A State Is Born: The Establishment Of The Israeli System Of Government, 1947–1951 1438467966, 9781438467962, 1438467974, 9781438467979, 9781438467986

Table of contents :
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 10
Acknowledgments......Page 12
Introduction......Page 14
A Bi-National Society......Page 15
Bureaucratic Mindset versus Political Party Experience......Page 16
Definition of Terms......Page 17
May 1948 to January 1949......Page 19
Main Questions......Page 20
Planning......Page 21
Implementation......Page 22
The Ministries of Interior and Labor as Case Studies......Page 23
Bureaucrats and Politicians......Page 24
Model 1: Policy and Administration......Page 25
Model 2: Facts and Interests......Page 26
Model 3: Energy and Equilibrium......Page 27
Model 4: The Pure Hybrid......Page 28
Introduction......Page 30
Changes in British Foreign Policy on the Question of Palestine Following WWII......Page 32
Formulation of the British Evacuation Policy......Page 34
The Attitude of the Yishuv Leadership toward the British Evacuation Policy......Page 38
The Attitude of the Yishuv Leadership to the Issue of the Transition Period......Page 40
C. The Structure of the Yishuv Establishment......Page 42
Knesset Yisrael......Page 43
The Histadrut......Page 44
D. The Political Status of Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 47
E. The Working Relationship between the Executive Bodies of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and the Jewish Agency......Page 50
Mapai: The Land of Israel Workers’ Party......Page 54
Mapam: The United Workers’ Party......Page 57
Mizrahi......Page 58
Party Politics during the Period of Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 59
A. Structure of Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 62
Studying the British Mandate System in Palestine......Page 63
B. The Future of the Jewish Mandatory Officials......Page 64
D. Intelligence-Gathering Methods and Approval of Departmental Plans......Page 65
A. Management of Essential Services......Page 68
B. Fuel Supply......Page 70
C. Transportation......Page 71
Defining Basic Transportation Issues......Page 72
Shortage of Armor for Vehicles......Page 73
Ports......Page 74
The Rail System......Page 75
D. Food Supply......Page 77
Dependence on the Transportation Network for the Transport of Food......Page 78
Management and Inspection: Basic Problems......Page 79
Supervision of Animal Slaughter and Distribution of Meat......Page 80
Organization on the National Level: The Council for Control of Food Supply and Distribution......Page 81
E. Contribution of the Experience Managing Essential Services to the Establishment of the Government System......Page 82
B. Establishing a Judicial System for Counsel and Oversight of Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 84
C. Defining the Legal Status of the Government during the Interim Period......Page 87
Voting Age......Page 89
Citizenship......Page 90
The Preferred Electoral System......Page 91
Division into Electoral Districts......Page 92
1. Government Ministries that Needed to be Rebuilt, as their Mandatory Precursors did not Meet the Needs of the New Government......Page 94
2. The Special Case of the Defense Ministry......Page 95
3. Government Ministries Based on the Mandatory System, According to Four Variables......Page 97
E. Significance of Va’adat HaMatzav’s Final Report......Page 98
B. Challenges in Ministry Organization: Between Administrative Centralization and Decentralization......Page 102
Planning of the Interior Ministry in Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 104
The Status of the District Commissioner in the Jewish State......Page 105
Division into Districts......Page 106
Buildings and Documents......Page 107
Staffing the Ministries......Page 108
The Information Department......Page 109
Police and Prison Services......Page 111
Planning and Construction Department......Page 112
The Mandatory Labor Department......Page 113
Va’adat Hamatzav Planning for the Labor Ministry......Page 114
Documents and Buildings......Page 116
Structure of the Ministry in Va’adat HaMatzav’s Summary Report......Page 117
Introduction......Page 120
A. Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Administration) and Moetzet Ha’Am (People’s Council)......Page 122
B. “Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708/1948” and Its Alternatives......Page 125
Drafting the Ordinance......Page 126
Continental Law and Jewish Law as Alternatives to the Ordinance......Page 128
C. The Effect of the War on the Government’s Powers: The Emergency Regulations......Page 130
D. Differences of Opinion over Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708/1948......Page 135
E. Powers of the Government Ministers and the Distribution of Portfolios......Page 139
F. The Political Struggle over Ministerial Portfolios......Page 143
B. Planning the District Administration: Establishing the General Administration Division......Page 146
Authorities of the District Commissioner......Page 148
The Jewish Mandatory Clerks in the District Administration and the Israeli Government......Page 150
Va’adat HaManganon and Its Decisions......Page 152
C. Roles of the General Administration Division......Page 154
The Jerusalem Municipality......Page 155
The Special Status of Tel Aviv......Page 156
D. Establishing the Local Government Division......Page 157
E. National-Level Oversight and Registration: Establishment of the Department of Population Registration......Page 158
Registration of New Immigrants......Page 160
F. The Effect of the War on the Implementation of the Recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav for the Interior Ministry......Page 162
Problems in International Law: Western Galilee......Page 163
Problems with International Law: The Negev......Page 164
Problems with International Law: Jerusalem......Page 165
Disputes between the Military Administration and the Civilian Administration......Page 166
G. Damage to Public Structures and Archives and Its Impact on Effective Governance during the War......Page 167
H. Staffing the Interior Ministry during the War......Page 169
I. Consolidation of the Interior Ministry during the War: Interim Summary......Page 171
A. Distinctive Issues of the Labor Ministry......Page 174
B. Structure of the Labor Ministry during the Provisional Government as Reflected in the Final Report of Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 175
C. The Political Context of the Establishment of the Labor Ministry......Page 177
D. The Establishment Stage: Specific Problems during the War......Page 180
Locating, Mobilizing, and Regulating Manpower for the Wartime Economy......Page 181
The Need to Prioritize National Production during the War......Page 184
Maintenance of Essential Infrastructure during the War: The Department for Public Works......Page 187
E. The Struggle between Mapai and Mapam over Centralized Planning, and Yaakov Reiser’s Dismissal......Page 190
F. First Signs of Routine in the Ministry’s Activities – Housing......Page 194
Building Inspection......Page 200
National (Amami) Insurance......Page 201
Staffing in the Labor Ministry during the Provisional Government......Page 202
G. Intermediate Summary on the Establishment of the Labor Ministry during the War......Page 203
Introduction......Page 206
A. Background and Basic Problems......Page 208
B. Major Issues during the Election Campaign......Page 209
C. The Results of the Elections and the Coalition Negotiations......Page 212
Placement of Party Members in the State Apparatus......Page 217
Organizing the Local Party Branches......Page 219
Special Target Populations (Youth, Women, and Intellectuals)......Page 220
E. The Transition Act......Page 221
F. Collective Responsibility as a Factor in Proper Governance......Page 224
B. Partisan Considerations in Transferring the Interior Ministry to the Mizrahi Movement......Page 228
C. Structural Reorganization within the Ministry......Page 231
Strengthening the Authority of the District Commissioners......Page 232
The Budgets of the Local Authorities......Page 233
Expansion of Local Government......Page 234
Registration and Census Data Collection for the Entire Population......Page 235
Marriage Registration......Page 237
Immigrant Registration......Page 239
Fundamental Problems in Formulating Israeli Policy toward the Arabs in the State of Israel......Page 240
The Military Administration......Page 242
The Police and Minorities Ministry......Page 243
International Law, Security, Economic Affairs, and Party Issues......Page 244
The Interior Ministry’s New Role in Dealing with the Arab Population......Page 245
Friction between the Interior Ministry, the Military Administration, and the Prime Minister’s Office......Page 246
The Registration of Arab Inhabitants......Page 248
Disputes over the Treatment of Arabs within the Interior Ministry......Page 249
F. The Division of Urban and Rural Construction......Page 253
G. Information: The Division of Press, Information, and Cinema......Page 254
Establishing a Supervisory Committee and Preliminary Recommendations......Page 257
The Local Government Division......Page 258
The Divisions of General Administration and Local Government: Committee Conclusions......Page 259
Intermediate Summary of the Management of the Interior Ministry: January 1949– November 1951......Page 261
A. Reorganizing the Labor Ministry following the Elections......Page 264
B. Between Centralized Planning Initiatives and Routine Planning: Relocating the Planning Division......Page 267
Finding Employment for Immigrants......Page 271
The Challenge of Training Decommissioned Soldiers for Integration into the Job Market......Page 278
Labor Relations......Page 279
D. Housing: Immigrant Camps to Transit Camps, Transit Camps to Housing Projects......Page 282
E. Public Works and Technical Services......Page 288
F. Inspection and Research......Page 290
Productivity......Page 292
Trade Unions......Page 293
G. National Insurance......Page 295
H. Interim Summary of the Activity of the Labor Ministry (January 1949–November 1951)......Page 296
I. Zeev Sharf’s Final Report on the Professional and Administrative Management of the Government Ministries (1950–1951)......Page 297
The Powers of the Ministries......Page 298
The Internal Structure of the Government Ministries and Recommendations for Reform......Page 301
The Contribution of Va’adat HaMatzav......Page 304
The Impact of the War of Independence in Shaping the Government System......Page 306
Party Politics......Page 307
Defining Powers......Page 308
Divisions of Power between Government Ministries......Page 309
The Interior Ministry......Page 310
The Labor Ministry......Page 312
Involvement in Politics and Policy-Making......Page 314
Lessons Learned from the Findings......Page 315
Summary of the Findings of Aberbach et al.......Page 316
Differences between Politicians and Bureaucrats in terms of Academic Training, Socioeconomic Status, and Professional Training......Page 317
Involvement in Politics and Policymaking......Page 319
Mediation between Interest Groups......Page 320
Which of the Models Best Fits the Israeli System of Government between 1947 and 1951?......Page 322
Biographical Appendix......Page 324
Map Appendix......Page 341
Notes......Page 344
Primary Sources......Page 394
Published Books and Articles......Page 397
Index......Page 414

Citation preview

A State Is Born

A State Is Born The Establishment of the

Israeli System of Government, 1947–1951

Jonathan David Fine Translated from Hebrew by

Tamar L. Cohen Edited by

Fray Hochstein

Originally published in Hebrew by Carmel Publishing House, 2009 The translation of this book was generously sponsored by the School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2018 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production, Ryan Morris Marketing, Fran Keneston Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Fine, Jonathan David, author. | Cohen, Tamar Liza, translator. | Hochstein, Fray, editor. Title: A state is born : the establishment of the Israeli system of government, 1947–1951 / Jonathan David Fine ; translated from Hebrew by Tamar L. Cohen ; edited by Fray Hochstein. Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, 2018. | "Originally published in Hebrew by Carmel Publishing House, 2009." | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017005399 (print) | LCCN 2017008176 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467979 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438467986 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Israel—Politics and government--1948-1967. | Israel. Vaadat HaMatzav. | Israel. Miśrad ha-penim. | Israel. Miśrad ha-ʻavodah òvehareòvaòhah. Classification: LCC JQ1830.A58 F56 2018 (print) | LCC JQ1830.A58 (ebook) | DDC 320.9569409/044—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017005399 10

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To the memory of our beloved Jonathan, so missed, so present Mickey, Danny, and Ruthie Fine

Contents

Preface • ix Acknowledgments • xi Introduction • xiii Part I:  Va’adat HaMatzav (January 1947–April 1948) Introduction  •  1 Chapter 1  •  3 The Backdrop for the Establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav Chapter 2  •  33 The Activity of Va’adat HaMatzav up to the Outbreak of the War of Independence (October–December 1947) Chapter 3  •  39 Va’adat HaMatzav during the War of Independence Chapter 4  •  55 Long-Range Planning: The Judicial System and the Final Report of Va’adat HaMatzav Chapter 5  •  73 Va’adat HaMatzav and the Planning of the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry

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Part II:  The Government Ministries during the War:

From the Establishment of the Provisional Government to the First Elections (April 1948–January 1949)   Introduction  •  91 Chapter 6  •  93 Establishing the Legal and Executive Foundations of the Government System Chapter 7  •  117 The Ministry of the Interior during the War of Independence (May 1948–January 1949) Chapter 8  •  145 The Labor Ministry during the War of Independence (May 1948–January 1949) Part III:  The Establishment of the Israeli Government

After the First Elections (January1949–November 1951) Introduction  •  177 Chapter 9  •  179 Elections to the First Knesset: Results and Significance Chapter 10  •  199 The Interior Ministry (January 1949–November 1951) Chapter 11  •  235 The Labor Ministry (January 1949–November 1951) General Summary  •  275 Biographical Appendix  •  295 Map Appendix  •  312 Notes  •  315 Bibliography  •  365 Index  •  385

Preface

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n January 1947, the British cabinet made the historic decision to transfer the question of the future of Palestine to the United Nations, a decision announced officially by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on February 18, 1947, in a speech to Parliament. Thus began the final stage of British rule in Palestine. May 1947 saw the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) Commission, which in August of that year recommended the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. This recommendation was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on November 29, 1947. A short time after the British decision to transfer the question of Palestine to the U.N., various bodies from the national institutions of the Yishuv (the Jewish settlement in Palestine) began to hold initial discussions to prepare for a possible transfer of power. On April 24, 1947, Eliezer Kaplan, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive Board, proposed establishing a joint committee, to be comprised of representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi, to prepare the Yishuv establishment for the transition from Mandatory rule to a Jewish sovereign state. The Emergency Committee (in Hebrew Va’adat HaMatzav) began its work in October 1947. Up until the U.N. Partition Plan resolution at the end of November, Va’adat HaMatzav focused on initial formulations of theoretical plans for the transition of power. However, following the outbreak of hostilities in December 1947, its members were forced to focus on the planning and implementation of a system of essential services, while at the same time filling the power vacuum that the disintegrating Mandatory government had left in its wake. On March 1, 1948, Minhelet Ha’Am ix

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(People’s Administration) and Mo’etzet Ha’Am (People’s Council) were established, forming the basis of the executive and legislative branches. Following the declaration of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, and the beginning of de-facto sovereignty, these were renamed, respectively, the Provisional Government and the Provisional State Council. The majority of the processes involved in consolidating the Israeli governmental system took place during wartime, and this fact has had long-term implications on its working methods and authority. Toward the end of the war, in January 1949, the first elections for the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) were held, but the work of delineating the powers and establishing the modi operandi of the administrative arms of government continued until the second round of elections in November 1951. Palestine was not the only colonial outpost to transition from European sovereignty to independence between the 1940s and the 1960s; similar processes occurred in the colonial territories of the British and French empires throughout East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. However, the establishment of the government system in Israel is notable for several unique characteristics that render the Israeli story a particularly interesting case study. This book is based on a doctoral dissertation written as an historical study at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the direction of Professor Peter Medding of the Department of Political Science and Professor Dalia Ofer of the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry. I wish to extend my warm thanks to them for their patience and perseverance. I would also like to thank Professor Alon Kadish from the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and head of the IDF history division, who, while I was still a master’s student, opened the gateway onto British imperial policy in the Middle East in general and Mandatory Palestine in particular. —Jonathan David Fine

Acknowledgments

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he manuscript of this book was under a last revision by the author, our dear Jonathan, when he passed away suddenly and prematurely on August 21, 2015. It was then our major goal to see the book, on which he worked so hard, published up to the standards he would have wanted. Many people have helped us in this process. Without their help this publication would have not been possible. Prof. Peter Medding, professor emeritus of political science and of contemporary judaism, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who took upon himself the revision and update of the translation. Prof. David Levi-Faur, head of the Federmann School of Public Policy and the Department of Political Science, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who offered us such significant and kind guidance. Dr. Susan Hattis Rolef, senior researcher, Knesset Research and Information Center, who provided crucial help in identifying the correct English titles of a long list of institutions. Ms. Keren Dinur, research assistant, Federmann School of Public Policy, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who contributed so much to the completion of the updated list of translated institutional names. Dr. Michael Rinella, senior acquisitions editor for African American politics and sociology, environmental studies, and political science at SUNY xi

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Press, whose understanding and patience while waiting for the last version of the manuscript has eased our minds over the last few months. Ms. Fray Hochstein, the wonderful English editor of the book, for her absolute dedication and excellent work. Prof. Boaz Ganor, dean of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel, and the Lauder School, for their generous support of the translation of this book. To all of Jonathan’s dear colleagues and students at IDC, for whom Jonathan cared so much, thank you for being at our side in such difficult moments. To all and each one of you our deepest gratitude and utmost recognition. Finally, this book is dedicated in loving memory of Jonathan, whose passion for expanding the research into and knowledge of the history of the State of Israel breathes and beats ceaselessly throughout the pages of this book. —Mickey, Danny, and Ruthie Fine

Introduction

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he book before us is a historical study whose primary purpose is to describe and analyze the transition from colonial/Mandatory rule to Israeli sovereignty. The research focuses on the policies of planning and implementation that comprised the establishment of the Israeli government system between 1947 and 1951. Palestine was not the only territory to make the transition from colonial rule to independence after the Second World War. This process, which took place in myriad places around the world, began in the second half of the 1940s and continued into the 1960s. Apart from Aden and Macao, which each gained independence somewhat later, and Hong Kong, which was returned to China only in 1997, many territories in the Near East, the Middle East, and Africa (which had been under British and French colonial rule), underwent similar yet distinctive processes during this period. In the British colonial context, examples include countries and territories such as India, Burma (today Myanmar), Ceylon (today Sri Lanka), Singapore, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, and Nigeria. There has been much scholarship on the impact of the colonial regimes on the societies that lived under them. Although there is no dispute as to the existence of such an influence, there is little agreement as to its scope or precise nature. Among the pioneers in this field are Emerson (1960),1 Lewis (1965),2 and Lijphart (1977).3 Dependency theory, originally pro­posed in the late 1970s, sought to explain the difficulties societies in developing countries face in adapting to a new economic reality, especially in light of the social and economic legacies of the colonial experience. The main question is how the colonial system of xiii

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administration and governance influenced a given territory or country after it attained independence. One of the widely held assumptions among postcolonial scholars is that the colonial legacy is felt in the continuity of administrative and organizational patterns, consisting first and foremost in an awareness of the manner in which government functions and of how government services, such as courts, police, and tax collection, should be conducted. According to this understanding, the transition to independence focused on the urgent need to establish an administrative system at the expense of the development of political parties and a political system that could have served as a better guarantee of regime stability. The scholar Yaakov Reuveni emphasizes in his book4 that a small bureaucracy, one that is not institutionalized but remains fundamentally political in nature (alongside which political parties can develop), is preferable to a large bureaucracy that draws the potential political forces into its orbit and then suppresses the nonbureaucratic elements in the system, especially the parties. In this context, the main question with regard to Israel is what characterized the process of transition from colonial/Mandatory rule to Israeli government system concerning the relative weight of the needs of political and partisan elements on the one hand and the needs of administrative elements on the other. As a historical case study, this book focuses on the transition of government from the Mandatory to the Israeli system, but in addition much can be learned by comparing the processes that took place in Israel with those that took place at the same time in other regions of the British Empire. This comparison serves to emphasize the former’s unique characteristics.

A Bi-National Society Both culturally and politically the population of Mandatory Palestine was bi-national and bi- ethnic. This was not the only place in the British Empire where a colonial regime ruled over a population split along religious, ethnic, national, tribal, cultural, or linguistic lines; time and again

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the exit of the colonial power was followed by an outbreak of hostilities between competing ethnic, religious, and national groups and resulted in hostile conflict that ended in territorial division (India/Pakistan and Cyprus being cases in point). However in the above instances, the local populations were comprised of mainly indigenous peoples, whereas in Palestine the majority of the Jewish population was comprised of European immigrants, and the Arabs were the indigenous population. This is unique to Israel and distinguishes this case from others in the British Empire. The differences between the populations in Israel were expressed across all levels of society: political institutionalization, education, choice of profession, standard of living, and level of culture. It resulted in enormous gaps between Jewish and Arab societies, gaps that ultimately influenced the transition from Mandatory to Israeli systems and to a great extent also affected the outcome of the War of Independence and determined the borders of the new Israeli state.

Bureaucratic Mindset versus Political Party Experience Because the Mandatory regime in Palestine encouraged an affinity between the Arab population and government bureaucracy (expressed, for example, in the fact that most of the leading Arab political figures, such as Hajj Amin al-Husseini and George Antonius, were employees of the Mandatory government), the party established afterward by this community was not one that represented the interests of, nor was it capable of resolving internal conflicts within, the Arab community. The development of the political party system in the Jewish Yishuv was different, as was its relationship to the bureaucracy of the British regime. The party was the central institution of the Jewish community in Palestine even before the British Mandate, including branches outside the country, and although many Jews did work for the Mandatory governmental system, the majority of them were sent there by the national institutions. In general, as opposed to Arab society, Jewish society emphasized a system of autonomous organizations characterized by particularistic

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tendencies. They were run by political parties and their leadership, external and parallel to Mandate bureaucracy.

Duration and Influence of the British Mandate in Palestine Palestine was defined by the League of Nations as a type-A mandate, as were Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. As opposed to B and C mandates, the duration of the colonial regime in a type A mandate up to the granting of independence was short—a mere 25 to 30 years. Unlike 300 years of British colonial rule in India, or 200 years of French and British colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa, the political culture of the local populations in Palestine, whether the Ottoman legacy in the case of the Arabs, or the Eastern European political heritage for the Jews, was not replaced by British political culture.

Definition of Terms Given the broad, general nature of the term “government system,” it should be emphasized that this book looks at establishment of the Israeli government ministries, focusing on two in particular (the Ministries of Interior and of Labor) as illustrative of the processes of planning and implementation that led to their establishment. To clarify the fields of definition, I distinguish between three basic concepts: government system, government, and regime. Government system is defined as the formal patterns of a state’s governing system, the order of the primary state institutions and their powers, the mutual relationships and other institutional and formal aspects. The government system is the “system” and the model by which the government institutions operate. It is important to note, however, that in reality there is often overlap between the government system and the governing institutions.

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The term government has two primary meanings: (1) the institution that determines national policy and that is comprised of members of the government and ministers (cabinet), and (2) the government ministries—central offices and local branches—that carry out the decisions of the government. The executive branch is comprised of the cabinet and its ministries. In the majority of parliamentary regimes, including Israel, government rules only after it is given a vote of confidence by the parliament. The government is generally comprised of the leaders of the parties, represented by ministers. It functions on an agreed-upon platform, supported by a majority of the members of its Assembly of Representatives. In every democratic regime, the government is the main locus of state power. It is not, however, the only locus; alongside the government are the parliament, political parties, economic conglomerates, professional associations, the media, and the academy. There is generally a mutually symbiotic relationship between these institutions and the government—especially the political parties and the parliament, and less so the other institutions. In democratic societies from World War I onward, modern government, as the institution that now controls the executive branch, the military, national census data, and legislation, has markedly expanded and broadened its activities. The term regime refers to the political culture of the state. The regime oversees the power structure and institutions through a separation of powers and division of responsibilities among the various authorities, as well as the system by which the leadership is elected or appointed. Although the phrase “establishment of the state” is commonly used in the context of diplomatic or military history (on which much has already been written), this work centers on the historical process by which the government ministries were established. Diplomatic or military events and the like are touched on only insofar as they relate to the issue at hand. Furthermore, and in differentiation from other studies on the government system in Israel that take a strictly political science perspective, this work is based on in-depth historical research grounded in a comprehensive archival foundation, of the sort that has not been done previously.

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Periodization The book is divided into three periods. January 1947 to April 1948 The first part of the book analyzes the initial planning and implementation stages in the establishment of the government system in Israel, from the moment the British decide to transfer the question of Palestine to the United Nations up to the submission of the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav, on the eve of the declaration of the state. In effect, this period must be divided into two subperiods: January 1947 to December 1947, and December 1947 to April 1948. The first is the initial stage in which the organized institutions of the Yishuv began to discuss possible plans of action for the transition of sovereignty, as well as defining problems in areas of diplomacy, security, economics, and organization; the crowning achievement of this period was of course the establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav. This committee constituted a political compromise between the various institutional bodies that wished to be a part of and influence the transition to sovereignty. From its establishment in October 1947 and up to the outbreak of hostilities in December of the same year, the committee focused on forming general plans. From December 1947, when the war began, and throughout its initial stages (December 1947–May 1948), the committee, out of necessity, shifted into managing essential services, an approach that, although imperative at the time, required that long-term planning be set aside. It was only in the course of submitting its final report in April 1948 that the committee formulated its final plans for the establishment of the different government ministries. May 1948 to January 1949 The second part of the book focuses on the transition from a system of government based on voluntary agreements and lacking any real authority to

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an official state with full sovereignty. Given that this transition took place while a war of survival was raging, it was not a shift to “business as usual.” The circumstances created by this situation affected the construction of patterns of government, the definition of powers, and the implementation of policies on the ground. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the war functions as a distinct period. January 1949 to November 1951 As the war came to an end, the government system began to return to a routine suitable for peacetime, and prepared for the first elections to the Knesset. These elections (January 1949) are the starting point for the third part of the book, which focuses on the continued process of the establishment of the government system after the war.

Main Questions An analysis of the establishment of the government system in Israel through the perspective of the three historical stages mentioned above provides a comprehensive picture of the main factors influencing the process of transition and establishment. Following are a number of essential questions that the book attempts to answer: 1. How was the Israeli government system established? 2. To what extent was the process of establishing the Israeli government system influenced by the structure and experience acquired within the Mandate government and by the structure of the Yishuv institutions? How was this influence expressed? And how was the new system created? 3. How did the war influence the establishment of the system, in terms of both the definition of the powers of the executive branch and the process of establishing the government ministries in actuality?

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4. How did the various players—politicians, party functionaries, experts, and professionals—fit in and what was unique about each one? 5. What can be learned from the two case studies presented in this book—the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry—about the system as a whole?

Between Planning and Implementation: Fundamental Issues Planning Does the concept of “planning” in actuality reflect the conception of an “ideal government system,” as they hoped it would be or as they were forced to plan it given the constraints of the period and the place? The initial stage, characterized by only partial sovereignty, was virtually the only realm in which the members of the Yishuv establishment could work unhindered. In the second phase, the element of planning combines with a sovereign government system with full powers of enforcement, a fact that enables the transition from planning to implementation. However, even before full sovereignty it is possible to identify a partial implementation policy, mainly the result of the accelerated disintegration of the Mandate government. Several important questions arise with regard to the connection between the planning policy and the three main chronological stages of the research. Planning Concept. Was an overall planning concept at work in each stage of planning and implementation, or was it in reality a series of reactive responses to changing situations and ongoing needs, whether the constraints of war or the pressures of the political parties? Between Theory and Practice. What happened when gaps formed between theoretical plans and the situation on the ground? What were the big

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problems the planners had to deal with? For example: continuity vs. change vis-à-vis the two previous governmental systems (Mandatory and Yishuv) or the question of amalgamating, assimilating, or voiding one or the other. How much previous infrastructure existed? With which fields did they have experience and with which not? How did they prepare in the face of two enormous demographic challenges: mass Jewish immigration on the one hand, and on the other, unexpectedly large numbers of Arabs (the result of the annexation of territories captured during the war; these territories were not included in the original boundaries of the Jewish state according to the Partition agreement and had significant Arab populations)? How much practical impact did the war have on the establishment of the government system, both in the short term, primarily in necessary changes to the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav, and in the long term, especially with regard to the executive branch’s exploitation of the emergency situation to embed enforcement patterns, such as the Emergency Laws. Professionalism. How prepared was the government to carry out its mission on the administrative, systemic, and personal levels? Who was appointed to the various planning bodies? What were the working relationships between the policymaking politicians and professional experts, and who had greater influence on the planning stage? How did the educational or institutional background of the players influence their work methods—for example, was there a difference between bureaucrats from the Yishuv establishment and those who had served the Mandate government and absorbed the British administrative tradition? And if so, how were these differences manifested? Implementation Policy implementation as used in the present study refers to the implementation of policy relating to the establishment of the government ministries. On the one hand it is possible to say that implementation was already an integral part of the planning stages, since between 1947 and 1951 it was the executive branch that ordered and supervised the planning. On the other

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hand, we should distinguish between theoretical planning and the implementation of policy as influenced by external factors, such as the stages of the war, or internal factors such as party pressures and the level of professionalism of the implementers. In terms of policy implementation, we must ask the following questions: • Who was in charge of implementing the planning policy? This group can be broken down into subcategories: the prime minister, ministers, ministry heads, and field workers; how did each of these influence the implementation? • Can we identify a coherent executive worldview at work? • How did the party system influence policy implementation, and how was this reflected? For example, the prioritization of partisan considerations over professional considerations, appointments to key positions in government ministries, or setting implementation guidelines for a given government ministry based on an ideological worldview. A case in point is the bitter dispute between the Labor Ministry under Mapam (the United Workers’ Party), and Mapai (the Land of Israel Workers’ Party) during the period of the provisional government, over the question of “initiated” national planning, i.e., the drafting of a national master plan.

The Ministries of Interior and Labor as Case Studies To illustrate the planning and implementation policy with regard to the establishment of the government system in Israel, I chose to focus on two government ministries that have not yet been studied—the Labor Ministry and the Interior Ministry. Both of these were large, active ministries during the period covered by this study, and thus a resource of plentiful data useful for reaching bigger-picture and more general conclusions about the processes that characterized the establishment of the government system during the period. In addition, the two ministries dealt with such different areas that

Introduction

xxiii

this enables us to compare two distinct systems, each one requiring particular processes of planning and implementation. For example, matters that fall under the responsibility of an Interior Ministry had been entirely the domain of the Mandatory government, and the Yishuv had little experience with or dealings in this realm. This meant that the new government had to quickly learn an entirely new field of governance. And, in fact, the fledgling Israeli Interior Ministry did set itself the task of studying the entire Mandatory governmental system, including an emphasis on the economic and strategic systems that had not been under its control, such as the refineries and oil tanks, the train system, airports, and the port of Haifa. With regard to the Labor Ministry, on the other hand, the Yishuv had rich experience with labor-related matters, mainly due to the many Yishuv institutions that dealt with this issue, such as the Histadrut Labor Federation (hereafter the Histadrut) and the various workers’ parties. These differences between the two ministries provided an opportunity to compare two very different planning and implementation situations and examine how these were dealt with by the staff of each ministry. This point is significant, as the split between those areas of government in which the Yishuv had some degree of prior experience, and those in which they had none, influenced the process of establishment throughout and is apparent in the final results.

Bureaucrats and Politicians Although this is an historical study, it is worthwhile to reflect on several theoretical subjects that have preoccupied political scientists and scholars of public administration regarding the influence of the political on the administrative echelons and vice versa; this adds an important measure by which to understand the events as they unfolded in Israel. When Max Weber was asked, at the end of World War I, what political options were applicable for Germany, he specified two important factors that had affected the behavior of the modern state in the twentieth century: the

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emergence of modern bureaucracy characterized by professional administrators, and the rise of a new class, comprised of professional politicians whose influence was no longer based on inherited social standing but on mass parties representing millions.5 From an historical perspective, it is possible to say that Weber was right; the world saw many changes between 1870 and 1970, but in terms of policymaking, two phenomenon stood out in the regimes of the West: professional politicians and civil servants (bureaucrats). To this we must add the massive growth in the size of bureaucracy in the modern state, and the significant expansion of the number of civil servants. For example, between 1911 and 1970 the number of documents dealing with regulations and administrative law on a yearly basis grew tenfold in Denmark, while in the United States the federal register, which deals with the publication of administrative law, grew four times larger between 1966 and 1975.6 In 1981, Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman published Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies.7 The book poses eight questions on the issue of politicians and bureaucrats as policymakers: (1) What is the difference between politicians and bureaucrats? (2) Do they come to their positions from different backgrounds? (3) Do they have different priorities? (4) Do they take different criteria into consideration in their decision-making? (5) Do they relate to public issues and policy-making in practice differently? (6) Do they have different worldviews? (7) How do these differences influence the working relationships between the two groups as well as policymaking in practice? (8) Would the situation be different if bureaucrats rather than politicians determined government policy?8 The authors attempt to answer these questions using four models (or, as they termed it, images), based on empirical studies conducted in seven democratic, Western, industrialized countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and the United States. Following is a short explanation of each of these models. Model 1: Policy and Administration This model assumes that politicians determine policy and bureaucrats carry out and administrate it. Frank Goodnow argued that a transition took place

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between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which the administration of state roles was split in two: the general will expressed politically, and the implementation of this will via the administration. The accepted norm, according to this understanding, is that the civil servant serves the politician. Bureaucrats’ advantage over politicians was in their ability to engage in politics without bearing any political responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Max Weber saw in this model the ideal reflection of the bureaucrat-politician relationship, while also recognizing the impossibility of completely separating the administrative from the political act. Even in situations where bureaucrats wanted to fulfill the wish of their political masters, this was not practical, as politicians lacked the professional expertise, the knowledge, and the time to deal with all the aspects of running a modern state. In effect, Weber is saying, the politician is in a position of “dilettante” vis-à-vis the expert administrator.9 Model 2: Facts and Interests This model assumes that both politicians and bureaucrats participate in policymaking. How, then, do their contributions differ? The bureaucrat provides facts and knowledge, while the politician emphasizes interests and values; the bureaucrat asks “Will this work?” while the politician asks, “Will it fly?” Thus, while bureaucrats emphasize the technical side of policy, politicians, in their response, focus on the public.10 Herbert Simon sought to separate the factual aspect from the ethical aspect of decision-making, and reached the conclusion that the bureaucrat provides expertise, while the politician provides value judgments.11 According to this model, there is a difference between administrative rationale and political rationale. While the politician does not want to deal overmuch in details, the political system needs a greater degree of maturity to make use of the administrative rationale. Karl Mannheim argues that the natural inclination of the bureaucrat is to transform every political problem into an administrative one.12 In democratic regimes, the second model views the role of the politician as mediating, listening, and clarifying conflicting demands and interests to resolve social conflicts. This model has also proven problematic, as in

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recent years reservations have arisen about the differences between politicians and bureaucrats. For example, politicians’ improved levels of education and training have cast a heavy shadow on the heretofore monopoly of the bureaucrat on expertise. Model 3: Energy and Equilibrium In this model, both politicians and bureaucrats make policy, with one essential difference: the politician tries to clarify and reconcile a broad and diffuse range of interests of unorganized individuals, while the bureaucrat mediates between the narrow, focused interests of an organized clientele; politicians are passionate and idealistic, while bureaucrats are careful, centralist, and pragmatic; the politician seeks fame, while the bureaucrat prefers the back room, dealing with change in a gradual manner and striving to implement a policy balanced between opposing sides; the ministers dictate policy to the bureaucrats, and the latter provide the ministers with the means of carrying it out.13 In reality, both politicians and bureaucrats question their own administrative policy. The interests of bureaucrats are focused and centered according to the professional department they represent. Before and after the legislation process, the bureaucrat checks the potential pressure groups likely to be affected by the change to come as a result of the new legislation. The role of the bureaucrat in the third model is to sketch the balance of power of organized political forces. But there are three limitations to the bureaucrat’s ability to influence interest groups through the administrative process: (1) Bureaucrats tend to ignore nonorganized interests, whereas politicians tend to intervene with regard to nonorganized interests to increase their popularity and their potential support. (2) Bureaucrats tend not to bridge between functional sectors. For example, ministers in the Danish government maintain close ties with organized interest groups, such as farmers, workers, and pensioners. Bureaucrats tend to listen to lower frequencies of interest groups than politicians do. (3) Bureaucrats treat the balance of political power as a given, while politicians tend to look beyond it. The more

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educated and skilled politicians are, the greater their access to systems of political power. Moreover, political principles accompanied by ideological thinking can give the politician a marked advantage over the bureaucrat.14 The third model also assumes a difference between the disposition of the politician and that of the bureaucrat, namely that the politician is more passionate and idealistic, while the bureaucrat is cautious and restrained and dedicated to avoiding risk. Both sides have political skills, but the politician prefers the podium and the bureaucrat the boardroom. The model also tries to understand how these differences influence the implementation of policy in practice. First, each group tends to present different issues on the public agenda. In Germany, for example, initiatives from the bureaucracy follow the observation of developments on the ground, contacts with the clientele of the department or ministry dealing with a particular issue, or feedback about programs that have already been implemented. The German political system, on the other hand, has evinced much greater sensitivity to public opinion and a tendency to take up issues of a philosophical and ideological nature that are of interest to the voting public. The model assumes that no group of bureaucrats would have been capable of initiating and advancing the socioeconomic worldview of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, nor the radical worldview of Labor MP Anthony Wedgwood Benn.15 The third model posits that in both the German and British cases, policymaking on the part of the bureaucratic establishment tends to preserve the status quo rather than initiate new policy. According to Mattei Dogan, all of the great reforms carried out in post-WWII Europe were initiated by political parties.16 Model 4: The Pure Hybrid Understanding the fourth model requires a few advance notions: the first model emerged in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century and was based on the premises of Max Weber. The second model, which proposed a certain degree of bureaucrat-driven policymaking, was suited to the first half of the twentieth century. The third model, which attributes

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a degree of political initiative to the bureaucratic echelon, emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. In the fourth model, on the other hand, the “Weberian dichotomy” disappears and is replaced by a mixed model, or “pure hybrid,” as it is referred to in academia.17 This model talks about an amalgamation of the two roles, but notes that the organizational structure varies from country to country. In Japan and France, for example, there is growing mobility between the career scales of bureaucracy and that of politics, and vice versa. In the UK and Germany there is an influx of “outsiders” into the system, that is, experts who come from outside the civil service. This phenomenon is also widespread in the United States. Researchers have termed this phenomenon the “bureaucratization of politics and the politicization of bureaucracy.”18 Some attribute this phenomenon of “super bureaucrats” to the expansion of governmental centers of power, such as the staff of the White House in the United States, the British Cabinet, and the office of the German Chancellor. A similar division exists between centers of power in the Swedish governmental system. Thus, a central question that arises from Aberbach et al. is to what extent are politicians and bureaucrats similar policymakers? In the conclusion of this book, I make use of Aberbach et al.’s findings regarding the proposed four models, first by summarizing them and then by examining their relevance to our understanding of the working relationships that developed between policymaking politicians and bureaucrats in Israel from the initial Va’adat HaMatzav until the end of the term of office of the First Knesset.

Part I

Va’adat HaMatzav (January 1947–April 1948)

Introduction The first part of this book analyzes the activities of Va’adat HaMatzav between January 1947 and April 1948. The primary goal of Va’adat HaMatzav was to address the question of what the administrative system of the government was supposed to do, how to divide the different responsibilities among the offices, and determine the authority and powers of the government and its divisions. Three main challenges affected the work of Va’adat HaMatzav between October 1947 and April 1948: (1) fear that the British evacuation policy would leave a governmental vacuum, leading to the collapse of the government system; (2) the need to operate essential services during the war, which delayed long-term planning; and (3) the inability to establish a sovereign government until the completion of the British evacuation delayed the takeover of strategic complexes that had been under direct British control, specifically the fuel infrastructures in Haifa Bay; the ground, sea, and air transportation infrastructures; military camps; and warehouses and public buildings. The historical discussion focuses primarily on the following subjects: the political and security situation that led to the establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav and its political status; the activities of Va’adat HaMatzav up to the outbreak of the war (October to November 1947); its operations during the war; and its recommendations regarding the structure of the Israeli government system on the eve of the establishment of the state (December 1947–April 1948). 1

Chapter 1

The Backdrop for the Establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav

A. Changes in British Foreign Policy on the Question of Palestine Following WWII The end of World War II saw a shift in British foreign policy, the result of two essential changes: the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s new roles as global powers, and the rise of the British Labor Party in 1945. The British Labor Party focused domestically on reconstructing the British economy and internationally on dismantling the empire, with particular emphasis on reducing its military forces around the globe. One example of the implementation of this policy in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean was the termination of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. The decision to evacuate India, Burma, and Ceylon diminished the importance of the Middle East as a strategic link between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, while the growing influence of the new superpowers in the region undermined British influence, eventually pushing them out of the Middle East entirely.1 The support of the American president, Harry S. Truman, for the Zionist cause also influenced British foreign policy on the question of Palestine. As a result of the American tendency to link the question of the displaced Jewish population in Europe with the question of Palestine (two issues the British wished to keep separate), British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin initiated the establishment of the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry.2 On the presentation of the committee’s final report, in April 1946, the British understood that the Americans favored the Zionist interpretation. Although the report did not contain a direct recommendation for the establishment of a Jewish state, it supported 3

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the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jewish refugees from the displaced persons camps in Europe, and made no recommendations that would be inconvenient for the Zionist movement, such as the dismantling of illegal forces (i.e., the Jewish militias).3 The British did not give up, however, and to advance their position transferred the question of Palestine to the Morrison-Grady Committee. On July 31, 1946, that committee recommended forced regional autonomy subject to British patronage, while vaguely implying the possibility of partition in the more distant future. The Morrison-Grady Plan was released after the events of “Black Saturday” on June 29, 1946, but was rejected outright by both the Zionist and the Arab leadership.4 On December 27, 1946, Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Minister Bevin made the decision to transfer the question of Palestine to the United Nations, where they believed it would be easier to counter American opposition. On February 18, 1947, this decision was officially reported to British Parliament. At the same time, Bevin made a final attempt to put together a new proposal with Harold Beeley, the head of the Palestine desk at the Foreign Ministry and Bevin’s adviser on Middle East affairs. As far as the Zionist movement was concerned, the Bevin-Beeley proposal was even worse than the MorrisonGrady Plan; it recommended dividing the country into autonomous regions, yet, unlike the Morisson-Grady Plan, it did not mention the possibility of dividing it into two states. Furthermore, it recommended the establishment of an Arab state after a period of five years, including limitations on Jewish immigration, which would itself be contingent on the decision of the British high commissioner or an international tribunal.5 The arrival of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)” to Palestine in May 1947 effectively signaled the end of British rule. Its recommendations in favor of partition were presented to the U.N. General Assembly in August 1947, and on November 29, 1947, the plan to divide Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, was approved. The shift in British Middle East foreign policy and subsequent preparations for the evacuation of Palestine had immediate consequences for the security situation. While the Yishuv leadership was trying to assess British evacuation

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5

policy, the Arabs displayed growing unease at the U.N. Partition Plan, and both sides began preparing for armed confrontation. The situation reached a boiling point with the launching of the battle for the country’s roads in December 1947, a battle that continued to be fought until April 1948. In summary, the combination of the political changes and the declining security situation created a state of emergency in the Yishuv. Therefore, the year 1947 was an important turning point, not only on the road to sovereignty but also with regard to the establishment of the Israeli government system.

B. Preparation for the British Evacuation The main issue that informed the early planning stages of the Israeli government system was the British evacuation policy from Palestine. Two questions preoccupied the Yishuv establishment as it tried to assess the evacuation policy. First, were the British sincere in their intentions to evacuate Palestine? And if they were sincere, what was their plan for evacuation? Would it be in cooperation with the local population so as to facilitate an orderly transfer of power in accordance with the decisions of the U.N., or would it be a hasty, unilateral evacuation? Second, would the evacuation leave a political vacuum that would lead to a complete government breakdown?6 In analyzing this issue it is important to distinguish between British intentions and actions, and the Yishuv leadership’s assessment of the British plans—assessments based on what turned out to be poor or incomplete information and their own interpretation of British policy. Formulation of the British Evacuation Policy Scholar Yoav Gelber7 notes that in early October 1947 it was not yet clear to Alan Cunningham, the last British high commissioner in Palestine, whether his government was planning an orderly transfer of power to the successors of the Mandate, or whether it intended to carry out a hasty evacuation leaving a power vacuum behind. Gelber also notes that at this point

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discussions about the evacuation plan on the operative level (both civilian and military) were still in very preliminary stages. In fact, the only thing that was clear in this period was the declaration British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones made on September 26, 1947, from Lake Success, emphasizing Britain’s determination to evacuate Palestine, though he did not set a target date. Gelber adds that opinions differed among the various British government offices dealing with the issue as to the method of evacuation and possible timetable. To resolve these questions, on October 28, 1947, the secretary of defense (with the backing of the foreign minister and the minister for colonial affairs) proposed the establishment of an interministerial commission whose task was defined as being to: “assist the Defense Committee with the problems arising from the imminent evacuation from Palestine.”8 The proposal was accepted and the committee duly formed. It included representatives from the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Offices of War, Defense, Navy, Air Force, Transportation, and the Finance Ministry. The purpose of the commission was to coordinate the preparation of the evacuation plans of the civil administration and the armed forces from Palestine; to serve as a steering committee (clearing house) for all eventualities related to the evacuation; and to coordinate interministerial activities related to the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine, if possible preempting the organization of such groups in their countries of departure.9 On November 5, 1947, the interministerial commission submitted its first report to the British Cabinet. On the diplomatic front, the members of the commission anticipated that the discussions about Palestine in the U.N. would end in one of the following ways: the Arabs and the Jews would agree together on a solution on their own; the U.N. would adopt a solution and take on itself the responsibility for implementing it; the U.N. would adopt the recommendations of the majority of the UNSCOP Commission members without deciding on how to implement them; or the discussions would end without a clear decision. The report also emphasized that the two latter eventualities would be the most problematic for the British government. The committee also emphasized that it would be a grave error to ignore the possibility of the outbreak of a bloody armed conflict in Palestine

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7

that would drag in the Arab states on the one hand, and an attempt on the part of the Yishuv to increase illegal Jewish immigration so as to reinforce their numbers on the other. As for the actual preparations, the report presented the positions of the chiefs of staff, the Foreign Office, and the representatives of the armed forces. The chiefs of staff emphasized that the evacuation must be carried out in an orderly fashion, according to the following principles: (1) during the evacuation the civil administration would continue to function throughout Palestine, with a focus on the management of the train system, vehicular traffic, and essential services; (2) the evacuation plan would determine in advance where personnel and equipment stockpiles would be transferred, including storage and collection points; (3) a sufficient number of merchant fleet ships should be allocated for the evacuation of equipment, along with a precise calculation of transport schedule and load capacity; (4) relative quiet should be maintained between Jews and Arabs during the evacuation. Fearing a general deterioration in relations with the Arab world, the Foreign Office demanded that the evacuation be done quickly, whereas the representatives of the armed forces warned that this would not be possible as it needed to be carried out in two stages: first the personnel and equipment needed to be concentrated in one of three enclaves, and only then could the actual evacuation from the country take place.10 On November 7, 1947, the British Defense Committee discussed the recommendations of the interministerial commission and decided that the evacuation of Palestine would be completed by August 1, 1948, and that after this date no British military or police forces would remain to protect the holy sites in Jerusalem. After the Cabinet ratified the decisions of the Defense Committee on January 11, 1947, the chiefs of staff asked the commanders of the various branches to prepare an outline of the evacuation of the civil administration and the military from Palestine, taking into consideration four basic assumptions: (1) those forces and equipment designated for Kirinaika (Lybia) would be evacuated last; (2) Egypt would be the primary way station for the evacuation, and an increase in forces there should thus be taken into account; (3) some of the equipment would be stored in Rafah

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for an indefinite period, which might require the continued occupation of the entire city, and therefore control of Jewish territory; (4) no British military forces would be left behind to guard the holy sites in Jerusalem.11 At this point, the chiefs of staff and the colonial secretary were given an order to begin planning the evacuation based on the principles iterated above, and the decision was made to begin an immediate evacuation of warehouses and stockpiles from Palestine as early as December 1947. On November 14, 1947, High Commissioner Alan Cunningham and the commander of the British Army in Palestine, Lieutenant General Macmillan, met with the commanders of the British forces in the region, headed by the commander-in-chief of the British forces in the Middle East, General Sir John Crocker. In that meeting, the high commissioner expressed his hope of there being complete coordination between the evacuation of the civilian administration and the military, especially in Jerusalem. But Crocker noted that he had received explicit instructions from London to leave no military forces behind to protect Jerusalem and the holy places, and that it was his intention to evacuate the city by mid-February 1948. However in light of Cunningham’s demand to leave the evacuation of Jerusalem to the final stages of the general evacuation from Palestine, Crocker presented the following timetable: phase one would be the evacuation of the south, to be completed by late February 1948; phase two would be the evacuation of Jerusalem, including the gradual thinning of British forces along the northern border and their concentration in the areas of the Sarafand Camp (later Tzrifin) and Haifa by May 31, 1948. In the third phase the remaining forces would concentrate at Haifa by the end of June 1948, and entire evacuation would be completed by July 31, 1948.12 Bendman writes that, based on the instructions received by the commanders of the Middle East land forces by the chiefs of staff on November 11, 1947, and the discussion in Jerusalem with the high commissioner (including the summary prepared by General MacMillan), they prepared an evacuation plan that was sent to London on November 17, 1947.13 Gelber notes that the plan was submitted for approval to the Ministerial Commission on Defense on November 25, 1947. According to the plan, the evacuation was to take place from south to north in four stages: the evacuation of the

The Backdrop for the Establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav

9

Gaza district was to take place by the end of February 1948; Jerusalem, the Lydda district, and part of Samaria by May 1948; the rest of Samaria and the Galilee by the end of June 1948; and Haifa by the end of July 1948.14 On the tactical level, the army demanded that the two main evacuation routes—the northern route through the coastal plain to the Haifa port, and the southern route through Beer Sheva to Rafah—remain open. Two days later the committee approved the plan.15 On December 4, 1947, the British Cabinet approved it, and on December 11–12, 1947, there was a discussion in Parliament on the government’s announcement regarding the question of Palestine. Two weeks after the U.N. General Assembly’s Resolution on the Partition of Palestine, the British Parliament approved the government’s announcement, and, in so doing, effectively approved the master plan for the evacuation of Palestine.16 The Attitude of the Yishuv Leadership toward the British Evacuation Policy To understand what the Yishuv leadership knew about the British evacuation policy, we must address three main factors: the scope of intelligence information gathered and its quality, Jewish mistrust of the British, and the attitude toward the “transition period.” The Yishuv leadership received most of its intelligence about the British from the Haganah Intelligence Service (HIS).17 Although this is not the place for a detailed description of its methods, it is worth noting that the HIS collected its intelligence through agents and informants, and by ongoing monitoring of the telephone network. Gelber notes that the first indication the Yishuv leadership got about a possible change in British policy on Palestine came through the HIS in the lead-up to the UNSCOP Commission visit to Palestine in the summer of 1947. In early August 1947, information began to surface about a scaling back of British military forces in the country, and at the end of that month more information arrived about a possible evacuation, though at this stage these were only rumors. All the information at the time was based on individual, nonbinding assessments by people who were not part of the decision-making circles and on contradictory statements, generally from low-level clerks. The heads of the

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Political Section of the Haganah's intelligence service dubbed Shai (which was responsible for gathering intelligence on the British government in Palestine, including the various commissions of inquiry), as well as Boris Guriel18 and Yigal Kimchi, estimated that it was the British intention to wage war of nerves on the Yishuv by hiding behind waves of rumors and gossip. They even assumed that the British government had not yet set a date for the evacuation or made the decision to dismantle its civil administration infrastructure. They explained the scaling back of the British garrison in Palestine and its redeployment as part of imperial reorganization and having nothing to do with a possible evacuation from Palestine. This accorded well with the policy of cutting back being implemented by the Labor government throughout the British Empire. Gelber emphasizes that there was great confusion and mistrust among the Yishuv leadership at the time with regard to the British intentions and their evacuation plans: Lacking reliable intelligence on British intentions and decisions about the evacuation, the intelligence agencies serving the Yishuv leadership were influenced by the widespread anti-British sentiment in the Yishuv during and following the struggle. Their estimates were based on the assumption that the British had no intention of abiding by the U.N. resolutions, and that their true goal was to undermine these and to impose a solution like that of Morrison.19 On September 26, 1947, a short time after the British colonial secretary’s announcement, rumors spread based on statements by opposition MP Richard Crossman that the British did not intend on evacuating all of Palestine.20 Policymakers such as David Ben-Gurion21 and Yisrael Galili22 did not believe the British would stay in Palestine, but neither did they think that the evacuation would take place in the near future.23 A more pessimistic approach gained support among senior intelligence people such as Reuben Shiloach (Salazani),24 who in January 1948 was appointed Ben-Gurion’s intelligence advisor, which maintained that the British were conspiring with the Arabs to realize the Morrison-Grady plan.25

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11

With the acceptance of the U.N. General Assembly’s Resolution on the Partition of Palestine and the end of the British Mandate, the flow of information about a possible British evacuation intensified. It is important to bear in mind, however, in addition to the factors mentioned above, that another reason for the mass of contradictory intelligence regarding British intentions was the complexity of the British government system itself. To illustrate the confusion that gripped the Yishuv leadership as it tried to estimate British policy before and after the U.N. resolution, we will try to analyze Golda Meyerson’s26 evacuation policy, voiced during a discussion held by the World Zionist Organization Executive on October 29, 1947: As for the English, today we no longer hear from the English administration about a departure, whereas just a few weeks ago they made sure to talk about this with every person they happened to meet, and in secret meetings pass on information so that it would not remain secret. This maneuver was aimed not so much at their evacuation of the country but at driving others crazy: to frighten the Jews and the Americans with the possibility of a vacuum. But the maneuver did not work. The Jews did not ask them to stay, nor did the Arabs, at least not in public, and the Americans weren’t scared either. We can assume that they do not intend to leave before a decision is made in the U.N. An orderly exit without abandoning the things that are important to them will take some time. A rushed exist will cause them heavy losses.27 The Attitude of the Yishuv Leadership to the Issue of the Transition Period According to Gelber, from the moment the Peel Commission’s partition plan was proposed in 1937, the Zionist leadership conceived of the transition period between the British Mandate and the subsequent regime as something that would take about two years. No one in the Yishuv assumed that the British would leave the country overnight.28 This was also the premise that guided the Yishuv leadership throughout 1947, following the revival of the possibility of an evacuation after it was deferred due to the

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outbreak of WWII. But as we have seen above, the leadership did not have up-to-date information about the discussions in the British Cabinet, in the Defense Committee, or in the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Withdrawal from Palestine. Therefore, it was not possible for them to accurately assess the intentions of the British or how much time the evacuation would take. Three days before the U.N. General Assembly meeting on November 26, 1947, Eric Mills,29 head of the Civil Mandatory Administration, summoned his department heads to formulate guidelines for the evacuation. At this meeting it was decided to annul the long-term appointments of local staff and clerks, to liquidate development funds, and to close the district commissioner’s advisory plans for local government officials.30 On January 7, 1948, the Secretariat of the Mandatory Government published an announcement on behalf of the chief secretary: “I have been advised to inform the departments that they should be prepared to evacuate their offices on one month’s notice.”31 Notwithstanding the sincere desire on the part of civil administration to reassure the local population, we must also take into account the military’s position. Often, what took place depended on personal relationships between representatives of the Haganah and the British commanders on the ground, or on terror attacks by the Etzel or Lehi on British forces. For example, the British army refused to come to the assistance of the Hadassah medical convoy to Mount Scopus. On the other hand, they oversaw the orderly evacuation and transfer to the Haganah of the Generali Building in the “Bevingrad” zone in Jerusalem.32 There is no doubt that such events created a feeling of uncertainty, in spite of the fact that the British had indeed begun to make preparations for the evacuation of Palestine. Again, policymakers such as Ben-Gurion and Galili did not accept the “British conspiracy” theory espoused by some in the intelligence services, and believed that the evacuation would eventually take place. However, they did think it best to be prepared for the worst-case scenario, including a possible war with the Arabs. As we will see below, regarding the activity of Va’adat HaMatzav on the ground this approach proved itself with regard to the gathering of intelligence and planning for the future. This was well illustrated by David Ben-Gurion’s speech on the eve of the establishment of the

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13

Committee, at a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive on October 12, 1947: “We must ensure the establishment of mechanisms that will be able to provide essential services and financial services, the post and the telegraph, telephone, port, food, transportation. This is the continuation of economic life more or less as usual. We are a very artificial and modern economy. If some crucial nuts and bolts are ruined, this will become a landslide, and with the economic landslide will come a political landslide.”33 With the acceptance of this appraisal of the situation as a basic premise for planning, the question was asked as to the extent to which the existing institutional structure was suitable for dealing with such a prognosis, in both the short and long terms. The answer was given following numerous discussions held by the Yishuv institutions between January and October 1947, and was unanimous: the existing administrative apparatus of the Yishuv was not prepared to deal with the transition between the Mandatory government and an Israeli government. Therefore, there was a need for different functional preparations (on these discussions, see below). Before I discuss the work of Va’adat HaMatzav, however, I would like to elaborate on the issue of party politics and alignments as it pertained to the structure of the government-to-be.

C. The Structure of the Yishuv Establishment It was no easy task to establish a new body within a political system that was accustomed, for many years, to working in a particular institutional structure. To understand the difficulty of the change, we must first describe in general outlines the structure of the Yishuv establishment as it had taken shape during the period of the British Mandate. Alongside the Mandatory government, and with its consent, two governmental bodies operated within the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine and served as the infrastructure for the state-to-be: the World Zionist Organization and Knesset Yisrael (the organized Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine). These two bodies operated in a typical parliamentary format, characterized by legislation, oversight of the executive branch, and a forum for public debates

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at the Zionist Congress and the Elected Assembly. As its supreme legislative body, the Zionist Congress chose an executive, much like a cabinet, to carry out its decisions. The World Zionist Organization was the representative of the entire Jewish people on matters of Palestine (called the Jewish Agency by the Mandate) and was responsible for all matters regarding the national home vis-à-vis the Mandatory government. With its expansion under the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, beginning in 1929, it included non-Zionist members as well. The activities of the Zionist executive and the Jewish Agency executive were divided into professional departments, headed by a representative of the administration (called the Hanhala) and staffed according to party affiliation and in light of coalition agreements.34 Knesset Yisrael Knesset Yisrael was one of the main institutions of the Yishuv between 1920 and 1948. It was structured around a representative body known as Assefat haNivharim (Elected Assembly), from which were chosen members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi (National Council), and from this committee were drawn the members of the executive branch known as the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive. In effect, the Va’ad HaLe’umi was a sort of community committee of the Jewish people living in Palestine, thus “Israel’s Assembly.” It focused on community issues: education, welfare, health, and municipal matters. It should further be noted that the Va’ad HaLe’umi also dealt with issues of security, since at the time there was clear separation between matters of defense and diplomacy. The institutions of Knesset Yisrael included the Va’ad HaLe’umi, the Assefat HaNivharim, the Chief Rabbinate, and the Communities Committee. This administrative mechanism was recognized officially by the British high commissioner on January 1, 1928. According to Mandate regulations, it was considered a religious community assembly, although in effect it was a political body comprised of representatives of most of the subgroups of the Jewish community in Palestine during the Mandate.35 Its executive branch was the Va’ad Le’umi Plenum, which numbered thirty-six representatives and worked through the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive.

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The Jewish Agency Executive The Jewish Agency Executive was the main policymaking body in the Yishuv and its highest representative vis-à-vis the British. It was founded in 1929, and included a number of professional departments, the most important of which were the political, financial, immigration, settlement, labor, trade and industry, and union departments.36 (Only some time later was David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, granted the defense portfolio.)37 The Histadrut The first conference of the Ha-Histadrut ha-Kelalit shel ha-Ovedim ha-Ivriyyim be-Ereẓ Israel (the General Federation of Jewish Labor) was held in December 1920. It was established by several political parties, and its initial goal was to ensure a standard of living for wage earners and the continuation of agricultural settlement by the workers’ movement, through a representative organization that would advocate for the movement’s status and influence immigration and settlement policy. The Histadrut’s activities encompassed several economic and social fields: control of the labor market through labor exchanges; establishment of the Office for Public Works and Construction to obtain contracts from the Mandate government and the Jewish Agency; establishment of the Agricultural Center, a union of the agricultural settlements; establishment of Bank HaPoalim (the Workers’ Bank) in 1921—an independent financial institution for the creation of a workers’ market; and establishment in 1927 of Nir, which provided credit to workers’ settlements. The Histadrut also established the Kupat Holim (HMO) health fund (1913), the Unemployment Fund for the unemployed, and a pension fund known as Mish’an. The Histadrut had a centralized national organizational structure. The makeup of its National Assembly was chosen by campaigning between the various parties it represented; according to its constitution, the National Assembly was to be chosen every two years. The National Assembly, in turn, chose the Executive Committee and

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Secretariat of the Histadrut, which constituted the political-executive arm of the organization. This structure also included a national Histadrut and local workers’ councils, organizations that wielded significant power, since they encompassed the entire working sector and managed the local labor exchanges. It is important to note that the power of the employers in the various industries, and the existence of other independent workers’ associations, constituted a constant threat to the Histadrut’s control of the labor market. In the 1930s the Histadrut grudgingly agreed to the establishment of shared labor exchanges, and from 1943 onward these came under the direct supervision of the Labor Department of the Jewish Agency. In 1923 the Hevrat HaOvdim (workers’ company), an umbrella organization for all of the Histadrut activities, was established. It was the supreme organizational framework for all the Histadrut’s economic activities and was run in a highly centrist manner. Towards the end of WWII, the Hevrat HaOvdim encompassed some 100 factories in the settlements and forty-seven urban factories. The power of the Histadrut was particularly evident in the marketing of agricultural produce (the Tnuva and Yakhin corporations) and in the field of public construction (Solel Boneh). Also established under the Hevrat HaOvdim were the HaSneh insurance company (1923) and the Shikun housing company (1935). Almost all public transportation in the country was cooperative, including much of the cargo transport network. It is also important to note that alongside the Histadrut, other workers’ organizations were established, such as HaMizrahi (which in 1924 split in two, with one part, HaPo’el HaMizrahi, joining the Histadrut). Only in 1924, after the religious workers’ group reunited under the Union for Religious Workers, did they reach a separate agreement with the Histadrut. The Revisionist Zionist Party and Betar (Brit Yosef Trumpeldor) workers’ associations were established in 1931, followed in 1934 by the Histadrut Ha-Ovdim Ha-Leumit (National Workers’ Federation), which waged fierce battles against the Histadrut over the division of responsibilities and control of the labor exchanges. The middle class was represented primarily by the Farmers Federation, which was established in 1921 and included most of the citrus growers.38

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As an intermediate summary of the Yishuv’s institutional structure, Lisak and Horowitz emphasize four factors contributing to greater consolidation of the political system: 1. The binational character of the Mandatory system and the conflict with the Arabs made the political organization of the Yishuv essential for two main reasons: security and political representation vis-à-vis the Mandatory government. 2. The organizational infrastructure of the local party branches, manifested primarily in the supply of manpower to key administrative posts and agencies for political recruitment. 3. Dependence on resources from the Diaspora: control of the economic center of the Yishuv establishment with regard to resources, and the ability to allocate them to the local branches, while simultaneously creating incentives for these local branches to strengthen the central command to gain influence over the mechanisms of resource allocation. 4. The absence of official sovereignty of the Yishuv leadership enabled secession of opposition groups or parties. Since such secessions (for example, of Agudat Yisrael and the Revisionists) could be destabilizing for the political system, most members of the Yishuv establishment preferred compromise as a proven problem-solving method. The acknowledged need for integration of the political system gave rise to an entire system of frameworks, institutions, and established guidelines, which were the only means by which internal conflicts could be resolved in the absence of the coercive force of a sovereign government. The result, which became the cardinal characteristic of the Yishuv’s political system, was “governmental legitimacy based on the voluntary powers created by the coalition regime.”39 The need for legitimacy based on these powers led to the creation of a coalition-based regime in all of the major Yishuv institutions, while at the same time helped to consolidate a political culture that was marked by a great degree of tolerance between the political factions

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that accepted the central authority of the institutions.40 We should note, moreover, that the aspiration of the Yishuv institutions for the status of a state-within-a-state was evidenced, on the one hand, by their ability to regulate internal conflicts in a democratic parliamentary framework, and on the other hand, by their uncompromising struggle to enshrine the powers of the political center.41

D. The Political Status of Va’adat HaMatzav From the above, it is apparent that on the eve of the establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav, the Yishuv had in fact a well-organized political and institutional system, lead by two policymaking bodies: the Jewish Agency Executive and the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive. Why, then, the need for an additional body? Va’adat HaMatzav was established in October 1947 as a result of a general feeling in the Yishuv leadership that the existing institutional system would not be able to deal with the needs arising from the developing emergency situation. The main reason for this was the multiplicity of organizations, which often worked against one another out of narrow self-interests—whether movement- or party-based. We find an enlightening example of this problematic situation in the speech of the Va’ad HaLe’umi chairman and Mapai member, David Remez,42 discussing the shortcomings of the Yishuv, at the meeting of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive on February 17, 1947: There are, at present, in the Yishuv two Jewish autonomies—one local autonomy and one central autonomy. The local autonomy is in effect a series of autonomies, a rather long chain of regional councils, district authorities, and local municipalities. This is a concrete autonomy, in which each part has its own budget, area of jurisdiction, its own issues, and is involved in daily life. There is a second, central, autonomy, namely Knesset Yisrael and the Va’ad HaLe’umi. This is a spiritual autonomy, comprising the

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offices of the Rabbinate, matters of ritual slaughter, education; from time to time it has value as a political protest, but it does not deal with actual and essential issues, it does not have to deal with things systematically. And when it comes to raising an issue of national importance, we need the second shoulder.43 And here the examples are well-known. Even in education, things are not whole, because the Executive Committee is comprised of a combination of the Knesset Yisrael Executive and representatives of the local authorities. And when it comes to matters of defense, we have a combination within a combination; within the combination of the Jewish Agency and Knesset Yisrael is yet another combination, namely, of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and the rest of the Yishuv. When it comes to fundraising appeals, the Va’ad HaLe’umi finds itself making proposals in order to increase its budget for the services that it provides, but instead of it being in charge, it is a kind of client; sometimes treated with respect, and sometimes with scrutiny [ . . . ] I have reached the conclusion that it has become an extremely pressing matter to eliminate this situation: that there is the “rest of the Yishuv” and the “Yishuv.” That there is a central Yishuv authority, and then after that there is this combination of authorities, and between the two there is no constitutional connection, we have no organic integration. This is a breach, in my opinion, that could eventually destroy the entire democratic structure of the Yishuv.44 In addition, the existing professional infrastructure was not equipped to meet the needs of a new sovereign governmental system. David Ben-Gurion candidly expressed his opinion of the existing professional infrastructure of the executive bodies of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi at the third meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav on October 28, 1947: “The present departments are not equipped to deal with these standing issues. They were not established with such a purpose in mind. There are three options: chaos, regularization, Arab sabotage. We must have contingency plans for all these eventualities.”45

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The solution for this complex situation was found in the establishment of a committee that would concentrate under one roof all of the senior political representation of the Yishuv establishment, alongside experts from a variety of professional fields. Well aware of the political sensitivities on all sides, Eliezer Kaplan,46 head of the Financial Department of the Jewish Agency Executive, proposed in April 1947 the establishment of a joint committee of representatives of the executive bodies of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi to deal with the situation.47 The appointment of policymakers to head Va’adat HaMatzav, both as party representatives and heads of the policymaking bodies in the Yishuv, was an expression of that same spirit of compromise highlighted by Lisak and Horowitz, and it was this that enabled the Yishuv leadership to successfully navigate the complex interim period of nonsovereignty and the absence of the authority to enforce law. On the one hand, it was agreed that a new body must be established to deal effectively with the new situation, and on the other hand the establishment old guard wished to ensure its own political survival following any future changes. Below is a cross-section of the partisan makeup of Va’adat HaMatzav on its establishment, which reflects the political dynamics in the Yishuv establishment of the period: The Jewish Agency Executive—Mapai representatives: David Ben-Gurion (chairman of the Jewish Agency and Va’adat HaMatzav chairman), Eliezer Kaplan, Golda Meir; independent representative: Yitzhak Gruenbaum;48 Mizrahi representative: Moshe Shapira;49 the General Zionists representative: Peretz Bernstein.50 The Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive—Mapai representatives: David Remez (chairman of the HaVa’ad HaLe’umi), Meir Grabovsky,51 Mordechai Shatner;52 Mizrahi representative: David-Zvi Pinkas;53 the Aliya Hadasha representative: Georg Landauer;54 representatives of HaShomer HaTzair: Zvi Luria55 and Abraham Granovsky.56 Breaking down the committee’s composition by party affiliation, we find that six out of thirteen members of Va’adat HaMatzav were from Mapai, two were from Mizrahi, two from the General Zionists, one from HaShomer HaTzair, one from the Progressive Party, and one independent. The committee did not include representatives of the Revisionists, Agudat Yisrael,

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and the communists, as they were not considered part of the official Yishuv establishment. What can we learn from this data? (1) Mapai was the dominant party in the committee, therefore what took place within its institutions is important to understanding its inner political dynamics and powers. (2) There was a very small representation of what can be defined as being to the left of Mapai (just one representative at this point). But this picture changed after the establishment of the United Workers’ Party (Mapam) and the election of two ministers on its behalf to the provisional government on May 15, 1948. What was the attitude of the Yishuv’s political echelon to the establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav and to membership therein? Here we must look at two points of friction: the first is the power struggles between members of the executives of the Jewish Agency and of the Va’ad HaLe’umi (who often belonged to the same party and held different positions in each one of the executive bodies), and the second point of friction was internal party criticism of their representatives in the committee.

E. The Working Relationship between the Executive Bodies of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and the Jewish Agency During the entire period of the Mandate, the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive played proverbial second fiddle to their counterparts in the Jewish Agency Executive. While the former was busy with internal Yishuv matters such as welfare and education, the Jewish Agency Executive was charged with determining and carrying out the Yishuv’s foreign, defense, and economic policy. The very establishment of a new body constituted an admission on the part of the Yishuv leadership of the deficiencies of the existing governmental system and recognition of the need to establish a new one. The implication of this was an imminent change in the structure of the political system, although the meaning of such a change was not entirely clear: would the change be temporary or permanent? Would the political status of the representatives of the old establishment remain

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intact with the change? A heavy anxiety weighed on the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive with regard to their future, both as part of the establishment and on a personal level. With the news of the Jewish Agency’s intentions to establish Va’adat HaMatzav growing,57 the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive gathered on August 3, 1947, to consolidate their main demands vis-à-vis the Jewish Agency Executive: full and equal representation of the Va’ad HaLe’umi in the Jewish Agency Executive, real collaboration of the Yishuv in all defense committees (both present and future), and the Zionist Actions Committee approval to delegate positions relating to internal Yishuv matters.58 However, the question of the status and powers of the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive vis-à-vis their counterparts in the Jewish Agency Executive was never resolved, even after the establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav. In the meeting of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive of October 13, 1947 (just hours before the first meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav), chairman David Remez stressed the need to influence the decision-making process on the key issues, but at the same time emphasized the importance of cooperation and unity between the two bodies: “We must wish our representatives success in advancing the issues themselves and that they assume an important role in leading these matters. But the cooperation itself is a given, the Committee will determine these programs, and it is a joint committee.”59 Berl Repetur,60 a member of Kibbutz Yagur and later Mapam’s representative in Moetzet Ha’Am (People’s Administration), wanted to know whether Va’adat HaMatzav would focus exclusively on the political makeup of the institutions of the state-to-be, or whether it would also be concerned with the programs of those same institutions. Remez responded to him as follows: “It [Va’adat HaMatzav] is a committee that can construe itself as it wishes. It can declare itself to be a committee or establish different working committees. It can say that its sole purpose is to put together the institutions. They have been entrusted with this entire operation of mobilizing people, funds, and the economy.”61 As for the tensions with members of the Jewish Agency Executive, Remez tried to reassure the members of his committee:

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I see no need to polish our swords at this table before we know that there is good reason to polish them. I will go the way of Shalom Aleichem and tell the truth that we have not predetermined this matter and we do not intend to decide on this matter until we know their positions. Any speculative decision is liable to do more harm than good, but experience teaches that this will be a barrier against a breach in the Yishuv’s democracy. My tendency would be to cooperate. There may be other members who approach the matter more vehemently at this crucial time.62 Not everyone accepted Remez’s “message of unity.” David Pinkas, the Mizrahi representative in the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, stressed the need to preserve the distinctiveness of the Va’ad HaLe’umi within the new body: I would like to strongly suggest that our two representatives on the [c]ommittee, Mr. Remez and Berl Repetur, view themselves as representatives of the Va’ad HaLe’umi, and not, as Mr. Remez has implied, as simply part of the committee with no institutional representation. Otherwise we will not be able to say that the Va’ad HaLe’umi is participating in this, or to oblige our representatives to report to us periodically and to consult on the key issues, and for all of the members [of the Va’ad HaLe’umi] to share in the general responsibility.63 As discussions about the establishment of the government got underway, the fears of the Va’ad HaLe’umi members that they would be left out mounted. This fear was expressed cogently by Mapai member Meir Grabovsky at the meeting of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive of January 6, 1948: It seems to me that we must devote one meeting of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive [to this issue] before the establishment of the government. This is a point of order. I propose that the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive dedicate one item of its agenda to this, seeing

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as the Zionist Action Committee is about to meet, and because Moshe Shertok may conceivably demand that the proposal be implemented and set dates, and very fundamental things, [so we need to discuss this] lest we fall.64 Grabovsky’s comment was made at a meeting on financial and logistical issues, focused on food and fuel supply and the general security situation. This was not coincidental. In the four weeks leading up to this meeting, the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive had become engrossed in intensive dealings with internal Yishuv matters, and some members had the growing feeling that the political arena was being neglected at a time when great changes were imminent. Some of these members also expressed their reservations about decision-making processes in the Jewish Agency Executive. An example of the frustration felt by many members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive can be found in the following statement by Nahum Nir-Rafalkes, the general secretary of the Poalei Zion Smol (Left Poalei Zion) and its representative on the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, about the discussion on the arrival of an international force to Palestine in light of the deteriorating security situation: I disagree with the opinion that we will always be in the corner; that we must “do first and understand later.” There is where the decision is made. Before they decide there is no need to talk and once they decide there is no need to talk. I believe this should be of utmost concern to us. I think that we can make a decision about an international army and also demand that our representatives [in Va’adat HaMatzav] raise this issue in the Jewish Agency Executive. First of all, sometimes a decision is made, and then circumstances change, and the decisions can be changed.65 Another example of the friction between the two bodies, which highlights the Jewish Agency’s position on the issue, can be seen in a vehement debate that took place in Va’adat HaMatzav on March 4, 1948, regarding its status vis-à-vis the United Nations Executive Committee (which in the end did not come to Palestine). Jewish Agency Executive member Yitzhak

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Gruenbaum summed up as follows the division of authorities between the Va’ad HaLe’umi and Jewish Agency Executives: “So long as the Mandate exists, the two agencies exist: the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi. The Jewish Agency is an international body, whereas the Va’ad HaLe’umi is a national body. It follows that the Jewish Agency holds wider authorities. Until the expiration of the Mandate there shall be no decisions as to the nullification of the existing bodies.”66 However, it is important to note that despite the differences of opinion and the tensions that accompanied the members of Va’adat HaMatzav in their joint efforts, the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi came to terms with the primacy of the Jewish Agency Executive and cooperated with its members in the management of essential services during the war and in the preparation of plans for the establishment of the future governmental system.

F. Party Politics and Va’adat HaMatzav Party tensions accompanied the entire period covered in this book, but it is important to take into account different levels of activity, according to the events and stages discussed in this study. The period discussed in Part 1 of this book focuses on the work of Va’adat HaMatzav, against the backdrop of the war and the emergency situation. This situation naturally limited the degree of party activity in comparison with peacetime. Nonetheless one cannot understand the process of establishment of the Israeli government system without analyzing the party constellation within Va’adat HaMatzav. As we will see in Part 2 of the book, the closer the British evacuation came, the more feverish party activity became, in preparation for the establishment of the provisional government and the distribution of portfolios. Mapai: The Land of Israel Workers’ Party From a comprehensive analysis of the four main institutions of Mapai (the Land of Israel Workers’ Party) in the period under discussion—the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Political Committee, and the Mapai Party

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Bureau—the following picture arises: first, there were no disagreements with regard to the severity of the Yishuv’s political and security crisis. A picture of the situation emerges from the meeting of the Mapai Central Committee on March 7, 1947,67 in which was emphasized the politicalsecurity “siege” created by British policy: “We find ourselves in a certain situation, and we need to discuss, not the situation, but how to get out of it. We are under siege from all sides. We are under political, geographical, and internal siege. There is a hand guiding matters in the Yishuv, and we have no control over it. The question is, what must we do in order to extricate ourselves from this situation?” 68 In what context, then, did criticism from the party institutions arise? The difference is found in the level of exposure and reporting that each of the party entities were accorded by their executive as the political-security crisis deepened. Herein lay the main cause of frustration among many in the party apparatus: fragmentary reporting from the party representatives in the national institutions and in Va’adat HaMatzav, and the feeling that they were not being sufficiently included in decision-making. It is important to recall that Mapai’s superior position in the Yishuv establishment had habituated its representatives to the status of “being in charge of things,” and now, with the worsening national and security crisis, this was no longer the case. The main reason for the lack of transparency was the direct result of the growing political pressure and the urgency with which the leadership had to respond to the growing number of problems. It was the nature of things that the emergency situation did not allow for an optimal division of time and broad inclusion of all of the party institutions in decision-making, as was the case during peacetime, and what is more, Va’adat HaMatzav often had to deal with political and defense issues of the most confidential and delicate nature. To understand the complexity of this situation, we must understand the hierarchy between the various party bodies: the Mapai Party Bureau received more-or-less regular reports from the party leadership on national and security matters (at some of the meetings no protocol was written due to the confidentiality of the discussion), while the other party bodies, such as the Secretariat, the Political Committee, and the Party Bureau, were left

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in the dark. For example: on December 9, 1947, David Ben-Gurion was invited to a meeting of the party Secretariat and mentioned things that needed to be addressed: “This item [security] is so serious that I am not capable of simply laying things out. I am also not sure that I will mention the most important things. I was not aware that there was a meeting this evening, nor that this issue would be on the agenda.”69 It is not clear whether Ben-Gurion knew about this meeting or not, and what the members of the party Secretariat expected him to say on the security situation, but we cannot ignore the bitterness the Secretariat members must have felt at being excluded by Ben-Gurion and at his evasion of the issue. An in-depth look at the protocols of the four main party bodies shows that one report alone was submitted to the members of the Mapai Party Bureau by the Mapai representative to Va’adat HaMatzav, Meir Grabovsky, on the activities of Va’adat HaMatzav: “Tomorrow a number of departments are to be approved: the police, civil administration, immigration, public works, postal, telephone, and telegraph services, the education department, et cetera. Some things are still in progress: currency and the foreign ministry.”70 The party leadership’s preoccupation with security and diplomatic affairs had an impact on the routine needs of the party. A comprehensive analysis of the subjects of discussion in the Mapai Party Bureau and Secretariat between January and October 1947, and later during the period of Va’adat HaMatzav from October to April 1947, reveals many practical issues, some of which seem secondary in importance in light of the general situation. For example, the fate of the Hadashot HaErev newspaper, the propaganda war against the Etzel, the future of the Yemenite and cooperative farms (moshavot) departments, and so on. Whereas the party leadership would normally intervene on such matters, now it did not have the time. It is also important to recall that such routine issues are part and parcel of the political existence of any political party, and the members of the Secretariat and the Mapai Party Bureau were sincere in their anxiety about the effect of this neglect. Even in normal times, however, the Mapai Party Bureau and Secretariat received more regular updates than did the

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members of the Central Committee, but the picture that emerges in the light of the emergency situation on the eve of the British evacuation testifies to a greater and even more deliberate level of exclusion, highlighting the fact that the Mapai Party Bureau was indeed the party body kept most abreast from among the four party bodies (Mapai Central Committee, Secretariat, Political Committee, and Central Committee). We see a clear awakening on the part of the party institutions in the lead-up to the establishment of Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Administration) and the provisional government from March 1948 onward, the main motivation behind which was appointments and portfolios. On March 6, 1948, a general discussion was held on the subject in the Central Committee, where it was decided that “Each party will decide its own people and will have free rein to take them from the Jewish Agency Executive or the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, or a combination of the two. When the time comes, the composition of the provisional government will be brought before the Mapai Party Bureau for approval.”71 Three days later, a more detailed notification was conveyed to the Mapai Central Committee: “The composition of the provisional government council was decided on in the Jewish Agency Executive: 4—Mapai, 2—Mapam, 2—The General Zionists, 1—Mizrahi, 1—Agudat Yisrael, 1—the Sephardim.”72 Mapam: The United Workers’ Party On April 24, 1947, HaShomer HaTzair member Yaakov Riftin73 came before the Mapai Party Bureau with a proposal to unify all of the workers’ parties in the country due to the national and security crisis. A positive response to this was received from the Mapai Party Bureau on May 4, 1947.74 Without getting into all of the stages that led to the eventual establishment of the Mapam, it is worth noting that in May 1944, Faction B, which had split from Mapai following the Kfar Vitkin conference in 1942, established an independent party which they called Ahdut HaAvodah, which itself united with Poalei Zion Smol in April 1946. On the eve of the establishment of the state, Ahdut HaAvoda and HaShomer HaTza’ir decided to form Mapam (the United Workers’ Party), which was officially established on January 24, 1948.75

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Because Mapam was established four months after the establishment of Va’adat HaMatzav, most of its political activity naturally became manifest later. After Va’adat HaMatzav finished its work the Provisional Government was established. Mapam joined the Provisional Government in May 1948 and was represented by two ministers. In effect, until Mapam’s establishment, the Zionist Left had only one representative in Va’adat HaMatzav—Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive member Zvi Luria. The discussion of Mapam and its complex relationship with Mapai will be expanded on in the second part of this book. Mizrahi An examination of the protocols of the central policymaking body of the Mizrahi movement (the Mizrahi Party World Center) and the correspondence between its leaders during the period of Va’adat HaMatzav between October 1947 and April 1948 found no reference to the work of the committee in the strategic or logistical areas, with the exception of an interesting reference to the fear of a disorganized British evacuation. Shlomo Zalman Shragai, a member of the Mizrahi Party World Center from the London branch of the Jewish Agency, wrote the following in a letter to his colleagues in Jerusalem: “Yet it is clear that they [the British] want to foil our efforts to bring about the realization of the White Paper even after their evacuation. The goal of our efforts is at the very least to ensure that they not obstruct us at the last moment and make an exit plan that will send the country into chaos.” 76 There is also no evidence of regular updates by Mizrahi’s representatives on Va’adat HaMatzav (Moshe Shapira from the Jewish Agency Executive and David Pinkas from the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive) to the party leadership, though this does not necessarily mean that there were no such reports. Nonetheless, two main issues discussed by the Justice Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav were of particular concern to the party: the question of a constitution for the Jewish state77 and the status of the religious sector. From March 1948 onward Mizrahi’s political involvement increased, against the backdrop of talks toward the establishment of Mo’etzet HaMedina (State Council) and Moetzet Ha’Am.78

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The General Zionists The General Zionists sent two representatives to Va’adat HaMatzav: Peretz Bernstein from the Jewish Agency Executive and Georg Landauer from the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive. Unfortunately, I was unsuccessful in my efforts to obtain the party protocols from this period of Va’adat HaMatzav. That being said, Bernstein and Landauer’s involvement in the committee is well documented in the reports of the subcommittees in which they participated, so that it is reasonable to assume that they reported to the heads of their party on the goings-on in the committee on a regular basis. Party Politics during the Period of Va’adat HaMatzav What, then, can we conclude from the above with regard to the participation of the political parties during the period of Va’adat HaMatzav? First, it is clear that given the seriousness of the diplomatic and security crisis, the Yishuv leadership had little time for trivial matters. The crisis was a serious one, and the decision-makers tended to be overly pessimistic and were preparing for every possible eventuality. Issues that party leaders would have dealt with in normal times were set aside, no longer a priority during this period. Second, the very establishment of a new body such as Va’adat HaMatzav created new frameworks for policymaking, and the beginning of change within the existing institutional structure. Throughout the months of Va’adat HaMatzav’s operation, it became clear that party politics would not occupy the same space as they did in peacetime, in particular when it came to actualities in the field. The emergency situation enabled the leadership to make decisions in a more limited forum than it used to do in peacetime, a trend that was expanded at the initiative of Ben-Gurion with the establishment of the Provisional Government and was particularly evident in the passing of the emergency laws, which will be discussed in the second part of this book. Of all of the parties discussed above, Mapai was the dominant body in the committee, providing six out of thirteen of the committee’s members. This fact explains to some extent

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the other parties’ apathy with regard to the activity of Va’adat HaMatzav, a kind of foregone capitulation to the senior party. However, it should be remembered that this decline in the influence of the party system was only temporary, and is not an indication of an end to its influence on the government system. With the establishment of the Provisional Government, and in the lead-up to the first elections in January 1949, the party system returned to claim a central and influential role in the new system.

Chapter 2

The Activity of Va’adat HaMatzav up to the Outbreak of the War of Independence (October–December 1947)

A. Structure of Va’adat HaMatzav At the head of Va’adat HaMatzav was David Ben-Gurion, followed by the heads of the various subcommittees and served by a Secretariat, headed by Zeev Sharf.1 A special budgetary committee, headed by Eliezer Kaplan, oversaw the committee’s expenses. The day-to-day work of Va’adat HaMatzav was divided among eight subcommittees, each headed by a policymaking politician: Subcommittee A (finance and economy), headed by Eliezer Kaplan; Subcommittee B (District Administration, public works, Jewish police brigades, and prisons), headed by Golda Meir; Subcommittee C (health and social services, immigration, and public information),2 headed by Yitzhak Gruenbaum. Two committees were established to deal with special problems arising from the implementation of the Partition Plan: Subcommittee D, headed by Yitzhak Ben-Zvi,3 to handle the status of the Jerusalem corridor following the internationalization of the city, and Subcommittee F, headed by Yosef Weitz,4 charged with dealing with the Jewish enclaves situated within the Arab state. In both instances, as a result of the outbreak of hostilities and Israel’s withdrawal from the Partition Plan in August 1948, neither subcommittee completed its work. Only the Negev Committee, which was established on December 20, 1947, continued to deal with the matters of the Jewish settlements there.5 Subcommittee E, headed by Dov Yosef and Yosef Burg,6 dealt with the establishment of the judicial system;7 Subcommittee G, headed by Abraham Granovsky, dealt with the plans for the government compound and offices; and Subcommittee H, headed 33

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by Meir Grabovsky, was in charge of the structure of the governmental system itself. Six of the eight subcommittees were headed by representatives of Mapai. The subcommittees delegated and coordinated their work according to fields of expertise. Alongside the committee heads, expert consultants were appointed in each field, some accompanying the work of the committee throughout, and some giving ad hoc lectures on specific issues.8 Studying the British Mandate System in Palestine It was British evacuation policy that to a large extent dictated the priorities regarding the planning of the future governmental system. Despite frictions and tensions with the British, it was they who had laid the groundwork for a modern governmental system in the Middle East, and thus were perceived by the Yishuv leadership as a model to be emulated. If we add to this the fear of a hasty, unilateral evacuation, one can understand the sense of urgency with which committee members saw the need to learn from the Mandatory system. Special attention was paid to those strategic military and economic complexes that were under exclusive British control, such as the airports, seaports, emergency warehouses, military camps, and public and government structures, so that when the time came it would be possible to take control of them and prevent them from falling into Arab hands.9 On the eve of the evacuation, the Mandatory government was comprised of forty-five professional departments10 divided into five categories: public services, security services, judiciary and courts, fiscal services, and administration, etc.11 Each of the subcommittees handled the Mandatory departments matching its field of expertise. For example, Subcommittee A (finance and economy), studied the whole system of fiscal departments of the Mandatory government, while Subcommittee B (in charge of transportation) studied the existing network of ports, trains, and airports.12 Intelligence on the Mandatory government was collected by the Hagana Intelligence Service, primarily through Jewish mandatory officials mobilized for this purpose,13 as well as from sympathetic British clerks, and some Arab clerks, who were paid for their services.

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B. The Future of the Jewish Mandatory Officials The professional future of the Jewish mandatory officials was an issue of great concern for Va’adat HaMatzav, and later for the provisional government. While they were considered more professional and more highly educated than the staff of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and the Jewish Agency, doubts were raised as to their loyalty, and several were accused of corruption. To deal with the complexities of the screening process, Eliezer Kaplan proposed on December 14, 1947, to establish a Committee on Administrative Personnel that would be responsible for hiring staff (including those who had served under the Mandate) for the entire government-to-be.14 During this period, against the backdrop of the looming evacuation, the situation of the Jewish mandatory officials deteriorated, and their professional future became unclear. Although instructed by the Yishuv leadership toward the end of 1947 to remain in their posts so that they could continue to pass on intelligence about the goings-on in the Mandatory government and to prevent a political and administrative vacuum, as the security situation worsened the danger to their lives increased, in particular those who worked in government buildings in the Arab areas or mixed cities, such as Jerusalem and Haifa. Their dire situation is attested to in a scathing report, submitted to Golda Meir, head of Subcommittee B: “The national security and defense establishment is not authorized to give them orders to go to work. This policy places the clerks in a difficult situation and may well lead to disaster. The Agency must take them under its auspices and guide them, or it must state clearly that it is not able or willing to do so.”15 Three main questions were discussed in Va’adat HaMatzav with regard to the future of the Jewish clerks: Who should be transitioned into the new system? How many? What about compensation? On November 27, 1947, Va’adat Hamatzav Secretary Zeev Sharf emphasized that the inclination was to transfer some, but by no means all, of these clerks into the new government.16 One of the considerations for a partial transition of these clerks was the intention, as a first stage, to establish small governmental offices in the hopes of minimizing expenses. As for compensation, Meir Grabovsky announced that only Level A clerks would receive compensation, as follows:

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one fifth of the final salary times twelve months, times the number of years remaining until retirement. In December 1947, this decision provoked a strike of the Level B clerks (the classification was based on position, level of education, and experience). Eliezer Kaplan was even more pessimistic about the question of compensation, saying that the Mandatory government had decided to compensate only the English staff, at a total cost of three million pounds sterling.17

C. The Future of the Arab Clerks Together with determining the future of the Jewish clerks, Va’adat HaMatzav also devoted time to the future of the Arab clerks who were to remain within the new Jewish state. Zeev Sharf estimated that there were some 28,000 Christian Arab clerks. Eliezer Kaplan proposed integrating only the best of them, while Mordechai Shatner (head of the subcommittee for fuel and food in Subcommittee A) emphasized the need to recruit any Arab clerk who was not hostile, mainly because of the dearth in professional manpower in the Yishuv.18 In the end, the issue in its entirety was handed over to Reuven Shiloach (Zaslani), and the decision on their integration into the Israeli government system was determined within the framework of the overall policy towards Israeli Arabs after the war.19 The professional fate of the Jewish mandatory officials was also not decided on by Va’adat HaMatzav, but at a later date (see part 2 of this book).

D. Intelligence-Gathering Methods and Approval of Departmental Plans Besides the Jewish clerks, Shai—the Haganah's Intelligence Service had other intelligence-gathering methods, such as tapping the British telephone and wireless system, though this was limited to the police network and issues of illegal immigration and document theft.20 Intelligence gathered

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included detailed information on the way in which each department was run, with an emphasis on its structure, key roles, budget, salary levels, and warehouses, as well as maps and plans of government and public buildings, in order to take them over when the time came.21 Additional emphasis was placed on recruiting professionals from fields in which the Yishuv had no prior experience or proper manpower. To this end, Va’adat HaMatzav prepared a list of potential candidates from among the British and Arab-Christian staff, and in some cases even approached them with offers to work in the Yishuv government system (a subject I will expand on later). The conclusions of each of the subcommittees were prepared in a special file and presented to the members of the plenum, and considered “final” only after approval in both the subcommittee and the plenum. In addition to a description of the infrastructure of each department of the Mandatory and Yishuv systems (if it existed), a general plan was created for each department in the future government. Each plan included the general structure of the intended government office and a definition of its responsibilities, a list of the main position-holders, and an estimated budget for the first year of operation (examples will be given in the chapters on the Ministries of Interior and Labor). In the first two months of its activity, until the initial outbreak of hostilities at the end of December 1947, Va’adat HaMatzav focused on studying the Mandatory system and preparing plans for the establishment of the new government in the long term. However, after the vote at the U.N. General Assembly on November 29, 1947, and with the outbreak of the battle over transportation routes, Va’adat HaMatzav was forced to provide answers to problems requiring immediate solutions in the field.

Chapter 3

Va’adat HaMatzav during the War of Independence

A. Management of Essential Services That much of the Israeli government system was created during wartime had a profound influence on the process. The immediate impact of the outbreak of hostilities on the work of Va’adat HaMatzav was felt in its transition from long-range planning to the urgent management of essential services and the survival of the Yishuv in the short term. The tension between the desire to deal with long-range planning and the preoccupation with the immediate survival of the Yishuv is clearly expressed in the response of Mapam leader Yaakov Hazan to Va’adat Hamatzav member and chairman of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, David Remez, in a discussion in the Histadrut Action Committee on October 15, 1947: “It seems to me that our institutions and Remez, God bless his soul, are often dealing with the big national problem, grand national plans, and big political and legislative questions, instead of focusing on the simple problem: how to ensure the existence of the Yishuv in the coming week, in the coming two weeks, in the coming three weeks.”1 “Essential services” can be defined as all those logistical, strategic, and financial services without which it is impossible to survive, in peacetime or in wartime: water, food, fuel, transportation (land, sea, and air), military and civilian recruitment, telecommunications, banking, and currency. The majority of the committee’s work regarding essential services during the war was to learn the complexities and plan policies that provided solutions to problems arising in the field. Committee members coordinated implementation of plans prepared by the various subcommittees through representatives in the field that they activated. 39

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Overall, essential services during the period of the British evacuation can be divided into two categories: services exclusively under British control that the Yishuv did not have prior access to or experience in operating, and services managed in whole or in part by the Yishuv, that the Yishuv had experience managing. The first category included fuel; transportation (land, sea, and air); warehouses for food, equipment, and spare parts; military camps, fortresses and police stations; water pumping stations; engineering and mechanical equipment for road maintenance; and hospitals. The second category included welfare, education and health services, employment services, distribution of food and agricultural produce, and a limited light industry infrastructure. Va’adat HaMatzav had two primary objectives with regard to these categories: first, prevent an Arab takeover of the strategic British complexes during or after the evacuation, and second, daily survival. With regard to the British-controlled essential services, Va’adat HaMatzav had four courses of action: (1) Studying a given service or set of services and planning its takeover, in coordination with the security services. This included the collection of intelligence files, photographs of buildings, and maps. (2) Infiltrating Jewish employees into particularly important complexes, such as the Haifa port and refineries and the Lydda airport. (3) Training professionals to operate important systems, such as pilots, rail conductors, fuel engineers, and telegraph experts and operators2. (4) Offering jobs in the future Jewish state to British Mandatory employees. One important contribution of Va’adat HaMatzav in the lead-up to the establishment of the government and management of infrastructure was the preparation of a comprehensive database of professionals, put together through a national census intended to identify professionals from various fields and map the gaps where professionals were lacking. The census was based on a previous attempt carried out by the Yishuv Mobilization Center for the British Army during WWII, under Dov Yosef.3 On October 6, 1947, the Hebrew press published the following announcement: “By decision of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi, we have established the Public Services’ Personnel Census Survey, to which we have invited, in addition to the chairmen of the national institutions, representatives

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of Agudat Yisrael, the municipalities and local and regional councils, the Sephardic Community, the Yemenite Association, the Council of Womens’ Organizations, the Manufacturers Association, the Histadrut, the Farmers Federation, the Agricultural Center, and HaPoel HaMizrahi.”4 The census data were incorporated into the conclusions of the subcommittees and were extremely useful in planning a cache of professionals for the future government ministries.5 The importance of this data was stressed by Golda Meir, co-chairperson, along with David Pinkas, of the Public Services Census Center: “We must prepare for the future. We must strengthen the forces that guard the security of the Yishuv, and ensure the manpower to maintain essential services. All of these jobs require trained personnel.”6 Three issues are particularly instructive when discussing the complexity of managing essential services during the war: fuel, transportation, and food. These three areas came under the responsibility of the Subcommittee for Fuel and Food, headed by Mordechai Shatner (under Subcommittee A on finance and economy), and Subcommittee B, which was also in charge of transportation. The planning and management of the strategic triangle of fuel, transportation, and food shows how problematic it is to manage essential services in a time of war and clarifies the contribution it made to the capability of the leadership in taking steps to establish its authority even before the Yishuv achieved full sovereignty.

B. Fuel Supply Of all the essential services without which the Yishuv could not be sustained, the role of fuel, on which crucial networks such as transportation, food supply, and water supply depended, stands out.7 Mordechai Shatner, in dealing with the issue of fuel, was faced with three main problems: supply, transportation, and storage.8 Fuel was supplied by three British oil companies: Shell, Mobile Oil, and Socony Vacuum.9 From the second half of 1947 onward, the British began to reroute oil from the refineries in Haifa and Tripoli for the reconstruction

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of Europe under the Marshall Plan. At the same time, they placed heavy pressure on these companies to take a neutral stance with regard to the Arab-Jewish conflict. On May 1, 1948, the British government decided to close the Haifa refineries, leading Va’adat HaMatzav to take two important steps: to conduct ongoing negotiations with the British to ensure a minimum necessary supply of fuel to the Yishuv, and to search for alternative fuel sources abroad.10 Only after the evacuation was complete and fighters from the “Port Company” of the Palmah’s Fourth Brigade (the rest of the platoon continued on to Jerusalem with the Fourth Brigade to join the Harel Brigade, returning some time later) took control of Haifa port with the refineries and adjacent tankers, was complete control of the national fuel network achieved.11 The main operative problem concerned transportation. All the tanker trucks were owned by British companies and driven by Arabs. After the outbreak of hostilities the Arab drivers refused to enter Jewish territory, forcing Va’adat HaMatzav to establish an independent fleet of tankers to prevent their dependence on either the British or the Arabs. Storage was an even more complicated issue, and despite attempts to set up their own tankers, the issue was ultimately resolved only after the takeover of the large storage tankers held by the British at the Haifa refineries.12

C. Transportation Alongside efforts to guarantee the regular supply of fuel, transportation was an extremely pressing issue. Given that the first part of the war (December 1947–April 1948) was marked primarily by battles over the transportation routes and the persistent attempts by the Arabs to cut off the Galilee, Jerusalem, and the central Negev from the center of the country,13 Va’adat HaMatzav was called on to come up with a logistically appropriate response. Transportation was one of the most important logistical challenges for the planners, as the entire system of supply in the Yishuv depended on ground transportation and the security of the roads.

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Defining Basic Transportation Issues In December 1947, the head of the Subcommittee on Fuel Supply, Mordechai Shatner, discussed three problematic transportation-related issues. The first was the urgent need to establish a center to deal with transportation in times of emergency (this was following the attack on an Egged bus that was driving from Lydda to Wilhelma on November 30, 1947, which marked the start of the battle for the transportation routes), as a result of which Mishael Shacham was appointed general staff officer for transportation.14 His job was to organize transportation and to deploy sufficient forces for its protection. However, as discussed later in the book, this was not enough to solve the problems because there were too many different offices and organizations involved. The second issue with regard to transportation was the lack of a single authority organizing the convoys, and the third was a severe shortage of vehicles capable of participating in the convoys on the dangerous transportation routes.15 On November 5, 1947, transportation expert Bar-Kochva Meirovich, a member of Subcommittee B, informed Subcommittee A that 2,500 tons of gasoline would be needed to maintain a minimum level of transportation for the Yishuv. Because the majority of the gasoline was stored in Haifa there was a danger of being cut off from the supply as a result of the security situation. It was clear to everyone that without securing the national transportation routes, the Yishuv would cease to exist. For example, 300 trucks a day were needed to meet the daily transportation and delivery needs to Jerusalem and the Negev in February 1948. But there was money to armor only fifty of them, which meant that most of the trucks traveling these routes did so without proper protection. Most of the drivers were from rural areas, a minority were from the cities, and a third group of private drivers took advantage of the situation to group together to demand better pay.16 A good example of the operative problems during this period can be found in the report sent by Harel Brigade commander of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv line, Maccabi Motzeri, who was later killed in battle. A rather grim picture comes out of his report to the general staff on February 9, 1948: “In the best case

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we can send three convoys, a total of 60 cars. In actuality, 45–50 make the trip (per day). The reason is that it is more worthwhile for transportation companies to drive other routes, and the drivers are afraid of driving on this route. As a result, Jerusalem gets about 15 cars less than we are capable of bringing up . . . there is no oversight on the transportation companies and the drivers, and as a result the companies and the drivers drive when they please and do not always transport the most essential commodities.”17 The Question of Authority It is important to understand that at this stage of the war, the Yishuv leadership did not have the authority to enforce the law and things were still operating on a voluntary basis. Thus, Bar-Kochva Meirovich suggested that Va’adat HaMatzav declare a state of emergency and issue mobilization orders to solve the problem of both drivers and trucks.18 The following steps were emphasized: all of the commercial transportation companies (such as Dan, Egged, and HaMekasher) would be required to allocate 30 percent of their vehicles for the use of an emergency transportation committee, while the drivers’ schedules and routes would be arranged by the Jewish Agency transportation bureau; the owners would shoulder some of the expenses. Likewise a special committee would be appointed to distribute the work fairly among the companies,19 and in the case of refusal or disobedience this committee alone would rule, and its decisions would be final and not open to appeal.20 Shortage of Armor for Vehicles Two major problems accompanied the question of armoring of vehicles: a shortage in armor plates, which had been confiscated by the British, and a lack of funding. A special Motor Vehicle Armouring Committee, staffed by Eliezer Kaplan, David Z. Pinkas, Mordechai Shatner, and a representative of the Haganah,21 was appointed to deal with these issues.

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Some General Battleground Statistics To illustrate the problems it is enough to look at data from the Harel Division’s campaign for the road to Jerusalem. Jerusalem required at least 100 tons of food per day but the supply that came in convoys from the coast contained only 70 percent of this amount. The city was completely dependent on the transportation network. In the war over the road to Jerusalem, 209 fighters from the Harel Division were killed, and 108 were injured.22 This was only one battleground. Similar transportation problems existed in the Galilee and the Negev, though not as extreme as the situation in Jerusalem. In the Negev the convoy system worked relatively smoothly after the first reprisal actions following ambushes on convoys, but in the rest of the country the situation deteriorated, reaching a climax in March 1948. The question of supply to the rural settlements was less pressing as these were more self-sufficient. Ports On the eve of the British evacuation, Palestine had three active ports: Haifa, Jaffa, and Tel Aviv (the last of which was built by the Yishuv during the Arab revolt of 1936–1939 in response to the Arab shutdown of Jaffa port). After WWII, the Gulf of Haifa was the most industrialized area of Palestine, with factories for food, munitions, and industrial infrastructure. The Mandate’s main rail terminal was also built there, and it included elaborate workshops and warehouses. The refineries, the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, and the military bases completed the British strategic economic complex in the Gulf of Haifa. The most immediate problem facing Va’adat HaMatzav was the shortage of Jewish workers in the port. We should remember that the port was of the utmost strategic importance to Yishuv leadership, not just because of its economic importance but also because it was the main gateway for new immigrants. After consulting with the Haifa Workers’ Council, Meirovich proposed sending between 500 and 600 Jewish workers to the port, as an interim solution until the arrival of

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reinforcements from the Palmah’s Fourth Brigade.23 On November 19, 1947, Va’adat HaMatzav appointed a Haifa Port Expert Committee. Its members included E. Landeman, Dr. A. Vidru, D. Sharkanski, and E. Tuvim. After the massacre of Jewish workers at the refineries on December 31, 1947, and as the evacuation proceeded, fears mounted that the British would not allow Yishuv representatives access to the port. Reinforcing the Jewish workforce in the port thus became all the more urgent. It is important to bear in mind that the British had two main evacuation axes from Palestine: the northern route along the Jerusalem-Jaffa-Beit Horon Road and from there by train to Haifa, and the southern route through the Hebron hills, the Rafah camps and Sinai, and from there to the Suez Canal. The guiding principle as far as they were concerned was to keep these routes open and secure the concentrations of military personnel and equipment along them. Simultaneously, proposals were made for the development of the Tel Aviv port, in particular due to the concerns of importers. These were increasingly afraid that as a result of the deteriorating security situation, foreign fleets would be prevented from anchoring in Haifa. The general idea was to double the capacity of the Tel Aviv port within six months. The overall expenses were estimated at 720,000 Palestinian lira, and the Importers’ Association was willing to cover half of the cost on condition that the Yishuv institutions cover the rest.24 However, once the Haganah conquered Haifa in April 1948, Haifa port became Israel’s primary entry and exit point for the country, until Ashdod port was opened in the 1960s to meet the need to dock container ships; the Tel Aviv port was never developed and fell into disuse. The Rail System Control of the trains was directly related to the question of control over the Haifa port, since the Mandate’s main rail terminal was located there. The terminal contained some of the most state-of-the-art workshops in the Middle East and a warehouse for engines and spare parts. The future of the

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rail system, much like that of the port, depended on the implementation of “the economic union” as stipulated in the U.N. Partition Plan. Two possibilities were considered: should the economic union come to pass, the rail would be jointly administered by Jews and Arabs; if not, the train would come under exclusive Jewish administration. To understand the potential significance of the train for the development of Israel and the region, a brief description of the Palestine Rail system is in order. The Palestine Rail System Administration was responsible for the operation of trains in Palestine, the Sinai Peninsula, and the East Bank of the Jordan. It also enjoyed right of passage on the Hejaz section of the train tracks between Tzemach and Nasib. The network consisted of 1,008 km of train tracks, of which 480 km were inside Palestine. Of these, 336 km were standard broad gauge, and 118 km were narrow (105 cm) gauge. The size of the track was significant in determining the type of train cars that could be used and the ability to maneuver on them. The Haifa-Rafah line and the Jaffa-Jerusalem line had broad-gauge tracks, as did the Haifa-AcreRosh HaNiqra/Ras al-Naqura line, whereas the Haifa-Afula-Tzemach-Tul Karm line had narrow-gauge tracks. The Palestine Rail system was mainly used for the transport of freight and raw materials, and to a lesser extent for passenger travel, except during WWII. The main transports were gasoline, quarry stones, grains, potash, and citrus fruits—most for export via the Haifa port.25 The future development of the train depended on two factors: good relations with the Arab neighbors and the observance of the partition agreements, and directions in the economic development of the new state. There was also the question of the feasibility of train transport during the war, in particular to areas that were far from the train route. In the north, the Yishuv ruled out use of the train due to British control over it and its distance from the battle areas, whereas in the south the Haifa-Lydda line became doubly important due to the shortage of trucks to the Negev. Although the rail system could not fill all the transportation and cargo needs of the Negev or completely replace the trucks, it was a relatively quick and inexpensive solution that provided some relief to the situation.26

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Airports As with the port in Haifa, Va’adat HaMatzav wanted to place Jewish workers at the main airport in Lydda. In March 1948 the Yishuv and the airport administration agreed to bring in 80 Jewish workers, an agreement the airport administration promptly went back on, saying that there were already enough Jewish workers, and ultimately agreed to only 40 new ones. Another reason for this decision was related to military air traffic during the evacuation. For security reasons the British did not want large numbers of Jews or Arabs at the airport.27 At this time, the Yishuv leadership asked the British to build a landing strip in the Tel Aviv area, but were denied. It was therefore decided that 20,000 Palestinian lira from independent sources would be invested in building an airstrip, and in addition two De Havilland aircrafts would be purchased from Great Britain for 30,000 Palestinian lira, and two people sent to England to receive pilot’s licenses. Due to the shortage of Jewish pilots, the flight industry employed a relatively large number of non-Jews. At a later stage, the Yishuv leadership even turned to British officers and offered them paid positions to manage the Lydda airport.28 (Va’adat HaMatzav, we should recall, collected a good deal of data about British professionals worth propositioning as potential employees).

D. Food Supply In the first stage (October–December 1947), the Subcommittee for Food and Fuel focused its efforts on studying the Mandatory food control system.29 However, with the outbreak of hostilities, there was an immediate threat to the food supply as a result of the battle over the transportation routes and the closing of British food warehouses in the Haifa port, the Jerusalem railway station, and Jaffa.30 This subcommittee was forced to abandon its “theoretical study” of the food supply network and find immediate solutions. To understand the issue of food supply and distribution during the period of Va’adat HaMatzav, we must analyze the following subjects: estimating

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the quantities in the stockpiles, centralization of transportation, and challenges with regard to inspection, management, and distribution. Estimating the Food Supply at the Outbreak of the War In addition to being responsible for the issue of fuel in Va’adat HaMatzav, Mordechai Shatner was also put in charge of food supply and distribution in the framework of Subcommittee A. In a report submitted on November 4, 1947, Shatner detailed the food stockpiles existing in the country: the Mandatory government’s warehouses contained a supply of 12,000 tons of wheat, enough for only one month of the Yishuv’s needs, and enough oil and margarine for two months, along with a projection of adequate supplies for the following six months. The national sugar supply, on the other hand, would only last for two months, until February 1948. The supply of meat was extremely limited, and the supply of imported dry goods such as legumes, barley, grains, and canned goods was only enough for five weeks.31 Two main problems hindered the ability to exactly estimate the food supply: difficulty in getting precise data from Jewish wholesalers, and the impossibility of estimating the amount of food that was sold to the Arabs, both because Jewish merchants did not report such sales and because the Mandatory Food Supply Department was one of the first to be disbanded in the run-up to the evacuation as a result of the British decision to clear out their food and equipment reserves beginning in December 1947. On the other hand, there were sufficient supplies of local produce, such as potatoes, milk, wine, citrus fruit, and oil.32 Dependence on the Transportation Network for the Transport of Food The transport and distribution of food depended on the transportation network, which in turn depended on three main factors already discussed: a regular supply of fuel, the number of trucks, and the security of the roads. Likewise, access to the government emergency warehouses across the country was impossible: most of the warehouses were in the Gulf of Haifa and under direct British control, while some of the warehouses were in Jaffa, an Arab

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area to which access was dangerous. The rest was stored in the area of the train station at the entrance to Jerusalem. Jerusalem (which had 100,000 Jewish inhabitants) quickly became the hardest hit: by November 1947 it was clear that the amount of food stored in Jerusalem was only enough to last for five weeks.33 Management and Inspection: Basic Problems As with transportation, the subject of food supply also required an administrative body to coordinate and instruct the different factions on how to act. One of the first steps taken by Va’adat HaMatzav was to prohibit the sale of food to Arabs, placing oversight of this matter in the hands of the local councils.34 Va’adat HaMatzav Secretary Zeev Sharf proposed establishing a special council on food supply modeled after the Fuel Council. There was also a decision to establish a buying syndicate that would take into account the demands of the grain millers, the food importers, and HaMashbir HaMerkazi. Many difficulties were encountered during the establishment of the syndicate, since wholesalers feared monetary losses. Va’adat HaMatzav member Peretz Bernstein, who was appointed as inspector over the syndicate, noted that in March 1948 the wholesalers agreed to allocate a mere 10,000 tons of wheat to the syndicate.35 Va’adat HaMatzav wanted to consolidate the three aspects of the issue (millers, importers, and HaMashbir HaMerkazi) under a single entity. The main problem encountered was the question of centralized oversight. On this matter, Shatner claimed, it would not be possible to wait until the end of the Mandate, and immediate action was required. It should be noted that the subjects of transportation and food supply were the first fields over which Va’adat HaMatzav took executive authority, although it had no sovereign framework in which to do so. After the dissolution of the Mandatory Food Control Department and the reduction in the regular supply of many products, it was decided to establish a central oversight body for food distribution to deal with the black market that had been created in large part by the wholesalers, and to fill the administrative vacuum left behind by the British. Among other things, this body was meant to track the import

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of food for people and for animals, and to regulate prices and distribution to consumers.36 The person appointed by Shatner to head this Inspection and Supervision Department was Zvi Givoli, coordinator of the Agicultural Supply Council Northern District. His job included overseeing the products that were still coming into the Haifa and Tel Aviv ports, while closely overseeing the wholesalers and constantly evaluating the state of supplies. Only then was the amount calculated distributed according to the number of inhabitants in the large cities of Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. Below I explain the problems that arose on the ground in three main areas of food supply: flour, meat, and agricultural produce. Inspection of the Flour Mills The flour mills required close supervision. From the very beginning of the evacuation the Mandatory government decided to stop grinding standard flour, which meant a breakdown in regulation and direct supply of flour to mill and bakery owners, who did as they wished in terms of weight, volume, prices, and supply. It thus was decided to make the local councils responsible for the flour supply so that they could more efficiently oversee the mills and bakeries. To prevent counterfeiting and smuggling, Givoli appointed engineer D. Pitchovitch as commissioner of the southern district, and Willie David as commissioner of the northern district, thus creating a nationwide oversight mechanism for the flour market, for both grinding and baking. David Tene, formerly coordinator of the Aliyah Hadasha Party in Haifa, was placed in charge of the distribution of food to wholesalers through regional centers established for this purpose. Supervision of Animal Slaughter and Distribution of Meat When it came to meat products, the local councils reached an internal agreement at the recommendation of Va’adat HaMatzav, in particular following the onset of difficulties in the import of meat due to the security situation and the heavy tax placed by Arab armed groups on local livestock growers who did business with Jews. It was decided that every purchase

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of meat by Jews must be done with a special permit issued by the Central Committee for Control of the Cattle Trade. This committee was made up of a representative of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and the local councils as well as a representative of the Tel Aviv Municipality. The committee oversaw the distribution of meat around the country and set regular slaughter days by region. The inspector on behalf of Va’adat HaMatzav was H. Magali.37 Oversight of Agricultural Produce Import difficulties and the lack of access to the local Arab agricultural sector hampered the ability of the Yishuv to provide agricultural products on a regular basis throughout the year. As a result of these shortages many farmers began selling their produce on the black market, bypassing the regular distribution mechanisms. Therefore it was decided to centralize the distribution of agricultural produce to maintain regular distribution on the national level and to regulate prices. To streamline inspection and supply, Shatner proposed placing agricultural distribution under the auspices of a national supply network, so that each farm would receive an amount of seed and fertilizer determined by the committee. The planning of this system was entrusted to Shimon Kushnir, who until then managed the Agriculture Section of the Association for Local Production. Dr. Orenstein from the Financial Department of the Va’ad HaLe’umi was appointed advisor on animal feed. Va’adat HaMatzav delegated the coordination of national supply to the Mashbir HaMerkazi, who were also owners of the “Haspaka Hevra Merkazit LeHakla'im” (a supply company). The Mashbir HaMerkazi received the agricultural products from several companies: Tnuva, Nasa, and Shivuk Chaklai. Organization on the National Level: The Council for Control of Food Supply and Distribution On March 13, 1948, Eliezer Freslin and Dr. Hans Freder were appointed directors of the Food Controller Office, and three representatives were

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appointed, one each from the National Census, the Va’ad HaLe’umi, and the Jewish Agency, to coordinate between the various Yishuv institutions on both the political and organizational levels. The two main geographical districts were the Haifa (northern) district, which stretched from the upper Galilee to Hadera, and the southern district, which included Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and the Negev. A decision was made to print 650,000 food-ration cards at a total cost of 10,000 Palestinian lira, 40 mil per card.38 To create a more effective system, it was decided to unite the various bodies into a single entity—the Council for Control of Food Supply and Distribution. Participants included the Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa Chambers of Commerce; the Merchants Associations of Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem; the Mashbir HaMerkazi; the Agricultural Center; the Farmers Federation; the general stores; cooperative villages; the Women’s International Zionist Organization (WIZO); Irgun Imahot Ovdot (the Histadrut’s women’s division); HaIrgun LeMa’an Tozeret HaAretz (the organization for encouraging local production); the Agricultural Department; the Industrialists Union; the Workers Association; the Mizrahi Workers; the National Workers Association; the Medical Association; Tnuva; Tene; the agricultural market; the Va’ad HaLe’umi; and the Jewish Agency.39 Bringing all these organizations together in a coordinated framework marked a growing trend on the part of Va’adat HaMatzav to break out of the particularist Yishuv frameworks and create preliminary patterns for assuming and delegating authority. This was in contrast to the tendency toward privatization and autonomy common in the period of the Yishuv.

E. Contribution of the Experience Managing Essential Services to the Establishment of the Government System The transition from long-range planning to short-term problem-solving and execution proved significant in the overall vision of the establishment of the Israeli government system. In light of the collapse of the Mandatory system and the constraints of war, Va’adat HaMatzav was required to take

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upon itself authority over a number of areas that had previously been under British management and supervision. Although the Yishuv did not assume actual sovereignty until May 15, 1948, as time went by they began taking authoritative steps characteristic of a sovereign government. The three cases described above clearly demonstrate this progression: in the first stage, centralized systemic planning that included an estimation of supply and inventory in every field; in the second stage, a transition from the decentralized framework that characterized the Yishuv institutions under the Mandate to a more centralized framework characteristic of an independent state. This shift, from a collection of organizations all dealing with the same issue to a single entity dealing with many issues, arose from the situation as it unfolded in real time, in light of which the previous structure and framework became unworkable and ineffective for the management of the war and the ability to enforce authority. Va’adat HaMatzav also created a structural-organizational change with far-reaching implications for the future governmental system and its internal political dynamics. Just as Va’adat HaMatzav was established to unify all of the main policymaking bodies in the Yishuv, it espoused the same approach toward every strategic or logistical field it encountered. Examples that reflect this trend are the merging of all of national bodies dealing with the storage and distribution of food, and the merging of all of the transportation bodies into a single centralized body with the authority to enforce rules and penalties, and with Va’adat HaMatzav supervising those responsible for implementation. This was the only way to begin enforcing rules, whether with regard to price gouging on essentials such as food and transportation or refusals to drive dangerous routes. Through their management of essential services, Va’adat HaMatzav acquired significant operative experience, to an extent never before experienced by the Yishuv leadership. In the case of essential services that had been under exclusive British control, Va’adat HaMatzav focused on placing Jewish workers and putting plans in place for their ultimate takeover.

Chapter 4

Long-Range Planning The Judicial System and the Final Report of Va’adat HaMatzav A. Long-Range Planning: Fundamental Issues Simultaneously with its management of essential services during the war, Va’adat HaMatzav returned to the task of long-range planning in two main areas: general recommendations for a constitution and type of government, and completion of plans for the establishment of government ministries. This process ran into complications arising from the situation on the ground: war-related uncertainty with regard to the diplomatic-security situation and the need to learn unfamiliar aspects of governance. On the diplomatic front, it is important to bear in mind that the Committee’s planning was based on the assumption that the U.N. Partition Plan would eventually be implemented. The conquering of additional areas during the war and the flight of Arab refugees, alongside the growing recognition on the part of the Yishuv leadership that the Partition Plan would not be implemented, necessitated deviations from the original plans of Va’adat HaMatzav, as we will see in part 2 of this book. In April 1948, Zeev Sharf, Va’adat HaMatzav secretary, submitted the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav to David Ben-Gurion.

B. Establishing a Judicial System for Counsel and Oversight of Va’adat HaMatzav The transition from the colonial regime of the Mandate to an independent, sovereign Jewish state necessitated a reorganization of the legal system. The 55

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existing normative legal framework and the court system were OttomanBritish creations, not Jewish ones. To cover the existing gaps, the Yishuv had organized itself on a voluntary basis that rested on agreement, arrangements, and noncoercive arbitration. Ron Harris notes that from the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine and until the eve of the end of the British Mandate, legal matters were relatively peripheral in comparison with other areas on the agenda of the Yishuv leadership. For the most part, legal activity in the Yishuv focused on defensive strategies against the restrictive measures of the Mandatory government—the White Paper, for example, or arrests and deportations based on the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945— and not on the proactive creation of judiciary frameworks for the Yishuv. However, on the eve of the establishment of the state, the responsibility to create and develop legal norms grew, to enable the transition from the colonial regime to the new Israeli government system, including responsibility for establishing and running a court system.1 Up until October 1947, the judicial activity of the national institutions, the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi did little more than provide legal counsel to the leaderships and executive bodies of those institutions. Here, Harris points out, the goal was to legitimize the struggle against the Mandatory regime and to establish a national home in the eyes of the international community. However, in practical terms, the Yishuv did not, during the Mandatory period, establish institutions specifically charged with legislation, jurisdiction, or judicature. Only in September-October 1947 did Mizrahi representative Zerah Warhaftig2 initiate discussions on the establishment of a Law Department within the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, whose role would be to make legal preparations in the lead-up to the establishment of the state.3 From late October 1947 onward, the Association of Jewish Lawyers tried to interest the Va’ad HaLe’umi and the Jewish Agency in the establishment of a judicial committee, including suggesting names of potential candidates for the committee from its membership. In early December 1947, Menachem Dunkelblum, chairman of the association, suggested to the Jewish Agency that it establish a legal department alongside a judicial committee. According to Harris, the Jewish Agency leadership apparently

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feared that the Va’ad HaLe’umi would beat them to the task of organizing a judicial system, both as a result of a general competition between the two institutions and the fear that this would give the Va’ad HaLe’umi members a foot in the door into the judicial establishment in the new state, and the belief that the Legal Department of the Va’ad HaLe’umi (headed by religious jurists such as Warhaftig and Mordechai Aliash) would try to advance a religious Zionist agenda.4 The main innovation in the constitutional and administrative transition from Yishuv to state was expressed in the establishment of a judicial system that had not existed in the framework of the state-in-the-making. On December 15, 1947, Va’adat HaMatzav held its first meeting on the judicial system in the new state.5 It was decided that the judicial committee would be responsible for the following: providing legal counsel to the subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav to give legal backing to their planning and implementation policy (a distinctive signal of impending sovereignty); selecting the laws of the Mandatory administration that could be carried over into the new system (with the intention of keeping Mandatory law intact until the establishment of a legislative assembly); consolidating a plan for the establishment of a Justice Ministry and national court system; and deciding on a protocol with regard to international agreements. In its meeting of December 22, 1947, Va’adat HaMatzav decided to establish its own Judicial Council, headed by Dov Yosef and Mordechai Aliash, the legal advisor of Knesset Yisrael.6 The two oversaw a thirty-one-member council, whose role was defined as follows: formulating recommendations for a legal apparatus; designating all of the laws then in existence that needed to be annulled on the establishment of the Jewish state; proposing new laws in lieu of those that were to be annulled, to avoid a legal vacuum; and appointing legal advisors to the subcommittees, each jurist being responsible for the field of expertise of the subcommittee to which he was assigned.7 Harris notes that at first Va’adat HaMatzav, with Ben-Gurion’s agreement, authorized only nineteen members for the council. However, due to pressures from various groups, the number eventually rose to thirty-one. The jurists thus created for themselves a “mini empire” without the explicit authorization of the political echelon. After an agreement was reached about

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its makeup, the Judicial Council convened for the first time on January 5, 1948. Due to the security situation on the roads, however, only eleven of its thirty-one members were able to attend the meeting. Therefore it was only on January 16, 1948, that the final appointments and divisions to the eighteen subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav were completed. Alongside the thirty-one council members, an additional nine experts and five committee secretaries were added. The council members were divided between eighteen different subcommittees according to topics, and only on January 30, 1948, was the work of the subcommittees begun, after Dov Yosef had settled the salaries of the five committee secretaries—Haim Cohen, Uri Heinsheimer (Yadin), A. Vita, Yehuda Golan, and Shabtai Rosen.8 Thus, two months passed between the Partition Resolution and the beginning of the work of the Judicial Council of Va’adat HaMatzav.9 In December 1947, the Jewish Agency entrusted Yehuda (Leo) Cohen with the task of writing a constitution for the Jewish state, but his task was never completed. We should remember that only in mid-November was the order given for the election of the Constituent Assembly, with the first elections held only in January 1949. It was the First Knesset that discussed the question of a constitution, in nine meetings held over the course of a year and a half, between February 1949 and June 1950. Religious, ideological, and partisan differences would bring the process to a dead end, however, culminating in the notorious Harari Compromise, which resulted in the decision not to decide on a constitution.10 (The search for alternatives to the Law and Administration Ordinance #1 5708-1948 will be discussed in part 2 of this book.)

C. Defining the Legal Status of the Government during the Interim Period According to the U.N. Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, there were to be three interim stages leading up to the establishment of the Jewish state: “The transition period envisaged in the UN Partition Resolution”—from the date of the U.N. resolution up to the establishment of the Jewish and

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Arab states; “the actual transition period”—from the end of the British Mandate on May 15, 1948, until the election of the government in March 1949 by the Constituent Assembly; and the “formal transition period”— from the day of the election of the Provisional Government up until the first assembly of the legislature.11 Working according to the assumption that the Partition Plan would be respected and the transition stages would take place as planned, the members of the Judicial Committee occupied themselves with the question of how to prevent a legal vacuum during the period between the end of the Mandate and the passing of the Basic Law by the Constituent Assembly. They assumed that with the termination of the Mandate, the Mandate charter and the Palestine Order in Council (1922), which until then constituted the basic law in the land, would also expire, as had happened when the British granted independence to Burma in 1947. They thus saw an urgent need to propose a law that would regulate matters of government until a legislative assembly would convene to draft a constitution. On February 10, 1948, Zerah Warhaftig offered a “Proposal for an Interim Basic Law for Publication by the Provisional Government of Israel the Day after the Termination of the Mandate.” This was the first proposal for a basic law presented to Va’adat HaMatzav.12 Following are the main points of Warhaftig’s proposal: (1) the Provis­ ional Government will hold all governmental powers, including legislative powers; (2) until the convening of the Constituent Assembly, all laws will appear in the form of “orders” signed by all the members of the Provisional State Council, and will be treated as rules in all of the government ministries; (3) Hebrew will be the official language, with exceptions being made for the Arab population, who may use the Arabic language; (4) all rights that had been granted to the Mandate government and the high commissioner will be transferred to the Provisional State Council from the day of the publication of this Law; (5) all Jewish holidays and festivals, as well as those of the minorities, will be declared holidays, and their observance will be anchored in the law.13 When Israel was declared a state the Law and Administration Ordinance #1 5708-1948 was published, in accordance with the guidelines set down by Warhaftig.

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Elections for the Constituent Assembly and the Legislature Alongside its advisory role with the subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav, the Judicial Committee devoted a fair amount of work to questions of government and elections regulations. The U.N. Partition Plan included rules for the management of elections and the establishment of constituent assemblies in both the Jewish and Arab states.14 Here, too, the committee’s planning was based on the assumption that the Partition Plan would be respected. In the U.N.’s original plan for the establishment of a constituent assembly, it was determined that the election campaign regulations would be determined by Great Britain, as the custodian of the territory. As early as December 1947, however, it became clear to the Jewish leadership that the whole issue of British cooperation would be problematic, and that any decision on the issue of elections would have to be settled in the framework of the negotiations between the U.N. Committee of Five and the Provisional Government. Va’adat HaMatzav believed that the main problem in planning the elections stemmed from the cultural and political gaps between the Arab population and the Jewish population in the new state. The Arabs were accustomed to the Ottoman framework and had no experience with democratic elections, whereas the Yishuv had gained quite a bit of electoral experience beginning with elections to the Zionist Congress and the representative assembly, and including elections for local and municipal councils.15 With regard to the Jewish sector, three primary problems were discussed: the desired voting age and status of women; the question of citizenship, with an emphasis on new immigrants; and the electoral system.16 Voting Age Until the establishment of the state, the voting age for the Zionist Congress was eighteen, and the minimum age to be elected to the Jewish local councils was twenty-five, and thirty for the Arab local councils.17 Only in the Histadruth Haklalit (General Workers Federation) was the minimum age to be elected eighteen years. According to the recommendations of the

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UNSCOP Commission, the voting age for the Constituent Assembly should be twenty-one, and most of the members of Va’adat HaMatzav supported this recommendation.18 As part of its work, the Judicial Committee examined the electoral systems of other democratic countries, with the following findings: in England, South Africa, Uruguay, and the United States (except for the state of Georgia, where the voting age was eighteen), the voting age was twenty-one. In many countries, a significant difference was noted between the age at which you could vote and the minimum age for election: in the United States, Poland, and Belgium, the minimum age for election was twenty-five, as opposed to twenty-one for voting. In Czechoslovakia only those aged thirty and over could be elected to government. Suffrage for Women The question of women’s suffrage arose primarily as a result of sensitivities in the Arab sector. Whereas there was no restriction in the Yishuv on women voting in elections for the local councils or municipalities (with the exception of ultra-Orthodox boycotts), in the Arab local councils and municipalities, as well as in the mixed cities, such a restriction did exist.19 Thus the granting of suffrage to Arab women in the Jewish state would be entirely new. In its recommendations for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the U.N. suggested that suffrage be granted also to women.20 Citizenship The U.N. commission divided voting eligibility for the Constituent Assembly into three types: (1) citizens of Palestine living in the Jewish State; (2) Jews or Arabs who are not citizens of Palestine but signed a declaration that they intend to become citizens of the Jewish or the Arab state prior to the elections; (3) Jewish residents of Jerusalem who signed a declaration of intent to become citizens of the Jewish state. However, the main issue for those concerned was the status of Jewish new immigrants. Under the assumption that the phases of transition between the British evacuation and the completion of the partition would take place according to the U.N. resolution,

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Va’adat HaMatzav was concerned with two main issues regarding citizenship: what would be the legal status of the new immigrants between the moment of independence and the elections to the Constituent Assembly, which would only subsequently pass the citizenship law? And should the granting of citizenship be conditional on prior residence in the country for a defined period of time? As to the first question, it was decided that the Provisional Government or the U.N. would need to pass interim rules about the legal status of the immigrants before the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the publication of the citizenship law. As to the second question, and after examining the regulations in different countries such as the United States, England, and New Zealand, it was decided that since the State of Israel would be an immigrant-receiving country, it could not stipulate the granting of citizenship on the immigrants’ prior residency in the country.21 The Preferred Electoral System The discussions in Va’adat HaMatzav about the future electoral system focused on the following subjects: the desired electoral system; division into electoral districts (with emphasis on particular problems relating to new immigrants and the Arab minority); determining the electoral method— whether by ad hoc voter roster for every election campaign or a permanent voter roster; appointing a Central Elections Committee; and studying the constitutions and government systems of other countries. In the planning stages, the Judicial Committee debated between a plurality voting system and a proportional representation system. Particular scrutiny was paid to Anglo-Saxon electoral systems in which the country is divided into small electoral districts, often with a single seat, in which the candidate wins by proportional majority, even if the candidate does not win 50 percent of all of the votes. This system was opposed in many circles in the Israeli public because of the possibility that power could rest in the hands of a minority, as indeed happened a few times in England. Nonetheless, the proportional representation system was accepted by the Jewish community

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in Mandatory Palestine for municipal elections and elections for Elected Assembly of Knesset Yisrael.22 The U.N. also recommended this type of electoral system for the legislature, whereas the desirable electoral system for the Constituent Assembly was not discussed at this stage, being designated as under the jurisdiction of the custodian during the transition period.23 The Judicial Committee recommended having a uniform electoral system for both the legislature and the Constituent Assembly.24 Division into Electoral Districts According to Article 5 of the Voting Regulations for the Elected Assembly, it was decided that the entire country would constitute a single electoral district. This arrangement, it should be noted, was greeted with much opposition from the Sephardic community and the independent (i.e., non-Labor-movement-affiliated) self-employed and employer groups, who went so far as to boycott the elections for the Fourth Elected Assembly in 1944. According to the Sephardic community and the independents (most of whose voters were in the cities), the majority of the pre-election campaign work took place in the rural sector, where voting rates stood at 95 percent. This gave them a huge advantage over the urban constituency, where voting rates were much lower. In October 1947, the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive decided on a district method for the Fifth Elected Assembly. Those who opposed this method claimed that the country was too small to be divided into separate districts. In further support of their claim, they emphasized that the imminent massive waves of immigration would make it even more difficult to maintain the effectiveness of this method, since new immigrants were likely to relocate more than once during their first period in the country. Likewise, the flow of immigrants could lead to geographic and demographic changes in many areas of the country within a short time, and therefore the number of districts should be reduced to an absolute minimum. Moreover, should it be decided to divide up the country into electoral districts, special precaution should be taken with regard to the Arabs, to avoid charges of discrimination

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based on the division into districts. On the other hand, those who supported the district method claimed that it would strengthen the connection between the voters and their places of residence, which might counteract the various party-line divisions already existing in the country.25 Another issue that arose was the voter lists. Two methods were proposed: creating an ad hoc voter roster for each new election, or managing a permanent voter roster. Although the permanent voter roster method appeared in articles 16 and 17 of the Assembly of Representatives Regulations, it was never actually implemented. Members of the Judicial Committee noted, furthermore, that in the first years of the state it would be difficult to produce a permanent voter roster due to the large waves of immigration and the resulting internal migration during their initial period in the country. It was emphasized that all efforts should be made to regularize a voter list law by the first elections.26 As for the Central Elections Committee, it was decided that an independent judge should be appointed. Both the District Committees and the Local Election Committees under the Mandate were organized by party. Looking at the methods in other countries, the Committee noted that the 1920s elections in both Czechoslovakia and Germany were held under administrative supervision, a method that did not ensure neutrality or order. On the other hand, in Poland from 1922 onward an independent judge was appointed to oversee elections. This method was also cited by its supporters as the best way to gain the support of the Arab minority.27 In the light of Va’adat HaMatzav’s desire to learn from the experiences of other countries, Committee Secretary Zeev Sharf went on a study tour, primarily in small and medium-sized countries that were more-or-less comparable in size to the fledgling state: Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.28 Despite the diplomatic and security uncertainty that characterized its work environment, the Judicial Committee managed to contribute greatly to preparing the infrastructure for the new governmental and judicial systems, a fact that facilitated both the leadership’s implementation policy at the time of the establishment of the state in May 1948 and the first election campaign in January 1949.

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D. The Final Report of Va’adat HaMatzav In February 1948, due to the security situation, Va’adat HaMatzav relocated from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. A special committee, “The Jerusalem Va’adat Matzav” headed by Hannah Even-Tov,29 remained in Jerusalem to handle the specific needs of the city.30 After the completion of the transition to Tel Aviv, Va’adat HaMatzav gradually returned to long-term planning, culminating in the completion of the plans for the government ministries. On April 21, 1948, Secretary Zeev Sharf presented the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav to Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Administration), under the title “The Executive Branch in a Jewish State: A Proposal for Departmental Structuring, Staffing, and Budgeting.”31 In the introduction, Sharf writes that the report should not be regarded as infallible, but that “it is a concentration of administrative experience and a sincere desire to make the system of the new country an efficient instrument, capable of filling the broad, varied, and complex roles required of the state in our age.”32 The report analyzes the structure of the future government ministries, with the exception of the Defense Ministry, which, due to its political sensitivity, was handled exclusively by Ben-Gurion, as will be explained further on.33 For each of the government ministries, the report described the subcommittee responsible for its planning, the analogous department or departments in the Mandatory and pre-state Yishuv governmental system, explained which of these should be incorporated into the new Israeli system, and defined the powers and estimated budget of each ministry. The report concludes with a comparative statistical summary of the expenditures of the Mandatory government and the estimated expenditures of the new government in its first year.34 The ministries detailed in the report fall into five planning categories: 1. Government Ministries that Needed to be Rebuilt, as their Mandatory Precursors did not Meet the Needs of the New Government These included the Prime Minister’s Office, the Finance Ministry, and the Defense Ministry. Plans for the establishment of the Prime Minister’s

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Office were discussed in Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat, but did not reach the stage of discussion in the subcommittees, primarily due to the political sensitivity and complexity of the subject. It was clear that the new sovereign Israeli governmental system would not be able to run the country with a high commissioner or chief secretary as had been done under the Mandate. Structural and political reorganization was in order. The planning of the ministry in Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat also ensured full control by policymakers from Mapai, who headed most of the subcommittees. As we recall, Mapai held six out of thirteen slots on Va’adat HaMatzav. The future of the Finance Ministry was also discussed in the Secretariat and did not come under discussion in the subcommittees, for the same reasons as was the case with the issue of the Prime Minister’s Office. 2. The Special Case of the Defense Ministry The situation regarding the Defense Ministry was unique. Considered his “baby,” Ben-Gurion was directly in charge of its planning, which took place under his leadership outside of the framework of Va’adat HaMatzav. The reason for this was its political sensitivity as well as the discretion and confidentiality demanded by its structural and professional complexity. Politically, Ben-Gurion had profound concerns regarding his ability to enforce discipline on the Etzel and Lehi resistance groups, while also fearing the infiltration of pro-Soviet ideology into the army ranks on the part of the parties to the left of Mapai (parties that later amalgamated to become Mapam, the United Workers’ Party). Zehava Ostfeld cites the first time Ben-Gurion indicated the conditions under which he would be willing to take on the defense portfolio. In the meeting of Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Administration) of April 26, 1948, after David Remez announced the distribution of positions in Minhelet Ha’Am and noted that Ben-Gurion would serve as “Defense Chairman,” Ben-Gurion announced that he could not give an answer about the portfolio but that he would continue to fulfill this role on behalf of the Jewish Agency Executive until a final decision was reached in Minhelet Ha’Am. However, in a discussion at Minhelet Ha’Am on May 3, 1948, the full scope of the divergence

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between two contradictory approaches to the design of the national security apparatus became clear: on the one hand was Ben-Gurion’s position, with his insistence on the annulment of the Yishuv security institutions, that is, a national headquarters headed by the Haganah, and the subordination of the army to the exclusive authority of the government without interference from the political echelons. Mapam, on the other hand, searched for legal grounding that would enable their party member, Yisrael Galili, to continue to serve as the head of the Haganah National Headquarters. Mapam held that the existing institutions should be incorporated into the new system and that the political parties should be involved with the military.35 The discussion of the defense portfolio was renewed only on May 12, 1948, since the declaration on the establishment of the state required the publication of the command to establish the military and appoint a minister of defense. The atmosphere during the discussion was fraught, since, as a result of the firing of the head of the Haganah National Headquarters and the disbanding of Haganah headquarters, Ben-Gurion was coming under significant personal attack. He stood his ground however, and elaborated on the weight of the responsibility placed on him: “I will not take this responsibility upon myself if two things, at least, do not take place: 1. That the army and all parts of the army be subordinate to the rule of the people and only the rule of the people; 2. That everyone who acts for the Haganah, or the army or any other name [ . . . ] do so only within a defined authority, that the government authorized to give this authority has given him [ . . . ] and this authority applies to every squad commander and to the division commander, and it applies to everyone.”36 The issue of the appointment was not resolved until after the State of Israel was established, and concluded on May 30, 1948, when the official appointment of the minister of defense was made. Ostfeld emphasizes that study of the materials shows that all of Ben-Gurion’s preconditions were met, in large part due to the dramatic events of May 1948: the establishment of the government institutions and the transfer of responsibility for defense to the government, which would ultimately enforce its authority over the military, and approval of the Order of the Establishment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which outlawed the existence of armed forces

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outside of the IDF. The Order laid the foundation for the establishment of a single, unified army and stated explicitly that the minister of defense was entrusted with the implementation of this law. Thus, Ostfeld writes, BenGurion’s unequivocal proviso of May 20, 1948, that he would not accept the defense portfolio until one unified army was established, was met. In addition, the Defense Ministry instructed all of the Palmah units to be in direct contact with the General Staff and not with its National Headquarters. On May 30, 1948, it was determined that Ben-Gurion would serve in two key roles: prime minister and minister of defense.37 (Two difficult tests with regard to imposing uniform government authority over all military forces began in June 1948. The first was the sinking of the Altalena, an Etzel ship laden with weapons, off the coast of Tel Aviv, and the second was the dismantlement of the Lehi after the assassination of the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, the U.N. mediator in Jerusalem.) With the end of the crisis and the issuance of the Order on Government and Justice, the groundwork was laid for the work of the Provisional Government. This will be explored at greater length in Part Two of this book. 3. Government Ministries Based on the Mandatory System, According to Four Variables Ministries that were planned solely based on the Mandatory model included the Ministries of Interior, Communications, and Transportation.38 Ministries that were a combination of the Mandatory department and its counterpart in the Jewish Agency or in the Va’ad HaLe’umi included the Ministries of Labor, Trade and Industry, and Agriculture.39 Examples of the consolidation of a few Mandatory departments under the authority of a single Israeli ministry include the postal, ports, trains, and airports departments, which were consolidated under the Communications and Transport Ministry, and the Department of Irrigation, which was brought under the Agriculture Ministry.40 And finally, some departments were established based on their Mandatory counterpart, though their incorporation into the Israeli system was temporarily delayed due to professional or political disputes. Examples

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of this include Ma’atz (the Department for Public Works), the Surveyor’s Office, and the Town Planning Department. With regard to the Ministry of Justice, it should be noted that the majority of the legislative infrastructure of the State of Israel was initially based on Mandatory law, with the structure of the Ministry altered to suit Israeli needs. The planning of the Ministry of Police was based on studying the Mandatory police system, but it ultimately became its own government ministry, together with minorities, which had not been dealt with separately under the previous system. 4. Government Ministries Based on Jewish Agency and Va’ad HaLe’umi Departments The planning of the Foreign Ministry, for example, was placed in the hands of a committee that included members from the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, and was based on its structure.41 On the other hand, departments such as education, health, and social services were based on departments in the Va’ad HaLe’umi.42 (An exception to this was the Department of Health, which incorporated Mandatory infrastructures, such as government hospitals, mental hospitals, and the central laboratories in Jerusalem.) 5. Ministries and Departments that Did Not Previously Exist Examples of this include the State Comptroller, the Government Printer, and a Special Staffing Committee for Vetting Government Officials.

E. Significance of Va’adat HaMatzav’s Final Report How is the report to be understood? To a large extent, the report reflects the range of problems that the Committee dealt with in its work on the diplomatic, security, and internal political level. It is important to note that all of

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the plans prepared by the Committee were based on the assumption that the U.N. Partition Plan would be implemented. The Partition Plan consisted of three stages in the transition from Mandate rule to Jewish and Arab sovereignty, within a particular time frame and geographic borders that dictated clear territorial and demographic frameworks. Also on the agenda was the upcoming “economic union” with the Arab state, obligated by the need to jointly manage the railroad and water systems. Three factors delayed the planning of the government system in the framework of the economic union: exclusive British control of facilities that were meant to come under joint Jewish-Arab control, such as the train system and the airports; British noncooperation with the U.N. Palestine Commission; and the complete refusal of the Arabs to cooperate in light of their rejection of the Partition Plan. The physical size of the Jewish state as determined in the Partition Plan influenced the planning of districts, the size of the ministries, and the estimated budgets they were allotted. Following the geographic and demographic changes that occurred during and after the war (including the decision of the Israeli government to withdraw from the Partition Plan in 1948), plans needed to be adjusted to match the new situation on the ground. The war diverted Va’adat HaMatzav’s work from long-term planning to the management of essential services and immediate problem-solving, which on the one hand gave them significant experience in management and enforcement of authority, but on the other hand prevented them from completing all the planning tasks that they had set for themselves. Aside from the constraints of the war, some plans for government ministries were not completed due to the complex party politics of the Yishuv establishment or the Committee’s inability to solve disputes relating to the designation of a given department under a given ministry. An excellent example of this is the issue of water. And so, what model of government system does Va’adat HaMatzav’s report reflect? It seems that it is best defined as the integration of the Mandatory model into that of the Yishuv. What differentiates the two? The difference is manifest in the way the Committee viewed the two systems—the Mandatory system as a model worthy of adapting for the Israeli government

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system, and the Yishuv system as a necessary given, in particular due to political considerations (aside from distinctive colonial trappings, such as the high commissioner, the chief secretary, and a few economic laws). The Yishuv system had extensive experience managing social services and party needs, but was conspicuously inexperienced in the management of the large strategic complexes that had been under exclusive British control. The gap between the imperial experience and that of the Yishuv stood prominently in front of the eyes of the Committee members and was clearly expressed in the report. However, more than professional considerations, it was the internal political complexity of the Yishuv establishment that dictated the need to incorporate departments and position holders from the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi into the new system. To demonstrate how Va’adat Hamatzav functioned in actuality, we will look closely at the planning of two government ministries: the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry.

Chapter 5

Va’adat HaMatzav and the Planning of the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry

A. The Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry: A Comparative Perspective The choice of these two ministries for our comparative study is not coincidental. Interior issues during the Mandate were handled exclus­ively by the British, so by looking at the Interior Ministry we can see how the Israeli governmental system learned to plan, implement, and manage a field in which it had no prior experience. On the other hand, the Yishuv had quite a significant amount of experience with regard to labor relations, so in the case of the Labor Ministry, we can see the ways in which the nascent Israeli government system tried to incorporate the experience it had gained in the Yishuv establishment in a given field with the legacy of British rule. A comparative analysis of the two ministries provides a look at how the two different systems (Mandatory and Yishuv) influenced and were incorporated into each other within the new Israeli system, and casts a spotlight on those moments when party politics trumped professional considerations, or vice versa. Moreover, in the period covered in the present study, both of the ministries under discussion were large ones, and findings about them can also shed light on the system as a whole.

B. Challenges in Ministry Organization: Between Administrative Centralization and Decentralization The primary structural and organizational question that preoccupied Va’adat HaMatzav when planning the government ministries was whether 73

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to concentrate all of the administrative services of a given ministry under a single division, or to distribute the services among different departments. For example, the administration of the Interior Ministry could be concentrated in a single General Administration Division or distributed among different departments, such as District Administration, Local Government, or some other. In late 1947, Va’adat HaMatzav asked Edwin Samuel,1 son of Herbert Samuel, the first high commissioner of Palestine, to submit a detailed proposal for the administrative structure of the ministries, listing the advantages and disadvantages of the different organizational approaches. Edwin Samuel had vast organizational and administrative experience gained over many years of service in the Mandatory government, and the majority of his conclusions appear in two large unpublished studies, the first about British administration in Palestine, and the second on the influence of the British governmental system on the administration in Israel.2 In his recommendations Samuel emphasized that much would depend on which organizational system was chosen: if the entire administrative system were to be run from a central building, for example, it would be preferable for each ministry to establish a general administrative bureau. However, should the offices be spread out physically, it would be preferable for each department to have its own administrative division. Should the decentralized route be chosen, Samuel recommended annulling the post of general secretary, which had existed in the Mandatory government, and instead he proposed increasing the number of aides to each ministry’s director general, to be appointed according to professional, and not political, considerations. In the specific case of the Interior Ministry, Samuel tended toward the centralized method, both because the district commissioner would need direct access to the interior minister (just as the district commissioner under the British had direct access to the chief secretary), and because of the distinctive nature of the ministry’s dealings with the Arab minority in the future Jewish state. However, in contrast to what was accepted in the Mandatory government, he suggested that the subject of population registry, including census-taking, come under a discrete department within the ministry.3

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C. The Interior Ministry Handling Domestic Issues during the British Mandate During the British Mandate domestic issues were not handled by a single entity but were divided between several different departments: the Chief Secretariat dealt with matters of district administration, including municipalities and local councils, and the Government Public Information Office dealt with propaganda and censorship. The District Administration issued identity cards and was in charge of marriage registrations, while the Health Department was in charge of birth and death records and the Immigration Department issued citizenship documents and passports. The dispersal of the population registry among different departments stemmed from the conception of Jewish immigration as a diplomatic, security issue.4 Other areas were the police and the prison services, which functioned as separate departments.5 The Mandatory government’s treatment of domestic issues was marked by its conflation of this area with that of defense and security, to an extent greater than was usual in a normal civil system. Planning of the Interior Ministry in Va’adat HaMatzav The planning of the Interior Ministry was divided among two subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav. Planning of the District Administration, the police, and the prisons, was in the hands of Subcommittee B, headed by Golda Meir. The subject of population registry and the Government Public Information Office was handled by Subcommittee C, under Yitzhak Gruenbaum. The functional split stemmed from the fact that Subcommittee B dealt with strategic complexes, while Subcommittee C dealt with social services. Of all of the domestic issues under the jurisdiction of the Mandatory government, the Yishuv establishment had gained experience in only one field, and that only to a limited degree: propaganda (hasbara), through the Va’ad HaLe’umi Press Office and the Jewish Agency Public Information Office. Like the rest of the subcommittees in Va’adat HaMatzav, the members of

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Subcommittees B and C also relied on professional experts, often Jews who had previously worked for the Mandatory government, given that the Yishuv establishment lacked the relevant experience in most of these matters.6 The main issues that preoccupied the members of Va’adat HaMatzav with regard to issues of the interior were the status of the district commissioner in the future Jewish state, as opposed to that of the colonial district commissioner of the British Empire;7 the organization and division of the territory; population registry and citizenship; state propaganda; and the structure of the police and the prison system. The Status of the District Commissioner in the Jewish State It was proposed that the District Administration be under the direct supervision of the Interior Ministry’s director general, in contrast to the district commissioners during the Mandate, who were subordinate to the chief secretary. Under the British colonial system, District Administration was not “departmental” in character, but rather an integral part of the Chief Secretariat.8 Thus the Chief Secretariat was directly responsible for District Administration, and all of the district commissioners were directly subordinate to the chief secretary, as opposed to other professional departments such as education, health, agriculture, and labor (this was also the case in Africa, India, and Asia). The powers of the district commissioner were not delineated in a single uniform document, but dispersed throughout the Mandatory legal code, leaving no area in which he was not mentioned, be it security, health, education, or the economy. The reason for this was a simple one— besides being the head of the entire district apparatus and the representative of the central government in the district, he was the central coordinating authority among the various government services and ensured that they functioned according to the general policy of the Mandatory government. The responsibilities of District Administration under the Mandate can be divided into four main fields: oversight and administration; budgets, taxes, and oversight of local government; judicial authority; and district law enforcement.9

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Already in the initial planning stages, Va’adat HaMatzav emphasized that the status of the district commissioner in the Jewish state would be quite different from the position as it was under the British Mandate. First, instead of a high commissioner and chief secretary, there would be an elected and sovereign Israeli government. Should the need arise to establish a coordinating body for all district activity in the Interior Ministry, Edwin Samuel’s recommendation to establish a general administrative branch within the ministry would be implemented. Most importantly, unlike his predecessor, the Jewish district commissioner would not have judicial authority. This would be the major difference between the two. On the other hand, like his British counterpart, he would serve as a representative of the state in his district and as the link between central and local government.10 Likewise, it was decided that he would oversee the budgets of the municipalities and the local authorities, and coordinate the work of the different government ministries in his district. Each district would be headed by a district commissioner and a deputy district commissioner. The intermediate position of assistant district commissioner, which existed under the Mandate, would be canceled. It was also recommended to appoint a district officer subordinate to the commissioner. All four of the district commissioners would be Jews, with three Arab deputies. Of the twenty-four district officers, eight would be Arabs. It is important to note that at this stage, Va’adat HaMatzav had the sincere intention of incorporating Arab professionals into the new Israeli government system. Moreover, to avoid discrimination based on ethnicity, it was decided that the criteria for service in the new government would be based on the recommendations of the Mandate’s civil officer in charge of the dismantlement of the Mandate administration, Eric Mills.11 But these intentions, as we will see in the second part of the book, were a casualty of the war.12 Division into Districts It is important to note that Va’adat HaMatzav’s planning of the division of the territory was based on the borders set down in the Partition Plan.

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According to the official newspaper of the Mandate published on January 30, 1947, the territory of Mandatory Palestine included 230 Jewish settlements and 487 Arab settlements. According to the partition borders, 285 Arab settlements and 222 Jewish settlements would remain within the borders of the Jewish state.13 A special subcommittee was established to deal with those Jewish settlements that were to be left outside the border of the Jewish state. However, as the war progressed, there was no longer a need for this committee. Based on the committee’s statistics, the State of Israel would be divided into four districts (Galilee, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Negev), with a total of twelve subdistricts.14 With regard to local government, an emphasis was placed on ensuring maximum territorial contiguity between Jewish settlements on the one hand, and between Arab settlements on the other, in view of eventually facilitating the organization of the local authorities.15 Buildings and Documents During Va’adat HaMatzav’s planning work, special attention was paid to infrastructure, with an emphasis on identifying structures that could eventually serve as government offices. This was no trivial matter, in light of the lack of available buildings for this purpose. And if we factor in budgetary considerations, every structure and room would have to be counted carefully, as would be done in the planning of all the governmental ministries. On February 17, 1948, Yehoshua Gvirtz, a Jewish clerk who worked in the British District Administration, submitted a document to Va’adat HaMatzav listing all of the buildings and offices that would be available for the District Administration under the partition.16 Here, once again, we see the important role that these clerks played as a source of reliable and precise information. Just how difficult this problem would be in reality we will see in the chapter on the actual establishment of the governmental system during the war. No less important for Va’adat HaMatzav was the question of documents. One of the conditions for efficient administration and for preventing

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a power vacuum during the transfer of power was access to official documents—of both the outgoing government and the new population that was coming under the protection of the new regime (i.e., the Arabs who would remain in the Jewish state). This was especially relevant on the district level, where issues of land and property taxes and ownership were dealt with. Of particular consequence was the systematic transfer of the Mandatory District Administration documents. An example of this can be seen in the planners’ concern about the future of District Administration documents in Haifa, where most of the district offices were located in rented apartments. Therefore the planners made sure to coordinate lease extensions with the British and with the apartment owners, to prevent the loss of the apartments and of the documents.17 Of particular importance with regard to the Arab population that would remain in the Jewish state were documents relating to urban property tax, rural tax, government loans, and loans to municipalities and local councils.18 This subject would also later prove problematic, in particular due to damages incurred during the war. Staffing the Ministries One of the important tasks of Va’adat HaMatzav was to identify potential candidates for the civil service. There were two main reasons for this: a severe shortage of professionals in all fields and at all levels, and the desire to avoid unnecessary upheaval and ensure continuity during the transition phase. It is especially interesting to look at the Interior Ministry from this perspective, in particular due to the Yishuv’s lack of experience in this area. Va’adat HaMatzav thus sought out potential Jewish candidates who had experience working in District Administration. They were successful in identifying three assistant district commissioners, as well as seven district officers,19 all of whom took on key roles during the process of de facto establishment of the ministry. Their stories will be expanded on in part 2 of this book.

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Establishment of the Population Registry The greatest innovation in the planning of the Israeli Interior Ministry, in contrast with its Mandate predecessor, was the concentration of all of the tasks related to population registration within a single department, following Edwin Samuel’s recommendation. The Mandatory government tended to combine interior issues with security issues (one of the reasons for the dispersal of these issues among several different departments, such as immigration and police), while under the new Israeli system it was decided for reasons of internal politics and security to remove these issues from the direct control of the Interior Ministry and to establish a special ministry for police and minorities. As a general rule, the Israeli Interior Ministry was not based on the British Home Office. It was decided that the authorities of the Department of Population Registry would be anchored by legislation in the Constituent Assembly and that the Interior Ministry would carry out its policy through district registration bureaus, managed from a central office, which eventually came to be known as the General Administration Section. It was also decided that the population registry would be the basis for food distribution, tax audits, and registration for labor exchanges. On the local government level, the municipalities and local councils would serve as support bureaus for the ministry’s subdistrict bureaus.20 The Information Department Alongside its responsibility for the District Administration system, the Chief Secretariat of the Mandate managed a special Public Information Office. Up until World War II there was only a single propaganda unit that operated out of Jerusalem. Two additional units were opened during the war—one for the Jewish sector in Tel Aviv, and the second for the Arab sector in Jaffa. The goal of the Public Information Office was to distribute government propaganda that the Mandate wished to reach the local Jewish and Arab press, and to enforce censorship. It also produced two

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newspapers: HaGalgal for the Jewish population, and Al-Muntadar for the Arab population.21 In the initial planning stages, the planners of Va’adat HaMatzav believed that the Public Information Office would be administered from within the Interior Ministry. During the planning stages, members of Subcommittee C under Zvi Luria met with all of the representatives of the main Hebrew newspapers in the country and asked them to submit recommendations for the department.22 Two alternative plans were also presented, one by a group of students from the Supplementary Training Institute of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency,23 and the other by a former Jewish clerk in the British Public Information Office.24 Both of these proposals were rejected because they did not include a proposal for a budget, nor did they give the number of positions to be filled.25 Luria believed that the information department should be an integral part of the Interior Ministry with the role of explaining the “structure, goals, and policy of the state to the citizens and journalists.” Ultimately Luria charged a high-ranking Jewish clerk, Reuven Alkalai, with the preparation of a plan to establish the department. Alkalai had been the head of the Mandatory Public Information Office in Tel Aviv, and later became head of the Government Press Office.26 Here, once again, Va’adat HaMatzav resorted to the Mandatory Jewish clerical ranks and employed an ad hoc expert, something the Committee would do in other fields as well. According to the plan of Va’adat HaMatzav (based on Alkalai’s recommendations), the Information Department would coordinate the public information of all the ministries, especially information relating to the Arab sector. It was decided that its responsibilities would not include Israel’s public relations abroad (this responsibility naturally went to the Foreign Ministry) or propaganda aimed at the Jewish Diaspora (which was left to the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization). Likewise, the department would include a press section, responsible for arranging press tours to explain government policy on domestic matters.27 Censorship of the written press, radio, and newsreels was also emphasized, especially with regard to foreign affairs and defense. This censorship

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also applied to the telephone, tele-printer, and telegraphic services, including the allocation of licenses for opening new newspapers. With regard to cinema, there was a recommendation to encourage what was defined as “educational films”28 (although there is no explanation as to what exactly this means: political, moral-sexual or both). Police and Prison Services I will not deal at length with issues related to the police or prison services, since even before the establishment of the state it was decided to establish a Ministry of Police that would be separate from the Interior Ministry. The question at the time was whether this ministry would also handle issues relating to minorities. The intended minister of the interior, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, objected to the merging of the police within the Interior Ministry, seeing this as a sign of a totalitarian regime. Ultimately the decision was made to establish the Police and Minorities Ministry under Bechor-Shalom Shitrit, formerly an officer in the Mandatory police force and a magistrate judge.29 However, insofar as the work of Va’adat HaMatzav went, they did in fact envision the police and prisons services to be an integral part of the Interior Ministry. In early December 1947, Zeev Sharf, secretary of Va’adat HaMatzav, asked Yehezkel Sahar (Sacharov), a former major in the British army, to prepare a plan to establish a police force in the Jewish state.30 Sacharov had served as a commander in the transportation unit of the British army and was active in the Haganah. His last position before he began working with Va’adat HaMatzav was as liaison officer between the Jewish Agency and the British police regarding Jewish police officers and guards who had served in the British police. Sacharov was joined by Yosef Nachmias, also a British army veteran, and also formerly a commander in the transportation unit and a Haganah member. Yehoshua Caspi writes that because the two had no experience in police work, they relied in the initial planning stage on British police officers and on Bechor Shitrit. Their plans focused on the precinct and subdistrict levels, since they were prevented from receiving intelligence information on the district or national

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levels.31 On January 20, 1948, Sacharov and Nachmias presented a proposal to Sharf that was based in large part on the infrastructure of the Mandatory police force.32 They proposed establishing a force of 2,000 Jewish police officers, alongside a gendarmerie of volunteers that would guard the rural and border areas. In the first stage, the police would be divided into two departments: a Department of Administration and Security, and an Investigations Department. Likewise, they proposed the establishment of a political police force, though without going into any details as to its structure or responsibilities.33 They also submitted a plan to Subcommittee B for the establishment of a prison service, but this plan was not completed by the submission of the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav in April 1948. In the first stage, they discussed the management of three prisons—three with a capacity of 100 Jewish and 100 Arab prisoners each, and a small women’s prison for only 25 inmates. They proposed using two of the British police’s detention centers, one in Tel Aviv and one in Haifa.34 Planning and Construction Department The subject of “initiated” planning, or the drafting of a national master plan, was of great concern for Va’adat HaMatzav, and, as we will see in the second part of this book, three different government ministries would be vigorously involved in the subject: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Labor Ministry, and the Interior Ministry. In Va’adat HaMatzav’s initial stage, the experts believed that this department should come under the Interior Ministry, since they felt that it should be under the direct supervision of the District Administration, as was the case during the Mandate. On April 8, 1948, Yehoshua Gvirtz presented a proposal defining the responsibilities of the department and emphasizing the goals of designating development areas for construction, agriculture, and industry, and of overseeing construction in both urban and rural areas (with a focus on quality of life and environment in terms of green areas and population density). Gvirtz also warned that if the construction industry were not placed under government supervision, private

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construction would be rampant and would hinder the consolidation of planning policy and regional development on the national level. To this end it was proposed to establish a committee for every district that would have two roles: supervision of planning and construction, and authorization of building plans.35 Structure of the Interior Ministry in Va’adat HaMatzav’s Final Report In Va’adat HaMatzav’s final report it was proposed that the Interior Ministry be composed of five units: a General Administration Division, which would run the ministry, including District Administration; a Department of Population Registration and Issue of Identity Cards to Citizens; a Policy Information Office; a police and prison services unit; and a Planning and Construction Department. According to the report, the ministry would have 872 staff members, an additional 2,604 police officers, and 100 temporary workers. The total expenditures for the first year were estimated at 2,227,682 Palestinian lira.36

D. The Labor Ministry The Mandatory Labor Department The Mandatory Labor Department was established by the British in 1942 in light of the process of industrialization that the country underwent during WWII.37 As part of its routine responsibilities, the department focused on inspection and safety in factories, construction sites, and at the ports, including the authorization of master plans and regulations for preventing work accidents. It also arbitrated between factory owners and workers on issues such as labor disputes, health benefits, and workmen’s compensation.38 From 1942 to 1948, six labor laws were passed and the department was in charge of their enforcement: the Department of Labor Ordinance 1943 (which set the general work regulations of the department); the Employment

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of Children and Young Persons and Women in Industry and Factories Ordinance of 1945 (stipulating reasonable work hours, night shifts, occupational hazards, and paid maternity leave); the Trade Board’s Ordinance of 1945 (setting minimum wage and work benefits); the Factories Ordinance of 1946 (regulating workplace security and health); the Compensations Law for Work Accidents and Professional Illnesses of 1947; and the Industrial Courts Ordinance for the Arbitration of Labor Disputes.39 The department activities included dealing with mandatory periodic reports from factory managers, surprise visits, and prosecution of employers who did not abide by labor laws. The department also had a small statistical division that tracked statistics about work accidents, hirings and firings, and salary levels. Special attention was given to decommissioned Jewish soldiers from the British army who were seeking employment. It is important to note that the Mandate’s Labor Department was preceded by three completely separate professional and technical departments: the Department for Public Works, the Surveyor’s Office, and the Town Planning Department. This point is an important one, since the Mandatory administration had a functional separation between areas touching on the legal and safety aspects of labor relations on the one hand, and the technical aspects on the other, whereas the Israeli Labor Ministry incorporated all these aspects into one ministry. This merger only effectively took place after the establishment of the ministry in May 1948 and the changes in its designation that took place in light of the war. Va’adat Hamatzav Planning for the Labor Ministry Subcommittee C of Va’adat HaMatzav, headed by Yitzhak Gruenbaum, was entrusted with the planning of the Labor Ministry. Two experts who helped prepare the plans were Lavi Schneider,40 a senior bureaucrat in the Mandate Labor Department, and Zvi Berenzon41 from the Labor Department of the Jewish Agency. The role of the Labor Ministry, as defined in the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav, was initially envisioned as a primarily regulative and judicial one. This meant that its main purpose was to focus on

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the enforcement of labor laws and regulation of the labor market via the labor exchanges.42 Accordingly, the ministry was in charge of the following fields: workplace safety and health; labor market regulation; regulation of labor relations between employers and employees, and oversight of enforcement of labor laws; responsibility for apprentices, women, and working youth; responsibility for social security insofar as this was related to labor laws (i.e., “social security” with regard to being fired and not to general social assistance, which in Berenzon’s opinion could not be separated from overall social security, as is done in modern governmental systems, since there too these things are not separated, and are dealt with by a separate governmental body).43 As was the practice in the British governmental system, Va’adat HaMatzav recommended separating the regulatory and judicial side of the ministry’s authorities from economic planning and technical implementation. In other words, the ministry’s Employment Division would be in charge of the regulation of the labor market, with the help of the labor exchanges that would collect data about the state of the labor market. This data would help the central government prevent unemployment by planning public works, although it would not be the Labor Ministry’s role to implement these works. Public works was a separate technical matter, and while general policymaking would be the responsibility of the government, advice regarding implementation on the ground would come from the relevant government ministries, such as the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Labor Ministry. Zvi Berenzon states “In a modern state, public works are a primary lever for preventing economic crisis and determining the standard of living. This is primarily a matter for a central institution for economic planning. This lever is activated by the central government with the advice of the relevant ministries, including the Labor Ministry.”44 According to this view, the government (or a designated central planning body, for example, the Finance Ministry) determines economic policy and only after the primary goals are defined will the Labor Ministry recommend practical plans in the field of public works to bring these goals to fruition; technical implementation is transferred over to the Department for Public Works. As we will see

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in the second part of this study, with the establishment of the Labor Ministry one of the fiercest disputes between Mapai and Mapam erupted regarding the issue of central planning for the State of Israel, a dispute that involved three government ministries during the period covered by this paper: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Interior Ministry, and the Labor Ministry. Planning for the Transition Period Just as the Interior Ministry planned the structure of the ministry and made preparations for its implementation in accordance with the U.N. Partition Plan, with its transition stages and partition borders, the planners of the Labor Ministry also prepared for two stages: the transition period (May 15, 1948 and October 1, 1948), and independence. In the first stage the planners focused on the day-to-day work of the ministry and tried to maintain the existing situation on the ground. To maintain continuity, it was recommended to keep as many Jewish mandatory officials as possible from the Mandatory Labor Department, with the exception of replacing the Arab clerk who had been in charge of severance pay for workers. The only changes in the labor laws during the transition period were those having to do with the obligation to report an imminent labor dispute, as decided on by the last Zionist Congress. Likewise new laws were needed to preserve freedom of association and collective bargaining, including contracts, work hours, vacation days, holidays, and annual leave. It was recommended to delay the discussion of subjects such as social security and minimum wage until the actual establishment of the state.45 Documents and Buildings Here, the focus was on the takeover and possession of two important institutions: the Mandatory Labor Department’s professional library with all its contents, and the building that had housed the Labor Department during the Mandate. These two things were connected, since the building and

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the library it housed were located in Jaffa, and there was a fear that the Arabs would attempt to destroy it or take it over before the arrival of the U.N. Palestine Commission. Here, as in the policy that was espoused with regard to the Interior Ministry, immense importance was placed on the need for continuity, to prevent an administrative vacuum during the transfer of power from the Mandate to the Yishuv; although Va’adat HaMatzav adhered to the U.N. plan, there was anxiety about political and diplomatic instability, in particular with regard to the British evacuation. It was also decided to make use of the Mandate Labor Department satellite offices in Haifa and in Jerusalem.46 Locating Staff Va’adat HaMatzav identified forty-three Jewish workers from the Mandate Labor Department and the Jewish Agency’s Labor Department, with the recommendation that only thirty-three senior staff be recruited in the initial stage, to reduce the size of the existing apparatus. Some positions were particularly urgent to fill during the transition period: a chief administrator to work alongside the minister and aid him in establishing the office; a labor relations officer from the Jewish Agency’s Labor Department; a head of the Department of Statistics; and a Jewish secretary to be in charge of the needs of the Arab population who would be living within the borders of the Jewish State.47 Structure of the Ministry in Va’adat HaMatzav’s Summary Report In contrast to issues relating to the Interior Ministry, which had been entirely under Mandate control, the Yishuv had acquired quite a lot of experience in the field of labor relations. This fact was not ignored by the planners, in particular since, politically, it was impossible to overlook the staff of the Jewish Agency’s Labor Department. Like the rest of the Jewish Agency staff, the latter heavily pressured their party representatives to ensure they be given positions in the new government. Aside from its Secretariat, the

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Labor Department of the Jewish Agency included a Department for Public Works Technical Section (which was far less developed than the British Department for Public Works, both professionally and in terms of the mechanical equipment it owned), immigration absorption, labor relations, training, and oversight of the labor exchanges. We must also not forget the Histadrut and its branches, which maintained its influence even after the establishment of the state.48 The final discussion about the future of the Labor Ministry took place in Subcommittee C of Va’adat HaMatzav on January 12, 1948.49 During the discussion, Committee Chairman Yitzhak Gruenbaum decided that the Israeli Labor Ministry would not be based on the Jewish Agency’s Labor Department. And after the establishment of the state, the Mandate departments of factory inspection and labor dispute investigations (effectively the Mandate Labor Department) were added to the ministry.50 The main disagreement during the committee’s final discussions revolved around the future of the Immigration Department. The fundamental question was whether the mechanism for the absorption of immigrants into the workforce would be under the Labor Ministry or through the World Zionist Organization. Gruenbaum insisted that only a government ministry could be in charge of immigrants, while Zvi Luria, another senior member of Subcommittee C, supported the move to keep the treatment of immigrant issues also within the WZO.51 The disagreements were primarily political, and they dealt with the weighty question of the fate of the Jewish Agency following the establishment of the state. Luria came from the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, while Gruenbaum was designated to be a minister in the new government. On the eve of the establishment of the state, the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi were fearful over their political fate with the transition to the Israeli government system. This fear was shared by many Jewish Agency employees, who did all in their power to ensure their professional and political survival during the transition. Despite her best efforts, Hannah Even-Tov, head of the Jerusalem branch of Va’adat HaMatzav, was unable to mediate between the two.52 As a result, Subcommittee C was unable to complete its task. Thus the introduction

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to the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav with regard to the Labor Ministry states as follows: “The plan for the organization of the Labor Ministry was submitted to and discussed by Subcommittee C, but no conclusions were reached. There was disagreement as to whether to include the employment of immigrants in the framework of the Labor Ministry, as was done in the Jewish Agency Labor Department. There were opposing opinions, and no decision was reached.”53 The final report of Va’adat HaMatzav stated that the future Labor Ministry would have five branches: general administration; inspection; labor relations; research and statistics; and the nucleus of an employment section. As we have said, with the actual establishment of the ministry it was decided to incorporate the divisions of Town Planning,54 the Surveyor’s Office,55 and Public Works into it as well.56 The ministry had some ninety-nine employees, and the estimated cost of its maintenance in the first year was 73,942 Israeli lira.57

Part II The Government Ministries during the War From the Establishment of the Provisional Government to the First Elections (April 1948–January 1949)

Introduction When the summary report of Va’adat HaMatzav was submitted to David Ben-Gurion in April 1948, the political system was immersed in accelerated organizational processes in preparation for the establishment of the provisional Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Administration) and Moetzet Ha’Am (People’s Council). When the British Mandate was officially terminated on May 15, 1948, the transfer of power from the Mandate to the Israeli government was completed, and the Provisional Government became the sovereign power, with full powers of enforcement and authority. (This despite the fact that the British evacuation was effectively completed only a month later.) This section of the book analyzes the process by which the powers of the Provisional Government were formed, and its operational policy with regard to the establishment of government ministries, taking the Ministries of Interior and Labor as case studies. It is worth noting that these two ministries already functioned as large ministries during the war, a fact that enables us to learn much about the problems that characterized the process by which government ministries were established during the period in question. The central question that will be discussed in this part of the book is to what extent the war influenced the design of the new government system, with an emphasis on the adherence to or divergence from 91

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the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, as expressed in the cases of the Ministries of Interior and Labor. The time frame discussed in this section deals with three main features: 1. The powers of the executive branch and the government ministries that were formed during wartime, with all that this implies. 2. The Provisional Government was not an elected body, a fact that influenced how it defined its powers and enforced its authority. 3. The events of the war influenced how government ministries were established and operated. The analysis of the establishment and operation of the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry in this section is limited to the period between May 15, 1948, and January 25, 1949. The reason for this is twofold: first, because the first official elections were held after the end of the war in January 1949, generating political and structural changes in these two ministries; and second, due to the tense relationship between Mapai and Mapam during the tenure of the Provisional Government. When Mapam left the coalition after the 1949 elections, the Labor Ministry was transferred to Mapai. Following the decision of Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum to retire from the General Zionists and to run in the Knesset elections on a separate list (and following his eventual defeat in the elections), the Interior Ministry was transferred to the Mizrahi movement. After the election campaign of January 1949, structural changes took place in both ministries, but this was particularly salient in the Labor Ministry, which was transferred to Mapai.

Chapter 6

Establishing the Legal and Executive Foundations of the Government System

A. Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Administration) and Moetzet Ha’Am (People’s Council) The legal basis for the establishment of the State of Israel lies in the U.N. resolution of November 29, 1947, which defined three transitional stages from the moment of the resolution and up to the election of the first government.1 However, in the international arena things unfolded differently: the British refused to cooperate with the U.N. Palestine Commission (which had the effect of taking the three transitional phases off the table). Moreover, the Yishuv leadership received a diplomatic blow when Washington decided to abandon its endorsement of the Partition Plan on March 19, 1948. The Palestine Commission, established after the acceptance of the U.N. resolution on November 29, consisted of five member countries: Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines. Its goal was to oversee the orderly transfer of power from the British to the Jews and the Arabs. This goal was made impossible by the British refusal to cooperate, and in the end the commission never made its planned trip to Palestine. The shift in American foreign policy stemmed from the growing fear in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense that the Yishuv would not be able to withstand a war and that American military intervention would be required, something the Americans wished to avoid at all costs.2 On March 1, 1948, the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive decided that the leadership of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi would be the core of the Provisional State Council. Two decisions were also made: (1) The elected representatives of the Zionist movement, the Jewish Agency 93

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Palestine Executive, and the elected representatives of Knesset Yisrael would make up the Provisional Government Council of the Jewish state. (2) According to the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 1947, the Provisional Government would include all of the branches of government, central and local.3 On March 19, 1948, the United States representative in the U.N. Security Council called for the establishment of a “temporary trusteeship for Palestine” (a proposal whose practical implications would be the effective annulment of the Partition Plan). In response, the Jewish Agency Executive decided on March 23, 1948, that with the termination of the British Mandate, the Yishuv would take control of the government into its own hands.4 In the meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive of March 30, 1948, and of the Zionist Action Committee, it was decided to establish a Provisional Government that would be called Minhelet Ha’Am (the People’s Administration) and would have thirteen representatives (hence its nickname, “The Thirteen”), and Moetzet Ha’Am (the People’s Council), which would have thirty-seven representatives (hence “The Thirty-Seven”). The use of the term “People’s Administration” as opposed to “government” and “People’s Council” as opposed to “government council” was an attempt to avoid provoking the British with the marks of sovereignty before the evacuation was complete. After May 15, 1948, Minhelet Ha’Am came to be known as the Provisional Government, and Moetzet Ha’Am, the Provisional State Council.5 The former was designated the executive branch, while the latter would be the legislative branch. In the absence of elections, however, both bodies were defined as provisional, yet vital due to the war, and were meant to be dismantled at the end of hostilities and following the first elections. Diplomatic and Political Challenges From the outset, Minhelet Ha’Am faced many challenges. Diplomatically, there was the issue of the U.N. Security Council’s proposal for the

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cessation of violence. On the ground there were the ongoing challenges of providing essential services on a daily basis, while simultaneously enacting the preliminary steps necessary to establish the new government. Politically, disputes regarding the future of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi continued to take place, as did partisan conflicts over ministerial appointments. At its first meeting on April 18, 1948, David Ben-Gurion defined the powers of Minhelet Ha’Am: “According to our decision, this institution will have exclusive authority in all matters with which it has been empowered, including: security, transportation, supply, policy, trade and industry, labor, public works, manpower, agriculture, and immigration.”6 The provisional Moetzet Ha’Am was the body that most broadly reflected the political map of the Yishuv, though Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lisak point out that the makeup of the council was not based on the balances of power that existed in the national institutions. The new political institutions were established as far as was possible on the basis of agreements among all of the parties active in the Yishuv on the eve of the establishment of the state. Likewise, it should be recalled that the coalition comprising Moetzet Ha’Am did not include new political entities not included within the recognized parties. For example, the assumption that the old Revisionist leadership represented the Etzel did not stand the reality test of the first elections to the Knesset, as at that point both the Lehi and the Etzel were represented by a separate list. This method of establishing institutions teaches us that the parties were the ones that established the early political institutions of the Israeli state.7 For the majority of the time in which Moetzet Ha’Am was active it was engaged in bitter disputes with the Provisional Government with regard to the authority of the council, especially over the authority of the Provisional Government to legislate and enact emergency laws, a subject that will be discussed at length later on. Eventually, the working relationship between the two bodies was formalized in a working document compiled by Israel’s first minister of justice, Pinchas Rosen.

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B. “Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708/1948” and Its Alternatives To facilitate the functioning of the executive branch and the government ministries during the war, it was decided to delay all formal legislative procedures until the end of the war and until the first elections were held. Hence the Provisional Government acted according to the standards of international law, namely, continuity with the prior legislative system in most areas. This is not the only case in which a polity transitions from colonial rule to independence during a period of conflict—Vietnam went through a similar process when it gained independence from the French. As for the use of “regulations” (see section below on the emergency regulations), we must distinguish between “laws” and “regulations”: a law is the outcome of a legislative process carried out by a legislative body (in Israel this would be the Knesset), whereas a regulation or ordinance is an order coming directly from the executive branch to carry out what it sees as the spirit of the law. In purely legal terms, a regulation has a lower status than a law, but in this case the Provisional Government had no alternative, as they had to run a country during wartime. The Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708/1948, processed by the Judicial Committee Secretariat of Va’adat HaMatzav, was intended to answer this need. The tenth and definitive draft of the ordinance was presented to the Provisional Government on May 15, 1948, and presented for the approval of the Provisional State Council on the same day.8 Justice Minister–designate Pinchas Rosen emphasized that the term “ordinance” had been chosen “because we want to save the term ‘law’ for such time as when all the laws have been legislated by the Parliament. In other words, these are not laws legislated by an elected democratic authority.”9 The ordinance was divided into seven essential issues, without which it would have been impossible to operate the government ministries: governance, budget and taxes, legislation, justice, courts, armed forces, and the transition of power. The text of the ordinance reveals the complexity of the transition from Mandatory to Jewish governance during the war,

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especially in its emphasis on a large concentration of powers in the hands of the executive branch. The feeling of urgency in implementing the ordinance was aptly expressed by David Ben-Gurion when bringing the ordinance before the provisional Moetzet Ha’Am for approval on May 15, 1948: “We have an urgent matter, without which there is no legal basis for the actions of the institutions, and without which we will also place the courts in a very awkward position. The first thing we must do is to endorse the ordinance brought today before the Provisional Government and called the Administrative Ordinance. This is not a constitution. It is an ordinance for the most essential and urgent matters.”10 Drafting the Ordinance At the head of the Judicial Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav were Dr. Dov (Bernard) Yosef11 and Mordechai Aliash. However, due to Alias’s extended stay abroad, Dr. Yosef coordinated most of the work. The Judicial Committee was divided into eighteen professional subcommittees, each dealing with a specific legal area. Experts were appointed ad hoc to some of the committees, as had been practiced in the expert committees of Va’adat HaMatzav.12 The objective difficulty in the committees’ job stemmed from the security situation, which limited the movement of the committee members who were geographically dispersed. As a result, most of the work was coordinated via the mail, which was, of course, subject to the same factors. To coordinate the subcommittees of the Judicial Committee, Dov Yosef established a Secretariat, which included five experts drafted from among the ranks of the top legal echelon of the Yishuv: Herman Cohen, Hans Heimer, Dr. Avraham Beitar, Yehuda Golan, and Pinchas Rosen. Pinchas Rosen summed up the goals and achievements of the committee at the Provisional Government meeting on May 15, 1948: In effect the work is not finished. We passed a number of bills regarding the establishment of the justice system and defining its powers: the courts, annulling the White Paper laws, emergency

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powers, national service, government, and police ordinances. But this work has yet to be summarized, and in most cases we are facing a problem, one for which I believe we will find an appropriate solution in the proposal that I bring before you now: to condense everything into a single general law, a law for the transition period. The head of the Provisional Government has stated explicitly that this is not a law but in fact an emergency ordinance, a transitional law. A law that contains only the bare minimum necessary at this time for the establishment of a legal foundation for our political system.13 What were the legal principles that underlay the drafting of the ordinance? When defining the powers of the Provisional Government, the members of the committee emphasized its temporary nature, therefore amendments were to be inserted by way of an ordinance. The latter also had the goal of preventing challenges to the proclamations published and approved by the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government also decided that the legal status in Israel would remain as it was during the Mandate. The retention of Mandatory law was in itself problematic, however. Some of the legal subcommittees proposed amending each law separately, thus transferring the authorities mentioned in them to the various branches of the new government. And yet, as it was still not clear which authorities the government would establish, it was decided to have one general guideline in the framework of a single law. To the extent possible, the committee members avoided adding new laws or additions to existing laws. Therefore they inserted into existing laws all of the amendments that they possibly could.14 What were the cases, then, in which existing laws were nonetheless annulled or significantly amended? What stood out above all was the decision to annul all of the Mandatory laws related to the White Paper. Likewise, all of the immigration laws were reorganized, and, as we will see later on, the powers of the district commissioner in the Interior Ministry were also amended.15 Other issues that demanded special legal attention included the National Service Law, which stated that every citizen (man or

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woman) would be enlisted for military service, civilian defense, or work in the industry or agriculture sectors, as well as the Civil Service Law, whose purpose was to regularize the issue of compensation for Jewish public servants under the British Mandate. The original intent of Law and Administration Ordinance no. 1 was to temporarily organize the system of government in the new state. Prof. Amnon Rubinstein points out, however, that since the constitutional process in Israel has never been completed, many of the sections of this ordinance remain in effect to this day.16 The most prominent example here pertains to the emergency regulations, which will be discussed in the following section. Continental Law and Jewish Law as Alternatives to the Ordinance Ron Harris points out that a few alternatives to the Law and Administration Ordinance were considered. In terms of the normative sources of the judicial system of Israel, there was the option of maintaining Mandatory law, which was based primarily on English common law. The two other avenues considered were, first, to import entire legal dogma and institutions from Europe, and second, to adopt Jewish law.17 Dov Yosef presented this dilemma at the beginning of the discussions of the Judicial Committee: “One question we will face is what will be the basic system of law in our country: whether we shall follow, as in England, the common law system, or institute a codification system. A second question is whether we shall institute Jewish law as a foundation for the state laws, or whether we shall take the laws of the Mandatory government as a basis, adding to them laws that befit an enlightened and progressive country.”18 Harris notes that the option of importing continental law was not entirely farfetched, since other new or renewed states in Europe, Asia, and South America had made sweeping use of continental legal codes after WWI, translating and adapting them. Turkey under Ataturk, for example, imported modern Swiss legal codes after WWI. Gad Tedeschi proposed using the same Swiss codes, with some modifications. It should be noted that the European option was attractive to many members of the Judicial

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Committee, because they had received their legal training there.19 Harris emphasizes that in the discussions of the Judicial Committee there were three polarized stances with regard to the possibility of incorporating Jewish law into the legal system: (1) The position of the ultra-Orthodox factions, including Neturei Karta, the Haredi sector, and Agudat Yisrael, that there should be no cooperation with the new country, because it was established by secular people who in any case would not want a state based on the Torah. (2) The position accepted by most of the religious Zionist movement, including Poalei Agudat Yisrael and, as the establishment of the state became imminent, also the pragmatic faction of Agudat Yisrael under Rabbi Yitzhak Meir Levin (eventually Israel’s first welfare minister), which saw the State of Israel as a stage on the way to redemption, or a fait accompli that could yet be influenced. This position espoused the transformation of Jewish law into state law. Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog worked energetically toward the advancement of this idea at the end of 1947. Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel also supported the joining of religion and state. (3) The position that sought to establish a secular Western legal system, whether with a continental-style codification or a continuation of British common law. This position, espoused by the various secular parties and streams, left no room for Jewish law and Torah in a secular state striving to be a modern democracy.20 The first of these positions was not presented in the discussions of the Judicial Committee, since those who espoused it did not collaborate with the Zionist leadership, however the two other positions hovered in the conference rooms of the Judicial Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav. Harris writes, however, that it was in fact a third option—a middle way, endorsing the integration of parts of Jewish law into the laws of the state—which was discussed at length. This option is particularly interesting because it received the support of a unique coalition that included the religious members of the Judicial Committee identified with the Mizrahi and Po’el Mizrahi movements, members who had experience in family law, and members who had studied Jewish law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This group understood that the possibility of basing the laws of the state entirely on

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a renewed codification of Jewish law was not practical, since most of the secular public would oppose this.21 In the Judicial Committee of early 1948, a new coalition arose between proponents of “Jewish Law Experts” and proponents of “the Hebrew Law of Peace.” The so-called Jewish magistrate court had begun operating in Jaffa in 1909 as an arbitrators’ tribunal, and was established as a scientific society in Moscow in 1918. As a system of legal tribunals, the Jewish magistrate court reached its peak in the 1920s, and as an intellectual movement it existed in Palestine throughout the 1930s. But toward the end of the 1930s, the enterprise began to fade as the institutions of the Yishuv placed a strong emphasis on education and defense, and not on law. The proponents of Jewish law were represented by Zerah Warhaftig, Avraham Haim Freimann, and Simha Assaf, while the “The Hebrew Law of Peace” faction was represented by Paltiel Dickstein and Shmuel Eisenstadt. These were joined by Mordechai Aliash and Moshe Silberg, who represented a synthesis of the two groups.22 Ultimately, Jewish law did not make its way into the final version of Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1-1948. Why, we must ask, was one of the extreme positions among the variety of opinions favored over the compromise positions? Harris argues that the option of the formulation of a new Hebrew codex, secular or religious, became less feasible as time went on without any real progress being made, and as the establishment of the state became more imminent. The option of honoring Jewish law within the state law, if only for its symbolic meaning, attracted more attention from nonjurists, while also drawing objections from Mapam and other secular parties.23

C. The Effect of the War on the Government’s Powers: The Emergency Regulations Although it was a heavy burden on the new government, the War of Independence also facilitated the centralization of power in the hands of

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the executive branch through emergency regulations. Regulation 9a of the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948 gave the provisional prime minister the authority to amend the emergency laws. The regulation was based on precedents in British law, replacing “The King’s Mandate.” These were implemented for the first time during the Arab revolt of 1937 and remained valid up until the end of the British evacuation of Palestine.24 The Judicial Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav explained the noninstitution of new laws by the Provisional Government, as follows: “Due to time pressures and the many issues at hand, we have reached the conclusion that there is no choice but to make do for the time being with existing regulations. Perhaps the justice minister will decide that the defense regulations are the first and most pressing issue to be formulated authoritatively in Hebrew.”25 The breadth of the power that the emergency laws conferred on the executive branch is illustrated in a large section of the document, Section1(3/4): “It is in the power of an emergency (defense) regulation to change or amend, annul, or validate any law under given conditions and changes. Emergency regulations, orders, bylaws, and sub-regulations, will be valid even if they contain a contradiction to any law other than an [emergency] law.”26 It was also stated that the emergency regulation would be applied immediately and remain in force until such time as the Provisional Government publishes a proclamation annulling it. Menahem Hoffnung notes that initially the intention was not to create permanent emergency legislation. In effect, the founding fathers hoped to replace the emergency legislation from the War of Independence with permanent legislation. Most of the sections of the emergency regulations recognized in Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 were laws that had been extended by five years by the British parliament in 1945 and by the high commissioner. According to Hoffnung, the Provisional Government clung to this excuse to justify their position on emergency matters.27 All told, forty-four emergency regulations were amended during the course of the war in 1948 and 1949. In the absence of an Israeli legislative process, the emergency regulations amended were those meant to resolve

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pressing day-to-day issues that could not be pushed off—for example, military and labor force recruitment, civil defense, exit visas, counterterrorism, absentee property, emergency regulations for the Finance Ministry, and even a general curfew for the purpose of conducting the census of November 1948.28 However, the general atmosphere of emergency in the country in the days before the implementation of the emergency regulations had unpleasant ramifications on the lives of civilians. The following is an example that illustrates this: on May 17, 1948, there was a decision to confiscate a threeroom apartment on 23 Mikveh Yisrael Street in Tel Aviv and to transform it into a distribution center for food vouchers. Below is the letter sent to the tenants by the Tel Aviv district commander, entitled: Confiscation Order no. 140: “Due to the security situation in the country and the urgent needs on our path to national revival, and by the powers vested in me by the national institutions, I hereby confiscate the abovementioned property, which is in your possession, for the purposes of national defense. I hope that you will understand the spirit of this order and acquiesce to it without us having to resort to the means with which we have been vested by the defense establishment in order to carry out this confiscation.”29 In addition to the official confiscations, dozens of quasiofficial confiscations took place, some bordering on the criminal. In a conversation between David Arian and David Jacobson, the chairmen of the Transport and Purchasing Committees during Emergencies, that took place at Beit Hadar in Tel Aviv on May 15, 1948, Jacobson harshly criticized the military’s behavior: “There is complete lawlessness in this area. Soldiers are confiscating automobiles at their discretion, without coordinating with the relevant authority. There are cases in which buildings or apartments are confiscated arbitrarily for military use. In Tel Aviv the Palmah invaded the Public Information Offices and took over the Government Public Information Office on 19 Eliezer Ben Yehuda Street. In order to put a stop to this lawlessness, you must confront all of the commanders and forbid all expropriations or confiscations of automobiles, apartments, or buildings, without the order of the relevant authority.”30

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It is important to note that following the passing of Law 9A, such acts were commonplace and sanctioned by the law of the new state. In May 1950, Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen proposed a statement of principles for eliminating the emergency legislation in the Knesset, and from the beginning of the 1950s we see a drop in their use. The Defense Emergency Law, for example, replaced the Defense Emergency Regulations of 1945. This position was also adopted as a decision of the Knesset assembly, where it was announced that the government was preparing a system of laws that would be presented before the Knesset before December 10, 1950, that would replace the existing emergency legislation. Every time the government brought proposals for extending the emergency laws before the Knesset, it met with resistance from the opposition. In response to the proposal of MK Hanan Rubin from Mapam, David Ben-Gurion stated as follows: “I am also of the opinion that, as we are no longer in the first years of the establishment of the state, there is no need for temporary emergency laws, and it would be preferable to replace these with permanent laws.”31 This statement by Ben-Gurion might lead us to think that he was unhappy with the emergency regulations and that he was considering cancelling them, but Hoffnung thinks otherwise: “On the surface, it seems that there is agreement with regard to eliminating the emergency legislation and replacing it with permanent legislation. This, we might assume, was how Ben-Gurion hoped his statement would be understood, but this was not Ben-Gurion’s intent. His intent was that the temporary emergency laws should be replaced with permanent emergency legislation.”32 What does Hoffnung mean by this? Clearly, the emergency laws gave the Provisional Government much room for maneuvering. However, this trend continued well after the elections of 1949, and we can learn about the adoption of permanent emergency legislation from two events from 1950: (1) the Harari Compromise, which will be discussed below, and (2) a discussion in the Knesset on November 21, 1950, about a bill for extending the validity of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1950. On June 13, 1950, the Knesset decided to accept the proposal of MK Yizhar Harari from the Progressive Party, calling on the First Knesset to

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entrust the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee with the drafting of a proposal for a constitution. In the proposal, the constitution would be divided into chapters, and each chapter would constitute a separate basic law. Harari recommended that should the committee finish its work, all of the chapters should be compiled into a constitution. After accepting the proposal, the Law and Justice Committee appointed a constitutional subcommittee, though ultimately the idea was not carried out. The significance of the Harari Compromise, writes Hoffnung, was the nonratification of a constitution for Israel, while the bill from November 1950 put an end to the promise of annulling the emergency laws.33 What, then, is the difference between the use of emergency laws in wartime and their use in times of peace? Hoffnung notes that in peacetime, the use of emergency regulations became a routine instrument for implementing policy. We see this in the use of emergency legislation for the solution of problems that are by definition not security issues, such as labor disputes or domestic economic policy. The extent to which this became a matter of routine and a source of confusion for the public is evident from the fact that in times of war, the government went out of its way to explain to the public that this was not a routine use of the emergency laws, as was often done on social and economic matters. Hence the regulations needed to be called by new names, since the state of war and a security situation require the enforcement of emergency laws, which is precisely the purpose for which these laws were designated. This happened during the Suez Crisis in 1956, in the Six-Day War of 1967, in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and during the first Lebanon War in 1982. On this, Hoffnung writes “The persistence of a state of emergency over a long period of time, and of such an extensive array of emergency laws, rendered the emergency legislation an inherent part of the day-to-day legal system. Hence, the maintenance of a state of emergency was necessary for the maintenance of the existing legal system, even if the circumstances under which the state of emergency was declared changed completely.”34 The powers to implement the emergency regulations were not vested solely in the hands of the prime minister and minister of defense, but with other ministers as well. It should be noted that

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Israel has three channels for emergency legislation: Mandatory legislation, administrative law, and Knesset legislation. For each of these, the processes of enforcement can fall under the jurisdiction of separate authorities, for example, the military, the police, or government ministries.35 From the first meetings of the Provisional State Council there was already a fierce criticism of Emergency Regulation 9A. The Mapai representative to the Provisional State Council, Meir Grabovsky, expressed this fear as follows: “I accept this proposal for a state of emergency as something temporary. However, there is nothing more dangerous than temporary orders that may last for a long time.”36

D. Differences of Opinion over Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708/1948 During the legislation of the Law and Administrative Ordinance no. 1 of 1948, a number of disputes arose among the members of the Secretariat of the Judicial Committee. Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen described the situation: “There were differences of opinion among the members of the Secretariat on a number of matters. There was not even one thing on which the opinions of the committee members were not divided. Only when the disagreement was over a fundamental issue or one that required a political decision, did we resort to the majority and minority opinions on legislative proposals, whether via an alternative proposal or via a comment or an addendum. All matters for which there was no such comment or alternative proposal, were ultimately accepted by all of the members of the Secretariat.”37 Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 never defined the responsibilities of the Provisional Government or the Provisional State Council. In theory, one could infer from the text of the ordinance that the council had virtually unlimited powers, and that the Provisional Government had only an executory role. However, because the Provisional Government was not chosen by the council but rather via a list published as an appendix

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to the ordinance, there was no way to express a vote of no-confidence in the Provisional Government, even if such a thing was desired. The only way to unseat the government was by changing the ordinance itself; therefore in the text of the ordinance the government is subordinate to the council, as stated in Article 2(b): “The Provisional Government will work according to the policy guidelines laid down by the Provisional State Council, will execute its decisions, will submit a report of all of its activities, and will have to answer to the Provisional State Council about all of its activities.”38 The Declaration of the State of Israel stated that the Provisional State Council and the Provisional Government would operate until the establishment of an elected government, according to a constitution that would be determined by the Elected Assembly, and no later than October 1, 1948. In effect, the Provisional State Council only began its discussions about legislation regarding the Constituent Assembly on this date. After these discussions, orders were issued regarding the time frame, arrangements, and budget for the elections, as well as governance arrangements up until the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the rules of the assembly, and its powers. What can we learn about the dynamic between the Provisional Government and the Provisional State Council with regard to the decisionmaking process between May 15, 1948, and January 25, 1949? A thorough analysis of the discussions of the Provisional State Council from that period reveals a growing frustration among many of its members at the behavior of the members of the government in almost every field. Below are three examples, pertaining, respectively, to legislation, defense, and taxes: one of the primary complaints of the members of the council had to do with the way in which Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 had been ratified. As Mapam member Nahum Nir-Rafalkes39 stated, as early as May 16, 1948: They could have prepared this in advance and let us review it properly. Now they come to us and recommend that we accept this constitution this evening. I may personally be somewhat

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familiar with it, but I am certain that most of the members of the council are not jurists and are not familiar with all of these matters. For this reason, in my opinion, we should not have begun with this matter, but with defining the powers of the government, how it works, what it does. We also need to define the responsibilities of the Council, legislation, elections, and committees. Ultimately, we are not a parliament of 600 people. We are only 38. The difference here is between 13 and 38. Why must every matter be given to the Thirteen. I don’t understand this. And I have my concerns.40 Further on, Nahum Nir focuses specifically on the Legislative Branch: All of the powers that by law were vested in the high commissioner and the Mandate or in the Jewish government in Palestine, will henceforth be vested in the Provisional Government, and not the council, which is the basis of sovereignty, but the government. If the council accepts these [laws] now, the members of the council can go home and not read them for another month or two months or three months. And in the meantime the government will continue to function. Based on these laws, the council can be annulled.41 Nahum Nir was a member of Mapam, and known for his sharp tongue, it is true, yet we cannot ignore the general resentment felt by many of the council members. Another example relates to defense policy. On June 3, 1948, David Ben-Gurion spoke before the members of the Provisional State Council about the progress of the war. Mapam representative Berl Repetur42 criticized him for not sharing with the council members the preliminary discussions about the possibility of a temporary truce:

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For the sake of having the entire Yishuv ready to be mobilized for the war, it is of utmost importance that on essential policy decisions, the State Council be apprised of the basic issues at hand. And I allow myself to say that the government made a mistake, in my opinion, in not convening the State Council this week. Had the council been convened, it would have only bolstered the government in its actions, by virtue of the fact that the main forum of the Jewish government, the State Council, is a partner to and lends of its authority and validity to its claims.43 It may not have been expected of the prime minister to bring every sensitive defense or diplomatic issue before the broad forum of the provisional Moetzet Ha’Am; no government does this. However, we cannot ignore the resentment expressed by many members of the council, a feeling that also stemmed from the way the Provisional Government tended to make decisions. Generally, matters of state were first discussed in the closed meetings of the government, where they were processed and presented for a vote. Only after that were they brought for the approval of the members of the Council, who often felt like a kind of rubber stamp. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the difficult circumstances and the fact that the entire process of establishing the government was taking place against the backdrop of a state of emergency and war. A good example of this is found in the response of Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen to a critique of the government regarding the imposition of taxes. According to Article 6 of Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1, government taxes that have yet to be ratified into law should not be levied, nor should taxes be raised except by order of the Provisional State Council. In a discussion about tax policy at the Provisional State Council, Rosen complained: “What will Kaplan do if he has to raise a tax that was already determined? Does this require a discussion in the Provisional State Council? There is a special emergency regulation in Article 9 [Emergency Regulation] that enables the levying of taxes in times of emergency.”44

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From Rosen’s statement we can understand that he supported the government’s policy and its use of the emergency laws.

E. Powers of the Government Ministers and the Distribution of Portfolios To understand how the authority of the ministers running the government ministries was designed in practice, we need to analyze the issue on three levels: (1) the powers of the ministers as they were entrenched in the law, (2) the definition of their roles, and (3) the practice of deciding ministerial appointments according to party lines. The ministers’ powers were anchored in Articles 3, 4 (a, b, c), 5, and 6 of Law A (1948) on the adaptation of the law and its powers. The most salient of these, however, is Article 2 (c, d, e) of the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948: “The Provisional Government shall elect one of its members to be prime minister, and shall prescribe the functions of each of its members. A member of the Provisional Government shall be called ‘minister.’ ”45 (In earlier meetings titles such as “minister” [using the English term as opposed to the Hebrew word for “minister,” sar] and “chancellor” were also suggested, but at a meeting of Moetzet Ha’Am on May 15, 1948 it was decided to use the Hebrew term, since in the opinion of one of the representatives of the religious community, the term “chancellor” [in Hebrew, nagid] was fundamentally a Diaspora term, giving as an example Shmuel HaNagid from eleventh-century Muslim Spain.) As for the powers of the ministers, Article 2(d) states as follows: “The Provisional Government may confer any of its powers upon the prime minister and upon any of the ministers, as the Provisional Government determines, whether or not one of the ordnances of the Provisional State Council awarded this specific authority to the prime minister or one of the ministers.”46 Likewise, members of the Provisional Government (and, later, government ministers), were authorized to confer the powers given to them to another person or authority, although this did not include the

power to amend regulations unless the law entitled them to do so. With regard to the employment of civil servants the powers of the ministers were quite broad: “The government or one of its ministers is entitled, within six months of the publication of this ordinance, as they see fit and without providing explanation, to terminate or transfer the service of a government employee.”47 On May 16, 1948, the Justice Ministry submitted to the Provisional Government a basic document defining the responsibilities of every minister and his ministry.48 This immediately raises the question as to just how faithful this document was to the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav, which had been presented to Ben-Gurion in April 1948. First of all, we should recall that the Ministries of Defense and Finance, as well as the Foreign Ministry, were not planned in the framework of Va’adat HaMatzav. The Foreign Ministry was based largely on the Political Department of the Jewish Agency and was established by its staff members, while the Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry were consolidated ex nihilo, since no parallel institution existed in the Yishuv establishment under the Mandate. Likewise, we should take into account the great sensitivity attributed by Ben-Gurion to the Defense Ministry, primarily for ideological and partisan reasons, which is why he took upon himself the entire process of its organization and establishment.49 In addition, we need to take into account the separation of the police from the Interior Ministry, which contradicted the original proposal of Va’adat HaMatzav (this issue will be discussed in the following section on the Interior Ministry), as well as a few departments whose ministerial affiliation was decided only after the establishment of the state (primarily for political and party considerations). Examples include the Ministry of Immigration, which was first established as a separate ministry but whose powers were eventually transferred to the Interior Ministry, and the decision to merge technical branches of the Mandate government, such as the Surveyor’s Office and Town Planning Department, into the Ministry of Labor and Construction. (This subject will be discussed below in the section about the Labor Ministry.) Aside from these changes, the

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government ministries were generally arranged based on the final report of Va’adat HaMatzav. Below is a list of government ministries and their specific fields of authority, as prepared by the Judicial Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav and approved by the Provisional Government in late May, 1948: Defense Minister. Responsible for all matters of the armed forces on land, sea, and air. Likewise he is responsible for the execution of the following laws: Defense (General) Regulations 1939, Emergency Defense Regulations 1945, Compensations Ordinance 1945, Firearms Ordinance, and Explosives Ordinance 1937. Foreign Minister. Responsible for representing the country internationally, for delegates and consuls abroad, hosting diplomats and consuls from foreign countries, conventions and contracts, agreements with foreign countries, foreign press, and public relations abroad. Finance Minister and Finance Ministry. Responsible for matters of budget, currency, and government loans, management of government property, management and auditing of the government’s accounts. Also responsible for the execution of the following laws: Income Tax, Corporate Tax, Urban Property Tax, Agricultural Property Tax, Tithe, Live-stock Tax, Stamp Duties, Custom Duties, and Control of Foreign Currency, Control of Banking, Credit Banks, Insurance, and Trade with the Enemy. Justice Minister. Responsible for all matters related to the courts, preparation of laws and general prosecution, matters pertaining to the Administrator General’s Office and Landed Property procedures, Property valuers, Bankruptcies, Custodian of Property, Rent Control, and Extradition. Police and Minorities Minister. Responsible for the police and execution of laws in the following fields: police, prisons, and minorities. Labor and Construction Minister. Responsible for public works, human resources, and the execution of laws in the areas of trade unions, regulation

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of women and child labor, workers’ compensation, inspection of factory labor, and city planning. Trade and Industry Minister. Responsible for matters of commerce, industry, supply, and tourism. (Eventually a separate tourism ministry would be established). Likewise, it was responsible for the execution of the following laws: control of food supplies, inventories and requirements, imports and exports, commerce and trade, control of foods, weights, measures, and franchises. Agriculture Minister. Responsible for all matters of agriculture, development of lands and water sources and responsibility for the execution of the following laws: supervision of citrus fruit, forestry, plant protection, locust destruction, fisheries, animal diseases, protection of game, fertilizers, land and sea-shore erosion, inspection of water sources and their measurement. Transportation Minister. Responsible for transportation on land, sea, and air, as well as the postal system and for the execution of laws regarding mail, telephone, telegraph, trains, road transport, shipping, ports, air travel and transportation. Immigration Minister. Responsible for all matters of immigration and execution of related laws (eventually, most of the powers of the ministry were transferred to the Interior Ministry). Welfare Minister. Responsible for all matters of social welfare and execution of laws pertaining to juvenile delinquents and probation officers for criminals. (Eventually there was a proposal to attach to this ministry the War Casualties Ministry.) Religious Affairs Minister. Responsible for all matters of religion and religious institutions, including the execution of laws pertaining to these areas: the religious communities and registration of marriage and divorce.50

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F. The Political Struggle over Ministerial Portfolios On the eve of the establishment of the Minhelet Ha’Am in April 1948, a three-member committee was established and charged with presenting a list of candidates for the ministerial posts in the Provisional Government. The committee was compiled along party lines: David Remez (Mapai), Berl Repetur (Mapam), and Peretz Bernstein (General Zionists). Later on, Rabbi Fishman was added by his own request, on behalf of the Mizrahi movement. Following repeated complaints from the religious sector about political discrimination, the Provisional Government decided in its third meeting on May 20, 1948 to establish a new committee that would make recommendations about the distribution of ministerial portfolios and the hiring process for civil servants. The members of the new committee were: Eliezer Kaplan (Mapai), Mordechai Ben-Tov (Mapam), Peretz Bernstein (General Zionists), and Pinchas Rosen from the New Aliya Party.51 The committee divided into two working groups: the first focused specifically on the reassignment of positions held by members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi to the Provisional Government, and the other focused more generally on the distribution of portfolios in the Provisional Government. At the same time, the committee recommended the establishment of a five-member committee headed by Ben-Gurion, which would serve as a kind of defense cabinet for managing the war. (We should note that until his powers as minister of defense were defined, Ben-Gurion refused to take this portfolio, which delayed the presentation of the government.) Another political dispute revolved around the integration of representatives of the religious parties in the government and the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The extent to which this political struggle dictated the appointment of ministers is apparent from the statement of the representative of the Mizrahi party, Moshe Shapira, upon bringing his complaints before the members of the Provisional Government: “As for the portfolios [ . . . ] there are some natural things that we cannot change: we will not say that David Ben-Gurion will not be Minister of Defense, Moshe Shertok Foreign Minister, or Kaplan Finance Minister. However, you should know that,

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along with Remez’s portfolio, you have taken all of the major portfolios in the government, which others have not done.”52 In the end it was decided to give the welfare portfolio to Rabbi Fishman of the Mizrahi party and the war casualties’ portfolio to Rabbi Yitzhak Meir Levin53 of Agudat Yisrael.54 Another issue at stake had to do with the dispute around the necessity for a Ministry of Religious Affairs. Aharon Zisling of Mapam and Yitzhak Gruenbaum of the General Zionists opposed the establishment of this ministry, and ultimately the matter was decided by a majority vote of five against two, primarily due to BenGurion’s decision to bring Mizrahi into the government as a balance against Mapam, and Rabbi Fishman was appointed the new Minister of Religious Affairs.55 Eight parties were represented in the Provisional Government: Mapai, Mapam, the General Zionists, the Oriental and Sephardic communities, Aliya Hadasha, Mizrahi, and Agudat Yisrael. On the other hand, in the Provisional State Council, thirteen parties were represented. Thus, not every party represented in Moetzet Ha’Am, such as the Communists and the Revisionists, took part in the government. And yet, despite all of the political-party tumult, there was an awareness of the degree of harm being caused by the over-involvement of the party system. As David Remez, transportation minister–elect on behalf of Mapai, eloquently said: “We can say that the central committees of the parties should not interfere and pry so much. Should they decide to do so, this will lead to unnecessary difficulties. I propose that we publish the names of the ministers and add that every minister is responsible for the execution of the laws and regulations according to the decision of the Provisional Government, and that the catalogue itself be published in the Official Gazette.”56 The composition of the Provisional Government was ultimately determined on May 23, 1948, and the list was presented by the chairman of the four-man Appointments Committee, Eliezer Kaplan: Mapai ministers: prime minister and minister of defense, David Ben-Gurion; treasurer, Eliezer Kaplan; foreign minister, Moshe Shertok; transportation minister, David Remez. Mapam ministers: labor minister, Mordechai Ben-Tov, agriculture minister, Aharon Zisling. Ministers from the General Zionists:

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interior minister, Yitzhak Gruenbaum; minister of industry and trade, Peretz Bernstein. Mizrahi ministers: health and immigration minister, Moshe Shapira; minister of religious affairs, Rabbi Fishman. Representative of the Aliya Hadasha Party: justice minister, Pinchas Rosen. Representative of Agudat Yisrael: welfare minister, Rabbi Yithak (Iche’) Meir Levin. Representative of the Sephardi and Oriental Communities Party: minister of police and minority affairs, Bechor-Shalom Shitrit.57 The distribution of portfolios thus reflected the same party constraints that determined the makeup of the Provisional Government, wherein Mapai was the dominant player in the whole system. The two following chapters present case studies of the government’s implementation policy in the formation of two of the major government ministries: the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry.

Chapter 7

The Ministry of the Interior during the War of Independence (May 1948–January 1949) A. Structure of the Ministry after the Final Report of Va’adat HaMatzav When it opened to the public on May 17, 1948, the Interior Ministry’s structure accorded, on the whole, with the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav. Whereas under the Mandate the various interior issues were dispersed among different departments, Va’adat HaMatzav recommended merging all of these under a single government ministry, which would be comprised of five divisions: District Administration, Department of Population Registration and Issue of Identity Documents, Information Bureau, Police, and Prisons. These recommendations were accepted, with the exception of the incorporation of the police and prisons services into the ministry. The new interior minister, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, refused to do so, stating that this was “a clear symptom of what is commonly done in totalitarian countries.” Thus it was decided to establish the Police and Minorities Ministry, under MK Bechor-Shalom Shitrit.

B. Planning the District Administration: Establishing the General Administration Division Headed by Yaakov Kislov, former deputy district commissioner of the Tel Aviv district under the Mandate, the General Administration Department 117

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was established toward the end of July 1948 (and quickly became a fullfledged division). The interior minister defined the roles and powers of the division in October 1948: “It is responsible for administration on the district, sub-district, and local levels. It facilitates initiatives related to district management and the understanding of relevant laws, while also representing the interests of the division before the minister and the other divisions [in the Interior Ministry]. It is responsible for numerous issues, from automobiles to matters of district security. Many small things need to be done, which require instruction and supervision.”1 The primary role of the division, as defined by Yaakov Kislov in a report dated November 16, 1948, was “to coordinate and supervise District Administration in the country, and coordinate the work of the various District Administrations with other ministries, on both the central and district levels.”2 In the spirit of Edwin Samuel’s recommendations to Va’adat HaMatzav, it was decided that the Interior Ministry would have one administrative center that would deal with three main areas: District Administration, routine municipal matters in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality, and the Jerusalem municipality. A ministerial committee, comprised of the ministers of the interior, police, and justice, was established to regulate the coordination between the District Administration and the rest of the government ministries. The committee decided that the district commissioners would have all of the powers that were held by the interior minister. To streamline the relationship with the other government ministries, interministerial regulations were set down to clearly define the relationship between the District Administration and the rest of the government ministries. The final report on the District Administration for the period of November 1, 1948, through January 31, 1949, emphasizes that, despite the opposition of other government officials to the concentration of all of District Administration activities under the General Administration Division, the situation on the ground had proven that this was indeed the best way: “On occasion, the government ministries turn to the [district] commissioners for assistance and guidance in public and social matters. Both the commissioners and

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the administration officers are invited to sit on the various inter-ministerial committees, such as: the Committee for Determining the Fate of German Property in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Acre; committees for exemptions from rural taxes; road transportation committees; etc.”3 Representatives of the District Administration also worked directly with the Ministries of Health and of Police with regard to weapons permits and the sale of alcoholic beverages, as well as with the Administrator General with regard to abandoned property. They also managed the housing committees and represented the public on issues before the government ministries. For example, “The commissioner and administration officers also came to the assistance of the residents by placing the necessary pressure on the government in order to have courthouses and police stations built, and services provided to the public.”4 Authorities of the District Commissioner In the British colonial system, district-level government was not defined as a discrete departmental or professional arena, but rather as an inseparable part of the Chief Secretariat of the British Mandatory Government, as opposed to professional departments such as health and education.5 The powers of the Mandatory district commissioner were not defined in any single document or corpus of regulations, but were dispersed across the gamut of Mandatory legislation, so that there was not a field in which the district commissioner was not mentioned. The reason for this is simple: the district commissioner had judicial authority and, as a representative of the central government, it was his responsibility to coordinate the different government offices and carry out the policy of the Mandate government. After the powers of the district commissioner in Israel were redefined, the justice minister decided to remove the role’s judicial authority: “giving judicial authority to administrative clerks is a trapping of colonialism, and we should not accept such a mixture of administration and jurisdiction.”6 Some of the powers of the district commissioner remained unchanged from the Mandatory era, such as the authority to be present alongside

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the police at investigations of instances of unnatural death. On the other hand, the power to confiscate public buildings and residential apartments was transferred to the Military Administration. This problem was notable in Tel Aviv and later in Jerusalem as well, primarily arising from the need for housing for government employees. However, the most noteworthy issue that arises from the periodic reports of the district commissioners in the beginning of the Israeli era was the question of their authority vis-à-vis other government ministries and the general public.7 (The question of the authority of the district commissioners will be discussed in a separate section, on the Ministry of Interior’s functioning during the war.) With regard to the definition of power vis-à-vis the government ministries, it appears that representatives of the government ministries in the field tended to bypass the representatives of the Interior Ministry, due both to the lack of a clear definition of powers vis-à-vis other ministries and also as a result of work habits that persisted from the pre-state Yishuv establishment, when the various branches operated independently. An example of this can be found in the complaint of Afula District Commissioner Michael Barkai, about other government departments: “None of them consulted with me about its work or its plans. Their usual answer: we have not received instructions to do so.”8 Barkai also complained about the fact that he himself had not received instructions about how to work with the other government ministries. And even the Interior Ministry itself neglected to inform him of public delegations they themselves sent to his district. And the police did not participate in the regional defense committees: “Police headquarters has no knowledge of the procedure detailed in your letter, and thus did not approve our participation in the local security committee concerning the allocation of weapons licenses, until it clarifies the proper procedure on the matter.”9 The Israeli district commissioners encountered similar difficulties in their interface with the general public. In particular they had a hard time habituating the public to the idea that the local District Administration representatives were a direct continuation of the central government.

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Already in Va’adat HaMatzav, Interior Minister–elect Yitzhak Gruenbaum, the head of the subcommittee for planning the District Administration, intimated that this would be a big problem. In a report submitted to the interior minister on the eve of the first elections to the Knesset, Barkai says, “It appears that the public is circumventing us and going straight to the central government. In effect the district offices are kept in the dark; I am not apprised of the decisions of the central government and its meetings with the public in the region.”10 All of the issues discussed above regarding the definition of the powers of the district commissioner can be related to a broader problem, one that stemmed primarily from the inexperience of most of the staff of the new government apparatus. These employees (unlike their colleagues who were alumnus of the Mandatory system, many of whom went on to fill the majority of the district commissioner positions) had come to these positions from roles they had held within the Yishuv establishment, where they had been accustomed to a decentralized, volunteer-based system. Graduates of the Mandatory system tried to streamline the work in the field and guide their counterparts from the Yishuv establishment, but the difficulties were many. It is also apparent that the new government was not successful in clarifying the powers of the various ministries, especially as some of the ministers acted as the rulers of their own personal fiefdoms, disregarding the need for interorganizational coordination. The Jewish Mandatory Clerks in the District Administration and the Israeli Government One unique characteristic of the early period of Israeli District Administration is that most of the staff came out of the Mandatory district government system, and served as a positive example for the kind of contribution that these clerks could make. Unlike their counterparts in the Yishuv establishment, most of the staff people had been sent to study abroad in England, so that apart from their rich experience, they also had a broader academic education than the members of the Va’ad HaLe’umi or the Jewish Agency. Following are a few examples:

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1. Jews who served as assistant district commissioners in the British Mandate: Yaakov Kisalov: served in the rural district of Tel Aviv; eventually became the head of the General Administration Division of the Interior Ministry.11 Held a degree in economics and administration from the London School of Economics. Yosef Kuperman: served in the rural district of Tel Aviv. Eventually appointed to the Tel Aviv district.12 Yaakov Bergman: served in the rural district of Haifa, eventually appointed to the Haifa district.13 2. Jews who served as district officers in the British Mandate: Yitzhak Chizik: served in the Tel Aviv rural district and eventually became a senior staff person in the Tel Aviv District Administration. Graduated from the Universities of Chicago and London, had a master’s degree in political science.14 (His sister, Sarah, was killed alongside Joseph Trumpeldor at Tel Hai.) Dr. Avraham Bergman: served in the Jerusalem district and was eventually appointed Jerusalem district commissioner (succeeding Bechor Shmuel Yeshaya). Had a PhD in archeology from Johns Hopkins University in the United States.15 Alfred David Levhar: served in the Haifa urban district; later became the assistant commissioner of the Haifa district. Had law degrees from the Lycée Charlemagne in Paris and from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.16 Yehoshua Gobravnik: served in the Tel Aviv urban district and

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eventually became assistant commissioner of the Tel Aviv district. A graduate of law at the London School of Economics.17 Shlomo Har-Even: served in the Netanya Bureau of Health and was eventually appointed commissioner of the Galilee district. Mordechai Kahana: served in the Safed Bureau of Health and later worked in the Haifa district. Michael Barkai: served in Afula and eventually became commissioner of the Afula and Rehovot districts. Va’adat HaManganon and Its Decisions Overall, the fate of the Jewish Mandatory clerks in the new Israeli government remained problematic. On June 6, 1948, the Provisional Government published an order by which all government workers who had worked in government during the Mandate must be evaluated by a governmentappointed public committee. The role of the committee was defined as: “to assess the personal suitability of every government worker and police officer to serve the State of Israel.”18 At first the Jewish Mandatory clerical service was defined as interim (six months), with an extension of a few months—until April 9, 1949. All in all, the Va’adat HaManganon (Committee for the Establishment of the Public Service and the Vetting of Government Officials) held sixty-one meetings and fifty-seven investigations for classifying government workers. Testimonies were given on a daily basis before at least two members of the committee. Members of the committee met frequently with the Ministerial Committee for Administrative Issues, which included the head of the commission, Golda Meir as well as Eilezer Kaplan, Moshe Shapira, Pinchas Rosen, and the Attorney General. According to the recommendations of Va’adat HaManganon, the public service ranks were comprised of 74 percent Class A Jewish Mandatory

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clerks (“Class A” meaning that there were no bribery complaints registered), 16 percent Class B clerks (those who had been implicated in small-scale bribery and who, in the committee’s words: “perhaps in a more humane work environment and a different atmosphere, could be efficient clerks”),19 and 10 percent Class C clerks. The question with regard to this last ranking was whether they should be fired forthwith or given another chance. Ultimately it was decided to recruit only some of them. These were clerks about whom the majority of testimony indicated significant corruption. They had the right to appeal to the committee, but only a small number of them were exonerated. It is worthwhile to dwell for a moment on the methodology of the committee: the committee did not make use of anonymous testimony, nor did it make judgments regarding professional standards. Its primary goal was to assess what they defined as “national loyalty and integrity.” An example of their method of assessing the Jewish Mandatory clerks can be found in the initial discussion held when establishing the Department of Planning and Building, which belonged to the Local (Self) Government Division of the Interior Ministry. About twenty Jews worked for the Mandatory government in this field and also served as Mandatory district supervisors. One of the most talented of these (according to the committee) was B. L., the Haifa district supervisor, who was ruled out for ethical reasons: “With regard to the Haifa district supervisor, Mr. B. L., there were complaints for years of his accepting bribes. We recommend not keeping him in his position.”20 B. L. is an example of a Class C clerk, as opposed to E. L. S. from Tel Aviv, who, despite his classification as “B” had changed his ways for the better: “There have been whispers about him of late that he accepts bribes, but just a few years ago he fought against this worthless practice. A transfer in post, even for a short while, should put an end to this tendency to go down this bad road.”21 Simply put, E. L. S. was not characterized as a “lost cause,” and the way to “reeducate him” was to “exile” him to Haifa. As it completed its mission, the Va’adat HaManganon stressed that most of the Jews who had joined the Mandatory service did so out of the desire to play a national role and help build the country, and the committee even

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expressed an understanding of the difficult work conditions and atmosphere that forced many of these civil servants to stray from the straight and narrow. The committee took note of the fact that the British staff treated the Jewish and Arab clerical ranks as “natives,” an attitude that was manifested in complete social and professional separation, beginning with their uniforms and personal attitudes and up to and including the salary they received. It was difficult for Jews to climb the ranks, and corrupt department heads dampened their motivation. The committee also remarked that the Jewish public’s generally negative opinion of the Mandatory government and service in it engendered indifference to the payoffs people were accustomed to offer these clerks in their attempts to navigate government bureaucracy. It was thus decided that an oversight committee would be established within the new Israeli civil service, to insure the integrity of the service.22 District Boundaries The country was divided into districts more or less according to the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, except for territorial changes resulting from the war, which will be discussed later in a separate section. On September 15, 1948, the director general of the Interior Ministry, Maximilian Hartglass,23 outlined a division of the country into four districts: Tel Aviv, Haifa, Galilee, and the South. In the areas under military administration annexed as a result of the war, the following districts were added: Jerusalem, Western Galilee, Nazareth, Jaffa, Lydda, and Ramle.24 On January 1, 1949, the urban and rural districts of Tel Aviv were consolidated into a single district, under the direction of Yosef Kuperman.25

C. Roles of the General Administration Division The General Administration Division was concerned primarily with the implementation of laws that came under the jurisdiction of the interior minister, such as the Emblem and Flag Law, the Firearms Law, the Daylights

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Savings Order, the Ottoman Law of Associations, and orders relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages. This division also enforced laws that were under the jurisdiction of other ministries but were implemented in part by the Interior Ministry—for example, the Rent Restrictions (DwellingHouses) Ordinance 1940, and Rent Restrictions (Business Premises) 1941, investigations of the cause of unnatural death (with the Health and Police Ministries), the Emergency Land Seizure Law, the Tenant Protection Law, and the Civil Defense Law.26 Eventually the General Administration Division’s actions included proposing an amendment to the Firearms Law, amending regulations regarding the use of the state flag, and proposing bills to establish public associations to supersede the Ottoman law. In addition, the division’s staff represented the Interior Ministry on all interministerial committees in which the ministry took part: the Central Housing Committee, the Committee for Determining the Salary of Reserve Forces, and the Defense (emergency) Regulations Committee. Likewise, the division played an active role in preparing national and municipal elections and devoted a good deal of time to preparing for the Independence Day celebrations and coordination among the local authorities on this subject.27 The Jerusalem Municipality With regard to Jerusalem, the General Administration Division was primarily concerned with ratifying laws for expanding the municipal council. In November 1948, the Jerusalem municipal council had six members, a legacy of the Mandate. The Mandatory council in Jerusalem was disbanded a few months before the evacuation, and British civil servants were appointed in their place. On the establishment of Israel, this forum was deemed to no longer represent the new demographic makeup of the city, especially in light of the fact that it no longer had any statutory validity. Therefore the General Administration Division initiated negotiations to expand the municipal council to seventeen members. Another problem had to do with the expansion of the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to include its western

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neighborhoods: Givat Shaul, Kiryat Moshe, Beit HaKerem, Yefe Nof, and Bayit VaGan. The municipality had an economic interest in stretching its boundaries to include these neighborhoods, thus allowing the collection of municipal taxes there. However, due to legal difficulties related to the city’s international status (which will be discussed in a separate section, on the war), a joint committee with the Foreign Ministry was established, which eventually approved the inclusion of these neighborhoods within the municipal borders.28 In its efforts to invest in the development of municipal infrastructures, the General Administration Division attained 300,000 lira for a new water works. In 1952, the budget of the Jerusalem Municipality reached four million lira and a loan of one million lira was approved for it. However we should not forget the great contribution of the Committee for the Development of Jerusalem, headed by former head of the Fuel and Food Committees in Va’adat HaMatzav, Mordechai Shatner, to the development of the city in the 1950s and beginning of the ’60s, including the establishment of the government compound.29 The Special Status of Tel Aviv Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum assigned to Tel Aviv its special status and decided to deal with the issues it faced directly. The special status of the city stemmed from the fact that it was the largest metropolis in the Jewish Yishuv, and especially because many of the political and party powers made it their home, such as, for example, the Histadrut, Mapai, Mizrahi, the Revisionists, among others. By November 1948 the General Administration Division had approved a loan of 250,000 lira for the Tel Aviv Municipality. The division also assisted the municipality in the approval of contracts, the institution of municipal bylaws and emergency tax and municipal tax policies, determination of the boundaries of the district, water supply, land expropriation, and determining terms of employment for the workers of the regional authority.30

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D. Establishing the Local Government Division In addition to the General Administration Division, a special division for self-government was established. On October 21, 1948, the Interior Ministry defined the role of the division as “making improvements within municipal areas and responsibility for initiating the law of unification of the councils and committees for small localities. The General Administration Division should not have to waste its time making amendments in the law.”31 Until the powers of the Local Government Division were definitively outlined in September 1949, its representatives were busy instructing local councils, municipalities, and local authorities on municipal matters. Just a few examples: in Rishon Letzion the illegal firing of the management board was prevented; in Ramat Gan an illegal tax was cancelled and a general training course on financial matters was provided; in Hadera the division’s intervention was necessary since there was only one person on the rural council there. In those places where there was no municipal framework whatsoever, the initiative to establish one came from the Local Government Division.32 From the early days of this division, there was a lack of clarity as to its powers vis-à-vis the General Administration Division. The two divisions intersected primarily on matters of budget, oversight, and bylaws. In effect, until the inauguration of the first elected government, it was difficult to set clear boundaries between the two divisions. As Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum said: “There may always be conflicts, however once things begin to take shape, the district government and the regional authorities will not feel discrimination from any side.”33 The majority of friction between the two divisions arose over budgetary disputes. While the local branches of the General Administration Division carried out the government’s policy of minimizing routine expenses, the Local Government Division, as the representative of the local councils and the municipalities, was usually in the position of demanding extra allocations. When disputes arose that were impossible to resolve, they were transferred for arbitration to the minister or the ministry’s director general.

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The Local Government Division was required to participate in the planning and implementation of every one of the budget discussions in the Regional Councils and the municipalities. For example, the representative of the division could decide that a six-classroom school had to be built in a given Regional Council’s jurisdiction, at which point the Council would have to remain in constant contact with the representatives of the Local Government Division while preparing the budget for presentation before the members of the Council. Budgetary issues were referred to the General Administration Division for oversight, because this division supervised every aspect of the ministry’s activities. This often gave rise to friction over issues of authority between the different sections within the ministry. Another example can be found regarding municipal bylaws: proposals were raised by the Local Government Division, while the final authorization was given by the General Administration Division, because the issues had an effect on the entire district. Exceptions to this rule were the municipalities of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem, which were in direct contact with the minister, and areas under control of the Military Administration, which were in direct contact with the General Administration Division, a subject that will be elaborated on in the section dealing with operational difficulties during the war.34

E. National-Level Oversight and Registration: Establishment of the Department of Population Registration As early as November 1948, a small office was opened in Jerusalem to serve as a population registry. It was headed by Uziel Schmaltz.35 The office employed fifty temporary workers charged with preparing the census.36 At the same time, Schmaltz came to an agreement with the Health Ministry that they would transfer data to him about births and deaths on an ongoing basis so that he could keep an updated demographic record. (Until January 1949, births and deaths continued to be registered according to the Mandatory system, i.e., via the Health Ministry. Only from January 1949 onward was

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registration transferred to the Interior Ministry, as per the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav.) On November 8, 1948, a nationwide census was taken, and by request of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) “it was decided to require all government workers to take part in the population registry project.”37 The first task of the Department of Population Registration, under the direction of Dr. Yaakov Marcus, was to process the results of the census so they could be used in the ministry’s daily work: issuing identification cards, birth and death certificates, and passports. Two central problems arose with the Central Bureau of Statistics: how the data would be transferred to the Department of Population Registration, and where the budget for compiling a national directory would come from. Until the first elections in January 1949, the Central Bureau of Statistics, under Prof. Roberto Baki,38 focused on four areas of activity: registration of inhabitants on the day of the census, preparation of a voter registry, preparation of identification books, and the distribution of these books.39 A meeting was held on November 14 with the participation of Prof. Baki, Yaakov Kislov, and Dr. Yaakov Marcus, to formulate the Interior Ministry’s registration procedures. It was decided that the CBS would transfer to the Department of Population Registration one copy (out of two) of the two questionnaires filled out by those who registered on November 8. This questionnaire would be kept in a permanent registration office (by district or subdistrict) according to the stated residence of the citizen. It was also agreed that the registration slips from the census would be transferred to the Department of Population Registration, where they would serve as a database for issuing identity cards and would be organized alphabetically by registration area. Despite Marcus’s suggestion to transfer the registration slips to the offices of the local councils and authorities, Baki and Kislov decided to send the data to the district and subdistrict offices, so that the registration slips and questionnaires, which included so much information about the citizens of the country, would be stored and processed in a single government office, a policy that was consistent with the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav on administrative centralization:40

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“In order to optimize the data gathered in the census, it has been decided to prepare a national directory. The directory was very necessary, due to both the large waves of immigration arriving in the country, and the addition of many Arabs to the State of Israel with the conquering of new territories. Only through an organized and up-to-date directory will it be possible to keep track of the national population.”41 Registration of New Immigrants The main problem with regard to this population was the difficulty in keeping track of and registering the newcomers. In November 1948, Israel had fifteen immigrant camps, with an intake capacity of 20,000 people. From November 8, the day of the general census, to November 23, 12,000 immigrants arrived in the country and were placed in these camps.42 Immigrants stayed in the camps for an average of about two months, during which time they went to work in the morning and returned to the camps in the evening. The registration of the immigrants was a mission of utmost importance for the Interior Ministry, and until new procedures were put in place by the Immigration Ministry, there was a sense of urgency as the registration mechanism was unable to bear the weight of the work load. It is important to note that without registration slips immigrants could not get food ration cards from the rationing officer. The suggestion was therefore made to register immigrants inside the camps themselves. An explicit order to this effect came out of the Main Office of the Food Controller for all the districts on November 9, 1948: “In light of the population census being conducted by the Interior Ministry, please note that the new food ration cards will be distributed to the residents only upon presentation of a registration slip. Any change of address must be notified immediately, and only after such notification will the food rationing card be given. New immigrants will also only be given their food rationing card after registration.”43 On November 14, 1948 Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum wrote to the Immigration Ministry and to the Consular Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to formalize the subject of immigrant registration. The

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proposal was based on two principles: (1) uniform and efficient registration by all government institutions dealing with the issues as well as the Jewish Agency; and (2) complete registration of the immigrants on embarkation at the coast, before their dispersal. The latter was of particular importance since many immigrants frequently changed their addresses. This made follow-up and registration almost impossible.44 In November 1948, immigrant registration was done separately abroad and in Israel. Immigrants registering abroad did so at the Israeli immigration offices and embassies, and in Israel registration was done at the Department of Population Registration of the Interior Ministry, and at the Immigration Ministry and the CBS. The most comprehensive data were collected about those who registered at the immigration offices and the Jewish Agency, as opposed to those who were sent a special permit from the Immigration Ministry (at the initiative of relatives), or affluent immigrants who did not go through the Immigration Ministry. The latter generally registered at Israeli consulates abroad, but on their arrival in the country they encountered problems with their registrations.45 To give two concrete examples of the problem of immigration registration: on December 5, 1948, the minister of police turned to the minister of the interior and to the CBS to request free access to the registration data of the immigrants, in particular in light of false data and name confusion, and the growing fear that the Eastern bloc was trying to infiltrate agents into the country.46 And on November 27, 1948, the Pardes Hannah local council wrote to the director of the registration department in the Interior Ministry: “It is impossible for the council to handle the registration issues in the immigrant camp, due to the massive movement of immigrants every week.”47 In their opinion, the best solution to the problem would be to appoint a permanent registration officer from the Interior Ministry to be stationed inside the camp. Following a comprehensive clarification of the issue between the Interior Ministry and the CBS, the parties came to several conclusions. The first was to consolidate as much as possible all registration measures taken by the various authorities and bodies with regard to the immigrant population. This consolidation would reduce the burden on the immigrants

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themselves and would also help optimize the work of the government ministries on this matter. It was also decided that the Immigration Ministry and the CBS would issue a uniform registration form that would include all of the necessary registration details. To prevent confusion, it was decided that the best place for registering the immigrants would be on board the ships as they made their way to Israel. On disembarkation, the Interior Ministry district registration officer (who was also the highest authority in the registration process and its authorization) would receive the list of immigrants, verify that the registration process was done properly (in particular checking passport photos), approve their entrance, and give them their registration slips and food-ration cards. The registration slip would also include instructions in different languages guiding the immigrants through the subsequent steps in the registration process in their localities, to obtain an identification card. On December 22, 1948, the Immigration Ministry notified the Interior Ministry that it had accepted its recommendation for the registration process of the immigrants. The head of the General Administration Section, Yaakov Kislov, published an official notification of this on January 4, 1949.48

F. The Effect of the War on the Implementation of the Recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav for the Interior Ministry A distinction should be made between the direct impact of the fighting on the routine operation of the ministry, and the ministry’s routine operation in general. The war’s impact can be understood by looking at the following issues: (1) The annexation of territories beyond those set forth in the Partition Plan created international legal problems that delayed the placement of the ministry’s representatives on the ground. It also brought with it an influx of a large Arab population that required substantial logistical attention with regard to registration, housing, food, and medicine. (2) The annexation generated tension between the military administration and the

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civil government over questions of jurisdiction. (3) The fighting damaged public buildings and government archives, which disrupted the original plans of Va’adat HaMatzav for the takeover of government and public buildings from the British, buildings that had now been destroyed by either the Arabs or by IDF forces. The damage to these structures created a severe shortage of office space and staff housing, while the damage to archives hindered the ability of the ministry’s clerks to begin their work. (4) the war also influenced staff recruitment and placement due to army recruitment or transfers to other government ministries. Problems in International Law: Western Galilee The Western Galilee (including Acre) was conquered during Operation Ben Ami by the Carmeli Brigade on May 14–15, 1948.49 The district government offices in Nahariya began operation on May 15. A preliminary meeting, held on May 14, took place between District Commissioner–elect Moshe Vandor and Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen. The city, which under the terms of the Partition agreement was not part of Israel’s territory, therefore had international status.50 Rosen instructed Vandor to continue in the role he held under the Mandate as district commissioner, but at the same time instructed him to limit his activity to preparatory work, due both to the ambiguous political situation and the sensitive international legal situation. Only in June 1948 did the Provisional Government decide to implement a network of emergency services in the Western Galilee, and on the eve of the first truce on June 9, 1948, Vandor was summoned to receive operative instructions from Government Secretary Zeev Sharf.51 The situation was particularly complicated, as all of the British district administrative offices were located in the Arab city of Acre. After meeting with some of the government ministers, Vandor received authorization to put a few departments, such as health and public works, into operation. Likewise, Dr. Mendelssohn, the supervisor of finances (formerly a consultant to the Financial Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav and representative of the Finance Ministry under Minister Eliezer Kaplan), authorized the

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district officer to be the representative of the Finance Ministry in the Western Galilee, a decision that gave Vandor authority to collect taxes. At the same time a police station was established in Nahariya, and a search began for an appropriate building for a courthouse, but again things were delayed pending clarification of the international status of the city. In July 1948, Vandor submitted a detailed report to the government on the particular problems of the district in light of this legal predicament, a report that led to a special government meeting in which it was decided to declare the Western Galilee under full Israeli military control.52 During August-September 1948 the administrative workload in the district grew and an emphasis was placed on strengthening ties between the District Administration and the local councils and bloc committees. Special attention was given to the still-populated Arab villages, in particular the village of Mizra, whose situation was deplorable. The district officer was accompanied on his visit there by Police and Minorities Minister Bechor Shitrit, though due to political uncertainty and lack of budget, the activities in the village focused on relieving unemployment by employing the inhabitants in public works projects and providing aid to ensure a basic standard of living: eradicating mosquitoes and providing basic commodities, medical assistance, blankets, and veterinary assistance.53 Problems with International Law: The Negev On December 20, 1947, a special Negev Committee was established to deal with the problems facing the Negev.54 David Ben-Gurion viewed the Negev as an inseparable part of the State of Israel and its preservation as a strategic goal of utmost importance, in particular in light of repeated attempts by the British to separate the Negev from the State of Israel to create territorial contiguity between the oil fields in western Iraq, through Jordan, and from there to the Negev, the Sinai, and the Suez Canal.55 The Negev Committee worked together with Va’adat HaMatzav until the latter’s submission of its final report in April 1948, after which members of the Negev Committee continued to represent the Negev before political and military bodies. Their

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influence waned considerably, however, after the invasion of the Egyptian army on May 15, when the military command took on the primary role. Among the members of the Negev Committee were Jewish National Fund representative Yosef Weitz; Levi Shkolnik (Eshkol), director of the Mekorot water company and representative of the Histadrut; Haim Gabati, representative of the agricultural lobby; Yosef Rochel, Haganah representative; Hillel Cohen, representative of Solel Boneh building company; and Yehuda Horin, representative of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department. Amiad Brezner notes that during the war, the Negev Committee focused on the budgeting of provisions for the Palmah and the settlements, and budgeting of equipment for regional defense (armoring of vehicles, fortifications, housing, maintenance, and fuel transport). The committee was also involved in the longer-term economic development of the settlements, as well as the establishment of small industry, paving of roads, and laying of water lines. The committee also functioned as a sort of local forum where many of the region’s issues were resolved. The main problem accompanying the committee’s work was the inevitable friction with the army as a result of its being a civil rather than a military body. Even so, it was Yigal Alon who emphasized the decisive contribution of the Negev Committee to the preservation of Jewish settlements in the region, including the great assistance it provided to the Negev Brigade in its darkest hours.56 Problems with International Law: Jerusalem The special international status of Jerusalem in the Partition Plan, and the sustained military campaign for the city and its environs, rendered it unique.57 On the eve of the British evacuation, there was much chaos in the offices of the District Administration in the city, in particular due to the division of most of the Mandatory departments into offices that were manned separately by Jewish, British, and Arab clerks. A clear-cut example of this is the request the British governor made to his Jewish district officer, to move his office to a separate apartment.58 With the termination of the Mandate, the work of the British District Administration ended, and after Shmuel Bachar Yeshaya assumed the role of new commissioner on behalf

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of the Interior Ministry on August 24, 1948, its operation was resumed in the western part of the city.59 Disputes between the Military Administration and the Civilian Administration One of the significant problems that arose during the establishment of the District Administration during the war touched on the need for clearly defined powers between the district commissioner (on behalf of the interior minister) and his counterpart, the military governor. It is also important to note that the validation of the Israeli government ministry’s authority in areas beyond the Partition Plan lines was tantamount to their annexation, resulting in numerous disagreements between military governors and government ministries. Nonetheless there were on the whole reasonable working relations between the two bodies, with much depending on the good will and personalities of the people involved. Following are two examples. The Western Galilee. On September 3, 1948, the Western Galilee was declared, along with all the other territories conquered up to that point in the war, to be “seized military territory,” and Israeli law was applied there.60 As a result, it was necessary to clearly define the division of authority between the military governor and Moshe Vandor, the district officer, to avoid conflicts. Despite anxiety over this matter, Vandor reported that after the appointment of the military governor in September 1948, relations between the two were proper. It was agreed that the military governor would not interfere in matters of the Jewish settlements in the district. The civilian district officer was asked to help the military government reactivate the services of the Acre Municipality, which had shut down during the conflict. This last was most important given the government decision to also allow Jews to settle in Acre, and from the end of October 1948 the Interior Ministry’s district officer participated in running the city. Likewise first steps were taken in recognizing the bloc committees as a regional council, and, in collaboration with the Military Administration, there was a drive

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to rid the area of malaria.61 On the eve of the first Knesset elections, the staff of the District Administration in Nahariya numbered four people: District Officer Michael Barkai, a head clerk, another clerk, and a cleaner.62 Jerusalem. More than in any other region in the country, in Jerusalem the relationship between the civilian governor of the district and the military governor was complex.63 On August 2, 1948, Dov Yosef was appointed military governor of the city, and in Order No. 2, his authorities were defined as follows: “Every authority given to the government ministers applies to the territory held by the Military Administration, which is appointed once every while by the defense minister. Every authority held according to the law of Israel on May 14, 1948, by the Jewish establishment, the high commissioner, the military commissioner, the Jerusalem district commissioner, and the heads of government departments and services, applies to the territory held by the military governor, on the condition that the military governor is entitled to transfer some or all of the above authorities as he sees fit.”64 To deal with the issues of rehabilitating the city, which had been hard hit during the conflict, Dov Yosef established an administrative system that was active on the ground before the representative of the district representative of the Interior Ministry assumed his position. The district officer was therefore compelled to ask for the transfer of powers from the military governor—no easy task. Only at the conclusion of a series of discussions with the legal advisor of the military governor did the sides reach an agreement with regard to those laws the district officer was allowed to implement on behalf of the military governor in the areas of trade and industry (opening of businesses) and press (censorship and publication of newspapers).

G. Damage to Public Structures and Archives and Its Impact on Effective Governance during the War Public structures and government archives that were not damaged in the districts or subdistricts, such as those in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tiberias, and

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Afula, enabled the District Administration and the central government to step immediately into action, while in the cities in which public buildings and archives were damaged, such as Safed and Jerusalem, the proper functioning of the District Administration and the rest of the government ministries was disrupted. These damages had a detrimental effect, as severe budget restrictions prevented the government from allocating money to build new structures or buy office equipment. These challenges were felt throughout the government ministries, and the ministry director general and commissioners scrambled to attain equipment in every way possible, even if it meant “dragging” it from other offices. A good example of this can be seen once the government ministries were installed in the Generali Building in central Jerusalem, and the complaint of the district officer that representatives of other government ministries simply took over rooms and equipment left behind by the British, leaving him to make do with a bare and insignificant room that had previously housed the League for the Prevention of Tuberculosis.65 These problems served to validate the work of Va’adat HaMatzav, which alongside the planning of the government system on the general level also made sure to prepare detailed lists of public structures and their contents. But we should remember that these plans were prepared for a peaceful evacuation under the auspices of the U.N., while the government ministries began operating while battles were still raging. It is also important to note that severe damage to government archives led to the loss of land registration documents, birth and death records, municipal and other tax records, and the like. For example, in Operation Broom to conquer Safed (May 5–11, 1948), all of the contents of the government building were destroyed, initially by the Arab armies, and later by Palmach flamethrowers, a fact that made it very difficult for the District Administration to resume public services once the fighting ended.66 With regard to the loss of district files during the evacuation and fighting, three examples are particularly illuminating: Jerusalem, Nahariya, and Afula. In Jerusalem the district officer complained about the loss of files from British and Arab offices, emphasizing that all of the data on the distribution

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of permits for the Jerusalem district had been located in the office of the Mandatory district clerk, an Arab. On the other hand, the files of the City Planning Committee were found, while the files of the trade unions were only partially recovered.67 In the district of Nahariya, during the period between August and September 1948, a feverish search was conducted in the offices of the governor in Acre, to locate the files of the Mandatory District Administration. Although the property tax registers were found, the estate books, which included the land registration documents containing all the information about ownership of land in the district, had disappeared. In an area such as the Western Galilee, densely populated with Arab villages, the estate books were of utmost importance when it came to formalizing land ownership and determining jurisdiction lines. Only after finding copies of the land registries in the district government offices in Haifa was it possible to reconstruct land and apartment ownership in the Nahariya district.68 In Afula, the district officer managed to save most of the property tax books from the offices of the Beit She’an sub-district, a fact that enabled the collection of rural and agricultural property taxes. Likewise, all of the material of the Mandatory Galilee district commissioner in Nazareth was found and transferred in its entirety to Afula.69

H. Staffing the Interior Ministry during the War The material and logistical problems that hindered the implementation of effective governance procedures had a similarly detrimental effect on staffing. While Va’adat HaMatzav had prepared detailed lists with recommendations for the staffing of positions both by former members of the Yishuv establishment and by staff members of the Mandatory government (both British and Arab Christians), the war forced changes to be made to these plans. The British and Arab clerks resigned immediately (most of the British officers did not wish to continue serving in the region and transferred to more lucrative posts, while the Arabs resigned or were rejected for security reasons), while the Jewish government system had to deal with

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the mobilization of many staff people to fight in the war and the transfer of staff people to other government ministries, all in contradiction to the original plans of Va’adat HaMatzav. Massive deployment led to the depletion of potential manpower reserves for the government ministries and necessitated reorganization and reprioritization with regard to the staffing of positions. Following are a few examples, from Tiberias, Safed, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. In Tiberias, which was captured on the night of April 16, 1948, two out of eight of the Jewish employees of the Mandate administration were mobilized, and one was remanded to the Finance Ministry. The District Administration in Safed had two Jewish clerks, one of whom was called up, though another clerk was sent immediately to replace him.70 On the eve of the termination of the British Mandate, the District Administration staff in Haifa numbered six British clerks, sixty-two Arab clerks, and twenty-seven Jewish clerks. On the morning of April 21, 1948, the British began the evacuation of their posts in the city, and the conquest of the city was completed by the Haganah the following day.71 On May 15, 1948, only Jewish workers came in to work at the District Administration offices in Haifa. Out of twenty-seven clerks, twelve were transferred to the Finance Ministry and were replaced by five new clerks. Despite these changes, and in comparison with other cities, Haifa did not suffer too much upheaval in the transition from the Mandatory system to the Israeli system, thanks both to the orderly British evacuation of the city and the existence of a strong and established Jewish civilian populace. The District Administration in the city quickly began to handle the issues covered by their predecessors, in particular the granting of building licenses by the City Planning Committee, and dealing with the nine local councils of the district. Weapons, explosives, and alcoholic beverage licenses were also issued.72 In the Tel Aviv rural district, most of the Jewish clerical rank remained intact. And yet, following the mobilization of seven of them to the army, two clerks and one tax collector were temporarily appointed. According to the arrangement with the Federation of Local Councils, the latter contributed 62 percent of the employment costs for clerks in the district.73 The

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situation was similar in the Tel Aviv urban district.74 In Jerusalem, the head of general administration in the Interior Ministry approved the employment of Jewish mandatory officials who had served in the Mandatory District Administration, but since the approval arrived only in October 1948, the work of the administration was delayed.75

I. Consolidation of the Interior Ministry during the War: Interim Summary To summarize the processes that the Interior Ministry went through during the war, the following should be emphasized: political negotiations for the establishment of the ministry were carried out with minimal fuss and opposition, as opposed to the situation with the Labor Ministry due to the complex relationship between Mapai and Mapam (more on this in the following chapter). Operatively and in terms of objectives, the structure of the ministry corresponded to most of the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, in particular with regard to the consolidation of interior affairs into a single government ministry, in contrast to the Mandate system, where these issues were dispersed among several ministries. Likewise, the ministry assumed control of all the issues designated in the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav: District Administration, population registry, local government, etc. Most of the Jewish administrative officers who had worked under the Mandate District Administration and were recommended by the committee eventually assumed high posts in the ministry and in the Israeli District Administration system. The main structural divergence from the plan of the Committee stemmed from the demands of Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum to place the police and the jails under a separate ministry, to avoid the trappings of a totalitarian state. Other divergences from the structure proposed in the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav were primarily due to the impact of the war, though the primary goals of the ministry were not changed. Divergences stood out particularly in the following fields:

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redrawing of some of the district borders, dealing with issues of international law (including the status of Arab territories and residents annexed to the Jewish state), redeployment of lower-level civilian staff due to military mobilization, finding alternative solutions for buildings, offices, and documents damaged in the war, and a clearer definition of the powers of the Ministry vis-à-vis other ministries, in particular in light of the lack of professional experience of most of the workers in the new Israeli governmental system.

Chapter 8

The Labor Ministry during the War of Independence (May 1948–January 1949)

A. Distinctive Issues of the Labor Ministry The functioning of the Labor Ministry during the war, like that of the Interior Ministry, needs to be examined from two vantage points: its authority and daily operation without regard for the war, and its performance in light of the constraints placed on it by the conflict. In contrast to the Interior Ministry, three factors make the situation of the Labor Ministry during this period unique. First, as part of its duties, the Labor Ministry was responsible for weighty financial subjects related to the regulation of the labor market, all the more so in light of the need to manage and redirect manpower during a wartime economy. It is important to note that during the period of the Provisional Government the Labor Ministry was controlled by the left-wing Mapam, a fact that brought into relief several ideological and political gaps between the ministry and Mapai, in particular on social and economic matters. Party politics was felt in many areas in the government, including, for example, Mapai’s refusal to incorporate Mapam members into senior positions in the Foreign or the Defense Ministries, and in the debate about the principle of creating a national master plan. The basic question discussed in this chapter is, to what extent did the structure and operation of the ministry correspond to the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, and to what extent did the war and the complex relations with Mapai dictate changes to its planned structure and goals? It is important to add, however, that the gap between the planning phase and that of the 145

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implementation phase of the Labor Ministry’s operations does not necessarily imply bad results once the system began to function.

B. Structure of the Labor Ministry during the Provisional Government as Reflected in the Final Report of Va’adat HaMatzav As we recall, responsibility for the planning of the Labor Ministry was placed on Subcommittee C of Va’adat HaMatzav, under Yitzhak Gruenbaum. Gruenbaum was assisted by Zvi Berenzon of the Jewish Agency’s Labor Department, and Levi Schneider, a senior Jewish staff member in the Department of Labor of the British Mandate. The role of the Labor Ministry, as defined by Va’adat HaMatzav, was primarily regulatory and judicial in nature, and in that sense it was modeled on its forerunner, established in 1942. The primary role of the ministry, as understood by the members of the Committee, was to enforce labor laws and regulate the labor market through the local labor exchanges. However, due to the politically ambiguous situation in the pre-state Jewish establishment, in which responsibility for labor issues was dispersed among many different bodies, it was decided that the relevant departments in the Jewish Agency (Technical Section for Public Works, labor relations, training and instruction, inspection of labor exchanges, and immigrant absorption) would constitute the structural core of the Labor Ministry, excluding immigration absorption, which would remain under the auspices of the Jewish Agency. According to the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, the ministry was to have five branches: general administration, labor relations, the beginnings of an Employment Section, inspection, and research and statistics. During the period of the Provisional Government, it was decided to annex the Town Planning Department, the Surveyor’s Office, and the Department for Public Works to the Labor Ministry as well, the final designation of these two departments not having been decided upon in the discussions of Va’adat HaMatzav.

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Below is the structure of the Labor Ministry as it came together under the Provisional Government during the war: Main Office (general administration), Labor Division, Manpower Division, Planning Division, Department for Public Works, Building Inspection Department, and the beginnings of a national insurance mechanism (eventually becoming the National Insurance Institute). The task of the Labor Division was to implement the laws of the Labor Department of the British Mandate that had been converted into orders under Administrative and Legal Ordinance no. 1-5708/1948. These laws included the Department of Labor Ordinance 1943, the Employment of Children and Young Persons Ordinance-1945, Employment of Women Ordinance-1945, the Trades Board Ordinance-1945, Factories Ordinance-1946, the Trades Union Ordinance-1947, the Workers Compensation Ordinance-1947, and the Accidents and Occupational Diseases (Notification) Ordinance-1945.1 The Labor Division also had two subdepartments: inspection and supervision, and research. The Inspection and Supervision Department was in charge of overseeing the implementation of labor laws, with an emphasis on preventing the exploitation of women, youth, and children, as well as ensuring the security and health of workers. The Research Department was responsible for collecting data on the Israeli labor market, while also conducting its own economic and sociological studies. Aside from these, the division had six smaller professional sections: the Labor Exchange Section, which oversaw the government labor exchanges; the Employment Section, which initiated work opportunities and thus worked closely with the Department for Public Works and local councils; the Section for the Treatment of the Arab Worker; the Section for Workers’ Housing; the Youth Section; the Trade Union Section; and the Section for New Immigrants Professional Training. The Manpower Division, which was also responsible for employment issues, consisted of three departments and one section: a Mobilization of Manpower Department (primarily for fortification and harvest work); a Special Department for Restraints and Releases, which worked in full coordination with the Defense Ministry and whose responsibilities included assessing the

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essentialness of factories that asked to prevent their workers from being mobilized to the front; a Census Department, which collected demographic data on the professional sector according to the day-to-day needs of the market, and the Female Workers’ Section, which was involved in hiring professional women. The Planning Division was intended to focus on long-term development planning for the country, while the Building Inspection Department was to direct building trends. The Department for Public Works was in charge of the maintenance of the roads and government public buildings. But the Labor Ministry’s actual functioning during the period of the Provisional Government, because of both party politics and changes to its goals due to the war, requires a different sort of discussion than the one on the Interior Ministry. Despite the war, the Interior Ministry was able to fulfill the majority of the goals set for it by Va’adat HaMatzav, but with the Labor Ministry the case was different.

C. The Political Context of the Establishment of the Labor Ministry Before delving into the ministry’s operations during the war, it is worth pointing out a few issues regarding internal political alignments. The question of which party would control the Labor Ministry was discussed in complex political negotiations between Mapai and Mapam. Mapam was officially established on January 24, 1948. Researcher Eli Tzur notes that Mapam was comprised of five social movements grouped under two parties: HaShomer HaTzair, which included members of HaKibbutz Ha’artzi (the National Kibbutz movement) and members of its urban branches; and Achdut HaAvoda (the Labor Union), which included most of the members of HaKibbutz HaMeuhad (the United Kibbutz movement) and the urban branches that had emerged from Faction B. The dominant body in the Shomer HaTzair party was the National Kibbutz movement, while the Labor Union was more of a confederation, with three components, though the chairmanship of the party was reserved for the heads of the Kibbutz HaMeuhad.2

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In March 1948, Mapam established an administration committee, under Hans Rubin. Its responsibilities included selecting party nominees for positions in the government-to-be, in coordination with the party heads: “There is, in our view, an urgent need for the Central Secretariat, in its upcoming meeting, along with our members in the directorate of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and Minhelet Ha’Am, to discuss the question of how to insert our members into the upper echelons of the government system, and to that end also release them from other roles.”3 The concrete negotiations between Mapam and Mapai took place between May and June 1948, with Mapam represented by Yisrael Barzilai and Yitzhak Ben Aharon.4 From the start of negotiations, the Mapam representatives demanded the incorporation of the party’s members in senior positions in the Foreign and Defense Ministries, a demand that Sharet and Ben-Gurion rejected outright due to Mapam’s pro-Soviet leanings. The climax of the conflict between Mapam and Mapai was on the issue of security— with Mapam’s demand to appoint Yisrael Galili, the head of the Haganah National Headquarters, as defense minister, and David Ben-Gurion’s dramatic decision to dissolve the Palmach headquarters in November 1948. Ben-Gurion’s primary concern about incorporating Mapam members in the defense system (including the promotion of Palmach members within the IDF ranks) stemmed from the former’s pro-Marxist orientation, and a deep fear of politicization within the military ranks, which could be detrimental to loyalty to the political echelon.5 When Mapam saw that the battle for the Foreign and Defense Ministries was lost, it turned its efforts to attaining the Ministries of Interior or Justice, which they preferred over the labor or education portfolios. In a discussion in the Mapam Party Bureau before the World Zionist Executive assembly in April 1948, it is apparent that two high-ranking Mapam members, Mordechai Ben-Tov6 (later the first Minister of Labor), and Berl Repetur, were opposed to taking the labor portfolio and preferred either interior, justice, or agriculture.7 The fear of accepting the labor portfolio stemmed primarily from the convoluted political structure of the pre-state Jewish economy, and particularly the power relations between the Histadrut Labor

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Federation and the rest of the market, and above all the ideological conflict with Mapai. Repetur, in that same discussion: Among all of the possible options should the government come to be [ . . . ] I believe that with regard to [the] labor and public works [portfolios] there will be many dangers and difficulties, with regards to the Histadrut, the Histadrut market and the trade unions. Under the present circumstances, we must not be co-opted and become the executors of the ideology of the workers’ movements against our own class interests. Therefore, I reject the option of the labor portfolio. And with regard to the interior, we will face difficulties and dangers. But in terms of the chance, the value, the stance, and its ties to [the] defense [portfolio], I suggest that, should we participate, we insist upon two portfolios: interior and agriculture. If they offer the interior, I will not condition it on the agriculture portfolio.8 To Ben-Tov’s credit, he foresaw the problematic nature of accepting the labor, agriculture, or education ministries. He preferred interior and justice: Of all the many portfolios, there are two that we must by no means accept: labor and public works, and education. In every portfolio there will be political differences of opinion. In each we will encounter difficulties. In labor, it is to realize the compulsory arbitration in the land of Israel. There is no greater likelihood of us having to conform as in the labor portfolio. The same can be said for education. There will be pressure for uniform education, and we will have to press for a policy that is at base oppositional. We must strive for a portfolio where we can influence internal economic matters. I am skeptical about being offered the interior portfolio. If they do not give it, then let it be the justice portfolio. A second portfolio: economic. Transportation and public works are

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preferable to agriculture. In agriculture they can place obstacles, withhold budgets. We have power in agriculture and in public works. Yes to transportation, general services, administration and services. I propose: interior or justice, and one of the three financial portfolios: public works, transportation, and agriculture.9 The political negotiations with Mapai ended with Mapam accepting the labor and agriculture portfolios. Many problems indeed arose in the operation of the two ministries, on both the ideological and professional-functional levels (which will be elaborated upon later). Mordechai Ben-Tov, a member of the National Kibbutz movement and of Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'Emek, was appointed minister of labor on May 15, 1948. Aharon Zisling,10 a member of the United Kibbutz movement and of Kibbutz Ein Harod, was appointed minister of agriculture. Because of their failure to be placed in what they considered to be the more “prestigious” government ministries, the members of the party’s Administration Committee turned their focus on manning positions in the Labor and Agriculture Ministries. On May 23, 1948, their Administration Committee examined a long list of candidates for positions in the Labor Ministry,11 and for managerial and lower clerical positions. Most of the senior-level managers came from the kibbutz sector, while the lower clerical ranks were filled for the most part by the urban sector of the party.12

D. The Establishment Stage: Specific Problems during the War Much like the interior minister, whose ministry was directly influenced by the war (for example, the expansion of district boundaries due to annexation of new territories brought under his jurisdiction an entire Arab population beyond the original boundaries set down by Va’adat HaMatzav as determined by the Partition Plan), so too did the new labor minister have to organize his ministry in light of wartime developments. However, it appears

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that the divergence from the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav was even greater in the case of the Labor Ministry. According to Va’adat HaMatzav’s recommendations, the mandate of the Labor Ministry was to enforce labor laws and regulate the civilian work force. After May 15, 1948, however, the ministry was given a new task, which had scarcely been a focus of Va’adat HaMatzav—namely, the regulation and rotation of civilian manpower in the wartime economy. To what extent, then, did the war force the founders of the ministry to diverge from the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav and focus on issues that are not characteristically its mission during times of peace? Although the structure of the ministry proposed by Va’adat HaMatzav remained intact, significant changes were made to the responsibilities of the various departments. To understand these changes we must analyze the unique ramifications of the war as it affected the Labor Ministry: (1) locating and mobilizing manpower for the wartime economy, and regulating it according to special needs as they arose; (2) establishing a nationwide policy for regulating raw materials and production, and the influence of this policy on the various industrial sectors and on the labor market; and (3) maintaining essential infrastructure during the war through the Department for Public Works. As previously noted, one of the main roles designated by Va’adat HaMatzav for the Labor Ministry was the regulation of the labor market, and when it began operating, its Labor Division was charged with supervision of the Histadrut Labor Exchanges that had been established by the Jewish Agency and the workers’ associations. However, due to the war, the main office of the Labor Ministry had to take charge of this network, to mobilize manpower for the war and maintain the industries deemed most essential for the war effort. Locating, Mobilizing, and Regulating Manpower for the Wartime Economy There was some apprehension in the Manpower Department in the Labor Ministry as to the fledgling state’s ability to exert its authority and fully

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exploit the manpower potential at its disposal. Three main problems presented themselves: (1) how to map the potential workforce that had not been mobilized to the front; (2) how to regulate between a civilian workforce earmarked for the war effort, such as fortifications and weapons production, and those intended for the civilian factories; and (3) how to upgrade the nationwide production plan according to the priorities of a wartime economy. The centralist, executive planning approach reflected in all of these activities stemmed from the needs of the war as well as from the dominant ideological and political approach that viewed national planning as an important value (on which I will elaborate later). Aware of the full weight of responsibility placed upon his ministry, the labor minister emphasized the following: “I have been tasked with organizing and mobilizing the workforce across the country for the great and essential effort: ensuring the victory of the IDF over the invading enemy, and ensuring the building and development of the country for its residents, and for the droves of immigrants whom we have called to join us.”13 To locate and map out available manpower for the required professions, the labor minister used data collected by Va’adat HaMatzav, and exercised the powers given him to pass emergency legislation. Following is an example of a regional order published on June 25, 1948: By the powers vested in me according to Regulation 3(a) of the Emergency Regulations for the Mobilization of Manpower 57081948, I, the General Supervisor of Manpower by virtue of my appointment by the Minister of Labor and Construction and the authorities vested in me, hereby order: all men born between the years 1898 and 1932 and all unmarried women born between 1913 and 1930, who reside in one of the following settlements: Nahalat Yehuda, Rishon Letzion, Nes Tziona, Rehovot, and any other settlement south of Nahalat Yehuda, or who during the period of this Order spend more than three days within one of these settlements, and who have not been fully mobilized for the defense of Israel or the state police, are called upon to join the workforce.14

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Every civilian mobilized according to an order of this type was exempted from military service and was eligible for financial aid from his or her employer. At the same time the Labor Relations Division began to consolidate nationwide plans for routing manpower based on data collected in the National Service Census. The goal was to employ all men between the ages of sixteen and forty-four and all women between the ages of sixteen and fifty who had not been drafted into the defense service. As Minister Ben-Tov reported to the Prime Minister’s Office: “By the powers vested in the Minister of Labor to legislate laws and pass emergency regulations, preparations are already being made for the creation of a mechanism to implement the groundwork done by the Center for the National Service Census, and that will henceforth include, besides the concern first and foremost for equipping those on the front, concern for the creation and expansion of food production, provision of public services, and provision of housing for those who have none.”15 To this end, the Labor Ministry established an advisory and executive body comprised of public representatives. This body focused on the processing of regulations about work conditions, employment, retirement and dismissals, and commitment of labor to factories that were defined as essential. Likewise, they began to organize training courses in various fields: “Their aim is to meet the urgent need for professionals in certain industries, which will also be an impetus for change in the lifestyles of thousands of men, women, and youth, helping them make the transition from a life of dependence to a productive life in essential, productive, and constructive factories. The urgent role of the Manpower Division will be to ensure and provide the necessary workers for the military industry.”16 One of the most notable fields provided for under the auspices of the ministry’s manpower authority, whose role was to prioritize manpower according to the needs of the war, was fortressing. On June 22, 1948, decisions were made about providing financial assistance to sectors that had suffered heavy losses as a result of the conflict.17 To help them build a network of fortressing works, it was decided to discontinue all civilian construction works in the cities and rural townships, and to redirect all of

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the construction workers to fortressing projects. All construction workers between the ages of thirty-five and forty who participated in the fortressing works received a certificate from the Solel Boneh construction company, exempting them from mobilization to the front until the completion of the projects. A special commission on behalf of the fortressing authority, including a representative from the regional command, determined the deployment of workers to the subdistricts according to military needs.18 This policy resulted in an almost complete freeze in civilian construction, making things particularly difficult for those attempting to provide housing for the waves of new immigrants. Another decision was made to mobilize sixteen-year-olds to help in agricultural work on struggling farmsteads, and quotas for the recruitment of these workers were based on economic needs. During the war, 50,000 workdays were invested in fortressing, while 1,000 workers were simultaneously mobilized for harvesting in the citrus groves of the Sharon region, 400 new immigrants were sent to do agricultural work, and 300 teachers were mobilized to teach new immigrants in the camps. During the summer of 1948, manpower was channeled as well into completing the grape, olive, and grain harvests around the country.19 Three problems related to labor and the deployment of manpower were left unresolved until after the war, despite the fact that early on they were identified as serious issues: future employment of people removed from the regular workforce due to the war effort (whether mobilized to the front or to essential factories); the integration of war veterans into the labor market after their release; and the integration of new immigrants who had been mobilized into the labor force at the end of the war. The Need to Prioritize National Production during the War Economists Nahum Gross and Yitzhak Greenberg emphasized that the War of Independence demanded from the new country a heavy price, in terms of both resources and human life. Adding to this was mass immigration, which in three short years more than doubled the Jewish population of the country, and it is clear that the economic problems facing the

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fledgling government were difficult and highly complex. It was therefore only natural that under these circumstances the government enforced an austerity regime with a wartime economy orientation, based on the British economic model enacted during WWII. During this period Britain, like many other countries, implemented a policy of strong government intervention in the economy. Despite the gradual transition to peacetime, this policy of government intervention remained in place even after the war ended. It is important to recall that in those years there was a lot of sympathy in the world for planned-economy models characterized by strong government intervention, whether to ensure financial stability and employment in the industrial countries, or to assist in the development of weaker countries. Gross and Greenberg emphasize that the legacy of the Mandate war economy and the economic and political worldviews prevalent at the time in the world to a large extent accorded well with the political culture of the Israeli leadership. Apart from the fact that the majority of the government’s members were socialist, there were also those who supported in one way or another economic statism. In its first fiscal year (during the war), Israel’s defense expenditures constituted some 40 percent of the gross national product. One of the characteristic problems of a wartime economy is the need to set out a national policy capable of balancing the needs of the military and those of the civilian home front, in terms of both raw materials and of workers. An example of this kind of issue arose in the textile industry, revolving around two questions: how much fabric should be allocated to the army at the expense of the civilian sector (with the national supply standing at two million yards and the army demanding one million), and how many workers were needed by the army to supply the required amount?20 The textile industry is just one of many examples, and the Labor Ministry was able to provide data and explain to the other government ministries the implications of a given policy relating to the national labor market (for example, the repercussions for the textile industry should the government meet the army’s demands), but it could not solve these problems on its own, and needed the cooperation of other government ministries, such as the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the

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Agriculture Ministry, and the Histadrut. To understand the complexity of the issue on a broader level, let us look at the factories and workshops. In the framework of its responsibility for enforcing labor laws, the Labor Ministry inspected over 500 factories around the country. Due to the war, it was also given authority to determine which factories would be expanded, which reduced, and which closed, according to the demands of the war effort. Minister of Labor Ben-Tov proposed a four-level rating system for the factories: Level 1. Factories and workshops whose production went directly to the war effort. These required maximum expansion and allocation of manpower. Level 2. Factories that were to be maintained at the most minimum level possible. For example: factories for the production of baby carriages. Workers at these type of factories who were eligible for military service were to be transferred to the front, but it was possible to leave a minimum workforce of workers exempt from the military. Level 3. Factories whose importance for the war effort was not high but, to avoid their complete collapse, a small core of draft-exempt workers could remain there. Level 4. The rest of the factories and workshops (which did not fit in to any of the above-mentioned categories), which were likely to close unless they could be manned exclusively by workers who were exempt from military service. In any case, the supply of raw materials and electricity would continue even to those factories defined as nonessential for the war effort.21 The temporary head of the Manpower Division in the Labor Ministry was Yitzhak Finkelstein, who was also in charge of employment. In addition to the department that mobilized construction workers for fortressing works, the division operated a special Department for Restraints and Releases to assess how essential to the war effort were the factories

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and workshops that requested that their workers not be mobilized or transferred. Here, the Restraints and Releases Department cooperated with the Defense Ministry. Another department in the division conducted censuses and polls according to the routine needs of the market and the demand for special professions. The Female Workers’ Section of the department was involved in mobilizing professional women workers and the recruitment of older women (who had not been part of the workforce) to substitute for young women workers who had been sent to the Front.22 Maintenance of Essential Infrastructure during the War: The Department for Public Works In the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav, the technical department of the Jewish Agency was supposed to absorb the Mandate Department for Public Works, with the amalgamated department operating as the Department for Public Works in the Labor Ministry. During peacetime, the department was responsible for the routine maintenance of roads, government buildings, and water and sewerage works. The heavy damage caused to this infrastructure by the war only augmented the urgency of putting this system into operation immediately. The highest priority was to enable unhindered mobility on the roads, for the logistical needs of both the war and the civilian home front. With the end of the Mandate, Israel was responsible for some 2,600 km of roads, as opposed to the 1,100 kilometers of roads it was supposed to have, according to the Partition Plan. Minister of Labor Ben-Tov emphasized the urgency of the matter: “At the top of our list of problems we have put the problem of maintaining the roads that are of the utmost importance by any criteria but above all in terms of the war effort. We are doing everything we can to give the needed service and have already begun making essential repairs on several roads in the Galilee, in the [Jezreel] Valley, in the Haifa district, and in the south. We have managed to secure a substantial amount of asphalt, without which we would not be able to provide this service.”23

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Concurrent to this began the renovation of government buildings, primarily fortressing works and erecting defenses against aerial attacks. During the war, the Department (later a division) of Public Works was structured as follows: at the top of the hierarchy was the main office, and under it four district offices, divided geographically: Haifa, Galilee, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. The main office also included sections for construction, roads, bridges, architecture, and electricity. Three Mandate offices also came under the Public Works Authority: Public Works, the Surveyor’s Office, and the Office of the Advisor on City Planning. The authority was also responsible for the central housing network of the government ministries and for importing construction material and equipment for public works, including prefabricated houses. Due to the great demand for its services, the Public Works Department went right into action immediately after the establishment of the state, as Ben-Tov’s report on the general operation of the ministry in its first days indicates: “I would like to note that our offices were open and all of our workers were in place on May 16, 1948. There was an address and there was someone to turn to. Difficulties became apparent with regard to the release of money, meaning the work itself. But here, too, we overcame the initial challenges, and approximately on May 20, 1948, we began implementation, in particular in the Department for Public Works.”24 Head of the Department of Public Works during the war was Yaakov Reiser,25 formerly the head of the Jewish Agency Technical Department. As we recall, it was Reiser who had been asked to present the program for the establishment of a Department for Public Works to Subcommittee B of Va’adat HaMatzav, and the program was accepted on January 12, 1948.26 Reiser, however, encountered difficulties as early as the initial establishment stages. In Mordechai Ben-Tov’s letter to the Minister of Labor on June 6, 1948, he mentions three main problems: (1) all of the professional department heads in the Mandatory period were British, (2) all of the workers of the main office were Arab residents of Jerusalem, and (3) difficulty in locating adequately skilled Jewish professionals.27 As already discussed, most of the British staff preferred to be transferred to other posts in the British Empire, where they could serve under

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better conditions than Israel could provide, while the integration of Arab workers was ruled out for a combination of two reasons: the Arab workers did not want to continue in their positions and left of their own will, and government policy that made the integration of Arab workers into government ministries difficult. The Jaffa Surveyor’s Office, for example, had to bring in twenty-five Jewish workers, following the departure of all of the Arab workers from the office.28 As for the staff of the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency, since most of them lived in Jerusalem, problems arose due to the siege and the blockade on the roads leading in and out of the city. Reiser was therefore forced to utilize Jewish workers from Tel Aviv. According to Reiser, the situation was far from satisfactory: “I cannot say that the core of workers gathered thus far is efficient or enables adequate organization and inspection of the work.”29 Nor was Reiser satisfied from the level of the Jewish staff, first and foremost his deputy, Mordechai Stern, formerly head of the Tel Aviv District Jewish Agency Technical Department. Stern did not, in Reiser’s opinion, meet the professional requirements of the job: “With all of Mr. Stern’s positive attributes, and my appreciation of his immense help and the efficiency he has demonstrated and will certainly continue to demonstrate in the coming months, he is not the man to manage this department, and we must appoint forthwith, even if only temporarily, a department head.”30 In terms of senior staff members, Reiser emphasized the lack of engineers, in particular a chief electrical engineer and mechanical engineer, as well as district engineers, although he was skeptical about finding sufficiently skilled engineers from the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency: “It seems to me that the appropriate thing would be to appoint workers from the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency for the positions of mechanical engineers, if we can find suitable candidates from this group.”31 As for the position of the advisor for city planning, Reiser states that there was no suitable Jewish candidate for the position. The problem of the quality of the Jewish staff was not new; it had been frequently raised in the discussions of Va’adat HaMatzav, with regard to most of the ministries.

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Va’adat HaMatzav had discussed the potential integration of qualified professionals from among the British or Arab (in particular Christian) staff into the ministries’ ranks. But the outbreak of the war obviated this possibility, and they had no choice but to compromise on the level of professionalism by making use of the available local Jewish candidates.

E. The Struggle between Mapai and Mapam over Centralized Planning, and Yaakov Reiser’s Dismissal Upon the establishment of the Provisional Government, a planning division was founded under the Labor Ministry, headed by architect Arye Sharon.32 Ben-Tov’s advisor on national planning was Israel Feinmesser.33 Joining the senior staff of this division were Zvi Hashimshoni, who came in as Sharon’s deputy; Heinz Rau, director for routine planning, who was appointed director of centralized planning initiatives; and Eliezer Brutzkus, who was appointed director of research and censuses. According to geographer Shalom Reichman: “The staff was a combination of people with planning experience from the local Jewish authorities, and some of the leading architects from private firms of the period. Conspicuously absent from the division, however, were experienced veteran professionals who had worked in the field for the national institutions.”34 Perhaps the absence of veteran planners from the Yishuv establishment testifies to an attempt to integrate professionals, on the one hand, and the desire to incorporate Mapam members on the other hand, in light of the dispute with Mapai over the question of national planning. In effect, what we have here is an extension of the common practice in the Yishuv establishment of inserting “our people” (people from the same political persuasion), although it is significant that all of them were professionals in the field. During the period of Mapam’s control of the Labor Ministry, a centralist management approach was established, according with the policy of Ben-Tov, Feinmesser, and Ziesling (all Mapam members, of course). They viewed the Planning Division as a new authority with a centralist

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approach to national planning that would work in close cooperation with the executive and inspection divisions under a single government ministry. Reichman notes that their main emphasis was on the drafting of a “centralized physical plan initiative.” This approach accorded with widely held opinions among professionals from the pre-state period. Those who supported national planning (including Mapam) wanted Arye Sharon to head the Planning Division, since they believed he would be most capable of mobilizing the best professionals in the field and advancing their approach.35 Mapai members such as Levi Eshkol (then head of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department) and Yaakov Reiser were of a different opinion; they viewed the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency (mostly staffed by Mapai) as the natural and preferable location for the implementation of a national master plan, along with the expansion of the system according to developments on the ground. Mapai asked to merge the Jewish Agency department into the new governmental ministries, thereby ensuring the professional continuity of “our people” from the Yishuv period, as happened in the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, which later became the Foreign Ministry.36 Mapam wanted Arye Sharon to head the planning division, while Mapai wanted Yaakov Reiser to head the division, taking his staff from the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency with him to the new division. The differences between Mapai and Mapam were immediately felt in the Labor Ministry, in the unpleasant relationship that developed between Ben-Tov and Reiser, ultimately leading to Reiser’s dismissal. At the beginning of June 1948, Reiser submitted to Ben-Tov a proposal for the efficient integration of the three Mandate departments (Public Works, Town Planning, and the Surveyor’s Office) into the Labor Ministry, which he himself was meant to oversee, including the appointment of staff. However on June 22, 1948 Reiser sent a letter to David Ben-Gurion, in which he did not mince words about Ben-Tov’s behavior: Unfortunately, by late May of this year [1948], I could already sense some hesitation on the part of Mr. Ben-Tov, which, I am

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certain, led to a delay in taking organizational action. Therefore, on May 27, I explained to him, clearly and unequivocally, that my work at the ministry would be contingent on my being given direct supervision of the three departments, namely, the Department for Public Works, the Surveyor’s Office, and the Town Planning Department. The insufficient support of the Ministry of Labor and Construction was reflected in particular with regards to staff appointments, even though without these appointments, it is impossible to organize the main offices, and I fear there will be a slow-down in the work of the Department for Public Works.37 Reiser tried to implement Mapai’s policy by structuring the department around staff from the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency, and expanding the administrative structure to include the three Mandatory departments. Ben-Tov, on the other hand, decided to split the department into two: one, incorporating the Department for Public Works and the Surveyor’s Office, and the second, a separate unit for Town Planning, which would be annexed into the Planning Division. However, besides a theoretical argument about the question of centralized planning and the functional structure of the ministry, each side tried to insert “its people.” Reiser writes: “At any rate, it is clear that there is no point in my working in a ministry whose management is organized on a covert commissary basis, and it seems to me that this is the case at hand. It is clear to me that Mr. Ben-Tov will act according to advice received from his private office, and this is unacceptable.”38 Toward the end of his letter, Reiser asked Ben-Gurion to relieve him of his position, submitting his letter of resignation to the minister on June 30, 1948.39 The dispute between Reiser and Ben- Tov can be summed up as an ideological, political, and personal dispute. To Reiser’s credit, we should note that his professional critique of the Department for Public Works corresponded to that of Ben-Tov’s advisor, Mapam member Israel Feinmesser, who wrote to Ben-Tov in August 1948:

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In this [Public Works] Authority routine currently prevails. Clarifications about methods and paths with the heads of the Authority are for now wishful thinking. No fundamental change from the habits of the Mandate, with all their shortcomings, has been carried out, and it is doubtful if they can be carried out in the present situation without an infusion of new blood at the senior levels, down through the departments, and to the foremen and supervisors. The head of the authority has yet to take control of it, and in the current situation, power and daring will not suffice to change anything.40 Implicit in Feinmesser’s words is also a criticism of Reiser, with regard to the continued integration of members of the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency into the Department for Public Works, and the lack of new blood in the department—from the top ranks down to the work supervisors. To summarize the main points of the dispute between Mapam and Mapai about the question of centralized planning during the war, it is important to highlight the following: according to the worldview of Ben-Tov and his staff, the planning policy of the planning division was to be done in two spheres: a planning sphere, namely, the Planning Division, and the implementation sphere, namely, the Department for Public Works. Reiser viewed the Department for Public Works as an autonomous unit within the Labor Ministry and subordinate exclusively to him, while Ben-Tov and his staff saw it as the implementer of the policy of the Planning Division and ministry leadership, and not an extension of Mapai’s policy via Reiser. Stemming from the holistic view that saw planning as an interdisciplinary activity and an interministerial responsibility, it was proposed to establish a national planning council headed by a ministerial committee that would guide the economic and physical planning for the State of Israel. Ben-Tov’s centralist policy was not realized during the ten months of the Provisional Government, because of both the dispute with Mapai and the constraints of the war. After the establishment of the first elected government in March 1949, as a result of which Mapam was left out of

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the new government, the Labor Ministry was placed under Mapai, changing its goals and structure. As we will see in the third section of this study, lacking a clear consensus on its mission, the Planning Division would continue to wander between different government ministries. Just how difficult the task of establishing a national planning division was can be seen in a critical report submitted by Israel Feinmesser, which emphasizes, among other things, the political complexities, including the ideological differences between Mapai and Mapam: National planning is a tedious, drawn-out activity that places a strain on the country’s financial, physical, political, military, and economic resources. A clear political policy is a necessity here. In effect, in this department what stands out is the fact of a collection and compilation of different social types, without a director to unite and merge them into one organic whole with shared socialist ideas and policies and a single backbone. It should be noted that many dangers and intrigues loom for this department. Any kind of national planning must be socialist, or at the very least very progressive in the field of agrarian reform, land, incometax, nationalization policy, etc. These things will not be easily regulated in a capitalist regime. Added to that are architects such as Klein and Kaufman, who do their best to undermine things, and they have supporters, and on the other hand, Ben-Sira, who is working on national planning from the Tel Aviv Municipality and can do a lot of harm. And then there is Reiser’s role, as you know. He covers or will cover for everyone once the first hint of criticism appears from the direction of Mapai.41

F. First Signs of Routine in the Ministry’s Activities – Housing The Provisional Government was concerned with the housing problem even during the war, particularly because of the large waves of immigration.

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However, only at the end of the war did work on a massive scale actually begin. Debora HaCohen notes in her study that the severe housing shortage was a main factor in the deteriorating situation of the immigrants. The discrepancy between the forecasts as to the number of immigrants and the actual numbers that arrived were large: the government had estimated that 100,000 immigrants would arrive in the first year (May 1948 to March 1949), whereas the actual number of immigrants reached 200,000.42 By late 1950, about 100,000 immigrants were cramped together in the immigrant absorption camps, which had been built hastily and without too much planning. It was essential to find permanent housing solutions for the immigrants, because of health and hygiene issues resulting from poor living conditions, as well as the heavy financial cost to the government and the Jewish Agency of maintaining the camps. HaCohen notes that according to the Finance Ministry’s calculations in 1948, about 55 million Israeli lira would be needed to house the 250,000 immigrants. The entire government budget for 1948/49 was 7.8 million lira (not including defense expenditures). As it was impossible to raise these funds in such a short period, thousands of immigrants crowded into tents, canvas huts, and tin shacks. As the pressure for finding a housing solution grew, so did the number of temporary solutions, which only made the situation worse. After the establishment of the Provisional Government, the Housing Office of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency was charged with dealing with the housing issue, but it soon became clear that it was well beyond its capabilities. The government decided to involve the Labor Ministry. On August 31, 1948, Minister of Labor Mordechai Ben-Tov summoned the representatives of all the housing corporations active in the country at the time, along with the senior staff of his ministry,43 for a comprehensive discussion on the housing issue. The public companies participating in the discussion were: Shikun, HaHevra Le’Shikun ‘Amami, Solel Boneh, Rassco, Bonei Haifa, and the Mishkenot Corporation of HaPo’el HaMizrahi. The private corporations represented were the Gav Yam Bayside Land Corporation Ltd., the Hevra Lim’onot B’eretz Yisrael, and HaDirah HaHeskhonit.

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(It should be noted that apart from the private companies, all the public companies were affiliated politically, a fact that complicated the fate of those “potential residents” who lacked an affiliation with one or the other of these organizations.) Representing the Labor Ministry at the meeting were Minister Ben-Tov; his national planning advisor, Israel Feinmesser; Arye Sharon, head of the Section for Central Planning Initiatives; David Svardlov, head of the Labor Division,44 and Yisrael Biletzky (who replaced Finkelstein), the head of the Manpower and Employment Section. After the war the severe housing shortage struck two populations in particular—new immigrants and war veterans, who were defined as economically problematic, especially in terms of employment. The housing boom, according to Ben-Tov, would solve both problems in a single stroke: “The problem of the war veterans will also be primarily one of employment, although there will also be serious housing issues there. For the immigrants, as well, housing will be the country’s cardinal problem. Our ministry is interested in the housing problem for several reasons: we are interested in it first of all from the point of view of employment; if the amount of construction should grow or be given a push, it will, within its first year or two, serve as a highly important source of integration.”45 It is also important to mention that the housing issue was dealt with simultaneously by several different bodies, and coordination between them, as in many other fields of government, was crucial. This was particularly relevant for sectors that had no defined organization dealing with their housing issues. The underlying problems that concerned the staff of the Labor Ministry as they came to formulate a housing policy were (1) Estimating the number of immigrants. In August 1948, the estimate was about a quarter of a million new immigrants over the coming two years, but the number was ultimately three times that amount. (2) Dispersing the population throughout the country to ensure suitable housing conditions. The estimate was that about 80 percent of the population, namely, 200,000 people, would settle in the urban sector, while 20 percent would choose to live in the rural sector. And (3) providing housing within reasonable proximity of places of work.46

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Taken together, these problems necessitated the coordination of several ministries, including the Ministries of Finance, Interior, Labor, and Trade and Industry, and thus it was not desirable to place the responsibility for construction in the hands of private contractors or companies. The main fear was that parcelization (the division of a given piece of land into parcels for construction), along with unplanned development, would lead to skyrocketing land prices, which would in turn paralyze activity. This fear stemmed primarily from the tendency of private contractors to demand high prices due to the high demand for housing in the center of the country compared to demand in the periphery. Here, thus, was a sincere attempt by a government ministry (in this case the Labor Ministry), to find a balance between government oversight and the private market, which, under certain conditions, could potentially drag the construction market into an uncontrolled pricing competition.47 Added to this was also the issue of time: the staff of the Labor Ministry calculated that from the moment a given housing corporation began a housing initiative, it took at least six months before a cornerstone was laid. Although the war was still raging, the ministry had no choice but to begin the work of creating a national plan. In Ben-Tov’s words, “It is thus important that we be apprised of the plans of each of the housing initiatives, what the different housing companies are preparing, and which of these plans are ready for implementation—be it immediately or in the future.”48 The Labor Ministry’s primary contribution to the issue was in the acceleration of the planning process and its adaptation to needs on a national level, including the practical and administrative aspect of carrying out surveying in the field. Likewise, an emphasis was placed on standardization of construction, which was immediately expressed in the pre-fab industry, and on the assistance provided to companies to help them save time and money. However, above all of these issues hovered the question of finance. As long as the war continued, most of the country’s resources were mobilized for the war effort, and Ben-Tov hoped that the participants in the meeting would be able to suggest solutions for this painful issue. The representatives of the housing corporations divided the issue of housing into a few subissues:

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1. New immigrants: In their opinion, the sheer scope of the issue necessitated full government support, with the backing of the World Zionist Organization, since there was no Israeli body that was capable of dealing with the scope of the cost of housing the immigrants. 2. War veterans: In their opinion, this was a burning issue that demanded a quick solution as soon as the war was over. 3. Low-income housing after the war: The classification of residents by socioeconomic status regardless of party or organizational affiliation was a problem that the government had to solve. Zeev Lubinker, representative of Shikun, believed that despite the emergency period, it would be possible to do quite a significant amount of construction, and that it would be possible to raise nearly two million lira for this purpose, on the condition that the two accepted mortgage options (Apotikai Bank and Bank Tfahot) be granted on regular terms. To prevent losses that might be caused by mortgages being given at regular terms, the companies would need government support. Lubinker asked the Labor Ministry to make some sort of adjustment between the rise in the costs of construction materials (which had tripled since November 1947), and consumers’ ability to pay, given that as of September 1948 about 80 percent of them could not afford the monthly mortgage payments existing in the market.49 The representative of Mishkenot HaPoel HaMizrahi warned about the payoffs that were common in construction during the Mandate, and called upon the Labor Ministry to supervise and ensure ethical practices in the industry. Likewise, he asked that access to low-cost housing be ensured for workers in the rural townships, who, because their salaries were low in comparison to those of construction workers, struggled to pay rent and certainly could not afford to buy an apartment. A representative of one of the private corporations participating in the discussion, CEO of the Gav Yam Bayside Land Corporation Ltd., M. Ettinger, emphasized the great importance their sector placed on national planning, in particular on the preparation stages. He gave the example of the infrastructural works needed for the Zevulon Valley, which included clearing the land,

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drainage, and installation of an electricity grid even before construction. Another problem raised by Ettinger, one that stemmed from the war, was the severe shortage of professional construction workers, a problem that Ettinger believed would be solved only after war veterans were redirected into the construction industry. In the meantime he proposed two solutions: opening professional courses for construction workers, or using simpler building methods that did not require high-skilled professionals (mainly construction of shacks or structures from small blocks, as opposed to more complicated casting work).50 Summing up the discussion, Ben-Tov remarked that the Labor Ministry had worked on the preparation of a national development plan for construction that would be coordinated with the rest of the relevant government ministries. The Manpower Division in his ministry would work to exempt professional construction workers from the military so that a permanent staff of workers could be trained and deployed to construction sites according to national priorities and not according to uncontrolled competition between private contractors. Here once again was the view that centralized national planning was the proper approach for developing the country once the State was established. Although this discussion was not capable of solving the problems on the ground in the immediate term, primarily because of the war, it did enable the main issues to be defined in the presence of representatives of all the main players in the construction industry at the time, raised possible solutions, and consolidated policy guidelines. After this discussion, it was decided to establish, in September 1948, a National Housing Department of the Labor Ministry, whose role it would be to plan a nationwide housing strategy. The department initiated the establishment of the Plan Committee 1948–1950, whose purpose was to prepare a detailed two-year plan that would include transportation, construction material, technical resources, and points of contact with construction companies and contractors. The committee included some of the leading experts in the Israeli construction industry, who, to find the most suitable model to meet the needs and budget restrictions, examined 150 different building models. However, it was actually the thorough work of the committee

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and the time it took to carry it out that proved its undoing. The projection of immigration numbers for 1949 was a quarter-million immigrants, and the supply of abandoned housing in the Arab villages and cities was running out. At the end of 1948, Amidar (the National Corporation for Immigrant Housing) was established, to facilitate extensive and quick construction of inexpensive permanent housing. This company was headed by three representatives from the government and from the Jewish Agency, and two representatives from the housing corporations. In the first stage it was decided to build 16,000 housing units in existing urban settlements, since the establishment of new settlements and the development of remote settlements would take more time and money than was available. But despite all the company’s efforts, it could not meet the demand.51 Only with the end of the war and the appointment of Golda Meir as minister of labor on behalf of Mapai did the ministry begin to carry out a more efficient implementation of a nationwide housing plan. Building Inspection The Building Inspection Department was established toward the end of 1948 as an attempt to partially implement some of the ideas raised in the discussions at the end of August. Although the department could not solve long-term issues such as the creation of a national plan or provide solutions to some of the short-term constraints resulting from the war, it had the power to do something to direct building trends and focus on preventing a shortage of materials and skilled workers for public construction.52 The assumption of the department heads was that public-sector construction was threatened by private construction, since the more skilled workers were drawn to the private sector (primarily due to better salaries), and better construction materials were used. Furthermore, there was a fear that the private companies would not respect uniform building methods or costs. The most salient example of this was the unrestrained labor market that took place during the building of the Hatikva and Menashiya neighborhoods in southern Tel Aviv in 1948, when private builders did whatever

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they wanted in terms of construction quality, apartment prices, and workers’ salaries.53 Behind the scenes one could also not ignore the political dimension. Public companies with a specific party affiliation, such as Solel Boneh, expressed a fear early on that the private companies would threaten the market share, although it soon became clear that this fear was unfounded. In fact, the exact opposite happened; ultimately it was the private companies who complained to the government ministries, in particular to the Labor Ministry, that the public companies were preventing any possibility of fair competition, and that the Labor Ministry itself favored contractors from Solel Boneh when awarding government tenders.54 (This subject will be expanded on in the following section of this book.) In its early days, the department was run by David Amir, and initially it was not placed under any particular division in the Labor Ministry. Eventually the department became a division in the newly founded Housing Ministry. As in many other fields related to the peacetime responsibilities of the ministry, only at the end of the war, when the ministry was reorganized under the leadership of Labor Minister Golda Meir in March 1949, did the Building Inspection Department begin working in full force, mostly as a result of legislative changes with regard to building inspection. National (Amami) Insurance Under the tenure of Labor Minister Mordechai Ben-Tov, preliminary initiatives in an additional field with direct bearing on the functioning of the Labor Ministry also took place, although they did not come to fruition during the tenure of the Provisional Government or during the war. This was an initiative to establish a national insurance system connected to the labor market. To this end, an interministerial committee was established in late 1948, headed by Yisrael Kanivsky. Its responsibilities included preparing a comprehensive state-sponsored life insurance plan that would give workers protection from work-related illnesses, work accidents, unemployment, old age, and diseases not caused by the workplace, as well as protection for widows and orphans. It was only implemented under Golda

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Meir, when the ministry came to be known as the Ministry of Labor and National Insurance Trade Unions Another initiative was the establishment of a Trade Union Department within the Labor Ministry in October 1948. The department had two subsections—registration and inspection, and research. The department’s main job was to help trade unions make their work more efficient, especially in representing themselves before governmental institutions.55 In this regard, Zvi Bar Niv, the legal advisor to the Ministry of Labor, commented in his report to Ben-Tov of July 11, 1948, that in general in other countries trade unions came under the authority of a designated government ministry. Since at the time most of the cooperatives were either agriculture- or transportation-related, Bar Niv saw no point in splitting the responsibility between the Labor and Justice Ministries, and proposed to transfer the issue of the cooperatives entirely to the minister of justice, since he already held all of the legal powers under the Companies Ordinance. Ben-Tov rejected the proposal, however, and the department was eventually incorporated into the Labor Ministry.56 Staffing in the Labor Ministry during the Provisional Government To sum up this chapter, which dealt with the establishment and management of the Labor Ministry under Mapam, it is worth giving a few statistics that have to do with the distribution of staff positions. When the Provisional Government disbanded, the Labor Ministry had a staff of 442. Of these, 160 held permanent positions. (For the sake of comparison, the number of staff members in the Department of Labor during the Mandate was two-thirds less.) A report on the staff of the Labor Ministry prepared by Government Secretary Eli Gali shows the following: the head office had 27 workers; the Labor Division, 92; the Manpower Division, 39; the Planning Division, 81; Public Works, 105; the Surveyor’s Office, 60; the

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Building Inspection Department, 20; the Antiquities Department, 13; and the Water Department, 5.57

G. Intermediate Summary on the Establishment of the Labor Ministry during the War The functional structure of the Labor Ministry more or less accorded with the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav. But this was not the case when it came to the practical implementation of the ministry’s mission in actuality. The Interior Ministry generally worked according to the goals defined for it by Va’adat HaMatzav, while the Labor Ministry was supposed to function as a “primarily regulative and judicial” body, as had been designated by Va’adat HaMatzav. During the war, however, the ministry became, in effect, a kind of giant agency for the supply of manpower to the wartime economy. While the ministry did manage to regulate Mandate-era labor laws, most of its time was spent mobilizing and redirecting manpower between the home front and the battlefront and vice versa—whether for fortressing, harvesting, and the repair of roads that had been damaged in the fighting, or channeling young workers to the front and providing older workers to take their place. A similar problem took place with the factories, the majority of which were diverted to the war effort, and where the role of the Labor Ministry was to determine which were vital enough to remain in operation, which needed to close, and which would be redirected to support the military. Whatever the case may be, the Labor Ministry had little time to devote to planning the labor market and labor relations for the medium or long term. This stood out most clearly with regard to the employment prospects of populations such as new immigrants and war veterans, or the development of a national housing or national insurance system. Despite the clear awareness and correct evaluation and definition of the scope of these issues, and despite attempts to begin implementation during the war, things never reached the stage of practical implementation during the

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tenure of the Provisional Government. Even the limited research done in the ministry during the war focused primarily on the day-to-day needs of the military rather than the civilian economy. As for long-term national planning trends, in particular the creation of a centralized physical plan, nothing was implemented, mainly as a result of ideological and political differences between Mapam and Mapai. As we will see in the third section of this study, with the transfer of the Labor Ministry to Mapai after the January 1949 elections, the ministry would undergo comprehensive reorganization in both its structure and goals.

Part III The Establishment of the Israeli Government After the First Elections (January 1949–November 1951) Introduction Israel’s first election campaign, held in January 1949, is the starting point for the third section of this book, and completed the transition from the institutions of the Yishuv and the Mandate to the new Israeli government system. As the major events of the war came to a close, the leadership set to the task of preparing for peacetime, and the elections were the first testimony to this. In this part of the book, I look at the processes that characterized the transition from the Provisional Government to the elected government, with a focus on two subjects: (1) the division of the political “pie” among the political parties and the structure of the division of authority throughout the government system, and (2) the continuing process of the establishment of the government ministries, through a detailed analysis of the Ministries of Interior and Labor. The leadership of the political system was preoccupied with issues of diplomacy and defense, such as the implementation of the armistice agreements and determining geographical borders, or with social issues such as immigrant absorption and the future of education in the State of Israel. At the same time, however, complex administrative and organizational issues were emerging, the most salient of which was the question of where to draw the line between the authority of one government ministry and that of another, and between the branches and administrative sections within each of the ministries. The Interior Ministry continued to 177

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deal with the enforcement of the authority of the district commissioners, and major problems in the registration of new immigrants and Arabs. The Labor Ministry, for its part, was refashioned, its main role being to find employment and housing solutions for thousands of decommissioned soldiers and new immigrants. The main questions discussed in this section are, first, how influential were the results of the elections on the redesign of the government system, on both the partisan level (for example, the transfer of the Interior Ministry to HaMizrahi and the Labor Ministry to Mapai) and in terms of its structure (was there a change in the powers of the executive branch)? And second, what were the unique problems that characterized the development of the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry after the elections and during peacetime, and how indicative are these issues of the situation with the rest of the government ministries during this period?

Chapter 9

Elections to the First Knesset Results and Significance A. Background and Basic Problems Elections for the First Knesset were held on January 25, 1949. Although the Declaration of Independence stated that elections would take place in October 1948, the date was postponed twice because of the war. The final major campaign of the southern front was Operation Horev (December 27, 1948–January 9, 1949), during which, after the IDF invaded the Gaza Strip and captured El Arish, the British threatened to act on their defense agreement with Egypt and delivered an ultimatum to Ben-Gurion to retreat from the Sinai, to which he acceded. Armistice talks with Egypt began in Rhodes on January 12, 1949, and the agreement with the Syrians was only completed in July 1949. Most of the decisive events of the war were over by the beginning of the year (the last military campaign, Operation Ovdah, took place in March 1949), and despite the problems facing the organizers, it was decided not to postpone elections any further.1 Three important issues relating to the number of potential voters hovered in the background of the elections: (1) new immigrants; (2) the inability to estimate the power of the political parties, both old and new (Mapam and Herut Party); and (3) the important fundamental decision regarding giving Arabs living in Israel the right to vote. Since the elections for the Elected Assembly that had been held in 1944, the eligible voting population had risen from 300,000 to 500,000.2 The main demographic problem preoccupying the election organizers was that of the immigrant population. Immigrants who arrived during the 179

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course of 1948 comprised about 15 percent of the voting population. In December 1948 alone, 30,000 immigrants arrived in the country—an estimated five seats.3 The national census was taken in November 1948, and a curfew was even imposed to enable the census-takers to reach as many citizens as possible. Immigrants, however, did not generally have a permanent address, and some had not even received their identity cards yet. In addition, since no polls were taken, it was impossible to assess the practical strength of new parties such as Mapam or Herut, which were established on the eve of the first elections.4

B. Major Issues during the Election Campaign The election campaign itself took place in the shadow of a fierce ideological dispute around the question of “who established the state?” Following is a list of the main parties that participated in the election campaign: Mapai (the Land of Israel Workers’ Party). Headed by David Ben-Gurion; the majority party in the World Zionist Organization as well. Mapam (The United Workers’ Party). Established in 1948 as a result of the unification of the Ahdut HaAvodah and HaShomer HaTza’ir. The United Religious Front. Established in the lead-up to the election, composed of several parties that continued to exist autonomously: Mizrahi, HaPoel HaMizrahi, Agudat Yisrael, and Poalei Agudat Yisrael. Herut Party. Established by the Etzel, this party absorbed veteran members of the Revisionist Party. The General Zionists. During the Mandate this party belonged to the right wing of the World General Zionist Organization; its electoral base came from the citrus-growing, industrial, and commercial spheres.

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The Progressives. Established just a few months before the elections, this party consisted of the New Aliyah movement, which was the political framework of the German-Jewish community, and the left wing of the General Zionists; its traditional line was definitively liberal. The Israeli Communist Party—Maki. This party had been outlawed under the Mandate, but its cooperation with the Soviet Union restored it to official, overt political activity. This was the only joint Jewish-Arab list. The Sephardi List. This party contained proponents of both the Right and Left on the political spectrum, and was based mainly on ethnic origin. Smaller parties include the Minorities List (Arab supporters of Mapai), as well as three other parties that managed to pass the electoral threshold and had one representative each in the Knesset: WIZO (Women’s International Zionist Organization), the Yemenite List, and the Fighters List of Former Lehi members, which ran separately from the Herut Party.5 Two traumatic events were at the heart of the dispute between the right and left wings of the political spectrum: the destruction of the Etzel weapons ship, the Altalena off the coast of Tel Aviv in June 19486 and the dismantlement of Palmach headquarters in November 1948.7 The Herut Party portrayed the Altalena affair as a deliberate act of sabotage by Mapai against the Etzel, while Mapam hoped to make electoral gains because of Palmach’s stature in the eyes of the public, and defined itself as an alternative to the old guard. As a result, Mapai portrayed them as arrogant and condescending. The three main parties were all vying for control of the country and most of the campaign revolved around this. Each tried to undermine the legitimacy of its opponent—Menachem Begin called the Provisional Government Judenrat, and Mapam accused Mapai of mismanaging the war and weakness in the face of the British ultimatum to withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza. Mapai, not to be outdone, accused Mapam of taking their marching orders from Moscow. Both Mapam and Mapai accused the Herut movement of fascism.

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However, because the Herut Party’s electoral strength remained an unknown, and since in any case there was no intention of bringing Menachem Begin into the government, most of the election campaign played out between Mapai and Mapam.8 Begin’s declaration, at the time of the acceptance of the Partition Plan, that “Israel has agreed to dismembering the soul of the people and not just the land,” had no significant audience. The General Zionists and the Progressives, who sent three ministers to the Provisional Government, did not present a serious political alternative to Mapai, which remained the leading force in the Provisional Government as well as in the election campaign.9 The campaign revolved mostly around diplomatic issues, although the smaller parties, targeting a small and defined political base, put socioeconomic issues, issues of religion and state, and sectarian issues on the agenda. For example, the Sephardi and Yemenite parties raised the subject of ethnic discrimination, while the Religious Front emphasized the need to preserve the Jewish-religious nature of the country. We should recall that the elections were taking place at a time when David Ben-Gurion ordered the IDF to retreat from the territory conquered in the Sinai Peninsula following British pressure, and during armistice negotiations with Egypt and secret talks with Abdallah King of Jordan.10 While most of the diplomatic maneuvering and secret talks were unfolding behind the scenes, the diplomatic issue was expressed in the campaign through the fundamental question of whether to continue the war to achieve all of Israel’s military and political goals, or to strive for peace through diplomatic and territorial concessions. The opinion in Mapai was that most of the public had been tired of the war, and they espoused Ben-Gurion’s slogan: “Better a democratic Jewish state on a smaller territory than a state on all of the land at the expense of its Jewish majority and its democracy.” Mapam, on the other hand, supported continuing the war, although internally, the situation was complex: members of the Ahdut HaAvodah thought that successes on the battle front should be used to determine facts on the ground and control of larger territories, while members of HaShomer HaTzair supported continuing the fighting only to eradicate the last signs of British and Jordanian control. On the

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other hand, Mapam supported the establishment of an Arab state alongside Israel, which was the natural continuation of their ideological position during the Mandate, which espoused a binational solution to the IsraeliArab conflict.11 The figure of Ben-Gurion himself was also an issue in the elections. Mapai presented him as the savior of the people and a talented and revered leader, while Mapam portrayed him as an old oligarch whose party was fostering a cult of personality around him.12 Another issue at the heart of the campaign, as far as Ben-Gurion was concerned, was the subject of collective responsibility, which will be discussed below in a separate section.

C. The Results of the Elections and the Coalition Negotiations Twenty-one parties participated in the first elections, which were held in January 1949. Nine of these did not pass the electoral threshold. With the inauguration of the Knesset, twelve factions were created (not taking into account the mergers and splits that happened within the various factions of the First Knesset).13 Mapai won 46 seats (a little more than one third of the votes); Mapam, 19; the United Religious Front, 16 (HaPoel HaMizrahi, 6; Mizrahi, 4; Agudat Yisrael, 3);14 Herut Party, 14; the General Zionists, 7; the Progressives, 5; the Sephardim, 4; the Communists, 4; the Arabs, 2; the Fighters List, 1; the Yemenites, 1; the Women, 1. Voter turnout, at 86.8 percent, was exceedingly high (in 1951, for example, voter turnout was only 75.1%).15 Peter Medding writes that Mapai had a practical numerical advantage, as it would be harder to form a government from six or seven parties without Mapai than it would be to form a government with Mapai in the center and one or two additional parties around it. The political reality that cemented this advantage was found in the fact that ideologically, Mapai was situated in the center of the political map, whereas the other parties were ideologically opposed to one another, and to form a government would have to bridge between Left and Right, between collective economy and

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free enterprise, and between the religious and the secular. On all important ideological issues, Mapai was situated in the middle of the political spectrum, and represented the consensus, without relinquishing its demand for political leadership or achieving its goals. It was Mapai’s centrism that earned it the support of the other parties on all major issues. On security and diplomatic issues, Mapai could count on the support of the center and moderate Right parties as well as the religious parties; on economics, Mapai was also in the center, which enabled it to incorporate stances of the Marxist Left with the free enterprise espoused by the Right. For example: in its advancement of a collective and public economy, Mapai could rely on the Left, and in its support of import and private investment, it could rely on the Right. The religious parties agreed with Mapai policy on most economic matters. On religious questions, Mapai came to an agreement about the public religious character of the state.16 David Ben-Gurion’s guiding principle during the coalition negotiations was to create a firm core of political consensus on which to base a parliamentary majority. Thus the first step focused on marginalizing extreme ideological views from Left and Right alike (as Ben-Gurion put it, “without Herut and without Maki”). Medding notes that the establishment of the coalition after the 1949 elections reveals a system with five principles, which with time became entrenched in the Israeli political system: 1. Mapai Members of the Knesset formed the majority in the Knesset coalition. 2. Government ministries were distributed among the parties in direct proportion to their representation in the coalition. 3. An absolute majority of Mapai in the government was maintained. 4. Mapai held all of the important government ministries. For example, in 1949, Mapai received the following ministries: the Prime Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the ministries of Defense, Finance, Education, Agriculture, and Supply and Rationing.17 5. Collective responsibility (this subject will also be discussed in a separate section in the following chapter).

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Although the third principle derived from the first and second principles, it was of great importance, and immediately following the elections it became the primary principle in Mapai’s coalition strategy. Although initially, at the beginning of the coalition negotiations, only five out of twelve of the proposed ministers were from Mapai, later, when Mapam and the General Zionists refused to join the coalition, Mapai was left with a majority in both the government and the coalition. Eventually, the principle of an absolute majority for Mapai in the government became a prerequisite for any coalition negotiations, even in cases of broad coalitions in which Mapai did not hold a majority. The negotiations can be divided into a few stages. In the first stage, the parties discussed a government that would contain twelve ministers, distributed as follows: 5 Mapai, 2 Mapam, 2 religious, 1 General Zionist, 1 Progressive, and 1 from the Sephardi list. In his speech to his party’s Knesset members on March 1, 1949, member of the Labor Party Secretariat Zeev Aharonovitch said “The Sephardi seat is not because of their numbers, because numerically they do not deserve it, but rather in light of the issues and needs of the state.” But the explosion of the negotiations in the first stage was primarily due to the demands of the religious parties: “The suggestion of twelve [ministers] imploded due to the special situation of the religious front. The religious front is comprised for internal reasons of sub-fronts, and they cannot make do with less than three. It turns out that they cannot make do with three either, because Poalei Agudat Yisrael has notified that they are leaving this front. When speaking about twelve, it was impossible to implement this proposal because of the religious front, and it was necessary to give the religious three, thus changing the calibration entirely.”18 In the second stage of the negotiations, it was proposed to form a government of sixteen members: Mapai, 7; Mapam, 3; Religious, 3; Progressives, 1; Sefardi List, 1; General Zionists, 1. According to Aharonovitch, this time it was the General Zionists who rejected the deal: “But since the General Zionists announced that they were willing to enter the government only with two representatives, and they could not be given two since we were talking about a government of 15 minus the General Zionists, based on the

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assumption that they were not in. In the case of a miracle or a catastrophe that they agree to enter with one, then the government will have 16 members.”19 Zeev Tzahor writes that, contrary to Mapai and Mapam, the General Zionists proposed an alternative socioeconomic policy. Its leaders were from among the “civilian circles” and demanded that the new state be based on free market and private enterprise. They called their party “the Center Party” and believed that they represented the middle class. Their campaign emphasized the reduction of government intervention in the economy, improvement of citizen services, and a general improvement in quality of life.20 Ben-Gurion rejected their demands based on the claim that the distribution of portfolios according to this ratio would raise the number of ministers to twenty-five, which was twice the number initially planned. Following this decision, the General Zionists opted not to join the coalition. But the most difficult negotiations were with Mapam, which demanded senior positions for its party members even in government ministries run by other parties, thus trying to extend the practice from the Provisional Government. Mapam demanded senior positions in the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Finance Ministry, besides its proportional ministerial representation. In a meeting of the Labor Party Bureau of February 21, 1949, Government Secretary Zeev Sharf expressed Mapai’s serious concerns regarding Mapam’s political goals with regard to receiving senior roles in the government ministries: If Mapam takes two portfolios, and I will discuss which ones, they will not settle for two regular portfolios, but will demand that one of them be a governing power in the country. I don’t need to explain these things here; I think that Ziama (Zalman Aran) can do it better than I. I understand that we have received a letter from them in which they propose a deal—and they are not the only ones proposing such a deal [the reference is to the General Zionists]—and they precondition negotiations for a broader coalition on an agreement between them and Mapai. They insist

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upon an influential portfolio; they do not insist upon having many portfolios. They are not eager to have a broad government.21 Mapam explained their position as a desire not to enter a “political ghetto,” but Ben-Gurion rejected their demands, and Mapam, too, remained outside of the government. Zeev Aharonovitch explains Ben-Gurion’s stance on Mapam on the matter of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry: “On foreign affairs you cannot demand to be part; your program on this matter was rejected, as, too, was your position on military matters, on the Marshall Plan. The party will not commit to things that have never been, and it was clear that the sting was completely removed from the programmatic field.”22 At the conclusion of the coalition negotiations, the General Zionists and Mapam remained outside of the government, and the religious inside. It should be noted that for Ben-Gurion, cooperation with the religious parties on essential subjects, such as foreign affairs and defense, was easy, in particular given that on socioeconomic issues they had no special demands, except for the issue of education, on which they focused their struggle with Mapai (this will be discussed at length in the chapter that deals with the Interior Ministry, which went to Mizrahi). The first coalition had 71 MKs (Members of Knesset) out of 120, with seats distributed as follows: Mapai, 46; the Religious Front, 16; the Progressive Party, 5; the Sephardi List, 4. The coalition also had the support of two representatives of the Arab list, which supported Mapai but were not a part of the party. The idea of ideological balance and a broad government was only partially successful. On the one hand, the absence of Mapam and the General Zionists from the coalition gave Mapai freedom to maneuver on foreign and defense issues. On the other hand, however, the makeup of the government gave the members of the United Religious Front the ability to topple the government, and indeed, they threatened to do so when some of their demands regarding religious education were not met. (I will expand on this issue as well in the chapter on the Interior Ministry under the Mizrahi Party.)

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D. Reorganization of Mapai after the Elections: Basic Problems One source of anxiety for Mapai following the elections was that other parties, such as Mapam or even the General Zionists, would eat away at its electoral base. Its members therefore wanted to strengthen the party’s standing in (1) distribution of perks to members through the state apparatus, (2) revival and reorganization of ongoing activities in the local branches, and (3) special efforts to mobilize target sectors, such as youth, women, and intellectuals. The sense on the part of many of the party activists was that due to the war and the administrative transition from Yishuv to a sovereign government system, activity in these areas had been neglected. They proposed two solutions: reinforcing the party’s immediate hold on the state apparatus, as they felt that the power of the party had been weakened in the field as a result of neglect of these issues throughout the various branches during the course of the war; and launching a campaign to strengthen the party apparatus and broaden its branch activities. This policy was seen as legitimate and necessary to advance Mapai’s policy and ensure its political survival. It was expressed at the first meeting of the Labor Party Bureau following the elections, on February 24, 1949. Placement of Party Members in the State Apparatus With regard to the state apparatus, a trend began to emerge that would characterize the staffing of positions in the government apparatus in the first decade of the country—insertion of “our people.” If during the work of Va’adat HaMatzav there was a clear tendency toward appointments based on professional merit and personal ability, after the elections, partisan interests began to trump professional considerations. Zeev Aharonovitch’s statement on the staffing of senior positions in the police, the military, and the government sheds light on the importance of this matter:

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I should add to this the military and the police, as well as the state apparatus. I was there on a certain matter, and I discovered, almost by chance, that out of 170–180 high-ranking officers in the police, only one and a half are party members. The “half” may or may not be a party member, but what stands out is that the “one” stands at the head of the police. The vast majority of the senior officers, 99%, are anything but what you want, anything but party members. Regarding the military, I don’t have to tell you. The army is about to undergo a major reorganization, leaving behind nothing more than a skeleton. There will be reserves, but the truth is that the officer ranks of the army are not ours. There is Herut Party, with its fascist-military orientation and is quite open about it. Begin said: “I promised you I’d kick out the British—and I did. I promise you I’ll come into power—and I will.” It’s not just Begin, it’s also Rokach. They’ll join forces; you don’t need to be a great prophet to see how they’ll come together. And I want to say another thing about the state apparatus, just from a superficial glance at the people I know more than superficially: the state apparatus is going through a fast process of disengagement from the party, and this is accompanied by a philosophy, a philosophy of a non-partisan government apparatus.23 Aharonovitch’s statement here is of particular interest, since it testifies to a tendency that could be found already in Va’adat HaMatzav, namely, the appointment of civil servants according to their skills and professional credentials, and not according to party affiliation. But as we will see below, in particular in the last part of this study, partisan considerations began to trump professional considerations, in particular because of the interference of the party apparatuses. A powerful illustration of the immense importance placed by the parties on inserting their people into the state apparatus can be found in the reorganization of the Labor Ministry under Golda Meir, described further below.

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Organizing the Local Party Branches Another problem raised by the participants in the meeting was how to gradually strengthen the party’s hold in the field over time, emphasizing the importance of branch activity and attention to target populations, such as young people, women, and intellectuals. It is important to emphasize that the apparatus members did not settle for senior positions in the government or in the government ministries. They also strove for a broader grip on the field as a whole, where public support and future voters came from. To this end, Aharonovitch stresses, the party needs to fix the impression among the public that Mapai is a party that organizes only once in four years for the elections: “This obligates the party to know how to rebuild itself, and not during the three months of the campaign, but in the three years leading up to the elections. While I say this every time before the elections, this time it is my feeling that if we make a mistake, it will be a fatal one.”24 Aharonovitch describes the situation in the local party branches as an optical illusion: We must bring these branches to life! These branches, what are they now? They say that in Tel Aviv there are eight to ten thousand party members, but if you call a public assembly no more than 800 people will come. What motivates the members? What we have now is mutual unmotivation, and this question of what is the party organizationally? The question of operating the branches is an entire theory in its own right, and people may have dealt with this theory but they never revived it. The vast majority of party members are never seen, maybe they are seen on election day. If the party wants to penetrate the masses, they can do it only through the party members. The question of operating the branches is a huge one, and we will have to learn how to do it. This has been spoken about quite a bit, but hardly anything has been done.25

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Special Target Populations (Youth, Women, and Intellectuals) Another issue that concerned those participating in the meeting was the “aging” of the party, a process created by neglecting its future generations: What I mean when I talk about rejuvenating the Party is that there must be many young people in the Party, and I am talking about to what extent these young people will be integrated into all our activities—in the Histadrut, in the Party, and in the various organizational, professional, cultural, and economic cells on the ground. In other words, we must prepare the natural heirs of the Party, of its intellectual capital, and its organizational capacity and achievements. And this will not be done by sending out a circular; the people must be prepared in various ways, through both deliberate education and deliberate action, including the philosophy of the Land of Israel Workers’ Party in this day and age.26 The main party institution that was meant to deal with training the younger generation was “Beit Berl.” Aharonovitch also stressed the neglect of the female demographic, in particular the lack of women members in the Histadrut. Other issues that concerned the members of the party apparatus were the standing of the party within the United Kibbutz movement and the question of recruiting new immigrants to join its ranks. Special attention was paid to the question of Oriental Jewry, who had been neglected, in the opinion of the speakers, and had therefore found their way to the Herut Party. This issue would have to be handled by the Histadrut and the party institutions. Another group mentioned was the “working intelligentsia,” meaning the members of the free professions such as lawyers and doctors, and intellectuals such as poets and writers. The speakers lamented that the potential of these two populations had not been tapped for the benefit of the party: “We can only assume that the Party would have benefited substantially from this class, had it put some effort into finding them. Without a doubt, this class—lawyers, doctors, engineers—has very

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important power with a spark of public interest. We are not so rich in this kind of force.”27 As for writers and poets, some of the members complained about the fact that, as a rule, most of the intellectuals were affiliated with Mapam. Mapai, for its part, was not doing enough to nurture those intellectuals who did see Mapai as their home: “I had a meeting with one of the young people from this intellectual circle. They are demanding that we establish a department within the Land of Israel Worker’s Party that will tend to them. They have major complaints against the intellectual institutions of the Party and the Histadrut. There are those among them who are members of the party but who are saying that the only place where they can get their book printed is Sifriyat HaPoalim [the publishing house of the Kibbutz movement—JF].”28 It seems, therefore, that after the elections of January 1949, Mapai needed to reorganize its institutions, having realized the heavy political price they were bound to pay as a result of their neglect of routine party matters in the transition to sovereign government and during the months of the war. It should be noted that, despite its electoral victory, the party apparatus did not rest on its laurels, and began organizing toward the objective of strengthening the party’s hold on all aspects of government. These efforts were particularly noticeable in the government ministries, but not just there.

E. The Transition Act With the passing of the Transition Act on February 16, 1948, the Israeli legislature was officially named the “Knesset,” the Constituent Assembly was named the “First Knesset,” and the delegates were called “Members of Knesset.” This legislation was called a “law” and not an “order” as had been the case during the Provisional Government. At the same time, the relationship between the executive branch (i.e., the government and its ministers) and the legislative branch (i.e., the Knesset) was taking shape. The question

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of a constitution remained unresolved, however. Following the U.N. stipulation that the future Jewish and Arab states must each ratify a constitution, the Jewish Agency charged Dr. Yehuda (Leo) Pinchas Cohen of the Judicial Committee of Va’adat HaMatzav with the task. In accordance with this decision, the Declaration of Independence contained guidelines about ratifying a constitution in the Constituent Assembly. Cohen proposed that the State of Israel be a democratic republic that would guarantee equality of civil and political rights for all its citizens. His proposal also listed fundamental principles such as freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and religion, individual liberties, and the sanctity of human life. Samuel Sager writes that the Constituent Assembly’s original and exclusive task was to draft a constitution, as stated in the Declaration of Independence: “Until such time as the regular elected powers of the state decide, subject to the constitution that will be determined by the Constituent Assembly [ . . . ] Moetzet Ha’Am will act as a Provisional State Council.”29 In other words, the Provisional State Council would continue to serve and would be responsible for routine legislation issues parallel to the Constituent Assembly. But in the Transition Order to the Constituent Assembly, the Council declared that it would disband once the Constituent Assembly convened, and that the new body would be given all of the authorities granted to it by the law as well as being the legislative branch. Sager writes that this declaration was not entirely surprising; in other countries as well the constituent body also served as a legislative body. However, the Council rejected the majority opinion reached in its constitution and legislation committees that explicitly charged the Assembly with drafting a constitution and stating that it would be disbanded only after the completion of this task. This marked the first shift away from the position that a comprehensive constitution must be adopted forthwith. Amnon Rubinstein notes that the Transition Law reflected a process of obviating the Constituent Assembly’s primary role—to draft a constitution. This process was completed with the decision of the First Knesset not to ratify a formal constitution, but to make do with passing basic laws that together would form a constitution.

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Rubinstein claims that with this decision, the First Knesset violated the obligation placed on it by the Declaration of Independence, namely to draft a constitution, in any case without which the permanent institutions spoken of in the Declaration of Independence could not be established. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that the Declaration of Independence was never a binding constitutional document, but a kind of declaration of intent, and this was the position upheld by the Supreme Court.30 The responsibilities of the Provisional State Council detailed in the Transition Order to the Constituent Assembly (January 13, 1949) were transferred from the Provisional State Council to the Constituent Assembly. In the council’s discussion on the Transition Order there were hints about the future direction with regard to a constitution. Although the speakers still expressed the understanding that the Constituent Assembly would draft a constitution, the ideas being expressed intimated that this constitution would be assembled from separate laws. Ben-Gurion stated that the Constituent Assembly would be able to change its name and that “it would determine its own agenda and responsibilities.”31 In effect, the Constituent Assembly held only four meetings from its first meeting on February 4, 1949, because two days later it accepted the Transition Law, which turned it into the First Knesset. In its sections on the legislature, the president, and the government, the Transition Law sketched out the form of government of the State of Israel along general lines. Although it was called the Transition Law, Pinchas Rosen, the first minister of justice, emphasized that its main purpose was to enable the establishment of a regular government. Questions that did not require an immediate decision “would be left for discussions in the parliament in the coming weeks.”32 When the Constituent Assembly accepted the section in the law that changed its name to the “First Knesset,” it further validated the decision of the Provisional State Council. In addition, they rejected the suggestion that determining a constitution was to be understood as its primary role, and that the intention was that with the acceptance of the constitution, elections to the legislature would be held as defined in the constitution. This was no mere change in name, but a clear tendency signifying a different position on the issue of the constitution.

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F. Collective Responsibility as a Factor in Proper Governance With the ratification of the Transition Law 5709-1949, it was determined that “each member of the government shall bear the responsibility before the government for his vote in the Knesset assembly, and for the vote of the faction to which he belongs.”33 Until this point the collective responsibility of the government had not been defined. None of the sections of the Order for the Foundation of the State referred to the collective responsibility of the ministers, since in any case Section 2(a) of the Order for the Foundation of the State states: “The Provisional Government is comprised of members of the Provisional State Council who signed the Declaration of Independence of the Jewish State.”34 In other words, since the members of the government were “decided upon” and not “elected,” the question of collective responsibility remained problematic. There is a direct correlation between this explanation and the trend toward continuity in the Yishuv establishment. Although the members of the Jewish Agency Executive were elected after the elections to the World Zionist Organization, the principle of collective responsibility was not applied, since it is contrary to the logic of negotiation-based coalition politics. Therefore Ben-Gurion’s aim of instituting this principle after the elections to the Constituent Assembly was in fact a revolutionary one. As we recall, Ben-Gurion raised the issue of collective responsibility during the election campaign of January 1949 and throughout the coalition negotiations as one of the most important issues. In his view, the government-to-be must be based on a stable majority.35 This, in his view, was not tantamount to a one-party government. Because of the need to achieve a broad national consensus, Ben-Gurion made it clear that Mapai must form a coalition government even if it won an absolute majority of the vote. In Ben-Gurion’s opinion, collective responsibility produces stable majority support, particularly in a multiparty coalition. Peter Medding notes that this fundamental principle of collective responsibility also determined a few basic rules of conduct for the government: the ministers were collectively responsible both for their own behavior and for that of their parties,

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with regard to all agreed-on coalition policies and government decisions. On the other hand, Knesset members in the coalition were entitled to dispute and to criticize the government in cases where it strayed from the policy determined by the coalition. Collective responsibility followed the British model and was enshrined in law, and was thus a departure from the system of voluntary agreements practiced in the Yishuv prior to the establishment of the state.36 Likewise we should note that the principle of collective responsibility was instrumental in promoting the centralization of the executive branch and government dominance, and strengthened existing tendencies toward a centralist policy. Collective responsibility led to the creation of a uniform government and facilitated the making and execution of a collective policy, but with time also prevented the transformation of the government into a federation of ministries. This, we should note, was one of the main problems of the government ministries in the period covered by this study, as we will see later in this book. To prevent a single party in the coalition from toppling the government, Ben-Gurion asked in 1949 to make use of two additional means to increase the consolidation of the government’s executive branch: ideological balance between opposing forces—religious vs. secular and left vs. right parties, and a tendency to form broader governments and larger coalitions than was strictly necessary. Large governments and ideological balance gave Mapai room to maneuver and enabled it to make use of other advantages of the coalition system to determine government policy. In this way it was able to limit to a minimum the ability of the various coalition parties to put pressure on it. This is also why in the first stage of the coalition negotiations after the 1949 elections, Ben-Gurion tried to recreate the broad coalition of the Provisional Government, which would have been comprised of over 95 MKs. In any case, Ben-Gurion refused to establish a two-party coalition as Mapam wanted, a structure that would have given the smaller of the two parties too much leverage. In the first meeting of the government on March 3, 1949, Ben-Gurion stated as follows: “The government was founded on the principle of the

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collective responsibility of all its members and the factions that form the government. This responsibility applies to the agreed-upon plans of the coalition and the government’s decisions. This responsibility does not preclude the freedom to disagree with any proposal that is raised for discussion in the Knesset and the freedom to criticize the government if it strays from the line determined for it by the Knesset or by the coalition.”37 Upon presenting his government before the Knesset on October 30, 1950, Ben-Gurion stated, “If this government is approved, they [the ministers] will have the right to appoint deputies from the members of Knesset and delegate some of their authorities to them. However, the appointment of a deputy does not release the ministers from their full responsibility towards all of the activities of their ministry, or their part of the government’s responsibility.”38 We can see the next stage in the establishment of the principle of collective responsibility in the ratification of the Transition Law Amendment 5711-1951: “The appointment of a deputy minister will not detract from the responsibility of a minister toward the activities of his ministry or from his part in the collective responsibility of the government.”39 A more constitutional formulation of the subject of collective responsibility can be found in Section 4 of the Basic Law of the Government 1968, which states that “the government bears collective responsibility before the Knesset.”40 This law is also a foundation of the British parliamentary system, which is based on a two-party system and one-party government, and according to which the members of the government bear collective responsibility for the government’s policy and decisions. Moreover, each minister bears ministerial responsibility for the activities of his ministry, before both the government and the Knesset.41 In the history of Israeli domestic politics, we have many examples of ministers resigning on the grounds of their ministerial responsibility. Following are a few salient examples from the 1950s and ’60s: The Lavon Affair of 1955, which led to the resignation of Pinhas Lavon; in 1956, Moshe Sharet resigned over a dispute with Ben-Gurion over foreign affairs and security; in 1960, Minister of Education Zalman Aran resigned over a dispute

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regarding the status of the Organization of Secondary School Teachers. To clarify, we should distinguish between the resignation and replacement of a single minister, the resignation of an entire faction (which may jeopardize the government’s majority in the Knesset), and the resignation of the prime minister, which means the collapse of the entire government (in which case it must be reconstituted or new elections declared). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the history of use of the principle of ministerial responsibility in Israeli politics shows that there is not necessarily a fixed and predetermined correlation between the event that serves as the basis for use of this principle and the end result or conclusions reached after the fact. In some cases, ministers resigned and in other cases they were transferred to a different position. In most cases, the decision was political. If a minister refused to resign, the only way the prime minister could make this happen was to submit his own resignation, bringing about the immediate collapse of the entire government. David Ben-Gurion did this twice: the first time in 1953, and the second time with his final resignation in June 1963; Prime Minister Golda Meir did the same in 1974.42 The period studied in this book laid the foundations for the principle of collective responsibility, though in effect only on May 15, 1981, was an amendment to the Basic Law of the Government ratified, stating: “A minister is responsible before the prime minister for the responsibilities for which he was appointed as minister.” Likewise, the prime minister is entitled to transfer a minister from his position if he first informs the government of his intention to do so.43

Chapter 10

The Interior Ministry (January 1949–November 1951)

A. The Interior Ministry during the Elected Government’s First Term: Basic Issues This chapter analyzes the political, organizational, and structural processes undergone by the Interior Ministry immediately after the war, particularly questions of continuity versus change with regard to the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav and the implementation policy of the Provisional Government during the war. The main question is the extent to which the end of the war and the establishment of the elected government influenced the continued consolidation of the ministry, looking at the following parameters: partisan issues (specifically the issues that preoccupied the Mizrahi Movement), district administration and local government (setting a clear division of authority between the two), population registry (in particular immigrants and Arabs), urban and rural development, and public advocacy.

B. Partisan Considerations in Transferring the Interior Ministry to the Mizrahi Movement The most obvious change in the Interior Ministry following the January 1949 elections and the coalition negotiations was the transfer of the ministry to the Mizrahi Movement under Minister Moshe Shapira. From Ben-Gurion’s point of view, this arrangement was preferable to having Mapam in the government, because apart from disagreements on social and educational issues related to the status of the religious communities 199

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in the new state, there were no major disagreements between Mapai and Mizrahi over external, security, or economic affairs, which were the major important issues for Mapai as the ruling party. Nevertheless, it seems that Mapai’s leadership did not accurately estimate the crises awaiting it with the religious sector and its representatives in the government regarding issues such as observance of the Sabbath and, above all, education. It is important to note that some of the issues that concerned Shapira, as Mizrahi’s representative in the government (and not in his capacity as interior minister per se), had to do with the religious sector’s sensitivity regarding its status and how it was perceived in national institutions such as the military, government ministries, and the workplace. This theme relates to broader questions of religion and state and the agreements reached, promises made, and problems that arose with regard to this issue. This is not the place to delve into the question of the status of religion in the State of Israel, not least because the subject has been extensively studied.1 However, it is worth mentioning what main points of friction occupied the religious parties (not only Mizrahi): the debate over the constitution and Ben-Gurion’s decision not to force the issue if it was opposed by the religious sector (mainly because he preferred the religious parties over Mapam as coalition partners); the interpretation of the controversy over Ben-Gurion’s “status quo” letter to Agudat Israel, declaring Saturday as the official day of rest for Jews; the question of women’s enlistment into national service; and the greatest bone of contention—the education system. In the 1948–1949 school year, the education system in Israel functioned according to three main streams: “the general stream” (bearing no distinctive political character or party affiliation), comprising approximately 40 percent of students; the “Labor stream” (founded by the Histadrut and affiliated with the values of the Labor Party), comprising 30 percent of students; and the “religious stream” (supervised by Mizrahi and HaPoel Mizrahi), which espoused a traditional-religious curriculum and accounted for 20 percent of the student body. When the massive waves of Jewish immigration from Arab countries began, the religious parties demanded that these children be given a religious education. This, they argued, was how

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most of them had been educated in their countries of origin, as opposed to the secular education that would be imposed on them in Israel. In contrast, their opponents from the other education streams declared that the country should strive toward an Israeli “melting pot” that would eventually bring about the merging of the different Diasporas. The main debate revolved around the education of the Yemenite immigrants, most of whom were observant Jews.2 In the fight for the education system, the religious camp was represented by the leader of the right-wing national-religious camp of the Mizrahi Movement, David Zvi Pinkas, who employed hyperbolic expressions during his speeches in the Knesset, such as “extinction,” “inquisition,” and “ka zet” (a reference to the Nazi concentration camps: “Cazet Lager”) to describe what the state was inflicting on the immigrant children. The situation deteriorated to the point that in February 1950 the religious ministers boycotted the cabinet meetings. Ben-Gurion’s declaration that this act was tantamount to their immediate exclusion from the government had no legal basis. He therefore ordered the confiscation of their official cars and even threatened to resign. Several weeks later, a compromise was reached, and the religious ministers returned to the government. It was agreed as follows: the camps with Yemenite immigrants would receive religious education, but the education system as a whole would come under the supervision of all the streams. In all the other immigrant camps (that did not include Yemenites), two streams would be recognized: religious and nonreligious. The religious education inspectors were allowed to enter the camps, and the representatives of the Labor stream also established a religious education network. The compromise agreement lasted about a year, during which most of the immigrants were transferred to ma’aborot (transit camps). Due to Mapai’s activity in these camps, the Labor stream had priority over the other streams.3 To illustrate the type of issues that Shapira had to deal with regarding the status of the religious public within the national institutions of the new state, take, for example, one problem facing observant soldiers during their military service. On November 20, 1950, the minister of the interior

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received a letter from a religious citizen, Moshe Aharoni, complaining about the attitude toward religious soldiers in the military. This letter authentically reflects the hardships encountered by the religious community during the first years of the state: “I would like to bring to your attention in writing the suffering of the religious Jew during his military service in the IDF. I have experienced it personally. I have now been in active reserve service for almost a month, and if I as an officer have suffered, imagine what the common private has suffered.”4 He went on to complain about the deputy battalion commander, who insisted on continuing a training session well into the Sabbath. According to Aharoni, the religious soldiers were afraid to ask that their particular needs be considered. He also complained that soldiers were driven in cars on the Sabbath and that Jewish dietary rules were not properly observed in the kitchen. The case at hand palpably reflects the problems of the religious public within the national institutions during the first years of the state: “On 13 November, soldiers brought two hens, which they decapitated and cooked using dishes from the general kitchen. I told the battalion commander and the rest of the officers about this and received only sarcasm in return, with no response. Needless to say, from that day forth I stopped eating food from that kitchen.”5 Letters of this kind flooded the minister’s office and touched on almost all areas of life. The controversy around the issue of education led to a profound crisis.

C. Structural Reorganization within the Ministry Shapira’s first act on entering office was to regulate the division of power and areas of authority between the two main divisions of his ministry, the General Administration Division and the Local (or as it was previously known, “Self”) Government Division. We should recall that when the ministry was established during the war, first priority was given to consolidating the General Administration Division, which was in charge of District Administration. This was of great importance, especially because of the need to lay the foundations for a

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system of Israeli governance (including over new territories annexed during the war). According to the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav and the policy of the newly established Interior Ministry, this came under the authority of the District Administration. During the war, local government was given second priority, and it only developed over time. This was the source of the friction and misunderstandings regarding jurisdiction. In Shapira’s report to the heads of the Local Government Division and the district commissioners, he stated: “I hereby inform you that I have decided to finalize the guidelines for the Local Government Division in its relationship with the local authorities and district commissioners.”6 During the work of the two divisions, three main problems arose: (1) the local authorities tended to circumvent the district commissioners and go directly to the central government; (2) the question of the authority of district commissioners vis-à-vis the general public; and (3) the question of who was in charge of the budgets of local authorities. Strengthening the Authority of the District Commissioners As a first step, Shapira ordered that the first two problems be addressed. To this end, he ordered that guidelines be established through the General Administration Division’s local representatives, namely, the district commissioners. We recall that already during Va’adat HaMatzav’s deliberations, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, committee member and minister of the interior-designate, warned against a situation in which local actors, including government agencies and the general public, would bypass the district commissioners and go directly to the central ministry. While Gruenbaum’s prediction was accurate, he was unable to prevent this from happening while serving as minister of the interior in the Provisional Government. Several factors contributed to the custom of bypassing the district commissioners: the great confusion created by the transition from the Yishuv to sovereignty, the lack of familiarity with the new governmental system, the prevailing perception existing from the Mandate period that “affairs can be settled” only at “headquarters,” and conditions during the war that sometimes prevented the resolution of issues on the ground. As a result, large numbers of citizens

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flooded the ministry’s headquarters in Tel Aviv, paralyzing it almost completely. To avoid this intolerable pressure on the main office in Tel Aviv, Shapira decided to bolster the authority of the district commissioners and made every effort so that the representatives of the local authorities and the public would address their issues first to the district offices. In so doing, he effectively restored the Mandate model, as had been recommended by Va’adat HaMatzav, by which the District Commissioner is the direct representative of the government on the ground. In contrast to his British predecessor, however, the district commissioner was devoid of any judicial authority. What, then, was the crux of Shapira’s reform? First, it was decided that the local authorities would contact the government through the district commissioners only in the following cases: (1) ratification or amendment of orders related to changes in the jurisdiction of a particular local council. In such cases, the matter would be brought before the minister for discussion only after the application was submitted, reviewed, and discussed at the district commissioner’s office; (2) approval of the establishment of a new local authority; and (3) approval for a loan to purchase equipment up to a specified amount: 5,000 lira for municipalities and 1,000 lira for local councils. A week later, Galilee District Commissioner Shlomo Har-Even wrote to the minister of the interior in support of his reform aimed at strengthening the position of district commissioner: “It is logical and most practical that such extensive work be undertaken by district administration officials who are familiar with the local authorities through daily interaction with them, and for whom it is relatively easy to master the subject matter and to supervise the municipal authority as required by the Interior Ministry. On the other hand, it should be said that it would be most difficult and unbeneficial to fulfill this role out of the main office at the Kirya (Tel Aviv) compound.”7 The Budgets of the Local Authorities The third issue that required a clear definition of authority was the question of responsibility for the budgets of the local authorities, which at the time was handled simultaneously by two different divisions of the ministry: General

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Administration and Local Government, and the Training and Supervision Department, a section of the ministry’s Head Office. Har-Even described the chaotic situation: “Currently, both the District Administration Division and the Ministry’s Supervisory Department are handling the budgets of the local authorities. Each is working separately, with no coordination between the two, which is leading to chaos. We now have a situation in which one approves and the other rejects; one recommends and the other opposes; and neither is familiar with the arguments of the other. Furthermore, a ridiculous situation has arisen in which no one can understand why two divisions under the same ministry act as if they are unaware of the existence of one another.”8 Har-Even gave an example of the absurdity of the situation: he summoned the representatives of Migdal, a local council near Tiberias, to discuss the council’s budget for 1949/50. However, on the day the discussion was set to take place, and with no prior coordination with the district commissioner, representatives of the Training and Supervision Department arrived in Migdal to discuss the same matter. To avoid such situations in the future, Har-Even suggested conducting joint meetings with the participation of all relevant ministry officials and council representatives. Expansion of Local Government In the years 1949 to 1951, the Local Government Division assisted 20 local councils by enacting laws and granting authorities. In addition, 14 regional councils, comprising 171 localities, were established. By the summer of 1951, the State of Israel included 14 municipalities, 44 local councils, and 18 regional councils, comprising 240 settlements. In total, 300 settlements were included in these municipal frameworks.9 To get an idea of the extent of the contribution of the Local Government Division to the country’s development boom, it should be noted that at the end of the British Mandate there were only 7 municipalities, 23 local councils, and four regional councils in the country. Besides this activity, the Local Government Division established an administrative mechanism for providing municipal services to 20 abandoned

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Arab villages that had been re-populated with 30,000 Jewish new immigrants. Moreover, regular municipal services were organized for another 37 immigrant neighborhoods, housing 40,000 individuals. Out of 90 Arab villages that remained within the jurisdiction of the State of Israel, only the village of Abu Ghosh near Jerusalem received municipal status recognizing it as a local council.10 In addition, the Division made a point not to include agricultural land within urban areas, which would have been detrimental to the agricultural sector. Industrial zones and factories were included within urban jurisdictions, and special emphasis was placed on maintaining the contiguity of jurisdictions to avoid the creation of ex-territorial enclaves. In 1951, 80 percent of the population belonged to a local authority.11 As a result of the massive immigration between 1948 to 1949, the budget of the local authorities rose from 6,300,000 lira to 10,000,000 lira, reaching 20,000,000 lira in 1950.12 By August 1951, the Local Government Division consisted of four departments: the Municipal Department, the Financial Training and Supervision Department, the Rural Department, and the Immigrant Settlements Department.

D. Organizing the Population Registry The Population Registry Division of the Interior Ministry had several issues that needed to be addressed: registration and census-data collection for the entire population, efficient and centralized data processing, monitoring populations at the district and subdistrict level, data privacy protection, and setting procedures to handle problematic population groups such as new immigrants and Arabs. Registration and Census Data Collection for the Entire Population The Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance was published in November 1948, under the Provisional Government. However, only after the elections and the end of the war was it possible to begin organizing

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census-taking and data-processing systems to effectively serve the needs of the government. In February 1949, twelve registry offices were established throughout the country: three on the district level —Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa; and nine on the subdistrict level—Nahariya, Nazareth, Afula, Tiberias, Hadera, Netanya, Petah Tikva, Rehovot, and Bet Shean.13 However, due to budgetary problems and for reasons of economy, it was decided to transfer some of the registration responsibilities to the local authorities. After completing the registration, the data were transferred to district and subdistrict bureaus, where it was easier for them to continue to track the population of the area under their jurisdiction. By tracking was meant registration in the population ledger; moving into and out of places of residence; switching apartments; changing names or addresses; searching addresses; registration of adoptions, marriages, and divorces; guardianship; and the issuance of identity cards.14 Another problem that required attention was the transfer of data from the census conducted in November 1948 on the eve of the elections, which was processed by the Central Bureau of Statistics under Prof. Roberto Baki. Baki had wanted to transfer the material to the Interior Ministry as quickly as possible, but since the material was coming from twelve different locations and divided into three age groups (0–15, 15–18, 19 and up), the Interior Ministry demanded that it be transferred in an orderly manner so that it could be redistributed to district and subdistrict registration offices for the sake of monitoring and oversight of population movement in any given area. It is important to recall that these statistics constituted the database for the elections to the Knesset, municipalities, and local councils, and that without it an updated voters’ registry could not be prepared. Upon completion of the registration card file and the national directory, it was decided that most of the material would remain at the offices of the District Registry, from where it would be easier to quickly retrieve it when the next elections were due to take place, rather than obtaining them from the subdistrict offices. Leaving the material at the district offices also gave the subdistrict representatives access to it when necessary.15

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Confidentiality and Privacy of Census Data In Va’adat HaMatzav’s initial planning of the Registry Department of the Interior Ministry, Yitzhak Gruenbaum suggested that government ministries be given relatively free access to the registry statistics at the Interior Ministry. However, Section 12 of the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance, issued by the Registry Department in November 1948 soon after its establishment, stated expressly that a census officer was prohibited from giving any details about registrants to non-authorized persons without the approval of the minister of the interior. Because of humanitarian and security reasons in the case of new immigrants and Arabs, there were two exceptions to this rule. On June 5, 1949, an agreement was reached between the minister of police and the minister of the interior allowing direct access to registry data to a small group of senior police officers.16 The demand was made for security reasons, primarily because of the fear of infiltration by Soviet spies under the guise of new immigrants from the Eastern Bloc, and because of the need to keep surveillance on suspects from the Arab population. The other exception, also related to new immigrants and Arabs, was the issue of family reunification. Many immigrants sought to locate relatives or acquaintances they had lost contact with during World War II, and Arabs living in the country were searching for their families (this problem will be discussed in a separate section about the Arab population). As for cooperation with other government ministries, the Interior Minister decided, with government approval, not to give the Finance Ministry details about property or accounts except when it was an issue of a criminal investigation, in which case special approval was required. Marriage Registration The main issue regarding marriage registration arose from Circular No. 56, issued by the Registry Department that required couples coming to register their marriage to provide a certificate from one of the branches of the rabbinate in Israel.

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On September 26 1949, Maximilian Hartglass, the director general of the Interior Ministry, informed the department heads at the ministry that this requirement applied only to couples who immigrated to Israel after its establishment. Couples who had arrived earlier, including illegal immigrants, could not present such certificates from their countries of origin or from Israel. Hartglass later emphasized: “It is not advisable to phrase circulars in such a way that they might be perceived as racially discriminatory and thus might give ammunition to the Arabs, and in general to those who hate us in the international community.”17 It is worth mentioning that the circular Hartglass cited referred only to Jews and not Arabs, which he considered to be improper. When speaking about “racial discrimination” and “those who hate us among the international community,” he was referring to the criticism that was beginning to be expressed in the international community toward Israel with regard to its treatment of the Arab population living in the new territories annexed during the war. In addition, the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance included a list of rights applicable to the Christian and Muslim populations in the State of Israel, and Hartglass stressed that these were not mentioned in the circular (which indeed referred only to the Jewish population), and argued that this should be emphasized. In October 1949, Moshe Alufi, head of the Registry Department at the Interior Ministry, responded that the circular only discussed the additions and amendments to the text of the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance, focusing in particular on the question of what documents candidates for marriage should provide.18 In his letter, Alufi notes that most of those who wished to change their marital status from “bachelor” to “married” did so based only on a name-change certificate in which both names of the couple appear as husband and wife. Therefore, the circular instructed that from then on, any change in marital status, such as marriage or divorce, would not be effectuated without presentation of marriage certificates issued by an Israeli rabbinical authority. Alufi stressed that different rules should apply to the non-Jewish population, not by way of discrimination, G-d forbid, but because of different religious customs prevailing within the Christian and Muslim communities with regard to marital issues.19

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The Interior Ministry still had far to go to achieve the level of bureaucratic and administrative efficiency for which they were striving. In May 1949, Alufi wrote to Hartglass, stressing the need to clarify the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance. From his words we can sense a fierce criticism of how things were being carried out in practice: Let me take this opportunity to dwell briefly on the provisions of the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance. The ordinance was passed seven months ago, and upon its publication the department was duty bound to disseminate clear instructions to the registry offices around the country, regarding their obligation to follow its provisions. These have yet to be formulated, and the ministries are in a state of confusion, each using its own discretion, and who knows how many errors have occurred in this area due to the lack of instructions. These internal circulars are not intended to replace the general provisions, but they are of extreme urgency in order to prevent the offices from registering changes in marital status based solely on a name-change approval.20 The case described here clearly illustrates one of the most pressing issues in the first years of the Israeli government. Administrative inexperience on the one hand, and problems that arose with complex populations that required unique solutions and distinct categories on the other, often resulted in a gap between the good intentions of the legislator and the planner and the implementation of the policy in practice. Such situations frequently surfaced during the Provisional Government and they became more frequent as government ministries began operating after the 1949 elections. Immigrant Registration The immigrant population was as difficult to monitor and register as the Arab population. During the war major issues arose around the registration of immigrants abroad, a situation that continued after their arrival in

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Israel due to the variety of organizations involved in their registration. It was therefore decided to simplify things by requiring only one form, which was to be filled out on the journey to Israel, with the assistance of a clerk who would be available to assist the new immigrants at the immigrant transit camps in Israel. On January 4, 1949, Yaakov Kislov, the head of the General Administration Division, notified the Ministry of Immigration about the Interior Ministry’s formulation of a definitive registration policy: “In accordance with the proposal presented by us: the registration process will begin on the ship by border control officers whom we will authorize to conduct the registration.”21 From April 1, 1949, to March 31, 1950, the Ministry’s registry offices (some 500 in number, in addition to the 12 subdistrict registry offices), the immigrant camps, and the border control stations registered some 223,000 immigrants, 29,100 newborns, and 8,050 returning citizens who had not been counted in the November 1948 census.22

E. Consolidation of Policy toward the Arab Population Fundamental Problems in Formulating Israeli Policy toward the Arabs in the State of Israel The issue of how to deal with the Arab population living in the territories that had been annexed by the State of Israel during the war provides one of the clearest examples of the administrative and political chaos that prevailed in the government ministries in the first years of the country. It also constituted a political problem in and of itself. Eli Reches notes that, toward the end of the War of Independence, the State of Israel faced a majority-minority problem that was unique. The Arab minority’s national, cultural, and religious affiliations to the Arab world beyond the borders of Israel, and the ongoing bloody conflict, created an acute dilemma of identity and allegiance for the Arab minority, and a split between an internal civilIsraeli focus and an external Arab-national one. The unique nature of this

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problem stemmed from a reality in which the State of Israel and its Jewish majority found themselves isolated in the midst of a hostile Middle East. The responsibility of deciding which line to adopt fell on the government, and the main dilemma during the period covered in this study was how to deal with the Arab population: whether as equal citizens before the law or as an enemy-affiliated minority.23 Answers to this dilemma fluctuated between two contradictory poles—the defensive, which regarded the Arab population annexed to the State of Israel as a security risk, and the egalitarian-liberal stance, which was expressed in safeguarding of the individual rights of all Israeli citizens, including the non-Jews, as stated in the Declaration of Independence: “total equality of social and political rights to all inhabitants of the country irrespective of religion, race, and gender, ensuring freedom of religion, conscience, language, education, and culture.”24 This idea was elaborated to some extent in the basic guidelines of the plans for the first government submitted to the Knesset on March 8, 1949, and has been repeated in various forms in the guidelines of all subsequent Israeli governments. The origin of the liberal-egalitarian approach arose from the genuine feeling among the Yishuv leadership that the Jews, who had lived for centuries as a persecuted minority, had been given an historic opportunity to demonstrate their attitude toward the minority now living in their midst. A good illustration of this approach is found in the visit of the first interior minister, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, to Haifa in September 1948, where he met with representatives of the city’s Arabs. In his address to Hajj Taha Qarman, the Arab deputy mayor, he said: “For many years I spoke as a representative of a minority [in the Polish parliament] and it is not easy for me now to respond as the representative of the majority, to the minority representatives in Israel.”25 It should be noted that both Pinchas Lavon and Yitzhak Ben Zvi believed that a concerted effort should be made to integrate the Arab population into the State of Israel. However, Reches notes that the commitment to the principle of equality, under the circumstances that emerged in 1948–1949, was very complex. This is reflected in complicated issues such as the Military Administration (which will be discussed at length

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later on), compulsory military service, the Naturalization Law, and the Law of Return. The desire to integrate the Arab population into civil life in the country ultimately won out over the security consideration. Underlying this consideration was the assumption that the Israeli Arabs were an enemy-affiliated minority, and as such posed a security risk to the state. The way to address this fear was expressed by areas of activity: partial expulsion of Arabs from their settlements during or after the war,26 takeover of abandoned Arab property, and land expropriations.27 The Interior Ministry Compared to other Ministries: Basic Issues The main problems that occupied the Interior Ministry in its handling of the Arab population in Israel should be analyzed in light of its relationship with other governmental ministries dealing with this issue, and in light of the clashes between the different divisions within the ministry itself that dealt with this population. In the period covered by this book, four entities dealt with the Arab population: the Military Administration, the Minorities Ministry, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Interior Ministry. The Military Administration The key party in implementing the security policy toward the Arab population was the Military Administration, which officially began operating on October 21, 1948. The Military Administration operated in five centers with heavy Arab populations: Nazareth, the Western Galilee, Ramle-Lydda, Jaffa, and the Negev. It was established to prevent the return of Arab refugees and the infiltration of hostile combatants, and to evacuate the partially abandoned Arab villages and neighborhoods. In effect, the Military Administration had unlimited powers, derived from Law 9(a), of Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1948, in other words the Emergency Regulations. It had the authority to restrict the movement of Arab citizens, and seize land

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and property, and also serve as a political mechanism and a recruiting instrument for the political parties. The Police and Minorities Ministry The Minorities Ministry was established during the Provisional Government. It was headed by Bechor Shalom Shitrit, who was also minister of police until June 1949. Shitrit had been a police officer in the British Mandatory police force and also served as a magistrate, and spoke Arabic well. He considered himself a worthy representative for the challenges of the Arab population in Israel. Politically, he represented the Sephardic community in the Provisional Government. Shitrit saw the role of his ministry as follows: “to make sure the rights of the minorities are not denied and to facilitate their return to normal life as soon as possible.”28 According to the announcement on the powers of ministers (Official Gazette, Issue 5), the minorities minister was granted the same powers previously held by the high commissioner.29 Gad Machnes was appointed general of the ministry. Under him were two departments: the Department for Rehabilitation and Fostering Relations with Minorities, headed by Moshe Aram, and the Department for Information, Culture, and Education, headed by the author Yehuda Burla. Reches notes that the ministry’s main activity was to coordinate and mediate between the Arab population and the various ministries, mainly in areas such as food supply, sanitation, employment, and credit. The ministry’s policy was identified with the liberal position, even though Shitrit favored security considerations. However, he looked for every way to alleviate the burden for Arab residents who suffered injury due to home demolitions or who had been evacuated from territories seized by the army. It is important to note that the ability of the Minorities Ministry to influence general policy and achieve real executive powers was rather limited. The ministry had no power base in the government or in the party system.30 Ultimately, after consulting with Yehoshua Palmon, his advisor for Arab affairs,31 David Ben-Gurion decided to dismantle the Minorities Ministry and distribute the responsibility for the various issues regarding the Arab

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population among the professional departments of the different ministries: the Finance Ministry took care of abandoned property and managed the assets of the Administrator General’s Office for Abandoned Property. The Defense Ministry operated the Military Administration; the Prime Minister’s Office housed the Advisor for Arab Affairs; and the Foreign Ministry dealt with a range of international legal issues relating to the new territories seized during the war, beyond the borders set in the Partition Plan. International Law, Security, Economic Affairs, and Party Issues With regard to diplomacy and international law, the most pressing question was the status of the new territories annexed during the war that were not included in the borders set by the Partition Plan. Although Israeli law had been applied to these territories, the international community did not recognize the annexation. This also led to friction between the Interior Ministry and the Military Administration, because any activity of an official government ministry outside of the Partition Plan borders was perceived by the U.N. as de facto annexation. Consequently, the political and legal status of the Arab residents and their property in these territories, including land and homes in the abandoned villages, was extremely complex. On the security level, the question of the allegiance of these Arabs to the State of Israel loomed large, and, contrary to the relatively moderate line that Shitrit supported, the Military Administration recommended that a harder line be taken, one that did not accord with the policy of the Minorities Ministry. On the partisan and political levels, the parties wanted to ensure the support of the Arab population. And on the economic level, severe problems emerged, from a lack of basic infrastructure for water and sewerage and a lack of medical services, to difficulties in finding work for thousands of unemployed Arabs.32 It is worth noting that bureaucratic competition existed between the government ministries as to “who should be in charge of the Arab population.” The Foreign Ministry, for example, claimed that the entire Arab issue essentially came under the category of “foreign affairs,” not only due

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to the international status of the newly annexed territories, but also due to the refugee question, which was being debated at the U.N. However, the Foreign Ministry could not handle the logistical needs of the Arab population on the ground, since it was not equipped to do so. Who, then, should be in charge? The Interior Ministry’s New Role in Dealing with the Arab Population Under the Provisional Government, the Interior Ministry was not responsible for the issue of the Arab population, since Mapai was not willing to entrust such a delicate political matter to Mapam due to ideological differences between the two parties. Following the elections of 1949, however, with Mapam outside the coalition and control of the ministry going to Mizrahi, an easy relationship emerged between Mizrahi and Mapai, facilitating the division of labor between the Interior Ministry and the Military Administration. This was also a pretext for dismantling the Minorities Ministry and establishing in its stead a Department of Minorities within the Interior Ministry. This department was headed by Shimon Landman and answered to the General Administration Section.33 At first, the department focused on selecting and training candidates for teaching positions in Arab schools and Arab-speaking broadcasters for the radio, granting transit permits and settling issues of permanent residency (this within the restrictions of the Military Administration, which prevented the return of those suspected of hostile activity or refugees who wanted to return and become permanent residents). In addition, the department dealt with logistics and food supplies, and handled the issue of assets and property that had been confiscated by the military. The department also provided welfare services; helped with the release of detainees, prisoners, and captives; established factories; and took steps toward improving hygiene and sanitation in the Arab villages. With regard to absentee property, the department worked in coordination with the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Justice, and Agriculture. However, the more involved they became in these areas, the more the Interior Ministry was faced with four issues requiring clear demarcations

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of power and authority vis-à-vis the other ministries: (1) their relationship with the Military Administration, (2) their relationship with the special bureau established by the Prime Minister’s Office and headed by Yehoshua Palmon, (3) the question of who was in charge of registering the Arabs, and (4) inter-ministerial relationships: who was in charge of what. Friction between the Interior Ministry, the Military Administration, and the Prime Minister’s Office With regard to relations with the Military Administration, Kislov was troubled by the rescindment of the Military Administration in Ramle, Lydda, and Jaffa, which, with Haifa, were four mixed Jewish-Arab cities transferred to the control of the civil District Commissioner under the Interior Ministry. The main problems revolved around the authority of the district civil commissioner versus the military governor. In the period covered by this book, the Military Administration went through two distinct subperiods: (1) its establishment in the territories captured during the war (in the Negev, the Tichon [center of the country], and the Galilee); and (2) the question of whether to continue with the Military Administration after the end of the war and the signing of the Armistice Agreement. On November 8, 1949, the government decided to establish a committee to study the question of the Arab population in Israel, which consisted of representatives from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Supply and Rationing, the Foreign Ministry, and the Interior Ministry.34 The Interior Ministry sought to clarify the status of the district commissioner vis-à- vis the military governor on three main issues: activities of the Interior Ministry within the jurisdiction of the Military Administration, authority and work processes of Arab Affairs officers in areas outside the jurisdiction of the military administration, and definition of the role of the Minorities Department of the Interior Ministry. The government resolution of July 21, 1949, stated: “Within the General Staff a division for the administration of the occupied territory will be established. The head of the division will be appointed with the consent of the ministers of defense, minorities, and the interior. The head of the division will appoint military

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governors throughout the occupied territories, this, too, with the consent of these three ministers. Each military governor will have two officers, one appointed by the minister of minority affairs and the other by the minister of the interior.”35 This decision emphasizes the subordination of the Military Admin­ istration to the government ministries. In fact, however, a dispute arose between the two bodies over authority, in which the Military Administration tried to invest the military governor with the powers of the Mandate district commissioner. The day before his retirement, Lieutenant Colonel Mor, a senior officer in the Military Administration, summed up this position: “Regarding authority, the Knesset will take care of and discuss the Emergency Regulations so long as they exist. In actuality, the (military) governor can deal with and hold civil and administrative authority, as was done in practice by the British district commissioner, for example. The question must be resolved as to whether the military governor will hold these authorities or whether they should be included in the Emergency Regulations.”36 On November 14, 1951, a meeting was held between Yaakov Kislov, Yehoshua Palmon, Shimon Landman, and Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhak Shani of the Military Administration, in an attempt to resolve disputes over the division of powers between the Interior Ministry and the army.37 It was decided that the military governor should receive from the Interior Minister the same powers given by the Interior Minister to the district commissioner, and that the Interior Ministry would appoint civilian officials to work alongside him. However, in spite of the attempt to resolve the issues, it remained a bone of contention throughout the period covered by this study. Yehoshua Palmon, head of the Arab Department in the Prime Minister’s Office, expressed it well when he said, “In my opinion the main problem to be resolved is with the Interior Ministry, since the others are fine with the defense services. De facto the district commissioner [the military governor] is somewhat undermined by the Interior Ministry, which does not want to give it [authority] to the governor.”38 By “defense services,” Palmon was referring to those areas of intelligence cooperation engaged in by the Military Administration with regard

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to arresting infiltrators and those suspected of hostile terrorist activities. With the establishment of the Arab Department in the Prime Minister’s Office, Kislov feared that the Military Administration would view it as the sole entity for Arab affairs rather than his own office. Thus he stressed that “it is therefore necessary to clarify the powers of this bureau and avoid any duplication whatsoever with regard to Arab affairs.”39 Ben-Gurion, it should be noted, tended to surround himself with advisors who were not always in agreement with government ministers. Yehoshua Palmon is one example of this phenomenon, and Reuven Shiloach (Zaslani) is another, on intelligence matters. As in many other cases mentioned, once again we see the issue of multiple departments and bureaus dealing simultaneously with the same issues. It was not long before a serious dispute arose between the Arab Department of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Military Administration on the one hand, and the Minorities Department of the Interior Ministry on the other: “Since we have suffered enough from the overlap of powers, I must inform you that if you are not also in charge of the Records Department, then the matter of population registration and supervision within the jurisdiction of the Military Administration is now a matter for the Military Administration to handle.”40 In this critique, Palmon is referring to the registration process—a complex issue in itself that will be discussed in the next section. The Registration of Arab Inhabitants Alongside these power struggles, another problem emerged—the registration of inhabitants. Who was to be in charge of registering the Arab population—the Military Administration or the Interior Ministry? How was the registration to be conducted? How would specific problems related to the Arab population be handled, in particular concerning women? The problems arose because of the traditional status of women in Arab society, mainly over the level of their exposure during the registration process: can she leave the house? Is she allowed to be photographed? If the registration clerks are men, can the registration be conducted in her home? etc.41

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Registration policy for the Arab population was agreed upon at the beginning of July 1949 between the head of the Registration Department of the Interior Ministry, Dr. Yaakov Marcus, and Major General Binyamin Avner of the Military Administration.42 It was decided that the registration itself would be carried out in three stages: in the first stage, Arab adults would appear (without the women) before the registration officers and provide details about themselves and their family members. This would be done under the supervision of Arabic-speaking soldiers, who would accompany the registration teams. In the second stage, the army would receive the registration forms, examine them, and prepare military identity cards. In parallel, the representative of the Department of Supply and Rationing would provide the name of the shopkeeper from whom the registrant would receive his family’s food rations. Copies of questionnaires would be transferred to the Central Bureau of Statistics for processing. In the third stage, the army returned the original questionnaires to the registration offices, and the registration teams would visit each home again for validation purposes. If the data turned out to be accurate, the participants would receive their identity cards.43 Full registration in the Galilee and in the Negev began only in July 1949.44 On September 1, 1949, Yehoshua Palmon handed Dr. Marcus the final guidelines regarding the registration of the Arab population, while emphasizing that Arab inhabitants were only registered if they met the following criteria: (1) they were at least sixteen years old on the day of the census; (2) according to the interministerial committee, they were entitled to enjoy the same rights as those who resided in the country at the time of the registration, and who were registered but were absent when it took place; and (3) they were inhabitants who were in detention in prisoners’ camps and were released45 (this condition was intended to prevent the inclusion of illegal infiltrators). Disputes over the Treatment of Arabs within the Interior Ministry Two main problems emerged in this area: the friction between the officer for minorities in the Minorities Department and the district commissioner,

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and the dispute between the General Administration Division and the Local Government Division with regard to the handling of abandoned Arab villages and their repopulation with new immigrants. Power Struggle between the District Commissioner and the Officer for Minorities . The main dispute between officers for minorities and district commissioners related to the former’s autonomy in the field. The officers viewed themselves as having complete autonomy with regard to the handling of the Arab population, and demanded that they work directly with other government ministries, whereas the district commissioners saw them as district officers for all intents and purposes, and thus subordinate directly to them. Following is an example of such a clash. In December 1950 there was some tension between the officer for minorities in Jaffa, Avraham Malul, and the Tel Aviv district commissioner, Yosef Kuperman. Malul believed himself to be an expert on coordinating issues related to the Arab population vis-à-vis other government ministries, and saw the district commissioner’s representative in Lydda and Ramle as subordinate to him. Kuperman, for his part, refused to shuttle his representative in Lydda around according to Malul’s needs in Jaffa, and rejected the latter’s assertion of exclusive authority with regard to the other ministries. In Kuperman’s words, “Mr. Malul’s attitude strikes me as erroneous at its core. It undermines the jurisdiction of the district officer, leads to misunderstandings between him and Mr. Lalo [the Ramle-Lydda District Officer], and causes duplication. Moreover, this attitude will cause mayhem within the Arab population in Ramle and Lydda, who view the district officer and his office as the sole authority for handling issues arising between them and the various government ministries.”46 Therefore, Kuperman suggested that the officer for minorities become a member of the staff of the district officer under the authority of the district commissioner, though with expertise in the Arab sector: “He will be in charge of their [the Arabs’] economic affairs and will supervise Arab affairs on the sub-district level and serve as the address for all the special problems and requests of the Arabs in the district. The interaction between the district officer and the Minorities

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Department of the Interior Ministry and other government ministries and institutions will be on behalf and under the authority of the [district] commissioner.”47 How should we understand the dispute between Malul and Kuperman? We can identify a number of problems (already discussed in previous chapters) relating to the establishment of the Interior Ministry, from the planning phase through its consolidation during the war and after the formation of the first elected government. The difficulties of the district commissioner in establishing his authority vis-à-vis those in the professional echelon under his authority in the office (see the clash with the Local Government Division, described below) was also a product of a certain lack of clarity regarding the division of authorities between the different position-holders. We must ask, therefore, whether these definitions were not expressed clearly in writing, or whether the space for interpretation was simply wide enough to lead to misunderstandings. With regard to the status of the district commissioner of the Israeli Interior Ministry, it was clear both in the planning phases in Va’adat HaMatzav and in the definitions of the General Administration Division and the director general of the ministry, that he was the highest authority in all matters relating to the government’s representation on the ground. However, from the unfolding of events, we understand that this definition was not sufficiently clear or accepted by other ministries, all the more so since there was the occasional clash between the professional level of a particular staff member (in this case, the officer for minorities) and the district commissioner. It is important to note here that most of the officers for minorities had rich experience working with the Arab population, dating back to the British Mandate, and were well educated and multilingual. The case of Avraham Malul is particularly salient, since as early as the Yishuv period, he had been asked by the national institutions to join the British Mandate District Administration, where he served as the district officer in Gaza. When he presented his candidacy to the Interior Ministry he submitted a letter of recommendation from then Head of the Intelligence Branch Binyamin Gibli, who highlighted Malul’s contribution to the Jewish settlement of

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the Negev.48 From Kuperman’s words it is quite clear that he acknowledged the professional merit of the officer for minorities, but it was not enough to negate the structure and hierarchy of the ministry. The Dispute between Divisions of the Interior Ministry on the Responsibility for Abandoned Villages and Their Repopulation. In an angry letter sent on April 1949 by Yaakov Kislov, head of the General Administration Division, to Maximilian Hartglass, director general of the Interior Ministry, the writer protests against the Local Government Division’s initiative to participate in the municipal committees of Ramle and Lydda and of a few abandoned villages, and claims full jurisdiction over these areas: “As you are aware, I am approaching the finalization of the arrangements to appoint municipal committees in these cities, and we are investigating the situation in the abandoned villages that have been populated with new immigrants. I see no possibility of fulfilling the request of the Local Government Division to be included in this activity. Not only do I find it unnecessary, but, moreover, such an arrangement would cause delays and duplication of work, and as such, is a waste of money for the State.”49 In principle, Kislov was right. The daily administration of Arab cities and abandoned villages came under the responsibility of his division, which, together with the Military Administration, was in charge of the Minorities Department. However, while Hartglass agreed with Kislov that in the case of the villages under the Military Administration, authority was in the hands of the General Administration Division, there was nothing to prevent those villages that were not under the Military Administration from coming under the authority of the local government. The distinction between a village under the Military Administration and a village not included in this category applied to those abandoned villages that according to the Partition agreements were outside the borders of the Jewish State, and thus were problematic from the point of view of international law. In particular, Hartglass was concerned about the status of new immigrants who were to be settled in settlements of this type. The director general thus put an end to the dispute as follows:

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Obviously, we must rule on what the situation in these territories is. Who are those who will populate it, the number of inhabitants, their sources of livelihood, their political make-up, can they fund their own local institutions, are they residents in actuality or in transit with no intention to settle permanently. There is no doubt that such an investigation is the responsibility of the General Administration and it is that office that must draw conclusions. However the evaluation of such suggestions belongs to the Division of Self [i.e. local] Government. They need to determine whether to take the necessary steps toward building a council or municipality at this place or another, or not.50

F. The Division of Urban and Rural Construction In previous chapters dealing with organization of the Labor Ministry, we saw that the subject of national planning came under its responsibility until 1949. From that point on, “initiated” planning (i.e., the drafting of a national master plan) was transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office, while “routine” planning was placed under the Interior Ministry.51 Once this process was completed, the Interior Ministry began implementing the policy set forth by the government. At the time of the transfer of the division to the Interior Ministry in 1949, it consisted of five regional departments: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, the Galilee, the Negev, and a department of coordination. The division dealt with planning issues of the local authorities and preparing development and inspection plans. Oversight of the implementation was part of the national master plan, which was entrusted to the Prime Minister’s Office.52 At the center of the division were five departments, based on the geographical division that existed under the Mandate. Each department was divided into two sections: the Tel Aviv section was in charge of planning, and the Jerusalem section was in charge of implementation and inspection. Each of the local authorities had a city planning committee, which was tasked with all licensing and construction activities within its jurisdiction, once construction plans were approved by the committee.

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With all the Mandatory material related to urban planning in its hands, the division made suggestions to amend existing plans in light of the changes that had occurred since the establishment of the state. This related to the settlement of the population, and of immigrants in particular, throughout the country. Four district committees—Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa and Tiberias—convened once a month to oversee the district authorities and coordinate between national and regional planning. The regional committees received instructions for implementation from the district committees. It should be noted that the relationship between the District Administration and local authorities was in line with the initial plans of Va’adat HaMatzav as understood by the General Administration Division. In other words, the district commissioner represented the government on the ground and served as the highest authority on the district level on behalf of the Interior Ministry. Gradually, the division of powers between the General Administration Division and the Local Government Division became clearer, and the status of the District Administration and the district commissioners and the working relationships between them and the various divisions within the ministry was clarified, in contrast to the many disputes that occurred with the other government ministries. In addition, the officials of the General Administration Division managed to convince the local authorities to amend development plans dating back to the British Mandate that no longer accorded with the needs of the state. In Jerusalem, for example, a completely new development plan was submitted, and in Safed, Tiberias, Acre, Beer Sheva, and Migdal preliminary development plans were prepared. The local councils in Nahariya, Hadera, Afula, and Rehovot began preparing development plans in 1950– 1951. At the same time, the division prepared new construction plans for dozens of abandoned Arab villages.53

G. Information: The Division of Press, Information, and Cinema The members of Va’adat HaMatzav considered integrating the Government Information Bureau into the Interior Ministry. Indeed, during the Provisional

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Government all handling of the media, information, the broadcasting authority, and cinema was the responsibility of the Interior Ministry. With the establishment of the elected government in March 1949, these matters were transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office, whereas the Interior Ministry was responsible for press-related legislation, such as licensing for new newspapers and the establishment of the Film and Theater Review Board, headed by Yaakov Kislov, who also headed the General Administration Division.54 During the period covered by this book, this division issued ninety-eight new permits for the establishment of newspapers, of which fifty-four were in Hebrew and forty-four in foreign languages, evidence of the many languages spoken in the country as a result of the mass immigration. As part of the implementation of the Press Law, officials of the Interior Ministry prosecuted newspapers operating without a license or publishing unverified information. Furthermore, the division conducted 280 information sessions on the activities of the different government ministries. The Cinema Section was active in two main areas: encouragement of initiatives to establish an Israeli film industry, and film censorship. An example of the Film and Theater Board’s activities can be seen from a letter that Board Chairman Yaakov Kislov sent to A. Shapira, manager of Eden Cinema in Jerusalem, after watching the premiere of The Magnificent Yankee, a film featuring the story of the Jewish-American Zionist leader, Louis Brandeis: “I am grateful for the special screening of the film The Magnificent Yankee. I am pleased to say that the Film and Theater Review Board welcomes the screening of this movie in Israel, since it is a first-rate artistic and cultural film worthy of being a fine example for film companies and their agents, about the kind of films that should be screened before the Israeli public.”55 The board consisted of four government representatives and four representatives of the public, including authors, teachers, and social workers. The criteria for approval or disqualification were divided into “national” and “moral.” With regard to the former, the intention was to veto the screening of films that might damage the Zionist ethos or the state (for example, films with a pro-Arab agenda or ones that negated the Zionist

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concept, either explicitly or implicitly), or films that could be interpreted as being critical of the government or its policy. There is no doubt that political considerations were dominant in these decisions, although it is very difficult to prove that a certain film was disqualified because of a certain political intention. On the “moral” level, the board served as a kind of “moral gatekeeper,” in particular when it came to sexual mores. The Film and Theater Review Board made its decisions after its members had viewed the films and then discussed them, followed by a vote. In any event, the final decision was in the hands of the head of the board, in particular when votes were tied. Another important instrument for explaining the government’s policy was the Carmel Newsreels, which were screened in movie theaters across the country, reporting once every two weeks about events of national importance. In 1950–1951, fifty newsreels were produced, as well as information films in Arabic and an information film for Jewish communities abroad that was called The State of Israel as a Land of Relaxation. When the government decided to support Ben-Gurion’s initiative to turn the Negev into a primary settlement destination, a film called The Negev was produced for screening before high school students and youth movements. Special emphasis was placed on youth education. To this end, the Film and Theater Review Board, together with the Ministry of Education, created a film archive and purchased fifty-five projectors from the United States. In 1951 the department possessed “some three hundred educational films,” according to their definition. These films disseminated what the board deemed to be “social and ideological messages” and emphasized the idea of making the desert bloom and the pioneering ethos, using American films depicting Westerns, stories of immigration, and the history of American settlement. On occasion, the Cinema Section sent its members to represent Israel at international film festivals in Cannes, Venice, and Brussels. In 1950 and 1951, 1,225 films were approved for screening in Israel and 6 were disqualified; out of 45 theater plays, 3 were disqualified.56 Based on this information we can see that in actuality the level of censorship was quite low.

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H. Reorganizing the Ministry: Summer 1951 Establishing a Supervisory Committee and Preliminary Recommendations During 1950 the situation within the government ministries became untenable. Complaints came from government employees themselves, politicians, and citizens who needed their services. Everyone deplored the bureaucratic red tape, the duplication of responsibilities and offices, and the time it took to resolve problems. In the cabinet meeting of February 15, 1950, Government Secretary Zeev Sharf was asked to submit a comprehensive report on the structure of the government ministries, addressing each ministry separately.57 After studying the ministries, Sharf submitted a report to the government for approval. The Committee for Restructuring the Interior Ministry convened on June 7, 1951, in the presence of Secretary Sharf, his assistant Avraham HaCohen, Yaakov Kislov, head of the General Administration Division, and his deputy Shmuel Bechar Yashaya.58 Sharf’s main suggestions regarding the Interior Ministry were preventing the overlap of responsibilities between offices and departments, decentralizing power from the center to the periphery as much as possible (i.e., from the head office to the District Administration), approval of only large administrative units and the integration of small units into large ones. For example, information and media affairs had been divided between two offices: the Prime Minister’s Office and the Interior Ministry. Bechar Yeshaya, the representative of the Interior Ministry, and Avraham HaCohen, Sharf’s assistant, stated that it must be decided which of the two should assume full responsibility for the issue. Bechar Yeshaya claimed that licensing and information should be separated and that all press affairs should be entrusted to the Interior Ministry, since the department dealt with the domestic press. The subject of cinema included the Film and Theater Review Board of the Interior Ministry, and the production of educational films for schools and adults. Avraham HaCohen, for his part, suggested that all cinema affairs come under the Ministry of Education, mostly because of the ethical-moral consideration relating to youth education.

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Another example of such overlap was the subject of housing, which was handled by both the Labor Ministry and the Interior Ministry. Following a careful examination of the matter, it was decided that housing affairs would be taken care of on the district and subdistrict levels in the Interior Ministry, since the technical, structural aspects of building were the responsibility of the district engineers associated with the District Administration, and since the chairman of the Central Housing Committee at the Labor Ministry could not deal with the technical aspects on a national scale. District Administration Regarding the transfer of authorities to the districts, HaCohen suggested reducing the workload in the ministries’ central office and transferring as much authority as possible to the District Administration. Special emphasis was placed on the following topics: contracts, budgets, local bylaws, local planning, and supervisory roles and training, including the ongoing handling of immigrant settlement. In response, the Interior Ministry was adamant in its insistence on a strong center with supervisory and coordination authority over the districts. Yeshaya suggested endorsing the organizational model proposed to the Status Commission by Edwin Samuel, namely, the consolidation of the administration of the government ministries under a single administrative framework in the District Administration: “Such a consolidation would benefit the public, create efficiency and order, and prevent delays. A single district administrative system would also help coordinate all the plans for managing and development, which would save both funds and personnel.”59 However commission members decided not to make decisions in haste, since such radical changes would require many changes in the District Administration. The Local Government Division As for local government, HaCohen suggested revoking the grants for local authorities and giving them the authority to collect government property tax. Besides the Interior Ministry’s objection in principle to providing

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grants from the government, which created an unhealthy dependency of the local authorities on the central government, this measure would save money. Yeshaya noted, however, that the income generated from tax collection would be significantly lower than the grants, which would not remove the dependency of local authorities on central government budgets. In HaCohen’s opinion, if the principle of establishing the large administrative units that would absorb the small ones were accepted, then “It will be difficult to justify the continued existence of the Divisions of Self [i.e., Local] Government, General Administration, and the Press as separate administrative units. We must recommend that they be reduced and annexed as small units to the central offices. The future of the Divisions of Self Government, the Press, and Urban and Rural Construction will be determined mainly with a mind toward preventing redundancy and transferring powers to the districts.”60 The Divisions of General Administration and Local Government: Committee Conclusions Regarding the General Administration Division, the representative of the Interior Ministry noted that the division was already reduced in its current format and that in addition the Departments of Naturalization and the Registration of Public Societies were being transferred to the Interior Ministry from the Labor Ministry. Toward the end of the discussion, HaCohen emphasized that only two entities should exist within the Interior Ministry: the Registration Department, which would include population registration and naturalization, and the District Administration Division. On June 14, 1951, Yaakov Kislov appeared before the Committee for Restructuring of the Interior Ministry and on June 20, 1951, Avraham Meron, head of the Local Government Division, made his appearance.61 Kislov came away with the impression that the committee members were leaning toward removing all matters of information, press, and cinema from the Interior Ministry and transferring District Administration matters to the ministry’s director general. In his presentation to the committee, Kislov stressed that transferring the areas of activity of the Interior Ministry to

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the Ministry of Education and to the Prime Minister’s Office undermined the authority of the ministers that had been agreed on in the government’s first cabinet meetings: “This last question certainly touches upon the government’s general policy regarding the centralization of official powers in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Finance Ministry, or their distribution, as we have been familiar, among all ministries.”62 Here there is an explicit criticism of Ben-Gurion’s centralist tendencies. Kislov thought that the committee had been entrusted with preventing administrative overlap between the ministries, and not with transferring powers from one ministry to another.63 On the one hand, the committee members maintained the right of autonomy in certain areas, such as planning, registration, District Administration, and financial management. However, they did not realize the importance of the existence of a general administrative system as a prerequisite for managing the ministry’s affairs: “Such a concept is, in my view, obsolete. The general character and the great variety of roles of the Administration Division cannot negate its professional character, just as not anyone can become a planner, engineer, etc., so must the civil servant be a professional.”64 Kislov further claimed that the role of a particular administrative unit cannot be determined according to the number of its employees or its offices, but rather according to the nature of problems it must address on the ground, and its dedicated tasks. With regard to District Administration, Kislov stressed that the Local Government Division is the body that grants the district commissioners all the permits and guidelines for handling matters of jurisdiction, elections, budgets, and contracts. The General Administration Division handles permitting of firearms, possession of explosives, and trade in alcohol and spirits. To conclude, Kislov said: “In light of the experience accumulated over the past three years, I have expressed the opinion that the General Administration Division should remain a separate administrative unit in the Interior Ministry and under its management.”65 Avraham Meron emphasized before the commission members the continued necessity to maintain this division as a separate unit, for the purpose of oversight over the local authorities and to provide them with guidance:

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“The policy of the Interior Ministry is to extend the powers of local authorities and to intervene as little as possible in the management of their internal affairs. However, the ministry will continue to generally supervise local authorities to prevent them from carrying out activities that exceed their legal powers or are contrary to the general policy of the government.”66 It should be noted that as the committee completed its tasks, HaCohen, the representative of the government apparatus, remained adamant that the departments should be transferred to the General Administration and Local Government should be transferred through the director general to the district commissioners. However, it should be emphasized that during the period covered in this book, the general structure of the ministry remained unchanged, and most of the divisions remained intact even after the elections to the second Knesset in November 1951. On December 24, 1950, Bechar Yeshaya submitted a comprehensive report on the number of permanent positions in the Interior Ministry, which totaled 350, and recommended the addition of 211 positions.67 The significance of this was that every minister sought to increase the number of positions in his respective ministry, a phenomenon that became widespread in all of the ministries at the time. Intermediate Summary of the Management of the Interior Ministry: January 1949– November 1951 During the period under discussion, the Interior Ministry continued to strengthen its position on the ground and to institutionalize the work of its various divisions, while coping on a daily basis with the political and administrative problems that characterized the government system as a whole. On the party level, particular problems arose between Mizrahi, which was given the ministry, and Mapai (besides the fundamental dispute over the future of education in the country), and most of the problems that arose during the period covered by this chapter touched on the structure and division of authorities between the Interior Ministry and other ministries, and between the various divisions within the ministry itself. One of the most noticeable phenomena relating to both these issues has to do with

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the difficulties of the district commissioner in establishing his authority in relation to the other ministries, the Local Government Division of the Interior Ministry, and the public. In spite of the challenges, the District Administration continued to act in the spirit of the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, and the stabilization of the Local Government Division created a balance that enabled the creation of good working relations between the different divisions. In the realm of population registration, a genuine effort was made to consolidate and optimize the registration methods, the analysis, and the use of the database, while emphasizing the difficulty of registering and monitoring two problematic population groups: new immigrants and Arabs. Furthermore, during the period in question the ministry received two new spheres of responsibility that were not included in the ministry during the planning stages of Va’adat HaMatzav or the period of the Provisional Government, namely, minorities and rural and urban construction, both of which were transferred to the Interior Ministry from the Labor Ministry. Responsibility for the Arab population, in cooperation with the Prime Minister’s Office and the Local Government Division, is an example of a complex and delicate subject, both politically and administratively, and the issue of rural and urban construction proved the efficiency of the Local Government Division. In conclusion, it can be said that structurally (with the exception of two areas that were added) and in terms of working methods, the Interior Ministry operated according to the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, and in the period of calm following the end of the war, it was able to focus on handling all the issues assigned to it in the preliminary planning stages: District Administration, population registration, local government, and domestic public information.

Chapter 11

The Labor Ministry (January 1949–November 1951)

A. Reorganizing the Labor Ministry following the Elections More than any other ministry in the period discussed in this book, the Labor Ministry underwent profound, far-reaching changes following the end of the war. The reasons for the changes were both political and functional, and they constitute a fascinating case study of the consolidation process of the Israeli government in its first years. On the political level, two things should be taken into account: the transition of Mapam to the opposition in 1949, and Ben-Gurion’s decision to give the Labor portfolio to Mapai member Golda Meir, then Israel’s Ambassador to Moscow. At the same time, the ministry was also undergoing structural changes that reflected the differences in opinions that prevailed between the political and professional echelons on the subject of planning in the new state. Furthermore, the ministry was required to cope with two very difficult problems: employment and immigration. Golda Meir writes in her memoirs about Ben-Gurion’s offer of the position of Labor Minister: “Ben-Gurion asked me whether I would be willing to join the government he was assembling. ‘I want you to be the Minister of Labor’ he said [ . . . ] I rejoiced at Ben-Gurion’s proposition. Finally I would be in a place that I really wanted, in a job that I felt that, unlike other positions, I am absolutely suited for. Not that at that stage I knew, nor did anyone else in the government, what exactly would be included in the responsibilities of the Labor Ministry.”1 It is worth noting that the appointment of Golda Meir as minister attracted severe criticism from the religious sector because of her gender, 235

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but, according to her account, the religious bloc accepted her argument that: “in ancient Israel, Deborah was a judge, a role at least equal to that of a government minister, if not more important.”2 As Golda Meir assumed office, two divisions that served as pillars of the ministry during the war were eliminated: the Division of Labor and the Manpower Division, both of which had focused on siphoning civilian personnel for wartime needs. Two new divisions were established in their stead: an Employment and Labor Relations Division and a Research and Inspection Division. The Antiquities Department (until then part of the Labor Ministry) was transferred to the Ministry of Education, and the Department for Cooperative Association (until then part of the Ministry of Agriculture) was transferred to the Labor Ministry. In addition, the Planning Division was detached from the Labor Ministry, part of which (centralized planning) was transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office, while routine planning was transferred to the Interior Ministry. The name of the Labor Ministry was then changed from the Ministry of Labor and Construction to the Ministry of Labor and National Insurance.3 On May 31, 1949, the Labor Ministry looked as follows: The senior management and central divisions included the following: General Administration, Employment and Labor Relations, Research and Inspection, and Social Security, the latter of which answered directly to the director general and dealt mainly with preparing insurance plans for a variety of areas: medical, accident, retirement, widow/ers and orphans, and unemployment. This division worked together with the Ministries of Finance, Health, and Welfare. The Division of Public Works and Technical Services included the Department of Public Works, the Surveyor’s Office, and the Water Department. Three departments were directly subordinate to the director general: Building Inspection, Trade Unions, and Social Security.4 As part of the restructuring plan, the ministry underwent a process of centralization and downsizing in the spirit of the plans submitted by Edwin Samuel to Va’adat HaMatzav: instead of three independent divisions, as was the situation during Ben-Tov’s tenure, most of the management and

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inspection work was concentrated in the General Administration Division. For the 1949/50 budget year, the ministry included four new administrative units: the Department of Factory and Workplace Inspection and three sections: labor productivity, professional training, and social security. During Ben-Tov’s term of office, the Labor Ministry had 160 permanent employees and 282 temporary employees, whereas during Golda Meir’s term this number decreased to 150 employees. Of the 150 posts available to the ministry on May 31, 1949, 17 were for professional specialists in the area of labor relations, and 61 were technical or clerical.5 Mapai members held all 17 professional positions. Before the reorganization was carried out, the ministry had separate branches for the oversight of labor relations and manpower in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. With the establishment of the new government in March 1949, all branches were relocated to Tel Aviv. The number of aides and messengers in the ministry thus rose from 35 during Ben-Tov’s tenure to 39 after Golda Meir took office, because the ministry was now in charge of employment throughout the country, and its relocation to Tel Aviv required the employment of additional messengers. This situation also created an urgent need for modes of transportation, as expressed by Levi Schneider, director general of the ministry: “The special roles of our ministry require a lot of travel, particularly for the inspection of factories and labor exchanges, and employment issues and agricultural and vocational training. The number of ministry cars is insufficient to meet the office’s needs, and we request the allocation of two additional cars.”6 To reduce office expenses and avoid the unnecessary creation of new posts, the labor minister decided that certain responsibilities of a scientific and professional nature (such as safety rules in workplaces or actuarial reviews of insurance policies) would be carried out by external experts recruited on an ad hoc basis for one-time fees. When the ministry planned its budget for 1950, the minister requested that 10,000 Israeli lira be allocated to recruit labor (mainly immigrants) for public works such as road construction, railroads, and similar projects.7

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B. Between Centralized Planning Initiatives and Routine Planning: Relocating the Planning Division Under the Provisional Government, centralized management of the ministry was based on the policy of Mordechai Ben-Tov, Israel Feinmesser, and Aharon Zisling, minister of agriculture on behalf of Mapam. All three viewed the Planning Division in the Labor Ministry as a new authority oriented toward a centralized view of national planning. The division was headed by architect Arye Sharon. His deputy, Zvi Hashimshoni, was appointed official in charge of routine planning, Heinz Rau was appointed head of central planning initiatives, and Eliezer Bruzkus was responsible for research and surveys. It should be noted that none of the above came from the national institutions and were instead recruited from the best and most well-regarded architecture firms in the country at the time. The reasoning was strictly professional, as Ben-Tov and Feinmesser wanted to bring the best minds in the country to the division. Geographer Shalom Reichman notes that the main emphasis was on “centralized physical planning initiatives.”8 Those who supported this approach for national planning (mainly representatives of Mapam) saw architect Arye Sharon as the most suitable person to head the division, since, in their view, he would be able to recruit the best professionals in the field and advance their approaches on a national scale. In contrast, Mapai representatives such as Levi Eshkol and Yaakov Reiser (head of the Department of Public Works in the Labor Ministry, who had become embroiled in a dispute with Ben-Tov), viewed the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency as the natural successor for implementing general planning, emphasizing the incorporation of the Jewish Agency’s professional departments into the new governmental system. Mapai therefore wanted Reiser to be appointed head of the Planning Division, as did the people of the Agency’s Technical Department, the majority of whom were also members of Mapai. However, only with the establishment of the new government in March 1949, and the subsequent transfer of the Labor Ministry to Mapai, did this change take place.9

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According to Reichman, the main question for the period between March 1949 and December 1952 was “why did the Planning Division shift between different government ministries, and why did the political echelon not recognize its significance?”10 What finally determined under which ministry the Planning Division was placed was the formal-legislative aspect, which was key to determining not only its ministerial affiliation but also its organizational structure and the applicability of its planning. The legal aspect focused on the question of which institutional framework inherited the statutory legacy of the Mandatory Town Planning Ordinance of 1936.11 When Golda Meir was appointed minister, she retained only one department from the Ministry of Planning—the Housing Department. This decision stemmed from the fact that the statutory powers relating to the Town Planning Ordinance of 1936 fell under the Interior Ministry rather than the Labor Ministry. According to the coalition agreement that enabled the announcement of the new government in March 1949, the departments of the Planning Division were to be annexed to the Interior Ministry. However, the professional echelon—Arye Sharon and his team—fiercely opposed this decision. They preferred to have the division relocated to the Prime Minister’s Office because they saw the move to the Interior Ministry as a blow to the power of central planning initiatives.12 On the other hand, the main entity charged with the implementation of the planning policy was the Division for Local Government within the Interior Ministry. In May 1949, Zvi Hashimshoni, representative of the Planning Admin­istration, proposed that the Interior Ministry be in charge of local planning and the Prime Minister’s Office be in charge of national planning. Regional plans would be prepared jointly, but in each case precedence would be given to the Prime Minister’s Office. Hashimshoni’s proposal was accepted, and a memorandum on the matter was signed on June 13, 1949, by Avraham Rosenblum and Yaakov Kislov, respectively director general of the Interior Ministry and head of the General Administration Division, on the one hand, and by Dr. David Arian from the Prime Minister’s Office and Zvi Hashimshoni from the Planning Administration on the other.

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On August 14, 1949, the government’s official decision on the matter was announced: The Planning Division, previously part of the Ministry of Labor and Construction, has been split and relocated in the Prime Minister’s Office and in the Interior Ministry. National planning, under Arye Sharon, will be conducted from the Prime Minister’s Office. He will deal with questions such as population dispersal, industry, water, transportation routes, establishing new towns and locating existing ones. The Interior Ministry will deal with issues of “urban and rural construction” and will be headed by Mr. Zvi Hashimshoni, whose responsibilities will include local and regional planning, with the exception of zoning and water issues. He will instruct the local authorities in questions of planning and will supervise the implementation of national and local plans. He will be conferred the authorities of the Town Planning Ordinance of 1936.13 As a result of this restructuring, 48 out of the 127 staff members of the Planning Administration were relocated to the Interior Ministry; the other 79 staff members remained in the Prime Minister’s Office and were responsible for centralized planning initiatives. From November 1949 to December 1951, the Planning Division operated under this organizational duality. Both routine and centralized planning initiatives operated out of the same offices in the Kirya compound in Tel Aviv and worked in full coordination. And yet, not everybody came to terms with the split in the Planning Division. On January 29, 1950, the Chizik Committee, established by Ben-Gurion to examine the criticism of the restructuring of the division, submitted its findings. Its recommendations, seeking to prevent the split of the division, were rejected. However, in July of that year Arye Sharon wrote to Ben-Gurion about the necessity to “establish a special ministry for urban planning, since only continuous support and broad executive powers can enable the drafting, coordination, and explanation of plans.”14

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On December 9, 1951, the government decided to merge the Plan­ ning Division of the Prime Minister’s Office with the Urban and Rural Construction Division in the Interior Ministry. Furthermore, it was decided to establish a planning council that would include representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Defense, Health, Agriculture and Development, Labor, Trade and Industry, Interior, and Transportation, as well as representatives from the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency. It was decided that the Interior Minister would serve as chairman of the council, which would have the authority to approve the establishment of new towns, transit camps, and municipal and regional council boundaries. On December 19, 1951, A. Rosenblum, the director general of the Interior Ministry, approved this arrangement with the director general of the Prime Minister’s Office.15 The Planning Division merged with the Interior Ministry and continued its work at the Kirya until early 1953. The case of the “wandering” of the Planning Division among different government ministries should be examined in the light of the differences in views and attitudes regarding its importance and structure. Centralized planning, as it was conceived in the Provisional Government with its practical, applied approach, located the Planning Division in the Ministry of Labor and Construction. The relocation of the entire planning apparatus and its departments to the Interior Ministry at the end of 1951 is evidence of the tendency to emphasize the statutory aspects of routine planning. The struggle to keep the division within the Prime Minister’s Office under Arye Sharon, and the latter’s recommendation to establish a separate Ministry of Urban Planning, testify to the tendency to combine the statutory and practical aspects of planning, with the remaining emphasis on initiated planning as a master framework.16 The relocation of the Planning Division to the Interior Ministry emphasized the importance of the legal aspect as an influential factor, in spite of the tremendous pressure from the professionals, who objected to the integration of the division into the Interior Ministry. They (the professionals) recognized the vital need for centralized national planning and were well aware of the political power such a body would hold, while the politicians showed insufficient understanding of the subject. Two prominent

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examples illustrate the point: when Golda Meir was appointed Minister of Labor, she relinquished most of the division’s departments, retaining only the Housing Division. At the same time, Interior Minister Moshe Shapira recognized the importance of routine planning through the framework of the Urban and Rural Construction Division of his ministry, and tacitly agreed to delay the merging of centralized planning and the Research and Architecture Division into the Interior Ministry for a period of two years.

C. Organizing and Managing the Labor Market Finding Employment for Immigrants As the war wound down, the fledgling state had to deal with two main issues related to employment: the need to find employment for new immigrants and the need to integrate decommissioned soldiers back into the labor market. The situation worsened toward the end of 1948. In June 1949, for example, 23,500 job seekers signed up at labor exchanges across the country, a third of whom were fully unemployed, while the rest were temporarily employed in jobs that lasted from a week to a month.17 Furthermore, the situation among the immigrant population in the transit camps and towns was on the brink of disaster: “The situation in the immigrant population centers is grave and reaching a boiling point. We must activate all sources of absorption in industry and agriculture, to advance the implementation of development plans, and to carry out mass absorption through the provision of emergency jobs, even if they are not required by the economy at this point, in order to stop the moral and physical degeneration of tens of thousands of new immigrants, and in order to prevent a political and social crisis.”18 Devora HaCohen writes that after the number of immigrants reached 350,000 in the autumn of 1949, all facets of the absorption system were on the verge of collapse. Therefore, the government and the Jewish Agency decided to take severe measures to restrict immigration. How, then, was

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the Labor Ministry supposed to cope with this difficult socioeconomic situation? It was impossible for one ministry to deal with a challenge of such complexity singlehandedly. In light of this, we can understand the words of Levi Schneider, the Labor Ministry’s director general, when he defined the scope of responsibility of the Division of Employment and its limitations, in a report about the ministry’s activity for the period from April until June 1949: “It is not the ministry’s job, nor is it within its capacity, to ensure employment in the economy, which is the economic function of the economic leadership of the country. The Labor Ministry and the National Insurance coordinate the public works implemented by the government and local authorities, divert whatever means at their disposal to afflicted areas, especially in difficult seasons, and follow the employment situation.”19 It is important to note that overall economic policy was determined by the government and the Finance Ministry, including policy related to public works. The Labor Ministry was tasked with implementing this policy on the ground in the areas under its responsibility. This included one of the government’s main policies with regard to finding employment for immigrants and veterans, namely, carrying out a program of initiated public works, as we will see below. One of the most difficult problems with regard to the labor market in Israel, which reached a climax in May 1950, was the growing attempt on the part of immigrants to break into the Israeli labor market (mainly for harvesting and other seasonal labor), without going through organized employment channels. As a result of trying to bypass the labor exchanges, immigrant workers were paid significantly less than the minimum wage, a phenomenon that could have destabilized the labor market and undermined wage agreements with the workers. In addition, it is important to bear in mind the political consideration: concentrating control of the labor market in the labor exchanges gave these offices political influence over workers, particularly immigrants who were completely dependent on them for employment. Labor exchanges had been established by the labor movements in the 1920s to prevent exploitation of workers by the private sector, mostly farmers and orchard owners. In 1950 this resulted in continuous

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conflict between employers affiliated with centrist parties such as the General Zionists, and the labor exchanges, which were identified with the labor movements. The atmosphere became increasingly heated and even erupted into violent clashes in some places, such as Petah Tikva, where staff of the local employment office went to Rosh Ha’ayin to prevent the employment of immigrants who had bypassed them. 1950 was also an election year for the local authorities, and the government, fearing the political fallout of these tensions, put a lot of effort into finding solutions. One of the most significant contributions of the Labor Ministry in alleviating unemployment during this period was through its recruitment of manpower for public works, including the establishment of farms and cooperatives, construction of housing units, road construction, and agriculture. For example, from August to September 1949, a construction project of 30,000 housing units provided employment for 4,000 workers.20 The policy of initiated public works was determined by the government as part of a national economic policy designed to address the problem of unemployment, and it was the Labor Ministry’s job to implement this policy. In the 1949–50 fiscal year, the Labor Ministry paid some two million Israeli lira to construct and repair roads, of which 800,000 lira were spent on maintaining existing roads. The total of all loans granted to local authorities to initiate and create employment (mainly in public works) was 1,200,000 lira.21 Toward the end of summer 1950, the employment situation improved, mainly due to the construction boom initiated by the Housing Division of the Labor Ministry, and because of an agreement signed between the Labor Ministry and the Farmers’ Union regarding summer employment in orchards and road construction. The division took care of workers during agricultural high seasons, and transferred Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth) companies and Youth Aliya groups to the agricultural sector to replace workers who were fired in the second half of 1951. A quick look at main sectors of unemployment in 1951 presents data relating to the number of unemployed laborers, especially in immigrant-absorbing towns: 1,000 unemployed in Jerusalem, 500 in Netanya, 500 in Hadera and Caesarea, 400 in Rehovot, 400 in Nahariya and Cabri, 400 in Tiberias, and 350 in Afula.22

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(There are no data on the number of immigrants employed in public works from these towns.) Because the Finance Ministry delayed the transfer of funds, the Labor Ministry more than once postponed the implementation of urgent public works. This also gives rise to an excellent example of the fundamental dispute over the question of who controlled centralized planning initiatives. Zvi Berenzon, director general of the Labor Ministry, commented in 1951 on the practical implications of these delays: “The difficulties caused riots in many employment offices, which were therefore forced to close for several days. Destroying equipment and beating office staff has become a most worrisome phenomenon.”23 It was a phenomenon that was particularly prominent in immigrant transit camps, such as Migdal, Beer Sheva, Ramle, Beit Lid, Beit Shean, Nahariya, and Tiberias. The situation was difficult in the Upper Galilee as well, where 1,500 unemployed women workers were registered, as opposed to the Haifa area, where the employment situation was less problematic, mainly because of the economic potential of the Gulf of Haifa and its industrial environs.24 In early September 1949 there emerged two categories of immigrants: those who were supported by the Jewish Agency in the immigrant camps, and those who had already passed through the transit camps and were living in housing blocks. Approximately 70,000 immigrants were living in the camps at the time, 23,000 of whom were potential wage earners. The cost of maintaining each immigrant in the camps stood at around ten lira per month, a total of 700,000 lira per month for the entire immigrant population.25 Some of the immigrants were employed in farming communities and orchards, while the Jewish Agency provided them with housing and food, although this was not sufficient to cover their cost of their keep. The wages of immigrants were much lower than the minimum wage set by the Histadrut, which had an adverse impact on the general wages in the economy. It is important to remember that this situation applies to immigrants who succeeded in finding employment; the rest fell into unemployment and despair. Prolonging the stay of immigrants in the transit camps became an intolerable financial and psychological burden. Many believe there was

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one justification for keeping them there, namely, the need to classify them according to their profession and health condition; however the intention was to transfer them at the end of the process to permanent housing as quickly as possible. (This issue will be discussed at greater length in the following section.) The Labor Ministry was in charge of immigrant employment, and in 1949 most of the immigrants were employed in three areas: 9 percent were employed in forestry, 45 percent worked for citrus growers, and 45 percent worked in construction and road work. Two-thirds of a given salary was paid in cash, and the rest was received in the form of benefits such as housing.26 The hardships this situation resulted in for many of the immigrants led to serious disputes among the parties involved: on December 2, 1949 Avraham Nagid, the head of economic affairs of the Defense Ministry, rejected the claim of Levi Eshkol,27 head of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, that it was untenable to force immigrants to be employed in particular jobs against their will. In a letter dated December 21, 1949, Eshkol compared the situation to the suchra (forced labor) that existed under the Ottomans.28 He even went further and compared it to forced labor under the Nazis. Nagid, unmoved, responded: “With us, it [the work] will take the form of urgent problem solving, such as extermination of locust in the fields, citrus harvesting etc. The government should use the appropriate tools to put some order into the productivity of labor in the country, in particular that of camp residents.”29 Nagid notes in his letter that the entire absorption process was not being handled properly, and that the immigrants should be given the opportunity to manage their own internal affairs in the camps. In particular, he protested the underuse of abandoned land to address the problem: I do not want to criticize the Provisional Government, which did not find it necessary at the time to enact appropriate laws to preserve the productivity of the existing Arab economy, and to task the appropriate circles with ongoing handling of the problem. This negligence and lack of foresight brought about severe economic problems, including lack of food and loss of property,

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which could have been used to settle immigrants without much further investment. This negligence created an even greater problem that puts the small farms at risk. I am referring to the problem created by the fact that the abandoned Arab land was not cultivated.30 While the facts seem to substantiate Nagid’s claims, he was ignoring the basic problem regarding the international legal status of the occupied territories, an issue the government was actually dealing with. It was therefore incorrect of him to analyze the situation from a purely social and economic perspective. To resolve the economic plight of the immigrants, Nagid proposed that they raise funds from wealthy Jews abroad, as the Americans did in the Marshall Plan.31 On January 25, 1951, Shalom Cohen, head of the Employment Division, reported to Labor Minister Golda Meir about a discussion he had had with Eshkol regarding immigrant employment.32 The Labor Ministry suggested that the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department refer immigrants to available jobs through a coordinating institution. To increase sources of employment in immigrant communities, Cohen suggested that the ministry cooperate with the Jewish Agency to encourage the construction of access roads to immigrant settlements, especially in the south. He further emphasized that the amount of work involved could provide employment to 5,000 immigrants. In June 1951, Cohen sent Meir a detailed report about immigrant employment across the country, from which it is possible to glean insights into the type of work they were given and the extent of unemployment by regions throughout the country. The report describes the situation in several settlements and cities such as Halassa, Afula, Tel Adashim, Haifa, Ramle, Gdera, Rehovot, Castina, Migdal Gad, Beer Sheva, and Gevim. The following examples illustrate the situation on the ground: according to the population distribution plan initiated by the government, a large group of immigrants was transferred to Afula between March and June 1951. This created a grave socioeconomic situation, which the Labor Ministry succeeded in alleviating somewhat by initiating public works. During this

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period 7,000 Afula residents were employed in public works—an indication of the scope of unemployment. To accelerate permanent employment, the Labor Ministry gave loans to the Afula municipality to construct industrial buildings. During the search for suitable sites to establish transit camps in the Jezreel Valley and Ephraim regions, a decision was made to build transit camps in Manssy (south of Afula) and north of Tel Adashim. Employment in that region also relied on public works, and, through the Jewish National Fund, dozens of immigrants were trained to undertake agricultural work in farms in the area. In Ramle, the Labor Ministry initiated the establishment of a vegetable garden that would employ immigrants, while in Rehovot many of the residents of the transit camps Zarnuga, Yavne, and Akir were employed on harvesting work at Givat Brenner. In Migdal the immigrants were employed in fruit orchards.33 In the summary of his report, Cohen emphasized that one of the main hindrances to job placement for the immigrants was that soon after their arrival many of them went wandering across the country looking for relatives, resulting in a migration from the periphery to the big cities. Cohen further notes that most of the burden of care for the immigrants was falling on the Labor Ministry: between January and June 1951, 757 immigrants were transferred to transit camps run by the ministry. In the summary of his report he did not mince words in describing the suffering of immigrants and the grim situation they were in: Let me take this opportunity to express my great anxiety in face of the problems caused by the lack of water supply to the transit camps. Every description given to you of this situation cannot express the true suffering of some of the transit camps’ residents. It is unnecessary for me to explain to you that we cannot solve the employment problem for all of the camp residents through public works. Indeed, we have initiated all types of works included in our plans: uprooting, rehabilitation, land cultivation, debris evacuation, etc. All of these works pay a very low wage in comparison to ordinary jobs, which is a problem. People refuse to go out to

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work, and in most cases this is also accompanied by incitement from various sources. Our success thus far does nothing to free me from the great anxiety I feel for the coming days, given the extent of the problem which will only continue to grow as the pace of the number of transit camps being established increases. Experience has shown that there are few cases in which employment solves itself, therefore the worry is ours.34 The Challenge of Training Decommissioned Soldiers for Integration into the Job Market The integration of decommissioned soldiers into the job market was of great concern to Ben-Gurion, resulting in a memorandum signed on December 25, 1950, between Ben-Gurion and Zvi Berenzon, the director general of the Labor Ministry, transferring the issue from the responsibility of the Defense Ministry to the Labor Ministry: “This division in the Defense Ministry will hereby cease its work and transfer it to the Labor Ministry on April 1, 1951. All decommissioned soldiers requesting vocational training from the Labor Ministry according to a note from the Rehabilitation Office are entitled to vocational training.”35 Following this decision, and with the help of a loan received from the United States, the Labor Ministry expanded the types of vocational training offered to immigrants and soldiers, which until 1949 consisted solely of agricultural training. In defining this division Berenzon wrote, “[I]t is the role of the Department for Professional Training to plan the accelerated training programs, allocate budgets, instruct them on how to supervise their own work, and review the quality of training.”36 With the decrease in unemployment levels in the spring of 1950 (mainly due to public-works projects) came an increase in the scope of training, and the Labor Ministry even encouraged the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency to step up the dispersal of immigrants across the country. In the years 1950 and 1951, the Department for Professional Training trained some 3,330 construction workers, of whom 1,299 were veterans.

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Some 1,250 men and women were trained for different areas of manufacturing and were even employed in laying the water pipe to Jerusalem, and 1,600 women, mostly immigrants, were trained to pick fruit. In the second half of 1951, the department reached a record number of workers trained—3,857 workers.37 The Employment Division handled unemployment and professional training in the Arab sector in collaboration with the Department for Minority Affairs and the Military Administration. During the period covered in this book, the Employment Division supervised 57 employment offices across the country and issued monthly status reports that gave a fairly accurate picture of employment and unemployment across the country. For example, the figures in the report for April 1951 show the number of job seekers who had registered: 9,471 in Tel Aviv, 6,755 in Jerusalem, and 7,062 in Haifa.38 In smaller settlement concentrations, there were relatively high numbers of job seekers, because there were many immigrants and they had difficulties finding employment. For example, there were 2,396 registered job seekers in Rehovot, 1,453 in Beer Sheva, 1,304 in Holon, and 1,453 in Migdal-Gad. In total, 65,058 job seekers signed up during the course of 1951, of whom 51.4 percent (33,445 people) were immigrants.39 Labor Relations The Department of Labor Relations, a counterpart to the Inspection Department in the Employment Division, was established in June 1949, when it moved from the Interior Ministry to the Labor Ministry. This department played a mediating role with regard to employer-employee relations, dealt with mediation and arbitration, was the deciding voice on appeals about cost-of-living increases, and prevented labor disputes by bringing the disputing parties to sign labor agreements. The following data illustrate the scope of the department’s activity: in 1949 and 1950 the department dealt with 394 labor disputes that involved whole sectors or individual factories. Eighty percent of the disputes were settled through mediation and

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arbitration. In 1950–1951, the department handled 520 labor disputes involving 18,000 workers and 65 strikes. Due to these strikes, the young Israeli economy lost a total of 31,106 work days. Forty percent of these disputes were settled through mediation and arbitration.40 For example, it was the Department of Labor Relations that managed to end a long drawn-out labor dispute in the diamond-polishing industry. It also settled a labor-management dispute in the Hevra HaYisraelit L’Tchina u’Mischar (the Israeli Grinding and Commerce Company, a poultry feed-supplier). The dispute broke out over the 1951 work contract, leading to a strike in the factory. The workers demanded that they receive the same benefits their colleagues received who worked in the large mills in the Haifa area. The company’s management conditioned its consent on confirmation from the Agriculture Ministry that it would raise the prices of produce. The strike lasted from August 18 until September 19, 1951, and involved forty-five workers. In the arbitration decision it was declared that due to the substantial gaps between the large mills in Haifa and other mills across the country, the mills of Haifa should not be seen as a representative example of the sector, but should instead be seen as an exception. The sides agreed on a pension fund of 4 percent, and two weeks of severance pay for day laborers on the basis of their final monthly salary. As a result of the stubborn stance of the representatives of the factory’s management at different stages of the negotiations, they were required to pay two-fifths of the strike costs.41 Such activity was a direct continuation of the approach of the British Mandate Department of Labor, all the more so since the arbitration process in these disputes was conducted without the help of the Histadrut. While this is not an indication of the disappearance of the Histadrut from the landscape of labor relations in the Israeli economy, this activity of the Inspection Department in the Labor Ministry can be seen as a good example of the work of a government ministry representing sovereign rule, as opposed to the particular labor-market management practices in the Yishuv during the British Mandate. That being said, the management of the Labor Ministry was often accused of discrimination for preferring one or another sector when giving

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employment. In this context it is interesting to look at Interior Minister Moshe Shapira’s complaint against Minister of Labor Golda Meir that her office was discriminating against religious youth: “Regarding what I had to say during the cabinet meeting on the matter of the expulsion of members of HaNoar HaDati HaOved [religious youth laborers] from work placements in factories and the denial by the Minister of Labor, I hereby have the honor to submit the material—a small amount that is evidence of a much larger phenomenon—that I received from the national headquarters of HaNoar HaDati HaOved.”42 Following are a few examples. The owner of the Extra factory for casting and manufacturing the heads for primus stoves in Tel Aviv was instructed by the workers’ union and the Histadrut to fire a young man because he was registered with the religious-youth employment bureau. Although the employer preferred this young man, he was unable to withstand the pressure from the workers’ committee. In another incident at the Tricot factory in Tel Aviv, a religious girl was replaced by a secular girl who was a member of the HaNoar HaOved veHaLomed youth movement. HaNoar HaDati HaOved headquarters sent a letter to the secretary of the Tel Aviv Workers’ Council, but did not receive a response. A similar case happened to five religious girls who worked in the Tova factory in Bnei Brak and were similarly fired. In spite of BenGurion’s explicit promise to prevent discrimination on religious grounds, in response to a query submitted by Mizrahi MK Zerah Warhaftig, the Defense Ministry signed a labor agreement with the HaNoar HaOved veHaLomed youth movement preventing all the military industry factories from employing religious youth.43 The main reason that the Defense Ministry preferred secular over religious youth in the military industry arises from a simple profit-based consideration: secular youth were willing to work in shifts on Saturdays and religious holidays, whereas religious youth were not, and this could hinder production in these factories. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the political dimension of this issue: a clear case of a preference for “our people,” in this case, a Mapai-affiliated youth movement over one that was not. This was a direct continuation of the practice common during the period of the organized Yishuv,

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and the Labor Ministry could not always prevent such phenomena from recurring.

D. Housing: Immigrant Camps to Transit Camps, Transit Camps to Housing Projects The increased pace of immigration in the spring and summer of 1949 aggravated an already dire housing situation. The stock of buildings in territories captured during the war and subsequently abandoned was running out, and the pace of construction on the national level was unable to meet the demand. Preliminary steps such as budget approvals, preparing land for construction, surveying, water supply, procurement of materials and machines, and hiring of labor required major planning and coordination efforts, but as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the entire issue of planning was bogged down in controversy as it wandered from one ministry to the next. Throughout 1949, general and district planning advanced only slightly and national development policy had not yet been finalized. Moreover, preparations for mapping the new settlements were still underway, and the construction efforts of the public housing company, Amidar, could not keep up with the rate of immigration. When in the spring of 1949, the immigrant camps were filled to capacity, the Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency decided to initiate the establishment of thirty tent camps to house 30,000 to 40,000 immigrants who would be transferred from the immigrant camps. These tent camps were established in Kfar Salame in Tel Aviv, in Abu Kabir, and in Petah Tikva. The Labor Ministry was given the task of constructing permanent housing for these immigrants.44 Upon Golda Meir’s appointment as minister, it was decided that 30,000 housing units would be constructed by the end of 1949. However by the end of that year only 18,000 had been completed. Prefab construction methods and low building standards yielded small apartments with unplastered walls and no bathtubs. When the Labor Ministry realized that

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implementation was lagging significantly behind, it was decided to place the responsibility for housing the immigrants across the country with the ministry’s Housing Division. This division, in accordance with the government’s policy of population dispersal, was given considerable authority and powers with regard to the planning, coordination, and construction of housing in the country. Meir instructed the division to prepare for the construction of 50,000 housing units during 1950; however these plans were also never carried out. The winter of 1950 was a particularly difficult one and slowed the pace of construction, so that only 28,000 housing units were constructed.45 Devora HaCohen notes that it was decided in October 1949 to set up temporary transit camps until the permanent housing was completed to which the immigrants would be transferred from the immigrant camps. These transit camps soon became known in Hebrew parlance as ma’abarot. The pace of construction was simply unable to keep up with the pace of immigration, however, and by the end of 1950 the transit camps housed some 100,000 immigrants; a number that increased to 250,000 in 1951. The unexpected “opening of the gates” to enable the aliyah of Iraqi Jewry and the ongoing financial crisis at the Jewish Agency drove Levi Eshkol, its treasurer, to voice his support, in March 1950, for the dismantling of the immigrant camps and the transfer of their inhabitants to transit camps. The transit camps were designed mainly to provide work and livelihood for immigrants who were no longer under the auspices of the Jewish Agency. The intention was to gradually shift immigrants off of their dependency on the Jewish Agency toward independence through initiated agricultural work. However, Eshkol had not counted on the slew of financial difficulties and the negative impact of the weather, all of which damaged and compromised his plan. Moreover it should be remembered that the issue of transit camps and other areas relating to the treatment of immigrants were handled by two separate authorities: the Jewish Agency, which funded and maintained the immigrant camps, and the central government, whose goal it was to integrate the immigrants into rural and urban areas and turn them into regular Israeli citizens, not dependent on the establishment.

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However, implementation of the transit-camp initiative went off course almost from the beginning. The comprehensive layout of the settlements, itself an integral part of the overall plan for various regions in the country, was not completed by 1950, due to both the delay in finalizing the data collection process and the preparatory work required to advance a project of such scope, and because of the lack of sufficient financial resources. The Jewish Agency needed the intervention of the government because of a budgetary crisis of their own, and the Labor Ministry was therefore tasked with actually establishing the transit camps and with finding employment for immigrants. It fell on Minister of Labor Golda Meir to coordinate among the different government ministries and the Jewish Agency on all issues relating to the establishment and maintenance of the camps. Note that even though the heads of the bodies responsible for these issues (immigration absorption and the transit camps) were members of Mapai (Eshkol, Meir, and Yosephtal), the work was not always carried out methodically or in full coordination, and the crucial time dimension worked against all parties involved. The immigrants themselves, both those who had just arrived and those already in the immigrant camps, refused to move to the transit camps, fearing the harsh sanitary conditions and the lack of employment. Because of this opposition, some of the immigrant camps were themselves converted to transit camps, the main difference being that from that moment on, the immigrants no longer received aid from the Jewish Agency and were expected to be self-sufficient. In addition to the reasons already mentioned, two other motivations lay behind the establishment of the transit camps: security and socialnational issues. The camps were placed in border areas as part of the goal to establish populated towns to better secure the borders. It was also felt that these camps would generate a “healthier” national and social structure. It became clear that the security goal was not met, since most of the immigrants had no military background, and since the economic and social conditions in the transit camps were so unbearable. The social and national goal was not met either, since despite the government’s call, there

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was no contact or personal interaction between the veteran population and the newcomers. Over years, many of the transit camps formed the nuclei of what morphed into “development towns.” Some were established in remote areas, and some in the vicinity of big cities. The common form of housing in the transit camps was a tent, a hut, or a shack. Toward the end of 1949, about a quarter of a million people were living in the transit camps under harsh conditions, often without electricity and with severe water rationing. Since the housing being offered to the immigrants was not adjacent to the long-established towns in the center (mainly because of the desire to disperse the immigrants throughout the country), there was a stark imbalance between the center of the country and the periphery with regard to deployment of the immigrant population. During the course of 1951 the pace of construction picked up in Jerusalem, Halasse, Acre, Tiberias, Beit She’an, Afula, Beer Sheva, Ashkelon, and Migdal Gad. A similar policy of increased construction was implemented in towns throughout the Sharon region, Samaria, Judea, and the Tel Aviv and Haifa districts. In addition, the ministry tried to develop villages for immigrants in the Galilee, the Jezreel and Hefer valleys, and in the Negev. In total some 27,500 housing units were constructed during 1950.46 Particular attention was also paid to constructing public buildings such as kindergartens, schools, day-care centers, and health clinics. Through a mechanism of special loans granted to local authorities, some 1,000 classrooms were constructed in 1950.47 The underlying assumption propelling the policy of the Labor Ministry was to use the housing projects to expand the circles of employment and labor. In light of the accelerated impetus in the construction sector, many contractors complained to the Labor Ministry that it was discriminating against the private sector in favor of the Histadrut-related sector, and that the situation on the ground with regard to construction tenders was anarchic. To clarify the issue, in July 1949 the Knesset Labor Committee established a subcommittee headed by Pinchas Sapir. The committee held thirteen meetings during which it listened to representatives from the Contractors’ Association and representatives of the government construction company,

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Solel Boneh.48 On December 27, 1950, the committee unanimously ruled that the allegations against the Labor Ministry were beyond its authority, since they had in the past been raised before the committee on black market issues and before a government committee headed by MK Peretz Bernstein.49 The case was therefore referred back to the Knesset Labor Committee for discussion. The main argument raised by the contractors was that the Labor Ministry was not allocating construction work according to the tenders or the law, whereas the Labor Ministry argued that the emergency situation required direct and swift action. MK Yaakov Gil of the General Zionists supported the contractors’ argument: The Department for Public Works at the Ministry of Labor and National Insurance, and the Housing Division of the same ministry, are accustomed to giving large-scale projects without publishing tenders or through a flawed tender. There is a proven approach of preferring a certain contractor without taking into account the issue of cost. If all the government projects were granted using a tender process that is accepted all over the world, costs would have been lowered through competition between the participants, who would be aware that the price quote for implementing the project is one of the criteria for winning the tender.50 The representative of the Labor Ministry who appeared before the committee was Yitzhak Finkelstein.51 In his testimony, Finkelstein claimed that the culmination of the war and the large waves of immigration flooding the country presented the Labor Ministry with the following problems: the need to construct tens of thousands of housing units and dozens of roads across the country, the creation of thousands of jobs, designation of regions for development and absorption, and basic vocational training for thousands of immigrants. On this matter he noted: “All this with insufficient detailed work plans, lack of technical conditions, maps, and topographical surveys, the vague legal status of the designated lands, absence of access roads, water problems, etc.; there is also a lack of proper tools, technical

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machinery, equipment, and the broad technical experience to cope with the new conditions.”52 The accelerated construction in the urban centers attracted private contractors hoping to make a profit. In the more remote development areas of the north and the Negev this was not the case. These facts determined to a large extent the working practices of the ministry, and according to Finkelstein, “In 1949 most of the housing and public works projects were distributed based on direct negotiations rather than on a competitive basis. In the second half of the year and throughout 1950, projects were given on a competitive basis [meaning tenders]. If we were to review the year 1949 we can find both forms. If we review the year 1950, there is only one form of granting projects and it is on a competitive basis.”53 Finkelstein did not deny that the existing arrangement until the year 1950 was flawed, but he rejected every claim of bias or discrimination on the part of the Labor Ministry. Several of the contractors’ representatives, such as Rubinstein, agreed that independent contractors did not have the same equipment at their disposal, in terms of both quality and quantity, as Solel Boneh, the government contractor. In addition, independent contractors also admitted that Solel Boneh was willing to construct housing developments in development areas where independent contractors were not willing to run the risk of financial failure. Nevertheless, the Labor Committee recommended granting the small private contracting companies governmental subsidies that would allow them to purchase more advanced equipment, which would pave the way for them to bid for tenders alongside Solel Boneh, “for the sake of eliminating even the possibility of the appearance of discrimination or bias, by one or more parties, while at the same time not preventing the Labor Ministry from fulfilling the emergency duties imposed on it.”54 Here are the main conclusions of the committee: all projects will be granted through public tenders, except for urgent cases in which projects will be handed out to contractors after direct negotiations. The whole process of granting projects and supervising tenders shall be carried out by the Tenders Committee of the Labor Ministry (preferably with the cooperation of an interministerial committee). The committee will also decide on the list of contractors according to their level of training and professionalism.

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This affair reveals three phenomena that characterized the prevailing situation in government ministries during the first years of the country: a lack of professional and organizational experience in dealing with the private sector, the ongoing politicization and preference for organized Yishuv-era bodies, and skepticism with regard to competition and work with private contractors.

E. Public Works and Technical Services One of the main executive arms of the Labor Ministry was the Division of Public Works. As you may recall, during the war the division included three departments: Public Works, Surveying, and Water. The division was also in charge of unique technical areas such as governmental public buildings, the import and export of machinery and materials required for public works, prefabricated houses, and routine maintenance of roads. The division consisted of a main office and four district offices, in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the Galilee. In 1949–1950, a Supreme National Road Committee was established, with representatives from the Ministries of Labor, Agriculture, Transportation, Interior, and Defense, as well as the Planning Division in the Prime Minister’s Office, and the settlement organizations (the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the Agricultural Center). The maintenance policy for roads, government buildings and vehicles was as follows: Roads. During the 1949–50 fiscal year, 868,000 lira were invested in maintaining 1,992 km of roads, of which 1,622 km were paved and the remainder were dirt roads. The project also included the repair of the entire British Mandate road grid, which had been damaged during the war. Rehabilitation and Expansion. During that period more than 1,460,000 lira were invested in the rehabilitation and expansion of axis roads, and 2,090,000 lira for new roads.55 To increase the supply of gravel for road construction, the work pace in quarries all over the country was accelerated.

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Government Buildings. More than 50,000 lira were invested in the renovation of 445 government buildings containing a total of 7,750 rooms. Special emphasis was placed on the expansion of Lod airport, the Knesset building in Jerusalem, and the foundations of the Broadcasting Authority building. Vehicles. Alongside the establishment of a central government garage in Holon, 68,000 lira was invested in the repair of 635 vehicles for governmental use. The Surveyor’s Office. This department was mainly focused on issuing topographical and cadastral maps (for land settlements purposes and land usage). Premises for Ministerial Offices. In August 1948 a Central Housing Committee was established. On March 28, 1949, Levi Schneider, director general of the Labor Ministry, wrote to the Committee of Inquiry of the Government Secretariat, whose role was to allocate buildings and rooms for government offices at the Kirya compound in Tel Aviv. His words clearly illustrate the shortage of premises from which all the ministries suffered: The crowding in the offices is great and we lack rooms for employees and equipment. Under the new structure of the ministry, it will include, in addition to existing staff, the Labor Relations Administration (until now part of the Interior Ministry) and the inter-ministerial committee for National Insurance, which is going to be expanded. I would be grateful if you could allocate an additional house nearby for our ministry. This house should be placed at my immediate disposal, so that I may finalize the preparations for the transfer of the administrative units upon the return of Mrs. Golda Meyerson from abroad. I believe that with the relocation of several offices and departments to Jerusalem, it will not be difficult for you to fulfill this request.56 It is worth noting that during the period covered in this book, the shortage of space in the government ministries was not resolved. Ministry employees

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worked in crowded conditions, and very often prefabricated huts or caravans were brought in to alleviate the overcrowding. This problem was partially resolved only after the Government Compound was built in Jerusalem.

F. Inspection and Research Alongside the ministry’s engagement in urgent issues, such as providing employment and housing for immigrants and decommissioned soldiers, the Research and Inspection Section focused on professional topics in the field of labor relations, such as the safety and health of workers, and supervising the implementation of labor laws, primarily the Factories Ordinance of 1946 and the Accidents and Occupational Diseases (Notification) Ordinance of 1945. In addition, the division provided training to those injured in occupational accidents, as required under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance of 1947. In doing so, the division actually continued the work of the British Mandate Labor Department and implemented the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav with regard to its legal and regulatory role. However, during the war the inspection process more or less came to a complete stop, and only after the 1949 elections was it able to resume functioning. In his explanatory words on the topic to the budget commissioner at the Finance Ministry, the director general of the ministry emphasized the following: “Its role is to ensure a high level of employee safety and health, sanitary conditions in factories and enterprises, and the implementation of labor laws. All this is recognized as one of the essential services provided by a well ordered country. Our inspection apparatus is no larger than that operated during the days of the Mandate government. Most of the professional staff are engineers.”57 It is important to note that in total, one physician and three district inspectors worked in the section. They were aided by 21 inspectors, most of whom were veterans of the Mandate Labor Ministry. To comprehend the scope of activity of this section from the spring of 1949 until the end of 1950, it is worth noting the statistics that reflect the reality in the country at that time: in the spring of 1949, 4,972 enterprises were registered in the

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Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa districts, and these were subject to 4,045 inspection visits.58 In terms of its work practices, its practices were very similar to that of its Mandate predecessor. In addition, the section published regulations for work in asphalt and construction and intensified medical inspections in various fields. These inspections led to the exposure of health and safety breaches in the factories. By the end of 1949 some 5,456 warning letters were sent to factory managers, and 61 offenders were sued for negligence causing death or injury. During 1949, 9,000 notices of occupational accidents were received, 646 of which were serious and were investigated. Special attention was given to youth in the labor force. Toward the end of 1950, 6,262 industrial plants were registered with the Inspection Department of the Ministry of Labor.59, 60 Investigations of workplace accidents included collecting testimony, drafting reports, and submitting indictments for negligence and for causing injury or death, all this with the support of the ministry’s Legal Department and the police. The Research Department, working together with the Central Bureau of Statistics, also regularly provided the ministry with statistical data on the labor market. The reports were generally about salaries, occupational accidents, compensation, disputes, absence and sickness, and workers employed monthly or yearly. Studies of a wider scope were dedicated to topics such as the employment balance, manpower, housing, taxes, and occupational accidents. In addition, they began to compile studies on pension and benefits funds, and established a professional library dedicated to labor relations. In January 1949 the division’s Employment Department issued “Newsletter Number 1: Employee Turnover Statistics: Absence and Sickness Rates.”61 The introduction to the newsletter emphasizes that “The newsletter’s purpose is to investigate the stability rate of employees in the industrial sector, which is known to be a positive factor in employee productivity and serves as an indication of good workplace conditions. Instability, by contrast, testifies to negative factors including inefficient management.”62 One of the interesting items presented in the newsletter relates to the causes of absence from work. Absences were mainly due to recruitment to the army or for public works. Other reasons included organizational deficiencies in the industrial sector or an employee’s attitude toward his or her

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place of work. Additionally, many absences resulted from sicknesses caused by employees’ health making them unsuitable for their workplaces, or from family issues. The newsletter sums up the importance of the subject: “Absentee rates in general, whatever the reason, would help determine a ‘concept’ that has not yet been accurately defined in our country [meaning the cause for absenteeism]. Reporting throughout the work-year on the number of working days would constitute an important criterion for statistics on labor matters in different areas: accident rates, social security, employment and productivity.”63 Productivity One of the section’s important divisions dealt with productivity, encompassing all the problems related to industrial manufacturing and assessing the economy’s capacity to encourage capital investments for the sake of immigration and general quality of life. It is important to note that they worked in coordination with the Finance Ministry, which determined economic policy more generally. The core activity of the section thus focused on the organization and management of production via the management teams of the various factories in order to increase productivity. Special emphasis was placed on increasing productivity in industries that produced rationed commodities defined as “products for all” and for export. (The first industry chosen for this experiment was the furniture industry.) In addition, the section reviewed existing production quotas in factories and tried to coordinate the distribution of production and manufacturing between factories working in the same industry. Another instance of interministerial cooperation was between the Office of Supply and Rationing and the Town Planning Department of the Interior Ministry concerning the conditions for granting licenses to construct industrial buildings. Every potential manufacturing plant had to bring a certificate of approval from the Ministry of Trade and Industry stating that the factory served the economic needs of the country and took the development needs of the country into consideration. Issues defined by the Finance Ministry on the general level required approval from the

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Labor Ministry and National Insurance Department regarding production forecasts.64 As mentioned, there was a special focus on increasing productivity in industries that manufactured rationed products, defined as “products for all and for export,” and the division reviewed existing manufacturing quotas and tried to coordinate production efforts and outputs among enterprises in the same industry. Based on the findings, the Office of Supply and Rationing allocated raw materials to factories. At the same time, the Labor Ministry’s management (in full coordination with the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Trade and Industry) ensured that permits for constructing industrial buildings would not be granted unless two authorizations were provided: one from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, that the future factory would indeed serve the country’s economic needs and take into consideration its development needs, and a second from the Ministry of Labor, regarding its estimated production levels.65 In addition, the Production Productivity Section advised factories on the arrangement of machinery and transportation within the factory and how to analyze their manufacturing and productivity indicators. The section employed engineers and economists who conducted research for the Institute for the Study of Labor Productivity and Production of the Association of Engineers and Architects, under the auspices of the Scientific Council.66 However, in spite of its attempts to lower prices in various manufacturing sectors by redirecting production to priority areas, the section encountered difficulties in coping with the great diversification in the various industries. In addition, a shortage in basic materials and supplies increased idle time in the factories. Also, existing manufacturing machines were not maximized and new machines were imported and purchased without any guidance. Trade Unions The Department for Trade Unions was another supervisory body, with the status of a full- fledged department in the Labor Ministry. It was

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officially established in October 1948, and consisted of two subdepartments: Registration and Supervision, and Inspection and Research. Its principal goal was to help trade unions improve their working practices and to represent them in the various government ministries in cases of liens, arbitrations, and liquidations. By July 1, 1949, 150 trade unions had been registered, which incorporated new immigrants and decommissioned soldiers. By the end of March 1950, 533 trade unions were registered in the country, of which 140 were agricultural; 229 were manufacturing associations, including those in factories, crafts, services, and transportation; 39 were consumer associations; and 46 were housing associations.67 During the period covered in this book, the supervision over all associations was tightened, foreclosures were issued and lifted, 3,724 liens were registered, and 1,356 liens were removed.68 In addition, associations that had lost their cooperative character were closed down. In this context, the department established two funds. This first of these, in Jerusalem, was for the development of immigrant cooperatives. Its stakeholders were the government, the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency, the Cooperative Center in Jerusalem, and a workers’ loan fund. Twelve trade unions were created with the fund’s assistance. The other foundation was for the encouragement of cooperatives for handicrafts and agriculture with the help of Bank HaPoalim and Nir. In addition, the department initiated the establishment of a foundation that would help start cooperative factories in immigration centers and among the Arab population.69 Decommissioned soldiers who wished to start a cooperative received guidance from the department. Particular emphasis was also placed on establishing contacts with cooperative institutions abroad, together with the Economic Council for Trade Unions, which was composed of three government representatives and twenty representatives of major trade unions,. After Israel joined the International Labor Organization, Israeli delegations participated in the organization’s annual conventions. The Israeli representatives to these conventions were the director general of the Labor Ministry and the ministry’s legal advisor.

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G. National Insurance An interministerial committee was established for the sake of planning social security. It operated under the National Insurance Section and dealt with the following areas: clarifying the scope of insurance coverage, defining the types of compulsory insurance and universal medical aid, and defining funding methods and subsidies, organization, and administration. As part of the planning efforts in Va’adat HaMatzav, it was recommended that a separate ministry handle national insurance matters, as was practiced in progressive countries, since it was not deemed advisable to separate national insurance from social welfare. The Labor Ministry would deal only with national insurance related to labor law and labor relations.70 During the war this issue was not attended to due to other pressing matters. In fact, it was not until May 15, 1949, that the interministerial committee submitted its proposals to the government pertaining to areas that could not delay implementation until after planning was completed. These areas included urgent improvement of hospitalization, employing immigrants in works to improve hygiene conditions in their towns, medical insurance for immigrants, and ownership and expansion of medical services for immigrants. The final recommendations were submitted to the government in January 1950, and included government services for the entire population—hospitalization, maternity-leave payments, social pensions, and different types of insurance—old age, orphan and widow insurance, and family grants in case of death. In addition, different types of insurance were proposed for agricultural workers, such as medical insurance, motherhood insurance, workmen’s compensation for accidents and illness, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance for wage and salary employees. With approval of the Knesset, the government also included a “progressive” scale for supplementary insurance on top of the social insurance. As a first step, the National Insurance Section was established in June 1949, and its name was added to that of the Labor Ministry, reflecting its importance. From then on the ministry was known as the Ministry of Labor and National Insurance.71 How important Golda Meir thought national insurance was can be seen in her summation of her term as Minister of Labor:

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When I write about that period in my life, I find myself unwittingly thinking of how lucky I was to have participated in the beginnings of so many things—not that I influenced the course of things, but to a great extent I was part of the events around me, and sometimes my ministry or I myself were given the opportunity to fill a crucial role in the building of the country. I assume, that if I limit myself—and I must—to two or three events that were in my opinion the most significant or beneficial during those seven years, I would have to start with the legislation that was led by the Labor Ministry. This symbolized for me, above all else, equality and social justice, without which I could not at all imagine the state in action. Old age pensions, retirement, widow and orphan pensions, maternity leave and maternity grants, workers’ compensation, disability, and unemployment insurance, are essential elements for any society that respects itself, and as much as we were missing other things or had to defer them, these were fundamental needs.72 It should be mentioned that the first national insurance law in the State of Israel was submitted to the Knesset in January 1952 (after the period covered by this book) and entered into force only in spring 1954.

H. Interim Summary of the Activity of the Labor Ministry (January 1949–November 1951) The end of the war and the elections of January 1949 led to a restructuring of the ministry from its format under the Provisional Government. From this point on the ministry focused on realizing the objectives originally set for it by Va’adat HaMatzav, especially those in the legal and regulatory spheres. However, in addition, three pressing issues that occupied the entire economy after the war were also emphasized: employment of immigrants, employment of decommissioned soldiers, and housing for immigrants. Regarding employment, the ministry acted decisively and even attained

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concrete achievements. However during the period covered in this study, no full solution to the housing plight of the immigrants was found, and the social legislation that would eventually result in the establishment of the Institute for National Insurance was not completed. However, during Golda Meir’s term, unlike the operation of the ministry during the war, a process of “professionalization” occurred in all matters relating to its objectives and structure.

I. Zeev Sharf’s Final Report on the Professional and Administrative Management of the Government Ministries (1950–1951) On February 15, 1950, Government Secretary Zeev Sharf was asked to submit a report to the government about the organizational structure of the government ministries, and to recommend changes and improvements. The report was submitted to the prime minister on June 23, 1950, after Sharf and his team held discussions with the director generals and division heads of all the ministries.73 This organizational and administrative audit of the government ministries was necessary because of the many complaints and criticisms that had been submitted, both from within the system and from those who came into contact with it. The criticism focused on four main areas: (1) unclear powers of the ministries; (2) an overabundance of administrative units in the ministries; (3) unsuitable pairings between certain administrative units and their host ministries; and (4) inflated professional titles that led to exaggeration in the status and budget of a given unit. In the introduction to his report, Sharf noted that he tried to avoid the political aspects of the issue, but he did not deny that this factor contributed to the general problem: “We did not discuss or submit proposals that had political ramifications, such as transferring entire fields of activity from one ministry to another, even though from a strictly administrative standpoint there is no room for changes of this type.”74 What, then, lay behind the problems that emerged in the governmental system? First, it is important to note that there is more than one reason

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for the array of problems discussed in Sharf’s report, as was the case with individualized studies of the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry. The transition from Yishuv to State, the hybridization of two different forms of administration and government (that of the Yishuv and that of the Mandate), the war and its constraints, flaws in planning and implementation, and the political appetite of the political parties—all contributed to the situation depicted in Sharf’s report. The Powers of the Ministries Ostensibly, the ministries did not have any difficulties in their daily operation; each ministry knew which domains came under its authority and responsibility. The powers of the ministries were defined in the provisions of Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 as early as the days of the Provisional Government, although in its early days things were not entirely clear, whether because Va’adat HaMatzav did not finalize its work in certain areas, or due to inexperience and the urgency of the times. This is how Minister of Trade and Industry Peretz Bernstein described it in May 1948: “Something about the distribution of portfolios, not from the political perspective but with regard to the questions raised, raises two issues that should be discussed: the first, defining the responsibilities of the ministries. For example: economy, trade, and industry. What is economy, what is trade, and what is industry? And secondly, there are a few matters (not entire portfolios) that are up in the air, and no one knows where they belong. For example: cooperatives, geology, franchises.”75 While problems such as these were in essence functional and are understandable for the time (May 1948), Haim HaCohen’s memorandum to the minister of justice in 1950 is indicative of a much more complex problem: A cognizance of the government’s collective responsibility has not seeped into the hearts of the officials responsible for the management of the ministries and their departments. A situation has emerged that in this unified government there are 17 ministries, each of which aims to be a whole and independent unit, each

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with distinct imperialist propensities: to expand at the expense of others. This results in a situation in which work that could and should be done in a single ministry, on behalf of other ministries, is done in each ministry separately. Different ministries handle similar subjects differently with different results, and there is a lack of clarity, both within the government and among the public, regarding the distribution of powers between them.76 HaCohen gives a few examples to illustrate the problem in four different domains: state property, import and export, personnel, and fuel. Following is a detailed example from the area of management of state property. The Defense Ministry was in charge of the Supply Division and the Assets Section, whereas the Prime Minister’s Office consulted on the subject of land in its Planning Division and in the Negev. The Finance Ministry handled state assets (including the Custodian for Absentee Property), enemy property, and the custodianship of German property. The Ministry of Justice handled the Land Regulation Department (the Administrator General’s Office). The Interior Ministry handled the District Administration and the Housing Committees.77 How can this duplication of powers be analyzed and understood? There would be no duplication and no waste of resources if the topics raised here regarding state property were efficiently handled by the authorized professional entity. In addition, it is not significant per se if the matter was handled by a single ministry or division, or divided into several subtopics and handled by different entities—so long as each of the subjects was handled efficiently, and on condition that a senior supervisory body was appointed to determine overarching policy and coordinate among the different bodies. However, the reports of HaCohen and Sharf depict a situation in which there were seventeen ministries, each aspiring to be an independent unit. The question, then, is what led to this overlap of authorities? In my opinion, the reality portrayed in the reports of Sharf and HaCohen mainly reflects the continued trend of decentralization and particularism that was practiced in the Yishuv institutions during the British Mandate, which

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were based on voluntary agreements. On the one hand it is possible to see that in several instances, the various players on the ministerial level and people in the field showed a genuine intention to streamline the system and to base it on professional standards as reflected in the agreement on a policy and the application of collective responsibility and budgetary guidance. On the other hand, some organizational and managerial patterns that stood out as difficult to eradicate in the first years of the state, since most of the directors of the ministries and the officials themselves had come from the administrative system of the Yishuv establishment. The same can be said for the apparatus of the political parties, which considered the government ministries under their control to be a sort of personal fiefdom and a locus of political and financial power. This was evident in the days of the Mapam-controlled Labor Ministry during the war, as well as under the Mapai-controlled Labor Ministry after the first elections to the Knesset. The government was ostensibly aware of the ills of the system and even tried to improve it. But the power struggles within the government reflected the difficult transition from an administrative system based on voluntary agreements, to a new administrative system that tried to combine the Yishuv and the Mandate systems in a single framework. The clash between this administrative tradition and that of Mandate can be seen in the difficulties encountered by the Israeli district commissioners (most of them graduates of the British Mandate system) early in their careers, when they tried to train representatives of other government ministries to act through the district commissioner rather than independently through their ministries. HaCohen also indicates that this fragmented management of matters led to unnecessary expenses, especially when nonprofessional workers signed contracts. Many transactions brought no profit or benefit to the state, mainly because of the absence of a central supervisor. HaCohen notes that the administrative mechanism of the Prime Minister’s Office encountered difficulties in imposing order in government ministries: “As of now, each minister and director general demonstrates absolute sovereignty over their ministry.”78

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The Internal Structure of the Government Ministries and Recommendations for Reform In his report, Sharf lists the structural problems that emerged on the ground and makes recommendations for their resolution. Toward the end of 1950, government ministries consisted of four main administrative units in the following order: division, department, section, and sector. Sharf claimed that the main reason for budgetary waste derived from the existence of redundant administrative units. Government ministries sometimes included departments with only three state employees, and sections with only one employee. The result, according to Sharf, was: “Instead of appointing someone to be responsible for a certain role, he would be made director of a department or section.”79 Another problem was related to the existence of duplicate administrative units, or units placed in the wrong government ministry in terms of their area of responsibility—for example, a technical-engineering office in the Ministry of Health and kashrut inspectors in the Ministry of Welfare. Sharf also warned against the trend of inflating professional titles to glorify a given section: “inflating the importance and thus the budget of the main unit, which needlessly complicated the way in which matters are handled and unjustifiably expands the technical apparatus, since the unit requires secretaries, clerks, and stenographers.”80 Sharf devoted an interesting chapter to a comparison between how British Mandate departments were assimilated within the Israeli administration and how this was done for the departments that came from the national institutions (the Jewish Agency or the Va’ad HaLe’umi). The Mandate departments that were transferred had been defined in British Mandate law and were translated into ordinances under the Law and Administrative Ordinance No. 1 of 1948. This was not the case with several of the departments that came from national institutions, such as the Labor Relations Department at the Ministry of Labor and National Insurance, the Department for Tourism at the Ministry of Immigration, and the Department for Physical Training at the Ministry of Education and

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Culture. New departments established in 1948–1950 were based in part on the orders of the Provisional State Council, and subsequently on Knesset laws, such as the Department for the Registration of Inhabitants of the Interior Ministry and the Custodian for Absentee Property of the Finance Ministry. Moreover, new departments were established that operated with no legal definition of their authorities, examples being major departments such as the Administrative Personnel Department of the Finance Ministry and the Planning Division of the Prime Minister’s Office. Why did this situation arise? As previously discussed, with regard to some of the designated ministries, Va’adat HaMatzav did not complete its work. There were two main reasons for this: political reasons and urgent needs, including those related to the war. One must distinguish between existing units about which the committee did not reach a consensus regarding their future affiliation for political reasons, such as the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency or the Mandate-era Water Department, and departments that had to be created from scratch, either because the unit did not correspond to its predecessor from the British Mandate (for example, the Finance Ministry or the Chief Secretariat), or because there was a need to create something entirely new (for example, the Defense Ministry or the State Comptroller’s Office). Topics that were politically or legally sensitive were left with no clear definition of powers. This is illustrated clearly by the “wandering” of the subject of national planning between several ministries, both for legal and for political reasons, the latter stemming primarily from divergent ideological points of view. It is also important to note that the more sensitive the issue, such as security and finance, the more convenient it was for the government to avoid a precise definition of their authorities. With regard to structural changes, Sharf proposed that the term “division” be eliminated and replaced with terms such as “sector” or “service,” and that the establishment of a department to perform a specific role not be authorized unless it was justified for the handling of a clearly defined issue. He also recommended avoiding to the extent possible the creation of new departments in the main offices or too many sections under the departments. One of the major changes proposed in this reform was to

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deny the ministries the authority to establish departments, and to transfer this authority to the government itself. Sharf recommended that, apart from exceptional cases, the government should meet only once a year to discuss the establishment of new departments as part of the annual budget discussions. If such measures were taken, Sharf emphasized, the work of government ministries would become more efficient and much money would be saved.81 As for the use of professional titles, it was decided not to bestow unnecessary titles on undeserving officials, all the more so if it impacted the ministry’s funds. It was also recommended that certain roles should have titles such as “doctor,” “engineer,” or “chief architect” attached to them to prevent nonprofessional or unsuitable people from entering the system. It would seem, therefore, that as 1951 approached, the inadequacy of the Israeli administrative and governance system was exposed in its full severity, and reform was in order. However, this reform was not undertaken during the period covered by this book.

General Summary

T

he Israeli system of government did not emerge in a vacuum. It was preceded by two very different and particular systems—that of the British Mandate and that of the Yishuv. Many of the founders of the Israeli government were influenced by both these systems and brought these experiences into the new entity. And yet, one cannot understand the end result of the establishment process of the Israeli system of government without understanding the political and diplomatic constraints that characterized this process, especially the impact of the War of Independence and its outcomes.

The Contribution of Va’adat HaMatzav The institutional structure that existed in the Yishuv was not prepared to deal with the problems posed by the transfer of power from the British and by the diplomatic security situation. It was for this reason that Va’adat HaMatzav was established in October 1947. The Committee brought together representatives of the political and professional echelons of the Yishuv to plan for the transfer of power and the management of essential services during the war. The political, defense, and logistical issues that would arise in the period of Va’adat HaMatzav (January 1947–April 1948) could not be resolved in the framework of separate bodies with contradictory interests, such as the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi, or the Histadrut. The senior policymakers who headed Va’adat HaMatzav and its various subcommittees gave it its prestige and authority. The appointments to Va’adat HaMatzav 275

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reflect three important patterns in the political system’s view of its powers and objectives: continuity between the old establishment and the new, the recognition that institutional change was taking place and political figures wished to ensure their place in the new establishment, and the appointment of policymaking politicians to head the committee. After the dissolution of Va’adat HaMatzav in April 1948, and the establishment of the Minhelet HaAm and the Provisional Government, one sees significant continuity between the modi operandi of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi executives and the implementation of work methods in Va’adat HaMatzav and in the Minhelet HaAm. In addition, the fact that most of those who made up the committee were appointed as ministers and other key posts in the new government offices also stands out. In assessing the final result of Va’adat HaMatzav’s work, we must take into account three major constraints that influenced its actions during this process: (1) their assessment of the British evacuation policy, (2) the management of essential services against the backdrop of the war, and (3) a planning process based on the assumption that the U.N. Partition Plan would be implemented, which was not to be the case. Despite these difficulties, it should be noted that during the war the leadership of the Yishuv did gain experience in asserting its authority, even while still under British sovereignty. In this way the leadership gained invaluable experience in managing a sovereign government. The negative influence of the factors mentioned above did stand out in the committee’s inability to complete plans for several of the government ministries. Va’adat HaMatzav’s final report provides a model for a government system that combines elements of both the Mandate and Yishuv systems. The influence of the former was clear in the large strategic complexes over which the Yishuv had no control. The Mandate system served as a role model, encompassing as it did the large strategic complexes, while the Yishuv infrastructure was limited to social and welfare services, although it did contain fundamental political features that could not be ignored. In areas where the committee could not lean on previous models, it offered new alternatives. With the establishment of the state on May 15, 1948, the

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leadership was given a picture of the situation in two areas: how to merge the two systems into a new entity—the Israeli government, and how the government ministries should be managed—their structure, appointments to key positions, and an estimated budget for their first year. And indeed, two days after the establishment of the State of Israel, all of the government ministries were up and running, ready to receive the public.

The Impact of the War of Independence in Shaping the Government System The impact of the war on the shaping of the government system during the Provisional Government from April 1948 to January 1949 can be seen in two main fields. First is the concentration of many powers in the hands of the Executive Branch through the wide employment of emergency regulations, with the grudging cooperation of the party system (manifested in the relationship between the Provisional State Council and the Provisional Government), because a functioning government and proper administration were needed during war and to prevent a governmental vacuum against the backdrop of the British evacuation. The concentration of powers in the hands of the executive branch would become a permanent pattern for many years. Likewise, the executive branch, and the government system on the whole, gained invaluable experience in enforcing its authority and running a sovereign government system on the ground under the most difficult conditions. Second, it required the transition from long-term planning to short-term management of essential services. The actual establishment of the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry entailed diversions, both structural and operational, from the plans of Va’adat HaMatzav, in general due to constraints dictated by the situation on the ground. The structural and substantive changes in the Interior Ministry were rather limited, while the changes in the Labor Ministry were more fundamental, due to the socioeconomic nature of the ministry. Nonetheless, it is important to note that despite the difficult situation brought on by

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the war, the government system managed to successfully establish itself in large part thanks to the basic plan provided by Va’adat HaMatzav—from the most elementary technical specifications to the structure of the government and recommendations for overall functioning. However, even when they diverged from their initial plans, the large amount of information collected by Va’adat HaMatzav became an indispensable database for the resolution of problems that arose on the ground. Even in instances where the actual implementation differed from the recommendations of the committee in their initial plans, it was able, generally speaking, to provide answers and even solve problems that the planners in Va’adat HaMatzav could not, by the nature of things, have foreseen.

Establishing the System of Government After the first elections in January 1949, and the diplomatic maneuverings toward an end to hostilities, the government system continued to work to establish itself. Two characteristics of this period stand out: (1) The government system could begin defining its authorities in peacetime and not under a state of emergency and war. (2) All the constraints that had influenced the government’s planning and establishing of the ministries during the war (such as the need to focus on the management of essential services) and that had often distracted the planners from their original goals, were drastically reduced. The effect of the end of the war and the elections on the ongoing establishment of the government system must be examined on three levels: party politics; the definition and division of authorities; and the structure of the government ministries, in particular the Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry. Party Politics In the first elections, Mapai became the most dominant force in the Israeli political system. Its centrality within the political and ideological spectrum

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enabled it to create a coalition and to bridge ideological gaps without relinquishing its claim to political leadership or its ability to achieve its goals in three essential areas: foreign affairs, defense, and the economy. The exclusion of Mapam from the coalition on the one hand and the creation of the historic alliance with Mizrahi on the other gave Ben-Gurion more maneuvering room than he had in the Provisional Government. Mapam was a constant obstacle on matters of foreign, defense, and economic affairs, whereas Mapai’s coalition partners from Mizrahi enabled them to move with relative ease through most of the important issues on the political agenda, with the exception of matters of education and the Jewish-religious nature of the state. It is therefore hard to cite problems related to the Interior Ministry in terms of the working relationship between Mapai and Mizrahi during this period; most of the problems that arose were of a purely professional nature. On the other hand, the transfer of the Labor Ministry from Mapam to Mapai after the elections and coalition negotiations gave Mapai the opportunity to do an ideological and organizational shake-up of the ministry and to manage labor-market issues to its own satisfaction, thus constituting a marked contrast from the disagreements that colored the tenure of the Provisional Government, when the Labor Ministry was controlled by Mapam. This shift was particularly striking with regard to the dispute that arose around the issue of the national master plan. Defining Powers After the elections, and toward the end of the war, the political leadership had the opportunity to define the authorities of the new government system in the spirit of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions and the Declaration of Independence, in particular with regard to ratifying a constitution and annulling the emergency regulations. However, as we have seen, things unfolded differently. The Transition Act was a manifestation of Ben-Gurion’s growing tendency to render meaningless the original goal of the Constituent Assembly, namely, to draft a formal constitution.

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Instead, the Knesset passed into legislation a series of basic laws. The emergency regulations also remained in place and served as a convenient tool for the government to implement policy, even when it did not touch directly on security issues. Ben-Gurion’s insistence on imposing collective responsibility on all the members of the government stemmed from his desire to form a government based on a stable majority. Since he was faced with weighty political and security issues, Ben-Gurion emphasized the importance of establishing a coalition government. He saw collective responsibility as a guarantee for the support of a stable majority, in particular in the framework of a multiparty coalition. Collective responsibility was adopted from the British model and became binding by law, constituting a shift away from the system of voluntary agreements that existed in the Yishuv. Divisions of Power between Government Ministries The ambiguity in the division of authority among the government ministries in the immediate postwar period can be attributed to two main factors. The first was the decentralized and particularistic administrative tradition that characterized the pre-state Yishuv. This practice, which stemmed in part from the lack of official enforcement authority during the Mandate period, continued to appear in the government ministries after the establishment of the state; the ministries operated out of a sort of inertia, as if they were the direct continuation of the Yishuv establishment, cooperating with other institutions through voluntary agreements. The second factor was the lack of professional experience needed for managing a sovereign system of government. Many individuals in Va’adat HaMatzav, and later also in the government ministries, recognized this problem and did their best to recruit experienced professionals from within the Jewish clerical ranks of the Mandate and Yishuv establishments, to offer positions to British officers, and even to open training courses. Despite the significance of this contribution, it could not deter the particularistic tendency. These factors led to the establishment of a convoluted administrative system characterized by

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great budgetary waste. This is exemplified by the government’s difficulty in dealing with the question of the management of the state’s assets. Nonetheless, there was an important difference between the prestate era and the early 1950s, in that numerous members of the political and professional echelons were aware of the situation and able to identify the main points of weakness. Here we can also identify the contribution of those same ministerial figures, including professional administrative staff, who warned about the situation that had developed in the government ministries and demanded change. Scharf was thus asked to write up a general report with recommendations for correcting the problems, but, as we have said, these were not implemented during the tenure of the first elected government. We will now examine how these processes affected the Labor and Interior Ministries. The Interior Ministry The organization of the Interior Ministry following the elections can be divided into three stages: the transfer of the ministry to Mizrahi, the reorganization in the Divisions of General Administration and Local Government, and the improvement of the population registration policy while dealing with two problematic populations—new immigrants and Arabs. To a large extent, the organizational issues that affected the Divisions of General Administration and Local Government reflect issues faced by all of the government ministries. This was particularly salient in the need to bolster the authorities of the district commissioners, who were the executive arm of the Interior Minister and of the government vis-à-vis representatives of other government ministries and of the local councils, which until then were wont to bypass the district commissioners and go directly to the head offices. To put a stop to this phenomenon, the interior minister refused to handle requests from representatives of the local councils unless they had gone through the district commissioners. Two organizational problems affected the Local Government Division, characterizing not only the confusion that reigned between the government ministries but that which

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existed between different administrative units within a single ministry. Examples of this are the fact that budgets for the local authorities were prepared simultaneously by three different ministries, and the disagreement between the Divisions of Local Government and General Administration over the issue of housing the new immigrants in abandoned Arab villages or in formerly mixed cities. The department’s activities with regard to population registration were focused on the preliminary organization of the national directory, registration of marriages and divorces, and the upholding of confidentiality in registration. But above all, they had to deal with the complex situation of the two most problematic population groups at the time: immigrants and Arabs. Most of the problems related to the registration of immigrants had already been resolved during the tenure of the Provisional Government, while the issue of registering the Arabs came to a head in this period. The issue was an extremely sensitive one in terms of international law and diplomacy, and also difficult to manage on an organizational level. On the diplomatic front there was the question of the Palestinian refugees and the annexation of territories beyond the borders of the Jewish state defined in the U.N. Partition Plan. On the administrative level, many different frameworks dealt with the issue simultaneously: the Civil Administration, the Department of Minority Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Interior Ministry. An agreement was reached between the Military Administration and the Interior Ministry as to the registration procedures for the Arab population in early July, 1949. In the spirit of the recommendations of Government Secretary Zeev Scharf, in July 1951 a committee for the restructuring of the Interior Ministry was established that emphasized the need to dismantle the ministry’s large branches and drastically downsize both staff and budget. But its recommendations were not implemented in the period covered by this study. Summing up the evolution of the Interior Ministry from the early planning stages (under Va’adat HaMatzav), through the war, and to the consolidation of the ministry after the war, one can say that on most levels the ministry operated according to the recommendations of Va’adat HaMatzav, with the exception of the police and prison services, which were moved to

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a different framework. Likewise, the ministry experienced no great political upsets, whether during the tenure of the Provisional Government or under the first elected government. The Labor Ministry The Labor Ministry had several new organizational patterns, some ideological or political and some functional. Unlike in the Interior Ministry, for the Labor Ministry the end of the war and the elections was a catalyst for a complete overhaul. We must recall that with the transfer of the Labor Ministry from Mapam to Mapai, differences in social and economic worldview on the issue of proactive national planning came into play, particularly in terms of the overall attitude toward the labor market. Mapam envisioned the Planning Division in the Labor Ministry as a new authority with a centralist orientation toward national planning, while Mapai feared that centralizing such a weighty subject as the national master plan in a single body would place too much political and economic power in a single ministry, and therefore the issue of planning was dispersed among several government ministries. Moreover, we should take into account the significant ideological differences between Mapam and Mapai; Mapam had explicitly socialist and Marxist tendencies and was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, while Mapai was a party with a socialist orientation that did not identify with the Soviet Union, especially given that with regard to the foreign affairs of the young country, Ben-Gurion was working toward building strategic ties with the West. Toward the end of the war, some structural changes were needed to prepare for the organization of the labor market in both the short and long term. The government and the Finance Ministry dictated economic policy on the general level, with an emphasis on finding employment for new immigrants and veterans, while the Labor Ministry was responsible for the implementation of this policy on the ground. Upon assuming her position, Labor Minister Golda Meir dismantled the two large war-era branches of the ministry: labor and manpower. These branches had been established to

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serve the wartime market, which demanded a constant flow of manpower to specific industrial sectors and for the building of fortifications. As the war drew to a close, the need to handle a system of vital services diminished and priorities changed because of the shift from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy. One of the results of this transition came under the responsibility of the Labor Ministry, namely, the need to find employment and housing for decommissioned solders and new immigrants. It is important to note, however, that the Labor Ministry on its own was not capable of providing comprehensive solutions to the economic and social problems of the State of Israel between 1949 and 1951, though it did not spare any effort to tackle the issues that lay before it. In the realm of employment, the Labor Ministry focused its efforts on redirecting veterans and new immigrants into public works in construction and agriculture. The situation of the new immigrants was generally quite dire, and the goal was to transfer them out of the transit camps and into permanent residences as quickly as possible. Most of the immigrants were employed during this period in forestry, citrus farming, and road works, but their salaries were lower than the minimum wage that was paid to the decommissioned soldiers. With regard to housing, the ministry had two main issues to contend with: the tension between the general tendency of most of the immigrants to settle in the center of the country and the state’s desire to settle them throughout the periphery, and the tension in the construction industry between the private and public sectors, for which the Labor Ministry tried to find a compromise. In parallel to its treatment of these pressing issues, a significant amount of energy was put into the longterm planning of the labor market, manifested in the establishment of the Oversight and Research Department and the Productivity Section. But without doubt the greatest long-term initiative of the Labor Ministry during this period was its national social security program, which encompassed the establishment of compulsory insurance and a universal medical insurance system. This initiative eventually led to the first National Insurance Law of the State of Israel, which was submitted to the Knesset in January 1952, and went into effect only in the spring of 1954.

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Bureaucrats and Politicians: Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman’s Findings and Their Relevance to Israel as a Case Study In the introduction to this book, four models and key questions were presented that appear in the research of Aberbach et al. on the dynamic between politicians and bureaucrats. We will now assess the applicability of their findings with regard to Israel. Disparities in Education and Training One of Aberbach et al.’s conclusions was that the academic background and social class of bureaucrats is generally higher than that of politicians. Likewise, bureaucrats generally climb the career ladder more slowly than politicians, all the more so when we take into account the difference in training and education. Although both types are involved in policymaking, the findings of this study contradict the assumptions of Model 1, which sees the role of the bureaucrat as implementing and executing the policy made by the politician, and no more. Furthermore, in this book we have seen a difference in the kinds of responsibilities taken by each of the two types, thus contradicting the assumption of Model 4, namely, that the two types of roles are amalgamated under the “pure hybrid.” On the other hand, there is a similarity between the present findings and Model 2 with regard to the fact that bureaucrats tend to focus on facts, while politicians focus on values. Involvement in Politics and Policy-Making While both politicians and bureaucrats are involved in politics and policymaking, they take differing approaches to it. The bureaucrat’s skills and expertise lead him to seek technical and administrative solutions to defined and specific problems, while the politician defines the problems before him in terms of political principles and benefits. Likewise the politician generally has a deep commitment to a path and is more willing to take risks, while

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the bureaucrat is more focused on administrative and technical aspects and problem-solving, including mediation between organized interest groups. The politician emphasizes his or her role as a fighter and an advocate for as broad a public as possible, and is less inclined to emphasize organized interest groups, or unorganized groups representing the interests of individuals. Unlike in Model 2, and similar to Model 3, the politician sees the mediation between different interests as less important, while for the bureaucrat it is more significant. The bureaucrat’s approach to policy implementation is characterized by caution and professionalism, but above all he or she is concerned with preserving balance. The bureaucrat is detail-oriented and is wary of innovations or big changes. The politician, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the larger picture, and does not shy away from change or innovation. Bureaucrats’ ideologies are defined by their administrative environment, while politicians’ ideologies are based around their party. Bureaucrats prefer to manage an effective policy in a closed room and do not question the existing regime, while politicians are more attentive to outsiders. Differences within the Groups Just as bureaucrats and politicians differ from one another, so, too are there differences within each of the groups. For example, there are bureaucrats whose work is related to budget-making, those who deal with supervision, and those charged with implementing plans. Among politicians, there are differences between those who take a more populist approach and come into contact with people in the field, and those who do their work primarily within the legislature, where they are required to respond to a wider spectrum of voters. Lessons Learned from the Findings Bureaucrats at the highest level of decision-making can wield enormous influence on policy, for example in countries such as Sweden and the United States. When it comes to conflict management, the role of politicians is evident in public arenas such as the parliament or the party, whereas

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bureaucrats prefer closed committee chambers, where they have an advantage over politicians in settling disputes between organized interest groups. As for the coordination and “give-and-take” on specific issues, bureaucrats may excel in planning and preparing budgets, but when problems arise that are beyond their ability to solve, they call on the politician. With their respective advantages and disadvantages, the two types cannot manage without one another. In recent years we have seen that the choice of candidates for managerial positions often takes into account their political background. In a rating of countries by level of involvement of bureaucrats in policymaking, as it arises from the study, France has the highest level of involvement, then England, Germany, the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. The bureaucrat’s moral dilemma relates only to the determination of policy without taking political responsibility, while the politician’s dilemma is that he sets policy without having the proper skills. A good example of this problem can be found in the case of immigration policy in France. Whereas the bureaucrats in charge of immigration policy espouse a technical and administrative approach, politicians and representatives of the various parties, whether on the right or left, take a distinctively ideological and social approach. Policymaking for the politician is characterized by ideological fervor and sensitivity to sectorial interests, whereas bureaucrats involved in determining policy are motivated by end goals of continuity, stability, and predictability. Bureaucrats focus more on practical tasks, while politicians focus on the larger vision. Bureaucrats approach policymaking with the aim of maintaining organizational harmony, and they are willing to compromise to achieve unity within the organization, because they are averse to risk-taking. But they can be so cautious as to cause paralysis or stagnation in the system. Politicians can also bring the system to a standstill if they are overly confident and become a prisoner of their own views, sliding into dogmatism and doctrines. Summary of the Findings of Aberbach et al. As they summed up the findings of their study, the three authors tried to determine how to make the most of the qualities of the bureaucrat on the

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one hand and those of the politician on the other hand. Aberbach et al. believe that some Western countries lean toward Model 4, meaning “the pure hybrid,” in particular the United States and Germany. But there are also reservations with regard to Model 4, since many political candidates in these two countries had better skills than their bureaucratic counterparts. Another reservation stems from the possibility that this model might generate an elite level of “superbureaucrats” who will weaken the party system. The scholars conclude that there is no formula today that can ensure cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats, and that it is therefore best that bureaucrats do what they know how to do best; the politicians will ensure the vision of the society they represent, and bureaucrats will translate this vision into a concrete national reality.

The Establishment of the Government System in Israel in Light of Aberbach Differences between Politicians and Bureaucrats in terms of Academic Training, Socioeconomic Status, and Professional Training A comparison of the academic backgrounds of most of the senior functionaries and bureaucrats in the governmental system in Israel during the period covered by this book, with those of the policymaking politicians whom they served, shows a clear advantage for the bureaucrats. This stood out in Va’adat HaMatzav and in the operation of the government ministries in the field, for example, in the district authorities of the Interior Ministry. Most of the district commissioners in Israel (alumni of the Mandate system) had an impressive academic résumé (generally with graduate degrees) from prestigious institutions in Europe and the United States, thus surpassing their counterparts from the Yishuv establishment. As for socioeconomic background, no remarkable differences were found between those who came from Europe and those who were born in Palestine. Quite a few of the bureaucrats came from the urban sector and from the middle class, and

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had professional degrees, although there were also many who had emerged from the labor settlements (see biographical appendix). With regard to the training paths in Israel, there were marked differences between the paths followed by bureaucrats versus those taken by politicians, and this accords well with the findings of Aberbach et al. Most of the members of Va’adat HaMatzav and, later, also the administrative ranks of the government ministries rose in the ranks of the professional departments of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executives or in the Mandate system. Generally, they underwent long, slow processes of training over the course of several years, including continuing education courses, while gaining on-the-job professional experience. Here are just three examples out of many. (1) Yaakov Reiser came to the management of the Department for Public Works in the Labor Ministry during the Provisional Government, after serving as the chief professional consultant in the establishment of the Department for Public Works in Subcommittee B of Va’adat HaMatzav. Before that he served as head of the Jewish Agency Technical Department Executive. (2) Bechor Shalom Sheetrit was appointed head of the Police and Minority Affairs Ministry as a representative of the Sephardic Community, but also by virtue of his many years of experience as a Mandatory police officer and justice of the peace. (3) Yaakov Kisalov was appointed Tel Aviv District Commissioner after serving for many years in the Mandatory District Administration system. Most of the politician policymakers climbed the promotional ladder through the political institutions of their parties. They held senior positions from the early stages of their careers, whether in the Jewish Agency or the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, the Histradrut, or other political movements. When we examine their professional qualification to head the subcommittees in Va’adat HaMatzav, and subsequently government ministries, generally speaking they were not professionally qualified, though in some cases they were. Examples include the appointment of Mapai member Mordechai Shatner to head the Subcommittee for the Supply of Fuel and Food in Subcommittee A, and after the establishment of the state, his appointment as Jerusalem Reconstruction Officer; and the appointment of

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Mapam member David Sverdlov to head the Labor Division in the Labor Ministry under Ben-Tov. Although these were political appointments, no one questions their professional qualifications. These discrepancies between politicians and bureaucrats appear in Models 2 and 3 of Aberbach et al., whereas Model 2 underscores that in recent years there has been a marked improvement in the educational level and training of politicians. This holds true for Israel as well, although in the period covered by this study the gaps remained. Involvement in Politics and Policymaking Both politicians and bureaucrats engage in policymaking, though each in their own way. Using Aberbach et al. we can understand that the source of the difficult dispute between Mapam and Mapai was over the question of who would be in charge of initiated national planning. This dispute manifested itself in the overt split between Minister of Labor Mordechai Ben-Tov and Yaakov Reiser, head of the ministry’s Department for Public Works. Although Reiser had been appointed to head the DPA, and though his criticism of the conduct of the department and Ben-Tov’s responsibility was professional and to the point, he had one “disadvantage,” namely, he was representing the position of Mapai and he was fired by a minister who represented Mapam. Although he was a professional and a technocrat, Reiser did not hesitate to harshly criticize the minister under whom he worked, and for this he paid the price. It is also important to note that even during Va’adat HaMatzav period, transportation expert Bar-Kochva Meirovich did not shy away from harsh criticism of a policymaking politician such as Itzhak Gruenbaum, and disagreed with him on professional matters in committee discussions. These instances notwithstanding, in general the findings of Aberbach et al. hold true with regard to the way bureaucrats tend to influence policy. In Va’adat HaMatzav, in the government ministries, and in the field, the experts emphasized caution and preference for gradual progress in the framework

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of expert committees, even though as a result of the state of emergency in which they existed, it was also demanded of them that they provide immediate solutions as well. There is no doubt that in the period covered by this book, the war was the finest hour of the experts and the bureaucrats. This is well illustrated in the work of Va’adat HaMatzav, in which the trust and consideration they were granted by the political echelon was admirable. But these things held true in the period of the Provisional Government during the war as well. There is a seeming paradox here. On the establishment of the Provisional Government, the executive branch received enormous centralized power, though I claim that precisely because of this the experts and bureaucrats were given the opportunity to work almost without interference. This was due to the great support they received from the political echelon, but even more as a result of the weak political party activity during the war. With the end of the war and after the elections to the First Knesset, the political system returned to functioning in full, and we can see a process of politicization of the ministries and the significant problems in organization and management that they experienced as a result. There were also failures in the system that stemmed from the particularistic and decentralized administrative legacy of the Yishuv establishment, although the fact that Zeev Scharf avoided calling out the political echelon for these failures in the system speaks volumes. Mediation between Interest Groups Aberbach’s findings suggest that bureaucrats tend to mediate and resolve conflicts between organized interest groups, whereas politicians prefer nonorganized interests represented by individuals. This tendency was evident during the period of Va’adat HaMatzav, though it continued into the subsequent periods as well. We see this clearly in the mediation efforts of the experts of Va’adat HaMatzav regarding transportation and supply, food, the establishment of the judiciary system, and effectively on almost every

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professional subject that arose and demanded a solution. The tendency was to reconcile the different interest groups to bring about solidarity and enable the broadest possible action. In effect this was one of the primary missions of Va’adat HaMatzav, since the particular structure of the interest groups in the Yishuv establishment was not suitable for what was required to run a country during a time of war and immediately after. A similar trend is evident in the operation of the government ministries in the field. For example, the Interior Ministry established interministerial expert committees for coordinating between the powers of the district commissioner and those of the representatives of other government ministries. And yet, it was not in every case possible to solve this type of problem without involving the political echelon. We have seen this in the inability of Subcommittee C of Va’adat HaMatzav to summarize its program due to a political dispute over the question of where to place the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency in the future government, and also over an even more complex question—that of the defense portfolio. It seems that the most difficult issues that arose from the imminent transition from the Yishuv to a sovereign state were of a distinctive political and ideological character, and thus they could be resolved only by the political echelon and not by the professional echelon. All this accords well with Model 2, which focuses on the division of roles between the bureaucrat, who emphasizes the factual elements, and the politician, who focuses on ethics and values. For example, only the government could make the ethical and moral decision to establish the IDF and dismantle the pre-state militias, out of a worldview and idea of statehood. Once the decision was made, the bureaucrats were charged with translating it into practice. Likewise, the decision to bomb the Altalena was made at the highest political level, by the prime minister himself, whereas implementation of the mission became a tactical matter for the defense forces to handle. And finally, the decision about the establishment and eventual dismantlement of the Ministry of Police and Minority Affairs was also fundamentally political, while the bureaucratic echelon was entrusted with carrying it out.

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Which of the Models Best Fits the Israeli System of Government between 1947 and 1951? It appears that in the period discussed in this book, it was clear who was subordinate to whom: at the head of Va’adat HaMatzav and its subcommittees, and eventually at the head of each of the government ministries, were policymaking politicians, and the experts and bureaucrats were subordinate to their authority. In purely structural terms, this fits in with Weber’s Model 1. But one cannot overlook the assumptions of Model 2, which assert that both politicians and bureaucrats are involved in policymaking, although they are distinguished by the varying natures of their contribution. Without a doubt, the dozens of experts who took part in the subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav, and thereafter in the government ministries, contributed to the shaping of policy by bringing to it their knowledge and facts, and their ability to answer questions such as “Will it work?,” “How will it work?,” and “How much will it cost?” But is the hybridization proposed in Model 2 between the expertise of the bureaucrat and the ethical values of the politician really so clear in Israel? Not necessarily. We find many cases in which bureaucrats intervened on issues of value judgments and even passed clear moral judgments on the way the system was being conducted or on their superiors, including policymaking politicians (with Reiser’s critique of Ben-Tov a case in point). It follows that of the four models presented by Aberbach et al., Model 3 (“Energy and Balance”) properly reflects, albeit in a limited way, the Israeli government system in all of the stages dealt with in the present study. In the case studies of the Labor Ministry and the Interior Ministry both bureaucrats and politicians participated in policymaking, though with different working methodologies and spheres of action. It is true that policymaking politicians in Israel tended to be idealistic and ideological, while bureaucrats were more cautious and practical, preferring the closed committee chamber over the public platform. But more than in any other place, the Israeli government system was planned, established, and consolidated in

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the committee rooms of expert bureaucrats—from the subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav, through the ministries of the Provisional Government and the practical establishment of the ministries in the field, and including the period following the first election. With regard to Model 4, one cannot speak of the appearance of the “pure hybrid” model in the period discussed in this book. However, one can see initial signs of the appearance of one byproduct of this model, namely, the phenomenon of the outsider, or experts who are “imported” from outside of the existing pool of civil servants but also from outside the pool of party politicians. This phenomenon was evident under David BenGurion, who on occasion surrounded himself with advisors on various issues. Examples of this are the appointment of Reuben Shiloach (Zaslani) as chief advisor for intelligence affairs in 1948, and the appointment of Yehoshua (Josh) Palmon to head the Arab Affairs Section in the Prime Minister’s Office in 1949. This phenomenon is widely practiced today in Europe and the United States and enables the incorporation of educated, talented, but above all loyal individuals into the political echelon when their services are needed. One can conclude by saying that there is no single formula that can ensure full cooperation and harmony between politicians and bureaucrats. Thus it is worthwhile to recall Aberbach’s own concluding words: “In a well-ordered polity, politicians and bureaucrats each can do what they are best able to do: Politicians articulate society’s dreams and bureaucrats help bring them to earth.”

Appendix

Biographical Appendix Aliash, Mordechai. 1892–1950. Born in the Ukraine and immigrated to Palestine in the early 1920s. He was a lawyer and a diplomat and served as the legal advisor of the Va’ad HaLe’umi in the Yishuv. He also represented the Jewish community in Jerusalem to both the Yishuv institutions and to the U.N., and was Israel’s first ambassador to Britain. Alkalai, Reuven. 1907–1976. Born in Jerusalem and a graduate of the Jerusalem Teachers’ Seminar. During WWII he served as a news editor at the British Mandate radio station the Voice of Jerusalem and was head of the British Public Information Office in Tel Aviv–Jaffa. After the establishment of the State of Israel, he became head of the Government Information Office. Baki, Roberto. 1909–1995. Born in Rome, Italy, and immigrated to Palestine in 1938. He was a professor of demography and statistics, and between 1948 and 1977 served as chief government statistician and head of the Central Bureau of Statistics. He published more than 200 books and articles in the field of statistics. Ben Aharon (Nisenbaum), Yizhak. 1906–2006. Born in Bukovina and immigrated to Palestine in 1928. He was one of the leading figures of the labor movement, and former general secretary of the Histadrut. He was a graduate of Berlin University and a member of the Shomer HaTzair Zionist youth movement in Romania. From 1932 to 1938 he served as general secretary of the Tel Aviv Labor Union, and as the Labor Party’s chief executive. 295

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During WWII he served in the British army and was imprisoned in a German POW camp. After the war, he became one of the founders of Mapam until he left the party in 1954. He served as a member of Knesset between 1949 and 1977 and was minister of transportation from 1959 to 1962. In 1965 he was among the founders of the Labor Alliance (in Hebrew: Ma’arakh) and was general secretary of the Histadrut between 1969 and 1973. He retired from political life in 1977, after which he became an enthusiastic supporter of the Israeli-Arab peace process. Ben-Gurion, David. 1886–1973. Born in Płonsk, Poland. He immigrated to Palestine in 1906 and settled in the Segera agricultural farm in the Galilee. In 1915 he was expelled by the Ottoman authorities to Egypt. From there he traveled to the U.S. and together with Izhak Ben- Zvi founded the Jewish Brigades, which supported the British in the Middle East during WWI. In 1919 he was among the founders of the Ahdut HaAvodah and was head of the Histadrut from 1921 to 1935. Following the relocation of the Jewish Agency Executive from London to Jerusalem, he became its director general. In 1930 he was among the founders of Mapai. In April 1948 he headed Minhelet Ha’Am and from May 15, 1948, he became Israel’s first prime minister and served until 1954. He returned as minister of defense in 1955 and became prime minister again until his final retirement in 1963. Ben-Tov, Mordechai. 1900–1985. Born in Grodzisk, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1920. He was a member of Kibbutz Mishmar HaEmek and graduated from the British Mandatory Law School. As head of the Shomer HaTzair (“Young Guard” in Hebrew), he represented the movement in all of the Zionist institutions. His positions included editor of the newspaper Al HaMishmar between 1943 and 1948 and member of the Yishuv leadership delegation to the U.N. in 1947. He was labor minister in the Provisional Government (1948–1949) and in the Knesset (1951–1961), and also minister of housing (1966 to 1969). Ben-Zvi (Shimshelevich), Yitzhak. 1884–1963. Born in Poltava, Ukraine. Immigrated to Palestine in 1907 and was among the founders of the first

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Jewish self-defense organization, HaShomer (“The Guard” in Hebrew). After his expulsion by the Ottoman authorities in 1915 he joined Ben-Gurion in the U.S. where they founded the “Hebrew Battalions” in 1918. Between 1931 and 1948 he headed the Va’ad HaLe’umi, and following the death of Israel’s first president, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, he became Israel’s second president, serving until 1962. Ben-Zvi showed much interest in Jewish history with an emphasis on Jews from the Middle East. The Ben-Zvi Institute for the Study of the Land of Israel is named after him. Biran (Bergman), Avraham. 1909–2008. Born in Jerusalem and a graduate of the Hebrew Reali High School in Haifa. In 1920 he joined the British Mandate district government system and between 1937 and 1948 served as district officer in the cities of Afula, Nazareth, Naharia, and Jerusalem. Following the establishment of Israel he replaced Shmuel Bechar-Yeshayahu as the Jerusalem district commissioner. Bergman, Yaakov. 1897–2001. Born in Rosh Pina in the northern Galilee and graduated from the Teachers’ Seminar in Jerusalem and the Ottoman officer school in Istanbul. With the arrival of the British expeditionary force to Palestine, he deserted the Turkish army and served in the British government. He served in the British mandate police force between 1920 and 1926. Between 1926 and 1948 he served as a district officer in the towns of Nazareth, Tiberias, Safed, Beit-Shean, Jerusalem, and Haifa. Following the establishment of Israel he became district commissioner of Haifa. Berenzon, Zvi. 1907–2001. Born in Safed, Upper Galilee. He graduated from Cambridge University with a degree in law and became an attorney on behalf of the British Mandatory government in Palestine. He taught law in the Scottish College at Safed from 1929 to 1931 and from 1937 to 1938 served as legal advisor to the Histadrut. Between 1949 and 1953 he served as director general of the Labor Ministry under Golda Meir. From 1958 to 1959 he headed the Israeli delegation to the International Labor Union and later was appointed Supreme Court justice.

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Bernstein, Peretz. 1890–1971. Born in Meiningen, Germany, and immigrated to Palestine in 1936. He was a member of the Jewish Agency Executive and the representative of the General Zionists Party in the People’s Council. Following his arrival he became the chief editor of the newspaper of the General Zionists party, HaBoker (“The Morning” in Hebrew), and in 1941 was elected to head the party and was in charge of the Department of Industry and Commerce in the Jewish Agency. Between 1948 and 1955 he served as minister of Trade and Industry. With the establishment of the Liberal Party he was elected as one of its two presidents, and after the party split in 1964 he headed the largest faction. Burg, Yosef. 1909–1999. Born in Dresden, Germany, and immigrated to Palestine in 1939. He started his professional career in education within the national religious sector. Between 1946 and 1949 he was sent to Paris to assist Holocaust survivors. On returning he became a major leader in the religious Zionist Mizrachi and Mizrachi Workers’ movements, heading the movements’ liberal faction, which advocated a moderate religious ideology and cooperation with the secular Zionist Labor party. In 1956 he was among the founders of the National Religious Party. Finally, he became a Knesset member and served as a minister in several governments between the years 1951 and 1986. Eshkol (Shkolnik), Levi. 1895–1969. Born in the Ukraine and immigrated to Palestine in 1914. Filled numerous positions in the labor movement, such as the head of the agriculture center, representative of the labor movement at all the Zionist congresses, general secretary of Tel-Aviv–Jaffa Worker’s Union, and member of the Histadrut Executive. He also directed several government companies, such as Nir, Amidar (public housing), and Mekorot (the national water company). He served as director general of the Defense Ministry (1948–1949), treasurer of the Jewish Agency (1950–1952), minister of agriculture (1951–1952), and head of the Settlement Department (1949–1963). From 1952 to 1963 he served as minister of finance, and was prime minster from 1963 to 1969.

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Even-Tov, Hannah. Head of Subcommittee C of Va’adat HaMatzav, in addition to heading the Jerusalem Va’adat Hamatzav. Following Israel’s establishment, she joined the executive of the Interior Ministry. During the War of Independence she was responsible for the transfer of part of the British Mandate government archives to Tel Aviv. Galili, Yisrael. 1911–1986. Born in Poland and immigrated to Palestine in 1914. He joined the Haganah underground in 1927 and became part of its command staff in 1935, heading the department that requisitioned arms and ammunition, together with Shaul Avigur and Eliyahu Golomb. He also took part in founding the following paramilitary units: the field platoons, the field corps, the youth battalions, and the Palmach. In June 1946 he was nominated as head of the Haganah’s national headquarters. Following the establishment of Israel he became a Knesset member on behalf of Mapai and a permanent member of its Defense and Security Committee. Grabovsky (Argov), Meir. 1905–1963. Born in Ravnize, Russia, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. He served on the pre-State Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive and as the representative of Mapai in the People’s Council. Granovsky (Granot), Avraham. 1890–1962. Born in Plauwshet, Serbia, and immigrated to Palestine in 1922. He graduated from the Universities of Freiburg and Lausanne with degrees in law and economy. In 1919 he was nominated as the director general of the Jewish National Fund and then relocated along with the JNF to Jerusalem in 1922, serving as head of the organization between 1945 and 1960. In 1948 he headed the Progressive Party and was elected to the First Knesset in January 1949, where he headed the parliamentary Finance Committee. His major contribution to government activity was forming a modern agrarian policy for the State of Israel. Gruenbaum, Yitzhak. 1879–1970. Born in Warsaw, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1933. As one of the most prominent leaders of Polish

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Jewry, he became a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, and between 1933 and 1938 headed the Departments of Immigration and Labor and took part in the Department of Organization and Logistics. At the same time he also headed the Bilaik Publishing House. During the time of the Provisional Government (1948–1949) he served as interior minister on behalf of Mapam, but toward the first elections (January 1949) he decided to run independently, heading a small party named the Yitzhak Gruenbaum List, which ran on a platform of the secularization of the state, and lost. He served as the treasurer of the Jewish Agency (1949–1950) and controller (1950–1951). Throughout this period he wrote regularly for the left-oriented Mapam party’s newspaper Al HaMishmar, and spent the rest of his life in Kibbutz Gan Shmuel. Gubernick, Yehoshua. 1910–1969. Born in Siberia, Russia, and served as a district officer in the British Mandate government in Netanya and Haifa from 1937. From March 1942 to May 1948 he was district officer in the Lydda region. Guriel (Gurevich), Baruch (Boris). 1903–1983. Born in Latvia. After he immigrated to Palestine he joined the Haganah. With the outbreak of WWII he joined the British army and was a German POW until his release in 1945. On his return, he joined the Haganah Intelligence Service (Shai), where he headed section M, which was responsible for tracking British officials in Palestine. In 1947 he was relocated to Shai’s headquarters in Tel Aviv. After the establishment of the Mossad in 1951, he was replaced by Reuven Shiloach (Zaslani) . Hartglass, Apolinari Maximillian. 1893–1962. Born in Biała-Portlaska, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1940. He studied law at the University of Warsaw and represented Polish Jewry at the Zionist Congresses between 1907 and 1929; also represented Polish Jewry at the Round Table Talks in London in 1939. In 1939 he was a member the Warsaw Ghetto Judenrat (Jewish Council) until he escaped to Palestine in February 1940. Until May

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1948 he was senior staff member in the Jewish Agency Executive, and then became the director general of the Interior Ministry. Kaplan, Eliezer. 1897–1952. Born in Minsk, Belarus, and immigrated to Palestine in 1920. He was among the founders of the Zionist youth movement, Tzeirei Tzion, in Russia. In 1919 he was member of the Jewish delegation to the Versailles Conference in Paris. He was also among the founders of the Histadrut and the Va’ad HaLe’umi. In 1933 he was elected to the Jewish Agency Executive and became its treasurer. During Israel’s War of Independence he was in charge of the budgets of Va’adat HaMatzav and the Minhelet Ha’Am, and after the establishment of the Provisional Government he became minister of finance. Kaplan contributed greatly to laying the foundations of Israel’s fiscal policies, and succeeded in obtaining Israel’s first loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States. Kislov, Yaacov. 1899–?. Born in Russia and joined the British Mandate civil service, acting as assistant district commissioner of Tel Aviv in 1933. He was among the founders of the Israeli Interior Ministry, and up to the early 1950s headed the General Administration Division and was a member of the Film and Theater Board. Kuperman, Yosef. 1898–?. Born in Zikhron Yaakov, Palestine. He graduated from the Alliance Française school system and served in the British police during the period of British martial law between the 1917 and 1920. From 192?–1929 he served as district officer in Zikhron Yaakov, Safed, Haifa, and Tel Aviv, and from 1929 was assistant district commissioner in Haifa. Following the establishment of Israel he became the supervisor of Tel Aviv’s rural area. Landauer, Georg. 1895–1954. Born in Cologne, Germany, and immigrated to Palestine in the early 1920s. He headed the Palestine branch of the German Zionist Federation between 1929 and 1933, and headed the

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resettlement of German Jews in Israel until 1954. From 1941 to 1948 he was a member of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive. Landman, Shimon. 1908–?. Born in Yesod HaMa’ala in the Upper Galilee, he graduated from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem with a degree in Islamic Studies, and served as head of the Minorities Department in the Interior Ministry until the end of the 1950s. Levhar, David (Alfred). 1904–?. Born in Jaffa; began his service in the British Mandatory government in 1920. Was district officer in Afula and Haifa between 1937 and 1948. After May 1948 he became the deputy commissioner of the Haifa district. Levin, Rabbi Izhak (Iche’), Meir. 1893–1971. Born in Gora-Calvare, Russia-Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1940. He was president of the Jewish ultra-Orthodox Agudat Yisrael movement until 1939 and was mainly involved in social welfare and charity. In 1939 he was part of the Warsaw Ghetto Judenrat (Jewish Council) but managed to escape to Palestine in 1940. In 1946 he represented Agudat Yisrael in the AngloAmerican Committee and in the UNSCOP Commission in 1947. He was among those who signed the Israeli Declaration of Independence on May 15, 1948. Served as minister of welfare from 1948 to 1952 and was a Knesset member from the First Knesset until the Seventh Knesset, during which time he passed away.. Luria, Zvi. 1906–1968. Born in Łodz, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. Between 1929 and 1931 he served as representative of the Shomer HaTzair youth movement in Poland, and from 1935 to 1937 was the movement’s general secretary and editor-in-chief of its newspaper. Served on the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive from 1941 to 1948 and headed its Department of Information and Public Relations. He headed Subcommittee C of Va’adat HaMatzav, which was responsible for the government’s public relations and information service. Between 1948 and 1955 he was a member of the

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Jewish Agency Executive in New York. From 1956 he headed the Jewish Agency’s Department of Organization and Logistics. Maimon (Fishman) Leib-Yehuda. 1875–1962. Born in Markuleshti, Serbia, and immigrated to Palestine in 1913. He was one of the founders of the Mizrachi religious Zionist movement. He was a member of the Provisional People’s Council and the Provisional Government, and was Israel’s first minister of religious affairs. Meirovich, Bar-Kochva. 1897–1974. Born in Rishon Lezion in Palestine. Served in the Turkish army in the beginning of WWI and then deserted for the Jewish Brigades. In 1902 he was ordered by the Yishuv leadership to begin a career in the British Mandate Immigration Department. In 1921 he was made liaison between the British Department for Public Works and the Histadrut’s construction company Solel Boneh. In 1929 he was elected secretary of the Workers’ Labor Union, and from 1935 directed the Jewish Agency’s Water Department. He was also sent to study social sciences and geography at the London School of Economics and became a leading expert on transportation. He built the Tel Aviv harbor during the Great Arab Revolt (1936–1939), founded fishermen’s villages in the Haifa Bay, Caesarea, and Atlit, and was among the founders of the ZIM merchant fleet company. He was on the board of Aviron Airways and the director of the Bizur construction company. During the British evacuation he was the liaison between the Jewish Agency and the Mandate Government and headed the supply network for the British army, while deploying Jewish workers in ports, airports, and railway stations. Meirovich serves a very good example of the crucial contribution of midlevel field experts to the establishment of the governmental system. Meir (Meyerson), Golda. 1898–1978. Born in Kiev, Ukraine. She immigrated with her family to the United States in 1906 and settled in Milwaukee. She joined the Left Zionist Workers’ movement in 1915, and immigrated with her husband to Kibbutz Merchavia in 1921. In 1928 she was elected

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secretary of the Female Workers’ Union, and between 1932 and 1934 represented the women of the Chalutz [Pioneers’] movement in the United States. She joined the Political Department of the Jewish Agency Executive in 1940 and after most of them were arrested during Black Saturday in June 1946, she became head of the department. After Moshe Sharet was released from prison, she was sent to the U.N. to debate the Partition Resolution for Palestine. In January 1948 she left for the U.S. to lead a fundraising expedition, and on May 1948 she led a delegation to King Abdullah in Jordan trying to prevent him from joining the war. After the 1948 war she was appointed Israel’s first ambassador to Moscow. Following the first elections in 1949, Ben-Gurion asked her to become minister of labor. From 1956 to 1965 she was foreign minister, and following the Six-Day War became secretary general of the Labor movement. Following the sudden death of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on February 26, 1969, she became prime minister until resigning in 1974, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Mills, Eric. 1892–1960. Born in England; graduated from Cambridge University. During WWI he joined the British Army as an officer in the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration in the Middle East under the command of General Allenby, and became the governor of Nablus. From 1920 to 1921 he held a special position at the Ministry of Colonies and returned to Palestine to serve as assistant district commissioner of the Galilee until 1925. From 1925 to 1934 he served as chief secretary of the British Mandatory government, occasionally substituting for the High Commissioner in his absence. In 1931 he conducted the first census in Palestine, and between 1934 and 1948 headed the Departments of Immigration and Statistics. In 1948 he became inspector general of the government and from 1947 supervised the evacuation of the British civil government. Nir (Rafalkes), Nahum. 1884–1968. Born in Warsaw, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. He studied law and was among the founders of the Left Zionist Workers’ Party, serving as its general secretary between 1930 and 1935. During the First Knesset he was a representative of Mapam,

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and during the third, fourth, and fifth Knessets he represented Ahdut HaAvodah. From 1959 onward he presided as chairman of the Knesset until its fourth term. Palmon, Yehoshua (Josh). 1913–1995. Born in Tel Aviv. From 1940 to 1948 he was a member of the Jewish Agency Political Department, and from 1948 to 1949 he served in the foreign ministry. From 1949 he became chief advisor on Arab affairs to the Prime Minister’s Office. Pinkas, David-Zvi. 1895–1952. Born in Sofron, Hungary, and immigrated to Palestine in 1935. He was a member of the Mizrachi national religious Zionist movement and headed the Mizrachi Bank after his arrival in Palestine. In 1935 he headed the Tel Aviv Municipality Education Department and represented the movement in the Va’ad HaLe’umi. He was elected to the Knesset as a representative of the National Religious Party and became minister of transportation in 1951. His attempt to prohibit vehicular transportation two days a week (including Saturday) resulted in him being blamed for trying to force religion on the country. Reiser, Yaakov. 1893–1974. Born in Belz, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. He was a graduate of the technological colleges in Vienna and Lvov and a civil engineer. He served as head of the Jewish Agency’s Technical and Housing Departments. During the work of Va’adat HaMatzav he was asked by Bar Kochva Meirovich, head of Subcommittee B (public works, transportation, police, and prisons services), to prepare the new Israeli Department for Public Works under the future labor ministry. During the tenure of the Provisional Government he worked as head of public works under Labor Minister Mordechai Ben Tov, until his resignation due to disagreements over the minister’s policies. Remez (Drabkin), Moshe-David. 1886–1951. Born in Copis, Belarus, and immigrated to Palestine in 1913. He was a member of the Histadrut, and headed its Department for Public Works between 1921 and 1927. He served

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as the Histadrut’s general secretary between 1935 and 1945. Between 1944 and 1945 he headed the Va’ad HaLe’umi. Following the establishment of the Provisional Government he became minister of transportation and in 1950 became minister of education. Repetur, Berl, 1902–1989. Born in Rozin, Russia, and immigrated to Palestine in 1920. From 1927 onward he served on the executive of the Haifa Workers’ Council and the directorship of the Solel Boneh construction company. Later he sat on the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive and was the representative of Mapam in the People’s Provisional Council. Riftin, Yaakov. 1907–1978. Born in Volka-Propachka, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1929. He was one of the leaders of the Shomer HaTzair youth movement in Poland. Later he sat on the board of directors of the Histadrut and was a member of the Va’ad HaLe’umi. He was among the founders of the Mapam party and a member of the delegation to the U.N. partition debate in 1947. Between 1948 and 1957 he was Mapam’s political secretary and a great supporter of Moshe Sneh, one of the prominent leaders of the Israeli left. In 1949 he was leader of a group that opposed joining the government under Ben-Gurion. Following the establishment of the Labor Alliance with the Labor Party in 1968, he left Mapam and established his own party, known as the Socialist Independent Left Alliance. Rosen (Rosenblit), Pinchas. 1887–1978. Born in Berlin, Germany, and immigrated to Palestine in 1923. He represented the Histadrut in the Solel Boneh construction company. From 1926 to 1931 he went to London to head the Jewish Agency’s Department of Organization and Logistics. Between 1935 and 1948 he was a member of the Tel Aviv Municipal Council, and in 1942 he founded the Aliya Hadasha (New Immigration) Party, whose constituency were Jewish immigrants from Germany and central Europe. During the 1948 war he was a member of the Minhelet Ha’Am and a signatory of Israel’s Declaration of Independence. Following Israel’s establishment he founded the Progressive Party. He served as minister of justice in all Israeli

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governments (except for the third Knesset) until November 1961. Between 1961 and 1965, he was among the founders of the Israeli Liberal Party. Samuel, Edwin. 1898–1978. Born in London and graduated from Oxford University. He arrived in Palestine as an artillery officer with General Allenby’s expeditionary force, and in March 1918 was appointed liaison between Allenby’s headquarters and the Zionist Commission. Between 1920 and 1925 he served under Jerusalem’s governor Ronald Stores, and also married the daughter of the famous Hebrew linguistic and writer Yehuda Goor. In 1925 he was transferred to the emigration office to set up the citizenship department, and in 1926 and 1927 he served as Jaffa’s governor. In 1929 he was transferred to the Chief Secretariat of the British Mandate in Jerusalem. In 1931 he was sent for a year to study at Columbia University in New York, and on his return became assistant district commissioner of Jerusalem. In 1934 he was appointed assistant district commissioner for the Galilee and a member of the government’s Revenue Committee. Between 1935 and 1939 he was assistant director of the Immigration Department, and head of the censor’s office (1939–1942). Between 1945 and May 1948 he was head of the British Mandate Broadcasting Authority. In 1947 he founded the Middle East Public Administration Center and delivered a series of lectures on British public administration at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Since Samuel had much experience in public administration and was considered an expert in the field, he was often consulted by the members of Va’adat HaMatzav. Schneider (Shani-Or), Lavi-Izhak. 1871–?. Born in Nikolyaev, Russia. He was a graduate of Odessa University and acted as director general and research supervisor of the Labor Ministry between 1948 and 1949, under Labor Minister Mordechai Ben-Tov. Shacham, Mishael. 1912–1992. One of the Haganah’s most prominent commanders. Among other positions, he commanded the Tel Hai and the Southern Galilee districts. With the outbreak of the 1948 war, he supervised

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national transportation logistics, and later assumed several command positions in the IDF. Shatner, Mordechai. 1904–1964. Born in Hungary and immigrated to Palestine in 1924. He was a member of the Va’ad HaLe’umi and a representative of the Moetzet Ha’Am. He fulfilled a major role in securing the Jewish home front during the 1948 war, and ran two subcommittees in Va’adat HaMatzav that supervised fuel and food supplies. After the war, he headed the committee for the restoration and development of Jerusalem, including the building complex of the government offices in Givat Ram. Shapira, Moshe-Chaim. 1902–1970. Born in Grodno, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. He was among the founders of the Mizrachi religious Zionist movement and headed the Aliya [Jewish immigration] Department of the Jewish Agency. He also acted as a mediator between the Haganah and the right-wing Etzel and Lehi. Served in 1948– 1949 as immigration minister and health minister in the Provisional Government, and following the 1949 elections he served as interior minister (until 1951) and minister of religious affairs and welfare (1952– 1958). He returned to serve as interior minister from 1959 to 1970. During the tense period prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War he was engaged in efforts to establish a national unity government. In 1957 he was wounded by a hand grenade thrown by a mentally ill person in the Knesset. This is why he added the name Chaim (meaning “Life”) to his name. Sherf, Zeev. 1906–1984. Born in Bucovina, Romania, and immigrated to Palestine in 1925. As a Socialist Zionist, he served as general secretary of the HaPo’el movement and from 1945 to 1947 acted as secretary of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department. From October 1947 to April 1948 he served as secretary of Va’adat HaMatzav, and as the secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office until 1957. From 1954 to 1961 he was in charge of state revenues. In the early 1970s he headed the Israeli Civil Service, and also

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served as minister of housing in Golda Meir’s government. In 1959, Sherf published a book entitled Three Days, describing the dramatic transition from the British Mandate to an independent Israeli state. Until the opening of the Israeli archives on the 1948 war, in the early eighties, Sherf’s book was the major source for studying Va’adat HaMatzav. Sharon, Arye. 1900–1984. Born in Yaroslavl, Poland, and immigrated to Palestine in 1920. In 1929 he finished his architecture studies in Desau, Germany, where he had the opportunity to work with some of the most famous architects of his time, such as Hans Myer and Gropius. Following his arrival in Palestine, he built the working-class housing projects in Tel Aviv, the Beilinson Hospital in Petach Tikva, the Ohel Theater building in Tel Aviv, Brenner House, and the Biram Gymnasium in Haifa. After Israel’s establishment, he headed the Planning Division of the Labor Ministry. Shiloach (Zaslani), Reuven. 1909–1954. Born in Jerusalem. In 1928 he began studying Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at the same time joined the Haganah. Sent to Baghdad from 1931 to 1934 by the Jewish Agency, where he also represented several newspapers. This gave him a proper cover for his intelligence-gathering operations, which included recruiting agents. In 1936 he joined the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, and along with Shaul Avigur, founded the Haganah’s Information Service. During WWII Shiloach and his men worked together with the British intelligence services by launching secret operations behind enemy lines, including dropping Jewish paratroopers in Nazi-occupied Europe. After Israel’s establishment he headed the Israeli armistice delegation talks to Jordan, and formalized a working relationship with the U.S. intelligence community. From 1953 to 1957 he held a special position in Israel’s embassy in Washington and served as a special strategic consultant for Third-World issues in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Sheetrit, Bechor-Shalom. 1895–1967. Born in Tiberias, he commanded the city’s police station in 1919 and subsequently the Lower Galilee district as

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well. Later he organized the Jewish police cavalry in the Galilee and became the deputy director of the British Mandate Police School in Jerusalem. In 1935 he became a Magistrates Court judge and in 1945, a senior Magistrate Court judge. In the First Knesset he headed a small political faction representing Sephardic and Oriental Jews as part of Mapai. He served as minister of police in all Israeli governments between 1948 and 1967. Svardlov, David. 1899–1963. Born in Belarus and immigrated to Palestine in 1908. He joined the Poel HaTzair party in 1910, and was among the founders of the Histadrut and the Solel Boneh government construction company. On his return from Poland, where he represented the Gordonia youth movement, he was asked to preside over the National Labor Exchange from 1939, holding a senior position in the Jewish Agency Labor Department. Following the establishment of the Provisional Government he was asked by Labor Minister Mordechai Ben-Tov to head the Employment Division. After the 1949 elections he became head of the Housing Department of the Jewish Agency. Warhaftig, Zerah. 1906–2002. Born in Russia and immigrated to Palestine in 1939. He held a PhD in law from Warsaw University. He was a representative of Polish Jewry at the Zionist Congress and very active in the religious Zionist movement, HaPoel HaMizrahi. Between 1943 and 1947 he served as the deputy of the American branch of HaPoel HaMizrahi and as assistant director of the New York–based Jewish Institute. In 1947 he became head of the constitution committee of the Va’ad HaLe’umi, and following the establishment of Israel headed the Institute for Jewish Law Research in the Ministry of Justice. From 1952 to 1958 he served as deputy religious affairs minister, and between 1960 and 1974 as minister of religious affairs. Weitz, Yosef. 1890–1972. Born in Russia and immigrated to Palestine in 1908. He was among the founders of the Jewish Agricultural Labor Workers’ Union, and between 1915 and 1917 ran the Segera agricultural farm in the Galilee. From 1919 to 1932 he headed the forestry Department of the Jewish

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National Fund (JNF) and from 1932 was in charge of land development there. From 1950 he became a member on the JNF board of directors and was a major contributor to Israel’s agricultural land development projects. Yosef, Dov (Bernard Joseph). 1899–1980. Born in Canada and immigrated to Palestine in 1908. He graduated from the Universities of London and McGill with a doctorate in philosophy and law and was a attorney. He served in the Jewish Brigades, in 1933 became a member of Mapai, and in 1936 was appointed the Jewish Agency’s legal advisor. From 1947 to 1948 he headed Va’adat HaMatzav’s legal committee and served as military governor of Jerusalem. In 1949–1950 he became minster of supplies and rationing. In subsequent years he held five different ministerial portfolios: transportation, agriculture, health, commerce and trade, and justice. From 1960–1961 he was treasurer of the Jewish Agency.

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Map Appendix

U.N. Armistice Map of Palestine: Summer 1949

Appendix

UN Partition Map of Palestine: November 1947

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Introduction 1. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). 2. W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965). 3. Arendt Lijphart. Democracies in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). 4. Yaakov Reuveni. The Administration of Palestine under the British Mandate. 1920–1948: An Institutional Analysis (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1993), 222. 5. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, eds. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing, 2004). 6. Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 3. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 4–5. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 6. 11. Ibid., 7. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 9. 14. Ibid., 10–11. 15. Ibid., 13. 16. Ibid., 15. 315

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17. Ibid., 16. 18. Ibid., 19.

Chapter 1 1. William R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1988), 8–15. 2. For an elaboration on the subject of the Anglo-American Committee, see Amikam Nachmani, The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry in Palestine, 1945–1946 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), and Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). 3. Joseph Heller, “Zionist Policy after the Second World War: The Case of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, 1945–1946,” in Shalem: Studies in the History of the Jews in Eretz-Israel (Hebrew), ed. Joseph Hacker, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981), 213–16. 4. On the Morrison-Grady Plan, see Joseph Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), 85–86. 5. On the Bevin-Beeley Plan, see ibid., 93. 6. Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive (October 12, 1947), Central Zionist Archive (CZA), S100/53B. It should be noted that at the same meeting, Eliezer Kaplan reported that Chief Secretary Gurney had authorized the directors of the professional departments to consult with the senior echelons in their offices regarding the orderly evacuation. Although individual policy decisions were not made, several possible methods were explored. 7. See Yoav Gelber, Growing a Fleur-de-Lis. The Intelligence Services of the Yishuv in Palestine, 1918–1947 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1992), 705. See also: Heller, The Struggle, 101. 8. See Yona Bendman, “Consolidation of British Policy on the Evacuation of Palestine” (Hebrew), in The War of Independence, 1948–1949: A New Discussion, ed. Alon Kadish (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry and the Galili Center for Defense Research, 2004), 608.

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9. Ibid., 609. 10. Ibid., 611. 11. Ibid., 617. 12. Ibid., 618. 13. Ibid. 14. The greater Tel Aviv area was transferred to Jewish control as early as December 1947. 15. Gelber, Intelligence Services, 709. 16. Bendman, “British Evacuation Policy,” 622–23. 17. For detailed studies on the Haganah Intelligence Service, see Gelber, Intelligence Services. See also Assa Lefen, The Roots of the Israeli Intelligence Community (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry and the Galili Center for Defense Studies, 1997). After the establishment of the Counter Intelligence Department (Acronym “Resh Nun”—Rigul Negdi in Hebrew) and the Arab Department of the intelligence service in June 1940, it was decided to establish a central intelligence service for the Yishuv. In a proposal presented by Shaul Avigur (Meirov) to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency and to the national headquarters of the Haganah, it was decided to establish a general information service that would serve both the Haganah and the Jewish Agency. The Counterintelligence Department and the Arab Department were to be integrated into a new service, but the unification did not ultimately happen until March 1942, with the appointment of Yisrael Amir (Zeblodovsky) to head the Haganah Intelligence Service, branches of which were distributed throughout the three major cities and in the villages. The staff at the Tel Aviv branch regularly listened in on British and Arab phone lines. The Jerusalem branch (the “Shafan” network headed by Yitzhak Navon, and the “Uri” network headed by Shalhevet Freier) was important for intelligence-gathering on the Mandatory government. See Gelber, Intelligence Services, 330, 498–99. 18. See Biographical Appendix. 19. Gelber, Intelligence Services, 710. 20. Ibid., 706. 21. See Biographical Appendix.

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22. See Biographical Appendix. 23. Lefen talks about the “conspiracy conception” espoused by the Yishuv leadership and senior intelligence figures with regard to the actual intentions of the British, as opposed to the Haganah’s military intelligence, which consistently held to the version that the British were intending to evacuate Palestine. (Lefen credits Prof. Yehoshafat Harkabi with coining the “conspiracy explanation.” Harkabi, as head of military intelligence in the 1950s, wrote an in-depth study on the theory of intelligence. According to him, the “conspiracy explanation” is the most common obstacle to any intelligence assessment. See Lefen, Roots of the Intelligence Community, 199, 298. Gelber claims that Lefen is too apologetic in his approach to the Haganah Intelligence Services (HIS), and that HIS also espoused the “conspiratorial approach,” as evidenced by their survey from early April 1948 called “the British Plot.” Looking at the HIS documents from those days (in particular Unit 115 of the Haganah Archive, known as “British Shai”), we see the variety of reports that testify to the confusion that gripped the entire system. See Gelber, Intelligence Services, 706. 24. See Biographical Appendix. 25. In Salazani’s words: “From what we know, it is clear that they will do all they can to thwart our every attempt to establish a government in the land.” See Gelber, Intelligence Services, 710. 26. See Biographical Appendix. 27. See the Protocol of the meeting of the World Zionist Organization (Jewish Agency) Executive (October 29, 1949), Moshe Sharett Labor and Pioneering Archive, Central Zionist Archive (CZA). 28. Gelber, Intelligence Services, 706–8. 29. See Bibliographic Appendix. 30. Haganah Archives (HA), RG-115, file 4 (November 26, 1947). Crook, who wrote the report, writes that there were forty people at the meeting, including all of the government department heads. The meeting was held in the main offices in Jerusalem and was classified as confidential. It is worthwhile emphasizing that to this day there is no in-depth study of the British evacuation policy of Palestine. Also, Prof. Alon Kadish of the Hebrew

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University has worked on a comprehensive study on this subject and edited the 2004 volume on the War of Independence featuring Bendman, “British Evacuation Policy.” A few years ago a discussion on the subject took place at the Ben Zvi Institute in Jerusalem, which was published in the journal Catedra as “The Decision on the British Evacuation of Palestine,” Catedra 15: 140–89. See also Motti Golani, “A Turning Point in Haifa: Britain and the Civil War in Palestine, December 1947–May 1948” (Hebrew), in State in Formation, ed. Anita Shapira (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 2001). 31. See Notice from the Secretariat of the Mandatory Government on behalf of Chief Secretary Gurney (January 7, 1948), HA, RG-115, file 4. 32. On both the Hadassah convoy and the evacuation of the Generali Building, see the report of Schnurmann, the Haganah’s intelligence officer, to Leo Cohen and Herzik Berman from May 17, 1947. Schnurmann reports that on Wednesday, May 12, 1947, Brigadier Jones notified him that on May 15 the Jews would be handed over all of the buildings they deserved in Jerusalem, and thus all Haganah commanders were to make contact with the British battalion commanders on the ground to coordinate. After Schnurmann met with Colonel Harper, commander of Battalion A of the Suplex Brigade, the latter agreed to allow the entrance of six unarmed Jewish representatives to Bevingrad on Thursday at 8 a.m., after which the entrance of six more was approved. At 7:30 p.m., another thirty people were allowed to enter. On Friday morning, May 15, a farewell party was held for the British forces in the Generali Building. See CZA, S25/10526. On the British evacuation of Jerusalem, see CZA, S25/8178. 33. See Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive (October 12, 1947), CZA, S25 (Political Unit) S53/100. 34. Samuel Sager, The Parliamentary System of Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Achiasaf Press, 1988), 14–15. 35. Elyakim Rubinstein, “The Zionist Institutions” (Hebrew), in The Jewish National Home, ed. Benjamin Eliav (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1976), 176. 36. For a comprehensive study on the establishment of the Jewish Agency, see Yigal Eilam, The Jewish Agency between the Years: 1920–1929 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Zionist Federation, 1990).

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37. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lisak, The Origins of the Israeli Polity (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 1986), 60–61. 38. Dan Giladi, “Portrait of the Yishuv in Its National Homeland and Its Social Organizations”(Hebrew), in The History of Eretz Israel, The British Mandate, and the Jewish National Homeland, eds. Yehoshua Porat and Yaakov Shavit (Jerusalem: Keter Press and Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982), 209–12. 39. Horowitz and Lisak, Origins of the Israeli Polity, 51. 40. Giladi, “Portrait of the Yishuv,” 209. 41. Horowitz and Lisak, Origins of the Israeli Polity, 52. 42. See Biographical Appendix. 43. The reference here is to the Jewish Agency. 44. Protocol of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive (February 17, 1947), CZA, J1-6944. 45. Protocol of the meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav (October 28, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. 46. See Biographical Appendix. 47. Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive (October 12, 1947), CZA, S25; S100/52B. 48. See Biographical Appendix. 49. See Biographical Appendix. 50. See Biographical Appendix. 51. See Biographical Appendix. 52. See Biographical Appendix. 53. See Biographical Appendix. 54. See Biographical Appendix. 55. See Biographical Appendix. 56. See Biographical Appendix. 57. Protocol of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive (August 3, 1947), CZA, J1-6944. 58. Ibid. 59. Protocol of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive (October 13, 1947), CZA, J1-3849.

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60. See Bibliographical Appendix. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Protocol of the Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive (January 6, 1948), CZA, J1-6587. 65. Ibid. 66. Israeli State Archive (ISA), RG-41 (Va’adat Hamatzav Archive), container C-110, file 30. 67. Protocol of the Labor Party Center (March 7, 1947), Labor Party Archive (LPA), file 2.23-1948. 68. Ibid. 69. Protocol of the Labor Party Secretariat (December 9, 1947), LPA, file 2.24-1947-19. On the Mapai institutions, see also Avi Bareli, Mapai in the Early Years of Israel ’s Independence 1948–1953 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2007), 53–63. Bareli discusses the fact that, between 1933 and 1948, Mapai had gained experience in the management of two executive systems: the Histadrut Labor Federation and the Jewish Agency. Mapai had also become familiar with coalition politics, and gained experience in negotiating, popular election campaigns, and provision of social needs, well before it became the main ruling party. See ibid., 37–38. 70. Protocol of the Mapai Party Bureau (January 27, 1948), LPA, file 2.25-1948-10. 71. Protocol of the Mapai Politbureau (March 6, 1948), LPA, file 2.23-1948-49. 72. Protocol of the Mapai Party Bureau (March 9, 1948), LPA, file 2.25-1948-10. 73. See Biographical Appendix. 74. Protocol of the Mapai Party Bureau (May 4, 1947), LPA, file 2.25-1947-8. 75. For a comprehensive study on the establishment of United Workers’ Party (Mapam), see Eli Tzur, Landscapes of Illusion—Mapam:1948–1954 (Hebrew) (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1998).

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76. See Letter of Shaz Shragai to B. Bizinsky (October 20, 1947), Religious Zionist Movement Archives (RZMA), file 2a/65. This file also contains the protocols of the Mizrahi Party World Center from 1937 to 1966. 77. See “Proposal for a Constitution, drafted by Dr. Leo Cohen” (July 1, 1948). Two proposals for a religious constitution for the Jewish state were raised by Zerah Warhaftig (later Mizarahi’s representative in the government and the minister of religious affairs) and by Yehuda (Leo) Cohen. Here it should be noted that the Religious Zionist Movement Archive is not well organized, and the file order often has no apparent rhyme or reason, making research difficult. For Zerah Warhaftig’s proposal, see CZA, S25/10630, in a file entitled “Memoranda on Constitutional and Zionist Problems” (February 20, 1948). 78. See Yaakov Berman’s letter to Moshe Shapira and Rabbi Gold (February 23, 1948/13 of First Adar 5708), RZMA, file 2a/65. In the letter, Berman tries to convince Gold and Shapira that the size of the provisional government must be increased to at least 12–15 members.

Chapter 2 1. See Biographical Appendix. 2. General Memorandum on the Activity of Va’adat HaMatzav (February 22, 1948), Israeli State Archives (ISA), RG-41 (Va’adat Hamatzav Archive), container C-117, file 36. 3. See Biographical Appendix. 4. See Biographical Appendix. 5. The decision to establish a special commission on the Negev was made by David Ben-Gurion, Avraham Hertzfeld, Yosef Weitz, and Pinhas Kosolovsky (Sapir) at a meeting in Tel Aviv on December 19, 1947. At first, Weitz proposed himself as a kind of commissar of the Negev, who would have a committee to support him, but Ben-Gurion opposed this appointment. He did agree to establish a small committee comprised of Weitz, a representative of the Mekorot water company, and a representative of the

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defense establishment. The makeup of the committee was not final, and it was decided that in the future they would be joined by representatives of other institutions. The next day, it was decided that the committee would be composed of Committee Chairman Yosef Weitz; the Jewish National Fund (JNF) representative, Levi Eshkol; head of the Mekorot water company and representative of the Histadrut Labor Federation, Haim Gabati; representative of the Agricultural Center, Hillel Cohen (in lieu of Avraham Hertzfeld, head of the Agricultural Center, who was about to travel to the United States); representative of the Solel-Boneh construction company; representative of the Mekorot water company, Pinhas Kosolovsky (Sapir); representative of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, Yehuda Horin. See also Amiad Brezner, The Struggle over the Negev 1941–1948 (Hebrew)] (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry and Galili Center for Defense Studies, 1994), 132–33. For a map of the Partition Plan borders, see Map 1 in Maps Appendix. 6. See Biographical Appendix. 7. The judiciary committee of Va’adat HaMatzav dealt with eighteen different fields. For a detailed list of these, see “Subcommittee of the Judicial Committee,” ISA, RG-41, container C-114, file 20. 8. General Memorandum on the Activity of Va’adat HaMatzav (February 22, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-115, file 36. For additional material on the structure of the subcommittees of Va’adat HaMatzav, see Central Zionist Archives (CZA), S25/9391. 9. For some important studies on the consolidation of the Mandatory governmental system in Palestine, see Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine—the Mandatory Government and the Arab Jewish Conflict in Palestine: 1917–1929 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1974). Gideon Biger, Crown Colony or National Homeland? British Influence upon Palestine, 1917–1930: A geo-historical Analysis (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1983). Rachela Makover, Government and Administration in Palestine 1917–1925 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1988). 10. See Memorandum on the Structure of the Mandatory Government (October 17, 1957), CZA, S25/3735.

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11. General report of the Haganah Intelligence Services entitled “Structure of Government in the Land of Israel” (March 1943; complete date missing) (Haganah Archives (HA), RG-115, file 1. Another report includes the number of workers in each department and the expenses of the departments for 1947. See “List of Departments in the British Administration in the Land of Israel” (January 1, 1948), ISA, RG 2, container C-121, file 20. 12. The idea for establishing subcommittees was raised by Ben-Gurion in the meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive of October 19, 1947. See CZA, S25/52B. Committee Secretary Zeev Sharf recommended that committees be appointed that would collect information about each of the Mandatory departments according to their field of expertise. See Protocol of Va’adat HaMatzav (October 27, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. 13. A study of the development of the governmental system in Israel was done in the 1970s by Prof. Yaakov Reuveni of Bar Ilan University. Among other things he discussed the Jewish officers of the Mandate. Reuveni’s research was done before the Israel State Archives on the period of the War of Independence were opened in the 1980s, and thus Reuveni did not have access to the material we have access to today. See Yaakov Reuveni, Public Administration in Israel: Development of the Israeli Civil Service 1948– 1973 (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Masada, 1974). 14. Summary of a conversation with Eliezer Kaplan before the meeting of the Secretariat of Va’adat HaMatzav of December 15, 1947 (December 14, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. 15. Report from Alhasid to Golda Meir (November 1947), CZA, S25/9215. 16. See Protocol of the Meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat (November 27, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. 17. Ibid. See also Natan Brun, “The ‘Purification Committees’ for Jewish officials of the British Mandate during the formation of the new administration of Israel” (Hebrew), in Citizens at War: Studies on the Civilian Society during the Israeli War of Independence, eds. Mordechai Bar-On and Meir Chazan (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2006), 45–94. 18. See Protocol of the Meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat (November 27, 1947), CZA, S25/7713.

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19. Ibid. 20. Gelber writes that the Haganah Intelligence Service was particularly interested in the wireless and telephone patterns of the British police and military in Palestine. The efficiency of tapping and the ability to produce intelligence from it was contingent on familiarity with the radio instructions and regulations concerning the wireless service, hence there was a great demand for telegraph commands, operation orders, and wireless registries. Informants who served on the police force passed on information about changes in the wireless service, such as the placement of new antennae or replacement of equipment, and on the police’s wireless tapping methods, which could be used for counter-tapping as well. See Yoav Gelber, Growing a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Yishuv in Palestine. 1918–1947 (Hebrew), vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1992), 580, 582–83, 589. 21. “Plan for the Takeover of Government Departments in order to Prevent Chaos,” report by Dr. Yehoshua Greenbaum, member of the judiciary subcommittee of Va’adat HaMatzav (January 23, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-121, file 119. See also the precise lists prepared by the Haganah Intelligence Service on the government building in Tel Aviv, and a detailed list of the government departments and ministries in the Haifa district Department for Public Works, HA, RG-115, file 1. A complete list of the Mandatory government buildings throughout the country can be found at CZA, S25/10045.

Chapter 3 1. See Protocol of the Histadrut Labor Federation Executive (October 15, 1947), Histadrut Archive. See also Jonathan Fine, “Organizing the Jewish Home Front for the War of Independence: Basic Problems in Governance and Logistics” (Hebrew), in Israel ’s War of Independence 1949–1949, ed. Alon Kadish, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry and the Yisrael Galili Center for Defense Studies, 2004), 679–711.

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2. On November 19, 1947, Meir Grabovsky reported to Subcommittee B on the opening of training courses in communications (post, tele-print, and telegraph) in Petah Tikva and Tel Aviv. See Protocol of Subcommittee B (December 19, 1947), Central Zionist Archive (CZA), S25/7713. 3. See “Guidelines of the Center for the Military Mobilization of the Yishuv” (Hebrew) (June 7, 1942), Israel State Archives (ISA), RG-41, container C-114, file 11. See also “Problems in Mobilization Recruitment, 1947–1948” (Hebrew), CZA, S25/7716. 4. See “Civil Service Census” (press release, October 6, 1947) (Hebrew), ISA, RG-41, container C-115, file 11. See also the discussion of Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat on the subject of the creation of a professional database (October 21, 1947), CZA, S25/7716. 5. A day before the establishment of the Public Services’ Personnel Census Survey, Va’adat HaMatzav estimated that the amount of manpower needed, as follows: for immediate security needs—3,000 full-time and 1,000 part-time workers; for the national guard: 70,000, plus 14,000 reservists; reinforcements in the agricultural sector: between 700 and 1,000 for the immediate term, and about 4,000 for the longer term; for the Haifa port, 500 workers; and for the police, 400. Likewise, the number of workers necessary for operating essential services such as rails, post, telegraph, telephone, and the Tel Aviv port was estimated at 20,000, not including 1,000 workers in future government ministries. The cost of establishing the classification mechanism and the census was estimated at 2,000 Palestinian lira. See Protocol 1 of the Public Services’ Personnel Census Survey (October 5, 1947), ISA, RG-41, container C-115, file 11. See also Meeting of the Subcommittee on Recruitment (October 15, 1947), ISA, RG-41, container C-115, file 12, and memorandum of the “Economic Institute of the Defense Industry on Manpower and Manifestations of Work in the Hebrew Yishuv: 1948,” CZA, S25/377. 6. See “Problems in Recruitment, 1947–1948,” CZA, S25/7716. See also Protocol of Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat (October 21, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. 7. Va’adat HaMatzav held a comprehensive discussion on the subject of fuel at a meeting on November 5, 1947. See Protocol of Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat (November 5, 1947), CZA, S25/7713.

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8. See report entitled “The Problem of Fuel Supply 1947–1948,” CZA, S25/9683. 9. Gasoline was piped to Haifa through a pipeline belonging to the Iraqi Petrol Company, which was established by the British with the help of American and French funds. In 1947 the British began to lay another pipeline between Iraq and Haifa, simultaneously planning to raise the production capacity in the refineries in Haifa from four million tons to six-and-a-half million tons a year. See Zohar Levkovitch, “Supply of Fuel during the War of Independence: Problems and Solutions” (Hebrew) in Maarakhot 304 (Tel Aviv: June 1986, 16–23). For the most comprehensive study to date on Israel’s fuel policy, see Uri Bialer, Oil and the Israeli-Arab Conflict 1948–1956 (New York: McMillan, 1999). 10. In Va’adat HaMatzav’s comprehensive discussion of fuel supply on November 5, 1947, D. Z. Pinkas proposed establishing gasoline reservoirs in one of the ports of the Mediterranean. See: “The Problem of Fuel Supply, 1947–1948” in the Protocol of Va’adat HaMatzav (November 5, 1947), CZA, S25/9683. 11. On the conquest of Haifa during the War of Independence, see Zvi Eshel, Haganah Campaigns in Haifa (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1978) On the actions of the “Ports Company” of the Palmah’s Fourth Battalion, which entered the port to protect its Jewish workers after the massacre in the refineries and in the lead-up to the takeover of the Haifa port, see Meir Pail and Avraham Zohar, The Naval Palmah (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 2001). 12. Regarding local storage solutions, Va’adat HaMatzav assessed the proposal by the Noa company to erect a central storage facility with a capacity of 20,000 tons. The cost of building such a facility was estimated at between 75,000 and 100,000 lira. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee A (February 20, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-117, files 38/39. The proposal was rejected. 13. The battle for Jerusalem is particularly exemplary of the battle over the transportation routes during the tenure of Va’adat HaMatzav. See Itzhak Levi, Jerusalem in the War of Independence (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense

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Ministry, 1986), 133–34. For a comprehensive picture of the national network of transportation routes in 1947–1948, see Shalom Reichman, Land Transportation Development in Palestine 1920 –1947 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Transportation, 1969). See also Ariyeh Yitzhaki, The Burma Road: The Campaign on the Road to Jerusalem (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Tamuz Publishing, 1993). For maps of the battle for the transportation routes and the battles in general, see Maps Appendix, Maps 2 and 3. 14. See Biographical Appendix. 15. See Protocol of the Meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav (December 15, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. The file also contains a report entitled “Transportation Problems” (no date), CZA, S25/9698. 16. Ibid. 17. Levi, Jerusalem in the War of Independence, 133–34. 18. It was the representatives of the “National Drivers Union” (irgun ha-nahagim ha-artzi in Hebrew) who notified that they would not drive without receiving emergency orders; they wanted to be insured in the case of damage to persons or property with a body they could turn to, with the emergency order serving as a reference. 19. See Protocol of the Meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav (February 2, 1948), CZA, S7713/25. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Levi, Jerusalem in the War of Independence, 180. See also Zvi Dror, Harel: Palmah Brigade in Jerusalem (Hebrew) (Bnei-Brak: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuchad Publishing, 2005), 274, and Yosef Tabenkin, The Turning Point in the War of Independence (Hebrew) (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin, the Yisrael Galili Research Center, 1989). 23. See Protocol of Subcommittee B (November 9, 1947), ISA, RG-41, container C-117, file 8/39. On the strategic importance of the Haifa port in British planning during the British Mandate, see Jonathan Fine, “British Policy toward the Development of Haifa Harbor, 1906–1924: Strategic Considerations” (Hebrew) Cathedra 89 (October 1998): 127–54. On the professional relations between Jews and Arabs in the port and in Haifa in

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general during the Mandate, see Tamir Goren, Arabs and Jews in Local Government in Haifa during the British Mandate (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2008). 24. See Proposal for the Development of the Tel Aviv Port, ISA, RG-41, container C-117, file 40. 25. See Report on the State of Israel Railways (no date or signature), CZA, S25/7713. On the day-to-day management of the Palestine Rail system, see ISA, RG-28. 26. On the option of supplying fuel during the war via rail, see Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee B (March 28, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-117, file 40. 27. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee B (March 2, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-117, file 40. 28. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee B (February 20, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-117, file 40; CZA S25/7713. 29. On the work regulations of the Mandatory Food Control Department on the eve of the evacuation, see ISA, RG-27 (Galilee District Administration), container 2449, file G/916/46/I. 30. The situation in Jerusalem was especially bad. A report submitted by the Haganah Intelligence Services on December 11, 1947, warned of the emptying of the Mandatory warehouses next to the Jerusalem train station, as the British were not replenishing supplies. Haganah Archives (HA), RG-115, file 27. On a similar shortage in the British food warehouses in the Haifa port, see the statistics on the food stocks in the port’s warehouses for 1947. These data indicate a drastic drop in the amounts of food imported to Palestine starting in October 1947. See ISA, RG-28 (Mandate Ports and Trains Authority), container 58. 31. See the report of Mordechai Shatner prepared in the lead-up to the meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav on November 5, 1947, entitled “Report of Recommendations on Food Supply to the Cities and Rural Areas,” CZA, S25/7713, 1–3 (hereafter “Shatner’s Food Supply Report”). 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid.

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34. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee A (December 17, 1947), CZA, S25/7713. 35. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee A (March 17, 1948), CZA, S25/7713; ISA, RG-41, container C-117, file 37. 36. Ibid. To illustrate how the Mandatory Food Control Department worked in the north, see the work directives in the Nazareth sub-district for 1946–1947. See ISA, RG-27 (Galilee District Administration), container 2449, file G/46/16/9. 37. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee A (March 17, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-17. 38. See Protocol of the Meeting of Subcommittee A (March 31, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-117. 39. See Appendix on the Establishment of the Council for Control of Food Supply and Distribution of the National Institutions (December 7, 1947), discussed at the meeting of Subcommittee A (December 17, 1947), CZA, S25/7713.

Chapter 4 1. See Ron Harris, “Absent-Minded Misses and Historical Opportunities: Jewish Law, Israeli Law and the Establishment of the State of Israel” (Hebrew) On Both Sides of the Bridge: Religion and State in the Early Years of Israel (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2002), 29. 2. See Biographical Appendix. 3. See Harris, “Historical Opportunities,” 29. 4. Ibid., 30. 5. See Protocol of the Meeting of Va’adat HaMatzav Secretariat (December 15, 1947), Central Zionist Archive (CZA), S25/7713. 6. See Harris, “Historical Opportunities,” 30. It should be noted that Alias spent most of this period in the United States as part of a delegation to the discussions at the U.N., and was not a part of the initial discussions of the Judicial Committee of the Executive Committee.

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7. See the report of the Jewish Agency Executive to Judiciary Committee member, Dr. Yosef Burg (January 19, 1948), Israel State Archives (ISA), RG 41, container C-117, file 38. 8. See Ron Harris, “Israeli Law and the Establishment of the State of Israel” (Hebrew), in The First Decade: 1948–1958, eds. Zvi Zameret and Hana Yablonka (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1997), 244. 9. For more on the work of the Judicial Committee, see Karp, “The Early Beginnings of the Judicial Committee” (Hebrew), in The Uri Yadin Book, eds. Aharon Barak and Tania Shpinetz (Jerusalem, 1990), 209–55. 10. See Harris, “Israeli Law,” 245. 11. UNGA Resolution 181, November 29, 1947 (hereafter: U.N. Partition Plan), Part I, Chapter 8, article 4. 12. See Zerah Werhaftig, “Memoranda on Constitutional Problems” (February 10, 1948), CZA, S25/10630 (hereafter: “Memoranda on Constitutional Problems”). 13. Ibid. 14. U.N. Partition Plan, Part I, Chapter 6, Article 2. 15. See “Memoranda on Constitutional Problems” Memo C (December 15, 1947), CZA, S25/10630. 16. Ibid. See other proposals as well in CZA, S25/9701, including a draft of a constitution drafted by Yehuda (Leo) Cohen, and proposals from 1948 (full dates not indicated). 17. In 1877 the Ottoman Empire adopted the Municipalities Law, part of its adoption of French governmental models on the backdrop of pressures from the European states and their attempt to solve the “Oriental Question.” Before this was the division of the Ottoman Empire into districts—walayat, according to the model of the French départements. 18. See “Memoranda on Constitutional Problems” Memo C (December 15, 1947), CZA, S25/106380. 19. See Addendum B to the Mandatory Municipalities Order—1934. 20. See U.N. Partition Plan, Part I, Chapter 6, article 2, B:4(a) 21. See “Memoranda on Constitutional Problems,” February 10, 1948, 5–6, CZA, S25/106830.

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22. See Addendum G to the Mandatory Municipalities Order—1934. On the representatives assembly of Knesset Israel see elections regulations, item 19(a). 23. See U.N. Partition Plan, Part I, Chapter 6: recommendation b:4(a). 24. See “Memoranda on Constitutional Problems,” 14. 25. Ibid., 15. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., 23. 28. ISA, container C-113, file 2. 29. See Biographical Appendix. 30. On the activity of Hannah Even-Tov in the Jerusalem Va’adat Hamatzav, including the transfer of the Government Printer’s equipment and parts of the Mandatory government archive to Tel Aviv (only special groups of documents needed for management of the war), see the report of Hannah Even-Tov to Eliezer Kaplan (June 6, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-113, file 17. 31. “Government Administration in the Hebrew State: A Recommendation for the Structures, Systems, and Budgets of the Departments—April 1948.” (hereafter: Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report), “Introduction,” ISA, RG-41, container C-121, file 19. 32. Ibid. See also Jonathan Fine, “The Impact of the War on the Establishment of the Government System of Israel during 1947–1949” (Hebrew), in Citizens at War: Studies on the Civilian Society during the Israeli War of Independence, eds. Mordechai Bar-On and Meir Chazan (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2006), 95–133. 33. For a comprehensive study on the establishment of the Defense Ministry and the Israel Defense Forces, see Zehava Ostfeld, An Army Is Born: Main Stages in the Buildup of the Army and the Defense Ministry under the Leadership of David Ben-Gurion (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1994). See also Gabriella Heikhal, Civil Control Over the Israel Defense Forces 1945–1957 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ariel Publishing, 1998). 34. Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report, 42–43. 35. Ostfeld, An Army Is Born, 95. There is a good deal of scholarship on the subject of the firing of the head of the national headquarters and

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the dismantling of the Palmah. See Anita Shapira, From the Firing of the Head of the Haganah National Headquarters to the Dismantling of the Palmah (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv. Ostfeld—Israeli Ministry of Defense. Shapira: Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 1985); Yoav Gelber, Why Was the Palmah Dissolved? (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken Press, 1986). 36. Ostfeld, An Army Is Born, 96. 37. Ibid., 99. 38. Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report, 13. 39. Ibid., 14, 16, 18. 40. Ibid., 19–20. 41. Ibid., 12–14. 42. Ibid., 35.

Chapter 5 1. See Biographical Appendix. 2. Edwin Samuel, “The Administration of Palestine under the British Mandate 1920–1948” (unpublished manuscript, 1948); and Samuel, “The Effect of the British Administration on Modern Israel” (unpublished manuscript, 1948). Both typed manuscripts are found in ISA, RG-103. 3. See Edwin Samuel’s recommendations (January 19, 1947), ISA, RG-41, container C-123, file 7. 4. UNGA Resolution 181, November 29, 1947 (hereafter: U.N. Partition Plan), part I, chapter 8, article h. 5. See Yehoshua Caspi, “The Transition from the British Mandatory Police the Israeli Police,” in From Yishuv to Statehood: Continuity and Change (Hebrew), ed. Varda Pilovsky (Haifa: Haifa University, the Herzl Institute for the Research of Zionism, 1990), 282–83. 6. The presence of the Jewish Mandatory officers will stand out once again during the actual establishment of the District Administration system. 7. For the principles guiding the organization of the British District Administration in Palestine, see Gideon Biger, Crown Colony or National

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Homeland? British Influence upon Palestine, 1917–1930. A Geo-historical Analysis (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1983), 65–75. On the day-to-day management of the districts in Palestine under the Mandatory government, see Israeli State Archive (ISA), RG-23 (Jerusalem District); RG-24 (Tel Aviv–Lydda District); RG-25 (Haifa District); RG-26 (Gaza District); and RG-112 (Samaria District). 8. See the survey by Yaakov Kislov, deputy district commissioner of the municipal Tel Aviv area: “On the Authorities of the Mandatory District Commissioner” (no date) (hereafter: Kislov, “Survey”), ISA, RG-41, container C-114, file 16. See also Biger, Crown Colony, 65–75. 9. Kislov, “Survey.” 10. Walter Ethan’s recommendation, entitled “Proposal for an Administrative Division into Districts” (December 8, 1947), was conveyed on January 23, 1948, to Dr. Yaakov Marcus, later head of the Department of Population Registration of the Interior Ministry. ISA, RG-41, container C-114, file 16. See also: Kislov, Survey. 11. See Biographical Appendix. 12. See Memorandum on the Structure of the Mandatory District Government, and Recommendation for the Structure of District Government in the Jewish State (January 1, 1948, no signature), ISA, RG-41, container C-17, file 19. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. See “Plan for the Municipal Administration of the Jewish State” (February 9, 1948, no signature), ISA, RG-41, container C-114, file 16. 16. See Yehoshua Gvirtz, “Buildings and Offices for Housing the District Administration,” Memorandum to Va’adat HaMatzav (February 17, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-123, file 6. 17. See “Plan for the municipal administration of the Jewish state” (February 9, 1948, no signature), ISA, RG-41, container C-114, file 16. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Yitzhak Gruenbaum, “Proposal for a Plan for the Establishment of a Population Census Mechanism” (October 1, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-123, file 9.

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21. Memorandum from Reuven Alkalai to Zvi Luria, chairman of Subcommittee C (April 8, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 2. 22. Zvi Luria to Moshe Shapira (March 9, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 2. 23. See “Proposal for a Structure of the Information Bureau, Drafted by a Group of Students at the Supplementary Training Institute of the Political Department,” ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 3. 24. See Dr. Shabtai Ginsburg, “Memorandum for the Establishment of an Information Department in the Jewish State” (November 20, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 2. 25. Handwritten comments on both proposals, apparently by Zvi Luria, chairman of Subcommittee C, ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 2. 26. See Biographical Appendix. 27. See Reuben Alkalai’s proposal as conveyed by Subcommittee C Chairman Zvi Luria in duplicate to Zeev Sharf and Moshe Shapira (April 18, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 2. 28. Ibid. 29. See Biographical Appendix. On the plans for establishing a police force in the Jewish state, see Yehezkel Sacharov (Sahar): “Proposal for the Establishment of a Police Force in the State of Israel,” Memorandum. The first comprehensive discussion on the subject was held in Subcommittee B on December 23, 1947, ISA, RG-41, container C-122, file 32. See also: “The Police Apparatus in the Jewish State,” Central Zionist Archive (CZA), S25/10041. 30. See Caspi, “Transition of Police Force,” 281–82. 31. Ibid. 32. Sacharov, “Proposal for the Establishment of a Police Force”; see also “Police Apparatus in the Jewish State,” CZA, S25/10041. 33. See Caspi, “Transition of Police Force,” 284–85. 34. See “Government Administration in the Hebrew State: A Recommendation for the Structures, Systems, and Budgets of the Departments—April 1948” (hereafter: Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report), 7. ISA, RG-41, container C-121, file 19.

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35. See Gvirtz, “Buildings and Offices.” 36. Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report, 11. 37. Following the closing off of the Mediterranean to British naval traffic due to the activities of the German and Italian submarine fleets, the British refrained from the regular transfer of supplies to its military in the Middle East. Therefore, Egypt, and in particular the port of Alexandria, became a military supply base, though the industrial zone of the Haifa Gulf also became a site for producing civilian and military goods for the British military. In effect, WWII expedited the laying of the foundations for Israeli industry in the pre-State era. 38. See Memorandum on the Role of the Mandatory Labor Department (no date or signature), ISA, RG-41, container C-108, file 24. Some of the material on the day-to-day activity of the department was left behind after the evacuation and is found in ISA, RG-13. 39. Ibid. For the annual reports of the department for 1943–1948, see ISA (Mandatory Labor Department), container 1426, file Aleph/9. 40. See Biographical Appendix. 41. See Biographical Appendix. 42. See Zvi Berenzon’s plan for Va’adat HaMatzav with guidelines for the establishment of the Labor Ministry in the Israeli governmental system (January 11, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-108, file 24, 1–5 (hereafter: “Berenzon’s memorandum on the Labor Ministry”). 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. See Protocol of Subcommittee C (September 12, 1948), CZA, S25/7733. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. See Hannah Even Tov to Zvi Berenzon (January 27, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-108, file 19.

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53. Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report, 18. 54. The advisor for city planning’s office was established in 1935, and was headed by the British architect Henry Candell. Its main responsibilities were planning, consultation, and oversight. In 1935, this office prepared the Town Planning Ordinance-1936. See Shalom Reichman and Mira Yehudai, A Survey of Innovative Planning 1948–1952 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University and the Israel State Archives, 1981), 6. On the development of the Municipal constitution (hukat ha’arim) in the state of Israel, see ISA, RG-56 (Interior Ministry) container C-2198, file Aleph/Dalet/Ayin Bet/1. 55. For more on the subject of the Mandatory Surveyor’s Office, see Dov Gavish, Land and Map: From Land Arrangement to the Map of the Land of Israel 1920–1948 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981). 56. On the Mandatory Department for Public Works and the recommendations for the establishment of an Israeli Department for Public Works, see the memorandum entitled: “Proposal for the Organization of a Department for Public Works,” prepared by the head of the Jewish Agency Technical Department, Yaakov Reiser, and presented to Secretary of Va’adat HaMatzav Zeev Sharf by member of Subcommittee B, Bar-Kochva Meirovich, on December 5, 1947, ISA, RG-43 (Prime Minister’s Office), container C-122, file 39. On the day-to-day activity of the Mandatory Department for Public Works see ISA, RG-12. 57. Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report, 18.

Chapter 6 1. Amnon Rubinstein, Israel ’s Constitutional Law (Hebrew), vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Schocken Publishing House, 1991), 37. 2. Joseph Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), 106. 3. Peter Y. Medding, “Government Institutions during the First Year of Independence” (Hebrew), in First Year of Independence: 1948–1949,

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ed. Mordechai Naor (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1988), 69. For an early draft on the establishment of the People’s Council, see “A proposal for the decision of the People’s Council” (corrected formulation), appendix to the Protocols of the People’s Administration from January 26, 1948, in “Protocols of the People’s Administration. May 13, 1947 to April 18, 1948” (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1978), 106–8. 4. Heller, Struggle for the Jewish State, 106–8. 5. Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken Press, 1977), 460. See also Israeli State Archives (ISA), 7732/S25. 6. Protocol of the Meetings of the People’s Administration (May 15, 1948), 5. 7. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lisak, The Origins of the Israeli Polity (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1986) 299. On the evolution of the Herut Party movement during the establishment of the state, and during the first and subsequent years of the state, see Yechiam Weitz, The First Step towards Ruling: The Herut Party Movement. 1949–1955 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, the Herzl Institute for the Research of Zionism at Haifa University, 2007). 8. Protocol of the Second Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 19, 1948), ISA. Jerusalem (henceforth: Protocol of the Meeting of the Provisional Government). On the tenth draft of the ordinance, see Provisional Government Legal Service: Law and Administrative Ordinance no. 1 of 5708-1948 (tenth proposal) (May 19, 1948), ISA, Container C-123, File 32. 9. See Biographical Appendix. Protocol of the Second Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 19, 1948), ISA. 10. Ibid. 11. See Biographical Appendix. 12. See: Memorandom of Subcommittees of the Legislative Council, ISA, container C-114, file 20. Following are the legal fields covered by the various subcommittees: civil law, commercial law, civil procedures, criminal law and criminal procedure, land law, family and inheritance law, religious courts and their jurisdiction, the place of Jewish law in Israeli law, maritime and aerial law, law of local government (including city planning),

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labor and social security law, law of public services (including post, telegraph, health, education, and transportation), laws of defense, military, police and prisons, Hebrew law terminology, citizenship and immigration laws, structure of the Justice Ministry and courts, laws of government services (including employment, discipline, pension, international law, taxes and Custom Duties, communities and dedications). 13. Protocol of the Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 16, 1948) ISA. Kaf-1. 14. Ibid. 15. See detailed memo of the Secretariat of the Judicial Committee to Dov Yosef, including final proposals for the adjustment of the law and its powers, ISA, RG-41 container C-11, file 3. These are the main subjects in the memo: the courts, annulment of the White Paper laws and emergency powers, national service, governmental and police administration. Special Mandatory laws that were annulled: Law III for 1948 for the annulment of the White Paper, final proposal, April 16, 1948, Article 16 of the King’s Speech on his Mandate for Palestine, 1922; regulations for the transfer of land—1940, Articles a-13, 14, 15 of the Immigration Ordinance of 1941 (April 18, 1948). 16. Rubinstein, Israel ’s Constitutional Law, 56–57. 17. Ron Harris, “Absent-Minded Misses and Historical Opportunities: Jewish Law, Israeli Law and the Establishment of the State of Israel” (Hebrew), in On Both Sides of the Bridge: Religion and State in the Early Years of Israel, eds. Mordechai Bar-On and Zvi Zameret (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2002), 31. 18. Ibid., 31. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., 32. 21. Ibid., 33. 22. Ibid., 34. 23. Ibid., 36. 24. Memo of the Secretariat of the Judicial Committee (April 18, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-11, file 3.

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25. Ibid. 26. Administrative and Legal Ordinance no. 1 of 5708/1948, chapter 3, section 9: Emergency Regulations. See Law no. 4 (1948): On Powers in Emergency Times, final proposal (April 18, 1948), ISA, RG-41 (Va’adat Hamatzav Archive), container C-123, file 32. 27. Menachem Hofnung, Israel—Security Needs vs. the Rule of Law (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Nevo Publishing, 1991), 67. 28. Ibid., 57. 29. Confiscation Order no. 141, from Tel Aviv District Commander to Mr. Rosenberg Meir, 23 Mikveh Yisrael Street, Tel Aviv (May 17, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-124, file 8. The confiscation decision was in fact already approved on May 12, 1948, when it was decided to turn the house into a food-card distribution center. 30. Conversation between David Jacobson and David Arian at Beit Hadar in Tel Aviv (May 12, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-124, file 8. 31. Hoffnung, Security Needs. 32. Ibid., 68. 33. Ibid., 32. 34. Ibid., 52. 35. Ibid., 58. Hofnung further writes that from the difference in the use of emergency regulations during wartime and peacetime, we can see that in time of peace the use of the emergency regulations became such a routine tool for the management of policy that in times of war it became necessary to call the emergency laws by special names, such as “exceptional powers,” “special state of emergency,” to clarify that at this time the use of these laws was not routine but that there was a real state of emergency. See Ibid., 61. 36. Protocol of the Provisional State Council (May 16, 1948), ISA Kaf-1, 1948–1949. 37. A detailed memorandum of the Judicial Committee to Dov Yosef (April 18, 1948), ISA, container C-11, file 3. 38. Law No. 4 (1948) on Emergency Powers, final proposal (April 18,

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1948); Law and Administrative Ordinance no. 1 of 1948, Articles a-b-1, a-b-2. See also ISA, 9700/S25. 39. See Biographical Appendix. 40. Protocol of the Provisional State Council (May 16, 1948), ISA, Kaf-1. 41. Ibid. 42. See Biographical Appendix. 43. Protocol of the Provisional State Council (May 23, 1948), ISA, Kaf-1. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. “The State of Israel, Provisional Government,” Official Gazette (June 6, 1948). Notice about acting members of the Provisional State Council, 16. 48. Proposal for the Meeting of the Provisional Government from the Ministry of Justice. The proposal was ratified at that same meeting (May 26, 1948), ISA, container C-124, file 4. 49. Zahava Ostfeld, An Army Is Born: Main Steps in the Buildup of the Army and the Defense Ministry under the Leadership of David Ben-Gurion (Hebrew), vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1994), 80–81, 98–99. 50. See Proposal ratified at the meeting of the Provisional Government (May 26, 1948), ISA, container C-124, file 4. 51. Protocol of the Third Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 20, 1948), ISA. Kaf-1. 52. Ibid. 53. See Biographical Appendix. 54. Protocol of the Third Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 20, 1948), ISA. Kaf-1. 55. Ibid., 53. 56. Protocol of the Sixth Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 30, 1948), ISA. Kaf-1. 57. Protocol of the Fourth Meeting of the Provisional Government (May 23, 1948), ISA. Kaf-1.

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Chapter 7 1. See Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum to District Officers (October 21, 1948), Israel State Archives (ISA), RG-56 (Interior Ministry), container C-2196, file Aleph-Dalet/Aleph-Kaf/10. 2. See Final Report of the Head of the General Administration Division, Yaakov Kislov (November 16, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph-Dalet/Aleph-Kaf/1/1. 3. See Report of David Pordor on District Administration, covering the period from November 1, 1948, to November 3, 1949 (March 7, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph-Dalet/Aleph-Kaf/1/1. 4. Ibid. 5. On the system of organization of the Mandatory District Administration in Palestine, see Gideon Biger, Crown Colony or National Homeland? British Influence upon Palestine 1917–1930: A Geo-historical Analysis (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1983), 65–76. 6. See: “Government Administration in the Hebrew State: A Proposal for the Structure, Mechanism, and Budget of the Departments—April 1948” (hereafter Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report), p. 7, ISA, container C-121, file 19. 7. See Yaakov Kislov, head of the General Administration Division, to the district heads of Tel Aviv (rural and urban), Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias, Afula, Safed, and Nahariya (November 19, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 8. See the report of Afula District Commissioner Michael Barkai to Yaakov Kislov (November 5, 1948), covering the period from August 1 to October 30, 1948. ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. See Biographical Appendix. 12. See Biographical Appendix. 13. See Biographical Appendix. 14. See Biographical Appendix. 15. See Biographical Appendix.

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16. See Biographical Appendix. 17. See Biographical Appendix. 18. See Report of the Va’adat HaManganon on the Establishment, Authorities, and Roles of the Apparatus (April 12, 1948), ISA, container 5477, file 2255. On the urgent need to establish a Va’adat HaManganon, see also the proposal of Zeev Sharf, Va’adat HaMatzav Protocol (February 2, 1948), Central Zionist Archive (CZA), S25/77134. On the establishment of the Apparatus Commission, see CZA, S25/9002. 19. Report of the Va’adat HaManganon on the establishment, authorities, and roles of the civil servant system (April 12, 1948), ISA, container 5477, file 2255. 20. See the section of the report of Yehoshua Gvirtz to Meir Grabovsky on plans to establish a Department of Planning and Building within the Local Government Division of the Interior Ministry, ISA, RG-41, container C-123, file 6. 21. Ibid. 22. For an in-depth study on the subject of the civil service in the Israeli government system, see Yaakov Reuveni, Public Administration in Israel: Development of the Israeli Civil Service 1948–1973 (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Masada Publishing, 1974). 23. See Biographical Appendix. 24. See Interior Ministry director general, Maximilian Hartglass to Yaakov Kislov (September 15, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file AlephDalet/Aleph’Kaf/1/1. 25. Report of David Pordor on District Administration, covering the period from November 1, 1948 to November 3, 1949 (March 7, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph-Dalet/Aleph-Kaf/1/1. 26. See Report on the Activity of the General Administration Division for 1951, ISA, RG-56, container C-2203, file Aleph-Dalet/Mem-Shin/5/2, 1–4. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid.

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31. See Summary of the Powers of the Division of Self-Government and the General Administration Division by Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum, during the meeting with the district Kaf/1commissioners (October 21, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph-Dalet/Aleph-0. See also Circular of the General Administration Division, ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Kaf/1/4. 32. Summary of the powers of the Division of Self Government and the Division of General Administration by Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum, during a meeting with the district commissioners (October 21, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph/ Dalet/Aleph Kaf/10. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Schmaltz eventually became the head of the Jewish Demographics Department in the Institute for the Study of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. 36. See the report of the head of the Population Registration Department in the Interior Ministry, Dr. Yaakov Marcus, on the visit in the registration office in Jerusalem (November 19, 1947), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Sameh/1. 37. Ibid. 38. See Biographical Appendix. 39. See Head of the CBS Roberto Baki to Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum (January 11, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Sameh/1. 40. See Summary of the Discussion between Roberto Baki and Interior Minister Yitzhak Gruenbaum (November 14, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file aleph dalet/aleph sameh/1. 41. See Yaakov Marcus, head of the Population Registration Department of the Interior Ministry, to David Meretz, Financial Comptroller in the Interior Ministry (December 14, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Sameh/1. 41. See Report of Yaakov Marcus to Yaakov Kisalov (November 28, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Sameh/1.

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42. See food ration supervisor Hans Froder to the southern, northern, and Haifa districts (November 9, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Sameh/1. 43. See Minister of the Interior Yitzhak Gruenbaum to the Ministry of Immigration and the Consular Section in the Minister of Foreign Affairs (November 14, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/ Aleph Sameh/1. 44. Ibid. 45. See Police and Minority Affairs Minister Bechor Shitrit to Interior Minister and the CBS (December 5, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Sameh/1. 46. See Pardes Hannah Council to the Population Registration Department of the Interior Ministry (November 27, 1947), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/AlephSameh/1. 47. See the official notification published by the head of the General Administration Division of the Interior Ministry, Yaakov Kislov, on the issue of the regularization of immigrant registration (January 4, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph-Sameh/1. 48. On the occupation of the Western Galilee, see David Koren, The Western Galilee in the War of Independence (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1988), 109–22. 49. See Yaakov Kislov to the district commissioners of Nahariya, Safed, Tiberias, Haifa, Afula, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv (November 19, 1948) ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. In his letter, Kisalov asks each commissioner to send him a status report on his district for MayOctober 1948, 50. Report of commissioner of the Nahariya district, Moshe Vandor, to Yaakov Kislov, covering the period between May 15 and October 30, 1948 (November 19, 1948), ISA, RG-56, Container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid.

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53. The decision to establish a special committee to deal with the problems of the Negev was taken by David Ben-Gurion, Avraham Hertzfeld, and Pinchas (Kozalovsky) Sapir in a meeting in Tel Aviv on December 19, 1947. See Amiad Brezner, The Struggle over the Negev 1941–1948 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry and Galili Center for the Defense Studies, 1994), 132–33. 54. Ibid. 55. See Report of the commissioner of the Jerusalem District Shmuel Becher Yishaya to Yaakov Kisalov (November 7, 1948), which surveys the period from October 30 to November 24, 1948, ISA, RG 56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. See Biographical Appendix. 59. See Report of Nahariya District Commissioner Moshe Vandor to Yaakov Kislov (November 19, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. See Report of Jerusalem District Commissioner Shmuel Becher Yishaya to Yaakov Kislov (November 7, 1948), covering the period of October 30 to November 24, 1948. In his report, the Jerusalem district commissioner also describes his complex relationship with Dov Yosef, the military governor of Jerusalem, ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 63. Ibid. See also: Dov Yosef, Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: 64. Schocken, 1979), which gives a personal account of the siege on Jerusalem. 65. Ibid. 66. See the report of the commissioner of the Safed and Tiberias district, Shaul Goral, to Yaakov Kislov (November 7, 1948), covering the period from May 2 to October 31, 1948, ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file

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Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. On the conquest of the city of Safed in Operation Broom, see Yaakov Ha-Meiri, Safed in a Vise (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1988). 67. See Report of Jerusalem District Commissioner Shmuel Becher Yeshaya to Yaakov Kislov (November 7, 1948), covering the period from October 30 to November 24, 1948, ISA RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaph/1/1. 68. See the report of the Nahariya District Commissioner Moshe Vandor to Yaakov Kislov (November 19, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaph/1/1. 69. See Report of Afula District Commissioner Michael Barkai to Yaakov Kislov (November 5, 1948), for the period of May 2 to October 30, 1948, ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaph/1/1. 70. Ibid. On the conquest of Tiberias, see Netanel Lorch, The History of the War of Independence (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Masada Publishing, 1958), 123. See also Oded Avisar, Book of Tiberias (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1973), 140. 71. On the conquest of Haifa, see Markovitzky, “The Battle for Haifa and Its Surroundings during the War of Independence,” in The Development of Haifa 1918–1948 (Hebrew), eds. Mordechai Naor and Yossi Ben-Arzi (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1989).” See also Zvi Eshel, Haganah Campaigns in Haifa (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1978). See also Ariyeh L. Avneri, Jewish Settlement and the Claim of Disposition 1878–1948 (Hebrew) (Bnei-Brak: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuchad Publishing, 1980), 236. 72. Haifa Deputy District Commissioner David Levhar to Yaakov Kislov, covering the period of May 15 to October 31, 1948 (no date), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. The report was written by the deputy commissioner of the district, since the district commissioner, Yaakov Bergman, was out of the country at the time. 73. See Report of Tel Aviv Rural District Commissioner Yosef Kuperman, to Yaakov Kislov, covering the period of May 15 to October 31 1948 (November 12, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1.

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74. Report of Tel Aviv Urban District Commissioner Yehoshua Gobernick, to Yaakov Kislov, covering the period from May 15 to October 31, 1948 (November 8, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1. 75. See Report of Jerusalem District Commissioner Shmuel Becher Yeshaya to Yaakov Kislov covering the period from October 30 to November 24, 1948 (November 7, 1948), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Kaf/1/1.

Chapter 8 1. See Administrative and Legal Ordinance no. 1 from 1948: Labor Department Order, Israel State Archives (ISA), RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. 2. See Eli Tzur, Landscapes of Illusion: Mapam 1948–1954 (Hebrew) (Beer Sheva: The Ben-Gurion Research Center & Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1998), 44. 3. See Hanan (Hans) Rubin to the Central Secretariat (April 25, 1948) Mapam Archives (MA), (1)90.58 4. See Biographical Appendix. 5. On the political and ideological struggle between Mapam and Mapai on defense matters and on the dissolution of the Palmah, see Yoav Gelber, Why was the Palmach Dissolved? (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1986; Anita Shapira, From Firing the Head of the National Headquarters to the Dissolution of the Palmach (Hebrew) (Bnei-Brak: Hakibuz ha-Meuchad Publishing, 1985); and Uri Brener, Dismissed: Why were Palmach Commanders Prevented from Integrating in the IDF in 1949? (Hebrew) (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin & Gallili Center for Defense Studies, 1987). 6. See Biographical Appendix. 7. See Protocol of the Meeting of the Mapam Political Assembly (April 1, 1948), MA (1) 66.90. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid.

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10. See Biographical Appendix. 11. See Protocols of Two Meetings of the Apparatus Committee from May 7 and 23, 1948, MA (1) 58.90. 12. See Tzur, Mapam, 44. 13. See Mordechai Ben-Tov, Minister of Labor and Construction, to the Prime Minister’s Office (June 1, 1948), ISA, RG-43 (PMO), container C-5444, file 1639. 14. See State of Israel—The Provisional Government: Emergency Regulations for the Mobilization of Manpower, 1948, Order no. 2: Essential Jobs (June 25, 1948), ISA, RG-43 (PMO), container C-5444, file 1639. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. See: “Decisions for the Summary of the Study of the Economic Situation of the Farms during the War,” ibid. 18. Ibid. For an expansion on the subject of fortressing in the localities, see Alon Kadish, To Arms and Farms: Trainings in the Palmach (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Tag and the Galili Center for Defense Studies, 1995), 39–94. 19. See Government Almanac, 1950, 152, ISA, RG-95 (Labor Ministry), container C-5441, file 3591 (Inspection and Supervision Department). 20. See Nachum Gross and Yitzhak Greenberg, Bank HaPoalim: The First 50 Years (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1993), 277–79. 21. Ibid. 22. See the report of Levi-Yitzhak Schneider (Shani Or), Director General of the Ministry of Labor and Construction to Government Secretary Eli Gal about the structure of the ministry (March 24, 1949), ISA, RG-43, Container C-5444, file 1639. 23. See Report of Labor and Construction Minister Mordechai Ben-Tov to the Prime Minister’s Office (June 1, 1948), ISA, RG-43, Container C-5444, file 1639. 24. Ibid. 25. See Biographical Appendix.

350

Notes to Chapter 8

26. See Protocol of Subcommittee B of Va’adat HaMatzav (January 12, 1948), ISA, RG-41 (Va’adat Hamatzav), container C-117, file 40. It is worthwhile to note that at the same meeting, Reiser was asked to talk about the structure of the department, and the department was indeed approved, though it was decided to deal with the issue of staffing for the department in a separate framework, in particular for political reasons relating to the integration of people from the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency (most of them Mapai members). See ISA, RG-43, container C-122, file 39, which was defined as top secret, and included lists of possible candidates for staffing the department from March 31, 1948. 27. See Report of the Head of the Department of Public Works in the Ministry of Labor and Construction Yaakov Reiser to Minister of Labor and Construction Mordechai Ben-Tov (June 1948), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639, 1–3. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. See Biographical Appendix. 33. See Shalom Reichman and Mira Yehudai, A Survey of Innovative Planning 1948–1952 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Israel State Archives, 1981), 10. 34. Ibid., 11. 35. Ibid., 12. 36. See “Government Administration in the Hebrew State: A proposal for the structure of the department, their apparatus and budgets—April 1948” (Hebrew) (henceforth: Va’adat Hamatzav Final Report), 19, ISA, RG-41, container C-121, file 19. 37. See Head of the Department of Public Works in the Ministry of Labor and Construction Yaakov Reiser to David Ben-Gurion (June 22, 1948), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid.

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351

40. See Israel Feinmesser to Minister of Labor and Construction Mordechai Ben-Tov (June 1, 1948), MA (Public Service Archive), (3) 5.8.95. 41. Ibid. 42. See: Debora HaCohen, Immigrants in a Storm: The Great Aliya and Its Absorption in Israel. 1948–1953 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1994), 293. 43. See Protocol of the Meeting of Housing and Construction Minister Mordechai Ben-Tov with representatives of the housing corporations (August 31, 1948), MA, (2) 5.8.95. 44. See Biographical Appendix. 45. See Protocol of the Meeting of Labor and Construction Minister Mordechai Ben-Tov with representatives of the housing corporations (August 31, 1948), Mem Aleph, (2) 5.8.5. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. See HaCohen, Immigrants in a Storm, 178–79. 52. See Report of the Director General of the Labor Ministry LeviYitzhak Schneider (Shani Or) on the structure of the Ministry of Labor and Construction to Government Secretary Eli Gali (March 24, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. See Proposal for the Establishment of a Department of Trade Union Registration, conversation with Mr. Ritov from the Cooperation Center (April 1, 1948). See also the letter from the secretary of the Minhelet Ha’Am, Aharon Ziesling, to the Chairman of the Farmer’s Association, H. Ariav (May 6, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-132, file 2. 56. See Zvi Bar Niv to Minister of Labor and Construction Mordechai Ben-Tov (July 11, 1948), MA, (3) 5.8.95. 57. See report of the Director general of the Ministry of Labor and

352

Notes to Chapter 9

Construction Levi-Yitzhak Schneider (Shani Or) to Government Secretary Eli Gali on the structure of the Ministry of Labor and Construction (March 24, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639.

Chapter 9 1. The main organizational discussions in the preparation of the election campaign were held in the meetings of the Provisional Government on August 8 and 11, 1948. On August 11, the Order on Registration for the Elections was declared. See Protocols of the Provisional Government (August 8, 1948, and August 11, 1948), Israeli State Archives (ISA). For the Armistice Agreement map, see Map Appendix, Map 2. 2. Zeev Tzahor, “The First Election Campaigns and the Political Map” (Hebrew), in The First Decade: 1948–1958, eds. Zvi Zameret and Hanna Yablonka (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1997), 30. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 31. 5. David Shoham, Israel—50 Years (Hebrew). (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1998), 53. On Herut Party and the situation of the Right after the elections, see Yechiam Weitz, The First Step to Power: The Herut Party Movement, 1949– 1955 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute & Herzl Institute), 29–33. 6. On the Altalena affair, see Uri Brener, Altalena: A Political Military Study (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuchad, 1978). 7. On the disbanding of the Palmah, see Yoav Gelber, Why Was the Palmcah Dissolved? (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Schocken Press, 1986), and Anita Shapira, From Firing the Head of the Haganah National Headquarters to the Dismantling of the Palmach (Hebrew) (Bnei-Brak: Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuchad, 1985). 8. Shaham, Israel—50 Years, 53. 9. Ibid., 54. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 9

353

12. Tzahor, Election Campaigns, 33. 13. Samuel Sager, The Parliamentary System in Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Achiassaf Press, 1988), 53. 14. Meeting of the Secretariat of the Labor Party with Representatives of the Party in the Knesset (March 1, 1949), Labor Party Archives (LPA), file 2-24-1949-22. 15. Asher Arian, Politics and Government in Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan and Modan Publishers, 1990), 238. 16. Peter Y. Medding, “The Organization of the Executive Branch,” in Transition from “Yishuv” to State, 1947–1949: Continuity and Change, ed. Varda Pilowsky (Hebrew) (Haifa: University of Haifa and the Herzl Institute for Research in Zionism, 1988), 39–40. 17. Ibid., 41. 18. Zeev Aharonovitch to Mapai Knesset Members (March 1, 1949), LPA, file 2-24-1949-22. 19. Ibid. 20. Tzahor, Election Campaigns, 36–37. 21. Meeting of the Labor Party Bureau with its Knesset Faction Directorate and Government Secretary Zeev Sharf (February 21, 1949), LPA, file 1-25-1949-12. 22. Ibid. 23. Protocol of the Meeting of the Mapai Party Bureau (February 24, 1949), LPA, file 2-25-1949-12. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Sager, Parliamentary System, 41. 30. Amnon Rubinstein, Israel ’s Constitutional Law (Hebrew), vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Schocken Press, 1991), 44. 31. Sager, Parliamentary System, 41. 32. Ibid., 42.

354

Notes to Chapter 10

33. Order for the Transition to the Constituent Assembly, No. 39, 1949. Published in the Official Gazette on January 14, 1949. 34. Protocol of the Provisional State Council (May 16, 1948), ISA, 20-1. 35. Medding, “Organization of the Executive Branch,” 41. 36. Ibid., 42. 37. Protocol of the Meeting of the Designated Government, 1949 (March 3, 1949), ISA. 38. See Yaakov Reuveni, Public Administration in Israel: Development of the Israeli Civil Service 1948–1973 (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: Masada Press, 1974), 132. 39. Ibid., 191. 40. See “Transition Law 5709-1949” in Regime in the State of Israel: A Source Book, eds. Yitzhak Galnoor and Menachem Hofnung (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Nevo Press, 1993), 50. 41. Yaakovi, Public Administration, 130–31. 42. Golda Meir’s version of the affair can be found in Golda Meir, My Life (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Maariv Press, 1975), 331–32. 43. See “Agranat Commission” in Galnoor and Hofnung, The Regime of the State of Israel, 748.

Chapter 10 1. See Eliezer Don-Yihye, “Cooperation and Conflict between Political Sectors: The Religious Sector and the Labor Party and the Ministry of Education in Israel. 1949–1951.” (PhD thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1977). 2. See David Shoham, Israel—50 Years (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved Press, 1998), 62–63. 3. Ibid. 4. See the Religious Zionist Movement Archive by the Rabbi Kook Institution in Jerusalem, file 1950, Moshe Aharoni to the Minister of the Interior (November 23, 1950).

Notes to Chapter 10

355

5. See Shoham, Israel—50 years, 62–63. 6. See Minister of the Interior Moshe Shapira to District Commissioners (29 September 1949). Israel State Archives, RG-56 (Interior Ministry), container 2196, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Kaf/10. On the same matter see ISA, RG-56, container 2196, file Aleph/ Kaf/13. 7. See Galilee District Commissioner Shlomo Har-Even to the Director General of the Interior Ministry General (September 29, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container 2196, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph/ Kaf1/4. 8. Ibid. 9. See the Head of the Local Government Division Elyahu Meron to all department heads (August 17 1951), ibid., 1–3. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. See Official Gazette 48, Supplement A (February 4, 1949). 14. See memorandum of meeting between Hartglass, Kislov, and Marcus (February 20, 1949). See also in the same file a letter sent by Yaakov Kislov to Abraham Bergman from the Finance Ministry (February 24, 1949), ISA, RG-Division 56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Gimel/2. 15. Memorandum of meeting between Hartglass, Kislov, and Marcus. 16. See announcement of the head of the Registration Division in the Interior Ministry, Yaakov Marcus, to all office departments (June 5, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Gimel/1. 17. See Executive Director of the Interior Ministry, Maximilian Hartglass, to Minister of the Interior Moshe Shapira (June 5, 1949), ibid. 18. See Moshe Alufi, Head of Registration Division of the Interior Ministry, to Maximilian Hartglass (October 10, 1949), ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. See Moshe Alufi to Maximilian Hartglass (May 24, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Alef Kaf/1/4. 21. See Head of the General Administration Division Yaakov Kislov to the Ministry of Immigration (January 4, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Kaf/1.

356

Notes to Chapter 10

22. Ibid. 23. See Reches, “Policy Fundamentals,” 291. 24. Ibid., 292. 25. Ibid. 26. Regarding the eviction of Palestinians, see both approaches: Morris Benny, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 316–29; Gelbar Yoav, Palestine 1948 (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), chapters 5 and 13. 27. See Arnon Golan, “Settlements during the First Decade,” in The First Decade (Hebrew), eds. Zvi Zameret and Hana Yablonka (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press), 83–103; Golan, Wartime Spatial Changes: Former Arab Territories within the State of Israel, 1948–1950 (Hebrew) (Sde Boker: The Ben-Gurion Heritage Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2001). 28. See Eli Reches, “Policy Fundamentals towards the Arab Population in Israel,” in Transition from “Yishuv” to State. 1947–1949: Continuity and Change (Hebrew), ed. Varda Pilovsky (Haifa: University of Haifa & the Herzl Institute for Research and Zionism, 1988), 249. 29. See two laws of the British Mandate that were translated into “orders”: “Order for Prevention of Crimes, Punishments and Lashings—July 4, 1935,” “Supervisory Order for Bedouins—August 1, 1942,” ISA, RG-56, container C-2213, file Aleph/Dalet/Mem/115. In addition see “Memorandum on the Status of Arabs in the Jewish State: 1947–1948,” CZA, S25/9679. 30. See Reches, “Policy Fundamentals,” 295. 31. See Biographical Appendix. 32. On the status of Arabs in Israel during the first years of the State, see Ilan Lustik, Arabs in a Jewish State (Hebrew) (Haifa: Mifras Press, 1985). 33. See Biographical Appendix. 34. See the report of the Committee on the Clarification of the Arab Question (June 2, 1950), IDF Archive, Delivery 1959, RG-848, file 53. 35. Ibid. 36. See summary of the meeting of the Military Administration in Jaffa (September 27, 1951), IDF Archive, Delivery 1953, RG-834, file 133. 37. See Report of the Committee for the Clarification of the Arab Question

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357

(June 2, 1950), IDF Archive, Delivery 1959, RG-848, file 53. Summary of conclusions from meeting between Yaakov Kislov, Yehoshua Palmon, and Lieutenant Colonel Shani on the division of authorities between the Interior Ministry and the Military Administration. 38. Ibid. 39. See the report of Yakov Kislov to the Interior Minister and the Director General (June 13, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2213, file Aleph/ Dalet/Mem/112. 40. See Ben-Gurion’s Arab Affairs advisor, Yehoshua Palmon, to head of the Minorities Department in the Interior Ministry, Shimon Landman (September 20, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph/ Dalet/ Aleph Samech/1. For additional material on the cooperation between the Military Administration to the District Administration, see ISA, RG-56, container C-2206.42, file Aleph Dalet/ Tsadik Beth/13/1. 41. See Moshe Alufi to Shimon Landman (February 28, 1950), and Landman to Alufi (March 16, 1950), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197 file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Samech/2. 42. See summary of meeting between Dr. Yaakov Marcus, Major General Avner, and Lieutenant Colonel Markovsky, from Dr. Yaakov Marcus to the Military Administration Headquarters in the Occupied Territories (July 4, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Samech/1. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. See Yehoshua Palmon to the Registration Division of the Interior Ministry (September 1, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2197, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Samech/2. 46. See Tel Aviv District Commissioner Yosef Kuperman to Yaakov Kislov (December 26, 1950), ISA, RG-56, container C-2213, file Aleph Dalet Mem/112. 47. Ibid. 48. See letter of recommendation to Head of Intelligence Branch Binyamin Jibli, on Avraham Malul to the Interior Ministry, ISA, RG-56, container C-2214, file Aleph Dalet Mem/148.

358

Notes to Chapter 10

49. See Yaakov Kislov to Maximilian Hartglass (April 1949). There is only a full Hebrew date on the document: 4 Nissan 1949, ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Koof 1/4/. For more detailed data on abandoned Arab villages that were populated during February– November 1949, see ISA, RG-56, container C-2201/113, file Aleph Dalet/Aleph Mem/5 50. See Maximilian Hartglass to Yaakov Kislov (March 30, 1949), ISA, RG-56, container C-2196, file Aleph Dalet Mem 1/4. 51. See Joshua Gvirtz to Meir Garbovsky about the first planning stages of this area in Va’adat HaMatzav (April 8, 1948), ISA, RG-41 (Va’adat Hamatzav archives), container C-123, file 6. 52. See Government Almanac, 1951, 154–55. 53. Ibid., 155. 54. See general file of the Interior Ministry documenting the activity of the Film and Theater Board, ISA, RG-43 (Prime Minister’s Office), container C-5506, file 2903. 55. Letter from Yaakov Kislov to A. Shapira, manager of Eden Cinema in Jerusalem (December 10, 1951), ISA, RG-43 (Prime Minister’s Office), container C-5506, file 2903. 56. See general file of the Interior Ministry dealing with the activity of the Film and Theater Board, ISA, RG-43 (Prime Minister’s Office), container C-5506, file 2903. 57. See Report on the Structure of Ministries (June 23, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-121, file 19. 58. See Structure of the Interior Ministry (June 1, 1951), ISA, RG-56, container C-2203, file Aleph Dalet/Mem Samech 3/5, 1–3. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. See the report of Kislov to the HaCohen Committee (June 14–18, 1951), ISA, RG-56, container C-2203, file Aleph Dalet/Mem Samech/5/3. 63. See “The Structure of the Interior Ministry” (June 1, 1951), ISA, RG-56, container C-2203, file Aleph Dalet/Mem S 5/3/1–3. 64. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 11

359

65. Ibid. 66. Cf. Avraham Meiron’s report and that of the HaCohen Committee (June 20, 1951), ISA, RG-56, container C-2203, file Aleph Dalet/Mem/ Samech 5/3/. 67. See the report of the deputy head of the General Administration Division of the Interior Ministry, Shmuel Bechar Yeshaya, regarding existing positions in the Interior Ministry until December 24, 1950, and which positions it was advisable to add should the responsibilities of the ministry so require, ISA, RG-56, container C-2203, file Aleph Dalet/Mem Samech 5/3.

Chapter 11 1. Golda Meir, My Life (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Maariv Press, 1975), 186–87. 2. Ibid. 3. About the reorganization, see the report of the director general of the Labor Ministry, Levi-Yitzhak Schneider (Shani Or) to the budget commissioner of the Finance Ministry (May 31, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1963. 4. Ibid. 5. List of positions in the Labor Ministry in 1948–1952, ISA, RG-43, container C-5366, file 189. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Shalom Reichman and Mira Yehudai, A Survey of Innovative Planning 1948–1952 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Hebrew University and the Israel State Archives, 1986), 10. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 17. 11. Town Planning Ordinance No. 28 of 1936, Palestine Gazette No. 589 (May 4, 1936); see also the book by then-head of the Mandatory Department of the Advisor for City Planning (and initiator of this ordinance): A. S. Kanddel, Local Government in Palestine (Jerusalem, 1947).

360

Notes to Chapter 11

12. Reichman and Yehudai, Survey of Innovative Planning, 17–18. 13. Ibid., 18–19. 14. Ibid., 21. 15. Ibid., 122. 16. Ibid., 10. 17. Report of the Director General of the Labor and National Insurance Ministry Levi-Yitzhak Schneider (Shani Or) on the activity of the ministry from April-June 1949, ISA, RG-43, container C-54444, file 1639. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Government Directory 1950, 151. 22. See ISA, RG-43, container C-5443, file 1633. For the report of the director general of the Labor Ministry, Zvi Berenzon (who replaced Schneider), regarding employment data during October-November 1951, see ISA, RG-95 (Labor Ministry), container C-391, file 75817 (Employment Organization Law—September 1949). 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Memorandum on the Employment of New Immigrants in Public Works (September 1, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5595, file 3906. 26. Ibid. 27. See Biographical Appendix. 28. Memorandum on the Employment of New Immigrants in Public Works (September 1, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5595, file 3906. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Shalom Cohen to Golda Meir: Unemployment Data on New Immigrants (June 1951; full date missing), CZA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 11

361

35. Memorandum between Director General of the Labor Ministry Zvi Berenzon and Y. Gurion, Head of Rehabilitation of Released Soldiers Division (December 25, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. The law proposal was brought up for approval by Minister of Labor and Construction Mordechai Ben-Tov on January 12, 1949, under the title: Labor Rights for Decommissioned Soldiers and their Families Ordinance, 5708/1948. The law underwent a few changes during 1950. See ISA, RG-95, container C-391, file 758217. 36. Report of Director General of the Labor Ministry Zvi Berenzon to Budget Commissioner at the Finance Ministry (May 3, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. See statistics for 1950–1953 at ISA, RG-95, container C-383, file 7323. 37. Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, 142. 38. Workers’ Histadrut Labor Exchanges Center, “The Status of Unemployment at the Labor Exchanges Sections during April 1951,” ISA, RG-43, container C-5442, file 3611. 39. Ibid. 40. Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, p. 143. During the First Knesset’s winter session, several labor laws were brought up for discussion: working hours and rest, labor unionizing, protection of women workers and working youth, annual paid leave, workplace accidents, prohibition of baking at night, and the beginning of implementation of social security for the entire population, ISA, R-95, container C-390, file 7580. 41. Workers’ Histadrut Labor Exchanges Center, “The Status of Unemployment at the Labor Exchanges Sections during April 1951,” ISA, RG-43, container C-5442, file 3611. 42. Interior Minister Moshe Shapira to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (January 5, 1951), ISA, RG-43, container C-5442, file 3611. 43. Ibid. 44. Debora HaCohen, “Kibutz Galuyot”: Immigration to the Land of Israel: Myth and Reality (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 1998), 180–81. 45. Ibid., 181.

362

Notes to Chapter 11

46. Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, p. 141. 47. Ibid. 48. Minutes of the Knesset Labor Committee, meeting summaries (March 27, 1951), ISA, RG-43, container C-5390, file 553. 49. Ibid. 50. Testimony of Yaakov Gil before the Knesset Labor Committee (August 1 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-5390, file 553. 51. Representative of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association Moshe Rau to Yitzhak Finkelstein (June 24, 1948) ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. This was not the first time that Finkelstein was accused of irregularities; some time earlier Moshe Rau had complained that the Labor Ministry made an exception and made “arrangements” to construct buildings for immigrants on the land of Zangeria, near Binyamina. Finkelstein extended his apologies to him, but asked him to show understanding of the urgent need for the housing of immigrants. 52. Testimony of Yitzhak Finkelstein before the Knesset Labor Committee (April 2, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-5390, file 553. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, p. 141. 56. Director General of the Labor Ministry Levi Schneider to the Government Secretariat (Kyria Committee) (March 28, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5447, file 1705. 57. Report of Director General of the Labor Ministry Levi Schneider to the Budget Commissioner (May 31, 1949), ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. For statistics on vocational training in 1950–1953, see ISA, RG-95, container C-383, file 7323. 58. Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, p. 151. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. “Statistics about Employee Turnover. Absentee Rates and Sicknesses,” Newsletter Number 1 (January 1949), ISA, RG-43 (Prime Minister’s Office), container C-5444, file 1639.

Notes to Chapter 11

363

62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Memoranda on the Establishment of the Institute for Labor Productivity, 1949–1952, ISA, RG-95, container C-383, file 740. 65. Ibid. 66. Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, p. 146. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. ISA, RG-43, container C-5444, file 1639. 70. See the plan of Director General of the Labor Ministry Zvi Berenzon regarding the establishment of the Labor Ministry (November 11, 1948), ISA, RG-41, container C-108, file 24. 71. See Occupational Accidents in 1951, ISA, RG-43, container C-5541, file 3599; see also Government Annual Directory 5711/1951, p. 144. 72. Meir, My Life, 201. 73. Report on the Structure of the Ministries (June 23, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-121, file 19. 74. Ibid., Article A general, 1, paragraph 2. 75. Minutes of the Provisional Government, Protocol 3 (May 20, 1948), ISA, Kaf-1. 76. Memorandum of Haim HaCohen to Minister of Justice Pinchas Rosen (September 11, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-5451, file 1795. 77. Report on the Structure of Ministries (June 23, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-121, file 19. 78. Ibid. 79. Occupational Accidents in 1951, ISA, RG-43, container C-5541, file 3599. 80. Report on the Structure of Ministries (June 23, 1950), ISA, RG-43, container C-121, file 19. 81. Ibid.

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—. “The Electoral Campaigns: The Political Map” (Hebrew). In The First Decade. 1948–1958, edited by Zvi Zameret and Hanah Yablonka, 27–41. Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1997. Tzur, Eli. Landscapes of Illusion: Mapam 1948–1954 (Hebrew). Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1998. Wasserstein, Bernard. The British in Palestine—The Mandatory Government and the Arab- Jewish Conflict in Palestine 1917–1929. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1973. Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” Translated by Rodney Livingstone. In The Vocation Lectures, edited by David Owen and Tracy. B. Strong. Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Press, 2004. Weiss, Shevach. Ha-Knesset: The Israeli Parliament (Hebrew). Bnei-Brak: Friedman Press, 1977. Weitz, Yechiam. The First Step to Power: The Herut Party Movement 1949– 1955 (Hebrew). Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute and Herzl Institute for the Research of Zionism, 2007. Yaacobi, Gad. The Government (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Am Oved Press, 1983. Yanai, Nathan. “Ben-Gurion’s Statehood Concept” (Hebrew). Cathedra 45 (1987): 169–89. Yizhaki, Ariyeh. The Burma Road: The Campaign on the Road to Jerusalem (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Tamuz Press, 1993. Yosef, Dov. Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Schocken Press, 1979. Zameret, Zvi, and Hanna Yablonka, eds. The First Decade: 1948–1958 (Hebrew). Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1997. Zidon, Asher. The Knesset (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Achiassaf Press, 1959.

Index

Aberbach, Joel D., 294. See also

Arab population, consolidation of

Bureaucrats and Politicians in

policy toward, 211–24

Western Democracies

Arab settlements, 78

absence from work, 262–63

Arab sovereignty, 70

administration, public, xxiii–xxv

Arab state, 61, 70, 193

Afula, 139, 140, 244, 247–48

economic union with, 47, 70

Agatha, Operation. See Black Saturday

establishment of an, 4, 183

agricultural produce, oversight of, 52

Arab–Israeli War of 1948. See War of

agricultural settlements, 15

Independence

Agriculture, Minister of, 113

Arabs in Israel, problems in formulat-

Agudat Yisrael, 28, 100, 115, 183, 200

ing Israeli policy toward the,

Aharoni, Moshe, 202

211–13

Aharonovitch, Zeev, 185, 187–91

archives, damage to, 139–40

airports, 48

armor for vehicles, shortage of, 44

Aliash, Mordechai, 57, 97, 101, 295

Assefat haNivharim (Elected Assembly),

Alkalai, Reuven, 81, 295

14. See also Elected Assembly

Altalena affair, 181

assistant district commissioners, 77, 79

Alufi, Moshe, 209, 210

Jews who served as, 122

Amidar (National Corporation for

Attlee, Clement, 4

Immigrant Housing), 171, 253

Baki, Roberto, 130, 207, 295

animal slaughter, supervision of,

Bank HaPoalim (Workers’ Bank), 15,

51–52

265

Arab clerks, 34, 87, 136, 140, 141

Barkai, Michael, 123

future of, 36

Basic Laws of Israel, 59, 105, 193,

Arab inhabitants, registration of, 219–20

197, 198, 280 385

386

Index

battleground statistics, general, 45

Foreign Ministry and, 187

Beeley, Harold, 4

Golda Meir and, 235, 304

Begin, Menachem, 181, 182, 189

Haganah National Headquarters

Ben Aharon (Nisenbaum), Yizhak, 149, 295–96

and, 67 IDF and, 179, 182

Ben-Ami, Operation, 134

Interior Ministry and, 199

Ben-Gurion, David, 66–68, 115,

Jewish Agency and, 15, 19, 20, 66,

149, 186

324n12

advisors, 10, 219, 294

Judicial Council and, 57

Arabs and, 214–15

Knesset and, 197

and Britain’s presence in Palestine,

Labor Ministry and, 235, 249

10, 12

Law and Administration Ordi-

centralist tendencies, 231

nance No. 1 and, 97

characterizations of, 183

Mapai and, 180, 182, 183, 195,

coalition government and, 184, 195, 196, 280 on collective responsibility, 183, 195–97, 280 committees, subcommittees, and, 322n5, 324n12 Constituent Assembly and, 194, 195, 279

196, 199–200 Mapam and, 104, 115, 149, 183, 186, 187, 196, 199–200, 279 Minhelet Ha’Am and, 66–67, 91, 95 Minorities Ministry and, 214 Mizrachi and, 115, 199–200, 279 Mordechai Ben-Tov and, 162, 163

constitution and, 200, 279

Moshe Shapira and, 199

cooperation with religious parties,

Moshe Sharet and, 197

187

Negev and, 135, 139, 227, 322n5

criticism of, 67, 231

Operation Horev and, 179

Defense Ministry and, 65–68,

overview, 296

111, 115, 187, 249 on emergency laws and legislation, 104 on establishing a coalition government, 280 first (1949) elections and, 183

Palmach and, 149 party Secretariat and, 27 Planning Division and, 240 political consensus and, 184 positions held by, 15, 20, 33, 65–68, 114, 115, 180

Index

as prime minister, 68, 115 resignations, 198 Provisional Government and, 30, 114, 196 Provisional State Council and, 108

387

Mapam and, 114, 115, 149, 161, 162, 164, 183, 279, 290 overview, 296 positions held by, 114, 115, 149, 172, 236–37, 290

relations with the West, 283

trade unions and, 173

religious discrimination and, 252

Yaakov Reiser and, 162–63, 238,

religious sector, religious parties, and, 200, 201 security and, 27, 67, 197

290, 293 Ben-Zvi (Shimshelevich), Yitzhak, 33, 296–97

slogan, 182

Bendman, Yona, 8

speeches, 12–13

Berenzon, Zvi, 85, 86, 146, 245,

Transition Act and, 279

249, 297

Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive and, 19

Bergman, Yaakov, 122

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 19, 20,

Bernstein, Peretz, 20, 30, 50,

30, 33, 55, 57, 91, 111. See

114–15, 257, 269, 298

also Va’adat HaMatzav Final

Bevin, Ernest, ix, 3, 4

Report: submitted in April

Bevin-Beeley proposal, 4

1948

Biran (Bergman), Avraham, 122, 297

War of Independence and, 108, 114 Yaakov Reiser and, 162–63 Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and, 297

Black Saturday (Operation Agatha), 4 Brandeis, Louis, 226 British-controlled essential services, 40, 54

Yosef Weitz and, 322n5

British Defense Committee, 7

Zeev Aharonovitch and, 187

British evacuation, preparation for

Ben Gurion Airport. See Lydda airport Ben-Tov, Mordechai Ben-Gurion and, 162, 163 David Sverdlov and, 167, 290, 310 housing and, 167, 168 Labor Ministry and, 168, 170, 172, 173, 236–38, 290

the, 5–13 British evacuation policy attitude of Yishuv leadership toward, 9–11 formulation of, 5–9 British foreign policy, shift in after World War II, 3 British Labor Party, 3

388

Index

British Mandate in Palestine. See

Burg, Yosef, 33, 298

Mandatory Palestine British Mandatory District Admin-

censorship, 80–82, 226, 227

istration. See under District

census, 40, 41, 103, 129–31

Administration

census data

British staff, 159–60

collection of, 148, 180, 206–7

Broom, Operation, 139

confidentiality and privacy of, 208

Building Inspection Department, 171–72, 236 buildings, government, 260 bureaucracy’s ability to influence interest groups through the

Center for the National Service Census, 154 Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 130, 132, 133, 207, 220, 262 centralization and decentralization,

administrative process, limita-

between administrative,

tions to, xxvi–xxvii

73–74

bureaucratic mindset vs. political party experience, xv–xvi bureaucrats. See also politicians and bureaucrats “super bureaucrats,” xxviii Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western

centralized planning, 241. See also planning struggle between Mapai and Mapam over, xxii, 87, 161–65, 283, 290 change vs. continuity, 199

Democracies (Aberbach et al.),

Chief Secretariat, 75, 76, 80, 119

xxiv, xxviii

Chizik, Yitzhak, 122

establishment of the government

cinema, 82, 226–28

system in Israel in light of,

citizenship, 61–62

288–92

City Planning, Office of the Advisor

findings, 285–88

on, 159, 160, 337n54

models presented in, xxiv–xxviii, 293 which model best fits the Israeli system of government (1947–1951), 293–94 questions posed regarding politicians and bureaucrats as policymakers, xxiv

city planning committees, 140, 141, 224 civil registration. See population registration civil service, identifying candidates for, 79 clerical service, 81, 123, 125, 141, 151. See also Arab clerks

Index

clerks, 35, 81, 119, 124, 125, 134, 136, 141 British, 34, 136, 140, 141 Class A, B, and C, 124 Jewish Mandatory clerks in

389

passing of the Basic Law by, 59 Provisional State Council and, 59, 107, 193, 194 Transition Order to the, 58, 193, 194. See also Transition to

District Administration

Constituent Assembly Ordi-

and Israeli government, 78,

nance

121–25

United Nations and, 60–63

Level A and Level B, 35, 36

voting age for, 61

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 35, 36, 78

voting eligibility for, 61

Cohen, Shalom, 247, 248 collective responsibility Ben-Gurion on, 183, 195–97, 280 as a factor in proper governance, 195–98 Communications and Transport, Ministry of, 68 conscription. See draft-exempt workers; National Service Law “conspiracy conception” regarding intentions of the British, 318n23 Constituent Assembly. See also First Knesset Ben-Gurion and, 194, 195, 279 constitution and, 193, 194, 279 Department of Population Registry and, 80 elections for, 58–62

Zerah Warhaftig’s proposal and, 59 constitution, 192–93 Constituent Assembly and, 193, 194, 279 First Knesset and, 58 construction, 15, 83–84, 112, 224–25, 230, 236. See also Solel Boneh housing, 253, 254 of industrial buildings, 248, 263, 264 continuity vs. change, 199 Council for Control of Food Supply and Distribution, 52–53 Counter-Intelligence Department, 317n17 Crocker, John, 8 Cunningham, Alan, 8

electoral system for, 63 goals and roles of, 193, 279

Declaration of the State of Israel, x,

meetings, 194

167. See also Israeli Declara-

name changed to “First Knesset,”

tion of Independence

192, 194

Defense, Minister of, 112

390

Index

Defense, Ministry of Ben-Gurion and, 65–68, 111, 115, 187, 249 special case of the, 66–68 Defense (Emergency) Regulations. See Emergency Regulations defense services, 154, 218–19. See also Military Administration Department of Labor. See Labor Department Department of Labor Ordinance of 1943, 84–85

staff, 138 Va’adat HaMatzav and, 33, 75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 117, 142, 203, 225, 233 Yaacov Kislov and, 118, 230–31 District Administration documents, 79 district boundaries, 125 district commissioners. See also assistant district commissioners authority(ies) of, 119–21 strengthening the, 203–4

dependency theory, xiii

power struggle between officer for

development towns, 256

minorities and, 221–23

Diaspora, dependence on resources from, 17 District Administration, 78, 134–37, 139, 141, 229, 231 during British Mandate, 75, 76,

status of, 76–77 district officers, Jews who served as, 122–23 draft-exempt workers, 157. See also National Service Law

79, 83, 136, 140–42, 222 categories of responsibilities, 76–77 Chief Secretariat and, 76, 80 General Administration Division and, 74, 84, 118, 202–3, 225, 231 Interior Ministry and, 74–76, 83, 84, 117, 118, 121, 142, 203, 228–31, 233, 270 Jewish Mandatory clerks in, 121–23 planning the, 117–25 responsibilities, 76 Shlomo Har-Even and, 204, 205

economic union with Arab state, 47, 70 education system, streams in, 200, 201 Elected Assembly, 14, 63, 107 election campaign between Mapam and Mapai, 182–85, 279 elections, 60. See also under First Knesset; Interior, Ministry of; Mapai for Constituent Assembly (1949), 195 minimum age to be elected, 60

Index

electoral districts, division into, 63–64 electoral system, preferred, 62–63 emergency, state of, 5, 44, 105–6, 109, 340n35 Emergency Committee to Prepare for

391

assessment of essentialness, 147–48, 157–58, 174 essential industries, 152 essential infrastructure, 152 essential services, 41, 261

Jewish Statehood in Palestine.

during British evacuation, 40

See Va’adat HaMatzav

categories of, 40

Emergency Regulations, 56, 104, 109, 153, 212, 218 Regulation 3(a), 153 Regulation 9A, 102, 104, 106 employment, 262 Employment of Children and Young Persons and Women in Industry and Factories Ordinance of 1945, 85, 147 equal citizens, Arabs as, 212 equality, 267 commitment to the principle of, 212 of social, civil, and political rights, 193, 212 Eshkol (Shkolnik), Levi

defined, 39 ensuring establishment of mechanisms for providing, 13 examples of, 41, 326n5 management of, 7, 41, 55, 95, 275 against the backdrop of the war, 276 and establishment of the government system, 53–54 Jewish Agency Executive and, 13, 25, 39 shift from long-term planning to short-term, ix, xviii, 1, 70, 277 number of workers necessary for operating, 326n5

death, 304

“establishment of the state,” xvii

immigrant employment and, 246,

Ettinger, M., 169–70

247 Jewish Agency and, 162, 238, 246, 254 Mapai and, 162, 238, 255 overview, 298 positions held by, 136, 162, 238, 246 essential factories, 153–55, 157

Etzel, 95 evacuation, British. See British evacuation Even-Tov, Hannah, 65, 89–90, 299, 332n30 “Executive Branch in a Jewish State, The.” See Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report

392

Index

factories, 206, 265. See also essential factories four-level rating system for, 157

problems in management and inspection, 50–51 Foreign Office, 7

Histadrut and, 16 inspections, 261, 262 Labor Ministry and, 153–55, 157, 174

Galilee. See Western Galilee; specific topics Galili, Yisrael, 299

productivity, 263–64

gasoline, 43, 327n9

religious youth working in, 252

Gelber, Yoav, 5–6, 8–11, 318n23,

Factories Ordinance of 1945, 85 Factories Ordinance of 1946, 147.85, 261 Feinmesser, Israel, 161, 163–65, 167, 238

325n20 General Administration Division, 117–18, 223 District Administration and, 74, 84, 118, 202–3, 225, 231

film, 82, 226–28

roles of, 118, 125–27

Film and Theater Review Board,

Yaacov Kislov and, 117–18, 133,

226–28 Finance Minister and Finance Ministry, responsibilities of, 112 First Knesset, 104–5, 192–94, 291,

211, 223, 226, 228, 230, 231, 239 General Organization of Workers in Israel. See Histadrut HaKelal-

361n40. See also Constituent

it shel HaOvedim Ha-Ivriyy-

Assembly

im Be’Ereẓ Israel

constitution and, 58

general stream (student body), 200

elections, 95, 138, 179–80

General Workers Federation in the

issues during election campaign, 180–83 results of, and coalition negotiations, 183–87

Land of Israel. See Histadrut HaKelalit shel HaOvedim Ha-Ivriyyim Be’Ereẓ Israel General Zionists, 181, 185–87

flour mills, inspection of, 51

Mapai and, 185–88

food supply, 48–52

overview, 30, 180

organization on the national level, 52–53 problems hindering the ability to estimate, 49

Provisional Government and, 28, 115, 182 representatives, 20, 28, 30, 114, 115, 182, 183, 185

Index

393

Gobravnik, Yehoshua, 122–23

overview, 299

Goodenow, Frank, xxiv–xxv

positions held by, 20, 27, 33–34,

government. See also specific topics

106

meanings of the term, xvii

Va’ad HaLe’umi and, 20, 23–24

terminology, xvi–xvii

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 27,

“Government Administration in the Hebrew State.” See Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report government buildings, 260 government departments. See ministries

33–36 Granovsky (Granot), Abraham, 20, 33, 299 Gruenbaum, Yitzhak, 121, 128, 299–300 Bar-Kochva Meirovich and, 290

government ministries. See ministries

immigration and, 89, 131

government system. See also political

Interior Ministry and, 75, 82, 92,

system; specific topics defined, xvi establishment of the Israeli, 278

115, 117, 121, 127, 128, 142, 203, 208 Jewish Agency and, 20, 24–25

defining powers, 279–80

Labor Ministry and, 85, 89, 146

divisions of power between gov-

overview, 299–300

ernment ministries, 280–81 Interior Ministry and, 281–83

police and, 82, 117, 142 positions held by, 20, 24–25, 33,

Labor Ministry and, 283–84

75, 82, 85, 89, 92, 115, 117,

in light of Bureaucrats and Poli-

121, 127, 128, 142, 203

ticians in Western Democracies,

prisons and, 82, 117, 142

288–92

Religious Affairs Ministry and,

party politics, 278–79 questions regarding the, xix–xx

115 Tel Aviv and, 127

ideal, xx

Va’ad HaLe’umi and, 24–25

models of the Israeli. See under

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 33, 75, 85,

Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies Grabovsky (Argov), Meir on compensation for clerks, 35–36 on Emergency Regulation 9A, 106 Mapal and, 23, 27, 106

89, 121, 146, 203, 208 Gubernick, Yehoshua, 300 Gulf of Haifa, 45, 49, 245 Guriel (Gurevich), Baruch (Boris), 10, 300 Gvirtz, Yehoshua, 78, 83–84

394

Index

HaCohen, Avraham, 228–30, 232 HaCohen, Debora, 166, 242, 254, 269–71

health insurance. See national insurance system Hebrew Law of Peace, 101

Haganah, 12, 67, 317n17

Herut Party, 180

Haganah Intelligence Service (HIS/

Hevrat HaOvdim (workers’ compa-

Shai), 9–10, 36–37, 317n17,

ny), 16. See also Histadrut

318n23, 325nn21–22

HaKelalit shel HaOvedim

Haganah National Headquarters, 67

Ha-Ivriyyim Be’Ereẓ Israel

Haifa, 8, 9, 46, 53. See also specific topics District Administration and, 79, 141 employment and unemployment in, 245, 250

Histadrut Ha-Ovdim Ha-Leumit (National Workers’ Federation), 16 Histadrut HaKelalit shel HaOvedim Ha-Ivriyyim Be’Ereẓ Israel (General Workers Federation

gasoline pipelines and, 327n9

in the Land of Israel), 15–16,

mills in, 251

60, 191

Haifa Bay. See Gulf of Haifa

activities of, 15, 16, 191

Haifa Oil Refinery massacre, 46

centralized national organizational

Haifa port, xxiii, 42, 45–48, 50

structure, 15–16

Haifa refineries, 42, 46

Mapai and, 192

HaMizrahi, 16. See also Mizrahi

and other workers’ organizations,

Interior Ministry transferred to, 178

16 power of, 16

HaPo’el HaMizrahi, 16, 41, 100, 183

Histadrut Labor Exchanges, 152

Mishkenot Corporation of, 166,

Histadrut Labor Federation (the

169

Histadrut), xxiii, 149–50

Har-Even, Shlomo, 123, 204, 205

Horev, Operation, 179

Harari, Yizhar, 104–5

Horowitz, Dan, 17, 20, 95

Harari Compromise/Harari Decision,

housing. See also immigrant camps;

58, 104, 105 Harris, Ron, 56–57, 99–101 Hartglass, Apolinari Maximillian, 125, 209, 210, 223, 300–301

transit camps first signs of routine in the Ministry’s housing activities, 165–74

Index

housing issues, 168–69 housing projects, transit camps to, 253–59

395

inspection, 50–51, 173, 236, 261–63, 265 Building Inspection Department, 147, 148, 171, 172, 174

immigrant camps, 131, 132, 211, 242, 245, 253, 254. See also transit camps converted to transit camps, 255 Jewish Agency and, 245, 253, 254 religiosity and, 201 immigrant registration, 210–11 immigrants

Institute for National Insurance, 268 insurance. See also national insurance system types of, 266 intellectuals, 191–92 intelligence-gathering methods and approval of departmental plans, 36–37 intelligence services, 317n17.

categories of, 245

See also Haganah Intelligence

finding employment for, 242–49

Service

new, 169 citizenship of, 61–62 registration of, 131–33

interim period. See also transition period defining the legal status of the

Immigration, Minister of, 113

government during the,

Immigration, Ministry of, 111

58–64

industrial buildings, constructing, 248, 263, 264 industrial sector(s), 262, 284. See also essential industries industrialization, 45, 84 industry, 112–13, 152, 263, 264. See also Labor, Ministry of textile, 156–57 information. See Press, Information, and Cinema, Division of Information Department, 81 infrastructure. See construction; essential infrastructure

Interior, Ministry of, 281–83. See also Town Planning Department; specific topics as case study, xxii–xxiii between centralized planning initiatives and routine planning, 238–42 compared to other ministries, 213 consolidation during the war, 142–43 Department of Minorities, 216, 217, 219–23. See also minorities

396

Index

Interior, Ministry of (continued) dispute between Ministry divisions on responsibility for abandoned villages and their repopulation, 223–24 disputes over the treatment of Arabs within, 220–24 District Administration and, 74–76, 83, 84, 117, 118,

post-election reorganization, 235–37 Press, Information, and Cinema Division, 225–27 Prime Minister’s Office and, 217–19 Public Information Office and, 81 reorganization (summer 1951), 229 Divisions of General Admin-

121, 142, 203, 228–31, 233,

istration and Local Govern-

270

ment, 230–32. See also Gen-

division into districts, 77–78 effect of the war on implemen-

eral Administration Division establishing a supervisory

tation of recommendations

committee and preliminary

of Va’adat HaMatzav for,

recommendations, 228–29

133–38 during elected government’s first term, 199 and establishment of population registry, 80 general administrative branch within, 77 handling domestic issues during British Mandate, 75 Information Department and, 81 management (January 1949–November 1951), 232–33 Military Administration and, 215–19, 282 planning of, in Va’adat HaMatzav, 75–76 police and prison services and, 75, 82, 84, 117

local government division, 229–30 Research and Architecture Division, 242 staffing of, 79 during the war, 140–42 stages in organization of the Ministry following the elections, 281 structural reorganization within, 202–6 structure of after Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report, 117 in Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report, 84 Yaacov Kislov and, 130, 211, 218, 223, 228, 230–31

Index

397

interministerial commission, 6–7

and disputes between military and

interministerial committees, 126,

civil administration, 138

172, 220, 258, 266 interministerial cooperation, 258, 263 international law, problems with, 134–37 internment. See immigrant camps; transit camps

employment and unemployment in, 244, 250 evacuation of, 8–9 international status of, 136–37 Jerusalem Municipality, 126–27. See also specific topics Jewish Agency Executive, 276

Israel. See also specific topics

Ben-Gurion and, 15, 19, 324n12

as case study, 285–88

joint committee of representatives

lessons learned from, 286–87 maps of, 312–13 Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 67–68, 292. See also Haganah Israel Prison Service. See police and prison services Israeli Communist Party, 181 Israeli Declaration of Independence, 179, 193–95, 212, 279. See also Declaration of the State of Israel Israeli Defense Service Law. See National Service Law “Israel’s Assembly.” See Va’ad HaLe’umi; Va’ad HaLe’umi

of Va’ad HaLe’umi and, ix, 20 overview, 15 Va’adat HaMatzav and, 20 working relationship between Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive and, 21–25 Jewish Agency for Israel. See also Jewish Agency Executive Ben-Gurion and, 15, 19, 20, 66, 324n12 departments of Labor Department, 16, 85, 88–90 ministries based on, 68, 69 Political Department, 317n17 Settlement Department, 246, 247

Jacobson, David, 103 Jaffa, 45, 80, 125, 213, 221. See also specific topics

Technical Department, 158–60, 162–64, 238 judicial activity, 56

Jaffa Surveyor’s Office, 160

judicial committee, 56

Jerusalem, 8, 45, 50, 61. See also

Technical Section for Public

specific topics

Works, 89, 146

398

Index

Jewish law, 99–101 stances regarding incorporating it into the legal system, 100

Film and Theater Review Board and, 226 General Administration Division

Jewish Law Experts, 101

and, 117–18, 133, 211, 223,

job market. See also labor market

226, 228, 230, 231, 239

challenge of training decommisioned soldiers for integration into, 249–50 Jones, Arthur Creech, 6

Interior Ministry and, 130, 211, 218, 223, 228, 230–31 Military Administration and, 217–19, 223

Joseph, Bernard. See Yosef, Dov

overview, 301

judicial authority, 56, 76, 77, 119.

positions held by, 117, 133, 211,

See also under Va’adat HaMatzav judicial committees, 56–57. See also under Va’adat HaMatzav Justice, Minister of, 112 Justice, Ministry of, 96, 104, 106, 115, 134

226, 228, 239 Knesset. See also First Knesset; specific topics Israeli legislature officially named, 192 Knesset Yisrael, 13, 18, 19, 63, 94 overview, 14 Va’ad HaLe’umi and, 14, 18, 19

Kahana, Mordechai, 123 Kaplan, Eliezer

Kuperman, Yosef, 122, 125, 221–23, 301

Christian Arab clerks and, 36 Jewish mandatory officials and, 35, 36 joint committee proposed by, ix, 20 overview, 301 positions held by, ix, 20, 33, 44, 114, 115, 123 taxation and, 109 kibbutz, 148, 151 Kislov, Yaacov Arabs and, 219, 223

Labor, Division of, 51, 147 Labor, Ministry of activity (January 1949–November 1951), 267–68 Building Inspection Department, 147, 148, 171, 172, 174 as case study, xxii–xxiii Department for Trade Unions, 173, 261–65 distinctive issues of, 145–46

Index

Division of Public Works and

399

Mordechai Ben-Tov and, 168,

Technical Services, 90, 159,

170, 172, 173, 236–38,

173, 236, 259

290

Department for Public Works, 85, 87, 146–48, 152, 158, 159, 162–64, 236, 257, 259, 289 divisions, 147, 236 Labor Relations Division, 154 documents and buildings, 87–88 establishment of, during the war, 174–75 Inspection Department, 261, 262

National Housing Department, 170 Oversight and Research Department, 284 planning for the transition period, 87 political context of the establishment of, 148–51 productivity and, 263–64 relocating the Planning Division, 238–42

Interior Ministry and, 73

roles of, 146

Jewish Agency departments and,

staffing in, during Provisional Gov-

146 labor relations and, 73, 85, 86, 90, 146, 154, 174, 236, 237, 250, 266, 272 Legal Department, 262 locating staff, 88 Mandatory Labor Department and, 84–85. See also Labor Department of the British Mandate Manpower Division, 147–48, 152–54, 157, 170, 173, 236 Mobilization of Manpower Department, 147, 152–53 Special Department for Restraints and Releases, 147, 157–58

ernment, 173–74 structure of under Provisional Government during the war, 147 in Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report, 88–90, 146–48 Va’adat Hamatzav planning for, 85–87 Labor and Construction, Minister of, 112 Labor and Construction, Ministry of, 236 Labor and National Insurance, Ministry of, 173, 236, 257, 266. See also Labor, Ministry of Labor Department of Jewish Agency, 16, 85, 88–90

400

Index

Labor Department of the British Mandate (Mandatory Labor Department), 84–85, 87–89, 147, 261 labor disputes, 84, 85, 87, 89, 250–51 labor laws, 361n40 changes in, during transition period, 87 enforcement, 85, 86, 146, 152, 157 implementation, 147, 261 Labor Ministry and, 146, 152, 157, 174, 266 Mandatory Labor Department and, 84 labor market. See also war economy organizing and managing the, 242–53 labor relations, 250–53, 261, 262

Labor stream (student body), 200, 201 Land of Israel Workers’ Party. See Mapai Landauer, Georg, 301–2 Landman, Shimon, 302 Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708-1948, 96–97 continental law and Jewish law as alternatives to, 99–101 differences of opinion over, 106–9 drafting, 97–99 legislature, elections for, 60. See also elections legitimacy, governmental, 17 Levhar, David (Alfred), 122, 302 Levin, Yitzhak-Meir, 100, 114–16, 302 Lisak, Moshe, 17, 20, 95 livestock, 51–52

Histadrut and, 251

local authorities, budgets of, 204–5

Jewish Agency and, 146

local government, expansion of,

Labor Ministry and, 73, 85, 86, 90, 146, 154, 174, 236, 237, 250, 266, 272 legal, safety, and technical aspects of, 85

205–6 Local Government Division, 229–30 establishing the, 128–29 Lubinker, Zeev, 169 Luria, Zvi, 20, 29, 81, 89, 302–3

Mandatory administration and, 85

Lydda, 221

national insurance and, 266

Lydda airport, 40, 48

Yishuv and, 73, 88 Labor Relations, Department of, 250, 251, 272 Labor Relations Administration, 260

ma’abarot (transit camps), 201, 254. See also transit camps Maimon (Fishman) Leib-Yehuda, 303

Index

Malul, Avraham, 221–23 Mandatory Palestine. See also United

401

Labor Ministry transferred to, 165, 175, 178, 238, 271, 279, 283

Nations Partition Plan for

Labor stream and, 201

Palestine; specific topics

leadership, 200

as bi-national and bi-ethnic, xiv– xv, 17

Levi Eshkol and, 162, 238, 255 main institutions of, 25–26

duration and influence of, xvi

Mizrahi and, 200, 216, 232, 279

studying the British Mandate

Mordechai Ben-Tov and, 164

system in Palestine, 34

overview, 25–28, 180

Mannheim, Karl, xxv

party politics and, 278–79

Mapai (Land of Israel Workers’

and the political spectrum, 184,

Party), 21, 30, 34, 184, 185, 187, 190. See also Mapam: Mapai and “aging” of, 191 Altalena affair and, 181 Arabs and, 216 Ben-Gurion and, 180, 182, 183, 195, 196, 199–200 coalition strategy, 185, 195, 196 Defense Ministry and, 145, 184 democracy and, 182

283 Provisional Government and, 115, 116, 164, 182 reorganization after the elections, 188 organizing the local party branches, 190 placement of party members in the state apparatus, 188–89 special target populations, 191–92

Foreign Ministry and, 145

Secretariat, 25–28

General Zionists and, 185–88

security and, 149

Herut Party and, 181

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 66, 145

intellectuals and, 191–92

War of Independence and, 145,

Interior Ministry and, 216, 232, 279 Jewish Agency and, 28, 162, 163, 238 Knesset coalition and, 184 Labor Ministry and, 92, 145, 148, 171

164 Yaakov Reiser and, 162–65, 238, 290 Yishuv and, 26, 162 Zeev Sherf and, 186 Mapai-affiliated youth movement, 252

402

Index

Mapai Central Committee, 26, 28 Mapai Party Bureau, 25–28 Mapam (United Workers’ Party), 67, 101, 179, 181, 183, 185 Arab state and, 183 Arye Sharon and, 162, 238 Ben-Gurion and, 104, 115, 149, 183, 186, 187, 196, 199– 200, 279 Defense Ministry and, 186, 187

relationship between, 29, 92, 142 struggle over centralized planning, xxii, 87, 161–65, 283, 290 Mizrahi and, 115, 199–200, 216, 279 Mordechai Ben-Tov and, 114, 115, 149, 161, 162, 164, 183, 279, 290

emergency regulations and, 104

overview, 180

establishment of, 21, 28–29, 66, 180

Provisional Government and, 29,

Foreign Ministry and, 186, 187

92, 115, 145, 186, 279

General Zionists and, 185–88

Provisional State Council and, 28

Interior Ministry and, 199–200,

security and, 149

216 Labor Ministry and, 87, 142, 145,

social movements comprising, 148 Va’adat HaMatzav and, 29

148, 161, 162, 164–65, 173,

War of Independence and, 182

235, 238, 271, 279, 283

Zeev Sherf on, 186

Mapai and, 21, 28, 66, 145, 185–88, 192, 271, 283 accusations against each other, 181 dispute over who would be in charge of initiated national planning, 290 election campaign between, 182–85, 279 ideological differences between, 149–50, 162, 165, 175, 184, 216, 283 political negotiations between, 148, 149–51, 185, 186, 279

marriage registration, 208–10 Matateh, Operation. See Broom, Operation meat, distribution of, 51–52 media, 80–81. See also film censorship of, 80–82, 226, 227 Meir, Golda (Golda Meyerson), 41, 172–73, 260 Ben-Gurion and, 235, 304 evacuation policy, 11 housing construction and, 253, 254 Housing Department and, 239 Jewish Agency and, 20

Index

Labor Ministry and, 171–73, 189, 235–37, 239, 242, 247, 252–55, 266–67, 283

403

250 powers of, 213–14 power to confiscate public

Mapai and, 235, 255

buildings and residential

on national insurance, 266–67

apartments, 120

overview, 303–4 positions held by, 20, 33, 35, 41,

Prime Minister’s Office and, 217–19

75, 123, 171–73, 198, 235,

principle of equality and, 212

236, 239, 242, 247, 252,

tension and disputes between civil

253, 255, 266–67, 283 religious sector and, 235–36, 252 Meirovich, Bar-Kochva, 43–46, 290, 303 overview, 303 Meron, Avraham, 231

administration and, 133–34, 137–38 villages under, 223 Yaacov Kislov and, 217–19, 223 Mills, Eric, 12, 77, 304 Minhelet Ha’Am (People’s Adminis-

Meyerson, Golda. See Meir, Golda

tration), 65, 66, 93–95, 276.

military. See defense services; Military

See also Provisional Govern-

Administration; paramilitary units Military Administration Arab population and, 213–19, 223, 250, 282 areas under control of, 129 annexed as a result of the war, 125 Defense Ministry and, 215 “defense services”/intelligence cooperation and, 218–19 General Administration Division and, 223 Interior Ministry and, 215–19, 282 Minorities Department and, 223,

ment Ben-Gurion and, 66–67, 91, 95 diplomatic and political challenges, 94–95 establishment of, ix–x, 28, 91, 94, 113, 276 powers of, 95 renamed Provisional Government, ix–x, 94 ministerial offices, premises for, 260–61 ministerial portfolios distribution of, 110–13 political struggle over, 113–16 ministers, government powers of, 110–13, 120

404

Index

ministers, government (continued) refusing to resign, 198 resigning on grounds of ministerial responsibility, 197–98 ministries, government, 120. See also interministerial commission;

minorities. See also Police and Minorities, Ministry of Department of Minorities, 216, 217, 219–23, 250, 282 officers for, 220, 222 power struggle between District

interministerial committees;

Commissioner and,

interministerial cooperation;

221–23

specific topics arranged based on Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report, 111 based on Jewish Agency and Va’ad HaLe’umi departments, 68, 69 based on the Mandatory system, 68–69 buildings and documents, 78–79 divisions of power between, 280–81 fields of authority, 111–13 internal structure and recommendations for reform, 272–74 list of, 111–13

Minorities, Minister of, 217 Minorities, Ministry of, 213–16 Minorities List, 181 Minority Affairs, Minister of, 218 Mishkenot Corporation of HaPo’el HaMizrahi, 166, 169 Mizrahi (movement), 28–29, 100, 200. See also HaMizrahi Ben-Gurion and, 115, 199–200, 279 Interior Ministry and, 232, 279 Interior Ministry transfer to, 92, 187, 216, 281 partisan considerations in, 199–202

list of candidates for, 114

Mapai and, 200, 216, 232, 279

new, 69

Mapam and, 115, 199, 216, 279

powers of the, 120, 269–71

Moshe-Chaim Shapira and, 20,

staffing, 79 that needed to be rebuilt, 65–66 Zeev Sherf ’s final report on professional and administrative management of, 268–74 ministry organization, challenges in, 73–74

29, 114, 199, 200 partisan considerations in transferring Interior Ministry to, 199–202 Mizrahi Party, 114. See also Mizrahi (movement) Mizrahi Party World Center, 29

Index

Mizrahi representatives, 20, 29, 114, 115. See also specific individuals Moetzet Ha’Am (People’s Council),

405

Military Administration and, 213, 217 transportation and, 42, 43, 45, 47

ix–x, 29, 91, 94, 95, 97, 115,

Negev, The (film), 227

193. See also Provisional State

Negev Committee, 33, 135–36

Council

Nir-Rafalkes, Nahum, 15, 24, 107–8,

Moetzet HaMedina. See Provisional

265, 304–5

State Council Morrison-Grady Plan, 4, 10

Order for the Foundation of the State, 195

Nachmias, Yosef, 82–83

Order of the Establishment of the

Nagid, Avraham, 246–47

Israel Defense Forces (IDF),

Nahariya, 134, 135, 138–40, 244

67–68

national insurance, Golda Meir on, 266–67 National Insurance Department,

Oriental Jewry, 191 Orthodox factions. See ultra-Orthodox factions

264 national insurance law, first, 267, 284

Palestine

National Insurance Section, 266

U.N. Armistice map of, 312

national insurance system, 172–74,

U.N. Partition map of, 313

243, 260, 266–68, 284.

Palestine, State of. See Arab state

See also Labor and National

Palestine Order in Council (1922),

Insurance, Ministry of National Labor Federation in Eretz-Israel (NLF). See Histadrut Ha-Ovdim Ha-Leumit National Service Census, 154 National Service Law, 98–99 Negev, 53, 78, 220, 222–24 Ben-Gurion and, 135, 139, 227, 322n5 international law and, 135–36

59 Palestine Rail System Administration, 47 Palestine War of 1948. See War of Independence Palestine white papers. See White Paper laws Palmach/Palmah, 68, 103, 136, 139, 149, 181 Fourth Brigade, 42, 46

406

Index

Palmon, Yehoshua (Josh), 214, 217–20, 294, 305 paramilitary units, 299. See also Haganah Partition Plan. See United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine Peel Commission’s partition plan, 11 People’s Administration. See Minhelet Ha’Am People’s Council. See Moetzet Ha’Am Pinkas, David-Zvi, 20, 23, 29, 41, 44, 201, 305 planning, xx–xxi, 83–84. See also centralized planning; city planning committees fundamental issues in long-range, 55 initiated, 83, 224, 241, 243 between theory and practice, xx–xxi planning concept, xx

policy implementation, xxi–xxii policy implications and policymaking, 286–87 political parties, 115, 180–83. See also specific parties two-party system, 196, 197 political system. See also government system factors contributing to consolidation of, 17 politicians and bureaucrats. See also Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies differences between in academic and professional training and socioeconomic status, 288–90 disparities in education and training, 285 energy and equilibrium, xxvi– xxvii

police, 120

facts vs. interests, xxv–xxvi

Police and Minorities, Minister of,

involvement in politics and poli-

112 Police and Minorities, Ministry of, 82, 112, 117, 214–15, 289, 292 police and prison services, 82–83, 117, 282–83 Interior Ministry and, 75, 82, 84, 117 policy. See also planning administration and, xxiii–xxv

cy-making, 285–86, 290–91 mediation between interest groups, 291–92 differences within the groups, 286 population registration, 173, 219–20, 230, 233, 265, 281, 282. See also under immigrants: new Population Registration, Department of, 84, 117 authorities of, 80

Index

establishment of, 129–33 population registry, 74–76, 142, 199

407

Avraham Nagid on, 246 Ben-Gurion and, 30, 114, 196

establishment of, 80, 129, 130

centralized planning and, 238, 241

organizing the, 206

composition, 28, 93–94, 113–16

confidentiality and privacy of census data, 208 immigrant registration, 210–11

emergency regulations and, 102, 104 establishment of, 25, 28–31, 68, 91, 94, 161, 166, 276, 291

marriage registration, 208–10

General Zionists and, 28, 115, 182

registration and census data

Law and Administration Ordi-

collection for entire population, 206–7 Population Registry Division of the Interior Ministry, 206

nance No. 1 and, 96, 106 Mapai and, 116, 182 Mapam and, 29, 186 Minhelet Ha’Am renamed, ix–x, 94

Port of Haifa. See Haifa port

ministerial portfolios and, 114

ports, 45–46

Moetzet HaAm’s disputes with, 95

Press, Information, and Cinema,

Moshe-Chaim Shapira and, 114,

Division of, 225–27

322n78

prime minister, 198

noninstitution of new laws by, 102

prison service, 83. See also police and

parties represented in, 115

prison services productivity, 263–64 Professional Training, Department for, 249 professionalism, xxi professionals, shortage of, 79 Progressives, 181, 182

Pinchas Rosen and, 95–98, 114 Provisional State Council and, 94, 106, 107, 110, 195, 277 staffing in Labor Ministry during, 173–74 structure of Labor Ministry during, 146–48

propaganda, 75, 76, 80, 81

U.N. Committee of Five and, 60

Provisional Government, 68, 92, 98,

War of Independence and, 277

106–10, 181. See also specific topics authority, powers, and responsi-

Warhaftig’s proposal and, 59 Provisional State Council (Moetzet HaMedina), 29, 59, 93, 110,

bilities of, 92, 95, 98, 106–8,

115, 273. See also Moetzet

110

Ha’Am

408

Index

Provisional State Council (continued) Constituent Assembly and, 59, 107, 193, 194 Emergency Regulation 9A and, 106 Jewish Agency and, 93–94 Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 and, 96, 106, 109 Moetzet HaAm renamed, ix–x, 94 nature of, 94, 115, 193 Provisional Government and, 94, 106, 107, 110, 195, 277 tax policy and, 109

regime, defined, xvii registration, population. See population registration Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance, 206 Reichman, Shalom, 161, 162 Reiser, Yaakov Ben-Gurion and, 162–63 Department of Public Works and, 159, 162–64, 238, 289, 290 Israel Feinmesser’s criticism of, 164, 165 Jewish Agency Technical Depart-

Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive and, 93

ment and, 159, 160, 162–64,

Warhaftig’s proposal and, 59

350n26

Public Information Office, 80–81

Labor Ministry and, 162–64, 289

public structures, damage to, 138–39

Mapai and, 162–65, 238, 290

public works, 86–87, 150–51,

Mordechai Ben-Tov and, 162–63,

243–45, 247–48. See also

238, 290, 293

under Labor, Ministry of

on Mordechai Stern, 160

Public Works and Construction, Office for, 15 Public Works Authority, 159 Office of the Advisor on City Planning, 159, 160, 337n54 Public Works Department (PWD), 69 Public Works Technical Section of Jewish Agency, 89, 146 Putnam, Robert D., xxiv. See also Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies

overview, 305 positions held by, 159, 162, 163, 238, 290 Religious Affairs, Minister of establishment of, 114 responsibilities of, 113 Religious Affairs, Ministry of, 115 religious discrimination, 252 religious law. See Jewish law religious parties, 114, 180, 187. See also ultra-Orthodox factions religious sector, 235–36, 252 religious stream (student body),

rail system, 46–47

200–201

Index

religious workers’ group, 16 religious Zionist movement, 57, 100 Remez (Drebkin), Moshe-David, 66, 114, 115, 305–6 Jewish Agency Executive and, 22–23 overview, 305–6

409

106, 114, 115, 123, 134, 194 Provisional Government and, 95–98, 114 taxation and, 109 Transition Law and, 194 Rosenblum, Avraham, 239, 241 Rubinstein, Amnon, 193, 194

positions held by, 18, 20, 39, 114, 115 Va’ad HaLe’umi and, 18–20, 22, 23, 39

Sahar (Sacharov), Yehezkel, 82–83 Samuel, Edwin, 236 Constituent Assembly and, 193

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 22

District Administration and, 229

Yaakov Hazan and, 39

on drafting a constitution, 193

on Yishuv, 18–19

Interior Ministry and, 74, 77, 80,

Repetur, Berl, 22, 23, 108, 114, 149, 150, 306 research, 147, 173, 236, 242, 261–63, 265, 284 Reuveni, Yaakov, xiv Riftin, Yaakov, 28, 306 roads, 259 rehabilitation and expansion of, 259 Rockman, Bert A., xxiv. See also Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies Rosen (Rosenblit), Pinchas

118, 229 overview, 307 positions held by, 74 recommendations/proposals, 74, 77, 80, 118, 229, 236 Va’adat HaMatzav and, 74, 77, 118, 236 Schmaltz, Uziel, 129 Schneider (Shani-Or), Levi-Izhak, 85, 146, 237, 243, 307 Security Service Act of 1949. See National Service Law Sephardi List, 181–83, 185, 187

emergency legislation and, 96, 109

Sephardic community, 41, 63, 115

Justice Ministry and, 96, 104, 106,

services. See essential services

115, 134

settlements, 15, 78, 136, 153, 171,

Moetzet Ha’Am and, 95

205, 247, 250, 253

Moshe Vandor and, 134

expulsion of Arabs from, 213

overview, 306–7

layout of, 255

positions held by, 95, 96, 104,

Shacham, Mishael, 307–8

410

Index

Shai. See Haganah Intelligence Service Shapira, Moshe-Chaim, 202

Va’ad HaLe’umi and, 20 Va’adat HaMatzav and, 36, 49, 50 Sheetrit, Bechor-Shalom, 101, 215

Golda Meir and, 252

overview, 214, 309–10

Interior Ministry and, 199, 200,

positions held by, 82, 116, 117,

242, 252 Mizrahi Movement and, 20, 29, 114, 199, 200 overview, 308 positions held by, 20, 29, 114, 115, 123, 199, 200, 242, 252 Provisional Government and, 114, 322n78

135, 214 Sherf, Zeev clerks and, 35, 36 final report on professional and administrative management of government ministries (1950–1951), 268–74 food supply and, 50

religious sector and, 200, 201, 252

Interior Ministry and, 228

strengthening the authority of

Mapai and, 186

district commissioners, 203,

Mapam and, 186

204

overview, 308–9

Yaakov Berman and, 322n78

police and, 82, 83

Sharon, Arye, 161, 162, 167,

positions held by, 33, 35, 50, 55,

238–41, 309

64, 82, 134, 186, 268

Sharon region/Sharon plain, 155, 256 Shatner, Mordechai agricultural produce and, 52

recommendations, 228, 272–74, 324n12 reports submitted by, 55, 65, 228, 268–74

on Arab clerks, 36

study tour, 64

food supply and distribution and,

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 33, 35, 50,

36, 41, 43, 49–52, 127, 289

55, 64, 65, 82

Mapai and, 20

Shertok, Moshe, 24, 114, 115

overview, 308

Shiloach (Zaslani), Reuven, 10, 36,

positions held by, 20, 36, 41, 43, 44, 49, 51, 127, 289 transportation issues and, 41, 43, 44

219, 294, 309 Simon, Herbert, xxv Solel Boneh (construction company), 155, 172, 256–58

Index

state of emergency, 5, 44, 105–6, 109, 340n35 Statistics, Central Bureau of. See Central Bureau of Statistics

411

transit camps, 211, 255. See also immigrant camps conditions in, 242, 245, 248–49, 255–56

suffrage for women, 61

and development towns, 256

Surveyor’s Office, 69, 85, 90, 146,

establishment of, 241, 248, 249, 254

159, 162, 163, 173, 236,

motivations behind the, 255

260. See also Jaffa Surveyor’s

forms of housing in, 256

Office

immigrants transferred to, 201,

Sverdlov, David, 167, 290, 310

248, 253–55 Interior Ministry and, 241

taxation, 109

Jewish Agency and, 245, 254, 255

technical services. See under Jewish

Labor Ministry and, 255

Agency for Israel; Labor, Ministry of Tel Aviv. See also specific topics the special status of, 127 Tel Aviv port, 45, 46, 51 textile industry, 156–57 Town Planning, Division of, 90 Town Planning Department, 11, 69, 85, 90, 146, 162, 163, 263 Town Planning Ordinance of 1936, 239, 240 Trade and Industry, Minister of, 112–13 Trade and Industry, Ministry of, 263, 264 trade unions, 173, 236, 264–65. See also under Labor, Ministry of

number of people in, 242, 248, 253, 254, 256 problems in, 245 prolonging the stay of immigrants in, 245–46 transition to permanent residences, 284 transition. See also specific topics from decentralized to centralized framework, 54 from long-range planning to shortterm problem-solving, 53 from Mandatory to Israeli systems, xv Transition Law 5709-1949, 194, 195 Transition Law Amendment 57111951, 197 Transition Order to the Constituent

trains, 46–47

Assembly, 58, 193, 194. See

transit-camp initiative, implementa-

also Transition to Constituent

tion of, 255

Assembly Ordinance

412

Index

transition period, 58–59. See also interim period

America’s abandoning its endorsement of, 93, 94

actual vs. formal, 59

Arabs and, 4–5, 70

desire to avoid unnecessary up-

assumption that it would be imple-

heaval and ensure continuity

mented/respected, 55, 59,

during, 79

60, 70

locating staff to fill positions during, 88 planning for, 87 Yishuv leadership’s attitude to the

borders set in, 70, 77–78, 87, 133, 137, 151, 215, 282 and economic union with Arab state, 47, 70

issue of the, 11–13

implementation of, 47, 55, 276

Transition to Constituent Assembly

problems arising from, 33

Ordinance (1949), 192–94,

Interior Ministry and, 87

279. See also Transition Order

Israel’s withdrawal from, 33, 70

to the Constituent Assembly

Jerusalem and, 136

Transportation, Minister of, 113

and stages in the transition from

transportation issues, 68

Mandate rule to Jewish and

defining basic, 43–44

Arab sovereignty, 58–59, 70

during War of Independence, and Va’adat HaMatzav, 42–48 transportation network, dependence on for transport of food, 49–50

United Religious Front, 180 United Workers’ Party. See Mapam Urban and Rural Construction, Division of, 224–25, 230 Uziel, Ben-Zion Meir Hai, 100

Truman, Harry S., 3 two-party system, 196, 197

Va’ad HaLe’umi (“Israel’s Assembly”), 23, 40, 95, 114, 149

ultra-Orthodox factions, 100. See also Agudat Yisrael United Nations Palestine Commission, 70 United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, 11, 58, 60, 93, 158, 182. See also specific topics

Assefat haNivharim and, 14 judicial activity and, 56–57 Knesset Yisrael and, 14, 18, 19 Legal Department of, 57. See also Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive: Law Department within Meir Grabovsky and, 20, 23–24

Index

ministries based on departments of, 68, 69 Moshe-David Remez and, 18–20, 22, 23, 39 overview and nature of, 14, 25 Provisional State Council and, 93

413

Statehood in Palestine). See also specific topics Ben-Gurion and, 19, 20, 30, 33, 55, 57, 91, 111 challenges that affected the work of, 1

Yishuv and, ix, 71

contribution of, 275–77

Yitzhak Gruenbaum and, 24–25

District Administration and, 33,

Zerah Warhaftig and, 56, 57 Va’ad HaLe’umi (National Council), 19 Va’ad HaLe’umi Executive, 14, 19, 28, 276. See also Va’ad HaLe’umi electoral districts and, 63

75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 117, 142, 203, 225, 233 Edwin Samuel and, 74, 77, 118, 236 establishing a judicial system for counsel and oversight of, 55–58

joint committee of representatives

establishment of, xviii

of Jewish Agency and, ix, 20

goals and tasks, 1, 79

Knesset Yisrael and, 14 Law Department within, 56. See also Va’ad HaLe’umi: Legal Department of members, 18, 20–24, 29, 30, 39, 52, 53, 89, 289

intelligence-gathering methods and approval of departmental plans, 36–37 Judicial Committee, 59–64, 96, 97, 99–102, 106, 111 Judicial Council, 33, 57, 58

Provisional State Council and, 93

Meir Grabovsky and, 27, 33–36

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 20

Mordechai Shatner and, 36, 49,

working relationship between

50

Jewish Agency Executive and,

overview, xviii

21–25

party politics and, 25–31

Yishuv and, 18, 24 Va’ad HaLe’umi Plenum, 14

political status, 18–21 and the professional future of

Va’adat HaManganon, 123–25

Jewish mandatory officials,

Va’adat HaMatzav (Emergency Com-

35–36

mittee to Prepare for Jewish

structure, 33–34

414

Index

Va’adat HaMatzav (continued) structure of Labor Ministry during Provisional Government as reflected in, 146–48 subcommittees, 33, 37, 41, 48, 49, 57, 58, 66, 97, 98, 289, 293, 294

ministries arranged based on, 111 significance of, 69–71 submitted in April 1948, xviii, 55, 65, 83, 91, 135 vehicles, 260 shortage of armor for, 44 veterans, war, 169

Ben-Gurion on, 324n12

vocational training, 249, 257

Subcommittee A, 34, 36, 43,

voting. See also elections

49, 289 Subcommittee B, 33–35, 41,

for women, 61 voting age, 60–61

43, 75–76, 83, 159, 289 Subcommittee C, 33, 75–76, 81, 85, 89, 90, 146, 292

war economy, 156 locating, mobilizing, and regu-

Subcommittee D, 33

lating manpower for, 145,

Subcommittee E, 33

152–54, 174

Subcommittee F, 33

problems of, 156

Subcommittee G, 33

shift to peacetime economy from,

Subcommittee H, 33–34 during War of Independence

284 War of Independence. See also under

fuel supply, 41–42

Labor, Ministry of; Va’adat

management of essential ser-

HaMatzav

vices, 39–41 the question of authority, 44 transportation, 42–48 Yitzhak Gruenbaum and, 33, 75, 85, 89, 121, 146, 203, 208 Zeev Sherf and, 33, 35, 50, 55, 64, 65, 82 Va’adat HaMatzav Final Report, 65–69, 111, 276 Labor Ministry and, 84, 88–90, 117, 146–48

consolidation of Interior Ministry during, 142–43 effect on government’s powers, 101–6 and elections for First Knesset, 179 food supply at outbreak of, 49 impact in shaping the government system, 277–78 impact of damage to public structures and archives on effective governance during, 138–40

Index

and implementation of Va’adat

415

women

HaMatzav’s recommenda-

Mapai and, 191

tions for Interior Ministry,

as ministers, 235–36

133–38

suffrage for, 61

low-income housing after, 169

work, absence from, 262–63

maintenance of essential infra-

workers’ organizations, 15–16

structure during, 158–61 need to prioritize national production during, 155–58

workforce. See labor market; war economy World War II (WWII), changes in

special problems during, 151–61

British foreign policy on the

staffing the Interior Ministry

question of Palestine follow-

during, 140–42 war veterans, 169 Warhaftig, Zerah, 252 Jewish law and, 59, 101 overview, 310

ing, 3–5 World Zionist Organization (WZO), 13–14, 81, 89, 169, 180, 195 World Zionist Organization Executive, 11, 14, 149

positions held by, 56, 322n77 proposals, 59, 322n77

Yishuv (Jewish settlement in Pal-

Provisional Government and, 59

estine), ix, 53, 54, 56, 71,

Va’ad HaLe’umi and, 56, 57

269–71, 275, 276, 280. See

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 59

also specific topics

Weber, Max, xxiii–xxv, xxvii, xxviii “Weberian dichotomy,” xxviii Weitz, Yosef, 33, 136, 310–11, 322n5 Weizmann, Chaim, 14

transportation and, 43 Yishuv establishment. See also Yishuv structure of, 13–18 Yishuv leadership, 212. See also Yishuv

Welfare, Minister of, 113

agenda, 56

Western Galilee, 125

airports, pilots, and, 48

and disputes between military and civil administration, 137–38 international status of, 134–35 White Paper laws, 29, 56, 97, 98, 339n15

attitude toward British evacuation policy, 4–5, 9–11 attitude toward transition period, 11–13 British and, 5, 9–11, 34

416

Index

Yishuv leadership (continued)

Va’adat HaMatzav Judicial Com-

Haifa ports and, 45 intelligence agencies serving, 9, 10

mittee and, 33, 57, 58, 97, 99 youth

Jewish mandatory officials and, 35

Mapai and, 191, 252

lack of authority and sovereignty,

religious, working in factories, 252

17, 44, 54 Partition Plan and, 55, 93

Zionism, 226

Va’adat HaMatzav and, 18, 20, 21,

Zionist Actions Committee, 22, 24,

30, 54 Yosef, Dov (Bernard Joseph), 138

94 Zionist Congress, 14, 60, 87

overview, 311

Zionist Left, 29

positions held by, 33, 57, 58, 97,

Zionist movement, religious, 57, 100

138

Zisling, Aharon, 115, 151