Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu: The Treasury of the Abhidharma and its (Auto) commentary Vol. 4 [4] 9788120836112, 9788120836075

Table of contents :
Vol. 4 Contents
9. Treatise of the Refutation of the Person
9. Outline
9. Treatise of the Refutation of the Person
9. Endnotes
Bibliography
Indices
Sanskrit-English Index Glossary
English-Sanskrit Index Glossary
Gāthās and Kārikās
Fragments from Sūtras and Śāstras
Name Index

Citation preview

Abhidharmakosa-Bha~ya of VASUBANDHU Volume IV

Abhidharmakosa-Bha~ya of VASUBANDHU The Treasury of the Abhidharma and its (Auto) commentary

Translated into French lYy

Louis

DE

LA VALLEE Pouss1N

Annotated English Translation lYy GELONG LODRO SANGPO

With a New Introduction lYy BHIKKHU

KL DHAMMAJOTI

Volume IV

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED• DELHI

1729328

-

First Edition: Delhi, 2012 Translated from L' Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu First edition 1823-1931, Paris, Paul Geuthner Second edition 1971, Bruxelles, Institute Belga des Hautes Etudes Chinoises

© GELONG LODRO SANGPO

All Rights Reseived

ISBN : 978-81-208-3608-2 978-81-208-3609-9 978-81-208-3610-5 978-81-208-3611-2 978-81-208-3607-5

(Vol. I) (Vol. II) (Vol. III) (Vol. IV) (Set)

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Volume IV •

Outline of Chapter Nine

•

Chapter Nine: Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati1edhaprakarar:ia)

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Endnotes to Chapter Nine

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Bibliography

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A. Selected primary sources (Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, TibetanJ

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Indices

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Selected secondary sources

Indices o

Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary

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English-Sanskrit Index-Glossary

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Gathiis and Karikas

o

Fragments of Sutras and Sastras

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Name Index: Siitras, Books, Scholars, Schools, etc.

Chapter Nine: Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)

t

Outline of Chapter Nine:

Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:za) 1.

Vasubandhu's theory ofpersons ..................................................................................... 2523 1.1. Vasubandhu's theory of persons vs. non-Buddhist doctrines of self & the impossibility of liberation in other doctrines .................................................. 2523 1.2. Vasubandhu's middle way argument for his theory ofpersons ............................ 2524

2.

Vasubandhu's objections to the Viitsiputriyas' theory of persons ................................. 2525 2.1. The Viitsiputriyas' existence thesis & Vasubandhu's first objection to their. theory of persons: two realities ..................................................................... 2525 2.1.1. The Viitsiputriyas' inexplicability thesis and aggregate-reliant identity thesis ............................................................................................. 2526 2.1.2. Vasubandhu's objection from the point of view of the causal reference principle ..................................................................................... 2526 2.1.3. The Viitsiputriyas' fire and fuel reply: three basic theses ......................... 2527 2.1.4. The Viitsiputriyas' middle way argument .................................................. 2527 2.1.5. The conventional definition of fire and fuel & Vasubandhu's first three objections to the fire and fuel reply .......................................... 2527 2.2. The Viitsiputriyas' inexplicability thesis & Vasubandhu's second objection to their theory of persons: the fifth.'category objection ............. 2530 2.3.

Vasubandhu's third objection to the Viitsiputriyas' theory of persons: the perceptual dilemma objection ........................... ,............................................. 2530

2.4. The Viitsiputriyas' explanation of aggregate-reliant identity & Vasubandhu's two objections ............................................................................... 2531 2.5. The Viitsiputriyas' account of how we are known to exist by the six consciousnesses ......................................................................................... 2531 2.5.1. Vasubandhu's first objection to the account: the objection from knowledge of the existence of milk .................................................. 2532 2.5.2. Vasubandhu's second objection to the account: the objection to the knowledge thesis .............................................................................. 2532 2.5.3. Vasubandhu's objection to the account from its incompatibility with the Buddha's teachings onperception ............................................... 2534 2.5.4. Vasubandhu's objection to the account from its incompatibility with the Buddha's enumerations of objects that are known to exist ......... 2536 2.5.5. Vasub~ndhu's objection to the account from its incompatibility with the Buddha's teaching on the selflessness of a sense-faculty of perception .............................................................................................. 2536 2.6. Vasubandhu's scriptural objections (seven passages) to the Viitsiputriyas' theory of persons .................................................................................................... 2537 2.7. The charge of inconsistency with doctrines in satras the Viitsiputriyas themselves accept as authoritative ..................................... ;.................................. 2540

2520 3.

Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara7Ja)

The Vatsiputriyas' objections to Vasubandhu's own theory of persons & Vasubandhu's replies ...................................................................................................... 2542 3.1. First of five undesirable consequences of Vasubandhu' s theory of persons: the Vatsiputriyas' objection from the impossibility of omniscience & Vasubandhu's reply ..................................... 2542 3.2. Second of five undesirable consequences of Vasubandhu's theory of persons: the Vatsiputriyas' objection from the passage on the bearer of the burden & Vasubandhu's three arguments reply ............................................................................................ 2543 3 .3. First of three undesirable consequences of Vasubandhu 's denial of the Vatsiputrlyas' theory of persons: the Vatsiputriyas' objection from spontaneous birth & Vasubandhu's reply .................................... 2545 3.4. Third of five undesirable consequences of Vasubandhu's theory of persons: the Vatsiputriyas' objection of one and many ........................ 2545 3.5. Fourth of five undesirable consequences of Vasubandhu's theory of persons: the Vatsiputriyas' objection from the Fortunate One's rejection of the otherness and sameness question & Vasubandhu's reply ............................................................ 2548 3.6. Second of three undesirable consequences of Vasubandhu's denial of the Vatsiputriyas' theory of persons: the Vatsiputrlyas' objection from the Buddha's rejection of nihilism & Vasubandhu's reply .......... 2554 3.7. Third of three undesirable consequences of Vasu bandhu 's denial of the Vatsiputriyas' theory of persons: the Vatsiputriyas' objection from the need for a basis for the coming to be and passing away of aggregates & Vasubandhu's reply .............................................. 2554 3.8

Fifth of five undesirable consequences ofVasubandhu's theory: the Vatsiputrlyas' objection from the Buddha's reference to himself in a past life & Vasubandhu's reply ......................................................... 2555

3.9. Vasubandhu's objection: the Vii.tsiputriyas' theory of persons makes liberation impossible, and his rejection of a reply to this objection .......... 2555 3.10. Vasubandhu's claim to present the middle way between the extreme theories propounded by the Vii.tsiputrTyas and Nii.garjuna ................ 2556 4.

The Vatsiputrlyas' and non-Buddhists' objections to Vasubandhu's own theory of persons & Vasubandhu's replies ............................................................. 2557 4.0. Why in addition the non-Buddhists' views must be considered ........................... 2557 4.1. The opponents' objection: If there is no self and thoughts are momentary, an account of the arising of a memory or recognition of an object is not possible & Vasubandhu's reply: no-self account of memory .................................................................................... 2558 4.2. The opponents' objection: Vasubandhu's denial of the existence of a self implies that there is no agent of remembering & Vasubandhu's reply ............................................................................................... 2560

Chapter Nine: Treatise of the Refutation of the Person

2521

4.3.

The opponents' objection: Vasubandhu's denial of the existence of a self implies that memory and consciousness are without an owner or possessor & Vasubandhu's reply ...................................................... 2560 4.4. The opponents' objection: A self is needed to explain the occurrence of a consciousness of an object & Vasubandhu's reply ........................................ 2562 The opponents' objection: If we are not selves, we cannot walk & Vasubandhu's reply ................................................................,. .............................. 2563 4.6. The opponents' objection: Vasubandhu makes consciousness into a self by making it an agent of the activity of apprehending an object & Vasubandhu's reply ........................................................................... 2563

4.5.

4.7.

The opponents' objection: If thoughts arise from other thoughts, the same kinds of thoughts always arise or they arise in a fixed order & Vasubandhu's reply ..................................................................... 2565

4.8.

The Vaise~ikas' objection: A self is needed as a basis for thoughts & Vasubandhu's reply ............................................................................................... 2571

4.9.

The Vaise~ikas' objection: Without a self there is nothing for the sake of which action is undertaken & Vasubandhu's reply ...................... 2571

4.10. The Vaise~ikas' objection: Without a self to possess it there can be no mind that conceives an "I"-& Vasubandhu's reply ............................... 2573 4.11. The Vaise~ikas' objection: Sensations cannot exist unless there is a self as a basis from which they arise & Vasubandhu's reply ................ 2573 4.12. The Vaise~ikas' objection: Without a self there is no agent of actions or subject that experiences their results & Vasubandhu's reply ............... 2573 4.13. The Vaise~ikas' objection: The existence of a self is required to explain why wholesome or unwholesome actions do not ripen in factors non-indicative of sentient beings; beings not in sarp.siira do not accumulate merit and demerit in the way that beings in sarp.siira do & Vasubandhu's reply ............................... 2575 4.14. The Vaise~ikas' objection: A past action cannot produce a future effect if there is no self & Vasubandhu's reply ....................................... 2576 5.

Concluding verses ........................................................................................................... 2580

Chapter Nine: 1

TREATISE OF THE REFUTATION OF THE PERSON (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara1Ja )2

or

REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE SELF (Atmavadaprati~edha)

1.

Vasubandhu's theory of persons; F 230

2.

Vasubandhu' s objections to the Viitsiputriyas' theory of persons; F 232

3.

The Viitsiputriyas' objections to Vasubandhu's own theory of persons & Vasubandhu's replies; F 254

4.

The Viitsiputriyas' and non-Buddhists' objections to Vasubandhu's own theory

5.

Concluding verses; F 300-1

of persons & Vasubandhu 's replies; F 273

1.1.

{5),{;;BANDHU'S THEORY OF PERSONS; F 230-32 Vasubandhu 's theory of persons vs. non-Buddhist doctrines of self & the impossibility of liberation in other doctrines; F 230 [Question:] - [If those who desire liberation were to apply themselves heedfully to the "teaching" (sasana) of the Muni (viii. 40),] then is it the case that there is no liberation outside of this doctrine (dharma) [-outside of Buddhism-] by relying on other doctrines? 3 [Answer: 4] - There is no liberation outside of this doctrine, because other doctrines are corrupted by a false view of a self [vitathatmadr~fi]. The self [iitman] [as other doctrines conceive it] is not [as we conceive it5 only 6] a provisional designation [prajfiapti7] for a stream of aggregates (skandhasaf!1tiina), but is a self as a substance [dravya] which is independent or separate (antara) from the aggregates. By the power [prabhava] of the "adhesion to the self' [iitmagriiha], the defilements [klesa] arise; 8 the revolving of the threefold existence, or the circling of the three realms, goes on; liberation is impossible.

2524 1.2.

Treatise of the.Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:,,a)

Vasubandhu's middle way argument for his theory of persons; 9 F 231-32 [Question:] - How do we know that the expression [abhidhii.na] "self' [iztman; i.e., person] is only a provisional designation for a stream of aggregates and that it [does not refer to something else,] does not exist as an independent or separate self? 10 { 9 a} [Answer:] - We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a self independent or separate from the aggregates: 1.

2.

no proof by means of direct perception [pratyak~a], no proof by means of inference [anumana]. 11

If the self were a substance or real entity [dravya], separate like other entities [bhii.va], 12 it necessarily would be attained (i.e., known) (1) by the apprehension of direct perception as are the objects of the five sensory consciousnesses and of mental consciousness [mental faculty (manas)] 13 or (2) by the apprehension of inference, as are the five sense-faculties [indriya] which are subtle matter. In the case of the five Sf"nse-faculties, they are indeed known through inference: It is common knowledge that, despite the presence of the general causes, an effect does not occur if certain specific causes are absent: [for instance,] for the sprout [ankura] to be able to arise, not only water, earth and human effort are necessary, but also the seed. - Likewise, [for instance, in the case of the blind and the deaf], although the general causes-the presence of an external object, mental application, etc.-are present, the blind and the deaf do not see or hear, whereas the non-blind and the nondeaf do see and hear. [We can thus infer that] the specific causes of the visual or auditory consciousness must be absent among the former but present among the latter: these [specific causes] are the sense-faculties, material sense-faculties made of invisible and impalpable matter, and known only through inference. 14 [On the other hand,] as for [the existence of] a self which is independent or separate from the aggregates, there is no direct perception or inference [to prove it]. We know therefore that a self as a substance or real entity does not exist.

2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Viitsfputrfyas' theory of persons

2525

{j)(;;BANDHU'S OBJECTIONS TO THE VATSlPUTRlYAS' THEORY OF PERSONS; 15 F 232-54 VASUBANDHU'S OBJECTIONS RELATED TO INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE V.ATSIPUTRIYA'S THEORY: 2.1. Vasubandhu' s two realities objection to the Vatsiputriyas' theory of persons (existence thesis; inexplicability thesis, aggregate-reliant identity thesis; fire and fuel analogy; middle way argument); F 232 2.2. Vasubandhu's fifth category objection to the Vatsiputriyas' inexplicability thesis; F 237 2.3. Vasubandhu's perceptual dilemma objection to the Vatsiputriyas' theory of persons; F 237 2.4. Vasubandhu' s two objections to the Vatsiputriyas' aggregate-reliant identity thesis; F 238 2.5. Vasubandhu's objection to the Vatsiputriyas' account of how we are known to exist by the six consciousnesses; F 238

V ASUBANDHU' S OBJECTIONS RELATED TO SCRIPTURE: 2.6. Vasubandhu' s scriptural objections to the Vatsiputriyas' theory of persons; F 245 2. 7. Vasubandhu' s charge of inconsistency with doctrines in satras the Vatsiputriyas themselves accept as authoritative; F 252-54

The Viitsfputrfyas' existence thesis & Vasubandhu 's first objection to their theory of persons: two realities; 16 F 232-37 [Vasubandhu:] - The Vatsiputriyas [or Pudgalavadins], it is true, assert that a person (pudgala 17 ) [who is neither the same as the aggregates (skandha) nor other than them] exists fpudagalaf!t santam icchanti]. 18 We must examine whether this person exists

1. 2.

as a real entity (dravyatas) or as a provisional designation, [of a nominal existence] (prajfiaptitas).

[Vasubandhu's Two realities objection:] 1. If it exists separately or by itself [bhiiviintara], like color or sound [rupiidi], then the person exists as a real entity.

2. If it is only a collection or a complex [samudiiya], like milk [k~fra], then the person exists as a provisional designation {9 b}. 19 [Vatsiputriyas:] - What is wrongI with accepting the first or the second hypothesis?

2526

Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalapratifedhaprakara1Ja)

[Vasubandhu:] - 1. If the person is a real entity, it will be other [anya] than the aggregates, because its nature exists [then] on its own [svabhavatvat], since each of the aggregates is other than the others; [in that case], either i.

it will be produced by causes [kara1Ja] [and then it will not be eternal as you say, and you will have to state its causes]; or else; ii. it will be unconditioned (asarriskrra): and this is a non-Buddhist false doctrine (tfrthikadrftiprasarigal:i); if it were unconditioned, the person is not able to "function" [or "be affected by anything or produce effects"] (niJ:iprayojanatva). 20

It is thus fruitless to believe that the person is a real entity. 2. But if you admit that the person exists only on the level of a provisional designation, you abandon your doctrine and you side with our opinion. 2.1.1.

The Viitsfputrfyas' inexplicability thesis and aggregate-reliant identity thesis; 21 F 233 [Vatsiputriyas:] - We say that the person exists; (1) we do not say that it is a real entity and (2) we do not say that it exists (LVP: only) as a provisional designation of the aggregates: For us, the person (pudgala) is conceived [prajiiapyate] 22 "in reliance upon aggregates" (skandhan upadaya) which are (i) internal or pertain to oneself [adhyiitmika], (ii) appropriated [upiittii] and (iii) exist in the present [pratyutpanna; vartamiina]. 23

2.1.2.

Vasubandhu's objection from the point of view of the cau~al reference principle; 24 F 233-34 [Vasubandhu:] - What an obscure statement (andhavacana) [that the person neither exists as a real entity nor as a provisional designation]! What does the expression "in reliance upon" (upiidiiya) mean?

1. If you explain [that a person is conceived] "in reliance upon aggregates" (skandhiin upiidiiya) 25 as meaning "on the condition that aggregates have been perceived" (skandhan alambya; iilambya = grhftvii, apekfya), 26 you end up saying: "The provisional designation person occurs by taking the aggregates as an object"; [~ut] this means to recognize that the person is a word or conception referring only to the aggregates [and not to an independently existent person]; just as the provi'sional designation milk occurs taking only the constituents of milk, color, etc., as its object.

i

I I I

J

2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory ofpersons

2527

2. If you explain [that a person is conceived] "in reliance upon aggregates" (skandhiin upiidiiya) as meaning "in dependence upon the aggregates" (skandhiin pratftya = priipya), the same conclusion follows [i.e., that the person is a word or conception referring only to the aggregates and not to an independently existent person]. You admit that it is the aggregates which are the cause (pratyaya) of the provisional designation person [and not an independently existing person as you claim].

2.u.

The Vatsfputrfyas' fire and fuel reply: three basic theses; 21 F 234 [Viitsiputriyas:] - [The way milk is conceived] is not the way we conceive the person and its relationship with the aggregates, but rather [we conceive the person] in the way the world conceives fire [iigni] and its relationship with fuel [indhana]. The world conceives fire "in reliance upon fuel" (indhanam upiidiiya) { 10 a} :28 it does not conceive fire independent or separate from fuel. 1.

2-3. The world believes that fire cannot be conceived if it either is or is not other than fuel. 29 - If fire were other than fuel, the fuel [in burning material] would not be hot. - If fire were not other than fuel, "what is burned" would be "what bums" it. 2.1.4.

The.Vatsfputrfyas' middle way argument; F234 [Viitsiputriyas:] - Likewise: 1. we do not conceive the "person" as independent or separate from the aggregates;

2-3. [Middle way argument:] we hold that the person cannot be conceived if it either is or is not othet; than the aggregates. - If the person were other than the aggregates, it would be eternal (siisvata) and thus unconditioned (asa1Jlskrta). - If the person were not .other than the aggregates,. it would then be liable to annihilation (uccheda). 2.1.5.

The conventional definition offire andfuel & Vasubandhu'sfirst three objections to the fire and fuel reply; F 234-37 [Vasubandhu:] - Define.fire [agni] andfuel [indhana] so that I can better understand how fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel. [Vatsiputriyas:] - [Conventional definition:] :What shall we say? Fuel is what is burned [dahya] and fire is what bums it [dahaka]: if you want to have an answer, here is the answer.

2528

Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati:jedhaprakarm:ia)

[Vasubandhu:]- [But these are mere conventional definitions]. The very things I want to know with precision are: (1) what is the thing called what is burned and (2) what is the thing called what burns it? [VasubandhuNii.tsiputriyas:] - It is commonly said that (1) the thing to be burned, which is not burning [but can bum], wood [ka:jfha], etc., is called what is burned or fuel; 30 (2) the thing which performs the action of burning [the wood, etc.], being bright, intensely hot, blazing, is called what burns it or fire. By means of the latter, i.e., the fire, [it is commonly said that] the series which constitutes the former, i.e., the fuel, is ignited (idhyate = dfpyate) and reduced to ashes (dahyate = bhasmfkriyate);31 by means of the fire it is brought abo~t that each moment of existence of the series (sarritati) of fuel differs from the preceding moment. - [Now analysis / shows that] fire and fuel are both composed of eight real entities; 32 yet fire arises in dependence upon (pratftya) fuel, just as sour milk [dadhi] and vinegar [sukta] arise in dependence upon milk [k:jfra] and wine [madhu]. This is why it is commonly agreed tI:iat [fire is conceived] "in reliance upon fuel". {10 b} [Vasubandhu:] - [First objection:] If this were the case, then fire is other than fuel, because their time-periods are different (bhinnakala): first there is fuel and then fire. [So] if your person exists in reliance upon the aggregates as fire exists in reliance upon fuel, you would have to admit, [second objection:] that, arising in dependence on the aggregates, it is other than the aggregates and, moreover, [third objection:] [contrary to your view that a person is not impermanent,] that it is impermanent (anityas ca prapnoti), [since the person arises in dependence upon aggregates]. 2.1.s.1.

The Vatsfputrfyas' own analysis and definition offire and fuel (according to Vasubanphu) & Vasubandhu's three objections; F235-37 [Vii.tsiputriyas: Second definition: 33 ) - (1) The heat (u~man)--one of the elements, namely, that kind of tangible which is heat-present in the burning thing, wood, etc., 34 is fire [agni]; (2) the other three elements [i.e., earth, water and wind], which conjointly arise with it [sahajata], are the fuel [indhana] [in reliance on which fire is conceived]. Therefore your comments on the precedence of fuel do not hold. [Three objections:]

[Vasubandhu:] - [Fir.st objection:] - But [according to this analysis] fire and fuel, arising at the same time, are [still] "other" (anyatva), since their defining characteristics are different (lak:jaJJ.abhedat). 35 The meaning that you attribute to the expression "in reliance upon" has again not been explained. 36 Since fire and fuel are generated at the same time, how can one say that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel?--

2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory of persons

2529

[Second objection:] - [-if the analyses are correct,] fire, which is one of the elements of the object which is burning, does not have fuel, which is the other elements of the said object, as a cause, since all these elements were generated at the same time, each from its own separate cause. But neither can one say that the designation or conception.fire had fuel as a cause (or object), since this des~gnation or conception is applied to fire, the tangible "heat".37 If the Vatsiputriyas would say: - The expression "fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel" is taken in the sense that fire coexists with fuel (sahabhava) or has fuel as its basis (asraya). 38

[Vasubandhu:] - That is to say that the person coexists with the aggregates or has the aggregates as its basis: (1) this then admits that it is other than the aggregates. (2) And logic also claims that, just as fire does not exist when fuel is absent, so the person does not exist without aggregates. You do not accept these conclusions; therefore your explanation is worthless. { 11 a} [Vatsiputriyas:] - I have shown (F 234, line 15) that fire is not other than fuel because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot. [Vasubandhu:] - [Third objection:] - What is the intrinsic nature of "hot"? 1. If hot were to be defined as being the tangible "heat", (namely, the element fire,) as has been done above, then fuel itself will not be hot, (since fuel is the burning object [i.e., the three elements] without the tangible "heat").

2. If one were to understand by hot that which is associated with heat (i.e., if one accepts that fuel is called hot because of its association with heat), then this is the reason that things, [even if] other (than "heat", which is hot by its intrinsic nature,) are called hot: yet only the tangible "heat,, is designated by fire; all that is associated with this tangible is designated by hot. To think thus is to admit that fuel is called hot, but then again it is other than fire or the tangible "heat". 39 The Vatsiputriyas are thus not justified in saying that "fire is not other than fuel because fuel [in burning material] is hot\'. 2.1.s.2.

The Viitsfputrfyas' hypothetical burning material analysis offire and fuel & Vasubandhu's two objections; F237 The Vatsiputriyas might then say, [in order to avoid the objection that fire is other than fuel,] that burning wood [as a whole] is both fire and fuel. [First objection:] - They should then explain what they mean by the expression "fire [is conceived] in reliance upon fuel"!

2530

Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati~edhaprakara,:ia)

[Second objection:] - The person, (the active component of the "reliance" [upadiiya],)

would be the same as the aggregates, (the passive component of the said "reliance"): no logical reasoning would be able to establish the non-sameness. 2.1.5.3.

The conclusion of Vasubandhu 's critique of the fire and fuel reply; F 237 The thesis of the Vii.tsiputriyas, that the person is conceived in reliance upon the aggregates in the same way [in which they believe] that fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis. 40

2.2.

The Vatsfputrfyas' inexplicability thesis & Vasubandhu 's second objection to their theory of persons: the fifth category objection; F 237 [Vii.tsiputriyas:] - The person is inexplicable (avaktavya) with regard to its relationship--its sameness or non-sameness-to the aggregates. [Vasubandhu:] -Then you cannot distinguish or say, as you do: There are five kinds or categories [paiicavidha] of "objects to be known" Uiieya]:41

1-3. conditioned phenomena (sarJlskrta) or, in other words, past [atfta], present fpratyupanna] and future [aniigata] phenomena; 42 4. unconditioned phenomena (asarJlskrta), 43 5. the inexplicable (or person fpudgala]). { 11 b} The person, indeed, should also be inexplicable from this point of view: if it is inexplicable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth category44 or that it is not a fifth category. 45 )

2.3.

Vasubandhu's third objection to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory of persons: the perceptual dilemma objection; F 237-38 [Vasubandhu:] - Let us examine on what the pudgala (person) relies. When conceived, is a person conceived after aggregates are perceived (upalabhya) or after a person is perceived?

L If the person relies on the aggregates [skandha], then the person exists solely as a provisional designation (prajiiaptisat), since the person relies on the aggregates- and not on the person. 2. If the person relies on the person itself, why do the V ii.tsiputriyas say that the provisional designation person exists "in reliance upon aggregates"? They should have said "in reliance upon the person". But, indeed, they do not maintain that the person is established in reliance upon the person.

2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory ofpersons

2531

We are left with the fact that person is a simple provisional designation of the aggregates. 2.4.

The Viits'fputr'fyas' explanation of aggregate-reliant identity & Vasubandhu's two objections; F238 [Viitsiputriyas:] - When aggregates are present (satsu skandhe~u), the person is perceived (upalabhyate): 46 that is why we say that the provisional designation person exists "in reliance upon aggregates". [Vasubandhu:] - But in that case, (1) if a visible form [rupa] is perceived when diverse causes, namely, the eye [cak~ur], mental application [manaskara], light [aloka], etc., are present, must we conclude thereby that the designation visible form exists "in reliance upon these diverse causes" [rather than because of the visible form that is perceivedJ?47 (2) And just as a visible form (is other than the eye, mental application and light present when a visible form is perceived), clearly a person would be other (than aggregates p,:esent when a person is perceived). 48

2.5.

The Viits'fputr'fyas' account of how we are known to exist by the six consciousnesses; F 238-44 [Vasubandhu:]-Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses-visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental consciousness-is the person perceived (upalabhyate )? [Viitsiputriyas:] - [It is perceived or known to exist] by the six consciousnesses. [(l) Knowledge thesis:] - When the visual consciousness cognizes color and shape (rupa = the body), it indirectly cognizes [prativibhavayati] the person [in dependence upon them],49 and then we can say that the person is known to exist by means of the visual consciousness. [(2) Primary object non-otherness thesis and (3) primary object non-sameness thesis:] - But the relationship of the person with color-shape is not describable as being the same or other. Likewise for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness cognizes the factors (dharma) (i.e., thought and thought-concomitants), it is aware of the person [in dependence upon them]; the [person] is known therefore to exist by means of the mental consciousness, {12 a} but its relationship with thought-thought-concomitants is not describable as being the same or other.

2532 2.s.1.

Treatise of the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalaprati(fedhaprakara,:za)

Vasubandhu 's first objection to the account: the objection from knowledge of the existence of milk; F 239 [Vasubandhu:] - It follows from this explanation that the person, just like milk [k(ffra], etc., exists solely as a provisional designation. When the visual consciousness

cognizes the color of milk, it is aware of milk [in dependence upon it]: the milk is then known to exist by means of the visual consciousness, but one cannot say that the milk is the same as its color or other than its color. 50 Likewise for odor, taste and tangible: [for example,] the tactile consciousness cognizes the tangible; from which there is the awareness of milk [in dependence upon it]; the milk is then known to exist by the tactile consciousness, without one being able to say that milk is the same as the tangible or other than the tangible. Indeed, milk is not fourfold: 51 thus it is not [the same as] color, odor, taste, tangible; but, on the other hand, one cannot suppose that the milk is not made of [or is other than] these four. The conclusion is imperative: one designates a collection [samasta] of aggregates by person, metaphorically, just as milk means a collection of color, odor, etc. They are merely provisional designations or conceptions without reality. 52 2.s.2.

Vasubandhu's second objection to the account: the objection to the knowledge thesis; F 239-41 [Vasubandhu:] - What meaning do you, however, attach to the phrase [in Section 2.5], "When the visual consciousness cognizes color-shape, it is aware of the person"?53 Do you mean to say [that a person is known to exist] 1. if color-shape is the cause of the perception (upalabdhi) of the person, or 2. if the person is perceived when color-shape is perceived? If the Viitsiputriyas answer that color-shape is the cause of the perception of the person, but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the person is other than colorshape, { 12 b} then they cannot say [as they do] that the conditions and the causes of the perception of color-light, eye and mental application-are other than colorshape. 1.

2. If the Viitsiputriyas answer that the person is perceived when color-shape is perceived,54 we would ask whether one perceives the person

i.

i. by means of the same perception by which one perceives color-shape, or ii. by means of another perception. In the first hypothesis, 55 the person is the same in intrinsic nature as color-shape

2. Vasubandhu's Objections to the Vatsfputrfyas' theory of persons

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and the designation "person,, applies only to color-shape. It is thus impossible to distinguish: "This is color-shape; that is the person." In the absence of this distinction, how can it be established that color-shape and the person exist [separately]? The existence (astitva) of the person can only be established by this distinction. This same argument can be used (for objects perceived by the other five consciousnesses) up to (and including) a factor (dharma) (perceived by the mental consciousness).

ii. In the second hypothesis, 56 the time of the two perceptions being different, the person inust be other than color-shape, just as yellow is other than blue and one moment [k~a~a] is other than another. This same argument can be used (for objects perceived by the other five consciousnesses) up to (and including) a factor (dharma) (perceived by the mental consciousness). 2.s.2.1.

The Vatsfputrfyas' reply from inexplicable perception & Vasubandhu 's objection; F 240 [Vatsiputrfyas:] - Just as the person and color-shape [i.e., the objects of perception] cannot be said either to be or not be other than one a!}other, so the perception of the · person and the perception of color-shape cannot be said either to be or not be other than one another. [Vasubandhu:] - This point of view will oblige you to say that-the perceptions, like [their objects, a person and color-shape, cannot be said either to be or not be other than one another], and being thus inexplicable [avaktavya], they are not part of the category of conditioned phenomena (see Section 2.2: F 237): but you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, every perception is a conditioned phenomenon.

2.s.2.2.

The Vatsfputrfyas' argument for inexplicable perception & Vasubandhu's objection; F 240-41 [Vasubandhu:] - If [the Vatsiputnyas state that] the person (pudgal