A Virtual Chinatown : The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand [1 ed.] 9789004258624, 9789004258631

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A Virtual Chinatown

Chinese Overseas History, Literature, and Society Chief Editor

Wang Gungwu Subject Editors

Evelyn Hu-DeHart, David Der-wei Wang, Wong Siu-lun Editorial Board

Ien Ang, Shirley Geok-lin Lim, Liu Hong, Frank Pieke, Elizabeth Sinn, Jing Tsu

volume 7

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/cho

A Virtual Chinatown The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in New Zealand By

Phoebe H. Li

Leiden • boston 2013

Cover illustration: Illusion of stepping into Chinatown. Photograph provided by Phoebe H. Li. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Li, Phoebe H.  A virtual Chinatown : the diasporic mediasphere of Chinese migrants in New Zealand / by Phoebe H. Li.   pages cm. — (Chinese overseas : history, literature, and society, ISSN 1876-3847 ; volume 7)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-25863-1 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-25862-4 (e-book) 1. Chinese—New Zealand. 2. Chinese—New Zealand—Communication. 3. Mass media—China. 4. Mass media and culture—China. 5. Immigrants—New Zealand. 6. New Zealand—Race relations. I. Title.  DU424.5.C5L5 2013  305.895’1093—dc23

2013025563

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the ­humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1876-3847 ISBN 978-90-04-25863-1 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-25862-4 (e-book) Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents List of Figures .................................................................................................... List of Charts ..................................................................................................... List of Tables ..................................................................................................... Foreword ............................................................................................................ Acknowledgements .........................................................................................

vii ix xi xiii xv

Chapter One Introduction ......................................................................... China’s New Wave of International Migration ................................... New Zealand Local Contexts ................................................................... New People, New Approach .................................................................... Diasporic Chinese Media beyond New Zealand ...............................

1 1 5 9 11

Chapter Two Conceptualising New Zealand Chinese Media ......... Central Concepts ......................................................................................... Towards an Analytical Framework ........................................................

15 16 30

Chapter Three Revisiting the History of New Zealand Chinese and Early Chinese Newspapers .............................................................. Chinese Immigration: From Sojourners to Settlers .......................... Early Chinese Newspapers ....................................................................... Rethinking Early Chinese Newspapers .................................................

41 41 48 57

Chapter Four New Chinese Immigrants and Contemporary New Zealand Chinese Media .................................................................. A New Wave of Chinese Immigration .................................................. Making a PRC Chinese Community ...................................................... Prc Chinese and Others’ Settlement ................................................... Evolution of New Chinese Media .......................................................... The New Chinese Community in their Own Media ........................

63 63 66 73 82 87

Chapter Five Ethnic Chinese Media during the 2005 New Zealand General Election ......................................................................... 93 Research Design and Background Information ................................. 94 Phase 1: New Zealand Election in Chinese Media ........................... 102 Phase 2: Relationship between Chinese Media and Migrants ..... 122

vi

contents Phase 3: A Perspective from Media Personnel ................................. 132 Summary ........................................................................................................ 135

Chapter Six Recent PRC Migrants in the Diasporic Mediasphere ................................................................................................. New Zealand Politics in Ethnic Chinese Media ................................ Recent PRC Migrants’ Affinity with Conservative Parties .............. Patriotic Sentiment Towards China .......................................................

137 137 148 158

Chapter Seven Conclusions ...................................................................... New Insight into the Chinese in New Zealand .................................. Expansion of China’s ‘Soft Power’ .......................................................... Chinese Media as an ‘Imagined Chinatown’ ......................................

165 165 169 172

Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 181 Index .................................................................................................................... 193

List of Figures 2.1. An analytical framework for examining New Zealand Chinese media ....................................................................................... 3.1. Cover pages of four early Chinese newspapers .......................... 3.2. Lessons 1 and 2 of the ‘Movement for Chinese Literacy’ ........ 3.3. Advertisements in early Chinese newspapers ............................ 4.1. A Malaysian Chinese lion dancing troupe ................................... 4.2. An annual Chinese book fair ............................................................ 4.3. A Chinese restaurant run by recent PRC migrants ................... 5.1. Advertisement for Kenneth Wang in the New Zealand Chinese Herald ........................................................................................ 5.2. Congratulatory messages in the New Zealand Chinese Herald ....................................................................................................... 6.1. ACT 2005 election billboard ............................................................ 6.2. ACT’s advertisement in the Chinese Times ................................... 7.1. Auckland Lantern Festival .................................................................

38 50 58 60 64 75 81 113 117 144 146 175

LIST OF CHARTS 4.1.. Top seven source countries for residence approvals, . 1992–2001 .................................................................................................. 4.2.. Top four source countries for residence approvals, . 1997–2008 ................................................................................................. 4.3.. Composition of the New Zealand Chinese population in . 2006 ............................................................................................................ 4.4. Migration from the PRC to New Zealand, 1986–2006 ................ 4.5.. Top six source countries for student permits, 1997–2006 ......... 4.6.. PRC Chinese business immigrants to New Zealand, . 2000–2006 ................................................................................................ 4.7.. Streams of PRC immigrants to New Zealand, 1997–2009 .......... 5.1.. A breakdown of I Love New Zealand on 936AM ........................... 5.2.. New Zealand local news in Chinese media .................................... 5.3.. Opinions of political parties expressed on Chinese . talkback radio .......................................................................................... 5.4.. Chinese internet viewers’ interests in New Zealand . local news .................................................................................................. 5.5.. Activities on www.chinese.net.nz ...................................................... 6.1.. New Zealand GDP growth in comparison with other OECD . countries, 1995–2005 .............................................................................

65 67 68 70 71 73 74 106 107 109 119 120 160

List of Tables 2.1. Three concepts for the analysis of immigrant adaptation ........ 3.1.. Chinese population in New Zealand, 1867–1971 census ............ 4.1.. A selective list of new Chinese media in New Zealand, . 1989–2008 ................................................................................................. 5.1.. Political parties in the 2005 New Zealand general election ..... 5.2.. Result of the New Zealand 2005 general election ....................... 5.3.. Content of the New Zealand Chinese Herald ................................. 5.4.. News holes in the New Zealand Chinese Herald ........................... 5.5.. I Love New Zealand on 936AM ........................................................... 5.6.. Profile of participants in focus groups ............................................

18 45 84 99 101 104 104 105 125

Foreword On a gloomy day early in 2004, I was sitting in a shabby Chinese restaurant in central Auckland waiting for the food that I had ordered. Opposite me sat my old friend, Peter Barling, whom I had invited to taste the special cuisine from my home region in northeastern China. The restaurant was a small family-run business and the service was predictably slow. With our boredom growing, Peter and I began to seek a way of escape. He looked around and picked up a tabloid from some Chinese-language newspapers piled loosely on an empty table next to us. “What is it about?” he asked. Most of the 40 or so colour-print pages carried photos of houses and smiling faces of real estate agents and finance brokers; it was a copy of the Chinese Property Weekly. To kill time, we looked through the photos, and discovered that nearly all the agents and brokers were Chinese, and the interior decorations and furniture of most houses were distinctively Chinese as well. These photos presented a clear Chinese buyer-seller housing market. After the first glance, we decided to trace their locations. To our surprise, most houses were clustered in four or five suburbs across greater Auckland, although their prices ranged from low to high. The expensive houses were almost exclusively located in Dannemora; they were all brand new and built in an ostentatious-looking style. Later on, when I accumulated knowledge about the Chinese Diaspora in other countries, I learnt the Canadian term, ‘monster houses’, for this particular style. “Where is Dannemora?” Despite having lived in Auckland for more than thirty years, Peter admitted that this new eastern suburb was not known to him at all, nor probably to many other European Aucklanders. Suddenly I realised that the Chinese newspapers revealed much of the inside of the Chinese migrant community. That day sowed the seed of my Ph.D. research on the Chinese-language media in New Zealand.

Acknowledgements This book is derived from my Ph.D. thesis proposed in 2004 and completed in 2009 at the University of Auckland. I acknowledge the supervision of Manying Ip and Na­beel Zuberi which has contributed to laying the foundation of the book. For guiding me to revise the thesis into a new form, my words of special gratitude must go to Wanning Sun and Paola Voci, whose examination reports have been a major source of inspiration to me. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the series editors for their constructive suggestions for revision of the book manuscript. Some content of this book appeared in Asian Culture (published by Singapore Society of Asian Studies) volume 34: 59–82 (2010), International Metropolis Project’s Feature of the Month in 2010, and Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu 华侨 华人历史研究 (published by Society of Overseas Chinese History Studies in China) volume 93: 21–30 (March 2011). There are other people helping me generously in the making of the book. I wish to thank James Ng for comments on a draft of the section about early New Zealand Chinese newspapers, Nigel Murphy and Thomas Faist for permitting me to reproduce their published tables, Kenneth Wang for providing me the original images of ACT’s advertisements created by himself and his team, Maggie Chen for allowing me to use the image published by the New Zealand Chinese Herald, and John B. Turner for giving me the right to use his photographs. I would also like to acknowledge support from the School of Asian Studies at the University of Auckland in the form of an honorary research fellowship, which enables me to utilise the university library resources; the Asian-language librarian, Haiqing Lin, has offered me great assistance. It would be beyond words to acknowledge the important support from my father in-law, John Collett, for his painstaking proof reading. My dear friend Katherine O’Keeffe also helped with the final stage of proofreading. Finally, I am always indebted to my supportive husband, Matthew Collett, for his unfailing encouragement to complete the book. This book is dedicated to him.

Chapter One

Introduction China’s New Wave of International Migration In February 1986, China promulgated the Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of Citizens (gongmin chu ru jing guanli fa 公民出入境管理法), which may be perceived as a milestone marking a significant governmental reaction to the staggering increase in the number of Chinese citizens going abroad for personal reasons ( yin si chuguo 因私出国) (such as reunion with their overseas relatives or studying in foreign countries) since the late 1970s. Since the ‘Open Door’ policy was implemented, the whole world has witnessed the resumption of large-scale flows, in and out, of both foreigners and Chinese nationals, across the Chinese borders, which had been closed for several decades subsequent to the 1949 communist revolution. It can be argued that the momentous feature of the 1986 Law is its intent, as this was the first time that the Chinese government, under the CCP’s rule, had openly proclaimed the right of all Chinese citizens to exit and return to China. Prior to this 1986 Law, the most notable legislation concerning Chinese citizens travelling abroad was the Provisional Method for Control of the Entry and Exit of Overseas Chinese (huaqiao chu ru guojing zan xing banfa 华侨出入国境暂行办法), which was introduced in 1951.1 As denoted by its title, this Provisional Method served the specific purpose of catering for the needs of a small number of Chinese nationals living overseas rather than those of the bulk of Chinese in the mainland. Since 1986, the Chinese government has further removed its restrictions on Chinese citizens going overseas for personal reasons. Those

1 Although the Chinese government launched a programme of sending strictly selected scholars and students to the West in 1978 and introduced the Provisional Regulation on Control of Self-funded Overseas Education (guanyu zifei chuguo liuxue de zanxing guiding 关于自费出国留学的暂行规定) in 1984, the two policies only affected a few elite scholars and students sponsored by their relatives overseas. (P. Englesberg, “Reversing China’s Brain Drain: the Study-abroad Policy, 1978–1993,” in Great Policies: Strategic Innovations in Asia and the Pacific Basin, ed. J.D. Montgomery and D.A. Rondinelli [Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995], 101).

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major policy changes made from the late 1990s onwards in particular deserve our attention. The first one was the Provisional Method for Control of Citizens’ Self-funded Overseas Tours (gongmin zifei chuguo lüyou guanli zan xing banfa 公民自费出国旅游管理暂行办法) implemented in 1997, which has generated the trend of affluent mainland Chinese going overseas for holidays; prior to this, except for official delegations, only a small number of people who had sponsorship from overseas relatives and friends were able to have sight-seeing trips overseas. Since this Provisional Method was introduced, joining a tour group organised by travel agencies has become the most common way for ordinary Chinese citizens to visit foreign countries including Hong Kong and Macau. Over a similar period, China’s international education market has also boomed due to the government promulgating the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education (zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding 自费留学中介服务管理规定) in 1999. In the past, the Chinese government did not intervene in the international education market, and illegal operations and frauds were rampant. This new regulation ensures that only qualified and licensed intermediary agencies are eligible to provide consulting service to self-funded students studying overseas, whose total number exploded from 32,293 in 2000 to 128,700 in 2007, almost a four-fold increase.2 While more and more Chinese tourists and students were going abroad, the government also further reduced barriers to make it easier for Chinese citizens to exit the country; major changes include the end of the requirement for a foreign invitation ( yaoqing han 邀请函) and a prior approval for departure (chu jing ka 出境卡) in 2002, which had been essential documents for Chinese citizens applying for a passport. The above moves have together triggered the rapid growth of the Chinese presence internationally. In 1998 the total number of domestic residents outbound was about 8.4 million,3 but by 2007 this had increased to over 40 million.4

2 Data from China’s Ministry of Education, http://www.moe.edu.cn (accessed 21 January 2010). 3 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ed., China Statistical Yearbook 中国统计年鉴 2 (2003): 691. 4 Data from China National Tourism Administration, http://en.cnta.gov.cn/html/200811/2008-11-9-21-35-50326.html (accessed 15 December 2009).



introduction

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These people departed for most parts of the world and comprised a wide range of Chinese permanent migrants and temporary migrants such as students, contract workers and tourists. Conversely, statistics of some receiving countries show that over the past ten years or so, China has been a top source country for immigrants to the United States,5 Canada,6 Australia7 and New Zealand. Since 1995, China has been a leading source for the inflow of foreigners to the whole OECD area, and by 2006 PRC Chinese immigrants were accounting for just over one in every ten new arrivals.8 As well as to the OECD, large inflows of PRC Chinese are also highly noticeable to less developed countries. For instance, Zhuang estimates that between 2.3 and 2.65 million mainland Chinese had emigrated to Southeast Asia since the late 1970s up to 2006.9 Among them, many were similar to those who went to the Philippines to join their relatives descended from early Chinese immigrants;10 meanwhile, migrant workers comprised another distinct element. Chinese migrant workers also constitute the predominant category of recent Chinese arrivals in Russia; according to official Russian sources, the total number of Chinese workers registered as labour migrants jumped from 26,200 to 241,000 between 2000 and 2008.11 A similar pattern has also appeared in Africa, which saw the total number of Chinese contract workers grow from 12,000 in 1990 to 95,000 in 2006, according

5 S.A. Camarota, “Immigrants in the United States, 2007: a Profile of America’s Foreignborn Population,” Center for Immigration Studies (Washington, DC), 2007, http://www .cis.org/immigrants_profile (accessed December 22, 2009), 11. 6 “Canada—permanent residents by source country,” Citizenship and Immigration Canada, http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLIsh/resources/statistics/facts2008/permanent/10.asp (accessed December 22, 2009). 7 “Census 2006—people born in China and India,” Australia Bureau of Statistics, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/Lookup/3416.0Main+Features22008#Anchor2 (accessed February 26, 2012). 8 http://www.oecd.org/document3/0,3343,en_2649_33931_41241219_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 27 November 2009). 9 Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, “Lun Zhongguoren yimin dongnanya de sici dachao 论中 国人移民东南亚的四次大潮 [On the Four Waves: History of Chinese Migration into Southeast Asia],” Southeast Asian Affairs 南洋问题研究 133, no. 1 (2008): 79. 10 T. Ang-See, “Influx of New Chinese Immigrants to the Philippines: Problems and Challenges,” in Beyong Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China, ed. M. Thunø (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007), 137. 11  I. Ivakhnyuk, “The Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development: the Historical Perspective,” New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2009, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/papers/HDRP_2009_14.pdf (accessed January 7, 2010), 59.

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to China’s National Statistics Bureau.12 These contract workers along with Chinese business people may have been a major factor of the surge in Chinese immigration to Africa since the mid-1990s.13 In Latin America, although the exact numbers of Chinese immigrants in recent years are hard to obtain, numerous international media reports of billions of dollars of Chinese investment to this region and cases of violence against the Chinese in Ecuador and Venezuela14 may help paint a picture of PRC Chinese presence there; in addition, the growing Chinese-language newspapers in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Panama15 also indicate that sizable new Chinese migrant communities are emerging in those countries. Chinese newcomers have even come under the spotlight in the Southern Pacific, especially in anti-Chinese riots in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tonga in recent years.16 Here is rich evidence that a new wave of international migration from mainland China has arisen. Clearly, this new wave of Chinese international migration is taking place within the broad context of the demands in receiving countries having facilitated global labour mobility and trading linkages. Furthermore, I also want to emphasise that China’s changing policies towards Chinese citizens’ going overseas should be considered as an equally important factor in examining the dynamics and complicity of the PRC migrants. As the most populous country in the world, China’s gradual removal of restrictions on its citizens leaving the country has resulted in and will continue to result in significant impacts on international migration.

12 Yin Hao 尹豪, “Gaige kaifang yi lai woguo duiwai laowu shuchu fazhan yanjiu 改革开放以来我国对外劳务输出发展研究 [Study on the Development of the Export of Labor Services in China since the Reform and Opening-up],” Population Journal 人口学刊 173 (2009): 29. 13 B. Sautman and H. Yan, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” African Studies Review 50, no. 3 (2008): 88–89. 14 Cited in E. Ellis, “China’s Maturing Relationship with Latin America,” China Brief 9, no. 6 (2009): 4–7, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1tx_ttnews5Btt_news5D= 34723 (accessed January 8, 2010). 15 Representatives for the Chinese-language newspapers produced in these countries attended the Forum of Global Chinese Language Media (shijie huaren chuanmei luntan 世界华人传媒论坛) in 2005, 2007 and 2009, which the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council played a key role in organising. For more information about this forum, see http://qwb.sh.gov.cn/shqb/node113/node814/index.html (accessed 5 March 2010). 16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7006428.stm, http://www.chinaqw.com/ zt/102/2006/0425/21.shtml,  and http://www.stuff.co.nz marlborough-express/news/worldnews/2416212/One-dead-in-anti-Chinese-riots-in-PNG (accessed 27 December 2009).



introduction

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New Zealand Local Contexts This book considers the new wave of international migration from Chi­na to New Zealand in particular. According to the most recent New Zealand census in 2006,17 Chinese constitute 3.4% of the New Zealand population. In comparison to Europeans who make up 67.6% of the population as the largest individual ethnic group in this country,18 3.4% might not seem sizable. Nevertheless, the Chinese now are the second largest ethnic minority group in New Zealand, next only to Maori, the indigenous people. The 2006 census also shows that the PRC Chinese comprise more than half of the New Zealand Chinese population, of which the rest includes almost one quarter of those born in New Zealand and smaller segments originally from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, etc. Statistics reveal that since the late 1990s, China has been the leading source of Chinese immigrants to New Zealand. In fact, China has been one of the top source countries for immigrants to New Zealand over the past ten years or so. China has also been the largest source country for foreign fee-paying (FFP) students to New Zealand since the 1999/2000 financial year; this happened shortly after China promulgated the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education (zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding 自费留学中介服务管 理规定) as noted earlier. As well as the sharp increase in immigrants and international students, a significant number of tourists from China in recent years have also contributed to the rapid expansion of the PRC Chinese community in New Zealand. The Ministry of Tourism notes that by 2008, China had became New Zealand’s fourth largest international visitor market. To pursue a comprehensive understanding of the PRC Chinese community requires that we begin with an overview of existing knowledge about the Chinese in New Zealand. The Chinese have been a significant ethnic group in New Zealand since Chinese pioneers participated in the early development of Central Otago and the West Coast. The earliest Chinese immigration to New Zealand can be traced back to 1866, when the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce invited twelve Chinese miners across the 17 New Zealand conducts its census every five years. The 2011 census was delayed until 2013 because of the devastating Canterbury Earthquake. 18 The 2006 census included a new ethnic category of ‘New Zealander’; most of the 10.7% of the population identifying with this group would previously have been included in the ‘European’ category.

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Tasman Sea from Victoria to work the abandoned Otago goldfields.19 Thus the Chinese came to be the non-European immigrants with the longest history of residence in this country, almost one hundred and fifty years. The Chinese are, however, an ethnic group that has lived under a persistent shadow of racism in New Zealand. Historically, systematic anti-Chinese legislation and restrictions (including exclusion from immigration, the denial of naturalisation, and restrictions on occupational competition) were imposed on the Chinese community.20 In contemporary times, new Chinese migrants (xin yimin 新移民) commonly feel that there is an inherent anti-Asian resentment in the host society, which has frequently been used by populist politicians to manipulate voters during general elections. In addition, New Zealand popular media have also played an important role in promulgation of racism by portraying Chinese and other Asian migrants as ‘undesirable others’.21 Even within the Chinese community itself, it is found that both New Zealand-born Chinese and new migrants have mixed feelings towards each other. It seems to many newcomers that some ‘bananas’22 are willing to collaborate with mainstream New Zealanders’ racial prejudice against Chinese immigrants.23 Conversely, many local-born Chinese incline to distance themselves from new migrants and resent being mistaken for being ‘new’ to the country, since they are conscious about newcomers’ ‘un-Kiwi’ behaviour that often arouse anti-Chinese sentiment among some mainstream New Zealanders.24 19 P.S. Butler, Opium and Gold (Martinborough: Alister Taylor, 1977); J. Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol. 1 (Dunedin: Otago Heritage Books, 1993); M. Ip, “Chinese New Zealanders: Old Settlers and New Immigrants,” in Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples? Ed. S.W. Greif (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1995), 161–199. 20 N. Murphy, “The Legislative Response to Chinese Immigration in New Zealand 1881– 1944,” in The Overseas Chinese in Australasia: History, Settlement and Interactions. Proceedings of the Symposium Held in Taipei, 6–7 January 2001 (Canberra: Centre for the Study of the Chinese South Diaspora, Australian National University, 2001), 82–90; N. Murphy, Guide to Laws and Policies Relating to the Chinese in New Zealand 1871–1997 (Auckland: New Zealand Chinese Association, 2008). 21  P. Spoonley and A.D. Trlin, Immigration, Immigrants and the Media: Making Sense of Multicultural New Zealand (Palmerston North: New Settlers Programme, Massey University, 2004); M. Ip and N. Murphy, Aliens at My Table: Asians as New Zealanders See Them (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2005). 22 ‘Banana’, meaning ‘yellow outside and white inside’, refers to Chinese who were born and have grown up in the West. The New Zealand-born Chinese commonly use this term to identify themselves. 23 Such comment was made by the informants of two focus groups, which I conducted in 2005. 24 M. Ip, Dragons on the Long White Cloud: the Making of Chinese New Zealanders (Auckland: Tandem Press, 1996), 125–142; B. Yee, “Coping with Insecurity: Everyday Experiences



introduction

7

This may all be interpreted within the specific historical and social contexts of New Zealand. As one of the well-established former British colonies, New Zealand, along with Canada and Australia, has traditionally been a major and desirable destination for immigrants from the United Kingdom. Brooking and Rabel have summarised a history of New Zealand’s other immigrants and have presented a forthright description of the long-lasting outcome of the country’s ‘whiter than white’ immigration policy: “mainstream British New Zealand had difficulty coping with the challenge of diversity” and so “politicians, bureaucrats, and the public showed a preference for immigrants whom they thought would fit most easily into the ‘Britain of the South’. ‘God’s Own Country’ was only to be open to the select white and preferably British few.”25 Parallel with this, the encounter between Maori and Pakeha26 contributes another significant part to the sociopolitical discourse of New Zealand. The Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 and accepted as the founding document governing relations between Maori and the British Crown, laid the foundation of the social dynamics of New Zealand. The Treaty recognised the status of Maori as partners, and provided privileges to Maori by regarding them as the indigenous people of Aotearoa with specific rights that are not shared by the whole New Zealand population. This exclusively bicultural perspective is widely presented and generally acknowledged at present in this country. Such a backdrop may help explain why earlier on there has been little scholarly attention to the social development of New Zealand in relation to its other ethnic minorities, including the Chinese.27 From the beginning, colonial historians concentrated on the narrative of the Anglo-Celtic majority as the main actors in New Zealand’s nation building. Since the 1950s, Maori-Pakeha relations have become a predominant theme of New Zealand history; biculturalism has especially become the vogue since the

of Chinese New Zealanders,” in Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003), 215–235. 25 T. Brooking and R. Rabel, “Neither British nor Polynesian: a Brief History of New Zealand’s Other Immigrants,” in Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples, ed. S.W. Greif (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1995), 36. 26 ‘Pakeha’ is a Maori term denoting New Zealanders of European descent. 27 T. Ballantyne, “Writing out Asia: Race, Colonialism and Chinese Migration in New Zealand History,” in East by South: China in the Australasian Imagination, ed. C. Ferrall, P. Millar, and K. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 87–109; P. O’Connor, “Keeping New Zealand White, 1908–1920,” New Zealand Journal of History 2, no. 1 (1968): 41–65.

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passage of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 197528 and the subsequent surge in Maori political activism.29 As Ballantyne argues, both ways of presenting the country’s past led to the conscious or unconscious exclusion of people who are neither Europeans nor Maoris.30 This general neglect on the part of scholarly experts has also impeded mainstream New Zealanders’ awareness and understanding of migrant communities and has perpetuated negative attitudes towards non-European immigrants, such as the Chinese. In such an unbalanced research context, Murphy shows that existing studies, especially early works, on the Chinese in New Zealand were mostly undertaken on immigration policy and European New Zealanders’ reactions to Chinese immigration.31 There are some notable exceptions to this paucity of scholarly consideration of a Chinese perspective, or of Chinese own views of their presence in the country. Bickleen Fong was the first researcher to publish her scholarly effort, which presented an anthropological study of the New Zealand Chinese community of the 1950s.32 Almost four decades later, in 1993, James Ng started to publish his research dedicated to the history of the Chinese in New Zealand, in four large volumes entitled Windows on a Chinese Past. Ng’s work mainly focuses on the period between the gold-mining age and the Second World War. The work of Manying Ip emerged in the 1990s when a considerable number of new Chinese immigrants had arrived in the country. Ip deals with both history and contemporary issues concerning the Chinese in New Zealand, including Maori-Chinese relations.33 The late 1990s also

28 This Act resulted in the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, which gave force to the Treaty of Waitangi within the New Zealand legal system. The tribunal is commissioned to settle breaches between Maori and the Crown in relation to the Treaty. 29 R. Walker, History of Maori Activism: Plus Critique by the Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa (Auckland: NCC Programme on Racism, 1983); R. Walker, The Political Development of the Maori People of New Zealand (Auckland: Centre for Continuing Education, University of Auckland, 1984). 30 Ballantyne, “Writing out Asia,” 93. 31  N. Murphy, “Present Archival and Library Resources on the Study of the Chinese in New Zealand, including Recent Asian Immigrants,” in Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003), 280–297. 32 N.B. Fong, The Chinese in New Zealand: a Study in Assimilation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1959). 33 For example, Ip, Dragons on the Long White Cloud: the Making of Chinese New Zealanders; Ip, Unfolding history; M. Ip, Being Maori-Chinese: Mixed Identities (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2008); M. Ip, ed., The Dragon and the Taniwha: Maori and Chinese in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 2009).



introduction

9

began to see a series of research essays on the new Chinese migrants in New Zealand by Elsie Ho and her associates.34 New People, New Approach The existing scholarly effort on the New Zealand Chinese community has been conducted predominantly by historians, sociologists and demographers. It is also noticeable that the majority of those studies focusing on or related to new Chinese migrants did not give enough attention to the PRC inflow, despite their having been the chief source modifying the New Zealand Chinese population since the late 1990s, as indicated earlier. The tens of thousands of PRC Chinese arrivals have rapidly increased the prosperity of the local Chinese community economy, and have also boosted the development of Chinese-language media in New Zealand. Today, anyone shopping in an Asian grocery store in major cities such as Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, and Christchurch could hardly fail to notice several piles of free Chinese-language newspapers stacked at the entrance of the store to greet the customers. There is ready access to Chinese radio and digital TV within the Auckland region and Chinese satellite TV throughout most of urban New Zealand. Numerous New Zealand-based Chinese-language websites have also mushroomed to serve the increasing Chinese internet users in the country. In 1922, Robert Park published his classic research on ethnic language media. His study discussed those newspapers that at the time were circulating within the immigrant communities in Chicago in more than forty ethnic languages. Park suggested that “The immigrant press . . . (was) . . . a powerful institution that served to keep the mother language from disintegrating; however, its main function was to help immigrants assimilate

34 For example, E. Ho, Researching Post-school Education and Employment Choices among Asian Adolescent Migrants: a Report on Methodological Issues (Hamilton: University of Waikato, Population Studies Centre, 1996); E. Ho, R. Bedford, and J. Goodwin, “‘Astronaut Families’: a Contemporary Migration Phenomenon,” in East Asian New Zealanders: Research on New Migrants, ed. W. Friesen et al. (Albany: Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network, 1997), 20–41; E. Ho, “Multi-local Residence, Transnational Networks: Chinese ‘Astronaut’ Families in New Zealand,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 11, no. 1 (2002): 145–164; E. Ho and R. Bedford, “The Chinese in Auckland: Changing Profiles in a More Diverse Society,” in From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim Countries, ed. W. Li (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 203–230.

10

chapter one

into the host society.”35 To what extent does this argument remain valid in the analysis of ethnic Chinese media and the social dynamics of the PRC Chinese migrant community in today’s New Zealand? This book presents a media and communication studies approach to research on the current development of the Chinese migrant community in New Zealand, with a specific focus on the recent influx from mainland China. Given that mass media usually mirror the reality of a given society, my intent is to gain insight into the PRC migrant community through a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the New Zealand Chineselanguage media as well as a critical examination of audience reception of these media. This approach is founded on my initial assumption that to probe the manner in which PRC migrants consume certain types of media content would lead to opening a window on these migrants’ needs of information, modes of thinking, and sense of belonging. In other words, diasporic Chinese media provide me with unique access to investigate PRC Chinese migrants’ settlement and adaptation in New Zealand. In this book, New Zealand Chinese-language media has been treat­ed as the primary source of information to generate robust empirical data for a new study, which gives great attention to the relationship between these media and a particular Chinese migrant community. Oriented to ana­ lyse new Chinese migrants’ adjustment to their host society, this study is centred around exploring whether and how ethnic Chinese media serves any special needs and interests of recent PRC Chinese immigrants to the country. Here, I am inclined to give emphasis to ‘recent’ as a prevailing facet of this research for two reasons. One concerns the nature of mass media, which in essence document open-ended flows of events. This means that current affairs or more recent events in media are more accessible than ‘old news’ for newcomers of a migrant community; besides, it would be impractical to use ‘old news’ for the simultaneous audience research at which I am primarily aimed. Therefore, the central part of this book is devoted to an in-depth empirical study of a particular ‘recent’ media event in New Zealand received by recent PRC Chinese migrants. The other reason concerns the ‘China factor’. As a rising world power, China’s growing prominence in the global economy and its subsequent influence has

35 As cited in W.Y. Lin, “Communication and Community Building: the Role of Ethnic Media in the Chinese Immigrant Community of Los Angeles” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2004), 5.



introduction

11

caused many significant impacts on Chinese society in recent years. To what extent have those impacts extended to New Zealand through the recently arrived PRC immigrants stemming from a ‘new China’? In addition to this, with satellite transmission and the Internet at present greatly accelerating the exportation of news and entertainment as well as other forms of media content from China, how does the diasporic mediasphere in New Zealand respond to it, in particular in the sense of revealing recent PRC migrants’ transnational consciousness towards their homeland and the host country? To answer such big questions, this research on the recent PRC Chinese immigrants to New Zealand must be closely linked to a careful scrutiny of the specific social context of China. Diasporic Chinese Media beyond New Zealand To date, research on New Zealand Chinese media is still underdeveloped. The first scholarly publication, by Ng and Murphy, was written as a component of a broader introduction to print culture in New Zealand.36 More recently, Ip and Voci have also brought public awareness of Chineselanguage broadcasting and websites in the country.37 However, these works do not focus on the complicated relationship between Chinese media and the community that they serve. Liu discusses the role of an Aucklandbased Chinese newspaper in shaping new migrants’ views of Maori.38 Within a global context, as Suryadinata notes, ‘three pillars’ which combine to support any given diasporic Chinese community are Chinese media, Chinese schools, and business-orientated Chinese clans and kinship

36 J. Ng and N. Murphy, “Chinese,” in Book & Print in New Zealand: A Guide to Print Culture in Aotearoa, ed. K. Maslen, P. Griffith, and Harvey, R. (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1997), 267–275. 37 M. Ip, “Chinese Media in New Zealand: Transnational Outpost or Unchecked Floodtide,” in Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce, ed. W. Sun (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 178–199; P. Voci, “From Middle Kingdom to Middle Earth and back: Chinese Media/mediated Identities in New Zealand,” in Asia in the Making of New Zealand, ed. H.M. Johnson and B. Moloughney (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006), 163–184; P. Voci, “Muticulturalism’s Pitfalls on New Zealand Television: the Rise and Fall of Touch China TV,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 10, no. 1 (2008): 85–107. 38 S. Liu, “Maori Issue Reports in Contemporary Chinese Language Media,” in The Dragon and the Taniwha: Maori and Chinese in New Zealand, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2009), 275–299.

12

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organisations.39 With its distinct role of service to the Chinese overseas, diasporic Chinese media has thus long been an intriguing subject for scholars who have interests in Chinese journalism and overseas Chinese communities. The earliest scholarly attention to diasporic Chinese media was a brief mention in Ge Gongzhen’s pioneering work published in Shanghai in 1927 on the history of the press in China.40 Over the following decades up to 1996, there appeared over ninety books and over one hundred and fifty research and journalistic articles fully or partially devoted to overseas Chinese media, which are neatly listed as references in the volume on “Media & publication” in the Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas.41 Not surprisingly, a great majority of these books and articles concerned Chinese newspapers circulated in Southeast Asia, where the oldest and largest overseas Chinese community is clustered; they were written in the Chinese language and were published predominantly in the Chinese-speaking world including China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. Most of these publications are historical accounts in a descriptive style, rather than empirical analysis; perhaps partly in consequence, the content of the later works, even academic ones, largely reiterates that of the earlier ones. From 1996 onwards, major Chinese-language publications on diasporic Chinese media continue to rework old material about newspapers, but also begin to touch upon radio, television and the Internet.42 By comparison, publications on overseas Chinese media in other languages are rather sparse. This is reflected by only thirteen references in foreign languages (including ten in English) being listed in the vol-

39 L. Suryadinata, Chinese and Nation-building in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 1997), 12. 40 Ge Gongzhen 戈公振, “Zhongguo bao xue shi 中国报学史,” 1927, http://book.cha oxing.com/ebook/read_10113283.html (accessed December 12, 2011), 266–267. 41  Zhou Nanjing 周南京 et al., eds., Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu 华侨华人百科全书 (Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe 中国华侨出版社, 1999–2002). 42 For example, Wang Shigu 王士谷, Haiwai huawen xinwenshi yanjiu 海外华文新闻 史研究 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe 新华出版社, 1998); Cheng Manli 程曼丽, Haiwai huawen chuanmei yanjiu 海外华文传媒研究 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe 新华出版社, 2001); Peng Weibu 彭伟步, Dongnanya huawen baozhi yanjiu 东南亚华文报纸研究 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe 社会科学文献出版社, 2005); Peng Weibu 彭伟步, Haiwai huawen chuanmei gailun 海外华文传媒概论 (Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe 暨南大学出版社, 2007); Peng Weibu 彭伟步, xingzhou ribao yanjiu《星洲 日报》研究 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe 复旦大学出版社, 2008); Li Dajiu 李大 玖, Huaiwai huaren wangluo meiti–kuai wenhua yujing 海外华人网络媒体—跨文化语 境 (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe 清华大学出版社, 2009).



introduction

13

ume on “Media & publication” in the Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas.43 Such sparsity is sadly contradictory to the obvious fact that the Chinese Diaspora is scattered in every continent of the world, and numerous Chinese-language newspapers have been produced locally in both historical and contemporary times. As far as English-language publications are concerned, Yang provides a more recent list of references, primarily dealing with the Chinese newspapers produced in the United States and Canada.44 So far, the most substantial recent research works in English on diasporic Chinese medium (including press, broadcasting media and websites) are either authored or edited by Wanning Sun, and are not confined to North America.45 Commenting on the shortage of such studies, Sun observes that To start filling this lacuna is a matter of urgency, considering the phenomenal scale of the global Chinese mediasphere and the infinitely fluid and dynamic ways in which it interacts with the movement of people, capital and technology, particularly in the current era when globalization has intensified—not to mention, of course, the implications of the rapidly growing impact of the export of Chinese nationalism from the PRC.46

Her allusion to the growing PRC impact is elaborated in a more recent paper.47 This book is intended to fill the lacuna.

43 Zhou Nanjing, Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu. 44 T. Yang, “Documenting Immigrant Experiences: a Study of the Chinese-language Newspapers Published in North America” (Paper presented at the World Library and Information Congress: 74th IFLA General Conference and Council, 10–14 August 2008, Québec, Canada, 2009), http://eprints.rclis.org/handle/10760/13100 (accessed December 20, 2011). 45 W. Sun, Leaving China: Media, Migration, and Transnational Imagination (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); W. Sun, “Introduction: Transnationalism and a Global Diasporic Chinese Mediasphere,” in Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication and Commerce, ed. W. Sun (London: Routledge, 2006), 1–25. 46 Sun, “Introduction: Transnationalism,” 4. 47 W. Sun et al., “Diasporic Chinese Media in Australia: a Post-2008 Overview,” Continuum 25, no. 4 (2011): 515–527.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALISING NEW ZEALAND CHINESE MEDIA According to media theorist Denis McQuail, “media to a large extent serve to constitute our perceptions and definitions of social reality and normality for purpose of public, shared social life, and are a key source of standards, models and norms.”1 Because of their mediation roles, mass media are often perceived as a window onto or a mirror of a society, and also, at the same time, as a filter of or a platform for selected information and views.2 With such perspectives, scholars of sociological media studies have commonly shared three theoretical foci: 1) media power and inequality, the question of who controls the media and whose version of the social reality is presented; 2) social integration and identity, raising the issue that mass communication as a process represents normative value systems, which have effects on forging individuals’ identities and binding society together; and 3) social change, especially technological advances in communication, which cause considerable changes to economic development and people’s participation in democratic politics.3 These conceptual approaches suggest the main angles from which I shall probe contemporary New Zealand Chinese media to access the Chinese migrant community. Does political disparity in New Zealand permit the influence of ethnic Chinese media? Do Chinese media contribute to shaping or reshaping Chinese identity, thereby consolidating a distinct migrant community in the country? Can technologically advanced Chinese-language media change the political landscape of New Zealand through their local or transnational content? Answers have to be sought by exploring and linking two separate fields—international migration studies and media and communication studies. This chapter thus consists of two main parts. The first part concentrates on conceptualising migrants’ adaptation, Chinese identity in New Zealand and ethnic Chinese media as a form of alternative media. Based

1 D. McQuail, McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, 4th ed. (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2000), 64. 2 Ibid., 66. 3 Ibid., 69–74.

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on these conceptual discussions, the second part presents an analytical framework for studying New Zealand Chinese media through empirical methods; this framework emphasises the production of Chinese media, the construction of Chinese media messages, and media reception among Chinese migrants. Central Concepts Modeling Migrants’ Adaptation According to canonical views, international migration is mainly caused by socioeconomic differences between developing countries and the industrialised world.4 Concerning migrants’ adaptation in their host country, the early assimilation model suggests that immigrants normally experience a ‘race relations cycle’ of contact, competition, accommodation, and eventual assimilation; assimilation is the eventual outcome of the process by which immigrants enter the social cliques and institutions of the core society at the primary group level.5 By comparison, the pluralism model places emphasis on the significance of immigrants’ retaining their own cultural heritage as well as embracing and practicing the culture of the core society.6 In this vein, more recent theoretical debates concentrate on immigrants’ segmented patterns of assimilation,7 arguing that ethnic4 For example, D.S. Massey et al., “Theories of International Migration: a Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–466; D.S. Massey et al., “An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: the North American Case,” Population and Development Review 20, no. 4 (1994): 699–751; C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind, eds., The Handbook of International Migration: the American Experience (New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 1999). 5 For example, R.E. Park and E. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969); M.M. Gordon, Assimilation in American life: the Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification (New York: Macmillan, 1965). 6 For example, W.L. Yancey, E.P. Ericksen, and R.N. Juliani, Emergent Ethnicity: a Review and Reformulation,” American Sociological Review (1976): 391–403; M.C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); R.D. Alba, Ethnic Identity: the Transformation of White America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 7 For example, A. Portes and M. Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530, no. 1 (1993): 74–96; A. Portes and R.G. Rumbaut, Legacies: the Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); R.D. Alba and V. Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); T. Jacoby, ed., Reinventing the Melting Pot: the New Immigrants and What It Means to Be American (New York: Basic Books, 2004);



conceptualising new zealand chinese media

17

ity and race carry weight in determining structural aspects of migrants’ incorporation and integration into their host country—most migrants are expected to achieve socioeconomic parity with the native-born and become part of the mainstream, but some experience downward mobility and fall into the underclass. Moving from immigrants’ one-way process of assimilation into a melting pot or a multicultural salad bowl, theorists of transnationalism focus on the nature of some specific groups of international emigrants “who live dual lives: speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and making a living through continuous regular contact across national borders”.8 Through intensive and simultaneous activities across international borders, transnational migrants forge and maintain multi-stranded social relations connecting their societies of origin and settlement. This is particularly so in a new age which is marked by the rapid technological developments in transportation and communication, especially the Internet.9 Since the 1990s, transnationalism has been a popular framework to explain the trends of contemporary international emigration, although critics have expressed the reservation that, “International migrants and their descendants do repeatedly engage in concerted action across state boundaries, but the use, form, and mobilization of the connections linking ‘here’ and ‘there’ are contingent outcomes subject to multiple political constraints.”10 Partly in response, one new development in transnationalism scholarship identifies the levels, types, and frequency of transnational activities11 and proposes that international migrants are constantly on the

P. Kivisto, Incorporating Diversity: Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005). 8 A. Portes, L.E. Guarnizo, and P. Landolt, “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 217. 9 For example, L.G. Basch, N.G. Schiller, and C.S. Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1994); N.G. Schiller and G.E. Fouron, “Terrains of Blood and Nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 340–366; S. Vertovec, “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 447–462; Kivisto, Incorporating Diversity. 10 R.D. Waldinger and D. Fitzgerald, “Transnationalism in question,” American Journal of Sociology 109, no. 5 (2004): 1177. 11  For example, A. Portes, “Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism,” International Migration Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 874–892; P. Levitt and N.G. Schiller, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: a Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society,” International Migration Review 38, no. 3 (2004): 1002–1039.

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Table 2.1. Three concepts for the analysis of immigrant adaptation (T. Faist, “Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 2 [2000]: 201). Approaches:

Assimilation

Ethnic pluralism

Realms of adaptation

Border-crossing expansion of social space

Main prediction

Melting into the core Pluralisation

Transnationalisation

Political

national citizenship: unitary national political culture

multicultural citizenship: common elements of political culture include recognition of cultural differences

dual state membership: elements of political culture from various states can be complementary

Cultural

acculturation: fullscale adaptation of values and behaviour to the nation-state’s core

cultural retention: practices maintained in a new context; collective identities transplanted from emigration country

transnational syncretism: diffusion of culture and emergence of new types-mixed identities

move between transnational social spaces, which have been described by Thomas Faist in three forms: transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits, and transnational communities.12 As Schmitter Heisler summarises, “Kinship groups are based on reciprocity within the family and may involve remittances of household family members and are typically short-lived; transnational circuits are based on exchange of goods, people, and information. Transnational communities are based on social solidarity, shared ideas, beliefs, and symbols, and may be bilocal (involving only two localities) or multilocal, involving several localities.”13 Faist has given a systematic comparison of the assimilation model, the pluralism model, and transnationalism, as shown in Table 2.1.14 The merit of this comparison is that it reminds us that migrants’ diverse experiences of adaptation, depicted in these models, probably result in fragmentation 12 T. Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 202–210. 13 B. Schmitter Heisler, “The Sociology of Immigration: from Assimilation to Segmented Integration, from the American Experience to the Global Arena,” in Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines, ed. C. Brettell and J.F. Hollifield (New York: Routledge, 2008), 97. 14 T. Faist, “Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 2 (2000): 201.



conceptualising new zealand chinese media

19

within one uprooted ethnic community. The social lives of one ethnic community, especially with a prolonged period of immigration and settlement, could be multilayered and multidimensional; such a community may contain members at different degrees and stages of assimilation into their host country. Moreover, Faist’s comparison also gives emphasis to the salient role of nation-state membership in defining cultural affinity for members of a minority community of migrant origin. This proposition casts new light on our understanding of racism. In the past, especially during the colonial era, racists embraced social Darwinism and believed that biologically ‘inferior’ aliens would bring in racial contamination. Today, in the age when transnationalism is increasingly becoming a way of life, neo-racism15 seems to have arisen in the form of attacking migrants who retain one national allegiance only to their homeland, since the world is still clearly carved up into many independent territorial nation-states, with each standing as a geopolitical entity as well as a cultural entity. Given that migrants may keep shifting their national allegiance and cultural affinity, further questions are posed, as to whether and to what extent members of one ethnic community can be predicated to have collective needs and to pursue common aspirations. These questions are particularly difficult to answer when political conflicts between migrants’ host and home countries arise as cultural clashes, for instance, the dilemma facing American Muslims after 9/11. I would like to argue strongly that neo-racism can be found even within one ethnic community, with newly arrived transnationals and assimilated earlier settlers (including descendants of early settlers generations ago) perceiving each other to be somehow ‘foreign’; the two groups may orientate their sense of belonging to different nation-states and thus different societies with dissimilar, even clashing, political interests, value systems and cultural norms. Even among the assimilated individuals or groups, assimilation takes various forms and levels as judged by the dominant group in the host society. Such diversity helps explain why members of one migrant community may encounter the host society differently and also react to racism differently. It is often observed that the less assimilated or less acculturated newcomers are more likely to be vulnerable to racial discrimination than the better assimilated early arrivals, some of

15 E. Balibar and I.M. Wallerstein, “Is there a ‘neo-racism’?” In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (New York: Verso Books, 1991), 17–28.

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whom may not even be concerned about race relations at all. These key points together lay out the ground on which I shall scrutinise the Chinese identity in contemporary New Zealand, which greatly influences how New Zealand Chinese media serve this particular diasporic Chinese community. Anatomy of Chinese Identity in New Zealand The 2006 census showed that 3.4% of the New Zealand population identified themselves as ethnic Chinese. To a large extent, being Chinese for many New Zealanders may be just a simplistic matter of subjective identification, because the census form required everyone to answer the question “Which ethnic group do you belong to?” The available options included New Zealand European, Maori, Samoan, Cook island Maori, Tongan, Niuean, Chinese and Indian.16 Thus, in New Zealand ‘Chineseness’ was imposed on a particular ethnic group by non-Chinese. However, for some ethnic Chinese, the English word ‘Chinese’ used in the census question may not mean the Chinese race (zhong hua min zu 中华 民族) solely, since this word can also be translated into ‘中国人(zhongguoren)’, which carries the connotation of two other distinct meanings. One of them is defined in a political sense and refers to the PRC Chinese national; the other one is defined in a cultural sense and refers to the people of ‘China’, which stands for a civilisation with a history of thousands of years. Reflecting such complexity, the 2006 census also revealed that 6% of New Zealand Chinese identified themselves further as Hong Kong Chinese, Cambodian Chinese, Malaysian Chinese, Singaporean Chinese, Vietnamese Chinese and Taiwanese, whereas 94% of Chinese preferred not to claim any sub-ethnicity.17 Such divisions not only reflect the diversity within the contemporary New Zealand Chinese community, but also arguably indicate that many members of the community would likely choose to conceal or invoke their pan-Chinese identity and sub-ethnicity according to circumstances. Within this context, I would like to refer to Wang Gungwu’s classic studies of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. As Wang summarises, ‘Chinese identity’ may refer to historical identity, Chinese nationalist identity, communal

16 http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/about-2006-census/information-by-variable/ethnicity.aspx (accessed 1 November 2007). 17 For more information, see http://www.stats.govt.nz/searchresults.aspx?q=Chinese% 20classification (accessed 1 November 2007).



conceptualising new zealand chinese media

21

identity, national (local) identity, cultural identity, ethnic identity and class identity.18 Given the long history of Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia and the dynamic nature inherent in this particular Chinese community, Wang’s insightful analysis provides an important reference when we interrogate the manifold dimensions of the Chinese identity in New Zealand. The New Zealand Chinese community is part of the global network of the Chinese Diaspora. The term ‘Chinese Diaspora’ refers to a cohort who live outside mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, and share a collective memory or consciousness of their ancestral roots back to China. The Chinese Diaspora contains a variety of individuals including Chinese nationals, and also those who are of Chinese descent but hold foreign citizenship through either natural birth or naturalisation. Because of such complexity, the equally ambiguous term ‘Chinese overseas’ is often used interchangeably with ‘Chinese Diaspora’. For some Chinese in New Zealand, ‘being Chinese’ may be just an unquestionable matter of biological fact concerning a particular ethnic group; however, for many others, ‘being Chinese’ is conditioned by their emotional reflections on the past, and their varied assessments of and responses to the changing reality of ‘Greater China’. Regarding the past, it is easy to understand that many New Zealandborn Chinese prefer to identify themselves as the descendants of poll tax payers who arrived in the country generations ago. For these people, their Chinese identity is in Wang Gungwu’s terms ‘ethnic’, ‘historical’ and ‘communal’. With several generations of settlement and integration into the core society of New Zealand, these well-assimilated New Zealand-born Chinese often emphasise that their Chinese identity contains a distinct ‘local’ element. This ‘local’ element means that these people are New Zealand orientated and hold to New Zealand values and social norms; in addition, English has become their first language, although some people may be able to speak a few Chinese words, mainly in Cantonese. On the whole, they are clearly distinguishable from the rest of the Chinese community originating from ‘Greater China’, a completely outside world to New Zealand. As Harry Harding observes, the concept of ‘Greater China’ has been used under various themes and reservations: “some refer primarily to the

18 G. Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press Singapore, 1991).

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commercial ties among ethnic Chinese, whereas others are more interested in cultural interactions, and still others in the prospects for political reunification. Some observers focus exclusively on Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and mainland China, others incorporate Singapore, and still others include the overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, America and Europe. To some writers, ‘Greater China’ is simply a way of summarising the new linkages among the far-flung international Chinese community; to others, it is a prescription of the institutions that should govern those ties.”19 Derived from those observations, Harding’s conceptual framework of ‘Greater China’ appears to be applicable to how Chinese in New Zealand identify themselves under different circumstances. Culturally, other Chinese originate from various countries with their own indigenous cultures, which to various degrees may be embedded in these people’s mindsets and social behaviour. Even so, many of them probably admit that they still share a common cultural root traced back to China, for they retain certain traditional Chinese customs, and take pleasure in Chinese festivals and foods. In addition, a large proportion of these people may possess competent Chinese language skills, both in literacy and listening, which would enable them to access a wide range of Chinese popular cultural products such as music, television dramas, and movies. With the rapid developments in the technologies of communication, especially the Internet, the spread of Chinese popular culture from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, could accelerate the formation of a cultural ‘Greater China’ in New Zealand. The presence of cultural ‘Greater China’ is especially meaningful for us to understand how the Chinese community economy in New Zealand may develop, since the arrival of new Chinese immigrants could contribute substantially. With newcomers’ demands for settlement (for instance, housing, transportation and foods), and the supply of goods and services, the flourishing of the Chinese community economy can be activated and realised by a number of Chinese cultural factors such as the commonly used Chinese language (including various dialects), networking within Chinese clans and kinships, specific Chinese communication ritual and customs, and even Chinese superstition, for example Fengshui. Chinese networks, along with institutionalised Chinese behaviour and attitudes, can transform into immense social capital to drive and sustain the Chinese community economy for both consumers and business operators, 19 H. Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations,” China Quarterly 136, no. 4 (1993): 660.



conceptualising new zealand chinese media

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but may be highly incomprehensible and inaccessible for non-Chinese who attempt to penetrate the Chinese market. In this sense, the microcosm of an economic ‘Greater China’ in New Zealand could exist for both Chinese and non-Chinese. In terms of defining new Chinese migrants’ identity in New Zealand in a political sense, the concept of political ‘Greater China’ is much more complicated. At first, their origins are different nation-states, which might have resulted in some individuals’ constant and strong consciousness and defence of their own national identity. Although there are indeed some individuals taking advantages of a ‘flexible citizenship’ in order to maximise their own political and economic gains,20 it should be noted that, with a distinct ‘local’ identity other than just being ethnic and cultural Chinese, new migrants are by and large similar to the New Zealand-born Chinese. The most divisive issue concerning new Chinese migrants’ political identity is whether and to what extent they admit any national allegiance to the PRC Chinese government. Some dissidents with an anti-Chinese government stance, such as the post-1989 democracy activists and Falun Gong practitioners, may be found among the PRC migrant community; more extreme cases are those activists devoted to the creation of an independent Taiwan. Anyone who entertains the concept of one unified political Chinese community in New Zealand would risk controversy in the current setting of two clearly divided Chinese regimes across the Taiwan Strait. Next, new Chinese migrants’ various attitudes towards New Zealand domestic politics fragment the new Chinese community into more than two rival groups, individuals’ diverse economic status and ideological beliefs resulting in political conflicts. Furthermore, new Chinese migrants’ various moral and intellectual judgments on significant international affairs such as the Iraq War or global climate change further fragment the Chinese migrant community into many confrontational interest groups. Overall, new Chinese migrants have heterogeneous attitudes towards New Zealand domestic politics and international politics just like other people in New Zealand, although the proportion of them favouring a particular political stance is indeed another matter. Nevertheless, a politically cohesive Chinese migrant community does exist in New Zealand. One factor shaping this community is the extent to which race relations and race-based issues have been politicised in this 20 A. Ong, Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

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country, as seen, for example, in Ip and Murphy’s review of relevant New Zealand cartoons over a period of 140 years.21 Revisiting the history of New Zealand’s immigration policies towards the Chinese, we have no difficulty in finding rich evidence that Chinese issues were repeatedly politicised. In contemporary New Zealand, while the law is essentially colour-blind (with the exception of specific rights for Maori), in practice, racial prejudice and institutionalised racism is still evident; for instance, in the job market, Chinese and Indian migrants often experience discrimination.22 To be a new Chinese migrant may mean to be vulnerable to this reality. Therefore, two kinds of self-consciousness may be in effect when new Chinese migrants claim their Chinese identity in New Zealand. On the one hand, the consciousness may be manifested as people’s wishes to preserve their common Chinese cultural heritage and to remain in a distinct ethnic group for companionship and communal support. On the other hand, the consciousness may be a catalyst uniting Chinese migrants to seek social justice, and to fight for legal and political rights equal to those of other ethnic groups in the country. Since the mid 1970s, the revival of Maori activism and recognition of the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi have become a central theme of the national politics in New Zealand. Unlike Canada and Australia where multiculturalism is openly promoted and exercised as an official policy, New Zealand emphasises a bicultural perspective, although some Maori may consider it in practice still a monocultural state dominated by Europeans. This sets up the background against which New Zealand immigration policy has been the subject of contentious debate over the past twenty years or so; and the most critical voice has come from Maori as the indigenous people of New Zealand and the treaty partner. A prominent Maori scholar comments that, “The government has defaulted on its obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi to consult widely with Maori people on its immigration scheme, which makes it vulnerable once again to an embarrassing claim before the Waitangi Tribunal.”23 Walker’s concern is closely associated with the fact that Maori are generally poorly educated and have a high rate of unemployment; whereas

21  Ip and Murphy, Aliens at My Table. 22 M.G. Wilson et al., “A Rose by Any Other Name: the Effect of Ethnicity and Name on Access to Employment,” University of Auckland Business Review 7, no. 2 (2005): 65–72. 23 R. Walker, “Immigration Policy and the Political Economy of New Zealand,” in Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples, ed. S.W. Greif (Dunmore Press, 1995), 301.



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the contemporary New Zealand immigration policy aims to bring in affluent entrepreneurs and better educated professionals, who happen to have largely originated from Asia.24 Public opinion surveys have consistently revealed that Maori attitudes towards Asian immigrants are often more negative than other New Zealanders, and Chinese have always been regarded as the core of Asian immigrants and thus the main target of racism.25 Conversely, from Chinese immigrants’ point of view, their feeling of exclusion from the host society could be intensified by New Zealand’s unique bicultural sociopolitical context; being the most visible group of Asian ‘outsiders’, Chinese are more likely to be treated more ‘like gatecrashers than welcomed guests’.26 Thus, we may argue that Chinese migrants are politically marginalised in contemporary New Zealand. Nevertheless, my earlier discussions on migrants’ adaptation have indicated that, when race relations are politicised, Chinese migrants at different stages of acculturation and assimilation may not necessarily feel excluded in the same way. In other words, less acculturated newcomers probably have a much stronger feeling of being politically marginalised than wellsettled earlier arrivals. Chinese Media as Alternative Media Since New Zealand Chinese-language media serve a diasporic Chinese community, these media may be treated as a form of alternative media, in contrast to New Zealand mainstream media that primarily serve the English-speaking mainstream New Zealanders. Although ‘alternative media’ is a vague term, scholars in the fields of critical media studies, radical and social movement media studies, citizen media studies, and community media studies, have established that alternative media by and large emerge to reflect some highly specific ideals, concerns and interests, which often clash with those standard to the large-scale mainstream media.27 As Atton

24 I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Four. 25 P. Spoonley and R. Bedford, Welcome to Our World? Immigration and the Reshaping of New Zealand (Auckland: Dunmore Publishing, 2012), 225–230. 26 M. Ip, “Introduction,” in Ip, The Dragon and the Taniwha, 3. 27 For example, J.D.H. Downing et al., Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001); J.D.H. Downing, “Audiences and Readers of Alternative Media: the Absent Lure of the Virtually Unknown,” Media, Culture & Society 25, no. 5 (2003): 625–645; T. Harcup, “ ‘The Unspoken-Said’: the Journalism of Alternative Media,” Journalism 4, no. 3 (2003): 356–376; C. Atton, Alternative Media (London: Sage Publications, 2002); C. Atton and J.F. Hamilton, Alternative Journalism (London: Sage, 2008); A.G. Dagron, “The Long and Winding Road of Alternative Media,”

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and Hamilton claim, “Alternative journalism proceeds from dissatisfaction not only with the mainstream coverage of certain issues and topics, but also with the epistemology of news. Its critique emphasizes alternatives to, inter alia, conventions of news sources and representation; the inverted pyramid of news texts; the hierarchical and capitalized economy of commercial journalism; the professional, elite basis of journalism as a practice; the professional norm of objectivity; and the subordinate role of audience as receiver.”28 These viewpoints may renovate our understanding of how media could reproduce the hierarchy of power in society, which has been discussed extensively by Stuart Hall and others.29 In contrast to mainstream media, alternative media publicise the existence and opinions of the powerless and the marginal, and in this way offer a perspective ‘from below’,30 which can be interpreted as aiming “to give a voice to the voiceless, to fill the gaps left by the mainstream [media], to empower ordinary people to participate in democracy, and in many instances, to educate people with information they cannot access elsewhere”.31 With alternative media representing the downtrodden counter to hegemony—“the dominance of one group, nation or culture over another”,32 Harcup extends Habermas’ key argument on the ‘public sphere’33 to deduce that, “alternative media can provide arenas for ‘subcultural or class-specific public spheres’ to compete with the dominant hegemonic public sphere”.34 Within such an alternative public sphere, members of its audience are able to exercise their power by enthusiastically supplying alternative sources of news and opinions to their own media to confirm their views of power and inequality. In Atton and Hamilton’s terms, this way of horizontal rather than hierarchical communication is ‘native reporting’— in The Sage Handbook of Media Studies, ed. J.D.H. Downing et al. (Sage Publications, 2004), 41–64. 28 Atton and Hamilton, Alternative Journalism, 1. 29 For example, S. Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978); S. Hall, “Media Power and Class Power,” in Bending Reality: the State of the Media (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 5–14; J. Curran and J. Seaton, Power without Responsibility: the Press and Broadcasting in Britain, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1991). 30 Harcup, “ ‘The Unspoken-Said’: the Journalism of Alternative Media,” 371. 31  S.R. Forde, Challenging the News: the Journalism of Alternative and Community Media (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 45. 32 J. Childers and G. Hentzi, The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 131. 33 J. Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. C. Calhoun (MIT press, 1992), 425–426. 34 Harcup, “ ‘The Unspoken-Said’: the Journalism of Alternative Media,” 371.



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“the activities of alternative journalists working within communities of interest to present news that is relevant to those communities’ interests, presented in a manner that is meaningful to them and with their collaboration and support.”35 By sharing information circulated by alternative media, the powerless and the marginalised who are initially in an isolated situation may become aware that they are actually not alone, but in a distinct, wider community. In consequence, alternative media can engender collective consciousness to strengthen the network within disadvantaged and vulnerable minority groups, especially in political and cultural senses. Along with earlier discussions of migrants’ adaptation models and the multilayered Chinese identity in New Zealand, the above survey of alternative media provides further interpretive resources to conceptualise the New Zealand Chinese media. My next focus is to interrogate the discourse of these media—as a whole, where is the diasporic Chinese media placed within the power structure of the New Zealand state? In his insightful analysis of space, place and diasporas, Ma notes that diasporas represent the ‘process of population dispersion in space’, and thus are manifested as spatial networks, which can be understood in the sense of “connectivity, exchange, and [the] spread of people, goods, ideas and information across networked space and among a number of places with a varying degree of intensity and directionality.”36 Departing from Ma’s standpoint and having reviewed diasporic Chinese media in various countries across historical and contemporary eras, Sun argues that Chinese media produced in different geographic locations enable Chinese migrants to carve out and affirm their place-based identity.37 Within the context of examining the Chinese-language media in New Zealand as a type of alternative media in the country, Sun’s idea of place-based identity has two important applications: on the one hand, with an emphasis on ‘place-based’, is New Zealand’s unique bicultural setting as the social reality in which Chinese media come to existence; on the other, with an emphasis on ‘identity’, is Chinese migrant community’s need for New Zealand-based Chinese media to help its members localise their identity.

35 Atton and Hamilton, Alternative Journalism, 127. 36 L.J.C. Ma, “Space, Place and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” in The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, ed. L.J.C. Ma and C.L. Cartier (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 8–9. 37 Sun, “Introduction: Transnationalism,” 9.

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As noted earlier, Chinese migrants comprise a sociopolitically marginalised minority group in contemporary bicultural New Zealand. While serving this community, the Chinese media, whether intentionally or not, can in effect create an alternative public sphere, which would inevitably accommodate some highly specific information and ideals concerning the community. In order to appreciate this media discourse, two key questions need to be addressed: 1) To what extent are Chinese migrants in New Zealand in need of localised Chinese media? 2) Who are the main audience of these media within the New Zealand Chinese migrant community? Previous discussions have revealed how the New Zealand Chinese migrant community is a complicated social mixture in terms of individual members’ cultural, economic and political identities within ‘Greater China’. Since Chinese migrants may demonstrate or claim their own Chinese identity in various ways, their needs for and responses to the content of Chinese media could differ. This means that within this community, some people may very much appreciate the Chinese media as an alternative arena to circulate particular information related to their needs and interests concerning migrants’ life, which somehow differ from and even clash with those of the core society of New Zealand; however, there are others who may not necessarily share the same sentiment. Here we need to return to the point that at different stages of adaptation and acculturation, immigrants might perceive and interact differently with the host society. It was argued earlier that, with different degrees of adaptation and acculturation, members of the Chinese migrant community may or may not share collective needs and aspirations, in particular when race relations in bicultural New Zealand are concerned. That is to say, while sociopolitical marginalisation is imposed on the Chinese migrant community in general, especially through the misrepresentations of mainstream media,38 not everyone in the community is necessarily sensitive about such distortion; only some members are motivated to elevate the collective image of the community. Since their specific concerns and viewpoints may disagree with that of the mainstream media controlled by the dominant society of New Zealand, these marginalised Chinese desire to speak out through their own media. Who are the people whose needs and voices are most likely to be absent from the New Zealand mainstream media? From the discussions in this 38 Spoonley and Trlin, Immigration, immigrants and the media.



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chapter so far, it can be deduced that they are the minimally acculturated new arrivals, especially the transnationals. With their frequent and continuing transnational activities orientated to the homeland and thus more distant from New Zealand, these people’s alien behaviour can be singled out easily by those nationhood-conscious ‘mainstream New Zealanders’ including European Pakeha and Maori, and even some well assimilated earlier arrivals within the Chinese migrant community itself, who may all stigmatise those newcomers and consider them ‘outsiders’ of a different culture. The newcomers’ minimal acculturation is inevitably connected with their lack of strong competence in the English language, which would otherwise help accelerate their acculturation. Therefore, many of them may feel comfortable falling back on the Chinese language to access and to convey sophisticated and provocative ideas. The issue of a language barrier does not concern the well-assimilated New Zealand-born Chinese and some new Chinese migrants who are fluent in English, since these two groups of people have no difficulty in accessing New Zealand mainstream media to voice themselves through their own letters to the editors, online postings, or participation in talkback radio shows, if they want to address certain issues, such as race-based politics. In some cases, English-speaking Chinese such as Tze Ming Mok and Lincoln Tan can be provocative writers or reporters for New Zealand mainstream media. Mok, a New Zealandborn writer, was a prominent advocate for the Asian community in New Zealand between 2005 and 2007, when she wrote a weekly column for the Sunday Star-Times, New Zealand’s largest Sunday newspaper. Tan, a Peranakan (Straits-born Chinese) migrant from Singapore, even founded iBall, a bilingual (English and Chinese) weekly that enjoyed popularity between 2004 and 2008 for frequently reporting controversial issues such as prostitution and illegal immigration within the Asian community. Tan later became a senior journalist for the New Zealand Herald, the largest daily newspaper in the country. Overall, Chinese migrants’ multilayered acculturation, especially where race-based politics and the language barrier are concerned, leads to the conclusion that New Zealand Chinese media primarily serve the needs of newly arrived migrants. Serving a sociopolitically marginalised audience, these media may be thus approached from some characteristic practices that they share with other forms of alternative media. As Hackett and Carroll have identified those characteristic practices, first of all, alternative media are “likely to be relatively autonomous from

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corporate capital and the state—to be run as cooperatives or small businesses”; this implies that these media lack funding and thus may be easily manipulated by whoever controls the financial resources. Second, an alternative medium “openly assumes a stance of advocacy rather than pseudo-‘objectivity’ ” and “accesses voices and issues marginalised in hegemonic media”; this implies that these media may be able to challenge and to reshape the existing power structure of a given democratic society. Finally, alternative media strengthen community connections and encourage horizontal communication between media operators and audience through the latter participating in the process of media production; however, this kind of communication may also ghettoise media users by confining their attention to parochial issues.39 In essence, these perspectives together enable me to construct the following analytical framework to interrogate Chinese media from several directions. Towards an Analytical Framework Semiotic Analysis of Chinese Media Semiotics is the study of signs (including sounds, marks, and other form of codes) and the ways in which they produce meaning. The study is based on the interpretation of the arbitrary connections between the thing signifying (signifier) and that which it signifies (signified). There are three basic types of arbitrary connections: icon, index and symbol.40 To explicate the meanings of such connections before moving on to interpret some characteristic signs and signifiers used in Chinese media, I would like to first bring in the compelling research by Hamid Naficy on Iranian television in Los Angeles, which is a detailed case study exemplifying the special features of textual strategies and practices of diasporic media.41 The discussion below of Naficy’s work is only intended to demonstrate how semiotic features of the Chinese media in New Zealand can be understood. Naficy’s research is situated within the context of the exilic Iranian community negotiating and constituting its cultural identity in the United States during the 1980s. After the 1978 Islamic Revolution in Iran, a large 39 R.A. Hackett and W.K. Carroll, Remaking Media: the Struggle to Democratize Public Communication (New York: Routledge, 2006), 58. 40 Childers and Hentzi, Columbia Dictionary, 272–279. 41  H. Naficy, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).



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number of middle and upper class Iranians who were involved with the development of Western culture under the Pahlavi Dynasty fled to Los Angeles. Los Angeles as the capital of American popular culture provided this exiled community with a vigorous platform on which to produce a wide range of music, dance, poetry and video as a presentation of Iranian culture in the West. Exile, as Naficy describes, is “a process of perpetual becoming, involving separation from home, a period of liminality and in-betweenness that can be temporary or permanent, and incorporation into the dominant host society that can be partial or complete.”42 Concentrating on liminality, Naficy argues that exile culture articulates the aesthetic expression of loss, separation and nostalgia. In terms of the use of language, Persian as the native language for all Iranians in exile was spoken and presented on exile-specific television. In these television programmes, the hosts always addressed the audience with, for example, “you dear ones,” or “let’s watch the following messages together,” to create a sense of communal cohesion.43 With regard to visual images and expressions, television producers often employed footage of tortured and dead bodies, and ruined and destroyed buildings, to convey the sense of loss and solitude. In particular, images such as wilderness, seas, birds, and gardens often appeared as the logos of programmes. These images were also frequently applied to set up the backgrounds and foregrounds of the programmes. As Naficy explains, wilderness, sea, birds, and gardens act as icons, indexes, and symbols of the nature order and of Iranian cosmology. In exile, each of these signs heightens the experience of the other and of the sense, and each intensification in turn enlarges the grandeur of the other. . . . The intimate intensity of individual exiles’ feelings for their homeland is expressed through their identification with the immensity and timelessness of these signs of nature.44

The use in this case of the Persian language and special images may be considered, in terms of semiotics, to differentiate the exilic Iranian community from the mainstream American society and to transform visual and linguistic material into an ‘Iranian cultural forum’. For Naficy, this cultural forum can disseminate information, and express shared beliefs and values. More importantly, it assists the producers and viewers in the

42 Ibid., 8–9. 43 Ibid., 108–109. 44 Ibid., 160.

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construction of individual and collective identities in exile.45 In this sense, Behdad argues that television in Naficy’s study plays a ‘mediating role in transforming an exile community into an ethnicity’.46 The key word ‘ethnicity’ brings us back to our early discussions on the emergence and existence of Chinese-language media in New Zealand. Here, I would like to argue that ‘Chinese ethnicity’, as provisionally defined earlier, contains an additional, metaphorical meaning. Within the context of studying the relationship between Chinese media and the Chinese migrant community, it is affirmed that ‘Chineseness’ defines the boundaries between Chinese migrants and the core society of New Zealand, not only in the sense of racial differentiation and confrontation, but also with regard to Chinese people’s promulgation of their cultural notions and practices. Just like the Iranian television in Los Angeles, the New Zealand Chinese-language media frequently employ culturallyspecific emotional expressions to deliver scripts, sound and images, which are only meaningful to members of an audience who are familiar with those signs. With such sociocultural boundaries, the existence of Chinese media as a means of articulating semiotic expressions of a distinct Chinese community becomes an exercise in constructing the identity of a marginal culture in New Zealand. Features and Main Function of Chinese Media Primarily serving the minimally acculturated newcomers to the Chinese migrant community, Chinese media at first open up an alternative platform for these people to address some highly politicised issues which concern them. These issues may include parliamentary debates on immigration policy, migrants’ rights and access to New Zealand’s public services, and so forth. Given that China has been the leading source country for recent Chinese immigrants to the country, issues concerning China could also be popular topics in Chinese media during more recent years. Setting up special agendas to engage the Chinese audience, Chinese media can create instances of free zones independent of the dominant institutions of the core society of New Zealand. These media may enable and empower new Chinese migrants to make use of their own public sphere to express themselves and to facilitate discussions triggered by 45 Ibid., 114. 46 A. Behdad, “Review of The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles, by Hamid Naficy,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 3 (1996): 457.



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cultural differences and ethnic conflicts between New Zealand and ‘Greater China’. During such discussions facilitated by Chinese media, marginalised newcomers are able to communicate with other like-minded people, and thereby to forge networks among them. As a result, newcomers can strengthen their communal solidarity and may be mobilised to take actions for improving their social status in New Zealand, especially to fight racial prejudice against them. While reinforcing marginalised Chinese migrants’ self-consciousness of their political identity, Chineselanguage media can play a significant role in molding and retaining a distinct Chinese community in New Zealand. For many recent migrants originating from China, the motivation to participate in political discussions in Chinese media is particularly strong for two reasons. One is connected with their early stage of adaptation in the New Zealand society; as noted earlier, minimally acculturated newcomers are likely to be the victims of racial discrimination and therefore more sensitive about race-based issues than other earlier arrivals within the Chinese migrant community. The other reason may be attributed to recent PRC migrants’ allegiance to mainland China; many people probably regard all politicised ‘Chinese issues’ as provocation to Chinese nationals, since they are still not used to making a distinction between ‘ethnic Chinese’ and ‘Chinese national’, two related but different concepts. One piece of evidence is clearly presented in Lincoln Tan’s reflections on his own news reports, for instance, about Chinese students turning into prostitutes, for which Tan was accused by some Chinese from the mainland of being a ‘traitor’; their ground was that Tan wrote English for Westerners, but did not intend to ‘save the face of Chinese’.47 As well as networking Chinese migrants and publicising race-based issues, Chinese media are also important in providing practical information (e.g. shopping, housing, employment, social services) to assist newcomers in removing language and cultural barriers, and thereby help them to adjust to their new life in New Zealand. In contrast, the more acculturated early arrivals, with language difficulties or not, are less reliant on the information provided by Chinese media, since they have been interacting with the core society more widely and are thus more familiar with the social surroundings in New Zealand.

47 For details, see “True Loyalty Transcends the Bounds of Tokenism” published by the New Zealand Herald, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid= 10382826 (accessed on 29 March 2011).

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Homeland news in Chinese media also keeps Chinese migrants emotionally tied together, in this case via their shared countries of origin. At an unprecedented speed and scale, the latest technologies of satellite transmission and the Internet enable the New Zealand Chinese media to source and disseminate to their audience up-to-the-minute news of political and economic situations in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, the origins of the majority of new Chinese migrants to the country. Following Hong Kong’s return to China and with Taiwan now maintaining a special relationship with the mainland, it is not surprising that China often appears as the center of homeland news in the New Zealand Chinese media. Moreover, the same technological advances give the Chinese audience easy access to the most recent cultural products from the three regions, which are increasingly collaborative among them. These pan-Chinese cultural products along with news of ‘Greater China’ further reinforce new migrants’ sense of belonging to an imagined Chinese community. Within this imagined community and through the sharing of information circulated via Chinese media,48 newly arrived Chinese who may otherwise feel alienated can find a comfort zone. To sum up, in contemporary New Zealand, sociopolitical marginalisation would encourage new Chinese migrants, especially recent arrivals from mainland China, to use Chinese media to articulate their political voices, to source practical information for settlement, and to seek suitable social networks for obtaining emotional and psychological support. In an English-speaking foreign land, it is difficult for many new Chinese migrants to receive comfort from faraway relatives and friends back in their home country; many are lonely and helpless. Under such circumstances, Chinese-language media provide an arena for new members of the Chinese community to support and socialise with each other, but without necessarily seeing each other. Production of Chinese Media The above discussions lead to the conclusion that in order to run Chinese media successfully, it is crucial for Chinese media operators to be aware of the components and settlement patterns of Chinese migrants, which determine who the Chinese audience will be and what kind of common needs and interests they have. These needs and interests are the soil 48 B.R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).



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in which the diasporic Chinese media in New Zealand is nurtured and cultivated. The production of Chinese media is greatly influenced by both institutional and technical factors. At an institutional level, Chinese media are not dissimilar to New Zealand mainstream media in the sense of establishing and operating media as a type of profitable business. Unlike the Chinese-language radio and television in Australia and Canada that receive state-funding to serve an official policy of multiculturalism in the two countries,49 the Chinese media have to rely on revenue streams drawn from the Chinese audience and advertisers. Being private business ventures, New Zealand Chinese media have to follow the general rules of a market economy in order to survive. Much research on media economy has established that a media market is formed by content providers who offer information and entertainment as products, and by consumers, including media audience and advertisers.50 In the case of New Zealand Chinese media, they have to confront issues such as governmental regulations for businesses, industrial supply, allocation of resources, and competition from rivals in the same way as those English-language mainstream media. The major difference between Chinese and mainstream media is the size of the media market. Unlike mainstream media which are sustained by a much larger economy generated by mainstream New Zealanders, Chinese media depend on the development of the Chinese community economy to pursue advertising revenues. At the institutional level, another influence on the existence of Chinese media is New Zealand’s official policies towards the rise of ethnic media. Generally speaking, a liberal democratic government can provide a free environment, which tolerates and encourages the development of ethnic media. By contrast, a dictatorial regime may not permit the emergence of independent ethnic media; such a regime may use strict censorship and promulgate specific broadcasting standards to control firmly controversial 49 For example, C. Husband, ed., A Richer Vision: the Development of Ethnic Minority Media in Western Democracies (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1994); S. Cunningham and J. Sinclair, Floating Lives: the Media and Asian Diasporas (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000); M. Zhou, W. Chen, and G. Cai, “Chinese Language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada,” in Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications, and Commerce, ed. W. Sun (New York: Routledge, 2006), 42–74. 50 For example, F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980); H.I. Chyi and G. Sylvie, “The Medium Is Global, the Content Is Not: the Role of Geography in Online Newspaper Markets,” The Journal of Media Economics 14, no. 4 (2001): 231–248; A.B. Albarran, Media Economics: Understanding Markets, Industries and Concepts, 2nd ed. (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 2002).

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issues concerning ethnic affairs, even when those issues would otherwise be addressed by official media of the regime. New Zealand is a Western democratic country, in which mass media are largely free of government control. The Advertising Standards Authority, the New Zealand Press Council and the Broadcasting Standards Authority are the three main bodies with power to intervene in the provision of New Zealand media content as a consequence of formal complaints from the audience. Independent of such audience complaints, New Zealand media personnel work in accordance with principles of self-regulation compiled and recognised by the industry. However, except for the state-funded Maori Television, all ethnic media in New Zealand, including the Chinese media, in fact operate in a regulatory vacuum, since they do not appear as members of any organisation related to the three authoritative bodies mentioned above. In New Zealand, there is no institution equivalent to the National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada.51 The Chinese Media Bureau, a private business, is the only ethnic media body engaged with the Advertising Standards Authority. From 2003 onwards, the Chinese Media Bureau translated the Advertising Codes of Practice into the Chinese language and distributed it among all Chinese media companies, from which the response was rather scant. The Chinese audience was also not responsive to the Codes of Practice which regulates the New Zealand media industry in general. For instance, from 2003 until 2007 the Advertising Standards Authority received only one formal complaint about the Chinese newspapers from one Chinese reader.52 Hence, it may be argued that the Chinese media in New Zealand enjoy absolute freedom to develop and flourish, and to deliver any kind of content. The availability of financial resources plays a crucial role in constraining the production and operation of Chinese media, since it determines whether or not media owners can afford to purchase facilities (including specialised equipment) to set up their businesses, and to employ media professionals such as editors, reporters and programme producers. Funding can also constrain or permit appropriate technology for Chinese media content to be created and to be updated. While continuing 51 For more information about this Council, see http://www.nepmcc.ca/ (accessed 11 June 2011). 52 The information released here is based on my interview with the director of the Chinese Media Bureau in November 2007, who noted that Chinese people did not like their names to be publicised for reasons possibly associated with cultural sensitivity, but publicising name(s) was an essential part of the handling of a formal complaint by the Advertising Standards Authority.



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to benefit from satellite-transmitted radio and television programmes from ‘Greater China’, New Zealand Chinese media have moved into the digitised age, with computers and the Internet becoming more powerful and sophisticated. As textual and audio-visual information can now be delivered promptly within the Chinese migrant community and between the homeland and New Zealand, there is increasing competition among Chinese media companies for media content, human resources, audiences and advertisers. Construction and Reception of Chinese Media Messages In order to conceptualise the construction of Chinese media messages and the reception of Chinese audience, I will use the framework of ‘discourse analysis’, developed by Fairclough.53 He highlights the relationship between the mass media and other parts of the network of social institutions they operate within: their relationship to ordinary life (the ‘lifeworld’) and the family on the one hand, their relationship to business and commerce on the other. . . . I see the mass media as operating within a social system, which makes it important not to isolate particular aspects such as these two tendencies from the way the media are shaped by, and in turn contribute to shaping, the system overall.54

Fairclough’s framework for analysing a communicative event emphasises an examination of the relationships between media content, media production and the process of an audience’s comprehension of media content, and between these and the wider social practices within which they are embedded.55 Derived from Fairclough’s framework, my modified version, shown in Figure 2.1, illustrates how to analyse the content of Chinese media and its reception by a Chinese audience. In terms of a critical linguistic approach, the Chinese text can be perceived as “built out of choices from within available systems of options in vocabulary, grammar, and so forth. . . . [T]he linguistic choices that are made in texts can carry ideological meaning.”56 From this point, certain texts in Chinese media reflect how sociopolitically marginalised Chinese migrants choose to use particular tones and vocabulary of the Chinese language, since the audience may

53 N. Fairclough, Media Discourse (London: E. Arnold, 1995). 54 Ibid., 12. 55 Ibid., 59. 56 Fairclough, Media Discourse, 25.

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Figure 2.1. An analytical framework for examining New Zealand Chinese media.

have a tendency to accept certain forms of linguistic expression in a manner molded by the sociocultural reality of New Zealand for Chinese migrants. As for visual and audible aspects of Chinese media, the patterns of Chinese migrants’ adaptation and acculturation in New Zealand can also shape certain modes of presentation. Here my argument is intended to cover two perspectives. One refers to the fact that Chinese media play a role in retaining Chinese cultural heritage through distributing Chinese cultural products for entertainment, such as popular movies and music, and organising Chinese cultural events such as erhu concerts and brushpainting exhibitions, even if they only appear as advertisements for promoting certain private businesses. The other perspective deals with the inner structure of the Chinese migrant community. Those who are minimally acculturated in New Zealand and comprise the main audience of Chinese media may greatly influence what material is to be presented and how. In more recent years China has been the leading source country for newcomers to the New Zealand Chinese community; the content and editorial style of Chinese media are likely to reflect this.



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Furthermore, different stages of adaptation in New Zealand can influence the reception of Chinese media among the audience as well. Depending on the extent of acculturation in New Zealand, people of different sub-groups within the Chinese migrant community may have various attitudes towards the available Chinese media. For more acculturated Chinese migrants who have a wider social network beyond the Chinese community, it would be optional to seek information or to communicate with others through the Chinese media; whereas, for the less acculturated transnationals, regular and constant consumption of the Chinese media may keep these people’s continual attachment with the homeland, but may further reinforce their sense of belonging to an isolated minority group in New Zealand. In summary, in contemporary New Zealand, ethnic Chinese media exist as a form of alternative media and primarily serve the needs and interests of the sociopolitically marginalised newcomers to the Chinese migrant community. This conceptual framework will be used in the following chapters to examine the recent PRC Chinese migrants through analysing the New Zealand Chinese media. However, prior to exploring contemporary issues, it is vitally important for us to understand the past—the history of Chinese immigration to New Zealand and the early Chinese-language newspapers in the country.

Chapter Three

Revisiting the history of New Zealand Chinese and early Chinese newspapers Chinese Immigration: From Sojourners to Settlers The first documented Chinese immigrant to New Zealand was Appo Hocton (c. 1821–1920), who was born in China and left the country at the age of about nine. After working as a cabin-boy and a steward on various British ships, he landed in Nelson in 1842 and stayed on. Ten years later, his application for naturalisation was granted, as he was by then a prosperous businessman married to a European wife.1 But it was not until the discovery of gold in central Otago in 1861 that the history of Chinese immigration to New Zealand really began to take shape. In 1866, the first organised group of Chinese arrived in New Zealand from Victoria, Australia, at the invitation of the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce, to rework abandoned claims and deserted mineshafts. Similar to their forerunners as gold-seekers in the United States, Canada and Australia, the Chinese arriving in New Zealand came large­ly from the villages of Canton, Southern China. Under the shadow of the declining Imperial Qing, they were originally rural artisans and hapless small farmers who were desperate because of paucity of land and heavy taxation. Over the years, they had also undergone many social disturbances caused by famine, banditry, and local militia riots. The two Opium Wars (1840–1842, 1858–1860) and the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) pushed them further to the edge of despair. For the early Chinese emigrants, going abroad was one practical way to acquire capital or just to survive. They stayed in Gum Shan (Cantonese pronunciation of ‘jin shan’, which literally means ‘gold mountain’) as sojourners and therefore tended to live a frugal life as confined solitary males, since they expected to return to their home villages with adequate gold for a relatively comfortable retirement. As Ip notes, “the presence of the Chinese in Otago was just part of the much larger global picture of the huge Chinese emigration in the mid-nineteenth 1 C.B. Malone, “Hocton, Appo,” Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 1990, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/1h31/1 (accessed October 1, 2010).

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century, with more than two million people leaving the homeland in search of better luck overseas.”2 The history of early Chinese immigration to New Zealand has been narrated in various ways from both Chinese and non-Chinese perspectives. Murphy gives a comprehensive list of these works in his compendium of the bibliographical references to archival and library resources on the study of the Chinese in New Zealand.3 Not yet unveiled archival material and family records such as letters and photo albums along with private memories will presumably contribute more pieces to the jigsaw of Chinese experiences within the newly formed white colony. New Zealand became part of the British Empire as a result of the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840, which at least according to one interpretation of the English version transferred New Zealand sovereignty from the Maori to the British Crown. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, architect of the New Zealand Company—‘the agent of the State for colonizing N.Z.’,4 had plans for New Zealand to “establish a ‘Better Britain’ or a ‘Britain of the South’ in which English class distinctions were preserved but where industrious artisans and farmers could more easily work their way towards prosperity and respectability”.5 Later, during the Long Depression (1879–96), Fabian Socialists and Liberal reformers such as William Pember Reeves endeavoured to lay down the foundation of an egalitarian New Zealand, ‘God’s Own Country’, with protected labour rights and social welfare. Within this specific historical context of building a ‘working man’s paradise’ to evolve into an ideal and extended British nation, a transient Chinese community consisting of poorly educated male sojourners without Christian belief and knowledge of the English language was considered a threat to the progress of colonial New Zealand. On the other hand, Curthoys has observed that the history of Australia’s Asian migration ‘happened within rather than after a history of colonization’,6 which was also what happened in New Zealand. Unfortunately, existing scholarly effort has paid little attention to the early history of New Zealand from the point of view of ethnic minority settlers, 2 Ip, “Chinese New Zealanders,” 163. 3 Murphy, “Unfolding History.” 4 As quoted in P. Burns, Fatal Success: a History of the New Zealand Company (Auckland: Heinemann Reed, 1989), 167. 5 M. King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003), 172. 6 As cited in B. Moloughney, “Translating Culture: Rethinking New Zealand’s Chineseness,” in East by South: China in the Australasian Imagination, ed. C. Ferrall, P. Millar, and K. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 394.



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including the Chinese, who have also made significant contributions to the social fabric and structure of the country.7 Furthermore, even within the Chinese settlers there was diversity in cultural norm, family structure and social economy arising from their origins in China (‘Qiaoxiang’ or sojourners’ home). As Chan indicates, an approach that recognises this “moves from an emphasis on the Chinese as simply victims of white racism and discriminatory restrictive immigration policies, to focus on the Chinese and their communities as subjects with historical agency.”8 With those notions outlined above, I intend to provide an overview of the early Chinese immigration to New Zealand throughout four main periods: toleration (1866–1880), restriction and exclusion (1881–1939), humanitarianism (1939–1947) and assimilation (1948–1970), which have been defined by Murphy according to immigration policies which shaped the Chinese community in this country.9 Alexander Don’s Roll of the Chinese10 documented in detail the origin of the Cantonese gold-seekers in New Zealand, predominantly from Panyu (番禺) and Zengcheng (增城).11 Many came under the so-called ‘credit ticket system’;12 they first arrived in Otago and some later moved to the West Coast. Those in the Otago goldfields have received significant scholarly attention. As Ng notes, in order to sustain the gold rush economy impaired by the departure of thousands of European miners, the Otago Provincial Council promised that the Chinese would receive ‘the same

7 Ballantyne, “Writing out Asia;” Murphy, “Unfolding History;” O’Connor, “Keeping New Zealand White.” 8 H. Chan, “Qiaoxing and the Diversity of Chinese Settlement in Australia and New Zealand,” in Chinese Transnational Networks, ed. C.B. Tan (London: Routledge, 2007), 167. 9 Murphy, Guide to laws and policies, 6–9. 10 Alexander Don (1857–1934) was a Presbyterian missionary preaching among the Chinese gold-miners from 1879 to 1913. In his time, he was the most important figure documenting the New Zealand Chinese community through detailed writings about the Chinese and extensive photographs taken of them. In his Roll of the Chinese, Don recorded 3,500 Chinese he met in the goldfields; the information covers a wide range of aspects such as their age, number of years of residence, occupation, clan, home village and movements. For a concise biography of Alexander Don, see J. Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol. 2 (Dunedin: Otago Heritage Books, 1995), 136–191. 11  H. Chan, “Zengcheng, 增城, and Its People in New Zealand,” in Zengcheng New Zealanders: History for the 80th Anniversary of the Tung Jung Association of NZ, ed. H. Chan (Katoomba, NSW: Echo Point Press for the Tung Jung Association of New Zealand, 2007), 12. 12 The passage for a Chinese gold-seeker to travel to New Zealand was advanced to him by a sponsor, who could be a kinsman or a Chinese broker in New Zealand. After arrival, he would work and repay the loan with interest.

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protection’ as Europeans upon their arrival.13 Between 1873 and 1885, the Chinese represented about 40 percent of Otago’s miners and produced about 30 percent of the province’s gold.14 Over 200 archaeological sites in Otago, found and recorded between 1977 and 1987, reveal the Chinese people’s way of life, their diet, work and recreation. They consumed Chinese tea, rice, dried fish and vegetables and so on, imported by Chinese merchants, and also large quantities of European preserved and manufactured foods, such as jams, pickles, relishes and Worcestershire sauce. They had imported Chinese accoutrements, but quickly adopted European miners’ working clothes and boots and Western manufactured tools. They smoked opium and drank Chinese-made alcohol, but also enjoyed brandy and beer.15 Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, local newspapers in the Otago goldfields reported each year that the Chinese camps received many European visitors to their New Year celebrations with flags, lanterns, firecrackers and food.16 The period of restriction began in 1881 with the New Zealand government introducing a tonnage ratio to limit the number of Chinese passengers on ships and an entry poll tax of £10 for newcomers; the tonnage ratio and poll tax were raised in 1888 and 1896. In 1907, an English language test was imposed on Chinese immigrants when they arrived in New Zealand. Those measures were intended clearly to control and reduce the Chinese population, though in any case it seemed to offer little threat of natural growth even before the implementation of the above legislation. This was because of a highly unbalanced gender ratio among the Chinese; as the New Zealand census shows in Table 3.1, there were thousands of men, but fewer than ten women in the Chinese community from 1867 to 1881. New Zealand did not prohibit the immigration of Chinese women in the same way as the Page Act of 1875 did in the United States.17 A plausible explanation for the absence of Chinese women is the Chinese 13 J. Ng, “The Sojourner Experience: the Cantonese Goldseekers in New Zealand, 1865– 1901,” in Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003), 20–21. 14 Ibid., 15. 15 N.A. Ritchie, “Traces of the Past: Archaeological Insights into the New Zealand Chinese Experience in Southern New Zealand,” in Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003), 45. 16 H. Johnson, “Performing Identity, Past and Present: Chinese Cultural Performance, New Year Celebrations, and the Heritage Industry,” in East by South: China in the Australasian Imagination, ed. C. Ferrall, P. Millar, and K. Smith (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 221. 17 Chan, “Qiaoxing and the Diversity of Chinese Settlement,” 160.



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Table 3.1. Chinese population in New Zealand, 1867–1971 census (Murphy, Guide to laws and policies, 336). Year

Male

Female

Total

1867 1871 1874 1878 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1936 1945 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971

1213 2637 4814 4424 4995 4527 4426 3773 2885 2515 2542 2017 2993 2927 2432 3414 3633 4026 4913 5700 7025

6 4 2 9 9 15 18 86 78 55 88 130 273 447 511 1526 2090 2705 3611 4583 5793

1219 2641 4816 4433 5004 4542 4444 3859 2963 2570 2630 2147 3266 3374 2943 4940 5723 6731 8524 10283 12818

attitude towards immigration to New Zealand; both Chinese men and women were content with the existing arrangement in which the latter stayed behind to maintain their household. Thus, the making of a Chinese community consisting predominantly of male sojourners was attributable to factors within both New Zealand and China. The New Zealand census showed that the Chinese population began to drop significantly from 1896 onwards and reached its lowest point in 1916. This decrease was likely due to the impact of the entry poll tax, which was raised to £100 in 1896, a considerable amount of money at that time.18

18 In 1896, the average income of the New Zealand population was about £41 per head for all ages and both sexes, and £91 per head for breadwinners; the average earnings per inhabitant in other rich countries was about £40 in Australia, £39 in the United States, £33 in the United Kingdom, £32 in Denmark, and £27 in France (Department of Statistics, The New Zealand Official Yearbook 1896 [Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1896], 174).

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With the decline of gold mining, this period saw the Chinese disperse into the urban and suburban areas, mainly of the North Island.19 They appeared predominantly in three occupations, namely, market-gardening, greengrocery and laundry work, which all required intensive labour input. Therefore several Chinese men, usually brothers or other kinsmen, ran a business collaboratively, worked long hours and lived frugally, in order to save and send remittances back to their families in China. In the eyes of European New Zealanders, especially the unionists, their businesses operated outside the rules of fair competition. This may explain the fact that under the First Liberal government (1891–1921), the Old Age Pensions Act 1898 excluded the Chinese, whether naturalised or not, from eligibility for an pension. In 1908, that government stopped the naturalisation of Chinese aliens, who became even more vulnerable under the permit system introduced in 1920, which empowered Customs officers to deny any nonBritish entry or re-entry to ‘White New Zealand’ without justification. New Zealand’s exclusion of the Chinese was simultaneous with the surge of Chinese nationalism after the Republic of China was established in 1912. The nationalists under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, and later Chiang Kai-shek, aimed to create a strong and prosperous Chinese nation; the revolution in China was evidently appealing to many Chinese overseas including those in New Zealand. The political circumstances of the 1920s both in New Zealand and China contributed to the reinforcement of their consciousness of Chinese identity, which was further consolidated by the Japanese invasion commenced in Manchuria in 1931. As the invasion intensified, it became urgent for patriotic Chinese in New Zealand to unite to resolve the political division between the Chee Kung Tong and Kuomingtang (KMT)20 and to bring together various organisations based on different clans and home counties.21 This led to the first New Zealand

19 M. Taher, “The Asians,” in Immigrants in New Zealand (Palmerston North: Massey University, 1970), 46–48. 20 The New Zealand branch of Chee Kung Tong or the Chinese Masonic Society was founded in 1907 and supported the Beiyang Government (1912–1928). The New Zealand branch of the Tong Meng Hui (Chinese Revolutionary League) may have been founded in 1910 and was transformed into the KMT in 1913. Ostensibly, the KMT’s reunification of China in 1928 ended the conflict between the two organisations about the legitimacy of the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the friction caused by difference in social classes among them may still have remained, since the KMT members came from a more intellectual background. For more details, see N. Murphy and K. Wong, Chee Kung Tong: the Hung League in New Zealand (Wellington: Alexander Turnbull Library, 1991); J. Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol. 3 (Dunedin: Otago Heritage Books, 1999), 163–170. 21 Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, 163–170.



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Chinese Association (NZCA)22 national conference held in Wellington in 1937; working closely with the Chinese Consul, the NZCA played the central role in coordinating and collecting the ‘save-China’ donations throughout the time of war. The war also led to a new era in New Zealand’s immigration policy towards the Chinese. By 1939, the Japanese armies had reached Canton and consequently threatened the home villages of the New Zealand Chinese. The Labour Premier Peter Fraser expressed great sympathy for the deteriorating situation in China and implemented a policy of issuing war refugee permits to family members of the Chinese in New Zealand. In 1947, the Fraser Government further announced that these Chinese refugees, mainly women and young children, were entitled to be granted permanent residence. Ip notes that “a total of 1,323 Chinese gained residence this way.”23 The arrival of these newcomers made a dramatic change to the unbalanced gender ratio among the Chinese; the New Zealand Chinese community was quickly transformed from male sojourners into settled families. Through interviewing New Zealand Chinese on the subject of ra­cial discrimination, Fong and Greif both found that New Zealanders had changed their attitudes significantly since the Second World War.24 For Chinese, the peace and prosperity of post-war New Zealand was a haven in contrast to China; their homeland suffered constantly from the horrors of the civil war (1945–1949) and later more chaos as the result of the communists’ victory. To many people, the most devastating thing was the communists’ land reform, “which destroyed the Cantonese sojourner base by the confiscation of land and persecution of sojourner families as landlords and bourgeoise”.25 While the Chinese were facing hurdles to return to China, the New Zealand government began implementing an assimilation policy towards all immigrants. In consequence, the late 1950s witnessed many cultural changes among the Chinese in New Zealand: Chinese festivals such as New Year, Ch’ing-ming, the Winter Solstice, the Dragon Boat and the Moon Festival were celebrated in only some private

22  The Chinese Association was first established in 1909, but only lasted until 1924 (ibid., 156). 23 Ip, “Chinese New Zealanders,” 182. 24 Fong, The Chinese in New Zealand; S.W. Greif, The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1974). 25 J. Ng, “The First Four Generations” (Paper presented at Rising Dragon Soaring Banana International Conference, University of Auckland, July 17–19, 2009).

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homes;26 the younger generation established a new custom of exchanging Christmas cards and gifts;27 children spoke English more fluently than Chinese28 and learned western culture (girls preferred ballet dancing, boys piano accordion, violin or other instruments).29 With the passing of the older generation, younger Chinese had developed a greater sense of assimilating to and participating in the New Zealand way of life and were moving into professional occupations such as medicine, engineering and accountancy; they were drawing away from the Chinese enclave formed by their parents’ market gardens, greengroceries and laundries. A public opinion poll in 1970 showed that over 90 percent of the Chinese in New Zealand under 59 years old regarded New Zealand as their ‘home’ without qualification,30 and nearly all Chinese under 40 were almost completely assimilated.31 These people were not literate in the Chinese language and lacked knowledge of or interest in events in China. Early Chinese Newspapers Given that early Chinese emigrants mostly originated from an illiterate or semi-literate rural background in China and were scattered throughout the New Zealand goldfields, it would be unimaginable for them to run a newspaper and maintain a sizable readership. According to Ng and Murphy,32 as far as can be established, the earliest Chinese-language newspaper produced in New Zealand was Kam Lei Tong I Po, which was first issued on 12 May 1883 by Alexander Don and appeared as a handwritten sheet. Kam Lei Tong was the rented premises where Don did his preaching; ‘I Po’ means newspaper. In the 1880s and the 1890s, there were some Chinese-language newspapers and magazines from overseas such as the Chinese Australian Herald (广益华报), the Chinese Illustrated News (华图新报), and the Chinese Globe Magazine (万国公报), circulating among the Chinese in New Zealand.33 The early 20th century saw the New Zealand-based Chinese newspapers become a significant part of Chinese community life. By that time 26 Fong, The Chinese in New Zealand, 51. 27 Ibid., 64. 28 Ibid., 83. 29 Ibid., 94. 30 Greif, The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand, 92. 31  Ibid., 161. 32 Ng and Murphy, “Chinese.” 33 Ibid.



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many Chinese in New Zealand had moved to urban areas to make a living, which made it easy to distribute Chinese newspapers; more importantly, a new generation of educated Chinese had grown up to form a stable readership. Chan notes that the first modern school in Zengcheng, the home county of many Chinese in New Zealand, was established in 1907, but there were twenty modern schools in Zengcheng in 1911. In these schools, the curriculum covered the Chinese language combined with Confucian ethics, and also hygiene and sports; nationalism was an important element of the curriculum, with children learning about the KMT and the changing political situation in China.34 Before the outbreak of the SinoJapanese War (1937–1945), it was normal for the Chinese to leave their young children, whether born in China or New Zealand, to stay in China to receive proper Chinese education in such schools. Those who came later, and those who returned to New Zealand formed the main cohort of those who read Chinese newspapers, which provided homeland-oriented content, especially about national politics. Between 1900 and the 1949 victory of the communist revolution that ended the possibility of Chinese sojourners’ return, there were four influential Chinese-language newspapers circulating within the New Zealand Chinese community. Only one of these newspapers survived after 1949; until 1961 it was pro-KMT in its political reporting of the conflicts between Taiwan and the mainland. After 1961, the contents of this newspaper became New Zealand-oriented because of pressure from the New Zealand government, and remained so until 1972 when the newspaper closed. Over several decades, these early Chinese newspapers preserved invaluable information, which revealed the New Zealand-based Chinese sojourners’ connections with the turbulent politics in China and their gradual transformation from transient transnationals into assimilated settlers in the South Pacific. For contemporary readers, these newspapers together stand as a unique source for the social history of the Chinese in New Zealand. Given the scope of this part of the book, the following section will provide only sketches of the four early Chinese newspapers. Man Sing Times (民声报) From a journalistic point of view, the first New Zealand Chinese-lan­guage newspaper to appear in the 20th century was the Man Sing Times (民声 报, or ‘People’s Voice Times’), which was launched by the KMT branch

34 Chan, “Zengcheng,” 7–9.

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(a) Man Sing Times

(c) New Zealand Weekly News

(b) Q-Sing Times

(d) New Zealand Chinese Growers’ Monthly Journal

Figure 3.1. Cover pages of four early Chinese newspapers.



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in Wellington in July 1921,35 shortly after Sun Yat-sen was elected as the ‘extraordinary president’ and established his militarist government in Canton in May 1921. The content of the first issue of the Man Sing Times begins with a portrait of Sun Yat-sen in full-dress uniform, surrounded by a congratulatory message on his new presidential role in the Republic of China. This was followed by one page of photographic portraits of the nineteen directors of the Man Sing Times and another page of a group photograph of some members of the KMT branch in New Zealand; most of whom were already depicted as directors of the newspaper. The next page was a cartoon indicating the KMT’s leading role in China’s national politics in the combat between the rival Chinese governments in Beijing and Canton. After these, the following page was a special editorial note in English proclaiming “The Man Sing Times is an official organ of the Chinese republicans in New Zealand and Australia, and also circulates throughout America, the Straits Settlements, the Pacific Island [sic], Hong Kong, Canton and other parts of China” (TMST, Vol. No. 1, July 1921). The Man Sing Times was priced at 6d per issue and published every ten days from July to December 1921. It became irregular between January and June 1922, and finally closed in October of that year. A total of 31 issues were published with from 28 to 40 pages, except for one issue containing 15 pages. This newspaper was stencilled and handwritten in classic Chinese without punctuation and was laid out in a classic Chinese written style, which ran from top to bottom and from right to left. There was no Chinese typesetting facility in New Zealand at that time, so every single Chinese character and drawing had to be copied by hand on stencil paper, and printed by cyclostyle machines. The content of the Man Sing Times was almost totally dominated by the KMT’s notices, telegraphic news from China and related political commentaries, which focused on the latest military moves by the Canton Government and its condemnation of the Beiyang Government. The paper also had a small section entitled ‘News of This Island’ reporting Chinese activities in New Zealand and up-to-date market prices for vegetables and fruits as well as gold. There was a small literature section at the end of each issue, which did not have a political focus. It is noticeable that advertisers of this paper included not only Chinese importers and shop keepers, but also 35 The earliest 20th-century Chinese publication in New Zealand was the annual report of the very first Chinese Association in 1911. This report was printed in China, and contained the association’s aims, activities and the names of founding members (Ng and Murphy, “Chinese”).

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European New Zealanders in businesses such as tailoring, bootmaking, home maintenance, photographic studios, and auctioneers for vegetables and fruits. Such contents suggest that the Man Sing Times primarily served the purpose of the KMT’s propaganda to the Chinese sojourners in New Zealand, some of whom were enjoying a middle-class standard of living in their host country. Q-Sing Times (屋伦侨声) ‘Q-sing’ was the Cantonese pronunciation of ‘qiao sheng’, which literally means “the voice of Chinese sojourners”. The pronunciation of ‘Auckland’ in Cantonese is more like ‘Oak-lun’, while it is ‘Wu-lun’ in Mandarin. The first issue of the Q-Sing Times was published in November 1938 with the Chinese title Wulun qiaosheng (屋伦侨声 or ‘Voice of the Overseas Chinese in Auckland’). In May 1939 it adopted its English name Q-Sing Times because of the requirement to register with the New Zealand government. As its original name indicated, the Q-Sing Times was mainly distributed within Auckland. During the Sino-Japanese War, the New Zealand Chinese Association (NZCA)’s Auckland branch ran the Q-Sing Times as its official newspaper, which was published every fortnight, on quarto paper. The newspaper contains around 20 pages and was handwritten and stencilled. The content was laid out in a classic Chinese written style, but the language was now vernacular Chinese. It contained editorials and telegraphic news of the warfare in China, reports of activities of the Chinese in New Zealand and their commentaries on the warfare. The advertisements included Chinese importers’ shops and European New Zealanders’ businesses including auctioneers for vegetables and fruits, florists, clothing suppliers, dyers and dry cleaners, car distributors and mechanics. In addition, the Q-Sing Times had a literature supplement ‘sheng guang (声光)’,36 which published patriotic poems and prose, as well as riddles and short stories, all relevant to the war. To contemporary readers, the most impressive part of the Q-Sing Times may be its special section publishing the details of people who made ‘save-China donations’ and also those who refused; those details included people’s names, the amount of money and goods donated, and the names of their home villages in Canton and their businesses in New Zealand. To humiliate publicly those who refused to make a donation, the newspaper

36 ‘sheng guang’ means ‘voice and light’ in Chinese.



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even called on the Chinese community to boycott them. As Ip comments, “in a tight-knit community where most people were related through intermarriages and kinship ties, and where the majority of the members were engaged in similar occupations (either market gardening or fruit shops)”,37 the list of donors’ names was an extremely powerful means of consolidating a patriotic Chinese community and promoting a positive atmosphere for more generous donations in future. In the late 1930s, seventy years after their first arrival in New Zealand, the Chinese still identified themselves as Chinese only, as is evident from news reports and editorials in the Q-Sing Times, which used terms like ‘our country’ and ‘our government’ when referring to China and the KMT Government. When the terms ‘we’, ‘us’ ‘my dear sisters’, etc., were applied in these texts, the authors meant to identify themselves with their compatriots in China and possibly all patriotic overseas Chinese, who wished to save China from the Japanese invasion.38 Two important figures made substantial contributions to running the Q-Sing Times. One was Y.S. Chau, the supervisor of the Q-Sing Times, who was then the pastor of the Chinese Presbyterian Church of Auckland. Chau wrote over ninety percent of the editorials for the Q-Sing Times for two years, and they were judged to be of high quality both in content and in language.39 The other notable contributor was Dan Chan, the actual organiser of the Q-Sing Times, who also acted as the executive editor, copyist, translator, and an initiator of the literature supplement. The editor(s) still faced the difficulty of laboriously stencilling and printing the newspaper. Dan Chan told an interviewer that it normally took at least an hour for him to copy one page and he had to copy everything himself from the first to the last page, including the advertisements.40 In today’s digital world, it is hard to imagine the amount of effort needed to produce such publications. In later years, Chan was also involved in running another important Chinese newspaper, the New Zealand Chinese Growers Monthly Journal (qiaonong 侨农), which will be discussed below. Who financed the Q-Sing Times remains unclear, but evidence shows that donations, advertisement revenue and subscription fees were significant sources. He implies that the newspaper probably received additional

37 Ip, “Chinese media in New Zealand,” 180. 38 Y. He, “A Study of a New Zealand Chinese Periodical—the Q-sing Times” (master’s thesis, University of Auckland, 1992), 51. 39 Vogel, cited in ibid., 37. 40 Ibid.

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support from the Chinese Consul to New Zealand, or even directly from the KMT.41 The Q-Sing Times was closed in 1946. New Zealand Chinese Weekly News (中国大事周刊) While the Q-Sing Times was circulating in Auckland, the NZCA’s national headquarters in Wellington also published a newspaper, the New Zealand Chinese Weekly News (zhongguo dashi zhoukan 中国大事周刊). Between September 1937 and July 1946, a total of 379 issues of this weekly were published and distributed within the Chinese community nationwide. Each issue contained twenty or thirty plus pages, on quarto paper, and was also laboriously stenciled and handwritten in vernacular Chinese, but laid out in a classic written style. Its main content was similar to that of the Q-Sing Times in terms of commentaries and telegraphic news focusing on the warfare in China, reports of the New Zealand Chinese community, and advertisements for Chinese importers’ shops as well as European New Zealanders’ businesses in auctioneering for vegetables and fruits, insurance, and clothing. However, this weekly did not have a literature supplement. According to its editorial announcement, this weekly began charging readers a fee of one Chinese dollar from its second issue; the revenue was used to cover the cost of printing and to contribute more donations to support China’s war efforts. During the period from 1938 to the end of the Second World War, the New Zealand Chinese Weekly News was used by the leadership of the NZCA to keep in touch with membership across the country;42 in this way, the NZCA’s aim of raising money for the China Relief Fund among the Chinese across New Zealand was best achieved. Throughout the war the NZCA imposed a mandatory weekly donation on every able-bodied Chinese male in the country. This led to a total donation of £174,149 by the New Zealand Chinese from 1937 to 1944, which per capita ranked the second highest among all Chinese overseas across the world.43 New Zealand Chinese Growers’ Monthly Journal (侨农) Published between July 1949 and August 1972 (700 copies per issue, 165 issues in total), the New Zealand Chinese Growers’ Monthly Journal was the

41 Ibid., 25. 42 Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, 176. 43 Ip, “Chinese New Zealanders,” 180.



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longest-lived newspaper within the Chinese community in the country. According to its final issue, it “first appeared in 1942 in the form of a booklet printed by gestetner” (NZCGMJ, Vol. 19 No. 165, 1972). The Growers’ Journal was the official organ of the Dominion Federation of N.Z. Chinese Commercial Growers, which later changed its name to the “New Zealand Chinese Commercial Growers’ Association”. The organisation was initially established in January 1943 with support from the then Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser in order to secure its supply of fresh produce to American forces in the Pacific. By offering three hundred pounds, the government encouraged the organisation to “unite the market gardeners and ensure the exchange of information”.44 In its second issue, published on 1 August 1949, the Growers’ Journal clearly proclaimed its purposes, Consider the Chinese growers in New Zealand. There is a large number of them, comprising almost half the population of Chinese sojourners. . . . They are scattered everywhere in both the South and North Islands. Because they are isolated from one another by remote mountains and rivers, are busy at work, and for other reasons, they find it difficult to exchange information among themselves. . . . At the Seventh National Assembly of the Federation, a decision was made to establish this journal. It aims to increase communication among growers in every place to improve the performance of the association. Meanwhile, it will also inculcate technological knowledge about agricultural production, inspire growers to raise their standard of living, and expound and spread the culture of our nation.

The Growers’ Journal was mostly monthly, sometimes bimonthly, and was distributed to the members of the Federation of N.Z. Chinese Commercial Growers and Chinese fruit shops nationwide. Similar in size to today’s A2 paper, the Growers’ Journal was printed on both sides and usually contained 4 to 16 pages. It was laid out in the familiar classic Chinese written style. The language was vernacular Chinese, but its grammar and style contained many elements of classic Chinese, for instance, ‘wu ren wei zhi (吾人, 谓之)’ being used instead of ‘wo men (we 我们) shuo (say 说)’. Initially handwritten and stenciled, the Growers’ Journal was typeset and printed after 1953 (NZCGMJ, Vol. 19 No. 165, 1972). With a strong sentiment in favour of the KMT Government in Taiwan, the Growers’ Journal used the calendar of the Republic of China to chronicle each issue. For its funding, the Growers’ Journal relied mainly on advertising revenues and donations from the Chinese community, which received free 44 C.P. Sedgwick, “The Politics of Survival: a Social History of the Chinese in New Zealand” (PhD diss., University of Canterbury, 1982), 413–414.

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copies of the periodical. While the Q-Sing Times and the New Zealand Chinese Weekly News mainly advertised Chinese shops in Auckland and Wellington, the Growers’ Journal had Chinese advertisers throughout New Zealand. Although most of the shopkeepers still operated traditional Chinese grocery stores, which primarily supplied imported ingredients for Chinese cooking and Chinese medicine, some also sold imported chinaware, embroidery, stationery, and even Chinese-language novels and records. From 1949 to 1972, advertisements in the Growers’ Journal clearly indicate that the Chinese community was widely engaged with the core society of New Zealand, since the European advertisers represented not only a wide range of businesses associated with market gardening, such as machinery, insecticide, fertilizer and seeds, but car distributors, catering and insurance as well. Prior to 1st October 1961, the Growers’ Journal contained columns of international news including reports about Taiwan and the mainland, which were probably sourced from Taiwan, given their style of Chinese language and negative tone towards the communist regime. For instance, a news item in February, 1954, was entitled “Taiwan Welcoming the Return of Anti-Communist P.O.W.”; it stated that 14,000 prisoners of war of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army detained in South Korea were welcome to stay in Taiwan as their ‘free homeland’, where they would be provided opportunities of work and education (NZCGMJ, Vol. 5 No. 7, 1954). Another report, in February 1960, called for communist pilots to rebel and fly to Taiwan. Taiwan’s airforce headquarters announced seven pledges to them, including a guarantee of personal security and free choices to work and study. A large sum of gold was also offered as a reward (NZCGMJ, Vol. VII No. 54, 1960).45 After October 1961 the newspaper was redesigned, and foreign news, mainly about the two rival Chinese governments across the Taiwan Strait, was eliminated because of pressure applied from the New Zealand government’s assimilation policy.46 Local news in the Growers’ Journal chiefly covered activities of the New Zealand Chinese, and also released notices from the Dominion Federation of N.Z. Chinese Commercial Growers. After the redesign of the newspaper in November 1961, it still carried reports about the New Zealand Chinese, but

45 Depending on the model of aircraft brought into Taiwan by the pilot, rewards ranged from one hundred to four hundred liangs of gold. Liang is a Chinese weight measurement; one liang is equivalent to 1.7637 ounces. 46 Ng and Murphy, “Chinese.”



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concentrated on providing information related to techniques and knowledge of market gardening. For the Chinese in New Zealand, the Growers’ Journal played an important secondary role in maintaining Chinese language and culture in the country. One significant piece of evidence is that, between August 1950 and February 1952, the Growers’ Journal published a series of Chinese language lessons entitled ‘Movement for Chinese Literacy’ (NZCGMJ, from Vol. 2 No. 1, 1950). Figure 2.1 is a photocopy of Lesson 1 and Lesson 2. In addition to these Chinese language lessons, to further promote Chinese language and culture, the Growers’ Journal also began to encourage readers to contribute apolitical articles, immediately after its redesign of content. As a result, there appeared in the journal an increased number of short passages of literary writing, mainly prose, including introductions to the history and geography of China. Despite being a Chinese newspaper, the Growers’ Journal sometimes carried moderate length English texts as public notices and advertisements for European New Zealanders’ businesses. Such editorial arrangements clearly served the needs of a changed Chinese readership that had increasingly become bilingual. While the influential Growers’ Journal was published from 1949 to 1972, there were some other small-scale bilingual newsletters also circulating among the New Zealand Chinese. These included the Chinese Anglican, Auckland Chinese Hall, the Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre Newsletter,47 and the Seyip Youth, a monthly publication run by the Seyip Association.48 In 1970, the Seyip Association was involved in publishing the cookery book Kiwi Chopsticks, the first local book to promote Chinese cooking, which “paved the way for more Chinese restaurants and takeaways”.49 Rethinking Early Chinese Newspapers The early Chinese-language newspapers in New Zealand gave voices to a diasporic Chinese community in the South Pacific, and they well documented political, economic and cultural aspects of this community for decades. Thereby, they extensively mirrored the social history of the New

47 Ng and Murphy, “Chinese.” 48 Seyip is the Cantonese pronunciation of ‘si yi’, which literally means ‘four districts’ (四邑), including San Wui (新会), Hoy Ping (开平), Toy San (台山), Yun Ping (恩平). 49 Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, 391–392.

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Figure 3.2. Lessons 1 and 2 of the ‘Movement for Chinese Literacy’.



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Zealand Chinese. During the early sojourner period, the New Zealand Chinese community was set apart from the host society as a result of a series of legislation against Chinese immigration. This alienated Chinese community consisted primarily of gold miners, market gardeners, greengrocers and laundrymen who wished to have a comfortable retirement in China with savings hard-earned in New Zealand. Serving such a community, the New Zealand Chinese-language newspapers of that time overwhelmingly delivered China-oriented news, in particular reporting China’s latest national politics, which essentially contributed to maintaining New Zealand Chinese people’s emotional ties with their homeland. This situation is especially evident when contemporary readers look through the content of the Q-sing Times and the New Zealand Chinese Weekly News, which were specifically published to coordinate fundraising to save China and to advocate patriotism towards China, then subject to the Japanese invasion. During wartime, the New Zealand Chinese newspapers were supported by the Chinese Consul to New Zealand through a supply of telegraphic news of the warfare. The KMT-run government of the Republic of China was then the only legitimate Chinese government, and played a central role in unifying patriotic overseas Chinese, including those in New Zealand. On the other hand, the Chinese sojourners’ stay in New Zealand inevitably meant their engagement with and integration into the New Zealand way of life. Over decades, the wide range of European New Zealanders’ businesses advertised in Chinese-language newspapers revealed patches of a gradual process of acculturation occurring within the New Zealand Chinese community. This was especially obvious after the New Zealand government imposed an assimilation policy on all ethnic minorities including the Chinese. The Growers’ Journal attested to this historical landmark by removing news reports of the homeland and calling for readers to contribute articles with apolitical content from November 1961; its editorial announcement stated clearly that such changed content was to serve harmonious race relations, so that Chinese sojourners might enjoy their peaceful and prosperous life in the host society (NZCGMJ, Vol. VII No. 70, 1961). With the anxious atmosphere of the Cold War, the New Zealand Chinese were caught in an awkward position and thereby further disconnected from China. Although the Growers’ Journal endeavoured to create a haven to preserve Chinese culture and traditions in the foreign land, its falling readership made it impossible to continue such a mission. The new generation of the New Zealand-born Chinese were mostly not literate in

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(a) Advertisements in the Man Sing Times.

(b) An advertisement in the Growers’ Journal.

Figure 3.3. Advertisements in early Chinese newspapers.

the Chinese language and no longer needed the information related to market gardening because of their new professional occupations. Nevertheless, these early Chinese-language newspapers, especially the Growers’ Journal, stand as a legacy, given their significant service to the early New Zealand Chinese community. They used the Chinese language to disseminate news of the homeland and information about members of the community, which formed vital links to connect the Chinese across New Zealand; such links were especially meaningful for those who lived in remote rural areas and had few opportunities to communicate with fellow Chinese. While these newspapers retained Chinese language and culture, they also spread information about adapting to the New Zealand way of life; and in this way, Chinese newspapers played an unexpected role in facilitating the transformation of the Chinese in New Zealand into Chinese New Zealanders. The full story of the early Chinese community in New Zealand, part of the unfolding history of New Zealand in conjunction with both modern China and Taiwan, still awaits writing and rewriting from various fresh



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angles. Recording many important events and people of this community, early Chinese newspapers in New Zealand deserve a separate book in their own right. This chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive or definitive account of them, but merely aims to provide a context for and a contrast with the contemporary New Zealand Chinese media that are the main focus of this book.

Chapter Four

New Chinese Immigrants and Contemporary New Zealand Chinese Media A New Wave of Chinese Immigration The new wave of Chinese immigration results from the 1987 Immigration Act introduced by the Fourth Labour Government (1984–1990). This was against the background of New Zealand facing a diminishing economic and political alliance with Britain since the latter joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. With the loss of this guaranteed export market, it became critical for New Zealand to seek new opportunities in Asia, a region geographically closer and increasingly prosperous. Jim Bolger, a former Prime Minister, openly admitted that from the perspective of the New Zealand government, a policy of facilitating immigration from Asia was the ideal mechanism to secure new trading partners, to stimulate the New Zealand economy, and thus to best serve the national interest.1 The late 1970s was also the period when major flows of young and better educated New Zealanders started emigrating to Australia.2 A new policy with a focus on attracting talented immigrants or valuable human capital to New Zealand from non-traditional source countries was an essential process of ‘replacement migration’. The most notable part of the 1987 Immigration Act was its non-discriminatory intent: “Immigrants are now selected on the basis of personal merit rather than national or ethnic origin. This is a significant departure from the bias in favour of the British and West Europeans which had shaped New Zealand migrant flows for almost a century”.3 With the passage of the 1987 Immigration Act and other succeeding policy changes, New Zealand has progressively become a multi-ethnic state because of the strong wave of non-European immigration, especially from Asia. According to 1 J.B. Bolger, “New Zealand and Asia,” Speech made at Massey University, Palmerston North, 19 August 1992. New Zealand External Relations and Trade Record 1, no. 3 (1992): 20. 2 G. Hugo, “New Zealanders in Australia in 2001,” New Zealand Population Review 30, nos. 1–2 (2004): 61–92. 3 Department of Statistics, The New Zealand Official Yearbook 1988–1989 (Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1989), 202.

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Figure 4.1. A Malaysian Chinese lion dancing troupe just after a performance. Balmoral, Auckland, July 2010. Photo: John B. Turner.

the Department of Internal Affairs, the New Zealand population consisted more than 200 ethnic groups, although only 28 groups had more than 4,000 members each.4 Census data shows that the Asian population in New Zealand has experienced the fastest growth, from 99,756 in 1991 to 372,895 in 2006, almost a four-fold increase. Ethnic Chinese are the most visible group, accounting for nearly half of the New Zealand Asian population. In fact, between 1986 and 2006, the New Zealand Chinese population increased by more than seven times, from 19,494 to 140,570, mainly through immigration. Chinese now constitute 3.4% of the New Zealand population, and are the second largest ethnic minority group in the country, next only to Maori, the indigenous people. Chart 4.1 shows the top seven source countries for immigrants to New Zealand between 1992 and 2002. It is clear that Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China provided the majority of new Chinese immigrants to New Zealand during this period. From the late 1980s up to the early 1990s, the number of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong was greater than that from Tai4 B. Thomson, “Ethnic Diversity in New Zealand: a Statistical Profile,” Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1999, http://www.ethnicaffairs.govt.nz/oeawebsite.nsf/ wpg_url/Resources-Ethnic-Affairs-Publications-Index/$file/EthnicDiversity.pdf (last accessed July 8, 2010), 5.



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Chart 4.1. Top seven source countries for residence approvals for the 1992/1993 to 2001/2002 financial years (data source: New Zealand Immigration Service).

wan and China; they were part of the massive wave of ‘reluctant exiles’— Hong Kong Chinese immigration to Western countries because of political uncertainties caused by the 1997 handover.5 The Taiwanese started to form the main body of new Chinese immigrants to New Zealand in the 1993/1994 financial year. Ip observes that, for Taiwanese in the early and mid-1990s, New Zealand was a more desirable country to migrate to than Canada and Australia, since they regarded New Zealand as ‘the last paradise’ due to its green environment, relaxing lifestyle and excellent education system for children.6 Between the 1992/1993 and 1995/1996 financial years, nearly 40,000 Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese were granted New Zealand permanent residence, though many of these people did not arrive in New Zealand or left the country later and did not return. China has become the leading source of ethnic Chinese immigrants to New Zealand following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Between 1997

5 R. Skeldon, ed., Reluctant Exiles?: Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994). 6 M. Ip, “Seeking the Last Utopia: the Taiwanese in New Zealand,” in Unfolding History, Evolving Identity, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003), 188–189.

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and 2009, nearly 85,000 PRC nationals were granted residence visas to New Zealand.7 However, the total number of Taiwanese and Hong Kong Chinese immigrants to New Zealand has decreased considerably during the same period; at the end of 2005, 46.3% of Taiwanese and 33.9% of Hong Kong Chinese who were approved for residence since 1998 did not live in New Zealand.8 Over the past ten years or so, China has been one of the top four source countries for immigrants to New Zealand. Chart 4.2 shows that the total number of PRC immigrants to New Zealand has been second only to that from the United Kingdom since the 2002/2003 financial year; the PRC immigrants were even more numerous than the British immigrants during the financial year ending in 2002. Chart 4.3 is a summary of the data of the 2006 census, which indicates that PRC Chinese now comprise more than half of the New Zealand Chinese population. Making a PRC Chinese Community As discussed in the Introduction, the PRC immigrants to New Zealand can be treated as one small segment contributing to the global picture of a new wave of Chinese international migration from mainland China; this has taken place as a result of China’s gradual removal of restrictions on its citizens leaving the country since the late 1970s. In New Zealand, the making of a specific PRC Chinese community is also attributed to major policy changes since the passage of the 1987 Immigration Act. Chart 4.4 is an illustration of the trend of permanent and long-term immigration from China to New Zealand between 1980 and 2006. It reveals that the first large inflow of PRC immigrants to the country happened around the mid1990s, and the early 2000s saw another sharp increase in the total number of PRC immigrants. The following discussion will in consequence focus on examining the variations in New Zealand immigration policy that have most affected the PRC immigrants during the mid-1990s and the early 2000s. The 1987 Immigration Act introduced a new legal and operational framework for attracting immigrants in three main streams: skilled and business, family, and humanitarian. It meant that those who were potentially 7 http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/ (accessed 16 December 2009). 8 P. Merwood, “Migration Trends 2005/06,” Wellington: Department of Labour, 2006, http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/migration-trends/MigrationTrends-200506.pdf (accessed September 21, 2008), 87.



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Chart 4.2. Top four source countries for residence approvals for the 1997/1998 to 2008/2009 financial years (data source: New Zealand Immigration Service).

qualified for immigration to New Zealand had to be suffering from extreme human conditions, or possess occupational skills prioritised in New Zealand, considerable amounts of capital for investment, or immediate relatives in New Zealand. Ip notes that during the period of the implementation of the 1987 Immigration Act up to 1991, the majority of Chinese immigrants to New Zealand were in the business stream and were originally from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore.9 It was a period when very few Chinese in the mainland had a chance to go overseas because of government restrictions; even fewer individuals were able to transfer the required minimum of NZ $150,000 to invest for immigration, since the Chinese economy was not strong enough to generate many such affluent business people. At that time, New Zealand did not experience a significant influx of post-Tiananmen mainland Chinese students-turnedimmigrants, which was particularly evident in the United States, Canada and Australia.10 This was because the total number of Chinese students

9 Ip, “Chinese New Zealanders,” 187, 191. 10 Zhou, Chen, and Cai, “Chinese language media and immigrant life,” 46; J. Gao, “Radio-activated Business and Power: a Case Study of 3CW Melbourne Chinese Radio,” in

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Chart 4.3. Composition of the New Zealand Chinese population in 2006 (data source: Statistics New Zealand).

in New Zealand was very small; even as late as 1998, fewer than 300 PRC Chinese students were enrolled in various educational sectors in New Zealand at all levels.11 In 1991, New Zealand followed in the steps of Canada and Australia and introduced the ‘Points System’, which was further modified in 1995. The significant part of the ‘Points System’ is that it brought in a new ‘general skills’ category. Applicants in this category were approved for residency on the basis of their awarded points for key factors such as age, employability, qualifications, work history, and English skills. Such specific criteria were perceived as a great improvement over the general list of prioritised occupations as designated in the 1987 Immigration Act. New Zealand statistics revealed that the introduction of the ‘Points System’ had a profound impact on Chinese immigration to the country; the ‘general skills’ category quickly became the main path accounting for the large inflow of new Chinese migrants. As Henderson reveals, between 1992 and 1995 the total number of skilled immigrants to New Zealand from Hong Kong, Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce, ed. W. Sun (London: Routledge, 2006), 154. 11 International Policy and Development Unit, “Foreign Fee-Paying Student Statistics to 2001,” Wellington: Ministry of Education, 2002, http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/ publications/series/15260/5147 (accessed March 1, 2008).



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Taiwan and China even overtook that from Britain and other traditional (white) sources. In consequence, an ‘Asian invasion’ backlash was widely discussed in New Zealand during the mid-1990s.12 The ‘Points System’ was particularly beneficial for skilled migrants from China. Having the largest population in the world, China in the early and mid-1990s was unable to generate many individuals with investment capital and direct family connections to New Zealand; however, it did accommodate a vast pool of young professionals who could qualify for immigration under the ‘general skills’ category. A number of studies of the 1991 and 1996 census have verified that the PRC Chinese immigrants to New Zealand during the mid-1990s largely fell into this category. It was also found that most of these people obtained academic qualifications and work experiences in China; they encountered great difficulties in finding employment in New Zealand, their talents effectively untapped.13 In contrast, the second large inflow of the PRC immigrants comprises a very different cohort, including two major groups. The first group are former Chinese international students in New Zealand. As mentioned earlier, until the late 1990s, the total number of Chinese students in the country was hardly noticeable. However, a dramatic change commenced in 1999 following China’s implementation of the Regulation on Control of Intermediary Agencies for Self-funded Overseas Education (zifei liuxue zhongjie fuwu guanli guiding 自费留学中介服务管理规定), which has triggered a boom in the international education market in China; New Zealand quickly became one of the most attractive countries for Chinese students. Chart 4.5 shows that China was the largest source country for foreign fee-paying (FFP) students to New Zealand between the 1999/2000 and 2006/2007 financial years. Between 2001 and 2003, more than 40,000 Chinese students were granted permits to study in New Zealand. Although the total number of Chinese students has decreased since then,14 12 A. Henderson, “Untapped Talents: the Employment and Settlement Experiences of Skilled Chinese Migrants in New Zealand,” in Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand, ed. M. Ip (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003), 144. 13 E. Ho, R. Bedford, and J. Goodwin, “Self-Employment among Chinese Immigrants in New Zealand,” in Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1998: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference held in Wellington, 26–27 November 1998 (Wellington: Institute of Geography, Victoria University of Wellington, 1999), 276–286; Henderson, “Untapped talents”; Ho and Bedford, “The Chinese in Auckland.” 14 In 2003, China’s Ministry of Education introduced a new system intended to warn self-funded students of the potential dangers of studying in certain countries including New Zealand. This happened mainly because of the collapse of several New Zealand private language schools, where many Chinese were attending; it was also against the

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Chart 4.4. Net permanent and long-term migration from the PRC to New Zealand, 1986–2006 (data source: New Zealand Immigration Service).

it still remains more than 20,000 each year. From a New Zealand perspective, the arrival of so many Chinese students is seen as the result of “New Zealand’s relatively open immigration system at the time, compared to the other ‘main English-speaking education destination countries’ . . . and perceptions of New Zealand as being a relatively safe and low-cost country in which to study, due partly to the lower value of the New Zealand dollar”.15 Since 2003, the New Zealand government has made some major modifications to the ‘Points System’: international students have been given more freedom to work while studying in this country, and to gain work permits after studying; they are also entitled to receive bonus points from their New Zealand qualifications and working experience when applying for residence through the Skilled Migrant Category (SMC). This new

background of many negative reports in Chinese media about Chinese students in New Zealand (Bai Limin 白莉民, Chuguo liuxue yu yuxiang budao de wenti: xinxilan zhongguo liuxuesheng shecun baogao 出国留学与预想不到的问题新西兰中国留学生生存报告 [Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe 华东师范大学出版社, 2008], 8–15). 15 International Division, “International Student Enrolments in New Zealand 2001– 2007,” Wellington: Ministry of Education, 2008, http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/ publications/series/15260/28332/24707, 6.



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Chart 4.5. Top six source countries for principal applicants granted student permits for the 1997/1998 to 2006/2007 financial years (data source: New Zealand Immigration Service).

approach emphasises the transition of international students from study to work and residence in New Zealand. Statistics reveal that Chinese students are the largest group taking advantage of this policy change; as Merwood notes, the rate of transition to work and residence for students from China was the highest (32%) compared to other main source countries such as South Korea (23%), Japan (10%) and the United States (10%).16 Along with the influx of students-turned-migrants, the other significant group from China are business people; China has been the largest source of business immigrants to New Zealand since 2000. This is an immediate result of New Zealand introducing a new and more flexible business immigration policy in 1999. Departing from its predecessors, the 1999 policy for the first time included a range of business residence categories including the Investor Category, the Employees of Businesses Relocation Category, the Long Term Business Visa (LTBV) Category, and the Entrepreneur

16 P. Merwood, “International Students: Studying and Staying on in New Zealand,” Wellington: Department of Labour, 2007, http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/ international-students/, 35.

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Category.17 Statistics show that PRC business immigrants primarily fell into the Investor Category and the Entrepreneur Category. Chart 4.6 depicts the pattern of the PRC business migrants to New Zealand from the 2000/2001 to 2006/2007 financial years. The total number of PRC investors was particularly large; almost all the PRC business immigrants were investors between 2000 and 2003; however, the number of PRC investor migrants decreased sharply after the 2003/2004 financial year. This was presumably because the New Zealand government introduced a tighter business immigration policy in November 2002 following an official evaluation of the 1999 policy, which found that “the major flows of business migrants come from countries (only three: China, Taiwan and Korea) with dissimilar cultures to New Zealand and from a non-English speaking background”.18 This report also revealed an even more cynical view about the Chinese investors as expressed by immigrant agents: “if you’ve got the money it’s a great way to buy New Zealand residence, continue business activities in China and get a good education for the kids”.19 In order to avoid an inflow of this kind, the new policy specifically emphasised the requirements of a minimum level of English language at IELTS 520 and details of the source of investment funds, which became hurdles for many potential business migrants from China. To sum up, the making of the PRC Chinese community in New Zealand is closely associated with two large influxes of immigrants respectively occurring around the mid-1990s and during the early 2000s. They are generally young, well-educated, and mostly professionals; the second influx even includes a considerable number of investors. Statistics New Zealand reveals that between the 2000/2001 and 2007/2008 financial years, 63,186 Chinese nationals from the PRC were granted permanent residence; among them, 7,286 were investors out of the 9,672 business migrants. Given that New Zealand, like the United States, Canada and 17  The LTBV is a temporary resident permit that allows applicants to enter into New Zealand to establish or acquire a business, providing a pathway to permanent residence. Migrants of the Entrepreneur Category refer to those who have been granted temporary resident permits with LTBVs and have established a successful business in New Zealand before being granted permanent resident permits. 18  New Zealand Immigration Service, “Business Immigration: the Evaluation of the 1999 Business Immigration Policy,” Wellington: Department of Labour, 2002, http://www.dol .govt.nz/publication-view.asp?ID=163 (accessed January 25, 2010), 7. 19  Ibid., 40. 20 IELTS stands for ‘International English Language Testing System’. The score of an IELTS test result could be ranging from 1 (no knowledge) to 9 (expert user). The test is required by Immigration New Zealand.



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Chart 4.6. PRC Chinese business immigrants to New Zealand for the 2000/2001 to 2006/2007 financial years (data source: New Zealand Immigration Service).

Australia, also applies a principle of ‘centre of gravity’ for family reunification, these skilled and business migrants accordingly become a source of more immigrants from China, who arrived as spouses, elderly parents, siblings and young children in the family stream. According to the New Zealand Immigration Service, between 1997 and 2009 a total of 32,679 PRC nationals were granted permanent residence in the family stream,21 accounting for 39% of all immigrants from China to the country during the twelve years. Chart 4.7 is a summary of the data of PRC immigrants to New Zealand between 1997 and 2009. PRC Chinese and Others’ Settlement As most new Chinese migrants are highly urbanised entrepreneurs and well-educated professionals from Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and some highly industrialised areas of China such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, they have been used to a bustling urban life and 21 http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/ (accessed 16 December 2009).

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Chart 4.7. Streams of PRC immigrants to New Zealand, 1997–2009 (data source: New Zealand Immigration Service).

therefore choose to settle in New Zealand’s large cities such as Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton. Auckland accommodates the largest population of Chinese immigrants to the country. The 2006 census showed that 79,422 overseas-born Chinese lived in Auckland, where 54% of the New Zealand Chinese population clustered; the proportion of the PRC-born Chinese population in Auckland was particularly high, 70% of the 77,157 PRC Chinese living in Auckland. With nearly one third of the New Zealand population, Auckland is the largest commercial centre in the country and is usually considered to be the only ‘international metropolis’ in New Zealand. In fact, Auckland is not only attractive to new Chinese migrants, but to all immigrants to New Zealand. The 2006 census also revealed that almost 40% of the Auckland population were immigrants (i.e. not born in New Zealand). After Toronto (with 44–45% immigrant population), Auckland is among the cites with the largest proportion of migrants in the world.22 Within Auckland, there are no settlements equivalent to an actual Chinatown or an ‘ethnoburb’,23 although many new Chinese migrants appear 22 P. Spoonley, “Cultural Transformation: New Zealand Challenges and Responses, Multiculturalism in a Globalising World—Different Perspectives” (Paper presented at the Cultural Identities in a Globalising World workshop, Wellington, 17 April, 2009). 23 W. Li, “Anatomy of a New Ethnic Settlement: the Chinese Ethnoburb in Los Angeles,” Urban Studies 35, no. 3 (1998): 479–501; W. Li, “Introduction: Asian Immigration and Com-



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Figure 4.2. An annual Chinese book fair organised by recent PRC migrants. Balmoral, Auckland, April 2011. Photo: John B. Turner.

to congregate in certain suburbs with a relatively greater density of Asian immigrants. These suburbs range widely from upper and middle classes to less affluent working-class neighbourhoods. This indicates that these newcomers are not homogeneous, but belong to various socioeconomic groups. Walking along the commercial streets in these suburbs, one can see some business signs written in Chinese characters, which signify that their owners are probably Chinese migrants. These businesses range from retail stores, restaurants and beauty salons to computer gaming rooms and photography studios, along with other professional services such as law firms, clinics and accountancies. In the past, these signs were written predominantly in traditional Chinese characters; over more recent years, simplified Chinese characters have been used increasingly. This change is apparently associated with the arrival of large numbers of foreign feepaying students and immigrants from mainland China since the early 2000s; they prefer the simplified system of Chinese characters, whereas most overseas Chinese including Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese use the traditional system.

munity in the Pacific Rim,” in From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim Countries, ed. W. Li, 1–22 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

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The new Chinese migrants came to New Zealand as a result of the 1987 Immigration Act and the ‘Points System’ initiated in 1991, so the majority of them are likely to be young, of balanced gender, well-educated and affluent, entering under the skilled, family and business migration streams. Some new Chinese migrants arrived in New Zealand as young nuclear families; others arrived as single people and formed their young families in the country later. A number of early studies on the settlement of new Chinese migrants have established that these migrants have encountered great difficulties in finding professional employment and starting a business in New Zealand.24 As Ip and Friesen have observed, “many highly qualified migrants failed to find employment even (if ) [sic] their skills were recognised. There is evidence of employers’ prejudice against applicants without local experience, or candidates who have a foreign accent”.25 In consequence, a large number of skilled Hong Kong and Taiwanese migrants have left New Zealand, either returning to Hong Kong and Taiwan, or travelling between New Zealand and the two regions to earn income and to maintain their New Zealand families at the same time. These phenomena were typified as ‘astronaut families’ among the Taiwanese and Hong Kong migrants and drew a lot of negative comments in New Zealand mainstream media in the mid-1990s.26 For many Hong Kong and Taiwanese business migrants, the hurdle in setting up a business stems mainly from the fact that New Zealand economy is based on agriculture, and thus is completely different from that of Hong Kong and Taiwan. A Hong Kong business migrant commented, “. . . Economically, New Zealand is very agricultural. Most of the Hong Kong business migrants are experienced in financial and industrial businesses. I’ve found it hard to start a business here”. In addition, “the inflexible attitude of the monopolist producer boards (which control the export of dairy products, meat, and apples and pears), the long distance to overseas markets, and the smallness of the domestic market” comprise other major

24 For example, Ho, Bedford, and Goodwin, “Self-Employment among Chinese Immigrants;” M. Ip and W. Friesen, “The New Chinese Community in New Zealand: Local Outcomes of Transnationalism,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 10, no. 2 (2001): 213–240; Henderson, “Untapped talents;” Ho and Bedford, “The Chinese in Auckland.” 25 Ip and Friesen, “The New Chinese community in New Zealand,” 225. 26 Ho, Bedford, and Goodwin, “ ‘Astronaut Families’;” R. Chui, “Auckland’s ‘Economic Immigrants’ from Asia,” in Almighty Auckland, ed. I. Carter, D. Craig, and Matthewman S. (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2004), 111–134.



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obstacles for new Chinese migrants to establish export and import businesses in New Zealand.27 The situation of PRC migrants is more diverse than that of Hong Kong and Taiwanese migrants. Those who arrived in the first influx during the mid-1990s were generally less affluent, and many former professionals had to work as low-paid manual labourers in order to make a living. The 1996 census showed that they had almost the lowest rate of labour force participation in the country; as Henderson notes, “24 percent of those in the 35–39 age group were ‘unemployed and actively seeking work’, and 38.2 percent were ‘not in the labour force’ ”.28 There were also a small number of self-employed people, among whom a high percentage had no other employees;29 the scale and profits of these people’s businesses were obviously very limited. Many of these PRC skilled migrants returned to study either to improve their English or to pursue New Zealand qualifications.30 For some people, a return to study may be simply a practical way of earning an income, since the government provides allowances for students; among them, some later re-migrated to Australia after obtaining a New Zealand university degree and New Zealand citizenship,31 since they considered that Australia could provide better opportunities for work and living. This happened especially before the Australian and New Zealand governments made a joint announcement in February 2001, which ended New Zealand citizens’ privileged position of receiving social security benefits in Australia. Birrell and Rapson have found that 2,027 PRC-born New Zealand citizens, accounting for 10% of the PRC Chinese migrants in New Zealand, re-migrated to Australia between 1996 and 2000.32 When I conducted field work in Auckland between 2005 and 2006, a number of informants mentioned that they had friends or family members who had moved to Australia. According to her study of the PRC immigrants of the mid-1990s, Ip notes that some even left New Zealand and returned 27 As cited in Ip and Friesen, “The New Chinese community in New Zealand,” 225. 28 Henderson, “Untapped talents,” 148. 29 Ho, Bedford, and Goodwin, “Self-Employment among Chinese Immigrants,” 281. 30 Henderson, “Untapped talents.” 31  During the 1990s when these PRC migrants arrived, it required a minimum threeyear of residence in New Zealand before citizenship could be applied for; the minimum length of residence was raised to five years in 2005. New Zealanders’ move to Australia is made easy by the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which since 1973 has allowed Australian and New Zealand citizens to live and work in each other’s country without restrictions. 32 B. Birrell and V. Rapson, “New Zealanders in Australia: the End of an Era?” People and Place 9, no. 1 (2001): 8.

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to China because of the homeland offering better opportunities for social mobility, and more importantly, their difficulty adapting to the cultural milieu of New Zealand society.33 The more recent PRC migrants are generally in a much better economic position. Apart from the affluent business people, the bulk of skilled migrants have been granted residence largely because they have been employed in New Zealand. As mentioned earlier, the formation of this new group of skilled migrants is closely associated with the New Zealand government’s modification of the ‘Points System’ in 2003, which began to encourage international students to become migrants once they complete their studies. Under this policy change, many former PRC foreign feepaying students who stayed on to work and became permanent residents had already spent at least three to four years studying in New Zealand before they obtained a New Zealand tertiary qualification; some of them have studied a longer time, since they also completed their high school education in New Zealand. These students-turned-migrants are thus more competent in the English language and more easily adapt into New Zealand society than the early skilled migrants, the majority of whom moved to New Zealand from China in one step. Many of these recent skilled PRC migrants have been employed by New Zealand companies to work in professional fields such as IT, marketing, accounting and bio-engineering; some work for local Chinese companies run by new migrants; some have purchased existing businesses such as motels and cafeterias and become self-employed. An Auckland-based Malaysian Chinese solicitor commented that in recent years most of her work has been for mainland Chinese who are only in their twenties, but have bought businesses and houses. Where did they get so much money?34 These former foreign fee-paying students are mostly single children of affluent families in China. One of my interviewees, a former Chinese student major in commerce and now a McDonald’s store manager, said I am a single child and my family may belong to the middle class in China; by comparison, many people I know came from a background of either super rich or very senior officials with power (gao guan quan gui 高官权 贵) . . . my impression is that about one third of my classmates from China at the university have remained in New Zealand and become migrants. Those 33 M. Ip, “Returnees and Transnationals: Evolving Identities of Chinese (PRC) Immigrants in New Zealand,” Journal of Population Studies 33 (2006): 61–102. 34 Interview conducted in July 2010.



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who have returned to China are probably called back by their parents, who have secured good jobs for them through connections (guanxi 关系).35

Many of those who have become migrants still receive family support as a supplement to their normal income from wages or salary; thus most recent PRC skilled migrants have less financial stress than their early predecessors. Skykiwi.com, a New Zealand-based Chinese-language website that primarily serves young students-turned-migrants and current foreign fee-paying students from China,36 reveals a lot of information about these recent skilled migrants. For instance, housing has been a popular topic of discussion at a forum for ‘working people in New Zealand’ (shang ban zu 上班族) on this website, which disclosed that a considerable number of these people have bought homes in New Zealand with help from their parents to pay the deposit, or even to make a full payment; in terms of their own incomes, an online survey in 2008 among 714 viewers within this forum showed that 47% of them earned more than NZ$2,500 per month after tax, which was well above the median level of income in New Zealand.37 Recent PRC business migrants adapt to New Zealand in different ways. My interviews reveal that many of them still keep assets such as ongoing businesses and properties in China; they also frequently transfer large amounts of money between China and New Zealand, since they still play the stock and foreign currency markets in China. Unlike those in the Entrepreneur Category who are required to run a business in New Zealand, investor migrants are actually not enthusiastic about relocating their businesses or starting something new in the country. Having arrived as an investor migrant, one former PRC national told me, “the market here for our products [for interior design] is too small to generate profits; we mainly deal with large orders from clients in the United States and Europe”.38 In New Zealand, he and his circle in similar situations spent 35 Ibid. 36 Skykiwi.com claims to have over 130,000 registered members; some of these, however, may be in China instead of New Zealand. 89% of Skykiwi.com users were born in China and 62.69% are in the age group of 21 to 35, http://www.skykiwi.co.nz/pages/about_ us/html-en/visitor.html (last accessed 3 October 2010). 37 This survey was conducted in July 2008. http://bbs.skykiwi.com/frame.php? frameon=yes&referer=http%3A//bbs.skykiwi.com/forumdisplay.php%3Ffid%3D6 1%26filter%3Ddigest (accessed 3 October 2010). A New Zealand income survey in June 2008 quarter showed that New Zealanders’ median weekly income before tax was $537, http://stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/income-and-work/Income/nz-income-survey-popu lation-rebase-jun97–08.aspx (last accessed 6 October 2011). 38 Interview conducted in January 2006.

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most of their time playing golf while waiting to become New Zealand citizens. As many remark, a New Zealand passport, unlike a Chinese one, allows them to travel to most countries in the world for business or for a holiday without needing a visa. To pursue a relaxing life for themselves is another common reason for PRC Chinese business people immigrating to New Zealand. This view is especially shared among those who came from places such as Beijing, Shanghai, and the highly industrialised Pearl River Delta region; dense population, polluted local environment and stressful daily life are their major concerns. Another interviewee from Guangzhou said to me, When I was in China, I had to go out almost every evening to accompany my boss and our clients, eating and drinking at restaurants, followed by playing Mah-jong and singing Karaoke till midnight. You know, every night! Gee, I wouldn’t live very long if this were to be the rest of my life. I need to spend time with my family.39

These people were also concerned about the stress and competition which their children had to suffer at school. With education becoming increasingly commercialised in China, attending elite universities and schools, even kindergartens, has turned out to be costly because of various types of expensive entry fees and follow-up tuitions. In contrast, New Zealand provides general and tertiary education of an international standard at a much lower cost to permanent residents of the country. The settlement of these better-off recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand has resulted in a significant impact on the local Chinese community economy. On their arrival, the tens of thousands of newcomers have an immediate demand for a wide range of social services such as food, housing, transport and other related arrangements for establishing a new home base. In addition, there are effects from the requirements for applicants under business migrant categories. For instance, the core criterion for investors is that the principal applicant is required to invest a specified minimum amount of funds in New Zealand. Between 1999 and 2005, the required minimum of funds was NZ $1 million; this figure was increased to NZ $2 million in 2005.40 As mentioned earlier, more than 7,000 PRC investors were granted residency; they have clearly brought considerable funds into New Zealand. For 39 Ibid. 40 Department of Labour, Active Investor Migrant Policy: Cabinet Paper, http://www .dol.govt.nz/actreview/cabinet/active-investor-migrant-policy2007.asp#fig2 (accessed 15 October 2008).



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Figure 4.3. A Chinese restaurant in Balmoral, Auckland, run by recent PRC migrants. August 2010. Photo: John B. Turner.

example, during the 2001/2002 financial year, the heyday of PRC investors migrating to New Zealand, approximately 2,800 such people were granted residence permits. This means that they poured at least $2.8 billion into the country. This figure is impressive, even in comparison with the $3.08 billion total value of New Zealand exports to China for the 2008/2009 financial year; this value includes an increase of 35% as the result of the two countries signing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2008.41 Most PRC business migrants have settled in Auckland, and their funds have followed. A recent study of ethnic Chinese businesses in Auckland reveals that new Chinese business migrants still experience difficulty in adjusting to the New Zealand business environment, in addition to their difficulty with the English language; their businesses are therefore Chinese oriented and mainly rely on the Chinese community as the source of labour, goods and customers.42 Nevertheless, with the tens of thousands 41  New Zealand is the first developed country to negotiate a FTA with China. The two countries began the process of negotiation in 2004, and the agreement was signed in April 2008 in Beijing. http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Asia-North/China.php (accessed 29 January 2010). 42 P. Spoonley and C. Meares, “Chinese Businesses and the Transformation of Auckland,” Wellington: Asia: New Zealand Foundation, 2009, http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/

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of new arrivals, the Chinese migrant community is now sizable enough to provide whatever is needed to sustain these businesses. As China becomes increasingly prosperous, business contacts in China contribute another important source of supplies for goods and new ideas. This is reflected in the numerous Chinese shops run by the recent PRC migrants, who primarily sell products imported from China, ranging from small items such as stationery and party toys to large electronic appliances and furniture. A restaurant owner even admits the need to learn new dishes popular in China in order to serve promptly the migrants here.43 A Chinese telephone directory gives an overview of the Chinese community economy. Over the past few years, there have been several kinds of Chinese telephone directories circulated within the Auckland Chinese community. Among them, the Chinese Yellow Pages is the largest in terms of size and number of pages. Published by a Chinese newspaper in conjunction with a Chinese advertising company, the Chinese Yellow Pages (Year 2005 version) lists Auckland-based Chinese community businesses. This beautifully colour-printed book contains 400 pages (later editions are even larger), which cover all commercial areas that Chinese migrants were involved in at the time of printing. Most of these businesses clustered within the service industry, ranging from restaurants, retail stores, motels, beauty salons, travel agents and internet bars, to car dealers, law firms, chartered accountants and international financial services. Noticeably, businesses related to construction and property development occupy more than 40 pages, the largest section of the book; these businesses include architectural design, supply of construction materials and manufacturing of fittings for kitchens and bathrooms. This section indicates that substantial amounts of PRC business migrants’ investment have gone to the Chinese property market. Evolution of New Chinese Media Over the past twenty years or so, the influxes of new Chinese migrants have revitalised the New Zealand Chinese-language media, moribund since the early 1970s. This process can be traced back to the launch of the Sing Tao Weekly in Auckland in 1989; the Sing Tao Weekly in New Zealand asianz.org.nz/files/Asia%20NZ%20Chinese%20Businesses.pdf  (accessed November 20, 2009). 43 Ibid., 12.



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belonged to the Hong Kong-based media empire, Sing Tao News Group, which started in Singapore in 1929. Prior to the arrival of a considerable number of Hong Kong Chinese immigrants to New Zealand in the late 1980s, the Sing Tao media empire had expanded its global network to the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, North America, Europe, and Australia.44 The Sing Tao Weekly (later daily) in New Zealand was published between 1989 and 1994. After the launch of the Sing Tao Weekly, many imitators appeared, but did not survive very long. It is difficult to construct a complete picture of the new Chineselanguage media in New Zealand, in particular of print media. This is mainly because, to date, the New Zealand-produced Chinese newspapers and magazines along with radio and television programmes have not been treated as meaningful materials for documenting the social history of the new Chinese community in the country. Thus, there is no comprehensive and systemic collection of these Chinese media by either public or private libraries. Ng and Murphy, Ip and Voci have, however, looked at these new Chinese media in general.45 Combining their inventories gives an overview of the new Chinese media in New Zealand; Table 4.1 shows the various forms of new Chinese media ranging from the earliest to the latest. This table is not intended to provide an entire list of the new Chinese-language media in New Zealand; instead, it portrays the variety of these media, including print, radio, television and websites. Such a wide variety of Chinese media forms indicates that new Chinese media have clearly benefited from the latest information technology including facilities for printing in colour, satellite transmission and the Internet. Several Chinese newspapers even have their own online version. Although some Chinese print media may be distributed and circulated within a limited region, as are Chinese radio broadcasts, Chinese satellite television programmes and Chinese websites are generally accessible nationwide. This means that wherever the new Chinese migrants stay in New Zealand, they have no difficulty in receiving and consuming Chineselanguage media. Nearly all of these new Chinese media are privately owned and run as small businesses. The New Zealand government has interfered little in their operation as long as the owners of these businesses comply with

44 Sun, “Introduction: Transnationalism,” 6. 45 Ng and Murphy, “Chinese”; Ip, “Chinese media in New Zealand”; Voci, “From Middle Kingdom to Middle Earth and back.”

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Table 4.1. A selective list of new Chinese media in New Zealand, 1989–2008. Print Media Sing Tao Daily New Zealand Chinese Weekly Mandarin Times New Zealand Chinese Magazine Chinese-English Business Directory New Zealand Federation of Chinese Medical Journal Christchurch Chinese Monthly News Dunedin Asian Monthly News New Zealand Chinese Herald Chinese Express Weekly New Zealand Chinese Weekly New Time Weekly The Independence Daily Mingshan Weekly Home Voice Chinese Weekly Capital Chinese News New Zealand Chinese Bizlink Oriental Times Asian Voice The Epoch Times Chinese Property Weekly New Zealand Bilingual Magazine WTV Magazine

Radio Radio Chinese AM 990 BBC/FM 90.6 Chinese Voice AM 936/ FM 95.8 Capital Chinese Voice Chinese FM 96.1/FM 88.5 Canterbury Chinese Voice FM 96.9 Television World TV Golden Raindrop Touch China Triangle TV Websites www.chinese.net.nz www.180.co.nz www.168.co.nz www.skykiwi.co.nz

laws and regulations set for commercial ventures. This is different from Canada and Australia, where the governments provide substantial funding to run ethnic media including Chinese-language media, especially broadcast media to promote and embrace the official policy of multiculturalism.46 Most of the New Zealand Chinese print media have been free of charge, except for two defunct newspapers, the Sing Tao Weekly (later the Sing Tao Daily) and the Independence Daily. The satellite-transmitted programmes on World TV are however only available to paying subscribers. The only New Zealand government-subsidised broadcast media are Chinese radio (the Community Access Radio in the early 1990s) and a very limited airtime for Golden Raindrop TV on Triangle TV, the Auckland regional TV station. In consequence, Chinese media have to rely on

46 For example, Zhou, Chen, and Cai, “Chinese language media and immigrant life;” Cunningham and Sinclair, Floating lives; Gao, “Radio-activated business.”



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audience and advertisers to provide revenue streams; they must follow the general rules of the market economy in order to survive. Primarily serving new Chinese migrants, these new Chinese media are dependent on the development of the Chinese community economy, in particular in terms of pursuing revenues from Chinese advertisers. A veteran publisher originally from Hong Kong told me, “It is very difficult to get European advertisers, since they think the Chinese market very small. Those European companies that advertise in Chinese media are mainly banks and telephone companies”.47 The competition to secure both Chinese and European advertisers is extremely severe among the Chinese print media. This is partially why so many Chinese newspapers have mushroomed but soon disappeared completely over the past twenty years; only a few have run for a relatively long period of time, such as the Mandarin Times, the New Times Weekly and the New Zealand Chinese Herald. The Malaysian Chinese-owned Mandarin Times was launched in 1991. Initially, it was a weekly and soon began to publish three issues every week; it has been a daily since 2004. In the extremely competitive market of Chinese print media in Auckland, the successful strategy of the Mandarin Times is its continuous emphasis on publishing a wide range of up-to-date advertisements; for a single business or a personal notice, an advertisement could be sized from whole broadsheet pages down to a 2cm × 2cm square and with a wide price range from thousands to six dollars in 2005. The newspaper itself just looks like a collection of advertising flyers. The high cost of printing is another hurdle for many Chinese newspapers with limited revenue from advertisers. In 2005 an editor revealed to me that it cost NZ$5,000 to print one issue of her newspaper, which contained 40 broadsheet pages per issue, was published once a week, and had a circulation of 5000 copies.48 Another editor noted that it usually cost NZ$8,000 to print one issue of 10,000 copies of his newspaper, which contained 40 to 50 broadsheet pages per issue.49 Because it has its own printing facilities, the New Times Weekly has been a relatively successful survivor since its launch in 1996, whereas many of its competitors had to find a printing company and may have had to spend more on printing and thus make less profit.50 47 Interview conducted in November 2007. 48 Interview conducted in February 2006. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

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Some Chinese newspapers have been published by Chinese companies offering financial services to recent arrivals including stock brokering, foreign currency exchange and international money transfer.51 For these companies, Chinese newspapers present a platform to advertise their services and provide the latest information on international stock markets and foreign currency exchange rates. This kind of newspaper, for example, the Mingshan Weekly and the New Zealand Chinese Bizlink, inevitably had to close down once their so-called ‘mother companies’ collapsed. The development of New Zealand Chinese-language media over the past two decades has clearly reflected the changing density pattern of Chinese immigrants to this country. In 1989, Hong Kong Chinese launched the first new Chinese print media in New Zealand; the New Zealand version of the Sing Tao Weekly (later the Sing Tao Daily) was similar to its counterparts in North America and Australia in that it contained a small proportion of local (New Zealand) news, but largely relied on the international news reports and other content transmitted from Sing Tao’s headquarters in Hong Kong. A few Hong Kong Chinese volunteers also ran New Zealand’s first Chinese community radio programme in Cantonese and English. Later, the Taiwanese became the largest group within the Chinese immigrant community; they started the popular Independent Daily. The New Zealand version of the Independent Daily was mainly dependent on the headquarters based in Sydney, from which it received most editorial content except for the New Zealand local news. The Independent Daily in Sydney came into existence in 1994 and was funded by pro-independence Taiwanese, who had a strong influence on the content of the newspaper. With the surge in PRC Chinese immigration to Australia since the late 1990s, it became increasingly difficult for this newspaper to attract enough advertisers and readers.52 My own interviews with Chinese media personnel and audience also revealed that the fate of the Independent Daily in Auckland, which closed in 2004, was for a similar reason. One Taiwanese community leader observed that there had been many newspapers 51  The existence of Chinese money transfer companies is associated with the fact that the Chinese government restricts free currency transfers between China and overseas. Therefore, companies dealing with international trade and individuals travelling overseas for personal reasons are in need of a smoother and faster channel to transfer money, especially when a large amount is involved. The Chinese Yuan is not a floating-rate currency, so most PRC Chinese use US or Hong Kong currency as intermediates in the exchange between Chinese Yuan and New Zealand dollars through these money transfer companies. 52 Ren Chuangong 任传功, “Cong zili kuaibaode xingshuai kan taidu jin shi renxin 从《自立快报》的兴衰看“台独”尽失人心,” Tongyi luntan 统一论坛 (2006): 28.



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run by mainland Chinese since the early 2000s, and commented, “There used to be fewer than five Chinese newspapers owned by Hong Kong Chinese, Taiwanese and Malaysian Chinese”.53 In the past few years, PRC Chinese have become the major player in operating the Chinese print media, some of which have their own online version. The PRC Chinese also own the popular Chinese-language websites in New Zealand, such as www.chinese.net.nz and www.skykiwi.com. The experiences of Chinese-language broadcasting are different from those of print media, since the severe competition for advertisers is a less obvious issue. In 2000, Taiwanese initiated World TV Ltd, New Zealand’s first Chinese-language television station. Similar to other New Zealand Chinese media companies, WTV is a privately operated enterprise; however, unlike the exclusive ownership of Chinese newspapers and websites, WTV has Taiwanese, Japanese and Korean shareholders, although the Taiwanese are predominant.54 At present, this company owns a satellite TV network in three Asian languages (Chinese, Japanese and Korean), a freeto-air digital TV channel in Chinese and two Chinese radio stations. The main sources of revenue for World TV Ltd are monthly fees charged to the subscribers of the satellite programmes and advertising. Since it has been managed very professionally and offers a variety of TV and radio programmes in Mandarin and Cantonese, WTV has dominated the market for Chinese broadcasting since it started. The New Chinese Community in their Own Media In terms of media content, there are some major characteristics that appear to be generally shared among all new Chinese-language media. First of all, advertisements comprise the main content of these media. These advertisements primarily include Chinese business services, which are mostly listed in the Chinese telephone directory as noted earlier. In addition to commercial advertising, personal advertisements are commonly seen in newspapers and websites; these advertisers include private tutors, escorts, genuine lonely hearts, and people seeking flatmates. As well as advertisements, Chinese media frequently present Chinese community notices regarding special social gatherings such as fund-raising for a Chinese Buddhist temple, or an alumni reunion. Most New Zealand 53 Interview conducted in November 2005. 54 Interview with a senior manager of World TV Ltd conducted in November 2007.

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local news in Chinese media is an edited translation of the news reports in the English mainstream media. For instance, Liu has examined how Chinese newspapers handled reports on Maori-related issues, and suggests that the Chinese reporters and editors tend to follow several reports of one issue in mainstream media and then produce one single article in the form of a translated summary.55 Only the New Zealand Chinese Herald and World TV Ltd have been delivering a limited amount of original reports of New Zealand local news by their own reporters. The New Zealand Chinese Herald was initially published in 1994 by the New Zealand Herald, a daily having the largest newspaper circulation in the country. At the beginning, the local news in the Chinese Herald was derived from its parent paper, thereby ensuring the journalistic quality. Since 1997, the ownership of the Chinese Herald has been transferred to different Chinese companies several times; however, this newspaper has become a brand name, which may have helped to maintain its quality. The paper also publishes commentaries by editor(s) and readers on New Zealand local news. World TV Ltd produces its own hour-long news programmes, which are broadcast on WTV and its two Chinese-language radio stations (936AM and 95.8FM) every weekend. The two radio stations also give airtime to commentary and talkback sessions on New Zealand local news on weekdays. Although Chinese websites generally do not carry original news reports, some of them provide space for viewers to post their comments on New Zealand local issues. Compared to their limited effort in presenting New Zealand local news, all Chinese media endeavour to deliver a large quantity of immediate reports about current politics, economy, sports and entertainment in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. World TV Ltd broadcasts mainly satellitetransmitted television and radio programmes from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Chinese print media and websites primarily rely on downloading from the websites of major media corporations based in China (such as chinanews.com.cn, sina.com.cn and sohu.com) to source news items. All these Chinese media provide small quantities of international news, which can also be traced from the main sources in China. Over the past two decades, New Zealand Chinese media have experienced a shifting political stance, as shown by their changing attitudes towards China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in commentaries and news reports. A number of my interviewees, including members of Chinese 55 Liu, “Maori Issue Reports.”



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audience and media personnel, noted that during the early 1990s, the socalled ‘post-Tiananmen era’, Chinese newspapers often appeared to publish critical comments on the Chinese government; criticism was heavily concentrated on China’s poor record of protecting human rights and rampant growth of corruption, both of which seemed connected with the dictatorship of the Communist Party. Chinese newspapers with such views were mainly run by Hong Kong Chinese, Taiwanese, and some mainland Chinese activists involved in the democracy movement subsequent to the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. In more recent years, it seems that political criticism of the Chinese government in New Zealand Chinese media has diminished and conversely the pro-Chinese government content has increased substantially, since most of the news reports about China are downloaded from the websites based in China, where mass media is still under strict censorship.56 Nevertheless, anti-Chinese government sentiment remains noticeable in two Chinese newspapers. One is the Auckland-based New Times Weekly, which often carries reports and commentaries revealing the sufferings of the dissidents during the Anti-rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, and some current incidents in China violating the freedom of speech and other human rights. Except for not delivering spiritual content, the New Times Weekly is similar to the New Zealand version of the Epoch Times, a Falun Gong-linked newspaper, which according to its website has its headquarters in New York, is published in 17 languages and is distributed in 30 countries. It claims that the Chinese-language Epoch Times started publishing in response to the growing need for uncensored coverage of events in China. The first newspaper was published in New York in May 2000, with the web launch in August 2000. Local editions published by regional bureaus soon followed, making it the largest of any Chinese-language newspaper outside of Mainland China and Taiwan.57

Falun Gong is a system of Buddhist beliefs and Qigong practices that emerged in China in 1992, which is perceived by some Western observers

56 For example, C.C. Lee, ed., Money, Power, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000); A.M. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in China (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Y. Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 57 The statement is quoted from the homepage of the Epoch Times, http://en.epochtimes. com/aboutus.html (last accessed 2 December 2007).

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(e.g. Amnesty International and the US Congressional Executive Commission on China) as a suppressed ‘spiritual movement’ in China; however, the Chinese government considers it an ‘evil cult’ threatening social stability and therefore has banned Falun Gong officially in mainland China since 1999. Falun Gong also has links to New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) and Sound of Hope Radio (SOH), which are both based in the United States and broadcast Chinese-language programmes to North America, Asia, Europe and Australia. In New Zealand, a NTDTV programme commenting on China and current international affairs was once transmitted by Triangle TV for one hour every weekend. In summary, the content of the New Zealand Chinese media has closely reflected the development of the new Chinese community. This community has taken shape as a result of New Zealand’s innovative immigration policy, which aimed to engage with the rapidly growing parts of Asia, and a completely new mode of political economy in ‘Greater China’, the homeland of the new Chinese migrants. This is a hybrid group, unlike the rather homogenous early Chinese settlers originating from the villages of Canton in the late 19th century. The new Chinese community is also sophisticated in terms of members’ socioeconomic status and sensibility to political culture as well as the experiences of their settlement in New Zealand and transnational movements between New Zealand and their countries of origin. Such sophistication has profound implications for the content of New Zealand Chinese media through the preferences of their owners, editors, and more importantly, advertisers and audience. The development of new Chinese media is primarily dependent on the prosperity of the new Chinese migrant community. In the old days, a small number of transient Chinese sojourners, mainly manual labourers, were unable to create such prosperity; however, the large number of new immigrants bring to New Zealand ample human and financial capital to establish a sizable lucrative Chinese market covering a variety of industries, dedicated to serving the needs of new Chinese settlers. Advertising revenues from the Chinese community economy have become the main source of finance to sustain these new Chinese media, which are purely commercial ventures, unlike the early Chinese newspapers mainly depending on donations from humble Chinese market gardeners and greengrocers. Given that the Chinese media rely so much on new migrants in an economic sense, the extent to which these media could enjoy freedom of speech in democratic New Zealand remains questionable. As we have observed, the attitudes of New Zealand Chinese media towards the



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Chinese government have undergone various changes from being critical of it to becoming complimentary. Such change may be explained in association with the large influx of recent PRC migrants; it seems that their ownership of these media and their position as the main source of advertisers have greatly altered the content of Chinese media in New Zealand. This is the case of Chinese media representing the politics of China. Regarding New Zealand politics, in particular relating to race relations between Chinese migrants and the core of New Zealand society, do these media also reflect the transformation of the New Zealand Chinese community as a result of the arrival of recent PRC migrants? This raises a number of further serious questions: To what extent do these Chinese media depict the current Chinese migrant community in New Zealand? Do these media still serve the new Chinese community as an institution for sustaining Chinese solidarity in the way that early Chinese newspapers did? What role do these media play in the process of new Chinese migrants’ acculturation in New Zealand society?

Chapter five

Ethnic Chinese Media during the 2005 New Zealand General Election This chapter presents a case study of the New Zealand Chinese media employing the conceptual framework developed in Chapter Two. This framework suggests that the Chinese media primarily serve the specific interests and needs of the minimally acculturated and sociopolitically marginalised Chinese migrants, especially those recent arrivals from the PRC. Thus, the objective in gathering empirical data was that the information compiled would illustrate the characteristics of New Zealand Chinese media as well as reveal their reciprocal relationship with the Chinese migrant community in general; and the selection of the information would be politically significant to the recent PRC Chinese migrants in particular. This objective pointed to the need for an investigation into the broad New Zealand Chinese mediasphere, spanning from the content of ethnic Chinese media to the reception by the Chinese audience. The content of Chinese media is miscellaneous and frequently changing; this case study was set during the 2005 New Zealand general election.1 I believed that the extent of Chinese migrants’ involvement in this particular political event of the host country would give many insights into their acculturation in New Zealand, which could be manifested as their level of political awareness, sense of social belonging, and emotional attachment to the homeland. This chapter is divided into two main parts: the first highlights the design concepts of this case study, including conceptual understanding of the relationship between mass media and democratic elections, and background information about democratic elections in ‘Greater China’ and New Zealand; the second part contains details of the research conducted in three phases, and its findings.

1 New Zealand runs its general election every three years. Once 18 years or older, a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident who has lived in the country for one year or more without leaving the country, is required by law to register on the Parliamentary Electoral Roll. Voting is not compulsory.

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Representative democracy, as Diamond notes, is “a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage.”2 Drawing on ideas from Elklit and Svensson,3 Diamond and Myers argue that ‘free’ and ‘fair’ elections are held under a number of circumstances: when candidates and partisans of different political parties have substantial freedom to campaign and solicit votes, while voters experience little or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices; when electoral districts and rules do not put opposition parties at a systematic disadvantage; when a neutral authority, not the ruling party, controls and administers elections to ensure voting and vote-counting under transparent and impartial procedures; and when competing parties and candidates all have access to publicly controlled (or state-influenced) mass media.4 To elaborate on the reciprocal relationship between mass media and politicians, Hayward and Rudd state it explicitly: political communication demands that politicians rely on mass media through words, sounds, images, and even actions in order to affect citizens and voters’ perception and reception of the political environment. Three groups of actors participate in this political communication: political parties and candidates; media personnel; and citizens and voters.5 Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg conceptualise the interactions between political elites, mass media and the public as taking part in three processes: 1) ‘top-down’, which refers to political elites setting the political agenda for the public through mass media, such as party advertising campaigns in newspapers and leaders’ debates on television; 2) ‘bottom-up’, which refers to the public setting the political agenda for the political elites through the media, for example through opinion polls, letters to the editor and talkback radio; and

2 L.J. Diamond, Developing Democracy: toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1999), 10. 3 J. Elklit and P. Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair?” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 32–46. 4 L. Diamond and R.H. Myers, “Introduction: Elections and Democracy in Greater China,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 366–367. 5 J. Hayward and Rudd. C., “Media and Political Communication,” in New Zealand Government and Politics, ed. R. Miller (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2006), 479.



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3) ‘mediacracy’ [sic], which refers to media determining political agendas for the public and political elites.6 The above ideas about democratic elections and mass media will be applied to analyse the relationships between New Zealand’s political elites, ethnic Chinese media and the Chinese migrant community during the 2005 general election. What specific agendas did New Zealand politicians set to communicate with Chinese migrants? To what extent did ethnic Chinese media serve the needs and interests of Chinese migrants? How did these media mediate between mainstream politicians and Chinese migrants? Along these lines, this case study focuses on inquiring into two aspects of the Chinese media related to the 2005 election: how did ethnic Chinese media represent the New Zealand election, and how did Chinese media play their role in communicating between Chinese migrants as voters and New Zealand political elites? A democratic general election is usually a catalyst for members of a civil society to express their political ambitions and aspirations for socioeconomic mobility. I expected that Chinese migrants’ response to the New Zealand election through Chinese-language media would give some important indication of their adaptation and acculturation in the host country. In this study, Chinese migrants’ adaptation and acculturation will be assessed from how they perceive and participate in New Zealand’s national politics; as new members of democratic New Zealand, Chinese migrants’ perceptions and participative actions can be predicted to be largely influenced by their immediate sociopolitical background in the homeland, which contributes to forging their new identity in New Zealand. As noted in Chapter Two, although Chinese identity has manifold dimensions, they always cluster around Chinese migrants’ consciousness of ‘self ’ in contrast to ‘others’, namely, Chinese as a whole in contrast to mainstream New Zealanders; such consciousness often extends to Chinese migrants’ nostalgic sentiments towards their homeland with a comparison with the present situation in New Zealand. For the purpose of studying Chinese migrants and the New Zealand election, it is essential to understand the background picture of democratic elections in the homeland of Chinese migrants.

6 J. Kleinnijenhuis and E.M. Rietberg, “Parties, Media, the Public and the Economy: Patterns of Societal Agenda-setting,” European Journal of Political Research 28, no. 1 (1995): 96–100.

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This study is intended to focus primarily on investigating the political significance of ethnic Chinese media to the recent PRC migrants. Still, it will touch upon election experiences not only in mainland China, but also in Hong Kong and Taiwan, since some of the discussions on the PRC migrants will be relevant to the wider Chinese migrant community. Democratic Experiences in Chinese Polities Among the three regions, Taiwan is generally regarded as the first Chinese democracy. Defeated by the communists in the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek led the KMT in retreat to Taiwan and resolved to build a different Chinese society on the basis of Western ideas of liberal democracy. At least once every three years between 1950 and 1987 Taiwan held five types of local elections: village, city, county, municipal city and province. By using many ‘dirty tricks’ and the guaranteed votes of military and government party members,7 the KMT manipulated the local elections and maintained its unchallenged leadership until 1986, when President Chiang Chingkuo announced that the KMT would launch major political reforms to democratise Taiwan. That was followed by a group of opposition politicians forming the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose avowed aim was the independence of Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo took no action to suppress the DPP. Instead, on 15 July 1987, the government lifted martial law, allowing the subsequent rapid democratisation of Taiwan. In 1988 and 1989, dozens of political parties were formed and a free press began to flourish; in early 1992, a constitutional reform took place and the electoral process began to expand; finally, in March 1996, Taiwan held its first national election for president and vice-president. Its colonial legacy forced Hong Kong, a British colony until 1997, to have a different experience of democracy. As Pepper notes, within a prevailing Chinese environment, the British authorities chose not to democratise Hong Kong,8 since they considered the Hong Kong Chinese to be ‘politically apathetic’ and to prefer ‘to leave the business of government to the professionals’.9 The colonial government feared the possibility that the mainland communists would endanger Hong Kong’s political stability; 7 L. Chao and R.H. Myers, “How Elections Promoted Democracy in Taiwan under Martial Law,” The China Quarterly 162, no. 1 (2000): 387–409. 8 S. Pepper, “Elections, Political Change and Basic Law Government: the Hong Kong System in Search of a Political Form,” The China Quarterly (2000): 410–438. 9 These two comments were made by Alexander Grantham, the governor of Hong Kong from 1947 to 1957. (Cited in ibid., 416).



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accordingly it left the “population’s anti-communist majority to go about their daily lives to raise their families and improve their livelihood”.10 It was the approaching 1997 handover which initiated the process of democratising Hong Kong. Following Margaret Thatcher’s confirmation in 1982 of Hong Kong’s return to China, the Hong Kong authority introduced a limited electoral process in 1984 and later produced the draft constitution, the Basic Law, for governing Hong Kong after the handover. As Baum has pointed out, the Basic Law, under the guiding principle of ‘one country, two systems’, “retained many of the key institutional features of the late colonial regime, including a strong, appointed chief executive and a weak, mainly advisory/consultative legislature, an arrangement popularly referred to as ‘executive-led government’ ”.11 Hence Baum concludes that Hong Kong retains its political institutions—semi-democratic in form but neo-authoritarian in essence.12 In mainland China, the ruling Communist Party has tightly controlled society since its victory in the 1949 revolution. Western-style democratic elections were forbidden in the country until 1988, which saw the launching of direct and contested elections for village committees and chairs. It is still arguable whether village elections in China are truly democratic.13 Critics such as Diamond and Myers comment that “the PRC leaders have repeatedly stressed their determination to avoid adopting any Western political models and instead design a Chinese-style polity, governed by a single ruling party that combines socialism and democracy with Chinese customs and thought.”14 The result of this is that mass political culture in China still has a minimal level of democratic orientation. Even so, Wang argues that, since China’s rapid economic growth has yielded social changes leading to democratisation, Chinese citizens have showed a promising trend to be in favour of such elements of liberal democracy as freedom of speech, political participation, and interest group politics.15 10 Diamond and Myers, “Elections and Democracy,” 379. 11  R. Baum, “Democracy Deformed: Hong Kong’s 1998 Legislative Elections—and Beyond,” The China Quarterly, no. 162 (2000): 440. 12 Ibid., 462. 13 For example, K.J. O’Brien and L. Li, “Accommodating Democracy in a Oneparty State: Introducing Village Elections in China,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 465–489; R.A. Pastor and Q. Tan, “The Meaning of China’s Village Elections,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 490–512; J.C. Oi and S. Rozelle, “Elections and Power: the Locus of Decision-making in Chinese Villages,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 513–539. 14 Diamond and Myers, “Elections and Democracy,” 382. 15 Z. Wang, “Public Support for Democracy in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 53 (2007): 561–579.

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A separate book would surely be needed to present a more thorough review of democratic experiences in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. Nevertheless, the above sketches are adequate to convey the fact that democratic elections are relatively new political exercises in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, where the majority of new Chinese immigrants to New Zealand were generated. Among them, the Taiwanese are likely to have more experience in party campaigns, fund-raising and political assemblies than the other two. Ip has mentioned that, during the 1996 New Zealand general election, the Hwa Hsia Society of Taiwan, a voluntary association of Taiwanese migrants, even organised a rally of over 3000 people to meet representatives of political parties to discuss the election; it was the largest Chinese political gathering ever seen in New Zealand.16 Party Politics in New Zealand and the 2005 General Election In a referendum held in late 1993, a majority of New Zealand electors voted to introduce a new electoral system known as Mixed-memberproportional (MMP) to replace the First-past-the-post (FPP) voting system, which had been used since 1853 when the first election took place in the country. Under the FPP system, the candidate in each constituency for whom the most votes were cast was elected to the New Zealand Parliament. As far as party politics is concerned, the current New Zealand twoparty system goes back to 1936 when the Labour Party and the National Party became the two clear-cut rivals. Over the following decades, the contest between Labour and National has been the predominant theme of New Zealand politics, despite a number of small political parties being occasionally influential. Those small parties in effect reflected the ideological diversity with­in New Zealand society; the new MMP voting system was designed to enhance their political opportunities. This system gives representation to all political parties crossing the threshold of 5% of the overall vote or winning an electorate seat. With the party vote determining the overall distribution of seats, electorate MPs and list MPs (according to the rankings chosen by party hierarchy) together comprise the New Zealand Parliament. Large parties that fail to win a majority of the seats in Parliament have to work with small parties, which thus may strongly influence the construction of the government. However, both small and large parties have to compromise in such a coalition. New Zealand’s first general election under the 16 Ip, “Seeking the last utopia,” 202.



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Table 5.1. Political parties in the 2005 New Zealand general election. Party

Date of Formation

Remarks

Labour

1916

National

1936

New Zealand First Green ACT

1993 1990 1994

United Future

2000

Progressive Maori

2002 2004

In government 1935–1949; 1957–1960; 1972–1975; 1984–1990; 1999– In government 1949–1957; 1960–1972; 1975–1984; 1990–1999 In government 1996–1998 Not in government prior to 2005 The Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (the forerunner of the ACT New Zealand party) was founded in 1993. Government support Party 2002– In government 2002– The co-leader of the party, Tariana Turia, was a former Labour Party member who had been a Cabinet minister of the Labour-led government.

MMP system was held in 1996. Between 1996 and 2005, three coalition governments (National-New Zealand First, 1996–1998; Labour-Alliance, 1999–2002; Labour-Progressive, 2002–2005) were formed as the results of the three general elections. According to the Chief Electoral Office, a total of nineteen political parties were registered for the 2005 New Zealand general election. However, only eight parties played any significant role in this election. They are listed in Table 5.1. The Labour Party is generally classified as a centre-left party. As Miller comments, the party “professed an early belief in the foundations of socialism, including the need for a fundamental restructuring of the capitalist economy towards public ownership and control”; since the Fourth Labour Government (1984–1990) launched a series of radical social and economic reforms that became better known as ‘Rogernomics’,17 the party

17 ‘Rogernomics’ is named after Roger Douglas, Minister of Finance in the Fourth Labour Government. During this government, he played a prominent role in dismantling the centrally organised welfare system and restructuring the New Zealand economy

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has transformed into “a ‘hybrid’ party of the neo-liberal and social democratic type.” The party still maintains its founding support among beneficiaries, low-income workers, but also appeals to middle-income voters with its free-market policies.18 As the opposition to Labour, the National Party usually presents itself as a hybrid party of the liberal/conservative type based on an ideology that is strongly anti-collectivist, anti-unionist and anti-inter­ven­tion­ist. Traditionally, National supporters tend to be high-income rural farmers or urban businessmen and professionals. After winning the 1990 general election, the party introduced a wide range of governmental changes including substantially reduced social spending and an increased pace of privatisation; it also introduced the Employment Contracts Act to reduce the power of unions. The National Party remained in power until 1999. The New Zealand First Party (NZ First) was founded in 1993 by Winston Peters, a sacked National Minister of Maori Affairs. As Miller observes, “New Zealand First offers the most complete manifestation of contemporary populism.”19 Since the party started, Peters has vigorously campaigned against commercial and political corruption and in favour of settling the Treaty of Waitangi between the Crown and Maori.20 He is best known, especially to migrants, for attacking immigrants. Some critics consider the party comparable to Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia. NZ First enjoyed sufficient popularity to enable it to play a ‘king-maker’ role in the formation of coalition governments after the 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections. The Green Party, as its name suggests, is committed to environmental activism aimed at conserving natural resources. However, Green activists tend to present the party as centre-left, since they believe in ‘post-materialist’ values and advocate liberal views such as opposition to nuclear

through deregulating market, privatising state-owned assets, increasing foreign investment, and so forth. 18 R. Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 153–154. 19 Ibid., 156. 20 A ‘Treaty settlement’ refers to an agreement between the Crown and a Maori claimant group to settle that claimant group’s claims against Crown violations of the Treaty of Waitangi. The New Zealand government has begun a series of major settlements since 1992 in the form of transfer of ownership of some lands, forests and fisheries, and also paying compensation in cash to Maori. By 2010, the total value of settlements exceeded 1 billion NZ dollars. For more information, see http://www.nz01.2day.terabyte.co.nz/ots/Document Library/FourMonthlyReportNov09toFeb10_final.pdf (accessed 15 September 2011).



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Table 5.2. Official result of the New Zealand 2005 general election (data source: New Zealand Electoral Commission). Party Labour National New Zealand First Green ACT United Future Progressive Maori Others Total

Percentage of Votes

Seats Won

41.10% 39.10% 5.72% 5.30% 1.51% 2.67% 1.16% 2.12% 1.32% 100.00%

50 48 7 6 2 3 1 4 0 121

weapons, and the protection of women’s and minorities’ rights. The ACT Party grew out of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers, which was founded by Roger Douglas. The party advocates small government and private enterprise, and also promotes conservative social policies such as low tax rates and welfare reforms. United Future was formed from the merger of centrist party United New Zealand and Christian-dominated conservative Future New Zealand. The party focuses on advocating universal family principles, although some critics object to its explicit religious connection. The Progressive Party is ideologically left-wing and holds policy objectives such as full employment and free education and healthcare. The Maori Party came into existence in response to a controversial law passed by the Labour Government in 2004, which reserved the ownership of the country’s foreshore and seabed to the state, pre-empting any Maori claims based on customary right. The party claims to unite ‘all Maori’ into a single political movement. Traditionally, Maori voters have provided strong support to Labour. Seven Maori seats are reserved for Maori political representation in the New Zealand Parliament. Table 5.2 shows the final result of the 2005 general election. Neither Labour nor National won an outright majority in the parliament. Negotiations with potential coalition partners were crucial for both parties after 17 September, the polling day. Among the six important minor parties, the Greens and Progressive had clearly proclaimed their support for Labour. The Maori Party’s position seemed ambivalent, since Tariana Turia, one of the party’s co-leaders, resigned from Labour, immediately after the Labour Government passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act. NZ First with seven

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seats once again played its role as ‘king maker’. After bitter experiences with National, Peters finally chose to work with Labour as Minister for Foreign Affairs outside cabinet. On 17 October, Helen Clark announced the arrangements for the new Labour-led government, which was a coalition between Labour and Progressive; NZ First and United Future entered into confidence and supply agreements with the government; the Greens promised to work with the government on agreed policy and budget initiatives, and not to oppose confidence or supply for this term of Parliament. Three Phases of the Research The research was designed to generate quantitative and qualitative data by following the development and consequences of the 2005 New Zealand general election as represented in Chinese media, and tracking the significance of those media to the Chinese migrant community, especially the newcomers from the PRC. The period of the 2005 New Zealand general election was defined as starting from 25 July, when the then Prime Minister Helen Clark officially announced the date of the 2005 general election, to October 21, 2005, shortly after the new coalition government was formed. This period covered thirteen weeks in total. Phase 1: New Zealand Election in Chinese Media General Content Analysis In the first phase, I attempted to acquire data which encapsulated the features of the general content of the Auck­land-based Chinese media (including radio, newspapers and websites) during the thirteen weeks, since Auckland has the largest Chinese migrant community and the most sophisticated Chinese media in the country. These features were expected to exhibit characteristics of editorial coverage, journalistic interests, and Chinese audience feedback on such content. Although programmes on WTV were popular among some Chinese migrants, data from Chinese television were not included. This was mainly because WTV was not accessible to those who did not have a subscription to this satellite network, for which there was a monthly fee ranging between $74.01 and $134.40 for different packages of programmes.21 I estimated that the total 21 The information of the pricing range of WTV was publicised on the website of the company http://www.wtv.co.nz/packages.pdf (accessed 8 March 2008).



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size of the Auckland-based Chinese audience who regularly watched WTV in 2005 was much small­er than that of the audience enjoying free Chinese newspapers and radio programmes, and also smaller than the number of Chinese internet viewers.22 At the time of the 2005 election, ten Chinese print media publications had a regular circulation within the Auckland region. As noted in Chapter Four, the New Zealand Chinese Herald has maintained a higher journalistic quality than other Chinese newspapers because of its special connection with the New Zealand Herald in the past. The Chinese Herald has the most diverse coverage with regular original news reports,23 current affairs commentaries, and letters to the editors, in comparison with other Chinese newspapers, which are dominated by commercial advertisements, mainly for Chinese community businesses. I therefore collected all issues of the New Zealand Chinese Herald during the thirteen weeks. This paper was published on every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday; at the end, a total of 39 issues were gathered. For additional information, I also collected special issues of other Chinese newspapers. On average, each issue of the New Zealand Chinese Herald contained 42 broadsheet pages. Although this paper had better journalistic value in contrast to other Chinese newspapers excessively covered by advertisements, this does not mean that the content of the New Zealand Chinese Herald was not predominantly for advertising. Table 5.3 presents a breakdown of the content of this paper. The data show that the content of the New Zealand Chinese Herald was roughly 80% advertisements and 20% news. Table 5.4 presents a further breakdown of the news of this paper. The editorial space for presenting New Zealand local news and current affairs was much less than that for what was happening in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China; news of China covered more space than news of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

22 In 2006, WTV claimed that more than 10,000 customers subscribed to their programmes, but this included both normal households and corporate subscribers, such as restaurants and motels. 23 The New Zealand Chinese Herald has its own reporters to contribute New Zealand news to its front page, while other Chinese-language newspapers rely mainly on translated news from the mainstream English-language media.

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Table 5.3. A breakdown of the content of the New Zealand Chinese Herald. Content News Advertisements Total Pages

Total Pages

% of Total Coverage

7.9 34.5 42.4

18.60% 81.40% 100.00%

Table 5.4. A breakdown of news holes in the New Zealand Chinese Herald. News of Regions New Zealand Hong Kong and Taiwan China Other countries and regions

Average Pages Per Issue

% of Total

1.16 0.74 0.67 0.63

0.027% 0.017% 0.016% 0.015%

While collecting Chinese newspapers, I was also monitoring the Chinese radio 936AM, which was broadcast in Mandarin. Given that both PRC Chinese and Taiwanese speak Mandarin and comprise the majority of the Auckland-based Chinese migrant population, I believed this radio station would generate the most suitable data for this study. It was found that the programmes on 936AM shared a similar pattern of content to that of the New Zealand Chinese Herald, with their dependency on advertisements for Chinese community businesses and programmes including news and entertainment transmitted from China and Taiwan. My primary interest was in monitoring I Love New Zealand, the major programme of news and current affairs produced by this radio station, broadcast between 7:30am and 9:30am from Monday to Friday. This programme is presented in the form of news reports and commentaries on current affairs hosted by two presenters, who also conducted short interviews with VIP guests and invited the audience to participate in the programme by calling in. All the sessions of I Love New Zealand were recorded during the thirteen weeks, which made 130 hours of airtime as raw data. For each day, each minute of the programme time was allocated to one content category, which thus broke down the two hours into a number of sections with different categories of content as shown in Table 5.5. From this table, Chart 5.1 was generated to summarise the data. It shows that advertisements for Chinese community businesses and homeland news (about China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) occupied nearly a quarter of the programme time, although the programme was intended to be news-oriented and is entitled I Love New Zealand.



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Table 5.5. A breakdown of I Love New Zealand on 936AM. Starting Time 7:30 am 7:32 am 7:34 am 7:42 am 7:58 am 8:01 am 8:04 am 8:07 am 8:12 am 8:20 am 8:24 am 8:30 am 8:32 am 8:35 am 8:38 am 8:43 am 9:01 am 9:03 am 9:06 am 9:09 am 9:12 am 9:28 am

Minutes 2 2 8 16 3 3 3 5 8 4 6 2 3 3 5 18 2 3 3 3 16 2

Category local news international news ads, weather comments on local news ads, weather local news international news ads, weather homeland news international news interview ads, weather local news international news ads, weather talk in ads, weather local news international news ads, weather talk in news summary

While monitoring Chinese radio and Chinese newspapers, I also collected data from chinese.net.nz, the most popular Chinese-language website in New Zealand at that time.24 It delivers New Zealand local news and international news including reports on China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and advertisements for Chinese community businesses, and also provides BBS discussion forums. My focus was on tracking Chinese internet viewers’ hits on New Zealand local news and their posts relating to the election during the thirteen weeks. Since New Zealand local news in Chinese-language media is usually an edited translation from mainstream English-language media, I also monitored content relevant to the 2005 general election in mainstream media including the New Zealand Herald, Sunday Star Times, Close Up, Agenda, and Face to Face with Kim Hill on TV One, and the Leaders’ Debates on

24 Although skykiwi.com claims that the website started its operation much earlier, it only began enjoying popularity some time after 2005. Skykiwi.com has now become the best-known Chinese-language website in New Zealand.

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Chart 5.1. A breakdown of I Love New Zealand on 936AM.

TV One and TV3. My objective in monitoring the political content in the mainstream media was merely to obtain a general awareness of the possible sources of information available to the Chinese media over the period of the election. No systematic comparison was intended between the political content in the Chinese media and that in New Zealand mainstream media. In analysing the content of the Chinese media, I aimed to seek answers to the following key questions during the first phase of the research: How did ethnic Chinese media depict the 2005 New Zealand general election? What kind of news reports in Chinese media appeared to draw special attention and interest among the Chinese audience during this election? Did the Chinese media reveal any correlation between Chinese migrants’ comprehension of New Zealand politics and their voting pattern in this election? Election Coverage In order to identify the priorities of Chinese editors’ choices in selecting New Zealand news to be delivered in the Chinese-language media, I categorised all New Zealand local news over the election period in the New Zealand Chinese Herald, I Love New Zealand and chinese.net.nz, into war, politics, economy, crime, health, accident, education, science, moral, amusement and interest. Chart 5.2 depicts the frequency distribution of New Zealand news in the three forms of Chinese media. It clearly shows that the three media shared a similar pattern in that news regarding New Zealand politics and its economy appeared much more frequently than



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Chart 5.2. New Zealand local news in Chinese media.

other types of news, but between these two, the Chinese media overall gave priority to news related to New Zealand politics. Talkback Radio Among the eight major political parties in the election, only ACT, National and Labour appeared on 936AM to promote their platform policies. Each of these three parties had a candidate who could speak Mandarin fluently.25 Standing for the ACT Party, Kenneth Wang arrived in New Zealand from mainland China in 1985 as an English language school student and later graduated with a Masters degree in Fine Arts from the University of Auckland. In the 1990s, Wang was known to the Chinese migrant community as an active critic of the Chinese government subsequent to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Wang was selected as the ninth candidate for the ACT Party in the 2002 general election; however, he did not enter Parliament until November 2004.26 Standing for the National Party, Pansy Wong was born in Shanghai, grew up in Hong Kong, and 25 The Progressive Party list included two ethnic Chinese candidates, but so far down the list that they had no chance of being elected. 26 The former ACT MP Donna Awatere Huata was charged with fraud, and finally evicted from her parliamentary office by a Supreme Court decision. Kenneth Wang then took Huata’s Parliamentary seat due to his high ranking on the party list.

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immigrated to New Zealand with her family in 1974. She was a chartered accountant in Christchurch and became a list MP for National in 1996 as the result of New Zealand’s first general election under the MMP voting system. In 2002, Wong moved to Auckland to contest the Central Auckland seat without success; however, she remained a list MP due to her high ranking within the National Party. Labour initially attempted to put Steven Ching up as a candidate. Originally from Taiwan, Ching was an Auckland-based businessman, and was known as a top fund-raiser for the Labour Party. He even established a Chinese branch for Labour and was given a ranking at No. 42 on the party list for the 2005 election. However, Ching stood down at the end. Every morning for nearly four weeks before 17 September, the polling day, the hosts of I Love New Zealand interviewed Kenneth Wang and Pansy Wong for seven minutes; they talked about the platform policies of ACT and National. ACT also sponsored a one-hour programme Xiaoxuan and You27 every Thursday night, in which Kenneth Wang was interviewed by a programme host and several current affair commentators from the Chinese migrant community; call-ins from the audience were invited. Similarly, Labour delivered a half-hour programme hosted by Steven Ching and another active Chinese Labour party member to advocate general policies of the Labour Party every Tuesday afternoon. I paid close attention to the call-in part of I Love New Zealand, which was a follow-up to hosts’ comments on current affairs, and occupied more than one quarter of the programme time. During the thirteen weeks, more than 500 calls were monitored and analysed. Three major issues relating to the election were frequently discussed by the Chinese callers: Kenneth Wang and the ACT Party; support for Chinese MPs and Chinese candidates; criticism of the Labour Government. According to their content, all call-ins regarding the election were cate­ gorised into three large groups based on callers’ opinions (against, neutral and for) towards the eight political parties. Chart 5.3 shows the results of the analysis of these call-ins. The majority of callers were interested in discussing Labour, National and ACT. With their focus on Labour and National, Chinese callers shared a similar tendency with mainstream New Zealanders who also paid attention to the two large parties. However, ACT attracted much more Chinese callers’ attention than any other minor parties. Only a few calls were made relating to the Greens and NZ First; as for 27 ‘Xiaoxuan’ is Kenneth Wang’s given name in Chinese.



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Chart 5.3. Opinions of political parties expressed on Chinese talkback radio.

the Maori Party, United Future and the Progressive Party, they received hardly any attention. Chinese callers gave overwhelming support to Chinese MPs and ethnic Chinese candidates, namely Kenneth Wang for ACT and Pansy Wong for National. This was particularly the case just before the polling day. Among the 350 call-ins prior to this day, 94 (26%) call-ins were in favour of the idea of Chinese representation in the New Zealand parliament; 98 (28%) call-ins were specifically about Kenneth Wang and the ACT Party. There were even callers differentiating between Kenneth Wang and Pansy Wong. For instance, one commented, “The Chinese community is so complicated and we mainland Chinese are the disadvantaged. Pansy Wong does not represent us. It is Wang Xiaoxuan who delivers our voice.” Another caller shared a similar view: “Wang Xiaoxuan is the pride of mainland Chinese and voices our concerns.” However, there were also callers attempting to soften such differentiation by saying “We should make sure there are two Chinese MPs to stand up for us in Parliament.” In terms of the total numbers of call-ins expressing the opinion ‘for’, Labour received less support than ACT and National combined. On the one hand, it has been explained that the two parties had Chinese candidates; on the other hand, it was also because National and ACT both

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promised tax-cuts if they won the election. Criticisms of Labour concentrated heavily on the Clark Government’s policies of ‘high’ taxation and ‘excessive’ welfare expenditure, in particular on interest-free student loans, unemployment benefits and state housing. In general, these callers complained that Labour abused taxpayers’ money to bribe beneficiaries and low-income earners in order to secure votes. Specifically, they expressed the following views: 1) Labour received a lot of support from Maori and the Pacific communities, since these two communities comprised the majority of beneficiaries; 2) beneficiaries were likely to commit robberies and burglaries, since their incomes were low; 3) the current rampant crimes may have been cultivated by Labour’s welfare policy. For example, one caller made a typical comment like this: For the purpose of stabilising society, Maori and Pacific Islanders should be looked after to some extent; otherwise, they will become mobs. Nevertheless, the current policy is to encourage those who do not work, but reap the rewards; it is actually harmful to them and makes them not motivated. If Chinese are asked to be assimilated (into the mainstream), I’d say it is more important to ask Maori and Islanders to do so, since many of them have become pitiful and dangerous social groups. Labour is their nanny.

Criticisms of the Labour Party also ranged over the Clark Government’s ‘impotent’ performance in controlling crimes and ‘inefficient’ strategies to develop the New Zealand economy. These kinds of comments were often related to Labour’s policies on taxation and social welfares; for instance, Labour is the party which confiscates from the rich and gives to the poor; it opposes entrepreneurs and taxpayers, and stands for the interests of lazy and marginalised social groups. Many African and Latin American countries in the Third World similarly confiscated capitalists’ assets and redistributed them. What’s the result? Those countries slid to the edge of collapse.

The Green Party was another factor contributing to the Chinese callers’ negative opinions of Labour, since the two parties were seen as campaign partners aiming to form a left-wing government after the election. The Greens were considered by many Chinese callers to be a political force with a hostile attitude towards the Chinese government, because the party had been actively involved in supporting the Tibetan independence movement, was openly critical of China’s human rights record, and had also opposed New Zealand’s proposed Free Trade Agreement with China. Call-ins after the polling day indicated that a large number of Chinese voters were disappointed with the final result of the election in which Labour won most seats; National and ACT would not be able to form a



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coalition government. One call-in on 20 September typified such sentiment: “Pansy did not work hard [on campaigning] within the Chinese community like Xiaoxuan did. This resulted in National’s loss of Chinese votes.” Noticeably, two post-election phenomena showed that some Chinese callers’ disappointment turned into personal attacks on Labour supporters within the Chinese community, especially Tommy Tay.28 Tommy Tay, the eponymous host of Tommy Tay’s Commentary on Current Affairs, another programme of news and current affairs on 936AM in each weekday afternoon for one hour,29 was known as a constant supporter of Labour. In his programme, Tay provided a wide range of general background information about previous New Zealand general elections, the MMP system, political parties and some high-profiled politicians. Immediately after the polling day, Tay was accused of misleading the Chinese audience through his programme. I Love New Zealand became the platform for voicing such accusation. One caller said, “Tommy Tay told us that it would be a waste to vote for a small party below the 5% threshold.” This view received a number of supportive call-ins, which all blamed Tay for misleading the Chinese audience not to vote for ACT. On 4 October, Tommy Tay was even labelled as a traitor to the Chinese community; as one caller expressed, “Tommy Tay betrayed our community’s interests . . . ACT could have gained more votes, if all Chinese had united [to vote for ACT].” From attacking Tay, call-ins on I Love New Zealand later shifted their target to elderly PRC Chinese migrants who lived on benefits ‘provided by the Labour Government’. Since the passage of the 1987 Immigration Act, elderly Chinese have migrated to New Zealand mainly under the category of Family Union, which enabled them to join their children living in the country. Mostly being retired, they lived on their own small amount of savings or pensions accrued from China or their children’s incomes which were low. Many of such elderly Chinese migrants therefore enrolled in various English language schools, which enabled them to receive financial support from the New Zealand government to cover student loans and living costs related to full-time studying. 28 Originally from Malaysia, Tommy Tay had been widely considered as a veteran figure within the circle of New Zealand Chinese media since the early 1990s. He was nominated as one of the candidates of the Progress Party in the 2005 election immediately after withdrawing his membership from Labour. However, Tay gave up his candidateship at the end. 29 The style and structure of this programme is similar to that of I Love New Zealand, but attracted very few call-ins from the audience, which made it difficult for me to acquire validate data; therefore, it was not a focus of this research.

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According to these callers, elderly Chinese migrants had made no contribution to New Zealand, but wasted taxpayers’ money by abusing the welfare system; they damaged the image of the Chinese community. Emotional call-ins were made by this kind of elderly Chinese to respond to this. They sounded deeply distressed by such attacks from their own community. As one such caller lamented, “We have had enough traumatic experiences in our life in China, but how could we imagine that Cultural Revolution-style insults would occur in New Zealand?” Afterwards, another caller commented, “National and ACT supporters truly resent the result of Labour winning the election. They choose to attack these vulnerable old people living on the generosity of Labour’s welfare.” The Chinese callers were very keen to discuss New Zealand politics before the release of the final result of the election (including special votes) on 1 October,30 but did not show much interest in following parties’ negotiation towards a coalition government. Before that day, they made more than 400 calls, of which mostly were related to the election. However, it was hard to identify any clear pattern in call-ins after that day, except for those related to one single issue of China’s manned space flight. On 12 October, China successfully launched its second manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou VI, carrying two Chinese astronauts into orbit. A recording of the launch was broadcast on 936AM. This news seemed to electrify some patriotic Chinese callers, who dominated the call-in time of I Love New Zealand. China’s space programme apparently intensified some callers’ national pride of China as a rising superpower. A number of call-ins also expressed disappointment with New Zealand mainstream media. As they commented, mainstream New Zealanders seemed to have no interest in the Chinese astronauts. Newspaper Coverage In the New Zealand Chinese Herald, an advertisement for the Labour Party with a portrait of Helen Clark only appeared a few times; in contrast, much larger advertisements for National and ACT were more frequently seen. The advertisements for National often used Pansy Wong’s portrait. One typical example was a quarter-page monochrome predominantly Chinese-language advertisement, with the logo of the National Party in one corner. Wong was portrayed as a confident and passionate Chinese 30 Special votes are from those who are unable to vote at a polling place in their own electorate on election day. They may include people in hospitals and rest homes, away overseas, etc.



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Figure 5.1. Advertisement for Kenneth Wang in the New Zealand Chinese Herald.

woman, clenching her fist and waving to the readers. It was intended to convey a strong message as shown by eight large Chinese characters: “Actions always follow her words; bold in speech and in action.” In semiotic terms, such advertisements clearly showed to the Chinese readers that as a National MP, Pansy Wong was an outspoken and active mainstream politician standing for the needs of the Chinese community. Figure 5.1 was a half-page advertisement for Kenneth Wang and ACT. Set in a background combined of blue and yellow, ACT’s iconic colours, this advertisement was also dominated by Chinese language under the title “His words will be followed by actions; actions will result in solutions; Xiaoxuan will work harder still”. From a semiotic perspective, this advertisement is a more convincing portrayal than the one for Pansy Wong of how an ethnic Chinese politician had actually served the Chinese community. With a large portrait of a thoughtful Kenneth Wang in the foreground, a series of photos with captions were laid out to highlight Wang’s significant political engagements with Chinese migrants since the 2002 election, in which he was ranked high on ACT’s party list. After showing all his hard work committed to the community as recorded in those photos, the designer of this advertisement aimed to convince Chinese readers that they should now do something for Kenneth Wang, since he had done so much for them. Another slogan, pronouncing that “the only way to

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support Xiaoxuan is to vote for ACT”, was placed at the bottom of those photos with ACT’s logo at both ends. The New Zealand Chinese Herald committed itself to covering the election regularly through one special page entitled “Let’s Look after the Interest of the Chinese Community and Pay Attention to the General Election”. This was in addition to the normal commentary section of this newspaper, which contained articles from regular contributors. Both this new special page and the normal commentary section gave their largest coverage to the ACT Party. Besides special news reports about Kenneth Wang, ACT ran an exclusive column, in which Kenneth Wang and his supporters contributed articles to promote the ACT Party; an article entitled “Be Clear of the Voting Situation, Cast your Vote with Seriousness” on 18 August was a typical example of this type of publication: Dear Chinese friends, please open your eyes to figure out who Peters and the New Zealand First Party are. The truth is: he is an utter political hooligan, who has constantly been anti-Chinese, anti-Asian and anti-immigration, stirring up racial hatred in order to obtain political benefits . . . Up to now, neither Labour nor National nor any other parties have openly opposed Peters. Only ACT is different. The party has a distinct credo, and not only stands up to debate with Peters . . . but also seeks social justice for us Chinese who are humiliated . . . We should be united to vote for ACT . . . since ACT and we have formed an intimate relationship, just like “you are inside me and I am inside you . . .”

On 26 August, the New Zealand Chinese Herald released the result of its survey on Chinese voters’ preferences for the eight major parties, which had responses from 604 Chinese informants. The result showed that Labour received 258 votes (42.72%), National 141 votes (23.34%), ACT 124 votes (20.53%), Greens 17 votes (2.81%), NZ First 5 votes (0.83%), United Future 2 votes (0.33%), Maori Party 2 votes (0.33%) and Progressive 1 vote (0.17%). This result, to a large extent, corresponded to the call-ins on 936AM: the 2005 election seemed a ‘three-horse race’ among Labour, National and ACT to the Chinese migrant community; compared to other minor parties, ACT received enormous support from the Chinese voters, enjoying almost the same level of popularity as National. The reporter admitted that this survey only partially revealed the political choices of the Chinese community, since the total number of people who responded to the survey was much smaller than they had hoped for. The New Zealand Chinese Herald published the questionnaire for the survey in 9 issues of the paper, which claimed to have a circulation of over 10,000 copies for each issue. It can be estimated that approximately



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100,000 copies of the questionnaire were distributed. However, only 250 or so readers answered the questionnaire via post and fax; around 300 people answered it in public places such as Chinese shops and restaurants. The reporter also noted that more than 55% of survey participants were low-income earners (annual income under $30,000); among these people, more than 35% were retired or unemployed (26 August 2005, New Zealand Chinese Herald). The socioeconomic profile of respondents may explain why Labour supporters were overrepresented in the survey. The result of the survey was similar to the patten of the call-ins on 936AM, since it also showed that Chinese voters paid special attention to three major issues: law and order (41.7%), tax cuts (39.9%) and the welfare state (38%). This can be interpreted in the following way: those who were concerned about welfare expenditures also paid attention to the issue of tax cuts; they inclined to relate the issue of law and order to the issue of the welfare state. Unlike 936AM, which allowed anonymous Chinese callers to criticise Maori and Pacific Islanders openly on air, the New Zealand Chinese Herald did not present any specific negative editorial content about the two communities. This may be because the newspaper applied some measure of self-regulation; the format of print media makes it easier than on talkback radio to select and publish only polished views and not random personal opinions. Nevertheless, this newspaper gave space to discussions of ethnic politics in New Zealand, in particular, to some critical voices about the political privilege of Maori. One commentary entitled “Discussing ‘Maori seats in Parliament’ ’’ on 25 August typified such sentiment: Under the MMP voting system, there should be some Maori seats . . . Why should Maori have special seats in Parliament, but not other ethnic groups? The reason is simple and clear, because these seats enable Maori interests to be protected; it also shows that only people from your own race can protect your own interests.

From this account of Maori seats representing Maori political interests, the author shifted to the issue of Chinese political representation in New Zealand Parliament and asked, “Is it safe for Chinese to depend not on Chinese MPs to protect Chinese interests, but on people from other races?” The reporter of this survey apparently approved of this author’s viewpoint, since he or she commented on the survey in this way: “Only people who share the same background and experiences as us can understand our feelings, and will be able to speak on our behalf of in the Parliament.” Sharing a common view with many callers on 936AM, this reporter

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also claimed that “It is Wang Xiaoxuan whom 53.64% of participants [in the survey] believed to represent our interests most.” (26 August 2005, New Zealand Chinese Herald) After the polling day, it was clear that Kenneth Wang’s loss disappointed many people, including the editor(s) of the New Zealand Chinese Herald, since a number of commentaries with a focus on the topic “Who is the winner of the election?” were chosen to be published. One commentator on 22 September wrote, “Although ACT lost the election and Xiaoxuan will be unable to return to the Parliament, we Chinese have been mobilised to participate in New Zealand politics; we therefore have our political influence on the mainstream society.” Another commentator expressed on 1 October, “I feel cold and sad that the tens of thousands of Chinese votes seemed to be swallowed by great oceans. The two large parties have gained large shares, some small parties small shares; what have we Chinese gained? My answer is ‘zero’.” On 15 October, he further commented, “During the election, the politicians knew that we Chinese were not united and took advantage of this. Large parties took more of our votes; small parties fewer. Our Chinese votes were thus divided.” Chinese media personnel Tommy Tay was not only attacked on the Chinese talkback radio, but also came under fire in the New Zealand Chinese Herald. On 20 September, a letter to the editor, entitled “Mr Tommy Tay, I Feel Really Ashamed for You!”, was published covering nearly half a page. In this letter, the writer pointed out, “In your programme, Mr Tay, you always use positive words to comment on Labour, but hardly any on other parties; you deliberately select favorable news reports of Labour, but utterly refuse to talk about the criticisms of Labour . . . many Chinese with difficulties in reading and using English-language media listen to the radio. If they are only able to hear such biased news and commentaries day by day, haven’t you misled them?” Just as the Chinese radio shifted their focus after the election result was released, the New Zealand Chinese Herald also devoted much effort to covering the single issue of China’s space programme; from 13 to 22 October its China news section was almost entirely occupied by reports on the Shenzhou VI. On 18 October, the day when the coalition government was finally constituted, this newspaper published a special editorial section entitled, “Enthusiastic Celebrations of China’s Complete Success in Launching the Manned Spaceflight, Shenzhou VI.” This section comprised a total of 8 pages and was a collection of all kinds of congratulatory messages and advertisements from Chinese community businesses. Phrases such as ‘join the Chinese in New Zealand to applaud our Motherland,’ ‘best



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Figure 5.2. Congratulatory messages in the New Zealand Chinese Herald.

wishes to our prosperous and strong Motherland,’ ‘our pride as overseas sons of the Yellow Emperor,’31 were commonly used in those messages. Figure 5.2 shows one typical page of this special section. From a perspective of semiotics, this section deserves a closer look to examine how meaningful it was to Chinese migrants, especially those from the PRC. First, its title was presented with Chinese characters set in a red background with a gold frame. Traditionally, red and gold are used by Chinese as symbolic colours to celebrate joyful occasions such as weddings and the Chinese Year; after 1949 red and gold have also been used in the mainland for the celebration of China’s National Day, which commemorates the victory of the communist revolution. With a title of such design, the editor clearly stressed the happiness of a special event to draw Chinese readers’ attention. Second, red and gold were also used to frame those celebratory messages along with an illustration of a rising rocket in skies. This illustration can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, it encouraged Chinese readers to revere the significance of an historical moment; on the other hand, it may bring to mind for many PRC Chinese 31 The Yellow Emperor is the legendary ancestor of all Han Chinese.

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certain images of the propaganda for ‘Four Modernisations’,32 with which they are already familiar, and which could arouse their nostalgic sentiment towards the homeland. While inspiring Chinese readers to embrace their cultural heritage and to maintain their emotional link to China, this special section constructed an imagined space in the New Zealand Chinese Herald, enhancing the sense of Chinese cultural and political identity, especially among the PRC Chinese, and consolidating their consciousness of belonging to a distinct group within the Chinese migrant community. .

Cyberspace My collection of data from chinese.net.nz primarily focused on tracing Chinese internet viewers’ hits on New Zealand local news items, which were all edited translations from New Zealand mainstream media. A total of 896 items of New Zealand local news on this website were viewed by Chinese internet users. The frequency of their hits on each of these news items ranged from 18 to 2099, but typically between 300 and 500. The 896 news items were also coded into 6 categories: election politics, other politics, economy, crime and morality, accidents and human interests, culture, science and education. Chart 5.4 displays the frequency distribution of Chinese internet viewers’ hits on these news items each week. One can see that the Chinese viewers’ strongest interest was in the election; this was the case especially before 17 September, the polling day. They did not show the same degree of interest in the process of political parties’ negotiations for forming the coalition government, although their hits increased slightly around the final stage of the negotiation. Besides politics, the Chinese internet viewers also showed strong interest in New Zealand’s economy. However, they had much less interest in news reports about other issues. During the thirteen weeks, a total of 97 initial threads related to the election were posted on this site, each of which attracted an average of 1872 hits and 7.9 responses. Chart 5.5 shows the activity on chinese.net .nz. It is clear that Labour, National, and ACT were still the foci of discussions. These threads and responsive posts can be broadly summarised as supporting National and ACT and criticising the Labour Government on 32 ‘Four Modernisations’ refers to the modernisation of China’s agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. Abandoning the Cultural Revolution ideology in the post-Mao era, the Communist Party set forth these pragmatic goals to strengthen China. Along with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Reform and Open Door policy’, the Four Modernisations programme has led to rapid economic development in China.



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Chart 5.4. Chinese internet viewers’ interests in New Zealand local news.

issues of high taxation and welfare expenditures on Maori and the Pacific Islanders; they had much in common with the discussions on Chinese talkback radio and the commentaries in the New Zealand Chinese Herald; Cyberspace apparently gave Chinese migrants more freedom to discuss the election, in comparison with talkback radio that allowed a limited call-in time for speaking, and the print media where reporters and editors screened the given information. Many posts were very long, and more importantly, provocative; their viewpoints appeared randomly on talkback radio and were hinted in the commentaries of the New Zealand Chinese Herald, but were clearly presented on the Internet. For instance, on 9 September, under the title “Make Sure All Chinese Compatriots Read This” someone advocated that, If Labour collects more tax to stabilise society, is so much discrimination and burglary targeting Chinese in the past three years a kind of harmony? You may receive benefits when you study; however, once you graduate, you will see a large amount of your money taken away to benefit those who are lazy, but discriminate against you, steal from you, and laugh at you. After paying high taxes from your income from hard work, you have to pay your mortgage and guard against burglary, discrimination and children being insulted at school; what is the point of your immigration? . . . If you want more discrimination, you vote for Labour . . . If New Zealand allows Labour

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Chart 5.5. Activities on www.chinese.net.nz. to carry on mismanaging the country, it will certainly fall to a Third World country, because thoughtful people all go to Australia; those left are beneficiaries including Maori, Pacific Islanders and the elderly people.

The author of this post used the phrase ‘all Chinese compatriots’ on the assumption that all Chinese migrants shared common concerns about high taxations, social discrimination against Chinese and crimes supposedly committed by Maori and Pacific Islanders. It received responses such as “I support National!” and What a wonderful thoughtful article! We do need some profound analysis like this . . . Labour has so many MPs, but not a single Chinese MP . . . Some of our compatriots thought because we were working-class, we ought to support Labour; how silly they are! Think about this: why do we work so hard, but only earn a little? Because we are not given well-paid jobs; we are not the people who make the rules of the game.

A similar view was also shared in another typical post entitled “Why Do I support National?”, which stated, Labour’s action is short-sighted. The government collects high taxation from hard-working people to subsidise those young and strongly built who do not work, but cheat, steal and rob . . . Labour’s way certainly gains many votes,



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since there are more poor people than rich in the world. Even so, I think, if National comes into power, I have a chance to become rich through my hard work, although I am poor at the moment; however, under a Labour Government, I will only remain poor and live on the dole, since Labour has no interest in developing the economy to improve our living conditions.

Kenneth Wang and ACT were once again the foci at the discussion forums of chinese.net.nz. On 14 October, a post entitled “Suggestion that Kenneth Wang Join the Labour Party” was the most popular one, receiving 6728 hits in total. The author listed a number of reasons in support of the suggestion, such as: 1) Labour looks after the interests of the working class, supports social justice and assists disadvantaged social groups . . . It is the party which really protects Chinese as an ethnic minority; 2) Kenneth Wang performed the miracle that we Chinese as a politically marginalised ethnic minority rescued the ultra right-wing ACT in this election; 3) ACT is in debt to Kenneth Wang who has done so much for the party, but he was only put No. 7 on the party list, which would not get him into Parliament.

This post received 55 responses. Unlike most responses which supported Kenneth Wang, one did not, but instead argued, I don’t support ACT, since it is a populist party similar to NZ First in the sense of playing the card of race issues. Well, the Chinese know ACT very well. It is not because of the Chinese understanding of the party’s policies and its performance in the Parliament, but because of the propaganda in the New Zealand Chinese Herald. Its editorial space on the election became ACT’s own notice board. . . . It only aimed to manipulate the Chinese to vote for Kenneth Wang. . . . ACT claims to represent the interests of the Chinese community, but what are they? We are unlike Maori who have a common interest associated with the Treaty of Waitangi. We ourselves cannot even define what the interests of the Chinese community are, so how can ACT represent us?

Another follow-up response noted, What a wonderful comment! The Chinese can blame Helen Clark and mock Peters, but cannot criticise Xiaoxuan, because such criticism is considered as helping Peters to suppress our own people. . . . We have arrived in this democratic country from an authoritarian society, but are still constrained by (political) suppression.

Overall, those quotations from 936AM, the New Zealand Chinese Herald and chinese.net.nz were distinct political voices that were rarely heard in New Zealand mainstream media throughout the election period.

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Phase 2: Relationship between Chinese Media and Migrants To what extent did the data reveal the reciprocal relationship between the Chinese media and the Chinese migrant community, especially recent arrivals from the PRC? This question was raised because Chinese editors’ choices in selecting the New Zealand local news to supply the content of Chinese media may not quite correlate with Chinese migrants’ diverse interests and concerns relevant to the election; furthermore, Chinese migrants who had interest in the election may not have entered into the alternative public sphere created by Chinese media, and so their views of the election may not have been revealed in Chinese media (through letters to editors, talkback radio, comments on internet news, responses to public surveys, etc.). I attempted to acquire more data subsequent to the election to complement the findings from the content of Chinese media. The main research objective of the second phase was to interrogate to what extent the diversity of the Chinese migrant community was revealed by the political content of the Chinese media. This implied an investigation of how Chinese migrants receive and make use of Chinese media in association with their experiences of adapting to their new life in New Zealand. What role do the Chinese media play in the process of the Chinese migrants’ settlement and acculturation in New Zealand? How do the Chinese media serve the needs and interests of Chinese migrants in general, and the recent PRC migrants in particular? What kind of content in the Chinese media particularly appeals to a wide range of Chinese audiences? To what extent were the wider concerns and interests within the Chinese migrant community concordant with the findings from the first phase of the research? Given the complexity of this community, I decided to use focus groups as a method to generate qualitative data from the Chinese audience. Regarding the utility of focus groups, Wilkinson argues that “In the focus group, people take differing individual experiences and attempt to make ‘collective sense’ of them. It is this process of collective sense-making which occurs through the interactions between focus group participants.”33 Appreciation of participants ‘collective sense’, according to Barbour and Kitzinger, enables researchers to explore people’s different perspectives, since they react to each other within an established social network. Within 33 S. Wilkinson, “How Useful Are Focus Groups in Feminist Research,” in Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice, ed. R.S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 67.



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such networks, peer communication and group norms drive members to articulate, censure, and exchange their opinions on sensitive issues.34 Since participants may consider a focus group as a relatively safe zone for disclosing sensitive issues, Waterton and Wynne point out that the researcher-researched relationship is essential for the two parties to negotiate their identities within the ‘community’ context of a focus group.35 As discussed in Chapter Two, each individual’s consciousness of his or her own Chinese identity within the Chinese migrant community may result in a variety of controversies, debates and even conflicts among the numerous types of ethnic Chinese. With my own background, originally from the PRC, I expected that non-PRC participants might feel uneasy talking with me about certain sensitive issues, such as conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. Having considered and actually encountered the difficulty of recruiting non-PRC participants to form focus groups, at the end, I decided to form focus groups with the PRC Chinese migrants as majority participants, meanwhile having one-to-one interviews with non-PRC Chinese. Michell notes that, in contrast with focus groups which can efficiently facilitate the exploration of mutual and communal experiences and identities, one-to-one interviews can provide a comfortable atmosphere for informants to reveal certain feelings and experiences which would have remained unspoken if they were in a focus group. This could be connected with social hierarchy, oppression, alienation and stigma that may exist amongst the informants within one focus group.36 In general, parallel one-to-one interviews can avoid the difficulty that some individuals are silent and marginalised in focus groups because of their private and alienating experiences. Taking these considerations into account, I aimed to recruit informants for one-to-one interviews among non-PRC Chinese migrants who were knowledgeable about and actively involved in the public affairs of the Chinese migrant community, especially within their own sub-groups; more importantly, they would openly express their views about this community without any significant barrier resulting from the interviewer being PRC Chinese and them not. 34 R.S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger, “Introduction: the Challenge and Promise of Focus Groups,” in Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice, ed. R.S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 5. 35 C. Waterton and B. Wynne, “Can Focus Groups Access Community Views?” In Developing Focus Group Research. Politics, Theory and Practice (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 139. 36 L. Michell, “Combining Focus Groups and Interviews: Telling How It Is; Telling How It Feels,” in Developing Focus Group Research. Politics, Theory and Practice, ed. R.S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 36–46.

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With my social contacts and knowledge of the Auckland-based Chinese migrant community, I applied the method of ‘snowballing’ to approach potential informants and also sent off the Information Sheet about the research and Consent Form to these people. While evaluating the informants’ experiences of living in New Zealand, I also gave particular conside­ration to their representation of the Chinese immigrants to New Zealand in terms of age, occupation, length of residing in New Zealand, immigration or visa category, and the mode of consuming the Chineselanguage media, in addition to their communication skills. Gender was not taken as a significant factor influencing an informant’s consumption of Chinese media. Finally, nine informants were chosen to form two PRC Chinese-dominated focus groups. I was the facilitator for the two focus groups both held in November 2005. Table 5.6 displays the profile of participants in Focus Group One held in a community centre in western Auckland. All participants in this group were living in neighbouring suburbs such as New Lynn, Avondale, Mt Albert and Henderson, where housing was relatively cheaper and which accommodated a large number of less affluent immigrants from the PRC under the categories of General Skills37 and Family Union as well as many Chinese foreign fee-paying students boarding in these immigrants’ families. Three participants knew each other quite well because they had been regularly attending sports and other leisure activities among the Chinese migrants at this community centre. All participants seemed relaxed and to feel a strong sense of sharing thoughts among companions about their experiences of living in New Zealand. The focus group was conducted in Mandarin Chinese. Focus Group Two was held in a Chinese language school located in Parnell, one of the most expensive suburbs in central Auckland. The students attending this school came from the greater Auckland region and their parents were Chinese immigrants from various countries of origin and mainly professionals with high incomes. Table 5.6 also depicts the profile of the participants in Focus Group Two. The three PRC participants knew each other quite well, but none of them had met the Malaysian Chinese participant before. Interviewing the Malaysian participant separately was considered, since he did not speak Mandarin well. However, he expressed

37 Ho and Bedford, “The Chinese in Auckland.”

Gender

male male female

female

male

male male male male

Pseudonym

Group 1 L W Y

T

J

Group 2 Lg Sh Le Sy

46 47 43 48

23

46

68 72 42

Age

school principal senior engineer self-employed painter secondary school teacher

retired police officer retired engineer self-employed shop owner housewife (volunteer community worker) student

Occupation

China China China Malaysia

China

Brunei

China China China

Country of Origin

10 years 19 years 10 years  4 years

  3 years

20 years

  9 years 10 years   4 years

Length of Residence in NZ

Table 5.6. Profile of participants in focus groups

general skilled general skilled general skilled family union

international student

family union

family union family union general skilled

Migration/Visa Category

excellent excellent very good excellent

good

very good

poor poor competent

English Competence

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willingness to meet others to discuss issues related to the New Zealand Chinese community, and the three PRC participants were also happy to talk in English. Eventually, Focus Group Two was conducted in Mandarin and English. In both focus groups, the schedule was distributed among the participants and they were invited to answer the questions through discussions. This schedule was intended to investigate participants’ perceptions of Chinese-language media, their information needs for living in New Zealand, and their interests in party politics of the country. Selected materials from the New Zealand Chinese Herald and iBall were used in the schedule because of their popularity. As mentioned earlier, iBall often published controversial reports about Asian migrants and students, and thus attracted some non-Chinese readers with interesting observations of Chinese migrants and Chinese media. Given the difficulty in recruiting Taiwanese and Hong Kong Chinese to participate in focus groups, in-depth one-to-one interviews were conducted with two Taiwanese community leaders, who both arrived in the early 1990s and had considerable knowledge of the Taiwanese community and abundant experiences in dealing with the PRC Chinese and Hong Kong Chinese as well as members of the old Chinese community. For them, the interview schedule was a slightly modified from that for the focus groups; the modification mainly covered queries about Taiwanese migrants’ experiences of settlement and their interactions with other subgroups within the New Zealand Chinese community. In addition to the two focus groups and two formal interviews, three informal interviews were also conducted. One was in October 2005 with a 1.5 generation Hong Kong migrant, who at that time was doing doctoral research related to the New Zealand Chinese community. Two other informal interviews took place in July and November 2006 respectively; both of the two informants migrated to New Zealand from China under the Investor category and shared an extensive network within the Aucklandbased Chinese investors who had migrated from various countries of origin. These three informants provided valuable data which could not be obtained from the two focus groups and two formal interviews. Key Findings Chinese Media Primarily Serving Newly Arrived Migrants The focus group discussions and one-to-one interviews revealed that New Zealand Chinese media mainly served newly-arrived migrants. Newcomers



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often regard these media as an essential source of information for their initial settlement in New Zealand. The earlier arrivals still consume Chinese media, but the degree of their dependency on these media to manage their life in New Zealand is much less significant than that in earlier years, since they have become familiar with their social surroundings and have more sources of information to assist in daily life. Many newcomers, even the well-educated skilled migrants who have passed the IELTS test, still consider that their competence in the English language is not strong enough to understand fully the news in New Zealand mainstream media. One participant in Focus Group One made a typical comment: “I read zhonggangtai (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) news on Chinese websites and New Zealand news in Chinese newspapers. It is easy and convenient to learn about New Zealand local news through the Chinese media.” One of the Taiwanese community leaders reinforced this point, “After all, our English is not as good as our Chinese, our mother tongue. As far as I know, very few Taiwanese [migrants] subscribe to English newspapers. . . . The Chinese media are very helpful to many of us.” He even mentioned that in the early 1990s when a large number of Taiwanese migrants arrived, they once formed a newspaper-reading club. As he told me, One person who had excellent English skills translated the news from the New Zealand Herald into Chinese and told others the content of the news, for example, the change into summer time; others then followed up to discuss the news. This [situation] lasted until we had the chance of publishing the New Zealand edition of the Independent Weekly.

The Chinese media are especially important for elderly immigrants. A participant in his 70s in Focus Group One noted, When I came to New Zealand ten years ago, there was only one Chineselanguage newspaper, the Mandarin Times, which was only one page like a flyer, not available everyday, only published once a week. I felt that I was being locked in a cage. I couldn’t hear and see anything [because it was all in English]. I did not know what was going on in New Zealand. I felt I was like a deaf and blind man . . . then I went back to China where I felt very happy with the material and spiritual life. . . . Two years later, I returned to New Zealand and found there were so many more Chinese people, Chinese-language newspapers and radio and TV programmes, and the Chinese community was organising many activities advertised in Chinese newspapers. I began to socialise with fellow Chinese and eventually felt well settled in New Zealand. Without the communication facilitated by the Chinese-language media, I would have gone back to China again.

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Elderly Chinese immigrants have great difficulty in understanding the English language and have to rely on Chinese media to manage their social lives in New Zealand. All informants shared the common view that Chinese media were important to the newcomers. However, they also shared a common concern about these media. The following is a quotation from the discussion within Focus Group One: W: These Chinese media have become a part of our life here . . . they should be responsible for the society and people, not only for the purpose of making money . . . they used to provide some free space for community notices, but now we can only see a few notices from temples and churches. Free community notices occupy editorial space, which affects publishers’ incomes. Y: Indeed. They even published advertisements for illegal services such as selling fake New Zealand qualifications and driving license, which have damaged the image of the Chinese community. Who should discipline them? Q (research question): Do you mean that the media operators should check the credibility of the advertisers before publication? L: Yes, where do the Chinese readers go to complain if they are cheated? W: The Chinese media should be under surveillance, because media can circulate information very quickly. If the information is wrong, it will mislead people. For example, a Chinese student sold illegal contraception pills through advertising in Chinese newspapers. Why do they provide her such space? Without such advertisements, she would be unable to do her business.

Chinese Migrants’ Perceptions of New Zealand Politics and Their Aspirations Most informants shared a view that the Chinese media played a significant role in facilitating and conducting political communication only among some members of the Chinese migrant community during the 2005 election. As described earlier, the coverage of New Zealand in Chinese media during this election was highly political, especially the call-in parts of I Love New Zealand, which were predominantly discussions about the election. However, the content of Chinese media did not seem to report this election in full; instead, the election was portrayed as a three-horse race, since only three political parties, namely Labour, National and ACT, appeared in the Chinese media. One participant in Focus Group Two commented, “We could only see the coverage of three parties up front, and didn’t know what’s going on [with others]. Was money talking behind the scenes? Presumably only



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these three parties spent money on Chinese media, given that these media are so business orientated.” This comment further revealed that some members of the Chinese audience were concerned about the commercial orientation of Chinese media, which may devalue the credibility of these media. In response to my question, “Do you think Chinese MPs represent the Chinese community’s interests?”, a variety of answers from the informants clearly indicated that newcomers largely believed this to be the case. Regarding the perceived ideal of Chinese MPs standing in the New Zealand parliament, the following views were typical among newcomers: “We share the same [Chinese] culture. They understand us”; “We always expect someone we trust to speak on our behalf ”; “We [Chinese] are 3% of the New Zealand population. Therefore, we should have two or three Chinese MPs in Parliament.” I invited all informants to compare the content about Kenneth Wang and Pansy Wong in Chinese media, and indicated that Kenneth Wang seemed to attract more attention and to enjoy wider popularity among the Chinese voters. One of the Taiwanese community leaders commented on this phenomenon, “Kenneth Wang has done many things [for the Chinese community] and took part in all the [Chinese community] gatherings. Compared to Pansy, he is more attractive and approachable to [Chinese] people.” He pointed out the close connection between Kenneth Wang’s main political activities since 2002 and the recent arrival of the PRC migrants. As noted earlier, Wang was selected as ACT’s ninth candidate in the 2002 election and became a list MP in 2004; this was the period which saw a large number of PRC migrants arrive in New Zealand. In contrast, early-arrived Chinese migrants did not seem so convinced about the reason for Kenneth Wang being popular, as shown in the following extract from discussion among the participants in Focus Group Two. This might typify a very different voice from the Chinese migrant community regarding Chinese representation in New Zealand politics. Lg: Some Chinese voters have too high expectations on Chinese candidates or MPs, who may not represent our interest. For example, Pansy Wong supported passing the law legalising prostitution, which is against Chinese cultural values and moral standards. I wish some people were rational and realistic. Sy: Pansy Wong is a list MP, not an elected constituency MP. She doesn’t represent anyone other than the National Party. Only 4% of the New Zealand population are Chinese, and they cannot influence the election much.

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chapter five Therefore, we only hope a MP will treat us equally and fairly, no matter whether he or she is Chinese or not. Sh: Many newcomers don’t understand party politics in New Zealand. Le: We hope New Zealand will be prosperous and safe to live in. I support whoever has such views, not necessarily a Chinese. Why focus on the issue of Chinese MPs?

Another Taiwanese community leader also challenged the idea of Chinese MPs representing common political interests among the Chinese migrants. As he put it, It is hard even to find a common interest within the Taiwanese community because of the activists yearning for an independent Taiwan. It is impossible to have one common interest of the Chinese community . . . The newcomers have limited social contacts [in New Zealand] and are easily manipulated by politicians.

During the interviews and the focus group discussions, I invited all participants to comment on one particular article entitled “Chinese Talking about the 2005 Election”, which was published as an original news report by the New Zealand Chinese Herald on 15 September. The reporter claimed that this article was based on interviews with a number of people within the Chinese migrant community and presented their views on the election. I raised the question whether these views represented theirs or were typical opinions among their social circles. The answers were various. Participants with longer length of residency and adequate knowledge of New Zealand politics tended to comment that the content of this article was rather shallow and superficial. For instance, one said, The reporter did not carefully choose the interviewees. These people cannot represent the wider Chinese community, but only some . . . We are not different from mainstream New Zealanders. Everyone has their own interests and views in a democratic society. Therefore, Chinese opinions on the election should not be just about the three parties and those few issues as reported in this article.

Such comments indicated that some members of the Chinese audience did question the journalistic quality of Chinese media, in particular, Chinese reporters’ knowledge of New Zealand party politics. When I told one of the Taiwanese community leaders that, among the call-ins on 936AM, National and ACT received more support than Labour, he responded,



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Really? The callers comprised more mainland Chinese. They are keen to discuss participation in New Zealand politics, but know very little [of it]. . . . The Taiwanese don’t listen to this programme much. If they do listen, they probably don’t want to call in.

When asked why this was, he did not give a clear answer. However, the other Taiwanese informant somehow gave a reason, Everyone has their own thoughts in a democratic society. These Chinese media have only revealed some people’s views; the majority [of the Chinese migrant community] keep silent, but people observe and make up their mind how to vote . . . The newcomers [from the mainland] have limited engagement with New Zealand politics. Don’t be manipulated by the politicians. Although we [Taiwanese] do not talk, it does not mean that we have no opinions.

From the Taiwanese community leaders’ perspective, in contrast to earlyarrived Taiwanese with more experiences in democratic elections and more knowledge of New Zealand politics, the recent PRC migrants were novices; however, Chinese media provided a platform for these newcomers to discuss their particular concerns and interests at a level which they were comfortable with. Chinese Media Associated with Recent PRC Migrants In response to my question about two mainstream New Zealanders’ comments on iBall, one of the Taiwanese informants said, “I can understand the Kiwis’ feeling that there are too many Chinese newspapers here. They carry similar content, and the competition (among them) is severe.” Having known that he initially arrived in New Zealand in 1993, I asked, “When did you notice such competition?” He answered, In the recent years since 2001 or 2002, during which many mainland Chinese came. It may be easy for them to set up a business like publishing a newspaper. There are so many now. There used to be fewer than five Chinese newspapers owned by Hong Kong Chinese, Taiwanese and Malaysian Chinese.

Taking a different angle to comment on PRC influence on Chinese newspapers, the other Taiwanese informant said, Media operators should take a neutral political stance. I have noticed that recent newspapers are very pro-China. The closed-down Independent Daily was pro-Taiwan. They all provide biased information. I now read hardly any Chinese newspapers.

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Regarding the pro-China content in Chinese media, recent PRC migrants mostly expressed approval and considered it important; for instance, one participant in Focus Group One made the following comment: Chinese newspapers should not report anything damaging our national interests. You are Chinese, China is your own country . . . The Epoch Times and the New Time Daily are betraying our country. In New Zealand, why do they only focus on the dark corners in China? Every country has its own problems.

This viewpoint was clearly shared with other participants. Patriotic sentiment towards China among the recent PRC migrants was even more obvious when focus group discussions were continued on the subject of a Chinese tracking ship’s visit to Auckland.38 As one participant said, We are proud China is leading aerospace science and technology in the world. I was surprised to see that some Taiwanese went to watch the ship. If good things [happen], they identify themselves as Chinese; if bad things, they become Taiwanese.

Phase 3: A Perspective from Media Personnel The findings from the first and second phases provided a broad understanding of the relationship between Chinese media and Chinese migrants. There remained, however, some ambiguity about how these Chinese media were orientated to serve various audiences within the Chinese migrant community. For the purpose of enriching and supplementing the findings and further understanding the relationship between Chinese media and Chinese migrants, the third phase of my research investigated the role of Chinese media personnel; the chief objective was to explore their views on the mission and vision of Chinese-language media, in particular their perceptions of how these media ought to function within New Zealand society. Since starting this research in May 2005, I had developed an extensive network among Chinese media personnel including reporters and editors of newspapers, as well as hosts of radio and TV programmes. Knowing about my research on the New Zealand Chinese media, most of these people were kind enough to provide me with the information requested.

38 On 25 October 2005, the Chinese tracking ship Yuangwang II visited Auckland harbour after collecting scientific data from the Shenzhou VI in the South Pacific.



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I maintained frequent contacts with them and often had discussions with them relevant to the Chinese media and the New Zealand Chinese community. Between November 2005 and February 2006, I attended a number of social occasions at the invitation of different Chinese media personnel, in which some high-profile public figures within the Chinese migrant community were present. Those social occasions enabled my observations of and conversations with a wide range of active members of the Chinese migrant community, including restaurant owners, real estate agents, financial advisers, lawyers, artists and others. As a consequence, my knowledge of the relationship between Chinese media and the New Zealand Chinese community was further extended. With such knowledge, I did not intend to interview many Chinese media personnel formally; instead, I always made sure to take notes of important conversations with these people, as well as maintaining detailed records of observations of the relevant social gatherings. I planned to interview only a few selected media personnel belonging to two main categories: 1) those who had become my personal friends and would enjoy free discussions with me on various topics related to the Chinese in New Zealand; and 2) those of less acquaintance, but who would be unique sources of information regarding the New Zealand Chinese media to which there was no alternative access. In the end, I interviewed the former owner of the New Zealand Chinese Herald (1997–2004) in November 2007, one former editor of a Chinese newspaper in February 2006, a senior manager of WTV in March 2007, the owner of skykiwi.com in August 2007 and a former columnist for Chinese newspapers in November 2007. All of these interviews were conducted informally. That is, there was no pre-set interview schedule, and answers were sought to only some specific questions from these people. In the third phase, answers were sought to three key questions through observations of and interviews with Chinese media personnel: How do Chinese media personnel evaluate the reception of Chinese media according to their understanding of Chinese audiences including advertisers? What vision do Chinese media personnel have of their mission to provide certain types of media content to serve the Chinese migrant community? How do Chinese media personnel position themselves to mediate between the Chinese migrant community and the core of New Zealand society? WTV may be considered the most active media player serving the Chinese migrant community. In addition to delivering translated news from New Zealand mainstream media on its own TV and radio programmes, WTV reports broad issues about New Zealand, including non-topical

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introductions to miscellaneous public service organisations (e.g. St John Ambulance). As the senior manager of WTV described their mission, We are located in New Zealand and ought to focus on serving the interests of the Chinese in New Zealand, no matter where they are originally from. We take a neutral stance on the politics in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. As a settled migrant with 17 years of living in New Zealand, I understand what kind of information Chinese migrants may generally need. . . . We want to be a bridge, a communication channel, between the Asian migrant community and the New Zealand mainstream.

The 2005 Election Campaign Seminar initiated by WTV provided clear evidence that Chinese media tried to build a bridge between Chinese migrants and mainstream New Zealanders. This seminar was hosted on 17 July at the meeting hall of the Auckland Institute of Studies and was organised by fifteen Chinese media companies (including WTV) across New Zealand. In the end, a total of twenty-two Chinese media companies appeared at the seminar, which was attended by around five hundred Chinese migrants. At the invitation of these Chinese media, eight major political parties sent their spokesmen (including Michael Cullen, the deputy Prime Minister of the Labour Government; Rodney Hide, the leader of ACT; and Peter Brown, the deputy leader of NZ First) to answer a total of twenty questions from the Chinese audience either on-site or through talkback radio on 936AM at the same time. According to WTV, the twenty questions were carefully selected by these Chinese media companies from more than one hundred questions generated from an opinion poll they conducted within the Chinese migrant community. Although these questions covered a wide range of issues, they seemed chiefly to focus on the maintenance of the welfare state, law and order, and education for youth. As the second phase of the research found, the actual content of Chinese media represented this election as a ‘three-horse race’ among Labour, National and ACT, although Chinese media personnel may have intended to report the 2005 election in full. Newly arrived Chinese migrants commonly had a high expectation of Chinese media as an important source of information about New Zealand society including party politics; however, these media were actually unable to cater for their needs. Most media personnel did not give a satisfactory explanation for this, except for one who was the editor of a closed-down Chinese newspaper. When I interviewed her in February 2007, she had left the circle of Chinese media completely. This may have enabled her to hold an outsider’s stance and to discuss openly her concerns about the Chinese media:



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These Chinese-language media are operated as private businesses constrained by commercial orientations and therefore only serve the interests of whoever buys the coverage. This is why advertisements comprise the main content of Chinese media.

Although some Chinese media operators may want to change this situation by providing more journalistic content, they have limited resources to recruit reporters and editors with highly developed professional skills to fill the demanding roles. For instance, the newspaper for which she had worked aimed to distinguish itself from other Chinese newspapers by providing characteristic content focusing on the economy and financial sectors both in China and New Zealand, but such content came primarily from Chinese-language sources on the Internet. She noted, A lot of Chinese migrants who have properties and play in the stock market of China also want to invest in New Zealand, either in the stock market or other business opportunities, but they feel it is hard to find such valuable information. We did try to meet their needs. However, we need money to buy such information to put in our newspaper. And again, someone with a thorough knowledge of the New Zealand investment market and good English skills would not work for us on low wages.

She also made a comment on the call-ins on 936AM, especially about the 2005 election: Callers enjoy enormous freedom of speech. Whatever they say is broadcast on the radio. This programme is a free space for people to relieve their feelings including stress and anger. There is no such freedom in the media in China.

I then asked for her view of the role and mission of Chinese media in New Zealand. She answered, It should be a cultural bridge between the Chinese migrants and the mainstream society, and ought to guide Chinese migrants to adapt to the New Zealand’s way of life; it must work beyond the Chinese community. However, in none of the current Chinese media is this actually the case.

Summary This chapter explains how to establish access to New Zealand Chinese media and the Chinese migrant community as scholarly research objects. The central aim was to collect quantitative and qualitative data, which would be able to reflect the wide range of interactions between the Chinese media and the Chinese migrant community. Set against the specific

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background of the 2005 New Zealand general election, this case study was conducted in three phases. First of all, it focused on analysing how ethnic Chinese media represented the New Zealand election. The preliminary findings of the first phase became the basis of the second phase of the research, which concentrated on acquiring data on audience reception of the Chinese media subsequent to the election. The third phase of data collection among the Chinese media personnel was directed by the findings of the previous two phases, which had constructed a rough picture of the relationship between the New Zealand Chinese media and the Chinese migrants, although some aspects still lacked clarity. The aim of the third phase of the research was to clarify some ambiguities through discussions with people who operate the Chinese media. The empirical findings show that the general content of New Zealand Chinese media is constrained by commercial advertisements for Chinese community businesses; however, the Chinese media covered the 2005 New Zealand general election extensively. The Chinese media is an important source of information about New Zealand society for Chinese migrants, especially for the new arrivals. These media construct an alternative public sphere for Chinese migrants to participate in New Zealand politics. Within the new Chinese migrants, especially recent arrivals from China, many were more eager to have Chinese representation in New Zealand politics than more established and earlier arrived people; in 2005 they gave enormous support to a small conservative party which had a candidate of PRC origin and claimed to represent the Chinese community’s interests. During the New Zealand election, a large number of PRC Chinese migrants were overwhelmed by patriotic sentiments toward their homeland because of China’s success in launching its second manned spacecraft.

Chapter Six

Recent PRC Migrants in the Diasporic Mediasphere During the 2005 election, how did ethnic Chinese media mediate between the politics of New Zealand mainstream and marginalised recent PRC migrants? Why did these migrants give enormous support to two conservative parties, in particular the small ACT Party? How can these newcomers’ political concerns and aspirations be assessed, assuming that they have their minimal acculturation to New Zealand? This chapter concentrates on discussing some specific political messages circulated through Chinese media during this election, and recent PRC migrants’ reception of those media messages. Given that their reception is expected to be closely associated with these migrants’ perception of New Zealand as the host country in contrast to how they think about China, their more familiar homeland, I will bring China’s current sociopolitical condition into the discussion. While contemplating the domestic situation in China, my main aim is to disclose the possible ongoing interface between China’s national status quo (guoqing 国情) and its flow-on effects on the Chinese migrant community in New Zealand. New Zealand Politics in Ethnic Chinese Media Chinese Media Economy In order to interpret the political messages in ethnic Chinese media, we have to revisit issues related to the Chinese media economy noted in earlier chapters. As a form of alternative media in New Zealand, the sustenance of Chinese media is essentially dependent on the Chinese migrant community. Although they may be independent of large media corporates and the New Zealand state, as small and private commercial ventures, they are inevitably constrained by their advertisers. The latter may not actually be ethnic Chinese, but do have the pragmatic goal of appealing to a Chinese audience. My content analysis of the predominance of commercial advertisements in Chinese newspapers and radio, and concerns about this among many members of the Chinese audience both show the Chinese media owners’ ultimate goal—maximising profits.

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For Chinese media owners, to pursue the best profits under normal circumstances means to solicit advertisers primarily within the Chinese migrant community, since mainstream New Zealand business operators mostly lack awareness and recognition of the importance of Chinese media; the hurdle of securing advertisers outside the Chinese business circle was commonly admitted by Chinese media personnel during my interviews with them. Given the difficulty in broadening their client basis, Chinese media owners have to cut down the costs of running these media in order to maximise their margin. The desire to keep costs low results directly in media owners’ tightening their recruitment budgets for qualified reporters and editors, and even for advertising sales representatives; in other words, they cannot afford rewarding pay rates to the right professionals. To be a qualified reporter or editor working for Chinese media requires the candidate to have a background of professional training in journalism and to possess strong bilingual skills as well as profound knowledge of both the Chinese migrant community and the New Zealand mainstream; for an advertising sales representative, bilingual skills and a thorough understanding of the Chinese community economy and New Zealand market surroundings including business culture and socials norms are crucial requisites. Ideally, such a person would be well aware of the information needs and preferences of Chinese consumers as migrants and could facilitate appropriate communication between the Chinese migrant community and the host society. In reality, someone with such advanced qualifications would be in high demand in the labour market and be capable of pursuing employment opportunities in mainstream media or other promising careers within the much wider mainstream society, which would be more likely to provide job security, sound working conditions, and more importantly financial satisfaction than Chinese media companies. For instance, a former editor for China Central Television (CCTV) chose to work as a Chinese-language teacher at an elite private school; a former reporter for the Xinhua News Agency turned down the offer from a Chinese newspaper that expected him to act as the chief editor at a salary of $20,000 per annum, which is far below the average income in New Zealand.1 My observations of and interviews with Chinese media personnel indicate that the majority of them are newly arrived PRC migrants 1 For more information about the New Zealand income survey, see http://stats.govt .nz/browse_for_stats/income-and-work/Income/nz-income-survey-population-rebasejun97-08.aspx (accessed 6 October 2010).



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who may put up with a rather low pay rate; they commonly work for Chinese media on a part-time or casual basis, while at the same time working elsewhere to seek other sources of income. Some people used to be media professionals in China and may speak reasonably good English; however they mostly lack in-depth knowledge of the New Zealand society. This lack of suitable professional staff is the main reason for the journalistic quality of Chinese media in general remaining low at a grass-roots level, since the content of these media is always confined to parochial issues and inherent interests among newly-arrived Chinese migrants as a minority group in New Zealand. Ethnic Chinese media can provide only limited coverage of the host society owing to their primary reliance on edited translations of New Zealand news from the mainstream media; one Chinese website owner even admitted to me that he only used translation software to get the job done. But New Zealand mainstream media concentrate on reporting local affairs to cater for the ongoing information needs and journalistic interests of mainstream New Zealanders, who typically do not need much background information. In consequence, newly arrived Chinese migrants, who do need such information about the host society and generally regard the Chinese media as a very important information source, are left with inadequate resources to develop a proper understanding of the social reality of New Zealand. The Chinese-language media and their personnel are therefore not highly regarded either inside or outside the Chinese community; Chinese newspapers are often treated as free advertising flyers piled up at the entrances to tatty Chinese restaurants and Asian supermarkets. Ethnic Chinese Mediacracy during the New Zealand Election The above discussion of the constraints on Chinese media is within the normal context of these media operating under orderly commercial circumstances; however, the situation is different at the time of an election when well-funded politicians become generous advertisers, or the patrons of ethnic Chinese media. Since Chinese media lack qualified reporters and have limited sources of advertising revenue, whoever pays more is likely to receive special coverage in Chinese media. This is what we have seen— the 2005 election was represented by Chinese media as a ‘three-horse race’ among Labour, National and ACT, which indicates that only three out of eight important political parties in this election bought special coverage in Chinese media. Moreover, in comparison with Labour and National, ACT probably spent more, since the party occupied much larger editorial

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space in the New Zealand Chinese Herald, and Kenneth Wang appeared at two interview programmes on 936AM during the election period. Such a ‘three-horse race’ representation of the 2005 election in Chinese media stood in strong contrast to New Zealand mainstream media, especially TV3, which was even under legal challenge because of its unfair treatment of two small parties. In order to appear on television to participate in the Leaders’ Debate during the campaign period, the party leaders of Progressive and United Future took TV3, New Zealand’s largest commercial television station, to the High Court in Wellington over its refusal to allow them on this debate. TV3’s decision was made according to its poll, which showed the two small parties did not receive adequate support. In the end, TV3 was ordered by the court to include the two party leaders on the ground that their exclusion would be detrimental to New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy. This court case was widely covered by mainstream media from the angle of discussing the interference of New Zealand’s legal system in the matter of TV3’s public responsibility. Unfortunately, this court case was not reported by any Chinese media; neither was it commented on by Chinese audiences. This may suggest that Chinese media deliberately avoided mentioning this news because of their own biased coverage of the election. As far as the Chinese media’s public responsibility is concerned, Chinese audiences primarily focused on criticising advertisements for illegal businesses (such as selling fake New Zealand qualifications and driving licenses, and smuggled contraception pills) in Chinese newspapers. This indicates that the Chinese audience may be unfamiliar with the legal and regulatory environment of New Zealand’s media, as well as with the MMP voting system and the importance of the two small political parties, and thus were not interested in discussing this court case. Without any authoritative intervention except for the drive of making profits, ethnic Chinese media enjoyed enormous freedom in their choice of what types of political information they provided. This context is crucial for our scrutiny of the interactions between New Zealand political elites, Chinese media and recent PRC Chinese migrants during the 2005 election. From the framework developed by Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg,2 it can be understood that they took part in the following three processes:—1) ‘Top-down’: at the beginning of the election period, only 2 Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, “Parties, media, the public and the economy.”



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three political parties, namely, Labour, National and ACT, relied on their Chinese candidates to set political agendas for the Chinese migrant community through Chinese media, although Labour eventually withdrew from this process because of its proposed Chinese candidate stepping down. 2) ‘Bottom-up’: some members of the Chinese migrant community, mostly the minimally acculturated recent PRC migrants, expressed their concerns and interests to the political elites of New Zealand mainstream through Chinese media (talkback radio, discussions in newspapers and on the Internet). However, their political agendas were inaccessible to mainstream political elites, except for Kenneth Wang and Pansy Wong who have Chinese-language skills and could understand them through the Chinese media. 3) ‘Mediacracy’: ethnic Chinese media determined political agendas for these migrants and ethnic Chinese political elites in the way that Chinese media represented the 2005 election as a ‘three-horse race’. Kenneth Wang and Pansy Wong were given a favourable treatment by the Chinese media to the direct benefit of ACT and National; of the two, Kenneth Wang even received considerably greater coverage in Chinese media than Pansy Wong. The special role played by Chinese media during the 2005 election suggests that the interaction between Kenneth Wang and the ACT Party and the Chinese migrant community deserves a closer look. ACT’s Asian Campaign The analysis of Chinese media content and a number of informants’ comments in the case study consistently indicate that Kenneth Wang and the ACT Party enjoyed enormous popularity among the newly-arrived PRC migrants during this election. To understand this, a brief overview of Kenneth Wang’s engagement with these migrants prior to the election may help. Despite his own PRC background which many PRC Chinese migrants appreciated, Kenneth Wang won credit largely because he acted as a Chinese community leader in handling three high-profile events involving recent PRC migrants. The first was associated with the New Zealand government’s introduction in November 2002 of a minimum standard of English required for applicants for residency in the Entrepreneur Category.3 This was because 3 Distinct from the Investor Category for people who have substantial capital to invest in the country, the Entrepreneur Category enables people who have successfully established a business in New Zealand to gain residency after their holding a Long-term

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the New Zealand government intended to reduce the main inflows of business migrants from China, Taiwan and Korea based on an official evaluation of the 1999 business immigration policy, which found those non-English speaking migrants with dissimilar cultures to New Zealand undesirable.4 This policy change was a shock to many intending PRC Chinese business migrants holding a LTBV who had established a business in New Zealand.5 They felt that it was impossible for them to learn English and pass the required test at middle age, that they had been deceived by the ‘racist’ Labour Government and that there was nowhere for them to go; they could neither stay in New Zealand nor go back to China, since they had relocated their businesses and families here and given up everything in China. They received a great deal of sympathy within the Chinese migrant community, in which various voices commented that the new rule could be perceived as a contemporary version of the poll tax restricting Chinese immigration to New Zealand. The Chinese media provided a platform for those voices supporting them; this was well documented by a quarter-page advertisement published by the New Zealand Chinese Herald on 26 July 2005, just after Helen Clark announced the commencement of the election. The following translation shows the key content of this advertisement: On 20 July, the Mandarin Times published an open letter by Entrepreneur Visa holders, which was entitled “Three Years of Hardship in Establishing Businesses, a Rough Journey of Future Immigration”; afterwards the New Zealand Chinese Herald published this letter on 23 July under the title of “Entrepreneur Migrants: We Have Nowhere to Go” . . . we have received wide support from the Chinese community including Chinese MPs Kenneth Wang and Pansy Wong, various organisations, and Chinese-language media, especially the radio station 936AM. This has really inspired us with enthusiasm, and we feel that we are no longer a small alienated group. Once again, we call the community and ask for your support to us. Please sign your name . . .

Business Visa (LTBV) usually for three years. Until November 2002, there were no language requirements for LTBV applicants. After that date, the principal applicant for a LTBV or Entrepreneur visa had to have a minimum competency in English; this even applied, though with a lower required standard, to those granted a LTBV before this date and subsequently applying for residence as entrepreneurs. 4 New Zealand Immigration Service, “Business Immigration.” 5 There were also some whose applications for Long-term Business Visa were lodged before the change and who complained that they had made substantial wasted efforts to prepare for coming to New Zealand. Many of those people lodged their applications through irresponsible immigration agents, who misled their clients into proceeding with their migration plans without informing them of the sudden policy change.



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We plead that the government retain the previous immigration policy and abandon this new language requirement.

It is clear that, while the 2005 election was starting, Chinese media helped refresh some Chinese migrants’ memories and interests connected with a past political event, which took place in 2002. Kenneth Wang participated in a number of public meetings concerning Chinese Entrepreneur migrants and made strongly supportive speeches; he organised a petition calling for the language requirement to be abandoned, which gathered 7296 signatures and was presented by an ACT MP at Parliament in December 2002.6 The second event centered around the case of Cong Bo. Cong was a former language school student from China, found guilty of dangerous driving causing death in March 2004. In December 2004, Cong was sentenced to 250 hours of community work and ordered to pay $10,000 reparation to the victim’s family. However, he had quietly fled New Zealand and gone back to China before sentencing. Kenneth Wang was actively involved in the preparation of a formal apology to the victim’s family on behalf of the Chinese community and called for the community to make generous donations to the family. The third was initiated by a PRC Chinese migrant’s open letter addressed to Parliament in March 2005. In his letter, Li Manchao expressed deep disappointment with the effectiveness of local police and the legal system of New Zealand after his house was broken into by burglars three times within twelve months. This letter, demanding ‘equal rights with the burglars’, was widely circulated and discussed on the Chinese media from March to June 2005. Kenneth Wang collected 4936 signatures from the Chinese community for a petition to strengthen criminal law that was presented by another ACT MP at Parliament in June 2005.7 It may be argued that the three events together signaled the building of solidarity and collective self-consciousness among the recent PRC migrants. They all took place after Kenneth Wang became a noticeable ethnic Chinese politician within the ACT Party in 2002; through these events, Kenneth Wang established himself as a spokesman for the recent PRC migrants within New Zealand’s political arena. 6 For more information about this petition, see http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/ Presented/Petitions/c/a/d/cad766a1fa4c41b8bb2327d0d5c66cd5.htm (accessed 3 January 2009). 7 For more detail about this petition, see http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/Search/ Results.htm?search=-1286006141 (last accessed 3 January 2009).

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Figure 6.1. ACT 2005 election billboard.

The ACT Party was fully aware of Kenneth Wang’s popularity among Chinese migrants. He was therefore assigned to lead ACT’s Asian campaign with the specific theme of ‘Stop Peters’ during the 2005 election. As noted earlier, Winston Peters, leader of the New Zealand First Party, had been well-known for his stance of anti-immigration; it is clear that this campaign was designed strategically to target Asian voters, the majority being Chinese migrants. For ACT, this Asian campaign was so vital that Rodney Hide, leader of the ACT Party, admitted that the Asian vote is “one of Act’s most potent weapons”8 and contributed to ACT’s victory in an electorate and in securing a list MP in Parliament.9 Figure 6.1 shows the image of the billboard for this campaign, which was the first political billboard in New Zealand with a nearly all-Chinese message.10 Fronted by Kenneth Wang, this billboard showed Peters playing kingmaker to Helen Clark (for Labour) and Don Brash (for National), and warned that any government with NZ First would be a recipe for chaos. From the billboard with an emphasis on anti-racism,11 it seemed that Kenneth Wang was sending three messages to Chinese voters on behalf of his party: 1) ACT is concerned about racism and looks after the particular interest of Chinese migrant community; 2) ‘Stop Peters’ was the only way to stop a racist politician holding the balance of power; 3) ACT shared a common view with National on the issue of tax cuts. To stress the first two 8 Hide’s address to the ACT campaign launch, Ellerslie Convention Centre, Auckland, September 4, 2005. 9 ‘ACT is Back’, a speech by Rodney Hide to the Victoria University 2005 Post-Election Conference, 2 December 2005, Legislative Chamber, Parliament Buildings. 10 ACT was the first political party in New Zealand to advertise using the Chinese language on campaign billboards, which appeared in the 2002 election. 11  When ACT launched this billboard, it noted, “Don Brash and Helen Clark should condemn Peters’ racist politics and rule out dealing with him. He only has power because National and Labour are prepared to deal with him.” For ACT’s newsletter entitled, “Stop Peters by action billboard launched”, see http://www.act.org.nz/node/27300 (last accessed 3 January 2009).



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points, a Chinese-language sentence, “ACT opposes racism most firmly”, was put along with Kenneth Wang’s portrait; under the portrait Kenneth Wang’s signature in Chinese appeared much larger than the English wording, ‘Kenneth Wang MP’. Those who did not know much about the ACT Party and Kenneth Wang’s role might assume that Kenneth Wang was the leader of ACT. Regarding tax cuts, the third message aimed to convince the audience that ACT is similar to National, which many Chinese migrants were familiar with because of Pansy Wong being another ethnic Chinese MP. With an overwhelming coverage in Chinese media, Kenneth Wang and ACT transmitted these three messages widely to Chinese migrants. Knowing well his extensive influence within the Chinese migrant community, Kenneth Wang proclaimed, “The only way to support Xiaoxuan is to give your party vote to ACT,” which was one of ACT’s campaign slogans in the Chinese print media. Figure 6.2 shows another ACT advertisement in the Chinese Times, a Chinese-language weekly claiming a circulation of 10,000 copies in Auckland. The content of this full-page advertisement was dominated by the signatures of many Chinese, who were presumably Kenneth Wang’s supporters. These signatures corresponded to the title of this advertisement, “From the same root and origin we share the same fate, Xiaoxuan, we support you!” At the bottom of these signatures, Kenneth Wang’s portrait was used again by the ACT Party to remind Chinese voters, “Let’s meet on 17 September, awaiting your participation and support”. On the whole, using Chinese media to set agendas for Chinese migrants, Kenneth Wang and the ACT Party made ‘Stop Peters’ or anti-racism the central issue of the 2005 election for Chinese voters. ACT’s strategy proved successful in the sense of winning a great deal of support among the recent PRC migrants, who were deeply disappointed with Kenneth Wang’s failure to return to Parliament. In contrast, as my interviews disclosed, a number of the earlier Chinese migrants including Taiwanese and some PRC immigrants did not show the same enthusiasm for Kenneth Wang and the ACT Party. The popularity that Kenneth Wang and ACT enjoyed among many recent PRC migrants may be interpreted in the following ways. First of all, it revealed these newly arrived migrants’ particular anxiety about a ‘racist’ politician being so influential in mainstream politics. Being sociocultural aliens and feeling vulnerable politically, these newcomers sought equally powerful leadership from a trustworthy mainstream politician, who ideally was also a leader of the Chinese community, to stand up

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Figure 6.2. ACT’s advertisement in the Chinese Times.

for them and thus provide protection. Given their orientation of supporting Chinese candidates and MPs, it suggests that these newcomers did not have faith in anyone other than ethnic Chinese politicians, who understood their major concern and claimed to represent Chinese migrants. Since Kenneth Wang had the advantage of coming from an authentic PRC background and Pansy Wong did not, some recent PRC migrants even did



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not have faith in Wong, simply because their nostalgic sentiment towards China played a central role in uniting them to forge a distinct sub-group within the Chinese community; their strong feeling towards China was clearly manifested as their zeal for celebrating the success of China’s space programme during the New Zealand election. Recent PRC migrants’ support for ACT, on the other hand, also revealed that these newcomers lacked in-depth understanding of New Zealand’s political system and the party politics in this country. Regarding the essence of MMP which enables political representations of minority views in Parliament, they hardly made any comment other than the issue of Chinese representation. Except for audiences’ few comments on NZ First connected to ACT and on Greens to Labour, the other three important small parties in the election were almost absent in the Chinese mediasphere. Among Chinese media operators and the audience, the silence about the high profile TV3 court case involving Progressive and United Future was an excellent example of their disregard for the two small parties. Neither Chinese media personnel nor audience paid attention to the Maori Party, a new race-based political party just emerging to contest in the 2005 election. Neglecting the ground of Maori politics associated with the Treaty of Waitangi, the content of Chinese media and audience’s interest instead focused mainly on the social aspect of Maori being welfare beneficiaries. I traced the discussion forum on chinese.net.nz and found not even a single post about the Orewa speeches by Don Brash,12 the then leader of the National Party. In contrast, New Zealand mainstream media showed that many critics commented on Brash playing the race card against Maori, which contributed to National’s soaring rate of popularity ever since its humiliating defeat by Labour at the 2002 election. The paucity of representation of the Maori Party and related political issues in the Chinese mediasphere suggests that most new Chinese migrants may not even have realised why and how they were marginalised, being uninvolved in the central theme of contemporary New Zealand politics.

12 Shortly after becoming the National Party leader, Brash made his first controversial Orewa speech on New Zealand nationhood in January 2004, in which he advocated ‘one rule for all’ by ending the Treaty of Waitangi as a basis for creating Maori separatism that he believed existed. In his second Orewa speech in January 2005, Brash emphasised the issue of welfare dependency, which was also sensitive for Maori with a high percentage of beneficiary population. For full texts of the two speeches, see http://www .national.org.nz/speech_article.aspx?ArticleID=1614, and http://www.national.org.nz/Article .aspx?articleId=3498 (last accessed 19 October 2011).

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In addition, recent PRC Chinese migrants’ poor understanding of New Zealand politics was ultimately exhibited by the fact that they barely compared the eight parties’ history, membership, ideology or even campaign platform policies. The post “Suggestion that Kenneth Wang Join the Labour Party” being popular on chinese.net.nz was another good example showing that these newcomers clearly lacked adequate knowledge of such issues. Furthermore, along with the many domestic issues on which Labour and National competed for most votes, New Zealand’s foreign policy, especially with regard to the nuclear-free zones legislation and the country’s complicated relationship with the United States,13 was another frontline of battle for the two major parties at the 2005 election. During the election, with the death of David Lange, the Prime Minister of the Fourth Labour Government, renowned for bringing New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance to the world stage, Labour and National’s nuclear policies were intensively covered by the mainstream media and were also widely discussed by their audiences. In contrast, the Chinese mediasphere was preoccupied by parochial issues concerning new Chinese migrants; this indicates that most people were not aware that New Zealand’s nuclear-free zone legislation contributed significantly to forging the national identity of their host country. Recent PRC Migrants’ Affinity with Conservative Parties The ‘new rich’ from China The Chinese mediasphere showed that during the 2005 election recent PRC migrants largely supported ACT and National, which are both considered as conservative parties in New Zealand; ACT is often considered as an ultra-right-wing party. As discussed above, their approval of the two parties was clearly because these new migrants had expectations of Chinese representation in the New Zealand Parliament, but in fact lacked understanding of the party politics of the host country. Besides this, with their conservative views mainly being expressed as criticism of the centreleft Labour Government, especially on issues of taxation and maintenance 13 The Fourth Labour Government passed the New Zealand nuclear-free zone legislation in 1987, which resulted in the United States suspending its ANZUS Treaty obligations to New Zealand and downgrading New Zealand’s status from ‘ally to friend’. For more information from the New Zealand official source, see http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/poli tics/nuclear-free-new-zealand/nuclear-free-zone (accessed 19 October 2011).



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of the welfare state, it suggests that there are also other factors contributing to recent PRC migrants having affinity with conservative parties, even if they have no Chinese candidates. To explore other factors, we have to go beyond New Zealand and to probe a much broader sociopolitical context in China. Why do those who recently immigrated to New Zealand from China tend to perceive their host country in a particular way? To answer this question, and to validate and make the following arguments concrete, a closer look at who are these recent PRC migrants against the backdrop of China’s current state of the nation (guoqing国情) is essential. As discussed earlier, recent PRC migrants are drawn from a certain category of people in China. Statistics show that since the early 2000s the major sources of recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand are former foreign fee-paying students, business people, and their family members. All of these are relatively wealthy, being the immediate beneficiaries of China’s rapid economic growth in recent years. They comprise a small stream of China’s newly emerged upper and middle classes, who largely cluster in the country’s eastern and coastal provinces, and are made up of the urban-based private entrepreneurs, managers in state or foreign firms, and some professionals in sectors such as IT and finance. China’s ‘new rich’ have drawn a great deal of international media attention, including Forbes, who now compile a list of the richest Chinese. In 1999, it took US$6 million to get on the China top 50. In 2002, the person who ranked 50th on the list was worth US$110 million (Time, 16 September 2002).14 The Merrill Lynch Cap Gemini survey shows that “China had 320,000 millionaires (those with $1 million in investible assets) in 2005, up 6.8% from 2004. Granted, China’s millionaire growth rate is the same as that of the U.S., which had 2.67 million millionaires in 2005. In other words, China has about the same number of millionaires as Ohio.”15 The wealth of the Chinese middle class has also significantly increased and the size of this social group is expanding, although the definition of the Chinese middle class varies. The survey by the Sociology Institute of the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2001 found that the Chinese middle class accounted for 20% of the total population (People’s

14 http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/1101020923/story.html (accessed 16 October 2008). 15 http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2007/05/30/chinas-new-billionaires/ (accessed 16 October 2008).

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Daily Online, 5 October 2008).16 According to Euromonitor International, the middle class in China is defined as comprising households with an annual income between RMB 60,000 and RMB 500,000 in 2005. By this definition, the Chinese middle class grew from 65.5 million in January 2005 to 80 million in January 2007.17 On the other hand, the world has also seen that the economic disparity in China between urban and rural, and between the country’s eastern coastal provinces and western hinterland, is another significant consequence of China’s economic boom. According to an official Chinese source, at the end of 2006, “75.5 percent of villages in the whole country still had no central water purifying systems, while 84.2 percent lacked garbage treatment plants and 79.4 percent had unhygienic toilets . . . Hamlets with gym facilities or libraries only accounted for less than 15 percent of the total. Licensed medical practitioners were unavailable in 23.9 percent of all villages” (Xihua News Agency, 22 February 2008).18 Regarding the uneven development between China’s eastern and western regions, Lu and Neilson note that, with 28.8% of the Chinese population and 71.4% of the land area of the country, the western interior’s share of the national GDP is under 17%; the per capita income of the western interior is less than 40% of that in the eastern provinces.19 Many more studies present further evidence depicting such a gap.20 This explains why the Chinese government implemented the Great Western Development Program in 2000. In order to seek a better life, millions of peasants, especially those in the western hinterland, have migrated to cities to work. China’s National Bureau of Statistics has revealed that the number of Chinese peasants moving to cities as migrant workers rose by more than 80 million between 16 http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6509680.html (accessed 16 October 2008). 17 http://www.euromonitor.com/chinas-middle-class-reaches-80-million/article (accessed 16 October 2011). 18 http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/243467.htm (accessed 8 October 2008). 19 D. Lu and W.A.W. Neilson, “Introduction: Western China Development—Issues and Challenge,” in China’s West Region Development: Domestic Strategies and Global Implications, ed. D. Lu and W.A.W. Neilson (Singapore: World Scientific, 2004), 1. 20 For example, S. Li and W. Tang, eds., China’s Regions, Polity, and Economy: a Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-reform Era (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000); J.Y. Lin, G. Wang, and Y. Zhao, “Regional Inequality and Labor Transfers in China,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 3 (2004): 587–603; M. Ravallion and S. Chen, “China’s (Uneven) Progress against Poverty,” Journal of Development Economics 82, no. 1 (2007): 1–42; C.C. Fan and M. Sun, “Regional Inequality in China, 1978–2006,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 49, no. 1 (2008): 1–18.



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1996 and 2006; the total number of migrant workers stood at 130 million by the end of 2006.21 This number is about 10% of the entire Chinese population. A large body of literature has well documented the life of these migrant workers who mainly find employment within labour-intensive sectors such as construction, food service, and manufacturing. These unskilled and menial jobs are usually considered low-paid and undesirable by urban residents’ standards.22 A large survey in 2004 by the Ford Foundation and Peking University’s Research Centre for Contemporary China shows that although the incomes of migrant workers are indeed higher than that of rural residents, they are in general still much lower than that of urban residents.23 It suggests that most migrant workers have fallen into urban poverty, even if they have much improved their living conditions. So far, studies on poverty in urban China are mostly related to the country’s large scale privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) started in the early 1990s, which has resulted in millions of laid-off (xiagang下岗) workers and retirees with limited or no regular pension.24 These studies capture the mushrooming protests by the unemployed and pensioners seen in one Chinese city after another, especially in the highly industrialised northeastern provinces.25 Protesters demanded compensation for their lay-off benefits and unpaid livelihood allowances including pensions. As Hussain comments, in the past “the urban poor were small in

21  http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/243467.htm (accessed 8 October 2008). 22 For example, D.J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); A. Chan, “The Culture of Survival: Lives of Migrant Workers through the Prism of Private Letters,” in Popular China: Unofficial Culture in a Globalizing Society, ed. P. Link, R.P. Madsen, and P.G. Pickowicz (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 163–189; W. Feng, X. Zuo, and D. Ruan, “Rural Migrants in Shanghai: Living Under the Shadow of Socialism,” International Migration Review 36, no. 2 (2002): 520–545; C.C. Fan, “Ruralurban Migration and Gender Division of Labor in Transitional China,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 1 (2003): 24–47. 23 W. Tang and Q. Yang, “The Chinese Urban Caste System in Transition,” The China Quarterly 196, no. 1 (2008): 767. 24 Solinger notes that government statistics for such laid-off workers are ‘murky’, and unofficial calculations ‘grim’. Therefore, it is even more difficult to trace the accurate figure of such retirees (D.J. Solinger, “Labour Market Reform and the Plight of the Laid-off Proletariat,” The China Quarterly 170 [2002]: 304–305). 25 For example, Solinger, “Labour Market Reform and the Plight of the Laid-off Proletariat”; W. Hurst and K.J. O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners,” The China Quarterly 170, no. 1 (2002): 345–360; F. Chen, “Privatization and Its Discontents in Chinese Factories,” The China Quarterly 185, no. 1 (2006): 42–60; C.K. Lee, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

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number and characterized by the so-called ‘three nos’: no ability to work, no savings or other income source and no relatives to depend on. The ‘new urban poor’ in the period since the 1990s have not only been more numerous but also, for the most part, able and willing to work but unable to find jobs.”26 The Gini coefficient is commonly used as an indicator for measuring the overall degree of income inequality of a country. Much research shows that China’s Gini coefficient has experienced a noticeable rise since the early 1990s.27 The danger line for the Gini coefficient as defined by the Chinese government is 0.40.28 Citing from a report by the World Bank, a Chinese official source admitted that China already reached the second most serious ‘yellow light’ Gini level of 0.458 in 2003.29 Statistical summaries help paint a clearer picture of the striking disparity in China—for instance, according to Euromonitor International, in 1990 the richest 10% of Chinese households possessed 19.0% of the national wealth; by 2006, their share had risen to over 40.0%.30 Shirk has another set of data: the richest 10 percent hold 45 percent of the country’s wealth, and the poorest 10 percent have only 1.4 percent. The per capita income of urban residents is now 3.23 times that of rural dwellers compared to 2.57 that of rural dwellers back in 1985. The annual growth rate of urban incomes (8–9 percent) is almost twice that of rural incomes (4–5 percent).31

Being the ‘new rich’ from China, the recent PRC migrants perceive New Zealand in a particular way, which is reflected primarily by their support for conservative parties, namely National and ACT, and their intense criticism of the centre-left Labour government and its conduct in maintaining the welfare state. The influence of these migrants’ privileged socioeconomic 26 A. Hussain, “Social Security in Transition,” in Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and Changing Patterns of Inequality, ed. V. Shue and C. Wong (London: Routledge, 2007), 108. 27 For example, A.R. Khan and C. Riskin, “Income and Inequality in China: Composition, Distribution and Growth of Household Income, 1988 to 1995,” China Quarterly 154 (1998): 221–253; X. Meng, R. Gregory, and Y. Wang, “Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Urban China, 1986–2000,” Journal of Comparative Economics 33, no. 4 (2005): 710–729; Ravallion and Chen, “China’s (Uneven) Progress against Poverty”; D. Benjamin et al., “Income Inequality during China’s Economic Transition,” in China’s Great Economic Transformation, ed. L. Brandt and T.G. Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 729–776. 28 S.L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 31. 29 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1045/2095334.html (accessed 26 October 2011). 30 http://www.euromonitor.com/chinas-middle-class-reaches-80-million/article (accessed 16 October 2011). 31  Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 31.



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background in their homeland is independent of the presence of Pansy Wong and Kenneth Wang as Chinese candidates and the propaganda by National and ACT; it is the common ground which these people share with National and ACT. In this context, their criticism of the Labour government’s ‘high’ tax policy and ‘massive expenditure’ on beneficiaries can be interpreted by reference to current China, a society in which uneven distribution of wealth and social inequalities are widespread and rapidly changing in contrast to the country’s delay in establishing an integrated social security system at a national level. Concerns about the Welfare State As discussed above, China’s Gini coefficient reached the ‘yellow light’ level in 2003; a small number of urban rich and a sizable middle-class control the greatest proportion of the country’s wealth, while the majority of the Chinese population remain in poverty. The Chinese government has realised the danger that such a pyramidal social structure is likely to result in political instability. To provide some financial assistance to the ‘new urban poor’, the government first experimented with the Minimum Living Standard Allowance (MLSA, or dibao 低保) in Shanghai in 1993, which was eventually adopted nationwide in 1999. In 1998, a new social security system aiming to cover a wider range of Chinese citizens was implemented under the management of the newly established Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Branch offices of this ministry in all provinces across China were finally set up by the end of 1999. However, as Hussain observes, “both rural and urban social security systems are highly decentralised, the former more than the latter”;32 for instance, social insurance and pension schemes only cover 7 percent of the total rural population in China, while “in the case of the old-age pension the number of participants came to 62 percent of the urban labor force”.33 Gao and her associates have also found that “2.3 percent of all urban residents were eligible for MLSA, but only slightly less than half of them were participants” of the scheme.34 In addition, as Gao points out, migrants, the so-called floating population between rural and urban China, “receive virtually no social

32 Hussain, “Social Security in Transition,” 112. 33 Ibid., 110. 34 Q. Gao, I. Garfinkel, and F. Zhai, “Anti-poverty Effectiveness of the Minimum Living Standard Assistance Policy in Urban China,” Review of Income and Wealth 55 (2009): 653.

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benefits . . . In 2002, less than 5% of migrants received any pensions, unemployment insurance, or health benefits.”35 In China, it has been a long established tradition that a person is expected to receive financial support from family members and friends, if needed; as Hurst and O’Brien note, even some Chinese experts on labour issues believe that retirees in financial difficulties ought to rely on their children or relatives instead of the state.36 In the past, especially during the pre-reform period, any state relief was expected to go mostly to those without supporters such as orphans, widows, the disabled, and the childless elderly. Hence, the increase of population receiving the MLSA is regarded by many Chinese as an undesirable aspect of the prosperous business districts in urban China; those people may also overlook the absence of MLSA for a much larger number of rural residents in much worse impoverishment. Overall, receiving benefits challenges both China’s conventional value system and its long-standing social norms which consistently reward hardworking people and condemn hangers-on. While a new social security system is in the making in China, those in severe poverty supported by state benefits still suffer from institutionalised social discrimination and stigmatisation. In addition, at local government levels new administrative obstacles brought out by the new system are also impeding the implementation of many new policies; for instance, as Cho documents, some local officials have been accused of corruption, since they are perceived to have granted the MLSA to ‘those who make big money’, but not to the applications from the ‘actually poor’.37 The above background information may help explain why during the 2005 election many recent PRC migrants in New Zealand expressed their concerns that a large number of working-aged New Zealanders lived on the dole, and even more people would enjoy benefits such as state housing, subsidies to working families, interest-free student loan, promised by the ‘overly generous’ Labour government. From their point of view, only the elderly and disabled people who are in a state of total helplessness without any power of earning income are entitled to or deserve government assistance. Their perception of the social security system primarily serving the poor is conditioned by the specific social context in China. 35 Q. Gao, “The Chinese Social Benefit System in Transition,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1136, no. 1 (2008): 346. 36 Hurst and O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners,” 352. 37 M.Y. Cho, “On the Edge between ‘the People’ and ‘the Population’: Ethnographic Research on the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee,” The China Quarterly 201, no. 1 (2010): 33.



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Within the developed world, the welfare state as an institutional framework is generally considered as a mechanism to coordinate social integration and maintain political stability. It has been well established that, “Welfare institutions intervene and alter the original allocation of resources in the society . . . Despite the popular view that welfare payments mainly assist the poor, these payments are only a small portion of government transfers. Thus, in many cases the term ‘social security spending’ is preferred to ‘welfare state’ to delineate the role of social security in maintaining a minimum income level, and the social security system itself generally evolves around three primary goals of welfare programs: redistribution, efficiency, and social cohesion”.38 Such a concept of the welfare state encompasses the provision of citizens’ social rights and their participation in a civil society. However, in the case of China, institutionalised social discrimination against recipients of state welfare such as the MLSA is not just due to the current value system of the Chinese society, but also to the slow pace of development of China’s civil society. In China, disadvantaged social groups lack legally protected rights to participate in the processes of decision-making about their welfare. This argument is based on the findings of many studies of the numerous protests by laid-off workers and vulnerable pensioners in urban China fighting for their rights as noted earlier. Furthermore, to canvass the infraction of Chinese citizens’ right ought to essentially connect with the hukou system, which restricts rural residents to live in cities.39 Numerous studies have well established that the hukou system

38 J. Li, Y. Feng, and I. Gizelis, “China’s New Social Security System in the Making: Problems and Prospects,” International Journal of Public Administration 31, no. 1 (2007): 10; also see: H.L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); J. Myles and J. Quadagno, “Political Theories of the Welfare State,” Social Service Review 76, no. 1 (2002): 34–57; C. Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State?: the New Political Economy of Welfare (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991). 39 ‘Hukou’ is a record of household registration, which officially identifies a Chinese citizen as an urban or rural resident. China originally implemented the hukou system in the 1950s. Under this system, rural residents are strictly prohibited from living in cities without an official urban residency permit; unlike urban residents they are not entitled to social welfare including job security, guaranteed incomes and pensions, subsidised housing, medical care, education, and so forth. Although the hukou system has been eroded since the 1980s, with the rural population increasingly leaving the land to seek temporary employment in many Chinese cities, it is still a long way from abolition. (K.W. Chan and W. Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” The China Quarterly 195 [2008]: 582–606).

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has institutionally differentiated the Chinese citizens into two classes and thus two worlds.40 It chiefly results in migrant workers experiencing an array of discrimination and injustice imposed by urban residents. There is abundant research to provide evidence of this: employers commonly charge migrant workers a ‘deposit’ of their wages to force them to become bonded labour; most migrant workers have no legal protection from workplace injuries, no sickness leave and unpredictable redundancy; migrant workers’ children are denied admission to urban schools or are charged much higher fees, so are left behind in the countryside.41 Unfortunately, attaining social equality and justice through redistributing social resources seems an alien ideology to China’s ‘new urban rich’. This is reflected in the fact that China currently lacks a broad tax base from which to generate revenues needed for its newly established social security system.42 For the rich, ‘taxation’ means a rather unpleasant byproduct of the process of accumulating their wealth. In 1999, the list of Forbes magazine survey of China’s richest was called the ‘death list’, since it resulted in a visit of the tax police to many who eventually ended in jail due to fraud (Bloomberg Businessweek, 6 February 2006).43 Findings of the surveys jointly conducted in 2003 and 2004 by China’s State Administration of Taxation and China Taxation magazine also revealed the ordinary Chinese public’s assumption that “tax evasion by the wealthy is rampant in China, ranging from private enterprise owners to wealthy pop stars that may not be paying the State what they truly owe (China Daily, 15 September 2005).”44 40 For example, J. Knight and L. Song, The Rural-urban Divide: Economic Disparities and Interactions in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Solinger, Contesting citizenship in urban China; F.L. Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); M.K. Whyte, ed., One Country, Two Societies: Rural-urban Inequality in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 41 For example, A. Chan, “Labor Standards and Human Rights: the Case of Chinese Workers under Market Socialism,” Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1998): 886–904; A. Chan, China’s Workers under Assault: the Exploitation of Labor in a Globalizing Economy (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); Gao, “The Chinese Social Benefit System in Transition”; J. Kwong, “Educating Migrant Children: Negotiations between the State and Civil Society,” The China Quarterly 180 (2004): 1073–1088; D.J. Solinger, “The Creation of a New Underclass in China and Its Implications,” Environment and Urbanization 18, no. 1 (2006): 177–193. 42 Li, Feng, and Gizelis, “China’s new social security system,” 16. 43 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_06/b3970072.htm (accessed 21 October 2008). 44 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/13/content_477439.htm (accessed 21 October 2008).



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China introduced its personal income tax system in 1980 with the threshold being 800 yuan a month. At that time, very few people in the country had such an income. With China’s rapid economic growth, this threshold was raised to 1,600 yuan in 2006, to 2,000 yuan in 2008, and to 3,500 yuan in 2011. The latest amendment was intended to narrow the country’s income gap; according to the Ministry of Finance, “under the new amendment, about 7.7 percent of wage earners will have to pay tax, down from the current 28 percent” (China Daily, 1 July 2011).45 In order to balance the country’s wealth distribution among the rich and the poor, China is also proposing a property tax on personal holdings including real estate, capital earnings, inherited property, and donations (China Daily, 25 April 2011).46 Insofar, only two cities, namely Chongqing and Shanghai, are experimenting with a property tax started in January 2011 (Xinhua News Agency, 27 January 2011).47 The picture is clear that the great majority of Chinese people are not accustomed to paying personal income tax. This context also helps to explain why throughout the 2005 election, many recent PRC migrants as China’s ‘new rich’ criticised Labour’s ‘high taxation’ policy and supported National and ACT, both of which parties trumpeted a platform policy of ‘tax-cuts’. Overall, it may be argued that recent PRC migrants’ conservative (or even I may say ‘distorted’) views towards the welfare state were well cultivated and established prior to their arrival in New Zealand. During the 2005 election, many of these migrants voiced their concerns through Chinese media; they expected to see a conservative government to replace the then centre-left Labour government. Their criticism of Labour’s policy of ‘high taxation’ and ‘massive expenditure’ on social welfare not only to the poor (‘the majority being Maori and Polynesians’ according to them),48 but also to serve the common people (such as interest-free student loans and the Working For Families Package covering tax credit, increase in

45 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-07/01/content_12815539.htm (accessed 1 November 2011). 46 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-04/25/content_12384206.htm (accessed 1 November 2011). 47 http://news.163.com/11/0127/19/6RE7L32B0001124J.html (accessed 1 November 2011). 48 Recent PRC migrants are commonly unable to distinguish between Maori and Polynesians and often lump the two communities into one group, just because the physical appearance of two is similar. On Chinese talkback radio, callers often used one single word ‘mao dao ren 毛岛人’ (literally means ‘people of the Maori and Islanders’ in Mandarin Chinese) to refer to the Maori and Polynesians in general.

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childcare assistance and accommodation supplement, etc.) cast light on these people’s distance from the core society of democratic and egalitarian New Zealand. Among them, the myth of only Labour caring for the poor, ‘the majority being Maori and Polynesians’, is presumably caused by their inadequate knowledge of the history of New Zealand. History shows that over the decades, there has been no difference between Labour and National on the issue of maintaining New Zealand as a welfare state. This has been so since at least 1938 when Michael Joseph Savage, the first Labour Prime Minister (1935–1940), announced that every New Zealander would be looked after ‘from the cradle to the grave’ through a comprehensive social security scheme.49 From then onwards, no matter which party was in power, it was always committed to maintaining a fiscal basis for existing welfare state arrangements, from income subsidies to state housing, health and education. The definition of the two major political parties in New Zealand as ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ is largely based on the relative priority each gives to the allocation of redistributed social resources to welfare or to economic growth; National inclines to offer tax cuts in contrast to Labour’s preference for more public expenditure. Patriotic Sentiment Towards China The preceding examination of recent PRC migrants’ alienation from the core of New Zealand society further helps our understanding why these people maintain a strong emotional tie with their homeland. This is clearly depicted by their embrace of Chinese nationalism. During the 2005 New Zealand election, China’s achievement in her space programme was one stimulus for this; as Chinese media revealed, many recent PRC migrants were enthusiastic about the successful launch of the Shenzhou VI. These migrants were very proud of China’s immense success in developing her economy. According to them, a prosperous China provides the basis for funding such an ambitious and costly project, which proclaims to the world China’s leading role in applying science and developing high technology. In their eyes, the Labour government squandered taxpayers’ money on the welfare state, but did not have efficient strategies to 49 In New Zealand, the idea of government provision of social security can be traced back much earlier. The first Liberal government introduced old age pensions in 1898. The United government passed the Unemployment Act in 1930.



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develop New Zealand’s economy, which appeared sluggish in contrast to the economic boom in China. Over the past three decades, the Chinese economy has grown at the staggering speed of an average of almost 10% each year, more than Japan and the Asian tigers achieved over similar periods when their economies took off (The Economist, 27 September 2007).50 China has been enjoying the fastest economic growth in the world; in comparison, New Zealand is apparently a slow runner, although it has achieved strong economic growth since the Fourth Labour Government implemented a wide range of economic and social reforms in the mid-1980s. The New Zealand economy experienced a stunning growth during the 1990s, particularly between 1993 and 1996, with annual average growth in real GDP peaking at 6.8% in June 1994. From 2002 to 2004, New Zealand GDP annual growth ranged between 3.4% and 4.5%, and achieved its peak of 5.2% in December 2004. Such a performance may not be considered impressive by Chinese standards, but it was above the OECD average during this period as depicted in Chart 6.1.51 The connection between the revival of Chinese nationalism and China’s fast economic growth has drawn a considerable amount of scholarly attention in recent years.52 Researchers mostly argue that the Chinese government has been using nationalism as a political strategy to legitimise and to consolidate the CCP’s rule, following the Tiananmen Square protests and the collapse of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe in 1989. After 1989, with Western countries’ political and economic sanctions and China’s domestic discontent over the communist ideology both imposing an array of uncertainties on the leadership of the CCP, the use of nationalism by the party as a political mechanism commenced in the early 1990s was closely associated with three crucial phases of building the theoretical framework of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’.

50 http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9861591 (accessed 16 October 2008). 51 Data for this chart is sourced from Economic Outlook No 84—December 2008—Annual Projections for OECD Countries, for more detail, see http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index. aspx?DataSetCode=EO84_MAIN (accessed 7 January 2009). 52 For example, J. Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: the Politics of Transition (New York: Cambridge University Press Press, 2001); D. Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (London: Cornell University Press, 2002); P.H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); C.R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (New York: Routledge, 2006).

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Chart 6.1. New Zealand GDP growth in comparison with other OECD countries, 1995–2005.

The first one refers to “Deng Xiaoping’s Theory” presented during Deng’s landmark Southern Tour in 1992. Through his influential speeches, Deng urged that China retain her road to socialism under the leadership of the CCP, and also stressed the important need of economic reform in the country. At the CCP Fourteenth Party Congress later that year, General Secretary Jiang Zeming announced another step towards creating a market economy in China. According to Jiang, this new formula deploys market principles to regulate the country’s economy, which used to be centralised under macroeconomic controls. Following this, the third volume of Deng’s selected works was published to provide further rationale for continuous radical economic reform under the CCP’s rule. In contrast to the previous version of Chinese socialism affiliated with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s Thought, ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ presents the CCP “as the party of national salvation, implementing a market-orientated economic reform process within a multipolar post-Cold War international situation, harnessing the forces of technology to ensure the survival of the Chinese nation-state in a globalising world.”53 53 Jiang Zeming 1998, cited in Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 69.



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In the post-1989 era, ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ as the CCP’s renewed paradigm emerged in response to the unprecedented challenges that the party had encountered in both domestic and international political terms. Its implementation has proved a remarkable success in the sense of bringing China back to the world stage. Economically, ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ has been the ideological force driving the staggering growth of the Chinese economy since the mid-1990s, with the government’s bold introduction of stock markets, expansion of foreign investment into China’s export industry, and more drastically, a large scale privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). These mechanisms promptly generated a large number of individuals who began to accumulate a considerable amount of wealth and become China’s ‘new rich’. As indicated earlier, these may include many of the recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand. Given that the majority of these migrants are relatively young as required by the rules of New Zealand immigration, an examination of the ideological atmosphere surrounding them during their formative years in China may provide an additional angle to explain why they hold strong patriotic sentiments towards their homeland. The early 1990s saw a massive ‘patriotic education campaign’ throughout China, which was also engineered by ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’.54 This campaign incorporated efforts from the Central Propaganda Department, the State Education Commission, the Radio, Film, and Television Ministry, the Ministry of Culture, and the Communist Youth League of China Central Committee, and particularly targeted youth in all educational levels, from kindergarten to university. Concentrating on teaching students to be proud of being Chinese by emphasising the ‘great achievements’ of the Chinese people and especially under the CCP leadership, the campaign was centred around two main themes. One was Chinese tradition and history with a special focus on the period that China suffered from humiliation by the West following its defeat during the Opium War. The other one was China’s national unity and territorial integrity. As Zhao observes, The Communist government took every opportunity to instigate nationalist resentment against foreign pressures . . . The regime thus created a sense of crisis among the Chinese people, in an attempt to convince them that 54 For example, S. Zhao, “A State-led Nationalism: the Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302; S. Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era.

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chapter six international ‘hostile forces’ were doing everything they could to take these territories (referring to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet) from China, or to prevent China from taking them back. These presentations told the Chinese people, especially the younger generation that, if not for the strong leadership of the CCP in fighting against these conspiracies, China would fall apart.55

This state-led patriotic education campaign has produced a significant impact on the content of China’s mass media and popular culture, which began thematically to depict and advocate Chinese people’s national pride in confrontation with the ‘hostile’ Western world, especially the United States and Japan. Ultra-nationalistic books such as The China That Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu 中国可以说不) and China’s Road under the Shadow of Globalisation (Quanquihua yinying xia de zhongguo zhi lu 全球 化阴影下的中国之路) were allowed to be published and sold millions of copies.56 The Global Times, the second largest Chinese newspaper under the People’s Daily since the late 1990s has consistently been promulgating ‘xenophobic nationalism’ with its sensational international news focusing on China’s security.57 More recently, with China’s growing prominence in the world economy and its subsequent influence on international politics, nationalistic elements in Chinese popular culture have shifted to portray China as a prosperous and confident great nation under globalisation. The 12-part documentary television series, The Rise of the Great Powers (Da guo jueqi 大国崛起) broadcast on China Central Television (CCTV) in 2006, to a large extent manifests the new form of Chinese nationalistic sentiments, which enhance the idea of China being a rising superpower. This documentary was highly popular with each part on average receiving four million viewers and was aired again three more times.58 A study of commercial advertisements on Chinese television between 2005 and 2008

55 Zhao, “A state-led nationalism,” 297–298. 56 One of the authors who wrote The China That Can Say No notes that four million legal copies of the book were sold, despite unaccountable piracies, http://news.sina.com .cn/c/sd/2009-09-23/133918710480.shtml (accessed 11 November 2011). This book triggered a genre with several others including China’s Road under the Shadow of Globalisation being published. 57 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 86–87. 58 Lou, cited in Q.E. Wang, “‘Rise of the Great Powers’= Rise of China? Challenges of the Advancement of Global History in the People’s Republic of China,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 64 (2010): 274.



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also reveals the trend of Chinese media promoting and deploying concepts of distinct ‘Chinese-ness’ to mold the audience’s patriotic behaviour.59 Beyond those popular cultural scenes, the diffusion of nationalism is also phenomenal in Chinese streets and people’s civil life, especially among the younger generation. Since the late 1990s onwards, world media attention has been drawn to outraged protests spreading from Beijing to many large Chinese cities, when American missiles struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, when an American reconnaissance plane collided with a Chinese interceptor off Hainan province in 2001, and when Japan campaigned for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2005. After reviewing the revival of nationalism in China, let us return to our focal discussion of the recent PRC Chinese migrants in New Zealand during the 2005 general election. While these ‘proud’ Chinese migrants celebrated the success of China’s space programme, it may be argued that their criticism of New Zealand’s ‘sluggish’ development under the ‘incompetent’ Labour government was probably bolstered by the revitalised Chinese nationalism back in their homeland. Within the discourse of new Chinese nationalism spreading over China’s national borders into New Zealand, we may also look at recent PRC migrants’ patriotic sentiments towards China in another form—these migrants’ ill feeling toward the Green Party. As Chinese talkback radio revealed, the party was known by many recent PRC migrants as ‘unfriendly’ or ‘hostile foreign pressure’ on China, for it had constantly given moral support to the Dalai Lama and thus to his exiled government, as well as opposing the New Zealand government signing a Free Trade Agreement with China. The matter of the Tibetan separatists was highly sensitive for these migrants whose ideological system was apparently cemented by the ‘patriotic circumstances’ in China, which emphasised national unity and territorial integrity. Furthermore, these people’s unease at Greens’ concerns about China’s environmental damage and other human rights issues corresponded to some focus group participants’ disapproval of the anti-Chinese government newspapers such as the New Zealand version of the Epoch Times and the locally produced New Times Weekly. With the Greens’ provocative criticism of China’s national status quo (guoqing 国情), the party seemed extremely alien to the recent PRC migrants. Overall, the Green Party

59 N. Frisch, “Cosmopolitan Nationalists in Chinese Advertising” (Paper presented at the EACS XVIIth Bi-annual Conference, held at Lund University, Sweden, 6–10 August, 2008).

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may have added another contribution to Labour’s extreme unpopularity among the recent PRC migrants, because the two parties worked closely during the 2005 election in order to form a left-wing government. To complete the case study of the relationship between New Zealand Chinese media and Chinese migrants, especially during the 2005 general election, this chapter concentrates on analysing the empirical findings under three main themes—recent PRC migrants’ enthusiastic support for ethnic Chinese politicians, their affinity with conservative parties, and their patriotic passion for China. Given that these migrants’ understanding of New Zealand politics is limited, my analysis also places emphasis on their socioeconomic background in China in conjunction with a scrutiny of China’s growing economic disparities and its delay in making a new social security system. Recent PRC migrants’ aspiration for Chinese political representation and their concerns about the centre-left Labour government’s conduct in dealing with social inequality and redistribution of social wealth cast light on the reality that these people, drawn from the ‘new rich’ in China, are still at an early stage of acculturation in democratic New Zealand. With their distance from the core value and belief system of New Zealand society, which has a strong and lasting tradition of egalitarianism, these newcomers naturally cling to strong patriotic sentiments towards their homeland.

Chapter Seven

Conclusions New Insight into the Chinese in New Zealand This book demonstrates a new way of studying the Chinese Diaspora in New Zealand through analysing the Chinese-language media that serve this community. Focusing on examining the reciprocal relationship between these media and Chinese migrants, the research has particularly captured the community life and aspirations of recent PRC immigrants who have arrived in New Zealand since the early 2000s. Having drawn elements from two distinct disciplines—international migration studies and media studies, this approach involves the usage of a wide range of theoretical concepts and empirical methods. Quantitative and qualitative data discussed in this research are primarily generated from the New Zealand Chinese media and other sources associated with these media. The collection of a body of such data and the way of interpreting it are significantly different from the methods used in existing research on the New Zealand Chinese community. The book also provides a new insight into the New Zealand Chinese community, which in recent years has been modified substantially by the large influx of new immigrants from mainland China. Originated from China’s ‘new rich’, the recent PRC migrants have a lot in common with the migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan during the late 1980s and the 1990s. First, these people are mostly fortunate frontrunners benefiting from the economic booms in their homelands. New Chinese migrants generally share a strong desire to maintain Chinese cultural heritage and to make use of the economic advantages generated from having been part of ‘Greater China’. Cultural and economic aspects of ‘Greater China’ together cement the foundation, on which these new migrants’ consciousness of their shared Chinese identity is cultivated and consolidated. Within the context of contemporary New Zealand, marked by biculturalism, Chinese identity is the vital force holding together a newly transplanted Chinese community while it merges with the existing old Chinese community. Thus, a more sophisticated New Zealand Chinese community makes its unique contribution to forging the multi-ethnic reality of this country.

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Second, in contrast to the old Chinese settlers who were often described as low-key and apolitical, newcomers appear highly ambitious and assertive. Since New Zealand initiated the MMP system in 1996, the new Chinese community has demonstrated a clear ambition to make their political mark in the host country.1 Also, on the other hand, the recently-arrived PRC migrants have shown many differences from the earlier-arrived Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and in particular from their precursors from China in the mid1990s. As Ip notes, “immigrants from Hong Kong are generally more politically apathetic, probably an attitude left over from their British colonial experience.”2 Among the compared three groups, the Taiwanese were seen as the most active in New Zealand politics, especially during the 1996 and 1999 general elections; democratic Taiwan may have enabled them to accumulate skills in organising public rallies, lobbying politicians and raising funds for political campaigns.3 The relative size of the Taiwanese community has diminished drastically since the late 1990s and thus their influence has reduced. The large group of new arrivals from the PRC now take the leading role in advocating the major concerns and interests of the Chinese migrants in New Zealand. In contrast to the earlier PRC immigrants who are almost invisible in New Zealand politics, the newcomers know how to make use of their own media to voice themselves. During the 2005 New Zealand election, the ethnic Chinese mediasphere revealed a clear tendency to political mobilisation among the recent PRC immigrants. Even more meaningfully, many recent PRC migrants took an opposition perspective to query and challenge the policies and accountability of the in-power Labour government. In the sense of measuring political efficacy,4 it is significant that these recent PRC migrants are willing to take a stance critical of authority, while in mainland China the majority of citizens still perceive the relationship

1 M. Ip, “Asian New Zealanders: Emergent Political Leadership,” in Political Leadership in New Zealand, ed. R. Miller and M. Mintrom (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006), 153–174. 2 Ibid., 168. 3 Ibid. 4 R.E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics (New York: Free Press, 1959), e.g. G.I. Balch, “Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: the Concept ‘Sense of Political Efficacy’,” Political Methodology 1 (1974): 1–43; S.C. Craig, R.G. Niemi, and G.E. Silver, “Political Efficacy and Trust: a Report on the NES Pilot Study Items,” Political Behavior 12, no. 3 (1990): 289–314.



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between the individual and the state to be hierarchical, and only a minority perceive it to be reciprocal.5 To seek explanation for this intriguing phenomenon, we may relate it to more recent studies on public support for democracy in China. Applying theories of economic growth and social modernisation,6 Wang argues that, with China’s rapid economic growth, an optimistic change is evolving among Chinese citizens in favour of such elements of liberal democracy as freedom of speech, political participation, and interest group politics.7 Wang’s claim has been witnessed to by numerous protests concerning house ownership and environment by the middle class in some large Chinese cities in recent years. Some high-profile cases were in the spotlight of international media, and even the strictly censored media in China.8 For instance, Xiamen residents opposed building a toxic chemical plant next to their neighbourhood in May 2007;9 Shanghai residents marched against the maglev railway in January 2008;10 and Beijing residents have become involved in urban conservation movements ( jiucheng baohu yundong 旧城保护运动).11 My intention in highlighting the emergence of China’s middle class and its political significance in the country12 is to assert that recent PRC immigrants’ enthusiasm for participating in New

5 T. Shi, “Cultural Values and Democracy in the People’s Republic of China,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 548. 6 For example, S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); A. Przeworski and F. Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World politics 49, no. 2 (1997): 155–183; R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 7 Wang, “Public Support for Democracy in China.” 8 For more detail of media censorship in China, see C.C. Lee, ed., Chinese Media, Global Contexts (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in China; Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict. 9 http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/239503.htm (accessed 11 November 2008). 10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7188122.stm (accessed 11 November 2008). 11  Y. Yao, ed., Beijing and Beijing: a Critical Dialogue (Beijing: UNESCO, 2005); Y. Yao, “The Rising Chinese Urban Movement in the Global Era: the Possibility of Building East Asian Community from Civil Society Level” (Paper presented at the Multinational Students Workshop on Regional Cooperation in East Asia, Waseda University, Japan, February 28–March 2, 2009). 12 For example, L. Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing,” The China Journal, no. 51 (2004): 1–26; G. Yang, “Brokering Environment and Health in China: Issue Entrepreneurs of the Public Sphere,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 63 (2010): 101–118; Y. Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 100–105.

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Zealand politics has to a large extent corresponded with and supported Wang’s argument—the booming Chinese economy has produced a prodemocratic new generation of Chinese people. Since 2005, New Zealand has held two general elections, respectively in 2008 and 2011, with the National Party winning the majority of votes. Although I myself did not do any specific studies on Chinese migrants’ political choices and behaviour during the two elections, my findings drawn from the 2005 election still stand. In 2008, two surveys conducted by the New Zealand Chinese Herald and New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR)13 showed that National and ACT, the two conservative parties, still enjoyed much higher popularity than any other political parties within the Chinese migrant community, which is predominantly made up of recent arrivals from China. In addition, most informants for the two surveys appeared to be still in favour of the idea of achieving Chinese representation in the New Zealand Parliament. With its great density of overseas-born Chinese population, the newly established Botany electorate became a battleground among four Chinese candidates from four parties (including National, Labour, ACT and the newly-formed Kiwi Party) to fight for Chinese votes. As a result, some non-Chinese Botany residents felt left out from their own electorate, which was in some way turned into a ‘Chinatown’, since they were overwhelmed by political pamphlets in the Chinese language (New Zealand Herald, 28 October 2008).14 The 2008 election saw the success of two Chinese MPs—Pansy Wong standing for National and Raymond Huo for Labour. Wong not only finally won herself the Botany electorate after twelve years as a list MP for the National Party, but also became the only cabinet minister of Asian descent in New Zealand history. Huo came to New Zealand from Beijing in 1994 and became a trained lawyer in this country. He was 21st on the Labour Party list; after Kenneth Wang, he is the second New Zealand MP to have been a PRC immigrant. The battle for Chinese migrants’ votes was repeated throughout the 2011 election; four political parties (including National, Labour, the newlyformed Conservative Party, and even NZ First) gave their Chinese candidates high rankings on the party lists. An online poll by skykiwi.com, the most popular Chinese website in New Zealand at present, showed that 13 The New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR) was founded in February 2008 by a group of recent Chinese business migrants. 14 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10539660 (accessed 28 October 2008).



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29,799 (59.85%) Chinese votes were in favor of National, in contrast to Labour’s 15,861 votes (31.86%). It was not surprising that National and Labour were still the major rivals. The small Conservative and NZ First parties may not realise that to attract Chinese votes, it was not sufficient merely to show Chinese names on their party list, but that they needed figures like Kenneth Wang with a high profile among Chinese migrants, since many of these people effectively voted for Chinese community leader(s). For this election, ACT did not appoint any Chinese candidate, and apparently lost a great deal of Chinese support as a result. The same poll showed that ACT received only 1,485 Chinese votes (2.98%). The party experienced an unprecedented struggle for survival—just to mention its single aim—to win the Epsom electorate seat only. In the end, the National leader John Key even signaled to Epsom’s National supporters that they should give their votes to the ACT candidate in order to keep ACT in Parliament as National’s coalition partner.15 The 2011 election brought the third New Zealand MP originating from mainland China. Jian Yang, a former university academic, took over Pansy Wong’s token role within the National Party.16 Before joining National in August 2011, Yang was often invited by the Auckland-based Chinese media to comment on New Zealand politics and current affairs, and thus became well known within the Chinese migrant community. Raymond Huo is still a Labour list MP; regarding his future political relationship with the new Chinese list MP from the rival party, Huo said that he would be ‘working closely’ with Yang to ‘improve ties between New Zealand and China’.17 Expansion of China’s ‘Soft Power’ Huo indicates that the two China-originated New Zealand MPs may collaborate, despite representing different interest groups of Chinese migrants and serving opposing parties. In this context, it is China, their shared homeland, that brings them together to pursue the national interests of 15 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/election-2011/news/article.cfm?c_id=1503012&object id=10765478 (accessed 12 November 2011). 16 Pansy Wong resigned from Parliament in December 2010 following allegations that she misused parliamentary travel allowance. National thus needed a new Chinese candidate. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10694214, and http:// www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10763276 (accessed 2 November 2011). 17 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10774257 (accessed 20 December 2011).

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their adopted homeland. Although it is still too early to predict the influences of Huo and Yang’s collaborative effort on New Zealand’s relations with China, recent PRC immigrants have already had significant impact on the country both economically and politically as discussed in early chapters. The acceleration of China’s economic growth since the mid-1990s has generated the main source of the recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand. With their increasing influences on the New Zealand society, I argue that these migrants’ perception of their host country and corresponding behaviour within the country have shed light on China’s changing social and political circumstances and the after-effects on New Zealand; in other words, with the arrival of recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand, the ‘soft power’ of a rising China has clearly expanded to this country. These articulate and ambitious newcomers are distinctly different from the preceding PRC migrants who arrived in New Zealand between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. The earlier PRC immigrants did not have the same immediate chance to enjoy China’s economic boom; given that they have been living for longer in New Zealand, in the remote Southern Pacific, they may not have such a direct feeling of China’s recent rise as a new world power; nor did they have significant experience of China’s massive ‘patriotic education campaign’ which was carried on throughout the 1990s and still appears to be an on-going exercise. China’s rapid economic growth coupled with the ‘patriotic education campaign’ has boosted a strong sentiment of national pride among the Chinese people in general, especially the younger generation. This younger generation, by and large, has been the main source of the recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand. With the ‘backup of a mighty powerful motherland’,18 these recent migrants from China have manifested an intense gratification in being ethnic Chinese in this small country of the Pacific Rim. Over the past few years New Zealand has also witnessed other highprofile events that closely involved recent PRC migrants including international students from China. In 2008, subsequent to the riot in Tibet in March, PRC Chinese organised rallies in Auckland and Wellington to protest against ‘reporting of untruths’ about Tibet by New Zealand mainstream media in order to support the Beijing Olympics;19 it was notice-

18 This phrase was frequently used by callers on 936AM. 19 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10501287, and http://tvnz.co.nz/content/1746418/423466/article.html (accessed 26 April 2008).



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able that rallies of this kind also took place in Britain, France, the United States, Australia and many other countries during the same period.20 Two months later, New Zealand mainstream media spotted that Chinese MP Raymond Huo was being criticised for his ‘defending Chinese rule over Tibet on a Labour Party website’; this followed Green Party co-leader Russel Norman protesting with a Tibetan flag while the Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping visited Parliament.21 Also in July 2008, a great number of recent PRC migrants were observed at an anti-crime protest in South Auckland, in which thousands of Asian immigrants participated; it was one of the largest demonstrations in New Zealand in recent years.22 Through recent PRC immigrants, the expansion of China’s ‘soft power’ to New Zealand reached its new height in 2010. Natural Dairy, a New Zealand Chinese company backed by billionaires in China, registered in the Cayman Islands and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, proposed a NZ$1.5 billion package to buy out the Crafar farms, New Zealand’s largest family-owned dairy business. Originally from Fujian province, Jack Chen, one of the men behind this proposed deal, was involved in founding the New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR) as well as the New Citizen Party, which contested the Botany by-election after Pansy Wong resigned from Parliament. It is notable that the New Citizen Party was supported overwhelmingly by the United Chinese Press, currently the most influential Chinese-language newspaper in New Zealand, which was set up in February 2010—also by Jack Chen.23 The party withdrew from the 2011 general election, possibly because of Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) laying charges against Chen and his business associate involved in the bid for the Crafar farms.

20 Li Dajiu, Huaiwai huaren wangluo meiti—kuai wenhua yujing 海外华人网络媒体— 跨文化语境, 200–204. 21  http://www.nzherald.co.nz/human-rights/news/article.cfm?c_id=500838&object id=10656194, and http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/3825646/MPs-Tibet-protestflag-removed (accessed 3 July 2008). 22 The organisers claimed that 10,000 people participated in the protest; however, the New Zealand police estimated the figure to be around 3,000 according to my interview in June 2009. This protest happened shortly after several brutal homicides of Asian immigrants in south Auckland. Chinese migrants participating in this protest re-addressed their concern about New Zealand’s law and order, which was already raised in the 2005 election. With a perception of New Zealand police tolerating criminals, they considered themselves as the target of racism. For more details, see http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/ article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10520213 (accessed 8 July 2008). 23 This free-of-charge newspaper claims to have united 40 or so local Chinese organisations and Chinese media companies to source content for its publication.

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The New Zealand government declined Natural Dairy’s application to acquire the Crafar farms on character grounds; however, another Chinese company turned up as the new bidder. The Shanghai-based Pengxin Group seems to have kept low key in comparison with the widely publicised Natural Dairy, despite one piece of news revealing that Pengxinrelated Chinese business people were major donors to the National Party at the 2011 election.24 Even so, Chinese bidding for New Zealand dairy farms has caused huge public backlash among many na­tional­ist­ic-minded New Zealanders, who still remember the 2008 Sanlu taint­ed milk scandal in China and believe that Chinese investment is threatening the country’s prime industry, and also further stirs the controversy about foreign ownership of New Zealand land. This led to the National-led government taking nine months to grant consent to Pengxin’s application. Critics commented that the government held up the decision because of its political sensitivity—Prime Minister John Key wanted to maintain his popularity at this election, and intended to make a gesture after winning the election to other potential Chinese investors that they are welcome in New Zealand. All of these scenes are part of the backdrop for the 40th anniversary celebration of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between New Zealand and China. Alongside the celebration, New Zealand is also moving to a more versatile engagement with China, which is well stated in the latest government plan entitled “Opening Doors to China: New Zealand’s 2015 Vision”. On skykiwi.com, one post responded to the release of this document by saying, “New Zealanders must realise that the country is no longer strong, and cannot even be classified as a second-class country. If they still hold a hostile attitude towards China, they will definitely exclude themselves from the mainstream of the world”; another post said, “hopefully, New Zealand can rely on China’s strength to grow. If Labour were in power, [the government] would definitely not seek China’s cooperation for development like this. At least, John Key has lit up a hope.” Chinese Media as an ‘Imagined Chinatown’ The strong confidence and vigorous courage with which recent PRC migrants have participated in New Zealand politics carries significant meaning, which has started a new chapter in the unfolding history of 24 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid= 10771749&ref=rss (accessed 8 December 2011).



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the Chinese in this country. A general picture of the more than 140-year history of the Chinese in New Zealand shows that the changing political and economic contexts in China have constantly impacted on the New Zealand Chinese community. The shadow of the declining Imperial Qing generated a small number of hapless Chinese sojourners to seek a better life in the Southern Pacific. However, they suffered a great deal of racial prejudice within this predominantly white British colony. Subsequent to the fall of the Imperial Qing, the succeeding Republic government was too fragile to encourage building up Chinese national pride among the Chinese overseas. The eight years of Japanese invasion of China further distracted the Chinese in New Zealand from consolidating self-esteem in their distinct ethnic identity. After 1949, New Zealand Chinese’s link with their homeland was virtually cut off because of the Chinese communist revolution. With the enforcement of New Zealand’s assimilation policy, ethnic Chinese gradually and eventually lost their visiblity in New Zealand until the Hong Kong immigrants arrived during the mid 1980s. Starting in the early 1980s, the massive wave of Hong Kong Chinese immigrants to Western countries including New Zealand was largely caused by Hong Kong’s future return to China, which resulted in their fear of political uncertainty in this former British colony. A large body of research work has shown that, with the continuity of Hong Kong’s prosperity since the smooth handover, the number of Hong Kong residents identifying themselves as Chinese has steadily increased.25 Some of my interviewees noted that many Hong Kong migrants in New Zealand have returned; the remaining small community has become latent in contrast to the high-profile Taiwanese and PRC migrant communities. Since the political situation across the Taiwan Strait has been changing from time to time, I did not intend to closely examine China’s overall political impact on the Taiwanese community in New Zealand, with my data being limited to the relevance of the 2005 general election. Even so, the content of Chinese media suggests that Taiwanese business personnel and other Taiwanese people have definitely enjoyed and obtained benefits from the present prosperity of the Chinese community economy, which is apparently boosted by the recent PRC immigrants, including a significant number of students. These PRC immigrants have also brought 25 For example, E.K.W. Ma and A.Y.H. Fung, “Negotiating Local and National Identifications: Hong Kong Identity Surveys 1996–2006,” Asian Journal of Communication 17, no. 2 (2007): 172–185; G. Mathews, E.K. Ma, and Lui T., Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation (London: Routledge, 2008).

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various Chinese-produced music, TV dramas and blockbuster movies into New Zealand, which are now widely circulated within the new Chinese community, and are even increasingly popular among mainstream audiences, in New Zealand as in the rest of the world.26 This indicates that Chinese migrants, from whatever country of origin, have somehow broken their political barriers and come together to embrace their shared Chinese cultural heritage in a foreign land. Regarding Chinese cultural influence on the wider society of New Zealand, the recent arrival of a large number of PRC immigrants has also changed or enriched New Zealanders’ diet structure and dining habits, especially those living in Auckland. A first-time visitor to Auckland may be surprised to find that Chinese restaurants run by recent PRC immigrants are everywhere, providing many kinds of regional cuisine, whether in bustling business districts or typical European neighbourhoods; in contrast to the past, Chinese restaurants were almost exclusively Cantonese style. Since 2000, the Auckland City Council in conjunction with the New Zealand Asia Foundation and principal sponsorship from the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, has been running its annual Chinese Lantern Festival, which is one of Auckland’s most popular summer events. The Lantern Festival is a pan-Chinese gala that involves Chinese lantern exhibitions, art performances, food tasting, and an array of business activities. With a large number of PRC Chinese migrants’ participation and their increasing influences, organisers of this event have been emphasising the presence of performers and lanterns from China. Overall, the above-mentioned phenomena ranging from Chinese activism in New Zealand politics to the prosperous community economy and cultural life of Chinese immigrants are all depicted in the changing content of the New Zealand Chinese media. At this point, how should we evaluate the existence and the significance of the ethnic Chinese media in New Zealand? Inspired by the conceptual framework of an ‘imagined community’ developed by Benedict Anderson,27 I arrive at the conclusion that the

26 For instance, films by the renowned Chinese director Zhang Yimou have been distributed internationally, including Hero (Yingxiong 英雄), House of Flying Daggers (Shimian Maifu 十面埋伏), and Curse of the Golden Flower (Mancheng Jin Dai Huangji Jia 满城 尽带黄金甲). 27 K.J. Anderson, “The Idea of Chinatown: the Power of Place and Institutional Practice in the Making of a Racial Category,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 77, no. 4 (1987): 580–598.



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Figure 7.1. Auckland Lantern Festival, Albert Park, February 2011. Photo: Phoebe H. Li.

existence of Chinese-language media may be perceived as an ‘imagined Chinatown’ in New Zealand.28 28 New Zealand once had old Chinatowns in Auckland and Wellington, which were demolished during inner-city redevelopment in the 1960s. There has been in this country none of the revitalisation of old Chinatowns that is characteristic of overseas.

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The idea of ‘Chinatown’ has been studied extensively by historians and sociologists over the years. Scholarly efforts have established that Chinatowns in various countries arose in three major categories: 1) an overseas Chinese settlement constructed by Europeans’ imagination and their institutional power;29 2) a unique element of the Western urban landscape;30 and 3) a cultural community.31 In the West, a Chinatown used to be a cluster of a non-white, nonChristian cohort, ‘uncivilised and amoral oriental’.32 It served as a haven providing protection, communal aid and ethnic solidarity for uprooted Chinese sojourners who could stay away from racial prejudice and discrimination, especially when facilitated by Chinese exclusion laws in a hostile host country. From this perspective, a Chinatown was a ghettoised ethnic enclave that held Chinese sojourners back from integrating and incorporating into the host society. As shown in this book, during the 2005 New Zealand general election, the role ethnic Chinese media played among many recent PRC immigrants, in particular the advocacy by these media of support for Chinese MPs and a specific representation of ‘the interest of the Chinese community’ in New Zealand Parliament, manifested many historical features of ghettoised Chinatowns. This argument is not to suggest that the recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand are mistreated like their forebears, the old Chinese settlers who were subjected to racial prejudice and cultural exclusion in New Zealand history. Rather, it is to provide an insight into the inclination among many recently-arrived PRC migrants to distance or even alienate themselves from the host society. Their mode of thinking and political behaviour have exhibited the characteristics of racial and cultural aliens in a foreign land, in particular their strong sense of insecurity caused by displacement. In addition to its distinct political content, the commercial advertisements in the New Zealand Chinese media offer a vivid window on the 29 For example, G. Barth, Bitter Strength: a History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850–1870 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); W.P. Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 1978); Anderson, “The idea of Chinatown.” 30 For example, D. Lai, in Socio-economic Structures and the Viability of Chinatown, ed. C. Forward, 5 (Victoria, Canada: University of Victoria, 1973), 101–129; C.M. Loo, Chinatown: Most Time, Hard Time (New York: Praeger, 1991); N. Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Li, “Anatomy of a New Ethnic Settlement: the Chinese Ethnoburb in Los Angeles.” 31  P. Linghu., Chinese St. Louis: from Enclave to Cultural Community (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004). 32 Anderson, “The idea of Chinatown,” 589.



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current Chinese migrant community in New Zealand, which appears prosperous and reveals strong economic potential. As discussed earlier, the current prosperity of the Chinese community economy is largely associated with the inflow of capital and a surge in commercial activities brought by the recent PRC immigrants. At present, members of the New Zealand Chinese migrant community, whether the earlier arrivals or newcomers from various countries of origin, even the old settlers, are all able to embrace and benefit from such prosperity, which has moved beyond the operation of Chinese restaurants and grocery stores, and has extended to the industries of property development, finance sectors, and of course many other professional services. By transmitting various kinds of business information, the New Zealand Chinese media play an influential role in shaping and forging the boundaries of a Chinese socioeconomic space in New Zealand. Without a physical location, this space is an imagined socioeconomic Chinatown, in which various sub-groups of Chinese migrants pursue and share common needs. Apparently, Chinese cultural heritage is the cornerstone of this imagined socioeconomic Chinatown in New Zealand. For new Chinese immigrants, and perhaps those few old Chinese settlers who consume Chinese-language media, an imagined Chinatown signifies the existence of a cultural community that enables a Chinese cohort with a desire to preserve and maintain Chinese cultural identity to enjoy a communal life based on intimate and spontaneous sociocultural relations. In this sense, New Zealand Chinese media also construct an imagined cultural Chinatown, in which Chinese migrants can seek psychological comfort and sense Chinese solidarity from others whom they may never meet physically. For non-Chinese in New Zealand, such a multi-layered imagined Chinatown constructed by Chinese-language media carries different sociological meanings. As someone commented on the Auckland-based Chinese newspapers: As a monolingual, English-speaking, white New Zealander . . . For years, I have viewed with disgust the growing number of ethnic newspapers published in ethnic scripts. They show utter disrespect to the wider community who view publications like those as a shroud of secrecy . . . I detest strongly the building of ‘psychological Chinatown’ where communities live on their own and not truly wanting to integrate . . .33

33 This is quoted from a letter to the editor of iBall on 23 February 2006. I used this letter to facilitate the focus group discussions.

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Such a viewpoint typifies the intolerance among some New Zealanders who still hold a Eurocentric sentiment and openly refuse to accept the multiethnic reality of the country. The actual number of these people may not be large. Most non-Chinese in New Zealand probably take either a neutral or a positive stance. A Chinatown is one distinct element of the urban landscape of many large cities in the West, such as those in New York, Vancouver, Sydney or Melbourne; in the contemporary era, a Chinatown is no longer a stigmatised Chinese ghetto, but more like a commercial theme park for nonChinese to go to for occasional shopping, or sightseeing, or just to obtain some exotic experiences. This is exactly the case in Auckland over the past few years: more and more European New Zealanders and Maori have appeared to join the crowds enjoying the annual Lantern Festival and various Chinese cuisines either in Chinese restaurants or at international food courts; they are also seen patronise the ‘mysterious’ Chinese shops selling Fengshui balls and statues of Guanying and Maitreya Buddha. Hence, in today’s New Zealand, the iconic significance of an imagined Chinatown is meaningful to both insiders and outsiders of the New Zealand Chinese community. With China arising as the economic powerhouse of the world and thus a new superpower, an imagined Chinatown presumably carries heavier social meanings in New Zealand as the host country for Chinese immigrants, especially from the PRC. On one hand, it retains PRC migrants’ definite emotional link with China; on the other hand, it may be perceived as a transplanted microcosmic China with radiating impact on the wider society of New Zealand. At the time of writing, Chinese New Zealand Television (TV 33), the new Auckland-based Chinese digital channel had emerged as WTV’s strong rival in the market of New Zealand Chinese media. With its free-toair broadcasting, TV 33 delivers Chinese-language news reports and commentaries as well as entertainment programmes transmitted by satellite from China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) and China Central Television (CCTV) for 24 hours a day, seven days a week, only interrupted by advertisements for New Zealand Chinese businesses. Meanwhile, many New Zealanders have noticed that they are now able to watch Englishlanguage news and television dramas transmitted from CCTV-9 on another free-of-charge channel. The expansion of China’s state media is not exclusive to New Zealand, but rather a global development. Broadcasting in five languages other than Chinese (English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian), CCTV in recent years has reached more than 120 countries and regions, and thus tens of



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millions viewers outside China.34 The latest breaking news about the CNC is that China’s top news agency has tapped the Hong Kong capital market in order to strengthen its influence, which has already reached nearly 60 countries and regions.35 China’s state media going global shows an interesting contrast to other state-sponsored global media corporations such as British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Welle (DW), Voice of America (VoA), Radio France International (RFI), and Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), which at present all deliver Chinese-language services including radio and online video clips on their own web portals, providing insightful reports and commentaries about China. China’s ambition in expanding its global influence through media has been articulated clearly at the most recent Forum of Global Chinese Language Media (shijie huaren chuanmei luntan 世界华人传媒论坛) in 2011; according to its official Chongqing Declaration, China aims to challenge the domination of Western media discourse, and is determined to establish a new international system that is ‘fair, balanced, righteous’.36 Will this state media strategy be effective in constructing or reconstructing China’s global images, and thus other people’s view of the world? I am sure that I am only one of many watching these developments with great interest.

34 http://cctvenchiridion.cctv.com/20090617/113152.shtml (accessed 14 February 2012). 35 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/08/content_14562415.htm (accessed 14 February 2012). 36 http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2011/09-18/3335313.shtml (accessed 14 February 2012).

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index 936AM 104–107, 111–115, 121, 130, 135, 140, 142. See also Wang, Kenneth  I Love New Zealand 104–112, 128 acculturation 18–19, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33, 38, 39, 59, 93, 95, 122, 137, 164 ACT Party 99, 101, 107–114, 116, 118, 121, 128–130, 134, 137, 139, 141–148, 152, 153, 157, 168, 169. See also Wang, Kenneth adaptation 10, 15–18, 25, 27, 33, 38, 39, 93, 122 alienation 34, 59, 123, 142, 158, 176 aliens 19, 46, 145, 156, 163, 176 alternative media 25–27, 39, 137 Anderson, Benedict 174  ‘imagined community’ 34n anti-Chinese riots 4 Asia 25, 63  ‘Asian invasion’ 69  Asian tigers 159  Chinese media (in) 90  financial crisis 65  immigrants 25, 29, 42, 46n, 64, 75, 126, 134, 171 assimilation 9, 16–19, 21, 25, 29, 43, 47–49, 56, 59, 110, 173 ‘astronaut families’ 76 Auckland 9, 11, 52–54, 56–57, 74, 77–78, 81–82, 85–86, 89, 102–104, 107–108, 124, 126, 132, 134, 145, 169, 177  Chinatown 175n  Lantern Festival 174, 178  protests 170–171 audience 10, 26, 28–29, 31–32, 34–39, 148. See also New Zealand Chinese media Australia 7, 24, 41, 45n, 48, 51, 63, 65, 68, 73, 100, 120, 171  Chinese gold-seekers 41  Chinese immigrants 3, 67, 77  Chinese media (in) 35, 48, 84, 86, 90  One Nation Party 100 Beijing 51, 73, 80, 163, 167–168  Olympics 170 Beiyang Government 46n, 51 biculturalism 7, 24–25, 27–28, 165 Bolger, Jim 63

Brash, Don 144, 147  Orewa speech 146. See also Waitangi,  Treaty of Britain, see United Kingdom Canada 7, 24, 68, 72  Chinese gold-seekers 40  Chinese immigrants 3, 65, 67  Chinese media (in) 13, 35, 84  National Ethnic Press and Media  Council 36 Canton 41, 43, 47, 51–52, 90 Canton Government 51 Cantonese 21, 41, 43, 47, 52, 57n, 86–87, 174 ‘centre of gravity’ 73 Chee Kung Tong 46 Chiang Ching-kuo 96 Chiang Kai-shek 46, 96 China business migrants 71–73, 79–82, 142–143, 171 contract workers 3–4 Four Modernisations 118 Gini coefficient 152–153 government 1, 2, 23, 86n, 89–91, 107, 150–153, 164 hukou system 155 international students 1n–3, 5, 33, 67–71, 75, 78–79, 124, 149, 170 laid-off (xiagang) workers 151 middle class 78, 149, 150, 153, 167 migrant workers 150–151, 156 Minimum Living Standard Allowance (MLSA) 153–155 nationalism 13, 46, 49, 158–163 ‘new rich’ 148–149, 152, 156, 157, 161, 164, 165 ‘Open Door’ policy 1, 118n overseas investment 4, 82. See also Crafar farms ‘patriotic education campaign’  161–162, 170 pension 151, 153–155 rising power 10, 112, 170, 178 Sanlu scandal 172 skilled migrants 69–73, 76–79 social security 153–156, 158, 164

194

index

‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ 159–160 space programme 112, 116, 132, 147, 158, 163  status quo (guoqing) 137, 163  Tiananmen Square protests 67, 89,  107, 159  tourists 2, 3, 5  urban poverty 151–154  China Central Television (CCTV) 138,  162, 178 Chinatown 75, 168, 175–178. See also Auckland, Chinatown; Wellington, Chinatown Chinese Australian Herald 48 Chinese Diaspora 13, 21, 27, 83, 165 Chinese Globe Magazine 48 Chinese identity 15, 20–24, 27–28, 33, 46, 95, 118, 123, 165, 177 Chinese Illustrated News 48 Chinese New Zealand Television (TV33) 178 Chinese Times 146 Chinese Yellow Pages 82 Chinese.net.nz 105–107, 118, 120–121, 147–148 ‘Chineseness’ 20, 32 Ching, Steven 108 citizenship 18, 21, 23, 63, 77 Clark, Helen 102, 112, 121, 142, 144 Cold War 59 communication 10, 15, 17, 22, 26, 30, 94, 123–124, 127–128, 134, 138 Conservative Party 168 Crafar farms 171–172 criticism 89, 108, 110, 116, 121, 148, 153, 157, 163 Dalai Lama 163. See also Tibet democracy 23, 26, 89, 94, 96–97, 140, 167 Deng, Xiaoping 118n, 160 Southern Tour 160 diasporic Chinese media 10–13, 20, 27, 35, 57. See also Australia, Chinese media; Canada, Chinese media; Europe, Chinese media; North America, Chinese media; United States, Chinese media; Forum of Global Chinese Language Media discourse 7, 27–28, 37, 163, 179 discrimination 19, 24, 33, 47, 119–120, 154–156, 176 Dominion Federation of N.Z. Chinese Commercial Growers 55–56

Don, Alexander 43, 48  Roll of the Chinese 43n Douglas, Roger 99, 101  ‘Rogernomics’ 99 Dunedin Chamber of Commerce 5 egalitarianism 42, 158, 164 Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas 12–13 ethnic media 9, 35, 36, 82, 176 ethnic minority 5, 19, 42, 64, 121 ethnicity 16, 20, 32 ‘ethnoburb’ 74 Europe 22, 79, 159  Chinese media (in) 83, 90 European Economic Community (EEC) 63 Fabian Socialists 42 Fairclough, Norman 37 Faist, Thomas 18 Falun Gong 23, 89–90  Epoch Times 84, 89, 132, 163  New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) 90  Sound of Hope Radio (SOH) 90 focus group 122–132 Fong, Bickleen 8 framework 16–17, 22, 30, 37–39, 66, 93, 140, 155, 159, 174 Fraser, Peter 47, 55 Free Trade Agreement 81, 110, 163 Forum of Global Chinese Language Media 4n, 179 Ge, Gongzhen 12 ghetto 30, 176, 178 ‘God’s Own Country’ 7, 42 ‘Greater China’ 21–23, 28, 33–34, 37, 90, 93, 165 Green Party 99–102, 108, 110, 114, 147, 163, 171 Hall, Stuart 26 Hanson, Pauline 100 Harding, Harry  ‘Greater China’ 21–22 Hide, Rodney 134, 144 Ho, Elsie 9 Hocton, Appo 41 Hong Kong 2, 5, 12, 20–22, 34, 51, 64, 66, 73, 83, 85–86, 88, 96–98, 103–105, 127, 134, 162, 165–166, 171, 179  government 96  Handover 65, 97, 173



index 

Hong Kong Chinese 20, 64–68, 75–77, 83, 86–87, 89, 126, 131, 173  ‘reluctant exiles’ 65 Huata, Donna Awatere 107n Huo, Raymond 169–171 iBall 29, 126, 131, 177n. See also Tan, Lincoln identity 15, 20–21, 23, 30–33, 95, 118, 148, 173. See also Chinese identity Imperial Qing 41, 173 Independent Daily 86, 127, 131 Independent Weekly 127 inequality 15, 26, 152, 164 integration 15, 17, 21, 59, 155 Ip, Manying 8 Japan 71, 159, 162–163, 179 Japanese invasion 46–47, 49, 52–53, 59, 173 Jiang, Zeming 160 Key, John 169, 172 Kiwi Party 168 Korea 56, 71–72, 87, 142 Kuomingtang (KMT) 46, 49–55, 59, 96 Labour Party 47, 55, 63, 98–121, 128, 130, 134, 139, 141–142, 144, 147–148, 152–154, 157–159, 163–164, 166, 168–169, 171–172  Fourth Labour Government 63, 99, 148, 159 Lange, David 148 Latin America 4, 110 Long Depression 42 Macau 2, 21–22 Malaysia 5, 12, 67, 73, 111, 125 Malaysian Chinese 20, 78, 85, 87, 108, 124, 131 Man Sing Times 49–52, 54 Mandarin Chinese 52, 85, 87, 104, 107, 124, 126, 157n Mandarin Times 84–85, 127 Maori 5, 7, 11, 20, 24–25, 29, 36, 42, 64, 88, 99–101, 110, 115, 119–121, 146, 157–158, 178 Maori Party 99, 101, 109, 114, 147 Maori Television 36 marginalisation 25–30, 32–34, 37, 39, 93, 110, 121, 123, 137, 147 McQuail, Denis 15 ‘mediacracy’ 95, 139, 141 mediasphere 11, 13, 93, 139, 147–148, 166

195

Mok, Tze Ming 29 multiculturalism 17–18, 24, 35, 84 Naficy, Hamid  Iranian television in Los Angeles  30–32 nation-state 18–19, 23, 160 National Party 98–99, 101–102, 107–121, 128–130, 139, 141, 144–145, 147–148, 152–153, 157–158, 168–169, 172 new Chinese immigrants (xin yimin) 4, 6, 8–10, 25, 29, 34, 63–66, 68, 73–76, 78, 81, 83, 85, 98, 138–139, 147–148, 165 New Citizen Party 171 New Times Weekly 85, 89, 163 New Zealand Advertising Standards Authority 36 assimilation policy 47, 56, 59, 173 Broadcasting Standards Authority 36 census 5, 20, 44–45, 64, 66, 69, 74, 77 Chinese MPs 108–109, 115, 129–130, 142, 145, 168, 176. See also Huo, Raymond; Wang, Kenneth; Wong, Pansy; Yang, Jian Chinese population 5, 9, 44–45, 55, 64, 66, 68, 74, 168 Europeans 5–8, 20, 24, 29, 41, 43, 45, 51, 53, 55, 56–57, 59, 63, 85, 174, 176, 178 government 24, 46–47, 49, 52, 55–56, 59, 63, 70, 72, 77–78, 83–84, 108, 110, 120–121, 134, 141–144, 148, 150, 152, 156–159, 163–164, 166, 172 coalition 99–102, 111–112, 118, 116, 169 Immigration Act 1987 63, 66–68, 76, 111 immigration policy 7–8, 24–25, 47, 59, 63, 66–68, 71–72, 142–143 immigration restriction 43–44 mainstream media 25, 28–29, 35, 76, 88, 103n, 105–106, 118, 121, 127, 133, 138–140, 147–148, 171. See also TV3 Old Age Pensions Act 46, 158 Parliament 93n, 98, 101–102, 107, 109, 115–116, 121, 129, 140, 143–145, 147–148, 168–169, 171, 176 poll tax 21, 44–45, 142 Press Council 36 refugee permit 47 Unemployment Act 158 New Zealand Chinese Association (NZCA) 47, 52, 54 New Zealand Chinese Business Roundtable Council (NZCBR) 168, 171

196

index

New Zealand Chinese Commercial Growers’ Association 55 New Zealand Chinese Growers’ Monthly Journal 53–57 New Zealand Chinese Herald 85, 88, 103–106, 114–121, 126, 130, 133, 140, 142, 168 New Zealand Chinese media 9–11, 15–16, 20, 25, 27–39, 61, 82–91, 93, 95–96, 102–148, 157–158, 163–168, 171–179 advertising 35, 37–38, 51–57, 59–60, 82, 85–87, 90–91, 103–105, 112–113, 116, 127–128, 133–142, 145–146, 176, 178 audience 10, 28–29, 34–39, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 102–104, 106, 108–112, 122, 129–130, 132–134, 136–137, 140, 145, 147–148, 163, 174 Chinese Media Bureau 36 internet 9, 11–12, 22, 34, 37, 82–83, 103, 105, 118–122, 135, 141, 168–169, 172. See also chinese.net.nz; skykiwi. com media personnel 36, 89, 94, 111–112, 116, 132–136, 138–139, 147 print 51, 53–55, 82, 82–88, 103–102, 112–119, 145. See also Chinese Times, Chinese Yellow Pages, Falun Gong Epoch Times, Independent Daily, Independent Weekly, Man Sing Times, Mandarin Times, New Times Weekly, New Zealand Chinese Growers’ Monthly, New Zealand Chinese Herald, New Zealand Chinese Weekly News, Q-Sing Times, Sing Tao News Group, United Chinese Press radio 9, 12, 29, 35, 37, 83–84, 86–88, 90, 94, 102–112, 115–116, 119, 122, 127, 132–135, 137, 141–142, 157n, 161, 163. See also 936AM reception 10, 16, 37–39, 93, 133, 136–137 satellite 9, 11, 34, 37, 83–84, 87–88, 102, 178 talkback radio 29, 88, 94, 107–112, 115–116, 119, 122, 134, 141, 157n, 163 television 12, 22, 30–32, 35–37, 83–84, 87–88, 90, 102, 178. See also Chinese New Zealand Television (TV33), World TV (WTV) New Zealand Chinese Weekly News 54, 56, 59 New Zealand Company 42

New Zealand First Party 99–101, 108, 114, 121, 134, 144, 147, 168–169 New Zealand general election 93, 95, 98 1990 100 1996 95, 96, 100, 108, 166 1999 100, 165 2002 100, 104, 108, 129, 143, 147 2005 95, 98–99, 101–103, 104–116, 118–119, 121–122, 128–131, 134–137, 139–148, 157–158, 163–164, 166, 168, 173, 176 2008 168 2011 168–169, 172 Botany electorate 168 First-past-the-post (FPP) 98 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 98–99, 108, 111, 115, 140, 147, 166 New Zealand Herald 29, 33n, 88, 103, 105 New Zealand-born Chinese 6, 21, 23, 29, 59 Ng, James 8  Windows on a Chinese Past 8 Norman, Russel 171 North America  Chinese media (in) 13, 83, 86, 90 NZCA, see New Zealand Chinese Association Opium War 41, 161 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 3, 159–160 Otago 5, 41, 43  goldfields 6, 44  Provincial Council 43 Pacific 4, 49, 51, 55, 57, 110, 132n, 170, 173 Pacific Islanders 110, 115, 119–120, 118, 157–158 Pakeha 7, 29 Panyu 43 Park, Robert 9 patriotism 46, 52–53, 59, 112, 132, 136, 158–164 perception 15, 19, 28, 37, 68, 70, 89, 94–95, 126, 128–129, 132, 137, 142, 149, 152, 154, 166–167, 170, 171n, 175, 178 Peters, Winston 100, 102, 114, 121, 144–145 pluralism 16, 18 ‘Points System’ 68–70, 76, 78



index 

Progressive Party 99, 101, 107n, 109, 114, 140, 147 public sphere 26, 28, 32, 122, 136 Q-Sing Times 52–54, 56, 59 racism 6, 19, 24–25, 43, 144–145, 171n  neo-racism 19 Reeves, William Pember 42 representation 15, 26–28, 44, 56, 91, 94–95, 98, 101–102, 109, 115–116, 121, 124, 129–130, 134, 136, 138–141, 146–148, 164, 168–169, 176 Republic of China 46, 51, 55, 59, 173 Savage, Michael Joseph 158  ‘cradle to grave’ 158 Second World War 8, 47, 54 semiotic 30–32, 113, 117 settlement 10, 17, 21–22, 34, 51, 73–74, 80, 90, 100n, 122, 126–127, 176 Seyip 57 Shanghai 12, 80, 107, 153, 157, 167, 172, 174 Sing Tao News Group 83, 86 Sing Tao Daily 83–84, 86 Sing Tao Weekly 82–84, 86 Singapore 5, 12, 22, 29, 67, 73, 83 Singaporean Chinese 20 skykiwi.com 79, 87, 105n, 133, 168, 172 Southeast Asia 3, 12, 20, 22, 83 Sun Yat-sen 46, 51 Sun, Wanning 13 Sunday Star-Times 29 Taiping Rebellion 41 Taiwan 5, 12, 21–23, 34, 49, 55–56, 60, 64, 67, 69, 72, 76, 88–89, 96, 98, 103– 105, 108, 121, 127, 128, 130–132, 142, 162, 165–166, 173  Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 96  election 96 Taiwanese 20, 65–66, 75–77, 86–87, 89, 98, 126–127, 129–132, 145, 166, 173 Tan, Lincoln 29, 33 taxation 41, 79, 99, 101, 110, 112, 115, 119–120, 142, 144–145, 148, 153, 156–158 Tay, Tommy 111, 116 Tibet 110, 162–163, 170–171

197

Tong Meng Hui (Chinese Revolutionary League) 45 transnationalism 11, 15, 17–19, 29, 39, 49, 90 Turia, Tariana 99, 101 TV3 140, 147 United Chinese Press 171 United Future Party 99, 101, 109, 114, 140, 147 United Kingdom 7, 42, 45n, 96, 165, 173  British Crown 7–8n, 42, 100 United States 30, 45n, 67, 71–72, 79, 147, 162, 171  ANZUS Treaty 148  Chinese gold-seekers 41  Chinese immigrants 3, 65  Chinese media (in) 13, 90  Page Act of 1875 44 Waitangi  Treaty of 7–8, 24, 42, 100, 121, 147  Tribunal 8, 24 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon 42 Wang Gungwu   Chinese identity 20–21 Wang, Kenneth 107–109, 113–114, 116, 121, 129, 140–146, 148, 153, 167–169  ACT’s billboard 144  petition 143 welfare 42, 99, 101, 110, 112, 115, 119, 147 welfare state 115, 134, 149, 152–153, 155–158 Wellington 9, 47, 51, 54, 56, 74, 140  Chinatown 175n  protests 170 Wong, Pansy 107–109, 112–113, 129, 141–142, 145–147, 153, 168–169, 171 World TV (WTV) 87–88, 102, 103, 133–134, 178 Xi, Jinping 171 Xinhua News Agency 138, 150, 157  China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) 179 Yang, Jian 169 Zengcheng 43, 49