Absolute monarchy on the frontiers: Louis XIV’s military occupations of Lorraine and Savoy 9781526110510

Table of contents :
Front matter
Dedication
Contents
A note on terms
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Maps
Introduction
Part I The eastern frontiers of France in the age of Louis XIV
Lorraine, Savoy and the frontiers of France
Military occupation in French frontier strategy
Part II Administration on the frontiers
The structures of occupation
The burdens of occupation
Part III The local elites under French occupation
The nobilities
The administrative elites
The church
Conclusions
Appendix: Officers of the sovereign companies of Savoy, 1690–1713
Select bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Absolute monarchy on the frontiers Louis XIV’s military occupations of Lorraine and Savoy

PHIL M C CLUSKEY

Absolute monarchy on the frontiers

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 1

12/03/2013 16:10

STUDI ES I N EARLY MODERN EURO P EA N HIS TORY This series aims to publish challenging and innovative research in all areas of early modern­continental history. The editors are committed to encouraging work that engages with current historio­graphical debates, adopts an interdisciplinary approach, or makes an original contribution to our­understanding of the period. series editors Joseph Bergin, William G. Naphy, Penny Roberts and Paolo Rossi Also available in the series Jews on trial:The papal inquisition in Modena, 1598-1638 Katherine Aron-Beller Sodomy in early modern Europe  ed. Tom Betteridge The Malleus Maleficarum and the construction of witchcraft Hans Peter Broedel Latin books and the Eastern Orthodox clerical elite in Kiev, 1632–1780 Liudmila V. Charipova Fathers, pastors and kings: visions of episcopacy in seventeenth-century France Alison Forrestal Princely power in the Dutch Republic: Patronage and William Frederick of Nassau (1613–64) Geert H. Janssen, trans. J. C. Grayson Representing the King’s splendour: Communication and reception of symbolic forms of power in viceregal Naples Gabriel Guarino The English Republican tradition and eighteenth-century France: between the ancients and the moderns  Rachel Hammersley Power and reputation at the court of Louis XIII: the career of Charles d’Albert, duc de Luynes (1578–1621)  Sharon Kettering Popular science and public opinion in eighteenth-century France Michael R. Lynn Catholic communities in Protestant states: Britain and the Netherlands c.1570–1720 eds Bob Moore, Henk van Nierop, Benjamin Kaplan and Judith Pollman Religion and superstition in Reformation Europe eds Helen Parish and William G. Naphy Religious choice in the Dutch Republic: the reformation of Arnoldus Buchelus (1565–1641) Judith Pollman Witchcraft narratives in Germany: Rothenburg, 1561–1652 Alison Rowlands Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650–1675 Jill Stern Authority and society in Nantes during the French Wars of Religion, 1559–98 Elizabeth C. Tingle The great favourite: the Duke of Lerma and the court and government of Philip III of Spain, 1598–1621

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 2

12/03/2013 16:10

Absolute monarchy on the frontiers Louis XIV’s military occupations of Lorraine and Savoy PHIL McCLUSKEY

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 3

12/03/2013 16:10

Copyright © Phil McCluskey 2013 The right of Phil McCluskey to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed exclusively in Canada by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN 978 0 7190 8716 5 hardback First published 2013 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Typeset in Perpetua with Albertus display by Koinonia, Manchester

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 4

12/03/2013 16:10

For MJA

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 5

12/03/2013 16:10

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 6

12/03/2013 16:10

Contents



A note on terms Acknowledgements Abbreviations Maps Introduction

page viii ix x xi 1

I The eastern frontiers of France in the age of Louis XIV 1 Lorraine, Savoy and the frontiers of France 2 Military occupation in French frontier strategy

11 33

II Administration on the frontiers 3 The structures of occupation 4 The burdens of occupation

65 86

III The local elites under French occupation 5 The nobilities 6 The administrative elites 7 The church

119 146 172

Conclusions

196

Appendix: Officers of the sovereign companies of Savoy, 1690–1713 Select bibliography Index

202 207 217

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 7

12/03/2013 16:10

A note on terms

The terminology of early modern composite states poses particular problems for modern Anglophone historians. To avoid confusion, I use the terms ‘Savoy’ and ‘Savoyard’ to refer specifically to the duchy of Savoy, while ‘Piedmont-Savoy’ and ‘Sabaudian’ are used for the composite possessions of the duke of Savoy. ‘Lorraine’ designates the composite state of the dukes of Lorraine, except where I have indicated a distinction between the duchy of Lorraine and the duchy of Bar. Equally problematic is the rendering into English of Lorrain/Lorraine, which is both an adjective of nationality and the word for a native of Lorraine; in the interests of simplicity I use the form ‘Lorrain’ for both, e.g. the Lorrain nobility, a Lorrain.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 8

12/03/2013 16:10

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the British Academy and the Scouloudi Foundation for their financial support when I was carrying out the research for this book. My thanks are also due to several people for their generosity and assistance, without which this book would not have taken quite the same shape: Mette Harder, Steve Murdoch, David Parrott, Jonathan Spangler, Grant Tapsell, Sara Wolfson and in particular Guy Rowlands. The staff of Manchester University Press also deserve acknowledgement for having made the publishing process remarkably straightforward. On a personal level, I would like to acknowledge my thanks to my parents, who have given me their unquestioning support, for which I will always be grateful. Parts of chapters 2, 5 and 6 previously appeared in the article ‘From Regime Change to Réunion: Louis XIV’s Quest for Legitimacy in Lorraine, 1670–97’ in the English Historical Review, 126 (2011), pp. 1386–1407, and are reproduced here with the permission of Oxford University Press. Phil McCluskey Manchester

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 9

12/03/2013 16:10

Abbreviations

AAE CP Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique Lorr. Lorraine Lorr. Sup. Lorraine Supplément Sard. Sardaigne ADMM

Archives Départementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle

ADS

Archives Départementales de Savoie

AMA RD Archives Municipales d’Annecy, Registre des Délibérations AMC

Archives Municipales de Chambéry

AMN Ord. Archives Municipales de Nancy, collection of royal ordonnances AN

Archives Nationales

Archivio di Stato di Torino, Paesi AST P Sav. Savoie: ‘Ecritures concernant le duché, et province de Savoye’ BMN

Bibliothèque Municipale de Nancy

Bibliothèque Nationale de France BN Col. Lorr. Collection Lorraine Mél. Col. Mélanges Colbert Man. Fr. Manuscrits Français NAF Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises SHDT

Service Historique de la Défense, Fonds de l’Armée de Terre

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 10

12/03/2013 16:10

M eus

e Arras

mb

rés

e

EL

in

CHANN

Lille Ca

Rh

ISH ENGL

Flanders Ar toi s

is

Cambrai Luxembourg Longwy

Landau

Verdun

Metz

Paris

Strasbourg

Nancy

Alsa

Toul

ce

Lorraine

Besançon FrancheComté

B AY

Savoy

Lyon

Chambéry

OF B I S C AY

Rhon

e

Grenoble

Frontiers of the kingdom of France in 1715 Annexed pays conquis

Nice

Territories occupied under Louis XIV and subsequently relinquished Rou

0 0

County of Nice

ssi

llon

Perpignan

200 kms 200 miles

N EA AN R R MEDITE

A SE

Map 1: The frontiers of Louis XIV’s France

Map 1 / MUP / AB / DS / 23.10.2012

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 11

12/03/2013 16:10

Verdun Metz

St. Mihiel Bar-le-Duc Nancy

Toul

Bishopric of Metz Bishopric of Toul

Épinal

Bishopric of Verdun Barrois mouvant Barrois non mouvant Duchy of Lorraine

0

50 kms

0

50 miles

Map 2: Political boundaries of Lorraine in the seventeenth century

Map 2 / MUP / AB / DS / 23.10.2012

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 12

12/03/2013 16:10

LUXEMBOURG Longwy

S

aa r

Thionville M

eu se

Vaudrevange Boulay VERDUN

Hombourg

Bouquenom Fénétrange

Rosières Commercy Ligny

Bitche

Sarralbe

Saint-Mihiel BAR-LE-DUC

Sarreguemines

Saint-Avold

Mose

lle

METZ

TOUL

Liverdun

Dieuze

Marsal

NANCY

Lixheim Sarrebourg

Lunéville M

eu

r

th

e

Rambervilliers Saint-Dié

Epinal

0

Remiremont

50 kms

0

50 miles

Map 3:The Lorraine region

Map 3 / MUP / AB / DS / 23.10.2012

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 13

12/03/2013 16:10

0

100 kms

0

CHABLAIS

Geneva 100 miles

FAUCIGNY

St-Julienen-Genevois

Benneville Bonneville

GENEVOIS SAVOY PROPER

Geneva

Annecy

Moutiers

Chambéry

TARENTAISE Sain-Jeande-Maurienne MAURIENNE

Annecy

Chambéry

DUCHY OF SAVOY

DUCHY OF AOSTA

Montmelian Montmélian

Grenoble

Briançon

Casale

Turin

Fenestrelles Fenestrelle Exilles

Dauphiné

Milan

PRINCIPALITY OF PIEDMONT

Pignerolo

Genoa

Embrun

FRANCE

Barcelonette COUNTY OF NICE

Provence

Toulon

Oneglia

Nice

L I G U R I AN S E A

N NEA RA R E MEDIT

SEA

Map 4: The duchy of Savoy and the Savoyard state, c. 1690

Map 4 / MUP / AB / DS / 23.10.2012

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 14

12/03/2013 16:10

Introduction

‘The frontier has always devoured French history’ (Fernand Braudel)1

The slow process of expansion by which France took the form of l’hexagone has been the object of much historical interest over the years. Louis XIV’s reign has naturally been the focus of much of this, as the Sun King presided over the acquisition of several new provinces which added significantly to the kingdom’s dimensions. Traditionally, the small states such as Lorraine and Piedmont-Savoy that were conquered, absorbed or dismembered along the way were ignored.Yet in the shadow of both the cultural and transnational ‘turns’, historians have begun to look anew at the way states and societies along the kingdom’s frontiers reacted to growing French influence. French territorial ambitions and c­onsequent military activity during the reign of Louis XIV ensured that a number of territories bordering on France were subject to military occupation for strategic reasons from the 1660s onwards. That these territories were conquered and subsequently handed back to their original rulers is something that historians have so far failed to address. It is the purpose of this book to investigate the occupations of two of these territories, Lorraine and Savoy, both of which were occupied twice during the course of Louis’s personal rule: Lorraine in 1670–97 and 1702–14, Savoy in 1690–96 and again in 1703–13. Part of the reason for the neglect of this topic lies in the curious nature of military occupation: a product of warfare but distinct from the conduct of hostilities.2 This is especially true for the early modern period, when military occupation was a relatively new concept and its definition still imprecise. After 1500, it became widely accepted that rulers could further their war aims through the temporary domination of foreign territory, whereas earlier, during the High Middle Ages, conquest alone made a change of ruler both lawful and lasting. The term occupatio bellica appeared in the seventeenth century as part of the evolution from the medieval theory of just war (bellum iustum) to the theory of legal war (bellum legale publicum), an evolution which occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.3 The conqueror’s rights to dispose of the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 1

12/03/2013 16:10

2

absolute monarchy on the frontiers

territory were upheld by theorists such as Grotius. The rationale was that the conqueror was allowed to reap his just military rewards during the prosecution of war itself. Grotius conceded far-reaching rights and powers to the conqueror over the lives and the freedom of the people of the conquered territory and their movable goods.4 He nevertheless advised moderation in the treatment of conquered populations, and argued that it was better to leave them to govern themselves if this did not interfere with the interests of the conqueror, as this would be beneficial to both parties in the long term.5 As so few studies of societies under occupation in the early modern period have been undertaken in any depth,6 it is necessary to draw on some of the methodological questions that have arisen in the study of more recent military occupations. One particularly useful development is the ambition to open up a comparative study of territories under occupation. In the conclusion to their highly influential publication of the proceedings of a 1990 conference held in Paris, Jean-Pierre Azéma and François Bédarida suggested the importance of studying the comparative history of European countries during the Second World War, adding: ‘In short, far from wishing to erase the differences, comparative history has had as its principal function to bring them very much to the forefront’.7 Philippe Burrin, moreover, has argued that, ‘a comparative method, in aiming to establish similarities and differences, requires an effort at conceptualization that may well lead historians to new questions’.8 Burrin has also shown how Nazi Europe represented a patchwork, as Hitler settled each situation by the expedients dictated by the political, strategic and ideological interests of the moment, hence the variation in the forms of domination, exploitation and persecution.9 Policies of occupation can vary greatly, as is evident if the Nazi ‘patchwork’ is compared with the relative (though by no means straightforward) uniformity of the occupation policies of Napoleon. Tim Blanning also followed this method in attempting to identify the most important similarities and differences between the experience of the Rhineland and that of other parts of Frenchoccupied Germany in the 1790s. The role of the French army was central to that comparison: military exploitation was a common experience shared by all who came under French occupation, but there was considerable variation in the political framework that came with it.10 Such a comparative approach applied to the occupations of Louis XIV’s reign will show whether the Bourbon monarchy applied a uniform structure to its occupations of foreign lands, or whether its methods varied according to time and place. New approaches have also focused on the face-to-face interaction between occupier and occupied, on the levels of both the lived experience and symbolic representation.11 In 2005, for instance, Jacques Hantraye produced a study of the allied occupation of France of 1815–18. This work concentrated on the meeting

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 2

12/03/2013 16:10

introduction

3

of different peoples, and the effects that this had on the collective psychology of both the occupiers and occupied, discussing the complexity of feelings and hesitations, and the confusion of attitudes, caused by the new experience of invasion and occupation. As Hantraye pointed out, ‘this dive into the mass of the population offers many suggestions to those who are interested in earlier occupations’.12 Though the wealth of private letters and journals available to the historian of the modern period is not available for the early modernist, this nevertheless highlights the importance of attempting to reconstruct attitudes in order to understand the way occupations progressed. Historians of the Grand Règne have so far failed to adapt to these methodological developments. Consequently, studies of territories under occupation in this period still tend to focus almost exclusively on the military, legal or administrative aspects of occupation.13 The inherent problem with this approach is that it shows only the official view, and the intentions of the occupier often differed greatly from reality.14 Inadequacies of supply for instance (a chronic problem in the later wars of Louis XIV’s reign, given the ramshackle state of the French economy) meant that, whatever the government’s objectives might have been, soldiers had no choice but to take their subsistence into their own hands.15 Lorraine and Savoy constitute ideal case studies for an initial comparative analysis of French occupations in the reign of Louis XIV. Both territories had much in common with France in language, culture, institutions and social structures. They were also almost exclusively Catholic,16 which largely precludes the need to factor French policy towards Protestants and Jews into the analysis. In many ways, Lorraine and Savoy presented far fewer challenges to French administrators than did Roussillon, Alsace or Flanders, which were all occupied and then permanently annexed.17 In short, Lorraine and Savoy have sufficient in common to make a comparative study of them manageable, but there are also sufficient differences between them to make such a study worthwhile. Furthermore, neither territory has been subjected to recent historical analysis for the period in question.18 An overview of the occupations of Lorraine and Savoy would therefore be valuable in itself. These territories were among the last territorial additions to mainland France: Lorraine was officially annexed on the death of its last duke, Stanislas Leszczyński, in 1766, and Savoy following a plebiscite in 1860. French scholars have devoted much attention and a sizeable quantity of scholarly works to Lorraine. This interest must in part be ascribed to the importance of the region in the national psyche, arising from its partial loss to the German Empire in 1871, together with the long-held historiographical concern about ‘natural frontiers’. English-speaking historians, in contrast, have largely ignored Lorraine, perhaps not fully understanding the situation of this sovereign duchy. Like PiedmontSavoy, it was a state in its own right and a home-grown patriot literature existed:

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 3

12/03/2013 16:10

4

absolute monarchy on the frontiers

Lorrain chroniclers of the eighteenth century wrote virulently anti-French accounts of Louis XIV’s occupation of 1670–97, accounts which had a lasting influence on later historians. These made out that the occupation was almost an act of brigandage, perpetrated with as much bad faith as brutality.19 Nineteenthcentury historians, such as Haussonville, predictably focused excessively on the lives and actions of the princes, rather than the situation in the duchies. However, in 1931, Edgar de Lanouvelle published a re-examination of the official correspondence and a different tale began to emerge: the French governor Marshal Créqui, it was now argued, completed a thankless task with ‘vigour and moderation’.20 But this was still only part of the story. Guy Cabourdin provided an excellent synthesis of existing works on the French occupations of Lorraine in his Encyclopédie illustrée de la Lorraine, but we still lack an up-to-date account based on thorough archival research.21 For Savoy, there exists no systematic study in French or English of the French occupations of 1690–96 and 1703–13. As part of a larger composite state, the duchy of Savoy as an entity in itself has been the subject of few studies.22 Finding things of relevance to the French occupations of the duchy therefore involves usually unrewarding consultation of locally written micro-histories with limited geographical and conceptual focus.23 Moreover, the tradition of local studies as part of French (and Italian) historiography, together with the political destiny which separated Savoy and Nice from Piedmont in 1860, meant that there were until recently few works that dealt with the Savoyard state as a whole: French scholars studied Savoy and Nice while their Italian counterparts studied Piedmont. Recent English-language studies of the Savoyard state, notably those of Geoffrey Symcox and Christopher Storrs, have begun to overcome this limited perspective. Though dealing with the territories of the House of Savoy as a whole, they devote some attention to the importance of the regions, where particularism still held sway against uniformity well into the reign of Victor Amadeus II. Storrs’s work also assesses the impact of the French occupations of Savoy on state formation. Both Storrs and Symcox therefore provide, up to a point, the necessary ‘state-wide’ context in which the duchy of Savoy must be placed.24 Studies of Lorraine and Savoy under occupation also have the potential to reveal much about the workings of the French state, through an investigation of the ways in which the local elites collaborated with the centre, on what terms, and why. Since the 1960s, revisionist historians have discredited the old idea of a powerful, autonomous, absolute monarchy reducing unruly society to obedience in the name of modernity and progress. While Louis XIV succeeded in drawing the state and France’s elites closer together after the Frondes, he was a traditionalist who maintained stability entirely through the effective use of traditional modes of governance.25 Yet there remain sizeable gaps in the work of the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 4

12/03/2013 16:10

introduction

5

revisionists: in particular, there is a lack of diversity in provincial studies.William Beik and James Collins provided important studies of Languedoc and Brittany respectively, but both of these provinces were pays d’états; equivalent political studies of the pays conquis have tended to lack the same depth or breadth of vision, with the exception of Georges Livet’s study of Alsace of 1956 and Daryl Dee’s more recent work on the Franche-Comté.26 Another large gap in our understanding of French politics under Louis XIV arises from a still considerable neglect of the crisis-filled second half of the reign. Only very recently have historians begun to analyse the effects of prolonged warfare on the development of the absolute monarchy;27 and based on these initial findings it looks increasingly likely that some of the conclusions of the revisionists – particularly their emphasis on co-operation and compromise – are relevant only to the first half of reign, as the monarchy resorted to more coercive measures after 1688. The occupations of Lorraine and Savoy together span forty-four years of Louis XIV’s personal rule, with Lorraine occupied around the time Louis was developing a new relationship with the pays d’états, and Savoy occupied during the two great wars later in the reign. They therefore offer a particular, if unusual, platform from which to view any evolution in the crown’s relations with the local elites, should any such evolution exist. Another debate to which the study of these occupations can contribute is that of Louis XIV’s policy towards France’s eastern frontier.With the noteworthy exception of Daniel Nordman, most historians in recent years have steered well clear of the issue.28 The topic has been imbued with so many erroneous agendas over the past century and a half, be they nationalist, étatist or whiggish, or simply resulting from an insufficient grasp of archival material, that many have been daunted by the task and decided to leave well alone. While twentiethcentury historians such as Gaston Zeller broke with the old ‘exultant and emphatic’ vision of the national past, they left an extremely fractured picture.29 Historians nowadays tend to agree that no early modern decision maker had any grand strategies for the conduct of foreign relations; as Andrew Lossky put it, ‘Most were pragmatically willing to take advantage of developments to achieve whatever gains were possible.’30 The most recent treatments stress that Louis’ ideas on foreign policy were often disjointed or incompatible, and the changes in his views through his reign were profound. Furthermore, in the field of international relations it has recently been argued that second-rank powers like Piedmont–Savoy helped circumscribe the options of major powers, whose policies may have been more reactive than hitherto appreciated.31 One further theme contributes to the overall shape and content of this book. Lorraine and Savoy were frontier societies, situated in the borderlands between the kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire. Though these boundaries were invisible, relations between the French on one side and the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 5

12/03/2013 16:10

6

absolute monarchy on the frontiers

Lorrains and the Savoyards on the other were conditioned by long-standing and deeply-held preconceptions of each other. These conceptions would have a decisive impact on the course of the occupations. Historians working in the field of frontier studies have called for approaches to and analyses of frontier societies from a local rather than centrist perspective.32 This study therefore aims to provide as much local perspective as possible. It is notoriously difficult, however, for historians of early modern societies to gauge the mood of a large group of people, even using modern methods such as prosopography. The present study does not, therefore, claim to tell the story of these occupations with equal emphasis on both points of view. This would be impossible, given the relative paucity of sources available for the occupied populations in this period. Its focus is principally on France’s policy towards occupied territories.Yet it will become clear that, to fully understand the formulation of French policy, one must take into account the attitudes and priorities of the occupied populations themselves. This study draws upon a wide range of sources, including archival material from Paris, Vincennes, Nancy, Chambéry, Annecy and Turin, as well as relevant secondary literature. Yet, as with many comparative studies, the same quantity and variety of sources are not available for each case study. In the French war archives, the volume of ministerial correspondence grows exponentially during the 1690s and 1700s, but is comparatively scant for much of the earlier period of the occupation of Lorraine, particularly between the Treaty of Nijmegen (1679) and the outbreak of the Nine Years War (1688). Furthermore, the suppression of the sovereign courts of Lorraine in early 1671 meant that the companies kept no records for almost the entire period of the French occupation, effectively depriving the Lorrain elites of any collective voice. By contrast, the periods of occupation of Savoy have left more abundant records, both from the French administrators and from the Savoyard elites. These disparities mean that the behaviour and motivations of both the French and the occupied populations are easier to understand in some periods and in some contexts than in others. Chapter 1 provides some necessary background in terms of French frontier strategy during the seventeenth century, and also relations between France, Lorraine and Piedmont-Savoy in the longer term; it includes a brief account of the occupation of Lorraine under cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, to provide useful comparison with an earlier occupation. Chapter 2 then gives a narrative analysis of the occupations from the point of view of France’s strategic priorities. Chapters 3 and 4 consider the administrative side of the occupations, in terms of the structures and personnel put in place by the French regime and the financial and security burdens imposed on occupier and occupied. In Part III, the final chapters of the book investigate French policy towards elite groups, and their reactions to French occupation. Chapter 5 looks at the ways in which

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 6

12/03/2013 16:10

introduction

7

the nobilities responded: whether they chose to collaborate with or resist the French, and what forms that collaboration and resistance took. In Chapter 6, attention turns to those who held offices in occupied territories, in the sovereign courts – where they continued to exist – as well as in the lower, subaltern courts and the towns. Finally, Chapter 7 considers the church: French policies towards, and the responses of, the episcopate, the religious superiors and the lower regular and secular clergy. By taking a thematic, comparative approach to the occupations of Lorraine and Savoy, this book attempts to identify the key similarities and differences between the way the French governed these territories and behaved towards the native populations. It considers the range of dynamic factors that influenced the course of the occupations, placing equal emphasis on issues of geopolitics (i.e., the reasons for the occupations and the reasons for relinquishing the territories), frontier administration and the socio-cultural factors which determined relations between France and the local populations. In doing so, it provides an original perspective on the aims and intentions, and also the limitations, of the early modern French state.

Notes

1 F. Braudel, The identity of France, trans. S. Reynolds (2 vols., London, 1988), i, p. 309. 2 P. Stirk, The politics of military occupation (Edinburgh, 2009), pp. 1–3. 3 H. Steiger, ‘ “Occupatio bellica” in der Literatur des Völkerrechts der Christenheit (Spätmittel­ alter bis 18. Jahrhundert)’ in M. Meumann and J. Rogge (eds), Die besetzte Res publica, pp. 201–40. 4 H. Grotius, The rights of war and peace, ed. R. Tuck (3 vols., Indianapolis, IN, 2005), iii, pp. 1375–7. 5 Ibid., iii, pp. 1507–10. 6 The English occupation of Scotland under Oliver Cromwell is one that has attracted significant attention from historians: e.g., F. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland (Edinburgh, 1979), and S. Barber, ‘The formation of cultural attitudes: the example of the three kingdoms in the 1650s’ in A. I. Macinnes and J. Ohlmeyer (eds), The Stuart kingdoms in the seventeenth century (Dublin, 2002). 7 J.-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida, Vichy et les Français (Paris, 1992), p. 767. 8 P. Burrin, ‘Writing the History of Military Occupations’ in S. Fishman et al. (eds), France at war: Vichy and the historians (Oxford, 2000), p. 78. 9 P. Burrin, ‘Vichy et les expériences étrangères’ in Azéma and Bédarida, Vichy et les Français, p. 650. 10 T. C. W. Blanning, The French Revolution in Germany: occupation and resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802 (Oxford, 1983), pp. 317–19. See also Michael Broers’ The Napoleonic empire in Italy, 1796–1814: cultural imperialism in a European context? (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 175–207 on the political frameworks put in place across Italy under Napoleon. 11 Burrin, ‘Writing the History’, p. 81. 12 J. Hantraye, Les Cosaques aux Champs-Elysées: L’Occupation de la France après la chute de Napoléon (Paris, 2005), p. 6. 13 See for example H. van Houtte, Les Occupations étrangères en Belgique sous l’ancien régime (Paris, 1930); I. Lameire, Les Occupations militaires en Italie pendant les guerres de Louis XIV (Paris 1903). For a recent, administrative study of Louis XIV’s occupation of Nice, see Pierre-Olivier Chaumet’s Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’: Etude politique et institutionnelle d’une annexion inaboutie (1691–1713) (Nice, 2006).

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 7

12/03/2013 16:10

8

absolute monarchy on the frontiers

14 See K. H. Wegert, German radicals confront the common people: revolutionary politics and popular politics, 1789–1849 (Mainz, 1992), p. 19; Blanning, French Revolution, p. 83. 15 See G. Rowlands, The financial decline of a great power: war, influence and money in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, 2012). 16 A small number of Protestants continued to live in the Vosges mountains in Lorraine, as well as in the southern Alps bordering on Savoy. Lorraine was also home to a very small community of Jews, but there were none in Savoy. See below, pp. 16 and 24. 17 On these territories see E. Coornaert, La Flandre française de la langue flamande (Paris, 1970); G. Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace de la guerre de trente ans à la morte de Louis XIV, 1634–1715 (2nd edn, Strasbourg, 1991); D. Stewart, Assimilation and acculturation in seventeenth-century Europe: Roussillon and France, 1659–1715 (Westport, CT, 1997). 18 By contrast, the earlier French occupation of Lorraine (1631–61) has been fairly well documented: M.C.Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu et la Lorraine (Paris, 2004); P. Martin, Une guerre de trente ans en Lorraine, 1631–1661 (Metz, 2002). 19 See for example A. Calmet, Histoire ecclesiastique et civile de Lorraine (4 vols., Nancy, 1728); J. Cléron de Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion de la Lorraine à la France (4 vols., Paris, 1860). 20 E. Lanouvelle, Le Maréchal de Créquy (Paris, 1931). 21 G. Cabourdin, Encyclopédie illustrée de la Lorraine: Les temps modernes (2 vols., Nancy, 1991). 22 One noteworthy exception to this is Jean Nicolas’s social and economic history, La Savoie au 18e siècle: Noblesse et bourgeoisie (2 vols., Paris, 1978). 23 There are, however, one or two short yet useful studies, e.g. J. C. Devos, ‘Aspects de l’occupation française en Savoie (1703–1712)’, Actes du Congres National – Sociétés Savantes Section D Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 85 (1960); drawing on documents from the war archives, this deals with some of the military and fiscal aspects of the occupation. 24 C. Storrs, War, diplomacy and the rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge, 1999); G. Symcox, Victor Amadeus II: absolutism in the Savoyard state, 1675–1730 (London, 1983). 25 W. Beik, ‘The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration’, Past and Present 188 (2005). 26 W. Beik, Absolutism and society in seventeenth-century France: state power and provincial aristocracy (Cambridge, 1985); J. Collins, Classes, estates and order in early-modern Brittany (Cambridge, 1994); D. Dee, Expansion and crisis in Louis XIV’s France: the Franche-Comté and absolute monarchy (Rochester, NY, 2009); Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace. 27 See for instance Dee, Expansion and crisis, and J. Swann, Provincial power and absolute monarchy: the Estates General of Burgundy, 1661–1790 (Cambridge, 2003), particularly chapters 6 and 7. 28 See D. Nordman, Frontières de France: de l’espace au territoire, XVIe–XIXe siècle (Paris, 1998). 29 Ibid., p. 90. 30 A. Lossky, ‘ “Maxims of State” in Louis XIV’s Foreign Policy in the 1680s’ in J. Bromley and R. Hatton (eds), William III and Louis XIV (Liverpool, 1968), p. 8. 31 J. Black, European international relations, 1648–1815 (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 42. 32 See for instance the introduction to Steven Ellis and Reingard Eßer’s Frontiers and the writing of history, 1500–1850 (Hanover, 2006).

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 8

12/03/2013 16:10

Part I The eastern frontiers of France in the age of Louis XIV

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 9

12/03/2013 16:10

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 10

12/03/2013 16:10

1 Lorraine, Savoy and the frontiers of France

Lorraine and Savoy existed in the political and cultural borderlands that separated France from, respectively, the Rhenish imperial principalities and Reichsitalien. Through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the rulers and elites of these frontier territories found themselves caught in the ongoing power struggle between the Valois/Bourbons and the Habsburgs, who jostled for influence in these small but strategically vital territories.1 Subject to frequent French military intervention over the centuries, both were occupied either wholly or partly on two separate occasions during the personal rule of Louis XIV. This chapter examines the background to the conquest and occupation of these territories during the reign of the Sun King. It begins with a brief exploration of French Government policies on the eastern frontiers of the kingdom in this period, with the aim of identifying the priorities and mindset of the king and his ministers. This context is essential in understanding the occupations of Savoy and Lorraine. This chapter also seeks to establish the political, social, economic and cultural circumstances of the territories themselves. Historians of more recent military occupations have demonstrated that, to fully comprehend the priorities and attitudes of both occupier and occupied, it is essential to understand the regime that preceded the occupation.2 Lorraine and Savoy were not, as they have sometimes been portrayed, wayward frontier provinces of France. Both were components of larger politico-dynastic sovereign entities which had their own ancient, separate histories.The dukes of Lorraine and Savoy ruled over ‘composite’ states (though they were composite by varying degrees),3 which comprised disparate lands held together principally by bonds of dynastic loyalty. The internal dynamics of these composite political structures would have an important effect on the way these territories responded to foreign occupation, as will become clear in Part III of this book.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 11

12/03/2013 16:10

12

the eastern frontiers of france

French frontier strategy under Louis XIV The first three decades of Louis XIV’s personal rule saw significant territorial additions to the kingdom of France. At the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, the Spanish province of Rosselló and part of the Cerdanya region were annexed and became the province of Roussillon. In the north, the border was gradually pushed back as parts of the Spanish Netherlands were annexed piecemeal at the Peace of the Pyrenees and the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668) and Nijmegen (1678), and Lorraine, the Franche-Comté, Strasbourg, Luxembourg and other réunion territories on the north-eastern frontier were conquered in the 1670s and early 1680s (see Map 1). Current thinking on the strategy behind these acquisitions is that Louis XIV was continuing the principal concern of French rulers for centuries: securing the kingdom’s borders through the acquisition of buffer zones and more defensible frontiers.4 The Valois and Bourbon kings had gained territories and fortifications on the Rhine and at strategic sites in northern Italy as a means of pursuing offensive and defensive warfare more effectively. As Gaston Zeller put it, ‘the ideal frontier was not only, nor even principally, that which sheltered the French from invasion; it was above all that which would permit them to carry their arms outside of the kingdom’.5 The real Leitmotiv of Louis XIV’s reign, it now seems, was ensuring the security of the Bourbon dynasty and the maintenance, if not strengthening, of the kingdom by boosting French prestige and influence. Partly this could be attained by the acquisition of territory to further develop these ‘strategic frontiers’ and partly by bringing surrounding smaller states directly into France’s orbit. Louis’s strategic goals were in many ways a continuation of the all-embracing concept of ‘long-term security’ seen in the assertive foreign policy of Cardinal Richelieu, whereby the cardinal sought to gain the greatest possible territorial and strategic advantages for France.6 In particular, Richelieu’s government was preoccupied for much of the early 1630s with the threat of an invasion across France’s eastern frontiers, and adopted the geostrategic concept of ‘gates’ – points of secure entry and exit for troops operating in Germany; he also occupied territories on France’s frontiers as a means of guaranteeing communications with France’s allies while disrupting Habsburg communication routes. Although the French crown routinely advanced dynastic claims to further its strategic aims on the frontiers throughout the seventeenth century, these claims had largely become a mere matter of form. Dynastic ambition was without doubt still a driving force in French foreign policy, but by Louis XIV’s reign it was tempered by a more general stress on considerations of raison d’état.7 These policies also reflected contemporary notions of the frontière, which by the seventeenth century denoted a liminal space at the extremity of the realm, a zone that could shrink, expand or shift location following territorial

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 12

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

13

changes.8 Yet such concepts were far from static through this period. Despite a revisionist stress on limited change in international relations before and after the Peace of Westphalia, improvements in mapping in the second half of the seventeenth century led to a firmer grasp of the nature both of the frontier and of political sovereignty.9 This evolution in mentalities was certainly reflected in policy: from the 1670s, strategists such as Vauban advocated the creation of more linear frontiers and, over the course of Louis XIV’s reign, the northern border which stretched from the North Sea to the Meuse was successfully squared off.10 But in spite of these trends, many of France’s borderlands remained irregular, riddled with enclaves, exclaves and pays indivis (territories where sovereignty was shared), and whose shape was still determined by feudal fief boundaries, well into the eighteenth century.11 This was especially the case in the northeast, where innumerable overlapping feudal jurisdictions meant that the frontier continued to be undefined and confused.12 Linked with these changes, an idea gained currency that the kingdom’s ideal form should constitute a space bounded and enclosed by nature. As Vauban put it in 1693, ‘All the ambitions of France should be contained within the summits of the Alps and the Pyrenees, the Swiss and the two seas: it is there that she should intend to establish her boundaries by legitimate means according to the times and the occasions.’13 While the concept of ‘natural frontiers’ as a guiding principle in Louis XIV’s foreign policy came to be dismissed by historians, thanks to the work of Gaston Zeller, more recent developments in methodology have meant that the debate over France’s ‘natural frontiers’ rumbles on, though with somewhat different points of emphasis. Peter Sahlins has argued that natural frontiers were, in a way, pivotal to French frontier policy, ‘not as boundaries but as passages’.14 Furthermore, Daniel Nordman has pointed out that Zeller ignored the importance of many publications in the seventeenth century, especially by Jesuits, which helped to make natural frontiers such as the Rhine a common image which permeated all levels of society from the nobility to labourers. While this may not have directly influenced the policy of Louis XIV, Nordman argues that the wide extent to which it informed contemporary preoccupations towards territory and strategy should not be ignored.15 Such geographic ‘visions’ of France’s frontiers in the popular consciousness extended not only to the Rhine, but to the entire limits of ancient Gaul, which extended in the south-east to the Alps and the Var.16 Prominent in the popular consciousness though such images may have been, the legitimating discourse in French expansionism in this period was not nature but a combination of history, dynastic inheritance and feudal law. In seventeenth-century Europe, brute conquest alone was rarely seen as sufficient for annexation, and territorial changes needed to be explained and justified by reference to both history and legal titles.17 The French were sensitive to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 13

12/03/2013 16:10

14

the eastern frontiers of france

this: under Richelieu, if circumstances dictated the permanent occupation of territories to which France had no dynastic claims, for instance in the towns of Alsace, the concept of military and diplomatic ‘protection’ was used instead; this shielded France from the reputation of Sweden, which was notorious for having claimed territory by right of conquest alone.18 To facilitate its strategic objectives, the French crown developed and maintained an arsenal of jealously guarded claims to territories on the kingdom’s frontiers, which needed to be kept alive, if hibernating, and could be activated whenever necessity dictated. The ‘use and abuse’ of history and feudal law to legitimise French expansionism had come into its own under the cardinal ministers: the annexations of Alsace and Roussillon, for example, were presented as ‘reunions’ of the crown’s legitimate patrimony to the kingdom.19 By the time Louis XIV assumed personal control of his government, therefore, there was already ample precedent for activating latent claims on titles to legitimise a French monarch’s control of conquered territory, which could be strengthened by the invocation of history and the laws of dynastic succession. At the French court, views on frontier states such as Lorraine and Savoy were conditioned also by the presence of a cohort of princes belonging to cadet branches of the ruling dynasties, such as the Lorraine-Guise, the SavoyNemours and the Gonzaga-Nevers. As Jonathan Spangler has recently suggested, these princely clans could be of great use to France in its cross-frontier links in several unofficial ways.20 Their continued presence and importance at court meant that the French Government had a channel of influence to Lorraine and Piedmont-Savoy, by which it could exert pressure and bind the Lorrain and Savoyard rulers to France. These links were also maintained by the presence in these borderlands of elites who belonged to a shared ‘geo-cultural landscape’ and whose family, property and material interests transcended the idea of the linear frontier, as Part III of this study details.21 Yet beyond the ‘society of princes’ and the elites who surrounded them, ideas about occupation, annexation or interstate relations with foreign territories just beyond the frontier did not extend into popular consciousness at this time; French public concepts of these territories were generally limited to crude stereotypes.22 Overall, factors conditioning French relations with Lorraine and Savoy were driven most of all by strategic and dynastic interests, and to a lesser extent by changing concepts of the frontier.The next section investigates these relations in further detail: it looks at diplomatic relations between the rulers, at the ties that existed across the frontier, and also at how France was viewed from within Lorrain and Savoyard societies.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 14

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

15

Lorraine and France, c.1552–1670 Lorraine sat at the crossroads of Europe – from the Middle Ages it had been open to influences from Germany, Italy, the Low Countries and France, flourishing culturally and artistically through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Its location, at a strategically vital point on the frontier between France and the Holy Roman Empire, heightened its relative importance. The multiple influences and pressures upon it had made the territory extremely complex in terms of overlapping frontiers: feudal, administrative, judicial, financial and religious – as one historian has said, Lorraine was ‘not one, but multiple’.23 Within what was termed ‘Lorraine’ were: the duchy of Lorraine proper (which had been a legally independent ‘protectorate’ of the Empire since 1542); the duchy of Bar, half of which (the Barrois mouvant) fell under the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris, while the other half (the Barrois non-mouvant) was under the full sovereignty of the dukes; and various small territories in the Holy Roman Empire. Further complicating the picture was the status of the Trois Evêchés – the towns of Metz, Toul and Verdun, which had been conquered by the French in 1552 and which were officially received into French sovereignty at the Treaty of Münster in 1648. These three bishoprics and their hinterlands came to be organised into a French généralité with its own intendant and governor, and the presence of these French exclaves meant that the Lorraine region was officially shared between two sovereignties, a fact which would prove to be of great diplomatic and strategic consequence, as these sovereignties were bound, by their orientation and interests, to compete against each other (see Map 2). The complexity and incertitudes of the political geography of the region did not predispose Lorraine to a centralised regime. Furthermore, the feudal nobility, naturally associated with public affairs thanks to the practice of holding yearly meetings of the Estates General, still wielded significant influence in the running of the state into the seventeenth century. The Lorrain nobility traditionally administered much of the justice in the state through the feudal Cour des assises, over which the duke had very little control.24 Though the sixteenth century had seen conflict between the duke – who wished to exert greater control over the state and its institutions – and the ancienne chevalerie (akin to the French ‘sword’ nobility), the continued existence of the tribunal of the assises attests to the place the nobility conserved for themselves in Lorrain society.25 In the Barrois, however, neither the chevalerie nor the assises existed, and government institutions were in general closer to the French model.26 Families of the ancienne chevalerie were also an important link between Lorraine and France. Among them were the Choiseul, Apremont and Nettancourt families, all originally from Champagne, the Ludres from Burgundy and the Beauvau family, who came from Anjou in the fifteenth century.27 The

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 15

12/03/2013 16:10

16

the eastern frontiers of france

Haraucourts, Lenoncourts and other high nobility married into French grandee families, creating dynastic alliances.28 Many of these families had long traditions of French military service and several – the Stainville-Couvonges, Lenoncourts and Nettancourts – fought on the French side in the Thirty Years War.29 The Barrois elites were particularly close to France. Many married into French society and became francisised in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a trend that continued despite – or because of – the ensuing French ­occupations.30 Economically, too, the Barrois was orientated towards the neighbouring French province of the Champagne, partly because its rivers flowed into the Marne and Meuse, whereas Lorraine looked east and was traditionally geared more to Rhenish trade networks than to France.31 Yet the French occupation of Metz, Toul and Verdun from 1552 contributed to the economic stagnation of both duchies. After its sixteenth-century peak, Lorraine’s economy declined significantly and commerce was severely hampered by an under-developed industrial sector. While the Trois Evêchés enjoyed significant trade and were home to a fairly cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, including many Protestants and Jews,32 society in ducal Lorraine remained overwhelmingly Catholic and rural, its towns few and small, its scattered bourgeoisie scarcely constituting a political or social force. Lorraine’s overlapping jurisdictions deprived it of strength and unity, and made it vulnerable. Moreover, due to its location it was caught, from the sixteenth century onwards, in a precarious position between France and the Holy Roman Empire. French rulers pursued a policy of dynastic alliances with Lorraine through the second half of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, as a means of maintaining and extending their influence there.33 Henri II’s occupation of the Trois Evêchés in 1552 gave France a firm military foothold in the region, curtailing Lorraine’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. This became increasingly apparent in the ThirtyYears War.34 In the mid-1620s a succession crisis in the duchy raised tensions between France and Lorraine, intensified in 1629 when Gaston d’Orléans went into open opposition to Richelieu and took refuge in Nancy. Given the increasingly volatile situation in Europe, the hostility of Duke Charles IV towards France presented Cardinal Richelieu with the alarming prospect of a potential imperial place d’armes in Lorraine. Attempts at forcing protectorate status on Lorraine proved fruitless after the duke repeatedly showed himself to be unreliable and unable to adhere to French terms.35 An irritated Cardinal Richelieu decided to solve the problem of Lorraine with a pre-emptive strike. Louis XIII occupied Bar in August 1633, meeting very little opposition; after a brief siege, Nancy fell in mid-September.The whole of Lorraine, including its fortresses, was in French hands by the middle of 1634.36 As David Parrott has argued, Lorraine’s importance for France originated in Richelieu’s strategic, fiscal and logistic requirements. The aim was to spare France as much as possible

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 16

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

17

the burdens of war, while increasing costs for the Spanish and the Imperials, and the key to this policy was to seize large swathes of enemy territory.37 These provinces could then serve as places d’armes: military zones in which occupying French armies could systematically plunder all resources they required from the local population, while also denying them to the enemy. Several months before the conquest of the duchies, the French had created the Parlement of Metz. This new institution, which started work in August 1633, marked a major development of the French Government’s influence and control in the region.38 After the suppression of a short-lived Conseil souverain in Nancy in 1637, the Parlement became the linchpin of French administration in Lorraine.39 Also in 1637, central authority was bolstered with the creation of an intendant residing in Metz.40 Yet the occupation rested very much on native services: the Chambres des comptes of Nancy and Bar were maintained, along with the bailliages and prévôtés (local courts). This reflected Richelieu’s intention to encourage collaboration with the Lorrain elites, and set the tone for French policy towards them for the rest of the occupation.41 Cardinal Mazarin maintained the same system of administration in Lorraine as established by Richelieu: governors and intendants were supe­rimposed on an indigenous local administration, collecting established taxes and making troops live off the province.42 Despite initial French military success, Croats de bois ravaged the country and these raiding parties tied down many French soldiers. Writing several decades later, the marquis de Beauvau claimed that these Lorrain brigands did far more harm to their compatriots than the French troops did, reducing the peasantry to a ‘deplorable misery’ and bringing famine: ‘one even saw many women reduced to the necessity of eating their own children so as not to starve’.43 A new governor, the comte de La Ferté-Senneterre, appointed in 1643, served for eighteen years. Though rapacious and avaricious, he re-imposed order on the duchies and put an end to much of the activity of the raiding parties, pointing to a shift in style from Richelieu’s era.44 The problem of Lorraine was not resolved at the Peace of Westphalia. Cardinal Mazarin wavered, uncertain whether to annex the duchies or return them demilitarised to the duke.45 The French therefore engineered the exclusion of the Lorrain envoys from the peace negotiations, and, as Charles IV was closer to the Spanish than to the emperor, the imperial negotiators would not make the return of Lorraine a precondition of peace. Furthermore, the duke had to watch from the sidelines as the emperor handed sovereignty of Metz, Toul and Verdun to the French monarchy. As the war between France and Spain continued, no solution could be found, and Lorraine’s fate was now more closely than ever tied up with the conflict. For the time being, the duke could do little other than go on supporting the Spanish side, and Lorraine remained under French rule.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 17

12/03/2013 16:10

18

the eastern frontiers of france

The assimilation of Lorraine into the French monarchy continued, but it remained fragile and superficial.46 The French simply lacked the time and resources required to fully impose their political or juridical authority on the duchies. Though in theory they had superimposed a new top layer of administration while co-opting the rest of the duchies’ traditional apparatus, this strategy was in practice frustrated by a laxity of control from Paris. Conditions were favourable to clandestine maintenance of the ducal-aligned administration, alongside that imposed by the French.Wherever French garrisons were not close, Lorrain tribunals loyal to the duke continued to function and exercise justice in Charles IV’s name, and still commanded much respect from the population.47 Furthermore the Cour souveraine of Lorraine continued to sit in exile in Luxembourg, ‘the soul of resistance to the French presence in Lorraine’, judging cases and reciprocally annulling the decrees of the Parlement of Metz. It also raised contributions for Charles IV, showing the ineffective control exercised over the duchies by the French.48 The example of Lorraine shows that French strategies of administering conquered provinces under the cardinal ministers were deeply problematic. It would be for Louis XIV and his ministers to study the mistakes of their predecessors and ensure they were not repeated. Despite a brief, partial reconquest of Lorraine during the Frondes, Charles IV remained exiled and, for the second half of the 1650s, imprisoned by the Spanish. During his captivity, the Lorrain regiments under the duke’s brother Nicolas-François passed into French service, playing an important role at the siege of Montmédy in 1657, and at the Battle of the Dunes the following year. As a result, fewer troops were quartered in Lorraine and the French authorities started a process of pacification and economic reconstruction.49 In 1659 Charles IV was not permitted to send emissaries to the peace negotiations between France and Spain. By the terms of the Peace of the Pyrenees that year, Lorraine would be returned to its duke defortified, and the Barrois was to be annexed by France. Along with these humiliations, the French were to have military rights of access through Lorraine, and the duke was to be obliged to quarter and provision French troops when necessary.50 Outraged by the Spanish sell-out of his interests, Charles refused to accept these terms and upon his release went to Paris to put his case to Mazarin directly. He succeeded in getting Louis XIV and Mazarin to re-open negotiations for the future of Lorraine, and discussions continued through 1660. Finally, on 28 February 1661, the dying Cardinal Mazarin solved the ‘Lorraine problem’ by concluding the Treaty of Vincennes, the terms of which differed considerably from those of the Peace of the Pyrenees. Most notably, Charles IV was to receive back the duchy of Bar, while the French gained certain villages in Lorraine which created a ‘French corridor’, allowing their troops to pass from France into Germany without hindrance. Lorraine had regained its independence, but had lost much of its territorial integrity,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 18

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

19

though this had been somewhat curtailed even before 1633. Henceforth the duchy of Lorraine would be indefensible; at any moment French soldiers could intervene.51 Through the conflict, Lorraine had been ravaged by enemy troops, plague and brigandage.52 As a consequence of nearly thirty years of occupation and hostilities, it suffered a demographic and economic catastrophe, perhaps losing as much as two thirds of its population.53 It is a striking feature of this occupation that the miseries it brought affirmed ‘le patriotisme lorrain’.54 Popular sentiment towards France was envenomed further by the confiscations of property of those who remained loyal to Charles IV. Mazarin’s policy at Vincennes of preparing the way for a future annexation had failed. Indeed, the prospect now seemed more distant than ever; as Braun put it, ‘thirty years of occupation, far from consummating the voluntary union of peoples which language, values and history had for a long time brought together, actually sowed in Lorraine the feelings of defiance, hostility and rancour … which did not disappear until the Revolutionary era’.55 Though the Lorrains had ceased to look to Spain to protect their interests after Westphalia, they were in no mood to throw in their lot with the French. Charles IV’s restoration, 1661–70 As the French regime was dismantled, a power struggle developed between the restored duke and the old elites of the duchy. No sooner had Charles signed the Treaty of Vincennes than he was forced to deal with the ancienne chevalerie of Lorraine which had, without his permission, met in Liverdun to discuss how to recover their old rights and privileges, lost during the war. He had the newly reconstituted Cour souveraine – established to abase the powers of the assises – issue an arrêt banishing the baron de Saffre – one of the principal leaders of the Liverdun assembly – and his family, giving them eight days to leave his states.56 Charles dealt harshly with members of the old elites who resisted his assaults on their privileges: exile and property confiscations were not uncommon.57 The duke also created new senior officers whose competence covered both duchies, in an attempt to reinforce the links between them. But he further alienated the old nobility from 1663 by appointing lower nobles and recently ennobled bourgeois to new judicial offices.58 They were also upset by Charles IV’s refusal to call the Estates General. The abolition of the tribunal of the assises deprived Lorrain noblemen of the possibility of supporting the interests of their corps, and Charles IV also divided them with the distribution of favours, appointing a new generation of nobles to state offices (a generation which had never known local liberties in their full existence).59

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 19

12/03/2013 16:10

20

the eastern frontiers of france

In February 1662 Louis XIV and Charles IV signed the Treaty of Mont­­ martre, which was intended to unite Lorraine and France by peaceful means. By its terms, Charles IV ceded his sovereign rights to the duchies of Lorraine and Bar, allowing France to annex the duchies on his death. In return he and his entire family would be aggregated to the royal family of France and placed in line to the French throne. The king was eager for gloire at this stage of his personal reign, and was more than willing to aggrandise the Lorraine-Guise family, for whom he had great respect, in exchange for strengthening the unstable northeastern frontier.60 French propaganda immediately presented the impending acquisition of Lorraine as the ‘reunion’ of an ancient French province. As the author of one such tract wrote to Louis, ‘You have not acquired Lorraine, you have only recovered it’, and he extolled the virtues of the king for beginning to give back to the French monarchy its ancient territorial limits.61 However, the treaty met with strong resistance in many quarters, including the Parlement of Paris, the Cour souveraine of Lorraine, the Imperial Diet, the French princes du sang, the duke’s heirs Nicolas-François and his son Prince Charles, and the whole of Lorrain society.62 Within a year the treaty had been completely abandoned as a dead letter due to the strength of opposition. The duke sent emissaries to the Imperial Diet to request the formal annulment of the treaty, but neither the emperor nor the German princes wished to upset Louis XIV, so the treaty was left in juridical limbo – something the French would later try to capitalise on.63 Strife would only increase. In 1663, citing one of the clauses of the Treaty of Montmartre, Louis XIV invested the fortress of Marsal. The duke had little choice but to agree to hand over the fortress. With Marsal occupied, future occupations would be just a case of a simple march forward. Further antagonism grew out of the uneasy relationship between Charles IV and the intendant of the Trois Evêchés, Jean-Paul de Choisy. On many occasions, Charles IV complained of Choisy’s lack of deference towards him, and relations between the two men became increasingly uncomfortable; Charles IV dubbed Choisy ‘the artillery’, and the French war minister Louvois was prompted to rebuke the intendant for his lack of respect.64 Essentially this antagonism was the manifestation of a more fundamental anxiety for both France and Lorraine: that of assuring their respective sovereignty and security. The decade saw repeated clashes over territorial control of certain towns, over rival claims to the appointments of benefices, and over Charles IV’s attempts to circumvent French ecclesiastical domination over his states by the creation of a new bishopric. More significantly still, Choisy was given orders to actively research all the titles and deeds which could prove the rights of the king in Lorraine, research which would ultimately prove the basis for the ‘reunions’ of the 1680s. If French intentions were driven by long-term interests such as this, the duke’s methods were driven by ill-will towards France. The later 1660s saw a

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 20

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

21

marked anti-French stance in Charles IV’s foreign policy. During the War of Devolution (1667–8), Charles negotiated a treaty of neutrality that served to allow Spanish soldiers from Luxembourg to use the duchies of Lorraine as a base from which to pillage the Trois Evêchés.65 Irritated by this, Louis XIV demanded the help of Lorrain troops for the Flanders campaign. Charles was understandably hesitant about military collaboration with France, obliging Louis to send his envoy d’Aubeville to Nancy to apply more pressure on the duke.66 In the end, the duke reluctantly agreed, but managed to frustrate Louis’s plans by sending only a part of the contingent he had promised, composed of inexperienced and badly armed recruits. From 1667, Charles also sought an alliance with England, Sweden and Holland to counter-balance the over-powerful position of France. His patience quickly dwindling, Louis XIV in January 1669 ordered Charles IV to disarm, threatening to invade his states if he did not comply. Confronted by an army of 15,000 French troops on his doorstep at Metz, the duke backed down and disarmed.67 But his intrigues continued, first negotiating a defensive alliance with the archbishop of Cologne and several German counts, and then attempting to obtain an alliance with the emperor and Spain.68 The closer relations between Lorraine and the Dutch Republic, facilitated by Prince Charles of Lorraine’s candidacy for the throne of Poland in 1669, was a further cause of worry for Louis XIV.69 Faced with this, Louis XIV charged his secretary of state for foreign affairs, Hugues de Lionne, with devising a plan to depose the duke. Choisy’s advice to Lionne was annexation of the duchies, but Lionne’s own project envisaged replacing Charles IV with his brother Nicolas-François, and fixing the succession on the descendants of Prince Charles.70 The dire state to which Franco-Lorrain relations had sunk by the end of 1669 was compounded in 1670 by a string of provocations on the part of Charles IV. Ducal agents raised customs on commerce between Charles’ lands and the Trois Evêchés, paralysing commerce and leading to a retaliatory French trade embargo. The duke’s position was now desperate, and he appears to have counted on the success of negotiations with the emperor and Holland to save him. Matters came to a head in April 1670 when rumours reached Paris that Lorraine had joined the Triple Alliance of England, Holland and Sweden, while popular unrest broke out in Metz as people suffered under the new customs barriers. As the situation in the Evêchés became more and more untenable, the position of the French Government finally shifted, and military occupation was decided upon, in either late July or August.71 With war against the Dutch Republic looming, it was impossible to leave a ruler as untrustworthy as Charles IV in possession of this strategically vital point for the security of both the frontier with Germany and the French lines of advance down the Meuse and Rhine. For this reason the occupation of Lorraine was a necessity for Louis XIV. Yet it had never been an inevitable course of action. To the king and his minis-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 21

12/03/2013 16:10

22

the eastern frontiers of france

ters, the actions of the duke amounted to a succession of needless provocations. Louis XIV, in his frustration, ultimately had little option but to impose a military solution. Of Charles IV, Louis would probably have shared Saint-Simon’s view that the duke’s life was ‘a tissue of perfidies’ and that through his sheer deceitfulness he had squandered the opportunity for peaceful co-existence between Lorraine and France.72 But the French king was equally to blame for the breakdown in relations during the 1660s, through his arrogant and overbearing behaviour. Thus, despite Louis’s attempts during Charles IV’s restoration to bring Lorraine into France’s political orbit, the House of Lorraine grew ever closer to the Habsburgs, and the kingdom’s north-eastern frontier remained weak and exposed. Moreover, for the population of Lorraine, thirty years of occupation had reinforced feelings of defiance and hostility towards France, which would remain strong and unyielding for the remainder of Louis XIV’s reign.73 Savoy and France, c.1559–1690 Far to the south things were no easier. In the late seventeenth century the House of Savoy ruled over the principality of Piedmont, the county of Nice, the principality of Oneglia, the duchy of Aosta and the duchy of Savoy, which comprised the provinces of Savoy proper, the Genevois, Faucigny, the Chablais, the Tarentaise and the Maurienne (see Map 4). The dynastic union grouping together these culturally and politically disparate territories straddled not only the Alps, but also the internal juridical boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire.74 By its vital geostrategic position the Sabaudian state inevitably found itself uncomfortably squeezed between France and the possessions of the House of Austria, and its dukes spent the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries alternating between support of one or the other. A long period of French occupation of Savoy and Piedmont (1536–59) was concluded by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, whereby France and Spain recognised that the existence of an independent Sabaudian state, guardian of the passages of the Alps, was necessary to maintain the European equilibrium.75 From that point, the French monarchy hoped – as it did in Lorraine – to bind the interests of the dukes of Savoy closer to their own through a series of dynastic alliances, beginning with the marriage of Emmanuel Philibert to Marguerite de Valois, the sister of Henri II. Despite these marriages, the dukes continued to pursue an opportunistic foreign policy, attempting to capitalise on French weaknesses whenever they could, resulting in two further, brief, French occupations of Savoy by Henri IV in 1600–01 and Louis XIII in 1630–31. But, following the death of Charles Emmanuel in 1630 and the signature of the Treaty of Cherasco, the Sabaudian

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 22

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

23

state was placed decisively in the political orbit of France. The French notably gained the fortress of Pinerolo, twenty miles west of Turin, giving them a bridgehead into Italy and a powerful military presence near the ducal capital. First Cardinal Richelieu, and then Cardinal Mazarin and Louis XIV profited from the regencies and periods of influence of the dowager duchesses Marie Christine (1637–48) and Marie Jeanne Baptiste (1675–80) to transform Piedmont-Savoy into a satellite of the French crown. Both women were naturally pro-French in inclination, the former being Louis XIII’s sister, and the latter belonging to the House of Savoy-Nemours, princes étrangers who had been resident in France since the sixteenth century. Through the marriage of Victor Amadeus II to Anne Marie d’Orléans in 1684, Louis XIV believed he could consolidate French tutelage of the Sabaudian state through the traditional method of dynastic alliance. In the context of the twists and turns in Franco-Sabaudian relations, the position of the duchy of Savoy to the west of the Alps made it a perpetual hostage to fortune. In light of this, Duke Emmanuel Philibert abandoned Chambéry and moved his capital to the more secure setting of Turin in 1563. This decision would be of great consequence, as the divide between Piedmont and the duchy of Savoy became increasingly pronounced thereafter. Despite the dynastic union tying them together, the two territories had little in common: while Piedmont was Italian in both language and culture, the essentially francophone duchy of Savoy was influenced more and more by France – particularly after the occupation of 1536–59.76 The French had used this occupation to impose institutions after their own governmental model, notably the introduction of a French-style Parlement in Chambéry.77 In 1560, Emmanuel Philibert reconstituted this court as the Sénat, which thereafter followed French usages, adapted to local customs. The Chambre des comptes of Chambéry, which supervised fiscal, monetary and economic policy in the duchy, was also raised to the status of a sovereign company in 1560. In both courts, the majority of magistrates had trained at the university of Valence in France, and the libraries of Savoyard magistrates were comparable with those of their provincial French colleagues.78 Though Savoy retained a mixture of French and Italian cultures, French was increasingly dominant: by the seventeenth century, the French language was used exclusively, even in official correspondence with Turin.79 French influence also permeated deep into the ecclesiastical sphere in Savoy. The duke nominated the archbishops of the Tarentaise and their suffragans at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne and Geneva/Annecy, but Chambéry and the province of Savoy proper belonged to the diocese of Grenoble, whose bishops were appointees of the French crown. Moreover, the absence of any seminaries in the duchy until the end of the seventeenth century meant that almost all ecclesiastics in Savoy, with the exception of Jesuits, were recruited from Lyon or the papal territory of Avignon, although the duke insisted that the superiors

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 23

12/03/2013 16:10

24

the eastern frontiers of france

of Savoyard religious houses be native subjects of his.80 Savoy was therefore exposed to the same religious currents that circulated in southern France, though substantial differences remained. In particular, despite the duchy’s position between Geneva, Lyon and the Valdesi valleys, Protestantism had failed to make inroads into Savoy, and since François de Sales reconverted the Chablais in the late 1590s, it had been entirely Catholic. Indeed it became, like Lorraine, a bastion of ‘Counter-Reformation’ Catholicism.81 Savoy was orientated to the French economy too, using the French unit of account (the livre tournois), while Piedmont had adopted the lire (similarly of 20 sols) in 1632.82 Though placed at a crossroads of international transit, Savoy was economically under-developed due to its lack of industry and produce.83 The principal source of wealth in Savoy was land, and the duchy’s economy relied heavily on the movement of people and goods. Its meagre commerce was based on cheese and seasonal fairs of livestock and horses, meaning that many Savoyard peasants were forced to work part of each year in neighbouring Piedmont or the Dauphiné in order to make enough money to subsist. Though the duchy had been spared from invasion and occupation for most of the seventeenth century, its inhabitants were forced to pay to lodge French troops during periods of international conflict, and their tax burden could be very heavy. This was aggravated by economic and demographic crises, and the last two decades of the seventeenth century in particular saw prolonged periods of climatic catastrophes.84 The condition of the peasantry of Savoy appears to have deteriorated significantly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and depopulation, abandonment of land and community indebtedness became chronic.85 In terms of finance, the duchy supplied only a small part of the duke’s revenues: in 1689, 5.9 million lire, or 75 per cent, came from Piedmont, while Savoy brought in only 1.7 million.86 Over the course of the seventeenth century, Savoy’s elites felt increasingly adrift from the ducal court at Turin. Only a small number of senior noble families had a presence there, such as that of the marquis de Sales, who functioned as the leader and representative of the nobility of the duchy of Savoy.87 Moreover, since the Estates General of Savoy ceased to be called at the end of the sixteenth century, the nobility’s collective political role in the state had diminished.88 Links between the nobility and the sovereign were henceforth of a more personal nature – notably in the strong tradition of military service in Savoy, though opportunities for service were rare and many therefore served foreign princes, of whom Louis XIV proved by far the most accommodating.89 The divide between Savoy and Piedmont was exacerbated during the personal rule of Victor Amadeus II, as Savoy became increasingly sidelined in the Sabaudian state. Since the time of Emmanuel Philibert, no native Savoyards had worked as local officials east of the Alps, but increasingly in the 1680s Victor

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 24

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

25

Amadeus employed Piedmontese as his representatives in Savoy.90 Even where local Savoyards were appointed in Chambéry, it did not enhance autonomy: in 1687 the duke appointed the Savoyard marquis de Bellegarde to the dual role of premier président of the Sénat and military commander of the duchy, and ­Bellegarde proved himself the most loyal henchman in the programme of greater central control at the expense of Savoy’s autonomy.91 As part of this drive, new structures were imposed on the duchy: the first moves were made in 1686, with the installation at Chambéry of the comte de Tarin as intendant général d’artillerie et des bâtiments, with a right of inspection of bridges and roads. By his appointment, the Chambre des comptes at Chambéry was deprived of its traditional role in matters of bridges and roads, as well as fortifications and military provisioning. It subsequently lost its right of inspection of étapes (military staging posts on set routes), as well as the farming of gunpowder and the management of vacant ecclesiastical benefices.92 Quickly, through a combination of pride and self-interest, the Chambre associated itself more and more with the duchy’s nobility, and so the duel with the intendant took on other dimensions: the Chambre became the focus of opposition to ducal policy and the defender of Savoyard particularism.93 Over the decades, the loss of pre-eminence in the Savoyard state hit the duchy hard, and there was a growing sense that its fortunes were in decline due to its neglect in favour of Piedmont.94 By contrast its links with France, cultural, economic and religious, continued to develop. Louis XIV, Victor Amadeus II and the road to war These links did not, though, make for easier relations between the duke and the king, relations which were under severe strain by the mid-1680s. Louis XIV’s foreign ministry did not possess a monopoly on diplomacy with foreign states: the war ministry under the marquis de Louvois was dominant in relations with Piedmont-Savoy from 1675 until 1690.95 Louvois’s character, authoritarian and imperious, was therefore a significant factor in determining France’s relations with the Sabaudian state. As John Lynn explained,‘in the 1680s Louvois’s tendency to favour force over finesse in the international arena encouraged Louis to bully his adversaries in ways that were both unnecessary and unwise’.96 The substantial body of correspondence between Louvois and the French envoy to Turin, and also with senior members of the Sabaudian court, testifies to overbearing French influence in Sabaudian affairs in this period.97 Weak ducal authority allowed this to happen. Victor Amadeus succeeded to the throne at the age of nine in 1675. He assumed power in 1684, ousting his mother, Marie Jeanne Baptiste, but soon

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 25

12/03/2013 16:10

26

the eastern frontiers of france

became aware of the extent of French influence in his affairs. France had acquired a vice-like grip on Turin when in 1681 Louis XIV took control of the Gonzaga fortress of Casale in the Montferrato, while continuing to control Pinerolo where the Alps met the Piedmontese plain.98 The permanent spectre of French intervention or interference was a source of much frustration for Victor Amadeus. On a personal level, the duke was pathologically secretive, and his desire for personal autonomy became, as Geoffrey Symcox noted, linked with ‘a fundamental maxim of Savoyard policy: to undo the treaty of Cherasco, end French influence, and regain sovereign independence’.99 But he was driven just as much by closely-related dynastic aims – most significantly, the ­recognition of his house’s royal status, and the expansion of his territorial base. Louis XIV showed himself to be stubbornly opposed to giving the duke and his family the traitement royal, as he saw the interests of the House of Savoy as subordinate to those of the House of France. He also had little faith in Italian rulers, believing that left to their own devices they might permit the r­ esurrection of Imperial power in northern Italy ‘by their own stupidity’.100 What was more, Victor Amadeus had a serious claim to the Spanish succession, and if he were allowed to become stronger he would pose a threat to the claims of Louis’s son, the grand dauphin.101 It was clear that as long as the French were a permanent presence east of the Alps, the duke’s ambitions would be frustrated. From 1687 the duke’s policy became increasingly anti-French, as he searched for a way to assert his aspirations and concerns. The opportunity came in 1688, with the outbreak of war between France and a coalition of the major European powers. Initially, the duke wished to remain neutral in the conflict, but he was not allowed to do so.102 For the French Government, their own strategic needs and dynastic pride were far more important than Victor Amadeus’s rights or even diplomatic niceties. Louis’s intention was that the Sabaudian state would remain politically and militarily dependent on France, and as such should focus on strengthening its fortresses along its border with the Spanish Milanese, leaving the direction of its army to the French generals. When Spain joined the war against France in March 1689, the need to secure the loyalty of Victor Amadeus was more acute than ever. Yet Louis’s blatant insensitivity towards the duke and disregard for Sabaudian interests in the spring of 1690 actually ended up driving Victor Amadeus into the arms of Louis’s enemies.103 In March 1690 the king ordered his general Catinat to march through Piedmont to attack Spanish Lombardy – with or without the permission of Victor Amadeus.104 In May, as word got to Versailles that the duke was planning to sign an alliance with Spain and the emperor, Catinat was ordered to proceed to Turin to deliver an ultimatum: Victor Amadeus was to hand over 2,000 infantrymen, three dragoon regiments, the citadel of Turin and the fortress of Verrua, further down the Po. He was informed that, if he did not, he would

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 26

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

27

be ‘punished in such a manner that he remembers it for the rest of his life’.105 After temporising to build up his forces and conclude the necessary alliances with the Spanish and imperial envoys, Victor Amadeus formally declared war on France on 4 June.106 And, of all the European states of the Grand Alliance ranged against Louis XIV in the Nine Years War, it was the Sabaudian state, a third-rank power in the 1680s, which caused Louis ‘a hugely disproportionate amount of trouble’,107 despite his occupation of significant portions of the duke’s lands in the years to come. Conclusions The most pragmatic and immediate concern of Louis XIV’s government in terms of frontier policy was to ensure the territorial security of the kingdom. This could be achieved in part by the acquisition of more territory and partly by bringing adjacent smaller states within the French orbit. The latter policy was predicated on the basis that these small states would benefit from French protection at the cost of surrendering their autonomy in matters of foreign policy – and, in some cases, their domestic policy as well. But Louis’s lack of sensitivity to and respect for the interests of their rulers ultimately led to its failure.Throughout his personal rule his tactics towards Lorraine and PiedmontSavoy were characterised by intimidation and arrogance: in the War of Devolution, Louis forced Duke Charles IV of Lorraine to hand over part of his army to fight alongside the French, and parallels can be seen in 1690 and 1703 when he made similar demands on Victor Amadeus II of Savoy. Guy Rowlands has recently suggested that this reflected a deliberate desire to undermine relations between untrustworthy neighbouring princes and their elites – hardly a gesture that would persuade wavering allies to return to the fold.108 By failing to accommodate the interests of these rulers, Louis ­effectively forced them into the arms of his enemies; in so doing, he inadvertently ­destabilised France’s eastern frontiers and created for himself new military commitments. But the strategic threats posed by Lorraine and Piedmont-Savoy were far from equal. Despite the striking similarity between these two small intermediary states, this resemblance should not be exaggerated: their g­ eostrategic situations were very different. The duc de Saint-Simon compared them with characteristic acuity at the turn of the eighteenth century: Piedmont-Savoy was ‘a separate state, independent without constraint, separated by the Alps, and always in a position to be powerfully supported by its neighbours’, whereas Lorraine was ‘an isolated and enclaved country, invaded whenever France wishes, an open country without fortification, without liberty to have any fortification … a country which can only subsist at France’s pleasure.’109

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 27

12/03/2013 16:10

28

the eastern frontiers of france

The two states were also extremely different internally. Savoy’s governing institutions had a long history of autonomy and strength going back over a century, while those of Lorraine lacked that level of prestige and authority, having been re-established only in the 1660s. Relations between the rulers and their elites were conditioned by wholly different assumptions and expectations, particularly given the long exile of the duke of Lorraine from the 1630s to 1661. Furthermore, the experiences and attitudes of their inhabitants vis-à-vis France were poles apart: the traumatised population of Lorraine harboured a deep hostility to the French, retaining in its collective memory for decades to come the devastation of Richelieu and Mazarin’s occupation. The importance of these differences, particularly in terms of past experiences with France, will become clearer in Part III of this book, which deals with relations between the occupied populations and the French occupiers. Nonetheless, Lorraine and Savoy bore at least one thing in common: both had the misfortune of bordering France in an era of almost continuous warfare. Their strategic positions made entanglement in Louis XIV’s European conflicts almost inevitable. The involvement of France in these territories over the period of Louis’s personal rule reflects, as we shall see, the successes and failures of French foreign policy, as well as the material needs of its war effort.







Notes

1 The best overviews of the two territories in this period are Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i: ‘De la Renaissance à la guerre de Trente Ans’; and R. Devos, ‘Un siècle en mutation (1536–1684)’ in P. Guichonnet, Histoire de la Savoie (Toulouse, 1973). From the French perspective, see Nordman, Frontières de France, pp. 81–7. 2 For example, T. C. W. Blanning, Reform and revolution in Mainz, 1743–1803 (Cambridge, 1974), p. 40. 3 As John Elliott put it, most states in the early modern period were composite, though some ‘were clearly more composite than others’. J. H. Elliott, ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, Past and Present, 137 (1992), p. 51. 4 J.-P. Cénat, Le Roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661–1715 (Rennes, 2010), pp. 299–301; J. O’Connor, ‘Louis XIV and Europe: War and Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century’ in S. G. Reinhardt (ed.), The Sun King: Louis XIV and the new world (New Orleans, LA, 1994), p. 60. 5 G. Zeller, ‘Saluces, Pignerol et Strasbourg: La Politique des frontières au temps de la prépondérance Espagnole’, Revue Historique, 193/2 (1942), p. 110. 6 D. Parrott, ‘The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635–59’ in J. Black (ed.), The origins of war in early modern Europe (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 96–7. 7 Black, European international relations, p. 16. 8 The term limite was used in a more metaphoric sense, signifying an outer limit to sovereignty, accepted by mutual agreement and definitive. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of these terms, see the chapter ‘Lexique de la frontière’ in Nordman’s Frontières de France, pp. 25–39; or L. Febvre, ‘Frontière: the word and the concept’ in P. Burke (ed.), A new kind of history: from the writings of Lucien Febvre (London, 1973), pp. 208–10. 9 See the introduction to Jeremy Black’s The Origins of War, p. 7. 10 N. Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge: les variations des limites septentrionales de la France de 1659 à 1789 (Paris, 1970); G. Zeller, L’Organisation défensive des frontières du nord et de l’est au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1929), p. 41; P. Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers Revisited: France’s

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 28

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

29

Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century’, American Historical Review, 95 (1990), p. 1434. 11 Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, pp. 1428–9. 12 A. Sinkoli, Frankreich, das Reich und die Reichsstände, 1697–1702 (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), pp. 78–87. 13 Vauban, ‘Intérét présent des états de la chrétiénté’ (c.1700), in Vauban, sa Famille et ses Écrits, ses Oisivetés et sa Correspondance, ed. A. Rochas d’Aiglun (2 vols, Paris, 1910), i, p. 492. 14 Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, p. 1433. 15 Nordman, Frontières de France, pp. 95–105. 16 Febvre, ‘Frontière: word and concept’, pp. 215–16; D. Nordman, ‘From the Boundaries of the State to National Borders’ in P. Nora (ed.), Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire, trans. D. P. Jordan (4 vols., Chicago, 2001), i, pp. 105–9. 17 A. Osiander, The states system of Europe, 1640–1990 (Oxford, 1994), p. 50. 18 Parrott, ‘Franco-Spanish War’, pp. 96–7. 19 Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, p. 1427; Nordman, Frontières de France, p. 127; Stewart, Assimilation and acculturation, pp. 20–3. 20 See J. Spangler, The society of princes: the Lorraine-Guise and the conservation of power and wealth in seventeenth-century France (Farnham, Surrey, 2009), pp. 118, 264; and also his chapter ‘Those in between: Princely Families on the Margins of the Great Powers – The Franco-German Frontier, 1477–1830’ in C. H. Johnson, D. W. Sabean, S. Teuscher and F. Trivellato (eds), Transregional and transnational families in Europe and beyond: experiences since the middle ages (New York, 2011). 21 The term ‘geo-cultural landscape’ is from William D. Godsey’s Nobles and nations in central Europe: free imperial knights in the age of revolution, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 13–14. 22 Both Lorraine and Savoy saw a continuance of popular witchcraft well into the seventeenth century, and Savoy was viewed from within France as a ‘citadelle de magique’: J. Nicolas, La vie quotidienne en Savoie aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1979), p. 293; R. Briggs, Communities of belief: cultural and social tensions in early modern France (Oxford, 1989), pp. 7–9. 23 Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu, p. 33. Lorraine also straddled a linguistic boundary which ran south-east from Longwy to Sarrebourg; approximately one third of the duchy of Lorraine was German speaking, and organised into the baillage d’Allemagne, centred on Vaudrevange/ Wallerfangen: M. Toussaint, La Frontière linguistique en Lorraine (Paris, 1955), pp. 40–2. 24 In a precursor to his son’s changes to Lorraine’s constitutional arrangements, Louis XIII abolished the assises in 1634. H. Mahuet, La Cour souveraine de Lorraine et Barrois, 1641–1790 (Nancy, 1959), pp. 14–17. 25 See M. Graves, The parliaments of early modern Europe (Harlow, 2001), pp. 149–51. 26 A. Schmitt, Le Barrois mouvant au XVIIe siècle (1624–1697), Mémoires de la Société des Lettres, Sciences et Arts de Bar-le-Duc et du Musée de Géographie, 5e série, 47 (1928–9), p. 227. 27 M.-J. Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine et Barrois à la fin du XVIIe siècle: edition critique du mémoire ‘pour l’instruction du duc de Bourgogne’ (Paris, 2006), p. 152. 28 Ibid., p. 153. 29 Ibid., pp. 154–6. 30 Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 144–5. 31 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i, pp. 137–8; Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 260–82. 32 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i, pp. 19–20; B. Blumenkranz, Histoire des Juifs en France (Toulouse, 1972), pp. 79–84. 33 J.-D. Pariset, ‘La Lorraine dans les relations internationales au XVIe siècle’ in Bled et al., Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, p. 53. 34 See R. Babel, ‘Dix années décisives: aspects de la politique étrangère de Charles IV de 1624 a 1634’ in Bled et al., Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, pp. 59–65. 35 By the Treaty of Vic of 1632, the duke was forced to cede Marsal for three years; he also promised not to sign any alliance or levy troops without the permission of the king, and was to guarantee the free passage of French troops through his states. D. Parrott, Richelieu’s army: war, government, and society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge, 2001), p. 104. 36 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i, pp. 185–94.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 29

12/03/2013 16:10

30

the eastern frontiers of france

37 Parrott, Richelieu’s army, pp. 77–83. This could be seen as the precursor to Louis XIV and Louvois’s system of contributions. 38 The main objective in establishing the Parlement was ultimately to separate the Trois Evêchés from the Empire. M.-O. Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre de Réunion de Metz (Paris, 1969), p. 16; Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i, pp. 189–90. 39 The Parlement sat in Toul for most of the war, returning to Metz in 1658. 40 Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu, pp. 181–93; Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i, pp. 220–1. 41 Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu, p. 224. 42 Ibid., p. 139. 43 H. de Beauvau, Mémoires du marquis de Beauvau: concernant ce qui s’est passé de plus mémorable sous le règne de Charles IV duc de Lorraine & de Bar (Metz, 1686), pp. 54–5. 44 Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 139. 45 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, i, pp. 227–8. 46 Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu, pp. 258–9. 47 P. Braun, La Lorraine pendant le gouvernement de la Ferté-Sénectère (1643–1661) (Nancy, 1907), p. 143. 48 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 23. 49 Ibid., ii, p. 26. 50 Ibid., ii, p. 17. 51 Ibid., ii, pp. 20–2. 52 Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu, p. 286. 53 At the start of the eighteenth century, Vauban estimated the population of Lorraine to be 361,000, down from a million a century earlier. J. Dupâquier (ed.), Histoire de la population Française (4 vols., Paris, 1988), ii, p. 76; M.-J. Laperche-Fournel, La Population du duché de Lorraine de 1580 à 1720 (Nancy, 1985), p. 202. 54 R. Taveneaux, Le Jansénisme en Lorraine (Paris, 1960), p. 55. 55 Braun, Ferté-Sénectère, p. 163. 56 Beauvau, Mémoires, pp. 184–5. 57 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 31. 58 E. Gerardin, Histoire de Lorraine: duchés–comtés–evêchés, depuis les origines jusqu’à la réunion des deux duchés à la France (1766) (Nancy, 1925), p. 277. 59 Beauvau, Mémoires, p. 454; Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iii, p. 154. 60 J. Spangler, ‘A Lesson in Diplomacy for Louis XIV: The Treaty of Montmartre, 1662, and the Princes of the House of Lorraine’, French History, 17 (2003), pp. 225–30. 61 Anon., Dissertation historique et politique, sur le Traitté fait entre le Roy et le Duc Charles, touchant la Lorraine (n.p., 1662). 62 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 28. The treaty drove Prince Charles (later Duke Charles V) to move to Vienna and join the imperial camp. 63 In his memoirs for the dauphin for 1662, Louis wrote: ‘It is still uncertain … what the advantages of this treaty for me will one day be, but you have seen at least that it will not be worthless’. Mémoires de Louis XIV, ed. J. Longnon, (Paris, 1979), p. 133. 64 N. Kaypaghian, ‘Le duché de Lorraine et les Trois Evêchés entre deux occupations (1663– 1670)’, Cahiers Lorrains, 33 (1981), p. 107. 65 Ibid., pp. 108–12. 66 Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iii, pp. 172–4. 67 P. Sonnino, Louis XIV and the origins of the DutchWar (Cambridge, 1988), p. 50; Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, pp. 654–6. 68 Ibid., iii, pp. 661–2. 69 Kaypaghian, ‘Le Duché de Lorraine’, p. 113. 70 Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, p. 662; Kaypaghian, ‘Le Duché de Lorraine’, p. 112; Sonnino, Dutch War, pp. 76, 105. 71 Kaypaghian, ‘Le Duché de Lorraine’, pp. 115–18. Sonnino argues that the king took the decision as late as 22 August, in a spontaneous fit of rage at having to postpone the Dutch War. Sonnino, Dutch War, pp. 110–11, 119.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 30

12/03/2013 16:10

lorraine, savoy and the frontiers of france

31

72 L. de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon, Mémoires, ed. A. M. Boislisle (40 vols., Paris, 1879–1928), xv, p. 28. 73 Saint-Simon reproached the dukes for their attachment to Germany, ‘which they cling to, without being a part of’. J. Voss, ‘La Lorraine et sa situation politique entre la France et l’Empire vues par le duc de Saint-Simon’ in Bled et al., Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, p. 92. 74 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 135. 75 R. Devos and B. Grosperrin, La Savoie de la Réforme à la Révolution française (Rennes, 1985), p. 23; Devos, ‘Un siècle’, pp. 234, 246–7; B. Haan, Une paix pour l’éternité: la négociation du traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (Madrid, 2010). 76 J. Balsamo, ‘Lorraine et Savoie, médiateurs culturels entre la France et l’Italie (1580–1630)’ in G. Mombello et al. (eds), Culture et pouvoir dans les Etats de Savoie du XVIIe siècle à la Révolution: actes du colloque d’Annecy–Chambéry–Turin (1982) (Chambéry, 1985), p. 273. 77 L. Chevallier, ‘L’occupation française de la Savoie (1536–1559): Réflexions sur quelques aspects politiques et institutionnels’, Cahiers d’Histoire, 5 (1960), pp. 321–8. 78 R. Devos, ‘Elite et culture. Les magistrats savoyards au XVIIe siècle’ in Mombello et al., Culture et pouvoir, pp. 219–20, 227. 79 Devos, ‘Un siècle’, p. 259. 80 F. Meyer, ‘Les Elites diocésaines en Savoie à la fin du XVIIe siècle’, Rives Méditerranées, 32–3 (2009), p. 5. 81 Devos, ‘Un siècle’, p. 264. Unlike the county of Nice, which had a long-established Jewish population, there had been no Jews in Savoy since the beginning of the sixteenth century: Blaumenkranz, Histoire des Juifs, p. 212. 82 Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 649. 83 Devos, ‘Un siècle’, p. 239. 84 Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 554. 85 Devos, ‘Un siècle’, p. 256–7. 86 Storrs, War, diplomacy, p. 77. 87 Ibid., p. 192. 88 Nicolas, La Savoie, i, p. 44. 89 Of 134 nobles who served abroad in the late seventeenth century, 109 served France. Ibid., i, pp. 231–2. 90 E. Burnier, Histoire du Sénat de Savoie et des autres compagnies judiciaires de la même province (2 vols., Paris, 1864–5), i, p. 285. 91 Ibid., ii, p. 88. 92 In 1720 Victor Amadeus abolished the Chambre des comptes altogether. Storrs, War, Diplomacy, pp. 179, 205; J. Nicolas, ‘Ombres et lumières du XVIIIe siècle’ in Guichonnet, Histoire de la Savoie, p. 305. 93 Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, pp. 602–3. 94 Ibid., i, p. 30. 95 G. Rowlands, The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661–1701 (Cambridge, 2002), p. 57. 96 J. A. Lynn, The wars of Louis XIV, 1664–1714 (London, 1999), p. 112. 97 Much of this correspondence can be found in J. Hardré (ed.), Letters of Louvois (Chapel Hill, NC, 1949), pp. 11–156. 98 C. Storrs, ‘Machiavelli Dethroned: Victor Amadeus II and the Making of the Anglo-Savoyard Alliance of 1690’, European History Quarterly, 22 (1992), p. 348; Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 81. 99 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 70. 100 G. Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 1689–96’, English Historical Review, 115 (2000), p. 539. 101 Ibid. 102 R. Oresko, ‘The Glorious Revolution and the House of Savoy’ in J. Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch moment: essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact (Cambridge, 1991), p. 371. 103 Christopher Storrs and Guy Rowlands have recently demonstrated that, far from being the Machiavellian operator ‘waiting for his moment’ depicted by Symcox, Victor Amadeus was in

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 31

12/03/2013 16:10

32

the eastern frontiers of france

fact the victim of French bullying and was in the end left with no option but to join the allies. Storrs, ‘Machiavelli Dethroned’, p. 351; Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, p. 541. 104 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 103. 105 Louvois, quoted in Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, p. 541. 106 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 104–5. 107 Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, p. 536. 108 G. Rowlands, ‘Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and His Forces Étrangères’, War in History, 17 (2010), p. 155. 109 Saint-Simon, Mémoires, vi, p. 4. See also Voss, ‘La Lorraine et sa situation politique’, p. 91.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 32

12/03/2013 16:10

2 Military occupation in French frontier strategy

In the context of foreign policy, Louis XIV viewed the defence of the kingdom as his most important duty; any loss of territory resulting from foreign aggression would have led to a significant diminution of the king’s gloire. At the time Louis assumed personal control of his government in 1661, there remained several weak points in the kingdom’s frontiers leaving it open to invasion, in particular from the Spanish Netherlands and on the border with the Holy Roman Empire in the north-east. As the reign progressed, shortcomings in French foreign policy and diplomacy meant that the south-eastern marches also became a significant cause for concern.1 The Sun King’s personal rule therefore witnessed an almost obsessive focus on frontier security, which was to consume a huge proportion of the state’s resources and energies. The monarchy’s concern for the frontier, though born principally out of a defensive impulse, provoked intense unease among contemporaries: each new territorial acquisition was seen as the precursor to further incursions into neighbouring territory, which would ultimately lead to ‘universal monarchy’. Louis was consequently portrayed as a warmonger and usurper bent on territorial expansion for its own sake – an image which proved surprisingly enduring among historians until fairly recently.2 In particular, the réunions of the early 1680s, by which the French Government attempted unilaterally to annex Lorraine and other disputed territories, were decried as pernicious legal trickery. More recent studies have stressed that Louis XIV’s methods and tactics shared much in common with other rulers of the period: his concern for the frontiers was matched, for instance, by a Dutch desire to protect their southern flanks, and the réunion policy had much in common with the aggressive policies of Denmark, as John Stoye pointed out. Historians have also become more conscious of similar proceedings within the Holy Roman Empire by German princes and the emperor himself.3 It was not, therefore, uniquely pernicious behaviour by the French. Chapter 1 examined the main factors which influenced Louis XIV’s fron­­ tier strategy, and how this strategy led to the military occupations of Lorraine

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 33

12/03/2013 16:10

34

the eastern frontiers of france

and Savoy. This chapter deals with the way these occupations developed, from conquest to ideas of possible annexation. During any occupation, matters gradually unfold and evolve, and it is necessary to ascertain whether there are any sorts of underlying dynamics to them; this chapter therefore uses a narrative analytical method, blending diplomatic, military and political elements to reveal the political and military contexts of the occupations (mostly from the French perspective), and how they relate to French strategy for the north-eastern and south-eastern frontiers during Louis XIV’s personal reign. By providing a chronological outline, the dynamic behind the occupations becomes much clearer, in that they often developed on the basis of events and pressures external to the territory itself. Lorraine and the north-eastern frontier, 1670–1714 As Louis XIV later explained in his Mémoires, he had by 1670 become ‘exhausted by the perfidy’ of Charles IV.4 In August 1670 he resolved, with the collaboration of his war minister Louvois, to kidnap the duke, occupy Lorraine, raze its fortifications and billet troops among its inhabitants.5 Accordingly, an advance party of 7,000 French cavalry under the chevalier de Fourilles entered Nancy on the morning of 26 August, but the duke had been alerted to their approach and had fled, escaping capture. The main force of 15,000 soldiers commanded by Marshal Créqui then advanced into Lorraine. The conquest was carried out without much opposition – most towns capitulated immediately, and there were few fortified places. In a last-ditch attempt at preserving Lorraine’s independence, the duke offered to abdicate in favour of his nephew, Prince Charles, if the king ceased hostilities.6 The offer was ignored. By mid-September the duke had fled to the Vosges mountains, and then went to Cologne.7 Epinal capitulated on 27 September, followed shortly afterwards by Longwy and Massy, and French troops were put into winter quarters across Lorraine the following month. Much of the hesitation of Louis XIV over military intervention in Lorraine must have come from the risks involved in upsetting neighbouring German princes.8 This was especially sensitive in the run-up to the Dutch War, when Louis was trying to keep much of Germany as compliant as possible. At the instance of Lionne, who had been a powerless spectator in the conquest of Lorraine, in September Louis XIV sent a circular to all his ambassadors and ministers containing a vague promise not to annex the duchy. This did not calm the German princes. In October, Choisy, intendant of the Trois Evêchés, informed Lionne that many in Germany feared that Lorraine would be annexed, as an ominous precursor to a French takeover of towns in Alsace, notably Strasbourg.9 Louis then wrote to his envoy at the Imperial Diet, Robert de Gravel,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 34

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

35

to explain that Charles IV had left him with very little choice but to invade Lorraine, citing ‘The bad conduct of the duke of Lorraine towards me, his disloyalty, his contraventions of the treaties we have together, and his negotiations with every court against my interests’.10 Despite these assurances, uncertainty hung over the longer-term intentions of the king and Louvois. Many, including Lionne, still hoped that Lorraine would be handed over to Prince Charles, though the latter’s lack of affection for Louis XIV made this problematic. Meanwhile, though Charles IV was now claiming to be ready to do ‘anything’ to please the king, many observers felt that the old duke’s reputation precluded any restitution during his lifetime.11 This suited the agenda of Louis XIV, who, encouraged by Louvois, was now determined to keep Lorraine as long as possible.12 For the moment, though, the French Government maintained the illusion of being willing to relinquish Lorraine, holding negotiations with imperial and Lorrain envoys in Paris throughout the spring of 1671.13 While there was much hope in the Empire that these negotiations would be successful, the French were merely playing for time.14 The terms proposed to the duke were so harsh that Louis XIV knew he would not accept them; finally, the imperial and Lorrain envoys lost patience and broke off negotiations in April and August respectively.15 Meanwhile, the French began to assert the king’s rights over the duchies more vocally. At the Imperial Diet, the French envoy instructed the delegates that the invasion of Lorraine was entirely justified by a number of legal claims, and that ‘the king is just as inclined to keep Lorraine as to give it to some other prince’.16 The legal arguments for the conquest centred on the fact that the Barrois mouvant was technically part of France, and Louis wrote to his ambassador in Vienna, the chevalier de Grémonville, explaining that the duke’s states had been confiscated as the fief of a disloyal vassal. This was exactly the same argument that had been used 36 years earlier to justify Cardinal Richelieu’s conquest of Lorraine.17 These justifications were, however, merely a matter of form: war with the Dutch Republic had been in the planning since 1668, and the conquest of Lorraine in 1670 was a necessary part of preparations.18 Seizing Lorraine gave France considerable advantages for the conquest of the Netherlands, making it more difficult for Spain and the other members of the Triple Alliance – England and Sweden – to help the Dutch, now that Spain’s territory of the FrancheComté (just east of Burgundy and south of Alsace) was cut off. Furthermore, once the war began in April 1672, the occupation of Lorraine reflected the strategic preoccupations of the conflict. As part of a plan to build a new defensive network of fortresses along the eastern frontier, Louis dispatched the military engineer Vauban in 1672 to rebuild Nancy’s fortifications on their old foundations, and he personally inspected the massive building programme when he stayed for several weeks in August 1673.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 35

12/03/2013 16:10

36

the eastern frontiers of france

The Dutch War did not proceed as Louis expected, however, and the stalling of the French expedition against Holland provoked an alliance in August 1673 between the emperor, the king of Spain and the United Provinces, who were joined by Duke Charles IV in October. The latter was engaged to raise 10,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, and the future of Lorraine was henceforth tied up in European coalition diplomacy.19 Throughout the conflict, Lorraine was on a direct route used by French armies to cross the Rhine; in consequence the duchies were obliged to accommodate and feed Louis XIV’s troops, and at the end of each campaigning season, give them winter quarters (usually December to April). It was, as it had been under Richelieu, a place d’armes – a giant military supply depot and a zone to quarter the army. Further fortification was undertaken in Lorraine as the war progressed, most importantly at Marsal, Thionville and the ville neuve of Nancy. This reflects the increasing importance of, and worries about, the defence of Lorraine for the French high command: in September 1675, Louvois wrote to Marshal Luxembourg that the prince of Orange was planning to give troops and subsidies to the duke of Lorraine as a means of re-entering his lands, establishing winter quarters there and putting the territory under contribution; this, it was feared, would be timed to coincide with an invasion of Alsace by the imperial General Montecuccoli.20 Charles IV had already proved adept at extracting money from the communities of Lorraine through raiding, to the extent that he was able to extract from the French a contributions treaty, whereby they would pay him 180,000 livres annually in return for his ordering the raiding parties to cease their activities.21 This was an admission by France that it was unable to seal off its new acquisition, though France’s strategic position in the north-east was greatly strengthened by the reoccupation of the Franche-Comté from 1674. Charles IV gained the final battlefield victory in his long career in August 1675, routing Créqui near Trier, before dying at Alembach the following month, on 18 September 1675. The succession fell to his nephew, Charles, with whom the allies swiftly renewed their treaty of alliance; as Charles V he became supreme commander of the emperor’s armies on the retirement of Montecuccoli in late 1675.22 But, despite several successful campaigns in the Lorraine region, his failure to reconquer his lands meant that when peace negotiations opened at Nijmegen, Louis XIV was more or less free to impose his own solution to the ‘Lorraine problem’. Louis offered two alternatives: Charles would have to cede either the duchy of Bar, or Nancy and four military roads of half a league in breadth; knowing the temperament of Charles V, Louis was probably certain that the duke would never accept these dishonourable and humiliating c­ onditions.23 The Emperor Leopold put increasing pressure on Charles V – who had married his half-sister, Archduchess Eleanora Maria, in February 1678 – to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 36

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

37

accept the French proposals, and by the autumn of that year Charles was increasingly inclined to accept the second of the French options. Ultimately the failure of the duke’s expedition to Alsace in the late summer of 1678, together with the defection of the emperor’s two most important allies, the United Provinces and the Spanish, forced the Emperor Leopold to accept the Peace of Nijmegen on 5 February 1679.24 But the clauses concerning Lorraine were included without the approval of Charles V, who renounced the treaty.25 For Louis XIV, the question of Lorraine was now closed. After Nijmegen, French frontier strategy, as directed by Louvois and Vauban, centred on the creation of the pré carré, a more defensible geometric frontier marked by a more linear fortress barrier.26 The great defences created by Louvois and Vauban on the Lorraine frontier comprised Phalsbourg, Longwy and Sarrelouis, strengthened by the acquisition of Strasbourg in 1681 and Luxembourg in 1684. Louis XIV’s policy on the north-eastern frontier became increasingly heavy-handed after November 1679, when the moderate Pomponne was replaced by the blunt and aggressive Colbert de Croissy as secretary of state for foreign affairs.27 During the next five years, the French embarked on what was essentially a policy of peacetime annexations or réunions of neighbouring states, including Lorraine.The réunions originated in claims going back to the treaties of Westphalia, whereby the French had been awarded territories along with their ‘dependencies’. The ambiguity of this term and the lack of specificities allowed French jurists to develop Louis XIV’s claims. Louvois was central to this policy, pressing it on the king to compensate for the lack of territory acquired during the Dutch War.28 The war minister’s control over the region was cemented when, immediately after the fall of Pomponne, Louvois gained the king’s approval to have the Trois Evêchés detached from the jurisdiction of the secretary of state for foreign affairs and attached to his own department, which since 1673 had also comprised Lorraine.29 Securing the eastern border had been a preoccupation of the kings of France ever since the acquisition of the Trois Evêchés in 1552. The bishoprics were vulnerable, since they were enclaved within ducal Lorraine. From Henri II onwards, French kings used feudal law and jurisprudence to argue their rights over Lorraine, aiming to acquire territory on which to build more solid defences.30 A spate of literature on the subject was produced during Richelieu’s occupation of the duchy in order to justify the conquest, but was never directly acted upon.31 In this tradition, in 1664 Charles Colbert de Croissy, then intendant of the Trois Evêchés, produced a memorandum on the rights of the king over Lorraine. Croissy’s work was continued by a commission named by the Parlement of Metz. Immediately after the conquest of Lorraine in 1670, this commission sent a report on the rights of the king over Lorraine, which were based on the ‘dependence’ of most of the duchy on the bishopric of Metz, and they recommended

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 37

12/03/2013 16:10

38

the eastern frontiers of france

that these be used to permanently annex the duchy. Louvois corresponded with the commission from 1672 and gave it much encouragement.32 In 1679, this commission suggested extending the formula to all p­ ossessions ceded by the treaties of Westphalia, Aix-la-Chapelle and Nijmegen.33 In October 1679, the process began: the king ordered the three bishops of Metz, Toul and Verdun to renew their homage to him and to present the status of their fiefs; they replied that their records were badly preserved, and that a tribunal would be needed to verify their possessions. By royal decree, the Chambre royale (or Chambre de réunion) of Metz was created on 23 October 1679. It was staffed by a président and ten councillors, all members of the Parlement of Metz, along with the procureur général, Roland Ravaulx.Their orders were to investigate all ‘usurpations and alienations’ of the Trois Evêchés by assembling the relevant documents to each case. From then until April 1682, the Chambre issued forty-two arrêts, which collectively resulted in the three bishops ‘regaining’ possession of about half of Lorraine and Bar; the remaining parts of the duchies of Lorraine and Bar were ‘reunited’ with France by further decrees of April, August and September 1683. During the same period, the Parlement of Besançon and the Conseil supérieur of Alsace (based just over the Rhine in Breisach) also adopted an aggressive réunion policy, and in September 1681 the French army obliged Strasbourg to capitulate.34 As the réunions gathered pace, France’s neighbours grew i­ ncreasingly alarmed, concerned that France was out of control, annexing territory seemingly arbitrarily: ‘there was no sense of when and where the process would end’.35 The emperor, pressed by the Imperial Diet, wrote to Louis in July 1680 to express his concerns about the policy. Negotiations followed at Frankfurt, and in August 1683 the king profited from the Ottoman siege of Vienna by proposing an armistice of thirty years. The emperor eventually agreed to a twenty-year truce, signed on 15 August 1684 at Regensburg, by which France was allowed to keep territories ‘reunited’ before 1 August 1681, along with Strasbourg, Kehl (across the Rhine) and Luxembourg; the duchy of Lorraine was passed over in silence.36 The réunion strategy became notorious and historians long condemned it as blatant imperialism. Recently a more nuanced view has been favoured, seeing the réunions as animated not by indiscriminate greed, but by an extension of the strategy of defensible frontiers.37 Many of the gains had a defensive logic: acquiring Luxembourg, for instance, deprived France’s enemies of the ability to launch raids into northern Lorraine or Champagne and put the territory under contribution. But there was a general feeling that Louis had pushed things too far and the réunion policy smacked of arrogance. As Guy Cabourdin put it, ‘the process of réunions failed not because it rode roughshod over laws and consciences, but because its excess condemned it to a short lifetime’.38 Moreover, its assault on a variety of European princes probably ensured a military backlash sooner or later.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 38

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

39

Lorraine was now, to all intents and purposes, an integral part of France. As the king put it in his instructions to the comte de La Vauguyon, going to Vienna as French ambassador in October 1685: ‘There is nobody in France who does not consider Lorraine as an inseparable part of the kingdom, and one could not propose the slightest detachment without arousing the indignation of all good Frenchmen.’39 But the dubious legal basis of France’s possession of Lorraine remained a source of anxiety for the French Government. By the early 1690s it was clear that the excesses of the Chambre de réunion of Metz had been counter-productive; the death of Louvois in 1691 permitted open criticism of the policy. As Pomponne remarked with characteristic tact, ‘It is true enough that the réunions were based upon the Treaty of Münster, but the way in which they were carried out was not always defensible.’40 More sharply, a memorandum by the chevalier du Hautoy, the bailli of Longwy, argued: ‘it appears that this work is very much opposed to the service of the king, and contains many contradictions.’41 Du Hautoy now advocated using history as well as feudal law to prove French ownership of Lorraine, by claiming that the duchy was a long-lost part of eastern France, while the Barrois belonged to the king by virtue of the Peace of the Pyrenees.42 These arguments, justified by the necessary titles and documents, could rectify all the wrongs perpetrated by the Chambre de réunion. Yet despite these and other plans to execute a definitive annexation, Lorraine’s future was once again decided by the outcome of a European war.43 Louis XIV neither desired nor expected the war that he set in motion in 1688 to be long or protracted.44 It led again to the militarisation of Lorraine but, unlike the Dutch War, this conflict did not make Lorraine and the Trois Evêchés a major theatre of battle; they served instead mainly as a strategic hub, a base of attack and supply, witnessing the incessant passage of troops.45 The area was not, however, invulnerable. In the summer of 1689, the main imperial army under Charles V of Lorraine besieged Mainz (100 miles from the Lorraine border), which surrendered in September.46 The French defensive barrier which had guarded the Rhine was now compromised, and the way was open for incursions into France itself. The duke’s unexpected death in April 1690 caused consternation throughout Europe, not least in Lorraine – the fall of Bonn and Mainz the previous year had raised hopes that the recovery of his states might be within his grasp. Louis XIV’s strategic adviser Chamlay described the news of the duke’s death as ‘the best news we could have’, and Marshal Lorge agreed that there was nobody else capable of uniting the German princes or getting them to act in concert.47 The duke was succeeded by his eleven-year-old son Leopold, who was raised at the court of Vienna and very much influenced by his uncle and namesake, the Emperor Leopold I. The Nine Years War marked a turning point in the reign of Louis XIV, who now found himself engaged in a conflict from which he could only extri-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 39

12/03/2013 16:10

40

the eastern frontiers of france

cate himself by offering major concessions to his enemies. Lorraine, now fully integrated into France, loomed large as a possible concession. For William III, king of Great Britain and Ireland since 1689 and head of the House of Orange, Strasbourg and Lorraine were crucial to a peace settlement for, as he wrote to the Grand Pensionary Heinsius in July 1696, ‘the whole matter revolves around these two points.’48 On 9 May 1697, a peace congress opened at Ryswick near The Hague, with Claude-François Canon and Joseph Le Bègue representing the young duke of Lorraine, under the protection (and control) of the emperor. The treaty concerning France and the Empire was signed on 30 October 1697 and ratified on 13 December,49 giving the duke full re-establishment of the duchies as held by Charles IV in 1670, with some minor adjustments. Louis kept only Sarrelouis and Longwy, which, detached from the duchy of Bar, increased the size of the Trois Evêchés. More importantly, French soldiers were accorded free passage through Lorraine without obstacle, with the duke providing food and supplies for the troops, paid for by the king.50 The terms of the Treaty of Ryswick concerning Lorraine were seen as fairly generous on the part of France. Marshal Villars later reflected that the politicians at the conference were surprised that the French gave back the old town of Nancy fortified, along with thirty pieces of cannon. Villars ascribed this to an act of kindness of Louis XIV towards his niece, Elisabeth Charlotte d’Orléans, whose marriage contract with the duke was negotiated at the same time.51 But this moderation is more likely to have resulted from the fact that in 1697–8, Louis XIV, preoccupied with the Spanish succession, wished to build bridges with William III to try to get the emperor to agree on the future of the Spanish monarchy. Between the 1670s and 1740s, a persistent theme in European international relations was the idea of territorial exchange, whereby rulers (including the dukes of Lorraine and Savoy) would cede all or part of their states to France in exchange for other, usually Italian, possessions.52 In the course of the negotiations for the Second Partition Treaty of 1700, it was envisaged that a division of the Spanish succession might entail the young duke of Lorraine exchanging his duchy for Milan, allowing Louis to definitively incorporate Lorraine into his kingdom.53 The idea was popular among some at the French court: Saint-Simon felt this would be a wise move for Duke Leopold, who would become a free prince in Italy rather than a ‘slave of France’, and the acquisition of Lorraine would make the north-east frontier easier to defend.54 Yet Louis XIV, writing to William III, claimed that this was not of great importance: ‘The acquisition of Lorraine would add practically nothing to my power, as this state is so completely surrounded by my possessions that it is impossible for a duke of Lorraine to take sides against me.’55 Despite this, Louis sent an envoy to Nancy to discuss the proposition with Leopold, who gave his consent to the project. Leopold’s only

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 40

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

41

condition was that the plan needed the consent of the emperor. But when Carlos II of Spain died in November, leaving his entire inheritance to Louis’s grandson the duc d’Anjou, the proposed exchange was abandoned. In May 1702 the Grand Alliance of The Hague, which reassembled the king of England, the United Provinces and the emperor, declared war on France. Before war had even been declared, Markgraf Ludwig of Baden marched his troops towards Alsace and launched several raids across Lorraine into French territory. The sense of alarm was palpable: the governor of Toul warned that enemy raiding parties would be able to make their way undetected from Maastricht and other strongholds on the Rhine to raid the Trois Evêchés at will, since the latter was an enclave within Lorraine.56 That summer, Saint-Contest (the intendant) wrote that, if the imperial army marched to the Saar, the duke’s natural inclination for the Imperials would be supported by force, which would ‘deliver him from the servitude which our places de guerre impose on him’, adding that ‘even though Leopold is a wise and circumspect man, I believe we have everything to fear’.57 Duke Leopold’s priority at this stage, however, was to avoid being dragged into the war at all. He agreed to honour the terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, by which he was obliged to give the French army free passage across his territory and subsistence supplies, for which he would be reimbursed by the king. Meanwhile in June he sent an envoy to Metz to negotiate with Saint-Contest for the neutrality of his states. These negotiations continued through the summer and autumn of 1702, as raiding parties became more numerous, threatening French communications with the front line. This situation, on the weakest and most dangerous frontier of the kingdom, was untenable; Marsal and Toul were virtually undefended, and leaving Nancy between the two would run the risk of it falling into enemy hands. There was, Villars insisted, only one course of action now possible: Lorraine must be put at the disposition of France for as long as the war lasted, and a French garrison installed in Nancy. Leopold would be paid exactly for what was taken, and his subjects would be treated ‘even better than those of the king’.58 In French frontier policy this was not without precedent: in 1675, after having promised to respect Liège’s neutrality in the Dutch War, Louis XIV decided that same neutrality would be better maintained if Liège’s citadel were in his possession, and he seized it.59 Likewise, in 1681 Louis took control of the Gonzaga fortress of Casale in the Monferrato, while sovereignty over the rest of the territory remained with the duke of Mantua.60 It was, however, a markedly restrained option when viewed in the context of Louis XIV’s policy towards Lorraine up to that point. The king sent an envoyé extraordinaire, Jean-Baptiste d’Audiffret, to the court of Lorraine to monitor and report back on the duke’s communications with the emperor and the king of the Romans (the future Emperor Joseph I).

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 41

12/03/2013 16:10

42

the eastern frontiers of france

For Louis XIV, it was clear that the duke’s birth and education would incline him to support the emperor, but he also felt that his prudence would lead him to uphold the neutrality offered on France’s terms.61 By early November, Louis was growing suspicious of the regularity of communication between the duke and the Imperials, and he suspected that Leopold and the Markgraf of Baden, who was at that moment marching towards the Rhine, were colluding to allow the latter to take Nancy.62 On 16 November, Louis XIV gave the order to Marshal Tallard to make preparations to occupy Nancy; if the duke opposed this, Louis authorised Tallard to take it by force, and secret preparations were made to besiege the town.63 On 1 December, François de Callières went to obtain Leopold’s permission for a French garrison to take control of his capital. As he was effectively denied any choice in the matter, Leopold reluctantly gave permission, writing to the king that ‘Your Majesty … is the arbiter of my fate … as I have neither the desire nor power to resist’.64 Leopold withdrew to Lunéville and French troops entered Nancy on the morning of 3 December. But Louis XIV’s advisers informed him that Nancy alone would not suffice to guarantee the frontier. Villars, one of the most vocal supporters of a full occupation of Lorraine, again pushed for this. He argued that unless all of Lorraine was occupied, Alsace was as good as lost: ‘You will be unable to count on any wheat or oat magazines, as these would be dependent on the will, often ill-disposed, of people over whom we have no control’; in addition, all letters which passed through Nancy would be carried by Lorrain postmasters, and it would be easy for them to break the seals and pass vital information to France’s enemies.65 He advocated granting the duke the equivalent in cash of the revenues he received annually from his states, plus a ‘bonus’ of 100,000 écus, in exchange for putting Lorraine under the administration of a French intendant.66 But Chamillart instructed Villars that ‘His Majesty does not believe we should presently undertake anything beyond what is absolutely necessary’.67 Instead of a full occupation, the king instructed Leopold that it would be necessary to put French troops in Lorrain fortresses along the Saar (again without any infringement on his sovereignty). As with Nancy, Leopold would not formally agree to allow the posts to be occupied, but he told the French envoy that if French troops appeared he would order his own to leave.68 At the end of December, Villars took Sarreguemines, Fénétrange, Sarralbe and Bouquenom, and later Boulay and Saint-Avold (see Map 3). After the French had occupied the posts on the Saar, Markgraf Ludwig of Baden, at the head of the imperial army, marched towards Lorraine and took the duke’s imperial fiefs, Bitche and Hombourg.69 French troops were then put into winter quarters along the frontier to protect it from imperial incursions.Yet the frontier was far from secure. By the spring of 1703, the French were plagued by imperial raiding parties, who used Lorraine for supplies and shelter, launching

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 42

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

43

raids into the Franche-Comté, Champagne and the Trois Evêchés. Furthermore, Tallard reported that many Lorrains were posing as Germans and had acquired the uniforms of hussars in order to attack French people with impunity.70 The freedom with which these parties crossed Lorraine infuriated the French. In May, Louis XIV was confronted by the news that a party of imperial hussars had stopped the coach of the duke of Lorraine in order to salute him.71 While the duke renewed his ordonnances preventing the Imperials from buying supplies in Lorraine and forbidding Lorrains from acting as guides, he would not refuse entry to raiding parties, as he saw this as an essential part of the neutrality of his states, given that French troops passed there daily.72 It appears, therefore, that he was willing to court ruin rather than appear a complete dependent of France. The change in French fortunes during the war did little to alter Louis XIV’s intentions towards Lorraine. In August 1704 the French suffered a militarily disastrous and psychologically grievous defeat at the Battle of Blenheim. The French generals took the opportunity to request a total occupation of Lorraine in order to, in the words of Marshal Villeroy, ‘make use of it … as if it were a province of the kingdom’.73 Louis XIV continued to resist these calls, but he found the duke of Lorraine’s reluctance to help the French increasingly annoying. That winter, as a large Imperial army set up camp between the Saar, Rhine and Moselle, Louis ordered the establishment of winter quarters along the Saar for several squadrons of cavalry. These troops could not be supported in Alsace, and placing them on the frontier of Lorraine would, it was hoped, discourage any imperial incursions.74 Though Leopold was assured of their good discipline, he refused to consent to these troops being quartered in Lorraine. The duke’s priority was to ensure that his states remained neutral, and he could not afford to give any impression of assisting the French beyond what was absolutely ­necessary. Despite occasional friction over raiding parties and winter quarters, French relations with the duke remained fairly good. But from 1708, as France’s fortunes in the war deteriorated, the prospect loomed of the duke entering the war on the allied side.75 The French Government was well aware of the level of support for the Imperials in Lorrain society generally: as Prince Eugène appeared to be approaching the Moselle in June 1708, many of the principal courtiers at Lunéville proclaimed that the prince would find all manner of support should he enter Lorraine.76 It was therefore all the more essential to France to keep Leopold in a state of neutrality. In an effort to win him over, Louis XIV asked him to act as intermediary to open peace negotiations with Vienna, but the Lorrain envoys were coldly received. The duke meanwhile sought to profit from France’s weakness: he sent his brother, the Bishop of Osnabrück, to the emperor to present his complaints against France and his claims on Alsace and Luxembourg, and after negotiations began at The Hague in 1709, Louis XIV had to refute rumours that he was planning to cede Toul and Verdun to Leopold.77

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 43

12/03/2013 16:10

44

the eastern frontiers of france

As preliminary peace negotiations got underway, the weather was deteriorating, with knock-on effects for the French war effort and the Lorrain duchies. In January 1709 a brutal cold hit western Europe, lasting in Lorraine from 6 January to 2 March. By the spring the state of provisions on France’s northeastern frontier was critical: the Franche-Comté and Lorraine, which together normally provided most of the supplies for French armies operating on the German frontier, could barely meet their own subsistence needs; the duke was therefore compelled to ban grain exports from Lorraine, which threatened the Trois Evêchés with starvation.78 The situation went from bad to worse in the summer of 1709, leading to a further deterioration in Franco-Lorrain relations. Marshal Harcourt informed the new war minister, Daniel Voysin, in August that unless some means could be found of obliging the duke to lift the export ban, the French cavalry would perish. The French continued to press Leopold to release more grain to supply the army, but he replied that his first priority was his people, and he would sooner the grain were taken by violence than give his consent to it leaving Lorraine. Fortunately, no such action needed to be taken: the winter of 1709–10 was not nearly as bad in Lorraine as in France. The duke permitted the French to buy substantial quantities of grain for the army, and in December he published an ordonnance re-establishing freedom of commerce in grain with the Trois Evêchés.79 Finally, the appearance of good harvests in 1710 permitted Leopold to lift the interdiction on taking grain out of the duchies in March 1710.80 The fact that France, even in the hour of its deepest need, did not intervene militarily to seize supplies for the French army during this period shows a commitment to preserving the neutrality of Lorraine, when necessity seemed to dictate the contrary. Moreover, Louis stood firm in maintaining Leopold’s sovereignty even though the level of mistrust between France and Lorraine continued to grow after 1709. Marshal Harcourt warned in May 1710 that, if a surprise attack were launched against the Franche-Comté capital Besançon and its citadel were lost, the province would rise in revolt and Lorraine would enter the war on the allied side.81 Meanwhile rumours reached Versailles that the duke of Lorraine had formed a secret alliance with the emperor, who would not consent to peace unless the Trois Evêchés reverted to being imperial towns.82 Shortly afterwards it was reported that the duke was stockpiling weapons and that he was ready to arm between 16,000 and 18,000 men in very little time; and the following year rumours circulated that Leopold had formed a plan with the Elector of Trier and the Elector Palatine to invade Luxembourg.83 The Treaty of Utrecht, signed 11 April 1713, made no mention of Lorraine. As a separate peace had to be negotiated between France and the Empire, the duke dispatched an envoy to Vienna; but his first cousin the Emperor Charles VI had little interest in the problems of Lorraine. Leopold tried in vain to act as

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 44

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

45

mediator between Vienna and Versailles, and failed in his attempts to obtain the perpetual neutrality of his states; the Treaty of Rastatt (6 March 1714) ignored them altogether. As soon as the treaty had been signed, Leopold sent a representative to Versailles to request the withdrawal of the French troops in Nancy, and the last French regiment left on 11 November 1714. By another treaty signed at Baden in Switzerland in September 1714, Louis XIV promised, with the agreement of the emperor, to finally fulfil the outstanding clauses of the Treaty of Ryswick which affected Lorraine; these were eventually resolved by the Treaty of Paris of 21 January 1718, by which Leopold confirmed the cession of Sarrelouis and Longwy, and received in exchange Rambervilliers.84 He also gained recognition of the title His Royal Highness, up to that point refused by France, a key characteristic of the traitement royal and highly coveted in the European dynastic system.85 Over the course of Louis XIV’s personal reign, the French moved through several distinct phases in dealing with Lorraine. Initially occupied to support the French strategic and logistical position in the Dutch War, Lorraine was retained afterwards on the basis that Charles V refused to receive it on the conditions underwritten by the plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen. The absence of a sufficiently compliant prince to rule Lorraine at Louis’s behest meant that a more ad hoc policy had to be adopted, which developed as a result of political expediency and the needs of the moment into one of outright annexation, though Louvois was probably bent on annexation all along.This policy continued until Ryswick, when the allied powers forced a French climbdown. France’s policies towards Lorraine reflect its huge strategic importance to the security of the kingdom: perhaps most notably of all, the administrative supervision of Lorraine was transferred in 1673 from the secretary of state for foreign affairs to that of war, reflecting the pre-eminence of strategic-logistical objectives in determining French policy in Lorraine. Along with Alsace and the entire north-eastern frontier, Lorraine was now a ‘military zone’. Slowly but surely, France imposed its presence in the Lorraine region, and isolated the duchies within its frontiers; in doing so, Louis XIV was essentially continuing the policies of Richelieu and Mazarin. Though Louis was forced to relinquish Lorraine in 1697, he nevertheless succeeded in limiting its ability to cause him trouble: when war broke out again in 1702, French forces were able to retake Nancy and several other strategic points with minimal resistance, thereby protecting Alsace and Champagne and supporting the line of the Saar. The king now moved towards a temporary, less threatening, more co-operative form of occupation. Around the same time, Saint-Simon wrote that the occupation of Lorraine had come to be expected in times of war, ‘and on such occasions one does not see a difference between it and a province of the kingdom’.86

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 45

12/03/2013 16:10

46

the eastern frontiers of france

Savoy and the south-eastern frontier, 1690–1713 If in the second half of Louis XIV’s personal rule France maintained some control over Lorraine without too much difficulty, the picture was far messier when it came to the lands of the duke of Savoy. Although the Italian frontier had been strategically pivotal to France during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, its military importance had diminished after the integration of Piedmont-Savoy into the French political orbit from the 1630s. For the first half of Louis XIV’s personal rule, therefore, it was of relatively little concern to the war ministry. But as Franco-Sabaudian relations deteriorated in the spring of 1690, the king and Louvois realised that they would have to make contingency arrangements for the increasingly likely prospect that Victor Amadeus would defect to the Grand Alliance. The commander of the French Army of Italy, Nicolas Catinat, wrote to Louis in mid-May from Avigliana to suggest that they devise a plan to ‘ruin Monsieur de Savoie’, to ‘devastate his states’ and to ‘take from his states so much money that they will be of no further help to him’.87 When the declaration of war came in early June, Catinat lost no time in starting to requisition foodstuff and livestock, and sent out orders to put the duke’s states under contribution.88 Yet the lack of military preparation on either side became immediately apparent: the French commander on the Dauphinois border with the duchy of Savoy, Larray, had at his disposal only a regiment of cavalry at half strength and a militia regiment. The French hastily assembled armed peasants to harry the countryside around Chambéry, while the commander awaited the arrival of more infantry and cavalry. The Savoyards, who were reported to be ‘dismayed’ at the course of events, were even less prepared to launch any incursions into France, only beginning to raise militias after the declaration of war.89 Larray informed Louvois with frustration that, given the weak state of defence of Savoy, he could conquer the whole duchy with just two infantry regiments. If Victor Amadeus were given time to build up his forces, he might use it as a base to launch an incursion into the Dauphiné to raise a Huguenot revolt there.90 Louvois’s priority, however, was not to conquer the duchy, but to advance to Briançon to secure the posts necessary for communication with Pinerolo. He reminded Larray that the king had not yet given any order to begin hostilities against the duchy of Savoy, unless the Sabaudian forces there started any. This was perhaps in the hope that Victor Amadeus could be detached from the allies, in which case a conquest of his states would be unnecessary. It was only in mid-June that Louvois began to concern himself with the logistics of a conquest of the duchy. Acknowledging that he had ‘absolutely no knowledge of this country, having only passed along the road which goes from Chambéry to Piedmont’, he demonstrated his usual zeal for m ­ icromanagement

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 46

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

47

by ordering Larray to provide a detailed report of the fortifications and communications of the duchy, and an estimate of how many troops could winter there. But his ignorance of Savoy was near-total: he had to ask whether or not Chambéry was fortified, and whether or not there was a town below the fortress of Montmélian.91 His request for such basic information indicates that the French never, during Louvois’s time at the war ministry, foresaw a need for occupying Savoy and certainly had no strategy for doing so in 1690; their eyes were directed far more towards dealing with the Milanese and the central Po valley. At last, on 18 July the marquis de Saint-Ruth arrived in Grenoble with an order to occupy Savoy – even then, other troops passed by him, headed straight for Pinerolo. His orders were to occupy the duchy specifically to stop Victor Amadeus extracting any money from it, to interrupt his communications and to give him no hope of wintering his troops there. Given the delay in ordering the occupation, Saint-Ruth worried that the duke and his allies would occupy Chambéry before the French. But finally, at noon on 13 August, French troops entered the town. The inhabitants put up no resistance, and the château surrendered. In it, the French found substantial stores of arms and foodstuffs, suggesting that the duke had planned an offensive and that the French had arrived there in the nick of time. Annecy too surrendered without resistance on 17 August, after having been advised by the Sabaudian commander to ‘capitulate as honourably as possible’.92 Within days the provinces of Faucigny, Savoy proper, the Chablais and the Genevois were under French occupation, the local militias also preferring to swear allegiance to the king of France rather than put up any resistance to Saint-Ruth and his army. The French invasion of Savoy had so far been watched with unease from Switzerland, where William III’s agents had been stirring up anti-French feeling. Saint-Ruth argued that it would therefore be of enormous benefit to occupy the area around Lake Geneva to control the passage of refugees and to intimidate Geneva and the canton of Bern, but his advice went unheeded. French resources in the south-east were already stretched to the limit, and Louvois made it clear that completing the conquest of the duchy of Savoy would take second place to building up forces in Piedmont. Versailles could not agree to occupying so many positions around Lake Geneva, as it would be easy for militias loyal to the duke of Savoy – or even the inhabitants (given how few troops were there) – to take them back; it was better to keep a corps of troops together, to be able to send reinforcements to Catinat, who had more important operations to pursue.93 This was indicative of the government’s lack of enthusiasm for tying down troops in an occupation and their lack of desire to keep Savoy in the long term, compared with the enthusiasm of the commanders on the spot. For Louis XIV and Louvois, the only aim was to rid themselves of a potentially

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 47

12/03/2013 16:10

48

the eastern frontiers of france

ruinous and certainly frustrating war in the Alps by bringing Victor Amadeus to terms as quickly as possible, by threatening him with the total loss of his states, especially Piedmont. Militarily, the occupation of Savoy was for entirely defensive purposes, to cover the Dauphiné and Bresse from invasion – advancing into the mountainous regions of the Tarentaise and the Maurienne immediately would be costly and, if Victor Amadeus could be brought to terms, potentially unnecessary.94 By the end of August, the conquest of the duchy still incomplete, SaintRuth became increasingly frustrated at its low priority. He observed regiments continuing to pass through the duchy on their way to Pinerolo, and noted with a hint of sarcasm that ‘Monsieur de Catinat must have a great need of troops’.95 Reinforcements finally arrived and in early September French troops advanced into the Tarentaise to engage with the militias of the marquis de Sales. On 12 September Saint-Ruth crushed the Sabaudian forces, taking de Sales hostage and prompting the immediate surrender of the regional centre, Moutiers. The comte de Bernex took the remnants of the defending forces over the Alps into the Aosta valley, and on 18 September Saint-Ruth wrote to Louvois that at last the king was master of the whole duchy.96 All that remained were the fortress of Montmélian and the state prison at Miolans, the latter capitulating in early October after the governor took a bribe of 10,500 livres.97 French policy towards the duchy of Savoy thereafter reflected the government’s wish to end the war with Victor Amadeus as quickly as possible, while using the duke’s territory to ease some of the financial burden of the conflict and minimise the likelihood of an allied invasion of France. A memorandum to Louvois written in January 1691 warned of the immense sums the war would cost, in transporting wheat across the Alps for stockpiling at Pinerolo as much as in the equipment and manpower required, since the French would be continually obliged to station troops in the region. The best way to end it would be to dispossess the duke of Savoy of his states, including Piedmont, ‘making him lead the life of Monsieur de Lorraine’ and forcing him to negotiate on the king’s terms.98 The plan was to knock Victor Amadeus out of the war by a quick offensive strike in the style of the Palatinate campaigns of 1688–9: shortly before the citadel of Nice fell in April 1691, Louvois ordered Catinat that, if the fortress should prove difficult to take, the entire town should be razed to the ground.99 The death of Louvois in July 1691 brought an important change in the king’s strategy. As Guy Rowlands has shown, Louis decided from then on to remain on the defensive on the south-eastern frontier.100 At the same time he again encouraged Victor Amadeus to sue for peace by trying to get the pope to act as intermediary, in order to be rid of a war which Louis himself described as being ‘as painful as it is ruinous’.101 But the duke was in no mood to compromise, having staked everything. In late August, an allied army seemed about to advance

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 48

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

49

into Savoy. The French were forced to keep the major towns well provisioned and in a state of defence, knowing that the Imperials were passing arms into the canton of Bern for ultimate transfer to Savoy, and Protestants were assembling there ready to pass into the Chablais. To make matters worse, dysentery swept through the French army as a result of the catastrophic supply problems.102 Some good news for the French came in December 1691 when the fortress of Montmélian finally surrendered, after a blockade and siege of sixteen months.103 The fortress of Nice had fallen earlier that year, leaving the French in possession of all of Victor Amadeus’s territories west of the Alps.Yet, as Louis XIV informed Catinat, he was undecided what to do with Montmélian: it would be useful for maintaining the security of Savoy and finishing the war in Piedmont, but it would be very prejudicial in the long term to give it back to the duke when it was so close to the Dauphiné frontier. If the fortress were razed, along with the fortress at Nice, he would permanently be master of the area and could do anything he desired there. His indecision is indicative of his response to the whole war in the south-east, and shows his inability to come to terms with the realities of what was going on, preferring to cling to the idea that, as he put it, ‘anything could change’, rather than admitting his limitations and bruising his pride.104 In the order sent out to governors and bishops across France for the singing of a Te Deum to mark the fall of Montmélian, Louis reiterated that the conquest of the fortress, and that of the duchy of Savoy as a whole, had ‘put my frontiers in a state by which we need fear nothing of the enterprises of my enemies, who always wish to try something around my province of Dauphiné’.105 It was, therefore, an entirely defensive regional strategy. Perhaps still hoping for an accommodation with Victor Amadeus, but in any case because they were useful in the war, the French decided not to destroy Montmélian or Nice.106 But hopes for an early peace came to little: despite continued negotiations through 1692, hopes foundered because of Victor Amadeus’s insistence on receiving the traitement royal in the diplomatic sphere, and Louis XIV’s continued refusal of this, despite his readiness to concede on many other points.107 Only in 1695 did negotiations start to move: in July, the French agreed to the handover and demolition of Casale, and by November were ready to concede Pinerolo, but tried to get in exchange either the town and county of Nice, or the Barcelonnette valley.108 In the end, they got neither: between April and June 1696, Tessé negotiated the Treaty of Turin, whereby Pinerolo would be returned to the duke of Savoy on condition it was razed and never rebuilt. Montmélian and Nice were also returned, with no such conditions. Article XIII of the treaty stipulated that after a general peace Victor Amadeus would be allowed only 1,500 infantry west of the Alps in Savoy and Nice.109 The treaty was ratified by both parties at the end of August, and in early September instructions were given for the evacuation of Savoy. The duchy was handed over

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 49

12/03/2013 16:10

50

the eastern frontiers of france

to the Sabaudian commander Carlo Tana on 28 September, with the exception of Chambéry, where the French commander de Thoy kept control for a week during the handover.110 The success of the Nine Years War enhanced Victor Amadeus’s prestige, allowing him to press on with reforms aimed at expanding the state’s military capacity.111 Yet as he embarked on an ambitious programme of administrative reform, events in Europe raised question marks over the future of the duchy of Savoy within the Sabaudian state. During the negotiations for the partition treaties preceding Carlos II’s death, Victor Amadeus’s main aim was the acquisition of Milan. But, by the terms of the Second Partition Treaty of March 1700, Milan was assigned to Leopold, duke of Lorraine. In July, Victor Amadeus sent an emissary to Louis XIV and William III to propose that Leopold instead be given Naples and Sicily, and that Victor Amadeus would receive Milan. In exchange he would cede an unspecified ‘part of our states’ – presumably Savoy or Nice, or both – to France.112 By this proposal, France would have gained both the contiguous territories of Lorraine and Savoy, while Milan could have provided Victor Amadeus with a springboard for the creation of a kingdom of Lombardy. Yet Louis XIV was ambivalent about such an exchange, revealing his lack of appetite for territorial expansion when it was not accompanied by significant strategic benefits. During negotiations he made it clear that he would not accept Savoy unless the neighbouring Alpine passes were also handed over to him, along with the county of Nice and the Barcelonette valley; otherwise the frontier would never be secure.113 In the end these negotiations proved unnecessary for the French because Carlos II died on 1 November, bequeathing his entire empire to the Bourbon candidate. Now encircled by two blocs of Bourbon territory, Victor Amadeus had little choice but to allow French troops to pass through his states to Milan. In April 1701 he signed an alliance with France, gaining for himself supreme command of the combined Sabaudian and Bourbon armies in Italy. But the terms of the alliance offered him no prospect of territorial expansion, and he maintained contacts with the emperor, explaining to him that he had only joined the Bourbon alliance under duress. The following spring, the Habsburg position in Italy deteriorated, prompting the emperor to offer significant territorial concessions to Victor Amadeus as a means of detaching him from the French and Spanish. The duke, fearing complete Bourbon domination of northern Italy, received an imperial envoy in Turin in the summer of 1703 to begin negotiations for an alliance. The decision to change sides (his third such decision in thirteen years) was, to paraphrase Geoffrey Symcox, a ‘prodigious gamble’, upon which hung the future of Victor Amadeus’s state and his dynasty.114 Upon hearing of Victor Amadeus’s intrigues, Louis XIV ordered his commander in the Milanese, the duc de Vendôme, to disarm the Sabaudian regiments, and this took place on

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 50

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

51

29 September 1703 in Lombardy. Vendôme then marched to Piedmont to force Victor Amadeus to hand over his fortresses. Shortly afterwards the duke ordered the arrest of all French subjects in his states, and on 24 October he declared war on France.115 Unlike during the NineYears War, when Italy was of secondary importance to France, it was now of the utmost significance, and Louis XIV was determined to knock Victor Amadeus out of the war in order to assure the security of the Milanese. Franco-Spanish forces therefore began a systematic conquest of Piedmont and Savoy.116 Savoy would be of great strategic importance to France, since Victor Amadeus had closed the Mont Cénis pass, making the duchy, along with the pro-French Swiss Republic of the Valais, the only routes by which reinforcements and supplies could reach Lombardy.117 The theatre was equally important for the allies, as it offered a weak point in France’s defences: from 1703 the Camisard rebels in Languedoc and the Cévennes were provided with English arms, money and officers, and plans were made by the Grand Alliance to invade from Savoy and the Dauphiné, with the aim of depriving the French of their Mediterranean fleet.118 The importance of this theatre to the allies is reflected in the fact that the Maritime Powers paid Victor Amadeus 80,000 écus per month as subsidy, which equated to roughly half his military expenditure.119 Avoiding the meagre Sabaudian defence forces, the comte de Tessé marched into Chambéry in mid-November and met no resistance at all. He informed the war minister, Chamillart, that he was sparing the king the cost of sending news of Chambéry’s surrender by special courier, as he did not think it sufficiently important.120 Within a few days French troops had marched into Annecy and the Chablais to cut off communication between Geneva and Piedmont. But the relatively low priority of its conquest, in the great scheme of the war, was abundantly clear. Once the key towns of Chambéry, Annecy and Rumilly had been occupied, no further advances into the duchy were made. Indeed, Louis XIV made it clear that he was far from overwhelmed by news of the fall of Chambéry: he informed Tessé that it was overshadowed by the much more important victory on the Rhine and the recapture of Landau.121 Tessé was to wait a further six weeks before advancing into the rest of Savoy, which left French positions far from secure: the marquis de Sales was still at large in the duchy, and his communication with Piedmont could not be stopped. In early December, the duc de La Feuillade arrived with reinforcements just in time to deal with a counter-attack by de Sales; the Sabaudian commander managed briefly to retake Annecy, but was quickly routed by the vastly superior French force and withdrew over the Alps. By the end of December 1703, the whole of Savoy – except for Montmélian – was under French occupation; on 2 January the intendant Bouchu wrote to Chamillart, ‘There you have it, Savoy conquered and the troops at rest.’122

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 51

12/03/2013 16:10

52

the eastern frontiers of france

French strategy with regard to Savoy was to follow the tried and tested methods of the last war: the duke was denied its revenues and men, which were instead taken by the French army. Bouchu urged Versailles to quickly send an invasion force, pointing out that the conquest of the duchy would disrupt the diplomatic channels between the duke of Savoy and the Swiss, at very little cost.123 Victor Amadeus, meanwhile, tried unsuccessfully to prevent French exploitation of Savoy’s resources by incorporating the duchy into the Swiss confederation.124 The French position in Savoy would not be secure, however, as long as the fortress of Montmélian held out, and for two years the French occupying forces were harried by bands of raiders in guerrilla-style attacks. The fortress finally capitulated in late November 1705 on condition that its garrison be allowed to cross the Alps into Piedmont, and that it not be razed. After hesitating for several weeks, the king (somewhat dishonourably) ordered its demolition on 21 December.125 The citadel of Nice fell in December, depriving Victor Amadeus of any foothold over the Alps, while the French continued to slowly occupy Piedmont. As spring came, and Vendôme and La Feuillade closed in to besiege Turin, it appeared that Victor Amadeus would soon be completely dispossessed of his states, something which might have led to the French annexation of Savoy. But in the meantime the duke continued to support the activity of raiding parties as a means of tying down French troops. The French defeat at Turin in the summer of 1706 was a critical moment in the war, and its repercussions were felt throughout Europe. It saved Victor Amadeus from the total loss of his states, and ensured that from then on the Habsburgs, rather than the Bourbons, would dominate northern Italy.126 The defeat also ensured that the French would no longer occupy Piedmont, because Louis felt compelled by logistics to evacuate his troops from Italy in 1706–7. For Savoy, the implications of this were immense: from then on, the French were on the defensive, and the duchy became one of the main theatres of conflict until the Peace of Utrecht. Before the defeat at Turin, the French military presence in Savoy was sparse: the marquis de Vallière had six companies of mountain fusiliers to defend French positions in the Chablais, and could call upon the militia of the Dauphiné if necessary. But from 1706 the French had to plan for incursions from across the Alps, and this required larger forces to be stationed in Savoy.127 During the spring of 1707 it appeared increasingly likely that the duke of Savoy would invade the duchy by way of the Aosta valley, and the French commanders became ever more worried that, should Victor Amadeus get through, the population would rise in his support. Tessé and Vallière were both extremely concerned that the Tarentaise was indefensible if invaded from the Aosta valley; the French army’s knowledge of the area was very limited and Tessé conceded that, given the abundance of untapped resources in the region, if the enemy invaded with the intention of raising a rebellion or reconquest it

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 52

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

53

was very possible they would succeed. Worse still, if the Tarentaise fell it was likely that Faucigny and the Chablais would rise in revolt the moment the duke’s army appeared. Added to this, the border with Switzerland was not secure: the raiding parties might have been contained, but Vallière warned that there were several groups in Switzerland just waiting for commissions from the duke to start rampaging.128 By early July 1707 it became clear that Victor Amadeus, at the behest of his allies, was planning an incursion into Provence rather than Savoy.129 But Savoy’s strategic position was still crucial, as it formed part of a French defensive barrier that stretched from the Savoyard mountain passes through the Dauphiné to Provence. This frontier was weak and difficult to manage: wherever the enemy invaded, troops in other provinces had a long march to meet them; and, as the defence of Provence was the highest priority, the Alpine valleys were only sparsely guarded.130 The allied force crossed the Alps at La Fenêtre pass and retook Nice in early July, advancing to besiege Toulon later that month and causing the loss of the entire French Mediterranean fleet. But in late August the siege was lifted and Victor Amadeus’s incursion into Provence was aborted. An expected rising of the Camisards had failed to materialise, and there was also a serious divergence of interests between the duke and the British on one side, and the Imperials on the other. By early September he was in retreat, reaching Piedmont on the 17 September, and retaking Susa shortly afterwards.131 The French commanders in Savoy worked during the winter and spring of 1708 to improve their defences, and place themselves in a state of readiness.132 An army of around 35,000 men commanded by Marshal Villars guarded the frontier, while Victor Amadeus and the imperial General Daun commanded an equal number of Sabaudian and Imperial troops on the other side of the Alps. Franco-Spanish troops hoped to block any invasion of France, and Savoy was again an essential part of this defensive line that stretched from Lake Geneva to Nice, with the priority being to protect Provence and the Dauphiné and stop the enemy army from crossing the Rhone.133 But the intentions of the enemy remained unclear until the last moment, and the French had no idea at which point the enemy would strike.134 By July, there was a strong sense of anxiety in Chamillart’s correspondence with the military commanders in the region, as he feared that the French army would scatter in terror when Victor Amadeus and Daun appeared. Later that month the duke descended on the lower Dauphiné with the aim of taking Briançon, France’s forward logistical base; Villars succeeded in driving the enemy back into Piedmont, but he could not prevent them from taking the fortresses of Exilles and Fenestrelle as they withdrew.135 By the autumn of 1708, Victor Amadeus had already achieved most of his war aims. In March 1707 the emperor finally fulfilled his side of the 1703 treaty

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 53

12/03/2013 16:10

54

the eastern frontiers of france

of alliance and gave him Alessandria, Lomellina and the Val Sesia in the Milanese; and also the Mantuan Montferrato pending formal investiture.136 But a recovery of Nice and Savoy would be more difficult, especially given the harsh winters of 1708 and 1709. From 1708 until the end of the war, Victor Amadeus’s efforts were therefore limited to incursions across the Alps, performing a vital function for the allies in keeping French forces tied down, but having limited real objectives beyond that. The duke’s hopes for the recovery of his states over the Alps now rested on the peace negotiations which opened at The Hague in the spring of 1709, where he was firmly backed by the British. Throughout these negotiations, Louis XIV demonstrated a willingness to give up Savoy.137 Meanwhile, Savoy, though under French occupation, was by no means under complete French control or barred to the allies. In 1709, Berwick commanded the defence of Savoy and the Dauphiné in place of Villars. Daun entered Savoy with the ambitious intention of achieving a pincer movement on the Franche-Comté with the imperial army of the comte de Mercy. Berwick, who placed the centre of his defence at Briançon, covered the Maurienne and the Dauphiné, but could not prevent allied forces taking the Tarantaise in late July, followed soon after by Faucigny, the Chablais and the Genevois. In August Annecy fell. But after Mercy’s defeat on the Rhine, the prospect of an invasion of the Franche-Comté disappeared and Daun retreated to winter in Piedmont.138 Victor Amadeus meanwhile kept his options open, holding negotiations with Berwick through the winter of 1710 and 1711, still apparently entertaining hopes that the French might be able to procure him the duchy of Milan in exchange for Savoy.139 At the same time he hoped that the campaign of 1711 would give him a better bargaining position. In July the imperial commander Schulemberg advanced into Savoy via the Aosta valley, while the main allied force under Daun and Victor Amadeus crossed the Mont Cénis pass. The French were well aware that their position in Savoy was much weaker than before, and their militias were put on alert in Bresse, Provence and even as far west as the Lyonnais.140 But Berwick managed to outmanoeuvre the allies and blocked their advance into the Dauphiné. While the allied armies were able to enter Savoy and sent detachments to occupy Annecy, Faverges and Chambéry, supply problems forced them to withdraw to Piedmont in September.141 Victor Amadeus, ever the shrewd operator, tried to strengthen his bargaining position with the allies by continuing secret negotiations with Berwick in 1711, and again in 1712.142 When the peace conference convened at Utrecht in January 1712, the British plenipotentiaries were ordered to strongly protect the interests of Victor Amadeus, to achieve the restoration of his states over the Alps and gain him the Alpine frontier he desired. At one point during the conference, the British proposed that Philip V exchange Spain for Savoy and Piedmont, along with Naples and Sicily, while Victor Amadeus would become

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 54

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

55

king of Spain. Louis XIV agreed to this proposal, but Philip V refused.143 On 14 March 1713, an armistice was finally agreed between Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus, and a peace treaty was concluded at Utrecht on 11 April. Britain’s backing had won him Sicily and the full royal status of king he had coveted for so long. By articles III and IV of the treaty, Louis immediately restored the duchy of Savoy and the county of Nice to Victor Amadeus, along with the Pragelato valley and the forts of Exilles and Fenestrelle; in exchange the French gained the Barcelonnette valley. In this way, it was hoped that the summits of the Alps would serve as the future limits between France, Piedmont and the county of Nice.144 The French army evacuated Savoy in May. In a ceremony in Chambéry on 5 June, the French brigadier de Prade officially handed over possession of the duchy to Victor Amadeus’s commander, von der Schulemburg, bringing the second French occupation to an end.145 It had not been a straightforward occupation after a short burst of fighting, as in the Nine Years War. Savoy in the War of the Spanish Succession had remained something of a war zone, with all the additional pressures on the population and the occupiers that this would naturally generate. Louis XIV and the politics of the frontier The military occupations of Lorraine and Savoy reflect, to a great extent, the failures of Louis XIV’s frontier policy. His insensitivity to the ambitions of Victor Amadeus II led to the breakdown in Franco-Sabaudian relations in 1690 and again in 1703, and required the occupation of part of the duke’s states in order to guarantee the south-eastern frontier of the kingdom. In the north-east, the French withdrawal from Lorraine in 1697 was a huge climbdown for the king, the most significant territorial concession of his reign. If Louis’s primary intention with regard to Lorraine and Piedmont-Savoy was to make them into friendly satellite states of France, he began to learn how to do this only when it was almost too late. The partial occupation of Lorraine in the War of the Spanish Succession, despite the extra cost and inconveniences, demonstrates that by the end of the reign Louis had begun to learn his lesson.146 His preferred ‘neutralisation’ of Lorraine was without doubt the more realistic and responsible of the two visions in 1702, and it was only as a result of events that he was forced to go further. Louis’s frontier policy was certainly never driven by any grand strategy to permanently annex these territories, even if they had strategic value. In the case of Savoy, the temporary conquest of the duchy supported the war, but there was no attempt to make it permanent, despite Vauban’s argument in favour of the permanent acquisition of Nice and Savoy: in 1696 he called for Louis XIV to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 55

12/03/2013 16:10

56

the eastern frontiers of france

cede Pinerolo and keep Montmélian, and in 1705 he was against the destruction of Montmélian, believing it should be kept as part of the pré carré.147 Even when peaceful annexation of Lorraine and Savoy became a real proposition during the exchange negotiations of 1700, Louis XIV’s enthusiasm for it was decidedly lukewarm. His preferred option was, as it always had been, the extension of France’s sphere of direct control into the buffer zone along the eastern frontiers through political and dynastic influence. While the course of these occupations was largely contingent on events beyond his government’s control, the methods deployed to legitimise French presence in occupied territory show a certain consistency. Just as Richelieu did after his occupation of Lorraine, Louis XIV employed jurists and historiographers to publicise the legal basis of his claims to the duchy, claims that were maintained and defended even after France relinquished Lorraine at Ryswick.148 These tactics were repeated in other occupied territories: when the FrancheComté was conquered in 1674, the French Government publicised its rights to the province through the claims of Queen Marie-Therèse, and in 1694 and 1697 the ducs de Noailles and Vendôme were invested by Louis’s command with the office of ‘viceroy of Catalonia’ when they occupied the province.149 These rights were activated particularly when a territory was seen as being strategically useful for France: thus Louis XIV used the title of ‘count of Nice’ during the occupations of the county in the 1690s and 1700s.150 More unusually, during the occupation of Savoy in the 1690s, medals designed by the members of the Académie Royale des Inscriptions in commemoration of the 1690 battle of Staffarda depicted Louis XIV (as Hercules) trampling a centaur (Victor Amadeus) and taking the ducal coronet.151 Of course, there was considerable variation in how substantial these claims actually were, and the activation of claims, particularly in the cases of Nice and Savoy, did not necessarily imply a desire to annex a territory outright. What begins to emerge from this chapter’s narrative of the political and military factors which necessitated the two occupations of Lorraine and Savoy is that the French had no preconceived or uniform policy on occupation. They developed policy on the basis of varying events and pressures, many of them born out of the strategic objectives, logistical requirements and diplomatic approaches of the French crown. Other pressures came from within the territories and their occupied populations, and others still came from the rightful, but usurped, rulers. Part II (chapters 3 and 4) looks further in analytical detail at the way the French administered the occupied territories, and how the French authorities and the occupied populations interacted.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 56

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy









57

Notes

1 For a discussion of the strategic importance of each frontier see Cénat, Le Roi stratège, pp. 274–89. 2 The north-eastern frontier in particular attracted the attention of numerous French and German historians from the nineteenth century onwards. A good historiographical overview can be found in G. Lottes, ‘Frontiers between Geography and History’ in S. G. Ellis and R. Eßer (eds), Frontiers and the writing of history, 1500–1850 (Hanover, 2006). 3 R. Hatton, ‘Louis XIV et l’Europe’, XVIIe siècle, 123 (1979), pp. 124–5; J. Stoye, Europe unfolding, 1648–88 (London, 1969), pp. 386–7. 4 The mémoire in question is printed in C. Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire (4 vols., Paris, 1877). Quotation from i, p. 519. 5 Sonnino, Dutch War, p. 119. 6 BNF Col. Lorr. ms. 18, fo. 29, Charles IV to Louis XIV, 14 Sep. 1670; ADMM 3F 100, fos. 5–6, Mémoire [undated]; ADMM 3F 315 no. 17, Act of Abdication, 14 Sep. 1670. 7 SHDT A1 250, fo. 44, Créqui to Louvois, 16 Sep. 1670; fo. 88, Créqui to Louvois, 27 Sep. 1670; fo. 177, Créqui to Louvois, 29 Nov. 1670; Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, pp. 679–80. 8 A vital element of Mazarin’s diplomacy after the Peace of Westphalia, continued by Lionne, was the cultivation of a clientele of German states around the river Rhine. The League of the Rhine was created in the 1650s, initially to safeguard ‘German liberties’ against Habsburg power. But by the 1660s the League was increasingly used by Louis XIV as a means of securing allies for his offensive campaigns in western Europe, and after the War of Devolution it was dissolved. O’Connor, ‘Louis XIV and Europe’, pp. 62–3. 9 Kaypaghian, ‘Le Duché de Lorraine’, p. 120. 10 Sonnino, Dutch War, p. 121; Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, p. 673. 11 SHDT, A1 253, fos. 135–6, Créqui to Louvois, 15 Feb. 1671. 12 Lionne continued to oppose retention of the duchy, but he had little say in determining strategy vis-à-vis Lorraine, and he died in September 1671. The supervision of Lorraine, having been in the jurisdiction of the secretary of state for foreign affairs, was officially transferred to Louvois’s department in 1673. Sonnino, Dutch War, p. 138; A. Corvisier, Louvois (Paris, 1983), p. 425. 13 ADMM 3F 28 no. 60, ‘Ambassade de Sr de Windisgratz de la part de l’empereur a Louis 14 pour le retablissement de duc de Lorraine’, 1671. 14 AAE CP Lorr. 43, fos. 30 and 33, Créqui to Lionne, 26 Feb. and 8 Mar. 1671. 15 ADMM 3F 5 no. 38, Canon to Charles IV, 20 Aug. 1671; Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, pp. 687–8. 16 AAE CP Lorr. 43, fo. 2, Créqui to Gravel, 9 Jan. 1671; SHDT A1 253, fo. 43, Créqui to Louvois, 11 Jan. 1671. 17 On 17 Sep. 1634 a royal edict declared the réunion of Lorraine and Bar with France, based on three factors: the ‘very considerable and ancient claims’ of Louis XIII, the ‘current possession by treaties and by force of arms’ and the ‘extraordinary felony of the duke’: Vignal Souleyreau, Richelieu, p. 233; Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 208–10. 18 Sonnino, Dutch War, p. 105. 19 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 64; Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iii, p. 195. 20 SHDT A1 452 no. 42, Louvois to Luxembourg, 11 Sep. 1675. 21 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 10, fo. 243, Treaty of contributions, 3 Jul. 1675. 22 On Louis XIV’s attempts to claim the duchy for himself in 1675 by invoking the Treaty of Montmartre, see P. McCluskey ‘From Regime Change to Réunion: Louis XIV’s Quest for Legitimacy in Lorraine, 1670–97’, English Historical Review, 126 (2011), pp. 1394–5. 23 J.-L. Etienne, ‘Charles V et les tentatives de recouvrement de ses Etats 1675–1679’, Univ. de Nancy mémoire de maîtrise (1968), pp. 101–18. 24 AAE CP Lorr. 43, fo. 200, Croissy to Pomponne, 4 Nov. 1678; fos. 236–7, ‘Mémoire sur les affaires de Lorraine’ [undated]. 25 ADMM 3F 104, fo. 147, Charles V to abbé of Saint-Mihiel and members of conseil d’état of Nancy, 14 Feb. 1679.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 57

12/03/2013 16:10

58







the eastern frontiers of france

26 Corvisier, Louvois, pp. 369–73. 27 Lynn, The wars, pp. 160–1; Rowlands, Dynastic state, p. 56. 28 Rowlands, Dynastic state, pp. 56–7. 29 Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre, p. 48. Louvois was unquestionably the biggest influence on Louis XIV’s strategy formulation after 1675, with the death of Turenne and the retirement of Condé. Cénat, Le Roi stratège, pp. 110–11. 30 Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre, p. 12. 31 These inquiries were led by Cardin Le Bret, intendant of the Trois Evêchés from 1624, his task being to find as many ‘usurpations’ as he could by foreigners of lands that owed obedience to the king of France. 32 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 9, fos. 245–8, ‘Mémoire concernant le service du Roy et les droits de Sa Majesté sur la Lorraine’, 1670; Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 223; Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre, p. 47. 33 Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre, pp. 44–6. 34 On the annexation of Strasbourg see Ford, Strasbourg in transition, 1648–1789 (New York, NY, 1966), pp. 38–52; on the réunions and the conquest of Luxembourg see B. Jeanmougin, Louis XIV à la conquête des Pays-Bas espagnols: La Guerre oubliée 1678–1684 (Paris, 2005). 35 Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre, pp. 80–81. 36 This was in spite of heavy lobbying for the restitution of Lorraine by Charles V’s ministers: ADMM 3F 5 no. 102, Canon to Charles V, 6 Aug. 1683; O’Connor, ‘Louis XIV and Europe’, p. 65; Piquet-Marchal, La Chambre, pp. 95–6. On the French occupation of Luxembourg, see R. Petit, ‘La politique française dans le Luxembourg de 1681 à 1697’ in R. Poidevin and G. Trausch, Les Relations franco-luxembourgeoises de Louis XIV à Robert Schuman (Metz, 1977). 37 Lynn, The wars, p. 169. 38 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 55; Lynn, The wars, p. 170. 39 ‘Mémoire du roi pour servir d’instruction au sieur comte de La Vauguyon s’en allant présentement à Vienne en qualité d’envoyé extraordinaire de Sa Majesté’, 24 Oct. 1685, in A. Sorel (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la Révolution Française, vol. i: Autriche (Paris, 1884), pp. 109–10. 40 Quoted in V.-L. Tapié, ‘Louis XIV’s Methods in Foreign Policy’ in R. Hatton, Louis XIV and Europe (London, 1976), pp. 10–11. Pomponne was recalled to the conseil d’en haut shortly after the death of Louvois in June 1691. 41 An outspoken Lorrain apologist for French expansionism, du Hautoy spent the 1690s composing memoranda detailing the king’s dynastic and feudal rights over several other territories along the eastern frontiers, including Luxembourg (by then already ‘reunited’ to France), the Palatinate and Savoy. ADMM 3F 97 no. 12, ‘Observations importantes au service du Roy dans les pays conquis’, by du Hautoy, Sep. 1691; no. 19, ‘Mémoire de plusieurs titres important au service du Roy’ by du Hautoy, Apr. 1697. As Peter Sahlins noted, many of the apologists for French expansion in the north-east of France were natives of the region, and were based there: Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, pp. 1431–2. 42 AAE CP Lorr. 45, fos. 94–98, ‘Remarques sur les arrests rendus en la Chambre royalle establie à Metz par Edit du neufiesme novembre 1679 pour la réunion des Duchez de Lorraine et de Bar’ by du Hautoy, 10 Aug. 1693. 43 AAE CP Lorr. 45, fos. 99–105, ‘Project de déclaration du Roy pour réunir les Duchez de Lorraine et de Bar à la Couronne’ [undated]. 44 Lynn, The wars, p. 199. 45 M.-J. Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant en pays de frontière: L’exemple de Jean-Baptiste Desmarets de Vaubourg, intendant de Lorraine et de Barrois (1691–1697)’, Annales de L’Est, 53 (2003), p. 323. 46 Lynn, The wars, p. 201. 47 SHDT A1 974 no. 26, Chamlay to Louis XIV, 1 May 1690; no. 47, Lorge to Louis XIV, 17 May 1690; A1 990 no. 77, Bissy to Louvois, 18 Jul. 1690; on Chamlay’s role in strategy formulation in the 1690s see Cénat, Le Roi stratège, pp. 181–9. 48 AAE CP Lorr. 45, fo. 352, Couvonges to Croissy, 20 Mar. 1696; fo. 373, Croissy to Couvonges, 26 Apr. 1696; Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iv. p. 24.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 58

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

59



49 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 70. 50 AAE CP Lorr. 46, fos. 27–33, Treaty of Ryswick. 51 SHDT A1 1582 no. 8, Villars to Chamillart, 23 Jul. 1702. 52 Black, European international relations, pp. 16–17. 53 The treaty’s main terms were that the Iberian lands and extra-European empire would go to the Archduke Charles, and Milan to the dauphin. 54 Saint-Simon, Mémoires, vii, pp. 119, 300. 55 Quoted in Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 122. 56 SHDT A1 1574 no. 48, Casteja to Chamillart, 10 May 1702. 57 SHDT A1 1583 no. 167, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 22 Jul. 1702. 58 SHDT A1 1582 no. 3, Villars to Chamillart, 19 Jul. 1702. 59 Black, European international relations, p. 44. 60 R. Oresko and D. Parrott, ‘The Sovereignty of Monferrato and the Citadel of Casale as European Problems in the early modern Period’ in D. Ferrari, Stephano Guazzo e Casale tra cinque e seicento Atti del convegno di studi nel quarto centenario della morte, Casale Monferrato, 22–23 ottobre 1993 (Rome, 1997), pp. 84–6. 61 AAE CP Lorr. 55 nos. 17 and 21, Louis XIV to Audiffret, 25 Aug. and 7 Sep. 1702. 62 AAE CP Lorr. 55 nos. 27 and 37, Louis XIV to Audiffret, 5 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1702. 63 SHDT A1 1571 no. 1bis, Louis XIV to Villars, 16 Nov. 1702; no. 2, Chamillart to Tallard, 16 Nov. 1702; nos. 3 and 12, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 16 and 22 Nov. 1702. 64 ADMM 3F 8, Leopold I to Louis XIV, 1 Dec. 1702; SHDT A1 1571 no. 29, Callières to Chamillart, Nancy 1 Dec. 1702; no. 28, Tallard to Chamillart, 1 Dec. 1702. 65 SHDT A1 1582 no. 239, Villars to Chamillart, 22 Dec. 1702. 66 SHDT A1 1571 no. 22, Villars to Chamillart, 29 Nov. 1702; no. 29bis, Villars to Chamillart, 3 Dec. 1702. 67 SHDT A1 1571 no. 35, Chamillart to Villars, 7 Dec. 1702. 68 AAE CP Lorr. 55 no. 47, Louis XIV to Audiffret, 21 Dec. 1702. 69 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 123. 70 SHDT A1 1664 nos. 9 and 35, Tallard to Chamillart, 16 and 29 May 1703. 71 AAE CP Lorr. 55 no. 71, Louis XIV to Audiffret, 30 May 1703. 72 SHDT A1 1671 no. 251, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 3 Jun. 1703; A1 1664 no. 94, Tallard to Chamillart, 11 Jul. 1703. 73 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 124. 74 SHDT A1 1754 no. 378, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 20 Oct. 1704. 75 Torcy received several memoranda during the summer of 1708, most of them anonymous, warning that the duke was amassing weapons and supplies in readiness to declare war on France. But the French envoy, d’Audiffret, informed the king that he had not seen anything which could give him the least suspicion. AAE CP Lorr. 70, fos. 271–80, Audiffret to Louis XIV; fo. 295, anon. to Torcy, 23 Sep. 1708. The ducal archives in Nancy do not refer to any such preparations. 76 AAE CP Lorr. 70, fos. 189–90, Audiffret to Louis XIV, 23 Jun. 1708. 77 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 126. 78 Ibid., ii, p. 100; SHDT A1 2166 no. 25, La Houssaye to Chamillart, 22 Apr. 1709; A1 2167 no. 34, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 29 Apr. 1709. 79 SHDT A1 2169 no. 128, Valeille to Voysin, 5 Nov. 1709; A1 2167 no. 335, Saint-Contest to Voysin, 10 Dec. 1709; no. 159, Geoffroy to Voysin, 10 Dec. 1709; Laperche-Fournel, La Population, p. 155. 80 SHDT A1 2241 no. 85, Saint-Contest to Voysin, 22 Mar. 1710; A1 2237 no. 114, Harcourt to Voysin, 30 Mar. 1710; Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, pp. 100–101. 81 SHDT A1 2237 no. 312, Harcourt to Voysin, 18 May 1710. The French had serious concerns about a possible uprising in the Franche-Comté, particularly after 1704. B. Grosperrin, L’Influence française et le sentiment national français en Franche-Comté de la conquête à la Révolution (1674–1789) (Paris, 1967), p. 45. In 1709 the French had discovered a conspiracy to raise a rebellion there, led by disaffected Comtois magistrates. On the suspected links between

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 59

12/03/2013 16:10

60

the eastern frontiers of france

certain members of the House of Lorraine (in particular the princesse de Lillebonne) and the abortive rebellion of 1709, see Spangler, Society of princes, pp. 248–51. 82 SHDT A1 2167 no. 231, anon. to Voysin [undated]. 83 SHDT A1 2238 no. 227, Bezons to Voysin, 18 Aug. 1710; no. 274, Bezons to Voysin, 29 Aug. 1710; A1 2317 no. 71, Druy to Voysin, 26 Feb. 1711. There is no evidence to suggest any of this was true. 84 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, pp. 127–8. 85 See R. Oresko, ‘The House of Savoy in search for a royal crown in the seventeenth century’ in R. Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott, Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe: essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton (Cambridge, 1997). 86 Saint-Simon, Mémoires, vii, p. 301. 87 SHDT A1 1009 no. 23, Catinat to Louis XIV, 14 May 1690. 88 J. Humbert, ‘Conquête et Occupation de la Savoie sous Louis XIV (1690–1691)’, Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Savoie, 6e série, 9 (1967), p. 19. 89 SHDT A1 1009 no. 107, Larray to Louvois, 9 Jun. 1690. 90 On allied plans for an invasion, see R. Oresko, ‘The Diplomatic Background to the Glorioso Rimpatrio: the Rupture between Vittorio Amedeo II and Louis XIV (1688–1690)’ in A. de Lange (ed.), Dall’Europa alle Valli Valdesi: Atti del XXIX Convegno storico internazionale: ‘Il Glorioso Rimpatrio (1689–1989). Contesto–Significato–Immagine’ (Turin, 1990), p. 380. 91 SHDT A1 1009 no. 114, Larray to Louvois, 12 Jun. 1690; A1 1011, fo. 375, Louvois to Larray, 13 Jun. 1690. 92 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 34. 93 SHDT A1 1010 nos. 50, 51 and 55, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 22 (twice) and 24 Aug. 1690. 94 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, pp. 35–6. 95 SHDT A1 1010 no. 58, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 28 Aug. 1690. 96 SHDT A1 1010 nos. 69 and 73, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 12 and 18 Sep. 1690. 97 SHDT A1 1010 no. 85, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 2 Oct. 1690. 98 SHDT A1 1101, fos. 238–43, Feuquières to Louvois, 5 Jan. 1691. 99 SHDT A1 1077 no. 141, Louvois to Catinat, 27 Mar. 1691. 100 Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, p. 547. 101 SHDT A1 1078 no. 29, Louis XIV to Catinat, 15 Aug. 1691. 102 Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, pp. 543–4. 103 The siege of Montmélian devastated the surrounding area. The month after the capitulation of the fortress, Cardinal Le Camus wrote of Savoy: ‘poverty is everywhere … [with] famine caused by the troops, bad harvests and fire, filling the people with despair’, quoted in J. Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 555. 104 SHDT A1 1078 no. 122, Louis XIV to Catinat, 16 Dec. 1691. 105 AAE CP Sard. 94 [unnumbered], Instructions of Louis XIV, 2 Jan. 1692. 106 SHDT A1 1169 no. 33, Catinat to Louis XIV, 12 Mar. 1692. 107 SHDT A1 1238 nos. 79 and 82, Tessé to Louis XIV, 22 and 29 Feb. 1692; no. 96, Catinat to the prince of Carignano [1692]. 108 Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, pp. 555–7; AAE CP Sard 94, fo. 275, Mémoire, Croissy, Nov. 1695. 109 Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, pp. 559–60. 110 SHDT A1 1375 nos. 59 and 78, Bonval to Barbezieux, 26 and 29 Sep. 1696; AST P Sav. 2 no. 21, ‘Instruction de S.A.R. au Marquis Tane pour aller prendre possession du Duché de Savoye’, 13 Sep. 1696. 111 Storrs, War, Diplomacy, pp. 101–2; Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 118. 112 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 137–8. 113 ‘Memoire pour servir d’instruction au sieur comte de Tessé, chevalier des ordres du roi, lieutenant general de ses armees etc., allant a turin par ordre de sa majesté’ (Oct. 1700), in C. Horric de Beaucaire (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la révolution française, vol. xiv: Savoie–Sardaigne (Paris, 1898), pp. 240–1.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 60

12/03/2013 16:10

military occupation in frontier strategy

61

114 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 139–44. 115 Victor Amadeus concluded a formal treaty with the allies on 8 November 1703. 116 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 144. 117 Ibid., p. 147. 118 Lynn, The wars, pp. 278–9. 119 Storrs gives the duke’s expenditure for 1703 as 5,450,000 lire: Storrs, War, diplomacy, p. 81; Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 146. 120 SHDT A1 1690 no. 177, Tessé to Louis XIV, 16 Nov. 1703. 121 SHDT A1 1690 no. 188, Louis XIV to Tessé, 21 Nov. 1703; A1 1690 no. 199, Tessé to Louis XIV, 1 Dec. 1703. 122 SHDT A1 1766 no. 1, Bouchu to Chamillart, 2 Jan. 1704 (quotation); Devos, ‘Aspects de l’occupation’, p. 36. 123 SHDT A1 1690 no. 31, Bouchu to Chamillart, 21 Oct. 1703. 124 H. Fazy, Les Suisses et la neutralité de la Savoie, 1703–1704 (Geneva, 1895), pp. 21–2, 110, 126–9, 180–200; AAE CP Sard. 114, fo. 162, Tessé to Torcy, 21 March 1704. 125 SHDT A1 1876, no. 456, La Fare to Chamillart, 27 Nov. 1705; A1 1877 no. 16, Chamillart to La Fare, 3 Dec. 1705; no. 205, La Fare to Chamillart, 28 Dec. 1705. 126 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 144. 127 SHDT A1 1880 no. 403 ‘Projet pour la défense de la Provence, le Dauphiné et la Savoy’, Dec. 1705. In December 1705 Victor Amadeus sent officers into Savoy to ‘arouse the zeal’ of the people of the duchy. AAE CP Sard. 115, fo. 123, ‘Copie de la commission de M. le duc de Savoye pour exciter en sa faveur un soulevement en Savoye’, 8 Dec. 1705. 128 SHDT A1 2038 no. 59, Vallière to Chamillart, 28 Jan. 1707; no. 124, Chamillart to Vallière, 12 Feb. 1707; no. 209, Tessé to Chamillart, 10 Mar. 1707; no. 239, Vallière to Chamillart, 18 Mar. 1707. 129 SHDT A1 2039 no. 318, La Closure to Chamillart, 29 Jun. 1707; A1 2040 no. 1, Chamillart to Vallière, 2 Jul. 1707. 130 SHDT A1 2040 no. 7, ‘Mémoire sur le Piémont, la Savoye, le Dauphiné et la Provence’, 15 Jul. 1707. 131 SHDT A1 2040 no. 80, Chamillart to de Masselin, 16 Aug. 1707; no. 108, Chamillart to Tessé, 6 Sep. 1707; no. 126, Tessé to Chamillart, 18 Sep. 1707; Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 154. 132 SHDT A1 2099 no. 98, Médavy, 19 May 1708. In May a second weekly post was established to carry letters from Chambéry to the front line. A1 2102 no. 101, Couppy to Chamillart, 26 May 1708. 133 Villars instructed the governor of Savoy, de Thoy, to defend his positions to the last. SHDT A1 2100 no. 56, Villars to de Thoy, 7 Jul. 1708. 134 SHDT A1 2100 no. 52, Villars to Chamillart, 8 Jul. 1708. 135 SHDT A1 2102 no. 213, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 26 Jul. 1708; Lynn, The Wars, pp. 323–4. 136 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 153–5. 137 Britain’s support of Victor Amadeus against the emperor lasted until the end of the war, and was in part based on Britain’s desire to increase its commerce in Italy, now threatened by Habsburg domination of the peninsula; it was also due to Queen Anne’s desire to obtain a crown for Victor Amadeus, her second cousin, whose Catholic line had been excluded from the British thrones by the 1701 Act of Settlement. Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 155–64; B. Grosperrin, La Savoie et la France de la Renaissance à la Révolution (Chambéry, 1992), p. 17. 138 SHDT A1 2172 no. 27, Berwick to Voysin, 6 Sep. 1709; A1 2174 no. 41,Voysin to Angervilliers, 14 Sep. 1709; Lynn, The wars, p. 335. 139 SHDT A1 2249 no. 159, Le Guerchois to Voysin, 5 Nov. 1710. The duke was holding these negotiations as he was worried the recent change of ministry in London would undercut his position. Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 162. 140 SHDT A1 2325 no. 32, Le Guerchois to Voysin, 8 Apr. 1711; A1 2327 no. 85, Angervilliers to Voysin, 9 Jul. 1711; Lynn, The wars, p. 345. 141 SHDT A1 2325 no. 165, Berwick to Voysin, 3 Aug. 1711; Lynn, The wars, p. 346. 142 SHDT A1 2398 no. 74, Le Guerchois to Voysin, 12 Apr. 1712.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 61

12/03/2013 16:10

62

the eastern frontiers of france

143 In 1710, Victor Amadeus agreed in principle to exchanging his ancestral lands for Naples and Sicily. Another suggestion that was discussed involved the exchange of Savoy for Milan. Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 161–4; Grosperrin, La Savoie et la France, p. 17. 144 SHDT A1 2446, Treaty of Utrecht; the treaty named the ‘watershed of the Alps’ as the border between France and Piedmont-Savoy; this was the first time the principle of natural frontiers was enshrined in a major peace treaty. Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, p. 1434. 145 AAE CP Sard. 117, fo. 63, Louis XIV to de Cilly, 11 May 1713; AMC BB 125, fo. 196, minutes for 5 Jun. 1713. 146 Recent scholarship supports the view that, by the early 1700s, Louis XIV’s foreign policy had become more opportunistic and flexible. See Cénat, Le Roi stratège, pp. 343–6. 147 P. Canestrier, ‘Mémoires inédits de Vauban sur le rasement des places de guerre’ and ‘L’œuvre de Vauban dans les Alpes Maritimes’ in Congrès Vauban: Xe congrès de l’Association bourguignonne des sociétés savantes (Beaune, 1935), pp. 97–9, 106. 148 For example, the professor of Law and Historiographer Royal, Jean Doujat, produced a memorandum on the subject in 1673: BNF Man. Fr., 4877, fo. 74, ‘Mémoire de l’Estat ancien et moderne de la Lorraine et les justes raisons qui ont obligé les Rois très Chrestiens Louis XIII et Louis XIV de s’asseurer des Estats du Duc Charles’, 1673. When Louis XIV heard through his envoy to the duke of Lorraine in 1704 that a ducal historiographer was writing a history in which it was argued that the succession to the duchy was transmitted in the male line at the exclusion of women (thereby bypassing Louis XIV’s claims), Louis insisted that the envoy lodge an objection, as this point was ‘far from decided’: AAE CP Lorr. 55, fo. 188, Louis XIV to Audiffret, 19 Jun. 1704. 149 According to French legal arguments, when Louis XIII accepted the Accords of Péronne in September 1641, he and his heirs had been accepted as the legitimate rulers of the Catalan people. Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 20–23; Grosperrin, L’Influence française, p. 9. 150 The title Ludovicus XIV Dei gratia rex Francia et Navarria comes Nisseae was used in the seals of the Sénat, the idea being that the county was a dependency of Provence: Chaumet, Louis XIV, ‘Comte de Nice’: Etude politique et institutionnelle d’une annexion inaboutie (1691–1713) (Nice, 2006), p. 213. 151 A medal struck in the early 1690s carries the legend SABAUDIA IN PROVINCIARUM REDACTA, expressing the irrevocable annexation of Savoy to France. J. Jacquiot, ‘La valeur d’information des allégories de médailles concernant l’Histoire de la Savoie dans la second moitié du XVIIe siècle’ in Mombello et al., Culture et pouvoir, pp. 148–50.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 62

12/03/2013 16:10

Part II Administration on the frontiers

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 63

12/03/2013 16:10

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 64

12/03/2013 16:10

3 The structures of occupation

A number of territories bordering on France were subject to military ­occupation during Louis XIV’s personal rule. If strategic necessity dictated that the French army occupy a territory, it was up to the king and his ministers to devise a suitable system to administer it. Chapter 2 identified France’s strategic aims in the occupied territories and how these aims changed over time; this chapter analyses the way these aims were manifested in administrative policy. Conquest brought the need to replace or adapt the existing regime, and the first question was who (individual or group) would govern on behalf of the king. Their precise functions would depend on multiple factors, including France’s evolving bureaucracy, its military needs and local circumstance. The administrative structures put in place in the occupied territories reflected (and can be compared with) the priorities of the French Government as they changed over the course of the reign. It is also possible to compare how far the administration of occupied territories differed from that of the annexed frontier provinces, the pays conquis. Studies have demonstrated that the increasing systemisation of the royal bureaucracy, in particular in the département de la guerre, under the cardinal ministers meant that by the 1660s the crown could enforce its will even in France’s remotest provinces with unprecedented (though still far from total) efficiency.1 The experience gained by officials in those outlying provinces was of great use in the occupied territories; indeed, the government used many of the same personnel to govern frontier provinces and occupied territories. This chapter therefore begins with an overview of the administration of conquered frontier territories during Louis XIV’s personal rule, to give context to the institutional structures erected in the occupied territories.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 65

12/03/2013 16:10

66

administration on the frontiers

The pays conquis: a template for occupation? ‘the reproach that has often been made of the French, but which I hope to efface completely by my conduct [is] that they can conquer but cannot preserve.’ (Louis  XIV)2

The great period of French expansion from the 1660s to the 1680s was domin­ ated by one figure: François-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois. As Louis XIV’s secretary of state for war from the mid-1660s until his death in 1691, Louvois had a profound influence on the development of French strategy in the conduct of war and administration of newly conquered territory. In the louisquatorzien system of government the three main secretaries of state each had personal responsibility for a number of provinces, with some of them corresponding to the nature of the ministry: from the early 1670s, for instance, Louvois directed the administration of many frontier provinces, as these tended to contain the bulk of the army,3 and his dominant position had a significant impact on policy, as Peter Wallace has demonstrated for the administration of the newly conquered province of Alsace. During the 1650s and 1660s, French policy towards Alsace was directed to a certain extent by the needs of foreign policy: as Louis XIV was a member of the League of the Rhine and keen to promote his image as the ‘defender of German liberties’, royal policy towards Alsace was softened accordingly. In 1673, however, the administrative supervision of Alsace (and also Lorraine) was transferred from the secretary of state for foreign affairs to the secretary of state for war, with the implication that diplomatic objectives no longer quite so much determined French policy in Alsace.4 The French Government had no fixed procedure for administering conquered lands, and practice varied from one territory to another, depending on local circumstances and at what stage of the reign the conquest took place. There were, however, several institutional structures that were common to all the pays conquis. At the time of conquest Louvois, with the king, would appoint a military governor, to represent the crown in the province and command all troops stationed there. Almost always a career soldier from the noblesse d’épée, his precise role depended on his commission, the needs of the moment and the character of the individual, but in general the governor was more of a conduit for the provincial nobility’s aspirations than a hands-on administrator. That task was given instead to the intendant, the crown’s principal means of administering a newly conquered province. The intendants administered a given area known as a généralité, but these were by no means uniform in size, authority or workload. Indeed, on the frontiers they developed ad hoc, according to local circumstances and needs.5 In Alsace, for instance, the French monarchy took charge of the province little by little – in terms of both territory and its administration. From being concerned solely

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 66

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

67

with the army when first introduced in the 1630s, the intendance slowly took on a broader administrative role.6 From 1673 the intendant received his orders direct from Louvois, instead of Pomponne, and this unification of military and civil administration proved vital for the build-up of French troops in the province and ultimately the acquisition of Strasbourg.7 The Franche-Comté was territorially far more coherent, and its institutions formed a clearly defined political body when the French occupied the province in 1668 and again in 1674. Implanting an intendant was therefore fairly rapid and simple, and the loss of credibility by the old governing elites allowed the intendant to fill a vacuum, though here as elsewhere the French did struggle with strong attachments to local privileges for decades to come. Just as in Alsace the intendant of the Franche-Comté had military responsibilities, including supplying the army, building and maintenance of fortifications, and relations between troops and civilians.8 In terms of implementation, ‘The monarchy defined policy, and the intendants executed it, after adapting it to the realities of their province, to its structures, or to its customs’.9 The intendants often functioned as arbiters between crown and province, or between local institutions. In Alsace, for instance, the monarchy left the intermediary corps in existence and even accepted the Protestant faith that it had vowed to extirpate elsewhere, though it was still curtailed in its privileges and status.10 The intendant above all had to work with the local elites through which the absolutist state functioned, and recent studies by Alain Lemaître and Collette Brossault of the intendancies of Alsace and the Franche-Comté have demonstrated that the intendance was an ‘administrative tissue which progressively inserted itself between the central and provincial powers’.11 By the personal reign of Louis XIV there were, below the intendants, subdélégués who were named by the intendant and were responsible to him, and their charges were his to revoke. The subdélégués varied from province to province and could be permanent or could last the duration of a specific task. Often they were drawn from local families, providing that important link between the administration and the administered.12 Many intendants of frontier provinces during the personal rule of Louis XIV became specialised in the administration of conquered provinces, or at least frontier provinces, which indicates an acknowledgement by government that these provinces were more difficult to manage.13 The enormous powers of the intendants in their departments meant that their policies bore the imprint of their personalities, excluding the possibility of real continuity.14 They also tended to be long-serving: through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they served on average nine years in each généralité. This meant that they got to know their provinces particularly well. The depth of their knowledge of economic, demographic, religious and institutional conditions in their province is shown in the Mémoires for the instruction of the duc de Bourgogne, composed

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 67

12/03/2013 16:10

68

administration on the frontiers

in the later 1690s.15 By the turn of the eighteenth century a pattern emerged whereby intendants would often start their careers in a province in the interior of the kingdom, and then be moved to a frontier province. In the east, a hierarchy appears to have existed: Jean-Baptiste Desmarets de Vaubourg passed from Lorraine to the Franche-Comté in 1698, and the intendants of the FrancheComté were often called to the intendance of Alsace.16 From the 1660s until the 1690s, intendants of the frontier provinces came to be drawn from the LeTellier clientele.17Thus the bond between central government and the periphery was not only loyalty to the king but also personal and family interest. Indeed, studies have shown that clientage was the principal means by which Louis XIV’s government extended its control over the provinces.18 In addition to the governor and the intendant, both from outside the province, Louvois usually relied on certain members of the local ruling elites who would serve French interests by providing him with an inside knowledge of the province, including the personalities of its key power brokers, in exchange for his patronage and protection.19 This group of local collaborators or ‘administrative clienteles’ formed part of a well co-ordinated network of loyal agents who would serve as the vital link between the local administration and the central power. When provincial elites proved unreceptive to their new French masters – as in Roussillon in the early 1660s – the French resorted to encouraging immigration from outside the province: these ‘new’ elites, having no local ties in Roussillon, were totally dependent on the French administration for the maintenance of their privileges. The most important leaders were closely allied with the Le Telliers, and these ‘new’ elites served as intermediaries between Paris and the people of Roussillon.20 The recognition of French sovereignty – or lack of it – also had a decisive impact on both policy and authority. France gained Alsace at the Peace of Westphalia, but the specific nature of French sovereignty was deliberately left unresolved by both French and Imperial negotiators.21 For a quarter of a century after Westphalia, France had no fixed political objectives towards the region, and as Peter Wallace has shown, this resulted in a series of conflicting policies leading to the breakdown of royal authority in the province in the 1670s. This was even clearer for former imperial free cities such as Colmar and Besançon (in the Franche-Comté) after their conquest by France. Strong urban patriciates in these cities attempted to block the demands of the state in the name of their privileges and liberties, and defended citizens from the rapacious demands of central government. But in both cases, serious change could not be attempted until sovereignty had been formally handed over to the French at Nijmegen – in the years of military occupation, the French authorities felt they should compromise more with existing institutions. However, the lines of authority and power changed quickly after the war ended. As elsewhere, the local administrators now became an extension of the French provincial administrative hierarchy,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 68

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

69

and this was a bitter pill to swallow after centuries of freedom. The existing networks of loyalty, family ties and professional pride had to be woven into the fabric of French provincial governance.22 To what degree, then, did French strategies of administration in the pays conquis represent a uniform approach? Comparing strategies in Roussillon and Alsace, David Stewart claimed that the French had a clear pattern of government for border provinces, whereby change was introduced slowly by the crown and then catalysed by local elites, all the while respecting, as far as possible, traditional forms and customs.23 Yet as more historians turn their attention to the conquered provinces of Louis XIV’s France, evidence increasingly suggests that there were no preconceived plans for integration; in each territory the French reacted differently to contingent needs, and many long-term policies began as pragmatic responses to problems specific to a given place.24 The diversity of territories acquired would also have precluded a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Yet the administrative structures put in place in frontier territories were certainly of a special character, reflected by the fact that personnel were specially trained for the purpose. They had to contend with cultural milieux and systems of reference which were foreign to the kingdom of France.25 By 1670, when the French occupation of Lorraine began, Louis XIV and his ministers had had almost a decade to develop and improve their techniques of government. The rest of this chapter investigates how far their techniques and objectives changed over the next four decades in lands they occupied. The ministerial approaches Shifting patterns at the apex of government, and the evolution of the war ministry, had a marked impact on the government and administration of occupied territories. Between 1670 and 1714 there were four secretaries of state for war under Louis XIV. Yet the position, and the département de la guerre as a whole, was so dominated and shaped by the marquis de Louvois that his successors were often found wanting by comparison. After Louvois’s death in 1691, his successors had to work within a system created by a man with almost superhuman energy, and none could match his capacity for work or attention to detail. Louvois’s obsession with detail is reflected in his correspondence, wherein French commanders were limited in their initiatives and obliged to give detailed accounts of the smallest matters. Many of Louvois’s decisions were short-termist: he was obsessed with immediate results and was often indifferent to the long-term consequences of his decisions, sometimes putting him at odds with local commanders or administrators of conquered provinces. The running of the war ministry continued under Barbezieux much as it had under his father, though the exceptionally heavy

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 69

12/03/2013 16:10

70

administration on the frontiers

demands of the Nine Years War strained the ministry’s administrative infrastructure, and Barbezieux’s inexperience (he was only twenty-three years old in 1691) meant that he had difficulty coping with his immense workload.26 Chamillart’s style of management of his department differed significantly from that of Louvois: from 1701 he had the unenviable task of overseeing not only the war ministry but also the contrôle général des finances, and so he was overstretched and had little command of detail. Furthermore, in contrast with Louvois, Chamillart failed to build up a substantial clientele network to provide him with information from the frontier provinces under the jurisdiction of the war ministry. Intendants of the army and commissaires des guerres had served as the breeding ground of the former Le Tellier clientele; Chamillart simply did not have enough time in office to replace these with his own clients.27 There was, moreover, a general transformation of clans at the end of the reign, leading to a decline (but not disappearance) in the vast ministerial clienteles, and bureaucratic practice became standardised and routine, so that by the 1690s and 1700s, the intendants co-ordinated the administration of their généralité with much less guidance from ministers.28 The link between ministry and provinces was therefore weaker than under the Le Telliers, and this is evident in Chamillart’s attitude to the administration of conquered provinces. It was now left entirely to the intendant to decide how to run a province: for the occupation of Savoy, it was over a year into the occupation, in February 1705, that Chamillart finally asked intendant Bouchu how the occupied duchy was being administered.29 When it came to the details of the occupying regime, much depended on where the energies of the king and his ministers were directed. The occupation of Savoy from 1703, for instance, appears somewhat cursory by comparison with that of Lorraine in 1670, and even more so with that of the Franche-Comté in 1668, which was directed by Louvois in person. Clearly, in the midst of the two major wars in which France became embroiled in the second half of the reign, Louis XIV’s war ministers had little time for the administrative details of occupied territories. It would be the military commander who initially set the tone of these occupations; the intendant would then decide on the overall framework of the occupying regime, and a commissaire ordonnateur des guerres answerable to the intendant would deal with the day-to-day running of the ­territory. Royal servants and French occupation strategies Developments and innovations in the département de la guerre also affected how an occupied territory was administered. Comparing the occupations of Lorraine and the Franche-Comté (both prior to Nijmegen) with those of Savoy and Nice from 1690 shows the evolution in methods used by the French to administer occupied

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 70

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

71

territory. In the first two cases, intendants with experience of running conquered and assimilated frontier provinces were employed. After the conquest of Lorraine in 1670, the king appointed Jacques Charuel as intendant. A créature of the Le Tellier family, Charuel had served as intendant of the Franche-Comté during the French occupation in 1668, and subsequently as intendant of Ath and Coutrai in Flanders before he was given the task of administering Lorraine.30 There were four commissaires des guerres under Charuel, one for each of the four bailliages of Lorraine and the Barrois; Louvois made sure that at least one of these had a good knowledge of the country, and the provincial provost of Metz was dispatched to help Charuel with army supplies.31 Louvois was therefore careful to appoint a group of men who together combined knowledge of the region with experience of administering newly conquered frontier provinces. The intendant also appointed subdélégués to specific tasks; as in other conquered provinces, these were native local officials who knew the country well.32 At Bar-le-Duc, the role was filled successively by Antoine and Antoine-Jérôme Morel, who were, ­respectively, secretary of the defunct Chambre des comptes and prévôt of Bar; they were succeeded by the bailliage assesseur Collin.33 Jacques Charuel, intendant until his death in 1691,34 was replaced by Jean-Baptiste Desmarets de Vaubourg, nephew of the ‘grand’ Colbert and protégé of contrôleur général Pontchartrain – representing a return of the Colbert clan to the Lorraine intendance after a long absence, and another twist in the long-running Le Tellier–Colbert struggle for dominance in the region.35 In other occupied territories the crown showed a reluctance to appoint ad hoc intendants, preferring to draft in adjunct personnel from neighbouring provinces. When Luxembourg was ‘reunited’ to France in 1681 it was added to Charuel’s department, and was administered by Jean Mahieu, a commissaire des guerres who served as subdélégué of Charuel.36 Similar arrangements were put in place in Savoy and Nice during the periods of French occupation. Savoy was added to the jurisdiction of the intendant of the Dauphiné, Etienne-Jean Bouchu, despite the fact that he had little knowledge of how to administer conquered provinces or deal with occupied populations. The Dauphiné was not normally a ‘frontier’ province in the military sense, and came under the jurisdiction of the foreign ministry. As such, Bouchu was a créature of the foreign minister Colbert de Croissy, rather than Louvois, and had somewhat weaker links to the war minister than his counterparts on the northern and eastern frontiers.Yet at the outbreak of war with Victor Amadeus in 1690, the Dauphiné was made the logistical hub of French war efforts in the Po valley, and Bouchu was also given the intendance of the army of Italy. He proved well suited to the role, which he held until 1697, and again in 1701–4.37 In the absence of resident intendants, Nice and Savoy were, like Luxembourg, run from day to day by commissaires des guerres. After 1688 the position of commissaire ordonnateur was especially suited to the task of administering

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 71

12/03/2013 16:10

72

administration on the frontiers

t­erritory occupied on a short-term basis. This new role, granted official status by an edict of March 1704, was given to commissaires ordinaires des guerres of outstanding ability who combined the administration of troops with financial management of an occupied territory. Having direct correspondence with Versailles, they were often seen by the occupied populations as intendants.38 The role varied according to circumstances: Guy Rowlands has pointed out that the commissaires ordonnateurs of the Franco-Italian border had very different competencies from those based in the Spanish Netherlands.39 Even between Savoy and Nice there was a major difference in the role: in Nice the commissaire ordonnateur was not answerable to any intendant, except briefly in 1695–6.40 The war ministry’s preference for ordonnateurs over full intendants in Nice reflected its prioritising of short-term financial and military needs over longerterm programmes of political reorganisation or assimilation, despite the advice of the local military commander. He recommended that commissaire ordonnateur Pageau be given the title of intendant, as people were accustomed to such a figure under the ducal regime and did not understand the difference between a normal commissaire and a commissaire ordonnateur.41 The latter generally had fairly limited scope, compared to the broad administrative jurisdiction of an intendant. Nevertheless, commissaires ordonnateurs did exercise a political role, sometimes seeking to submit the occupied population to obedience to the king: commissaire Jean Couppy purchased the office of chevalier d’honneur in the Sénat of Chambéry in 1706, presumably as a means of supervising the activity of the magistrates, and also as an investment. Similarly, in the Sénat of Nice, the commissaire ordonnateur Sainte-Colombe purchased the office of second chevalier in 1711 in order to better control the activity of the Niçois magistrates.42 Savoy provides a good example of how the war ministry deployed its agents. The functions of the intendant, covering finance and the administration of troops, were carried out from 1690 on a day-to-day basis by a commissaire ordonnateur des guerres, Nicolas de Bonval, who resided in Chambéry. Bonval functioned in effect as a subdélégué of Bouchu, though he corresponded directly with Louvois and had five commissaires ordinaires des guerres under his authority. Representing the crown directly in Savoy was a governor, the marquis de Thoy, under the command of the military lieutenant-général commanding the province, the comte de La Hoguette. Other figures connected with the corps of commissaires des guerres also doubled as members of the political, financial and judicial administration of Savoy. The sieur de Flaucourt, for instance, held the charges of trésorier général and commissaire ordinaire des guerres during both occupations of Savoy, thus giving him a formal role in the Extraordinaire des Guerres, the treasury which was officially separate from war ministry functionaries;43 and, in 1703–5, the subdélégué général of the intendant of the Dauphiné, Jean-Guy Basset, also held the charge of président des finances in the Chambre des comptes of Chambéry.44

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 72

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

73

Military commanders as organisers of territories Above the intendants and commissaires, the military commanders were crucial in setting the initial tone of an occupation.45 At the outset of each occupation, there was a clear sense of eagerness on the part of military commanders to take ­advantage of any goodwill shown them by the population. This was particularly clear during both conquests of Savoy: in 1690, the marquis de Saint-Ruth enthused that ‘in treating them with gentleness, they will find that they love much better to be subjects of the king than Monsieur de Savoie’.46 Likewise, when the duc de La Feuillade arrived to take command of Savoy in early December 1703, he assured the population of his good intentions: ‘you have in me an assured protector and faithful friend’ who spoke to them ‘on behalf of His Majesty, who regards you as good and true subjects’.47 The government also intended that the new province be treated well, though perhaps for different reasons from the military men – it would, after all, bring a commanding officer untold gloire to conquer in its entirety a province which might be definitively annexed to the kingdom. The precise role of military commanders in the administration of occupied territories varied much. The commander of the French army that conquered Lorraine in 1670 was Marshal Créqui. Forthright to the point of arrogance, Créqui repeatedly clashed with Louvois, for whom he had little deference: when the war minister pressed him to determine the capacity of the duchies to quarter troops in September 1670, the marshal shot back ‘In the midst of all our military activity, do not ask me for your lists.’48 The conquest finished, Créqui demanded to supervise the intendant of Lorraine in matters of taxation, but was promptly refused by the king; his primary administrative role, like other provincial governors, was to deal with the local nobility. In April 1672 Créqui was disgraced for refusing to accept subordination to Turenne, and was replaced as governor of Lorraine by the marquis de Rochefort, a protégé of Louvois.49 Rochefort commanded the army of Germany until his premature death in 1676, when Créqui was once again given the governorship of the duchies. Créqui excelled himself against Charles V of Lorraine during the remainder of the Dutch War and, by now a firm ally of Louvois, commanded the siege of neighbouring Luxembourg in 1684.50 Throughout the French occupation of 1670–97, Louis XIV’s appointees to the governorship of Lorraine were those commanders who operated extensively out of Lorraine, reflecting a pattern that continued throughout the reign in other frontier provinces.51 Créqui was succeeded in 1687 by the marquis de Boufflers, who had been governor of Luxembourg and who went on to command the small but vital army of the Moselle during the early 1690s; upon Boufflers’s transfer to French Flanders in 1694, the comte de Lorge became the final governor of

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 73

12/03/2013 16:10

74

administration on the frontiers

Lorraine of the occupation, commanding French forces in the Rhineland until the Treaty of Ryswick.52 Boufflers in particular developed extensive links with elements of the local elites, in a notably short period.53 There were relatively few problems in Lorraine associated with these senior officers. The role of the military commanders in the French-occupied Savoyard lands was less clear-cut than in Lorraine, in large part because it was the Briançonnais and Pinerolo that were the main French launching zones for warfare in the Po valley. Furthermore, changes in the course of the war necessitated reorganisation in the military command structures. This can be seen most clearly in the War of the Spanish Succession, when, after the failure of the siege of Turin, the French logistical position in Savoy became increasingly precarious. In changing the command structure of the duchy to place it in a more defensive posture, Chamillart and the king appear to have made serious oversights which envenomed relations between commanders and jeopardised relations with the occupied population. In May 1707, as retreating French troops streamed into Savoy from across the Alps, the king replaced the marquis de Vallière with the comte de Médavy as overall commander of the duchy. Médavy’s principal objective was to put Savoy in a state of readiness for an imminent enemy invasion, but he was frustrated in this task by obstructiveness on the part of Vallière, as well as his own inexperience. Vallière stubbornly refused to be subordinated to Médavy, and in the following months seized on any opportunity to denounce his rival, which highlights the lack of authority of Chamillart as a secretary of state for war.54 Further command confusion ensued in the autumn, when Médavy gave the military command of Chambéry – still supposedly in the hands of Vallière – to Monsieur du Vivier, after the same post had already been assigned to de Bonneval; Médavy was duly reprimanded for superseding the orders of the king.55 The growing chaos in the command structure in Savoy had serious repercussions for the sensitive relations between the French authorities and the occupied population. Soon after his arrival in Savoy, Médavy issued particularly harsh ordonnances requiring the inhabitants of the duchy to carry all of their provisions, barring what they needed for their own subsistence, up to twenty leagues to Conflans or Fort de Barraux; Médavy would also be sending cavalry detachments into villages to force them to give up their arms.56 In his inexperience, Médavy had not followed the central credo of what had been French strategy up to that point in the administration of occupied Savoy, and Chamillart rebuked him for endangering the subsistence of troops in the duchy through his excessive severity.57 A similar problem emerged in the Chablais that summer: Marshal Tessé reported that the infantry brigadier charged with defending the frontier of Savoy, Le Guerchois, had published ordonnnances so harsh that they inspired terror, ‘and terror often inspires the decision to flee’. He added, ‘if I

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 74

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

75

were Savoyard I would do exactly the same’.58 Tessé’s view of the problem was that Le Guerchois was simply not equipped with the necessary experience to carry out his task; as he wrote back to the king, ‘A man can excel at commanding a garrison and on the battlefield, and be totally unsuited to commanding in a province’.59 A degree of moderation in dealing with conquered populations had certainly been central to the success of Louvois’ and Barbezieux’s strategies in other pays conquis. A large part of the problem in Savoy stemmed from the fact that, for nearly all of the periods of French occupation, there was nobody in the administration of Savoy or Nice who had experience of dealing with newly conquered populations. It was therefore subsidiary military commanders who made contact with the local population, a task they performed with varying degrees of success. This explains why the marquis de Vallière was maintained in Savoy, despite his repeated clashes with other French officers there, not to mention with the war minister himself. He became a popular figure among the inhabitants of Chambéry for intervening to reduce the number of troops being quartered in the town, and throughout Savoy for his generosity to poor families; by this means he was said to have gained the affection of the people and ‘inspired them in a pro-French inclination’.60 Vallière was also responsible for building contacts among the raiding parties which plagued the duchy; one of his tactics for dealing with these parties was to secretly allow them to return home on the condition that they turned informants.61 Moreover, it was to him that members of the sovereign companies came when they felt aggrieved: to all intents and purposes he, rather than the commissaires or intendant, was the main point of contact between the local authorities and central government.62 That he was so underappreciated in this role by Chamillart is a further indication of this minister’s profound lack of understanding of how conquered provinces should be handled. But, by failing to properly address the command problems in Savoy, Chamillart also jeopardised its defence. In the autumn of 1707 Marshal Catinat was brought out of retirement to provide strategic advice on defending France’s south-eastern frontier. He wrote that, as the enemy was now firmly on the offensive, the defence of the Dauphiné must be prioritised over that of Savoy, as a false allied diversionary operation into Savoy could lead to the loss of the French fortresses in the Alps.63 The lack of strategic co-ordination in the duchy became apparent again that winter, when the bitter animosity between Vallière and Médavy flared up again after Chamillart requested Vallière’s advice on which posts to occupy in Savoy. The resulting memorandum was sent to Médavy who dismissed it as ‘ridiculous’, prompting Vallière to reply in worse terms to Médavy’s own propositions. The war minister attempted to resolve the situation by taking the decision out of their hands and letting Catinat decide instead.64 But Catinat argued that such matters must be decided by local commanders with a good

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 75

12/03/2013 16:10

76

administration on the frontiers

knowledge of the country.65 Chamillart’s weak attempt to patch over the deep rivalry in the command of Savoy did not work; his appointment of Médavy had been a disaster, and the administration and defence of Savoy was now riven with discord, preventing efficient co-ordination when it was most needed. Daniel Voysin tried in vain to resolve the confusion in the command structure of Savoy soon after he replaced Chamillart as secretary for war in June 1709. In late November, Médavy learned that the marquis de Cilly had been appointed to the command of Savoy, under his orders; Vallière, by now on leave due to ill health, was to be further sidelined without being completely removed. His fate reflects the fact that he antagonised most French people he worked with, but his vast knowledge of the country and his contacts throughout it made him extremely useful.66 The structure of command in Savoy had become increasingly complicated and confused as a result of the change in the course of the war and the heightened strategic importance of Savoy. This chaos, which continued under Voysin, was a marked departure from the much clearer systems of Louvois and Barbezieux. Many of France’s problems during the second occupation of Savoy clearly stemmed from a personnel problem. By employing inexperienced military officers to govern the duchy instead of civilian administrators with the experience of the pays conquis intendants, the central element of the crown’s policy towards conquered provinces after the 1680s – of moderation and sensitivity – was jeopardised, and this risked losing the goodwill of the population. The French were naive to think that the population of Savoy was so pro-French that the duchy could be temporarily joined to the Dauphiné and pose no problems for them. They certainly lacked forethought: when the long-serving intendant Bouchu was replaced in 1705, his position was filled not by an intendant who had experience of dealing with ‘conquered’ populations on the frontiers of the kingdom, but with the intendant of Normandy. The inexperience of the military administrators meant that the French were extremely slow to deal with problems typical of conquered provinces; moreover, these officers were responsible for several serious blunders that could have triggered popular uprisings. The actual handling of the local structures of government therefore also needs to be considered. Governance in the occupied territories The general changes made to the local systems of governance of the various occupied territories reveal a good deal about French motivations, concerns and priorities. The way the French used, abused, reformed or abolished native institutions and officers is tackled at greater length in Chapter 6. But a broad

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 76

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

77

outline is necessary here to understand the structures and burdens placed on the occupied territories. As described in the previous chapter, Lorraine was initially occupied to secure France’s north-eastern frontier in preparation for the Dutch War, and it functioned as a place d’armes to support the French army once the conflict actually began. During this period, the administrative structures imposed on Lorraine differed little from those in other recent pays conquis, the emphasis being on order and security. After the Treaty of Nijmegen in 1678, however, another phase can be identified, in which the French actively pursued integration of Lorraine into the kingdom. On an administrative level, this involved dismemberment of the duchies of Lorraine and Bar, which were carved up and ‘reunited’ with the Trois Evêchés of Metz, Toul and Verdun over a period of four years. These political ‘reunions’ were followed by far-reaching judicial and financial changes blatantly designed to assimilate Lorraine. The Cour souveraine and the Chambres des comptes of Lorraine had been suppressed in early 1671, their competencies being transferred to the Parlement of Metz and the intendant respectively.67 In the 1680s, the French further reorganised the judicial system of Lorraine by creating new offices and introducing a measure of uniformity in the form of French law (though this itself was plural). On 1 July 1685 the bailliages of Nancy, Saint-Mihiel, Etain, Epinal, Vaudrevange and Mirecourt were suppressed, and in their place, French-style cours présidiaux were established at Metz, Toul, Verdun and Sarrelouis, and a new bailliage court was created at Longwy. This was a key element in Louvois’ programme for integrating Lorraine into the kingdom: his instructions stipulated that new jurisdictions were to be established only in towns that had long been in French possession, so that the old duchies of Lorraine and the Barrois would no longer be recognisable.68 In 1686, the French civil and criminal ordonnances of 1667 and 1670 were introduced into the Barrois, pointing to a policy there of more intense assimilation.69 The administrative and judicial reorganisations of the 1680s in Lorraine were accompanied by equally far-reaching fiscal reorganisation. As in all the pays conquis under the war ministry’s supervision, peacetime administration of finances in Lorraine was handed over to the contrôleur général des finances, linking it more directly to the fiscal structures of the French monarchy.70 This allowed Colbert to pursue a series of reforms which not only promoted greater fiscal efficiency, but also contributed to the extension of Colbert clan influence in Lorraine. In the early stages of the occupation, Colbert had been instrumental in organising transfer of the jurisdiction of the Chambre des comptes of Bar-le-Duc to that of Paris; this enabled him to personally oversee the absorption of the ducal domains of the Barrois.71 In 1681 this policy was extended to Lorraine: an order of the Conseil d’état of 25 July suppressed the financial offices of receveur, contrôleur and gruyeur of the ducal domains in those parts of Lorraine so far

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 77

12/03/2013 16:10

78

administration on the frontiers

‘reunited’ with the Trois Evêchés.72 Colbert then moved to suppress the receveurs généraux and their staff in the rest of Lorraine, with a view to transferring their competency to the neighbouring généralité of Metz-Alsace, where the receveurs généraux were protégés and long-established allies of the Colbert clan.73 This was against the advice of intendant Charuel, who wrote that the existing officers had been of great use during the Dutch War in organising the subsistence of troops, as well as fortification works, convoys and supply magazines; it would be far more expedient, he argued, to maintain these officers than to replace them with men from outside the province who had no knowledge of Lorraine.74 But in spite of the intendant’s protests, and those of the receveurs themselves, the remaining offices were suppressed on 1 January 1685.75 Colbert further instructed Charuel to look into suppressing the taxes and duties of Lorraine established by the dukes.76 There was the feeling that, given the ill-defined borders between France and Lorraine, the collection of taxes was confused, ‘to the extent that an inhabitant calls himself Lorrain and pays the taxes of Lorraine, and another inhabitant of the same village pays the taxes of France’.77 Charuel agreed that ‘it is in the interest of the king to obliterate the rights and the pretensions of the dukes of Lorraine in order to strengthen and maintain those of His Majesty’.78 In October 1684 local taxes were suppressed and replaced by a general imposition or ‘subvention’ over the country, similar to that which had existed in Alsace since the 1660s.79 The intendancies of the Trois Evêchés and Lorraine were merged under Charuel, and all internal customs were removed to make Lorraine, the Barrois and the Evêchés ‘one single province’.80 Further integration came with devaluation of the franc barrois in 1692 and the introduction of the livre tournois – the French unit of account against which the coins were calibrated – in Lorraine.81 Financial needs lay behind the introduction of monopolies on sales of salt and tobacco, and the obligation to use stamped paper for judicial and notarial acts.82 What this all meant for the burdens on the occupied is discussed in Chapter 4. Such reorganisations were not exclusive to Lorraine – similar policies were seen in other conquered provinces which the French wished to integrate. In Alsace, the inferior justices were suppressed in 1686 to regularise the judicial system, and comparable changes were made in Luxembourg shortly afterwards.83 Moreover, in the period after 1678, certain similarities can be seen between the processes of integration in Lorraine and those in the Franche-Comté, the sovereignty of which was handed over to France by the Treaty of Nijmegen. In both cases, the French made significant changes to the provincial fiscal and judicial systems to bring them into line with the rest of France.84 Yet by their sheer extent, the changes effected in Lorraine were very unusual. Luxembourg was ‘reunited’ to France in 1681 and joined to Charuel’s department the following year, yet it was not subjected to any of these financial reorganisations, keeping its

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 78

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

79

existing fiscal system largely intact.85 This suggests that the government’s more aggressive policy of assimilation in Lorraine may have been a response to the lack of international recognition of its sovereignty there. By imposing its presence so indelibly, it could then demonstrate to the rest of Europe that Lorraine was now unequivocally French. Indeed, in 1685 the king informed his ambassador to Vienna that Lorraine, ‘should now be regarded as a French province, inseparable from the crown.’86 By the 1690s the French had very nearly succeeded in literally wiping Lorraine off the map – a hugely important symbolic gesture in an era when the geographical depiction of a place was of vital political importance due to the lack of territorial unity in composite states. This trend was reinforced when in September 1691 Jacques Charuel, the long-serving intendant of Lorraine, the Barrois and the Trois Evêchés, died and the généralité was divided into two: the premier président of the Parlement of Metz, Guillaume de Sève, was assigned Metz, Verdun, Luxembourg and the county of Chiny, while Jean-Baptiste Desmarets de Vaubourg was given Toul, Lorraine and the Barrois. De Sève, who was enlisted to split the intendancies, warned that it might be dangerous to re-establish the territorial integrity of the duchies of Lorraine and Bar, ‘which we believed to be in the interests of His Majesty to disfigure’. Furthermore the tax receipts for the two intendancies would be mixed up, much confusion would ensue about the geographical limits of each, and it would be necessary to separate a bishopric from the Trois Evêchés.87 When the commission was given to Vaubourg in mid-November, covering ‘the Barrois, the bishopric of Toul and dependant bailliages including Nancy’, the word Lorraine was conspicuously absent from his commission.88 Savoy and Nice had very different experiences from that of Lorraine in 1670–97. Savoy was occupied from 1690 to 1696 in order to knock Victor Amadeus out of the war by depriving him of resources and using the province as a source of money and supplies for the army. Here though, the French showed themselves willing to work with existing native personnel, maintaining the sovereign courts and the subaltern officers of finance and justice in the duchy. In keeping the existing framework, the French were no doubt consciously saving themselves the expensive task of reorganising the duchy’s administrative and judicial apparatus. The initial warmth of their reception had probably convinced them that the local elites would be happy to work with them. They could therefore peaceably extract money from the duke’s territory in order to fund the war against him. In fact, the French largely left the Savoyard financial regime intact, even at the level of farming contracts. Immediately after the conquest of Chambéry, Monsieur de la Marc, the fermier général of the gabelles of Savoy (and a Frenchman), presented himself to the new rulers with the bail he had made with Victor Amadeus, and the French were willing to allow him to continue up until

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 79

12/03/2013 16:10

80

administration on the frontiers

the end of his contract, which was due to expire in 1693, on payment of 490,000 livres.89 The same formula was used when the French occupied Savoy a second time in 1703. Again, many of the existing financial arrangements were left in place by the new occupying regime: the contract for the farm of gunpowder and saltpetre was left in the hands of the existing holder; the contract for the ferme générale of Savoy, meanwhile, was negotiated in November 1703 to commence at the beginning of 1704 and was given to Jean-Jacques Gamba, a banker from Turin, for 624,000 livres annually.90 The French occupations of Nice of 1691–6 and 1705–13 were, like those of Savoy, characterised by continuity with the regime of the duke of Savoy. The occupiers’ administrative structures in Nice and Savoy were remarkably similar, though the French had a somewhat different emphasis in their motivations for occupying the two territories. In Savoy, there was a sense – clearest in the first occupation, but present in the second – of financial opportunism whereby the French would make the most of their stay there, however long that would last. By contrast, the occupation of Nice was actually a drain on French resources: a memorandum of 1707 recommended abandoning the county, as to occupy it cost three times as much as the king took from it in revenues; if the county was instead put under contribution as enemy territory, the money raised would easily exceed what was taken in the taille and other ‘regular’ taxes.91 Yet France’s strategic interest in Nice outweighed the financial benefits of its occupation, and it was retained until the end of the war. Pierre-Olivier Chaumet has argued that, during both occupations of Nice, the French pursued a conscious policy of administrative assimilation, and the return of Nice to Victor Amadeus in 1696 and 1713 amounted to a ‘failed annexation’.92 Yet this assumes that Louis XIV wished to retain Nice, when in fact his attitude was ambivalent. By comparison with territories which the French did wish to retain permanently, their approach in Nice was relatively laissez-faire, and the measures which Chaumet labels as ‘administrative assimilation’ were driven more by financial expediency and strategic necessity than a desire to keep the territory permanently. Strategic interest also outweighed financial considerations in the French occupation of Lorraine of 1702–14, as it had in 1670–97, but this time the duchy was not restructured, either for political or material reasons. As discussed in Chapter 2, Lorraine was partly reoccupied to ensure the security of France’s north-eastern frontier. But this time it was limited to the Saar fortresses and Nancy, where the ducal palace remained at the disposal of the duke. The Cour souveraine and the Chambre des comptes continued to sit in Nancy without obstacle, and the administration and exercise of justice remained in the hands of Duke Leopold’s government.93 The king’s intentions were to ‘maintain all the rights and all the prerogatives of the duke of Lorraine’s sovereignty, and French troops will be in Nancy on the same terms as they are in the Spanish places’, which

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 80

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

81

were possessions of Louis’ grandson King Philip V.94 In effect, Louis wanted the duke to view the French troops as auxiliaries to his own. The garrison was commanded by the comte d’Avejan, with two commissaires des guerres, Le Sueur and Geoffroy, and was quartered not among the townspeople, but in specially built barracks.95 Louis XIV initially hoped that Leopold would return to Nancy once proof had been given of the good discipline of the French troops, and that, ‘he be no less the master than he was before’, but Leopold and his court remained in Lunéville until the end of the war.96 Nevertheless, the French garrison fitted in with existing power structures: they dutifully saluted members of the duke’s family when they came to Nancy, and they also took part in the honours for royal and ducal births and deaths.97 Conclusions Multiple factors influenced the way the French structured the administration of occupied territories, from set-ups at the apex of government down to local conditions. The different styles of leadership of the war ministry, along with the different pressures on the secretaries of state for war at different points in the reign, led to significant variation in the amount of ministerial direction. Developments and innovations in personnel in the war department meant that new positions emerged, notably the role of commissaire ordonnateur des guerres, which proved particularly well suited to administering occupied territory.The extent of the authority of the military commanders also differed widely, as this depended on the territory and its strategic importance. Finally, in the longer term, the expectation of retention by France or eventual restitution to the original sovereign was a major factor in determining the structures of ­governance. Superficially it may appear that the administration of a conquered territory changed very little whether it was ‘officially’ French (where sovereignty had been formally ceded by treaty) or not. For the crown, as well as its local representatives, there was no formal distinction between an occupied territory and a recently annexed province: all were referred to as pays conquis.Yet whether or not a territory was legally incorporated into the kingdom did have a bearing on how it was governed. During the twenty-eight year occupation of Lorraine, the duchies were given a stronger ‘French’ character in their administration, and this had as much to do with a conscious programme of political assimilation as with financial need. This is a far cry from the occupation which preceded it, begun under Cardinal Richelieu, which merely superimposed several bureaucrats on the local administration. The period of peace between the Treaty of Nijmegen and the outbreak of the Nine Years War allowed the French the time and resources needed to assimilate the province. Other territories, such as Savoy,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 81

12/03/2013 16:10

82

administration on the frontiers

which were occupied only during the course of wars and were not subject to such a programme of assimilation because the necessary resources and attention were not available; in any case Savoy would not have been considered as desirable for annexation as Lorraine from a strategic point of view. There was, therefore, no ‘pattern’ to the occupation of these territories. French policy overall towards the frontier provinces was not a preconceived exercise in rationalisation and centralisation, or ‘absolutism’, but a series of pragmatic decisions taken in response to the needs of the moment.

Notes

1 The key work on this subject is R. Bonney, Political change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624–1661 (Oxford, 1978). See also W. Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 98–116; J. A. Lynn, Giant of the grand siècle: the French army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 84–6. It should be stressed that this increase in royal control was achieved in an ad hoc fashion, rather than through planned centralisation: Parrott, Richelieu’s army, pp. 547–54. 2 Louis XIV, Mémoires for the instruction of the dauphin, ed. P. Sonnino (New York, 1970), p. 53. 3 By the mid-1670s the secretary of state for war supervised the provinces of the Dauphiné, Roussillon, Alsace, Lorraine, Flanders, Artois, Hainault, Marche and Poitou. Corvisier, Louvois, pp. 424–5; Rowlands, Dynastic state, pp. 36–7. Colbert’s multiple ministerial briefs allowed him to retain a degree of influence in these provinces, making Louvois’s dominance in them less total until Colbert’s death in 1683. R. Mettam, Power and faction in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, 1988), pp. 242–3. 4 P. G. Wallace, Communities and conflict in early modern Colmar, 1575–1730 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1995), pp. 108–12. While acting as interim secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1671, Louvois named his cousin Poncet de la Rivière as intendant of Alsace, giving him an important channel of influence there; he intervened frequently in Alsace, even though the province was not yet officially under his supervision. Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 363–5, 368. 5 A. J. Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance en Alsace, Franche-Comté et Lorraine aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles’, Annales de L’Est, 50 (2000), pp. 208–9. 6 G. Livet, ‘Royal Administration in a Frontier Province: The Intendancy of Alsace under Louis XIV’, in R. Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and absolutism (Columbus, OH, 1976), p. 15. 7 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, p. 213. 8 Ibid., pp. 214–15. 9 Ibid., pp. 221–2. 10 Ford, Strasbourg, pp. 86–9. 11 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, p. 207 (quotation); C. Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, 1674–1790 (Paris, 1999), pp. 266–72. 12 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, p. 224; Grosperrin, L’Influence française, p. 25. 13 Between 1668 and 1715, the Franche-Comté had ten intendants, all of whom had experience in the administration of frontier provinces. Grosperrin, L’Influence française, p. 24. 14 Ibid. 15 See, for example, Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine. 16 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, p. 227. 17 Rowlands, Dynastic state, pp. 91–3; Dee, Expansion and crisis, p. 43; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 417. 18 S. Kettering, Patrons, brokers, and clients in seventeenth-century France (Oxford, 1986), pp. 167–75. 19 See, for instance, Dee, Expansion and crisis, p. 43. 20 Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 27–8, 44. 21 Wallace, Early modern Colmar, pp. 99–100. 22 Ibid., pp. 138–41. 23 Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 144–5. 24 Dee, Expansion and crisis, pp. 57–60; Wallace, Early modern Colmar, p. 199.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 82

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

83

25 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, p. 208. 26 Rowlands, Dynastic state, pp. 64–72. 27 Research by Douglas Baxter indicates that Chamillart did attempt to replace some of the Le Tellier clientele with his own: ‘Premier commis in the war department in the latter part of the reign of Louis XIV’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, 8 (1980), p. 84. 28 Kettering, Patrons, brokers, and clients, pp. 230–1; E. Pénicaut, Faveur et pouvoir au tournant du grand siècle: Michel Chamillart, ministre et secrétaire d’état de la guerre de Louis XIV (Paris, 2004), pp. 111–15. Sara Chapman has argued that, by this time, relationships between superiors and inferiors were increasingly professional and less personal, hinging less on clientele networks: S. Chapman, Private ambition and political alliances: the Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain family and Louis XIV’s government, 1650–1715 (Rochester, NY, 2004), p. 147. 29 SHDT A1 1879 no. 38, Bouchu to Chamillart, 20 Feb. 1705. 30 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 44; Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 17. 31 SHDT A1 250, fo. 163, Saint-Pouange to Louvois, 25 Oct. 1670; fo. 183, Charuel to Louvois, 31 Oct. 1670. The commissaries des guerres had exhausting workloads in Lorraine, as their departments were very large and contained poor roads. A1 358 no. 81, Charuel to Louvois, 11 Feb. 1671. 32 Coornaert, La Flandre française, p. 170; Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, p. 53. 33 Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 222; Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, pp. 32–3. 34 From April 1672 to July 1673 Lorraine was attached to the généralité of Metz under JeanPaul de Choisy, Charuel having been temporarily reassigned to the intendance of the army of Flanders. 35 Vaubourg’s cousin Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Saint-Pouange had been intendant of Lorraine from 1657 to 1661, and his second cousin, Charles Colbert de Vandières de Saint-Mars, was intendant of Alsace from 1663 to 1670. Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, pp. 17–18. Vaubourg’s previous experience was not in the pays conquis but in Navarre and Béarn (1685–7) and the Auvergne (1687–91); his appointment reflects Pontchartrain’s dominance in domestic policy in the period after the death of Louvois, when the young Barbezieux was struggling to manage his department. 36 Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 41. 37 In 1704 Chamillart sacked him as intendant of the army of Italy due to an apparent mismanagement of its accounts, but he was retained as the intendant of the Dauphiné thanks to the intervention of Chamillart’s son-in-law, the general La Feuillade. SHDT A1 1764 no. 165, La Feuillade to Chamillart, 17 Apr. 1704. But Bouchu’s health problems persuaded Chamillart to replace him in May 1705 with the intendant of Normandy, Nicolas d’Angervilliers. Chamillart was a former intendant of Normandy, and the selection of Angervilliers for this post reflects his desire to draw upon a personal friend to fill this position.This is consistent with Emmanuel Pénicaut’s view that Chamillart preferred to work with a group of old friends and relations smaller than that of Louvois or Barbezieux. Pénicaut, Faveur et pouvoir, p. 94. 38 To give one instance, the sieur Boringe, a Savoyard captain in the French régiment etranger of Mauroux, referred to the commissaire ordonnateur Couppy as, ‘M Couppy intendant en Savoie’. SHDT A1 2102 no. 158, Boringe to Angervilliers, 22 Jun. 1708. 39 Rowlands, Dynastic state, pp. 89–91. 40 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 93. 41 SHDT A1 1874 no. 101, Usson to Chamillart, 27 May 1705. 42 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 94. 43 SHDT A1 1879 no. 313, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 29 Nov. 1705; no. 321, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 6 Dec. 1705. 44 SHDT A1 1690 no. 87, Chamillart to Bouchu, 29 Nov. 1703. The outgoing Intendant Bouchu recommended in 1705 that Basset be replaced, for, although he was well versed in matters of judicature, his knowledge of military affairs proved inadequate for the post. A. M. Boislisle, Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances avec les intendants des provinces, 1683–1715 (3 vols., Paris, 1874–97), ii, p. 244, no. 784, Bouchu to Chamillart, 13 Apr. 1705.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 83

12/03/2013 16:10

84

administration on the frontiers

45 In Freiburg-im-Breisgau, held by France from 1677 to 1697, the French were conscious from the outset that the governor of the territory should be someone who was well liked by the occupied population, most likely because it was a German-speaking region on the other side of the Rhine. See Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 431. 46 SHDT A1 1010 nos. 51 and 55, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 22 and 24 Aug. 1690. 47 He also assured them that the king would make no differentiation between the nouveaux convertis and the anciens catholiques: SHDT A1 1690 no. 218, La Feuillade to the people of Savoy, Dec. 1703. 48 Quoted in Sonnino, Dutch war, p. 120. 49 Rowlands, Dynastic state, p. 54. 50 F. Bluche, Dictionnaire du grand siècle (Paris, 1990), pp. 428, 1345–6; Lanouvelle, Créquy, pp. 157–60, 167. 51 Rowlands, Dynastic state, pp. 310, 314. 52 Bluche, Dictionnaire, pp. 219, 891–2. 53 See p. 127. 54 SHDT A1 2039 no. 296, Vallière to Chamillart, 27 Jun. 1707; A1 2040 no. 1, Chamillart to Vallière, 2 Jul. 1707. This is consistent with Emmanuel Pénicaut’s view that Chamillart was generally ineffective at dealing with such matters: see his Faveur et pouvoir, pp. 208, 415. 55 SHDT A1 2040 no. 247, Bonneval to Chamillart, 14 Oct. 1707; no. 278, Chamillart to Bonneval, 20 Oct. 1707; no. 279, Chamillart to Médavy, 20 Oct. 1707. The structure of command during the occupation of Nice from 1705 to 1713 was equally problematic: it had five different governors in the eight-year period, and their competencies were badly defined. See Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 88–9. 56 AMA RD 48, fo. 61, 29 June 1707. 57 SHDT A1 2040 nos. 2 and 3, Chamillart to Médavy, 3 and 6 Jul. 1707. 58 SHDT A1 2038 no. 207, Tessé to Chamillart, 9 Mar. 1707. 59 Ibid. 60 SHDT A1 2251 no. 419, bishop of Geneva/Annecy to Voysin, 4 Oct. 1710; Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, pp. 142–3. 61 SHDT A1 2038 no. 59, Vallière to Chamillart, 28 Jan. 1707. 62 After a second ordonnance of June 1707 on preparations for an enemy invasion, members of the Sénat, the Chambre des comptes and syndics from across the duchy came to him with complaints that the ordonnance was almost impossible to fulfil: SHDT A1 2039 no. 296, Vallière to Chamillart, 27 Jun. 1707. 63 SHDT A1 2040 no. 331, Catinat to Chamillart, 6 Nov. 1707. Whatever Catinat’s faults as a plains commander, as seen in 1701, he was the acknowledged expert on the southern Alps. 64 SHDT A1 2040 no. 395, Médavy to Chamillart, 15 Nov. 1707; no. 390, Chamillart to Catinat, 1 Dec. 1707. 65 Catinat recommended that both the mémoire and the reply should be burnt. SHDT A1 2040 no. 392, Catinat to Chamillart, 3 Dec. 1707. 66 SHDT A1 2175 no. 213, Ponnat to Voysin, 6 Aug. 1709; A1 2172 no. 254, Médavy to Voysin, 6 Dec. 1709. 67 See below, p. 148. 68 Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 48 no. 180, Ravaulx to Le Peletier, 27 May 1685. 69 This long-term strategy of the French government can also be seen in 1672, when the French had issued a notarial act stipulating that the Barrois (in both parts) was subject to the king of France and was now a pays d’états. BNF NAF 22320, ‘Memoire sur la Lorraine’, fo. 44, 18 May 1672. The government’s efforts in this regard appear to have born fruit, as the Barrois was much more francisised, and showed hostility to the Duke after 1697. Schmitt, ‘Le Barrois ’, pp. 223, 431. 70 M-L. Legay, Les Etats provinciaux dans la construction de l’état moderne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle (Geneva, 2001), p. 48.The gabelle farm for Lorraine had already been merged with the Fermes générales of France in 1674. Bail des gabelles de France et des évêchés de Metz, Toul et Verdun, des salines et domaines de Lorraine et du comté de Bourgogne (Paris, 1676).

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 84

12/03/2013 16:10

the structures of occupation

85

71 Charles IV’s envoy to Paris noted that this move had been opposed by Louvois. ADMM 3F 5 no. 39, Canon to Charles IV, 26 Aug. 1671. 72 AN G7 374 no. 325, ‘Arrêt du conseil d’état qui supprime les offices de receveur, controlleur & gruyeur établis dans les lieux de Lorraine réunis aux trois Evêchés’, 25 Jul. 1681. The previous December, Colbert had combined all the domains of France in one farm. R. Mousnier, The institutions of France under the absolute monarchy (2 vols., Chicago, 1984), ii, p. 442. 73 M-J. Laperche-Fournel, ‘Les Chevalier, receveurs généraux de la généralité de Metz–Alsace (1661–1723). Trajectoires sociales, stratégies et réseaux’, Les Cahiers lorrains, 2 (2003), pp. 36–51. 74 AN G7 374 no. 194, Charuel to Colbert, 19 Mar. 1682. 75 The receveurs called for an emergency meeting in Nancy, ‘where we will together take measures to prevent this fatal blow’: AAE CP Lorr. 44, fo. 307bis, ‘Circulaire des receveurs généraux de Lorraine’, 6 Nov. 1684. 76 AN G7 1 [unnumbered], Colbert to Charuel, 18 Dec. 1681. 77 AN G7 1 [unnumbered], Colbert to Charuel, 14 Nov. 1682. 78 AN G7 374 no. 261, Charuel to Colbert, 22 Nov. 1682. 79 Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 481. 80 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 12, fo. 2, ‘Extrait des Registres du Conseil d’Etat’, 10 Dec. 1685. 81 Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 225. 82 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 45. 83 Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 730; Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 47. 84 Grosperrin, L’Influence française, pp. 28–37. 85 Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 51. 86 ‘Mémoire du roi pour servir d’instruction au sieur comte de La Vauguyon s’en allant présentement à Vienne en qualité d’envoyé extraordinaire de Sa Majesté’, 24 Oct. 1685, in A. Sorel (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la Révolution française, vol. I: Autriche (Paris, 1884), pp. 109–10. 87 SHDT A1 1071 no. 118, de Sève to Pontchartrain, 10 Oct. 1691. 88 SHDT A1 1071 no. 166, Barbezieux to Vaubourg, 13 Nov. 1691. 89 SHDT A1 1010 no. 31, Bonval to Louvois, 15 Aug. 1690. 90 SHDT A1 1690 no. 91, Bouchu to Chamillart, 1 Dec. 03; no. 98, ‘Mémoire sur les fermes de Savoie’, 29 Nov. 1703. 91 SHDT A1 2043 no. 208, Paratte to Chamillart, ‘Mémoire sur la comté de Nice’, 26 Oct. 1707. 92 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 282. 93 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 123. 94 SHDT A1 1571 no. 32, Chamillart to Tallard, 4 Dec. 1702; no. 33, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 4 Dec. 1702. 95 The French only resorted to billeting troops among the inhabitants of Nancy in extraordinary circumstances. SHDT A1 1661 no. 58, townspeople of Nancy to Chamillart, July 1703. 96 AAE CP Lorr. 55 nos. 45 and 47, Louis XIV to Audiffret, 14 and 21 Dec. 1702. 97 SHDT A1 1661 no. 52, Avejan to Chamillart, 31 Jul. 1703; A1 1761 no. 21, Avejan to Chamillart, 29 Jan. 1704; A1 1852 no. 145, Chamillart to Avejan, 6 May 1705.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 85

12/03/2013 16:10

4 The burdens of occupation

Over the course of the early modern period, a clear evolution took place in the way occupied territories were treated by conquering powers, particularly in terms of the material and financial burdens imposed on the territory, and of civil-military relations. While military occupations of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century were usually horrific for the affected populations, those in the eighteenth century tended towards lighter exactions and better discipline.1 Louis XIV’s personal rule can be seen as representing a decisive shift in this respect,2 as advances in the administration of the army and improved discipline meant that the state could better control how it extracted resources. Yet the fiscal imperative remained the same: the vast increase in size of the French army under Louis XIV, alongside a fairly static tax base, created a massive shortfall between military needs and state support. It was therefore essential that the expense incurred in the conquest of foreign territory be defrayed through sources other than the royal treasury. From the 1660s, the fundamental principle of French fiscal policy in conquered territories was that they ought to support their own military burdens, although this was not always possible. There were two paths open to the king and his ministers to facilitate this. One option was the levying of ‘contributions’, which was one step short of full occupation. Administered by civil agents, this represented a considerable improvement over the previous system of exaction by brutal pillaging.3 The system of ‘strategic frontiers’ facilitated this, as it allowed easy access to enemy territory, enabling French commanders to have their army live off the enemy instead of French civilians. The system of contributions became regularised after 1667, whereby formal agreements or traités would be negotiated between local officials and the French authorities. These were generally assessed and collected by the military intendants and their agents, which made the assessment and collection ‘more analogous to taxation than to robbery’.4 Yet, they remained extortion, and civilians also had to pay normal taxes to their own ruler, so the system was extremely burdensome and would quickly exhaust a territory.5

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 86

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

87

Lorraine and Savoy were therefore relatively fortunate to be placed under full military occupation, rather than subjected to these contributions. This meant that they were taxed more like the French frontier provinces, instead of being exploited as enemy territory. Yet their burdens were far from light. Indeed, French military occupation could transform the economy of a territory, as its resources would be channelled to feeding and supplying the French war machine. This was particularly the case for Lorraine and Savoy, which were on crucial military supply routes. Studies of the French frontier provinces have already demonstrated that Louis XIV’s intendants had to reorganise the economies of their généralité for the military, which meant constituting a market which not only exploited but also dynamised local resources.6 This may explain the fact that the frontier territories tended to be kept economically separate from the rest of France and were excluded from Colbert’s tariff system: from 1669 Alsace and the Trois Evêchés were given the status of à l’instar de l’étranger effectif, keeping the liberty to trade freely with foreign powers and paying the same tariffs as foreigners when trading with the French interior. Flanders and the Franche-Comté meanwhile were réputée étrangère, paying taxes on merchandises imported from the rest of the kingdom, and also on those imported from abroad.7 This reflects the fact that the frontier was not only a limit of sovereignty, it was also a zone of exchange, far from the central power and often linked to foreign economic networks (Alsace being the most prominent example of this).8 The structures put in place in a conquered territory, and the amount of resources and money that the French could take from it, depended to a large extent on how well they were able to control the population, their soldiers, and brigands and raiding parties within and outside the territory. The issues of security, order and discipline therefore affected the whole tenor of the occupying regime.The role played by the French military was central to this. Louis XIV and his war ministers exerted a hitherto unknown level of control over the army and its commanders, and their intense disciplinary action stamped out many of the worst abuses which had marked the conduct of the army during the Thirty Years War.9Yet, discipline problems did not disappear altogether, re-emerging in times of shortage, and often leading to confrontation with local inhabitants. Moreover, security problems in occupied territories often tied down French forces and used up vital resources. This chapter therefore examines not only the burdens placed on the occupied populations, but also the reciprocal obligations required of the occupying regime. It begins with an examination of the financial and material burdens placed on Lorraine and Savoy with a view to comparing how these changed over the course of the reign, and how they differed from the demands made of the French frontier provinces; it then looks at the problems of security, order and discipline in the occupied territories, which dictated what resources the French Government needed to invest there and how much they could take.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 87

12/03/2013 16:10

88

administration on the frontiers

Financial and material burdens Lorraine, 1670–97 The principal objective of royal policy in Lorraine in the first few years of French rule was to cover the costs of the military occupation, but in the longer run much depended on whether the French stayed. There was something of a debate on what tactics to pursue regarding Lorraine’s resources. Marshal Créqui wrote to Colbert and Louvois in October 1670 that, if the king intended to keep Lorraine, its resources should be spared: the French should avoid harassing the tax farmers in their duties, reassure the population, exploit the ducal domains and, in particular, take good care of the salt works. If not, they should make it more difficult for the dukes of Lorraine to hinder France in future by stripping the country of its resources and destroying its salt works.10 Again in February 1671, when the return of Lorraine appeared likely, Créqui recommended destroying the salt works of Lorraine, as this would make the duchy dependent on the French salt works at Moyenvic, and would deprive the duke of its revenues for several years to come.11 Haussonville argued that the French took as much as they could from Lorraine during the Dutch War in order to hand it back completely stripped of resources.12Yet, far from being the object of a brutal and methodical devastation, Lorraine was merely exploited like any other province of the kingdom. Créqui repeatedly argued that it was in the king’s interests to wait until they left before ruining the place, and that in the meantime the government should moderate their demands on the population so as not to exhaust them too quickly.13 Intendant Charuel initially tried to apportion the burden fairly, and place it on those who could most afford it. For the subsistence of troops in Lorraine in 1671, for instance, it was decided that the Barrois, being more prosperous than Lorraine, should shoulder most of the cost.14 Moderation was the key, ‘as that makes a country abundant and is the link which keeps the peasant attached to his miserable little house’.15 In occupied territory where the French decided they were not staying, their approach would be quite different, as Darryl Dee found for the occupation of the Franche-Comté in 1668: the French destroyed the fortifications of Dole and Gray and subjected the province to a ‘wholesale depredation’, taking with them all the arms and money they could find.16 Initially, then, the burden on Lorraine was heavy, but not disproportionate: until 1684 the French continued to raise and collect the taxes and duties of the ducal regime, notably the aide Saint Rémy, a direct tax similar to the French taille, levied on the inhabitants of all villages in Lorraine and the Barrois, and paid every 1 October after the harvests had finished. This was set at the 1669 level throughout the 1670s,17 but supplemented from November 1670 with an imposition for troop subsistence, levied at 60,000 livres per month.18 In

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 88

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

89

these early years, however, there was the problem of uncertainty – caused in part by Louis XIV’s dissimulation – about France’s long-term intentions, which hampered the tasks of Créqui and Charuel. Charuel wrote to Louvois in July 1671 that the impositions for the previous month were not forthcoming, as the inhabitants of Lorraine believed an agreement had been made with the duke, and that they did not therefore need to pay anything further. He had to send in dragoons to divest them of this opinion.19 In the summer of 1671 when it was announced that the French would be staying in Lorraine, moderation was again the order of the day, and Créqui reported that villages in Lorraine had been treated ‘too violently’ in being pressed to pay their debts. He therefore ordered the restitution of livestock that had been seized, and the Parlement of Metz was ordered to stop sending in bailiffs to ‘torment’ communities, as this would be detrimental to the collection of money by tax officials.20 Such steps were consistent with Colbert’s approach in the rest of the kingdom. When the French arrived they found Lorraine and the Barrois were enjoying a relative abundance. But any optimism about Lorraine’s fiscal potential was short-lived. After less than two months, Charuel reported that Lorraine’s poverty would severely limit its ability to support its charges.21 By March 1671, two or three of the prévôtés in Lorraine and the Barrois were starting to weaken and were incapable of paying taxes.22 At the beginning of the occupation, Louvois had promised Colbert that Lorraine would bring in two million livres per year, yet this was not fulfilled: the receipts from November 1670 to October 1671 brought in only 1,614,175.23 But Lorraine was nonetheless crucial to the French war effort during the Dutch War: it was, as it had been under Richelieu, a place d’armes – a military supply depot and a zone to quarter the army. As it sat on a direct route used by French armies to cross the Rhine, its inhabitants had to lodge and feed substantial numbers of troops both during the campaigning season and during winter quarters.24 For winter quarters, inhabitants had to provide bread, meat and wine for the soldiers and forage for horses; from 1674 the system of the ustensile was introduced, designating the supplementary fees paid by communities to officers for the maintenance of their troops during the winter. For the five-month period of winter quarters from December to April 1673–4, the French imposed 600,000 livres on Lorraine and the Barrois.25 The inhabitants also had to provide the gunpowder to demolish their town walls and pay the cost of new fortifications.26 Overall the burden on Lorraine was not unlike that on the neighbouring Franche-Comté, also occupied during the Dutch War: total impositions on each were approximately three times those on a French pays d’états, but less than double those on a pays d’élections27 and certainly much lighter than that of a territory under contribution as a result of wartime conquest.28 In the early 1680s elements of the French Government even worried that the burden on Lorraine was too great.29

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 89

12/03/2013 16:10

90

administration on the frontiers

During the war, the French were not the only ones attempting to exploit the duchies: from 1673 the allies began sending demands to the prévôtés of Lorraine to pay contributions.30 As allied raiding became worse and communities increasingly fell into destitution, Charles IV proposed a contributions treaty to stop raiding in Lorraine in exchange for the payment by France of a fixed sum of money. Through his intermediary, the sieur Durant, Charles’s secrétaire d’état Le Bègue wrote that the duke was resolved to ask for a contribution treaty to cover Lorraine that would include the king of Spain, the Dutch and the elector Palatine. Charuel advised Louvois that the king should accept the offer, for otherwise the people of Lorraine would soon be completely incapable of supporting French troops.31 By the terms of the treaty, signed in Nancy on 3 July 1675, the French paid 180,000 livres annually to the duke, in exchange for him ordering the raiding parties to stop their activities.32 The contributions treaty allowed the French to continue using Lorraine to quarter their armies without the territory being wrecked.33 But finances were still tight: in August 1677 it was reported that the 80,000 livres imposed on Lorraine to pay for meat for the infantry was not forthcoming.34 The necessity of upholding the contributions treaty was made all the more obvious the following year when Charles V temporarily abandoned the treaty after the French claimed exorbitant sums from him in compensation for fires in the Verdunois, part of the Trois Evêchés.35 As negotiations to renew the treaty faltered, raiding parties recommenced their activities with a vengeance; finally in June of that year a new contributions treaty was agreed, on exactly the same terms as the one signed in July 1675.36 The intendant’s eagerness to quickly renegotiate the treaty illustrates its importance to the French war effort in Lorraine, and the long-term effects of the rupture would indeed have been serious.37 If the 1670s had seen relatively heavy French demands, the end of the Dutch War brought some leniency by Louis XIV’s ministers. Colbert instigated extensive fiscal reforms in Lorraine, explaining that the existing charges were generally ‘too heavy for the people’.38 When the duchy of Luxembourg was annexed in 1681, Louvois instructed the intendant to impose the same sums as the king of Spain had the previous year, and no more.39 Yet throughout the 1680s, chronic indebtedness among Lorrain communities remained a serious problem, and their financial resources were further dislocated by the réunions and associated troop burdens. From 1682 Charuel pressed Colbert to reimburse the communities for the étapes; he wrote that the communities could no longer support the cost of the military tax, particularly those on the ‘great roads’, for they were also obliged to support large numbers of troops in winter quarters as well as the appointements (salaries) of the governors and army generals in Lorraine.40 Nancy’s municipal debts were truly crippling: by 1679 they amounted to 149,682 livres, against annual revenues of 35,085 livres, leaving

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 90

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

91

insufficient funds to pay their charges as well as the arrears on their debts. In such circumstances, the best they could hope for was a temporary suspension of creditor pursuit.41 Financially, therefore, Lorraine was already in a precarious state even before it was hit by the crisis of the 1690s. The remilitarisation of Lorraine during the Nine Years War meant once more a heavy burden of charges, including the gabelle, the subvention (which replaced the aide Saint Rémy in 1684), the étapes (military tax for passing troops), the salaries of officiers généraux of Lorraine and the ustensile. Lorraine also had to provide men. The first battalions of the new royal provincial militia were raised in Lorraine, as in other provinces, in November 1688; a second regiment of fifteen companies was raised in late 1692: as in the rest of France, enrolments for these were carried out by force, with communes held responsible for absences.42 Charuel decided early on in the war that it was better to provision the army by free enterprise rather than by imposition, ‘as nothing in the world fatigues the people as much as making them transport their forage to distant towns’.43 He hoped that, by sparing Lorrains this imposition, they would be better able to pay other charges and provide the French with as much cash as possible.Yet environmental factors intervened: a series of bad harvests led to famine in 1693–4, and in 1694 a quantity of wheat that normally sold for 8 to 10 francs reached 80. The villages of Lorraine, without grain for their own needs, were forced to send their wheat for the magazines of Alsace.44 Furthermore, the intendant switched to purchasing grains by imposition in 1695, causing prices to plummet, and leaving labourers unable to pay their charges.45 The dire situation of Lorrain communities was further compounded by the establishment of the capitation, a direct tax imposed on nobles and commoners alike across France, in 1695.46 John Lynn has argued that by the 1690s the quartering of troops enriched rather than impoverished localities.47 Yet, even allowing for special pleading, the correspondence of Lorrain communities with the intendant shows this was far from the case. The magistrates of Epinal wrote to him in December 1690 that their town was destitute and had been reduced to only 300 inhabitants, but was still being forced to garrison three companies of cuirassiers, and asked to be discharged of them.48 In 1695, the municipal syndics of Lunéville wrote that the town was ruined by onerous fiscal burdens and the constant passage of troops: of 250 bourgeois there were now only seventy, all of whom were insolvent. Each day they had to lodge troops, and the better-off families had fled. The town was charged with 4,600 rations of forage, 5,000 livres for the winter quarters, the subvention, and the verification of roles for the capitation. Furthermore, most were forced to ‘take bread from their own mouth’ to give to troops who were not satisfied with their own rations.49 The intendant replied that he could not reduce their impositions without having to shift the charges onto

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 91

12/03/2013 16:10

92

administration on the frontiers

other communities, which were no better off.50 The abuses of over-zealous tax receivers escalated tensions: in 1695 over a thousand depositions were collected in a court case against the receivers of the Barrois and Toul. Even the intendant recommended that some of these receivers be condemned, so as to placate the people and assure the collection of taxes.51 To compound these problems, France was hit by a general financial crisis in 1694: credit was in short supply and military contractors in Lorraine frequently defaulted.52 As the French Government’s priority was to pay its armies, the administrators could no longer show moderation and the intendance of Lorraine became less inclined to dialogue and indulgence. Moreover, France was preparing to abandon Lorraine; so, in contrast to Alsace or the FrancheComté, keeping people’s goodwill was no longer a major concern. Vaubourg therefore met sedition with force: henceforth, violence perpetrated by the state replaced random violence committed by soldiers, and the intendance became the symbol of this new discipline.53 Necessity also led Vaubourg, despite their protests, to leave the communities of Lorraine and the Barrois to their creditors.54 For many, France’s treatment of Lorraine in this period merely continued the ruthless exploitation to which it had been subjected since 1670.55 But in fact, while the financial and material burdens on Lorraine did increase substantially during the NineYears War, especially in comparison to the more favourable treatment shown to the pays d’états, the burdens on Lorraine cease to appear exorbitant when compared to other frontier provinces such as the FrancheComté, or even some pays d’élections in the interior of the kingdom, whose tax levels also increased significantly in the 1690s.56 Lorraine, 1702–14 The financial burden placed on Lorraine during the French occupation from 1702 was minimal, reflecting the king’s desire to keep Duke Leopold friendly and dissuade him from joining the allied side in the war.Yet the heavy French military presence meant that the economy of the area was again geared to supplying the French army. Lorraine’s principal function in this conflict, as far as the French were concerned, was to provide subsistence goods to military warehouses in Alsace, though these were paid for, rather than requisitioned: at the beginning of the occupation, Chamillart informed intendant Saint-Contest of the Trois Evêchés that the duke of Lorraine’s ministers were to make these supplies available, either through entrepreneurs or by a general imposition.57 However, the French were prepared to ensure this arrangement met their needs: as the initial negotiations took too long, the intendant was authorised to force the inhabitants to provide supplies, paying whatever he considered to be ‘a reasonable price’.58 Lorraine also had to provide free lodgings for French troops on their way to the frontier, as per the terms of the Treaty of Ryswick. Every time a French

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 92

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

93

army passed through Lorraine, the duke would send his commissioners to facilitate the passage of the troops and protect the interests of his subjects; the French then imposed the costs of the passage of the army on enemy territory.59 France also agreed to pay for the transport of supplies to the army as it passed through Lorraine, paying four livres per wagon per day in summer, and six livres in winter.60 When French troops were put into winter quarters along the Saar in the winter of 1702–3, the local Lorrain officials refused to pay for the wood and candles used by the troops quartered among them (traditionally part of the ustensile), and after the intervention of the duke on their behalf, the king agreed to pay these costs out of the main French military treasury, the Extraordinaire des Guerres.61 Thereafter, when the French wintered in Lorraine, they paid indemnities to the duke, though the latter always lodged formal complaints about French troops wintering in his territory.62 In addition the French paid all the customs duties for transporting supplies: a wagon carrying five bags of barley from Verdun to Nancy would pay duties of 15 sols 9 deniers, on top of the 10 sols 2 deniers imposed by the town of Nancy for each 200 lb bag of grain.63 Normally such supplies were duty-exempt when moved within France or into occupied territory; Louis was trying to make the occupation as palatable as possible for Leopold. Similarly, the fact that the French did not increase the burdens on Lorrain communities during the economic crisis of 1709–10 shows their commitment to maintaining the neutrality of Lorraine even in moments of dire necessity. In October 1710, the French commander of the garrison of Marsal informed Voysin of his urgent need for money to pay his soldiers, to prevent pillaging: ‘we are here in a Lorrain town where the bourgeois are our masters, being stronger than us’; he could not expect any help from the Lorrains ‘because they are surely our enemies’.64 The situation in Lorraine became increasingly rancorous as France’s position in the war became more desperate. The financial crisis meant that from 1709 the French regularly defaulted on payments to their étapiers (officials responsible for supplying the network of étapes, or military staging posts) in Lorraine, and many of these officials fled to avoid their creditors.65 Louis XIV’s refusal to fully occupy Lorraine caused further complications for the war effort. The lack of control over economic policy in the territory, for instance, meant that Lorraine remained open to all foreign trade, so French coinage used to pay the troops quartered in the Trois Evêchés could pass to the Empire or the Dutch Republic. To make matters worse, the duke of Lorraine set his coinage to parallel the French coinage/unit-of-account ratio, but at a slightly different level, thus attracting French specie into Lorraine. By 1704 the intendant Saint-Contest wrote to the contrôleur général that there were no more louis d’or or écus in Metz; moreover, trade in the Trois Evêchés was ruined, as the advantageous exchange rates in Lorraine meant that merchants from the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 93

12/03/2013 16:10

94

administration on the frontiers

German frontier and the Low Countries were able to buy French goods more cheaply in Lorraine, and avoided the Trois Evêchés altogether.66 Despite pressure from the French, the duke refused to rectify the problem by standardising the coinage/unit-of-account ratio.67 This problem reflected the porous nature of the frontier at this time, especially given the enclaving of territory and the presence of two distinct sovereignties in the Lorraine region.Yet, problems with currency regulation along the frontier existed even where sovereignty was undivided, as in Alsace; in most cases the French came to accept that the problem was inevitable, and its effects could only be attenuated.68 Savoy, 1690–6 The occupation of Savoy began somewhat haphazardly, since the French Government had not expected the turn that events had taken. At the beginning of May 1690, Louvois ordered the marquis de Larray, commander in the Dauphiné, to prepare to put the duchy under contribution, and told intendant Bouchu to choose one of his most experienced commissaires des guerres to organise it.69 Larray proceeded to levy contributions on as much of the duchy as possible, though this was no easy task, given the poverty of the country and the shortage of troops. To compound his difficulties, peasants in the villages closest to France had abandoned their homes en masse and taken their livestock to the mountains for safety, blocking the roads with rocks as they went. Thus only Chambéry and its hinterland could be placed under contribution. Apart from the lack of troops, there was no organisation to collect the contributions – there was not a single receiver in the Dauphiné capable of performing the task, and the intendant was out of the province.70 From the beginning, commissaire Bonval’s primary function was to take as much money from the conquered province as possible for the Extraordinaire des Guerres. Bonval felt that it would be far better to impose the taille rather than military contributions, being ‘more to the taste of the people’ and easier for them to fulfil. The interim military commander Saint-Ruth agreed, advising that those who had sworn allegiance to the king now regarded themselves as ‘subjects of His Majesty’ and the duchy should therefore not be distinguished from other parts of the kingdom. Saint-Ruth justified his moderation after the conquest of Savoy in 1690 to Louvois in similar terms: ‘I believe we should treat these people with gentleness, as I am persuaded that it is in the king’s interests to keep them for ever.’71 Louvois responded initially that the king was indifferent whether the taille or contributions were imposed on Savoy, but eventually settled on an imposition of the taille, as it would upset people less.72 He also instructed Saint-Ruth that any revenues usually raised on behalf of the duke were now to be raised for the king. In Savoy, therefore, the French decided on a simple substitution of Louis XIV in place of Victor Amadeus, in order to foster good

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 94

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

95

relations with the people so that they would continue to provide money and winter quarters for the army. This is in contrast to the much harsher treatment given to the more hostile population of Piedmont: General Catinat was ordered to impose extensive contributions and to show no mercy to communities who did not pay what was demanded; and furthermore, as Louvois put it, ‘The more your army makes disorders, the sooner Monsieur de Savoie will fall’.73 Yet, as with Lorraine by now, the burden placed on Savoy was far from light, for Louvois was determined to maximise the short-term financial benefits of the occupation. Bonval acted in accordance with Louvois’s order to Bouchu of 14 June to impose double what Victor Amadeus normally took from Savoy: the duchy was to pay an entire year’s worth of the taille in the final six months of 1690, irrespective of what they had already paid to the duke. This was in addition to the contributions imposed on Chambéry prior to the conquest, and an exceptional supplementary payment of 100,000 livres to be raised across the whole duchy.74 Furthermore, once the campaigning season was at an end, the French set about quartering the army. Thirty-six infantry companies were quartered in the duchy during the winter of 1690–91, as well as three dragoon regiments, probably totalling around 8,000 men and 1,200 horse.75 The French desire to take as much as they could from Savoy at minimal cost to themselves is also reflected in their economic management of the duchy. On arrival, they found abundant forage – perfect for feeding dragoons and cavalry – but resolved to leave it until the winter so as not to destroy commerce, which depended on forage to feed draught animals. Despite these initial attempts at far-sightedness, the problems of supply for the army of Italy soon made such gestures impossible to repeat.The French imposed an export ban on grains from the duchy, thereby depriving the people of their only source of money, and by May 1691 Savoy had been stripped of all of its commerce – traders were forced to buy things in Geneva using cash as they had no merchandise of their own, using foreign coins that had circulated before the French takeover.76 But with the Chambre des comptes of Chambéry prohibiting the removal of gold and silver from the duchy, traders were now forced to use billets de commissaire (from the commissaires des guerres) to avoid the total ruin of the duchy.77 The French also quickly made use of what natural resources the duchy possessed: by August 1691, after a year of French occupation, saltpetre production had been increased from 20,000 lb a year to 50,000, and Bonval expected that this could be pushed up to 60,000, all of this being sent to French warehouses in Lyon.78 Throughout the occupation, the French looked for new sources of revenue in the duchy. In 1695, for instance, after a tip-off from a nun, they sent a commissaire des guerres to Beton to investigate claims of gold, silver and other precious metals in the mountains.79 The period 1694–6 was particularly harsh for the population of Savoy. On top of failed harvests and the crippling cost of billeting troops, people had to pay

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 95

12/03/2013 16:10

96

administration on the frontiers

the capitation, levied at 238,190 livres for the duchy, and a one-off imposition of 100,000 livres to pay for the fortification of Fenestrelle.80 Savoy was exhausted, and the non-payment of taxes had become so chronic that the French made plans to carry out a census in the duchy.81 Furthermore, a good harvest in 1694 had driven down the price of wheat in Savoy and, as the French prohibited its sale outside the duchy, most people had no money to pay the capitation in 1695. The administrators were forced to allow the sale of a limited amount of wheat to Geneva, if they were to collect taxes.82 Subsistence problems in Savoy were exacerbated that year by bad weather: constant rain and snow ruined the harvest of wheat and oats, and communities became incapable of paying their charges.83 Savoy, 1703–13 In terms of fiscal and material extraction, the second occupation of Savoy was far worse than that of Lorraine in the 1700s. Ordinary taxes levied on Savoy remained fairly constant during the occupation – an imposition of 725,419 livres for the taille, 336,804 livres for the capitation and a fund for ‘unexpected expenses’ of 100,000 livres – though the duchy’s ability to pay diminished substantially.84 The province was also faced with the ‘extraordinary expenses’ of winter quarters, which could vary widely: for 1705 and 1706 this came to 688,799 livres (it was raised generally but indemnified specific communities for the cost of billeting and provisioning troops). But parishes faced with lodging troops were quickly exhausted as the costs were far higher than the indemnities received: a parish would be 11 sous per day worse off for each cavalier or dragoon quartered there.85 There were also the indirect taxes of the gabelles and customs to pay. In addition, the French demanded ‘one-off’ payments, such as the sum of 321,618 livres for compensation payments for losses caused by enemy raiding parties.86 In total, direct taxes amounted to around 2,210,000 livres, similar to the sum imposed on the Franche-Comté, about 50 per cent heavier than the burden on a pays d’élections and 350 per cent heavier than that on a pays d’états.87 A memorandum of October 1703 (probably by Louis’ personal adviser Chamlay) had initially set out reasons for treating the Savoyards softly: they were bons gens and quite pro-French, but also the king could take more from the province by this means, commerce could continue, and the duchy could stay continuously cultivated.88 Certainly the regime maintained the duchy’s traditions in financial obligations for which the sovereign took responsibility.89 From 1704, those Savoyards who had suffered the loss of their revenues in Piedmont, and had sworn allegiance to the king, received indemnities. This exceeded the revenue from confiscations of property of the duke of Savoy or his supporters, so the intendant had to take 18,000 livres each year from the extraordinary imposition of 100,000 livres for unexpected expenses: clearly the French wanted to reward collaboration, even if it was minimal and symbolic. Furthermore, to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 96

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

97

compensate people for damage during the siege of Montmélian, a sum of 60,000 livres was raised in 1706. That year, Savoy experienced violent storms and the intendant advised Chamillart that it was customary in Savoy for the sovereign to support those who had incurred losses; the minister lowered the taille accordingly by nearly 50,000 livres, and deducted another 30,000 livres from the taille to compensate communities who had been victims of fire.90 Both these reductions were agreed on the basis that the communities were so poor that it was useless to force them to pay any of this, and the reductions would be covered by the ‘unexpected expenses’ fund. A reduction of 64,000 livres was similarly granted in 1709 for losses caused by the passage of enemy troops. Angervilliers reassured the war minister that this sum was not exorbitant, given that they took over a million annually from the taille and capitation.91 All seemed set fair. In 1705 intendant Bouchu advised that up to now they had employed the methods used during the last war, and he believed this should continue.92 But this approach – which assumed that the occupation could be conducted by the same methods as the last one, when Savoyards consistently co-operated with the occupiers and no allied military penetrations occurred – shows a certain naivety from the intendant. The attitude of the population had changed,93 and the financial management of Savoy slipped into chaos by the summer of 1705. There were shortfalls in collection of the taille, and the treasurer of the Extraordinaire des Guerres for Savoy had a substantial deficit of 58,463 livres of money spent against money received.94 By the summer of 1705, the new intendant, Angervilliers, reported extreme confusion among tax collectors in the duchy; he was forced to call them all to a meeting in Chambéry to inform them exactly what impositions they were to collect, and to find out what was paid or unpaid. The collection of taxes was falling behind, because of the pre-existing poverty of the country, the fact that many receivers were simply not doing their job95 and the increasing difficulty of recruiting more collectors, no doubt due to the memory of Victor Amadeus’s Chambre de justice which had investigated the activities of Savoyard finance officers during the previous French occupation.96 Before 1706, Savoy was spared a heavier burden because it was not a theatre of war. It was not so fortunate after the French defeat at Turin: from 1707, Sabaudian and Imperial troops regularly entered Savoy and took everything they could from already poverty-stricken communities.97 Moreover, as Piedmont was now lost, Savoy had to lodge a large part of the army: seven battalions around Chambéry, and twelve battalions plus twelve dragoon regiments in the Tarentaise.98 By the summer of 1708, there were unpaid taxes for the years 1706, 1707 and two quarters of 1708. As an invasion by the Sabaudian-Imperial army made the loss of Savoy look increasingly likely, Angervilliers and Chamillart agreed on contingency measures to ensure these unpaid sums would not

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 97

12/03/2013 16:10

98

administration on the frontiers

be lost with the duchy. In that case, Marshal Villars was instructed to arrest all receivers and all notables in Chambéry; it was normal, wrote the intendant, to take hostages when abandoning conquered territory, to ensure outstanding debts were paid.99 Abandonment of the duchy proved unnecessary, but vast sums remained unpaid and harsh methods were the order of the day: though the French Government knew many communities were unable to pay, the war minister ordered that troops wintering in Savoy should be sent into communities to enforce payment of their debts.100 This solved two problems: soldiers supplied the lack of tax collectors and, in doing so, paid for their own subsistence. This tactic was repeated in subsequent winters.101 Savoy’s economic woes were compounded by a string of agricultural disasters from 1708. The passage of troops in the summer months spoilt much of the harvest. In any case, even in ordinary years Savoy never produced enough grain to feed itself and usually imported three months’ worth from the neighbouring Dauphiné and Bresse. The 1708 harvest was very bad in those provinces, made worse by the fact that the cavalry and dragoons wintering in Savoy had eaten most of the rye because of a shortage of oats. Vallière therefore asked permission to buy grain from Marseille to feed the duchy, funded by an interest-free loan from four individuals in Chambéry. But there was no grain to spare in Provence, and the war minister could only recommend importing wheat from abroad.102 This message – that Savoy would have to import grain – was repeated in March when the town of Chambéry was denied permission by the contrôleur général Desmarets to purchase 20,000 bags of grain from Bresse.103 The year 1709 was particularly hard for Savoy. In May senior officers of the sovereign courts wrote to Desmarets that the misery of the people was so extreme that they were ‘reduced to living off the pastures of animals’.104 By July wheat in Chambéry was retailing at 54 florins per unit, compared with an average price of 12 florins a year earlier.105 This was aggravated by a SabaudianImperial counter-offensive in the summer, as allied troops employed a scorchedearth policy around the areas they controlled.106 By the end of September, the allied forces had recrossed the Alps, but the French army now had to find winter quarters in a pillaged and destitute country. Intendant Angervilliers was ordered to find quarters for twelve squadrons, but he told Voysin that it was absolutely impossible to accommodate more than five, adding that it was not out of interest for the people that he said this, but in the interest of the troops: all the grain in the duchy had been consumed during the campaign, and the inhabitants were now reduced to eating oats, leaving none for the horses. He added that he thought it impossible to take from the people their only means of avoiding starvation. Nor was there any money to be taken from the inhabitants by force.107 For the French war effort all this spelled disaster: since 1 January 1709 no further impositions were levied on the Dauphiné or Savoy ‘so as not to reduce

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 98

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

99

the people to the last extremity’. But as Angervilliers pointed out, this meant that by November the army would be without any resources.108 These problems were compounded by the fact that Savoy was being flooded with counterfeit coinage by inhabitants trying to capitalise on the monetary crisis and undermine confidence in the French regime.109 With the regular sources of money drying up, the intendant was forced to turn to more unusual sources. In 1709 he ordered the seizure of 13,237 livres from the revenues of the vacant bishopric of the Tarentaise so it could be used by Marshal Berwick to pay his troops; the intendant had to replace the money in the winter.110 From 1709 until the end of the war, the supply of money and provisions was a constant source of anxiety for the intendant: what little money was coming in went straight to the army, and as a result the whole apparatus of the occupation teetered on the brink of collapse.111 By February 1710, the members of the Sénat had not been paid their wages for fourteen months and gave warning that they would soon be unable to perform their judicial functions.112 And a remonstrance sent to the king by the syndics of Chambéry on behalf of the third estate of Savoy warned that, if they were not relieved, Savoy would be faced with total desolation.113 For all that the duchy had suffered excessively since 1706 by the quartering of troops, the French continued to wring it dry. When, in August 1710, the intendant imposed 352,038 livres on Savoy to pay for the winter quartering of the army the previous year, the Chambre des comptes of Chambéry pleaded that the burden be paid through the capitation or the taille instead of a new imposition.114 In October the syndics of Chambéry offered to cancel the king’s debts to the communities if he would stop the new imposition; the intendant agreed, as the outstanding debts would have to be paid to the duke after peace was restored and it was better to have them liquidated immediately. But the syndics had no authority to make such an offer, and things were left as they were. The same month, a further imposition of 632,000 livres was levied to pay for cavalry, dragoons and infantry for the year 1710–11.115 Also in 1710, an increase of 150,000 livres on the capitation was imposed on Savoy in lieu of the introduction of the dixième, introduced in the rest of the kingdom in October that year.116 The sovereign companies again sent representatives to Angervilliers to protest that the duchy was incapable of paying, but the intendant replied that he could not reduce the burden, and that they should be grateful the dixième was not being imposed as this would have been even heavier.117 Sabaudian-Imperial offensives into Savoy continued to intensify the burden: in March 1710, the procureur général of the Chambre des comptes of Chambéry asked Angervilliers, on the basis of usage in Savoy, to deduct from the tax bill of the province of Faucigny 55,000 livres which had been paid to the duke of Savoy’s army during the previous campaign. But the intendant was unwilling to compromise.118 Similarly, in January 1711, the syndics of Annecy requested the 3,313

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 99

12/03/2013 16:10

100

administration on the frontiers

livres paid to the intendant of the duke of Savoy’s army during the time they were under occupation in 1709 be struck from the town’s imposition; Voysin replied that the king would not allow Annecy to be reimbursed, as it was ‘not his custom to pay the expenses of his enemies’.119 Worse was to come. The allied offensive in 1711 cost the French authorities dearly: the intendant reported that during the summer the enemy army had carried off more than 400,000 livres, but he consoled himself that if they had managed to winter in Savoy the losses would probably have amounted to three million.120 Though environmental and military setbacks undermined the French position in Savoy, the duchy’s continued importance to the French war effort should not be underestimated. By 1710, the French army was living hand-tomouth, and the intendant reported that the gabelle farm of Savoy now supported ‘everything’ in his department, as this account always contained ‘a sure and prompt fund’, bringing in 52,500 livres to Grenoble monthly.121 The contract of the farm of Savoy, due to end in January 1709, had been extended for a year due to the terrible winter but needed renegotiating for 1710 onwards. As it was far from certain how much longer the French presence in Savoy would last, nobody could be found to take over the contract. The farmers general of France were subrogated to the contract of the farmers of Savoy for 1711, highlighting the importance of Savoy as a vital source of revenue.122 Overall, the experience of Savoy shows that, even if French rapacity knew its limits, the French were – particularly after 1706 – compelled to squeeze everything they could out of the duchy. This is in contrast to most provinces, where, as recent studies have demonstrated, the overall increase in direct taxation in this period was much less than previously thought; even in those provinces without estates, informal constraints limited what the crown could raise.123 Security, order and discipline The occupied territories bore the costs of these occupations, but in exchange the French commanders assured them of order, security and exact discipline. Guarantees of the good behaviour of troops ensured that people could go about their business unhindered and the economy could support the French impositions.124 In Lorraine in 1670, Louvois made it clear that discipline in the army must be maintained, so that peasants who had fled during the invasion would return home and the king would be able to pay for the occupation from Lorraine itself rather than the royal treasury.125 To guarantee good relations between soldiers and civilians, the French Government was selective in the troops it used to garrison occupied territories. For instance, the Irish troops used in the conquest of Savoy in 1690 were withdrawn the following year, partly because

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 100

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

101

of language problems, but also because they had a terrible reputation for poor discipline.126 Similarly, in December 1702, the king ordered Villars to replace the battalions of Nice and Pery (ironically, both regiments raised in the duke of Savoy’s lands) in the garrison of Nancy with two French battalions ‘as a means of guaranteeing the inhabitants against inconveniences’.127 Despite the best efforts of the French, discipline problems did inevitably arise in the occupied territories. In part, this was because troops believed they were on foreign soil, and so they were less likely to observe regulations closely. As the intendant Charuel put it in 1670: ‘It is difficult to prevent the troops from thinking that Lorraine is a country where they can take a few more liberties than inside the kingdom’.128 During the Dutch War, the French cavalry behaved so badly in Lorraine that Louvois issued a general order that they should be quartered together in towns, where commanding officers could be better held responsible for any discipline problems.129 Despite these efforts, the intendant Choisy toured Lorraine in 1673 and wrote that if he had to punish every cavalryman of the Royal regiment who had contravened the king’s regulations, it would be necessary to ‘hang them all’.130 Yet Louvois wrote that, ‘His Majesty regards Lorraine as a country which belongs to him a little more than in previous years, and which might very well stay his’, telling the intendant to maintain a firm hand on discipline.131 The problem was not unique to Lorraine. After the conquest of Strasbourg in 1681, the presence of a garrison of roughly 10,000 men gave rise to many insults and injuries to native townspeople.132 Similarly, the French commander in Savoy in 1690–91 told Louvois that ‘all the troops who come here imagine they must have all sorts of liberties because it is a newly conquered territory’;133 this was despite the efforts of commissaire Bonval, who had put in place a full team of military police to maintain discipline, including a lieutenant prévôt of the maréchaussée, a procureur du roi, an exempt, a greffier, twelve archers and the exécuteur.134 Much depended on how heavy the troop burden on a territory was, and whether the troops were away on campaign or in winter quarters. In the early stages of the first occupation of Savoy, the troop density was relatively light. The bishop of Geneva/Annecy, himself no supporter of the French presence in Savoy, admitted in October 1690 that ‘We have here a garrison of 200 cavalry and 1,200 infantry who are the most disciplined in the world.’135 But this was to change as soon as Catinat’s troops came back from Piedmont in the winter. The town council of Annecy sent representatives to the commander La Hoguette to protest at the misery caused by continual quartering of disorderly troops.136 Discipline problems could be exacerbated by the venality of officers: in April 1691 the commander of the regiment of Grancey threatened to bypass the town council’s billeting system and force his soldiers on the people of Annecy directly if they dared refuse him financial ‘gratifications’.137 With Savoy’s elites, relations

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 101

12/03/2013 16:10

102

administration on the frontiers

tended to be more cordial: towards the end of 1691 the bishop of Geneva/ Annecy wrote that, ‘all is quite tranquil here, our officers, which are not that numerous, entertain our ladies’.138 The Lorrain communities situated close to French military roads had most contact with French troops and this increased the chances of disturbances. The village of Sainte-Marie-aux-Mines, straddling the border between France and Lorraine, was the scene of an incident in the winter of 1703–04, when the French tried to quarter troops there.While the French half of the village accommodated the troops as ordered, officials from the Lorrain part protested as their duke had not ordered them to house troops. The captain of the regiment then forced them to accept the troops, who went into the homes and met no resistance in doing so; but no sooner were they lodged than the Lorrain greffier sounded the tocsin of two nearby churches and by ‘seditious discourse’ aroused the populace who proceeded to attack the soldiers, hitting them with sticks and stones.139 John Lynn has argued that, although the ‘tax of violence’ against French subjects continued into the 1670s, it had greatly declined by the end of that decade.140 The occupations of the second half of the reign certainly saw better discipline and better civil–military relations, although there were some flare-ups. It is perhaps best to sum up by saying the government had a constant struggle to rein in troops, even if terrible excesses were rare. In the winter of 1693–4, units of the elite cavalry Gendarmerie de France were quartered across Savoy without brigade commanders, causing ‘extraordinary vexations’ against the inhabitants, the gendarmes often demanding double their official rations.141 In January 1703, Chamillart reprimanded the marquis de Varennes for having quartered his troops in Saint-Avold and Boulay in Lorraine ‘with reckless violence and with much disorder, as one would do in enemy territory’, and the war minister explained that ‘nothing is more contrary to the intentions of the king’.142 Several months later Varennes was instructed that, if there was the least disorder in the occupied parts of Lorraine, the king would order his commanders to recompense the duke of Lorraine in double.143 Historians have recognised that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whatever the intentions and objectives of governments, l­ogistical problems and inadequacies of supply remained chronic, meaning that soldiers often had to find their own subsistence.144Times of economic trouble had particularly detrimental effects on military discipline. For the whole of 1694, the army of Italy was supplied on a hand-to-mouth basis.145 From September, Catinat sent troops into Savoy to subsist until they could go into winter quarters, causing strain on its already impoverished communities.146 Inevitably, an underfed army quartered in Savoy caused havoc with the population, and it came to the king’s attention that his troops had lived there the last year ‘with much licence’, though

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 102

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

103

the French commander in the duchy, Bachivilliers, denied any disorder, claiming he had managed to keep a very strict discipline.147 In Lorraine, the unpaid garrison of Nancy robbed the townspeople on a daily basis.148 The potential for confrontation grew during the subsistence crisis of 1709–10. In Nancy, the commissaire des guerres Geoffroy wrote in August that the soldiers of the garrison were due two months’ subsistence and payment of officers was long overdue.149 The soldiers had only bread to live on, and the bourgeois refused their requests for hand-outs. Rumours spread that the townspeople planned to ransack the market, prompting the French commander to post guards there to prevent disorders, ‘which would be more considerable in this town than in France because of the animosity of the people’.150 Voysin subsequently gave his permission to Marshal Harcourt to send his troops to find forage in Lorrain villages near his camp, rather than let them perish.151 In nearby Marsal the unpaid and underfed French troops caused increasing problems: in July 1709 a French regiment ransacked the town’s market, and the following winter the garrison pillaged the surrounding Lorrain villages, prompting a demand from the envoy of the duke of Lorraine for indemnities as well as exemplary justice.152 The French authorities took measures to minimise the risk of conflict between the military and civilians, enforcing curfews in the towns of occupied territories to prevent confrontations or seditious behaviour.153 Pre-emptive action could also entail exemplary justice to discourage people from helping France’s enemies: in 1690, the prévôt of Saint-Dié sentenced a gang of robbers to be broken on the wheel and hanged; he confiscated the property of the head of the gang to set an example which would intimidate the people. The comte de Bissy (the French military commander in Lorraine) approved, noting that ‘such an example at the start of a war will give much tranquillity in all of the mountains of Lorraine’.154 To further minimise the likelihood of sedition, identity controls were established at the gates of important towns, and the French authorities listed the name and status of every foreigner staying in the town. During the occupation of Nancy from 1702, however, the French had no jurisdiction over the town and could not control who came and went. In 1709 the garrison commander noted that there were new people in Nancy all the time, especially Germans, and ‘all sorts of suspect people’ were being received by the townspeople; this, he feared, could easily lead to a surprise attack on the garrison.155 The French routinely disarmed the inhabitants of towns when a territory was occupied,156 extending this to the entire territory if there was a particularly high security risk: in April 1671, Créqui banned Lorrains, except for the nobility, from carrying arms as a result of the ‘many violences and murders committed in Lorraine and the Barrois by various individuals’.157 Likewise, in Savoy in 1695, following serious indiscipline among underfed and underpaid troops quartered there, the French disarmed the peasantry across the duchy, using local provosts

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 103

12/03/2013 16:10

104

administration on the frontiers

to confiscate any firearms.158 Security measures in the occupied territories very much depended on the extent to which the territory was itself a theatre of operations. Though most of Savoy surrendered without a fight in 1690, the resistance of the fortress of Montmélian until November 1691 meant that a heavy French military presence was necessary to maintain a siege, and the fort’s continued resistance sustained anti-French sentiment: while it still held out, the French commander wrote that the inhabitants ‘always have Montmélian in the corner of their eyes, which leaves them the memory and the hope of their liberty’.159 This problem was all the more serious in the second occupation of Savoy: following the siege of Turin, the duchy became a regular theatre of war, and the French attempted to disarm Savoy and Nice completely in the summer of 1707, in light of the Sabaudian-Imperial offensive that was underway.160 In occupied territories, especially in wartime, there was a delicate balance to be maintained between security concerns and the need to respect the livelihoods of the inhabitants, whose taxes went to pay for the French army. In some cases, this balance was disturbed by over-zealous military officers. At the beginning of the NineYears War, the French authorities in Lorraine banned everybody from carrying arms without exception from September 1689.161 The indignant fermiers généraux appealed to contrôleur général Pontchartrain, pleading their need to bear arms to protect themselves and assure the receipt of taxes. But the military commander in Lorraine, the comte de Bissy, warned Louvois that this would open the door to the same claims from farmers of tobacco and forestry officers, and that soon ‘all the countryside will be full of armed men’. He added that these farms had been too free in giving out commissions to everybody who wanted to hunt, and this was detrimental to the security of the province.162 By 1694, the fermiers généraux complained that their brigades were unable to resist the huge number of fraudsters who carried out armed contraband.163 But as the war ministry had final say over the administration of Lorraine, the priorities of the military were deemed to be higher than those of the tax farmers, and Pontchartrain could do little to help them. This indicates some confusion in crown aims in Lorraine, with two mutually contradictory pressures at work: one casting it as a sanitised military frontier zone, while another treated it as a new province that had to contribute to its own incorporation into Louis XIV’s administrative system.164 It was, with hindsight, counter-productive of the war ministry to place immediate and perhaps exaggerated security needs higher than the collection of revenues destined to support the French occupying troops. Maintaining security could also be complicated by the need to keep the frontier open for trade, so the territory could continue to pay taxes to fund the French war effort. Patterns of economic activity in frontier zones meant that the French could not close borders or trade routes without ruining the economy of a whole area. In Savoy, for instance, livelihoods depended on trade

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 104

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

105

with Piedmont, so the French allowed trade to continue, though they banned arms and war materiel, and passports were needed from the French authorities. Monitoring of the passage of individuals was fairly lax before the siege of Turin, but the French reinforced controls from 1707.165 Controls were placed on commerce between Piedmont and the county of Nice during both occupations, though these were relaxed in times of economic crisis.166 There was widespread smuggling, especially in Savoy, though this problem was endemic across all France’s frontiers.167 Irrespective of whether an occupied territory was a major zone of operations, a perennial security problem was raiding by bands of enemy troops or ‘partisans’ in the pay of enemy governments. French solutions to these problems varied according to each territory, reflecting the ad hoc nature of occupation strategy generally. Lorraine was, throughout the Dutch War, plagued by raiding parties sent by the duke and his allies. The French tried to assure communication by raising free companies to defend the frontiers, using Lorrain soldiers with captains chosen by king, from early 1673. But by the summer of 1674 the situation had deteriorated to the point where Charuel remarked that the raiding parties came and went with such facility that communications would soon be cut altogether unless troops were sent against them immediately.168 Bar-le-Duc found itself forced to repair its walls from the spring of 1674 to protect itself from raiding parties from Luxembourg.169 The new governor, the marquis de Rochefort, and the maréchal de camp the comte de Bissy were obliged to post free companies of cavalry and fusiliers at vital points throughout the duchy in order to protect the communication with the army. In spite of their efforts, the French post was intercepted on several occasions by ducal raiding parties in Lorraine.170 During the NineYears War, Lorraine was again the victim of enemy raiding parties, though this was less significant now that the border had been strengthened.171 More serious problems emerged in the War of the Spanish Succession, when France’s security needs were complicated by the neutrality agreement with the duke. Throughout the war, the French were plagued by imperial raiding parties, who used Lorraine for supplies and shelter while launching raids into the Franche-Comté, Champagne and the Trois Evêchés. Making matters worse was the attitude of the Lorrains, many of whom joined the raiding parties or at least guided them and gave them shelter. Hostility to the French ran deep in Lorraine, and there were many reports of peasants giving help to imperial raiders during the Dutch War and the Nine Years War.172 During the War of the Spanish Succession, Lorrain peasants gave full expression to their francophobia, and there was little the French could do about it without contravening the neutrality agreement. Not only did they serve as guides to enemy parties, they also bought the booty of the Imperial hussars at rock-bottom prices: the intendant of the Trois Evêchés wrote in 1702 that the country was in such a free-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 105

12/03/2013 16:10

106

administration on the frontiers

for-all that no sooner had the hussars taken the booty than they had unloaded it and received payment.173 Marshal Tallard reported that many Lorrains were posing as Imperials and had bought the uniforms of hussars in order to attack French people with impunity.174 At the very least, these parties were finding the people of Lorraine very hospitable: ‘they pay regularly for everything they take; our parties do not find the same facilities’.175 Indeed, by contrast, the Lorrains were reported to be very unwilling to provide goods for the French army. The second occupation of Lorraine was peculiar in that the French were unable, bar exceptional circumstances, to pursue the raiders and those who assisted them. In more typical cases of occupation, they would have several means at their disposal. In response to insurgency during the occupation of the Franche-Comté for example, the governor deployed regular infantry and dragoons in addition to paramilitary maréchaussée companies from neighbouring provinces.176 Yet, faced with similar problems in Lorraine, the French were limited in their choice of response. Initially, they banned the inhabitants of the Évêchés from carrying money, and forbade the payment of ransoms for individuals who had been kidnapped, so as not to perpetuate the problem: in October 1705 the French authorities refused to pay the 100 écus demanded for the return of eight peasants kidnapped from a village on the Lorraine–Comtois border, as it would set a dangerous precedent and the hostages were ‘only mediocre inhabitants of the place’.177 They also encouraged partisans and heads of raiding parties to enter French service: in the summer of 1707, for example, the king gave his approval for the leader of a raiding party named Gregoire to be made a captain under the orders of the sieur de Hollange.178 The French were also forced to deal with heavy raiding during the second occupation of Savoy. As soon as La Feuillade and his army left the duchy in 1704 to take the fortress of Susa in the Alps, the governor of Montmélian profited from the absence of French troops in the duchy to send out raiding parties; one of these got to the gates of Chambéry in April 1704 before being beaten back.179 During the following winter the situation deteriorated rapidly: in February 1705 a raiding party of 150 men from Montmélian took more than 33,000 livres from raids on the tax receivers of Faucigny and the Chablais. The French resident diplomat in Geneva, La Closure, expressed his disbelief that the receipts of the province were left in open places with minimal protection, and blamed the deteriorating security situation on the inexperience of the maréchal de camp who commanded in Savoy, the marquis de Vallière.180 La Closure judged that, given the success of these first raids, they would only become more numerous, leading to a protracted guerrilla war similar to that in the Cévennes.181 The resident’s ­predictions proved sadly accurate, as the security situation in Savoy grew increasingly unstable during 1705. Vallière wrote that the militia regiment which the king had ordered raised in Savoy the previous year was causing

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 106

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

107

massive disorders, as deserters from it, together with the raiding parties from Montmélian, were now devastating the country. To improve security, he ordered the treasurers to choose one place in each province to bring receipts where troops would be stationed to guard them.182 He also advised stepping up the siege of Montmélian to seal it off; up until then the blockade had been lax, which allowed the raiding parties to become stronger and bolder. But rivalry between the chevalier de La Fare, who commanded the siege, and Vallière, who commanded in Savoy, meant that the siege took much longer than anticipated.183 After the fall of Montmélian, Chamillart expected the security situation in Savoy to improve considerably.184 But the bandits continued harrying French officials through the spring of 1706 and he received troubling reports that the duke’s emissaries in Switzerland were now financing the raiding parties. As La Closure wrote despairingly to the foreign minister, Torcy, ‘My Lord, this little war has already begun’.185 Preventing these raids would require a large military presence, something the French could not afford. Vallière was instructed to ensure the tax collectors sent their receipts regularly to Grenoble and provide them with escorts.186 Yet bandits continued to rob and assassinate French officials.187 The French then turned to a new strategy to deal with raiding parties. Deserters and looters were brought together in a free company of commandos in French pay, which Angervilliers assured would ‘do more than six companies together’.188 This use of local thugs is unparalleled in other French occupations of the period, and indicates just how difficult this occupation was. From June 1706, the shores of Lake Geneva were occupied and Vallière sent out regular patrols of the area. The use of free companies proved very effective: raiding party activity was reduced and La Closure reflected, ‘if we had done this at the beginning of the occupation, we would never have had so much trouble’.189 In September 1706 Vallière captured an entire raiding party of peasants from around the Chablais, executing the ringleaders, and promised the war minister that the situation would soon be under control.190 Under pressure from Chamillart, he also began to employ harsher measures towards the population at large: communities were held financially responsible for robberies carried out by brigands and raiders who resided there, the families of those accused of recruiting for the duke were expelled from Savoy, and individuals who were caught were beaten in front of their houses, then left hanging on the highways to serve as a discouragement to others.191 Many of the problems in Savoy can in part be attributed to a confusion in French aims: some commanders includingTessé, La Feuillade andVallière believed in treating the occupied population with sensitivity and moderation to win over hearts and minds, while others such as La Closure and Le Guerchois recognised that a dedicated and zealous commander needed to prioritise security concerns over pleasing the population. Tessé even advised against raising a militia in Savoy,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 107

12/03/2013 16:10

108

administration on the frontiers

as this would be unpopular, ‘always involving a sort of forced and involuntary compulsion’.192 But Chamillart came to support the need for harsher measures, particularly given that after 1706 the duke sent ‘skilful and diligent men’ into Savoy to incite an uprising against the French; in these circumstances, moderation could only play into the hands of France’s enemies.193 Conclusions Improvements in military discipline meant that the occupations of Louis XIV’s personal rule were significantly less harsh on the population than occupations earlier in the seventeenth century under Cardinal Richelieu. French officials were certainly encouraged to exercise a degree of vigilance, anticipation and sensitivity in the ‘police’ of these territories. Yet, as with the financial burdens, the moderation of the occupiers could give way, though reluctantly, to harsher security burdens, should circumstances appear to require it. Overall, the evidence from Lorraine and Savoy suggests that French policy was to mollify the elites as far as possible, to encourage collaboration. But they also wanted to take as much as they could from the territories. It was therefore the commoners who bore the brunt of the occupations, though the government appears to have had a good sense of how far people could be pushed without completely ruining a territory’s fiscal potential or provoking a popular rising. Indeed, the French only abandoned their relative fiscal restraint in the occupied territories when, in the 1690s and 1700s, and especially from 1707 onwards, they really had to. The crown did not want to risk alienating the elites by disrupting traditional socio-fiscal arrangements. Only in 1695 with the introduction of the capitation, and again during the crisis of 1709–10, did the monarchy turn up the fiscal heat on the privileged groups in these societies, as it did in France itself. The continued use of the taille, which tapped the unprivileged rather than the elites, together with the generous continuation of compensation systems that mostly benefited those with property and wealth, seems to prove this tendency to be moderate with the elites but far harsher with the rest of the populace, who despite relative improvements, were still faced with financial and material exactions that were generally heavier than those on most French provinces, indeed far heavier than in the pays d’états. Along with problems of ensuring security, this rarely created a good atmosphere for winning the hearts and minds of occupied populations.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 108

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

109

Notes

1 For an example of a particularly destructive and extractive occupation see Philippe Martin’s Une guerre de trente ans en Lorraine. On the later period see H. Carl, ‘Restricted Violence? Military Occupation during the Eighteenth Century’ in E. Charters, E. Rosenhaft and H. Smith (eds), Civilians and war in Europe, 1618–1815 (Liverpool, 2012). 2 Louvois’ approach during the 1680s (particularly in the Palatinate) is seen as something of a temporary aberration in this respect. Cénat, Le Roi stratège, pp. 152–3. 3 J. A. Lynn, ‘How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siècle’, Journal of Modern History, 65 (1993), p. 288. 4 Ibid., pp. 297–8, 307; Rowlands, Dynastic state, p. 366. For an account of how contributions were organised, see G. Satterfield, Princes, posts and partisans: the army of Louis XIV and partisan warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678) (Leiden, 2003), pp. 45–56. 5 Lynn, ‘How War Fed War’, pp. 299, 305. 6 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, pp. 208, 215. 7 Ibid., p. 218; Grosperrin, L’Influence française, p. 34; A. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’ in M. Greengrass, Conquest and coalescence: the shaping of the state in early modern Europe (London, 1991), p. 91. 8 Lemaître, ‘L’Intendance’, p. 208; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 506–12. 9 Lynn, ‘How War Fed War’, p. 294. 10 SHDT A1 250, fos. 146–7, Créqui to Louvois, 19 Oct. 1670; Lanouvelle, Créquy, p. 150. 11 BNF Mél. Col. 156, fo. 144, Créqui to Louvois, 18 Feb. 1671. From 1670 the sale of salt in Lorraine was organised by a ferme; it became an major source of revenue, with production of 10,000 tonnes by 1697. M. Romac, ‘Le commerce illicite du sel en Lorraine au XVIIIe siècle’, Pays Lorraine, 71 (1990), pp. 16–17. 12 Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iii, p. 279. 13 SHDT A1 253, fo. 164, Créqui to Louvois, 26 Feb. 1671. 14 SHDT A1 253, fo. 153, Charuel to Louvois, 22 Feb. 1671. 15 SHDT A1 250, fo. 208, Créqui to Le Tellier, 5 Nov. 1670; A1 253, fos. 38–40, Créqui to Louvois, Jan. 1671. 16 Dee, Expansion and crisis, pp. 32–3. 17 After investigating the receipts of the tax collectors of the duchies, it was found that the tax revenues for Lorraine and the Barrois were 781,493 livres tournois, SHDT A1 250, fo. 311, Charuel to Louvois, 26 Nov. 1670. Combined with the monthly levy of 66,000 livres for troop subsistence, this roughly equates to 4.36 livres per capita, which is significantly higher than the burden on both the pays d’états and the pays d’élections during the same period (see n.27, below). M. Potter, Corps and clienteles: public finance and political change in France, 1688–1715 (Aldershot, 2003), p. 108. Lorraine population figures from Dupâquier, Histoire de la population, ii, p. 76. 18 AMN Ord., ordonnance of 12 Dec. 1670. This was increased to 66,000 livres monthly from 1 May 1671. SHDT A1 253, fo. 118, Charuel to Louvois, 11 Feb. 1671. 19 SHDT A1 253, fo. 255, Charuel to Louvois, 5 Jul. 1671. 20 SHDT A1 253, fos. 352 and 357, Créqui to Louvois, 30 Sep. and 3 Oct. 1671. 21 SHDT A1 250, fo. 29, Saint-Pouange to Louvois, 11 Sep. 1670; fo. 168, Charuel to Louvois, 25 Oct. 1670. 22 SHDT A1 253, fo. 177, Charuel to Louvois, 4 Mar. 1671. 23 SHDT A1 253, fo. 394, Charuel to Louvois, 25 Oct. 1671; G. Zeller, ‘Les Charges de la Lorraine pendant la guerre de Hollande’, Mémoires de la Société d’Archéologie Lorraine, 61 (1911), p. 46. 24 During the Dutch war, between 10,000 and 15,000 troops were quartered in Lorraine. Ibid., p. 16. 25 SHDT A1 351 no. 417, Charuel to Louvois, 24 Dec. 1673. 26 The sum of 150,000 livres for the fortification of the ville neuve of Nancy was imposed on Lorraine in 1677, of which the bourgeois of Nancy had to pay 70,000 livres; Zeller, ‘Les Charges’, pp. 59–60. Alsace and the Franche-Comté also had to bear the cost of their own fortification during this period: Dee, Expansion and crisis, p. 80; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 486–7.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 109

12/03/2013 16:10

110

administration on the frontiers

27 The Franche-Comté paid a direct tax imposition of 1,322,000 livres (3.9 per capita) in 1677, similar to Lorraine’s average of 1,575,000 livres (4.3 per capita) in the 1670s. Burgundy, a pays d’états, paid only 1.37 per capita; the généralité of Rouen, a pays d’élections, paid 2.95. Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, p. 190; Dupâquier, Histoire de la population, ii, p. 76; Potter, Corps and clienteles, pp. 59, 108. 28 The contributions imposed on Spanish Flanders during the 1670s may have reached as much as 5,375,000 livres annually. Satterfield, Princes, posts and partisans, pp. 79–81. 29 See p. 90. 30 SHDT A1 351 no. 232, Charuel to Louvois, 5 Nov. 1673. 31 SHDT A1 417 no. 134, Charuel to Louvois, 18 Apr. 1674. 32 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 10, fo. 243, 3 Jul. 1675. Durant was the former procureur général of the Cour souveraine of Saint-Mihiel. 33 Lynn, The wars, p. 151. In the winter of 1678–9, fourteen companies of the Navarre regiment were quartered in Nancy. SHDT A1 614 no. 81, Charuel to Louvois, 8 Nov. 1678. 34 SHDT A1 564 no. 106, Bazin to Louvois, 7 Aug. 1677. 35 SHDT A1 615 no. 3, Charuel to Louvois, 9 Jan. 1678. 36 SHDT A1 606 no. 103, Créqui to Louvois, 8 Mar. 1678; A1 615 no. 163, ‘Traité de contribution’, 1 Jun. 1678. 37 Charuel noted that it was Colbert who was pushing for an accommodation: SHDT A1 606 nos. 38 and 64, Charuel to Louvois, 27 Jan. and 13 Feb. 1678. 38 AN G7 1 [unnumbered], Colbert to Charuel, 18 Dec. 1681. 39 This amounted to 262,409 florins (roughly 330,000 livres tournois). AN G7 374 no. 170, Charuel to Colbert, 25 Nov. 1681. 40 AN G7 374 nos. 240, 280 and 288, Charuel to Colbert, 13 Sep. 1682, 25 Jan. and 20 Mar. 1683. 41 AN G7 374 no. 165, ‘Estat sommaire des revenus et dettes de la ville de Nancy’ (1679); no. 119 Charuel to Colbert, 18 May 1681. Municipal debt was a problem in the towns of all the conquered provinces; those of Flanders also required suspension of their debts after 1679. Coornaert, La Flandre francaise, p. 178. 42 SHDT A1 1157 no. 176, Vaubourg to Barbezieux, 4 Oct. 1692. On the militias, see M. Sautai, Les Milices provinciales sous Louvois et Barbezieux (1688–1697) (Paris, 1909). 43 SHDT A1 971 no. 271, Charuel to Louvois, 25 Apr. 1690. 44 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 52; M.-J. Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant en pays de frontière: L’exemple de Jean-Baptiste Desmarets de Vaubourg, intendant de Lorraine et de Barrois (1691–1697)’, Annales de L’Est, 53/2 (2003), p. 339. 45 In 1695 the imposition of 35,000 sacks of wheat was paid for at 9 livres per sack, whereas in 1693 the munitioner had paid 15 livres per sack for 42,000 sacks. The difference of 180,000 livres was massive in an area that relied on selling wheat to the military for its livelihood. Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 398, no. 1451, Vaubourg to Pontchartrain, 6 Aug. 1695. 46 The capitation was based on the perceived social hierarchical structure of France, and had twenty-two tax ‘classes’. It was abolished in France in 1699 and then reintroduced in 1702. 47 J. Lynn, ‘How War Fed War’, p. 307. The intendant’s report for the duc de Bourgogne in 1697 also claimed that the passage of troops was beneficial for communities – and indeed it could be if it was orderly and done in stable circumstances: Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 269. 48 SHDT A1 1071 no. 13, governor and magistrates of Epinal to Charuel, 19 Dec. 1690. 49 AN G7 415 no. 266, syndics of Lunéville to Pontchartrain, 8 Apr. 1695. 50 AN G7 415 no. 270, Vaubourg to Pontchartain, 28 Apr. 1695. 51 Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 393 no. 1438, Sève to Pontchartrain, 16 and 21 June 1695. 52 SHDT A1 1284 no. 99, Sève to Barbezieux, 14 Feb. 1694. 53 Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant’, pp. 344–5. 54 From 1691 Vaubourg began lifting the suspension on debt repayments which had been in effect since September 1684. BMN 152(345) no. 105, Ordonnnance of 4 Nov. 1686; LapercheFournel, ‘Etre intendant’, p. 343.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 110

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

111

55 Early in the peace negotiations, the dowager duchess of Lorraine demanded indemnities for all that France had taken from Lorraine since 1670: she (somewhat arbitrarily) estimated this at 10,000,000 livres. ADMM 3F 106 no. 32, ‘Projet de paix envoyé a M le Comte de Strattman par la Reyne’, 2 Sep. 1693. 56 Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, pp. 197–200. On the tax burdens in Rouen and Burgundy in the 1690s, see Potter, Corps and clienteles, pp. 105–8. 57 In 1703 the duchies provided 43,000 sacks of wheat and oats to supply the French army of the Rhine. Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 124. 58 SHDT A1 1671 nos. 4 and 15, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 2 and 15 Jan. 1703. 59 SHDT A1 1754 no. 244, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 28 May 1704. 60 SHDT A1 1671 no. 172, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 22 Apr. 1703; no. 187, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 30 Apr. 1703. 61 SHDT A1 1672 no. 576, Chamillart to Varennes, 6 Feb. 1703; A1 1671 no. 333. Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 27 Jul. 1703; A1 1672 no. 347, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 2 Aug. 1703. 62 ADMM 3F 8 no. 32, Leopold I to Louis XIV, 29 Oct. 1704; SHDT A1 1954 no. 305, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 29 Mar. 1706; ADMM 3F 8 no. 38, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 12 Oct. 1706. 63 SHDT A1 1851 no. 235, ‘Ordre de S.A.R.’, 25 Feb. 1705; A1 2236 no. 169, Geoffroy to Voysin, 25 Jan. 1710; no. 217, Voysin to Geoffroy, 2 Feb. 1710. 64 SHDT A1 2244 no. 195, Arques to Voysin, 2 Oct. 1710. 65 SHDT A1 2241 no. 104, ‘mémoire de l’envoyé de Lorraine’ [undated]. 66 Boislisle, Correspondance, ii, p. 180, no. 605, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 30 Apr. 1704; p. 214, no. 704, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 30 Nov. 1704; iii, p. 80, no. 251, ‘Les maître-echevin et gens des trois orders de la ville de Metz’ to Desmarets, 22 Dec. 1708. 67 ADMM 3F 37, fo. 52, Leopold I to Barrois, 11 Apr. 1705; 3F 39, fo. 18, Leopold I to Barrois, 30 Jan. 1710. 68 Illicit profiteering from the overvaluation of imperial coinage extended across all of eastern France and the frontier provinces. Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 500, 855–6. On similar problems during the occupation of Luxembourg see Petit, ‘La politique française’, pp. 56–8. 69 Ibid., p. 19. 70 SHDT A1 1009 nos. 104, 107 and 111, Larray to Louvois, 7, 9 and 10 Jun. 1690. 71 SHDT A1 1009 nos. 180 and 181, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 18 and 22 Jul. 1690; A1 1010 no. 28, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 13 Aug. 1690. 72 SHDT A1 1010 nos. 34 and 52, Bonval to Louvois, 17 and 23 Aug. 1690; nos. 40 and 61, SaintRuth to Louvois, 18 and 30 Aug. 1690.The total receipt for the taille in Savoy, it was found, was 545,963 livres tournois, 8,500 of which were found in the chest of the receiver in Chambéry. A1 1010 no. 31, Bonval to Louvois, 15 Aug. 1690. 73 Quoted in Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 40. 74 Ibid., p. 43. 75 SHDT A1 1011, fos. 467–9, Bouchu to Louvois, 7 Dec. 1690. 76 Under Victor Amadeus, the duchy used écus of Bern and Geneva, or ducats of Milan and Venice. After the French conquest this caused problems with the receivers of the army, as none of these coins were used in France. SHDT A1 1010 no. 54, Bonval to Louvois, 24 Aug. 1690. 77 SHDT A1 1093 no. 14, Bonval to Louvois, 3 May 1691. This suggests that the commissaires des guerres were acting like international bankers. 78 SHDT A1 1239 no. 91, Bonval to Barbezieux, 21 Aug. 1691. 79 SHDT A1 1331 no. 153, Bachivilliers to Barbezieux, 15 Jan. 1695. The commissaire found only copper. 80 SHDT A1 1331 no. 27, Bouchu to Barbezieux, 16 Apr. 1695; no. 184, Bonval to Barbezieux, 30 Mar. 1695. 81 SHDT A1 1331 no. 172, Bonval to Barbezieux, 2 Jan. 1695. 82 SHDT A1 1331 no. 191, Bonval to Barbezieux, 19 May 1695. 83 SHDT A1 1331 nos. 211 and 220, Bonval to Barbezieux, 16 and 22 Oct. 1695; A1 1331 no. 218, Mémoire, 1695.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 111

12/03/2013 16:10

112

administration on the frontiers

84 By 1709, the effective product of tax collection in Savoy (after expenses) reached 1,300,687 livres. SHDT A1 1690 no. 88, Chamillart to Bouchu, 20 Nov. 1703; A1 1879 nos. 184 and 254, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 14 Aug. and 26 Oct. 1705; A1 1972 no. 326, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 2 Nov. 1706; A1 2102 no. 313, Angervilliers to Voysin, 2 Nov. 1708; A1 2174 no. 81, Angervilliers to Voysin, 14 Oct. 1709; AN G7 249 no. 342, Angervilliers to Rebours, 13 Jun. 1712; Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 557. 85 Ibid., ii, pp. 556–7. 86 SHDT A1 1879 no. 198, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 30 Aug. 1705. 87 One (probably high) estimate puts the total imposition on the Franche-Comté for 1705 at 2,585,373 livres (7.60 per capita), while Savoy’s works out at 6.90. For the généralité of Rouen the per capita figure for 1705 is 4.29, and for Burgundy, 1.93. Broussault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, p. 213; Dupâquier, Histoire de la population, ii, p. 76; Potter, Corps and clienteles, p. 108. 88 By contrast, the same memorandum describes the Piedmontese as being ‘as savage and wicked as the Germans’: SHDT A1 1693 no. 166, ‘Mémoire sur le Palatinat, le Piedmont et la Savoye’, 20 Oct. 1703. 89 Prior to the conquest, the sieur de Lasary had been paid 320 livres annually from the finances of Savoy. This was a debt of the House of Savoy, ‘to which the King is not beholden’, but Angervilliers felt that since it had been paid for over a century, and it was Lasary’s only income, it should be continued. SHDT A1 1972 no. 22, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 7 May 1706. 90 SHDT A1 2045 no. 273, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 10 Dec. 1707. 91 SHDT A1 2174 no. 182, Angervilliers toVoysin, 13 Dec. 1709; J. Devos,‘Aspects de l’occupation’, p. 41. 92 SHDT A1 1879 no. 38, Bouchu to Chamillart, 20 Feb. 1705. 93 See below, p. 162. 94 SHDT A1 1879 no. 195, trésorier de l’Extraordinaire des Guerres of Chambéry to Angervillers, 19 Aug. 1705; no. 200, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 4 Sep. 1705. It appears that Chamillart mis-read his copy of the treasurer’s letter, and subsequently quoted the figure as 584,263 livres. 95 SHDT A1 1879 nos. 198 and 240, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 30 Aug. and 11 Oct. 1705. Problems with the collection of the taille had also been evident under the duke in the period between the French occupations: AST P Sav. 4, no. 3, ‘Mémoires de l’Avocat Perret et avis du Président de Bellegarde sur le mémoire de l’Avocat Perret’ [undated]. 96 SHDT A1 1971 no. 20, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 10 Jan. 1706. On the Chambre de justice, see p. 162. 97 SHDT A1 2325 no. 194, Berwick to Voysin, 17 Aug. 1711. 98 SHDT A1 1968 no. 159. Vallière to Chamillart, 9 Apr. 1706; no. 429, Vallière to Chamillart, 24 Sep. 1706; A1 1972 no. 236, commissaire Colonges to Chamillart, 24 Sep. 1706. 99 SHDT A1 2102 no. 217, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 30 Jul. 1708; A1 2100 no. 285, Chamillart to Villars, 5 Aug. 1708. By the terms of the French tax farming contract, the farmer was to pay any outstanding sums to Grenoble within four months of a peace treaty. 100 SHDT A1 2102 no. 313, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 2 Nov. 1708; no. 343, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 11 Dec. 1708. 101 SHDT A1 2327 no. 115, Voysin to Angervilliers, 28 Oct. 1711. This is an unusual example of the classic sociological notion of the extortion–coercion loop; Roy McCullough has shown this was normally far subtler, in his Coercion, conversion and counterinsurgency in Louis XIV’s France (Leiden, 2007), pp. 34–42. 102 SHDT A1 2102 no. 349, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 21 Dec. 1708; A1 2173 no. 1, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 1 Jan. 1709. 103 SHDT A1 2170 no. 148, Médavy to Chamillart, 9 Mar. 1709; no. 192, Desmarets to Chamillart, 24 Mar. 1709. 104 Boislisle, Correspondance, iii, p. 154 no. 416, avocat général of the Sénat and procureur général of the Chambre des comptes to Demarets, 13 May 1709. 105 Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 567. Grain in Savoy was measured in coupes d’Annecy of 88.86 litres each. 106 SHDT A1 2171 no. 246, Médavy to Voysin, 31 Jul. 1709; Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 556.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 112

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

113

107 SHDT A1 2174 no. 63, Angervilliers to Voysin, 3 Oct. 1709; no. 65, Angervilliers to Voysin, 6 Oct. 1709. 108 SHDT A1 2174 no. 46, Angervilliers to Desmarets, 19 Sep. 1709. 109 SHDT A1 2175 no. 291, Vallière to Voysin, 29 Nov. 1709. 110 SHDT A1 2174 no. 17, Angervilliers to Voysin, 18 Aug. 1709; Devos, ‘Aspects de l’occupation’, p. 43. 111 Ibid., p. 47: by 1710–11 the deficit in the collection of the taille and capitation had risen to 158,859 livres. 112 SHDT A1 2251 no. 73, de Ville to Voysin, 17 Feb. 1710. In France the situation was not much different: J. Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements: the assertion of royal authority (Manchester, 2002), pp. 111–13. 113 SHDT A1 2250 no. 68, syndics of Chambéry to Voysin, 1710. 114 SHDT A1 2251 no. 318, Ponnat to Voysin, 1 Aug. 1710. 115 SHDT A1 2250 no. 154, Angervilliers to Voysin, 19 Oct. 1710; no. 157bis, Voysin to Angervilliers, 25 Oct. 1710. 116 The dixième was a personal tax on various forms of income, evaluated by self-assessment. It met with much opposition from taxpayers in France, limiting its effectiveness. See R. Bonney, ‘“Le secret de leurs familles”: The Fiscal and Social Limits of Louis XIV’s Dixième’, French History, 7 (1993), pp. 383–416. 117 Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, p. 148. 118 SHDT A1 2250 no. 37, Voysin to Angervilliers, 14 Mar. 1710. 119 SHDT A1 2327 no. 14, Angervilliers to Voysin, 20 Jan. 1711; no. 19. Voysin to Angervilliers, 29 Jan. 1711. 120 Boislisle, Correspondance, iii, p. 387, no. 1094, Angervilliers to Desmarets, 16 and 22 July 1711; p. 412, no. 1172, Angervilliers to Desmarets, 2 Nov. 1711. 121 SHDT A1 2250 no. 193, Angervilliers to Voysin, 28 Dec. 1710; A1 2327 no. 18, Voysin to Angervilliers, 29 Jan. 1711. 122 SHDT A1 2102 no. 351, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 21 Dec. 1708; A1 2327 no. 2, Voysin to Angervilliers, 5 Jan. 1711. 123 Potter, Corps and Clienteles, pp. 60, 104. 124 See e.g., Dee, Expansion and Crisis, p. 32. 125 SHDT A1 252, fo. 68, Louvois to Créqui, 3 Oct. 1670; fo. 78, Louvois to Saint-Pouange, 4 Oct. 1670; A1 253, fo. 26, Charuel to Louvois, 31 Dec. 1670. 126 The bishop of Geneva/Annecy’s cousin wrote to him in August 1690, ‘This town is filled with Irish, who make a hundred insolences’. ADS 2B 81 [unnumbered], cousin [unnamed] to Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex, 15 Aug. 1690. 127 SHDT A1 1571 no. 35, Chamillart to Villars, 7 Dec. 1702. 128 Quoted in Zeller, ‘Les Charges’, pp. 26–7. 129 Ibid., p. 18. 130 Ibid. 131 Louvois to Choisy, 7 Jan. 1673, quoted in Zeller, ‘Les Charges’, p. 50. 132 Ford, Strasbourg, p. 162. 133 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 56. In the older French provinces, the period from 1660 onwards saw a much better standard of troop regulation, though problems continued with both the étapes and winter quarters. Beik, Absolutism and society, p. 282. 134 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 54. 135 ADS 2B 81 [unnumbered], Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex to Denis d’Alex, 10 Oct. 1690. 136 AMA RD 47, fo. 222, La Hoguette to the syndics of Annecy, 9 Mar. 1691. 137 AMA RD 47, fos. 224–5, minutes, 11 Apr. 1691. 138 Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex, cited in Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 57. 139 SHDT A1 1761 no. 47, Chamillart to Avejan, 8 Mar. 1704. 140 Lynn, ‘How War Fed War’, p. 293. 141 The commissaire Bonval sent a native Savoyard into the communities to make restitutions. SHDT A1 1272, fos. 23–4, Bonval to Barbezieux, 25 Jan. 1694.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 113

12/03/2013 16:10

114

administration on the frontiers

142 SHDT A1 1672 no. 564, Chamillart to Varennes, 18 Jan. 1703. 143 SHDT A1 1672 no. 661, Chamillart to Varennes, 18 Jun. 1703. 144 On the later eighteenth century, see T. C. W. Blanning, ‘German Jacobins and the French Revolution’, Historical Journal, 23 (1980), p. 999. 145 Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, p. 555. 146 SHDT A1 1275 no. 11, de Thoy to Barbezieux, 23 Sep. 1694. 147 SHDT A1 1331 no. 167, Bachivilliers to Barbezieux, 6 Dec. 1695. 148 Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant’, p. 338. 149 SHDT A1 2167 no. 150, Saint-Contest to Voysin, 18 Jul. 1709; A1 2169 no. 75, Geoffroy to Voysin, 19 Aug. 1709. 150 SHDT A1 2169 no. 136, Geoffroy to Voysin, 9 Nov. 1709. 151 SHDT A1 2164 no. 74, Voysin to Harcourt, 20 Aug. 1709. 152 SHDT A1 2241 nos. 14 and 56, Saint-Contest to Voysin, 7 Jan. and 4 Mar. 1710. 153 This was the case for Nice, and in Nancy prior to 1698. Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 83; BMN 152(345) no. 14, Ordonnance of 17 Oct. 1676; no. 57, Ordonnance of 5 Nov. 1680. 154 SHDT A1 990 no. 69, Bissy to Louvois, 4 Jul. 1690. 155 SHDT A1 2169 no. 79, Labatut to Voysin, 27 Aug. 1709. 156 SHDT A1 1010 no. 50, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 22 Aug. 1690. 157 AMN Ord., Ordonnance of 10 Apr. 1671. The ordonnance specifically held the officers of each community responsible for the security of their area of jurisdiction. 158 SHDT A1 1331 no. 190, Bonval to Barbezieux, 7 May 1695. 159 La Hoguette to Louvois, Aug. 1691, quoted in Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 58. 160 In Savoy, a fine of 25 écus was imposed on all those who did not give up their arms to local officers. SHDT A1 2039 no. 130, Médavy to Chamillart, 6 Jun. 1707; Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 84. 161 SHDT A1 990 no. 77, Bissy to Louvois, 18 Jul. 1690. Créqui and Bissy had previously issued ordonnances banning peasants alone from carrying arms or hunting: BMN 152(345) no. 71, Ordonnance of 12 Nov. 1681. 162 SHDT A1 990 no. 109, Bissy to Louvois, 13 Aug. 1690. 163 AN G7 415 no. 253, Vaubourg to Pontchartain, 9 Mar. 1694. 164 The same complaints from farm employees were received in other disarmed frontier or remote provinces: see for example Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 20 no. 73, Bois de Baillet (intendant of Montauban) to Le Peletier, 7 Jun. 1684. 165 SHDT A1 2038 no. 47, Chamillart to Masselin, 25 Jan. 1707. 166 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 162–4. 167 McCullough, Coercion, conversion, pp. 44–9. 168 SHDT A1 344 no. 128, Louvois to Rochefort, 3 Feb. 1673; A1 413 no. 291, Charuel to Louvois, 19 Aug. 1674. 169 Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 218. 170 SHDT A1 460 no. 145, Bissy to Louvois, 18 Aug. 1675; A1 461 no. 64, Charuel to Louvois, 17 Oct. 1675. 171 SHDT A1 1071 no. 91, Louvois to Charuel, 11 Jul. 1691. 172 SHDT A1 358 no. 75, Charuel to Louvois, 28 Jan. 1671; A1 460 no. 146, Charuel to Louvois, 18 Aug. 1675. In the 1690s they were known as schenepans, and made ferocious guerrilla attacks on French troops. Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, pp. 192–3. 173 SHDT A1 1583 no. 232, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 23 Sep. 1702. 174 SHDT A1 1664 nos. 9 and 35, Tallard to Chamillart, 16 and 29 May 1703; Boislisle, Correspondance, iii, p. 447 no. 1297, Lescalopier (intendant of Champagne) to Desmarets, 14/19 June 1712. 175 SHDT A1 1583 no. 167, Saint-Contest to Chamillart, 22 Jul. 1702. 176 Dee, Expansion and crisis, p. 64. 177 SHDT A1 1850 no. 222, Bernay to Chamillart, 25 Oct. 1705. 178 SHDT A1 2035 no. 180, Chamillart to Druy, 15 Sep. 1707. 179 SHDT A1 1764 no. 165, Tessé to Chamillart, 17 Apr. 1704.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 114

12/03/2013 16:10

the burdens of occupation

115

180 SHDT A1 1873 no. 45, La Closure to Chamillart, 6 Mar. 1705. 181 Ibid.; no. 327, Saint-Fremond to Chamillart, 18 Apr. 1705; no. 347, La Feuillade to Chamillart, 20 Apr. 1705. 182 SHDT A1 1873 no. 117, Vallière to Chamillart, 16 Mar. 1705. 183 After Montmélian fell, Angervilliers decided to end the intense rivalry of La Fare and Vallière (it even split the people of Chambéry) and La Fare was transferred. Devos, ‘Aspects de l’occupation’, pp. 36, 42. 184 SHDT A1 1877 no. 108, Chamillart to La Closure, 16 Dec. 1705. 185 SHDT A1 1968 no. 164, La Closure to Torcy 12 Apr. 1706. 186 SHDT A1 1968 no. 64, Chamillart to Vallière, 9 Feb. 1706. 187 SHDT A1 1968 no. 103, Chamillart to Vallière, 6 May 1706; no. 104bis, Chamillart to Borstat, 6 May 1706; no. 133, Chamillart to La Closure, 21 Mar. 1706; no. 164, La Closure to Torcy 12 Apr. 1706. 188 Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 556. 189 SHDT A1 1968 no. 270, La Closure to Chamillart, 4 Jun. 1706; no. 297, Vallière to Chamillart, 7 Jul. 1706. Vallière formed two free companies (one dragoon, one infantry); after his death in July 1709, they were disbanded. SHDT A1 2248 no. 154. Médavy to Voysin, 12 Jul. 1710. 190 SHDT A1 1968 no. 340, Vallière to Chamillart 6 Aug. 1706; no. 405, Chamillart to Vallière, 31 Aug. 1706; no. 407, Vallière to Chamillart, 3 Sep. 1706. 191 SHDT A1 1968 no. 274, Chamillart to Vallière, 8 June 1706; nos. 168 and 488, Vallière to Chamillart, 16 Apr. and 6 Dec. 1706. 192 SHDT A1 2039 no. 42, Tessé to Chamillart, 15 May 1707. 193 Boislisle, Correspondance, ii, p. 390, no. 1211, La Closure to Chamillart, 21 Mar. 1707.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 115

12/03/2013 16:10

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 116

12/03/2013 16:10

Part III The local elites under French occupation

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 117

12/03/2013 16:10

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 118

12/03/2013 16:10

5 The nobilities

Although they made up only a few per cent of the population, noble elites in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century were crucial in all areas of human activity: social relations, political and religious life, and economic enterprise.1 When the French Government occupied a territory, therefore, circum­ spection and sensitivity in their dealings with the local nobles were usually more expedient than repression. In examining that relationship, this chapter looks at the way it evolved in each occupation and the means by which the French attempted to secure nobles’ allegiance. But French strategies cannot be explained without considering the attitudes of the nobles themselves, the forms of noble collaboration and resistance, and some of the factors which motivated nobles to co-operate, resist or adopt an approach somewhere between those two. In this period many noblemen of Savoy and Lorraine had been, or were still, in uniform.2 For the French occupier, therefore, the principal means of winning them over was to appeal to their service ethic by offering them positions in the French army.Yet they could not force foreign (or domestic) noblemen to serve, and many were permitted to stay at home after swearing an oath of allegiance to the king. This reflects the fact that nobles and rulers still saw their relationship primarily in personal terms, and service was to the ruling dynast rather than the impersonal state.3 It also shows that nobles continued to define themselves by reference to a code of honour. How far this code and the ideals behind it were compromised by occupation is an issue that has never been properly explored. It was often extremely difficult to reconcile the oath demanded by the French king with the oath they had sworn to their original sovereign. To compound the problem, the French often resorted to coercion, in particular property ­confiscation, to dissuade noblemen from leaving to join France’s enemies. Faced with the dilemmas of occupation, not all nobles could live up to the high (and sometimes mutually conflicting) ideals of their order, especially when faced with the very real threat of destitution. As noble allegiance could be so unpredictable, the French often found

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 119

12/03/2013 16:10

120

local elites under french occupation

it hard to strike an appropriate balance. First, much depended on the nobles’ relationship with their original sovereign, and this was conditioned by several long-term factors such as the diminution of the nobility’s political roles in the state, described in Chapter 1. Also crucial were the perceptions of the occupier, as well as personal and dynastic interests of individual nobles. In the past, historians ascribed patterns of resistance and collaboration among the nobility in Lorraine and Savoy to the strength of ‘national’ sentiments in each territory.4 More recent scholarship has highlighted the ‘supra-regional’ interests and loyalties of nobles in these frontier territories. In particular, William Godsey in his study of the Rhenish imperial nobility argued convincingly in favour of the notion of a ‘geo-cultural landscape’, which stretched far beyond immediate jurisdictional boundaries, and which anchored the nobility of the Rhineland into a much wider territorial sphere which stretched deep into what is today France and Belgium.5 Godsey showed that the indistinct nature of frontiers at this time, along with patterns of estate ownership, French military service, and linguistic and cultural affinities all helped perpetuate this continuum.This model is equally applicable to Lorraine, which lacked territorial cohesion and whose nobility was closely linked to both France (especially neighbouring Champagne) and the Holy Roman Empire.6 Likewise, in Savoy, noble attachments extended into Piedmont, the French provinces of the Lyonnais and Dauphiné, and the Swiss cantons.With much to lose whichever side they supported, nobles adopted various strategies to survive French occupation, and current research suggests that the maintenance of nobles’ social positions, particularly in small states and frontier zones, rested to a large extent on adaptation and accommodation.7 French strategies were also conditioned by certain expectations of noble behaviour, which could be incompatible with non-French nobilities. Historians have recently demonstrated that relations between the French crown and the provincial nobility evolved over the course of the seventeenth century. By the time of Louis XIV’s personal rule, French noble culture placed more emphasis on self-discipline, and less on individual pursuit of honour and gloire as in the first half of seventeenth century.8 The French would therefore have expected nobles in occupied territories to conform to a view that emphasised order and utility over strict attention to individuals’ rights.Yet in both Lorraine and Savoy they encountered nobles who had traditions and expectations of much more influence in political affairs than the majority of their French counterparts. Both of these territories therefore offer interesting perspectives on relations between rulers and elites during this period, not least because the French occupations began during periods of rising tension between the nobilities of Lorraine and Savoy and their respective ‘legitimate’ rulers. Moreover, the French also had to contend with nobles whose position and status were in flux within their own societies. This reflects a broader trend,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 120

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

121

whereby poor noblemen were becoming politically marginalised in Europe.9 Among the Savoyard nobility, 22 per cent controlled about two thirds of the landed wealth of the order as a whole, while poorer nobles increasingly relied on fiscal privileges to sustain their social position.10 In Lorraine the situation was even more polarised, as a tiny elite enjoyed incomes of 4,000 to 12,000 livres per year, while the majority existed barely above subsistence level.11 The cohesiveness of the nobilities was also weakened by changes in hierarchies during this period: in Lorraine and Savoy, as elsewhere, impoverished old noble families declined and new anoblis took their place. In Lorraine, the number of families belonging to the ancienne chevalerie dropped significantly in the seventeenth century, while the numbers and influence of the anoblis increased.12 At the same time, social mobility allowed many among the Savoyard bourgeoisie to purchase noble titles, and a new robe nobility increasingly took the place of the older feudal nobility.13 The French often failed to grasp the subtleties in the internal dynamics of the occupied nobilities, and this had significant repercussions in their relations with nobles. It is therefore important to examine the nobilities of Lorraine and Savoy with an eye to their plural nature, beginning with the bulk of the nobility – those families often referred to, inaccurately, as ‘sword’ nobles.14 Nobles of Lorraine: ‘Little inclined to the service of the king’? The behaviour of the French authorities and the Lorrain nobles in the immediate aftermath of the conquest of 1670 reflects political uncertainty over the territory’s future. Duke Charles IV of Lorraine fled his states in September with a small band of retainers, leaving his army of roughly 3,000 cavalry and 1,200 infantry in French-occupied Lorraine.15 Though this small force could mount only a symbolic resistance to the French invasion, many noble officers fought bravely at the defence of Epinal, and when the town fell many were taken as prisoners of war.16 The French soon realised, however, that there was no chance of these noble prisoners being able to raise their own ransoms, as most of them were poor gentilshommes verriers, and the ransoms were lowered from 100 écus to whatever they could pay.17 Over 200 Lorrain officers and cavalrymen who had been loyal to Charles IV were still in prison in Epinal and Metz in December 1670, when the king decided to free them.18 By that point, the French were increasingly optimistic that the Lorrain nobility were ready to desert the duke: Créqui reported that the majority of those who had followed Charles IV were leaving him in droves and were returning to their homes in Lorraine.19 When the prince de Lixin, for instance, decided to leave Charles IV in late November 1670, the French allowed him to return and live peacefully on his estates on the condition that he did nothing to ‘concern himself with the affairs of Monsieur

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 121

12/03/2013 16:10

122

local elites under french occupation

de Lorraine’;20 many others were reported to be disposed to do likewise.21 For the nobles, this was probably more out of necessity than choice: neither the duke nor the nobles had the means to support themselves in Cologne.22 But to facilitate their return, in December Louvois ordered that all Lorrain officers who had returned to their homes without first acquiring passports could stay, provided they gave up their arms and horses.23 Despite this cautious optimism, the French were about to face real difficulties over the military activity of the Lorrain nobility. The older feudal nobility of Lorraine proved particularly difficult for the French to deal with in the months after the conquest. By early 1671 several cavalry officers who had earlier been released from prison had returned to fight alongside Charles IV. This resulted in stricter passport controls at the frontiers on the Saar and with the Franche-Comté and Trier, and Créqui advised that the king should raise troops in Lorraine to make it more difficult for the duke to encourage these nobles to return to him.24 The intendant and the governor both appear to have seriously underestimated the attachment of the feudal aristocracy to their duke. Charuel mistakenly believed that the Lorrain cavalry showed little sign of wanting to go to join Charles; he argued that most were married and had property to lose, and therefore had little inclination to leave, though this soon proved to be wishful thinking on his part.25 By September, Créqui admitted to Louvois that they were a security risk: they could easily cross the border into Luxembourg, and he had received intelligence that most were keen to join the duke as soon as possible. This prompted the French authorities to adopt a fiercer stance: those who remained in Lorraine were confined to their homes; in addition, the prévôté officials where each cavalryman lived were told to keep a watchful eye on their movements, and to find out what they owned as a means of containing them.26 French captains also began raising companies throughout Lorraine, though Lorrain cavalrymen could only be enlisted with the express permission of Créqui on a case-by-case basis.27 During the Dutch War the French renewed their efforts to enlist Lorrain officers to stop them joining the service of the duke. To achieve this they sought out the senior noblemen of the duchy in the hope that this would encourage others to join them.This gives a strong sense of how clientage within the nobility was perceived by the French as important for officer recruitment. In January 1673 the king resolved to raise a cavalry regiment of ten companies to be composed entirely of Lorrains, and provided 9,000 livres for the levy of each company.28 Rochefort proposed to put at the head of this regiment either the marquis d’Haraucourt or the prince de Lillebonne, as both were of high birth, the latter belonging to a cadet branch of the House of Lorraine itself.29 Haraucourt initially agreed to offer his service, and it was felt that this would break the ice and many other Lorrain noblemen would join him, he being ‘a man of

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 122

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

123

quality, merit and valour’, who belonged to one of the four grands chevaux families at the apex of the Lorrain nobility.30 But the prospect of fighting against his sovereign proved too uncomfortable: he decided instead to enter the service of the elector of Bavaria, and those who had presented themselves as captains for the regiment withdrew.31 With Haraucourt went France’s best chance of getting the Lorrain nobility to join their cause; not a single Lorrain presented himself as an officer in the regiment, which had to be composed instead of Champenois. As the lieutenant général the chevalier de Fourilles remarked, ‘It is necessary to understand the Lorrains better’, adding that the fault lay with the intendant, who did not have sufficient grasp of such matters.32 Haraucourt’s decision reflected a dilemma many Lorrain nobles faced. Charles IV had made several attempts to recruit Lorrain nobles in the early 1670s, but he was forced to disband or give away his new regiments for lack of funds.33 Many nobles had little choice but to leave the duke’s service, as opportunities to fight alongside him were rare and poorly rewarded.The obvious alternative was to accept the overtures of the French, but, having sworn allegiance to their duke, their code of honour forbade them to fight against him. Haraucourt’s brother-in-law, the marquis de Beauvau, explained how the situation left his conscience in turmoil: though relations between the duke and the older nobility had been fraught through the 1660s,34 they were still imbued with a deep sense of attachment to their ‘natural prince’ and could not turn away from him, however convenient it would have been to do so. ‘It is certain that a state loses more than it gains when there is a change of domination, however mild and favourable it may seem at the beginning. It is never permitted for vassals of a prince, for whatever cause or pretext there may be, to dispossess him. That is a decision reserved for God alone.’35 Many, including Beauvau himself, tried to circumvent this anxiety by serving neutral princes. But their dilemma was made worse by the intransigent attitude of Charles IV, who refused to tolerate his nobility engaging in the service of neutral powers, let alone the French, and he reportedly singled out Beauvau and Haraucourt, both in the service of the elector of Bavaria, for scorn.36 Caught between the duke’s contempt and destitution, and under permanent French surveillance, the Lorrain nobles were in an unenviable position. Many of those with long-standing traditions of French service did fight for Louis XIV, but on the proviso that they did not have to face their duke in battle: the marquis de Lenoncourt-Blainville and the comte de Viange both fought on the French side in Catalonia in the mid-1670s.37 There are also numerous examples of other chevalerie families who had members fighting on different sides during the wars of Louis XIV’s reign, such as the Lutzelbourg, Mauléon and du Châtelet.38 The Stainvilles also divided their allegiances, with the comte de Couvonges’s brother serving as a lieutenant général in the French army, while the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 123

12/03/2013 16:10

124

local elites under french occupation

Stainville-Beurey branch remained faithful to the duke.39 Some of these divisions may have been due to deliberate family strategies to serve both sides at once, for the preservation and advancement of their dynasties. A recent study of the Mahuet family of Lorraine illustrates how a robe family attempted to survive the occupation without compromising their dynastic interests: after the French conquest, the Mahuet had family members serve both sides in order to keep the door open to any eventuality, and to gain high-ranking protectors in both the French occupying regime and the Lorraine court in exile.40 Such strategies may have been equally appropriate for the families of the older chevalerie.41 The complexities of Lorraine’s political geography also created significant regional variations in allegiance. The Barrois mouvant was a feudal dependence of France, through which the duke owed homage to the king. For many of the nobles of the Barrois, therefore, there would not have been the same anxieties about serving a ‘foreign’ prince, as Louis technically was their sovereign. Equally, in Lorraine, which was a ‘non-incorporated’ territory of the Holy Roman Empire, nobles could similarly take advantage of the ambiguities of the situation to further their personal or family strategies within the Empire.42 As it became clearer to the French that many Lorrain nobles did not wish to join them, the occupying authorities became increasingly heavy-handed: in April 1673, Créqui ordered the prévôté officials of Lorraine to send him the names of all Lorrain cavalry officers resident in the towns and villages under their jurisdiction. These were then confined to their homes; if they joined the service of the enemies of France their houses would be razed, and if they were caught they would be hanged.43 Meanwhile the French continued to try to find other means of containing the nobility: one was to raise the traditional feudal levy of regional nobility, the arrière ban. This was activated in the summer of 1674, to try to augment Marshal Turenne’s forces on the Rhine and prevent an invasion of Lorraine and Alsace.44 Between 5,000 and 6,000 cavalry met in Nancy, commanded by Créqui, and were sent to join Turenne in October. But Créqui complained that these troops were untrained, inexperienced and ‘good for nothing’, and they were disbanded after only a week of service.45 The problems of the Lorrain nobility were highlighted by the fact that Louis XIV took his court to Nancy in the summer of 1673 in an attempt to personally impress upon them the benefits of French rule. Along with the queen and part of the court, Louis stayed at the ducal palace in Nancy from 31 July to 24 August, and again from 8 to 30 September.46 During his stay he tried to win over the nobility with a programme of lavish entertainment, but they steadfastly resisted his overtures.47 Haussonville argued that Louis was so impressed by their fidelity to their prince that he released them to enter service in Germany, and that this generosity was intended to consolidate French domination.48 It is more likely, however, that far from being a question of magnanimity, it was thought

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 124

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

125

better for them to serve openly abroad than to be a fifth column at home. Louis also addressed complaints about the rigour of the intendants and their staff, and granted a package of measures designed to further satisfy the nobility.49 Among these measures, the king granted the noblemen of Lorraine a suspension of ten years in repayments of their debts, preventing them from being pursued by their creditors.50 This was an extreme procedure used en masse only rarely during the reign, as it would have dire consequences for many merchants. It indicates how desperate Louis was to win over the nobles. The French authorities hoped that the death of Charles IV in September 1675 might cause a sea change in attitudes. But they were to be disappointed. While they permitted many Lorrain nobles to stay on their estates, the French harboured a lingering feeling of discomfort with the nobles’ continued loyalty to the Lorraine dynasty. Marshal Créqui wrote in 1676 that he had been observing the Lorrain nobles since 1670 and, while there was nothing in their behaviour which particularly displeased him, it was very apparent that ‘the most prominent individuals have a strong desire, following their obligations, to make arrangements with Monsieur de Lorraine, as a master with whom they believe they will one day live.’51 But with the Treaty of Nijmegen began a new phase in relations between the French occupier and the Lorrain nobles: the French were no longer prepared to tolerate this mood of passive attentisme, for the king and Louvois had determined on the permanent integration of Lorraine into the kingdom. Though he lacked international recognition, Louis XIV now insisted that Lorraine was an inseparable part of France. As such, all Lorrain nobles who served abroad were deemed to be traitors. On 3 July 1679 Louis promulgated an ordonnance ordering all Lorrains in the service of foreign princes to return to their homes by September or see their property confiscated. The order was aimed particularly at those nobles who had followed Charles V, who had little choice but to authorise them to return – most did, though a small number remained with him at Innsbruck.52 Those who returned to Lorraine were forced to adapt to the new regime, as it appeared to be there to stay. The path taken by the Mahuet family reflects this pragmatism: after serving Charles V in exile during the 1670s, Marc-Antoine de Mahuet then returned to Lorraine after the edict of 1679 to live a quiet life on his estates; his policy of ‘non-involvement’ with the French regime preserved the family’s personal identification with House of Lorraine, and indeed the family was rewarded with high office again after 1697.53 The Mahuets’ story was undoubtedly shared by other relatively recent anobli families whose interests were closely tied by bonds of gratitude to the House of Lorraine. Continued uncertainty regarding French sovereignty in Lorraine did not help. In the Franche-Comté, where sovereignty was ceded definitively to France in 1678, the majority of nobles accepted the new political realities relatively

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 125

12/03/2013 16:10

126

local elites under french occupation

quickly and threw in their lot with the French soon after annexation, if they had not already done so.54 By contrast, as the Treaty of Nijmegen had failed to resolve definitively the question of Lorraine’s political future, the duchy’s nobles refrained from wholeheartedly embracing the French regime. In this respect, they were similar to the Luxembourgeois nobility, most of whom retired to their estates during the French occupation from 1681 to 1697, to watch how events unfolded – relatively few engaged in French service, though their attitude overall was far from hostile.55 In Lorraine, as it became clearer that the nobles were unwilling to co-operate, the irritation of the French authorities became more pronounced. This resulted in more severe restrictions on the nobility’s freedom of movement and communication. It was not only men whom the French deemed untrustworthy. As many Lorrain officers were in Spanish service during the short War of the Reunions, the French were suspicious that their wives were passing on sensitive information in their correspondence. By a particularly harsh ordonnance of January 1684, the French obliged these women to leave Lorraine and the Trois Evêchés within one month, a drastic move that was later repeated in Savoy and Nice in 1690.56 Moreover, following the outbreak of the Nine Years War, the French were so suspicious of the Lorrain nobility that they forbade them, along with the rest of the population, to bear arms.57 Despite two decades of foreign occupation, little had changed in terms of where the nobility’s loyalties lay. The enduring attachment of Lorrain nobles to the ducal dynasty was also very much in evidence in the aftermath of Charles V’s death in 1690. Encouraged by the duke’s widow and advisers, many nobles remained in or passed into exile, and with the emperor’s support the prince de Commercy was able to conserve and expand the late duke’s regiment, thereby guaranteeing continued opportunities for service.58 In response, the French tightened restrictions on communication between those noblemen still resident in Lorraine and the exiled ducal court: when the prince de Lixin, Charles V’s uncle, requested a passport to send a gentleman to Innsbruck to give his condolences to Charles’s widow, the French commander replied that these would be just as good by ordinary letter.59 The French also kept a close watch on those who appeared the most ‘loyalist’. In 1690, the comte de Bissy reported that he was observing the conduct of the sieur de la Pommeray, who had returned from service in Germany a few years previously to forestall the seizure of his property near Nancy; Pommeray was thought to have been closely attached to Charles V, and his communication with foreign countries was closely monitored.60 During the 1690s, as it became clearer that the French would have to surrender the Lorraine duchies at the coming peace, the nobility became increasingly reluctant to work with the occupier. In January 1695, the intendantVaubourg was unable to find any nobleman who would work on compiling the capitation roles for the nobility in each bailliage. Each nobleman he approached refused to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 126

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

127

work on the pretext of illness, and ‘all of these gentlemen, except those who are presently in French service, are little inclined to the service of the king, and keep their old loyalties for the Lorrain princes.’ Instead of recruiting a nobleman from each bailliage, he was obliged to name seven for the whole of Lorraine and the Barrois; those chosen were members of the old chevalerie, who the intendant felt had ‘least affection for their prince’.61 Yet ‘least affection’ was relative, and those on the list were still devoted to the dynasty. Two of these noblemen, the comte de Couvonges and the marquis de Gerbevilliers, were named by the intendant Vaubourg in 1694 as potential candidates to go to the court of Lorraine in exile in Innsbruck, to open secret preliminary negotiations with the dowager duchess.62 Couvonges was selected for the mission as he had a reputation as a man of honour and integrity, and was trusted by both sides. But he was unambiguous about where his loyalties lay: shortly before he left for Innsbruck he wrote to Croissy that, ‘I was born Lorrain, and am devoted to this most serene house. … His Majesty would have no esteem for me if he charged me with things which could be against their interests.’63 Couvonges had already proven himself completely intractable over the issue of the return of Lorraine to the duke: several years earlier Louvois had tried to employ him to negotiate a territorial exchange between Louis XIV and Charles V, but Couvonges had refused.64 Though the majority of Lorrains remained ill-disposed, many could still be enticed into serving in Louis XIV’s army, and the French remained eager to recruit officers, thereby preventing them from serving France’s enemies. In October 1688, for example, the governor of Lorraine, the marquis de Boufflers, raised an infantry regiment composed of Lorrain officers.65 In addition, joining the French militias in Lorraine represented, for many, an attractive prospect. In December 1690 Bissy recommended the marquis de Lenoncourt-Blainville as colonel of the newly created militia regiment: ‘under him all who enter this regiment will serve with greater pleasure than under another who did not have such an illustrious name, as this Lorrain is glorious, and they defer greatly to men of the first rank.’66 After Lenoncourt agreed to serve, a significant number of young Lorrains presented themselves for service in the militia, showing how far the Lorrain nobles looked up to the grands chevaux, and were prepared to follow them.67 This may also reflect the importance of generational variables in the way a society behaves during foreign occupation: the younger generation of Lorrains had grown up under French rule, and were therefore more likely than their parents to enter French service. For their part, the government also left the door open through the 1690s for nobles in service abroad to return home, and many did, mainly for financial reasons.68 The War of the Spanish Succession marked another moment of change in the crown’s relations with the Lorrain nobility. Because Lorraine was under a very different form of pressure compared to 1670–97, the French successfully

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 127

12/03/2013 16:10

128

local elites under french occupation

enticed many Lorrain noblemen into their service. In July 1706 the comte de Gourcy, a member of one of the most prominent noble families in the duchy, offered to raise a dragoon regiment for the king, and it was felt that this would bring many other Lorrain noblemen into French service.69 Similarly, when the comte de Raigecourt, a Lorrain who commanded a French cavalry regiment, died in September 1706, it was reported that the Lorrain nobility wanted to see the regiment given to his son; it was felt that this was the surest means of keeping the affection of the nobility and maintaining them in French service, and so the king agreed.70 Furthermore, many of those who served France during the previous occupation wished to return during the War of the Spanish Succession.71 It helped that the French were attentive to rewarding the loyalty of those Lorrains who had served them: Gabriel-François d’Armur de Gerbéviller was one of the first Lorrain nobles to join the French in 1670, and was successful in obtaining a knighthood of the Order of Saint-Louis for his son who followed him into French service during the War of the Spanish Succession.72 One of the arguments put forward in favour of the occupation of Lorraine during the War of the Spanish Succession was that it would deprive the emperor of Lorrain officers and troops. The French envoy wrote of his concern that the Lorrain nobility were flocking to join imperial service during the summer of 1702, andVillars recommended using pro-French Lorrain officers to raise 7–8,000 men from the duchy.73 Though the king declined to raise any regiments in Lorraine, he and Chamillart agreed that Lorrain officers should be given pre-existing regiments in the French army, primarily to stop them joining imperial service.74 Throughout the war, the French kept the nobility of Lorraine under observation, making enquiries as to the route taken by officers in the service of the emperor returning home to Lorraine under the pretext of their domestic affairs.75 For his part, the duke of Lorraine actively encouraged Lorrain nobles to enter French service. When Raigecourt’s son prematurely died in 1707, Leopold successfully intervened to request that the regiment be given to the deceased’s brother, who happened to be a page at Leopold’s court.76 Yet he also gave equal encouragement to others who wanted to enter imperial service. It is unclear, however, exactly how many Lorrain nobles served on either side: writing to the Dutch in June 1707, Leopold claimed that there were far more Lorrain officers in allied service than in French service; writing to his own envoy to France two years later, he stated that the opposite was true.77 Most likely out of pragmatism, the duke also agreed to encourage his pages, who were the youthful scions of the highest noble families in Lorraine, to enter the French army ‘by preference to all other service’, and he appears to have stayed true to his word. Reciprocally, Leopold also accepted the sons of French officers stationed in Nancy as his pages.78 Despite the strains, the two courts – as well as the nobilities of France and Lorraine to a certain extent – were intertwined.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 128

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

129

Nobles of Savoy: ‘enemies of their patrie, traitors and rebels’? France’s relationship with the nobility of Savoy was significantly different to that with the Lorrain nobles. In 1690 the French did not see Savoy’s nobles as much of a threat, and at ministerial level there was very little concern other than to make them swear the oath of allegiance to the king. During the conquest, French military commanders believed that the majority of nobles in Savoy would readily swear the oath, rather than join their duke in Piedmont.79 And, following the fall of Chambéry, it appeared that there would be a rapid realignment of the nobility. Chambéry contained the residences of over half the nobility,80 and the town seemed particularly accommodating in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. This earned the scorn of the pro-ducal bishop of Geneva/Annecy who lamented that, ‘Chambéry is completely French. People there sing nothing but “Vive France”!’81 Those with the closest links to France came forward first. Within days of the conquest, the French appointed the sieur d’Argenson, ‘a man of quality of Savoy’, as colonel of the French-raised militia.82 He was followed by the marquis de Saint-Maurice, whose father and grandfather had been ambassadors to France and who owned estates in the Dauphiné and who had a Dauphinoise wife.83 Saint-Maurice had been solicited to raise a regiment for Victor Amadeus in June 1690 but refused, requesting instead to enter French service in September, offering to raise a cavalry regiment for the king.84 The marquis de Châtillon, whose family likewise had important links with the Dauphiné, also came forward; as a member of one of the most distinguished families in Savoy, he was esteemed by everybody in the duchy ‘as though he were the head of the Savoyard nobility.’85 Although a handful of senior Savoyard noblemen such as Châtillon did join French service in the weeks and months after the conquest, the avalanche of support the French expected failed to materialise. The French governor, the marquis de Thoy, received a commission in September 1691 to raise an infantry regiment of two battalions of eight companies, paid for by the king. He anticipated recruiting the necessary Savoyard officers once the nobility had sworn the oath of allegiance to the king, but the heads of the noble families prohibited the officers from joining, fearing the return of Victor Amadeus, and by 2 November de Thoy had only 300 recruits. But nor was the nobility rushing en masse to the duke’s service: Bonval sent a list to Louvois in 1690, naming all Savoyard noblemen in the service of Victor Amadeus or his allies: the list contained only forty-three names.86 It appears, therefore, that the nobility were mostly – much like the Lorrains – attentiste, waiting to see which way the war was likely to go, before they committed themselves to either side. Yet the initial response to the French invasion clearly differed from that in Lorraine in 1670, and so did the wider pattern of noble collaboration. Relations

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 129

12/03/2013 16:10

130

local elites under french occupation

between the nobility and the duke of Savoy seem to have been at a low point in 1690: when Victor Amadeus’ agents tried to raise infantry, cavalry and dragoon companies for the defence of the duchy, many noblemen refused and returned their commissions.87 The Savoyard nobility’s sense of disaffection from Victor Amadeus can largely be ascribed to the duchy’s position as part of a composite monarchy in which the Savoyard elites were becoming increasingly marginalised. As described in Chapter 1, this long-term trend was exacerbated from the beginning of Victor Amadeus’ personal rule in 1684, as his favouritism towards the Piedmontese elites became increasingly pronounced with most military, court and bureaucratic posts going their way. There was therefore a feeling of disappointment and disconnection in Savoy, particularly because of limited opportunities for service in the state, and a military occupation by an apparently friendly power would obviously be attractive – especially if, as it seemed for a while, the French might be there to stay.88 Even the most pro-ducal nobles had to confront their situation pragmatically.There were few families in Savoy more attached to the interests of the duke than the Arenthon d’Alex of the Genevois. In August 1690, Denis d’Alex, then in Turin, received a letter from his cousin in Chambéry, who was full of despair that the town had fallen to the French: ‘They demand from us the oath of allegiance to the king or our properties shall be confiscated without mercy. What am I to do in these cruel extremities?’89 But within weeks, the cousin had already started to adapt, writing, ‘I wish to act with honour and fulfil the obligations which attach me to my sovereign. Meanwhile, it is necessary to live and feed my family. Everyone takes their part according to their family’s interests, which is the only thing that concerns me.’90 Denis d’Alex had more reason than most to feel conflicted: as well as being a government functionary in Turin, he was also a chevalier in the Sénat of Savoy, a charge he would lose if he stayed in Piedmont. His uncle, the bishop of Geneva/Annecy Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex wrote to him, sharing his dilemma: ‘I do not know how to advise you concerning your return. I fear that in returning you will expose yourself to the displeasure of our good master, and in staying in Piedmont you will not obtain the protection of the king and his officers.’91 Not long after, the threat of seizure of the d’Alex estates in Savoy made the bishop revise his position, ‘You must not hesitate in your return. If you do not come immediately your properties will be confiscated, together with your office in the Sénat, and you will be left stark naked’, adding, ‘you must come back’.92 After temporising for some time, he finally returned to Savoy towards the end of 1691.93 This was the dilemma for most Savoyard nobles: they were obliged to answer the call of the duke, but the threat of confiscation of their property was a major source of anxiety. Following the French invasion, several Savoyard nobles did assemble militia corps for the duke.94 And some volunteered for the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 130

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

131

defence of Montmélian, though once the fortress fell, most of these volunteers went back to their estates, feeling that their duty had been fulfilled.95 But in the early 1690s many nobles must have felt that the interests of their order and their patrie could have been better served under the French monarchy, where there were more opportunities to serve. Indeed, records in the Archivio di Stato in Turin suggest that as many as a quarter of Savoy’s nobles of fighting age had joined French service.96Yet once it became clear that the French had no desire to retain Savoy, fewer nobles were willing to collaborate. By 1695, a large number of noblemen who had served the king now returned to their estates ‘to live an idle life’ or even went to join the duke.97 And if the French grew increasingly suspicious of Savoy’s nobles in the later stages of the war, they had every reason to be so. Though the French authorities obliged those nobles who remained in Savoy to swear an oath of allegiance to the king, not every nobleman regarded this as binding. Some would return from service in Piedmont, swear the oath, and then engage in recruitment for the duke’s army.98 The Savoyard nobility as a whole was noticeably more wary of joining the French during the War of the Spanish Succession, as Victor Amadeus had disgraced those who had accepted positions under the French in 1690–96.99 As Tessé put it to the king in 1703, Generally speaking, the people appear quite happy to see the French arrive, and while the nobility and the Sénat among themselves have the same feelings, the inexpressible harshness with which the duke treated those who had helped us during the last war makes them extremely wary. They are afraid of being given back, and to mix the comic with the serious, one of them said to me yesterday, ‘I pray to God that France no longer regards Savoy like an enema, which is taken only to be given back’.100

Victor Amadeus meanwhile sent new letters out to all the nobility of Savoy, exhorting them to murder the French and threatening to degrade them if they swore fidelity to Louis XIV.101 There were certainly some who took up this call. During the upsurge in raiding activity in Savoy of 1705–6, a number of noblemen were complicit in sheltering, sharing intelligence with or even commanding the activity of raiding parties.102 Though noticeably more wary on the whole, many senior nobles still asked to enter French service, particularly in the early stages of the war. In April 1705, for instance, the baron de Troches asked to enter the regiment the French were raising in Savoy. La Feuillade believed de Troches to be a man of ‘condition, spirit  and merit’ and suggested putting him at the head of the regiment, as he felt it would be easier for the nobility of Savoy to serve a local commander.103 But the king was increasingly reluctant to give commissions to Savoyard nobles, and shortly afterwards he turned away the sieurTournier, despite glowing recommendations from the French resident in Geneva.104 The following year, the marquis

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 131

12/03/2013 16:10

132

local elites under french occupation

de Broglie proposed to raise another regiment in Savoy, bearing the name ‘Royal Savoye’; yet Chamillart rejected de Broglie’s offer, on the grounds that the king did not wish to increase the number of foreigners in his service.105 This was contrary to usual French practice in conquered territory, and by denying the Savoyard nobles the opportunity to serve, Louis and Chamillart were inadvertently undermining the positions of the local commanders, who insisted that recruitment was the best guarantee of collaboration.106 In April 1706 La Feuillade and Vallière suggested raising two battalions so as to contain the ‘libertines and the nobility of the country’. Vallière reported that there were many officers in Savoy who had left the service of Victor Amadeus, but time was pressing and they must be enlisted immediately.107 The matter was raised again the following year by Tessé, and at last, the king consented to raising an infantry regiment, to be named ‘Royal Savoye’ and composed entirely of Savoyards, complete with a special uniform according to local custom. The expense of raising the regiment, Tessé pointed out, was offset by the fact that it would deprive Victor Amadeus of the officers and soldiers he would otherwise be able to take from the duchy.108 Yet French military setbacks changed the dynamics of collaboration once again. In any era, the attitudes of occupied people have been shown to be affected by the success or otherwise of the occupying power in warfare. Savoyard nobles were far less likely to join the French army after the defeat at Turin, when it became clear that French chances of victory were increasingly slim. Prior to this, when it appeared that the final denouement for the duke might be approaching, the French had been successful at encouraging Savoyard nobles to quit his service: in January 1706, for instance, the sieurs Beaufort and du Tour de Villeneuve returned to their estates in Savoy and were granted permission to stay, under the usual conditions.109 But afterwards, French forces were well and truly on the defensive, and in March 1707 the war minister wrote that gentlemen of good Savoyard families were passing daily into Piedmont to join the service of their duke, and that the mothers and fathers of these gentlemen consented freely to their departures, even supplying the money for their journeys.110 Many of these were officers who had been taken prisoner and later allowed to return to their families, after promising to have no contact with the duke.111 It is no surprise that the French authorities stepped up their policy of property confiscations after this point, as more and more nobles realised which way the wind was blowing and scrambled to prove their loyalty to Turin. One Savoyard nobleman explained to the French commander in Savoy that, ‘while the nobility have a less than perfect inclination for Monsieur the duke of Savoy, they will not abandon him, by fear, and in order to gain his good graces in view of the coming peace, which is much discussed in Savoy’.112 A further element to this fear was that the duke could invade at any time. The duke’s agents in Savoy routinely exaggerated the number of troops at the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 132

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

133

duke’s command, allowing them to animate those who were already sympathetic to the duke, and strike fear into everyone else. Furthermore, Victor Amadeus proved particularly adept at appealing to the Savoyard elite’s sense of honour and identity – as well as personal gain – to persuade them to enter his service. Honour during this period involved a strong attachment to a certain code of ethics, and was a particularly important element in the conscience of a seventeenth-century nobleman. On several occasions Victor Amadeus’ agents posted provocative notices in towns and villages across Savoy; these promised honour and certain recompense if they went to the frontier and joined the service of the duke, ‘a journey so advantageous to your own interests as well as those of the whole Nation Savoyarde.’113 Such language would certainly have appealed to the Savoyards’ sense of identity.114 Furthermore, propaganda circulated by Victor Amadeus’ agents offered amnesty to all those who joined his service, and those who did not would be regarded and treated as ‘enemies of their patrie, traitors and rebels against their legitimate sovereign.’ This appeal to their sense of nation or patrie (designating the whole Sabaudian state) was an astute move by a ruler living in an age before the emergence of a modern sense of nationalism defined by language and a distinct ‘national’ culture.115 Victor Amadeus’s interventions certainly seem to have been very effective, judging by French reports.116 In response to this, and the worsening security situation in Savoy, the French resorted to harsher methods to contain the nobility. In 1706, Vallière was authorised to raze the houses of the sieur Trouvet, to show other Savoyard noblemen that those who joined the service of Victor Amadeus would be severely punished.117 As mentioned above, the marquis de Saint-Maurice had offered his service to France in 1690 but been rebuffed. During the second occupation he was found to be ‘intriguing’ with the duke, leading to the confiscation of his properties and exile in Geneva.118 Harsher tactics were also seen in Nice, where the nobility showed itself to be decidedly anti-French. By the middle of the War of the Spanish Succession, the French were unwilling even to let noblemen return to their estates on the usual terms of the oath of allegiance; the sieur de Villar, a colonel in the service of Victor Amadeus who had previously served the French, indicated in 1708 that he would like to leave Sabaudian service if he were allowed to return to his home in Nice, but the French would only allow him to do so if he rejoined their service, as the risks would otherwise be too great.119 The same year, the sieur Perani, the son of a président at the Senato of Turin was found to be staying near Nice without permission or a passport; the local commander ordered his house demolished and published notices in Nice and the surrounding area to the effect that anyone who housed him would suffer the same fate.120 As the French became ever more suspicious of the nobilities of Savoy and Nice, their treatment of them became even more severe. In early 1707, Vallière

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 133

12/03/2013 16:10

134

local elites under french occupation

arrested the baron de Lornay, a Savoyard nobleman in the service of Victor Amadeus, along with his valet and two Savoyard soldiers, for smuggling men and supplies into the Aosta valley. With the security of the duchy so precarious, Vallière argued that the Savoyard nobility could no longer be trusted: he advised that it was essential to expel from Savoy all those who had been taken prisoner and subsequently allowed to stay in the duchy with their families after having sworn not to rejoin the service of the duke. These men, he was now certain, would give as much covert assistance as they could to the smuggling of recruits into Piedmont.121 The following year, concerned that several Niçois noblewomen were passing sensitive information to their husbands in the service of the duke, the French confiscated the property of all of these women, and ordered them into Piedmont.122 More draconian measures were to follow: in May 1709, Victor Amadeus expelled from the Pragelato valley anyone who had family members serving the French. In retaliation, Berwick ordered all inhabitants of Savoy with family members in Piedmont or in the service of Victor Amadeus to leave the duchy within three days.The order was disproportionate, arbitrary and highly damaging to France’s relations with Savoy’s elites, playing into the hands of Victor Amadeus perfectly. As the premier président of the Chambre des comptes of Chambéry wrote to Versailles, this would leave the sovereign courts unmanned, would leave France’s two regiments in Savoy without any officers and would furnish the duke of Savoy with ‘an infinity of officers and soldiers, many of whom have already crossed the mountains of the Chablais and Faucigny’.123 The war minister attempted to clarify this, asserting that anybody who had already sworn the oath of allegiance was exempt from the order, but much damage was already done. A similar order was issued in Nice the following month.124 Though a disaster for propaganda, in practice these orders were often ignored and the French authorities in Savoy and Nice left the way open for noblemen to return, unless they were seen to pose a serious threat.125 Moreover, despite these setbacks for the French, a large number of Savoyard nobles continued to serve: in 1709 the président of the Chambre des comptes wrote that there were 700 or 800 Savoyard noblemen still in the duchy, many of whom were officers in French service.126 Clearly, despite all of the ‘push and pull’ factors described above, the continued attraction of French service remained strong. This reflects the degree of estrangement between Victor Amadeus and the Savoyard nobility, and also the specifically Sabaudian problem of intense antipathy between the Savoyards and the Piedmontese.127

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 134

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

135

French strategies and noble responses Notwithstanding the disparities highlighted throughout this chapter, the policy of the French crown towards the nobility of conquered provinces remained fairly consistent throughout Louis XIV’s personal rule: this was to treat them with respect and moderation, and to uphold their privileges and property rights. Only when financial necessity dictated otherwise, or when the nobility were perceived to be hostile (as opposed to merely uncomfortable with the occupation) were harsher measures sanctioned. This was because it was in France’s interests to have nobles collaborate.Yet, while ministerial policy remained essentially the same, the tactics used to deal with the noble elites in Lorraine and Savoy showed substantial variation, illustrating how reactive French occupation policy was. Furthermore, the extent to which government policy was carried through varied according to the abilities and attitudes of the crown’s local representatives, the governors and military commanders. The war minister Michel Chamillart was forced to articulate the crown’s views on this on more than one occasion, when he received complaints about military commanders acting with too much severity. In 1707, he grew increasingly anxious about the comte de Médavy’s terse style of dealing with the nobility in Savoy, warning him that ‘you should be able to see even more clearly than me, that the thing which contributes most to maintaining you in Savoy, is to win over the spirit of the people who have always been well intentioned for France.’128 This echoed what he had written a year earlier to Médavy’s predecessor, at the explicit behest of the king: ‘One cannot conduct oneself with too much moderation and gentleness in a newly conquered country … and by your behaviour you must gain the affection of its people’.129 Also in 1707, the commander in the Chablais, Le Guerchois, displayed such severity towards the nobility and people of the province that they fled en masse. Marshal Tessé reported that Le Guerchois’s excess of zeal unreasonably required that ‘a Savoyard would have for the king the same sentiments as a Frenchman born in Paris’. Tessé tried his best to deal with a ‘glorious and abundant’ volume of complaints from the nobility of the region, but lamented ‘a newly conquered territory certainly cannot be administered like this’.130 In order to demonstrate their credentials as protectors of noble interests, the French showed respect for property in occupied territory, as long as the property owner was not suspect. In 1706, for instance, the dame de Bose of Villefranche in the county of Nice complained that she was unable to draw revenue from her property because it was being used to accommodate a French guard corps; the war minister awarded her 300 livres in compensation.131 This example confirms the tendency to moderation towards the elites highlighted in the previous chapter. But the occupying regime could also use property as a means of punishing resistance and encouraging collaboration. Measures to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 135

12/03/2013 16:10

136

local elites under french occupation

confiscate the properties and revenues of those refusing to submit to the king were put in place at the beginning of each occupation.132 How far these measures were enforced, however, depended on the needs of the French authorities and their relations with the local nobility. Property seizures were carried out in Lorraine from 1670, but, as part of the contributions treaty negotiated with Charles V in 1675, the French ceased further confiscations.133 When the treaty was broken the following year, any Lorrain noblemen who left Lorraine without permission found that their properties were seized and houses razed in retribution.134 Yet confiscations brought in such little revenue in Lorraine, due to the widespread poverty of the nobility, that the intendant did not deem it of great value.135 Even during the Nine Years War, property confiscation was employed in Lorraine sparingly.136 In Savoy, by contrast, confiscation was an important source of revenue for the French authorities and was pursued enthusiastically: already by December 1690, revenues from the confiscation of property of Savoyards loyal to their duke amounted to 110,000 livres.137 In 1707, Chamillart reproached ­commissaire Couppy for neglecting the confiscation of property, and told him to apply himself to the task as the money was needed to reward collaborators.138 The importance of revenues confiscated from noblemen to the Extraordinaire des Guerres in Savoy was even greater in times of financial crisis: in 1709, the marquis de Lucinge, the former governor of Turin whom the king allowed back into Savoy in 1707, requested his property be returned. But the intendant advised against this, pointing out that the total product of confiscated property in Savoy did not match the level of gratifications that were assigned from it; each year, he had to take 18,000 francs from the impositions on Savoy to supplement it and, given the precarious state of French finances in 1709, it had to be redirected to paying the troops.The annual revenue from Lucinge’s property was 12,309 livres, so it suited the French not to receive the oath.139 In another example, on the death in 1709 of the duke’s first cousin once removed, the prince di Carignano, his considerable income of 100,400 livres from tailles in the Tarentaise was confiscated, as his son was in the service of Victor Amadeus.140 This provided quite a windfall for the Extraordinaires des Guerres, and much of the money was immediately used to pay for desperately needed equipment for French troops.141 C ­ onfiscated property which yielded less revenue was usually released to the rightful inheritors, as long as they were not seen as being too ‘disloyal’ to France.142 With regard to noble fiscal privileges, the French interfered only in times of extreme necessity, or when the privileges were deemed particularly ­obstructive to French interests. During the crises of the 1690s, for instance, the French authorities turned to nobles in the occupied territories in order to raise money for the war, as they did in other provinces.143 From 1695 all nobles were obliged to pay the new capitation. That they were unaccustomed to such

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 136

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

137

demands is clear from their immediate response: the Savoyard nobles dispatched a representative to war minister Barbezieux to complain about the introduction of the new tax, but the commissaire ordonnateur reminded Barbezieux that they had no reason to complain, having so far contributed nothing to the financial burdens of the war.144 Under Louvois, there had also been a drive to suppress noble financial privileges where they were seen as being disproportionate and excessive. This was the case in Lorraine from 1670.145 Upon arrival, the French found a large group of nobles whose titles had been created by Charles IV, and who now claimed exemption from the French impositions. As these recent anoblis all owed their positions to the duke, the French also viewed them as deeply untrustworthy, and they themselves showed little interest in collaborating. By an ordonnance of March 1671 they were deprived of their nobility with immediate effect, and lost their exemption.146 The ordonnance did, however, confirm the privileges of those noblemen who held titles prior to 1611. A similar measure was introduced after the French annexed Luxembourg: there they found a large group of anoblis of recent creation, and after 1687 only pre-1611 creations continued to enjoy exemption from charges and impositions.147 These changes were designed principally to increase the amount of exploitable resources, and the French tried to wring from them as much profit as much as they could. In September 1696, after the restitution of Lorraine had already been agreed, the French attempted to raise more money by selling exemptions back to the anoblis who had been stripped of these privileges in 1671.148 An important corollary of these measures was that they also served to increase the status of the older nobility, whose co-operation was seen as vital to the occupying regime.149 The French were consistent in giving special attention to the most senior nobles of a territory, in the hope that these links would encourage collaboration through the vertical links of patron–client relationships.150 This was used particularly for officer recruitment, but also to contain those whose loyalties were in doubt. In Nice the French consistently showed special favour to the signori forestieri, one of the highest levels of nobility in the Sabaudian state, in particular the Lascaris family, who had a long tradition of French military service.151 Likewise, in Lorraine the French attempted to win over members of the ancienne chevalerie such as the Haraucourt and Lenoncourt by offering them prestigious commissions, and a mutual trust developed between them. In the 1690s, suspect noblemen held in detention were released only with guarantees of senior nobles such as Haraucourt.152 Another tactic to encourage collaboration was the promotion of dynastic alliances between French military commanders and senior noble families. In the appointment of governors of the occupied territories, the king and his ministers deliberately chose individuals with dynastic links to the upper echelons of

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 137

12/03/2013 16:10

138

local elites under french occupation

the local nobility. For example, the marquis de Thoy, governor of Savoy during both occupations, was from the Bugey (a Sabaudian land before 1601), but like many nobles in the region had close kin among the nobility of Savoy and the Dauphiné.153 Marshal Créqui was allied by marriage (via the Villeroy) to the Lorraine-Guise at Louis XIV’s court, and was also linked dynastically to the Choiseul, who had a long history of service to both France and Lorraine.154 Further dynastic links developed during the occupation of Lorraine: the comte de Bissy, who served successively as maréchal de camp and lieutenant général in Lorraine, married into the Haraucourt family (later becoming their heir), and there are numerous examples of French officers marrying into the Lorrain and Barrisien nobility.155 For all the government’s efforts, winning over the local nobilities in the occupied territories often proved to be beyond their means. Inadequacies on the part of the French administration had a large hand in this failure: as in any occupation, the gulf between initial intentions and the realities of strategic necessity widened as the occupations progressed. Furthermore, if the French became more repressive towards the nobility, it was because they felt the nobles were working against them. In this respect, French occupation policy was predominantly reactive to events and pressures on the ground. In many cases, it appears that inadequate knowledge or understanding of local practice led to the French over-reacting or under-reacting. For their part, the nobles’ actions were guided to a large extent by the strength of their bonds of loyalty to their ‘natural’ sovereign, or the fear of punishment on his return. Though loyalties were by no means uniform across each territory, the French seem to have had much more success in attracting Savoyard nobles to their cause than in Lorraine. This was due just as much to the internal political dynamics of Lorraine and the Sabaudian state as to the opportunities offered by the French. But whatever the initial response to French conquest, factors such as a change in French fortunes in war, or the active intervention of the usurped sovereign, could persuade a nobleman to reverse his initial decision. Personal and dynastic interests certainly played their part too: during the occupations, many who had gone into exile returned simply to regain their confiscated property and incomes. In these cases, swearing an oath of allegiance to the French king was little more than a formality. Getting occupied nobles to collaborate, therefore, was no easy task, and was certainly not as easy to accomplish as in the older French provinces. In Languedoc, for instance, William Beik has shown how Louis XIV’s programme of training nobility for military service proved extremely popular, and there was a constant demand for more places.156 It also appears to have been significantly more difficult in the pays conquis that had been absorbed in a sovereign manner, such as the Franche-Comté, Alsace and Roussillon, where the majority of nobles came to accept the benefits of Bourbon rule, but many ‘irreconcilables’ remained

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 138

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

139

in exile.157 For many nobles in Lorraine and Savoy, the wars of Louis XIV’s reign proved particularly awkward, given the strength of ties that existed over the frontier and the level of ensuing disruption. This was particularly true for the highest ranks of nobility, whose properties and interests straddled international boundaries. In the remaining chapters, attention turns to those who held judicial and administrative offices in the occupied territories, and then to those in the church. Many of these were nobles, and likewise had to adapt to a change of domination.

Notes

1 H. M. Scott and C. Storrs, ‘Introduction: The Consolidation of Noble Power in Europe, c.1600–1800’ in H. M. Scott (ed.), The European nobilities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, vol. i:Western Europe (London, 1995), p. 2. 2 Jean Nicolas puts this figure at one in two adult male nobles for Savoy. Nicolas, La Savoie, i, p. 45. John Lynn gives a similar figure for the French nobility (as an average): Lynn, Giant of the grand siècle, p. 261. There is no equivalent figure for Lorraine. On the Savoyard noble military tradition, see Storrs, War, diplomacy, pp. 235–6. 3 Scott and Storrs, ‘Consolidation of Noble Power’, p. 40. 4 See e.g. Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iii, pp. 196–7, 273–4, 282. 5 Godsey, Nobles and nations, pp. 79–80. On supra-regional economic patterns in the Rhineland, see T. Scott, Regional identity and economic change: the Upper Rhine, 1450–1600 (Oxford, 1997). 6 Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, pp. 152–6; A. Petiot, Les Lorrains et l’Empire: dictionnaire biographique des Lorrains et de leurs descendants au service des Habsbourg de la Maison d’Autriche (Versailles, 2005). 7 M. P. Romaniello and C. Lipp, ‘The spaces of nobility’ in M. P. Rommaniello and C. Lipp (eds), The contested spaces of nobility (Aldershot, 2010), p. 3; Spangler, ‘Those in between’, pp. 136–8. 8 J. Dewald, The European nobility, 1400–1800 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 139; R. Asch, Nobilities in transition, 1550–1700: courtiers and rebels in Britain and Europe (London, 2003), pp. 131–2. 9 Dewald, European nobility, p. 146. 10 The duchy contained 795 noble houses at the end of the seventeenth century. In total this meant 3,400 individuals from a total population of about 320,000, or 1.6 per cent, a proportion similar to that of France (1.4 per cent). Nicolas, La Savoie, i, pp. 11–12, 16; Lynn, The wars, p. 28. 11 Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 150. 12 C. Lipp, Noble strategies in an early modern small state: the Mahuet of Lorraine (Rochester, NY, 2011), p. 125. 13 Devos, ‘Ombres et lumières’, pp. 250–1. 14 Very little is known about the landed and sword nobility in the context of assimilating new territories into France; among the studies of the pays conquis, only Georges Livet’s work on Alsace addresses this issue: Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 808–40. 15 These figures are from intendant Vaubourg’s mémoire for the duc de Bourgogne written in 1697: Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 285. 16 SHDT A1 252, fo. 64, Louvois to Saint-Pouange, 2 Oct. 1670. A quarter of officers in the Lorrain army were noble. J.-C. Fulaine, Le duc Charles IV de Lorraine et son armée, 1624–1675 (Metz, 1997), p. 257. 17 SHDT A1 250, fos. 56 and 97, Saint-Pouange to Louvois, 18 and 29 Sep. 1670. 18 SHDT A1 252, fo. 64, Louvois to Saint-Pouange, 2 Oct. 1670; A1 250, fo. 327, Créqui to Louis XIV, 4 Dec. 1670. 19 SHDT A1 250, fo. 365, Créqui to Louis XIV, 24 Dec. 1670. 20 SHDT A1 252, fo. 158, Louvois to Créqui, 12 Dec. 1670. Lixin (or Lixheim) was Charles’s brother-in-law, Genoese by birth and from a collateral branch of the Grimaldi family. A. Calmet, Notice de la Lorraine (2 vols., Lunéville, 1840; reprint of Nancy, 1756), i, p. 498. 21 SHDT A1 250, fo. 338, Créqui to Louvois, 10 Dec. 1670.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 139

12/03/2013 16:10

140

local elites under french occupation



22 Beauvau, Mémoires, p. 359. 23 SHDT A1 250, fo. 321, Créqui to Louis XIV, 4 Dec. 1670. 24 SHDT A1 253, fos. 95–6, Créqui to Louvois, 4 Feb. 1671. 25 SHDT A1 253, fo. 139, Charuel to Louvois, 15 Feb. 1671; fo. 148, Créqui to Louvois, 18 Feb. 1671. 26 SHDT A1 253, fos. 347–8, Créqui to Louvois, 26 Sep. 1671. 27 SHDT A1 253, fo. 340, Créqui to Louvois, 15 Sep. 1671. The archives give no indication of how many were enlisted in this fashion. 28 SHDT A1 344 no. 66, Louvois to Rochefort, 19 Jan. 1673; nos. 210 and 234, Rochefort to Louvois, 21 and 26 Feb. 1673. 29 In addition to being Charles IV’s son-in-law, Lillebonne was a grandson of Henri IV, and had fought for France during the 1650s. 30 SHDT A1 344 no. 2, Fourilles to Louvois, 1 Jan. 1673. Haraucourt had been captain of the guards of Charles IV. 31 Beauvau, Mémoires, p. 372. Beauvau asserted that the king fully understood this decision. Beauvau himself had entered the elector’s service in 1666 after falling out with Charles IV. 32 SHDT A1 344 no. 173, Fourilles to Louvois, 12 Feb. 1673; no. 175, Rochefort to Louvois, 12 Feb. 1673. 33 Fulaine, Charles IV de Lorraine, p. 238. The duke’s suite was also small, only a handful of Lorrain nobles. 34 See above, p. 19. 35 Beauvau, Mémoires, p. 230. 36 Ibid., pp. 376–7. 37 Ibid., p. 393. 38 Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 157; Lipp, Noble strategies, p. 100. 39 Etienne de Stainville became an Imperial general and fought alongside Charles V against the Turks. Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 157. 40 Lipp, Noble strategies, p. 89. 41 Jonathan Spangler has argued that princely families in frontier regions also ‘continued to play both sides of the political divide’. Spangler, ‘Those in between’, p. 141. 42 J. Peltre and M. Noël, ‘Les Mercy en Europe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. De la Lorraine au Banat’, Le Pays Lorrain, 77 (1996). 43 These admonitions were extended in April 1676 to the superiors of religious houses and the heads of all families in the duchies, on pain of having their houses razed and property confiscated. BMN 152(345) no. 1, Ordonnance, Apr. 1673; no. 13, Ordonnance, 15 Apr. 1676. 44 This was levied on the whole area within 100 leagues of Alsace; it was also raised generally in France that year. 45 Lanouvelle, Créquy, pp. 169–72. 46 Ibid., p. 167. 47 Also present was the duchesse de Montpensier, ‘La Grande Mademoiselle’, who was closely related to the Guise branch of the House of Lorraine. In her memoirs, she noted that while many Lorrain noblewomen came to pay their respects, the noblemen refrained altogether from interacting with the French court. A.M.L. Montpensier, Mémoires de Mlle de Montpensier, fille de Gaston d’Orléans, frère de Louis XIII (4 vols., Paris, 1824–5), iv, pp. 360–1. 48 Haussonville, Histoire de la réunion, iii, p. 197. 49 Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, p. 696. 50 BMN 152(245) no. 2, ‘Extrait des Registres du Conseil d’Etat du Roy’, 26 Sep. 1673. 51 SHDT A1 514 no. 68, Créqui to Louvois, 10 Dec. 1676. 52 Etienne, ‘Charles V’, p. 122. 53 The ‘non-involvement’ was far from total: the protection of their property required engagement with the French legal system, and Mahuet performed acts of faith and homage to king in 1681, as required to retain properties held in fief. Lipp, Noble strategies, p. 102. 54 Grosperrin, L’Influence française, pp. 43–7. 55 Culturally, the Luxembourgeois nobility did not fall into the French sphere; most marriage

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 140

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities













141

alliances tended to be with houses from Lorraine, Wallonia or the electorate of Trier. P. Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets? Les Luxembourgeois sous Louis XIV’ in Poidevin and Trausch, Les relations franco-luxembourgeoises, pp. 32, 36–7. 56 AAE CP Lorr. 44, fo. 97, Ordonnance, 4 Jan. 1684; SHDT A1 1004, fo. 107, La Hoguette to Louvois, 21 Dec. 1690. 57 SHDT A1 990 no. 77, Bissy to Louvois, 18 Jul. 1690. 58 ADMM 3F 6, fo. 441, Commercy to le Bègue, 21 Apr. 1690; fo. 550, Le Bègue to Commercy, 24 May 1690. 59 SHDT A1 990 no. 9, Bissy to Louvois, 9 May. 1690. 60 SHDT A1 990 nos. 211 and 242, Bissy to Barbezieux, 11 Nov. and 9 Dec. 1690. 61 They were the marquis de Gerbevilliers, the comte de Viange, the comte de Couvonges, the marquis du Bassompierre Rémonville, the marquis de Lenoncourt Blainville, the marquis de Lamberty and the sieur des Salles Vouthon. AN G7 415 no. 263, Vaubourg to Pontchartrain, 22 Jan. 1695. 62 Both had negotiating experience, Couvonges having been named the commissioner and executor of the will of the late duchesse de Guise, and Gerbevilliers having been sent by Charles IV to England after the French invasion of Lorraine in 1670. AAE CP Lorr. 45, fos. 293–4, Vaubourg to Croissy, 18 Mar. 1694. 63 Ultimately, the negotiations failed as the dowager duchess made demands that exceeded Couvonge’s brief. AAE CP Lorr. 45, fo. 325, Couvonges to Croissy, 10 Jan. 1696; fo. 387, Vaubourg to Croissy, 2 May 1696. 64 AAE CP Lorr. 45, fo. 294, Vaubourg to Croissy, 18 Mar. 1694. 65 BN Man. Fr. 22753, fo. 283. 66 SHDT A1 990 nos. 240 and 270, Bissy to Louvois 5 and 26 Dec. 1690; A1 1021 no. 323, Louvois to Lenoncourt, 9 Jan. 1691. 67 SHDT A1 990 no. 242, Bissy to Louvois, 9 Dec. 1690. The Lenoncourts were one of the four grands chevaux families at the apex of the Lorrain nobility. Lenoncourt-Blainville had already served France as captain of a cavalry regiment in Catalonia, having left the service of the duke of Lorraine in May 1675. A1 458 no. 282, Charuel to Louvois, 28 May 1675. 68 The sieur de Ficqelmont, a major in the comte de Mercy’s regiment, offered to join French service in 1690 if his properties were returned to him; Louvois agreed to return the property, but Ficqelmont was not permitted to enter French service as he was clearly only returning for financial reasons. SHDT A1 990 nos. 176 and 195, Bissy to Louvois, 12 and 28 Oct. 1690. 69 SHDT A1 1952 no. 62, Gourcy to Chamillart, 16 Jul. 1706. 70 SHDT A1 1952 no. 334, Avejan to Chamillart, 14 Sep. 1706; no. 354, Chamillart to Avejan, 19 Sep. 1706. 71 AAE CP Lorr. 60, Mémoire, 15 Jan. 1704; SHDT A1 1953 no. 67, La Chapelle to Chamillart, 22 Oct. 1706. 72 SHDT A1 1761 no. 439, Gerbéviller to Chamillart, 25 Dec. 1704. The Order was a hybrid of a chivalric order and a medal for outstanding service and wounds. 73 SHDT A1 1571 no. 1, Guiscard to Chamillart, 2 Aug. 1702; A1 1582 no. 167,Villars to Chamillart, 12 Nov. 1702. 74 SHDT A1 1672 no. 447, Saint Contest to Chamillart, 18 Oct. 1703; no. 458, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 22 Oct. 1703. 75 AAE CP Lorr. 70, fo. 189, Audiffret to Torcy, 23 Jun. 1708. 76 ADMM 3F 38, fo. 43, Leopold I to Chamillart, 7 Jul. 1707; SHDT A1 2035 no. 49, Audiffret to Chamillart, 16 Jul. 1707; A1 2236 no. 14, Leopold I to Voysin, 3 Jan. 1710. 77 Leopold was writing to the Dutch to obtain the release of the sieur de Boncourt and the seigneur de la Tour, two Lorrain officers in French service captured on Lorrain territory by the allies. ADMM 3F 29 no. 22, ‘Mémoire presenté à Messieurs les Etats Généraux’, 4 Jun. 1707; 3F 28, fo. 126, Leopold I to Barrois, 15 Aug. 1709. 78 SHDT A1 1672 no. 508, Saint Contest to Chamillart, 4 Nov. 1703; A1 2167 no. 339, Saint Contest to Voysin, 11 Dec. 1709. A1 1950 no. 32, Châteauvieux (major of the ville neuve of Nancy) to Chamillart, 7 Jan. 1706.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 141

12/03/2013 16:10

142

local elites under french occupation



79 SHDT A1 1010 no. 50, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 22 Aug. 1690. 80 Nicolas, La Savoie, i, p. 16. 81 ADS 2B 81, Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex to Denis d’Alex, 15 Aug. 1690. 82 SHDT A1 1010 no. 57, Larray to Louvois, 26 Aug. 1690. 83 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 53. 84 SHDT A1 1010 no. 74, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 20 Sep 1690. Louvois turned him away, telling him that the king had no need of a cavalry regiment in Savoy. Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 53. 85 Châtillon had been a lieutenant in the guards of Victor Amadeus, had commanded the château of Chambéry, was son-in-law of the Savoyard ambassador to France, and was from the House of Seyssel, one of the oldest in Savoy. SHDT A1 1010 nos. 64 and 72, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 4 and 16 Sep. 1690. 86 These included the marquises de Sales, d’Aix, de Lucinge, de Saint-Michel, de Saint-Thomas, de Conflans, de Fleury and de Bellegarde, and barons d’Alex, de Miolans and d’Aiguebelle. Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, pp. 46–7. 87 SHDT A1 1009 no. 131, Larray to Louvois, 20 Jun. 1690. 88 The bishop of Geneva/Annecy wrote in November 1691 that he was unsure whether the Savoyards would remain French or return ‘to their original state’. Quoted in Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 51. 89 ADS 2B 81, cousin to d’Alex, 15 Aug. 1690. The letter’s author addresses d’Alex as ‘mon cousin’, but he does not reveal his own name. 90 ADS 2B 81, cousin to d’Alex, 4 Sep. 1690. 91 ADS 2B 81, Jean d’Alex d’Arenthon to Denis d’Alex, 10 Oct. 1690. 92 ADS 2B 81, de Thoy to Jean d’Alex d’Arenthon, 21 Sep. 1690; Jean d’Alex d’Arenthon to Denis d’Alex, 15 Oct. 1690. 93 ADS 2B 80, 5 Sep. 1692. Thanks to the intervention of the bishop, Bonval awarded him the gages for the year 1691 even though he had been absent. 94 The marquis de Sales, the marquis de Vallisère, the comte de Bernex and the marquis de Chamousset all raised militia corps to defend Savoy through the summer of 1690. SHDT A1 1009, nos. 131 and 149, Larray to Louvois, 20 Jun. and 1 Jul. 1690; A1 1010 no. 45, Larray to Louvois, 20 Aug. 1690; A1 1010 no. 66, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 6 Sep 1690. 95 Humbert cites eight nobles who did this: ‘Conquête et occupation’ pp. 50–1. 96 AST P Sav. 3 no. 10, ‘Etats des Gentils hommes des Provinces de la Savoye avec distinctions de leurs noms propres, et appellatifs avec leur age, et profession’, 1702; for a precise breakdown of these figures see Nicolas, La Savoie, pp. 226–31. 97 SHDT A1 1331 no. 183, Bonval to Barbezieux, 27 Mar. 1695. 98 The sieur Machette was arrested for doing this in April 1695. SHDT A1 1331 no. 160, Bachivilliers to Barbezieux, 9 Jun. 1695. 99 SHDT A1 1690 no. 185, Tessé to Louis XIV, 19 Nov. 1703. 100 Ibid. 101 SHDT A1 1702 no. 221, Vallière to Chamillart, 5 Dec. 1703; A1 1690 no. 208, Tessé to Louis XIV, 7 Dec. 1703. 102 SHDT A1 1968 no. 164, La Closure to Torcy, 12 Apr. 1706; no. 233, Vallière to Chamillart, 18 May 1706; no. 274, Chamillart to Vallière, 8 Jun. 1706; no. 509, Vallière to Chamillart, 17 Dec. 1706. Among those arrested were the marquis de Coudré and the sieur de Belletour. 103 SHDT A1 1873 no. 295, La Feuillade to Chamillart, 12 Apr. 1705. 104 As the resident put it, ‘One might wish that all Frenchmen were as full of this desire to serve their patrie’. SHDT A1 1876 nos. 29 and 115, La Closure to Chamillart, 5 and 12 Oct. 1705. 105 SHDT A1 1966 no. 58, Chamillart to La Feuillade, 10 Feb. 1706. 106 Rowlands, ‘Foreign Service’, p. 156. 107 SHDT A1 1968 no. 159, Vallière to Chamillart, 9 Apr. 1706. 108 SHDT A1 2039 no. 42, Tessé to Chamillart, 15 May 1707. 109 SHDT A1 1968 no. 11, Vallière to Chamillart, 8 Jan. 1706; and nos. 12–13, attached letters from sieurs Beaufort and du Tour de Villeneuve, both 4 Jan. 1706. Chamillart reminded Vallière

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 142

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

143

to keep the two noblemen under observation. 110 SHDT A1 2044 no. 110, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 1 Mar. 1707. 111 Two such men, named de Mathieu and de Broti, were arrested in February 1707 while trying to pass into Piedmont. SHDT A1 2038 no. 133, Le Guerchois to Chamillart, 17 Feb. 1707. 112 Ibid. The nobleman was the sieur de Corsinge, a lieutenant in the service of France’s ally the elector of Bavaria, then present in Savoy to recruit for his regiment. 113 SHDT A1 1968 no. 509, Vallière to Chamillart, 17 Dec. 1706; A1 2175 no. 21, ‘À la belle jeunesse Savoyarde’, 1 Mar. 1709. 114 The slippery concept of identity is crucial in explaining the behaviour of an occupied people in any era. See F. Bédarida, ‘Vichy et la crise de la conscience française’ in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds), Vichy et les Français (Paris, 1992), p. 79. 115 Jeremy Black has argued that in this period ‘nationalist’ sentiment could be invoked to define a common threat, and Christopher Storrs also noted that Victor Amadeus deliberately exploited the common experience of war to create a pan-Sabaudian national identity: Black, European international relations, p. 22; Storrs, War, diplomacy, p. 220. On national sentiment in pre-modern times, see the introduction to Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer’s Power and the nation in European history (Cambridge, 2005), especially pp. 3–13. A discussion of how local identity was formed around the ruling dynasty can be found in J-M. Moeglin, ‘Nations et nationalisme du Moyen Age à l’Epoque Moderne’, Revue Historique, 123 (1999). 116 SHDT A1 1968 no. 509, Vallière to Chamillart, 17 Dec. 1706; A1 2038 no. 59, Vallière to Chamillart, 28 Jan. 1707. 117 SHDT A1 1968 no. 282, Chamilllart to Vallière, 13 Jun. 1706. 118 On his deathbed in 1712, Saint-Maurice asked permission to return to Savoy to breathe his ‘air natal’ once more; Berwick believed him to be too dangerous, and the request was denied. SHDT A1 2398 no. 273, Berwick to Voysin, 22 Sep. 1712. 119 SHDT A1 2098 no. 306, Montgeorges to Chamillart, 18 Apr. 1708. 120 SHDT A1 2098 no. 301, Artaignan to Chamillart, 7 Apr. 1708. 121 SHDT A1 2038 no. 59, Vallière to Chamillart, 28 Jan. 1707; no. 275, Ravenel (commander at Saint-Julien-en-Genevois) to Chamillart, 31 Mar. 1707. 122 The order applied to thirteen women. SHDT A1 2098 no. 207, Artaignan to Chamillart, 19 Mar. 1708; A1 2099 nos. 16–17, Artaignan to Chamillart, 5 May 1708; no. 84, Chamillart to Grignan, 17 May 1708; Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 120. 123 SHDT A1 2175 no. 147, Ponnat to Chamillart, 9 Jun. 1709; no. 149, Ordonnance, 5 Jun. 1709. The order came at a particularly bad time as, unlike Savoy, Piedmont was not experiencing famine, making the prospect of temporary exile there all the more attractive. 124 SHDT A1 2171 no. 16, Berwick to Voysin, 6 Jun. 1709; A1 2173 no. 165, Voysin to Angervilliers, 19 Jun. 1709; A1 2175 no. 167, Regnault de Sollier to Voysin, 3 Jul. 1709; A1 2171 no. 161, Voysin to Regnault de Sollier, 13 Jul. 1709; Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 121. 125 SHDT A1 2175 no. 131, Gayot to Voysin, 1 May 1709; A1 2249 nos. 203–4, Artaignan to Voysin, 25 Nov. 1710. 126 SHDT A1 2175 no. 150, Ponnat to Voysin, 9 Jun. 1709. 127 Tessé noted that many Savoyards wished to enter French service because they did not want to live among the Piedmontese, ‘who, generally speaking, have much contempt for them’. SHDT A1 2039 no. 42, Tessé to Chamillart, 15 May 1707. 128 SHDT A1 2040 nos. 2–3, Chamillart to Médavy, 3 and 6 Jul. 1707. 129 SHDT A1 1968 no. 38, Chamillart to Vallière, 25 Jan. 1706. 130 SHDT A1 2038 no. 207, Tessé to Chamillart, 9 Mar. 1707. 131 SHDT A1 1974 no. 237, Chamillart to Gayot, 6 Sep. 1706. 132 SHDT A1 1010 no. 67, de Thoy to Louvois, 9 Sep. 1690. Ordonnances threatening the confiscation of property were also issued in Nice at the beginning of both occupations, in 1691 and 1705: Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 115. In Luxembourg, the French created an office ‘des confiscations par droit de guerre de la Province des Luxembourg’, directed by Jean Beyer. Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 31. 133 SHDT A1 461 no. 103, Charuel to Louvois, 27 Oct. 1675.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 143

12/03/2013 16:10

144

local elites under french occupation

134 This happened to the sieur d’Armoison in September 1677. SHDT A1 560 no. 86, Créqui to Louvois, 21 Sep. 1677. 135 These were often worth less than 100 francs; as Rochefort put it, ‘there is nobody so poor as these people here’. SHDT A1 458 no. 200, Rochefort to Louvois, 21 Apr. 1675; A1 461 no. 103, Charuel to Louvois, 27 Oct. 1675. 136 There are only a handful of references to confiscation in the war archives for this period, e.g. SHDT A1 971 no. 228, Charuel to Louvois, 1 Mar. 1690. 137 SHDT A1 1004 no. 108, Bonval to Louvois, 21 Dec. 1690. 138 SHDT A1 1994, fo. 435, Chamillart to Couppy, 30 Jan. 1707. Among those receiving gratifications from Savoy were the comte Palavacino de Perla from Nice who was paid 6,000 livres annually. A1 2174 nos. 177 and 217, Angervilliers to Voysin, 12 and 29 Dec. 1709. 139 Angervilliers argued that as he was a chevalier of one of Victor Amadeus’s military orders, he was unlikely to swear the oath anyway. SHDT A1 2039 no. 318, La Closure to Chamillart, 29 Jun. 1707; A1 2174 no. 157, Angervilliers to Voysin, 6 Dec. 1709. 140 SHDT A1 2173 no. 204, Angervilliers to Voysin, 14 Jul. 1709; A1 2250 120bis,Voysin to Angervilliers, 27 Aug. 1710. Though Carignano had been resident at the Turin court, the French had not confiscated his property at the start of the occupation out of the king’s personal consideration for him. A1 1766 no. 53, Chamillart to Bouchu, 17 Feb. 1704; A1 1754 no. 446, Chamillart to Saint-Contest, 4 Dec. 1704. On relations between Louis and Carignano, see Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II’, pp. 549–50. 141 SHDT A1 2327 no. 2, Voysin to Angervilliers, 5 Jan. 1711; A1 2400 no. 63, Angervilliers to Voysin, 20 Jul. 1712. In 1712, the king lifted the confiscation in light of the letters patent of French naturalisation obtained by the prince: A1 2398 no. 146, Carignano to Voysin, 20 Jun. 1712. 142 SHDT A1 2102 no. 185, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 11 Jul. 1708. The son of the marquis de la Pierre was denied his inheritance in 1707 as the king believed he would voluntarily join the service of Victor Amadeus ‘if the occasion presented itself’. A1 2038 no. 345, Tessé to Chamillart, 25 Apr. 1707. 143 The French repeatedly violated old privileges in the face of military imperatives in Alsace during this period, and Mark Potter has argued that Louis XIV’s strategy for war finance from the 1690s consisted of using privilege as leverage in negotiations for higher taxes. Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 594; Potter, Corps and clienteles, p.189. 144 SHDT A1 1331 no. 183, Bonval to Barbezieux, 27 Mar. 1695. 145 During the 1660s, Charles Colbert de Croissy had also found the amount of nobles in the Alsace–Trois Evêchés region to be excessive, and recommended launching a commission to verify noble titles. Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, pp. 151–2. 146 SHDT A1 252, fo. 176, Louvois to Charuel, 2 Jan. 1671; AMN Ord., Ordonnance, 4 Mar. 1671. 147 In Luxembourg this also applied to the lower ranks of the nobility including francs-hommes and the rural chevalerie. Boislisle, Correspondence, i, p. 116 no. 454, Mahieu to Le Peletier, 19 Aug. 1687; Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 55. 148 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 13, fos. 66–8, ‘Declaration du Roy, qui rétablit dans leur Noblesse les Annoblis par les Ducs de Lorraine, revoquez par l’Ordonnance du 4 Mars 1671’, 18 Sep. 1696. The declaration noted that many anoblis had continued to use titles and privileges of nobility, indicating that the earlier edict had not been enforced. 149 In the 1680s, the chief exponent of French assimilation in Lorraine, Roland Ravaulx, advocated complete abolition of the Lorrain anoblis as a means of attracting the older nobility to the French cause. M. Roux, Louis XIV et les provinces conquises (Paris, 1938), p. 303. 150 On such links between nobles see Scott and Storrs, ‘Consolidation of Noble Power’ p. 24. Another example is that of the princes d’Epinoy after the French annexation of Artois: see Spangler, ‘Those in between’, p. 141. 151 R. Oresko, ‘The Sabaudian Court’ in J. Adamson (ed.), The princely courts of Europe: 1500–1750 (London, 1998), p. 241. SHDT A1 2098 no. 322, Montgeorges to Chamillart, 21 Apr. 1708; A1 2099 no. 84, Chamillart to Grignan, 17 May 1708; A1 2249 nos. 203–4, Artaignan to Voysin, 25 Nov. 1710. The Lascaris were granted exemption from the expulsion order which applied

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 144

12/03/2013 16:10

the nobilities

145

to all noble families who had relatives in the service of the duke (the comte de Lascaris served in the chancellery in Turin). 152 This was the case in 1690 for the baron de Saphy. SHDT A1 971 no. 223, Charuel to Louvois, 22 Feb. 1690. 153 F-A. Aubert de la Chenaye Desbois, Dictionnaire de la noblesse, (2nd ed., Paris, 1775) ix. p. 91. 154 Lanouvelle, Créquy, p. 38; Spangler, Society of princes, p. 115. 155 SHDT A1 1761 no. 162. Varennes to Chamillart, 17 Jun. 1704; Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 154;Y. Le Moigne, ‘Le partage de l’espace lorrain’ in M. Parisse (ed.), Histoire de la Lorraine (Toulouse, 1978), pp. 303–4; Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 144–5. 156 Beik, Absolutism and society, p. 320. 157 Grosperrin, L’Influence française, pp. 43–7; Stewart, Roussillon, p. 43–8. Many Alsacian nobles continued to serve the Empire against France in the 1690s and 1700s: Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 819–24.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 145

12/03/2013 16:10

6 The administrative elites

Of all the territories conquered or annexed by France in this period that have been subject to detailed study, none suffered a wholesale shutdown or replacement of the existing institutional apparatus. Conquests were usually followed by a confirmation of corporate and provincial privileges, signifying that the traditional contractual relationship of the ruler with his subjects was to be maintained.1 Retention of the traditional forms of administration would, it was hoped, keep the local elites on side. In 1661, for instance, a plan to suppress the Conseil souverain of Roussillon and transfer its authority to Montpellier was opposed and ultimately dropped.2 The policy of maintaining the existing apparatus was strongly championed by Louvois, and on the issue of provincial privileges he differed significantly from Colbert. The two clashed over the administration of Artois, Walloon Flanders and the Cambrésis, conquered successively during the first two decades of the personal rule; all possessed active provincial estates at the time of conquest, and it was Colbert’s intention to suppress them as part of a drive to improve commerce and revenue collection. Louvois, however, had the final say in the administration of frontier provinces, and allowed the estates to be preserved as part of their respective provincial governments, and they continued to play important administrative roles.3 Thus, despite occasionally riding roughshod over many of their traditions, Louvois usually acted as protector of the traditional corporate bodies as long as they did not harm security or impede revenue-gathering. In the Franche-Comté in 1674, the king and Louvois even re-established the provincial parlement, recently suppressed by the Habsburgs, as part of an effort to rally the high robe nobility to the Bourbon regime.4 The parlement was recreated in a much altered form, however: while it had previously exercised wide-ranging political and financial powers, it was now restricted to administering justice.5 This reflects a pattern identified by Marie-Laure Legay, who argued that there existed an important distinction between two types of provincial privilege: in conquered provinces, the crown would suppress or modify financial privileges according to

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 146

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

147

its needs; judicial privileges, on the other hand, were allowed to survive as long as they did not conflict with royal interests.6 This pattern appears to have also been borne out in Luxembourg and Flanders, where the existing courts were stripped of their political and financial powers and placed under the appellate jurisdictions of French parlements, but retained their judicial functions.7 In the older French province of Languedoc, Louis XIV also assigned the parlement ‘a legitimate and satisfying role’ in the judicial management of the province.8 That the French Government was in general not opposed to the continuation of estates, parlements and other traditional bodies reflects the fact that co-operation with existing local elites was usually the most effective way of imposing royal authority; reckless suppression or subjugation could be dangerous and could undermine stability and order. Though neither Lorraine nor Savoy’s Estates General was active at the moment of French conquest,9 they did both possess sovereign courts with wide-ranging powers. In addition to monitoring subordinate magistrates and acting as courts of appeal, both the Sénat of Savoy and the Cour souveraine of Lorraine had extensive political functions, among which were the right of remonstrance over all affairs of state and the right to modify edicts. The Sénat also had the right of presentation of magistrates, meaning it could control its membership. Working alongside these courts were the Chambres des comptes of Chambéry, Nancy and Bar-le-Duc, which judged all criminal and civil cases relating to fiscal matters; in Savoy, the Chambre also had wide-ranging administrative powers including the maintenance of bridges and roads, the supervision of fortifications and military supplies, and the overall administration of the duchy’s tax farms and finances.10 The offices of the sovereign companies of both Lorraine and Savoy conferred noble status upon their holders, and often these officers came from well-established families. Consequently, relations between the magistrature and the French occupiers bore many reflections of the patterns described in Chapter 5, but Louis XIV’s occupations of Lorraine and Savoy also saw deep disruption to these institutions. This was a departure from ‘usual’ practice in the pays conquis, and had important consequences for relations with the occupied elites. The sovereign courts The contrast between Lorraine and Savoy in the actions of the French with regard to their sovereign companies demonstrates how far French policy towards occupied elites depended on the warmth, or otherwise, of their initial reception. Following the conquest of Lorraine in 1670, the French immediately found certain members of the Chambre des comptes of Nancy to be deeply hostile, even obstructing access to their archives by withholding the keys.11 As

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 147

12/03/2013 16:10

148

local elites under french occupation

the months passed, French suspicions grew: in November 1670 they imprisoned several of Charles IV’s treasury officers of the Chambre des comptes, the procureur général later being sent to the citadel at Metz by order of Michel Le Tellier, Louvois’ father and co-secretary of war.12 It was believed that these officers had information on the whereabouts of money that the duke had hidden before the invasion, and they were also suspected of hiding papers concerning the ducal domains. They were freed after several months’ detention, as it transpired that they had not hidden any papers, and the duke had sent his money abroad.13 But by this stage, it appears that the king and Louvois had grave doubts about the loyalties of the Lorrain magistrates. In late November 1670 Louvois instructed the intendant, Jacques Charuel, that the courts in Lorraine would henceforth exercise justice in the king’s name, and that appeals from the Cour souveraine – up to then the highest court of appeal in Lorraine – would be sent to the Parlement of Metz.14 The intendant was also to provide as much information as possible on the administration of justice in Lorraine, and this was to be done as quickly as possible, ‘to take away the hope the people may have of having their prince back any time soon’.15 Charuel provided a memorandum shortly afterwards containing the names of all those who held judicial offices in Lorraine, as well as their ‘inclinations’ and whether they knew people who could fill the vacant offices. It was the latter point that turned out to be problematic. Charuel’s opinion was that, If the king persuaded the Lorrains that he wanted them as subjects, many would come out of hiding due to the desire they have to serve His Majesty and to be given these charges. Yet in the opinion they have that their prince will return, there are none who would work while the king occupies Lorraine, and they dare not come forward to give the slightest information.16

On this basis, the order came from Paris in late December to separate and suspend the Cour souveraine of Lorraine along with the Chambres des comptes of Nancy and Bar, their jurisdictions passing to the Parlement of Metz and the intendant, respectively.17 As Charuel saw it, the separation of the companies was to give time to get to know who in Lorraine could be trusted to serve the king in place of those officers whose loyalty was deemed suspect.18 The courts obeyed the order promptly but informed the governor that, as they had been re-established before, they would try to obtain the same grace again from the king in the near future.19 The treatment of the sovereign companies of Lorraine appears drastic and out of keeping with the French monarchy’s usual strategy in conquered territory, which was to maintain existing judicial structures and privileges. In this case the French were no doubt conscious of the events of the previous occupation: the memory of Cardinal Richelieu’s short-lived Conseil souverain of Nancy in the 1630s indicated that the Lorrain elites were unlikely to be co-operative. The

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 148

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

149

alternative would have been to replace the Lorrain magistrates with Frenchmen, but the pre-existence of the Parlement of Metz in the Lorraine region saved them that necessity. Moreover, the transfer of judicial authority over ducal Lorraine to Metz served Le Tellier interests, as Louvois was already closely linked with the Parlement, having briefly trained there, and it also lent itself to the furtherance of the Bourbon government’s long-term agenda of consolidating its position in the region. What appeared as a pragmatic response to ensuring the loyalty of Lorraine in the run-up to the Dutch War, therefore, was with hindsight crucial in paving the way for the réunions of the early 1680s. The sovereign companies remained suppressed for the duration of the French occupation and, unlike in Richelieu’s time, there was no ‘Cour souveraine in exile’ offering a rival pole of authority to French rule.20 Of their members, a small number left Lorraine after the French conquest: the président, ClaudeFrançois Canon, remained at the side of the dukes throughout the occupation, and the procureur général François-Henri Huin died in exile in Brussels in 1684.21 The majority remained in Lorraine, retaining their titles and precedence, but not their incomes.22 They seem to have caused little trouble for the French authorities, and some were trusted enough to act as intermediaries between the French and the duke when circumstances required it: the sieur Durant, for example, who was a former procureur général of the Cour souveraine, helped initiate negotiations for the contributions treaty of 1674.23 The Cour souveraine and Chambres des comptes of Lorraine and the Barrois were only restored by Duke Leopold in 1698, in similar form to those dissolved in 1671 and with surviving members automatically reappointed to their old posts.24 When the French felt that the elites of a conquered territory posed no threat, treatment of local institutions was more benign: when Luxembourg fell in 1684, the Conseil provincial was maintained, and the capitulation agreement gave the magistrates six months to either swear allegiance to the king, or leave.25 Of the existing members, all but one remained in place, so the superior court continued to be composed almost entirely of Luxembourgeois.26 This reflected the French Government’s practice elsewhere: in Roussillon, Strasbourg and Nice, the crown filled one or two key positions with Frenchmen, but allowed the majority of magistrates to remain in place.27 In the Franche-Comté, where Louvois had a particularly effective local agent, the parlement was filled entirely with native elites without the need for any Frenchmen to bolster the government’s authority.28 French attitudes towards the sovereign courts of Savoy in 1690 reflect this broader trend, and differ considerably from the action taken in Lorraine twenty years earlier. The capitulations of Chambéry gave the magistrates ten days to swear the oath of allegiance to the king, but the French extended this to one month to make it easier for them to get to the town from wherever they were.29

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 149

12/03/2013 16:10

150

local elites under french occupation

After the king had been assured of the faithfulness of the magistrates of Savoy, he issued an edict on 17 January 1691 confirming the Sénat, the Chambre des comptes and all subaltern judicial officers in their functions.30 Among the magistracy of Savoy, a few – two members of the Sénat and four of the Chambre des comptes – fled to Piedmont; the rest remained in situ. Among those who fled was the premier président of the Sénat, Horace Provana, leaving the most senior position in the company vacant. Louvois appointed another Savoyard senator to replace him, Victor Emmanuel de Bertrand, seigneur de la Pérouse, in February 1691, as he had given proofs of ‘a singular affection for the king’.31 Pérouse died in August and was replaced by the président à mortier of the Parlement of Grenoble, Antoine de Guerin, seigneur de Tencin, a relative of the Dauphiné intendant Bouchu and a client of the Colbert clan under the protection of Torcy.32 These appointments were consistent with royal practice towards French parlements at this time, where the premier présidents were always non-venal royal appointees from outside the province.33 In the immediate aftermath of the conquest, the Savoyard magistrates may well have felt a sense of quiet optimism and business as usual. They were sorely disappointed, however, when the dust settled and the realities of French rule became clearer. French officials in Savoy saw little value in paying anything more than lip service to the rights of sovereign companies and this was soon illustrated by their financial neglect of the magistrates. By guaranteeing the privileges of Savoy’s elites in the capitulation of Chambéry, and confirming them by edict in January 1691, the king undertook to pay the magistrates their gages, the stipends paid for carrying out their functions (corresponding to French appointements, as opposed to French venal gages, which were the returns on investment in venal offices).34 Yet from the time of their arrival, the French failed to pay the officers’ gages, which were in many cases their only source of income. In July 1691, the premier président of the Sénat complained that since the French conquered Savoy the Sénat had been unable to exercise criminal justice: the duke of Savoy had paid their gages quarterly, but they were now eighteen months in arrears.35 Payments finally began later that year, but in the financial crisis of 1694–95 the payment of gages again fell into arrears, with two quarters due by July 1695, and many officers had no means of paying the new capitation tax.36 As the French paid the sovereign companies from the Extraordinaire des Guerres (the military treasury), payment of the magistrates’ gages was never likely to be a high priority in times of financial shortage.37 Any magistrates who had misgivings about France’s commitment to protecting their interests had their fears confirmed by the increasingly haughty and arrogant attitude of the French towards the companies. The first disputes arose out of the companies’ defence of their rights of nomination to their ranks. Both the Sénat and Chambre des comptes had numerous vacancies due to a spate of

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 150

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

151

deaths in the early 1690s. In the Sénat, there were five vacancies for the office of senator, as well as the office of quatrième président.38 In the Chambre, nine offices were vacant by death, and there were four absentees in Piedmont. The French were therefore eager to fill all of these positions, as their sale would provide considerable sums of money. Yet few people came forward for the offices and even fewer were prepared to pay the prices at which the French wanted to sell them.39 Given this situation, when a candidate did come forward with the requisite sum of money, the French were eager for the sale to be ­transacted quickly, and for the appointee to be received promptly by the courts. In the Sénat, the leadership of Tencin ensured that this was carried out.40 But the Chambre des comptes, still under the leadership of the duke’s appointee, the marquis de Lescheraine, was not so submissive. The Chambre became a centre of opposition during the first occupation, putting up a concerted resistance to France foisting appointees to a wide range of offices upon them without their traditional vetting process. In December 1692, Marc Depuy purchased the office of juge mage of Ternier and Gaillard, as well as that of senator. The Sénat verified the provisions for senator, but the Chambre hesitated as it claimed it had received no letters patent. Commissaire Bonval remarked that they had no business blocking the appointment, as their approval was purely a formality.41 His dismissive attitude only made the situation deteriorate. The magistrature, gauging that the return of Savoy to Victor Amadeus was increasingly likely, dug in their heels and resorted to measures outside the palais de justice. During the night of 11 January 1695, notices were stuck up on street corners around Chambéry addressed ‘Aux Bons Savoyars’, instructing them not to buy any vacant offices. Bachivilliers, the French commander, noted that these contained much the same sentiments as a heated conversation he had recently had with président Gaud, who had been heading the Sénat in the absence of the premier président Tencin. There were, he added, many people capable of filling the vacancies, but who had turned away after being informed – maliciously, so the French said – that they would be dispossessed after the return of the duke of Savoy. The officers of both sovereign companies were warned that if they continued in this manner they would not be paid, as their fees came from the sale of the very offices they were blocking.42 To a certain extent this was a clash between two very different systems, the sovereign companies of Savoy encountering a monarchy that had been curbing the powers of their French counterparts for several decades.43 The Savoyard companies’ adamant defence of their rights and privileges, which exceeded those of any French court, caused increasing friction with the French authorities who were inclined to view these difficulties as resistance borne out of loyalty to their duke. Yet the magistrates had an equally difficult relationship with Victor Amadeus. Just prior to the French conquest, in 1686, the duke established an intendant in Savoy to improve tax collection, which inevitably encroached on the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 151

12/03/2013 16:10

152

local elites under french occupation

powers of the Chambre and led to a defensive spirit among the magistrates. This state offensive against the sovereign courts was renewed following the return of the duchy to Victor Amadeus in 1696: within two years the duke had stripped the Chambre of its jurisdiction over the taille, customs and the gabelles.44 The magistrates’ ambivalent relationship with the duke was well known, and they were certainly viewed with suspicion by the court of Turin: a report of 1713 put it mildly when it stated ‘we cannot quite understand their inclinations’.45 If this was the background, the momentum for disputes with occupying officials originated more immediately in French practice, which was often insensitive and arrogant, leading to resistance on the part of the native members of the companies.The French were more mindful of this at the beginning of the second occupation in the 1700s, but there was also a determined enforcement of things as France wanted them, and as time went on relations soured again. Though the French again confirmed the companies in their rights and privileges shortly after the conquest, one of Marshal Tessé’s priorities was to replace the heads of the Sénat and Chambre with loyal Frenchmen. Antoine de Tencin was quickly reinstalled as premier président of the Sénat. La Feuillade persuaded Chamillart to reappoint Tencin as he was a judge of ‘integrity and enlightenment’, and he commanded the respect of the magistrates. Tencin served from 1704 until his death the following year, when, again on the recommendation of La Feuillade, he was replaced by his son, François de Tencin de Froges. This was despite Tessé’s assessment of the younger Tencin as ‘a donkey’ – revealing divisions among the French over personnel policy.46 The French also increased their presence in the Sénat by appointing Jean Dominique Giraud to the vacant seconde présidence in October 1705.47 In the Chambre des comptes, which had proved especially resistant to French appointees during the first occupation, the king removed the sitting premier président Antoine Gaud and replaced him with the second président of the Chambre des comptes of Grenoble, the comte de Ferrière. To fortify the French position in the Chambre, another Dauphinois, Jean-Guy Basset, a subdélégué of Bouchu and the premier président of the bureau des finances of Grenoble, was given the vacant office of président ordinaire des finances (see appendix).48 The French authorities did make some attempt to show more moderation and probity in their dealings with the magistrature this time around. Immediately after the conquest, the French had taken the unprecedented step of stripping Gaud of this office of premier président in the Chambre. Yet Chamillart agreed to continue to pay Gaud the gages attached to the office, as this was his only means of subsistence. This act of generosity earned him the praise of the intendant: ‘I cannot express to you the extent to which the bounty of His Majesty and the fairness of your ministry are applauded by the people of these lands’.49 Furthermore, the French now paid the gages of the officers of both companies directly from the Trésor royal (part of the purview of the contrôleur général) rather than

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 152

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

153

the Extraordinaire des Guerres, and consequently they received their pay regularly, except during the financial crisis of 1709–10. The total cost of the gages for the sovereign companies in Savoy in 1709 was 146,163 livres, a substantial increase on the 110,104 livres paid in 1694 and a reflection of the higher regard in which the French now held the companies.50 In spite of this apparent increase in French sensitivity, hopes of a new era of amiable mutual co-operation between the French and the sovereign companies were soon dashed. This time round, it was the Sénat with whom the French repeatedly came into conflict. In part, this must have been motivated by the magistrates’ instinct for self-preservation. As described in Chapter 5, Victor Amadeus proved highly effective at creating a climate of fear, to induce any wavering subjects to remain loyal. The stakes were raised considerably after the first occupation when, soon after the restitution of Savoy to Victor Amadeus, the duke purged the Sénat of all magistrates appointed by Louis XIV. Of their number, two thirds were Savoyards who had committed no crime but to administer justice with faithfulness in execution of their promises.51 The consequences of this for the attitudes of the magistrates during the second occupation seem to have been considerable, and the elites were far more cautious about showing support for French officers and administrators in 1703. Marshal Tessé felt that the magistrates’ lack of enthusiasm was quite understandable, given that those who had collaborated with the French the last time around had been so badly mistreated by the duke.52 The register of the Sénat’s first sitting after the French arrived revealed their ambivalence clearly: ‘The Sénat has decided to swear the oath, to avoid justice being administered by foreigners.’53 For obvious reasons, the magistrates had to appear more guarded this time around. The French were aware of this, but as time went on they lost patience and were more inclined to interpret the magistrates’ self-preservation as disloyalty. Conflict again took the form of jurisdictional disputes. The most serious and long-running clash arose from the Sénat’s defence of its right to administer the revenues of vacant benefices in Savoy. In 1706, the king ordered the use of revenues from the vacant archbishopric of the Tarentaise for the repair of churches damaged during the siege of Montmélian. The Sénat immediately raised objections to this on the grounds that the king did not have the right to appropriate these revenues: according to Savoyard practice, the Sénat administered them until the appointment of a successor to the benefice. Tencin and the avocat général de Ville appealed to Chamillart that it would appear ‘much more considerate’ to find the necessary funds elsewhere.54 But Versailles was not interested in showing sensitivity to Savoyard practice. A related example further illustrates this point: in 1704 the king named the abbé de Carpinel, dean of the Sainte-Chapelle of Chambéry, to a vacant abbacy in the Faucigny. But the sover-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 153

12/03/2013 16:10

154

local elites under french occupation

eign courts refused to release the abbey’s revenues to Carpinel, as the requisite bulls from Rome were not forthcoming due to the war.55 By March 1708, the matter had not been resolved, so the king authorised intendant Angervilliers to overturn the opposition of the Sénat and put Carpinel in possession of the revenues anyway. The magistrates wrote to Chamillart repeating their objections. But the prolonged dispute had by this point soured relations between the sovereign companies and the crown: the king now believed that their objections were based on the self-interest of the officers of the Sénat and Chambre des comptes, ‘who regard themselves as natural subjects of the duke of Savoy’, and who believed they should do nothing that might displease either the duke or the pope.56 The sovereign companies, however, maintained that their motives were more virtuous, and they did have recent form in blocking what they saw as arbitrary ducal authority in the period between the two French occupations.57 Yet the French clearly perceived the sovereign companies’ defence of their rights and traditions as malicious obstructionism borne out of loyalty to their duke. Uninterested in the companies’ uses and customs, the French became increasingly heavy-handed as they became more frustrated. The companies, in turn, dug in their heels to resist what they viewed as the arrogant and abusive manner of the French Government. The two sides were pursuing mutually incompatible ends: the companies saw the capitulations of November 1703 and the king’s edict of 1704 as binding, but the French did not. Of course, this was not a problem unique to Savoy, as similar tensions developed in other conquered territories: the French authorities clashed repeatedly with the municipal regime in Besançon from 1674, as well as with the local authorities in newly annexed provinces of Flanders and Roussillon in the 1660s and 1670s.58 And, as Georges Livet found in Alsace, ‘the monarchy was inclined to suspect everything which did not emanate directly from it.’59 Clearly, despite paying lip service to notions of moderation in occupation, the French saw blind obedience to the crown as more important than contractual obligations, and their political mindset was such that any obstruction to the immediate execution of the royal will, however small, was seen as insubordination or disloyalty. Believing the Savoyard magistrates not merely to be highly legalistic but also irretrievably refractory, the French resorted to bypassing the rights and jurisdictions of the Sénat wherever it was felt necessary. In 1708 it was discovered that over one hundred smugglers were working on the frontier with the Dauphiné, with warehouses in Savoy, running goods to Orange and Avignon. The intendant tried to arrest the contrabandists and seize their merchandise, but the Sénat insisted that nothing could be done without their permission as such crimes fell under their purview. In response, Chamillart warned them that the king did not want them to cause any trouble and expected their help: in other words, they were not to interfere.60 The following year, a counterfeiting operation was

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 154

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

155

discovered in Chambéry and the French arrested a Monsieur Salteur and several workers. The magistrates protested that counterfeiting fell under their jurisdiction, but Angervilliers replied that as Salteur had relatives and friends in the Sénat, the arrest had been carried out on the express order of the king.61 These episodes offer a significant corrective to Geoffrey Symcox’s view that, during the French occupations, ‘the Senate and the Chambre became the real governing agencies of the duchy’.62 They were in fact limited to maintaining public order. Quite a different story emerged during the second occupation of Nice, as the French left the Niçois magistrates to administer justice and maintain public order with relatively little interference. Due to a weaker French administration, the Niçois Sénat was able to assert its independence much more successfully than its Savoyard counterpart, and actually acquired more responsibilities than it had had under Victor Amadeus, including the supervision of the farms of the gabelles, tobacco and wine (which had belonged to the Camera dei conti of Turin), and the adjudication of construction contracts.63 The clashes between the Sénat of Savoy and the French authorities demonstrate also that the French-appointed (and French subject) premier président was far from being a docile creature of the king. François de Tencin steadfastly defended the rights and prerogatives of the company during his tenure of office from 1705 until 1713. Though not always able to secure majorities in the Sénat on behalf of the king, he was nevertheless successful in maintaining the respect of his fellow magistrates. He may have been the direct representative of royal authority, but his fellow judges expected him to maintain a balanced position and defend the privileges and interests of the Sénat. The French accepted this, for otherwise he would lose the confidence of the court: the sovereign companies of France were expected to form opinions of and voice their opposition to the king’s decisions if they felt it was counter to the public good, which ruled out passive and unconditional obedience.64 Tencin’s counterpart in Nice demonstrated the pitfalls of failing to take this into account.There, the French appointed the relatively inexperienced Provençal lawyer Lombard de Gourdon.65 He failed to act with circumspection and balance, siding invariably with the king, and the administration of justice became increasingly problematic during the second occupation, descending into obstructionism and chicanery.66 In every newly conquered province under Louis XIV, the control of the esprit public became a priority for the French Government to prevent any possible conspiracies.67 In these territories, this meant public opinion as represented by the administrative and social elites. As the French commander in Savoy put it, ‘by controlling the attitudes of these companies, we can be sure of controlling the attitudes of everyone else’.68 Yet the French were constantly suspicious that the Savoyard magistrates were working against them, and their treatment of magistrates considered particularly suspect could be brutal. In 1705, for instance,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 155

12/03/2013 16:10

156

local elites under french occupation

suspicions fell on the sieur Bazin de Chancy, a senator. Angervilliers reported that he had intercepted letters between Victor Amadeus and one of his agents indicating that Bazin could be used as a go-between. Bazin fled to Geneva before he could be arrested; the French decided that they did not have enough proof to put him on trial, so instead they prevented his return to Savoy.69 Similarly, in 1708, the comte de Rochefort, the receveur of the tailles for the Tarentaise and a ducal-appointed chevalier d’honneur in the Sénat, was implicated in a counterfeiting operation in the Tarentaise.70 Rochefort was detained in the arsenal of Grenoble to prevent him supplying credit to the duke of Savoy during the allied incursion that summer. After the allies had retreated, the French freed Rochefort, but would not allow him to resume his functions in the Sénat as they could not trust him.71 Essentially, if the French maintained the sovereign companies in their existing forms, and those companies continued to operate during the French occupation, it was because it suited both parties. For their part, the French maintained the sovereign courts because their own authority in the occupied territories was relatively tenuous and depended on a military presence, which, due to more pressing commitments elsewhere, could not always be relied upon. This was especially important given French concerns over a potential popular uprising in the duchy. The Savoyard elites also gained from the continued existence of sovereign companies, being much more afraid of social disorder than they were of being bullied and humiliated by the French Government. And they certainly fared better than they would have under the alternative, stripped of their offices and income. There were certainly projects mooted in the Savoyard lands for the wholesale suppression of the existing companies, as had happened during the previous French occupation of 1630–31.72 In 1692 a memorandum came to the office of contrôleur général Pontchartrain arguing in favour of suppressing the sovereign companies of Savoy and in their place creating a parlement and a chambre des comptes modelled more closely on the French models, to be filled with French officers.73 This was a potential source of a considerable sum of money, and could have been an attractive prospect for a monarchy with a budget deficit reaching historic and escalating proportions. But the French did not intend to remain in Savoy longer than was absolutely necessary, and, desperate to be rid of the war in the south-east, the king probably felt that such a reorganisation would have both created more local resistance and complicated peace proposals. They recognised that in order to keep the people of the occupied territories under control, they had to leave the existing authority structure intact, while dominating its personnel. The French also opted to maintain the existing structures in Nice. In 1707, the governor of Nice advised Chamillart that occupation of the county

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 156

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

157

cost the king three times as much as he took from it in revenues; he recommended suppressing the Sénat and administering justice through a prefect, with appeals going to the Parlement of Aix-en-Provence. But again Versailles rejected such a drastic shake-up in the administration of a pays conquis.74 Nothing would have turned the elites of these territories against France more than a full attack on the main organs of provincial particularism. Furthermore, as we shall see, French surveillance of the subaltern judicial officers of Savoy remained cursory, making their control of the sovereign courts all the more essential to affirm the authority of the king. For the French, the elites were essential to their hold on the province: as the governor of Savoy, de Thoy, put it to the comte de Médavy in 1707, he was to do everything to hold Chambéry in the event of an allied invasion of Savoy, as the capital had within it the magistrates and a dense concentration of the nobility, ‘who contain the people’.75 The people of Savoy more generally probably benefited from the continued existence of companies which were committed to acting in their interests. In 1709, for instance, the Sénat sent two deputies to Angervilliers to present a detailed memorandum on Savoy’s economic situation, and the intendant immediately halted any further impositions on the duchy.76 Less successfully, in May 1711, the sovereign companies protested at the decision to raise the capitation by a half in lieu of an imposition of the dixième in Savoy, claiming that they were incapable of paying either.77 The intendant wrote to Desmarets on their behalf, but the contrôleur général replied that he could do nothing to help them.78 By comparison, Lorraine was without means of voicing its grievances during the occupation of 1670–97. Until the Cour souveraine of Lorraine was closed in January 1671, it acted as the protector of the interests of the people, sending deputations to the French intendant as well as to the court to request lowering the impositions.79 After its suppression, the elites and the people of Lorraine effectively lost any collective voice. Subaltern officers of justice and finance Effective control and exploitation of an occupied territory often required the reorganisation of governance on a local level. In Lorraine, prévôts dispensed justice in the first instance within the limits of their jurisdiction, or prévôté. At the time of the French conquest of 1670, the majority of prévôts were also army officers and creatures of the duke of Lorraine, having been given the judicial charges to subsist. The intendant realised that they would be unlikely to force people to lodge troops, and could also be involved in the clandestine raising of troops on behalf of Charles IV. He therefore advised that they should be stripped of their offices as soon as the king sent out the order to dispense justice in his name.80

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 157

12/03/2013 16:10

158

local elites under french occupation

The baillis and prévôts could not serve the interests of the king, he argued, as ‘these are men of quality, who by their birth and character support the interests of the duke of Lorraine and his creatures, and will serve our interests in no way at all’.81 In February 1671, shortly after the suppression of the sovereign companies of Lorraine, four conseillers from the Parlement of Metz were sent to the principal towns of Lorraine and the Barrois so that all officers of justice could swear allegiance to the king.82 When the conseiller arrived in Nancy to receive the oaths from the officers of the bailliage, several of them were absent, confirming the intendant’s suspicions.83 Later that month, the king suppressed the most suspect baillis and prévôts, and, to make sure they could pose no threat, Créqui was advised to disarm all the other prévôtés.84 The suppression of the old judicial offices of Lorraine reportedly caused a ‘strong mortification’ for the creatures of Charles IV, who were now being denuded of any protection. As the intendant put it, ‘the future will show that this is the best means possible of undermining any hopes Monsieur de Lorraine may have of maintaining his officers and cavaliers, because the inhabitants now feel free from the power that these men formerly had over them.’85 The reorganisation of justice also had financial advantages for the French: the reform of bailliages and prévôtés increased the size of the ducal domain, now in the hands of the king, and the suppression of many judicial offices in the duchy meant that very few people were now exempt from lodging troops. Charuel had warned that, without imposing troop billeting on magistrates, the newly ennobled and several other privileged groups, it would be impossible for the people of Lorraine to support the tax burden or the troops quartered there.86 Also deemed suspect were Lorrain finance officers. In the spring of 1671 the duke sent an order commanding the officials of the salt works of Lorraine to join him in exile and give him an account of their actions; out of loyalty or fear, many followed the order and deserted, or at least stopped working. This prompted a counter-order from the French intendant, forbidding them from abandoning their posts.87 As their loyalty could not be guaranteed, the French then moved to take the overall supervision of tax collection in Lorraine out of the hands of ducal officers, and entrusted it instead to the Parlement of Metz. Unlike the dispossessed officers of justice, though, the fermiers généraux of Lorraine and the Barrois were compensated for the loss of their charges, being paid the sum of 2,560 livres each by the Parlement of Metz in 1671.88 In addition to the offices suppressed in the early 1670s, a spate of further suppressions took place in the 1680s and 1690s as part of the French Government’s plans to integrate the province, described in Chapter 3.To further this aim, venality was gradually introduced: from 1681 officers had to acquit themselves of the droit annuel by paying an eighth of the value of their office; in return, they could bequeath offices to their heirs. The droit annuel was claimed by the crown

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 158

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

159

for three years (1681 to 1683) and then again for nine years (1684 to 1692); if it was unpaid, the offices were declared vacant.89 Venality was extended after the Nine Years War began. Between 1690 and 1691, the prévôtés of Lorraine and the Barrois were suppressed wholesale, and in their place, the king created new venal prévôtés, whose officers enjoyed the same powers and privileges as those suppressed and as those in other parts of the kingdom.90 In 1692, various other offices were suppressed and recreated in venal form to raise money.91 Venal offices were introduced in all the pays conquis during the Nine Years War to provide badly needed cash to pay for the army.92 This represented a significant shift in policy from the earlier decades of the personal rule: in most of the conquered provinces, the existing political and judicial institutions which the French had maintained were non-venal and had served French purposes very well, as such systems enhanced the requisite loyalty and obedience to the crown.93 The introduction of venality in the 1690s fundamentally changed the way the central government interacted with local elites, and was an important test both of their loyalties and the extent to which the conquered provinces had been integrated into the kingdom. In several cases it has been shown that this period was indeed crucial for deepening the ties between central government and local elites, as new fiscal demands dictated that the elites invest in public debt, purchase venal offices and become involved with tax farming, making them increasingly tied to the French system in the long term.94 In Lorraine, however, the test of loyalty did not produce encouraging results. In part this stemmed from the fact that the new offices often encroached on existing privileges, which the French chose to ignore.95 These new offices directly violated the promises made by Louis XIV at the time of the conquest, but, for the French crown, financial necessity outweighed any contractual obligations with its subjects. It was an absolutist, neo-Roman law dictum that necessitas legem non habet. Many changes imposed on Lorraine were also badly conceived: for instance, the suppression of so many offices was detrimental to the economies of several towns, especially Saint-Mihiel, which had been a seat of the Cour souveraine. A memorandum written in 1689 reported that, since the court was suppressed in 1671, more than 1,500 people had left the town to go and live abroad. SaintMihiel was on the most important military road in the Barrois, but its reduced circumstances meant that it could no longer provide for the subsistence of French troops.96 In other cases the reorganisations had been only partly carried out. It was reported in 1689 that the edicts of 1685 which suppressed the old bailliages of Lorraine had not been executed, and in Epinal the suppressed officers continued to render justice as local royal judges, with the full support of the Parlement of Metz.97 For many, the reorganisation seemed arbitrary and made life difficult: with no officiers d’élections or other juges ordinaires des droits du Roy in the généralité, clergy, noblemen and commoners alike had to travel

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 159

12/03/2013 16:10

160

local elites under french occupation

great distances for the least contestation; those without the means to do so had to acquiesce to anything demanded of them. By the late 1680s it was widely acknowledged that many of the changes had had a detrimental effect; not only was justice more difficult to pursue, but there was now only one general tax receiver for the whole of Lorraine, whose collectors were hopelessly overburdened (previously there had been a receiver for each prévôté).98 The extensive judicial and administrative reorganisations during the French occupation also created a large dispossessed group in Lorrain society, and compensation was generally granted only to those appointed to office after the French conquest in 1670.99 Unsurprisingly, resentment towards the French grew as the years of occupation took their toll, reaching a high point in the 1690s. It was reported to the contrôleur général in 1694 that the officers of the bailliage of Bar-le-Duc, who were obliged to feed the poor of the town, refused food to French paupers, ‘as they have a mortal aversion for this nation, and ­sacrifice them voluntarily as they have done many times despite being punished’.100 Moreover, rumours of peace and the restitution of Lorraine to its duke meant that many of the new offices went unsold.101 Not all Lorrains stood aloof from the French regime, however, and many successfully adapted to the French judicial system. Jean-Baptiste de Mahuet, for instance, whose elder brother was secretary to Charles V during the 1670s, served during the same period as lieutenant civil et criminel in the bailliage of Nancy thanks to the protection of Marshal Créqui.102 Following the restructuring of the mid-1680s, Mahuet purchased the office of président in the présidial of Toul in 1686, before becoming président à mortier in the Parlement of Metz in 1691.103 Jean-Léonard, baron de Bourcier, another graduate in law from the University of Pont-à-Mousson, became an avocat at the Parlement of Metz in 1674, and went on to be procureur général at the Conseil provincial of L­ uxembourg in 1684.104 Other families, the du Hautoy and Hoffelize among them, also worked within the French system either in subaltern offices or at the Parlement of Metz. This allowed them to protect, and perhaps even advance, their family interests.105 Furthermore, after 1697, most moved comfortably into the ducal system.106 Despite the many changes the occupation brought about, the French continued to use privileges to bind to them those office-holders who either survived or had acquired a position. To encourage the officers of the domains to continue working after the conquest, the French initially guaranteed them continuation of their privileges, although in March 1671 exemptions from lodging troops were withdrawn for all but a few commis.107 As described in Chapter 5, the French sometimes suppressed privileges deemed particularly obstructive to French interests. But in times of crisis they were often obliged to go further, and as the fiscal demands of the NineYear War began to multiply, their attitude to privilege in Lorraine shifted decisively.108 The unprecedented size of

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 160

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

161

the French army meant that the intendant was forced to further reduce the exemptions from lodging troops.Thus, despite many complaints to the contrôleur général in Versailles, troops were quartered for the first time among wealthy bourgeois, fermiers of domains and diverse other officers who, like the contrôleurs, directeurs and commis of the postal system, had been exempted since 1670.109 As intendant Vaubourg wrote to Pontchartrain in 1693: ‘it is not possible that those who claim exemption dispense themselves from sharing part of the burden’.110 French officials usually realised that alienating local officers or communities was detrimental to the king’s interests and was to be avoided, so the harshness shown in Lorraine indicates unprecedented levels of pre-existing hostility on the part of the elites, though the French may have over-reacted. By contrast, if local officials co-operated, it greatly benefited the French administrators in an occupied territory. In Savoy, the French used employees of the gabelles as well as the syndics of communities to keep an eye on soldiers who had deserted from the service of Victor Amadeus and returned to live with their families. These officials knew the country and its inhabitants well, and through them the French were informed of all deserters in Savoy, as well as the ways in which Victor Amadeus called them back to his service. They often risked their lives for the service of the king: in January 1707, for instance, the commander of the Chablais reported that an employee of the gabelles named Pelicier had recently arrested two noblemen on the frontier for trying to smuggle Savoyard peasants into Piedmont. Pelicier took his prisoners to Chambéry, without recompense, and had since been menaced by the families of the noblemen. The French commander advised giving Pelicier ten pistoles for his trouble and the promise of further recompense in the future, and the king agreed to reward the zeal of all such employees and guards working on the frontier.111 The French also used local officers to carry out censuses in Savoy and Lorraine, to find out how many men were in the service of the king and how many in foreign service, as well as a list of the property of those fighting abroad.112 The main principle of the French regime during both occupations of Savoy with regard to local officers of justice and finance was to change as little as possible.The intendant Bouchu was convinced that the collectors of the taille and the gabelles should be kept in their positions and treated well ‘as these men are necessary to us, as they guarantee prompt collections, and any Frenchmen we put in their place would acquit themselves much less well’. Frenchmen brought in to do the job would cost six times as much in salaries as the Savoyard incumbents and, not having any knowledge of the area, would bring in less revenue. Furthermore, experience showed that native officers were less likely to be robbed by raiding parties from Montmélian than French employees.113 In Savoy, therefore, it suited the French to maintain existing financial and judicial officers as they did not pose an obvious threat to French security in the region, as the Lorrain prévôts

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 161

12/03/2013 16:10

162

local elites under french occupation

had done in 1670. This reflected French practice elsewhere: in Luxembourg, for instance, the local administration was maintained in its existing form, and most personnel followed their material interests and remained in place.114 In such cases, the French must also have considered that the wholesale replacement of officials would create a large group with little to lose by resistance. In any case, reorganisation or replacement of the existing system would be expensive, and the French were keen to avoid unnecessary costs in Savoy, which they had little expectation of keeping in the long term. In retaining native local officials, the French were demonstrating their faith in (what they saw as) the natural goodwill of Savoyards towards them. But such pro-French sentiment had its limits. Although Savoyard officials were generally quite co-operative during the first occupation, they were not so the second time around, again mainly because of intimidation by the duke. Following the restitution of Savoy in 1696, Victor Amadeus established a special tribunal, headed by his intendant and comprising select members of the Sénat and Chambre des comptes. The precise function of this Chambre de justice was to ‘examine the conduct of local officers, syndics, chatelaines and other persons who, during the occupation, ran the affairs of towns and communes and committed malpractice in their administration’.115 It sat every day until its suppression on 30 April 1699. Though there were few important sentences, the tribunal had an ugly character as it depended on denunciations: the church hierarchy coerced the faithful to come forward with information under threat of ecclesiastical censure.116 By the second occupation, therefore, the attitude of local officials had shifted, and they were now much less willing to work with the French. As early as 1703, the intendant believed several tax collectors were not declaring their receipts.117 This became even more apparent after the war turned against France in 1706: Victor Amadeus renewed his threats, and the French found that the native officials could no longer be trusted. At the salt works, Savoyard guards were infiltrated by ducal agents and released imprisoned smugglers to go to Piedmont, prompting calls from the commis général des gabelles to replace them with twelve or fifteen Frenchmen.118 When some Savoyard finance officers even let themselves be robbed by raiding parties financed by the duke,119 the French ordered the Savoyard fermier général to replace his native employees with Frenchmen; he refused, as having Frenchmen serve under him would reflect very badly upon him in the eyes of the duke.120 For many, the risks involved in collaborating with the French were now simply too great. The justice officials of the county of Nice proved even more unwilling to co-operate, and Frenchmen were brought in to replace native officials wherever possible.121 More significantly, the trésorier général of the county of Nice, Cotto, informed the French commissaire in 1705 that he could not continue in his position as it would be too risky for him.122

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 162

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

163

Though they were not blind to the predicament of these officers, the French were selective in whom they helped: they showed a lot less sympathy for lower functionaries than for the magistrates of the sovereign courts. Following incursions into Savoy by Victor Amadeus in the summer of 1711, two maîtres of the Chambre des comptes of Chambéry and a minor judicial officer from the Faucigny were found to have diverted tax receipts to the invading army. The intendant advised treating the two maîtres leniently, or Victor Amadeus might exact vengeance on the other magistrates who had served under the French in the previous eight years; the judicial officer, however, was arrested.123 The towns The French realised that major towns could be of crucial importance in main­­ taining their hold on a conquered province, and towns were the scene of much of the interaction between the occupiers and occupied, particularly on a symbolic level. The French demanded regular displays of loyalty from town councils so that the glories and benefits of Bourbon rule would be clear to the wider population. This included visible and active participation at festivities for French royal visits, as well as royal births, marriages and deaths. Usually French officials orchestrated these events, but the councils were expected to add their own embellishments: in 1680, municipal officers of Nancy were instructed what to do for reception of the dauphine, and they added fireworks in the garden of the palace where she stayed.124 For the birth of the duke of Brittany in 1707, the festivities in Nice were particularly extravagant, including a military parade, street illuminations, fireworks and a wine fountain which cascaded from an enormous sun surmounted by the king’s coat of arms.125 The French were usually eager to court the municipal regimes and were careful to respect their privileges and customs. Peter Wallace’s study of French rule in Freiburg im Breisgau between 1677 and 1697 revealed that the French authorities there respected and even increased the status and influence of the civic regime in order to encourage collaboration.126 In Luxembourg, the seven échevins of the town’s magistrat remained in place throughout the period of French rule.127 Likewise, the French behaved with moderation towards Chambéry and Nice, where most of the nobility (of Savoy and the county of Nice respectively) resided, as well as the magistrates who formed the sovereign companies. Shortly after the capitulation of Chambéry in November 1703, Tessé told the syndics of the town that he did not want to make the French presence hard or odious, and assured them of his protection and the good order he was determined to keep.128 In Chambéry the municipal regime proved co-operative, and there was little interference in its affairs. The French authorities were often willing to listen

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 163

12/03/2013 16:10

164

local elites under french occupation

to appeals for reductions in the fiscal burden on the province: in September 1690, for instance, when the syndics of Chambéry sent a deputation to Versailles to protest at the immense sums imposed on Savoy, Louvois eased the burden by reducing the taille by half.129 Annecy’s municipal regime was left intact and annual elections went ahead as usual, though on occasion the French authorities intervened to secure the election of their own choice of syndics.130 To strengthen their voices, the town councils of Chambéry and Annecy sometimes acted collectively to request concessions from the war minister.131 During the War of the Spanish Succession, Chamillart insisted that French agents and governors in these Savoyard towns act with as much sensitivity as possible. This was even the case in Nice, where relations with the town council were frosty at best. In 1705 the Niçois consuls were so reluctant to swear the oath of allegiance to the king that Chamillart felt compelled to write to them on several occasions to emphasise the advantages of co-operation.132 He spelled out his feelings clearly to the French governor of Nice when the consuls complained of the latter’s high-handed manner: ‘Nothing is worse than to be too brusque with people who are newly conquered’; he then ordered the governor to modify his behaviour, ‘so that they may have recourse to you in their needs, and that you give them the necessary protection in every thing which is not contrary to service of the king’.133 Chamillart’s approach was somewhat inappropriate given the level of sheer obstructionism by some members of the municipal council: the commissaire ordonnateur, Gayot, sneered that it was run by ‘peasants and artisans intoxicated on their own ignorance’, even arguing that the municipality was so badly managed that it should be replaced by a French commissaire.134 The war minister would only agree to exclusion of the most troublesome consuls, however, and the council continued to make difficulties over its financial obligations and providing winter quarters.135 That it was maintained in spite of all of this reflects the French Government’s inability (and unwillingness) to adapt to the change in attitudes in Nice during the second occupation, and the relative weakness of the French position in Nice overall. By contrast, when the French conquered Lorraine in 1670 their treatment of the municipalities displayed none of the moderation and respect later shown in Savoy and Nice, again suggesting that Louvois’ policy was partly shaped by his initial judgements of the warmth, or otherwise, of the elites. In May 1671 the French cancelled the elections for municipal offices in Lorraine, fearing that changes in personnel could be detrimental to the king’s interests.136 This was almost certainly due to fears that the corporations would be filled with agents of the duke. As the future of Lorraine was still undecided, the municipalities were still eager to prove their loyalty to Charles IV and sought instructions from him and his secretary of state on how to proceed.137 Furthermore, when the duke fell seriously ill in July 1671, the officers of the hôtel de ville of Nancy asked if they

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 164

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

165

could send two envoys to Cologne to see him.138 Further evidence of their loyalty was shown after the duke’s death in September 1675 when the French governor, Rochefort, refused requests from the civic magistrates of Nancy to have public prayers said for the duke; he also prevented anybody from sending deputations to the duchess, Prince Charles or the prince de Vaudémont.139 This strength of loyalty to the duke helps to explain why the French felt obliged to reorganise local administration in Lorraine so drastically. In the second phase of the occupation after 1679, the changes to justice and finance in Lorraine had quite an impact on towns, and the introduction of venal offices to the municipalities from 1690 – whereby the offices of procureur, secrétaire and greffier were offered for sale – demeaned existing members of the corporations. In 1692, further municipal reform in Nancy and Bar-le-Duc introduced venality of office for mayors and conseillers assesseurs, and the post of mayor of Nancy went to non-Lorrains until the end of the occupation.140 Conclusions France’s relations with the administrative elites in occupied territories again demonstrate that the government’s policy was essentially fashioned ad hoc, rather than with a clearly defined policy. The most important factor in determining policy appears to have been the initial warmth with which the French were received in the occupied lands: they were much more likely to maintain a territory’s existing institutions if the local elites were perceived as friendly and likely to collaborate. The experience of several conquered territories seems to confirm this: in Luxembourg, Freiburg, Nice and elsewhere the French were keen to work with existing structures wherever possible. Placing Lorraine in this context reveals just how unusual was the wholesale rejection of the duchy’s system of government and how deep was the level of hostility the French must have encountered. Though the treatment of Lorraine was without doubt highly atypical, an emphasis on moderation as ‘usual’ practice would be misleading. The monarchy’s primary reflex in these territories was to assert the king’s power, and it was almost always inclined to view the local defence of privilege as resistance. The general tone of French conduct in the occupied territories makes it difficult to see the policy as one of compromise, especially when compared with the monarchy’s much more favourable attitude to equivalent institutions and groups within the kingdom: in Burgundy, for instance, though co-operation between the elites and the crown was very much on the latter’s terms, the elites were rewarded with immediate gains and consolidation of their own political positions.141 There was also substantial variation from one occupied territory to the next, and over

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 165

12/03/2013 16:10

166

local elites under french occupation

time, as the short-term financial and strategic priorities of the government often over-rode a more general policy of sensitivity to privileged interests. This was a feature of French practice throughout Louis XIV’s personal rule, but became much more evident as a result of the fiscal and political crises which gripped France in the 1690s and 1700s. Although the French Government hoped at first to encourage collaboration among the occupied administrative elites by promising accommodation and negotiation, the monarchy soon resorted to arbitrary and even relatively brutal action. In many cases, French officials could not hide their contempt for the native officials and institutions of conquered territories, regardless of whether they perpetuated such institutions for ease of governance. In response, the occupied institutions could do little other than suffer the countless humiliations and indignities to which the French subjected them. This is particularly clear in regard to the sovereign courts: in Savoy and Lorraine, treatment of the courts differs considerably from the pattern in those pays conquis where the French acquired full sovereignty. There, the French would typically strip the courts of their political functions while allowing them to retain their judicial authority, and would use their membership to build wider support for the French regime. In Lorraine, this policy was abandoned altogether; in Savoy the Sénat was increasingly sidelined in the 1700s, losing important elements of its judicial competency after these were perceived to interfere with military security and the war effort. Nevertheless, these authoritarian tactics may well have ultimately paid dividends: by inculcating in officials the sense that the slightest insubordination would be punished severely, the French may have prevented more serious resistance and intrigue during the darkest phases of the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession.



Notes

1 For the Franche-Comté, see Dee, Expansion and crisis, pp. 31, 40; for Flanders, Legay, Les Etats provinciaux, pp. 40–2. 2 Stewart, Roussillon, p. 42. 3 R. Blaufarb, ‘The survival of the pays d’états: the example of Provence’, Past and Present, 209 (2010); Legay, Les Etats provinciaux, pp. 50–1. 4 Dee, Expansion and crisis, p. 70. 5 Grosperrin, L’Influence francaise, p. 20. 6 Legay, Les Etats provinciaux, p. 37. 7 Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, pp. 28–9. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, p. 89. The French ‘suspended’ the Estates of Luxembourg for the duration of their presence there, though the subdélégué Mahieu still had contact with representatives regarding financial matters such as exemptions. Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 42. 8 Beik, Absolutism and society, p. 309. 9 Savoy’s was last summoned in 1560, and Lorraine’s in 1629. Devos, ‘Un siècle’, p. 235; Lipp, Noble strategies, p. 124. 10 Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, i, pp. 272–80; H. Mahuet, La Cour souveraine de Lorraine et Barrois, 1641–1790 (Nancy, 1959), pp. 125, 149–54. 11 ADMM 3F 247 no. 3, ‘Proces-verbal des violences exercées contre les sieurs Mengin et

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 166

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

167

Vignolles pour obtenir d’eux les clefs du Trésor des chartes’, 9 Sep. 1670. 12 Those imprisoned were Salet, the tresorier général, Rousselange, the procureur général, and Cachez, a conseiller and greffier. SHDT A1 250, fo. 215, Charuel to Louvois, 5 Nov. 1670. 13 SHDT A1 250, fo. 263, Charuel to Louvois, 23 Nov. 1670; fo. 357, Charuel to Colbert, 3 Dec. 1670; fo. 359, Colbert to Charuel, 12 Dec. 1670. 14 The duke promptly issued an edict forbidding his subjects from making appeals to Metz. Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 45. 15 SHDT A1 252, fos. 145–6, Louvois to Charuel, 28 Nov. 1670. 16 SHDT A1 250, fo. 318, Charuel to Louvois 2 Dec. 1670; fo. 338, Charuel to Louvois, 10 Dec. 1670. 17 SHDT A1 252, fo. 164, Louvois to Charuel, 17 Dec. 1670; fo. 202, Louvois to Charuel, 26 Jan. 1671; AMN Ord., Ordonnance of 22 Dec. 1670. 18 SHDT A1 253, fo. 14, Charuel to Louvois, 28 Dec. 1670. 19 SHDT A1 253, fo. 38, Créqui to Louvois, 9 Jan. 1671. 20 Several times during the occupation the French considered re-establishing the Chambre des comptes of Bar-le-Duc, but this was never enacted. SHDT A1 253, fo. 218, Charuel to Louvois, 10 May 1671. ADMM 3F 97 no. 24, ‘Offices de Lorraine & Barrois’ by du Hautoy [undated]; Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 217. 21 Canon was permanently separated from his wife, who remained in Nancy, though the French allowed her to visit him when he was ill. SHDT A1 509 no. 148, Charuel to Louvois, 18 Oct. 1676. A. Gain, Histoire de Lorraine. Publié avec le concours de seize collaborateurs (Nancy, 1939), p. 415; Mahuet, Cour souveraine, p. 234. 22 Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 217. 23 SHDT A1 417 no. 134, Charuel to Louvois, 18 Apr. 1674. 24 ADMM 3F 229 no. 3, Instruction for Carlingford, 1 Dec. 1697; Mahuet, Cour souveraine, p. 47. 25 Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 27. 26 The king insisted on replacing the procureur général with a Frenchman, Jean-Léonard Bourcier, who was a lawyer from Parlement of Metz. Ibid., pp. 28–9. 27 Ford, Strasbourg, p. 87. 28 Dee, Expansion and Crisis, p. 76. 29 SHDT A1 1010 no. 31, Bonval to Louvois, 15 Aug. 1690. 30 An identical edict was registered in March 1704. ADS 2B 21 [unnumbered], ‘Declaration du Roy pour authoriser le Senat & la Chambre des Comptes de Savoye, & autres Jurisdictions dudit Pais’, 17 Jan. 1691 and 9 Mar. 1704; Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, p. 132. 31 Ibid., ii, pp. 95–7. 32 Tencin’s appointment came about as a result of Louvois’ demise in July 1691, as this freed the intendant to appoint his own candidate. 33 Chapman, Private ambition, p. 149. 34 The total expenses of the gages for officers of the Sénat and Chambre des comptes, royal officers and payments to religious communities came to a surprisingly low 27,526 livres per quarter. SHDT A1 1274 no. 13, Bonval to Barbezieux, 19 Jul. 1694. 35 SHDT A1 1116 no. 208, Bonval to Louvois, 12 Jul. 1691; no. 209, ‘Memoire pour les interests du Senat de Savoie’; no. 210, ‘Memoire pour l’Exercise de la Justice’. 36 SHDT A1 1331 no. 203, Tencin to Barbezieux, 7 Jul. 1695. 37 Chaumet points out that, during the two occupations of Nice, the remuneration of Niçois magistrates was irregular and was interrupted on three occasions as a result of the financial problems of the French authorities. Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 196. 38 The only live absentee was Gian-Battista Marelli, who was also abbot of Hautecombe, the old burial place of the dukes of Savoy. 39 The French refused to sell the office of senator for less than 10,000 livres. SHDT A1 1331 no. 184, Bonval to Barbezieux, 30 Mar. 1695. 40 SHDT A1 1272 no. 31, Bonval to Barbezieux, 11 Apr. 1694. 41 SHDT A1 1331 no. 240, Dupuy to Barbezieux, 12 Dec. 1694; A1 1331 no. 178, Bonval to Barbezieux, 30 Jan. 1695.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 167

12/03/2013 16:10

168

local elites under french occupation

42 SHDT A1 1331 no. 151, Bachivilliers to Barbezieux, 12 Jan. 1695; no. 175, Bonval to Barbezieux, 13 Jan. 1695. 43 See Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements, particularly pp. 38–59 on the critical period of 1671–3. 44 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 118–21. The Chambre was abolished altogether in 1720. 45 AST P Sav. 2 no. 24, ‘Rapport général sur la Savoie, 1713’. 46 SHDT A1 1690 no. 190, Tessé to Chamillart, 23 Nov. 1703; A1 1764 no. 1, La Feuillade to Chamillart, 2 Jan. 1704; A1 1766 no. 37, Chamillart to Bouchu, 3 Feb. 1704. 47 AAE CP Sard. 115, fo. 118, La Feuillade to Torcy, 23 Nov. 1705; SHDT A1 1876 no. 420, La Feuillade to Chamillart, 23 Nov. 1705. 48 SHDT A1 1690 no. 87, Chamillart to Bouchu, 29 Nov. 1703. 49 SHDT A1 1690 no. 119, Bouchu to Chamillart, 16 Dec. 1703; A1 1764 no. 2, Chamillart to Bouchu, 3 Jan. 1704. Gaud was rewarded with the more senior post of premier président of the Sénat by Victor Amadeus after the French withdrawal in 1713. 50 SHDT A1 2251 no. 73, de Ville to Voysin, 17 Feb. 1710; AN G7 no. 249, ‘Compte de la taille, capitation et ferme générale de l’année 1709’. 51 Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, pp. 105–10. Niçois magistrates seen as too close to France were also stripped of functions in 1696 and 1713: Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 224. 52 SHDT A1 1690 no. 177, Tessé to Chamillart, 16 Nov. 1703. Darryl Dee noted that the elites of the Franche-Comté (also occupied twice by France during this period) were noticeably less enthusiastic the second time around: Expansion and Crisis, p. 48. 53 Quoted in Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, p. 131. 54 SHDT A1 1972 no. 188, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 29 Aug. 1706; no. 190, de Ville to Chamillart, 13 Aug. 1706. De Ville pointed out that this practice had been respected at all times, even under Henri II when he occupied Savoy. 55 SHDT A1 1972 no. 188, Angervilliers, to Chamillart, 29 Aug. 1706. 56 ADS 2B 23, fo. 48, Sénat to Louis XIV, 3 Mar. 1708; fo. 51, Cany to Tencin, 24 Mar. 1708. 57 From 1696 to 1702 the Sénat had refused to register an edict imposing the compulsory recording of deeds by state-approved notaries (tabellion). Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 57. They certainly had few compunctions about displeasing the pope, the entire company having been excommunicated for siding with the duke over the issue of clerical immunities. Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, p. 123. 58 Dee, Expansion and crisis, pp. 51–2; Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, pp. 88–9; Stewart, Roussillon, p. 85. 59 Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 754. 60 SHDT A1 2102 no. 290, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 30 Sep. 1708. 61 Boislisle, Correspondance, iii, pp. 58–9 no. 181, Voysin to Angervilliers, 5 Jan. 1709; AN G7 247 no. 291, Angervilliers to Desmarets, 7 Nov. 1709; Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, pp. 140–41. 62 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 57. 63 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 208–10, 220. For a particular instance of this, see pp. 222–4, which describes how the Niçois senators managed to resist the attempted replacement of their local practices with French ones in the adjudication of tax farms. 64 Mousnier, The institutions of France, i, p. 434. Of course, this had to be done in a more submissive and humble fashion after the 1660s and early 1670s. 65 Gourdon was second président, though the frequent absence of the elderly premier président Regnault de Sollier made him the principal French agent in the Sénat. 66 SHDT A1 2173 no. 68, Voysin to Gayot, 19 Mar. 1709; Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 192–3. The magistrates also resented Gourdon because he was Provençal; they feared the French would assert their claim that Nice was a dependent territory of Provence and threaten a réunion on the Côte d’Azur. 67 Ibid., p. 117; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 748. 68 SHDT A1 1004, no. 106, La Hoguette to Louvois, 21 Dec. 1690. 69 SHDT A1 1879 no. 301, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 22 Nov. 1705. 70 Rochefort was also chargé d’affaires of the prince di Carignano, the principal landowner in the area. The principal accused was a M. Desaires, one of Rochefort’s clerks.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 168

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

169

71 SHDT A1 2102 no. 318, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 7 Nov. 1708; ADS 2B 23, fo. 54, Desmarets to Sénat, 18 Nov. 1708. 72 J. Humbert, Une grande entreprise oubliée: Les Français en Savoie sous Louis XIII (Paris, 1960), pp. 226–8. 73 AN G7 242 no. 247, ‘Mémoire concernant le Piedmont et la Savoie’ [undated]; a memorandum on the same theme had been sent to the secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1690: AAE CP Sard. 93 no. 223, ‘Mémoire concernant le Piedmont et la Savoye’, 1690. 74 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 185. 75 SHDT A1 2041 no. 19, de Thoy to Chamillart, 6 Jul. 1707. 76 Burnier, Histoire du Sénat, ii, p. 146. 77 ADS 2B 26 no. 15, Sénat and Chambre des comptes to Angervilliers, 24 May 1711 and reply of Angervilliers, 26 May 1711. 78 ADS 2B 26 no. 16, Angervilliers to de Ville, 20 Dec. 1711. 79 SHDT A1 250, fo. 247, Charuel to Louvois, 19 Nov. 1670; fo. 272, Créqui to Louvois, 26 Nov. 1670. 80 SHDT A1 250, fo. 350, Charuel to Louvois, 10 Dec. 1670. 81 SHDT A1 253, fo. 26, Charuel to Louvois, 31 Dec. 1670. 82 SHDT A1 252, fo. 202, Louvois to Créqui, 7 Feb. 1671; AMN Ord.. Ordonnance of 9 Feb. 1671. 83 SHDT A1 253, fo. 189, Charuel to Louvois, 10 Mar. 1671. 84 AAE CP Lorr. 43, fo. 31, Créqui to Lionne, 26 Feb. 1671; Lanouvelle, Créquy, p. 150. 85 SHDT A1 253, fo. 84, Charuel to Louvois, 25 Jan. 1671. 86 SHDT A1 253, fos. 38–40, Créqui to Louvois, 9 Jan. 1671; fo. 59, Charuel to Louvois, 18 Jan. 1671. 87 SHDT A1 253, fo. 237, Charuel to Louvois, 7 June 1671; ADMM 3F 264 no. 25, ‘Ordonnance du Roy’, 23 June 1671. 88 BN Mél. Col. 156bis, fo. 393, François de Tilly (greffier of Bar-le-Duc) to Colbert, 1671. 89 AN G7 374 no. 330, ‘Arrêt du conseil d’état qui ordonne que tous les officiers … pourvues par les Ducs de Lorraine, seront receus a payer le Droit Annuel pendant le temps & aux conditions portées par les Déclaration & Arrêt des 4. & 8. du présent mois de Mars’, 15 Mar. 1681; Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 45. 90 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 12, fo. 113, ‘Edit du Roy, portant suppression & Creation d’Offices dans les Prevotez de la Province de Lorraine & Barrois’, Jul. 1691; AN G7 415 no. 62, François Bournaq (prévot of Epinal) to Pontchartrain, 24 Jun. 1692. 91 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 12, fos. 117–18, ‘Edit du Roy, portant confirmation & etablissement de plusieurs officiers dans les Bailliages de Bar & Gondrecourt….’, 9 Dec. 1692. 92 For Alsace see Wallace, Early modern Colmar, p. 6; for the Franche-Comté see Grosperrin, L’Influence française, p. 22. Luxembourg was initially exempted from these creations on the grounds that the government had promised to conserve their local usages ‘for a certain time’; by the 1690s, however, new venal offices were created there too as the crown’s financial situation deteriorated. Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 170 no. 652, Le Peletier to Charuel, 27 Aug 1689; AN G7 354 no. 4, Mahieu to Pontchartain, 4 Oct. 1691. 93 Stewart, Roussillon, p. 31. 94 Potter, Corps and clienteles, pp. 189–90; Wallace, Early modern Colmar, p. 199. 95 AN G7 5 no. 2. Le Peletier to Charuel, 10 Feb. 1689; G7 374 no. 448, inhabitants of Epinal to Charuel [undated]. 96 AN G7 374 no. 293, ‘Mémoire pour les officiers de Lorraine et Barrois’, 1689. 97 AN G7 374 no. 500, procureur du roi of Epinal to Le Peletier, 31 Aug. 1689. 98 ADMM 3F 97 no. 24, ‘Mémoire on Offices de Lorraine & Barrois’, by du Hautoy [undated]. 99 Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 62 no. 239, Le Peletier to the président and procureur général of the Parlement of Metz, 21 Feb. and 10 May 1686. 100 AN G7 415, no. 258, ‘Avis à Monseigneur le Controlleur General’, 1694. 101 AN G7 6, Pontchartrain to Vaubourg, 31 Dec. 1692; G7 415 no. 167, lieutenant général of Toul to Pontchartrain, 17 Oct 1693. Boislisle, Correspondance, i, p. 457 no. 1643, Vaubourg to Pontchartrain, 20 Aug. 1697.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 169

12/03/2013 16:10

170

local elites under french occupation

102 Lipp, Noble strategies, p. 96. Charuel suggested that he could be a contact through which they could negotiate with the duke, from 1675. SHDT A1 460 no. 308, Charuel to Louvois, 24 Sep. 1675. 103 Mahuet, Cour souveraine, p. 48. 104 Bourcier also did well following the restitution of Lorraine to the duke, becoming conseiller d’état and procureur général of both Lorraine and the Barrois in 1698, and he succeeded Mahuet as premier président 1721. Mahuet, Cour souveraine, p. 232. 105 Lipp, Noble strategies, pp. 100, 140; Mahuet, Cour souveraine, pp. 232, 236, 241. 106 Lipp, Noble strategies, p. 141; ADMM 3F 229 no. 3, Instruction for Carlingford, 1 Dec. 1697. All local offices of justices were to be re-established as per 1670, with original judges reappointed if still alive. 107 AMN Ord., Ordonnances of 18 Oct. 1670 and 4 Mar. 1671. Zeller, ‘Les Charges’, p. 45. The privilege was reduced to a small number of commis to be chosen amongst themselves. 108 Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant’, p. 342. 109 AMN Ord., Ordonnance of 12 Dec. 1670. 110 Quoted in Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant’, p. 341. Such privileges were also revoked in other frontier provinces in the 1690s, such as Alsace. Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 700. 111 SHDT A1 1994, fos. 439–41, Le Guerchois to Chamillart, 22 Jan. 1707; fo. 435, Chamillart to Couppy, 30 Jan. 1707. 112 These were carried out in Lorraine in 1681, and in Savoy in 1695. BMN 152(345) no. 63, Ordonnance, 10 Feb. 1681; SHDT A1 1331 no. 172, Bonval to Barbezieux, 2 Jan. 1695. 113 SHDT A1 1690 no. 123 Bouchu to Chamillart, 20 Dec. 1703; A1 1879 no. 38, Bouchu to Chamillart, 20 Feb. 1705. 114 Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 27; Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 51. 115 ADS 2B 2566 [unnumbered], declaration of Victor Amadeus, 28 Mar. 1697. 116 The two most serious sentences were a fine of 5,000 livres and banishment for a year. The tribunal’s proceedings are contained in five dossiers: ADS 2B 2566–70. 117 This was denied by the sieur Saillet, the Savoyard trésorier général who continued in his post under the French. SHDT A1 1690 no. 123, Bouchu to Chamillart, 20 Dec. 1703 and no. 124. Saillet to Chamillart [undated]. 118 SHDT A1 2038 no. 185, Le Guerchois to Chamillart, 3 Mar. 1707. 119 Devos, ‘Aspects de l’occupation’, p. 39. 120 Blaisot, the fermier général, had a long history of service to the duke, having previously been maître des comptes in the Chambre of Chambéry. SHDT A1 2038 no. 213, Le Guerchois to Chamillart, 10 Mar. 1707. 121 In the Barcelonette valley, for instance, the French insisted that the vacant office of prefect be filled by a Provençal rather than a native. SHDT A1 1973 no. 138, Regnault de Sollier to Chamillart, 3 Mar. 1706; A1 2044 no. 169, Angervilliers to Chamillart, 14 Apr. 1707. 122 SHDT A1 1880 no. 113, Payeau to Chamillart, 6 June 1705. Cotte later fled into Piedmont, and the French confiscated his property. A1 2043 no. 100, Chamillart to Gourdon, 14 Sep. 1707. 123 Boislisle, Correspondance, iii, p. 412 no. 1172, Angervilliers to Desmarets, 2 Nov. 1711. 124 SHDT A1 668, no. 22, Bissy to Louvois, 11 Feb. 1680. Municipal officials were also required to participate in Te Deums for French military victories: A1 1862 no. 12, Tencin to Chamillart, 4 May 1705; A1 1968 no. 42, Tencin to Chamillart, 27 Jan. 1706. 125 SHDT A1 1973 nos. 70 and 222, Paratte to Chamillart, 30 Jan. and 19 May 1706. 126 P. G. Wallace, ‘Between Bourbon and Habsburg: Elite Political Identities at Freiburg im Breisgau, 1651–1715’, Austrian HistoryYearbook, 33 (2002), pp. 34–6. 127 Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 30. The French also maintained the municipal governments in Roussillon. Stewart, Roussillon, p. 15. 128 SHDT A1 1690 no. 177, Tessé to Louis XIV, 16 Nov. 1703. 129 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 44. 130 AMA RD 47, fo. 227, 1 May 1691; RD 48, fo. 20, 19 Aug. 1704. 131 AMA RD, fo. 114, Syndics of Chambery to Syndics of Annecy, 2 March 1710. On its own,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 170

12/03/2013 16:10

the administrative elites

171

Annecy was less successful, as for example in 1704 when the syndics requested exemption from provisioning the army’s wheat magazines due to the town’s heavy debts of 30,000 livres. AMA RD 48, fo. 9, Syndics of Annecy to Bouchu, 17 Feb. 1704, and reply dated 21 Feb. 1704. 132 SHDT A1 1874 nos. 122 and 193, Chamillart to consuls of Nice, 31 May and 13 June 1705. 133 SHDT A1 1973 no. 280, Chamillart to Paratte, 21 Jul. 1706. 134 SHDT A1 1974 no. 231, Gayott to Chamillart, 21 Aug. 1706. 135 SHDT A1 1874 no. 459, consuls of Nice to Chamillart, 29 July 1705; Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 148–9. 136 SHDT A1 253, fo. 222, Créqui to Louvois, 20 May 1671. 137 ADMM 3F 228 no. 69, Chambre de ville of Nancy to Le Bègue [undated]. 138 SHDT A1 253, fo. 294, Charuel to Louvois, 19 Jul. 1671. 139 SHDT A1 461 no. 23, Rochefort to Louvois, 7 Oct. 1675. 140 Venal mayoral offices were introduced throughout the kingdom by an edict of March 1692. Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 724; Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 46; Laperche-Fournel, ‘Etre intendant’, p. 327; Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 389–90. 141 Potter, Corps and Clienteles, p. 98. See also J. Swann, Provincial Power and Absolute Monarchy: The Estates General of Burgundy, 1661–1790 (Cambridge, 2003), chapter 7.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 171

12/03/2013 16:10

7 The church

The French Government was well aware of the importance of religion in managing conquered populations.1 The church was central to the diffusion of pro- (or anti-) French views; as with the lay elites, the co-operation of the clergy was vital in maintaining order. Lorraine and Savoy were predominantly Catholic societies, and the clergy possessed immense influence over consciences and public opinion, but experience in several newly annexed provinces showed that the loyalties of the religious elites could be the most difficult to win out of all of the social groups in conquered societies.2 Of course, as in France, the clergy of Lorraine and Savoy were far from being unified or homogeneous social entities. The upper ranks were often filled with nobles, who shared many of the dynastic interests and concerns highlighted in the previous chapters.3 The church served as an important vehicle for supra-regional mobility for nobles, many of whom had long-standing family ties to religious houses and other benefices; any change to the status quo would therefore risk upsetting the occupied nobilities, something the French generally wished to avoid.4 At the opposite end of the social scale, many of the lower clergy, particularly parish priests and regulars of the reformed mendicant orders, shared more of a mindset with the common people, who, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, had to bear most of the burdens of occupation.5 The extent of religious tensions between France and the conquered popu­­ lation could also be crucial in determining the tone of the occupation regime. This was most obvious where the French took over Protestant territories, as in Alsace, where they strove to consolidate their political control by adopting a more aggressive policy of confessionalisation from the 1680s.6 Yet, as studies of certain other pays conquis have indicated, the divide between ultramontane Tridentine Catholicism and the Gallican church could pose as many problems as the divide between Protestant and Catholic.7 The French political and clerical authorities perceived the pays conquis on the frontiers, as Joseph Bergin has argued, as ‘unduly influenced by “baroque” and “popular” forms of ­Catholicism

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 172

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

173

which stood in need of “Gallican” correction’.8 For this reason, the French Government reorganised the religious make-up of the conquered provinces wherever it differed significantly from the Gallican set-up. But it usually did so with a measure of compromise with both the papacy and the local religious elites: as such, the ‘new’ dioceses on the kingdom’s frontiers were the church’s equivalent of the crown’s financial provinces réputées étrangères and were only halfintegrated into the French church.9 Both Savoy and Lorraine (including the Barrois) were independent and distinct from the Gallican church, and furthermore both territories had recognised the decrees of the Council of Trent in full.10 But, as their societies and cultures were so closely linked to France, there was also a long-standing tradition of interaction across the frontier. As described in Chapter 1, French influences permeated these frontier territories in several ways, through overlapping political and diocesan boundaries, and a shared intellectual landscape. Many religious orders in Lorraine and Savoy depended on French provinces, so exchange of ideas as well as individuals was common.11 Lorraine had been under French occupation for much of the seventeenth century, and this left a profound imprint on its ecclesiastical hierarchy.12 Many of the Savoyard episcopate had trained in France,13 and much in the Savoyard church had been reformed in the seventeenth century on the French model, including the diocesan seminaries established in Annecy and Saint-Jean.14 All these influences meant that Lorraine and Savoy were subject to many of the same currents circulating in France, so during periods of French occupation the lines between dynastic loyalty, religious obedience and self-interest were often less than clear-cut. The bishops Dealing with bishops in the occupied territories meant dealing with structures, powers and individuals. In ancien régime France, diocesan boundaries rarely corresponded to provincial or national borders.The most prominent example of this was in the Lorraine region, where the bishops of Metz, Toul and Verdun (all three of them suffragans of the archbishop of Trier) were also rulers of extensive domains in the surrounding area. After the French acquired the Trois Evêchés in the 1550s, the Concordat of Vienna remained in force, allowing the dukes of Lorraine to influence episcopal elections15 until 1664, when Louis XIV obtained a papal indult giving him the sole right to nominate the three bishops. This move was bitterly resented by the duke and had significant political repercussions in the region.16 In Savoy, the French bishop of Grenoble had spiritual jurisdiction over the décanat of Savoy, the area around Chambéry. From 1671 the see was held by the influential Cardinal Etienne Le Camus, a zealous reformer who

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 173

12/03/2013 16:10

174

local elites under french occupation

made frequent visits to Savoy.17 Though such situations were not uncommon in frontier areas, ‘foreign’ bishops were rarely welcomed by the secular authorities on whose territory they encroached. Le Camus was in almost continual conflict with the Savoyard Sénat, who viewed him as an intruder (and a Jansenist) and tried unsuccessfully to assert their independence of him.18 Savoy was not alone in the Sabaudian state in falling under the jurisdiction of foreign bishops: the county of Nice was split between five different dioceses, three of which were French.19 This was viewed with unease from Turin, where the duke made several unsuccessful attempts to limit the jurisdiction of foreign (particularly French) bishops within his states.20 Likewise, the French crown was loath to tolerate any such encroachment: wherever newly annexed territories fell under the jurisdiction of foreign bishops, as on the frontier with the Spanish Netherlands, there were immediate requests that Rome redraw the boundaries or hand over the nomination rights to the king.21 This sometimes led to long-running disputes between the kings of France and the papacy, which could be deliberately slow to act because it wished to retain its prerogatives in those frontier territories not covered by the Concordat of Bologna.22 Yet the French Government was more than happy to see its own authority spill across the frontier through these cross-border dioceses.They recognised the advantages this might offer in the conquest and occupation of such territories. Wherever a bishop’s authority extended, he would usually establish a network of agents and informers. This proved very useful in Savoy: in the run-up to the conquests of 1690 and 1703, Cardinal Le Camus was very active in passing intelligence to French military commanders from his agents based in and around Chambéry.23 In the county of Nice, the archbishop of Embrun offered the French his assistance in putting the Barcelonette valley under contribution in 1690, as the area came under his jurisdiction.24 Having a co-operative bishop was also very useful in conveying the benefits of French rule once a conquest was complete, as in Strasbourg, where the pro-French Cardinal Fürstenberg as bishop gave the French significant advantages after they acquired the town in 1681.25 For this reason the French crown was extremely careful about its appointments to the Trois Evêchés, just as it was in the other pays conquis.26 The bishops appointed to Metz, Toul and Verdun in this period were all of high social and intellectual standing,27 and with their French entourages slowly introduced Gallican practices into Lorraine.28 There was also evidence in some appointments of a deliberate policy of family advancement in the region: in 1687 the king named as bishop of Toul the son of Claude Thiard de Bissy, the long-serving lieutenant général of Lorraine.29 Bishops had wide-ranging powers that could be deployed to the profit of the new regime. Episcopal visitations were charged with enforcing the ordonnances that required prayers for the king of France on Sundays and holy days.30

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 174

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

175

Louis XIV could also order the bishops, whatever their original loyalties, to organise public prayers for the success of French arms and Te Deum services for French victories.31 But beyond such symbolic gestures, much depended on how far the bishop could actually enforce his authority. The bishops of the Trois Evêchés had a relatively weak grip on the parish clergy in Lorraine at this time, as most priests were not named by the bishops but were selected either according to the Tridentine system of examination (concours), or by ecclesiastical or lay patrons.32 Furthermore, although the diocese of Toul covered three fifths of the duchy of Lorraine, several of its larger chapters and abbeys claimed to be under the immediate jurisdiction of the pope, so many Lorrains regarded themselves as belonging to no diocese at all.33 Shortly after the French conquest of Lorraine in 1670, the governor wrote that many ecclesiastics were not subject to the jurisdiction of the bishop, and that it would be in the interest of the king to back up the execution of the bishop’s pastoral letters.34 In Luxembourg, the authority of the bishop of Metz was limited, but there the French made priests promise under oath that they would inform the conseil provincial of anything they heard which was against the interests of the king.35 The tasks of the bishops of the Trois Evêchés were made even more difficult by the uncertain legal basis of the French presence in Lorraine, and a growing sense of resentment on the part of the population.This arose from the c­ onfusion between the spiritual mission of the bishop as pastor of the diocese, and his political role as agent of the king of France. A memorandum written for the (exiled) duke in the 1690s complained that the bishops treated the people of Lorraine like foreigners and without any pastoral affection.36 The Lorrains refused to reconcile themselves with these ‘foreign’ bishops, and complained bitterly about their Gallican practices and their rejection of the decrees of the Council of Trent, ‘without regard to the interests of the duke or his people’; furthermore there was a feeling that the bishops were not just outsiders, but the very instruments of French insidiousness: ‘when it pleases their king to make war on the duke, they conspire with him and forge outrages with their spiritual weapons’.37 The ecclesiastical situation in Lorraine remained complicated after the return of the duke in 1697, as the French continually blocked Leopold’s attempts to erect a new diocese at Nancy, free from French control.38 The vast diocese of Toul stretched over much of ducal Lorraine, a situation the French exploited to deal with troop desertion in the War of the Spanish Succession: in 1705, for instance, the bishop’s cross-border jurisdiction was invoked to order all parish priests to supply the names of Frenchmen who had moved to their parish recently, in an effort to find deserters. The measure was promptly denounced as a clear infringement of ducal sovereignty.39 Yet Leopold did not protest too loudly, for he wished to keep Louis XIV on side in his burgeoning dispute with the papacy after the publication of the Code Léopold in 1703.40 This document,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 175

12/03/2013 16:10

176

local elites under french occupation

which contained distinctly Gallican positions on benefices and the régale (a right claimed by rulers to appropriate the revenues of vacant dioceses and abbeys, and to confer certain benefices), was vigorously opposed by Bishop Bissy of Toul, who, thanks to successful lobbying by the Lorraine ‘interest’ at Versailles, was transferred to another see the following year.41 However, the bishops made some attempt to fulfil their role as pastor and father-figure: in 1698, on the arrival of Duke Leopold in Lorraine, Bissy ordered Te Deum services throughout his diocese, for the Lorrains ‘will now possess a prince, who will be no less the heir to the virtues and piety of his glorious ancestors, than to their throne.’42 Bissy’s successor François Blouet de Camilly even intervened when he felt the French Government had overstepped the mark. In 1710, for instance, the intendant of the Trois Evêchés ordered that an ecclesiastical registry be set up at Toul; this meant that everyone in the diocese, whether French or Lorrain, had to travel there to obtain dispensations for banns of marriage, provisions for benefices and licences to hear confession.43 The bishop objected on the grounds that his relationship with the people and priests of Lorraine was ‘already quite estranged’ and he did not wish alienate them further.44 By contrast to Lorraine, where the bishops were used as agents of influence and even integration, French policy in Savoy appears to have been one of keeping a respectful distance from the ducally appointed bishops.45 During the first occupation, the French commander considered the episcopate (and the clergy in general) such a minimal cause for concern that he actually forgot to get them to swear the oath of allegiance to the king until May 1691.46 When bishoprics fell vacant in occupied Savoy and Nice, Louis XIV made no attempt to nominate his own candidates to replace them. Following the death in 1695 of the bishop of Geneva/Annecy, for instance, traditional custom was observed: the Sénat took control of the revenues of the diocese, and those interested in the position addressed themselves to Victor Amadeus.47 There was also no attempt to replace the bishop of Nice when he died in 1706; and, though the French governor de Paratte did recommend the abbé de Sabran, an ecclesiastic of a pro-French Niçois family, as a possible successor, the king declined to act upon his suggestion.48 Yet the French were certainly keen to work with the Savoyard episcopate to ensure order and stability: in 1705 the bishop of Saint-Jean-deMaurienne requested the return of revenues confiscated from the abbey of Saint-Pierre des Chalons; the king agreed on condition that the bishop swore allegiance to him.49 Existing structures and practices were left in place during the occupations of the county of Nice, though the French tried to block the bishops from appealing judicially to the court of Turin.50 How the Savoyard bishops responded to occupation varied according to their personal and dynastic interests. As most of the bishops had trained in France, the French authorities might have expected a warmer welcome; but,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 176

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

177

though the bishops were generally compliant, their loyalties clearly reflected who had appointed them. In 1690 the bishop of Geneva/Annecy, Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex, wrote a long letter to his nephew on the progress of the French invasion, adding that he was doing all he could to ensure ‘that our august sovereign will be victorious’ by organising prayers throughout his diocese for the success of the duke’s arms: ‘I am by the grace of God constant in the design to never blush at the cause of my sovereign, and to defend him until the last breath I take’.51 The bishop was also active in organising the defence, and subsequent capitulation, of the town.52 Once the town had fallen, the bishop was not impressed by the visits of the French commanders to his residence and reaffirmed his old loyalties: ‘I assure you that my heart will be Savoyard as long as God gives me life’ and, with a touch of melodrama, ‘If it is necessary to swear an oath of allegiance to the king, I assure you that death will be more agreeable’.53 But he later co-operated fully with the French.54 The bishop of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne informed the duke of French military progress and the level of desertion in the bourgeois militia of Saint-Jean.55 In Nice, by contrast, Bishop Henri Provana showed great enthusiasm for the arrival of the French, deciding to go to the court in person to pay homage to the king.56 As elsewhere, the French agreed to respect the bishop’s privileges, including his right of appeal to the vice-legate of Avignon, and agreed to assist him in safeguarding public morals and doctrine.57 Though he was more circumspect in his relations with the French during the second occupation,58 he continued to serve as a valued interlocutor between them and the Niçois.59 And the French continued to protect his interests: in 1706, the archbishop of Embrun, Charles Brûlart de Genlis, attempted to impose a personal enemy of the bishop, the Père Arnaud, as his metropolitan vicar in Nice. In response, Chamillart intervened to have the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Paolucci, deprive Arnaud of his charge.60 When the bishop died later that year, Paratte declared, ‘the king has no subject who could have been more attached to his interests’.61 The see remained vacant for the remainder of the occupation. Religious superiors For religious houses, almost always part of international religious orders, the picture was just as complicated. Like bishops, religious superiors often wielded great authority and could be vital in building pro-French sentiment. But the systems of appointment to consistorial benefices in Savoy and Lorraine differed significantly from French practice. In the Savoyard system, rights of preferment to abbeys had been a perpetual source of discord between the House of Savoy and the papacy.62 Most houses in Savoy were reformed and chose their superiors by

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 177

12/03/2013 16:10

178

local elites under french occupation

election, but the commende (the system whereby an individual drew the revenues of the abbey without acting as abbot) was used in several larger Benedictine and Cistercian houses. Abbots commendataires tended to be absentee secular clergy; at the time of the French conquest in 1690, many were Piedmontese and closely aligned to the duke, so most fled to Piedmont immediately after the invasion. This allowed the French authorities to confiscate the revenues of these houses, which included the large and wealthy abbeys of Hautecombe, Abondance and Entremont.63 The abbots who remained were allowed to stay if they swore an oath of allegiance to the king.64 But they were kept under surveillance, and if found to be suspect they were forced to leave Savoy. In December 1690, for instance, Jean-Thomas de Provana (abbot commendataire of Notre-Dame d’Aulps) was given three days to leave Savoy, most likely because his father had been the premier président of the Sénat and the duke’s commander in Savoy, and had fled to Turin at the time of the French invasion.65 In Lorraine the benefice system was particularly complicated. Clement IX’s brief of March 1668 granted Louis XIV nomination rights to all benefices within the temporal jurisdiction of the Trois Evêchés, but this did not extend to ducal Lorraine, which remained a pays d’obédience where the rights of appointment belonged to the pope.66 Though the papacy had attempted to reassert its authority in Lorraine in the seventeenth century, particularly through the use of the commende (also used extensively in France), most religious houses elected their superiors.67 As the superiors present in 1670 were not ducal appointees, the French allowed them to remain in situ, showing again that the government tended to let arrangements stand if they perceived no serious potential threat. They even allowed existing arrangements to remain for those families who had close links to the Habsburgs: the rich secular abbey and chapter of Saint-Pierre de Remiremont, for instance, remained under the abbacy of Princess-Abbess Dorothea Maria zu Salm throughout occupation, despite her brother being tutor to the king of the Romans.68 But the French did keep a close eye on superiors who had relatives serving the dukes in exile, and there were suspicions that the abbot of Domèvre, a brother of the duke’s secrétaire d’état, Le Bègue, was passing on sensitive information to the duke via a woman and a ‘Maître Jacques’ from Saint-Avold who had apparently been making journeys to Austria on his behalf.69 While the French allowed Lorrain superiors to remain in place, the crown’s policy on vacant benefices in Lorraine changed over the course of the occupation of 1670–97. The 1670s passed quietly as the crown allowed the chapters of Lorrain monasteries to elect their superiors and collect the revenues of vacant benefices according to local usage. From the 1680s, as the king and his ministers set about integrating Lorraine into the kingdom, they became increasingly anxious to ensure that superiors had the requisite loyalty to France. In consequence, the method of selecting superiors changed, as it did in other pays

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 178

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

179

conquis that the crown wished to integrate. In the 1680s, Louvois attempted to introduce the ‘Flanders method’ into Alsacian abbeys, whereby religious communities presented three candidates to the king, who made the final choice. Livet argued that the changes to the benefice system in Alsace were born out of the court’s ignorance, though it seems more likely to have been deliberate.70 The king also ordered the exclusion of all foreigners from Alsacian benefices, secular or regular, from 1681.71 From the late 1680s this was extended into Lorraine, partly reflecting the Lorrain regular clergy’s growing hostility to the French. In March 1690 the intendant forbade the Carmelite friary in Metz to elect as a superior any Lorrain regular; the same order was then sent to all Carmelite houses in Lorraine and the Trois Evêchés.72 These changes also reflected the hardening of Louis XIV’s Gallican pretensions, in particular the quarrel with the papacy over the régale.73 The dispute over nomination to consistorial benefices went back to the Concordat of Bologna of 1516. In the eyes of some this was restricted to the limits of France in 1516; to others it was valid wherever the dominion of the king extended.74 Though Clement IX’s indult of 1668 had ceded to the king the pontifical prerogatives over nomination to benefices in the Trois Evêchés, it had excluded those parts of the dioceses which fell inside the duchies of Lorraine and Bar, and at first Louis accepted this. The king indeed issued an edict in April 1674 which confirmed the existing rules on benefices in Lorraine and the Trois Evêchés.75 But from the late 1680s the French Government abruptly changed course: Louis now unilaterally extended the régale across Lorraine, and began to impose his own choice of candidates by brevet royal, irrespective of traditional practices. Louis XIV and Louvois decided to signal this change of policy through a controversial appointment to the largest and richest Benedictine house in Lorraine: the abbey of Saint-Mihiel.76 The king gave no warning of what was to come: after the death of the previous abbot in September 1689, his confessor Père La Chaise wrote to inform the monks that the king would not oppose their right to elect their superior. In November, the chapter assembled and elected Dom Gabriel Maillet. But in the meantime, contrary to Père La Chaise’s assurances, the king decided to give the abbey instead in commendam to the abbé de Luxembourg.77 Maillet fled to Germany, which the French Government took as an act of disobedience; Louvois ordered the president of the congregation of Saint-Vanne to send two regulars to find Maillet and bring him back to Lorraine.78 But they were unsuccessful. In response, in January 1690 the intendant of Lorraine seized the revenues and possessions of the abbey of Saint-Mihiel, as well as those of its prior and monks. In 1691, as Maillet had still not returned, the intendant extended the seizure to all properties and revenues of Vannist congregations in Lorraine.79 Meanwhile, the requisite bulls for the nomination of Luxembourg were refused in Rome,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 179

12/03/2013 16:10

180

local elites under french occupation

as the king had no rights over the benefices in Lorraine. To overcome this, the king put Luxembourg in possession of the monastery by an arrêt de conseil, an act which, even in areas covered by the concordat, was arrogant and abusive.80 Several other vacant benefices were distributed in this way in the 1690s, including the Augustinian abbey of Saint-Remi of Lunéville, to which the king named Claude de Sève, son of the intendant of Metz, again reflecting a policy of advancing French families in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Lorraine.81 These appointments were essentially an extension of the commende, whereby the crown used benefices as rewards to courtiers, ministers and other crown servants.82 The policy, and that of excluding Lorrains from benefices in general, was naturally unpopular among the Lorrain nobles and princes, who had traditionally established their own children there.83 The papacy was equally unhappy about this usurpation of its rights, and refused to issue the bulls of appointment. Following the restitution of Lorraine in 1697, Duke Leopold was able to use this uncertainty to his advantage, and – despite the terms of the Treaty of Ryswick which guaranteed benefice holders would not be removed – declared several abbeys vacant on the basis that the French appointees had not been elected c­ anonically.84 By contrast, in the first occupation of Savoy, France often left the appointment of vacant benefices to Victor Amadeus, reflecting the crown’s lack of interest in the territory beyond its short-term financial and strategic benefits. For instance, on the death in 1695 of La Perouse, dean of the Sainte-Chapelle of Chambéry, the French left the duke to distribute his benefices.85 On the very rare occasions when the French tried to appoint their own candidates to vacant benefices in Savoy, these were always Savoyards. Yet even these attempts proved deeply problematic. When the commander of the Priory of Ripaille (headquarters of the Order of Saint-Maurice and Saint-Lazare) died in May 1691, Louvois attempted to install the marquis de Marigny as his successor. But the following year, Marigny still had not taken possession of the commandery due to his uncertainty over the status of the benefice, and ‘not wishing to damn himself’ enquired if he might address his concerns to Rome.86 In another case, in May 1704 the king named the abbé de Carpinel of the Sainte-Chapelle of Chambéry to the vacant abbey of Entremont by an arrêt de conseil, a measure promptly denounced as abusive by the Sénat and which became bogged down for years in resistance from the magistrates.87 Elsewhere in Savoy, Louis XIV allowed traditional patterns to continue: in those abbeys ‘in rule’, elections to vacant benefices continued through both occupations.88 This was because Louis was confident that the Savoyard clergy was largely pro-French in inclination. In 1707 for example, the monks of the wealthiest and most prominent abbey, Tamié, exercised their right to elect their superior. Following Savoyard practice, Louis ordered the premier président of the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 180

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

181

Sénat to preside over the vote, in which the monks elected a Frenchman, Dom Arsène de Jougla, a scion of the robe nobility of Toulouse.89 Jougla was known for his personal austerity, and the monks selected him not out of deference to the king but on his reputation as prior at the Trappist monastery of Buonsolazzo in Tuscany.90 He proved anything but a French stooge: though installed in 1708, Jougla deliberately waited until the end of the war to register his election with the Sénat and to receive his abbatial blessing, to avoid being tainted in the eyes of Victor Amadeus; his predecessor, Dom Jean-Antoine de la Forest de Somont, had been treated with disdain by the duke for his ‘dishonest compromises’ with the French in the previous occupation.91 Louis XIV and Chamillart were aware that the return of Savoy to Victor Amadeus would result in the disgrace of any superiors appointed by them, and therefore permitted elections to continue. This reflects treatment of the clergy of Savoy in general: though the French demanded that each cleric swear an oath of allegiance, they did not require loyalty so much as non-resistance. And the French Government showed no appetite for altering the religious make-up of Savoy: when Chamillart received an anonymous letter in 1706 advising him that French superiors should be imposed on Récollet and Capuchin religious houses under French domination in Savoy and Piedmont, he simply wrote to the intendant, Angervilliers, ‘make of this advice what you think most appropriate’.92 Regulars and seculars The French realised from their experience in other pays conquis that the lower clergy could be crucial to building pro-French sentiment93 and rooting out sedition: as Michel Le Tellier wrote, shortly after the sovereignty of Artois had been handed over to Louis XIV at the Peace of the Pyrenees, ‘The king will secure for himself the loyalty of the people of Artois by means of the religious who direct their consciences.’94 In Lorraine, therefore, the French were initially cautious in their dealings with the clergy. In February 1671, as the justice officials were being made to swear allegiance to the king, the governor reported that the clerics wanted to know if they were to replace the name of Charles IV with Louis XIV in their prayers; Louvois replied that it was no longer necessary to say public prayers for the duke of Lorraine, but they were not to insert the name of Louis XIV at this time.95 This also reflects the uncertainty within the French Government over the status of Lorraine. Given these circumstances, the Lorrain clergy unsurprisingly showed no enthusiasm for the French presence. Though it was no longer necessary to say prayers for their duke, they still continued to do so; as Créqui put it to Louvois, ‘those of Nancy, who are the most Lorrain, and many of the other towns as well, persist in saying their ordinary prayers for

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 181

12/03/2013 16:10

182

local elites under french occupation

their duke, and do not discontinue, because we have not explicitly told them to.’96 They were formally told to abstain later that month.97 As the French occupation went on, it became increasingly clear to the French authorities that the Lorrain clergy, particularly the regulars, maintained a deep loyalty to the dukes. The Chambre de réunion of Metz complained in March 1681 of difficulties in getting the religious houses of Lorraine to provide details of their property; the officers of the Chambre suspected this was motivated by ‘badly intentioned or ignorant spirits’ among the clergy.98 They also resisted in more subtle ways: reports stated that prayers for the king, now mandatory, were often omitted in monasteries.99 The mendicant orders were particularly antiFrench. In 1694 at the Franciscan friary of Ligny, in the Barrois, a Lorrain named Bernardin Bidot refused to pray for the health and prosperity of Louis XIV, deliberately omitting the words hostes superare during prayers,100 despite being ordered to include them several times by his superiors. Bidot also denounced the French members of the community, saying ‘Yes, I am Lorrain, and if ever our princes return to their states, which we hope they will, we will chase you out like the scoundrels that you are’.101 The Franciscans had stood out as the ‘apostles of resistance’ during the previous occupation;102 they had a particularly important place in Lorrain society, being involved heavily in pastoral tasks, and therefore had a strong influence on the consciences of much of the population.103 Their houses placed a strong emphasis on Marian spirituality, which was closely associated with the Lorraine dynasty and quite unlike the more sober, interior spirituality that the French bishops were trying to introduce.104 This demonstrates how spirituality could be tied to ‘national’ sentiment: if the allegiance of secular or regular clerics traditionally belonged to another ruler, this could be highly detrimental to relations with the French, given the hold that priests had over the thoughts and ideas of communities in this period.105 Attachment to Tridentine Catholicism was rendered even more problematic by the growing rift with the papacy. Even the Jesuits, normally key allies of the monarchy in conquered territory,106 felt their loyalties torn in the 1680s: in Flanders, for instance, the Jesuits were initially pro-French, playing a crucial role in rallying people to the king through processions and public ceremonies, but relations became strained as the conflict with the pope grew more serious.107 This was also an issue in Lorraine, where many Jesuits were of French nationality, the order there having been attached to the province of Champagne since 1616.108 The French authorities encountered particular resistance in the largest Jesuit college in the region, the University of Pont-à-Mousson.109 In 1680, tensions were already high due to French interference in the university’s affairs: as part of the monarchy’s drive towards integrating Lorraine, the law faculty received new statutes and a new chair of French law, entrusted to an advocate of the Parlement of Metz.110 Difficulties multiplied as, under pressure from mounting

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 182

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

183

Gallican and Jansenist propaganda, the university found itself caught between its obedience to Louis XIV and to the Holy See. From 1682, the government struck out at what it saw as Pont-à-Mousson’s disloyalty and exiled two senior Jesuits, one of whom was the chancellor.111 Elsewhere in Lorraine, the more pro-French among the Jesuits suffered for their association with the occupier: in 1694 the inhabitants of Epinal, considering the Jesuits there to be French agents, deliberately overcharged the farmers who managed the lands of the Jesuit College and obliged them to quit, leaving the college in penury.112 It appears therefore that there were serious and ongoing divisions within the order. The large body of evidence pointing to clerical resistance in Lorraine reflects what happened in other newly conquered territories. Regulars, ­particularly the mendicant orders, proved especially unwelcoming to French rule in Alsace, Flanders, the Franche-Comté and Luxembourg.113 In response to hostility from the native clergy, religious houses in these territories were all reorientated towards France and forced to have French superiors.114 In some cases French monks were introduced to discourage sedition.115 Yet, given the limitations of the state in this period, these measures met only moderate success – religious practice being the thing to which people were most stubbornly attached – and Louis could not push ‘gallicanisation’ too hard or he would risk rebellion. Native clergy were therefore generally treated with respect by the French authorities. Even when they demonstrated hostility to the French monks now living alongside them, as in Roussillon, the French authorities erred on the side of prudence; while some dissident clerics were removed by transfer or exile, the French were careful not to make the Catalans into victims.116 Furthermore, when in the mid-1680s Roland Ravaulx, the procureur général of the Chambre de réunion of Metz, proposed the unusual step of formally incorporating Lorrain clerics into the ‘Clergé de France’ to gain their loyalty, the idea was rejected.117 For these reasons, the changes put in place in Lorraine proved largely ineffective, and the hostility among the clergy in Lorraine only increased. In 1696 curés in several Lorraine villages pre-emptively organised public prayers for the duke of Lorraine’s re-establishment, even though peace had not yet been concluded.118 Moreover, during the War of the Spanish Succession there was an avalanche of anti-French feeling in Lorraine, despite the duchies not being under formal occupation. Since most towns in Lorraine remained free of French domination, the French experienced most trouble from the older monastic orders in the countryside. Early on in the war, Benedictine monks living near the frontier at Boulay and Saint-Avold were suspected of sheltering enemy raiding parties.119 More provocatively, in 1705, Hyacinthe Gillot, a Benedictine monk at the Priory of Bar-le-Duc, publicly tore the arms of Louis XIV from the town walls and threw them to the ground. He was reported to have said many times he would like to command 50,000 Lorrains to seize Louis XIV to punish him

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 183

12/03/2013 16:10

184

local elites under french occupation

for being ‘the usurper of the public good’ and that he hoped God would one day exterminate all French people.120 Hatred of the French among the clergy of Lorraine sometimes had more serious repercussions: both regular and secular clergy in Lorraine were active in providing shelter to raiding parties who would then travel on to ravage the Trois Evêchés. Priests with their good knowledge of roads along the frontier could be a particular nuisance. The curé of Fougerolles on the border between the Franche-Comté and Lorraine was imprisoned in 1705 for having helped raiding parties from imperial-held Landau, and stated publicly that he ‘wished as many curses on the French as blessings on his parishioners’.121 Other Lorrain curés made their feelings equally clear: in 1707 the curé of Torcheville in north-east Lorraine was reprimanded by the duke after mockingly telling a French officer that he would gladly give shelter to Imperial hussars, and would be very sorry to see them harmed by ‘French rif-raf’.122 Even more alarmingly, in the winter of 1709–10, when the sale of wheat to France was prohibited in Lorraine, Lorrain peasants began secretly selling their surplus wheat to the wealthy Benedictine abbeys for storage, rather than letting it go to the starving French in the Trois Evêchés.123 By contrast to Lorraine and most other conquered territories, in Savoy the French encountered very few problems with the clergy. Though some confided privately that their loyalties remained with the House of Savoy, there were no open manifestations of hostility.124 In part this must have been because the Savoyards remained largely passive throughout both occupations. It is also a testament to the long-term French influence in the church in Savoy: most clerics there were French, or French-educated.125 And once again, the relationship between the Savoyards and their duke played a role: since the 1680s they had been subject to an onslaught by Victor Amadeus who wished to abase the clergy’s power – particularly their fiscal immunities.126 Knowing the wide respect and popularity the clergy commanded in Savoy, the French were circumspect in dealing with them. Responses to the French occupation in Savoy, as elsewhere, also depended on the degree of contact between clergy and occupiers. Chambéry, the centre of French activity in Savoy, naturally saw more interaction than remoter parts of the duchy. The Ursuline convent of Chambéry had regular contact with the French, and not all of it was welcome: in 1706 the Mother Superior complained that a French officer had put his daughter in the convent in 1703 and now owed the nuns three years’ pension.127 In the same convent the following year, two French officers, the marquis de Vassé and the chevalier de Saint-Vallier, were found euphemistically to have committed ‘some foolishness’ with two of the nuns. Cardinal Le Camus sentenced the two men to a fine of 1,000 livres; Chamillart ordered that the affair was not to be spoken of any further.128 But in

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 184

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

185

general the Savoyard clergy posed no discernible threat to the French regime, obeying Louis XIV just as passively as they did Victor Amadeus.129 A case of supposed intriguing in favour of the duke (by arming peasants to fight in his service) in monasteries around Annecy in May 1695 turned out, after investigation by Bonval and the bishop of Geneva/Annecy, to be motivated more by personal animosities and the ‘fantasies’ of monks than by a spirit of sedition against the service of the king.130 French occupation and the clergy As they did with other elite groups, the French generally upheld the privileges of the clergy. By far the greatest infringement on the church’s rights in occupied territory was Louis XIV’s interference in the benefice system. In Lorraine, the principal intention behind this was integrating the territory into France, very similar to the policies of ‘gallicanisation’ in other pays conquis. That the policy was enforced with such zeal in Lorraine reflects not only the determination of the crown to integrate the territory, but also the level of resistance from the regular clergy. In Savoy, the rare occasions when the crown attempted to distribute benefices were generally clumsy attempts to reward Savoyard collaborators. These efforts were half-hearted by comparison with Lorraine, reflecting the crown’s lack of long-term interest in the territory and the clergy’s passivity. Aside from patronage, the French respected more mundane ecclesiastical privilege in the occupied territories. In the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Lorraine in 1670, the French forced some religious houses to lodge troops, but their exemption was renewed in March 1671.131 And, although the Catholic Church owned some 5 per cent of the land in Savoy and 15 to 20 per cent in Lorraine, the French generally refrained from tapping this wealth.132 The church’s fiscal privileges were maintained in Savoy and Nice right from the beginning of both occupations of each territory, and plans by the commissaire ordonnateur of Nice to force the clergy there to contribute to the fiscal burden on the county in 1706 were quashed by the king.133 Clerics continued to enjoy exemption from the capitation in Savoy, and in Nice from the capitation and dixième.134 Furthermore, in Savoy, as in other occupied territories such as Nice and Luxembourg, French authorities respected the property rights of communities displaced by the military, by paying financial compensation for depredations and damages.135 Louis also agreed to pay for the repair and upkeep of monasteries whose assets were confiscated in the absence of the benefice holder.136 In Lorraine the French provided the poorer religious houses with rations or financial aid to prevent them from starving.137 Essentially, the king was willing to maintain the status quo as far as possible, even if this meant he would be out of pocket, suggesting

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 185

12/03/2013 16:10

186

local elites under french occupation

that the salvation of souls was a long-term concern of his which transcended war and his immediate fiscal needs. As it did with other privileged groups, the crown interfered only when its military priorities were threatened: in the late 1680s, for instance, several monasteries in Nancy began profiting from the impoverishment of neighbouring bourgeois by acquiring and then demolishing their houses to increase the size of the conventual gardens. By doing so they prevented troops lodging there; they were therefore ordered to desist, and to leave houses in the possession of private individuals.138 Yet in times of crisis, as the French became increasingly desperate for resources, they were forced to suspend the privileges which the king had promised to respect. When famine struck Lorraine and Alsace in 1694–5, for instance, the authorities forced the nobility and clergy of both provinces to provide wheat to cover the shortfall, to ensure supplies of wheat to the army.139 The same measures were put in place in Savoy in November 1709: the intendant ordered the syndics of all communities in the duchy to take a certain amount of wheat from the people and the clergy.140 The bishop of Geneva/ Annecy fulminated that it went against the church’s privileges to subject clerics to lay authority: it should be left to the senior clergy to deal with these subventions, and for the clergy as a whole to hand over a quantity of wheat.141 But the intendant replied that it was impossible to dispense with subjecting the clergy and the nobility in Savoy and the Dauphiné to these demands: they were already exempt from the taille, and if they were also exempted from supplying grain there would be a shortfall of two thirds of requirements. He argued that the First and Second Estates always contributed without difficulty in all cases of ‘de droit’, which included natural disasters and emergencies. He added, with real justification, ‘it appears to me that if there was ever a case of de droit, this would be it’. The stockpiling of grain, he argued, was essential to give subsistence to the army which defended clergy, nobles and commoners alike.142 The bishop of Geneva/Annecy backed down and agreed to the intendant’s proposal.143 But clerical resistance to French impositions became increasingly widespread across the duchy in the last few, desperate years of the French occupation. In 1709, all the authority of Marshal Berwick failed against the intransigence of the dean and chapter of Chambéry; and Berwick also took the extreme step of expelling the dean of Moutiers-en-Tarentaise from Savoy for denouncing infringements of ecclesiastical privilege.144 In the absence of the dean, the chapter of Moutiers repeated the complaint three years later when the French again tried to requisition wheat and fodder from the church; the intendant reminded them that the requisition was to protect their supplies from foraging enemy troops, but he acknowledged to the war minister that the real reason was that, had the church’s privileges been respected, there would have been a shortfall in the military’s needs.145 In another such case, in 1711, the

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 186

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

187

commissaire ordonnateur of Nice began confiscating the property of clerics living in enemy territory; the grand vicar of Nice asked for a suspension of the confiscations as this contravened an agreement between the war minister, Voysin, and the papal nuncio in Paris, but as finances were so tight Voysin ordered the confiscations to continue.146 These issues were essentially born out of the Savoyards’ defence of their privileges, but the French were – as usual – inclined to interpret them as resistance; as such, the results were similar to the French authorities’ conflicts with other Savoyard elite groups seen in the previous chapters. That the bishops as well as some of the upper clergy in Savoy were ducal appointees meant that they were automatically suspect, even though many had resisted Victor Amadeus’s own attempts to curtail clerical immunities as part of his fiscal reforms after 1696.147 Nevertheless, the period from 1709 to the end of the war was exceptional, in that the burdens of war now began to cause tensions between the Savoyard clergy and the French authorities, which until then had been largely absent. This period aside, the contrast between the reactions of the Savoyard and Lorrain clergies to French occupation is a striking one. What made the Savoyard clergy more likely than the Lorrains to co-operate with the French? The answer lies partly in the religious character of each territory. Lorraine, like many of the territories conquered by France during Louis XIV’s reign, possessed a vigorous Tridentine spirit, due to its position as an ‘advance post’ in the fight against Protestantism, and also because of the density of religious houses, dominated by Jesuits and Franciscans.148 This meant that anything which deviated from the Tridentine ‘norms’ would be viewed with deep suspicion. In Roussillon and those parts of the Spanish Netherlands annexed by France, the clergy, both regular and secular, demonstrated a deep hostility to the king in the aftermath of the conquests, motivated in large part by an aversion to Gallican practice.149 Like them, many Lorrains also deeply resented the fact that Protestant worship was, at least until 1685, permitted by the French.150 Following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, this was less of a problem in occupied territory: in Savoy, which was also seen as a frontier of Catholicism, the French now worked with the church hierarchy to combat Protestantism, granting money to help with the teaching of nouveaux convertis in the neighbouring mountains.151 Religious orthodoxy was also closely tied to dynastic loyalty, and the Lorrains’ hostility to the imposition of Gallican practice served in turn to reinforce their loyalty to the dukes. Among a long list of grievances compiled in the 1690s was that they were forbidden to pray for the duke, as Saint Paul and the councils obliged them to.152 In addition, Charles V’s crucial role in defeating the Turks outside Vienna in 1683 had immense repercussions in Lorraine, as the dispossessed duke was now presented as the prestigious heir to an ancestral tradition.153

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 187

12/03/2013 16:10

188

local elites under french occupation

Furthermore, the bond between papacy and dynasty was strengthened in the reign of Charles V, as the Holy See proved very supportive of his cause: even after Nijmegen, pontifical diplomacy tried to promote the dynasty’s interests in Paris at every opportunity.154 Similarly, in the Franche-Comté traditions of loyalty to the House of Austria and Tridentine Catholicism proved particularly enduring and a cause of considerable anxiety for the crown’s local agents.155 This was repeated in Roussillon and Flanders, where the kings of Spain retained the support of the clergy long after French annexation.156 By contrast, many Savoyard clergy saw in Victor Amadeus’ rule only the further debasement of their privileges. A further element conditioning the Lorrain clergy’s views was their anger at what decades of French aggression had done to their country; both secular and regular clergy would have witnessed this at first hand, with many churches and monasteries falling into ruin or disrepair.157 By comparison, the French presence in Savoy was relatively short, and the duchy escaped the widespread destruction and devastation of Lorraine (at least before 1709).158 War and occupation could also be highly disruptive to society in ways that were subtler, but no less damaging. Occupation, its associated disturbances and the Gallican disputes with the pope all seem to have contributed to a crisis of spirituality in Lorraine.159 Seminaries saw a decline in numbers,160 and in the mid-1690s the intendant Vaubourg wrote, with apparent understatement, that ‘The secular clergy is not presently filled with subjects of great merit’,161 while the rector of the college of Epinal described Lorraine as being ‘destitute of spiritual succour’.162 All this had repercussions for the occupying regime and for society at large.163 Without an active and co-operative parish clergy, bishops’ pastoral orders were ignored and episcopal authority was often weakened further by the passive resistance of the faithful who remained attached to their old customs and to pre-Tridentine forms of popular piety.164 The absence of a well-educated priesthood in Lorraine to help the regime impose order had long-term effects which endured even after the French left the territory: a study of capital punishment in Lorraine after 1697 argues convincingly that the great instability of the late seventeenth century led to an increase in delinquency.165 There were further implications of the breakdown in clerical morals and culture in Lorraine. Conditions there proved extremely favourable to the spread of Jansenism in the late seventeenth century, so much so that it became one of the most profoundly Jansenist countries.166 In Savoy, Jansenism failed to make comparable inroads; the duchy had been spared the level of destruction seen in Lorraine, and reformed Tridentine Catholicism had flourished there throughout the seventeenth century, overseen by a vigorous parish clergy and episcopate.167 Although Savoy was profoundly affected by the currents of Jansenist theology coming from France, a strong episcopate and a strict policy of censorship in the Sénat prevented the new dogma from taking hold.168

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 188

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

189

Conclusions French occupation policies towards the clergy reveal many of the same concerns, motivations and justifications that the French displayed with the lay elites. These policies clearly reflected France’s long-terms intentions in the territory. In Lorraine, this was one of integration, whereas in Savoy it was one of financial opportunism while upholding the status quo, combined with the need to reward collaboration. But, as happened with the other elite groups, French policy could also react strongly to external pressures like war and internal pressures within the elite groups themselves. The secular elites were clearly not the only ones who had to bend to the French occupying authorities – the clergy too faced new demands. For all the good intentions of the French Government and its agents, war and occupation were not conducive to maintaining a strong and healthy church. The impact of this was often profound, and its legacy felt long after the French armies had departed.







Notes

1 See e.g. Stewart, Roussillon, p. 53. 2 Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière, p. 381; Stewart, Roussillon, p. 84. 3 On Savoy see Nicolas, La Savoie, i, pp. 249–58; on Lorraine see e.g. F. Boquillon, ‘Les dames nobles des chapitres de Lorraine sous l’Ancien Régime’ in M. Parisse and P. Heili (eds), Les chapitres de dames nobles entre France et Empire (Paris, 1996), or Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, pp. 217–40. 4 Godsey, Nobles and nations, p. 86. The Rhenish imperial nobility had long-standing ties to religious houses in Alsace, Lorraine and Metz, as well as Luxembourg, the Habsburg Low Countries and Liège. Ibid., pp. 88–90. 5 Parish benefices in Lorraine and the Barrois were particularly poor: by the 1680s and 1690s half of all curés were dependent on the portion congrue, a basic living allowance of around 300 livres.Taveneaux, Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 265. In Savoy, most curés were slightly better off, with incomes of 300 to 600 livres. Nicolas, La Savoie, i, p. 266. 6 Ford, Strasbourg, p. 160; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 750–1; R. McCoy, ‘Religious Accommodation and Political Authority in an Alsatian Community, 1648–1715’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 52 (2001), p. 264; Wallace, Early modern Colmar, p. 245. 7 Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 53–60. 8 J. Bergin, Church, society, and religious change in France, 1580–1730 (London, 2009), p. 431. 9 J. Bergin, Crown, church and episcopate under Louis XIV (London, 2004), pp. 26–30. 10 G. Cabourdin, La Vie quotidienne en Lorraine aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1984) pp. 145–6; Devos, ‘Un siècle’, p. 262. 11 Nicolas, La Savoie, i, p. 255; R. Taveneaux and J.-F. Michel (eds), Bénédictins entre Saône et Meuse: actes du colloque de l’Association Saône Lorraine, 19–20 août 1995 (Paris, 1996), p. 9; R. Taveneaux, Encyclopédie illustrée de la Lorraine: La Vie religieuse (Nancy, 1988), p. 130. 12 Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 144–5. 13 In the see of Geneva/Annecy, for example, Jean d’Arenthon d’Alex (served 1661–95) trained in Paris at the seminary of Saint-Magloire; his successor Michel-Gabriel Rossillon de Bernex (1696–1734) trained at Toulouse. F. Meyer, ‘Les élites diocésaines en Savoie à la fin du XVIIe siècle’, Rives Méditerranéennes, 32–3 (2009), p. 3. 14 The new seminaries in Savoy were run by French Lazarists. Ibid., p. 4. 15 The House of Lorraine and its cadets retained the diocese of Metz until 1607, Toul until 1637 and Verdun until 1661. M. Pernot, ‘La maison de Lorraine dans l’église de l’empire’ in Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, p. 70.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 189

12/03/2013 16:10

190

local elites under french occupation

16 Bergin, Crown, church, episcopate, pp. 26–7; Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, pp. 55–6; R. Darricau, ‘Louis XIV et le Saint-Siège. Les Indults de nomination aux bénefices consistoriaux (1643– 1670)’, Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, 66 (1965). 17 See J. Lovie, ‘Le Cardinal Le Camus et le décanat de Savoie, 1671–1707’ in J. Godel et al. (eds), Le Cardinal des montagnes. Etienne Le Camus Evêque de Grenoble (1671–1707) (Grenoble, 1974). 18 Lovie, ‘Le Camus’ p. 172; Meyer, ‘Les Elites’, p. 7. 19 These were the bishops of Ventimiglia, Nice (who was suffragan of the French archbishop of Embrun), and (the French bishops of) Vence, Senez and Glandèves. 20 In the 1690s Victor Amadeus demanded that special vicars be appointed to administer ‘his’ parts of the dioceses, but the bishops refused. Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 130. 21 Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière, p. 382. Similarly, in Roussillon, the see of Perpignan was transferred from the province of Tarragona to Narbonne. Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 57–60. 22 Bergin, Church, society, p. 24. 23 SHDT A1 1009 nos. 133 and 140, Larray to Louvois, 21 and 24 Jun. 1690; no. 175, Saint-Ruth to Louvois, 14 Jul. 1690; A1 1690 no. 33, Le Camus to Bouchu, 21 Oct. 1703; no. 31, Bouchu to Chamillart, 21 Oct. 1703. 24 SHDT A1 1009 no. 158, Bachivilliers to Louvois, 6 July 1690. The archbishop of Embrun 1668–1714 was Charles Brûlart de Genlis. 25 J. Bergin, ‘Des Indults aux hommes: La monarchie et les églises des provinces conquises sous Louis XIV’ in B. Barbiche, J.-P. Poussou and A. Tallon (eds), Pouvoirs, contestations et comportements dans l’Europe moderne. Mélangés en l’honneur du professeurYves-Marie Bercé (Paris, 2005), p. 333. 26 Bergin, Crown, church, episcopate, pp. 30–41. 27 All bar one had studied at the Sorbonne and held the degree of doctor of theology (Hippolyte de Béthune, bishop of Verdun 1681–1720, had studied at Bourges). 28 Taveneaux, La Vie religieuse, p. 135. 29 Henri-Pons de Thiard de Bissy’s appointment was ‘a reward as much for his father’s services as his own’. Bergin, Crown, church, episcopate, pp. 481–2. 30 M. Pernot, Etude sur la vie religieuse de la campagne lorraine à la fin du XVIIe siècle, le visage religieux du Xaintois d’après la visite canonique de 1687 (Nancy, 1971), p. 17; Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 46. 31 ADMM 3F 488 no. 11, ‘Lettre de cachet du Roy au Monsieur du Saussay Évêque comte de Toul pour faire des prières publiques’, 23 Apr. 1672; no. 8, Louis XIV to bishop of Toul, 30 Apr. 1679. SHDT A1 2398 no. 319, bishop of Geneva/Annecy to Voysin, 17 Oct. 1712. 32 Cabourdin, LaVie quotidienne, pp. 145–6; Taveneaux, LaVie religieuse, p. 139; Taveneaux, Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 61. 33 Bergin, Church, society, p. 23; Taveneaux, Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 61. 34 SHDT A1 253, fos. 180–1, Créqui to Louvois, 7 Mar. 1671. 35 Petit, ‘La politique française’, p. 46. 36 ADMM 3F 226, fos. 97–109, Mémoire [undated]. 37 Ibid. 38 Taveneaux, La Vie religieuse, p. 152. 39 AAE CP Lorr. 61, fos. 275 and 311, Audiffret to Torcy, 24 Feb. and 28 Mar. 1705. 40 Cabourdin, Encyclopédie, ii, p. 118. 41 Bergin, Crown, church, episcopate, p. 41. 42 ADMM 3F 309 no. 22, ‘Mandement de Messieurs les Grands Vicaires de Toul’, 7 Feb. 1698. 43 The tax on letters of licence to hear confession had been a grievance during the occupation of 1670–97. ADMM 3F 226, fos. 97–109, Mémoire [undated]. 44 SHDT A1 2236 no. 285, bishop of Toul to Voysin, 18 Feb. 1710. 45 The dukes of Savoy had gained the right to nominate the bishops of Saint-Jean-en-Maurienne and Geneva/Annecy, and the archbishop of the Tarentaise, through a papal indult of 1451. Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 127. 46 SHDT A1 1077 no. 164, Louvois to La Hoguette, 23 Apr. 1691; no. 202, Louvois to La Hoguette, 17 May 1691. The lower clergy swore the oath the following August. M. L. Pillet,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 190

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

191

‘Notes pour la guerre de Savoie (1690 à 1697) d’après un manuscrit inédit de dom François Luc de Lucinge’, Mémoires de l’académie des sciences, belles lettres et arts de Savoie, 3ème série, 12 (1887), pp. 9–10. 47 SHDT A1 1331 no. 203, Tencin to Barbezieux, 7 July 1695; no. 205, Bonval, 7 Aug. 1695. 48 SHDT A1 1973 no. 374, Paratte to Chamillart, 28 Nov. 1706. 49 SHDT A1 1879 no. 29, Chamillart to Bouchu, 4 Feb. 1705. 50 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 203–4. In 1712 the bishop of Gladèves appealed against a judgment of the Sénat of Nice before the duke of Savoy, earning him a stern rebuke from the French war minister, Daniel Voysin. SHDT A1 2398 no. 73, Voysin to bishop of Glandèves, 11 Apr. 1712. 51 Quoted in Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 32.The baron was serving as a minor government functionary at the court in Turin. 52 AMA RD 48, fos. 4–6, ‘Brève description de ce qui s’est passé des la déclaration de la guerre jusques a la prise de la ville’. 53 ADS 2B 81 [unnumbered], bishop of Geneva/Annecy to Denis d’Alex, 15 Aug. 1690. 54 Pillet, ‘Notes pour la guerre de Savoie’, pp. 35–6. 55 F. Meyer, ‘Occupations ou annexions? La Savoie soumise. 1536–1749’, L’Histoire en Savoie, 20 (2010), pp. 30–1. 56 SHDT A1 1093 no. 98, La Fare to Louvois, 16 May 1691. 57 SHDT A1 1116 no. 228, bishop of Nice to Louis XIV, 11 Sep. 1691. 58 SHDT A1 1875 no. 303, Paratte to Chamillart, 16 Sep. 1705; no. 304, bishop of Nice to Chamillart, 16 Sep. 1705. 59 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, pp. 103–4. 60 SHDT A1 1973 no. 216, Paratte to Chamillart, 12 May 1706; no. 217, Cardinal Paolucci to bishop of Nice, 6 Apr. 1706; no. 267, Chamillart to Paratte, 11 July 1706. 61 SHDT A1 1973 no. 374, Paratte to Chamillart, 28 Nov. 1706. 62 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 127–30. 63 SHDT A1 1010 no. 62: list of benefices. The revenues of further houses were confiscated over the course of the occupation, including Chézery in 1695 (whose abbot commendataire was Dom Joseph de Savoie, Victor Amadeus’ half-brother). SHDT A1 1331 no. 181, Bonval to Barbezieux, 5 Mar. 1695. 64 SHDT A1 1010 no. 115, de Thoy to Louvois, 2 Nov. 1690. 65 The local French commander and commissaire were both surprised by Louvois’s decision, as they had received his oath of allegiance and believed his conduct to have been above reproach. SHDT A1 1004 no. 104, La Hoguette to Louvois, 19 Dec. 1690; A1 1004 no. 108, Bonval to Louvois, 21 Dec. 1690. 66 A. Calmet, Histoire de Lorraine, qui comprend ce qui s’est passé de plus mémorable dans l’Archevêché de Trèves, & dans les Evêchés de Metz,Toul &Verdun, depuis l’entrée de Jules César dans les Gaules, jusqu’à la cession de la Lorraine, arrivée en 1737, inclusivement (7 vols., Nancy, 1757), vii, pp. 321–2. 67 In the later seventeenth century, the commende applied to just one in four of Lorraine’s religious houses; in the Barrois, where French influence was stronger, it was four fifths. LapercheFournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 217. In France, the figure was about seven eighths. Bergin, Church, society, p. 89. 68 The Salm princes served mainly in the imperial armies in the seventeenth century, with Karl Theodor Otto, Dorothea’s brother, becoming an Imperial Feldmarschall in 1687: P. La Condamine, Une principauté de conte de fées, Salm enVosges (Paris, 1974), pp. 65–9. On Dorothea’s abbacy see M. Pernot, ‘La querelle de l’abbesse et du chapitre à Remiremont au temps de Dorothée de Salm (1661–1702)’ in Parisse and Heili (eds), Les chapitres de dames. 69 SHDT A1 704 no. 188, Charuel to Louvois, 23 Dec. 1683. 70 Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, pp. 751–2. After much protest the crown restored the tradition of election after 1700. 71 Ibid., p. 754. 72 SHDT A1 971 no. 229, Charuel to Louvois, 7 Mar. 1690. 73 Louis XIV’s encroachments in the sphere of papal authority are well documented elsewhere,

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 191

12/03/2013 16:10

192

local elites under french occupation

e.g. John T. O’Connor, ‘Louis XIV’s “cold war” with the papacy: French diplomats and papal nuncios’, Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, 2 (1974), pp. 127–36; L. Pastor, The history of the popes from the close of the middle ages (40 vols., London, 1891–1953), vol. xxxi (1940). 74 Bergin, ‘Des indults aux hommes’, pp. 329–30. 75 ADMM 3F 309 no. 21, Mémoire, 1697; Taveneaux, Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 61. 76 It had annual revenues of 20,000 livres. Laperche-Fournel, L’Intendance de Lorraine, p. 221. 77 This was Pierre Henri de Montmorency-Luxembourg, the second son of Marshal Luxembourg. 78 SHDT A1 971 no. 219, Charuel to Louvois, 14 Jan. 1690; no. 238, Charuel to Louvois, 31 Mar. 1690. 79 SHDT A1 1071 no. 1, Charuel to Louvois, 3 Jan. 1691. Maillet eventually gained possession of the abbey after the Treaty of Ryswick. Calmet, Histoire ecclésiastique, iii, p. clx. 80 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 13, fos. 12–18, ‘Mémoire sur les bénéfices de Lorraine’, 16 Oct. 1693. 81 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 13, fo. 30, Vaubourg to Torcy, 16 Oct. 1693. 82 The French crown did not use the commende in mendicant orders or female convents. Bergin, Church, society, p. 88. 83 ADMM 3F 226, fos. 97–109, Mémoire [undated]. 84 ADMM 3F 309 no. 21, Mémoire, 1697; Calmet, Histoire de Lorraine, vii, pp. 323–4. 85 SHDT A1 1331 no. 157, de Thoy to Barbezieux, 10 May 1695. 86 Humbert, ‘Conquête et occupation’, p. 47. 87 See above, p. 153. 88 See e.g. F. Mugnier, ‘Le prieuré de Peillonnex en Faucigny’, Mémoires et documents de société savoisienne d’histoire et archéologie, 22 (1884), pp. 43–4. 89 E. Burnier, Histoire de l’Abbaye de Tamié en Savoie (Chambery, 1865), pp. 136–7. 90 C. Regat, Tamié et les Cisterciens en Savoie: l’abbatiat d’Arsène de Jougla, 1707–27 (Annecy, 1998), pp. 62–4. 91 Ibid., p. 96. Jougla would enjoy cordial relations with Victor Amadeus, and the abbey played host to the duke and his court for three weeks during his invasion of Savoy in the summer of 1711. 92 SHDT A1 1972 no. 221, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 20 Sep. 1706. 93 In the conquered provinces the crown used the clergy (particularly the Jesuits) to help build a sense of French identity. Teaching the French language was key to this policy: in 1677 the governor of Pinerolo wrote that the Jesuits ‘make a huge contribution to maintaining the people in their affection for the [French] language’. SHDT A1 568 no. 64, ‘Mémoire de M. Herbeville’, 3 Mar. 1677. The crown’s growing awareness of the importance of language in nation-building can clearly be seen in Mazarin’s foundation of the Collège des Quatre Nations in Paris in 1661. H. Ballon, Louis Le Vau: Mazarin’s Collège, Colbert’s revenge (Princeton NJ, 1999), p. 15. 94 Le Tellier, quoted in Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière, p. 381. 95 SHDT A1 253, fo. 90, Créqui to Louvois, 1 Feb. 1671; SHDT A1 252, fo. 202, Louvois to Créqui, 7 Feb. 1671. 96 SHDT A1 253, fo. 104, Créqui to Louvois, 11 Feb. 1671. 97 SHDT A1 253, fo. 152, Créqui to Louvois, 22 Feb. 1671. 98 BMN 152(345) no. 65, Ordonnance, 13 Mar. 1681. 99 Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 224. 100 Meaning ‘vanquish his enemies’: this was part of the Salvum fac regem, or prayers for the king. 101 AN G7 415 no. 229, Philippe de Montigny to Pontchartrain, 30 July 1694; no. 236, Vaubourg to Pontchartrain, 2 Sep. 1694. 102 Taveneaux and Michel (eds), Bénédictins entre Saône et Meuse, p. 9; Vignal-Souleyreau, Richelieu, pp. 230–1. 103 J.-R. Armogathe, ‘L’axe catholique lorrain au début du XVIIe siècle’ in D.-M. Dauzet and M. Plouvier (eds), Les Prémontrés et la Lorraine XIIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1998), p. 91; Pernot, ‘Etude sur la vie religieuse’, p. 112.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 192

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

193

104 Taveneaux, La Vie religieuse, pp. 98–9, 141. 105 Grosperrin, L’Influence française, pp. 12–13. 106 Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 35; Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 57–60; Wallace, Early modern Colmar, p. 245. 107 Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, p. 90. The Franche-Comte also saw manifestations of clerical hostility arising from the rift: Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, p. 263. 108 Châtellier gives the figure as two thirds French. L. Châtellier, ‘Un lien entre la Lorraine et le Saint Empire: La Compagnie de Jésus’ in Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, p. 84. 109 The university, which had a faculty of around sixty, had a strongly ultramontane character; its teaching was very different from institutions in the French kingdom on moral theology and casuistry, and it often served as refuge for Jesuits chased from France for their opinions. Ibid., pp. 84–5. 110 ADMM 3F 226, fos. 97–109, Mémoire [undated]; Le Moigne, ‘Le partage de l’espace Lorrain’, p. 306. 111 Taveneaux, Le Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 249. The university had form in this regard: in 1637 fourteen Jesuits left the university rather than swear fidelity to Louis XIII. Braun, FertéSénectère, p. 141. 112 AN G7 415 no. 206, rector of College of Epinal to Pontchartrain, 18 May 1694. 113 Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, p. 263; Grosperrin, L’Influence française, pp. 13, 43–4; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 754; Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, p. 90; Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 31. 114 Brossault, Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, p. 263; Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière, p. 381; Grosperrin, L’Influence française, p. 37; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 754; Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, p. 90. 115 Girard d’Albissin. Genèse de la frontière, p. 381; Stewart, Roussillon, p. 55. 116 A. Ayats, Louis XIV et les Pyrénées catalanes de 1659 à 1681: frontière politique et frontières militaires (Canet, 2002), pp. 76–7; Stewart, Roussillon, pp. 57–60. 117 Roux, Louis XIV et les provinces conquises, p. 96. 118 AAE CP Lorr. Sup. 13, fo. 56, Aubry (curé of Vanault) to Torcy, 10 Sep 1696. 119 SHDT A1 1672 no. 567, Varennes to Chamillart, 24 Jan. 1703. 120 SHDT A1 1850 no. 95, Bernay to Chamillart, 14 Apr. 1705; no. 96, anonymous letter [undated]. 121 The curé objected strongly to sovereignty over Fougerolles having been adjudged to France in the border agreement of the previous year. SHDT A1 1850 no. 188, Bernay to Chamillart, 25 Aug. 1705; no. 190, La Prade (major of citadel of Besançon) to Chamillart, 31 Jul. 1705. 122 SHDT A1 2035 no. 17, La Garde (commander of Bouquenom) to Chamillart, 5 July 1707; no. 18, Fournier de Macheville to Chamillart, 19 June 1707. 123 The commissaire Geoffroy reported that he knew for sure that the monks of Saint-Mihiel were amassing huge quantities of grain. SHDT A1 2236 no. 99, Geoffroy to Voysin, 16 Jan. 1710. 124 For example Dom François Luc de Lucinge, vicar of the Dominican friary at Annecy, wrote of his discomfort at having to swear an oath of allegiance to the king of France in 1691. Pillet, ‘Notes pour la guerre de Savoie’, p. 10. 125 In Chambéry religious communities were divided along ‘national’ lines: the older mendicant orders, including the Franciscans and Dominicans, were all Savoyard; the Jesuits, Carmelites and Augustinians were French. G. Perouse, ‘Etat de la Savoie à la fin du XVIIe siècle, 1679–1713’, Mémoires et documents publiés par la Société savoisienne d’histoire et d’archéologie, 63 (1926), p. 19. 126 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 127. 127 SHDT A1 1968 no. 132, soeur de Grimottiere (superior of Ursulines) to Chamillart, 21 Mar. 1706. 128 SHDT A1 2044 no. 7, Chamillart to Angervilliers, 8 Jan. 1707. 129 On the duke’s relations with the clergy see Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 34–5. 130 SHDT A1 1331 no. 190, Bonval to Barbezieux, 7 May 1695. 131 SHDT A1 250 no. 322, Créqui to Louis XIV, 4 Dec. 1670; AMN Ord., Ordonnance of 4 Mar. 1671; SHDT A1 1284 no. 41, Sève to Barbezieux, 18 Jan. 1694.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 193

12/03/2013 16:10

194

local elites under french occupation

132 In France itself the average was between 6 and 10 per cent. Bergin, Church, Society, p. 39; Nicolas, La Savoie, i, pp. 250–1. 133 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 162. 134 SHDT A1 2327 no. 126, Angervilliers to Voysin, 12 Nov. 1711. The church’s employees were not exempted from these charges. A1 2326 no. 247, Voysin to Sainte-Colombe, 10 Oct. 1711; no. 260, Sainte-Colombe to Voysin, 21 Oct. 1711. The grand vicar of Nice attempted unsuccessfully to extend the exemption beyond the foundation property of the church to the property of all secular priests, something which would have by extension exempted most families in Nice from the dixième. 135 This included repairs of monastic buildings damaged in the sieges of Montmélian and Nice. SHDT A1 1974 no. 28, Chamillart to Gayot, 21 Jan. 1706; no. 80, Gayot to Chamillart, 13 Mar. 1706. The rectors of the hospital of Saint-Roch in Nice were paid 200 livres per year in compensation for the loss of their building which was used for the duration of the war as a barracks: no. 173, Gayot to Chamillart, 12 June 1706. In Luxembourg the religious of SaintEsprit were compensated for the loss of their monastery during construction of the citadel with 15,000 écus from king. Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 35. 136 SHDT A1 1331 no. 181, Bonval to Barbezieux, 5 Mar. 1695. 137 This was the case in Lorraine in 1670 with the nuns of Dieuze, and the Capuchin friars at Vaudrevange. SHDT A1 250 no. 322, Créqui to Louis XIV, 4 Dec. 1670. 138 BMN 152 (245), no. 100, ‘Ordonnance du conseil de la Ville de Nancy’, 4 Apr. 1686. 139 SHDT A1 1284 no. 41, Sève to Barbezieux, 18 Jan. 1694; Livet, L’Intendance d’Alsace, p. 764. 140 AMA RD 48, fo. 93, 4 Nov. 1709. The same measures were enforced in the Dauphiné. 141 SHDT A1 2174 no. 197, bishop of Geneva/Annecy to Voysin, Dec. 1709. 142 SHDT A1 2174 no. 198, Angervilliers to Voysin, 22 Dec. 1709. 143 SHDT A1 2250 no. 17, Angervilliers to Voysin, 30 Jan. 1710. 144 SHDT A1 2174 no. 198, Angervilliers to Voysin, 22 Dec. 1709. 145 SHDT A1 2400 no. 47, Angervilliers to Voysin, 24 Apr. 1712. 146 It was thought that this property would yield 8,000 livres annually. SHDT A1 2326 no. 230, Sainte-Colombe to Voysin, 30 Sep. 1711; no. 247, Voysin to Sainte-Colombe, 10 Oct. 1711. 147 Symcox, Victor Amadeus, pp. 127–8. 148 R. Taveneaux, ‘La Lorraine, les Habsbourg et l’Europe’ in Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, pp. 12–16 ; Taveneaux, Le Jansénisme en Lorraine, pp. 64–8. 149 Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière, p. 381; Stewart, Roussillon, p. 84. 150 In the early 1680s one of Roland Ravaulx’s suggestions for gaining the loyalty of the Lorrains was to proscribe Protestant worship completely in the territory. Roux, Louis XIV et les provinces conquises, p. 96. 151 The bishop of Geneva/Annecy was granted 250 livres for this purpose in 1704. SHDT A1 1766 no. 171, bishop of Geneva/Annecy to Bouchu, 29 Jun. 1704; no. 169, Bouchu to Chamillart, 1 Aug. 1704. 152 ADMM 3F 226, fos. 97–109, Mémoire [undated]. 153 R. Taveneaux, ‘L’Esprit de Croisade en Lorraine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles’ in G. Livet (ed.), L’Europe, L’Alsace et la France: Problèmes intérieurs et relations internationales à l’époque moderne (Colmar, 1986), pp. 260–1. 154 F. Bonnard, Les Relations de la famille ducale de Lorraine et du Saint-Siège dans les trois derniers siècles de l’indépendance (Paris, 1934), p. 295. 155 SHDT A1 1850 no. 139, de Bernay to Chamillart, 24 May 1705. 156 In Roussillon this hostility remained well into the eighteenth century, while in the former Spanish Netherlands it disappeared when Louis XIV appeared as the champion of the fight against Jansenism. Girard d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière, p. 381; Stewart, Roussillon, p. 5. 157 Schmitt, Le Barrois, pp. 289–92, 327; Pernot, Etude sur la vie religieuse, p. 38. 158 Nicolas, La Savoie, ii, p. 567; J. Lovie, Les Diocèses de Chambéry,Tarentaise, Maurienne (Paris, 1979), p. 123. 159 The following works provide significant details: J. Choux, ‘Journal de la visite pastorale de Georges d’Aubusson, évêque de Metz, dans l’archidiaconé de Sarrebourg en 1680’, Le Pays

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 194

12/03/2013 16:10

the church

195

Lorrain, 61 (1980), pp. 13–34; Pernot, Etude sur la vie religieuse. 160 Jesuit colleges saw a fall in numbers from 2,300 students in 1629 to 1,300 by the 1690s. Le Moigne, ‘Le partage de l’espace Lorrain’ pp. 302–5; Schmitt, Le Barrois, p. 328. 161 BNF Col. Lorr. 501, fo. 120, ‘Mémoire concernant le Duché de Lorraine’ [1690s]. 162 AN G7 415 no. 206, Rector of College of Epinal to Pontchartrain, 18 May 1694. 163 Taveneaux, Le Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 254; Pernot, Etude sur la vie religieuse, p. 16; Taveneaux, La Vie religieuse, pp. 138–9. 164 Cabourdin, La Vie quotidienne, p. 267; Pernot, Etude sur la vie religieuse, pp. 46, 111; Taveneaux, Le Jansénisme en Lorraine, p. 62. 165 A. Logette, ‘La peine capitale devant la cour souveraine de Lorraine et Barrois à la fin du règne de Louis XIV’, XVIIe siècle, 126 (1980), pp. 7–19. 166 Taveneaux, Le Jansénisme en Lorraine, pp. 63, 116, 158–9; P. Chaunu, ‘Jansenisme et frontière de catholicité (XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles): A propos du Jansénisme lorrain’, Revue Historique, 227 (1962), pp. 129–30. 167 Devos, ‘Un siècle’, pp. 268–70; S. Crochon, La Réforme pastorale dans le décanat de Savoie d’après les procès-verbaux des visites de Mgr Le Camus (1673–1703) (Grenoble, 1960); Symcox, Victor Amadeus, p. 35. 168 M. Perroud, Le Jansénisme en Savoie (Chambéry, 1945), pp. 24, 28–40; Lovie, Les Diocèses, p. 118. Meyer, ‘Les Elites’, p. 7; B. Neveu, ‘Le Camus et les jansénistes français’ in J. Godel et al., Le Cardinal des montagnes. Etienne Le Camus Evêque de Grenoble (1671–1707) (Grenoble, 1974), pp. 108–11.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 195

12/03/2013 16:10

Conclusions

The occupations of these territories reflected various strategic concerns of the French Government. The overarching priority of Louis XIV’s reign was to secure France’s frontiers; how the government did this, given its limitations in resources and energy, varied greatly between one territory and another, and over time.There is no inherent contradiction here: the government’s overall aims remained consistent, though there was certainly a lack of coherence in Louis XIV’s occupation policy from a comparative perspective. In part this reflected changing conceptions of the frontier, and in part a necessary pragmatism on the part of the king. More than once Louis made serious errors in his judgement of events; most ruinously, this led to the loss of Lorraine, Luxembourg, Freiburg, Breisach, Casale and Pinerolo within the space of three years in 1695–7. This also shows that an occupying power was in this era fairly limited in its range and choice of actions. The present study has demonstrated how these occupations developed on the basis of events and pressures external to the territories themselves, and which were often beyond the control of the French Government. This underlines the fact that Louis XIV’s foreign policy in general was a lot more reactive than has previously been appreciated. There was no ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy for French administration of occupied territories: each military occupation was a response to a unique set of circumstances, and the structures of governance put in place varied with local conditions and the immediate requirements – strategic and logistical – of the French monarchy. The success of France in efficiently administering these territories depended on several variables: differences brought about by time, place (and the related geostrategic considerations), security issues, local loyalties and the expectation of either retention by France or restitution to the original sovereign. The French approach to occupied territories was essentially paternalistic, ensuring the natives accepted Louis’s newly-asserted sovereignty and paid the costs of the occupation, impressing upon local elites the benefits of collaboration and the pitfalls of continued loyalty to their old ruler and providing plausible opportuni-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 196

12/03/2013 16:10

conclusions

197

ties for local elites to serve the king, as in the French provinces. French attitudes to occupied territories seem to have become more sophisticated as the reign of Louis XIV progressed, at least as far as circumstances allowed. Nonetheless, unless the government saw a serious possibility of collaboration, it would act against agencies of potential resistance. The French certainly had no conscious long-term plan of centralisation and elimination of local privileges in occupied territories. The most urgent priorities for the king and Louvois after the conquest of Lorraine in 1670 were to make the territory meet the costs of its own occupation, and to ensure that it could not pose a security threat in the coming war with the Dutch. The suppression of various offices and privileges reflected these imperatives and not an over-riding plan of assimilation. From 1679, however, there does appear to have been a strategy aiming to bring Lorraine into line with French fiscal and judicial administrative practice. Yet this too developed largely out of financial and military needs, as well as Colbert’s desire to improve commerce and tax collection. Similarly, France’s treatment of Savoy and Nice indicates that, as long as the local privileges of these territories did not clash with the interests of Paris, the French could live with their maintenance. The regime installed in Nice was especially restrained: judicial officers of the county were even permitted to continue to use the local dialect in court cases.1 Yet, far from pointing to a policy of assimilation and integration (as argued by Chaumet) French policy towards Nice, when compared to Lorraine and Savoy, was characterised instead by a striking ambivalence. The moderation used in Nice was a consequence of the relative weakness of the French regime in such a strategically important place – due to the insufficiency of troops and vessels that could be spared for this theatre – rather than a conscious decision to treat the county with extra sensitivity in order to promote assimilation into France. French policy towards privileged groups did not always correspond to any political logic regarding long-term plans to keep the occupied territory. Instead, it seems that the government’s behaviour towards the elites of each territory was directed by a sense of scepticism or even strong suspicion, the intensity of which varied according to pragmatic issues and perceptions of regional threats. As French fears of fifth-column activity grew, the firmness of the occupying regime was intensified and major privileges and liberties might accordingly be overturned, as in Lorraine. Moreover, as the mentality of the French Government became more defensive in the war-torn and crisis-ridden second half of the reign, more mundane local privileges too were cast aside with increasing frequency. From the beginning of the Nine Years War, and increasingly during the War of the Spanish Succession, elites in the occupied territories – just as in France itself – were coerced into meeting the government’s burgeoning financial

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 197

12/03/2013 16:10

198

absolute monarchy on the frontiers

demands. The louisquatorzien state was an authoritarian system which insisted on far greater obedience from the 1660s than previously. But it was also a state that was willing to co-operate with elites and respect their interests when these coincided with – or at least did not damage – the interests of the monarchy. This had been the basis of the regime’s stability and success. The French appear to have always doubted whether this model could work in Lorraine in the seventeenth century; when the major wars after 1688 imposed greater financial and political strains, any co-operation on this basis was further undermined, as can be seen in all the occupied territories as well as in France itself. Even where relations with occupied territories were not bad, the financial and strategic priorities of the French Government at times had to take precedence over certain rights of the local elites, and these rights were disregarded, sidestepped or abolished. That these rights were solemnly guaranteed by the king at the beginning of an occupation was ultimately of limited concern to the French: obedience to the king and his interests in painful circumstances was far more important than upholding contractual promises. The fact that the monarchy was ready to go back on its word with few qualms reflects the deep flaw at the heart of the doctrine of absolutism: it could not be made to uphold its own legal pronouncements and, most importantly, there was little due process to alter the law or opportunities for subjects to influence these alterations. In the occupied territories, when the government failed to uphold the rights and privileges of the elites, these groups often became embittered and resentful. The displays of loyalty the French demanded of corporations and elite groups, such as Te Deum services and fireworks for royal births and military victories, must have been a bitter pill to swallow, and local elites showed little enthusiasm for complying. When the French behaved with greater brutality, the chances of harmonious collaboration on a large scale were certainly reduced. In Lorraine the French gradually enacted a series of measures that deprived the local elites of most of their privileges; the result was a monumental failure to rally the traditional Lorrain elites to French allegiance. This harshness was largely a response to the unusually strong fidelity of the Lorrain elites to their dukes. For all the avoidance of uprisings, the attempt between 1670 and 1697 to incorporate Lorraine into France represents a failure of the absolutist programme, which had been largely successful elsewhere in winning over provincial elites so they identified with the monarchy’s aims. This is perhaps unsurprising. Far from building a broad base of support for the Sun King’s regime, as they managed to do in the Franche-Comté and elsewhere, the French instead gradually destroyed everything they could of Lorraine’s institutions and even its geographical integrity. Though certain individuals and families were co-opted by France, the administration of Lorraine was increasingly put in the hands of Frenchmen, depriving the Lorrain elites of

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 198

12/03/2013 16:10

conclusions

199

their privileges and power. This led to problems selling offices in the 1690s and a massive security problem when the nobility had to be disarmed and confined to their estates. In other conquered territories, the attitudes of local elites to their traditional rulers covered a much wider spectrum, and many more were prepared to collaborate with the French from the moment of conquest. Local attitudes therefore played a large part in setting the tone of French occupations. A population’s reaction to this military presence depended on their previous experiences, collective memory and perceptions of the occupier. The degree of cultural similarity with France played a large part in this reaction, as did the divisions of power in the province before the French arrived and the level of unity among the elites. The experiences of Savoy and Lorraine in the seventeenth century were dissimilar in several ways, leading to strikingly different attitudes to the French as occupiers. Lorraine had already experienced three decades of French occupation, whereas Savoy’s contact with the French army before 1690 had been much more limited. Another important factor was the status of these territories within the possessions of their respective rulers. Though Lorraine was not a unitary state administratively or linguistically, it had more unity than Piedmont-Savoy. Victor Amadeus ruled over lands that were legally, ethnically and linguistically much more distinct from each other, and his states lacked a shared sense of past or present interests. Furthermore, the occupations of Savoy must be seen in the context of the fiscal-military reforms initiated by the duke in the 1680s, which entailed a state offensive against the traditional privileges of the Savoyard elites and created a strong sense of alienation from Turin. The reactions of the occupied populations were also conditioned to a large extent by uncertainty over the permanence of French rule. In old-regime Europe it could take generations for people to adapt to a change of domination, because the formation of opinion depended not only on dynastic loyalty but also on long-term economic and cultural factors.2 This could be even more problematic if a ruler lacked international recognition for his possession of the territory. In the case of Lorraine, most of the population proved overwhelmingly loyal to the duchy’s ancestral dynasty, and this remained a powerful and worrying sentiment throughout the occupation of 1670–97. In Luxembourg too, Carlos II was always seen as the legitimate sovereign during the period of French rule from 1681 to 1697, and the population’s attitude remained one of ‘docile yet provisional attentisme’.3 In the longer term, popular sentiment had little bearing on the political destiny of these territories, but a legitimate ruler could exploit such feelings, particularly in wartime. Victor Amadeus’ success at invoking ‘national’ sentiment in Savoy during the periods of French occupation owed much to a conscious use of the Other to depict both the French and the ‘traitors’ who collaborated with them.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 199

12/03/2013 16:10

200

absolute monarchy on the frontiers

Furthermore, in any ‘accommodation’ with an occupier, there are always generational, social and regional variables. Of all the elite groups, the native clergy were the least likely to welcome the French occupiers with open arms, as they usually harboured the strongest attachment to the ruling (but usurped) dynasties. At the opposite end of the social spectrum, the non-privileged sections of society had least to gain through collaboration: it was on them that the burdens of occupation under Louis XIV weighed heaviest, and any favourable aspects of a change of domination did not concern them. However, the older nobilities of Lorraine and Savoy belonged to ‘geo-cultural landscapes’ which overlapped with neighbouring French provinces, and their dynastic interests made them far more inclined to collaborate. In some cases, these dynastic interests coincided with a parallel ‘geo-political landscape’, where the French crown had legal claims over neighbouring territory, or included it in its sphere of influence: this is clearest in the case of the Barrois mouvant, which showed a tendency to separatism from Lorraine from the beginning of the seventeenth century, increasing after the return of Lorraine and the Barrois to Duke Leopold. The supra-national spheres to which many of these elites belonged persisted until the creation of fixed, clearly defined borders in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But the second half of Louis XIV’s reign already saw a clear trend from the idea of frontier as zone, towards that of a distinct border that could be charted on a map as a line.4 This change was reflected in a greater stress on undivided sovereignty: in the 1680s, Colbert tried to eliminate many of the anomalies in Lorraine, and there were a number of border agreements with the restored duke of Lorraine from the beginning of the eighteenth century to correct boundary issues.5 More generally, borders were increasingly based on legal-political theories such as the ‘balance of power’, rather than historical arguments about lineage: the exchange plans mooted for Lorraine and Savoy in the period immediately before the War of the Spanish Succession shows rulers already willing to trade their dynastic rights, and the bonds of loyalty between rulers and elites beginning to wither. The gradual superseding of genealogies by maps and knowledge of actual state power was part of a self-conscious rationalisation of the spatial dimension of diplomacy, and increasingly of international relations.6 These changes were reflected in the major international treaties of the period: unlike the Peace of the Pyrenees, which invoked the ancient frontier of Gaul along the Pyrenees mountain range, Ryswick did not mention any such principles, and Utrecht named the ‘watershed of the Alps’ as the division of France from Piedmont-Savoy.7 To a significant extent, the way the French Government treated these frontier territories reflected the political, administrative and juridical novelty to contemporaries of ‘occupied zones’. Louis XIV’s ministers clearly had differing views – and were often in dispute with each other – over whether these terri-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 200

12/03/2013 16:10

conclusions

201

tories should be treated simply as bases for military activity outwith their own borders, or as likely future French provinces. Alterations to privileges and rights reflected these concerns. As in the annexed pays conquis, the existing structures of governance remained in place unless they posed, or appeared to pose, a serious threat to French interests. As time went on the French attempted to impose their authority over local structures, motivated in part by the fact that the outcome of any war was uncertain and the territory might well be retained in a peace settlement. The superimposition of a French layer of bureaucracy above existing forms in Savoy and Nice bears a resemblance to the occupation policies of Richelieu and Mazarin in Lorraine, though an analysis of the way the French worked much more closely and systematically with occupied elites during Louis XIV’s personal rule shows that this resemblance is only superficial. That the early modern state was becoming more sophisticated at administering occupied territory reflects a clear evolution in the politics of military occupation, as it became a more widely recognised feature in European international relations and rulers increasingly resorted to occupation to attain their war objectives. Yet, in contrast to the bleak picture of territorial occupations from the French Revolution to the present day, there was still a fundamental decency, despite fiscal excesses, in the French military and administrators’ attitude to subject populations: resistance was more frequently punished by confiscation of property than mass execution, and in general the property rights and status of existing elites were respected. Despite all the effects that did arise, early modern societies therefore tended to be less psychologically affected by the experience of occupation than their modern counterparts. After the French Revolution swept the ancien régime away, occupying states in general would have far more powerful and terrifying means at their disposal to transform both political institutions and societies at large.8 Notes

1 Chaumet, Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’, p. 212. 2 See e.g. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’, p. 92. Though Flanders had been annexed in the 1660s, it was only after the Anglo-Dutch occupation of 1709–13 that its population became reconciled to French rule. 3 Margue, ‘Assujettis ou sujets?’, p. 37. 4 Black, European international relations, p. 34. 5 AN G7 374 no. 261, Charuel to Colbert, 22 Nov. 1682; Nordman, ‘From the boundaries’, p. 115. 6 Black, European international relations, p. 37; Ellis and Eßer (eds), Frontiers and the writing of history, p. 13. 7 Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, p. 1434. 8 Stirk, The politics of military occupation, pp. 208–9. On the Napoleonic period in particular see D. A. Bell, The first total war. Napoleon’s Europe and the birth of modern warfare (London, 2007) and S. Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (London, 1991).

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 201

12/03/2013 16:10

Appendix Officers of the sovereign companies † of Savoy, 1690–1713  Senior officers of the Sénat, October 1695 *Appointed by Louis XIV (date). Those in italics died in office during the occupation.

Présidents in order of seniority La Perouse* (Feb. 1691) 1er 1er de Tencin, Antoine* (Dec. 1692) Gaud 2ème 3ème de Lescheraine

Chevaliers d’honneur Deschamp Daracour D’Alex

Senateurs Chevillard, Claude-Louis Chevillard de La Duy, Pierre de Clermont* (Apr. 1695) du Clos Denys Depuys* (Dec. 1692) Desprez* (1695) D’Entremont Favier de la Biguerne de La Tour de Cordon

† SHDT A1 1331 nos. 222–3, ‘Etat des gages’, 1695; AN G7 249 [unnumbered] ‘Revenus de Savoie 1709 et 1710’. For a list of personnel in Lorraine’s Cour souveraine (suspended, 1671–98) see Mahuet, Cour souveraine, pp. 231–41.

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 202

12/03/2013 16:10

officers of the sovereign companies of savoy

203

Mallery La Perouse* (1695) Reveyron Tencin de Froges, François* (1693) de Valerieux

Avocat général de Ville

Procureur général Favier

Senior officers of the Sénat, December 1709 *Appointed by Louis XIV (date). Officers present in the Sénat during the previous occupation are named in bold. Those in italics died in office during the occupation.

Présidents in order of seniority de Tencin, Antoine* (Jan. 1704) 1er Tencin de Froges, François* (Nov. 1705) 1er Giraud* (Oct. 1705) 2ème de Lescheraine 3ème d’Entremont 4ème

Chevaliers d’honneur Couppy* (Sep. 1706) du Prayet* (1706) Manissi de Tenières* (Jan. 1705) Tencin, Claude-François* (Nov. 1709)

Senateurs de Brissiaux* (May 1704) de Chales Chalvet* (Sep. 1706) Chevillard, Pierre Chevillard de La Duy Du Clos Costa de St Remy Denys

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 203

12/03/2013 16:10

204

appendix

Dichat Dufrenay* (Jun. 1704) La Grange Marelli Planchamp de Mieusy Rebut Reyveron de Valerieux

Avocat général de Ville

Procureur général Favier

Senior officers of the Chambre des Comptes, October 1695 *Appointed by Louis XIV (date)

Présidents in order of seniority de Lescheraine 1er Doncieu 2ème Provana 3ème de la Saunière 4ème Costa 5ème

Chevaliers d’honneur Passerat de Troches

Auditeurs Bouillet Capré de Megève Carrely Carron de Cessans Emanuel Favre Favre de Marmy Fichet Flacourt Jolly

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 204

12/03/2013 16:10

officers of the sovereign companies of savoy

205

Metral Salteur Vibert Vulliet de la Saunière

Avocat général Perret* (Jul. 1695)

Senior officers of the Chambre des Comptes, December 1709 *Appointed by Louis XIV (date). Officers present in the Chambre during the previous occupation are in bold. Those in italics died in office during the occupation.

Présidents in order of seniority de Ferrière* (Nov. 1703) 1er de Ponnat* (1708) 1er Châtelier 2ème de la Saunière 3ème Buffière 4ème Girin 5ème Basset* (1703) ordinaire

Chevaliers d’honneur Passerat de Troches Heron* (1705)

Auditeurs Blaizot Borré Carrely Carron de Cessans Favre d’Annecy Favre de Marmy Fichet Graine Guerignon Guige Marcelier Metral

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 205

12/03/2013 16:10

206

appendix

Montforte Montjoye Pucet Saillet Raby Salteur Vulliet de la Saunière

Avocats généraux Millet Richard

Procureur général Morand

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 206

12/03/2013 16:10

Select bibliography

Archival sources Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris Correspondance Politique Lorraine 43–6, 55–7, 60–3, 68, 70, 72 Lorraine Supplément 9–13 Sardaigne 92–6, 113–17 Sardaigne Supplément 5 Archives Départementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, Nancy Series 3F (Fonds de  Vienne) 5, 6, 8, 9, 28, 29, 37–9, 46, 50–2, 96–8, 100, 103–6, 128, 153, 226, 228, 229, 238, 247, 264, 309, 315, 347, 350 Archives Départementales de Savoie, Chambéry Series 2B (Archives of the Sénat of Savoie) 21, 23, 24, 26, 43, 57, 75–81, 176, 2566–70, 2573, 2574, 2612, 8062–5 Series SA (Archives of the Chambre des Comptes of Savoie) 480–2, 488, 498 Archives Municipales d’Annecy Registres des Délibérations 47, 48 Archives Municipales de Chambéry Minutes BB 123–5

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 207

12/03/2013 16:10

208

select bibliography

Archives Municipales de Nancy Collection of royal ordonnances [uncatalogued] Archives Nationales, Paris Series G7 (Papers of the Controller-General of Finances) 1, 2, 4–6, 7, 9, 242, 243, 246–8, 250, 354, 415, 416 Archivio di Stato di Torino Paesi ‘Ecritures concernant le duché, et province de Savoye’ Mazzo 3 fascicoli 10–16 Bibliothèque Municipale de Nancy Manuscripts 152(345) Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris Collection Lorraine 18, 501, 571 Mélanges Colbert 156, 156bis Manuscrits Françaises 4877, 4889, 22753 Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises 22320 Pièces Originales 694 Service Historique de la Défense, Fonds de l’Armée de Terre,  Vincennes Series A1 (ministerial correspondence) 249–54, 259, 260, 275–80, 292–6, 328–31, 340, 342, 344, 346, 347, 350, 351, 354, 358, 407, 408, 411, 413, 417, 428, 429, 434, 444, 445, 452, 454, 458, 460, 461, 466, 509, 514, 560, 564, 565, 568, 606, 612, 614, 615, 630, 631, 668, 703, 704, 734, 735, 777, 794, 794, 830, 971, 974, 986, 990, 1004, 1009–11, 1021, 1071, 1077–9, 1093–5, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1113, 1116, 1157, 1168–70, 1227, 1238, 1239, 1266, 1272–6, 1284–7, 1289, 1329, 1331, 1373, 1375, 1380, 1436, 1522, 1549, 1550, 1563, 1568, 1571, 1574, 1582, 1583, 1606, 1644, 1661, 1663, 1664, 1671, 1672, 1687, 1690, 1693, 1701, 1702, 1746, 1754, 1761, 1764, 1766–8, 1773, 1783, 1785, 1829, 1846, 1848, 1850–9, 1861, 1862, 1873–80, 1948, 1950–4, 1966, 1968, 1971–4, 1994, 2033–5, 2038–45, 2091, 2092, 2095, 2098–102, 2142, 2162–7, 2169–76, 2236–8, 2241, 2242, 2244–6, 2248–51, 2258, 2267, 2317, 2320, 2321, 2324–7, 2340, 2346, 2370, 2391–93, 2395, 2396, 2398, 2400, 2422, 2446, 2452–463, 2487, 2505, 2506

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 208

12/03/2013 16:10

select bibliography

209

Published primary sources Anon., Dissertation historique et politique, sur le traitté fait entre le Roy et le Duc Charles, touchant la Lorraine (n.p., 1662) Beauvau, Henri, marquis de, Mémoires du marquis de Beauvau: concernant ce qui s’est passé de plus mémorable sous le règne de Charles IV duc de Lorraine & de Bar (Metz, 1686) Boislisle, A. M. (ed.), Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances (3 vols., Paris, 1874–97) Calmet, A., Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Lorraine … depuis l’entrée de Jules César dans les Gaules, jusqu’à la mort de Charles V, Duc de Lorraine, arrivée en 1690 (4 vols., Nancy, 1728) —, Notice de la Lorraine (2 vols., Lunéville, 1840; reprint of Nancy, 1756) —, Histoire de Lorraine, qui comprend ce qui s’est passé de plus mémorable dans l’Archevêché de Trèves, & dans les Evêchés de Metz, Toul &  Verdun, depuis l’entrée de Jules César dans les Gaules, jusqu’à la cession de la Lorraine, arrivée en 1737, inclusivement (7 vols., Nancy, 1757) Grotius, H., The rights of war and peace, ed. R. Tuck (3 vols., Indianapolis IN, 2005) Hardré, J. (ed.), Letters of Louvois (Chapel Hill NC, 1949) Horric de Beaucaire, C. (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la Révolution Française, vols. XIV and XV: Savoie-Sardaigne et Mantoue (Paris, 1898–99) Longnon, J. (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV (Paris, 1979) Rochas d’Aiglun, A., Vauban, sa famille et ses écrits, ses oisivetés et sa correspondance (2 vols., Paris, 1910) Saint-Simon, L. de Rouvroy, duc de, Mémoires, ed. A. M. Boislisle (40 vols., Paris, 1879–1928) Smedley-Weill, A. (ed.), Correspondance des intendants avec le contrôleur général des finances, 1677–1689: naissance d’une administration: sous-série G7, inventaire analytique (Paris, 1991) Sorel, A. (ed.), Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la Révolution Française, vol. I: Autriche (Paris, 1884)

Secondary sources Arminjon, H., De la noblesse des sénateurs au souverain Sénat de Savoie (Annecy, 1971) Asch, R., Nobilities in transition, 1550–1700: courtiers and rebels in Britain and Europe (London, 2003) Babel, R., ‘Dix années décisives: aspects de la politique étrangère de Charles IV de 1624 a 1634’, in J. P. Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine (Nancy, 1988) Ballon, H., Louis Le Vau: Mazarin’s Collège, Colbert’s revenge (Princeton NJ, 1999)

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 209

12/03/2013 16:10

210

select bibliography

Balsamo, J., ‘Lorraine et Savoie, médiateurs culturels entre la France et l’Italie (1580– 1630)’ in G. Mombello et al. (eds), Culture et pouvoir dans les Etats de Savoie du XVIIe siècle à la Révolution: actes du colloque d’Annecy-Chambéry-Turin (1982) (Chambéry, 1985) Baxter, D. C., ‘Premier commis in the war department in the latter part of the reign of Louis XIV’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of theWestern Society for French History, 8 (1980), pp. 81–9 Beik, W., Absolutism and society in seventeenth-century France: state power and provincial aristocracy (Cambridge, 1985) ­—, ‘The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration’, Past and Present, 188 (2005) Bergès, A., Des libertés de l’Eglise savoyarde et du gallicanisme du souverain Sénat de Savoie aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1942) Black, J., European international relations, 1648–1815 (Basingstoke, 2002) Blanning, T. C. W., Reform and revolution in Mainz, 1743–1803 (Cambridge, 1974) ­—, ‘German Jacobins and the French Revolution’, The Historical Journal, 23 (1980), pp. 985–1002 ­—, The French Revolution in Germany: occupation and resistance in the Rhineland 1792–1802 (Oxford, 1983) Bonnard, F., Les Relations de la famille ducale de Lorraine et du Saint-Siège dans les trois derniers siècles de l’indépendance (Paris, 1934) Bonney, R., ‘“Le Secret de leurs familles”: The Fiscal and Social Limits of Louis XIV’s Dixième’, French History, 7 (1993), pp. 383–416 Braudel, F., The identity of France, trans. S. Reynolds (2 vols., London, 1988) Braun, P., La Lorraine pendant le gouvernement de la Ferté-Sénectère (1643–1661) (Nancy, 1907) Briggs, R., Communities of belief: cultural and social tensions in early modern France (Oxford, 1989) Brossault, C., Les Intendants de Franche-Comté, 1674–1790 (Paris, 1999) Burnier, E., Histoire du Sénat de Savoie et des autres compagnies judiciaires de la même province (2 vols., Paris, 1864–65) Burrin, P., ‘Vichy et les expériences étrangères’ in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds), Vichy et les Français (Paris, 1992) ­—, ‘Writing the History of Military Occupations’ in S. Fishman et al. (eds), France at war:Vichy and the historians (Oxford, 2000) Cabourdin, G., La Vie quotidienne en Lorraine aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1984) ­—, Encyclopédie illustrée de la Lorraine: Les Temps modernes (2 vols., Nancy, 1991) Canestrier, P., ‘L’Œuvre de Vauban dans les Alpes Maritimes’ and ‘Mémoires inédits de Vauban sur le rasement des places de guerre’ in Congrès Vauban: Xe congrès de l’Association bourguignonne des sociétés savantes (Beaune, 1935) Cénat, J.-P., Le Roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661–1715 (Rennes, 2010) Chapman, S., Private ambition and political alliances: the Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain family and Louis XIV’s government, 1650–1715 (Rochester NY, 2004)

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 210

12/03/2013 16:10

select bibliography

211

Chaumet, P.-O., Louis XIV ‘Comte de Nice’: Etude politique et institutionnelle d’une annexion inaboutie (1691–1713) (Nice, 2006) Chaunu, P., ‘Jansenisme et frontière de catholicité (XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles): A propos du Jansenisme lorraine’, Revue Historique, 227 (1962), pp. 115–38 Chevailler, L., Essai sur le souverain Sénat de Savoie, 1559–1793: Organisation, procédure, compétence (Annecy, 1953) ­—, ‘L’Occupation française de la Savoie (1536–1559): Réflexions sur quelques aspects politiques et institutionnels’, Cahiers d’Histoire, 5 (1960), pp. 321–8 Cléron de Haussonville, J., Histoire de la réunion de la Lorraine à la France (4 vols., Paris, 1860) Coornaert, E., La Flandre française de la langue flamande (Paris, 1970) Corvisier, A., Louvois (Paris, 1983) Crochon, S., La Réforme pastorale dans le décanat de Savoie d’après les procès-verbaux des visites de Mgr Le Camus (1673–1703) (Grenoble, 1960) Darricau, R.,‘Louis XIV et le Saint-Siège: Les Indults de nomination aux bénéfices consistoriaux (1643–1670)’, Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, 66 (1965), pp. 16–34 ­—, ‘Une heure mémorable dans les rapports entre la France et le Saint-Siège: le ­pontificat de Clément IX (1667–1669)’, Bolletino Storico Pistoiese, 61 (1969), pp. 73–98 Dee, D., Expansion and crisis in Louis XIV’s France: the Franche-Comte and absolute monarchy (Rochester NY, 2009) Devos, J. C., ‘Aspects de l’occupation française en Savoie pendant la guerre de Succession d’Espagne (1703–1712)’, Actes du Congres National – Sociétés Savantes Section D Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 85 (1960), pp. 35–48 Devos, R., ‘Un siècle en mutation (1536–1684)’ in P. Guichonnet (ed.), Histoire de la Savoie (Toulouse, 1973) ­—, ‘Elite et culture. Les Magistrats savoyards au XVIIe siècle’ in G. Mombello et al. (eds), Culture et pouvoir dans les Etats de Savoie du XVIIe siècle à la Révolution: actes du colloque d’Annecy-Chambéry-Turin (1982) (Chambéry, 1985) ­—, and Grosperrin, B., La Savoie de la Réforme à la Révolution française (Rennes, 1985) Dewald, J., The European nobility, 1400–1800 (Cambridge, 1996) Doyle, W., Jansenism: Catholic resistance to authority from the Reformation to the Revolution (Basingstoke, 2000) Dupâquier, J. (ed.), Histoire de la population Française (4 vols., Paris, 1988) Duparc, P., ‘Les Projets de réunion de la Savoie à la France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles’, Revue de Savoie, 100 (1960), pp. 13–37 Elliott, J. H.,‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, Past and Present, 137 (1992), pp. 48–71 Etienne, J-L., ‘Charles V et les tentatives de recouvrement de ses Etats 1675–1679’ [unpublished mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Nancy, 1968] Fazy, H., Les Suisses et la neutralité de la Savoie, 1703–1704 (Geneva, 1895) Febvre, L., ‘Frontière: the word and the concept’ in P. Burke (ed.), A new kind of history: from the writings of Lucien Febvre (London, 1973)

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 211

12/03/2013 16:10

212

select bibliography

Gerardin, E., Histoire de Lorraine: duchés-comtés-evêchés, depuis les origines jusqu’à la réunion des deux duchés à la France (1766) (Nancy, 1925) Girard d’Albissin, N., Genèse de la frontière franco-belge: les variations des limites septentrionales de la France de 1659 à 1789 (Paris, 1970) Godsey, W.  D., Nobles and nations in central Europe: free imperial knights in the age of revolution, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, 2006) Grosperrin, B., L’Influence française et le sentiment national français en Franche-Comté de la conquête à la Révolution (1674–1789) (Paris, 1967) ­—, La Savoie et la France de la Renaissance à la Révolution (Chambéry, 1992) Haan, B., Une paix pour l’éternité: la négociation du traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (Madrid, 2010) Hantraye, J., Les Cosaques aux Champs-Elysées: L’Occupation de la France après la Chute de Napoléon (Paris, 2005) Hatton, R., ‘Louis XIV et l’Europe’, XVIIe siècle, 123 (1979), pp. 109–35 Houtte, H. van, Les Occupations étrangères en Belgique sous l’ancien régime (Paris, 1930) Humbert, J., Une grande entreprise oubliée: Les Français en Savoie sous Louis XIII (Paris, 1960) ­—, ‘Conquête et occupation de la Savoie sous Louis XIV (1690–1691)’, Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Savoie, 6e série, 9 (1967), pp. 13–99 Hurt, J., Louis XIV and the parlements: the assertion of royal authority (Manchester, 2002) Jacquiot, J., ‘La Valeur d’information des allégories de médailles concernant l’Histoire de la Savoie dans la seconde moitie du XVIIe siècle’ in Culture et pouvoir dans les Etats de Savoie du XVIIe siècle à la Révolution: actes du colloque d’Annecy-Chambery-Turin (1982) (Chambéry, 1985) Kaypaghian, N., ‘Le Duché de Lorraine et les Trois-Evêchés entre deux occupations (1663–1670)’, Cahiers Lorrains, 33 (1981), pp. 105–22 Kettering, S., Patrons, brokers, and clients in seventeenth-century France (Oxford, 1986) Lameire, I., Les Occupations militaires en Italie pendant les guerres de Louis XIV (Paris, 1903) Lanouvelle, E., Le Maréchal de Créquy (Paris, 1931) Laperche-Fournel, M.-J., ‘Etre intendant en pays de frontière: L’Exemple de JeanBaptiste Desmarets de Vaubourg, intendant de Lorraine et de Barrois (1691– 1697)’, Annales de L’Est, 53/2 (2003), pp. 323–45 ­—, L’Intendance de Lorraine et Barrois à la fin du XVIIe siècle: Edition critique du mémoire ‘pour l’instruction du duc de Bourgogne’ (Paris, 2006) ­—, La Population du duché de Lorraine de 1580 à 1720 (Nancy, 1985) Leestmans, C., Charles IV, duc de Lorraine (1604–1675): Une errance baroque (Lasne, 2003) Legay, M.-L., Les Etats provinciaux dans la construction de l’état moderne aux XVIIe et XVIIe siècle (Geneva, 2001) Lemaître, A. J., ‘L’Intendance en Alsace, Franche-Comté et Lorraine aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles’, Annales de L’Est, 50/2 (2000), pp. 205–31 Lipp, C., Noble strategies in an early modern small state: the Mahuet of Lorraine (Rochester NY, 2011)

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 212

12/03/2013 16:10

select bibliography

213

Livet, G., ‘Louis XIV et les provinces conquises’, XVIIe siècle, 16 (1952), pp. 481–507 ­—, ‘Royal Administration in a Frontier Province: The Intendancy of Alsace under Louis XIV’ in R. Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and Absolutism (Columbus OH, 1976) ­—, L’Intendance d’Alsace: De la guerre de Trente Ans à la mort de Louis XIV, 1634–1715 (2nd edn, Strasbourg, 1991) Lossky, A., ‘“Maxims of State” in Louis XIV’s Foreign Policy in the 1680s’ in J. Bromley and R. Hatton (eds), William III and Louis XIV (Liverpool, 1968) Lottes, G., ‘Frontiers between Geography and History’ in S. G. Ellis and R. Eßer (eds), Frontiers and the writing of history, 1500–1850 (Hanover, 2006) Lottin, A., ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’ in M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and coalescence: the shaping of the state in early modern Europe (London, 1991) Lovie, J., ‘Le Cardinal Le Camus et le décanat de Savoie, 1671–1707’ in J. Godel et al. Le Cardinal des montagnes: Etienne Le Camus, Evêque de Grenoble (1671–1707) (Grenoble, 1974) ­—, Les Dioceses de Chambéry,Tarentaise, Maurienne (Paris, 1979) Lynn, J. A., ‘How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siècle’, Journal of Modern History, 65 (June 1993), pp. 286–310 ­—, Giant of the grand siècle: the French army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge, 1997) ­—, The wars of Louis XIV, 1664–1714 (London, 1999) Mahuet, H., La Cour souveraine de Lorraine et Barrois, 1641–1790 (Nancy, 1959) Margue, P., ‘Assujettis ou sujets? Les Luxembourgeois sous Louis XIV’ in R. Poidevin and G. Trausch (eds), Les Relations franco-luxembourgeoises de Louis XIV à Robert Schuman (Metz, 1978) Martin, P., Une guerre de trente ans en Lorraine, 1631–1661 (Metz, 2002) McCluskey, P., ‘From Regime Change to Réunion: Louis XIV’s Quest for Legitimacy in Lorraine, 1670–97’, English Historical Review, 126 (2011), pp. 1386–1407 McCullough, R., Coercion, conversion and counterinsurgency in Louis XIV’s France (Leiden, 2007) Mettam, R., Power and faction in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, 1988) Meumann, M. and J. Rogge (eds), Die besetzte Res publica: zum Verhältnis von ziviler Obrigkeit und militärischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten vom Spätmittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 2006) Meyer, F., ‘Les Elites diocésaines en Savoie à la fin du XVIIe siècle’, Rives Méditerranées, 32–3 (2009), pp. 173–89 ­—, ‘Occupations ou annexions? La Savoie soumise, 1536–1749’, L’Histoire en Savoie, 20 (2010), pp. 13–35 Mousnier, R., The institutions of France under the absolute monarchy, 1598–1789, trans. B. Pierce (2 vols., Chicago, 1979) Nicolas, J., ‘Ombres et lumières du XVIIIe siècle’ in P. Guichonnet (ed.), Histoire de la Savoie (Toulouse, 1973) ­—, ‘La Noblesse et l’état en Savoie au 18e siècle’, Cahiers d’Histoire, 22/2 (1977), pp. 135–51

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 213

12/03/2013 16:10

214

select bibliography

­ , La Savoie au 18e siècle noblesse et bourgeoisie (2 vols., Paris, 1978) — ­—, La Vie quotidienne en Savoie aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1979) Nordman, D., Frontières de France: de l’espace au territoire, XVIe–XIXe siècle (Paris, 1998) ­—, ‘From the Boundaries of the State to National Borders’ in P. Nora (ed.), Rethinking France: Les Lieux de Mémoire, trans. D. P. Jordan (4 vols., Chicago, 2001), vol. i Nouzille, J., ‘Charles V de Lorraine, les Habsbourg et la guerre contre les Turcs de 1683 à 1687’ in J. P. Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine (Nancy, 1988) O’Connor, J., ‘Louis XIV and Europe: War and Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century’ in S. G. Reinhardt (ed.), The Sun King: Louis XIV and the new world (New Orleans, 1994) Oresko, R., ‘The Diplomatic Background to the Glorioso Rimpatrio: the Rupture between Vittorio Amedeo II and Louis XIV (1688–1690)’ in A. de Lange (ed.), Dall’Europa alleValliValdesi: Atti del XXIX Convegno storico internazionale:‘Il Glorioso Rimpatrio (1689–1989). Contesto-Significato-Immagine’ (Turin, 1990) ­—, ‘The Glorious Revolution and the House of Savoy’ in J. Israel, The Anglo-Dutch moment: essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact (Cambridge, 1991) ­—, ‘The House of Savoy in search of a royal crown in the seventeenth century’ in R. Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott (eds), Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe: essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton (Cambridge, 1997) ­—, and Parrott, D.,‘The Sovereignty of Monferrato and the citadel of Casale as European problems in the early modern period’ in D. Ferrari (ed.), Stephano Guazzo e Casale tra cinque e seicento Atti del convegno di studi nel quarto centenario della morte, Casale Monferrato, 22–23 ottobre 1993 (Rome, 1997) Pariset, J.-D., ‘La Lorraine dans les relations internationales au XVIe siècle’, in J. P. Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine (Nancy, 1988) Parrott, D., ‘The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635–59’ in J. Black (ed.), The origins of war in early modern Europe (Edinburgh, 1987) ­—, Richelieu’s army: war, government, and society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge, 2001) Pénicaut, E., Faveur et pouvoir au tournant du grand siècle: Michel Chamillart, ministre et secrétaire d’état de la guerre de Louis XIV (Paris, 2004) Pérouse, G., ‘Etat de la Savoie à la fin du XVIIe siècle, 1679–1713’, Mémoires et documents publiés par la Societé savoisienne d’histoire et d’archéologie, Chambéry, 63 (1926), pp. 1–60 Perroud, M., Le Jansenisme en Savoie (Chambéry, 1945) Petit, R., ‘La Politique Française dans le Luxembourg de 1681 à 1697’ in R. Poidevin and G. Trausch (eds), Les Relations franco-luxembourgeoises de Louis XIV à Robert Schuman (Metz, 1978) Piquet-Marchal, M-O., La Chambre de Réunion de Metz (Paris, 1969) Potter, M., Corps and clienteles: public finance and political change in France, 1688–1715 (Aldershot and Burlington VT, 2003) Rebut, M., ‘Annecy pendant la guerre de succession d’Espagne’, Revue Savoisienne, 114 (1974), pp. 64–108

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 214

12/03/2013 16:10

select bibliography

215

Romac, M., ‘Le Commerce illicite du sel en Lorraine au XVIIIe siècle’, Pays Lorraine, 71 (1990), pp. 15–22 Rousset, C., Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire (4 vols., Paris, 1877) Roux, M., Louis XIV et les provinces conquises (Paris, 1938) Rowe, M. (ed.), Collaboration and resistance in Napoleonic Europe: state-formation in the age of upheaval, c.1800–1815 (Basingstoke, 2003) Rowlands, G., ‘Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 1689–96’, English Historical Review, 115 (2000), pp. 534–69 ­—, The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661–1701 (Cambridge, 2002) ­—, ‘Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and His Forces ­Étrangères’, War in History, 17/2 (April 2010), pp. 141–65 ­—, The financial decline of a great power: war, influence and money in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, 2012) Sahlins, P., ‘Natural Frontiers Revisited: France’s Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century’, American Historical Review, 95/5 (December 1990), pp. 1423–51 ­—, Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley CA, 1990) ­—,‘La Nationalité avant la lettre. Les Pratiques de naturalisation en France sous l’Ancien Régime’, Annales, 55 (2000), pp. 1081–1108 Schmitt, A., Le Barrois mouvant au XVIIe siècle (1624–1697), Mémoires de la Société des Lettres, Sciences et Arts de Bar-le-Duc et du Musée de Géographie [series], 5e série, vols. 7, 47 (Bar-le-Duc, 1928–9) Scott, H. M. (ed.), The European nobilities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, vol. i: Western Europe (London, 1995) Sonnino, P., Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge, 1988) Spangler, J., ‘A Lesson in Diplomacy for Louis XIV: The Treaty of Montmartre, 1662, and the Princes of the House of Lorraine’, French History, 17 (2003), pp. 225–50 ­—, The society of princes: the Lorraine-Guise and the conservation of power and wealth in seventeenth-century France (Farnham, Surrey, 2009) ­—, ‘Those in Between: Princely Families on the Margins of the Great Powers – The Franco-German Frontier, 1477–1830’ in C. H. Johnson, D. W. Sabean, S.Teuscher and F. Trivellato (eds), Transregional and transnational families in Europe and beyond: experiences since the middle ages (New York, 2011) Steiger, H., ‘“Occupatio bellica” in der Literatur des Völkerrechts der Christenheit (Spätmittelalter bis 18. Jahrhundert)’ in M. Meumann and J. Rogge (eds), Die besetzte Res publica: ZumVerhältnis von ziviler Obrigkeit und militärischer Herrschaft in besetzten Gebieten vom Spätmittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 2006) Stewart, D., Assimilation and acculturation in seventeenth-century Europe: Roussillon and France, 1659–1715 (Westport CT, 1997) Stirk, P., The politics of military occupation (Edinburgh, 2009) Storrs, C., ‘Machiavelli Dethroned: Victor Amadeus II and the Making of the Anglo-

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 215

12/03/2013 16:10

216

select bibliography

Savoyard Alliance of 1690’, European History Quarterly, 22/3 (1992), pp. 347–81 ­—, War, diplomacy and the rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge, 1999) Stoye, J., Europe unfolding, 1648–88 (London, 1969) Swann, J., ‘War Finance in Burgundy in the Reign of Louis XIV, 1661–1715’ in W. Ormrod et al. (eds), Crises, revolutions and self-sustained growth: essays in European fiscal history, 1130–1830 (Stamford, 1999) ­—, Provincial power and absolute monarchy: the Estates General of Burgundy, 1661–1790 (Cambridge, 2003) Symcox, G., Victor Amadeus II: absolutism in the Savoyard state, 1675–1730 (London, 1983) Tapié, V.-L., ‘Louis XIV’s Methods in Foreign Policy’ in R. Hatton (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe (London, 1976) Taveneaux, R., Le Jansénisme en Lorraine (Paris, 1960) ­—, ‘L’Esprit de croisade en Lorraine aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles’ in L’Europe, l’Alsace et la France: problèmes intérieurs et relations internationales à l’époque moderne. Etudes réunies en l’honneur du doyen Georges Livet pour son 70e anniversaire (Colmar, 1986), pp. 256–63 ­—, ‘La Lorraine, les Habsbourg et l’Europe’ in J. P. Bled et al., Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine (Nancy, 1988) ­—, (ed.) Encyclopédie illustrée de la Lorraine: La Vie religieuse (Nancy, 1988) ­—, and J-F. Michel (eds), Bénédictins entre Saône et Meuse: actes du colloque de l’Association Saône Lorraine, 19–20 août 1995 (Paris, 1996) Toussaint, M., La Frontière linguistique en Lorraine (Paris, 1955) Vignal Souleyreau, M.-C., Richelieu et la Lorraine (Paris, 2004) Voss, J., ‘La Lorraine et sa situation politique entre la France et l’empire vues par le duc de Saint-Simon’ in J. P. Bled et al. (eds), Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine (Nancy, 1988) Waksmann, P., ‘Les Français à Barcelonnette de 1690 à 1693’, Actes du 90e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes, Nice 1965 (2 vols., Paris, 1966) Wallace, P. G., Communities and conflict in early modern Colmar: 1575–1730 (Atlantic Highlands NJ, 1995) ­—, ‘Between Bourbon and Habsburg: Elite Political Identities at Freiburg im Breisgau, 1651–1715’, Austrian HistoryYearbook, 33 (2002), pp. 15–41 Zeller, G., ‘Les Charges de la Lorraine pendant la guerre de Hollande’, Mémoires de la Société d’archéologie Lorraine, 61 (1911), pp. 21–3 ­—, L’Organisation défensive des frontières du nord et de l’est au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1929) ­—, ‘Saluces, Pignerol et Strasbourg: La Politique des frontières au temps de la preponderance Espagnole’, Revue Historique, 193/2 (1942–3), pp. 97–110 ­—, Aspects de la politique française sous l’ancien régime (Paris, 1964)

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 216

12/03/2013 16:10

Index

N.B.: ‘n.’ after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page; dates of birth and death are given where known. ‘absolutism’ 4-5, 82, 159, 197-9 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of (1668) 12, 38 Alps, as boundary 13, 55, 62n.144, 200 Alsace 14, 38 administration 3, 66–9, 78, 82n.4, 87, 94, 154 church 172, 179, 183, 186, 189n.4 fortification 109n.26 military activity 36, 37, 41 supplies 42, 43, 91 nobles 138, 186 ancienne chevalerie see nobility Angervilliers, Nicolas Prosper Bauyn, seigneur d’, intendant of the Dauphiné (1675–1740) 83n.37, 97–9, 107, 112n.89, 154, 156, 157 Annecy 51, 54, 99–100, 101, 164, 173 Aosta 22, 52, 54, 134 Apremont family 15 Arenthon d’Alex family 130 Arenthon d’Alex, Jean, bishop of Geneva/Annecy (1620–95) 113n.126, 130, 176–7, 189n.13 see also Geneva/Annecy, bishop of Artois 82n.3, 144n.150, 146, 181

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 217

Audiffret, Jean-Baptiste, French envoy to Lorraine 41, 59n.75 Baden, Markgraf Ludwig von (1655– 1707) 41–2 Bar, duchy of (Barrois) 15, 18, 77–9, 200 administration 84n.69, 88, 92, 127 Chambre des comptes 71, 77–8, 147, 148–9, 167n.20 church 173, 179 economy 16, 88–9 sovereignty 35–9, 57n.17, 124 Bar-le-duc 16, 71, 105, 160, 183 Barbezieux, Louis François Marie Le Tellier, marquis de, French war minister (1668–1701) 69–70, 75–6, 83n.35, 137 Barcelonnette valley 49–50, 55, 170n.121, 174 Bazin de Chancy, sieur de, Savoyard senator 156 Beauvau family 15 Beauvau, Henri, marquis de, Lorrain nobleman and memorialist (1610–83) 17, 123, 140n.31 Bellegarde, marquis de, Savoyard nobleman 25, 142n.86

12/03/2013 16:10

218

index

Benedictines 178, 179, 183, 184 benefices 20, 175, 177–9 Berwick, James FitzJames, duke of, marshal of France (1670–1734) 54, 99, 134, 186 Besançon 38, 44, 68, 154 Bissy, Claude de Thiard, comte de, French commander in Lorraine (1620–1701) 103, 105, 126, 127, 138, 174 Bissy, Henri-Pons de Thiard de, bishop of Toul (1657–1737) 174, 176, 190n.29 see also Toul, bishop, bishopric of Bitche 42 Blenheim, Battle of (1704) 43 Blouet de Camilly, François, bishop of Toul (1664–1723) 176 see also Toul, bishop, bishopric of Bologna, Concordat of (1516) 179 borderlands see frontiers Bouchu, Etienne-Jean, intendant of the Dauphiné (1655–1715) 51, 71, 83n., 94–5, 150 Boufflers, Louis François, duc de, marshal of France (1644–1711) 73–4, 127 Boulay 42, 102, 183 Bouquenom 42 Bourcier, Jean-Léonard, baron de, procureur général of Conseil provincial of Luxembourg 160, 167n.26, 170n.104 Briançon, Briançonnais 46, 53–4, 74 Camisards 51, 53 see also Cévennes Canon, Claude-François, président of Cour souveraine of Lorraine 149 capitation 91, 95–6, 99, 108, 126, 136, 150, 157, 185

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 218

Carignano, Emanuele Filiberto, principe di (1628–1709) 136, 144n.140 Carlos II, king of Spain (1661–1700) 41, 50, 199 Carpinel, abbé de, dean of the SaintChapelle of Chambéry 153–4, 180 Casale 26, 41, 49, 196 Catalonia, Catalans 56, 62n.149, 123, 183 Cateau-Cambrésis, Treaty of (1559) 22 Catholics, Catholicism 3, 172–3, 182 see also clergy Catinat, Nicolas, marshal of France (1637–1712) 26, 46–7, 75–6, 95, 102 Cévennes 51, 106 Chablais, the 22, 23, 47, 49, 51–4, 106–7 Chambéry 23, 157, 173–4, 184, 186 military activity 46–7, 50–1, 54–5, 94, 97–8, 106 municipal regime 99, 163–4 Sainte-Chapelle 180 Chambre des comptes see respective territories Chambre de réunion of Metz 38–9, 182 see also ‘reunion’ policy Chamillart, Michel, French war minister and controller general of finances (1652–1721) and military commanders 53, 74–6 policies towards occupied territories 42, 92, 97, 102, 107–8, 128, 132, 135, 136, 152, 153, 154, 164, 177, 181, 184 style of government 70, 83n.27, 83n.37, 112n.94 Chamlay, Jules Louis Bolé, marquis de, French military strategist (1650–1719) 39, 96 Champagne 38, 43, 120 Charles IV, duke of Lorraine (1604–75)

12/03/2013 16:10

index

34–5, 157–8, 164–5, 181 hostility to France 16, 20–1 and the Lorrain nobility 19–20, 121–3, 125, 137 military campaigns 18, 36 Charles V, duke of Lorraine (1643–90) 30n.62, 36–7, 45, 90, 187–8 inheritance of Lorraine 20, 21, 34, 35, 36 and the Lorrain nobility 125, 126 military campaigns 36, 39, 187 Charles VI, holy roman emperor (1685– 1740) 44 Charuel, Jacques, intendant of Lorraine 71, 78–9, 88–91, 101, 105, 122, 148, 158 du Châtelet family 123 Châtillon, marquis de, Savoyard nobleman 129, 142n.85 Cherasco, Treaty of (1631) 22, 26 Choiseul family 15 Choisy, Jean-Paul de, intendant of the Trois Evêchés 20, 34, 83n.34, 101 Clement IX, pope (1600–69) 178, 179 clergy 172, 200 commende 178, 180, 191n.67 episcopate 173–7 oath of allegiance 176, 178, 191n.65 parish 175, 181–2, 184, 188, 189n.5 privileges 185–7 religious orders 181–5, 193n.125 religious superiors 177–81, 183 clienteles 68, 70, 83n.28 Code Léopold 175–6 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, controller general of finances (1619–1683) 77, 82n.3, 90, 146, 197, 200 collaboration 96, 129–30, 132, 135, 162, 163, 165, 185, 189, 196, 200 Colmar 68

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 219

219

commende see clergy commissaires des guerres 71, 81, 83n.31, 94, 95, 111n.77 commissaires ordonnateur 71–2, 137, 185, 186–7 ‘composite’ states 11 Concordat of Bologna see Bologna, Concordat of confiscations 96, 125, 132, 136, 138, 143n.132, 191n.63, 201 contributions 30n.37, 36, 38, 86–7, 90, 94, 95, 110n.28 Council of Trent see Trent, Council of counterfeit (coinage) 99, 154–5 Couvonges, comte de, Lorrain nobleman 123, 127, 141n.61–3 Couvonges family see Stainville family Créqui, François, marquis de, governor of Lorraine (1629–87) 73, 88–9, 103, 158, 181 and the Lorrain nobility 121–2, 124–5, 138, 160 military campaigns 34, 36 Croissy, Charles Colbert, marquis de, French foreign minister (1625– 96) 37, 71, 127, 144n.145 Dauphiné, the 46, 48–9, 52–3, 71, 75, 94, 98, 120, 129, 138, 154 Desmarets, Nicolas, controller general of finances (1648–1721) 98, 157 dixième 99, 113n.116, 157, 185 droit annuel 158–9 Dutch Republic 21, 36, 41, 93 Eleanora Maria of Austria, duchess of Lorraine (1653–97) 36, 111n.55, 127 Elisabeth Charlotte d’Orléans, duchess of Lorraine (1676–1744) 40

12/03/2013 16:10

220

index

Embrun, archbishop of 174, 177, 190n.19, 190n.24 Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy (1528–80) 22, 23, 24 England see Great Britain Entremont, abbey of 178, 180 Epinal 34, 77, 91, 121, 183, 188 Estates General of Lorraine 15, 19, 147 of Savoy 24, 147 étapes 25, 90, 91, 93 Exilles 53, 55 Extraordinaire des Guerres 72, 93, 97, 136, 150, 153 Faucigny 22, 47, 53, 99, 106, 153 Fenestrelle 53, 55, 96 Fénétrange 42 Flanders (French) 3, 87, 146, 147, 154, 182, 183, 188, 201n.2 Franche-Comté, the 5, 12, 59–60n.81 administration 67–8, 78, 82n.13, 87, 146, 198 church 183, 184, 188, 193n.107 fortification 67, 109n.26 military activity 43, 44, 54, 56, 67 nobles 125, 138 Parlement of 38, 149 strategic importance 35, 36 taxation 92, 110n.27, 112n.87 under French occupation 36, 88, 89, 106, 149 Franciscans 182, 187, 193n.125 Freiburg im Breisgau 84n.45, 163, 165, 196 French see language Frondes 4 frontiers 5–6, 12–13, 28n.8, 196, 200 ‘natural frontiers’ 3, 13 security 33, 37, 87, 104–5, 196 ‘strategic frontiers’ 12, 86

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 220

trade across 104–5 Fürstenburg, Wilhelm Egon von, cardinal (1629–1704) 174 gabelles 91, 96, 100, 152, 161, 162 see also salt Gallican, Gallicanism 172–3, 174, 175, 176, 179, 182–3, 187, 188 ‘gallicanisation’ 183, 185 Gaul (ancient region) 13 Gendarmerie de France 102 Geneva/Annecy, bishop of 23, 101–2, 129, 176–7, 186, 189n.13, 190n.45 Genevois, the 22, 47, 54 ‘geo-cultural landscape’ 14, 29n.21, 120, 200 Gerbéviller, Gabriel-François d’Armur de, Lorraine nobleman 128 Gerbevilliers, Charles Emmanuel de Tornielle, marquis de, Lorrain nobleman 127, 141n.61–2 Gourcy, comte de, Lorrain nobleman 128 governors, of provinces 66 Great Britain 7n.6, 21, 41, 61n.137 Grenoble, bishop of 23, 173–4 Grotius, Hugo, jurist (1583–1645) 2 Haraucourt, Charles, marquis de, Lorrain nobleman 122–3 Haraucourt family 16, 137, 138 Haussonville, Joseph Othenin Bernard de Cléron, comte de, historian (1809–84) 4, 88, 124 Hautecombe abbey 167n.38, 178 du Hautoy, chevalier, Lorrain nobleman 39, 58n.41, 160 Holy Roman Empire 40, 44, 124 boundaries 22, 33 responses to French policies 33, 35 Hombourg, 42

12/03/2013 16:10

index

Huguenots see Protestants intendants 66, 70–2, 82n.13, 87, 125 Jansenism, Jansenists 174, 188, 194n.156 Jesuits 13, 23, 182–3, 187, 192n.93, 193n.125, 195n.160 Jews 8n.16, 16, 31n.81 Joseph I, holy roman emperor (1678– 1711) 41 La Chaise, François, confessor of Louis XIV (1624–1709) 179 La Ferté-Senneterre, Henri, comte de, governor of Lorraine (1599– 1681) 17 La Feuillade, Louis d’Aubusson de, French general (1673–1725) 51–2, 73, 83n.37, 106, 107, 131–2, 152 language 23, 29n.23, 120, 192n.93, 199 Languedoc 147 law 13 legal claims to territory 13–14, 37–8, 56, 57n.17, 62n.148–9 Le Bègue, François, Lorrain statesman (1643–99) 90, 178 Le Bret, Cardin, jurist 58n.31 Le Camus, Etienne, cardinal (1632– 1707) 173–4, 184 see also Grenoble, bishop of Le Guerchois, French commander in the Chablais 74–5, 107, 135 Leopold, duke of Lorraine (1679–1729) restoration 39–40, 175–6, 180, 183, 200 in the War of the Spanish Succession 41–5, 92–3, 128, 175 Leopold I, holy roman emperor (1640– 1705) 36, 41

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 221

221

Lenoncourt-Blainville, marquis de, Lorrain nobleman 123, 127, 141n.61, 141n.67 Lenoncourt family 16, 137, 141n.67 Leszczyński, Stanislas, duke of Lorraine (1677–1766) 3 Le Tellier, Michel, chancellor of France (1603–1685) 148, 181 Liège 41 Lillebonne, François Marie, prince de (1624–94) 122, 140n.29 Lionne, Hugues de, French foreign minister (1611–1671) 21, 34, 57n.12 Lixin, François de Grimaldi, prince de 121, 126, 139n.20 Longwy 37, 45, 77 Lorraine attitudes to France 28, 43, 105–6, 160, 175, 188, 199–200 bailliages 17, 71, 77, 126–7, 159 Chambre des comptes 17, 77, 80, 147–9 Cour des assises 15, 19, 29n.24 Cour souveraine 18, 19, 77, 80, 147, 148, 157 economy 88–9, 93 fermiers généraux 104, 158 fortifications 36, 42 French military activity 16, 34–5, 39, 92 integration into France 17–19, 77–9, 81–2, 104, 158–9, 197–9 military supplies 44, 92, 111n.57 prévôts, prévôtés 17, 89, 90, 103, 157–8, 159, 160, 161–2 sovereignty 38–9, 40, 44, 57n.17, 124 strategic importance 27 Lorraine-Guise family 14, 20 Louis XIII, king of France (1601–43) 16, 22, 57n.17, 62n.149

12/03/2013 16:10

222

index

Louvois, François-Michel Le Tellier, mar­­­quis de, French war minister (1641–91) 57n.12, 66–8, 73 character 25, 69 foreign policy 20, 25 occupation policies 34–9, 46–8, 71, 75–6, 94–5, 100–1, 122, 125, 148, 164, 180, 181, 197 provincial management 66–9, 82n.3–4, 146 Lucinge, marquis de, Savoyard nobleman 136, 142n.86 Lunéville 91 Lutzelbourg family 123 Luxembourg 12, 21, 37–8, 43, 71, 196 conseil provincial 149, 160 ecclesiastical policy 175, 183, 185, 189n.4, 194n.135 military activity in 44 under French occupation 78, 90, 126, 137, 147, 162, 163, 165, 166n.7, 199 Luxembourg, François-Henri de Montmorency, duc de, marshal of France (1628–95) 36 Luxembourg, Pierre-Henri de Mont­­ mor­ency, abbé de (1663–1700) 179–80 Mahuet family 124, 125, 140n.53, 160 Maillet, Gabriel, abbot of Saint-Mihiel 179–80 Mainz 39 mapping 13, 200 maréchausée 101, 106 Marie Christine, duchess of Savoy (1606–63) 23 Marie Jeanne Baptiste, duchess of Savoy (1644–1724) 23, 25

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 222

Marigny, marquis de, Savoyard nobleman 180 Marsal 20, 36, 41, 93, 103 Mauléon family 123 Maurienne, the 22, 48 Mazarin, Jules, cardinal (1602–61) 17, 18–19, 23, 45, 57n., 201 Médavy, Jacques-Eléonor Rouxel, comte de (1655–1725), French commander in Savoy 74–6, 135, 157 Metz 15–17, 77, 121, 179, 189n.4 bishop/bishopric of 15, 37–8, 173, 174, 175, 189n.15 Parlement of 17, 18, 30n.38–9, 37–8, 79, 89, 148–9, 158, 159, 160, 182 see also Trois Evêchés Milan, Milanese 40, 50–1, 53, 54 military discipline 17, 43, 81, 86–7, 92, 93, 101–3, 113n.133 militia 46, 47, 52, 54, 91, 107 Montecuccoli, Raimondo, conte di, Imperial field marshal (1609– 80) 36 Montmartre, Treaty of (1662) 20, 30n.63 Montmélian 47–9, 52, 56, 60n.103, 97, 104, 106–7, 131, 153, 161 Montpensier, Anne Marie Louise d’Orléans, duchesse de (1627– 93) 140n.47 Moutiers-en-Tarentaise 48, 186 Münster, Treaty of (1648) see Westphalia, Peace of Nancy 124, 175, 186 administration 77, 158 fortifications 35–6, 40 French garrison 41–2, 45, 80–1, 103 municipal regime 90, 163, 164–5 ‘nationalist’ sentiment 143n.115

12/03/2013 16:10

index

Nettancourt family 15–16 Nice, county of 22, 50, 71–2, 79–80, 84n.55, 105, 133–4, 156, 162, 197, 201 church 174, 176, 185, 187, 194n.134–5 Sénat 72, 155, 157, 191n.50 town 48–9, 52–3, 163, 164 Nicolas-François, duke of Lorraine (1612–70) 21 Nijmegen, Treaties of (1678–79) 12, 36–8, 45, 125, 126, 188 Nine Years War 39, 91–2, 105, 126–7, 136, 159, 160, 197–8 nobility 119–21, 139n.14 of Alsace 145n.157 fiscal privileges 136–7, 144n.143 of the Franche-Comté 125, 138, 146 of Lorraine 15, 120–8, 137–8 ancienne chevalerie 15, 19, 123–4,  137 anoblis 121, 124, 125, 137 grands chevaux 123, 127, 141n.67 of Luxembourg 126, 137, 140–1n.55 of Nice 133–4, 135, 137 noblesse d’epée 66 oath of allegiance 119, 129, 131 of Savoy 24, 120–1, 126, 129–34, 135–7, 139n.10 nouveaux convertis see Protestants Order of Saint-Louis 128, 141n.72 Order of Saint-Maurice and Saint-Lazare 180 Ottomans 38, 187 Paolucci, Fabrizio, cardinal secretary of state (1651–1726) 177 papacy 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 183, 188 parlements 147, 150

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 223

223

see also respective territories Partition Treaty (1700) 40, 50 patrie 131, 133, 142n.104 ‘patriotism’ 19 see also ‘nationalist’ sentiment pays conquis 5, 65–9, 77, 81, 138, 147, 159, 166, 172, 174, 178–9, 181, 185, 201 pays d’élections 89, 92, 96, 109n.17, 110n.27 pays d’états 5, 89, 92, 96, 108, 109n.17, 110n.27 pays indivis 13 Phalsbourg 37 Piedmont French occupation of 22, 52, 95, 97 relations with Savoy 23, 24, 134, 143n.127 Piedmont-Savoy 5, 22, 24, 27, 199, 200 relations with France 23, 25 Pinerolo 23, 26, 46–9, 56, 74, 196 Pomponne, Simon Arnauld, marquis de, French foreign minister (1618– 99) 37, 39, 58n.40 Pont-à-Mousson, university of 182–3, 193n.109 Pontchartrain, Louis Phélypeaux, comte de, controller general of finances (1643–1727) 71, 83n.35, 104, 156 population 19, 24, 30n.53 pré carré 37, 56 Protestants 8n.16, 16, 24, 46, 49, 67, 172, 187 Provana, Henri, bishop of Nice (1631– 1706) 177 Pyrenees, Peace of the (1659) 12, 18, 39, 181, 200 raiding 42, 75, 87, 90, 105–7, 114n.172, 131, 161, 184

12/03/2013 16:10

224

index

Raigecourt, comte, Lorrain nobleman de 128 Rambervilliers 45 Rastatt, Treaty of (1714) 45 Ravaulx, Roland, procureur général of the Chambre de réunion of Metz 38, 144n.149, 183, 194n.150 see also Chambre de réunion régale 176, 179 Remiremont, abbey of Saint-Pierre de 178 ‘reunion’ policy 14, 20, 33, 37–9, 77, 149 see also Chambre de réunion Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) 187 Rhine 13, 36, 39, 41, 43 League of the 57n.8, 66 Rhineland 2, 16, 120 Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, cardinal (1585–1642) frontier policy 12, 13–14 occupation of Lorraine 16, 35, 36, 37, 45, 56, 81, 108, 148, 201 relations with Savoy 23, 156 Rochefort, comte de, chevalier d’honneur in Sénat of Savoy 156 Rochefort, Henri-Louis d’Aloigny, marquis de, governor of Lorraine 73, 105, 122, 165 Roussillon administration 3, 68–9, 154 Conseil souverain 146, 149 ecclesiastical policy 183, 187, 188, 190n.21, 194n.156 French annexation 12, 14, 138–9 Royal Savoye regiment 132 Ryswick, Treaty of (1697) 40–1, 45, 92, 180, 200 Saar 43, 45, 93 fortresses 42

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 224

Sabaudian state see Piedmont-Savoy Saint-Avold 42, 102, 183 Saint-Contest, Dominique Claude Barberie (1668–1730) marquis de, intendant of the Trois Evêchés 41, 92, 93 Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne 173 bishop of 23, 176, 177, 190n.45 Saint-Marie-aix-Mines 102 Saint-Maurice, marquis de, Savoyard nobleman 129, 133, 143n.118 Saint-Mihiel 77, 159 abbey of 179–80 Saint-Ruth, Charles, marquis de, French commander in Savoy 47–8, 73, 94 Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de, French memorialist (1675– 1755) 22, 27, 31n.73, 40, 45 Sales, François de, saint (1567–1622) 23 Sales, marquis de, Savoyard nobleman 24, 48, 51, 142n.86, 142n.94 Salm, Dorothea Maria zu, princessabbess of Remiremont 178 salt 88, 109n.11 Sarralbe, 42 Sarreguemines 42 Sarrelouis 37, 45, 77 Savoy, duchy of administration 50, 79–80, 94–100, 112n.95, 161–3 attitude to France 79, 96, 130, 162, 184, 199–200 Chambre des comptes personnel 23, 72, 147, 150–2 powers 3, 25, 147, 151–2 under French occupation 84n.62,   95, 99, 134, 150–3, 154, 163 Chambre de justice (1696–9) 97, 131, 162 economy 24, 95

12/03/2013 16:10

index

exchange plans 50, 54–56, 62n.143, 200 gages 150, 152–3, 167n.34 Savoy proper (subdivision) 22–3, 47 Sénat 23, 72, 75, 147, 174 personnel 72, 150–2, 178 relations with Victor Amadeus II   154, 168n.57, 184–5 under French occupation 84n.62,   99, 131, 149–50, 153–6, 157,   166, 176, 180–1, 197 strategic importance 22, 46 status within composite state 24, 134 Savoy-Nemours family 14, 23 secretaries of state responsibilities 37, 45, 57n.12, 66–7, 82n.3 sénat see respective territories Sève, Claude de, abbot of Saint-Remi de Lunéville 180 Sève, Guillaume de, intendant of Metz (1638–93) 79, 180 smuggling 105, 134, 154 Spain 35, 40 Spanish Netherlands 12, 33, 72, 110n.28, 174, 187 Stainville family 16, 123, 140n.39 Strasbourg 12, 34, 37–8, 40, 101, 149, 174 subdélégués 67, 71, 72 Sweden 14, 21 taille 80, 95–7, 99, 108, 111n.72, 152, 186 Tallard, Camille d’Hostun, duc de, marshal of France (1652–1728) 42–3, 106 Tamié, abbey of 180 Tarentaise, the 22, 48, 52–4, 97, 136, 156 archbishopric of 23, 153, 190n.45

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 225

225

Te Deum 175, 176, 198 Tencin, Antoine de Guerin, seigneur de, président of Sénat of Savoy 150, 151, 167n.32 Tencin de Froges, François de, président of Sénat of Savoy 152, 155 Tessé, René de Froulay, comte de, marshal of France (1648–1725) 51–2, 74–5, 107, 132, 135, 152, 153 Thionville 36 Thoy, marquis de, French governor of Savoy 72, 138, 157 Torcy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de, French foreign minister (1665– 1746) 59n.75, 107, 150 Toul 15–17, 30n., 41, 43, 77, 92 bishop/bishopric of 38, 173, 174, 175–6, 189n.15 see also Trois Evêchés traitement royal 26, 45, 49 Trent, Council of 173, 175 Trésor royal 152 Troches, baron de, Savoyard nobleman 131 Trois Evêchés 178–9 administration 37, 78–9, 87 commerce 21, 44, 93–4 conquest by Henri II (1552) 16, 37, 173 military activity in 21, 39, 41, 184 raiding 43, 90, 105–6 sovereignty 15, 17, 38, 44 see also Metz, Toul, Verdun Turin 23, 26 siege of (1706) 52, 74, 97, 104, 132 Treaty of (1696) 49 ustensile 89, 91, 93 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713) 44, 54–5, 200

12/03/2013 16:10

226

index

Valais, the 51 Vallière, marquis de, French commander in Savoy 52–3, 74–6, 98, 106–7, 115n.189, 132–4 Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de, marshal of France (1633–1707) 13, 35, 37, 55 Vaubourg, Jean-Baptiste Desmarets de, intendant of Lorraine 68, 79, 83n.35, 92, 110n.54, 126, 127, 161, 188 venality of office 150, 158–9, 165, 169n.92, 171n.140 Vendôme, Louis Joseph de Bourbon, duc de, marshal of France (1654– 1712), 50–2, 56 Verdun 15–17, 38, 43, 77 bishop/bishopric of 173, 174, 189n.15 see also Trois Evêchés Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy (1666– 1732) 4 character 26, 31–2n.103 in the Nine Years War 48, 50, 129–30

McCluskey_AbsolMonarchy.indd 226

policies towards Savoy, 24–5, 50, 97, 130–2, 153, 181, 187, 199 relations with Louis XIV 25–6 in the War of the Spanish Succession 50–5, 62n.143, 108, 131–4, Vic, Treaty of (1632) 29n.35 Villars, Claude Louis Hector, duc de, marshal of France (1653–34) 40–2, 53, 98, 101, 128 Vincennes, Treaty of (1661) 18–19 Voysin, Daniel François, French war minister (1654–1717) 44, 76, 98, 100, 103, 187 war ministry 25, 46, 69–70, 72, 77, 81, 104 Westphalia, Peace of (1648–49) 13, 15, 17, 37–9 William III, king of Great Britain (1650– 1702) 40–1, 47 winter quarters 36, 42, 89, 93, 95, 96, 97, 102 witchcraft 29n.22

12/03/2013 16:10