Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics 9780198807933, 0198807937

Table of contents :
Cover......Page 1
Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Contents......Page 6
Abbreviations......Page 10
Chronology of Selected Writings......Page 12
Acknowledgements......Page 16
Introduction......Page 18
Existing Literature......Page 19
Scope......Page 21
General Theses......Page 23
Overview......Page 27
1.2.1 Antiquity: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine......Page 30
1.2.2 The long Middle Ages: Averroes to Suárez......Page 35
1.2.3 Descartes......Page 37
1.3.1 British Aristotelianism......Page 38
1.3.2 British natural philosophy......Page 40
1.3.3 British Platonism......Page 41
1.3.4 British materialism......Page 44
1.4 The Wider British Seventeenth-Century Scene......Page 45
2.1 Introduction......Page 48
2.2 Sketching More’s Life and Works......Page 49
2.3 More’s Evolving Views on Time and Duration......Page 50
2.4.1 More on ‘nullibism’ and ‘holenmerism’......Page 57
2.4.2 More’s mature asymmetric account of God’s presence in space and time......Page 60
2.5 The Development of More’s Early Views on Time......Page 62
2.6 Understanding More’s Mature Absolutism......Page 68
2.7 The Influence of More’s Account of Absolute Duration......Page 73
3.2 Jan Baptist van Helmont’s Platonic Time......Page 75
3.3 Pierre Gassendi’s Space and Time Absolutism......Page 77
3.4 Walter Charleton and the Reality of Time......Page 80
4.1 Introduction......Page 85
4.2 Sketching Barrow’s Life and Works......Page 86
4.3 Barrow’s Texts on Space and Time......Page 89
4.4.1 The first reading: Barrow lacks a deeper metaphysics of space and time......Page 94
4.4.2 The second reading: identifying space and time with God’s attributes......Page 95
4.4.3 The third reading: space and time as unreal containers......Page 98
4.5.1 Barrow as a modal relationist......Page 99
4.5.2 Modal relationism in Barrow and Leibniz......Page 101
4.5.3 An objection to reading Barrow as a modal relationist......Page 105
4.6 Barrow, Newton, and Leibniz......Page 108
5.2 New Gassendist and Morean Absolutists......Page 110
5.3 Emerging Critics of Absolutism......Page 113
6.1 Introduction......Page 121
6.2 Sketching Newton’s Life and Works......Page 122
6.3 The Existing Scholarship on Newtonian Time and Space......Page 124
6.4 A New Causation Reading of De Gravitatione......Page 127
6.5 God’s Presence in Time and Space......Page 136
6.6 After De Gravitatione......Page 141
7.1 Introduction......Page 142
7.2 Sketching Locke’s Life and Works......Page 143
7.3.1 Locke’s 1671 Draft B......Page 145
7.3.2 Locke’s 1676–1678 journals......Page 146
7.3.3 Locke’s 1685 Draft C......Page 151
7.4 A Newtonian Interlude: Locke, Newton, and the 1687 Principia......Page 154
7.5.1 Reading Locke’s 1690 Essay as explicitly neutral......Page 157
7.5.2 Undermining the absolutist reading of Locke’s 1690 Essay......Page 158
7.5.3 Reading Locke’s 1690 Essay as implicitly relationist......Page 164
8.2 New Gassendist, Morean, and Newtonian Absolutists......Page 167
8.3 New Critics of Absolutism......Page 170
9.1 Introduction......Page 173
9.2 Sketching Clarke’s Life and Works......Page 174
9.3.1 The existing scholarship......Page 177
9.3.2 Clarke’s 1704 A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God......Page 178
9.4 Another Newtonian interlude: the 1706 Optice and 1713 Principia......Page 180
9.5.1 Clarke’s 1713–1719 letters on time and space......Page 181
9.5.2 Clarke’s post-1719 texts on time, space, and deity......Page 189
9.6.2 Why Clarke’s God is not extended, nor nullibist......Page 193
9.6.3 Clarke’s holenmeric God......Page 196
9.7 In Summary: Clarke, More, and Newton......Page 197
10.1 Introduction......Page 199
10.2.1 New British absolutists 1704–1731......Page 200
10.2.2 New British critics of absolutism 1704–1731......Page 204
10.2.3 Edmund Law’s 1731 Essay and the storm that followed......Page 207
10.3.1 Sketching Jackson’s life and works......Page 213
10.3.2 Jackson’s 1734 The Existence and Unity of God......Page 215
10.3.3 Absolutism and eternalism......Page 219
10.4 After 1734: The Debate Rolls On......Page 220
Conclusion......Page 224
Bibliography......Page 228
Index......Page 246

Citation preview

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Absolute Time

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Absolute Time Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics

Emily Thomas

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Emily Thomas 2018 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2018 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2017957995 ISBN 978–0–19–880793–3 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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Contents Abbreviations Chronology of Selected Writings Acknowledgements

ix xi xv

Introduction

1 2 4 6 10

Existing Literature Scope General Theses Overview

1. Scene Setting: Time, Philosophy, and Seventeenth-Century Britain 1.1 Introduction 1.2 A Cook’s Tour of the History of Time: From Plato to Descartes 1.2.1 Antiquity: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine 1.2.2 The long Middle Ages: Averroes to Suárez 1.2.3 Descartes 1.3 Time in Early Seventeenth-Century British Philosophy 1.3.1 British Aristotelianism 1.3.2 British natural philosophy 1.3.3 British Platonism 1.3.4 British materialism 1.4 The Wider British Seventeenth-Century Scene

2. Henry More and the Development of Absolute Time 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Introduction Sketching More’s Life and Works More’s Evolving Views on Time and Duration More’s Evolving Views on Divine Presence in Space and Time 2.4.1 More on ‘nullibism’ and ‘holenmerism’ 2.4.2 More’s mature asymmetric account of God’s presence in space and time 2.5 The Development of More’s Early Views on Time 2.6 Understanding More’s Mature Absolutism 2.7 The Influence of More’s Account of Absolute Duration

3. A Continental Interlude: Time in van Helmont, Gassendi, and Charleton 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Introduction Jan Baptist van Helmont’s Platonic Time Pierre Gassendi’s Space and Time Absolutism Walter Charleton and the Reality of Time

13 13 13 13 18 20 21 21 23 24 27 28 31 31 32 33 40 40 43 45 51 56

58 58 58 60 63

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4. Space and Time in Isaac Barrow: A Modal Relationist Metaphysic 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Introduction Sketching Barrow’s Life and Works Barrow’s Texts on Space and Time Existing Readings of Barrow on Space and Time 4.4.1 The first reading: Barrow lacks a deeper metaphysics of space and time 4.4.2 The second reading: identifying space and time with God’s attributes 4.4.3 The third reading: space and time as unreal containers 4.5 A New Reading of Barrow on Space and Time 4.5.1 Barrow as a modal relationist 4.5.2 Modal relationism in Barrow and Leibniz 4.5.3 An objection to reading Barrow as a modal relationist 4.6 Barrow, Newton, and Leibniz

5. Early British Reactions to Absolutism: 1664 to 1687 5.1 Introduction 5.2 New Gassendist and Morean Absolutists 5.3 Emerging Critics of Absolutism

6. Newton’s De Gravitatione on God and his Emanative Effects 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6

Introduction Sketching Newton’s Life and Works The Existing Scholarship on Newtonian Time and Space A New Causation Reading of De Gravitatione God’s Presence in Time and Space After De Gravitatione

7. Locke as a Steadfast Relationist about Time and Space 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Sketching Locke’s Life and Works 7.3 Locke’s 1671–1685 Texts on Time and space 7.3.1 Locke’s 1671 Draft B 7.3.2 Locke’s 1676–1678 journals 7.3.3 Locke’s 1685 Draft C 7.4 A Newtonian Interlude: Locke, Newton, and the 1687 Principia 7.5 Space and Time in Locke’s 1690 Essay 7.5.1 Reading Locke’s 1690 Essay as explicitly neutral 7.5.2 Undermining the absolutist reading of Locke’s 1690 Essay 7.5.3 Reading Locke’s 1690 Essay as implicitly relationist

8. Later British Reactions to Absolutism: 1690–1704 8.1 Introduction 8.2 New Gassendist, Morean, and Newtonian Absolutists 8.3 New Critics of Absolutism

68 68 69 72 77 77 78 81 82 82 84 88 91

93 93 93 96 104 104 105 107 110 119 124 125 125 126 128 128 129 134 137 140 140 141 147 150 150 150 153

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9. Samuel Clarke’s Evolving Morean Absolutism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Sketching Clarke’s Life and Works 9.3 Clarke’s Account of Time and Space: Part I 9.3.1 The existing scholarship 9.3.2 Clarke’s 1704 A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God 9.4 Another Newtonian interlude: the 1706 Optice and 1713 Principia 9.5 Clarke’s Account of Time and Space: Part II 9.5.1 Clarke’s 1713–1719 letters on time and space 9.5.2 Clarke’s post-1719 texts on time, space, and deity 9.6 God’s Presence in Time and Space 9.6.1 The existing scholarship 9.6.2 Why Clarke’s God is not extended, nor nullibist 9.6.3 Clarke’s holenmeric God 9.7 In Summary: Clarke, More, and Newton

10. Last Battles over Absolutism: 1704 Onwards 10.1 Introduction 10.2 In the Shadows of Giants: Absolutists and Critics 1704 to 1734 10.2.1 New British absolutists 1704–1731 10.2.2 New British critics of absolutism 1704–1731 10.2.3 Edmund Law’s 1731 Essay and the storm that followed 10.3 John Jackson on Time 10.3.1 Sketching Jackson’s life and works 10.3.2 Jackson’s 1734 The Existence and Unity of God 10.3.3 Absolutism and eternalism 10.4 After 1734: The Debate Rolls On

vii 156 156 157 160 160 161 163 164 164 172 176 176 176 179 180 182 182 183 183 187 190 196 196 198 202 203

Conclusion

207

Bibliography Index

211 229

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Abbreviations AT

Descartes, Rene (1964–76). Oeuvres de Descartes [Vols I–XII]. Edited by Adam, C. & Tannery, P. Vrin/C.N.R.S.: Paris.

CL

Nicolson, Marjorie and Sarah Hutton (eds.) (1992). The Conway Letters: the Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More and their Friends, 1642–1684. Oxford University Press: New York.

CSM/K Descartes, Rene (1985–91). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes [Volumes I–III]. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (for Volume III) Anthony Kenny. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. H

Clarke, Samuel (1738). The Works of Samuel Clarke. Edited by Benjamin Hoadley. London.

N

Barrow, Isaac (1859). The Theological Works of Isaac Barrow. Edited by Alexander Napier. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

PP

More, Henry (1878). The Complete Poems of Dr. Henry More. Edited by Alexander B. Grosart. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh.

PW

Newton, Isaac (2004). Philosophical Writings. Edited by Andrew Janiak. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

W

Barrow, Isaac (1860). The Mathematical Works of Isaac Barrow. Edited by William Whewell. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

V

Clarke, Samuel (1998). A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, and other writings. Edited by Ezio Vailati. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

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Chronology of Selected Writings 1644 1644 1647 1648 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1655 1655 1658 1659 1664 1665 c.1664–66 1668 1670 1671 1671 1674 1675 1676–78 c.1677–79 1677 1678 1679 1683 1683 c.1664–85

Descartes Principles of Philosophy Gassendi Disquisitio Metaphysica Henry More Philosophical Poems Jan Baptist van Helmont Ortus medicinae Hobbes Leviathan Isaac Barrow Cartesiana Hypothesis Henry More Antidote against Atheism Walter Charleton Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana Hobbes De Corpore Henry More Antidote against Atheism, second edition Thomas Hobbes De Corpore Gassendi Opera Omnia Henry More Immortality of the Soule Margaret Cavendish Philosophical Letters Samuel Parker Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo Isaac Barrow delivers two sets of lectures at Cambridge, later published as Lectiones Geometricae and Mathematicae Henry More Divine Dialogues Isaac Barrow Lectiones Geometricae Henry More Enchiridium Metaphysicum Locke composes Drafts A and B of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Nathaniel Fairfax A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World Robert Boyle Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion Locke makes several journal entries on time and space Anne Conway composes The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy Spinoza Ethics Ralph Cudworth The Intellectual System of the Universe Henry More Enchiridium Metaphysicum, second edition John Turner Discourse of the Divine Omnipresence Isaac Barrow Lectiones Mathematicae Newton composes De Gravitatione

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CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED WRITINGS

1685 1687 1690 1690

1694 1696 1697 1702 1704 1704 1704 1704 1704 1705 1705 1706 1710 1712 1713 1714 1715 1715–16 1717 1718 1718 1726 1728 1731 1732 1732

Locke composes Draft C of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Newton Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Anne Conway’s The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy is anonymously published in the collection Opuscula philosophica Richard Burthogge An Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits Richard Bentley Eight Sermons preach’d at the Honourable Robert Boyle’s Lecture Joseph Raphson De Spatio Reali John Keill Introductio ad veram physical William King De Origine Mali Newton Opticks John Toland Letters to Serena Samuel Clarke delivers his first set of Boyle lectures, later published as A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God William Wotton A Letter to Eusebia Samuel Clarke A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God George Cheyne Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion Newton’s Opticks translated into Latin Optice Berkeley Principles of Human Knowledge Samuel Clarke Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity Newton Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, second edition John Jackson Three Letters to Dr. Samuel Clarke George Cheyne Philosophical Principles of Religion, Natural and Revealed. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke correspond A Collection of Papers, Which passed between the late Learned Mr. Leibniz and Dr. Clarke Newton Opticks, second edition Samuel Colliber An Impartial Inquiry into the Existence and Nature of God Newton Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, third edition Henry Pemberton A View of Sir I. Newton’s Philosophy Edmund Law An Essay on the Origin of Evil John Clarke Defence of Dr. Clarke’s Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God Edmund Law An Essay on the Origin of Evil, second edition

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CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED WRITINGS

1733 1733 1733 1733 1734 1734 1734 1735 1735 1743

xiii

John Clarke Second defence of Dr. Clarke’s Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God Joseph Clarke Dr. Clarke’s notions of space examined John Clarke Third defence of Dr. Clarke’s Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God Isaac Watts Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects John Jackson The Existence and Unity of God Joseph Clarke A farther examination of Dr. Clarke’s notions of space Edmund Law An Enquiry Into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity &c John Jackson Defence of The Existence and Unity of God Samuel Colliber An Impartial Enquiry Into the Existence and Nature of God, third edition Catharine Cockburn Remarks Upon some Writers on Morality

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Acknowledgements Metaphysical theories do not spring fully formed from the ether, and nor do books. A number of people and institutions have helped me bring this book into existence, and I offer them my sincere thanks. Over cups of tea and glasses of wine, I’ve especially received advice from Christoph Jedan, Martin Lenz, Andrea Sangiacomo, Erin Wilson, Matt Duncombe, Han Thomas Adriaenssen, Sander de Boer, Bianca Bosman, Sarah Hutton, Robin Le Poidevin, Tim Crane, Tom Stoneham, Jeremy Dunham, Jess Leech, Ori Belkind, Eric Schliesser, Carla Rita Palmerino, Geoff Gorham, Ed Slowik, and Andrew Janiak. I am also grateful for the thoughtful work of Peter Momtchiloff, and that of the other staff at Oxford University Press, throughout the publication process. The first people to read this manuscript as a whole were in fact two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press, and their detailed comments on that first (significantly rougher) draft were phenomenally helpful—you know who you are. Along the way, I have presented portions of this book at a variety of meetings, seminars, and conferences, including talks at the Ghent University; University of Cambridge; University of York; University of Groningen; Kohn Institute, Tel Aviv; Durham University; CUNY, New York; Macalester College; University of Alaska, Anchorage; and Leiden University. In addition, the book benefited hugely from a full-day CHiPhi book in progress workshop, hosted in 2015 by the University of Sheffield. I am grateful to everyone who participated in these talks. This book forms part of a larger project that was supported throughout by a Netherlands Research Council (NWO) Veni grant. It was written and revised across my time as a postdoc at the University of Groningen; as a visiting fellow at Christ’s College, Cambridge; and as a lecturer at Durham University. I am extremely grateful to all four of these institutions for their support. Appropriately, this book’s cover image is taken from an early eighteenth-century manuscript authored by a Dutchman. Two chapters of the book are partly based on material that has already been published. Chapter 2 makes use of my paper ‘Henry More on the Development of Absolute Time’ (2015, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 54: 11–19). Chapter VII makes use of my paper ‘On the “Evolution” of Locke’s Space and Time Metaphysics’ (2016, History of Philosophy of Quarterly 33: 305–326). I am

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

grateful to both of these journals for providing me with the appropriate permissions, and to their anonymous referees for improving both the articles and the requisite parts of the monograph. Finally, I’d like to thank my wonderful family, with a special mention to CT and FR. This book is dedicated to them.

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Introduction Misshapen Time, copesmate of ugly night, Swift subtle post, carrier of grislie care, Eater of youth, false slave to false delight, Base watch of woes, sin’s packhorse, vertues snare; Thou nursest all, and murthrest all that are. William Shakespeare (1594, 925–9)

As Shakespeare so baroquely describes, our lives take place in time. We are nursed in it, and ultimately we die in it. Philosophers have long asked, What is time? Traditionally, it has been answered that time is a product of the human mind, or the motion of celestial bodies. In the seventeenth century, another answer emerged: time is ‘absolute’, something that is independent of human minds and material bodies. Absolutism comes in many varieties, and some absolutists considered time to be a barely real being, whilst others identified it with God’s eternity. This study explores the development of absolute time during one of Britain’s richest and most creative metaphysical periods, from the 1640s to the 1730s. It features an interconnected set of main characters—Henry More, Walter Charleton, Isaac Barrow, Isaac Newton, John Locke, Samuel Clarke, and John Jackson— alongside a large and varied supporting cast, whose metaphysics are all read in their historical context and given a place in the seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury development of thought on time. Although Newton and Locke are by some distance the most familiar of the main cast, it will be seen that they are parts of a much larger British network. This wedge of philosophical history is interesting for several reasons. One is that absolutism raises many further important philosophical questions. What kinds of things exist? How are things created? How do they change? Is God present in time? If so, how? Another reason is that, as we shall see, the metaphysics of time together with space was one of the defining metaphysical issues of the period, discussed by philosophers of all stripes. Further, going beyond the

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INTRODUCTION

history, work on time in metaphysics and philosophy of physics continues apace today, and several current debates draw directly on the conceptual frameworks developed during this period. Finally, going beyond philosophy, another reason absolutism is interesting is that from the mid-eighteenth century onwards it has played a role in subjects as diverse as art, geology, and philosophical theology. In what follows I will place this study in the existing literature and explain its scope, before setting out its general theses and giving an overview of the coming chapters.

Existing Literature The existing literature dealing with absolute time or space in the early modern period can be roughly categorized into four groups. The first comprises general overviews of the history of philosophy of time, from antiquity onwards. As one would expect, these overviews are extremely selective, and they usually restrict themselves to relatively brief comments on some pick of the early modern philosophical giants: Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Newton, or Leibniz. To give a relatively recent example, Adrian Bardon’s 2013 A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time runs from the pre-Socratics to the present day, and selects a small group of early modern time theorists, including Locke, Newton, and Leibniz.1 In contrast, the present study deals with a much larger number of thinkers, many of whom are not well known. The second group lies at the other extreme: focused, specialist literature dealing with the work of just one early modern thinker, including their views on time or space. This literature may take the form of individual journal articles, such as Geoffrey Gorham and Edward’s Slowik’s 2014 paper on Locke’s absolutism; or monographs, such as Antonia LoLordo’s 2007 Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy. Whilst valuable in themselves, these specialist studies are not generally concerned with the wider development of time or space in this period. That said, Jasper Reid’s 2012 The Metaphysics of Henry More constitutes an important exception to this rule. The third group relates to an ongoing, multifaceted debate that draws directly on the conceptual frameworks developed during our period. One of the most famous set pieces of early modern metaphysics is a series of letters that passed between Samuel Clarke, who is sometimes read as acting as Newton’s mouthpiece, and Leibniz. As detailed in Chapter IX, Clarke defends ‘absolutism’, and Leibniz appears to defend ‘relationism’, on which time and space are identified with the temporal and spatial relations holding between bodies. 1

See also Gunn (1929), Heath (1936), Whitrow (1988), Turetzky (1998), and Jammer (2006).

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Today, a descendant of this debate continues: absolutism or ‘substantivalism’2 still battles relationism. As a result of the close connections between the early modern absolutism–relationism debate, and today’s absolutism/substantivalism– relationism debate, a number of studies dig into the former with the aim of shedding light on the latter. To illustrate, John Earman’s 1989 World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute Vs. Relational Theories of Space and Time opens by considering Newtonian absolutism; and Gordon Belot’s 2011 Geometric Possibility, a study of relationism, contains a lengthy exploration of Leibniz.3 Although fascinating, these studies rarely go beyond their tightly limited remit, and hence are unconcerned with the developmental story of early modern absolutism. Finally, there is the group of literature most relevant to this study: wideranging explorations of the early modern period with a special emphasis on the development of the relevant metaphysics. The twentieth century saw several such magisterial tomes: E. A. Burtt’s 1924 The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, Alexandre Koyré’s 1957 From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, and Edward Grant’s 1981 Much Ado About Nothing.4 Although these studies are focused on space rather than time, many of their conclusions are important to us because so many philosophers treat time and space symmetrically. However, Burtt, Koyré, and Grant are interested in the developmental history of space in Western European philosophy more broadly, considering the work of Italian thinkers such as Galileo; French thinkers such as Descartes, Gassendi, and Nicolas Malebranche; Dutch thinkers such as Spinoza; and German thinkers such as Johannes Kepler and Leibniz. In contrast, this study focuses exclusively on British thinkers. Whilst these tomes discuss British thinkers—and the following pages will frequently engage with them—they do not enter nearly so deeply or broadly into the British context. The final piece of literature belonging to this group deserves a special mention: John Tull Baker’s 1930 An Historical and Critical Examination of English Space and Time Theories. As its title suggests, Baker’s monograph bears comparison

2 ‘Substantivalism’ is a twentieth-century term of art for a position which is usually taken to be closely related to absolutism. Sklar (1977, 162) characterizes substantivalism as the view that space or spacetime has an ‘independent reality . . . a kind of substance’. Dainton (2001, 2) writes that substantivalists would include space and time in their inventory of the world, and provides a handy pictorial representation of space as a container. Belot (2011, 2) writes that substantivalists maintain that space consists of parts and that the geometric relations between bodies are derivative on the relations between the parts of space they occupy. 3 See also Sklar (1977), Barbour (1989; 1999), Jammer (1993), and Dainton (2001). 4 If readers are wondering why I do not place Michael Edwards’ excellent 2013 Time and the Science of the Soul in Early Modern Philosophy in this group, it is because Edwards explicitly tracks the Aristotelian tradition through this period, and absolutism is an anti-Aristotelian position.

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INTRODUCTION

with the present volume: it considers the developmental history of space and time in English philosophy, and its choice of figures partly overlaps with my own. Nonetheless, there are differences. One is that Baker is concerned with English theories generally, not absolutism in particular. Another is that the present study enters significantly further into the period, discussing a far broader selection of figures and views. Additionally, it is worth noting that on many issues this study disagrees with Baker’s; for example, Baker reads Barrow, Locke, and Newton as absolutists in the style of More, and I reject such readings. Nonetheless, this study owes a great debt to Baker’s work, and to many, many other works of scholarship.

Scope This section explains the scope of this study with regard to geography, historical period, and topic. Geographically, I take ‘British’ in the early modern sense, to cover the Stuart kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the principality Wales. It will be seen that all the main figures of this study and many (though certainly not all) of the supporting cast are English. As Sarah Hutton (2015, 4) explains in her landmark British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, it is a matter of historical record that in the seventeenth century, England produced more philosophers of note than the rest of the Stuart kingdoms put together. Although Scotland had emerged as a philosophical power by the mid-eighteenth century, this study will not take us quite so far. An advantage of this geographic focus is that it allows us to study an interconnected network of philosophers, many of whom were personally acquainted. In addition to personal friendships, these philosophers came into contact through correspondence, and by reading one another’s books. To provide a few illustrations, Newton read More and Charleton closely, and engaged personally with More and Barrow at Cambridge; Newton and Clarke became close friends and were later neighbours in London; Locke read More, and developed a friendship with Newton; Clarke exchanged letters on philosophy with Jackson, which in turn led to a friendship; and Jackson made use of Locke’s texts. It is no coincidence that these figures are so closely linked; on the contrary, I have selected them precisely because of it. The process of tracing intellectual connections has led me to figures far outside of the canon, with the aim of more accurately sketching the development of absolute time in early modern British metaphysics. Although this study focuses on a tightly connected core of British figures, they were not working in a geographic vacuum from the rest of Europe. As we will see, in addition to reading books authored by philosophers living on the Continent, British philosophers sometimes corresponded through letter with their Continental contemporaries, or met them through travel. To give a few examples,

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some of our philosophers are engaging with Descartes’ identification in reality of space with material body; with Gassendi’s absolutism; with Spinoza’s perceived pantheism or atheism; and with Leibniz’s relationism. Consequently, I provide brief discussions of these issues along the way. Although this study does not offer in-depth interpretations of non-British figures, it does provide references to further literature for the interested reader. Historically, the scope of this study is roughly a century, starting from the 1640s. To be more precise, this study starts with More’s 1647 Philosophical Poems, and ends with Jackson’s 1734 The Existence and Unity of God, which I take to be the last real contribution to British absolutist metaphysics of time during the early modern period. Although this study is limited in temporal scope, our figures were no more working in a temporal vacuum than a geographic one, and many of them are responding to past understandings of time, including, most prominently, Aristotle’s. For this reason, the first chapter of this study provides a speedy and highly selective introduction to the history of philosophy of time from antiquity, again with many references to further reading. Relatedly, as absolutism about time does not pull to a complete halt in 1734, the final chapter indicates how the debate continues after this point. Moving on to the object of this study, the primary focus is (as indicated by the title) on absolutist metaphysics of time. However, its scope is wider than this in several respects. For example, I also discuss the work of two figures I read as nonabsolutists: Barrow and Locke. They are included here because they are commonly read as absolutists. As time and space are so closely linked in this period, I discuss (albeit more briefly) British absolutism about space. I also discuss various critiques of absolutism, and a number of non-absolutist positions on time advanced by British thinkers in reaction to absolutism. With regard to my discussions of the latter, I add a note. Of British philosophers writing between 1647 and 1734, four ‘giants’ stand out: Hobbes, Newton, Locke, and Berkeley. Of these giants, only Newton and Locke are discussed in detail in this study, because only Newton and Locke are commonly taken to be absolutists. Nonetheless, it might be wondered why Hobbes and Berkeley are not accorded more prominent discussions. The reason is that I simply couldn’t cover everything, and where possible I chose to focus my energies on neglected parts of the history. There is a significant amount of scholarship on time in Hobbes and Berkeley (again, these references are provided in the appropriate places for the interested reader). In contrast, as far as I am aware, there is no scholarship at all on time in the work of figures such as Margaret Cavendish, Nathaniel Fairfax, or Joseph Clarke. I take ‘metaphysics’ very broadly, in line with the way it was understood during the period: metaphysics was not clearly distinguished from subjects we might

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now label physics or theology, and consequently discussions of metaphysics frequently lead into them.5 Despite how broadly I interpret metaphysics, this study still goes beyond metaphysics in various ways. Balancing the history and the philosophy in any history of philosophy is difficult, and along the way this study aims to provide enough history—scientific, theological, social, and political—to understand the philosophy. To this end, the first chapter provides historical context as well as philosophical context, for example, discussing the development of the pendulum clock and the rise of apocalypse studies. Additionally, each of the main figures in this study receives a brief biographical sketch, which helps us to place them historically and intellectually (as well as communicating a faint impression of the people behind the ideas under discussion). Although this study will primarily be of interest to historians of philosophy and contemporary philosophers of time, this contextualization should help to render the book accessible to scholars working in related fields, such as the history of science, or philosophical theology.

General Theses In addition to the theses advanced by individual chapters, this study advances two general developmental theses. The first is that the complexity of positions on time (and space) defended in early modern thought is hugely under-appreciated. To make this point, imagine that our wedge of history is a kind of landscape that is being studied and painted. Many pieces of literature—in the first, third, or fourth groups described in Section I.1 of this chapter—are approaching this landscape from afar, painting it as part of a larger backdrop. From this wider perspective, the mountains are especially prominent, whilst the less obvious features of the landscape fade to an indistinguishable blur. Consequently, one can come away with the impression that there is nothing to this landscape except its mountains. This is especially true of the lavish literature dealing with the debate between Newtonian absolutism and Leibnizian relationism, either on its own terms or with an eye to more recent philosophy: these mountainous positions are foregrounded so exclusively that one can come away with the impression that in early modern philosophy they were the only positions ever defended.6 5

To illustrate, Descartes once happily covered the nature of the soul, the necessity of God, the formation of the material universe, and the movement of the tides in just one work—the Principles of Philosophy—and many of our British authors adopt a similarly wholesale approach. 6 For example, Earman’s (1989, 1–2) opening historical survey of the relationism–absolutism debate mentions no other positions. Dainton (2001, 2) writes that there are ‘two opposed views’ on

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Question I: Assuming reality is temporal or spatial, is time, duration, or space something?

Yes

No

Question II: Is time, duration, or space independent of human minds?

Yes

‘Void’ theory e.g. time is nothing

No

‘Idealism’ e.g. time comprises an abstract idea, or mind-dependent relations

Question III: Is time, duration, or space independent of material bodies?

No Yes

‘Absolutism’ e.g. time is identified with God’s eternity, or time is an independently existing being

‘Non-absolutist realism’ e.g. time is identified with the successive motions of real bodies, or time comprises real relations

Figure I.1. Roadmap to early modern metaphysics of time, duration, or space.

By painting this landscape from a closer perspective, resolving the blur into woods and hills and folds, this study decisively overthrows such misimpressions. As we will see, a wide range of positions on time, duration, and space are defended by early moderns. As there is so much variety, I have created a kind of (non-exhaustive) roadmap to them (see Figure I.1). Understanding the map requires some explanation, a process which will have the additional advantage of pinning down the terminology used throughout this the ontological issue of whether space and time exist: substantivalism and relationism. Having defined ‘realism’ as the view that reality has a determinate spatial structure, Belot (2011, 1–2) tells us firmly, ‘Realists about space can be either relationists or substantivalists’.

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study. Question I assumes that the world is temporal or spatial, in the sense that reality has some kind of temporal or spatial structure, such that things really happen before or after one another, or space can be said to be infinite or finite. As far as I am aware, this assumption is shared by all British thinkers during this period; it is only denied by certain idealists who hold that time and space belong to appearance, not reality.7 Question I asks whether time, duration, or space is anything at all, including a product of the human mind. Theorists who answer this question negatively are committed to ‘void theory’: the position that time, duration, and space are literally nothing, they are mere absence or (as Samuel Clarke puts it) ‘absolutely Nothing’.8 In early modern British philosophy this position seems to have been adopted by Anthony Collins and William Wollaston. Question II asks whether time, duration, or space is independent of human minds. I label thinkers who answer this question negatively ‘idealists’9 about time, duration, or space, and there is huge variety amongst them. For example, in the early seventeenth century, Hobbes describes time and space as imaginary chimeras; Hobbes is working in the major Aristotelian tradition which takes time to depend on the mind. In the early eighteenth century, Edmund Law and Isaac Watts holds that time and space are Lockean abstract ideas; Berkeley appears to identify time with the succession of ideas in our minds; and Joseph Clarke holds that time and space are mind-dependent relations, a form of relationism. It is important to distinguish these metaphysical views about what time is, from epistemological views about our knowledge of time. To illustrate, it would be consistent to hold the metaphysical view that time is absolute, and also hold the epistemological view that we obtain our idea of time by (say) reflecting on the succession of our ideas. Against the idealists, all thinkers who answer Question II positively are ‘realists’ about time, duration, or space. Question III divides these realists into two camps. Thinkers who answer Question III negatively are realists but not absolutists, and they are rather a mixed bunch. Into this camp falls advocates of the second major Aristotelian tradition on time: those who identify time with the motion, or the measure of the motion, of the celestial bodies. This camp includes thinkers such as Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway, who identify time with

7

To give an example, the early twentieth-century idealist J. M. E. McTaggart argues that in reality nothing is temporal or spatial, such that nothing really happens before or after anything else. For many further examples, see Thomas (2015b). 8 As we will see, Clarke distinguishes this view from the position that space is ‘a mere Idea’. So too do Isaac Watts and Edmund Law. 9 There is historical basis for this terminology. For example, Joseph Clarke (1734, 4) labels things that only exist in the mind ‘ideal’.

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the motions or activities of created beings. Further, this camp includes relationists such as the early Locke, who hold that time comprises mind-independent temporal relations. Thinkers who answer Question III affirmatively are absolutists. Together, these three questions underlie my characterization of absolutism as the view that time, duration, or space is independent of human minds and material bodies. Although this precise characterization is my own, I do not believe it is controversial. Many scholarly discussions of absolutism refrain from characterizing it, but those that do generally emphasize the independence of time, duration, or space from other beings.10 Although I speak of ‘absolute’ time, duration, and space with regard to many figures, some of them did not use this term, as it did not become common currency until after the publication of Newton’s 1687 Principia. Nonetheless, I do not believe any of them would object to my use of the term ‘absolute’ when it is understood to mean independent of human minds or material bodies.11 In any case, the term ‘absolute’ is widely applied in existing scholarship to theories of time predating Newton. The second general, developmental thesis of this study is that during this period three distinct kinds of absolutism emerged in British philosophy. One is ‘Morean’ absolutism, and it holds that time, duration, or space is really identical with God. On this view, time, duration, or space may be conceptually distinct from God, but, in reality, they are the same being. We will see that Henry More’s work lies at the roots of this position with regard to early modern British metaphysics. Morean absolutism can be contrasted with ‘Gassendist’ absolutism, on which time, duration, or space is really distinct from God. As my label suggests, Gassendist absolutisms have their roots in the work of Gassendi (although we will see that Gassendi’s actual position on the relationship between space, time, and God is unclear).

10 Earman (1989, 11) takes one sense of absoluteness to be that there is an absolute duration, ‘independent of the path connecting the events’. Ariotti (1973, 31) describes absolute time as ‘independent of external motion’. Ferguson (1974, 42) writes of Newton’s absolutism, ‘the status of space and time is that of substances which have their own independent existence’. Hutton (1977, 363) refers to the ‘measure of independence’ accorded to absolute time. Edwards (2013, 1) writes that absolute time is ‘wholly independent’ of anything ‘external’, including motion and the human soul. As we will see later in this section, Janiak also emphasizes independence. 11 As we will see in Chapter IV, Barrow uses the term before Newton, for example, in the context of arguing that the absolute (absolutam) and intrinsic nature of time does not imply motion. Following Newton’s Principia, Toland (1704, 12–13) describes ‘absolute Time’ as distinct from the durations of things. Later, again writing on Newton’s absolutism, Henry Pemberton (1728, 112) states that absolute time ‘considered in its self passes on equably without relation to any thing external’. All these characterizations of absolutism are compatible with mine.

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Morean and Gassendist absolutisms can be further illuminated using a useful distinction Andrew Janiak (2008, 152) draws between two kinds of absolutism about space: ‘strong absolutism’ holds that space exists independently of every entity; and ‘weak absolutism’ holds that space exists independently of all material bodies and all possible relations but depends on God. This distinction can easily be carried across to time and duration. For the strong absolutist, time or duration is independent of God such that in an utterly empty universe there would still be time or duration; in contrast, for the weak absolutist, time or duration depends on God such that in a universe without God there would be no time or duration. As should be obvious, all forms of Morean absolutism are weak. However, Gassendist absolutisms may be weak or strong: for example, it might be argued that time is distinct from God yet depends on God for its existence, or that time would exist even if God did not. The third kind of absolutism is ‘Newtonian’, and it distinctively makes use of Newtonian texts and language with regard to time, duration, and space. Newtonian absolutists began to emerge in British philosophy following the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687, but—as in Newton’s published writing—the early Newtonian absolutists do not comment on the connection between time, duration, space, and God. Later, following for example the second edition of Newton’s Principia in 1713, Newtonian absolutists follow Newton in connecting these beings, often leading to what I call Morean-Newtonian absolutism. As the study progresses, we will see that the majority of British absolutists about time were Morean or Morean-Newtonian, including John Turner, Joseph Raphson, Samuel Clarke, the early George Cheyne, Samuel Colliber, and John Clarke. Although there were Gassendist absolutists about time—such as Walter Charleton and Samuel Parker—they were very much in the minority. I suspect that Morean or Morean-Newtonian absolutism was particularly attractive to British thinkers because so many of them were concerned with the role of God in the world, and on Morean absolutism, God is immediately and intimately connected with the world.

Overview The chapters are arranged chronologically. Chapter I contextualizes this study, providing a speedy Cook’s tour of the history of the metaphysics of time from Plato to Descartes, giving an overview of early seventeenth-century British philosophy in relation to time, and briefly going beyond philosophy to introduce other developments that may have prompted increasing British interest in time. Chapter II considers the work of Henry More. It argues that More advances two

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connected accounts of time over the course of his career, and that the development of his early account was prompted by his newfound Cartesian cosmology; that More’s later account really identifies time with the substance of God; and that More’s mature work introduces an asymmetry with regard to God’s presence, in that God is extended in space but not in time. Chapter III sets out the 1640s absolutisms of Continental Europeans Jan Baptist van Helmont and Pierre Gassendi, and explores the early adoption of Gassendi’s absolutism by English thinker Walter Charleton. It argues that Charleton sets out his Gassendist position, that time is real and independent of God, less ambiguously than Gassendi. Chapter IV enters into the 1660s lectures of Isaac Barrow, and argues against existing readings of Barrow that he is not an absolutist about time but a modal relationist. Given this reading, I argue we should downplay the influence that Barrow’s account of time exerted over Newton, and consider the possibility that Barrow’s relationism was a source for Leibniz. Chapter V provides an overview of early British reactions to absolutism, between the start of Barrow’s lectures in 1664, and the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687. We will see that, even at this early point, new absolutisms were either in the style of More or Gassendi. Chapter VI brings us to the work of Newton. It focuses on the sustained metaphysical discussion provided in Newton’s early manuscript De Gravitatione, and argues that Newton conceives time and space to be causally produced emanative effects of God. Further, unlike on More’s position, Newton’s God is unextended in time and space. Chapter VII explores Locke’s views on time. There is a near-consensus amongst scholars that, as the result of Newton’s influence, Locke’s metaphysics of time and space undergo a radical shift from relationism to Newtonian absolutism. Against this, I argue that Locke remains a relationist throughout his entire career. Chapter VIII discusses the wide variety of British reactions to absolutism between the 1690 publication of Locke’s Essay and the 1704 delivery of Clarke’s Boyle lectures. Chapter IX discusses Clarke’s work itself. Against existing scholarship, I argue that Clarke’s views on time and space can be rendered clear and compatible across the course of his career. Additionally, I conclude that Clarke’s position is not that of Newton but is—in several key respects—that of the mature More. That said, the final part of this chapter argues that, like Newton and unlike More, Clarke’s God is unextended. Having discussed the work of well-known absolutists Newton and Clarke, it might be thought that this study would come to an end. However, as Chapter X shows, the British debates over absolutism only intensified following Clarke’s Boyle lectures and Newton’s 1713 Principia. This chapter tracks these debates

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and the explosion of absolutist and non-absolutist positions that were developed as a result, ultimately focusing on John Jackson’s 1734 work. I argue that, unlike all the figures we have previously considered, Jackson takes God to be extendedly present in space and time, completing the arc of thought begun nearly a century previously by More. The final part of this chapter sketches the afterlife of debates over absolutism, drawing an end to this study. The Conclusion recaps some of this study’s findings, and briefly outlines the long-lived ways that British absolutist metaphysics influenced philosophy, and fields beyond philosophy.

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1 Scene Setting Time, Philosophy, and Seventeenth-Century Britain

I saw Eternity the other night, Like a great ring of pure and endless light, All calm, as it was bright; And round beneath it, Time in hours, days, years, Driv’n by the spheres Henry Vaughan (1650, 91).

1.1 Introduction This chapter sets the scene for our study. Section 1.2 provides a speedy and extremely selective Cook’s tour of the history of philosophy of time leading up to seventeenthcentury philosophy; I focus on authors who are directly referenced by figures in this study, such as Plotinus and Descartes. Section 1.3 explores the metaphysics of time found in early seventeenth-century British philosophy. As we will see, two major Aristotelian themes recur: first, time is ideal, dependent on the mind or soul; second, time reduces to the movement, or measure of the movement, of the heavens. Having set the philosophical scene, Section 1.4 enters into the wider history of the period, discussing three non-philosophical reasons that may have played a role in increasing early modern interest in time: horology, chronology, and apocalypse studies.

1.2 A Cook’s Tour of the History of Time: From Plato to Descartes 1.2.1 Antiquity: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine Plato (c.429–347 BCE) sets out his views on time in the Timaeus, a myth-like cosmogony that explains how the universe came to be the way it is. Through the

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protagonist Timaeus, Plato (trans. 1997, Tim 29a) explains that our world is subject to becoming but it is modelled on that which is changeless. Plato (trans. 1997, Tim 38c) connects the Sun, the Moon, and five other stars to time: ‘These are called “wanderers”, and they came to be in order to set limits to and stand guard over the numbers of time’. (The Greek term for wanderer is the origin of our word ‘planet’.) Plato’s account has been read in several ways: as identifying time with the wandering of the celestial bodies; as identifying time with the measure of their wanderings; or as holding time to be wholly independent of celestial motions, a kind of absolutism.1 As we will see, Plotinus reads Plato in the latter way. Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE) work grounds two of the traditional ways of understanding time. In considering the nature of time, Aristotle argues that time is not identical to movement (trans. 1984, Phys 218b20), but there is a deep connection between time and motion. Aristotle argues that we only apprehend time through motion: when the state of our minds does not change at all—or we have not noticed its changing—we do not think that time has elapsed (trans. 1984, Phys 218b21–2). This gives us reason to believe that motion is prior to time.2 Aristotle goes on to explain what time is: [T]ime is just this—number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’. Hence time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration. An indication of this: we discriminate the more or the less by number, but more or less movement by time. Time then is a kind of number (Aristotle, trans. 1984, Phys 219b1–4).

Although scholars disagree over how to understand this definition,3 the idea roughly seems to be this: in the same way we perceive the greater or lesser by number—such as a greater or lesser number of substances—we perceive greater and lesser motion by time. 1 On the first reading, see Whitrow (1988, 41); on the second, see Von Leyden (1964, 39) and Hussey (1983, 141). Sorabji’s (1983, 70) reading falls into one of these camps but it is not clear which as he writes merely that, for Plato, time depends on celestial revolutions. On the third reading, see Rau (1953, 515). 2 A problem with Aristotle’s argument here is that he appears to move from the epistemology to the metaphysics of time. In defence, Sorabji (1983, 75) argues that this argument is ‘very plausible’ if you add two supplementary premises: changeless times would be in principle undetectable, and it is meaningless or false to posit undetectable times. 3 Some examples. Annas (1975) explains the idea that time is a kind of number by arguing that Aristotle literally equates measuring and counting. Sorabji (1983, 84–9) holds that time is that countable aspect of change; he argues against Annas and others that number is not equated with measure. Coope (2005, 85–98) argues that Aristotle understands time as a kind of universal order, and that is why he represents it as a number; she also rejects Annas’s view that Aristotle equates counting and measuring. Roark (2011) argues—against all of the above—that Aristotle conceives time as a hylomorphic compound: motion is the matter of time, and perception is its form.

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Two further aspects of Aristotle’s view are relevant to us. First, for Aristotle, time appears to depend on the soul, for Aristotle (trans. 1984, Phys 223a22) holds that numbers and times are counted, and only souls can count.4 In the parlance of this study, this is a kind of idealism about time. Second, Aristotle (trans. 1984, Phys 223b18–24) associates time with the measure of the outermost ‘celestial sphere’. This statement requires some background. In the Aristotelian universe, the earth is immobile, and it is surrounded by rotating spheres. The celestial bodies—the moon, sun, and stars—are fixed to the spheres, and the motion of the spheres explains the motion of the heavenly bodies (Aristotle, trans. 1984, Cael 289b32–3). Aristotle (trans. 1984, Cael 271b26) argues the universe is finite. The universe neither came into being nor admits of destruction (Aristotle, trans. 1984, Cael 283b22–3); it is a ‘steady state’ universe. On Aristotelian cosmology, the stars are fixed to the outermost celestial sphere, and so the movement of this outermost sphere provides an excellent starting point for our understanding of time: its movements are uniform, standard, and measurable. For example, one revolution of the sphere measures a day, and a day can be used to measure other motions, such as a sea voyage. Aristotle’s cosmology was modified somewhat at the hands of Ptolemy in the second century, whose astronomical observations revealed that the motions of the nearest celestial bodies—the moon, sun, and planets—were not perfectly circular or regular. In order to account for these discrepancies, Ptolemy introduced many more celestial spheres on which these bodies travelled.5 From then on, Aristotelian celestial reductionism identified time with the movement (or the measure of the movement) of the ‘outermost’ supralunar sphere, sometimes named the ‘primum mobile’, to which the most distant stars are affixed. In the Enneads, Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) rejects what he takes to be Aristotle’s account of time in favour of developing what he takes to be Plato’s account.6 The Enneads are somewhat obscure, but I will attempt to render them clearly. At the heart of Plotinus’ metaphysics is ‘Soul’, the divine world soul which creates the natural world; I capitalize ‘Soul’ to distinguish this notion from that of lowly, individual human souls.

4

On this see Heath (1936, 60–3), Annas (1975, 101), Sorabji (1983, 89–93), Hussey (1983, 173) and Coope (2005, 159–72). 5 For more on Greek cosmology see Harrison (1981), and Goldstein & Bowen (1983). 6 Andrew Smith (1996) provides a particularly informative discussion of the relationship between Plato and Plotinus on time; Sorabji (1983, 112–4) contrasts their views on eternity. On Plotinus’ rejection of rival accounts of time, advanced by Aristotle and others, see Heath (1936, 41–2), Clark (1944, 337–50), Rau (1953, 519–20) and Smith (1996, 204–9).

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For Plotinus (trans. 1969, III.7.3–7) eternity is the Soul at rest. He argues that we know eternity as ‘a Life changelessly motionless and ever holding the Universal content (time, space, and phenomena) in actual presence’: eternity knows no succession or change, no parts, all remains identical with itself. The idea is that there is a kind of life which admits of diversity and yet is wholly unified, such that it does not change; there can be no past or future for such a being, for it has and always will be what it is. Plotinus goes on to explain that eternity may be described ‘as God made manifest’, as God declaring what he is, ‘existence without jolt or change’. For Plotinus (trans. 1969, III.7.11) time is a ‘descent’ from eternity; there is no time in eternity but time can be created out of the concept of progressive derivation, which remained latent in the divine eternity. When Soul stirred from its rest to create the natural world, time stirred with it, involving a ceaseless succession and the discrimination of identity and establishment of difference, such that time is only the image of eternity. Plotinus compares this process to the growth of a seed: A seed is at rest; the nature-principle within, uncoiling outwards, makes way towards what seems to it a large life; but by that partition it loses; it was a unity self-gathered, and now, in going forth from itself, it fritters its unity away . . . To bring this Cosmos into being, the Soul first laid aside its eternity and clothed itself with Time . . . Time, then, is contained in differentiation of the Life; the ceaseless forward movement of Life brings with it unending time (Plotinus, trans. 1969, III.7.11).

For Plotinus, eternity is the life of the Soul ‘in repose’, containing—like a seed— all differentiation within itself. In contrast, time is the life of the Soul ‘in movement’, a moving image of eternity.7 On Plotinus’ view, the existence of time is closely tangled with the existence of the Soul: And this is how Time is omnipresent: that Soul is absent from no fragment of the Cosmos just as our Soul is absent from no particle of ourselves. As for those who pronounce Time a thing of no substantial existence, of no reality, they clearly belie God Himself whenever they say ‘He was’ or ‘He will be’: for the existence indicated by the ‘was and will be’ can have only such reality as belongs to that in which it is said to be situated (Plotinus, trans. 1969, III.7.13).

The created world stems from the moving Soul, and time is the life of the Soul in motion. As Soul permeates the world, so does time.

7 This idea is glossed in different ways in the scholarship; see Heath (1936, 43–4), Clark (1944, 351), Rau (1953, 520) and Andrew Smith (1996, 210).

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Plotinus is explicit that the motion of the heavens allows us to measure time but is not time. In this context, he writes: The Spheral Circuit, then, performed in Time, indicates it: but when we come to Time itself there is no question of its being ‘within’ something else: it must be primary, a thing ‘within itself ’. It is that in which all the rest happens, in which all movement and rest exist smoothly and under order (Plotinus, trans. 1969, III.7.12).

In this passage, Plotinus argues that time is an independent thing, ‘within itself ’; contra Aristotle, time is not dependent on motion, rather, time is that in which motion and rest occurs. On my characterization of absolutism, this counts as an absolute conception of time, as time is independent of human minds and material bodies.8 Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) is best known for infusing the (then relatively new) Christian religion with Platonic philosophy. Along the way, he produced a widely read account of time, outlined in his Confessions (trans. 1974, 228–38; XI.14.17–33). Augustine argues that God exists apart from time, such that no period of time is coeternal with God. When God created the world, God made time. This position would be taken by many later theologians, including Aquinas. Famously, Augustine expresses bafflement over the nature of time: ‘What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; but, if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know’. Augustine considers a variety of issues pertaining to the nature of time, and in this context comments on the thesis that the movements of the sun, moon, and stars are times. Augustine rejects this thesis, arguing that whilst these movements measure time, time would continue even if they ceased: if the sun stood still for an hour, an hour would have passed. Augustine concludes that time is ‘nothing but extension’ (distentionem) and it would be amazing if this extension were not ‘of the mind itself ’. Augustine’s opaque conclusion is usually read as arguing that time depends on human minds or souls, and so is not a real feature of the world; this places Augustine into one of our Aristotelian traditions. Time is a kind of extension or stretching of the soul, from the present moment into successive moments. As God does not exist in time, the temporality of our existence puts us at a remove from God.9 8

Sambursky (1959) argues that several other classical thinkers may have absolute views of time too; for critique, see Sorabji (1983). 9 See Rau (1953, 520–3), Sorabji (1983) and Knuuttila (2001). Bettetini (2001) provides an alternative reading on which Augustine—like Plotinus—holds time to proceed from the world soul. It is also worth pointing out that in De Civitate Dei Augustine seemingly advances the view that time is connected to the motion of bodies; however, it is the Confessions that our early moderns reference.

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1.2.2 The long Middle Ages: Averroes to Suárez Skipping forward to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the introduction of Aristotle’s texts during this period of Western thought saw Aristotelianism come to dominate the philosophy of time. One or both of two Aristotelian themes were defended by a wide range of thinkers: time is associated with the movements of the heavenly spheres, or time depends on the human mind. These themes can be found early commentaries on Aristotle, such as those authored by Averroes (1126–1198), Albertus Magnus (c.1193/1206–1280) and Aquinas (1225–1274).10 They proliferated throughout the Middle Ages and can be found in Peter Auriol (1280–1322), Copernicus (1473–1543), Toletus (1532–1596), Galileo (1564–1642),11 and many more besides.12 There is no space to treat the work of these thinkers properly here, but I urge interested readers to consult the references provided in the footnotes. Very gradually, from the sixteenth century onwards, anti-Aristotelian accounts of time were developed that count as absolute or quasi-absolute; these argued that time is independent of the stars, and of human minds or souls. To illustrate, I recount Sarah Hutton’s (1977) discussion of time in three thinkers: Bernadino Telesio (1509-1588), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) and Francesco Patrizi (1529–1597). Telesio’s 1565 De rerum nature argues against Aristotle that time exists independently of motion but does not explain what time is. Bruno’s 1588 Camoeracensis acrotismus argues that time is independent of motion, but it does not flow uniformly; instead, time has variable speeds according to the object with which it is joined, such that there are as many times as there are stars. Patrizi’s 1591 Nova de universis philosophia explicitly argues for an absolute account of space, conceiving it as incorporeal and extended. In contrast, Patrizi critiques Aristotle’s account of time on a number of points but ultimately accepts that time depends on motion.13 Of these thinkers, Telesio’s bare view comes closest to the kind of absolutism explored in this study.

10 On time in Averroes, see Trifogli (2000, 240–6) and Edwards (2013, 21–2). On Albertus Magnus, see Lang (1992, 125–60) and Edwards (2013, 19–20). On Aquinas, see Kneale (1960–1, 96–7) and Leftow (1990). 11 On time in Aureol, see Duhem (1985, 300–5). On Copernicus, see Doss (1970), Ariotti (1973, 31), Hutton (1977, 349) and Daniel (1981, 588–90). On Toletus, see Edwards (2013, 24–6). On Galileo, see Ariotti (1973, 36) and Torrini (2001). 12 Duhem (1985, 296–330) records several thinkers who held that if the heavens stopped rotating, all motions would cease; and that if the heavens sped up, so would time. Many more examples can be found in Hutton (1977, 347–53), Trifogli (2000), Porro (2001) and Edwards (2013). 13 In addition to Hutton, on Telesio, see Čapek (1987, 606–8). On Bruno, see Heath (1936, 84–6), Čapek (1987, 603–6), and Granada (2001). On Patrizi, see Henry (1979), who explores Patrizi’s possible influence on Gassendi and More with regard to space; and Kochiras (2012, 54–5).

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Writing around the same time as Telesio is Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). As Suárez’s work involves a number of ideas utilized in this study, I will enter into it in more detail. Suárez’s 1597 Dispuationes Metaphysicae aims to provide a ‘higher and more abstract’ discussion of ‘when’ (quando) than found in Aristotle, and it offers two senses of time. The first is ‘intrinsic time’, which involves the notion of ‘duration’. Suárez (repr. 1965, 50.1.1) argues that all singular things have duration, in the sense that a thing perseveres in its existence. For example, a tree that exists for ten years has a duration of ten years. For Suárez (repr. 1965,40.9.4), the duration of a thing is not really distinct from its existence; consequently, duration is not a substance, or an accident, or a mode of a substance. Different entities endure in different ways: the duration of God, a permanent and unchanging being, is permanent and unchanging; in contrast, the duration of successive beings like ourselves is successive, in the sense that our changing parts are spread out over time. As intrinsic time is linked to existence, effectively this entails that there are as many intrinsic times as there are existents. However, Suárez (repr. 1965, 50.9.15) allows that we can compare intrinsic times using an ‘imaginary succession’, a being of reason (ens rationis) that we conceive as an infinite extension co-existing with finite temporal extensions. This imaginary succession allows us to say that one thing has endured longer than another. Suárez’s (repr. 1965, 50.11.11) second sense of time is ‘extrinsic time’, on which an entity’s duration can be measured extrinsically with regard to something else. Although the measure that is chosen depends on human reason, as in Aristotle the best one is celestial motion. As is sometimes marked in discussions of Suárez’s ‘absolutism’, he uses the language of flow and flux to describe this imaginary succession.14 These descriptions are relatively commonplace, and date at least to the pre-Socratic Heraclitus.15 Scholars differ over how best to read Suárez’s account of time, and especially over whether Suárez’s imaginary succession is an anticipation of Newtonian absolute time. Given the text, I am persuaded by Daniel’s (1981, 595) reading, on which this succession is an imaginative, mind-dependent concept.16 For example, Suárez (repr. 1965, 50.9.15) writes, est quia illud spatium imaginarium fluens concipitur ut omnino necessarium et immutabile in suo fluxu. 15 Plato’s Cratylus (trans. 1997, 402a) states that amongst the wisdom Heraclitus offers is the thesis that ‘everything gives way and nothing stands fast’, and likens the things that are to the flowing of a river. 16 In contrast, Ariotti (1973, 34) argues that Suárez’s extrinsic sense of time is fundamental, and that Suárez reduces time to celestial motions. Against Ariotti, Diaz-Herrera (2006, 146) argues that Suárez’s work exhibits a ‘baroque profusion’ of notions of time, such that he is neither a celestial reductionist nor an absolutist. Bexley (2012) rejects all of these readings, and argues that by 14

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1.2.3 Descartes As René Descartes (1596–1650) arguably fathered ‘modern philosophy’, his work provides a suitable end point to this whistle-stop tour. To understand Descartes’ account of time, it is necessary to say a little about his substance-attribute-mode metaphysic. I will focus on the account provided in Descartes’ 1644 Principles of Philosophy (CSM I 210–2; AT VIIIA 24–6). Descartes states, ‘By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence’. Substances can be contrasted with ‘modes’, the changing states or modifications of substances; modes are dependent on their substances in the sense they cannot exist without them. To each substance belongs one ‘principal attribute’ which constitutes its nature or essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. As God is immutable, there are no modes in God, merely attributes. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the principal attribute of corporeal or material substance; and thought constitutes the principal attribute of incorporeal or thinking substance. On duration, Descartes’ Principles writes: ‘we should regard the duration of a thing simply as a mode under which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist’. However, ‘properly’ speaking, duration is not a mode but an attribute. This is because we employ the term ‘mode’ when we are thinking of a substance as being affected or modified, but duration remains unmodified in God and created things (CSM I 211–12; AT VIIIA 26). For Descartes, the duration of a thing—the time that it continues to exist—is an attribute of that thing. Descartes goes on to discuss time: Now some attributes or modes are in the very things of which they are said to be attributes or modes, while others are only in our thought. For example, when time is distinguished from duration taken in the general sense and called the measure of movement, it is simply a mode of thought. For the duration which we understand to be involved in movement is certainly no different from the duration involved in things which do not move. . . . But in order to measure the duration of all things, we compare their duration with the duration of the greatest and most regular motions which give rise to years and days, and we call this duration ‘time’. Yet nothing is thereby added to duration, taken in its general sense, except for a mode of thought (CSM I 212; AT VIIIA 27).

For Descartes, duration is an attribute that is ‘in’ enduring things. We can distinguish time from duration, where time appears to be a way of measuring distinct durations, but when we do so time is only ‘in’ our thought. To put the ‘imaginary’ Suárez does not mean ‘figment of the imagination’ but rather something that can only be apprehended through reason.

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point more clearly, duration is a mind-independent feature of things but time is not. To measure the durations of things, we compare their durations to the duration of the ‘greatest and most regular motions’: that of the heavenly bodies.17 Although how best to understand Descartes’ account of time is controversial, it certainly seems that Descartes is working in the Aristotelian tradition that takes time to be dependent on the human mind or soul.18

1.3 Time in Early Seventeenth-Century British Philosophy The verse that opens this chapter—taken from the Welsh poet Henry Vaughan’s The World—illustrates just how widespread Aristotelianism about time was in seventeenth-century British thought. This section introduces the theories of time available in the early part of this period. Two points will emerge from this discussion. First, many thinkers do not have a theory of time at all, or at least not a well worked out one. Second, many of these theories are in one or other Aristotelian tradition, even if the work of their authors more generally is not. I categorize thinkers into four streams: Aristotelians, natural philosophers, Platonists, and materialists. Although these categorizations are loose, and not exhaustive, they should themselves serve to provide a flavour of British philosophy during this period. For a more general philosophical history, I can do no better than direct readers to Hutton (2015). It is also notable that, during this period, English was becoming an academic tongue in its own right; although many of the British authors discussed in this chapter are writing in Latin, more are writing in English.

1.3.1 British Aristotelianism Let’s begin with John Swan (c.1605–1671), a somewhat obscure Church of England clergyman. In 1635, Swan published an English language encyclopaedia, Speculum mundi. It was based on an earlier encyclopaedia authored by Guillaume de Saluste du Bartas which, like earlier medieval encyclopaedias, depicts a Christianized Aristotelian system. Swan (1635, 334–9) provides an excellent example of English celestial reductionism: ‘the starres, by divine ordination, were 17 Descartes’ characterization of ‘duration’ is reminiscent of Suárez’s ‘intrinsic time’, although note that Descartes does not describe duration as time. Descartes’ description of ‘time’ is reminiscent of Suárez’s ‘extrinsic time’. On the possible influence of Suárez in this regard, see Solère (1997) and Bexley (2012); the latter reports that Descartes was thought always to carry a copy of the Metaphysical Disputations when he travelled. 18 On Cartesian time, see Gorham (2008), Schmaltz (2009), and Edwards (2013, 119–62).

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set in the heavens . . . appointed to be (as it were) heavenly clocks, and remarkable measures, by their motions defining and discerning Time and the parts there-of, as dayes, weeks, months and yeares’. Swan presents heliocentrism and the celestial spheres as facts, explaining that Sol ‘cheerfully’ rides ‘his gold-like fierie chariot, just in the middest between the Artick and Antartick Poles’.19 A day is the time it takes for the primum mobile to rotate once. Although Swan is little known today, his encyclopaedia proved popular in the period and was reprinted many times. A similarly obscure text, written in the same encyclopaedic tradition as Speculum mundi, came out the same year by a Scottish ‘Gentleman’ David Person: Varieties: Or, a survey of rare and excellent matters. Of time, Person (1635, 29) states, ‘with Aristotle, I understand only such things to be in Time as are subject to mutations, changes, risings, and fallings, such as are all naturall things below the Sphere of the Moone’. The rather less obscure diplomat and natural philosopher Kenelm Digby (1603–1665) also wrote but a little on time, and his views are also solidly Aristotelian. Digby’s 1644 Two Treatises connects time with the motion of the stars. For example, Digby’s (1644, 79) First Treatise writes, time, which is the common measure of all succession, for the change of situation of the starres, but especially of the sunne and moon, is observed more or lesse by all mankind: and . . . is as it were by nature it self set in their way and offered unto them as fittest to estimate and judge all other particular successions.

Digby inspired our final Aristotelian, Thomas White (1593–1676), to write his 1646 Institutionum peripateticarum. Ten years later, the book was translated into English. White (1656, 36–8) explains that as the motions of the Heavens are constant and equal, it is the ‘fittest’ for measuring other motions, and it is this that we call ‘Time’. White considers the Augustinian objection (see Section 1.2.1 of this chapter) that this is a poor definition of time, as there was time before the creation of the world, and if the sun stood still time would continue to pass. White replies firmly, ‘Before the creation of the World, there was no time; however, we may imagine Time before the World, as we do Place out of the World: but these Opinions are ill grounded in the Fancy’. Similarly, if the sun stopped moving, White states that time ‘would not, really, passe on’, although we would ‘make use of it as if it did’. White does not explain quite how this would work, but it would presumably involve using our imaginations.

In the preface, Swan apologizes for the lack of ‘quaint language, or fragrant flowers of flowing Rhetorick’ in his work. Another section of Speculum mundi lacking in rhetoric deals with the habits of dragons. 19

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1.3.2 British natural philosophy The most prominent natural philosophers of this period are known as ‘experimentalists’ for their emphasis on empirical experiments. They include William Gilbert (1544–1603), who amongst other achievements is credited with developing the term ‘electricity’; Francis Bacon (1561–1626), sometimes invoked as the guiding spirit of the Royal Society, which put (what we would now call) a ‘scientific’ emphasis on studying the natural world; and John Wilkins (1614– 1672), who was one of the founding members of the Royal Society in 1660. As far as I am aware, none of these figures evinced any deep interest in the metaphysics of time or space, although they were somewhat interested in the possibility of vacuum (space empty of body).20 Wilkins’ An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language comes closest to commenting on the metaphysics of time. In a section on measurement, Wilkins (1668, 192–3) states, ‘Time is usually distributed by the Revolution of the heavenly Bodies’. Quite what Wilkins means by this he does not explain but the thesis certainly appears to be Aristotelian. In this context, Wilkins makes an early reference to the pendulum clock, describing Huygens as a ‘worthy Member’ of the Royal Society. Experimentalism is a tradition that would be continued by Robert Boyle and Newton. A lesser known group of British natural philosophers during this period were ‘atomists’. Atomism is a Greek tradition, stretching roughly from the fifth century BCE to the second century CE. It is most closely associated with Epicurus, although it can also be found in other thinkers, including Epicurus’ predecessors Leucippus and Democritus, and his follower Lucretius. On Epicurean natural philosophy, the world is composed of atoms—indivisible, partless entities bearing limited properties such as size and shape—interlocking in an incorporeal, infinite space known as ‘void’. The English natural philosopher Nicholas Hill (1570–c.1610) offered an Epicurean system in his 1601 Philosophia epicurea. Although its propositions are set out in a somewhat fragmentary way, study reveals a fairly coherent system. God is an active principle, working throughout an infinite universe. Alongside God, Hill (1601, §352) holds that three further principles or Tetrarchs order nature: matter, space, and time (spatium tempus). For Hill (1601, §359), atoms move through unbounded space. The younger English natural philosopher Walter Warner (1563–1643) produced a system that is similar to Hill’s in these respects. Warner remained unpublished in his lifetime but his manuscripts 20

In his 1600 De Magnete, Gilbert (trans. 1893, 326) argues that the space above the earth’s exhalations is a vacuum; this is a decidedly non-Aristotelian doctrine. Bacon discusses Gilbert’s pure vacuum but Bacon (trans. 2011, 376) states he is not prepared to say whether there may be vacuum.

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survive. Having consulted their statements on time and space, Jacquot (1974, 118) writes that Warner uses four concepts to account for the universe: time, space, matter, and energy. Time and space are the ‘prerequisites’ for all existents, they are eternal, infinite, and continuous. To properly understand the role that time is playing in the systems of Hill and Warner, further scholarship is required.21 Whatever is going on, there is no sign their work is connected to later British Epicureans, such as Walter Charleton.22 In this context, it is worth briefly mentioning another early English atomist, Thomas Harriot (1560–1621). As one would expect of an atomist, Harriot holds that a vacuum exists. However, as far as I am aware, he has nothing to say on the metaphysics of space or time, neither in his Artis Analyticae Praxis (edited and published posthumously in 1631 by Warner) nor his unpublished manuscripts.

1.3.3 British Platonism We will begin by considering an assorted set of seventeenth-century philosophers who are broadly working within Platonic traditions. Following the likes of Plotinus and Augustine, these philosophers disassociate time from motion, but that is where their agreement ends.23 Thomas Jackson (1579–1640) was an early Oxford Platonist. In A Treatise Concerning the Originall of Unbeliefe, Jackson (1625, 101–2) argues in Aristotelian style that we only apprehend the passing of time by motion. He explains that although Aristotle ‘the Philosopher’ defines time by motion, motion is not the essence of time, as time transcends motion. Drawing on Augustine, Jackson explains that in pursing the Amorites, Joshua ‘lost no time’ by the sun standing still. Similarly, if ‘clockes and houre-glasses’ moved twice as swiftly, time would still be the same. Jackson (1625, 103) concludes, ‘All these argue time to have a nature of its owne distinct from motion more abstract and immaterial . . . but very hard to define what it is distinctly’. In support of this final point, Jackson quotes Augustine’s famous expression of bafflement. Edward Herbert, the Anglo-Welsh Lord of Cherbury (1583–1648), was also an Oxford-educated thinker who made use of Platonism. He is sometimes described as the father of English deism, on which appeals to reason are preferred to revelation as a source of religious knowledge. In 1624 Herbert published 21 Jacquot (1974) also discusses Hill. Further, brief discussions of Hill on time and space can be found in McColley (1939) and Plastina (2004). 22 In fact, Kargon (1964) argues that, ‘strictly speaking’, Hill’s system wasn’t Epicurean. 23 Gaukroger (2006) discusses the gradual rediscovery of Plato’s texts and Platonic thought from the fifteenth century onwards. On Cambridge Platonism specifically, see Patrides (1969) and Hutton (2015, 136–59).

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De Veritate, said to be the first purely metaphysical treatise written by an Englishman. Although Herbert does not provide a metaphysics of time, he does make a few remarks. For example, Herbert (trans. 1992, 272–3) writes that the ‘general order of time is properly derived from the movements of the heavenly bodies’, although time and motion are distinct. Robert Greville (1607–1643), the second Lord Brooke, was a politician and military general who ventured into philosophy with his 1641 The Nature of Truth. Greville (1641, 90) aims to show ‘that time and place are nothing’. Greville (1641, 95–7) claims that time does not affect the Deity, as existing through two moments of time does not ‘make two’ of the Deity, it remains one; nor does time make any ‘difference, or any way act’ on ourselves. Greville (1641, 99) argues that ‘we make Time something’, as succession is apprehended by us but not by God, and therefore time is ‘nothing’. Although his reasoning is unusual, Greville is effectively working in the Aristotelian tradition that takes time to be a product of the human mind. A few years later, the English mathematician John Wallis (1616–1703) published a critique of Greville, Truth Tried: or, Animadversions on a Treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brooke. Wallis (1643, 70–1) explains that he is less interested in enquiring what time and place are, as in whether they are something or nothing. He denies Greville’s thesis that time and place are nothing, arguing that if it were true, a body could be in diverse places at the same time, or several bodies could be in the same place at one time. Wallis (1643, 76–7) goes on to argue that, if time were nothing and succession were imaginary, then everything would be simultaneous, and there would be no difference between the long life ‘of the Aged’, and the few days of someone that ‘dyeth in his Youth’. Wallis (1643, 78) concludes that there is a real succession, implying that time is not nothing. We will now move on to the group of philosophers that have come to be known as the ‘Cambridge Platonists’, a group who read neo-Platonists such as Plotinus, as well as Plato. Hutton (2015, 139) explains that whilst these thinkers were not a ‘school’ in the strict sense, their shared religious rationalism and use of Platonism justifies their being treated as such. We will be meeting two of the most prominent Cambridge Platonists, Henry More, and Ralph Cudworth, later in this study. Here, we will meet some of their companions. Benjamin Whichcote (1609–1683) is sometimes said to be the founding father of Cambridge Platonism, as so many of the group studied at Emmanuel where he taught. Most of his philosophical writings were published posthumously. Whichcote does not does not set out a metaphysics of time or space but, as

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Cooper (2006, 72) notes, Whichcote frequently expresses a strong sense of living in God’s Spirit ‘as in a house’ and regularly quotes from St Paul’s sermon, ‘in him we live and move and have our being’. Cooper takes these remarks to imply a literal kind of panentheism, the view that the universe is ‘in’ God. Whilst these remarks are suggestive, they are no more than that, being common sentiments in the seventeenth century. Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651) is also known exclusively through posthumously published writings, including his Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, written in the 1640s and first published in 1652 (I reference a slightly later edition). In this text, Culverwell (1669, 167–8) briefly remarks that duration is a ‘continuation and abiding in Being, the spinning out of Entity’, and a soul cannot see the ‘vastness’ of God’s duration, which is ‘commensurate’ to the degree of his Entity. Culverwell (1669, 107) explains that, unlike us, God is above the ‘temporal conditions’ of past, present, and future. The implication is that whilst God is eternal, God is not in time. John Smith (1618–1652) writes very briefly on time and space in his posthumous 1660 Select Discourses. Although Smith (repr. 1859, 145) happily allows that God, that ‘Omnipresent Life’ penetrates and runs through all things, this presence is not literal. Smith writes that when we reflect on God’s perfect essence, ‘we can find no such as time or place, or any corporeal or finite properties’. Only created beings are in time and space. In this vein, Smith continues: [W]e may also know God to be eternal and omnipresent, not because He fills either place or time, but rather because He wanteth neither. That which first begets the notion of time in, is nothing else but that succession and multiplicity which we find in our own thoughts, which move from one thing to another. And therefore where there is no such vicissitude or variety, as there can be no sense of time, so there can be nothing of the thing (Smith, repr. 1859, 130–1).

For Smith, there can be no time without change; as such, an unchanging God cannot persist through time. Smith briefly goes on to discuss space and—as one would expect, given Smith’s statement that God does not fill place or time—Smith (repr. 1859, 132) argues that only material beings ‘contend’ to fill space.24

24

It is possible that this part of Smith’s Discourses were composed with an awareness of More’s early writings on time and space in mind. However, I am inclined to think otherwise. Although Smith’s remarks are reminiscent of Plotinus—and indeed he cites Plotinus at various points—there is no mention here of More’s early view that space is a barely existent capacity for matter, nor a detailed discussion of the relationship between time and eternity.

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1.3.4 British materialism Materialists hold that everything in the universe is material, including humans and their minds, and sometimes even God. Later in this study we will meet the materialists Margaret Cavendish and Anthony Collins. Here, we meet the materialist of greatest renown: Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). In his 1655 De Corpore Hobbes offers an account of time.25 Like many early moderns, Hobbes argues from the nature of space to time. Early on in the discussion, De Corpore rejects the Aristotelian-Cartesian identification of space with the extension of bodies. Against this identification, Hobbes (repr. 1839, 92–3) argues that space is not called ‘space’ for being already filled, but because it may be filled; nor does any man think bodies carry their places away with them, rather, the same space can contain different bodies at different times. Hobbes asks us to consider the annihilation of the world. In this context, he writes that if we have a ‘phantasm’ of anything that was in the world before the supposed annihilation of the world, and consider ‘not that the thing was such or such, but only that it had a being without the mind’, then we have a conception of that which we call space, an ‘imaginary thing’. Space may seem to exist externally to us, independent of our minds, but it does not. Having set out his views on space, Hobbes continues: As a body leaves a phantasm of its magnitude in the mind, so a moved body leaves a phantasm of its, namely, an idea of that body passing out of one space into another by continual succession. And this idea, or phantasm, is that, which (without receding much from the common opinion, or from Aristotle’s definition) I call Time (Hobbes, repr. 1839, 94).

For Hobbes, space and time are internally produced, mind-dependent imaginary phantasms; they are generated in our minds through contact with mindindependent material bodies that possess magnitude and move. Hobbes (repr. 1839, 46) goes on to expand this definition of time slightly, adding that it is the phantasm of ‘before and after in motion’; this comprehends the succession in the motion of a body, in the sense that it is first here and then there. As Hobbes himself notes, his account of time can be understood within the Aristotelian tradition of conceiving time to depend on the human mind. Whether, or how far, Hobbes’ views diverge from this tradition is a matter of debate.26

25

Although Hobbes writes about time and space in several further texts. See Gaukroger (2006, 284–7), who also discusses Hobbes’ materialism more generally; and especially Edwards (2013, 163–206) who also discusses Hobbes’ account of time in relation to that of Thomas White. 26 For more on Hobbes’ ontology of time, see Leijenhorst (2002, 101–37), Mintz (2010, 63–79), Edwards (2013, 163–206), and Gorham (2014).

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1.4 The Wider British Seventeenth-Century Scene Having set the British early seventeenth-century philosophical scene, this section goes a little further, sketching three non-philosophical historical reasons that may have played a role in the increasing interest seventeenth century British philosophers evinced in the nature of time: concerning horology, chronology, and apocalypse studies. The seventeenth century saw something of a horological revolution. Early clocks—such as water clocks, sundials, and later weight driven clocks—were not very accurate. In 1657, continuing the work of Galileo and Marin Mersenne, the Dutch thinker Christiaan Huygens revolutionized timekeeping accuracy when he produced the first pendulum clock. As John Clarke (1730, 258) puts it, ‘The Invention of the Pendulum, is of excellent Use in Astronomy, and whereever there is occasion to know the true Time . . . till this Instrument was found out, there was no certain Measure of Time’. Huygens’ work was especially well known in England, a country to which he made several trips; he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1663. Over the years, Huygens met many of the thinkers included in this study, including Robert Boyle, John Wallis, Kenelm Digby, John Finch, Newton, and Locke. Huygens’ great horological text, Horologium Oscillatorium sive de motu pendulorum, was published in 1673 and copies were distributed to fellows of London’s Royal Society.27 Huygens is one of relatively few figures referred to in Newton’s Principia (1687, 20), and Locke’s Essay describes Huygens as a ‘master’. By the turn of the eighteenth century, clocks would become a common, albeit controversial metaphor for a mechanistic conception of the universe.28 George Cheyne (1705, 5) provides a neat example of this: ‘This Great Machine of the Universe, may in some degree be liken’d to a finished Piece of Clock-Work, form’d upon Geometrick Principles’. Although these developments came too late to affect some thinkers—by 1657, the absolutists Jan Baptist van Helmont and Gassendi had passed away, and the groundwork for More’s mature absolutism had already been laid—they may have affected later thinkers, as a plausible corollary of interest in measuring time is interest in the nature of time itself. The second non-philosophical reason that may have led to increasing interest in the philosophy of time during this period is the enormous interest British early moderns evinced in chronology. Crudely, early moderns distinguished between 27 On the development of Huygen’s work, see Mahoney (1980); on Huygen’s contacts in England, see M. B. Hall (1980). 28 On the development of clocks and the clockwork universe metaphor in relation to philosophy, see Merchant (1983, 221–35), Whitrow (1988, 120–7), Schoen (2002), and Jammer (2006, 59–63).

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history as the study of past events, and chronology as the task of ordering them. The necessity of the latter process becomes apparent once one appreciates that the Bible—considered to be the most important historical record—does not contain dates. Thus, the dates must be computed, and history divided into computable periods: epochs, cycles, months, and so on. Henry Isaacson’s 1633 Saturni Ephemerides illustrates this distinction, opening with a depiction of Time personified as Saturn, and flanked by Historia and Chronologia. Some flavour of the book is communicated by the first event that Isaacson (1633, §I) lists: ‘Adam Created the Sixth day of the world, and EVE of his Rib’. Many of the thinkers in this study found chronology important. For example, in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke (1693, 217–18) argues that chronology should go hand in hand with geography, so that a student may have in his mind a view of the ‘whole current of time’. He continues that, without these disciplines, ‘History will be very ill retained, and very little useful; but be only a jumble of Matters of Fact, confusedly heaped together without Order or Instruction’.29 Newton produced a Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended, and Jackson produced Chronological Antiquities. In the preface, Jackson (1752, I.xxiii) claims that chronology is important to history not just because it renders it a ‘real Science’ but because it renders it ‘entertaining’. As chronology was considered to be a way of studying time, it is perhaps no surprise that some of its students also studied time in another way, through metaphysics. The third non-philosophical reason is related to the second. If the study of chronology is the ordering of past events, one might think of the study of prophecy as the ordering of future events. Various parts of the Bible prophesy an apocalypse, the end of the world as we know it, and several figures in this study—including More, Barrow, and Newton—were deeply concerned with it.30 If this sounds strange to modern ears, consider two facts. One is that the apocalypse described by the Bible involves death by ‘sword and with famine and with pestilence’, a time during which ‘the stars in the sky fell to earth’ (Revelation 6:8–13). The other is that the older figures in this study lived through some of the most tumultuous times Britain has ever seen, witnessing war, plague, starvation, and celestial portents. To support this latter claim, and to further contextualize the biographical sketches upcoming in this study, I will briefly describe these events.

29 Alkon (1984) pointed me to the discussion of chronology in Locke, and Alkon provides an excellent discussion of chronology more generally in this period. 30 See Kubrin (1967), Popkin (1992, 90–119), Almond (1993), Iliffe (1994), and Hutton (1994; forthcoming).

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Following an extended period of political unrest between the reigning monarch Charles I of the House of Stuart, and Parliament, a series of conflicts known as the ‘English Civil War’ broke out (despite its misleading name) across all of Britain in 1642. Charles I was ultimately captured in 1649, and tried and executed for treason. From this point onwards England was ruled intermittently by a republican government and (due to internal Parliamentary schisms) by the Parliamentarian Oliver Cromwell. Following Cromwell’s death the government saw further upheavals, which ultimately led to the ‘Restoration’: in 1660 Parliament accepted Charles II’s offer to return from exile and accept the British Crown. The period between the death of Charles I and the Restoration has become known as the ‘Interregnum’. Gradually, stability returned to England, until Charles II died in 1685. He was succeeded by his brother, James II, who—in part because of his Catholicism—faced further trouble from Parliament. In 1688, Parliament worked with the suitably Protestant William of Orange to bring a Dutch army to England, and James II fled to exile in France. Following this ‘Glorious Revolution’, during which Parliament became yet more powerful, William of Orange ruled jointly with his wife Mary II, the Stuart daughter of James II. On Mary’s death in 1694, William ruled solely until his own death in 1702. At this point, the throne passed to Queen Anne and finally—on Anne’s death in 1714—to George I, leaving the House of Stuarts altogether. Political turmoil was not the only kind of turmoil facing mid-seventeenth century thinkers. During this period, Britain also suffered horrifically from the bubonic plague. As Lord (2014, 2–6) explains in her study of the plague in Cambridge, it affected this city especially badly in the 1640s and 1660s, and it led to starvation as well as sickness, as people were too scared to bring their produce to town. This period also saw ominous astrological harbingers, such as meteors and comets. As Lord reports, on 4 January 1663 More wrote to Anne Conway: ‘There have been many fiery Meteors seen, several rivers and wells dry’d which show that there have been considerable changes in the Entrails of the Earth. I wish these things be not forerunners of some greater Mortality’. These happenings—war, pestilence, starvation, and portents—must have appeared to be like something out of Revelation, which perhaps partly accounts for the rise of apocalypse studies in the generations that lived through them. The process of ordering future events in time may also have led to interest in the nature of time itself.

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2 Henry More and the Development of Absolute Time Wherefore with leave th’ infinitie I’ll sing Of Time, of Space . . . My nimble mind this clammie clod doth leave Henry More (PP 91)

2.1 Introduction This chapter explores the first British absolute account of time or duration, developed in the mid-seventeenth century by the Cambridge Platonist Henry More. It proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief biographical sketch of More. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 explore the evolution of More’s views. Section 2.3 argues that More advances two accounts of time and duration—an early account from 1647, and a later account from 1655—and that they are deeply connected. Along the way, I correct various misperceptions in the scholarship, including the thesis that More does not have views on time or duration. Section 2.4 shows that, as More’s views developed across the course of his career, an asymmetry emerged in his mature work with regard to divine presence: God is extendedly present in space, yet holenmerically present in time. Section 2.5 asks what led More to develop an absolute account of duration in 1647, and argues that the answer lies in More’s newfound Cartesian cosmology and cosmogony. This provides a new illustration of More’s wider project to combine Cartesian natural philosophy with Platonic metaphysics, and puts a fresh twist on the development of early modern theories of absolute time or duration more generally. Section 2.6 enters deeper into More’s later account of time and duration, arguing that More really identifies duration with God. Section 2.7 concludes with a note on the influence More may have wielded over later British thinkers.

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2.2 Sketching More’s Life and Works More (1614–1687) was born in Grantham, Lincolnshire. He attended a free grammar school before matriculating at Christ’s College, Cambridge in 1631, where he became a fellow ten years later.1 More’s time at Cambridge covered some of the most tumultuous years the university has ever seen. The university was largely royalist, and it came under parliamentary rule almost from the beginning of the Civil War, leading to various purges of fellows deemed too royalist. Following many political swings, stability was reached following the Restoration, which involved a purge of fellows deemed too sympathetic to the parliamentarian cause. Astonishingly, college life and undergraduate teaching continued throughout the war, the Interregnum, and the Restoration. In part, this was due to the existence of fellows such as More and Ralph Cudworth, who stood sufficiently remote from the strife to be ready to carry on under every regime.2 It was More’s distance from politics that allowed him to retain his position at Christ’s throughout, although not always without difficulty. Alongside Cudworth, More would become one of the leading figures of the Cambridge Platonists. His philosophical poems, published from 1642 and culminating in his 1647 Philosophical Poems, provide a microcosm of More’s interests, involving Platonism, the science of Galileo and Copernicus, and Cartesianism. The poems are written in the style of Edmund Spenser’s 1590 Faerie Queen; Spenser himself was fascinated by time.3 More’s early interest in Cartesianism was shared by Cudworth, and Cudworth strongly encouraged More to correspond with Descartes.4 More’s early enthusiasm in Descartes eventually waned, but he is still credited as being one of the primary channels by which Cartesianism became known in Britain. Between 1647 and 1650 More made the acquaintance of John Finch, then a student at Christ’s. Finch became a lifelong friend of More, and it was through Finch that More became acquainted with his sister, Anne Conway, who would also become a lifelong friend. During the outbreaks of plague in Cambridge, More stayed at Ragley Hall, the Conways’ country residence.

1

My sources for the biographical part of this sketch include Tulloch (1966, 303–409), the introduction to Hall (1990a), Gabbey (1990), Ward (repr. 2000), and Hutton (2008). 2 See Roach (1959) and Gascoigne (1990, 250–4) who discuss Cambridge’s plight during the Civil War more generally. 3 To illustrate, Spenser’s Epithalamion is carefully divided into twenty-four stanzas, representing the hours in a day; and comprises 365 lines, representing the days of the year. 4 See Sailor (1962), Saveson (1960) and especially Webster (1969, 364).

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More had always been deeply religious5—which led him to oppose Hobbes’ materialism and Spinoza’s pantheism—but towards the end of his life he became increasingly concerned with theology, especially biblical prophecy. In 1680, More records discussing the Book of Revelation with the young Isaac Newton. In 1681, More edited Joseph Glanvill’s Sadducismus triumphatus, a collection of empirical data on witchcraft and the occult aimed at demonstrating the reality of the supernatural and the spiritual realm. More remained a fellow at Christ’s for the rest of his life, declining all other offers. He never married and spent his life surrounded by loyal friends, including Cudworth, Finch, and Conway. More died in 1687 after a short illness, and was buried in Christ’s College chapel. During More’s lifetime he was a highly regarded figure—he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1664—and his work was widely read. According to his publisher, More’s publications ‘ruled all the booksellers in London’. Although More’s rule in this regard has waned, there is a significant body of scholarship on More. And, as we will see, More’s writings make excellent reading, being both philosophically rich and prone to passionate hyperbole.

2.3 More’s Evolving Views on Time and Duration There is very little literature on More’s views on time or duration, and many scholars claim that More lacks substantive views. For example, Burtt (1924, 149–54) claims, ‘More was not much interested in time’, and credits Barrow as being the first to develop an absolute account of time. Whilst Baker (1930, 14) reads More as conceiving time as an attribute of God, Baker provides almost no discussion and claims that More ‘had but little’ to say of time. Citing Baker, Gascoigne (1990, 269) writes that as a ‘self-proclaimed Platonist’, More was not inclined to deal with the concept of time. Jammer (2006, 69) argues that Barrow’s philosophy of time ‘appears to have been strongly influenced’ by More’s philosophy of space, overlooking More’s account of time. LoLordo (2007, 108) states, ‘More has almost nothing to say on time’. Ducheyne (2008, 217) writes, ‘More . . . said nothing of substance on absolute time’. Even scholars who do not overlook More’s views on time or duration have surprisingly little to say about them. Nicolson (1959, 158) claims that More advocates an absolute account of time in his Philosophical Poems but she provides no details, and adds that it was less More than Barrow who formulated the 5 As More’s friend and biographer Ward (repr. 2000, 26) puts it, the ‘Doctor’s Great Mind’ had a ‘wonderful Sense of GOD, Sacred and Ineffable’.

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theories of absolute time that were developed by later thinkers such as Newton. Gabbey (1982, 192–3) states that absolutism about space and time is an ‘implied assumption’ in More’s letters to Descartes and Anne Conway but does not expand on this. Reid’s (2012) study of More’s metaphysics discusses various aspects of More’s system relating to time and duration but does not discuss the nature of time or duration per se. Leech’s study of More’s rational theology discusses More’s views on space over several chapters, yet Leech (2013, 141) addresses More’s views on time in one solitary footnote. This section will belie the misperception that More lacks substantive views on time or duration, and expand on the existing scholarship that allows More holds views on time or duration. I argue that More actually advances two accounts of time or duration—an early account given in 1647, and a later account given from 1655 onwards—although these two accounts are deeply connected. We will begin with More’s early account. More’s 1642 Psychodia Platonica draws on neo-Platonism to characterize the universe as a sequence of eight emanations. More argues that the ‘Platonicall Triad’ that comprises the first three of these emanations—Ahad, Aeon, and Psyche—can be unified with the Christian Trinity. Ahad, the One, is unified with God; Aeon, the Platonist mind, is unified with Christ, the son of God; and Psyche, the Platonic Soul, is unified with the Holy Spirit (PP 10–12). As we descend from Ahad, the emanations become less real, until the eighth emanation—‘hyle’ or matter—barely exists. Matter is infinitely remote from God’s goodness and perfection, leading to More’s disparagement of it as ‘perverse’ and an ‘old hag’ (PP 54). Psychodia Platonica does not offer an account of time, though there are passing references. For example, in the context of describing Psyche, More briefly writes, ‘O life of Time, and all Alterity!’ (PP 13). Psychodia Platonica was reprinted in More’s 1647 Philosophical Poems, and More added lengthy notes to the new edition. One of these notes is an extensive commentary on More’s earlier description of Psyche: For what is time but the perseverance of the motion of the soul of the world, while she by her restless power brings forth these things in succession, that Eternity hath at once altogether. For such is the nature of Aeon or Eternity, viz. A life exhibiting all things at once, and in one . . . The seed of a plant hath all the whole tree, branches, leaves, and fruit at once, in one point after a manner closed up, but potentially. Eternity hath all the world in an indivisible in-distant way at once, and that actually. Psyche or the Soul of the world, when she begins this world, begets a grosser kind of Alterity . . . as the seminall forme spreads out it self, and the body it inacts into distant branches from the quiet and silent seed, making that actuall in time and succession which could not be here below in bodies at once. See Plotin. Ennead 3. lib. 7. cap. 10. where the nature of time is more fully described (PP 136).

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As is evident from More’s explicit reference, this account is deeply inspired by that of Plotinus. As we saw in Chapter 1, Plotinus holds that eternity is the life of the Soul (i.e., the world soul) at rest, and time is the life of the Soul in motion. In this passage, More describes the nature of ‘Aeon or Eternity’—the nature of Christ—as a ‘life exhibiting all things at once’. Thus, there is no ‘Alterity’ (otherness or differentiation) or succession in Eternity, in Christ. More goes on to write that ‘Psyche or the Soul of the world’ begets a grosser (i.e., coarser) kind of alterity. Recall that, for More, ‘Soul’ is unified with the Holy Spirit. In Christian theology, the Holy Spirit is God’s active presence in the world. For example, the opening lines of Genesis (1:1–2) state that at the beginning the earth was without form and void, darkness was over the face of the deep, ‘And the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters’. Psalm (104:6) states that God established the earth and ‘covered it with the deep as with a garment’. Echoing this, More describes how each of the stars that God creates is ‘but a knot’ tied in Psyche’s garment (PP 92). Psyche—understood as the Holy Spirit, God’s active presence— brings forth things from Eternity that are ‘at once together’ into succession, and it is this that produces alterity. To summarize, More is arguing that when the Holy Spirit draws alterity out of Eternity, she draws time with it. More has adapted Plotinus’ account of time, going so far as to borrow Plotinus’ analogy of a seed. Is More’s early account of time absolute? Answering this question depends on how we understand the relationship between time and created beings. As we saw earlier, Plotinus is explicit that time is ‘primary, a thing ‘within itself ’ . . . that in which all the rest happens, in which all movement and rest exist’. For Plotinus, time appears to be a kind of container that is prior to the movements of created things. This account is certainly absolute: time is independent of human minds, and of material bodies or their motions. However, More does not comment on the relationship between time and created beings, leaving open two possible readings. First, More may follow Plotinus in conceiving time as prior to created beings, in which case his early account would be absolute. Second, More may identify time with the successive differentiations of created beings, the idea being that time just is alterity in the created world. On this latter reading, time would be identified with the successive differentiations of created beings such as material bodies, so time would not be absolute. More’s later account of time and duration begins to emerge in a 1651 letter to Conway. In the context of arguing that the notion of ‘empty space’—space devoid of matter—is not a contradiction, More argues that an empty space would have a measurable extension, parts, and duration: There is the same reason of duration that there is of extension, but duration belongs to Non-entityes. as you will presently confesse. For suppose after the world had continued

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1000 yeares, God annihilated it, and that now since the world was made againe, it were but a thousand, did not the absence of the world, or the Non-World as I so speake, continue above three thousand yeare (CL 487).

If God were to annihilate the world, and later remake it, the intervening ‘NonWorld’—or, empty space—would still have duration.6 Crucially, this passage substantiates Gabbey’s claim that More advances absolutism in his letters to Descartes and Conway: here, More holds that there would be duration even in the absence of the created world. The later account emerges in much more detail in the 1655 Appendix to More’s Antidote Against Atheism (I cite a slightly later version). Here, More puts forward three possible accounts of space. First, the ‘Immensity of the Divine essence’ could be the subject of that diffusion and measurability; in other words, space could refer to God’s immensity. Second, space is not a real thing, merely ‘the large and immense capacity’ for holding matter. Third, space could be an incorporeal substance, necessary and eternal: God (More, 1662a, 163–5; VIII: 1–6). More does not choose between these accounts, and Reid (2012, 164) argues that this text marks a transitional point in the evolution of More’s account of space; more on this in Section 2.5 of this chapter. Of the three possible accounts of space, time, or duration is only mentioned with regard to the first. Having argued that infinite space could refer to God’s attribute of immensity, More makes a similar case for time or duration: Now there is the same reason for Time (by Time I mean Duration) as for Space. For we cannot imagine but that there has been such a continued Duration as could have no beginning nor interruption. And any one will say it is non-sense that there should be such a necessary duration, when there is no reall Essence that must of it self thus be always, and for ever so endure. What or who is it then that this eternal, uninterrupted and neverfading duration must belong to? . . . I say that those unavoidable imaginations of the necessity of an Infinite Space, as they call it, and Eternal duration are, are no proofs of a Self-existent Matter, but rather obscure sub-indications of the necessary Existence of God (More, 1662a, 164; VII: 2).

To understand this passage, consider these two ways of understanding ‘duration’. First, duration is simply continuance in time, such that ‘a duration’ is just ‘a period of time’. Second, duration is the continuance of something in time, such that a duration is the time during which something continues to exist.7 In this second sense, a tree has a finite duration, and God has an eternal or infinite 6

See also More (1662b, 73–4). As we saw in Chapter 1, Suárez and Descartes understand duration in this second sense: the perseverance of a thing in its existence. 7

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duration. As this passage argues that an eternal duration ‘must belong’ to something, it is clear that More understands duration exclusively in the second sense. Additionally, the relationship between a being and its duration is extremely close. In this same text, More (1662a, 14; IV: 1) discusses God’s attributes, including ‘Duration as Essence’. This implies that we should understand the duration of a thing as its essence, its being.8 With this understanding of duration in place, we are ready to approach the argument of this passage. More is arguing that we are compelled to imagine a duration that has no beginning or interruption. As an eternal duration must belong to an eternal essence—God—this entails that eternal duration is an ‘obscure sub-indication’ of God. The fact that More only puts forward one account of time or duration in this text (as opposed to the three accounts of space) strongly suggests that More takes this to be the correct account of time or duration, even though he has not yet decided which is the correct account of space. In the context of discounting More as one of the sources that Newton may have drawn on, Ducheyne cites this same passage:9 Plato and later Neo-Platonists, although some pointed to the connexion between time and eternity, did not go as far to identify both . . . Equating time and eternal duration is . . . clearly absent in Barrow’s and More’s account of time . . . More (1662, 164) explicitly stressed that an infinite duration is inconceivable (Ducheyne, 2008, 222).

Against Ducheyne, this passage argues precisely that an infinite duration is conceivable: More argues that we cannot imagine but that there has been such a continued duration as could have no beginning nor interruption. The likely explanation for Ducheyne’s misreading is More’s relentless use of double negatives. More presents his later account of time or duration in several further texts. It is hinted at in his 1659 Immortality of the Soule, where—in the context of discussing the thesis that what is ‘plainly and manifestly concluded, ought to be held undeniable’—More (1659, 10; I.2.viii) writes it is ‘most certain That there is Infinite Duration of something or other in the world’. The account is made explicit in More’s Divine Dialogues (1668, 559; III: 40) where, in response to the suggestion that an ‘eternity of duration’ is necessarily conceivable before the

8 Further confirmation of this can be found in More’s later Enchiridion Metaphysicum, where More (trans. 1995, I 35; V: 9) states, ‘As a being is . . . so also is its duration’ (Ut est igitur Ens, sic & illius Duratio est). Here and elsewhere, I take the original Latin from More (1679). 9 Identifying the object of Ducheyne’s reference is tricky because each text in More’s Collection is individually paginated, and Ducheyne does not give the text’s name. However, of all the multiple page 164s in the Collection, this is the only one that mentions time.

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world is created, one character approvingly explains, ‘and this marvellously anticipating eternity is the proper and necessary eternal duration of God . . . the permanent expansion or amplitude of the radical essentiality of God’. It can also be found in More’s metaphysical magnum opus, the Enchiridium Metaphysicum. The Scholia added to Chapter VIII of the 1679 edition states: when we meet with this sort of immobile and external extension [space], what can be more agreeable to reason than that we refer to God . . . [infinite extension and antemundane duration] are certain adulterated representations of the divine eternity and immensity (adulterinas quasdam esse Aeternitatis Immensitati sque Divine Repraesentationes) . . . it is necessary that one be, indeed, a certain obscure revelation of the divine presence, the other, indeed, of its duration (More, trans. 1995, I 68–9; VIII Scholia: 13).

Again, More is arguing that antemundane duration is the eternal duration of God. Thus far, in setting out More’s later account, I have not distinguished between time and duration. Although More himself occasionally conflates the two notions—for example, the 1655 Appendix above states ‘by Time I mean Duration’— I have come to believe that More’s later work draws an important distinction between them.10 By way of leading up to this distinction, it will be helpful to say a little about succession. More (trans. 1995, I 89; X.15) conceives successive duration as having a ‘fluid’ (fluxa) existence, consisting of ‘successive and alternate’ (successiva & alterativa) parts that are spread out across the past, present, and future. Traditionally, God is held to be a unified or simple being, lacking parts. In the Divine Dialogues and the Enchiridium Metaphysicum, More aims to show that God’s duration is not successive because a successive duration would involve having parts. For example, in the Divine Dialogues, one character asks the following (in language which echoes More’s Poems): ‘For what can be more contradictious, then that all things should have been really and essentially with God from all eternity at once, and yet be born in time and succession?’ More goes on to explain the relationship between God’s eternal duration and successive time as follows: the whole Evolution of Times and Ages from everlasting to everlasting is so collectedly and presentisickly represented to God at once, as if all things and Actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were at this very Instant, and so always, really present and existent 10

I have been persuaded of this by an anonymous referee for this press, to whom I am grateful. Consequently, in this regard my views have changed from those I expressed in Thomas (2015a, 14–5).

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before him . . . like the Permanency of a steady Rock by which a River slides; the standing of the Rock, as well as the sliding of the River, has a Continuity of Duration. And no other way can Eternity be commensurate to Time then so; that is to say, the Comprehension of the Evolution of all Times, Things and Transactions is permanently exhibited to God in every moment of the succession of Ages (More, 1668, 60–61; I: 15).

The explicit thesis of this passage is that the whole successive ‘Evolution of Times and Ages’ is represented to God, even though God’s own existence is not successive: ‘And no other way can Eternity be commensurate to Time than so’.11 However, tacitly, this passage tells us more about how More conceives duration and time. This passage tells us that all existing things have duration, including God (the ‘steady rock’) and created beings (‘the sliding of the river’). Further, eternity is not ‘commensurate’ with time. This means that God’s eternal duration is not merely non-successive, it is not in time. In contrast, the durations of created beings are successive and in time. God’s eternal duration is very different to the successive time experienced by created beings. In these later texts, More is an absolutist: he holds that there is duration before the creation of the world, and that there would be duration following the destruction of the world. This duration is clearly independent of human minds and material bodies, and it is in fact identified with the eternity of God. However, strictly speaking, this is an absolutism about duration, rather than about time. Finally, as should be evident, More’s early and later accounts of time or duration are closely connected: the distinction the later account draws between God’s non-successive duration and successive time parallels the distinction More drew in his early account between the Soul’s life at rest and the Soul’s life in motion. In 1647, More explained that Eternity—Christ—was a ‘life exhibiting all things at once, and in one’, and Eternity was contrasted with the created world’s alterity and succession. This is exactly the distinction More draws in his later work: God exists permanently and all at once, whilst the created world exists with successive and alternate parts. The deep continuity between More’s early and later accounts of time provide evidence of the lasting influence of Plotinus on More’s metaphysics.

11

More’s Enchiridion Metaphysicum (trans. 1995, I 35; V.9) explains why the duration of some beings is successive, whilst God’s is not: ‘If a being is in number one and the same, the whole coexisting at the same time, its duration, from the point at which it first existed till it ceased to exist, is a certain present thing and one in number . . . permanent duration bears its origin from the numerical identity of the subject’. If a being exists permanently—the phrase ‘in number one and the same’ implying a lack of parts—its duration will not be successive. In contrast, a being with ‘flowing parts’ has successive duration.

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2.4 More’s Evolving Views on Divine Presence in Space and Time 2.4.1 More on ‘nullibism’ and ‘holenmerism’ The Enchiridion Metaphysicum contains an impassioned rant against two accounts of the relationship between immaterial substances and space; winningly, More describes these accounts as two ‘vast mounds of darkness’. More invents new labels for these accounts, and I will apply these labels anachronistically (i.e., to versions of the accounts that predate More). The first account, which More dubs ‘nullibism’, holds that immaterial substances do not exist in space at all, and are literally nowhere. Nullibism is usually paired with the view that, whilst immaterial substances are not literally present in place, they can be virtually present through their actions. More (trans. 1995, I 98; XXVII.1–2) describes Descartes as ‘chief ’ of the nullibists but this may be incorrect (more on this towards the end of this section). The second account of immaterial presence, which More dubs ‘holenmerism’, holds that immaterial substances exist in space in a non-extended way. It distinguishes between things that exist with ‘parts outside of parts’, or with ‘the whole in the whole and the whole in each part’. Greville (1641, 95) provides an early English characterization of holenmerism: ‘the soule, they say, is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte; whilst they spread and diffuse the soule over the whole body, from one extremity to the other, Place maketh no division in the soule’. Things that have parts outside of parts include material things such as a human body: its parts—its hands, organs, and feet—are not identical to each other, or to the whole. In contrast, an immaterial spirit could exist with the whole in the whole and the whole in each part: the whole soul is in each of its parts, so its parts are identical to each other and the whole. More (trans. 1995, I 108; XXVII.11) provides a helpful diagram to illustrate (see Figure 2.1), explaining that for the holenmerians, the entire spirit ‘fully occupies and possesses’ the whole body CDE and that it is entirely in every part or point of the body, such as A and B. More never accepted spatial nullibism. For example, More’s Enchiridion Metaphysicum (trans. 1995, I 101–2; XXVII.5–6) argues that a substance must be actually present where it acts or operates, entailing that the soul must be present in the body and God must be everywhere. Even in More’s early work— where space is distinct from God—God is literally omnipresent.12 In contrast, the 12 On divine omnipresence, Democritus Platonissans writes: ‘Who being every where doth multiplie/His own broad shade that endless throughout all doth lie’ (PP 92). And later: ‘Space,

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D

C

A

E B

Figure 2.1. Henry More’s holenmerism illustration (More, trans. 1995, I 108; XXVII.11).

early More did accept spatial holenmerism. For example, in his address to the reader preceding Psychodia Platonica, More tells us that the Platonic triad—aka the Christian Trinity—are all omnipresent in the most perfect way that human reason can conceive: ‘For they are in the world all totally and at once every where’ (PP 10). It is only later that More rejects spatial holenmerism. More’s 1659 Immortality of the Soul includes a discussion of Hobbes; or, as More (1659, 64; I.10.1) describes him, ‘that confident Exploder of Immaterial Substances out of the world’.13 One of the parts of Hobbes’ work that More reacts to is an attack on holenmerism found in Hobbes’ 1651 Leviathan. This was not the first time that holenmerism had been rejected,14 but Hobbes particularly ridicules it. For example, Hobbes writes that those who believe in the existence of incorporeal souls must say the following of a person’s soul: [the soul is] All of it in his little Finger, and All of it in every other Part (how small soever) of his Body; and yet no more Soul in the Whole Body, than in any one of those parts. Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to those that will believe the Existence of an Incorporeal Soul, Separated from the Body (Hobbes, 1651, 373; IV.46).

More writes of Hobbes’ remarks: [this] argument is drawn from that Scholastic Riddle, which I must confess seems to verge too near to profound Nonsense, That the Soule of man is tota in toto and tota in qualibet parte corporis. This mad Jingle it seems has so frighted Mr. Hobbs sometime or other, that he never since could endure to come near the notion of a Spirit again . . . But if Passion had that ever pacesth on/Unstop’d, unstaid, till it have filled quite/That immense infinite Orb where God himself doth sit’ (PP 94). 13 With characteristic colour, More (1659, 70; I.10.6) remarks a little later of Hobbes’ arguments for materialism, ‘One might well be amazed to observe such slight and vain arguing come from so grave a Philosopher, were not a man well aware that his peculiar eminency, as himself somewhere professes, lies in Politicks, to which the humours and Bravadoes of Eloquence, especially among the simple, is a very effectuall and serviceable instrument’. 14 See Pasnau (2011, 339–40).

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not surprised his better Faculties, he might have found a true settled meaning thereof, and yet secluded these wilde intricacies that the heedless Schools seem to have charged it with: For the Immediate properties of a Spirit are very well intelligible without these enigmatical flourishes (More, 1659, 72–3; I.10.8).

Here, More agrees with Hobbes that holenmerism is ‘profound Nonsense’, a ‘mad Jingle’, but he disagrees with Hobbes over its implications for the existence of immaterial spirits. More argues that our notion of spirit is ‘intelligible’ without holenmerism (exactly how will be explained in Section 2.4.2 of this chapter).15 More goes on to attack holenmerism in a number of texts, including the Enchiridion Metaphysicum, where More (trans. 1995, I 109–11; XXVII.12–13) objects that the very idea ‘seems close to a clear contradiction or repugnancy’. For example, More argues that if the whole of a spirit were present at one point, there would be none left for it to be present at another. Some scholars seem to have been impressed by Hobbes and More’s arguments against the coherence of holenmerism16 but not all. For example, Pasnau (2011, 341) writes of Hobbes’ mockery of the consequences of holenmerism—that the whole soul of a person is in their finger, as well as in every other part of their body—that this shows Hobbes at his ‘philosophical worst’: ‘the consequences he describes are ones that proponents of holenmerism insist on, and that they take to be distinctive of immaterial entities . . . it is their very weirdness that justifies a dualism between two fundamentally different kinds of entities, material and immaterial’. Further, Pasnau and Kochiras argue that More’s attack on holenmerism is misguided because More builds mistaken assumptions into his understanding of immaterial substances.17 Leaving aside debates over the coherence of holenmerism, it is undeniable that many medieval and early modern philosophers held the doctrine. As Pasnau (2011, 337) puts it, holenmerism is the ‘standard view’ regarding immaterial entities from Plotinus, Augustine, and Anselm, ‘all the way through’ to the scholastics, including Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan.18 In the early modern period, it has been persuasively argued that none other than 15 For more on More’s shift away from holenmerism, see Reid (2007, 98–9; 2012, 141–72) and Leech (2013, 59–63). 16 see Grant (1981, 253), and McGuire and Slowik (2012, 277). 17 For example, Pasnau (2011, 341–3) argues that one of More’s arguments depends on More’s assumption that immaterial substances are intrinsically extended, but holenmerists need not assume that. Similarly, Kochiras (2012, 65–6) argues that More implicitly assumes that more or less of a soul’s essence can be in a given place—this is how more of a spirit could be present at one place than another—but holenmerists need not assume this. 18 Further discussion of the history of holenmerism can be found in Rozemond (2003), SuárezNani (2008), and McGuire and Slowik (2012).

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Descartes held it19 and (as we will see) there is lively debate over holenmerism in other figures too.

2.4.2 More’s mature asymmetric account of God’s presence in space and time Taking himself to have shown in the Enchiridion Metaphysicum that nullibism and holenmerism fail as accounts of immaterial spatial presence, More (trans. 1995, I 101; XXVII.5) advances an alternative account: ‘God and our soul and, therefore, all other immaterial things are in some way extended’. To understand precisely how they are extended, we must delve deeper into More’s dualism. Although the mature More (trans. 1995, I 119; XXVIII.3) argues that material and immaterial substances are spatially extended, he maintains a strict dualism between them, and holds that they differ with regard to penetrability and discerpibility. Sprits are ‘penetrable’ in the sense that sprits have the capacity to penetrate bodies and other spirits; and bodies are ‘impenetrable’, in the sense that they lack this capacity. If something is ‘discerpible’, its parts can be actually or really divided, pulled apart or separated; if something is ‘indiscerpible’ it does not have parts that can be actually separated. On More’s mature view, material substances (except for atoms) are discerpible, whilst immaterial substances are indiscerpible. More (trans. 1995, I 120–2; XXVIII.8–9) sets out to show that indiscerpibility is compatible with extension. As evidence, he points to the ‘subtle and immaterial extension’ that would remain if all worldly matter were exterminated: this extension is extended, and cannot be discerped into parts. Immaterial extension cannot be divided into parts because ‘with an indissoluble, necessary and plainly essential link’ it is united and ‘coheres with itself ’ everywhere. Whilst extension is commonly taken to imply parts outside of parts that can be separated from one another, in itself extension includes no such thing, merely a ‘running out’ everywhere or towards every direction. Although immaterial substances are indiscerpible in the sense they do not possess parts that can be actually separated, More allows they possess parts that can be conceptually or intellectually separated: it is not at all harmful to our cause if we were to consider this metaphysical extension of spirits to be indeed divisible, but only logically, not physically, that is, to be not discerpible. That, however, anyone should add physical divisibility to this sort of extension, that indeed necessarily proceeds from the impotence of his own imagination . . .

19

Although Descartes is often associated with nullibism—for example, Kim (2005, 74) states that Cartesian minds are not in space—it has been persuasively argued he is in fact a holenmerist. See Rozemond (2003) and Pasnau (2011, 333–9).

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That an extended substance can be divided logically or intellectually, when however it cannot in any way be discerped, appears sufficiently from the fact that a physical monad which has some amplitude, although it may be the least that can be, is thus understood to be divided into lines (More, trans. 1995, I 124; XXVIII.10).

In this sense, as More goes on to explain, we can distinguish the conceptual parts of a human soul as it is distributed between the head, trunk, and limbs of a human body. Similarly, we can consider one part of God’s substance to be in one place, and another part in another place. Recall More’s diagram in Section 2.4.1 of this chapter. Immaterial substances are not extended partes extra partes, such that A and B are actually separable—or, as More puts it, physically discerpible— parts of CDE. However, they are extended with conceptual partes extra partes, such that A and B are conceptually separable—or, as More puts it, logically discerpible—parts of CDE. Having seen how the mature More conceives immaterial spatial presence, we are ready to approach immaterial temporal presence. Just as an immaterial substance may be ‘holenmerically present’ in space, it may be holenmerically present in time, such that its being exists wholly at every successive moment of time.20 Similarly, just as an immaterial substance may be ‘extendedly present’ in space, it may be extendedly present in time, such that its being is ‘spread out’ across the successive parts of time. This terminology will be used throughout the study.21 Throughout his career, More consistently holds that God is holenmerically present in time. Reid (2012, 182) has already made a case for this reading of More’s Poems, arguing that the description above of Eternity as a life exhibiting ‘all things at once, and in one’ implies that it is the nature of Christ—and presumably that of God, and the Holy Spirit too—that they exist wholly at every moment in time. Later, the Enchiridion Metaphysicum states that More (trans. 1995, 18; II: Scholia) is of the opinion of those who ‘assign duration even to eternity, which however I consider in no way to be successive’; and adds that God’s eternity is present ‘at all physical moments’ (omnibusque Temporis Physici momentis adesse). Moments in time are successive in that they are spread out in time, one after another, akin to the way that the parts of space are spread out. By asserting that God’s eternity is present in every physical moment, yet denying 20

John Wallis (1643, 72) precisely articulates this parallelism, asking if the whole soul can be present to one part of the body without ceasing to be wholly present to another part, ‘Why not to one Point of Time, without ceasing to be present to another, though Successive?’ 21 Some early moderns and some commentators occasionally use ‘extension’ to mean merely ‘presence’ in space; I will not.

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that God’s duration is successive, More seems to mean that God’s whole being is in every moment yet is not spread out through time—in other words, God is holenmerically present in time. This means that, whilst More rejected holenmerism for divine spatial presence, he maintained it for divine temporal presence. It is odd that More did not perceive the contrast here, but it is perhaps the product of the way that More’s thinking on time and space evolved independently: unlike other thinkers, More does not start off by treating these beings symmetrically.

2.5 The Development of More’s Early Views on Time There is a (surprisingly) small body of literature on why sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thinkers developed absolute accounts of time or duration. As these thinkers did not record their reasons, scholars must reconstruct their reasons and show why they are plausible. Three such kinds of reasons have been suggested. I will discuss them in turn, showing that only the first can be plausibly applied to More. Following this discussion, I will give a fourth reason. The first reason offered in the scholarship to explain the development of absolute time or duration is the returning influence of Platonism, given that (as we saw in Chapter 1) Plato and Plotinus arguably held absolute accounts of time. Although several scholars credit this influence they give little detail.22 As this chapter has shown, in More’s case the influence of neo-Platonism is readily apparent. However, it is significant that whilst in 1642 More had read Plotinus’ account of time—indicated by More’s brief description of Psyche as the life of time—More’s own account did not appear until 1647. This suggests that another factor was at work in the intervening period. The second kind of reason concerns developments in cosmology and physics, including the implications of Galileo’s work and heliocentrism.23 The latter particularly contributed to the undermining of the view that time is the motion (or the measure of the motion) of the outermost celestial sphere, as heliocentrism does not fit as neatly with the celestial sphere cosmology as geocentrism. It is possible to modify Aristotelian cosmology such that time becomes the regular motion (or the measure of the motion) of the stars rather than the outermost celestial sphere. However, as Ariotti (1973, 41) argues, on this modification the

22

See Burtt (1924), Baker (1935b, 279), Ariotti (1973, 50), and Hutton (1977, 345). On the implications of Galileo’s thought, see Burtt (1924, 81–4) and Baker (1935b). On the undermining of Aristotelian cosmology, see Baker (1935b, 278), Heath (1936, 82), Ariotti (1973), Daniel (1981), and Čapek (1987). 23

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regularity of the celestial motions becomes problematic, as it is no longer ‘mechanically guaranteed’ by the spheres. More held heliocentrism from 164224 but did not advance any account of time or duration until later; again, this suggests that another factor was at work. The third reason is offered by Gorham (2012, 24–6), who argues that the success of spatial absolutism, coupled with a tradition of space-time parallelism, encouraged seventeenth-century philosophers to freely extend the attributes of absolute space to time with ‘little independent rationale’. Gorham argues that this ‘largely analogical and parasitic foundation’ for absolute time is apparent in More, Barrow, and Newton. Gorham’s thesis fits neatly with the increasing amalgamation of mathematics with natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, which, for example, integrated Euclidean geometry with absolute space,25 but More was not overly concerned with mathematics in this regard. Against Gorham, I argue that More’s views on time or duration are not parasitic on his views on space. To explain why, we must contrast More’s views on time or duration with his views on space. Reid (2012, 96–7) has convincingly shown that More’s views on space evolved dramatically, such that—over several decades—space found itself ‘leaping up’ from near the bottom of More’s ontological hierarchy almost to the very top. Reid argues that in More’s earliest work More associates space with matter, as indicated by the way that More similarly disparages matter and space. For example, More writes, ‘For who will not say that Space or Vacuum is infinitely worse, then any reall thing, and yet its extension is infinite’ (PP 142). Reid finds further confirmation of this early view in More’s letters to Descartes and Conway. For example, in More’s 1651 letter to Conway (given in Section 2.3 of this chapter) empty space is described as a a ‘non-entity’: it has extension and duration but is unreal. As Reid (2012, 96) explains, ‘The infinite antemundane void, in this early period, was unreal to the extent that there was no actual thing there, but only the possibility that something should be put there’. In contrast to his early account of space, in 1647 More holds time to sit much higher up the ontological totem pole, identified with the continuance of the motion of the Holy Spirit. Further, whereas the 1655 Appendix to the Antidote Against Atheism appears to be a transitional point in More’s views on space, 24 His Psychodia Platonica states, ‘So doth the Earth . . . Wheel round the fixed sunne’ (PP 77). Interestingly, Nicolson (1959, 130) suggests the Cambridge Platonists may have been ‘peculiarly receptive’ to heliocentrism because they saw it as a return to classical cosmologies. Nicholson does not substantiate her suggestion but evidence can be found in More’s (1662c, 82; II:1) which attributes heliocentrism to the Pythagoreans. 25 See Reid (2012, 235–6) for discussion of geometrical space in Barrow and Newton.

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the fact that More only advances one view on time or duration suggests that this view is not in transition. As we have seen, More’s later texts—Divine Dialogues and the Enchiridion Metaphysicum—argue that both antemundane duration and space are attributes of God.26 Against Gorham, I argue there is no space to time or duration parasitism in More. If, by 1655, More already held his mature account of time or duration but not his mature account of space, then—far from his views on time or duration being parasitic on his account of space— More’s account of time or duration preceded his account of space. Even if readers are not persuaded that More held his mature account of time or duration by 1655, the account of time or duration set out in More’s Divine Dialogues is given independently of his account of space, implying that More developed his mature views on space and time or duration symmetrically. I argue another reason altogether underlies the development of More’s early account of time, which in turn led to his later account of absolute duration: his reaction to Descartes’ cosmology and cosmogony. I will outline the pertinent parts of Descartes’ work, explain why it could prompt one to develop an alternative account of time or duration, and finally argue this is a factor in More. Descartes’ 1644 Principles of Philosophy argues that the material world is a matter-filled plenum. Matter moves in ‘vortices’, rings of material bodies in motion, akin to whirlpools or whirlwinds. Vortex theory underlies Descartes’ cosmology; for example, the orbit of the planets around the sun is explained by the way they are carried along in vortices (CSM I 266; AT VIIIA 202). Vortices also lie at the heart of Descartes’ cosmogony, his account of how the universe came to be the way it is. Descartes—wary of clashing with the Church over Genesis—describes this cosmogony as a hypothesis but explains that even if it is false it will have achieved something if it agrees with our observations. Descartes’ cosmogony is important because it is the first early modern mechanist account, aiming to explain the current state of the universe purely via matter.27 Following creation, on Descartes’ cosmogony variously sized material particles moved in such a way as to form the celestial bodies: First, they moved individually and separately about their own centres, so as to form a fluid body such as we take the heavens to be; and secondly, they moved together in groups around certain other equidistant points corresponding to the present centres of fixed stars, and also around other rather more numerous points equalling the number of

26

Further literature on More’s mature account of space includes Burtt (1924, 135–42), Baker (1930, 6–13; 1935b, 281–4), Hall (1990a), and Castro (2011). 27 For more on early modern cosmogonies, see Numbers (2002).

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the planets and the comets . . . to make up as many different vortices as there are now heavenly bodies (CSM I 257; AT VIIIA 101).

Vortices explain how celestial bodies such as stars and planets came into being. Vortex theory underlies many additional parts of Descartes’ physics, including gravity, tidal theory, light propagation, and magnetism.28 Whilst cosmological developments such as heliocentrism undermined Aristotelian cosmology but could be rendered compatible with it, Descartes’ cosmology and cosmogony is absolutely incompatible with Aristotelianism cosmology. In place of a regular, finite universe bounded by stars affixed to celestial spheres, the universe becomes a indefinitely large ocean seething with vortices. Cartesian cosmology is certainly not compatible with the view that time is the measure of the movement of the celestial sphere, as on the Cartesian picture the universe is indefinitely extended and there are no spheres. Nor is it compatible with the view that time is the measurement of the regular movement of the heavenly bodies, for unlike Aristotle’s steady-state universe, the movements of the heavenly bodies have not always been regular. Given Descartes’ cosmogony there were no heavenly bodies immediately following creation; the heavenly bodies as we know them came into being through the effects of vortices on clumps of matter. Descartes’ cosmology and cosmogony are incompatible with all variations of the view that time depends on the motion (or the measure of the motion) of the celestial bodies; this could provide thinkers who accept these aspects of Descartes’ work reason to develop alternative accounts of time. I argue that this line of thought is present in More. The influence that Descartes exerted over More’s early work is well documented.29 More read Descartes’ Principles before writing his 1646 Democritus Platonissans, a preface to which explains that More has been ‘roused up by a new Philosophick furie’ (PP 90). This fury can be largely (if not entirely) attributed to Descartes. To illustrate, throughout his career, More held that the material world is a plenum, and he adopts Descartes’ account of motion in a plenum.30 The only way that motion can occur in a plenum is that, when one body moves, another body also moves to make way for it, and so on. Vortices provide a natural account of motion in a plenum, and this likely explains why More went on to embrace Cartesian vortices with enthusiasm. In 1647, More uses vortices to explain a wide range of phenomena.

28

Schuster (2013) provides the most comprehensive study to date. See Lamprecht (1935), Patrides (1969, 29–31), Gabbey (1982), and Reid (2012, 23–6). 30 To illustrate, Democritus Platonissans writes approvingly of Descartes’ system, ‘if any space be left out unstuffd with Atoms, it will hazard the dissipation of the whole frame of Nature into disjointed dust’ (PP 90). 29

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For example, he advocates Descartes’ vortex theory of tides, and his ‘ingenuous’ account of light involving ‘gentle’ ethereal vortices (PP 150). He also espouses Descartes’ cosmology. ‘[T]he Sun, the Centre of this great Vortex, about which all the liquid matter of our Heaven is carried about, as grosse water in a whirlepooll; and with it the Planets like corks or strawes’ (PP 153). More’s 1646 and 1647 poems clearly show that he takes Cartesian vortices to best explain a large range of physical phenomena. Although More does not explicitly comment on vortex theory with regards to cosmogony here, he would certainly have read Descartes’ account of it alongside his cosmology, and there is no reason to believe that More did not accept it at this point, given his explicit acceptance of Descartes’ cosmogony in his later work. More’s Conjectura Cabbalistica provides an excellent illustration.31 The Conjectura Cabbalistica sets out three interpretations of Genesis: a literal interpretation, a kind of paraphrase; a philosophical interpretation, which reads metaphysical meanings into the text; and a moral interpretation, providing moral guidance. In the context of discussing the creation of matter, More’s defence of the philosophical interpretation describes the various kinds of material particles that make up the world, and explains that they correspond to those described by Descartes. For example, ‘the Earth consists of the third Element in the Cartesian Philosophy . . . for the truth of that Philosophy will force it self in whether I will or no’ (1662c, 79; II:1). A little later, More writes: ‘This fourth day’s Creation is the contrivance of Matter into Suns and Planets, or into Suns, Moons, and Earths. For the Aethereal Vortices were then set agoing, and the Corporeal world had got into an useful order and shape’ (1662c, 81–2; II:1). The truth of Descartes’ philosophy has forced itself into More’s cosmogony: after creation, the corporeal world gradually ‘got into’ its familiar useful order through vortices. The thesis that More developed his early account of time in response to Descartes’ cosmology and cosmogony is extremely plausible given the timing: More developed his account of time in the Notes to his 1647 Poems, the same Notes in which he adopts Cartesian vortices to explain cosmology and other phenomena. I suggest that the incompatibility between Descartes’ vortices and the view that time depends on the motion of the celestial bodies pushed More to draw deeper on Plotinus and develop an alternative account of time. Plausible though the timing may be, the thesis that More developed his early account of time in response to Descartes’ cosmology and cosmogony faces an obvious objection. If More were so impressed by Descartes’ physics that he 31 More also endorses Descartes’ cosmogony and cosmology in the Epistola appended to his published correspondence with Descartes; see More (1662b, 128).

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adopted it, why did More not also adopt Descartes’ account of time and duration which—as we saw in Chapter 1—is in the Aristotelian tradition? I argue that the answer lies in More’s wider intellectual patterns of behaviour. Marjorie Nicolson (1959, 114) once described More as a ‘seventeenth-century weather vane’, who responded now to one, and then to another, winds of doctrine affecting the climate of opinion. Whilst striking, this simile is problematic, because it implies that More lacked intrinsic direction of his own. If we are going to use metaphoric language, it would be better to think of More as a philosophic magpie. It is true that More picked up ideas here and ideas there but—just as magpies are legendarily consistent in picking up shiny things over dull ones—More is consistent with regard to the kinds of ideas he picks up. Namely, More consistently picks ideas from Descartes’ ‘shiny’ natural philosophy and ignores Descartes’ ‘dull’ metaphysics. This behaviour has been recognized (in less metaphorical terms) by other scholars.32 For example, Richard Popkin (1990, 98) writes that More accepted the new science offered by Descartes and others but violently rejected the proposed metaphysics to buttress it. More’s Platonic heritage was lacking in natural philosophy, but it was abundant in metaphysics. A relevant illustration of More’s magpie behaviour can be found in his views on vortices. In several works, More advocates Cartesian vortices as the correct mechanism by which motion occurs but rejects the Cartesian metaphysics underlying that mechanism. For example: let the Universal Matter be a heterogeneal Chaos of confusion, variously moved and as it happens, I say, there is no likelihood that this mad Motion would ever amount to so wise a Contrivance as is discernible even in the general Delineations of Nature . . . a round Sun, Moon, and Earth. For it is shrewdly to be suspected, if there were no Superintendent over the Motions of those ethereal whirle-pools, which the French Philosophy supposes, that the form of the sun and the rest of the Stars would be oblong (More, 1662a, 39; II: 1).

In this passage, More is not denying the existence of ethereal whirlpools. Rather, he is arguing against the metaphysics that he takes Descartes to be advancing alongside his theory of vortices: Descartes’ metaphysical view that matter can move without God acting as Superintendent.33 More’s rejection of this Cartesian metaphysical view does not prevent him from espousing vortex theory throughout his career.34 In reply to the objection framed above, I say that More did not 32

See also Reid (2012, 18–9). More voices similar objections elsewhere; see More (1662b, 80) and (1662c, 78; II:1). 34 For example, in 1671, More endorses parts of Descartes’ vortex theory on ocean tides (trans. 1995, II 108; XIV.6). On More’s use (and non-use) of Cartesian physics, and his philosophical interpretation of Genesis, see Webster (1969), Gabbey (1982), Rogers (1985), Hall (1990b), and Reid (2012, 287–91). 33

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accept Descartes’ account of time because he already had a sufficiently powerful metaphysics of time to draw on: that of Plotinus. Nonetheless, I argue it was More’s adoption of Descartes’ cosmology and cosmogony that prompted him to develop this account of time. As such, More’s account of time provides a microcosm of his larger intellectual patterns of behaviour: More borrowed Descartes’ natural philosophy and supplemented this with Plotinian metaphysics.

2.6 Understanding More’s Mature Absolutism Thus far I have argued that, on More’s later account, More holds eternal duration—the duration that we cannot help but conceive before creation, or after the destruction of creation—to be an attribute of God. More’s account of eternal duration parallels his account of infinite space. But what exactly does it mean to More to claim that duration or space are attributes of God? Matters are complicated by the way that More advances seemingly contradictory characterizations of what he means, even within the same text. By way of elucidating More’s meaning, this section tackles these characterizations. On the one hand, at various points in the texts given above More appears to literally identify space and eternal duration with God’s immensity and eternity, and in the Enchiridon Metaphysicum More (trans. 1995, 59; VIII:12) even describes space as a substance. For example, he writes that infinite extension is ‘a substance, that is, being subsisting by itself (Substantia, hoc est, Ens per se subsistens)’. A little later More (trans. 1995, 66; VIII:13 Scholia) expands on this, writing that every external object is either a substance, a mode of a substance, or nothing at all. The space in an empty room is not nothing, and it is not the mode of a substance, therefore it is a substance (substantia). And yet on the other hand, as we saw in the Enchiridion Metaphysicum and other texts, More describes space and duration as adulterated representations, obscure revelations, and sub-indications of God’s immensity and eternity. How do we reconcile these two kinds of characterizations? I argue that the answer lies in the fact a conceptual distinction can be drawn between God and his attributes. By way of leading up to More’s distinctions, it will be helpful to give a little relevant history. Here are two ways Descartes distinguishes between things (CSM I 213–15; AT VIIIA 28–31). A ‘real distinction’ exists only between two or more substances. We can perceive that two substances are really distinct from the fact that we can ‘clearly and distinctly’ understand one apart from the other. In contrast, a ‘conceptual distinction’ is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction between two attributes of a single substance. A conceptual

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distinction is indicated by our ‘inability to form a clear and distinct idea of the substance if we exclude from it the attribute in question’. To illustrate these distinctions, there is a real distinction between a person’s mind and their body, which are two substances. In contrast, there is only a conceptual distinction between a material substance (such as a person’s body) and its attribute of extension, such that, in reality, extension must be considered as the extended substance itself; additionally, there is only a conceptual distinction between God and his attributes. Predecessors of these Cartesian distinctions can be found in the work of Suárez’s Dispuationes Metaphysicae (trans. 1947, 18–19). Suárez writes of ‘mental’ distinctions, as opposed to ‘real’ ones: ‘This sort of distinction does not formally and actually intervene between the things designated as distinct . . . but only as they exist in our ideas, from which they receive some denomination’. Suárez further distinguishes between two kinds of mental distinction. One is the distinction of the reasoning reason, and this has ‘no foundation in reality’: it arises exclusively though the activity of the intellect. For example, the mind could consider Peter as subject or as predicate, and in both conceptions the concept of Peter remains unchanged. Another is the distinction of reasoned reason, and this has a foundation in reality, albeit in a weak sense: it ‘arises not entirely from the sheer operation of the intellect, but from the occasion offered by the thing itself on which the mind is reflecting’. This latter kind of distinction can arise when our minds consider ‘inadequate concepts of one and the same thing’. Although the same object is apprehended in each concept, the whole reality contained in the object ‘is not adequately represented’, nor its entire essence exhausted. For example, when we consider God’s justice as distinct from his mercy, we are drawing a distinction of reasoned reason because we do not conceive the ‘sublimely simple virtue of God’ as it is in itself, in its full range. More (trans. 1995, I 26-8; IV.1–6) also sets out various kinds of distinctions. More explains that a ‘rational’ distinction is attached to things by our reason, when ‘no physical or real difference’ actually holds between them. This is akin to Suárez’s mental distinction of reasoning reason. More goes on to describe a ‘formal’ distinction, on which ‘a physical and real differentia supports distinguishing limits’. This is akin to Suárez’s mental distinction of reasoned reason. For More, a formal distinction has several subspecies, including ‘modal’ and ‘attributive’ distinctions. Modal distinctions hold between a substance and its modes. More approvingly reads Descartes as holding attributes to be a special kind of mode, the difference being that we use the term ‘mode’ when the substance is modified or varied, and the term ‘attribute’ when the substance is

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not modified.35 More goes on to contrast rational and formal distinctions with ‘real’ distinctions, which includes at least potential separability. By separability, More explains that he means ‘some local distance’ between things, such that they may occupy ‘two different and separated places’. For More, a real distinction holds between the soul and the body because they could occupy two separate places. In contrast, there is only a non-real, attributive distinction between God and his attributes. We are now ready to return to More’s metaphysics of space and duration. I will focus on space here, as More’s line of argument in this regard is explicit, but it is evident in More’s conclusions that he treats space and duration symmetrically. Using a variety of arguments, the Enchiridion Metaphysicum (trans. 1995, I 52; VII:15) demonstrates against Descartes that there is everywhere ‘a certain immobile extension diffused all round in all parts even to infinity and distinct from mobile matter’. However—making use of Descartes in a way that he would not welcome—More goes on to argue that as extension is a real attribute of matter, we must accept that extension is a real attribute of some other subject in the absence of matter: the real attribute of some real subject (realis Subjecti Attributum) can be found nowhere else except where in the same place there is some real subject under it. And, indeed, extension is the real attribute of a real subject (namely matter), which however is found elsewhere . . . Therefore, it is necessary that some real subject be under this extension, since it is a real attribute (More, trans. 1995, I 56–7; VIII:6).

In the same way that extension is an attribute of matter, extension is an attribute of some other ‘real subject’—God. As More (trans. 1995, 57–60; VIII:7–13) goes on to demonstrate, this extension is divine, as space shares at least twenty of God’s titles, including one, simple, immobile, eternal, complete, independent, existing from itself. More concludes that a thing so ‘decorated’ with divine names cannot be imaginary: ‘that infinite extension which is supposed by the common people to be mere space, is indeed a certain substance, and that incorporeal, or spirit’. Further on, More draws some conclusions from his foregoing discussion: this infinite immobile extension distinct from matter is a certain rough representation of the divine essence . . . this immense internal place, or space really distinct from matter

35 More writes of Descartes, ‘he says that mode (modus) is the same as attribute (attributum)’. How far More’s gloss is correct is arguable, but Descartes does indeed say, ‘By mode, as used above, we understand exactly the same as what is elsewhere meant by an attribute or quality. But we employ the term mode when we are thinking of a substance as being affect or modified . . . when we are simply thinking in a more general way of what is in a substance, we use the term attribute’ (CSM I 211; AT VIIIA 26).

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which we conceive in our mind, is a certain rude sketch . . . and confused and general representation (Repraesentatio) of the divine essence or essential presence, insofar as it is separated from life and operations . . . How these attributes (Attributa) are joined by a necessary connection to those which refer to life and operation is indeed not to be investigated in this place (More, trans. 1995, 61; VIII. 15).

This passage is explicit that the immensity of space is an attribute of God. In reality, there is no distinction between God and his attributes, so in reality the substance of God is identical with his immensity, and—as space is God’s immensity—in reality, space is identical with the substance of God. Precisely the same reasoning goes for eternal duration: ‘when we meet with this sort of immobile and external extension, what can be more agreeable to reason than that we refer to God . . . [infinite extension and antemundane duration] are certain adulterated representations of the divine eternity and immensity’ (More, trans. 1995, I 68–9; VIII Scholia: 13). Above, we saw Descartes claim that we cannot clearly conceive a substance if we exclude its principal attributes. More (trans. 1995, I 27; IV:4) may build on this in arguing that ‘an attribute (attributorum) cannot be conceived without substance or essence’. Thus, although we can conceptually distinguish between God and his attributes, any attempt to consider space or eternal duration independently of God results at best in an unclear or confused representation of God, as we are attempting to conceive God’s attributes—his immensity or eternity—independently of his life and operations. A little later, More puts this point clearly: As when someone descries some object visibly, and, from a distance in the twilight, he apprehends it simply to be some opaque body, he does not know of what kind, animal, or tree, the backside of a horse . . . so, indeed, is the matter here. The object of our mind which we say to be internal space is only a slight and diluted, and general, shadow (umbra) representing the nature of the uninterrupted divine presence under the obscure light of our intellect, until one would attend it more vigilantly and approach the thing to be contemplated more closely (More, trans. 1995, 67; VIII.13 Scholia).

In considering space or eternal duration, we are indistinctly or imperfectly considering God, in the same way that a man coming on a twilight object does not clearly perceive that object.36

36

Reid (2012, 215) appears to read these passages in a similar way, briefly writing that for More our conception of space would only amount to a very imperfect apprehension of the divine substance, because it misses out so many of God’s other attributes.

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In conceiving eternal duration and space to be attributes of God, More has avoided a particular kind of blasphemy or heresy. In his 1710 Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley sets out a dangerous dilemma: ‘[The] dangerous dilemma . . . of thinking either that real space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions’ (Berkeley, repr. 1989, 113–14; §117). The first horn of Berkeley’s dilemma is (what I label) ‘pantheistic blasphemy’; more on this in Chapter 9, Section 9.3.4. The second horn is (what I label) ‘polytheistic blasphemy’.37 It posits space as a real being, distinct from God, and yet possessed of attributes that are usually held to be uniquely divine. God and human beings can share attributes; they may, for example, both be knowing and loving, albeit to different degrees. However, there are some attributes that are traditionally ascribed uniquely to God: he is eternal, uncreated, infinite, and immutable. In positing a substance with these attributes that is distinct from God, one is in effect positing a second God. I argue that More, the seventeenth-century weathervane, was sensitive to the problem of polytheistic blasphemy and aware that he escaped it by identifying eternal duration and space with God’s attributes. There are two texts that support this reading of More. In a letter dated 17 November (likely 1651), More discusses a supposition posed by Anne Conway: [To the supposition that] matter is uncreated, I answer, that seems to me not so rationall. For then there will be some thing independent of God . . . and if matter may be independent, why may not immaterial beings be also independent, suppose angels and the soules of men, Nay if we can admit, that any thing may be of it self uncreated of the first most perfect being, we may as well admit that there are more Gods than one independent that may war with another, and againe be at peace, and when the toy takes them to the head, they fling the bodyes of the planets at one another, as lads do snow-balles (CL 491).

Here, More is conscious that ascribing independence to something distinct from God—in this case matter, or immaterial beings—would be tantamount to positing further gods. Additionally, in the 1679 edition of Enchiridion Metaphysicum, More writes that to believe that space or antemundane duration is eternal and necessary and unconnected to God would lead one into ‘myriad labyrinths and little agreeable to reason and religion’. These labyrinths can be escaped if one ‘would clearly remember’ that duration and space are adulterated representations of the divine eternity and immensity. More (trans. 1995, I 68–9; VIII Scholia 13) reports that

37

I discuss these blasphemies in more detail in Thomas (2013, 195–8).

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an (unnamed) author attributed to More the view that a spirit distinct from God pervades all things. More is referring to a passage in Nathaniel Fairfax: the excellent Dr. Hen. More, whose soul may have roamed as far into these scopes and vastnesses as most mens in this world, has not only (in his Enchirid. Metaph.) made Ghost, as such, extended; but has started such a boundless roomthiness, as needful as God is (if I understand him) as is a kind of ghost inwardly drilling through the All of body, and such a one too as is so far a likeness of God himself, that it wants nothing of him but only his life and working (Fairfax, 1674, 61).

Fairfax reads More as conceiving space as a rival omnipresent spirit to God. Against Fairfax, More explains that his conception of immobile extension distinct from matter did not aim to prove that a spirit distinct from God pervades all things. More firmly rejects the view that eternal duration and space are certain external ‘concomitants’ of God (externa quaedam . . . Divinae Existentiae Concomitantia).38 Of Fairfax, More (trans. 1995, I 68–9; VIII Scholia: 13) testily writes, ‘And if he himself would sufficiently attend, he would be able to easily foresee that it will be impossible, since I make this immobile extension something real, and adorned with so many divine attributes, but that I shall have to conclude that it itself is God’. More is well aware that to adorn space—or eternal duration—with divine attributes and not identify space with God would amount to polytheistic blasphemy.

2.7 The Influence of More’s Account of Absolute Duration More’s views on time or duration have been neglected—and, in some cases, even erased—by scholars. This chapter has shown that such treatments are unjust, but a little more remains to be said. Even if readers are persuaded that the mature More has an absolute account of duration, they might still doubt the possibility that it was used as a source by later thinkers on the grounds that, if previous scholars have missed it, More’s account is too deeply buried in his texts to make it likely that his contemporaries excavated it. To allay this worry, I argue that More’s account of absolute duration is no more buried than, say, Barrow’s account of time. As we will see, Barrow’s account of time is found in one lecture of his Lectiones Geometricae, and it is untitled.

38

It would be interesting to know who (if anyone) More takes to hold this position. As we will see in Chapters 3 and 5, by this date possible candidates include Gassendi, Walter Charleton, or Samuel Parker.

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Whilst More’s early account of time does require some excavation39 his later account of time and duration does not. More’s later account can be found in two chapters in his Divine Dialogues, helpfully titled ‘The Attribute of Eternity’ and ‘That there is an ever-anticipative eternity and inextermixable amplitude that are proper to the Deity only’. In the Enchiridion Metaphysicum, More’s ontology of duration is included in the chapter primarily concerned with his ontology of space—titled ‘That that immobile extension from mobile matter which is to be demonstrated is not something imaginary, but at least real, if not divine’—and, given how intermixed More’s discussions of space and duration are here, it seems unlikely that a close reader of More’s account of space could fail to notice his account of duration. Additionally, as I will argue in several subsequent chapters, there are various positive reasons to include More as a source that later thinkers drew on.

39 As it is submerged in the notes to More’s Poems. That said, this account is found under a section titled ‘O life of time and all Alterity!’ (PP 136).

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3 A Continental Interlude Time in van Helmont, Gassendi, and Charleton

[I saw that] abhorred monster, Atheisme, proudly strutting with a lofty gate and impudent forehead, boasting himself the onely genuine offspring of the true Wisdom and Philosophy, namely of that which makes Matter alone the substance of all things in the world. This misshapen Creature was first nourished up in the stie of Epicurus Henry More (1660, vii)

3.1 Introduction Unlike, say, Yorkshire pudding or Welsh rarebit, absolutism was not exclusive to Britain. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter introduce the absolutisms of Jan Baptist van Helmont and Pierre Gassendi, working on the European continent in the Low Countries and France respectively. These discussions will prove useful because it has been argued that various British thinkers pick up on their ideas. Section 3.4 explores the work of English philosopher Walter Charleton, who took up Gassendist absolutism very early. We will see that Charleton’s account of space and time stays extremely close to Gassendi’s, often merely translating Gassendi from Latin into English (were matters otherwise, Charleton’s work would have owned a much larger place in this study). Nonetheless, we will see that there is one interesting difference between their views: Charleton unreservedly implies that time is real and independent of God, whilst Gassendi does not.

3.2 Jan Baptist van Helmont’s Platonic Time Jan Baptist van Helmont (1580–1644) was a Flemish scientist and physician whose work occasionally took him into metaphysics. A large collection of his

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works, Ortus Medicinae, was published posthumously in 1648 by his son, Francis Mercury. As the title suggests, Ortus Medicinae is primarily concerned with medicine—discussing, for example, diseases, scabs, and coughs—but it strays into many further areas, and includes a tract on time: ‘De Tempore’. Ortus Medicinae was translated from Latin into English in 1662, under the title Oriatrike. I reference the English translation, and take the Latin from the original. ‘De Tempore’ opens by explaining that van Helmont is concerned with time because he is concerned with longevity of life. Our lives are measured by years and months but these measures are not time. Van Helmont (1662, 634–6) writes that, in the same way that there is unlimited place beyond the heavens ‘which is deprived of all Body and Motion; yet filled with spirit’, so too is there time in the absence of bodies and motions. Van Helmont advances various thought experiments in support of this latter claim, for example arguing in Augustinian style that if the sun stood still, time would continue. Ultimately, van Helmont associates time with God: I acknowledge Time to be a Being, which gives and distributes all things to all, according to an ordained participation of eternal Duration, and that for the confounding of Atheists. Therefore I consider Time, as the issuing Splendour of Eternity, (tempus tanquam aeternitatis emanantem splendorem) and the which Splendour doth no more subsist beneath and without Eternity, than the Splendour of the Light beneath the Light. Time therefore, ought to be unto us a manuduction or hand-leading unto the Super-intellectual, One, Eternal, Infinite, Intimate Being in every Thing . . . to whom be praise and glory in its own Eternity (van Helmont, 1662, 641).

Van Helmont considers time to be a real being that emanates from God, analogous to the emanation of light from a light source. This analogy is Platonic, and Pagel (1948, 390) argues that van Helmont is drawing directly on Plotinus’ account of time, including the idea that time is the unfolding of eternity. It is unclear whether time is really distinct from God, but it is clear that van Helmont is a weak absolutist. In its Platonic overtones, van Helmont’s account of time is similar to the account found in More’s Poems. However, there is no reason to believe that van Helmont’s work influenced More’s. To recap the dates, More published his Poems in 1647, and van Helmont’s Ortus Medicinae was published a year later. Although ‘De Tempore’ would of course been written some time before van Helmont’s death in 1644, it seems extremely unlikely that More would have read the unpublished manuscript, especially as it was in Dutch.1 1 The frontispiece of Ortus Medicinae states that Francis Mercury translated his father’s work from Dutch into Latin.

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3.3 Pierre Gassendi’s Space and Time Absolutism Pierre Gassendi’s (1592–1655) work constitutes another revival of Epicurean atomism and, along the way, the Frenchman advanced absolutism. Gassendi developed an absolute account of space earlier than an absolute account of time,2 although his absolutist tendencies with regard to time are also evidenced in his earlier work. For example, Gassendi’s 1644 Disquisitio Metaphysica—reprinted in his Opera Omnia (1658, III.347)—states: ‘Whether things exist, or do not exist, whether they move, or are at rest, time always flows at an equal tenor’ (eodem tenore fluit tempus). Fully absolute time can be found in Gassendi’s 1649 Animadversiones and Syntagma Philosophicum. I will make use of a twentieth-century translation of the latter. The Syntagma is presented as a critique of scholasticism, but it may be directed at Descartes.3 Gassendi opens his discussion of space and time by observing that reality is customarily divided into two categories: substance and accident. Gassendi explains that he will question this division, with a view to asking whether space and time should not be considered as ‘fundamental elements of all classification’ (ut membra diuifionis primaria). Gassendi sets out to reject the ‘common opinion’ which holds that place and time are corporeal accidents, and consequently if there were no bodies upon which they depended, there would be no space and time. From the outset, Gassendi claims that space and time are real things (relia Entia) that exist even when no one is conscious of them (trans. 1972, 383–4; 1658, I.179). As scholars have noted, this rejection of Aristotelianism about space and time borrows from earlier thinkers such as Bruno, Telesio, and Patrizi.4 Gassendi argues that even if there were no bodies, there would still be space and time. Consequently, he argues that space and time are ‘certain incorporeal natures’ of a different kind from those ordinary called substance and accident. Whence it follows that being . . . is not adequately classified as substance and accident, but that space and time must be added as two members of the classification . . . This is because there is no substance and no accident for which it is not appropriate to say that it exists somewhere, or in some place, and exists sometime, or at some moment, and in such a way that even if the substance of the accident should perish, the place would continue Čapek (1987, 599–601) discusses the development of Gassendi’s views in detail. As late as Gassendi’s 1649 Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma, he holds the non-absolutist view that time is ‘superadded’ (superaccidit) by our minds to events (O III 183). 3 Edwards (2013, 128–39) suggests this, considering in detail Gassendi’s earlier critique of Descartes with regard to time, and argues that in general Gassendi’s engagement with Aristotelianism has been missed. 4 See LoLordo (2007, 103–6) and Fisher (2014). 2

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nevertheless to abide and the time would continue nonetheless to flow. From this we conclude that space and time must be considered real things, or actual entities (Gassendi, trans. 1972, 384).

For Gassendi (trans. 1972, 385–8) space possesses incorporeal dimensions, is boundless and immobile. Gassendi (trans. 1972, 389–96) goes on to explain that space is an incorporeal being of some kind, but it is not an incorporeal substance, a category which includes God and human minds. The latter are genuine substances with genuine natures, and appropriate faculties and actions. In contrast, space cannot act or suffer anything to happen to it, it merely has the negative quality (repugnantia) of allowing other things to occupy it or pass through it; the same can be said for time. Adding more on time, Gassendi writes that by analogy from corporeal motion, we imagine incorporeal successive duration: ‘so time may be described as an incorporeal fluid extension in which it is possible to designate the past, present, and future so that every object may have its time’. Gassendi writes that, whilst men make use of the motion of the heavens to measure time, time does not depend on motion. Indeed, citing Empedocles’ report that in the beginning the days lasted much longer than they do now, Gassendi writes ‘we must believe’ that the motion of the sun has become sixty times faster since those days, though time has not become faster. For Gassendi, space and time are incorporeal, dimensional beings which can be occupied by bodies. However, as Gassendi acknowledges, these beings appear to be uncreated and to exist independently of God, effectively raising the spectre of polytheistic blasphemy. LoLordo (2007, 121) considers the fact that Gassendi’s space and time are uncreated and argues that the Syntagma suggests two ways of dealing with it. The first is suggested by this passage: [W]e must eliminate any scruple that might possibly arise from thinking that space as defined here may be inferred to be uncreated and independent of God, for since it has been said that it is indeed a thing, it might seem to follow that God is not the author of all things. But it is undeniable that by the words ‘space’ and ‘spatial dimensions’ we do not mean anything but that space which is generally called imaginary and which the majority of sacred doctors admit exists beyond the universe. And they do not permit this space to be called imaginary merely because it depends upon the imagination, like a chimera, but because we have an image of its dimensions by analogy to the dimensions that appear to our senses. Nor are they deterred by those who say that this space is uncreated and independent of God by alleging that it is nothing positive, neither a substance nor an accident, under which all things created by God are subsumed. On the contrary, this concept appears to be far more acceptable than another that the doctors commonly admit, namely that the essences of things are eternal, uncreated, and independent of God (Gassendi, trans. 1972, 389).

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LoLordo argues this passage suggests that God is the creator of all substances but not all things, and there is no scruple in holding this. This is because it is only expected that God creates all positive things, and space is not a positive thing (nihil positivum). Gassendi claims this position is no worse than another that the doctors ‘commonly admit’: holding that there are uncreated essences. If we emphasize this passage in Gassendi, we can read him as a strong absolutist: space is uncreated and exists independently of God, although it is not a positive thing. Before moving on to the second way that LoLordo suggests the Syntagma could deal with polytheistic blasphemy, let’s take a detour into this passage’s reference to imaginary space. As Grant (1981, 116–21) explains in detail, the history of imaginary space is as follows. Aristotle (trans. 1984, Phys 3.4.203b25–7) writes that in our imagination, certain things appear to be inexhaustible or unbounded, such as mathematical measures ‘and what is outside the heaven’. From the thirteenth century, this led to the discussion of imaginary extracosmic space in two contexts. The first is the possible existence of a void space, really distinct from God but assumed to have been created by God before, during, or after the creation of the world. Grant emphasizes that while imaginary space in this sense was discussed during the Middle Ages, nobody actually defended it. In the second context, extracosmic space is not taken to be distinct from God; rather, it is associated in some way with God’s omnipresent immensity.5 Although Gassendi uses the terminology of imaginary space in the above passage, seemingly placing himself in these Aristotelian traditions, LoLordo (2007, 121–2) rightly explains that this is misleading. In the scholastic tradition, space was usually understood as imaginary in the sense that it is a minddependent being of the imagination or reason.6 In contrast, Gassendi’s space is imaginary not because it is mind-dependent but because we imagine it by analogy with corporeal dimensions. As LoLordo puts it, Gassendi’s description of space as imaginary is a ‘rhetorical trick’, aimed at making it sound less radical than it actually is. Even though it is not a positive thing, space is still a mind-independent thing. Moving on, LoLordo (2007, 123–4) argues the Syntagma suggests a second way to deal with the fact that space is uncreated: allow that space and time are

5 Grant (1981, 135–44) details the development of this view in the fourteenth century thinker Thomas Bradwardine, explaining for example that on this view space only possesses properties that are compatible with God—because space is identified with God’s immensity—and as such it is partless and lacks dimensions. Given the latter, this is very different to the mature position of More. 6 With regard to time, a parallel illustration can be drawn with Suárez, for whom imaginary succession is arguably a being of reason.

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uncreated but hold that they are dependent on God. This strategy is suggested in the following passage (I borrow LoLordo’s translation): because it follows from the perfection of the divine essence that it is eternal and immense, from this all time and all space are connoted (connotari), without which neither eternity nor immensity can be understood. And therefore God is indeed in se most highly and infinitely perfect, but nevertheless is also in every time, and in every place (Gassendi, 1658, I.191).

This passage suggests that, whilst space and time are uncreated, they are dependent on God for their existence because they are somehow connoted by his eternity and immensity. Precisely how this would work is unclear, but, if this part of his text were emphasized, it would make Gassendi a weak absolutist. It is worth stressing that whilst these two strategies for tackling polytheistic blasphemy are both suggested by Gassendi’s Syntagma, neither are explicitly defended by it. Whether Gassendi would choose to emphasize one of these strategies over the other—space is uncreated, but this is not impious because it is not a substance or positive thing, or space is uncreated but depends on God— is unclear.

3.4 Walter Charleton and the Reality of Time As the quote that opens this chapter indicates, Henry More was unimpressed by Epicureanism, perceiving its emphasis on matter and mechanism as atheistic. On the same page, More (1660, vii) singles out Gassendi for special mention: ‘as for the Philosophy of Epicurus, it seemed to me at the very first sight such a foolery, that I was much amazed that a person of so commendable parts as P. Gassendus could ever have the patience to rake out such old course rags out of that rotten dunghill to stuffe his large Volumes withall’.7 However, More’s negative reaction was not shared by all British philosophers. In this chapter, we’ll see that Gassendi’s work gained one British convert in Charleton, and in Chapters 5 and 8 we’ll meet several more. Walter Charleton (1620–1707) was an English physician and natural philosopher.8 He came up to Magdalen Hall, Oxford in 1635, and subsequently established a medical practice in London. He was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1661, less than a year after its foundation. Charleton was well read in natural philosophy, and his works evince familiarity with Kenelm Digby (with whom he

7 8

Gabbey (1990, 19) notes that, despite More’s intellectual curiosity, he found Gassendi tedious. I borrow the following biographic details from Henry (2010).

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became close friends) as well as Descartes, Gassendi, and Hobbes. He was also extremely familiar with the medical work of van Helmont, some tracts of which he translated into English.9 While the bulk of Charleton’s writings concern natural philosophy, his 1654 Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana represents a significant venture into metaphysics. The opening pages proclaim that its system was ‘founded’ by Epicuris, ‘repaired’ by Gassendi, and ‘augmented’ by Charleton.10 The text is based on Gassendi’s Animadversiones, but—as Henry (2010) notes—it also shows familiarity with material not published until Gassendi’s Opera Omnia. Charleton is credited as being one of the main routes through which Gassendi’s work was disseminated in English.11 It is Charleton’s Physiologia that sets out a metaphysics of time and space. Charleton (1654, 65–6) describes the ‘Epidemick Errour’ of limiting reality to two categories, substance and accident. Like Gassendi, he argues that time and space fall into a third and fourth category of being respectively: [most Scholars] hold that what is neither Substance, nor Accident, can pretend to no Reality, but must be damned to the predicament of Chimaera’s, or be excluded from Being . . . Now this their Scheme is defective . . . it fails in the General Distribution of Ens, or Res, into Substance and Accident: in regard, that to those two Members of the Division there ought to be superadded other two, more general then those; viz. Place and Time, Things most unreducible to the Categories of Substance and Accident (Charleton, 1654, 65–6).

Against the likes of Hobbes’ chimeras, Charleton is explicit that space is a real being: Place and Time are not pertinent to the Classis either of substances, or Accidents: yet they are notwithstanding Realities, Things, or not-Nothings, insomuch as no substance can be conceived existent without Place and Time . . . [Against the view] Whatever is neither Substance, or Accident, is a downright Nothing, &c, we need no other buckler then to except Place and Time (Charleton, 1654, 66).

Charleton has been read as holding that space or time are nothingness12 but, to my mind, his claims here decisively count against such readings. Charleton goes on to defend these claims as follows.

9

Although it is possible Charleton read De Tempore, there is no sign of it in Charleton’s account of time. 10 On Charleton’s place in British Epicureanism, see Kargon (1964). 11 On the dissemination of Gassendi’s work more generally, see Osler (2010). 12 For example, see Connolly (2015, 84).

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Charleton (1654, 66) argues that space is not an accident because ‘Place is uncapable of Access and Recess’. The idea seems to be that, unlike other accidents— such as colour or smell—spatial location is not an accident that moves with substances over time. This reading is confirmed by the additional reason Charleton gives for denying that space is an accident: ‘various bodies may be successively situate in one and the same Place, without causing any the least mutation therein’, which suggests that space is ‘nearest to the propriety of a substance’. Charleton is arguing that space is closer to substance than accident because a space remains whilst the bodies that occupy it change, akin to the way that a substance remains whilst its accidents change. However, Charleton (1654, 66) goes on to argue that space is not a substance because substances are usually understood to be corporeal, and as active or passive, yet none of these attributes apply to space. Charleton throws further light on his understanding of passivity and activity a little further on. Charleton (1654, 68) argues that the term ‘incorporeal’ can be used in two ways. First, it can be used to signify a ‘true and germane substance, to which certain Faculties and Operations essentially belong’. In this sense, the term incorporeal can be applied to God, angels, and human souls. Second, ‘incorporeal’ can signify ‘a mere Negation of Corporiety, and so of corporeal Dimensions, and not any positive Nature capable of Faculties and Operations’. In this sense, incorporeal can be applied to space, which is neither active nor passive, but has only a ‘general Non-repugnancy, or Admissive Capacity’, whereby it receives bodies. Charleton is arguing that to be active is to possess faculties— such as the capacity to move or understand—and as space lacks such faculties and this is required to be a substance, space is not a substance. Charleton (1654, 71) concludes that space is incorporeal dimensions. Charleton (1654, 73) goes on to consider time, the ‘Twin-brother of Space’. He argues that time is not a ‘mere Ens Rationis’ (i.e., being of the mind), ‘as if Time had no other subject of inherence but the Mind’; and nor is it an accident dependent on corporeal subjects, for time is ‘absolutely independent on the Existence of any Nature whatever’. Against the Aristotelian association of time with motion, Charleton argues that time in its being ‘owes no respect at all’ to motion, as ‘the understanding must deprehend Time to continue to be what it ever was and is, whether be any Motion or Mutation in the world, or not, nay, whether there be any World’. Even in the absence of the world, our understanding apprehends that there would be time. As Charleton (1654, 75–6) puts it, ‘Time flows on eternally in the same calm and equal tenor, whether any or nothing hath duration therein, whether any thing be moved or remain quiet’.

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Charleton (1654, 75–6) draws several parallels between space and time, including the following: space is immense and time is interminable; as every moment of time is the same in all places, so every part of space is the same at all times; space is immovable and time uniformly flows; space has ‘permanent’ dimensions suitable to receiving bodies, and time has ‘successive’ dimensions, suitable to accommodating the motions of bodies; all bodies and things enjoy a part of space and time, except for God who is in every place and every time. Having set out Charleton’s account, let’s dig a little deeper into the relationship between God, time, and space. We will see that God is present in time and space, and that time and space do not appear to depend on God for their existence. Charleton (1654, 76) is explicit that ‘those two illustrious Attributes’, immensity and eternity, by which God is present in all places and in all times, are ‘proper’ only to God. Charleton (1654, 70) argues that it is a virtue of his account that God is in space, as it is preferable to place God in infinite space than nowhere. Similarly, he argues that angels are diffused through a certain part of space. Charleton (1654, 80–1) also holds it is a virtue of his account that God is present in time, as it provides us with a better account of God’s eternity. We are no longer committed to the ‘unintelligible’ view that eternity is an everlasting ‘now’, or that this now somehow coexists with time. Instead, we coexist with God in time: ‘we are existent in a small part of that Duration, in which God infinitely existeth’. Charleton supports his position with scripture, arguing that ‘YEARS are attributed to God, but not any mutation of Substance’. As far as I am aware, Gassendi does not make his views on the precise nature of God’s presence in time or space explicit13 and certainly Charleton does not: although Charleton is not a nullibist, it is unclear whether he is a holenmerist. Charleton (1654, 82–3) is firm that although God’s eternity has succession, God does not have parts. Charleton argues that God is a pure, simple, homogeneous substance, and thus is not subject to the ‘corruption’ that beings with compound natures experience in time. Following Gassendi, Charleton considers the worry that space and time are independent of God: Here we discover our selves in danger of a nice Scruple, deductive from this our Description of Space, viz. That, according to the tenor of Conceptions, Space must be unproduced by, and independent upon the original of all Things, God. Which to praevent, we observe, that from the very word Spatial Dimensions, it is sufficiently evident, that we understand no other Spaces in the World, than what most of our Ecclesiastical Doctors allow to be on the outside thereof, and denominate Imaginary: not that they are merely Phantastical, as Chimaera’s; but that our Imaginations can and doth apprehend them to 13

Of Gassendi’s God, McGuire and Slowik (2012, 290) plump for holenmerism.

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have Dimensions . . . And, in that respect, though we concede them [spaces] to be improduct by, and independent upon God; yet cannot our Adversaries therefore impeach us of impiety, or distort it to the disparagement of our theory: since we consider these Spaces, and their Dimensions to be Nihil Positivum, i.e. nor Substance, nor Accident, under which two Categories all works of the Creation are comprehended. Besides, this sounds much less harsh in the ears of the Church, then that which not a few of her Chair-men have adventured to patronise; viz. That the Essence of Things are Nonprincipiate, Improduct, and Independent (Charleton, 1654, 68).

Charleton’s Physiologia evinces Gassendi’s first suggestion for avoiding the threat of polytheistic blasphemy. Charleton is arguing that God has created all substances and accidents but not all things, and this position is weaker than another view that the Church already tolerates: that there are uncreated essences. The Physiologia does not evince the second suggestion seemingly found in Gassendi, that space and time are distinct yet connoted by God. This implies that—unlike Gassendi—Charleton is unreservedly convinced of strong absolutism: space and time do not depend on God for their existence.

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4 Space and Time in Isaac Barrow A Modal Relationist Metaphysic

[Space] is deservedly to be placed in the same Order of Beings with Creability, Sensibility, Mobility . . . Contiguity is the Mode of Magnitudes which signifies that no Magnitude can come between them . . . Space is that Mode of the same. Isaac Barrow (trans. 1734, 177–8)

4.1 Introduction In 1660s Cambridge, Barrow set out a new, symmetric account of space and time. Barrow’s account of time is important in part because it is argued to be one of the sources that Newton used to construct his absolutism, yet scholars are divided over how best to read Barrow’s account. This chapter advances a new reading of Barrow, grounded in his description of space as a mode of magnitudes (in the passage that opens this chapter). I argue that Barrow is a modal relationist about space, and—as he explicitly treats space and time analogously—this entails that he is a modal relationist about time too. For Barrow, as on the view sometimes attributed to Leibniz, space and time are grounded in relations between actual and possible things. I find confirmation of this reading in the work of another early modern thinker, the Newtonian John Keill. However, unusually for a relationist, Barrow does hold an absolute account of motion. This new reading entails that Barrow’s account of time may not have played as large a role in the development of Newton’s work as has been thought, but it also raises the possibility that Leibniz drew on Barrow’s relationism. The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 4.2 gives a brief biographical sketch of Barrow. Section 4.3 sets out Barrow’s account of space and time. Section 4.4 discusses the three existing readings of Barrow’s metaphysics of space and time: Barrow’s metaphysics lacks depth, space and time are divine attributes, and space and time are unreal containers for bodies. I show that all

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these readings struggle to account for Barrow’s puzzling passage. Section 4.5 argues for a new reading of Barrow as a modal relationist, identifying space and time with the relational modes of magnitudes. We will see that Barrow’s unusual conjunction of views allow him to escape impiety in a way that he takes to contrast favourably with Gassendi’s absolutism. Section 4.6 concludes by discussing the implications this reading of Barrow has for his intellectual relationships with Newton and Leibniz.

4.2 Sketching Barrow’s Life and Works Isaac Barrow (1630–1677) was born in London to a royalist family. The Civil War brought the family great difficulties, but Barrow eventually succeeded in attaining (and, finally, retaining) a place at Cambridge. Barrow graduated in 1649 from Trinity College and was elected a fellow shortly afterwards. As Feingold (2007) writes, this academic success seems to have been based on merit alone, as Barrow never disguised his royalist sympathies.1 During the early 1650s Barrow read widely. He was well versed in Aristotle and retained a deep respect for Aristotle throughout his career, describing him as the ‘unchallenged Prince of all who have ever been or ever will be philosophers’ (N IX 161). During this period, Barrow also engaged with Descartes in depth. This early enthusiasm is displayed in his 1652 Cartesiana Hypothesis De Materia et Motu Haud Satisfacit Praecipuis Naturae Phaenomenis. The essay opens by discussing the post-Aristotelian neglect of natural philosophy, and goes on to praise Descartes—that best and most ingenious (ingeniosissimus) philosopher—and his natural philosophy in high terms (N IX, 79–81). Despite this praise, Barrow does not accept all aspects of his work. For example, Barrow distinguishes between Descartes’ explanations of natural phenomena such as the motions of the heavenly bodies and the sea, which he accepts; and Descartes’ explanations of animals, planets, minerals, and stones, which he does not accept. Even here, Barrow is wary of the materialist connotations of Descartes’ system, writing that it exhibits no vital spirit (Spiritum quendam vitalem) (N IX, 82–104). A quirk of Barrow’s was his tendency to turn his thoughts into Latin verse—indeed, Overton (1885, 302) claims that Barrow had ‘almost a mania’ in this regard—and this quirk is evidenced by his subsequent verses on Descartes (N IX 441–3).

1 My sources for the biographical part of this sketch include Hill’s memoir in (N I); Whewell’s biography in (N IX); Overton (1885); Windred (1933, 126–9); Gascoigne (1990); and Feingold (1990a; 1993; 2007).

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Echoing More’s intellectual development, Barrow later grew more critical of Descartes, likely because Barrow also perceived Cartesianism to carry the risk of materialism and atheism. By Barrow’s 1661 Oratio Sarcasmica in Schola Graeca, his enthusiasm for Descartes had significantly waned. Oratio Sarcasmica praises Aristotle’s natural philosophy and contrasts it unfavourably with a new philosophy involving ‘meditation’ (N IX 165). As Osmond (1944, 95) notes, this is of course an allusion to Descartes’ Meditations. Barrow goes on to explain that this new philosophy is based on arbitrary figments of the mind, taking refuge in absurd hypotheses, and scraping together the dust of subtile matter (N IX 165–6). The latter implies that Barrow is connecting Cartesianism with materialism, and in general Barrow is scathing of materialism. Barrow’s Being of God proved from the Frame of Human Nature states that it is ‘monstrous baseness’ for us to own any parentage from matter, to hold that we are less than beasts, ‘a mere corporeal machine, a ball of fate and chance, a thing violently tossed and tumbled up and down by bodies all about it’ (N V 218). By 1654, Barrow’s royalism made continuing at Cambridge untenable, and in 1655 he was granted a travelling fellowship from Trinity. Barrow travelled through France, Italy, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands. Along the way, he describes (in Latin verse) how a ship he travelled on was attacked and he took a lively part in rebuffing the attackers (N IX 458–80). Barrow returned to Trinity in 1659 and became ordained; Feingold (2007) reports that Barrow mystified the chaplain by providing ‘rhyming answers’ to moral questions. The 1660 Restoration turned Barrow’s fortunes around, and soon afterward he was elected to two professorships—a Greek professorship, and the Gresham professorship of geometry—which he held concurrently. In 1662 Barrow was elected a fellow of the Royal Society, though he was not active within it. In 1663, Barrow preached the consecration sermon in Westminster Abbey. The same year, the Lucasian professorship of mathematics was founded and Barrow elected its first incumbent; he later resigned the Greek and Gresham professorships. In the course of his duties as Lucasian professor, Barrow came into contact with Newton, whom he examined in Euclid in 1664 in connection with a mathematical scholarship at Trinity. From 1664 to 1666 Barrow delivered his Lectiones Mathematicae; Lectures IX and X of this series contain his views on space. Their delivery was interrupted by various plague-related university closures, and by ‘injections’ of additional lectures. One such injection of lectures includes the first five of Barrow’s Lectiones Geometricae, in the spring and winter of 1665; Lecture I of this series concerns time. It seems likely—because Barrow’s lecture on time makes reference to

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his views on space—that Barrow delivered the pertinent Lectiones Mathematicae in 1664 or early 1665.2 In 1669, Barrow resigned the Lucasian professorship to Newton. Barrow’s Lectiones Geometricae were published in 1670, and in 1735 they were translated into English by Edmund Stone. This translation includes a preface in which Barrow (trans. 1735, iv) thanks Newton—‘a Man of great Learning and Sagacity’— for helping to revise the text. However, there is some confusion as to whether Newton helped Barrow revise this text, or whether this preface was intended to apply exclusively to a different text.3 After 1670, Barrow’s studies focused largely on theology. His sermons were highly regarded, if prolix.4 King Charles II jested that Barrow was an ‘unfair’ preacher because ‘he exhausted every subject, and left no room for others to come after him’ (N XI xlviii). Overton (1885, 303) reports that Locke regarded Barrow’s sermons as ‘masterpieces of their kind’. In 1673, Barrow was elected Master of Trinity College, and one of his legacies is the Wren Library. In I675 he was chosen Vice-Chancellor of the University. In 1677, Barrow contracted a ‘malignant fever’ and died, at the age of forty-seven. He was subsequently buried in Westminster Abbey. Many of Barrow’s works were published posthumously, including the Lectiones Mathematicae which first came out in 1683. The Lectiones Mathematicae and Lectiones Geometricae were translated into English in 1734 and 1735 respectively, and I use these translations.5 In the two centuries following his death, Barrow was highly regarded as a mathematician and theologian. Henry Pemberton (1728, preface) states that with the exception of Newton, Barrow ‘may be esteemed as having shewn a compass of invention equal, if not superior, to any of the moderns’. However, Barrow’s reputation has since declined, moving A. R. Hall (1980, 8) to write that 2

See Feingold (2007). The 1670 edition of Lectiones Geometricae does not name Newton in the preface. In 1672, Barrow published a joint edition of his Lectiones Opticae, and Lectiones Geometricae—titled Lectiones XVIII, Cantabrigiæ in scholis publicis habitæ; in quibus opticorum phænomenōn genuinæ rationes investigantur, ac exponuntur. Annexæ sunt lectiones aliquot geometricæ—and this volume included a preface thanking Newton. Consequently, it is unclear whether the preface applies exclusively to the Lectiones Opticae; or also, as Stone assumed in 1735, to the Lectiones Geometricae too. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this press for drawing this to my attention. 4 Overton (1885, 302) writes that the delivery of Barrow’s sermons were notoriously long, ‘even for those days of long sermons’. He recounts an occasion on which Barrow preached so long in Westminster Abbey that the vergers caused the church organs to play ‘till they had blowed him down’. 5 Whewell is scathing of Stone’s English translation of Lectiones Geometricae, claiming it is ‘so badly executed that it cannot be of use to any one’ (W I viii). At least with regard to the metaphysics passages that are my concern, I have found this wholly untrue. 3

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it ‘seems to be descending toward the status of an elegant codifier’. The reasons underlying the decline of Barrow’s reputation are complex but one is particularly relevant to this study: the eclipse of Barrow’s star by Newton’s. Barrow and Newton worked on many of the same topics, and Newton’s advancements went further. Feingold (1993, 310) argues that the domains of Barrow and Newton overlapped so far that it is ‘virtually impossible’ to study Barrow in isolation from Newton, but not the other way around. Feingold argues this unidirectional linkage is largely the result of contemporary Newton scholarship, which considers Barrow’s life and labours—if at all—as a ‘prolegomenon’ to the study of Newton’s calculus or optics. Barrow’s eclipse may also have been exaggerated by a contingent turn in the scholarship. In 1911, Child issued a new “translation” of Barrow’s Lectiones Geometricae. I put scare quotes around the description because—as Child (1911, x–xi) himself explains in the preface—Child has ‘to all intents’ rewritten Barrow’s text, hugely abbreviating it and retaining only those parts which are essential to Child’s own scholarly purposes. In this and other works, Child claims that Barrow invented the calculus, and strongly implies that Newton and Leibniz took the calculus from this.6 Feingold (1993, 311–12) speculates that, as the result of ‘belated indignation’ at Child’s ‘outrageous’ thesis, Leibniz and Newton scholars forged a tacit alliance, successfully setting out to obliterate the thesis. In the process of downplaying the influence of Barrow on Newton and Leibniz with regard to the calculus, Barrow’s work was downplayed altogether.

4.3 Barrow’s Texts on Space and Time As Barrow’s lectures likely discussed space then time, I will set out his texts on these topics in this order. However, before entering into space or time, it will be helpful to say a little about magnitude. In the first chapter of Lectiones Mathematicae, Barrow (1734, 10; W I 30) describes magnitude as continuous quantity (continuam quantitatem). Unpacking this requires some background. When asking after the ‘quantity’ of something, we are asking ‘how much’ of it there is. In this vein, Newton’s Principia (trans. 2004, 59) states, ‘Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from its density and volume’. Aristotle’s Categories divides quantities into two kinds. ‘Discrete quantities’ are so called because their parts lack a common boundary at which they join together; numbers are discrete quantities because, for example, the two number ‘fives’ that are parts of the number ten lack a common boundary. In contrast, the parts 6

See Child (1911, xi; 1916).

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of ‘continuous quantities’ share common boundaries; lines, surfaces, and bodies are continuous quantities because, for example, the parts of a body join together in such a way as to share common boundaries (4b20–5a6). Traditionally, an intimate relationship was perceived between material body and quantity, although this relationship could be understood in many different ways. To give just one example, Descartes’ Principles argues there is only a conceptual distinction between an extended, material body and its quantity (CSM I 226; AT VIIIA 44).7 Barrow (trans. 1734, 21) also holds there is an intimate relationship of some kind between material body and continuous quantity or magnitude: ‘Magnitude is the common Affection of all physical Things, it is interwoven in the Nature of Bodies, blended with all corporeal Accidents’. For Barrow, all material bodies have continuous quantity or magnitude. This is why, although it may sound odd to modern ears, Barrow often refers to magnitudes in ways that bodies are more familiarly referred to, such as discussing how a magnitude can move from one place to another. Having described magnitude as continuous quantity, Barrow (trans. 1734, 10–13; W I 30) goes on to explain that magnitude may be considered in two ways. First, abstractly, as mentally separated (mente separatur vel abstrahitur) from matter. Second, concretely, as inhering in some particular subject. Barrow gives the example of a line: it can either be conceived abstractly as the ‘most simple Dimension’; or concretely, as the distance between the sun and the Earth. Barrow writes that geometry studies magnitude in the abstract, alongside its general affections, including divisibility, congruence, proportionality, capacity of different situation and position, and mobility. To put Barrow’s point another way, take ‘seaworthiness’: we can consider seaworthiness abstractly, separate from particular subjects, and study its general affections such as watertightness or manoeuvrability; or we can consider seaworthiness concretely, as it inheres in particular subjects such as the Mayflower. Much of Lectiones Mathematicae is dedicated to investigating the properties of magnitude considered abstractly and this is true of Lecture X, which opens by explaining that it will consider several affections of magnitude, including occupation of space and determinate position. With this discussion in place, we are ready to tackle this lecture. Barrow states that it is wont to be attributed to magnitude that it occupies or fills space, but it is difficult to explain what this space is. By way of leading up to his account of space, Barrow argues for two seemingly incompatible theses. The first is that there is ‘no Difference of Space from Magnitude’. Barrow (trans. 1734, 164) attributes this thesis to Aristotle and Descartes; I will discuss 7

For many more examples, see Pasnau’s (2011, 279–99) history of quantity.

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the latter. As explained previously, Descartes holds that the principal attribute of material substance is extension in length, breadth, and depth; and there is no real distinction between a substance and its attributes. Descartes concludes that the extension that constitutes a space is in reality identical to the extension that constitutes a material body (CSM I 227; AT VIIIA 45). This entails that, for Descartes, there is no space distinct from body (or, as Barrow puts it, from magnitude). Barrow puts forward several arguments for this thesis. For example, Barrow argues that if space did exist separately, it would be unproduced and independent of God, and eternal and immense; this would be ‘contrary’ to religion. In other words, such a space would constitute an instance of polytheistic blasphemy. Further, Barrow (trans. 1734, 164–5) argues that if space existed separately from body it would violate the substance–accident distinction: ‘For every Thing either subsists of itself, or is an Accident to another thing; but neither of these seems to agree with space’. Space is not an accident because accidents are ‘carried about’ with their substances, and space remains after substances are removed. Presumably, space is not a substance because it would be theologically precarious: a substance that is unproduced and independent of God would be especially contrary to religion (more on these theological concerns will follow shortly in this section). Having argued for the first thesis—that space is not diverse from magnitude— Barrow (trans. 1734, 165) argues for a contradictory second thesis: that space is diverse from magnitude. In doing so, Barrow is now arguing against Descartes. This is not a new move for Barrow: his 1652 Cartesiana Hypothesis rejected Descartes’ identification of matter with space (N IX 98–100). Intriguingly, in this context Cartesiana Hypothesis approvingly cites Jan Baptist van Helmont’s treatise on vacuum (N IX 100). As far as I am aware, the fact that Barrow’s account of space is in any way connected to van Helmont’s has passed unregarded.8 In support of the second thesis, the Lectiones Mathematicae puts forward several thought experiments. For example, God could cause the material universe to contract and space would remain behind. Further, God could maintain the relations between the parts of our material universe and move it through space; Barrow (trans. 1734, 169–72) argues that to make sense of this possibility we must allow that the universe is moving through ‘a successive Change of Space’. 8 Van Helmont’s ‘Vacuum Naturae’ (1662, 82–3) rejects Aristotle’s thesis that there is no void in nature, and in support of this describes various experiments, such as pumping air out of bottles to show that there are ‘vacuities’ in it. Van Helmont’s ‘Vacuum Naturae’ is found in Ortus Medicinae, which prompts the question, Did Barrow also read ‘De Tempore’? Although there are similarities between van Helmont and Barrow—for example, both deny that time is motion yet allow that we measure time by motion—these could be merely coincidental.

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Barrow reconciles these seemingly incompatible theses—that space is not, and is, distinct from magnitude—in the following way: I would say first, that Space is a thing really distinct from Magnitude; i.e. that something is designed by that Name, that a Conception answers it, that it is founded in the Nature of Things, that it is different from the Conception of Magnitude, and though Magnitude had no Existence at all, yet there would be space. I would say, secondly, that Space is not any thing actually existent, and actually different from Quantity (Barrow, trans. 1734, 175–6).

This is unhelpful: space is distinct from magnitude, yet it is not anything different from quantity, and Barrow claimed earlier that magnitude is continuous quantity. Further, space is founded in the nature of things yet it is not actually existent. Barrow is aware that his solution is less than pellucid, so he explains further: Space is nothing else but the mere Power, Capacity, Ponibility, or (begging pardon for the Expressions) Interponibility of Magnitude. I thus explain my meaning: Before the Creation of the World, there was no Body any where (as is reasonable and pious to believe) but yet it was possible for the greatest Body whatsoever then to exist, and obtain a determinate Position by the Will and Power of God, i.e. there is space. There lies no Body, there is found no actual Dimension beyond the Mass of the Universe; but it is possible for a Body to be constituted and a real Dimension to be extended beyond that itself, i.e. there is an Ultramundane Space (Barrow, trans. 1734, 176).9

Following a little more discussion comes the puzzling passage that opens this chapter. Here, I give it in full: This Name therefore of Space is not of a mere Nothing or Thing feigned at pleasure, as of an Hircocervus or Chimera, but is deservedly to be placed in the same Order of Beings with Creability, Sensibility, Mobility, and such Possibilities; and there are scarce any but who adjudge some sort of Reality to these. Nor do I see why this Space may not be a Being as well as Contiguity, to which it seems to be directly opposed. For Contiguity is the Mode of Magnitudes which signifies that no Magnitude can come between them but by moving them out of the Places: And on the contrary Space is that Mode of the same which intimates that some other Magnitude may be interposed without moving them out of their Place (Barrow, trans. 1734, 177–8).10 9 spatium nihil est aliud quam pura puta potentia, mera capacitas, ponibilitas, aut (vocabulis istis veniam) interponibilias magnitudinis alicujus. Mentem meam explicatam do: olim ante conditum mundum, nullum alicubi corpus exstitit (ut credere fas est et pium) at potuit etiam tum existere quantumcunque corpus, potuit hoc determinatam positionem obtinere, volente scilicet et effectore Deo: hoc est, fiat spatium. Ultra molem mundanam nullum corpus excubat, nulla reperitur actualis dimensio; verum potest ultra ipsam corpus aliquod constitui, aliqua realis dimensio extendi, hoc est, datur spatium ultramundanum (W I 158–9). 10 Nec ideo merum nihil est aut temere confictum hoc numen, sicut hircocervi vel chimarae, sed in eodem entium ordine, quo creabilitas, sensibilitas, mobiltas, et cujusmodi possibilitates, merito jure reponendum (istis vero nemo fere non aliqualem adjudicat realitatem), nec ferme video cur hujusmodi spatium non aeque sit ens, ac ipsa contiguitas, cui directe videtur opponi. Contiguitas enim est modus

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Immediately after, Barrow (trans. 1734, 178) continues, ‘And this Notion of Space being supposed and granted, we may untie the Knots and remove the Difficulties of both the aforesaid Opinions . . . ’. Barrow goes on to claim that his account of space avoids various difficulties facing other accounts. For example, he claims it is not impious, as space is not a real being, ‘really eternal and infinite’; nor does it ‘bring in any other new Beings into the Account besides Substance and Accident (substantiam et accidens)’. The puzzling passage above comprises the concluding paragraph of Barrow’s account of space, given prior to the advantages Barrow offers for the account. Consequently, this passage is no throwaway piece of reasoning on Barrow’s part; rather, I take it to express the very heart of his account of space. If I am right, then it is incumbent upon any reading of Barrow to make sense of this passage. Moving on, Barrow’s lecture on time explains that his interest in this topic derives from his interest in the mobility of magnitudes. Here, Barrow (trans. 1735, 3–4) is concerned with quantifying ‘motive force’—that which determines the speed of a body’s motion—and he writes that this cannot be achieved without time. Thus, Barrow is interested in time as a mathematical tool. Having explained why time is important to him, Barrow raises Augustine’s famous worry that, when asked, Augustine cannot explain what time is. In response, Barrow writes that mathematicians ought to have a distinct idea of time, ‘otherwise they are Quacks’. Barrow’s own idea runs as follows: Time . . . is the continuance of any Thing in its own being. But some Things continue longer in their Beings than others; those were when these were not, and are when these are not . . . Time absolutely therefore is Quantity, as admitting in some Manner the chief Affections of Quantity, Equality, Inequality, and Proportion . . . Commonsense, therefore allows Time to partake of Quantity, as the Measure of the Continuance of Things in their Being (Barrow, trans. 1735, 4–5).11

Barrow is referring to the understanding of duration on which it is the duration of a thing. In this sense, two durations—such as that of Socrates’ life, and Plato’s life—can be quantified and, say, be shown to be of unequal length. Barrow continues: magnitudinum significans nullam ipsis motu secluso interponi posse magnitudinum; spatium vero, contra, modus earundem, quo innuitur aliam magnitudinem interponi posse, vel adponi; quamvis loco neutiquam emoveantur (W I 160). 11

tempus est perseverantia rei cujusque in suo esse. Alias vero res aliis diutius in esse suo permanere; fuisse cum hae non errant, esse cum hae non sunt . . . Ergo tempus absolute quantum est; ut quantitatis admittens (modo suo) praecipuas affectiones aequalitatem, inaequalitatem, proportionem . . . Quantitatis igitur particeps esse tempus communis sensus agnoscit, pro modo permanentiae rerum in suo esse (W II 160–1).

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But perhaps you may ask, whether Time was not before the World was created? And if time does not flow in the Extramundane Space, where nothing is: a mere Vacuum? I answer, since there was Space before the World was created, and that there now is an Extramundane, infinite Space . . . inasmuch as there might have been of old, and now may be, such, and so many Bodies, which then were not, and now are not; consequently Time existed before the World began, and does exist together with the World in the Extramundane Space, because ’tis possible that some Thing might have existed long before the World was made; and there may now be something in the Extramundane Space, capable of such a Continuance (Barrow, trans. 1735, 5–6).12

Barrow is arguing that if a material body existed in pre-creation or extramundane space, it would have duration. Thus, time must coexist with pre-creation and extramundane space. Barrow (trans. 1734, 184) perceives a great ‘Affinity and Analogy’ between space and time. Given this, it is no surprise that Barrow’s ontology of time is analogous to his ontology of space: ‘Time therefore does not imply an actual Existence, but only the Capacity or Possibility of the Continuance of Existence; just as Space expresses the Capacity of a Magnitude contain’d in it’ (Barrow, trans. 1735, 6).13 The following sections discuss how best to understand this.

4.4 Existing Readings of Barrow on Space and Time As explained in Section 4.1 of this chapter, there are currently three major readings of Barrow on space and time. Section 4.4.1 discusses the view that Barrow is lacks deeper views on time, Section 4.4.2 discusses the view that time is God’s eternal duration, and Section 4.4.3 discusses the view that time is a kind of unreal container. I show that all these readings struggle to make sense of the puzzling passage that opens this chapter.

4.4.1 The first reading: Barrow lacks a deeper metaphysics of space and time On this reading of Barrow, space or time is a capacity or potentiality simpliciter, in that there is nothing more to be said of its ontology. This reading arguably

12 At enim dices: ante res omnes conditas anon tempus fuit? Extra mundum, ubi nihil manet, anon tempus labitur? respondeo, sicut ante conditum mundum fuit spatium, et extra mundum nunc est et quidem infinitum . . . quatenus potuerunt olim, et possunt jam existere talia tantaque corpora, quae tum non fuerunt, aut jam non sunt; ita prius mundo, et simul cum mundo (licet extra mundum) tempus fuit, et est; quatenus ante mundum exortum potuerunt alique res in esse tamdiu permanere, possint jam extra mundum talis permanentiae capaces res existere (W II 161). 13 Tempus igitur non actualem existentiam, at capacitatem tantum seu possibilitatem denotat permanentis existentiae; sicut spatium capacitatem designat magnitudinis intercedentis (W II 161).

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dates to J. M. Child’s (1911, 35) translation of Lectiones Geometricae, which writes, ‘Time denotes . . . a certain capacity or possibility for a continuity of existence’. Child (1911, 41) concludes Lecture I by noting, ‘There is not much in this lecture calling for remark’. Given this astonishing note, it seems that Child does not read anything further into Barrow’s account of time. Andrea Malet has recently provided a far more developed discussion. Malet’s focus is on space rather than time but, as Barrow treats space and time symmetrically, it is important to us nonetheless. Malet (2007, 106) describes Barrow’s space as something that exists as pure potentiality (pura potencialidad). Importantly, Malet makes explicit the lack of depth he perceives in Barrow’s ontology, writing that Barrow’s defence of space contains no clues (pistas) about its nature. Partly on the basis of this, Malet (2007, 111) concludes that Barrow is anti (contra) metaphysics. Malet’s arguments certainly succeed in showing that Barrow is not primarily interested in metaphysics; in these texts, Barrow is primarily working as a mathematician. However, I disagree with Malet’s thesis that Barrow is antimetaphysics. In general, Barrow does not disparage metaphysics, in fact at one point Barrow (trans. 1734, 105) praises it: ‘Metaphysics which is, or ought to be, the Treasure of the most general simple Notions; and is therefore . . . by Aristotle nam’d the Mistress of all Sciences; by Proclus, the one shoeless Science from which others receive their Principles’.14 Further, the puzzling passage prefacing this chapter poses an obvious problem for this reading of Barrow’s space, as its claims—that space is to be placed in the same order of beings as creability, mobility, and sensibility; and that space is a mode of magnitudes—strongly imply that there are unplumbed depths to Barrow’s metaphysics. Against Malet, I say that Barrow’s account of space contains many clues as to its nature; the problem lies in fitting them together. Barrow is a mathematician and a theologian, and a metaphysician.

4.4.2 The second reading: identifying space and time with God’s attributes On this reading of Barrow, space is identified with God’s immensity, and time with God’s eternal duration. This reading also has a long history.15 I will focus on the interpretation found in John Gascoigne, as it is developed in especial detail.

14

In a very late defence of absolutism (briefly discussed in Chapter 10, Section 10.4 of this study) Gregory Sharpe (1744, v–vii) laments the ‘universal contempt’ he believes metaphysics to have fallen into, and—in addition to citing this passage—describes Barrow as a past metaphysical giant. 15 See Burtt (1924, 152–3), Baker (1930, 16; 1935b, 282–3), Čapek (1987, 599), and Jammer (2007, 270).

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Gascoigne (1990, 269) reads Barrow’s space and time as attributes of God, and advances two arguments for this. First, Gascoigne (1990, 266–9) advances an argument from influence, arguing it is ‘highly probable’ that Barrow is indebted to More for his theory of space. In support of this, Gascoigne points to various intellectual links between Barrow and More.16 Further, Gascoigne claims that More expounded his views on absolute space in his 1655 Antidote Against Atheism, and that Barrow possessed this book. Gascoigne believes that More does not have an absolute account of time, and so he characterizes Barrow’s extension of absolutism from space to time as evidence of Barrow’s ‘intellectual independence’ from More. Second, Gascoigne (1990, 268–9) advances an argument from textual evidence, pointing out that Barrow repeatedly describes God as ‘present’ in space (Barrow, trans. 1735, 5; c.f. Barrow, trans. 1734, 178).17 Presumably, God is present in time too. Additionally, Barrow states (trans. 1734, 171): ‘the Conception which we have, or ought to have, concerning the Divine Infinity, Power and Immutability do involve some distinct Reality of Space’. In the context of describing this statement, Gascoigne (1990, 268) writes that Barrow is arguing in a manner ‘that makes plain the apologetical purposes’ he shared with More: their agreement that God is intimately involved in the material world.18 Persuasive though they appear, I reject both of Gascoigne’s arguments. Gascoigne’s argument from influence is founded on false premises: Gascoigne claims that More first expounded his views on absolute space in his 1655 Antidote Against Atheism, and that Barrow owned this book. Neither claim is true. The first edition of More’s Antidote Against Atheism was published in 1653, and it does not discuss absolutism about space; this is the edition that Barrow owned.19 The second edition of More’s Antidote Against Atheism was published in 1655, with a new Appendix that does discuss space. Whilst Barrow could have had access to later editions containing this Appendix, it must be remembered that the Appendix does not actually defend an absolute account of space. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Appendix marks a transitional point in More’s thinking: it 16 Gascoigne describes how Barrow came into contact with the Cambridge Platonists Cudworth and Whichcote; Barrow appeared to be on friendly terms with More after the Restoration; Barrow’s Cartesiana Hypothesis (N IX, 82–104) argues there is a More-esque vital spirit in nature; and Barrow and More shared interests, such as using witchcraft to support religion. 17 Čapek (1987, 599) and Slowik (2012, 117) also cite Barrow’s remarks concerning God’s presence as evidence for this reading. 18 Baker (1935b, 282–4) argues along these lines too: More’s account of space was attractive to Barrow in part because it provided a way of attacking Cartesian ‘materialism’, and conceiving space and duration as divine attributes enforces the presence of God. 19 See Barrow’s library catalogue in Feingold (1990b, 358).

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discusses More’s early view that space is a kind of barely real capacity; and what will come to be More’s mature view, that space is God’s immensity. The Appendix puts both views on the table but does not defend one view over another. More does not defend his mature view until his 1668 Divine Dialogues, published after the delivery of Barrow’s Lectiones. Gascoigne’s argument from textual evidence is also uncompelling. Barrow holds that God is present in extramundane space, but—unlike More—he does not explicitly identify space with God’s immensity. An advocate of Gascoigne’s reading might argue that this is because Barrow’s Lectiones Mathematicae and Geometricae—being undergraduate teaching materials—were necessarily limited, and precluded a more detailed discussion of the relationship between space, time, and God. Against this, I say that Barrow had ample opportunity to discuss the relationship further. In his theological works—the Napier edition of which runs to nine volumes—Barrow considers the mysterious nature of various divine attributes at length. For example, Barrow asks: [W]ho can imagine, or understand, how God’s immensity doth consist with his perfect simplicity; or that without any parts he doth coexist to all possible extensions of matter; being all here, and wholly there, and immensely every where? Who can apprehend his indivisible eternity, or how all successions of time are ever present to him (N IV 507; cf N V 220).

Here, Barrow claims that God’s immensity coexists with all possible extensions of matter: this suggests that God’s immensity exists in addition to space, not that God’s immensity should be identified with space.20 Similarly, the successions of time are present to God but not identified with his eternity. Gascoigne’s view that space and time are attributes of God is difficult to square with our puzzling passage above, where Barrow describes space as a mode yet makes no mention of God. And, independently of this problem, this reading struggles to make sense of two aspects of Barrow’s account. First, if space and time are identified with God’s immensity and duration, why would Barrow deny that they are real? Denying that God’s immensity and duration are real amounts to denying that God is real, and this is heretical. Second, Barrow (trans. 1734, 180) draws an analogy that is problematic for this reading. ‘For Space by Occupation ceases in some sort to be Space, as far as Power is extinguished by Act, and a Thing ceases to be farther possible which already exists . . . Nothing can be poured into a full Vessel, but the Want of Space’.21 For Barrow, there is a way in 20

The Lectiones also states, cui Deus coëxistit (W II 161). spatium enim per occupationem quodammodo definit esse spatium, quatenus per actum potentia velut extinguitur . . . (W I 161). 21

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which once a space is filled by magnitude, it ceases to be space. To identify space with God’s immensity, and to hold that once filled a space ceases to be space, appears to attribute mutability to divine immensity; again, this would have been an implicitly heretical position. In light of these problems, it is extremely unlikely that Barrow is identifying space or time with the divine attributes.

4.4.3 The third reading: space and time as unreal containers On this last reading of Barrow, space and time are unreal containers—a kind of capacity, quantity, or potentiality—into which bodies are placed.22 The most developed reading of this kind belongs to Edward Grant, who also focuses on space rather than time. Grant (1981, 236–8) describes space as a kind of barely real capacity: ‘if we acknowledge, as we must, the possibility that a body could be constituted beyond the world, a capacity to receive body must already exist there . . . space’. When unoccupied and ‘in a state of potency’, space possesses no dimensions of its own; however, when occupied by bodies, it ‘receives’ their dimensions. For Grant, Barrow’s space is a ‘rather shadowy thing, a mere potentiality barely possessed of existence’. To my mind this is the most plausible existing reading of Barrow but, like its fellows, I argue this reading struggles to make sense of our puzzling passage. Although this passage is usually ignored by commentators, Grant is the exception, and he writes of it: Despite its lack of dimension and positive attributes and its status as a mere potentiality capable only of the reception of body, space is no chimera or figment of the imagination. It has the same kind of reality as ‘creability, sensibility, (and) mobility.’ By this Barrow meant, for example, that just as body at rest has the capacity or potentiality for motion, so a space devoid of body has the capacity to receive body (Grant 1981, 237).

Grant is right to say that space is not a figment of the imagination23 and Barrow is attributing to space the same kind of reality as to creability, sensibility, and mobility. However, I argue that Grant misunderstands what Barrow means by this. If we read Barrow’s passage closely, we see that Barrow is not attributing a

22

The following scholars may hold this reading, but in some cases there is not enough detail to be sure. Windred (1933, 130) writes that Barrow considers time to be a ‘hypothetical medium’ that can be measured. Strong (1970, 163) writes that extensions and terminations are located in an ‘unmovable, mathematical space’. Mahoney (1990, 204) reads time as a ‘quantity’ that can be measured by uniform motions. Hall (1992, 273–4) writes that space is the potentiality of which magnitude is the actuality, and time is the potentiality of existence. Nikolić (1993, 204) writes that time implies ‘the capacity or possibility of the continuance of existence’. Connolly (2015, 84) states that space is ‘pure possibility’, unreal in itself. 23 This is directed at Hobbes. For discussion, see Malet (2007, 107–8).

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capacity (the capacity to receive bodies) to space; rather, Barrow is explicitly describing space as a mode of magnitudes. ‘Mobility’ was listed above amongst the general affections of magnitude considered abstractly, and Barrow places space in the same category. Further, Barrow states that contiguity is a mode of magnitudes (modus magnitudinum) and space is a ‘Mode of the same’ (modus earundem). Space is a general affection or mode of magnitudes considered abstractly. How best to understand this position will be discussed in section 4.5; here, I merely emphasize that this position is incompatible with Grant’s reading of space as a kind of unreal container that has at least one capacity, to receive bodies.

4.5 A New Reading of Barrow on Space and Time 4.5.1 Barrow as a modal relationist On my reading of Barrow, this puzzling passage is key to understanding his account of space and time, as it is making explicit Barrow’s modal relationism. I will unpack the passage slowly. The passage makes use of the term ‘mode’ (modus). Although Barrow does not define it, the term is generally used in early modern thought to refer to the ways that substances can be. To illustrate, the modes of a pear could be greenness and plumpness. Modes are a kind of accident that cannot exist without a substance, as opposed to ‘real accidents’ which can.24 We know that Barrow conceives accidents to be modes, not real accidents, because (as we saw in Section 4.3 of this chapter) Barrow holds that accidents are ‘carried about’ by their substances. Although the term ‘mode’ is usually used to refer to the way that substances can be, Barrow is using it to refer to the way that magnitude considered abstractly can be; as Barrow puts it, he is considering the general affections of magnitude. The passage states that ‘contiguity’ is a mode of magnitude. To be contiguous with something is to be in contact or bordering with it; for example, two clumps of ice could be contiguous with one another. As Barrow writes, if two things are contiguous then nothing can come between them except by moving them out of their places. Contiguity is a mode of magnitude considered abstractly in the sense that it is an affection that all magnitudes may have. Importantly, a thing cannot be in a state of contiguity by itself: to be in this state depends on a thing’s relations with other things. Considered independently of its surroundings, a clump of ice cannot be said to be in a state of contiguity, as being in this state depends on its 24

On the history of modes, see Garber (1992, 64–70) and Pasnau (2011, 260–2).

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relations with other things. In contrast, two clumps of ice considered together can be said to be contiguous. Thus, this particular mode is relational. This is likely why Barrow writes that contiguity is a mode of magnitudes. Moving on, the passage states that something is directly opposed to contiguity. For now, let’s call this ‘non-contiguity’. To be non-contiguous with another thing is to lack contact with that thing. For example, a clump of ice in space may be non-contiguous with a nearby asteroid. As Barrow writes, if two things are noncontiguous then a third thing can be interposed between them without moving anything out of its place. This mode of being is also relational, as being in a state of non-contiguity depends on a thing’s relationship with other things. Like contiguity, non-contiguity is a mode of magnitude considered abstractly in that it is a mode that all magnitudes may have. It is this relational mode of non-contiguity that Barrow labels ‘space’: the puzzling passage writes that contiguity is a mode of magnitudes, and space is a mode of magnitudes that is directly opposed to this. Where things are contiguous with one another, there is no space; where things are non-contiguous with one another such that a third thing could be placed between them, there is space. Hence, space is a mode of magnitude considered abstractly. This reading explains how it is consistent for Barrow to describe space and time as distinct from magnitude yet as nothing different from quantity: they are not identical to magnitude or continuous quantity considered abstractly, rather they are relational modes of magnitude or continuous quantity considered abstractly. As a relational mode of an abstraction, space and time are not existents but they are founded in the nature of things: magnitude considered abstractly is founded in particular magnitudes, material bodies. This reading provides a way of understanding Barrow’s claim that space is the ‘mere Power, Capacity, Ponibility, or . . . Interponibility of Magnitude’. Magnitude in general has the capacity to be placed—to be ponible and interponible—in empty spaces. This gives rise to a sense in which space is a capacity of magnitude. In turn, this understanding of capacity helps us to understand Barrow’s claim (given in Section 4.4.2 of this chapter) that ‘Space by Occupation ceases in some sort to be Space, as far as Power is extinguished by Act’. When a body exercises one of its powers, such as its power to move, there is a sense in which that power is extinguished: by acting on or exercising its capacity for motion, the body no longer has its capacity for motion. Similarly, once a magnitude acts on its capacity to be placed in space, there is a sense in which power has been extinguished by act. It might be worried that I have introduced a new kind of being—capacities— into Barrow’s substance–accident ontology. Against this worry, I read Barrow as conceiving capacities as modes. The other modes of magnitude that Barrow lists

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in this passage are also capacities: ‘creability’ is the power to be created, ‘mobility’ is the power to move, and ‘sensibility’ is the power to perceive or feel. Strange though it may sound to describe capacities or powers as modes, this view is not alien to early modern metaphysics, and it can arguably be found in Descartes.25 One way of understanding the view is suggested by Desmond Clarke (2000, 143), who conceives powers as dispositions. Dispositions—such as the pear’s dispositions to turn brown and shrivel—are ways of modifying bodies; as such, powers are modes. Similarly, we can understand a magnitude’s capacity to be placed as a disposition, a mode. As I read Barrow, space is a relational mode of magnitude considered abstractly, and—given the great affinity and analogy that Barrow perceives between space and time—we should offer a symmetrical account of time. Just as magnitudes can be in a state of contiguity or non-contiguity with each other, magnitudes can be in a state of simultaneity or non-simultaneity with each other. To be in a state of simultaneity, to exist at the same time as other things, is also a mode that depends on a thing’s relations with other things. As Barrow explained, the durations of things stand in various relations to one another: some things continue longer than others, some things were when others were not. A time can be measured in virtue of the precise relationships holding between enduring things. ‘Empty times’, times in which no magnitudes exist, depend on the relations between actual and possible magnitudes’ durations. This explains Barrow’s statement that there was time before the creation of the world, and that there is time in extramundane space: magnitudes have the capacity to exist, to have durations, there. In this sense, ‘Time . . . [is] the Capacity or Possibility of the Continuance of Existence’.

4.5.2 Modal relationism in Barrow and Leibniz The view I have ascribed to Barrow, that space and time are relational modes of magnitudes considered abstractly, is similar to a view sometimes ascribed to Leibniz. Leibniz (1646–1716) is of a younger generation than Barrow, so there is no suggestion that Barrow was borrowing from Leibniz (although, as we will see in Section 4.6 of this chapter, it is possible that Leibniz was borrowing from Barrow). Nonetheless, comparing Leibniz’s views on space and time with Barrow’s will be instructive.

25 Descartes uses powers to explain phenomena—e.g., the soul has the power to move the body, and the body has the power to cause sensations in the soul (CSMK 218)—but there does not appear to be room for powers in Descartes’ substance–attribute–mode ontology. This has led scholars such as Clarke to conceive powers as modes.

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Leibniz’s views on space and time are an extremely complex affair. This section will not offer a reading of Leibniz’s metaphysics—to do so would require a far fuller investigation into his work than is offered here—it will merely sketch some of the intricacies and controversies.26 Traditionally, Leibniz is read as a relationist, grounding time and space in relations holding between bodies. One reason Leibniz’s system is complicated is that bodies are usually taken to be founded in monads, which Leibniz (trans. 1989, 214–15) describes as the ‘true atoms of nature’. Leibniz (trans. 1989, 34) states, ‘Extension and motion, as well as bodies themselves . . . are not substances, but true phenomena, like rainbows’. A rainbow is a phenomenon that is ‘wellfounded’ in real beings, its water droplets; similarly, material bodies, spatial extension, and movement are well-founded phenomena grounded in monads. Another reason Leibniz’s system is complicated lies in the difficult relationships between monads, bodies, space, and time. Rescher (1979, 90–1) reads Leibniz as holding that monads’ perceptions ground space and time. Space is grounded in the way that each monad mirrors the universe from its own point of view, and time is grounded in the way that monads change their state, from one perception to another: ‘space and time are manifolds of order among the monads with respect to coexistence and succession’. On Rescher’s reading, Leibniz holds a two-tier ontology: monads lie on the bottom tier of reality, and time lies on the tier above. In his later work, Leibniz describes time as ‘ideal’. For example, in a 1705 letter, Leibniz writes: [Time] is nothing but a principle of relations, a foundation of the order of things, in so far as one conceives their successive existence, or without which they would exist together. It must be the same in the case of space . . . Both of these foundations are true, although they are ideal (Leibniz, trans. in Hartz & Cover, 1988, 501).

In a 1716 letter, Leibniz (trans. 1989, 339) writes that the certain order that is time is analogous to genealogical relations, which express real truths yet are ‘ideal things’. Leibniz is arguing that genealogical relations hold between brothers, sisters, and mothers and yet are merely ideal things, entia rationis or objects of the mind; similarly, spatial and temporal relations hold between bodies and yet are merely ideal things. Hartz and Cover (1988, 512) take passages such as this to indicate—against Rescher—that in his mature writings Leibniz conceives matter as a well-founded phenomenon, but time is a mere ‘ideal order’, abstracted away

26 For recent, fuller overviews of the scholarship on Leibnizian space and time, see Lloyd (2008) and McDonough (2014, §5.2).

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from what is well-founded. On this reading, Leibniz’s mature writings posit a three-tier ontology: monads lie at the foundational level; well-founded phenomena grounded in monads, such as matter, lie one tier up; and ideal things, such as time, lie two tiers up. Nonetheless, many scholars—including Rescher, Hartz, and Cover—agree that, in some way, time is grounded in the succession of monads’ states.27 If Leibniz is read as identifying time with relations, then we can further ask what kind of relationist he is. We can distinguish two kinds of relationism: ‘nonmodal relationism’ grounds space and time on actual, existing bodies; and ‘modal relationism’ grounds the spatio-temporal structure of reality on possible bodies, that could exist but do not. Leibniz is sometimes read as a modal relationist28 in virtue of passages such as this: As for my Own Opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold Space to be something merely relative, as Time is; that I hold it to be an Order of Coexistences, as Time is an Order of Successions. For Space denotes, in Terms of Possibility, an Order of Things which exist at the same time, considered as existing together; without enquiring into their Manner of Existing (Leibniz, 1717, 57; III.4).

Leibniz’s emphasis on possible orders of things fuels modal relationist readings of his work, and twenty-first century modal relationisms more generally. Let’s compare Barrow and Leibniz’s views on space and time. Even if readers are persuaded of my relationist reading of Barrow, there are significant differences between them. Monads play no role in Barrow’s account, whereas they clearly play some role in Leibniz’s; Barrow expresses his relationism using the language of modes, not relations; and Leibniz describes space and time as ideal and phenomenal, whereas Barrow does not. Nonetheless, there are also uncontroversial points of similarity between them: Leibniz (1717, 97; IV.10) shares Barrow’s theological concerns over positing space as a real entity independent of God; Leibniz (1717, 189; V.36) rejects identifying space with God’s immensity; Leibniz (1717, 201; V.47) holds that space is not a real entity; and Leibniz (trans. 1982, 151) rejects the Cartesian identification of matter with extension. There may be an additional similarity between Leibniz and Barrow too. Barrow can’t be a non-modal relationist because he holds that there is space prior to the creation of bodies; instead, I argue that Barrow is a modal relationist. This explains his statement that space is a mode of magnitudes which intimates that 27 See McGuire (1976, 308), Lloyd (2008, 250), Futch (2008, 167), McDonough (2014, §5.2), and Belot (2011, 2). 28 Gordon Belot (2011, 173–85) provides a recent reading of Leibniz as a modal relationist, and Belot locates the origins of his own modal relationism in Leibniz.

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some other magnitude may be interposed between them. Further confirmation that Barrow is thinking along modal lines is provided by his selection of ‘creability’ as a kind of mode. Creability is always a mode of possible but non-actual bodies, as created bodies have already exercised their capacity to be created. Precreation, there were no bodies, yet there was space because bodies could have been placed there. To my mind, Barrow is a pre-Leibnizian modal relationist. However, there is one last major difference between the modal relationism I am ascribing to Barrow and the view traditionally ascribed to Leibniz. On a ‘relative’ account of motion, the motion of bodies is exclusively understood relative to the motion of other bodies. In contrast, on an ‘absolute’ account of motion, the motion of bodies can be understood with regard to absolute reference frames: space and time. The difference between these accounts can be teased out through thought experiments. Leibniz holds a relative account of motion, and consequently Leibniz (1717, 95; IV.6) claims it is an ‘impossible Fiction’ to hold that all the parts of the universe could have the same situation amongst themselves yet occupy a different position in time or place. In contrast, as we saw above, Barrow claims that this is possible. This entails that, for Barrow, the spatio-temporal structure of reality is rich enough to support absolute motion. Where does this richness derive from, if not space and time understood as absolute beings? I suggest this richness derives from God’s creative power. As I read Barrow, space and time are modes of magnitude considered abstractly, and magnitude depends on God. Recall Barrow’s statement that pre-creation it was possible for magnitudes to exist and obtain a ‘determinate position’ (determinatam positionem) by God’s will. A little later, Barrow (trans. 1734, 178) adds, ‘God can place Magnitudes anywhere’. Actual and possible magnitudes obtain the determinate positions necessary for absolute motion in extramundane space, and in time pre-creation, because God has the power to create them there. God’s coexistence with space and time does not indicate that space and time are God’s immensity and eternity. Rather, God coexists with space and time because space and time are projections of where and when magnitudes could be created which—given God’s omnipotence—is everywhere and everywhen.29 This suggestion would go some way to explaining the fact that Barrow’s space and time shares so many of the properties one usually associates with absolute space and time: they are infinite, eternal, immutable, dependent on God, and support absolute motion. 29 Malet (2007, 107) holds a similar view on this: for Barrow, space proclaims (proclama) God’s power to create.

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Further evidence in support of my relationist reading of Barrow can be found in the reception of his work. In 1702, the Newtonian John Keill published Introductio ad veram physicam; this ran through multiple editions and was translated into English in 1720. In a brief discussion of the nature of space, Keill writes: [T]here is in reality a Space distinct from all Body; which is as a universal Receptacle, wherein all Bodies are contained and moved. But what is the Nature of this Space, whether it is any thing positive, actually extended in itself, and endued with real Dimensions, or whether its Extension arises from the Relation of Bodies (relatione corporum) existing in it, so that it may be a mere Capacity, Ponibility, or interponibility, as some love to express themselves, and to be reckoned in the same Class of Being with Mobility and Contiguity; or whether this our Space is the divine Immensity itself . . . these things we do not here inquire into, but leave them to be disputed by the Metaphysicians (Keill, 1720, 19).

In this passage, Keill is opposing More’s view that space is God’s immensity, with Barrow’s view that space is a mere capacity. Keill reads Barrow as holding that the extension of space arises from the relation of bodies, and in doing so connects Barrow’s claim that space is mere capacity or ponibility with Barrow’s claim that space is be placed in the same class of beings as mobility and contiguity. Keill reads Barrow as a relationist (and, also notably, as a metaphysician).

4.5.3 An objection to reading Barrow as a modal relationist There is an interesting objection that could be made to this reading. A critic might ask, How is this reading compatible with Barrow’s statement that time flows? Barrow (trans. 1735, 6) writes that, ‘whether Things move on, or stand still; whether we sleep or wake, Time flows perpetually with an equal Tenor’. This statement appears to support an absolutist reading of Barrow: it might be argued that time must be real in itself in order to flow; and the fact that time flows at an even tenor, regardless of whether things in time are moving or resting, implies that time is independent of things in time. This absolutist reading could be further supported by pointing to other absolutists who hold that time flows, including Gassendi and Newton. This statement is a problem for my reading of Barrow, and I see two ways of responding to it. First, I could retain my reading of Barrow as a modal relationist about space, but drop the parallel thesis for time; although Barrow tells us that he perceives a great analogy between space and time, he does not specifically tell us that time is a mode of magnitudes. It might be argued that Barrow does not make the latter claim precisely because there is some absolutism lurking in the background of his metaphysics of time, perhaps as a result of the influence of Gassendi or Charleton (more on this shortly).

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Although it would be possible to take this strategy, I am inclined to resist it, because Barrow emphasizes the analogy he perceives between space and time so strongly, and the statements he makes about time parallel those he makes about space so closely. Instead, I suggest that Barrow’s statement about the flow of time can be explained using his particular brand of modal relationism, which is grounded on possible as well as actual magnitudes, and is rich enough to allow for absolute as well as relative motion. For the non-modal relationist, there is no sense in which time is independent of actual things. To illustrate, if our entire universe were to be destroyed, there would be no time. In contrast, for Barrow, there would be time, because things could possibly come to exist. In this sense, time is independent of things—at least actual ones. If we ground the tenor of time in possible rather than actual things, it’s also possible to show how we can measure time independently of the actual world. Let’s say that, in a period of time lasting five seconds, five atoms could dance in and out of existence. If our universe were slowed down, such that everything took twice as long as it does now, we would be unaware of it. However, God would be aware of it, because he could create twice as many dancing atoms during the duration of our universe than he could before. In this way, it could be argued that the tenor of time is independent of actual beings but inextricably linked to possible ones. The objection from the flow of time is particularly interesting because the critic might go on to argue that, in asserting the flow of time, Barrow is specifically drawing on Gassendi’s views. In an important study, Bernard Rochot (1956, 97–8) argues that Barrow ‘borrows’ (l’emprunt) from Gassendi, and supports his case by pointing to Barrow’s use of tenore (tenor) and labitur (to flow). To illustrate, Rochot compares Gassendi’s statement sive res sint, sive non sint, sive moveantur, sive quiescant, eodem tenore fluit tempus (O III 347); with Barrow’s statement, seu dormiamus nos, sive viegilemus aequo tenore tempus labitur (W II 160). Rochot (1956, 98–9) also points out that both Gassendi and Barrow discuss Augustine’s puzzlement over time; Aristotle on our perception of change with regard to time; and Empedocles’ report that the days used to last longer than they do now. Rochot’s thesis that Barrow was familiar with Gassendi is convincing, and I would like to add further support to it, by pointing out that Barrow’s Cartesiana Hypothesis mentions Gassendi several times.30 That said, with regard to time, it is also worth mentioning a possibility that Rochot does not consider: that

30 For example, Barrow references the ‘Epicurean’ Gassendi (N IX 80) and Gassendi’s discussion of vacuum (N IX 100).

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Barrow read Gassendi’s views on time indirectly, through the work of Walter Charleton.31 Our imaginary critic could argue that Barrow is borrowing Gassendi’s absolutism, in addition to his language of flow. Against this, I argue that Barrow is not straightforwardly ‘borrowing’ from Gassendi. Barrow’s account of space and time disagrees with that of Gassendi on many points; I give four examples to illustrate. First, Gassendi holds that space and time are neither substance nor accident, rejecting the substance–accident distinction; in contrast, Barrow upholds this distinction. Second, Gassendi holds that space and time are real beings, albeit lacking a ‘positive nature’; Barrow explicitly condemns this view as impious. Third, Gassendi lends credence to Empedocles’ report that the days used to last longer; Gassendi (trans. 1972, 396) writes ‘we must believe’ that the motion of the sun has sped up, though time has not become faster. In contrast, Barrow (trans. 1735, 12) writes that Empedocles’ fable ‘does not seem agreeable to Reason’ because such circular motions are not wont to continually decay; this is an implicit reference to the Aristotelian view that the movements of heavenly bodies are eternally regular.32 In the context of discussing heavenly motions, Barrow (trans. 1735, 9–10) cites Genesis 1.14: ‘Let there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the Day from the Night . . . ’. As Barrow believes the heavenly lights have been divinely created for us, I suspect he finds impiety in the view that their motions are irregular.33 Fourth, Gassendi holds that space has incorporeal dimensions; Barrow (trans. 1734, 177–9) denies this. In this context, it is telling that Barrow states he has disproved the dimensional account of space advanced by ‘Epicurus with his Followers’; this is very likely an oblique reference to Gassendi. I believe Barrow discusses his views on all of these issues specifically to distinguish them from Gassendi’s. To make my case, consider the second disagreement given above, over attributing reality to space and time. Barrow effectively argues that such a position is impious because it constitutes polytheistic blasphemy. I argue that Barrow was keenly aware of the theistic dangers of Gassendi’s account, and this is why he goes to such pains to emphasize the Charleton’s Physiologia contains all the similarities that Rochot finds in Gassendi and Barrow, including the statement that ‘Time flows on eternally in the same calm and equal tenor’, which Barrow could have translated back into Latin. 32 Elsewhere, Barrow (trans. 1734, 215–6) makes this reference explicit. Although Barrow (trans. 1735, 8–9) does not hold that time depends on celestial motion, he accepts that we can only measure time using motion. 33 Some confirmation of this suspicion is found in Barrow’s claim that the heavens—‘the steady course, the beneficial efficacy of those glorious lamps’—astonish us, and lead us to adore their maker (N V 202–3). 31

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advantages of his own account: Barrow’s modal relationism allows him to make use of absolute motion in a way that upholds the substance–accident distinction; and it does not attribute independent reality to space and time, thus avoiding polytheistic blasphemy. As I read Barrow, he is not borrowing from Gassendi but critiquing him.

4.6 Barrow, Newton, and Leibniz As far as I am aware, the ontology of space and time I have ascribed to Barrow is unique to him: its foundation in magnitudes’ relational modes of continuity and non-contiguity is quite different to, say, the imaginary space traditions found in scholasticism or to More’s metaphysics. This raises the question of Barrow’s influence on later thinkers. A large body of scholarship argues that Barrow’s account of time is one of the sources that Newton drew on in developing his own.34 The early friendship between Barrow and Newton is well documented by Feingold (1993, 310–24), who argues it had elements of an intellectual father–son relationship.35 Edward Strong (1970, 164–8) develops his case for the influence of Barrow on Newton at length, pointing out that, like Barrow, Newton’s views oppose both Descartes and Hobbes; and arguing that Newton composed De Gravitatione between 1664 and 1668, around the same period that Barrow’s Lectiones were delivered.36 Whether Newton attended the delivery of Barrow’s lectures is not known with certainty, but it seems likely.37 As we saw above, it is also possible that Newton helped Barrow to revise Lectiones Geometricae for publication. There are several uncontroversial similarities between the views of Barrow and Newton on time: both describe time as duration; both describe time as flowing; both treat space and time symmetrically; both hold absolute accounts of motion. However, my reading of Barrow as a relationist opens a huge gulf between his work and that of Newton. Although—as we will see in Chapter 6—how best to understand Newtonian time and space is hugely controversial, he has never to my knowledge been read as a relationist, or as identifying time and space with relational modes of bodies. This gulf may lead scholars to conclude that Barrow’s work played a lesser role in Newton’s than has previously been argued. 34 See Burtt (1924, 144), Baker (1930, 21), Windred (1933, 139), Osmond (1944, 117), Rochot (1956), Čapek (1961, 36), Mahoney (1990, 204), Hall (1990a, 214; 1992, 273), and Nikolić (1993, 204). 35 See also Osmond (1944) and Strong (1970). 36 As we will see in Chapter 6, this dating is controversial. 37 See McGuire and Tamny (1983, 54).

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However, this reading of Barrow does raise the possibility that his relationism provided a source for Leibniz. Although Child’s thesis that Leibniz borrowed from Barrow in constructing the calculus once drew ‘indignation’ from Leibniz scholars, it has been recently reconsidered and revived: Nauenberg (2014) has shown convincingly that Leibniz did make use of various parts of Barrow’s Lectiones Geometricae. This raises a possibility worthy of further exploration: that Leibniz also made use of Barrow in constructing his account of time and space.

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5 Early British Reactions to Absolutism: 1664 to 1687 time may come, when men With Angels may participate . . . Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit, Improv’d by tract of time, and, wingd, ascend Ethereal John Milton (1667, V.493–500)

5.1 Introduction This chapter considers early British reactions to absolutism, between the start of Barrow’s pertinent lectures in 1664 and the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687. Although the amount of discussion absolutism received in Britain during these early decades was small compared to the amount it would receive later, it was already capturing the attention of some important thinkers. This chapter provides a history of that early reception. Already, we will see that two distinct lines of absolutism are beginning to emerge in British thought: Gassendist and Morean. As Section 5.2 shows, Gassendist absolutism was adopted by Samuel Parker and Robert Boyle; and Morean absolutism by John Turner. Although these absolutists all agree that there is time and space independent of mind and body, they radically disagree over the relationship between time, space, and God. We will also see that absolutism was already proving controversial. Section 5.3 explores some of the negative British reactions to absolutism, from Margaret Cavendish, Ralph Cudworth, Nathaniel Fairfax, and Anne Conway. Although Conway rejects absolutism about time, she may hold a kind of Morean absolutism about space.

5.2 New Gassendist and Morean Absolutists Alongside Walter Charleton, Samuel Parker (1640–1688) was one of the earliest converts to Gassendist absolutism. Parker matriculated at Wadham College,

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Oxford in 1657; he wrote prolifically and would later become a fellow of the Royal Society, and Bishop of Oxford.1 We will be concerned with Parker’s first published work, the 1665 Tentamina de Deo. One of the aims of this text is to attack Cartesianism, and with it the English thinkers who have taken up elements of Cartesian thought, including More. To achieve this, Parker makes direct use of Gassendi’s critiques of Descartes. In fact, Parker goes so far in his use of Gassendi that—in a rare piece of literature on the Tentamina—Levitin (2014) argues we can classify it as ‘the most radical and important example’ of the uptake of Gassendi’s epistemology in seventeenth-century England. As far as I am aware, there is no literature at all on Parker’s absolutism about time. Parker (1665, 376–8) argues there is a kind of ‘abstract’ (abstracta) duration, which would be even if God never created anything. This duration has very little reality, and no positive reality (positive realitatis), yet it is not a chimera or imaginary. Additionally, it is independent and unproduced by God. Frustratingly, Parker does not explain his ontology of time further. Nonetheless, his description of time as lacking positive reality suggests that this part of his work is also in the Gassendist tradition, a suggestion which receives further support by the way he approvingly goes on to discuss Gassendi’s account of time. In support of his absolutism, Parker (1665, 383) offers a thought experiment on which God created the world, and then unmade it, and years later made it again; Parker argues that there would be years, or time, in the intervening period. It is possible that the origins of this particular thought experiment lie in More. As we saw in Chapter 2, More privately put a very similar thought experiment to Conway in 1651. Although Parker would not have had access to the correspondence of More and Conway, he would have had access to the correspondence of More and Descartes, in which More advanced a similar thesis; this latter correspondence was published in More’s 1662 Collection of Several Philosophical Writings. Parker (1665, 399) is explicit that neither space nor time are attributes of God. It is possible that Parker has derived this conclusion independently, or reads it in Gassendi; and it is even possible that Parker is responding to the speculations of More’s 1655 Appendix to the Antidote Against Atheism. Moving on, the Irish-born natural philosopher and experimentalist Robert Boyle (1627–1691), sometimes known as the father of chemistry and one of the

1 Parkin’s (2004) biography of Parker recounts anecdotal evidence to support the view that Parker was a man of ‘no judgment, and of as little virtue’. Reportedly, when asked ‘What was the best body of divinity?’ Parker is said to have answered, ‘That which would help a man to keep a coach and six horses was certainly the best’.

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founders of the Royal Society, also adopted a form of Epicureanism.2 There is evidence in some of Boyle’s later texts to suggest he accepted Gassendist absolutism about space and time. McGuire (1972, 532) once argued that, as Boyle is generally critical of the ‘reification of concepts’—i.e., making concrete realities out of mere concepts—he would have rejected the doctrine of absolute space. However, MacIntosh and Anstey (2014) argue that Boyle’s 1659 Some Motive and Incentives to the Love of God implies an absolute account of time. In this text, Boyle implies that God could have made the world earlier than he did: ‘Witness his Suspension of the World’s Creation, which certainly had had an earlier Date; were the Deity capable of Want, and the Creatures of Supplying it’. Shortly afterwards, Boyle (repr. 1999–2000, I.97–8) quotes Acts (17.28) ‘In Him, we live, and move, and have our being’; and adds that God’s ubiquity is present everywhere. As MacIntosh and Anstey point out, Boyle regards space and time as ‘Primary’ or ‘Heteroclite’ (i.e., irregular) things. In his 1675 Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion, Boyle (repr. 1999–2000, VIII.269) explains that since the natures of space and time are so different from that of anything else, ‘tis no wonder, that our limited and imperfect Understandings should not be able to reach to a full and clear Comprehension of them . . . to which there seems to belong, in some respect or other, a kind of Infinity’. MacIntosh and Anstey argue that remarks such as this certainly ‘do not at least amount to a rejection of absolute space and time’. I am in agreement with MacIntosh and Anstey that Boyle’s texts imply absolutism, and in the latter text—the 1675 Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion—there are remarks which speak even more strongly for this reading. For example, Boyle writes (repr. 1999–2000, VIII.269), ‘the Learned Gassendus and his Followers have very plausibly (if not solidly) shewn, that Duration, (and Time is but Duration measur’d) is neither a Substance nor an Accident’. Further, Boyle’s 1681 A Discourse of Things Above Reason (repr. 1999–2000, IX.389) discusses the conceptual limitations we encounter in attempting to conceive God, and in this context writes: this discovery of God’s Incomprehensibleness may be made . . . by a direct view of the Mind . . . who finds her self upon tryal as unable fully to measure the divine perfections as the dimensions of space, which we can conceive to be greater and greater, without ever being able to determine any extent beyond whose limits they cannot reach.

The direct comparison of God’s perfections with the dimensions of space is suggestive, albeit perhaps of More rather than Gassendi. 2

On Boyle’s Epicureanism, see Kargon (1964) and Osler (2010).

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Finally, in these early decades, More’s absolutism gained one convert: John Turner, a one-time fellow of Christ’s. In his Discourse, Turner (1683, 3–5) states that God’s substance and attributes are ‘Omnipresent, or infinitely extended over all his Works’. Claiming scriptural support, Turner claims that God’s immensity is unbounded, and his extension infinite. Turner (1683, 6) makes it clear that God’s immensity is space, explaining how we live and move in ‘Divine Space or Substance’. Leech (2013, 176) rightly describes More’s influence on Turner as one of the more easily documentable.

5.3 Emerging Critics of Absolutism The philosopher, novelist, and scientist Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) was a materialist (although, unlike Hobbes, she allows that God is immaterial). Of particular interest to us is Cavendish’s 1664 Philosophical Letters, in which Cavendish engages with the works of various philosophers by writing to a fictional correspondent. These works include van Helmont’s ‘De Tempore’ and Charleton’s Physiologia, on which Cavendish provides an extremely early commentary. Cavendish read ‘De Tempore’ in the Oriatrike. In the preface to her Philosophical Letters, Cavendish explains that she has read the works she discusses ‘as I found them printed, in my native Language.’3 Cavendish opens her discussion of van Helmont’s treatise by stating firmly (to her fictional correspondent): ‘I am not of your Authors opinion, that Time hath no relation to Motion . . . that Time is plainly the Same with Eternity’. Cavendish explains: For, in my opinion, there can be no such thing as Time in Nature, but what Man calls Time, is onely the variation of natural motions; wherefore Time and the alteration of motion, is one and the fame thing under two different names; and as Matter, Figure and Motion, are inseparable, so is Time inseparably united, or rather the fame thing with them, and not a thing subsisting by it self (Cavendish 1664, 303).

For Cavendish (1664, 304) a material body is ‘inseparably’ united to its figure, motion, and duration. Time is inseparable from motion and so time cannot be unchanging eternity, ‘for Eternity hath no change’. Cavendish’s critique of Charleton makes a similar point. Cavendish (1664, 454) objects to Charleton’s account of space or vacuum that he makes it into ‘a God’: Charleton’s vacuum is immovable, when only God should be immovable

3 With the exception of Descartes’, parts of which were translated for her. Cavendish’s lack of Latin reflects the lack of classical learning that many of her male peers enjoyed.

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and unalterable; and it is uncreated and independent of God. In effect, Cavendish is charging Charleton with polytheistic blasphemy. Cavendish goes on to argue that there can be no such thing as an empty space, a space void of matter; there is only the distance between corporeal parts. Cavendish’s views on the possibility of empty space change over the course of her career,4 but, at this point, Cavendish holds that the material world is a plenum. Just as space is merely distance between corporeal parts, time is merely corporeal motions in nature, where particular times are particular motions. However Cavendish’s views are best understood, it is clear that she rejects absolutism about time and space. Alongside his friend and colleague More, Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) is the greatest of the Cambridge Platonists. Cudworth is best known for his leviathan Intellectual System of the Universe, which came out in 1678 but bears an imprimatur dated 1671, suggesting it was complete by this year. Given Cudworth’s notoriously slow publishing speed—a stark contrast to the profundity of More— the relevant passages may have been written much earlier.5 Cudworth’s Intellectual System rejects absolutism about time and space, and the views it expresses on both issues take account of More’s. Cudworth (1678, 642–4) discusses time in the context of rejecting an argument for atheism, which seeks to show that the infinite God of Christianity does not exist because ‘there can be Nothing Infinite’. Cudworth agrees with these atheists that there cannot be a ‘positive infinity’ in the sense of a numerical infinity to which nothing can be added; to illustrate, he argues that material body can never be so vast that more body may not be added to it. This addition of body—‘this Addition of Finites’—creates a ‘potential infinity’ though it will never add up to a positive infinity. Cudworth goes on to ‘likewise’ affirm there can be no infinity of ‘Time or Successive Duration’, for that would also constitute a positive infinity. As time and matter exist but cannot have existed infinitely far back into the past, this implies that they were created by ‘some other Being’. Cudworth explains that this being is in order of nature ‘Senior’ to time, existing without time and before time. This being, God, is ‘Infinite in Duration, and without Beginning’. Unlike ours, God’s duration is not a successive flux, which is why God’s eternity can be a positive eternity; the idea seems to be that, unlike ours, God’s duration is not

4

For example, in her Philosophical Fancies, Cavendish (1653, 8–9) advances arguments for and against the existence of vacuum, and adds ‘The Readers may take either Opinion’. In contrast, in her Grounds of Natural Philosophy, Cavendish (1668, 4) states firmly ‘In my opinion, there cannot possibly be any Vacuum . . . Body and Place is but one thing’. 5 Nicolson (1959, 219) observes that Cudworth was the type of academic so slow to write and publish that a ‘generation’ of his students were teaching and writing according to his doctrines before Cudworth had published any major work.

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made up of parts. As this brief discussion shows, Cudworth agrees with More that God is prior to time and succession. This agreement is especially pronounced in the following passage, where Cudworth discusses the different ways that beings can endure: [T]he Duration of every thing must of necessity be agreeable to its Nature; and therefore, As that whose Imperfect Nature is ever Flowing like a River, and consists in Continual Motion and Changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a Successive and Flowing Duration, sliding perpetually from Present into Past . . . So must that, whose Perfect Nature, is Essentially Immutable, and always the Same, and Necessarily Existent, have a Permanent Duration (Cudworth 1678, 645).

The language here is strongly reminiscent of More’s Divine Dialogues, where the successive duration of finite things into the past is also compared to the river. However, unlike More, Cudworth does not seem to accept absolutism about space. For example, Cudworth (1678, 643–4) claims that the potential infinity of matter ‘seems to have been mistaken’ for an actual infinity of space. Nonetheless, Cudworth respectfully makes use of More’s mature absolutist position on space to rebuff Gassendi’s absolutism. Cudworth argues that if Gassendi is right, and space is incorporeal, infinite, and distinct from body, it must either be an accident existing by itself, which is impossible; or it is an accident of an incorporeal, infinite deity. Cudworth reads Gassendi as rejecting this last implication: But will Gassendus step in, to help out his good Friends . . . and undertake to maintain, that though Space be indeed an Incorporeal Thing, yet it . . . is really, neither Accident, nor Substance, but a certain Middle Nature or Essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his . . . we shall make this Reply; That unquestionably, Whatsoever Is, or hath any kind of Entity, doth either subsist by it self, or else is an Attribute, Affection, or Mode of something that doth Subsist by itself . . . We conclude therefore . . . because there can be nothing Infinite, but only the Deity, that it [space] is the Infinite Extension of an Incorporeal Deity; as as some Learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted (Cudworth 1678, 769–70).

Cudworth takes Gassendi to hold that space is distinct from God, and Cudworth rejects this position by defending the substance–accident distinction, concluding that if Gassendi were right that such an infinite space exists then More would be right to identify it with God’s immensity. Finally, it is worth noting that although Cudworth is a holenmerist, Cudworth (1678, 833–4) acknowledges that some ‘Learned Asserters’ of incorporeal substance hold that it is extendedly present in space. He adds that as it is not ‘our part’ here to oppose theists, he will leave the different sorts of incorporealists to ‘dispute it out friendly amongst themselves’.6

6

On Cudworth’s holenmerism, see Reid’s (2007, 222–4) excellent discussion.

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A less polite critic of More was the English physician and philosopher Nathaniel Fairfax (1637–1690), whom we briefly met in Chapter 2, Section 2.6. Here, I put Fairfax’s reading of More in the context of Fairfax’s larger critique of absolutism. Fairfax’s A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World is primarily concerned with the nature of body but he discusses time and space at some length. Fairfax (1674, 16) considers the position—that he takes to be held by Gassendi, Charleton, and Parker—that God is present in time and space, and that time and space are independent of all things yet not positive beings. Fairfax describes the former thesis as ‘frightful’, for it would be ‘make such a medly’ of God’s attributes, introducing succession and division. Against this position, Fairfax (1674, 60) claims that God is in space and time ‘without any roomthy spreadingness’. Although this claim implies that God has some spatial and temporal presence, at other points it is implied that God is wholly outside space and time. Fairfax advances a fascinating objection to the position that time is independent of all things yet not a positive being. Fairfax (1674, 19–20) argues it is a ‘contradiction’ for something to be eternal yet not real, for whatever ‘is big’ with eternity cannot be ‘privative’ of real entity: ‘a thing cannot be everlasting, and not be at all’. The idea is that for something to have enough reality to be eternal, it must be real. However, Fairfax continues, once one has acknowledged that time has a ‘little reality’, we must attribute more and more reality to it, ‘for why, ’tis such a craving Horsleech, it will suck in more whether a man will or not’.7 Fairfax’s worry is that if time is real at any one moment, it will be real at every moment, until it is as real as anything that has infinite reality. Although of course Fairfax does not use my label, he effectively concludes that this view of time leads to polytheistic blasphemy: Its independency or loofness from God, lies as crotchet [peculiarly] every whit, as its being . . . Whence comes it? The answer must fare as if it were a God; for ’tis to be said, God did not make it, nor did any thing else; and yet ’tis indeed and was unbeginningly, and will be endlessly, and that is as much as can be said of God himself (Fairfax, 1674, 20).

As this position is theologically untenable, Fairfax (1674, 21) rejects it, ultimately arguing that there is no time unless God makes ‘time-some beings’, and nor is there space or room unless God makes ‘roomthy’ beings. Fairfax attended John Swan’s school of fragrant flowers rhetoric. In the address To the Reader, Fairfax offers a wonderful mix of metaphors to excuse writing his Treatise: ‘For every man’s mind is his Castle; and if it can’t be taken by strength of reason, the throwing in Granadoes, will be nothing but a smutty, stinking token to the world . . . he who has but a teeming brain, may have leave to lay his eggs in his own nest, which is built beyond the reach of every mans puddering pole’. 7

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Fairfax considers Parker’s argument concerning inter-world durations—that if God made the world and then unmade it, there would be time in the intervening period—and replies to it as follows: to suppose God before any thing else was made to make something, and then to unmake all that he had made, and leave nothing as he found nothing, and yet to leave ten thousand years . . . is to suppose God to leave nothing, and yet to leave something: for ten thousand years . . . are, in my mind, as much something as the other were that were made nothing (Fairfax, 1674, 36–7).

Effectively, Fairfax is objecting that if we suppose God to have left nothing in the intervening period he would truly have left nothing—years included. Fairfax (1674, 37–8) concludes that on Parker’s scenario there would be ‘no Time at all’ between unmaking and remaking of the world, and—rather astonishingly— not even would one world ‘be before the other’. This is because, if there were truly nothing, then for Fairfax there would only be God, for whom there is no time. Finally, we come to the work of Anne Conway née Finch (1631–1679). Unlike the other philosophers discussed in this section, Conway does not formally critique absolutism. Nonetheless, given that she adopts such an interesting non-absolutist position on time and that position is intricately linked to More’s work, it is worth exploring her views. Conway’s brother, John Finch, was tutored in philosophy at Christ’s by More and, through Finch, More, and Conway entered into a kind of informal philosophy correspondence course.8 We know that they were corresponding from 1650; at this time, More was in his mid-thirties and Conway was eighteen. As the years went on, the teacher–pupil relationship between Conway and More developed into one of intellectual equality, and they became close friends.9 Towards the end of her life, likely from 1677 to early 1679, Conway began working on a notebook. After Conway’s death, the English text was translated into Latin and titled Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae; as the original text was then lost, this is the closest we have to the original. The Latin text was published anonymously as part of a collection, the 1690 Opuscula Philosophica. The text was re-translated into English in 1692—under the title The

8

For a full intellectual biography of Conway, see Hutton (2004). More dedicated his Antidote Against Atheism to ‘The Honourable, The Lady Anne Conway’. This Epistle Dedication—which runs to six pages—praises Conway’s ‘singular Wit and Vertues’, and writes that Conway has ‘out-gone all of your own Sex, but even of that other also’. Having read the book, Conway (CL 70–1) writes to More that the ‘obstinate Atheist cannot but confesse . . . that there are sufficient reasons to inforce him to a contrary believe’; she adds that she cannot read what he has said of her without blushing. 9

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Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy—and again in 1996; I cite the latter. A copy of the Principles came into the hands of Leibniz, and he was impressed by the book and referred to on several occasions. (Although the book was published anonymously, Leibniz was clearly aware of its authorship, as his copy is inscribed ‘La comtesse de Konnouay’.) In a letter dated 24 August 1697, Leibniz draws comparisons between the work of several British philosophers and his own: I have heretofore observed to you in what I differ a little from Mr. Lock . . . My Sentiments in Philosophy come somewhat nearer (approchent) those of the late Countess of Conway, and keep a Medium betwixt Plato and Democritus; since I believe, that every Thing is made mechanically, as Democritus and Des Cartes advance against the Opinion of Dr. More, and others; and nevertheless, that every Thing is made vitally . . . against the Opinion of the Disciples of Democritus.10

The fact that Conway’s work is one of the sources Leibniz drew on in constructing his metaphysics constitutes an important part of Conway’s legacy.11 Time is a central notion in Conway’s Principles. Here is an example of the kind of remarks she makes about it: ‘time is nothing but the motion or change of creatures from one condition or state to another’ (Conway, trans. 1996, 51; VII:4).12 Time is incredibly important to Conway because it is the nature of creatures be continually changing. Further, Conway (trans. 1996, 35–6; VI:7) holds that the way that creatures change is connected to divine justice: when they change for better, they are rewarded by becoming more purely spirit; when they change for worse, they are punished by becoming more purely corporeal. In this way, a man who lives a pure life on earth may become like an angel, an idea illustrated in the excerpt from Milton’s Paradise Lost that opens this chapter.13 Several scholars have argued that Conway holds a proto-Leibnizian view about time. Against this, I have argued that Conway’s views are not similar to Leibniz’s, because she is neither a relationist nor an idealist about time; rather, they are akin to the views put forward in More’s early Poems.14 Reid (2012, 266–7) has argued that, although More’s Poems were several decades old by the time Conway wrote This letter was first translated from French into English and printed in Sharpe (1744, 149). Merchant (1979) is the classic text on this but see also Nicolson (CL xxvii), Loptson’s introduction to Conway (repr. 1982, 1–58), Coudert and Corse’s introduction to Conway (trans. 1996), and Hutton (2004, 233–5; 2010). 12 Cum tempora nihil sint nisi motio vel mutatio creaturae, a una conditione statuve in alium (Conway, repr. 1982, 116; VII:4). 13 Fallon (1991, 111–36) argues that Conway’s vitalism bears significant comparison with Milton’s. 14 See Thomas (2017, 993–1002). 10 11

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her Principles, she was still ‘greatly enamoured’ of them.15 There are many commonalities between Conway’s Principles and More’s Poems, and several pertain to time. For example, as we saw previously, in More’s Plotinus-inspired Poems, Christ (and presumably God) lacks time and succession, yet the created world is both temporal and successive. Conway’s description of God’s creative act is reminiscent of this: this continual action or operation of God, insofar as it is in him, proceeds from him, or insofar as it refers to himself, is only one continual action or command of his will; it has no succession or time in it, no before or after, but is always simultaneously present to God so that nothing is past or future because he has no parts. But insofar as it is manifested in or terminates in creatures, it is temporal (tempus) and has a succession of parts (Conway, trans. 1996, 18; III:8).

Conway’s God is not in succession or time, but his creation is. With regard to More’s early account of time, I suggested two ways of understanding the relationship between time and created beings: either time is a kind of container, metaphysically prior to the motions and activities of created beings, as appears to be the case in Plotinus; or, time is identified with the motions of created beings. Although More does not remark on this relationship, Conway does: she tells us that time ‘just is’ the motions and operations of creatures. God’s continual creativity is manifested in creatures, and their successive activities is identified with time. Conway seems to be drawing on More’s account of time, even though she does not appear to draw on More’s absolutism about eternal duration. However, I believe Conway may have adopted More’s absolutism about space.16 More holds that absolute, divine space can be found in the kabbalah.17 Similarly, the Annotations in the first chapter of Conway’s Principles explain that creatures cannot endure God’s intense light, and so God acted as follows: For the sake of his creatures (so that there might be a place for them) he diminished the highest degree of his intense light. Thus a place arose, like an empty circle, a space (spatium) for worlds. This void was not privation or non-being but an actual place of diminished light, which was the soul of the Messiah, called Adam Kadmon by the Hebrews, who filled this entire space (spatium implebatur) . . . [This Messiah] made from within himself . . . the succession of all creatures (Conway, trans. 1996, 10; I: Annotations). 15

In support, Reid points to Conway’s 1669/1670 request in correspondence for More to translate a Greek verse from one of the minor poems (CL 299); and she writes in a 1675/1676 letter that his book of poems is one ‘I highly value’ (CL 420). 16 See Thomas (2017, 1002–5). 17 For example, More (trans.1995, 61; VIII.14) writes that the Cabbalists enumerate place among the attributes of God. More references Cornelius Agrippa, rather than any of the texts contained in the Kabbala Denudata. For more on this, see Copenhaver (1980, 515–29).

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There are two important points in this passage. First, place or space arises prior to creatures. (Presumably, as Conway holds that creation is eternal, this priority is metaphorical or ontological rather than temporal, but either way space is distinct from creatures.) Second, place or space is intimately connected to God. Although it is not clear whether this space is God; or whether space is distinct from God yet intimately depends on him, there is clearly some close connection between God and space. Although this passage may appear to conclusively support reading Conway as an absolutist about space, there is room for doubt, as it is not absolutely certain that Conway authored the requisite Annotations— they may have been added by a later editorial hand. Conway concludes our discussion of early absolutists and their critics. Chapter 6 moves on to the figure whose work is often considered the peak of absolutist thought: Newton.

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6 Newton’s De Gravitatione on God and his Emanative Effects The heavens are all his own; from the wild rule Of whirling vortices, and circling spheres, To their first great simplicity restor’d. James Thomson (1735, 55–6)

6.1 Introduction It cannot be said of many philosophers that they are the subject of substantial amounts of poetry, and yet—as this excerpt from Scottish poet James Thomson indicates1—this can be said of Newton. Later chapters will say a little on the increasing reverence accorded to Newton and his work. Meanwhile, this chapter explores Newton’s early manuscript De Gravitatione, composed before he became the subject of poetry. De Gravitatione is of special importance to this study because it contains Newton’s most sustained treatment of the metaphysics of time or duration.2 As with so many of our figures, Newton treats time and space symmetrically, and I will consider both here. This chapter asks two questions of Newton’s De Gravitatione. First, what are time and space? My answer builds on John Carriero’s 1990 ‘Causation’ reading, which argued that Newton was drawing on Henry More’s account of emanative causation, and held that time and space are emanative effects of God. I argue we should look deeper into More’s account of emanation, and ask what that does and does not tell us about Newton’s thesis that time and space are emanative effects. I conclude that time and space are real but not really distinct from God, and they should be 1

It is taken from A Poem Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton, written within weeks of Newton’s death in 1727. Thomson also composed the words to ‘Rule, Britannia!’. 2 I will often use the word ‘time’, although De Gravitatione often uses ‘duration’. As we will see in Chapter 7, Newton’s Principia states that ‘Absolute, true, and mathematical time’ is by another name is called ‘duration’.

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understood as incorporeal dimensions à la Walter Charleton. Second, how is God present in time and space? My answer is that Newton’s God is holenmeric, not extended. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces Newton’s life and works. Section 6.3 sets out the existing scholarship on Newtonian space and time. Section 6.4 considers the nature of time and space in De Gravitatione, and argues for a Causation reading. Section 6.5 argues that Newton’s God is holenmerically present in time and space, and considers potential problems for this reading. Section 6.6 looks forward to the following chapters.

6.2 Sketching Newton’s Life and Works Newton (1642–1727) was born in the manor house of Woolsthorpe, around seven miles south of Grantham, Lincolnshire; he attended the same school as More. As he grew older it was intended that Newton would take charge of his family estates, but ultimately the arrangement failed and Newton came up to Trinity College, Cambridge.3 At Trinity, Newton’s prescribed course of reading was Aristotelian, but he seems to have struck out early on his own. Around 1664 to 1665, Newton kept a notebook containing a section labelled Quæstiones quædam Philosophiæ;4 this notebook was published by McGuire and Tamny in 1983 as Newton’s Certain Philosophical Questions. Newton’s Questions includes notes from his reading of Descartes, Walter Charleton, Galileo, Robert Boyle, Hobbes, Kenelm Digby, Joseph Glanvil, and More. From mid-1665 to 1667, Newton spent much of his time in Woolsthrope because Cambridge was closed due to plague. This period has been known as Newton’s annus mirabilis, during which he entered into various mathematical discoveries, and theories of colour and gravity. As we saw in Chapter 4, Newton may have attended Barrow’s lectures during this period. In 1667, Newton was elected a fellow of Trinity, and in 1669 Barrow helped Newton to succeed him as Lucasian professor of mathematics. Newton’s work on optics and on a new kind of telescope reached the Royal Society in 1671, and they elected him a fellow the following year. Following various disputes, in 1675 Newton ultimately submitted a paper that would (decades later) form part of the Opticks.

3

My sources for the biographical part of this sketch include George Smith (2008) and Westfall (2009). 4 On the dating, see McGuire and Tamny’s (1983, 5–8) introduction to the text.

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From the 1670s onwards Newton became deeply interested in more private pursuits: alchemy and theology. Newton’s study of the Bible and its prophecies, and the history of the Church, quickly led him towards some decidedly nonorthodox views. In a 1680 letter, More describes a meeting with Newton in which they discussed More’s exposition of the apocalypse. More wrote that Newton’s countenance was ‘ordinarily melancholy and thoughtful’ but became ‘mighty lightsome and cheerful’ with the profession of what he took satisfaction in. Although they had some disagreements over theology, More stated they had ‘a free and converse friendship’5 (CL 478–9). More and Newton may have known each other before this, through their shared connections to Grantham (CL 98). In 1684, Newton’s attention turned towards celestial motion, the result in part of an especially visible comet. In 1685 Newton developed what would become his three laws of motion, and the concept of universal gravitation. These would form the backbone of Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, published in 1687. With it, Newton’s stature as a leading British intellectual was assured. At some point prior to this, Newton composed a Latin manuscript that has come to be known as De Gravitatione. Its date of composition is notoriously controversial, and it has been placed anywhere between 1660 and 1687, although it is likely to be before August 1684.6 Around 1692–16937 Newton composed a Latin manuscript that has come to be known as Tempus et Locus; this was published alongside an English translation in McGuire (1978b). In 1693 Newton suffered some kind of mental breakdown, and this has been said to effectively end his intellectual profundity. Rather than continue at Cambridge, Newton accepted a position at the London Royal Mint. English money had deteriorated in the early 1690s, and it was a measure of the Principia’s success that Newton’s advice was sought as a financial expert. Newton seems to have run the Mint with panache, and in 1699 he became its master. Additional successes followed. In 1703, Newton was elected president of the Royal Society, a position he held until his death. In 1704, Newton published his Opticks, which drew substantially on his 1660s work. In 1705, Newton was knighted. In 1713, Newton published the second edition of his Principia, including a new General Scholium. However, controversies followed too, including most famously the dispute with Leibniz over the invention of the calculus.8 In 5

For more on Newton’s relationship with More and other Cambridge Platonists, see Hutton (forthcoming). 6 See Ruffner (2012) who also provides an overview of the dating controversies. 7 On the dating, see McGuire’s (1978b, 114) introduction to the text. 8 See A. R. Hall (1980).

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1726, a third edition of the Principia was published, with small modifications to the General Scholium; Cohen and Whitman’s 1999 translation of Newton’s Principia is based on this edition. Towards the end of his life, Newton oversaw further editions of his texts, and acted as a scientific expert for the government. He also returned to theology, producing enormous numbers of manuscript pages. Some of these manuscripts were published after his death, including Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended, and Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John. Some of these manuscripts remain unpublished, including those that have come to be known as Drafts on the History of the Church, composed during the 1710s. On Newton’s death, he was buried with pomp in Westminster Abbey, under a monument describing him as a great ‘Ornament’ to the human race.

6.3 The Existing Scholarship on Newtonian Time and Space The bodies of relevant scholarship on most of the figures in this study are modestly sized (and, in some cases, Lilliputian). In contrast, the existing scholarship on Newtonian time and space is a sprawling, gargantuan mass. Newton’s remarks on time and space range from the gently enigmatic to the obtusely cryptic, and they have attracted not just many scholars but also many conflicting readings. Consequently, although this section provides a rough overview of the scholarly terrain, it does not claim to be comprehensive. I follow Gorham (2011, 283) in distinguishing three lines of interpretation with regard to Newtonian space and time. The ‘Assimilation’ reading holds that space and time are attributes of God, identified with God’s immensity and duration. The ‘Independence’ reading holds that Newton’s natural philosophy, including his views on space and time, are not essentially related to his metaphysics or theology. The ‘Causation’ reading holds that space and time are caused by God. The Causation reading is compatible with the further view that space, time, and God are in reality the same being (akin to the Assimilation reading); or with the view that space, time, and God are really distinct beings (as on the Anti-Assimilation reading described below). Building on Gorham’s distinctions, I find two further readings sufficiently distinct from these three to warrant their own labels. On (what I label) the ‘Predication’ reading, space and time are existence conditions pertaining to all things, such that to exist is to be in space and time. On (what I label) the ‘Anti-Assimilation’ reading, space

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and time are really distinct from God, although some link between space, time, and God may be acknowledged. Historically, the Assimilation reading has received the most support.9 This interpretation itself takes several forms. For example, Burtt (1924, 256–60) grounds his view that Newton’s absolute space ‘is the omnipresence of God’ in the General Scholium and the Opticks, and argues that in this respect Newton was following More.10 In contrast, Gorham (2011, 284) has recently argued that the metaphysics found in Newton’s De Gravitatione are not drawing on More but on Descartes, and that the relationship between God, space, and time in Newton should be understood ‘precisely’ as the Cartesian relation between substances and their ‘most general’ attributes, such as duration. I should add that Descartes and More are hardly the only figures that scholars have claimed as sources of Newton’s position: additional sources arguably include Gassendi, Charleton, Barrow, and Jan Baptist van Helmont.11 The remaining four lines of interpretation have gained support from the 1950s onwards. Strong (1952, 165–7) provides an early Independence reading, arguing that Newton keeps his natural philosophy distinct from metaphysics and theology.12 I have nothing to add to the persuasive critiques that have already been advanced against the Independence reading13 so I will say no more about that here. McGuire first developed the Predication reading. Although he has modified it somewhat over the years, McGuire’s seminal paper (1978a, 466) argued that Newton conceives space and time not as accidents or attributes inhering in things, but as predications or affections of a thing’s existence: ‘conceptual characterisations through we understand something’s nature of existence’.14 Partly in

9 In the twentieth century, see Gunn (1929, 61), Baker (1930, 29–30; 1935b, 286), Koyré and Cohen (1962, 93), Koyré (1965, 166), Lacey (1970, 324), Power (1970, 291), and Grant (1981, 243). More recently, Jammer (2006, 73) argues that Newton conflates space and time with divine attributes; Leech (2013, 184) identifies Newtonian space with God’s omnipresence; and Schliesser’s (2013, 97) claims that Newtonian time is an ‘attribute-like’ aspect of God, a position which could arguably be placed in this camp. 10 On More as a source for Newton’s account of space, see Burtt (1924, 256–60), Baker (1930, 1–4; 1935a, 267–9; 1935b, 284–6), Čapek (1961, 10–11), Koyré (1957, 247), Nicolson (1959, 129–30), Patrides (1969, 31–9), Boylan (1980), Copenhaver (1980, 529–31), Hall (1990a, 202–23; 1990b, 45–52; 1992, 264–9), Popkin (1990, 110–11), Power (1970), Castro (2011), Reid (2012, 215–36), and Leech (2013, 176–93). 11 All except van Helmont will be discussed in this chapter, so I add a note on him here. Van Helmont’s influence has been argued for by Ducheyne (2008) but—as explained in Thomas (2015a, 18)—I do not find the evidence that Newton drew on van Helmont conclusive. 12 See also Toulmin (1959, 225) and Stein (2002). 13 See Ducheyne (2006), Janiak (2008, 155–62), Slowik (2009), and Gorham (2011, 285–8). 14 See also McGuire (1990), Janiak (2008, 139–49), and McGuire and Slowik (2012).

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response to McGuire, Carriero (1990) developed the Causation reading, which lays weight on Newton’s description of space and time as ‘emanative effects’, and argues that God emanatively causes space and time. Later still, Connolly (2015) has advanced an Anti-Assimilation reading, arguing that God and space are ‘ontologically distinct entities’. Connolly (2015, 89–92) reads Newton as holding that the relationship between God and space is ‘extremely tight, yet still denying that they are the same thing’; Connolly does not comment on the precise nature of the relationship. As Connolly’s arguments for a real distinction between God and space are grounded in texts other than De Gravitatione, I will not discuss them here. As this chapter defends a Causation reading of Newton’s De Gravitatione, it will be helpful to briefly recount a debate that took place between McGuire and Carriero over this. Divine emanation can be usefully compared with creation: when God creates something, he does so via a conscious act of will; in contrast, if something emanates from God, it flows from him without a conscious act of will. Emanation is usually taken to involve ‘efficient’ causation, on which a cause is prior to its effects. As far as I am aware, McGuire (1978a, 471) was the first scholar to argue that Newton’s use of the phrase ‘emanative effect’ points to Henry More, and Carriero is in agreement with McGuire on this. From Newton’s Questions15 we know that Newton read More’s Immortality of the Soule early and closely, and this text includes a detailed discussion of emanative causality. Although he acknowledges More’s role as a possible influence on Newton, McGuire (1978a, 482) argues that Newton’s account of space and time does not involve Morean efficient, emanative causation because that is incompatible with Newton’s claim that God, space and time are coeternal.16 The worry is that God cannot be prior to space and time in the way required by efficient causation because God, space, and time have always existed. McGuire concludes that Newton’s use of the phrase ‘emanative effect’ is misleading. Against McGuire, Carriero (1990, 112) persuasively argues that emanative effects can be coeternal with their causes, because whilst traditionally a cause must be ontologically prior to its effect it need not be temporally prior.

The notebook is littered with references to the ‘excellent Dr. More’; see Newton (1983, 341). McGuire and Tamny (1983, 121–5) suggest that More’s Immortality is the source of Newton’s antinullibism. 16 Janiak (2008, 146–7) advances a related argument against Carriero: the fact that Newton describes space as ‘uncreated’ suggests it is ‘uncaused’. Against Janiak, it seems possible that by ‘uncreated’ Newton merely means not created by an act of divine will, or that it has no beginning in time, both of which are compatible with being emanatively caused. 15

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In response, McGuire softens his reading somewhat and allows that Newton does conceive emanation to be a form of efficient causation, but in a very weak way. To support his case, McGuire cites More’s account of emanation: ‘By an Emanative Cause is understood such a Cause as merely by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect’. McGuire (1990, 105) argues that as this account barely involves efficient causation, it is difficult to distinguish between causal dependence and mere ontic dependence. In reply, Carriero (1990, 112–13) objects that McGuire has treated More’s views imprecisely because McGuire has overlooked the word ‘other’ in More’s statement, and there is a great deal of difference between denying that any activity is involved in the relation of an emanative cause to its effect, and denying that any other activity is involved than the being of the cause. On accounts of emanative causation, the latter claim is usually assumed so—as Carriero puts it—it would be ‘quite surprising’ if More were to claim that any other activity is involved. In summary, the McGuire–Carriero debate has established that More is almost certainly the source of Newton’s emanation language; that the coeternality of God, space, and time does not count against the Causation reading; and nor does the fact that emanative effects are produced merely through the existence of their cause.

6.4 A New Causation Reading of De Gravitatione As stated in the introduction to this chapter, I provide a Causation reading of De Gravitatione, although the lines of my interpretation differ from Carriero’s. Before getting into the details, it will be helpful to set out the early passages in De Gravitatione that motivate the Causation reading. As in Barrow’s work,17 one of De Gravitatione’s explicit aims is to ‘overthrow’ the Cartesian thesis that there is no difference between extension and body. In this context, Newton begins to explain how he understands extension or space: Perhaps now it may be expected that I should define extension as substance, or accident, or else nothing at all (definiam esse vel substantiam vel accidens aut omnino nihil). But by no means, for it has its own manner of existing which is proper to it and which fits neither substances nor accidents. It is not substance: on the one hand because it is not absolute in itself, but is as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being (Dei effectus emanativus, et omnis entis affectio quaedam subsistit); on the other hand, because it is not among the proper affections that denote substance, namely actions . . . although philosophers do not define substance as an entity that can act upon things, yet

17

On Barrow’s influence, see Rochot (1944), Burtt (1924, 144–9), and Hall (1992, 273–9).

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everyone tacitly understands this of substances, as follows from the fact that they would readily allow extension to be substance in the manner of body if only it would capable of motion and of sharing in the actions of body . . . Moreover, since we can clearly conceive extension existing without any subject, as when we may imagine spaces outside the world or places empty of any body whatsoever . . . it follows that [extension] does not exist as an accident adhering in some subject. And hence it is not an accident. And much less may it be said to be nothing, since it is something more than accident, and approaches more nearly to the nature of substance (quippe quae magis est aliquid quam accidens et ad naturam substantiae magis accedit) (PW, 21–2).18

This famous passage motivates the Causation reading: extension is not substance or accident or nothing, it has its own ‘manner of existing’ and is described as an emanative effect of God. In another passage set out below, Newton is explicit that the same is true of duration. I will now set out my reading, which runs as follows: I enquire into More’s account of emanative causation; I explain what More’s account does, and does not, tell us about Newton’s thesis that space and time are emanative effects; and finally I argue that to flesh out the ontology of Newtonian space and time we should look to Charleton. Along the way, I indicate where this reading departs from existing readings. Although Carriero entered a little way into the account of emanative causality presented in More’s Immortality of the Soule, I believe there is more to be gleaned from it. It will be helpful to place More’s Immortality in the context of More’s developing views on space and time. The Immortality was published in 1659, after More’s 1655 Appendix to the Antidote against Atheism, where his views seem to be in transition; and before More’s 1668 Divine Dialogues or 1671 Enchiridion Metaphysicum, which set out More’s mature account of space and time. In the context of discussing the link Carriero draws between More and Newton, Janiak (2008, 144) states that More was ‘famous’ for claiming that space is an emanative effect of God. As far as I am aware, More never made this claim, and further it is important to note that More’s Immortality does not present any account of space or time. It is also worth emphasizing that as De Gravitatione has been dated between 1660 and 1687, it is just possible that this manuscript was composed before More even published his mature account of space. Whilst we know that Newton took notes on the Immortality, we do not know that Newton ever read More’s Divine Dialogues or Enchiridion Metaphysicum (although Newton’s library included many works by More, it did not include these19). 18

The Latin is taken from the original manuscript, held in Cambridge University Library (MS Add. 4003); it is reprinted in Hall & Hall (1962). 19 See Harrison’s (1978, 196) edition of Newton’s library catalogue.

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As the title suggests, More’s Immortality aims to defend the existence and immortality of human spirits or souls. Along the way, More uses axioms to build up a metaphysic of material and immaterial substances. As some odd remarks have been made of the Immortality in the literature, I will go through the relevant passages in detail. More (1659, 17; I.3.ii) argues that the notion of ‘substance’ is the same in material body and immaterial spirit: it comprises activity, and extension in space. As in More’s later Enchiridion Metaphysicum, More holds here that the difference between body and spirit is that body is discerpible and impenetrable, whereas spirit is indiscerpible and penetrable. More (1659, 20; I.4.i) explains that there are several kinds of spirit, including God, angels, and the souls of men. More begins by considering the infinite and uncreated spirit we usually call God and, once ‘done’ with that, More (1659, 24–5; I.5.i) moves on to finite and created spirits. More explains that each finite, created spirit has a ‘centre’, which is not a finite point but an indiscerpible extended substance. Although the centre has a ‘little’ magnitude, it is ‘in virtue so great’ that it can ‘send forth out of it self ’ a large yet similarly indiscerpible sphere of ‘Secondary Substance’ that is able to ‘actuate’ proportions of matter. Having set out this thesis, More (1659, 32; I.6.i) goes on to ‘prove’ it. To do so, More (1659, 32–4; I.6.2) provides four axioms, which together comprise what can be thought of as his ‘model’ of emanative causality. Axiom XVI states, ‘An Emanative Cause is the notion of a thing possible’. It is here that More’s remark (above) occurs, that an emanative cause is a cause merely by being. Axiom XVII states, ‘An Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very substance of that which is said to be the cause thereof ’. More explains that an emanative effect coexists in time with its cause because the effect is produced at all times the cause exists. Axiom XVIII states, ‘No Emanative Effect, that exceeds not the virtues and powers of a Cause, can be said to be impossible to be produced by it’. To rephrase, the idea is that a cause can produce an emanative effect that doesn’t exceed its virtues or powers; presumably, More also means by this that a cause cannot produce an effect which does exceed its virtues or powers.20 Finally, Axiom XIX states, ‘There may be a Substance of that high Vertue and Excellency, that it may produce another Substance by Emanative causality, provided that

20 Gorham (2011, 290–2) mounts an objection to the Causation reading using this axiom, arguing that space’s capacity to receive objects must be mirrored in God. I reply that as Newton explicitly tells us that space cannot act on things, it cannot have powers or virtues that could exceed God’s.

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Substance produced be in due graduall proportions inferiour to that which causes it’. As More’s remarks on Axiom XIX are of special interest, I give them in full: Nor is there any incongruity, that one Substance should cause something else which we may in some sense call Substance, though but Secondary or Emanatory; acknowledging the Primary Substance to be the more adequate Object of Divine Creation, but the secondary to be referrible also to the Primary or Centrall Substance by way of causall relation . . . Finally, this Secondary or Emanatory Substance may be rightly called Substance, because it is a Subject indued with certain powers and activities, and that it does not inhere as an Accident in any other Substance or Matter, but could maintain its place, though all Matter or what other Substance soever where removed out of that space it is extended through, provided its Primary Substance be but safe (More, 1659, 34–5; I.6.2).

Through emanative causation, one substance can produce another secondary or emanatory substance. To more fully understand this passage, it will be helpful to give an example of something that More takes it to apply to: a finite spirit, such as a human spirit or soul. The centre of a human spirit is a ‘primary substance’, an emanatory cause that produces an effect. This emanative effect—the large, indiscerpible sphere that the centre can send out of itself—is a ‘secondary substance’, rightly so called because it has powers and activities, is not an accident, and depends for its being only on its primary substance. Presumably, one of the powers of this secondary substance is to actuate the matter of the human body. The primary substance, such as a human spirit, is the ‘more adequate Object of Divine Creation’ in the sense that this is what God directly creates. Nonetheless, a chain of causal relations holds between all of these substances: God causes the human spirit to come into being, and the human spirit causes its secondary substance to come into being. More (1659, 35; I.6.iii) takes himself to have demonstrated how a finite spirit, from centre to circumference, is utterly indiscerpible.21 Although More’s model of emanative causality is explicated with regard to finite spirits such as human spirits, it is clear from the text that More also applies his model of emanative causality to other things. In defence of Axiom XVI, More (1659, 450; III.12.i) briefly states we know that an emanative cause is possible because another example of such a cause is ‘in the world’: the cause that moves matter. Later, More explains that a ‘Spirit of Nature’ directs the parts of matter 21 Previous scholars have read these passages very differently but I cannot find the evidence for their interpretations. For example, McGuire (1978a, 471; 479) writes that here More is explaining how ‘secondary substances relate to the essence of Divine nature’. Gorham (2011, 292) also takes the ‘primary’ being here to be God. Henry (2012) cites these passages in his description of the Spirit of Nature as an emanation from God. Against these readings, at no point in these passages is God described as an emanatory cause: only finite spirits and the Spirit of Nature are so described.

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and their motions. This ‘real Being’ is a ‘substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe’. Having set out More’s account of emanative causation, I ask what it does, and does not, tell us about this process; and in turn what this can tell us about Newton’s thesis that time and space are emanative effects. The first thing More’s account tells us is that emanative effects are real, seemingly more robustly real than, say, mere predicates of a thing’s existence: More’s emanative effects are described as secondary ‘substances’, and they have powers. Consequently, if Newtonian time and space are Morean emanative effects, this would seem to count against the Predication reading. To bring out this point further, let’s return to Newton’s first positive pronouncement on extension or space, that it is ‘as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being’. An awful lot of the dispute between the Predication and Causation readings turns on how we read this sentence. It might be thought that the difference in interpretation simply hangs on which half of the conjunction we start from: the Predication reading stresses that space is an ‘affection’, and the Causation reading stresses that space is an ‘emanative effect’. However, that is not quite right. The Predication reading must stress the claim that space is an affection at the expense of the claim that space is an emanative effect, downplaying any robust meaning as McGuire does above. Similarly, Janiak—who I also take to be providing a Predication reading of De Gravitatione22—starts exclusively from the claim that space is an affection, and later downplays the literal import of Newton’s emanation language. Janiak seeks to achieve this by placing heavy emphasis on Newton’s explanation of one of extension’s properties (labeled (iv) later in this section): Space is an affection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither every where nor anywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being is posited, space is posited. And the same may be asserted of duration (PW, 25).

Janiak (2008, 144–5) advances two kinds of arguments against taking emanation language seriously. First, Newton’s claim that space is an emanation appears to ‘follow’ or be entailed by the claim it is an affection of all beings. But, Janiak objects, it is ‘difficult to see’ how the affection claim could be said to entail the claim that space was efficiently caused by God. Against Janiak, I reply that the entailment

22 Janiak (2008, 148) understands this text to be ‘providing an analysis of what it means to exist’.

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can be understood if we consider God’s role as creator: everything that exists is in space and time because everything is created by God, from whom space and time emanates. To put the point another way, if per impossibile there were no God, there could be no beings at all. Thus, if we posit any being it follows that we posit God, and his emanative effects space and duration. Newton writes that it is an advantage of his creation story (described in Section 6.5 of this chapter) that we cannot posit the kinds of bodies he has hypothesized creating ‘without at the same time positing that God exists’ (PW, 31). Second, Janiak argues that any being could be the emanative cause of space and time, pulling apart the exclusive link the Causation reading draws between God, space, and time.23 In reply, I point to convincing arguments made by other scholars that by the ‘first existing being’ Newton means God.24 To my mind, it is undeniable that the Predication reading must downplay Newton’s emanation language in some way. In contrast, I claim a significant advantage of the Causation reading is that it can take the et in Newton’s pronouncement above seriously. As Carriero (1990, 115–16) argues, on his reading there is no tension in holding that Newtonian space and time are caused by God and affections of being just as being in the sense that all beings are in space and time. As the Causation reading does not have to downplay half of Newton’s conjunction, it can stay closer to the text. The second thing More’s account tells us is that Morean emanatory causes are not really distinct from their effects. This is evident in More’s view that the emanatory substance cannot exist without its primary substance, and the two are indiscerpible. For example, More (1659, 35; I.6.iii) writes that the extension of the primary and emanatory substance are indiscerpible, ‘for it implyes a contradiction that an Emanative effect should be disjoyned from its originall’. More makes this point even more explicitly in a set of Notes appended to the 1679 edition of the Immortality: there is a vast different between Emanation and Creation: For in Emanation that which means, as I may so speak, is the same in reality with its emanative Cause: but in Creation, the thing Creating and Created are really distinguished; for the former may be without the latter. The Emanative Effect there is in reality the very Cause it self meaning, more largely unfolded by, and within itself; nor is it any more than one and the same Substance (More, 1712, 22).25

If Newtonian space and time are emanative effects of God in the Morean sense, then they are only conceptually distinct from God. In reality, God is one with his emanative effects. 23 24 25

See also Stein (2002, 268). See Ducheyne (2012, 272), Gorham (2012, 287), and McGuire and Slowik (2012, 302–3). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Oxford University Press for advice on this issue.

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This provides a deep kinship between the ontological category of Morean ‘emanative effect’ and the category of Cartesian ‘attribute’: neither are really distinct from their substances. This kinship brings my Causation reading very close to the Assimilation reading, in the sense that both assimilate time and space into God. However, the difference is that whereas Assimilation readings assimilate time and space into God as attributes, my Causation reading assimilates them as emanative effects.26 Finally, let’s consider something that More’s account does not tell us about the process of emanative causation: it only tells us how space and time are produced, not what they are. More effectively provides a model or theory of causal emanation that can be applied to various beings, including finite spirits, and the Spirit of Nature. Thus, in merely describing a being as an emanative cause or effect, More has not told us what that being is. Analogously, if one were to describe a being as the product of biological reproduction as opposed to artificial construction, that would not tell us what that being is. Importantly, although Newton has borrowed More’s model of emanative causality, Newton has not borrowed the applications that More puts the model to. Newton is applying emanative causation to God, space, and time; not to finite spirits and their emanatory substances, or to a Spirit of Nature. Consequently, I argue it is not sufficient for the Causality reading merely to describe Newtonian space and time as emanative effects: to understand how Newton is applying More’s model of emanative causation to space and time, we must look beyond More. I find evidence for this interpretation of Newton in the following passage. Having stated that extension or space is neither substance, accident, nor nothing, Newton continues: There is no idea of nothing, nor has nothing any properties, but we have an exceptionally clear idea of extension by abstracting the dispositions and properties of a body so that there remains only the uniform and unlimited stretching out of space in length, breadth and depth. And furthermore, many of its properties are associated with this idea; these I shall now enumerate not only to show that it is something, but also to show what it is (PW, 22).

26 Usefully, this difference allows my Causation reading to avoid a problem that Connolly poses for the Assimilation reading. Connolly (2015, 92–5) states there are broadly two ways of thinking about attributes. First, as ways of conceiving a substance; More favours this understanding of attributes, which is why he sometimes claims that space is a ‘representation’ of God. Second, as properties that inhere in substances. Connolly rightly claims that Newton doesn’t use Morean language of representation to describe space, or the language of properties and inherence; Connolly concludes that these facts count against the Assimilation reading. However, these facts are compatible with my Causation view, which is grounded in Newton’s distinctive language of emanation.

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This passage implies that Newton takes himself to have already shown that space is something, but that he has not yet shown what it is. If I am right, then Newton is showing us what space is through its properties. Newton goes on to discuss six properties of space, in this context sometimes discussing time or duration too: i) space can be distinguished in parts ii) it is extended infinitely in all directions iii) the parts of space and duration are motionless iv) space and duration are affections of a being just as a being v) the positions, distances, and motions of bodies are to be referred the parts of space, effectively providing an absolute account of location and motion and vi) space is eternal and immutable (PW, 22–7). As scholars have long recognized,27 Newton’s statement that space and time are neither substance nor accident strongly recalls Gassendi and Charleton, who also hold that space and time occupy a third and fourth category of being respectively.28 Against some scholars, Chapter 3 of this study argued that Gassendi and Charleton hold space and time to be real.29 There is no evidence that Newton read Gassendi directly30 whereas we know that Newton was extremely familiar with Charleton’s Physiologica. Newton’s Questions open by discussing matter with reference to Charleton, and there are debts to Charleton on many other topics too.31 McGuire and Tamny (1983, 6) have argued that the interesting ideas Newton found in the Physiologica probably motivated him to start the Questions, and they point out that Charleton’s book contains eighteen of the original thirtyseven section headings Newton used in the Questions. In light of this, I focus on Charleton as Newton’s source. Charleton and Newton’s agreement that space is not substance, accident, nor nothing is not a passing similarity in their respective metaphysics of time and space. Further similarities between Charleton’s Physiologia and Newton’s De Gravitatione leap off the page. Newton and Charleton agree on one reason 27 Baker (1935a, 1935b, 285) and Rochot (1944) discuss the direct influence of Gassendi on Newton. I believe that McGuire (1978a) was the first to argue that this Gassendist influence was mediated through Charleton; see also Grant (1981, 241), Hall (1992, 261–4), and Reid (2012, 126). 28 In contrast, More holds the emanative effects he describes to be substances, in keeping with his advocacy of the substance–accident distinction. As we saw in Chapter 2, although More makes room in his ontology for Cartesian attributes, he takes himself to be following Descartes in conceiving attributes to be a special kind of mode or accident. 29 It is presumably because McGuire feels secure that Gassendi and Charleton do not conceive space and time to be real that, in the context of advancing his Predication reading, McGuire (1978a, 464) remarks that Newton is ‘largely a Gassendist’ on the problems of space and time. Whilst advancing his Assimilation reading, Gorham (2011, 284; 297) objects it is unhelpful to consider Gassendi and Charleton as sources that Newton may have drawn on, in part because they regard space and time as ‘positively nothing real’. 30 Although Westfall (1962–3, 172–3) makes a case for it. For further discussion, see McGuire and Tamny (1983, 20). 31 See McGuire and Tamny (1983, 26–43).

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why space is not a substance: substances are active, for example corporeal substances can act and move, yet space cannot. Charleton writes that there is time even where there is not body, and Newton writes there is space where there is not body. Charleton and Newton both conclude that space is closer to substance than to accident. Five of the properties Newton attributes to space or extension are also so attributed by Charleton: on (i), Charleton writes space and time have dimensions suitable to receiving bodies and their motions; on (ii), Charleton writes that space is immense and time is interminable; on (iii), Charleton writes that space is immovable; on (iv), although Charleton does not use the term ‘affection’, he similarly holds that everything—including God—is in space and time; on (vi), Charleton agrees that space is eternal, and holds that as every moment of time is the same in all places, so every part of space is the same at all times. The remaining property (v) is not articulated by Charleton but it is certainly compatible with his other views. Charleton and Newton agree that space and time are real beings, distinct from God. Given their further agreement that space and time violate the substance– accident distinction, and their agreement on the properties of space and time, I argue that Newton conceives space and time as Charleton does: to be real, incorporeal dimensions. The difference is that Newton also provides us with a model explaining how these dimensions are produced: they are emaned from God. If this chapter is correct in arguing that Newton shares Charleton’s view that time and space are incorporeal dimensions, a question emerges. Why, unlike Charleton, does Newton hold that these dimensions are emanatively caused by God? My suggestion is that Newton is worried by polytheistic blasphemy, at least with regard to positing beings that are independent of God. By conceiving time and space as causal products of God that are not really distinct from him, Newton has mitigated this worry: he has not posited any beings with divine properties that are really distinct from God. Additionally, this account explains the nature of space and time: as Newton writes, space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being (PW, 26). To summarize, this Causation reading has argued that in De Gravitatione, Newtonian space and time are Morean emanatory effects. This reading explains various passages in Newton. Extension is not substance, accident, or nothing, yet extension approaches ‘more nearly’ the nature of substance because it is an emanatory being. Space and time are coeternal with God because, in reality, God’s emanatory effects are not distinct from him. Finally, by merely claiming that Newton is drawing on More’s model of emanative causation, and not More’s ontology of space and time, room is left open to acknowledge the additional sources that Newton is drawing on for his ontology.

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6.5 God’s Presence in Time and Space Newton’s God is undoubtedly present in time and space, but is his presence extended, or holenmeric? Newton’s texts are difficult to read on this issue and there are persuasive arguments on both sides. Nonetheless, I argue for the latter reading. To make my case, I recap More’s mature account of indiscerpibility, given in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2. For More, material substances are discerpible: they possess actually separable parts. In contrast, immaterial substances are indiscerpible: they do not possess actually separable parts, but they do possess conceptual parts, such that we can ‘logically or intellectually’ divide their amplitude. The idea is that any extended substance—including God—has ‘amplitude’ or spatial extent, and so we can imagine dividing lines through it, even if in reality it cannot be divided. There is no doubt that Newtonian space and time are indiscerpible in More’s sense: they cannot actually be divided, but they do possess conceptual parts. De Gravitatione states that ‘space can be distinguished into parts’, that the ‘parts of space are motionless’, and that the ‘parts of duration are individuated by their order’.32 In contrast, I argue that God’s immensity does not have parts in any sense. My argument is grounded in the following passage33 which begins by writing of space and duration: both are affections or attributes of a being according to which the quantity of any thing’s existence is individuated to the degree that the size of its presence and persistence is specified. So the quantity of the existence of God is eternal in relation to duration, and infinite in relation to the space in which he is present (PW, 25).

Prima facie, this seems to count against the holenmeric reading, as it implies that all beings exist in space and time the same way, it is merely that God is eternal and infinite whereas created beings are not. However, the passage continues: lest anyone should for this reason imagine God to be like a body, extended and made of divisible parts (partibus divisibilibus), it should be known that spaces themselves are not actually divisible, and furthermore, that any being has a manner proper to itself of being present in spaces . . . And just as we understand any moment of duration to be diffused throughout all spaces, according to its kind, without any concept of its parts, so it is no

Similarly, the General Scholium states ‘each and every particle of space is always, and each and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere’. 33 Previous scholars have briefly remarked that they find this passage indicative of holenmerism—see Pasnau (2011, 338) and Kochiras (2012, 68)—but as far as I am aware there is no discussion in the literature. 32

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more contradictory that mind also, according to its kind, can be diffused (diffundi) through space without any concept of its parts (PW, 26).

On this analogy, a ‘moment of duration’ is diffused through space ‘without any concept of its parts’. In other words, any single moment of duration is present throughout all the parts of space, and that moment lacks conceptual parts. Analogously, a mind can be present to many parts of space ‘without any concept of its parts’, such that a mind also lacks conceptual parts. Newton is telling us that God’s spatial presence lacks even conceptual parts.34 Incidentally, this provides one of several instances where Newton argues from time to space, undermining Gorham’s (2012) thesis that Newton’s account of time is parasitic on his account of space.35 How are we to make sense of Newton’s claim that God is infinite in relation to space, and the claim that God’s presence in space lacks conceptual parts? My answer is that Newton’s God is holenmerically present in space: God is infinite in relation to space because God is in every part of space but—unlike More’s God— Newton’s God lacks amplitude or spatial extent. God’s presence in space lacks conceptual parts because God is wholly present in every part of space. I find confirmation of Newton’s holenmerism in the General Scholium.36 Having stated that God is substantially omnipresent, Newton continues: It is agreed that the supreme God necessarily exists, and by the same necessity he is always and everywhere. It follows that all of him is like himself: he is all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all force of sensing, of understanding, and of acting, but in a way not at all human, in a way not at all corporeal, in a way utterly unknown to us (Newton, trans. 1999, 942).37

I find this passage strongly indicative of holenmerism. I am not the only scholar to read Newton’s God as holenmeric.38 Nonetheless, the reading is controversial, and I will consider two sets of issues that have been raised for it. The first set are raised by Grant (1981, 244–6), who argues that if Newton follows More in making space a divine attribute—which Grant believes 34 Perhaps it might be objected that here Newton is not concerned with whether God’s spatial presence lacks conceptual parts but with whether God’s mind lacks conceptual parts. The problem with this response is that in De Gravitatione Newton’s discussion of how a mind is diffused through space with no concept of its parts occurs in a section explicitly concerned with whether God simpliciter has divisible parts. 35 Schliesser (2013, 93–4) and Brading (forthcoming) discuss this issue further. It is also worth noting that Newton’s Principia defines time before space (see Chapter IX). 36 And in Newton’s Drafts on the History of the Church, p.128r: ‘He [God] is simple & not compound. He is all like & equal to himself all sense all spirit all perception . . . all ear, all eye all light’. 37 Deum summum necessario existere in confesso est: Et eadem necessitate semper est & ubique. Unde etiam totus est sui similis, totus oculus, totus auris . . . (Newton, 1713, 483). 38 See McGuire (1978a, 506), Pasnau (2011, 338), and Reid (2012, 227–9).

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he does—then ‘surely it follows’ that God is an extended, dimensional being. Grant finds confirmation of this in the Opticks, where God is understood to be literally omnipresent. Grant (1981, 253) considers the holenmeric reading of Newton and writes bluntly, ‘Any attempt to foist this interpretation on Newton must be rejected’. Grant argues that Newton was ‘probably’ familiar with More’s objections to holenmerism in the Enchiridion Metaphysicum, and Grant approvingly recites some of More’s objections, concluding that holenmerism is ‘unintelligible’. There are several minor points to make against Grant’s thesis here. One is that all the Newtonian texts that Grant cites in support of his extended reading are compatible with the holenmeric reading, as they merely show that Newton’s God is present in space, they do not further characterize the nature of that presence. As McGuire (1978a, 506) rightly states, ‘Newton nowhere says that God is an extended spirit or that infinite space is the innermost amplitude of Divine essence’. Whilst there is no doubt that Grant finds holenmerism unintelligible, that in itself is not sufficient to show that Newton agrees. As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1, the charge of incoherence against holenmerism can be resisted; and, in any case, holenmerism was held by many early moderns. Another point is— again—there is no evidence that Newton read More’s Enchiridion Metaphysicum, and De Gravitatione may have been composed prior to its publication. Although we know that Newton did read More’s Immortality, which describes holenmerism as ‘profound Nonsense’, this text doesn’t actually contain arguments against holenmerism, and it seems plausible that Newton’s views on divine presence (whatever they were) would not be shaken by mere hyperbole. Further, whilst the Immortality is explicit that finite spirits are extendedly present in space, the thesis is not made explicit of God. Despite these minor points, the major thrust of Grant’s objection stands: if God is not really distinct from space, and space is extended and dimensional, then ‘surely it follows’ that God is an extended, dimensional being. To respond to this objection, I make use of an ingenious suggestion found in Reid, who considers how Samuel Clarke can hold that space is an attribute of God and God is holenmeric. At one point in his corpus (more on this in Chapter 9), Clarke states that God is equally present to every point of the boundless immensity ‘as if it were really all but one single point’. Reid (2012, 232–6) places weight on this statement, arguing that it would be ‘all the same to God if there was to be just one single point, with him wholly present in it’. Given this, Reid argues, space does not derive its extension from God’s essence but from God’s power to create. God can produce bodies in different places, and if a limitless variety of bodies is going to be capable

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of coexisting at a single moment, they ‘will need to be spread out’ and be ‘geometrically ordered’ with respect to one another. Reid quotes another passage in Clarke: ‘the infinity or immensity or omnipresence of God can not otherwise be proved than by considering a priori the nature of a necessary or self-existent cause’. Focusing on Clarke’s thesis that God is a cause, Reid argues that God’s omnipotence will entail the infinite repetition of the whole of his indivisible substance in the infinitely many places which he could create: ‘So God’s omnipotence will give us his omnipresence, and his omnipresence will give us space’. Reid concludes: ‘The existence of space will refer upwards to God’s own essence and existence, but its structure will refer downwards to the structure that any arrangement of possible products of God’s omnipotence will be obliged to instantiate’. By grounding the structure of space in God’s creative powers, Clarke can conceive time and space to be attributes of God, and hold that God is holenmeric. I suggest a similar story could be told for Newton. God causally emanates space and time, and their existence refers upwards to God. However, the structure of space and time—the geometric parts of space, and the successive parts of time— refers downwards to created bodies. God is present in every part of space and time but he is not spread out partes extra partes. This story provides a way of understanding how God is non-extended, and space and time are extended, even though God is not really distinct from space and time. Let’s consider the second set of issues. Although McGuire once defended the holenmeric reading, he has since changed his mind, and McGuire and Slowik (2012) offer a particularly interesting argument in which they claim that Newton’s creation story ‘strongly supports’ the view that Newton rejects holenmerism. Explicating this will take a little background. Having described ‘extension’, De Gravitatione turns to the nature of ‘body’ or matter, and in this context advances a hypothesis or story as to how God might have created it: God, by the sole action of thinking and willing, can prevent a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits. If he should exercise this power, and cause some space projecting above the earth, like a mountain or any other body, to be impervious to bodies and thus stop or reflect light and all impinging things, it seems impossible that we should not consider this space really to be a body from the evidence of our senses . . . Thus we may assume that there are empty spaces scattered through the world, one of which, defined by certain limits, happens by divine power to be impervious to bodies . . . and assume all the properties of a corporeal particle, except that it will be regarded as motionless. If we should suppose that that impenetrability is not always maintained in the same part of space but can be transferred here and there and according to certain laws, yet so that the

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quantity and shape of that impenetrable space are not changed, there will be no property of body which it does not possess . . . And so if all of this world were constituted out of these beings, it would hardly seem to be inhabited differently. And hence these beings will either be bodies, or very similar to bodies (PW, 27–8).

Establishing what is going on in this story is difficult. On one line of interpretation, Newton is claiming that God could make bodies by adding properties to some parts of space, numerically identifying some parts of space with material bodies. A difficultly with this interpretation is that Newton claims that bodies move, and the parts of space do not move.39 On another line of interpretation, Newton is creating bodies ‘in’ space ex nihilo, such that a body is fully independent of the space it occupies; this interpretation would be compatible with the definition of body Newton gives earlier in the text: ‘Body is that which fills place’ (PW, 13). A difficulty with this interpretation is Newton’s language, which strongly implies there is some special relationship between space and body: Newton speaks of spaces becoming impervious, and spaces assuming all the properties of material bodies. I suggest we should run a middle road through these interpretations, conceiving a ‘body’ as a collection of properties—including impenetrability and tangibility— that can be ‘transferred here and there’ in space. Although a body is really distinct from the part of space it occupies, I am persuaded by Newton’s language that there is a special relationship between body and space. Speculatively, in conceiving a body as a collection of properties, Newton may require a subject for those properties to be ‘pinned’ to, even though the body is not identified with that subject. If I am right, then Newton is a kind of ‘super-substantivalist’, a twentieth-century term of art which takes there to be an especially intimate relationship between space and body.40 McGuire and Slowik (2012, 295–6) argue this creation story poses a problem for holenmeric readings, because ‘God’s attribute of extension plays the ‘container’ role for the presence of corporeal substance’ by acting as the subject in which the form of the body is conserved, and this erodes the distinction posited by holenmeric readings that God and bodies exist in space in different ways. 39 Conn (1999, 438–40) provides an interpretation along these lines, and discusses previous authors who do the same. Cohn solves the mobility issue by arguing that a body need only be identified with a part of space, not one in particular. Boldly, Gorham (2011, 308) argues that Newton takes bodies to be ‘modes’ of space which, for Gorham, entails that they are modes of God. 40 A similar idea can be found in some mind–body emergence theories: a mind is a collection of properties, distinct from its brain—and, if some thought experiments are to be believed, could conceivably be ‘transferred’ from one brain to another—and yet the mind depends on having a brain.

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I argue we can answer this problem by making use of the suggestion above that the structure of space depends on the bodies that can be created in it. However this creation story is understood—whether bodies are identified with space, created in space ex nihilo, or are bundles of properties dependent yet distinct from space—Newton is explicit that bodies are created in space. It is the very nature of bodies to be spatial (and, presumably, temporal) and this fact can be used to support, rather than erode, the holenmeric thesis that God and bodies are spatially (and temporally) present in different ways.

6.6 After De Gravitatione It might be asked whether Newton maintains these metaphysical views over the course of his career. A proper answer to this question would involve digging into all of Newton’s later texts on time and space, a lengthy (if not book-length) project that I do not attempt here. Certainly, the language that Newton uses to describe time and space shifts. In his later texts, Newton’s language of emanation drops away, and is replaced by new—equally oblique—language. For example, in drafts of the 1720 Des Maiseaux preface (see Chapter 9), Newton describes time and space as ‘modes of existence’ of God. Whilst linguistic shifts do not necessarily track philosophic shifts, it should not be surprising if Newton’s views did evolve, given that Newton worried about time and space for over half a century.

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7 Locke as a Steadfast Relationist about Time and Space The great Mr. Locke was the first who became a Newtonian Philosopher without the Help of Geometry; for having asked Mr. Huygens, whether all the mathematical Propositions in Sir Isaac’s Principia were true, and being told he might depend upon their Certainty; he took them for granted, and carefully examined the Reasonings and Corollaries drawn from them, became Master of all the Physicks, and was fully convinc’d of the great Discoveries contained in that Book. John Theophilus Desaguliers (1734, preface)

7.1 Introduction Unique amongst the figures of this study, the bulk of John Locke’s writings on time concern epistemology rather than metaphysics.1 There is a near-consensus in the literature that Locke’s metaphysics of space and time undergo a radical evolution: in the 1670s, Locke holds relationism; by the first, 16902 edition of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke has adopted Newtonian absolutism. This chapter argues for an alternative reading, on which Locke’s Essay is explicitly neutral or non-committal with regard to the ontology of space and time; and yet there is reason to believe that the Essay implicitly preserves Locke’s earlier relationism. In addition to challenging the existing scholarship, this chapter excavates a form of pre-Leibnizian relationism, which may be of interest to twenty-first century relationists looking to uncover the roots of their position;3 illuminates Locke’s views on space and time, highlighting his

1

Locke’s own bias is reflected in the literature. Burtt (1924) and Koyré (1957), two of the landmark tomes in early modern space scholarship, omit Locke’s metaphysics. More surprisingly, so too does Stuart’s (2013) recent study of Locke’s metaphysics. 2 The date on the Essay’s imprimatur, although the text was sent to the press in late 1689. 3 This is an approach pursued, for example, by Belot (2011).

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opposition to Cartesianism on this head; and provides ammunition to nonNewtonian readings of Locke’s Essay. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief sketch of Locke’s life and relevant works. Section 7.3 sets out Locke’s pre-1690 texts on time and space, showing that Locke holds a non-modal form of relationism on which time and space are real, mind-independent relations holding between existing bodies. Surprisingly, despite Locke’s stature in the scholarship, his early relationism has not been excavated in much depth, and I remedy this. Although my focus is on time, we will see that as Locke treats time and space symmetrically, many of his views on space will prove relevant too. Section 7.4 discusses the relationships between Locke, Newton, and their texts; and explains which relevant theses are, and are not, found in Newton’s 1687 Principia. Section 7.5 investigates Locke’s 1690 Essay, arguing that the text is explicitly neutral on the nature of space and time, that the case for reading Locke as an absolutist can be undermined, and that there is reason to believe Locke implicitly remained a relationist. The final part of this section offers some concluding remarks on the continuity of Locke’s thought after 1690.

7.2 Sketching Locke’s Life and Works Locke (1632–1704) was born in Wrington, Somerset, to a modest Puritan family. Through his father’s connections. Locke received an excellent education. After arriving at Christ Church, Oxford, Locke studied logic, metaphysics, classical languages, and later medicine. Aaron’s (1955, 8–11) biography describes how widely Locke read around this time, studying Cicero, the scholastics, Gassendi, and Descartes. Lamprecht (1935) discusses the evolution of Locke’s admiring and critical intellectual relationship with Descartes.4 At Oxford, Locke became involved with figures who would later form the Royal Society, and he would be elected a fellow in 1668. Locke’s involvement is highlighted by his Epistle to the Reader at the beginning of the Essay: The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.

4 My sources for the biographical part of this sketch include Aaron (1955), Woolhouse (2007), and Milton (2008).

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By the time Locke wrote this, he personally knew all the figures named here: Robert Boyle, Thomas Sydenham, Christiaan Huygens, and Newton. During his medical studies, Locke met Anthony Ashley Cooper, who would become the first Earl of Shaftesbury. In 1667, Shaftesbury persuaded Locke to move to London and become his personal physician. Shortly after arriving, Locke formed a professional relationship with the physician Sydenham, and Milton (2008) explains that in 1668 and 1669 two medical manuscripts were composed that argue for a purely empirical approach to medicine; these manuscripts are sometimes attributed to Sydenham but are in Locke’s hand. In addition to pursuing his medical studies, Locke held a number of governmental posts, via Shaftesbury’s involved political career. It was whilst in London that Locke began writing the Essay. After spending eight years there, he returned to Oxford and graduated with a degree in medicine in 1674. From 1675, Locke travelled in France for several years. While he was away the British political scene shifted, and Shaftesbury fell out of favour. Around this time, Locke composed his most famous political work, Two Treatises Concerning Government. Locke returned to England and, in late 1681, met and subsequently became close friends with the philosopher Damaris Cudworth (daughter of Ralph Cudworth). Following Shaftesbury’s death in 1683, Locke fled to the Netherlands to escape political persecution. Whilst there Locke travelled a great deal and continued working on a number of philosophical tracts, including the Essay. He also kept abreast of the latest intellectual developments of his day; Aaron (1955, 25) argues that some of the greatest broad movements on Locke’s thought during this period were Cambridge Platonism and Gassendist criticism of Cartesianism. Locke became acquainted with Huygens, of pendulum clock fame. Following the Glorious Revolution the political winds shifted again, and in 1688 Locke returned to England. On his return, Locke published his Essay and Two Treatises. Together, these assured his intellectual stature in Britain and beyond. In 1691, Locke took up residence at Oates, a country house in Essex, home of Damaris Masham (née Cudworth) and her husband Francis Masham. Whilst at Oates, Locke remained hugely active, and amongst other political and intellectual activities supervised four further editions of the Essay. Locke and Damaris Masham remained companions until the very end of Locke’s life. Locke’s views on time and space can be found in a number of texts: two early drafts of the Essay, ‘Draft B’ composed in late 1671 and ‘Draft C ’ composed in 1685;5 journal entries from 1676 to 1678; and the 1690 Essay

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The earliest draft, ‘Draft A’, barely mentions time or space, so is irrelevant to us.

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itself. With the exception of Draft C, the early drafts of the Essay have since been published.6 As Locke’s texts are structured in different ways, it may be helpful to explain how I cite them. I reference Draft B by page number, followed by section number; the Journals by page number only; Draft C by chapter and paragraph number only; and the Essay by page number, followed by chapter and section number.

7.3 Locke’s 1671–1685 Texts on Time and Space This section sets out Locke’s pre-Essay texts on time and space, excavates Locke’s relationism, and argues that Locke held relationism as late as 1685.

7.3.1 Locke’s 1671 Draft B Locke’s Draft B (repr. 1990, 223–5; §102) explains that time, ‘wherein all things that have or ever had existence’, is the ‘assigning’ of temporal distances or durations between any two instants, according to some common measure. For example, one common measure is a ‘year’—a single revolution of the sun—and thus the time between creation and the birth of Christ is putatively 3,950 years. Locke advances a parallel account of place: the assigning of spatial distances between any two points, using common measures such as yards. Locke goes on to write on the epistemology of time. Locke (repr. 1990, 225–6; §103–4) argues that if we reflect on the operation of thinking in our own minds, specifically the appearance of ideas ‘one after an other’, we arrive at the idea of succession. If we reflect on the ‘distances’ between the parts of that succession— between the ideas in our mind—we arrive at the idea of duration. Once we have this idea, Locke argues it is natural that we should try to measure the durations of things. Locke argues that whilst measuring spatial extensions is ‘easily performd’— for example by laying a measuring ruler against other portions of matter— measuring durations is not. Locke discusses various ways of measuring durations, such as using the periodical revolutions of the sun and moon, and ‘of late’ pendulum motions. Locke (repr. 1990, 231–3; §106–9) concludes that—unlike with spatial distances—we can never be certain that any two temporal distances are equal because the parts of duration are fleeting and in succession, and we can never ‘bring two of them togeather’ to compare them. Locke’s scepticism with

6 On the history of these manuscripts, see Aaron (1955, 50–5), and Nidditch & Rogers’ introduction to their edition of Drafts A and B.

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regard to measuring durations, especially following the invention of the pendulum clock, was not shared by all his peers.7 Once people have arrived at a length of duration, such as a year, Locke (repr. 1990, 241; §115) argues that they can apply it in their minds to the ‘measureing of duration wherein noe such body or motion did exist’. Thus, we can understand statements such as ‘angells were created . . . 63 years before the beginning of the world’. The latter statement means that the duration of the angels ‘would have taken up’ sixty-three annual revolutions of the sun, even though pre-creation there was no sun. Locke (repr. 1990, 245–9; §123) explains that in our thoughts we can add distances of time or space together ad infinitum, and arrive at the ideas of eternity and infinite spatial extension. Locke suggests this is possible because, unlike other ideas, our ideas of space and time include a numerable ‘aggregation of parts’. Locke’s (repr. 1990, 244; §121) account of eternity explains why, in our thoughts, we cannot set a limit to extension and duration: like the utmost bounds of number, they are beyond the ‘largest comprehensions’ of the mind. Locke (repr. 1990, 250–1; §127) states that infinity can only belong to things possessing parts, and ‘therefore when we apply the Idea of infinite to god we doe it properly in respect of his duration & ubiquity’, and ‘more figuratively’ in respect to his other attributes. The implication that God is literally infinite, at least with regard to duration, is brought out more fully shortly afterwards. Locke states that men have ‘certain knowledge’ that some thing hath existed from eternity, ‘that all that infinite duration whereof we have the Idea hath been taken up by the reall existence of some thing . . . commensurate to that infinite duration whereof we have the Idea’. Locke is, of course, referring to God. Our knowledge that something has existed eternally does not derive from our idea of infinite duration, ‘which informes us not of the existence of any thing’, but rather from considering ‘causes & effects’.8 Locke (repr. 1990, 253; §130) adds that although we have the parallel idea of infinite space, we cannot come to know whether that infinite space ‘whereof we have the Idea’ is filled up by anything.

7.3.2 Locke’s 1676–1678 journals In these journals, Locke develops his views on space and time, and positions himself against Descartes’ account of space. Locke’s entry of 20 June 1676 argues 7

For example, John Clarke (1730, 258) argues that through the invention of the pendulum we have a ‘certain Measure’ of time, by which we can compute it with the ‘utmost Exactness, by half Seconds or Seconds’. 8 Shortly afterwards, Locke (repr. 1990, 258; §140) offers a cosmological argument for God’s existence.

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that people such as Descartes have been misled into attributing the properties of bodies to distances because we are used to measuring distances using bodies such as rulers. In contrast, Locke claims that a distance, ‘which is not barely an imaginary thing’, is ‘really a relation between two separate beings’. As further evidence against the identification of distance with body, Locke (repr. 1936, 78) argues that the parts of distance—unlike body—are not ‘separable’, their ‘continuity’ are indivisible really and mentally, and they are ‘immovable’. Locke (repr. 1936, 101) adds later that if someone can imagine separating the parts of space and moving them away from one another, they have a ‘much more powerful phansy’ than he does. Locke elucidates his views on space further using time: The great agreement that there is between distance in time with that of place may perhaps make this a little clearer for as distance in time is noe thing but the relation between two beings that have existed one before an other, and is that space of duration which intervend between them which duration though it cannot be divided nor hath parts separable may yet be measurd by motion that hath parts one after another and may be stopd, i.e. interrupted and the parts of motion separated but yet notwithstanding that that duration might be measured by motion, yet in its self it is wholly separated from it and is a destinct thing, and would have been just the same though there had been noe concurrent motion at all between the two periods (Locke, repr. 1936, 79).

Distances in space and time are relations holding between beings. Time can be measured by motions which are divisible; for example, the motion of a pendulum has parts, and it could be interrupted mid-swing. However, a period of duration ‘in itself ’ is separated from motion, it is a ‘distinct thing’ independent of the motions that take place in it. Similarly, space can be measured using bodies but is not body. Locke (repr. 1936, 80) gives a virtue of this account: it will render intelligible the thesis that ‘distance may be something’ though it is not body, and that although ‘it be something’ it is not uncreated, ‘which have been the difficultys that have arisen about this matter’. The difficulties that Locke refers to is presumably our familiar threat of polytheistic blasphemy, on which there is a real, uncreated being in addition to God.9 Locke explains that, just as relations of bigger or less only come into existence with the creation of bodies, so too do distance relations. Assuming Locke retains the views he set out five years previously in Draft B, this reading produces an oddity: space and time are finite, as they only come into 9 If Locke has in mind some particular figures who have run into this difficulty he does not say; possible candidates include Gassendi, Walter Charleton, or Samuel Parker.

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existence with the creation of bodies; and yet God is infinite with regard to space and time. Locke does not appear to perceive any incompatibility here (or later, as Draft C also asserts relationism and that God fills eternity and immensity). I suggest this is because Locke is drawing on medieval views concerning ‘imaginary space’. Aristotle (trans. 1984, Phys 3.4.203b25–7) writes that in our imagination certain things appear to be inexhaustible or unbounded, such as mathematical measures ‘and what is outside the heaven’. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, from the thirteenth century onwards thinkers discussed imagining space or time beyond the bounds of our finite created universe, frequently associating imaginary space or time with God’s immensity and eternity. Support for this suggestion can be found in the way that Locke frequently uses the term ‘imaginary space’ (more on this in Section 7.5.2 of this chapter). If Locke is drawing on this tradition, then strictly speaking God is not in space or time—as space and time are distance relations holding between material bodies—but we can still speak of God’s existence in imaginary space or time. Locke (repr. 1936, 94–6) returns to space on 16 September 1677, and introduces new terminology: ‘Space in its self seems to be noe thing but a capacity or possibility for extended beings or bodys to be or exist’. Although we are apt to imagine that space is ‘really something’ and has a ‘reall existence’, in truth it is ‘really noe thing’. A little later, Locke argues that if we imagine eliminating all beings from any place, then ‘this imaginary space is just noe thing, and signifies noe more but a bare possibility that body may exist where now there is none’. Despite this terminology, Locke’s relationism remains: as for distance I suppose that to be the relation of two bodys or beings neare or remote to one an other measurable by the Ideas we have of distance taken from solid bodys. For were there noe beings at all we might truly say there were noe distance . . . we are apt to consider that space as some positive reall being existing without them [bodies], where as it seems to me but a bare relation (Locke, repr. 1936, 95).

Again, the spatial distance between bodies is ‘a bare relation’. Fascinatingly, Locke asks what would be entailed if, in the absence of all bodies, there was something rather than nothing: If it be impossible to suppose pure noe thing . . . this space void of body must be something belonging to the idea of deity . . . if there be a necessity to suppose a being there it must be god whose being we thus make i.e. suppose extended . . . [but it seems to me] distance [is] noe thing but the relation of space resulting from the existence of two positive beings or which is all one two parts of the same being (Locke, repr. 1936, 96).

Locke is arguing that if space void of body were something it must be associated with God, who would be spatially extended. This view is, of course, the mature

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position of Henry More.10 Reid (2012, 136–9) argues that this journal entry was specifically inspired by the Appendix to More’s Antidote Against Atheism. As Reid notes, Locke’s library contained two copies of this text.11 Reid argues that the order of ideas under consideration in Locke’s journal entry follows the order of possible ontologies presented by More: More describes space as the ‘large and immense capacity’ of matter, suggests that distance is ‘nothing else but the privation of tactual union’ between bodies, and finally writes that if space must be ‘something’ then it must be God. Although we cannot know with certainty that More’s Antidote was the inspiration, Reid’s argument is extremely persuasive. It is faintly possible that an alternative or additional source of Locke’s new terminology is Barrow, who describes space and time using the language of capacity in both Lectiones Mathematicae and Geometricae. It will be helpful to briefly recap the dates. Locke’s pertinent journal entries were composed from 1676 to 1678. At this time, Lectiones Mathematicae was not published (although the lectures were delivered in the mid-1660s, this text did not appear in print until 1683); however, Lectiones Geometricae had appeared in 1670. Barrow and Locke actually met in 1672, and Barrow gave Locke an inscribed copy of his Lectiones Geometricae.12 Although Barrow may be a source of Locke’s new language of capacity, there is no additional evidence in favour of this thesis, and further on this section will argue that there are significant dissimilarities between their views on space and time, which may further count against it. On 20 January 1678, Locke explains how he understands the relationship between distances and space void of bodies: when we speake of space (as ordinarily we doe) as the abstract distance between two bodies it seems to me to be a pure relation . . . But when we speake of Space in generall abstract and separate from all consideration of any body at all or any other being it seems not then to be any reall thing but the consideration of a bare possibility of body to exist . . . noe thing but the Idea of the possibility of the existence of body . . . and in this sense space may be said infinite (Locke, repr. 1936, 100–1).

On 24 January 1678, Locke adds: Space in its confused and generall sense signifies noething but the existibility of body, when we have a more destinct and precise notion of it and make it the same with distance

10

This has been noted before—see Gibson (1917, 250) and Baker (1930, 39)—but none have made the case as strongly as Reid. 11 See Harrison and Laslett (1965, 192). Aaron (1955, 93–4) argues on independent grounds that Locke read More’s Antidote. 12 See Rogers (1978, 230).

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it is noe thing but the relation of two reall beings . . . for one cannot say nor conceive that there is any such thing as space or distance between something and noething or which is yet more absurd two noethings (Locke, repr. 1936, 105).

I explicate the two sense of space that Locke gives here as follows. In the precise sense, space is a spatial distance, a real relation that holds between real beings such as bodies. A space is ‘real’ in that it exists independent of our thought. Above, there is ample textual evidence to support this: distance is not imaginary but ‘really a relation’ between beings, duration is ‘a distinct thing’ from motion, and distance is ‘something’ yet not uncreated. Distance relations depend on the existence of real beings, and this is why there is no distance between something and nothing. This latter thesis is emphasized in Locke’s discussion of whether the universe can be said to be distant from anything. Locke argues (repr. 1936, 102) that if a material body were placed beyond the utmost extremity of the world, one might truly say ‘it were a foot distant from the world’, as a relation would ‘appeare’ between the body and the world. However, one cannot say the universe is distant from anything otherwise, as a relation of distance requires another body to be ‘the other terme’ of this relation. In contrast, in the ‘general abstract’ or ‘confused’ sense, space is merely ‘the consideration’ or ‘the Idea’ of the possibility of the existence of body. In this sense, space is a mind-dependent ideal, or imaginary, being; and it is only in this sense that space may be said to be infinite. If one were to annihilate the universe, there would not be space in the precise sense—as there would be no relata to ground distance relations—but there would be space in this abstract sense. It may be useful to briefly compare Locke’s early relationism with that of Barrow, who I (albeit controversially) read as a relationist; and that of Leibniz, who is often read as a relationist. Let’s begin with Barrow, who I argue advanced relationism in the mid-1660s, before Locke composed these journal entries. There are some uncontroversial similarities between the views of Locke and Barrow: as mentioned above, both use the language of capacity to describe space and time; both reject the Cartesian identification in reality of space with material substance; and both explicitly point out that their positions are theologically virtuous. Although these broad similarities are present, I argue that the details of Barrow and Locke’s views differ hugely. Consider my reading of Barrow: space is non-contiguity, a relational mode of magnitude considered abstractly; and, I argue, time is non-simultaneity, a relational mode of magnitude considered abstractly. Barrow is a modal relationist in virtue of his insistence that there was time before creation, and space beyond the bounds of the material world. This is because, for Barrow, time and space are founded in possible and actual things. In contrast, for Locke, space and time in

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the precise sense do not appear to be modes at all. Barrow’s modes modify things, such that a particular magnitude can be square, or red, or in a state of continuity with another magnitude. Locke’s relations do not modify things in this way: a ‘bare’ or ‘pure’ distance relation may hold between two things, but it seems to be really distinct from both of them. Locke is explicit that there cannot be space or time in the precise sense where there are no things, for relations can only hold between existing things. Although Locke allows us to speak of infinite space and time in the abstract sense, he is clear—unlike Barrow—that in this sense space and time are imaginary. Consequently, unlike on my reading of Barrow, the early Locke is a non-modal relationist: times and spaces are distance relations holding exclusively between existing relata. Let’s move on to Leibniz, who began writing on space and time in the 1680s, after Locke composed these journal entries. (Of course, that does not mean that Leibniz had access to Locke’s journals, as they were not published during either man’s lifetime.) One difference between their views is that Leibniz is often read as a modal relationist, whereas we have seen that Locke is a non-modal relationist. One similarity is that Locke, like Leibniz but unlike Barrow, actually uses the language of relation: Leibniz describes space and time as a principal of relations, and Locke describes spaces and times as distance relations. However, unlike Leibniz’s texts, Locke’s journal entries nowhere describe relations as phenomenal, ideal, or mind-dependent. Instead, Locke appears to be a realist about relations: distance relations are not imaginary but real. To my mind, Locke’s relationism is intellectually isolated from both Barrow’s earlier relationism, and Leibniz’s later relationism: in this regard, there is no indication Locke was drawing on Barrow, and Leibniz was certainly not drawing on Locke.

7.3.3 Locke’s 1685 Draft C13 Locke writes there are ‘some that would persuade us’ that body and extension are the same—this is almost certainly a reference to Descartes—but Locke argues they are mistaken, for this confounds two distinct ideas: space or extension, with solidity or body. Locke claims that our idea of solidity is ‘inseparable’ from our idea of body, as upon that ‘depends its filling of space’. Locke argues that our idea of space is distinct from our idea of body in three ways: our idea of space does not include solidity, such that—as Locke (1685, xvi.26) puts it later—on our 13

This unpublished manuscript is held in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York (MA 998). Building on the work of G. A. J. Rogers, John Milton is preparing Draft C for publication, and I am grateful to him for kindly sharing his copy of the manuscript with me.

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idea of ‘empty or pure space’ a body may be placed there; the parts of pure space are really and mentally ‘inseparable’ from one another; and the parts of space are ‘immoveable’. Locke (1685, xvi.11) concludes, ‘Thus the cleare & distinct Idea of simple space destinguishes it plainly & sufficiently from body’. As I read Locke, the discussion so far has focused exclusively on our idea of space and, to quote Locke’s Draft B, our ideas of space or duration do not inform us of the existence of anything. However, at this point, the discussion takes a new turn: If any one aske me what this space I speake of is I will tell him when he tells me what his Extension is . . . Those who contend that space and body are the same bring this Dilemma: either this space is something or noething; if nothing be between two bodies they must necessarily touch; if it be allowd to be something they aske whether it be body or spirit. To which I answer by another question, who told them that there was or could be nothing but solid beings which could not think & thinkeing beings that were not Extended . . . If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space void of body be Substance or accident I shall readily answer I know not nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance till they that aske shew me a cleare distinct Idea of Substance (Locke, 1685, xvi.18–20).

I argue this passage is neutral on the ontology of space. Locke does not know what space understood as extension is, nor does he classify space as substance or accident. Locke does reject the Cartesian view that space and body are the same, along with Descartes’ dilemma (CSM I 231) aiming to show otherwise, on the grounds that we need not accept its implicit Cartesian ontology of extended body and unextended spirit: Locke suggests it is possible to solve the dilemma by positing a being that does not fit this ontology. However, Locke does not positively tell us what that being might be: it could be absolute space, or a distance relation. Towards the end of this chapter, Locke turns again to the ontology of space: But whether any one will take space only to be a relation resulting from the Existence of other beings at a distance or whether they will thinke the words of the most knowing King Salomon, The heaven & and the heaven of heavens cannot conteine thee or those more Emphaticall ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, In him we live move & have our Being are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to Consider (Locke, 1685, xvi.26).14

Again, this passage is neutral: Locke leaves ‘every one to consider’ what appears to be a choice between relationism or absolutism in the style of More. Locke’s remarks on duration run parallel to those on space. Chapter XVII tells us that our simple idea of duration also admits of modes, including one hour; and ‘eternity’, infinite duration (Locke, 1685, xvii.20). Once again, Locke (1685; 14

The biblical references are to Kings I (8:27) and Acts (17:28).

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xvii.26) warns against identifying motion with duration. Analogously to spatial location, Locke (1685; xviii.9) writes that a body’s temporal location is shown relative to the temporal durations of other bodies, ‘some Knowne & fixed periods of longer duration’. Chapter XVIII returns to Locke’s earlier remarks on Solomon: Nor let any one say that beyond the bounds of body there is noething at all unlesse he will confine God within the limits of matter. Salomon whose understanding was fild and inlarged with wisdome seems to have other thoughts when he says Heaven & the Heaven of Heavens, cannot conteine thee: & he, I thinke, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his owne understanding who perswades himself that he can Extend his thoughts farther than God exists (Locke, 1685, xviii.2).

God exists in space beyond matter, and in time before creation: God everyone easily allows fills Eternity & tis hard to finde a reason why any one should doubt that he likewise fills Immensity: his infinite being is certainly as boundlesse one way as another & me thinkes it ascribes a little too much to matter to say where there is noe body there is noething (Locke, 1685, xviii.3).

Locke’s thinking has undergone a shift from Draft B, where he held that the infinite duration of which we have the idea is taken up by God’s duration, but we cannot know whether anything takes up the infinite immensity of which we have the idea. Here, Locke’s claim that God’s being is boundless in every way suggests he has become convinced that God’s immensity should parallel his eternity. Towards the end of this chapter, Locke returns to the nature of space and time: Men haveing in their mindes the Ideas of infinite space & infinite duration make use of time & place to denote the position as it were of things they know in these infinite Oceans of duration & space. therefore time & place are nothing but Ideas of determinate distances from certain known points fixed in sensible things . . . which otherwise being uniforme & boundlesse the order & position of things would be lost & there would be therein utter Confusion. place & time are real relations resulting from the Existence of real different beings & in their general acception Commonly stand for soe much of those infinite uniforme Oceans as is taken to be set out & Supposd to be destinguishd from the rest by real & destinguishable marks & fixed boundarys & soe seeme to be determinate portions of those infinite Extensions of space & duration we have in our imaginations . . . [rightly considered] the Idea of Extension of any body is soe much of that imaginary space as the bulke of that body takes up . . . As the Idea of the particular duration of any thing is an Idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes dureing the Existence of that thing (Locke, 1685, xviii.10–11; my emphasis).

As in Locke’s journals, place and time are ‘real relations’, resulting from the existence of real beings. In contrast, the ‘oceans’ of infinite space and duration are ideas that people have in their ‘minds’, or ‘imaginations’.

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Further, there are no absolute locations in space or time: things only have locations relative to the ‘certain known points’ of sensible things. We begin from these certain known points, and from these ‘measure out portions’ of our ideas of infinite space and duration. For example, taking a known point such as Creation, we can measure out portions of the imaginary infinite duration that preceded it. But, if there were no sensible things to provide certain known points, ‘the order and position of things would be lost’: there would be no locations. Later, Locke explicitly states that ‘our Idea of place is nothing else but relative position of any body amongst others’, and adds: when any one can finde out & frame in his minde clearely & distinctly where the place of the universe is he will then have discoverd that place is not a relation of real destinct beings . . . but till then I thinke must be content with me to take it for a Relation as it is applied to particular bodys (Locke, 1685, xviii.12; my emphasis).

As in Locke’s journals, the material universe does not have a place because Locke only has a relative account of place, and there is nothing outside of the universe whereby we could fix its location. If someone could find out the place of the universe, they would have discovered that Locke’s non-modal relationism is false.

7.4 A Newtonian Interlude: Locke, Newton, and the 1687 Principia It is important to be clear on the chronology of Locke and Newton’s relationship. Newton’s Principia was first published in 1687, and the subsequent editions came out after Locke’s death in 1704. We know that Locke read the 1687 Principia because he published an anonymous review of it in 1688,15 but neither Locke’s review, nor his notes, discuss space or time.16 It is generally assumed that Locke and Newton first met in 1689 or 1690, after Locke’s return from exile.17 They became friends and Locke may have been the first person that Newton shared his more unorthodox theological views with. An open issue in the scholarship is whether, or how far, Locke became a Newtonian. As illustrated by the passage that opens this chapter—from the French-born, British Newtonian Desaguliers, who claims that he was told the 15

16 See Axtell (1965). See Rogers (1978, 222). Rogers (1978, 230–1) explains that while there is no evidence to suggest that Locke and Newton met prior to this, it is just possible, as they briefly overlapped in London in 1669 and in February 1675. Rogers adds that even if the men did meet then, they certainly did not become friends until after 1689. On their friendship, see also Aaron (1955) and Woolhouse (2007). 17

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story ‘several times’ by Newton himself—the thesis that Locke was a Newtonian was propagated early, and it continues to be debated today. For example, it has been argued that Locke accepted Newton’s theory of gravity.18 If Locke did adopt Newton’s space and time absolutism, it would fuel stronger Newtonian readings of Locke. In contrast, if Locke did not adopt Newtonian absolutism, it would undermine this thesis. The final part of this section discusses three theses associated with Newtonian time and space, and explains which of these are and are not present in the first edition of the Principia. One thesis that is not present is that there is a connection between space, time, and God, evidenced in Newtonian claims such as space is an ‘emanative effect’ of God. This connection is only found in Newton’s early unpublished manuscripts, such as De Gravitatione; and in Newton’s later published texts, including his 1706 Optice and 1713 Principia (see Chapter IX, Section 3.3). Another thesis that is absent from the 1687 Principia is that time and space are real beings. Whereas De Gravitatione stated firmly that space is not nothing, ‘and approaches more nearly to the nature of substance’, the 1687 Principia contains no such statements. One thesis that is present in the 1687 Principia is that time and space are absolute, in the sense that they are independent of other things (including human minds and body): Absolute, true, and mathematical (absolutum verum & Mathematicum) time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and by another name is called duration. Relative, apparent, and common (relativum apparens & vulgare) time is any sensible and external measure (precise or imprecise) of duration by means of motion . . . Absolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything external, always remains homogeneous and immovable. Relative space is any moveable measure or dimension of this absolute space (Newton, 1687, 5; trans. 1999, 408–9).

Brading (forthcoming) considers these three Newtonian distinctions—absolute versus relative, true versus apparent, and mathematical versus common—at length. As it will be helpful below and in future chapters, I briefly recount her findings.19 Brading argues that Newton’s understanding of ‘absolute time’ is connected to his absolutism about motion. Relatedly, this text also distinguishes between absolute places, the unchangeable parts of absolute space and time; and relative 18

On this, and Locke’s putative Newtonianism more generally, see Downing (1997) and Domski (2011). 19 As Brading explains, she is building on earlier work, including Schliesser (2013). Although Brading and Schliesser rightly agree that absolute time must be distinguished from true time, they disagree over the details; see Brading (forthcoming).

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places, which are relative spaces. To illustrate, when the Earth moves, its air will retain its relative place with regard to the Earth, but the Earth and its air will have moved from one part of absolute space to another (Newton, 1687, 5–6; trans. 1999, 409). Brading makes use of Newton’s account of absolute motion to explain the distinction he draws between absolute and relative time: ‘Absolute time is independent of material bodies, whereas relative time is an aspect of material bodies or of the relations among them’. For relative time theorists, time is grounded in material bodies: for example, Aristotelians identify time with the motion (or the measure of the motion) of celestial bodies; and a relationist identifies time with the temporal relations holding between bodies. Brading argues that Newton’s distinction between true and apparent time would have been familiar to his readers from the dispute over Copernicanism. For example, a heliocentrist would argue that although the sun appears to move around the stationary Earth, this motion is only apparent, as the true motion is that of the Earth around the stationary sun. Absolute and true motion can come apart; to illustrate, one might hold that with regard to the sun and the Earth the true motion belongs to the Earth, yet the Earth is still moving relative to other bodies. Brading argues that these first two pairs of distinctions were already drawn with regard to motion, and Newton gathers them together and standardizes them across time: Just as true motion is unique and proper to the body (or system of bodies) in question, in contrast to being a property of the appearances, so too true time is unique and proper to the body (or system of bodies) in question, a property of the body or system itself rather than of the appearances.

Finally, Brading argues that the third distinction has its origins not in discussions of motion, but in the treatment of time in mathematical astronomy. ‘Common time’ is the division of the passage of time into the intervals by which the rhythms of our lives are marked out, such as the apparent movement of the sun as measured by clocks, and has no more precision that necessary. In contrast, ‘mathematical time’ was an abstract time parameter suitable for the purposes of mathematical astronomy (such as considering irregular celestial motions). Brading argues that common and mathematical time would have been understood by Newton’s intended readership, who would have been well versed in horology and mathematical astronomy. Brading persuasively argues that all the terms used in Newton’s three distinctions have meanings that are ‘prior to, and external to’ the project of the Principia. Newton was merely the first to bring these contrasts together, and apply them uniformly and systematically across time, space, place, and motion.

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7.5 Space and Time in Locke’s 1690 Essay 7.5.1 Reading Locke’s 1690 Essay as explicitly neutral The vast majority of scholars who have considered Locke’s metaphysics of space and time argue that in his 1690 Essay Locke abandons relationism for Newtonian absolutism.20 One exception21 is Richard Aaron, who reads Locke as ‘anxious not to commit himself ’ to a theory of space or time. As Aaron’s reading is akin to my own, this section states my reading and compares it with Aaron’s. As explained in Section 7.3.3 of this chapter, the three chapters concerning our ideas of space and duration in the 1690 Essay bear strong similarities to their Draft C predecessors. All of the Draft C passages given there are repeated verbatim in the Essay (albeit with minor changes in punctuation) with two significant exceptions: the final two passages asserting relationism. Up to this point, I argued that Draft C was neutral on the nature of space and time. A significant difference between Draft C and the Essay is that, where Draft C goes on from this point to assert relationism, the Essay excises those remarks. Given this, I hold that—unlike Draft C—the Essay remains neutral throughout on the nature of space and time. In reading Locke’s Essay as neutral in this regard, I am in agreement with Aaron’s (1955, 156) statement that one of the most ‘striking features’ of its chapters on space is the ‘absence of any definite statement’ on the nature of space. Although Aaron and I concur that Locke advances no explicit theses on the ontology of space and time, we differ over the position we take Locke to implicitly hold. Aaron (1955, 158–9) seems to suggest that Locke leans towards Henry More’s absolutist position that space and time are divine attributes; Aaron writes that although Locke would not ‘openly’ accept More’s position, the language in the rest of the Essay ‘implies’ absolutism. On time, Aaron (1955, 162) writes that Locke appears to ‘assume the Newtonian view’ as the basis for his

20 Gibson (1917, 251–2) identifies Newton’s Principia as an ‘external influence’ on this aspect of Locke’s Essay. Baker (1930, 49–51) argues that Locke moved towards absolutism due to the ‘scientific authority’ of Newton. Heath (1936, 106–7) writes that Locke’s account of time was ‘Newtonian’. Tuveson (1951, 28) writes that Locke ‘eagerly’ embraced ideas of absolute space and time. Grant (1981, 239–40) argues that by 1690 Locke’s views on space have been ‘transformed’ away from relationism. North (1983, 140) writes that Locke moved away from the relationism he ‘flirted’ with. Ayers (1991, 233) cautiously argues that Locke goes over to Newton’s ‘Cambridge’ theory. Priest (2007, 102) writes that Locke’s philosophy of space is ‘essentially Newtonian’. Reid (2012, 135) claims that Locke’s position ‘conformed in all of its salient points’ with Newton’s. 21 Another is Rogers (1978, 221–2), who claims that Locke ‘roughly’ remained a relationist but does not argue the point.

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discussion. In contrast, Section 7.5.3 of this chapter argues that Locke implicitly holds relationism.

7.5.2 Undermining the absolutist reading of Locke’s 1690 Essay Why do so many scholars hold that, by 1690, Locke has evolved into a Newtonian absolutist? Similar answers can be found in the work of various researchers, most of which are collected—along with fresh arguments—in a recent, forceful paper by Geoffrey Gorham and Edward Slowik (2014). Consequently, I take Gorham and Slowik’s absolutist reading of Locke as a target. Like previous scholars, Gorham and Slowik support their reading using various passages from the Essay, arguing that Locke’s views have evolved since Draft C. By way of structuring the following discussion, I place these passages into three groups and undermine in turn the support they provide for the absolutist reading. The first group of passages support the thesis that there is an intimate connection, one that goes beyond mere presence, between God, space, and time. These passages—found in Draft C, and repeated in the Essay (1690, 93–4; II.xv.2–3)—include Locke’s biblical quotations, his view that God is present beyond the bounds of body, and that God fills eternity and immensity. Gorham and Slowik (2014, 122–3) argue that Locke’s references to scripture imply that he takes scripture to favour realism about space over his former relationism, adding ‘Paul’s pantheism presumably makes space an attribute of God’. On their reading, space and time are identified with God’s immensity and eternity. Baker (1930, 49) provides a very similar reading; and, as we saw, Aaron may accept this too. Several points can be made against this absolutist interpretation. First, although these passages leave no doubt that God is literally present in space and time, that is all these passages say. Unlike in More’s mature work, there is no explicit statement identifying infinite duration and immensity with God’s attributes; and, unlike in Newton’s work, there are no statements holding that God is the emanative cause of, or constitutes, space and time. Second, the theses that God is literally present in space and time were present in Locke’s earlier work: the thesis that God fills eternity was present in Draft B, and the above passages are present verbatim in Draft C. As Locke maintained relationism in Draft C, this implies (as already discussed) that he does not perceive any incompatibility between relationism and these theses. Consequently, these theses cannot be used to support an absolutist reading. Let’s take a tangent into the question of Locke’s sources for the view that space and time are intimately connected to God. Baker (1930, 49–51) points to Newton’s Principia, but this thesis is faulty, as the intimate connection was not

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present in the first edition. Other scholars point to More.22 Gorham and Slowik (2014, 125) do not mention More in this regard, and instead return to the possible influence of Newton. Gorham and Slowik explain that the first edition of Newton’s Principia did not evince Newton’s theological views about space or time, but they suggest that Locke could have had access to these views through an alternative source: Newton’s manuscript De Gravitatione. As we saw in Chapter 6, this manuscript was unpublished in Newton’s lifetime and its date of composition is unknown, but it is generally supposed to be before 1685. Gorham and Slowik (2014, 125) support their case by pointing to independent evidence that Locke had access to the contents of De Gravitatione: Pierre Coste’s report that Newton personally explained to Locke De Gravitatione’s theory of bodily creation, and this was the source for the ‘dim and seeming’ conception of creation Locke hinted at in the second edition of the Essay. Although creative, I find Gorham and Slowik’s suggestion uncompelling. All of the passages discussed above are present in Draft C, and it seems extremely unlikely that Locke could have had access to the contents of De Gravitatione before composing Draft C, given that there is no evidence that Newton and Locke had met by 1685, let alone established a collegial relationship. Another issue is that even if Coste’s controversial report is accepted, it implies that Locke became familiar with at least this aspect of De Gravitatione after publishing the first edition of the Essay, as Locke made changes to the second edition. The second group of Essay passages support reading Locke as taking space and time to be real beings. For example, Gorham and Slowik (2014, 123) read Locke as attributing ‘inherent dimension and quantity to our idea of empty space’. In support of this they cite Locke’s (1690, 95; II.xv.7) statement, ‘we sometimes speak of Place, Distance, or Bulk in the great Inane, beyond the Confines of the World, when we consider so much of that Space, as is equal to, or capable to receive a Body of any assigned Dimensions, as a Cubick foot’. Against this, I argue that these remarks merely attribute dimension and quantity to our idea of empty space, not to space itself; further, Locke made such remarks in earlier works. In his journals, Locke writes that we can imagine creating a ‘solid body of any figure’ beyond the bounds of the material universe. The Essay repeats Locke’s thesis, found as far back as Draft B, that our idea of infinite space is obtained by adding ideas of distances—which may be onedimensional lengths or three-dimensional capacities; see Locke (1690, 75; II. xiii.3)—so it makes sense that we can ‘speak of ’ distances in infinite space, and 22 See Gibson (1917, 252–3), Aaron (1955, 157–8), Grant (1981, 239–40), and North (1983, 133–40).

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imagine placing bodies where there are none. Additionally, proponents of the absolutist reading might argue that Locke’s use of the term ‘inane’ (i.e., emptiness or void) is reifying space. Against this, recall that Locke’s relationist journal entries discussed space ‘void of all bodys’ as nothingness. Gorham and Slowik go on to make a case for reading the parallel thesis about time in Locke, based on this passage: [W]e must therefore carefully distinguish betwixt Duration it self, and the measures we make use of to judge its length. Duration in it self is to be considered, as going on in one constant equal uniform Course; but none of the measures of it we can make use of can be known to do so (Locke, 1690, 89; II.xiv.21).

Gorham and Slowik argue that this passage attributes ‘an intrinsic rate’ to duration itself. Previous scholars have made similar arguments.23 To undermine this reading, I put this passage in context. As in Draft B, the Essay claims we can never know with certainty that the measures we use to measure lengths of duration are equal. Having stated this, Locke continues: search has discovered inequality in the diurnal Revolutions of the Sun . . . Those yet by their presum’d and apparent Equality serve as well to reckon time by, though not to measure the parts of Duration exactly, as if they could be proved to be exactly equal: we must therefore carefully distinguish betwixt Duration it self, and the measures we make use of to judge its length. Duration in it self is to be considered, as going on in one constant equal uniform Course; but none of the measures of it we can make use of can be known to do so (Locke, 1690, 89; II.xiv.21; my emphasis).

In this passage, Locke is returning to his old thesis that we must avoid conflating duration with our measures of it. Locke does not attribute an intrinsic rate to duration, he merely states that duration is to be considered as going on equally, independently of our possibly unequal measures of it. As we saw, these sentiments can be found in Locke’s earlier works; for example, his journals emphasize that duration is a ‘destinct thing’ from its measures. As such, the Essay’s statements that we must distinguish between duration and its measures are compatible with absolutism or relationism. Gorham and Slowik (2014, 123–4) also argue that the Essay is now ‘derisive’ about the ‘imaginary space’ label Locke once embraced. For example, Locke writes that if men’s ideas carry them beyond the limits of the universe, they 23 For example, Gibson (1917, 251–2) argues that Locke’s ‘space in itself ’ is Newton’s absolute space, and that Locke’s ‘duration itself ’ is Newton’s absolute time. Baker (1930, 48–9) places emphasis on the ‘equal uniform course’ of duration in his absolutist reading of Locke. Ayers (1991, 233–4) and Grant (1981, 239) also emphasize Locke’s rejection of the term ‘imaginary space’.

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term what is there ‘imaginary Space’, as if it were nothing. Gorham and Slowik point to various related shifts between Draft C and the Essay, and argue that in the latter there are several instances in which Locke removes the term ‘imaginary’ from his descriptions of space and duration, implying that Locke has come to think that they are real. To provide an alternative reading of Locke’s derision, it is again necessary to place it in context. The remarks follow Locke’s statement—carried over from Draft C—that although our ideas of duration and space are boundless, they cannot go beyond all being, as they cannot go beyond God. Locke continues: when Men pursue their Thoughts of Space, they are apt to stop at the confines of Body; as if Space were there at an end too, and reached no farther: Or if their Ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the Universe, imaginary Space; as if it were nothing, because there is no Body existing in it. Whereas Duration . . . they never term imaginary, because it is never supposed void of some other real existence (Locke, 1690, 94; II.xv.3–4).

On Locke’s view, men refrain from labelling duration pre-creation ‘imaginary’ because they accept that God is there; however, they label space beyond the material universe ‘imaginary’ because they wrongly deny that God is there. There is no doubt that Locke is derisive of the label ‘imaginary space’ insofar as it implies that God is not present beyond the limits of our universe. However, this is compatible with the view that the infinite space or immensity under discussion is imaginary. In support of this, consider the passage above. Locke specifically emphasizes that men’s ideas may carry them beyond the confines of body. Locke (1690, 97; II. xv.4) confirms this a little further on: ‘whoever pursues his own Thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of Body, into the Infinity of Space or Expansion; the Idea whereof is distinct and separate from Body, and all other things’. (It is also notable that this statement asserts that our idea of infinite space is distinct from all others, including presumably our idea of God.) Although Gorham and Slowik are correct that in some instances Locke has removed the term ‘imaginary’, many instances remain. For example, Locke writes of our idea of infinite space: ‘whereof having settled Ideas [of space] in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and them to one another as we will, and consider the Space or Distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts . . . or else as void of Solidity’ (Locke, 1690, 83; II.xiii.26; my emphasis). And of our idea of duration: ‘By being able to repeat those Measures of Time, or Ideas of stated length of Duration in our Minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine Duration, where nothing does really endure or exist’ (Locke, 1690, 92; II.xiv.32; my emphasis). This language of ideas and imagination does not conclusively show

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that space and duration are imaginary for Locke—it is compatible for a person to imagine Paris, and for Paris to be real—but it does provide evidence that Locke is only discussing our ideas of space and duration in the Essay. This language remains in all the subsequent editions. There is a final point to be made about the passages discussed in this group. Although, unlike Gorham and Slowik, I believe that Locke is merely discussing our ideas of space and time here, it must be acknowledged that at various points Locke’s language is careless about the differences between ideas and the things they signify, such that he appears to slip between them. For example, Locke does not make it clear that his remarks on ‘boundless Oceans’ concern our ideas of space and time. This might prompt proponents of the absolutist reading to argue that Locke’s language is careless because he is slipping between discussions of ideas and the things they signify. Against this, I suggest that Locke’s language is not as careful as one would wish because Locke may believe he has already made it clear—in the titles and introductions of the relevant Essay chapters—that his focus is on ideas, and he did not feel the need to remind the reader of this in every remark. The final group of passages support the thesis that Locke distinguishes between absolute and relative space and time, in the manner of Newton. This appears to be what Gorham and Slowik (2014, 123) mean when they state that Locke ‘insists just as strongly as Newton’ on the distinction between ‘those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space’ and ‘points fixed in sensible Beings we reckon, and from them we measure out Portions of those infinite Quantities’. Gorham and Slowik (2014, 125) argue that in Draft C place and time ‘denote the conventional “position as it were” of finite beings in infinite space and duration’ whereas in the Essay ‘such positions seem to be objective’. They add that a paragraph in Draft C against the universe as a whole having a place is replaced in the Essay by a ‘more conciliatory treatment’. Previous scholars have also argued for this Newtonian distinction in Locke.24 If Locke did adopt a Newtonian absolute–relative distinction, then space and time would provide absolute locations, enabling Locke to say that the Earth has moved its location relative to other bodies; and has moved its location absolutely with regard to absolute space. Against this reading, I argue that Locke’s Essay only provides a relative account of location. Consider the passage mentioned above in full: Time in general is to Duration, as Place to Expansion. They are so much of those boundless Oceans of Eternity and Immensity, as it set out and distinguished from the

24

See Baker (1930, 50) and Ayers (1991, 235–6).

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rest, as it were by Landmarks; and so are made use of, to denote the Position of finite real Beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space. These rightly considered are nothing but Ideas of determinate Distances, from certain known points fixed in distinguishable sensible things . . . From such points in sensible Beings we reckon, and from them we measure out Portions of those infinite quantities; which so considered, are that which we call Time and Place. For Duration and Space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the Order and Position of things, without such known settled Points, would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable Confusion (Locke, 1690, 94–5; II.xv.5).

This passage states that time and place are ‘Ideas of determinate Distances’, from certain known points fixed in sensible things. Starting from these known points, we can measure portions of the infinite oceans beyond them. If there were no known points, there could be no locations, and—as in Draft C—the order of things would be ‘lost’. In contrast, if Locke accepted that space and time provided absolute locations, there would be locations even if there were no known points. As in Locke’s earlier works, he is providing an exclusively relative account of location. It must also be remembered that these ‘oceans’ are not real beings; rather, as Locke (1690, 94; II.xv.4) reminded us directly before this passage, a man goes beyond the material universe in ‘his own Thoughts’, to reach the ‘Idea’ of infinite space and duration. Further evidence that in the Lockean universe things lack absolute locations in space or time can be found in Locke’s remarks on place. Locke (1690, 76; II.xiii.7) carries his account of place from Draft C to the Essay verbatim: ‘in our Idea of Place, we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any thing, and any two or more points’. The Essay, like Draft C, only provides this relative account of location: ‘That our Idea of Place, is nothing else, but such a relative Position of any thing . . . I think, is plain’ (Locke, 1690, 77; II.xiii.10). Locke adds that this will be ‘easily admitted’ once we consider the following: we can have no Idea of the place of the Universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that, we have not the Idea of any fixed, distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which, we can imagine it to have any relation of distance . . . and when one can find out, and frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the Place of the Universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable Inane of infinite Space; tho’ it be true, that the Word Place, has sometimes a more confused Sense, and stands for that Space, which any Body takes up, and so the Universe is in a Place (Locke, 1690, 78; II.xiii.10).

This is the passage that Gorham and Slowik argue is ‘more conciliatory’ than its Draft C predecessor. Although it is more conciliatory, in that it acknowledges an alternative view to Locke’s exclusively relative account of place, it does not endorse that alternative account.

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The alternative that Locke describes, on which the universe has a place because space has a ‘more confused’ sense, is given so briefly that scholars differ over whose view the remarks are aimed at. For example, Aaron (1955, 160) identifies it as the Gassendi–Newton position that place is an occupied part of space. In contrast, Ayers (1991, 235) suggests (but does not endorse) the possibility that this is Descartes’ identification of body with internal place. In a heroic attempt to render this passage compatible with his absolutist reading of Locke, Ayers (1991, 235–6) goes on to argue that in describing this alternative idea of ‘place’ as confused Locke is not disparaging it, but rather admitting that it is unclear yet indispensable, akin to our ‘confused’ yet indispensable account of substance. Whilst this reading is admirably clever, it is implausible, given that Locke prefaces the passage by writing that his relative idea of place is ‘plain’ and will be ‘easily admitted’. Whoever Locke takes this alternative view to belong to,25 Locke is crystal clear that his own view is that we can have no idea of the place of the universe. There is one last point to be made on this head. Locke’s Journals and Draft C argue that the universe cannot have a place. However, Locke’s Essay argues that we cannot have an idea of the place of the universe. This might appear to leave open the possibility that the universe has a place or absolute location, even though we cannot have an idea of it. Although this possibility would be compatible with the absolutist interpretation of Locke, there is no reason to believe that Locke is deliberately leaving this possibility open. Further, Locke writes that we cannot have an idea of the place of the universe ‘because’ we do not have ideas of any beings outside it. This implies that the only way we could come to have an idea of the place of the universe would be if there were other bodies existing in distance relations to it, a view antithetical to absolutism.

7.5.3 Reading Locke’s 1690 Essay as implicitly relationist Thus far, building on Locke’s statement that he leaves ‘every one to Consider’ the choice between relationism or Morean absolutism, this chapter has argued that the Essay is explicitly neutral with regard to the ontology of space and time; and that the case for the absolutist reading can be undermined. Where does this leave us on how we should read the Essay? I see three possible interpretations. First, Locke is confused. Arguably, some elements in the Essay pull towards an absolutist reading (such as Locke’s approval of Solomon) and others pull towards Given Locke’s use of the Cartesian slogan ‘clear and distinct’, and Locke’s long-standing rejection of the Cartesian identification of matter with space and internal place which dates to Draft A (45–6; §27), I favour Ayers’ suggestion that Locke is referencing Descartes. 25

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relationism (such as his relativity about location); perhaps Locke simply did not recognize or resolve this tension. I make two points against this reading. First, Newton’s theses concerning absolute motion and place are a central plank in the absolutism of his 1687 Principia, occurring just a few paragraphs after Newton’s statements on the nature of space and time. It seems unlikely that an astute reader such as Locke would have failed to recognize this and, had he been otherwise persuaded by Newton’s absolutism, surely he would have altered his view on the place on the universe. Second, it seems unlikely that such a careful and considered text as the Essay—written over several decades—would contain such an obvious tension, especially given that we know Locke was grappling with the ontology of space and time from the 1670s. If possible, it would be better to take a more charitable view of Locke. Second, we should take Locke’s explicit neutrality at face value: Locke became uncertain of relationism but was not ready to embrace absolutism either. Perhaps Locke’s study of Newton’s Principia persuaded Locke that the nature of space and time was a far thornier problem than he had hitherto believed. Previous texts dealing with space and time largely focused on theology or metaphysics, whereas the Principia enters deeply into physics and mathematics, matters that Locke may have felt less comfortable with and consequently less able to assess. These difficulties may have left Locke undecided on his position. Unlike the first reading, this interpretation of Locke’s Essay is charitable; nonetheless, I argue there is a better reading available. This study argues we should read Locke as explicitly neutral on the nature of space and time but implicitly defending relationism, given his views on the place of the universe. As we saw above, Locke’s views on the relativity of location were part and parcel of Locke’s earlier relationism, and in holding them Locke rejects a key aspect of Newtonian absolutism: bodies do not possess absolute locations in space. This entails the further rejection of absolute motion: if bodies do not move relative to a backdrop of absolute space, then they only move relative to one another, and cannot be said to move absolutely in the Newtonian sense. I suggest that in rejecting absolute location and motion Locke is tacitly rejecting absolutism, in favour of his earlier relationism. If this is the case, it would explain Locke’s newfound apparent neutrality on the ontology of space and time: in light of the Principia’s absolutism, he must have been aware that his relationism would be controversial. This reading is more charitable than the first—the Essay is not confused, rather, it is consciously eliding explicit assertions of Locke’s ongoing commitment to relationism—and, unlike the second reading, it explains why Locke maintained his views on the universe’s place. Either of these latter interpretations could be used to support non-Newtonian readings of Locke’s work.

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On a final note, it is worth emphasizing that all the Essay passages discussed here remain verbatim throughout all the subsequent editions published in Locke’s lifetime: the second, 1694 edition; the third, 1695 edition; and the fourth, 1700 edition. Confirmation that Locke did not leave these passages untouched out of neglect can be found at least with regards to his view that the universe does not have a place, for he adds a few lines (irrelevant to us) to this discussion in the 1700 edition of the Essay (II.xiii.10). This implies that Locke deliberately maintained his exclusively relative account of location throughout his career, and with it his relationism.

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8 Later British Reactions to Absolutism: 1690–1704 A Frenchman who arrives in London, will find Philosophy, like every Thing else, very much chang’d there. He had left the World a plenum, and he now finds it a vacuum. At Paris the Universe is seen, compos’d of Vortices of subtile Matter; but nothing like that is seen in London Voltaire (1733, 109)

8.1 Introduction This chapter considers British reactions to absolutism between the 1690 publication of Locke’s Essay and the 1704 delivery of Clarke’s Boyle lectures. I have found that although these fourteen years proved a fertile period for debating the metaphysics of space, they were relatively arid for time, and for this reason we will pass over them lightly. Nonetheless, this chapter will show just how embedded the debate over absolutism was becoming in British philosophy around the turn of the eighteenth century.

8.2 New Gassendist, Morean, and Newtonian Absolutists With the exception of Raphson’s, the new absolutisms that emerged during this period were not developed in great detail. However, the thinkers can be seen to be working within distinct strains of absolutism. The first strain is familiar: it is Gassendist. In 1697, an anonymous ‘Lover of the Corpuscular Philosophy’ published An Essay Concerning a Vacuum, Wherein Is endeavoured to be demonstrated, that a vacuum Interspersum runs through the World, and is more or less in all Bodies. In some catalogues this author is identified as John Jackson, who may be the father of our John Jackson, discussed

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at rather more length in Chapter 10, Section 10.3.1 In any case, this elder Jackson (1697, 3–5) states that ever since he read ‘Gassendus, with some other late Improvers’—Jackson also names Charleton—he could never accept the doctrine of plentitude. As indicated by the title, Jackson goes on to argue for vacuum Interspersum. Around the turn of the eighteenth century, it is not uncommon to find authors distinguishing between different kinds of vacuum. For example, Nathaniel Bailey’s 1730 Dictionarium Britannicum entry on ‘Vacuum’ (unpaginated) distinguished between vacuum interspersum, small void spaces dispersed between the particles of all bodies; vacuum coacervatum, larger void spaces; and vacuum Boyleanum, real vacuum arrived at via air pumps. Whilst the former kinds of vacuum have classical roots, the latter was of course more recent. Frustratingly, Jackson does not enter into the ontology of any kind of vacuum. Another Gassendist may be the Irish thinker William King, Archbishop of Dublin. In De Origine Mali, King (1704, 10) imagines removing matter from space, and argues that space remains behind, an extended, immovable being that is capable of receiving matter. Recalling Gassendi, King (1704, 31–6) claims that space cannot act nor be acted on; however, unlike Gassendi, King suggests that space is created, writing that God made (fabricavit) space to place things in. In a footnote, King (1704, 36–9) makes reference to a group of thinkers (he does not name them) who identify space with God’s amplitude (amplitudinem) and argues against them that space is not self-existent, and that space and spirit cannot be paired together. As ‘amplitude’—and its Latin cognate—was one of More’s favourite terms, King likely has More in mind here.2 The second strain of absolutism is also familiar: it is Morean. In 1697,3 Joseph Raphson4 published an appendix to the second edition of his mathematical tract Analysis aequationum universalis. This appendix, De Spatio Reali, aims to demonstrate that space is real, infinite, and divine. De Spatio Reali runs the gamut of

1 Our John Jackson (1686–1763) was the eldest son of John Jackson (c.1651–1706), prebendary of Southwell and rector of Sessay. 2 A short discussion of King’s views can be found in Baker (1932, 585–6). 3 There is some confusion over this date. Several scholars—including Ferguson (1974, 44), and Koyré and Cohen (1962, 86)—give De Spatio Reali’s publication date as 1702, possibly because it was reprinted that year. David Thomas (2010) gives the correct date. 4 Very little is known about Raphson, including his dates of birth and death. We do know that in 1689 Raphson was elected a fellow of the Royal Society, and two years later Raphson met Newton. Raphson’s knowledge of the kabbalah, together with his name, has led scholars to speculate that he was of Jewish extraction and an Irish immigrant. For Raphson’s biography, see David Thomas (2010). On De Spatio Reali, see Ferguson (1974, 43–4), Koyré (1957, 190–205), Copenhaver (1980, 529–47), and Reid (2012, 123–4).

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theories about space, discussing classical thinkers from Thales to Aristotle, and slowly closing in on Raphson’s own views. Raphson (1697, 22–3) sides with thinkers who hold that space is ‘a real and infinite thing and substance, really distinct from matter’ (my emphasis).5 Like More, Raphson is identifying space with the substance of God. Raphson provides various familiar sources of support for this thesis, including the Jewish view that Makom (place) is one of the names of God; scriptural references, such as Paul’s remark that in God we have our being; and the kabbalistic thesis that the first being created a space for founding universes by retracting its light.6 Raphson (1697, 24–6) cites various seventeenthcentury thinkers ‘of sufficiently illustrious repute’ who assert that space is incorporeal (incorporeum) or an attribute (attributum) of the first cause, including Gassendi, that ‘famous man’ Locke,7 and that ‘most erudite man’ Newton. Raphson closes this ‘cohort of authorities’ with More, ‘the most celebrated man worthy of all praise’, who ‘revived and resurrected this most ancient doctrine from its ashes’, and confirmed it throughout his metaphysics. Raphson goes on to set out More’s views in detail, making particular use of More’s arguments against identifying space with body, and along the way—as Reid (2012, 124) notes— lifting four whole pages out of More’s Enchiridion Metaphysicum, including diagrams; see Raphson (1697, 63–6). Like More, Raphson (1697, 74–7) argues that space is immobile, infinite, all-containing, incorporeal, immutable, eternal, and necessary. This leads Raphson (1697, 79) to conclude that space is an attribute (attributum) of the First Cause, its immensity. Raphson (1697, 80–3) also holds More’s radical position that God is extended. Surprisingly, given the length of his tract on space, Raphson does not set out any views on time at all; otherwise, he would have featured more prominently in this study. In this period a third strain of absolutism emerged, which I label ‘Newtonian’. By this, I mean that figures are working in the tradition of Newton, drawing on Newton’s texts rather than More or Gassendi’s. The earliest thinker I am aware of who produces a consciously Newtonian position on time or space is the Cambridge scholar Richard Bentley. Robert Boyle passed away in 1691, and left an endowment for an annual series of lectures devoted to ‘proving the Christian Religion’. In 1692, Bentley delivered the first set of Boyle lectures, later published as The Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism. Before sending the sixth and seventh lectures to press, Bentley corresponded with Newton, and the result is a

5

Extensum reale, & infinitum, substantiamq; spatium, esse asserunt. As we saw in Chapter 5, Section 5.3, this thesis was also found in Anne Conway. 7 In support of this, Raphson cites the familiar passages from Locke’s Essay concerning the boundless oceans of eternity and infinity. 6

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fusion of natural theology and Newtonian physics. For example, Bentley (1693, VII.9–10)8 firmly rejects the Cartesian identification of matter with space: ‘mere and simple Extension or Space hath quite a different nature and notion from real Body and impenetrable Substance’. Bentley (1693, VII.28–9) uses this ‘mere and simple’ Newtonian space to mount a new argument against atheism, arguing it is ‘utterly inconceivable’ that pieces of ‘inanimate brute Matter’ could act on other pieces scattered throughout space and form the system of our world, ‘without the mediation of some Immaterial Being’. Disappointingly from our perspective, Bentley did not correspond with Newton over the nature of time. Here is Bentley (1693, III.20) on God’s eternity: ‘his Eternal Duration is permanent and indivisible, not measurable by Time and Motion, nor to be computed by number of successive Moments’. There is not enough here to guess at the precise nature of the relationship between God and time. Another early Newtonian absolutist is John Keill, whose 1702 Introductio ad veram physicam we first met in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2. Although, as we saw, Keill refrains from commenting on the nature of space, his claim that there is ‘in reality a Space distinct from all Body . . . wherein all Bodies are contained and moved’ leaves us in no doubt that it is absolute. Keill (1720, 75) makes analogous remarks about time: ‘Absolute Time flows equally, that is, it never proceeds faster or slower, but without any relation to the Motion of Bodies, it glides along with an equal Tenor’. In keeping with the fact that Newton had not yet published on the link he perceives between space, time, and God, these Newtonians also do not make any connection. It is interesting that, in contrast, Raphson already takes Newton’s bare definition of absolute space in the first edition of the Principia to support the link he draws between space and God.

8.3 New Critics of Absolutism Although support for absolutism was growing, it hardly went unchallenged in Britain. Henry More’s position continued to gather criticism, for example at the hands of physician and magistrate Richard Burthogge. In An Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits, Burthogge defends a kind of Cartesian dualism on which God is ‘pure mind’, and in this context Burthogge (1694, 119–21) rejects the opinion ‘of Dr. More and his Followers’ that God is infinite extension or space. One reason Burthogge finds this objectionable is that ‘meer Space’ does not differ from ‘vacuum’, so More is identifying God with an ‘Infinite Nothing’. 8

As the lectures are individually paginated, I reference by lecture number and page number.

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Burthogge concludes that we have no clear idea of the omnipresence of God. Similarly, Burthogge (1694, 147–8) argues that God is not in time.9 However, by the 1690s, the main focus of absolutist critique was no longer More but Locke. It is notable how speedily Locke’s Essay gathered critiques, and how wide the range of interpretations it was afforded were. One of Locke’s most famous critics was the English theologian John Sergeant. Reflecting on Locke’s Essay, Sergeant (1697, 180) upholds the substance–accident distinction, and argues that vacuum is neither substance nor accident, and so is ‘pure Nothing’. In addition to rejecting space beyond the world, Sergeant (1697, 197) rejects time before the world. He also objects to Locke’s application of our idea of duration, ‘which is a Mode of Ens’ to time before creation, ‘when no such Ens as was Capable of such a Mode’. For Sergeant, it is nonsensical to measure spaces and durations where none can exist. Sergeant (1697, 199) reads Locke as reifying infinite space and time and as deifying them, objecting to the ‘incredible Extravagancies’ fancy transports Locke and other men to when they conceive God’s immensity as infinite expansion. The following year, Edward Stillingfleet (1698, 82) objected to Locke’s account of the way we obtain our ideas of space and duration. Locke received a friendlier reception in the pages of rector Henry Lee’s Anti-Scepticism, which offered notes on each chapter of Locke’s Essay. Lee (1702, 72) is in agreement with Locke that we can only have a relative account of location in place and time. He writes that we can have no notion of place or time ‘without Relation . . . to something else’, and this is why we cannot have a notion of the place of the whole world. Lee does not comment on Locke’s ontology of space or time. A final, especially important critic of absolutism is the Irish-born freethinker John Toland.10 In his Letters to Serena, Toland (1704, 182–3) writes, ‘I can no more believe an absolute Space distinct from Matter . . . than that there is an absolute Time, different from the things whose Duration are consider’d’. And yet, Toland continues, in this I am said to have ‘the greatest Man in the world against me’: Newton. Toland goes on to quote from Newton’s Principia. For Toland (1704, 218–19) there is no space distinct from body, and he writes that 9

On Burthogge’s additional objections to More, see Leech (2013, 34–5). I also wonder if Samuel Parker junior implicitly continues his father’s critique of More. In his rather anomalous Six Essays— which range from remarks on ‘The Weather’ to ‘The Existence of a Deity’—Parker junior (1700, 97–8) argues that succession is inseparable from extension, and God’s existence is neither successive nor extended. 10 Interestingly, Hutton (2015, 210) suggests that some of Toland’s ideas—such as his rejection as unintelligible any distinction between the material and immaterial—bears comparison with those of Anne Conway, whose Principles was available in Leibniz’s circle; and Raphson, from whom Toland apparently appropriated the term ‘pantheism’.

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the ‘Defenders of Space’ who mistakenly disagree with him cannot decide what space is: ‘a Substance neither Body nor Spirit, or a new kind of Nothing’. Some thinkers have even conceived space as ‘the Supreme Being it self ’; Toland cites ‘the ingenious’ Raphson, although notes that Raphson was ‘neither the first Broacher of this Conceit, nor the only Maintainer of it now’. A little later, Toland (1704, 222) writes of Locke’s account of abstracting space from bodies that this provides no reason to imagine that space exists in such a state. Toland (1704, 220) argues that theistic identifications of space with God can lead to atheism, and his helpful poem explaining how opens Chapter 9.

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9 Samuel Clarke’s Evolving Morean Absolutism Others, whose Heads sublimer Notions trace, Cunningly prove that thou’rt Almighty Space; And Space w’are sure is nothing, ergo Thou: These Men slip into Truth they know not how. John Toland (1704, 220)

9.1 Introduction Although the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence has been the subject of intense scholarly attention, Samuel Clarke’s wider writings on time and space have been relatively neglected. This chapter will focus on Clarke’s wider writings, and consider two issues therein. The major part of this chapter considers Clarke’s account of time and space. Clarke states that time and space are attributes, modes, or properties of God, but establishing what Clarke means by this is difficult. James P. Ferguson and Ezio Vailati are leading Clarke scholars who have considered Clarke’s views on this issue in rare detail, and they argue that his views are ultimately unclear and incompatible. Against these scholars, I argue that Clarke’s views on time and space can be rendered clear and compatible if we posit a shift in his views over his career, and by offering alternative interpretations of problematic passages. My reading of Clarke has two wider implications. First, Clarke’s absolutism (perhaps unwittingly) shares key theses with that of the mature Henry More. Second, it is widely claimed that Clarke’s position on time and space is identical with Newton’s, because Clarke adopted Newton’s views; depending on how one reads Newton, this reading of Clarke may or may not support this claim. As I read Clarke and Newton, their positions are not identical, and Clarke is an independent thinker who did not simply adopt Newton’s views. The minor part of this chapter considers Clarke’s account of divine presence in time and space, and argues that Clarke is a holenmerist.

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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 9.2 provides a sketch of Clarke’s life and works. Section 9.3 comprises the first part of our study of Clarke on time and space. Section 9.3.1 provides an overview of the existing scholarship. Section 9.3.2 explores Clarke’s 1704 Boyle lectures and argues that, like More, Clarke holds that our ideas of space and time are partial ideas of God. Section 9.4 is a brief detour from the main discussion, setting out some of the relevant views found in Newton’s later texts. Section 9.5 comprises the second part of our study of Clarke on time and space. Section 9.5.1 considers the metaphysical views Clarke provides in various letters, dated between 1713 and 1719. It argues that Clarke, like More, identifies space and time with the divine attributes of immensity and eternity. Section 9.5.2 argues there is a significant shift in Clarke’s understanding of divine immensity and eternity after 1719, although this does not appear to affect his account of space and time. Section 9.6 considers Clarke’s views on divine presence, and argues that Clarke holds God to be neither extended or nullibist; instead, I argue that Clarke’s God is holenmeric. Section 9.7 offers some final thoughts on the relationships between the views of Clarke, More, and Newton.

9.2 Sketching Clarke’s Life and Works Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) was born in Norwich, where he was educated at a free grammar school before matriculating in 1691 at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. It is worth emphasizing that Clarke is of a much younger generation than the previous figures focused on in this study. To put his life in context, Clarke was a teenager when he arrived at Cambridge, yet by this point many of our other thinkers had passed away: Barrow died in 1677, and More in 1687. At this point, Newton was turning fifty, and Locke was turning sixty.1 Clarke’s earliest publication was a 1697 Latin translation of Jacques Rohault’s 1671 Traité de physique, a translation adorned with footnotes rejecting Rohault’s Cartesian physics, and advocating Newtonian physics in its stead; I reference the later English translation. To give a relevant example, Clarke (1735, 39; I.10) argues—against Rouault—that to fully describe motion we need absolute motion, which in turn requires absolute space, ‘infinite and immovable’. Further on, in the context of arguing that experiments can produce vacuums, Clarke (1735, 64; I.12) adds: ‘It is very true indeed that Nothing has no Properties; but how does it follow, that Space which is void of Matter, has therefore Nothing in it, or is it self entirely Nothing’. Clarke’s translation of Rouhault proved enormously 1

My sources for the biographical parts of this sketch are Whiston (1730), Hoadly’s preface to Clarke’s Works (H I i–xiv), and Gascoigne (2004).

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popular, running through three editions by 1710, and it played an important part in the Cambridge shift towards Newtonianism.2 Hoadly (H I ii) claims that Clarke’s translation became the ‘standing text’ for lectures at Cambridge; Whiston (1730, 5) agrees. Ultimately, Clarke’s work led to a close friendship with Newton himself. According to Newton’s half-nephew, of all his friends Newton ‘had the greatest regard for Dr. Clarke’3 and (unlike with many of his other friends) Newton does not seem to have fallen out with Clarke at any point. No correspondence between the men has survived, but as they were neighbours in London—Clarke would become Newton’s parish priest at St James’s—they may simply have conversed in person. In 1698, Clarke accepted the position of chaplain to Bishop Moore of Norwich, who became a patron of Clarke and granted him the rectorship of Drayton, near Norwich. Clarke subsequently married Katherine Lockwood, and the pair produced seven children. In 1706, Clarke moved to London to take another rectorship, this time at St Benet Paul’s Wharf. Soon afterwards he appeared at the court of Queen Anne and, in 1709, acquired the valuable living of St James’s, Westminster. On the latter appointment, Clarke took the degree of doctor of divinity. Throughout his career Clarke published a steady stream of theological tracts, but he became best known for his Boyle lectures. Clarke’s first Boyle lectures, delivered in 1704 and published in 1705 as A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, carefully constructed arguments for the existence and nature of God. These lectures were so successful that Clarke was invited to give a second set, delivered in 1705 and published in 1706 as A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion. Both sets of lectures proved enormously popular, and by 1728 the Demonstration enjoyed seven editions. Like Newton, Clarke held some unorthodox theological views. Unlike Newton, Clarke was prepared to publish on them. Clarke’s 1712 Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity argued for the controversial position that Christ, unlike God, is not selfcaused (a view that Newton seems to have shared). Mainstream Christianity is ‘Trinitarian’, holding that the Holy Trinity—God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit— are three equal persons who are united in one being. Clarke did not reject the Trinity but, in holding that Christ is not self-caused, Clarke denied that all the persons of the Trinity are equal. Consequently, Clarke’s position is a weak form of ‘non-Trinitarianism’. (Clarke was sometimes mislabelled an ‘Arian’, someone who believes that Christ is divine but not eternal; however, Clarke did believe that Christ and God were coeternal, merely that Christ was not self-caused.) 2

See Perl (1969).

3

See Gascoigne (2004).

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If Voltaire at least is to be believed, Clarke’s non-Trinitarianism affected Clarke’s career. In his 1733 Letters Concerning the English Nation—based on his time in England from 1726 to 1729—Voltaire (1733, 48–9) described Clarke as a ‘sanguine stickler for Arianism’, and writes of Clarke’s Scripture-doctrine that it won him ‘a great number of partizans, and lost him the See of Canterbury’.4 Voltaire adds that Clarke is ‘rigidly virtuous’, and a ‘reasoning machine’. Despite his unorthodox theology, Clarke’s renown grew, leading to public exchanges with well-known intellectuals such as Joseph Butler, Anthony Collins, John Jackson, Daniel Waterland, and of course Leibniz. Towards the end of his life, Clarke continued to publish sermons, and contribute to classical scholarship. Whiston (1730, 84–5) writes that in 1727, on Newton’s death, Clarke was offered Newton’s lucrative position as Master of the Mint but declined it, a decision which Whiston described as one of the ‘most glorious actions of his life . . . affording undeniable conviction that he was in earnest in his religion’. Clarke died of a sudden illness two years later at the rectory of St James, and was buried in his church. After Clarke’s death, his brother John Clarke began to publish his manuscripts, a process which ended with Bishop Benjamin Hoadly’s 1738, fourvolume Works of Samuel Clarke. Of particular interest to us is a set of 114 sermons, which (as far as I am aware) were first published posthumously in these Works. Clarke’s philosophical legacy has been mixed, especially with regard to his views on time and space, where at worst he is cast as Newton’s mouthpiece and at best as holding the same views as Newton. This sentiment has a long history: in his eulogy to Clarke, Whiston (1730, 95) considers the claim that Clarke’s philosophy was his own invention and firmly rejects it, stating that it was ‘generally’ just Newton’s philosophy applied by Clarke with ‘great Sagacity’. This sentiment can also be found in more recent scholarship. To give a few examples, Ferguson (1974, 31) states that Clarke took his conception of time and space from Newton. Vailati (1997, 109) claims that Clarke’s account of time and space is ‘virtually identical’ to Newton’s.5 With regard to time and space, I will argue that Clarke is not a mouthpiece for Newton, and nor are his views identical with Newton’s.

Voltaire also spread the (possibly fictitious) story that the Bishop of London had prevented Clarke from becoming Archbishop of Canterbury by approvingly telling the Queen that Clarke was the best qualified man for the job, though he was not a Christian. For more on Clarke’s heterodox theological views, see Stewart (1981). 5 Stewart (1981, 59) writes that Newton’s account of God, space, and time set out in the General Scholium was the ‘foundation’ upon which Clarke’s theology rested. Reid (2012, 134) claims that Clarke’s views on space were ‘almost entirely determined’ by Newton’s. 4

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9.3 Clarke’s Account of Time and Space: Part I 9.3.1 The existing scholarship Before digging into Clarke’s texts on time and space, it will be helpful to introduce the existing scholarship on them. All scholars rightly agree that Clarke holds time and space to be attributes, modes, or properties of God.6 The question is, What does Clarke mean by this? Ferguson and Vailati have considered Clarke’s account in depth, and they read him as follows. Ferguson (1974, 35–6) writes that, on the whole, Clarke’s doctrine is that ‘space and time are the attributes of the divine Being, his immensity and eternity’. However, Ferguson adds that there are signs that Clarke is ‘not fully satisfied’ with this position, which is why several passages in his writings appear to modify or qualify it, variously describing space as a ‘consequence’ of God’s existence, and God as the ‘substratum’ of space and time. Ferguson concludes that Clarke presents ‘several incompatible views’ regarding space and time. Vailati (1997, 27) agrees, writing of Clarke’s 1713–1714 correspondence with Butler that here Clarke seems ‘dissatisfied’ with the idea that space and time are ‘properties’ of God in the proper sense of the term, but was unable to formulate a clear alternative. Like Ferguson, Vailati holds that some of the alternatives Clarke offers are incompatible. The following year, Vailati (1998, xvii) wrote that Clarke’s identification of space and time with God’s immensity and eternity is ‘fraught with difficulties’, partly because Clarke’s position is ‘not clear’. Yenter and Vailati (2014, §3.4) repeat the latter complaint. Leech (2013, 188) agrees there is ‘vagueness’ in Clarke. The complaints that Clarke is unclear, vague, or more damagingly inconsistent have their grounding in the plethora of terminology surrounding Clarke’s views on space and time, which includes language of abstraction, attributes, properties, causality, and modes of existence. I will argue that Clarke is clearer than he appears, and there are ways to render Clarke’s views consistent. This is a good point to add a note on Clarke’s use of the terms ‘time’ and ‘duration’. As we have seen in this course of this study, some writers distinguish between time and duration. For example, Chapter 2 of this study claims that More holds time to be successive, applying exclusively to created beings; whereas infinite duration is identified with God’s attribute of eternity. For More, there is duration in God but not time, and it is true to say that infinite duration is a divine

6 See Koyré (1957, 302), Gay (1963, 90), Grant (1981, 249), Stewart (1981, 59), and Yenter and Vailati (2014, §4.2).

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attribute but false to say that time is. In contrast, Clarke does not appear to draw such a distinction. As we will see in this chapter, Clarke often refers to ‘time or duration’, Clarke is explicit that time is independent of created beings, Clarke writes that God’s existence causes space and time, and Clarke sometimes slips from speaking of duration to time.

9.3.2 Clarke’s 1704 A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God I will consider Clarke’s writings on time and space in chronological order, starting with these Boyle lectures, delivered in 1704 and published the following year. Clarke’s Demonstration argues for the existence of an eternal, necessary, unchangeable, and independent being. Clarke (1705, 74–8; §IV) claims we have no idea of the substance or essence of that being, holding—like Locke and others—that we are ‘utterly ignorant’ of the substance or essence of all beings. At this point, Clarke turns to space, and attacks philosophers who hold a certain view: ‘The Weakness of Such, as have presumed to imagin Infinite Space to be a just Representation or adequate Idea of the Essence of the Supreme Cause. This is a weak and fond Imagination . . . But the Fallacy is too gross, to deserve being Insisted upon’ (Clarke, 1705, 78–9; §IV). Clarke claims that some philosophers take infinite space to be a correct representation or adequate idea of the essence of God. Clarke does not explain what he means by an ‘adequate idea’, but, as Clarke is concerned here with the accessibility of essences and Locke popularized the notion of adequate ideas in this context, Clarke probably has a Lockean model in mind.7 To explicate this model, let’s turn to Locke himself. Locke (1690, 171; II.xxx.1) distinguishes between adequate ideas, which ‘perfectly represent those Archetypes, which the Mind supposes them taken from’; and inadequate ideas, which are ‘a partial, or incomplete representation of those Archetypes to which they are referred’. Locke doesn’t define ‘archetypes’, but, by his usage, Locke appears to mean the things the mind intends its ideas to stand for. Assuming Clarke is using a Lockean model of adequate ideas, by denying that our idea of infinite space is an adequate idea of the essence of God, Clarke is arguing that our idea of infinite space does not perfectly represent the essence of God. An interesting question is whom Clarke is targeting in this passage. One possibility is Spinoza, whom Clarke attacks repeatedly: the full title of Clarke’s

7 It is worth noting that—although the preface to Clarke’s 1706 Discourse claims that Clarke never cited nor borrowed arguments from the ‘learned Mr Lock’—Clarke’s work makes use of several distinctions modelled by Locke; further examples are discussed in Gay (1963, 104) and Yenter and Vailati (2014, §3.4).

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text is A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: more particularly in answer to Mr Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers. As detailed in Section 9.5.1 of this chapter, Spinoza holds that extension is an attribute of God, and although he nowhere claims that extension or space is an adequate idea of God, perhaps some thinkers could misattribute this view to him. Another possibility are absolutists who sometimes identify space with the substance of God: Henry More and Joseph Raphson. Identifying space with the substance of God could be taken to support the further thesis that space provides us with an idea of the substance of God (although, as explained below, neither More nor Raphson hold this further thesis). An additional reason to believe that Clarke is targeting More is that Clarke uses the term ‘representation’ and, as we saw in Chapter 2 of this study, More holds that infinite immobile extension provides a representation (repraesentatio) of the divine essence. Having denied that space provides an adequate idea of the essence of God, Clarke’s Demonstration explains what infinite duration and space are: There are Numberless Substances in the World, whose Essences are . . . intirely unknown and impossible to be represented to our Imaginations . . . there is no Substance in the World, of which we know anything further, than only a certain Number of its Properties or Attributes . . . Infinite Space, is nothing else but an abstract Idea of Immensity or Infinity; even as Infinite Duration, is of eternity; and it would not be much less proper, to say that Eternity is the Essence of the Supreme Cause; than to say, that Immensity is so. Indeed they seem Both to be but Attributes of an Essence Incomprehensible to Us (Clarke, 1705, 79–80; §IV).

We cannot know the essence of God the supreme cause, only his attributes, which include eternity and immensity. What does it mean to say that infinite space and duration are ‘abstract ideas’ of God’s immensity and eternity? Clarke returns to this issue in a 1713 letter: The idea of space, as also of time or duration, is an abstract or partial idea, an idea of a certain quality or relation, which we evidently see to be necessarily existing and yet which, not being itself a substance, at the same time necessarily presuppose a substance without which it could not exist (V 108).

For Clarke, an abstract idea is a partial idea. What exists is God with all of his attributes. However, in our minds, we can have an abstract or partial idea of God or his attributes. In this sense, our ideas of infinite space, or infinite time or duration, are abstract or partial ideas of God’s immensity and eternity respectively. Although Clarke may not realize it, More and Raphson also hold this position (hence, if Clarke is targeting them in the passage above, his aim has missed). Although More describes space as a representation of God’s essence, More would

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wholeheartedly deny that this representation provides a just or adequate idea of that essence. In Chapter 2 we encountered More’s account of a formal, attributive distinction, on which there is no real distinction between things, but there is a ‘real differentia which supports distinguishing limits’. This is akin to what Suárez labelled a distinction of reasoned reason, which occurs when we consider ‘inadequate’ or incomplete concepts of the same thing. Prefiguring Locke, More holds that in general we have no knowledge of substance or essence.8 Further, More specifically describes infinite extension as a ‘rough . . . confused and general’ representation of the divine essence. The attributive distinction that More draws between God and his attributes is such that when we consider any of God’s attributes independently of God—including God’s eternity and immensity—we can only achieve an inadequate or incomplete idea of God. As More puts it, the object of our mind which we say to be internal space is only a ‘shadow’ representing the nature of God’s omnipresence. Following More, Raphson (1697, 82) is explicit that space is an inadequate concept (inadaequatus est conceptus) of the Infinite Being. To summarize, Clarke’s Demonstration holds that our ideas of infinite duration and space are ‘abstract’—incomplete or partial—representations of God’s eternity and immensity, a position also held by More.

9.4 Another Newtonian interlude: the 1706 Optice and 1713 Principia The theological account of time and space presented in Clarke’s 1704 Boyle lectures predates the publication of Newton’s own theological remarks on time and space by several years: at this time, there were only the first editions of Newton’s Principia and Opticks. However, in the next nine years, two extremely important Newtonian texts were published: the Latin translation of Newton’s Opticks, and the second edition of the Principia. At this point, it will be helpful to set out some of their remarks on time and space. Newton’s 1704 Opticks does not offer a metaphysics of the relationship between God, time, and space. However, two years later, the text was translated from English to Latin, producing the 1706 Optice. New material was added to the Optice, including the following notorious passage: does it not appear from Phaenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory (tanquam Sensorio), sees the As More (1659, 11; I.ii.9) puts it, the ‘naked Essence or Substance of things is utterly unconceivable to any of our Faculties’; if a man in his mind takes away all the properties and activities of a subject, ‘his conception thereof vanishes into nothing’. 8

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things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself (Newton, 1718, 345).9

The claim that space is God’s sensory or sensorium led to huge debate, not least because some versions of the text are missing the qualifier tanquam, ‘as it were’.10 Not only do Clarke’s Boyle lectures predate the Optice, it is even possible that Clarke may have prompted Newton to publish on these issues, given that it was none other than Clarke who translated the Optice. To the second, 1713 edition of the Principia, Newton added a General Scholium. This makes a number of remarks on God’s relationship to time and space, including most famously the following: He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration and space, but he endures and is present. He endures always and is present everywhere, and by existing always and everywhere he constitutes duration and space, eternity, and infinity. Since each and every particle of space is always, and each and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, certainly the maker and lord of all things will not be never or nowhere (Newton, trans. 1999, 941).11

As in Newton’s earlier texts, there is no doubt here that God is literally present in time and space, but how best to interpret the further details of their relationship is difficult.

9.5 Clarke’s Account of Time and Space: Part II 9.5.1 Clarke’s 1713–1719 letters on time and space The letters Clarke composes during this period are explicit that time and space are attributes of God. These letters fall into four sets. The first of these, Several Letters to the Reverend Dr Clarke from a Gentleman in Gloucester, is Clarke’s 1713–1714 exchange with Butler. The letters (five on each side) were published with the fourth, 1716 edition of Clarke’s Demonstration. Clarke’s second letter states, ‘nothing can possibly be conceived to exist without thereby presupposing space, which therefore I apprehend to be a property or mode of the self-existent substance’ (V 103). Clarke’s third letter expands on this:

9

This English translation is borrowed from the 1718 edition of the Opticks. For discussion, see Koyré (1957, 206–20), Koyré and Cohen (1961), and Connolly (2014). 11 Non est aeternitas vel infinitas, sed aeternus & infinitus; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat & adest. Durat semper & adest ubique, & existendo semper & ubique durationem & spatium, aeternitatem & infinitatem constituit . . . (Newton, 1713, 483). 10

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space is a property or mode of the self-existent substance, but not of any other substances . . . [the self-existent substance] is itself (if I may so speak) the substratum of space, the ground of the existence of space and duration itself. Which (space and duration) being evidently necessary and yet themselves not substances but properties or modes, show evidently that the substance without which these modes could not subsist is itself much more (if that were possible) necessary (V 105–6).

Straightforwardly, space and duration are ‘properties or modes’ of the selfexistent substance, God. The second set comprises part of Clarke’s intermittent correspondence with his colleague and friend John Jackson (of whom we will hear more in Chapter 10, Section 10.3).12 In a 1715, unpublished letter to Jackson—I have been unable to make out the precise date—Clarke explains that ‘Space & Time are independent of the existence of all created things, & are not merely the Relation & Order of Bodies’.13 In support, Clarke advances several of the thought experiments he will also put to Leibniz, including that God could ‘impel’ the material universe through space. Clarke states that the order of successive things is not time, but merely the order of things in time because the order of succession might not match the intervals of time: ‘God may create matter, & Annihilate it All again, & create new matter either immediately after the Annihilation of the first Universe, or after a very long Interval.’ Clarke refers Jackson to Newton’s definitions of time and space, found in the first edition of Newton’s Principia, confirming the hints given in his translation of Rohault that Clarke takes this alone to be sufficient evidence of absolutism. Clarke concludes that space, ‘being itself not a substance’, must be the ‘Property of a Substance’. The third set is Clarke’s 1715–1716 correspondence with Leibniz, published in 1717 as A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr Leibniz and Dr Clarke.14 Whether, or to what degree, Newton had a hand in Clarke’s side of the correspondence is controversial.15 Certainly Leibniz assumed that Newton had some involvement, writing of their correspondence, ‘I am now grinding a philosophical axe with Newton or, what amounts to the same thing, 12 Stewart (1981) provides a rare discussion of these letters, and rightly emphasizes their importance, given that the Clarke–Jackson correspondence takes place around the Clarke–Butler and Clarke–Leibniz exchanges. I am grateful to Taka Oda for helping me to transcribe some of the correspondence. 13 Held at Cambridge University Library (Add. MSS, 7113). Charmingly, Clarke adds in this letter that ‘Berkeley’s whole philosophy, is to me altogether unintelligible’. 14 Amusingly and aptly, Grant (1981, 250) writes of the correspondence, ‘It was less a genuine dialogue than two monologues in tandem where, by some strange coincidence or prearranged harmony, the letters of each correspondent contain identically numbered paragraphs that frequently treat the same theme’. 15 For more on the correspondence and its history, see Koyré and Cohen (1962) and Vailati (1997).

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with his champion, Clarke, a royal almoner’.16 The exchange was cut short by Leibniz’s death. In his third letter to Leibniz, dated 15 May 1716, Clarke writes: ‘Space is not a Being, an eternal and infinite Being, but a Property, or a consequence of the Existence of a Being infinite and eternal. Infinite Space, is Immensity: But Immensity is not God: And therefore Infinite Space, is not God’ (Clarke, 1717, 77; III.3). In his fourth letter to Leibniz, dated 26 June 1716, Clarke (1717, 125–7; IV.7–8) states firmly that extramundane space ‘is not imaginary, but real’ and that ‘Space void of Body, is the Property of an incorporeal Substance’. Clarke adds: Space is not a Substance, but a Property; And if it be a Property of That which is necessary, it will consequently (as all other Properties of That which is necessary must do,) exist more necessarily, (though it be not itself a Substance,) than those Substances Themselves which are not necessary. Space is immense, and immutable, and eternal; and so also is Duration. Yet it does not at all from hence follow, that any thing is eternal hors de Dieu [i.e. outside of God]. For Space and Duration are not hors de Dieu, but * are caused by and are immediate and necessary Consequences of His Existence (Clarke, 1717, 129–31; IV.10).

The asterisk references a footnote, quoting from the General Scholium passage given in Section 9.4 of this chapter. Again, Clarke is explicit that space is not a being but a ‘property’ of God, and that infinite space is immensity, but immensity is not God. In various thought experiments strongly reminiscent of Barrow, Clarke (1717, 79; III.4) argues that positing absolute time and space allows us to make sense of God creating the material universe sooner than he did, or moving it through space. The final set comprises just one letter: Clarke’s reply to a sixth letter from an anonymous gentleman relating to his correspondence with Butler. Clarke does not date his reply, but it is published for the first time in the 1719, fifth edition of Clarke’s Demonstration. Thus, it was likely authored after the publication of the fourth, 1716 edition of Clarke’s Demonstration. Internal textual evidence that this exchange took place after 18 August 1716 is that Clarke rejects the view, first expounded by Leibniz at this date in their correspondence, that space is relations between bodies (V 115). In this letter, Clarke again implies that infinite time and space are attributes of God: Beings which exist in time, and in space (as every finite thing must needs do) presuppose time and space. But that being whose existence makes duration and space must be infinite and eternal because duration and space can have no bounds . . . necessary attributes do necessarily and inseparably infer, or show to us a necessary substance (V 115).

16

Reprinted in Newton (1976, 355).

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The existence of time and space, ‘necessary attributes’, entails the existence of a ‘necessary substance’, God. In these four sets of letters, Clarke does not define or distinguish between modes, properties, or attributes, and the way he moves freely between these terms implies that he takes them to be synonymous terms for the same category of beings.17 Thus, in the same way that More identifies infinite space and duration with God’s attributes of immensity and eternity, Clarke identifies space, and duration or time, with God’s attributes of immensity and eternity. Despite this agreement over the kind of ontological relationship that holds between space, duration, and God, there appears to be some disagreement between them, as More identifies space and duration with the substance of God and Clarke steadfastly refuses to. To understand this apparent disagreement, it will be helpful to return to the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence. Clarke’s fifth reply to Leibniz explains: The principal Occasion or Reason of the Confusion and Inconsistencies, which appear in what most Writers have advanced concerning the Nature of Space, seems to be This: that (unless they attend carefully,) men are very apt to neglect That Necessary Distinction . . . between Abstracts and Concretes, such as are Immensitas & Immensum; & also between Ideas and Things, such as are The Notion (which is Within our own Mind) of Immensity, and the real Immensity actually existing Without us (Clarke, 1717, 303–5; V.36–48).

Previously, Clarke spoke of abstract or partial ideas. Here, Clarke is distinguishing between ‘abstracts’ and ‘concretes’ and he appears to be using the term ‘abstract’ in the same way: to indicate an idea that is partial or incomplete. An ‘abstract’ such as the quality of immensity (immensitas)—‘which is Within our own Mind’—is an incomplete idea; in contrast, ‘concretes’, such as the immense (immensum) is a complete thing that exists outside ourselves. Our idea of space is a partial idea of some real immensity. This same letter advances the only argument Clarke ever gives for his metaphysics. Clarke begins by setting out what he takes be all possible theories of space: All conceptions (I think) that ever have been or can be framed concerning Space, are these which follow. That it is either [(i)] absolutely Nothing, or [(ii)] a mere Idea, [(iii)] or only a

17 Although Clarke usually uses all three terms in the same text, it is notable that he does not once use the term ‘attribute’ in his correspondence with Leibniz. This is likely—as Koyré (1957, 302) suggests—because Leibniz raised the spectre of Spinoza, with whom the term ‘attribute’ became particularly associated. As we have seen, Clarke happily uses ‘attribute’ again in 1719. And Koyré (1957, 302) points out that the French translation of Clarke’s letters to Leibniz, reviewed by Clarke himself, substitutes ‘attribute’ for ‘property’.

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Relation of one thing to another, or [(iv)] that it is Body, or [(v)] some other Substance, or else [(vi)] a Property of a Substance (Clarke, 1717, 305; V.36–48).

We have already met proponents of some of these conceptions of space: (ii) is held by Hobbes; (iii) is held by (at least) the early Locke, and arguably Leibniz; and (iv) is held by Descartes. The remaining conceptions are trickier to match with proponents. Vailati (1997, 35) suggests that John Toland is the target of (i) but, with respect to Vailati, whilst Clarke’s Demonstration certainly takes Toland as a target,18 I do not find this view of space in Toland. Instead, I suggest that Clarke is referring to Anthony Collins, who (as we shall briefly see in Chapter 10, Section 10.2.2) defended this view in correspondence with Clarke. On (v), space is a substance. Space could be identified with the substance of God, a position associated with More and Raphson. Alternatively, space could be conceived as a new kind of substance altogether (in Chapter 10, Section 10.4, we will see that this unusual position was held by Catharine Cockburn). Having set out these six conceptions, Clarke rejects the first five, effectively providing an argument from elimination for his own conception (vi), as the only conception left standing. Of especial interest19 in the way that Clarke rejects (v): That Space is not Any kind of Substance . . . Because infinite Space is Immensitas, not Immensum; whereas infinite Substance is Immensum, not Immensitas. Just as Duration is not a Substance: because infinite Duration is aeternitas, not aeternum; but infinite Substance is aeternum, not aeternitas. It remains therefore, by Necessary Consequence, that Space is a Property, in like manner as Duration is (Clarke, 1717, 307; V.36–48).

God is the eternal (aeternum). Infinite duration is not the eternal, it is eternity (aeternitas). Similarly, God is the immense and space is merely immensity. It is on the basis of this distinction that Clarke identifies time and space with God’s attributes, and not with God’s substance. Although Clarke may not recognize it, I argue that his understanding of the relationship between space, duration, and God is identical to More’s, and the apparent disagreement between them is superficial. The distinction Clarke draws between God as a concrete being, and his attributes of immensity and eternity as 18

For example, Clarke (1705, 46; §3) critiques Toland’s understanding of matter. For more on their relationship, see Stewart (1981, 54–5). 19 Although I provide Clarke’s remaining arguments for the interested reader. Clarke rejects (i) because space has quantity, dimensions, and properties, which nothing does not; (ii) because space is infinite, and as such we cannot have an idea of it; (iii) because space is quantity, and relations are not; and (iv) because this would entail that body is necessarily infinite, and no space could be void of resistance to motion, which is contrary to experience.

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abstractions away from God’s being, can only be a rational or conceptual one. This cannot be a real distinction because, if it were, God would have parts, and Clarke accepts the traditional theological thesis that God is partless. God has many attributes, but he is still one, simple being. At a conceptual level, Clarke is entitled to say that space is immensity, but immensity is not God. This is why God is the ‘substratum’ of space and time: his attributes inhere in his substance. Yet, in reality, God’s substance is identical with his attributes, so God is his immensity and eternity (as well as his wisdom and power, and so on), and thus in reality infinite space and time are identical with the substance of God. As argued in Chapter 2, Section 2.6, More holds exactly the same position: an attributive distinction can be drawn between God and his attributes, but in reality God is identical with his attributes, which is why More—boldly and correctly following through on the principles of his metaphysics—sometimes identifies space with the divine substance. Given that in reality there is no distinction between God and his attributes, why does Clarke refuse to follow More (and Raphson) in identifying the substance of God with his immensity or eternity? The reason almost certainly lies in the looming shade of Spinoza. Spinoza’s Ethics, published posthumously in 1677, argues that the world consists of literally one substance: God. All other entities, from pebbles to stars to human beings, are merely modes of this one substance expressed through its attributes. Spinoza’s system is both monistic and pantheistic: the world is one, and that one is God. Clarke was hardly the only figure to attack the Ethics’ radically unorthodox theology. To give a particularly lurid example, Pierre Bayle (repr. 1997, 208) labels Spinoza a ‘systematical Atheist’, and describes the Ethics as ‘the most absurd and monstrous hypothesis that can be imagined’. One part of what made Spinoza’s system so problematic was its pantheism. Another part was his apparent identification of extension with God. Spinoza’s Ethics (trans. 2000, IIP1–2) argues that God has an infinity of attributes, of which we only know two: extension and thought. God is extended, and at various points Spinoza implies that God is his attributes; see for example Spinoza (trans. 2000, IP4). Recall Berkeley’s dangerous dilemma, set out in Chapter 2, Section 2.6. Prior to the Ethics, absolutists were largely concerned with avoiding polytheistic blasphemy. Following the Ethics, a new threat arose: the ‘pantheistic blasphemy’ of thinking that real space is God. Although Henry More read (and attempted to repudiate) Spinoza in the late 1670s,20 worries over Spinozism did not sway More from his well-established metaphysics of divine extension. However, for the

20

For an overview of More’s replies to Spinoza, see Henry (2012).

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absolutists that came after More, positions that smacked of Spinozism—such as the view that spatial extension is an attribute of God, that God is extended, or that God is space—were to be treated with great caution, lest they be accused by critics such as Berkeley of holding ‘pernicious and absurd’ notions. I submit that this is why Clarke refrains from identifying the substance of God with his immensity or eternity: to do so would be just too Spinozistic, and (as we will see in section 9.5.2) some of Clarke’s views were already too Spinozistic for some of his peers. There is one last element of Clarke’s metaphysics during this period that requires discussion: his occasional causal language. For example, Clarke writes to Leibniz that space and duration are ‘caused by and are immediate and necessary Consequences’ of God’s existence. Ferguson and Vailati both argue that this leads to an incompatibility. Ferguson (1974, 99) writes that it is not ‘easy to see’ how something can be both an attribute and a consequence of the same substance: ‘An effect is separate from its cause in a way in which an attribute is not separate from its substance, and if space is caused by God, it can scarcely be his attribute’. Vailati (1997, 26) agrees. As neither Ferguson nor Vailati attempt to solve this incompatibility in Clarke, the implication is that they simply find this element of Clarke’s work problematic. Did Clarke just miss this incompatibility, or is there some way of rendering his remarks consistent? One strategy would be to read Clarke as holding the view that I attribute to Newton in his De Gravitatione: God is the emanative cause of space and time. Some evidence in support of this strategy can be found in Clarke’s claim that space and duration are caused by God’s existence, which is faintly reminiscent of More’s claim that an emanative cause is a cause ‘meerly by Being’.21 However, what counts against this strategy is that—unlike Newton—Clarke nowhere uses the language of emanation, sticking instead to the language of properties, modes, and attributes. Consequently, I propose an alternative strategy: we should reinterpret Clarke’s language of causality as language of priority or dependence. In early modern metaphysics, it is commonly held that modes or accidents depend on substances for their being. Descartes is often read as holding that modes depend on attributes for their being, and attributes in turn arguably depend on substances for their being. Modes presuppose their attribute: ‘Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes (praesupponit) extension’ (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210). And more generally, in the Principles, Descartes writes that ‘nothingness possesses no attributes, that is to say, no properties or qualities’. This suggests that if we perceive the presence of any attribute or property, we can infer there must be a substance to which it is attributed. The conceptual distinction 21

Thanks to an anonymous referee for Oxford University Press for this point.

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between substance and attribute can allow for a sense in which attributes asymmetrically depend on substances. This dependence is not causal but ontological: attributes presuppose a substance, whereas a substance arguably need not presuppose any particular attribute. In this sense, God’s attributes depend on God’s substance, and I suggest that this is what Clarke is getting at when he tells us above that time and space are attributes that presuppose a substance without which they could not exist. Time and space are consequences of God’s existence in the sense that time and space depend on God. This is compatible with Clarke’s thesis that time and space are attributes of God. Some confirmation of this reading of Clarke can be found in Jackson, who would later follow Clarke in using causal language. For example, Jackson (1734, 56) states, ‘the infinite necessary Existence of God makes Space, and the eternal necessary Continuance of his Existence makes Duration’. Jackson came under fire for these remarks the same year. Edmund Law’s Enquiry (more on this in Chapter 10, Section 10.2.3) includes a note by an anonymous ‘Learned Writer’— almost certainly Daniel Waterland22—on the causal language found in the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence: the Doctor [Clarke] infers that God causes Time and Space . . . and then blunders farther, in making Eternity and Immensity Consequences of his Existence; as if they were any thing distinct from him . . . If there exists an immense and eternal Being, what follows? That there exists an immense and eternal Being. Immensity and Eternity are necessary Consequences of Immensity and Eternity. This is all the Sense I can make of it (A Learned Writer, cited in Law, 1734, 93–4).

In reply, Jackson—who takes himself to be replying to his old adversary Waterland—scorns the idea that Clarke’s causal language makes time and space distinct beings from God: Suppose then I say that Extension and Solidity are the Consequences of the Existence of Matter; must I infer thereby that these Properties are Things really distinct from Matter; or that they are Consequences only of themselves? Who, but an eminent Writer that may say any Thing, would venture to argue in this manner? Are not all essential Properties Consequences of the Existence of their Subject? Do they not exist in Consequence of their Subject? Therefore it is right and proper to say that Eternity and Immensity are Consequences of the Existence of God, because they are Properties of him who is eternal and immense or omnipresent (Jackson, 1735a, 89–90).

Jackson is arguing that properties, such as the extension or solidity of matter, exist ‘in Consequence’ of their subject; in other words, they depend on their 22 Appended to Law’s Enquiry is a dissertation by a ‘Learned Hand’ acknowledged to be Waterland. As we will see, Law has a history of using Waterland’s work in these debates.

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subject for their existence. In this sense, it is ‘right and proper’ to say that eternity and immensity are consequences of God: they are properties of God that depend for their existence on the existence of God.

9.5.2 Clarke’s post-1719 texts on time, space, and deity As several scholars have noted, in some texts Clarke describes God’s immensity and eternity as ‘modes of existence’. Whilst Ferguson and Vailati appear to perceive an inconsistency between this and Clarke’s usual account of immensity and eternity as ‘attributes’,23 I do not. Rather, I argue that Clarke’s account shifts: up to 1719, God’s immensity and eternity are attributes, properties, or modes; afterwards, they are ‘modes of existence’. Clarke does not simultaneously hold incompatible views, rather, his views have evolved over the course of his career. This section further argues that this terminological shift is significant for Clarke’s metaphysics of deity but not for his account of time and space. Clarke’s shift is most prominent in his reply to an anonymous ‘seventh letter’ relating to his Butler correspondence (as we will see, this was also likely authored by Waterland). Clarke’s reply is undated, but it was published with the sixth, 1725 edition of his Demonstration. Clarke writes: To the objection that an attribute cannot be the ground or reason of the existence of the substance itself, which is always on the contrary the support of the attributes, I answer that in strictness of speech necessity of existence is not an attribute in the sense that attributes are properly so styled, but it is (sui generis) the ground or foundation of existence both of the substance and of all the attributes. Thus, in other instances, immensity is not an attribute in the sense that wisdom, power, and the like are strictly so called, but it is (sui generis) a mode of existence both of the substance and of all the attributes. In like manner, eternity is not an attribute or property in the sense that other attributes, inhering in the substance and supported by it are, properly so called, but it is (sui generis) the duration of existence both of the substance and of all the attributes. Attributes or properties, strictly so called, cannot be predicated one of another. Wisdom cannot be properly said to be powerful or power to be wise. But immensity is a mode of existence both of the divine substance and of all the attributes. Eternity is the duration of existence both of the divine substance and of all the attributes. And necessity is the ground, or reason, or foundation of existence, both of the divine substance and of all the attributes (V 122–3).

The objection is that substances are supposed to be ontologically prior to their attributes, yet it seems that God’s attribute of necessary existence is ontologically prior to God’s substance, as God would not exist without it. In response, Clarke 23 This is one of the modifications Ferguson (1974, 98–9) points to as leading to incompatibilities. Vailati (1998, xvii) refers to this in the context of explaining that Clarke’s position was not clear.

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distinguishes between two categories of being: ‘attributes’, and ‘modes of existence’. I will explain the difference. Up to at least the fifth edition of the Demonstration published in 1719, Clarke places immensity and eternity in the category of ‘attributes’ of God (and remember, up to this point, Clarke uses the terms ‘attribute’, ‘mode’, and ‘property’ synonymously). In these texts, the way Clarke describes the God–attribute relationship closely resembles regular substance–property relationships. To illustrate, as we saw above, in 1716, Clarke describes space and duration as modes that ‘subsist’ in God, where God is the ‘substratum of space’; and in 1716, Clarke describes immensity and eternity as properties. These and other statements imply that, as is frequently taken to be the case in substance–property relationships, immensity and eternity inhere in the substance of God, and God’s substance is prior to them. However, in 1725, Clarke places immensity and eternity in a new category, ‘modes of existence’. The difference between an ‘attribute’ and a ‘mode of existence’ is that attributes cannot be predicated of one another, whereas modes of existence can. To illustrate, God’s wisdom cannot be predicated of his other attributes—God’s power cannot be said to be wise—so wisdom remains an attribute. In contrast, God’s eternity can be predicated of his other attributes— God’s power and wisdom are both eternal—so eternity is not an attribute but a mode of existence. The relationship between God and his modes of existence no longer mirrors regular substance–property relationships. Immensity and eternity no longer inhere in the substance of God in the way that his wisdom and power do. Rather, in some unexplained sui generis way, immensity and eternity modify God’s substance and all of his attributes together. Further, it is unclear whether a substance is ontologically prior to its modes of existence in the way that a substance is usually taken to be prior to its attributes or modes. Certainly, as Clarke explains above, God’s substance is not prior to his necessity of existence, or else God would be prior to his own existence. If God is not prior to his immensity or eternity either then Clarke’s new description of immensity and eternity as modes of existence is straightforwardly incompatible with my reading of his causal language above. By placing immensity and eternity in a new category, the way Clarke conceives them has significantly changed. What has prompted this shift? Clarke does not tell us, but I suggest there are two possibilities. The first possibility involves, once again, the shade of Spinoza. Leibniz was not alone in hinting at a Spinozistic tint to Clarke’s views. Following Clarke’s first Boyle lectures, several thinkers impugned his metaphysics on these grounds. For example, William Carroll’s 1705 Remarks upon Mr Clarke’s Sermons

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declares on the title page that Clarke has confirmed rather than confuted Spinoza. Carroll (1705, 39–40) particularly targets Clarke’s implied ascription of duration and space to God, arguing that Clarke has followed Spinoza in making God extended and material.24 Almost ten years later, John Edwards’ 1714 Some Remarks on Clarke’s Last Papers writes in a surprised tone that the second edition of Newton’s Principia has taken up some of Clarke’s ‘odd Notions’.25 Whilst trying to make sense of the views in Newton’s General Scholium—views which Edwards also attributes to Clarke—Edwards writes: doth not Sr. Isaac seem to approach to Spinoza’s Conceit concerning God, who mixes him with Matter, and sometimes scarcely distinguishes him from the Body of the Universe? Or may we not think that our Author’s Notion is a kin to that of Mr. Raphson, That the Infinite Extension is God? which seems to have been also the Apprehension of Dr. H. More . . . After all these Conjectures, this is certain and unquestionable, that he [Newton] holds God to have a Body, which is Unphilosophical enough, as well as Untheological (Edwards, 1714, 38).

It is noteworthy that Edwards lists More and Raphson alongside Spinoza. Carroll and Edwards were not Clarke’s only critics; Ferguson (1974, 31) argues it is ‘most probable’ that Berkeley’s 1710 dangerous dilemma is partly aimed at Clarke. Unfair though these Spinozistic readings of Clarke may be, in this period the cumulative effect of them may have been sufficient to damage Clarke. By denying that immensity is an attribute of God, Clarke is putting further blue water between his position and the too-Spinozist position that space is an attribute of God. The second possibility is that, rather than being pushed away from his earlier view, Clarke has been pulled towards his later view, through the influence of Newton. Between the fifth, 1719 edition and the sixth, 1725 edition of Clarke’s Demonstration, a new edition of the Leibniz–Clarke papers was published. In the preface to this new edition, the editor Pierre Des Maiseaux writes: Since the terms quality or property have normally a sense different from that in which they must be taken here, M. Clarke has asked me to warn his readers that ‘when he speaks of infinite space or immensity and infinite duration or eternity, and gives them, through an inevitable imperfection of language, the name of qualities or properties of a substance which is immense or eternal, he does not claim to take the term quality or property in the same sense as they are taken by those who discuss logic or metaphysics when they apply them to matter; but that by this name he means only that space and 24 With a touch of hysteria, Carroll (1705, 25) also states in this text that Locke’s Essay is merely Spinoza translated into English. 25 Intriguingly, Edwards (1714, 36) attributes this to the fact that Newton and Clarke have lately ‘conferr’d Notes together’.

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duration are modes of existence of the Substance which is really necessary, and substantially omnipresent and eternal. This existence is neither a substance nor a quality nor a property; but is the existence of a Substance with all its attributes, all its qualities, and all its properties; and place and duration are modes of this existence of such a kind that one cannot reject them without rejecting the existence itself. When we speak of things which do not fall under the senses it is difficult to speak without using figurative expressions’.26

As multiple, earlier drafts of this preface have survived in Newton’s hand27 we know that it was actually authored by Newton, not Clarke. The fact that the preface warns readers about the contents of Clarke’s letters strongly suggests that the view Clarke defends in the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence is not Newton’s own. This preface was published in 1720, so, given the timing, it is possible that Newton’s fresh language—that space and duration are ‘modes of existence’— pulled Clarke towards this language and position too. Whatever may have prompted Clarke to shift his views, I argue that although there has been a significant shift in Clarke’s account of divine immensity and eternity, there is no significant shift in his absolutism. Clarke does not discuss space or time in his reply to Waterland, but he does in the Demonstration published alongside his reply. The passages concerning time and space in the Demonstration had remained unchanged through the previous five editions but, from the sixth edition, Clarke began to tinker. In the sixth, 1725 edition of his Demonstration, Clarke substitutes the term ‘mode’ for ‘attribute’. In the seventh, 1728 edition, Clarke removes the term ‘abstract idea’. Thus, the crucial sentences in the final version read: ‘Infinite Space, is nothing else but abstract Immensity or Infinity; even as infinite Duration is abstract Eternity . . . they seem Both to be but Modes of an Essence or Substance Incomprehensible to Us’ (Clarke, 1728, 39; §IV). Clarke does not explain his use of the term ‘abstract’, but, given his letters to Leibniz, we can make an educated guess at his intentions. Clarke is no longer claiming that our ideas of infinite space and duration are partial ideas of God’s immensity and eternity. Rather, Clarke is claiming that infinite space and duration are partial ideas of two of God’s modes of existence: the immensity and eternity respectively of God and all his attributes. To illustrate, our idea of time is a partial idea of the eternity of God and his attributes, such as the eternity of his omniscience and omnipotence.

26

Reprinted in Alexander (1965, xxix). Cambridge University Library, Portsmouth Collection manuscripts add. 9597/2/14/1–2. The drafts are reprinted in Koyré and Cohen (1962), who also provide discussion. 27

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These changes do not affect Clarke’s space and time absolutism. Even if space and time are God’s modes of existence rather than God’s attributes, they are still absolute in the sense they are independent of human minds and bodies. Clarke’s position in his early translation of Rohault remains unchanged: space void of matter is not nothing. Additionally, the thought experiments that Clarke offers to Leibniz stand: we can still make sense of moving the finite material universe around in time or space. Finally, as one would expect of what is effectively an evolved form of Morean absolutism, space and time remain divine.

9.6 God’s Presence in Time and Space 9.6.1 The existing scholarship Although relatively few scholars have considered Clarke’s views on divine presence, there is a wide range of readings. Vailati (1997, 20–2) reads Clarke as holding that God is not in time at all, a kind of nullibism, yet adds that Clarke ‘intimates’ that God is extendedly present in space. Gay (1963, 93) and Leech (2013, 186–7) agree that Clarke’s God is extended in space. Yenter and Vailati (2014) understand Clarke’s God as not ‘technically’ in time or space; perhaps Vailati’s reading of Clarke on the latter issue has changed. Reid (2012, 229–30) argues, against Vailati, that Clarke is a holenmerist. I will also argue that Clarke is a holenmerist.

9.6.2 Why Clarke’s God is not extended, nor nullibist I will undermine rival readings before giving my own reading of Clarke. Let’s begin with the reading on which God is extendedly present in space or time. One reason to hold this reading, offered by Vailati (1993, 390) and echoed by Leech (2013, 187), is that if Clarke were a holenmerist one would expect him to have addressed More’s critique of holenmerism. Against this, Reid (2012, 229) objects that Clarke may not have been familiar with More’s anti-holenmerian arguments, and there is no ‘solid proof ’ that Clarke ever perused them. Additionally, Vailati (1997, 22) points out that Clarke does not make use of holenmerism in replying to Leibniz’s objections that extension is incompatible with divine simplicity, which ‘intimates’ that Clarke thought of divine omnipresence in terms of ‘local extension and dimensionality’. Vailati is referring to several passages in which Clarke stresses that the parts of immensity or duration do not hinder God from being essentially one; for example see Clarke (1717, 303; V.36–48). Although it is true that Clarke doesn’t refer to holenmerism in this context, it is also true that he does not make any remarks implying that he takes

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God to be extended. Consequently, I deny that these passages provide support for either reading of Clarke. Another reason is that Clarke arguably takes human minds or souls to be extended,28 which suggests he could conceive God as extended too. Whilst this is an interesting line of thought, it is not compelling because, even if Clarke does take human minds to be extended, Clarke is explicit (see below) that God’s presence in time and space is different to that of created beings: created and finite beings are ‘in’ time and space, whereas there is a sense in which God is not. There is one final reason to read Clarke as holding God to be extendedly present: space is extended, and as an attribute (or mode of existence) of God, this implies that God is extended. However, as already detailed in Chapter 6, Section 6.5, Reid offers a response to this problem: for Clarke, space derives its extension not from God’s essence but rather from God’s power to create extended things. I find Reid’s response compelling: for Clarke, God is in every part of space, yet it is all the same to God whether space is extended or is merely a single point. Whilst I do not find any persuasive reasons to read Clarke’s God as extendedly present in space or time, there is a persuasive reason to read Clarke as a nullibist: textual evidence. Vailati (1997, 20) points out that, in Clarke’s 1713 exchange with Butler, Clarke ‘made clear’ that God is not in space or time. Vailati is referring to this passage: ‘All other substances are in space and are penetrated by it; but the self-existent substance is not in space nor penetrated by it, but is itself (if I may speak so) the substratum of space, the ground of the existence of space and duration itself ’ (V 105–6). In his correspondence with Leibniz, Clarke makes another remark akin to this: ‘God does not exist In Space, and In Time, but His Existence causes Space and Time. And when, according to the Analogy of vulgar Speech, we say that he exists in All Space and in All Time; the Words mean only that he is Omnipresent and Eternal’ (Clarke, 1717, 303; V.36–48). Clarke does not explain what he has in mind here. As we saw above, Yenter and Vailati (2014) claim that ‘technically’ Clarke’s God is not in space or time, and they read Clarke as holding that God is ‘prior’ in order of nature to time, whereas things in time are ‘metaphysically subsequent’ to the existence of time. If Clarke’s passages here do support this view, then they pose a problem for any reading that takes God to be present in space or time, including the holenmeric reading. However, I suggest there are three ways of interpreting these passages that are consistent with God having presence in time and space.

28

See Vailati (1993) and Benítez Grobert (2005).

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The first and second ways are both evident in this passage from Clarke’s 114 sermons: All created Beings are, by the necessary condition of the Nature, finite and circumscribed. They can be present in one certain determinate place at once, and they can move but within certain bounds in certain periods of time. The larger those Limits are, in which any Creature can be and act . . . so much the greater share has it of this Kind of Perfection: And, by enlarging this perfection to its utmost Possibility, we must consequently ascribe to God, the most perfect Being, Infinity or Immensity. That is, we must conceive of him, as of a Being that fills all things, and that contains all things within its own boundless Nature; that is not defined or circumscribed by any Space, but co-exists with, and is present with all things . . . without limits and without bounds (H I 46–7).

First, unlike created or finite beings, God is not in space or time in the sense that he is contained or bounded by them; on the contrary, God’s infinite nature is unbounded. As illustrated in this passage, this view is consistent with the additional view that God is ‘present with all things’ in space and time. Second, Clarke’s use of the term ‘circumscribed’ may imply that God is not extendedly present in space. This term has a long history, and some medieval philosophers distinguish between the circumscribed, extended presence of material bodies in a place; and the non-circumscribed, non-extended presence of incorporeal beings.29 If Clarke is using ‘circumscribed’ in this sense, it would further support the holenmeric reading. Third, although God is present in space and time, there is a sense in which he lacks a place. More explains that there is a sense in which God is nowhere, as well as everywhere: Since indeed God is the first place and even cause of himself and of all other things, it is necessary that he be nowhere . . . since this first and internal place is necessarily infinite in an absolute way, nor can any other thing be placed outside it, and since any things whatsoever are located . . . by the very fact that God is this internal place and therefore nowhere, he is still everywhere, that is, wherever anything is understood to be located (More, trans. 1995, I 16; II Scholia).

On a relative account of place, God lacks place, as there is nothing ‘outside’ of God by which his place can be fixed—this is the same reasoning Locke employs to argue that the universe lacks a place. This is compatible with God being in every part of space: God is everywhere in that he is ‘wherever anything is understood to be located’.30 Clarke may be thinking along the same lines: as God is the ‘ground’ of place, there is nothing outside of God in virtue of which God has a place. 29

On the medieval usage, see Suárez-Nani (2008, 90–1). Raphson (1697, 91) also argues there is a sense in which God is nowhere, because he is everywhere. 30

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Again, this could explain Clarke’s statements that God is not in space or time—he does not have a place there—yet God is literally everywhere and everywhen. The textual evidence supporting a nullibist reading of Clarke is open to other interpretations. Given Clarke’s frequent avowals that God is present always and everywhere, I argue it is more plausible to read his infrequent claims that God is not in space or time in ways that renders them compatible with these avowals. In section 9.6.3, I argue for a holenmerist reading.

9.6.3 Clarke’s holenmeric God I find Clarke’s holenmerism as early as his 1705 Demonstration, falling out of his views on God’s necessity of existence. On God’s eternity, Clarke writes: ‘That Being therefore, which has no other Cause of its Existence, but the absolute Necessity of its own Nature; must of Necessity have existed from everlasting, without Beginning; and must of Necessity exist to everlasting, without end’ (Clarke, 1705, 82; §V). On God’s immensity, Clarke writes: as to the particular Manner of his [God] being Infinite or every where present . . . It is as impossible for our finite Understandings, to comprehend or explain; as it is for us to form an adequate Idea of Infinity: Yet that the thing is true, that he is actually Omnipresent, we are as certain as we are that there must Something be Infinite (Clarke, 1705, 91–2; §VI).

God’s necessity of existence entails that God is eternal, present always; and immense, present everywhere. As to the manner of God’s presence in time and space, although Clarke writes that it is ‘impossible’ for us to comprehend it, he does drop hints. Clarke’s Demonstration repeatedly states that God is everywhere and always, and that God is ‘in every place alike’ and ‘equally present everywhere’. In one passage, he helps us to understand this by contrasting the nature of God’s presence with that of our presence: The Schoolmen indeed have presumed to assert, that the Immensity of God is a Point, as his Eternity is an Instant. But this being altogether Unintelligible; That which we can more safely affirm . . . is this: That whereas all Finite and Created Beings, can be present but in One definite Place at Once; and corporeal Beings even in that One place very imperfectly and unequally, to any Purpose of Power or Activity only by the Successive Motion of different Members and Organs: The Supreme Cause, on the contrary, being an Infinite and most Simple Essence . . . is at all times equally present, both in his Simple Essence, and by the Immediate and Perfect Exercise of all his Attributes, to every Point of the Boundless Immensity, as if it were really all but one Single Point (Clarke, 1705, 92; §VI).

Created beings are present in space and time ‘imperfectly and unequally’, whereas God is present in a place ‘equally’ by his essence and his attributes.

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This seems to be an explicit endorsement of holenmerism: created beings are extendedly present, and God is holenmerically present in space and time. All of the above passages survived through every subsequent edition of the Demonstration, which implies—as we know that Clarke tinkered with later editions—that Clarke held these views throughout his career. Further evidence of Clarke’s holenmerism can be found in other texts. For example, Reid especially grounds his holenmeric reading in Clarke’s reply to a sixth letter, where Clarke writes that the ‘individual consciousness of the one immense Being is as truly one as the present moment of time is individually one in all places at once’, and adds that just as there is no such thing as an ell or a mile of time, neither is there an ell or mile of consciousness (V 116). As Reid (2012, 230) points out, Newton draws the same comparison in the General Scholium, and Reid interprets the comparison in the same way for both thinkers: a moment of time is ‘not partly in one place and partly in another’, rather, it occurs ‘in its entirety’ in all places at once, indicating holenmerism. Evidence can also be found in Clarke’s posthumously published 114 sermons (we do not know when they were composed).31 Two of these sermons—Sermon IV ‘Of the Eternity of God’, and Sermon VIII ‘Of the Omnipresence of God’— emphasize that God has real duration and immensity, and God is the same in every part of duration and space: ‘As the Eternity of God, signifies his continued existence, through all the periods of boundless Duration: so his Immensity or Omnipresence, signifies his being equally present in every Part, of the Infinite Expansion of the Universe’ (H I 46). Again, I find this thesis—that God is ‘equally present’ in every part of duration and the universe’s expansion—conclusive of Clarke’s holenmerism. The sermons also repeat various passages from the Demonstration, including the comparison above between God’s presence in space and that of created beings (H I 47–8). Like Newton, Clarke holds that God is holenmericly present in space and time.

9.7 In Summary: Clarke, More, and Newton The major part of this chapter has argued that Clarke’s views on time and space can be read in ways to avoid incompatibilities. This reading of Clarke matters for two reasons. First, it shows that Clarke share two key theses with the mature More: our ideas of infinite space and duration are inadequate ideas of God’s 31

This is frustrating because the sermons repeatedly describe God’s eternity and immensity as ‘attributes’ (H I 20; 46) and we do not know whether the sermons were composed before or after 1719.

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immensity and eternity, and infinite space and duration are God’s immensity and eternity. Leibniz (1717, 205; V.48) was correct to read Clarke’s position as a ‘revival of the odd Imaginations of Dr. Henry More’. Whether Clarke drew his views from More’s texts directly, or how far Clarke was aware of the similarities between their positions, is unclear. Unlike Raphson, Clarke rarely cites More,32 and it is possible that Clarke reinvented these Morean theses independently. Second, it shows that Clarke is a Newtonian, but he is not merely Newton’s mouthpiece. Whilst Clarke took Newton’s physics to provide empirical reasons for absolute time and space, Clarke developed his theological account before Newton’s Optice or General Scholium. On my reading, Clarke does not share the account of time and space Newton advances in at least De Gravitatione. The minor part of this chapter has argued that Clarke is a holenmerist about God’s presence in space and time. As I read Newton, Clarke and Newton are in agreement on this point; however, as I read More, Clarke and More agree that God is holenmerically present in time but disagree over the nature of God’s presence in space. In Chapter 10, we will see that as the British debate moves on, it is Clarke’s views, rather than Newton’s, that become the focus.

32 Clarke’s translation of Rohault features a rare mention of More, a ‘learned man’, in Clarke’s work; see Clarke (1735, 45; I.10).

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10 Last Battles over Absolutism: 1704 Onwards from the very first Dawn of Philosophy to the present Time scarce two Authors of Note have entertain’d precisely the same Opinion concerning it [space]. Some have been induced to think it a Substance, others a Property, others some middle thing . . . a Mode of Existence, a Relation, a mere Possibility, Ponibility . . . Some have made it the very Substance of the Deity, others one of his Attributes; others an Attribute both of the divine Substance and Attributes; and others have gone so far as to conceive of it as some Organ of the Deity, or as it were his sensorium. Some make it the same with solid matter . . . and others contend that it is absolutely nothing. Edmund Law (1734, 3)

10.1 Introduction If the debate over absolute time and space was becoming heated in 1690s Britain, it was nothing compared to the explosion of discussion in the four decades following Clarke’s 1704 Boyle lectures, and the publication of Newton’s 1706 Optice (with its new queries) and 1713 Principia (with its new General Scholium). One remarkable feature of these debates is the sheer breadth of positions defended with regard to time and space across British philosophy, illustrated in the quote that opens this chapter from Edmund Law.1 Another is the frequent appeals to authority made by its participants: to Newton, Locke, and Clarke. By 1729, all three of these philosophical giants had passed away, yet they continued to cast long shadows. A final notable feature of these debates is the way that, as they persist from the 1710s into the 1730s, they enter into progressively deeper metaphysical territory. Earlier thinkers draw their arguments for absolute space 1

All the positions mentioned by Law are discussed in this study, and readers are welcome to make educated cases as to who he is referring to. Note especially Law’s reference to Barrow’s idiosyncratic ‘ponibility’, and to Newton’s ‘sensorium’ (a term also used, as we will see, by Cheyne).

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and time from Newton’s physics, such as the necessity of real vacuums and absolute motion; in contrast, later thinkers ground their absolutist and nonabsolutist positions on concerns about the nature of properties, or nothingness. Of these later thinkers, John Jackson’s unique views on time and God’s presence in it are of particular interest. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 10.2 charts the explosion of debate in British philosophy from 1704 onwards, considering new absolutists such as George Cheyne and Samuel Colliber, various new critics, and finally the new stage of debate opened by Edmund Law. Section 10.3 discusses John Jackson, providing a brief biography before examining his metaphysics. We will see that Jackson takes God to be extendedly present in space and in time, effectively completing an arc of thought begun by Henry More. Section 10.4 sketches the afterlife of the Law–Jackson debate.

10.2 In the Shadows of Giants: Absolutists and Critics 1704 to 1734 10.2.1 New British absolutists 1704–1731 In Chapter 8, Section 8.2, we saw a new kind of ‘Newtonian’ absolutism emerge, wherein absolutists are specifically drawing on Newton’s texts. As the years went on, Newtonian absolutism grew ever larger, and gathered moss in the shape of Clarke’s texts. Commentators moved freely between Newton and Clarke’s work, and (although this is not made explicit) it seems to have been assumed that Newton and Clarke were in agreement on the details of their absolutism. Importantly, as we saw in Chapter 8, Section 8.2, the early Newtonian absolutists Bentley and Keill do not connect space and time with God, almost certainly because neither Newton nor Clarke had yet published their views on that connection. To recap the dates, Clarke connected space, time, and God in his Boyle lectures, delivered in 1704 and published the following year; and Newton began publishing on the connection in his 1706 Optice and the 1713 edition of the Principia. Following these publications, later Newtonian absolutists also began to connect space and time with God, usually implying that space and time were not really distinct from God. The introduction of this strong Morean element produced what I label ‘Morean-Newtonian’ absolutism: absolutists are combining Newton’s texts and language with the Morean thesis that space, duration, or time are in reality identified with God. Understood in this sense, Morean-Newtonian absolutism bloomed in the early decades of the eighteenth century. For example, the Irish Newtonian John

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Maxwell—who published the first English translation of Newton’s General Scholium in his 1715 A Discourse Concerning God—states that God is coextended with infinite duration and space. Maxwell (1715, 5) explains that this is because God necessarily exists and thus is always and everywhere. Two years after editing the third edition of Newton’s Principia, Henry Pemberton published A View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy. In its conclusion, Pemberton (1728, 405–6) briefly explains that space and time are infinite and necessary, and so ‘wherever space and time is found, there God must also be’. Although Maxwell and Pemberton clearly perceive some connection between God, space, and time, they do not further describe it, so although they are hinting at Morean absolutism we cannot be certain that they identify time, duration, or space with God. Absolutism spread far beyond the traditional Newtonian crowd. For example, the classical scholar and linguist William Wotton2 published a reply to Toland defending Newtonian space. Wotton (1704, 66) puns that a man who can comprehend Newton’s discovery ‘will hardly ever afterwards talk with Gravity against a Void’. At the end of his discussion of void, Wotton (1704, 71) explains that he ‘got thus far’ when Clarke’s ‘admirable’ Demonstration fell into his hands, and Wotton commends Clarke’s critique of Toland’s account of matter. Additionally, the poet and physician Richard Blackmore (1728, 15–16) proclaimed that all places and things are in God, and that after we have ‘applied with the most deliberate Attention’ to understand space, we will ‘perhaps’ conceive it to be God’s immensity. Although all these figures defend absolutism, they do not enter into metaphysics in any serious depth. By contrast, developed absolutist metaphysics can be found in Cheyne and Colliber. The Scottish thinker George Cheyne (1671/2–1743)3 is best known as a physician and mathematician, but he also made forays into philosophy. The preface to Cheyne’s 1705 Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion explains that some of Cheyne’s materials are ‘borrowed’ from the works of ‘Learned Men’ whom he ‘industriously’ avoids naming, although Newton is an exception. In this 2 Rather charmingly, Abraham de la Pryme (1869, 28–9) describes how Wotton came up to Cambridge when he was but eleven years old, and how he is a ‘most excellent preacher, but a drunken whoring soul’. 3 Cheyne studied at Aberdeen and Edinburgh before moving to London, where he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1702. Cheyne held that Newtonian natural philosophy could inform medicine, and he briefly became a member of Newton’s circle, until his relationship with the Royal Society and Newton came to an disappointing halt in 1705. Ultimately, Cheyne would become a successful physician and medical writer in Bath, named a fellow of the Edinburgh College of Physicians in 1724. On Cheyne’s biography, see Guerrini (2008); on his Newtonianism, see Schofield (1970, 57–62).

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early work, Cheyne (1705, IV.13)4 argues that ‘time or Duration must have for ever been’, which he takes to entail that some real being must have existed forever. A little further on, he adds: Time and Space, are no real things, nor compleat Subsistences, they are only the Modes and Circumstances of other things. I do not here determine, whether infinite Extension, and eternal Duration, may be the Immensity and Eternity of that first great Being . . . tho’ perhaps, there may be abundance of Reason to lead one to think so (Cheyne, 1705, IV.19–20).

Cheyne’s claim that some real being has existed for ever, coupled with his claim that time and space are modes of things, suggests that extension and duration are divine attributes. It is difficult to know who Cheyne is drawing on here— possible candidates include More, Raphson, or Clarke—but his work did come out the year after Clarke’s first set of Boyle lectures. Cheyne returns to metaphysics in his 1715 Philosophical Principles of Religion, Natural and Revealed. In the preface to the first part of this book, Cheyne explains that additions to his views are due to the second editions of Newton’s Opticks (by which Cheyne presumably means the Optice) and Principia. In this later text, Cheyne appears to have changed his mind about the nature of space and time. Time and space bear some connection to God. For example, Cheyne (1715, I.112)5 writes that if time and space have existed forever it may be because they ‘have some relation to a Being endow’d with all other suitable qualities’; further on, Cheyne (1715, I.164) adds that infinite space is the place of divine ubiquity. Additionally, Cheyne (1715, II.53–61) claims that universal space is the ‘Image and Representation in Nature’ of the divine infinitude; and duration is the image of eternity. Echoing Newton, Cheyne (1715, II.53–4) adds that space ‘may be very aptly called the Sensorum Divinitatis, since it is the Place wherein all natural Things . . . are presented to the Divine Omniscience’. However, it is no longer hinted that space and time are modes of God. Instead, space now appears to be a created being. Although the focus of this study is on time, Cheyne’s account of space is sufficiently unusual to warrant a detour (especially as, to my mind, quite how odd it is has not been appreciated by the scholarship). Cheyne (1715, II.48–9) explains that amongst ‘natural and material things’ we can rise no higher than infinite space, and as such it is the opposite of a mathematical point, which ‘differ the most widely that natural Things possibly can, and have nothing in common but Entity’. Cheyne is arguing that infinite

4 5

As each chapter is individually paginated, I reference by chapter and page number. As each part of the book is individually paginated, I reference by part and page number.

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space is, like mathematical points, a kind of entity. In the preface to the second part of his book, Cheyne sets out his commitment to what has become known as the Great Chain of Being: there is a descending, ‘continual Scale’, running from the highest spiritual intelligences down to brute matter. Each ‘step’ on the scale is analogous to the step preceding it, and Cheyne places space in this chain: In the Analogy of Things, and Order of Nature, as the material World, is to Universal Space, it’s highest Limit and Boundary, so is the Spiritual World to the supreme and absolute Infinite, the highest Limit and Boundary of all Things . . . And as Space is Similar to a spiritual Substance, so is that to the Divine Substance (Cheyne, 1715, II.116–17).

The chain runs from the material world, to space, to the spiritual world, to God. Building on the analogy that holds between different steps of the chain, Cheyne comments on the extension of God: since both Matter and Space are extended, so also must spiritual substances be: And the Divine Ubiquity, and Omnipresence, not Virtually only, but Substantially and Essentially; makes it not unlikely that there may be, in the Divine Substance, a resemblance of Extension . . . but infinitely more pure and perfect, than that of created Space is, or can be (Cheyne, 1715, II.117).

God possesses a ‘resemblance’ of space’s extension and space is ‘created’. Frustratingly, Cheyne doesn’t explain his metaphysics any further, but it is fascinating nonetheless to find a Newtonian who does not identify space with God’s attribute of immensity, and has apparently come to do so in light of reading Newton. There are parallels to be drawn here with the work of Catharine Cockburn (described in Section 10.4 of this chapter) who also conceives space as a distinct entity with a unique place in the Great Chain. I am not aware of any dedicated scholarship on Cheyne’s account of space, but there are brief remarks in the literature. In a short discussion of Cheyne that touches on his sensorium comments regarding space, Strong (1952, 166) writes that only ‘extensive quotation’ from Cheyne’s work could convey the ‘weird logomachy resulting from traditional religious and metaphysical doctrines cross-fertilised with conceptions and terms of Newtonian science’. Despite this rare attention to Cheyne’s metaphysics, Strong does not appear to appreciate how unusual Cheyne’s account of space is, perhaps because of its tangled logomachies. Reid (2012, 221–2) argues that Cheyne’s metaphysics of spirit is drawn directly out of More, and he comments that More’s description of space as a representation of God ‘finds some echo’ in Cheyne’s description of space as the image of God. Whilst I am persuaded by Reid’s case concerning spirit, I am not by his case concerning God, as Cheyne’s metaphysic of space—as a created being distinct from God—is very far removed from More’s.

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Samuel Colliber (fl.1718–1737)6 also offers an unusual metaphysic on which I do not know of any dedicated scholarship. Colliber’s 1718 An Impartial Enquiry into the Existence and Nature of God—whose subtitle explains that it includes remarks on Clarke’s Demonstration—offers an ‘intelligible’ account of the divine attributes. Colliber (1718, 212) explains that understanding space and duration is necessary to understanding God’s immensity and eternity. Colliber (1718, 212–14) argues there is real space distinct from matter, and he notes that this has also been ‘fully demonstrated’ by Newton, Locke, Bentley, and others ‘of the First Rank for Learning’. Colliber (1718, 217–21) goes on to argue that real space or ‘Immaterial Expansion’ is the ‘Chief and Original Reality’, God. To show that this conclusion is ‘neither Novel nor Dangerous’, Colliber (1718, 224–6) claims that it has been held by several moderns: including More, whose opinion is ‘wel known’; Cudworth, in support of which Colliber quotes from the preface to Cudworth’s Intellectual System; Locke, in support of which Cheyne quotes Locke’s Essay remarks on Solomon and St Paul; and finally Cheyne, in support of which Colliber quotes Cheyne’s 1705 Philosophical Principles. What is unusual about Colliber’s position is not his absolutism about space per se but the fact it is asymmetrically paired with non-absolutism about time. Colliber (1718, 206) tells us firmly, ‘Duration and Time are Both of ’em Ideas of our Minds’. Echoing Hobbes, Colliber (1718, 228) describes duration as a ‘Phantasm of Space’; and, following Locke, explains that we acquire this notion by reflecting on the succession of our ideas. For Colliber, space is the substance of God, and yet time is merely a mind-dependent idea. This asymmetry led to Colliber being cited—like Locke—on both sides of the subsequent debate. For example, Law (1731, 58–9) uses Colliber as support against the reality of time, and Jackson (1735a, 16–17) uses Colliber as support for the divinity of space.

10.2.2 New British critics of absolutism 1704–1731 Although the early decades of the eighteenth century saw many new British adherents of absolutism, opposition to absolutism also flourished. It is notable that although Newton and Clarke were assumed to adopt similar, if not identical, positions on time and space, nearly all critics took Clarke as their target. As the poetry that opened Chapter 6 indicated, Newton was already a man of stature in Britain at the turn of the eighteenth century, and by his death in 1727 he was a giant. A few years after this, Voltaire (1733, 111–12) wrote that the English nation 6

Almost nothing is known of Colliber’s life; it has been suggested he served in the navy as a volunteer, or as a schoolmaster. Discussions of his views on space and time can be found in Baker (1932, 583–4) and Ferguson (1974, 81–3).

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have interred Newton as though ‘he had been a King who had made his People happy’. Young (2004a, 646) plausibly suggests that Newton, the ‘revered master’, was ‘isolated’ from critique either by the ‘assumed authority of age’ or the ‘pious distinction’ conferred by death. This left Clarke, ‘the champion’, to take the brunt of the assaults levelled at Newtonianism by ‘angered contemporaries’. In fact, Young (2004a, 650) argues that the more ‘inviolate’ Newton’s reputation became, the more the reputation of his followers lay open to ‘vigorous execration’. A huge variety of critics were ranged against absolutism during this period. In his 1707–8 exchange with Clarke, the English materialist Anthony Collins offers what I have labelled a ‘void theory’, stating that space is ‘nothing but the mere Absence or Place of Bodies’ (H I 775). A few years later, his Discourse of FreeThinking discusses various competing understandings of God’s nature, and Collins (1713, 47–8) names More, Turner, and Clarke amongst those who held God to be ‘extended Substance without Solidity’. Collins adds that William Carroll has argued that Clarke is an atheist in the sense he makes God into the material universe. In previous chapters, we briefly met the ‘dangerous dilemma’ levelled against absolutists about space, authored by the infamous Irish idealist George Berkeley. We will now consider Berkeley’s views on time and space in more detail. With regard to time, Berkeley’s 1710 Principles of Human Knowledge writes: Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties . . . Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows . . . (Berkeley, repr. 1989, 107; §98).

For Locke, we saw that time could be measured by the succession of ideas in our minds. In contrast, in this passage, Berkeley seems to claim that time is the succession of ideas in our minds. Berkeley makes similar remarks in other texts that were not intended for publication. For example, his earlier Notebook B7 states, ‘Time is a sensation, therefore onely in ye mind’ (Berkeley, repr. 1989, 253; N 13). And, in a letter to Samuel Johnson dated 24 March 1730, Berkeley states, ‘A succession of ideas I take to constitute Time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think’ (Berkeley, repr. 1989, 354). Continuing with his published Principles, Berkeley goes on to critique ‘a certain celebrated treatise of mechanics: in the entrance of which justly admired treatise, time, space and motion, are distinguished into absolute and relative,

7 This is one of a pair of notebooks generally taken to have been authored between 1707 and 1708; for further background, see McKim (2005).

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true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar . . . ’. As explained above, it is rare in this period to find Newton’s work attacked explicitly, but Berkeley undertakes the task, arguing against the possibility of absolute motion. Berkeley concludes that the philosophical consideration of motion ‘doth not imply the being of an absolute space’, and that space ‘cannot exist without the mind’ (Berkeley, repr. 1989, 110–13; §110–16). As one would expect, given Berkeley’s remarks, scholars who have considered his views on time and space generally take him to hold that time and space are somehow dependent on our minds.8 At this point, it may be useful to restate Berkeley’s dangerous dilemma in full: What is here laid down, seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties, which have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure space. But the chief advantage arising from it, is, that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on this subject, imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that real space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew, that the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it (Berkeley, repr. 1989, 113–14; §117).

The ‘divines’ and ‘philosophers’ Berkeley is referring to here likely include some selection of More, Newton, Locke, Raphson, and Clarke. Koyré (1957, 223) suggests that Berkeley’s attack on absolutism was one factor in Newton’s decision to add the General Scholium to the second edition of his Principia, in order to show that his natural philosophy necessarily led to the ‘affirmation’ of God’s existence and action in the world. It remains to briefly cover four last critics. In a 1713 letter to Clarke, Joseph Butler wrote that space and duration should be considered ‘affections’ which belong to all things, as opposed to God exclusively (V 101). In a later letter Butler adds, perhaps out of politeness, that Clarke’s position may be correct as Butler owns his ‘ignorance’ about the nature of space and duration (V 110). In his 1713 Clavis Universalis, the English idealist Arthur Collier (repr. 1836, 100–5) critiques the position that space is the very substance of God. In The Religion of Nature Delineated, the English priest and teacher William Wollaston (1725, 74–5) argues that neither infinite space nor duration can be God because space taken separately from things is ‘an empty scene or vacuum . . . a vast void . . . a kind of diffused nothing’, and to identify vacuum with God is ‘absurd, or blasphemous’; Wollaston’s choice 8

See Baker (1930, 68–81), Koyré (1957, 221–3), MacIntosh (1978), and Priest (2007, 136–8).

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of words here recall Berkeley. Similarly, Wollaston argues that infinite duration is not God because when ‘abstracted from all durables’ duration is ‘nothing actually existing by itself ’. In a brief critique of Clarke’s account of infinite space, the English rector Phillips Gretton (1726, 26) follows Berkeley and Wollaston in labelling Clarke’s position ‘absurd’.

10.2.3 Edmund Law’s 1731 Essay and the storm that followed Following its initial publication in 1702, King’s De Origine Mali (discussed in Chapter 8, Section 8.2) did not seem likely to become a landmark in the history of time and space metaphysics. However, this was destined to change. In 1731, the Cambridge thinker Edmund Law9 published an English translation of King’s book, An Essay on the Origin of Evil, and affixed to it copious footnotes criticizing absolutism about space. In his important history of these events, Baker (1932, 585) writes that up to 1731 Clarke and Colliber have been but ‘lightly criticised’, and that Law’s Essay opens up a new stage of discourse in this regard.10 Whilst I would deny that Clarke has been ‘lightly’ criticized up to this point, I am in agreement with Baker that Law opens a new chapter in the dispute. Law’s writing is important to us in part because he considers the metaphysics of absolutism in huge depth. Law briefly mentions More, Gassendi, and Raphson, but the brunt of his attacks are reserved for ‘Dr. Clarke’, whose views he identifies and criticizes repeatedly. (As Clarke had passed away two years before, in 1729, this was arguably rather unsporting.) Although the position under attack is also Newtonian, Newton’s own name and works are conspicuously absent. Young (2004a, 654) suggests that this posthumous assault on Clarke masked a critique of Newton which, given Newton’s stature as a culture hero, would have been difficult to sustain in ad hominem terms. At first sight, it might seem as though Law is arguing for relationism, given that he makes several references to Leibniz’s work—for example, Law (1731, 9) repeats Leibniz’s sentiment that space is the idol of some modern Englishmen— and Leibniz is best known as a relationist.11 However, this is not the case, as Law is unconcerned by relations. Law (1731, 58) accepts that ‘local Extension’ and ‘successive Duration’ are ‘modes of the Existence of most Beings’; by this, I take Law to mean that most beings exist at a region of space and over some period of time. However, making use of Locke—indeed, Law’s (1731, 2) very first footnote 9

Law (1703–87) was a fellow of Christ’s College, and later Master of Peterhouse, and Bishop of Carlisle. The Essay was the first work in what would be a prolific career. See Young (2004b). 10 Baker (1932) and Ferguson (1974, 59–78) provide the only existing commentaries on the following debates. 11 Broad (2002, 159) describes Law as a relationist, likely for these reasons.

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provides a lengthy discussion of Locke’s views on substance—Law argues that time and space conceived independently of beings are merely abstract ideas. Law (1731, 7) argues that when we pay ‘due Attention’ to the methods by which we obtain our ideas of time and space, we will realize they are nothing beyond ideas: ‘Duration, Space . . . have no real Existence in Nature, no proper Ideatum or Objective Reality, nor consequently be a Proof of any Thing beside that Power which the mind has to form them’. Law (1732, 9) explains that he can only frame two notions of space: as either mere negation or absence of matter, or as the extension of body considered abstractly. Law is happy to allow that we have these ideas of space but argues that we have many ideas that lack mind-independent reality, such as ideas of darkness distinct from light, or silence distinct from sound. Thus, to argue from our idea of space to the reality of space is as weak as arguing from our idea of darkness to the reality of darkness. It is worth adding that this comparison of space with darkness has long roots—even More considers (and rejects) it.12 Law advances a slew of arguments against the mind-independent reality of space, arguing, for example, that the properties of space that make it appear to have existence, such as penetrability or the capacity to receive body, are no more ‘positive’ properties than darkness’ property to receive light. Returning to his two ideas of space, Law (1731, 10) argues that neither lead to the mind-independent reality of space: if space is the absence of matter, it is ‘mere non entity, or nothing’; or, if space is an abstraction away from matter, it is ‘only’ an abstract Idea formed in the mind. As time and space are at best mind-dependent ideas, it is no surprise that Law disconnects time and space from God. In the context of considering God’s eternity, Law writes the following: what we mean by Time, which (according to Mr. Locke) is of the very same kind with Duration . . . This is very well defin’d by Leibniz, to be the Order of Succession of Created Beings. We manifestly get the Notion of it, by reflecting on the Succession of Ideas in our Mind (Law, 1731, 58).

Law (1731, 58–9) argues we have no idea of duration without succession, and thus duration belongs only to a particular kind of existence: that which is successive. Primarily, Law seems to be quoting Leibniz to support the connection he perceives between time or duration and succession. However, there may be a deeper connection between the views of Law and Leibniz. Although there is no 12

See More (trans. 1995, I 67; VIII: 13 Scholia).

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indication that Law is a relationist about space and time, he is an idealist, in the sense that space and time are at best mind-dependent ideas. Leibniz compares space and time to phenomena like rainbows, a view that has some resonance with Law’s comparison of space with darkness. As such, it is possible that Law is superimposing Lockean language on a Leibnizian view. Janiak (2016, §3.2) suggests that Locke and Leibniz may agree on how we come to construct our representations of space; this could add weight to such an interpretation. Having connected duration to succession, Law connects succession with change. In a piece of reasoning not found in Locke, Law argues: ‘it is only from the variableness and contingency of our own Existence, that all our Sucessione spring’. Law concludes that as there is no change in God, neither is there succession, duration, or time; he further supports his case by citing Colliber. One reason Law’s Essay is important is because it bears on the trend—already hinted at in Chapter 7, Section 7.4—to fuse the work of Newton and Locke together in a grand empiricist amalgam.13 Voltaire is often said to be the source of this fusion. For example, following the quote that opens Chapter 8 on the way that philosophy has changed in London, Voltaire (1733, 109–11) sketches the divide between Cartesian and Newtonian philosophy, and in this context smoothly runs from Newton’s views to Locke’s views and back again. However, I have found earlier examples of this trend in various Newtonians. For example, in Chapter 8, we saw Bentley state in his 1692 Boyle lectures: ‘Space hath quite a different nature and notion from real Body’ (my emphasis). Bentley may be running together a Newtonian claim with a Lockean one: space and bodies have distinct natures, and our notions—i.e., our ideas—of them are also distinct. In the context of setting out Newton’s absolutism about time, Pemberton (1728, 112–13) seamlessly adds that we receive our first idea of time from the succession of thoughts in our mind, as though this thesis were part and parcel of Newton’s views. Nathaniel Bailey’s 1730 English dictionary, Dictionarium Britannicum, fuses Newtonian and Lockean ideas with similar ease. The entry on ‘Time’ (unpaginated) states that our idea of time consists in the ‘Order of successive Perceptions’, and it goes on to quote from Newton’s characterization of absolute time.14 Schliesser (2016) argues that Berkeley’s 1710 Principles conflates Newton and Locke’s views on time, perhaps deliberately.

13 That this amalgam is problematic has, of course, been recognized by other scholars. Young (2004a) provides a wider discussion. 14 This entry also provides characterizations of time found in neither Locke nor Newton, including time ‘of the Sword’ in fencing, and time ‘of a Horse’ in horsemanship.

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In drawing on Locke’s epistemology of time and space to combat MoreanNewtonian absolutism, Law and his fellows are providing a vibrant counterexample to the trend of fusing Locke and Newton together. That said, it should not be thought that the battle is straightforwardly between Newtonian absolutists and Lockean idealists, as in fact Locke was used to support both sides of the debate. With regard to Locke’s writings on space and time, in the early eighteenth century philosophers only had access to Locke’s Essay (not to Locke’s unpublished journal entries, or earlier drafts of the Essay). The neutrality evinced in the Essay’s metaphysical position on time and space allowed Locke to be claimed by critics of absolutism and by absolutists. For the most part, this tug of war over Locke simmers beneath the surface, but, at one point at least, Jackson (1725a, 21) makes it explicit, reproducing lengthy tracts from Locke’s Essay with the aim of silencing ‘all future Pretences’ that Locke did not believe in the reality and infinity of time and space.15 Another reason Law’s Essay matters is that it stirred the teacup of British time and space metaphysics into a fury. Just as Law takes Clarke’s absolutism as his primary target, so too do the subsequent debate participants, both attacking and defending it. In this way, Clarke’s absolutism becomes the sugar cube at the centre of a spiralling storm. Soon after the publication of Law’s Essay, Samuel Clarke’s younger brother John16 answered Law on his behalf. (To avoid confusion over which Clarke is under discussion—especially as a third Clarke will shortly join Samuel and John—from hereon I will always provide the first name of the requisite Clarke.) John Clarke’s 1732 Defence of Dr Clarke’s Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God declares in one of its subtitles to be an answer to Law. John Clarke (1732, 7) reveals himself to be an able thinker and tackles Law’s arguments in detail, arguing, for example, that space differs from darkness because space cannot cease to exist, whereas darkness can. At various points, John Clarke makes use of Locke’s ideas.17 In defence of his brother, John Clarke (1732, 33) argues that infinite space is a mode of that infinite being which is the substratum of space. John Clarke (1732, 50) adds that the same ‘may be said Time as was of Space’: as time or duration is not a substance, it is a mode

Jackson (1735a, 112) complains, ‘Must Mr. Lock always be either misrepresented, misunderstood or misapply’d?’. Baker (1932, 587–8) also discusses Locke’s dual role in these debates. 16 John Clarke (1682–1757) was a Cambridge mathematician who would become Dean of Salisbury. In addition to various religious works, readers may remember from this study’s Introduction that John Clarke published a book on Newton’s natural philosophy. For a full biography, see Gordon (2004). 17 For example see John Clarke (1732, 9–10). 15

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of some substance, and it is ‘the uniform perpetual Flowing of the Existence of the Deity’. John Clarke’s (1732, 51–6) reply to Law’s account of divine eternity without duration is of particular interest. Whilst John Clarke is happy to entertain Law’s Lockean thesis that we obtain our idea of duration from considering the succession of our ideas, he firmly states that duration does not ‘nor can possibly depend at all upon the Succession of Ideas in any Person’s Mind’. Law erroneously ‘supposes Succession to be Duration’, when succession is merely how we get the idea of duration; that does not entail that duration is the succession of ideas, or change in nature. Duration is, instead, the enduring or unceasing existence of that infinite being ‘whose Attribute it is’. Whilst John Clarke accepts that ‘such a Succession as ours’ may not be necessarily joined with existence, this does not entail that duration is not joined with existence. The implication is that whilst God’s eternity is duration, this duration is not successive (or, presumably, changing). In this context, John Clarke rather surprisingly echoes the likes of Anne Conway, and argues that God may have created the world from eternity, as God always acts on some reason, and as his mind is unchanging he would always have had whatever reasons he currently does to create. Law replied to John Clarke’s Defence in an individually paginated Postscript appended to the second, 1732 edition of his Essay; Law also reworked his original footnotes. At the end of the Postscript’s critique, Law (1732, 17) writes cattily that John Clarke has ‘taken a deal of pains’ to prove that darkness is really nothing, and he ‘might as well’ have added space and duration, and concluded them to be three nothings. John Clarke counters Law’s Postscript in his 1733a Second Defence. The same year, two additional British philosophers came out in favour of absolutism: Charles Mayne, who was possibly an expatriated Irishman; and the Scottish philosopher Andrew Baxter.18 However, further critics of absolutism also emerged. The English theologian and hymn writer Isaac Watts published a lengthy essay on space in his 1733 Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects. Interestingly, Watts (1733, 1–3) explicitly states that he is happy to accept Newton’s proof that there is vacuum or void space scattered throughout the universe, but that does not prevent him from asking what space is, and critiquing various possibilities. For example, against the position that space is God, Watts (1733, 11) objects with horror that not only would this mean that bodies exist in God, but also that 18

Mayne (1733, 185–7) argued that space is a natural effect or product of God. Baxter (1733, 177–8) critiques the Newton–Cheyne thesis that space is God’s sensorium but allows that space is ‘necessary and something, (not a pure negation)’ that somehow belongs to God.

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‘a Mountain, a Whale, or a wicked Giant’ would possess more of God’s essence than the best and holiest man in the world—‘unless he be of equal size’. Watts (1733, 44) concludes that space is ‘nothing’ in itself, merely an abstract idea in the mind. It is unclear whether Watts is following Law or reaches this conclusion independently. On the one hand, Watts explains in the preface that some of these essays were composed thirty years ago. On the other hand, Watts (1733, 42–3) was aware of Law, who he describes as ‘ingenious’, and Watts draws on Law’s arguments concerning darkness. Additional attacks on absolutism were still in the offing. Law belonged to a group of Cambridge divines that included Phillips Gretton, of Trinity College; and Daniel Waterland and Joseph Clarke, of Magdalene College. We have already met two critiques of absolutism made by this group—those of Gretton and Law— and we will now meet another: that of Joseph Clarke (who, despite his surname, is no relation to Samuel or John). In 1733, Joseph Clarke19 published Dr Clarke’s Notions of Space examin’d, the subtitle of which explains that it will vindicate Law and reply to John Clarke’s first and second Defences. Like Law, Joseph Clarke advances a form of idealism grounded in Locke. Unlike Law, Joseph Clarke’s position is a kind of relationism: Distance is the imaginary Length of SPACE, considered between any two Beings: ’Tis a Relation the Bodies bear to each other; and therefore to talk of Distance really existing, i.e. of Relation really existing, is rather, if possible, more absurd than to talk of SPACE as really existing (Joseph Clarke, 1733, 37).

As in Locke’s 1670s texts, distance is a relation; yet where Locke describes those relations as mind-independent, Joseph Clarke describes them as minddependent.20 In this fashion, Joseph Clarke (1733, 63) agrees with Law that time or duration is merely an idea. Although he frequently makes use of Locke, Joseph Clarke (1733, 25–6) acknowledges that Locke’s position on space is evasive, although he ‘seems’ to hold that it is something existing. By way of finding clearer support for his views, Joseph Clarke cites passages from Wollaston (given in Section 10.2.2 of this chapter). The following year, a new character enters into the storm caused by Law’s Essay: John Jackson.

19 Joseph Clarke (1712?–1750) was a protégé of Waterland and became a clergyman; see Stephens (2011). 20 Joseph Clarke’s relationism is akin to that held by the Irish scientist Richard Kirwan, who provides a rare early history of our absolutist debates. Kirwan (1806, 206) concludes by stating the ‘true notion of space’, which he finds so obvious that it is surprising it should have escaped the notice of these ‘profound metaphysicians’: mind-dependent spatial relations.

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10.3 John Jackson on Time 10.3.1 Sketching Jackson’s life and works Although we are only meeting Jackson properly at this point in our narrative, he was active well before the 1730s. John Jackson (1686–1763) came up to Jesus College, Cambridge, in 1702, and he would go on to have a long (and contentious) career in the Church.21 On reading Samuel Clarke’s Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity, Jackson was converted to non-Trinitarianism. In 1714 Jackson wrote to Samuel Clarke praising the work, and published some of their letters; Jackson (1714, 2–3) argues that Samuel Clarke’s scheme is ‘much more agreeable’ than the alternatives. Jackson and Samuel Clarke met in 1714 and became friends.22 It was through the recommendation of Samuel Clarke, master of Wigston’s Hospital, Leicester, that Jackson was advanced to its confraternership in 1719; on Samuel Clarke’s death in 1729, Jackson inherited his Hospital mastership. Young (2004a, 650) writes that Jackson’s Newtonianism was ‘imbibed through Clarke’, rather than having been taken in ‘at source’. I quite agree: Jackson’s writings evince far deeper familiarity with the work of Samuel Clarke and Locke than with Newton’s. Jackson’s non-Trinitarianism led to a dispute with Waterland, which initially took place in private correspondence. In 1716, Jackson anonymously published the issues Waterland raised as A Collection of Queries, adding his own nonTrinitarian replies in defence of Samuel Clarke. Although Waterland was reportedly unhappy with the manner in which he was dragged into public debate, he replied to Jackson in print, and the saga continued at length. In his posthumous memoirs, Jackson (1764, 121–4) explains that soon after their Trinitarian debate, he and Waterland started on another debate relating to Samuel Clarke’s Demonstration, in which Waterland argued that Samuel Clarke had failed to prove the existence and nature of God a priori. Many sheets passed between Waterland and Jackson on this subject and after the debate was ended ‘in a friendly Manner, neither Side being able to convince the other’, Jackson proposed that the letters should be published, to enable Samuel Clarke ‘if he pleased’ to take his cause in his own hands. Waterland declined but subsequently circulated his side of the correspondence around Cambridge, conduct that was perceived to be ‘ungenerous and unfair’, as it effectively denied Samuel Clarke the opportunity to reply. Ferguson (1974, 55) argues it is ‘most probable’ that this led 21

My sources for the biographical parts of this section are Jackson’s (1764) posthumous memoirs, and Young (2006). 22 On their relationship more generally, see Stewart (1981) and Young (2004a).

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Jackson to share the correspondence with Samuel Clarke, and it is this that Samuel Clarke described—and replied to—as a ‘seventh letter’ relating to his Butler correspondence. Jackson (1764, 13) goes on to claim that the principal objections which Waterland made to Samuel Clarke’s Demonstration were published in Law’s Essay, and that these ‘have been since owned’ to be Waterland’s. Certainly, Jackson (1735a, 112) takes Law’s arguments to be Waterland’s. If Jackson is believed, then Waterland—the final member of our group of Cambridge divines described in Section 10.2.3 of this chapter—is the driving force behind Law’s critique. Although Law does not comment on the extent of Waterland’s role, Law does dedicate the second edition of his Essay to Waterland, and Waterland pops up at various points in Law’s texts on time and space. For example, in the context of explaining how we come by our idea of space, Law’s Essay (1731, 11; 40) refers to the work of a ‘very eminent’ and ‘learned’ writer; from the fourth edition, a footnote is added identifying this writer as Waterland. Appended to Law’s Enquiry is a dissertation by a ‘Learned Hand’ acknowledged to be Waterland, and—as we saw in Chapter 9—this same text includes a note on the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence authored by a ‘Learned Writer’. Assuming this note is authored by Waterland, it provides evidence that Waterland shared, or even inspired, the idealisms of Law and Joseph Clarke. The note states: ‘The Doctor [Samuel Clarke] says farther, that God’s Existence causes Space and Time. That’s true in one Sense: God makes Bees, and Bees make Honey: He makes Men, and Men make abstract Ideas. As to any other Sense it is ridiculous’ (A Learned Writer, cited in Law, 1734, 93–4). Again, space and time are ideas dependent on human minds. Jackson’s non-Trinitarianism upset thinkers beyond Waterland, and it would ultimately cost him in his career. For example, Jackson was denied his M.A. at Cambridge in 1718. Young (2004a, 652) comments that Waterland would have taken particular pleasure in this.23 Jackson’s unorthodoxy also garnered him an increasingly troublesome reputation. To illustrate, on a visit to Bath ‘on account of a Lameness in one of his Legs’, Jackson was refused the sacrament by Dr Coney of St James’s, on the grounds that Jackson did not believe in the divinity of Christ. Jackson (1736, 10) anonymously published a narrative of the incident, so that the public may judge ‘the Injury done to Mr. Jackson’; and the spirit ‘which acted Dr. Coney’ which, if not discouraged, may possess other ‘weak, superstitious and ill-natur’d Bigots’. Towards the end of his career, Jackson focused on classical and biblical chronology, consciously following in the footsteps of Newton. Jackson’s 1752 23

Young (2004a) describes many more of Jackson’s theological troubles.

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Chronological Antiquities was well received, and its three volumes were even translated into German.

10.3.2 Jackson’s 1734 The Existence and Unity of God Although Jackson’s metaphysics blossom in 1734, there are earlier indications of the directions it would take. For example, in an unpublished letter to Samuel Clarke dated 10 July 1716, Jackson writes that he ‘could not be satisfied’ with the ‘school-notion’ of divine presence: holenmerism. Instead, Jackson explains he has concluded ‘with some diffidence’ that ‘God being undoubtedly omnipresent’, his substance must be coextended ‘with all space’ but not ‘after the manner of material divisible extension’.24 Jackson briefly comments on God’s omnipresence in print the same year. In a footnote, Jackson (1716, 56) explains that the word ‘infinite’ when applied to God generally signifies the ‘incomprehensible Manner of God’s filling all Things’, his immensity by which he takes up ‘all Space’. Fifteen years later, Jackson’s (1731, 54–5) Calumny no Conviction briefly states that space has a real existence distinct from matter, and adds—echoing Samuel Clarke—that this immensity is a property of God.25 Jackson had read Law’s Essay by the time this text went to press, as he briefly comments on it, but Jackson does not dispute Law’s position on time or space until his tour de force three years later. Jackson’s 1734 The Existence and Unity of God declares on its frontispiece that it is a vindication of Samuel Clarke’s Demonstration. Jackson (1734, 7) explains that Law has offered several arguments against Samuel Clarke’s views and Jackson had intended to consider them but was anticipated by John Clarke’s ‘ingenious’ Defence. However—seemingly in light of the second edition of Law’s Essay— Jackson (1734, 13) has now been moved to enter the debate, and one of the issues he considers is Law’s objections to Samuel Clarke’s views on space and time. Although Jackson writes in defence of Samuel Clarke, I argue that Jackson’s position is closer to More’s than to Samuel Clarke’s. For example, Jackson (1734, 2) reads Samuel Clarke as arguing that because time and space exist, some eternal, infinite, or immense being (i.e., God) must exist in which they inhere. Although Jackson clearly approves of this line of argument, it is not actually found in Samuel Clarke. As we saw in Chapter 9, Section 9.3.2, Samuel Clarke’s Demonstration establishes the existence of an eternal, necessary, unchangeable, and independent being (i.e., God) and only at this point turns to the nature of space and time. However, this line of argument is found in More, who—as we 24

Held at Cambridge University Library (Add. MSS, 7113). As in Samuel Clarke’s earlier work, Jackson moves freely between the terms ‘attribute’ and ‘property’; see for example Jackson (1734, 16). 25

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saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.6—argues from the existence of ‘a certain immobile extension’ to God. Jackson also shares More’s account of God’s presence in space. Jackson (1734, 104–6) holds that a substance must be where it acts, and argues that it is impossible to conceive any substance—material or spirit—to exist without space. As space is extended, so is God. Against the objection that a spatially extended God would have parts, Jackson argues that God would not have parts in any ‘partable’ or divisible sense; rather, God’s substance is a ‘close, essential, and inseparable Connection of Parts . . . the whole infinitely expanded Substance, [is] as much one individually, or numerically, as if it had no Parts at all’. Jackson rails against holenmeric accounts of divine presence: the Substance cannot but consist of Parts, as being infinitely expanded and omnipresent, and so cannot all of it exist in every Place . . . No good Sense can ever bear with a totum in toto, and totum in qualibet parte, which, with respect to the Substance of God, is errant Nonsense . . . This is the Difference betwixt Dr. Clarke’s Notion and mine, of the Divine Omnipresence, and the School Jargon of totum in toto, &c. (Jackson, 1734, 107–9).

Jackson’s description of holenmerism as nonsense is one that the mature More would applaud. However, Jackson’s comparison of his position on divine omnipresence with Samuel Clarke’s is frustratingly ambiguous: does Jackson take himself and Samuel Clarke to be in agreement on the rejection of holenmerism, against the schools; or, does Jackson perceive a difference between the views of himself and Samuel Clarke on the issue of the school jargon? In support of the reality of space and time Jackson advances no fewer than nine distinct arguments. Many of these arguments are familiar; for example, Jackson (1734, 88) argues there could not be motion without real space. Baker (1932, 590–1) observes that by this point the arguments have become ‘somewhat codified’, and he goes so far as to provide a helpful table of Jackson’s arguments and Law’s replies, which I urge the interested reader to consult. Although Jackson’s arguments for absolute space are not new, the lines of reasoning he employs to prove the existence and nature of real time or duration are. Like Clarke, Jackson uses time and duration interchangeably. In my reconstruction of Jackson’s reasoning on time, I take him to set up two ‘difficulties’ or puzzles: Ex absurdo. If Time is Nothing, then a Child is as old as Methuselah, the Difference of Age being a Difference of Nothing, i.e. no Difference . . . If Time be Nothing, it would follow, that if God had created the World Millions of Ages sooner than he did, yet it would not have been created at all the sooner (Jackson, 1734, 95).

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One puzzle is, why are children younger than Methuselah, an exceptionally longlived biblical figure? Another puzzle is, how could God have created the world ages before he did? On the latter, Jackson references Samuel Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz (although he would also have been familiar with the idea through his own correspondence with Samuel Clarke). I read Jackson as providing a line of argument that makes sense of these puzzles. I reconstruct it as having three premises and a conclusion: i) Real things have duration ii) We have an idea of time or duration distinct from things iii) Our idea of time or duration is not an abstraction of the durations of finite things but of the duration of an infinite thing: God iv) God’s infinite duration is real. As we saw in Section 10.2.3 of this chapter, and as Jackson (1734, 95) notes, Law accepts (i) and (ii): existing things or beings have ‘particular Durations’, and we obtain an idea of time or duration by reflecting on the succession of our ideas. However, Law would absolutely deny (iii). Earlier, we saw Law claim that one notion of space distinct from body is the extensions of bodies considered abstractly. Jackson (1734, 96) considers the parallel claim, that time distinct from body is the duration of things considered abstractly, and objects that this cannot be our idea of time: ‘If it was, the Consequence would be, that the Idea of Time, was the Idea of a finite Thing, whereas the Finiteness of Time is impossible to be conceived’. Jackson does not fully spell out his reasoning, but I believe it to be this: if our idea of duration distinct from body were merely an abstraction from bodies that exist for finite periods of time, then our idea of duration should also be finite. However, Jackson (1734, 55) claims that we cannot imagine removing time from the universe. This implies that our idea of time is necessary and infinite; if it were contingent or finite, we could imagine a part of the universe without time. As Jackson believes our idea of duration is necessary and infinite, it follows that our idea of duration cannot be an abstraction from a contingent, finite enduring thing, it must instead be an abstraction from a necessary, infinite enduring thing. As Jackson (1734, 96) puts it, our idea of time must be ‘the abstract Idea of the Eternity of a necessary existing Being, and so can only be a Property of God’. Jackson (1735a, 115) confirms later that, like Samuel Clarke, by an abstract idea he means a partial idea. The move from (iii) to (iv) is the move from considering the idea of time as God’s eternity to the reality of time as God’s eternity. As we saw above, Law would reject (iv) because he denies that God’s eternity has duration. Against Law

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and in support of (iv), I read Jackson as arguing that if God’s eternity lacks duration, we cannot solve the puzzles above: the particular Durations of other Things, can only be, in Reality, their Co-existence with particular Portions of the Duration of God . . . And so the true Reason why one Thing is older than another, is, that the Existence of one Thing has been present to more successive Portions of God’s Duration, than another Thing: And had the World been created sooner, and continued to the present Instant of Time, it would, for the same Reason, have been present to, or co-existed with more successive Portions of real Time, or of the real duration of the Existence of God (Jackson, 1734, 96).

For Jackson, positing real duration allows us to explain why a child is not the same age as Methuselah: the child has not coexisted with as many portions of God’s duration. Similarly, we can make sense of the claim that our world might have been created sooner than it was because that means it might have been created alongside an earlier portion of God’s duration. In contrast, if duration were merely an abstract idea, Jackson implies that we could not solve these puzzles. In response to Law’s reply that duration beyond the world is merely imaginary, Jackson (1735a, 86–7) argues that the application of such an imaginary duration cannot make creation ‘really sooner or later’, any more than imagining my existing at the Siege of Troy can make me to have really existed at that time. In contrast, identifying time with God’s existence will ‘solve all Difficulties’, as the world might really have been created sooner or later. Jackson has arrived at the same conclusions as Samuel Clarke—the epistemological conclusion that our idea of time is an abstract idea of God’s eternity, and the metaphysical conclusion that time is God’s eternity—via his own route. As this talk of ‘Portions’ of God’s duration suggests, Jackson holds God to be extendedly present in time, as well as space. Like Law, Jackson accepts that we obtain our idea of duration from reflecting on the succession of ideas in our mind, and that we have no idea of duration without succession. Where these theses lead Law to argue that God’s existence must lack duration and succession, they lead Jackson (1734, 55) to argue that God’s existence must have duration and succession: ‘Duration can no more be conceived, with respect to God, without actual Succession, than with Respect to the Existence of any other Thing’. This is a significant departure from both Samuel and John Clarke, who (as I read them) argue that God is holenmerically present in time. The following year, Jackson expands on this: It is proper farther to observe on the Idea of Duration that it is a mistake to think there is no Succession or Change of Ideas in the divine Mind . . . as the Existence of Things changes, and Things succeed one another and vary their Relations to each other, they

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must of Necessity produce a Change and Succession and Variation of the Ideas of them in the divine Mind . . . [God’s] Duration or Continuance is coexistent with the mutable successive Existence of the Creatures, we have no other Way of conceiving it but by our own successive Duration: and there is no Impropriety at all in the Conception, so long as we remove Mutability from it (Jackson, 1735a, 20–1).

Jackson is arguing that, as God exists through each moment of time with creation, his ‘view’ of the changing world changes. As it is only the world and God’s view that changes, rather than God, this is compatible with divine immutability. Reid (2012, 135) once wrote of these British 1730s debates that whilst they discussed themes addressed by Henry More, they had moved away from More himself. Whilst it is true that More’s name rarely makes an appearance in these debates, it is also true that the spirit of More is very much alive in them. More’s position has finally been pushed all the way through: space and time are divine, and God is extendedly present throughout both of them.

10.3.3 Absolutism and eternalism Before moving on, I would like to pause on one final thesis introduced by Jackson: the thesis that absolutism entails eternalism. This will take a little unpacking. In the late twentieth century, new labels were introduced for various theories of time, including the following. ‘Eternalism’ holds that the past, present, and future exist; this does not mean that every moment of time must exist now, merely that every moment exists simpliciter. In contrast, ‘presentism’ holds that only the present exists simpliciter, whilst the past and future are unreal. Although the labels are relatively recent, the positions themselves are much older; for example, Aristotle and Hobbes are sometimes read as presentists. I suggest that Morean absolutists about time are committed to eternalism. If time is God’s eternal duration, in reality the substance of God, then—as God lacks parts, and is unchanging—there is a case to be made that the whole stretch of infinite time must exist, as opposed to merely the changing present moment. If this suggestion has merit, and Morean absolutism necessarily involves eternalism, then one way of resisting Morean absolutism would be to reject eternalism. As far as I am aware, in the early modern period this line of reasoning was only followed once: in a debate between Jackson and Law. Considering the relationship between time or duration, and the finite temporary beings it comprehends, Jackson writes: Duration must have existed before them, and cannot but exist after them: And though one Moment of it can but exist at once, yet every present Moment is an immoveable and inseparable Part of Eternity, and is necessarily connected with the Moment of Duration

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past, and the Moment to come, without any possible Interruption or Vacuity, and so Eternity is but one (Jackson, 1734, 55).

Jackson is describing an eternalist position: although only one moment of time can exist now ‘at once’, all moments of time exist simpliciter, creating ‘one’ seamless eternity. Jackson (1735a, 114) reiterates this same idea later: ‘every Part of Time is necessarily existent in its Nature, and cannot but be what it is, some past, some present and some future’. Jackson must hold this, as otherwise God’s existence would be spread out through time in portions that are separable from each other. Fascinatingly, the same year, Law picks up on this passage and replies to it as follows: Every present Moment may be said to be immoveable till ’tis past, and then it vanishes and is no more: To connect this with the Moment preceding, which is gone, and the Moment succeeding, which is not come, is to connect it with two nothings; and an Eternity made out of this, will be one—What? One Moment, if any thing; for it can never be a Whole (Law, 1734, 84).

Law is advocating presentism: the present moment is real, but once it becomes past it is ‘no more’. We cannot connect past moments or future moments with the present moment because past and future moments are ‘nothings’; they do not exist. Although Law does not quite drive it home, the point is that if presentism is true then time cannot be identified with God’s duration in the way that Jackson wishes to, as it would mean that God is not a whole being, only one part of God would exist at any time simpliciter. Why has the importance of eternalism not been recognized by any other participants of the debate over Morean absolute time? I believe the reason is simply that the debate over eternalism did not achieve its current, formalized stage until the twentieth century, following the heavy emphasis the likes of British idealist J. M. E. McTaggart placed on the changing present. In the exchange above, Jackson appears to simply assume eternalism, just as Law appears to simply assume presentism, and neither appreciates the depth of the philosophical gulf yawning between them.

10.4 After 1734: The Debate Rolls On Jackson has brought us full circle with More and, to my mind, The Existence and Unity of God represents the last peak of early modern British absolutist metaphysics of time. Although our narrative proper ends at this point, I will briefly explain how the debate continued afterwards.

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At the very end of his first book, Joseph Clarke (1733, 110) offers a brief answer to John Clarke’s Second Defence, and complains that John Clarke has not raised any new works, or fortified old ones, merely provided ‘old Arguments new vampt’. Joseph Clarke’s work drew a 1733b Third Defence from John Clarke.26 Joseph Clarke replied with his 1734 A Farther Examination of Dr Clarke’s notions of space. Apparently tired of rewriting the footnotes to An Essay on the Origin of Evil, in 1734 Law published a new text: An Enquiry Into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity &c (it is this text that contains the reply to Jackson, discussed in Section 10.3.3 of this chapter). Jackson published several more works dealing with time and space but none so lengthy as his 1734 tract. Jackson’s 1735a A Defence of The Existence and Unity of God replies to Law’s Enquiry, and although it does not produce much that is new, it does clarify some of the ideas above. Jackson’s anti-materialist tract A Dissertation on Matter and Spirit also repeats some of these ideas. For example, Jackson (1735b, 22–3) emphasizes here that all substances are extended. Jackson’s views provoked Colliber to publish a new edition of An Impartial Enquiry, where for example Colliber (1735, 248–9) restates that God’s eternity is not successive. Jackson’s work also prompted an exchange of letters from 1735 to 1736 with the Scottish tenant farmer William Dudgeon, which were later published. Dudgeon objects to Jackson’s view that God is literally omnipresent, arguing, for example, that if God filled space then nothing else could exist there (Jackson & Dudgeon, 1737, 6). Edmund Law published two further editions of his Essay—in 1739, and 1758—continuing his opposition to Samuel Clarke and Jackson in footnotes. Late in her career, Catharine Cockburn née Trotter—described by Toland (1704, preface) as an ‘absolute Mistress of the most abstract Speculations in the Metaphysics’—published her 1743 Remarks Upon some Writers on Morality. This text attacks the position of Law and Watts on space, and in the process of defending Samuel Clarke’s view sets out her own position. Cockburn (repr. 2006, 95–7) puts forward several arguments for realism about space, including her empiricist claim that, like the idea of matter, the idea of space is early obtruded on the senses. If one rejects the existence of space one must also reject the existence of matter, an implicitly unacceptable position. Having argued that space is real, Cockburn sets out to determine its nature. Like Cheyne, Cockburn accepts the Great Chain of Being. However, Cockburn argues that, as matters stand, our picture of the Great Chain is unfinished, for body and soul do not 26

In which it becomes apparent there was no love lost between John Clarke and Gretton. John Clarke (1733b, preface) writes that his brother Samuel always said of Gretton he was ‘ignorant of the first Principles of the Question in Debate’.

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differ from each other by sufficiently gradual degrees. To fill this gap, Cockburn posits a further substance that partakes of the nature of both: ‘And why may not space be such a being . . . an immaterial unintelligent substance, the place of bodies, and of spirits, having some of the properties of both’. Remarkably, space is posited as a third kind of substance, in addition to body and spirit: akin to matter, it is unintelligent; but, akin to spirit, it is immaterial.27 In another late intervention in these debates, the English chaplain and scholar Gregory Sharpe—who later become a member of the Royal Society—defended Samuel Clarke’s position on time and space against a tract written on behalf of Leibniz by ‘Sieur Lewis-Philip Thummig’. Sharpe (1744, viii) writes that he believes ‘Thummig’ to be fictitious, and the real author to be the German philosopher Christian Wolff. However, I suggest instead that our author is Ludwig Philipp Thümmig (1697–1728), a German philosopher who studied under Wolff.28 Against Thümmig, Sharpe (1744, 76) argues that space and duration are properties of God. Leibniz and Thümmig were not the only writers outside of Britain commenting on British absolutisms. Across the channel, Pierre Bayle’s Dictionary entry on ‘Leucippus’ provides a breathless commentary of the dispute over vacuum that incorporates French, Dutch, and English perspectives: Gassendus, the great restorer of Leucippus’ system, brought it into fashion . . . Mr Des Cartes declared for a plenum . . . Thus the reign of the plenum seemed to be better established than ever, when, to our great surprise, we have seen some great Mathematicians of the contrary opinion. Mr Huygens has declared for a vacuum; Mr Newton has taken the same side . . . they dare not maintain, as the school Philosophers do, that space is a pure privation. When therefore they are asked, what these spaces are . . . they know not how to answer, and are almost induced to adopt the chimera . . . that space is nothing but the immensity of God (Bayle, repr. 1997, 792–3).

Bayle implies that he sides with the non-absolutists. Meanwhile, across the pond, Jonathan Edwards argues in his c.1721 Of Being for a Morean position, on which space is God’s immensity and God is extended.29 In his correspondence with Berkeley, the Connecticut scholar Samuel Johnson (1696–1772) expressed his leanings towards absolutism in a letter dated 5 February 1730: ‘External space and duration therefore I take to be those properties or attributes in God, to which our ideas, which we signify by those names, are correspondent . . . This I take to be Sir Isaac Newton’s meaning’.30 27 28 30

For more on Cockburn’s position, see my (2013). Thanks to Stefan Hessbrüggen-Walter for this identification. Cited in Berkeley (1989, 350).

29

See Reid (2003).

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Although British philosophers continued to write on absolute time and space after the 1730s, the familiar debate framed by figures such as More, Newton, and Samuel Clarke slowly died away. This may have been in part because the theological motivations and concerns underlying the debate weakened their hold: later thinkers were no longer quite so worried about demonstrating God’s intimate connection with the world, or about the theological implications of positing eternal time. Comments on Morean-Newtonian absolutism continued to turn up—and sometimes in unlikely places31—but the debate ceased to occupy the central philosophical stage. As the century matured, philosophy would move in new directions, in Britain seeing the rise of thinkers such as Thomas Reid, David Hume, and Mary Wollstonecraft; and on the Continent thinkers such as Kant, Émilie du Châtelet, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

31 To give a few examples, Benjamin Parker, a London stocking-maker, discusses time and space in his Philosophical Dissertations. Parker (1736?, 2–7) argues that, unlike time, God’s eternity cannot be measured nor evinces progression; yet God is literally omnipresent in infinite, eternal space. In Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy Explained for the use of the Ladies, Francesco Algarotti (1739, 184–5) explains that we owe our newfound consideration of eternity to Newton. In his Memoirs: Containing the Lives of Several Ladies of Great Britain, Thomas Amory (1755, 71–2) writes—apropos of very little—in a footnote that Watts’ Philosophical Essays were the ‘weakest things he writ’, and what he says of space is ‘very weak’, and as ‘despicable’ as those of Law.

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Conclusion As These Spheres Measure Duration, they no less inspire The Godlike Hope of Ages without End. The boundless Space, thro’ which these Rovers take Their restless Roam, suggests the Sister-Thought Of boundless Time Edward Young (1750, 337; IX.1172–4)

This study opened with Shakespeare’s description of time as ‘misshapen’, the partner of ‘ugly night’. Similarly unflattering descriptions of time abound in the early seventeenth century. In Robert Allot’s (1600, 284–6) collection of verse, time is characterized by a variety of poets as ‘wicked’, ‘stealing’, ‘traitorous’, and a ‘bondslave’ to eternity. In the entry under ‘Time’, Joshua Poole’s (1657) guide to poetry writers lists the following associations: ‘irrecoverable, grey-headed, aged, crazie, growing, speed, sluttish, wistful . . . injurious, tyrannizing, domineering, waving, rusty, dusty, moldie, consuming’. As the early modern period progressed, these associations changed. By the time Young authored the poem that opens this chapter, the association of time with boundlessness and God was firmly ensconced in the British consciousness: as the philosophy of time evolved, so too did the poetry of time. To conclude this study, I recount its general theses, and say a little on the impact of absolutism within and beyond philosophy. As explained in the Introduction, this study advances two general theses. The first is that the complexity of positions on time, duration, and space defended in early modern British thought is under-appreciated. As illustrated by the quote from Edmund Law that opens Chapter 10, an enormous variety of positions were defended during this period, going far beyond the well-known absolutism– relationism debate. The second general thesis is that during this period three kinds of absolutism can be found in British philosophy: Morean, Gassendist, and Newtonian. As we have seen, in the second half of the seventeenth century British absolutists were largely Morean, and in the early decades of the eighteenth

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century they were largely Morean-Newtonian. Although Gassendist absolutists did emerge in Britain, they were in the minority. As Morean absolutism provides a way of intimately placing God in the created world—or, as placing the created world in God—this may be an indication of how deeply British thinkers felt about this aspect of theology. As explained in the Introduction, the roots of today’s absolutism/ substantivalism–relationism debate are found in the early modern absolutism– relationism debate. Speculatively, I wonder if absolutism also laid the groundwork for eternalism. As we saw in Chapter 10, Section 10.3.3, eternalism holds that the past, present, and future are real, and there is a case to be made that this position is a necessary ingredient of Morean absolutism. If this is so, then early modern temporal absolutism forms part of the history of eternalism. In addition, it may form part of the history of another twentieth- and twenty-first-century position: anti-realism about temporal passage. This requires a little explaining. Realism about temporal passage holds that the present moment—the ‘now’— really moves, such that events really become present and then past; anti-realism about temporal passage denies this. Today, eternalism is frequently combined with anti-realism about temporal passage.1 A useful analogy can be drawn with the directions of space, such as ‘up’ and ‘down’, ‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’. All these directions are real, and there is no implicit movement from one to the other akin to the way that realists about temporal passage hold there is implicit direction in time from the past to the future. In pulling apart the Aristotelian connection between motion and change, these absolutists may have laid the groundwork for pulling apart the connection between time and this implicit direction. My reasoning is as follows. Motions generally have an implicit direction: they start and finish in particular ways, they act as causes or effects. Water can be poured downwards but not upwards, photosynthesis gives off oxygen but does not use it, a shattered ice cube cannot reassemble itself. Given this, we can think of motions as having a kind of grain, akin to the grain in a piece of wood. When time is associated with motions, it arguably acquires a grain too. I suggest that by pulling apart the connection between time and motion, absolutism about time disconnects time from this grain, opening the door to directionless time, and with it anti-realism about temporal passage. 1 In contrast, we saw that Jackson’s eternalism seems to be combined with realism about temporal passage, given that he emphatically distinguishes between past, present, and future. In today’s parlance, Jackson’s eternalism is a ‘moving spotlight’ theory: the present moment ‘shines’ on events as it moves through the time series. The classic discussion of this theory can be found in C. D. Broad (1923, 59), who describes the spotlight as a ‘policeman’s bull’s eye traversing the fronts of the houses in a street’.

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Moving beyond philosophy, absolutist metaphysics played a role in later developments in other fields: art, geology, and philosophical theology. In her classic study Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory, Marjorie Hope Nicolson considers the transformation of mountains in art, from seventeenthcentury depictions as ugly protuberances or ‘warts’, to late eighteenth-century glorious ‘cathedrals’. Nicolson (1959, 114–43) argues that More’s divinization of time and space laid the foundation for an aesthetics of the infinite, changing our perceptions of barren landscapes such as mountains from ugly to divine. One example can be found in Byron (1788–1824), who writes the following of the Alps in Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage: The palaces of Nature, whose vast walls Have pinnacled in clouds their snowy scalps, And thron’d Eternity in icy halls (Byron, repr. 1829, III.lxii).

Edward Young’s poem at the start of this chapter, considering the barren yet infinite landscape of outer space, is working in this same vein. Nicolson (1959, 158–9) also connects Newtonian temporal absolutism with an awakening sense of lengthy geological time. In the period covered by this study, the Earth (and all creation) was usually taken to be around 6,000 years old. As many non-absolutist theories hold that time begins with the creation of the Earth, a corollary is that time itself is only 6,000 years old. Nicolson (1959, 252–3) suggests that an awakening sense of infinite or indefinite time contributed to advancements in geology, which began to push the age of the Earth further and further back, in order to understand the Earth’s inner workings.2 Finally, absolutist metaphysics has had an impact on philosophical theology far past the period covered by this study. For example, Robert Oakes (2006) has lately argued for a literal understanding of divine omnipresence that draws on Clarke and Newton’s view that God ‘constitutes’ space. R. T. Mullins (2016, 15) has recently argued that God is in time, and traces this view to Newton and Clarke.3 Debates over the metaphysics of time were a defining feature of early modern British philosophy, and they have sourced a variety of later developments inside and outside of philosophy more generally. Newton’s work comprises the mountain of this landscape but it is, by no means, the only feature of interest.

2

See also Tuveson (1951) on this issue. Oakes and Mullins provide many further references to recent debates over divine temporality and spatiality. Another philosophical theologian who discusses the early modern debate over absolutism in great detail is William Lane Craig; see for example his (2001). 3

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Index Aaron, Richard 140–1, 147 absolutism 1–2, 5, 7, 9 absolutism–relationism debate 2–3, 6–7, 207, 208 critics of 93, 96–103, 153–5, 187–90 early British reactions to 93–103 and eternalism 202–3, 208 existing literature on 2–4 late British reactions to 150–5 late British absolutists 183–7 strong versus weak 9, 10, 63, 67 see also Gassendist absolutism; Morean absolutism; Newtonian absolutism accident–substance distinction in Barrow 76, 82, 83–4, 90, 91 in Charleton 65, 67 in Clarke 170–1 in Cudworth 98 in Gassendi 60–1 and Locke 135 in Newton 116, 117–18 Algarotti, Francesco 206 Allot, Robert 207 Amory, Thomas 206 angels 65, 66, 112, 129 Anselm 42 antiquity, time in 13–17 anti-realism about temporal passage 208 apocalypse studies 13, 28, 29–30, 106 Aquinas 18, 42 Aristotelianism 8, 13, 17, 18, 21–2, 139, 208 British 21–2 cosmology 15, 45, 48, 50 Aristotle 5, 14–15, 18, 19, 24, 152 and Barrow 78, 90 Categories 72–3 on imaginary space 62 art and absolutist metaphysics 209 Assimilation reading, of Newtonian space and time 107, 108, 116 atheism Barrow on Cartesianism and 70 and critics of absolutism 153, 155, 188 Cudworth on 97 atomists 23–4 attributive distinctions 52–3 Augustine of Hippo, Saint 24, 42, 76 Confessions 17

Auriol, Peter 18 Averroes 18 Bacon, Francis 23 Bailey, Nathaniel 151 Barrow, Isaac 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 46, 68–92, 157 and apocalypse studies 29 Cartesiana Hypothesis 69, 74, 89 and Clarke 166 and Descartes 69–70 existing readings on space and time 77–82 and Gassendi 88, 89–91 intellectual connections 4 Lectiones 11, 56–7, 70–1, 72, 73, 74, 78, 80, 91, 93, 132 and Leibniz 68, 72, 84–8, 92 life and works 69–72 and Locke 132, 133–4 as a modal relationist 11, 68, 82–91, 133–4 and More 33–4, 79–80 and Newton 70, 71–2, 88, 91, 105, 108, 110 sermons 71 texts on space and time 72–7 Baxter, Andrew 194 Bayle, Pierre 169, 205 Bentley, Richard 152–3 Berkeley, George 5, 8, 170, 190, 205 dangerous dilemma 55, 169, 188, 189 Principles of Human Knowledge 188–9 Bible and chronology 29 Genesis 49, 90 More on the Holy Spirit 35 prophecy 29, 30, 33 Blackmore, Richard 184 bodies, space and time in Locke 130, 131–3, 134–5, 155 in Newton 122–4, 139 Boyle, Robert 23, 28, 93, 94–5, 105, 127 Bradwardine, Thomas 62 Broad, C.D. 208 Bruno, Giordano 18, 60 Burthogge, Richard, An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits 153–4 Butler, Joseph 159, 160, 164, 166, 172, 177, 189, 197 Byron, George Gordon, Lord, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage 209

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Cambridge Platonists 25–6, 46 and Barrow 79 and Locke 127 and Newton 106 Whichcote 25–6, 79 see also Cudworth, Ralph; More, Henry Cambridge University and Barrow 69, 70–1 and More 32, 33 and Newton 105 Carriero, John, Causation reading of Newtonian space and time 104, 109–10, 111, 115 Carroll, William 188 Remarks upon Mr Clarke’s Sermons 173–4 Cartesian cosmology and cosmogony, in More 11, 32, 47–51 Causation readings, of Newtonian space and time 104–5, 107, 109, 110–18 Cavendish, Margaret 5, 8–9, 27, 93 Philosophical Letters 96–7 celestial bodies/motion 1, 7, 8–9, 13 Aristotelians on 22, 23, 139 in Aristotle 15, 18 British Platonists on 25 in Descartes 21, 47–8, 49 and Newton 106 in Plato 14 celestial spheres and Aristotelian cosmology 15, 22, 45, 48 and More’s heliocentrism 45–6 Charleton, Walter 1, 10, 24, 56, 58, 63–7, 93, 105 and Barrow 88, 89, 90 Cavendish’s critique of 96–7 and Fairfax 99 and Gassendi 11, 63, 151 intellectual connections 4 and Newton 105, 108, 117–18 Cheyne, George 11, 28, 183, 184–6, 187, 204 chronology 13, 28–9 Clarke, John 10, 28, 129, 159 defences of Samuel Clarke 193–4, 195, 198, 201, 204 Clarke, Joseph 5, 8, 195, 197, 204 Clarke, Samuel 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 156–81, 206 Boyle lectures 11, 150, 157, 158, 161–3, 164, 173, 182, 183, 185 Butler–Clarke correspondence 159, 160, 164, 166, 172, 177, 189, 197 and Cockburn 204 Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God 158, 161–3, 164, 166, 168, 172–3, 173–4, 175, 179, 187, 196, 197, 198 on God’s presence in time and space 176–81 as a holenmerist 121–2, 156, 157, 176, 179–80, 181 intellectual connections 4, 159

in Voltaire 159 and Jackson 171–2, 196–7, 198, 199, 200, 201 and later absolutism 182, 183 and Law’s Essay 190, 193, 204 Leibniz–Clarke correspondence 156, 159, 165–6, 167, 168, 170, 171, 174–5, 176, 177, 197, 200 letters on time and space 164–72 life and works 157–9 and More 11, 156, 157, 162–3, 168, 169, 174, 180–1 and new British critics of absolutism 187–8, 189–90 and Newton 11, 156, 157, 158, 159, 165–6, 170, 174–5, 181 and non-Trinitarianism 158–9 and philosophical theology 209 Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity 158, 196 sermons 178, 180 Sharpe’s defence of 205 on space as an attribute of God 121–2, 161–3 texts on time, space and deity (post-1719) 172–6 translation of Rohault’s Traité de physique 157–8, 165, 176 Cockburn, Catharine 168, 186 Remarks Upon some Writers on Morality 204–5 Colliber, Samuel 10, 183, 187, 190, 204 Collier, Arthur 189 Collins, Anthony 8, 27, 159, 168, 188 comets 30 contiguity, as a mode of magnitude in Barrow 82–3, 84 Conway, Anne 8–9, 93, 100–3 and More 32, 33, 34, 35, 46, 55, 94, 100, 102 Copernicus, N. 18, 32, 139 cosmology Aristotelian 15, 45, 48, 50 Cartesian 11, 32, 47–51 Coste, Pierre 142 Cudworth, Ralph 25, 32, 33, 79, 93, 97–8, 187 Culverwell, Nathaniel, Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature 26 darkness, Law on space as 191, 192, 193, 195 De Gravitatione (Newton) 11, 91, 104–24, 181 and Clarke 170 holenmeric reading of 119–24 and Locke 138, 142 new causation reading of 110–18 Democritus 23 Desaguliers, John Theophilus 125, 137–8 Descartes, René 2, 3, 5, 13, 20–1, 64 and Barrow 69–70, 73–4, 84 Cartesian dualism 153 and Clarke’s conception of space 168

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and Gassendist absolutism 60, 127 and holenmerism 43 and Locke 126, 129–30, 133, 134, 135, 147 Meditations 70 and More 34, 36, 46, 51–3, 54 and Newton 91, 105 and nullibism 40 and Parker 94 Principles of Philosophy 6, 20, 47, 73 see also Cartesian cosmology and cosmogony Digby, Kenelm 22, 28, 63–4, 105 discerpibility, in More 43, 112, 119 distinctions More and Cartesian distinctions 52–4 see also substance–accident distinction Dudgeon, William 204 duration in Barrow 76–7, 80, 84, 91 in Charleton 65 in Clarke 160–1, 162, 167, 168 in Descartes 20–1 and Gassendist absolutism 61 in Jackson 199–202, 202–3 in Law’s Essay 191–2, 193–4 in Locke 128–9, 130, 135–7, 141, 143–6, 154 in More 31, 33–9, 47, 51, 53, 54–5, 56–7, 102 and new British absolutists 184, 185 and new British critics of absolutism 189–90 in Newton 91, 104, 120 Sharpe on 205 in Suárez 19, 21 Edwards, John 174, 205 emanative causation and Clarke 170 in More 104, 111–16, 118 in Newtonian time and space 109–10, 111, 114–18 Empedocles 61, 90 Epicureanism 63, 95 British Epicureans 23–4 see also Charleton, Walter eternalism 202–3, 208 eternity of God 7 in Barrow 87 in Clarke 157, 160, 162, 167, 168–9, 170, 172, 173, 175, 179, 181 in Colliber 204 in Gassendi 62 in Jackson 200–1 in Law’s Essay 194 in Locke 129, 136, 141 in More 44–5, 51, 54, 163, 180–1 and new British absolutists 187 in Newton 118, 119–20 eternity and the Soul, in Plotinus 16, 35 experimentalists 23



extension in Clarke 162, 170, 176–7 in Collins 188 in Locke 129, 134–5 in More 43–4, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57 and Morean absolutism 152 and new British absolutists 185, 186 in Newton 110–11, 116, 123–4 extrinsic time in Suárez 19 Fairfax, Nathaniel 5, 56, 93, 99–100 Ferguson, James P. 156, 160, 170, 172, 196–7 Finch, John 28, 32, 33, 100 formal distinctions 52–3 Galileo Galilei 3, 18, 28 and More 32, 45 and Newton 105 Gascoigne, John, on Barrow’s space and time 78–81 Gassendi, Pierre 3, 28, 56, 58 and Barrow 88, 89–91 and Charleton 64, 67, 151 and Cudworth 98 Disquisitio Metaphysica 60 and Fairfax 99 and Law’s Essay 190 and Locke 127, 147 and Newton 108, 117 Syntagma Philosophicum 60–3 Gassendist absolutism 5, 9–10, 11, 58, 60–3, 93–5 new 151–2 geological time 209 Gilbert, William 23 Glanvill, Joseph 105 Sadducismus triumphatus 33 God, space and time in Augustine 17 in Barrow 78–81, 89 in Boyle 95 and British Platonism 25, 26 in Clarke 11, 156, 157, 160–3, 176–81, 209 in Conway 102–3 in Cudworth 97–8 in Epicurean natural philosophy 23 in Fairfax 99–100 and Gassendist absolutism 9, 10, 61–3, 94 in Jackson 12, 198–202 in Locke 129, 131, 132, 136, 138, 141, 144 and materialism 27 modal relationism in Barrow and Leibniz 86, 87, 88 in More 31, 34, 35–45, 51, 53–6, 112 and Morean absolutism 10, 11, 152 and new British absolutists 184, 185–6

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God, space and time (cont.) new causation reading of De Gravitatione 104, 110–18 in Newton 11, 119–24, 209 and Newtonian absolutism 153 and strong/weak absolutism 10 and van Helmont’s Platonic time 59 see also eternity of God; immensity of God; pantheistic blasphemy; polytheistic blasphemy Gorham, Geoffrey 46, 112, 113, 141, 142, 143–4, 145, 146 Grant, Edward 81–2, 120–1 Great Chain of Being 186, 204–5 Gretton, Phillips 190, 195, 204 Greville, Robert, second Lord Brooke on holenmerism 40 The Nature of Truth 25 Harriot, Thomas 24 heliocentrism 22 in More 45–6 Heraclitus 19 Herbert, Edward, Lord of Cherbury, De Veritate 24–5 Hill, Nicholas, Philosophia epicurea 23 history, and chronology 28–9 Hoadley, Bishop Benjamin 158, 159 Hobbes, Thomas 2, 5, 8, 168, 187 and Charleton 64 De Corpore 27 Leviathan 41–2 materialism 27, 33, 41, 96 and Newton 91, 105 holenmerism and Charleton 66 in Clarke 121–2, 156, 157, 176, 179–80, 181 in Cudworth 98 Jackson on 198, 199 in More 40–5 Newton’s God as holenmeric 105, 119–24 Holy Spirit, in More 35, 44, 46 horology 13, 28 human mind and time 1, 7, 8, 13 in the Aristotelian tradition 21, 25, 27 Augustine on 17 and Hobbes 27 Huygens, Christiaan 23, 28, 127 idealism 7, 8 in Aristotle 15 in Joseph Clarke 195 see also Berkeley, George ideal, Leibniz on time as 85–6 imaginary space 62, 131 in Locke 141, 143–5 imaginary succession 19, 25, 62

immaterial substances, in More 43–4 immensity of God in Barrow 78, 80–1, 87, 88 in Clarke 121–2, 157, 160, 162, 167, 168–9, 170, 172, 173, 175, 178, 179, 180, 181 and imaginary space 62 in Leibniz 86 in Locke 131, 136, 141 in More 51, 54, 180–1, 205 and new British absolutists 186, 187 Independence reading, of Newtonian space and time 107, 108 indiscerpibility, in More 43–4, 112, 113, 119 intrinsic time in Suárez 19 Isaacson, Henry, Saturni Ephemerides 29 Jackson, John 1, 12, 151, 159, 183, 196–203 Chronological Antiquities 29, 197–8 and Clarke 165, 171–2 and Colliber 187 Defence of the Existence and Unity of God 204 Dissertation on Matter and Spirit 204 eternalism in 202–3, 208 Existence and Unity of God 5, 198–202, 203 intellectual connections 4 and Law 183, 195, 197, 198, 200–1, 202–3 life and works 196–8 and Samuel Clarke 196–7, 198, 199, 200, 201 Jackson, John (the Elder) 150–1 Jacquot, Jean 24 Johnson, Samuel 188, 205 Keill, John 68, 88, 153 Kepler, Johannes 3 King, William, Archbishop of Dublin De Origine Mali 151, 190 Law’s translation of 190–5 Kirwan, Richard 195 Koyré, Alexander 167, 189 Law, Edmund 8, 182, 183, 207 An Essay on the Origin of Evil 190–5, 197, 198, 200–1, 202–3, 204 and Cockburn 204 and Colliber 187 Enquiry 171, 204 Lee, Henry, Anti-Scepticism 154 Leibniz, G. 2, 3, 5, 11 and Barrow 68, 72, 84–8, 92 on Clarke and More 181 Clarke’s correspondence with 156, 159, 165–6, 167, 168, 170, 171, 174–5, 176, 177, 197, 200

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INDEX

and Conway 101 and Law’s Essay 190, 191–2 and Locke 133, 134 and Newton 106 relationism 6 Leucippus 23 Locke, John 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 28, 125–49, 152 and Barrow 132, 133–4 and Berkeley 188, 189 and Clarke 157, 161, 168 critics of 154, 155 and Descartes 126, 129–30, 133, 134, 135, 147 Essay Concerning Human Understanding 11, 125, 126–7, 140–9, 150, 154, 193 ‘Draft B’ 127, 128–9, 135, 142 ‘Draft C’ 127–8, 131, 134–7, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147 intellectual connections 4 and Jackson 196 journal entries (1676 to 1678) 127, 129–34, 147 and later absolutism 182 and Law’s Essay 190–1, 192–3, 195 and Leibniz 133, 134 life and works 126–8 and More 132, 140, 163 and new British absolutists 187 and Newtonian absolutism 11, 126, 137–9, 140–7, 148 and non-modal relationism 134, 137 and relationism 11, 125, 125–6, 128–37, 141, 147–9 Some Thoughts Concerning Education 29 Two Treatises Concerning Government 127 Lucretius 23 McGuire, J.E. 121, 122, 123 Predication reading of Newtonian space and time 108–10, 117 McTaggart, J.M.E. 203 magnitudes, Barrow on space as a mode of 68, 69, 73–6, 78, 82–4, 87 Magnus, Albertus 18 Maiseaux, Pierre Des 124, 174–5 Malebranche, Nicolas 3 Masham, Damaris 127 materialism Barrow and Cartesian materialism 70, 79 British 21, 27 in Cavendish 96 defining 27 in Hobbes 27, 33, 41, 96 mathematical astronomy 139 mathematics and natural philosophy 46 Maxwell, John 183–4

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Mayne, Charles 194 Mersenne, Martin 28 metaphysics definition and interpretation of 5–6 More and Cartesian 50–1 and readings of Barrow on space and time 77–8 meteors 30 Milton, John, Paradise Lost 93, 101 mind-dependent/independent temporal relations 8, 9, 27 in Law’s Essay 191 modal distinctions, More 52–3 modal relationism in Barrow 11, 68, 82–91, 133–4 in Leibniz 84–8 monads, in Leibniz 85, 86 Morean absolutism 9, 10, 11, 93, 95–6, 151–3, 205, 207–8 and eternalism 202, 203 and Fairfax 99–100 and new British absolutists 184 and Raphson 151–2 see also Clarke, Samuel Morean–Newtonian absolutism 10, 183–4, 206, 208 and Law’s Essay 193 More, Henry 1, 4, 10–11, 31–57, 58, 206, 209 Antidote Against Atheism 36–7, 46–7, 79–80, 94, 100, 111, 132 and the apocalypse 29, 30, 106 and Barrow 91 as a Cambridge Platonist 25, 31, 32 Cartesian cosmology and cosmogony in 11, 31, 32, 47–51 and Clarke 11, 156, 157, 162–3, 168, 169, 174, 180–1 Conjectura Cabbalistica 49 and Conway 32, 33, 34, 35, 46, 55, 94, 100, 102 critics of 153–4 and Cudworth 98 Democritus Platonissans 40–1, 48 Divine Dialogues 37–8, 47, 57, 80, 98, 111 early views on time 45–51 on emanative causation 104, 111–16, 118 Enchiridon Metaphysicum 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47, 51, 53–4, 55–6, 57, 111, 112, 121, 152 evolving views on time and duration 31, 33–9 and Gassendist absolutism 63 on God’s presence in space and time 31, 40–5 and horology 28 Immortality of the Soule 37, 41, 109, 111, 115, 121

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INDEX

More, Henry (cont.) influence of 56–7 intellectual connections 4 and Jackson 198–9 and Law’s Essay 190 life and works 32–3 and Locke 132, 140, 163 mature absolutism 51–6 and new British absolutists 186, 187, 202 and new British critics of absolutism 188, 189 and Newton 33, 104, 105, 106, 109 and Parker 94 Philosophical Poems 5, 30, 31, 34, 38, 44, 57, 59, 101–2 Psychodia Platonica 34–5, 41, 46 and Spinoza 169–70 and van Helmont 59 motion and time in Aristotle 14, 18, 24, 208 in Barrow and Leibniz 87 and British Platonism 24, 25 see also celestial bodies/motion mountains 209 ‘moving spotlight’ theory 208 natural philosophy British 21, 23–4 and mathematics 46 and More 50 Newtonian absolutism 6, 10, 11, 152–3, 183–4, 186, 205 and geological time 209 and Jackson 196 and Locke 11, 126, 137–9, 140–7, 148 see also Morean–Newtonian absolutism Newton, Isaac 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 23, 46, 103, 104–24, 206 and apocalypse studies 29 and Barrow 68, 70, 71–2, 88, 91, 105 Certain Philosophical Questions 105, 117 and chronology 29 and Clarke 11, 156, 157, 158, 159, 165–6, 170, 174–5, 181 and the Des Maiseaux preface 124, 125–6 existing scholarship on Newtonian time and space 107–10 on God’s presence in time and space 11, 119–24 intellectual connections 4 and Jackson 197 and later absolutism 182, 183 and Law’s Essay 190 life and works 105–7 and More 33, 34, 104, 105, 106, 109

and new British critics of absolutism 187–8, 189, 194 Optice 138, 163–4, 181, 182, 183, 185 Opticks 105, 106, 121, 163 and philosophical theology 209 Principia 9, 10, 11, 14, 28, 72, 93, 104, 106–7, 126, 137, 138–9, 153, 154, 163, 164, 165, 174, 182, 183, 185, 189 Tempus et Locus 106 theological manuscripts 107 see also De Gravitatione (Newton) Nicolson, Marjorie Hope, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory 209 non-modal relationism 86 and Locke 134, 137 non-Trinitarianism in Clark 158–9 in Jackson 196, 197 nullibism 40, 43, 66 and Clarke 176, 177–9 Oxford University, Locke at 126–7 pantheistic blasphemy 55, 169–70 Parker, Benjamin 206 Parker, Samuel 10, 56, 93–4, 99, 100 Patrizi, Francesco 18, 60 Pemberton, Henry 9, 71, 184, 192 pendulum clock 23, 127, 129 Person, David 22 Plato 45 Timaeus 13–14 Platonic time, in van Helmont 58–9 Platonic triad/Christian Trinity, in More 34–5, 41 Platonism British 21, 24–6 in More 31, 32, 33, 45 see also Cambridge Platonists Plotinus 13, 14, 24, 25 Enneads 15–17 and More 35, 39, 42, 45, 51, 102 poetry of time 207 polytheistic blasphemy 169 and Barrow 74, 90–1 and Charleton 67, 97 and Fairfax 99 and Gassendi 61, 62–3, 67 and Locke 130 and More 55, 56 and Newton 118 Poole, Joshua 207 Predication reading, of Newtonian space and time 108–10, 114–15 presentism 202, 203 Psyche, More on 34–5, 45, 49 Ptolemy 15

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INDEX

Raphson, Joseph 10, 151–2, 155, 162, 163, 168, 169, 174, 178, 181, 185, 189 and Law’s Essay 190 rational distinctions 52–3 realism, space and time 8–9, 20 in Cockburn 204–5 non-absolutist 7 Reid, Jasper 46, 54, 121–2, 177, 180, 186, 202 relationism 2–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 in Joseph Clarke 195 and Locke 11, 125, 125–6, 128–37, 141, 147–9 relationism/absolutism debate 2–3, 6–7, 207, 208 Rohault, Jacques, Traité de physique 157–8, 165, 176 Royal Society 23, 28, 33, 63, 70, 94, 95, 105, 106, 126, 184, 205 Sergeant, John 154 Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of 127 Shakespeare, William 1, 207 Sharpe, Gregory 78, 205 Slowik, Edward 122, 123, 141, 142, 143–4, 145, 146 Smith, John, Select Discourses 26 soul, the Augustine on 17 Hobbes and holenmerism 41–2 in More 34–5, 39, 40–2, 43, 44, 53, 112 Plotinus on the Soul 15–16, 35 space 3, 5 and atomism 23 Barrow on space and time 72–87 and British natural philosophy 23, 24 in British Platonism 26 in Charleton 64–7 Cockburn on 204–5 Cudworth on 98 Gassendi’s space and time absolutism 5, 9–10, 11, 58, 60–3, 93–5 in Hobbes 27 imaginary space 62, 131 Locke’s texts on time and space 128–37, 140–9 and Morean absolutism 152 More on 35–6, 40–5, 46, 51–6 Newton on 115–18 Sharpe on 205 spatial absolutism 10, 46 and void theory 8 see also extension; God, space and time; imaginary space

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Spenser, Edmund Epithalamion 32 Faerie Queen 32 Spinoza, B. 2, 3, 5, 161–2, 173–4 Ethics 169–70 spirits, in More 35, 44, 46, 112, 113–14, 116 Stillingfleet, Edward 154 strong absolutism 10, 67 Suárez, Francisco 36, 62, 163 Dispuationes Metaphysicae 19–20, 21, 52 substance–accident distinction in Barrow 76, 82, 83–4, 90, 91 in Charleton 65 in Clarke 170–1 in Cudworth 98 in Gassendian absolutism 60–1 and Locke 135, 154 in Newton 116, 117–18 substantivalism 3, 7, 208 Newton as a ‘super-substantivalist’ 123 succession imaginary 19, 25, 62 in Jackson 200, 201–2 in Law’s Essay 191–2, 194 in Locke 128 More on successive duration 38–9 Swan, John 99 Speculum mundi 21–2 Sydenham, Thomas 127 Telesio, Bernardino 19, 60 De rerum nature 18 Thales 152 Thümigg, Ludwig Philipp 205 Toland, John 168, 184, 204 Letters to Serena 154–5 Toletus 18 Trinity see non-Trinitarianism Turner, John 10, 96, 188 vacuum and space 154, 157, 205 and Gassendist absolutism 150–1 Vailati, Ezio, on Clarke 156, 159, 160, 168, 170, 172, 176, 177 van Helmont, Jan Baptist 11, 28, 58–9, 64 and Barrow 74 and Newton 108 Ortus Medicinae 59, 74 ‘De Tempore’ 59, 96 Vaughan, Henry, The World 13, 21 void theory 7, 8, 188 Voltaire 150, 159, 187–8 vortex theory 47–9 Wallis, John 25, 28, 44 Warner, Walter 23–4

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INDEX

Waterland, Daniel 159, 171, 195 and Jackson 196, 197 Watts, Isaac 8 and Cockburn 204 Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects 194–5 weak absolutism 9, 10, 62 Whichcote, Benjamin 25–6, 79 Whiston, William 158, 159

White, Thomas 22 Wilkins, John, An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language 23 Wolff, Christian 205 Wollaston, William 8, 189–90, 195 Wotton, William 184 Young, Edward 207, 209