and the Italian tour operator Paolo Bosusco.8 The tactics and approaches of the Naxalites are clear and loud. They have learned that without mixing up their concerns with Adivasi problems, the conducive environment for the settlement of political issues with the state would not be created. The Naxalites have not been able to provide an alternative model to the state model of development for which they have been contemplating for so long. The reading of the original intent and debut of the Naxalites in South Odisha suggests that the Adivasi welfare was not their primary concern. This was demonstrated during the interview with Ganapathi, the general secretary of the Naxalites, where he pointed out that the central goal of the Naxalites was ‘seizure of power’ and not the welfare of the Adivasis (Mukherji 2012: 92). In this context, it raises apprehension whether the Naxalites entered South Odisha in the late 1980s with Adivasi development in mind at all. In the context of Bihar, Bhatia (2005: 1547) underlines that the Naxalite leaders are not interested in the development of the region and some even advocate underdevelopment because it could intensify the revolutionary movement. Gradually, they realised the mixing of Adivasi problems with their intent of developing and strengthening guerrilla base to secure support in the area. In the name of providing alternative development/governance to the state model of development, the Naxalites have denied the Adivasis the benefits of welfare measures extended by the so-­called modern democratic state. In this context, their approach towards Adivasi advancement has come under close scrutiny. The nature of demands they placed before the state government during the negotiation process presumably seems to be mainly to secure the release of leaders and workers of their organisations. So, the different factions of the Naxalites are involved in kidnapping the state machinery, and in this process, kidnapping has come to be used as a method for settlement of political issues (Haragopal 2011: 26). The Naxalites have also been allegedly involved in settling personal rivalries than addressing injustices (Ivey 2007: 78). Meanwhile, the Naxalites have created paradoxical space in Odisha. Sometimes they misrepresent the land question as well as other aspirations of Adivasi communities to increase conflicts between Adivasis and Dalits (SC, former untouchables) in Odisha (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2010: 124). The Naxalites build up a predatory financial base through the demonstrative use of violence. They follow extortion method for collecting tax, which has been considered by the Naxalites as a collection of the levy9 and by the contractors and government officials as ‘protection money’, from 211

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the marginalised groups in South Odisha (Mishra 2010; Chakrabarty and Kujur 2010: 128), as well as other parts of the country (Mahapatra, Verma and Das 2001; Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012: 144; Kennedy 2015: 151). The growing insurgent activities of the Naxalites have severely affected the development work of the area. School and panchayat office buildings have become soft targets of the Naxalites (GOI 2008b: 53), and their continuous involvement in blowing up these buildings appear to add further to this dimension.10 A large number of cases have been reported that the Naxalites have killed contractors, and one such incident was the killing of a contractor P. K. Swain on 22 February 2009 at Govindpally, who was instrumental in executing many infrastructure development works in Malkangiri district.11 In this context, even after the sanction of funds, contractors are reluctant to initiate developmental works in Adivasi areas of South Odisha. The Naxalites intended to create a sense of absence of the state in Adivasi regions concerning development so that people do not lose their faith in the Naxalites. It has also been reported that Naxalite cadres take away a share of development funds, and in the case of Odisha, they routinely grab 10 percent of the government money sanctioned for development and infrastructure work (The Times of India 2011). This state of affairs has become unusually severe in Malkangiri district, where the Naxalites also demand a share of the development funds that reach to the panchayats and NGOs. The Adivasi communities are generating disenchantment with the Naxalites. The Adivasis of South Odisha protested the abduction of the Malkangiri district collector R. Vineel Krishna, and Adivasi junior engineer Pabitra Mohan Majhi. R. Vineel Krishna was better known for his developmental works in the Adivasi areas of Malkangiri district. The land mining of the Naxalites in 2008 really touched the heart of the local people, where 17 policemen, some of them local Adivasi young boys, were killed. Consequently, the local Adivasis were discontented and cynical towards the Naxalites and protested, although they did not come out publicly in fear. The Naxalites violently silence all voices that do not conform to their ideological agendas. So, protests against the dictate of the Naxalites have been silenced violently. Meanwhile, the innocent Adivasi communities are also the victims of the insurgent activities of the Naxalites. Overwhelming cases have been reported concerning the killing of Adivasis in the pretext of police informers. For instance, on the night of 12 December 2013, a group of 40 armed Naxalites came to the house of a 60-­year-­old Adivasi, Prabhakar Madkami, in Malkangiri district; accused of being a 212

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police informer, he was taken to the nearby forest and killed (Mohanty 2013a). In November 2013, they abducted seven villagers from two villages of the Kalimela block in Malkangiri district. Dragging themselves into the ongoing debate over the inclusion and exclusion of the different communities in the category of Adivasis, they killed a 50-­year-­old Adivasi sarapanch, Madhab Kirsani, who was presumably not benevolent to their demand for declaring the Konda Reddy community as Adivasi (Mohanty 2013b). So, South Odisha is growingly experiencing the kidnapping and killing of civilians by the Naxalites. Bhatia (2005: 1544) emphasises that the continuous presence of the Naxalites has unleashed the atmosphere of fear, mistrust and suspicion. In short, the support of the Naxalites to the Adivasi communities’ struggle for their social, economic and political rights has come under scrutiny. Exploring the role of the Naxalites/Maoists in India and Nepal in addressing the issues and concerns of Adivasis and Janajatis, respectively, Ismail and Shah (2015) argue that the Indian Naxalites have paid less attention to the Adivasi problems than their Nepali counterparts. While exploring the Naxalite movement in central Bihar, Bhatia (2005) argues for the ‘politics of people’.12 For her, ‘people are seen not just as supporters, but also as actors and thinkers who ultimately shape the movement’ (2005: 1536). They are not just passive actors; over the period, they have become active actors. As a consequence, people have responded to the insurgent activities and have critically examined their achievements towards general welfare. Gradually, they have started distancing themselves from the Naxalites over the period. The participation of Adivasis in the Naxalite movement can be seen as a short-­term mobilising process. Cases have been reported concerning the surrendering of a substantial number of Adivasis. At this stage, the prime reason seems to be the Naxalites using the Adivasis to carry on their insurgent activities. In the context of the surrendering of at least 50 Adivasis, including seven children, the Koraput superintendent of police, Awinash Kumar, said that the villagers were supporting the Naxalites out of fear. When they realised that the rebels were using them as shields to carry out their offensives, they decided to return to the mainstream and cooperate with the administration in carrying out development work (Pioneer 2013). More than 1,500 CMAS activists have surrendered between January and July 2013, giving clear signals that the activists are not going to support the Naxalites in the near future (Nayak 2013: 9). Four Naxalites surrendered in August 2013 citing an overwhelming pressure on them to carry on their activities like collecting ransom, arranging for hosting Naxal leaders at different places, arranging grocery and other materials and passing messages from place to place. 213

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The Naxalites who surrendered on 23 September 2013 underlined that they have been discriminated and ill treated by the senior leaders (The Economic Times 2013). The existing literature demonstrates that the Naxalites draw their leadership from the higher caste (Bhatia 2005: 1537–­8; Harriss 2011: 319; Shah 2010: 291) and that the leaders are involved in caste discrimination against the Adivasis. They indulge in such practices to sustain their hierarchical dominance by appropriating significant positions within the cadre. In this context, the commitment of the Naxalites to fight against caste oppression seems to be futile. Ghasiram Majhi, who had occupied the fourth rank amongst Odiya Naxal leaders, surrendered along with his wife by citing the Naxalites’ failure to protect and promote the rights of the Adivasi communities. He further emphasised that the problems have rather increased, thereby leading to disillusionment (The New Indian Express 2009).13 Between August and September 2015, more than 270 Naxal supporters, including the militia members, surrendered in Malkangiri district.14 They cited that the state’s developmental policies are not reaching their village due to the presence of the Naxalites. So, they wanted to join the mainstream society and not support the Naxalites. The other reasons for surrendering are linked with the Naxalites being easy targets, hence often being killed during encounters with the security forces. In the case of Bihar, Kunnath (2006) argues that the poor, marginalised people have considerably withdrawn their support because the Naxalites are enabling the middle-­and upper-­caste people to materialise their goal of capturing the state power. These cases are only illustrations and not exhaustive. The caste discrimination and failure of the Naxalites to address the Adivasi problems may not be the only reasons for surrendering, and the other possible reason could be the state’s attractive rehabilitation policies for the surrendered Naxalites.15 Notwithstanding the fact is that the Naxalites are gradually weakening their support base even in Adivasi-­dominated areas. In short, although the Naxalites designed their strategy of mass mobilisation along the line of everyday experiences of the state which appeared as the means of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation, their relationship with the Adivasis has undergone a dramatic change once they established their control.

State–­Naxalites interface and its impact on Adivasis There is a persistent interface between the state and the Naxalites in India. Such instances are conspicuous in South Odisha. The Naxalites 214

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and the Indian state are engaged in violent confrontation, resulting in casualties on both sides. In 2006, then prime minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh conceived the Naxal insurgency as India’s biggest internal security challenge. As a result, the Indian state invariably felt the necessity of adopting strategies in security and development fronts. The Odisha state adopted three-­pronged strategies to tackle the Naxalite problem. First, security measures were beefed up in the affected areas. Second, the development process was accelerated in the regions affected by, or prone to, the Naxalite problem. And, third, steps were also taken to improve accessibility to the affected areas by bringing them into the mainstream development process (GOO 2007: 1/26). The significant implication has been that even after more than six decades of India’s independence, the state is still struggling to mainstream the countryside that is inhabited by the Adivasis in India. Meanwhile, it is important to underline that while deciding the fate of Adivasis in the post-­colonial period, the members of the Constituent Assembly (1946–­49)16 resolved to mainstream the Adivasis by preferring an integration approach over the isolation and assimilation approaches. Nevertheless, the Adivasi-­dominated areas of Odisha remain at the periphery, underdeveloped, geographically inaccessible and politically disconnected. The Indian state had adopted the ‘Green Hunt Operation’ to combat the Naxalite problems in the countryside known as the ‘red corridor’. The immediate impact of such operations in South Odisha was the arrest and killing of a number of Naxalites from Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Rayagada districts, and an overwhelming number of cases were filed against them. On 23 July 2003, the police arrested 17 hard-­core Naxalites in Rayagada and Malkangiri districts and recovered a huge quantity of explosives from their possession (Jha 2003). The Malkangiri police detained 11 Naxal supporters in Kalimela block in October 2009 (The Hindu 2009a). During a combing operation by a personnel of the elite SOG and DVF, two hard-­core Naxals, including a woman, were arrested on 14 February 2013, who were allegedly involved in the abduction of the Malkangiri district collector, R. Vineel Krishna from the forest of Chitrakonda (The Hindu 2013). During the combing operation, the anti-­Naxal cell of the Malkangiri police also arrested two red rebels in connection with the attack on the Congress convoy in Chattisgarh (Deccan Herald 2013). For the first time in the history of the Naxalite movement in Odisha, in a combing operation on 19 September 2015, the elite section of the anti-­Naxalite squad killed two Naxalites inside the village at Bhejaguda of Malkangiri district in broad daylight. The second significant 215

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encounter and perhaps the biggest in Malkangiri district after the incident of September 2013 was witnessed on 24 October 2016, where 13 Naxalites were killed in Podia block of Malkangiri district. The routine combing operation jointly carried out by the Greyhound (an elite anti-­Naxalite force) of Andhra Pradesh and armed forces of the Odisha police resulted in the killing of 24 Naxalites, including seven women cadres, on the border of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha. The killed Naxalites were part of the AOBSZC led by Ramakrishna allies RK (Rao and Das 2016). The state has also invoked highly repressive laws to deal with the Naxal sympathisers. The state has been implicating a large number of Adivasis in false cases of being Naxalite or their supporter. The Adivasi communities have been undergoing constant torture and harassment by the state machinery. The state machinery has been vexing the Adivasi communities in the name of containing Naxalite violence. Allegations such as frequent raids of Adivasi villages, beating up of villagers and misbehaviour with women have been made against the CRPF. Despite the constitutional provision of equal citizenship, the state considers the Adivasis more as ‘subject’ than equal citizens (Sundar 2011). After centuries of exploitation, marginalisation and subjugation at the hands of the state machinery, landlords, moneylenders, industrial interests and labour contractors, Adivasis have been compelled to acquire some degree of militancy to defend their rights. The Naxalites are also violently targeting the state machinery in the area described as ‘red corridor’. Overwhelming cases of the Naxalites’ attacks on paramilitary forces, CRPF and other police personnel have been reported from different parts of the country. On 28 June 2008, Naxalites ambushed a boat carrying Greyhound jawans in the reservoir at Alampaka of Malkangiri district of Odisha that resulted in the killing of 38 persons, including 35 Greyhound jawans of Andhra Pradesh (Rao and Das 2016). They are involved in such activities to send a ‘political message’, ‘create an electrifying effect’ and use it as a propaganda tool in other parts of the country in which they envisage to establish their presence (Ramana 2014: 340), demoralise the police force and materialise their aim of creating parallel and liberated zones. The presence of vast forests has become secured weapons of the Naxalites to regulate the activities of police and CRPF personnel in South Odisha. It is worth mentioning that on 19 May 2009, more than 250 trees were cut down near Govindpally to block the communication between Koraput and Malkangiri, which was cleared by the next morning. The Naxalites and their supporters again cut down more than 250 trees on the night of 20 May 2009. The Naxalites more often 216

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engaged in such activities with regular intervals in South Odisha. The immediate impact was that it severely disrupted the normal way of life curtailing the supply of essential goods (The Hindu 2009b). More than this is its effect on the livelihood pattern of the Adivasi communities, who, due to their subsistence agricultural economy, heavily depended on forest produces to meet their day-­to-­day requirements. The vulnerable Adivasis are experiencing different levels and magnitudes of marginalisation, dispossession and deprivation. They are caught in a vicious war between the Naxalites and the state and continued to live amidst deprivation, insecurity, strife and struggle. On one hand, the Naxalites are beheading the innocent Adivasis by recriminating them as police informers. On the contrary, the Adivasis are also subject to the wrath of the police in the pretext of Naxalite sympathisers and supporters. Both are engaged in violence against the Adivasis. The Naxalites project their involvement as ‘good’ violence in the pretext of performing a righteous service and the state’s involvement as ‘bad’ violence (Roy 2012: 55). The vulnerable Adivasi communities in India are becoming easy targets of the state as well as the Naxalites. Both the forces are belligerent towards Adivasis in India. What is disconcerting is that both the state and the Naxalites are competing with each other to promote their own interests in the name of Adivasi development. They are competing to recruit the Adivasis in their respective camps. The Naxalites are targeting the Adivasi youth for their cadre and the state is engaged in recruiting the Adivasis in police services as well as preparing the civil militia to counter the Naxalites in different parts of the country (notable example is the case of Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh), thereby pitting the Adivasis against each other in the line of violence and conflict. Both the state and the Naxalites have established their monopoly over violence and counter-­violence, which has become a recurring phenomenon in the lives of the Adivasi community in and around the area, hitherto called the liberated zone by the Naxalites. The Adivasi communities in different parts of the country are struggling to protect themselves from the repressive measures of the state and the insurgent activities of the Naxalites.

State, Naxalites and the multinational corporations The changing relationship between the state, the Naxalites and MNCs have greater ramification over the Adivasi communities. The era of the 1990s has marked the beginning of the entry of MNCs in the resource-­ rich region of India, and the Adivasi areas have abundant natural 217

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resources. Since the 1990s, the Indian state provided a substantial amount of relaxations to private players in relation to the extraction of natural resources, especially mining, forest and land resources. Such relaxations through legislative measures further marginalised the already marginalised communities, which essentially provoked resistance and protest from the marginalised groups.17 The state, however, is reluctant to address the marginalised position but supports the private companies to follow the confrontational path and suppress the dissent. The MNCs are consistently engaged in extracting natural resources from the resource-­ rich Adivasi regions and perpetuated violence against the Adivasis by challenging significant means of their livelihood. As a consequence, the marginalised communities began to look for their potential support and the Naxalites were at the forefront to extend their support (Arundhati Roy 2010). The pamphlet of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee stated that ‘[i]t is against this violence that we have been compelled to answer with “violence”. Had we not resisted they would have succeeded in their objectives’ (quoted in Navlakha 2010: 40). Subsequently, the Naxalites have been seen as anti-­state and anti-­capitalist actors who have the potential to protect the Adivasis from becoming further dispossessed and marginalised. As a result, the Adivasis find solace in the Naxalites and support them (Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012: 144; Kennedy 2015: 161). Various states have engaged with the MNCs and signing MoUs to allow them to extract resources from the Adivasi areas. The state of Odisha has signed 43 MoUs with the MNCs between 15 May 2002 and 31 November 2005 (GOO 2006a: 196–­7), which have had invariably marginalised and dispossessed a large number of Adivasis. The socio-­economic conditions of the Adivasis have become vulnerable with the emergence of the neoliberal economy, where the state has taken all necessary steps to promote the private sectors and equip them with all possible means to extract resources of the Adivasi areas. This has invariably deprived the Adivasis of their fundamental human rights. This has not only challenged their means of livelihood but also has led to the gradual erosion of the Adivasi way of life, culture, values and traditions in Odisha (Ambagudia 2010). Consequently, Adivasis of Odisha have spearheaded a number of movements against the state as well as the MNCs. It appears that the Naxalites have established a cordial relationship with the private sectors in India. Although the private sectors are the main players in the neoliberal economy and are responsible 218

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for the growing violation of the rights of Adivasi communities over resources, the Naxalites have not launched a major attack on the private players. No cases or very little cases have been reported concerning the Naxalites attacking private companies. Meanwhile, a case of a small attack on the pipelines of a leading steel company cutting through Chitrakonda has been reported from Malkangiri district. But after receiving the ransom of Rs 2 crore from the company, they stopped attacking (The Times of India 2011). In addition, they have not launched any attack on the private players who are involved in marginalising the Adivasis to a large-­scale, for instance, companies that participate in establishing industries in Adivasi areas and exploiting the natural resources such as land, forests and mining. Although the state model of development, that is, surrendering abundant natural resources to corporates and MNCs appears to be the main reason for kidnapping the Malkangiri district collector and the Sukuma district collector (Chhattisgarh) (Haragopal 2012), the Naxalites are, however, less interested in targeting corporates and MNCs. One possible reason for this is that the private sector has become one of the essential means of revenue generation for the Naxalites. Miklian and Carney (2010: 110) examine the revenue generation of the Naxalites and illustrate that the revenue of the Naxalites is around US$500 million per annum and is mainly coming from companies/ individuals primarily engaging with legal/illegal mining in Jharkhand. They went ahead to emphasise that many of the local commanders of the Naxalites appear to be in the Naxalite movement for the money alone. So, it may be generalised that ‘Maoists have become as much a business as anything else’ (Miklian and Carney 2010: 108). Even if we read the nature of the 2011 negotiation between the Odisha state and the Naxalite to release the abducted Malkangiri Collector, the demand related to the cancellation of mining leases and withdrawing MoUs with various MNCs appeared at the seventh and eight positions on priority basis on the charter of demand (Haragopal 2011: 24). So, the availability of natural resources has provided economic opportunities for the Naxalites. The resources required for carrying our guerrilla warfare do not provoke them to launch scathing attacks on MNCs (Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012: 144). In the case of Kerala, Steur (2014) argues that the failure of the CPI to protect the Adivasis from the neoliberal forces has generated political disillusionment in Kerala and moving away from the party to form their own organisation as an alternative to the CPI to express their genuine social needs. At this instance, it appears that their fight for the exploited and oppressed Adivasi communities is merely an 219

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eyewash and rhetoric (Ismail and Shah 2015). The Naxalites are no longer abiding by the principles of protecting the rights of the unorganised masses under which the Naxalite movement emerged in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal in 1967. They are paying less attention to the rights of the marginalised groups in India, and the idea and philosophy of Naxalism have now become an underground platform for threat, settling the political issues with the might of gun. Simeon (2010) underlined that [t]he Naxalite movement is not a movement of landless peasants and tribals seeking to overthrow state power. It is a project defined as such by those who are neither peasants nor workers nor tribals; but who claim to represent their interests. The right to make this claim was dependent upon what the earliest Naxalites refer to as revolutionary authority. So, the contemporary period is gradually moving from a period of Naxalism to pseudo-­Naxalism.

Conclusion Resources have become the ground for the emergence of Naxalite politics in India. The existing literature indicates that there is a positive relationship between the presence of natural resources and conflict, between availability of resources and insurgent activities (Ivey 2007; Miklian and Carney 2010; Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012; Gomes 2015; Kennedy 2015). The presence of resources alone is not necessarily a driver of conflict. It, however, accentuates conflicts when different actors disproportionately appropriate benefits. The mere presence of resources is insufficient to cause insurgent violence but provides the ground for the emergence of insurgent activities. Availability of abundant resources tends to facilitate the insurgent groups to use coercion for their financial benefits. The Naxalites have established their control over nearly 10.3 million hectares of forests in India (Mahapatra, Verma and Das 2001). Contested forest areas and agricultural lands rather than mineral resources have become the ground for the Naxalites to enter into conflictual relationships (Ivey 2007: 77). Resource-­rich regions of India experience a high degree of insurgent activities (Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012; Kennedy 2015: 160). On the other hand, the scarcity of resources may tend to enable the social elites, governments, mafias and others to use coercion in creating and facilitating the skewed distribution of 220

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resources, thereby creating a regime of deprivation and marginalisation that the insurgent groups have been contemplating to address since long (Ivey 2007: 83). The availability of abundant resources and the increasing marginalisation that the state and other vested interest actors perpetuate to communities led to the emergence of Naxalite politics in India. The Naxalites are active in those areas where resource scarcity has had detrimental socio-­economic consequences over the Adivasis in India. Highlighting such paradoxical situations does not mean to articulate that mere availability or absence of resources would create conflicts. However, the persistence competition between actors to control over or access to resources perpetuate conflicts in India. The insurgent groups, governments and other actors aim to either control or contain resources for their respective benefits and thereby contribute to the emergence of resource conflicts in India. The ‘politics of development, deprivation and alternative governance’ advocated by the state and the Naxalites severely compromised the rights of the Adivasis. On one hand, in the name of development, the state has further marginalised and dispossessed the Adivasi communities by controlling over their natural resources. Even after more than six decades of India’s independence and the implementation of different entitlement policies, the Adivasis are the worst sufferers of the growth driven development. At the Chief Ministers’ Conference on Implementation of the Forest Rights Act on 4 November 2009, the then prime minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, admitted that ‘[t]here has been a systemic failure in giving the tribals (Adivasis) a stake in the modern economic processes that inexorably intrude into their living spaces. The alienation built over decades is now taking [a] dangerous turn in some parts of the country’ (cited in World Bank 2011: 37). The Adivasi communities are lagging behind in social, economic, cultural, political and health sectors. Regarding poverty, they are 20 years behind the average population (World Bank 2011: 41). There is an incremental erosion of Adivasi culture, tradition and language with the imposition of values of the so-­called mainstream society from the above. The state is increasingly controlling over Adivasi communities to manage its own affairs. The state has not addressed the structural discrimination and marginalisation. On the other hand, the Naxalites are highlighting the notion of the ‘politics of deprivation’ and advancing their own agenda citing alternative development/governance to the backward Adivasi areas. But even after more than two decades of their existence in Adivasi areas, the Naxalites have not been able to address the problems of the Adivasi 221

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communities in South Odisha. Rather they have succeeded in negotiating with the state in advancing their own interest. The closer analysis of the negotiation process shows that one of the major demands was granting land pattas to the Adivasis of Koraput, Malkangiri, Narayanpatna and Visakapatnam areas. If this was their genuine concern, why did they kill the wheelchair-­bound Adivasi MLA from the Umerkote assembly constituency of Nabarangpur district while distributing land patta to the Adivasis in Gona village under the Forest Rights Act, 2006? The state and the Naxalites have established a trade-­off relationship with Adivasi communities in India. They are forcefully entering the lifeworld of the Adivasis in the name of protecting and promoting the rights of the Adivasi communities. The state and the Naxalites have consistently engaged violently in defining or redefining the relationship between the Adivasis and the Naxalites, or Adivasis and the state, and have established their monopoly over violence and counter-­violence. The Adivasis are forced to demonstrate their allegiance either to the Naxalites or the state. The state is severely regulating the Adivasi society in the name of extending preferential policies. The state is justifying its dominant role of violence in the name of protection from the internal and external threat (Tilly 1985: 171). The Naxalites, on the other hand, are also inexorably intruding into the Adivasi society under the cloak of providing an alternative model of development and governance in Adivasi areas. These interferences are neither desirable nor feasible for the democratisation of Adivasi societies in India. The Adivasis are demanding protection and restoration of their alienated rights over the principal means of livelihood such as land and forests in different parts of the country and struggling to live with dignity. The interface among these three actors such as the Adivasis, state and the Naxalites creates a paradoxical situation. The Adivasi communities want their means of livelihood, the state wants control over forests and land resources and the Naxalites want ‘revolution’ against state. The state and the Naxalites must not appropriate the helplessness of the Adivasis. So, the need of the hour is to change the approach of these forces towards the vulnerable Adivasi communities. The innocent Adivasis should not be made the easy targets of violence. The state and the Naxalites shall respect the rights of the Adivasis in India.

Notes 1 For instance, Annual Report 2007–­08 of the Ministry of Rural Development, GOI shows that a total of 105,491 cases alleging 104,742 acres of land alienation were filed in the court in Odisha. Out of which 104,644 (99.19 percent) cases were disposed and 61,431 (58.70 percent) cases

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were decided in favour of the Adivasis, resulting in the restoration of 56,854 (54.28 percent) acres of land to the Adivasis (GOI 2008a: 276, Annexure-­XVIII). 2 The existing literature, however, also refutes the link between the landlord colonial institutions and Naxalite conflicts in India (Hoelscher, Miklian and Vadlamannati 2012: 154). 3 Ten states affected by the Naxalites are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. However, while redrawing the areas of the red corridor, the MHA has also included the state of Kerala in the list (GOI 2017). 4 The union government provides to the tune of Rs 30 crore annually to the districts that fall under the red corridor area for various developmental work (Singh 2016). 5 Answering the unstarred question no. 241, the minister of state in the MHA, Hansraj Gangaram Ahir mentioned in the Lok Sabha on 18 July 2017 (GOI 2017). 6 In an interview in the wake of the land struggle in Naranpatna block of Koraput district of Odisha, Gananath Patra, the advisor of the Chashi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (an outfit of the CPIML) emphasised on the process of land restoration and distribution. While restoring and distributing the land among the landless, the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh sought to ensure that they do not succumb to dispossession again. To materialise the collective support, 60 percent of the produce of the restored land was given to the cultivators and 40 percent to the Sangh, out of which 15 percent was spent on fighting cases related to the occupation of land and 25 percent towards meeting various expenditure of the party (CPIML) (Upadhyaya 2014: 294). 7 It is clear from the statement of the general secretary of the Naxalites, Ganapathi, that there was nothing at all in their agenda not to debar the voter from participating in the political processes, where he states that ‘it is important to guard against getting bogged down in legalism and economism and forget that masses have to be prepared for seizure of power’ (Mukherji 2012: 92). 8 Jhina Hikaka was abducted from Laxmipur block of Koraput district on 23 March 2012 by the AOBSZC of the CPI (M), whereas Paolo Basusco was kidnapped on 14 March 2012 by the Sabyasachi Panda’s Odisha State Organising Committee from Kandhamal district. 9 The Times of India (2011) published a report on fund-­raising tactics of the Naxalites in the states of Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Odisha, where the extortion method of fund collection is highly emphasised. 10 The Naxalites are involved in demolishing the school and panchayat buildings by alleging that these buildings are used for accommodating the security forces during anti-­Naxalites operations. They destroyed the two-­storey school building at Gamphakonda in Kalimela area of Malkangiri district on 7 November 2010 (Outlook 2010). The report of the MHA figured that nearly 260 schools had been destroyed in Naxal violence in CPI(M) affected states during 2006–­11. The MHA maintained that the Naxalites have hit the highest number of schools in Chhattisgarh (131) followed by Jharkhand (63). A total of 71 schools were targeted by them in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh in 2009. They attacked 59, 43, 25, 39 and 21 schools in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 (till November), respectively. In a report concerning

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challenges faced by educational institutions globally, the UNESCO has stated that 11 and 9 schools have been destroyed during Naxalite violence Jharkhand and Bihar in 2009 (UNESCO 2010: 191). Several cases of destroying the school and panchayat buildings by the Naxalites have been reported from South Odisha. For instance, they blew up the panchayat building at Poteru in Podia block of Malakngiri district on 9 September 2010 by alleging that the building was to be used by the Border Security Force during the anti-­Naxal operations (The Hindu 2010). 11 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/timelines/2009/ orissa.html (accessed on 22 April 2016). 12 The approach of ‘politics of people’ deals with ‘asking who these people are, what they think, how they act, and why they think or act the way they do’ (Bhatia 2005: 1536). 13 On 9 October 2015, the DD Odiya television channel aired a special programme on Pragati Pathe Malkangiri (Malkangiri on the path of development). In an interview for the programme, two surrendered Adivasi Naxalites of Malkangiri district pointed out their increasing disillusionment with the Naxalites. They emphasised that they joined the Naxalites because they perceived that the Naxalites are meant for development, but the Naxalites have not been able to provide alternative development/ governance to the Adivasis. So, they decided to surrender, and now they are happy with the facilities that the government provided to them under the rehabilitation policies designed for the surrendered Naxalites. 14 ‘Over 100 Maoists supporters surrender in Malkangiri’, https://odisha mail.com/article/over-­1 00-­m aoist-­supporters-­surrender-­in-­malkangiri (accessed on 13 September 2015). 15 Due to the increasing occurrence of violence by the Naxalites across the country, the state has adopted the Surrender-­cum-­Rehabilitation Policy to encourage the Naxalites to surrender and join the mainstream, and discourage joining Naxalite movement again. The surrenderee will be imparted training in a vocation/trade of their liking or befitting their aptitude. During the training period, they will be paid a monthly scholarship of Rs 2000 for a maximum period of three years. The policy also has a provision of keeping Rs 1.5 lakh in a bank as a fixed deposit in the name of the surrenderee, which can be withdrawn by the surrenderee after the completion of three years. In addition, the surrenderee can also get additional financial assistance if he or she surrenders with different kinds of weapons/ammunition. 16 The Constituent Assembly was set up in 1946 to draft the constitution for independent India by carefully examining various issues and concerns that affected the everyday lives of the Indians. 17 The period of LPG has enabled the government to enact a number of legislative measures to ease the process of extracting natural resources, especially mineral resources. In this context, the National Mineral Policy 2008 and the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 2012 can be demonstrated. These legislations, especially the later has eased the process for the corporation to extract mineral resources and posed significant challenges for the objectors to halt the process (Kennedy 2015: 153).

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Adivasi regions of India have been easy targets for the rehabilitation of migrants. Be it the rehabilitation of Bengali migrants in Odisha, Assam, Tripura, Manipur or the Chakma and Hajong migrants in Arunachal Pradesh, the government decided to settle them in Adivasi areas. The state took such decisions due to the availability of large tract of geographical regions with low density of population in Adivasi areas. There was no effective resistance to these decisions due to the absence of active civil society organisations and ignorance of the Adivasis about the future strains on their resources. Such decision of the government exerted pressure on social, economic, civic, cultural and political facilities that the Adivasis used to enjoy earlier. The rehabilitation of migrants in Adivasi areas further intensified the competition to gain control over the resources. Before the implementation of the DNK Project in Dandakaranya region, the Adivasis were exploited and marginalised by the non-­Adivasis, and this process was accentuated with the rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants in the Adivasi-­ dominated district. The process of exploitation, marginalisation and dispossession of the Adivasis has increased manifold due to the entry of outsiders into the Adivasi areas. The approach of the colonial state in bringing the Adivasis under a single political authority through coercion, war and conquest opened up the window for the frequent intrusion of dikus (outsiders) into the Adivasi areas. Such incursion apparently led to the process of exploitation by appropriating resources of the Adivasi areas and pushed them to a situation of dispossession, deprivation, marginalisation and exclusion. Adivasis are one of the most dispossessed and marginalised communities in India. The exposure of Adivasis to the outside world has mostly contributed to their marginalised position. Different state and non-­state actors (MNCs) are equal partners in pushing the Adivasis 225

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into a situation of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation. The marginalised conditions of Adivasis not only provided opportunities to the democratic state to address their issues and concerns with sensitivity and seriousness but also expanded the scope to different NGOs to delve into their problems. However, democratic institutions and various agencies have paid little attention to the marginalised situation of Adivasi communities that emerges out of their day-­to-­day interactions with the non-­Adivasis, especially migrant communities. So, the nature and extent of dispossession and marginalisation of Adivasi communities are not only because of the state and non-­state actors but also because of being equally pushed by the migrants to such situations, thereby unleashing community conflicts in India. Resources have become arenas of contestation for entitlement across the globe. This is embedded in processes in which different communities come into conflict while competing for access to or control over resources. The competition for control over or access to economic wealth, political power and social status generate conflicts between different communities. Community conflicts over resources have become the defining feature of eastern India. The entry of outsiders in Adivasi areas has become a regular phenomenon in India. The entry of non-­Adivasis into Adivasi area has not only initiated the process of exploitation of Adivasis and denied access to and use of natural resources such as land, forest and water but has also affected the lifestyles of Adivasis negatively. Such intrusions have also initiated the process of cultural disarticulation. The socio-­economic exploitation and cultural marginalisation have compounded the overall marginalisation of the Adivasis. The marginalisation of the Adivasis sometimes arises due to their isolated position. Isolation also perpetuates marginalisation. Sometimes Adivasis do not interact with outsiders and distance themselves from the mainstream/larger society and the modernisation process due to their hostile and exploitative nature towards the Adivasis. The Adivasis prefer to maintain isolation based on their gathering experiences of many decades which appear to suggest that the history of the Adivasis has been the history of exploitation, marginalisation, dispossession, deprivation and subjugation. It is pertinent to mention that the state extended affirmative policies to Adivasi communities due to their isolation and to integrate them into the so-­called mainstream society (Xaxa 2008). But most of the time the state pushed the Adivasis to the marginalised position and deprived them of their natural resources such as land and forest. Because of the faulty survey, most of the land in South Odisha was documented as government land. Privately 226

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owned land was very marginal. For instance, 20 percent of land in Koraput, 19 percent in Malkangiri, 30 percent in Nabarangpur and 20 percent in Rayagada was considered as individually owned land (GOO not dated a: 195). The non-­Adivasis also drastically affected the landholding patterns of Adivasis. The emergence of state–­society relationship has significantly contributed to incompatible relations between the Adivasi communities and the state, where the problems of the former have not been dealt with utmost care by the latter. Adivasi communities have their own problems in respective social contexts, and the modern welfare state does not address them seriously. They have their own social, economic, cultural and political values, as well as organisations, whereas the state neither protects nor promotes them. Subsequently, the state imposes its rules and regulations over the Adivasis from the above, which are not compatible with their traditional institutions and cultures. It also imposes policies and programmes by violating the rights of the Adivasis. One such instance was the decision of the Indian state to rehabilitate the Bengali migrants from East Pakistan under the centrally sponsored Dandakaranya Project in the undivided Koraput district way back in the late 1950s. Such decision of the central government did not invoke any protest due to the absence of strong civil society organisations. The government took such haphazard steps with total disregard for the issues and concerns of Adivasis. Conflicts due to competition to control over or access to resources have been conspicuous between the autochthonous communities (Adivasis) and outsiders (Bengali migrants) in the eastern Indian state of Odisha, especially in Koraput, Malkangiri and Nabarangpur districts. Adivasis are becoming increasingly concerned about their rights over resources. Conflicts between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants are directed towards capturing the Adivasis’ traditional inalienable rights to control, use and manage their ancestral land, forest and water. Looking at the structural dimensions of the contemporary community conflicts in Odisha, it is the assertion of the traditional rights of the Adivasis over resources that has come to define the conflicts. The episodes of dissent and conflict suggest that the Adivasis of Odisha initiated all these conflicts. Does this mean the Adivasis do not want to live in peace and tranquillity, or do they not respect other communities? This seems to be quite unrealistic and far from tenable. For instance, when the GOI in consultation with the state government decided to settle the Bengali migrants in the DNK region of Odisha, the government did not take the Adivasis of the area into consideration. The Adivasi communities were merely spectators of the rehabilitation activities, and 227

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they did not probably resist and protest the decision of the government. Their dissent and resistance emerged more effectively in the 1990s due to the rolling back of the state from public sector undertakings and the exploitation of natural resources by different MNCs, which created a regime of marginalisation and deprivation. This situation was also exploited by Bengali migrants effectively, who tried to grab different kinds of resources primarily meant for the Adivasis. Both the state and the Bengali migrants have been consistently involved in eroding the traditional Adivasi rights over resources. There are different kinds of threats to native Adivasis, and the Bengali migrants appear to be one such significant threat. When the innocent Adivasis felt extremely threatened and challenged, they resorted to violence as they believed that the administration and policy-­making process would respond effectively to violent means (GOI 2008b: 44). So, resistance and contestations were formulated after Bengali migrants began to threaten the native Adivasis of Odisha. This is one of the important reasons why there was a lack of protest and resistance during the preliminary phase of DNK Project in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. The book presented a case of resistance and conflicts emerging out of sharing resources between Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in Odisha. What clearly emerges from this study is that scarcity of resources creates marginal communities. The marginality of one community, already confronting resource scarcity, gets further compounded when another marginal community is thrust upon in the same area/region. When a group of ‘political oustees’ are grafted by the state over socio-­economic and political spaces belonging to culturally distinct but marginalised Adivasi communities; it leads to conflicts, tensions, assertions and contests between the natives and outsiders. The ‘native’ versus ‘outsiders’ identities are often articulated and realised through efforts of claiming and ‘re’-claiming resources and cultural spaces. They get further accentuated by the state policies which tend to favour one group over the other perpetuating definite positions and oppositions among groups vis-­à-­vis each other. Against this backdrop, the book examined how the state’s initiative and intervention to settle the Bengali migrants from East Pakistan under the Dandakaranya Project accentuated dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation of the local Adivasis resulting in competition, domination, conflicts and violence. Based on extensive empirical research in the districts of Malkangiri and Nabarangpur located in eastern Indian state of Odisha, the book connected the ground experiences with sociological, political, cultural and economic aspects of marginalisation; inter-­community relations; and a critical role of the state. 228

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Conflicts occur when there is a change in the power structure by giving political opportunities to the migrants. The Bengali migrants have established their political dominance due to their inclusion in the Indian democratic system through the extension of citizenship rights. The settlement of Bengali migrants in the Adivasi region has exerted tremendous pressure on existing resources and increased population thereby causing drastic ecological and demographic changes. The state also recognised them as ‘SCs’, which has considerably contributed to the political marginalisation of the native Adivasis in South Odisha. The recognition of Bengali migrants as the scheduled group has significantly increased the number of SCs, which eventually led to the conversion of ‘Adivasi reserved constituency’ into ‘SC reserved constituency’ both in the state legislative assembly and PRIs, where the Adivasis cannot contest for political representation. So, the Adivasis perceived the Bengali migrants as a political threat. This empirical research illustrated that the inclusive experiences of Indian democracy, accommodation and extension of preferential policies to Bengali migrants from East Pakistan led to the emergence of violent conflicts between the Adivasi communities and Bengali migrants in Odisha. The Adivasi communities perceived that the inclusion of Bengali migrants in the Indian democratic process enabled the migrants to become politically dominant and that led to the political marginalisation of the native Adivasi communities. The relative backwardness of Adivasis reinforced the dominance of Bengali migrants. In addition, the DNK Project took all the necessary steps – ­providing land, conducting research on their crops, creating market facilities, financial assistance and so on – to enable the Bengali migrants to become economically prosperous. On the contrary, the state largely neglected the native Adivasis in relation to addressing the differentiated marginality (Chapter 3). Adivasis were, however, partaking the developmental facilities that were primarily created for the benefits of the Bengali migrants. The so-­ called common welfare services designed along the lines of issues, concerns and cultural dimensions of Bengali migrants eventually ignored the issues, concerns and values of Adivasis. The DDA displaced the Adivasis at a large scale from their place of residence by clearing the forest resources required to accommodate the migrants. The resettlement of Adivasis, however, was left to the states of Odisha and Madhya Pradesh, which were more casual in addressing the issues and problems of the Adivasis. The DDA justified its non-­involvement in resettling the Adivasis in the pretext of non-­interference in the Adivasi lifeworld. 229

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Settling of non-­Adivasi migrants in an Adivasi area is bound to create serious social, economic, cultural and political problems. Apart from intervention, curtailment of Adivasis’ rights to natural resources by a forcible settlement of outsiders in Adivasi areas led to the degradation of natural resources. Imposition of the DNK Project from above in the Adivasi-­dominated DNK region has stimulated rather than prevented unproductive conflicts. The government’s decision to rehabilitate Bengali migrants in Adivasi areas must not trample the aspirations and traditional rights of the Adivasi communities over natural resources. So, there is a need to both educate and bring awareness among the Adivasis concerning their rights over resources and orient the Bengali migrants to respect such rights. Various factors will come into play in defining the resource relationship at different times between communities. The root cause of community conflicts between Adivasis and Bengali migrants is associated with the access to natural resources and grounded in the power and politics of resource use and control. These conflicts are embedded and constructed in the processes by which Adivasis and the Bengali migrants interact with one another in the context of natural resources. The mistrust and tensions between Adivasis and Bengali migrants have increased over the period. So, we need to explore why there is a steady rise in resource conflicts over the years in eastern India. We need to think about the conflicts and struggles engendered by the forms of access to and control over natural resources. There is a need for a deeper understanding of the role of different factors in the outbreak of conflicts over natural resources. The need for a deeper understanding of conflicts constitutes a vantage point of conflict resolution. Since land and forests are critical to issues of survival, culture and identity of Adivasis, any attempt to dismantle the symbiotic relationship would invoke stiff resistance. The Adivasis do not seem to give up their protest against the illegal transfer and encroachment of their traditional resources. The state and Bengali migrants must recognise the centrality of land and forests in Adivasi life. The Adivasis would not appreciate any sign that attempts to dilute the importance of natural resources or disrespects their traditional rights over resources. The protest of Adivasis is not against the rehabilitation of the Bengali migrants per se rather it aims to reinstate and establish their control over the means of livelihood such as land and forest. Relative normalcy would not return in the DNK region as long as the Bengali migrants indulge in the process of exploitation and marginalisation of the native Adivasis. For instance, Malkangiri district has not experienced any conflict between the Adivasis and Tamil migrants primarily 230

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due to, among other reasons, non-­involvement of Tamil migrants in exploitation and appropriation of Adivasi resources. The DNK region, however, has experienced violent conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants. The conflict between Adivasis and Bengali migrants has much to do with growing Adivasi land alienation and the erosion of Adivasi rights over resources because resources such as land and forests are seen not only as the critical means of their livelihood but also as the philosophy of their life (Ambagudia 2010). Normalcy would only return when the Bengali migrants become sensitive to the demands or genuine needs of the native Adivasis. Respecting the traditional Adivasi rights over natural resources will be one of the essential means of developing a cordial relationship and building consensus and cooperation among the Adivasi communities and the Bengali migrants in Odisha. Unlike the Chakma and Hajong migrants of Arunachal Pradesh, who have been struggling for citizenship rights, the Bengali migrants should not take advantage of citizenship rights over the Adivasis. Meanwhile, it is also vital for the state to implement various legislative measures more effectively to restore the rights of the Adivasis over resources by revisiting the settlement operation that was completed in the 1950s in undivided Koraput district (Behuria 1966). Failure to do so will lead to the emergence of more community conflicts over resources. There is a more significant role for the state to play in resolving these conflicts by restoring the rights of Adivasis over natural resources and at the same time ensuring the Bengali migrants’ right to citizenship in Odisha. The state, however, unfortunately, gives priority to the migrants over the native Adivasis. Despite people’s demand for addressing the root cause of their deprivation, dispossession and marginalisation, the state eventually tackles these demands (if they are articulated through resistance, conflict and violence) by preferring preventive strategies that address the immediate source of conflict than proactive policies that take care of the underlying structural conditions. The state must ensure the recognition and fair distribution of benefits, rights, entitlement and resources. Laws and policies related to natural resources should be updated to make them more consistent with the new situations over the period. Conflicts revolve around competing claims over resources between communities. Due to the emergence of resource conflicts day by day, the relationship between communities seems to be one of the hostile relationships. Depending on resources in question, different factors will come into play at various stages of community relations. It is somewhat premature to judge whether the relationship would be 231

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hostile or cordial, but there is ample scope for improving community relationship between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Odisha. The emergence of conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants over natural resources in South Odisha in 2001 compelled the government to explore different possible methods of conflict resolution. The vital approach to deal with the simmering situation that emerged before the administration was the formation of a joint conflict management committee, commonly known as a peace committee. The committee consisted of ten members each from the Adivasi and Bengali communities. The committee was expected to arrest the propensity of conflict immediately and initiate the process of confidence-­building measures among these communities and host open meetings for these two communities to interact. A dialogue could resolve around possible changes that these people wanted to see in each other and would at least give the parties the option to make their voice heard. The task of mediating between the Adivasis and the Bengali migrants required engagement with these communities. This relationship was primarily a two-­way process, and changes could only begin with a better dialogue between these communities. Peace committee like this could be formed in the context of demanding circumstances. During the field study, the respondents from both communities underlined that committees mostly remain issue-­oriented, and once the issues wane out, the committees also get dissolved. The pertinent questions remain: who had initiated the process of the formation of peace committees? Was it the Adivasi community or the Bengali migrants or was it the state that had initiated the process? Did they emerge from below or the above, that is, the state? These queries demand critical analysis. We must acknowledge that the idea of the formation of the peace committee did not emanate either from the Adivasi or the Bengali communities. The initiative to form the joint committee did not emerge from the grass-­roots level either, but it was the tactics of the administration to control violent conflicts between Adivasis and Bengali migrants to some extent. In other words, the formation of the peace committee was an imposition from above and had not emerged from below. Given the prevailed perception that there is a reciprocal relationship between the Adivasis and the militant organisations such as the Naxalites (see Chapter 6), it has been perceived that the marginalised and dispossessed Adivasis move to the Naxalites to protect their rights and interests. Bhatia (2005: 1541) argues that community conflicts can also be resolved by taking the help of militants organisations such as the Naxalites. This understanding, however, seems to be futile, as 232

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none of the Adivasis prefer taking the support of militant organisations to resolve conflictual issues. To put it differently, Adivasi communities are innocent and they prefer to lead a peaceful and dignified life. Paradoxically, one can argue that the Adivasis were increasingly involved in a conflictual relationship with the Bengali migrants during the 2001 resource conflict. The extensive empirical research, however, underlines that the involvement of the Adivasis was not to disturb the existing social milieu but to reinstate their lost rights over their own resources, which were illegally grabbed by the Bengali migrants. On the other hand, as Adivasis perceived Bengali migrants are indulging in exploitation and depriving them of their lands and forests, a possibility nevertheless arises that the native Adivasis would emerge to threaten and displace the Bengali migrants. In such a situation, the Bengali migrants would perhaps prefer to resolve conflictual situations through dialogue, forming community organisations representing both sides. Hence, the field research demonstrates that neither the Adivasis nor the Bengali migrants would prefer to resolve conflicts through violent means by moving towards or joining militant organisations. In a society where the competition for control over or access to scarce resources exists between different communities, defining the future prospect of community relationships is not an easy task. Community relationship becomes more complicated when it is governed by time, space and respective social contexts. Without drawing prior inferences, it is pertinent to know the views of the parties involved in this relationship. Within this perspective, what would be the prospect of Adivasi–­Bengali relationship? Will it be conflictual or cooperative in the future? Will Adivasi–­Bengali relationship improve in future? These questions pose far more complexities, and it will not be possible to offer any concrete answer at this moment unless we meet with the context, time and place. The empirical study suggested that the changing relationship between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants is based on cooperation as well as conflict. Two dominant views emerged from the field in relation to the prospect of community relationships. One, the positive impact of modern education and the reduction in the socio-­economic gap due development policies and programmes can improve the relationship between two competing communities. The respondents emphasised that the Adivasi–­Bengali relationship can also be improved if there is enough inter-­mixing of these communities, and it sometimes helps to reduce the existing differences. No doubt, the question of superiority and inferiority is always associated with different societies; there are some occasions where different communities subvert their 233

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specific community identities and come together to celebrate popular festivals (Freitag 1989), and the Adivasi and Bengali communities are no exceptions. The people of Malkangiri district collectively celebrate Bada Yatra,1 which takes place every alternate year, irrespective of their caste, class, colour, sex and so on. The celebration of popular festivals collectively shows their cooperation as well as cultural appropriation and assimilation. There is an apprehension that the relationship would improve in future. The Adivasis believed that as long as the Bengali migrants involve in dispossessing and marginalising them, there is a little scope for improvement in their relationship. The Adivasis contended that the Bengali migrants grab the large chunk of development facilities either meant for the Adivasis or common welfare. Going by the present circumstances, the field experiences indicated that Bengali migrants believe that the relationship would not improve as long as both communities consider and treat ‘the other’ differently. They also argued that unless the community/political leaders stop disturbing the existing social milieu and cordial relationship between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants, there is limited scope for improvement. In this context, the Bengali migrants repeatedly mentioned the role played by late Jagabandhu Majhi2 in creating differences between these two communities since his college days. Experiences from the eastern Indian state of Odisha raise one of the pertinent questions: why do Adivasis have to engage in conflicts with various actors: state, MNCs, non-­Adivasis, migrants, insurgent groups and so on? This question raises the nature and dynamics of relationships that these parties maintain with the Adivasis in the context of resource utilisation. The concerned parties are directly or indirectly causing deprivation, dispossession and marginalisation of Adivasis in India. All these parties are trying to maintain trade-­off relationships with Adivasis. Such attempts have become more prominent in the age of resource scarcity. In the name of extending preferential considerations to the Adivasis, the state controls resources of Adivasi areas (Xaxa 2005) and wants to keep them under its shadow (Shah 2010). The state’s policies do nothing more than creating ethnic deprivation of communities (Mohanty 2014), and the Adivasis are more prone to such deprivation. MNCs are involved in extracting resources from the Adivasi region. The insurgent groups intrude the Adivasi areas in the cloak of providing alternative governance. In short, these actors are forcefully making inroads to the Adivasi lifeworld/areas, which has proved to be incompatible with cultures, traditions and languages of Adivasi societies, thereby creating a regime of dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation. 234

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Conflicts over resources do not just occur between different communities. There are a number of cases stating intra-­community conflicts in Odisha. This is because constituents of a particular community belonging to the same ethnic and social groups depend on and use resources in their own way. Each group and individual have different levels and types of access to and control over the resources. The field research demonstrated that conflicts over resources not only take place between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants but also occur amongst the Adivasi communities. For instance, conflicts arose between the Adivasis of Gona and Bharsundi Adivasi villages of Raigharh block in Nabarangpur district. This conflict emerged from the use of forest land by the Adivasis of these villages. Similarly, Kandhas (Adivasis) opposed the Adivasis who were possibly encroaching on forest land in Dabadara Kandha village of Nabarangpur district in 2001. In Narayanpatna block of Koraput district of Odisha, the members of the CMAS targeted not only the non-­Adivasis but also the Adivasis who were opposing their activities concerning the forceful restoration of alienated Adivasi land (Ambagudia 2015). For instance, in Upargumundi on 18 May 2009, the members of CMAS destroyed more than ten Adivasi houses whose occupants were not in the benevolence of their activities. On 20 May 2009, five Adivasi houses have been targeted by the CMAS (Dharitri 21 May 2009). To put it differently, this suggests that the specific ethnic identity and distinctions among the Adivasis are becoming less significant than their common subjugated, exploited and deprived position. The Adivasis are, thus, articulating themselves along the line of resource relationship (Xaxa 2012: 180–­203). Resources have assumed critical significance in community life. Future societies are going to witness more competition and conflicts revolving around resources. Due to the scarcity of resources and privileges, communities are competing to come under an identity of a particular kind. This is because contemporary Indian society is essentially considering community identities while allocating resources. The struggle of Gujjars in Rajasthan and six ethnic communities – Ahom, Koch-­Rajbangshi, Moran, Matak, Chutiya and Adivasi (tea tribes) – of Assam to get them included in the ST (Adivasi) List can constitute an appropriate example. In a period where the Adivasis are struggling to get rid of a discriminated and marginalised position based on ethnic affiliation, various groups are struggling to enter into the boundaries of identities, which are considered to be backward. This is necessarily not because they want to experience the similar kind of discrimination, marginalisation and dispossession but because they want to 235

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acquire a certain amount of state resources and privileges of the entitlement policy based on community identity.

Future direction in researching community conflicts over resources Community conflicts over resources are not isolated phenomena. This is primarily because of the involvement of numerous agencies and actors in engendering conflicts with their implications on social, economic, cultural and political spheres in the contemporary period. Various issues affect community conflicts and open a broader scope for future research in the following areas with their implications on conflicts over resources in the contemporary period: 1 The future of community relationships is going to be considerably defined in term of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and ‘native’ versus ‘outsiders’ along the line of resources. So, future research on community relationships should take up these issues and address the questions, why ethnic identities which communities perhaps had contemplated for so long are now becoming less significant? Why do the Adivasis have to involve themselves in conflictual relationships with various parties to reinstate, promote and protect their rights over resources in India? 2 The concept of development has attracted increased research attention in the contemporary period and has essentially become a contested notion. Such contentious dimension of development has become more prominent and limited consensus exists on the popular legitimacy of the idea of development. The volatile nature of development is because of either attempting to impose the dominant model of development from the above or addressing the local concerns with less sensitivity. The decision of the state to rehabilitate the Bengali migrants in Adivasi region is one such example. Thus, the thrust of development in India essentially marginalises the Adivasis. So, the future study needs to engage with the notion of development more democratically by considering the views of different stakeholders. There is a need for micro-­level research to address some of the intricate questions: how does development actually benefit various stakeholders? What do the Adivasis at the grassroots level mean by development? What kind of development the Adivasis really want? Do the Adivasis have any say in decisions that critically affect their society on a short-­and long-­term basis? Can development be a source of community conflicts in India? 236

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3 Community conflicts also emerge due to the scarcity of resources. MNCs are actively engaged in extracting resources from the Adivasi region and opening the scope for stiff competition. However, the MNCs claim that they provide economic opportunities to the local communities. In this context, micro-­level study is needed to understand why does the state facilitate the entry of corporates and what are the impacts of these initiatives on society? How many jobs have the corporates provided to the local communities of the areas in which they have operated? What are the pros and cons of the entry of corporates on ecology, environment, river, natural resources and local communities? 4 There is also a need to study the changing relationship between the Adivasis and political parties. Does the affiliation of Adivasis to political parties benefit them? If affirmative, to what extent political affiliation addresses the issues and concerns critical to Adivasi society? Whether Adivasis really wanted to be affiliated with political parties? What kind of negotiation do the Adivasis make with political parties while addressing critical issues of development, dispossession, deprivation and marginalisation? Do they behave cohesively and as ‘a bloc’ during elections? Or, are political supports to political parties more of a community faction? Since political parties maintain a patron–­client relationship, how do the Adivasis respond to such a relationship? 5 Numerous intricate issues grapple with the contemporary Adivasi movements. Research is needed to comprehend various problems and concerns raised by Adivasi movements in the contemporary period. Why does the leadership of Adivasi movements more often come from either civil society organisations or social activists or non-­Adivasis? Why have the Adivasis failed to develop leadership in themselves in carrying out their movements? What kind of role do these leaders play in engendering or addressing community conflicts over resources? What kind of role a civil society plays in fuelling or resolving conflicts? 6 Although the relationship between the Adivasis and Naxalites has attracted increased research attention, there is, however, little consensus exists on Adivasis’ support to Naxalites? Do the Adivasis support the Naxalites voluntarily? The present study provides one such example to understand the nature and dynamics of Adivasis’ support towards Naxalites. However, there is a need to conduct similar studies, in fact, comparative studies, on the changing relationship between the Adivasis and Naxalites in different parts of the country to comprehend the ground reality. 237

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7 Since various agencies/actors perpetuate conflicts, studies are needed to address, what roles do the non-­Adivasis play in unleashing community conflicts over resources? 8 Since conflicts occur in relation to various resources, they are uneven in nature and pattern. There is a need to understand, why some resources are prone to more conflicts and fewer conflicts are invisible in other areas? For instance, the preferential considerations in politics (political resource) seem to be less conflictual than the other two areas such as higher education and government employment where special considerations are also practised. Community conflicts over preferential considerations in education and public employment are also visible with the frequent involvement of institutions such as the judiciary in deciding the future of such practices in India.

Notes 1 The Bada Yatra is literally translated as grand festival celebrated by different tribal communities of Malkangiri district in Odisha. Three mysterious deities, such as Kanamraju, Potraju and Balraju, are primarily worshipped by the Adivasi communities, but other communities irrespective of their caste, class, colour, sex and so on also participate in the festival enthusiastically. 2 Jagabandhu Majhi was the vanguard of conflicts between the Adivasis and Bengali migrants in Nabarangpur district in 2001.

238

Appendix I LIST OF HILL TRIBES OF KORAPUT

Sl. Name of castes notified as Hill Tribes no. of scheduled tribes with sub-­caste 1

Bagata

2

Bhottadas –­ Bodo Bhottada, Muria Bhottada, Sano Bhottada Bhumias –­ Bhuri Bhumia, Bodo Bhumia Barangi Jodia Bissoy –­ Binangi Bissoy, Daduva Bissoy, Frangi Bissoy, Hollar Bissoy, Jhoriya Bissoy, Kollai Bissoy, Kondi Bossoy, Paranga Bissoy, Pangajodia Bissoy, Sodojodia Bissoy, Takoda Bissoy Bato Gaudas Bhiritiya Gaudas Baiga Bangara or Banjari Bathudi Bhuya or Bhuyan Binjal Binjhia or Binjhoa Birhor Bhumij Bhunjia Chenchu Domb –­ Andhiya Dombs, Adhinia Dombs, Chandal Dombs, Christian Dombs, Mirgani Dombs, Oriya Dombs, Ponaka Dombs, Telega Dombs, Umania Dombs

3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Period or periods when they were treated as Hill Tribes or Adivasis 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-1927 4-­7-­1927 to up to date 1-­3-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 1-­3-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950

18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­1927 4-­7-­1927 to 13-­1-­1943

(Continued)

239

Sl. Name of castes notified as Hill Tribes no. of scheduled tribes with sub-­caste

Period or periods when they were treated as Hill Tribes or Adivasis

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­1927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­1927 4-­7-­1927 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to up to date

27 28 29 30 31 32

Dhakkada Dudhokouria Gaudas Dal Desua Bhumij Dharua Didayi Ghasis –­ Bodo Ghasi, Sano Ghasi Gonds –­ Madya Gond, Rajo Gond Gadaba –­ Bodo Gadaba, Cerllam Gadaba, Franji Gadaba, Jodia Gadaba, Olaro Gadaba, Pangi Gadaba, Paranga Gadaba Ghara Gorait or Korait Gandia Ho Hato Gaudas Holva

33 34

Juang Jadapus

35

Jatapus

36 37 38

Jatako Gaudas Juria Gaudas Kosalya Gaudas –­ Bisothoriya Gaudas, Chhiti Gaudas, Dangayat Gaudas, Dodukomariya Gaudas, Dudu Kamoro Gaudas, Ladiya Gaudas, Pullosoriya Gaudas 1-­3-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 Khatis –­ Khati, Kommaro, Lohara Kodu 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 Kommar 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 Konda Dora 25-­1-­1918 to 28.2.1927 4-­7-­1927 to up to date Konda Kapus 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­1927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to up to date Kandhas –­ Desaya Kondh, Dangaria Kondh, Kotia Kondh, Tikiria Kondh, Yenity Kondh, Nanguli Kondh, Sitha Kondh

25 26

39 40 41 42 43 44

6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to 25-­9-­1956 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 23-­7-­1918 to 28-­2-­1927 4-­7-­1927 to up to date 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 1-­3-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950

Sl. Name of castes notified as Hill Tribes no. of scheduled tribes with sub-­caste

Period or periods when they were treated as Hill Tribes or Adivasis

45

25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1956 to up to date

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

Kotia –­ Bartika, Bentho Oriya, Dulia or Dhulia, Holva Paik, Putiya, Sanorana, Sidho Paika Koyas

63

Kawar Kharia or Kharian Kharwar Kisan Kolan-­Kol-­Loharas Kolha Koli including Malhar Kora Korua Kulia Kandha Gauda Kol Kulis Lodha Malas or Agency Malas or Valmies Malis –­ Korchia Malis, Paiko Malis, Pedda Mates Maune

64

Manna Dora

65

Mukha Dora or Nooka Dora

66

Muli or Mulia

67 68 69 70 71 72

Muria Mahali Mankidi Mandirdia Mirdhas Munda –­ Munda Lohara, Munda Mohalia Mundari Madia Matya Magatha Gaudas –­ Bennia Gaudas, Bodo Magatha, Dangayat Gaudas, Ladya Gaudas, Ponna Magatha, Sana Magatha

62

73 74 75 76

25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to 24-­9-­1956 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950

(Continued)

Sl. Name of castes notified as Hill Tribes no. of scheduled tribes with sub-­caste

Period or periods when they were treated as Hill Tribes or Adivasis

77 78

Mugal Gaudas Ojulas or Metta Kansalis

79 80 81 82

Omanaito Oraon Omanatya Paigarapu

83

Palasi

84

Palli

85

Pentias

86

Pydi

87 88

89

Parenga Paraja –­ Bodo Paraja, Bonda Paraja, Daruva Paraja, Didua Paraja, Jodia Paraja, Mundili Paraja, Pengu Paraja, Saliya Paraja Reddi Doras

4-­7-­1927 to 17-­6-­1931 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­1927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 1-­3-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­1-­1918 to up to date

90

Relli or Sachandi

91 92 93

Rajuar Ronas Savaras –­ Kapu Savaras, Khuttu Savaras, Muliya Savaras Seerithi Gaudas Santal Shabar or Lodha Saunti Therua

94 95 96 97 98

25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to 28-­2-­927 4-­7-­1927 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 25-­1-­1918 to up to date 18-­6-­1931 to 5-­9-­1950 6-­9-­1950 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 25-­9-­1956 to up to date 6-­9-­1950 to up to date

Source: N. C. Behuria. 1966. Final Report on the Major Settlement Operations in Koraput District, 1938-­1964, Cuttack: Orissa Government Press, pp. 244–­7.

Appendix II REHABILITATION OF BENGALI MIGRANTS IN UMERKOTE AND MALKANGIRI ZONES AS OF 31.10.1963 No. of the village

Name of the village

Date of opening

Umerkote Zone: Umerkote Area UV-­1 Badakumari-­I 21.01.1960 UV-­2 Badakumari-­II 21.01.1960 UV-­3 22.01.1960 Dangariguda UV-­4 20.05.1960 Dargaguda UV-­5 Burja 24.05.1960 UV-­6 Murtama 28.10.1960 UV-­7 05.01.1961 Nuaguda UV-­8 21.04.1960 Khutuguda UV-­9 22.11.1960 Pujariguda UV-­10 Sunabeda 01.11.1960 03.11.1960 UV-­11 Nayakguda UV-­12 22.11.1960 Khanda UV-­13 Jamrunda-­I 25.01.1961 UV-­14 Jamrunda-­II 04.12.1960 UV-­15 Sankarada 18.12.1960 UV-­16 Silati 05.01.1961 UV-­17 Mahuli 04.01.1961 UV-­18 Karagaon 17.02.1961 UV-­19 Chatiguda 02.01.1961 UV-­20 Purla 07.01.1961 UV-­21 Gobri 10.02.1961 Kodabhatta UV-­22 27.01.1961 UV-­23 Anchala 02.12.1960 Umerkote Zone: Raighar Area URV-­24 Sarguli URV-­25 Kacharapara-­I URV-­26 Kacharapara-­II URV-­27 Dumrimunda URV-­28 Gurusingha Mohand URV-­29

31.01.1961 28.02.1962 29.03.1962 23.12.1961 28.12.1961 10.03.1962

No. of families No. of persons in position 50 49 49 45 47 70 60 86 40 27 43 50 47 68 53 64 40 79 61 79 49 54 41

226 224 241 219 208 313 286 385 152 136 180 239 195 287 254 275 164 334 279 358 160 253 181

74 44 50 96 102 98

359 209 206 427 427 401 (Continued)

243

No. of the village

Name of the village

Date of opening

No. of families No. of persons in position

URV-­30 URV-­31 (a) URV-­31 (b) URV-­32 URV-­33 URV-­34 URV-­35 URV-­36 URV-­37 URV-­38 URV-­39 URV-­40 URV-­41 URV-­45 URV-­46 URV-­48 URV-­49 URV-­50 URV-­51 Total

Udaypur Hatibena Biripur Hirapara Jalangapara-­I Paurbella-­I Paurbella-­II Kacharapara-­III Turudihi Jorjenga Kibikonga Parchipara Naktisimara Kusumpur Sonepur Bharsundi Chhotabeda Kumuli Chotaguda

30.01.1962 07.01.1962 11.01.1962 30.11.1961 11.02.1962 27.02.1962 24.02.1962 03.04.1962 22.02.1962 23.04.1962 30.04.1962 15.05.1962 07.02.1962 18.01.1952 25.11.1962 09.12.1961 03.03.1962 19.11.1961 24.04.1963

67 33 34 50 41 47 59 78 87 42 47 69 35 41 64 101 93 91 85 2879

288 148 146 224 208 205 302 308 378 191 192 305 150 155 279 450 433 389 361 12690

22.10.1962 21.11.1962 17.12.1962 22.12.1962 31.12.1962 16.01.1963 30.01.1963 06.02.1963 08.02.1963 14.03.1963 13.03.1963 29.03.1963 30.03.1963 19.04.1963 22.04.1963 27.04.1963 02.05.1963 04.05.1963 10.05.1963 12.05.1963 30.05.1963 03.06.1963 05.06.1963 18.10.1963

40 44 49 44 60 23 62 86 53 56 87 30 33 40 40 49 34 35 18 50 26 30 34 45 1068

179 204 202 197 276 107 296 345 219 251 354 139 122 176 177 209 133 163 80 232 107 126 147 168 4609

Malkangiri Zone MV-­2 MV-­3 MV-­4 MV-­6 MV-­8 MV-­5 MV-­7 MV-­9 MV-­14 MV-­1 MV-­15 MV-­12 MV-­47 MV-­21 MV-­10 MV-­16 MV-­11 MV-­20 MV-­44 MV-­42 MV-­45 Badli-­I Badli-­II MV-­13 Total

Source: GOI. 1963. Dandakaranya, New Delhi: Ministry of Work, Housing and Rehabilitation, pp. 25–­8, Annexure-­I.

Appendix III CARD ISSUED TO BENGALI MIGRANTS

Seal Photograph of the Head of the Family

š[¹¤àì¹¹ A¡v¢¡à¹ ó¡ìi¡àNøàó¡

Identification.................................................................. Î>àv¡û¡A¡¹o [W¡Òû¡à[ƒ Date............................................................................... t¡à[¹J Village (No, & Name).................................................... Nøà³ (>} &¤} >à³) P. S................................................................................. =à>à Zone.............................................................................. ë\à> District........................................................................... ë\ºà Signature & Designation of Issuing Authority Û¡³t¡àšøàœ¡ "[ó¡Îàì¹¹ ѬàÛ¡¹ * šƒ¤ã

245

A ppendix I I I

Personal particulars ¤¸[v¡û¡Kt¡ [¤¤¹o 1. Name of the Head of Family......................................................... š[¹¤àì¹¹ A¡v¢¡à¹ >à³ 2. Father’s/Husband’s Name.............................................................. [št¡à¹/Ѭà³ã¹ >à³ 3. Religion & Caste........................................................................... ‹³¢ &¤} ¤o¢ 4. Age................................................................................................ ¤ÚÎ 5. Occupation.................................................................................... ëšÅà 6. Month & Year of arrival in DnK Project....................................... ƒr¡A¡à¹ìo¸ ëšòïáàÒü¤à¹ t¡à[¹J 7. R. R. No........................................................................................ ë¹[\ìÊ¡öÅ> >} 8. Month & Year of indication in the Resettlement phase................. šå>¢¤àÎ> ëA¡ì–ƒø "à[Τ๠³àÎ * ¤;ι 9. Remarks........................................................................................ ³”z¤¸

246

A ppendix I I I

Personal particulars Name of other members of the family š[¹¤àì¹¹ ">¸à>¸ Î쮡¸¹ >à³

Age ¤ÚÎ

Relationship with head of the family š[¹¤àì¹¹ A¡v¢¡à¹ Î[Òt¡ δ¬Þê¡

Note: As and when any change occurs in the family particulars due to birth, marriage and death, etc. the same is to be recorded in RED INK with dated initial of a responsible officer [¤@ ‰@ –­š[¹¤àì¹ \–þμ, [¤¤àÒ * ³õt塸¹ \>¸ ™[ƒ ëA¡à> š[¹¤t¢¡> ÒÚ, t¡àÒà ÒÒüìº l¡üÒà &A¡\> ƒàÚãâ«šèo¢ "[ó¡Îàì¹¹ t¡à[¹J ÎÒ Ñ¬àÛ¡¹ ‡à¹à ºàº A¡àºã [ƒÚà [º[Jìt¡ ÒÒü줡ú

247

A ppendix I I I

Particulars of Land Allotted to the Family šà[¹¤à[¹A¡ \àÚKà \[³ ëƒ*Ú๠[¤¤¹o Nature of land [A¡ ‹¹ì>¹ \[³

Village/Police Station/District and Tahsil Nøà³/ =à>à/ë\ºà &¤} t¡Ò[κ

Plot No. Area Boundaries šÃi¡ >} "àÚt¡> ëW¡ïÒ[„

Agriculture Aõ¡[È \[³

Homestead ¤àÑñ \[³

248

Date of delivery possession ƒJº ëƒ*Ú๠t¡à[¹J

A ppendix I I I

Loan advanced by the Project šøA¡¿ šøƒv¡ ˜¡ìo¹ [¤¤¹o Purpose and nature of loan [A¡ìι \>¸ &¤} [A¡ ‹¹ìo¹ ˜¡o

Date of disbursement ¤–i¡ì>¹ t¡à[¹J

Amount š[¹³ào

Remarks ³”z¤¸

Source: Sample of the card was collected from one of the Bengali respondents during the field study in Malkangiri district, Odisha, India.

249

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271

INDEX

abduction 206, 212, 215 aboriginal people 45 aboriginals 65 – 6, 68 accommodation 19, 41n2, 80n19, 158, 229 Adimjati 52 Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha (AGMS) 9 Adivasi Mahasabha 51 Adivasi society: executive power 71; judicial power 71; legislative power 71 Agency Tracts Interests and Land Transfer Act (1917) 64, 79n9 Agency tracts of Visakhapatnam 63 Agricultural Expert Committee 99 Aguayo, Sergio 2, 21, 41n3 Ahmad, Aijazuddin 98, 101 alcohol 68; see also wine alien language 102 All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU) 37 All Assam Ahom Association 35 All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) 32, 36 All India Gana Parishad (GP) 161, 163, 191n2 All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) 166 alternative model 211, 222 Amanatya 67 – 8 Andhra-Orissa (Odisha) Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) 205, 216, 223n8 animism 45 – 6; see also tribe, tribal animist

anti-slavery society 55 Aristotle 169 Aryans 50 – 2, 57, 69 Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network 50 Assam Accord (1985) 33, 35 – 7 Assam Movement 32 Assam Sanmilita Mahasangh 35 assimilation 26, 46, 56, 215, 234 Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) 129 autochthonous community 7, 46, 227 Backward classes Commission 60 Bada yatra 234, 238n1 bad violence 217 Bagchi, Kathakali S. 68, 118 Bailey, F. G. 45, 47, 54, 76, 166 – 7, 187 Bangladesh 2 – 3, 9, 16, 22 – 4, 26 – 7, 30, 33 – 4, 42n12, 42n14, 43n15, 74, 189, 202; migrants from 21, 26 – 7, 29, 30, 34, 36, 40, 149, 156n52, 173, 188 – 9 bank 35, 124 – 5, 129, 198, 224n15; see also economic institutions; financial institutions Bannon, Ian 8, 131 Banton, Michael 190 Bardhan, Pranab 106 Barik, R. K. 30, 82, 98 – 9, 104, 119, 131, 135, 178, 187 Barnard, Alan 56 – 7 Baruah, Sanjib 9, 30, 32 – 4 Bates, Crispin 48 – 9, 51 Baviskar, Amita 8

272

INDEX

Behuria, N. C. 64, 151, 231, 242 Bell, R. C. S. 63 – 5, 70, 79n9, 79n10, 79n11, 107 Below poverty line (BPL) 199 Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation (1873) 37 Bengali migrants as moneylenders 125 Bengali migrants as political community 14, 177 – 8; Bengali migrants as sexual exporters 131; Bengali samaj 137, 140; as Namasudras 32, 75, 77, 86 – 8, 90, 94, 104, 108, 110, 114, 155n34, 177, 179 – 80, 184, 186, 193n19, 194n21; as scheduled castes 32 Benhabib, Seyla 2, 18, 178 Beteille, Andre 47 – 8, 54, 56 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 30, 34, 40, 42n12, 53, 161, 163, 171 – 3, 177, 182, 184, 187 – 9, 191n2, 192n4, 192n8, 193n16, 195n31 Bharat kalyan pratisthan 52 Bhatia, Bela 206, 211, 213 – 14, 224n12, 232 Bhaumik, Subir 9 Bienen, Henry 185 Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 139, 146, 161, 163, 171 – 3, 177, 182, 187 – 9, 191n2, 193n11, 193n12, 193n13, 195n31, 210 – 11 Bird, Karen 159 Biswal, Hemananda 165 Biswas, Nadiabasi 161, 179 Block development officer (BDO) 140 block vote system 160 Bose, A. 92 Bose, N. K. 46 Bosusco, Paolo 211, 223n8 Brahmins 48, 68, 76, 124, 154 – 5n13, 166 – 7 Brass, Paul 9, 34, 203 bribe 139 Brubaker, Rogers16 Buckles, Daniel 124, 126 Buddhist 3, 36, 42n12, 43n17, 47 caste 32, 45 – 9, 51, 54, 65 – 6, 74 – 7, 90, 102 – 4, 106, 117, 126, 132,

157 – 8, 160 – 1, 163, 165 – 70, 177, 182 – 3, 185, 193n14, 234, 238n1; see also caste discrimination caste discrimination 92, 214; see also caste Census town (CT) 110 – 11 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 144, 206, 209 – 10, 216 Centre for Indian Trade Union (CITU) 166 centre-regional conflict 7 ceremony 68, 124, 153n13 Chadha, Vivek 29, 30, 34 Chakrabarty, Bidyut 204, 207, 211, 212 Chanda Committee 50 Chandhoke, Neera 189 Chandra, Uday 57 charity 22 – 3 Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (CMAS) 170, 213, 223n6, 235 Chatterji, Joya 22, 93 Chattopadhyaya, Haraprasad 133, 194n26 Chimni, B. S. 18 Chittagong Hill Tracts 36 Christianity 47, 53; see also Christian missionaries Christian missionaries 51; see also Christianity Circle sub-inspector (CSI) 129 citizenship 12, 16 – 19, 30; Citizenship Act (1955) 28, 30, 33, 37 – 9; Citizenship Amendment Act (1986) 33, 36; Citizenship Amendment Act (2003) 28; Citizenship Amendment Bill (2016) 42n12; citizenship and India 27 – 30; citizenship law 12, 17 – 19; definition of 17; economic citizenship 17; Inclusive citizenship 31; layered citizenship 30, 33; Passport (Entry into India) Act, (1920) 28; Passport Act (1967) 28; political citizenship 2, 17 – 18; social citizenship 17; struggling citizenship 36; Suspended citizenship 32, 33, 39; universal citizenship 17 (see also rights, citizenship rights)

273

INDEX

civil society 107, 225, 227, 237n5 class 5, 33, 42, 48, 64 – 5, 71, 74, 97, 101 – 2, 136, 159, 166 – 7, 174, 208, 234, 238n1 Coates, Ken S. 54 collective support 223n6 Collier, Paul 8, 131 colonialism 48, 78n1 colonial state 8, 225 Committee of Ministers 75 Committee on the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) 45 communist ideology 204 Communist Party of India (CPI) 164 – 5, 204, 207 – 8, 219 Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI [M]) 164, 194n23, 204 – 5, 223n8, 223n10 Communist Party of India-MarxistLeninist (CPI [M-L]) 223n6 communitarian 19, 182 community versus community conflict 7 community consciousness 170, 179; we-Adivasis 174; we-Bengalis 174; we-feeling 90 community representation 158 company versus community conflict 7 conflict group 5 conflict management 91 conflict management committee 232; see also peace committee conflict prevention 144, 230 conflict resolution 13, 144, 230, 232; dialogue and 144, 232 – 3; mediation and 144; negotiation and 32, 144, 206, 210 – 11, 219, 222, 237 Constituent Assembly 45, 193n14, 215, 224n16 consumption pattern 4 contestation 1, 14, 34, 36, 43n17, 133, 157, 179, 185 – 6, 190 – 1, 226, 228 contested space 123 contractors 134, 201, 208, 211 – 12, 216 Convention 107 (ILO) 53 – 4

Convention 169 (ILO) 53 – 6 conversion 46, 53, 63, 193n9, 195n31, 229; see also reconversion Coser, Lewis A. 1, 4 – 5, 145 – 6 cultural assimilation 46, 56, 234 cultural discrimination 157 cultural diversity 1, 5, 7, 19, 56, 58, 122 – 3, 178, 228; see also cultural identities; cultural values cultural homogeneity 47 cultural identities 4, 9, 23, 27, 29, 57, 81, 189, 228 cultural mobilisation 179 cultural pluralism 19 cultural space 7, 135, 228 cultural values 6, 8, 66, 121, 221, 227 customary laws 69, 72 cynicism 125, 196 Daes, Erica-Irene 78n5 Dahrendorf, Ralf 1, 5 Dalai Lama government (DLG) 43n18 Dalit 58, 103, 136, 140, 160, 172, 179, 194n26, 201, 211; see also Dalit samaj Dalit samaj 136 – 7, 144 – 6, 155n34, 171, 193n18 Damodaran, Vinita 46, 48 Dandakaranya (DNK) Project 11 – 13, 59, 64, 76, 79n6, 81, 88, 95, 97, 98 – 9, 101 – 4, 114, 117 – 18, 121, 124, 134 – 5, 138, 140, 147, 155n32, 186, 194n26, 225, 228 – 9, 230; DNK Project and Adivasi disadvantage 97 – 104; DNK Project and Bengali migrants 84 – 6, 88 – 9, 93 – 4; DNK Project and the Adivasis 94 – 7; see also Dandakaranya Development Authority Dandakaranya Development Authority (DDA) 13, 82, 90 – 1, 105, 105n3, 131, 141, 229; chairman of the DDA 79n17, 80n18, 105n6; composition of DDA 82, 84; mandate of 13; see also Dandakaranya Project

274

INDEX

Das, Samir Kumar 27, 36, 41, 85, 92, 104 Dasgupta, Abhijit 21 Dasgupta, Pannalal 76 – 7, 86, 90 – 1, 93 – 4, 103, 105n6 Das Gupta, Sanjukta 48 decision-making process 129, 159, 173, 176 delimitation commission 159 Delimitation order (2008) 108, 186 delimitation process 159 democratic process 158, 190, 208, 229 democratic rights 208 democratic state 16, 18, 78n5, 158 – 9, 183, 202, 211, 226 density of population 15n6, 43n17, 76, 225 Department of Rehabilitation 31 detribalisation 95, 123 development funds 212 Dhali, Arabinda 161, 170, 173, 175, 177, 181 – 3, 187 – 8, 193n9, 193n16, 194n22, 194n31, 209 Dhangadi basa (girls’ sleeping hut) 69 dictate 125, 128, 212 differential citizenship 45, 169 differentiated marginality 13, 104, 229 dikus 225 direct conflict 7 discriminatory model 134 disenchantment 133 – 4, 196, 202, 212 displaced person 21 – 2, 41n5, 75, 82, 95 dissent 16, 43n17, 123, 190, 207, 218, 227 – 8 distributive justice 105n5, 169 distributive vote system 160 District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) 129, 183 District voluntary force (DVF) 215 Dobkowski, Michael 106 dominated marginality 185 donger cultivation 79n14 double crop 121, 131 double-member constituency 159 – 60, 162, 191n1 D voters 35, 40

East Pakistan 21, 23, 25, 27, 74 – 5; migrants from 2, 9, 12, 24, 27, 29 – 30, 36 – 7, 40, 64, 66, 74 – 5, 77, 78n6, 79n16, 82, 90, 190201, 227 – 9 economic boycott 37 economic disparity 5 economic institutions 124 economic uncertainty 6 economic wealth 5, 8, 226 economism 223n7 education index 108 – 9, 153n2 Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) 132 – 3 Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 132 Ekal vidyalaya 52 – 3 Elahi, K. Maudood 76, 85, 104 election boycott 32, 208 – 9 electoral reservation 158 Elwin, Verrier 50 – 1, 65, 67 – 9, 71, 78n4, 79n12, 79n13 emigration 2, 23; see also immigration; migration emotional expression 4 Engels, Friedrich 5 Estimates Committee 31, 101 ethnic composition 7, 152n1, 185 exploitation 9, 47, 51, 57, 70 – 1, 77, 78n1, 104, 126 – 7, 131, 134, 136 – 7, 152, 186 – 7, 202 – 4, 207 – 8, 216, 225 – 6, 228, 230 – 1, 233; exploitation of forest 103 Farmer, B. H. 22, 45, 75, 80n18, 84 – 5, 90 – 1, 98 – 9, 103, 105n2, 120 fear 20 – 1, 34, 74, 76 Fernandes, Walter 54, 85 Fifth Scheduled Areas 59; see also Scheduled Areas financial institutions 125 First information report (FIR) 144 Foreigners Act (1946) 28, 32, 156n52 Foreigners Order (1948) 28 Forest Protection Committee 137, 139, 155n30, 155n37, 155n38, 155n39, 155n41, 155n43

275

INDEX

group identity conflict 7 Guha, Ramachandra 8, 65, 70 Guha Thakurta, Paranjoy 172, 189 Gupta, S. K. 85, 92, 105n6 Gurr, Ted Robert 5, 105, 134, 187 Guru, Madakami 160

forest resources 8 – 9, 43n17, 70, 82, 85, 96, 98 – 9, 128, 130, 137 – 8, 147, 197, 201, 229; forest as the pillar of Adivasi economy 99, 144 Forest Rights Act (2006) 118, 168, 173, 210, 221 – 2 Forest Survey of India 103 – 4 formal and informal network 90 Francis, W. 107 Freitag, Sandria B. 234 friends of tribal society 52 Froerer, Peggy 68 Galanter, Marc 49 Ganapati 211 Ganatantra Parishad (GP*) 161, 163 Gandhi, Indira 30, 78n2 Gandhi, Rajiv 32 Ganjam and Visakhapatnam Act (1839) 63, 79n9 Ganpathi 223n7 Gender Development Index (GDI) 108 – 9, 153n2 general secretary 189, 211, 223n7 geographical dimension of community 3 geographical isolation 45 – 6, 50 Ghurye, G. S. 46 – 7, 52, 54 Gibney, Matthew J. 19 – 20 Gomango, Giridhar 165, 192n4 governance 54, 57, 152n1; alternative governance 211, 221 – 2, 224n13, 234 Government of Arunachal Pradesh (GOAP) 36 Government of India (GOI) 11, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31 – 2, 38, 41, 47, 49 – 51, 58 – 9, 65, 72 – 3, 75, 78, 82, 84, 88, 90, 95, 97, 114, 122, 130, 160 – 1, 163 – 4, 171, 191, 193, 198, 200, 206, 212, 222 – 3, 227 – 8 Government of Odisha (GOO) 11, 58, 60, 61, 66, 68, 86 – 7, 96, 102 – 3, 109, 112 – 16, 132, 134, 152 – 3, 177 Government of West Bengal (GOWB) 25, 41n5 Governor of Assam 33 green hunt operation 215 group entitlement 104

Haat (weekly market) 123 Haragopal, G. 210 – 11, 219 Hardiman, David 51, 68 Harriss, John 206, 214 Haynes, Douglas E. 202 health index 108 Held, David 158 highlanders 65 – 8 Hikaka, Jhina 211, 223n8 Hindu civilisation 47 Hinduisation 46, 67 Hindu Mazdoor Sangh (HMS) 166 Hindus 23, 30, 34 – 5, 66, 74 – 5, 157, 166; Assamese Hindus 33 – 4 Hindutva ideology 192n8 Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 7, 153n1 Horowitz, Donald 5, 104, 158 Human development index (HDI) 108 – 9, 200 human rights 18, 75 human rights violation 37, 218 human sacrifice 67 Huntington, Samuel P. 135 Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal (IMDT) Act (1983) 34, 36 illegal migration 32 – 3 Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act (1950) 29, 34, 42n11 immigration 14n1, 16, 23, 29, 64; immigration from Bangladesh 34; policy of 7; as a process 23 Imperatively coordinated associations (ICAs) 5 inclusion and exclusion 4, 17 –1   8, 50, 213 income index 108 – 9 Indian Constitution 28, 41, 49, 59, 78n2, 158, 174 Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) 166 Indian Statistical Institute 41n5 indigenous people 12, 19, 39, 45, 53 – 7, 155n34, 192n7;

276

INDEX

Draft declaration on the rights of the indigenous people 53; International year of indigenous people 53; Operational directives 4.20 on indigenous people 53; Permanent Forum On Indigenous People 53; United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) 53, 56; Working Group on Indigenous Population (WGIP) 55, 78n5 Indira-Mujib Pact (1972) 30, 39 indirect conflict 7 Inspector In-Charge (IIC) 139 institutionalised marginality 185 insurgent activities 203, 210, 212 – 13, 217, 220 Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) 133, 154n25 inter-community marriage 123 – 4 interest group 5 interlocutor 190, 210; see also mediator internal colonisation 55 international conflicts 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 29, 42n7 International Labour Organization (ILO) 53 – 4, 56 – 7 International Organization for Migration 2 interventionist state 13, 201 Isin, Engin F. 18 – 19, 40 Ivey, William Noel 201 – 2, 205 – 6, 208, 211, 220 – 1 Janata Dal (JD) 161, 163, 191n2 Janata Party (JNP) 161, 163, 179, 191n2, 192n3 Jawahar rojagar yojana (JRY) 120 Jayal, Niraja Gopal 9, 29, 33, 40, 53, 104, 166, 174, 201 Joppke, Christian 18 Kalekar Commission 50 Kandha 9, 58, 61, 65, 67 – 8, 70, 132, 235 Kandhamal 9, 59 – 60, 62, 64, 72 – 3, 87, 109, 205, 223n8 Kannaya, Naka 161, 179, 182

Kanungo, Pralay 52, 166 Kaptai Hydro Electric Project 36 Karlsson, Bengt G. 54 – 5, 78n5 Karstedt, Susanne 190 Kartami, Nanda Kumar 210 Kennedy, Jonathan 48, 57, 206, 212, 218, 220, 224n17 Kenrick, Justine 55 – 6 Khan, Liaquat Ali 29 Kolarian race 65 Kolers, Avery 93, 105n5 Kornel, Das 89, 117, 129, 131, 133 Kothari, Rajni 165, 168 Krishna, R. Vineel 210, 212, 215 Kshatriyas 77, 166 Kudaisya, Gyanesh 22, 31, 75, 80n18, 88, 91, 93, 105n6 Kunnath, George K. 214 Kuper, Adam 54 – 5 Kymlicka¸ Will 18 – 19, 158 labour/labourer 52 – 3, 56, 66, 69, 84, 117, 126, 127, 216 Lama, Dalai 37 landlords 78n1, 79n9, 202 – 3, 206, 216, 223n2 land mining 212 land philosophy of life of Adivasi life 231 language policy 102 languti 121 legalism 223n7 Lewis, Jerome 55 – 6 Liaquat-Nehru Pact 29 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 133 literacy rate index 108 – 9 Lokayan (NGO) 55 Lok sabha 37, 95, 101, 159 – 60, 173, 192n4, 223 Lok Sabha Secretariat 31, 74, 75, 82, 85, 89, 92, 94 – 5, 97, 101 – 2, 185, 193n19 Lokur Committee 50 love affairs 124 Madkami, Somnath 210 Mahanta, Prafulla Kumar 32

277

INDEX

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 120, 205 Maize Research Centre 99 Majhi, Jagabandhu 137, 144 – 6, 155n35, 155n44, 156n46, 156n47, 163, 168, 171, 189, 193n12, 210, 234, 238n2 malaria 68, 82 Malkangiri Potteru village (MPV) 11, 118, 131, 153n6, 153n11, 154n17, 154n22 Malkangiri village (MV) 11, 123 – 4, 132, 170, 192n8, 204 Manor, James 166 marginalisation 1, 5, 9, 12, 13 – 14, 39, 51, 56 – 7, 70, 77, 78n1, 122, 127 – 8, 134, 136 – 7, 141, 157 – 9, 167, 187, 190, 196 – 7, 200 – 4, 214, 216 – 17, 221, 225 – 6, 228, 230 – 2, 234 – 5, 237; Cultural marginalisation 13, 187, 226, 228; economic marginalisation 70, 130, 152; historical context of 55; political marginalisation 157, 185 – 6, 190, 229; process of 77, 158; structural marginalisation 202 Marichjhapi 93 marriage by capture 69 Marshall, T. H. 17 Marx, Karl 5 Marxist-Leninist 204 Mattiyas 88 McMillan, Alistair 48, 158, 160 mediator 144; see also interlocutor Member of legislative assembly (MLA) 160 – 3, 173, 189, 206, 210 – 11, 222 Memorandum of understanding (MoU) 193n11, 210, 218 – 19 middle class 33, 74, 102, 136, 167, 208 migration 1, 12, 14 – 15n1, 15n2, 15n4, 16 – 19, 21, 28, 30, 32 – 4, 39, 64, 70, 135, 186; causes of migration 7; definition of 2; international migration 12; inter-state war causes migration 3; meaning of 2; migration as a

process 2; national migration 7; see also emigration; immigration Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act (2012) 224n17 mining 9, 193n11, 210, 218 – 19 Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) 84, 203, 223n3, 223n5, 223n10 Ministry of Supply and Rehabilitation 31 Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MTA) 50, 154n25, 166 Modi, Narendra 34 Mohanty, Dandapani 210 Mohanty, Manoranjan 107, 127, 143, 166, 234 Mohua flower 68; see also alcohol moneylender 69, 78n1, 79n9, 203 – 4, 208, 216 Mother Indian Language (MIL) 102 Mukherji, Nirmalangshu 164, 197, 205 – 6, 211, 223n7 Multinational corporations (MNCs) 9, 127, 144, 193n11, 197, 210, 217 – 19, 225, 228, 234, 237 munda race 65 museum specimen 50 Nagalim 55 Namasudra 32, 75, 77, 86 – 8, 90, 94, 104, 108, 110, 114, 155n34, 177, 179 – 80, 184, 186, 193n19, 194n21 Narayanpatna 9, 170, 202, 210, 222, 235 National Council of Applied Economic Research 82 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 42n12 National Development Council (NDC) 81 National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 38 National Mineral Policy (2008) 224n17 National Register of Citizens (NRC) 35, 42n12 National socialist council of Nagaland 55 nation-building process 2, 55

278

INDEX

Navlakha, Gautam 218 Naxalites 14, 164 – 5, 168, 181, 196 – 224; Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee 205; Guerrilla 196, 204 – 5, 211, 219; Insurgent mission 208; as a means of political disempowerment 208; Naxalite movement 202, 204; Naxalite politics 10, 14, 196 – 7, 202 – 6; Naxalites and Adivasis 206 – 14; Naxalites and fear 196, 207 – 8, 212 – 13; Naxalites and good violence 207 – 8, 217; Naxalites and multinational corporations 217 – 20; Naxalites and police informer 212 – 13, 217; Naxalites: Extortion 211, 223n9; Naxalite-state interface 214 – 17; pamphlet of 218; Surrendered naxalites 213 – 14, 224n13 negotiation 32, 69, 144, 164, 206, 210 – 11, 219, 222, 237 Nehru, Jawaharlal 29, 36 Non-governmental organisation (NGO) 55, 212, 226 non-state actors 225 – 6 non-state service provider 52 North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) 36 – 7 Notified Area Council (NAC) 110 Odisha Administrative Service (OAS) 129 Odisha University of Agriculture and Technology (OUAT) 99 old generation 122, 126, 208 Orissa (Odisha)–Andhra Joint Committee (OAJC) 205 Pai, Sudha 136 Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) (1996) 173 Panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) 184, 186, 229 Panda, Sabyasachi 223n8 Pande, Rohini 168, 173 paper citizen 36 paradoxical space 211 parliamentary democracy 208 partially excluded areas 45

Particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs) 58 partition 2, 12, 21 – 3, 27 – 30, 34, 36, 39, 41n4, 74 – 5, 78n6, 82 past discrimination 158 Pati, Biswamoy 46 – 8, 78n1 Patnayak, D. P. 103 Patra, Gananath 223n6 patta rights 86, 92, 125, 137, 140 – 1, 153n5, 155n42, 168, 183, 210, 222 peace committee 138, 232 People’s war group (PWG) 204 – 5, 209 Phillips, Anne 174 Planning commission 79n17, 105n1 podu cultivation 79n14 Polavaram project 210 policy of isolation 47 political activism 49 political broker 187 political community 2 political contestation 14, 157, 179 political exclusion 158 political institution 7, 16, 74, 106, 153n1, 157 political power 5, 8, 136, 185, 194n27 political power structure 226 political reservation 48, 77, 127 – 8, 158 – 9, 161, 166, 172, 173 – 4, 177 – 8 politics of number 7, 108, 185 politics of people 213, 224n12 politics of representation 176 pollution and purity 126 post-colonial state 49 Potteru 11, 99, 209 Potteru irrigation project 11, 85, 99, 114, 130 Potteru Resettlement Scheme 85 Poundra Kshatriyas 77 poverty 8, 61, 199, 221 poverty ration 199 powerlessness 157, 191 Pradhan mantri sadak yojana (PMSY) 120 Prakash, Gyan 185, 202 Pratyantavasinah 64 preventive strategies 231

279

INDEX

Prime Minister’s Rural Development (PMRD) fellow scheme 205 primitive society 47 proactive policies 231 protection 19, 22, 28, 137 – 8, 210, 222; British and Adivasi protection 47; constitutional protection 49; humanitarian protection 29; international protection 20, 28; legal protection 21 protection money 211 Provincial Legislative Assembly 48 Public distributive system (PDS) 187 puja 58, 68, 124, 135 quasi-group 5 Quit Arunachal Pradesh notice 37 race 20, 65 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur 30 raja festival 135 Rao, Someswar 210 reciprocal 42n6, 232 reconversion 53; see also conversion Record of right (RoR) 125, 141 red corridor 197, 203, 207, 215 – 16, 223n3, 223n4 Registrar General of India (RGI) 50, 78n3 Registration Act (1939) 28 relational dimension of community 3 relative deprivation 5, 15n3, 105, 132, 134, 187, 190, 203 relative deprivation conflict 7 religious discrimination 3 reservation 22, 29, 141 resistance 10, 32, 34, 39 – 40, 42n12, 91, 136, 146, 177, 187, 189 – 91, 196, 202, 218, 225, 228, 230 – 1 resource scarcity 4, 10, 14, 136, 196 – 7, 201 – 2, 220 – 1, 228, 234 – 5, 237; environmental scarcity 6 – 7; geopolitical scarcity 6; physical scarcity 6; socioeconomic scarcity 6; unequal distribution 6 revolutionary movement 211 rights 9 – 10, 12, 16, 17 – 19, 29, 51, 56, 86, 136 – 7, 145 – 7, 159,

172, 176, 178, 185, 191, 196 – 7, 201 – 2, 208, 214, 216, 220 – 2, 227, 231 – 2; accommodation rights 19, 42n2; citizenship rights 16 – 18, 28 – 32, 36 – 40, 43n19, 75, 177, 183, 188, 229, 231; cultural rights 19; economic rights 18; fundamental rights 19; group rights 55; judicial rights 71; land rights 56, 68, 92, 105n3, 118, 132, 200; political rights 7, 18, 172 – 3, 180, 213; privileged rights 55; property rights 6, 203; rights over resources 56, 136 – 7, 141, 144, 147, 202, 208, 228, 230 – 1, 233, 236; resource rights 9; social rights 18; voting rights 33, 92; welfare rights 17 Roy, Anupama 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 Roy, Arundhati 218 Roy, Haimanti 22 – 3, 29 Roy, Renuka 80n19, 92 – 3 Roy Burman, B. K. 48 Saddharma 64 Sadiq, Kamal 29, 33, 36, 42n14 Saksena, H. S. 45 salap (country-wine) 67 – 8 Samaddar, Ranabir 17 – 18, 41n1 Samruddha Odisha Party 210 Sangh parivar 52 – 3 Sanskritisation 46 Sarkar, Nimai Chandra 129, 154n20, 161, 175, 182 – 3, 193n16, 193n20, 194n23 Scheduled Areas 59 – 60, 79n8 secret ballot 192n6 self-determination 2, 54 – 5 self-governance 54, 57 Sen, Amartya 189, 192n5 Senapati, Nilamani 64, 66, 69, 75, 79n11, 97, 107 Sewa Bharati 52 – 3 shadow of the state 234 Shah, Alpa 48 – 9, 51, 168, 178, 187, 206, 213 – 14, 220, 234 Shahid Diwas (martyr day) 141 Shahid Sthambh (martyr memorial) 141, 143

280

INDEX

Regulation (OSATIP) (1956) 153n5; Paharis 52; Sabara 65, 71; tribal animist 44; tribal policy 36; tribe and isolation 47, 50, 69, 103, 127, 215, 226; tribes as backward Hindus 47; see also animism Turner, Bryan S. 18 twin-language formula 102 Two-Member Constituencies (Abolition) Act, (1961) 160

shifting cultivation 70, 79n14, 79n15, 103, 201 Sidaway, Roger 6 silencing 207 simple scarcity conflict 7 Singh, Jaipal 45 Singh, Rajnath 34 single-member constituency 159 – 60 Sissons, Jeffrey 54 Skillshare International 200 sons of the soil 51, 56 – 7, 100, 136 Soysal, Yasemin 18 – 19, 40 Special operation group (SOG) 215 Spencer, Sarah 2 Srinivas, M. N. 46 state versus community conflict 7 state machinery 17, 144, 148, 158, 177, 206, 211, 216 Suhrke, Astri 2, 21, 41n3 Sundar, Nandini 52, 216 Supreme court 16, 34, 35, 38 Swain, P. K. 212 Swu, Isak Chishi 55 Tamil migrants 2 – 3, 13, 132 – 4, 154n25, 154n26, 230 – 1 Tan, Tai Young 22, 31, 75, 80n18, 93, 105n6 tea garden 52, 64, 79n11 terrace bonding 85 terror 208 Tilly, Charles 222 tribe (Adivasis) 44 – 8; backward tribes 45, 48, 65; Baiga 239; Bhatra 68; Bhottods 65; Bhumia 65, 68, 71, 239; Bonda 58, 67 – 8, 70 – 1, 242; colonial understanding of tribe 44, 48 – 9; Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order (1950) 49; Gadaba 61, 65, 70; Gond 46, 62, 65, 68; hill and forest tribes 44 – 5; hill tribes 64 – 6; primitive tribes 45, 58; Janjati 52, 57; Khasi 47; Koya 61, 65 – 6, 70 – 1, 98 – 9, 124, 129; Mizo 47; Naga 9, 47, 55; National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) 50, 78n3, 154n25; Orissa Scheduled Area Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes)

Udbastu Unnayanisila Samity 90, 92, 93, 105n4 Umerkote Raigharh village (URV) 11, 138 Umerkote village (UV) 11, 118, 120, 155n28, 155n32, 155n33, 147, 153n4, 153n10, 154n19, 194n27 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 224n10 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 22, 25, 27, 42n8 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 34 UN Refugee convention 20, 21, 28, 29 unwelcome competitors 7, 187 US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) 24, 29 Utkal Congress (UTC) 161, 163 – 4, 191n2, 192n3 Vanvasi 44, 52, 57 Vanvasi kalyan ashram (VKA) 52, 53 Vanvasi kalyan parishad (VKP) 52 Vedic civilisation 52 village council 71 – 2 Village level workers (VLWs) 120 Visakhapatnam 63, 70, 79n9, 107, 210 Vivekananda kendra 52 vote buying 192n6 wage 96 wage discrimination 208 Wallimann, Isidor 106

281

INDEX

Weiner, Myron 3, 5, 7, 9, 29, 34, 51, 57, 135, 164 – 5, 181, 185, 191n1 wine 68; see also alcohol; MOHUA flower Wood, Patricia K. 19, 40 World Bank 50, 53, 197, 201, 221 Xaxa, Virginius 45 – 6, 54 – 5, 57, 102 – 3, 136, 173, 201, 226, 234 – 5

Young, Iris Marion 45, 159, 169 zamindar 46, 64, 78n1, 167 Zamindar, Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali 29 Zilla Parishad 144, 146, 184, 210 Zolberg, Aristride R. 2, 21, 41n3

282