A Society Transformed 9789633865545

Table of contents :
Contents
List of tables
List of figures
List of contributors
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Scaling change in Hungary
1 Long-term modernization of Hungarian society
2. Population: birth, marriage, and death
3. Denomination and religious practice
4. The scope of the state and private sectors
5. The post-Communist economic elite
6. The middle strata in transformation
7. Consciousness of inequality
8. Welfare programmes and the alleviation of poverty
9. Dissatisfaction and alienation
10. Parties and social divisions: a common East-Central European pattern?
11 The long and the short of transformation in Central Europe
Index

Citation preview

A SOCIETY TRANSFORMED HUNGARY IN TIME-SPACE PERSPECTIVE

A SOCIETY TRANSFORMED Hungary in Time-Space Perspective Edited by RUDOLF ANDORKA TAMÁS KOLOSI RICHARD ROSE AND

GYÖRGY VUKOVICH

..:,"',CEUPRESS ,,�

Central European University Press, Budapest

Published by Central European University Press Október 6. utca 12 H-1051 Budapest Hungary 400 West 59 th Street New York, NY 10019 USA © 1999 by Central European University Press Distributed by Plymbridge Distributors Ltd., Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PZ, United Kingdom All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher

ISBN: 978-963-9116-49-8 ISBN: 978-963-386-554-5 ebook

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book is available upon request Printed in Hungary by Akaprint

CONTENTS

List of tables

vu

List of figures List of contributors Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction: Scaling change in Hungary Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa Population: birth, marriage, and death György Vukovich Denomination and religious practice Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa The scope of the state and private sectors Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik The post-Communist economic elite György Lengyel The middle strata in transformation Zoltán Fábián Consciousness of inequality Péter Róbert Welfare programmes and the alleviation of poverty István György T óth Dissatisfaction and alienation Rudolf Andorka Parties and social divisions: a common East-Central European pattern? Gábor Tóka The long and the short of transformation in Central Europe Richard Rose Index

Xll Xlll

1 21 50 61 73 85 97 113 128 147 155 179 205

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Social structure, 1949-93 Table 1.2 Population and family, 1948-93 Table 1.3 Educational achievement, 1955-93 Table 1.4 Increased gender equality in education, 1920-90 Table 1.5 Employment, by gender, 1949-90 Table 1.6 Income, 1950-94 Table 1.7 Time budgets, 1977-93 Table 1.8 Cultural activities, 1950-93 Table 1.9 Deviance, 1920-93 Table 1.10 Household size, 1949-90 Table 1.11 Income distribution, 1962-94

26 28 30 31 33 35 42 44 45 45 46

Table 2.1 Total fertility rate of married women Table 2.2 Age composition of population Table 2.3 Number and rate of marriages Table 2.4 Life expectancy at birth for men and women, 1960-93 Table 2.5 Mortality rates of men

52 56 57 59 59

Table 3.1 Hungary's denominations, 1869-1949 Table 3.2 Denominational structure in Hungary, 1957-88 Table 3.3 Religious affiliation by age, 1992 Table 3.4 Extent of religious endogamy Table 3.5 Religious affiliation of grandparents, parents and married couples Table 3.6 Religious affiliation by education, average 1978-91 Table 3.7 Religious affiliation and strength of commitment Table 3.8 Religious affiliation and religious practice Table 3.9 Religious affiliation according to baptism and practice

62 63 63 65 66

Table 4.1 Worktime in public, mixed and private sectors Table 4.2 Worktime in the public and private sectors, annual activity, 1993

76 77

67 68 70 70

viii

List of tables

Table 5.1 Socio-economic characteristics of the elite Table 5.2 Old and new leaders in the economic elite Table 5.3 Continuity: previous job in the same sector Table 5.4 Dissatisfaction within the economic elite Table 5.5 Elite attitudes towards financial prospects Table 5.6 Entrepreneurs, population and economic elite feelings Table 5.7 Income - estimated and deemed just

87 89 90 92 92 93 94

Table 6.1 Structural relations and the schema of classes Table 6.2 The distribution of earners by the type of work place Table 6.3 Mean household per capita income, 1992 and 1994

97 105 106

Table 7.1 Class identification, 1991-3 Table 7.2 Changing class identification in 1992-3, panel survey Table 7.3 Mean subjective status by social-demographic characteristics Table 7.4 Intemal structure of social inequality consciousness Table 7.5 Factors influencing social status Table 7.6 Dimensions of social status for different sociodemographic groups

115 115 118

Table 8.1 Poverty rate by household characteristics Table 8.2 Decile shares of types of income Table 8.3 Incidence of social transfers Table 8.4 Income composition of social policy target groups Table 8.5 Market income quintiles by their household income quintile Table 8.6 Ratio bottom quintile market incomes (pre-transfer poverty rates) and total household incomes (post-transfer poverty rates) Table 8.7 Household-specific poverty rates Table 9.1 Satisfaction with dimensions of respondent's life, 1992-4 Table 9.2 Values in the Inglehart scale, 1994 Table 9.3 Psychological problems, 1993 Table 9.4 Manifestations of anomie and alienation, 1993 Table 9.5 Self-confidence and life goals, 1978, 1990 and 1994

119 121 122 131 135 137 139 140 141 142 148 149 150 151 153

List of tables

ix 156

Table 10.1 Area list votes, parliamentary elections 25 March 1990 and 8 May 1994 Table 10.2 Correlations between social variables and party preference Table 10.3 Correlation between economic status and party preference Table 10.4 Recalled list votes by economic policy attitudes, 1990 and 1994 Table 10.5 MSZP voters by age and occupation

165

Table 11.1 Infant mortality in Central Europe Table 11.2 Life-expectancy trends in Central Europe Table 11.3 Widespread rejection of undemocratic altematives Table 11.4 Increases in freedom in post-Communist societies

183 185 199 201

160

170 176

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 0.la Changing map of Hungary, 1914-41 Figure 0.lb Hungary today Figure 0.2 Growth rate of the official Hungarian economy Figure 0.3 Election results in Hungary, 1990-8

4 5 10 13

Figure 1.1 Stock of education, 1920-90 Figure 1.2 Rise in consumption, 1950-92 Figure 1.3 lmprovement in the quality of housing, 1949-93 Figure 1.4 Steady improvement in infant mortality, 1900-93 Figure 1.5 Trends in life expectancy; doctors since 1900

29 36 38 39 40

Figure 2.1 Total fertility rate

51

Figure 4.1 Private sector in official and total GDP Figure 4.2 Public and private sectors by economic branch Figure 4.3 Individual income in public and private sectors Figure 4.4 Strategies to earn extra income Figure 4.5 Social services provided by employers

74 79 80 81 85

Figure 6.1 Proportion of entrepreneurs ín the economically active population, 1982-93

103

Figure 7.1 Attitudes toward wealth

124

Figure 11.1 Mathematical achievement of Central European youths Figure 11.2 Car ownership: making progress and falling behind Figure 11.3 Purchasing power of Central Europeans Figure 11.4 Importance of multiple economies in getting by Figure 11.5 Trends in GDP, 1989-96 Figure 11.6 Rating economic systems: past, present and future Figure 11.7 Rating political systems: past, present and future

186 188 190 191 194 196 198

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Rudolf Andorka, the late Rector, Budapest University of Economics Zoltán Fábián, Head of Department of Data Archives and lnformatics, TÁRKI (Social Research Informatics Centre), Budapest István Harcsa, Head of Department, Central Statistical Office, Budapest Tamás Kolosi, President, TÁRKI and Professor of Sociology, ELTE (Eötvös Loránd University), Budapest György Lengyel, Professor of Sociology, Budapest University of Economics Péter Róbert, Professor of Sociology, ELTE and TÁRKI, Budapest Richard Rose, Director, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow Endre Sik, Professor of Economic Sociology, Budapest University of Economics Gábor Tóka, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest Miklós Tomka, Director, Research Centre for Philosophy of Religion, Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest István György Tóth, General Director, TÁRKI, Budapest György Vukovich, former Director, Central Statistical Office, Budapest

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ÜUR first obligation is to acknowledge thanks to the institutions essential in creating a volume that looks at Hungary broadly across both time and space. Since a social science book requires the training of social scien­ tists, the starting point is the Budapest University of Economics, where Rudolf Andorka was both Professor of Sociology and Rector. Since the analysis of long-term social trends requires data, the Central Statistical Office, of which György Vukovich is the former Director, has made an indispensable contribution to the materials contained herein. Yet the census and official statistics are not the only source of data: since Paul Lazarsfeld's pioneering study of unemployment in Austria in the early 1930s, sample surveys have frequently been used to collect social data. T ÁRKI (Társadalomkutatási Informatikai Egyesülés; in English, the Social Research Informatics Centre), is the archive for survey data about Hungary. Tamás Kolosi is a founder and now President of T ÁRKI. ln addition, the General Director, István György Tóth, has efficiently co­ ordinated the collection of materials from many authors and the movement of paper and machine-readable files between Budapest and Glasgow. On the Scottish side, the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde has provided the comparative perspective useful in seeing Hungary in a broader European perspective. The Director, Professor Richard Rose, has been comparing mass response to transformation in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, utilizing both census data and survey data. Moreover, Hungary is one of the ten countries in the New Democracies Barometer of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna, for which Rose acts as international scien­ tific advisor. This book has been made possible by a grant from the European Commission, Directorate General XII, Science Research and Development under the PECO/ Copernicus programme (ERBCIPAACT 930091). Results from research in progress have been presented in seminars at a wide variety of conferences and academic institutions outside Hungary as well as within . it, including the School of Slavonic

xiv

Acknowledgments

and East European Studies, London; the OECD, Paris; the Max Planck Arbeitsgruppe on Transformationsprozesse, Berlin; the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna; and the World Bank, Washington DC. Our only regret about this book is that the senior editor, Rudolf Andorka, did not live to see it published. lt should be clear from the contributions here by a variety of colleagues and former students that his spirit lives on. Rudolf Andorka, Tamás Kolosi, Richard Rose and György Vukovich

INTRODUCTION

SCALING CHANGE IN HUNGARY Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

CHANGE and persistence are perennial themes in the social sciences. ln politics, a change of regime - whether from authoritarianism to democ­ racy or in the other direction - should make a big change in society. But for a historian, it is the /ongue durée that counts. Since Hungary's origin in the tenth century, change has been an inevitable feature of adapting to a millennium of transformation in Central Europe. Yet the maintenance of a distinctive Finno-Ungam language and a distinctive national culture, notwithstanding centuries of rule by Ottoman and Austrian emperors, is formidable evidence of persistence. Sociologically, the critical question is: how can we determine what does and does not change in a country over long and short periods of time? The object of this book is to examine the scale of change - that is, both the presence and absence of change - in Hungarian society as a conse­ quence of the great transformation from a Communist into a democratic regime. To do this requires careful attention to the character and tempo of different types of change in society. ln a democratic polity, a government can change över night with the result of a general election, and the fickle­ ness of public and parliamentary opinion led British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to claim, 'A week is a long time in politics.' However, a demographer sees change taking place over decades or generations. While birth and death are inevitable, an increase in life expectancy or a fall in birth rates takes twenty years or longer to make a major impact on the population structure of a society. Gradual changes noticeable in Hungarian society after the fall of Communism actually started under the old regime. This is true not only of family life and demography but in many other features of society as well. ln fact, it is in the nature of a non-

2

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

totalitarian society that the political regime does not attempt to plan or command what happens in every aspect of social life but accepts what happens as a consequence of processes of change in civil society. With a national identity strong enough to survive many centuries of rule by foreign powers, the Hungarian nation has shown the capacity to survive. Yet the introduction after the Second World War of a Communist regime under pressure from Soviet occupation forces was an abrupt discontinuity from the past. It also set in train processes of modemization such as urbanization, mass education at the secondary and university levei and women entering paid employment. Hungary was the leader among Communist countries in distancing itself from the political and economic orthodoxies of Marxist-Leninism, even though it was impossible to break with Moscow, as the failed 1956 Hungarian revolu­ tion demonstrated. The Hungarian regime developed 'goulash socialism' in an attempt to create a form of market socialism. Political liberalization meant that Hungarian social scientists could undertake empirical studies of the conditions of Hungarian society. Even before the Berlin Wall fell, the ruling Communist Party had begun to negotiate the conversion of a People's 'Democracy' into a democratic republic. The collapse of the Communist regime in 1989 was less of a shock in Hungary than elsewhere in the Soviet world for Hungary had begun to move in a post-Communist direction decades before glasnost and perestroika became Kremlin slogans. None the less, the full-scale movement from a socialist economy to a market economy in the 1990s has involved structural changes that have greatly altered conditions for many people, some for the better and some for the worse economically. A LONG ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE ANDA LONGE R ROAD TO DEMOCRACY Hungarian society is as old or older than England or France. Magyars travelling from east of the Ural mountains arrived in what is now Hungary in the ninth century. The first Hungarian king, Stephen, was crowned in 1001 and secured the Christianization of the country. ln medieval times the crown passed through the hands of different families, native and foreign, and royal territory expanded and contracted with the fortunes of war. This period closed with the defeat of Hungary at the hands of the Ottomans under Suleiman the Magnificent at the Battle of Mohács in 1526. A century and a half later, after the Turks failed in their

Introduction: scaling change in Hungary

3

siege of Vienna, the Ottoman forces withdrew. This did not mean independence, for in 1699 the Habsburg monarchy gained dominion over Hungary and Translyvania. Under Habsburg administration, the German language and German-speaking population spread throughout much of Hungary's territory. The wave of nationalism that spread across Europe following the Napoleonic Wars involved Hungary: its national leaders demanded both national self-determination and constitutional liberalization in the English fashion. ln March 1848, the Hungarian diet enacted laws autho­ rizing a liberal constitutional monarchy under the Habsburg crown; national minorities in what was then the territory of Hungary protested. After Franz Josef became the Habsburg emperor later in that year, he sought to repress constitutional change. ln April, 1849, Lajos Kossuth proclaimed Hungary an independent republic, but it was short-lived, surrendering to Austrian forces in August 1849. The Ausgleich of 1867 created a dual monarchy with Franz Josef crowned king of Hungary as well as being emperor of the Austro­ Hungarian Empire. The territory of Hungary at that time included Translyvania, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia and Ruthenia and the Bánát (Figure O. la). Thus, like other parts of the Habsburg Empire, Hungary was a multi-national state. lndustrialization commenced and Budapest, the capital of the Hungarian Empire, boomed; its population quadrupled between 1850 and 1900. From 1869 to 1910, the population of the whole of the territory increased by almost half, reaching eighteen million just before the First World War. The size of ethnic minorities created additional political complications. At the outbreak of the First World War, the ethnic composition of the Hungarian Empire was barely half Hungarian. lt also included Slovaks, Romanians, Croats, Germans, Jews, gypsies and others. There were economic divisions in Hungary between the well-off minority and the poor urban and rural workers and also between an urban bourgeoisie and the nobility that controlled much of the countryside. There was little scope for the representation of competing interests; in keeping with the practice elsewhere in Europe, the majority of males and all women were not allowed to vote.

Independence The end of the First World War, in which the Austro-Hungarian Empire was allied with Germany, saw the fall of the Habsburg monarchy and the proclamation of an independent republic by Count Mihály Károlyi,

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Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

minister-president. However, the first govemment of · the new state promptly collapsed as a consequence of the loss of territory to foreign armies, the influx of refugees to Budapest and inflation. A Communist regime under Béla Kun seized power in early 1919, seeking to establish a soviet regime orientated toward Moscow. It nationalized land belonging to the aristocrats and aggressively intimidated its class enemies. However, the Béla Kun regime was unable to resist the advance of Romanian troops on its eastem front and allied pressures. ln August 1919, shortly before Romanian troops entered Budapest, Kun fled to Moscow. A counter-revolution was launched under Admiral Miklós Horthy, who represented the military leadership in a coalition of soldiers, conser­ vative aristocrats, the Catholic hierarchy and very right-wing nationalists and peasants that dominated Hungarian politics from 1919 until near the end of the Second World War. ln 1920 Admiral Horthy was proclaimed regent. When the Habsburg emperor sought to take power the following year the attempt failed. The allied policy of national self-determination recognized Hungary's status as an independent state but also applied the same principle to ethnic groups seeking independence from Budapest. When different nationalities disputed claims to territory, Hungary tended to lose, because it was among the defeated powers in the First World War. The result was a substantial contraction of Hungarian borders. The Treaty of Trianon, signed outside Paris in 1920, reduced the population of Hungary from eighteen million in 1910 to eight million in 1920, and two-thirds of the territory of the pre-1914 kingdom was ceded to other countries. Virtually all the non-Magyar territories were transferred to new states, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, or to an enlarged Romania, which had fought on the allied side in the First World War. The settlement left substantial Hungarian minorities in Romania, the Slovakian part of Czechoslovakia and in the Vojvodina in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. The reduced territory was now 90 per cent Hungarian in its population, but one-third of Hungarians were minorities in neighbouring countries that gained territory in the Trianon treaty (Figure 0. lb). Interwar Hungary was formally a kingdom without a king, as Admiral Horthy was throughout this period its bead as regent. ln 1920 an election was held with a franchise allowing all males to vote and a secret ballot; the result was negated by political upheavals. Before the 1922 election, a law was enacted abolishing the secret ballot in rural areas. Given the large holdings of a few landowners and the numerical dominance of the

Intro ductio n : scaling change in Hungary

7

countryside, this effectively made elections neíther free nor fair, even though they continued to be held through 1935 (cf. Bachmann, 1969). The regime continued in a tradition characterized by Janos (1982) as The Politics of Backwardness. From 1921 to 1931 the prime minister was István Bethlen, who led a Christian national movement that govemed in an authoritarian manner; its power was based on rural landowners. The govemment supported and was supported by the Catholic Church, whose members constituted two­ thirds of the post-Trianon population of Hungary. Anti-Semitic laws were enacted to appease the radical right but were little enforced. The liberal and social democratic opposition was more or less tolerated but ineffective. The world depression hit the agricultural base of the Bethlen govemment hard, and the prime minister resigned in August 1931, succeeded for a year by a supporter, Gyula Károlyi. ln 1932 Gyula Gömbös became prime minister in a radical right-wing govemment, the first in Hungarian history not to have a count in the cabinet. His attacks on the old conservative order made him a populist. He was an anti-Semite and also an admirer of Mussolini's corporatist style of Fascism; his enemies nicknamed him 'Gömbölini'. To revive the economy, Gömbös negotiated a trade agreement with Germany. Political ties with the Third Reich were also strengthened. He died while on a trip to Germany in October 1936. A series of conservative aristocrats then served as prime minister; the radical right's influence remained strong. A semi-military Fascist group, the Arrow Cross, claimed 200,000 members. The return of the secret ballot before the 1 938 election increased the electoral weight of peasants as against large landowners, and in the 1939 election, even though the party of govemment claimed a substantial majority of votes and seats, the Arrow Cross was able to become the second largest party in the 260-seat Parliament with forty-nine seats. The Second World War led the Hungarian govemment to side with the Axis to regain territories lost under the Treaty of Trianon. This policy was agreeable to both traditional conservatives and radical right populists. However, the divisions between these groups meant that conservatives tended to resist the aggressive anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi pressures of the Hungarian radical right. The Anschluss integrating Austria with Germany in 1938 gave Hungary a common border with the Third Reich. Following the German advance into Czechoslovakia, Hungary regained territories in southem Slovakia and Ruthenia. When the Second World War broke out, the Hungarian govemment proclaimed it was a non-belligerent. ln December 1940, the govemment

8

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

signed a friendship treaty with Yugoslavia. However, Germany insisted on passing through Hungary when it invaded Yugoslavia in March, 1941. The prime minister, Count Pál Teleki, committed suicide and Hungary joined the war on Germany's side. By summer 1941, Hungary had regained half the territory lost in the Treaty of Trianon, and was a partner with the Axis in the war against the Soviet Union; in December 1941 it declared war on the United States. When the tide of war turned, the Hungarian govemment sought to withdraw from the Axis. ln response, German troops officially occupied the country in March, 1944.

The Red Army arrives The Soviet Army entered Hungary in autumn 1944 and by April 1945 had occupied Budapest. A general election, 'the füst free election ever held in Hungary', occurred on 4 November 1945 (Heinrich, 1986: 27). The largest party, the Smallholders, a lineal descendant of pre-war right­ wing groups, won 57 per cent of the vote and a majority of seats in Parliament; the Social Democrats were second with 17.4 per cent of the vote. The Communists won only 17.0 per cent of the vote, and 76 of the 415 seats in Parliament. A new constitution was adopted in 1946 and the 1947 Peace Treaty restored the Trianon boundaries of Hungary that remain in place today. With Soviet troops omnipresent, the Communist Party was able to put pressure on parties that were coalition partners in govemment, revise the electoral law and purge the voting register of almost a tenth of the electorate. ln the 31 August 1947 election, the vote was evenly divided among many parties, and ten won seats in Parliament. The Communists became the largest party with 22.0 per cent of the vote and one hundred seats. Through their control of the Ministry of the Interior, in early 1948 the Communists arrested political opponents, deposed Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy and took control of the state. ln 1949 Hungary was proclaimed to be a People's Republic, a new Soviet-style constitution was adopted and the Communist-dominated Independence Front was the only party allowed to contest an election. Subsequent elections were controlled by the party. ln 1947 its list of candidates won as much as 99.7 per cent of the vote on a tumout of nearly 99 per cent (see Bárány, 1990; Dessewffy and Hammer, 1995: Tables 1 and 2). During four decades of Communist rule of Hungary, there were signif­ icant changes in political direction. The Stalinist period commenced in 1949 under the leadership of Party General Secretary Mátyás Rákosi

Introduction: scaling change in Hungary

9

with the show trial on treason charges of László Rajk, farmer minister of the interior. Cardinal József Mindszenty, Primate of Hungary, was arrested and charged with treason. At a public trial he confessed, but there were grounds to suspect he had been psychologically brainwashed and drugged; the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On the economic front, the first five-year plan commenced in January 1950, promoting industrialization under state ownership. After Stalin's death in 1953 the balance of power within the Communist leadership altemated between moderates and radicals. Imre Nagy became prime minister in 1953, but reduction of repression cost him the job and led to expulsion from the Party. Rákosi regained control as Party secretary. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign led to Rákosi being deposed in July 1956. Demonstrations in Budapest against Soviet domination began on 23 October; Nagy was named prime minister as a concession. Nagy sought to assert Hungary 's independence by withdrawing from the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Pact. However, Minister of the Interior János Kádár appealed to the Soviet Union to crush the 'insurrection', and Moscow responded by sending in tanks. The Nagy govemment appealed to the United Nations far aid, but it was not forth­ coming. Soviet troops brutally repressed Hungarian protesters and there was substantial street-fighting in Budapest. Imre Nagy and other leading ministers were executed, and Kádár förmed a new govemment under Soviet protection. The 1956 Hungarian revolution had a chastening effect on both Soviet forces and Hungarian opponents. Hardline Communists realized that there was such a thing as 'too much ' repression, leading to popular outbursts. Opponents of Communist rule realized that the Soviet Union would not allow the regime to be overthrown, but that it might be possible to reduce, avoid or get around the most disliked features of Communist rule. The Party made fewer demands on Hungarians. Kádár stated the terms of the compromise in the formula, 'Those who are not against us are with us.' Elemér Hankiss (1990, 7; italics in original) described the opponents of the regime as having 'ironical freedom', that is, 'the freedom of living outside the system in which they lived, the freedom of not identifying themselves with the system' . An early sign o f liberalization was the amnesty of prisoners from the 1956 revolution in 1963 . The regime sought to promote economic growth by introducing prices or quasi-prices into transactions, thus creating what was heralded as a 'socialist market ' economy. ln hopes of mollifying the mass of the people, the economy also expanded the

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

10 8.0%

- 0.5 -2.0% �---------'------"----'----..______.'-------'

1 95 1 -5 1 956-60 1 96 1 -5

1 966-70 1 97 1 -5

1 976-80 1 98 1-5

1 986-90

Figure 0.2 Growth rate of the official Hungarian economy Sources: Compiled from CMEA Statistica/ Yearbook and Economic Commission for Europe

production of consumer goods; was described as 'goulash socialism'. However, there were limits to liberalization. ln 1968 the Hungarian regime reaffirmed its opposition to radical reform by sending troops to support the Soviet army's invasion of Czechoslovakia. The initial burst of investment in the 1950s had brought rapid growth in an industrializing economy, but much of this was an artefact of starting from a very low base and an economy badly racked by war. This was a common experience of countries in Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe. ln the 1960s growth was sustained at a rate of almost 6 per cent a year, and benefits began to take the form of rising mass consumption (Figure 0.2). The economy continued to grow at a rate of 6 per cent in the first half of the 1970s. The economy began to show visible signs of slowing down in the latter half of the 1970s, a decade that saw two oil price shocks. The growth rate from 1976 to 1980 was only 2.8 per cent annually, less than half that in the two previous five years. Growth slowed even more in the 1980s. From 1986 to 1990 the official economy actually _went into reverse. contracting at a rate of 0.5 per cent annually. As subsequent

Introduction: scaling change in Hungary

11

chapters emphasize, official statistics left out a substantial portion of economic activity. Yet since official statistics tend to err on the side of over-estimating the success of the command economy, there is no doubt that 'goulash' socialism had lost its savour by the end of the 1980s. Before the 1980s the Hungarian regime was liberal within a Soviet, but not a Western, frame of reference. Travel to Western countries was permitted from 1961 books and ideas could circulate relatively freely in Budapest thereafter. The election law of 1983 made mandatory the nomination of more than one candidate for each electoral district. The candidates nominated had to work within the limitations of the Hungarian system, but the system allowed a range of opinions to be expressed and for voters to cast meaningful votes against candidates that they disliked (Bárány, 1990: 78ft). Before Gorbachev's proclamation of the Soviet Union's need for openness and restructuring, Hungarians were already practising what he was to preach there. The opening of divisions in the Soviet Union encouraged Hungarian dissenters to go public with criticisms of their regime, and made János Kádár respond in a relatively tolerant rather than repressive fashion. ln September 1987, the Hungarian Democratic Forum was founded to mobilize support for change. ln March 1988, the Alliance of Young Democrats was founded with a rule that members could not belong to any other youth organization, that is, the Communist league. Later in the year, the Independent Smallholders party was founded, a name linking it with interwar politics. Divisions in the goveming Hungarian Socialist Workers Party emerged between reformers, led by Imre Pozsgay, and hardliners who opposed any change. ln May 1988 János Kádár was deposed from the leadership. The balance of power within the government tipped toward reform. ln February 1989 the Central Committee accepted the introduc­ tion of multi-party democracy. Roundtable talks commenced on the drafting of a new electoral law. Reform Communists argued for a popularly elected presidency with executive powers, believing that their leader, Pozsgay, would win. ln a referendum on 26 November 1989 the proposal was rejected by a bare majority. By this time, the governing party had already dissolved itself and re-formed as the Hungarian Socialist Party (for accounts of the change, see for example Szoboszlai, 1991; for the longer period, see Tőkés, 1996). Hungary was in the lead in formally rejecting the Communist regime; a month before the Berlin Wall fell, the Parliament overwhelmingly endorsed a new constitution that declared in its preamble:

12

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose The Hungarian Republic is an independent, democratic, law-based state in which the values of bourgeoi s democracy and democratic socialism hold good in equal measure. Ali power belongs to the people which they exercise directly and through the elected representatives of popular sovereignty.

ln an explicit slap at Communist domination, the preamble added, ' No party may direct any organs of state.' A return to democracy The first free elections in the new post-Communist Hungary were held on 25 March 1990. The result was a resounding defeat for the Socialist Party, the reformist successor of the party of the old regime, which dissolved itself in October 1989. Its party list secured less than 11 per cent of the vote, and under Hungary's complicated electoral law took only thirty-three of the 386 seats in the new Parliament. The winner was the Democratic Forum, a conservative party (Figure 0.3). The complex electoral system combined elements of first-past-the-post and propor­ tional representation. The result was a very disproportional distribution of seats in Parliament in comparison with actual votes. The Democratic Forum won 42 per cent of the seats with 25 per cent of the vote, while small parties securing in total 16 per cent of the vote won less than 3 per cent of the seats. A referendum was held in July 1990 to decide whether the president should be directly elected. Because only 14 per cent turned out to vote, the proposal failed. A former dissident Árpád Göncz, was elected president. The leader of the Democratic Forum, József Antall, became prime minister of a coalition government with two conservative parties as partners, the lndependent Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. Together, the three parties held 59 per cent of the seats with 43 per cent of the vote. The parliamentary opposition consisted of a mixture of old Communists and pro-market liberal parties. The new government soon found that the slowing down of the economy that had begun in the mid-1970s, and had turned into a fullfledged recession by the 1980s (Figure 0. 2), could not be reversed by election results. The ' liberalization' of prices in a command economy was inadequate to prepare Hungary for a market economy (cf. Kornai, 1992). The official economy contracted by 12 per cent in 1991. By the end of 1993, the official economy had contracted by 15 per cent (see Chapter 11, Figure 11.5). While this slump was far less than that of

Introduction: scaling change in Hungary

13

% votes 45

40 35

Q

i alist Part

'--

---------------1900 1 998 1 994

Figure 0.3 Election results in Hungary, 1 990-8, votes won by each party (%) Source: Table l O in Chapter 1 0, supplemented by first-round ballot of May 1 998

some post-Communist countries, it was enough to create widespread popular dissatisfaction. By 1 993 the new govemment was in political crisis. The prime minister was challenged by the party' s ultra-nationalist right, led by István Csurka, who was expelled with a few parliamentary colleagues. The prime minister was a sick man, and died in December. Sándor Lezsák took over as party leader and prime minister. But the changes in the party could not save it from disaster in the May 1 994 election. The Democratic Forum's share of the popular vote dropped to 1 2 per cent and its share of seats in Parliament dropped to less than 10 per cent. The election winner was the Hungarian Socialist Party, which had sufficiently purged itself of its Communist past to secure admission to the social democratic Socialist Intemational. The Socialist Party took a third of the vote and, thanks to the mechanics of the electoral system and divisions among its opponents, it won an absolute majority of seats in Parliament and Gyula Horn became prime minister. The extreme right Justice and Life Party of Csurka won only 1.6 per cent of the popular vote and failed to win any seats. Faced with continuing economic difficulties, the new Socialist govem­ ment accelerated market reforms, cut public spending and devalued the currency. Hungary gained intemational recognition for its move to the market with its admission to the Organization for Economic Co-opera­ tion and Development (OECD), the Paris-based club of advanced indus­ trial nations. However, economic measures caused substantial difficulties within the goveming party, leading to resignations of cabinet ministers.

14

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

The govemment emphasized its Western orientation by seeking member­ ship in Nato; in a November 1997 referendum this was endorsed by more than five-sixths of those voting in a tum out of just under 50 per cent. The economy started to grow slowly; by the end of 1997 the official national product was within five points of its standing in 1990 and the underlying economy was far healthier, thanks to the squeezing out of inefficiencies in the planned economy, the development of new market-oriented enterprises and foreign investment in producing new factories. And Hungarians still had the resources of 'unofficial' economies to cushion themselves from difficulties. The essential of democracy is competition, and the 1998 parliamen­ tary election established Hungary's credentials as a working democracy for the govemment of the day was once again tumed out of office. The change in votes was far less than the change in seats: the Socialist share of the vote fell by less than 1 per cent but it lost seventy-five seats and its parliamentary majority. The Csurka Party won just enough votes to gain representation in Parliament, but more than nine-tenths of the Hungarian electorate once again rejected extremist parties. The big winner was FIDESZ, initially a party of young democrats restricting membership to those under the age of 35, but subsequently broadening its appeal after a disastrous 1994 election showing. FIDESZ won 148 seats and förmed a coalition govemment with the more right-wing inclined Independent Party of Smallholders and the Democratic Forum. The FIDESZ leader, Viktor Orbán, became prime minister. A major priority of the new govemment is to negotiate Hungarian entry into the European Union. PATH DEPENDENCE AND CHANGING PATH S The logic of path dependence is simple: what happens today is largely determined by what was done yesterday. By extension, what happened last year, a decade ago, or even a century ago, can determine what is done today, as in the technically obsolete but still persisting layout of a typewriter keyboard (see David, 1985). Taken literally, dependence on what happens yesterday can be true yet banal: a country's gross national product is likely to change by about 0.01 per cent from one day to the next, the demographic composition of the population varies little from one year to the next and the great bulk: of the laws on the statute book at the beginning of a year were placed there years, decades or even genera­ tions before. ln a society such as Great Britain's, which has not under-

Introduction: scaling change in Hungary

15

gone the trauma of transformation from a Communist to a democratic regime, political inertia maintains much in place from one decade to the next, reflecting the preferences of the electorate and of competing parties (see Rose and Davies, 1 994). Yet it is sophistical to assume that because each change is very small, the sum of small changes is also small. Changes in the demographic composition of society are predictable: for every member of society will die, and old people will die much sooner than younger. Therefore, demographers can describe with some precision the increase in the ratio of pensioners to the working population in the year 2020 or 2030, or the rise in the educational level of the population, as younger cohorts tend to have more education than the oldest cohorts. Even though such changes happen slowly, their cumulative effect can be big. ln some cases, the compounding of changes can cause a fundamental alteration in the composition of society. Any review of Hungarian political history shows that continuity is the wrong word to describe a path that includes war, conquest, defeat and independence. Changes cannot even be described as reversals for that would imply a stable framework of cyclical change. Independence disap­ peared through Ottoman conquest, and subsequently with the expulsion of the Turks and the arrival of Habsburg rule. The independence achieved after the First World War was at the price of losing territory in which millions of Hungarians lived. Defeat in the Second World War was followed by the introduction of a Communist regime with the revolutionary intent of transforming Hungarian society, polity and economy. The collapse of that regime and the creation of a new democ­ ratic political system in 1989-90 was part of a political revolution that covered half of Europe and the former Soviet Union. If we view history as a learning process, the past remains influential but its influence is ambiguous, depending on the lessons people learn from their past. The consequences of flirting with populist Fascism and alignment with Hitler's Reich taught Hungarians a lesson about the costs of right-wing radical parties. The 1956 uprising taught Hungarians that they lacked the military power or allies to defend themselves against Soviet demands - if the Soviet Union wished to coerce Hungary. The resistance of the Hungarians taught Moscow the problems of using force to repress subject states. The extent of continuity along a previously set path varies from field to field. The high points of twentieth-century Hungarian politics show radical political changes, such as the switch from subjugation to a

16

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

foreign ruler to national independence or the shift from an authoritarian regime to Communism and then to a democratic constitution. While such shifts occur in a matter of months or a year or two, everyday conditions in Hungarian society, such as gender ratios, birth rates or death rates, change by less than 1 per cent from one year, or even one decade, to the next, and we can monitor them through census statistics. Changes in values and beliefs often lack regularity and predictability. To monitor such changes we must have data from sample surveys of public opinion; they have been undertaken longer in Hungary than in most formerly Communist societies. Since the editors of this book include three founders of TÁRKI, the major social science survey institute in the country, use is frequently made of survey data to monitor changes in what people think and what people do. The idea of what constitutes a 'big' or a 'small' change is relative, and our ideas are shaped by comparison. This is implicit in comparing past and present; the longer the time period, the bigger the change we would expect to see. Comparison between Communist and post-Communist countries is useful to determine what may constitute a 'high' or 'low' standard of living within the context of a non-markel economy. Comparison between non-market and market economies is much more risky, because of the absence of such comparators as prices. However, many social trends can be monitored across great spans of time and space since census statistics tended to be standardized across Europe well before the imposition of the Iron Curtain. For long-term compar­ isons, this volume makes use of comparative data from censuses of many European countries, and to compare response in the post-Communist era, use is made of the New Democracies Barometer, a trend survey of mass response to transformation by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna. The chapters that follow provide concrete examples of both continuity and change - within a regime as well as across landmark political upheavals. ln Chapter 1 , Rudolf Andorka looks at the modemization of Hungarian society since the end of the Second World War. At that time, Hungary had an underdeveloped economy and society; more than half the wage earners were in agriculture and education was very limited. By the beginning of the 1 970s Hungary was approaching the standards of an advanced industrial society in terms of urbanization, education and occupational structure with a growing middle class. The scale of changes encouraged some Western analysts to treat such changes as evidence of the convergence of Communist and non-Communist systems, 'except' for problems peculiar to the political and economic structure of a non-

Introduction: scaling change ín Hungary

17

market party-state. However, Hungarians could not ignore these peculiarities, which remained central to their society until the collapse of the regime. The second chapter, by György Vukovich, takes a similarly long-term view of population and identifies social changes in Hungary common to most advanced industrial societies. The birthrate has been falling substantially from the 1920s to the 1940s, and has continued to fall since. Today, the number of children bom is less than the replacement rate for the total population. ln consequence, the proportion of the population of retirement age is increasing, and because of the declining birth rates and longer life expectancy, this trend is sure to continue into the next century. However, increased longevity has widened inequalities between men and women. ln 1960 the life expectancy of women was 4.2 years greater than for men. By 1996 the gap in life expectancy had become 8. 1 years between Hungarian women and men. Moreover, the life expectancy of males fell after reaching a peak in 1966, while the life expectancy of women continued to rise until 1987, and has remained virtually constant since. Religion, a basis of traditional loyalties, has historically been a source of division in Hungarian society, which has had large Calvinist, Lutheran and Jewish minorities as well as a Catholic majority. ln pre-Trianon Hungary there was even greater religious diversity, with a fifth of the then population Orthodox, Jewish, Moslem or other religions. The analysis of long-term trends in religious denomination and religious commitment by Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa in Chapter 3 shows that the proportion of nominal Catholics has remained at about two­ thirds of the Hungarian population since the 1 940s, and the Lutheran minority has been more stable in size than the Calvinists. However, the strength of religion varies with the method of measurement: by many criteria, half or less of the Hungarian population today is religious or regular churchgoers. This is true of many denominations - and this trend is also found in non-Communist countries in Central Europe. The transformation of Hungary from a Communist to a post­ Communist society was of major political significance, but it was not, and was not intended to be, a social revolution or counter-revolution. The change has been most dramatic in the economy, for the collapse of the Marxist economic system has meant the rapid expansion of employ­ ment in the private sector, with all that may portend for economic growth, changes in social status and in political attitudes. None the less, Kolosi and Sik demonstrate in Chapter 4 that the change is less a break

18

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

with the past than might be expected, given the importance of hidden or shadow economies in the days of the nominally state-controlled economy. These economies were accounting for a fifth or more of the national product before the old system collapsed. A classic sociological method for tracing change and continuity is to examine the careers of the new elite. ln Chapter 5 György Lengyel examines the Hungarian economic elite today. There has been substantial change in the personnel and social backgrounds of individuals in leading positions of the Hungarian economy. Yet in 1993, with an anti­ Communist conservative government in power, the changes were far from complete. Of those holding top jobs in state enterprises, 68 per cent had been there prior to the regime change, and in banking and the ministries more than half were there before 1989. The transformation has brought costs as well as benefits, affecting the social psychology of the middle strata, as Zoltán Fábián points out in Chapter 6. The evolution of Hungarian society has followed a pattern familiar to Western sociologists. Even though capitalists in the conven­ tional market economy sense did not exist under the command economy, managerial power and party power did. Moreover, the hidden economy offered scope for individuals to better themselves. With a multiplicity of ' middling ' classes, Hungarian society was therefore well placed to respond to a shift to a more market-oriented economy. The complexity of a modern society, whether nominally socialist or nominally capitalist, inevitably brings with it differentiation, and this leads to inequalities too. This was true of Hungary under Communist rule, and also since 1989, as Péter Róbert shows in Chapter 7. ln socio­ logical terms, inequalities are not so much a matter of income as of occupational class and social status. Róbert shows that the correlations between different objective and subjective measures of social status are limited, thus making an individual 's relatíve position on measures of inequality vary from measure to measure. This is confirmed by evidence from the Hungarian Household Panel which shows that a substantial minority of the population does not maintain a consistent class identifica­ tion from year to year. The old command economy had not abolished poverty; up to a point, it had made money less important as a source of privilege than other things, such as position in the Communist nómenklatúra. lt also collec­ tivized the provision of welfare, providing a safety net for everyone and guaranteeing a job, but also running the economy in such a way that the average citizen was poor compared to the average citizen in a market

Introduction: scaling change in Hungary

19

economy such as Austria or Italy. Yet whatever the average standard of living, there will always be a group clustered at the bottom that can be described as living in poverty. ln Chapter 8 István György Tóth analyses the problematic nature of defining poverty in Hungary, and then presents evidence of what has been happening since the economic transformation. This shows that those in poverty today form about one-sixth to one-fifth of the Hungarian population. However, some groups have a much higher incidence of poverty: for example, lone parents, the unemployed and, above all, gypsies; poverty is least in Budapest. The incidence of poverty and income inequality is offset to some extent by cash-transfer programmes, for the end of the Communist system did not mean the abolition of pensions, children's allowances and other forms of state assistance. The emphasis on materialism is common in both Marxist and market economies. Yet the extent to which an individual is satisfied or dissatis­ fied with life is a psychological state of mind, and this is even more true of the extent of social exclusion integration or alienation. ln Chapter 9 Rudolf Andorka marshalls public opinion data to show the extent to which Hungarians do or do not feel satisfied with life. At the interper­ sonal level, there is a high degree of satisfaction with family and work and health, but this satisfaction co-exists with a high level of material­ istic dissatisfaction with income. Free and fair elections give Hungarians, like their West European counterparts, a chance to register their approval or disapproval of government. ln 1990 Hungarians voted the party created by ex­ Communists out of office; in 1994 they voted ex-Communists back into office and out again in 1998, a pattern common in Central and Eastem Europe. Yet a democratic election necessarily reveals divisions among the electorate. ln Chapter 10 Gábor Tóka examines what accounts for differences in the party preferences of Hungarians - social structure influences such as age, class and education or political attitudes - and how electoral divisions in Hungary compare with electoral behaviour in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. To determine the extent of change in the past half-century in such fundamentals of social conditions as health, education, employment and life expectancy, the concluding chapter by Richard Rose compares census data about Hungary and neighbouring nations in Central Europe, including Austria and Germany, with which Hungary has had far closer ties over the centuries than with Russia. It assesses the extent to which current conditions of Hungarian society are normal when judged by two

20

Tamás Kolosi and Richard Rose

very different standards: comparison with neighbouring social market democracies as against neighbouring ex-Communist societies. It also uses survey data from the New Democracies Barometer, a cross-national survey of public opinion in post-Communist countries, to assess the extent to which Hungarians are nostalgic for the past in view of economic difficulties, or determined not to go back to an undemocratic form of government because they are positive about gains in freedom (Rose et al., 1998).

References Andorka, Rudolf, 1990. 'Changes in Social Mobility in Hungary, 1930-1983 '. ln M. Haller, ed., Class Structure ín Europe. Annonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Bachmann, Gerhard, 1969. ' Ungam ' . ln Dolf Stemberger and Bernhard Vogel, eds, Díe Wahl der Parlamente. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, vol. 2., 1365-405. Bárány, Zoltán D., 1990. 'Elections in Hungary '. ln Robert K. Furtak, ed., Elections in Socialist States. Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf, 71-97. David, Paul A., 1985. 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY', Amerícan Economic Review, 75,1, 332-7. Dessewffy, Tibor and Hammer, Ferenc, 1 995. 'The Transition in Hungary'. ln G. Tóka, ed., The 1 990 Election to the Hungarian Natíonal Assembly. Berlin: Sigma, 1 1 -31. Hankiss, Elemér, 1990. East European A lternatives. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Heinrich, Hans-George, 1986. Hungary: Po litícs, Economics and Society. London: Frances Pinter. Janos, Andrew C., 1982. The Po litics ofBackwardness in Hungary, 1825-1 945. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Komai, János, 1992. The Socialist System: the Po litical Economy of Communísm. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rose, Richard, Mishler, William and Haerpfer, Christian, 1998. Democracy and lts Alternatives: Understandíng Post-Communist Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Rose, Richard and Davies, Phillip L., 1994. lnheritance in Public Po licy: Change without Cho íce ín Britain. New Haven: Yale University Press. Szoboszlai, György, ed., 1991. Democracy and Po litícal Transformation. Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association. Tóka, Gábor, ed., 1995. The 1 990 Election to the Hungarian National Assembly. Berlin: Sigma. Tőkés, Rudolf L., 1996. Hungary' s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reforms, Social Change and Political Succession: 1 957-1 990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

C H A P TER 1

LONG -TERM MODERNIZATION O F HUNG ARIAN S O CIETY Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

T HE history of Hungary over the last two centuries can be interpreted as a series of attempts at modernization and catching up with more advanced Western societies in order to break out from a semi-peripheral position (Janos, 1982). These attempts were more or less failures and sometimes ended in catastrophe. The reform period of 1825-49 ended in the defeat of the Hungarian war of independence, the dual monarchy ended in the First World War and the interwar period ended in the devastation of the Second World War. The Communist or, according to the self-definition of the ruling elite, socialist period might also be interpreted as an attempt at modernization. The ruling party elite based its legitimation increasingly on the claim that it could achieve a higher rate of economic growth and that Hungary would sooner or later catch up with the more advanced capitalist societies of the West. ln economic terms this claim was falsified, since by 1990 Hungary was farther behind the countries of Western Europe than before the Second World War (Ehrlich, 199 1; Bekker, 1994). The 1989 changes were revolutionary in the sense of creating major and rapid changes in both economic and political structures and institu­ tions (Dahrendorf, 1990). Change in the economic sphere consisted of a move from a more or less centrally planned economy based on the predominance of state ownership of productive assets to a market economy with the private sector controlling more than 50 per cent of productive assets. Change in the political system resulted in a move from a one-party dictatorship that was initially totalitarian which later softened into an authoritarian system and then to a multi-party parliamentary democracy, where the opposition in 1990 and in 1994 was able to win an

22

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

election and form a new government, in accord with the rotation of leaders in a democracy. The system transformation is proving to be more difficult and longer than expected. Hungary is going through a serious economic depression. This depression might be interpreted as a conse­ quence of the necessary 'creative destruction ' of old structures (Kornai, 1 993). More pessimistic evaluations predict the possibility of Hungary falling back into a peripheral situation in the world economy and speak about 'Balkanization' or 'Latinamericanization' of Hungary. The social indicators presented in this chapter provide the basis to analyse in what sense and how much Hungarian society has been modernized since 1 945. The research has been carried out since the mid1 970s in Hungary and the first time-series compendium of social indicators was published in Hungarian in 1986 and in English in 1988 (Andorka and Harcsa, 1 990). Since 1990 social reports in Hungarian are published at two-year intervals and the Social Report 1 990 was translated into English (Andorka et al. , 1 992). The present analysis is based on the Social Report published in Hungarian in 1 994. The social indicators encompassing the first four post-transition years evaluate change and persistence in order to judge whether Hungary has started a successful modernization or is moving toward peripheralization and long-lasting backwardness. M O D E R N IZAT I O N T H E O RY A N D P E R I O D S OF DEVELOPMENT Modernization theory i s considered the most appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis of time-series of social indicators. Modernity is here defined as consisting of four interrelated aspects of society: the market, a welfare system, a democratic party system and a modern mentality (Zapf, 1 994). The social indicators used to measure these aspects are the numerical strength of the middle strata, population and fertility measures, forma! educational attainment indicators, income and income inequality measures, mass consumption, health status and life expectancy of the population and leisure time. The system change in 1 989 was a break point, separating two entirely different periods. The multi-party parliamentary election in spring 1990 introduced political democracy and movement toward the market economy. The major cause of the system change was that the public, professionals influencing public opinion, the government and the opposi-

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

23

tion increasingly recognized that the 'socialist market economy ' could not function efficiently and that managers of the state-owned enterprises would never behave like private entrepreneurs in a market economy. They developed the view that the state-owned enterprises had to be priva­ tized, but that it was impossible to implement mass privatization under the rule of one party, interested in maintaining its dominance in the economy via ownership of the major productive enterprises (Kornai, 1992). It was also recognized that market-oriented reforms and privatiza­ tion of state-owned enterprises was not sufficient. ln addition the political system also had to be changed. The structural and institutional changes since 1989 are based on a widespread consensus concerning the goal of a market economy based on private ownership and political democracy. However, the Communist period from 1945 to spring 1990 should not be treated as uniform. Nor was there a linear development from the death of Stalin in 1953 to the collapse of the system in 1989. Subperiods can be distinguished that differ not only in the characteristics of the macroeco­ nomic and political systems but also in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens during Communist times. The first period, 1945 to 1947, represented the liberation of the country from German occupation and the onset of Soviet occupation. For somewhat more than two years some formai democracy was tolerated by the Soviet Union. The parliamentary election of 1945 was free and resulted in an absolute majority for the Smallholder (Peasant) Party, which formed a coalition with other parties, including the Communist Party. The parliamentary election of August 1 947 was still a multi-party election, but the Communist Party committed serious frauds. Nevertheless, the Communists were only able to obtain 22 per cent of the vote. Soon after, the Communists eliminated some opposition parties from Parliament and absorbed others in a Communist front to be the unchallenged rulers of the country. The second period, 1947 to the mid- l960s, was the totalitarian period. A small power elite belonging to the Communist Party completely dominated the political and economic system. Not only was public opposition suppressed, but the private expression of critical views was severely punished. False criminal charges and trials were conducted against politicians and ordinary citizens who were considered by the power elite to be potential opponents. The most important enterprises were taken over by the state and the collectivization of agriculture began. By means of a command economy a rapid industrialization process was initiated by setting very detailed plans for every productive unit. This

24

RudolfAndorka and István Harcsa

process was orientated toward heavy industry, even though the country did not possess the necessary raw materials, coal and iron ore. This later caused severe economic problems, as Hungarian heavy industry was and still is not competitive on the world market. The trend toward growing totalitarianism was broken twice. After the death of Stalin the Soviet leadership ordered Imre Nagy to be prime minister and under his leader­ ship of twenty-two months the worst features of totalitarian rule were somewhat relaxed. From July 1 955 the former Communist power elite tried to reinstate totalitarian rule and this led to the uprising of 1 956. During its twelve days the first steps toward a multi-party democracy were taken. The second invasion of Budapest by the Soviet army, however, reinstated the totalitarian system, although with a changed Communist leadership. Severe oppression continued till 1 963. The third period, from the mid- 1 960s to the second half of the 1 970s, was a time of tentative liberalization. The start of this period might be set in 1 963, the year of the political amnesty, when the majority of political prisoners were liberated; in 1 966, when the Central Committee of the Party decided to introduce market-oriented reforms; or in 1968 , when the reforms were implemented. These political decisions resulted from a recognition by the power elite that the totalitarian system and the command economy failed to work efficiently and a new uprising, similar to 1 956, might occur. Therefore, the power elite introduced a number of liberalizing measures. Fewer persons were imprisoned for political opposition, false charges were rarely made, political conformity was demanded only in public and citizens were permitted to travel to Western countries. Some Western cultural goods were imported, and in art and literature the famous categorization of ' supported, tolerated and prohib­ ited' works was modified so that strictly Marxist and socialist works were sometimes classified as 'tolerated' . The so-called 'economic mechanism reforms ' tried to implement a ' socialist market economy ' in which the state-owned enterprises would operate in a manner similar to private enterprises in a capitalist system. An important and somewhat unintended by-product of these reforms was the development of a small-scale private economy, mostly in the form of second jobs, that is, income-supple­ menting activities after regular work in the first economy. The fourth and final period from the second half of the 1 970s to 1 989 was a period of stagnation, ultimately ending in the collapse of 1 989. During this period the power elite attempted to stop the political liberal­ ization and market-oriented reforms that had been introduced. The economy almost stagnated and on the surface one-party rule was

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

25

strengthened, while beneath the surface opposition to the regime was increasing and beginning to be organized. An increasing number of the Socialist Party leaders seem to have recognized that this stagnation might lead to a violent break:down of the system. The starting date might be set at the oil crisis of 1973 and the changes that followed in the world economy, to which the state-owned Hungarian enterprises were unable to adapt. Or it could be seen as 1974, when there was Soviet pressure to stop the market-oriented reforms and two proponents of the reforms, R. Nyers and L. Fehér, were removed. Or it could be seen as dating from 1978, when real wages were indexed to a levei never achieved since. Although the decisive changes happened before 1975, the leadership was able to avert their consequences by foreign borrowing. This policy, however, was stopped in 1 978, when the Hungarian economy had severe difficulties in servicing its foreign debt. From 1978 the power elite muddled through, oscillating between the reintroduction of oppressive measures and reinforcing elements of the command economy on the one hand, and giving liberalizing palliatives to the population and tolerating the spread of the second economy on the other.

S O CIAL S T RUCTURE ln the immediate post-war years Hungary had an underdeveloped economy and society : 54 per cent of the employed population were in agriculture and less than 1 0 per cent had non-manual jobs and just over a fifth were in industry or construction (Table 1.1). The enforced socialist industrialization of the 1950s greatly increased the number employed in industry, but by the end of the decade almost two-fifths still remained in agriculture. lndustrialization also resulted in the growth of non-skilled workers, who came from agriculture and from the villages. The politi­ cally inspired repression of self-employment reduced the proportion of artisans and merchants in the society. ln agriculture the collectivization process was begun but not yet fully accomplished. ln the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s Hungary slowly approached some features of industrial economies: increasing numbers of profes­ sional and skilled workers and a diminishing number of agricultural workers. There were, however, trends which clearly differed from modem economies. The most striking was the almost complete disap­ pearance of the self-employed, especially in agriculture. lndependent peasant smallholders were virtually eliminated from the economy and the

26

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

Table 1 . 1 : Social structure, 1949-93 (%) Occupational status

Managers and professionals Clericals Artisans, merchants Skilled workers Semi- and unskilled workers Self-employed peasants Agricultural workers (Total) Non-manual Employed, industry and construction Employed in agriculture Self-employed

1949

1960

1970

1 980

1 990

1993

Change

1 .8 8.0 8. 1 1 1 .2

3.0 1 3 .7 2.4 15.5

5.1 20.7 1 .6 1 9 .5

7.8 22.5 1 .5 23.2

1 1 .0 22.4 4.2 25.7

16.1 22.9 7.2 27 . 1

14.3 1 4.9 -0.9 1 5 .9

1 7.3 46.7 6.9 ( 1 00)

27. 1 29.6 28.5 24.0 17.8 0.5 1 9.9 1 .6 1.1 0.6 3.3 -43 .4 1 8.4 2 1 .9 1 5.8 1 1 .6 5 .6 -1 .3 ( 1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00)

9.5

1 7.2

24.5

30.5

33.4

39.0

29.5

2 1 .6 53.8 55

34 38.4 22.3

43.7 24.7 3 .4

42. 1 1 8.6 2.8

38. 1 1 2.7 5.3

3 1 .0 8.9 1 0.5

9.4 -44.9 -44. 5

number of agricultural workers employed on state farms greatly increased. Self-employed artisans and merchants were also almost completely eliminated. ln the 1980s, and particularly in the second half of the 1980s, the Hungarian social structure began to move toward that of the advanced Western societies. The share of self-employed artisans, merchants and peasants began to increase, employment in industry and construction began to diminish and employment in non-manual jobs increased to a third of the labour force. By 1990 the number of skilled manual workers outnumbered semi-skilled and non-skilled workers. Since 1990 changes seem to have gathered momentum with the the radical change in the structure of the economy. The proportion of managers and professionals increased by almost half in three years, and doubled in little more than a decade. The proportion of self-employed has doubled in three years, and the number of skilled workers is rising while that of non-skilled workers is falling. Thus, the occupational or social structure of Hungarian society is heading toward a modern capitalist society. Changes at the top of the social hierarchy can not be gauged from these indicators, but they are also very important. Instead of a small but powerful political elite being at the top, in 1994 the elite seems to be

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

27

much more numerous and rather heterogeneous. This elite consists of a political, an economic and a cultural elite that more or less counterbal­ ance each other. A consequence of the pluralist elite structure is that none is nearly as powerful as the elite of the Communist period (Konrád and Szelényi, 1991). It might be questioned whether social strata or classes are appropriate indicators of the social structure since the Communist state defined itself as a classless society. The data on the per capita income levels indicate that there were important and consistent differences between these strata, and they were similar to the income differences in capitalist societies, including Scandinavian countries. Analysis of social mobility has shown that the relative mobility opportunities - the openness of the Hungarian society in terms of mobility - were more or less similar to the openness of Western societies (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). This openness seems to have increased from the inter-war period to the 1960s but declined slightly from the 1960s to the 1990s (Andorka, 1990). P O P ULAT I O N AND FAMILY

The most remarkable feature of the population processes in Hungary is the early decline in fertility to below the repiacement level by the end of the 1950s; by 1958 the net reproduction rate fell below 1.00. A simiiar decline did not occur in Western Europe till around 1970 to 1975. Since the first half of the l 960s, the levei of fertility calculated from yearly data shows some oscillations, but over longer periods the cohort fertility rates demonstrate remarkable stability at 1.85-1.90 children per woman. This net cohort reproduction rate of about 0.9 is 10 per cent iower than the rate needed for simpie repiacement (Tabie 1.2). After the system transformation, the levei of fertility has not noticeably declined although there have been significant declines in fertility during the same period in some other former Communist countries, for example East Germany. The most visible consequence of the low fertility rate is the decline of the total population size since 1981. The high rate of mortality is certainly a contributing factor, but even a significant reduction in mortality could not prevent a fall in population. A secondary factor in population decline was a net outflow of emigrants, ranging between 19,000 and 33,000 in the Communist period. Marriage has been traditionally young and almost universal in

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

28

Table 1 .2: Population andfamily, 1 948-93 Year

1 948 1953 1 958 1 963 1 968 1 973 1 978 1 983 1 988 1 993

Change

Population (1 ,000)

9.1 19 9.545 9.850 10.074 1 0.244 10.4 1 0 1 0.660 1 0.67 1 1 0.464

lil.J.lil 1 .191

Natural growth rate (%)

9.4 9.9 6. 1 3.2 3.9 3.2 2.7 -2.0 -1 .5 -3 . 2 -1 2.6

Net cohort reproduction 1/legitimacy rate rate (%)

1 .202 0.973 0.8 1 9 0.952 0.906 0.979 0.837 0.852 0.804 -0.398

Divorce (per 1 ,000

marriages)

8.2

5.3

5.9 5.5 8.3 1 1 .5

7. 1 7.9 9.2 9.8 1 0.7 9. 1

9.4

3.9

ru

2.l

Hungary, with women marrying around 21-3 years of age. The age of marriage declined slightly during the Communist period; it was 22.8 years in 1948, 21.5 years in 1988 and then 21.7 years in 1993. The per cent of never-marrying women increased during and just after the Second World War but from this point on generally declined until the system change. From the second half of the l 980s the marriage rate began to decline and the age of marriage has begun to rise toward the West European average. The divorce rate rose significantly in the first decades after the Second World War but has fallen slightly since the early 1980s, as the rate of marriage has also fallen, suggesting an increase in cohabita­ tion without marriage or divorce. Traditionally, most adult Hungarians have lived in families and while most households consisted of a nuclear family, a signíficant mínority contained persons not belonging to the family nucleus (for example, a wídowed parent as well) and ín some cases two nuclear famílíes lived temporarily ín the same household (mostly married parents and one of their married children) before each could obtain a dwelling of their own. However, by the 1970s the proportíon of multí-generatíonal famílies had become small. While the nuclear family household remains the norm, the size of families has shown a substantíal decline; ín 1949 the average family had 3.39 members; by 1984 it had fallen to 2.92 members, where it appears to have stabilized. The low fertility rate means families with four or more children have fallen from nearly a tenth in 1949 to just above 1 per cent today. The proportion of households wíth only a single

29

Lo ng-term modernizatio n of Hungarian so ciety

member has risen from one in seven in 1960 to almost one in four today (Appendix Table 1.1). The proportion of families with children and a single parent was high immediately after the war because of deaths of men in military service, but then fell to 10 per cent in 1970. Since then it has risen to 15 per cent, due to a trebling in the rate of illegitimate births since 1978 and the rate of remar­ riage of divorced women falling by more than half in the same period. E D U CATI O N The stock of education in a society represents the cumulative effects of institutional changes introduced over more than half a century: today, elderly Hungarians have been educated in the system as it prevailed before the Communist takeover, and at the time of the Communist takeover, older Hungarians had been educated in the Habsburg system. ln 1920, barely one in ten Hungarian adults had had as many as eight years of elementary education, and less than one in twenty had had _ either a secondary or tertiary diploma. Educational levels rose a little in the 1920s and 1930s, but the disruption of the Second World War resulted in the overall levei of education in the adult population remaining much the same in 1949. The Hungarian population as a whole has only become educated (as distinct from having basic literacy) in the post-war era (Figure 1.1). (% in population age 15 or over)

80%

■ ■

1 920

• 1949

60%

1990

40%

20% 8 0%

Eight years of elementary education

Secondary diploma

Figure 1 . 1 Stock of education, 1920-90

Tertiary diploma

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

30

Modemization of education in the population as a whole is achieved by increasing the percentage of children and young people who enter succes­ sive higher levels of education, thus producing a flow of more educated young people into the adult labour force. Just before the First World War only one in six of young Hungarians had eight years of elementary educa­ tion, and by the start of the Second World War, the proportion was about one in four. ln the post-war era, eight years of elementary education has effectively been delivered to almost all children, and the proportion in kindergartens rose from 23 per cent in 1950 to 96 per cent in 1989, falling slightly to 87 per cent in 1993. Enrolment in secondary schools was very selective before the Communist period, and coverage of secondary education was incomplete in the Communist era. ln 1960, 75 per cent of young people went on to secondary school after finishing primary school, and one-quarter did not. By 1 980 the proportion going to secondary school reached 93 per cent, and has remained at that levei since. About half in secondary education attend three-year vocationally oriented schools for skilled workers. While these schools give training for the world of work, they do not guarantee a job and restrict the possibility for further study. About 35 to 40 per cent of young persons study in four-year secondary schools, either gymnasia or special secondary schools. Successfully completion there is a necessary qualification to continue studying at university or a further education college (Table 1 .3). Table 1 .3 : 1 955-93 Those completing education, (%) of population of relevant age secondary Year

primary school

1 95 5 1 960 1 965 1 970 1 975 1 980 1 985 1 989 1 990 1 99 1 1 992 1 993

66.5 79.8 90.4 90.4 90.8 92.2 95.6 9 1 .0 9 1 .2 93.5 94.5

gymnasium

special

tertiary

23.0 29.2 38.5 36.6 37.7

1 1 .2 1 9.7 1 4.4 1 3. 1 15.1

5 .9 9.5 1 1 .5 1 2.8 1 7.5

3.2 5.8 7.4 8.0 9.6

34.8 34.0 3 3 .0 37.4 34.8

1 6.6

1 7.3

1 1 .9 1 1 .2 1 1 .4 1 1 .3 1 1 .3

skilled worker

36.5 36.2 47.0 44. 1

Lo ng-term modernizatio n of Hungarian so ciety

31

Table 1 .4: lncreased gender equality in education, / 920-90 Male/female inequality Year 1 920 1 930 1 94 1 1 949 1 960 1 970 1 9 80 1 984 1 990

Change

at secondary diploma levei 4.27 3 .68 4.64 2. 1 5 1 . 80 1 .3 1 1 .08 1 .00 0.96 -3. 3 1

at tertiary diploma levei 1 3 .00 1 2.50 7.67 6.00 3 .60 2.36 1 .88 1 .49 1 .36 -1 1 .64

ln the Communist era, the Planning Bureau imposed strict quotas on the number entering tertiary institutions. Yet tertiary enrolments increased in the post-war years under the slogan of 'democratization of higher education'. By 1960, 30 per cent with a secondary school qualifi­ cation were entering higher education, and the proportion rose to 39 per cent by 1980. However, since many graduates were unable to find work, stricter quotas were implemented in order to decrease enrolment in tertiary education; it fell to 36 per cent by 1985. Since only a minority of young Hungarians have attended academic secondary schools and only a minority of these enter tertiary education, the result is that the proportion of graduates tends to be lower in Hungary than in most Western societies. lncreased education has also brought about a great reduction in gender inequalities. ln 1920 young males were more than four times as likely as young women to achieve a secondary school diploma, and thirteen times more likely to gain a tertiary qualification. The inequality in tertiary education fell substantially in the next two decades, but not at the secondary level. At the start of the Communist era men outnumbered women with secondary diplomas by more than two to one, and by more than six to one at the tertiary level. By 1990 women were slightly more likely to have a secondary diploma, and the ratio of men to women among college graduates was of the order of four to three (Table 1.4) of young males. There has been a gender revolution in education.

32

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

E M P L OYMENT The potential labour force has grown greatly in the post-war era, as the number of children in the population has declined, few adults die before retirement age, education has made more people employable and women have increased their participation in the labour force. ln the post-war era, the most dramatic change has been in the gender ratio of participants in the labour force. ln 1949, men outnumbered women in the labour force by more than two and one to one; by 1990 the gender ratio was 1.15 men to each employed woman (Table 1.5). A second major structural change has been the decrease in the number of older people in the labour force as pensions have made retirement economically feasible. ln 1949 more than two in five of the population over 60 were employed; four decades later barely two in one hundred were working, as the age of drawing a pension was lowered, especially for women. Zero unemployment was an important legitimating claim of the Communist system. During the whole period no open unemployment existed, albeit controlled wages and mismanagement of workers gener­ ated 'underemployment' and dissatisfaction, as in the saying: 'They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.' The consequence of the so­ called 'soft budgetary constraint' (Kornai, 1980) was that enterprises and government institutions employed more persons than necessary. Although secondary education provided a more skilled labour force, it also delayed entry into employment, as fewer youths started work at 15. Throughout the period there was a continuous shortage of labour and all potential labour reserves were absorbed by the economy; this also encouraged mobilizing women in paid employment. After the system change, unemployment suddenly appeared, reaching 13.2 per cent in 1993, but declining to 10.9 per cent at the end of 1994. The decline in the number of employed persons was, however, much higher than the number of unemployed. From 1990 to 1994 the number of employed persons declined by 1.4 million, 25 per cent, while the number of the unemployed accounted for less than half of this decline. The remaining part of the decline in employment can be accounted for by the growth in the number of pensioners, partly through early retirement, and by some growth in the number of dependent housewives.

Table 1 .5 : Employment by gender, 1 949-90 Female population aged 1 5-54

Ma/e population aged 15-59 Year

Active earner

Unemp loyed

ln education

Other dependent

Active earner

Unemployed

ln education

Other dependent

Active earner in population aged 60+

1 949 1 960 1 970 1 980 1 984 1 990

89.7 9 1 .4 85.6 85.9 86.2 80.4

1 .6 1.1 2.6 5. 1 5.8 7.4

4.9 6.1 1 0. 6 7.9 7.1 8 .4

3.8 1 .4 1 .2 1.1 0.9 1.1

34.5 53.3 64.3 73.2 73.8 69.6

1 .3 0.7 5.6 1 2. 2 1 0.9 1 3 .6

2.9 4.4 8 .7 7.8 8.3 8.5

6 1 .3 4 1 .6 2 1 .4 6.8 7.0 6. 8

42.4 39.3 1 6.5 5.0 2. 1 2.0

34

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

I N C O M E O F THE P O P UL AT I O N Since the Second World War national income has increased significantly, but it was slower than in most Western European capitalist countries. Until 1989 national income was calculated according to the socialist concept of Net Material Product, excluding services, but Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has also been calculated since the 1960s according to the System of National Accounts proposed by the United Nations, thus permitting approximate comparison of the macro-economy before and after the introduction of the market economy. The diverse elements constituting the national income grew at very different rates in the Communist era. Per capita national income grew at a faster rate than per capita GDP, reflecting the Communist stress on manufacturing material goods. The Communist macro-economy also grew at a faster rate than per capita real income, and very much faster than real wages. ln fact, official statistics showed real wages, after rapid increase in the 1950s and 1960s, actually declining from 1980 to 1989. Social benefits supplemented real wages, and they grew extremely sharply in the post-war era; however, the dramatic percentage increase is due to their initial low base. Yet from 1980 to 1989 social benefits grew by 38 per cent while real wages fell by 5 per cent. Since the total cost of social benefits was smaller than that of wages, the former did not, ipso facto, compensate for the decline in wages. Average income indicators provide signals of the economic crisis of Hungarian Communism. The growth rate in the national income, GDP and the real income of the population was clearly higher in the decade from 1965 to 1975 than in the ten years before and after this decade. From the point of view of economic development the subperiod of tenta­ tive liberalization and market-oriented reforms from the mid-1960s to the second half of the 1970s were the most successful years. After the system change in 1989, the officially calculated GDP declined by about one-fifth up to 1993, and then started to rise again. However, the official figures in Table 1.6 are only approximate because production from the 'grey' or ' informal' economy is not known and only partially taken into consideration in calculating GDP. According to a recent estimation 22 to 25 per cent of the GDP was produced by the informal economy in 1992 (Árvay and Vértes, 1993). Over this period the decline in real incomes of the population was less than the decline in the GDP, as investment declined much more than the income of the popula-

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

35

Table 1 .6: lncome, 1950-94 Per capita national income

Year

( 1 950 = 1 00)

1 950 1 955 1 960 1 965 1 970 1 975 1 980 1 985 1 989 1 990 1991 1 992 1 993 1 994

1 00 1 26 1 65 198 270 360 405 433 450

Per capita GDP

Per capita real income

( 1 960 = 1 00)

( 1 950 = 1 00)

1 00 1 22 1 62 213 249 275 297 279 247 234 229 235

1 00 1 15 1 54 181 245 307 334 360 378 377 370 357 339 351

Real wage

Real value per capita social benefits

(1950 = 100) ( 1 950 = 1 00) 1 00 1 05 1 54 168 1 99 234 238 226 222 214 1 97 195 1 87

1 00 286 415 688 1 , 1 86 1 ,578 1 ,792 2,1 77 2 , 1 66 2,1 88

tion. Real wages also declined by 16 per cent between 1989 and 1993. However, both real incomes and real wages have increased since. The household income surveys of the Central Statistical Office from 1962 to 1987 and the Hungarian Household Panel Surveys of 1992-4 provide data on income inequalities (Appendix Table A.2). Measured by the share of the highest and lowest income decile in the total income of households, income inequalities existed in the Communist period at levels more or less similar to the income inequalities observed in Scandinavian countries. ln 1962, the top decile in the population had 20 per cent of the income and the bottom decile less than 4 per cent. It is also noteworthy that, while from 1962 to 1982 the inequalities tended to decline slightly, from 1982 to 1987 they increased again, with the top tenth of earners gaining 21 per cent of total income. During this period there were two important gradual shifts in inequali­ ties. The first was the decline in the relative advantage of managers and professionals, although important fringe benefits are not taken into consideration in registered income. Second was the relative improvement of the income position of peasants in the period 1967-77, followed by a fall in the 1980s. The transformation of the economy means that income figures after

Rudolf Andorka and István Harcsa

36

1990 are not strictly comparable with the earlier period. ln so far as this dóes not distort overall pattems, then we can say that income inequalities have increased; the top decile now earns 24 per cent of income and the bottom decile 3 .4 per cent: results similar to income inequalities in West Germany. Disregarding problems introduced by measurement, the data also suggest that the income differences between different social or occupational groups have increased. On average managers, professionals and the self-employed have been the winners since the system change, while semi- and unskilled workers and peasants have seen their relative income fall. C ON SU M P T I O N Consumption data might b e more reliable than income a s a measure of the material well-being of the population, given the serious omissions in official economic statistics due to a flourishing informal economy. Moreover, the objects of consumption have shifted dramatically in relative emphasis in the post-war period. Food is a staple, and a significant amount can be grown by households for themselves or acquired outside official markets especially ín a rich agricultural country such as Hungary. ln the period since 1950 total food

■

3,000

Total consumption

• Food consumption

2,500

11 Consumer durables

2,000

1 ,500 1 ,000 500 0

1 950

1955

1 960

1 965

1970

1 975

1 980

1 985

Fi gure 1 .2 Rise in consumption, 1 950-92

1 989

1 992

Long-teim modernization of Hungarian society

37

consumption doubled by the mid- 1980s, and has fallen slightly since the transformation. The consumption indicator makes allowances for how food is produced, its price and quality. Calorie intake, a direct measure of food consumption, shows very limited change: it rose by 20 per cent between 1 950 and 1975, and has remained virtually constant at around 3,300 calories a day since (Figure 1 . 2). Modernization is most dramatically evident in the great rise of consumer durables. ln a sense, this is an artefact of the traditional Hungarian household, especially in rural areas, having very few mass produced goods. The impact of war actually resulted in a fall in the level of consumer goods between 1938 and 1950. During the post-war era, Hungarian households have entered into the era of mass consumption, with television sets, refrigerators, telephones and other consumer goods. The levei of mass affluence has not reached West European standards, as indicated by the fact that less than half Hungarian households have an automobile. None the less, the rise in material living standards has been very real. Furthermore, the ownership of consumer durables has continued since the opening of the borders to goods from the West; the durable index rose by 26 per cent between 1 988 and 1 992. The continued rise in consumer durables, combined with a 5 per cent fall in the overall consumer index and in the notional per capita GDP, illustrates a tendency to unreliability in economic statistics since they point toward opposite conclusions. The divergence is due in part at least to the failure of official statistics to capture all the resources of informal economies on which Hungarians have relied to a significant extent for food and for cash income used to purchase consumer durables. HOUSING ln the inter-war era the housing stock o f Hungary was generally o f low quality. ln 1 930 only one house in eight had its own piped water supply and one in four had electricity, and there was overcrowding, with an average of 2.6 persons per room. Housing conditions further deteriorated due to the devastation of the Second World War. As of 1949, the levei of overcrowding was the same as two decades earlier, less than half of houses had electricity and only one in six had piped water and one in eight had a flush toilet. Housing conditions improved only slowly in the first fifteen years after the war, because centrally planned investments were concentrated on manufacturing and particularly in heavy industry.

38

RudolfAndorka and István Harcsa

o/o 1 00

- Flush toilet

- Piped water supply

E Electricity

80 60

40

20 0

1949

1960

1970

1980

1 984

1988

1993

Figure 1 .3 lmprovement in the quality of housing, /949-93 (%)

ln addition the great majority of the population was so poor that it could not afford to build its own house. More or less in parallel with the introduction of market-oriented reforms in the 1960s, the government endorsed a fifteen-year housing construction programme. However, the majority of housing was built by private resources, not by the state, with families, friends and neighbours doing much of the work themselves and hiring people working in the informal economy. The result was a major growth in the number of houses and in their quality. At the end of the 1970s, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies led to state investment in housing construction being very heavily reduced. As the growth of persona! incomes also slowed in the 1980s, private housing construction also began to decline. Since 1989 state housing construction has almost completely stopped and private building also declined sharply. Because houses have a life of half a century or more, the cumulative effect of decades of new construction has been a big increase in the quality of housing. Today, from three-quarters to virtually all Hungarian houses have a flush toilet, piped water and electricity (Figure 1.3). The number of dwellings with three or more rooms has risen from 5 per cent in 1949, 11 per cent in 1970 to 40 per cent today. The contraction in population size and in the size of households and families has caused the

Lo ng-term modernization ofHungarian so ciety

39

number of persons per room, 259 in 1949, to be halved by the early 1980s, and fall further to 121 in 1988 and 110 in 1993. H EA LTH Health has improved throughout Europe in the twentieth century, and Hungary is no exception. One commonly cited cause is advancements in medical science, a second the rise in the material standard of living and a third the increase in health care provided through the welfare state. Trends in Hungary emphasize the importance of the first two influences, and raise questions about the extent to which more inputs of doctors and hospital beds are sufficient to improve health standards. The most consistent improvement is in infant mortality. Before the First World War about one in five babies died in infancy. While the rate was halved by 1949, infant mortality was still ninety-one deaths per thousand births. ln the post-war years infant mortality has been greatly reduced. ln 1989 it was 15.7 deaths per thousand, and it has continued to fall since the big changes, standing at 12.5 deaths per thousand in 1993 (Figure 1.4) Life expectancy has risen substantially in Hungary since 1900, but it has not done so consistently, or equally for men and women (Figure 1.5).

250

Infant mortality per 1 ,000 children born (0-1 year)

200

1 50

1 00

50

0

Figure 1 .4 Steady improvement ín infant mortality, 1900-93

RudolfAndorka and István Harcsa

40 75 70 65 60 55

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 0

Figure 1 .5 Trends in life expectancy; doctors since 1900

ln 1900, life expectancy for men was 36.6 years, and for women, 38. 1 years. lt rose slowly in the first two decades of the century, and more sharply between the wars. By 1949, life expectancy had increased by three-fifths or more; it was 59.3 years for men, and 63.4 years for women, a slight widening of the gender gap. Life expectancy rose slowly for men in the first two decades of the Communist regime, reaching 67 .5 years for men in 1966. As female life expectancy had risen to 72.2 years, the gender gap remained. Thereafter, life expectancy for men began falling. By 1989, life expectancy for men had dropped to 65.4 years, and by 1993 it stood at 64.5 years. The life expectancy of women rose very slowly throughout the final two decades of the Communist regime, reaching 74.0 years in 1988. Since the male rate was falling, the gender gap increased to eight years. Since then, female life expectancy has been virtually constant, and the gender gap has widened to more than nine years. The decline in life expectancy is very striking, given that the big drop in infant mortality gives a substantial boost to these figures. lt is due to men in the age bracket 40 to 60 tending to die prematurely from a variety of pathological causes, such as road accidents, which rose substantially as car ownership rose under Communism, and then abruptly increased between 1989 and 199 1 as Hungarian motorists showed less and less respect for traffic rules in the midst of regime change, before calming down and returning to the normal accident rate by 1993. Accidental

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

41

deaths from other causes have shown a steady rise in the post-war era, and this has continued since regime change. The expansion of health care services in the Communist era was great (Figure 1.5) : the number of doctors per 10,0000 people more than trebled between 1949 and 1989, and the number of hospital beds almost doubled. However, the correlation with life expectancy appears perverse, for the latter fell while the former continued to rise. Between 1966, the high point for male life expectancy, and 1989, the number of doctors per 10,000 people increased by 81 per cent and hospital beds increased 27 per cent; in the same period, male life expectancy fell 3 per cent. Invalidity pensions, introduced in 1971, have also risen greatly from 207 ,OOO in the initial year. By 1980, invalidity pensions were paid to 408,000 people and by 1989, 502,000, and they rose to 664,000 by 1993. These figures, which are commonly found in Western Europe too, are as much a reflection of the consequences of rising unemployment leading some people to be classified as too ill to work rather than as unable to find a job in a tight labour market. The Hungarian pattern of health rising, then falling, during the Communist era, is common throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union too. It can be attributed not to the lack of health care but to its inefficiencies and low standards, and also to the social stresses generated by the political system and a command economy; jobs were guaranteed, but they were unhealthy jobs. P. Józan (1988 , 1989, 1994) describes the complex of influences on health in the Communist era as a 'social maladaptation syndrome'.

TIME B U D G E T S National time budget surveys were performed in Hungary by the Central Statistical Office in 1963, 1976-7, 1986-7 and in 1993 on a fully compa­ rable hasis (Andorka and Falussy, 1982; Falussy and Zoltánka, 1994). These data allow us to analyse the changes in the main characteristics of everyday life in terms of continuities and change. The amount of time that Hungarians have spent in meeting their basic physiological needs. such as sleeping, eating and washing, has remained virtually constant regardless of the political regime: almost half of each day. ln the 1970s adult Hungarians devoted very many hours to contracted and committed activities (that is, working activities and leaming). Long working hours were explained by the high rate of employment of both

42

RudolfAndorka and István Harcsa

men and women, and by the widespread supplementary use of time spent producing food, averaging an hour a day for men and three-quarters of an hour for women. While women spent less time in paid employment than men, because they spent much more time on household chores, their total committed time was greater (Table 1.7). From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the length of contracted and committed time declined only slightly as part of the reduction in the working hours in the main job was compensated by the growth of time spent in the second economy and, for men, increased time spent in growing food for their own consumption or sale in informal markets. From the mid-1980s to 1993 the hours spent in the main job strongly declined because of the reduction in employment. This decline was, however, not compensated by a growth of activities in the second economy. ln part this was due to some second economy activities changing into main jobs (for example, peasants who earlier cultivated Table 1.7: Time budgets, 1977-93 (average minutes per day) Men

Women

Type of activity

1 977

1 986

1 993

1977

1 986

1 993

Main job Supplementary non-agricultural work Supplementary agricultural work Learning Household chores Shopping Care for children Transport

284 3

255 16

209 5

176

161 9

1 39 2

60

75

73

47

41

34

10 83

7 73 16 14 67 522

7 82 19 17 62 474

6 242 24 28 51 574

6 221 26 41 51 555

5 225 28 49 49 532

61 5 22 16 95 13

62 5 29 11 1 17 11

63 3 19 9 161 15

44 3 9 9 83 9

47 2 17 11 1 07 6

46 2 13 14 135 7

14 227 677

14 250 668

14 286 68 1

27 1 86 680

29 219 666

16 235 673

Total contracted and commited time

Socializing Culture in institutions Newspapers and joumals Reading books Television, video Active sports, outdoor exercise Other leisure Total leisure

Physiological needs

13 13

69 536

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

43

their household plots after their working hours became self-employed peasants), and partly because economic changes led to a fall in the effec­ tive demand for second economy work, that is, the ability of people to pay cash-in-hand. The total amount of time spent in leisure activities increased from 14 to 18 per cent of a twenty-four-hour day in the decades under review, and it increased even more by comparison with the time spent in contracted and committed activities. Men gained an extra fifty-nine minutes a day for leisure, and women an extra forty-nine minutes. Virtually all this increase in leisure time was devoted to watching television and, in the case of men, this resulted in some other activities, such as reading books or newspapers, actually contracting. ln the Communist era and afterwards, men and women show signifi­ cantly different profiles of time use. Because of domestic activities, women have always had more contracted and committed time - and it has consistently been in non-waged work. There is little difference between men and women in time spent in meeting physiological needs. As for leisure, men have always had more leisure time than women, and the gender gap has widened over the years (Table 1.7). C ULTURE Taste in cultural activities has changed dramatically in the post-war era. ln 1 950, people had little time for leisure, and little money to spend in cultural pursuits. The chief activity, often viewed as a treat, was going to the cinema. Cinema attendance, which required money for making films, paying admission and time to watch, peaked in 1960. It then fell dramati­ cally with the advent of television. By 1 989, cinema attendance was below the levei of 1950. A similar rise and fall in cinema attendance has been recorded in Western Europe. Attendance at the theatre has altered much less. It peaked in 1955, and has since declined by about one­ quarter. Attendance at museums increased more slowly, reaching a peak in 1987, and then falling sharply by 1989 and more than halving by 1993 (Table 1.8). Book production increased substantially in the Communist era, due to state subsidies to publishing houses making books cheap, and an increase in education promoting readership. The number of different book titles reached a peak in 1984, and then fell sharply prior to the big change of 1989. It has subsequently risen as publishing houses have had greater

RudolfAndorka and István Harcsa

44

Table 1 .8 : Cultural activities, 1 950-93 Books pub. (per 100,000 pop) Copies (per capita)

Attendance (per 100 population)

Year

titles

thousand daily volumes magazines newspapers

theatre

cinema

museum

1 950 1 955 1 960 1 965 1 970 1 975 1 980 1 985 1 989 1 990 1991 1 992 1 993

20 28 30 39 46 73 77 75 72 72 70 74 82

216 233 348 442 454 702 884 825 1 ,024 1 ,09 1 884 786 700

32 69 64 59 54 59 53 57 49 48 49 46 43

504 1 , 1 79 1 ,401 1 ,045 772 706 567 659 440 349 210 1 48

14 22 37 55 69 1 13 151 1 82 1 54 1 35 1 15 98 90

20

20

23 27 36 41 47 46

44

47 49

31 40 47 59 71 79 82 86 73 76 75

freedom to select titles to publish. The total number of volumes printed has shown a different trajectory; it was at a peak in 1 990, and has fallen sharply since, as costs of production and prices have risen and income has declined. Similarly, the number of daily newspapers in circulation has declined from ninety-one per capita in 1988 to seventy-five per capita in 1993. T he number of copies of weekly, monthly and quarterly joumals has remained relatively constant since the early 1980s. Today, the main cultural activity of most Hungarians is the 'free' activity of viewing television. D E V I A N CE The writings of Emile Durkheim established the suicide rate as a major indicator of social pathology. Historically, Hungarians have had a high rate of reported suicide by European standards, but the rate has fluctu­ ated down as well as up. At the tum of the century, it was about eighteen suicides per 100,000 populatíon, and then rose by more than half in the inter-war years, peaking in the early 1930s' depression. Suicide rates fell during the Second World War, and continued to fall thereafter, reaching a low of 20.5 in 1955. A steady and sharp rise more than doubled the rate

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

45

Table 1 .9 : Deviance, 1 920-93

Year 1 920-4 1 925-9 1 930-4 1935-9 1 940-2 1 950 1955 1 960 1 965 1 970 1 975 1 980 1 985 1 989 1 990 1991 1 992 1 993

Death : liver Per capita consumption of cirrhosis Suicide rate (per / 00,000 pop.) (per 1 00,000 pop.) alcohol ( litre) 27 .0 29.7 32.9 29.2 24.2 22.2 20.5 26.6 29.8 34.6 38.1 44.9 44.4 4 1 .6 39.9 3 8 .6 38.7 35.9

7.4

5.5

5.0 5.5 8.9 9.8 1 2.9 1 8 .2 27 .7 43. 1 5 1 .8 52.6 56.9 70.5 8 1 .7

4.9 4.5 6. 1 6.8 9.1 10.1 1 1 .7 1 1 .5 1 1 .3 11.1 10.7 1 0.5

Persons sentenced (per 10,000 pop.) 52 47 41 49 62 1 10 99 56 68 49 61 56 56 62 46 59 70 68

by 1980, when it hit its post-war peak. Since 1989, the suicide rate has fallen by 14 per cent, and by 1993 was at its lowest in two decades (Table 1.9). Statistics on alcohol consumption reflect both actual drinking and the capacity of official statistics to reflect the amount of alcohol produced and consumed. The pattern in Table 1.9 shows that alcohol consumption Table 1 . 10: Household size, 1949-90

Year 1 949 1960 1 970 1980 1 9 84 1 990 Change

Average household (No.)

One-member households

3.10 2.95 2.79 2.70 2.66 --0.44

One-parent families

Families with 4 + children

(%)

Average family (No.)

(%)

(%)

14.5 17.5 19 . 6 19.8 24.3 9.8

3.39 3. 1 2 3.01 2.94 2.92 2.93 --0.46

1 2.9 1 3 .4 1 0.2 1 1 .3 1 2.6 1 5 .5 2.6

9.5 5.1 2.9 1 .6 1 .3

1A

-8 . 1

Table 1 . 1 1 : lncome distribution , / 962-94 (%)

Year

1 962 1 967 1 972 1 977 1 982 1 987 1 992 1 993 1 994

a b

% share of Lowest Highest deci/e of deci/e of pop . pop.

3 .9 4.1 4.0 4.5 4.9 4.5 3 .5 3 .7 3 .4

20.2 1 8.0 1 9.9 1 8.6 1 8.6 20.9 23. 1 23.6 23.8

ProfesManager sional

1 54 1 40 1 50 1 42 1 27 1 25

-

1 62 1 84

1 40 1 56

Per capita income of social strata in % of national averagea SemiSkilled ski/led Unskilled Se lfSupervisorb Clerical employed worker worker worker Peasant

1 28 1 22 1 15 1 08 1 07 1 17 1 14 1 38

119 111 1 08 97 99 93

-

1 20 118

1 09 1 03 1 00 99 99

95 92 89 93 92 88

-

1 02 1 22 121

1 00 96

1 962-87 by social position of the bead of household, 1 993-94 by social position of the person 1 962-87 semi-professional; 1 993-94 supervisor, foreman

90 88

82 86 86 86 84 81

87 101 1 05 1 04 95 90 85 83

Pensioner

84 81 83 91 98 94

96 101

Lo ng-term modernizatio n of Hungarian so ciety

47

more than doubled in the first three decades of the Communist regime, reaching a peak in 1980, and then levelled off in that decade. These figures are consistent with the death rate from cirrhosis of the liver, a major disease caused by excess drinking. It has risen steadily and very substantially through the years. Since cirrhosis of the liver is a degenera­ tive disease resulting from many years of excess drinking, the rates since 1989 retlect pattems of behaviour from the Communist era. By contrast, since 1989 consumption of alcohol appears to have dropped by a tenth from its post-war peak. Statistical data on crime retlect the functioning of the police, the criminal courts and the severity of criminal law. Between the wars the number of persons sentenced was relatively low, and actually fell during the early 1930s ' depression. It more than doubled at the start of the Communist era, as the regime invented new crimes and was harsh on anyone deemed to be out of line. The peak of sentencing was reached during the most severe time of Stalinist oppression: in 1952, 152 persons per 10,000 were sentenced to prison. Since the 1960s the rate seems to have been more or less stable. ln 1993, the number sentenced for anti­ social crimes was a tenth higher than in 1989, but less than half the proportion sentenced on political, economic and social grounds during the height of the Stalinist repression. No reliable statistical time-series are available on the prevalence of mental problems in the population. The number of persons cared for in psychiatric institutions and the number of patients discharged from mental hospitals indicate more the level of psychiatric care than the frequency of mental illness. Both show a continuous increase. Data from sociological surveys of mental health in the 1980s (Kopp and Skrabski, 1992), however, show that menta! problems are widespread. The authors concluded that 25 per cent of the adult population exhibited depressive symptoms of which 17 per cent were mild, 5 per cent were more severe and 3 per cent had serious symptoms. CONCLUSION During the Communist period the Hungarian economy and society was modemized in so far as social structure became more similar to industrial societies, the levei of education increased and the level of income improved. ln terms of improvement in income and the standard of living, the subperiod of tentative liberalization from the mid-1960s to the second

48

RudolfAndorka and István Harcsa

half of the 1970s was the most successful, as the standard of living of the majority of the Hungarian society began approaching West European standards. However, the totalitarian character of the political system and command economy went counter to trends in modem societies in Western Europe. The slowdown, or even reversal of modernization could be observed in the 1 960s when mortality began to deteriorate and the rise in education almost stopped. Beginning in the late 1970s, stagnation produced signs of crisis, and the failure of modernization became more and more visible. Some underlying trends-the deterioration of health and the growth of certain forms of deviance--demonstrate that the basic process of modernization is not complete. The roots of the failure of modernization are in the totalitarian and laterally authoritarian character of the Communist political system which impeded the development of rationality and modern values. References Andorka, R.,1990. 'Changes in Social Mobility in Hungary, 1 930-1983 ' . ln M. Haller, ed., Class Structure in Europe. Annonk: Sharpe, 198-232. Andorka, R., 1 994. ' Social Changes and Social Problems in Hungary Since the 1 930s: Economic, Social and Political Causes of the Demise of State Socialism ' . Comparative Social Research, 14, 49-96. Andorka, R. and Falussy, B., 1 982. 'The Way of Life of the Hungarian Society on the Basis of the Time Budget Survey of 1976--1 977 ' . Social Indicators Research, 1 1 , 1 , 3 1-74. Andorka, R. and Harcsa, 1., 1 990. 'Modemization in Hungary in the Long and Short Run Measured by Social lndicators ' . Social Indicators R esearch, 23, 1-2, 1-199. Andorka, R., Kolosi, T. and Vukovich, G., eds, 1 992. Social Report. Budapest: TÁRKI. Árvay, J. and Vértes, A., 1993. A rejtett gazdaság Magyarországon [The Hidden Economy in Hungary] . Research Report. Budapest: Central Statistical Office. Bekker, Zs., 1994. Rendszerválság 1970-1990 [System Crisis] . Doctoral disser­ tation. Dahrendorf, R., 1 990. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto and Windus. Ehrlich, É., 1 991 . Országok versenye 1937-1986 [Competition between Countries 1937-1986] . Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Erikson, R. and Goldthorpe, J. H., 1992. The Constant Flux. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Long-term modernization of Hungarian society

49

Falussy, B . and Zoltánka, V., 1 994. A magyar társadalom életmódjának változásai az 1 976-77. , az 1 986-87 . és az 1 993. évi életmód-időmérleg felvételek alapján [Changing Lifestyle of the Hungarian Society - Analysis Based on Lifestyle and Time Budget Surveys Carried Out in 1 976-77, 1 986-87 and 1 993] . B udapest: KSH. Janos, A. C . , 1 982. The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary 1 825-1 945. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Józan, P., 1 988. A halálozási viszonyok alakulása Magyarországon / 945-1985 [Changing Mortality Trends in Hungary between 1 945 and 1 985] . Budapest: KSH. Józan, P., 1 989 . ' Contrasts in Mortality Trends ' . ln lnternational Population Conference, vol. 3. New Delhi, 23 1-46. Józan, P., 1 994. A halálozási viszonyok alakulása Magyarországon 1 980-1 992 [Changing Mortality Trends in Hungary between 1 980 and 1 992] . Budapest: KSH. Konrád, Gy. and Szelényi, I., 1 99 1 . ' Intellectuals and Domination in Post­ Communist Societies. ln J.S. Coleman and P. Bourdieu, eds, Social Theory for a Changing Society. New York: Russell Sage, 337-6 1 . Kopp, M . and Skrabski , Á ., 1 992. Magyar lelkiállapot [Hungarian Flood] . Budapest: Végeken. Kornai, J., 1 980. Economics ofShortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Komai, J., 1 992. The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Komai, J., 1 993. Útkeresés [Seeking Ways and Means] . Budapest: Századvég. Zapf, W., 1 994. Modernisierung, Woh(f'ahrtsentwicklung und Transformation. Berlin: Sigma.

C H A P T ER 2

POPULATIO N : BIRTH , MARRIAGE AND DEATH György Vukovich

T HE size of the population and its age composition are the results of demographic processes fixed in different moments of time. ln this chapter some characteristic features of these processes are examined. We will focus specifically on fertility rates, mortality and the changing demographic composition of the population. These features will show that Hungary has experienced some trends that differ from both its Eastern European counterparts and Western Europe while others follow similar pattems.

F E RTILITY The number of births in Hungary has shown a declining tendency during the last forty years with some fluctuations. This tendency of continuous decline is identical to the processes also occurring in the majority of developed countries. The fluctuations in births can, however, be consid­ ered to be a specific domestic feature. There was an extremely high upswing in the birth rate in the middle of the 1950s until the beginning of the 1960s which was followed by a downswing to a degree never seen before. Then the birth rate, increasing with moderate short-term fluctua­ tions, had another upswing in the middle of the 1970s, followed by another period of decline. This decline was initially slow at the begin­ ning but increased rapidly. The new bottom was much lower than that of the early 1960s. The number of children born in 1989 was 123,000, the lowest in the history of Hungarian demography. ln 1990 there was a moderate increase, with 125,600 children born.

Population: birth, marriage, and death

51

As regards number of births, Hungary has a favourable place in the European gradation. For instance, in 1985 the gross birth rate in Hungary was 12.3 per thousand: in 1990 it was 12.1 per thousand. ln 1990 there were lower rates in Austria (11.6 per thousand), Belgium (11.6 per thousand), Greece (10.1 per thousand), the German Federal Republic (11.4 per thousand) and ltaly (9.8 per thousand). One cannot find much higher rates in the other developed countries of the European region: ln all the farmer socialist countries - except far Bulgaria (11. 7 per thousand) - birth rates have been higher and in some much higher than in Hungary. ln Poland it has been over 14.0 per thousand, while in Romania it has come close to this number. The birth rate in the farmer Soviet Union in 1990 was 16.8 per thousand. ln the non-European countries birth rates are usually considerably higher. For instance in Egypt it is 41.1 per thousand, in Mexico it is 31.5 per thousand. ln the developed non-European countries birth rates are lower but higher than in Europe. For instance, in Australia the birth rate is 14.9 per thousand, in the USA 16.7 per thousand, in Canada 14.9 per thousand. Since the number of births depends essentially on fertility it is impor­ tant to trace its development. The total fertility rate (TFR) is the most suitable indicator; it is the average number of children bome by a woman during the whole fertile period of her life, calculated on the hasis of the birth rate of a given year or period. The rate has declined during the last two or three decades in the countries with highly developed economies and it is a process that has been accelerating in the last ten years. During the last four decades this indicator has declined by more than a quarter, and most sharply between the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 2.1). 3 2.5 2

0.5

a Total fertility rate is the average number of all children borne by a woman during the whole fertile period of her life, calculated on the hasis of the birth rate of a given year of period

o �-----------------------"' '1' "' r-00 � � � "j' � � � � � � � � � r-"' r-� � � � V'}

0

0

V'}

V'}

�

N

00

00

00

Years

Figure 2. 1 Total fertility rate

V'} 00

00

00

00 00

00

György Vukovich

52

ln some developed countries we can find a much more intensive decline in fertility. ln Hungary, the average value of TFR in the 1950s and early 1960s was between 2.7 and 2.8; now it is about 1.9. Compared to thirty years ago, women now give birth to one less child. For the last thirty years, the fertility level in Hungary has not been high enough to maintain the simple reproduction of the population in the longer term. T his inevitable decline in the population size was kept at bay for a period by the age composition of the population and sometimes by bringing forward the timing of birth. When compared to twenty-three European countries, the value of completed fertility of the female cohort bom in 1930 is the lowest at 2.03, while in countries with similar or lower values of TFR per calendar year, the TFR for women born in 1930 is higher or much higher. The completed fertility of the last married female cohort born in 1940 is 1.86 and the completed fertility of the female cohort born in 1920 was also not higher than 2.19. During the last three years the TFR has shown a very moderate increase from 1.78 to 1.84. This might be attributed to the introduction of a child care allowance. The female fertility data from the population censuses (the total number of recorded children ever borne by women) also show a considerable decline during the last couple of decades. Table 2.1 shows the number of children ever bom per married woman in 1920 was 3.60. This value declined by 1 970 to 2.0 1 and then by 1 980 to 1 .89. This tendency of decline has stopped during the last decade. By 1990 the number of children ever born per married woman had increased slightly to 1.90. ln 1920 more than 40 per cent of married women bore four or more children. By 1980 this rate had declined to 9 per cent, then, by 1990 to about 6 per cent. ln the last two decades a woman with two children has Tabi e 2. 1 : Total fertility rate of married women Number of children ever born per 100 married women (total) 4 2 3 0 1 920 1 93 0 1 949 1 960 1 970 1 980 1 990

1 7.9 17. 1 1 8.4 15.1 1 3.8 1 1 .9 8.7

1 6.6 1 6.9 22.3 25.3 29.2 27.9 25.6

1 2.5 1 6.5 20.7 25.8 3 1 .0 39. 1 46. 1

1 0.9 1 2.8 1 3. 1 13.8 1 2.7 1 2.3 1 3 .2

42.2 36.7 25.6 1 9.8 1 3.2 8.8 6.4

(1 00) (1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00) ( 1 00)

Children per married woman 3 .62 3.27 2.57 2.32 2.01 1 .89 1 .90

Source: The annual demographic reports by the Central Statistical Office

Population: birth, marriage, and death

53

become the norm. ln 1980 it was 39 per cent and by 1990 its value attained 46 per cent. During the period since 1920, the greatest increase has occurred in women with two children. New forms of fertility behaviour are also confirmed by the results of representative surveys of family planning. According to the results of a family-planning survey carried out in 1989, the number of children planned by young couples declined from 2.07 to 2.00 over the course of the first six years of their marriage. Families who plan at the beginning of their marriage on having three children want to have only two of them after six years of marriage, while a smaller group who initially plan on two children want to have only one after six years. A major reason advanced for the decline in fertility in societies with a European culture is the radical change in the family model brought about by industrialization and capitalist development. Historical processes have transformed the family from a productive economic unit into a consumer one; a child is becoming a commodity. ln line with this process there has been a decline in mortality (including infant mortality) and an increase in the number of children surviving to adulthood. As a result families have limited the number of children. Aside from large-scale socio-economic changes we think one impor­ tant factor is the decline of traditional moral values, a second is the inability of families to provide for children under prevailing economic conditions and a third is the greater availability of the means of contra­ ception. M O RTALITY From the viewpoint of morbidity, the last forty-five years can be charac­ terized by the prevalence of chronic degenerative diseases, divided into two parts, the period between 1945 and 1964 and between 1965 to 1990. By the early 1960s mortality declined to a lower level than ever before. Between 1949 and 1964 life expectancy at birth increased from 61.4 to 69.4 years, an outstanding rise compared both to the previous period and to other countries in the period of reconstruction after the Second World War. However, during the last twenty-five years, mortality rates have increased again. 1 About three-fourths of the increase in the mortality rate is due to the ageing of the population, while one-fourth is the result of the growing mortality by age. The worsening of mortality conditions was

54

György Vukovich

reflected with a slight delay in life expectancies at birth. This can be explained partly by the decline in the life expectancies of men„ the slight increase in women's life expectancy until 1989, with a decline from 1990 onwards. ln 1990 the average life expectancy at birth in Hungary was 69. 3 years (men: 65.1 years; women: 73.7 years). The decline in mortality conditions of the adult population is shown by the decline in life expectancy of men aged 30 by 4. 3 years between 1964 and 1990, near the value it was in the 1930s. The life expectancy of women did not change during the same period. Life expectancies in 1990 at the age of 30 were: men, 37.5 years; women, 45.4 years. On the other hand, the mortality of infants, children and adults under 30 has improved a great deal during the last two decades. The relatively high infant mortality is largely a result of infants born with very low birth weight. ln the period between 1964 and 1990 the mortality of the male popula­ tion over 30 years increased in all age groups. The mortality rates of men in the age groups 40-4 and 45-59 more than doubled. The mortality rates of men between 40-74 years in 1990 were higher than those in 1947. ln the period between 1964 and 1990 the mortality of women by age increased in the groups between 30 and 64 years, while it diminished in the others. The decline in mortality conditions of the middle-aged female population is much more moderate than that of the male popula­ tion of the same age. The greatest increase in mortality rates, between a quarter and a third, can be found in the stratum of women aged between 30-4 and 40-4 years. The unfavourably high mortality level is due to several connected factors. The first group consists of unfavourable habits of life, the territo­ rial mobility of the population, declining economic conditions and tradi­ tions. These contribute to the early and mass occurrence of degenerative diseases, the most significant being heart and vascular system diseases and tumours.The second group consists of that broad stratum of the society that do not recognize the value of health, have high-risk health behaviours, such as excessive alcohol consumption and tobacco smoking, and poor public health education. The third group reflects deficiency in the infrastructure of public health, and its increasing failure í.u fulfil growing demands or reach international standards. Undoubtedly, these factors have always influenced morbidity and mortality in other countries, too. ln the highly developed countries, however, these effects have partly diminished or ceased. Negative attitudes have been replaced by positive ones and the amounts invested in public health have been much greater than those in Hungary.

Population: birth, marriage, and death

55

The above mentioned factors and the age distribution of the popula­ tion determine the number of deaths per year. Examining the gross mortality rate for the 1 980s, the data show the greatest number of deaths ( 148,000) was recorded in 1983 declining by about three thousand by 1 990. These values may indicate the beginning of a slow improvement in mortality, or at least a halt in the former deterioration. The high mortality rate is the major factor responsible for the decline in the population size that started in the early 1980s. Even a fertility trend for several decades would not assure the simple reproduction of population in the long run, but the decline in mortality during the last two decades, with a considerable improvement of the same indicator in the highly developed countries, resulted in negative population growth.

D E M O G R A P H I C S I T UATI O N The number and composition of the popu/ation The change in the Hungarian demographic situation in 1993, compared to the previous years, was a decline in births from 1 2 1 ,724 (a very low value) in 1 992 to 1 16,500, resulting in the lowest rates of birth and a natural decrease in the population. ln early 1994 there was a more favourable picture of demographic processes with a moderate increase in birth rates along with a moderate decline in death rates. The birth rate in Hungary, in comparison with the other European countries, is not very low. An essential difference from other European populations, however, is that there has been a continuous decline for several decades. ln most European countries, fertility - characterized by total fertility rates - has been declining for a shorter time and in a more abrupt way. The composition of the population showed three major trends in population movement rates. First in early 1994 the population number was 10,276,968, down 33,2 1 1 from the previous year. That was the highest actual decrease in times of peace. The gender ratio in the popula­ tion - because of the extremely high mortality of men - has continued to change to the advantage of women. ln 1994 the number of women for every thousand of men was 1 ,088, while in the previous year it was 1 ,086 and in 1 970 it was 1 ,063 . The second important trend has been the continuing increase in the number as well as the proportion of divorced and widowed in the total population. Among widowed people, males were about 1 54,000, while females were about 795,000 and widows inceased by 5,000 in number

56

György Vukovich

Table 2.2: Age composition ofpopulation (%) 1 980

1 990

1 994

0 1-4 5-9 1 0-1 4 (0-14)

1 .5 6.6 7.2 6.5 (21 .8)

1 .2 4.8 6.3 8.3 (20.5)

1.1 4.8 6.0 6.7 ( 1 8 .6)

1 5- 1 9 20-24 25-29 30-34 3 5-39 ( 1 5-39)

6. 1 7.6 8.3 7. 1 6.7 (35.8)

7.4 6.5 6.0 7.5 8.2 (35.5)

8.6 7. 1 6.3 6. 1 8.0 (36. 1 )

40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 (40-59)

6. 1 6.4 6.5 6.3 (25.3)

6.9 6.5 5.8 5.9 (25 .0)

7.7 6.7 6. 1 5.5 (26.0)

3.5 5.1 3.9

5.6 5. 1 2.6

1 .4 0.6 (17.1)

1 .7 0.8 ( 1 8.9)

5.4 4.9 4.2 1 .9 1 .9 1 .0 ( 1 9.3)

60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85 + (60 +)

2.6

3. 1

in the year; the number of divorced was 271.7 and 391.7 respectively. The final major trend has been a definite ageing of the population. The proportion of those under 14 years declined from 20.5 per cent (1990) to 18.6 in1994. There was a moderate increase in the proportion of those aged between 15-39 and 40-59 years, and of those aged over 60. ln 1994 the proportion of the latter was 19.3 per cent (Table 2.2). Marriage

There has been a continuous decline in the number and rate of marriages. The gross rate has - because of the diminishing population size - declined to a lesser extent, while the net rate has in the case of both sexes declined considerably. There has been a decline in marriage in all age groups regardless of gender. ln the age groups under 24 years it is particularly

57

Population : birth, marriage, and death Table 2.3 : Number and rate of marriages

Year

Tatai

1 970 1 980 1 990 1 99 1 1 992 1 993

96,6 1 2 80,3 3 1 66,405 6 1 , 1 98 57,005 54,099

No. of marriages per 1 ,000 non-married aged 15 + per / ,OOO men women persons

9.3 7.5 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.3

8 1 .7 68.7 47.4 42.3 38.3 35.4

62. 1 51.1 35.9 32.3 29.3 27 .2

Average age in years at marriage men women

27 . 1 27.2 27.4 27 .4 27.4

23.6 24.2 24.4 24.4 24.4

striking in the period between 1 980 and 1993. These rates (calculated far the married population of the appropriate age and sex) declined in the case of men from 140.5 to 85.7 and in the case of women from 250.5 to 123.9 (Table 2.3). As regards family status before marriage, there is also a decline in all cases of family status. Besides these marriage movements, there is an increasing number of temporary and long-term extra-marital cohabita­ tions, though there has been no continuous data collection by the official statistics on this matter. This increase is shown by the increasing number of children bom out of wedlock. ln spite of the decline in the total number of children bom, those out of wedlock increased from 16,5 1 1 in 1 990 to 20,647 in 1 993. Fertility

Fertility has continued to decline. ln 1 993 the birth rate was 1 1.37 per thousand, the lowest value ever measured. Births per women aged 1 5-49 declined from 49.4 (1 990) to 45.3 per thousand ( 1 993) and there was a similar decline in the birth rate calculated per married women. If the age distribution of the population today was the same as it was in 1 9 10, then the gross birth rate would be 13.80 instead of 1 1.37. As a result of the long-term decline in fertility and increase in mortality, the rate of the female population of child-bearing age in the present age distribution is much lower than it was in the years 1 9 1 9 and 1 949. When examining the number of births by the age of mothers, we can find a striking decline in the age group 20-4, while there is a definite increase in the groups aged 25-9 and over 40 years. The fertility of women - after a short period of increase after 1 990 - had a distinct

58

György Vukovich

decline in 1992 and 1993, mainly because of the decreasing rates in the 20--4 year age group. Since for fertility this age group is of primary importance, the significant decline in recent years deserves attention. This decline cannot be counterbalanced by the stagnant or slightly declining fertility rates of the other age groups. The development of fertility indicators for 1993 and before indicates that the expected increase in birth numbers of the more populous cohorts as they come to child-bearing age might be considerably less than estimated previously. ln 1993 the value of the net reproduction coefficient was 0.804, or 20 per cent less than needed for the simple replacement of the population. ln the previous year the total fertility rate was 1.69. The number of abortions, after a maximum (nearly 200,000) in the early 1970s, fluctuated between eighty to ninety thousand in the 1980s, then, in 1993, it declined to 75,300 from 87,000 in 1992. This decline, however, was not followed by an increase in the number of births, indicating that couples are practising more effective birth control.

Mortality

ln 1993 there were 150,244 deaths and the annual gross mortality rate was 14.6 per thousand. Because of the different mortality and age composition of the two sexes, the number of men and women who died was 80,498 and 69,746 respectively. Consequently, the mortality rates were 16.32 and 13.01 for males and females respectively. These data reflect unfavourable mortality conditions. ln 1993 the life expectancies at birth were 64.53 years for men and 73.81 years for women, a synthetic indicator best reflecting the overall leve! of mortality (Table 2.4). These data clearly indicate a dramatic decline in male mortality since 1966, the year with the most favourable life expectancy values. Female mortality has, with minor fluctuations, stagnated but it has never regained its 1988 top value. The different mortality processes of the two sexes have considerably increased the differences between their life expectancies. ln 1993 the life expectancy of women at birth was more than nine years longer than that of men. Such a great difference cannot be found in any other country. Compared to the highly developed countries, female mortality in Hungary is also very high. ln the early 1990s the life expectancy of women at birth was about 78-82 years, while in Japan it was nearly 83 years. Only in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe ( except for Romania) could we

Population: birth, marriage, and death

59

Table 2.4: Life expectancy at birth for men and women, 1960-93 1 949 1 955 1 960 1 966 1 970 1 9 80 1981 1 982 1 983 1 984 1985 1 986 1 9 87 1988 1 989 1 990 1991 1 992 1 993

Men

Women

(Difference)

59.28 64.77 65 .89 67.53 a 66. 3 1 65 .45 65 .46 65 .63 65.08 65 .05 65 .09 65.30 65.67 66. 1 6 65 .44 65 . 1 3 65 .02 64.55 64.53

63 .40 68 .67 70. 1 0 72.23 72.08 72.70 72.86 73 . 1 8 72.99 73 . 1 6 73 .07 73.2 1 73 .74 74.03 a 73 .79 73.7 1 73.83 73.73 73.8 1

(4. 1 2) (3.90) (4. 2 1 ) (4.70) (5 .77) (7.25) (7.40) (7.55) (7.9 1 ) (8. 1 1 ) (7.98) (7.9 1 ) (8.07) (7.87) (8.35) (8.58) (8. 8 1 )• (9. 1 8 ) (9.28)

• The highest life expectancies and the largest difference

find values much less than in the leading countries but nevertheless more favourable than in Hungary. Such a decline in the mortality conditions of men is due to an extreme worsening of mortality of the middle-aged population. Since the mid­ l960s, mortality rates of the population aged 35-54 have more than doubled. Table 2.5 shows the average male mortality rate per thousand for 1993, for the favourable 1959-1960 years and for Austria. Table 2.5: Mortality rates of men (per thousand) 1959-60 30-4 35-9 40-4 45-9 50-4 55-9 60-4 65-9

1 .99 2.54 3.48 5 .50 9.14 1 6.08 25.30 40.02

Hungary

1993

Austria, 1 992

3.20 5.95 9. 1 3 1 2.97 1 9.58 25.67 36.36 49.43

1 .36 1 .88 2.94 4.85 7.13 1 1 .26 1 8 .60 28.39

60

György Vukovich

There is, however, a definite deterioration in all groups. Among the highly developed countries, the mortality level of Austria is better than average. The comparison of the Austrian and Hungarian data needs no comment, especially when taking into consideration that these rates were very close in the years 1959-60. Although it is difficult to examine the causes of the dramatic decline, the structure of the causes of death is very similar in the highly developed countries and in Hungary, with some special exceptions such as accidents and suicide. The characteristic feature of the domestic situation is that the major diseases resulting in death occur in much younger age groups than in Western countries, due to an unconcerned attitude toward the way of life and health, and, in a wider sense, to the relatively poor level of public health infrastructure. Note

1 For a detailed analysis of mortality see The Development of Mortality in Hungary between 1945 and 1985 (Mortality Studies, 5) issued by the Central Statistical Office. The author is Péter Józan.

CH A PTER 3

DENOMINATION AND RELIGIOUS P RACTICE Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

Tms chapter is concemed with the change in denominational composi­ tion in Hungary and the social determinants of religious affiliation and religiosity. It summarizes the most important conclusions of sociological studies based on large surveys conducted between 1971 and 1991 and results from the 1992-3 annual survey by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office on social structure and mobility (Bukodi et al. 1994; VKSH 1993). Over the past century it is generally thought that the proportion of the Catholic population has increased, while the Lutheran population has decreased. The total size of the different denominations were obviously different before and after the First World War. Before that war, the Hungarian empire include large parts of Central Europe which later became new states. Thus pre-First World War Hungary had about three times the population and about four times the territory of 1918 Hungary. The new countries were, however, not only ethnically but denomination­ ally mixed with a strong representation of Orthodox believers and Uniates (Greek Catholics). On the other hand, Hungary became ethni­ cally homogenous with large groups of Hungarian minorities remaining in the neighbouring 'new ' countries. With the country 's territorial change after the Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920), the significant proportion of Hungarians adhering to the Orthodox religion all but disappeared. The Calvinist proportion increased by one and a half in relation to the previous period (Karner, 1931; Kovacsis, 1963; Nyárády, 1981; KSH, 1992). ln spite of all these changes, in both periods the Catholic propor­ tion of the population continued to increase while the Calvinist propor­ tion continued to decline (Table 3.1). There is a correlation between religious affiliation and socio-econornic

62

Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

Table 3. 1 : Hungary' s denominations, 1 869-1949 Pre-Versailles Treaty (Trianon) territory b 1 869 1 880 1 890 1 900 1910 Present-day territory 1910 1 920 1 930 1 94 1 1 949

Catholic a Calvinist Lutheran

Other

57.4 58. 1 58.9 59.6 60.3

14.9 14.7 1 4.6 14.4 1 4.3

8.1 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.2

19.6 19.1 1 8.7 1 8 .5 1 8.2

65.0 66. 1 67.2 68.2 70.5

21 .4 20.9 20.9 20.8 2 1 .9

6.4 6.2 6. 1 6.0 5.2

7.2 6.8 5.8 5 .0 2.4

a Roman, Greek, and Armenian Catholic b Excludes Croatia and Slavonia Source: Census data, as reprinted by Kovacsics ( 1 963 : 306)

characteristics. The Catholic religion has had an above average ratio of believers in the country's central and western regions and among the landless peasantry. The Calvinists were disproportionately present in the eastem regions and among the small and middle-size landowners. Lutherans were concentrated in the urban areas and among the ethnic Slovaks, while the Jewish population was concentrated in the larger cities. There were differences in education, income, lifestyle and culture among the different religious groupings. The effects of the recent past on religious statistics are partly evident but numerically unclarified. Far example, the Holocaust and the ensuing emigration reduced the Jewish denomination to one-tenth or even less of its original number, while a significant number of Slovaks and Germans left Hungary either via population exchange, deportation or voluntary emigration, thus reducing the size of the Lutheran Church. The deporta­ tions of the early 1950s, the continuous influx into urban areas, a trend toward vertical mobility and the discrimination against those practising their religion all contributed toward breaking down the previously existing religious sub-cultures and hindered their regeneration. Extensive denominational statistics were last prepared in Hungary in 1949. Although data from representative samples exist only since 1972 (Tomka, 1991), several authoritative foreign sources published detailed estimated data on Hungary's denominational structures over the last decades (Table 3.2). Barrett's (1982) World Christian Encyc/opedia

63

Denomination and religious practice Table 3 .2: Denominational structure in Hungary, 1 957-88 Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Jewish Other No religion

1 957 a

1 980 a

1980 b

1 980 C

1 988 b

1 988 d

1 991 d

67 20 6

6 1 .4 1 6. 8 3.3 0.7 0.8 17

58.6 23.9

53.9 2 1 .6

0.9 0.6 16

0.9 0.5 23 . 1

66.2 1 7.9 4 2.4

70.6 20.6 4.4 0.4 0.3 3 .7

72.2 20.3 3. 5 0.2 0.4 3 .4

? ? ?

9.5

a Estimates do not mention criteria used for classifying into denominations b Estimates give criteria used as baptisms and inscriptions e Estimates based on self-identification d Survey data Sources: 1 957 (Bilan, 1 964); 1 980 (András); 1 980 (Barrett, 1 982); 1 988; (Tomka, 1 99 1 ) . 1988, 1 99 1 surveys (Tomka, 1 994, 3 34f.).

became a source whose data - with reference to it or not - numerous foreign and native writers have adopted (Clévenot, 1987; Gergely, 1986; Voss, 1984). These estimates were not based on systematic surveys but on intemal ecclesiastical reports (Morel and András, 1984), some appearing in intemational publications (Annuarium Statisticum Ecclesiae, 1989; World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1986; Baptist World Alliance 1984). However, statistical accuracy is not guaranteed in ecclesiastical reports. Systematic errors can slip in, such as the insufficient tracking of geographical mobility. Nor can one dismiss the distortions dictated by various interests (Tomka, 1988a). The fourteen studies with large sample surveys between 1972 and 1991 (Table 3.3) support the earlier work. There has been a slight increase in the proportion of Catholics over time, while the proportion of Calvinists and Lutherans has declined. As is consistent with trends in other Western countries there has been an increase in the proportion of the population who indicate that they have no religious affiliation. Amalgamating surveys between 1978 and 1991 makes it possible to undertake a detailed examination of the denominational structure of the population. The Table 3 . 3 : Religious affiliation by age, 1 992 Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Other religion No religion Unknown 1 8-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 + Difference: Old-Young

6 1 .3 67.3 67.0 69. 1 68.8

1 8.0 20.3 22.3 22.3 22.5

3 .0 3.3 4.2 5 .0 5.5

1 .8 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.9

1 4. 1 4.4 1 .8 0.5 0.4

1.8 1 .9 1 .9 0.7 0.7

7.5

4.5

2.5

1.1

- 1 3 .7

-1.1

64

Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

samples chosen were restricted by the question wording, so we have used integrated samples produced from studies done partly between 1972 and 1981 and in 1985, and partly from annual samples between 1984 and1991. AG E AND D E N O MINATI ONAL REPRO D U C T I O N The comparison of the youngest and oldest age groups is particularly suitable for the illustration of structural change. When we examine religious affiliation within different age groups, (Table 3.3), the spread of those with no religious affiliation is much stronger among the young than the old. Thus, 14.1 per cent of those aged 18 to 29 reported no affili­ ation in 1992 compared to 0.4 per cent of those aged 60 and older. The proportion of Lutherans under 25 is less than two-thirds that of those 60 or older, and the Calvinist ratio is also significantly lower in the younger age groups. By contrast, the proportion of Catholics and ' other ' denomi­ nations in the younger group is only slightly lower than in the older group. The decrease within the Jewish denomination is so large that several Protestant sects bypass it in the younger age groups. At the insti­ tutional level, one can compare the shift in the overall membership of the churches. Among Catholics, the ratio of the younger age group declined slightly in comparison to the older group, but it grew significantly in relative size in comparison to other denominations in the 1978 to 1991 period. This raises the possibility that the Catholic prevalence in the non­ adult group is even greater than is shown here. RELI G I O U S END O G A M Y Earlier studies provide only fragmented information on the religious affiliations of husbands and wives (Tomka, 1980; Utasi, 1992), yet inter­ marriage across religious groups affects the preservation of values and traditions. Given the limitations of the sample size, the analysis is restricted to the Catholic and Calvinist denominations, although certain broad tendencies can be shown for the Lutherans and for those with no religious affiliation. Endogamy is highest among Catholics (Table 3.4). More than four­ fifths of Catholics choose partners within their denomination. The proportionate value for Calvinists is 54 per cent, and 36 per cent for Lutherans. This relatively large discrepancy could possibly be explained by the difference in denominational size. Being in the majority,

65

Denomination and religious practice Table 3 .4: Extent of religious endogamy (W(fe)

(Husband) Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Other N o affiliation

Catholic

Calvinist

81.3

1 2.6

39.2 47.5 36.7 46.4

53.7

1 2.9 23.3 1 4.3

Lutheran

Other

(Row percentages) 1 .5 3.0 1 .9 3.1 4.0 35.6 1 .8

36.7 1 .8

No religion

Unknown

0.9 1 .3

0.7 0.8

3.3

32.1

3.6

Catholics have a much higher chance of choosing a partner within the same denomination than do the other denominations. To a lesser degree, the difference presumably can be explained in that the 'capability' for denominational maintenance is greater for Catholics than for Calvinists. This latter assumption is strengthened by differences observed in the day-to-day practices of different religious groups, such as baptism and church attendance. However, endogamy is still relatively high among the smaller religious groups that make up the ' other' category with one­ third choosing a partner with the same religious category. The probable explanation for this is a greater inner cohesiveness of the smaller churches and their distance and their antipathy toward the big, institu­ tionalized churches and their adherents. Around one-third of those with no religious affiliation are also married to partners who also report no religious affiliation. If we look at religious endogamy within different levels of educational attainment, the higher the husband's educational attainment (and presum­ ably the wife's), the lower the probability that members of the same denomination marry. This association is significantly stronger among Calvinists than among Catholics with 40 per cent of Calvinists with post­ secondary education reporting an endogamous marriage, 14 per cent below the Calvinist average, as compared to 75 per cent of Catholics with post-secondary education, 6 per cent below the Catholic average. Several factors combine to explain this phenomenon. Aspiration for a higher education characterizes the less traditional groups, where denominational openness is probably greater. Conversely, a higher educational attainment usually makes people more open or receptive to new ideas and values. This favours the spread of inter-denominational or exogamous marriages. Finally, the attainment of a higher education generally goes hand-in-hand with an alienation from the tradition-preserving social group of orienta-

66

Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

Table 3.5: Religious affiliation of grandparents, parents and married couples (Husbands) •

Both Catholic Both Protestant Husband Catholic - wife Protestant Husband Protestant - wife Catholic Other m ixed combination

Paternal and maternal grandfather

parents

married couples

change

63.6 22.0 3.4 8.4 2.6

64.3 2 1 .9 3.8 5.5 4.5

55 .9 1 6.3 1 0. 1 1 0.2 7.5

-7 .7 -5 .7 +6.7 + 1 .8 +4.9

a Missing cases excluded

tion, a change in social connections and ericountering an environment in which there is less emphasis placed on religious affiliation. A further important question is whether - among those surveyed parental religious affiliation influences the propensity of children towards endogamous marriages. Do the religious values and attitudes received at home play a role in the choice of a partner? Before the 1940s there evolved fairly strict customs - the majority of those getting married chose a partner within the same denomination. Where there was inter­ marriage across different dominations, one could expect serious family conflicts. Consequently, such marriages were rare. Table 3.5 examines the religious affiliations of the husband's paternal and maternal grandfather and the husband's parents and compares them with current marriages. The per cent of endogamous Catholic marriages among grandparents (patemal and maternal grandfather) and parents (father and mother) was approximately 64 per cent, 22 per cent were endogamous Calvinist marriages and the remaining portion consists of different mixed families. Two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the denominational composition of the families was relatively stable in previous generations; the second is that percentage distribution resem­ bles the denominational proportion that was characteristic of the total population. W hen we compare present marriages with those of the parents, the rate of mixed marriages has noticeably increased in the last three to four decades. The increase in mixed marriages varies across different religious groups. Where both parents are Catholic, 82 per cent of marriages are also Catholic. ln instances where both parents are Calvinist, only 63 per cent of the marriages are Calvinist. Among

67

Denomination and religious practice

Calvinists, the extent of endogamous marriage declines more rapidly than among Catholics.

E D U CAT I O N AND D E N O M I NAT I O N The educational attainment o f the different denominational groups and those with no religious affiliation shows quite a significant structural difference. Close to two-thirds of the adults with no affiliation, more than half of the Jewish religion, and close to half of the 'other ' category have secondary or post-secondary education. There are also consider­ able deviations within the three 'historical ' churches, the big churches with deep roots in Hungarian history. The education level of the Lutherans is higher than that of either the Catholics or the Calvinists. The pattern is affected by the historical patterns of behaviour which continue to be present. ln addition, religion was a basis for exclusion from higher education during the Communist period, and those with aspirations for upward mobility were expected to be atheists with no religious affiliation. The ratio of the highest to the lowest level of educational attainment shown in the last column of Table 3.6 indicates that educational attain­ ment is higher for those with no denominational affiliation, Jews, Lutherans and the 'other ' category, and the probability of obtaining a secondary or post-secondary education is below average for Catholics or Calvinists. According to the 1 992 data, of those belonging to the three big churches (Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran) one-third (32.8 Table 3 .6: Religious affi liation by education, average 1 978-91 (%) Education leve/s less than grade 8 Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Jewish Other No affiliation Missing data (N)

72. 1 22.7 4.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 (23 ,629)

Source: Tomka ( 1 994: 3 37)

grade 8

secondary

college! university

ratio of high to /ow edu.

7 1 .8 2 1 .6 3 .7 0.3 0.2 1 .8 0.6 (43 , 1 03)

70.3 1 9. 1 4.8 0.5 0.4 4.3 0.6 (20,630)

69.2 1 9 .4 5 .4 1 .0 0.4 4.4 0.2 (8,657)

96 86 1 24 616 1 53 1 ,834 116

68

Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

per cent) completed grade 8 or less, one-third (3j per cent) obtained a skilled worker's certificate and one-third (32.1 per cent) a secondary or university diploma. Among the non-affiliated, the ratio of those with grade 8 or less is only 23 per cent. ln contrast, the number with secondary certificates or diplomas is twice as large, 44.3 per cent (Bukodi et al. 1994). RELIG I O U S REPRO D U CTION Changes that were occurring in religious affiliations have been attributed to six factors. These were the higher birth ratio for Catholics; lower birth rates among Calvinists; the movement of people from the large Protestant churches to the sects; political factors; mixed marriages; and the rigid Catholic stand which insisted on all offspring being baptized as Catholic. ln the last fifty years there has also been a move toward de­ Christianization which has been apparent in Western societies. Although religiosity and religious affiliation are not identical, and one does not assume the other, it can be presumed that those with lower levels of religiosity will be less likely to maintain their religious affiliations. ln the past two decades opinion surveys and sociological research posed the question about religiosity in two ways. Between 1 972 and Table 3.7: Religious affiliation and strength of commitment a (%)

Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Jewish Other No affiliation Missing data (n) Per cent of total population

Baptisms or inscription

Religious in own wayb

Religioiw

Religiousd

7 1 .3 21.1 4.3 0.4 0.2 2.2 0.5 (96,01 9) 1 00

75. 1 1 9.2 4.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0. 1 (35,628) 60

77.0 18.1 4.2 0. 1 0.3 0.1 0.2 ( 19,323) 40

78.6 1 5 .5 4.6 0.2 0.9 0.2 0. 1 (8, 1 00) 13

a Average of data between 1 978-91 b Respondents who indicated 'I am religious according to the teachings of the Church • or 'I am religious in my own way' e Respondents who said 'yes' to the question: 'Are you religious? ' d Respondents who indicated they are religious according to the teachings of the church Source: Tomka ( 1 994)

Denomination and religious practice

69

1981 they generally used a simple yes-no question: 'Are you a religious person? Yes or No.' From 1984 a five-item scale has become widespread (Table 3.7). When the two highest points on the scale are grouped, a higher ratio of religiosity is provided than from the simple dichotomous question asked prior to 1984. Regardless of which question is used, there is a significant difference in the percentage who consider themselves religious among the different denominations. According to Central Statistical Office, for the adult population (KSH, 1993) 48 per cent baptized as Catholics practise their religion; 0.6 per cent are practising members of another denomination; 31.5 per cent are believers, but non-practising; and 19.9 per cent are non­ believers or atheists. By comparison, the percentage practising in the denomination of their baptism is 42.7 per cent among Lutherans and among Calvinists 39.8 per cent. Approached from the other aspect, the combined non-believers and atheists among baptized Lutherans is 21.4 per cent and baptized Calvinists, 25.5 per cent. The studies represent four different approaches in the way in which religiosity is defined (see Table 3.7). The first shows the denominational distribution of the total population using baptismal records as a starting point. The second measure shows approximately 60 per cent are religious in the broadest sense on average from 1978 to 91 (the percentage increases to 74 per cent in 1993). The third measure is the yes-no question regarding religiosity: 40 per cent of the adult population considers itself religious. Finally, the fourth looks at those who are religious according to the 'teachings of the Church'. ln practice, this is the group that goes to church on Sundays; the average in the period 1978-91 was 13.5 per cent and 16.6 per cent in 1994. Comparing the four approaches, we see that the stronger the religiosity criteria, the higher the proportion of Catholic, Lutheran, and ' other' numbers; and conversely the lower the proportion of Calvinists. If we compare denominational identification according to religion registered at birth and the actual practice of religion, there are differences among the various denominations (Table 3.8). Thirty-eight per cent of Catholics, 32 per cent of Lutherans and 28 per cent of Calvinists practise in Church: they participate at religious services more or less regularly, send their children to religious instruction and participate in the religious community on different occasions. One out of five members of Catholic, Calvinist or Lutheran churches claim to follow religious practices not in institutional forms but as private prayers and devotions. A group of the same size preserves a denominational adherence and identity without

Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

70

Table 3 . 8 : Religious afjiliation and religious practice

Form of religious practice in Church

Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Other religion No affiliation Unknown Total

regularly

se/dom

15.1 8.2 1 0. 3 29.8 0.4 1.1 1 2.7

22.6 1 9.7 2 1 .5 9.8 0.4 2.6 20.6

does not practise in own but is a non-believer/ way believer atheist unknown 9.9 1 2.8 1 1 .4 9.8 0.7 0.8 10.0

1 9.2 24.2 20.5 1 8.4 84.9 35.0 23.6

30.4 30.9 32.5 30. 1 5.9 8.4 29.0

2.8 4.3 3.7 2. 1 7.8 52. 1 4.0

Source:Bukodi, et al. ( 1 994 : 1 25)

believing. The percentage of non-believers and atheists is from 19 to 24 per cent for Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists. There are relatively few cases where people leave their denomination of baptism and join another denomination. For those joining the largest denomination (Catholic), this proportion does not exceed 2 per cent. Any significant difference observed is among those who become non­ believers, atheists or who are simply believers but do not practise their faith. The change to non-believer or atheist is highest for those belonging to the Calvinist denomination. Thus the ' maintaining capacity' of the church is the weakest here (Table 3.9). The reason for the reduction in the number of people who practice a religion is not inter-denominational migration but de-Christianization. The size of this effect varies among the three dominating religious cultures in Hungary. The majority of those who no longer practise a Table 3.9: Religious affiliation according to baptism and practice

(Non-practising)

(Re/igion practised) Baptised Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Other No affiliation Total

Catholic Calvinist Lutheran other 47.8 1 .8 1 .5 2.0 0.5 32.7

0.3 39.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 8.7

Source: Bukodi, et al. ( 1 994 : 1 27)

0.1 0. 1 42.7 0.1 1 .9

0.2 0.3 0.6 47.5 0.3 1 .7

believer non-believer, atheist 3 1 .7 32.5 3 3 .7 3 1 .2 6.4 30.6

20.0 25.5 2 1 .4 1 8 .8 92.2 24.5

Denominatio n and religio us practice

71

religion are still believers; however this is smallest amongst the Calvinists. Thus the 'maintaining capacity ' of the Calvinist Church is weakest. Surveys of the last twenty-four years provide clear proof of a slow but continuous shift in the denominational structure of Hungarian society. The most important new phenomenon is the emergence and growth in the population of those not affiliated to any church. The change in the relative size of denominations follows historical pattems. Catholicism is growing bigger by comparison with the Calvinists and Lutherans. The biggest challenge for the Lutheran population is the lack of youth. There are marked differences in educational attainment among the different denominations. Jews and Lutherans have the highest levels of educa­ tional attainment, and Calvinists have particularly low levels. Religious endogamy is weakening. Before, it was less explicit among Protestants than Catholics, but the dissolution of denominational endogamy charac­ terizes the Protestant population particularly. Denominational distribu­ tion depends on the criteria used. Distribution according to denomination at birth is contested by some as being irrelevant for the present situation. If religious people are taken as a hasis of denominational belonging, religiosity has to be defined. The stronger the criteria for religious commitment used, the higher the proportion of the Catholic and Lutheran groups, the lower the proportion of Calvinists and the lower the propor­ tion of religious people in the population.

References András, Imre, 1 984. 'L'Église de Hongrie ' . Pro Mundi Vita: Dossiers, 2, 1 -32. Secretaria Status Rationarium Generale Ecclesiae, 1 989. Annuarium Statisticum Ecclesiae, 1 989. Vatican City : Secretaria Status Rationarium Generale Ecclesiae. Baptist World Alliance, 1 984. The World Family of Baptists. Washington DC: Baptist World Alliance. Barrett, D .B . , ed. , 1 982. World Christian Encyclopedia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Encyclopédie Catholique de Monde Chrétien /-II. Bilan de Monde, 1 964 . Toumai: Casterman. Bukodi, Erzsébet, Harcsa, István and Reisz, László, 1 994. Társadalmi tagozódás, mobilitás. Az 1 992 . mobilitásvizsgálat alapján [Social Structure and Mobility - According to Data of Mobility-survey of 1 992] . Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.

72

Miklós Tomka and István Harcsa

Clévenot, M., ed. , 1 987. L' état des religions dans la monde. Paris: Ed. Découverte - Ed.Cerf. Gergely, Jenő, 1 986. ll. János Pál. (John Paul 11) Budapest: Kossuth. Karner, Károly, 1 93 1 . A felekezetek Magyarországon a statisztikai megvilágításban [Denominations in Hungary in Statistical View] . Debrecen: Debreceni Nyomda. Kovacsics, József, 1 963 . Magyarország történelmi demográfiája [Historical Demography of Hungary] . Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvhiasló. KSH (Central Statistical Office) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1 992. Történeti statisztikai idősorok 1 867-1992 [Trends in Historical Statistics. 1 867- 1 992] . B udapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. KSH (Central Statistical Office) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1993. Vallási élet Magyarországon 1992-ben [Religious Life in Hungary in 1 992] . Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. Morel, J. and András, E., 1 984. Handbuch des ungarischen Katholizismus. Wien: Ungarisches Kirchensoziologisches Institut. Nyárády, R. Károly, 1 98 1 . Erdély népességének etnikai és vallási tagolódása a magyar államalapítástól a dualizmus koráig [Ethnic and Denominational structure of Transylvania from the Foundation of the Hungarian State until the Period of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy] . Budapest: KSH Népesedéstudományi Kutatóintézet. Tomka, Miklós, 1 980. A vallásos önjellemzés néhány tendenciája [Tendencies of Religious Identification] . Világosság, 6, 360-6. Tomka, Miklós, 1 988a. A magyarországi katolicizmus statisztikája és szoci­ ológiája [Statistics and Sociology of Hungarian Catholicism] . ln L. Turányi ed., Magyar Katolikus Almanach ll [Hungarian Catholic Almanac 11] . Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 5 1 0-77 . Tomka, Miklós, 1 988b. 'Elveszett katolikusok? ' - avagy, mennyi a katolikusok létszáma ma Magyarországon? [Lost Catholics? - or: How Many Catholics Live in Contemporary Hungary?] . Teológia, 2, 1 1 3- 1 8 . Tomka, Miklós, 1 99 1 . Magyar katolicizmus 199 1 [Hungarian Catholicism : 1 99 1 ] . Budapest: Országos Lelkipásztori Intézet. Tomka, Miklós, 1 994. Felekezeti szerkezet - felekezeti reprodukció [Denominational Structure, Reproduction of Denominations] . Statisztikai Szemle, 4-5, 329-43 . Utasi, Ágnes, 1 992. Vallási házassági homogámia és kulturális reprodukció [Religious Homogamy of Marriages and Cultural Reproduction] . Szociológiai Szemle, 2, 45-59. Voss, E., ed. , 1 984. Die Religionsfreiheit in Osteuropa. Zollikon: GZW. World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1 986. Handbook of Member Churches. Genf: World Alliance of Reformed Churches.

C H A PTER 4

THE S COPE OF THE S TATE AND P RIVATE SECTO R S Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik

OF C E N T R A L importance in the changing structure of the Hungarian economy is the change in the scope of the public and private sectors. The proportion of private property was estimated on the principle of dominance. If there was evidence that the majority of ownership of the property was private according to the records of the Tax Office, the property was considered private. By the early 1980s the statistics for property were altered by transferring the production of small companies, small co-operatives, household farming and complementary farm plots into the private sector. The proportion of private-sector involvement in the production of gross domestic production was already significant (10 per cent) as early as the early 1 9 80s, and if production in the hidden economy is included, it was 1 7 per cent. Rapid expansion started in the 1990s (Árvay and Vértes, 1994). ln 1993 the public sector lost its dominance in the produc­ tion of GDP (Figure 4.1). The private sector is larger still when one takes into consideration production from the hidden economy as well. According to intemationally accepted definitions, it includes those forms of activity that create ( or increase the value of) products or services that satisfy real social demands. These activities are considered hidden because incomes derived from them are not retumed to the Tax Office or the Statistical Office. We do not include in the category of hidden economy the incomes obtained by means of corruption and other indictable offenses involving imprisonment (Árvay and Vértes, 1994a). There has been an increase in both the absolute value and the relative proportion of GDP produced in the hidden economy (cf. Sik, 1992). With the inclusion of the hidden economy, the share of GDP held by the private sector will be higher than that of the public sector.

Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik

74 70

EBOfficial •Total

(% share in GDP)

60

60

50

40

30

20

100

1 990

1991

1992

1 993

Figure 4.1 Private property in official and total GDP Source: Árvay and Vértes, 1994

PUBLIC AND P R I VATE SECTORS IN TERMS O F EMPLOYMENT A N D AMOUNT O F WORKTIME

ln this chapter we will use data from the 1993 Hungarian Household Panel, a survey conducted in April-May, 1993. The base period for estimation was either March 1993 or the total period from April 1992, depending on the topic. ln the case of agriculture, the estimates are based on one typical week of the year. The Hungarian Household Panel data includes 2,218 employed persons, of whom sixty-six were officially unemployed but in fact had full-time jobs. They were asked whether the company they worked for was totally public, totally private, or partly private and partly publicly owned. Two estimates of the amount of time spent at work were calculated: the activity of the respondent in March 1993 and activity during the past twelve months. When referring to the former estimate we use the term 'March estimate' and when referring to the latter we use the term 'annual estimate'. ln the case of the March estimate, although starting from individual data, we made our calculations by interpolating aggregates, in the case of the annual estimate we carried out all calculations on the

The scope of the state and private sectors

75

hasis of individual data. When carrying out the March estimate, in the case of employed persons not knowing the sectorial status of their workplaces, we assumed that their worktime had been divided the same way as the worktime of those with known sectoral status; in the case of the annual estimate, persons who did not know the sectorial status of their workplaces were left out from the analysis. ln the March estimate, those without jobs are divided between the two sectors, while the annual estimate includes all of them in the private sector. Por the March estimate, besides the public and private sectors, we distinguished the category of mixed ownership as well. ln the case of the annual estimate we have included the latter in the private sector.

E S T I M ATING THE MONTHLY MARCH DATA We started our calculations with the estimation of the number of persons employed in each sector along with the estimation of the principal and extra worktime in these sectors. We completed it with an estimation of the worktime of people without jobs but working regularly for salary (further on we will call them 'workers without formai jobs'. The next step was the estimation of the extra hours worked. Detailed questions were asked about the number and average worktime of persons occupied in agricultural small-scale production, of those having secondary employment or part-time jobs and of those undertaking odd jobs. The average number of working hours in a week was estimated on the hasis of frequency and hours of work on each occasion. Unfortunately, the data cannot be broken down by sector. Thus, for the estimation of the total amount of worktime we assumed that secondary employment and part-time jobs were divided among the sectors in the same proportions as the main jobs were; in the case of odd jobs we assigned 20 per cent of the worktime to the public sector, 10 per cent to the mixed sector and 70 per cent to the private sector, while the total worktime spent for agricul­ tural small-scale production was assigned to the private sector. On the hasis of these assumptions, while nearly half (49.6 per cent) of the employed work in the public sector, the share of this sector in the main worktime is only 45.5 per cent. These proportions change little when overtime and workers without formai employment are included as well. The inclusion of work yielding extra income, however, changes the overall picture: the share of the public sector in the total worktime drops to 35.5 per cent (Table 4.1).

76

Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik

Table 4. 1 . Worktime in public, mixed and private sectors (% of total) Share of employment Total principal worktime Total worktime

Public

Mixed

Private

50 46 35

15 15 11

35 39 53

Source: 1 993 Hungarian Household Panel Survey; number of employed respondents,

2,2 1 8

E S T I M AT I N G A N N UAL A C T I V I T Y The first step o f the estimate was carried out on the hasis o f the numher of those employed, and of the quantity of annual worktime in the principal joh. This was followed hy the estimation of the amount of overtime worked hy full-time employees and of the principal worktime (odd johs or auxiliary work executed as family memher) of the workers without a joh (i.e. the unemployed on 31 March 1993). The next step of the procedure was the estimation of the quantity of extra work hy the respondents: the numher of months of the period investigated yielding income from the given kind of work, multiplied hy the frequency of doing this work in the given month, multiplied by the number of hours worked on each occasion. The final result is the number of hours worked. This value, if multiplied hy the weighted value of the sample, gives, in the case of a given activity, the worktime of the population over fifteen years. The second step was to estimate the quantity of extra income earned hy occupational sector. This we did hy dividing the employed population into nine different employment categories. Of these, the only categories in which extra income was primarily in the public sector were secondary employment, part-time johs and casual intellectual work. The majority of extra income was in the non-public sector, including agriculture. Although in the present national account system and calculation of GDP it is unusual, calculations were also made for the annual total worktime involved in the exchange of labour between households and of domestic work as well. ln the annual estimate, we have not been able to identify those in mixed enterprises separately; the estimate of worktime is divided solely hetween public and private sectors. On this hasis, the number of employed were divided 50:50 in the period, but private-sector employees accounted for 54 per cent of worktime, and when the hidden sector is

The scope of the state and private sectors

77

Table 4.2: Worktime in the public and private sectors, annual activity, 1993 Number employed Annual amount of worktime Total principal worktime Above + annual amount of extra work Above + agricultural small-scale production Above + labour-exchange between households Above + non-waged domestic work

Public

Private

49.8 46.0 45.7 43 . 3-44. 1 32.4--33. 1 3 1 .7-32.3 1 6.9-1 7.2

50.2 54.0 54. 3 56.7-55.9 67.6-66.9 68.3---07.7 8 3. 1 -82.8

added, for 64 per cent of total worktime. The annual estimate indicates that public-sector output was 2 to 3 per cent less than the value of the March estimate. The inclusion of the exchange of labour between house­ holds in the model hardly increases the weight of the private sector. But taking non-waged domestic work into consideration, the share of the public sector by worktime, according to our calculations, would be just a sixth of the output of the whole economy (Table 4.2). It is evident that the proportion of the public sector estimated on the hasis of both the number employed and the amount of worktime has considerably dimin­ ished since the beginning of 1 99 1 . W E I G H T O F THE P U B L I C AND PRIVATE S E C T O R S I N I N COMES ln estimating the distribution of household annual income, we have distinguished two main types of income: non-redistributive income from employment and redistributive income independent of employment and provided by the state sector such as child care allowance, pensions, income support, etc. (Fábián, 1994). Thus, the state not only provides direct income to employees but also provides income through redistribu­ tive policies. Income from the public and the private sector was defined in each case by the source of employment. Thus, when an entrepreneur sells his product to the state, the income will be 'private ', not 'public '. We have considered companies with mixed ownership part of the private sector. The ratio of public to private workplaces in 1 992 was 46:54 and in 1 993 it was 48:52. ln the case of occasional income (bonuses, travelling allowances, etc.) we have assumed that the principal workplace is the source. ln our calculations we have proceeded in the same way as for

78

Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sík

income from the principal workplace. For odd jobs, we assume most comes from the private sector and have divided it between the public and private sectors in the ratio of 20 to 80. The only exception was income from tips, which we have fully included in the private economy. The difference between 1992 and 1993 calculations is that in the latter case we did not consider the so-called 'other forms' of occasional income. This difference, however, does not have much influence on the calculated sectorial proportions. Comparing the data of the Household Panel of 1993 and the macro­ statistical report of the Central Statistical Office, we found that there were about 400 thousand million forints missing in the Household Panel data (Bedekovics et al., 1994). This is due to income from entrepre­ neurial profit, small-scale agricultural production and extra work which comes mainly from the private sector. ln order to bring the 'deficient' income categories closer to the macro-statistical data they were multi­ plied by a coefficient calculated as the difference between the measured and the unexpected size of income. During the period under investigation there have been changes in the sectorial distribution of household income. Income from the private sector has increased 7 per cent in line with the reduction in the weight of the public sector by that amount. At the same time the share of redistrib­ utive income, 32 per cent, has not changed. Leaving aside redistributive income, there is about an 11 per cent difference in annual household income in favour of the private sector. F E AT U R E S O F THE P R I VATE S E C T O R The greatest expansion of the private sector took place in the industrial sectors of trade, building, and then in services. These are sectors that have been growing in market economies too (Figure 4. 2). Employment in the private sector is above average in indústry and agriculture. lt is well below the overall national average in transport, education and health, fields where public employment is high in market economies too. The Hungarian Household survey can provide a socio-economic profile of the public/private sector division of the workforce in three branches: industry and building, agriculture and trade (cf. Rose, 1985). Women are found disproportionately in the public sector in all three branches, and especially in trade, where women are in a majority in both

79

The scope of the state and private sectors % private sector

Trade

75

Building Other services Persona! services Industry Agriculture Transport Education, culture Public health

0

20

40

60

80

Figure 4.2 Public and private sectors by economic branch

Source: 1 993 Hungarian Household Panel Survey; number of resondents: 2,2 18

the public and private sectors. The 3 per cent of gypsy respondents in the sample were also more likely to be working in the public than the private sector. As for education, workers in the public sector in each of the three branches are more likely to have had only an elementary education and less likely to have achieved a higher education. It is specially noteworthy that in private trade there is an unusually high proportion of well­ educated people. This suggests that for younger people with a high level of educational attainment trade is a refuge from unemployment and/or a suitable starting point for an independent existence in the labour market. The latter assumption is confirmed by a breakdown by age. One-fourth of workers employed in private trade are under 25, and more than half of them are under 35. ln the building industry also, the proportion of young workers employed in the private sector is higher than that in the public sector. The average annual income of workers varies in two dimensions - by the branch of the economy and by whether a person is in the public or private sector. Trade shows the biggest difference between public and private sector: those in private trade have an annual income half again as great as those in the public sector (Figure 4. 3). Those in private industry on average earn more than those in public industries, but the difference is only a few per cent. Agriculture is the lowest paid branch of the

Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sík

80

Private trade Private industry Public industry Public agriculture Private agriculture Public trade 0

50

1 00

1 50

200

250

300

Figure 4.3 Jndividual income in public and private sectors Source: 1 993 Hungarian Household Panel Survey; nurnber of respondents included here, 1 ,065

economy; within this branch, those in the public sector earn more than agriculturalists working in the private sector. There are also substantial differences in income within each branch and within the public and private sector. Income differences are least in industry, and this is true of both public and private sectors. While the mean levei of income is low, there is a relatively wide but even spread of incomes among those working in both the public and private sectors of agriculture. ln trade, the income of those in the public sector tends to be fairly widely distributed with a tendency to over-represent those with wages just below average. ln the private sector of trade, there is some evidence of polarization, as a third are in the top quintile of income, but those in the bottom quintile are half again as numerous as those in the bottom quintile in other categories. ln an economy in transformation, being in the upper half of the income distribution does not necessarily provide a sufficiency of income, and there are many potential strategies that workers can explore to augment their incomes (Figure 4.4). The most favoured way of sécuring extra income is by working overtime, which is done by 28 per cent. Of course, this is only possible where workers have strictly defined limits for normal working time; hence, working overtime is twice as frequent in industry and building (36 per cent) than in agriculture, where there are

The scope of the state and private sectors

81

Overtime work Second job Other extra income Trading

Entrepreneurship

0

10

20

30

40

50

Figure 4.4 Strategies to earn extra income

Source: 1993 Hungarian Household Panel Survey. Percentages refer to total in industry, building, agriculture and trade; total number, 1 ,072

daily routines but no hourly limit on the time in the working week. Traders in both the public and private sectors are also below average in working overtime, because their jobs often have no hourly limit. Getting a second job is the second commonest altemative for supplementing income, especially among those in private trade, and also disproportion­ ately found among those in public industry and public agriculture. Entrepreneurial activity is most often found among private traders, and least often found among farmers. Given the conditions of entrepreneur­ ship in a socialist or post-socialist economy, such activities are more likely to resemble 'wild capitalism' than long-term investment. Those in industry and building are unlikely to be making money by making deals, whether in the public or private sector. ln short, traders in the private sector are likely to be extroverts, looking outside their normal routines to mak:e more money, whereas those in industry and agriculture are more likely to seek more money by working more hours at their principal place of employment. ln socialist economies wages were often supplemented by the differ­ ential reward of benefits in kind. Some benefits could be supplied by the firm to all workers; this strategy was useful to avoid the loss of labour to other enterprises. A second altemative was to award benefits selectively to the most productive workers. Neither criterion is that used by social

Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik

82

% receiving

57

Meals Medical care Reduced price goods Recreation Insurance Subsidized transport Payment, use of own car

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Figure 4.5 Social services provided by employers Source: 1 993 Hungarian Household Panel Survey. Percentages refer to total in industry, building, agriculture and trade; total number, 953

ministries, the provision of benefits according to need. The commonest benefit is meals at work, and a majority of employees in all branches, private and public, receive subsidized or free meals (Figure 4.5). lndustry is most likely to provide medical care, but even then only 30 per cent in this branch of the economy so benefit; the difference between public and private sectors is only 4 per cent. ln trade an eighth receive medical care and in agriculture, less than an eighth. ln a command economy, industrial enterprises could offer 'shortage' goods as an incen­ tive to production. ln a market economy, higher wages is the normal method of increasing consumption; those most likely to benefit by buying goods at a reduced price are traders.

C O MPARlSl O N S WlTH O THER TRANSl T l O N E C O N O MIES The size o f the private sector in Hungary can b e evaluated b y compar­ isons across space as well as time. Comparisons can only be approxi­ mate, because, while a hidden private sector has existed in all former socialist countries, it was often officially denied and rarely the subject of systematic investigation that could be generalized to the national levei. Hungarian researchers have been very much in the vanguard in this field.

The scope of the state and private secto rs

83

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet-driven command economy, the private sector normally accounted for less than 10 per cent of the official GDP. ln Czechoslovakia in 1989 it was estimated to account for only 4 per cent. Hungary was therefore exceptional in its private sector accounting for one-fifth of the economy. ln Poland the proportion was even higher, 29 per cent, due to agriculture remaining in private hands there. ln the former Yugoslavia, the doctrine of 'workers' self-manage­ ment' recognized and often encouraged private sector employment (Árvay, 1994). After the change of regime, each country has put the development of the private sector as a central plank of economic policy, and this has been a priority or condition of Western economic aid. By 1993, Hungary had caught up with Poland in having at least half the labour force in the private sector; the two countries were also in the vanguard in private employment. ln the Czech Republic only a third of the labour force was in the private sector and in Bulgaria one-tenth. The logic of ' marketiza­ tion' is that private sector employment will expand in all of the former command economies, and the hidden economy will increasingly become recognized and integrated in official statistics. But because the tempo of change is variable, it is fair to describe Hungary as a leader rather than a laggard in advancing from a socialist to a market economy. References Árvay, János, 1 994. 'The Dimension of Private and Hidden Economies ' . ln The National Economic Weight of Private and Hidden Economies. A Survey for the State Property Agency (ÁVÜ). Budapest: lnformatics Centre for Social Research (TÁRKI), May. Árvay, János and Vértes, András, 1 994. 'The Weight of Private Economy in GDP ' . ln The National Economic Weight of Private and Hidden Economies. A Survey for the State Property Agency (ÁVÜ), Budapest: Informatics Centre for Social Research (TÁRKI), May. Árvay, János and Vértes, András, 1 994a. 'A magángazdaság ' [Private Economy] . ln R. Andorka, K. Tamás and V. György, eds, Társadalmi riport 1 994 [Social Report 1994] . B udapest: lnformatics Centre for Social Research (TÁRKI). Bedekovics, István, Kolosi, Tamás and Szivós, Péter, 1 994. ' Jövedelmi helyzet a 90-es évek első felében ' [lncome Situation in the First Half of the Nineties] . ln R. Andorka, K. Tamás and V. György, eds, Társadalmi riport 1 994 [Social Report 1 994] . B udapest: Informatics Centre for Social Research (TÁRKI).

84

Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik

Fábián, Zoltán ( 1 994). 'The Wei ght of the Public and Private Sectors in the Population ' s Incomes ' . ln The National Economic Weight of Private and Hidden Economies. A Survey for the State Property Agency (ÁVÜ). B udapest: Informatics Centre for Social Research (TÁRKI), May. Rose, Richard, 1 995. Public Employment in Western Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sik, Endre, 1 992. ' From the Second to the Informal Economy ' . Journal of Public Policy, 1 2,2, 1 5 3-76.

C H A P T ER S

THE P O S T- C OMMUNI S T E C O NOMIC ELITE György Lengyel

ELITE theory suggests two theses accounting for the relation between the transformation of the elite and change in the political system. The first, a weak thesis, is that if the replacement of the elite precedes the processes of political change, this will reduce the social costs of the transformation. The second, a strong thesis, asserts that change of the elite is a structural prerequisite for the transformation of the political system. The processes of political change become irreversible when a fundamental change has taken place in the manner of recruitment, the composition and the insti­ tutional conditions of the elite. Using two empirical surveys this chapter examines the recruitment of the Hungarian economic elite and the changes in its composition between 1990 and 1993 . 1 The first survey was undertaken in the first quarter of 1990, prior to parliamentary elections. It is a representative sample of 371 top leaders, covering the elite in the banking sector, indus­ trial enterprises and the economic ministries. The second survey, carried out in the last quarter of 1993, contains a representative sample of 342 persons from the former three segments, with the addition of senior managerial staff of private companies and members of the parliamentary economic committees. Due to the limited scope of the data, our research results provide information mainly on the composition and processes of recruitment; however the data also allow us to illuminate the implica­ tions that flow from these processes.

86

György Lengyel C H A N G E S I N THE SO C I O- E C O N O M I C P RO F IL E O F T H E ECONOMIC ELITE

A s regards the weak thesis - elite change as the historical precondition for the change of the political system - one can correctly assume that it was in part due to the start of the elite change back in the 1980s that the Hungarian transition was accompanied by smaller social tensions than the Romanian, Bulgarian or Yugoslavian transformations. This applies both to the appearance of the altemative political elite and to changes in the economic elite. The change in the Hungarian economic elite began in the second half of the 1980s, before political change (Szalai, 1989). The rate of annual circulation rose to more than one and a half times as much as it had been at the beginning of the decade. The available information reveals no such change occurred in the Bulgarian and the Yugoslavian elite (Kostova, 1992; Lazic, 1992; Bartha-Martin, 1995). One of the distinguishing characteristics of the recruitment of the Hungarian elite was high standards of educational attainment in the 1980s (Szelényi and Szelényi, 1992), and it remained so in the 1990s. More than nine out of ten of the economic elite have completed tertiary education. However, the processes whereby these diplomas were obtained have changed significantly between 1 990 and 1 993. ln 1 990 two-fifths of the economic elite obtained their diplomas through evening and correspon­ dence courses; by 1993 this rate dropped to around one-fourth. Another characteristic important in the last phase of state socialism party membership - had lost its significance by 1990. As against four­ fifths of the economic elite in 1987, a mere 13 per cent were members of the Socialist Party in 1990. However, former Socialist Party members amounted to three-fourths of the economic elite in 1990. Since then, the percentage of ex-Socialist Party members has decreased, but they still make up over half of the economic elite. There are some variations among the different elite groups (Table 5.1). ln 1990 former Socialist Party members were more likely to be found in the ministries (81 per cent) and least likely to be found in banking (64 per cent). By 1993 this had changed quite dramatically, with only 43 per cent of those in the ministries and 44 per cent in banking having formerly been Socialist Party members. Former Socialist Party members are over-represented in the leadership of state and privatized companies compared to other segments of the economic elite (Böröcz and R6na­ Tas, 1994). Table 5.1 shows that in 1990 74 per cent of the elite in state

87

The post-Communist economic elite Table 5 . 1 : Socio -economic characteristics of the elite (%) Former Socialist Party member

Ministry Parliament B anking Enterprise (state) Enterprise (private) (Total)

Under 45 years old

Ministry Parliament Banking Enterprise (state) Enterprise (private) (Total) Father a worker

Ministry Parliament B anking Enterprise (state) Enterprise (private) (Total) Mother only completed primary education

Ministry Banking Enterprise (state) (Total) Female

Ministry Parliament Banking Enterprise (state) Enterprise (private) (Total)

1 990

1993

Change

81

43 26 44 70 66 (56)

38

na

64 74

na

(74)

na

20 4

na

( 1 8)

18

(35)

48 49 55 29 33 (39)

(4)

45 38 33 55 42 (50)

31 33 25 38 50 (35)

14 5 8 17 8 ( 1 5)

60 48 78 (68)

22 23 43 (37)

38 25 35 (3 1 )

20

30 5 26 12 9 ( 1 6)

30

na

59 29

na

na

19 14

na

( 1 7)

na

4 0

na

10

na

7 2

na

(1)

enterprises were former Socialist Party members; this had declined by only 4 per cent in 1993. The rate of those being formally affiliated with a political party is only 16 per cent, and the majority of these are members of the Parliament's economic committees who are usually affiliated with one or another party. Since 1989 the elite has become somewhat younger with leaders under

88

György Lengyel

45 increasing by 4 per cent. Chiefly accounting for this was the rejuvena­ tion of the economic political staff. Just under one-third of senior ministry personnel were under 45 in 1990. By 1 993 this had increased by 18 per cent; a similar proportion of the elite in Parliament are also under 45. Por enterprises, there has been no change in the age profile although the proportion of the elite under 45 is slightly higher in the private than the state sector. ln other respects, no significant difference has been found between leaders of private and state companies (Matonite, 1 994). As for recruitment, the dividing line is between Hungarian and foreign firms (Bartha et al., 1 992). Among bankers, who have always constituted the youngest segment of the economic elite, the percentage of young leaders dropped from 59 to 55 in the three-year period. A considerable change occurred in the inter-generational mobility of the economic elite. A content analysis of economic leaders' biographies published in a popular economic weekly reveals that social origin has increased in importance in the public imagination. ln the mid-1 980s only a quarter referred to social origin; in the early 1990s two-thirds did (Révai-Molnár, 1 995). Unlike their Yugoslav and Bulgarian counterparts, prior to 1989 the Hungarian economic elite was characterized by high status family backgrounds (Kostova, 1 994; Lazic, 1994). This appears to be connected to the fact that working-class origin no longer played a significant forma! role in cadre policies or as evidence of party loyalty. A relatively small proportion of the Hungarian elite have had worker parents and parents who only completed primary education, and their numbers continue to decline. ln 1 990 half the economic elite had working-class fathers; by 1 993 that percentage was down to 35 per cent. The question is rightly raised whether significant differences in social status were not caused by the institutional transformations that have taken place in the meantime. Do new fractions of the elite - the parlia­ mentary and private sphere - have radically new and different social backgrounds? The research results definitely refute this assumption. Among the MPs involved in the economic committees, there is a higher proportion of those with lower-status parents than among bank and ministry leaders, while the leaders of private firms are more likely to be from parents of lower status than leaders of state enterprises. While earlier some 60 per cent of senior ministry officials and over three-quarters of company directors had mothers whose education did not exceed primary level, their numbers have been reduced to around 20 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. This fact is more closely connected to a cohort effect, in as much as among younger leaders parental qualifi-

89

The post-Co mmunist economic elite

Table 5.2: Old and new leaders in the economic elite (%) 1990 Risen to position Before 1 988 1 988-90 Economic sectors Ministries Parliament Bank.s Enterprises Enterprises (state) Enterprises (private) (Total) Socio-economic characteristics Leaders age under 45 Evening or correspondence school Having secondary education Working class origin Mothers working as housewives Former Socialist Party members

1 993 Risen to position Before 1 990 1 990-3 11 5

31

69

31 57 na na (45)

69 43 na na (55)

na 30 30 (2 1 )

89 95 87 na 70 70 (79)

22 39 3 55 60 73

46 40 6 45 42 76

24 27 6 45 47 76

43 27 4 30 44 50

13

cations are necessarily different because of the changed historical patterns of education. It continued to hold true, however, that the Hungarian economic elite were more likely to come from the strata of higher status families than leaders of the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian economy. The recruitment of the Hungarian economic elite thus diverged relatively early from the course determined by East European cadre policy and began to approach the international inter-generational mobility pattern in which the majority of the elite come from upper and upper-middle strata families. ln terms of gender, overall there appears to have been no change in the proportion of women among the economic elite. Table 5.2 shows that in both 1990 and 1993 they accounted for around one-sixth of the economic elite. However, the unchanged average conceals effects dictated by the institutional structure (Nagy, 1993). There has been an increase in the representation of women in certain segments of the elite, rising from 20 to 30 per cent among heads of ministry departments and from 19 to 26 per cent among bankers. ln the newly emerging segments, such as the economic committees of Parliament and private enterprise, the number of women is conspicuously low, at 5 and 9 per cent respectively. There has also been a drop in the number of women directing state enterprises. The tendency that is taking shape suggests that in large administrative

90

György Lengyel

organizations, in which the rate of female labour is high anyway, women get an increasing share in management, while in the senior managerial levels of economic organizations and in political decision-making there is noticeable social discrimination against women. R E P L A C E M E N T O F THE E CO N O M I C E L I T E

Did the replacement of the economic elite continue in the period of transi­ tion? Yes; Table 5.3 shows that four-fifths of the economic elite have risen to their posts since 1990 and the numbers are even higher in the ministries, banks and the economic committees of Parliament. The corre­ sponding number among company leaders is 70 per cent. This high rate of turnover dates from the end of the 1980s. The survey of early 1990 showed that just over half of the economic elite had been in office for no longer than three years at that time, and there were differences between sectors. New holders of top positions numbered below the average among company leaders and way above the average in ministries and banks. These high fluctuation rates were possibly attributable to the govem­ ment's response to recession in the case of economic positions and to the emergence of a two-tier banking system with respect to bankers. Studying the annual fluctuation rate or, more precisely, the proportion of leaders appointed in the past year, one finds that their rates are 38 and 36 per cent respectively, one and a half times higher than was the case in the first half of the 1980s. The fluctuation rate of ministry and bank managers far exceeded the rate of company leaders in both 1990 and 1993. In 1993 there was a slight drop of 9 per cent in newly appointed leaders in ministries and a slight rise in state companies from 27 to 34 per cent. Newcomers to the echelon of private firms had a higher rate at 39 per cent, related to the expansion of the private sphere. Tab le 5.3: Continuity: previo us job in the same sector (%) Ministry Parliament Bank Enterprise (state) Enterprise (private) (Total)

1 990

1 993

Change

79 na 46 80 na (73)

58 9 59 68 42 (54)

21 na 13 12 na ( 1 9)

The post-Communist economic elite

91

ln the economic elite, if one compares the socio-economic backgrounds of the sub-group appointed before 1990 with that appointed since 1990, one can detect a few specific features. Among newcomers, the numbers of younger leaders and those coming from white-collar parents are consider­ ably higher. Also, there is a significant drop from three-fourths to around 50 per cent among former Socialist Party members. More detailed break­ downs reveal that the majority of the old-timers in the top echelon were also appointed to their posts in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the majority of the economic elite have had continuous administrative careers: 73 per cent of the elite had had their previous job in the same sector in 1990 (Table 5.3). Seventy-nine per cent of the ministerial leaders and 46 per cent of bank managers rose within their own sectors, while most company leaders ascended inside their own firms (80 per cent). The decline in intra-sector mobility between 1990 and 1 993 was mainly due to the continuous career patterns being below average in the economic committees of members of Parliament and among private firm leaders. Though the representation of such career patterns has decreased among the senior ministerial staff and company leaders, it still remained predominant and showed a rise in the stabilizing banking sphere; newly appointed leaders in these sectors displayed no markedly different traits. ELITE P E R S P E C T I V E S O N S O C IAL A N D ECONOMIC CONDITIONS A s far a s one can infer from the available data, no important change occurred in the elite's opinion about the social-economic conditions and their personal prospects. Early work showed that the opinions of the leaders sharply differed from that of the employees, and it had not changed by 1993. There is a difference between the economic elite and the adult population in general concerning self-evaluation and social content. The members of the economic elite are far more satisfied with their careers, living standard and future prospects than the average. Comparing the opinions of the elite in 1 990 to 1 993, it is striking that members of the new elite are more satisfied than their predecessors in nearly every aspect of life. Table 5.4 shows that dissatisfaction declined by 4 per cent for family relations and 37 per cent for future prospects. The majority were satisfied with their work, housing, social status and family relations in 1 990 and by 1 993 had become even more satisfied.

92

György Lengyel

Tab le 5.4: Dissatisfaction within the economic elite (%) Country's socio-economic plight Children's outlook Future prospects Levei of education Standard of Iiving Social status Health Life-course so far Housing Work Interpersonal relations Family relations

1 990

1 993

Change

91 59 51 46 39 27 25 21 19 16 16 10

75 25 14 16 11 5 11 3 15 6 5 6

16 34 37 30 28 22 14 18 4 10

11 4

Their uncertainty decreased, but they still remained dissatisfied with the country's economic perspectives. Members of the elite judge their own material prospects more favourably, but they are more pessimistic regarding the general popula­ tion. Table 5.5 indicates that between 1990 and 1993 the proportion of the elite who think that their families' financial standing will deteriorate drops by 26 per cent, whereas the proportion who think that the popula­ tion's financial standing will deteriorate increases by 10 per cent. A feeling of helplessness, ill-luck, the conviction that one can hardly lessen one's burdens, which characterized about half the population, were typical of less than one-fifth of the economic elite. Some 30 per cent of the population were worried about their health, have headaches, constant nervousness, while the corresponding rate among the economic leaders is one-fifth. Exhaustion and depression are mentioned more often by the economic elite than the Hungarian average, which itself is high in Table 5.5: Elite attitudes towardsfinancial prospects (%) ln the next years the financial standing of: Population Family Deteriorate sharply Deteriorate Not change Improve Improve massively

1 990

1 993

1 990

1 993

4 44 28 22 2

2 20 57 21

47 20 23

10

13 54 23 10

93

The post-Communist economic elite

Tab le 5.6: Entrepreneurs, population and economic elite feelings (% answering 'yes' )

I often feel exhausted, depressed I mostly feel I have no luck I am always restless, nervous Those who want to get on must break some rules

Entrepeneurs a

Adult population b

Elite

62 38 33

57 53 31

61 19 20

64

78

49

a Source: Venturers and Entrepreneurs, BKE-KSH, 1 993 (N= l ,473) b Source : Household Panel Survey, BKE-TÁRKI, 1 993 (N=3,898)

comparison to international levels. Around 60 per cent of entrepreneurs, the elite and the adult population report that they often feel exhausted and depressed (Table 5.6). Special mention must be made of the violation of norms, which with reservation can be used as an indicator of an anomalous social state. Over three-quarters of the adult population regarded it as a truism that anyone who wishes to get on is forced to breach certain rules. This compares with about half of the economic elite who found this statement true. ln Hungarian society a great majority of the population and half the economic leaders regard the breaking of norms as prevalent and a condi­ tion of success. When the violation of norms is accepted as generally prevalent and entailing no sanctions, people may sometimes adjust their behaviour accordingly. Beneath this phenomenon, one can also detect strategies of success which evaded legal and moral rules, since the economic elite are able to adapt themselves to the requirements of institutional bargaining and market networks alike. The role of the former seems to be reinforced, among others, by the paradoxical feature of contractual discipline condi­ tioning market relations among companies. Only an insignificant fraction, 7 per cent, noted that they were unable to pay their trading partners, whereas 40 per cent complained that their partners were in arrears with payment.The difference in magnitude is chiefly due to the fact that indebted companies are concentrated in the sector of large enter­ prises which are in favourable positions to bargain. There was one point about which the opinion of the economic elite has changed - the difference between estimated and just income (Tóth, 1992). Compared to the majority of the public, what the Hungarian economic elite (Czirják et al., 1994) regarded as acceptable was not the cutback of leaders' income in absolute terms but the moderation of the relative

94

György Lengyel

Table 5.7: Income - estimated and deemedjust (forints) (1 993)

(1990)

Typist Skilled worker Entrepreneur General director Minister

estimated

just

estimated

just

1 00 1 42 618 807 683

1 00 1 60 538 692 760

1 00 1 24 61 1 732 627

1 00 1 50 494 620 725

income advantages of entrepreneurs and company leaders. This might at the same time have redressed the fact that the income of general directors was put before that of ministers. This tendency held its ground in the early 1990s. What did change after the development of a transitional economy was that the economic elite considered the difference between their own income and the eamings of the employees smaller than in the late phase of the planned economy. ln connection with this and increasing social tensions, the elite seems inclined to moderate even justifiable income differences (see Table 5.7). Sociological surveys on incomes, however, do not support this assumption (Andorka et al. , 1994), nor does the public see developments in this way (Csepeli et al. , 1992). CONCLUSION W hat conclusion can then be drawn conceming the strong thesis of the interrelation of elite change and regime change? Research suggests that the personnel composition of the elite had changed fully by the early 1990s, with changes already begun in the late 1980s. The logic of elite selection was also modified. The most noteworthy change brought about the demotion of the formai and contextual aspects of party affiliation, and possibly strengthened persona! and corporate loyalty. New institu­ tional conditions emerged as the economic committees of Parliament now seem to have real economic political competencies and private companies emerge as an independent sector. It must be kept in mind at the same time that the superiority of state enterprises and redistributive institutions did not cease in the transitional economy and various forms of state influence survived, entailing the preservation of concomitant managerial behaviour. It has also to be realized that although the composition of the economic elite changed

The post-Communist economic elite

95

fundamentally, the social hasis of recruitment remained relatively unchanged and narrow in regard to career pattems, while it narrowed in respect of inter-generational mobility, social composition, attitudes and institutional circumstances of the economic elite, containing old features as well. The cautious conclusion is that the modification of the economic elite foreshadows the possibility that the replacement of the elite might be the structural precondition for a change of the overall system, but in the early 1 990s it did not reach a level that would ensure the irreversibility of the transformation process.

Note 1 The first survey was conducted by Tamás Rozgonyi and the author with funding support from the OTKA. The second one, conducted by the author was supported by the OTKA and the Central European University Research Support Scheme. Pál Juhász, Dobrinka Kostova, Mladen Lazic and Erzsébet Szalai assisted in the preparatory aspects of this research.

References Andorka, R., Headey, B . and Krause, P., 1 994. 'A gazdasági és a politikai követelmények szerepe a rendszerváltozásban : Magyarország és Kelet­ Németország 1 990- 1 994' [The Role of Economic and Political Imperatives in System Transformation: Hungary and East Germany 1 990-1 994] . Szociológia Szemle, 4. Bartha, A., Gombás, É. and Hajdú, G., 1992. ' A forma hatalma' [The Power of the Form] . Figyelő, jún.25 . 3 1 . Bartha, A . and Martin, J., 1 995. Attitűdök metamorfózisa. A magyar, a bolgár, a szerb és a horvát gazdasági elit a posztkommunista rendszerátalakulás küszöbén [Metamorphosis of Attitudes. The Hungarian, Bulgarian, Serb and Croat Economic Elites at the Thresholds of the Post-Communist Transformation] . Ms. Böröcz, J. and Róna-Tas, Á. , 1 994. Formation of the New Economic Elites. Ms. Czirják, 1 . , Delhey, J . , Huitema, V . and Szőke, A., 1 993. ' Attitudes towards lncome lnequality, a Comparison Between the Netherlands, Germany and Hungary' . ln J. L. Peschar, ed. , Social Stratifi cation in Comparative Perspective. Papers from a TEMPUS seminar, Groningen. Csepeli, Gy. , Neményi, M. and Örkény, A., 1 992. 'Jövőtlen értékeink' [Our Futureless Values] . ln R. Andorka, T. Kolosi and Gy. Vukovich, szerk., Társadalmi riport 1992 [Social Report 1 992] , 334-58.

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Kostova, D., 1 992. 'The economic leaders in post-totalitarian society: the case of Bulgaria' . ln G. Lengyel, C. Offe and J. Tholen, eds, Economic Institutions, Actors and Attitudes: East-Central Europe in Transition. Centre for Social Policy Research, Bremen, University of Bremen 1 8 1 -93. Kostova, D., 1 994. The Economic Elite in Bulgaria - Adaptation and Change.

Ms.

Lazic, M., 1 992. ' Prisoners of the Command Economy: The Managerial Stratum and the Disintegration of "actually existing socialism "' . ln G. Lengyel, C. Offe and J. Tholen, eds, Economic lnstitutions, Actors and Attitudes: East­ Central Europe in Transition. Centre for Social Policy Research, University of Bremen, 1 69-80. Lazic, M., 1 994. Transformation of the Economic Elite Ms. Lengyel, Gy. , Offe, C. and Tholen, J., eds, 1 992. Economic Institutions, Acto rs and Attitudes: East-Central Europe in Transition. Centre for Social Policy Research, University of Bremen. Matonite, 1., 1 994. East European Transformations and the Economic Elite: Diversification of the Top Managerial Stratum in Hungary. M.A. Thesis, Central European University, B udapest. Nagy, B . , 1 993. 'Női vezetők - férfiakra szabott szerepben ' [Female Leaders in the Roles of Men] . Társadalom és gazdaság, l .sz., 22-9. Révai, E. and Molnár, L., 1 995. Gazdasági elit a 80-as évek közepén és a rendszerváltásban tartalomelemzés [Economic Elite in the mid- 1 980s and a Content Analysis of the Systemic Change] . Ms. Szalai, E., 1 989. Az új elit [The New Elite] . Beszélő. 27. Szelényi, 1. and Szelényi, Sz., 1 992. 'A társadalmi szerkezet változásai Közép­ Európában a poszt-kommunizmusba való átmenet korszakában ' [Changes to the Social Structure in Central Europe in the Period of Transition to Post­ Communism] . ln 1. Szelényi, A poszt- kommunista átmenet társadalmi konfliktusai [Social Conflicts of Post-Communist Transition] . Hungarian Academy of Science, Budapest, 1 49-55. Tóth, I . Gy, 1 992. Attitudes towards 'Just' Earnings Dijj'erentials in Eight Countries. unpublished Ms.

CH A PTER 6

THE MIDDLE STRATA IN TRAN S F O RMATION 1 Zoltán Fábián

M I D D LE C L A S S E S AND MIDDLE S T R ATA : P O S S IBLE D E F I N I T I O N S A S O C I O L O G I C A L definition of the middle class(es) raises a number of theoretical and empirical problems. Por example, class and stratification theories approach their object from different perspectives. Class theories try to describe the main groups of society on the hasis of their functional processes. According to Erik Olin Wright, formulator of the neo-Marxist class paradigm, the operation of modern bourgeois societies is based on complex mechanisms of exploitation. Wright and Martin ( 1987) mention three mechanisms based on ownership relations, control of organizations and ownership of skills. The first relation distinguishes between groups with and without possessions, i.e. the bourgeoisie and the workers. The second allows the identification of the group that controls organizations, i.e. managers, as opposed to those under control, namely employees. Skill assets are possessed by experts, as against those who lack them. Table 6. 1 summarizes the schema of classes defined by production relations. Table 6. 1 : Structural relations and the schema of classes Type of exploitation

Apppropriation of surplus

Production relations

Capital assets: ownership of means of production

Profit

Capital-labour

Control of organization assets

Loyalty dividend (wage trajectories)

Manager-worker

Skill assets

Rent component of the wage

Expert-non expert

98

Zoltán Fábián

This gives rise to the question: where do we place the middle classes? The answer given by Wright and Martin is as follows: 'Within this complex matrix of relations, certain positions are simultaneously exploiting along one dimension of production relations and exploited along another . . . These simultaneous exploiting/exploited positions correspond to what in common language is generally called the middle class ' (1987: 7). ln other words, Wright defines the middle classes by their contradictory class position. Whoever appears as 'exploiter ' along one dimension of the structural relations of society while appearing as 'exploited ' along another belongs to the middle class(es). ln sociological jargon it is customary to call the bourgeoisie old, and the classes 'exploiting ' along the two other dimensions new middle c/ass (for example, Kriesi, 1989). The distinction is based on monopoly capitalism appearing during the twentieth century to create the conditions for the dominance of the new middle class, while, simultaneously, the old middle class recedes into the background. ln his classic essay on social psychology published during the Second World War, Erich Fromm (1941) explained the rise to power of Nazism by the impairment of the economic position, and the resultant socio­ psychological situation of the German old middle class. His reasoning also brings the reader 's attention to the relationship between the social position of the middle strata and political stability (Fábián, 1 994a). ln Hungary and a number of other former state socialist countries the complete elimination of the old middle class was accomplished by Fascism, and then by the Communist govemments that came into .power after the Second World War. With the collapse of the state socialist systems, a strange situation arose. The reorganization and recreation of the middle class called 'old' in Western sociology was incorporated into political agendas. During the initial stages of the system transformation, the combination of privatization with compensation for that former property-owning middle class was one of the most important objectives of the Hungarian conservative coalition govemments. At the same time, the transformation did not leave the old-new employee middle class untouched since the traumatic appearance of mass unemployment affected not only unskilled workers but also skilled workers and white­ collar employees to an above average degree. Others claim that the characteristic groups of consumer societies are to be identified not in terms of production relations but in terms of styles of consumption. After all, consumption on the level of the whole of society not only homogenizes but also differentiates society. ln consumer

The middle strata in transformation

99

societies, class affiliation is determined not by the volume but by the culture of consumption. However much money someone has, spending it without a certain degree of 'taste ' betrays affiliation to a lower class. As a result, class boundaries can only be established on the hasis of an investigation of the given society 's pattems of consumption and their cultural significance. ln terms of their styles of consumption, the members of the middle class try to align themselves with those above them on the social ladder, while endeavouring to separate themselves from the classes below. It is not only the sociological trends of interpre­ tative or qualitative sociology (for example, Fussele, 1987) that utilize such an approach. Its adherents can also be found within empirical quantitative sociology, usually under the heading of 'lifestyle ' (for example, Soebel, 1981). Research on social stratification studies the hierarchical articulation of socially relevant differences among individuals that is called the system of inequalities. A group of individuals is considered to constitute a social stratum if they occupy typically similar positions along the different dimensions of the system of inequalities. Naturally, deciding which differences to consider important in determining inequality presents certain problems, as systems of social inequality are determined histori­ cally and differ between societies and epochs. However, sociological research has identified some regularities that are generally applicable to industrialized societies. Among them is the close similarity of the prestige-distribution of occupations (Treiman, 1977), or the ' sponta­ neous ' co-variance of social advantages and disadvantages (Lenski, 1954). Most often, three relatively easily measurable variables are used for the measurement of social status - income, level of education and prestige of occupation. However, many argue that it is theoretically more appropriate to bring a larger section of the system of social inequalities into the perspective of scientific research (Kolosi, 1984, 1987a). Two points are very important here. First, from the perspective of social stratification research, the number of ways the middle strata may be defined is the same as the number of important dimensions of inequality we examine. We may discuss the middle strata according to income, assets, levei of education, consumption, cultural activity, power, etc. Our second important point is connected with what Lenski (1954) called ' status crystallization ' , or status consistency. The co-occurrence of advantages and disadvantages is variable not only from the perspective of social history but also across individuals and social groups, with the result that the degree of status crystallization differs by the lével of strati-

100

Zoltán Fábián

fication. Differences along various dimensions of status, such as income, levei of education, etc. are termed status inconsistency. Lenski defined the concept as the horizontal dimension of stratification. Werner Landecker's (1987) hypothesis conceming the relation between status inconsistency and social hierarchy was summed up by Kolosi (1987b) as follows: 'the extensive horizontal and vertical differentiation of a society and rapid social change both decrease the degree of status crystallisation, and the extremes of stratification necessarily experience a greater degree of crystallisation than the middle strata' (italics added). This is equiva­ lent to the claim that the levei of status inconsistency is higher in the middle strata. 2 For the sake of drawing a parallel we may refer back to Wright's observation conceming the 'contradictory' position of the middle class. Researchers studying the middle groups of society may avail themselves of a number of possible terminologies. Therefore we find it expedient - for the reduction of terminological confusion - to break away from the logic of everyday language, and to use the term 'middle class', along with class in general, in the neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian sense. The widely used everyday concept of the middle class is much more likely to be based on an implicit stratification theory. It is our impression that in everyday communication, a middle-class position is taken to refer to people occupying a middle position in some dimension of hierarchical inequalities. However, when sociologists speak in that sense, they usually use the expression 'middle strata'. E M B O U RG E O I S EM E N T A N D M I D D LE S T R ATA From the perspective of the stability of modem bourgeois society and its multi-party parliamentary democratic political structure, the destiny of economically relatively independent autonomous middle strata is of decisive importance. Historically, the development of the organizational system of bourgeois democracies and the unfolding of the capitalist system of production has been hand in hand with the economic and polit­ ical emancipation of the middle strata. The concepts of embourgeoise­ ment and middle-class formation are not sociologically identical. The concept of bourgeoisie involves a relative economic autonomy and independence and a particular form of life and mentality. 3 The empirical separation of the middle class and the bourgeoisie is well demonstrated by the structure of Hungarian society between the two

The middle strata in transformation

101

World Wars, which Ferenc Erdei (1980) called a ' double social struc­ ture ' . It is especially apparent in the separation of the gentry section of the middle class, that is the so-called Christian-nationalistic middle class, from the bourgeois middle class, which was recruited from the ethnically non-Hungarian population, for example Germans and Jews. The former group is characterized by its economic and political dependence on the state and administrative sector and corresponding political influence, based on feudal origin and status in the Weberian sense. The character­ istic feature of the bourgeois section was its ownership of marketable assets, property and skills. Approaching the present, the middle-class formation of the Kádár era, which was made possible largely by the development of the so called ' second economy ' connected to market reform, also promoted the process of embourgeoisement. All of that, with the widespread development of enterprise skills and the gradual strengthening of civil society, was part of the social foundation of the system transformation. The problem of embourgeoisement is one of the most contentious and sensitive topics in Hungarian sociology, and often makes an appearance on party agendas and in political slogans. Many refrain from even using the term because they feel it is an overused, elastic concept, or because they find it acceptable only in connection with a determinate period of social history, the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. However, 'embourgeoisement' is a term that sociology cannot surrender to historians, as it affords a good grasp of the modemization of the structure of society, the transformation of the society based on privileges linked to status characteristics, such as ethnicity and party membership, to a capitalist class society. ln Hungary, the economically independent middle strata that may provide the hasis for the formation of autonomous middle classes are now being created. There are a number of possible ' scenarios ' for the composition and sociological profile of the middle class. One of the main aims of the privatization strategy formulated by the first democratically elected post-Communist governments in Hungary was the creation of a national property-owning bourgeoisie by the reorganization and compen­ sation of the former property-owning middle class. Another policy aimed at the middle strata shows a preference for the interests of the employee middle stratum during the deconstruction of state ownership by bringing in foreign capital. This creates large privatized companies that modernize the deficit-producing public sector by improving productivity and which act as creators of employment. The political risks of the latter strategy -

102

Zoltán Fábián

a temporary increase in unemployment, xenophobia, etc. - are obvious. ln Hungary the above two scenarios are being realized together.

THE E X PA N S I O N O F THE P R I VATE S E C T O R

Owners and entrepreneurs: rebirth of the old middle class The distinguishing feature of Kádár's ' soft' dictatorship (the so-called ' goulash Communism') was that it allowed a wide strata of society to maintain or improve their standard of living by activities in the so-called ' second' economy. The socio-structural role of the second economy was recognized by Hungarian sociologists relatively early. Along with the structure defined by the state-redistributive economy, their models also took account of the role of the second economy, the actual market condi­ tions (Szelényi and Manchin, 1986; Kolosi, 1987a). Kolosi (1987:151) found that during the first half of the 1980s, three-quarters of the active population participated in the second economy by undertaking some sort of income-generating activity outside the state sector. Following the system transformation, the various forms of second economy activities, especially small-scale agricultural production for the market and casual work, have declined in importance. Examining households engaged in small-scale agricultural production, Spéder (1994: 80) reported that the percentage of those producing for the markel as well was 27 .5 per cent in 1987. That figure decreased to 14.5 per cent by 1992, while the propor­ tion of households producing only for their own consumption increased. The tendency probably reflects not only the appearance of mass unemployment and the crisis of agriculture in transformation, but also a proportion of those once engaged in the second economy have now entered the private sector as their primary occupation. That hypothesis is supported by a number of indicators that show the expansion of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. The subject is given a detailed treatment by Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik in Chapter 4 in this volume, and in the study of the development of the private sector by TÁRKI and Economic Research Ltd. (TÁRKI and GKI, 1994). Tht: various approaches in this volume - though prepared using very different methodologies and research hypotheses-have all led to similar conclu­ sions. The proportion of the private sector within the Hungarian economy was around 60 per cent in 1993. The proportion of the Hungarian and foreign private sector within the production of the GDP

The middle strata in transformation

1 03

10.5 0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

1 2%

Figure 6. 1 Proportion of entrepreneurs in the economically active population, 1 982-93 Sources: aKolosi and Róbert, 1 99 1 :6; bKolosi et al., 1 993 : 13

was estimated by János Árvay and András Vértes at 56 to 63 per cent. Tamás Kolosi and Endre Sik estimated that two-thirds of the total working hours were spent in the private sector. I estimated the proportion of private-sector income in the total income of households at 45 per cent. If we exclude from consideration income of a redistributive type, to which the distinction of private and public sectors is not applicable, that proportion rises to 66 per cent. From the perspective of this chapter, indicators attesting to the rebirth of the 'old' middle class are particularly important. The dominant tendency is the strengthening of entrepreneurial inclination. ln 1988, 25 per cent of subjects said they would 'like to be entrepreneurs'; two years later the figure had increased to 44 per cent. The gap between aspirations and actual behaviour is large, but, significantly, the number of people actually starting a business4 also doubled between 1989 and 1993 as is shown by Figure 6.1. The percentage of Hungarian entrepreneurs had become very similar to the corresponding figure in Western Europe and other developed countries by 1993. That is true even if we take into account that we have lumped together the two large groups of proprietory bourgeoisie:

1 04

Zoltán Fábián

employers and the self-employed petty bourgeoisie. The proportion of the former group is around 1 to 3 per cent in developed countries. Por example, in Finland the proportion of entrepreneurs employing more than ten people was 1 per cent (Biom and Kivinen, 1989:20). Kolosi and Sik (1991) provide some information concerning the internal divisions of entrepreneurs. ln 1992, 74 per cent of entrepreneurs were self-employed, 19 per cent were active owners of companies (managing a limited company they partially owned) and 7 per cent were helping family members or were pensioner-entrepreneurs. Since Figure 6.1 only contains people who report themselves as independent entrepreneurs in their primary occupation, the number involved in some sort of entrepreneurial activity is probably larger. ln 1991, for instance, TÁRKl put the following question to subjects: 'More and more people these days work for companies not owned by ,the state. Have you, or someone in your family, tried any of the following?' The question was followed by a list of various forms of enterprise. Of the subjects and their household, 16.9 per cent had tried some form of enter­ prise. ln most cases that meant independent production or service enter­ prise, or participation in a limited company. ln 1992, the largest proportion of entrepreneurs, 35 per cent, were working in service industries, 24 per cent were in retail, 22 in industry and 1 0 per cent in agriculture. The remaining 9 per cent were freelance non-manuals (Kolosi and Sik, 1992:10). The proportion of independent entrepreneurs is greatest in those sectors of the economy which were earlier 'surrendered' to the second economy by the redistributive system.

Employees and the development of the private economy The expansion of the private sector is considerable in terms of jobs as well. ln 1992, nationally 35.8 per cent of employees were working in the private sector (see Table 6.2), and in Budapest 46 per cent. Examining the private sector in 1992 the greatest difference between national and Budapest figures is in the case of privately owned companies. The proportion of people employed in that category was over 25 per cent in Budapest. lt is generally the case that the expansion of the private sector is fastest in the capital. There, the proportion of those employed by companies in foreign ownership is also greater than the national average. When evaluating the rate of increase, however, it must be taken into account that 'the expansion of the private sector has so far been dynamic only among small and medium companies, while it remained very slow

105

The middle strata in transformation Tab le 6.2: The distrihution of earners hy the type of work place Public sector Publicly financed institutions Public corporations Local govemment companies Traditional cooperative State-owned companies Private sector Partly privately owned companies Privately owned companies Individual entrepreneurs and enterprises with no legal entity (Total)

1 992

1 993

22. 1 23.2 5.2 8.0 5.7

1 6. 1 1 9 .8 5.9 5.8 8.9

9.3 1 4. 1 1 2.4 ( 1 00)

12.5 1 6.5 1 3 .8 ( 1 00)

Sources: 1 992: Kolosi and Sik, 1 992:21 ; 1 993: Kolosi et al., 1 993: 1 8

among large ones ' (Kolosi and Sik, 1992:10). That further substantiates the claim that up until 1993 the rate of development of the private sector was determined largely by new enterprises rather than privatization. ln terms of the nationality of ownership in 1992, 90 per cent of employees worked for companies entirely in Hungarian ownership, 8.7 per cent were located in part Hungarian, part foreign-owned companies, while only 1.4 per cent worked for firms entirely in foreign hands. Despite the high level of working capital influx, unparalleled in the region, the propor­ tion of foreign ownership is relatively low in the whole of the economy; in some small Western European countries the proportion of places of employment partially or wholly in foreign ownership reaches 50 per cent. Therefore, the view concerning the domination of foreign capital is unfounded (Kolosi and Sik, 1992: 10). ln 1993, the ratio of those working for companies partially or wholly in foreign ownership did not reach 20 per cent even in the 'more privatized' and cosmopolitan Budapest. C H A N G E OF T H E I N C O M E D I S TRIBUTI O N A N D THE M I D D L E S T R ATA The inequality of income in society is monitored by the Hungarian Household Panel Study. Researchers asked about all forms of income, and their changes, in detail (see Kolosi et al., 1993) . Despite the relative reliability of the data, it must be emphasized that declared income is estimated to be 30-50 per cent below actual levels. 5

Zoltán Fábián

106

Table 6.3 : Mean household per capita income, 1 992 and 1 994 Population deciles

( 1 992) Mean income (1 99 1 = 1 00)

B oltom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top Top/boltom ratio

4,6 1 7 6,593 7,677 8,564 9,394 1 0,378 1 1 ,72 1 1 3,629 1 6,858 28,649 6.2 1

1 28 1 28 1 25 1 24 1 24 1 24 1 25 1 26 1 27 1 27

(1994) Mean income (1 993=100) 4,600 7,264 8,873 1 0,03 1 1 1 ,073 1 2,234 1 3 ,694 1 5 ,933 1 9,806 33 ,920 7 . 37

101 1 05 1 10 1 12 1 14 1 14 1 14 1 16 1 17 1 18

Sources: 1 992: Kolosi and Sik, 1 992:24. 1 994: Kolosi et al. , 1 994: 1 9

If we divide the population into ten groups of equal size by level of income, it becomes possible to sketch the main tendencies of the effects of the system transformation on the distribution of income between 1991 and 1994 (Table 6. 3). The detailed study of temporal series of income deciles reveals that the income differentiation accompanying the system transformation occurred not at the expense of members of the two bottom deciles, but at the cost of a deterioration in the positions of the members of deciles 3 to 7. The widely held opinion that during the system transfor­ mation the poor became poorer is true only to a very limited extent. While the rich became richer, it was mainly the lower middle strata whose circumstances declined, while the most disadvantaged bottom tenth of the population managed to maintain its level of income. It would appear that the economic burden of the first period of the transition was largely born by the middle stratum, which, even during the late Kádár era, could only maintain its standard of living by entering the second economy in a self­ exploitative manner. It may be a result of the disillusionment of those strata that in 1992, the Hungarian Democratic Party, the largest party in the coalition government, was the most unpopular among those identi­ fying themselves as 'lower middle class' (Róbert, 1994:15). The process whereby the differentiation of income was being realized by the rich becoming richer and the middle strata losing ground, which has been a long-term trend, seems to be coming to a halt. Between the bottom and top inequalities of income increased to a considerable extent in the period between 1992 and 1994, and the middle-income groups could attain greater growth in income than lower-income groups.

The middle strata in transformation

1 07

I D E N T I F I CATION WITH THE MIDDLE C L A S S A N D S O CIAL ATTITUDES The explanation of behaviour must tak:e psychological elements into account as well. One of these important subjective factors is the sense of identity, which is often rooted in the deep layers of human personality. According to the results of Western European analyses, in democratic circumstances, (Almond and Verba, 1963) citizens are confident that they can affect the democratic institutions by rational action (participating in elections) and because they hold those institutions predictable (confi­ dence in the law). They are also free to pursue activities in civil society (Berlin, 1979). This requires economic autonomy or independence. The post-industrial capitalist middle classes maintain their autonomy by controlling assets (see Table 6.1). Historically, that image of citizenry (citoyen) connected with a polit­ ical culture originated at the time of the French Revolution. That age is the period of political struggle between, on the one hand, the nobility and the clergy, and on the other their opponent, the third estate (Bibó, 1990). Just as the concept of the third estate is wider than that of the bourgeoisie, the political sense of the concept of citizen differs from the concept of the middle class defined by position within the division of labour and/or social stratification. The middle classes of Western societies can be considered rather homogenous in that sense that they can be characterized by a civic political culture. ln societies undergoing delayed modernization, such as in Central and Eastern Europe, the socio­ logical composition of the middle classes is more heterogeneous. The dual, gentry and bourgeois, nature of the middle class of Hungarian society between the two World Wars is a case in point. The reason often cited for heterogeneity in their political culture is that the economic autonomy required for civil liberties is lacking in some form or another in the middle strata of these societies. Totalitarian systems strive to control the members of society to such an extent that they even demand the right to determine their personal identities (Erős, 1993). ln the state socialist system, for a long time the only elements of social identity that could be publicly professed were those recognized by Communist ideology. ' Bourgeois ' became a forbidden category and the whole of the bourgeoisie was pronounced 'class-alien'. The effect of the state manipulation of identity was cushioned to some extent by the remaining ' sm all circles ' of liberty, the

108

Zoltán Fábián

family and the remnants of civic society, so in reality, traditional elements of identity remained inheritable (Bibó, 1990; Szummer, 1992). The most effective means used by state socialism to prevent the survival of citizens' political culture was the abolition of private property and the market economy. As the processes of reform initiated in the 1960s began to take shape, the conditions for a pluralism of identities were created in parallel with the rebirth of civil society (Fábián, 1992). T he validity of the above line of reasoning is supported by the empir­ ical analyses of Róbert and Sági (1994) which show the role of the second economy in the identification with 'middle class' and ' bourgeoisie' . Their time-series of data also show that the normative context of the above elements of identity changed after the system trans­ formation. After the system transformation, the category of middle class and of the bourgeoisie was re-evaluated in political discourse. Its earlier pejorative connotation was lost, not least because the parties started an intensive race for the votes of those groups. ln his analysis of the connection between class identities and political attitudes towards the system transformation, Péter Róbert (1994) has shown that the social impact of the system transformation is evaluated in a more differentiated manner by those identifying with the middle class than with the lower class, working class or lower-middle class. The last respond to the increasing social differences resulting from the system transformation with a frustrated patemalistic attitude. Ascending the social ladder, refusal of a guardian state becomes the more characteristic political attitude from the lower-middle class upwards. Our portrait of the Hungarian middle strata and the economic and social processes affecting these social groups is necessarily fragmentary in comparison with the theoretic frameworks introduced. Summarizing our main observations, the economic burden of the initial stage of the system transformation was bome by the lower band of the middle strata. T his tendency appears to be changing in the 1993-4 period, inasmuch as the bottom 30 per cent in income was able to maintain its levei of income of the previous year less well than the middle strata. According to the subsistence minimum calculations of the KSH (Central Institute of Statistics), the proportion of the population living below the subsistence levei has tripled since 1989. The private sector has expanded dynamically, especially independent entrepreneurs and private-sector employees, and in the case of the former, they now approach the proportion in Western European societies. By 1993, a significant lower and middle property­ owning class (petite bourgeoisie) had developed in Hungary. However,

The middle strata in transformatio n

109

the privatization of large companies progressed at a much lower rate. Despite the exceptional influx of foreign capital, only a small fraction of jobs are provided by companies in foreign hands. ln terms of the intemal differentiation of the middle class, this, along with the underdeveloped character of the home capital market, hinders the development of an employee or managerial 'new ' middle class.

Notes 1 Commisioned by the Ministry of Wefare, TÁRKl examined the circum­ stances of middle strata from September 1 993 to March 1994. This essay forms a part of the summary report on that research (see Kolosi, Róbert, Sági and Fábián, 1 994). 2 ln his corresponding analyses ( 1 987a, 1 987b), Kolosi found that in compar­ ison with Dutch, West German and Czechoslovakian societies, Hungarian society is less well characterized by consistent middle strata. ln the 1 980s, the distinguishing feature of Hungarian middle strata was precisely that high levei of inconsistency. Since the system transformation, the levei of status crystallization has increased in Hungarian society (Fábián, 1 994b). However, we do not know what effect that general trend is having on the sociological profile of the middle strata. 3 It is worth noting here that 'civil' and bourgeois ' are denoted by the same word in Hungarian, and consequently political-cultural connotations (e.g. civic culture) are often neglected or confused with the socio-economic meaning of the word. 4 We should mention that the above figures contain so-called 'forced enterpre­ neurs ', who are actually employees and only figure as independents to secure better national insurance and tax terms. We do not have reliable data about the size of that group. 5 We may also note that questionnaire studies are not suitable for investigating the very top and very bottom layers of society, the homeless and the highest groups of the elite, as they are technically impossible to reach, and the chances of members of those groups occurring in a sample are minimal. About 400 billion Forints (approximately $4.3 billion) are missing in compar­ ison with the macro-statistical data, most of which comes from the private sector (Kolosi et al., 1 993).

References Almond, A. and Verba, S., 1963 . The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

1 10

Zoltán Fábián

Berlin, lsaiah, 1 979. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bibó, István, 1 990 ( 1 979) 'A kapitalista liberalizmus és a szocializmus-kommu­ nizmus állítólagos kiegyenlíthetetlen ellentéte ' [About the Reputed Irreconciable Opposite Between Liberal Capitalism and Socialism-Communism] . ln ifj. Bibó István, ed. , Válogatott tanulmányok, 1 935-1979 [Selected Works, 1 935-1 979] , Budapest: Magvető. Biom, Raimo and Kivinen, Markku 1 989. 'The Relevance and Dimensions of Class Theories ' . ln Raimo Biom, Studies in Class Theory. Tampere: Department of Sociology and Social Psychology at the University of Tampere. Erdei, Ferenc, 1 980 ( 1 944). 'A magyar társadalom ' [The Hungarian Society] . ln A magyar társadalom. Budapest. Erős, Ferenc. 1 993 . 'Rendszerváltás-identitásváltás ' [Change of Regime and Change of ldentity] . ln Erős Ferenc, A válság szociálpszichológiája [Social Psychology of Crisis] . Budapest: T-Twins, 1 96-205 . (Originally published in Magyar Tudomány, 9, 1 99 1 , 1 1 04-1 0.) Fábián, Zoltán, 1 992. 'Rendszer és identitás: Ami változik és ami nem ' [System and Identity: Persistence and Change] . Magyar Tudomány, 7, 838-44. Fábián, Zoltán, 1 994a. 'Szabadság és identitás: Recenzió E. Fromm Menekülés a szabadság elől cimű könyvéről [Freedom and Identity: Review of E. Fromm 's Escape from Freedom] . BUKSZ. (Nyár), 232-4. Fábián, Zoltán, 1 994b. 'A státuszinkonzisztencia mértékének változása Magyarországon, 1 982-1 992 [Change in the Size of Status Inconsistency in Hungary, 1 982- 1 992] . Kézirat. [Mimeograph] , B udapest: TÁRKI. Fromm, Erich, 1 94 1. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Fussele, Paul, 1 987. Osztálylétrán Amerikában. Budapest: Európa. [Originally: Class. Guide through the American Status System. Ballantine, 1 984.] Kohn, Melvin L., Naoi, Atsushi, Schoenbach, Carrie, Schooler, Carmi and Slomczynski, Kazimierz M., 1 990. 'Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the United States, Japan, and Poland. ' American Journal of Sociology, January, 964-1 008. Kolosi, Tamás, 1 984. 'Status and Stratification ' . ln Rudolf Andorka and T. Kolosi, eds, Stratification and Inequalities. Budapest: Institute of Social Sciences. Kolosi, Tamás, 1 987a. Tagolt társadalom [Stratified Society] . Budapest: Gondolat. Kolosi, Tamás, 1 987b. 'A státuszinkonzisztencia mérése' [Measurement of Status lnconsistency] . Szociológia, l , 1-20. Kolosi, Tamás and Sik, Endre, 1 992. ' Munkaerőpiac és jövedelmek. ' ln Endre S ik and István György Tóth, eds, 'Jelentés a Magyar Háztartás Panel 1. hullámának eredményeiről ' [Report on the Results of the 1 st Wave of Hungarian Household Panel Study] . Magyar Háztartás Panel

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Műhelytanulmányok 1 . Budapest: Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem Szociológiai Tanszék, TÁRKI. Kolosi, Tamás, Szivós, Péter and Bedekovics, István, 1 993. ' Munkaerőpiac és jövedelmek ' [Labour Market and Incomes] . ln E. Sik and I. Gy. Tóth, eds, ' Egy év után: Jelentés a Magyar Háztartás Panel III. hullámának eredményeirő l ' [A Year After: Report on the Results of the 2nd Wave of Hungarian Household Panel Study] . Magyar Háztartás Panel Műhelytanulmányok 3. Budapest: Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem Szociológiai Tanszék, TÁRKI. Kolosi, Tamás, Szivós, Péter, and Bedekovics, István, 1 994. ' Munkaerőpiac és jövedelmek ' [Labour Market and Incomes] . ln I. Gy. Tóth, ed. , 'Társadalmi átalakulás, 1 992-1 994: Jelentés a Magyar Háztartás Panel III. hullámának eredményeiről. ' [Social Transformation: Report on the Results of the 3rd Wave of Hungarian Household Panel Study.] Magyar Háztartás Panel Műhelytanulmányok 5. Budapest: Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem Szociológiai Tanszék, TÁRKI és KSH. Kolosi, Tamás, Róbert, Péter, Sági, Mati ld and Fábián, Zoltán, 1 994. ' A rend­ szerváltás társadalmi hatásai és a középrétegek' [Social Impacts of System Transformations on Middle Strata] . ln József Mészáros, ed. , Magyarország átalakulóban [Hungary in Transformation] . Budapest: Népjóléti Minisztérium [Ministry of Welfare] . Kriesi, Hanspeter, 1 989. ' New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands ' , American Journal ofSociology, March, 1 078- 1 1 6. Landecker, Werner S . , 1 987 . Class Crystallization. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Lens ki, Gerhard, 1 954. ' Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status ' . American Sociological Review, 19. Róbert, Péter, 1 994. ' Középosztály, attitűdök, politikai preferenciák ' [Middle Class, Attitudes, Political Preferences] . ln István Balogh, ed. , Törésvonalak és értékválasztások [Cleaveges and Value Preferences] . Budapest: MTA PTI . Róbert, Péter and Sági, M . , 1 994. ' A középosztály megerősödésének szubjektív aspektusai ' [Subjective Aspects of Middle Class Development] . Kézirat. [Mimeograph] . B udapest: TÁRKI. Soebel, M . , 1 98 1 . Life Style and Social Structure. New York: Academic Press. Spéder, Zsolt, 1 994. ' A második gazdaság súlya' [The Role of Second Economy] . ln TÁRKI, GKI, A magánszektor fejlődése Magyarországon, 1 990-1 993. Összefoglaló kutatási beszámoló az ÁVÜ számára [The Development of Private Economy: Research Report for the State Property Agency] 79-84. Szelényi, Iván and Manchin, Róbert, 1 990 ( 1 986). ' Piac , redisztribúció és társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek a kelet-európai szocialista társadalmakban ' . ln Iván Szelényi, Új osztály, állam, politika [New Class, State, Politics] . Budapest: Európa.

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Szummer, Csaba, 1 992. ' Identitásváltás vagy identitáspatológia' [Change or Pathology of Identity] . Magyar Tudomány, 2. Treiman, D., 1 977. Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Academic. Weber, Max, 1 987. Gazdaság és társadalom. A megértő szociológia alapvon­ alai. 1 . kötet. [Economy and Society] . Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyokiadó. Wright, Erik Olin and Martin Bill, 1 987. 'The Transformation of the American Class Structure' . American Journal ofSociology, July, 1-29.

CH A PTER 7

C O N S CIOUS NE S S O F INEQUALITY Péter Róbert

THE investigation of social inequalities has been one of the central subjects of sociological research for a long time. How has the system of relations pertaining to social inequality been reshaped by the economic and political transition in Hungary? Sociologists may attempt an answer by means of ' measuring ' the social status of people, that is various characteristics related to their occupation, qualifications, incomes, consumption or living circumstances and draw their conclusions as regards the distance between various social groups. It is also possible to ask people how they themselves perceive their position and whether their circumstances and opportunities have improved or deteriorated. Many consider social facts, that is data on inequalities and distances between social groups, to be a scientifically more valuable and reliable source than what can be inferred from people 's own feelings and impressions. Yet since social inequalities manifest themselves as political problems, the latter approach is equally relevant, since people 's political prefer­ ences and voting behaviour are far more determined by their feelings than by the way social scientists choose to describe them. Moreover, people 's opinions and attitudes may also be considered social facts. Consequently, the reflection of social inequalities on the subjective, individual level is an objective phenomenon which requires analysis. This study attempts to present some aspects of inequality conscious­ ness in Hungarian society in the early 1990s. The available data provide an overview of people 's subjective class identification, where they place themselves in the Hungarian social hierarchy, which factors they consider significant for determining changes of social status and what their feelings are about the social inequalities which have resulted from

1 14

Péter Róbert

the transition. When possible, tables present data from before and after the transition. The source is the 1992 mobility survey conducted by T ÁRKI (Social Research lnformatics Centre) and the ISSP (lntemational Social Science Program). 1

CLA S S I D E N T I F I CAT I O N The most general reflection of inequality consciousness is class­ consciousness: with which social class do people identify themselves? Analyses of social structure and the related theoretical debates have been characterized by a constant fluctuation between class-based and strata­ based approaches. 2 Class self-identification has been successfully used in public opinion polls and attitude surveys aimed at the analysis of polit­ ical opinions in nearly all societies. Sometimes the categories used in these surveys only make a distinction within the dichotomy of working class and middle class, but as a rule they distinguish between lower class, working class, middle class and upper class. While it is an obvious fact that these class positions are quite heterogeneous empirically, they nevertheless make sense as words stimulating a general consciousness of identity in the majority of people. Identification with classes may be considered the way in which class formation processes of the transition period are reflected in people's consciousness. The Hungarian praxis has shown the need to complete the classification with the lower-middle and upper-middle classes which provides for a more sophisticated range of choices and thus registers subtler differences in a society undergoing a real economic and social transition. With respect to class-consciousness for three consecutive years (1991, 1992, 1993)3 there are fluctuations in the data, some within the range of sampling error and some statistically significant. A linear trend can only be seen with regard to the lower class which is growing moderately, but still lower than the measure based on answers to questions about whether the respondent lives below the minimum subsistence level (Table 7 .1). The data reveal a major decrease followed by a minor increase in the identification with the working class. ln any case this is the most stable social group. As Table 7 .2 shows, two-thirds of the same respondents asked in 1992 and 1993 identified themselves with the working class in both years. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a marked fluctuation between the working class and the lower class. Forty-six per cent of those who identified themselves with the lower class in 1992 came to

1 15

Consciousness of inequality Table 7 . 1 : Class identification, 1 991-3 (%) Lower class Working class Lower-middle class Middle class Upper-middle class Upper class (N)

1 991

1 992

1 993

(% change)

7.2 48 .8 1 7 .6 23.8 2.4 0.2 (97 1 )

9 .4 39.8 1 6. 1 3 1 .9 2.4 0.4 (2,953)

1 0.0 42.6 1 8 .5 27.6 1 .3

(+2.8) (-6.2) (+0.9) (+3 .8) (-1 . 1 ) (--0.2)

(1 , 1 40)

identify themselves with the working class in 1993 ; conversely, 49 per cent of those identifying themselves with the lower class in 1993 had classified themselves as working class in 1992. ln the case of the middle class the trend is the opposite: there is a major increase between 199 1 and 1992, followed by a minor decline in 1 993. The stability of the middle class is smaller than that of the working class: 50 to 60 per cent between 1992 and 1993 . The smaller stability of the middle class is due primarily to the fact that one in every four (26 per cent) who identified themselves as middle class in 1992 came to classify themselves as lower-middle class in 1993 . Seen from the other aspect, 44 Table 7 .2: Changing class ident/fication in 1 992-3, panel surveya (%) ( 1 993) 1 992 Outflow Lower Working Lower-middle Middle Upper-middle lnflow Lower Working Lower-middle Middle Upper-middle Upper

Lower

Working

Lower-middle

Middle

42 12 9 2

46 66 38 18 (8)

5 10

7 12 21

29

49 15 7

8

64 15 13

32

26

51

Upper-middle

3

(8)

(76)

(8)

2 23

2 19 14

(8)

30

44 1

59

6

(64)

(14)

( 1 4)

a N = 1 , 1 40. Bold figures express stable class identification. Bracketed numbers are values based on such a small number of cases that they are unreliable

1 16

Péter Róbert

per cent of the lower-middle class of 1993 had considered itself middle class in 1992. ln Hungary, the lower-middle class is in fact typically the 'buffer zone' which, according to Giddens (1973), delimits the middle class from the lower-status working class. Its stability is substantially smaller (30 per cent) than that of either the working class or the middle class. This is the sphere where the two-way mobility of classes actually occurs. Elsewhere, we have analysed statistically the social-demographical determinants of class formation, identification with the middle class in particular (Róbert and Sági, 1994). That analysis revealed the significant and unchanging effect of occupation, qualifications and even social background on belonging to the middle class. Fluctuation, however, was largely a result of the growing role of material factors (income, wealth) in determining identification with a certain class. Financial status had some impact previously, but mere participation in the second economy embodied an altemative chance for relative independence and material affluence which gave people the sense of having made a major step towards the middle class. As a result of the transition, however, the second economy is contracting. The privatization of state industry brings about the end of working in Enterprise Business Communities, in which people employed by or retired from a state-owned company do separate work for the company on commission. One of the main areas of the second economy was the small-scale production of agricultural goods at home, but based on resources of the co-operative. The liquidation of agricultural co-operatives, turning agriculture into a crisis branch of the economy, means that household farming cannot be continued. These changes explain why earlier relative affluence has depreciated and a great number of those whose middle-class existence was based on this relative security and consumer affluence feel that they are suddenly going downhill. As the possibility of participation becomes available to an ever narrowing circle, the less influence this factor has on class­ consciousness and the more factors such as wealth and material consumption have come to determine class-consciousness.

P L AC E O N T H E S O CI A L L A D D E R 'There are people in Hungary in higher and lower social pos1t1ons, respectively. You can see a ladder in this picture. If the top step of the ladder means those in the highest position and the bottom step means

Consciousness of inequality

1 17

those in the lowest, where would you place yourself on it? ' We asked this question in a survey conducted on a nation-wide representative sample first in 1987, in 1992 and again in the autumn of 1993 (Róbert and Sági, 1992). The Hungarian data could also be evaluated in an international comparison, as the survey was conducted within the framework of ISSP research. We concluded that, in comparison with the data of developed market economies, Hungarians feel that their social status has improved more compared to their parents ' , yet on average they evaluate their own status on the social ladder as having deteriorated. The more recent data enable us to show how the evaluation of the situation has changed in a period which includes the political transition with all its economic and social consequences. People evaluated their social status more unfavourably in the early 1 990s than they did before the transition. On a 10-point scale with 1 the top and 10 the bottom, in 1 987 the mean rating for subjective status was 6. 30. ln 1 992, the mean rating had fallen to 7.08. It recovered to 6.96 in the following year, but was still more than half a step down from six years earlier. While there was a broad stratum (30 per cent) on the fifth step in 1987, the 1992 and 1993 percentage of those at this levei was less than 10 per cent. ln 1987, 52 per cent of the respondents were located on steps 5 and 6. The same proportion of people are found on steps 6 and 7 in 1993. While a fourth of the respondents placed themselves on the lowest three steps in 1 987, the proportion was 40 per cent in 1992 and 35 per cent in 1 993. However, the decline in social status was also matched by a decline in inequality, as measured by the standard deviation: it was 1 .7 in 1987, falling to 1 .6 in 1992 and 1 .4 the following year. We also examined findings in relation to occupation, qualifications, place of residence and income. Table 7.3 shows that social status as measured by objective indicators is related to subjective evaluation: the higher the occupational group one belongs to, the more educated one is, the more urban the settlement one lives in and the higher one 's income, the higher one will place oneself on the social ladder. On the other hand, there is not a single occupational group, educational level, category of settlement or income group that does not feel a deterioration of social status compared to the period preceding the transition. ln the case of occupation, managers felt a stronger deterioration of social status than intellectuals. Skilled workers are the other group, both on the hasis of occupation and qualifications, which has experienced a marked decline. As one moves down the slope of urbanization, the

118

Péter Róbert

Table 7 . 3 : Mean subjective status by social-demographic characteristics 1 987

1 992

1 993

Change

(Mean: a higher score means worse social status, since I was the top step of the ladder)

Occupation

Agricultural manual Unskilled and semi-skilled worker Skilled worker Self-employed White-collar worker Professional Manager

6.72 6.63 6.22 5.88 6.08 5.49 5.49

7.94 7.46 7. 1 6 6.59 6.7 1 6.09 6.46

7.34 7.26 6.83 6.24 6.55 6. 1 3 5 .97

-0.62 --0.63 --0.6 1 --0.36 --0.47 --0.64 --0.48

Below 8 years 8 years Vocational school Secondary College University

7. 1 2 6.33 6. 1 6 6.05 5.55 5. 1 8

7.68 7.62 7. 1 3 6.57 6.42 5 .76

7.77 7.4 1 6.97 6.49 6. 1 2 5 .92

--0.65 -1 .08 --0. 8 1 --0.44 --0.57 -0.74

Village Town County seat Budapest

6.52 6.26 6. 1 2 6.03

7.41 7.06 6.89 6.56

7.34 6.94 6.56 6.55

--0.82 --0.68 --0.44 --0.52

Bottom quintile

6.65 6.74 6.22 6. 1 4 5.8 1

7.41 7.65 7.14 7.02 6.23

na na na na na

Education

Place of Living

lncome

Top quintile na:

(--0.76) (--0.9 1 ) (--0.92) (--0.88) (--0.42)

the question about income was not included in the 1 993 questionnaire

inhabitants' perception of their social status deteriorates. The structural changes in the industry, and unfavourable processes in foreign markets are all developments which adversely affect the skilled workers' earlier opportunities for income strategies based on participation in the second economy. It is primarily people living in the country whose social status is unfavourably affected by the bankruptcy of agriculture. The managers' feeling of a fall in status above the average may be explained by the fact that their reference category has become, more than ever before, the West and its managerial incomes, lifestyles and consumption levels. The only favourable result is that the data show no further deteriora­ tion of the subjective social status between 1992 and 1993. With respect to occupation it is only the intellectuals who placed themselves even

1 19

Co nscio usness of inequality Tab le 7 .4: / nternal structure of social inequality consciousness

(N = 2,418, correlation coejj'icients)" lncome Subjective indicators

(Subjective indicators) Occupation Culture

Subjective income Subjective culture Subjective occupational prestige Subjective social status

1 .00 .47 .42 .64

1 .00 .62 .59

1 .00 .60

Occupation Education Income Place of living Age Subjective class

.23 .27 .24 .08 -. 1 2 .39

.43 .50 .21 . 17 -. 1 4 .45

.42 .45 .23 .15 -.09 .42

Objective indicators

Status

1 .00 .33 .37 .24

.10 - . 11

.46

a All correlations are significant at p < .001

lower on the social ladder in 1993 than a year before, while with respect to qualifications it is those holding university degrees and those without any education who did so. Elsewhere the data are similar or somewhat better than previously but often within the margin of sampling error. Since status is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, we have attempted to distinguish the most significant dimensions. Consequently, in the TÁRKI mobility survey of spring 1992 people were asked to place themselves on a 10-step ladder according to their financial status, their education and culture, their occupational prestige and finally according to their social status. The mean rating for financial status was 4.1; far social status 4.5; occupational prestige, 4.7 ; and far education and culture, 5.1. There is a difference of one whole step in the means far financial status, which is highest, and culture, which is lowest. General social status is the most closely related to financial status: the term 'social status' makes people think mostly of their financial status. There is only a relatively small correlation between subjective financial status and subjective status in the hierarchy of cultural and occupational inequalities (Table 7.4). The latter two variables, however, have a more marked correlation. One dimension of inequality consciousness is financial status, while the other dimension is cultural, educational and occupational status. 4 The evaluation of one's situation with respect to financial inequalities is the least connected to social-demographic variables and class­ consciousness. The correlation coefficients in the lower part of Table 7 .2

1 20

Péter Róbert

show, according to the objective and subjective indicators of social status, that inequality consciousness (excepting the distinctive experi­ ence of financial status) is consistently highly correlated with occupa­ tion, education and class-consciousness, moderately correlated with income and weakly correlated with the place of residence and age. The direction of the correlations is always positive, except for age, with a higher social status associated with a more favourable experience in consciousness. The negative correlation with age indicates that the young evaluate their status more favourably than the elderly.

FACTO R S I N F L U E N C I N G S O C I A L S TATU S Which social factors are considered by people to influence their social status and to what degree are these an important element of inequality consciousness? The factors which they consider to have a greater role in determining their circumstances and opportunities will be those dimen­ sions of inequality in which perceived success or failure has been achieved. These factors will make a primary impact on their general mood, behaviour and evaluation of their status. Respondents to the T ÁRKI mobility survey of spring 1992 had to rank twenty factors on a scale of 1 to 5 on the hasis of the degree to which they influence social status. These factors are presented in Table 7 .5 in the order of the means of the responses. Looking at the top of the ranking (an average value of 4 or higher on the scale of 5), we can see that social status is primarily influenced by factors such as the amount of income from a full-time job, the existence or lack of network connections and status as a manager or subordinate employee. This result once again suggests that people, when considering their social status, think of finan­ cial status first; besides income from a full-time job, the amount of additional income comes fifth in the rankings. Beyond financial status they also think of an informal status which gives one access to 'that which cannot be measured in money'; and this is followed by a formal status of power, a managerial position. All these three factors influencing social status are of a remarkably material character and imply that demands are not satisfied to a sufficient degree, but this insufficient satis­ faction can be maximized by optimising control (money, connections worth money and power). Postmaterial features of status - such as one's way of thinking, prestige or the values by which one lives - are at the bottom of the rank order.

Consciousness of inequality

121

Table 7.5: Factors infiuencing social status Mean Full-time income Connections Manager o r subordinate employee Type of job Additional income Talent Family background Education Lifestyle Self-employed or employee Luck Way of thinking Prestige Values followed Type of settlement Region Ethnicity Gender Political views Religion (N = 2,499)

Deviation

% saying a great deal

(Great deal = 5; Not at all = 1 ) 4.2 .9 4.2 .9 4.0 1 .0 .9 3.9 3.9 1 .0 .9 3.8 3.8 1 .0 3.8 1 .0 3.8 .9 3.8 1 .0 3.8 1 .0 3 .7 1 .0 3.6 1 .0 3.5 1 .0 3.3 1.1 3.3 1 .2 1 .2 2.9 2.8 1 .2 2.6 1 .2 1 .8 1 .9

45 .5 45 . l 40.5 32.6 3 1 .6 27.5 3 1.8 27. 1 22.8 26.3 29.2 22.8 1 9. 3 1 4.7 1 6.6 17.3 9.2 8.9 6.2 1 .8

Looking at the bottom of the rank order, an average value of 3 or lower, we see ethnicity, political views and religion influencing social status the least. What these factors share is an opposition to the principle of achievement, in so far as they are all ascriptive factors deriving social status from whether the person in question is male or female, belongs to a certain ethnic group or religious denomination. People perceive these discriminatory factors to have no more than a minor effect on social status. It is only natural .that certain connections appear between social status itself and opinions conceming the factors which have an influence on it. Characteristically, those who ranked lifestyle, way of thinking and values as more strongly influencing status were people with higher education and in more senior employment roles. ln addition, as we proceed upwards in the hierarchy of occupations and qualifications, the mention of factors such as place of residence, region or even ethnicity and gender

Tab le 7 .6: Dimensions of social status far different socio-demographic groups lob status versus qualifications qualifications both job Occupation Manager Professional White-collar Lower manager Self-employed Skilled labourer Unskilled labourer Agricult. manual (Total) N Education Below 8 classes of primary school 8 classes of primary school Vocational school Vocational secondary school Secondary gymnasium College University (Total) N Place of living Village Town County seat Budapest (Total) N

lob status versus salary salary both job

Qualifications versus salary qualifications both salary

5 1.6 56.3 52.7 58.3 54.7 55.6 48.5 44.6 (51.7) 1 ,348

18.1 15.8 17.5 9.2 15.1 1 4.8 19.6 1 7.4 (16.7) 435

30.2 27.9 29.8 32.5 30.2 29.6 3 1. 9 38.0 (3 1 .6) 822

32.8 28.0 20.6 1 8 .5 17 .6 1 5 .9 1 5 .4 19.6 (19. 1 ) 502

38.7 45 .3 50.3 54.1 55.6 58.2 57.4 50.0 (53.3) 1,407

28.5 26.7 29.1 27.4 26.8 25.9 27.2 30.4 (27.6) 729

22.5 24. 8 1 4 .9 12.9 1 0.2 12.0 1 2.0 1 4.6 ( 1 4.2) 376

54.0 5 1 .6 57.9 65 . l 62.0 63.4 60.9 5 1 .6 (59.3) 1,567

23.5 23.6 27.2 22.0 27.8 24.6 27. 1 33.8 (26.5) 702

43.1 48.5 53.0 59.6 55.0 50.2 55.5 (5 1 .4) 1 ,461

21 .1 18.2 15.4 14.1 16.3 1 7.4 16.0 (17.0) 483

35.8 33.3 3 1 .6 26.3 28.7 32.4 28.5 (31.6) 897

17.6 1 6.7 14.8 23.8 2 1 .4 32.4 23 .8 (19.2) 552

5 1 .0 55.9 58.2 52.9 49.3 38.6 49.2 (53 .2) 1 ,529

3 1 .4 27.4 27.0 23.3 29.3 29.0 27.0 (27.6) 795

1 3 .7 13.3 1 1 .9 1 5 .7 14.9 24.3 19.5 ( 1 4.5) 419

53.7 59.3 6 1. 1 62.3 5 8 .6 52.4 58.5 (58 .7) 1 ,692

32.6 27.4 27.0 22.0 26.5 23.3 22.0 (26.8) 77 1

47.4 52.4 52.0 57.0 (51.4) 1,46 1

16.3 17.1 20.6 16.0 (17. l ) 485

36.3 30.5 27.4 27.0 (3 1 .5) 897

1 6.5 19.8 24.6 19.8 ( 19.2) 553

5 1 .8 54. l 52.9 54.5 (53.2) 1,530

3 1 .7 26. l 22.5 25 .7 (27.6) 795

13.8 13.4 1 7 .9 15.3 (14.6) 420

54.9 61.0 60.5 6 1 .3 (58.7) 1,693

3 1 .3 25 .6 21 .6 23 .4 (26.7) 771

C onsciousness of inequality

1 23

increases as well. This may imply that those in higher positions and with higher qualifications consider the influence of discriminatory factors in determining social status to be greater. Religion and political views only show a statistically significant connection with the older age group. Interestingly, it is possible to ascertain the impact of social strata on the factors which rank in the middle or at bottom, while the same is less frequent in the case of the high-ranking factors. Differences of occupa­ tional status, education and place of residence seem to have less impact on whether full-time income or network connections are considered to be factors crucial in determining social status. We approached the same question in a different way by asking people what thoughts the expressions ' she/he has done well in life' and ' his/her social status has improved' evoke in their minds. Do they think of someone who has achieved high status in their job, attained high educa­ tional qualifications, or secured a job with a good salary? The aim was to measure what influence the three conventional dimensions of stratifica­ tion and inequality research - occupation, cultural and material resources - had in an evaluation of doing well in society. The three dimensions were arranged in contrasting pairs. Respondents always had to choose between two dimensions at a time: first between a senior employment role or high qualifications, then between a senior job position or a good salary, and finally between high qualifications or a good salary. If respon­ dents could not decide, their answers were interpreted as both. People measure progress and the improvement of social status predominantly in terms of money (Table 7.6). When a senior employ­ ment role was contrasted with a good salary, 59 per cent chose salary as opposed to 14 per cent choosing the senior employment status. When high qualifications were contrasted with a good salary, 53 per cent chose salary, while 19 per cent chose the former. High qualifications lost in the competition with a senior employment role as well: 51 per cent consid­ ered the latter, while 17 per cent considered the former a sign of having done well. The data show differences across social strata. Those in lower managerial positions and professionals are on average more likely to choose a senior employment role over high qualifications. With respect to qualifications, those who have completed vocational secondary schools and those living in Budapest are on average more likely to choose a senior employment role rather than high educational qualifica­ tions. A good salary was more often preferred to a senior employment role by semi-skilled or unskilled workers, while it was more often

Péter Róbert

1 24

preferred to high qualifications by those in lower managerial positions and skilled workers. CONCLUSION The system transition which has taken place in Hungarian society i n the past few years has resulted in increasing social inequalities. It is a process the population apparently finds hard to tolerate. When asked whether 'Inequalities of income are too great', 76 per cent of the repre­ sentative sample agreed in 1987 , 84 per cent agreed in 1992 and 88 per cent agreed in 1993. This attitude is so unanimous that analysis of variance by social-demographic variables scarcely yields any significant differences. When asked about their level of agreement with the state­ ment 'Great d.ifferences of income are necessary for the development of Hungary ' , 26 per cent agreed in 1987, 21 per cent agreed in 1992 and 17 per cent in 1993. As long as the majority perceive their own social status to be deteriorating, only a minority will accept the existing inequalities of income which they may consider to be increasing.

lt should be the duty of the state to investigate in each case how a person got rich It should be the duty of the state to decrease differences of income between the poor and the rich There may be exceptions but the majority of the rich are only different from thieves and frauds in that they are not punished Only dishonest people can get rich in this country 0%

20%

40%

60%

Figure 7 . 1 Attitudes toward wealth

80%

1 00%

Co nscio usness of inequality

1 25

The increasing wealth of a minority appears illegitimate, even suspect and illegal. The above is apparent from the distribution of answers to the questions of the TÁRKI Mobility survey of spring 1992 (Figure 7.1).Three-fourths consider it a duty of the state to decrease inequalities of income; moreover, they would even support the state investigating how individuals have accumulated their wealth. The reason is that wealth and becoming wealthy are linked with dishonesty and crime (fraud and theft) in inequality consciousness. ln connection with questions related to the magnitude of differences in income and the duty of the state to interfere with it, Kolosi (1990) demonstrated that even before the political transition in Hungary (1987 ISSP data) the relevant Hungarian attitudes were significantly different from those measured in the Anglo-Saxon countries, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. They were rather close, however, to the opinions of those asked in Austria and Italy. It is also worth noting that research on social inequalities has always demonstrated the determining role of cultural and educational differ­ ences. Yet the experience of these inequalities and people's related attitudes and emotions are apparently dominated by material factors. It is a moot point whether this contrast is real or virtual. If it is a real contrast, our earlier knowledge of objective social processes may have to be reconsidered. We might suspect that cultural and educational differences may have appeared so important with regard to social inequalities because we have continuously underestimated the role of material differ­ ences in the process of measurement. We might also venture another explanation: while under state socialism cultural capital determined opportunities to a greater extent, in a market economy material capital does so. On the basis of earlier sociological research, we could argue that cultural capital has nevertheless been the social factor playing the essen­ tial role both in determining inequalities and the consciousness thereof. ln this case we must assume a somewhat more complex chain of causal relations. Even though inequality consciousness follows from the material conditions of life to a greater degree, the latter are only 'inter­ mediate variables ' in a chain of cause and effect in which success or failure in a material sense are determined by cultural and educational differences, access to cultural capital and the capital of connections.

1 26

Péter Róbert

Notes 1 This study is based on the results of research project No. 2617 supported by the National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA), The Cultural and Material Detennination of the Contents of Social Consciousness. The research project is directed by Péter Róbert. 2 There was a period in American empirical sociology - subsequent to research conducted by Wamer and associates (1941, 1942) - when stratification research completely replaced class-based analyses. Later, however, Erik 0. Wright's neo-Marxist class-based approach (1979, 1985) brought the latter back into sociological thought. Class-based approaches have always been present along with empirical stratification research in Western Europe in French (e.g. Bourdieu, 1966) and English (e.g. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, 1969 or Giddens, 1973) sociology. ln the fonner socialist countries the function of research of this kind (Ferge, 1973 ; Kolosi, 1987) was to balance the ideologically based class model. 3 The source of the 1991 distribution is the comparable questioning of the earlier (1989) sample. The 1992 data are from the TÁRKI mobility survey, and the 1993 distribution is based on the repeated questioning of a sub­ sample of the 1992 survey. The 1 992 and the 1993 data thus come from identical people. 4 We have examined this statement by principal component analysis, as well. Even though the variables expressing the subjective perception of status fonned a single dimension, both the loadings and the communality of the variable referring to the evaluation of income were smaller than those of the other variables.

References Bourdieu, P., 1966. Condition de classe et status de classe. Archives Européennes de Sociologie, VII. Ferge, Zs., 1973. Társadalmunk rétegződése [The Stratification of Our Society]. Budapest: KJK. Giddens, A., 1973. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. London: Hutchinson. Goldthorpe, J.H. and Lockwood, D. et al., 1969. The Affl,uent Worker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kolosi, T., 1987. Tagolt társadalom [Segmented society]. Budapest: Gondolat. Kolosi, T., 1990. 'Egyenlőtlenségtudat nemzetközi összehasonlításban' [lnequality Consciousness in lntemational Comparison]. ln R. Andorka, T. Kolosi and Gy. Vukovich, eds., Társadalmi riport 1990 [Social Report 1990]. Budapest: TÁRKI

Consciousness of inequality

1 27

Róbert, P. and Sági, M., 1 992. ' Amikor a sokkal jobb még mindig rossz. Szubjektív társadalmi helyzet nemzetközi összehasonlításban ' [When the Much Better is Still Bad. Subjective Social Status in an International Comparison] . Szociológiai Szemle, 4. sz. Róbert, P. and Sági, M., 1 994. A középosztály megerősödésének szubjektív aspektusai. [Subjective Aspects of the Strengthening of the Middle Class] . Budapest: TÁRKI. Manuscript. Warner, W.L. and Lunt, P.S., 1 94 1 . The Social Life of a Modern Community. New Haven: Yale University Press. Warner, W.L. and Lunt, P.S., 1 942. The Status System of a Modern Community. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wright, E.O., 1 979. Class Structure and lncome Determination. New York: Academic Press. Wright, E.O., 1985. Classes. London: New Left Books.

CH A PTER 8

WELFARE P RO G RAMMES AND THE ALLEVIATION OF P OVERTY 1 István György Tóth

Poverty has both increased and become more visible in Hungary as an inevitable consequence of the 'transformational recession' (Komai, 1993) accompanying the change of the economic system. According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office the absolute number of people living under the poverty line in 1992 rose by approximately half from its relatively stable levei of 10 per cent poverty rate in the 1980s (KSH, 1993). The Hungarian Household Panel showed that poverty had grown to 22-25 per cent by 1993 (Kolosi, et al. , 1993). Social policy programmes have played an important role in keeping poverty from growing to an even greater degree, and have thereby contributed to the reduction of the social costs of economic transformation. However, analyses of the social policy system give grounds for concem about efficiency and equity in the social policy system. The first part of the chapter summarizes the types and extent of poverty. Next there is an investigation into the role welfare programmes (social insurance, family aid, financial support) actually play in the reduction of poverty: the patterns of incidence of social programmes are examined followed by an attempt to see if there are groups neglected by the welfare system. THE HUNGARIAN H O U SEHOLD PANEL DATA The analyses rely on the 1993 wave of the Hungarian Household Panel (HHP), a longitudinal study of incomes, wealth and labour market positions of Hungarian households. The HHP is a joint excercise of

Welfare programmes and the al/eviation of poverty

1 29

TÁRKl, the Department of Sociology at the Budapest University of Economic Sciences and the Central Statistical Office with T ÁRKl responsible for fieldwork, documentation and release of the data. The first wave occured in the spring of 1 992 and the second wave of data, used here, was collected in April-May 1 993. The initial sample was a four-stage stratified sample from the 1 990 census. ln the first wave 2,059 households were questioned, while some 1 ,93 1 were questioned in the second wave - a very low drop-out rate in comparison to other panels. However, since the drop-out was not entirely random, it was necessary to weight data from the second wave, resulting in 2, 1 57 weighted cases. The poverty-related variables are composed of answers to blocks of questions about incomes of persons and households. Poverty can also be measured with variables other than income. ln this period of transition in Hungary an approach to poverty analysing consumption and belongings might be justified to sift out uncertainties arising in a simple measure­ ment of poor families ' incomes. However, consumption data would be of limited use: while income reflects the possibility for consumption, actual consumption style is determined by personal spending preferences. The incomes of households can be compared in several ways. At one extreme households are not distinguished by size. This method ignores the fact that family size determines both the earning capacity and consumption needs of the household. The underlyning assumption is that household expenses do not change with family size. At the other extreme, when per capita incomes are compared, the assumption is that costs of living rise in a direct proportion to family size. Both methods are used in the literature on income inequalities. A method between these two extremes reflects reality best. The underlying assumption behind equivalent incomes is that a growth in family size means a non-linear growth in costs of living. Equivalence scales assign a weight to individual household members which takes economies of scale into account. To put it more formally a family 's income is equivalent to that of a single-person household if J= h/N, where J represents the income of a single-person household, h represents the total income of the household in question, and N is a co-efficient indicating differing needs depending on family size. It has been shown in the literature that the co-efficient expressing family needs can be expressed by the formula N=Se , where S equals the family (household) size, while e represents the elasticity of needs to unit size (Buchman et al.: 1 988, Förster, 1993). ln this study weighted household incomes are

1 30

István György Tóth

used. Consumption weights are assigned to the respective household members with the first person in the household being assigned a weight of 1 , the second person a weight of 0. 7 and the third and subsequent persons a weight of 0.5. These weights were estimated with the value e= 0.73. WHO IS POOR? The charting of the composition of absolute poverty based on data from the Hungarian Household Panel was carried out by Kolosi and Sik ( 1 992), while the charting of relatíve poverty was initially carried out by Rudolf Andorka (Andorka, 1992; Andorka and Spéder, 1993a, 1993b). A more recent analysis took a detailed look at the composition of poverty using three different equivalence scales and four definitions of poverty (Tóth, et al., 1 994). Table 8. 1 displays the risks of falling into poverty by households and their members in the data given by the ethnic affiliation of the head of household, his occupational status, level of education, age, size of house­ hold, home location and number of children under the age of 18. The table contains the cell frequencies of nine cross-tables in decreasing order. This compact presentation allows for a direct comparison of poverty risks shared by people in the various household categories. Five general points can be drawn from this table. First, gypsy families are seriously affected by poverty. Sixty-nine per cent of all gypsy house­ holds are poor and some 72 per cent of those living in families in which the head of family is a gypsy are poor. A more detailed analysis shows that the more restrictive the definition of poverty used, the higher the percentage of gypsy households who fall into the poor category. Longitudinal analysis has also shown that gypsies have little chance of escaping from poverty. Second, demographical determinants of poverty are important. Poverty rates are higher among households with at least three children if the head of household is under 40 years of age, or within a single-parent household. Differences between various household types are smaller for age categories between 40 and 60 years. Finally, households headed by a person over 60 are greatly at risk of being impoverished if the older person lives alone. The lower we go in the income hierarchy, the greater the number of families with four or more children and of single-child families, and, at least partially in consequence, the greater the number of people from three-person or five- or more person households.

Welfare programmes and the alleviation ofpoverty Tab le 8 . 1 : Poverty rate by household characteristics % Gypsy Not gypsy Unemployed Not unemployed Education: Less than primary Primary Vocational Secondary Tertiary Household head Pensioner Male Female Lone male Lone female Lone parent Age 30 7 .0 24.3

30-40 7.4 1 9.3

Household size 4 3

1 0.0 1 4.0

2.8 1 6.9

S+ 6. 1 24.4

Age of head of household

40-50

s.s

1 9.0

50-60 1 2.6 1 5.4

Numher of children 2 3

0

Pre-transfer Post-transfer

30.0 1 6.6

Pre-transfer Post-transfer

employed head 1 9 .7 16.2

Pre-transfer Post-transfer

single male single female male-headed 1 2. 1 50.8 37. 1 1 7. 1 40.6 16.1

Pre-transfer Post-transfer

less than primary 39.4 4 1 .6

Pre-transfer Post-transfer

detached house 23.7 22.9

5.8 1 8.2

2.8 1 6.3

1 0.0 24.8

60+ 42.3 1 9.3 4+ 27.0 67.2

Occupational status of head

unemployed head 24. 1 47.0 Household types

female-headed 19. l 27.0

single pensioner 59. 1 41.1

Education of the head

primary 25.S 3 1 .S

vocational 1 2.7 1 6.0

high school 14.8 8.4

university 13.1 3.0

Type of settlement

village 14.9 23.7

city 20.4 1 8.7

county capital 23.3 1 8.7

Budapest 27.2 8.3

The household income is weighted by number of household members, e = 0.73 Pre-transfer: the percentage in the lowest quintile as defined by markel income e Post-transfer: the percentage in the lowest quintile as defined by the household's total equivalent incomes Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1 992-3 a

b

142

István György Tóth

Table 8.7: Household-specific poverty rates Poverty ratesa total income

total incomes minus benefits

Above retirement age Below retirement age

24.2 1 7.6

87.9 26.9

1 2 3 4

1 9.3 1 6.4 25.6 65.2

27.5 29.5 5 1 .6 86.9

Not unemployed Unemployed

1 8.2 4 1 .0

1 9.9 50.7

Bottom quintile

20.0

20.6

Head of household

No. of children under 1 8 in household

Occupational status of household head lncome position of the household

a those households are defined to be poor. where the household has an income less then the upper breakpoint of the lowest quintile, based on total (equivalent) household incomes Source: Hungarian Household Panel, 1 992-3

poverty risk nm by households where the head of family is under the 'older' age limit from 18 per cent to 27 per cent. The share of pensions in total household incomes - as we have seen it earlier - is above 70 per cent in elderly households, and even higher in the case of single pensioners and retired couples. Therefore, the reduction, (ad absurdum: the cessation) of pensions would immediately push these people into absolute poverty, as it would lead to a total lack of income in the majority of cases. The risk that the minority of pensioners who earn market incomes, or live in households with at least one active wage earner, would fall into poverty is smaller. The poverty risk run by families with a number of children would also significantly increase if there were (ad absurdum) absolutely no form of family allowance, but this risk would be affected by the number of children. The poverty rate of households with one child would increase from 19 per cent to 27 per cent, while the poverty rates of households with two children would grow from 16 per cent to 26 per cent. The poverty rate of families with three children would double from 26 per cent to 52 per cent, and the already high poverty rate of families with four or inore children would increase to an even greater . degree. These

Welfare programmes and the alleviatio n of po verty

143

data show that although the family allowance tends to benefit the middle income groups, an erosion of the family allowance would have a greater effect on those whose income status is lower. Consequently, the effec­ tiveness of the family allowance as an income support programme could be increased by mak:ing it more dependent on the number of children, and by mak:ing the net family allowance depend on income by taxing it. The repeal of the unemployment benefit and social support would lead to less dramatic effects. These are the types of income that contribute least to the alleviation of poverty of the respective social groups. The poverty risk run by households where the household bead is unemployed would increase by approximately 25 per cent, from 40 per cent to 51 per cent. Thus, half of the households headed by an unemployed individual would not sink into destitution even if the unemployment benefit were completely eliminated. The repeal of social assistance benefits would have little impact on the poverty risk of the population as a whole, while causing a grave problem far the poorest of the poor. Cessation would significantly harm those who are already impoverished, as well as decreasing the income of poor households living above the recently fixed absolute poverty levei. Poverty in Hungary is determined by a number of social factors. Ethnic affiliation, stage in the demographic life cycle, lost labour market attachments, lower education, lower occupational status and geographic location all play an essential part in impoverishment. Social transfers play an important role in decreasing the order of poverty and are conse­ quently needed. At the same time, however, a significant part of social policy benefits do not favour poor people, but instead favour the non­ poor and better off.

144

István György Tóth

Notes 1 This study is a revised, shortened version of the research report submitted to the Active Society Foundation (Aktív Társadalom Alapítvány), sponsored by the SOCO Program of IWM, Vienna. An earlier version in Kovács, ed. ( 1 996). 2 ln theory income from the sale of property or possessions should fit into this group, but, since selling an asset in one year may be followed by buying another one in another year, huge uncertainties arise for the amount of net income. So these types of income are excluded from the present analysis. 3 The Hungarian Household Panel questionnaire asks about net incomes, the wage actually taken home by a bead of household. Exceptions here are incomes brought in by the whole of the family (for example, income from the sale of agricultural products raised on a small scale by the household). This form of income does not cause a great distortion in data: income from small­ scale agricultural production, for example, enjoys such great tax allowances that the overwhelming majority can be regarded as net income.

References Andorka, Rudolf, 1992. Szegénység [Poverty] . ln Sik and Tóth ( 1 992). Andorka, Rudolf and Spéder, Zsolt, 1993a. 'Szegénység' [Poverty]. ln Sik and Tóth, (1993). Andorka, Rudolf and Spéder, Zsolt, 1993b. Poverty in Hungary. Some Results of the First Two Waves of the Hungarian Household Panel Survey in 1992 and 1993, Berlin: October. Andorka, Rudolf and Tóth, István György, 1992. 'A szociális kiadások és a szociálpolitika Magyarországon' [Social Expenditures and Social Policy in Hungary]. ln R. Andorka, T. Kolosi and Gy. Vukovich, eds., Társadalmi Riport 1992 [Social Report 1992] Budapest: TÁRKI. Andorka, Rudolf, Kondratas, Anna and Tóth, István György, 1994. The Hungarian Welfare State in Transition: Structure, Developments and First Steps towards Reform. The Joint Hungarian International Blue Ribbon Commission Policy Study No 3. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute. Buchman, B., Rainwater, L., Schmaus, G. and Smeeding, T., 1988. ' Equivalence Scales, Weil and Being, Inequality and Poverty: Sensitivity Estimates Across Ten Countries Using the LIS Database'. Review of Income and Wealth, 34, 115-42. Förster, Michael and Tóth, István György, 1993. 'A háztartások jövedelmi szerkezete és a szociális újraelosztás' [The income structure of households and the social redistribution] ln Sik and Tóth (1993). Förster, Michael and Tóth, István György, 1994. Income Poverty and Households' Income Composition in Hungary. Paper prepared for the Third

Welfare programmes and the alleviation of poverty

145

Prague International Workshop on Social Responses to Transfromations in East and Central Europe, 6 and 8 May 1 994, Prague. Förster, Michael F., 1 993. Comparing Poverty in 13 OECD Countries: Traditional and Synthetic Approaches, Luxemburg lncome Study Working Paper No 1 00. Kessides, C., Davey, K., Micklewright, J., Smith, A. and Hinayon, C . , 1 99 1 . Hungary: Reform of the Social Policy and Distribution System. The World Bank, draft, February. Kolosi , Tamás and Sík, Endre., 1 992. ' Munkaerőpiac és jövedelmek' [Labour Market and lncomes] . ln Sik, and Tóth ( 1 992). Kolosi , Tamás, 1 993 . 'A népesség követése ' [Following the Sample] ln Sik and Tóth, ( 1 993). Kolosi, Tamás, Szivós, Péter and Bedekovics, István, 1 993. ' Munkaerőpiac és jövedelmek' [Labour Market and Incomes] in Sik and Tóth, ( 1 993). Kopits, G . , Holzmann, R., Schieber, G. and Sidgwick, E., 1 990. Social Security Reform in Hungary. Washington DC: IMF. Kornai, János, 1 993 'Transzformációs visszaesés Egy általános jelenség vizsgálata a magyar fejlődés példáján ' [Transformational Recession. A Study of a General Phenomenon in the Case of Hungary] . Közgazdasági Szemle, 7 and 8 . , sz. 569 and 599. KSH, 1 990a. lncidence Study, ' 90 The Hungarian Social Policy Systems and Distribution of lncomes of Households. Paper prepared by an expert team of the Ministry of Finance and of the Central Statistical Office, Budapest, mimeo. KSH, 1 990b. A természetbeni társadalmi jövedelmek és a dotációk rétegelosz­ lása 1 989-ben [The Incidence of Social Transfers and Subsidies in Hungary, 1 989] . B udapest. KSH, 1 993 . A létminimum szintjén és alatt élő népesség jellemzői. [Characteristics of the Population Living from lncomes Below Subsistence Minimum] . Budapest. Sik, Endre and Tóth, István György (eds.) 1 992. Jelentés a Magyar Háztartás Panel /. hullámának eredményeiről [A Report on the Results of the First Wave of the Hungarian Household Panel] . Budapest: Magyar Háztartás Panel Műhelytanulmányok 1. szám BKE Szociológia Tanszék and Társadalomkutatási Informatikai Egyesülés, December. Sík, Endre and Tóth, István György. (eds), 1993. Egy év után . . . Jelentés a Magyar Háztartás Panel 11. hullámának eredményei alapján [A year after . . . A Report on the Results of the First Wave of the Hungarian Household Panel] . Budapest: Magyar Háztartás Panel Műhelytanulmányok 3. szám B KE Szociológia Tanszék and Társadalomkutatási Informatikai Egyesülés, December. Tóth, István György. 1 992. 'A szociális újraelosztás és a háztartások jövedelmi szerkezete ' [Social Redistribution and the lncome Structure of Hungarian Households] . ln Sik and Tóth ( 1 992).

1 46

István György Tóth

Tóth, István György, 1994. 'A jóléti rendszer az átmenet időszakában' [The Hungarian Welfare System in the Period of Transition]. Közgazdasági Szemle, április. Tóth, István György, Andorka, Rudolf, Förster, Michael and Spéder, Zsolt, 1994. Poverty, Inequalities and the lncidence ofSocial Transfers in Hungary. Paper prepared for the Budapest World Bank Office, Budapest, June. Tóth, István György, 1996. 'The Role of Welfare programs in alleviating Poverty in Hyngary '. ln: Social costs of economic transformation in Central Europe. lnternationa/ Review of Comparative Public Po licy Vol. 7, 125- 1 47.

CH A P T E R 9

DIS S ATISFACTION AND ALIENATION RudolfAndorka

UNDER the Communist system few surveys included questions on satis­ faction, psychological well-being or manifestations of anomie and alienation. The official ideology claimed that every, or almost every, member of the society was satisfied, enjoying psychological well-being. By definition anomie and alienation were non-existent in a Communist or, according to the self-definition of the ruling elite, Socialist system. The increasing rate of suicide and alcoholism in the 1970s and 1980s indicated that there were, and are, serious problems in these domains. Of the few studies prior to 1989 that addressed these issues, the most notable were the survey by Hankiss and co-authors ( 1978) concerning lifestyle, quality of life and values, two surveys on mental health by Kopp and Skrabaski (1992) in 1983 and 1988 and surveys of the economic and political system by the Department of Sociology of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences (Andorka, 1990). All these studies pointed to a high levei of dissatisfaction, serious mental health problems and widespread symptoms of anomie, alienation and a general crisis of values and norms. More recently there have been attempts to examine systematically these aspects of Hungarian society. The Hungarian Household Panel surveys in 1992, 1993 and 1994 included, in addition to the questions on household income and on employment of the household members, questions on satis­ faction with several dimensions of the respondent 's persona! life, on symptoms of psychological problems, on the deeper manifestation of anomie and alienation and in 1994 for the first time questions on values. The value questions were the Ingelhart (1977) post-materialist/materialist

RudolfAndorka

148

scale, while all of the others were taken from the household panel surveys undertaken in Eastern Germany since 1990 (Habich et al., 1991; Noll, 1994). Each of these dimensions will be considered in turn. S AT I S FACT I O N Today it is almost a truism that Hungarians are very dissatisfied with their present living conditions. Many surveys have found similarly high levels of dissatisfaction. Table 9.1 shows that the highest average levels of dissatisfaction are with the levei of income and the current standard of living and future prospects. The dissatisfied are more numerous than those who are satisfied. There are differences in levels of satisfaction between males and females, young and old and those with low and high incomes. ln terms of gender, dissatisfaction is higher among men than among women for all of the domains except health. Middle-aged adults are generally more dissat­ isfied with the various dimensions of their life than the young or the old. However, as with gender, the relationship between satisfaction with health and age is somewhat different. As people age they report higher levels of dissatisfaction with their persona! health. Finally, dissatisfaction is higher among those belonging to the lowest income quintile and much lower among those belonging to the highest quintile, indicating that dissatisfac­ tion is, indeed, correlated with the objective material situation of persons and households. ln six domains the satisfied outnumbered the dissatisfied. Family is the Tabie 9 . 1 : Satisfaction with dimensions of respondent' s life, 1 992-4 (Mean levei of satisfaction)a Family Work Housing environment Housing Persona! health Persona! life till now Present level of living Future perspectives lncome

1992

1993

1994

8.65 7.43 7.32 7. 1 4 6.39 5 .15 4.58 4.20 3 .62

8.52 7.37 6.9 1 7.01 6.20 5.53 4.49 4.20 3.69

8.49 7.27 7.01 7. 1 3 6.34 5.83 4.88 4.85 3 .99

a 0 (low satisfaction) to 1 0 (high satisfaction)

(%, 1 994) Dissatisfied Medium Satisfied 3 .4 6.6 1 2.3 9.7 2 1 .2 1 5 .0 27.6 29.6 44.6

1 1 .9 26.9 23.8 25.4 24.7 45.4 47.4 43.6 38.3

84.7 66.5 63.9 64.9 54. 1 39.6 25.0 26.8 1 7. 1

149

Dissatisfaction and alienation

domain where satisfaction is declared to be the highest; 84 per cent report they are satisfied. It is also noteworthy that dissatisfaction with income and with future perspectives somewhat diminished from 1992 to 1994, although the objective income data from the same surveys seem to indicate that the average real income level of the population continued to decline up to the time the 1994 survey was carried out. However, the other dimensions indicate a relative stability in the average positive level of satisfaction. M ATERIALI S T / P O S T-MATERIALI S T VAL U E S The high level o f dissatisfaction with present income level ought t o be considered a highly important social fact as, according to the rank order given to the four basic values of the shortest version of the Inglehart value questions, Hungarians are very materialist. They attribute much higher importance to the ' materialist ' values of order and price stability than to the 'post- materialist ' values of participation in political decisions and freedom of speech (Table 9.2). According to the classification proposed by Inglehart 59 per cent of the respondents belonged to the 'materialist ' type, putting the two ' materialist ' values first and second. Only 2 per cent are 'post-materialist ' , putting the two 'post-materialist ' values in the first two places; the remaining 39 per cent are of the mixed type. Only minor and inconsistent differences can be seen between the value orientations of men and women. As might be expected, the breakdown of values by age indicates that younger adults tend to be somewhat less materialistic, but persons having higher education are as materialistic as those having lower education.

Table 9.2: Values in the lnglehart scale, 1 994 (%) lmportance

Maintain public order in the country Fight against inflation More voice for citizens in government decisions Protect freedom of speech

Most

Second

Third

Least

49 . 1 35.4

28 .8 38.7

1 2.5 16.1

5.9 5. 1

3.9 3.7

9.9 3.4

18.1 1 0.0

39.6 27.2

27.7 54.7

4.7 4.6

Don ' t know

150

RudolfAndorka

PSYCHOL O G I CA L WELL-BEING Nine questions were included o n mental health an d psychological well­ being; the answers demonstrate the high prevalence of these symptoms of disturbance (Table 9. 3). Sixty-one per cent complained of frequent exhaustion and depression, 57 per cent declared that they usually have the feeling of being unlucky, 41 per cent are very worried about their health, 34 per cent complained of frequent palpitations, 31 per cent said they were continuously irritated and nervous, 30 per cent complained of frequent headaches, 29 per cent stated that they become confused if they have to perform several tasks in a short time, 21 per cent complained of frequent tremors and 20 per cent stated that they were not able to be forget their fears and anxieties. There are significant differences between socio-economic groups in psychological well-being. Consistently, women are more likely than men to report lower levels of well-being than men, as do the old, those with lower levels of formai education and the poor. ln some cases these differ­ ences are large. For example, 18 per cent more women report feeling continuously irritated and nervous, 14 per cent more women report feeling frequent exhaustion and depression and 13 per cent report frequent palpi­ tations. Not unexpectedly, the old are 47 per cent more likely to report they are worried about their health than the young and 3 3 per cent more Table 9.3: Psychological problems, 1993 (%) Percentag_e difterence OldLow-high Femaleyoung education ma/e (Total/Yes)

I often feel exhausted, depressed ln most cases I feel I have no luck I worry a lot about my health I often have a strong heartbeat I am constantly upset and nervous I often have a had headache I get very confused when I have to carry out different things in a short time I often find myself trembling all over I cannot get rid o f my fears and anxieties

(61 ) (57) (41 ) (34) (3 1 ) {30)

14 4 12 13 8 18

19 18 47 33 17 16

-1 4 -36 -1 5 -1 1 -1 7 -1 3

( 29) (21 )

10

11

16 22

-20 -12

(20)

11

12

-1 5

Dissatisfaction and alienation

151

likely to report frequent heart palpitations. Although those with low levels of completed formai education, are consistently more likely to report lower levels of well-being than those with higher levels of formai educa­ tion the largest differences are observed on the two items referring to luck and confusion. ln the farmer, those with lower levels of education are 36 per cent more likely to report that they feel unlucky than those with higher levels of education and the difference on feeling confused is 20 per cent. Those who are more dissatisfied with the various domains of their life also report lower levels of psychological well-being. It is difficult to deter­ mine the causative links between the high work load (long working hours in the first and second job and in the household), the stress of everyday life, the high level of dissatisfaction and these symptoms of psychological problems. It is, however, clear that they are linked.

A N O M I E AND ALIENAT I O N It might b e hypothesized that both symptoms of psychological problems and of general dissatisfaction are at least partly due to widespread anomie and alienation. Here I interpret anomie and alienation as reflecting the same phenomenon, a crisis of values and the feeling of powerlessness. Table 9.4: Manifestations of anomie and alienation, 1 993 (%) Completely Partly agrees agrees

Anomie If one wishes to achieve something, it is necessary to break some rules Nowadays I am barely able to find my way in everyday matters Alienation I am confident in my own future I carry out what I decide My future depends first of all on myself I am barely able to influence my own fortune I am barely able to alleviate the majority of my worries I often feel helpless in important matters I often feel lonely I am unable to solve my problems I usually do not find pleasure in my work

Somewhat Completely disagrees disagrees

38.9

39.0

1 2.4

9.8

24.7

37.2

20.2

1 7 .9

36.0 33.8 25 .3 1 6.7

36.7 52.8 41.1 40.3

15.l 1 0.2 21.0 25.3

1 2.2 3 .7 1 2.6 1 7.7

1 5 .6 1 3 .7 1 1 .8 9.7 5.7

35.5 33.4 14.3 42.0 1 7.3

27. 1 26.6 1 7.3 24.4 22.6

2 1 .8 26.3 56.6 23.8 54.4

1 52

RudolfAndorka

The answers in Table 9.4 of respondents to questions and statements exploring different possible manifestations of anomie and alienation indicate that a few are widespread in Hungary. A majoríty think that to achieve something, it is necessary to break rules, and a majoríty also find it difficult to cope with everyday matters or influence their own fortune. On the other hand, a very large majority also think they can carry out whatever they decide, are confident of their future and believe that it depends on what they themselves do. W hen we examine the manifestations of anomie and alienation among different socio-economic groups, more women report high levels of anomie and alienation than men. As with the satisfaction and well-being measures, older people report higher levels of anomie and alienation than the young and similarly those with low levels of formai education report higher levels than those who have completed more years of formai educa­ tion. There are also differences in income, with those from poor backgrounds reporting higher levels of anomie and alienation than the more affluent. However, men and the young were much more likely to indicate agreement with the statement: 'If one wishes to achieve something, it is necessary to break some rules.' Interestingly there was no significant difference between those on low and high incomes in agree­ ment with this statement. There are significant inter-relationships between anomie and alienation and general dissatisfaction with the various aspects of life and psycholog­ ical well-being. Respondents who were more dissatisfied with their general life situation were also more likely to report higher levels of anomie and alienation. This was also the case with those who reported lower levels of psychological well-being. W hen four statements and questions on other aspects of anomie and alienation, referred to as self-confidence and life goals (Table 9.5), asked by Hankiss and co-authors ( 1 978), were included in a survey in spring 1990 and again in spríng 1994, it was found that manifestations of anomie and alienation increased strongly from 1978 to 1990. lt might be hypothe­ sized that this anomie and alienation crisis was an important factor leading to the collapse of the Communist system (Andorka, 1 994). From 1990 to 1 994 these symptoms of anomie and alienation do not seem to have increased and some answers show a decline. At about the same time the growth in the suicide rate declined. lf the root of anomie and alienation is the feeling of powerlessness, than it might be concluded that the regime change clearly lessened the exposure of ordinary citizens to arbitrary measures of the govemment and its repressive organs. As a consequence

153

Dissatisfaction and alienation Table 9.5: Self confidence and life goals, 1 978, 1 990 and 1 994 (%) How often do you have the feeling that your life has no sense, no purpose? Never Sometimes Often Very often Continuously How often do you lose your faith in yourself, do you have the feeling that you are useless for every purpose? Never Sometimes Often Very often Continuously

1 978

1 990

1 994

72

55 33 6 4 2

47 36 9 5 3

71 22 4 2 1

53 38 4 3 1

60 28 6 4 2

13 28 59

38 49

17 35 48

20 34 46

19 4 3 2

Ideals, purposes, principles change so rapidly that one does not know in what to believe and how to live Does not agree 46 Partly agrees 33 Completely agrees 21 It is not worth while to make plans and to formulate perspective life goals? Does not agree Partly agrees Completely agrees

69 17 14

13

there was a diminution of the feeling of being helplessly exposed to external forces, of being unable to plan and influence one 's own fortunes. There are differences between materialists and post-materialists and the four measures of self-confidence and life goals. Materialists report higher levels of feeling useless and that their life is senseless. However, they are less likely to report that it is not worthwhile to make plans and to formu­ late life goals and that they do not know in what to believe or how to live.

1 54

Rudolf Andorka C O N CLUSION

These data show evidence of dissatisfaction with income, living condi­ tions and future perspectives, psychological problems and manifestations of anomie and alienation, and interesting differences between different socio-economic groups. Whereas men report higher levels of dissatisfac­ tion with their lives, it is women who report lower levels of psychological well-being and higher levels of anomie and alienation. The poor and those with lower levels of formal education report higher levels of general dissatisfaction, anomie and alienation, and lower levels of well-being. The young tend to be more satisfied, have higher levels of well-being and lower levels of anomie and alienation. It ought to be emphasised that all these problems existed and were increasing during the Communist system. There are not yet enough data - and also the time is too short - to ascertain whether this crisis is deepening, lessening or remaining stable since the system change. References Andorka, R., 1 990. ' 1 988 utózöngéi - mit kell meghallani 1 990-ben ' [Reverberants of 1 988 - what should be feared in 1 990] . Közgazdasági Szemle, 37, 1 0, 1 1 9-2 1 . Andorka, R., 1 994. ' Social changes and social problems i n Hungary since the 1 930s. Economic, social and political causes of the demise of state socialism ' . Comparative Social Research, 1 4, 49-96. Habich, R., Krause,P. and Priller, E., 1 99 1 . ' Die Entwicklung des subj ektiven Wohlbefindens vom Januar bis Herbst 1 990 in der DDR und Ostdeutschland' . l n Projektgruppe Das Sozio-ökonomische Panel, eds, Lebenslagen im Wandel . Frankfurt: Campus, 332-56. Hankiss, E., Manchin, R. and Füstös, L., 1 978. ' Életmód, életminőség, értékrend­ szer' . A lapadatok !-Ili [Lifestyle, Quality of Life and System of Values. Basic Data 1-III] . Budapest: MTA Népművelési Intézet. Inglehart, R . , 1 977. The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kopp, M . and Skrabski, Á., 1 992. Magyar lelkiállapot [Hungarian mood] . Budapest: Végeken. Noll, H. H., 1 994. Steigende Zufriedenheit in Ostdeutschland, sinkende Zufriedenheit in Westdeutschland. lnformationsdienst Soziale lndikatoren, 1 1 , 1-7.

CH A PTER 1 0

PARTI E S AND S O CIAL DIVIS I O N S I N HUN G ARY: A COMMON EAST CENTRAL EURO P EAN PATTERN ? 1 Gábor Tóka

lt is still an oft-mentioned commonplace that in new democracies the party loyalties of voters are weak. But how weak? The standard means of comparing partisanship internationally is the volatility-index, first devel­ oped by Pedersen. The index is calculated as fallows: if two subsequent elections are entered by the same parties, and if they all get the same results on both occasions, the value of the index is zero; on the other hand, if at the second election all the votes are taken by entirely new parties, the value of the index is one hundred. ln practice, we always record values between these two extremes. The index can simply be calculated by summing the change in the percentage of votes cast far the parties with decreasing support (or its mirror image, the increase of votes of the parties that have gained support). Por votes cast far the regional party lists at the 1990 and 1994 Hungarian elections the volatility index is 28. 3 (see Table 10.1). This is more than three times the Western European average far the hundred years between 1885 and 1985 (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990). ln addition, the Hungarian index is relatively low in comparison with the figure of 34 far the 1991 and 1993 elections in Poland. Rose (1995) has demonstrated the extraordinary volatility of East European electoral alignments with data from many of the new democracies. How can we explain this phenomenon? It is possible that the mere novelty of multi-party systems provides a sufficient explanation far

1 56

Gábor Tóka

Table 1 0. 1 : Area list votes, Hungarian elections 25 March 1 990 and 8 May 1 994 (%) Pro-business parties: Republic Party (KP) Party of Entrepreneurs (VP) (Sub total) Liberal parties: Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) (Sub total) Straight agrarian parties: Agrarian Alliance (ASZ) Co-operative and Agrarian Party (MSZAP) (Sub total) Independent Small Holders Party, splinters, and related: Independent Small Holders Party (FKGP) United Small Holders Party (EKGP) Reconciliation Ind. Small Holders Party (KFKGP) Conservative Party (KP) Hungarian lndependence Party (MFP) National Small Holders Party (NKGP) Freedom Party (SZP) (Sub-total) Christian parties: Christian Democratic People 's Party (KDNP) Christian Coalition of Somogy (SKK) (Sub total) Hungarian Democratic Forum, splinters, and related: Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) Independent Hungarian. Democratic Party (FMDP) Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP) Hungarian People 's Party (MNP) National Democratic Alliance (NDSZ) Market Party (PP) (Sub total) Green parties: Green Party of Hungary (MZP) Green Altemative (ZA) (Sub total) Social democrats: Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP) Post-Communist formations: Patriotic Electoral Coalition (HVK) Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) Worker' s Party (MP, ex-MSZMP) (Sub total)

1 990

1 994

(Change)

1 .9 (1 .9)

2.6 0.6 (3 .2)

( + 1 .3)

9.0 2 1 .4 (30.4)

7.0 19.7 (26.7)

(-3 .7)

3.1 0. 1 (3 .2)

2. 1

1 1 .7

0.04 0.2 .06 ( 1 2.0) 6.5 0. 1 (6.6) 24.7 0.06 0.8

(2. 1 )

(- 1 . 1 )

8.8 0.8 0. 1 0.04

( 1 6.9)

(+4.9)

7.0 (7.0)

(+0.4)

1 1 .7 1 .6 0.5 0.01 ( 1 3 .8)

(-1 1 .8)

(0.4)

0.2 0.02 (0.2)

(--0.2)

3.6

1 .0

(-2.6)

1 .9 1 0.9 3.7 ( 1 6.5)

33.0 3.2 (36.2)

(+ 19.7)

(25 .6) 0.4

Sources: Országos Választási Bizottság, 1 990. 'Az Országos Választási Bizottság Jelentése, [Report of the National Election Committee] . Magyar Közlöny, 13 May 1 990; Országos Választási B izottság, 1 990. ' Az Országos Választási Bizottság Jelentése, [Report of the National Election Committee] . Magyar Közlöny, 24 June 1 994

Parties and social divisions

1 57

volatility. That explanation may be reassuring - after all, infantile disor­ ders do come to an end with time - but for precisely that reason, few find it intellectually exciting. As a consequence, many analysts have attempted to find a more sophisticated explanation. ln the Hungarian popular press, Iván Szelényi, Mihály Bihari and others have argued that the weakness of party loyalties is due to the fact that the new parties follow 'catch-all' strategies, with the result that voters are unable to identify them clearly as the representatives of opposed social groups. I argue that this explanation is hardly appropriate. The first two parts of this chapter compare the electoral bases of the Polish, Czech, Slovakian and Hungarian party groupings and examine which socio-demographic groups recognize their representatives in the ' spiritual families ' of parties. The 1991 figures indicate that there is usually a strong correspondence between voters ' socio-cultural charac­ teristics and their party preferences in East Central Europe. It is only in Slovakia and Hungary that the volatility of preferences can be explained by the weakness of such connections, if we attribute particular impor­ tance to class voting among linkages of this kind. The third and fourth sections discuss the changes, among them the appearance of the phenom­ enon of 'class voting' , in the electoral bases of Hungarian parties between the first two free elections. I argue that the loyalties of the electorate are still very much in question. The current analysis has limits. ln the first part I rely on data from a questionnaire survey initiated and sponsored by the Institute for East-West Studies and conducted in October 199 1 (Dohnalik et a l . , 1 99 1 ). ln the course of that survey we asked the same questions of randomly selected groups of 800 people in Slovakia, 1 ,500 each in Poland and Hungary and 1,200 in Czech lands. While I am trying to analyse the similarities and differences between the profiles of related families of parties in particular countries (Christian, liberal, agrarian, secular right-wing, former ruling parties, etc.), the data only refer to the party within the mass electorate, and not the party in govemment or Parliament. An additional limitation is technical, arising from the relative lack of consolidation of the party systems under examination. Numerous small parties together enjoy the confidence of a not inconsiderable section of the electorate, but, because of their insufficient frequency in the data, these voters - and thus, their parties - had to be excluded from the analysis. Excluded parties had support below 1 or 2 per cent of the voters; they are irrelevant to the socio-political cleavages represented by the party system. This problem can be alleviated by combining some of

158

Gábo r Tóka

the smaller parties in the analysis. This course was chosen for three small Christian-democratic parties and movements in the Czech Republic despite its similarity, the People's Party (CSL) remained in a category of its own - and in the case of Poland with the various peasants' parties; with parties of a Christian orientation; with the smaller liberal parties and the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD); and with electoral alliances bearing the name of the Solidarity Union in some form or another.

PARTY P R E F E R E N C E S IN P O S T- CO M M U N I S T S O C IE T I E S The literature concerning post-Communist countries contains two, seemingly diametrically opposed, expectations regarding the determina­ tion of party preferences by socio-demographic factors. The majority view is that in the early stages of development of post-Communist Party systems following the fall of authoritarian regimes, three characteristics were apparent. First, individual parties - in comparison with their counterparts in established party systems - relied on extraordinarily heterogeneous electoral bases. Second, newly established parties, often united by no more than their opposition to the old regime or the demand for democratization, were unable to fulfil their interest-articulating and representative functions. Third, the resulting party systems were immature. The most succinct statement of the normative thrust of this approach has been given by Alain Touraine ( 1 99 1 : 263): Representative democracies not only imply institutions guaranteeing freedom of political choice; they also require the pre-existence of social interests which can be represented, which ensures a measure of priority to people in society over their political representation. If Western Europe . . . have had strong democracies, it is because their parties faithfully reflected the categories or even social classes bom of industrialisation. Where the link was strong, as in Britain and the Scandinavian countries, the primacy of civil society was ensured; where, on the contrary, the concept of the state remained predominant, as in France, democracy has always been weaker, threatened or destroyed by Bonapartist-style movements or by parties more concemed with taking power than with defending the interests of a particular social category and therefore recognizing political pluralism.

The thesis that 'connections between party preferences and social position are extraordinarily weak in Eastern Europe' is not so much based on factual observation but stems from the supposed immaturity of

Parties and social divisions

1 59

the new democracies. lt is also important to note the origins of the idea. Starting from the historical analysis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Bartolini and Mair ( 1 990: 2 1 2--49) argue that the political conflicts which determine the long-term cleavages of party systems are those that bring into opposition groups that can be demarcated by certain social characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, class, religious affiliation - the demand för democratization does not itself usually bring such groups into opposi­ tion). ln addition, when groups are brought into opposition, they often possess a strong sense of collective identity, are ready to act on this basis and represent a social cleavage that has some förm of organizational expression. Yet, after förty years of state socialism, it is unlikely that the potentially important cleavages of the near future should possess such cognitive, affective and organizational expression. ln these ' atomized ' societies there is initially little chance that important social cleavages will translate into party ideologies and into the organizational linkages between parties and voluntary organizations (see Mair, 1991). The altemative approach argues that in a relatively new party system over and above the fact that the political priorities of the parties themselves are not yet fully förmed - the electorate 's image of the parties, their functional roles and their possible govemment activities are underdeveloped. However, that is precisely the reason why superficial signs of the socio-demographic and cultural position of the parties and their leaders may affect the voters ' choice of party to an extraordinary degree. ln the West German case, according to Klingemann and Wattenberg ( 1 992), the period following the first democratic change of govemment between 1 969 and 1 987 was one in which the image förmed by the German electorate of the two major parties became increasingly variegated and detailed. At the same time, both the strength of identifica­ tion with the parties and the socio-demographic base of the vote weakened. The significance of class voting, for example, decreased despite the fact that the average voter was forming a stronger image of the class roots of the CDU. To the extent that this trend can be under­ stood as indicative of a more rational, politically conscious pattem of electoral behaviour, the increased socio-demographic determination of the vote could also be seen as a sign of the 'immaturity ' of the party system. ln other words, the weak and the strong character of the social embeddedness of the vote could equally be interpreted as a logical consequence of the weak motivational bases of party attachments. Table 10.2 show s the strength of the connections between party prefer­ ences and certain socio-demographic background variables in nine

Gábo r Tóka

1 60

Table 1 0.2: Correlations between social variables and party preference Party preferencef Australia

USA

Great B ritain Germany Austria Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Poland

Educ a

/NCOME b CHURCAT C URBRUR d

AGE4 e

.004 .00 1 .022 .0 1 7 .01 0 .039 .026 .035 .083

(Symmetric uncertainty coefficient) .0 1 7 .005 .029 .005* .0 1 4 .003 .020 .009 .008 .01 1 na .035 .01 I . 1 00 .024 .072 .020 .030 .030 . 1 48 .0 14* .01 8 .078 .023 .022 .032 . 1 01

.005 .004* .008 .002* .004* .035 .045 .080 .0 1 3*

* chi-square statistic not significant at the .05 levei na no data available a EDUC: education was coded as l maximum primary, 2 vocational school, incompleled secondary school, 3 finished secondary school, 4 higher educalion b JNCOME: lolal family income: l one-third with lowesl income, 2 one-third in between or lack of dala, 3 one-lhird with highesl income c CHURCAT: frequency of church-going: l once a month al least, 2 several limes a year, 3 less frequenlly or never d URBRUR: place of residence: l big city ( 1 00,000 inhabitanls or more), 2 small settlemenl (less than 2,000-2,500 inhabitants), 3 other e AGE4: age: 1 1 8-29, 2 30-44, 3 45-59, 4 60 years old or older f Parties considered in the given countries: Australia: Liberal Party, Labour, Country (National) Party, Democratic Party United States: Reagan, Mondale Great Britain: Conservative, Labour, Alliance (or Liberal or SDP) Germany: CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, The Greens Austria: OVP, SPÖ, FPÖ Czech Republic and Moravia: Czech People ' s Party (CSL),, Social Democratic Party (CSSD), Communist Party (KSCM), Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Civic Movement (OH), Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), Agrarian Party (member of the Socialist Union), Green Party (member of the Social Liberal Union), Socialist Party (member of the Social Liberal Union), smaller Christian democratic parties and movements), Moravian Parties (HSD­ SMS), Republican Party (SPR-RSC) Slovakia: Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), Slovak National Party (SNS), Movement for Democratic S lovakia (HZDS), Party of Democratic Left (SDL), Civic Democratic Union (VPN-ODU) Hungary: MDF, SZDSZ, FKGP, MSZP, FIDESZ, KDNP Poland: peasant parties (PL and PSL), Solidarnosc (aggregate supporters of electoral lists and parties using the name of the union), Christian parties (including Centre Agreement (POC), and Catholic Electoral Action (WAK), Democratic Union (UD), liberal parties (including Liberal Democralic Congress (KLD), and Union of Real politics (UPR), Confederation for lndependent Poland (KPN), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)) Sources: Zentralarchiv, 1 987. The Role of Government, ISSP 1985, Machine-Readable Data File. Köln: Zentralarchiv; Dohnalik, Jacek, Hartl, Jan, Krazyszlof, Jasiewicz, Markowski, Radoslaw, Mateju, Peter, Rezler, Lubos, Tóka, Gábor, Tucek, Milan, 1 99 1 . Dismantling of the Socia/ Safety Net and its Political Consequences in East Central Europe. An lnternationa/ Comparative Study lnitiated and Sponsored by the lnstitute of East-West Studies, New York-Prague. Machine-Readable Data File. Distributors: IEWS, New York and TÁRKI , Budapest

Parties and social divisions

161

countries. The strength o f the connections i s indicated by the symmetric uncertainty coefficient, whose value would be zero if, in a given country, there were no connections between socio-demographic characteristics and party preferences, and one when party preferences could be wholly explained by socio-demographic characteristics. The data for the five Western democracies is the 1985-6 ISSP Role of Government survey (Zentralarchiv, 1987), while the Eastern European data are the October 1991 survey mentioned above. ln the USA, Austria, Germany and Australia current party preferences were used instead of votes cast at their most recent national elections. Non-voters, respondents giving no party preference and supporters of small parties were excluded from the analysis. The number of parties taken into consideration in the Western countries ranges from two in the USA to four in West Germany and Australia, while in the Eastern European countries it varies from five in Slovakia to twelve in Czechland-Moravia. Two simple indicators of social status, education and income, have a stronger correlation with choice of party in each of the four new democ­ racies than in the five established ones. The effect of age is similar: with the exception of Poland, the impact of age on party preference is compa­ rable or - as in Hungary - larger than that of social status. Although slight differences in the party preferences of various age groups do occur in Western democracies as well, their significance tends to be marginal. By contrast, the effect of age is much larger in each of the four new democracies: in the two different party systems of Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, age is a major factor shaping the competition of the parties. Along with the Hungarian Small holders, we find the Hungarian and the Slovakian Christian Democrats, and the People 's Party (CSL) and the Communists (KSCM) of Czechland among the East Central European parties with the oldest supporters. Although it is tempting to explain this by the ' historical ' character of these parties, our sample contains at least one 'historical ' party - the Czech social democrats (CSSD) - whose electoral base shows only a marginal over-representation of older voters. The same pattem holds for the Polish and Czech agrarian parties. Among former Communist parties and Christian parties - with the exception of the rather insignificant Czech Christian democrats - it is generally the case that the average age of their voters is above the national average. Although the Polish Christian parties also display this tendency only to a very limited extent, and though the consistent characteristic of former Communist parties seems to be extremely small numbers of supporters among the youngest age groups rather than a high ratio among the

1 62

Gábor T óka

elderly, certain party types have a particular appeal to certain age groups across the whole region. The list of parties with younger electoral bases also demonstrates the systematic but complex nature of the phenomenon. According to our data, in East Central Europe, along with the Hungarian FIDESZ, it is the Czech republicans (SPR-RSC, the alliance of two xenophobic parties whose profi.les are similar to that of the German republicans), certain Czech centre-left opposition parties 2 (notably the Greens) and the Slovak National Party that can lay claim to the youngest voters. Nevertheless, it is not simply the protest-voting tendency of the young that accounts for this pattern, since the relatively low average age of the electoral base is also common among liberal parties in government and in opposition. For example, in October 199 1 it was also a characteristic of the Slovakian Public Against Violence, the Czech Civic Movement of Petr Pithart and Jiri Dienstbier, the Polish Liberal Democratic Congress and Democratic Union as well as the Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). A peculiar characteristic of the politics of age in East Central Europe is provided by Vaclav Klaus 's secular-conservative Civic Democratic Party which is typically and dominantly the party of the middle aged. Turning to party preference, religion and place of residence, in East Central Europe both are approximately as important as - if not more important than - they are in those Western countries where the urban-rural or the religious-secular cleavage is traditionally very impor­ tant. ln Hungary and the Czech Republic the extent of separation between parties relying on more rural and on more urban electoral bases is similar to that in Austria or Australia, while in Poland the same separation takes on rather extreme proportions. ln this regard, Slovakia is exceptional, probably because it is the only area in the region where former agrarian parties have not re-emerged. lt is only in Poland that agrarian parties in the narrow sense dominate the villages. The likely explanation is that Polish agricultural conditions were the least trans­ formed by state socialism. Given the unusually high ratio of agricultural employment, this makes the rural-urban cleavage one of the most impor­ tant factors in Polish electoral politics. While the Polish and Czech agrarian parties find more than half of their supporters among those actually working in agriculture, in the case of the Hungarian Small Holders Party the figure is below 20 per cent. Once the age and religious distributions of their electoral bases are also taken into account, the social base of the Small Holders Party is similar to that of the Czech People 's Party and to the Hungarian and Slovakian

Parties and social divisions

1 63

Christian democrats rather than to the agrarian parties. ln the new democracies, as in Austria and West Germany, apart from agrarian parties it is Christian parties that enjoy above-average support among country dwellers and those employed in agriculture. Polish Christian democratic parties, which face strong competition from peasants' parties , an d the small Czech Christian democratic parties outside the People's Party, constitute exceptions to this rule, as, according to our data, they achieve considerably less than their national average among voters employed in agriculture and/or living in rural areas. ln the predominantly Anglo-Saxon countries the religious-secular cleavage has no significant role to play in party politics. By contrast, in West Germany and especially Austria there is a strong correlation between the frequency of churchgoing and party preference. (Rose, 1974: 11). There is nothing unusual in the way in which religion differentiates the electoral bases of the individual East Central European parties. Practising religious voters pledge above-average support to the various Christian parties, while the support far farmer Communist parties is significantly lower among these voters. To a lesser degree, all of the liberal (UD, KLD, OH, ODA, VPN-ODU, SZDSZ, FIDESZ) and the secular nationalist (KPN, Slovak National Party, HZDS, Czech republi­ cans) parties of the region, as well as the Czech centre-left, are parties supported by less religious voters. ln this context, the Hungarian Democratic Forum is situated more on the 'clerical' side, while Vaclav Klaus's conservative-liberal Civic Democratic Party is on the secular side. Among the four East Central European countries, predicting a person's vote on the hasis of his or her religious affiliation is least effec­ tive in Poland. At the same time, the accuracy of such a prediction is similar in West Germany, while in the other three countries it is signifi­ cantly more accurate despite the fact that in West Germany the Christian parties are opposed to three clearly and traditionally anti-clerical ones. This is especially interesting considering that both the Czech Republic and Hungary appear more secularized (as indicated by the ratio of regular churchgoers) than either West Germany or Austria. ln Slovakia, where the ratio of regular churchgoers is closer to that in the two German-speaking countries, the party preferences of individual subjects can be predicted on the hasis of churchgoing even more accurately than in Austria. We can conclude that in East Central Europe party preferences are influenced by the socio-demographic characteristics of the electorate more than in the established Western democracies. We can also say that

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Gábor Tóka

the electoral bases of East Central European parties are in general more socially homogeneous than those of their Western counterparts . However, this i s not necessarily a sign o f 'maturity ' on the part of East Central European democracies. Neither does it mean that East Central Europe has more and politically more relevant cleavages than the other democracies of continental Europe. It may be only a symptom of the emergence of mass democracy today in societies which are in some respects pre-modern.

C LA S S A N D PARTY P R E F E R E N C E With some caveats, the theory that posits a weaker connection between party preference and social position in the new Eastern European democ­ racies than in the Western democracies is not confirmed. The situation is the same for occupational class: if the respondents are divided into three categories similar to those used in Western countries (differentiating between the 'middle class' , comprising mostly non-manual workers and independents; the 'working class'; and the largely inactive 'other' category), the connection between occupation and party choice is weaker in all of the Western countries (with the exception of Britain and, partially, Austria) than in any of the East Central European ones (see Table 10.3 , column 1). This picture changes somewhat if we frame the question like this: in individual countries, how do the party preferences of non-manual employees, farmers and agricultural workers, and other manual workers differ from the national pattern? Out of our nine countries, the identifica­ tion of the party that sees itself as the primary representative of agrarian interests is a problem only in the United States and Slovakia, and the small number of agricultural workers in Britain and the United States makes quantitative comparison meaningless. Consequently, if we compare only the remaining three Western countries with the four East European ones, the significant differences we find are not between the two groups but within them. ln other words, we cannot claim that the background variable in question (AGRIC, see Table 10. 3) has a stronger effect on choice of party in the new democracies than in the established ones. We do find such signs for NONMAN: in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic it is easier to identify the typical party preferences of non-manual employees than in any of the Western democracies with the exception of Britain.

1 65

Parties and social divisions Table 10.3: Correlation between economic status and party preference CLASS • Party preference f Australia USA Great Britain Germany Austria Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Poland

.009 .006* .039 .0 1 3 .0 1 4 .027 .020 .0 1 4 .ű3 1

A GR/C b

NONMAN C

(Symmetric .ű2 1 na na .036 .039 .035 .002* .0 1 4 .112

/NDWRK d MEMBER e

uncertainty coefficient) .016 .007 .007 .006* .028 .030 .01 6 .003 * .0 1 6 .003 * .020 .0 1 7 .003 * .004* .005 * .0 1 7 .020 .059

.ű2 1 .035 .űl l .029 .043 .025 .069 .039 .045

* chi-square statistic is not significant at the .05 levei na numbers are too small to provide reliable estimates a CLASS: present or last job: 1 non-manual employee or self-employed, 3 manual worker, 2 other or nothing b AGRIC: present or !ast job: I independent farmer or agricultural manual worker, 2 other or nothing e NONMAN: present or last job: 1 non-manual employee, 2 other or nothing e INDWRK : present or !ast job: 1 other manual worker, 2 other or nothing f MEMBER: trade union membership in Western countries, former CS KP membership in Czechoslovakia, former LEMP membership in Poland and former MSZMP membership in Hungary: l member, 2 not member g see Table 10.2 for description of parties Sources: Zentralarchiv, 1 987. The Role of Government, ISSP 1 985, Machine-Readable Data File. Köln: Zentralarchiv; Dohnalik, Jacek, Hartl, Jan, Krazysztof, Jasiewicz, Markowski, Rad©slaw, Mateju, Peter, Rezler, Lubos, Tóka, Gábor, Tucek, Milan, 1 99 1 . Dismantling of the Social Safety Net and its Political Consequences in East Central Europe. An lnternational Comparative Study lnitiated and Sponsored by the lnstitute of East-West Studies, New York-Prague. Machine-Readable Data File. Distributors: IEWS, New York and TÁRKI, Budapest

The reverse is the case for non-agricultural manual workers. The INDWRK variable (see Table 10.3) shows a statistically significant (though not very strong) connection with party choice in all Western countries , but of the four new democracies this occurs only in Poland and Czechland. However, the 'class vote' manifests itself in a somewhat peculiar, rather negative farm there : not as support far certain parties but rather as lack of support far other parties. ln Poland the parties bearing the name of the Solidarity Union, and in Czechland the Communist Party and some of the centre-left parties, were preferred by slightly more manual than non-manual workers. The Polish Democratic Union and liberals as well as the Czech Civic Democratic Party appear to attract half as much support from manual workers as from all other voters. Possible explanations far this include the connection of the farmer party

166

Gábor Tóka

with the Balcerowicz plan, and the latter with the economic programme of Vaclav Klaus. Our quantitative comparison confirms beyond doubt in Slovakia and Hungary, and tentatively in Czechland and Poland, that the East Central European parties rely on extraordinarily heterogeneous electoral bases. An important element of the explanation for this phenomenon is, of course, that in these countries - with the exception of Czechland - the only significant representatives of the traditional left in the political arena are the successors of the former Communist parties, and these parties rely on an extremely narrow electoral base. Using a simile, while in Western countries union membership is usually a more accurate indicator of a vote cast for a left-wing party than occupation itself, in East Central Europe former PZPR, KSCS and MSZMP memberships play the same role (see Table 10.3). The Communist successor parties attracted between 50 to 65 per cent of their 1991 support among former party members in all four republics, while the probability of other voters supporting them is seven to ten times smaller than that of former party members. ln all of the countries examined, former party members mostly came from non-manual workers, and since - with the single exception of the Czech Republic - among former party members the likelihood of sympathizing with the successor party is the same for manual and non­ manual workers, it is understandable that the electoral bases of East Central European left-wing parties are consistently more non-manual than manual. 3 Czechland may be an exception to this pattern, partly because of the presence of the Social Liberal Union (LSU), and partly because of the unusual electoral base of the Czech Communists. Former party members are difficult to identify as a separate social group - such as the membership of a religious denomination or an occupational group - hence it is difficult to claim that we are dealing with a peculiarly Eastern European cleavage in the Lipset-Rokkan sense. Despite this, it still seems that the characteristics of East Central European party systems cannot be reduced to the symptoms of 'immaturity' (fragment­ edness, underdevelopment, instability, etc.), but in some respects they are distinctly different from the party systems of the Western democracies. While our findings are reinforced by other studies (see Tóka, 1995), the absence of a ' class vote' in Hungary and Slovakia, and the phenom­ enon of a 'negative' class vote, has proved to be temporary. ln Slovakia, the explanation was the emergence of the Slovak Workers' Party, a strongly étatist party founded in 1994 by a former post-Communist member of Parliament, and its subsequent remarkable election perfor-

Parties and social divisions

167

mance. ln Hungary, the explanation was the sudden increase in the popularity of the reformist socialist party (MSZP) in 1993-4. ln 1991-2, popular dissatisfaction with the coalition govemment of the Christian­ nationalist parties seemed to enhance the election prospects of the pro­ market liberal parties. However, a movement favouring the socialists began to emerge in early 1993. While FIDESZ, having led the polls since early 1991, become more outspoken about its pro-business economic policies, the liberal plurality began to transform itself into a socialist grouping. Although Hungarian commentators mostly emphasized the role of other factors to explain the shift in public opinion, the data below underline the importance of economic policy. Thus, electoral choice has become more meaningful in terms of class politics; but have the party attachments of the voters become stronger in the course of this change?

E X P L A I N I N G S T RO N G E R PARTY ATTACH M E N T S ln this section we shall rely primarily on three sources o f data. First, we use the May 1990 TÁRKI study and the April-May 1994 mass survey by the Department of Political Science of the Central European University and Medián to determine in which social group individual parties lost or gained support between the two elections. Both studies used national clustered random samples of adult citizens, whose members were questioned shortly after the 1990 and the 1994 elections. Since all the respondents in the 1990 study were over 1 9 years old, respondents under 20 were excluded from the analysis of the data of the CEU survey as well. To screen out the possible distorting effect of small differences between the compositions of the two samples, we imple­ mented a weighing procedure whereby the ratios of 126 socio­ demographic groups (differentiated by gender, age, place of residence and level of education) within the samples were made to agree with the corresponding estimates for the 1990 national census. Along with these two studies, we shall also use an election day exit poll conducted on 8 May 1994 by the Népszabadság newspaper and the Medián Institute of Market and Public Opinion Research. What reason do we have to suppose that the volatility of Hungarian voters may prove permanent? Bartolini and Mair have demonstrated that extraordinarily volatile elections have occurred in twos or threes, rather than in isolation. At the same time, their effect on the balance of power between parties has been such that the historical analogy with other

1 68

Gábo r Tóka

volatile elections tends to support the argument that the further transfor­ mation of the Hungarian party system, especially in the direction of left­ wing dominance, will become permanent. Thus, if two or more consecutive elections produce high levels of volatility, then they will strengthen the same party or party family. However, we may be more interested in discovering whether the decisions of individual voters showed more or less temporal variability during the 1994 election campaign than during the corresponding period of the 1990 campaign. We can make some estimates of inter-election volatility by comparing a February-March 1 99 1 panel conducted by Gallup-Budapest with the 1994 CEU panel data. The results show that the within-campaign volatility of the Christian Democrat (KDNP) and Socialist (MSZP) constituencies had probably increased, and that of MDF and FIDESZ voters had probably decreased between the two elections. The loyalty of the FKGP and SZDSZ constituencies did not show significant change over time. Yet this comparison is somewhat unreliable, as the two panel studies examined stability during different periods of the two campaigns. lt is more worthwhile to compare data from the 1994 exit poll and the May 1990 T ÁRKI study to identify how congruent the list votes of the voters were with their votes in the single-member constituencies during the first round4 (see Tóka, 1994). We assume that the frequency of congruent votes, though less than the temporal constancy of party prefer­ ences, is still an acceptable indicator of the strength of voters' party loyalties. The increase in the congruency between list votes and single­ members' votes is likely to have been greater than our data suggest, as the 1990 figures come from a study conducted a month after the second round of elections, while our 1994 estimates were recorded at the exit poll conducted the day after the first round. Nevertheless, a significant increase in consistency is still evident for three of the six major parties, while none shows a statistically significant decrease. ln 1994, about 90 per cent of the voters of a given major party's list voted for the party's candidate in the single-member districts. Yet a closer look finds no trace of strengthened party loyalties. The reason for the increase in the congru­ ency of the two votes is that, on the one hand, the proportion of those voters who supported an independent candidate in the single-member constituencies apparently decreased among the supporters of each major party 's list since, in 1994, considerably fewer serious candidates stood as independents. On the other hand, where the increase in congruency of votes is significant, as with the FIDESZ, the explanation may be in the

Parties and social divisions

169

increased strength of that party 's organization rather than in the ' strengthening party loyalties ' hypothesis. FIDESZ entered a party list in every region both in 1990 and 1994, but in 1990 it had candidates in only half as many single-member districts. The other major parties did not force their 1990 followers to split their vote in the same way as the organizationally weaker FIDESZ did. Only one of the factors capable of increasing the congruency of the two votes would imply the strengthening of voters ' party loyalties : namely i f the proportion o f voters splitting their votes between two parties in the first round definitely decreased among followers of the four major parties (MDF, SZDSZ, FKGP and MSZP) whose number of candi­ dates was equally good at both elections. Yet overall there is little reason to believe that such a development took place. ln the cases of the MDF and the SZDSZ the proportion of such voters shows a slight increase, while for the MSZP and the FKGP a decrease was registered. It seems certain that the congruence of list votes and single-member votes increased, but according to the above reasoning that does not necessarily mean that the psychological loyalties of voters increased.

THE MOVE TO THE LEFT The other explanation of the volatility of Hungarian voters is that the parties are uncommitted to distinguishable economic policies, with the result that their electoral bases are indistinguishable from each other in terms both of mass attitudes towards economic policy and in the support of specific occupational groups. Data from the 1990-2 period do show that the voters of the six major Hungarian parties are more heteroge­ neous in these two respects compared not only to British voters, but also to Polish, Czech and Slovakian voters as well (see Tóka, 1995). ln expla­ nations advanced for the results of the 1994 election, however, it became almost compulsory to suggest that the spectacular increase in MSZP votes was not merely the result of dissatisfaction with the performance of the Antall government, or opposition to the Christian-national spirit and style, but rather - and maybe most of all - the result of a latent demand for a left-wing shift in economic policy. Following the logic of these comments, the polarization of electoral bases in terms of attitudes towards economic policy should also imply the strengthening of voters' party loyalties. The latter, as we argued above, did not occur. But did the polarization in terms of economic policy itself occur?

Table 1 0.4: Recalled list votes by economic policy attitudes, 1 990 and 1 994 (%) (1990) FIDESZ FKGP KDNP MDF MSZP SZDSZ Other

State controls pricesa

{Weighted N)

(1 994)

FIDESZ FKGP KDNP MDF MSZP SZDSZ Other (Weighted N)

Does not agree Both Agrees

7 15 8

9 8 14

5 4 8

34 34 37

6 9 8

32 24 17

7 6 9

(2 1 6) ( 1 36) (277)

8 6 6

6 8 10

5 6 8

13 9 10

33 38 39

25 25 17

11 8 10

(259) (237) (937)

Does not agree Both Agrees

8 4 12

6 9 13

3 8 8

39 39 31

9 7 8

28 27 20

8 7 8

(2 1 1 ) ( 1 1 6) (299)

11 8 5

7 7 9

7 5 8

13 12 10

24 37 40

26 21 19

11 9 9

( 1 52) (287) (987)

Against inflation Against unemployment

9 10

10 15

6 10

35 33

9 5

24 21

8 6

(469) ( 1 50)

6 7

10 8

8 7

12 9

32 42

22 19

10 10

(547) (804)

Too little As much as needed Too much

10 10 8

10 9 10

5 12 4

36 37 35

9 7 6

25 16 29

6 10 9

(36 1 ) ( 1 05 ) (97)

7 5 2

8 11 11

6 9 8

8 10 26

43 36 14

21 21 26

8 9 14

(8 1 9) (393)

Against privatization Preferably slower The faster the better

6 10 10

14 9 9

9 6 16

34 36 37

10 7 8

17 26 18

10 7 3

( 1 34) (443) (47)

4 7 6

10 9 8

8 7 8

7 11 23

43 36 30

16 22 23

12 9 2

(367) (994) (40)

Not allowed to buy Buy only companies with deficit Anything, if highest price

10 7 8

14 12 8

8 9 5

40 28 41

6 7 9

15 28 23

7 10 6

(99) (2 1 5) (278)

6 7 6

11 8 6

7 8 6

8 9 18

42 39 32

16 20 24

11 9 8

(523) (467) (355)

No Yes

13 8

10 8

6 4

35 37

8 8

20 30

9 5

( 1 36) ( 1 62)

6 6

5 12

7 6

7 7

49 26

18 35

8 9

(287) (81)

lndustry subsidizedb

Inflation/unemploymentc Trade union influenced

Privatizatione

Foreign ownshipf

Privatized own companyg

(9 6)

a

' I am going to give you some examples of how the state can influence the economy . . . do you agree with the fact that [the state] controls prices by decrees? ' . • . and do you agree with the fact that industrial branches in crisis should be subsidized so that people working there won ' t become unemployed?' e 'If the government were to choose between decreasing inflation or unemployment, which do you think they should choose: which do you think is more important, to curb inflation or to decrease unemployment? ' ct ' Do you think that the influence trade unions exert in Hungary is more, less or about as much as they should?' e 'Privatizing state-owned companies is an issue frequently mentioned nowadays. It is also said that a Iot of abuses have occurred in this respect in the past few years . What do you think of this question? State-owned companies should not be privatized, or they should be privatized but abuses should be stopped even if it means slowing down changes, or the process of privatization should be accelerated even if it involves abuses?' f ' Nowadays they often talk about foreign companies and private individuals buying Hungarian companies. What do you think would be right: foreigners should not be allowed to buy Hungarian companies at all, or foreigners should be allowed to buy companies operating with deficit, or foreigners should be allowed to buy any Hungarian company if they offer the highest price? ' b

Sources: TÁRKl-C lSSP (May 1 990) ; CEU-Medián : May Panel (April-May 1 994)

172

Gábor Tóka

Table 10.4 shows the proportions of votes cast for individual parties in 1990 and 1994 by opinion groups. Subjects who did not answer, or gave a 'don't know' answer, as well as non-voters and those who refused to divulge how they voted, are excluded from these estimates. ln both years, more people recalled voting for the winning party, and fewer for the list of one of the parties that did not win election to Parliament, than would be expected from a representative sample. As a result, these figures mak.e the gain of the MSZP, as well as the loss of the MDF, appear greater than they really were. However, as the probability of a false vote recall is presumed to be random and uncorrelated with opinions on economic policy, this should not distort the results of our analysis. The composition and size of individual opinion groups did not remain constant with time. According to our data, 44 per cent of the 1990 electorate and 65 per cent in 1994 agreed that the state should control prices by means of laws and statutes. ln 1990 48 per cent agreed that sectors in crisis should be supported in order to save jobs, compared to 69 per cent in 1 994. ln 1990, 24 per cent agreed that the fight against unemployment was more important than the fight against inflation, compared to 60 per cent in 1994. ln both years, just over six out of ten felt that the influence of the unions was too weak., while in 1990 only 17 per cent and in 1994 only 7 per cent felt that it was too strong. Between the two surveys, the proportion of those opposed to the sale of Hungarian companies to foreigners more than doubled, while the proportion of those supporting the privatization of their own places of employment decreased from 54 to 22 per cent. 5 Changes of opinion are connected with the progress of privatization, changes in the range of companies still in public ownership and the decrease in inflation. ln this case, however, causes are less important than the effect: the economic attitudes of the Hungarian electorate took a significant and consistent tum to the left. Por all of the questions consid­ ered, the increase in the MSZP vote was much greater in ' left-wing' opinion groups than in 'right-wing' ones. SZDSZ voters are consistently over-represented in the 'right-wing' groups in both years, but there is no indication that the correlation between economic policy attitudes and SZDSZ voting became any stronger. The situation is different with the MDF. Among 1990 MDF voters, for a small proportion of questions, the ' left-wing' group and for the others the 'right-wing' group, appears to be over-represented to a statistically insignificant degree; by contrast, in 1 994 the 'right-wing' group is over-represented for almost all of the seven questions among MDF voters. While the electoral bases of the

Parties and social divisions

1 73

FKGP and the KDNP were a little more 'left- ' than 'right-wing ', especially in 1990, in the case of the three smaller parliamentary parties there appears to be no consistent correlation between votes cast and economic attitudes either in 1990 or in 1994. In a statistical sense (expressed by the eta coefficient), in 1994 respon­ dents ' choice of party was more strongly related to their age or church­ going habits than to their responses to any of the economic policy questions. However, while the strength of the first two correlations did not increase from 1990 to 1994, the majority of the last seven - and, most significantly, their average - did. Thus, contrary to the observations of the first year or two of the Antall government (see Tóka, 1993), considering the 1990-4 period as a whole, the polarization of the electoral bases of the Hungarian parties did not increase with respect to generational and religious divisions - which were already important in 1990 - but polariza­ tion did increase with respect to economic policy attitudes. What effect did this have on the composition of the parties ' electoral bases? However tempting it is to assume that the parties in government lost support among those harmed by the transformation of the economy, and that MSZP gains came mostly from this group, the hypothesis is difficult to test. First, various analysts disagree over who the main losers were: pensioners, those unable to compensate for losses by taking on extra work; young people and unskilled manual workers, most at risk from unemployment; the middle classes; workers in agriculture and other sectors in crisis. The list is so all-embracing that it is hard to say which groups are likely to show a swing below the national average. If the proportion of such groups in the electorate is as small as it is for entre­ preneurs, it is hardly possible that any significant group should show MSZP gains or MDF losses considerably above the national average. Second, the subcultural embeddedness of Hungarian electoral behav­ iour - reflected most of all in terms of generational and religious differ­ ences, as well as former MSZMP membership - remained the fundamental determinant of party preferences in 1994 as well as in 1990. This is particularly important as the age and religious composition of the various constituencies also have an effect on their socio-economic composition. Any understanding of the socio-economic changes between 1990 and 1994 must begin with an analysis of subcultural factors. Here, we can only give a brief overview of the figures. Comparing the data from the exit poll and the CEU study with the results of the 1990 T ÁRKI study, only the electoral base of the KDNP remained the same in terms of religion. Support for the FKGP decreased by about 10 per cent among

174

Gábor Tóka

weekly churchgoers, while hardly at all in the other groups. At the same time, the electoral bases of the FIDESZ and the SZDSZ shifted slightly towards more religious voters. Nevertheless, the strength of the connec­ tion between churchgoing and party choice did not decrease, because the MSZP's gains and the MDF's losses both show a negative correlation with religiosity: each was roughly twice as strong among non-church­ goers as among weekly churchgoers. lt is also true that in general the losses of the MDF, the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ, as well as the gains of the MSZP, were below the national average mostly among the more traditional subcultures of society, while the losses of the FKGP, which shifted from the more traditional Christian right-wing line towards a more radical anti-establishment stance, were the greatest in these same groups. The gains of the MSZP and the losses of the MDF, the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ were below average in rural areas, whereas the losses of the FKGP were above the national trend. W hile the urban bias of the MSZP base grew marginally in comparison with its 1990 level, that of the SZDSZ decreased, that of the FIDESZ became practically non-existent and that of the MDF reversed. Comparisons in terms of age are similar, showing above-average losses for the FKGP and below-average losses for the MDF in the more traditional (i.e. rural and older) social groups. ln the electoral bases of the other parties there is little change in age group composition compared to 1990: in both elections, the MSZP was most attractive to the middle aged and least attractive to the young. The connections between the liberal vote and the young, and between the older age groups and the workers' party, social democratic and KDNP votes show no change in direction or strength.

OCCUPATION , EDUCATION ANDPA RT Y CHO ICE Comparing the data from the exit poll with the opinion polls of 1990, we do not find a single educational or occupational group within which the proportions of votes for any of the six major parties differed from the national trend in excess of the relatively large statistical error margins of the 1990 sample between the two elections. On the other hand, due to the negligible 1994 statistical error for the large sample of the exit poll, and the agreement between the corresponding results of all available opinion polls from 1990, it is likely that the MDF electoral base shifted slightly towards groups of lower educational and occupational status between

Parties and social divisions

175

1990 and 1994, while that of the MSZP moved towards non-agricultural manual workers. While according to the 1990 opinion polls, those of higher status were generally over-represented among voters of both parties (in particular, non-manual employees in the case of the MDF, management for the MSZP), by 1994 the situation had changed. It is probable that MSZP's gain in votes, which averaged 22 per cent nation­ ally, was a few percentage points more among manual workers, while the MDF's loss was as much as 10 per cent smaller among less educated groups than nationally. Yet the fact that their effect manifested itself differently in individual age groups already indicates that differences in status were still only secondary determinants of party preference in 1994. With the exception of a few smaller parties, a consistent correspondence between level of education and vote over all age groups can only be established in the case of the FKGP, generally supported by those of the lowest educational level, and the SZDSZ, generally supported by more educated people. But even this observation needs to be qualified. What seems to be the most interesting phenomenon is that the strength of the correlation between educational level and vote cast for the liberal parties decreases with increasing age, while the direction of the correlation between workers' party and MSZP votes on the one hand, and educational level on the other, is reversed. The more detailed figures (which are not shown for reasons of space) show that while among 18-29, 30-9 and 40-9 year-old graduates the orthodox (Communist) Workers ' Party only attracted 0.4, 0.9 and 1 .6 per cent of the vote respectively, in the same age groups, among those with fewer than eight years of primary education its share of the vote was 13 .8, 11.0 and 9.2 per cent, respectively. ln contrast, in the strongest age group of the Workers' Party, those born between 1924 and 1934, they attracted 8.1 per cent of the graduate vote, but only 5.1 per cent of those with fewer than eight years of schooling. The same trend is observable with the MSZP, though in a less extreme farm. While among those under 40 the party received the least support from graduates and the most support from people with only primary education, among people over 40 educational leve! and the proportion of MSZP votes rose together. The extreme case is again the generation who reached adulthood in the 1940s and early 1950s (who are aged in their sixties today): 47 per cent of graduates, 31 per cent of people with eight years of schooling and 24 per cent of the less educated voted for the MSZP. The KDNP only becomes the party of the less rather than the more educated among people aged

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Table 10.5: MSZP voters hy age and occupation ( 1 8-60 years; a (%) (Age groupings) Unemployed on benefit Agricultural manual workers b Professionals Top/middle managers Other non-manual workers Foremen and skilled workers Unskilled workers Inactivec

/8-20

30-39

4�9

50-59

20 21 23 20 22 26 26 20

29 27 26 30 29 32 33 29

36 33 38 42 37 38 37 35

36 30 36 41 36 38 34 35

a Respondents were asked to choose one of 13 groups of economic activities and occupations that best described their circumstances b Includes self-employed farmers e Includes pensioners, mothers on child care and child benefit and the dependent Source: Népszabadság-Medián exit-poll (8 May 1 994)

over 50. Among younger people, it enjoys marginally more support from graduates than from others in the same age group. The distribution of MSZP votes is only marginally correlated with occupational group (Table 1 0.5). Among people over 40 it is those in managerial positions, followed by skilled workers and intellectuals, who voted for them most frequently. Among those under 40 the proportion of MSZP voters shows a sharp decline, especially among managers, and other non-manual workers. ln these age groups we witness a 'positive class vote ' : here the MSZP is supported mostly by non-agricultural manual workers. Today it is difficult to say whether that represents some form of potential advantage or rather an unusual weakness of the MSZP among the younger part of the elite. However, it is certainly true to say that the occupational group composition of the MSZP's electoral base has changed somewhat compared to 1990; among the inactive, agricul­ tural workers and the unemployed that support for the MSZP did not even reach the age group average within any age group. CONCLUSION

The 1994 Hungarian election arena was divided into two different worlds. ln the first group people over 40 or 50 chose between the left, supported mainly by white-collar workers, and the Christian-national parties mainly representing people of low status. ln the second world

Parties and social divisions

1 77

people under 40 were polarized on a classical class hasis between the secular left-wing parties of the industrial workers and the liberal parties of those of higher status. Following Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the economic policy issue was institutionalized as a significant electoral divide in Hungary as well. Nevertheless, not even this develop­ ment was able to transform the volatile character of party loyalties. Our results challenge some common wisdom about new party systems. First, we have shown that high levels of volatility (that is the weakness of party loyalties) can, and in East Central Europe do, go together with relatively strong statistical association between party choice and various socio-cultural characteristics of the voters. The direc­ tion of these correlations seems to be maintained over time; in that respect we see no signs of high volatility. However, the strength of some correlations probably stems more from the superficiality of the clues that the voters utilize in making their choices than from a strong social embeddedness of the new parties. Second, the empirical evidence of Hungary suggests that party loyalties are not getting any stronger either by the mere ageing of the party system, or by the rise of class voting or by the increase in issue voting such as suggested by Table 10.4. Indeed, commercial polls (see Szonda-Ipsos Report, Népszabadság, 10 July 1995, page 8) already suggest that the swing from government to opposi­ tion parties was even bigger in the first year of the Horn government (1994--5) than it was during the first year of the Antall government (1990-1) . A relatively strong structuration of the vote is found in East Central Europe, yet this is not inconsistent with high levels of volatility. Notes l This essay was written as part of a research project (code F006900) supported by the Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA). 2 The expression covers the Social Democrats (CSSD), the two Moravian parties treated here under one heading (HSD-SMS) and the Green, socialist and agrarian parties forming the Social-Liberal Union, all of whom may be classified as being to the ' left' of the centrist Civic Democratic Party of Klaus (ODS), the Civic Movement (OH) and the Civic Democratic Alliance, which were in govemment at the time the data were collected. 3 It is especially striking that this tendency is apparent even in Poland, despite the fact that our party preference variable was not simply measuring votes to be cast for the SDRP but for the Democratic Left (a common election list which included the post-Communist party, the union alliance OPZZ and other, smaller left-wing groups).

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4 Hungarian elections are conducted ín two rounds. ln the first, voters may cast two separate votes. 5 For the purpose of analysing the last question, only answers given by subjects actively employed at the time of questioning but not employed by some national or local authority or in the private sector were considered.

References B artolini, Stefano and Mair, Peter, 1 990. Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of the European Electorates / 885-1 985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dohnalik, Jacek, Hartl, Jan, Jasiewich, Krzysztof, Markowski, Radoslaw, Mateju, Peter, Rezler, Lubos, Tóka, Gábor and Tucek, Milan, 1 99 1 .

Dismantling of the Social Safety Net and Its Political Consequences in East Central Europe. An Intemational Comparative Study initiated and sponsored by the Institute of East-West Studies, NY, Prague. Machine-Readable Data File. Distributors: IEWS, New York and TÁRKI, Budapest. Klingemann, Hans-Dieter and Wattenberg, Martin P., 1 992. ' Decaying Versus Developing Party Systems: A Comparison of Party Images in the United States and West Germany ' . British Journal of Political Science, 22, 1 3 1-49. Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein, 1 967 . ' Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. lntroduction ' . ln Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press. Mair, Peter, 1 99 1 . ' (Electoral) Markets and (Stable) States ' . ln Micheal Moran and Maurice Wright, eds, Markets Against the State. London: Macmillan. Rose, Richard, ed. , 1 974. Electoral Behaviour. A Comparative Handbook. New York: Free Press. Rose, Richard, 1 995 . ' Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies ' . Party Politics, 1 ,4, 549-63. Tóka, Gábor, 1 993. 'The lmpact of the Religion lssue . . .' ln Klaus G. Troitzsch, ed., Wahlen in Zeiten des Umbruchs. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag. Tóka, Gábor, 1 994. 'The Parties and Their Voters in 1 990 and 1 994 ' . ln Rudolf Andorka, Tamás Kolosi and György Vukovich, eds, Társadalmi Riport [Social Report] / 992. Budapest: TÁRKI. (ln Hungarian.) Tóka, Gábor, 1995. ' Parties and Electoral Choices in East Central Europe ' . ln Paul Lewis and Geoffrey Pridham, eds, Roo ting Fragile Democracies. London: Routledge. Touraine, Alain, 1 99 1 . 'What Does Democracy Mean Today? ' International Social Science Journal, 43 : 259-68. Zentralarchiv, 1 987. The Role of Government. JSSP / 985. Machine-Readable Data File. Köln: Zentralarchiv.

CH A PTER 1 1

THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF TRANS F O RMATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE Richard Rose

HuNGARY has always been part of Central Europe, but as the boundaries of Central Europe have shifted it has sometimes found itself 'too far ' East. This was true during the century of Ottoman occupation, and it was again the case after Soviet troops arrived in Budapest in 1945. Por most of modem European history, the Habsburg empire was the central kingdom of Central Europe, and Hungary was part of this empire. Between the wars Hungary was a Central European state that shared with Austria, Germany, Poland and other countries in the region the experi­ ence of a brief attempt at democratization, then authoritarian rule and severe economic depression. The Iron Curtain that separated Communist countries from Western Europe denied the very idea of Mitteleuropa - and Hungary was indubitably on the eastem side of the Curtain. Moscow made itself the focal point for govemment throughout the Soviet bloc. The collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989, with Hungary the first country to open its boundaries to the West, has made Central Europe once again a meaningful political fact. The Danube originates in south-west Germany, and flows through Austria before it becomes a border between Slovakia and Hungary. And Budapest and Vienna are in many senses closer to each other than to smaller cities and towns in their own countries. With neighbouring countries in Central Europe in the post-war era, Hungarians have shared the experience of a fundamental transformation in social conditions. Health, education and material standards of living have changed fundamentally since the beginning of the twentieth

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century, and they have changed dramatically between the end of the Second World War and the present (see e.g. Rose, 1994). But because of forty years of division, the Central Europe to which Hungary now belongs is not the same as before. There is now a fault line within Central Europe, for four decades of living in a Communist system meant that Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland progressed at a slower tempo, as well as in a different manner, from countries outside the Soviet bloc. This can be demonstrated most dramatically by differences between the two parts of Germany (Rose and Haerpfer, 1997). The first object of this chapter is to measure the impact of Communism on Hungary by comparing trends there with neighbouring and historically linked countries - Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland. Because the Iron Curtain divided Central Europe, countries that shared much in common up to 1945 have diverged since. Comparing Hungary with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic provides evidence of how Hungarians progressed compared to other Soviet-dominated societies. Comparing Hungary with Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany yields insights into differences created by a market as against a nonmarket economy, and a democratic as against an undemocratic political system. With hindsight, countries that were free to side with the West during the cold war era were obviously better off. But the point was not so obvious when the Iron Curtain was put in place. German cities had been bombed flat as a consequence of Hitler's determination to fight the war to the bitter end, and German food rations were at subsistence levels. Austria had been incorporated in the Third German Reich in 1938 and, while separated after 1945, it suffered four-power military occupation for a decade. Austria only escaped German-style partition by the 1955 Peace Treaty that led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria and an Austrian commitment to formai neutrality between East and West. Second, the chapter assesses transformation in the 1990s. The descrip­ tion of economic transformation as an 'interruption' in econometric time-series analysis is an English understatement. Moreover, transforma­ tion can cause abrupt short-term reversals. This is most evident in the economy, where inflation rates have soared and then fallen, and where unemployment has replaced the Communist practices of over-employ­ ment and under-utilization of the productive capacities of employees. It is also registered by the swing of the electoral pendulum in competition between democratic parties.

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181

MA KINGPROGR E S S AND FA LLI NG B E HIND IN SOCIA L CONDI TI ON S Absolute progress is the twentieth-century norm over any period as long as a decade or generation. By comparison with neighbouring countries in the Communist bloc, Hungarians often appeared ahead. Por example, in political and civil rights, Hungary in the mid- 1980s was the ' least illib­ eral ' of the Soviet bloc regimes (Gastil, 1 987), tolerating diverse forms of expression that did not threaten the regime. The economy was relatively open and the private sector more tolerated than in the appar­ ently prosperous but highly regimented East German regime. But when compared with Austria and the Pederal Republic of Germany, the record of Communist Hungary appears different. This shows the extent to which progress in Hungary was slow compared to societies also devastated by war and interwar depression - but without a Communist regime. While living conditions in Hungary progressed in the absolute sense, the rate of change was so slow that Hungary was simultaneously falling behind Austria and West Germany. Comparison across the Iron Curtain emphasizes that the ' shock' of transformation may also be viewed as liberation from the