A Manufactured Plague The History of Foot-and-mouth Disease in Britain 9781849770309, 1849770301, 1844070816, 1844070808

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A MANUFACTURED PLAGUE THE H I S T O R Y OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE IN BRI TAI N

A Manufactured Plague?

To my parents

A Manufactured Plague? T h e H is to ry o f F o o t a n d M o u th D isease in B rita in

A bigail Woods

ij^iasiEiaaCTiEi L ondon • Sterling, VA

First published by E arthscan in the UK and USA in 2004 C opyright © Abigail W oods, 2004 All rights reserved ISBN: 1-84407-081-6 1-84407-080-8

paperback hardback

Typesetting by JS Typesetting Ltd, W ellingborough, N orthants Printed and b ound in the UK by Crom w ell Press Ltd, Trowbridge C over design by R uth Bateson For a full list o f publications please contact: Earthscan 8 -1 2 C am den H igh Street Tel: +44 (0)20 7387 8558 Fax: +44 (0)20 7387 8998 Email: earthinfo@ earthscan.co.uk W eb: w w w .earthscan.co.uk 22883 Q uicksilver Drive, Sterling, VA 20166-2012, USA E arthscan publishes in association w ith W W F -U K and the International Institute for E nvironm ent and D evelopm ent A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library L ibrary o f Congress C ataloging-in-Publication D ata A m anufactured plague : the history o f foot-and-m outh disease in Britain / by Abigail W oods. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-84407-080-8 (hardback : alk.) 1. Foot-and-m outh disease-G reat B ritain-H istory. I. Title. S F 793.W 66 2004 6 3 6 .0 8 9 '4 5 8 -d c 2 2 2004010130 T his book is printed on elem ental chlorine free paper

C ontents

List o f plates Acknowledgements List o f Acronyms a n d Abbreviations

vii viii x

In tro d u c tio n

xiii

1

Foot and M o u th D isease in 1 9 th -ce n tu ry B ritain: From E veryday A ilm ent to A nim al Plague F M D strikes John G am gee and the diseased m eat problem T h e cattle plague epidem ic, 1 8 6 5 -1 8 6 7 F M D becom es a plague

1 1 6 10 14

2

T h e Politics o f Plague: H o m e Rule for Ireland, 1 9 1 2 -1 9 2 3 T h e Irish question G ettin g to grips w ith F M D

20 20 27

3

T h e E pidem ics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4 O verview T h e C heshire experience, 1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 4 A c ountry under siege Resolution and afterm ath

32 32 36 40 47

4

Effects on the A n g lo -A rg e n tin e M eat T rade, 1 9 2 4 -1 9 3 9 T h e rise o f the intern atio n al m eat trade Suspicions aroused? T h e A rgentine reaction Twisted science

51 51 53 60 63

5

T h e Science, 1 9 1 2 -1 9 5 8 T h e birth o f scientific m edicine? Starting out: F M D research in Britain and E urope up to 1924

68 68 70

VI

6

7

8

Contents

D o c to rs, vets a n d th e p u rp o se o f sc ien tific e n q u iry K eep in g F M D o u t, 1 9 2 4 -1 9 3 8

74 81

A w a rtim e th re a t

84

T h e C o ld W ar a n d b iological w e ap o n s research

87

T h e 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 V a c c in a tio n C o n tro v e rs y

92

F M D re tu rn s C alls to vaccinate

92 95

T h e m in istry sta n d s firm T h e d isp u te c o n tin u e s T h e G o w ers C o m m itte e o f In q u iry

97 101 104

T h e 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 E p id e m ic S e ttin g th e scene T h e view from th e g ro u n d

108 108 110

T h e v a c c in a tio n q u e stio n

116

T o im p o rt o r n o t to im p o rt? T h e m e a t q u e stio n P o s t-m o rte m an d a fte rm a th

119 126

F o o t a n d M o u th D ise a se, 2 0 0 1

131

F ig h tin g F M D , 1 9 6 8 -2 0 0 0

131

E p id e m ic , 2001

137

C o n c lu s io n : F o o t a n d M o u th D ise a se in B rita in , 1 8 3 9 -2 0 0 1 L essons L earn ed ?

146

References

152 186

In d e x

201

N otes

List o f plates (see p la te section)

1

2 3 4 5

6 7

8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15

16

G raph o f foot and m o u th disease incidence, 1 8 3 9 -2001 John G iblett, leaflet on the 1864 C attle Diseases Bill J B Sim onds G eorge Brown C o u n ty o f Linlithgow , Foot and M o u th Disease Bill, 1883 G roup o f Royal Irish C onstabulary at Swords, 1912 ‘M o u th in g ’ a suspected anim al, Ireland, 1912 D isinfecting before leaving an infected place, Ireland, 1912 D isinfecting before leaving, 2001 Sir Stew art Stockm an Policem an at the gate, 1938 T h e scene at S turm inster N ew ton, 1935 Research facility, Pirbright, circa 1924 Funeral pyre, Lower Dalby, Yorkshire, 1958 F M D d isruption, 1967 ‘Swill m ust be boiled’ M A FF education poster, 1960s

Acknowledgements

T h is book represents the fruits o f four years’ w ork, undertaken towards the degrees o f M Sc and P hD at the C entre for the H istory o f Science, T ech­ nology and M edicine (C H S T M ), M anchester University. I owe an imm ense d ebt o f gratitude to the m any people w ho helped m e to research and write it, and to keep body and soul together in the m eantim e. O n the academ ic side, I m u st th an k , above all, m y supervisor, Professor Jo h n Pickstone, w ith o u t w hom I w ould never have started or finished this project. M y colleagues at C H S T M have also provided precious help and encourage­ m ent. In addition, 1 am indebted to Pete A tkins, John Fisher, A nne Hardy, Peter Koolmees, Alison Kraft, D avid Sm ith and Keir W addington, whose related research greatly assisted m y w ork. Also to Brigitte N erlich and her colleagues w orking on foot and m o uth disease (F M D ) at the Institute for the S tu d y o f G e n etics an d B iorisk in Society (IG B iS) at N o ttin g h a m University. F urtherm ore, I m ust th an k those individuals and institutions th a t allow ed m e the o p p o rtu n ity to p resen t m y w ork at sem inars and conferences, and m em bers o f the audience for their questions and com m ents. M any people provided invaluable assistance as I followed the paper trail betw een different libraries and archives. I wish to express my gratitude to the staff o f the Public Records Office (the N ational Archives), the British Library, the Jo h n R ylands U niversity Library, M anchester, the H a ro ld C o h e n L ibrary at L iverpool U niversity a n d C h e sh ire R ecords O ffice, Chester. I located m any im p o rta n t docum ents and photographs thanks to Jon ath an Brown and his staff at the Rural H istory C entre, U niversity o f R ead in g a n d to D e b o ra h W alk er a n d F rances H o u s to n o f the Royal V eterinary College Library. Tom R oper o f the Royal College o f V eterinary Surgeons’ library was helpful and encouraging th ro u g h o u t, and I am very grateful to D r D o n a ld so n o f the In stitu te for A nim al H e a lth (IA H ), Pirbright, for allowing m e to access the institute’s archives. I w ould also like to th an k several retired veterinary surgeons for their help and assistance. First, H u b e rt Skinner, whose cataloguing o f the IAH archives facilitated m y research, and w ho gave generously o f his tim e to tell me o f his life and w o rk at th e in stitu te . S eco n d , I m u st th a n k M ary

Acknowledgements

ix

B rancker and Professor A lisdair Steele-B odger for relating th e ir first-hand experiences o f veterinary practice d u rin g the m id 2 0 th century. I am also in d eb te d to H o w ard Rees, w ho told m e o f his years in the State V eterinary Service, and to K eith M e ld ru m an d C h ris S h e rm b ru ck e r w ho p o in te d me in the directio n o f valuable d o c u m e n ts. Finally, I wish to th a n k all those people w ho shared th e ir experiences o f th e 1967 F M D ep id e m ic at the recent W ellcom e W itness Sem inar. T h e reappearance o f F M D in 2001 led to a flood o f m edia interest in m y w ork. Jo h n V idal o f the G uardian kindly com m issio n ed a piece on the h is to ry o f th e d isease, w h ile jo u rn a lis ts a t th e S u n d a y Tim es a n d th e Independent h elped to dissem inate m y findings. 1 w ish to th a n k L aw rence W oodw ard o f the Elm Farm Research C e n tre an d m em bers o f the N atio n al F o o t a n d M o u th G ro u p for th e ir e n c o u ra g e m e n t; also Ian H u n te r o f L ittoral A rts for involving m e in the ‘c u ltu re ’ o f F M D . I owe a d eb t to m any friends, w ho offered a c c o m m o d a tio n d u rin g m y treks to th e archives, plied m e w ith alcohol a n d re m in d ed m e th a t there were things in life o th e r th an F M D . In particular, I m u st th an k Ali, A nneli a n d D ave, T in a an d D a n , Jo an d Jam es, R ob an d R o n n ie, Faye, K aren, E sther and D u stin . I could n o t have survived w ith o u t the m oral su p p o rt o f m y M a n c h e ste r frien d s, A d ria n , H e le n , M a rio n , F rancis, Sarah and S im o n e , C a rs te n a n d A ya. N ic k a rriv e d o n th e sc e n e in g o o d tim e , a n d , to g e th e r w ith m y p a re n ts , p ro v id e d n e v e r-e n d in g s u p p o r t a n d e n co u rag em en t. I m u st th an k Phillip Jo h n sto n , form er headm aster o f Q u e en Elizabeth’s G ra m m a r School, B lackburn, for his energetic an d e nthusiastic reading o f m y m an u scrip t. Last, b u t n o t least, I wish to express m y g ra titu d e to the W ellcom e T rust for th eir generous a n d o n g o in g financial su p p o rt.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AHDI ARC BSE BT BVA COBRA COSALFA CVO DCVO D EFRA EU FM D EEC EU EU FM D FAO FM D FM DRC FM DRCCM FM D R C CP FO IAH IGBiS GDP IRA MAF M AFF M I5 MOD MOH MP

A nim al H ealth D ivision I (M AFF) A gricultural Research C ouncil bovine spongiform encephalopathy Board ofT rad e British V eterinary Association C abinet O ffice Briefing Room C om ision Sudam ericana para la Lucha C o n tra La Fiebre Aftosa C h ief Veterinary O fficer d eputy chief veterinary officer D e p artm en t o f the E nvironm ent, Food and Rural Affairs E uropean C om m ission on Foot and M ou th Disease E uropean E conom ic C o m m u n ity E uropean U nion E uropean C om m ission for the C on tro l o f Foot and M o u th Disease U nited N ations Food and A griculture O rganization foot and m o u th disease Foot and M ou th Disease Research C o m m ittee Foot and M o u th Disease Research C o m m ittee M eeting Foot and M o u th Disease Research C o m m ittee Paper Foreign Office Institute for A nim al H ealth Institute for the Study o f G enetics and Biorisk in Society gross dom estic pro d u ct Irish Republican A rm y M inistry o f A griculture and Fisheries M inistry o f A griculture, Fisheries and Food M inistry o f Intelligence M inistry o f Defence m edical officer o f health m em ber o f parliam ent

List o f Acronyms and Abbreviations

MRC N IM R NFU NVM A O IE Panaftosa PA H O RAS RCV S RVC RVO TB UN VLA WHO W TO

M edical Research C o u n c il N a tio n a l In stitu te for M edical Research N a tio n a l Farm ers’ U n io n N a tio n a l V eterinary M edical A ssociation O ffice In tern a tio n a le des E pizooties P an-A m erican F oot an d M o u th D isease Bureau Pan-A m erican H ealth O rg an izatio n Royal A gricultural Society Royal C ollege o f V eterinary Surgeons Royal V eterinary C ollege regional v eterinary officcr tuberculosis U n ited N a tio n s V eterinary L aboratories A gency W orld H ealth O rg a n iza tio n W orld T rade O rg a n iza tio n

One feels guilty insulting the dead, Walking on graves. B ut this pig D id not seem able to accuse. It was too dead (Ted Hughes, View o f a Pig, I960)

In tro d u c tio n

Just w h a t is foot an d m o u th disease (F M D )? S cientists say th a t it is a viral disease o f cloven-footed m am m als, w hich causes p ainful blisters to appear in m o u th s a n d on feet an d udders, an d leads to lam eness, d ro o lin g at the m o u th , a loss o f ap p etite a n d reduced m ilk p ro d u c tio n . T h e y explain th at, in the sh o rt term , m any diseased anim als will suffer. Som e, especially the w eak a n d th e young, will die, and even anim als recovering from the disease will show costly long-term reductions in grow th rates and m ilk p ro d u c tio n . T h ey also p o in t o u t th a t F M D is one o f the m ost contagious diseases know n to m an and can spread in alm ost every w ay im aginable. Farm ers view F M D from a very differen t perspective. T h e y say th a t it is o n e o f th e diseases th ey fear th e m o st. It sto p s th em fro m m o v in g livestock a ro u n d an d sending th em to m arket, restricts th eir social lives and leaves financial hard sh ip in its wake. An u n fo rtu n a te m in o rity can recall the day w h en , w ith a heavy h eart, they rang the vet to re p o rt suspicious sy m p to m s a m o n g th eir stock. T h ey tell o f th eir pain at seeing th eir anim als slaughtered, a lifetim e’s w ork destroyed; o f th e silence the next m o rn in g , an d k n o w ing th a t life w ould never be q u ite the sam e again. F or th e v e te rin a ry su rg e o n , F M D is n o t ju s t an y old disease, and infected anim als are n o t patien ts like any other. T h o se w ho w ork for the M in istry o f A griculture tell o f the e n o rm o u s pressure to c o n ta in F M D as q u ick ly as possible, a n d o f th e m an y difficu lties involved in trac in g its spread an d sta m p in g it o u t. T h ey recall how, at tim es o f crisis, they w orked h o u r after hour, day after day, d irecting the destru ctio n o f anim als that they had sp en t th eir careers try in g to save from d e ath and disease. A n d how, despite w orking to the best o f th eir abilities, they frequently faced a critical pu b lic and a hostile m edia. V eterinary surgeons in practice speak o f th eir feelings o f helplessness as farm ing clients see th eir anim als succum b to the disease, o f th e financial w orries b ro u g h t on by the loss o f w ork, and o f the anxiety th a t they m ig h t in ad v erten tly transfer the virus betw een farm s. From the v iew p o in t o f ag ric u ltu ra l policy-m akers, F M D presents a serious political p ro b lem . T h e y speak o f th e ir extensive efforts to secure B ritain’s b orders against the repeated invasions o f this m uch-feared plague,

XIV

^ M anufactured Plague?

a n d o f th e p o litic a l row s t h a t e n s u e d b o th a t h o m e a n d a b ro a d . T h e y e x p la in ju s t h o w d if f ic u lt it is to d e v ise m e a su re s to sa tisfy e v e ry o n e c o n c e rn e d , a n d c o m p la in a b o u t th e m an y criticism s th ey have faced in th e course o f th e ir w o rk . T h e se are n o t th e o n ly p eo p le to u c h e d by F M D . W e m u st n o t forget b u tc h e rs, a u c tio n e e rs, dealers, h a u lie rs, im p o rte rs a n d e x p o rte rs o f m ea t an d livestock, participants in the tourist trade, m em bers o f rural c o m m u n itie s an d jo u rn alists. All have th e ir ow n sad stories o f F M D , stories th a t vary over space an d tim e, a n d betw een regions, co u n tries, c o n tin e n ts a n d generations. T h is h isto ry relates th e ir experiences w ith F M D . A n d it e xplains w hy, over tim e , F M D cam e to m ea n w h a t it d id . F or h isto ry w as n o t inev itab le. F M D d id n o t have to b e co m e a feared disease. It d id n o t necessarily have to be c o n tro lle d , tim e a fte r tim e fo r over a c en tu ry , by iso latin g o r sla u g h t­ e rin g in fe c te d a n im a ls a n d re s tric tin g th e d o m e s tic a n d in te r n a tio n a l m o v e m e n ts o f m e a t a n d livestock. A n d scien tific e n q u iries in to th e disease c o u ld have b e en p u rs u e d u n d e r v ery d iffe re n t c irc u m s ta n c e s , w ith very d iffe re n t re su lts a n d p o lic y im p lic a tio n s . A lth o u g h F M D is a ‘n a tu r a l’ entity , w h ic h in d is p u ta b ly possesses c erta in b iological ch ara cte ristics, th e reason w h y it is so feared, an d th e reason w h y its a p p ea ran c e causes such d e v a sta tio n , is because o f th e m e th o d s used to c o n tro l it. T h o s e m e th o d s are m a n -m a d e . It is th e th o u g h ts an d a ctio n s o f h u m a n s th a t have ‘m a n u ­ fa c tu re d ’ F M D in to th e p a rtic u la r p o litica l, e c o n o m ic , social a n d p sy c h o ­ lo g ical p ro b le m th a t it is to d ay . H a d th o se th o u g h ts a n d a c tio n s b e en d iffere n t, th e n F M D m ig h t n ow pose a very d iffe re n t challenge. T h is b o o k sheds lig h t u p o n th e process by w h ich F M D was m a n u fa c t­ u re d . It reveals how , a t d iffe re n t tim e s a n d places, p eo p le have e x p erien c e d a n d u n d e rs to o d F M D , a n d w h y th ey re sp o n d e d to it in th e w ays th a t they did . It describes how policies w ere m ad e , a tta c k e d a n d d e fen d e d , a n d w h a t co n ce rn s sh a p e d scientific e n q u iries in to th e disease. T h r o u g h o u t, it show s th a t, h a d c irc u m sta n c e s been d iffere n t, a n d h a d th e voices o f so m e p eople carried m o re w e ig h t th a n o th ers, F M D c o u ld have b e co m e a very d iffere n t disease a n d h a d an im p a c t far rem o v ed from th a t o f today. S om e c o m m e n ta to rs w ill d o u b tle ss disagree w ith th is tale. T h e y will say th a t th e d a n g e rs o f F M D are se lf-e v id e n t a n d sc ien tific ally d e fin e d . T h e y w ill claim th a t o n ly th e d e lu d e d o r th e ig n o r a n t ever d is p u te d its sta tu s as o n e o f th e w o r ld ’s w o rs t a n im a l p lag u e s, b u t th a t, th a n k fu lly , e n lig h te n e d in d iv id u a ls m a n a g e d to o v e rc o m e th is in tr a n s ig e n c e a n d e d u c a te th e n a tio n as to its tr u e n a tu r e . T h e y w ill also a rg u e th a t th e c e n tu ry -o ld m e th o d s o f sla u g h te rin g in fec te d a n im a ls, re stric tin g livestock m o v e m e n ts an d lim itin g th e im p o rt o f goo d s from F M D -in fe c te d c o u n ­ tries re p re se n ted th e o n ly in te llig e n t resp o n se to th e disease. T o b a ck up th e ir c la im s , th e y w ill p o in t to th e h is to r ic su c c esses o f th is p o lic y in

Introduction

XV

keeping F M D o u t o f Britain an d in sta m p in g o u t the o utbreaks th a t did occur. T h ey will also h ig h lig h t the fact th a t all developed n a tio n s follow ed B ritain’s exam ple in a d o p tin g it. Ipso facto, it had to be. B ut history, w hen it is d o n e properly, does n o t judge its subjects on th e basis o f presen t-d ay p re co n c ep tio n s; rather, it asks how a n d why, at different tim es a n d places, people th o u g h t and acted in the m a n n e r th at they did. So let us suspend o u r m odern conceptions and go back to the year 1839, w hen F M D first ap peared in B ritain. W e will ask w h at F M D m ean t w h e n u n d e rsta n d in g s o f disease, th e sta te o f a g ric u ltu re , th e n a tu re o f scientific e n q u iry and the role o f g o v e rn m e n t were all very d ifferent from today. T h e n we will m ove forw ard in tim e, assessing how an d w hy reactions to F M D changed in relation to th e political, eco n o m ic, social, scientific a n d g eographic c o n te x t. A n d instead o f c o n c e n tra tin g on peo p le w hose o p in io n s directly shaped th e w o rld as it is today, we will ask how everyone u n d e rsto o d F M D a n d why. In th is m an n er, w e can restore to historical significance the voices o f o rd in ary people, and those w hose views deviated from the status quo. T h is a p p ro a c h w ill reveal a h isto ry b eset by controversy, in w h ich different parties, at h o m e a n d a b ro ad , repeatedly clashed over the n ature an d c o n tro l o f F M D . It will d e m o n stra te th a t c u rre n tly inco n tro v ertib le facts were once n o th in g o f the sort, and th a t ‘e n lig h ten e d ’ an d ‘ig n o ra n t’ individuals alike acted, at least partly, on th e basis o f self-interest. Above all, it will show th a t w hile th e U K g o v e rn m e n t’s lo n g -term a p p ro ach to F M D c o n tro l was by no m eans irratio n al, it was n o t the only or even the m o st obvious m e th o d o f tackling the disease, an d th a t it prevailed n o t by any obvious superiority, b u t because its su p p o rte rs w ielded considerably m ore political a n d econom ic pow er th an th eir critics. B ecause so m an y d iffe re n t p o litic a l, e c o n o m ic , c u ltu ra l a n d social factors coloured ideas a b o u t F M D , an d influenced reactions to the disease, the history o f F M D in Britain is the history o f Britain in m icrocosm . F M D helps to extend o u r know ledge o f agricu ltu re - for exam ple, by revealing th a t ‘m o d e rn ’ concerns a b o u t intensive farm in g a n d large-scale livestock m ovem ents are actually 150 years old. It provides insights in to the historic d e v e lo p m e n t o f the m ea t trad e, in te rn a tio n a l p o litical a n d co m m e rc ial re la tio n s , n o tio n s o f n a tio n a l id e n tity a n d fears o f g e rm w a rfa re . It illum inates the rise o f the v e terinary profession, chan g in g u n d erstan d in g s o f disease an d the d e v elo p m en t o f ‘m o d e rn ’ scientific ideas an d practices. F M D has, at d ifferent tim es, shaped B ritain’s relationship w ith Ireland and A rgentina. A nd th ro u g h its history, w e can learn how B ritish veterinarians, d o c to rs , c attle b re ed e rs, fa rm e rs, p o litic ia n s, sc ie n tists, a n d m e a t and livestock traders lived, w orked and related to each other.

XVI

^ M anufactured Plague?

W h a t follow s is a ro u g h ly c h ro n o lo g ic a l a c c o u n t, in w h ic h each ch ap ter describes a p a rticu la r th em e , event or controversy, from 1839 to the present day. It is b u ilt u p o n an extensive range o f previously u n ex am ­ in ed m ate ria l, m u ch o f it u n p u b lis h e d . Im p o rta n t sources in c lu d e th e N atio n al Archives at the Public Records O ffice, the archives o f the In stitu te for A nim al H e alth , P irb rig h t, records o f n a tio n a l farm ing organizations, H a n sa rd P arliam en tary debates, P arliam en tary papers, a n d n a tio n a l an d local press re p o rts . It is, a b o v e all, a h is to ry o f p o litic s , so c ie ty a n d know ledge. It does n o t detail the scientific discoveries in the field o f F M D research o r th e legislative responses to th e disease; these h isto rie s have already been w r itte n .1 A nd w hile m ore in fo rm a tio n u p o n the in te rn atio n al F M D situ atio n is desirable, it is, sadly, beyond the scope o f this book. As we all know , F M D re tu rn e d w ith a vengeance to B ritain in th e spring o f 2 0 0 1 . H isto ry was b ro u g h t to life, a n d the e nsuing e pidem ic was one o f the m o st devastating on record. It is still too early to evaluate th e lo n g ­ term im plicatio n s o f th a t event, especially as m an y o f the details will n o t com e to light for a n o th e r 30 years, w hen g o v e rn m e n t files are declassified. B ut it is possible to assess th e e x te n t to w h ich th e events o f 2001 w ere shaped by the past. T h is book will d o c u m e n t the sim ilarities and differences b etw ee n th a t a n d p re v io u s e p id e m ic s a n d ask w h e th e r, in th e lig h t o f history, th e official response to F M D was justified. For we are n o t, as th e A n d e rso n in q u iry in to th e 2001 e p id e m ic claim ed, ‘destined to repeat the m istakes o f history’. Lessons can an d should be learned. T h is acc o u n t is w ritte n in the hope th a t readers will take heed o f th e past an d use it to m ake sense o f recent events and to plan th eir future resp o n se to F M D . T h e n e x t tim e th e disease ap p ea rs - a n d th e re will inevitably be a next tim e - th ere will be no excuse for repeating the sam e c en tu ry -o ld m istakes.

Chapter 1

Foot and M ou th Disease in 19th-century Britain: From Everyday Ailm ent to Animal Plague

FMD

STRIKES

It was in A ugust 1839, the second year o f Q ueen V ictorias reign, that the ow ner o f a large Islington dairy herd noticed th a t six o f his cows were lim ping and had begun to drool. Perplexed by their illness, he did som e­ thing that at the tim e was rather unusual - he sum m oned the vet. M r H ill, veterinary surgeon, had learned his craft du rin g a short course o f study at the Royal V eterinary College (RVC) in L ondon. Like the vast m ajority o f his peers, he m ade a m odest living atten d in g to horses, and rarely visited sick cows, which were m ore usually treated by their owners or by lay healers know n as cow leeches. However, in the fiercely com petitive world o f anim al docto rin g , he was grateful for any form o f e m p lo y m en t and h urried to atten d the affected herd. A fter w eighing up the evidence, he decided that the cows had probably eaten a poisonous p lant while grazing at p a stu re.1 H e was soon proved w rong, however, as a flood o f press reports revealed that the same disease had appeared in Sm ithfield m arket and was spreading rapidly through N orfolk, Essex and Scotland, causing: a decline o f appetite, a drooping o f the ears, a drowsiness o f the eyes, a nd a grating o f the teeth. Then the tongue, nose a n d mouth become blistered, the h o o f separates fro m the skin, a violent dischargefrom the nostrils takes place, a powerful influenza seizes the anim al, a n d then comes a great fallin g o f f in the flesh?

2

A M anufactured Plague?

N o n e re m e m b e re d ever h av in g seen th is disease before. T h e y called it ‘m u rra in ’ (a g en eric term m e a n in g plag u e), ‘e p iz o o tic a p h th a ’ a n d ‘th e vesicu lar e p iz o o tic ’ (o r ‘tic ’ for s h o rt), an ‘e p iz o o tic ’ b e in g th e a n im al eq uivalent o f an epidem ic. Its m o st p o p u lar nam e, however, was th a t by w hich it is still kno w n today: 'foot an d m o u th disease’ (F M D ). R ep o rts o f F M D quickly a ttra c te d the a tte n tio n o f th e Royal A g ri­ cu ltu ral Society (RAS), a new o rganization for w ealthy landow ners in te r­ ested in a dvancing agriculture by th e ap p licatio n o f science.3 In the first system atic a tte m p t to find o u t a b o u t the new disease, it sent circulars to m e m b e rs, a sk in g th e m o f th e ir e x p erien c e s. It also c o n s u lte d C h a rle s Sewell, RVC p rincipal, a b o u t disease m an ag em en t. A su m m ary o f the 700 replies appeared in th e society’s jo u rn al. M o st c o rresp o n d en ts agreed th at F M D w as h ig h ly c o n ta g io u s, b u t n o te d th a t in fe c te d an im a ls q u ick ly recovered a n d lost only 5 p er c en t o f th eir value. D airy cattle, however, lost up to 30 per c en t in value because ‘udders su bsequently becam e inflam ed and tu m efied; an d abscesses were form ed, term in a tin g frequently in a total loss o f m ilk ’. A ccording to Sewell, sick anim als should be bled and purged. H e d e scrib ed how to m ake u p a n d a d m in iste r m ed ic in e s, how to treat m o u th and foot lesions, and recom m ended th a t farm ers isolate the diseased to p revent infection from sp read in g .4 H ow ever, m o st ignored his advice — som e because th ey believed F M D beneficial, in th a t an im als seem ed to u n dergo a grow th sp u rt on recovery, o thers because they felt th a t isolation o nly delayed th e inevitable spread o f infection an d th a t it was best to ‘get it over w ith ’. T h e y fed soft food to affected anim als an d dosed them w ith tr a d itio n a l fam ily m e d ic in e s a n d d re n c h e s m ad e w ith E p so m salts o r b ic a rb o n a te o f soda. T h o se th a t a p p ea red u n lik ely to recover they d is­ p a tc h ed to the b u tc h e r’s, w here m o st diseased m id 1 9 th -ce n tu ry livestock e n d ed th eir days.5 F M D c o n tin u e d to rage d u rin g 1841; b u t farm ers an d dealers to o k little n o tice a n d c o n tin u e d to m ove livestock a ro u n d a n d take th em to m arket. A ccording to veterinary surgeon G eorge B row n, infected cows an d pigs were displayed so frequently at S m ithficld m ark et th at floor sweepers filled baskets w ith their shed hooves. T ow ards the end o f the year, disease spread d im in ish e d a n d sy m p to m s b ecam e less severe; b u t F M D never disappeared com pletely, and d u rin g th e years 1845, 1 8 4 9 -1 8 5 2 , 1861 — 1863 a n d 1 8 6 5 -1 8 6 6 , waves o f disease w ashed across the n a tio n .6 W riting in 1 8 4 8 , liv esto ck o w n e r H a ll K eary c la im e d th a t F M D w as n o w ‘so universal th at, like the m easles o r w h o o p in g -c o u g h in the h u m a n subject, all cattle are expected to have it at least once in th eir lives’. T h e 1853 edition o f C la te r’s Cattle Doctor agreed, an d n o te d th a t th e disease had ‘scarcely spar[ed] a single parish’. '

Foot a n d M outh Disease in 19th-century B ritain

^

B ecause F M D w as so p re v a le n t, farm e rs b eg an to view it as an u n ­ a v o id a b le fa c t o f life .8 T h is a ttitu d e , w h e n v iew ed fro m a p re s e n t-d a y p e rs p e c tiv e , se e m s in c r e d ib le . W h y w e re th e y n o t c o n c e r n e d b y th e ra m p a n t sp re a d o f F M D a n d its d a m a g in g effects u p o n m e a t a n d m ilk p r o d u c tio n ? A n d w h y d id th e y n o t try to a v o id it, o r ask th e sta te fo r assistance? O n e p o p u la r e x p la n a tio n h olds th a t m id 1 9 th -c e n tu ry p a rtic i­ p a n ts in th e m e a t a n d livestock trad e w ere sim p ly u n in fo rm e d , a n d th a t o n c e th ey b e ca m e e d u c a te d as to th e tru e n a tu re o f F M D th e y w illingly a cc ep te d p ro p o sals for its legislative c o n tro l.9 T h is a rg u m e n t has appeal as it su g g e sts t h a t w e are far m o re in te llig e n t a n d p ro g re s siv e t h a n o u r forebears; b u t it is sim p ly n o t tru e. E arly V ic to rian responses to F M D w ere d iffe re n t fro m o u rs, b u t th e y w ere n o t irra tio n a l. J u d g e d in th e ir o w n c o n te x t, th ey m ad e very g o o d sense. M id 1 9 th -c e n tu ry farm ers w ere p ro b a b ly co rre c t to see F M D as a m ild a ilm e n t. It is n ow k n o w n th a t th e in fec tio n causes m o re serio u s sy m p to m s in h ig h ly b red a n d h ig h ly p ro d u c tiv e a n im a ls th a n in th e tra d itio n a l types o f sto c k th a t p o p u la te d m o st o f B rita in ’s farm s 1 50 years a g o .10 A lso, the e co n o m ic s o f a g ric u ltu re w ere very d iffe re n t back th e n . M o s t farm ers w ere far less c o n c e rn e d w ith p ro fit m a rg in s a n d p ro d u c tiv ity th a n th e ir later 2 0 th - a n d 2 1 s t-c e n tu ry c o u n te rp a rts , a n d k e p t c attle n o t to m ake m oney, b u t to p ro p u p th e m ix e d fa rm in g sy stem u n d e r w h ic h cow s p ro d u c e d d u n g to fertilize arable c ro p s a n d fed o ff h o m e -p ro d u c e d ro o ts an d grain . M oreover, as a cu rab le, tra n s ie n t a ilm e n t, F M D h a d little im p a c t in an age w h e n disease w as so p re v alen t th a t m o st livestock existed in a su b o p tim a l state o f h e a l t h ." As o n e c o m m e n ta to r n o ted : H e a lth ? W h a t does th a t m a tter to an a n im a l w hich has to live b u t a y ea r or tw o ? I g ra n t you th a t i t w o u ld d ie naturally before its tim e a n d th a t it is a race between the b u tch e r’s k n ife a n d the d a rt o f death; b u t the k n ife is q u icker on its p in s. 12 A lth o u g h ‘g e rm s’ in th e m o d e rn -d a y sense w ere scarcely k n o w n , m id 1 9 th c e n tu ry c o m m e n ta to rs h a d a so p h istic a te d u n d e rs ta n d in g o f disease. T h e y b lam e d m o st illnesses u p o n ‘m o rb id p o iso n s’ th a t g e n era te d sp o n ta n e o u sly a n d sp read by c o n ta g io n . T h e y believed th a t th e sy m p to m s o f disease a n d its c ap a city to sp re ad w ere in flu e n c e d by th e sta te o f th e a tm o sp h e re , the p resen ce o f d irt an d d a m p , a n d th e p a tie n t’s h e re d ita ry c o n s titu tio n a n d n u tr itio n a l o r e m o tio n a l s ta te .13 V e te rin a ria n s a n d fa rm e rs u n d e r s to o d F M D w ith in this m o d el. In as m u ch as it spread rapidly w ith in a n d betw een herds, it possessed a highly c o n ta g io u s n a tu re ; b u t w h e n it appeared in herds a n d flocks th a t had n o t re ce n tly m ixed w ith o th e r an im als, its g e n e ra tio n w as ‘s p o n ta n e o u s ’. T h e y felt th a t w h ile q u a ra n tin e -ty p e m ea su re s c o u ld

4

A M anufactured Plague?

lim it the spread o f c ontagious disease, it was m ore d ifficult to an ticip ate and p revent sp o n ta n eo u s disease generation; an d in the belief th a t F M D c ould n o t be avoided, they grew to accept its a p p ea ran c e.14 O n e question co m m o n ly asked was w here F M D had com e from . Later 1 9 th -ce n tu ry c o m m e n ta to rs blam ed the im p o rta tio n o f diseased livestock from th e C o n tin e n t, an e x p la n a tio n th a t is generally acc ep te d to d a y .15 H ow ever, at the tim e, it was n o t so credible because livestock im p o rts were officially b a n n ed u n til the m id 1840s, w hen the repeal o f the C o rn Laws o pen ed B ritish po rts to foreign agricultural pro d u ce a n d ushered in an era o f free trade. To m ost c o n te m p o ra ry observers, the appearance a n d spread o f F M D was th e d irec t result o f changes to a n im a l h u sb a n d ry a n d the livestock trade. M id 1 9 th -cen tu ry B ritain was in the throes o f the Industrial R evo lu tio n , and as rural in h a b ita n ts flooded in to the tow ns in search o f w ork, so the u rb a n d e m a n d for m eat rose. A n e tw o rk o f cattle dealers an d tra d e rs sp ra n g u p to su p p ly th is new m a rk e t. T h a n k s to railw ay a n d steam sh ip d e v elo p m en t a n d th e o p e n in g o f the p o rts, they w ere able to m ove large n u m b ers o f livestock q uicker and over far greater distances than ever b efo re. A n im als in tra n s it w ere packed to g e th e r closely in p o o rly ventilated trucks or holds and deprived o f food an d w ater. T h ese w ere the very c o n d itio n s believ ed re sp o n sib le fo r th e fo rm a tio n a n d sp re a d o f infection, so few were surprised to discover th a t anim als c o m m o n ly arrived at th eir d e stin a tio n s suffering from F M D . For th eir m ilk, city-dw ellers tu rn e d to u rb a n dairies. T h e ow ners o f these d irty a n d po o rly v e n tilated estab lish m en ts b o u g h t in new ly calved cattle from the c o u n try a n d fed th em on b rew er’s grains (an 'u n n a tu ra l fo o d ’) u n til th e ir m ilk d ried up an d they b ecam e b u tc h e rs’ m eat. F M D often p u t in an appearance at the dairies, w hich were w ell-know n ‘hotb ed s o f disease’. M eanw hile, agricultural practices were c hanging as n u m ero u s farm e rs s to p p e d fe ed in g th e ir a n im a ls grass o r hay d u rin g th e w in ter, in stea d usin g a rtificial feeds m ad e of lin seed , rapeseed or c o tto n seed. C ritics believed th at this type o f fodder increased the b o d y ’s susceptibility to diseases in general, and F M D in p a rticu la r.16 As for c o n tro llin g F M D , few m id 1 9 th -ce n tu ry B ritish farm ers w ould have e x p e c te d o r w e lc o m e d s ta te in te rv e n tio n . W h ile , to d ay , c e n tra l go v ern m en t governs m any different aspects o f anim al and h u m a n health, d u rin g th e 18th and early 19th centuries it was m ostly co n cern ed w ith tax c o lle c tio n a n d n a tio n a l d e fe n c e , a n d le ft o th e r in itia tiv e s to p riv a te individuals, charities or local authorities. O n ly d u rin g m ajo r epidem ics did it intervene, an d th en only to enforce q u a ran tin e , a m easure first applied d u rin g the 1 6 th -c e n tu ry plague epidem ics; ships arriving from plague- or yellow fever-infected p o rts w ere also ro u tin e ly isolated. Q u a ra n tin e was extrem ely u n p o p u la r because it halted trad e an d p revented p eople from

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

^

fleeing disease.17 T h e Privy C o u n cil m eted o u t sim ilar trea tm e n t to anim als suffering from rin d erp e st o r cattle plague, an extrem ely fatal an d highly contag io u s a ilm en t th a t appeared in B ritain in 1 7 1 4 -1 7 1 5 , 1 7 4 5 -1 7 5 8 , 1769, 1774 an d 1781. It b a n n e d livestock m ovem ents, required farm ers to isolate sick cattle and offered co m p e n sa tio n if they slaughtered diseased stock. L ivestock ow ners resisted a n d evaded these m easures, an d local ju st­ ices o f th e peace w ho sy m p ath ized w ith th e ir plig h t rarely a tte m p te d to enforce th e law. N evertheless, cattle plague eventually disappeared a n d did n o t re tu rn for alm ost a c e n tu ry .18 C e n tra l g o v e rn m e n ts interest in p u b lic h ealth grew d u rin g the m id 1 9 th -c e n tu ry as in d u stria liz atio n gave rise to th e trem e n d o u s social and e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro b le m s so v iv id ly d e p ic te d by th e n o v e lists C h a rle s D ic k en s a n d E liz ab e th G askell, a n d the social c o m m e n ta to r F red erick Engels in his 1844 b o o k The Condition o f the Working-class in England. T h e p o p u latio n o f E ngland a n d W ales grew from 9 to 18 m illion betw een 1801 an d 1850, a n d as tow ns grew ever d irtie r an d m ore crow ded, pau p ers died in th eir th o u san d s from disease and dep riv atio n . P arliam en t responded to th e grow ing crisis by passing new' p u b lic h ealth legislation; b u t in accord­ ance w ith the political ideology o f th e day - w hich em phasized state n o n ­ in te rv en tio n (know n as laissez-faire) an d self-help - m o st new laws were perm issive an d m erely enab led th e local a u th o ritie s to in tro d u c e a p p ro ­ priate m easures if they so w ished. A t a b o u t the sam e tim e, resistance to q u a ra n tin e grew, partly because it c urtailed individual liberty (an a ttrib u te th a t m an y saw as a natural right o f all British subjects), an d partly because it was seen to fail du rin g the 1832 an d 1848 B ritish cholera epidem ics. T h e cholera experience c o n trib u te d to a grow ing feeling a m o n g d o c to rs th a t th e sp o n ta n e o u s g e n era tio n o f disease was m ore im p o rta n t th an they had once th o u g h t. C onseq u en tly , q u a ran tin e - a m easure th a t co u ld only help to co n tro l contagious diseases - ceased to m ake sense. A n o th e r reason w hy its p o p u larity nose-dived was th a t th e q u a ra n tin in g o f ships c o n trav en ed free trade, a policy th a t grew to virtually c o n stitu tio n a l status on a cco u n t o f the trem en d o u s grow th in th e British e conom y th a t follow ed its m id 1 9 th -ce n tu ry in s titu tio n .19 At tim es like these, few B ritish farm ers w o u ld have w an ted or dared to suggest th a t the g o v e rn m e n t co n tro l F M D in the sam e m an n e r as plague, cholera or cattle plague. H ow ever, m in o r legislative F M D controls crep t in by default in 1848 as a result o f g o v e rn m e n t efforts to c o n tro l sheep-pox, a contag io u s and highly fatal disease th a t had been im p o rte d w ith Spanish sheep th e year before. Sheep-pox was believed to be a fittin g subject for legislative c ontrol because o f th e p re c e d e n t set by its h u m a n eq u iv alen t, sm all-pox. U sing an e ig h t-y e a r-o ld b o y as an e x p e rim e n ta l su b je c t, E d w a rd J e n n e r had

A M anufactured Plague?

d e m o n stra ted in 1796 th a t inocu latio n w ith the cow -pox virus p ro tected h u m a n s from sm all-pox infection. T h e practice soon to o k off. Acts passed in 1 8 4 0 -1 8 4 1 m ade free vaccination universally available, an d in 1853 it becam e com p u lso ry for all in fan ts.20 T h e success o f this m e th o d - w hich was n o t w ith o u t its critics - m e a n t th a t w h en the previously u n k n o w n sh e e p -p o x a p p e a re d in 1 8 4 7 , in o c u la tio n w as o n e o f th e first c o n tro l m eth o d s investigated by veterinary surgeon J B Sim onds, h o ld er o f a new R A S-sponsored chair in cattle pathology at the RVC. S im onds believed that s h e e p -p o x w as, like its h u m a n e q u iv a le n t, in c a p a b le o f s p o n ta n e o u s g eneration a n d , hence, controllable by q u a ran tin e . H e w e n t on to advise the go v ern m en t on the passage o f tw o Acts to lim it th e im p o rta tio n and m o v em e n t o f in fected sheep.'11 In su b se q u e n t years th e w o rd in g o f this legislation gave rise to som e confusion: did it apply on ly to sheep-pox, or to o th e r c o n ta g io u s a n im a l diseases su ch as F M D a n d b o v in e p le u ro ­ p n e u m o n ia (another new disease w hich first appeared in 1842)? In practice, o n e A ct, w h ic h p re v e n te d th e m o v e m e n t a n d sale o f in fe c te d a n im a ls w ith in B rita in , w as a p p lie d o n ly to sh e e p -p o x . T h e o th e r A ct, w h ic h p rovided for the inspection o f livestock im p o rts, was applied to a range o f diseases so th a t w h e n c u sto m s in sp e cto rs discovered a single im p o rte d anim al suffering from F M D they w o u ld ord er th e im m ed iate slaughter o f the entire cargo, m uch to the chagrin o f livestock im p o rte rs.22

Jo

hn

Gamgee

and

t h e d ise a se d

MEAT PROBLEM It was n o t u n til the 1860s, alm ost 30 years after F M D first ap peared in B ritain, th a t a h an d fu l o f individuals began to argue against th e p o p u lar b elief th a t it was a m ild an d uncon tro llab le disease. C h ie f am o n g th em was J o h n G a m g cc ( 1 8 3 0 - 1 8 9 4 ) , a c h a rism a tic , a m b itio u s a n d o u ts p o k e n v ete rin a ry su rg eo n , w ho declared F M D an extrem ely costly a n d serious p roblem th a t was in need o f a legislative so lu tio n . T h e son o f a prosperous Florentine horse d o ctor and bro th er o f tw o w ell-know n doctors, A rth u r and Joseph, Jo h n G am gee belonged to a h ig h er social class th an m o st v e te rin ­ arians. H e had also received a b e tte r ed u ca tio n , having to u red veterinary schools on the C o n tin e n t, w here training was m ore scientific and veterinary surgeons were held in h igher regard th a n in B ritain. In 1856 he to o k u p a p o st at th e E d in b u rg h v e te rin a ry sc h o o l, b u t q u ick ly fell o u t w ith his e m p lo y er, th e a g in g P ro fesso r D ic k , a n d left to e stab lish a rival ‘N ew E d in b u rg h V eterinary College’, w hich boasted a C ontinental-style veterinary e d u catio n .23

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

'J

D u rin g the late 1850s an d early 1860s, G am gee and his b ro th er Joseph waged a private w ar against the sale o f diseased m eat. A t th a t tim e, there was rising concern over the d eteriorating quality o f food, especially the food o f the u rb a n w o rking classes, w hich was co m m o n ly a d u lte ra ted by greedy shopkeepers. Like m o st o th e r trades, the buying, selling an d h a n d lin g o f food was unregulated; b u t w ith the developm ent o f new chem ical analytical tech n iq u es, it becam e possible to d e te ct a d u lte ra tio n , an d the pu b lish ed results o f several investigations resulted in w idespread d em a n d s for official a c tio n .24 O n e o f th e m o st in flu e n tia l in q u irie s w as c arried o u t by th e A nalytical S anitary C o m m issio n , set up in 1850 by T h o m a s W akley, e d ito r o f the m edical jo u rn a l th e Lancet. For several years he a n d his m edical colleagues collected sam ples o f food and subjected them to m icroscopic and c h e m ic a l a n aly sis. T h e L a n c e t p u b lis h e d th e n a m e s a n d a d d resses o f o ffe n d in g retailers, a m o n g th e m sh o p k e e p e rs w h o h a d sold m ilk c o n ­ tam in ated w'ith sheep’s brains or coffee a d u lte ra ted w ith earth a n d chicory. It also pressed for legislative a c tio n o n th e g ro u n d s th a t a d u lte ra tio n a m o u n te d to fraud an d th reaten ed the p u b lic ’s health. T h e g o v e rn m e n t’s 1 8 5 5 - 1 8 5 6 S elect C o m m itte e o n F ood A d u lte ra tio n in v estig a te d th e n a tu re an d scope o f the p ro b le m , an d new legislation soon follow ed in 1860. T h is m ad e it illegal to k n o w in g ly sell a d u lte ra te d food, a n d p e r­ m itte d local a u th o ritie s to a p p o in t pu b lic analysts to check sam ples. Few did so; b u t the Act, nevertheless, helped to reduce the scale o f the pro b lem .25 T h e 1860 Act did n o t directly address the sale o f diseased m eat, despite w itnesses’ co m p la in ts a b o u t th e trade in: slin ke d beef. . .a class o f m ea t o b ta in ed fro m cows w hich are diseased a n d u n fit fo r h u m a n food. The anim als are subject to various diseases. Some are called ticked [they have the epizootic F M D ]; some have the m ilk fever; some have worm i'th tail; some are gaped; others are broken-up old cows}b S om e c o n tro ls already existed u n d e r th e 1855 N u isan ces R em oval A ct, w hich p e rm itte d local a u th o rity inspectors to en te r prem ises, inspect m eat an d seize any th a t proved u n fit for h u m a n c o n su m p tio n .2 U n fortunately, such m easures were po o rly enforced. M o st inspectors w ere bu tch ers w ho refused to re p o rt their erring colleagues, and farm ers open ly a d m itte d th at they could n o t m ake a living w ith o u t selling diseased and even dead anim als for h u m a n c o n su m p tio n .28 In 1857 Jo h n S im o n , p resid en t o f the M edical D e p a rtm e n t o f the Privy C ouncil, com m issioned D r E H eadlam G reenhow , lecturer on public health at St T h o m a s’s H ospital in L ondon, to rep o rt upon livestock disease, the sale o f diseased m eat and the effects o f its c o n su m p tio n u p o n h u m a n h e alth .29 A t a b o u t the sam e tim e, the G am gee bro th ers began

g

A M anufactured Plague?

to visit E d in b u rg h dairies, m ark ets a n d sla u g h te rh o u se s. In a stream o f letters to p ro m in e n t politicians and to the national, local an d m edical press, they described the h o rro rs o f the diseased m eat trade an d issued d em an d s for its leg islativ e re fo rm . J o h n G a m g e e also p re s e n te d S im o n w ith a volum inous rep o rt on the m atter, in w hich he argued th at a third o f all m eat sold was dam ag in g to the p u b lic ’s h e a lth .'0 M an y livestock ow ners, dealers an d b u tch ers were d o w n rig h t hostile to G am gee’s claim s, an d regarded him as an irrita tin g nuisance w ho had no right to interfere w ith their (largely legitim ate) business practices. Public health d o ctors w ere m ore enthusiastic, a n d several voiced su p p o rt for his cam p aig n , th o u g h n o t the in flu e n tia l Jo h n S im o n , w ho arg u ed th a t as h u m a n h e a lth h a d n o t m a rk e d ly d e te r io r a te d o f late , d ise ased m e a t co n su m p tio n could n eith er be as prevalent n o r as dangerous as G am gee had alleged.31 Som e historians regard G am gee as a hero, an enlightened and far­ sighted m an w ho sadly failed to stir an ig n o ran t a n d in tran sig en t establish­ m e n t.32 B ut alth o u g h , in later years, m an y o f G am gee’s re co m m e n d a tio n s w ere im p le m e n te d ,33 th ere w ere m an y goo d reasons w hy his c am p aig n in itially failed. T h e sale o f diseased m ea t was o n ly o n e o f a n u m b e r o f pressing p u b lic h ealth issues, and in c o n tra st to food a d u lte ra tio n , there w ere no a c c e p te d m e th o d s o f p ro v in g th a t m e a t w as u n fit for h u m a n c o n s u m p tio n . T h e laissez-faire sta te fro w n e d u p o n u n n e c e ssa ry tra d e regu lation; a n d , at a tim e w hen v eterinary surgeons had little status in the eyes o f th e p u b lic , G a m g e e ’s o p in io n s c arried little w e ig h t w ith in th e political sphere. U n p e rtu rb e d , G am gee tried to achieve his goal by d ifferen t m eans. Instead o f d e m a n d in g d irect restrictions u p o n the sale o f diseased m eat, he tried to stop livestock from becom ing sick in the first place by cam paigning for new m easu res to p re v e n t c o n ta g io u s a n im a l disease sp re ad . U sin g statistics provided by b a n k ru p t livestock insurance com panies an d E d in ­ bu rg h d airy m en , he calculated th a t livestock disease cost the n a tio n U K £8 m illio n a n n u ally , a n d d e d u c e d th a t because F M D caused a lo n g -te rm re d u ctio n in m ea t a n d m ilk p ro d u c tio n , its associated losses o utw eighed those caused by any o th er disease. H e argued th a t F M D , along w ith several o th e r contagious anim al diseases such as p leu ro -p n e u m o n ia , arose n o t by sp o n ta n e o u s g e n e ra tio n b u t by im p o rta tio n , a n d sp read by c o n ta g io n alone. T h e y c o u ld easily be p re v e n te d if, u n d e r v e te rin a ry su p e rv isio n , affected anim als were slaughtered an d livestock im p o rts reg u lated .34 G am gee tried to persuade his fellow v eterinary surgeons to back these proposals. H e told them to go o u t a n d ed ucate ig n o ran t form ers an d the state a b o u t disease c o n tro l, and prom ised th a t professional benefits w ould follow, as on the C o n tin e n t w here state-em ployed veterinarians had risen in term s o f in co m e an d social sta tu s.35 U n fo rtu n ately , he m et w ith little

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

C)

success. M ost v eterinarians disagreed w ith his u n d e rstan d in g o f disease, and because th eir train in g exten d ed only to horse d o c to rin g , they knew far less a b o u t cow s th a n m o st farm ers. A lso, G a m g ee was n o t p o p u la r in th e p ro fe ssio n .36 H e was b o m b a s tic , b o a stfu l, a n d clashed re p ea te d ly w ith B ritain’s leading veterinary expert on livestock disease, J B Sim onds, w hom he regarded as an ignoram us. O n on e occasion he w en t so far as to dig up so m e d e a d sh eep to pro v e th a t S im o n d s ’s d isease d ia g n o sis h a d b een in correct; b u t he failed to dislodge or d iscredit his o p p o n e n t, an austere m an w ho refused to rise to the b a it.3/ G am gee was rath er m ore successful in d ru m m in g up th e su p p o rt o f leading agriculturalists. Several were a ttrac ted by his claim th a t they w ould benefit financially from anim al disease con tro l. T h e y also c o n cu rred w ith his p o rtra y a l o f F M D as a severe disease re q u irin g legislative c o n tro l. C o m p are d to the c o m m o n stock, th eir w ell-m ain tain ed herds o f valuable, highly bred pedigree cattle suffered severely from F M D , and the occasional fatalities a n d delays in breeding th a t it caused proved extrem ely costly. Also, because th eir standards o f h u sb a n d ry w ere high, they sensed aspects o f the disease w hich o rd in ary farm ers did n o t, n o tab ly its lo n g -term effects upo n m eat and m ilk p ro d u c tio n . In 1863, RAS m em b e r E dw ard H o llan d M P in tro d u c e d a p riv ate m e m b e rs’ bill based u p o n G a m g e e ’s pro p o sals for livestock disease c o n tro l, b u t w ith d rew it on learning th a t the go v ern m en t was p lan n in g its ow n legislation.38 T h e follow ing year, P arliam en t sat to consider a new C a ttle Diseases Prevention Bill. T h is proposed m easures for th e c o n tro l o f F M D , p le u ro -p n e u m o n ia , glanders (a rare b u t fatal horse disease th a t c ould spread to hum ans) and cattle plague (w hich raged on the C o n tin e n t b u t was n o t presen t in B ritain ), to be executed by v eterinary inspectors a p p o in te d by local a u th o ritie s.39 U n fo rtu n a te ly for G am gee, m any p a rticip a n ts in the m eat an d live­ stock trade vehem ently o pposed the g o v e rn m e n t’s bill an d fought long and hard to defeat it (see Plate 2). Its proposed restrictions u p o n the m ovem ent o f diseased stock th reaten ed th eir businesses, an d they w ere outraged at the in c lu sio n o f F M D , w h ic h they th o u g h t a h a rm less a n d u n p re v c n ta b le illness. For veterinary advice they tu rn e d to S im onds, w ho m ade no secret o f his o p p o s itio n to G a m g e e ’s p ro p o sa ls. T h e y h e ld p u b lic m e e tin g s c o n d e m n in g the bill, advertised its faults in the fa rm in g press a n d sent skilled w itnesses to give evidence before a g o v ern m en t select c o m m itte e .40 Feelings ran high, and a t on e c o m m itte e session ‘th e Professor had rath er a b u sy tim e o f it w h e n e v e r th e ro o m w as c le a re d , as th e o p p o s itio n m ustered stro n g a n d (two o f th em at first n o t in the m ost civil way) m ade a succession o f little ru n s at him ’.41 L ong before its hearings were com plete, th e c o m m itte e decided to strike F M D from the bill. S h o rtly afterw ards, Jo h n H a ll M axw ell, se c re tary o f th e in flu e n tia l H ig h la n d A g ric u ltu ra l

]Q

A Manufactured Plague?

Society, rounded up the E dinburgh dairy m en w hom G am gee had nam ed as sources for his statistics and persuaded them to sign a disclaim er stating th at they had supplied no such inform ation. T his spelt the end for Gam gee, as the Illustrated London News reported: As the inquiry proceeds, it seems to be more a nd more evident that the very persons whose interests it is the avow ed object o f the legislature to protect are really those most opposed to the bill. They w ant to be left to conduct their own business, a t their own risk, w ithout any such official dry-nursing, a n d they regard the great arm y o f locusts which w ould overrun the land in the shape o f inspectors as an utter nuisance a n d delusion. They contend that the whole question has been blown into the most undue dim en­ sions, a n d that it has collapsed into nothing now that evidence has been heard in reply... The Evil, as fa r as it exists, seems to them to be self-preventative. M en dare not, fo r fea r o f the future consequences to their business, bring beasts a n d sheep to market when their diseased condition is patent. . .they consider that an arm y o f inspectors, such as Professor Gamgee m ight propose to educate, would be physically powerless a t Falkirk a n d Ballinasloe [fairs], a n d practically powerless fo r anything b u t annoyance in a smaller sphere o f action}1 O n the advice o f the select com m ittee, the governm ent w ithdrew its bill. C elebrating o pponents claim ed that the whole affair had ‘tau g h t the good old E nglish lesson th a t in d iv id u a l effo rt was b e tte r th an g o v e rn m e n t assistance’.43 But as we shall see, the m eat and livestock trade did n o t long escape the threat o f state interference.

T

h e cattle plag ue e p id e m ic ,

1865-1867

Britain in the year 1865 suffered from two devastating disease epidem ics. T h e first was cholera, w hich appeared in Septem ber and killed 15,000 people before disappearing a year later. T h e second was rinderpest or cattle plague, a highly fatal and contagious disease that rem ained in Britain for over two years and caused the deaths o f at least 420,000 cows, or 7 per cent o f the national herd. A century had passed since Britain last experienced th e c attle plag u e, an d the q u a ra n tin e -b a se d m easures th a t had once controlled it were long forgotten. As British farm ers, veterinary surgeons and officials w restled anew w ith th e disease, im p o rta n t differences o f opinion em erged. G am gee and Sim onds both knew th at it had raged for

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

] ]

som e years on th e C o n tin e n t a n d d educed th a t it m u st have been carried in to B rita in by in fe c te d liv e sto c k im p o rts . T h e y also k n e w t h a t th e C o n tin e n ta l search for a scientific cure o r preventative had failed, an d th a t the only practicable m e th o d o f c o n tro llin g disease spread was to restrict livestock m ovem ents an d slau g h ter cattle exposed to infection. How ever, a lm o st e v ery o n e else believed th a t b o th c attle plag u e a n d c h o le ra had g e n e ra te d sp o n ta n e o u s ly as a result o f a tm o sp h e ric a n d e n v iro n m e n ta l influences, an d th o u g h t G am gee’s a n d S im o n d s’s proposals o b jectionable an d unw orkable. At first, the g o v e rn m e n t tried to co n tro l cattle plague using the 1848 Sheep-pox Act. It asked local a u th o ritie s to a p p o in t v eterinary inspectors w h o sh o u ld m o n ito r cattle m arkets for the presence o f disease, restrict the m ovem ents o f infected anim als a n d slaughter them w here necessary. T h ey also gathered statistics o f disease incidence a n d forw arded th em to a new ly established, tem p o rary State V eterinary D e p a rtm e n t, headed by S im onds, w ith G eorge B row n, form erly professor o f v eterinary science at the Royal A gricultural C ollege, as d e p u ty (see Plates 3 and 4). T hese m easures failed to check the spread o f disease, an d as cattle died in th eir th o u sa n d s, panic spread across the n a tio n . A Royal C o m m issio n re p o rtin g in 1866 echoed S im o n d s’s a n d G am gee’s reco m m e n d a tio n s, an d ordered m edical scientists to p u rsu e sc ie n tific in v e stig a tio n s. W h e n th ey failed to fin d a c u re o r vaccine, th e g o v e rn m e n t step p ed in. R eluctantly, it passed new legislation th a t led to the slaughter o f all infected anim als an d th eir contacts. Railway tran sit was sto p p ed , fairs a n d m arkets closed, a n d all livestock im p o rts w ere s la u g h te re d on d is e m b a r k a tio n . A m a rk e d d ro p in disease in c id e n c e follow ed, a lthough it was som e m o n th s before the plague disappeared from B ritain. T h e cattle plague epidem ic was a trem en d o u sly significant event th at b ro u g h t a b o u t m ajor shifts in the u n d e rsta n d in g o f livestock diseases, an d led to the in tro d u c tio n o f a d m in istrativ e m ac h in ery a n d disease c o n tro l m eth o d s th a t still exist today. It cam e as an e n o rm o u s shock to participants in th e m eat an d livestock trade, w ho had h ith e rto view ed anim al disease as a m anageable occu p atio n al hazard, an d its eventual e lim in a tio n forced them to accept G am gee’s an d S im onds’s claim s th at it had arisen by im p o rt­ atio n , spread by c o n ta g io n , an d should be subject to legislative c o n tro l.44 L ooking back, there was a n o th e r reason for c o n te m p la tio n . It seem ed th at the new co n tro l m easures had n o t only w orked against cattle plague; they had also reduced the spread o f F M D a n d p leu ro -p n e u m o n ia . T h is finding suggested th at, in co n tra st to previous o p in io n , the latter tw o diseases also spread m ostly by c o ntagion, arose rarely if at all by sp ontaneous generation, an d could be co n tro lled by legislative m eans.45 H ow ever, the cattle plague experience d id little to shake th e p o p u la r b e lie f th a t F M D w as a m ild ,

]2

A M anufactured Plague?

tra n s ie n t in fec tio n . C o n se q u e n tly , a lth o u g h th e g o v e rn m e n t d e cid ed to include F M D (and p leu ro -p n e u m o n ia ) in its 1869 C o n tag io u s Diseases o f A nim als Bill, it laid dow n far m ore lenient controls for F M D than for cattle plague: ow ners were n o t required to notify the authorities o f the appearance o f F M D ; inspectors had no right o f e ntry o nto private property; and infected anim als were n o t slaughtered b u t isolated, a n d b a n n ed from m arkets an d fairs.46 P arliam ent accepted these proposals an d the bill becam e law. As a result, th e ‘te m p o ra ry ’ State V eterinary D e p a rtm e n t gained new areas o f responsibility a n d becam e a p e rm a n e n t body. It still exists today. U nfortunately, the new' Act had virtually no im pact upo n the extension o f a new F M D epidem ic, w hich em erged d u rin g the a u tu m n a n d w in ter o f 1869. Legislators th en faced a difficult decision. S hould they allow F M D co n tro l to pass back in to the hands o f the farm er? O r sh o u ld they m ake a fu rth er a tte m p t to contain th e disease, this tim e using stricter, m ore w ideranging regulations?47 N o n e could agree. For th e next 15 years, th e issue was debated repeatedly in Parliam ent, at veterinary, farm ing and trade associ­ atio n m eetings, and by three g o v e rn m e n t select co m m ittees o f inquiry, b u t to no avail. T h e cause o f F M D , th e sy m p to m s it p ro d u c ed , and the m eans by w hich it spread rem ained m o o t p oints; consequently, there could be no consensus u p o n the type an d stringency o f m easures needed to co n tro l it. D ivisions o f o p in io n h a d n ’t m attered before, w hen it was up to th e farm er to decide w hat, if anything, to do a b o u t the disease; b u t now the stakes were raised as legislation th re a te n e d to im p a c t u p o n th e personal an d profes­ sional interests o f veterinarians, politicians, farm ers an d p a rticip a n ts in the m eat and livestock trade. Factions form ed betw een an d w ith in these groups as individuals fo u g h t for a personally advantageous so lu tio n to F M D th a t seem ed sensible in the lig h t o f th e ir private disease experiences. C o n se ­ quently, F M D co n tro l becam e a highly political an d em otive issue. P ro m in e n t in these debates were S im o n d s - now the acknow ledged leader o f the British veterinary profession - an d G am gee, w ho becam e an increasingly m arginal figure as tim e passed. T h e ir disagreem ents c o n tin u e d well in to the 1870s, an d th eir c o n tra d ic to ry views o f F M D shaped p ublic o p in io n . G am gee c o n tin u e d to tell veterinary m eetings, farm in g clubs an d g o v ern m en t select co m m ittees th a t F M D was an extrem ely serious disease th a t e n tered the n a tio n by im p o rta tio n a n d w o u ld die a n a tu ra l d e ath if the livestock im p o rt trade was h alted for several m o n th s. Ever inventive, he tried to discover a tec h n iq u e for preserving dead m eat in the h o p e th a t dead m eat im p o rts could replace th e disease-ridden live anim al trade. H is view s w ere tak en up by a g ro u p o f a risto cratic ag ricu ltu ralists, pedigree cattle breeders and Tory M Ps, w ho were keen to secure a prosperous future for rural B ritain and to guard the health o f th eir ow n anim als, w h ich , as m e n tio n e d earlier, suffered severe F M D sym ptom s. B ut alth o u g h several

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

13

o f his proposals eventually gained legislative expression, G am gee received little credit an d died a fru strated m an in 1894. S im onds, w ho rem ained head o f th e veterinary d e p a rtm e n t u n til his 1872 a p p o in tm e n t as RV C p rin cip al, a n d B row n, w h o succeeded h im , m ain tain ed th a t F M D was n o t a d angerous disease an d th a t w ide-ranging co n tro l m easures were in ap p ro p riate. W h ile acknow ledging th a t F M D was occasionally im p o rte d from ab ro ad , they b lam ed the d o m estic livestock trad e for m o st cases o f disease spread, a n d reco m m e n d e d th a t instead o f h a ltin g im p o rts, the g o v e rn m e n t sh o u ld em ploy veterinary inspectors to d etect an d isolate infected B ritish livestock. N aturally, such proposals were p o p u la r a m o n g struggling v e terinary surgeons. T h e y were also ad o p te d by L iberal a n d u rb a n m em b e rs o f p a rlia m e n t (M P s), w ho o p p o se d im p o rt c o n tro ls p a rtly because they v iolated free trad e, an d p a rtly because they w ould restrict the m eat supply, thereby reversing th e recent trend tow ards cheaper m eat an d placing it o u t o f reach o f the w o rking classes. Like m ost m em bers o f the V ictorian u p p e r classes, these politicians w ere h a u n te d by th e spectre o f w orking-class revolt, an d th ey feared th a t the p o o r - w ho w a n te d to e at m o re m e a t - w o u ld grew restiv e if its p ric e in cre a se d . M oreover, a ccording to the new science o f n u tritio n , m eat c o n su m p tio n was essential to m uscle grow th a n d energy levels. If w orkers failed to eat eno u g h , th eir prod u ctiv ity levels - an d capitalists’ profits - w ould flounder. Im p o rt restriction c o u ld n o t, therefore, be p e rm itte d . T ory agriculturalists c o u n te red such objections by claim ing th a t dead m eat im p o rts could easily replace th e live trad e, a n d th a t freedom from F M D w o u ld increase the p ro d u c tiv ity o f B ritish livestock a n d give farm ers th e c o n fid e n c e they need ed to b re ed m ore anim als. T h e ir L iberal o p p o n e n ts w ere n o t c o n ­ v in ce d by th is in te rp re ta tio n o f th e laws o f su p p ly a n d d e m a n d , a n d accused them o f seeking higher prices for their ow n livestock at the expense o f th e urban poor. P articipants in the m eat an d livestock trade were also divided over w hat to d o a b o u t F M D , a n d fo r g o o d reaso n . S o m e liv esto ck o w n e rs w ere p articularly p ro n e to the effects o f F M D , eith er because they ow ned dairy a n d b re e d in g sto c k - w h ic h su ffered especially serious sy m p to m s - or because th e ir businesses relied u p o n th e p u rc h a se o f new a n im a ls th a t fre q u e n tly in tro d u c e d in fe c tio n in to th e ir flocks a n d herds. T h e y w ere keener to get rid o f F M D th an dealers - w ho could quickly offload infected anim als - and farm ers w ho bred th eir ow n replacem ents, or engaged in the rearing a n d fa tten in g o f livestock. H ow ever, m o st parties were prepared to s u p p o r t leg islativ e m ea su re s as lo n g as th e y p o se d n o th re a t to th e ir b u sin e sse s. T h o s e in v o lv e d in th e d o m e s tic liv e sto c k tra d e n a tu ra lly expressed a p re fe re n c e fo r im p o r t c o n tro ls , w h ile p a r tic ip a n ts in th e overseas an d im p o rt trade argued th e case for d om estic trad e restrictions.48

14

A M anufactured Plague?

FMD

BE C O M E S A PLAGUE

S urprisingly, o u t o f th is sto rm o f co n tro v ersy , p o litica l, p ro fessio n al an d p o p u la r o p in io n slow ly b e g an to coalesce a ro u n d a new view o f F M D . By th e m id 188 0 s - a lm o st h a lf a c e n tu ry a fte r F M D first ap p ea red in B ritain - m o st c o m m e n ta to rs no lo n g er saw it as a m in o r u n a v o id a b le a ilm e n t, b u t as a foreign in v a d in g a n im a l p lag u e th a t c o u ld a n d sh o u ld be c o n tro lle d by fa r-re a ch in g a n d e x trem ely strin g e n t legislative m easures. A t th e sam e tim e , th e fram e w o rk o f th e 2 0 th -c e n tu r y F M D c o n tro l po licy cam e in to bein g . B u t w h y d id these ch an g es occur? H o w d id th e vocal o p p o n e n ts o f th e 1864 bill tra n s m u te in to fervent su p p o rte rs o f g o v e rn m e n t in te rv en tio n , a n d h ow d id th e o n c e d isreg ard ed F M D b e co m e a feared foreign plague? O n e p o p u la r e x p la n a tio n h o ld s th a t v e te rin a ria n s , p o litic ia n s a n d farm ers belated ly realized th a t F M D w as, in fact, an ex trem ely d a n g e ro u s a n d d a m a g in g disease th a t h a d to be c o n tro lle d by m ea n s o f im p o rt a n d d o m e stic tra d e re stric tio n s. B u t th is is sim p ly n o t tru e. As we have seen, th e clinical m a n ife s ta tio n s o f F M D w ere e x trem ely variable, it im p a c te d m o re u p o n so m e businesses th a n o th ers, a n d p roposals for its c o n tro l h a d d iffere n t im p lic a tio n s for d iffere n t sectio n s o f th e m ea t a n d livestock trade. C o n se q u e n tly , th e re existed m a n y rival o p in io n s a b o u t th e disease, n o n e o f w h ic h sto o d o u t as an y m o re m o ra l o r ra tio n a l th a n th e rest. So it is sim plistic to assum e th a t th e p re sen t-d a y im age o f F M D as a terrib le an im al p lag u e e m e rg ed because it w as o b v io u sly co rre c t. In fact, a w h o le range o f so c ial, e c o n o m ic , s c ie n tific , p o litic a l a n d leg isla tiv e m a tte rs h e lp e d to tra n sfo rm F M D from in c o n s e q u e n tia l a ilm e n t to a n im a l plague. In m id to late V icto rian B ritain, upper-class aristo crats an d lan d o w n ers w ie ld e d a su b s ta n tia l degree o f p o litica l a n d e c o n o m ic pow er, a n d th e ir v iew s w e re a c c o rd e d far m o re w e ig h t th a n th e o p in io n s o f th o s e w h o w o rk e d fo r a living. Social h iera rch ie s also existed w ith in fa rm in g an d th e m ea t a n d livestock trad e: ped ig ree c a ttle -b re e d in g w as a h ig h ly p re stig io u s a c tiv ity ; m ix e d o r ‘h ig h ’ f a r m in g c a rrie d c e r ta in k u d o s ; b u t d e a le rs , m id d le m e n a n d jo b b e rs g a rn ere d little respect. Faith in B ritish su p e rio rity w as su ch th a t th e o p in io n s o f Irish graziers a n d foreign im p o rte rs carried little w e ig h t, w h ile v e te rin a ry su rg e o n s, w h o se pro fessio n al a sp ira tio n s h a d yet to b e co m e reality, h a d o n ly lim ite d a u th o rity . R esp o n sib ility for sh ap in g legislation lay w ith m em b e rs o f p a rlia m e n t a n d th e civil service, w hereas th o s e w h o s to o d o u ts id e th e c o r rid o r s o f p o w e r c o u ld o n ly h o p e to in flu e n ce policy if selected to give evidence before a d e p a rtm e n ta l c o m m it­ tee o f in q u iry , o r by a m a ssin g d e p u ta tio n s a n d c allin g o n th e ir M P s.49 W ith in th is se ttin g , u pper-class ped ig ree breeders a n d T o ry M P s w ere by far the m o st in flu e n tia l livestock ow ners, a n d for reasons already discussed, th e y th o u g h t F M D a fo re ig n a n d e x tre m e ly se rio u s disease. B u t w h ile

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

j ^

im p o rta n t, th e ir political influence c a n n o t solely a cc o u n t for w hy F M D becam e a plague; after all, th eir 1864 a tte m p t to force th ro u g h G am gee’s u n p o p u la r legislation had actually failed. T h e c h an g in g fate o f B ritish agriculture also influenced the status o f F M D . D u rin g the 1860s, farm ing had prospered; b u t in late 1870s an d early 1880s, it fell in to depression as th e b u ild in g o f railroads across the A m erican prairies led to a rise in cheap grain im p o rts, w hile in cle m e n t w e ath e r red u ced d o m estic p ro d u c tio n . For m an y m ixed farm ers, arable profits no longer cloaked th e financial status o f livestock p ro d u c tio n , an d so the losses inflicted by F M D u p o n m eat an d m ilk p ro d u c tio n becam e m ore app aren t and econom ically significant. Som e activists even c o n te n d ed th a t th e effects o f F M D had m ad e farm ers re lu c ta n t to invest in cattle instead o f corn, and argued th at it was the g overnm ent’s job to protect them from this terrible disease.50 H ow ever, for m an y farm ers, legislative restric­ tio n s u p o n th e m o v e m e n t a n d m a rk e tin g o f a n im a ls w o u ld have c o m ­ p o u n d e d th e ir fin a n c ia l d iffic u ltie s ; th e re fo re , d e c lin in g a g ric u ltu ra l fo rtu n es c a n n o t in itself explain the tran sfo rm a tio n o f F M D . D e b a te s over F M D c o in c id e d w ith new s o f P a s te u r’s a n d K o ch ’s fo rm u la tio n o f th e germ th e o ry o f disease. So d id th e re aliz a tio n th a t in fe c tio u s diseases w ere cau sed by m ic ro b e s c h an g e a ttitu d e s to w a rd s FM D ? T h e evidence w o u ld suggest n o t. C o n tra ry to p o p u lar assum ptions, th e germ th eo ry and new bacteriological m eth o d s o f disease investigation d id n o t cause an o v ernight tran sfo rm a tio n in the u n d e rsta n d in g o f disease. Instead, th ey w ere a d o p te d piecem eal over a 20-year perio d , in d ifferent ways by d ifferent groups, w ith debates u p o n th eir validity peaking a ro u n d 1875. As a result o f their cattle plague experience, m ost veterinarians readily accepted th a t contagious germ s were responsible for disease. How ever, they were re lu c ta n t to rule o u t sp o n ta n eo u s g en eratio n c om pletely because it provided the m o st plausible e x p lan atio n for th e first-ever case o f F M D . A lso, they had little tim e for scientific th eo rizin g or for new lab o rato ry based m e th o d s o f d ia g n o s in g a n d in v e s tig a tin g disease. S im o n d s a n d Brow n view ed know ledge o f disease pathology an d the n a tu re o f the disease en tity irrelevant to the question o f F M D control. T h ey had long recognized it as a contagious p roblem , and cared little w h e th er it was caused by a living m ic ro b e o r by a c h em ica l p o iso n , fu n g i o r fe rm e n t, as w as p re v io u sly b e lie v e d .51 In c o m p a ris o n , m ed ic al sc ie n tists w ere m o re in te re s te d in bacteriological research; b u t th ere w ere few jobs an d little state fu n d in g available for investigations in to anim al diseases. D u rin g the later 1870s, the RAS asked D r Jo h n B urdon-S anderson, a m edical scientist w ho had carried o u t experim ents for th e 1866 C a ttle Plague C o m m issio n , to research in to F M D ; b u t d u e to cost re stric tio n s and p o o r facilities, his in vestigations failed to bear fru it.52

16

A M anufactured Plague?

It seem s th a t th e factor m o st responsible for tran sfo rm in g F M D from inco n seq u en tial a ilm en t to foreign anim al plague was the legislation used to co n tro l it. W e te n d to assum e th a t th e m easures used to co n tro l disease are based u p o n an u n d e rsta n d in g o f its clinical sy m p to m s a n d m eans o f spread - th a t know ledge com es first a n d action follows. B ut for F M D , th e reverse was true. As we shall see, th e very fo rm u la tio n a n d o p e ratio n o f legislative F M D co n tro ls d u rin g the years 1 8 6 9 -1 8 8 4 had an im p o rta n t and u n a n tic ip a te d influence u p o n experiences an d u n d erstan d in g s o f the disease. It becam e increasingly feared a n d eventually was seen as on e o f the w o r ld ’s w o rs t a n im a l p lag u e s, a h ig h ly c o n ta g io u s a n d e c o n o m ic a lly devastating a ilm en t akin to th e cattle plague. It was in this sense th a t F M D was ‘m a n u fa c tu re d ’. F M D -a s-p lag u e w asn’t always ‘o u t th ere ’ in n a tu re , aw aiting discovery by e n lig h ten ed individuals. It was a new creation, a by­ p ro d u c t o f the processes involved in its c o n tro l. A n d as this new vision o f F M D grew in stre n g th , its social origins w ere gradually obscured, u n til it cam e to be view'ed as an inco n tro v ertib le fact o f n ature. W h en the 1869 A ct failed, the g o v ern m en t tried to im prove its F M D co n tro ls by in tro d u c in g a d d itio n al m easures u n d e r order. Local a u th o rity v e te rin a ry in sp e cto rs w'ere p e rm itte d to e n te r p riv ate prem ises a n d , on diag n o sin g disease, to declare an ‘infected place’ o f 1-m ile radius w ith in w hich livestock m ovem ents were p ro h ib ite d for several weeks. A ro u n d h a lf o f th e local au th o rities m ade use o f th eir powers; b u t com p lain ts a b o u n d ed th a t the new co n tro ls caused unnecessary trade interference, a n d , in 1873, on the advice o f a select c o m m itte e , the Liberal g o v e rn m e n t a b an d o n e d th em .'’'5 Several m o n th s a n d a general election later, they were reinstated by th e new T o ry g o v e rn m e n t, w h ic h p ro v ed m o re sy m p a th e tic to the d e m a n d s o f lea d in g a g ric u ltu ra lists. A gain, th ey failed to ch ec k F M D spread, and in 1877, th e cattle plague briefly re tu rn e d to B ritain. 54 T h e g o v e rn m e n t re sp o n d ed by a p p o in tin g a n o th e r tw o select c o m m itte es to re co n sid e r c o n ta g io u s a n im a l disease c o n tro l, a n d based its 1878 C o n ­ tagious D iseases o f A nim als Bill u p o n th eir re co m m e n d a tio n s. P arliam ent readily agreed u p o n the bill’s proposals for m ore strin g en t controls against th e d o m e s tic sp re ad o f F M D . H ow ever, its p ro p o sa l to b a n liv esto ck im p o rts from infected natio n s proved highly c o n te n tio n s, and after several lo n g a n d e x tre m e ly to r tu o u s d e b a te s o n th e m a tte r, th e g o v e rn m e n t d ecided to a d m it foreign anim als, subject to th eir im m e d ia te slaughter on arrival.55 Yet again, th e new' m easures failed to have th e desired effect, an d in 1884, the L iberal g o v e rn m e n t re lu c ta n tly agreed to ban all livestock im p o rts from n a tio n s infected w ith F M D , p leu ro -p n e u m o n ia , sheep-pox o r cattle plague. Few c o u n tries w'ere free o f all these ailm ents, an d so the livestock im p o rt trad e virtually ceased. S hortly afterw ards, e n d em ic F M D disappeared from B rita in .56

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century Britain

j 'J

T h ese re cu rre n t debates an d policy changes m ade F M D c o n tro l an extrem ely p ro m in e n t a n d pressing issue, an d en h an ced its profile co n sid er­ ably. P articipants in the m eat a n d livestock trade naturally w a n ted to know w h e th e r p ro p o se d re g u la tio n s w ere likely to su cceed , how th e y w o u ld im pact u p o n th eir daily lives, an d w h e th er th eir benefits w o u ld outw eigh th e costs incurred. C onsequently, they sto p p e d ign o rin g F M D a n d began to scrutinize its clinical sym ptom s, eco n o m ic effects a n d epidem iological behaviour. T h ey to o k n o te of, an d aw arded new significance to, everyday events such as the im p o rta tio n o f infected stock from Ireland an d abroad, an d the m o v em en t an d sale o f diseased anim als w ith in B ritain. T h ey also beg an to n o tic e th a t in a d d itio n to its a c u te sy m p to m s , F M D caused ch ro n ic red u ctio n s in m eat and m ilk p ro d u c tio n . R eflections such as these p ro m p te d m any livestock ow ners to a b a n d o n the belief th a t F M D was a m ild, incid en tal illness an d to su p p o rt its legislative con tro l. In th e m e a n tim e , n ew g o v e rn m e n t legislatio n m ad e it possib le to e stim ate m ore accurately th e costs o f infection. Betw een 1870 a n d 1872, all liv e sto c k o w n e rs h a d to in fo rm th e lo cal a u th o ritie s w h e n F M D a p p e a re d a m o n g th e ir sto c k . S ta tistics w ere c o lla te d by th e v e te rin a ry d e p a rtm e n t, and revealed th a t in th e three m o n th s to M arch 1870, there w ere o utbreaks u p o n a staggering 16,140 prem ises.5' Farm ing an d v eterin ­ ary representatives to o k these figures an d m u ltip lied th em by the loss in value suffered by F M D -in fe c te d cows, a m u c h -d isp u te d sum th a t varied betw een U K £1 a n d U K £8 a head for d airy cows alone. T h e result was a figure th a t a p p ro x im ate d to th e n a tio n a l costs o f F M D infection. Som e translated this sum into volum es o f m eat an d m ilk lost, b rin g in g th e effects o f F M D h o m e to u rb an consum ers, as well as to agricultural p ro d u c ers.58 T h e ir calcu latio n s h elped to raise aw areness o f th e im p a c t o f F M D and d ru m m e d up su p p o rt for m ore effective controls. Before the cattle plague, the unexpected appearance o f F M D w ould often have been explained by reference to sp o n ta n eo u s generation. Now , however, its arrival a m o n g anim als th a t had had no kno w n c o n ta ct w ith the diseased was blam ed u p o n the in d ire ct transfer o f germ s u p o n clothes, boots o r vehicles. N ew legislative initiatives m ade these in d ire ct routes o f disease transm ission m ore visible: in restricting the m ovem en ts o f infected sto ck th ey reduced the o p p o rtu n itie s for d irec t disease spread. In 1881, Brow n traced the resurgence o f F M D to infected French cattle, w h ich had been sla u g h te red o n arrival in B ritain a n d p ro p a g a te d th e disease in d i­ rectly.59 T h is event revealed the danger posed even by dead foreign anim als, an d helped to stren g th en the case for co m p lete im p o rt p ro h ib itio n . As aw areness o f the e co n o m ic cost an d highly co n ta g io u s n a tu re o f F M D rose, m any participants in the m eat and livestock trade began to back the in tro d u c tio n o f m ore strict, w ide-ranging control m easures.60 How ever,

Jg

A M anufactured Plague?

th e re su ltin g re stric tio n s fu n d a m e n ta lly a lte re d th e ir experiences o f F M D a n d b r o u g h t it to th e n o tic e o f a far larg e r se c tio n o f so c iety th a n ever before. F or exam ple, th e a p p ea ran c e o f F M D led to th e d ra w in g o f infected areas w ith in w h ic h liv e sto c k m o v e m e n ts w ere p r o h ib ite d e x c e p t u n d e r licence. T h is m e a n t th a t F M D b e ca m e a g e o g rap h ica l p ro b le m situ a te d w ith in a p a rtic u la r re g io n , ra th e r th a n a b iological p ro b lem lo ca ted w ith in th e a n im a l b o d y . W h e re a s p re v io u s ly F M D h a d m a tte r e d o n ly to th e ow n ers o f diseased sto c k , it n o w affected th e d aily lives o f all p a rtic ip a n ts in th e m ea t a n d livestock tra d e w ith in th e s u rro u n d in g d istric t (see Plate 5). D u r in g th e early 1 8 8 0 s, th e g o v e rn m e n t b e g an to c an c e l fairs a n d m a rk e ts in F M D -in fc c tc d areas. T h is n o t o n ly in flic te d severe fin an c ia l losses; it also e n h a n c e d feelings o f iso latio n a m o n g ru ra l c o m m u n itie s, for w h o m th e w eekly m a rk e t day w as th e social h ig h lig h t o f th e w eek. As the h a rd sh ip s in flic te d by F M D c o n tro l grew, livestock owmers began to fear th e a p p e a ra n c e o f disease a n d th re w th em se lv e s in to th e c a m p a ig n for im p o rt re stric tio n in th e h o p e th a t th is w o u ld h a lt its invasion a n d rem ove th e need for irk so m e, co stly d o m e stic trad e c o n tro ls.61 A t th e sam e tim e , P a r lia m e n ta ry o p p o s itio n to im p o r t re s tr ic tio n d e c lin e d , p a r tly o u t o f sy m p a th y for th e fa rm in g p lig h t, b u t also because th e re ce n t ex p an sio n in th e dead m e a t tra d e m e a n t th a t m a n y L iberal M P s no lo n g er feared fo r th e m e a t supply. T h e se d e v e lo p m e n ts m e a n t th a t a c o m p le te b a n u p o n live­ stock im p o rts - a m easure u n th in k a b le ju st a few years previously - b ecam e m o re generally acc ep ta b le a n d passed in to law in 1 8 8 4 .62 T h e 1 8 8 4 A ct h a d th e desired effect as F M D ceased to sp re ad a n d th e n a tio n b e ca m e free o f in fe c tio n fo r th e first tim e since 1839. It se ttle d a lo n g -ru n n in g feu d by p ro v in g th e significance o f F M D im p o rta tio n a n d th e n e ed fo r re stric tio n s u p o n th e foreign livestock im p o r t tra d e . It also b r o u g h t a b o u t fu r th e r c h an g e s in p o p u la r e x p erien c e s of, a n d a ttitu d e s tow ards, F M D . Previously, F M D h a d been a fam iliar everyday e vent; b u t as th e m o n th s stre tc h e d in to years w ith o n ly sp o ra d ic , easily e x tin g u ish e d , o u tb re a k s, m em o ries fad ed a n d it b e ca m e an u n k n o w n a n d alien in v ad e r th a t a p p eared w ith o u t w a rn in g a n d spread in m ysterious ways. A n d because n a tio n a l fre e d o m fro m F M D w as n o w th e n o rm , even a sin g le case o f disease w as m o re visible th a n ever before, p ro v o k in g w id e sp rea d c o m m e n t a n d a la rm .63 M e a n w h ile , o th e r F M D -fre e c o u n trie s su c h as th e U S , C a n a d a an d A ustralia d e cid ed th a t they, to o , sh o u ld b a n livestock im p o rts from F M D in fected n a tio n s. A lth o u g h B rita in w as a n e t livestock im p o rte r, a h a n d fu l o f p o litica lly in flu e n tia l p edigree b reed ers reg u larly sold valuable an im a ls to o v e rsea s b u y e r s .64 T h e y w e re e x tre m e ly u p s e t b y th e e x p o r t tr a d e re stric tio n s th a t follow'ed th e re a p p e ara n ce o f F M D in B rita in , an d began to press th e v e te rin a ry d e p a r tm e n t to sla u g h te r in fec te d livestock in the

Foot and M outh Disease in 19th-century B ritain

j C)

b e lie f th a t th is w o u ld e lim in a te F M D faster th a n iso latio n . B row n initially resisted th e ir lo b b y in g . H e claim ed th a t sla u g h te r was to o costly, a n d th a t m o s t liv e sto c k o w n e rs a n d local a u th o r itie s p re fe rre d is o la tio n , w h ic h w o rk e d w ell. H e w as p re p a re d to p e rm it local a u th o ritie s to sla u g h te r if th e y w ish e d ; b u t few d id so , p a rtly b e ca u se th e y w ere re q u ire d to pay c o m p e n s a tio n , b u t also b e c a u se th e y w ere u n a b le to p r e v e n t d ise ase rein v ad in g from n e ig h b o u rin g c o u n ties. H ow ever, as tim e w e n t o n , B row n’s resistance w e ak e n e d , a n d w h e n F M D re ap p e are d in 1892 he re so rted to sla u g h te r to defeat a s tu b b o rn p o c k e t o f in fe c tio n . L ater th a t year, a new D iseases o f A n im als A ct e n ab led th e Privy C o u n c il to o rd e r th e sla u g h te r of, a n d p rovide c o m p e n sa tio n for, F M D -in fe c te d a n im a ls.65 In the sporadic o u tb re a k s o f s u b s e q u e n t years, B ro w n ’s successors tu rn e d in cre asin g ly to slau g h ter. Initially, th e y used it o n ly in th e first o r last few cases o f each o u tb re a k in an a tte m p t to speed u p disease e lim in a tio n . B u t as C h a p te rs 2 a n d 3 w ill reveal, it e v en tu ally b e ca m e a universal an d c o m p u lso ry policy. So, by th e tu rn o f th e 2 0 th c en tu ry , a n ew vision o f F M D h a d taken h o ld in B ritain u n d e r th e influence o f legislation th a t w o u ld e n d u re for over a cen tu ry . M e m o rie s o f th e earlier c o n tro v e rsy h a d fad ed , an d m o st p eo p le fo u n d it in cre d ib le th a t a n y o n e c o u ld ever have believed F M D an in c o n se ­ q u e n tia l a ilm e n t a n d resisted its c o n tro l by th e state. Yet, arguably, if the c attle plague h a d n o t in v ad ed B ritain , F M D w o u ld never have b e co m e a plag u e. It w o u ld have c o n tin u e d to evade p u b lic a n d p o litic a l s c ru tin y ; legislative F M D c o n tro ls w o u ld n o t have been in tro d u c e d ; th e sla u g h te r o f in fec te d a n im a ls w o u ld have re m a in e d an u n th in k a b le act; a n d F M D w o u ld have c o n tin u e d to be a p riv a te fa rm in g affa ir in ste a d o f a h ig h profile p u b lic issue w ith m a jo r social a n d e c o n o m ic im p lic a tio n s for e n tire ru ral c o m m u n itie s. O f course, th is is all sp e c u la tio n ; b u t th e p o in t is th a t F M D -a s-p la g u e was a ‘m a n u f a c tu re d ’ p ro b le m , th e e m e rg en c e o f w h ic h w as in ex trica b ly lin k e d to th e social, e c o n o m ic a n d p o litical c o n ce rn s o f m id to late V ic to ria n B ritain. T h e consensus g e n era te d d u rin g th e late 19th c e n tu ry u p o n the n a tu re a n d c o n tro l o f F M D d id n o t last long. It was m erely the first in a succession o f te m p o ra ry lulls th a t o c cu rre d w h e n ev e r F M D w as a b se n t from B ritain a n d legislation ap p ea red to be w o rk in g . Before lo n g , F M D w o u ld reinvade a n d sp re ad inexorably, a n d d isp u te s a b o u t its n a tu re a n d c o n tro l w o u ld b eg in all over again. N e x t tim e , how ever, few w o u ld d isp u te th e fact th a t F M D w as a d a n g e ro u s fo re ig n p la g u e th a t h a d to be e lim in a te d fro m B ritain.

Chapter 2

T h e Politics of Plague: H om e Rule for Ireland, 1912-19 23

T

he

Ir ish

q u e s t io n

T h e years 19 1 2 -1 9 1 9 saw rioting, bloodshed and finally civil w'ar in Ireland as rival factions fought over its political future. Since the 1801 Act o f U nion, Ireland had been governed from L ondon and sent 100 MPs to W estm inster. B ut the later 19th cen tu ry saw an increasing d em a n d for n ational selfgovernm ent. W illiam G ladstone, then leader o f the Liberal party, twice tried to repeal the Act o f U nion and allow Ireland a parliam ent for dom estic affairs. His first a tte m p t took place in 1886, w hen 93 Liberal M Ps voted against the governm ent and defected to the Tory or U nionist party, forcing his resignation. O n returning to power in 1892, he tried again. T his tim e the bill passed the C om m ons, only to be throw n o u t by the H ouse o f Lords. But the issue did not go away, and w hen, in 1910, two general elections returned hung parliam ents, John R edm ond, the leader o f the Irish party, seized his chance. H e offered to su p p o rt Liberal leader H erb ert A squith in return for H om e Rule. R e d m o n d ’s b a ck in g e n a b le d A sq u ith to force th ro u g h th e 1911 Parliam ent Act, an im p o rta n t piece o f legislation that prevented the H ouse o f Lords from perm anently vetoing legislation passed by the C om m ons. Its passage m eant that the third Irish H om e Rule Bill, introduced in 1912, was m ore likely to succeed than its predecessors. N evertheless, Irish H om e Rule rem ained an incredibly co n ten tio u s issue, w ith Parliam ent and the nation divided over w 'hether Ireland was fit for self-governm ent, w hat form this should take, and w hat should be done a bout Protestant Ulster. As a general rule, Liberals and the nationalist Irish party supported H om e Rule, w hile U lster U nionists and C onservative politicians opposed it; b u t the form at o f the third H o m e Rule Bill gave rise to m isgivings on b oth sides

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2 1

o f the H o u se. A fter n u m ero u s a m e n d m en ts, it passed in 1914; b u t w ith the w orld d egenerating into war, its operatio n was tem porarily su sp e n d e d .1 W h ile these events were u n fo ld in g , Ireland faced a n o th e r crisis as foot an d m o u th disease (F M D ) re tu rn e d w ith a savage vengeance a fter long years o f a b sen ce. Its a p p e a ra n c e th re a te n e d th e m a in sta y o f th e Irish e c o n o m y ; th e m e a t a n d liv esto ck tra d e . E ach year, Irish fa rm e rs se n t hu n d re d s o f th o u sa n d s o f anim als across the Irish Sea to ind u strial B ritain, w here d e m a n d for m eat co n sid erab ly o u tw e ig h e d the m a in la n d supply. M a k in g th e jo u rn e y w ere fat sto ck for sla u g h te r, a n d sto re an im a ls for fu rth e r fa tte n in g in th e rich grazing lands o f S c o tla n d a n d East A nglia. Farm ers, dealers, m id d le m e n , im p o rte rs, sh ip -o w n e rs a n d b u tc h e rs all p articip a te d in th e trade, and anim als changed han d s m an y tim es before arriving at th eir final d estin atio n s.2 O n several occasions betw een 1912 and 1923, the v eterin ary inspectors o f th e B ritish B oard o f A griculture d iag­ n o sed F M D in a n im a ls recen tly lan d e d from Irela n d , a n d co n tro v e rsy e ru p te d as p a rties on b o th sides o f the Irish Sea accused each o th e r o f h a rb o u rin g infection. A t th e h e art o f these disputes lay several c o n te n tio u s q uestions. Was there incontrovertible p ro o f th a t the disease in question was F M D ? H a d an im als c o n tra c te d in fectio n before or after th e ir d e p artu re from Ireland? W ere Irish farm ers and th eir D e p a rtm e n t o f A griculture and T ech n ical In s tru c tio n capable o f id e n tify in g a n d resp o n sib ly m an a g in g F M D ? A nd w h a t m easures w ere justified in th e n am e o f F M D control? T h erefo re, ru n n in g alongside the battle for Irish H o m e Rule was a n o th e r b a ttle over th e o rig in , spread a n d c o n tro l o f F M D . As we shall see, the fo rm er pow erfully influen ced th e latter, so th at, once again, F M D becam e a highly politicized affair. In the sp rin g o f 1912, as the H ouse o f C o m m o n s deb ated the th ird Irish H o m e Rule Bill, a L iverpool offal dealer a n n o u n ce d th at he had found F M D -lik e blisters in th e to n g u es o f sla u g h te red cattle th a t had recently been im p o rte d from Ireland. T h is news was conveyed to Stew art Stockm an, th e c h ie f v e te rin a ry o ffice r (C V O ) o f th e B o ard o f A g ric u ltu re , w h o c o n firm e d th a t th e an im a ls w ere, in d e e d , in fe c te d .3 T h is w as a la rm in g news. B oth British an d Irish agricultural authorities had th o u g h t the nation free o f F M D and w ere c o n fid e n t th a t the c o n tro ls on livestock im p o rts w o u ld p re v en t new disease invasions. N ow , how ever, it seem ed th a t an und etected focus o f F M D existed som ew here in Ireland, an d had m anaged to evade th e a tte n tio n o f livestock inspectors statio n ed on b o th sides o f the Irish Sea. As we have already seen, 1 9 th -c e n tu ry debates u p o n F M D led to its reco g n itio n as a highly contag io u s a ilm en t th a t caused costly red u ctio n s in m eat and m ilk p ro d u c tio n . C onsequently, on its re tu rn in 1912, there was no d o u b t in a n y o n e ’s m in d th a t it had to be elim inated. T W Russell, an

22

^ M anufactured Plague?

U lste r P resbyterian a n d U n io n ist w ho headed th e Irish D e p a rtm e n t for A griculture an d T echnical In stru c tio n , im m ediately directed his veterinary inspectors to discover the w hereabouts o f F M D . T h ey traced the infection to a farm n e ar Sw ords in C o u n ty D u b lin , w here an u n q u a lifie d cattle d o c to r was in a tten d an ce. T h e cow m an was prosecuted for failing to notify the au th o ritie s o f the presence o f F M D , an d all rem ain in g livestock on the farm were slaughtered. T h e n began the p a in sta k in g task o f tracin g all o f th e an im a ls th a t h a d co m e in to c o n ta c t w ith th e diseased d u rin g th e ir jo u rn e y fro m S w ords to L iv e rp o o l. O n d isc o v erin g an in fe c te d farm , inspectors slaughtered clinically sick anim als an d isolated the rest. T h ey also h alted livestock m ovem ents, fairs and m arkets in th e su rro u n d in g infected area, an d called in the Royal Irish C o n stab u lary to enforce these restrictions (sec Plate 6). S to ck m an an d th e veterin ary inspectors o f the Board o f A griculture w ere sim ilarly o ccupied on th e m ain lan d . H ow ever, u nlike Russell, Stock­ m an chose n o t to apply th e d iscretionary policy o f slau g h ter th a t he had in h erited from his predecessors a n d , instead, ordered th e slaughter o f all liv e sto c k u p o n in fe c te d fa rm s. T h is , he a rg u e d , w as a m o re effective m e a su re as, n o rm a lly , F M D s y m p to m s d id n o t a p p e a r u n til several days after infection had o ccurred, so th a t anim als w hich appeared healthy m ig h t a c tu a lly be s p re a d in g th e disease. H is p o lic y p ro v e d p o p u la r w ith leading pedigree breeders because in speeding up th e e lim in a tio n o f F M D , it p rom ised to allow th e rapid re su m p tio n o f exports to F M D -free n ations. S to c k m a n so o n d isco v ered th a t F M D h a d sp re ad to a n u m b e r o f d ifferent m ain lan d locations. O n receipt o f this alarm in g new s, the b o a rd s p re s id e n t, W a lte r R u n c im a n MP, d e c id e d to sto p all im p o rts o f Irish livestock u n til R ussell’s sta ff h a d discovered th e full e x te n t o f F M D in Irelan d .4 T h is new s dealt a c atastro p h ic blow to p a rticip a n ts in the Irish m eat a n d livestock trade, a n d was strongly d e n o u n c e d by the Irish party M Ps Jo h n D illo n , T M Healy, Jam es Farrell a n d W illiam O ’B rien, w ho p roclaim ed it an unnecessary an d unjustified m easure.5 H ow ever, British upper-class landow ners an d U n io n ist M Ps, such as H e n ry C h a p lin (a past p re sid e n t o f the B oard o f A g ric u ltu re w h o h a d led the 1880s d rive for livestock im p o rt p ro h ib itio n ), C harles B a th u rst a n d C a p ta in P rety m an , w elcom ed the news on the g ro u n d s th at B ritain had to be p ro tec te d from fu rth e r invasions o f a disease th a t e n d an g e red b o th a g ric u ltu re an d the pedigree livestock e x p o rt trad e.6 T h e tw o sides battled over F M D c o n tro l in P arliam en t a n d the press. S oon it becam e clear th a t they w ere n o t fighting sim ply over how best to defeat a terrible anim al plague, o r over how to m in im ize th e financial costs o f F M D c o n tr o l. A lth o u g h th ese w ere im p o r ta n t fa c to rs, a far m o re

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2 3

w eighty concern was the im plicatio n o f F M D for H o m e Rule. Each side drew c o n n e c tio n s betw een Irela n d ’s capacity to u n d e rsta n d a n d c o n tro l F M D , a n d its ability to u n d e rstan d the principles o f self-governm ent and c o n tro l its ow n people. C onsequently, debates becam e extrem ely em otive an d achieved a high political profile. As far as C h a p lin , B a th u rs t, P re ty m a n a n d th e ir c o lle ag u e s w ere con cern ed , Irish reactions to F M D were totally inadequate. C h a p lin had held this view since the 1870s a n d 1880s, w hen Irish farm ers an d dealers had resisted legislative controls upo n the m ovem ent o f infected anim als and claim ed th a t F M D was n o t a serious p ro b lem .7 C onsequently, he was n o t s u rp ris e d to h e a r ru m o u rs o f Iris h m e n e v a d in g liv e sto c k m o v e m e n t restrictions an d sm uggling cattle o u t o f infected areas at n ig h t. H e argued th a t in the absence o f the trad e e m b a rg o , th e Irish w o u ld spread F M D w illy-nilly th ro u g h o u t the m ain lan d . B athurst focused his attack u p o n the Irish D e p a r tm e n t o f A g ric u ltu re , c la im in g : ‘Ire la n d ow es h e r p re s e n t m isfo rtu n es and E ngland th e recent serious recrudescence o f this disease to the ignorance, w eakness an d dilatoriness o f the D e p a rtm e n t w hich M r T W Russell now c o n tro ls .’8 H e arg u ed th a t R ussell an d his team had probably kno w n all along th a t F M D was presen t in Ireland - after all, the Irish w ere so ta lk a tiv e t h a t th e y w ere in c a p a b le o f k e e p in g a secret! C ertainly, it sh o u ld n o t have taken Russell three days to trace th e disease to Sw ords, a n d he was com pletely m istaken in culling only visibly infected anim als and isolating th e ir contacts. In B a th u rst’s o p in io n , Russell sh o u ld have follow ed th e exam ple o f the B ritish B oard o f A griculture, w hich had learned, d u rin g the sporadic o u tb reak s o f th e past 28 years (a p e riod in w hich Ireland had been free o f F M D ), to diagnose a n d c o n tro l th e disease properly. H e even argued for the transfer o f responsibility for contagious a n im al disease c o n tro l from the Irish d e p a rtm e n t to the B oard o f A gri­ c ulture, a m ove th at w ould have sim ultaneously u n d e rm in ed the Irish fight for H o m e R ule.9 U nsurprisingly, such dero g ato ry c o m m e n ts did n o t go dow n well in Ireland. H caly an d his colleagues refuted the charges m ade against Russell, an d begged Stockm an an d his staff to com e a n d w itness for them selves how effectively Irish inspectors could c o n tro l F M D . S to ck m an refused; th ere­ fore, to prove its c o m p eten ce, the Irish A gricultural D e p a rtm e n t to o k the extrem ely u n u su al step o f p u b lish in g p h o to g rap h s o f veterin ary inspectors a t w ork in its an n u al re p o rt (see Plates 7 an d 8 ) .10 Irish spokesm en argued th a t a trad e em bargo was co m pletely unneces­ sary as F M D only existed in on e o r tw o o f th e seven Irish counties. N o r w ere they satisfied w h en , three weeks after th e discovery o f F M D , R uncim an decided to a d m it sm all n u m b ers o f Irish fat stock p ro viding th a t they w ere sent from disease-free areas o f Ireland to specified B ritish p o rts for

24

^ M anufactured Plague?

sla u g h te r on d ise m b a rk a tio n . N o rm ally , th e fa t-sto c k tra d e m ad e up o n ly 25 p e r c e n t o f Irish ex p o rts. M u c h m o re im p o r ta n t w as th e trad e in store an im a ls, w h ic h e arn e d U K £1() m illio n each year. M o st Irish farm ers h a d in su fficien t fo d d e r to feed stores d u rin g th e a u tu m n a n d w in te r a n d relied u p o n th e ir sale to pay re n ts o r m ak e p e rio d ic re p a y m e n ts on th e ir farm p u rc h ase loans. C o n se q u e n tly , th ey c o n tin u e d to a g itate for th e c o m p le te liftin g o f all tra d e re stric tio n s .11 B ritish a g ric u ltu ra lists re a so n e d th a t th e b o a r d ’s e m b a rg o w as o n ly eq u iv a le n t to th a t w h ic h th e Irish d e p a rtm e n t h a d p lac ed o n th e B ritish e x p o rt tra d e th e p re v io u s year, w 'hen F M D h a d b ro k e n o u t in Surrey. H ow ever, th e B ritish e x p o rt trad e to Irela n d c o m p rise d o n ly a few pedigree beasts w o rth in to ta l less th a n U K £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 a year. A c co rd in g to th e Irish, th e ir trad e sh o u ld receive m o re le n ie n t tre a tm e n t because it w as th e m o re valuable. O n th e co n tra ry , said C h a p lin . B ecause th e Irish tra d e w as m o re extensive a n d involved th e crow 'ding to g e th e r o f h u n d re d s o f a n im a ls in closely c o n fin e d c o n d itio n s , it w as far m o re likely to sp read disease th a n th e B ritish e x p o rt tra d e , w h ic h tr a n s p o r te d a n im a ls singly, u n d e r close s u p e rv is io n . In s te a d o f c o m p la in in g a b o u t th e s itu a tio n , Irish fa rm e rs sh o u ld sh o w so m e in itiativ e a n d a d a p t to th e c h a n g in g c o n d itio n s o f trad e. F o r ex am p le, th e y c o u ld lea rn h o w to gro w w in te r fo d d e r, o r c o n s tru c t ab a tto irs so th a t an im a ls c o u ld be killed before e x p o rt to th e m a in la n d .12 U n io n is t b reed ers c la im e d th a t Irish farm ers h a d o b v io u sly failed to u n d e rs ta n d th e severity o f th e s itu a tio n , o th e rw ise th e y w o u ld n o t have lo b b ie d for th e re su m p tio n o f tra d e a t a tim e w h e n fresh F M D o u tb re a k s a p p e a rin g in Irelan d . T h e y also alleged th a t farm ers o n th e m a in la n d h a d g ro w n m is tru s tfu l o f th e Irish a n im a ls , a s itu a tio n t h a t c o u ld o n ly be rectified if Irish farm ers q u ietly a cc ep te d th e trad e e m b a rg o .13 The Tim es s ag ric u ltu ra l c o rre s p o n d e n t stro n g ly su p p o rte d su ch view s, w hile c la im in g th a t th e Irish re ac tio n to th e tra d e e m b a rg o ‘show s a lack o f experience in m a tte rs o f th e k in d - a n d , it has been suggested, h e r dislike o f legislative c o n tr o l’. F o llo w in g th is lo g ic, Irish fa rm e rs w ere d a m n e d if th e y c o m ­ p la in e d a b o u t th e e m b a rg o a n d d a m n e d if th ey d id n o t. H ow ever, n o t all B ritish in te re s ts a g reed w 'ith C h a p lin a n d his colleag u es. G ra zie rs from N o rfo lk a n d S c o tla n d , w h o usually b o u g h t u p Irish sto res for fa tte n in g , d e m a n d e d th e sw ift re s u m p tio n o f tra d e , as d id s h ip p e rs , a u c tio n e e rs , dealers, salesm en, b u tc h e rs a n d th e N a tio n a l F e d e ra tio n o f M e a t T ra d e rs.14 B reeders s to o d firm , how ever, d ism issin g such re p re se n ta tio n s as ‘selfish’, w hile c la im in g th a t th e e m b a rg o w as ‘in th e interests o f th e n a tio n ’. O n e p r o m in e n t Irish criticism w as th a t in its resp o n se to F M D , th e B oard o f A g ric u ltu re h a d tre a te d Ire la n d as it w o u ld a fo reig n in fe c te d c o u n try . S p o k e sm e n c o n tra ste d th e b o a rd ’s to ta l b a n u p o n all Irish e x p o rts w ith th e 1 5 -m ile tra d e exclusion zone th a t it drew a ro u n d in fected farm s

The Politics o f Plague

2 5

on the m ain lan d . T h e y also p o in te d o u t th a t the 1 9 th -ce n tu ry legislation u n d e r w hich th e em bargo had been im posed was only ever in te n d e d for use against foreign countries. T h e board dism issed such co m p lain ts, saying th a t it n orm ally b a n n ed exports from foreign F M D -in fe c te d natio n s for a period o f six m o n th s, w hile the Irish trade was resum ed, in p art, after only th ree w eeks. T h is sta te m e n t failed to quell Irish susp icio n s because, on re a d m ittin g Irish fa t-sto c k e x p o rts, th e b o a rd re q u ire d th e ir la n d in g at ‘foreign an im als’ w harves’, isolated areas o f m ain lan d p o rts th a t had been b u ilt d u rin g th e 1870s to receive a n im a ls fro m c attle p la g u e -in fe c te d nations. H ealy later com plained to Parliam ent th at ‘the d o ctrin e apparently is th a t w e arc to have all th e disadvantages o f the U n io n a n d n o n e o f its advantages’. 15 H ow ever, since this a rg u m e n t was open to the in terp retatio n th a t Irela n d had no desire to be categ o rized as a ‘fo reig n ’ n a tio n , Irish nationalists had to reign in th e ir co m p la in ts in ord er to advance th eir fight for H o m e R u le.16 As the d ispute c o n tin u e d , U nionists and Irish nationalists accused each o th e r o f a tte m p tin g to m ake F M D c o n tro l a political issue, w hile d enying th a t th e y p e rso n a lly view ed it as s u c h .17 Irish p a rty M P J o h n D illo n d esc rib e d th e tra d e e m b a rg o as ‘a m o st in fa m o u s a n d sc a n d alo u s c o n ­ spiracy, largely political an d su p p o rte d by pow erful interests in E ngland to m ain tain u n reasonable a n d unnecessary regulations against the Irish cattle trad e ’.18 O n e o f his colleagues, J P Farrell, claim ed th a t E nglish su p p o rters o f th e em b arg o w ere actu ally try in g to ru in th e Irish e c o n o m y ,19 w hile H ealy argued th a t the B ritish g o v e rn m e n t had a m o ral resp o n sib ility to p ro tec t the Irish livestock trad e .20 T h e su m m e r passed a n d th e trade still did n o t re tu rn to norm al. Irish p arty m em bers c o m p lain ed to P arliam ent th a t th eir people felt ‘persecuted a n d coerced’ an d th a t th e w hole affair was a U n io n ist conspiracy.21 H ealy declared: ‘T h is is im perialism - th a t the M in istry o f the Irish D e p a rtm e n t is n o t even c o n su lte d , m u ch less tru sted , by the M in ister o f the E nglish D e p a rtm e n t, w ho is supposed to have the sam e interests at h e a rt.’22 Irish grievances were heig h ten ed by the case o f the ‘W aterford h ead ’, a pig’s head o f su sp ected Irish o rig in th a t was discovered b earin g F M D lesions in a Liverpool m ark et in July 1912. A ccording to one o f the b o a rd ’s veterinary inspectors, the to n g u e had been deliberately rem oved in ord er to conceal th e presence o f infectio n , a view later repeated in P arliam ent as p ro o f o f Irish subterfuge. In fact, su b seq u en t investigations show ed th a t the rem oval o f the to n g u e was a no rm al practice in th e dead m eat trade, a n d th a t there was no evidence to suggest th a t the head cam e from W aterford or, indeed, from anyw here else in Ireland.23 R u n c im a n ’s d e c isio n to re a d m it sm a ll n u m b e rs o f Irish fat sto c k infuriated B ath u rst an d his U n io n ist colleagues, w ho w arned repeatedly o f

2 (5

A M anufactured Plague?

th e d ire c o n se q u e n c e s t h a t w o u ld follow a n y re la x a tio n o f th e tra d e em bargo. M eanw hile, encouraged by a cam paign in the Irish Times, Irish a g ita tio n a g ain st th e tra d e re stric tio n s grew. G raziers asked w hy Jo h n R e d m o n d had n o t secured the lifting o f the em bargo w hen only recently he had b o a sted th a t he held th e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t in th e palm o f his h a n d ."4 Farrell an d W illiam Field, president o f the Irish C a ttle T raders’ and S tockow ners’ A ssociation, felt th a t in p ro test at th e b o a rd ’s h a n d lin g o f F M D , R e d m o n d sh o u ld w ith d raw Irish p a rty s u p p o rt from th e Liberal g o v ern m en t, thereby forcing a general election. H ow ever, R e d m o n d knew full well th a t if he b ro u g h t dow n the g o v ern m en t, the Liberals m ig h t n o t regain power, a n d th a t if a U n io n ist g o v e rn m e n t was re tu rn e d , it w ould n o t p ro ceed fu rth e r w ith H o m e R ule. So, for th e sake o f n a tio n a l selfg o v ern m en t, he refused to take drastic a ction against the e m b a rg o .25 T h is was a wise m ove, as b rin g in g dow n the Liberal g o v e rn m e n t was a p rim e goal o f leading U nionists. T h e y so u g h t an en d to b o th Irish H o m e Rule an d Lloyd G eorge’s 1909 ‘p eople’s b u d g e t’, w hich had increased the taxes and d e ath duties o f upper-class lan d o w n ers.26 Russell, an U lster U n io n ist, and R u n c im a n , a Liberal, were so m ew hat isolated from the increasingly polarized debate betw een Irish nationalists an d E nglish U n io n ists, a n d th e ir a tte m p ts to reach a c o m p ro m ise over F M D c o n tro l d id n o t please e ith e r side. D u rin g A ugust a n d S e p tem b e r 1912, R u n cim an gradually relaxed restrictions u p o n Irish fat-stock exports. In early O c to b er, as Irish F M D incidence fell further, he in tro d u c e d a new A nim als (L anding from Ireland) O rd er, w hich p e rm itte d lim ited im p o rts o f store anim als, subject to their inspection an d q u a ran tin e at th e ports and d e te n tio n at th e farm o f d e stin a tio n .2 C h a p lin was incensed, an d tried to persuade th e H ouse o f C o m m o n s to reconsider th e order. H e alleged th a t R u n cim an was inexperienced in F M D co n tro l and had yielded, wrongly, b o th to Irish pressure an d to th e Liberal p a rty ’s self-interested desire to stay in power. H e grew even angrier several days later u p o n learning th a t several new cases o f F M D had appeared in form erly disease-free areas o f Ireland. W h en R u n c im a n refused to am e n d his plans, B athurst tu rn e d to th e local a u th o ritie s, w h o at th a t tim e w ere able to re g u la te a n im a l m o v em e n ts w ith in th eir b o u n d a rie s. A t his behest, all b u t six forbade the e n try and m o v em e n t o f Irish sto c k .28 T h e Irish w ere also unhappy. T h e a d d itio n al layers o f b u re a u c ra c y th a t th e new o rd e r h a d im p o se d u p o n th e tra d e im p ed ed its sm o o th ru n n in g and reduced profits, an d they w'ere furious w h en , in Ja n u a ry 1913, th e g o v e rn m e n t m ade it a p e rm a n e n t m easure. By th e n , how ever, F M D had d isa p p ea red from Irela n d a n d E n g la n d a fte r causing 68 and 83 outbreaks, respectively. As previously infected areas were released from restrictions, exports to the m ain lan d began to increase and debates u p o n the c o n tro l o f F M D tem p o rarily died away.29

The Politics o f Plague

2 7

F o r m an y Irish a n d E n g lish p o litic ia n s a n d liv esto ck o w n e rs, th is episode affirm ed th eir existing a ttitu d e s tow ards Irish H o m e Rule. As far as C h ap lin , B athurst an d th eir colleagues were concerned, Ireland’s reaction to F M D epitom ized all o f the reasons w hy it was u n fit for self-governm ent. Its people disliked an d rebelled against regulations; they were em o tio n al, irratio n al an d irresponsib le; a n d they failed to place th e interests o f the n a tio n ahead o f in d iv id u a l desires. B ut for Irish natio n alists, the b o a rd ’s a ctivities a n d th e c o m m e n ts o f lead in g a g ric u ltu ra lists re in fo rc ed th e ir d e ep -se a te d c o n v ic tio n th a t o n ly H o m e R ule c o u ld achieve ju stic e for Ire la n d . T h e y saw th e tra d e e m b a rg o as a p u n itiv e m ea su re , an a ct o f im perialism an d p ro tec tio n ism th at was p ro o f o f th eir u n fair trea tm e n t at th e h an d s o f the E nglish.

G

e t t in g

to

g r ip s w i t h

FM D

T h e disappearance o f F M D an d the passage o f the H o m e Rule Bill b ro u g h t a b o u t a tem p o rary lull in the controversy; b u t before long, b o th item s were back on the political agenda. O n several occasions betw een 1913 and 1923, F M D -in fec ted Irish livestock were again discovered on the m ain lan d . Each tim e the Board o f A griculture placed an im m ed iate em bargo on the Irish trade, an d each tim e th e Irish objected. Som etim es the em bargo was m o d i­ fied a few days later, w hen th e b o a rd ’s v eterinary inspectors discovered th a t th eir diagnosis o f F M D had been m istaken or th a t infection had n o t orig in ­ ated in Ireland; on o th er occasions it rem ained in place for several weeks. In e ith e r case, the Irish reaction was the sam e, as farm ers, livestock traders a n d politician s p ro teste d furiously a b o u t the ‘unnecessary’ d isru p tio n to trade.30 H ealy told Parliam ent: ‘It is w ished to prove th a t at the present tim e all this disease cam e from Ireland. Irishm en are supposed to have a double d ose o f o rig in a l sin. . .a n d a p p a re n tly th e sam e th in g a p p lie s to Irish c a ttle .’31 M eanw hile, the political situ atio n d e te rio ra ted as a result o f the 1916 E aster U p risin g , in w hich n a tio n a list rebels tried - an d failed - to seize power. In its afte rm a th , Irish voters deserted R e d m o n d ’s Irish party, w hich favoured a c o n stitu tio n a l so lu tio n to th e crisis, in favour o f th e re v o lu tio n ­ a ry m o v e m e n t S in n F ein. A fte r w in n in g 7 3 seats in th e 1918 g e n era l election, Sinn Fein set up an Irish P arliam ent, the D ail, a n d declared an in d e p e n d e n t Ireland. A ro u n d this tim e, the Irish R epublican A rm y (IRA) began its cam paign against any form o f British g o v e rn m e n t in Ireland, and as violence escalated, th e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t sent its n o to rio u s ‘black and tan ’ soldiers to sort o u t th e situ atio n . In an a tte m p t to resolve th e situ atio n , N a tio n a list a n d U n io n ist leaders signed an A n g lo -Irish T reaty in 1921.

28

A M anufactured Plague?

T h is allowed the 26 so u th e rn counties to becom e an in d ep e n d en t Irish Free State, w hile the six n o rth e rn counties rem ained p a rt o f th e U K . It was n o t accepted by all N atio n alists, however, a n d civil w ar c o n tin u e d in the so u th u n til 1 9 2 3 .32 T h e 1912 F M D controversy had tau g h t Irish politicians, agriculture officials a n d livestock ow ners o f th e difficulties involved in resisting the B oard o f A g ric u ltu re ’s rep ea te d tra d e e m bargoes. A n o u t- a n d -o u t fight against the British g overnm ent w ould have jeopardized the drive for H o m e R ule, w hile tit-fo r-ta t restrictions on exports from the m ain lan d had only a lim ited effect because o f the sm all size o f the British pedigree export trade. C onsequently, from 1913, they ad o p te d a som ew hat different tactic an d began to attack th e scientific basis o f th e b o a rd ’s actions. In criticizing its inspectors’ diagnoses o f F M D and tracings o f disease spread, they reopened old debates a b o u t the n a tu re a n d b eh av io u r o f F M D , an d add ed fuel to the controversy su rro u n d in g its c ontrol. E a rlie r re sea rc h , u n d e r ta k e n a t th e close o f th e 1 9 th c e n tu r y by G e rm a n scientists F ried rich L oeffler a n d Paul Frosch, had revealed th a t fluid-filled blisters in the m o u th s and on th e feet o f F M D -in fec ted anim als c o n ta in e d the agent responsible for disease. T h e b eh av io u r o f th is agent differed from th a t o f o th e r know n germ s: it c ould pass th ro u g h filters th a t n orm ally retained bacteria, co u ld n o t be view ed th ro u g h a m icroscope an d p roved im p o ssib le to c u ltu re . L oeffler te rm e d it a ‘filterab le v iru s’ a n d assum ed th at, in all o th e r respects, it was akin to bacteria. How ever, because it could n o t be isolated or visualized, practically the only w ay o f co n firm in g its p re sen c e w as to tak e tissu e sa m p le s fro m m o u th a n d feet lesio n s, inoculate th em in to susceptible livestock an d w ait to see w h e th er sim ilar sym ptom s developed.33 T h is tec h n iq u e was too com plicated a n d expensive for w idespread use, an d so, in the field, veterinarians c o n tin u e d to diagnose F M D on the basis o f its clinical sy m p to m s an d p ro p en sity to spread. But m atters were n o t always clear cut. W h a t if an anim al show ed sy m p to m s o f F M D b u t failed to spread the disease? O r w h a t if it show ed sy m p to m s o f a highly contagious ailm en t th a t bore only a passing resem blance to FM D ? It w as sim ilarly d iffic u lt to decide u p o n th e o rig in o f th e in fe c tio n . Its in cu b a tio n perio d was som ew hat variable, a n d , given the possibilities for in direct virus spread, it was usually im possible to say how, w here an d w hen livestock had c o n tracted th e disease. T hese am biguities allow ed politicians, veterinarians an d p a rticip a n ts in the m eat an d livestock trade to in te rp ret the available evidence in a m a n n e r th a t accorded b o th w ith th eir personal experiences o f F M D a n d w ith th e ir perso n al, professional an d n a tio n a l interests. V eterin ary in sp ecto rs o f th e B ritish B oard o f A g ric u ltu re te n d e d to d ia g n o s e F M D even w h e n th e a n im a ls c o n c e rn e d sh o w ed e x tre m e ly

The Politics o f Plague

2 9

o bscure sy m p to m s and had failed to spread infection to th e ir susceptible contacts. O fte n , they decided th a t infection had o riginated in Ireland, even in cases w here anim als had left disease-free Irish farm s, failed to convey infection to livestock w ith w hich they had m ixed d u rin g the journey, and d e v elo p ed sy m p to m s several days a fte r arriv in g on th e m a in la n d . T h ey explained this occurrence by reference to the in d irect spread o f virus, and precautionary action against the Irish trade soon followed. By contrast, Irish spokesm en rejected diagnosis on suspicion a n d required classic foot an d m o u th blisters before they w o u ld a d m it to the presence o f F M D . T h ey also argued th a t the b o a rd ’s trac in g o f disease spread was lacking in evidence a n d could n o t justify a trade e m b a rg o .34 H isto ry was p a rtly to blam e for these differences o f o p in io n . As we have already seen, rigorous restrictions upo n livestock im ports caused F M D to d isappear from Ireland an d the m ain lan d d u rin g the 1880s. It seem ed th a t th e source o f F M D - foreign in fected livestock - had at last been d etected and defeated. T h e resulting absence o f F M D in Ireland m ean t th a t th is view h e ld sw ay u n til th e 1910s; b u t, in th e m e a n tim e , m a in la n d o p in io n had m oved on , m ainly as a result o f sporadic reinvasions o f F M D th a t could only be explained by reference to in d irect co n tag io n . In 1908, th e b o ard restricted im p o rts o f hay a n d straw after they were im plicated in an E d in b u rg h F M D o u tb rea k , a n d w ith the appearance o f six u n c o n ­ nected o utbreaks in 1911, R u n cim an asked a d e p artm e n tal c o m m itte e to c onsider fu rth e r m easures against the disease. N u m e ro u s w itnesses to ld the c o m m itte e o f th e ir suspicions th a t F M D c ould e n te r B ritain in infected m ilk, hides, vaccine ly m p h , offal, vehicles, vegetables, straw a n d m any o th e r substances. Its su b se q u e n t re p o rt help ed to raise aw areness o f the m any different ways in w hich the invisible F M D virus could en ter Britain. N ew a m b ig u itie s a b o u t th e clinical p ic tu re o f F M D cam e to lig h t fo llo w in g th e 1912 Sw ords o u tb re a k , w h e n th e B oard o f A g ric u ltu re d ecided th a t all cattle leaving Ireland should be ‘m o u th e d ’ - exam ined to sec if they show ed F M D -lik c oral lesions (sec Plate 6). T h is practice led to th e discovery o f a huge variety o f pathological changes. Previously, v eterin ­ a ria n s a n d fa rm e rs h a d n o t b een in th e h a b it o f lo o k in g in sid e cow s’ m o u th s, an d so su b stan tial d o u b t arose over w h a t was, a n d w h at was n o t, characteristic o f F M D . Inspectors also tried to age the lesions they discov­ e red - o n th a t basis, th e y c o u ld d ecid e w h e n (a n d , m o re im p o rta n tly , w here) anim als had c o n tracted disease. H ow ever, this was a ra th e r inexact art a n d inspectors’ c onclusions were open to criticism .36 C o m p o u n d in g th ese d iffic u ltie s w ere th e d iv e rg e n t in te re s ts a n d p re co n c ep tio n s o f v eterin ary surgeons, farm ers an d p o litician s on e ith e r side o f th e Irish Sea. T h e circ u m stan c es s u rro u n d in g th e 1912 Sw ords o u tb rea k had aroused m ain lan d suspicions th a t F M D lurked, u n n o tic e d ,

^Q

A M anufactured Plague?

u p o n Irish fa rm s, w h ile th e p o p u la r ste re o ty p e o f th e Iris h m a n as a talkative, unreliable an d ig n o ran t individual m ea n t th a t Irish denials were n o t tak e n seriously.37 As far as v e te rin a ry in sp e cto rs o f th e b o a rd were c o n ce rn ed , if a disease resem bling F M D a p p ea red in recently im p o rte d Irish stock, th en it was best to play safe an d c onfirm the diagnosis because a fu ro re w o u ld e ru p t sh o u ld they fail to p rev en t F M D from spreading. (In tere stin g ly , th ey w ere n o t so stric t a b o u t F M D in B ritish livestock, p referring to ‘w ait and see’ w h en diagnosis was in d o u b t.) For the political reasons already discussed, aristocratic lando w n in g U n io n ist M P s su p p o rte d th e ir actions, as d id m any livestock ow ners, w ho in the absence o f Irish c o m p e titio n co u ld o b tain hig h er prices for th eir ow n anim als. T h e Irish, on th e o th e r h a n d , w ere keen to clear th e c louds o f susp icio n th a t s u r­ ro u n d e d the health o f their cattle, and to avoid the p ro fo u n d econom ic and political consequences o f trad e em bargoes. C onsequently, they d e m a n d ed s u b s ta n tia l, in c o n tro v e rtib le e v id e n ce b e fo re th ey w o u ld a d m it th a t a disease was F M D an d had orig in ated in Irelan d .38 T h e m an y a m b ig u itie s su rro u n d in g F M D m e a n t th a t n e ith e r side c ould w in th is scientific d ispute; as a result, the board c o n tin u e d to halt the Irish trad e on suspicion o f F M D an d th e Irish c o n tin u e d to criticize its a ctio n s. H ow ever, in 1 9 1 6 , fo llo w in g re p ea te d Irish jib es a b o u t its m istaken F M D diagnoses an d im plausible disease tracings, the b o a rd ’s new president, R ow land P rothero, decided th a t the tw o sides should try to clear up the dispute. H e suggested a jo in t investigation, ‘by m eans o f experim ent o r otherw ise’, in to m eth o d s o f d iagnosing F M D . T P G ill, secretary o f th e Irish d e p a rtm e n t, replied th a t he was happy to cooperate in investigations if they h e lp e d to rem ove the u n c e rta in ty felt by th e b o a rd ’s v e te rin a ry officers, b u t th a t his veterinarians required no such aid. S tockm an re to rted th a t if the d e p a rtm e n t did n o t participate, he w ould c o n tin u e to ‘play safe’ a n d diagnose F M D on suspicion. T h is forced the d e p a rtm e n t’s h a n d , and in 1917, a Jo in t C o m m itte e on S to m atitis was a p p o in te d . C o m m itte e m em bers included Professor Jo h n M cFadyean, S tockm an’s father-in-law an d RVC prin cip al, an d the head o f the D u b lin V eterinary C ollege, Professor M c tta m , w ho was soon to die o f pern icio u s anaem ia. T h e y trie d to c u ltu re th e disease ag en t a n d to re p ro d u c e sy m p to m s by in o cu la tin g m aterial taken from disease lesions in to susceptible anim als. Results were distinctly unrem arkable. A fter taking evidence from practising veterinarians on how best to diagnose F M D , th e c o m m itte e cam e up w ith the hardly e a rth -sh a tte rin g c on clusion th a t it was often d ifficult to reach a definite diagnosis using m o u th lesions alone, and th a t o th er characteristics, such as fever an d the ability o f the disease to spread, sh o u ld be taken into consid eratio n . T h e re p o rt was n o t published on th e gro u n d s o f insufficient p ublic in te rest.39

The Politics o f Plague

31

In 1920 th e Irish tra d e w as again h a lte d , a n d th e n resu m ed w hen B ritish v e te rin a ry officials d e cid ed th a t th e disease in q u e stio n was n o t F M D . Sim ilar events occurred the follow ing year w hen F M D broke o u t in D e rb y sh ire a m o n g c attle recen tly im p o rte d from Irela n d . T h e Irish d e p a rtm e n t p ro te ste d in vain th a t it h a d suffered on ly on e o u tb re a k o f F M D since 1914, a n d several m o n th s later, w hen F M D really was c o n ­ firm ed in Ireland, S tockm an m ade plain his belief th a t it had existed all along.40 In 1922, a devastating F M D epidem ic to o k hold on the m ainland, an d E nglish farm ers’ suspicions again fell up o n Irish livestock im p o rts. In this case, S tockm an claim ed th a t there was n o evidence th a t F M D existed in Irela n d . H ow ever, he th o u g h t fa rm e rs’ c o m p la in ts p e rfe c tly u n d e r ­ s ta n d a b le given th e Irish h a b it o f d e n y in g F M D in th e face o f o v e r­ w h elm in g evidence. H e w en t on to launch a scathing a tta ck u p o n ig n o ran t Irish dealers, w ho had helped to pro p ag ate F M D by sh iftin g livestock over large distances an d th ro u g h n u m ero u s fairs. H is veterinary inspectors had no ju risd ictio n over these m en, w ho had usually re tu rn e d to Ireland by the tim e th eir involvem ent was discovered. T h e y fu rth e r h in d ere d the b o a rd ’s a tte m p ts to trace F M D spread by failing to keep records o f livestock sales, o ften because they could n o t read o r w rite.41 T h e d e p artm e n tal co m m ittee th a t later en q u ire d in to th e 1922 epidem ic also to o k a dim view o f Irish dealers’ habits, a lth o u g h this was hardly surprising given the id en tity o f its c h airm a n - C a p ta in P retym an, U n io n ist M P an d arch-critic o f the Irish trad e.42 T h e B ritish ten d en cy to scapegoat the Irish d im in ish e d m arkedly after 1923. Perhaps this was because F M D disappeared from Ireland, alth o u g h the absence o f disease had n o t p revented past controversies from eru p tin g . O r possibly it resulted from new legislative restrictions u p o n Irish dealers’ activities, in tro d u c e d on P re ty m a n ’s re c o m m e n d a tio n , to p re v en t th em from m oving anim als rapidly betw een m arkets a n d fairs.43 H ow ever, it was no coincidence th a t controversy over F M D ceased at a b o u t the sam e tim e as debates over Irish H o m e Rule. W ith the settling o f the Irish q u estio n in 1923, relations betw een the tw o cou n tries substantially im proved. It was th en no lo n g er necessary for Irish a n d m ain lan d interests to use F M D as a tool w ith w hich to express th eir o p in io n s o f each o th er an d to fu rth e r th eir eco n o m ic and political agendas. B ut as C h a p te r 4 show s alth o u g h F M D becam e de-politicized w ith in the c o n te x t o f A n g lo -Irish relations, it was soon to re stru ctu re B ritain’s political and e co n o m ic dealings w ith a very d ifferen t country, A rgentina.

Chapter 3

T h e Epidem ics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4

O

v e r v ie w

Betw een 1922 an d 1924, rural B ritain experienced tw o o f th e w orst foot and m o u th disease (F M D ) epidem ics in 40 years. T h e ir u n k n o w n origin and rapacious spread caused anxiety and pan ic to livestock ow ners, an d for m o n th s on e n d , th e v e te rin a ry sta ff o f th e M in istry o f A g ric u ltu re an d Fisheries (MAF, w hich to o k over from the B oard o f A griculture in 1919) struggled desperately to b rin g F M D u n d e r c ontrol. T h e ir efforts eventually succeeded, b u t at a price. F M D c ontrol cost the taxpayer m illions o f po u n d s an d p ractically h alted rural life in pa rts o f B ritain. A t th e h e ig h t o f the epidem ics, suffering farm ers rebelled, issuing increasingly d esperate b u t ultim ately unsuccessful d e m a n d s th a t M A F alter its F M D c o n tro l policy. T h is chapter relates the events an d experiences o f those years, focusing upon the plig h t o f C heshire farm ers, w ho were th e hardest hit by th e disease. T h e o rigins o f the epidem ics w ere never discovered; b u t in c irc u m ­ stances re m in isc e n t o f th e 2001 e p id e m ic , th e extensive m o v e m e n t o f livestock (especially store stock im p o rted from Ireland) was held responsible for the ra p id extension o f disease th ro u g h o u t th e n a tio n . Investigations suggested th a t F M D -in fcc tcd anim als first appeared in m arkets in Jan u ary 1922, d u rin g one o f the busiest trad in g periods o f the year. T h ey spread infectio n b o th directly, to the anim als they m ixed w ith, an d indirectly, as the m arket pens, lo ading bays and railw ay trucks in w'hich they were held, as well as th e clothes a n d b o o ts o f th e ir han d lers, becam e c o n ta m in a te d w ith th e F M D virus. M A F w'as un aw are o f th e presence o f F M D u n til alerted by Belgian vets at A n tw e rp , w'ho discovered sy m p to m s in cattle recently e x ported from H u ll for slaughter. By th e n th e plague had been sp re a d in g u n n o tic e d for at least a w eek, a n d th e seeds o f 7 0 0 to 8 0 0 outbreaks were already sow n.

The Epidemics o f 1922—1924

R esponsibility for co n tro llin g th e disease lay w ith Stew art S tockm an, ch ie f veterinary officer (C V O ) o f the M in istry o f A griculture (see Plate 10). As we have already seen, S to c k m a n believed th a t sla u g h te rin g diseased anim als and th eir con tacts was the best m e th o d o f elim in a tin g F M D from B ritain. H e arg u ed th a t unlik e the fo rm er policy o f iso latio n , sla u g h te r s to p p e d in fected a nim als from m a n u fa c tu rin g virus a n d th erefo re c o n ­ trolled the disease faster. T h is, in tu rn , lessened the need for restrictions up o n the m o v em en t a n d m ark e tin g o f anim als in the su rro u n d in g area an im p o r ta n t b e n e fit c o n sid e rin g th e re c e n t increase in th e scale a n d frequency o f livestock m ovem ents. S laughter also m inim ized th e im pact o f F M D u p o n the livestock e x p o rt trade, w hich was subject to restrictions im p o sed by F M D -fre c n a tio n s such as C a n a d a , th e U S , N ew Z e a la n d , A ustralia a n d S o u th A frica. S to ck m an a tta ch e d great im p o rta n c e to the preservation o f this trade, as a lth o u g h econom ically insig n ifican t, it was d o m in a te d by influential upper-class landow ners w ho view ed the foreign d e m a n d for th eir pedigree stock as a sign o f British n ational su p e rio rity .1 S to ck m an s p e n c h a n t for slau g h ter did n o t extend to valuable pedigree anim als, w hich he isolated an d allow ed to recover from F M D . H e argued th a t it was in the natio n al interest to preserve these irreplaceable p ro d u c ts o f g enerations o f livestock breeding. A n o th e r m o tiv a tin g factor was cost: the 65 infected farm s th a t he subjected to isolation d u rin g the 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 3 e pidem ic w o u ld , if slaughtered o u t, have increased th e c o m p en satio n bill by 25 per cent. S tockm an also believed th a t in c o n tra st to m ost farm ers, p e d ig re e livestock b re ed e rs w ere e d u c a te d , in flu e n tia l a n d re sp o n sib le individuals w ho possessed the facilities a n d the resources to nurse anim als back to health, a n d c ould be tru sted to take a dequate precau tio n s against the spread o f disease. T h erefo re, w hile no m in ally serving the interests o f British agriculture as a w hole, S tockm an’s slaughter policy actually favoured upper-class livestock breeders, w ho encouraged the slaughter o f ‘o rd in ary ’ stock in ord er th a t th eir anim als co u ld escape infection a n d em b ark u p o n lucrative jo u rn ey s overseas. T h e 1922 e pidem ic lasted eight m o n th s. D u rin g th at tim e, the sh o rtstaffed, poorly eq u ip p e d State V eterinary D e p a rtm e n t, n u m b e rin g ju st 59 inspectors at the start o f the epidem ic, struggled to co n tro l a to tal o f 1140 F M D o u tb reak s. E ach v ete rin a ry in sp e cto r to o k charge o f all o u tb reak s o ccu rrin g w ith in a set geographical area. T h e y c o n firm ed th e diagnosis o f F M D , oversaw the valuation a n d slaughter o f diseased anim als an d th eir c ontacts, directed b u tch ers to salvage the m eat from healthy carcasses, and organized a supply o f m an p o w er and fuel for the b u rn in g o r burial o f dis­ eased carcasses. T h e y also m apped o u t infected areas, usually 15 m iles in radius from the infected farm , w ith in w hich h u n tin g was b a n n ed and live­ stock m o v em en t restrictions o f varying severity im posed for several weeks.

A M anufactured Plague?

It fell to th e local a u th o ritie s to enforce these m easures a n d , if they th o u g h t fit, to im pose ad d itio n al restrictions u p o n livestock m o v em en ts w ith in th eir b o u n d a rie s. T h ey acted th ro u g h D iseases o f A nim als C o m ­ m ittees, w hich in tu rn , a p p o in te d inspectors (usually policem en, a lthough by law th ey had to a p p o in t at least one v e te rin a ry su rg eo n ) to execute disease c ontrols. Lay inspectors issued licenses for fat-stock m arkets an d necessary livestock m ovem ents, organized the disinfection o f railway trucks and pens, an d arranged for policem en to guard footpaths and the entrances o f infected farm s (see Plate 11). V eterinary inspectors exam ined livestock in m arkets for signs o f in fection; they w ere first on the scene w hen farm ers re p o rte d th e a p p e a ra n c e o f disease a n d h a d p o w e rs to h a lt liv e sto c k m ov em ents in the vicinity. In 1922, the disease had a h e ad start, a n d as n o tific a tio n s flooded in, M A F a n d local a u th o rity in sp e cto rs alike w ere u n a v o id a b ly delay ed in e x e c u tin g th e c o n tro l policy. E ventually, th ey succeeded in halting disease spread, b u t n o t u n til an u n p reced en ted 56,000 livestock had been slaughtered. C o m p en satio n for this loss cost the taxpayer U K £ 7 5 0 ,0 0 0 , a vast sum d u rin g the financially straitened post-w ar years. A fter 12 m o n th s’ respite, th e disease flared up again. In A ugust 1923, M A F received several sim u ltan eo u s reports o f F M D from w'idely separated geographic locations. Its F M D co n tro l m ach in ery again sw ung into action; b u t this tim e delays in the diagnosis, sla u g h te r and disposal o f infected sto ck w ere even m ore m ark e d . T h e next n in e m o n th s saw n early 2691 F M D o u tb re a k s, m o re th a n an y o th e r e p id e m ic o n reco rd , a n d nearly 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 liv e sto c k w ere sla u g h te re d , a t a c o st o f U K £ 3 .3 m illio n in co m p e n sa tio n . C heshire experienced 1385 o utbreaks a n d bore th e b ru n t o f th e e p id e m ic . For m o n th s , F M D ran ra m p a n t th ro u g h th e co u n ty , inflicting terrible suffering u p o n its rural in h ab itan ts. T h e final death toll - 5 0 ,0 0 0 dairy cattle — a m o u n te d to one th ird o f the C heshire herd, and in the w orst affected areas up to 60 per c e n t o f farm s w ere e m p tie d o f livestock. In b o th ep id em ics, b u t particu larly d u rin g 1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 4 , S to c k m a n ’s decisio n to sla u g h te r a lm o st all in fec te d a n d c o n ta c t livestock a ro u sed considerable co n cern . H e had used this policy before, d u rin g the 1910s; b u t th en , o utbreaks had n u m b e re d less th an 100 a year, an d slaughter had provoked little criticism , partly because few experienced it at first h a n d , bu t also because it had the desired effect o f e lim in a tin g F M D ra p id ly from B ritain. In 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4 , however, the effects o f this policy w'ere felt m ore w idely as th o u sa n d s o f farm ers from all over B ritain lost th eir stock an d w ere co n fin e d to e m p ty farm s, th e ir life’s w o rk destroyed. As th e weeks passed an d disease c o n tin u e d to spread, d isappearing only to retu rn upo n a far g reater scale than before, w hisperings against the slaughter policy grew in to an im m ense pu b lic outcry. Som e o f its critics saw no justificatio n in

The Epidem ics o f 1922—1924

^ ‘j

killing a n im a ls w h ic h , if left to th e ir ow n devices, w o u ld so o n recover from F M D ; o th e r s saw s la u g h te r as a g o o d th in g in p rin c ip le , b u t b e c a m e increasingly un easy a t its failure to w o rk in practice. T h e o n e q u e stio n on ev ery o n e ’s lips w as w h e th e r th e legislative ‘c u re ’ fo r F M D w as w orse th a n th e disease itself. D u rin g th e a u tu m n a n d w in te r o f 1 9 2 3 , th e co n tro v e rsy over F M D c o n tro l reached a level o f in te n sity n o t experienced since th e 1870s. V iew ed re tro sp ec tiv e ly , it a m o u n te d to o n e o f th e m o st p o w e rfu l 2 0 th - c e n tu r y forces fo r c h a n g e in th e g o v e rn m e n t’s h a n d lin g o f F M D . M A F h a d no experience o f sla u g h te r in th e c o n tro l o f a raging e p id e m ic , a n d n o n e c o u ld be sure th a t it w o u ld succeed. A t th e sam e tim e , th e o ld e r iso latio n p olicy - w hich h a d , d u rin g th e 1880s, h elp ed to drive e n d em ic F M D from B ritain - still carried sig n ific a n t a u th o rity . T h e re was e v ery th in g to play for, an d as th e crisis d e e p e n e d , farm ers, v e te rin a ry su rg e o n s, d o c to rs, p a rtic ip a n ts in th e m e a t a n d livestock tra d e , a n d M A F an d local a u th o rity officials all p itc h e d in to a d e sp e ra te b a ttle over F M D c o n tro l. S to c k m a n an d his u pper-class a g ric u ltu ra l s u p p o rte rs w ere ab so lu tely c o n v in c ed th a t sla u g h te r was th e rig h t policy, a n d th a t given tim e it w o u ld pro v e its w o rth . T h e y e m p lo y e d several key a rg u m e n ts in an a tte m p t to im p re s s th e i r v iew s u p o n a h o s tile p u b lic . F irst, th e y c o n tr a s te d th e im m e n s e c o sts o f e n d e m ic F M D w ith th e low a n n u a l av era g e c o st o f slau g h ter. S e c o n d , th e y e m p h a size d th a t w h e n c o m p a re d w ith slau g h ter, is o la tio n w o u ld re su lt in g re a te r tra d e losses b e c a u se it re q u ire d m o re len g th y restrictions u p o n livestock m o v em en ts. T h ird , they drew favourable c o m p a ris o n s b e tw ee n B rita in ’s F M D in c id e n c e a n d th a t o f C o n tin e n ta l n a tio n s , w h ic h u se d is o la tio n . F inally, th e y re w ro te h is to r y to p re s e n t sla u g h te r as the tra d itio n a l c o n tro l policy, w h ich fo r 30 years h a d k e p t the n a tio n relatively free o f disease. As we shall see, S to c k m a n e v en tu ally su c c ee d ed in c o n tro llin g b o th F M D a n d p u b lic o p in io n , a n d saw his views on slau g h ter e n d o rsed by tw o g o v e rn m e n t-a p p o in te d c o m m itte e s o f in q u iry in to th e e p id e m ic s .2 H is v icto ry was h ig h ly sig n ifican t; h a v in g discovered th ro u g h experience th a t sla u g h te r c o u ld succeed in th e face o f w id e sp rea d disease, M A F resolved to use it in th e c o n tro l o f all fu tu re ep id e m ic s, regardless o f p u b lic o p in io n . So, p aradoxically, th e m o st w id e sp re a d , a u th o rita tiv e 2 0 th -c e n tu ry c h al­ lenge to F M D c o n tro l by sla u g h te r re su lte d n o t in th e o v e rth ro w o f this policy, b u t in its rising a u th o rity . D u rin g th e years th a t follow ed, critics o f th e sla u g h te r m ad e little headw ay, an d this p olicy w as n o t th re a te n e d again u n til th e 1 950s, w h e n v a cc in a tio n a p p e a re d o n th e scene (see C h a p te r 6).

2

A M anufactured Plague?

T

he

C

h e sh ir e e x p e r ie n c e ,

1923-1924

Too late! Too late! w ill be w ritten o fW b ite h a ll by the Historian o f the Cattle Plague in Cheshire in the years o f grace 1 9 2 3 -2 4 } C h e s h ire , d u rin g th e 1 9 2 0 s, w as a la n d o f d a iry farm s p o p u la te d by th o u s a n d s o f d a iry s h o r th o r n c a ttle . T h e s e ‘d u a l- p u r p o s e ’ cow s also p ro d u c ed good quality b e ef a n d were extrem ely p o p u la r u n til the 1940s, w h en th ey w ere g radually replaced by th e h ig h er-y ield in g Friesian H olsteins. T h e rigours o f han d -m ilk in g im posed a natural lim it upo n herd sizes, a n d few fa rm e rs ow 'ncd m o re th a n 100 cow s. M a n y b re d th e ir ow n replacem ents, selling old cows to the b u tc h e r w hen th eir m ilk p ro d u c tio n d ro p p e d . T h e y w ere closely b o n d e d to th eir anim als, an d often boasted o f th eir high q u ality an d com m ercial value. T h e m ilk p ro d u c ed supplied the u rb an p o p u latio n s o f L iverpool and M an ch ester a n d was also tu rn e d into C h esh ire cheese, a d eclin in g practice th a t, nevertheless, c o n trib u te d to a s tro n g se n se o f lo cal id e n tity . C h e e s e -m a k in g w as w ell s u ite d to th e geography o f C heshire, a flat plain w ith high rainfall w here grass grew all year ro u n d . Instead o f h o u sin g an d feeding th eir cattle d u rin g the w inter, m any sm allholders sto p p e d m ilking th em a n d left th em outsid e to graze. T h e y m ade cheese in th e spring, w h en m ilk yields increased after calving, and again in a u tu m n . T h is ‘low in p u t-lo w o u tp u t’ system did n o t p roduce p articularly large volum es o f m ilk; b u t it m ade econom ic s e n s e / W h e n , in S ep tem b er 1923, F M D first appeared at C rew e, C heshire farm ers’ p rim e concern was the circum stances su rro u n d in g its e n try into the county. T h ey fo u n d M A F officials ‘close as oysters’ on the subject, an d so J Sadler o f the C heshire C h a m b e r o f A griculture tu rn e d local detective. H e u n e arth ed evidence to show th at the m istaken actions o f tw o veterinary surgeons had allow ed F M D to take hold. O n e had failed to disinfect his clothing after inspecting infected anim als at Blackpool; in a subsequent call, he carried virus to F leetw ood docks, w here it infected livestock in transit from Irela n d to C rew e. S h o rtly a fterw ard s, ru m o u rs o f th e presence o f F M D spread th ro u g h C rew e m arket, a n d there was a rush to m ove anim als o u t o f th e area. T h e v e te rin a ry s u rg e o n in c h a rg e o f th e m a rk e t, M r M an u el, eventually im posed restrictions u p o n livestock m ovem ents; b u t it was all too late. Infected anim als had already m oved deep in to C heshire, sc a tterin g F M D virus in th e ir w ake. M a n u e l later d efen d e d his b elated action, explaining: ‘You m u st consider, I have to live by m y profession in the d istric t a n d if a m an certifies a n d stops th e w'hole c o u n try sid e he is practically d o n e in his practice in th a t d istric t . . . had it tu rn e d o u t at a s u b s e q u e n t in v e s tig a tio n n o t to have b e en F M D , p e o p le w o u ld have d eem ed m e a fool.’ M o st C heshire farm ers sym pathized w ith his d ilem m a,

The Epidemics o f 1922—1924

an d reserved th eir criticism s for those M A F officials w ho had tried to cover up the ro o t cause o f disease sp re ad .1 A fter an u neventful m o n th , C heshire experienced a su d d e n explosion o f F M D cases late in O cto b er. Shortly afterw ards, S to ck m an visited the c o u n ty an d discussed the situ atio n at a public m eeting at W h itc h u rc h . T his was a re s tra in e d affair. F a rm ers lis te n e d p o lite ly as he e x p la in e d th a t shortages o f m an p o w er w ere p re v en tin g his sta ff from m ak in g progress ag ain st th e disease, w h ic h was a c tin g stran g ely a n d ‘ju m p in g ’ betw een farm s. H e enco u rag ed farm ers to take p recau tio n s against disease spread by lim itin g th e ir social c o n ta c t w ith o th e r stockow ners, placing anim als indoors, an d disinfecting people and vehicles leaving an d en terin g the farm . H e also argued in favour o f the cu rren t policy, claim ing th at the alternative, isolation, was m ore costly and less likely to c o n tro l the disease.6 D u r in g th e w eeks th a t fo llo w e d , F M D c o n tin u e d to sp re a d u n ­ checked, and increasing n u m b ers o f form ers experienced a la rm in g delays in th e v a lu a tio n , sla u g h te r a n d disp o sal o f th e ir in fec te d sto c k . By 24 N ovem ber, the c o u n ty had lost 300 0 cattle, an d as their patience w ith M A F w ore th in , form ers began to d em a n d greater local p a rtic ip a tio n in F M D co n tro l. T h e y alleged th a t veterinary p ra ctitio n ers could diagnose disease an d slaughter infected stock far q uicker th a n M A F inspectors, and called on Stockm an to delegate tasks to th e c o u n ty council, w hich was m ore in tu n e w ith local c o n d itio n s th a n m in istry m e n .7 S to ck m an regarded such d e m a n d s as a challenge to his p erso n al a n d p rofessional a u th o rity , a n d re je c te d th e m o u trig h t. H is o n g o in g refusal to d e v ia te fro m a h ig h ly centralized a n d seem ingly inefficient m eth o d o f disease co n tro l did little to d a m p e n form ing criticism s, an d p rovoked quarrels betw een local an d central g o v e rn m e n t officials.8 Early in D ecem ber, the tide o f C heshire o p in io n began to tu rn against th e slaughter policy. By th e n , M A F was receiving 60 no tificatio n s o f F M D a day from C h e sh ire alone, a n d th e rising d e ath toll a n d grow ing delay betw een diagnosis a n d slaughter led m an y advocates o f the latter policy to a d m it th a t in C h e sh ire, at least, it had foiled. C h e sh ire Farm ers’ U n io n d e cid ed to re co n sid e r a re so lu tio n it had re ce n tly passed in s u p p o rt o f sla u g h te r. A t a m e e tin g a tte n d e d by N a tio n a l F a rm ers’ U n io n (N F U ) P resid en t H a rry G e rm a n , m em b e rs discussed th e spread o f disease and m ade tentative suggestions o f alternative c o n tro l policies. G e rm an spoke o u t in su p p o rt o f the slaughter. H e told form ers th a t they had to consider th e rest o f th e n a tio n as well as them selves, a n d th a t S to c k m a n had no in te n tio n o f c h an g in g his policy. M o st o f th e au d ien ce ignored him and voted in favour o f a resolution th a t co n d em n ed slaughter as ineffective, and d e m a n d e d its im m e d ia te re p la c e m e n t by ‘p ro te c tiv e a n d p re v e n tiv e m easures’.9

A M anufactured Plague?

T h is m eetin g m arked the sta rt o f G e rm an ’s efforts to persuade C h e sh ­ ire farm ers to accep t the sla u g h te r policy. It seem s th a t he regarded the 1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 4 F M D epidem ic as a p rim e o p p o rtu n ity to gain political pow er a n d influence for th e N F U , a body established 15 years before by a group o f L in co ln sh ire te n a n t farm ers. W h ereas th e Royal A g ricu ltu ral Society (RAS) an d C h a m b e r o f A griculture were upper-class o rganizations m ade up o f landow ners, aristocrats an d m em bers o f p a rliam e n t (M Ps), th e N F U m ostly consisted o f te n a n t farm ers w ho lacked p a rliam e n ta ry influence. G e rm an aim ed to enhance its profile by b u ild in g d irect links w ith MAF, a strategy th a t cam e to full fru itio n d u rin g a n d after W o rld W ar II, w hen M A F regularly con su lted the N F U regarding subsidies for a g ric u ltu re .10 In conversation w ith S to ck m an , he p o rtray ed the N F U as a responsible body m ade up o f e d u ca te d farm ers w ho w ere p repared to suffer the hardships o f th e slaughter policy for th e good o f the n ation. H e also a tte n d ed farm ers’ m eetings w here he urged co m p lian ce w ith M A F ’s disease c o n tro l policy. A t the h e ig h t o f the epidem ic, he w e n t so far as to appeal ‘to b ranches o f the U n io n n o t to send up resolutions to H Q advocating th a t the govern­ m e n t sh o u ld be asked to sto p th e ir policy o f sla u g h te rin g ’. M em o s and press releases issued by the N F U council fu rth e r advertised its b acking for slaughter, w hile advo catin g farm in g vigilance an d listing th e p recautions necessary to p revent disease sp re ad .11 T h e beleaguered S tockm an grew to d e p en d u p o n the N F U ’s su p p o rt, an d the M inister o f A griculture rew arded G e rm an w ith a p p o in tm e n ts to b o th the 1922 a n d the m u ch sm aller 1924 c o m m itte e o f in q u iry in to th e F M D e p id e m ic s.12 In C h e sh ire however, G e rm a n ’s w ell-know n s u p p o rt for th e slau g h ter policy a n d p ro x im ity to S tockm an m ade him an object o f suspicion. Farm ers called him an ‘a p o lo ­ gist for W h ite h a ll’ a n d resented his a tte m p t to sway local debates u p o n F M D .13 M A F ’s delays in c o n tro llin g F M D forced 64 C heshire farm ers to w ait over 14 days betw een disease diagnosis an d slaughter. D u rin g th a t tim e, m a n y to o k v e te rin a ry a d v ice u p o n h o w to alle v ia te th e s y m p to m s o f disease. T h e y cleaned and dressed the feet o f infected anim als an d supplied n o u rish in g feed, a n d w ere surprised to discover th a t after several days, the m ajo rity had recovered. Several ow ners o f infected pedigree livestock th a t had been exem pted from the slau g h ter rep o rted sim ilar experiences, w hile o lder farm ers an d v eterinary surgeons recalled the ease w ith w hich anim als h ad been c u red o f F M D d u r in g th e 187 0 s a n d 1 8 8 0 s .14 S u ch re p o rts su g g ested th a t F M D w as n o t th e te rrib le a n d d e v a s ta tin g plag u e th a t S tockm an had m ade o u t, and encouraged fu rth er resistance to the slaughter policy. A n u m b e r o f farm ers tried to conceal F M D from th e au th o rities and nurse th eir anim als back to health. O n e alleged cure an d preventive th a t

The Epidemics o f 1922—1924

^ C)

g a in e d a High r e p u ta tio n in C h e s h ire w as D r S h a w ’s rem edy. G e o rg e T h o m a sso n , a farm er from N a n tw ich , and Sydney Barker, a Salop farm er a n d re g iste red v e te rin a ry p ra c titio n e r, p u rc h a se d several b a tc h e s a fte r reading an adv ertisem en t in the press an d ad m in istered th em on over 20 farm s, w ith rep o rted success.15 O n investigating the m atter, V in cen t Boyle, a M A F v e te rin a ry in sp ecto r, fo u n d B arker ‘en tirely ig n o ra n t’ u p o n the subject o f F M D and reported th at m any o f the anim als ‘successfully’ treated had never actually suffered from F M D . H ow ever, the e n o rm o u s local faith in D r Shaw ’s rem edy caused the 1924 c o m m itte e o f in q u iry to override M A F ’s objections an d com m ission a scientific test, in the h o p e th a t this w o u ld convince C heshire farm ers o f its w o rth lessn ess.16 A lth o u g h m an y anim als had practically recovered by the tim e M A F v eterinary inspectors arrived, they w ere slaughtered anyway, m u ch to the fury o f th eir ow ners. T h e local press publicized the case o f M r W in w ard , a M alpas fa rm e r w h o had sp e n t a fo rtn ig h t n u rsin g his a n im a ls b ack to health. H e th en argued th a t because they were no longer contagious there was no need to kill th e m , a n d appealed to G e rm a n to in te rv en e on his behalf. G e rm an refused, a n d soon th e slaughter team arrived. T h e y killed W in w ard ’s 100 cows, o f w hich 94 were du e to calve in spring, and returned several days later to slaughter his pigs. H e told a friend: ‘T h is place is hell! T h e y are pole-axing in the sh ip p o n s a n d sh o o tin g th em in the field; 13 are now on the fire; the stench is unbearable, I am going away.’17 R eports o f M A F cruelty a n d in co m p eten ce a b o u n d ed , fuelling fu rth er d e m a n d s for a change in F M D co n tro l policy.18 O n e classic a cc o u n t was delivered by farm er Jo sep h W illet to th e 1924 c o m m itte e o f in q u iry in FM D : I saw on 17 th D ecem ber 1 4 heifers in a fie ld adjacent to the county M a in R o a d near Calverly Station. Two a t least were visibly affected w ith the disease a n d were slavering. I saw them again on the 18th. O ne a n im a l h a d its head through the rails on the fo o tp a th . T he new spaper boy w a lk e d before m e a n d swished a t it as he passed w ith his bag o f newspapers. On Sunday, 2 3 r d Decem ber, the 1 4 were collected on a railw ay bridge, p e n n ed in by gates, area about 1 00 square yards. A n inspector came fro m W hitchurch a t 1 0 .3 0 am. H e hadforgotten his killer. H e e n q u ire d w here he c o u ld borrow a g u n a n d secured an ordinary sporting g un fro m the D avenport Arms. H e took it w ith a pocketful o f cartridges, w ent on the bridge a n d w hile the church bells were ringing he blew out the brains o f the 1 4 heifers. A visitor fro m the inn h adfollow ed the inspector a n d was a witness to the act. This m an was sum m oned fo r going onto an infected

40

A M anufactured Plague?

fa rm w ith o u t a perm it. Just a bout this tim e the police officer in the local court stated th a t it was an offence to destroy, by killing, one a n im a l in the sight o f another. Inform ation was la id as to the shooting on the bridge. The police declined to prosecute a n d w ith d rew the su m m o n s taken o u t a g a in st the witness. The anim als were left lying on the bridge u n til the fo llow ing Tuesday when a local waggoner brought a num ber o f horses in traces a n d dragged them to a hole prepared 3 0 0 yards aw ay.v)

A

C O U N T Y U N D E R SIEGE

By m id D ecem ber, 7 0 0 0 C heshire cattle h a d lost th eir lives. Local new s­ p apers a d o p te d an in creasingly desp e ra te to n e a n d p u b lish e d evocative accounts o f th e c o n d itio n s experienced by those u n d e r siege from F M D . G angs o f labourers - w hom m any farm ers blam ed for spreading the disease - proceeded daily from N a n tw ich to dig trenches, sh o o t cattle, build pyres and feed the flam es w ith dead anim als (see Plate 14). Lorries bearing coal a nd w o o d traversed th e c o u n try sid e . Farm ers experienced ‘th e agony o f listening to th e G reen er killer p u n c tu a te the m o m e n ts w hen death passes along lines o f assem bled cattle’. In villages, m en cursed w hile w om en w ept. A t nig h t, chains o f fires lit up th e co u n try sid e, th e sm oke ‘defacing it w ith its s in is te r e n v e lo p m e n t a n d p e n e tra tin g to farm s far b e y o n d ’. T h o se left u naffected w ith d rew in to th eir ho m es to w ait o u t the siege, locking gates a n d placing d isin fe c ta n t soaked straw across p a th s, su m m o n e d to the outside w orld only by bells placed outsid e the gate. T h ey ro u n d e d up th e ir c a ttle a n d p lac ed th e m in d o o rs for safety; b u t still th e re w as no respite to ‘the biggest blow th a t o u r local agriculture has suffered in living m em o ry ’ a n d ‘th e ho rrib le pest extends, till ru in stares the farm er in the face’. F o o tp a th s were closed, h u n tin g sto p p e d a n d social fu n c tio n s were cancelled; all agricultural business ceased, and labourers, w ho were n o t then e n title d to claim u n e m p lo y m en t benefit, w ere th ro w n o u t o f w ork an d left d e stitu te .20 T h e sm o k e a n d sm e ll fro m th e p yres w as p a r tic u la r ly perv asiv e. A ccording to a D aily M a il jo u rn alist, ‘O v e r a w'ide area the strong, sickly sm ell o f b u rn in g flesh is inescapable and d u rin g the d ay tim e, c louds o f sm oke d rift slow ly over the fields.’21 M a n y believed th a t the sm oke was responsible for d issem inating virus, a view given scientific credibility by D r Sloane, a m edical officer at the c o u n ty sa n a to riu m , w ho believed th a t fires d id n o t reach a high e n o u g h te m p e ra tu re to kill th e v iru s.22 T h e 1924 c o m m itte e o f in q u ir y la te r a d d re sse d th is issue. M e m b e rs ’ view s are illustrated in the follow ing exchange, w hich also provides insights in to the

The Epidemics o f 1922—1924

\

respective characters o f G erm an, a hard-nosed, arrogant m an, and Stock­ m an, w ho was m ore sym pathetic to the rural plight: G erm an: 7 went to some burnings during an outbreak; I d id not th in k there was anything offensive about it a t all. ’ Stockm an: 'No, there is not; b u t the people were suffering from nerves; they saw the fires blazing a t night a n d it kept it all before th em .’ C aptain Pretym an (chairm an): ‘It was an additional horror?’ Stockm an: 'It was, from the farm ers’poin t o f view. . .it is really a sentim ental feeling a n d we are prepared to meet that where it arises. . .you could not look out o f a w indow or go out o f doors withou t seeing a fire a n d it kept the whole horror o f the thing before them a ll the time. ’ W B rom ley-D avenport: 'It was rather a w fu l in Cheshire?’ Stockm an: ‘Yes. ’ W Sm ith: ‘To see those continuous fires exercised a very depressing influence on the people generally a n d contributed very much to the antagonism to the policy o f slaughtering.' S to ck m an : 7 th in k we should consider th a t sort o f th in g i f hum an sentim ent is involved, a n d bury where we can.' G erm an: ‘I t seems to me very weak-kneed, sir.' Stockm an: 'You have had, as we have had, the letters o f com­ p la in t that came in. It m ust be very real in the m inds o f these people. ’ G erm an: 'Their m inds are not very strong.?’ Stockm an: 'Doyou th in k the majority o f people’s m inds are very strong?’ B rom ley-D avenport: 'There is a very widespread belief that the fires d id spread the disease, however wrong it may be from a scien­ tific p o in t o f view; but fro m a practical p o in t o f view these people d id believe that the smoke was, as they said, spreading the disease.’23 As F M D con tin u ed to rage, farm ers grew anxious that soon there w ould be no dairy cows left in C heshire, and called for the preservation o f the few stock that rem ained, w ith o u t w hich all hope o f regaining the traditional way o f life w ould be lost. T h ey railed against M A F ’s policy o f restricting the ‘privilege’ o f isolation to m en o f influence, and dem anded its extension to their young and in-calf dairy cows. But Cheshire was a lone voice, which failed to dissuade national agricultural organizations from passing repeated resolutions in su p p o rt o f the slaughter policy. In desperation, the Crewe Chronicle cried: ‘IT IS T H E V O IC E O F T H E C O U N T Y W E W ANT, not

4 2

^ M anufactured Plague?

th a t o f th e c o u n try , th e N F U o r a n y o th e r o rg a n iz a tio n .’ It urg ed farm ers to tak e m a tte rs in to th e ir ow n h a n d s, fo r th e d e v asta tio n w as to o terrib le to w a it a n y lo n g er.24 As th e situ a tio n in C h e sh ire in te n sified , c riticism s o f in c o m p e te n c e , vacillation, d iso rg a n iz atio n a n d ig n o ran ce w ere h e ap e d u p o n the v eterin ary d e p a r tm e n t, a n d S to c k m a n w as fo rc e d to d e fe n d his c h o se n p o lic y in m em o s to th e press a n d in w ritte n responses to th e letters th a t p o u re d in to his office. H e late r c o m p la in e d : ‘T h e re w as a n e w sp a p e r s tu n t o rg a n iz ed against us, a n d I h a d to c o m e o ff w h a t I call m y n a tu ra l w o rk a n d do a great deal o f th is so rt o f fig h tin g to stiffen up the p o sitio n . . . I sh o u ld never have been asked to do it.’25 T h e 1 9 2 2 e p id e m ic h a d already tak e n its toll u p o n S to c k m a n ’s stre n g th , a n d he h a d c o m p la in e d b itte rly to th e first c o m m itte e o f in q u iry o f the appalling w o rking c o n d itio n s th at he a n d his staff had faced: People in charge like M r S m a r t, M r Piggott, M r Jackson a n d myself, a n d so fo rth , were terribly overworked. I t was som etim es a question o f w hether we could physically stick it out; b u t we do fe e l th a t in these tim es, a lth o u g h w e k n o w th a t econom y is necessary, it is not right to k ill us. We were a t it till 1 2 o’c lock a t n ig h t over a n d over again, S u n d a y after Sunday, Saturday after Saturday. . .you could say th a t the Diseases o f A n im a ls Branch s ta ff should n o t be sweated. . .you cannot get first-class w ork out o f m en w ho are d e a d tired.16 C o n d itio n s w ere n o d iffere n t in 1923. M A F v e terinary inspector, M r Berry, w as th e e p id e m ic ’s first v ic tim . H is u n c e a sin g a n d largely u n su c c essfu l efforts to tackle F M D in S o u th C h e sh ire resu lted in illness; b u t fearin g the loss o f his p e n sio n he refused to step d o w n a n d e v en tu ally suffered a h e art a tta c k . F a rm e rs b e lie v e d h im i n c o m p e te n t; b u t S to c k m a n v ig o ro u sly d e fen d e d Berry, a lo n g w ith th e rest o f his staff: ‘It has been a b so lu te slavery for th e m ; b u t w e have all sto o d it a n d we arc n o t g o in g to c o m p la in , b u t w e are n o t p re p are d to accep t b lam e if o u r h e a lth b re ak s.’ H e later sp o k e o f his ow n stru g g le again st F M D , sta tin g : ‘I am 54 n o w a n d I su p p o se I lo o k y o u n g e r. I am n o t lik ely to b re ak d o w n now ; I have h a d to o m a n y tria ls.’27 S u ch c o n fid e n c e w as sadly m isp la c ed . S to c k m a n , to o , b e ca m e a v ictim o f F M D , d y in g su d d e n ly ju st tw o years later. D u r i n g D e c e m b e r 1 9 2 3 , th e n a tio n a l p re ss b e c a m e in c re a s in g ly im p a tie n t w ith M A F ’s efforts, a n d as th e d e a th toll an d th e c o m p e n sa tio n bill grew, political p ressure m o u n te d fo r a c h an g e in F M D c o n tro l policy.28 T h e g o v e r n m e n t d e c id e d to a p p o i n t a sp e c ia l c a b in e t c o m m i tt e e to c o n sid er th e situ a tio n . A t its first m e e tin g o n 11 D e ce m b er, th e c o m m itte e d e c id e d t h a t s la u g h te r s h o u ld c o n tin u e fo r th e tim e b e in g . H o w ev e r,

The Epidemics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4

m em bers q u estio n ed S to ck m an ’s con v ictio n th a t this was the only m eth o d o f ta c k lin g F M D , a n d in v ite d e m in e n t m ed ical sc ie n tist a n d d ire c to rgeneral o f the A rm y M edical Services, L ie u te n a n t-G e n e ra l Sir W illiam L eishm an, to pass an o p in io n on the m atter. L eishm an replied th a t a lack o f sc ie n tific k n o w le d g e a b o u t th e n a tu re a n d sp re ad o f F M D m ad e it im possible to evaluate the existing policy. H e w en t on to reco m m en d m ore research in to the disease, a n d his in p u t e n co u ra g ed th e g o v e rn m e n t to e sta b lish a F M D research c o m m itte e , w h ic h b e g an w o rk d u r in g th e su m m e r o f 1924 (see C h a p te r 5).29 Pressed by a d e p u ta tio n o f C h e sh ire farm ers, S to c k m a n agreed to atte n d a m eeting at C rew e on 20 D ecem ber, as did Sir Francis F loud, M A F p e rm a n e n t secretary. T h e re , th e tw o m en ex p erien ced a ‘full a n d fran k ex p ressio n o f view s a n d c o n sid e ra b le c ritic ism o f th e m e th o d s o f th e m in istry ’. Farm ers w ere angry an d in d ig n a n t at M A F ’s c o n tin u in g failure to c o n tro l F M D . T h e y w ere in no m o o d to a c c e p t th e p ro -s la u g h te r a rg u m e n ts p u t fo rw ard by S to c k m a n , F lo u d a n d G e rm a n , a n d instead d e m a n d ed perm ission to isolate th e ir stock. S to ck m an and Floud argued th a t isolation w ould lead to even greater hardships th a n slaughter. Farm s w o u ld have to be q u a ra n tin e d for m o n th s u n d e r th e surveillance o f an ‘arm y ’ o f officials. T h e re w o u ld be no g o v e rn m e n t co m p e n sa tio n , an d the c o u n ty w ould be ostracized by the n atio n . In an y case, it was im possible to isolate selected cows because there was no fair m eans o f decid in g w hich to save a n d w hich to sacrifice. In d eed , S to ck m an privately believed th a t n o n e were w o rth saving. H e told the c o m m itte e o f inquiry: ‘I do n o t like to say it, b u t in C heshire I have never seen such a collection o f bad cows in all m y life.’50 T h ere was p robably som e tru th in this claim , despite the local rhetoric. Bovine tuberculosis (T B ) was prevalent in the area, an d the lack o f farm ing particip atio n in M A F ’s m ilk recording schem e suggests that few C heshire farm ers were interested in im p ro v in g m ilk p ro d u c tio n by the selective breeding o f livestock.51 A lth o u g h som e farm ers w ere sw ayed by S to ck m an ’s po rtray al o f the dangers, difficulties an d costs o f isolation, the m ore desperate a m o n g them re je cte d th e official lin e. T h e y d e m a n d e d th a t M A F take n o te o f th e suffering inflicted by the slaughter policy an d g ran t them the right to w ork to w a rd s th e ir ow n sa lv a tio n . T h e y p ro p o s e d a re s o lu tio n : w h o le sa le slaughter had n o t achieved its desired object, an d therefore isolation and tre a tm e n t m u st b egin im m ed iately , u n d e r c o n d itio n s w o rk e d o u t by a co m m ittee o f dairy farm ers in consu ltatio n w ith MAF. It passed by 63 votes to 59, th o u g h there w ere n u m ero u s ab sten tio n s. T h e C h esh ire C h a m b e r o f A griculture an d C heshire and Shropshire Farm ers’ U n io n branches then conferred in selecting a sta n d in g c o m m itte e to discuss fu tu re policy w ith Stockm an. T h e m ajority o f its m em bers su p p o rted slaughter an d they failed

44

A M anufactured Plague?

to agree u p o n an alternative policy. O n hearing the news, on e farm er told th e local press: ‘W e are at a d e a d e n d , a n d m u s t sit d o w n a n d w a tch Cheshire’s great dairy stock roasted in front o f o u r eyes.’32 In o th e r areas o f Britain, where slaughter had succeeded in first c o n ­ taining a nd later elim inating F M D , farmers a d o p te d an u n c o m p ro m isin g a tt i tu d e to w a rds C h e s h i r e ’s pligh t. T h e y feared t h a t u n d e r a policy o f isolation, F M D w o uld escape from the c o u n ty m ore easily, a n d so insisted that the slaughter m u st continue. A b a n d o n e d by the nation, a p r o fo u n d sense o f iso latio n s e ttle d over C h e s h i r e . C h r i s t m a s c e l e b r a t io n s were cancelled as disease c o n ti n u e d to ram p age, a n d c hu rchg oe rs in C h e ster cathedral prayed for deliverance from the plague th at ha d befallen them . B ut the siege also gave rise to a sense o f solidarity as farmers, practising ve te rin a ry su rgeons, local a u th o r i t y officials, a n d l a n d o w n e r Sir H e n r y T olle m a ch e j o in e d in o p p o s in g the slaugh ter.33 Also p r o m i n e n t in this c am paign were several Cheshire medical officers o f health, w'ho c o n d e m n e d S to c k m a n ’s ‘policy o f delay, obstruction and in ep titu d e ’ at farm ers’ m ee t­ ings a nd in the press.34 S to c k m a n genuin ely sym pathized with Cheshire farmers’ complaints. H e told the c o m m itte e o f inquiry: W hen they attacked us, o f course, I do not say they were not right in m a n y cases fr o m th eir p o in t o f view. They said: 'W e are suffering fo r the good o f h u m a n ity a n d we have suffered rather too much. ’ I was in absolute sym pathy w ith them , a n d I w ould not say a hard w ord to anyone about that,35 However, he was infuriated by the inte rvention o f medical officials in w h at he regarded as a purely veterinary a n d agricultural affair. D octo rs were, at t h a t t im e , h e ld in sig n ific a n tly g re a te r estee m t h a n vets. T h e i r views influenced public op in io n , a n d seriously u n d e r m i n e d S to c k m a n ’s personal a nd professional a u tho rity (see C h a p te r 4). H e tried, w it h o u t success, to persuade the c o m m itte e o f inquiry to criticize the offending individuals: I do n o t th in k th a t sh o u ld have been allowed. . .th e trouble created by these official people, people o f standing, was enormous d uring the fig h t. We h a d m eeting after m eeting to stop the riot, a n d as S ir W illiam [Brom ley D a v e n p o r t, lo rd -lie u te n an t o f C heshire and m e m b e r o f the c o m m itte e o f inquiry] knows, it was a question o f letting them h it a t us; we sim ply d id not bother w ith anything, w a itin g u n til we h a d this outbreak o f disease settled. N o w th a t is done, we fe e l we ought to tackle the m en w hom we th in k im p e d ed our efforts. . . I th in k i t was

The Epidemics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4

^5

perfectly disgraceful th a t they should have been allow ed to do that. I m ake th a t protest because a t the tim e I f e l t it a heavy obstacle to success, although I set m y teeth a n d stuck it out.36 A f u r t h e r m e e tin g b etw een S to c k m a n a n d the fa rm e rs’ c o m m i tt e e was s c h e d u le d at C r e w e o n 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 2 4 . By t h e n , C h e s h i r e h a d lost ap proxim ately 2 0 ,0 0 0 cattle, o f which 90 per c ent were in calf, an d in the previous week had experienced a record 211 new outbreaks o f disease. W ord spread that this w o u ld be a public m eeting, a n d as the c om m itte e began its deliberations, betw een 2 00 a n d 3 00 angry farmers, m a n y o f w h o m had lost their stock, sto rm ed the room in w h ich the m eetin g was taking place. G e r m a n tried hastily to calm the a narchic crowd a n d the terrified c o m m i t ­ tee w ith d re w into a n o th e r ro om , leaving formers to hold an im p r o m p t u mass meeting. Stirring speeches were made, d e n o u n c in g M A F ’s ignorance o f F M D a nd its in com pe te n ce in executing the slaughter policy. Farmers cited n u m e r o u s instances in w hich infected anim als h a d recovered from F M D before ‘red tape cam e along a nd killed th e m ’. T h e y argued th at the official definition o f isolation was unacceptable a n d that other, less arduous m e th o d s o f disease control were possible. A resolution d e m a n d i n g an end to t h e sla u g h te r was s u p p o r t e d by all b u t six. Several h o u r s later, the com m ittee an n o u n ce d the result o f its deliberations. Six m em bers had voted in favour o f slaughter a nd five against. It declined to take further responsi­ bility for action a n d asked the C heshire C h a m b e r a nd Cheshire Farmers’ U n i o n to arrange a vote u p o n the matter. T h ese events m ade national news. Even the pro-establishm ent Times was m oved by the display o f local feeling, arguin g th at it was tim e for the go v e rn m e n t to realize th at the drastic enforc e m e nt o f slaughter, however m u c h re co m m e n d e d as a general rule, m ay have ceased to m ake e cono m ic sense in Cheshire. T h e Crewe Chronicle criticized the c o m m i tt e e ’s ‘lame conclusion’; b u t the Cheshire Observer welcom ed the novel a nd democratic idea o f allowing farmers to vote. All seemed co nfiden t o f an overw helm in g v o te a g ain st t h e sl a u g h te r policy.37 T h e C h e s h i r e C o u n t y Diseases o f A n i m a l s C o m m i t t e e i m m e d i a t e l y passed a r e s o l u ti o n s u p p o r t i n g the e x te n sio n o f iso lation to d a ir y c a ttle ,38 a n d the C h e s h ir e C h a m b e r o f Agriculture similarly urged M A F to suspend the slaughter. However, to the surprise o f onlookers, 14 o u t o f the 18 branches o f the Cheshire Farm ers’ U nio n voted against isolation. C o m p la ints abou t the irregularity o f the vote so o n f ollo w ed . M a n y b r a n c h e s h a d a p p a r e n t l y failed to d i f f e re n tia te betw een completely replacing slaughter w ith isolation and c o n tin u in g to slaughter while perm itting isolation in selected cases. W h ere this distinction had been m ade, a m ajority favoured the latter o p t io n . 39 T h e inconclusive o u t c o m e o f the vote forced the decision back to the original c o m m itte e,

4 (5

A M anufactured Plague?

w h ic h m e t on 8 J a n u a r y w ith S to c k m a n a n d F lo ud. After a f o u r - h o u r discussion, it voted upo n extending isolation to selected dairy cattle in cases where b o th M A F a n d the ow n e r agreed. T h e first vote was evenly split and in the second, advocates o f isolation lost by one vote. T h is left S tockm an w ith a free h a n d to c o n tin u e the slaughter policy.40 Stock m ans decision to involve local farmers in discussions ab out F M D c ontrol was unique to Cheshire, and reveals the tension th at lay at the heart o f the slaughter policy. In m a n y ways, this was a dictato rial policy th at o v e rro d e i n d iv i d u a l or local d i s e a s e - c o n tr o l p re fe re n c e s in f a v o u r o f unifo rm , c o m pulsory an d centralized action. At the same tim e, however, its success d e p e n d e d u p o n the v o l u n ta ry actions o f in d iv id u a l farmers. M A F officials w e re help less u n t il s t o c k o w n e r s i n f o r m e d t h e m o f the appearance o f F M D , a n d disease could n o t be c o n ta in ed unless farmers a d o p t e d ‘s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t e d ’ b u t n o t legislatively e n fo rc e d m o d e s o f b e h a v i o u r , su c h as c o n f i n i n g th e m se lv e s to t h e i r h o m e s a n d p l a c i n g disinfected straw mats outside farm gates. Legally, the policy had few ‘teeth’, a nd the absence o f m ajor deterrents to law-breaking forced M A F to d e pend u p o n the willing c om plianc e o f c once rned individuals. In m o st parts o f Britain, Sto c km a n h a d m anaged to gain the necessary farm ing su p p o rt by a rguing th at slaughter was the cheapest, m o st effective m e th o d o f disease control, a nd th at in restoring Britain’s valued freedom from F M D , it w ould b en efit the n a tio n as a w hole. In C he shire, however, d esperate farm ers refused to accept these a rg um e nts. T h e i r lack o f su p p o r t th rea te n e d the future o f S to c k m a n ’s preferred policy a n d forced him to the negotiating table. M a n y o f S t o c k m a n ’s critics were e xtre m e ly pleased to h e ar o f his m ee tings w ith the fa rm ers’ c o m m i tt e e . T h e y felt th a t M A F h a d at last acknowledged their suffering a n d accepted the validity o f their complaints, a n d for a short period, they su spended their attack on the slaughter policy. T h is was n ot the only way in which the c o m m i tt e e ’s deliberations be n e ­ f i t e d S t o c k m a n . F M D c o n tr o l b e ca m e a p rivate r a th e r t h a n a p u b lic m atter. ‘R a n k - a n d - f ile ’ activists c o u ld no lo nger d o m in a t e th e agenda, while the representatives o f agricultural organizations - which at a national level s u p p o rte d the slaughter policy - gained a greater say. Consequently, the c o m m itte e agreed to let Stoc km a n persist w ith the slaughter until an alternative h a d been decided up o n . T h is decision was crucial because, on the g r ou nd, fu ture chie f ve terinary officer P J Kelland was slowly catching up with F M D . H e sto p p e d the t im e -c o n s u m in g process o f salvaging m eat from healthy contact animals, tried to slaughter the m ost infectious animals first, and organized agricultural stu den ts a n d farmers’ sons into an effective labour force. H e gained valuable assistance from Jo h n D o n e , a local farmer a n d p r o m i n e n t Ch e shire Farm ers’ U n i o n official, w h o threw' his weight

The Epidemics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4

/±~j

b e h in d the slaughter policy, a cc o m m o d a te d Kelland at his farm, a n d urged his colleagues to p a r tic ip a te in F M D c o n tro l. N o t all a p p r e c ia te d his effo rts; h e was b r a n d e d a ‘m i n i s t r y m a n ’ a n d o stra cize d by t h e local c om m unity. Nevertheless, in late December, his a nd Kelland’s efforts began to pay off a n d the epid em ic w e nt into decline.41 As a result o f these developm ents the m ost pressing issue for Stockman as he b e g an m e e t in g s w i t h th e f a r m e r s ’ c o m m i t t e e was n o t w h e t h e r s l a u g h te r c o u ld c o n t r o l F M D , b u t w h e t h e r it w o u l d be a llo w e d th e opportunity. H e k new that m ost critics objected n o t to the slaughter policy itself b u t to the ineffective m a n n e r in w hich it ha d been executed. I f he c ould only m ain tain it for a few m ore days until the falling incidence o f F M D b ecam e clear, the battle w o u ld be won. T h e c o m m itte e ’s decision to allow a fa rm in g vote u p o n F M D c o n tro l b o u g h t an a d d itio n a l stay o f execution. Voting at the various branches to o k over a week. M o s t farmers were inexperienced in politics a nd una cc usto m e d to taking decisions that affected others in a ddition to themselves. Faced with a highly controversial an d politically i m p o rt a n t decision, and pressed by farmers’ leaders to take a 'broad, unselfish’ view o f the situation, m o st proved relu ctant to follow th ro u g h the expressions o f resistance th at had characterized public m ee t­ ings.42 Fearing to step i n to th e u n k n o w n a n d a d o p t a po licy o p p o s e d o u tr ig h t by M A F and the N F U , th ey agreed th a t slaughter should c o n ­ tinue, with the possible exception o f selected animals.

R eso lutio n

and

aftermath

Several p r o m in e n t op p o n e n ts o f slaughter refused to accept the c o m m itte e ’s narrow rejection o f partial isolation a nd persisted in their d e m a n d s for a change in policy. Led by Sir H e n r y Tollemache, they form ed a d e p u ta tio n a n d travelled to L o n d o n to m e e t w ith S t o c k m a n . T h e y to ld h i m th a t because the c o m m i t t e e h a d c o n ta i n e d representatives o f n e ig h b o u r i n g counties, it h a d n o t accurately represented the view o f Cheshire farmers, m ost o f w h o m su p p o r te d the isolation o f selected he rds.43 Realizing that th e issue was n o t going to go away, Sto c k m a n reluctantly agreed to pe rm it isolation, in carefully circumscribed areas only, o f selected cases chose n by his officials in consultation w ith a farmers’ com m ittee. H e w a rn ed th at few anim als w o u ld be eligible, there w o u ld be no c o m pe nsa tion , and e m p h a ­ sized that his actions did n ot represent a departure from the slaughter policy.44 A few days later, S t o c k m a n e x p a n d e d u p o n his decision in c o rre ­ spon de nc e to J Sadler o f the C heshire C ha m be r, w h o forwarded it to the local press for public ation. In his letter, S to c k m a n expressed his ho p e that th e ‘m enta l strain ’ suffered by Che sh ire farmers w o u ld n o t result in any

43

^ M anufactured Plague?

‘m is u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ o f his actions. H e claimed to have been in favour o f partial isolation from the very start, b u t ha d been unable to act because farmers had d e m a n d e d com pensation and insisted upo n their right to select animals for isolation. In w ithdraw ing these ‘impossible’ conditions they had cleared their own path to partial isolation, which was a ppropri ate only in very lim ited circumstances. H e h o p e d that farmers w ou ld now allow the slaughter to proceed u n h in d e r e d , a n d w o u ld n o t hold any m ore meetings since they enabled the infection to spread.45 Tollemache a n d his colleagues bitterly rejected S to c k m a n ’s claim that the full onu s for disease control ha d always rested w ith farmers, w h o had becom e m ore en ligh ten ed over time. H e a n d his colleagues still believed t h a t s l a u g h te r h a d b e en a to ta lly i n a p p r o p r i a t e r e sp o n se to F M D in C h e sh ir e a n d th a t M A F ’s con ce ssion o c c u r r e d m u c h too late to m ak e a m ends. But their influence waned as disease incidence fell d u r in g January 1924 .46 As Sto c k m a n ha d predicted, criticisms o f the slaughter lessened. T h e y diminished further in February, w h e n the g overnm ent a n n o u n c e d the a p p o i n t m e n t o f a scientific research c o m m i t t e e to investigate ways o f ‘m ak in g F M D less h arm fu l to Britain’. In the e nd , a h a ndfu l o f farmers benefited from M A F ’s policy concession. In February, S to c k m a n offered to help farmers restock the c o u n ty on c o n ditio n th at partial isolation cease. Local farmers’ leaders, w h o believed th a t the e nd o f the epid em ic was now in sight, agreed to this proposal, a n d the region was r e tu r n e d to a fully fledged slaughter policy.47 T h e r e were only six cases o f F M D in M arch, n o ne in April a nd one in May. W it h the passing o f the crisis, farmers began to look to the future. T h e y re sto c k e d t h e ir e m p t y fa rm s, m a r k e ts r e s u m e d a n d , slowly, life r e tu r n e d to n o r m a l . 48 In the m e a n tim e , th e p o s t - m o r te m began. As in 1922, the c o m m itte e o f in q u iry in to the ep ide m ic was chaired by landow'ner C a p ta in Ernest Pretyman. O t h e r m em b ers included H a rry G e r m a n o f the N F U a n d Sir W illia m Bromley D a v e n p o rt, the lord lie utena nt o f Cheshire w'ho h a d chaired the c o m m itte e o f C heshire farm ers.49 Several representatives from Cheshire attended its hearings and subm itted extremely d a m n i n g e v id e n ce . Sir W i l l i a m H o d g s o n o f th e C o u n t y Diseases o f A n im als C o m m i t t e e c laim ed th a t M A F ’s a ction s h a d a m o u n t e d to ‘an a d m in istratio n o f despotism a n d ty ranny w hich is n o t in consonance w ith the ethics o f the British p eople’. O t h e r witnesses argued that slaughter had su cceed ed o n ly because there were n o livestock left in C h e sh ire. T h e y accused officials o f failing to c o n tro l disease p ro m p tly , o f carryin g the infection betw een farm s a n d w ro n g ly refusing offers o f help from local a uthorities a nd veterinary surgeons. In response to this onslaught, Stock­ m an claimed that farmers a nd dealers had w'ilfully concealed F M D , evaded m o v e m e n t re g u la tio n s a n d n eglected to d isinfec t them selves. Also, in

The Epidemics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4

49

forcing him to defend the slaughter, they had diverted him from his true line o f work, the elim ination o f disease.’ 0 Records o f the c o m m itte e ’s proceedings show that, from the very o u t ­ set, it was u tte rly c o n v in c e d o f th e m erits o f slaughter. P r e ty m a n told Stockman: The slaughter policy is undoubtedly the only one policy. There is no difference o f opinion. There is no single h u m a n being th a t I kn o w o f th a t has any com m on sense or an y know ledge o f the subject th a t is not in fa v o u r o f the slaughter policy. . .b u t a half­ hearted policy is a fa ta l thing a n d it is because the policy has been carried out in a rather h alting manner, not by you b u t by the country, th a t it has not succeeded,51 Believing that the pro blem lay n o t in the slaughter policy itself b u t in the m a n n e r o f its execution, c o m m itte e m em b e rs took little heed o f the p r o ­ isolationist views o f C heshire representatives a nd rep orted th a t ‘A policy o f isolation w o u l d be e q u iv a l e n t to th e a b a n d o n m e n t o f a n y h o p e o f eradicating the disease from this c ountry.’ T h e y clearly saw F M D control as a national problem th a t could only be c o m b a te d effectively by a policy th a t placed th e interests o f the n a tio n above those o f th e region o r the individual. F M D control was the responsibility o f central go vernm ent, and as the state bore the cost, stockowners a n d local auth oritie s had no right to select the policy. W h ile a d m ittin g that M A F had been disorganized a n d inefficient, the c o m m itte e ’s report h ighlighted m an y o th e r reasons for the delayed control o f F M D , su ch as th e ‘indiffe renc e o f the o w n e r to t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f p r o m p t r e p o r t i n g ’ a n d the failure o f local a u th o r itie s to take effective precautions against disease spread. It proposed to rectify these problem s by e n h a n c in g the compulsory, centralized a n d paternalistic n a ture o f F M D c o n tr o l a n d m in i m iz i n g the role o f discretionary, in d iv id u a l a n d local decisio n-m aking .52 Stoc k m a n welcom ed these suggestions, claiming ‘there is only o n e so u n d way o f dealing w ith disease, a n d that is by autocratic powers. . . It m u st be th a t the powers are invested in the c h ie f a d m i n i ­ strator, w h o m u s t act at onc e.’53 O n its publication in M a rch 1925, the c o m m itte e ’s report m arke d the close o f a t u m u l t u o u s p e r io d in t h e h i s t o r y o f F M D . In e c h o i n g its predecessors e n d o r se m e n t o f the slaughter, this second Pretym an c o m m i t ­ tee set the seal u p o n the three-year transfo rm a tio n o f the slaughter policy from new and controversial measure to proven, effective m e th o d o f F M D co n tro l. T h e events o f 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 2 4 were therefore crucial in ge n era tin g acceptance o f a policy th at was to survive into the 21st century. For a brief

50

A M anufactured Plague?

pe riod, th e o p p o n e n t s o f sla ug hte r sto o d a very real c h a n c e o f o v e r tu rn i n g w h a t they q u ite rightly view ed as an u n te s te d a n d inefficient policy. H a d they su cceed ed , the h isto ry o f F M D in Britain a n d the w o rld w o u l d lo ok v e ry d i f f e r e n t. As it w as, h o w e v er, s e r i o u s r e sista n c e t o s l a u g h t e r d i s ­ ap p e a re d as the disease c am e u n d e r c o n tr o l a n d the policy finally proved its w o rth . W id e s p r e a d criticism s did n o t re-em erge u n til 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 , w h e n in the face o f w id e sp rea d F M D , m e m b e r s o f the p u b lic again called for an e n d to the slaughter, this tim e d e m a n d i n g its re p la ce m ent w ith vaccination. A l t h o u g h t h e 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 4 C h e s h ir e e p id e m ic was so o n f o r g o tte n , it ha d t r e m e n d o u s historical significance. T h e eventu al e lim in a tio n o f F M D a n d the P r e ty m a n c o m m i t t e e s s u p p o r t for the sla ugh te r c o nv inc ed officials t h a t this m e a su re c o u ld a n d s h o u ld c o n tro l F M D , a n d th at they h a d been r ig h t to resist p u b l ic p re ssure for a c h a n g e in policy. I m b u e d w i t h ne w c o n f i d e n c e , t h e y c hose , d u r i n g s u b s e q u e n t e p id e m ic s , to s l a u g h t e r all infected a nim a ls, even p e d igre e stock, a n d saw little reason to n e g o tia te w ith their critics. N e ver again did th e C V O allow o r d i n a r y farm ers to vote u p o n F M D c o n tr o l, a n d th e h a n d f u l o f cattle pre served from sla u g h te r in 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 4 were, w ith th e e x ce p tion o f a few e x p e r im e n ta l anim als, the last British livestock ever to recover from th e disease. T h e fate o f F M D infected a n im a ls a n d their o w n e rs was sealed so t h a t w h e n , over 4 0 years later, a n o t h e r F M D e p i d e m i c h i t C h e s h i r e , f a rm e r s s u f f e r e d as t h e i r an cestors h a d suffered th e loss o f h u n d r e d s o f th o u s a n d s o f stock. It is i m p o r t a n t to re cognize the timeless q u a lity o f th e social, financial a n d psychological h a rdsh ips inflicted by th e official F M D c o n tro l policy. T h is c h a p t e r relates th e suffe rin g o f a sm all rural c o m m u n i t y over 80 years ago, w h e n b o t h ag ric ulture a n d th e role o f g o v e r n m e n t w ere very different t h a n today. B u t as C h a p te r s 7 a n d 8 will show, witness repo rts d a ti n g from 1967 o r 2 001 stro ngly r e sem bled the expressions o f fear, anger, panic a n d so rrow related here. T h is is the h u m a n tragedy o f F M D . It will recur as the disease recurs, for as lo n g as the British g o v e r n m e n t persists in a policy o f slaughter.

Chapter 4

Effects on the A n g lo -A rg en tin e M eat Trade, 1 9 2 4 -1 9 3 9

T

h e rise o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l

MEAT T RADE At the tu rn o f the 2 0 th century, Argentina was a prosperous and peaceful nation, half way th ro u g h a 50-year period o f remarkable e cono m ic growth. Its m o st im p o r t a n t p rodu c ts were livestock and agricultural goods, and its m o st i m p o rt a n t m ark e t was industrial Britain, w hich needed m ea t to feed th e b u r g e o n in g u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n . In re tu rn , A r g e n tin a ab sorb ed large quantities o f British m anufactured goods. Meanwhile, British investors built railways across th e A rgentin e pam pas, b o u g h t up m ea t-p a c kin g plants and sh ip p in g lines, and participated in Argentin e com m erce, bank ing , govern­ m e n t b on ds and public services. Indeed, links between the two nations were so close th at Argentin a was som etim es regarded as an unofficial m e m b e r o f the British E m pire. T h e im porta n ce o f cattle ra nching to the A rgentine national econ om y was reflected in the political d o m in a n c e o f an aristocratic lan d o w n in g elite, which h a d consolidated its hold over vast tracts o f land by d riv in g o u t i n d ig e n o u s p eoples. M a n y jo in e d th e A r g e n t in e Rural Society, and invested heavily in British pedigree anim als in an a tt e m p t to improve the quality o f indigenous stock. A r g e n tin a ’s e c o n o m ic success resulted m ainly from the e xpo nen tial gro w th o f its m ea t e x port trade, w h ic h was facilitated by the late 19thcentu ry discovery o f new m e th o d s o f freezing a n d refrigerating meat. T h e early 188 0s saw the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f several frigorificos (w hic h were a c o m b in a tio n o f slaughterhouse, m eat-packing plant a n d cold store) along the estuary o f the River Plate. T h e owners, mostly British, b o u g h t livestock direct from the farmer, slaughte red th e m a n d packed the carcasses o n to refrigerated ships for the voyage to Britain. Between 1890 a nd 1899, they

^2

A M anufactured Plague?

se n t an average 3 8 , 5 0 0 t o n n e s o f frozen m u t t o n a n d lam b , a n d 2 8 0 0 t o n n e s o f frozen b e e f to th e U K each year. M e a n w h i le , a d v a n c e s in steam ship design cut jou rney times betw een Argentina an d E n gland from three m o n th s to three weeks, allowing companies to ship live animals across the A tlan tic for sla u g h te r o n arrival in Britain. By the later 1890s, an average 7 0 , 7 5 6 fat stock m a d e the jo u rn ey every year, a n d trade profits soared to record levels. However, there was a cloud on the horizon. Foot a n d m o u th disease (F M D ) h a d arrived in A rgentina d u rin g the late 1860s, a nd by 1900 it had becom e endem ic. O n learning that the disease had spread to Buenos Aires Province, where m ost m eat a n d livestock export businesses were situated, the British Board o f A griculture a n n o u n c e d th at it w ou ld no longer accept Argentine livestock imports. H o p i n g to persuade the board to change its policy, the A rge ntine g o v e r n m e n t passed F M D c o n tro l legislation. T h is required the isolation o f infected anim als a n d prevented the m o v e m e n t o f livestock off infected premises. C o n v in ce d , the board re opened the ports in 1903; b u t d u r i n g the m o n t h s th a t followed, its vete rin ary inspectors discovered several cargoes o f F M D -in f e c te d Argentin e cattle, and the ban was swiftly re-impose d. From then o n , the board ignored repeated A rge n ­ tine assurances th at F M D was u n d e r control a n d refused to resume trade, claiming th a t the dead m eat trade was a considerably m ore h u m a n e way o f sh ippin g m eat to Britain. T h e Argentine g o v e rn m e n t believed - a n d n ot w it h o u t g ro und s - that the board still suspected its livestock o f h a rb ouring F M D . Its national pride affronted, it c o n d e m n e d the trade ban as politic­ ally m o ti v a te d a n d a n n o u n c e d in 1910 t h a t it w o u l d h e n c e f o r th o nly accept British livestock im p o rts w h e n Britain ha d been free o f F M D for six m o n th s . British agriculturalists saw this as an unjustified retaliatory policy a nd lobbied vigorously for its relaxation; b u t it was five years before the A rgen tine g o v e rn m e n t gave way.1 T h e Argentine g o v e rn m e n t’s reaction to the b o a rd ’s trade em bargo was o u t o f all p r o p o r t i o n to its e c o n o m i c i m p a c t , as t u r n - o f - t h e - c e n t u r y im p r o v e m e n ts in refrigeration techniq ues m e a n t th at livestock could be easily e x p o r te d in the sh a p e o f ch illed m e a t. T h i s p r o d u c t was m o re perishable a nd required m ore careful ha n d lin g th an frozen meat, b u t was po p ular w ith the c o n su m e r a nd significantly cheaper th an the fresh-killed British p r o d u c t . As the c hilled m e a t trad e e x p a n d e d , n e w firm s were estab lish e d , s o m e o f t h e m U S o w n e d , a l t h o u g h the h u g e i n v e s tm e n t needed to fo u n d a n d ru n a frigorifico restricted the n u m b e r o f competitors. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the m ea t trade to the A r g e n tin e n a tio n a l e c o n o m y m e a n t th at the ow'ners o f these plants wielded considerable power. They in te rm itten tly fou ght for control o f the market; b u t m ost o f the tim e they maxim ized their profits by operating as a ‘p o o l’ that shared o u t shipping

Effects on the Anglo-Argentine M eat Trade

^^

space a n d re gulated exp orts to Britain a c c o rdin g to d e m a n d . T h e y also exerted som e control over supply by purchasing large quantities o f cattle direct from the larger ranches (estaneias) a n d filling any excess shipp ing space with livestock b o u g h t at local markets. D u r i n g the 1910s, the Argentin e m eat trade c o n tin u e d to grow. But in 1921, by which tim e m eat exports stood at an a n nual 4 0 5 ,0 0 0 tonnes, the post-war depression led to a sud den fall in d e m a n d , m u c h to the alarm o f cattle producers. After two years in the do ld ru m s , trade recovered; b u t from then on d e m a n d fluctuated a n d cattle ra nching be came a m u c h less secure venture than in past years. M a n y Argentines, nevertheless, c o ntin ue d to pin their hopes u p o n the further expansion o f the m eat trade, w hich they believed w o u ld e nh anc e national e con om ic d e v elo p m en t a n d allow their c o u n t r y to c o m p e t e w ith th e US for c o m m e r c i a l lea d ers h ip in S o u t h America. T h e m ost im p o r t a n t threat to these am b itio n s was F M D , which c o n tin u e d to spread unchecked. British (and Am erican) auth orities were increasingly c oncerned by this state o f affairs, a n d w hen , in 1926, British scientists discovered th a t the m ea t o f infected anim als could convey the F M D virus, th e future o f the A rg e n tin e m e a t e x p o rt trade h u n g in the balance.2 T h e problem o f preventin g F M D from ente rin g Britain in Argentine m ea t im p o rts was to vex farmers, veterinary surgeons, officials a n d m eat traders in b o th countries for over 40 years. T h e issue finally cam e to a head in 1967—1968 (see C h a p te r 7). T h is chapter examines early debates in the years leading up to W o rld W ar II, a n d explores the ‘spin’, su bterfuge a n d scientific m anipulation that characterized the British g overnm ent’s response to the disease threat. As earlier chapters showed, F M D was n o t simply a scientific problem or a biological disease. It was also an issue o f trem end ous political, e co nom ic and cultural im p o rta n ce , a nd was to exert a powerful influence u p o n 2 0 th - c e n tu r y A n g lo -A r g e n tin e relations.

Suspicio ns

aroused

?

It was d u r i n g the m id 1920s th at veterinary officials o f the M in istr y o f A gric ulture a n d Fisheries (M A F) first began to consider w h e t h e r F M D c ould spread via infected meat. T h e y h a d k n o w n for som e tim e that virus was present in the blood d u ring the early stages o f F M D infection, an d that in o c u la tio n o f in fected b lo o d in to susceptib le a n im als caused disease.3 H ow ever, ne w eviden ce o b ta i n e d by the 1924 P r e ty m a n c o m m i t t e e o f inquiry suggested that, on several occasions, pigs had contracted F M D after eating swill containing scraps o f foreign meat.'* T his was a potentially serious matter: fresh-killed m eat from Europe, and chilled and frozen imports from

A M anufactured Plague?

S o uth America, N e w Z ealan d a n d Australia, m ade up over 50 per c en t o f British m eat supplies, a n d in the form er two regions, F M D was rife. In a new leaflet, Advice to Farmers on F M D ’, M A F r e c o m m e n d e d th at they boil swill before feeding to kill any virus.5 M eanwhile, the chie f veterinary officer ( C V O ), Stewart Stoc k m a n , tried to obtain m ore definite in fo rm a ­ tion o n the d u r a ti o n o f virus survival at different te m p e ra t u r e s a n d in different parts o f the body. T h is project was one o f several taken up in 1924 by the newly f o r m e d F M D Research C o m m i t t e e ( F M D R C ) , o f w h ic h Sto c k m a n was a m em ber. Scientists also tried, w ith o u t success, to detect F M D virus in pigs’ feet i m p o r t e d from H o l l a n d . S to c k m a n w a n t e d to obtain a dditional experimental material from diseased animals killed at the A rgentin e frigorificos. H e travelled to Argentina to investigate the m a tte r further, b u t died sudden ly on his re tu rn .6 Evidence o btained d u rin g the s u m m e r o f 1926 swept away all re m a in ­ ing d ou bts on the matter. M A F ve terinary officials investigating a disease o u t b r e a k in cattle at C a r lu k e , L an arkshire, revealed t h a t th e so urce o f infection was a nearby bacon factory, from which virus had spread either in factory effluent, w hich had c o n ta m in a te d nearby grazing pastures, or by carriage on w o rk m e n ’s clothes. Significantly, the factory had recently begun to im p o rt pig carcasses from the C o n t i n e n t for curing, a nd on inspection, several showed typical F M D lesions on their feet. Scientists th en d e m o n ­ strated th a t tissue samples taken from i m p o r t e d D u t c h carcasses caused sy m p tom s o f F M D w h e n inoculate d into a susceptible cow. H e re was the p r o o f t h a t M A F ha d b een l o o k in g for. S h o rtly afterw ards, M i n i s t e r o f A g r ic u ltu r e W a lte r G u i n n e s s i n f o r m e d th e n a ti o n o f the d iscovery o f ‘definite a n d com plete evidence th at F M D is b ro u g h t into the c o u n try by foreign m e a t’. C laim in g th at fu rther steps were needed to secure Britain’s boundaries, he a n n o u n c e d a fo r th c o m in g ban u p o n im p o rts o f carcasses an d offal from F M D -in fe c te d E uropean n a t i o n s / At first, farm ing organizations were extremely pleased by the trade ban. Lord M ild m a y o f the Royal Agricultural Society (RAS) tru m p e ted : ‘A t last there had com e the o p p o r t u n it y o f dealing w ith a m o st d a ngerous channel o f infection’. Criticisms cam e mostly from p articipants in the C o n tin e n ta l trade, whose businesses faced ruin. T h e y argued that the trade em bargo was unjust, that it had halved the L o n d o n m eat su pply a n d created price rises. M A F spokesm en dismissed such complaints, p o in tin g o u t th at the volum e o f C o n t in e n t a l i m p o rts was extremely small, a n d th a t a ccording to data collected by the N ational Farmers’ U n io n (N F U ) , the ban had n o t affected the retail price o f m ea t.8 Before long, however, M A F ’s m ea t im p o rt policy becam e the subject o f a w ide-ranging controversy th at was played o u t in Parliam ent a n d in the meetings o f agricultural a nd trade organizations. Following the im position

Effects on the A nglo-A rgentine M ea t Trade

^^

o f th e C o n t i n e n t a l trad e b a n , farm ers a n d o t h e r inte rested parties natu rally w a n t e d to k n o w w h a t action M A F p r o p o s e d to take against m e a t im p o r ts from F M D - i n f e c t e d S o u th A m e ric a n c o u n tr ie s .9 G u in n e s s replied th a t no a ctio n was necessary, as scientific e x p e rim e n ts h a d sh o w ed o n ly t h a t virus c o u ld survive in fresh carcasses b r o u g h t fro m the C o n t i n e n t , n o t in frozen carcasses from S o u th A m erica. In th a t case, asked c o n s u m e r s ’ re p re se n ta ­ tives, c o u ld he allow th e i m p o r t a ti o n o f frozen m ea t from the C o n t in e n t ? N o , replied G u in n e ss, for there was n o reason to su p p o s e th a t virus d id not survive in frozen m eat. B ut w'hy, asked his critics, d id he persist in allowing c hilled m e a t im p o r t s from A r g e n t in a w h e n it was k n o w n th at the b lo o d th ey c o n ta i n e d c o u ld carry infection? Because, he a rgued, S o u t h A m e ric a n i m p o r t s p r e se n te d a lesser ‘degree o f d a n g e r ’ t h a n E u r o p e a n m eat. F M D was less p re valent in th at p a r t o f the w o rld , c o n tro l m easures w ere m o re effective, a n d there was a greater possibility t h a t virus w'ould die o u t d u r i n g th e long j o u r n e y to Britain. Also, there was no direct evid ence th a t S o u th A m e r ic a n m e a t im p o r t s h a d ever caused a British F M D o u t b r e a k . 10 In fact, G u i n n e s s ’s claims w'ere highly q u e stio n a b le. A l m o s t all S o u th A m e r ic a n m e a t i m p o r t s c a m e from A rg e n tin a , w h e re no official statistics o f F M D in cid ence existed a n d disease was re p u te d ly widespread. M A F had no k n o w le d ge o f th e c o n tr o l m easures used there, a n d o n seeking o u t such in f o r m a t io n , learned t h a t th e i m p l e m e n t a t io n o f m easures i n tr o d u c e d in 19 00 a n d 1 902 was s p a s m o d ic a n d evasion w ide sprea d . It was im possible to say w h e t h e r A r g e n tin e m e a t was d a n g e r o u s because scientific investiga­ tion s were still in their early stages, a n d th e feet o f A r g e n tin e carcasses were c o m m o n l y re m ove d before export. H ow ever, C V O R a lph Jackson believed th a t s o o n e r o r later the F M D virus w o u l d be d e te cte d in A r g e n tin e m ea t a n d ‘t h e n a serious s i t u a t i o n will have to be fa ce d ’. Also, G u i n n e s s h a d overstated the significance o f scientists' findings. T h e y h a d carried o u t only o n e in o c u l a ti o n e x p e r i m e n t , a n d th e m ate ria l used h a d n o t c o m e fro m carcasses c o n ta i n e d w i th in the C a r lu k e factory at th e tim e o f the o u tb r e a k . H e n c e , there was n o direct scientific p r o o f th a t C o n t i n e n t a l m e a t im p o rts ha d ‘c aused’ a British F M D o u t b r e a k . 11 T h is m ass o f evid ence shows clearly th a t G u i n n e s s was e n g a g in g in a c o v e r -u p o p e r a t io n . B u t w h a t was his m o tiv a tio n ? A fter all, F M D was a w idely feared disease t h a t h a d recently caused tw o o f the m o s t expensive, devastating B ritish e pide m ic s o n record. In sh ort, there was far m o r e at stake th a n British agricu lture. As far as th e British g o v e r n m e n t was c o n c e rn e d , the interests o f th e c o n su m er, the m a n u f a c t u r e r a n d th e investo r t o o k pre ce denc e over th ose o f th e farmer, a n d M A F h a d to a d ju s t its a g e n d a accordingly. Britain sim p ly c o u ld n o t feed itself w i t h o u t A rg e n tin e m e a t im p o rts. Even if d o m e s tic p r o d u c ti o n a n d im p o r t s f ro m F M D - f r e e c o u n tries su c h as N e w Z e a la n d a n d Australia increased, they could n o t m atc h the h uge volumes supplied by th e Argentin e

^(5

A M anufactured Plague?

trade. Interference w ith the latter w o u l d th erefore increase the price o f meat. Political agitation w o u ld surely follow, for the British valued m eat c o n s u m p tio n extremely highly, n o t only on nu tritio nal gro u n d s b u t also because it sym boliz ed affluence a n d social status. T h e g o v e r n m e n t had lea rned bitter lessons only four years before in a row over the C a n a d ia n livestock i m p o r t trade . A l t h o u g h C a n a d a was t h e n free o f the m a j o r co n ta g io u s diseases o f livestock, the agricu ltural lobby a n d m in iste r o f agriculture, Sir A r th u r Griffith-Boscawen, opposed the relaxation o f a trade e m b a rg o im p o s e d 30 years earlier w h e n bovine p l e u r o - p n e u m o n i a was discovered in C a n a d ia n cattle. Critics such as the D aily Express, w hich ran a massive cam paign in s u p p o r t o f trade re su m p tio n , accused the govern­ m e n t o f d e p r iv in g th e p o p u l a t i o n o f c h ea p m eat. N e w ly e n fra n c h is e d u rb a n voters expressed their displeasure by tu r n in g Boscawcn o u t o f his D u d le y seat at the next by-election. T h e message was clear: d o n ’t m eddle with the peop le’s food. T h e r e w'as a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t reason w h y th e British g o v e r n m e n t refused to ban A rg entine m eat imports. It k new that the m eat trade was o f trem en d o u s econom ic im po rta nce to Argentina a n d was heavily invested with national pride. For these reasons, the Argentine g o ve rn m e n t was likely to retaliate - as it had in 1910 - against British im posed trade restrictions. Such m easure s w o u l d also h a rm British investors, w h o h a d substantial stakes in the frigoriftcos, railways a n d shipping. O n balance, therefore, the m e a t trad e h a d to c o n ti n u e , despite th e t h r e a t th a t it posed to British ag ricu lture.12 T h e fact th at agriculture was aw'arded so low a priority by the British go v e rn m e n t was indicative o f its declining influence a nd perceived irrelev­ ance to national prosperity. T h e drift away from the land, which had begun du rin g the early years o f the Industrial Revolution, c o n tin u e d d u rin g the late 19th a n d early 2 0 th century. Agriculture - especially the arable sector - fell into deep depression as foreign countries that were better eq u ip p e d to p r o d u c e cheap food e x p o rte d surpluses to Britain a n d , in exchange, a b s o r b e d large q u a n t i t i e s o f B ritish m a n u f a c t u r i n g g o o d s. By 1 9 1 3 , agriculture c o n trib u ted only 6.4 per cent o f gross d om estic p ro d u c t ( G D P ) com pa red to 18.4 per cen t in 1856. M a n y landlords were forced to reduce rents in order to retain tenan t farmers, or to sell off parcels o f land. As their in co m e d r o p p e d , they spen t less o n their estates; land was poorly m a i n ­ tained, a n d building s a nd m a c h in e ry fell into disrepair. Lloyd G e o rg e ’s 190 9 b u d g e t, w h ic h i n t r o d u c e d ne w taxes targ e te d at the l a n d o w n in g classes, further eroded their W'ealth. T h e re was a b rief revival o f agricultural fortunes d u rin g W orld W ar I, w h e n the g o v e rn m e n t realized, belatedly, the crucial im p o r t a n c e o f increasing d o m es tic food p r o d u c ti o n to m ak e up for lost im ports. But in 1919, in a policy U - t u r n later term ed the ‘great

Effects on the Anglo-Argentine M eat Trade

betrayal’, it repealed w a rtim e legislation that had guaran teed farmers fixed prices for corn. Food im p orts resum ed a n d British agriculture once again sank into depression. D u rin g the 1920s, a sizeable n u m b e r o f agrarian Tory m em be rs o f parliam e n t (MPs) lo bbied Parlia m ent on b e h a lf o f the rural in terest, w h ile th e N F U b e g an to assert itself politically. B u t d iv id e d priorities a n d political in fig h tin g m e a n t th a t they failed to c aptu re the Parliam entary agenda; a nd at a tim e w h e n Britain’s e co n o m y was failing, e x p o r ts w ere c o n t r a c t i n g a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t was risin g , a g r ic u lt u r e re m ained low d ow n on the g o v e rn m e n t’s list o f priorities.13 M o s t o f t h e social, p o litica l a n d c o m m e r c i a l fa ctors t h a t sh a p e d go ve rnm e nt attitu des towards the Argentin e m eat trade were n o t explained to the public. M A F sp okesm en did occasionally a d m it to the impossibility o f depriving the public o f so im p o r t a n t a source o f meat, but the m ajority o f their p r o n o u n c e m e n t s p e rp etu ate d the m y th that policy was guided by science. However, officials were well aware o f the contradictions in here n t in the g o v e r n m e n t ’s m e a t i m p o r t policy. B e h in d th e scenes, th ey tried hurriedly to establish som e sort o f disease control fram ework that w ould sup port the m inister’s claims a b o u t the safety o f Argentine meat. T h e C V O , R a lp h Ja c k so n , m e t w ith J u a n R iche let, th e v e te r in a r y a tt a c h e to the Argentin e embassy in L o n d o n , a nd C o lonel D u n l o p Young, a veterinary e x p e r t o n t h e m e a t t r a d e w h o h a d re c e n tly visite d A r g e n t in a . A fter com piling b a ck grou nd inform ation u p o n the natu re o f the Argentine meat trade a n d the scale o f the F M D problem , th e m e n decided th at the best m e t h o d o f r e d u c i n g t h e F M D risk to B rita in was for th e A r g e n t in e g o v e r n m e n t to i n tr o d u c e ne w trad e regula tions. T h e s e sh o u ld pre v en t diseased animals from leaving the estaneias, an d p ro hibit their slaughter for export. M A F shou ld also station on e or two veterinary inspectors p e rm a ­ nently in the region to check that these measures work ed properly. Initially, the Argentine response to these suggestions was n o t encourag­ ing. T h e am bassador to L o n d o n , D o n Evanisto U rib u ru , argued that there was no evidence that A rgentine chilled m eat could convey infection, that effective F M D controls were already in place a nd that, in any case, F M D was a mild, u n p roblem atic disease. Jackson told h im th at F M D was widely feared in Britain and that farmers were pressing for an outrigh t ban on m eat im ports from infected countries. I f Argentina did n o t take action a n d new e vidence em e rg ed to sh ow th at virus c o u ld survive in chilled m eat, the British g o v e rn m e n t could no longer m ake the case for treating the Argen­ tine and C o n tin e n tal m eat trades differently. T his a rg u m e n t had the desired effect. In Sep tem ber 1926, the A rgentine g o v e rn m e n t agreed in principle to M A F ’s suggestions on co n d itio n that they were also accepted by o th e r m eat-e xpo rtin g S o uth Am eric an nations. M A F was delighted, describing the a greem ent as a u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t y by w h ich G re at Britain protects

^g

A M anufactured Plague?

itself at th e expense o f the e x p o r ti n g c o u n t r y ’. T h e n , a c tin g t h r o u g h the Foreign Office, it o p e n e d n e g o tia tio n s w ith the g o v e r n m e n ts o f Uru guay, Brazil a n d C h i l e . 14 B efore th e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s c o u l d be f o r m a l i z e d , B ritish s c ie n tists a n n o u n c e d new discoveries th a t h e ig h t e n e d th e con tro versy s u r r o u n d i n g the A rge n tine m e a t trade. T h e i r ex perim en ts, p e rfo r m e d u p o n the carcasses o f artificially in fecte d livestock, revealed t h a t in b e e f a n d b a c o n , p re pare d a n d stored u n d e r sta n d a r d c o m m e rc ial c o n d itio n s, the F M D virus survived up to 8 7 days in th e b o n e m a r r o w a n d 4 6 days in th e b loo d. W h e n b ones f rom in fecte d a nim als were c ru s h e d a n d fed to pigs, th ey caused abrasions to the m o u t h a n d g u m s, t h r o u g h w h ic h virus p re sent in the b o n e m a r r o w co u ld e n te r the b o d y a n d cause disease. T h e s e results, w hich were p u b lish ed in F e b r u a ry 1 9 2 7 a n d J u n e 19 2 8 , sh o w ed u n e q u iv o c a lly th a t i f in fected an im als were slaughtered in A rg e n tin a a n d e x p o rte d to Britain, virus c o uld easily survive th e jo u r n e y a n d initiate o u tb r e a k s o f F M D via th e feeding o f pigswill.15 T h e y th erefore u n d e r m i n e d G u i n n e s s ’s claim th a t A rg e n tin e m e a t im p o r t s were far less d a n g e r o u s th a n th ose fro m th e C o n t i n e n t In response to this news, M A F passed t h e F M D (Boiling o f A n im a l F oodstuffs) O r d e r , w h ic h re q uire d swill to b e boiled for o n e hour. T h is , it cla im ed, w o u l d ensu re t h a t in th e u nlik ely event o f in fecte d carcasses b eing i m p o r t e d , they c o u ld n o t initiate infection. Officials also arg u ed t h a t the n e w f i n d in g s p r o v e d t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n r i g h t to b a n t h e C o n t i n e n t a l t r a d e . 16 T h e d irec to r o f th e D u t c h State V eterin ary Service disagreed. H e w a s still a g g r ie v e d b y M A F ’s t r a d e e m b a r g o , a n d to p r o v e its lack o f ju stification he cited G e r m a n a n d D u t c h scientific findin gs. T h e s e s h o w ed t h a t pigs fed w i t h th e flesh o f F M D i n f e c te d a n im a ls d i d n o t c o n t r a c t F M D , a n d th a t F M D virus was killed rapid ly by the rise in m u scle acidity t h a t oc cu rre d after d e a t h . 1 T h e F M D R C t h o u g h t these results insignifi­ can t because even if virus did n o t survive in m eat, it c o u ld e n d u r e for m a n y weeks in t h e b o n e m arro w , offal a n d l y m p h no d e s. In any case, a rg u e d G u i n n e s s , th e de fin ite pro v e n link be tw e e n British F M D o u t b re a k s a n d i m p o r t e d D u t c h carcasses m e a n t t h a t n o a m o u n t o f la b o ra to ry -d e r i v e d evid ence c o u ld pe rsu ad e h i m to re o p en th e p o r t s . 18 M A F ’s critics again d re w a tt e n t i o n to the in co n s is te n c y o f its actions. W h y did it require a trad e e m b a r g o to sto p C o n t i n e n t a l i m p o r t s o f virus, b u t o n ly sw ill-b o ilin g to p re v e n t A r g e n t i n e m e a t f r o m c a u s in g disease? Surely, arg u ed f a rm i n g s p o k e s m e n , th e g o v e r n m e n t s h o u ld take h e ed o f r e c e n t s c ie n tif ic f i n d i n g s a n d e x t e n d its b a n to c o v e r A r g e n t i n e m e a t i m p o r t s . 15 O n the contrary, c la im e d representatives o f the m e a t trade, the g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d p e r m i t t h e C o n t i n e n t a l t r a d e to re s u m e p r o v i d i n g co u n tries a d o p te d the sam e a d m in istrativ e m easures as A rg e n tin a . Again, G u in n e ss tried to deflect criticism s by h ig h lig h tin g t h e proven link betw een

Effects on the Anglo-Argentine M eat Trade

^C)

C o n tin e n ta l m ea t im p o rts a n d British F M D . 20 But leading agriculturalists refused to accept his explanation, arguing th at the g o v e rn m e n t’s policy was confused, c o n tra dic tory a n d d o w n r ig h t wrong. Even if swill-boiling was successful - which was unlikely, as it was impossible to enforce - there were m a n y o t h e r p o tential routes o f disease spread. H u m a n s w'ho cam e into c o n ta ct w ith infected m ea t c ou ld carry the virus u p o n their clothes a nd boots, dogs c ould carry infected bones into farmyards, a n d pigs could feed o ff rubbish heaps co n ta in in g scraps o f infected m eat a n d bones. T h e y also d o u b t e d w h e th er the A rgentine go v e rn m e n t could be trusted to carry o ut th e prop ose d adm inistrative measures. In any case, it was n o t en o u g h to reduce the disease risk, because even one case o f F M D im p o r ta tio n could have a d e v a s ta tin g effect o n British a g ric u ltu re . I n ste a d , risk m u s t be removed altogether by m eans o f a trade b a n .21 S o m e h i s t o r ia n s believe t h a t B ritish fa rm e rs o n l y s u p p o r t e d the b a n n in g o f Argentine m eat im p o rts because they knew it w o u ld result in h igher prices for h o m e - p r o d u c e d m e a t . 22 In certain cases, this was u n ­ d o u b t e d l y tru e . F or e x am p le, t h e C o u n c il o f A g r ic u ltu r e for E n g la n d s u p p o r t e d a resolution p u t forward by G eorge C o u r t h o p e w'hich stated th at, due to the survival o f F M D virus in the b o n e m arrow , all chilled A rgentine m eat im p orts shou ld be b o n e d . C o u r t h o p e later a d m itte d that his aim was to force the Argentines to freeze all their m ea t exports, thereby elim inating trade c o m p e titio n between hom e-killed an d Argentine chilled m e a t.23 S u p p o r t e d by th e RAS, f o rm e r President o f the Board o f A gri­ c ulture L ord Ernie suggested th a t M A F place all chilled A rgen tine m eat im ports in cold storage for three weeks after arrival in order to kill the virus. T h i s w o u l d have th e a d d itio n a l effect o f e n su rin g t h a t A rg e n tin e m eat looked far less palatable than the British variety.24 However, British farmers’ d e m a n d s were n o t entirely self-interested a n d arose partly from their very real fear o f F M D . M a n y h a d suffe red a p p a l l in g h a r d s h i p d u r i n g the epidemics o f 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 2 4 a nd w hen, after several years’ lull, F M D incidence increased d u rin g the early m o n th s o f 1928, they were extremely concerned that a n o th e r epidem ic was just a ro u n d the corner. Like the vast majority o f the po p u latio n , they had great faith in scientific enquiry, a n d believed th at recent discoveries d e m o n s tra ted a real risk o f F M D invasion. A n d in h igh ligh ting the m u ltiple a n d indirect routes o f F M D spread, they were o n l y e c h o i n g a r g u m e n t s used by M A F officials to ju stify th e ir earlier e m bargo u p o n Irish livestock imports. Guinn ess a n d his colleagues tried to deflect criticism by claiming that scientists had merely dem onstrated the ‘theoretical’ possibility that Argentine m ea t could convey F M D virus, a nd th a t this shou ld be distinguished from th e actual experience o f viral carriage by C o n tin e n ta l carcasses. But, at the sam e tim e, he argued th at it was n o t necessary to search for a m ore definite

60

A M anufactured Plague?

link betw een Argentin e m eat im p orts and British F M D cases - for e x am ­ ple, by feeding Argentin e m ea t to pigs a n d w aiting to see if they developed s y m ptom s - as this w ou ld merely ‘test the existence o f a c ontingency which has already been a d m itte d an d which has already been provided against’.25 Even if germ s were im p o r te d in Argentin e meat, they were n ot dangerous unless they gained access to susceptible livestock. T h e illegal feeding o f u n ­ b o i le d swill was t h e o n l y way in w h i c h this c o u ld h a p p e n ; all o t h e r p o stu late d routes o f virus tr a nsm issio n were m ere ‘sp e c u la tio n ’.26 Such claims no t only c o n tra dic ted the c o m m o n l y accepted view o f F M D as a highly conta gious disease that was capable o f spreading via m ultiple a n d indirect routes. T h e y also portrayed scientific research as an activity that had little o r no relation to the real world, a n d which should certainly not form the basis for policy decisions.

T

he

A rg entine

rea c tio n

Meanwhile , trouble was brewing in A rgentina over the i n tro d u c tio n o f the new F M D control measures. In S ep tem ber 1927, J L Frood, M A F veterin ­ ary adviser in Buenos Aires, rep orted th a t the A rgen tine auth oritie s had insufficient resources to i m p l e m e n t c o n tro ls, a n d t h a t o p p o s i t io n was widespread and evasion c o m m o n p la c e . Som e parties, su ch as the British n ewspaper Review o f the R iver Plate t h o u g h t th a t the new regulations were necessary to c o u n te r a c t British farm ers’ calls for a c o m p le te trade ban. However, m an y cattle producers, frigorifico owners a n d politicians argued t h a t th ey were w h o lly u n ju s tifie d a n d resisted th e i r i m p o s it i o n . T h e y c la im ed th a t F M D was only a m ild, insignificant a ilm en t, th a t existing F M D controls were completely effective a nd that all Argentine livestock were healthy. H a vin g assisted Jackson in fram ing the new regulations, Juan Richelet, A rgentine veterinary attache, now claimed that his co u n try never e xported diseased m eat because o f its system o f veterinary m eat inspection, w hich was a m o n g the best in the world. M a n y Argentine critics believed that the British g o v e rn m e n t’s drive for a dditional F M D controls was a political act. T h e y k ne w th at moves were afoot in Britain to replace the free trade policy th a t h a d prevailed since Victorian times with a new policy o f imperial preference, w hich w ould levy duties on i m p o rts from foreign countries a n d g ra n t preference to goods from the empire a nd d o m in io n s. O n learning th at m ea t exporters such as N e w Z e a la n d a n d Australia were n o t re qu ire d to a d o p t the sam e trade regulations as South A m erican countries, they accused the British govern­ m e n t o f using F M D as a smokescreen to disguise its in tro d u c tio n o f a new trade policy.27

Effects on the Anglo-Argentine M eat Trade

]

At h o m e, Guin ness a n d his M A F colleagues played do w n the signifi­ cance o f British scientists’ findings in order to deflect calls for a meat im po rt b a n . B u t t h e y p lay e d u p t h e i r i m p o r t a n c e d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s w ith Argentine officials w ho were, as yet, un con vin ced o f the need for new trade regulations. Unfortunately , this tactic backfired because the US was using th e same scientific evidence to justify an ou trig h t ban on Argentine meat im p o r ts.28 Like Britain, the US pursued a goal o f national freedom from F M D . It applied a similar set o f preventative a n d co ntro l measures, a nd had suffered only occasional epidemics, in 1870, 1880, 1884, 1902, 1908 a n d 1914. In 1924, a devastating e ig h t- m o n th -lo n g F M D epidem ic struck California, resulting in the slaughter o f over 100 ,00 0 anim als at a cost o f approxim ately U S $ 7 million. In its afterm ath , the g o v e rn m e n t introdu c ed a package o f additional control measures, including a ban on m eat im ports from F M D - in fe c te d regions, w hich came into operation in J an uary 1927. In c o n tr a s t to B rita in , th e US p r o d u c e d e n o u g h m e a t to feed its people, and so it i m p o rte d only small volumes from A rgentina. N e v erth e ­ less, A rg e n tin e politicians, cattle p r odu c ers a n d frigoriftco owners vehe­ m en tly resisted its trade em bargo on a c c o u n t o f the ‘diseased’ stigma that it attached to their animals. M A F ’s refusal to follow' suit provoked outrage a m o n g British farm ers, a n d led A r g e n tin e interests to assum e t h a t the scientific evidence o f virus survival in m eat was unsubstantiated. Guin ness’s parliam entary speeches lent su p p o r t to this view by referring disparagingly to scientific t h e o ry ’. As seen earlier, D u t c h a n d G e r m a n scientists also d i s p u t e d the sign ific a nce o f the F M D R C ’s fin d in g s , as d id A r g e n tin e veterinary scientist, D r Josd Lignieres. Referring to the recent discovery o f three types o f F M D virus, A, O a n d C, Lignieres declared th at the virus present in Britain was an O type. It could not, therefore, have originated in A rgentina, where, according to his test results, the A type prevailed (the F M D R C later retyped his samples an d de em ed this c onclusion invalid). M e a n w h i le , p r o m i n e n t F re n c h F M D e x p e r t Professor Vallee t o ld the A rgentine Rural Society that as m ea t was only one o f m a n y ways by which F M D could ente r a n d spread t h r o u g h o u t a nation, its significance should n o t be overstated.29 S o m e a u th o r s have a rg u ed t h a t the A r g e n t in e failure to recognize F M D as a terrible plague was du e to ign orance.30 T h is is unfair. W h ile the A r g e n t in e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f F M D was very d iffere n t from t h a t w'hich prevailed in Britain, it was n o t irrational. As we have already seen, the main reason w h y British farmers dreaded F M D was because o f the h ardships inflicted by measures used to control the disease. In A rgentina, there were no such controls a n d therefore the disease had very different social and e conom ic implications. It also presented a far milder clinical picture. F M D sy m p to m s were n o t particularly severe in fattening stock w he n com p ared

2

A M anufactured Plague?

to b re e d in g o r d a iry cattle, a n d fre q u e n t b o u t s o f infection w o u l d have left A r g e n t i n e c a t t le w i t h a h i g h d e g re e o f i m m u n i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , m o s t A rge n tine a nim als were reared extensively o n vast estancias, w h ere they were h a n d l e d in f r e q u e n tl y a n d t h e i r c o n d i t i o n m o n i t o r e d o n ly occasionally. C o n se q u e n tly , the effects o f F M D were n o t closely observed. So a lth o u g h c au s ed by th e sa m e virus, F M D was actually a very dif fe r e n t disease in Britain a n d A rg e n tin a . I nd e ed, after readin g British d e sc rip tio n s o f F M D , m a n y A rg e n tin e s sim p ly d id n o t believe t h a t it was the sa m e as th e m ild a ilm e n t th at they called aftosa. M o s t t h o u g h t th a t try in g to c o n tr o l F M D w o u l d cause greater financial losses t h a n th e disease itself. A n d , living in a c o u n t r y w h e re F M D was e n d e m i c a n d w h e r e infec tion spread m o stly via th e m o v e m e n t s o f i n f e c te d sto c k , t h e y s i m p ly d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d the British fixation w ith disease im p o r t a ti o n . N o r did Vallee, w h o c am e from France, w h e re F M D was sim ilarly e n d e m ic . It is u n su rp r isin g , therefore, th at the A rgen tines a d o p te d h im as their scientific ‘c h a m p i o n ’ in o pp o sitio n to the F M D R C . M a n y British c ritics c l a i m e d t h a t t h e A r g e n t i n e g o v e r n m e n t o n l y de n ie d th a t F M D was a p r o b l e m a n d refused to c o m m i t to disease e radica­ t io n b e ca u se it w a n t e d to m a i n t a i n th e m e a t e x p o r t t r a d e a n d to avoid im p o s in g u n p o p u l a r d o m e s tic trade restrictions. To a certain extent this was tr u e . A n e x p o r t b a n w o u l d have seriously u n d e r m i n e d n a tio n a l m o rale, d a m a g e d th e e c o n o m y a n d affected th e g o v e r n m e n t ’s political s t a n d i n g b o t h at h o m e a n d a b road . D o m e s t ic trad e reg ulation s were also p r o b l e m ­ atic. In flu en tial cattle p ro d u c e r s were a n gere d by th e way in w h i c h they tre a te d each vast estancia as a single u n i t, w ith n o livestock m o v e m e n ts b e in g p e r m i t t e d for 21 days a fte r F M D a p p e a r e d . P o w e r f u l frig o rific o ow ne rs o b jec ted to the expense, since disease c o n tro ls in terfered w ith the su p p ly o f livestock a n d r e quire d in fecte d carcasses - o f w h a tev e r q u a lity to be sold cheaply for local c o n s u m p t i o n or as c a n n e d m eat. ' 1 If, ind ee d, F M D was a far m ild e r disease in A rg e n t in a t h a n in Britain, o n e can hardly b lam e A r g e n tin e politicians, livestock ow n e rs a n d b usin e ssm e n for believi­ n g th a t c o n tr o l was m o r e costly t h a n the disease itself. A n d it m u s t n o t be f o r g o t te n t h a t B ritish a tt i tu d e s to w a r d s F M D were sim ila rly s h a p e d by political a n d e c o n o m i c m otives. P r e s s u r iz e d by t h e B r i ti s h g o v e r n m e n t a n d w e ll a w a r e o f B r itis h f a rm e r s ’ d e m a n d s fo r a c o m p l e t e t r a d e b a n , t h e A r g e n t i n e g o v e r n m e n t overrode p o p u l a r resistance a n d passed a decree, in F e bruary 1928, t h a t laid d o w n ne w restrictions u p o n the m o v e m e n t a n d slaugh ter o f F M D - i n f e c t e d anim als. M A F feared t h a t the pow erful o p p o s itio n o f cattle p ro d u c e r s a n d frigorifico o w n e rs w o u l d m e a n th at, like so m u c h o t h e r S o u t h A m e r ic a n legislatio n, th e d e cre e w o u l d n o t be e n f o rc e d . It d e c i d e d , th e re fo re , to sta tio n a v e te r in a r y in s p e c t o r in A r g e n t i n a to c h e c k t h a t m easures were

Effects on the Anglo-Argentine M eat Trade

(^3

properly im p le m e n te d , a n d suggested th at Parliam entary Secretary L ord Bledisloe (formerly Charles Bathurst) take tim e o u t o f a plan n e d pleasure cruise to explain the new regulations to A rge ntine cattle p rod uc ers a nd encourage their e nforcem ent by the state. D u r in g his visit, Bledisloe learned th a t there were few syste m atic a tt e m p t s to pre v en t the e n try o f F M D infected animals into the frigorificos or to halt their export to Britain. H e likened the situation to that o f Britain 60 years previously, a n d argued that im po sing strict controls in a n ation where F M D was generally disregarded w ould only lead to evasion. Instead, he asked estancieros to m ake it ‘a m atter o f h o n o u r a nd conscience’ n o t to move diseased stock a nd to teach other cattle p roducers ab o u t the British fear o f F M D . T his, he believed, w ould m a k e an im p re ss io n u p o n the ‘n o n - E u r o p e a n m i n d . ’ H is visit quelled A r g e n t i n e fears o f an i m m i n e n t t r a d e b a n , w o n over t h e i n f lu e n t ia l Argentine Rural Society a n d led to the signing o f the ‘Bledisloe ag reem en t’, a d o c u m e n t that laid d ow n the c o nditions u n d e r which Argentin a agreed to e xport livestock to Britain.32 T h e Bledisloe a greem ent was a huge relief to MAF. Finally, a nd with confidence, it could state th at measures were in place to stop the export o f diseased livestock from Argentin a to Britain. It also w arn ed farmers th at if they did n o t stop agitating for c o nsistent tre a tm e n t o f C o n t in e n t a l and South Am eric an m ea t trades, it w o u ld be forced to lift the C o n t in e n t a l trade embargo. T h is rhetoric, together w ith the falling incidence o f F M D du rin g the late 1920s a n d early 1930s, d a m p e n e d British farmers’ d em an ds for a trade ban. British farmers’ anxieties also d im inish e d following the visit o f H a r r y G e r m a n , pre sident o f the N F U M e a t an d Livestock C o m m itte e , to Argentin a in O c t o b e r 1928. H e reported that while infected animals did ente r the frigorificos, they were usually detected prior to slaughter, a n d that p o s t - m o r t e m i n s p e c tio n p ro v id e d an a d d it i o n a l safegu ard a g ain st the shipp ing of diseased carcasses to Britain.33

T

w isted

science

Meanw hile , in the laboratory, investigations into virus survival in anim al carcasses c o n tin u e d . In 1930, M A F ’s chie f scientific adviser, D aniel Hall, re q u este d the F M D R C to be g in fe ed in g e x p e r i m e n t s o f a type w h i c h G uin ne ss had previously rejected as worthless. Presum ably because o f the earlier furore over its m ea t im p o rt policy, tests were carried o u t in absolute secrecy, a lthough the Argentin e g o ve rnm e nt was in fo rm e d .34 O n c e a week, Argentin e cattle bones were removed from Smithfield market, crushed and fed to three pigs. Samples were also inoculated into guinea pigs, a species whose susceptibility to F M D infection had been recently de m o n s tra ted by

(^4

A M anufactured Plague?

G e r m a n researcher O t t o W a l d m a n n . O v e r the next 14 days, anim als were observed for signs o f disease. T h e n , in order to rule o u t the possibility that the bones had c o nta in ed an extremely m ild form o f virus w hich h ad n o t p ro d u c e d noticeable disease sy m p to m s b u t had, nevertheless, given rise to disease im m unity, all anim als were inoculate d w ith the F M D virus. T h e presence o f sy m p tom s showed that animals h ad n ot previously e ncountered the disease, while their absence suggested prior infection by virus contained w ithin the bones. T h r o u g h o u t these tests, precautions were taken to prevent extraneous F M D virus from accidentally c o n ta m in a tin g bones or infecting e xperimental anim als.35 Initially, all results proved negative; b u t in August 1930, two out o f three pigs foiled to develop F M D sy m p to m s after virus inoculation. T h e y h a d n o t sh o w n signs o f disease d u r i n g th e 14-day o b se rv atio n period , a lthough guinea pigs in oculated with the same bo n e extract had d o n e so. Paradoxically, w h e n scientists in oculated samples o f tissue a n d blister fluid from the infected guinea pigs into a batch o f i m m u n e guinea pigs, they also developed disease s y m p to m s .36 However, they paid little heed to this part o f the test, k n o w in g from experience that inoculation experim ents so m e ­ tim es gave rise to a m b ig u o u s results. T h e y also k n e w th a t so m e viruses varied in th eir ten d e n cy to infect different species an d in the severity o f disease s y m p t o m s p r o d u c e d . 37 T h e y t h ere fo re d e c id e d t h a t virus had, indeed, been present in the Argentine bones from Smithfield m arket and had, on feeding, ind uced sub-clinical F M D infection in pigs.38 T h e F M D R C (of w hich two p r o m in e n t m em bers —the C V O a nd the head o f the W eybridge Veterinary Laboratory, W I i Andrews - were M A F employees) interpreted the results in a very different way. T h ey decided that the experimental animals had been accidentally infected with a virus th at had recently been tested with in the laboratory a nd had also behaved oddly w h e n i n o c u l a te d i n to i m m u n i z e d g u i n e a p igs.39 T h i s c o n c l u s i o n was certainly viable as tests were occasionally h am pered by the accidental spread o f infection;40 b u t it represented a rath er obscure reading o f experimental results a nd smacked o f political convenience. Keen to shore up the existing F M D control policy, M A F representatives exploited experimental u n c e rt­ a inties in o r d e r to o b t a i n a c o n c l u s i o n th a t s u ite d th e ir p o litica l a n d e cono m ic ends. S u b s eq u e n t events provide a d d itio n al evidence for the c o m m i t t e e s political motives. Feeding experiments c o n tin u e d into 1931, b u t no m ore positive results were ob tain ed. In D e c e m b e r 1932, Jack son s successor as C V O , Jo h n Kelland, told the F M D R C o f the ‘official p ositio n’ u p o n these tests. H e claimed th a t no definite co n clu sio n could be d ra w n from the positive reactions th at had been obtaine d in guinea pigs, a n d that ‘if any [parliamentary] questions arose in the future, the reply sh ould merely state

Effects on the A nglo-A rgentine M ea t Trade

(^5

t h a t sw ine h a d be en fed a n d in o cu la te d w ith m aterial from i m p o r t e d bones o f S o u t h A m e r i c a n o r ig in b u t t h a t n o e v id e n c e o f i n f e c ti o n h a d b e e n o b ta in e d by this m e t h o d ’. T h e c o m m i tt e e a greed.41 T h e following N o v e m ­ ber, K elland arg u ed t h a t feeding e x p erim e n ts s h o u l d be e x clu ded from the c o m m i t t e e ’s next p u b lis h e d progress repo rt. A n d re w s led the c o m m i t t e e in ag ree m e nt, stating t h a t as the results were largely negative, they c o u ld prove m is le a d in g , a n d t h a t it was ‘desirab le to a v o id giving a h a n d le to those w hose interests m ig h t lead t h e m to dra w u n w a rran ta b le c onclusions in their o w n fa v o u r’.42 M e a n w h i l e , it b e c a m e in c re a s in g l y o b v i o u s to M A F officials t h a t A r g e n tin a was still e x p o r tin g F M D - i n f e c t e d m ea t, a n d t h a t British F M D o u t b r e a k s w e re o c c u r r i n g as a re su lt. A c c o r d i n g to J R F r o o d , M A F ’s vete rin ary inspector in A rge ntina , the Bledisloe a g ree m e n t was n o t w o rk in g properly. T h e r e w ere still no n a tio n a l figures o f disease inciden ce; m a n y livestock o w n e rs n e g le cte d to n o tif y t h e a u th o r i t ie s o f F M D o u tb re a k s; railway tru ck s were n o t cle aned p ro p e rly after the u n l o a d i n g o f cattle; a n d F M D a pp ea red f re q u e n tly in m u n ic i p a l m a r k e ts a n d a lm o s t daily in the B u e n o s Aires frigorificos. D u r i n g t h e early 1 9 3 0 s , F r o o d r e p o r t e d t h a t c o m p lia n c e was i m p r o v i n g a n d disease in cid e n ce d i m in is h in g . However, in 1932 , the e c o n o m i c situ atio n w a r ra n te d his recall. D e p riv ed o f a reliable s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n , M A F ’s o n l y m e a n s o f k e e p i n g a c h e c k o n t h e A rg e ntin e F M D situ ation was to ask the A rg e ntin e g o v e r n m e n t, repeatedly, to c o n firm its c o m m i t m e n t to the Bledisoe a g re e m e n t.45 T h r e e years later, in r e s p o n s e t o r e n e w e d N F U p r e s s u r e fo r i m p o r t r e s t r ic ti o n s , it s e n t v e te r in a r y s u r g e o n V i n c e n t Boyle u p o n a y e a r- l o n g t o u r o f A r g e n t in a . Boyle discovered t h a t F M D - i n f e c t e d a n im a ls were s o m e tim e s slaugh tered for ex p o rt to Britain; b u t o n receipt o f this news, M A F d id little o t h e r t h a n req uest a d d itio n a l assurances from the A r g e n tin e government."*4 At the sam e tim e, M A F vete rin ary in spectors investigating new British o u tb r e a k s o f F M D fo u n d th a t A r g e n tin e m e a t was strongly im p lic a te d in a large p r o p o r t i o n o f cases. D u r i n g the five-year p e rio d , 1 9 3 0 - 1 9 3 4 , th ey a tt r i b u te d 6 4 o u tb r e a k s to fresh invasions o f virus. O f these 6 4 ‘p r i m a r y ’ o u tb r e a k s ( m o st o f w'hich spread to cause ‘s e c o n d a r y ’ ou tb rea k s), 4 2 were caused by in fected i m p o r t e d m ea t, w hile a n o th e r 18 - officially classified as ‘o b sc u r e ’ - were possibly linke d to this source. T h e e viden ce involv ed was pu rely c irc u m s tan tia l: diseased pigs m ig h t have c o n s u m e d u n c o o k e d sw'ill c o n t a i n i n g f o r e i g n m e a t ; g a i n e d access to f o r e i g n m e a t b o n e s ; scavenged o f f ru b b ish d u m p s c o n ta i n in g m e a t scraps o r w rappers; or eaten f o o d tr a n s p o r te d in vehicles o r c o n ta in e r s t h a t h a d previo usly c o n ta i n e d swill or A r g e n tin e m e a t .45 In 193 6, the n e w C V O , D a n ie l C a b o t , c irc u ­ lated an inte rn al M A F m e m o w h ic h stated t h a t 25 p e r c e n t o f all p r i m a r y o u tb r e a k s o c c u r r in g d u r i n g th e p revious ten years were defin itely caused

A M anufactured Plague?

by i m p o rt e d m eat, a nd a n o th e r 25 per cen t were possibly linked to the trade . H e also n o t e d t h a t F M D w o u l d re c u r for as lo n g as m e a t was im p o rte d from infected countries. T h e following year, Perm anent Secretary D o n a ld Vandepeer a d m itte d to fellow M A F officials th at ‘som e degree o f risk is th erefore inevitable if we c o n ti n u e (as we m u st) to i m p o r t large quantities o f m eat from South America. T h e policy has been to decrease this risk to a m i n i m u m . ’46 But while M A F officials privately acknowledged that their m eat i m ­ p o rt policy was failing to keep F M D o u t o f Britain, they c o n tin u e d , p u b ­ licly, to deny that there was any proven link betw een A rgentine m ea t a nd British F M D outbreaks an d to state that they were satisfied w ith A rgentine F M D controls.47 In orde r to ensure th at their private suspicions did n ot e n te r the p u b lic d o m a i n , they n o t only ccnsored the F M D R C ’s experi­ m ental reports, b u t also m arked as ‘confid ential’ all F M D R C papers c o n ­ tain in g details o f F M D o u tbreak s caused by i m p o r t e d meat. A n d w he n farmers, politicians or journalists b r o u g h t forward circumstantial evidence linking Argentine m ea t to British cases o f F M D , M A F officials dismissed their sta te m ents as ‘inconclusive’, a n d claimed th at policy should be based on fact, n o t suspicion. T h e 1930s did, in fact, see reductio ns in the volu m e o f m ea t exported from Argentina to Britain; b u t this had n o th in g to do with F M D . Faced w ith a d e ep e nin g eco n o m ic crisis, the British g o v e rn m e n t finally a b a n d ­ o n e d its c en tu ry - lo n g predilection for free trade in favour o f tariffs a nd trad e barriers, w h ic h p ro te c te d British p r o d u c e from c o m p e t it i o n a n d g ra n te d e xports from the em pire a n d d o m in i o n s preference over goods from foreign countries. By rights, this new policy should have significantly c u rta ile d A rg e n t in e m e a t i m p o r t s . 48 H o w ever, to the a n g e r o f British farmers, w h o were already suffering from ‘p h e n o m e n a l’ falls in m eat prices, negotiations with the A rgentine go v e rn m e n t resulted in the signing o f the R o c a-R u n c im a n agreement, which obliged Britain to m ain tain Argentin e chilled m e a t im p o r ts at the sam e level as 1932 in exchange for redu ced tariffs u p o n British exports to A rgen tina.49 K n o w in g that w hatever h a p ­ p e n e d , th ey were n o w u n a b l e to i m p o s e a d d it i o n a l re str ic tio n s u p o n A rgentin e m eat in the n a m e o f F M D control, M A F officials lost interest in the m atter and instead diverted their attention towards alternative routes o f F M D invasion, such as birds, w in d a n d wild m am m als. S h ortly afterwards, the o u tb re a k o f W o rld W a r II b r o u g h t farm ers’ grum blin gs to an end. After all, they could ha rdly d e m a n d reductio ns in food i m p o rt s at a tim e w h e n G e r m a n U - b o a t b o m b i n g in the A tlantic im perilled the British food supply. For th e sam e reason, M A F officials c o u ld get aw ay w ith a d m i t t i n g publicly, for t h e first tim e , t h a t S o u th A m erican m ea t im p o rts were implicated in m a n y British F M D outbreaks.

Effects on the A n g lo -A rg e n tin e M e a t Trade

(*f~J

B u t as l a t e r c h a p t e r s reveal, t h e p r o b l e m o f i n f e c t e d m e a t d i d n o t g o away. D u r i n g t h e p o s t - w a r y ears, B ritish a n d A r g e n t i n e g o v e r n m e n t s a n d f a rm e r s re n ew ed th eir squ ab b les over th e A rg e n tin e m e a t trad e a n d u p o n th e n a tu re a n d i m p l i c a t i o n s o f sc i e n t i f ic ‘p r o o f ’.

Chapter 5

T h e Science, 1 9 1 2 -1 9 5 8

T

h e birth

of scientific m e d ic in e

?

To m a n y historians o f medicine, the germ theory o f disease is on e o f the greatest discoveries o f m o d e r n science.1 Postulated by Pasteur a n d Koch d u rin g the late 19th century, it is supposed to have b ro u g h t e n lig h te n m e n t a nd progress to a medical field still steeped in ignorance and superstition. A new science was bo rn, bacteriology, as well as a new g rou p of laboratorybased research workers, the ‘m ic ro b e -h u n te rs’, w h o identified the germs r e sp o n sib le fo r disease a n d s o u g h t ne w ways o f c o n t r o l l i n g t h e m . In discov ering vaccines a n d se r u m s w ith w h ic h to p r e v e n t infection they vanquished ailments such as typhoid, plague, cholera a nd diphtheria, which for centuries ha d struck fear into the hearts o f m en a n d w o m e n . A n d in e x pan ding the knowledge a nd u n d e rsta n d in g of disease, they m ade m e d i­ cine ‘m o d e r n ’ a nd ‘scientific’. It was therefore inevitable, so the story goes, that doctors a nd the state w o uld take note o f their findings a nd encourage further research, for only the ignorant, old-fashioned or self-interested could fail to recognize the benefits o f bacteriology. Unfortunately , while appealing, this heroic talc o f progress is simply n ot true. For one thing, rational m cdicine was no t su dde n ly bo rn at the e nd o f the 19th century. As C h a p te r 1 show ed, highly sophisticated disease theories existed long before th at date a nd led to the evolu tion o f policies t h at m arke d ly im p rove d public health. D oc to rs m ay have used different rem edie s back t h en , b u t to th e m a n d their patien ts, they w'orked. A n d v e te r in a r y surge o ns w i t h o u t a ny real k n o w le d g e o f g e rm s m a n a g e d to sta m p o u t cattle plague a nd sheep-pox by restricting livestock m ov em e n ts a n d s u b j e c t i n g in f e c te d a n im a ls to sl a u g h te r o r q u a r a n t i n e . It is also m istaken to view as inevitable the a d o p tio n and application o f the germ theory. In fact, different professional groups re sponded in different ways on a c c o u n t o f their varying interests and resources. M a n y late 19th- and

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early 2 0 t h - c e n t u r y doc to rs, especially clinicians, felt t h a t the utility o f lab orato ry science h a d been overstated because vaccines a n d serum s - the sup posed ‘miracles’ o f scientific m edicine - were only available against a very limited range o f a ilm ents a nd did n o t always work. Besides, they were un c onv inc ed by scientists’ atte m p ts to reduce whole patients, as seen at the bedside, to collections o f cells, tissues o r anim al bodies m an ip u lated within th e laboratory. D iv ision s o p e n e d u p be tw ee n d iffe re n t section s o f the medical profession as they vied for expert’ status a nd for the right to define the relationship betw een laborato ry science a n d medical practice.2 So germ th e o r y a n d the associated science o f b a cterio logy d id n o t s u d d e n l y alter the face o f m e d ic in e . C h a n g e s o c c u r r e d g r a dually over several decades, and it was n o t until the inter-war perio d that scrum s and vaccines, laboratory-based disease diagnosis a nd bacteriological research became integral to the medical field. I m p o rta n t developm ents included the t u r n - o f - t h e - c e n t u r y f o u n d i n g o f n e w p riv a te ly a n d p u b l ic l y f u n d e d research laboratories such as the J e nn e r Institu te (established in 1891 and later ren am ed th e Lister Institute), the W ellcom e Physiological Research Laboratories (established in 1894 by Burroughs, W ellcom e a n d C o , the pharm aceutical com pany) and the L o n d o n School o f H ygiene and Tropical M edicine (established in 1902, w ith the assistance o f the C olonial Office). By the 1910s, medical schools attached to British universities had begun to offer training in basic medical science an d o ppo rtunities for em p lo y m en t in medical research. General hospitals increasingly i n c o rp o ra te d labora ­ tories for the diagnosis a n d investigation o f disease a nd the preparation o f thera pie s, a n d local a u th o ri t ie s be gan to e m p lo y m e d ic a l sc ientists to diagnose disease in their new public health laboratories. W it h the passage o f the 1911 N a t io n a l In su r a n c e Act, m o re fu n d s b e ca m e available for medical research. T his m on ey was administere d by a new body, the Medical Research C o m m i t te e , head ed by physiologist W alter Morley Fletcher. It was reconstituted as the Medical Research C o unc il (M R C ) after W orld W ar I, f o u n d e d a la b o ra to ry , th e N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e for M e d ic a l Research ( N I M R ) a nd, u n d e r Fletcher’s direction, becam e extremely influential in the f u n d in g a n d de velopm ent o f medical science.3 British v e te r in a r y surg e o n s w ere q u i c k to a d o p t the g e rm theory, primarily because it justified their p e n c h a n t for sta m p in g o u t contagious anim al diseases. How ever, w h e n c o m p a re d to the medical field, the new science o f bacteriology had relatively little im pact u p o n veterinary research, education a n d practice. T h e first veterinary surgeon to take an extensive interest in the subject was Professor (later Sir) J o h n M cFadyean, w h o had also trained as a doctor. In 1892 he was a p p o in te d to a new chair in p a th ­ ology a n d bacteriology at the Royal Veterinary College (RVC), a n d with th e aid o f t h e Royal A g r i c u lt u r a l S o c ie ty (RAS) he f o u n d e d a sm a ll

y Q

A M anufactured Plague?

veterinary laborato ry at the school, the first o f its k in d in Britain.4 Investi­ gations u n d e r the veterinary d e p a rtm e n t o f the Board o f Agriculture began in 1905, w he n M cFadyean’s son-in-law, Stewart Stockm an , be came chie f veterinary officer ( C V O ) . H e rented a laborato ry a n d a p p o in te d a c o m ­ m ittee to research into a cattle disease k n o w n as contagious a bo rtion (or brucellosis). In the years th at followed, Sto c k m a n ’s laborato ry expanded, a n d by 1909 he had five assistants a n d was u n d e rta k in g diagnostic work, as well as investigations in to o th e r anim al diseases. Additionally, in 1909, the g o v e r n m e n t passed the D e v e lo p m e n t Act, w hich a im ed to revitalize agriculture by increasing the m o n ey available for agricultural and veterinary research. F u n d in g was to be a dm inistered by a specially ap p o in te d body, the D e v e lo p m e n t C om m iss io n . O n e o f its first projects was to fu n d a new v e te r in a r y d e p a r t m e n t l a b o r a to r y at W e y b rid g e , w h e r e the V e terin ary Laboratories Agency (VLA) o f the D e p a r t m e n t o f the E n v iro n m e n t, Food a nd Rural Affairs (D E F R A ) is still situated today.5 For alm ost two decades, Stockm an’s a nd McFadyean’s laboratories were the only sites o f veterinary research in Britain. T h e w ork that w e nt on there had relatively little im pact u po n veterinary practice because m ost veterinary surgeons and farmers viewed slaughter as an acceptable solutio n to m an y ills, a n d saw little p o i n t in seeking o u t new m e th o d s o f disease diagnosis a n d th era p y w h e n they w o u ld p ro b a b ly cost m o re th an the p a tie n t was w o rth. T h is state o f affairs was self-perpetu atin g because o f the privately funded nature o f British veterinary education. Schools responded to m arket d e m a n d by educating students to becom e veterinary practitioners. Because a rigorous scientific training was deem ed unnecessary for this role, qualified veterinarians had little tim e for laborato ry enquiries and were ill-equipped to enter the research field. N o r were M inistry o f Agriculture a nd Fisheries (MAF) veterinary surgeons concerned ab out the lack o f veterinary research. T h e y kn e w th a t their predecessors had m a n a g e d to s ta m p o u t diseases w ith o u t recourse to the laboratory, a nd favourably com pa red their achieve­ m ents to those o f doctors, whose serum s a nd vaccines had yet to eliminate a single h u m a n ailm ent from Britain. So, for m ost m em be rs o f the profes­ sio n, b a c te rio lo g ic a l w o r k was irrelev a n t to th e goals a n d p r a c tic e o f veterinary medicine. This attitude p ro foundly influenced the initiation and evolution o f foot a n d m o u t h disease ( F M D ) research in Britain.

S ta rtin g o u t:

FMD

r e s e a r c h in B r i t a i n

a n d E u r o p e up t o

1924

F M D research began on the C o n t i n e n t in 1897, w he n concerns a b o u t the costly im pa c t o f end em ic F M D u p o n m ea t and m ilk p r o d u c tio n led the

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7 \

P russian g o v e r n m e n t to in s t r u c t bacteriologist Friederich Loeffler to seek a m e t h o d o f c o m b a t i n g the disease. Loeffler h a d previously w o r k e d w ith K oc h a n d h a d identifie d th e g erm responsible for d i p h th e r i a infection. H e q u i c k l y d isc o v e r e d t h a t t h e b l o o d (or, m o r e specifically, t h e s e r u m ) o f a n im a ls t h a t h a d r e co v e red f ro m F M D c o u ld , o n i n o c u l a t i o n , p r o t e c t susceptible livestock from infection. H e also realized th at disease was caused n o t by a b a c te r iu m , b u t by a m u c h sm aller m ic ro b e th a t c o u ld n o t be seen t h r o u g h a m ic ro sc o p e (at least n o t un til the 1930s, w h e n ele ctron m ic r o ­ sc o p e s w ere d isc o v ere d ). H e called this g e rm a ‘filte r -p a ss in g v i r u s ’ o n a c c o u n t o f its p ro p e n sity to pass th r o u g h filters th at re ta in ed bacteria. O t h e r viruses identified in the late 19th c e n tu r y includ ed the tobacco mosaic virus, the m y x o m a to sis virus a n d th e African horse sickncss virus, discovered by M c F a d y e a n in 1899 . U n lik e bactcria, th e y c o u ld n o t be c u lt u re d in-vitro, a n d this po sed p ro b le m s for vaccine p r o d u c ti o n . N orm ally, scientists m ade v a c c in e s b y c u l t u r i n g b a c t e r i a o n a n a g a r p l a t e a n d t h e n m o d i f y i n g (a tt e n u a t in g ) t h e m in so m e way, so t h a t o n in o c u l a ti o n in to susceptib le a n im a ls or h u m a n s they s tim u la te d a n t i b o d y f o r m a tio n b u t d id n o t cause serio us disease. Because viruses c o u ld o n l y be g r o w n in-vivo (inside the a n im a l b o d y ), v accine p r o d u c tio n was m o re difficu lt, a lth o u g h n o t im possible - as Pasteur h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d in 1 8 8 4 w h e n he p r o d u c e d a rabies vaccine from ra b b its’ spinal c ord s.6 G e r m a n , F re n c h , D u t c h a n d Italian scientists b u i lt u p o n Loeffler’s e arly f i n d in g s , d e s c r i b i n g t h e i r w o r k in p a p e r s p u b l i s h e d in sc ien tific jou rnals. T h e y discovered ways o f p r o d u c i n g F M D se ru m m o re c heaply a n d in la rg e r v o l u m e s , a n d f o u n d t h a t it i n d u c e d v a ria b le d e g r e e s o f i m m u n i t y t h a t lasted a p p r o x i m a t e l y te n days. T h e y s h o w e d t h a t if the F M D virus was a d m in iste re d at the sam e tim e as se r u m , a nim als d eveloped very m il d disease s y m p t o m s b u t g a in e d far l o n g e r- la s tin g i m m u n i t y to in fection. T h e y n o t e d also th a t w h e n a nim als already infecte d w ith F M D were treated w ith s e ru m , th e severity o f th eir s y m p t o m s a n d the associated losses in m e a t a n d m ilk p r o d u c t i o n d e clin ed . E xcited by these find ing s, several E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n ts established s e r u m - p ro d u c t io n institutes. By the early 1920s, s c r u m a d m i n i s t r a t i o n - e ith e r a lo n e o r in c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h F M D virus - was r e p o rte d ly w id e sp re a d o n th e C o n t i n e n t . W h il e it h a d little effect u p o n disease incide nce , its tru e benefits lay in r e d u c in g the e c o n o m i c costs o f in f e c tio n .7 F M D research began m u c h later in Britain t h a n o n the C o n t i n e n t . As C h a p t e r 1 described, e n d e m i c F M D d isapp eared in 1886. For th e next 25 ye ars, F M D i n v a s io n s w e re o c c a s io n a l a n d s h o r t lived; b u t in 1911 it r e a p p e a r e d a n d s p r e a d to c a u s e 2 5 o u t b r e a k s . A l a r m e d , t h e B o a r d o f A g r ic u ltu r e a p p o i n t e d a d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e to c o n sid e r a d d itio n a l pre ven tative m easures. T o several m e m b e rs , it se e m e d a p r o p i ti o u s tim e to

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begin F M D research: no investigations had taken place since the smallscale, largely unsuccessful efforts o f the late 1870s a n d early 1880s (see C h a p te r 1); the go v e rn m e n t seemed increasingly keen to fu n d veterinary research; new investigative techniques were now available; a n d the recent discovery o f vaccines, serums a nd antitoxins against h u m a n diseases aroused h o p e s o f f i n d i n g a sim ila r m e t h o d to c o m b a t F M D . T h e c o m m i t t e e therefore asked witnesses how they felt a b o u t F M D research. M a n y were overwhelm ingly opposed, a n d the m ost vocal critic o f all was Stockm an, w h o insisted that the risks involved far o utw eighed the likely benefits. Sto c k m a n assured the c o m m itte e th at he was n o t o p pose d to F M D research p e r se; in d ee d , he ha d a great interest in the disease (‘N o t h i n g w o u l d give m e g re a te r p leasure. . . 1 th irs t to investig ate th e t h i n g ’) .8 However, he believed that investigations could prove e xtremely dangerous. T h e F M D viru s was h i g h ly c o n t a g i o u s , a n d as F r e n c h a n d G e r m a n investigators had recently discovered to their cost, it could be easily carried o u t o f the laborato ry on clothes a n d shoes. For this reason, he refused to pe rm it i n d ep e n d en t British investigations into F M D . But even if the board t o o k c harge o f research a n d m a n a g e d to c o n ta i n th e viru s w i t h i n the laboratory, its very presence w ith in Britain w ou ld prevent the n ation from attain ing the ‘F M D - fr e e ’ status needed to e xport livestock to disease-free nations. In any case, Stoc k m a n argued, there was no real need to search for a F M D serum or vaccine within the laborato ry because the existing policy o f slaughter and im p o r t restriction was m ore than capable o f controllin g the disease. A n d while experiments could possibly detect w h e th er virus was c o n ta in e d w ith in i m p o r t e d goods o r carried by the w in d , birds or wild m am m als, this was n o t a priority because it w o u ld be difficult to prevent disease from spreading by these routes, a nd obtaining positive results w ould be like lookin g for a needle in a haystack. C o n v in c e d by these argum ents, th e c o m m i t t e e r e c o m m e n d e d in 1912 t h a t f u tu r e in v es tig a tio n s take place outside the m ain lan d , u n d e r c ond ition s th at satisfied the Board o f Agriculture.9 Shortly afterwards, Stoc k m a n sent several veterinary surgeons to the British colo ny o f Ind ia to carry o u t investigations into F M D . T h e r e , at least, e x p e r i m e n t s c o u ld n o t pose a t h re a t to British ‘F M D fr e e d o m ’. However, m e m b e rs o f the team soo n discovered th a t in d ige n ous In dian livestock were naturally resistant to infection. Unable to o btain m eaningful results, they he aded h o m e and recom m end ed that future investigations take place on an island o ff E u ro p e .10 Stoc k m a n interpreted this suggestion in rath er imaginative fashion a n d arranged, in 1920, for tests to take place u p o n a disused warship, the H M S D ahlia, m o o red off the coast o f H a r ­ wich. H e a p p o in te d a small research c o m m i tt e e o f do c tors a n d ve te rin­ a ria n s to oversee th e p r o je c t, a n d ask e d J o s e p h A rkw 'r ight, a ssista n t

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bacteriologist at the Lister In stitu te , to devise a n d carry o u t the e xperi­ m ents. U n d e r the c o m m itte e ’s direction, A rkw rig ht tried to culture F M D (a feat n o t actually a cc o m p lish e d u n til 1929) a n d to devise a practical m e th o d o f im m u n iz a tio n . H e also explored how different en viro nm enta l c ond ition s m ig h t affect virus survival. Alm ost im m ediately the project ran in to tro u b le . First, th e s h ip ’s crew refused to w o r k u n til their pay was br o u g h t into line with u n io n rates. T h e n A rkw rig ht discovered th at o n ­ board livestock a cc o m m o d a tio n was inadequate, a n d delays set in while the re n am ed M inistry o f Agriculture fitted o u t two extra boats. T h r e e m o n th s later, a new threat emerged as the deterio ratin g post-war financial situation b r o u g h t a b o u t a 20 p e r c c n t c u t in M A F ’s 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 2 3 b u d g e t . T h e c o m m itte e w a n te d research to continue; b u t A rk w right h a d h a d e no ugh a nd resigned. His lack o f progress led m em bers to r e c o m m e n d that future research take place on d r y l a n d . 11 T h e r e are several e x p la n a tio n s for the m a r k e d d ifference be tw ee n British and E u ropea n attitudes to F M D research. M o st significantly, as an island, Britain could impose strin gent regulations u p o n its im p o r t trade. It there fore suffe red o n ly occasional invasions o f F M D t h a t c o u ld be sta m p e d o u t quickly using slaughter. T h es e measures work ed well d u rin g th e 1890s a nd 1900s, a nd so Sto c k m a n ’s ve terinary d e p a r t m e n t saw little po in t in h u n t in g for alternatives within the laboratory, especially given the cost o f research - in term s o f lost exports to F M D -fre e na tio ns - a n d the associated risk o f virus escape. In E u ro p e , however, m o s t n a tio n s were un a ble to a d o p t British-style F M D controls. T h e i r g e ography was very different, a nd a lthough im p o r t regulations existed on paper, it was practic­ ally impossible to police land borders effectively. F M D therefore invaded repeatedly and be came e n d e m i c . 12 T h e high incidence o f infection m ade slaughter unfeasible, and livestock owners - who, like their British c o u n te r­ parts in the 19th century, were accustomed to, and even accepting of, F M D - objected to disruptive, costly restrictions u p o n the m o v e m e n t o f diseased anim als. C o nsequently , E u ro p ea n go v e rn m e n ts viewed i m m u n i z a t io n an d , he n ce , scientific e n q u ir y - as the m o st p r o m is in g ro u te to F M D control. Unlike Britain, they had little to lose in term s o f exports to F M D free n ations, a n d with F M D already prevalent, its escape from the labora­ to ry posed less o f a threat to agriculture. A n o t h e r im p o r t a n t factor was that, especially in the ve terinary field, Britain had a m u c h weaker traditio n o f laboratory research th an France and G erm any. Ever since the m id 19th century, French veterinary students had received a rigo rou s scientific t r a in in g t h a t was very d iffere nt from the practical e d u c a tio n im p a r te d by British schools. After g ra duating , som e became laborato ry researchers, a career trajectory u n k n o w n in Britain. T h e m o s t fa m o u s were Bouley a n d C h a v ea u . Based at the Alfort veterin ary

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school, they m ad e discoveries th at u n d e r p in n e d Pasteur’s later work. T h is scientific ap proac h to veterinary m edic in e was reinforced in France a n d a d o pte d in G e r m a n y w h e n Pasteur a n d Koch m ade their fam ous discover­ ies. Veterinary surgeons in those countries h a d a far higher status than in Britain. T h e facilities at their publicly fu n d e d schools were far superior to those at cash-strapped British institutions, a n d their professors engaged in research, whereas in Britain they merely taught. So, while veterinary science to o k off in France a n d G erm any, Britain boasted only two small labora­ tories ru n by Stoc km a n a n d M cFadyean, which as late as 1922 em ployed j u s t five f u l l- t i m e v e te rin a ry s u r g e o n s. Sm all w o n d e r , th e re f o r e , t h a t C o n t i n e n t a l vete rina ry surgeons fa voured a scientific m e t h o d o f F M D control, while their British counte rparts preferred a legislative s o l u t io n .13

D

o c t o r s, vets a n d

th e purpose of

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY D u ri n g the a u t u m n o f 1923, in the m id s t o f the second devastating F M D epidem ic to hit Britain in three years, questio ns began to be raised a b o u t th e c o n ti n u e d lack o f British F M D research. An in creasin g n u m b e r o f medical docto rs, scientific enth usia sts a n d critics o f the slaughter policy arg ued that, in th e lig ht o f recen t events, th e tim e ha d c o m e to ex ten d knowledge o f the disease a n d to search, w ith in the laboratory, for a cheap, h u m a n e a n d scientific c o n tr o l m e t h o d . H ow ever, S t o c k m a n ’s a tt i tu d e towards F M D research had n o t changed a n d he refused to give in to the m o u n t i n g pressure. H e argu ed th a t enquiries were unnecessary because veterinary surgeons ga ined sufficient insights from experiencing F M D in the field a n d ob se rv in g e x p e ri m e n t s th a t w e n t on ‘before o u r eyes, in n a t u r e ’. R esearch, he in sisted , was a d a n g e r o u s e n te rp ris e t h a t c o u ld co n trib u te little to the control o f F M D . In fact, because vaccines typically wo rked by giving animals a m ild case o f disease, they c ould actually e n c o u ­ rage F M D spread, a nd so there was no po in t in trying to p ro d u c e t h e m . 14 S t o c k m a n ’s claim s c o n v in c e d m a n y livestock ow ne rs t h a t research pose d a threat to their eco n o m ic interests a n d he quickly w o n the s u p p o r t o f the e m p i ri c a ll y o r i e n t e d v e te r in a r y p ro f e s sio n . F or m a n y d o c to rs , however, his a n tip a th y to scientific e n q u iry did n o t m ake sense. T h is was because in controlling h u m a n infectious diseases they based decisions on very d ifferent criteria from those o f ve te rin a ry surgeons. S la u ghte r was obviously impossible; therefore, w h e n epidem ics struck they aim ed n o t to sta m p o u t disease b u t to restrict its spre ad - for exam ple, by re m o ving patients to isolation hospitals (in the case o f scarlet fever), vaccinating (in

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the case o f small-pox) or adm inistering antiserum to the diseased (as for d i p h th e ri a ) . T h e success o f this e n te rp rise d e p e n d e d heavily u p o n the lab o ra to ry as it was there t h a t diseases were researched, diag n o s ed an d preventatives prepared. D octors schooled in the benefits o f the laboratory were far m ore inclined th an veterinarians to seek solutions w ithin its walls, an d as the 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 4 epidem ic worsened they be came increasingly critical o f S to c k m a n ’s refusal to pe rm it F M D research.15 D o c to rs’ o p inions received widespread circulation in the medical and pu b lic press, a n d because o f the esteem w ith w h ic h the profession was regarded, they h a d a significant im pact u p o n public o p inio n. T h e editor o f one o f the leading medical journals, the Lancet, was especially critical o f M A F ’s ‘m e d ie v a l’ a tt i tu d e to F M D c o n tr o l, its ‘d e v as ta tin g w a n t o f k no w le d ge ’ a n d its ‘t im id ity ’ in facing up to th e small risks involved in e xperimental e nq uiry .16 H e argued th at circumstantial evidence gained in the field was no substitute for laboratory-based enquiry, which alone could discover d e fin ite facts a b o u t F M D a n d devise a vaccine to p r e v e n t its spread. T h e fear o f disease escaping from the lab oratory was n o t a suffi­ ciently goo d reason to ban research, for if su ch a spirit prevailed w ithin h u m a n m edicin e, ‘medical knowledge w ould stagnate, and the profession w ould m erit the c o n te m p t o f enlightened m e n ’.17 T h e editor o f the British M edical J ournal agreed. H e attacked M A F ’s ‘stranglehold on research’, and asked how Sto c km a n could possibly offer impartial scientific advice w hen he was ‘so deeply involved in th e m a i n t e n a n c e o f an official po licy ’. 18 C h e sh ire d o c to rs c a u g h t up in the c o u n t y ’s o p p o sitio n to the slaughter policy (see C h a p te r 3) similarly emphasized the need for a ‘really scientific’ m e t h o d o f F M D c o n t r o l a n d s u g g e ste d t h a t m e d ic a l a n d v e te rin a r y professions join forces in the p ursuit o f this goal.19 O n e outspo ken medical officer o f health, T H Peyton, w e n t so far as to claim that Sto c k m a n and his colleagues were ‘too conservative a nd too jealous to learn for themselves, or to allow others to instruct th e m ’.20 O n e o f S t o c k m a n ’s m o re c o n tro v e rsial acts was to p r e v e n t d i s t i n ­ guished medical scientist Professor Beattie from u n d e rta k in g investigations in to F M D . Beattie held the chair o f bacteriology at Liverpool University. H e was interested in public health, carried o ut bacteriological investigations on b ehalf o f Liverpool C ity C o u n c il a nd ha d been a m e m b e r o f the 1920 F M D R esearch C o m m i t t e e ( F M D R C ) . 21 W h e n disease b r o k e o u t in ne a rb y C h e sh ir e he tried to o b t a i n m aterial for e x p e r im e n t; b u t M A F ve terinary staff refused to allow h im access to infected animals. In despera­ tion he t u r n e d to the Liverpool city m ea t inspector, w h o gave him lym ph nodes salvaged from cows th at had been in c ontact w ith infected animals a nd were pro bab ly in cu b a tin g F M D at the tim e o f slaughter. Beattie fed samples o f this tissue to rats, w hich reportedly w e n t on to develop signs o f

7

A M anufactured Plague?

F M D . In letters to the Lancet, he a n n o u n c e d th e signific a nce o f this f i n d in g , su g g e stin g , first, t h a t rats c o u ld a ct as wild life reservoirs o f infection; second, th at c o n s u m in g m eat a n d offal from infected animals c ould tr a n s m it virus; a nd, third, th at rats c o uld be used as experimental a nim als, th ere b y r e d u c in g the costs a n d risks involved in large a n im a l research.’2 S to c k m a n insisted th a t he ha d been correct to refuse e xp erim e ntal facilities to m en like Beattie. H e told the c o m m itte e o f inq uiry into the epidemic: O ur trouble is, as I have said before, a large n u m b er o f people w ho are o f no p a rtic u la r account b u t w ho wish to be in the lim elig h t w a n t to establish experim ental stations a ll over the country a n d do some work on fo o t a n d m outh. I have held the fo r t against this single handed up to the present a n d I have got into rather b ad repute - they say, here is a m an who is trying to obstruct science in stea d o f help in g it. W h a t I say is, w ith a dangerous disease like this you m ust investigate it; but you m ust do so under organized conditions, so th a t M r so a n d so, say, up in N o rth u m b e rla n d cannot start a station w hich is under no supervision. H e m ay let the disease o u t o f th a t station. We m ust investigate in certain stations w ith responsible men who w ill give an u n d erta kin g to the com m ittee th a t they w ill carry out the regulations against spread th a t are laid d o w n P Such a rg um e nts cut little ice with W alter M otley Fletcher, the extremely influential and outspoken secretary o f the M R C . A physiologist by training, Fletcher ha d w ork e d at St B a rth o lo m e w ’s H o spital, L o n d o n , a nd C a m ­ bridge University prior to his 1914 a p p o i n t m e n t . 24 H e privately info rm e d medical colleagues that M A F ha d been 'singularly ill-advised’ on F M D : The c h ie fp a rt has been the jealousy o fp a rtic u la r leaders o f the veterinary profession who, w ith o u t being a t all distinguished in science themselves, have been intensely jealous o f the encroach­ m e n t by h u m a n pathologists or m edical m en upon w h a t they consider their own f ie l d P Fletcher’s claim was n o t u n f o u n d e d . For so m e time, medical scientists had tried to gain access to the field o f anim al disease. T h e y had justified their interest by arguing that disease involved the same processes in b o th m an a nd anim als a nd could som etim es be transferred betw een the tw'o. They p o in te d to physiologists, w h o vivisected animals in order to find o u t how

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t h e h u m a n b o d y f u n c t i o n e d , a n d to b a cterio lo g ic a l a n d p a th o lo g ic a l researchers, w h o used laborato ry anim als as substitutes for h um ans. T h e y no ted th at rabies a nd anth rax, as investigated by Pasteur a n d Koch, were diseases o f bo th m an and animals; th at diphtheria serum was m anufactured in horses a nd small-pox vaccine in calves; a nd that three Royal C o m m i s ­ sions h a d recently tried to ascertain w h e th e r h u m a n s were susceptible to th e b o vine fo rm o f tub erc u lo s is (T B ). B u t S t o c k m a n a n d M c F a d y e an sh ru g g e d off such co n n ec tio n s. T h e y suspected th at a m b itio u s m edical scientists w a n ted to take over the field o f anim al disease research a n d to tu rn veterinary m edicin e into a lesser branch o f medicine, stripped o f all its a u th ority a n d claims to expertise. T h e y therefore set o u t to defend the ve terinary field from e n cro a ch m e n t. T h e y m e t w ith considerable success because, as the leaders o f the profession a n d the heads o f its only research laboratories, th ey exerted considerable influ ence over the D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m i s s i o n , w h i c h c o n tr o l l e d g o v e r n m e n t f u n d s for a n im a l disease research. D u ri n g the 1910s a nd early 1920s, they rejected olive branches proffered by leading medical scientists and obstructe d do c tors’ atte m p ts to in itiate e n q u ir ie s at sites b e y o n d th e ir c o n tr o l , su c h as un iv ers ity and medical research laboratories. As a result, the field o f animal disease research re m ain ed extremely small a n d u n d e r fu n d e d . 26 T h ese m ach ination s infuriated Fletcher. H e was utterly convinced o f the national benefits o f scientific enquiry and felt that scientists worked best w h e n freed from political restraints, a principle th at prevailed w ith in his own M R C , w h ich answered n o t to the M in istry o f H e alth b u t directly to the Privy C ouncil. U ntil his death in 1933, he wo rked hard to impress his vision o f research u p o n the medical profession, a n d used his influence to encourage specific individuals a n d bra nches o f research at the expense o f others.2 However, w hen it cam e to anim al disease research he was p ow er­ less to act, a nd c o m pla ine d bitterly that the failure to m ake progress was holding back medical advances. H e told a friend: I have long been doing everything I can to get proper governm ent support fo r research into a n im a l diseases a n d fu rth e r to lin k up our work a t every p o in t w ith the study o f a n im a l diseases. You m ay no t know , perhaps, o f the m ost incredible obstacles th a t are p u t in the way o f these two purposes by the present vested interests o f the vet world a n d their ram ifications in the B oard o f Agriculture.2S Fletcher was n o t the only medical scientist to com pla in a b o u t S tockm an a n d M cFadyean’s territorial attitude. D u r in g Jun e 1920, Sir George Adam i, a m e m b e r o f th e m e d ic a l pro fessio n a n d v ice - c h a n c e llo r o f L iverpoo l

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A Manufactured Plague?

University, engaged in a lengthy vitriolic dispute with McFadyean in the correspondence pages o f The Times. Adami believed that McFadyean’s RVC a n d the E d in b u rg h an d Glasgow ve terinary schools shou ld follow the example o f the Liverpool school, which had been part o f the university since 1904. However, in the field o f veterinary education, just as in veterinary research, McFadyean d e m a nded absolute professional autonomy, and he viciously rejected A dam i’s suggestions.29 T h e latter complained: ‘Surely a broad-m inded man, enthusiastic for the advancement o f his science, would welcome and support every m ovem ent for increased study and research in his subject’, and used the following tale to poke fun at McFadyean: I was taking a Sunday afternoon stroll w ith my host round his home farm . A s we came to the stable yard the great m a stiff which h a d accom panied us m ade towards the coachm an’s dog w ith evident m agnanim ity. This dog, instead o f welcom ing him , retreated snarling into his kennel. W hether he thought that the stable yard was his own particular property, or feared that the m a stiff w ould take possession o f a kennel several times too sm all fo r it, I could not m ake out; it was the snarl that impressed me.,0 T h e F M D research issue was fought out against this background o f inter­ professional strife a n d anim osity, a n d given th eir previous exchanges, neither side was inclined to mince their words. Stockman derided doctors’ ‘sentim ental’ attitude towards the slaughter and their failure to understand the issues involved in animal disease control. H e w ent on to claim that because they had no personal experience o f F M D , they had no authority to com ment. He told the National Veterinary Medical Association (NVMA): Some o f the things th a t have come fro m some members o f the medical profession in a public position are most inconsiderate and almost insulting. . . I am in no sense closed to good suggestions; but, as often happens, the wrong men run to p rin t when the lime­ light is on. . .the majority know too much to speak, the m inority know too little to be silen t}1 Several leading veterinarians rallied to Stockman’s defence. F Hobday, editor o f the Veterinary Journal and future principal o f the RVC, criticized those ‘old ladies, clergymen, fossils o f various kinds, and even m em bers o f the medical profession’ who th o u g h t they knew' the veterinary surgeon’s job.32 T h e editor o f the Veterinary Record referred specifically to doctors when he spoke o f the ‘folly and stupidity o f which men may be capable when they write about subjects o f w'hich they have little or no understanding’,33 while

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J Brittlebank, a m e m b e r o f the N V M A C ou nc il, professed his hope that ‘the profession will rem ain loyal to itself. W e c a n n o t c o n d e m n too severely the interference o f outsiders.’34 Su c h c o m m e n t s , how e ver, received little c ir c u la t io n o u t s i d e the veterinary press. Consequently, veterinarians had little im pact on political o p i n io n , w h ic h was fast b e c o m i n g d isillusio ne d b o t h w ith S t o c k m a n ’s unsw erving s u p p o rt for the slaughter policy a nd his o pp osition to labora­ tory enquiry. ‘Gravely exercised at the ghastly waste caused by the disease’, a C a bine t sub -c om m itte e m et in D e ce m b er 1923 to consider an alternative strategy o f control. T u r n in g their backs on veterinary o p in io n , m em bers asked S t o c k m a n ’s critic, F letcher, to r e c o m m e n d an e m i n e n t h u m a n path ologist to advise th em on F M D . H e suggested L ieu ten ant-G eneral Sir W illiam Leishm an, a highly respected bacteriologist a nd director-general o f the A rm y Medical Services.35 Fletcher knew th at he could rely on Leishm an to echo his own views a b o u t F M D research, as the two m en were good friends. T h e y had worked t o g e t h e r in th e M R C a n d o n several p re v io u s o c ca sio n s h a d trie d to d islo d g e S t o c k m a n a n d M c F a d y e a n fr o m t h e i r p o s i t io n s o f p o w e r .36 S to c km a n, had he k n o w n , w ould u n d o u b t e d l y have kicked up a fuss; b u t he was only in form e d o f Leishm an’s involvem ent after the invitation had been issued and, according to Fletcher, c oncurred ‘with som e reluctance’.37 S t o c k m a n described his feelings later in a letter to L ord Ernie, f o rm e r president o f the Board o f Agriculture: I am always w illin g to consult a n d collaborate w ith any good m an inside or outside the departm ent; b u t I th in k you w ill real­ ize. . .th a t i t is d iffia ilt to sometimes get m en who do not u nder­ sta n d the problem in all its practical bearings to see th a t m any o f their suggestions, when based upon purely abstract principles, m ay be o f very little use; in fact, they m ay be a waste o f tim e,38 Stoc k m a n sent a lengthy letter to Lcishm an, in which he fully e x p o u n d e d his views on F M D research a n d control. But he c o uld hardly have h o p e d to convince that c h a m p io n o f bacteriological research (who gave his nam e to the tropical disease Leishmaniasis) th at labo ratory e n q u iry into F M D was unnecessary. A l t h o u g h , in his re p o rt, L e ish m a n a c k n o w le d g e d the validity o f S to c k m a n ’s opinio ns, he w e n t on to argue th at the un c ertain ty a n d lack o f k n ow le dge t h a t s u r r o u n d e d F M D were seriously i m p e d in g efforts to c o n tro l the disease. H e re c o m m e n d e d th at organized research begin immediately, c o o rd in a te d by a c o m m itte e o f experts in veterinary science, m edicin e, bacteriology, i m m u n o lo g y a nd epidemiology. A lthou gh M A F sh ould take overall control, it was i m p o r t a n t for the c o m m itte e to

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liaise w ith M R C experts, a n d th e lim ite d s u p p ly o f ve te rina ry researchers m e a n t t h a t m e m b e r s o f o t h e r professions m u s t be directly invo lve d .39 R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t l a b o r a t o r y - b a s e d e n q u i r e s w ere n o w in e v i t a b l e , S t o c k m a n quickly a t t e m p t e d to ensu re t h a t c o n tro l o f this activity d id n o t pass o u t o f v e te rin a ry h a n d s . H e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t as F M D was an agri­ cultural p ro b le m , M A F m u s t take charge o f research. H e also p r o p o s e d a p r e d o m i n a n t l y v e te rin a ry c o m m i t t e e a n d r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t w o r k take p l a c e a t his o w n a n d M c F a d y e a n ’s l a b o r a t o r i e s , a n d a t a n e w M A F c o n tr o lle d field s t a ti o n . 40 F le tc he r h a d o t h e r ideas. H e k n e w t h a t m a n y d o c to r s w o u l d refuse to w o r k ‘u n d e r ’ v e te rin a rian s , w h o lay far b e n e a th t h e m o n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l h i e r a r c h y . H e p r o p o s e d a m o r e ‘b a l a n c e d ’ c o m m i t t e e o f b o t h v e te r in a r i a n s a n d d o c t o r s , a n d r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t research also take place at m ed ic al research institu tes .41 F l e t c h e r ’s v is io n p r o v e d t h e m o r e i n f l u e n t i a l . In F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 4 , M i n i s t e r o f A g r i c u lt u r e , R o b e r t S a n d e r s , a p p o i n t e d a n F M D research c o m m i tt e e ( F M D R C ) , c o m p r is in g four v e te rin a ry su rg e o n s a n d six d i s tin ­ g u ish e d m e d ic a l scientists. M A F was to take overall c h arg e o f research, w h i c h w o u l d ta k e p lac e a t several i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g S t o c k m a n ’s laboratory, th e Lister In stitute , th e M R C ’s N I M R a n d a new' field sta tio n located at P i r b ri g h t (see Plate 13). F a m o u s phy siologist C ha rle s S h e r rin g ­ t o n , a f o r m e r L iv e rp o o l U n iv e r sity p ro fes so r a n d an M R C colleag ue o f Fletcher’s, b e ca m e the first c h a ir m a n o f the F M D R C . H e soon resigned du e to ill he alth , a n d L e ish m a n to o k over u n til J u n e 192 6, w h e n he d ied on th e sam e day as S to c k m a n . 42 It is d if f ic u lt to k n o w h o w M c F a d y e a n a n d S t o c k m a n j u d g e d th e o u t c o m e o f this controversy. As we have seen, the F M D research q u e stio n r e o p e n e d l o n g -s t a n d i n g feuds over t h e a uthority, territo ry a n d a p p r o p ria te activities o f the healing professions. It illustrated i m p o r t a n t differences in t h e i r a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s disease re sea rc h a n d c o n t r o l , a n d e x p o s e d th e p r o f o u n d g u l f t h a t t h e n e xiste d b e tw e e n t h e e s ta b lis h e d , a u t h o r i t a t i v e m ed ical pro fession a n d the stru g g lin g ve te rin a ry trade. So, were S to c k m a n a n d M c F a d y e a n o u t m a n o e u v r e d a n d o v e r th ro w n by influential m e m b e rs o f the m edical profession? O r, in th e e n d , h a d they lost the battle b u t w o n t h e war? A fter all, S t o c k m a n was n o t o n ly e ngaged in a c ontrove rsy over a n i m a l disease re sea rc h ; h e w'as also f i g h t i n g to d e f e n d th e u n p o p u l a r s l a u g h t e r p o l ic y (see C h a p t e r 3). H i s c ritic s v i e w e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’s decision to initiate F M D research as an i m p o r t a n t co ncession, a n d , in the belief t h a t alternativ e c o n tr o l m e t h o d s w o u l d so o n be fo rt h c o m i n g , they allow'ed S t o c k m a n to c o n t i n u e w ith the slaughter. T h i s was n o t his only victory. As th e n e x t section will reveal, he a n d his colleagues w e n t o n to achieve a su bsta n tia l degree o f c o n tro l over t h e o rg a n iz atio n a n d d irec tio n o f F M D research, w ith i m p o r t a n t co n se q u en c es for th e n a tio n .

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In a n o th e r sense, however, the c o m m e n c e m e n t o f F M D research in Britain m ark e d the e n d o f an era. Before long, S to c k m a n was d ead and M cFadyean retired. T h e i r 20-year period o f professional d o m in a n c e was at a close a n d the ethos o f ‘splendid veterinary isolation’ died with them . O t h e r new research initiatives were already beginning. In 1921, a group o f Scottish farmers fund e d the fo rm atio n o f the A nim al Diseases Research A sso c ia tio n. T h i s b o d y e m p l o y e d v e te rin a rian s to investigate fa rm in g problem s a n d f o u n d e d the M o re d u n Research Institute near E d inbu rgh, which still exists today. In 1922, research into canine d istem pe r began at th e M R C - c o n tr o lle d N I M R , fu n d e d by subscribers to the F ield magazine. T h e following year, the D e v e lo p m e n t C o m m iss io n en dow ed a professor­ ship a n d erected a new Institu te o f C o m p ara tiv e Pathology at C a m b rid g e University.43 Tog eth er with the form ation o f the F M D R C , these activities exten ded the ve terinary research field a n d p e rm itte d closer collaboration b e tw e e n veterin ary, m edic al a n d a g r ic u ltu r a l scientists. M e a n w h i le , a y o u n g e r g e n e r a tio n o f ve te rina rian s rose to p r o m i n e n c e a n d set a b o u t sh apin g the veterinary profession o f the future.

K eep in g

FMD

ou t,

1924-1938

From its fo rm atio n in 1924 until the outb rea k o f W orld W ar II, m em bers o f the F M D R C m e t every one or two m o n th s . T h e y discussed ad m in istra ­ tion and staffing, reviewed scientists’ written reports o f research progress a n d d e c id e d u p o n subjects for f u tu re in v e s tig a tio n .44 A l t h o u g h it was nom inally an i n d e p e n d e n t body, M A F exerted substantial control over its activities. Officials requested certain experiments, arranged the publication o f research results a nd he lped to select c o m m itte e m em bers a nd scientists, while ensuring that m o st o f the latter were veterinary surgeons. M A F also stationed a veterinary inspector at the Pirbright field station to check that sta ff t o o k the necessary p r e c a u ti o n s a g ain st disease sp read. F o llow ing S t o c k m a n ’s early de a th , his responsibilitie s were div ided so th a t Ralp h Jackson b ecam e C V O , while W H A ndrew s was ap p o in te d head o f veteri­ n a r y re sea rc h. B o t h g a in e d p e r m a n e n t p laces o n th e F M D R C . Like Sto ckm an, they feared the escape o f virus from the laborato ry a n d insisted that the c om m itte e tu r n d o w n all i n d e p e n d e n t requests to c o n d u c t F M D research.45 T h e o n ly e x ce ptio n to this rule was Profess or Beattie w h o , probably as a result o f political pressure, was p e rm itte d to carry o u t u npa id experiments at Liverpool University. T h is a r ra n g e m e n t lasted for only two years. H i n d e r e d by his o t h e r resp o n sib ilitie s a n d d e m o ra li z e d by the c o m m i tt e e ’s lack o f regard for his efforts, Beattie a b a n d o n e d the field in 1926 .46

32

A M anufactured Plague?

F r o m 1 9 3 1 , F M D research b e c a m e su b je ct to the s c r u tin y o f the A g ric u ltu ral Research C o u n c i l (A R C ), a new o r g a n iz a tio n established against M A F ’s wishes w ith the object o f g uid ing , a n d p r o viding greater freedom for, a g ric ultu ra l research. In 19 37, M A F successfully resisted moves to place the F M D R C u n d e r the A R C by claiming th at only M A F was capable o f preventin g the F M D virus from escaping from the labora­ tory.4 It retained this m o n o p o ly o f power until the 1950s, w h e n reluct­ antly, a nd in piecemeal fashion, it h a n d e d over to the ARC. Until that time, M A F ’s no tion s o f h ow F M D o u g h t to be controlled exerted a powerful influence over scientists’ activities. T h e F M D R C ’s remit was ‘to direct a nd c o n d u c t investigations into F M D , either in this c o u n try or elsewhere, w ith the view o f discovering m eans w hereby the invasions o f disease m ay be rendered less h a rm fu l to agriculture’.48 To m o st m em bers o f the British public, m ak in g F M D ‘less h a r m f u l ’ m e a n t searching for a vaccine or se rum w ith w hich to prevent disease spread. To MAF, however, the best way to m ake F M D ‘less h a r m f u l ’ was to stop it from e n te r in g Britain in the first place because the controversial slaughter policy w ould n o t then be required. U n d e r its direction, British F M D scientists devoted m o st o f their tim e betw'een 1924 a n d the o u t b r e a k o f W o rld W a r II in investigating w h ere F M D h a d c o m e from a n d ho w it was spreading, a s om e w ha t one-sided approach. By contrast, in E uropean countries where F M D was e n d e m i c a n d foreign invasions o f virus less sig nific a n t th an internal disease d issem in atio n, m ak ing F M D ‘less h a rm fu l’ m e a n t limiting its s p r e a d a n d r e d u c i n g its i m p a c t u p o n m e a t a n d m ilk p r o d u c t i o n . Consequently, C o n tin e n ta l scientists focused far more u p o n serum p ro d u c ­ tion a nd vaccine research th an their British counterparts. Before they could begin work, British F M D scientists had to familiar­ ize themselves with the techniques a nd findings o f a q uarter o f a century o f E u r o p e a n F M D research.49 For exam ple, G e r m a n scientist Professor W a l d m a n n h a d recen tly discovered t h a t g u in e a pigs c o u ld be used as experimental animals. Also, along w ith French Professors Vallee a n d Carre, he ha d d e m o n s tra ted the existence o f three types o f F M D virus, O , A a nd C, a nd had show n that infection with on e type d id n o t p rod uc e im m u n i ty against the oth ers.50 British scientists d evo ted m u c h effort to discovering the virus type responsible for British F M D outbreaks. T h e i r results help ed to d e te rm ine w h e th e r outbreaks were c onnected, and because the distribu tion o f virus types varied a ro u n d the world, they gave som e in dication o f the co u n try o f origin. Researchers also assessed w'hether wildlife was su sceptib le to infection, u n d e r w h a t c o nditions virus survived in the e n v iro n m en t, and how' long it could live on im p o rte d substances such as dried milk, m eat and packing materials.51 M A F used their findings as a basis for new legislative

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§3

orders, su ch as the Boiling o f A n im a l F oodstuffs a n d the I m p o r t a t i o n o f M e a t ( W r a p p i n g M a t e r i a l s ) O r d e r s , w h i c h a i m e d to p r e v e n t F M D c o n ta m in a te d i m p o rts from c o m in g into c onta ct w ith susceptible anim als.52 A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t line o f w o r k was se ru m testing, a n d b etw een 19 30 a n d 1934, C V O J o h n K ella nd trialled this p r o d u c t in th e field. B u t while, o n the C o n t i n e n t , s e r u m was e m p lo y e d as a first line o f d efence against F M D spread, K ella nd view ed it ra th e r differently, as ‘an a d d itio n a l w e a p o n in the a r m o u r y o f th e state’s w a rfare’. It was n o t in te n d e d to replace the s l a u g h t e r policy , b u t to p r o t e c t a t- r i s k a n i m a l s l o c a t e d n e a r i n f e c t e d fa rm s.53 It c o u ld also re duce F M D i m p o r t a ti o n in to Britain, as ‘the disease u n d o u b t e d l y c o m e s here fro m a b r o a d , a n d if the c o m m i t t e e ’s w o r k were success ful a n d results c o u ld be p u t i n to o p e r a t i o n a b ro a d , th is c o u n t r y w o u l d reap th e b e n e fi t ’.54 U n f o r t u n a t e ly , field trials sh o w e d t h a t sc ru m failed to p r o d u c e reliable, long-lived i m m u n i t y against F M D . 55 T h is was well k n o w n on th e c o n t i n e n t b u t d id n o t m atter, as s e r u m still redu ced the clinical severity a n d e c o n o m i c c o st o f F M D . B u t in B r ita in , w h e r e the sla u g h te r policy m a d e th e l o n g -te r m clinical effects o f F M D irrelevant, the m a i n p r o b l e m facing M A F was h o w to p r e v e n t disease f ro m sp re adin g. Se ru m use actually c o n tr i b u t e d to th a t p ro b le m : in m a k i n g s y m p t o m s less obv ious, it h i n d e r e d th e early diagnosis a n d c o n tro l o f F M D . 56 Because M A F officials were c o n v in c e d t h a t sla ugh te r was a n d w o u ld re m a in th e best m e t h o d o f c o n tr o l l in g F M D in B rita in , t h e y saw little reason to e n c o u ra g e v accine research. In a n y case, this was a tech nically difficult line o f e n q u iry : virus c u ltu re still posed p r o b le m s ; early e xp eri­ m e n t s u p o n vaccines devised o n th e C o n t i n e n t m e t w ith little success; a n d ne w c o m p le x ities e m e r g e d d u r i n g th e 1920s a n d 1930s, w h e n scientists discovered th a t each virus type c onsisted o f a n u m b e r o f stra ins t h a t varied in their p ro p e n sity to infect different species a n d in the clinical signs th at th ey p r o d u c e d . 5 In 1937, an A R C s u b - c o m m i t te e reviewed t h e F M D R C ’s p r o g r e s s a n d s u g g e s t e d t h a t it s h o u l d p a y m o r e a t t e n t i o n t o v a c c in e research. However, it was well aware o f the difficulties involved, a n d view ed vaccines in th e sa m e lim ite d way t h a t K clland h a d view ed scru m : they were to s u p p l e m e n t , n o t r e p la ce , t h e s l a u g h t e r p o l ic y a n d m i g h t be useful overseas to p re v e n t th e e x p o rt o f virus to B r ita in .58 Scientist J T E d w a rd s rose to th e challenge, b u t su c c ee ded o n ly in devising e xtre m e ly c o m p le x v a cc in a tio n regim es th a t w o u l d have be en q u ite im possible to a p p ly in the field.59 M A F officials k ne w full well th at m a n y m e m b e rs o f the p u b lic believed scientists w ere p rim a rily eng ag e d in discovering a vaccine t h a t w o u l d on e d a y replace th e sla ug hte r policy. To d a m p e n d o w n su c h e xpec ta tio ns th ey p revented scientists from pu b lis h in g their findings freely in scientific j o u r n ­ als, a restriction t h a t o n e researcher, H Skinner, view ed ‘as necessary. . .to

A M anufactured Plague?

a void false i n te r p r e t a t i o n by th o se w h o lo b b ie d a g ain st th e s l a u g h te r policy’. Results were, instead, com piled into occasional F M D R C progress re po rts, released in 1925, 1927, 1928, 1931 a n d 1937. T h e s e official p u b l ic a ti o n s re p ea te d ly e m p h a s i z e d th e m a n y difficulties in volve d in vaccine research and the po or prospects o f success. Skinner later elaborated: The w ord vaccine, you h a d to be very careful not to use it too m uch because the fe a r was th a t i f the p u b lic knew there was a vaccine a v a ila b le there’d be a cla m o u r f o r a b a n d o n in g the stam ping out policy, a n d the M in istry really w ouldn’t stand fo r that. They knew th a t stam ping o ut was the only thing, to stam p it out. C ouldn’t have people vaccinating anim als against it.60 It is clear, therefore, that for the first 14 years o f the F M D R C ’s existence, British F M D research follo w ed a d istin c tiv e p a th t h a t w»as selected in accordance w ith , a n d help ed to sho re up M A F ’s existing F M D c o n tro l policy. T h e official conviction th at national freedom from F M D had to be m ain tained at all costs, and th at i m p o r t barriers represented the first line o f defence against F M D and slaughter the second line o f defence, all had a direct im p a c t u p o n sc ientists’ activities. U n d e r M A F ’s d irection th ey looked n o t for new m e th o d s o f F M D control, b u t for ways o f im proving th e existing control policy a n d thereby re ducing the criticisms th a t had su rro u n d e d it since its late 1 9 th-ce ntu ry inception. However, one only has to look to the C o n t in e n t to see that British F M D research could have taken a very different direction.

A

WARTIME THREAT

T h e late 1930s saw a dra m a tic shift in M A F ’s a pproach to F M D research, as a result o f w h ich British F M D scientists began, for the first time, to pursue similar goals to their C on tinental counterparts. Directing this change was C V O D a n ie l C a b o t. H e evaluated the m e t h o d s available for F M D control and decided that, in future, it m ig ht prove difficult to prevent F M D invasion. H e also acknowledged that u n d e r certain conditions, slaughter m ig h t fail and w ould have to be replaced w ith im m u n iz a tio n . In anticip a­ tion o f this event, he arranged for the F M D R C to stop epidem iological investigations, resume serum trials a n d prioritize vaccine research. Driving C a b o t s re th in k was the fear that Britain could fall victim to germ warfare. H e w'as extremely concerned that u n d e r w a rtim e conditions, hostile countries w o uld m anage to in tro d u c e the F M D virus in to Britain in such quantitie s th a t a devastating epid e m ic w o u ld result. U n d e r such

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g 5

c irc um stanc es, th e sla u g h te r polic y w o u l d p r o b a b ly fail. W i t h i n n o tim e at all, F M D w o u l d b e c o m e e n d e m i c a n d British m e a t a n d m ilk p ro d u c ti o n w o u l d fall. T h is was far m o r e t h a n just an e c o n o m ic issue. D u r i n g w a rtim e, it w o u l d be im possible to i m p o r t re p la c e m e n t supplies, a n d the resulting d r o p in d o m e s tic c o n s u m p t i o n w o u l d seriously i m p a c t u p o n th e health, m o rale a n d f ighting ability o f th e British pe ople. T h e lik e liho od o f G e r m a n y e m p lo y in g g erm warfare was first c o n s i d ­ ered by th e g o v e r n m e n t ’s C o m m i t t e e o f Im p erial D e fen c e in 1 9 3 6 as part o f the c o n ti n g e n c y p la n n i n g for war. It c o n c l u d e d th a t G e r m a n y p ro b a b ly d id n o t possess h u m a n biological w e a p o n s a n d was unlik ely to develop any because it was e x tre m e ly difficult to p r o d u c e a n d d istr ib u te t h e m w i t h o u t risk to G e r m a n civilians. F M D , however, was a different m atter. Becausc th e dise ase w a s e n d e m i c in G e r m a n y , m o s t l iv e s t o c k p o ss e s se d s o m e resistance to infection, a n d so scientists cou ld develop w e ap o n s w i t h o u t fear o f i n itia tin g an e p id e m ic . G e r m s c o u ld be easily d i s t r ib u t e d by air; they w ere h i g h ly c o n t a g i o u s a n d c o u ld s p r e a d rapidly. M o re o v er, all B ritish livestock w ere susceptib le to in fe c tio n .61 Initially, C a b o t was n o t c o n v in c e d by th e c o m m i t t e e ’s c o n c lusions. A fter all, there were three types o f F M D virus, a n d infection w ith o n e did n o t p r o d u c e i m m u n i t y to th e others. G e r m a n livestock were u nlik e ly to have solid resistance to all three, a n d the highly contagious F M D virus could easily escape fro m th e research la b o r a to r y to infect t h e m . 62 B u t in J u n e 19 3 8 , th e situ a tio n c h a n g e d dramatically, as Professor W a l d m a n n , h e ad o f G e r m a n y ’s F M D research institute o n th e Island o f R iem s, a n n o u n c e d th a t he h a d discovered the first effective F M D vaccine.63 U nlik e se rum , vaccines p ro v id ed long-la sting resistance to infection a n d were a far m o re effective m e a n s o f l im itin g F M D sp read. T h e im p lic a tio n s o f this disc overy were p o ten tially devastating. G e r m a n scientists c o u ld n ow devise a biological w e a p o n w i t h o u t risk to th eir o w n livestock a n d w i t h o u t fear o f reprisals.64 C a b o t quickly realized th at if Britain was subject to germ warfare, there was on ly o n e way o f l im i ti n g the d a m a g e to th e n a t i o n ’s m e a t a n d m ilk sup ply; i m m u n i z a t i o n . T h e r e were tw o o p t i o n s o p e n to h i m . H e c o u ld either d e fen d Britain’s livestock u sing W a l d m a n n ’s n e w vaccine, or he c ould resort to se r u m t r e a tm e n t. H e t u r n e d to the F M D R C fo r advice. M e m b e r s h a d been in c o m m u n i c a ti o n w ith W a l d m a n n a n d were n o t overly impressed w i t h his claims. It a p p e a r e d t h a t t h a t his v accine was n o t fully effective against all th ree types o f virus a n d its m e t h o d o f p r o d u c t i o n was extrem ely co m p lica te d . By contrast, se ru m was cheap a n d easy to prepare, a n d if g a th ­ ered at th e site o f an o u t b r e a k , w o u l d p r ovid e a d e q u a te th o u g h short-liv ed p ro te c tio n against th e prevailing virus type. C a b o t th erefore d e cid ed th a t s e r u m s h o u ld prov ide th e n a ti o n ’s m a in defence against biological a tta c k .65 T h e r e w a s a sn a g , h o w e v e r. B ritish s c ie n tis ts h a d n o idea h o w to

A M anufactured Plague?

p r o d u c e s e r u m , h a v in g b o u g h t su pp lies for earlier e x p e r i m e n t s direc tly from W a l d m a n n ’s labora tory. T h e F M D R C h u rr ie d ly d is p a tc h e d scientist H S k i n n e r on a fa ct-fin d in g t o u r o f the C o n t i n e n t . H e r e tu r n e d a head o f schedule w h e n w a r b ro k e o u t, c lu t c h in g p lans o f the D a n i s h g o v e r n m e n t s s e r u m - p r o d u c t i o n a p p a r a tu s . M A F installed a c a r b o n copy at P irb rig h t, where all F M D scientists were n o w based, u n d e r th e c on trol o f the director, Ian Galloway. D u r i n g th e years th a t followed, they p r o d u c e d t h o u s a n d s o f g a ll o n s o f s e r u m f r o m t h e b l o o d o f a r ti f i c i a l l y i n f e c t e d a n i m a l s a n d t ra n s p o r te d it by car to re q u is itio n ed co ld stores in Surrey. T h e y used the sa m e a p p a r a t u s to p r o d u c e c a ttle p l a g u e s e r u m for fear t h a t G e r m a n y w o u l d also use this dead ly disease as a w e a p o n . M e a n w h ile , M A F d istrib ­ u te d p o r ta b le s e r u m - p r o d u c t i o n e q u i p m e n t to ten centres t h r o u g h o u t the n a ti o n so that, if necessary, it c o u ld be collected fro m local a n im a ls th at ha d recovered fro m F M D . 66 C a b o t d id n o t lose sight o f the fact t h a t in t h e lo n g term , sub ject to vario us techn ical im p r o v e m e n t s , va c c in a tio n offere d a m o r e reliable a n d longer-lasting m e t h o d o f p ro te c tio n . H e th erefore d irected those scientists w h o w e r e n o t e n g a g e d in s e r u m p r o d u c t i o n to s t o p e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l enqu iries (which, in a n y case, were h in d e r e d by the w a r t im e lack o f gu inea pigs) a n d focus th e ir a tt e n ti o n u p o n vaccine researc h.67 T h i s m e a n t t h a t for th e first tim e, British F M D scientists were p u r s u i n g sim ilar goals a n d lines o f e n q u iry as their C o n t in e n t a l c o u n te rp arts. B ut this shift m ad e sense because i f Britain d i d fall victim to biological attack, it w o u l d have experi­ en ce d F M D in the sam e m a n n e r as C o n t i n e n t a l n a tio n s a n d h a d recourse to the sa m e m e t h o d s o f c o ntro l. D u r i n g th e war, all research p u b l ic a ti o n was s u s p e n d e d a n d regular F M D R C m e e t in g s ceased. A core c o m m i t t e e c o n t i n u e d to g a th e r u n til 1944, w h e n - u p o n th e d e ath o f j A rk w rig ht, c h a ir m a n since 1931 - C a b o t a s s u m e d d ire c t c o n tro l. Several sc ientists left to jo in t h e forces o r w o r k elsewhere; b u t tw o e x trem ely c apab le v e te rin a ry surgeons, J B roo ksb y a n d W H e n d e r s o n , r e m a i n e d at P i r b r i g h t a n d c a r r i e d o u t m u c h v a lu a b le w o r k . 68 M e a n w h ile , at the biolo gy d e p a r t m e n t at P o r t o n D o w n , W iltshire, a m u c h larger b o d y o f scientists was carry ing o u t to p-secret investigations i n to the offensive a n d defensive possibilities o f o t h e r types o f g e rm warfare. In c o lla b o ra tio n w i t h the U S a n d C a n a d a , they d ev elo p ed anth rax -filled cattle cakes, a n ti- liv e s to c k w e a p o n s i n t e n d e d for re ta li a to ry use o nly; 5 m illion lay stoc k pile d b y t h e e n d o f th e war. Scientists also devised a n th ra x b o m b s a n d carried o u t o p e n - a i r tests o f th e ir w e a p o n s o n G r u i n a r d Island, Sc o tla n d , w h ic h left the island c o m p le te ly u n i n h a b i t a b l e . 69 In t h e e v ent, G e r m a n y did n o t use biolo gical w e a p o n s . T h e British g o v e r n m e n t s elab orate plans to d e fe n d th e n a ti o n were n o t p u t in to p r a c t ­ ice a n d M A F m a i n t a i n e d its trad itio n a l F M D c o n tr o l policy t h r o u g h o u t

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the war. O u tb re a k s oc curred frequently, m ainly because o f a rise in pigkeeping, w hich M A F had encouraged since pigs could eat kitchen waste a nd sup p le m e n t w artim e food rations. From tim e to time, scraps o f foreign infected m eat fo u n d their way into un -bo iled pigswill a n d caused F M D . 0 T h e years 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 2 saw the largest epid em ic since 1 9 2 2 - 2 4 a nd drew complaints that the slaughter policy wasted valuable meat. C a b o t responded by allowing butchers to salvage the carcasses o f healthy anim als th at were culled alongside their diseased contacts, a practice that had been stopped in 1923 because it slowed the elimination o f disease.71 H e also took adv an t­ age o f the British g o v e r n m e n t’s extensive w a rtim e control over the n a tion ’s food supp ly and diverted supplies o f suspect So uth Am eric an m eat away from rural areas a nd towards the cities, where the g o v e rn m e n t’s Waste Food Board ran swill-boiling plants. W it h the exception o f a brief period a ro u n d D-day, this sc heme ran from 1942 until 1954, w h e n the g ov e rnm e nt relin­ quished control over the food industry, a nd M A F and the M inistry o f Food jo ined to form the M inistry o f Agriculture, Fisheries an d Food (M A FF). M A F th o u g h t the schem e effective in reducing F M D incidence, b u t did n o t in form the general public for fear o f com plaints from urb a n residents, w h o m ig h t prefer home-killed m eat b u t received only im p o rte d pro duc e.72 It is debatable w h e th e r G e r m a n y ever in te n d e d to attack Britain using the F M D virus. Certainly, W a ld m a n n m ade few a tte m pts to keep vaccine discovery secret, a nd readily shared details o f p ro d u c tio n techniq ues with his British coun te rparts. T h r o u g h o u t the war, British intelligence kept a close eye on activities at his laborato ry a n d interrog ated several G e r m a n scientists ab o u t their c o untry’s progress in biological weapons development. Reassuring facts were discovered: W a l d m a n n ’s research in stitute o n the Island o f Riems was apparently incapable o f p ro d u c in g large quantities o f F M D vaccine a n d d id n o t h o ld large stocks; moreover, H i t le r was n o t interested in biological warfare.7’ However, a recent a cc o u n t in The Times, based upo n G e rm a n sources, suggested that the G e rm a n Secret Service was, in fact, p l a n n i n g an a tta c k . It r e p o r t e d l y o rg a n iz e d large-scale virus pro duc tion at Ricms, carried o ut successful weapons-testing u p o n a Russian island a nd, by the e n d o f the war, was capable o f attacking Britain.74

T

he

C

old

W

ar a n d

bio lo g ical w e a p o n s

RESEARCH British fears o f germ warfare did n o t cease w ith G e r m a n y ’s defeat. The descending ‘Iron C u rt a i n ’ a r o u n d Soviet-controlled countries in 1947, the 195 0 Korean W a r and th e sig ning o f the W arsaw p a ct by E aste rn bloc

gg

A M anufactured Plague?

E uro pean nations in 1955 all m arked the rise o f a new a n d hostile power th a t was allegedly capable o f e m p lo y in g biological w e a p o n s against the West. Believing th a t the n a tion sh o u ld be ready to defend itself against attack and to retaliate w ith sim ilar weapons, the post-war British govern­ m e n t allocated large resources to b o th defensive a n d offensive biological w e a p o n s research. D u r i n g the late 1940s, the D e fenc e Research Policy C o m m i t te e o f the M inistry o f Defence ( M O D ) r e c o m m e n d e d a massive increase in effort to ensure that, by 1957, biological w eapons w ould be o f c o m p a r a b l e readiness to th e a to m b o m b . To achieve th is goal, Britain e ntered into tripartite research agreements w ith C a n a d a a nd the US. As a general rule, the US - which unlike Britain had n ot signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol p ro h ib itin g the use o f offensive biological w eapons - carried o u t s h o r t - t e r m w e a p o n s research, w h ile British scientists, m a in ly base d at P orton D o w n , focused u p o n m ore f u n d a m e n ta l p ro blem s.75 F M D was a w ard e d high p r io r ity w i t h in this research p r o g r a m m e . C a n a d a a n d the US felt vulnerable to attack on acc o u n t o f their national f reedo m from F M D a n d su s ce p tib le livestock p o p u l a t i o n . T h e i r fears increased w h e n , in 1952, C a n a d a suffered its first ever F M D e pid em ic , later a ttrib u te d to a G e rm a n im m ig r a n t farm w o rker whose clothes were c o n ta m in a te d with the virus. In plan n in g their defences, all three nations decided th a t th ey sh ould possess sufficient supplies o f vaccine a n d sera, facilities for their p ro duc tion at short notice, a nd the intelligence to provide an early w a rning system against attack. T h e y also believed that they should be in a position to retaliate if necessary.76 As already described, the devastating F M D epidem ic o f 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 4 caused the g overnm ent to override M A F ’s resistance to F M D research. Such pressures had never arisen in C a n a d a a n d the US, where F M D incidence was far lower in Britain. Consequently, fears that virus w o u ld escape from the labora tory prevailed a n d no research to o k place until 1954, w h e n the US ope n ed its first F M D research laborato ry on Plum Island, off the coast o f L ong Island. Prior to that date, all three nations dep en d e d u p o n work taking place at Pirbrig ht. T h e M O D regarded this situatio n as a p rim e o p p o r t u n it y to im prove its relationship w ith the U S .' 7 In August 1951, it re c o m m e n d e d th at a recently pro posed seven-year plan to extend labora­ to r y a c c o m m o d a t i o n , facilities a n d re sea rc h at P i r b r i g h t s h o u l d , fo r m a x i m u m m ilita ry value, be intensified an d c o m p l e te d in two years.78 Scientists w ould th en be in a p ositio n to u n d e rta k e a ‘stu d y o f offensive possibilities and defence req uirem en ts in their widest sense’.79 Because M A F was re sp o n sib le for m a i n t a i n i n g disease se c u rity at P irb rig h t, selected officials b e c a m e privy to th e M O D ’s p lans.80 C V O Th om as D alling reportedly told his staff th a t the goals o f research were twofold: to p ro tect livestock against e n em y attacks (possibly by large-scale

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im m u n iz a tio n , a lthou gh this m e th o d was n o t to replace slaughter d u rin g ‘peacetime’) a nd to enable Britain to take ‘offensive actions versus a possible e n e m y ’.81 However, m any m em be rs o f the Pirbright Institute’s governing body (which replaced the F M D R C after the war) were n o t inform ed, no r was the scientific c o m m u n i ty at large.82 T h is level o f secrecy placed M A F officials in an aw'kward position. H o w were they sup p o s ed to explain a g o v e r n m e n t grant o f U K £ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 to Pirbright w hen post-w ar financial strin g en c y m e a n t th a t the total su m available for 12 o t h e r agricultural research institutes d urin g 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 3 was only U K £3 00,00 0? T h e Treasury suggested th at they pass off the m o n e y as ‘an acceleration o f research o f purely civilian interest’, a som e w ha t implausible explanation. Sir H a rold Parker at the M O D had a different idea: T he f u l l reasons fo r the expansion a n d acceleration certainly cannot be given. I w ould not, however, see any difficulty in yo u r saying. . .th a t there is considerable defence interest in this work fro m the p o in t o f view th a t the ensuring o f our fo o d supplies in w ar is vital, a n d th a t a solution o f the F M D problem is a very im portant factor;83 In an obvious reference to biological warfare research, Sir D o n a ld Vandepeer, M A F p e r m a n e n t secretary, replied, ‘W e s h o u ld certainly n o t have placed it [ F M D research] at all high on o u r list o f priorities for research from the p o in t o f view o f e nsuring future food supplies if it had n o t been for the defence considerations, which are just the sort o f th in g you w ould n o t w a n t us to m e n t i o n . ’84 In the e nd, officials de cided, u n d e r pledge o f secrecy, to tell a few c oncerned parties o f the M O D ’s inv olv em en t.85 N a tion a l econom ic difficulties caused the revaluation o f m any defence plans in M a y 1952. How ever, the M O D c o n ti n u e d to prioritize F M D research and d e m a n d e d the c o m ple tio n o f build ing w ork at Pirbright by th e end o f the year. In the event, the project ran five years b e h in d schedule, its progress hind ere d by clashes betw een Pirbrig ht’s director, Ian Galloway, m em bers o f the governing body, the Agricultural Research C o un c il (which, in 1951, to o k charge o f research), and M A F (which retained con tro l over financing, staffing an d disease security).86 Ernest Gowers, c h airm a n o f the 1952 c o m m itte e o f in q u iry in to F M D (see C h a p te r 6), s u m m e d up the situation in a letter to G H R N u g e n t, M A F p arliam en tary secretary: You ought to look a t the P irb rig h t p roblem personally. The scientists there are splendid people doing splendid work. B u t the system o f control is ju s t chaos. The governing body say they are responsible to the M in ister [of Agriculture]; b u t the A R C say

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they are responsible to them . W hichever o f the two is supposed to control the governing body, the governing body its e lf is q u ite incapable o f controlling Galloway, [who has] been charged (so he says) w ith highly secret w ork w hich he cannot possibly tell his governing body about because they have not been passed by M I 5 ! S7 By the tim e building w ork was completed at Pirbright, the fear o f biological attack a nd the status o f biological warfare research in Britain h a d fallen considerably, partly because the M O D regarded the possession o f nuc lear arms as an adequ ate d e te rren t to biological attack, a n d also because the US h a d a d o p t e d an in c r e a s in g sh are o f re se a r c h .88 T h e fate o f the F M D biological weapons pro g ram m e remains a mystery, although m ore in fo rm a ­ tion m ay well c om e to light w he n rem ain ing g o v e rn m e n t files are declassi­ fied.89 Clearly, however, the M O D s g e n e r o u s i n v e s tm e n t was o f great benefit to Pirbright. By 1958, 29 full-time research staff were e m ployed at th e laboratory, c o m p a red to just five in 1939. T h e y worked n o t only in the traditional fields o f vaccine p r o d u c tio n a n d serology, b u t also in new and rapidly expanding areas, such as genetics, biophysics and biochemistry.90 As the th re a t o f biological warfare w a n ed , M A F felt it less a n d less likely th at F M D vaccines w o uld be needed in Britain. Officials regained c o nfide nce in the trad itio n a l F M D c o n tro l policy, a n d the p ro b le m o f keeping F M D o u t o f Britain re turn e d to the top o f their agenda. But the retu rn to a p re-W orld W ar II ap pro ach to F M D control was n o t m atc h ed by a similar shift in research activity. C o n tr a r y to w h a t one m ig h t expect, M A F officials did not, in the a fterm ath o f the biological warfare threat, view vaccine research as unnecessary a nd irrelevant. Instead, they de cided that vaccination - if used overseas - was a prime means o f preventing F M D im p orta tio n. T h e y therefore encouraged scientists to intensify their efforts in this field. M A F s tu c k w ith va c c in a tio n p a rtly because o f re ce n t advances in technology, which considerably en hanced the prospects o f success. A noth e r m otiva tin g factor was a devastating F M D epidem ic (sec C h a p te r 6) that swept across E uro pe a nd into Britain d u rin g 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 . In its aftermath, C V O T h o m a s D a l li n g (w h o left his p o s t in 1 9 5 2 to j o in th e U n i t e d N a tio n s Food a n d Agriculture O r ga n iza tio n - the F A O )91 a n d his M A F colleagues decided th at only a systematic inte rnational attack u p o n F M D could possibly p ro te c t Britain from fu ture invasions. To this e n d , they proposed th at the FAO establish a E urop ea n C o m m iss io n for the C o n tro l o f F M D ( E U F M D ) , a n d laid d o w n a F M D c o n tr o l sc h e m e to w h ic h m e m b e r nations should adhere. T h e ultim ate goal o f the scheme was F M D eradication. It was to be achieved by livestock m o v e m e n t restrictions, plus

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C) \

o n e o r m o r e o f t h e f o l lo w in g : s l a u g h t e r ; s l a u g h t e r a n d v a c c i n a t i o n ; vaccination to m a i n t a i n a totally i m m u n e a n im a l p o p u l a t i o n ; o r v accina­ tio n in barrier zones a lo n g frontiers. In D e c e m b e r 1952 , the FA O c o n s id ­ ered a n d a p p r o v e d these plans a n d in July 1954 , after ju st six n a tio n s had jo in e d , the E U F M D held its first m ee ting. M o r e n a tio n s j o in e d in subseq u e n t years. In h e l p i n g to set u p th is n e w o r g a n i z a t i o n , D a l l i n g m a n a g e d to institutionalize, at an in te rn atio n al level, M A F ’s vision o f F M D c ontrol a n d its ideal o f n a tio n a l ‘F M D - f r e e d o m ’. T h e fo u r-tie r system a d o p t e d by the E U F M D was designed to e n g in e er con sen sus be tw ee n n a tio n s t h a t e xperi­ e nced a n d r e s p o n d e d to F M D in very different ways. Initially, it p e rm i t te d a n d e v en e n c o u r a g e d va c c in e use; b u t as dise ase i n c i d e n c e d r o p p e d , it d i r e c t e d n a t i o n s a l o n g t h e r o a d t o w a r d s a f u lly fl e d g e d B r i ti s h - s ty l c slaughte r policy. T h e success o f this ve n tu re d e p e n d e d u p o n the p r o d u c ti o n o f large q u a n t i t i e s o f safe, p o t e n t v a cc in e s, a n d t h a t in t u r n r e q u ir e d su bsta n tia l research efforts. M A F w a n t e d P ir b r ig h t to p lay a leading role, a n d was extrem ely pleased w h e n , in 19 5 7 , it b e c a m e th e F A O -d e sig n a te d ‘W o r ld F M D R e fere n ce L a b o r a t o r y ’.93 Five years later, M A F a n d A R C h a n d e d resp o n sib ility for v accine w o r k to th e p h a r m a c e u t ic a l c o m p a n y B u rr o u g h s W e llc o m e a n d C o , w h i c h e stablished a la b o r a to r y w'ithin th e co nfines o f the P ir b rig h t field sta tio n .94 As a result o f these d e v e lo p m e n ts, the d e clin in g biological w arfare th r e a t failed to im p a c t u p o n British F M D vaccine research, w h ic h c o n t i n u e d in earnest, h aving fo u n d a n e w p u rp o se a n d a n e w in stitu tio n a l h o m e . T h i s h isto r y show s clearly t h a t for m u c h o f t h e late 19th a n d 2 0 t h cen turies, th e goals o f F M D research a n d c o n tr o l were inextricably lin ked, a n d th a t for political, geographical, professional, c o m m e rc ia l a n d scientific reasons, th ey va ried b e tw e e n n a tio n s a n d over tim e. Research d id n o t so m u c h sh ape F M D c o n tro l policy as grow o u t o f it. I n d e e d , British F M D scientists’ activities on ly m a k e sense w h e n view ed in th e light o f M A F ’s lo n g - s ta n d in g drive for n a tio n a l F M D - f r e c d o m , a n d its m i d - c e n t u r y fear o f g e r m w a rfare . H a d M A F failed to gain a n d re ta in c o n t r o l o f F M D research, a n d h a d Britain n o t e x perienced the crises o f W o r ld W a r II a n d th e C o l d War, t h e n research m i g h t h ave follo w ed a very differe nt p a th and h a d a very different relationsh ip w i t h disease c o n tro l policy. B ut as C h a p te r 6 explains, M A F ’s vision o f F M D research was n o t universally accepted, a n d d u r i n g t h e e a r ly 1 9 5 0 s , it b e c a m e t h e s u b j e c t o f a w i d e - r a n g i n g controversy.

Chapter 6

T h e 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 2 Vaccination C ontroversy

FMD

RE TURNS

Towards the e nd o f April 1952, R u p e rt G uinness, second Earl o f Iveagh, c h airm a n o f the fa m ous brew ing c o m p a n y a nd elder b r o th e r o f the late W a lte r G u in n e s s , f o r m e r m in iste r o f a g ricu lture, su rveyed his Elveden estate. Ju s t seven years earlier, his h erd o f pedigree G u e r n se y cows ha d contracted foot a nd m o u th disease (F M D ) a nd been slaughtered. N o w their replacem ents ha d suffered the same fate. Iveagh was angry, upset a nd his patience was wearing thin. W hy, he asked, h a d n ’t the M in istry o f A gri­ culture and Fisheries (MAF) devised a better way o f protecting Britain’s herds against F M D ? Were officials no t aware th at in D e n m a rk , T h e N etherland s a nd G e r m a n y livestock were now vaccinated against the disease? Surely it was tim e to reassess the situation, as in the curre nt scientifically advanced age, vaccination was clearly preferable to the o u td a te d Victorian policy o f slaughter.1 Ivcagh was n o t alone in th in k in g that the slaughter policy h a d ha d its day. By the spring o f 1952, Britain was in the grip o f an F M D epidemic, w hich ha d begun the N o v e m b e r before w h e n birds m igrating from F M D infected E uro p ea n nations h ad allegedly carried virus into coastal parts o f eastern a n d so u th e rn England. As the disease spread, seemingly unchecked by the slaughter policy, in to the M idlan ds, Scotland a n d Wales, criticisms o f M A F ’s a ctio n s a n d calls for F M D va cc in a tio n b e ca m e ever lo u d e r.2 S t u n g by p u b l ic o p i n i o n , M A F a n d its s u p p o r t e r s r e s p o n d e d w i t h a vigorous defence o f the status quo. T h e resulting controversy was played o u t in Parliament, th e n ational press a nd in private hearings o f the Gow ers C o m m i t te e o f Inq uiry into the epidemic. Participants included British and foreign scientists, veterinarians, selected livestock owners, journalists, M A F

The 1951—1952 Vaccination Controversy

t)^

officials a n d m e m b e r s o f the A gric u ltural Research C o u n c il (A RC). T h e d ispu te was never fully resolved, a n d d ied away only w h e n disease incidence fell. T h e 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 row over v a cc ina tio n was th e first m a jo r challenge to M A F ’s F M D c o n tr o l policy for a lm o st 30 years. T h e vig oro us criticism s o f sla ugh te r t h a t h a d c haracteri zed the 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 2 4 e pid e m ic s (see C h a p t e r 3) - faded in th e spring o f 1 924 a n d r e m a in e d m u t e d d u r i n g the years that followed. T h is was partly because b o t h th e 1 922 a n d 1 924 c o m m i tt e e s o f in q u ir y in to F M D b acked sla ug hte r a n d dism issed calls for a r e tu rn to the earlier po licy o f iso latio n. F u r t h e r m o r e , d u r i n g th e years t h a t follo w ed, sla u g h te r was m o re successful in lim itin g F M D sp read. In a d d it i o n , M A F a n d its m a n y s u p p o r t e r s a c t e d to e x c lu d e critics f ro m th e p rocesses o f p o lic y -m a k in g a n d executio n. Legislative changes, i n tr o d u c e d in a c c o r d ­ a nce w ith the c o m m i tt e e s ’ r e c o m m e n d a tio n s , resulted in a m o re centralized F M D c o n tr o l p o lic y a n d e n h a n c e d M A F ’s p o w e r s at th e expense o f the local au th o ritie s, m a n y o f w h ic h h a d o bjec ted to its h a n d li n g o f th e 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 4 e p i d e m i c s . 3 M e a n w h i l e , t h a t avow'ed a d v o c a t e o f s l a u g h te r , th e N a t i o n a l F a r m e r s ’ U n i o n ( N F U ) , c o n s o l i d a t e d its h o l d o v e r f a r m i n g politics a n d e lim ina ted dissenting voices from policy discussions. T h e 1926 discovery t h a t im p o r t e d m ea t cou ld c onvey the F M D virus f u r th e r diverted f a r m i n g a t t e n t i o n a w a y f r o m t h e s l a u g h t e r policy, a n d as a g r i c u l t u r e be ca m e m o re pro sp e ro u s d u r i n g a n d after W o r ld W a r II, farm ers b e ca m e less inclin ed to c o m p la in a b o u t the costs o f c o n tr o llin g F M D . 4 T h i s ceasefire e n d e d w ith th e 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 F M D e pide m ic . By 2 0 t h c e n t u r y British sta n d ard s , this was a m o d e r a te sized e p ide m ic : 6 0 0 F M D o u tb r e a k s o c cu rre d d u r i n g a 1 2 - m o n t h pe rio d a n d led to th e sla u g h te r o f 8 5 , 0 0 0 live stoc k a t a co st o f U K £ 3 m il l io n in c o m p e n s a t i o n . 5 W h e n c o m p a r e d to earlier a n d larger e p id e m ic s - i n c lu d in g th a t o f 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 2 , w h ic h barely dre w m e n t i o n in the ne w sp a p ers - the o u t c ry t h a t a c c o m p ­ a n ie d it was o u t o f all p r o p o r t i o n to its size. A n d a lth o u g h the controversy fe atured traditional f a rm in g c o m p la in ts a b o u t the social, psychological a n d e c o n o m i c ha rd sh ip s o f F M D c o n tro l, it was also fuelled by a novel set o f criticism s t h a t , in th e ir sou rc e, sc o p e a n d m o d e o f e x p ress io n , d iffered significantly fro m those th a t h a d be en voiced before. Britain, after W o r ld W a r II, h a d an e c o n o m y b o r d e rin g o n b a n k r u p tc y a n d an e m p ir e o n the b r i n k o f collapse, a n d its status as a w o rld p o w e r was in te rm in a l decline. Fearing an e c o n o m i c b o o m a n d s l u m p sim ilar to th a t w h i c h h a d f o l lo w e d W o r l d W a r I, t h e g o v e r n m e n t m a i n t a i n e d m a n y w a r t im e c o n tro ls over p r o d u c t i o n a n d supply. C o n se q u e n tly , the austerity th a t h a d characterized th e w a r years c o n t i n u e d well in to the 1950s. In an a t t e m p t to red uce s p e n d i n g o n im p o r t s an d to m e e t the th rea t o f a world food sh orta ge, th e g o v e r n m e n t passed th e 1 9 4 7 A g r ic u ltu r e Act. W h i c h

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A M anufactured Plague?

p r o m o t e d a n d su s ta in ed ‘a stable a n d efficient agricultural in d u s t r y ’, this ush e red in an era o f increasingly intensive farm ing, a n d b r o u g h t prosp erity to the m a n y p a r tic ip a n ts .6 T h e e c o n o m i c crisis led to ne w p rotests over the cost o f F M D c on trol. A n a dditional c o n ce rn was w h e t h e r the rise o f m o t o r t ra n s p o rt a n d the shift to larger farm s w ith h ig h e r sto c k in g densities h a d e n ab led F M D spread to ou tstrip the capacity o f the slaughte r policy.7 T h e r e were fu rth e r co m p la in ts th a t c o n tr o llin g F M D by sla u g h te r w asted m eat, a highly v alu ed f o o d s tu f f th a t was still r a ti o n e d . 8 T h e D a ily Telegraph proteste d: This is the position after the disease has been notifiable f o r 8 3 years, after the slaughter policy has been p ursued fo r 6 0 years, a n d after intensive research has been pu rsu ed f o r 3 0 years. W h a t was once an inconvenience threatens to become a disaster a t a tim e w hen we ca n n o t afford to lose a morsel o f m ea t? B u t w hile these issues w ere u n d o u b t e d l y i m p o r t a n t , th e m o s t i m p o r t a n t cause o f th e 1 9 5 2 backlash against the sla ugh te r policy was t h e news t h a t E u r o p e a n (and S o u t h A m e ric an ) n a tio n s h a d recently a d o p te d a n e w a n d re p o rte d ly successful m e t h o d o f F M D c o n tr o l - vaccination . T h e British 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 e p id e m ic was an o ffsh o o t o f a p a n - E u r o p e a n e p i d e m i c , w h i c h c o m p r i s e d o v e r 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 o u t b r e a k s . 10 As t h e disease ex te n d e d across th e c o n ti n e n t, a la rm e d g o v e r n m e n ts a n d livestock o w ners r e a c h e d for F M D vaccin es, u s i n g t h e m a lo n g s id e t h e m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l m e t h o d o f seru m a d m in istra tio n . A l th o u g h vaccines were n o t yet p r o d u c e d in sufficient q ua n titie s to allow systematic, E u ro p e -w id e application , recent t e c h n i c a l a d v a n c e s h a d in c r e a s e d t h e i r a v a ila b ility t o a level at w h i c h stra te g ic use b e c a m e p o s s ib l e . 11 F ra n c e , B e lg i u m , H o l l a n d , D e n m a r k , Sw itzerland a n d Sw eden tried to create ne w barriers to F M D invasion by i m m u n i z i n g su s ce p tib le liv estock n e a r c o u n t r y b o rd e rs ; in S w e d e n a n d Sw itzerland, ‘ring v a c c in a tio n ’ t o o k h o ld , w h e r e b y a n im a ls in th e region s u r r o u n d i n g a disease o u t b r e a k were i m m u n i z e d . M a n y n a tio n s chose to se lectively i m m u n i z e v u l n e r a b l e o r v a lu a b le s to c k , a n d th e y also u se d vaccines to d a m p e n d o w n the v o lu m e o f in fectio n w i t h in a given g e o g ra p h ­ ical area. In s o m e regions, farm ers w ere allowed to vaccin ate v o lu n ta rily at their o w n expense, while elsewhere, vaccination was enforced by the s ta te .12 V a c c i n a t i o n d i d n o t p r e v e n t F M D fro m e x t e n d i n g across E u r o p e , partly because vaccines were in s h o rt supply, a n d also because a n e w type o f v i r u s e m e r g e d m i d e p i d e m i c , w h i c h h a d n o t b e e n i n c l u d e d in th e v a c c in e .13 N everth eless, m a n y E u r o p e a n scientists, livestock o w n e rs an d g o v e r n m e n t officials b e lie v ed t h a t v a c c in e use h a d b e e n b e n e f i c i a l in lim itin g the size a n d e c o n o m i c i m p a c t o f the e p id e m ic . T h e y also felt t h a t

The 1951—1952 Vaccination Controversy

t) ^

it had help ed farmers psychologically by allowing th e m to take personal re sponsibility for the health o f their stock a n d ab o lish in g m u c h o f the uncertainty a b o u t w h e th er disease w ou ld strike.14 As F M D spread th r o u g h o u t Britain, journalists began to report u p o n the p urportedly successful use o f vaccination on the C o n t in e n t . 15 T his news had extremely i m p o r t a n t implications. As C h a p te r 5 clearly show ed, M A F habitually w ith held info rm a tion relating to vaccine de v elop m en t from the p u b l ic d o m a i n . B ut d u r i n g 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 , its p o lic y o f secrecy b e c a m e unsustainable as newspaper readers learned - m an y for the first tim e - that F M D vaccines were available a n d could help to co ntrol the disease. T h e previously m arginalized o p p o n e n ts o f the slaughter policy gained a new w e apon o f attack, a nd as M A F had long feared, they began to c la m ou r for F M D vaccination in Britain.

C alls

t o vaccinate

British p r o p o n e n ts o f F M D vaccination were selected veterinary surgeons, journalists, a nd farmers. Som e had always objected to the slaughter policy; others h a d only tolerated it in the (som ew hat mistaken) belief th a t British scientists were striving to discover a vaccine with which to replace it.16 T h e y viewed slaughter as a ‘barbaric and medieval’ policy, ‘a deplorable a nd abject confession o f defeat. It is M edicine M a n stuff, a survival from the un scien­ tific past.’17 Vaccines, on the o th e r h a n d , appeared m o d e rn , scientific a nd h u m a n e . T h e y felt that u n d e r a vaccination policy, farmers w ou ld cease to suffer the periodic loss o f th ousand s o f animals, the cost o f F M D control w ould diminish, a nd there w ou ld be no further loss o f meat. For influential upper-class livestock breeders such as Lord Iveagh, whose valuable pedigree anim als had once been exem pt from the slaughter (see C h a p te r 3), vaccine discovery also raised the prospect o f w resting c o n tro l o f F M D from an undiscerning centralized g o ve rn m e n t d e p a rtm e n t and its ‘one-sizc-fits-all’ policy.18 A d d in g fuel to the flames o f this controversy was D r W illiam C ro fto n , a m averick Irish m an w h o believed th at he personally held the secrets to F M D vaccine prod uction. C ro fto n had been k n o w n to M A F since the later 1930s, w'hen, in a stream o f letters to ministers, officials and the press, he claimed to have disproved the generally accepted n o tion that viruses caused disease. In his b o o k le t The True N a tu re o f Viruses, 19 he c o n te n d e d th a t viruses w'ere b u t one stage in the bacterial life cycle, and claimed to have cu ltured the bacterial agent o f F M D a n d used it to p ro duc e an effective vaccine. A l t h o u g h dism issed as a q u a c k by th e m edical a n d v e te rin a ry e stablishm ents, C r o f t o n was no swindler. H e seriously believed th a t his

()

A M anufactured Plague?

discovery was o f great benefit to the natio n, a n d he m anaged to convince m a n y w e ll-c o n n ec ted politicians a n d aristocrats o f his g oo d in te n tio n s . T h ese influential individuals wrote countless testim onials on his b e half to the m in i s t e r o f a g ric u ltu re , a n d th e re su ltin g political pressure forced reluctant officials to comm ission a scientific test.20 As they had anticipated, F M D researchers at Pirbright proclaimed the vaccine worthless. But Crofton declared the test invalid because it had been carried o u t on guinea pigs, not farm animals, a n d m ade an unsuccessful bid for furth er investigations. At the o u t b r e a k o f W o rld W a r II, C r o f t o n offered his discovery to MAF, free o f charge, for the d u ra tio n o f the war. Rebuffed, he head ed to Sou th America in order to carry o ut further tests and to m arket his vaccine. H e did n o t give up on MAF, however. To the evident irritation o f officials, he c o n t i n u e d to press his claim s, b o t h in p e rso n a n d in d ir e c tly via a collection o f w o r th y a nd notable p a tro n s .21 As the years passed, he grew in c r e a s in g ly b i t t e r a b o u t his failure to c o n v in c e a n y m e m b e r o f the scientific establishm ent, at h o m e or abroad, to take up his F M D vaccine, and his c o m m u n ic a tio n s with M A F becam e ever m ore hostile. In spring 1952, he a d ded his voice to the r u m blings against the slaughter policy a nd cast scorn o n g o v e r n m e n t- b a c k e d F M D scientists, w h o had seem ingly failed to discover a vaccine in spite o f high-level fu n d in g .22 His claims stuck a cho rd with m a n y pro-vaccinators, w h o regarded h im as a beleaguered hero w ho ha d for m a n y years engaged in a valiant, altruistic battle against a politically m otivate d, intransigent establishm ent. T h e ed itor o f the D aily Telegraph argued: Surely any m ethod offering p rim e facie possibilities o f this k in d deserves renewed investigation, under conditions agreed on all hands to be satisfactory, by the highly qua lified scientific organi­ zation which the governm ent has a t its com m and. I t m ust never be said that, in such an emergency as the present, claims which m ight be va lid should be rejected w ith o u t f u l l a n d fa ir trials}* C r o fto n ’s criticisms helped to focus public a tte n tion u p o n the organization and achievements o f British F M D research. It was c o m m o n ly assumed that the purpose o f F M D research was to find a vaccine w ith w hich to replace the slaugh ter policy. C o n se q u e n tly , th e a d o p ti o n o f va cc in a tio n o n the C o n t i n e n t a n d M A F ’s c o n ti n u i n g a d h e r e n c e to sla ug hte r caused m a n y c o m m e n ta to rs to conclude th at British scientists lagged far b e h in d their C o n tin e n tal counterparts. T h e y tried to rationalize this state o f affairs. Were British scientists c o m p e t e n t to u n d e rta k e vaccine research? D id they lack fu nds? H a d th ey tak e n suffic ie n t no tic e o f discoveries m a d e overseas? A ltern a tiv e ly , was M A F to b lam e ? H a d it m is d ir e c te d B ritish F M D

The 1951—1952 Vaccination Controversy

C

research, o r failed to a d ju s t its F M D c o n tro l policy in acc ord anc e w ith the latest scientific advances? W h a t e v e r th e reason, c o m m e n t a t o r s agreed th a t M A F o u g h t to r e p o r t - for t h e first t i m e since 1 9 3 7 - u p o n sc ien tists’ progress. It s h o u l d also try to reassure the p u b lic t h a t it was aware o f the n e ed for b e tte r F M D vaccines a n d was e n c o u r a g in g research th a t w o u ld eventually allow the d i s c o n ti n u a ti o n o f th e sla u ghte r policy. As the D aily Telegraph w a rn e d : ‘if farm ers are c o n v in c e d th a t s t r e n u o u s a n d objective efforts are b e in g m a d e to find o t h e r less w asteful ways o f c o m b a t i n g the disease, t h e n a n d t h e n alone will th ey c o n ti n u e their r e lu c ta n t c o m p lia n c e [with the sla ugh te r policy ].’24

T

h e m inistry sta nds

firm

T h e s e c riticism s stirred M A F officials i n to a c tio n w h ile th e ir b e lie f t h a t sla u g h te r was by far th e best policy still g a rnere d sub sta ntia l s u p p o r t , they realized t h a t farm ers o p p o se d to it c o u ld easily o b s t r u c t its w o rk ings. For example, they could neglect to re p o rt early disease sy m p to m s , refuse to keep a w ay fro m in fec te d prem ises, o r m ix w ith i n d iv id u a ls w h o h a d b e en in c o n ta c t w ith diseased anim als. Such b e h a v io u r w o u l d facilitate th e sp read o f disease, a n d f u r t h e r c riticism s o f t h e sla u g h te r a n d re n ew e d calls for va cc ina tion w o u l d in evitably follow. It was, therefore, in M A F ’s interest to w in over f a rm in g o p i n io n (if n o t p u b lic o p i n io n , in general) by justifying its o p p o s itio n to F M D vaccination. As C h a p t e r 5 sh o w e d , v accin e d e v e l o p m e n t h a d h e a d e d th e list o f British F M D research priorities ever since th e o u t b r e a k o f W o r ld W a r II, a n d by 195 2, scientists h a d m a d e c on sidera ble progress. T h e y h a d devised i m p o r t a n t t e c h n iq u e s for testing vaccines, m a d e con sidera ble advances in vaccine p o te n c y a n d safety, a n d , b e tw e e n 1946 a n d 1951, assisted in the c o n tro l by vaccination o f a severe e p id e m ic in M e x ic o .25 B ut M A F officials n e v e r i n t e n d e d to use v a c c in e s in B r i ta i n e x c e p t in re s p o n s e to g e rm warfare. T h e y ne ver public ly c o m m u n i c a t e d this fact, partly because o f the secrecy su r r o u n d i n g biological w e a p o n s a n d partly bccause they feared th at t h e p u b lic w'ould sim p ly refuse to accept t h a t sla ugh te r was the last w o rd o n F M D c o n tro l. D u r i n g the early 1950s, th eir strategy o f c o n c e a l m e n t b e c a m e u n te n a b le , th a n k s to w id e sp rea d press rep orts th a t m a d e vaccine d isc ov ery c o m m o n k n o w le d g e . C o n s e q u e n tl y , officials h a d to fi n d n e w ways o f m a i n t a i n i n g p u b l ic c o n f id e n c e in th e t r a d i t io n a l F M D c o n tr o l policy a n d in British F M D research. D e n y i n g t h a t vaccines existed was sim p ly n o t a n o p t io n , as this w o u l d c o n firm p u b lic suspicions th a t British F M D research was m isd ire c te d or i n a d e q u a te ; b u t a d m i t t i n g to their poss ession w o u l d p ro v o k e a d d itio n a l

() g

A M anufactured Plague?

d e m a n d s for a c h a n g e in F M D c o n tro l policy. Officials th erefo re arg u ed — in P a rlia m e n t a n d in th e press - t h a t a lt h o u g h vaccines existed, sla ug hte r was, for scientific a n d e c o n o m i c reasons, still the best policy. T h e i r claims w ere w idely s u p p o r t e d by m e m b e r s o f A R C (w h ic h h a d , in M a y 19 5 1 , tak e n c o n tro l o f the P ir b rig h t research p r o g r a m m e ) , 26 scientists c o n n e c te d w ith F M D research, a n d veterinary a n d f a rm in g leaders, several o f w h o m w ro te press articles t h a t ba ck e d u p M A F ’s sta n ce .27 M A F s p o k e sm e n a n d th eir su p p o r te r s used several key a r g u m e n ts in su p p o rt o f their belief th a t slaughte r was the best F M D c ontrol policy. First, they declared v accin atio n m o re expensive th a n slaughter. T h e i r calculations sh o w ed th a t to m a i n t a i n c o m p l e te n a tio n a l i m m u n i t y to in fec tio n , vets w o u l d have to in o c u la tc all susceptib le a nim als against all three strains o f F M D virus every f o u r m o n t h s , at an a n n u a l cost o f U K £ 1 3 m illion . By c o n tra st, over t h e last 25 years, the sla u g h te r p o lic y h a d cost an average U K £ 1 7 6 , 0 0 0 a year in c o m p e n s a ti o n . Seco nd, th ey a rgu ed th a t vaccines w ere d a n g e r o u s because a nim als d id n o t develop F M D i m m u n i t y u n til 14 days after inoculation . D u r i n g t h a t period, a n d w h e n vaccines were wearing off, a n im a ls c o u ld still c o n tr a c t a n d sp read F M D b u t were likely to sho w o n l y m i l d c li n i c a l s y m p t o m s t h a t c o u l d easily pass u n n o t i c e d . T h i s p h e n o m e n o n th e y te rm e d ‘m a s k in g ’, a n d c laim ed t h a t a n im a ls infected in this way c o u ld b e c o m e lo n g -te rm carriers o f the F M D virus a n d therefore pose an o n g o i n g th rea t. T h e i r th ir d a r g u m e n t sta te d t h a t vaccines were far less effective t h a n sla ughter. T h e y w ere useless in y o u n g anim als, failed to w o r k p ro p e rly in pigs a n d sheep, a n d p ro vided effective i m m u n i t y against on ly o n e o f the three types o f virus responsible for infection. Finally, th ey em p lo y e d n a tion a l statistics o f F M D incidence to d e m o n s tr a t e th a t nations w hich a d o p te d a slaughte r policy e n c o u n te re d F M D far less frequently th an tho se w h ic h vaccinated. M A F ’s d e f e n d e r s were q u i c k to p o i n t o u t t h a t n e i t h e r officials n o r F M D researchers w ere t o b l a m e for th e deficiencies o f F M D vaccines. Rather, in identifying the flawed n a ture o f F M D vaccines a n d the p ro b lem s c o n n e c te d w ith th eir use, British scientists h a d sh o w n themse lves to be far m o re adv an c ed th an their C o n t i n e n t a l c o u n te r p a r ts, w h o h a d yet to no tice such d raw back s. T h e y c la im e d th a t P ir b r ig h t led the w o r ld in the quality o f its F M D research. It received m a n y visitors f r o m a b ro ad , assisted o t h e r n a t i o n s in d i a g n o s i n g a n d c o n t r o l l i n g F M D , a n d th e dir e c to r , D r Ian G allo w ay, travelled w i d e ly o n t h e C o n t i n e n t , f o rg in g c o n n e c t i o n s a n d e x ch a n g in g ideas w ith foreign scientists. M A F was well aware o f sc ientists’ progress, a n d was so c o n v in c e d o f th e i m p o r t a n c e o f th eir w o r k t h a t it h a d d ecided to i m p ro v e a n d ex ten d th eir research facilities (this version o f the sto ry o m i t t e d to m e n t i o n t h a t m o s t o f th e f u n d i n g for this p rojec t c am e f r o m t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n c e , w h i c h w a s i n te r e s t e d in f u r t h e r i n g its

The 1951—1952 Vaccination Controversy

t)C)

b iologic al w a rfa re researc h p r o g r a m m e ; see C h a p t e r 5 ).2S I n d e p e n d e n t research, as a dvocated by som e critics, was b o th unnecessary a n d d a ngerous, as only P irb rig h t was p rope rly e q u ip p e d to p re ven t the highly co n ta g io u s F M D virus escaping from the lab oratory.29 T h e s e a dvocates o f the sla u g h te r polic y alleged t h a t foreign n a tio n s e n v ie d B rita in ’s relative f re e d o m fro m F M D a n d w ish e d t h a t they, to o , c o u ld s t a m p o u t in f e c ti o n u sin g sla u g h te r. H o w ev e r, t h e p re v alen c e o f F M D w i t h in their bo rd e rs m a d e this policy u n te n a b le , a n d so th ey were forced to a d o p t the inferior m e t h o d o f v accin atio n. It was utterly ridiculous for M A F ’s critics to claim t h a t Britain s h o u l d follow th e ir e x a m p le a n d a d o p t a ‘ba c k w a rd ’ c o n tro l m e t h o d , w h ic h w o u l d actually w orsen the F M D situation. N o r s h o u ld they listen to D r C r o fto n , a w e ll-k n o w n q u a c k whose theories h a d b e en scientifically d ispro ve d by F M D researchers.30 T h e r e was m u c h t r u t h in m a n y o f M A F ’s a r g u m e n ts . As C h a p t e r 5 r e v e a le d , n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s in g e o g r a p h y , c o m m e r c e a n d s c ie n tif ic t r a d itio n m e a n t t h a t th a t Britain a n d the C o n t i n e n t experienced F M D in very differe n t ways a n d chose very different F M D c o n tro l policies. W h ile the f o r m e r a im e d to e lim ina te F M D from the n a tio n by m ea n s o f slaug hter a n d to p re v e n t its re-entry, th e latter tried to restrict th e sp read o f e n d e m i c disease a n d to lessen its i m p a c t u p o n m e a t a n d m ilk p r o d u c t i o n . T h e s e differences m e a n t t h a t British a n d C o n t i n e n t a l researchers j u d g e d vaccines in very different ways a n d reached varyin g co nclusio ns a b o u t their risks a n d benefits. In m o s t o f W este rn E u ro p e , w h e re F M D was e n d e m ic , sla u ghte r was sim ply n o t a policy o p t io n : it was expensive, u n p o p u l a r a n d p r ov ided no g u a ra n te e against the rein vasion o f disease from n e ig h b o u r i n g co untries. O f the r e m a in i n g o p t io n s for F M D c o n tro l, vaccines p ro v id e d far m o re d u r a b l e a n d reliable p r o t e c t i o n t h a n s e r u m . F a r m i n g d e m a n d for th is tec h n o lo g y was extrem ely hig h. C o n se q u e n tly , scientists released vaccines for use in the field, p rio r to exhaustive la b o ra to r y testing. T h e y f o u n d it i m p o s s i b le , i f n o t u n e t h i c a l , to e st a b l i s h t h e ‘c o n t r o l ’ p o p u l a t i o n s o f u n v a c c in a t e d livestock, a n d so w ere u n a b le to assess a cc u rate ly th e effi­ ciency o f F M D va cc ina tion. H ow ever, th ey were n o t overly c o n c e r n e d by th is lack o f te s tin g , a n d believed t h a t th e re s u l ti n g r e d u c t i o n in F M D spre ad m a d e plain th e benefits o f vaccination. I n B r i ta i n , M A F ’s i n s i s t e n c e u p o n a s l a u g h t e r p o l i c y m e a n t t h a t scientists c o u ld o n l y test vaccin es w i t h in th e la b o r a to r y o r field sta tio n . T h e r e th ey faced a p ro b l e m rarely e n c o u n t e r e d a b r o a d - t h a t o f replicatin g ‘n a tu ra l ’ infection . Placing susceptib le a n im a ls in c o n ta c t w ith the diseased in the h o p e t h a t t h e y w o u l d c o n tr a c t infection p r o d u c e d unreliable results; in stea d , scientists t r a n s m i t t e d F M D by i n je c tin g m e a s u re d a m o u n t s o f virus in to the t o n g u e s o f test anim als. Because all British a nim als w'ere fully

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^ M anufactured Plague?

susceptible to F M D , scientists were able to closely m o n it o r the degree a nd d u r a ti o n o f i m m u n i t y i n d u c e d by F M D vaccines. T h e s e features were regarded as extremely im p o r t a n t in Britain, where even a single u nchecked case o f F M D could lead to a devastating epidem ic; b u t they were ignored in Europe, where the occasional use o f ineffective vaccines had little impact u p o n the overall disease situation. So, while British scientists a nd officials regarded vaccination as a risky technology that had to be exhaustively tested w ith in the lab o ra to ry before it c o u ld be p r o n o u n c e d safe, C o n t in e n t a l observers ha d little tim e for ‘artificial’ lab o ra to ry e x p erim e n ts a n d p re ­ su m ed that vaccines were safe until proven otherw ise.31 T h e r e w ere o t h e r i m p o r t a n t reasons w h y M A F officials a n d their supporters refused to ad o p t vaccination. T h e i r private discussions upo n the m a t t e r sho w clearly th a t th eir policy preferences were u n d e r p i n n e d by d e e p - s e a te d - a n d p e r h a p s n o t even c o n sc io u s ly r e cog nize d - m o ral, cultural a n d nationalistic convictions. It seems th at they viewed slaughter n o t only as a m e t h o d o f disease control, b u t as a moralizing, disciplinary a nd educational force, a n d a ‘virility sym b ol’ o f Britain’s superiority over vaccinating nations. T h e impact o f M A F ’s F M D control policy was never uniform. Although in te n d e d to bring a b o u t a ‘national benefit’ - th at o f freedom from F M D —the costs o f this policy were overwhelm ingly bo rne by individuals living in regions affected by the disease. Unsurprisingly, it was these individuals t h a t proved critical o f the slaughter policy (see C h a p te r 3). M A F b ra n d e d their com plaints ‘selfish’, and told th em th at they should quietly bear the hardships associated with F M D control just as in different times a nd places others had suffered on their behalf. It seems that officials viewed slaughter as a character-buildin g policy th at ta u g h t self-denial, a ‘stiff u p p e r lip’ a n d instilled a sense o f the national good. It was also a disciplining policy that required farmers to m o n it o r their animals closely for signs o f disease and to a d o p t certain m o d es o f b e h av io u r to lim it disease spread. W i t h two W o r ld W ars w ith in living m em o ry, the m erits o f an o b e d ie n t, resilient p op ulation w h o p u t n ational interests ahead o f personal gain could n o t be overstated, a n d these aspects o f the slaughter policy help to explain w hy M A F was so relu ctant to a d o p t vaccination. Indeed, in controlling F M D , officials were waging a m etaphorical war on disease: F M D was an ‘invading e n em y ’ that had to be ‘fo u g h t’ a nd ‘defeated.’ Anim als had to be ‘sacrificed’ in the ‘c am paign’ against F M D ; M A F veterinary inspectors acted as ‘foot soldiers’; the Pirbright institute was the ‘British C o m m a n d o ’; and slaughter was ‘the first line o f defence’.32 British p ro p o n e n ts o f slaughter felt that nations w h o a d opte d it were automatically on a higher plane th an those w h o did n o t because it stam ped o u t germ s and gave rise to national disease freedom , a state w hich M A F

The 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 2 Vaccination Controversy

1Q 1

had long regarded as the highest possible achievem ent in livestock disease control. Vaccination, on the o th e r hand, was incapable o f defeating F M D because it involved m odifying an d living alongside the virus. T h e y believed t h a t slaughter could only succeed in disciplined, ordered nations ru n by e nlightened governm ents. Its effective control o f F M D within Britain was testam ent to M A F ’s administrative efficiency, Britain’s tho ro u g h veterinary policing and the educate d n ature o f British farmers - w h o lived in fear o f F M D a n d were mostly prepared to abide by objectionable disease regula­ tions for the benefit o f the nation. But in nations where ig norant farmers d id n o t regard F M D as a d a n g e r o u s disease a n d refused to a d h e r e to livestock m o v em e n t controls, vaccination was the only o p tio n .33 According to this logic, if Britain a d op te d a policy o f vaccination, it w ou ld be reduced to the same level as disorganized, inefficient, ignorant a n d im m oral nations such as France, w'here ‘the Latin t e m p e ra m e n t o f the p o p u lation a n d the in tr u s io n o f politics m ilitate against the effective im p o s itio n o f restric­ tions’.34 Such a move could not, therefore, be con te m p la te d .

T

he dispute c o n t in u e s

M A F ’s defence o f the slau ghter policy failed to satisfy its critics, whose co m p la in ts c o n ti n u e d into the s u m m e r a n d a u t u m n of 1952. Officials blam e d public ignorance a n d ‘ill-informed journalism ’ a n d increased their efforts, b u t to no avail.35 In fact, they m istook the situation. O p p o n e n t s o f the slaughter policy were n o t ig norant o f the issues su r ro u n d in g F M D control. T h e y disagreed with M A F officials and their supporters because, for th em , F M D control was n o t the purely technical a n d e con om ic issue th at M A F ha d m ad e out; it was also an ideological affair that was closely b o u n d up with the role a n d status o f science in society, the accountability o f go v e rn m e n t bodies a nd Britain’s international standing. In effect, the dispute a m o u n te d to a clash o f worldviews, in which p ro ­ vaccinators fervently criticized those very aspects o f the slaughter policy that M A F officials had th o u g h t m ost beneficial. So, while officials ad o p te d a paternalistic view o f F M D control, in w hich a central go v e rn m e n t b ody decided w h a t was best for the n a tio n, their critics favoured a m ore liberal policy that allowed individuals to take responsibility for F M D control and act in accordance with their personal o r regional interests. W h ile officials view'ed s l a u g h te r as an ‘a d v a n c e d ’ m e t h o d t h a t d e m o n s t r a t e d British su periority, critics t h o u g h t it an u n sc ientific m ea sure t h a t sym bolized Britain’s ‘backwardness’; and w'hile officials saw' vaccination as dangerously uncertain, to critics it provided greater security against the unpredic ta ble invasion a nd spread o f F M D .

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a

M anufactured Plague?

A bove all, p r o-v ac c in a tors t h o u g h t M A F officials o ld -fa s h io n e d , o u t o f to u ch and, worse, anti-scientific. T h e 1950s was a tim e o f u n p r e c e d e n te d o p t im i s m a n d faith in th e value o f science, a n d as o n e o f th e m o s t i m p o r t ­ a n t achievem ents o f m o d e r n m edicin e, vaccines were celebrated as a sym bol o f m a n ’s m aste ry over n a tu re a n d a m ea n s o f a d v a n c in g society. To m a n y advocates o f scientific enquiry, M A F ’s criticism s o f F M D v a cc ina tio n just did n o t m ak e sense. H a d it n o t n o tic e d t h a t in a tim e o f radical agricultural, e c o n o m i c a n d political chang e, the trad itio n a l policy o f sla ugh te r inflicted greater hardships a n d was less likely to succeed th a n ever before? H o w co uld a 60-y e ar-old policy o f sla u g h te r possibly be m o r e scientific t h a n v accina­ tion? H o w c o u ld v a cc in a ting n a tio n s be inferior to Britain? A n d w h y was M A F so pessimistic a b o u t scientists’ c apacity to develop n e w a n d im p ro v e d vaccines th at w o u l d o n e d ay replace the slaugh ter policy?36 C ritics w e n t on to q u e r y w h e t h e r scientists w o r k i n g for a m in istry th a t se e m e d so u n c o n v in c e d o f t h e m erits o f scientific e n q u i r y c o u ld achieve a n y t h i n g o f v a lue , especially w h e n t h e y s e e m e d m o r e b e n t o n so lv in g foreign n a ti o n s ’ p ro b le m s t h a n their o w n . T h e D a ily Telegraph argued: ‘It is n o t, however, for reasons o f n a tio n a l pre stige t h a t we have m a i n t a i n e d this in stitu te [Pirbright] for th e last 3 0 years a n d are s p e n d i n g o n it this year £ 9 3 , 5 4 0 . T h e aim is, o r s h o u l d be, to find a cure o r p reventative for a s c ourg e.’3' W h e n , in A u g u s t 19 5 2 , A R C belatedly p u b lis h e d a r e p o rt o f research progress. However, this did n o t have the desired effect o f reassuring t h e p u b l ic t h a t ‘w o r k is b e in g p r o se c u te d w ith b o t h v ig o u r a n d c o m p e t ­ e nce’. Rather, in discussing vaccines o n o n ly 1 o u t o f 12 pages, it c o n fir m e d c ritics’ suspicion s t h a t scientists h a d n o t be en c o n c e n t r a t i n g su fficiently u p o n this i m p o r t a n t issue.38 T h e D aily Telegraph c o m p la in e d : T he only p o in t o f value in it is th a t the scope o f the in stitu te is to be greatly enlarged. . .in th a t the report is designed to show th a t the present s t a f f have done th eir best, i t is superfluous; in so f a r as it im plies th a t this best has been good enough, it is farcical.39 Far from b e in g the ‘ig n o r a n t la y m e n ’ th a t M A F g o v e r n m e n t officials h a d a ssum e d, s o m e critics u n d e r s t o o d the v a cc in a tio n issue so t h o r o u g h ly th at t h e y w e re able to d e t e c t w e a k n e ss e s in M A F ’s p r o n o u n c e m e n t s . T h e y a rg u ed t h a t th ere was n o ne ed to m a i n t a i n c o m p l e te n a tio n a l i m m u n i t y a gainst F M D , at an e stim a te d cost o f U K £ 1 3 m illio n per year, as a nim als in th e vicinity o f an o u t b r e a k c o u ld be ring-vaccinated, o n c e only, against t h e type o f virus c a usin g disease. Alternatively, M A F c o u ld p e r m i t h e rd ow ners to ino cu late their anim als a t their o w n expense if they wished. T h e y d r e w o n f o r e i g n s c i e n t i s t s ’ e v i d e n c e to c la i m t h a t v a c c in e s w e r e n o t d a n g e r o u s b e ca u se ‘m a s k i n g ’ rarely o c c u rr e d a n d F M D carriers d id n o t

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exist. T h e y also argued that M A F ’s com p a rison o f British a nd C o n tin e n ta l F M D control m e tho ds had failed to take into accou nt the indirect financial losses inflicted by slaughter, the psychological benefits o f vaccination and the ‘teething problem s’ associated with early vaccine use on the C o n tin e n t.40 It seemed, therefore, that M A F ’s case against vaccination was at best flawed a nd at worst propaganda. T h e D aily Telegraph com plain ed: ‘T h e re seems to be m ore energy directed towards discrediting vaccination than to trying it.’41 Farm er G e o rge Villiers agreed, stating: ‘N e v er has a case been p u t before the public so completely from one angle, a n d I believe, never w ith so m u c h bias and distortion a n d obstructive prejudice.’42 T h e H o n o u r a b le R H Bathurst, a cattle breeder, was similarly forthright: In trying to secure a reasonable measure o f security fo r our herds we seem to be fig h tin g som ething more virulent than virus. We are up against a fo rm id a b le com bination o f official ignorance reinforced by personal a n d professional jealousy.41. T h ese c om p la ints were n o t w it h o u t fo u n d a tio n . Even D irector Ian Gallo­ way, o f Pirbright, felt th a t M A F had exaggerated the prob lem s associated with vaccination. H e wrote a letter to c om pla in th at official criticisms had: become more general than is desirable, a n d have probably arisen fro m the necessity fe lt in some quarters so as not to embarrass the m a in ten a n c e o f the slaughter policy, o f stressing, rather, the complications a n d difficulties a n d impossibilities o f producing vaccines o f uniform ly high protective value. H e protested: I fe e l it isn’t a good policy, which is adopted in some quarters, to persist in suggesting th a t figures o f disease here compared to the C ontinent indicate th a t vaccination is an inferior m ethod com­ pared to slaughter. Too m any factors are involved. . . M a n y o fth e argum ents p u t up against vaccination are not sound or based on scientific evidence. This has, no doubt, given the impression that any sort o f argum ent is good enough to use against vaccination as a policy, a n d above all, to prevent any suggestions th a t the slaughter policy should be abandoned,44

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T

he

G

owers

C

o m m itt e e of

In q u i r y

In an a tte m p t to d a m p e n d o w n th e o n g o in g controversy, M A F a p p o in te d , in A u g u st 19 5 2 , a d e p a rtm e n ta l c o m m itte e o f in q u iry in to th e e p id e m ic , c h aired by Sir E rn e st G ow ers, an e x p erien c e d c o m m itte e m a n a n d career civil s e rv a n t.45 It d ire c te d th e c o m m itte e to focus its a tte n tio n o n th e v a c c in a tio n q u e stio n , a n d eagerly a n tic ip a te d a re p o rt th a t w o u ld silence, o n c e a n d fo r a ll, th e c ritic s o f B ritis h F M D re se a rc h a n d c o n tr o l. A s p e c tru m o f ‘sta k e h o ld e rs’ w ere re p re se n te d o n th e c o m m itte e : fa rm in g , v e terinary, scientific, L a b o u r a n d th e g eneral p u b lic .46 G o w ers’s preference w as for a p u b lic in q u iry , a n d M in iste r o f A g ric u ltu re Sir T h o m a s D u g d a le a g re e d , b e lie v in g t h a t th is f o r m a t w o u ld re a ss u re a f r a c tio u s p u b lic . H ow ever, th e m a jo rity w ith in th e c o m m itte e v o ted for closed h e a rin g s.4 In th is th ey w ere s u p p o rte d by M A F officials, w h o felt th a t as th e in q u iry a d d ressed q u e stio n s o f policy ra th e r th a n th e exercise o f po w er by a p u b lic body, m em b e rs o f th e p u b lic n e ed n o t be a d m itte d .48 O v e r th e course o f 39 m eetings, th e c o m m itte e gath ered , discussed a n d c ritic a lly a ssessed in f o r m a tio n d ra w n fro m m a n y d if f e r e n t a n d o fte n c o n tra d ic to ry sources. It to o k oral a n d w ritte n evidence from M A F offi­ cials, A R C m em b e rs, v e te rin a ry a n d fa rm in g re p re se n tativ es, in d iv id u a ls c la im in g to possess F M D cures, local a u th o ritie s an d tra n s p o rt associations. E ven D r C ro fto n w as given a h e a rin g , in w h ic h he p e rsu ad e d th e c o m m it­ tee - a g a in st M A F ’s w ish e s - to c o n s id e r fu r th e r sc ie n tific tests o n his v a c c in e .49 C o m m itte e m e m b e rs also v isite d S o u th A m e ric a a n d several E u ro p e a n n a tio n s , w h e re th e y g a th e re d in f o r m a tio n u p o n a lte rn a tiv e disease c o n tr o l p o lic ies a n d le a rn e d o f fo re ig n e x p e rts ’ view s o n F M D v a c c in a tio n .50 As M A F had h o p e d , th e c o m m itte e ’s re p o rt dism issed p u b lic criticism s o f B ritish F M D sc ie n tists a n d u p h e ld th e o fficial b e lie f th a t th e re w as c u r re n tly n o a lte rn a tiv e to s la u g h te r . N a tio n - w id e v a c c in a tio n w as a ‘g ig a n tic o p e r a t io n ’ t h a t w as ‘m a n ife s tly i m p r a c tic a l’ a n d w o u ld c o st U K £ 2 4 m illio n , a c c o rd in g to a d e ta ile d M A F e stim a te p u b lis h e d in th e a p p e n d ix . V accines w ere slow to a ct, ineffective in c ertain an im a ls a n d n o t c o m p le te ly reliable in o th ers. C o n se q u e n tly : In the circumstances o f today, a n d o f the im m ed ia te fu tu re. . .any idea th a t i t w o u ld be possible to do aw ay w ith sta m p in g o u t by m a k in g the w hole susceptible a n im a l p o p u la tio n — or even a ll cattle — im m u n e by vaccination is in the realms o f fantasy. In present circumstances stam ping o u t m u st continue to be the policy in G reat Britain.*’'

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However, all did not go to plan. In the rest of its report, the committee expressed many opinions that deviated from those held by British sup­ porters of the slaughter policy and directly threatened MAF’s position. These differences emerged because, unlike MAF officials, the committee assumed that subject to future technical advances, vaccination would eventually replace slaughter as the preferred method of controlling FMD in Britain.52 It devoted a considerable proportion of its report to discussing available information on vaccines and mapping out vaccination strategies best suited to the British context.53 In this, it relied heavily upon the evidence of foreign witnesses whose view of vaccination was, at times, blatantly at odds with that held by MAF officials. For example, Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) Thomas Calling told the committee that the Dutch held such a low opinion of vaccination that they had recently decided to adopt slaughter.54 He was later contradicted by Dutch experts, who expressed great faith in vaccines.55 Dalling also claimed that slaughter had brought the recent Mexican FMD epidemic under control, while Dr Simms, head of the US Bureau of Animal Industry, reported that vaccina­ tion had played a valuable role.56 Members of the Gowers committee realized, after hearing evidence from many foreign FMD experts, that the view of FMD control which MAF had attempted to impress so dogmatically upon the nation was not universally accepted, and that the costs, benefits and risks of vaccination were by no means well defined.5 Its report listed many points upon which experts disagreed and, in discussing the lack of evidence on whether vaccines could mask disease spread, went so far as to claim that MAF’s fears had been driven by a tendency - natural enough in the circumstances — to magnify the unknown’. 58 Although the committee stopped short of defining the exact circumstances under which vaccination should occur in Britain, it reported that during severe epidemics it was prudent to act early, and that ring vaccination in conjunction with slaughter was the most suitable policy. It also rccommcndcd that MAF expand the facilities available at Pirbright so that, during an epidemic, it could producc large quantities of vaccine at short notice.59 These latter aspects of the Gowers report alarmed MAF officials. In giving credence to the opinions of foreign scientists, they undermined MAF’s attempt to present the ‘British’ view of vaccination as correct, and gave rise to fears that critics - who had long thought MAF’s opinions one sided and inaccurate - would declare themselves vindicated. Officials were also horrified by the committee’s assumption that MAF would vaccinate in future. Deputy Secretary W 'Fame wrote:

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The c o m m itte e ’s recom m endation on this p o in t is n o t q u ite as fo rth rig h t as m ig h t have been expected. . . the C V O ’s view is th a t circumstances w o u ld have to be m uch worse th a n a n y th in g so f a r experienced this century before he could agree to vaccinate. The com m ittee’s recom m endations may, however, m ean th a t i f we get another epidem ic like th a t o f 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 , there w ill be strong pressure on th e m in is tr y f r o m c erta in q u a rte rs to agree to vaccination,60 M A F a d m in istra to r, G R D u n n e tt, agreed: I th in k m inisters m ay wish to be rather stijfer on the question o f vaccination. They m ight, fo r instance, wish to say th a t they accept the a rg u m en t th a t i f the disease got o u t o f control by m eans o f sla u g h ter i t w o u ld be necessary to consider w h e th e r vaccines should be used, perhaps f o r a short period, to enable control by slaughter to be regained, b u t th a t in the g o vern m en t’s view we have never approached such conditions a n d the g overnm ent see no reason to th in k th a t we need a n ticipate do in g so; they m u st not, therefore, be understood to be accepting any recom m endation to include vaccination as p a r t o f the m ethods we use to control the disease. 61 T am e, D u n n e tt a n d th e ir colleagues need n o t have w o rried . T h e c o m m it­ tee ’s re p o rt w as n o t p u b lish e d u n til Ju ly 1 9 5 4 , by w h ic h tim e F M D was v irtu a lly a b se n t a n d th e earlier e p id e m ic h a d faded in to m em ory. H a v in g failed to force a chan g e in policy, critics h a d a b a n d o n e d th e ir c am p aig n a n d to o k little in te rest in th e c o m m itte e ’s b e la ted co n clu sio n s. M A F was careful n o t to reig n ite th e d e b ate. Ig n o rin g th e m o re c o n tro v e rsial aspects o f th e re p o rt, its p ress release sim p ly s ta te d th a t a fte r c a rry in g o u t e x te n siv e e n q u ir ie s , th e i n d e p e n d e n t G o w e rs c o m m itte e h a d d is m is s e d F M D v a c c in a tio n in B ritain as too risky. S la u g h te r th ere fo re re m a in e d th e best m e th o d o f F M D c o n tro l, a lth o u g h v a c c in a tio n m ig h t be ju stifie d d u rin g a m a jo r e p id e m ic . 62 T h e re p o rt a ttra c te d little a tte n tio n in th e press an d M A F P a rlia m e n ta ry S ecretary L o rd St A ld w y n faced few q u e stio n s w h e n , in July 1955, he told the H o u se o f C o m m o n s th a t th e g o v e rn m e n t in te n d e d to acc ep t its re c o m m e n d a tio n s. N evertheless, he w as careful to e m p h asize - in a cco rd an ce w ith th e advice o fT a m e a n d D u n n e tt - th a t vaccines w o u ld o n ly be n e ed e d w h e n c irc u m stan c es w ere ‘e x ce p tio n a lly b a d - m u c h w orse th a n a n y th in g so far e n c o u n te re d . . .frankly, th e c o n tin g e n c y seem s ra th e r re m o te ’. 63

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107

MAF’s ‘cherry-picking’ of the Gowers committee’s conclusions, together with the public apathy which by now surrounded the issue of FMD control, seriously curtailed the impact of one of the most painstaking, wide-ranging and open-minded enquiries ever undertaken into FMD vaccination. As Chapter 7 shows, for the next 13 years, and even during the devastating 1967-1968 FMD epidemic, MAF officials and their sup­ porters selectively cited the Gowers report in support of existing policy, while ignoring its detailed assessment of the various ways in which vaccina­ tion could assist British FMD control. FMD vaccination did not head the political agenda again until 2001 - half a century after it first captured the nation’s attention.

Chapter 7

T h e 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 Epidemic

Settin g

th e scene

In the years follow ing the 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 2 foot and m o u th disease (F M D ) epidem ic, Britain ‘never had it so good’.1 T h e austerity o f the post-w ar years passed into history as the econom y im proved and standards o f living rose. U nem ploym ent was low and life expectancy increased. People bought better cars, bigger houses and m ore sophisticated dom estic appliances, and a social revolution began as the younger generation began to assert itself. Overseas, B ritannia no longer ruled the waves. It gradually gave up its em pire and, hum iliated by the Suez crisis o f 1956, when international opposition forced th e w ith d raw al o f B ritish tro o p s from E gypt, it lost m u ch o f its selfconfidence. O n the E uropean scene, it played second fiddle to France, and suffered the indignity o f seeing its 1963 and 1967 applications for European E conom ic C o m m u n ity (EEC) m em bership vetoed by French President C harles de G aulle. A griculture also changed as intensive farm ing took hold. T h e govern­ m ent continued to believe that increased dom estic food p roduction was in the national interest, b u t aim ed for selective grow th and greater efficiency rather than ou trig h t agricultural expansion. It con tin u ed to offer generous farm ing subsidies, w hich the M inistry o f A griculture, Fisheries and Food (M A FF) reviewed every year in consultation w ith the N ational Farm ers’ U nion (N F U ). T h e 1957 A griculture Act prevented it from m aking drastic changes to subsidy levels in the belief that farmers receiving a stable, assured incom e were m ore likely to m odernize, invest and a d o p t the latest tech­ nologies. Farms grew larger as sm aller holdings becam e unprofitable, and artificial fertilizers, pesticides, purchased feedstuffs, new varieties o f crops and anim als, the artificial insem ination o f livestock, and the m echanization o f field and farm yard operations all led to enorm ous grow'ths in o u tp u t. M ost dairy farm ers abandoned traditional breeds in favour o f the Friesian

The 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 Epidemic

] QC)

cow, m ilk yields increased d ram atically an d herds grew larger as m achine m ilking to o k h o ld .2 T h e sam e p e rio d saw great strid es in v e te rin a ry m e d ic in e . D u rin g W orld W ar II, the N atio n al V eterinary M edical A ssociation (N V M A ), led by H a rry Steele-B odger, m anaged to convince farm ers an d the g overnm ent th a t the veterinary profession had a crucial role to play in preserving the n a tio n s precious m eat an d m ilk supply. A M A FF an d N F U -b a ck e d schem e to provide d airy farm ers w ith subsidized veterinary tre a tm e n t ran betw een 1942 an d 1950. In guaran teein g m any v eterinary p ra ctitio n ers a place on th e farm , it reversed the fo rtu n es o f th e profession, w hich had declined d u rin g th e in ter-w ar years, as the m o to r engine replaced the horse. Farm ers becam e persuaded o f the veterinary surgeon’s capacity to act as ‘physician o f th e fa rm ’, a n d , in th e b e lie f th a t th e p ro fessio n served th e n a tio n a l interest, the g o v e rn m e n t p rovided m ore fu n d in g for veterin ary research, backed the creation o f a new university-based system o f v e terinary ed u ca­ tio n , a n d passed the 1948 V eterinary Surgeons Act, w hich m ade it illegal for unqualified individuals to practise veterinary m edicine. M eanw hile, the a p p ea ran c e o f new d ru g s such as a n tib io tic s a n d h o rm o n e s m e a n t th a t v eterinary p ra ctitio n ers becam e b e tte r at m an ag in g disease, an d farm ers, increasingly m in d fu l o f th e ir p ro fit m arg in s, b ecam e keen er to e m ploy th em , n o t sim ply on a ‘fire-brigade’ basis as before, b u t for th e m anagem ent o f herd h ealth a n d th e prev en tio n o f disease. A t th e sam e tim e, M A F F ’s e x p an d ed State V eterinary Service m ad e su b sta n tia l progress in tackling lo n g -sta n d in g , co stly disease p ro b le m s, su ch as tu b e rc u lo sis (T B ) and brucellosis.3 B ut one disease was still at large. Its m an a g em e n t had hardly changed in 7 0 years (see P la te 12) a n d it w as a b o u t to cause o n e o f th e m o st devastating epidem ics o f the 2 0 th century. F M D stru c k first at a farm near Osw estry, S hropshire, on 25 O c to b e r 1967. For the next three days there were no m ore cases, an d The Times declared the disease ‘u n d e r c o n tro l’.4 B u t th e n o u tb re a k s cam e th ic k a n d fast, a n d o n e m o n th later, M A F F veterinarians were diagnosing up to 80 new eases each day. F M D incidence dro p p e d d u rin g D ecem ber an d January; b u t the disease w as n o t com pletely stam ped o u t u n til June 1968. A ltogether, there were 222 8 o utbreaks, 94 per cen t o f th em in the n o rth -w est M id lan d s an d n o rth W ales. N early h a lf - 1021 o u tb re a k s - o c c u rre d in C h e sh ire a n d 7 2 7 in S h ro p sh ire . T h e sla u g h te r tally an d the cost o f disease e lim in a tio n w ere u n p re c e d e n te d . 4 5 0 ,0 0 0 livestock lost th e ir lives, a m o n g th em on e th ird o f the cows in C heshire. C o m p e n sa tio n cost U K £ 2 7 m illion, w ith to tal losses estim ated a t betw een U K £ 7 0 m illion and £ 1 5 0 m illio n .5 T h e im p a c t o f th is e p id e m ic w as fe lt a t m a n y levels. As in p a st epidem ics, the m eth o d s used to co n tro l F M D affected the w ork and lives

] ]Q

A M anufactured Plague?

o f th o u san d s o f rural in h ab itan ts. T h e disease also m ade its presence felt w ith in u rb an areas, w here for the first tim e a broad section o f the populace saw th eir leisure pursuits curtailed. For M A FF officials, the ra m p a n t spread o f infection caused a crisis o f co nfidence in the trad itio n a l slaughter policy, and, in agreeing to im pose a tem p o rary ban on m eat im p o rts from F M D in fec te d n a tio n s, th e g o v e rn m e n t p re c ip ita te d a b re a k d o w n in A n g lo A rgentine relations, w hich had ram ifications for B ritain’s export industries. B ut w hile th e effects o f F M D w ere experienced in m an y d ifferent ways by a great variety o f people, on one m a tte r there was u n a n im ity : all w ho had b een to u c h e d by th e disease vow ed th a t such an e p id e m ic m u st never h a p p en again. B ut as everyone know s, F M D reappeared in 2001 an d w reaked greater havoc th an ever before. T h e h isto ry o f 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 provides an im p o rta n t b a ck d ro p for th a t ev en t (see C h a p te r 8) a n d reveals ju s t how few' o f its lessons w'ere rem em bered 33 years later. It also draw s to g eth er several issues raised earlier in th e b o o k , such as th e in te n se su fferin g in flicted by th e official F M D co n tro l policy, the highly political n a tu re o f disease c ontrol, th e d isp a rity betw 'een M A F F ’s p u b lic p ro n o u n c e m e n ts a n d its p riv ate actions, the difficulties involved in co n tro llin g the im p o rta tio n o f F M D infected m eat, an d th e in stitu tio n a l resistance to vaccination. O n c e again, F M D was far m ore th an ju st an anim al disease.

T

he view from t h e g r o u n d

W h e n F M D broke o u t near O sw estry on 25 O c to b er, M A F F ’s veterinary d e p a r tm e n t w as re la tiv e ly u n c o n c e rn e d . It h a d a lre a d y o v erseen th e e lim ination o f 33 o utbreaks th a t year an d had no reason to believe th a t this w ould be any different.6 Regional veterinary staff w ent th ro u g h the fam iliar ro u tin e o f su p e rv isin g th e d e stru c tio n a n d bu rial o f in fec te d sto c k an d tracing the anim als w ith w hich they had com e in to c o n tact, a som ew hat d iffic u lt jo b sin c e tw o cow s h a d b e en se n t fro m th e in fe c te d farm to O sw estry m ark et, along w ith a n o th e r 7 0 0 0 anim als. N evertheless, by 30 O c to b er, the task was com plete. N o fu rth e r cases o f F M D had com e to light, an d so M A F F lifted the restrictions that it had autom atically im posed u p o n the m o v em e n t o f livestock in the su rro u n d in g counties. B ut, th en , tw o new notificatio n s were received from C h esh ire a n d N o rth Lancashire. O th e rs follow ed. By 1 N ovem ber, 19 o u tb reak s o f F M D had been id e n ti­ fied a n d over 4 0 0 0 a n im a ls d e stro y e d . Six days late r, th e n u m b e r o f o u tb reak s reached 106, m o st o f th em w ith in th e n o rth -w est M idlands. As sla u g h te r a n d b u ria l p ro g re sse d , th e O s w e s try area b e c a m e ‘a landscape w ith o u t life. M ile a fter m ile o f fields, w hich should be full o f

The 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 Epidemic

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sheep a n d cattle, are em pty.’7 For those farm ers w ho had lost th e ir stock, it seem ed th a t little h a d ch an g e d since th e ir g ra n d p a re n ts ’ day. As one c o m m e n ta to r n oted: ‘T h ey use an a u to m a tic pistol to slaughter the cattle instead o f a pole-axe, an d a m echanical digger for the grave instead o f m en w ith spades. . .n o t a very goo d a d v ertisem e n t for 40 years o f m inisterial re sea rc h .’8 For th e second tim e in h a lf a c en tu ry , ru ral life in C h e sh ire g ro u n d to a halt. Farm ers barricaded them selves inside th eir properties, laid d isinfectant-soaked straw on roads outside, ordered grocery deliveries to be d ro p p e d at the farm gate, an d h u n g up notices w arn in g people to ‘Keep o ut!’ ‘Stay away!’ an d ‘Be o ff or be shot!’ Tow ns becam e ghostlike as m arkets an d social gatherings w ere cancelled, pubs e m p tied an d child ren sto p p ed going to school.9 W h ere possible, farm ers tried to follow M A F F an d N F U advicc a b o u t h ousing anim als, m oving them away from farm b o u n d aries, disinfecting m ilk ch u rn s before and after collection, a n d avoiding c o n ta ct w ith o th er liv esto ck o w n ers. B u t in sp ite o f e v e ry th in g , th e disease c o n tin u e d to spread, attacking rich and poor, pedigree and com m ercial herds alike. Every w eek, th e Chester Chronicle's list o f infected farm s grew longer. Successive press rep o rts described the e pidem ic as ‘th e w orst since 1 9 6 6 ’, ‘the w orst since 1960. . .1 9 5 2 . . .1 9 2 3 . . .this century. . .since the sla u g h te r policy b egan. . .ever re c o rd e d ’. T h e n it w as lik e n e d to th e 1865 c attle p lague epidem ic; finally, it becam e ‘th e plague to end all plagues’, ‘th e biggest loss an d crisis ever to hit the livestock in d u stry o f G reat Britain . 10 A chain o f regional c o n tro l centres sprang up as F M D spread to new areas o f th e c o u n try . E ach w as h e ad e d by a M A F F regional v e te rin a ry officer (R V O ), w ith th e assistance o f a lay regional controller. V eterinary su rg e o n s to o k ch arg e o f disease c o n tro l a n d d e le g a te d th e d a y -to -d a y ru n n in g o f the centre to lay sta ff w ho kept in to u ch w ith the local a u th o ri­ ties, police, an d N F U branches. It soon becam e clear th a t the centres were grossly u n d e rs ta ffe d , so M A F F d ra fte d in v e te rin a ria n s fro m n e a rb y p racticcs, m e m b e rs o f th e R oyal A rm y V eterin ary C o rp s, in te rn a tio n a l volunteers a n d staff based at o th e r M A F F ccntres and laboratories. O v er 500 were tem p o rarily enrolled in the State V eterinary Scrvicc betw een 25 O c to b e r an d 8 D ecem ber. Based far from th eir hom es an d fam ilies, they w orked long days, carrying o u t extrem ely un p leasan t tasks u n d e r intense pressure.11T h e Chester Chronicle h ad n o th in g b u t praise for their hard w ork an d dedication: ‘T h e y are essentially h u m a n e m en, and for th em to have to tu rn . . .to w holesale d e stru ctio n c a n n o t b u t be a revolting exercise to w hich they m u st steel them selves.’12 V arious logistical p ro b lem s h in d ere d the c o n tro l o f F M D , and after ju st 12 days, M A FF had no a lte rn a tiv e b u t to ask the a rm y for h e lp .13 S la u g h te r m en w ere in s h o rt supply, th ere w ere d isp u te s over pay a n d ,

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^ Manufactured Plague?

reportedly, m an y labourers left prem ises w ith o u t d isinfecting them selves. M aps a n d form s were unsatisfactory, new staff needed train in g and local a cc o m m o d a tio n was often poor. B urial, th e preferred m e th o d o f carcass d isp o sa l, re q u ire d p e rm is s io n fro m th e w a te r a u th o ritie s , a n d m an y carcasses had to be b u rn e d , a m ore un p leasan t an d costly m eth o d . T h ere w ere sh o rta g es o f heavy m ac h in ery , c lo th in g a n d p ressure sprayers for d isinfection; an d overloaded p h o n e lines led to c o m m u n ica tio n s difficu lt­ ies. Several o f these p roblem s w ould n o t have arisen had regional control centres m ade full use o f local a u th o rity resources, an d th e ir failure to do so drew m u ch c ritic ism .14 M A F F later looked in to its a rra n g e m e n ts for m anaging the disease an d acknow ledged th at it had n o t been well prepared. N evertheless, officials argued th a t ‘O n the basis o f experience in the years before O c to b e r 1967, it w ould have been unreasonable for the m in istry to have b u ilt up arran g em en ts for c o p in g .’15 An a d d itio n al pressure, w hich to o k M A FF by surprise, was the pu b lic a n d m edia interest in the disease. As one official no ted : ‘From the o u tset the d em a n d for in fo rm a tio n was overw h elm in g .’16 A t O sw estry, officials jo in e d w ith th e N F U to establish a separate in fo rm a tio n centre th a t issued b ulletin s to local radio an d T V sta tio n s and held a daily press conference a t w h ic h a v e te rin a ry o ffice r a n sw e red q u e stio n s . S ta ff n u m b e rs w ere increased as p h o n e lines grew busier, an d reporters a n d cam eram en were in c o n s ta n t a tte n d a n c e u n til m id D ece m b er. M A F F ’s v e te rin a ry h e a d ­ q u arters at T o lw o rth also set up a press an d general e n q u iry p o in t, w'hich issued b ulletins direct to the BBC an d Press A ssociation, a n d released press n o tic e s d e ta ilin g c h a n g e s to th e in fe c te d a n d c o n tro lle d areas. Such in fo rm a tio n h elped to keep people abreast o f the c hanging disease situ a­ tio n , a n d im p ressed u p o n th e m th o se m o d es o f b e h a v io u r re q u ire d to m inim ize the risk o f F M D spread. M o st m edia coverage was uncritical in to n e, a n d officials later praised jo u rn alists’ ‘responsible re p o rtin g ’ o f the e p id e m ic .1 T h e situ atio n was very d ifferent in 2001 (see C h a p te r 8). O n 18 N ovem ber, by w hich tim e 495 cases o f F M D had been c o n ­ firm ed an d 9 3 ,0 0 0 anim als slaughtered, the w hole o f E n g lan d an d W ales becam e a ‘co n tro lled area’. M arkets for store stock w ere fo rb id d en a n d the h o ld in g o f fa t-sto c k m ark e ts re q u ire d a local a u th o rity licence, usually issued by the police. O n e w eek later, S cotland becam e subject to the sam e re stric tio n s. W ith in in fected areas (anyw here w ith in 10 m iles o f a c o n ­ firm ed outbreak), all anim al m ovem ents had to be licensed. Because a u tu m n w as on e o f th e b usiest tim es o f year for sh iftin g livestock a ro u n d , these restrictions caused w idespread d isru p tio n a n d th e price o f m eat soon rose. Farm ers and veterinary surgeons alike p o n d e red the ‘u n p re c e d e n te d ’ speed o f F M D spread and its curious ‘ju m p in g ’ betw een w idely separated farm s. Som e b lam e d sta rlin g s fo r c a rry in g th e viru s o n th e ir feet; b u t

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o rnithologists rejected the idea. O th e rs suggested th a t the w in d had carried virus across the C h e sh ire p lain , a th e o ry c o n firm e d later fo llow ing th e analysis o f epidem iological and m eteorological data. B ut to m ost observers, it was clear th a t intensive farm ing practices were at least partly to blam e. Farm s w ere larg er a n d m o re den sely sto c k ed th a n in th e p ast, so each o u tb re a k affected m ore anim als, g en erated a larger v olum e o f virus and resulted in a hig h er slaughter tally. T h e increasing scale an d frequency o f livestock m o v em en ts fu rth e r c o n trib u te d to F M D spread, as did m o d ern practices such as the collection a n d tra n sp o rt o f m ilk in b ulk tankers, the spraying o f slurry an d artificial in se m in a tio n .18 W ith in th e in fected areas, M A FF used its sta tu to ry pow ers to close fo o tp ath s a n d halt c o u n try sports, such as angling, sh o o tin g , h u n tin g and racing (sec Plate 15). M in ister o f A griculture Fred Peart also appealed to th e p u b lic to stay aw ay from th e c o u n try s id e a n d n o t to p a rtic ip a te in c lim bing, w alking, b o a tin g , coursing, m o to r racing an d rallies, as well as o utw ard b o u n d courses. For events involving large gatherings o f people in rural areas, officials so u g h t v e terinary advice u p o n the disease risk involved a n d , w here necessary, re co m m e n d e d th e relevant o rganizations to halt or curtail th eir activities. T h ro u g h such restrictions, F M D im pacted u p o n the lives o f in d iv id u a ls far rem o v ed fro m a g ric u ltu ra l c irc le s.19 For so m e , however, Peart had n o t d o n e eno u g h . T h e N F U a n d th e T ory o p p o sitio n w a n ted a m ore ‘c u t-a n d -d rie d ’ set o f guidelines an d criticized Peart s refusal to follow th e exam ple o f Irish P resident Blaney, w ho had halted all rural leisure a ctiv ities th r o u g h o u t Irela n d for fear o f F M D sp re ad fro m th e m a in la n d .20 T h e m o u n tin g pressure co m pelled M A FF officials to reco n ­ sider th eir policy in the light o f political ra th e r th an veterinary concerns. T h ey su bsequently b a n n e d all h u n tin g a n d horse racing, an d in tro d u c ed a new F M D (T e m p o ra ry R e stric tio n s) O rd e r, w h ich g ra n te d Peart th e pow er to halt events in agricu ltu ral areas. T h e y also con sid ered w h e th er P eart sh o u ld seek e m e rg en c y p o w ers to fo rcib ly re stric t access to th e c o u n try sid e , b u t decid ed (in stark c o n tra st to 2 0 0 1 ) th a t such m easures w ould cause unju stified d isru p tio n .21 E arly in D ecem ber, Peart a n n o u n c e d th a t he w o u ld set up an in d e ­ p e n d e n t in q u iry in to the e pidem ic an d an in te rn al in vestigation in to its source.22 By th en , th e n u m b e r o f new F M D cases n o tified each day had begun to fall, and soon it becam e clear th a t the e pidem ic was in decline. T h ere was little celebration in C heshire, however, as th o u san d s aw oke each day to silence and an em p ty farm yard. T h e n u m b ers afflicted increased, day by day, as m ore farm s were slaughtered o u t. T h o se w ho had so far escaped th e infection rem ained in th eir hom es to w ait and pray. As in 1923, local new spapers began to voice fears th a t the c o u n ty w ould never recover from th e blow stru c k by F M D .23 The e d ito r o f the Chester Chronicle w rote:

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Along the high roads, braziers glow a t fa rm gates a n d deep in the country, the ruthless slaughter goes on, signalled by fire a n d stench a n d drifting smoke. . . It is a sad, grim, desperate business. No other industry, or way o f life, suffers like this, a n d it takes a great deal o f nerve to stand it. H e also told o f the ‘Farmers and their wives and workers [who] w rite to us in a way I have never before know n. T hey tell us on the phone o f their losses and fears and shattered futures. T hey seek not sym pathy so m uch as a shared understanding o f their m isfortune.’24 Several farm ers told their stories to the national press. O n e m an, who had lost his stock tw'ice before in 1952 and 1961, wrote: I have no hope. . . You think the bottom has dropped out o f your world. You fee l like doing nothing a t first. The first night I d id not sleep a t all, ju s t thinking about w hat was in fro n t o f me fo r the th ird tim e. You wake up in the m orning a n d prepare yourself, but there is nothing. Every day is black. Every neighbour has h ad his herd slaughtered.1’’ A n o th e r related his sorrow a n d a n g er a t th e c ity -d w e lle rs’ failure to com prehend the rural plight: You listen on the wireless: 'Numbers down, only 4 5 — all in the controlled area. ’ Only 45■ No one who isn’t tied a n d connected w ith the land can understand the enormity o f the disaster which is now w ith us —you walk, you drive through a countryside which you do not realize is locked in battle, which is under siege. . . You don’t love a h erd —you can’t love 150 animals —but they are a symbol o f your achievement; they are your fulfilm ent. A n d when that’s snuffed out in this brutal fashion, well, you die a little. . . The cost w ill be calculated one day —in cash, but never in h u m an tragedy. . . A t least i f you got the disease, w aiting would be over; b u t a pressure builds up a n d is w ith you day a n d night. . . A nd, oh, how I wish the general public could under­ stand how we, the Cheshire farmers, feel when we hear that bold a n d terrible phrase, ‘Only 4 5 today. ’26 U nder norm al circum stances, farm ers could restock their farm s four to six weeks after slaughter en d ed . B ut because the en tire c o u n try was still a controlled area, it was im possible to move livestock around. Som e farm ers were insured against consequential losses; b u t the rem ainder had to survive

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long periods w ith o u t incom e, an d m any could no longer afford to pay their w orkers. T h e scale o f the slaughter aroused fears th a t w hen th e n a tio n was released from restrictions, th e d e m a n d for new stock w ould push up prices an d encourage the sale o f T B or b rucella-infected anim als. Indeed, to the d isa d v a n ta g e o f farm ers w h o h a d lo st th e ir a n im a ls at th e sta rt o f th e e p id e m ic , c o m p e n sa tio n p a y -o u ts had already crep t up. M A F F trie d to address these issues. W o rk in g alongside th e N F U a n d breed societies, it drew up lists o f farm ers w ho had stock for sale. It paid farm ers to disinfect th eir p ro p e rty after the slaughter an d fo u n d places for m an y agricultural lab o u rers w ith in its sla u g h te r a n d b u rial team s. O n c o n d itio n th a t the in d u stry c o n trib u te d h a lf o f the cost, it offered to p -u p c o m p e n sa tio n to farm ers w ho had lost their stock d u rin g the first four weeks o f the epidem ic. It also a n n o u n c e d a 'p lo u g h in g -u p g ra n t’ for farm ers w ho d ecided to delay re sto ck in g a n d c o n v e rt th e ir la n d to arable. O th e r b e n efits in clu d e d a te m p o r a ry tax e x e m p tio n on c o m p e n s a tio n p a y -o u ts a n d n o loss o f subsidies for slaughtered a n im a ls.27 By th e end o f D ecem ber, new o utbreaks had d ro p p e d from a peak o f over 80 to betw een 10 an d 20 a day. T h e situ atio n c o n tin u e d to im prove th ro u g h o u t Ja n u a ry and February, causing M A F F officials to redraw the b o u n d a rie s o f in fec te d a n d c o n tro lle d areas a n d reassess th e tra d e a n d leisure restrictions required w ith in th em . T h is proved an extrem ely difficult task. Farm ers fearing the spread o f F M D w a n ted m easures to rem ain in force; b u t rural in h ab itan ts w hose businesses had suffered pressed for th eir rem oval.2S O n 4 January, E H B o tt, M A FF u n d e r-sec re ta ry for A nim al H e a lth D iv isio n I (A H D I), discu ssed th e issue in a m e m o , am u sin g ly e n titled ‘H u n tin ’ S h o o tin ’ n’ Fishin” : From a veterinary view point it seems to us here in A H D I th a t there m ig h t be risks involved i f persons livin g in contact w ith livestock in infected areas contacted livestock in other areas: a n d no more th a n this is involved. The rest is a piece o f w indow dressing. B u t let us try to dress the w indow sensibly.1'’ B o tt re c o m m e n d e d th e release o f larg e sw ath e s o f th e c o u n tr y fro m restrictions; b u t M A FF D e p u ty Secretary W T am e released only selected areas, saying: ‘W e w o u ld n ever be forg iv en i f w e relax to o s o o n .’ B o tt com plained th a t his plan had been based u p o n expert veterinary advice and was: ‘W h a t I m yself believe is needed on political g rounds, if we realize th at the N F U c o n stitu te on ly a sm all m in o rity o f the p o p u latio n o f this urban c o u n try .’ A n o th e r M A FF u nder-secretary, J C a rn o c h a n , later pro tested : A ny benefits from m ain tain in g controls longer than needs be are necessarily speculative; the disadvantages do n o t have to be speculated on for they are

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plain to see.’ H ow ever, T am e refused to lift th e c o n tro lle d area re stric tio n s u n til th e very e n d o f F eb ru ary .30 Slowly, farm ers began to restock, a n d by th e en d o f M a rch over 1300 h a d d o n e so , a id e d in C h e s h ir e b y th e F o o t a n d M o u th R e s to c k in g A ssociation, w h ich n e g o tia te d prices on th e ir behalf. A larm ingly, a h a n d fu l o f farm s su c c u m b e d to th e disease a second tim e, a n d , b lam in g th e presence o f in fec te d hay, M A F F v e te rin a ria n s m a d e a rra n g e m e n ts for all hay a n d loose feed o n e m p ty prem ises to be sprayed w ith fo rm a lin .’ 1 B ut, gradually, life in th e ru ra l m id la n d s re tu rn e d to n o rm a l, a n d o n 13 M a rc h , O sw e stry c a ttle m a rk e t o p e n e d fo r th e first tim e in fo u r a n d a h a lf m o n th s . T h e fo llow ing day saw th e first m e e tin g o f th e c o m m itte e o f in q u iry in to the e p id e m ic , c h aired by th e D u k e o f N o r th u m b e r la n d .3’ B ut th e e p id e m ic w as n o t y e t over. O c c a sio n a l o u tb re a k s c o n tin u e d , a n d M A F F d id n o t declare th e n a tio n free o f F M D u n til 25 Ju n e 1968.

T

he vaccination

question

T h e 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 e p id e m ic again raised th e q u e stio n o f F M D c o n tro l by v a cc in a tio n . P ro p o n e n ts o f th is p olicy believed th a t it w as a m o re m oral, sc ien tific a n d e c o n o m ic m e th o d th a n s la u g h te r a n d c o n sid e ra b ly b e tte r s u ite d to m o d e rn f a rm in g c o n d itio n s . H o w e v e r, su c h v iew s — th o u g h seem ingly p re v alen t a t grassroots level —received little p u b lic ity o u tsid e th e co rre sp o n d e n c e pages o f new spapers.33 A lm o st all jo u rn alists a n d politicians expressed a pre fe re n ce fo r sla u g h te r, even w h e n it b e ca m e a p p a re n t th a t F M D w as ru n n in g ra p id ly o u t o f c o n tro l. C o n se q u e n tly , th ere was n o re­ ru n o f th e earlier co n tro v e rsy d e scrib ed in C h a p te r 6. T h e re are several e x p la n atio n s fo r th is tu rn a ro u n d in p u b lic o p in io n . It seem s th a t p eople no lo n g er expected - as they had in 1952 - th a t vaccine discovery w o u ld lead to th e re p la c e m e n t o f th e sla u g h te r policy. In a lm o st every sizeable e p id e m ic since th e n , M A F F a n d its su p p o rte rs h a d advertised the m a n y p ro b lem s associated w ith v a ccin atio n . T h e y h a d cited th e G ow ers c o m m itte e e stim a te th a t v a c c in a tio n w o u ld c o st U K £ 1 5 m illio n a year, h i g h lig h te d its r e c o m m e n d a tio n t h a t s la u g h te r s h o u ld c o n ti n u e a n d e m p h a size d th e d a n g ers o f v a c c in a tio n a n d its m a n y scien tific deficiencies. In fa c t, sin c e th e 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 e p id e m ic , s c ie n tific a n d te c h n o lo g ic a l progress h a d c o n sid era b ly re d u ce d th e risks a n d cost o f F M D v a cc in a tio n ; b u t a n ti-v a c c in a to rs to o k little n o tic e a n d , by fo rce o f re p e titio n , th e ir a rg u m e n ts had th e desired effect u p o n p u b lic o p in io n . The case fo r v a cc in a tio n w as w e ak en ed fu rth e r by th e successes o f th e tra d itio n a l policy, w h ich left th e n a tio n free o f in fec tio n fo r a lm o st th ree years d u rin g th e early 1960s. A lso, m an y c o n tin u e d to s u p p o rt sla u g h te r fo r n a tio n a lis tic re aso n s, se e in g it as a sign o f B rita in ’s s u p e rio rity over

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v a c c in a tin g n a tio n s. B rita in c o u ld ‘b o a s t’ o f its F M D -fre e d o m a n d h a d ‘g o n e to g re a t le n g th s a n d e x p e n s e to re m a in th e h e a lth ie s t liv e sto c k c o u n try in th e w o rld ’. M A F F ’s pro fessio n al sta ff a n d th e research c en tre at P irb rig h t w ere ‘th e best in th e w o rld ’. T o v accin ate w o u ld be ‘a n a tio n a l c alam ity ’, fo r it w as still a ‘last re so rt’, a ‘se c o n d line o f d e fen c e ’ o r a ‘fall­ b a ck ’. It w o u ld ‘ru in B rita in ’s role as a p ro d u c e r o f disease-free livestock’, a n d was ‘ta n ta m o u n t to re sig n in g o u r p ro u d freedom from disease’. As one C h e sh ire v e te rin a ry officer p o in te d o u t: ‘W e are fig h tin g fo r th e h e a lth o f B ritish a g ric u ltu re a n d w h e n w e w in th ro u g h th e sla u g h te r o f so m an y o f o u r sto c k [it] w ill n o t have been in v a in .’34 As far as th e g eneral p u b lic w ere c o n c e rn e d , v a c c in a tio n w as n o t the d o m in a n t issue o f th e 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 e p id e m ic . A lth o u g h m u c h d iscussed in th e press a n d in P a rlia m e n t, th ere w as little p u b lic o r p o litica l pressure for its a d o p tio n . F o r M A F F ’s v e te rin a ry d e p a r tm e n t, how ever, v a c c in a tio n assu m e d u n p re c e d e n te d im p o rta n c e as N o v e m b e r drew o n a n d th e disease situ a tio n w o rsen e d . In p u b lic , P eart a n d his v e te rin a ry sta ff c o n tin u e d to reassure th e n a tio n o f th e fo rth c o m in g v icto ry over F M D ; b u t, in p rivate, th ere w as a g ro w in g sense o f an x ie ty a n d even p a n ic as th e y realized th a t th e u n im a g in a b le m ig h t h a p p e n an d th e sla u g h te r p olicy fail. E ventually, M A F F ’s se n io r v e te rin a ry s ta ff d e c id e d th a t th e y m u s t d ra w u p p lan s to vaccinate in th e n o rth -w e s t M id la n d s.35 T h is was a m o m e n to u s concession. N ever before, except u n d e r th re a t o f biological a tta ck , h a d M A F F con ced ed a role to F M D v acc in e s in B rita in . W h e n h e h e a rd th e n ew s, D r N o e l M o w a t, a sc ie n tist based a t P irb rig h t, to ld a colleague: ‘W e are liv in g in histo ry ; th e m in istry are g o in g to v a cc in a te.’36 D e s p ite th e sig n ific a n c e o f th is m o v e , it re c e iv e d little p u b lic ity . W h e th e r for fear o f a n g erin g th e N F U , a ro u sin g the hopes o f a n ti-sla u g h te r c a m p a ig n e rs, o r p e rh a p s b ecau se M A F F w as still e x tre m e ly re lu c ta n t to a d m it th a t its age-old policy m ig h t fail, Peart d elib e ra tely played d o w n the p la n to v a c c in a te . H e in f o r m e d P a rlia m e n t n o t in h is s ta te m e n t o f 27 N o v e m b e r, w h ic h d isc u sse d th e p ro g ress o f th e e p id e m ic a n d receiv ed w id e sp rea d p u blicity, b u t th e fo llo w in g day in a concise reply to a p a rlia ­ m en ta ry q u e stio n . H e em p h asized th a t vaccin atio n w o u ld provide ‘a second lin e o f d efen ce’ again st th e disease, a n d d esc rib e d his decision to acq u ire v accine fro m overseas as p u re ly a p re c a u tio n . I am still c o n v in c e d o n th e basis o f th e advice o f m y p ro fessio n al sta ff - th e best in th e w o rld - th a t th e sla u g h te r policy is in the best interests o f th e c o u n try .’37 Later, in a BB C b ro a d ca st, he repeated th e usual e c o n o m ic an d scientific a rg u m e n ts against v a c c in a tio n , a n d said th a t he w o u ld use it o n ly ‘as a last resort. . .w hen the p re se n t c o n tro l c am p aig n c o m p le te ly breaks d o w n ’.38 T h is a p p ro ac h had th e d e sire d e ffe c t; th e r e w as n o su rg e o f p u b lic in te re s t a n d th e n ew s c o m m a n d e d little a tte n tio n in th e press.

] ] §

A M anufactured Plague?

In th e clays th a t follow ed, P eart c o n tin u e d to reaffirm his faith in th e sla u g h te r p olicy a n d to em p h a size th e p ro b le m s associated w'ith v a cc in a ­ tio n . B e h in d th e sc e n e s, h o w e v er, p r e p a ra tio n s to v a c c in a te w ere w ell u n d e rw ay . T h re e m illio n doses w ere flow n in fro m F ran ce, u n d e r tig h t security in case they fell in to th e w ro n g h a n d s, a n d a n o th e r 2 m illio n doses w ere p u rc h a se d from th e W ellco m e lab o ra to rie s in S o u th A m erica. 39 O n 28 N o v e m b er, th e C V O , J o h n R eid, s u m m o n e d M a ry B rancker, p re sid en t o f th e B ritish V e te rin a ry A sso c ia tio n (BVA, fo rm e rly th e N V M A ), to a m e e tin g a n d to g e th e r th ey p la n n e d th e v a cc in a tio n c a m p a ig n .40 She later exp lain ed : We c a lc u la te d th e n u m b e r o f a n im a ls to be vaccinated, the n u m b e r th a t could be e xa m in e d a n d vaccinated in an ho u r a n d the n u m b e r o f hours o f daylig h t available in December. These calculations gave us the n u m b e r o f veterinary surgeons required . . .finally, we agreed the rate o f pay f o r them .'1' O n 2 D ecem b er, as M A F F press officers sco tch ed ru m o u rs th a t vaccin atio n w as a b o u t to b eg in , se n io r sta ff a t th e O sw e stry c o n tro l c en tre m e t to devise a b lu e p rin t area v a cc in a tio n schem e. T h e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n s fo rm e d th e basis fo r a m e m o , se n t from M A F F ’s v e te rin a ry h e a d q u a rte rs a t T o lw o rth to se n io r v e te rin a ry a n d lay sta ff in th e field. It d e ta ile d h ow v a c c in a tio n w o u ld be c arried o u t in th e C h e sh ire a n d S h ro p sh ire areas, a n d covered sta ffin g a rra n g e m e n ts , p a p e r w o rk a n d v a cc in e su p p lies. It e m p h a size d : ‘this. . .is n o t to be in te rp re te d as an in d ic a tio n th a t any such decision [to v acc in a te] has b e en o r is likely to be ta k e n . T h e w o rk is p u re ly p re c a u ­ tio n a ry ; b u t it sh o u ld be p u t in h a n d a t o n c e .’42 By th e tim e th e m e m o was issued, on 7 D e ce m b er, F M D in cid e n ce h a d b e g u n to fall. S h o rtly a f te r w a r d s , s e n io r M A F F v e te r in a r ia n s at T o lw o rth ju d g e d th a t s la u g h te r w o u ld w in th r o u g h a fte r all, a n d th e y a b a n d o n e d p lans to vaccinate. O n c e again, M A F F h a d m an a g ed - th is tim e by th e skin o f its tee th - to m a in ta in its reco rd o f n ever h a v in g v a ccin ated a g a in st F M D . B u t official c o n fid e n c e in th e sla u g h te r p o lic y h a d been sh a k e n . As G e o rg e A m o s, M A F F re g io n a l c o n tro lle r fo r th e n o rth -w e s t re g io n , n o te d : ‘I w o n d e r w h e th e r th e disease m ig h t have g o t aw ay c o m ­ pletely. W as it a d a m n e d n e a r thing? W h a t are th e risks now ad ay s o f an e p id e m ic o f a c o m p a ra b le o r even larger scale h a p p e n in g again?’43 R ealizing th a t, in th e s h o r t te rm , p u b lic o p in io n w o u ld n o t to le rate a re ru n o f th e 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 e p id e m ic , officials d e cid ed to keep th e im p o rte d vaccines o n h a n d in case F M D re ap p eared ; b u t, th an k fu lly , it d id n o t. In th e lo n g te rm , how ever, th e y w ere less c o n v in c e d o f th e need fo r v a cc in a ­ tio n . M o s t c o n tin u e d to view it as a costly, scientifically u n s o u n d policy,

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a n d T a m e even believed it p sy c h o lo g ic ally d a m a g in g to fa rm e rs to have ‘c o m p u lso ry v a c c in a tio n im p o se d on th e m w ith liab ility for p ro se c u tio n a n d fines if th ey do n o t c o m p ly ’.'54 T h e y su b m itte d evidence a lo n g these lines to th e N o rth u m b e r la n d c o m m itte e a n d p u t fu tu re p olicy c o n sid e ra ­ tio n s o n h o ld u n til it r e p o rte d .45

T O IMPORT OR N O T TO IMPORT? T

he meat q u estio n

T h e 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 e p id e m ic w as o n ly days o ld w h e n c o m m e n ta to rs began to ask th e p e ren n ial q u e stio n : w here h a d F M D c o m e from ? As th e disease situ a tio n w o rsen e d , th is issue increasingly d o m in a te d th e p o litical a g en d a a n d b r o u g h t to a c lim ax th e 4 0 -y e a r-o ld c o n tro v e rsy o v er B ritish m e a t im p o rt policy. As C h a p te r 4 show ed, fa rm in g a g ita tio n for a ban u p o n m ea t im p o rts from F M D -in fe c te d c o u n trie s began w ith th e 1 9 2 6 discovery th a t m eat c o u ld carry th e F M D virus. T h e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t resisted such calls on a c c o u n t o f th e c o n su m e r d e m a n d for cheap m eat, b u t tried to encourage m e a t-e x p o rtin g S o u th A m e ric an n a tio n s, m o st n o ta b ly A rg e n tin a , to take m o re effective a c tio n a g a in st F M D . H o w ev er, b e ca u se th e tw o n a tio n s ex p erien c e d F M D in very d iffe re n t w ays, a n d h a d d iffe re n t p o litical goals, c o m m e rc ia l in te re s ts a n d c u ltu ra l p e rsp ec tiv e s, th e y f o u n d it e x tre m e ly d iffic u lt to agree u p o n th e c o rre c t m a n n e r o f F M D c o n tro l. B ritis h fa rm e r s ’ d e m a n d s fo r an i m p o r t b a n d ie d a w ay w ith th e o u tb re a k o f W o rld W ar II, o n ly to re-em erg e d u rin g th e later 1950s w h e n m ea t ra tio n in g e n d e d a n d F M D in cid e n ce rose.46 In th e in te rv e n in g years, B ritish m ea t p ro d u c tio n a n d im p o rts from F M D -fre e n a tio n s h a d risen, w h ile u n d e r p o p u lis t P re sid e n t Ju a n P e ro n , A rg e n tin e m e a t e x p o rts h a d fallen to a p p ro x im a te ly h a lf o f th e ir p re -w a r levels.4/ T h is new sta te o f affairs m a d e an im p o rt b a n m o re feasible th a n ever before. M e a n w h ile , new s fro m A rg e n tin a gave stre n g th to farm e rs’ claim s th a t its m ea t posed an u n a c c e p ta b le disease risk. T h e B ledisloe a g re e m e n t o f 1928 (w h ich was d esig n ed to p re v e n t th e e x p o rt o f diseased m ea t to B ritain; see C h a p te r 4) w as n o t w o r k in g p r o p e r ly b e c a u s e th e re w e re in s u f f ic ie n t A r g e n tin e v e te rin a ry su rg eo n s to ex am in e livestock on ra n ch e s a n d a t slau g h terh o u ses for signs o f F M D . V a cc in atio n was un d erw ay , b u t h a d h a d little im p a c t on disease in cid e n ce because vaccines w ere n o t used in a system atic m an n e r, su p p lies w ere lim ite d a n d q u a lity c o n tro l w as n o n -e x is te n t.48 D u rin g th e late 19 50s, th e C V O , Jo h n R itch ie, trie d again to p ersuade th e A rg e n tin e s to im p ro v e th e ir F M D c o n tro ls , as d id A n th o n y H u r d , c h airm a n o f th e C onservative A g ricu ltu ral C o m m itte e . T h e y m e t w ith little

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success, m ain ly because th e A rg e n tin e g o v e rn m e n t refused to acknow ledge th a t F M D was n o t u n d e r c o n tro l. H u r d b lam e d A rg e n tin e p rid e ’ a n d th e A rg e n tin e te m p e ra m e n t’ (w h ic h he lik e n e d to th a t o f th e F ren ch !), b u t c o m m e rc ial a n d p o litica l factors w ere also in v o lv e d .49 A rg e n tin a w as still heavily d e p e n d e n t u p o n m ea t e x p o rts to B rita in , w h ic h p ro v id ed 4 0 per c e n t o f its ste rlin g e arn in g s, a n d th e th re a t th a t F M D posed to the n a tio n a l e c o n o m y was w ell recognized. N evertheless, c attle p ro d u c ers a n d frigorifico o w n ers resisted th e in tro d u c tio n o f a d d itio n a l disease c o n tro ls, p a rtly on g ro u n d s o f co st, a n d p a rtly because m a n y still disagreed w ith th e B ritish b e lie f th a t F M D w as a se rio u s p la g u e , a n d re je cte d th e ‘u n p ro v e n ’ lin k b etw een th e ir m e a t an d B ritish F M D o u tb rea k s. T h e succession o f w eak g o v e rn m e n ts th a t follow ed in P ero n ’s w ake w ere u n a b le to ov erco m e this resistance a n d c o u ld do little to preserve the th re a te n e d trad e o th e r th e n d e n y th e existence o f F M D . 50 A lth o u g h , in p u b lic , M A F F sp o k e sm e n m a in ta in e d th e ir tra d itio n a l re s is ta n c e to f a rm e rs ’ d e m a n d s , in p riv a te th e y trie d to d r u m u p th e n e c e ssa ry g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t fo r r e s tric tio n s u p o n th e m e a t i m p o r t tr a d e .5’ H o w ev e r, th e y m a d e little h e a d w a y u n til 1 9 6 0 , w h e n B rita in suffered th e w'orst F M D e p id e m ic since 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 2 . Im p o rte d m eat, bo n es a n d sw ill w e re s tro n g ly im p lic a te d (see P la te 1 3 ), a n d M A F F g a in e d pe rm issio n to b a n p o rk im p o rts fro m n a tio n s w here F M D w as e n d e m ic .52 In A rg e n tin a , p o rk d id n o t c a rry th e sam e c u ltu ra l sig n ific a n ce as beef. N ev erth eless, th e g o v e rn m e n t w as ex tre m e ly u n h a p p y w ith th e b a n , a n d d e cid ed , a t lo n g last, to sta rt a m o re effective F M D c o n tro l p ro g ra m m e . It e m p o w e r e d th e m in is te r o f a g r ic u ltu r e to e n fo rc e th e c o m p u ls o r y v a cc in a tio n o f c attle, a p p o in t a d d itio n a l v e te rin a rian s a n d establish zones w ith in w h ic h v a c c in a tio n o f all species w as re q u ire d . Slowly, th e disease situ a tio n im p ro v e d . C o n c u rre n tly , B rita in e x p erien c e d its lo n g est p e rio d o f F M D freedom for over 60 years (June 1962 to A pril 1 9 65), a n d fa rm in g calls fo r trad e re stric tio n s d ied aw ay.53 B ut th is was m erely th e calm before th e sto rm . By th e a u tu m n o f 19 6 7 , B ritain w as o n c e m o re in th e grip o f F M D , a n d it w as n o t lo n g before b lam e d e sc en d e d u p o n im p o rte d m eat. As usual, farm ers led calls for a ban u p o n m ea t im p o rts from F M D in fe c te d c o u n tr ie s , a n d th e y b e c a m e in c re a s in g ly v o c al as th e d isease s itu a tio n w o rs e n e d . B u tc h e rs a n d m e a t tra d e rs n a tu ra lly o p p o s e d th e ir d e m a n d s a n d lo b b ie d for th e m a in te n a n c e o f th e tra d e .54 T h e issue arose fre q u e n tly in P a rlia m e n t, w h e re P e a rt d e n ie d all k n o w le d g e o f th e e p i­ d e m ic ’s cause a n d refused to c o m m it h im s e lf to a c tio n a g ain st th e m ea t im p o r t tra d e .55 O n c e a g ain , th o u g h , M A F F ’s activ ities b e h in d th e scenes to ld a very d iffe re n t story. A lth o u g h th e e v id en ce w as far from c o n cre te , officials h a d , from th e sta rt, su sp ec ted th e in v o lv e m e n t o f S o u th A m e ric an m eat, an d o n 23 N o v em b er, P eart suggested to fellow m in iste rs th a t he h a lt

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the trade. T h e y were n o n e too enthusiastic, a n d so he agreed to seek m ore d e fin ite e v id e n ce o f disease o rig in a n d re p o rt again in a w eek. In th e m ea n tim e, the A rgentine foreign m in ister su m m o n e d the B ritish am bas­ sador to B uenos Aires, Sir M ichael Cressw ell, an d w arned him o f the 'grave co nsequences’ th a t w o u ld follow any in terference w ith the m eat tra d e .56 O n h e a rin g o f th is th in ly v eiled th r e a t, th e F o re ig n O ffic e b e ca m e e x tre m e ly a la rm e d . A n tic ip a tin g th a t th e A rg e n tin e s w o u ld p ro b a b ly retaliate against the British export trade an d stym ie c o n cu rre n t negotiations over th e fu tu re o f th e F alkland Islands (w hich th e L ab o u r g o v e rn m e n t w a n ted to h a n d over to A rg e n tin a ),57 it p lan n e d to resist Peart’s call for a trad e b a n .58 H ow ever, by the next C a b in e t m eetin g , Peart had changed his ra tio n ­ ale. H e no longer w a n ted to ban S o u th A m erican m eat im p o rts bccausc they had caused the c u rre n t crisis; he sim ply w a n ted to ensure th a t F M D d id n o t reappear at a tim e w hen M A F F ’s v e terinary resources were o p e rat­ ing at full stretch. T h is was a m ore persuasive arg u m e n t. W ith over 70 new cases o f disease re p o rte d every day, th e last th in g C a b in e t m em bers w anted was a n o th e r epidem ic. For the first tim e in the 4 0-year history o f co n tro v ­ ersy over infected m eat im p o rts, M A F F ’s request for a trade ban gained the necessary g o v e rn m e n t su p p o rt. H ow ever, at the insistence o f th e Foreign O ffice, it was agreed th a t th e em bargo sh o u ld last only u n til the e pidem ic cam e u n d e r c o n tro l o r for th ree m o n th s a t th e m o st. F u rth e rm o re , to te m p e r th e in e v ita b le A rg e n tin e o u tcry , it sh o u ld a p p ly to all F M D infected nations. O n 4 D e ce m b er 1967, th e H ouse o f C o m m o n s learned o f th e C a b in e t’s decision. Farm ers were extrem ely pleased, alth o u g h there follow ed ‘great pressure by c orrespondence an d telep h o n e from the m eat trad e ’.'19 Inevitably, Peart was asked w hy he had w aited u n til the epidem ic was a m o n th old before tak in g a ctio n . T h e D aily Telegraph c o m m e n te d : ‘T h e case. . .is far from m ade o u t, and the suspicion m u st rem ain th at M r Peart has yielded a d o u b tfu l p o in t u n d e r pressure.’60 Peart was careful to em phasize th a t the trade em bargo d id n o t im ply th a t im p o r te d m e a t h a d c au sed th e e p id e m ic ; b u t few believ ed h im , especially in A rgentina. T h e Foreign O ffice’s fears w ere quickly realized as th e day after the trade em bargo was im posed, A rgentine buyers a n n o u n ce d th eir in te n tio n to boycott N ew m arket horse sales, w here they were expected to spend U K £ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 .61 O v e r th e next few w eeks, new s gradually filtered th ro u g h o f u nexplained delays in th e signing o f p u b lic c o n tra cts th a t the A rg en tin e g o v e rn m e n t had provisionally aw arded to B ritish firm s dealing in ro a d -b u ild in g e q u ip m e n t, aircraft, su b m arin es a n d teleco m m u n icatio n s equipm ent. W h en tackled on the issue, A rgentine governm ent representatives d enied all know ledge o f retaliatory practices. H ow ever, th e British em bassy in B uenos A ires late r discovered th a t an in s tru c tio n to sto p sig n in g or

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a w a rd in g c o n tra c ts to B ritish firm s h a d c o m e fro m th e v ery to p , from P re sid e n t O n g a n ia ’s office.62 T h e s e m ea su re s h it h o m e as a re su lt o f th e c o n c u r re n t crisis in th e B ritish econom y. In N o v e m b e r 1967, th e g o v e rn m e n t re co rd e d th e w o rst ever p e ac etim e trad e d e fic it a n d a n n o u n c e d th e d e v alu atio n o f th e p o u n d . S olving B rita in ’s b a la n c e -o f-p a y m e n t p ro b le m s h in g e d u p o n e x p a n d in g e x p o rts, a n d A rg e n tin a , w h ere th e e c o n o m y w as reco v erin g a fte r years o f crisis, h a d b e en v iew ed as a p ro m is in g m a rk e t.63 S u c h h o p e s w ere n o w d a sh e d . A rg e n tin e o fficials to o k f u r th e r a d v a n ta g e o f th e s itu a tio n by su g g e stin g th a t th e tw o n a tio n s o p e n n e g o tia tio n s u p o n th e p o te n tia l ex p an sio n o f A n g lo -A rg e n tin e trad e , a n d late r in d ic a te d th e ir w illingness to sp e n d U K £ 1 8 0 m illio n o n B ritish g oods, an offer th a t w as delib erately leaked to th e B ritish p ress.64 T h e A rg e n tin e re sp o n se to th e m e a t im p o r t b a n is u n d e rs ta n d a b le w h e n o n e c o n sid ers th e c o m m e rc ial a n d c u ltu ra l im p o rta n c e o f its m ea t trad e, a n d it sh o u ld have c o m e as no surprise to B ritish g o v e rn m e n t officials w h o h a d lea rn ed , from th e events d esc rib e d in C h a p te r 4, o f its te n d e n c y to react v io le n tly a g ain st p ro p o se d a n d a ctu al tra d e re stric tio n s. As already described, th e tw o n a tio n s w ere b o u n d by a co m p lex set o f co m m e rc ial an d histo ric ties. In an a tte m p t to preserve these links, th e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t h a d , d u rin g th e m id 2 0 th cen tu ry , e x em p ted S o u th A m erican n a tio n s from th e risin g s ta n d a rd s o f a n im a l a n d p u b lic h e a lth t h a t it h a d g ra d u a lly im p o s e d u p o n o th e r m e a t-e x p o rtin g c o u n tr ie s .65 H a v in g a c q u ire d th is privileged p o sitio n , th e A rg e n tin e g o v e rn m e n t d id n o t in te n d to relin q u ish it w ith o u t a fig h t.66 Its re ta lia to ry re sp o n se to th e m e a t e m b a rg o tra n s ­ fo rm e d F M D fro m an a g ric u ltu ra l in to a d ip lo m a tic a n d a c o m m e rc ia l issue, a n d forced th e in te rv e n tio n o f B ritish g o v e rn m e n t d e p a rtm e n ts o th e r th a n M A FF. Such tactics w ere relatively successful, as we shall see. As th e new year d a w n e d , M A F F officials m e t to discuss th e fu tu re o f th e trad e ban . M o st w a n ted it to re m a in in place on an im a l h e alth g ro u n d s. D e e p d o w n , how ever, all realized th a t th e c o n d itio n s u n d e r w h ich it h a d b e e n im p o s e d a n d th e re a c tio n s t h a t it h a d p ro v o k e d m a d e r e te n tio n p o litica lly im p o ssib le. T h e y w ere also aw are th a t o n re su m in g trad e they w o u ld be c riticize d fo r ex p o sin g th e n a tio n to disease. U n til th e N o r t h ­ u m b e rla n d c o m m itte e o f in q u iry re p o rte d , th e y c o u ld n o t finalize fu tu re m e a t im p o r t p o lic y ; b u t th is w o u ld n o t o c c u r fo r so m e m o n th s as th e c o m m itte e ’s m e m b e rs h ip h a d n o t y e t b e e n d e c id e d .67 S o, how , in th e m e a n tim e , c o u ld th ey reco n cile A rg e n tin a ’s re n o w n e d sen sitiv ity tow ards its m e a t w 'ith th e d e m a n d s o f B ritish fa rm e rs, c o n su m e rs , m e a t trad e rs, foreign p o lic y -m ak e rs an d th e e x p o rte rs o f m a n u fa c tu rin g goods? O n c o n sid e ra tio n , M A F F officials d e c id e d th a t th e ir best o p tio n was to s e n d a h ig h -le v e l B ritis h v e te r in a r y m is s io n to S o u th A m e ric a to

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investigate the w orkings o f its F M D co n tro l legislation an d to reco m m en d future safeguards u p o n the m eat im p o rt trade. All acknow ledged th a t the tru e purpose o f th e m ission was ‘w indow dressing’ (n o t th e first tim e this phrase had been used!). It could n o t possibly overcom e the m ain obstacle to A rgentine F M D c o n tro l, w hich was its sm all a n d ineffectual veterinary service. It c o u ld , how ever, red u ce criticism s o n b o th sides by so o th in g A rgentine passions a n d allow ing Peart to tell the British n a tio n th a t m oves were u nderw ay to reduce th e risk o f F M D im p o rta tio n . M A F F in te n d e d to send the m ission in early February so th a t it co u ld re p o rt back before the m eat trade resum ed in M arch; b u t on 6 February Peart received R eid’s re p o rt on the origin o f th e epidem ic. T h is co n clu d ed th at lam b e x ported from A rg e n tin e frigorifico n u m b e r 1408 was responsible for sta rtin g the epidem ic. All a ction was p u t on h o ld as officials m et to reconsider th eir o p tio n s .68 M eanw hile, P eart’s p o sitio n becam e a lm o st u n ten a b le as conflictin g interest gro u p s issued ever-m ore vocal d em ands. P oliticians a n d farm ing o rg a n iz atio n s insisted th a t the ban m u st stay in place, at least u n til the in d e p e n d e n t c o m m itte e o f in q u iry re p o rte d .69 T h o u g h less well re p re ­ sented in the H ouse o f C o m m o n s, th e N atio n al F ederation o f M eat Traders an d a han d fu l o f co n su m ers’ representatives were equally a d a m a n t th a t it m u st be lifted. In A rgentina, go v ern m en t officials a n d cattle producers p ro ­ claim ed the ban an unjustified insult to th eir national honour. T h ey c o n tin ­ ued to tu rn dow n British bids for public co n tracts, in clu d in g the British N u clear E x p o rt E xecutive’s bid to b u ild a U K £75 m illion nuclear pow er plant. M eanw hile, A rgentine custom s au th o rities intercepted B ritish goods b o u n d for th e Falkland Islan d s.70 Such reprisals were n o t publicized in B ritain; therefore, m an y m em bers o f th e public were m ystified by Peart’s c o n tin u in g claim th at the trade had to resum e because the ban was only ever in te n d e d to be a tem p o rary m easure. Shropshire N F U co m plained: ‘If there was no dan g er from im p o rted m eat, w hy was the ban im posed in the first place? If there is danger, w hy is it being lifted now? Clearly one o f these decisions is w rong.’71 T h e g o v e rn m e n t knew th a t it was in deep trouble. If it relaxed the ban a n d y et a n o th e r F M D e p id e m ic to o k h o ld , it w o u ld fin d its e lf in an im possible p o sitio n . O n the o th e r h a n d , if th e em bargo rem ained in situ, A n g lo -A rg e n tin e relations an d th e B ritish eco n o m y could suffer fu rth e r d a m a g e .72 A C a b in e t c o m m itte e m e t to discuss th e issue fu rth er. P eart p ressed fo r th e re te n tio n o f th e b a n , a n d g a in e d th e s u p p o r t o f th e C o m m o n w e a lth O ffice (w hich was m o tiv ated by th e Irish fear o f F M D spread) an d th e g o v e rn m e n t’s c h ie f scientific adviser, Solly Z u c k e rm a n . H o w ev e r, th e F o re ig n O ffic e , s u p p o r te d b y th e B oard o f T rad e a n d Treasury, insisted th a t it m u st be lifted because A rg en tin e retaliation w ould

]24

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cost th e e x p o rt tra d e an a n n u a l U K £ 2 5 m illio n to £ 4 5 m illio n , w hereas F M D c o n tro l w o u ld cost o n ly U K £ 5 m illio n a year. T h e d iv id e d c o m m it­ tee th e n exp lo red v arious c o m p ro m ise so lu tio n s. In th e e n d , it selected a politically feasible yet scientifically nonsensical m easure: th e ban u p o n lam b a n d m u tto n im p o rts w o u ld re m a in b u t b e e f im p o rts w o u ld be a d m itte d . 73 P eart h a d th e u n e n v ia b le task o f selling th is policy to P a rlia m e n t a n d th e n a tio n . O n 4 M a rc h , he in fo rm e d the H o u se o f C o m m o n s o f th e R eid re p o rt’s fin d in g s, o f his in te n tio n to resum e im p o rts o f b e e f b u t n o t lam b, a n d o f th e fo rth c o m in g visit to A rg e n tin a o f th e B ritish v e te rin a ry m is­ sio n .74 C ritic s cried ‘sh a m e!’ a n d p o in te d o u t th e illogicality o f b a n n in g o n ly sh eep m e a t w h e n c attle w ere eq u ally su sc e p tib le to F M D . Sir A V H a rv e y M P saw stra ig h t th ro u g h M A F F ’s w in d o w d ressin g a n d asked w hy a m is sio n w as n e e d e d w h e n M A F F a lre a d y h a d v e te rin a r y in s p e c to rs sta tio n e d in A rg e n tin a . B u t th e real o u tc ry cam e n in e days later. By th e n , m a n y m em b e rs o f p a rlia m e n t (M P s) h a d actu ally read th e R eid re p o rt a n d fo u n d little in it to ju stify P eart’s ch o sen c ourse o f a ctio n . T h e d e b ate lasted n e a rly six h o u rs; as m e m b e r a fte r m e m b e r rose to d e n o u n c e his p a rtia l liftin g o f th e b a n . N evertheless, th e m easu re passed, th a n k s to th e g o v e rn ­ m e n t’s large m ajo rity .75 P a rtic ip a n ts in th e A rg e n tin e m e a t tra d e w ere e x tre m e ly relieved to h ear o f the partial re su m p tio n o f trad e , b u t th ey w ere in fu ria ted by the Reid re p o rt, w h ich h a d im p lic a te d th e ir lam b u p o n th e basis o f c irc u m sta n tia l evidence re la tin g to th e o rig in s a n d d e stin a tio n s o f im p o rte d m ea t cargoes. N o n e o f th e su sp e c te d m e a t h a d b e en te s te d to see if it c o n ta in e d virus because, by th e tim e its role was ascertain ed , m o st h a d been eaten. 6 B ritish farm ers a n d M A F F officials k n e w from e x p erien c e th a t it w as ex trem ely rare to o b ta in d e fin ite evidence o f disease o rig in a n d readily a cc ep te d the R eid re p o rt; b u t th e lack o f d irec t scien tific p r o o f en ab led th e A rg e n tin e s to reject its c o n c lu sio n s.77 O n 18 M a rc h , in th e m id s t o f th is fu ro re , th e v e te rin a ry m issio n arriv ed in B uenos A ires. M e m b e rs in c lu d e d D e p u ty C V O A lb e rt B cynon a n d W illia m H e n d e rs o n , a fo rm e r F M D researcher at P irb rig h t a n d past h e ad o f th e P a n -A m erican F M D b u re au in R io dc Jan eiro , w h o w as already o n am icab le term s w ith th e A rg e n tin e a u th o ritie s .78 L argely as a resu lt o f h is p re se n c e , th e m issio n ach iev e d its goals, a n d in M a y 1 9 6 8 B e y n o n p re se n te d its re p o rt to M A FF. It re c o m m e n d e d several im p ro v e m e n ts to th e B led islo e a g re e m e n t a n d a c o n tin u e d b a n u p o n p o rk a n d m u tto n im p o rts. It also sug g ested th a t M A F F h a lt offal im p o rts a n d a d m it o n ly boneless beef, since th e to n g u es, kidneys, liver an d b o n e m arrow ' o f infected a n im a ls c o n ta in e d th e greatest c o n c e n tra tio n s o f F M D v iru s.79 A lth o u g h th e m issio n ’s visit h e lp e d to restore A n g lo -A rg e n tin e rela­ tio n s a t a v e te rin a ry level, all w as n o t w ell. In a p ro p a g a n d a m ove desig n ed

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to d e m o n stra te its rejection o f th e Reid rep o rt, th e A rgentine g o v e rn m e n t refused to re su m e b e e f e x p o rts to B rita in a n d c o n tin u e d to b lo c k th e purchase o f British ex p o rts.80 M em bers o f th e British em bassy in Buenos A ires, w ho already view ed th e A rg e n tin e s as an irra tio n a l a n d u n tr u s t­ w o rth y people, were a sto u n d ed . M alcolm G ale, the com m ercial m inister, rem arked ‘th at the A rgentine capacity for n ose-cutting is alm ost u n lim ite d ’, w hile Sir M ichael Cressw ell, the am bassador, a ttrib u te d th eir reaction to a ‘guilty conscience’ a n d ‘excessive e m o tio n ’.81 T h e A rgentine go v ern m en t a n n o u n c e d th a t it w ould n o t resum e trade u n til the origin o f the B ritish epidem ic had been properly investigated and d e m o n s tra te d by ‘th e m o st rig o ro u s sc ien tific m e th o d s ’. It th e n se n t a m ission to B ritain, led by fam ous N o b el p rize -w in n in g physiologist an d o c to g e n a ria n D r B e rn a rd H o u s sa y .82 T h is c o n c lu d e d th a t F M D was e n d e m ic in B rita in a n d th a t p ro d u c e r in te re s ts ra th e r th a n sc ie n tific evidence had led to the ban on trad e.83 Satisfied, the A rgentine g overnm ent agreed to lift its e m b arg o u p o n B ritish exports; b u t trad e resum ed only slowly, m u ch business was p e rm a n en tly lost an d e x p o rt licences w ere n o t gran ted freely u n til late July.84 M eat exports to Britain also resum ed, b u t u n d e r new c o n d itio n s laid dow n by G arcia M ata, p resid en t o f the A rgen­ tine N a tio n a l M eat B oard. Instead o f sen d in g b e ef sides to B ritain for sale by a u ctio n at a price th a t varied according to supply a n d d e m a n d , chilled be ef was to be exported as partially b o n e d , plastic-w rapped cuts, sold direct to su p e rm a rk e ts a n d re sta u ra n ts , a t a fixed p ric e agreed in a d v an ce o f sh ip m e n t. It is n o t h a rd to guess G arcia M ata’s m otives. H e m u st have k n o w n th a t B ritish m e a t im p o rt policy was still u n d e r d isc u ssio n , a n d probably h o p e d to persuade the B ritish g o v e rn m e n t th a t there was a viable a lte rn a tiv e to an a ll-o u t tra d e b a n . M o re o v er, th e b o n e le ss tra d e was profitable because it used A rgentine labour, allow ed m ore efficient use o f sh ip p in g space a n d resulted in a m ore predictable m arket. British purchasers were n o t keen on the new system . T h ey d id n o t like to agree u p o n a fixed price for a highly perishable p ro d u c t several weeks in advance o f its arrival, and consequently only 350 0 tonnes o f chilled m eat left B uenos Aires betw een A pril and June 1968, 7 7 ,5 0 0 to n n es less than in 1966. F ru strated , new M in ister o f A griculture C lew dyn H ughes urged retaliation against A rgentina. L ord B row n, th e m in ister o f state, agreed th at it w as tim e w e ‘sh o w ed o u r te e th ’ a n d im p o s e d tra d e s a n c tio n s . H e co m p la in e d th a t A rg e n tin a had behaved b adly since th e war, a n d th a t it w as tim e th e F oreign O ffice sto p p e d p a n d e rin g to its p o litica l gam es. H ow ever, F o reig n S e c retary M ic h ae l S te w a rt ad v ised c a u tio n because sa n c tio n s w o u ld lead to an a ll-o u t trad e w ar w h ic h w o u ld o n ly b e n efit B ritain’s c o m p e tito rs.85

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By O c to b e r 1968, A n g lo -A rg e n tin e relations were on the m en d . B oth g o v e rn m e n ts signed a ‘record o f u n d e rs ta n d in g ’, w h ich sta te d th a t th e origin o f F M D o utbreaks was n o t always capable o f scientific proof, th a t M A FF w o u ld encourage A rg en tin e p a rticip a tio n in fu tu re investigations in to B ritish o u tb rea k s, a n d th a t if m eat w ere im p lica ted , the A rg e n tin e go v ern m en t w o u ld be the first to know. In re tu rn , the A rgentine govern­ m e n t agreed to accep t a m e n d m e n ts to th e B ledisloe a g ree m e n t, w hich m ade F M D a n o tifiab le disease, allow ed on ly v accinated m eat to be ex­ p o rte d , a n d laid d o w n new c o n tro ls u p o n v accine safety a n d potency. G radually, B ritish purchasers began to accept the altered m eat trade, an d by Ja n u a ry 1969, A rg en tin e exports had re tu rn e d to p re-b an levels.86 But the crisis was n o t over, for the N o rth u m b e rla n d c o m m itte e o f in q u iry into the e pidem ic had n o t yet rep o rted .

P o s t -m o r t e m

a n d aftermath

T h e A rgentine reaction to the tem p o rary m eat im p o rt ban had m ade one th in g c le ar to all B ritish g o v e rn m e n t d e p a r tm e n ts , M A F F in c lu d e d . Regardless o f the F M D risk an d th e w ishes o f B ritish farm ers, th e im p o rta ­ tio n o f m eat from S o u th A m erica sim ply had to c o n tin u e . W h ile it was feasible to a d ju st th e c o n d itio n s o f trade, a renew ed im p o rt ban was o u t o f the question. It was im p o rta n t, therefore, to ensure th at the N o rth u m b e r­ land co m m ittee did n o t ‘reignite A rgentine passions’ by re co m m e n d in g th e latter policy. M A FF d irected it to investigate only the ‘technical’ a n d n o t the political o r com m ercial dim en sio n s o f F M D co n tro l in the ho p e th a t it w o u ld co n ce n tra te u p o n d om estic c o n tro l m easures w ith o u t b ecom ing too heavily em b ro iled in the m eat im p o rt issue. S enior officials also m et several tim es w ith the D u k e o f N o rth u m b e rla n d an d inform ed him o f the b ro a d er issues su rro u n d in g F M D c o n tro l.8 N e v erth e le ss, m an y officials c o n tin u e d to fear th a t the c o m m itte e w ould reco m m en d a com plete im p o rt ban. T h ey w ere especially concerned by one piece o f evidence, a c o st-b c n c fit analysis o f F M D c o n tro l, prepared at the c o m m itte e ’s request by A H Pow er and S H arris o f M A F F ’s econom ic division. It p re d ic te d the likely n u m b e r and im p a c t o f o u tb reak s d u rin g the p e riod o f 1 9 6 9 -1 9 8 5 a n d q u a n tified the d irect costs involved in th eir c o n tro l by v acc in a tio n , sla u g h te r a n d a m ea t im p o rt b a n , a n d slau g h ter to g eth er w ith a ban u p o n b o n e -in m eat im ports. T h e a u th o rs concluded th a t th e second o p tio n w o u ld be th e cheapest and m o st effective m eth o d o f c o n tro llin g F M D . A d m ittin g o n ly bo n e le ss m e a t w o u ld be e q u ally effective b u t m ore expensive. V accination w ould be m ore expensive still, a lthough if n o n -q u a n tifiab le effects w ere taken in to a cc o u n t the difference

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betw een the policies was less m ark e d .88 O fficials b o th w ith in and o utside M A F F feared th a t, on c o n sid era tio n o f th is d ata, th e c o m m itte e w ould im m e d ia te ly c h o o se an im p o rt b a n a n d th e re fo re trie d to p re v e n t its su b m issio n in evidence. H ow ever, C a rn o c h a n in sisted th a t it m u st go forw ard, partly because it provided a ‘sober a n tid o te ’ to the N F U ’s far larger e stim ate o f the benefits deriving from an im p o rt ban, b u t also because it shone a favourable light upo n a boneless b e ef im p o rt policy. T h is m ove had already been p roposed by the veterinary m ission and, in the light o f recent trad e ad ju stm en ts, w ould p robably prove acceptable to the A rgentines. In agreeing to su p p o rt C a rn o c h a n ’s bid, T am e c o m m e n te d : ‘It is nice to be able to see a possible fall-back po sitio n em erging at this early stage!’89 In spring 1969, in anticip atio n o f the first p art o f the N o rth u m b e rla n d c o m m itte e ’s re p o rt, B ritish farm ers agitated once m ore for a p e rm a n e n t m eat im p o rt ban, tension rose in A rg en tin a an d the Foreign O ffice steeled itself for a renew ed crisis in A n g lo -A rg e n tin e relations.90 In th e event, the c o m m itte e suggested a particu larly d ip lo m a tic solu tio n to the p roblem o f F M D control. Instead o f re co m m e n d in g a single policy, it presented several d iffe re n t o p tio n s . S ig n ific a n tly , th ese c o n n e c te d th e m e th o d s used to c o n tro l F M D w ith in B ritain to th e m eans by w hich F M D could be kept o u t o f B ritain: The adoption o f a policy which relies on the slaughter policy alone should, in our view, be dependent either on a complete ban on imports, or a t least on the exclusion o f the dangerous components o f m e a t fr o m countries or areas o f countries w here F M D is endemic. I f these dangerous com ponents are not excluded, we th in k i t essential th a t som e fo r m o f v a ccin a tio n sh o u ld be introduced,‘;l A com plete ban u p o n m eat im p o rts was the best policy ‘on anim al health g ro u n d s’. If, however, ‘for social, political o r com m ercial reasons’ it proved unacceptable, the next best policy was to lim it im p o rts to b o n ed beef. In past epidem ics, it had been M A F F ’s job to resp o n d to such reports; b u t th is tim e it b e c a m e a m a tte r fo r th e ‘H u g h e s g r o u p ’, a n i n te r ­ d e p artm e n tal w orking p a rty th a t sat to consider the political a n d econom ic im p lic a tio n s o f th e re p o rt a n d to fram e th e g o v e rn m e n t’s re sp o n se .92 M e m b e rs w ere q u ic k to reject a c o m p le te tra d e b a n a n d agree u p o n a b o n ed b e ef im p o rt policy, subject to a sub stan tial red u ctio n in the existing 20 per c e n t ta riff on th is p ro d u c t. T h e y expressed im p a tie n c e w ith the A rg en tin e g o v e rn m e n t’s political gam es and w arned th a t if it retaliated w hich it did n o t, despite veiled threats - they w o u ld im pose a com plete im p o rt b a n .93

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The Hughes group went on to consider the Northumberland commit­ tees views on vaccination. The committee had decided that the technical problems and the expense of vaccination meant that slaughter was still preferable to the routine prophylactic immunization of all susceptible British livestock. However, it felt that because modern vaccines were much cheaper, safer and more effective than when the Gowers committee reported, ring vaccination was a feasible and, indeed, valuable method of FMD control, especially as the growth of intensive farming meant that future epidemics might be even larger that that of 1967-1968. If meat import policy failed to substantially reduce the risk of FMD invasion, then ‘the slaughter policy should be reinforced by a ring vaccination schemc\ In any case, ‘contingency plans for the application of ring vaccination should be kept in constant readiness’. One member, Anthony Cripps, went so far as to issue a minority report, stating that the risk of FMD invasion and spread meant that ‘The immediate application of ring vaccination to any outbreak which occurs seems to me essential.’94 The idea of emergency ring vaccination appealed to the Hughes group and to the Cabinet. Therefore, having persuaded a reluctant Treasury to part with the estimated UK£1 million a year needed for vaccine purchase and storage, MAFF started to draw up contingency plans.95 However, as time went on and FMD did not return, its institutional resistance to vaccination began to reassert itself. In September 1969, MAFF UnderSecretary J Carnochan raised the possibility of giving ‘Ministers and our senior colleagues a further chance to consider whether we should go for ring vaccination at all?’ He claimed that the decision to press ahead with contingency planning had been taken in a ‘traumatic atmosphere’; but now that the crisis had passed and the boned beef import policy had reduced the FMD risk to a minimum, vaccination was probably not required.96 Reid’s reply is extremely revealing and caused Carnochan to put aside his reservations: I have no heart for being the CVO who first pressed the button to push FMD vaccine into British stock; but against this I would not let my reluctance outweigh my judgement i f circumstances arise which might light a fire that could not be put out without using every known defensive method o f control. It would be irresponsible, following our experience in 1967-1968, not to use vaccine and to use it quickly i f one saw a potentially dangerous situation?7 Officials agreed that vaccination should remain a ‘reserve’ measure for use in emergencies. It should be adopted only on the basis of veterinary advice

The 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 Epidemic

\ 29

a n d w ith o u t reference to in terest groups o u tsid e th e M A F F (a re c o m m e n d a ­ tio n ig n o red in 2 0 0 1 , w h e n th e N F U w as allow ed to veto plan s). Farm ers sh o u ld n o t be allow ed to vaccinate a t will because ‘w e m u st avoid u n d e r ­ m in in g c o n fid e n c e in th e sla u g h te r policy a n d its sta tu s as th e m ain line o f d e fen c e ’. T h e first-ever decision to vaccinate w o u ld be ‘an h isto ric affair, w ith e m o tio n a l u n d e rc u rre n ts , w h ic h c o u ld be th e su b je c t o f co n tro v e rsy fo r at least a decad e, a n d as su ch it w o u ld te n d to be o f a p o litic a l/te c h n ic a l c h a ra c te r’. S u b s e q u e n t decisio n s, ‘w h ic h , b e in g based o n actu al experience a n d w ith th e fa rm in g a n d general p u b lic a cclim atized , m ig h t w ell be taken w ith less d iffic u lty (a n d p e rh a p s m o re q u ic k ly ) a n d m ig h t c o m e to be view ed p rim a rily as a tec h n ica l exercise’.98 Inevitably, w h e n c o n su lte d o n these plans, v irtu a lly all fa rm in g g ro u p s expressed firm resistance. R e p resen tativ es arg u ed th a t v a c c in a tio n w o u ld h in d e r liv esto ck e x p o rts , ‘c o n v ey to th e w o rld th a t F M D is e n d e m ic in G re at B rita in ’, an d ‘c h an g e th e s ta n d in g o f th is c o u n try , w h ic h , in th e past, w e have been p ro u d to call th e stu d farm o f th e w o rld ’. M oreover, for fear o f a c q u irin g ‘carriers’ o f th e F M D virus, farm ers w o u ld n o t w a n t to b u y vaccin ated stock. In d ire c t c o n tra d ic tio n to m a n y o f its earlier sta te m e n ts, M A F F c la im e d t h a t su c h fears w e re u n f o u n d e d . It also e x p la in e d th a t s la u g h te r w o u ld re m a in its m a in p o lic y , b u t t h a t it h a d to c o n s id e r v a c c in a tio n in o rd e r to avoid fu tu re c riticism . It a d d e d a clause to th e 1970 A g ric u ltu ra l B ill to e n a b le it to e n fo rc e v a c c in a tio n w h e re ne ce ssa ry , m a in ta in e d a v accine b a n k o f 1.5 m illio n doses a n d in stitu te d sta ff tra in in g exercises. T h e b a n k re m a in e d in existence u n til 1 9 8 5 , w h e n for cost reasons it w as replaced w ith an in te rn a tio n a l vaccine b a n k .99 So, w h a t can w e d e d u c e a b o u t M A F F ’s c h a n g in g a ttitu d e s to w a rd s F M D v accination? ‘S h ak en b u t n o t s tirre d ’ is p ro b a b ly th e phrase th a t best describes th e p o s t- 1967 state o f affairs. In o n e sense, th e crisis h a d b r o u g h t a b o u t a m o m e n to u s c h an g e, as officials b ro k e w ith th e past a n d a c k n o w ­ ledged th a t th ere w ere c irc u m stan c es o th e r th a n biological w arfare in w hich v a c c in a tio n w as r e q u ire d . T h e y re a liz e d fo r th e first tim e t h a t u n d e r m o d e rn fa rm in g c o n d itio n s , F M D m ig h t sp re ad to o q u ick ly to be c o n ­ ta in e d by sla u g h te r alone. T h e y also k n e w th a t p u b lic o p in io n , sick en ed by th e re c e n t d e a th to ll, w o u ld be less to le ra n t o f sla u g h te r in fu tu re . B ut th e ir h isto ric ties to sla u g h te r a n d th e ir p ro fessio n al, c u ltu ra l a n d n a tio n a l­ istic a n tip a th y to v a c c in a tio n ra n deep. T h e y w a n te d to u p h o ld B rita in ’s sta tu s as a n o n -v a c c in a tin g n a tio n , to m a in ta in M A F F ’s record o f d e fea tin g F M D by sla u g h te r a lo n e, a n d to sta m p o u t germ s w ith o u t h a v in g to take o n b o a rd th e u n c e rta in tie s o f an u n fa m ilia r technology. T h e w o rld m ig h t have c h a n g e d , b u t v a cc in a tio n h a d n o t. It w as still a se c o n d -b e st, risky and costly policy, a n d th ey h o p e d a g ain st h o p e th a t th ey w o u ld n ever have to p u t th e ir c o n tin g e n c y p lan s in to p ractice.

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F o r th e A rg e n tin e g o v e r n m e n t, th e c risis h a d d e m o n s tr a t e d th e b e n efits o f a re ta lia to ry foreign policy. H a d it q u ie tly a cc ep te d re sp o n si­ b ility fo r th e e p id e m ic a n d recognized th e valid ity o f th e tra d e em b a rg o , th e n F M D w o u ld have re m a in e d a pu rely a g ric u ltu ra l p ro b le m , a m a tte r fo r B ritis h fa rm e rs a n d M A F F o ffic ia ls w h o , g iv en B r ita in ’s r e d u c e d d e p e n d e n c e u p o n A rg e n tin e m ea t im p o rts, w o u ld have h a d little difficu lty in e n su rin g th a t th e te m p o ra ry m ea t im p o rt b a n re m a in e d in place. As it was, A rg e n tin a ’s vocal c riticism s o f th e m ea t ban a n d its refusal to p u rc h ase B ritish g o o d s at a tim e o f e c o n o m ic crisis ‘m a n u f a c tu r e d ’ F M D in to a m a tte r fo r th e F o re ig n O ffic e , B o a rd o f T ra d e a n d th e T rea su ry . T h e v e te rin a ry ra tio n a le th a t h a d ju stifie d th e tra d e b a n w as o v e rth ro w n by pressing p olitical an d c o m m ercial issues, a n d p o ten tially diseased m ea t once m o re fo u n d its w ay in to B ritain - b u t n o t for long. A rg e n tin e m ea t im p o rts d ro p p e d o ff w h e n B ritain jo in e d th e E E C in 1 9 7 3 , an d th e fo llow ing year th e y w ere b a n n e d , th is tim e in d e fin ite ly a n d from th e w h o le E E C . T h e reason w as n o t F M D , b u t a serious g lu t o f b e e f o n th e E u ro p e a n m ark e t. A rg e n tin a c o u ld h a rd ly c arry o u t reprisals a g ain st all m e m b e r n a tio n s, and so th e b a n stayed in place u n til 1977. By th e n , B ritain’s E E C ties p re v en ted it from a cc e p tin g extensive A rg e n tin e e x p o rts, an d th e ‘special re la tio n s h ip ’ t h a t h a d for so m a n y years p u t B ritish liv e sto c k a t risk o f F M D finally e n d e d .100 F or th e B ritish n a tio n as a w hole, th e 1967—1968 F M D e p id e m ic w e n t d o w n in h isto ry as th e m o st b ru ta l a n d d e vastating o f all. T h e cost o f disease c o n tro l a n d th e re su ltin g d e a th to ll w ere u n p re c e d e n te d , a n d th e social, e c o n o m ic a n d psychological im p a c t o f th e d isaster was felt far b e y o n d th e fa rm y a rd . R u ra l c o m m u n itie s , b u sin e sse s c o n n e c te d w ith a g r ic u ltu re , p a rticip a n ts in th e m eat an d livestock trad e, veterinarians, city dw ellers w ho engaged in c o u n try s id e leisure p u rsu its, officials o f all g o v e rn m e n t d e p a rt­ m e n ts, e x p o rte rs to A rg e n tin a : all w ere to u c h e d by F M D . H ow ever, o n c e sta m p e d o u t, F M D d id n o t re tu rn to B ritain. Businesses recovered, farm in g p icked up a n d the ep id e m ic passed in to m em ory. B ut th e disease still lu rk ed a b ro a d , a n d it w as o n ly a m a tte r o f tim e before it re tu rn e d to w reak havoc o n an u n fo resee n scale.

Chapter 8

Foot and M o u th Disease, 2001

Fig h t i n g F M D , 1 9 6 8 - 2 0 0 0 As previous c h ap ters show ed, betw'een 1886 a n d 1968, foot a n d m o u th disease (F M D ) was a fact o f life in B ritain, as barely a year w'ent by w ith o u t n u m ero u s fresh invasions o f virus. B ut w ith th e sta m p in g o u t o f th e great 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 epidem ic, the natio n entered a long period o f disease freedom . As the years passed a n d F M D did n o t re tu rn , farm ers, v eterinary surgeons a n d officials o f th e M in istry o f A griculture, Fisheries a n d Food (M A FF) began to n u rtu re hopes th a t the re cu rre n t scourge had at long last been defeated. T h ey received a scare in 1981, w hen F M D ap peared in the Isle o f W ig h t an d caused 13 o utbreaks. B ut the disease did n o t spread to the m ain lan d , w hich by the tu rn o f the 21 st c en tu ry co u ld boast over 30 years o f freedom from F M D . So, was th e absence o f F M D fortuitous? O r did it represent the final victory o f a m an -m ad e disease-control policy, b o rn in B ritain d u rin g the later 19th cen tu ry an d e x ported th ro u g h o u t the devel­ op ed world? A nd how an d w hy did this period o f F M D freedom e n d , in 20 0 1 , w ith one o f the m ost devastating epidem ics ever experienced? T h e later 20 th c entury saw a m arked im provem ent in the international F M D s itu a tio n , w h ic h c o n tr ib u te d to B rita in ’s lo n g p e rio d o f F M D freedom . As C h a p te r 5 revealed, follow ing the 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 2 p a n -E u ro p e an epidem ic, M in istry o f A griculture an d Fisheries (M A F) officials and form er C h ie f V eterinary O fficer (C V O ) T h o m a s D allin g led the fo rm atio n o f a E u ro p ea n body, the E u ro p ean C o m m issio n for the C o n tro l o f F oot and M o u th D isease (E U F M D ), a n d fo rm u la te d a sy stem atic, in te rn a tio n a l cam paign against th e disease. T h e E U F M D was slow to get o ff the g ro u n d because the French g o v e rn m e n t o p p o se d its e sta b lish m e n t and trie d to c o n stitu te a rival bod y u n d e r th e Paris-based organization for in tern atio n al a n im a l disease c o n tro l, th e O ffice In te rn a tio n a le des E p iz o o tie s (O IE , established in 1 9 2 4 ).’ B ut by the 1960s, the E U F M D ’s m em b ersh ip was

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in creasin g a n d it w as b e g in n in g to have a real im p a c t u p o n th e E u ro p e a n F M D s itu a tio n .2 A t th e sam e tim e , E u ro p e a n g o v e rn m e n ts v igorously a tta ck e d F M D spread u sin g a m ix tu re o f sla u g h te r a n d v a c c in a tio n / In fo rm e r years, there h a d b e en a sh o rta g e o f vaccines, a n d m o st n a tio n s h a d h a d to use th e ir su p p lies strategically, im m u n iz in g a n im a ls a lo n g n a tio n a l fro n tie rs o r in areas s u rro u n d in g disease o u tb re a k s. B ut th e early 1960s saw th e d ev elo p ­ m e n t o f new vaccine p ro d u c tio n te c h n iq u e s at P irb rig h t. S cientists discov­ ered th a t instead o f having to cu ltu re the virus needed for vaccine p ro d u c tio n in to n g u e tissu e o b ta in e d fro m s la u g h te rh o u s e s (th e ‘F re n k e l’ m e th o d , devised by D u tc h sc ien tist H S F renkel in 1 9 4 7 ), th ey c o u ld use h u g e vats o f h a m ste r k id n e y cells to p ro d u c c virus c o n tin u o u sly a n d in large q u a n ti­ ties. V arious c o m m e rc ial c o m p a n ie s - d o m in a te d by th e p h a rm a c c u tic a l c o m p a n y W ellco m e a n d C o - to o k ad v an tag e o f th is n ew tec h n o lo g y a n d e re c te d c h a in s o f v a c c in e - p r o d u c tio n u n i ts a c ro ss th e w o r l d .4 T h e s e d e v e lo p m e n ts increased th e availability a n d red u ce d th e co st o f vaccines, allow ing g o v e rn m e n ts to regularly im m u n iz e all su sceptible livestock w ith in th e ir b o rd e rs. As a result, E u ro p e a n F M D in cid e n ce d ro p p e d considerably, from 2 2 ,5 0 0 cases in 1960 to 3 6 5 8 cases in 1 9 6 8 .5 Flow ever, so m e p ro b le m s re m a in e d . It w as still d iffic u lt to im m u n iz e species o th e r th a n c attle, as illu stra te d by th e w id e sp rea d in v o lv e m e n t o f p ig s in E u ro p e a n o u tb r e a k s d u r in g th e 1 9 6 0 s. T h is o b sta c le w as la te r o v erco m e by th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f new oil-b ased vaccines.6 T h e n th e re was th e th re a t th a t exotic viral types (p rim a rily S o u th A frican type 1, w h ich was im m u n o lo g ic a lly d is tin c t fro m th e A, O a n d C ty p es m o re c o m m o n ly fo u n d in th e W est) w o u ld sp re ad from T urkey, w here th ey w ere e n d e m ic , in to G reece a n d B ulgaria.7 A t g reat cost, th e E U F M D , in c o n ju n c tio n w ith th e U n ite d N a tio n s F o o d a n d A g ric u ltu re O rg a n iz a tio n (F A O ) a n d th e O I E , a r ra n g e d fo r s u s c e p tib le a n im a ls in th e re g io n to be v a c c in a te d re p e a te d ly a g a in st th e p re v a ilin g v iru s ty p e s .8 T h is cordon sa n ita ire w as m a in ta in e d from th e m id 196 0 s u n til 19 8 9 . E u ro p e a n F M D c o n tro l was also h in d e re d by th e u n k n o w n disease situ a tio n b e y o n d th e Iro n C u rta in , a n d by th e refusal o f certain n a tio n s to jo in th e E U F M D , n o ta b ly France (w h ich still m a in ta in e d th a t th e E U F M D d u p lic a te d th e activities o f the O IE ), G e rm a n y (w h ich acted o u t o f so lid arity w ith F rance) a n d S p ain (for p o litica l re a so n s).9 In 1 9 7 4 , G e rm a n y agreed to b e co m e a m e m b e r, a n d fo llo w in g G e n era l F ra n c o ’s d e a th in 19 7 5 , Spain signalled its w illingness to jo in . B u t a lth o u g h F ra n c e re g u la rly s e n t o b se rv e rs to th e E U F M D m ee tin g s, it d id n o t subscribe fully u n til 1 9 8 1 .10 By th e m id 1 970s, m o st E u ro p e a n n a tio n s h a d e lim in a te d e n d e m ic F M D , a lth o u g h th e y c o n tin u e d to suffer from sp o ra d ic o u tb rea k s. A t th a t tim e , m o st n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts laid d o w n th e ir ow n m ea t an d livestock

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i m p o r t p o lic ie s ; b u t F ra n c e , G e rm a n y , Ita ly , H o l l a n d , B e lg iu m a n d L u x e m b o u rg , w h ic h h a d jo in e d to g e th e r in 1 9 5 7 to fo rm th e E u ro p e a n E c o n o m ic C o m m u n i t y (E E C ) , a d o p te d a c o m m o n se t o f m e a su re s. Im p o rte d livestock h a d to o rig in ate from F M D -fre e areas a n d be vaccinated b e fo re e n try , a n d m e m b e r c o u n tr ie s c o u ld , i f th e y w 'ished, b a n m e a t im p o rts fro m F M D -in fe c te d territo rie s o r n a tio n s .11 Q u e s tio n s beg an to be raised a b o u t th is policy in 1 9 7 3 , w h e n B rita in , D e n m a rk a n d Irela n d jo in e d th e E E C . W h ile e xisting m em b e rs all e m p lo y ed so m e form o f F M D v a cc in a tio n , these th ree n a tio n s used a sla u g h te r p olicy a n d p ro h ib ite d the im p o rta tio n o f vacc in a ted livestock for fear th a t th ey c o u ld carry o r m ask F M D in fe c tio n . Irela n d refused to acc ep t a n y m ea t from F M D -in fe c te d n a tio n s, w hereas B ritain w o u ld o n ly p e rm it im p o rts from E u ro p ea n regions situ a te d over 2 0 k ilo m e tre s from disease o u tb re a k s, a n d reserved th e rig h t to sto p th e trad e c o m p le te ly sh o u ld w idespread o u tb rea k s o r u n c o n tro lla b le epidem ics o c cu r.12 B oth w ere re lu c ta n t to a d o p t E E C regulations on a cc o u n t o f th e ir v a lu a b le e x p o rt tra d e w ith F M D -fre e n a tio n s su c h as C a n a d a , A u stralia, N e w Z e a la n d a n d th e U S , w h ic h restric te d th e im p o rta tio n o f m e a t a n d livestock from in fected o r v a c c in a tin g c o u n trie s . E x istin g E E C m e m b e rs th ere fo re agreed u p o n special d e ro g a tio n s th a t allow ed B rita in , Irelan d a n d D e n m a rk to m a in ta in th e ir ex istin g F M D c o n tro l p o lic ies.13 By 1 9 8 0 , e n d e m ic F M D h a d been m o stly e lim in a te d from E u ro p e, a lth o u g h s p o ra d ic o u tb re a k s c o n tin u e d to o c cu r, m a n y a sso c iated w'ith p o o rly in ac tiv a te d vaccines a n d escapes o f v iru s from v a c c in e -p ro d u c tio n p la n ts. T h e s e n ew c irc u m s ta n c e s led several E u ro p e a n a g ric u ltu ra lists to d e m a n d an e n d to F M D v a cc in a tio n in th e b e lie f th a t th is w o u ld facilitate trad e w ith n o n -v a c c in a tin g c o u n tries. Initially, th e E U F M D rejected these calls. It c la im e d th a t E u ro p e was still at risk from F M D invasions. Also, its in te n siv e a g ric u ltu ra l p ra c tic e s a n d larg e-scale liv e sto c k m o v e m e n ts m e a n t th a t, in th e a b sen ce o f v a c c in a tio n , a w id e sp rea d e p iz o o tic c o u ld easily take h o ld .1,1 B efore lo n g , how ever, it b ecam e necessary to stre am lin e E u ro p e a n F M D c o n tro l policies, because th e y w ere h in d e rin g th e E E C ’s drive to rem ove trade barriers a n d tu rn the ‘c o m m o n m a rk e t’ in to a g en u in e single m a rk e t a ro u n d w h ich g oods, services, p eo p le a n d capital c o u ld freely c irc u la te . In a n tic ip a tio n o f th is tr a n s itio n to a E u ro p e a n U n io n (E U , sc h e d u le d to o p e rate fro m 1 9 9 3 ), th e E U F M D re co n sid e red its stance. It c o n c lu d e d th a t th e e c o n o m ic ju stific a tio n for c o n tin u in g m ass v a cc in a tio n w as q u e stio n a b le an d th a t m e m b e r n a tio n s sh o u ld a b a n d o n it in favour o f a sta m p in g -o u t policy. H ow ever, som e c o u n trie s c o n tin u e d to s u p p o rt v a cc in a tio n ; th erefo re, in 1989 th e E E C carried o u t a c o s t-b e n e fit survey o f F M D c o n tro l. T h is e s tim a te d th e likely n u m b e rs o f p rim a r y a n d s e c o n d a ry o u tb re a k s d u r ­ in g th e p e rio d o f 1 9 9 3 - 2 0 0 3 , a n d p re d ic te d a w o rs t-c a s e s c e n a rio o f

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20 invasions of FMD into the region, each of which could give rise to 150 secondary outbreaks. It concluded that under such circumstances, a Europe-wide slaughter policy would prove much cheaper than compulsory mass prophylactic vaccination. The Council of Ministers then decided that, from 1992, all EU members should stop vaccinating against FMD, adopt a compulsory slaughter policy and ban the importation of vaccinated livestock. Ring vaccination in the areas surrounding disease outbreaks would remain an option; but nations wishing to take this step would have to apply for EU permission. Governments should also formulate and submit contingency plans for the control of up to ten cases of FMD at any one time; MAFF’s plan was approved in 1993.15 MAFF was extremely satisfied with the change in European FMD control policy. For almost a century, its officials had tried repeatedly to persuade other countries to adopt an ideal of national FMD freedom and British-style disease controls. As we have seen, they were moderately successful. This was partly because, as a net importer of meat and livestock, Britain could impose trade restrictions upon foreign infected nations. Also, thanks to Britain’s international influence, had enabled MAF officials to establish the EUFMD and its four-tier system of FMD control, which framed vaccination as a necessary yet temporary step along the road to a slaughter policy. With the EU’s decision to abandon vaccination, MAFF at last saw its policy preferences enshrined in international law. The impact of this move was felt far beyond the EU because countries wishing to export to the region also had to adopt a goal of national FMD freedom, favour slaughter over vaccination and restrict the importation of goods from infected or vaccinating nations. In this manner, MAFF’s formerly conten­ tious view of FMD became incontrovertible fact, accepted by all civilized’ nations. At the same time, its disputed method of FMD control became set in stone, the basis for an international system of trade. With the revamping of EU FMD control policy, the OIE laid down new guidelines upon how FMD should affect the international movement of meat and livestock. It set out a formal procedure for defining nations as ‘FMD free’, ‘FMD free with vaccination’ and ‘FMD free without vaccina­ tion’. It also introduced new rules, which stated that when FMD-free nations succumbed to infection, they would not regain their former status - and would, therefore, be subject to the trade barriers of other FMD-free nations - until 3 months after the last case was stamped out, or 12 months after emergency vaccination ceased.16 These measures both reflected and reinforced MAFF’s belief that vaccination was risky and should only be used as a last resort, and they discouraged exporting nations from vaccinat­ ing even in ‘emergency situations’. This was a paradoxical state of affairs. At a time when technological advances meant that vaccination was capable

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o f c o n tro llin g F M D m o re safely a n d m o re effectively th a n ever b e fo re , in te rn a tio n a l o p in io n sw u n g in fa vour o f F M D c o n tro l by slaughter. M e a n w h ile , th e S o u th A m e ric an F M D situ a tio n w as slow ly im p ro v ­ ing, a lth o u g h it still lagged far b e h in d th a t o f E u ro p e. In te rn a tio n a l c o o p e r­ a tio n played an im p o r ta n t role, a n d was p rim a rily m e d ia te d by th e P anA m e ric an F M D B ureau (P anaftosa). T h is b o d y was estab lish e d in 1951 at th e re q u est o f th e O rg a n iz a tio n o f A m e ric an States. It w as based in R io de J a n e iro a n d w o rk e d u n d e r th e a u sp ic e s o f th e P a n - A m e ric a n H e a lth O rg a n iz a tio n (P A H O ), th e reg io n al office o f th e W o rld H e a lth O rg a n iz a ­ tio n ( W H O ) . B etw een 1957 a n d 1966 it w as h e a d e d by B ritish v e te rin a ry su rg e o n D r W H e n d e rs o n , w h o d u rin g th e 18 years p rio r to his a p p o in t­ m e n t h a d c a rrie d o u t m u c h v a lu a b le re se a rc h in to F M D v a c c in e s at P irb r ig h t.1 P an afto sa in itially fu n c tio n e d as a research c en tre , e x a m in in g m e th o d s o f im p ro v in g v a c c in a tio n te c h n iq u e s an d tra in in g p e rso n n e l to p a rtic ip a te in th e c o n tro l sch em es o f m e m b e r c o u n trie s. H ow ever, it later ex p an d e d its role to fo rm u la te plans for F M D c o n tro l in S o u th an d C e n tra l A m erica, a n d , d u rin g th e 1 960s, h e lp e d n a tio n s to d evelop b ilateral F M D c o n tro l a g ree m e n ts th a t re q u ire d v a c c in a tio n , in sp e ctio n a n d th e exchange o f in fo rm a tio n u p o n disease in cid e n ce a n d spread. In 1972, it b ecam e the h o m e o f C O S A L F A (C o m is io n S u d a m e ric a n a p a ra la L u ch a C o n tr a La Fiebre A ftosa), a new b o d y th a t, in its aim s a n d sta tu s, w as e q u iv a le n t to th e E U F M D .18 Progress w ith in th e region w as slow o w in g to th e size o f S o u th A m e ri­ c a n n a tio n s , th e ir p o litic a l i n s ta b ility a n d th e ir larg e p o p u l a t i o n s o f extensively fa rm e d livestock. T h e p o o r-q u a lity vaccines p ro d u c e d by m an y local c o m p a n ie s h in d e re d th e efficacy o f v a c c in a tio n p ro g ra m m e s . B u t, gradually, F M D in cid en ce d im in ish e d . D u rin g th e later 1980s, several areas w ere cleared o f en d e m ic in fec tio n a n d C h ile w as d eclared F M D free. T h e P A H O , w o rk in g th ro u g h P anaftosa, su b seq u e n tly d eveloped a h e m isp h e ric plan th a t set a targ e t d a te o f 2 0 0 9 fo r th e c o m p le te e rad ic a tio n o f F M D from th e re g io n . T h e im p e tu s to o p e n u p new' m ark e ts in F M D -frc e areas o f th e w o rld su ch as th e E U , U S a n d Ja p a n e n c o u ra g e d farm ers to c o o p e r­ ate. A id ed by an im p ro v e d disease surveillance system a n d new oil-based vaccines th a t p ro d u c e d longer, m o re reliable im m u n ity , S o u th A m e ric an n a tio n s m ad e su b s ta n tia l progress. C h ile re m a in e d F M D free a n d , d u rin g th e 1990s, A rg e n tin a , U ru g u a y a n d Brazil w ere d eclared ‘F M D free w ith v a c c in a tio n ’. T h e fo rm e r tw o c o u n trie s late r b e ca m e ‘F M D free w 'ith o u t v a c c in a tio n ’. B u t in 2 0 0 0 , all th re e w e re h it by F M D . T h e y lo st th e ir c o v eted ‘F M D -fre e ’ sta tu s a n d th e ir e x p o rt m ark e ts, a n d A rg e n tin a a n d U ru g u a y w ere forced to re start v a cc in a tio n p ro g ra m m e s .15 F o llo w in g th e c e s sa tio n o f E u ro p e a n F M D v a c c in a tio n , s p o ra d ic disease o u tb re a k s w ere sta m p e d o u t in Italy (1 9 9 3 ) a n d G reece (1 9 9 4 a n d

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19 96). Several E astern E u ro p e a n n a tio n s th a t h a d sto p p e d v a cc in a tio n in o rd e r to tra d e w ith th e E U also su ffe red o c c a sio n a l in v asio n s: B u lgaria ex p erien c e d F M D in 1991, 1993 a n d 1996; R ussia in 1995; a n d M a c e ­ d o n ia in 1996; w hile T u rk ey w as su b je c t to re p ea te d o u tb rea k s. In several cases, vaccin atio n was tem p o rarily ap p lie d a n d disease rap id ly e lim in a te d .20 Fears o f disease invasion a n d sp re ad rose to w a rd s th e e n d o f th e 1990s. In a 1 9 9 9 p a p e r, Y L e fo rb a n , E U F M D s e c re ta ry , n o te d t h a t th e ille g al im p o rta tio n o f m ea t from F M D -in fe c te d reg io n s su c h th e M id d le E ast, su b -S ah a ran A frica a n d p a rts o f S o u th -E a s t Asia w as an im p o rta n t ro u te by w 'hich virus c o u ld e n te r E u ro p e. H e e m p h a size d th a t if th e v iru s d id m an ag e to invade, it w as likely to sp read faster a n d fu rth e r th a n ever before. T h is w as because th e tre n d to w a rd s in te n siv e fa rm in g h a d led to larger, m o re d e n se ly s to c k e d fa rm s , w h ile th e d e c lin e o f in te r n a t i o n a l tra d e b a rrie rs h a d f a c ilita te d lo n g -d is ta n c e a n im a l tr a d in g . H e a rg u e d t h a t E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s sh o u ld re co n sid e r th e ir F M D c o n tro l p olicies in the lig h t o f these risks, a n d e n su re th a t th e y h a d a d e q u a te m easures in place to p re v e n t F M D invasion a n d to d iag n o se a n d c o n tro l it p ro m p tly . T h e y sh o u ld also p la n fo r th e \v o rst-c a se sc e n a rio ’ by p re p a rin g c o n tin g e n c y p lan s for v a cc in a tio n a n d c arry in g o u t sim u la tio n exercises.21 In M a rch 1999, th e E u ro p e a n C o m m iss io n ’s S cientific C o m m itte e on A n im a l H e a lth a n d A n im a l W e lfa re issu e d a ‘S tra te g y f o r E m e rg e n c y V accination a g ain st F M D ’. T h is view ed v a cc in a tio n as a viable su p p le m e n t to F M D c o n tro l by slaughter. It arg u ed th a t re ce n t scien tific advances h a d m ad e vaccines ex trem ely p o te n t, a n d th a t th e ir use w o u ld c o u n te ra c t th e p ro b lem s o f m a n p o w e r shortages, carcass disp o sal a n d p u b lic o p p o sitio n th a t w ere c o m m o n ly associated w ith a sla u g h te r policy. It also p o in te d o u t th a t th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f new tests to d iffere n tia te v accin ated from in fected an im a ls (a p re v io u sly im p o ssib le task since b o th possessed a n tib o d ie s to F M D ) m e a n t th a t, in fu tu re , v a c c in a tio n n e e d n o t n e c e ssa rily h in d e r in te rn a tio n a l trad e . T h e re p o rt suggested several v a cc in a tio n strategies a n d listed c o n sid e ra tio n s relevant to th e ir a d o p tio n , su ch as th e p o te n tia l for la rg e -sc a le m o v e m e n ts o f in f e c te d a n im a ls a n d th e d i s t r ib u t i o n a n d in c id e n c e o f F M D .22 M e a n w h ile , fears o f F M D invasion increased follow ­ in g re p o rts th a t a pan-A sia O stra in o f virus h a d sp re ad b e y o n d its tra d i­ tio n a l ‘e n d e m ic ’ areas to in fect Ja p a n , K orea, M o n g o lia a n d S o u th A frica, som e o f w h ic h h a d n o t e x p erien c e d F M D fo r decades. E u ro p e a n experts, m e e tin g in S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 0 , d e c id e d th a t w ith in th e n ex t five years F M D w as h ig h ly likely to invade B ritain o r S c a n d in a v ia .23 T h e re fo re , a t th e t u r n o f th e 2 1 s t c e n tu ry , a fte r a lo n g p e rio d o f im p ro v e m e n t in th e in te rn a tio n a l F M D s itu a tio n , m a n y n a tio n s fo u n d th em selv es in cre asin g ly a t risk o f viral in v asio n . S ig n ifican tly , late 2 0 th c e n tu r y d e v e lo p m e n ts in a g r ic u ltu r e a n d c o m m e rc e m e a n t t h a t a n y

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invasions o f F M D w ere likely to cause g reater e c o n o m ic a n d a n im a l w elfare p ro b le m s th a n ever b e fo re . As L e fo rb a n h a d n o te d , fa rm s h a d b e c o m e larger a n d m o re densely sto c k ed , so a n y single F M D o u tb re a k was likely to involve m o re an im a ls th a n d u rin g past years. T h e sh ift tow ards intensive fa rm in g h a d fav o u red th e selective b re e d in g o f hig h ly p ro d u c tiv e livestock, w h ic h w o u ld suffer m o re severely from F M D in fec tio n th a n ‘u n im p ro v e d ’ o r in d ig e n o u s stock. M e a n w h ile , u n d e r th e in flu e n ce o f the E U a n d W o rld T rad e O rg a n iz a tio n ( W T O ) , in te r n a tio n a l tra d e b a rrie rs h a d d e c lin e d , allow ing E u ro p ea n n a tio n s to increase th e ir livestock ex p o rts. T h is valuable trad e w o u ld be h a rd h it by th e a p p ea ran c e o f F M D . T h e s e d e v e lo p m e n ts m e a n t th a t, by 2 0 0 1 , F M D w as n o lo n g e r the sam e disease th a t it h a d been in 19 6 8 . C h a n g in g c o m m e rc ial, a g ric u ltu ra l a n d p o litic a l c irc u m s ta n c e s h a d ‘m a n u f a c tu r e d ’ it in to a m o re te rrib le plague th a n ever before, w ith an increased c ap acity to invade, sp re ad , h arm a n im a ls a n d in flic t e c o n o m ic d am ag e. T h is n ew state o f affairs called fo r a re -e v a lu a tio n o f th e m e th o d s used to p re v e n t a n d c o n tro l th e disease. B ut a lth o u g h m em b e rs o f th e B ritish S tate V eterin ary Service - in c lu d in g the C V O - th o u g h t th a t th e ir 1993 c o n tin g e n c y p lan fo r F M D c o n tro l needed u p d a tin g , M A F F d id n o t regard th is as a p rio rity . A fte r all, in BSE a n d sw ine fever, officials h a d far m o re re ce n t a n d p ressing disease p ro b lem s to deal w ith .24 T h e y a p p a re n tly saw little p o in t in d e v o tin g tim e to a disease th a t h a d n o t been seen on th e m a in la n d for over 3 0 years, a n d th o u g h t th a t its v irtu a l d isa p p e a ra n c e fro m n o r th e r n E u ro p e a n a n d S o u th A m e ric an c o u n trie s m ad e its re a p p e ara n ce in B ritain e x trem ely unlikely. T h e y w ere also c o n fid e n t th a t if F M D d id invade, it c o u ld be ra p id ly sta m p e d o u t by m e a n s o f s la u g h te r. T h e y th e re fo re ig n o r e d d e v e lo p m e n ts in v a c c in e te c h n o lo g y a n d to o k little h e ed o f th e g lobal resurgence o f F M D . C o n se ­ q u e n tly , th e re ap p e ara n ce o f F M D in F e b ru a ry 2001 fo u n d M A F F u n p re ­ p a re d , la c k in g in k n o w le d g e a n d in e x p e rie n c e d in F M D c o n tro l, w ith to ta lly d e v asta tin g co n se q u en c es for th e n a tio n .

Epid em ic , 2001 In F e b ru a ry 2 0 0 1 , th e official v e te rin a ry su rg e o n a t C h e ales a b a tto ir in Essex n o tic e d th a t th ree g ro u p s o f pigs aw aitin g sla u g h te r w ere ex trem ely lam e. A lth o u g h he h a d n ever seen F M D before, he beg an to su sp ec t the disease after fin d in g blisters o n th e ir feet. A visiting M A F F v eterin ary officer agreed w ith his diag n o sis a n d se n t tissue sam ples to P irb rig h t fo r testing. Positive results w ere o b ta in e d a n d o n 20 F ebruary, F M D w as c o n firm e d in B ritain fo r o n ly th e se c o n d tim e since 1 9 6 8 .25

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N ew s o f F M D led to an im m e d ia te ban u p o n th e e x p o rt o f B ritish m eat, livestock an d various agricultural p roducts. As shock waves rippled th ro u g h th e B ritish fa rm in g c o m m u n ity , M A FF sta ff began trac in g the origin an d spread o f disease. It tran sp ired th a t the affected pigs had begun th eir jo u rn ey far away, at B urnside farm in N o rth u m b e rla n d . A lth o u g h the route by w hich they had co n tra cte d infection was never definitively traced, officials d educed th a t they had been fed in adequately boiled swill c o n ta in ­ ing infected m eat, a practice co n n ec te d w ith countless past F M D e p id e m ­ ics. T h e q u e stio n was: w here h a d th is m ea t co m e from ? Im p o rts from regions w here F M D was en d em ic w ere fo rb id d en , an d v accinating natio n s w ere p e rm itte d to send only d e -b o n cd beef, w h ich was extrem ely unlikely to convey th e virus. H ow ever, illegal m eat sm uggling from F M D -in fcc tcd regions was an acknow ledged p ro b lem an d seem ed to be the m o st likely cause o f th e e p id e m ic . M A F F re sp o n d ed to th is new s by b a n n in g sw ill feeding (u p o n w hich on ly 1.4 per cen t o f B ritish pigs now d e p en d e d ). It also prosecuted the ow ner o f the infected pigs, B obby W augh. H e was later fo u n d g u ilty o f feeding u n processed w aste, causing un n ecessary a n im a l suffering a n d failing to no tify th e a u th o ritie s o f th e presence o f F M D .26 M A F F ’s hopes th a t th is w o u ld be a sm all and easily c o n ta in ed F M D ou tb rea k w ere soon dashed as officials discovered th a t disease had already spread from W augh’s farm to infect neig h b o u rin g sheep. T hese anim als had since passed th ro u g h H exham m arket in N o rth u m b e rla n d an d L ongtow n m arket in C u m b ria , potentially transferring infection to thou san d s o f o th er anim als. T h ree days after th e discovery o f F M D , M A FF im posed a n a tio n ­ w ide standstill u p o n livestock m ovem ents; b u t it was all too late. D u rin g t h a t p e rio d , th o u s a n d s o f in fe c te d a n im a ls h a d b e en m o v ed a r o u n d B ritain.2 So, like the 1922 epidem ic, this was a ‘m ark et’ infection in w hich ra p id , extensive livestock m o v e m e n ts sow ed th e ‘seeds’ o f h u n d re d s o f o u tb re a k s. In fe c tio n h a d sp re a d as far as D e v o n , D u rh a m , H e re fo rd , L ancashire, A nglesey in W ales, and D um fries and G allow ay in S c o tla n d .28 It had also invaded Ireland, Francc a n d T h e N e th erlan d s. So B ritain was no longer the in n o c e n t victim o f o th e r c o u n tries’ failure to co n tro l F M D ; instead, it had bccom e a p e rp e tra to r o f the crim e. M A F F re sp o n d e d to the risin g n u m b e r o f disease n o tific a tio n s by applying the trad itio n a l slaughter policy, as laid dow n in the 1993 c o n tin g ­ ency plan. B ut as in 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4 (and, to a lesser extent, 1967), its resources were rapidly overw helm ed. T h ere was a desperate shortage o f vets as a result o f 50 p er cent cuts in the State V eterinary Service d u rin g the previous 20 years. T h e long absence o f F M D m ea n t th a t th e m ac h in ery for its co n tro l was no longer well oiled. S taff were poorly organized and lacked experience and expertise, M A F F ’s d a ta b ase - w h ic h su p p o se d ly held de ta ils o f all B ritish farm s - was b o th inaccurate an d o u t o f date, and official ignorance

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o f th e scale o f sheep m o v em en ts in B ritain e n h an c ed th e inefficiency o f disease tracing a n d con tro l. A n o th e r p ro b lem was th e flood o f tissue sam ples sent by v eterinary su rg e o n s in th e field to th e n o w -re n a m e d In s titu te for A n im al H e a lth (IA H ) at P irb rig h t for F M D diagnosis.29 Tests to o k several days, an d until positive results w ere o b tain e d , infected anim als re m a in e d alive a n d c o n ­ tin u e d to m an u fa ctu re virus. T h is problem had n o t arisen d u rin g 1 9 6 7 1968 w hen the disease had affected m ostly pigs an d cows, species w hich displayed characteristic disease sym ptom s. In 2001 however, F M D affected th o u sa n d s o f sheep, w hich show ed few, if any, clinical signs o f infection. T h e tardy diagnosis o f F M D an d ever-increasing delays in th e slaughter an d disposal o f infected anim als generated vocal, w idespread criticism s o f M A F F ’s bureaucratic, over-centralized a n d poorly organized co n tro l policy. Farm ers also grew angry at its p u b lic claim s th a t F M D was u n d e r co n tro l w h e n , from th e ir perspective, the situ a tio n was w o rsen in g by the day.30 How ever, in co n tra st to 1924, those w ho experienced delays in the slau g h t­ ering o f infected anim als did n o t claim th a t F M D was a m ild a n d inconse­ q u e n tia l illness. T h is was partly because o f chan g in g p erceptions o f anim al welfare, b u t also because F M D inflicted greater in ju ry u p o n th eir m o d ern , selectively bred livestock th an u p o n th e less-im proved anim als th a t had once p o p u late d C h esh ire’s farm s. M A FF an d the State V eterinary Service were initially re lu c ta n t to ask for assistance from th e arm y, the local au th o rities or W h ite h all; b u t by m id M a rc h , as disease in c id e n c e sp ira lle d a n d th e m ed ia grew in creasin g ly critical, it becam e plain th a t drastic a ction was required if F M D was n o t to becom e endem ic. M A FF therefore in stru cte d its veterinary staff to stop w a itin g for th e results o f lab o ra to ry tests and to ‘slaughter on su sp icio n ’ anim als th at were potentially infected. T h is m arked a shift to the m eth o d s o f F M D diagnosis applied to Irish livestock im p o rts d u rin g 1 9 1 2 -1 9 2 3 (see C h a p te r 2). Inexperienced veterinarians, w ho feared the consequences sh o u ld they m isdiagnose F M D , began to see the disease everyw here, an d even o rd e re d th e s la u g h te r o f liv e sto c k th a t h a d n o ‘c la ssic a l’ F M D sy m p to m s an d no h isto ry o f exposure to the disease. F u rth e rm o re , because they w ere n o t used to looking in anim als’ m o u th s, they o ften did n o t know w h at h a d caused the lesions they discovered; on the w hole, however, they played safe and con firm ed F M D . As the situ atio n w orsened, M A FF began to c o n te m p la te a ‘firebreak’ cull in S cotland an d C u m b ria o f all sheep w ith in 3 kilom etres o f infected prem ises. C o m p u te r m odels o f the likely course o f th e epidem ic, devised by a team o f epidem iologists, len t su p p o rt to this m ove, w hen c o m b in ed w ith th e cull o f all susceptible livestock on farm s c o n tig u o u s to infected prem ises. A lth o u g h th ere w ere d o u b ts a b o u t the legality o f an ex tended

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cull, M A FF nevertheless a d o p te d it a n d set targets for the slaughter o f all anim als on (suspected) infected prem ises w ith in 24 ho u rs o f n o tificatio n , a nd o f anim als on co n tig u o u s prem ises w ith in 48 hours. A rm y personnel were d rafted in to provide the necessary logistical skill. M eanw hile, rising aw areness o f the extent o f the crisis led the prim e m in iste r to claim th at he was taking personal co n tro l o f the situ atio n . By o p e n in g o f the C a b in e t O ffice B riefing R oom (C O B R A ), he b ro u g h t the ‘full force o f g o v ern m en t’ to bear u p o n th e disease. In the carnage th at follow ed, anim als died in th eir m illions.31 Som e a m in o rity - were u n d o u b te d ly suffering from F M D . O th e rs died because they show ed sy m p to m s th a t m ig h t have been caused by F M D a n d no one w a n ted to risk leaving th em alive. B ut the vast m ajo rity w ere com pletely healthy; they ju st h ap p en e d to be in the w ro n g place at the w ro n g tim e. Som e w ere killed because, as cloven-footed anim als living w ith in 3 k ilo­ m etres o f an infected place, they m ig h t have becom e infected. O th e rs died u n d e r th e so m ew h at inco n g ru o u sly n am ed W elfare Schem e, w hich M A FF in tro d u c ed in th e w ake o f its n a tio n -w id e ban on anim al m ovem ents. T h is ban had trapped m any livestock in unsuitable a cc o m m o d atio n an d w ith o u t a dequate food w hen th e lam bing season was a b o u t to sta rt and w hen m any grazing stock were du e to m ove to spring pastures. As photo g rap h s o f lam bs d ro w n in g in m u d began to a p p e a r on th e n a tio n ’s T V screens, M A FF stepped in to offer farm ers co m p e n sa tio n for culling suffering an im als.32 T h e c o m b in e d effect o f these policies was devastating. T h e n u m b e r o f disease o u tb reak s o ccu rrin g in 2001 was 2 0 2 6 . T h is was actually less th an the 22 2 8 o utbreaks o f 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 an d th e 2691 o utbreaks o f 1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 4 . B ut in 2 0 0 1 , over 10 m illion anim als died, w hereas the death tolls in the earlier epidem ics were 4 4 2 ,0 0 0 and 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 , respectively.33 A nd the reason fo r th is c arn a g e lay n o t in th e disease itself, b u t in th e g o v e rn m e n t’s ‘m an u fa c tu re d ’ response to it. M A F F ’s conviction th at pre-em ptive culling was vital for F M D control received a m ixed reception. As in the epidem ics o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4 an d 1951 — 1 9 5 2 , fa rm in g o p in io n s w ere d iv id e d . T h e N a tio n a l F a rm e rs’ U n io n (N F U ) was, by 2 0 0 1 , the m o st p ro m in e n t a n d p olitically in flu e n tia l o f several B ritish fa rm in g o rg a n iz a tio n s, a n d w as g en era lly s u p p o rtiv e o f M A F F ’s F M D co n tro l policy, m ainly because it w a n ted to resum e exports as quickly as possible. How ever, a significant p ro p o rtio n o f farm ers rejected the N F U ’s stance a n d d e m a n d e d F M D v acc in a tio n . A m o n g th em w ere m a n y o rg a n ic fa rm e rs, th o se liv in g w ith in th e w o rs t affe c te d areas o f D e v o n , C u m b ria , W ales a n d S c o tla n d , an d th e ow ners o f rare breeds or irreplaceable hefted sheep. The v e terinary profession was sim ilarly split betw een guarded su p p o rt fo r M A F F a n d fe rv e n t o p p o s itio n to its F M D c o n tro l m e th o d s. In a

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situ a tio n th a t recalled th e 1924 d isp u te b etw een v e te rin a rian s a n d d o c to rs (see C h a p te r 5), m a n y vets w ere an g ry th a t re sp o n sib ility for F M D c o n tro l policy h a d been tran sferre d aw ay from th e S tate V eterin ary Service a n d the I A H ’s scientific experts, a n d h a n d e d to a g ro u p o f e p id e m io lo g ists w h o had n o p rio r experience o f th e disease.34 L ead in g v e te rin a rian s w ere n o t alone in c la im in g th a t th e e p id e m io lo g ists h a d g ain ed th e ear o f g o v e rn m e n t as a result o f u n d u e p o litical influ en ce, an d w ere driven n o t by a h u m a n ita ria n c o n c e rn for th e F M D situ a tio n b u t by th e desire for pro fessio n al a d v an c e ­ m e n t. C ritic s a rg u ed th a t th e c o m p u te r m o d els u p o n w h ic h th e e x te n d e d cull w as b ased w ere sta tistic a lly flaw ed, th a t th e y h a d failed to c o n sid e r v a cc in a tio n as a policy o p tio n , a n d th a t they had n o t taken the practicalities o f sla u g h te r in to a c c o u n t.35 S o m e o f th e s tro n g e s t c ritic ism s o f M A F F ’s a c tio n s cam e fro m the to u ris t in d u stry , w h ic h suffered far m o re extensive d a m a g e in 2001 th a n d u r in g p a s t y e ars. M A F F in siste d o n c lo s in g th e c o u n try s id e , a m o v e c o n sid ere d in 1967 b u t rejected as im p ractical a n d u n h e lp fu l in c o n tro llin g disease sp re ad . Its a c tio n s, to g e th e r w ith th e w id e sp rea d film fo o tag e o f b u rn in g carcasses d isse m in a ted by th e w o rld ’s m ed ia, caused a steep decline in in co m e from to u rism , especially w ith in th e w o rst affected areas o f D evon a n d C u m b ria . T h e to u ris t in d u stry had grow n su b sta n tia lly d u rin g th e later 2 0 th c e n tu r y a n d w as o f far g r e a te r e c o n o m ic im p o r ta n c e t h a n th e a g ric u ltu ra l e x p o rt m a rk e t, w h ic h h a d h a lv e d in size sin ce 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 . C o n se q u e n tly , th e selection o f a F M D c o n tro l p olicy th a t p rio ritiz e d the a g ric u ltu ra l in te re st over to u rism caused se e th in g d is c o n te n t.36 O p p o n e n ts o f th e official F M D c o n tro l p o lic y w ere largely u n d is ­ tu rb e d by th e im p a c t o f F M D u p o n B rita in ’s a g ric u ltu ra l e x p o rt tra d e . H ow ever, th ey w ere in ten sely c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e th re a t th a t th e disease posed to th e ir local c o m m u n itie s, e c o n o m ic solvency, w ay o f life, p erso n al a n d p ro fessio n al re la tio n s h ip s , a n d e m o tio n a l a n d p sy ch o lo g ical h e alth . T h e y d id n o t agree w ith M A F F ’s claim th a t F M D c o u ld o n ly be c o n tro lle d by a u n iv ersal, c e n tra liz e d p o lic y o f sla u g h te r, a n d t h o u g h t th e p ric e it d e m a n d e d for disease e lim in a tio n w as too high. T h e y c o m p la in e d - as they ha d in 1 9 2 4 a n d 1952 - th a t c u llin g w as an u n sc ie n tific , u n e th ic a l a n d b a rb aric m e th o d o f F M D c o n tro l. T h e y also felt - a n d lo u d ly said - th a t th e c o n tig u o u s c u ll w as u n ju s tifia b le o n th e g ro u n d s th a t v a c c in a tio n , c o u p le d w ith m o re d isc rim in a te slau g h ter, c o u ld have achieved th e sam e n a tio n a l goal a t a c o n sid era b ly low er p e rso n al c o st.37 As th e e p id e m ic le n g th e n e d , M A F F ’s claim th a t sla u g h te r re p re se n ted th e c h e a p e s t, m o s t e ffe c tiv e m e th o d o f s ta m p in g o u t F M D b e c a m e progressively w eaker.38 H ow ever, to g e th e r w ith th e N F U , it rejected th e use o f v a c c in a tio n b e c a u se u n d e r O I E ru le s th is w o u ld h a v e d e la y e d th e re su m p tio n o f th e e x p o rt trad e. In fact, from th e very sta rt o f th e e p id e m ic ,

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the in fo rm a tio n dissem inated by these bodies (w hich the natio n al m edia often repeated, u n q u e stio n in g ly ) p o rtray e d v accination as a ‘last reso rt’. U sing virtually the sam e a rg u m en ts as in 1952, it labelled this technology unsafe, ineffective and practically problem atic, w hile claim ing th a t it w ould m ask F M D infection o r in d u ce a carrier state. It c o n tra sted the ‘u n k n o w n ’ n atu re o f vaccination w ith the historically successful a n d fam iliar slaughter policy. It also alleged th a t B ritain c o u ld learn n o th in g from vaccin atin g n a tio n s such as U ruguay a n d T h e N e th erlan d s because th eir F M D situ a­ tion, farm ing practices an d livestock d istrib u tio n were very d ifferent from in Britain. Significantly, as in past years, m ost o f these reports were directed tow ards discred itin g m ass vaccination, w hereas ring vaccination - the m ost feasible policy, w hich had been re co m m e n d e d by the 1968 N o rth u m b e r­ land co m m ittee an d was p erm itted u n d e r E U law - received little m ention. As in 1952, pro-vaccinators claim ed th a t M A FF had exaggerated the deficiencies and risks o f vaccination. T h e y asked how vaccines - w hich had significantly c o n trib u te d to h u m an an d anim al disease co n tro l - co u ld be dangerous, and presented historical exam ples o f th eir effective use overseas. P ro m in e n t c o n trib u to rs to this debate included several foreign and British F M D experts, w hose advice M A FF p o in te d ly ignored. T h e y detailed the v a rio u s w ays in w h ic h v accines c o u ld assist B ritish F M D c o n tro l a n d c o u n te re d M A F F ’s p ro p a g a n d a a b o u t th e d angers involved. A n d , as in 1952, scientists at P irb rig h t did n o t escape criticism , as it tran sp ired th a t p rio r to th e 2001 e pidem ic they had failed to validate tests for the ‘penside’ diagnosis o f F M D th a t could have considerably reduced th e culling o f h ealthy anim als.39 It is d ifficult to escape the c onclusion th a t n a tio n a l pride once again influenced M A F F ’s insistence upo n m ain tain in g the slaughter policy. It had never had to vaccinate, a n d it did n o t w an t to start now. It had show ed the w orld how to co n tro l F M D effectively, a n d was n o t a b o u t to sacrifice its m u c h -la u d e d p rin c ip le o f F M D fre e d o m a n d a d o p t a p o lic y th a t all civilized natio n s had a b a n d o n e d .40 B ut such p ride w'as sadly o u t o f place. R ecent epidem ics o f BSE a n d sw ine fever had p u t paid to the B ritish boast o f p ro d u c in g the finest, h ealthiest livestock in th e w orld, an d few people at h o m e o r ab ro ad th o u g h t th a t the slaughter o f 10 m illio n livestock - so vividly dep icted by the w o rld ’s m edia - was a n y th in g to be p ro u d of. T h e a pplication o f this policy foiled to convey the im age o f a rational, organized, e ducated B ritain, and it d im in ish e d rath er th an e n h an c ed B ritain’s in te r­ n a tio n a l stan d in g . O th e r elem ents o f the British g overnm ent began to view vaccines m ore favourably as th e disease situ atio n grew increasingly desperate, and plans were draw’n up for vaccination in selected areas. B ut in direct c o n tra d ic tio n to th e p o st-1 9 6 7 re co m m e n d a tio n s o f its v eterin ary staff, M A FF refused

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to act without consulting and gaining the support of the NFU, which doggedly resisted the move. As in the 1923-1924 Cheshire epidemic (Chapter 3), it overruled the wishes of farmers within the worst affected areas and insisted that slaughter continue. It claimed that FMD was too widespread for vaccination to work and that consumers - who, in the wake of BSE, were extremely suspicious about meat quality - would not believe that vaccinated meat was safe to eat.41 Pro-vaccinators were furious. They felt that only vaccination could halt the culling of healthy stock, preserve valuable and rare animals, and enable the rapid reopening of the countryside. They claimed that the arguments against vaccination were self-interested and flawed, and pointed out that consumers were already eating meat from animals that had been vaccinated against numerous other diseases.42 But although discussions about vac­ cination continued in specific regions of the country, plans were never implemented. For farmers and their families, the experience of FMD had changed little since 1967 and even since 1922-1924. Thousands lived through the tragedy of seeing their stock suffer, die and be burned. But then, at least for them, the anxiety was over and a compensation cheque was due. Many more were forced to wait out the epidemic, living every day in fear that the disease might strike. They withdrew into their homes, surrounded their farms with disinfectant baths and sealed off the entrances. British farming was already struggling in the face of foreign competition and in the wake of the BSE disaster. Now the crisis deepened. Unable to move their stock without going through a lengthy, complicated licensing procedure, farmers were denied the means of making a living. And they were not alone. Workers in the tourist industry, auctioneers, dealers, hauliers, shop owners and publicans in rural areas, and many, many more found their businesses curtailed and their lives on hold. But there was a new source of strength — the internet. Websites and newsgroups sprang up as people sought to make sense of events. Many issued complaints about MAFF s actions, comforted those who were suffering, organized pro-vaccination campaigns and publicized various outrages that MAFF staff had allegedly committed in the course of their duties. Although the impact of FMD was felt most intensely in rural areas, city dwellers also found their activities curtailed as the countryside closed to sports and tourist activities. While few of them experienced the disease at first hand, intense media interest in the epidemic meant that none could avoid hearing about it. FMD was more newsworthy than ever before and dominated the national press for nearly a month. In contrast to past years, there was less factual reporting of FMD spread and more analysis of its implications. Many journalists and columnists were highly critical of

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M A F F ’s actions an d they used the e pidem ic to question related issues, such as the validity o f intensive farm ing, th e n a tu re o f go v ern m en t, the state o f rural B rita in , th e role o f science an d scientists in policy fo rm a tio n , the political influence o f the N F U and the ethics o f the veterinary profession.43 As in earlier epidem ics, th e a p p a re n t failure o f th e sla u g h te r policy p recip itated a debate over w ho was to blam e. M an y farm ers alleged th at M A F F v e te rin a ry s u rg e o n s , s la u g h te re rs , la b o u re rs a n d h a u lie rs h a d c o n trib u te d to disease spread by carry in g virus b etw een prem ises u p o n inadeq u ately disinfected vehicles a n d clothes, a n d by failing to slaughter and dispose o f infected anim als prom ptly. T h ey also claim ed, as they had in 1924, th a t virus spread in the sm oke from funeral pyres. T h e y attacked M A F F ’s lack o f preparedness, its p o o r o rg a n iz atio n , its lack o f heed for recent w arnings a b o u t the increased F M D th rea t a n d its failure to abide by the N o rth u m b e rla n d c o m m itte e rep o rt. T h e latter had re co m m e n d e d p ro m p t slaughter, calling in the arm y quickly, m inim al restrictions u p o n the c ountryside and contin g en cy p lan n in g for vaccination. C ritics resented the fact th a t F M D was co n tro lled by a universal policy th a t did n o t take a c c o u n t o f local o r in d iv id u a l c irc u m s ta n c e s o r d is c rim in a te b e tw ee n different degrees o f risk o f infection. Som e alleged th a t M A FF officials had acted illegally or im m orally in th e ir efforts to enforce th e cull o f healthy a n im a ls , a n d t h a t th e y h a d in tim id a te d fa rm e rs in to p e r m ittin g th e slaughter, lied a b o u t th eir rig h t to appeal an d broken in to private prem ises to kill stock. A significant n u m b er o f livestock ow ners (200 in D evon alone) tu rn e d to lawyers an d the co u rts to p ro tec t th eir anim als from the c o n tig u ­ ous cull. *4 Such challenges had o ccurred rarely d u rin g previous epidem ics, w hen th e legality o f the slaughter policy had n o t been in d o u b t a n d w hen healthy anim als on c o n tig u o u s prem ises were rarely slaughtered. M A FF and the N F U vigorously d enied such criticism s an d a tte m p ted , as d u rin g earlier epidem ics, to divert blam e for the o n going spread o f F M D to w a rd s th o se ‘a w k w a rd ’ fa rm e rs a n d dealers w ho refused to b ack the o fficial c o n tro l policy. O ffic ia ls still saw s la u g h te r as a d is c ip lin in g , m oralizing policy u n d e r w hich all m em bers o f the p o p u la tio n had to w ork to g e th e r tow ards the c o m m o n g o o d . T h e y a rg u ed th a t it w as the on ly scientific, ratio n al and historically proven m e th o d o f F M D c o n tro l, and th at all intelligent an d e n lig h ten ed individuals su p p o rte d it. C ritics o f this policy w ere ig n o ran t, im m o ra l an d selfish. T h e y did n o t u n d e rstan d the m any reasons w'hy vaccination w ould n o t w ork, failed to realize th a t M A FF w as a c tin g in th e in te rests o f th e n a tio n a n d , in c o n te stin g th e cull o f potentially infected anim als, w ere responsible for pro lo n g in g the epidem ic. M A FF also alleged th a t m an y farm ers an d dealers had assisted th e spread o f infection by failing to abide by g o v ern m en t ‘b io-security’ re co m m e n d a ­ tio n s. S o m e h a d d e lib e ra te ly in fe c te d th e ir a n im a ls in o rd e r to claim

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g o v e rn m e n t c o m p e n sa tio n ; o th ers had trie d to cash in on the g enerous valuations offered by the welfare schem e. Such claim s angered farm ers, w ho view ed them selves as th e victim s ra th e r th an the perp etrato rs o f the crisis. Instead o f d ru m m in g up s u p p o rt for the slaughter, M A F F ’s p ro n o u n c e ­ m e n ts h e ig h te n e d p o p u la r m is tru s t a n d s tre n g th e n e d resistance to the e x tended cull.45 D u r in g A p ril 2 0 0 1 , F M D in c id e n c e d e cre ased a n d th e e p id e m ic ceased to be headline news. H earten ed by the decline, M A FF decided, from th e en d o f A pril, to allow m ore d iscretion in a pplying the e x te n d ed cull policy, a m ove th a t cynics claim ed was stim u la te d by m ed ia in te re st in Phoenix the calf, w hose fu tu re h u n g in the balance after he was overlooked d u rin g a farm yard cull.46 P hoenix lived, an d as the extent o f the slaughter d eclined , p o p u lar resistance gradually d im in ish ed . B ut disputes c o n tin u e d to rage as p ro p o n e n ts o f th e ex tended cull, w ho claim ed th a t th eir policy had evidently w orked, clashed w ith its critics, w ho argued th a t vaccination o r the trad itio n a l slaughter policy w o u ld have had a sim ilar im p a c t u p o n disease incidence an d caused considerably less suffering.47 In Ju n e 2 0 0 1 , M A FF was itself culled and its officials absorbed in to a new g o v e rn m e n t b o d y , th e D e p a r tm e n t o f th e E n v ir o n m e n t, F o o d a n d R u ra l A ffairs (D E F R A ).48 F M D o u tb re a k s c o n tin u e d t h r o u g h o u t th e s u m m e r a n d d id n o t disappear alto g eth er u n til Septem ber.49 C ritics began to call for a pub lic in q u iry in to the epidem ic, in the hope th a t this w ould reveal the full extent o f the g o v e rn m e n t’s in ep titu d e . B ut the g o v e rn m e n t argued th a t a public in q u iry w ould be too lengthy and expensive. Instead, it established three o verlapping enquiries, a Policy C o m m issio n u p o n the F u tu re o f Farm ing an d F ood led by Sir D o n C urry, a Lessons L earned In q u iry chaired by D r Iain A nderson, an d a Royal Society In q u iry led by Sir B rian F ollett, w hich was to investigate scientific qu estio n s o f disease p revention an d c o n tro l.50 O p p o n e n ts com plained th at the three inquiries w ould be neither im partial, no r useful and that the im p o rta n t questions w ould ‘slip betw een the cracks’. T h e ir several H igh C o u rt attem p ts to force a public inq u iry were unsuccess­ fu l.'’1 H ow ever, a E uropean P arliam ent pu b lic in q u iry - w hich the British g o v e rn m e n t trie d a n d failed to b lo c k - d id tak e p lac e. V ario u s o th e r inquiries w ere in stitu ted at a local level, inclu d in g the D evon, C u m b ria and N o rth u m b e rla n d inquiries a n d a Royal Society o f E d in b u rg h inquiry. All proved h ighly critical o f M A F F ’s h a n d lin g o f th e e p id e m ic a n d re co m ­ m en d ed far-reaching changes to policy. T h e follow ing conclusion discusses som e o f th eir m ore im p o rta n t findings, and sum s up w h at we have learned a b o u t the past, presen t an d fu tu re o f F M D in Britain.

C o n clu sio n : F oot a n d M o u th Disease in B ritain , 1 8 3 9 - 2 0 0 1 - Lessons Learned?

T h e c a la m ito u s re a p p e ara n ce o f fo o t a n d m o u th disease (F M D ) in 2001 b ro u g h t to th e fore old q u e stio n s a b o u t th e n a tu re o f th e disease, its m eans o f spread an d th e b est m e th o d s o f c o n tro llin g it. W h ile u n p re c e d e n te d in its inten sity , th e sh ift to a w holesale cull po licy w as a logical ex ten sio n o f th e tra d itio n a l, c e n tu ry -o ld m e th o d o f F M D c o n tro l. H e n c e , a t th e sta rt o f th e 2 1 s t c e n tu r y , B ritis h F M D c o n tr o l w as b a s e d u p o n th e sa m e prin cip les as th e m easures in tro d u c e d d u rin g th e later 19th c en tu ry , w hen Q u e e n V ic to ria w as em press o f In d ia a n d th e germ th e o ry o f disease had y et to be a c c e p te d .1 H o w can we a c c o u n t fo r th e p e rsisten ce o f th is p olicy in th e lig h t o f the controversies th a t have repeatedly su rro u n d e d it? As C h a p te r 1 revealed, th e vision o f F M D u p o n w h ic h it was based - th a t o f a fo reig n , in v ad in g plague th a t sp read in a lm o st every w ay im a g in ab le a n d caused sig n ific a n t losses in m eat an d m ilk p ro d u c tio n - first cam e to th e fore in B ritain d u rin g th e later 1 9 th cen tu ry . I have a rg u ed th a t th e p o litical, e co n o m ic, scientific a n d so cial c irc u m s ta n c e s th a t h e lp e d to c re a te th is v isio n w e re largely specific to th a t p a rtic u la r tim e a n d place (late V ic to ria n B rita in ). So it is n o surprise th a t ind iv id u als experien cin g F M D a t d iffere n t tim es a n d places c a m e to v e ry d iffe re n t c o n c lu s io n s . M o re o v e r, sin c e m u c h o f th e fear s u rr o u n d in g F M D w as ‘m a n u fa c tu re d ’ by th e social, p sy c h o lo g ic al a n d eco n o m ic im pacts o f the m easures used to c o n tro l it, individuals e n c o u n te r­ ing d iffere n t c o n tro l policies n a tu ra lly a d o p te d very d iffe re n t u n d e rs ta n d ­ ings o f th e disease. W e have seen how , a t re g u la r in terv als, in B ritain a n d a b ro a d , various farm ers, v e terinarians, politician s and p a rtic ip a n ts in th e m ea t a n d livestock trad e ch allen g ed th e o p in io n s o f th e B ritish a g ric u ltu ra l a u th o ritie s. T h e y

Conclusion

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m ad e claim s th a t F M D w as a m ild a ilm e n t, th a t in fec te d a n im a ls qu ick ly recovered, an d th a t certain routes o f virus spread w ere m o re im p o rta n t th a n o th ers, a n d th ey reach ed very d iffe re n t c o n clu sio n s a b o u t how it sh o u ld be c o n tr o lle d . W e s h o u ld n o t label as ‘w ro n g ’ th e se d iffe rin g ideas a b o u t F M D . T h e y m ay n o t a cco rd w ith p re sen t-d a y B ritish e x p ert o p in io n ; b u t if w e tak e a c c o u n t o f th e g e o g rap h ica l, p o litical, c u ltu ra l, a d m in istra tiv e , a g ric u ltu ra l, n a tio n a l a n d c o m m e rc ial fram e w o rk w ith in w h ich th ey arose, th e y m ak e g o o d sense. W h e th e r th e disease w as ‘severe’ in 1890 d e p e n d e d u p o n w h a t k in d s o f a n im a ls y o u w e re ra is in g a n d fo r w h a t m a rk e ts . W h e th e r v a cc in a tio n w as p ro m is in g in 2001 d e p e n d e d , in p a rt, u p o n the likely a ttitu d e s o f c o n su m e rs a n d foreign re g u la to ry a u th o ritie s. As th e h isto ric a l c o n te x t c h a n g e d , so d id F M D . It has n ever b e en a fixed biological entity, w ith its n a tu re , m o d e o f spread a n d m eans o f c o n tro l clearly d e fin e d by science. S cien tists have fre q u e n tly disagreed over such m a tte rs to th e e x te n t th a t m o s t d is p u ta n ts w ere a b le to fin d sc ie n tific e v id en ce in s u p p o rt o f th e ir claim s. W e have seen th a t F M D w as n o t, a n d is n o t, sim p ly an a n im a l issue; th e issues it raised alw ays involved e co n o m ic a n d p o litical c ircu m stan ces a n d calcu latio n s, an d every e p id e m ic h a d m ajo r e c o n o m ic , p o litic a l, social a n d p sy c h o lo g ic a l im p a c ts . S ince th e 1 8 7 0 s, F M D has re p ea te d ly b ro u g h t fear, anxiety, trag e d y a n d so rro w to B ritain ; it has c u r ta ile d b u sin e sse s a n d so c ial lives; it has sh a p e d in te r n a tio n a l relatio n s; a n d it has a lte re d th e b o n d s th a t lin k d iffe re n t g ro u p s o f society to g eth e r. So, if th e F M D c o n tro l p olicy devised by th e late 1 9 th -c e n tu ry B ritish g o v e rn m e n t w as n o t th e o n ly o r even th e m o st o b v io u s m e th o d o f c o n tro l­ ling F M D , a n d if th e c o n te x ts o f F M D have c h a n g e d radically over th e e n su in g c en tu ry , how can we a c c o u n t fo r th e c o n tin u a n c e - in d e e d , th e in te n sific a tio n - o f th e policy? I have suggested th a t th e an sw er lies largely in th e pow ers a n d a c tio n s o f B ritish a g ric u ltu ra l a n d v e te rin a ry officials, w h o w ere alw ays c o n v in c e d of th e b e n e fits o f n a tio n a l F M D fre e d o m . B ecause o f B rita in ’s in te rn a tio n a l e c o n o m ic a n d p o litica l in flu e n c e , they c o u ld ignore foreign criticism s o f th e ir m ea t a n d livestock im p o rt policies. A t h o m e , th e y c o u ld resh ap e th e p o lic y -m a k in g process so as to exclude th e ir critics a n d g ra n t easy access to su p p o rtiv e , in flu e n tia l b o d ies su ch as th e N a tio n a l F arm ers’ U n io n (N F U ). T h e ir p ro p a g a n d a c am p a ig n exagge­ ra te d th e b e n e fits o f s la u g h te r a n d th e d ra w b a c k s o f v a c c in a tio n , a n d b ra n d e d as im m o ra l a n d selfish th o se in d iv id u a ls w h o d e m a n d e d po licy change. W h e n it su ited th e m , th e y c o u ld conceal p o te n tia lly in fla m m a to ry in fo r m a tio n fro m th e p u b lic d o m a in . A n d a t tim e s o f crisis, w h e n th e p o lic y w as a t risk, th e y le a rn e d to d a m p e n d o w n c ritic ism s b y m a k in g su b tle a d ju s tm e n ts , fo r ex am p le, by a greeing to isolate lim ite d n u m b e rs o f C h e sh ire c attle in 1924 an d to m o d e ra te th e e x te n d e d cull p olicy d u rin g

148

^ M anufactured Plague?

A pril 2 0 0 1 . B ut a t n o p o in t d id th e y su sp e n d th e p rin cip les o n w h ic h th e sla u g h te r policy was fo u n d e d . F rom th e late 1 9 th c e n tu ry u n til 1 9 6 8 , F M D c o n tro l in B ritain was alm o st c o n tin u a lly u n d e r review. Five c o m m itte e s o f in q u iry sat b etw een 1 9 2 2 a n d 1 9 6 8 , a n d i n te r n a l a p p ra is a ls o f p o lic y o c c u r r e d fa r m o re fre q u e n tly . As a re s u lt, th e B ritish a g r ic u ltu ra l a u th o r itie s in tr o d u c e d a d d itio n a l im p o rt re stric tio n s, th ey p ro p o se d in itiativ es for in te rn a tio n a l F M D c o n tro l su ch as th e B ledisloe a g re e m e n t a n d th e E u ro p e a n C o m m is ­ sio n fo r th e C o n tr o l o f F o o t a n d M o u th D isease ( E U F M D ) , a n d th e y s tim u la te d in te n s iv e s c ie n tific re se a rc h in to v a cc in e s. T h e y also m a d e c o n tin g e n c y p lan s fo r se ru m a d m in is tra tio n in case B rita in cam e u n d e r biological a ttack , a n d for rin g v a cc in a tio n sh o u ld it suffer an ep id e m ic m o re ex ten siv e th a n th a t o f 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 6 8 . By su c h a d ju s tm e n ts , th e y k e p t th e V ic to ria n F M D c o n tro l p o lic y u p to d a te a n d in to u c h w ith a c h a n g in g w o rld . T h e irs was n o t th e o n ly w ay o f c o n tro llin g F M D , an d h isto ry c o u ld have been d iffe re n t h a d o th e r m easures been trie d . B u t w h e n view ed in th e lig h t o f B rita in ’s g e o g ra p h y a n d p a tte rn s o f tra d e , s la u g h te r re m a in e d a ra tio n a l response. H ow ever, a fte r F M D d isa p p ea red in 19 6 8 , officials o f th e M in istry o f A g ric u ltu re , F isheries a n d F o o d (M A F F ) lo st to u c h w ith th e disease. As tim e w e n t by, th e ir p e rc e p tio n s of, a n d p o licy responses to , F M D b ecam e increasingly d a te d a n d e v en tu ally ceased to m ake sense. In th e b e lie f th a t im p o rt ba rrie rs a n d im p ro v e d in te rn a tio n a l F M D c o n tro ls h a d ab o lish e d th e risk o f F M D in v asio n , th ey p a id n o h e ed to w a rn in g s a b o u t th e rising disease th rea t. T h e y d id n o t recognize th a t th e e n h an c ed capacity fo r disease sp read w ith in th e n a tio n m e a n t th a t sla u g h te r m ig h t n o t succeed in fu tu re, a n d th e y n eg lected to c o n sid er h ow advances in vaccine tec h n o lo g y m ig h t im p a c t u p o n d o m e stic F M D c o n tro l. T h e y also failed to realize th a t after 30 years o f fre e d o m from F M D , th e m a c h in e ry for disease c o n tro l was so m e w h a t rusty, w'hile sta ff fam iliar w ith its w orkings h a d a lm o st all retired. In th e a fte rm a th o f th e 2001 tragedy, th e re p o rts issued by th e Royal Society, th e ‘L essons L ea rn e d ’ a n d E u ro p e a n P a rlia m e n t in q u irie s w ere all e x tre m e ly c ritic a l o f M A F F ’s p r e p a r a tio n s for, a n d h a n d lin g o f, th e e p id e m ic .2 T h e y q u e rie d th e reliance u p o n th e tra d itio n a l c o n tro l policy, a rg u in g th a t, h o w e v e r s tr in g e n t, B rita in ’s im p o r t b a rrie rs c o u ld n e v e r p ro v id e c o m p le te se c u rity a g ain st th e in tro d u c tio n o f F M D virus. T h e y w e n t o n to n o te t h a t n e w o p p o r t u n it i e s fo r F M D sp re a d w ith in th e c o u n try m e a n t th a t a single invasion o f disease c o u ld ra p id ly o u ts trip the resources available for F M D c o n tro l by slau g h ter. W h ile 2001 h a d show n th a t radical sla u g h te r c o u ld still c o n ta in a w id e sp rea d F M D e p id e m ic , it h ad also b ro u g h t to lig h t th e severe social an d p sychological ra m ifica tio n s o f th is policy and its d e clin in g e co n o m ic ju stific a tio n .3 D isease e lim in a tio n

Conclusion

149

had cost th e B ritish e co n o m y U K £ 8 b illio n . C o m p e n s a tio n to farm ers a m o u n te d to U K £ 1 .3 b illio n ; to u ris m a n d a sso c ia te d in d u s trie s lo st b etw een U K £ 4 .5 billion a n d £ 5 .4 b illio n .4 B ut exports o f livestock an d livestock p ro d u c ts - the trade th a t th e slaughter policy was engineered to preserve - were w o rth ju st U K £ 1 .3 billion a year.5 All th e in q u irie s w e n t o n to re c o m m e n d th a t fu tu re B ritish F M D c o n tro l policy in c o rp o ra te v a cc in a tio n , a tec h n o lo g y th a t had advanced considerably d u rin g recent years a n d was safer th an ever before. A ccording to the Royal Society rep o rt, there were no longer any ‘technical, scientific, trad e o r c u ltu ra l’ barriers to vaccine use. It echoed b o th th e N o rth u m b e r­ land and G ow ers com m ittees in claim ing that the risk o f vaccinated anim als becom ing ‘carriers’ o f F M D had been exaggerated, an d reco m m en d ed th at, h e n ce fo rth , v accination sh o u ld be regarded as a ‘policy o f choicc’ instead o f a ‘last re s o rt’. It also su g g e ste d th a t sc ie n tists v a lid a te new tests to d iffe re n tia te v a cc in a ted a n im a ls from th o se w h ic h had recovered from F M D , a n d suggested th a t these w o u ld p e rm it th e d ism a n tlin g o f trad e b a rrie rs a g a in st v a c c in a tin g n a tio n s . T h e E u ro p e a n in q u ir y th o u g h t likewise, and - recognizing th a t recent advances m ade v accination a m uch less risky business - the O ffice In tern a tio n a le des E pizooties (O IE ) revised its regulations, allow ing n a tio n s to regain ‘F M D -fre e sta tu s’ six m o n th s instead o f on e year after vaccination ceased. T h e re p o rts n o t o n ly a tta ck e d th e p ro -sla u g h te r ideology th a t had u n d e rp in n e d M A F F ’s c o n tro l policy for nearly a century, they also reco m ­ m en d e d in stitu tio n a l changes to lessen the D e p a rtm e n t o f th e E n v iro n ­ m e n t, F ood and R ural A ffairs’ (D E F R A ’s) tig h t c o n tro l over th e field o f contagious anim al disease control. T h ey argued th a t F M D could no longer be seen as a purely agricultural p ro b lem , best m anaged by ag ricultural and veterinary officials, because it affected a range o f different stakeholders w ho should also influence policy-m aking. F u rth e rm o re , F M D c o n tro l was too centralized; in future, policies sh o u ld be devised in c o n su lta tio n w ith local a u th o ritie s an d sh o u ld take greater acc o u n t o f local circum stances.6 Such re c o m m e n d a tio n s arc lau d ab le; b u t, as n o te d in the ‘Lessons L e a rn e d ’ re p o rt, m an y o f the p ro b lem s a n d d ifficu lties e n c o u n te re d in 2001 had been m et in previous epidem ics an d w ere recollected by m an y farm ers, v eterinary surgeons and rural in h a b ita n ts.' Yet, d u rin g the crisis, M A F F p o lic y -m ak e rs b ehaved as if th a t e p id e m ic , a n d th e su b s e q u e n t discussion o f vaccination, had never h a p p en e d . Few, if any, had read the N o rth u m b e rla n d c o m m itte e reports. N o r had they b o th ere d to exam ine th e countless files com piled by th eir predecessors in an a tte m p t to identify an d correct the p roblem s e n co u n tere d d u rin g 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 . So it was th a t th e m istakes o f 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4 , 1952 and 1968 w ere tragically repeated in 20 0 1 .

150

a M anufactured Plague?

T h e ‘Lessons L earn ed ’ re p o rt w en t on to suggest th a t ‘the U K govern­ m e n t sh o u ld take th e lead in th e in te r n a tio n a l d e b a te ’ to e n su re th a t vaccination becam e an in te rn atio n ally acceptable m e th o d o f F M D co n tro l a n d did n o t im pede trad e .8 It failed to recognize th a t in past years, M A FF officials had played a m ajo r role in creating those trade barriers betw een F M D -fre e a n d F M D -v a c c in a tin g c o u n trie s , th e re b y b u ild in g a g lobal c u ltu re predisposed to F M D co n tro l by slaughter. In 2 0 0 1 , B ritish farm ers fo u n d them selves at the ‘sharp e n d ’ o f th e policies th a t th eir g overnm ent representatives had fo u g h t so hard to in tro d u ce. N ow , it seems, B ritain will p ush towards vaccination. T h e Royal Society in q u iry re co m m e n d e d m ore scientific research into F M D in the b elief th a t this w ould help to resolve m any o f the problem s o f F M D c o n tro l.9 T h is suggestion m ay be too sa n g u in e, especially if a ‘scientific view ’ excludes the w ider issues th a t have always shaped debates a n d , indeed, th e scientific research itself. A dd itio n al investigations w ill n o t necessarily provide definitive answ ers to th e p roblem s o f F M D p revention a nd c o n tro l. M uch dep en d s u p o n scientists’ p reco n cep tio n s, u p o n w ho is fu n d in g o r d irec tin g th e ir w ork, and u p o n its in te rp re ta tio n by D E F R A policy-m akers. A n d , in any case, w h a t c o n stitu tes the ‘correct’ science o f F M D , a n d w ho should decide how it influences disease co n tro l policy? T h e biology is b u t on e c o m p o n e n t o f an eco n o m ic an d social p roblem a n d in 2001 the pro blem was m ore the lack o f h isto ry th an an y lack o f science. So w h a t o f the future? In response to the in q u iries’ criticism s, D E F R A p u b lish ed a revised F M D co n tro l contin g en cy plan in M arch 2 0 0 3 .10 T h is set o u t the various factors u p o n w hich a decision to vaccinate w ould be based, an d laid dow n the procedures necessary to prevent an e pidem ic like th a t o f 2001 h a p p e n ­ ing again. B ut som e observers rem ain suspicious. T h ey claim th a t th e plan does n o t do e n o u g h to ensure th a t v accination w ould be used in future, a n d o bject to the fact th a t it includes pre-em ptive an d ‘firebreak’ culling o f anim als n o t exposed to disease.” Suspicions th a t D E F R A inten d s to reapply its 2001 policy in future outbreaks were first aroused in a u tu m n 2 0 0 1 , w hen it in tro d u c ed a new A nim al H ealth Bill, proposing legal pow er to enforce an extended cull. T h e bill con firm ed critics’ suspicions a b o u t the illegality o f its actions d u rin g the 2001 epidem ic. It was d e n o u n c e d in the H o u se o f L ords a n d defeated; b u t the g o v e rn m e n t’s large m ajority in th e H ouse o f C o m m o n s e nsured its passage in 2 0 0 2 . In th e ir re c e n t analysis o f these events, U n iv e rsity o f C a rd iff law professors D avid C am p b ell an d R o b ert Lee com plained: ‘T h e g o v e rn m e n t, ra th e r th a n review' th e flaws in its policy. . .is a voiding any lessons to be learned by p u rp o rtin g to give itself th e legal pow er to repeat its m istakes. . .it is legislation w hich in ten tio n ally gives a pow er to p an ic.’12

C onclusion

151

S o , w h ile t h e 2 0 0 1 e p i d e m i c h a s o p e n e d a w i n d o w f o r c h a n g e in B r i ta i n ’s c e n t u r y - o l d F M D c o n t r o l p o lic y , it is n o t y e t c le a r w h a t w ill h a p p e n w h e n F M D a p p e a rs a g a in , as it su re ly w ill. A fte r all, c o n tin g e n c y v a c c i n a t i o n p l a n s h a v e b e e n m a d e b e f o r e , b u t w e r e n e v e r u s e d . W il l D E F R A fo llo w th e e x a m p le o f t h e n o w - d e f u n c t M A F F a n d s tic k s t u b ­ b o r n ly to a s l a u g h te r - o n ly p o lic y ? O r w ill it m a k e a n e w k i n d o f h is to r y a n d a d o p t v a c c in a tio n ? A n d h o w w ill its a c tio n s b e ju d g e d ? O n l y tim e w ill te ll w h e t h e r B r i ta i n c a n f in a lly b r e a k t h e m o u l d o f th is m a n u f a c t u r e d p la g u e .

N o te s

In 1

tr o d u c t io n

For exam ple, see A non (1965); F Brown (2003)

C

hapter

1

F M D strikes 1 A non (1965), pp 135—6; I Pattison (1984), ch 1 and 2; J Fisher (1993a) 2 ‘T h e m urrain’, The Times, L ondon, 31 O cto b er 1840, p6, col c 3 N G oddard (1988) 4 A non (1840); W Sewell (1841) 5 ‘T h e m u rrain ’, The Times, L o n d o n , 31 O c to b er 1840, p6, col e; ibid, 28 D ecem ber 1840, p3 col d; H Keary (1848), p446; F C later (1853), p 141; R Perren (1978), ch 4 6 G Brown (1873), p441 7 H Keary (1848), p 4 4 6 ;F C later (1853), p i 40 8 G Flem ing (1869) 9 J H ow ard (1886); F Sm ith (1933); A non (1865), p265 10 F Fenner and E P G ibbs (1993), p415; D C Blood and O Radostits (1994),

p967 11 12 13 14

D Taylor (1975); R Perren (1978), p p 5 9 -6 3 ; J W alton (1986) J H om fray (1884), p 15 M Pelling (1978), ch 1; C H am lin (1992); J Pickstone (1992); M W orboys (2000), p p l3 6 - 7 8 A non (1840); ‘T h e m urrain’, The Times, L ondon, 31 O ctober, p6, col e; W Sewell (1841); J B S im onds (1857) Evidence to Select C o m m itte e on the S heep, etc C o n tag io u s D iseases P revention Bill, 1857; J G ib le tt, ‘C a ttle disease’, The Times, L ondon, 24 N ovem ber 1863, p5, col e; C , 'T h e diseases in cattle’, The Times, L ondon, 4 D ecem ber 1863, p6, col f

Notes

I 53

15 16

J H ow ard (1886), p p l - 3 T h e Analytical Sanitary C om m ission (1851); J Caird speech, Hansard [H C ], 9 M arch 1864, vol 173, col 1750; Evidence by J G iblett and J H o n k to Select C om m ittee on the C attle Diseases Prevention Bill, 1864; ‘T h e cattle disease question’, Farmers M agazine, vol 25, 1865, pp 1 1 9 -2 2 , 2 1 7 -2 0 , 3 3 1 -3 3 ; J Blackm an (1975); D Taylor (1975), p p l9 - 2 0 ; R Perren (1978), ch 2 17 J C M cD onald (1951); K M aglen (2002) 18 J Broad (1983); J Fisher (2003), p p 3 1 5 -17 19 E A ckerknecht (1948); R M orris (1976); O M acD onagh (1977), ch 8; M D urey (1979); A H ardy (1993a); A H ardy (1993b), ch 9; C H am lin (1994); P Baldwin (1999) pp2—36; K M aglen (2002) 20 E P H ennock (1998), pp5 4 —55 21 A non (1965), p p l6 2 - 6 3 ; I Pattison (1990), p p 3 5 -4 4 22 W D rak e, E vidence to Select C o m m itte e on th e Sheep, etc C o n tag io u s Diseases Prevention Bill, 1857; J G iblett, J H onk and W Sim m onds, Evidence to Sclect C om m ittee on the C attle Diseases Prevention Bill, 1864

John Gamgee and the diseased meat problem 23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36

R D ’Arcy T h o m p so n (1974) F Accum (1820); A non (1830); J M itchell (1848) P J Row linson (1982), p p 6 3 -6 6 ; J B urnett (1979), p p 7 2 -9 0 R J R ichardson, Evidence to Third Report from the Select Comm ittee on the Adulteration o f Food, 1856 Bill to C onsolidate and A m end N uisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts, 1848 and 1849 Evidence by J B Sim onds to Select C om m ittee on the Sheep, etc C ontagious Diseases Prevention Bill, 1857; A Friend o f Rory O -M oo-oh, ‘Cattie-D isease’, The Times, 1 D ecem ber 1863, plO col e E H eadlam G reenhow (1857) J G am gee, ‘U nw holesom e m eat’, Lancet, vol II, 1860, pp 5 9 5 -9 6 ; J Gam gee (1863); R Perren (1978), ch 2 and 4; J Fisher (1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 0 ) Fifth Report o f the M edical Officer o f Health o f the Privy Council, 1863, pp 19— 31 F Sm ith (1933); S H all (1962), p p 4 8 -5 0 ; A non (1965), p265 For m ore inform ation, see A H ardy (1999) J G am gee, ‘C attle disease in relation to the public health' and ‘T h e system o f inspection in relation to the traffic in diseased anim als or th eir p ro d u c e ’, clip p in g s d ated 1863, c o n ta in e d w ith in J B S im o n d s C o lle c tio n , RVC, L ondon; J G am gee, Evidence to Report from the Select Comm ittee on Cattle Diseases Prevention Bill, 1864 ‘N o rth o f England Veterinary Association quarterly m eeting’, Veterinarian, vol 37, 1864, p p 6 5 4 -6 6 See disputes su rro u n d in g veterinary obstetrics and an ou tb reak o f disease am ong foxhounds, Veterinarian 1860 and 1863, passim

154

37 38

39 40

41 42

43

A M anu fa ctu red Plague?

‘T h e sm allpox in sheep’, Farmers’Magazine, vol 22, 1862, p p 3 5 5 -5 6 E H olland, ‘O n disease in cattle’, and 'M r H o llan d ’s practical suggestions as to the prevention o f disease’, clippings dated 1863, J B Sim onds C ollection, RVC, London; Bill to Extend the Provision and C on tin u e the Term o f the Act o f the 12th Year to Prevent Spreading o f C ontagious and Infectious Disorders A m ong Sheep and C attle, 1863 Bill to M ake F u rth e r Provisions for the Prevention o f Infectious Diseases am ongst C attle, 1864 N o rth British A griculturalist Office, 1863, com m unication to J B Sim onds, J B Sim onds C ollection, RVC, L ondon; Report from the Select Comm ittee on Cattle Diseases Prevention, 1864; J Fisher (1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 0 ), p p 5 1—53 'T h e farm ’, Illustrated London News, 18 June 1864, J B Sim onds C ollection, RVC, London Illustrated London News, 25 Ju n e 1864, J B S im o n d s C o lle c tio n , RVC, L ondon; Falkirk and Ballinasloe were two im p o rtan t fairs w here store stock changed hands Hansard [H C ], 15 July 1864, vol 176, col 1 5 3 7 -3 9 ; C aptain O ’Brien, ‘T he Sale and T ransport o f C a ttle ’, M a rk Lane Express, 26 D ecem ber 1864, J B Sim onds C ollection, RVC, L ondon

T he cattle plague epidemic, 1 8 6 5 - 1 9 6 7 44 45 46

47 48

S Hall (1962); A non (1965), p p l 3 -2 1 , 1 25-34; J Fisher (1980); M W orboys (1991); J Fisher (1993); T R om ano (1997) ‘E ditorial’, Veterinarian, vol 40, 1867, p p 3 9 6 -9 9 ; G Flem ing (1880) Bill to C onsolidate, A m end and M ake Perpetual the Acts for Preventing the In troduction or Spreading o f C ontagious or Infectious Diseases am ong C attle and oth er A nim als in G reat B ritain, 1 8 6 8 -1 8 6 9 ‘M ou th and foot disease’, Veterinarian, vol 42, 1869, p p 7 5 1 -2 For a sum m ary o f these debates, see Report o f the Select Comm ittee on Con­ tagious Diseases o f A nim als (1873); H Jen k in s (1873); Report o f the Select Committee on Cattle Plague a n d the Importation o f Livestock (1877); Hansard [H C ], 24 June 1864, vol 241, col 1 3 4 -9 8 ; ibid, 25 June 1864, vol 241, col 3 3 1 -4 0 8 ; ibid, 27 June 1864, vol 241, col 5 0 0 -7 5 ; ibid, 1 July 1864, vol 241, col 5 0 0 -7 3 ; Report o f the Lords Select Comm ittee on the Contagious Diseases o f A nim als B ill (1878). For m ore inform ation on the nature and geographical d istribution o f farm ing patterns, see J Fisher (1980), p p 2 8 6 -9 2 ; P Brassley (2000a); B A H olderness (2000). For V ictorian politics, see T A Jenkins (1996). For inform ation on n u tritio n and m eat consum ption, see E Sm ith (1863); J B urnett (1979); A Rabinach (1992); H Kam m inga and A C u n n in g ­ ham (1995)

Notes

\ 5 5

FMD becomes a plague 49

50 51

52

53

54 55

56 57 58 59 60

61

E vening Standard, L o n d o n , 8 July 1869, J B S im onds C o lle c tio n , RVC, L ondon; L P C urtis (1968); H Ritvo (1987), p p 4 5—81; J Fisher (1993a); T A Jenkins (1996), ch 5; J Fisher (2000) ‘M r H enry C haplin M P on F M D ’, Bells Weekly Messenger, 21 January 1884, p6; J Brown (1987) pp5—59; P Perry (1973), ppxiv-xxiii M W orboys (1991), p p 3 14—17; M W orboys (2000), ‘Introduction ; T Rom ano (2002), ch 5; J B Sim onds, ‘Intro d u cto ry address to the RV C’, Veterinarian, vol 48, 1875, p724. For opinions relating to the cause o f F M D , see witness evidence published in Report o f the Select Committee on Contagious Diseases o f A n im a ls (1 8 7 3 ); Report o f the Select C om m ittee on C attle Plague a n d the Im portation o f Livestock (1877); Report o f the Lords Select Comm ittee on the Contagious Diseases o f A nim als B ill (1878) ‘R eport o f the C o u n cil’, Journal o f the Royal Agricultural Society o f England, vol 37 1876, p p v -x ; J B tirdon-S anderson (1877); W D u g u id (1 8 7 7 ). T R o m an o (2 0 0 2 ) surveys 1 9 th -c e n tu ry career o p p o rtu n itie s for m edical scientists. ‘F M D O rder, 12/69’ Veterinarian, vol 43, 1870, p p 5 9 -6 0 ; Hansard [H C ] 15 July 1872, vol 212, col 1126; ibid, 14 February 1873, vol 214, col 509 and 520; Report o f the Select Committee on Contagious Diseases o f Anim als (1873) ‘RASE on cattle disease’, Veterinarian, vol 47, 1874, p p 4 5 6 -5 8 ; Hansard [Hh], 10 February 1876, vol 221, col 6 6 8 -7 0 Report o f the Select Committee on Cattle Plague a n d the Importation o f Livestock (1877); Report o f the Lords Select C om m ittee on the Contagious Diseases o f A nim als B ill (1878); Bill for M aking Better Provision Respecting C ontagious and Infectious Diseases o f C attle and other Anim als (1878); ibid, as am ended in com m ittee (1878) Bill to A m end the C ontagious Diseases (Animals) Act (1878, 1884); A non (1965); A n n u a l Report o f the Agricultural D epartment (1885) Return o fN u m b e r o f Farms Infected w ith Foot-and-M outh Disease (1870) W itness evidence, Report o f the Select C om m ittee on Contagious Diseases o f Anim als (1873) A n n u a l Report o f the Agricultural D epartm ent (1883); ‘Professor Brown at the RASE Veterinary C o m m ittee’, Veterinarian, vol 56, 1883, p p 2 5 6 -6 2 Report o f the Select Committee on Contagious Diseases o f Anim als (1873); Report o f the Select Committee on Cattle Plague and the Importation ofLivestock (1877); Report o f the Lords Select Committee on the Contagious Diseases o f A nim als B ill (1878); Parliam entary D ebates on the 1878 C ontagious Diseases o f Anim als Bill, Hansard [H C ], 1878, passim A n n u a l Reports o f the Agricultural D epartm ent (1 8 8 0 -1 8 8 3 ); Hansard [H C ], 22 March 1881, vol 259, col 1662-729; ibid, 16 April 1883, vol 278, col 172— 93; ibid, 10 July 1883, vol 281, col 1 0 2 0 -8 7 . See also Veterinarian, Veterinary journal and Bells Weekly Messenger, 1 8 8 3 -1 8 8 4 , passim ; A H H M atthew s (1915), ch 2

156

62

63

64 65

A M anu fa ctu red Plague?

Hansard [H C ], 14 February 1884, vol 284, col 8 3 8 -5 0 ; ibid, 19 February 1884, vol 284, col 1 2 9 1 -1 3 0 0 ; ibid, 21 February 1884, vol 284, col 1 5 2 8 39; ibid, 18 M arch 1884, vol 286, col 162-211 See d escrip tio n s o f F M D outbreaks in A n n u a l Reports o f the A gricultural Department, and reports upon disease spread in The Times, L ondon, 1885— 1906. For an analysis o f reactions to epidem ic diseases, see C R osenberg (1992). E W hetham (1979) A n n u a l Report o f the Agricultural Department (1 8 8 4 -1 8 9 2 )

C

hapter

2

The Irish question 1 2

3 4

5 6 7 8 9

10 11

D Spring (1984), pp 3 3 -3 4 ; G W illiam s and J R am sden (1990), p p 3 6 8 -7 1 ; A O ’D ay (1998), ch 9-11 A n n u a l Report ofD epartm ent o f Agriculture a n d Technical Instruction fo r Ireland (1914), p59; G H Collinge, T D un lo p Young and A P M cD ougall (1929), pp 139—42; R Perren (1978), pp 9 5 -1 0 0 ; K Miller (1985), p p 3 6 2 -6 4 , 3 8 0 -4 0 2 O bituary, Stew art Stockm an (1926) Above paragraphs draw n from Report on F M D in Ireland in the Year 1912 (1912); A n n u a l Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f A nim als Acts (1912); A n n u a l Report ofD epartm ent o f Agriculture and Technical Instruction fo r Ireland (1912); ‘F M D -Ire la n d ’, The Times, London, 1 July 1912, p8 col b; ibid, 2 July 1912, p8, col d; ibid, 8 August 1912, p i 1 col d T hese m en played a pro m in en t role during late 19th- and early 2 0 th-century battles for Irish land reform . See D Jones (1983) and P Bew (1987). Hansard [H C ], 5 July 1912, vol 40, col 1 4 8 7 -1 5 6 7 H Jenkins (1873); Irish evidence to Report o f the Lords Select Committee on the Contagious Diseases o f A nim als B ill (1878) C B athurst, ‘F M D -lre la n d ’, The Times, L ondon, 3 July 1912, plO , col c ‘Special article’, ibid, 15 July 1912, p 13 col e; C B athurst, correspondence, ibid, 3 Septem ber 1912, p6 col a; ibid, 20 Septem ber 1912, p8 col c; ibid, 1 O ctober, p 12 col d; Hansard [H C ], 5 July 1912, vol 40, col 14 8 7 -5 6 7 ; ibid, 18 O cto b er 1912, vol 42, col 160 7 -8 2 ; A O ’Day (1998), p p 2 1 9 -2 0 A n n u a l Report ofD epartm ent o f Agriculture a n d Technical Instruction fo r Ireland (1912) Hansard [H C ], 5 July 1912, vol 40, col 1 4 8 7 -5 6 7 ; ibid, 8 July, 1912, vol 40, col 1 7 4 9 -5 5 ; ibid, 18 O cto b er 1912, vol 42, col 1 6 0 7 -8 2 ; ‘ The Irish cattle trade’, The Times, L ondon, 6 Septem ber 1912, p 10 col a; ‘Party politics and cattle disease’, ibid, 16 Septem ber 1912, p8 col a; E Kennedy, correspondence, ibid, 16 Septem ber 1912, p3 col e; ‘M r T W Russell on Irish cattle’, ibid, 18 Septem ber 1912, p4 col d; ‘Irish D ep u tatio n ’, ibid, 5 O cto b er 1912, p4 col f

N otes

12

13 14 15 16

17

18 19 20

21 22 23

24

25

26 27 28

157

‘Special a rtic ic - H M D ’, TheTim es, 15 July 1912, p i 3, col e ; ‘T h e Irish cattle trade’, ibid, 6 Septem ber 1912, plO col a; ‘F M D ’, ibid, 9 Septem ber 1912, p4 col a; C B athurst, correspondence, ibid, 20 Septem ber 1912, p8 col c; ‘F M D ’, ibid, 7 O ctober 1912, p3 col e; Hansard [H C ], 18 O ctober 1912, vol 42, col 160 7 -8 2 ; ibid, 8 February 1913, vol 48 col 366 ‘Special article - F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 15 July 1912, p 13 col e ‘FM D - outbreaks, Ireland', The Times, L ondon, 8 August 1912, p8 col c; ibid, 2 Septem ber 1912, p3 col d; ibid 18 Septem ber 1912, p4 col c Hansard [H C ], 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 409 Hansard [H C ], 5 July 1912, vol 40, col 1502; ibid 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 3 4 9 -4 5 0 ; M ajor H ead, correspondence to The Times, L ondon, 11 Sep­ tem ber 1912, p8 col d; Lord M ayo, ibid, 28 Septem ber 1912, plO col d Hansard [H C ], 5 July, 1912, vol 40, col 1567; ibid, 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 3 4 9 -4 5 0 ; ‘Party Politics and C attle Disease’, The Times, 16 Septem ber 1912, p8 col a R e p o rt o f D illo n s le tte r to Freemason's Journal, The Times, L o n d o n , 26 Septem ber 1912, p4 col d Hansard [H C ], 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 375 ‘N ationalist su p p o rt for stock ow ners’, The Times, L ondon, 24 Septem ber 1912, p4 col d; R Sanders letter to C B athurst, ibid, 15 O ctober 1912, p 12 col f; Hansard \H C ], 18 O ctober 1912, vol 42, col 1 6 2 1 -3 0 , 1660; ibid, 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 4 09-11 Hansard [H C ], 18 O c to b er 1912, vol 42, col 1 6 2 5 -2 9 , 1 6 5 6 -6 2 ; ibid, 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 362, 364 Hansard [H C ], 18 O ctober 1912, vol 42, col 1659 'F M D - Ireland’, The Times, L ondon, 9 July 1912, p 12 col a; Hansard [H C ], 8 July 1912, vol 40, col 1 7 4 9 -5 5 ; ibid, 18 O cto b er 1912, vol 42, col 1651; Report on F M D in Ireland in the Year 1912 (1912), p p 8 19-21 Hansard [H C ], 7 August 1912, vol 41, col 3 2 8 4 -9 0 ; ‘T h e Irish cattle trade’, The Times, L ondon, 31 August 1912, p6 col c; C B athurst correspondence, ibid, 3 Septem ber, p6 col e; C haplin correspondence, ibid, 6 Septem ber 1912, plO col b; Pretym an correspondence, ibid, 17 Septem ber 1912, p6 col e; ‘T W Russell’s position’, ibid, 24 Septem ber 1912, p4 col c; ‘Special article’, ibid, 7 O ctober 1912, p3 col d; ‘D ep u tatio n s’, ibid, 10 O ctober 1912, p3 col a ‘T h e Irish cattle trade’, The Times, L ondon, 6 Septem ber 1912, plO col a; ‘N ationalist sup p o rt for stock ow ners’, ibid, 24 Septem ber 1912, p4 col d; Dillon correspondence to Freemason’s Journal, ibid, 26 Septem ber 1912, p8 col d; ibid, 3 O cto b er 1912, p i 1 col e; Hansard [H C ] 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 3 9 9 -4 0 5 D Spring (1984), p p 3 4 -3 8 Report on F M D in Ireland in the year 1912 (1912), p p 8 4 2 -4 4 ; ‘T h e Irish cattle trade’, The Times, L ondon 30 Septem ber 1912, p4 col e ‘D eputations to M r R uncim an’, The Times, London, 10 O ctober 1912, p3 col a; C B athurst correspondence, ibid, 10 O c to b er 1912, p3 col b; C h ap lin correspondence, ibid, 29 O ctober, p i 2, col d; ‘F M D ’ ibid, 28 O ctober 1912, p 12 col c; Hansard [H C ], 18 O ctober 1912, vol 42, col 1 6 0 7 -8 2

J58

29

^ M anufactured Plague?

Report on FM D in Ireland in the year 1912 (1912), pp8 5 3 -5 7 ; A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f Animals Acts (1912); ‘F M D ’, The Times, London, 2 October 1912, p4 col d; ‘Deputations to M r Runciman’, The Times, London, 10 O ctober 1912, p3 col a; Hansard [H C ], 18 O ctober 1912, vol 42, col 1607-82; ibid, 8 February 1913, vol 48, col 3 4 9 -4 4 7

Getting to grips with FMD 30 31 32 33

34

35

36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43

A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f Animals Acts (1912-1923), passim Hansard [WC], 23 February 1914, vol 58, col 1457 D Spring (1984), pp 3 3 -34; G W illiams and J Ramsden (1990), pp368-71; A O ’Day (1998), ch 9-11 H Skinner, Passive Im m unisation against FM D : a review’, FM D R C CP 411 (1940?), Pirbright Archive; S Smith Hughes (1977), ppl 1—87; T van Helvoort (1994), p p l9 0 -9 4 ; H P Schmiedcbach (1999) A nnual report ofDepartment ofAgriculture and 'Technical Instruction for Ireland (1912-1916); Report o f Proceedings at a Conference held at Birkenhead on the 26th o f February 1914 (1914); A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases ofAnim als Acts (1912-1923); A nnual Report o f Department o f Agriculture and Technical Instruction fo r Ireland (1912-1916) A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f Animals Acts (1908, 1911, 1912); Report o f the 1912 Departmental Committee on FM D (1912), including Evidence, Appendices and Index Report on FM D in Ireland in the year 1912 (1912), p805 L P C urtis (1968); L P Curtis (1997); S Gilley (1978) RAS Correspondence with Royal D ublin Society, 31 M arch to 5 May 1914, archives o f Reading University Rural History Unit; Report o f Proceedings at a Conference held at Birkenhead on the 26th o f February 1914 (1914); Hansard [H C], 23 Feburary 1914, vol 58, col 1439-94; ibid, 16 June 1916, vol 63, col 9 5 6-1030; ibid, 13 Decem ber 1915, vol 76, col 1788-90; ibid, 20 April 1921, vol 140, col 1886-87; A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f Animals Acts (1914-1922); A nnual Report o f Department o f Agriculture and Technical Instruction fo r Ireland (1914-1916) Report and correspondence, 1916-1917, PRO MAF 35/158 A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f Animals Acts (1921), p p 3 0 33 Evidence to and Report o f 1922 Committee o f Inquiry (1922), PRO MAF 35/ 162 and MAF 35/165 Report o f the 1922 Departmental Committee on FM D (1922), p24 Anon (1965), p393

Notes

C

hapter

159

3

Overview 1 O n the culture o f cattle breeding, see ‘Barons o f Beef’ in H Ritvo (1987) 2 T h e above section is drawn from A nnual Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f A nim als Acts (1 9 2 0 -1 9 2 4 ); Report o f the 1922 D epartm ental Committee on F M D (1922); Report o f the 1924 D epartm ental Comm ittee on F M D (1924); Evidence to the com m ittees, contained w ithin PRO MAE 3 5 /1 5 9 , M AF 35/ 160, M A F 3 5 /1 6 2 , M AF 3 5/165; The Times, L ondon, Jan u ary -M arch 1922 and Septem ber 1923-January 1924, passim; RAS council m inutes, 12 D ecem ­ ber 1923, Rural H istory C entre, Reading University

T h e Cheshire experience, 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 4 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Crewe Chronicle (hereafter C Q , Chester, 19 January 1924, p8 col a E D river (1909); G Scard (1981), p65; D Taylor (1987), p p 4 8 -5 0 Cheshire Observer (hereafter CO), Chester, 22 Septem ber 1923, p8 col a; CC, 3 N ovem ber 1923, p7 col b; C orrespondence, PRO M AF 35/164 CO, Chester, O ctober 1923, passim; CC, Chester, 10 N ovem ber 1923, p7 col c-e CC, Chester, 17 N ovem ber 1923, p7, col d -e ; ibid, 24 N ovem ber 1923, p4 col h; CO, Chester, 1 D ecem ber 1923, p5 col d -e W itness evidence, PRO M AF 3 5 /1 6 4 , M AF 3 5 /1 6 5 , M AF 35/166 C heshire F arm ers’ U n io n m in u te s, 3 D ecem b er 1923, C heshire C o u n ty Records Office; CC, Chester, 8 D ecem ber 1923, p7 A M atthew s (1915); N G oddard (1988), p p l - 3 , 154-5. For m ore inform ation on the N F U ’s historic relationship w ith MAF, see P Self and H Storing (1963); G Cox, P Lowe, and M W inter (1986); ibid (1991); M Sm ith (1990); J Brown (2 0 0 0 )

11

12 13 14

‘F M D ’, Daily M ail, L ondon, 17 D ecem ber 1923, p9; N F U M eat and LiveStock C om m ittee m inutes, 18 Decem ber 1923, Rural H istory Centre, Reading U niversity; CC, C hester, 29 D ecem ber 1923, p4 col f -h ; ‘T h e policy o f slaughter’, The Times, L ondon, 2 January 1924, p7 col a; H G erm an corre­ spondence, ibid, 8 January 1924, p8, col c; ‘Farm ers’ policy’, ibid, 17 January 1924, p i 8, col a; G erm an contrib u tio n to com m ittee o f inquiry, PR O M AF 3 5 /1 6 2 , p p200, 204, 220 C om m ittee evidence, PRO M AF 35/168 CC, C hester, 5 January 1924, p8; ‘C attle plague’, The Times, L o n d o n , 8 January 1924, p9, col a ‘F M D ’, D aily M ail, L o ndon, 17 D ecem ber 1923, p9; ‘C heshire farm ers’ com plaints’, The Times, L ondon, 5 January 1924, p i 2 col c; D uke o f W est­ m in s te r c o rre sp o n d e n c e, ibid, 6 F e b ru a ry 1924, p l l col e; C o m m itte e evidence, PRO M A F 3 5/165, p p 6 9 -7 0 and PRO M AF 3 5 /1 6 6

160

15

16

17 18 19

^ M anu fa ctu red Plague?

T hose anim al healers who did not possess the RCVS diplom a were, under the 1881 Veterinary Surgeon’s Act, placed on a register o f Veterinary practitioners’; F Bullock (1930), p i 5 Evidence by T h o m asso n , Barker and Boyle, PRO M AF 3 5 /1 6 6 , Report o f the 1924 D epartm ental Committee on F M D (1924), p33; ‘Farm ers’ Policy’, The Times, L ondon, 22 January 1925, p i 8, col c; ibid, 12 August 1925, p9, col c; H Skinner (1989), p35 ‘FM D still raging’, CC, Chester, 8 D ecem ber 1923, p7; ‘Stirring story o f the cattle plague’, CC, C hester, 15 D ecem ber 1923, p7 ibid; ‘C heshire’s D isappearing H erds’, CO, Chester, 29 D ecem ber 1912, p8 C o m m ittee evidence, PRO M AF 35/164

A county under siege 20 21 22

23 24

25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32

33

34

C C and CO, Chester, 15 D ecem ber, 22 D ecem ber and 29 D ecem ber 1923, passim ‘Anim al disease spreads’, Daily M ail, L ondon, 14 D ecem ber 1923, p p 9 -1 0 ‘C o m m e n t’ and ‘M edical officer on crem ation’, CC, Chester, 22 D ecem ber 1923, p7; CO. Chester, 29 D ecem ber 1923, p8; J Crowe evidence, PRO MAF 35/164 Stockm an evidence, PR O MAF 3 5 /1 6 5 , day 2, p 4 8 -5 0 RAS council m inutes, 12 D ecem ber 1923, Archives o f R eading University Rural H istory U nit; ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 14 D ecem ber 1923, p4, col e; CC, Chester, 15 D ecem ber 1923, p7; CO, Chester, 15 D ecem ber 1923, p7, col c; R J H ickes evidence, PR O M AF 3 5/159 Stockm an evidence, PR O M AF 35/165 C o m m ittee evidence, PR O M AF 3 5/162, p p l0 4 , 109 Stockm an evidence, PRO MAF 3 5/165, p p 9 2 -9 7 ‘Disaster to Cheshire’, The Times, L ondon, 15 D ecem ber 1923, p9, col a; ‘T he stock farm ers’ stoicism ’, ibid, 24 D ecem ber 1923, p l l , col c; ‘Slaughter policy’, ibid, 2 Ja n u a ry 1924, p l l , col b; ‘C a ttle slau g h ter’, D aily M ail, L ondon, 17 D ecem ber 1923, p p 8 -9 PR O MAF 3 5 /2 1 7 Stockm an evidence, PRO MAF 3 5 /1 6 5 , day 2, p 19 F Floud (1927), p 129; W M ercer (1963), p p 2 0 -6 ‘M inistry faces the m usic’, CO, Chester, 22 D ecem ber 1923, p8; ‘Resolutions versus slaughter policy carried’, CC, Chester, 29 D ecem ber 1923, p4, col f— h; ibid, p7, col a -d ; ibid, p8, col a; ‘Farm ers condem n policy o f slaughter’, The Times, L o n d o n , 21 D ecem b er 1923, plO , col d; ‘T h e stock farm ers’ stoicism ’, ibid, 24 D ecem ber 1923, p l l , col c ‘C hester C athedral: special prayers’, The Times, L ondon, 29 D ecem ber 1923, p8, col f; ‘Partial isolation in C heshire’, ibid, 16 Jan u ary 1924, p9, col a; ‘Farm ing notes’, CC, Chester, 5 January 1924, p7 D r B urton correspondence, CO, Chester, 15 D ecem ber 1923, p i 2, col b; J S T h o m so n c o rre sp o n d e n c e, CC, C h ester, 29 D ece m b er 1923, p 7 , col b;

Notes

35 36 37

38 39 40 41 42

161

‘M edical views’, The Times, L ondon, 4 January 1924, p i 2, col c; ‘A m edical view’, CO, Chester, 5 January 1924, p3, col c Stockm an evidence, PRO 3 5 /165, p 18 Stockm an evidence, PRO 3 5 /1 6 5 , pp 1 5 -17 ‘C attle disease’, The Times, L ondon, 1 January 1924, p i 2, col g; ‘T h e policy o f slaughter’, ibid, 2 January 1924, p7, col a; ‘Farmers and the M inistry’, ibid, 2 January 1924, p i 1, col b; ‘Farmers’ com m ittee m eet M inistry officials’, CC, Chester, 5 January 1924, p7; ‘Cheshire farmers: open m eeting w ith prayer’, CO, Chester, 5 January 1924, p3 C heshire C o u n ty C ouncil Diseases of A nim als Sub-com m ittee m inutes, 4 January 1924, Cheshire C o u n try Records Office ‘C attle Scourge’, CO, Chester, 12 January 1924, p3, col a ‘Slaughter policy to go on’, CC, Chester, 12 January 1924, p7 Stockm an evidence, PRO MAF 3 5/165, pp96—97 H olm es Chapel Farm ers’ U nion m inutes, 2 January 1924, Cheshire C ou n try Records Office

Resolution and aftermath 43 44 45 46

47 48 49 50 51 52 53

CO, Chester, 12 January 1924, p7, col d 'F M D - slaughter policy’, The Times, L ondon, 17 January 1924, p8, col d CO, Chester, 19 January 1924, p i H Tollem ache correspondence, CO, Chester, 26 January 1924, p5, col e; J W illett, ‘T h e grim tragedy ending - w hat o f the future?’, CC, C hester, 26 January 1924, p7; ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 29 February 1924, p7, col c N F U C o u n ty R estocking C o m m itte e m in u te s, 20 F ebruary 1924, R ural H istory C entre, Reading University A n n u a l Proceedings under the Diseases o f A nim als Acts (1924) C om m ittee evidence, PRO M AF 35/168 Cheshire representatives’ evidence, PR O M AF 35/164; Stockm an evidence, PRO M AF 35/165 C hairm an com m ents, PR O M AF 3 5 /1 6 5 , day 2, p9 Report o f the 1924 D epartm ental Comm ittee on F M D (1924) Stockm an evidence, PRO M AF 3 5 /1 6 5 , p50

C

hapter

4

The rise o f the international meat trade 1

Evidence o f W M Furnival, F P M atthew s and W Sm art, Appendices and Index to Report o f the 1912 Departmental Committee on F M D (1912); RAS Veterinary C om m ittee m inutes, July 1914-D ecem ber 1915, passim, Rural H istory Centre, Reading University

162

2

^ M a n u fa c tu re d P lague?

T h e above section is draw n from P Sm ith (1969), c h i - 5 ; M M achado (1969), p3; R G ravil (1 970), p p l 4 7 - 6 0 ; R Perren (1 9 7 8 ), chlO ; P G o o d w in (1981), p p 2 9 -3 5 ; D R ock (1985); D Sheinin (1 994), p p 5 0 1 - l 1

Suspicions aroused? 3 4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13 14

G C osco and A Aguzzi (1919) W Young evidence, P R O M A F 3 5 /1 6 6 ; J O Powley a n d J Kelland evidence, P R O M A F 3 5 /1 6 4 ; Report o f the 1 9 2 4 D e p a rtm en ta l C om m ittee on F M D (1 924), p p lO , 3 7 - 3 8 , 5 8 -5 9 Leaflet d ated 31 D ecem b er 1923, PR O M A F 3 5 /1 6 4 F M D R esearch C o m m itte e , C o m m itte e M eetin g s 9 - 1 5 , A p ril-D e c e m b e r 1925 (hereafter F M D R C C M ), passim ; F M D Research C o m m itte e , C o m m i­ tte e P aper 3 0 B , M a rc h 1925 (h e re a fte r F M D R C C P ); F M D R C C M 16, F ebruary 1925; F M D R C C P 50, M arch 1926; O b itu ary ; Stew art Stockm an (1926) A n n u a l Reports o f Proceedings under the Diseases o fA n im a ls Acts ( 1926), p 2 4 25; F M D R C C P 54, M ay 1926; RAS m in u tes, 2 June 1926, R ural H isto ry C en tre, R eading U niversity H ansard [H C ], 9 June 1926, vol 196, col 1 4 6 5 -6 7 ; ibid, 17 Ju n e 1926, vol 196, col 2 4 5 4 -5 6 ; ibid, 23 Ju n e 1926, vol 197, col 3 5 9 - 6 2 ; ibid, 24 June 1916, vol 1 9 7 ,col 5 7 5 -7 6 ; ibid, 12 July 1 9 2 6 ,vol 1 9 8 ,col 1 6 0 8 ;N F U M e a t a n d L ivestock C o m m itte e m in u te s, 16 Ju n e 1926, R ural H isto ry C e n tre , R eading U niversity RAS m inutes, 2 Ju n e 1926, Rural H istory C entre, R eading University; L ondon C e n tra l M arkets D e p u ta tio n , 3 June 1926, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 6 ; N F U M eat a n d L ivestock C o m m itte e m in u tes, 16 June 1926, R eading U niversity R ural H isto ry U n it A rchive H ansard [H C ], 17 June 1926, vol 196, col 2 4 5 4 -5 6 ; ibid, 28 Ju n e , 1926, vol 197, col 7 9 2 - 9 4 ; ibid, 5 July 1926, vol 197, col 1592—94; N F M T A D e p u ta ­ tion, 13 July 1926, PR O M A F 3 5 /2 0 6 ; ‘M eat em bargo’, Journal o fth e M inistry o f Agriculture, vol 33, 1 9 2 6 -1 9 2 7 , p p 5 7 7 - 7 8 F M D R C C P 54, M ay 1926; F M D R C C M 19, June 1926; M A F c o rre sp o n d ­ ence w ith A rgentine L egation, Ju n e 1926, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 6 M A F correspondence w ith R obertson, N o v em b er 1928, PR O M A F 3 5 /2 0 8 ; P S m ith (1 9 6 9 ), ch 2 and 3; P G o o d w in (1981); D R ock (1 9 85), p p l 6 2 - 8 6 ; M Foran (1998); S M oore (1993) D S pring (1984); J Brown (1 9 8 7 ), c h 3 -5 ; A C o o p e r (1989); G C ox, P Lowe and M W in te r (1991); S M oore (1991); J Brown (2000) C o rresp o n d en ce, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 6 , M A F 3 5 /2 1 0 , M A F 3 5 /2 1 1 , M A F 3 5 / 121

15

F M D R C C M 23, 7 D ecem ber 1926; F M D R C C P 59b, N ovem ber 1926; 2 n d Progress Report o f the F M D Research Com m ittee, H M S O , L o n d o n , 1927; 3 rd Progress Report o f the F M D Research Com m ittee, H M S O , L o n d o n , 1928

Nates

16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23 24 25 26

163

A n n u a l Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f A nim als Acts (1927), p27 F M D R C C P 58, N ovem ber 1926 F M D R C C P 59b, N ovem ber 1926; F M D R C C M 23 , D ecem b er 1926; Hansard [H C ], 25 N ovem ber 1926, vol 200, col 5 2 7 -2 8 ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 9 January 1928, p20, col a; ibid, 13 February 1928, p i 8, col a Hansard [H C ], 28 February 1928, vol 214, col 245—46; ‘C ouncil o f Agri­ culture for England ’, Journal o f the M inistry o f Agriculture, vol 34, 1927—1928, p p 1127-28 Hansard [HL], 21 February 1928, vol 70, col 206; ibid, 20 M arch 1928, vol 70, col 5 1 3 -2 8 ; ibid, 2 M ay 1928, col 9 5 5 -6 7 ; ibid, 8 M ay 1928, vol 70, col 1 015-28 P Sm ith (1969), p p l 1 9 -2 1 ; F C apie (1981) Report o f C ouncil o f Agriculture m eeting, January (1928), PRO M AF 35/208 RAS C o u n cil m inutes, 2 M ay 1928, Rural H istory C entre, R eading U n i­ versity; Hansard [HL], 27 June 1928, vol 71, col 7 4 7 -6 6 Hansard [H C ], 23 April 1928, vol 216, col 6 1 3 -1 5 ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 6 A ugust 1928, p l 6 , col b; Hansard [H C ], 1 M arch 1928, vol 214, col 5 9 2 -9 4 ; Hansard [HL], 21 February 1928, vol 70, col 206; ibid, 20 M arch 1928, vol 70, col 5 1 3 -2 8 ; ibid, 2 M ay 1928, col 955— 67; ibid, 8 M ay 1928, vol 70, col 101 5 -2 8

T h e Argentine reaction 27

28 29

30 31

32

33

J Richelet, ‘M eat inspection in the A rgentine’, PR O M A F 3 5 /2 0 6 ; R Jackson correspondence, press notice o f m eeting betw een frigorifico owners, report by R obertson, PRO M AF 3 5/208; P G oodw in (1981), pp31, 3 9 -4 2 Internal correspondence, January 1927, PR O M AF 3 5/208 ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 8 August 1930, p7, col d; Lignieres correspond­ ence and W H Andrews m inutes, 3 February 1932, PR O M AF 35/208; M M achado (1969), p p 5 -1 0 ; D Spear (1982); D Sheinin (1994), pp51 1 -2 0 Sec, for exam ple, M M achado (1969). M eeting, G uinness and U riburu, 26 July 1926; Jackson to Sm art, 4 August 1926; R Jackson m inutes, 3 N ovem ber 1927; C orrespondence w ith R obert­ son, N ovem ber 1928, PRO M AF 35/206; J Richelet (1929); P Sm ith (1969), p p l - 3 ; C Solberg (1971), p27; D Sheinin (1994), p p 5 18—19 R eport o f Bledisloes visit, letter from Luis D uhau to Bledisloe, Review o f the River Plate, 2 M arch 1928, PR O MAF 35/208; Bledisloe correspondence to The Times, L ondon, 24 M arch 1928, plO , col b C orrespondence, January 1918, PR O M AF 3 5 /2 0 8 ; G erm an report, N F U m inutes, 17 O cto b er 1928, Rural H istory C entre, Reading University

164

A M a n u fa c tu re d P lague?

Twisted science 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46

47 48 49

FM D R C CM FM DRC FM DRC FM D RC CP

48, F ebruary 1930; F M D R C C M 58, April 1931 C P 102C , O c to b e r 1930; W W ittm a n (1 999), p28 C P 102C , O c to b e r 1930; F M D R C C M 54, N ovem ber 1930 106B , Ja n u a ry 1 9 3 1 ; F M D R C C M 4 2 - 5 6 , M ay 1929 to

F ebruary 1931, passim F M D R C C P 102B , O c to b e r 1 9 3 0 ; F M D R C C P 1 0 6 B , J a n u a ry 193 1 ; F M D R C C M 55, D ecem b er 1930 F M D R C C M 55, D ecem b er 1930 H S k in n er (1989) FM DRC C M 7 3 , D e cem b er 1932 FM DRC C M 81, N o v em b er 1933 F ro o d re p o rts , P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 8 ; M e m o , ‘F M D : M easu res to p re v e n t in tro d u c tio n by carcasses from A rgentina’, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 7 C orresp o n d en ce, 1 9 3 4 -3 5 , P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 7 ; R eports by C a p ta in V Boyle, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 9 Kelland m inutes, 31 January 1933, List o f p rim ary F M D outbreaks 1933—34, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 7 ; F M D R C C M 78, Ju n e 1933; F M D R C C M 81, N ovem ­ ber 1933; F M D R C 9 2 - 9 4 , D e cem b er 1 9 3 4 -F e b ru a ry 1935; F M D R C C P 242, F ebruary 1935 R eport by C a b o t, O c to b e r 1935, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 7 ; M em o by C a b o t, 31 D ecem ber 1936, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 2 7 ; V andepeer m inutes, 22 N ovem ber 1937, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 0 9 ; F M D R C C M 120, N ovem ber 1937; F M D R C C M 122, F ebruary 1938 A n n u a l Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f A n im a ls Acts (1 9 3 5 ), p55 T R ooth (1 985), p p l 7 3 - 7 4 , 1 8 9 -9 0 ; F C apie (1 978), p p 4 9 - 5 1 C a b in e t m ee tin g , 2 N o v e m b er 1933, P R O CAB 2 7 /4 9 5 ; N F U M eat and L ivestock C o m m itte e m in u te s, 1 9 3 3 - 3 7 , passim , R ural H is to ry C e n tre , R eading U niversity; P S m ith (1 969), p p l 4 0 - 4 9 , 1 9 8 -9 9 ; R G ravil (1970); P G o o d w in (1 981), p p 4 3 -4 5 ; D R ock (1 985), p p 2 2 4 —31; D Sheinin (1994), p520

C

hapter

5

T h e birth o f scientific medicine? 1 2

For a classic acco u n t, see P de K ru if (1926). For discussions o f these issues, see S F, D S h o rtt (1983); C Law rence (1985); J A ustoker (1 988), ch 2; B L atour (1988); A C u n n in g h a m (1992); P W eindling (1992); J H W arner (1995); M H arrison (1996); J A M endelsohn (unpublished, 1996); P W eindling (1993); S Sturdy and R C o o ter (1998); C Law rence (1998); P Baldw in (1999); L Bryder (1999); M W orboys (2000); K W addington (2001); a n d J Fisher (2003)

Notes

3

4

5

165

H C hick, M H um e and M M acFarlane (1971); A L andsborough T hom son (1973), ch 1; G M acD onald (1980); W Foster (1983), ch 1 and 2; C Booth (1987); J Austoker (1988), ch 2; K Vernon (1990); C B ooth (1993); S Sturdy and R C o o ter (1998) A laboratory existed at the Board o f Agriculture as early as 1893; bu t for m any years this was just a room where post-m ortem specim ens were exam ined for signs o f sw ine fever or bovine p leuro-pneum onia. See I Pattison (1981); I Pattison (1984), ch 16; O bituary: Sir John M cFadyean (1995). Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f A nim als A ct (1909); A non (1967), p62; I Pattison (1979); R O lby (1991); M W orboys (1991), p p 3 2 5 -2 6 ; K Vernon (1997); w w w .defra.gov.uk/corporate/vla/aboutus/aboutus-history.htm

Starting out: FM D research in Britain and Europe up to 1924 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13

Sm ith H ughes (1977); A P W aterson and L W ilkinson (1978) H Skinner, ‘Passive im m unisation against F M D , a review’, F M D R C C P 411 (1940?); H Schm iedebach (1999); W W ittm an n (1999) S tockm an evidence, Report o f the 1912 D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D (1912) Evidence, Appendices and Index to Report o f the 1912 Departmental Committee on F M D (1912); Report o f the 1912 D epartm ental Committee on F M D Report o f the D epartm ental Committee Appointed to Inquire into F M D (1914) C o rresp o n d en ce, PR O M AF 3 5 /2 1 6 ; ‘R ep o rt on th e F M D C o m m itte e ’, F M D R C C P 2, 1924 For European disease incidence, 1 9 2 1 -2 5 , see Hansard [H C ], lO Ju n e 1926, vol 196, pp 171 3—14; for in fo rm a tio n on how geography affected disease control policies, see P Baldwin (1999). I Pattison (1984), ch 16; H Skinner (1992); J Fisher (2003)

Doctors, vets and the purpose o f scientific enquiry 14 15 16 17 18

19

Stockm an correspondence to D r Leishm an, 7 January 1924, PR O M AF 35/ 217 See notes 2 and 3 in ‘T h e birth o f scientific m edicine?’; J Eylcr (1987) E ditorial’, Lancet, 8 M arch 1924, p p 5 0 4 -0 5 ‘E ditorial’, Lancet, 12 January 1924, p p 8 3 -8 5 ‘E ditorial’, British M edical Journal, 19 January 1924, pp 1 21-22. Like MAF, the M inistry o f H ealth believed its scientists should pursue research that served its policies. See E Higgs (2000). ‘Medical views - divided counsels in Cheshire’, The Times, L ondon, 4 January 1924, p i 2, col c; D r Young, D r Peyton and D r Grace correspondence, ibid, 7 January 1924, p i 8, col c

166

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29

30

A M anu fa ctu red Plague?

Peyton interview, CO, Chester, 5 January 1924, p3, col c Ibid; D r W H odgson, evidence to 1924 com m ittee o f inquiry, PRO M AF 35/ 164; O bituary; Professor Beattie (1955) J M Beattie and D Peden, ‘F M D in rats’, Lancet, 2 February 1924, p p 2 2 1 22 Stockm an evidence to 1924 com m ittee o f inquiry, PRO M AF 35/165 O bituary: Sir W M Fletcher, (1932—35) Fletcher correspondence to Lord M ildmay, 1 April 1924, PR O FD 1/1346 E vidence, A ppendices, Index an d Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee Appointed to Inquire into the Requirements o f the Public Services w ith Regard to O fficers Possessing Veterinary Q ualifications (1 9 1 2 -1 9 1 3 ); D e v e lo p m e n t C om m ission C om m ittee, 1913, PRO D 4 /9 1; ‘Swine fever - need for research’, The Times, L ondon, 4 M ay 1914, p4, col a; Sir C A llbutt correspondence to Veterinary Record, 26 June 1920, p p 6 0 9 - l 1; ongoing correspondence, ibid, 1920—21, passim; D evelopm ent C om m ission Advisory C om m ittee, 1920—22, PRO FD 1/4364; M R C C om m ittee on RVC Charter, 1922, PRO FD 1/5048; Stockm an correspondence to D r Leishm an, 7 January 1924, PRO M AF 35 / 217; Sir C A llbutt, ‘Inaugural address’, Veterinary Record, 12 January 1924, pp 17—18; R D letter to The Times, L ondon, 8 January 1924, p8, col c; H A Reid letter, ibid, 14 January 1924, p i 4, col b; I Pattison (1979); I Pattison (1984); R O lby (1991); T DeJager (1993); K Vernon (1997); M W orboys (1991) J A ustoker (1988), ch 3 ; T DeJager (1993); E Higgs (2000) M R C C om m ittee on RVC C harter, 1922, PRO FD 1/5048; Fletcher corre­ spondence, January 1922, PRO FD 1/4364 A Kraft (unpublished, 2003) G Adam i, correspondence to The Times, quoted in Veterinary Record, vol 33,

1920-1921, pp21-22 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

‘Sir Stewart Stockm an on the F M D problem ’ Veterinary Record, 19 January 1 9 2 4 ,p p 3 5 -3 9 ‘E ditorial’, Veterinary Journal, February 1924, p p 5 6 -5 7 ‘E ditorial’, Veterinary Record, 19 January 1924, p49 ‘Sir Stew art Stockm an on the F M D problem ’, Veterinary Record, 19 January 1924, P35 C a b in e t C o m m itte e m ee tin g s, PR O M A F 3 5 /2 1 7 ; F letch er letter to C Sherrington, 22 February 1924, PR O FD 1/1346 Fletcher correspondence w ith L eishm an, A ugust 1921, PR O FD 1/4364; M R C C om m ittee on RVC C harter, PR O FD 1/5048 Fletcher letter to C Sherrington, 22 February 1924, PR O FD 1/1346 Stockm an letter to Lord Ernie, 7 January 1924, PRO M AF 3 5/217 Stockm an letter to Leishm an, 7 January 1924; Leishm an report, PRO M AF 35/217 Stockm an response, 8 February 1924, PRO MAF 3 5/217 Fletcher letters to C Sherrington, 22 and 25 February 1924, PRO FD 1/1346 ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 29 February 1924, p7, col c; O bituary: W illiam Leishm an (1995)

N otes

43

167

C o rresp o n d en ce, PR O M A F 3 3 /6 4 ; K A ngus (1 990), ch 1 and 2; E Tansey (1994)

K eeping F M D out, 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 3 8 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55

56 57

58 59

60

A W oods interview w ith H H S kinner, 7 M arch 2 0 0 0 ; H S k in n e r (1 9 8 —, un p u b lish ed ), section 1 ibid; F M D R C C M 1 9 2 4 -3 7 , passim F M D R C C P 4, 29 F e b ru a ry 1 9 2 9 ; F M D R C C M 19, 30 M a rc h 1 926; F M D R C C P 20, 6 July 1926 C o rresp o n d en ce, P R O M A F 3 3 /5 3 3 ; T D ejager (1 993), p 147 ‘F M D ’ The Times, L o n d o n , 29 F ebruary 1924, p7, col c For a chro n o lo g y o f scientific b reakthroughs, see F B row n (2003). ibid; F M D R C C M 1 9 2 4 -2 5 , passim F M D R C C M 1 9 2 5 -3 9 , passim A n n u a l Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o fA n im a ls Acts, (1 925), p 17; ibid, 1928, p 17; ibid, 1932, p p 3 4 -3 5 ‘Foot a n d m o u th disease’, The Times, L o n d o n , 25 S eptem ber 1930, p9, col c; ‘Serum tre a tm e n t in c o n n ec tio n w ith F M D ’, Veterinary Record, 6 D ecem ber 1930 K elland m in u tes to H D ale, D ecem b er 1932, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 2 6 F M D R C C M 1 9 2 5 - 3 3 , p assim ; A n n u a l R eport o f Proceedings u n d e r the Diseases o f A nim als Acts (1 930), p8; ibid, 1931, p26; ibid, 1932, p i 1; ibid, 1933, p 24; A ndrew s m em o to K elland, 30 Ju n e 1931, P R O M A F 3 5 /2 6 6 ; F M D R C C P 11 IB , A ugust 1931 F M D R C co rrespondence, PR O M A F 3 5 /2 2 6 F M D R C C M a n d F M D R C CP, 1 9 2 5 - 3 7 , p assim ; R e p o rt o f th e A R C C o m m itte e a p p o in te d to review th e w ork o f the F M D R C , July 1933, P R O M A F 3 3 /5 5 4 R e p o rt o f th e su b -c o m m itte e o f th e A RC a p p o in te d to review the research w ork in progress on F M D , July 1937, PR O M A F 3 3 /4 8 2 F M D R C C P 3 6 0 , O c to b e r 1938; E d w a rd s m arrie d M cF ad y ean ’s seco n d d a u g h te r in 1922 a n d , hence, was S to ck m an ’s brother-in-law . T h e m arriage did n o t survive. M em oir, J T G E dw ards (1953) l s t- 5 th Progress Reports o f the F M D Research C om m ittee (1 9 2 5 -3 7 ); A note on the re p o rtin g o f findings in the early years o f F M D research’ in H S kinner ( 1 9 8 -, u n p u b lish ed ); A W oods, interview w ith H Skinner, 7 M arch 2000

A w artim e threat 61

R eport o f S ub-com m ittee o n Biological W arfare, M arch 1937, PR O M A F 3 5 /

62

231 C a b o t m em o , A pril 1937, n o te by M a rk et D ivision, M ay 1937, P R O M A F 35/231

168

63 64 65

66

67 68

69 70

71

72 73 74

^ M a n u fa c tu re d P lague?

F M D R C C P 3 5 1 , 2 June 1938 C a b o t paper, 13 N ovem ber 1939, P R O M A F 2 5 0 /1 2 6 I G allow ay, ‘M e m o o n re p o rts o f a new m e th o d o f active im m u n isa tio n ’, F M D R C C P 355, 30 June 1938; F M D R C C M 1 3 4 ,3 1 O c to b er 1939; C a b o t c o rrespondence, M ay 1939, PR O M A F 3 5 /2 3 1 ; M em o, ‘F M D : p reparation o f serum ’, PR O M A F 2 5 0 /1 2 6 R e p o rts re su ltin g from S k in n e r’s visit, box file 8, IA H P irb rig h t archive; F M D R C C M 133, 2 7 July 1939; F M D R C C M 134, 31 O c to b e r 1939; F M D R C C M 139, 7 A ugust 1940; F M D R C C M 142, 20 M ay 1941; F M D R C C P 3 98, 1939; R in d erp est research at P irb rig h t, 1 9 4 0 -4 2 , box file 9, IA H P irb rig h t archive; M em o , ‘F M D : p re p ara tio n o f serum ’, P R O M A F 2 5 0 /1 2 6 F M D R C C M and F M D R C CP, 1 9 3 8 -4 2 , passim ; Progress report, 1 9 4 4 -4 5 , box file 9, IA H P irb rig h t archive J Francis letter to H Skinner, 24 July 1942, box file 8, IA H P irb rig h t archive; ‘A N o te on the re p o rtin g o f findings in the early years o f F M D research’ in H S k in n e r ( 1 9 8 -, u n p u b lish e d ); H S k in n e r ( 1 9 8 - , u n p u b lis h e d ), se c tio n 1. Brooksby later becam e director o f P irbright, while H enderson w ent on to direct the Pan-A m erican F M D C entre in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and becam e secretary o f the A R C in 1972. A W oods interview w ith H Skinner, 7 M arch 2000 B B ernstein (1 987); B Balm er a n d G C a rte r (1 999), p p 3 0 9 -1 0 W A Stew art, ‘Pig keeping in w a rtim e ’, Journal o f the M inistry o f Agriculture, vol 46, 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 0 , p62 7 ; ‘Pig feeding w ith sw ill’, ibid, p p 6 9 2 -9 3 ; Pigs on every farm ’, ibid, pp 170—71; Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f A nim als Acts (1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 7 ), p p 4 -5 ‘Foot and m o u th disease’, The Times, L ondon, 6 M arch 1941, p5, col c; ‘Foot a n d m o u th disease’, ibid, 7 M arch 1941, p5, col e; A n n u a l Report o f Proceed­ ings under the Diseases o f A nim als Acts ( 1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 7 ), p2 M em os and correspondence, PR O M A F 8 8 /2 9 5 , M A F 8 8 /2 9 6 and M A F 3 5 / 696 P R O W O 2 0 8 /3 9 7 3 ‘N azis p lan n ed to use virus against B ritain’, The Times, L o ndon, 12 M arch 2 0 0 1 , p6, col f-g

T h e C old War and biological w eapon s research 75 76

77 78

M D a n d o (1 994), p80; G C a rte r and G Pearson (1 996); B B alm er (1997), p p l 1 7 -1 8 ; B B alm er and G C a rte r (1 999), p p 3 1 1 -1 2 R esearch on F M D , D R P /P (51) 6 2 , 23 A ugust 1951, P R O D E F E 10/30; C landestine attack o n crops a n d livestock o f the com m onw ealth, D R P /P (51) 77, 5 O c to b er 1951, PR O D E F E 10/30; ‘C anada: F M D ’, TheTim es, London, 1 M arch 1952, p5, col c; P R O W O 1 9 5 /1 2 4 5 8 ; K H arrison-Jones (M A F) to H o m e O ffice, 26 F ebruary 1955, PR O M A F 2 5 0 /1 6 3 D R P /P (51) 62, 23 A ugust 1951, PR O D E F E 10/30 ibid; B artlett to H a rrison-Jones (M A F), 3 A pril 1952, PR O M A F 2 5 0 /1 6 3

Notes

79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

92

93 94

169

PRO W O 195/11426; D R P /P (51) 62, 23 August 1951, PR O D E FE 10/30; B Balm er (1997), p 121, states th at in the absence o f accurate intelligence, m uch biological weapons research was shaped by the rationale that if British scientists could achieve som ething, then the enem y probably could, as well. T h is represented a self-perpetuating justification for offensive research. PRO W O 195/10780 W ilcox m inutes to M anktelow , 12 D ecem ber 1951, PRO MAF 250/163 C orrespondence, PRO M AF 117/394 Sir FI Parker, 6 D ecem ber 1951, PR O M AF 250/163 Sir D Vandepeer, 7 January 1952, PRO M AF 250/163 C orrespondence, D ecem ber 1 9 51-M ay 1952, PR O M AF 250/163 C orrespondence, PRO M AF 250 /1 6 3 , M AF 117/203, M AF 117/222, M AF 117/391 and M AF 117/394. Gow ers correspondence to N ugent, 15 July 1954, PR O M AF 117/394 D R P /P (54), 8 O c t 1954, PR O D E F E 10/33; B Balm er (1997), p p l 1 9 -33; B Balmer and G C arter (1999), p p 3 10—1 1 PRO W O 2 1 9 /1 4 2 1 , W O 195/14245 Report o f the A R C 1 9 5 6 -1 9 5 7 (1 9 5 6 -1 9 5 7 ), p p l0 1 - 0 4 ; ibid, 1 9 5 7 -1 9 5 8 , p i 33 T h e FAO was established in 1945 w ith a m andate to raise levels o f nu tritio n and stan d ard s o f living, im prove ag ricultural p ro d u c tiv ity and b e tte r the condition o f rural populations. It was initially headed by Sir John Boyd Orr, w ho tried to coordinate international action against the loom ing world food shortage, w hile also considering long-term problem s in food p ro d u c tio n , distribution and consum ption. J H Lockc, ‘FAO - an experim ent in inter­ national cooperation’, Journal o f the M inistry o f Agriculture, vol 53, 1946— 1947, p p 3 8 1—85; FAO website, w w w .fao.org/U N FA O /e/w m ain-e.htm Correspondence, PRO MAF 35/868, MAF 35/869 and MAF 252/48; Consti­ tution o f the European Commission fo r the Control ofF oot-and-M outh Disease (1953) PRO M AF 252/165 Anon (1978), p i 93

C

hapter

6

FM D returns 1

2 3

‘Lord Iveagh, herd o f G uernseys destroyed’, The Times, L ondon, 11 August 1945, p2, col d; ‘Lord Iveagh, pedigree G uernsey herd slaughtered’, ibid, p6, col e; Lord Iveagh correspondence, ibid, 3 July 1952, p7, col e A n im a l Health Services Report (1952); W W ilson and R C M atheson (1952— 1953) Report o f the 1922 Departmental Committee on F M D (1922); Report o f the 1924 Departmental Committee on F M D (1924); PR O M AF 3 5/153 and M AF 35/ 170

170

4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

^ M a n u fa c tu re d Plague?

P Self a n d H J S to rin g (1 963); J M a rtin (2000), p p 6 7 - 8 3 ; J Brow n (2000) A n im a l H ealth Services Report (1952); W W ilson and R C M ath eso n (1 9 5 2 — 1953) M Tracy (1989), ch 11; J Bowers (1 985), p 66; T h e F M D epidem ic coincided w ith a balance-of-paym ents crisis, w hich the C onservative go v ern m en t tried to m anage by repeated increases in the bank rate. T h e crisis eventually resolved itself as im p o rt prices fell; C Schenk (1998) ‘Foot and m o u th policy u n d e r fire’, D aily Telegraph, L on d o n , Ju n e 1952, IAH P irbright A rchive L ord Bledisloe correspondence to The Times, L o n d o n , 7 M ay 1952, p 7 , col e; ‘F M D : K ent farm ers’ p ro test’, ibid, 4 July 1952, p6, col a ‘F M D ’ D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , M ay 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive W Rees (un d ated ) u n p u b lish ed , p p l - 2 Frenkel discovered th a t virus could be c ultured in-vitro using to n g u e tissue. T h is m ean t th a t scientists no longer relied u p o n the slow, expensive m ethod o f harvesting virus from the tongues o f live infected cattle. T D alling, evidence to G ow ers c o m m ittee, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /1 8 ; A n o n (1 978), p 194 G ow er c o m m itte e m eetings, PR O M A F 3 8 7 /2 8 ; Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 -4 , pp 1 3 5 -9 ‘F M D in France: o u tb rea k spreading’, The Times, L o n d o n , 14 July 1952, p6 col f; W Rees (date u n k n o w n , u n p u b lish ed ), p p l - 2 Evidence to G ow ers c o m m itte e, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 8 and M A F 3 8 7 /3 1 ; A non (1 978), P 194 Exam ples include J T D avies correspondence to The Times, L o n d o n , 5 M ay 1952, p7, col g; ‘R ep o rt from D e n m a rk ’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 30 June 1952, IA H Pirbright A rchive; W D T h o m as, ‘D anish C attle Policy’, ibid, June 1952; Lord Iveagh correspondence to The Times, L o n d o n , 3 July 1952, p7, col e; ‘F M D : F rance’, ibid, 5 S eptem ber 1952, p 5 , col a; C h a p m a n Pincher, ‘F M D ’, D aily Express, L o n d o n , 13 N ovem ber 1952, P R O CAB 124 /1 5 6 2

Calls to vaccinate 16

17 18

19

L ord Bledisloe correspond ence to The Times, L o n d o n , 7 M ay 1952, p7, col e; L ord Iveagh evidence to G ow ers c o m m ittee, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /7 ; G loucester­ shire C a ttle Society evidence to G ow ers c o m m ittee, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /1 6 Sunday Express, L o n d o n , 15 Ju n e 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive G eorge Villiers correspondence to D aily Telegraph, L ondon 19 A pril 1952; ‘Is there no b e tte r answ er?’, D aily Express, L o n d o n , 15 Ju n e 1952; ‘R ep o rt from D e n m a rk ’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 30 Ju n e 1952, all from IA H P irbright Archive; Lord Iveagh correspondence to The Times, L o n d o n , 3 July 1952, p7, col e; ‘L et’s look again’, D aily M a il, L o n d o n , 12 July 1952, P R O M A F 2 5 5 / 3 8; ‘V accination: corresp o n d en ce’, The Times, L o n d o n , 11 A ugust 1952, p9, col b W M C ro fto n (1936)

Notes

20

21 22 23 24

\J \

W M C ro fto n article in the Spectator, D e cem b er 1938, P R O F D 1/1346; W C ro fto n co rre sp o n d e n c e to The Times, L o n d o n , 7 M a rch 1941, p 5 , col e; C ro fto n p ra ctised vaccine therapy, a co n tro v ersial a n d largely d isc red ited th era p eu tic m easure. See M W orboys (1992) C o rresp o n d en ce, P R O M A F 3 5 /4 5 2 and 453 W C ro fto n correspondence to D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , M arch 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive ‘F M D ’, D aily Telegraph, L on d o n , M ay 1952, IAH P irb rig h t Archive ‘Foot a n d m o u th policy’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 5 Ju n e 1952; ‘Foot and m o u th policy u n d e r fire’, ibid, 12 Ju n e 1952; ‘Is there n o b e tte r answ er?’, S u n d a y Express, L o n d o n , 15 J u n e 195 2 ; ‘R e p o rt fro m D e n m a r k ’, D a ily Telegraph, L ondon, 30 Ju n e 1952, all from IA H Pirbright A rchive; Lord Iveagh correspondence to The Times, L ondon, 3 July 1952, p7, col e; ‘Let’s look again’, D aily M ail, L o n d o n , 12 July 1952, P R O M A F 2 5 5 /1 7 4 ; ‘F M D ’, Veterinary Record, 16 A ugust 1952, p481

T h e m inistry stands firm 25

26

27

28

‘W o rk w ith M e x ica n field stra in s , 1 9 4 6 - 4 7 ’, IA H P irb irg h t A rc h iv e; I Galloway, ‘D raft R eport, 1 9 3 7 -1 9 5 2 ’, IA H P irb rig h t A rchive, p p l 9 - 2 2 , 3 0 31 T h is transfer o f control resulted from a dispute betw een M A F officials and the F M D R C , w hich was reconstituted after the w ar u n d e r the chairm an, Sir Alan D rury. T h e F M D R C felt th at its pre-w ar freedom o f action had been curtailed, and w hen, in 1948, the Treasury intervened to prevent it from raising scientists’ salaries, m an y m em b ers th reaten ed to resign. Fearing adverse publicity, M A F agreed to transfer co n tro l o f P irbright to the A R C , and to a p p o in t the existing F M D R C as its governing body, a m ove th a t b ro u g h t P irb rig h t in to line w ith the o th er state-aided agricultural research institutes. M A F retained control over financing and contin u ed to station an officer at Pirbright; b u t the A RC became responsible for the research p rogram m e and for staffing. O n e con d itio n o f the change was the c o n tin u e d a p p o in tm e n t o f the C V O to the governing body. See P R O M A F 3 3 /9 4 4 a n d M A F 1 17/73. N F U sta te m e n t, The Times, L o n d o n , 10 D e ce m b er 1951, p 2 , col e; W R W ooldridge, ‘F M D : slaughter policy ju stified ’, ibid, 17 D ecem b er 1951, p3, col c; J S a ite r-C h alk e r co rre sp o n d e n c e to D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , M arch 19 5 2 , IA H P ir b r ig h t A rch iv e; M e m o , 'F M D - a p p re c ia tio n o f p re se n t position’, 8 M ay 1952, P R O M A F 2 5 5 /1 7 4 ; Sir M errik Burrell c o rre sp o n d ­ ence to The Times, L o n d o n , 12 July 1952, p5, col f; J T urner, ‘W h y slaughter m u st go o n ’, News o f the World, L o n d o n , 11 M ay 1952, P R O M A F 2 5 5 /1 7 4 ; ‘F M D ’, Veterinary Record, 16 A ugust 1952, p48 1 ; L ord R othschild, ‘F M D ’, Sunday Times, L o n d o n , 5 O c to b e r 1952. R othschild w rote this article after discussing the m a tte r w ith M A F officials; P R O M A F 12 4 /1 5 6 2 PR O M A F 2 5 0 /1 6 3

17 2

29

30

31

32

33

34

^ M a n u fa c tu re d Plague?

W T h o m a s , ‘Fighting F M D ’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 25 M arch 1952, IA H P irb rig h t A rchive; ‘F M D ’, The Times, 28 M arch 1952, p7, col d; ibid, 9 M ay 1952, p7, col c; ‘“Forceps”; foot a n d m o u th disease and its c o n tro l’, Sport a n d Country, 16 A pril 1952, IA H P irb rig h t A rchive; ‘M in iste r’s s ta te m e n t on slau g h ter policy’, The Times, L o n d o n , 3 M ay 1952, p3, col b; T D ugdale, P a rlia m e n ta ry sp e e ch , ib id , 9 M ay 1 9 5 2 , p 6 , col g; T D u g d a le answ ers P a rlia m e n ta ry Q u e stio n s, Veterinary Record, 17 M ay 195 2 , p 2 9 6 ; ‘F M D research’ and ‘Ban on cattle from channel islands’, D aily Telegraph, June 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive; I Galloway, ‘F M D ’, British A gricultural B ulletin, July 1952, p 67; ‘A R C re p o rt’, The Times, L o n d o n , 28 A ugust 1952, p2, col e ‘F M D p o lic y -c o m p a ris o n s w ith the C o n tin e n t’, The Times, L o ndon, 1 2 M a y 1 952, p 3 , col d; ‘T h e p re sen t F M D p o sitio n : BVA s ta te m e n t’, Veterinary Record, 17 M ay 1952, p295; ‘V accination fails to save E uropean cattle’, Sunday Times, L o n d o n , 29 Ju n e 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive; T D ugdale in Parlia­ m en t, Veterinary Record, 5 July 1952, p40 3 ; F M D Research — Interim Report (1 952), p p l - 2 Evidence draw n from F M D R C C M , 1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 1 , passim ; Lab 2 c o rre sp o n d ­ ence, 1 9 4 0 -1 9 4 2 , box file 8, IA H P irb rig h t Archive; ‘Progress rep o rt, 1944— 1 9 4 5 ’, box file 9, IA H P irb rig h t Archive; F M D R C m eeting, 25 M arch 1946, IA H P irbright Archive; I Galloway, ‘C onsiderations o f som e im p o rta n t aspects o f recent investigations on F M D ’, cited in H S kinner (1 9 8 -, u n p u b lish ed ), section 10; I Galloway, ‘D raft rep o rt for 1 9 3 5 -1 9 5 2 ’, box file 9, IA H P irbright A rchive, pp 14—19; W H en d erso n (1 985), p p l 0 - 2 2 M e ta p h o rs d raw n from The Times a n d D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , M a rc h A ugust 1952, passim ; for strik in g exam ples o f m ilitary m etap h o rs em ployed d u rin g the 1 9 2 2 -1 9 2 4 epidem ics, see co m m e n ts by S tockm an, G erm an and Pretym an, P R O M A F 3 5 /1 6 4 and M A F 3 5 /1 6 5 ; for their use du rin g the 2001 epid em ic, see B N erlich, C H a m ilto n , a n d V Rowe (2001) W W ooldridge correspondence to The Times, L o n d o n , 9 M ay 1952, p 7, col e; Evidence o f j R itchie a n d W T a m e to G ow ers c o m m itte e, P R O M A F 3 8 7 / 2; G ow ers c o m m itte e visit to France a n d Sw itzerland, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 3 ; E vidence o f T D allin g to G ow ers c o m m itte e , P R O M A F 3 8 7 /1 8 ; G ow ers c o m m itte e m eetings, PR O M A F 3 8 7 /2 8 ; D r S im m s c o rrespondence, PR O M A F 387/31 G ow ers c o m m itte e m eetings, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 3

T h e dispute continues 35 36

H S k in n er (1993) F. Ratcliffe, correspondence to D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , M arch 1952, IAH P irbright Archive; ‘Foot a n d m o u th ’, Economist, L ondon, 24 M ay 1952, p506; ‘Foot and m o u th policy u n d e r fire’, D aily Telegraph, L on d o n , Ju n e 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive; ‘R ep o rt from D e n m a rk ’, ibid, 30 June 1952; L ord Iveagh c o rresp o n d en ce to The Times, L o n d o n , 3 July 1952, p7, col e; A M A llen,

Notes

37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44

173

Im m u n ise d cattle’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , O c to b e r 1952, IA H P irb rig h t A rchive; G eorge Villiers, ‘T h e case for inoculation as an aid to the fight against F M D ’, P R O M A F 3 5 /8 6 6 ‘F M D ’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 5 June 1952, IA H P irb rig h t archive F M D Research - Interim Report (1 952). T h e original forew ord to this report, d ra fte d by Lord W o o ito n , sta te d th a t the re p o rt was in te n d e d ‘to provide assurance th a t the w ork is being prosecuted b oth vigorously and on lines likely to lead to results o f practical value.’T h e last phrase was rem oved at the A R C ’s suggestion. P R O CAB 12 4 /1 5 6 2 ‘F M D ’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n 28 A ugust 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive G ow ers c o m m itte e m eetings, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 3 ‘Foot and m o u th policy u n d e r fire’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 12 Ju n e 1952, IA H P irb rig h t Archive G eorge Villiers, ‘T h e case for inocu latio n as an aid to the fight against F M D ’, P R O M A F 3 5 /8 6 6 Evidence o f R H B athurst to G ow ers c o m m ittee, PR O M A F 3 8 7 /1 6 G allow ay correspondence to MAF, 26 Ju n e 1952, P R O M A F 3 5 /8 6 6

T h e Gowers C o m m itte e o f Inquiry 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59

‘F M D ’, The Times, L o n d o n , 2 A ugust 1952, p7, col d PR O M A F 387/1 G ow ers c o m m itte e m eeting, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 PR O M A F 387/1 Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), p p 5 5 -5 6 ; PR O M A F 3 8 7 /7 and M A F 3 8 7 /9 ; G allow ay apparently prevented fu rth e r tests from going ahead. Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), P P 6 -7 Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D , 1952—1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), p p 4 0 - 4 1, a ppendix xv Report o f the D epartm ental Com m ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), p 4 l Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), PP2 1 - 3 5 , 4 1 - 5 7 , 1 3 5 -3 9 PR O M A F 3 8 7 /2 4 G ow ers c o m m itte e m eetings, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 8 PR O M A F 3 8 7 /1 4 and M A F 3 8 7 /1 8 ; Report o f the D epartm ental Com m ittee on F M D , 1952—1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), p35; M M achado (1968); L L om nitz and L M ayer (1994) ibid, p p 2 1—35; G ow ers c o m m itte e m eetings, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /1 8 , M A F 3 8 7 / 28 a n d M A F 3 8 7 /2 4 Report o f the D epartm ental Comm ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), p50 Report o f the D epartm ental C om m ittee on F M D , 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 (1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ), p p 5 2 -5 4 ; G ow er to T h o rn e , 8 M arch 1954, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /3 5

174

60 61 62 63

A M anu fa ctu red Plague?

Tam e m inutes, 17 M arch 1955, PRO M AF 3 5/872 D u n n e tt m inutes, 19 M arch 1955, PRO M AF 35/872 M A FF press release, The Times, L ondon, 29 July 1954, p4, col c ‘T h e D e p a rtm e n ta l C o m m itte e on F o o t-a n d -M o u th D isease’, Veterinary Record, 30 April 1955, p p 3 2 7 -2 8

C

hapter

7

Setting the scene 1 A phrase coined by Prim e M inister H arold M acM illan during the later 1950s. 2 Anon (1965); F. M adden (1984); J Bowers (1985); D Grigg (1987), p p l 8 3 87; P Brassley (2000b); J M artin (2000). To learn how the N F U m anaged to gain such power over agricultural policy, see P Self and H Storing (1963), G Cox, P Lowe and M W inter (1986); M Sm ith (1990). 3 H W Steele-Bodger, ‘Presidential Address’, Veterinary Record, 16 N ovem ber 1940, p p 7 9 5 -9 8 ; Second Report o f the Comm ittee on Veterinary Education in Great Britain (1944), p p 3 -6 ; M em oir, H enry W illiam Steele-Bodger (1952); W W ooldridge (1954); A non (1965), p p 2 1 4 -3 5 ; O bituary: D r W R W ool­ dridge (1966); E M adden (1984); I Pattison (1984), ch 19 and 20; Interviews with M ary Brancker, FRCVS, 4 N ovem ber 2002, and Professor Alisdair StcclcBodger, FRCVS, 27 January 2003. T h e old system whereby veterinary inspect­ ors were attached either to M A F or to the local authorities ended in 1938, w hen a unified, centralized veterinary adm inistration was established. See A H ardy (2003). 4 ‘F M D ’, The Times, L ondon, 28 O cto b er 1967, p3, col d 5 Report o f the Committee o f Inquiry into F M D (1 9 6 8 -1 9 6 9 ), p867

The view from the ground 6 7 8 9 10

11

A n im a l Health Services Report (1967), p 10 ‘Funeral pyres light lifeless landscape’, Daily Telegraph, L ondon, 7 N ovem ber 1967, p i 7, col a G Brooke correspondence to D aily Telegraph, L ondon, 24 N ovem ber 1967, p 13, col a T he epidem ic dealt a second blow to rural pubs. Business had already dropped off when the police force adopted the breathalyser to detect drunken m otorists. T h e above three paragraphs are draw n from the Daily Telegraph, L ondon, and the Chester Chronicle, Chester, N ovem ber-D ecem ber 1967, passim; H H ughes a n d jjo n e s (1969); R W h itlo ck (1969); A n im a l Health Services Report (1968) ‘C ontrols over outbreaks: statutory procedures’, PR O M AF 2 87/497; N ote by T Ivey, 8 February 1968, PRO M AF 287/482

N otes

12 13 14

15 16 17 18

19 20

21

22 23 24 25 26 27

I 75

‘W h at F& M m eans’, Chester Chronicle, Chester, N ovem ber 24, p9; C o rre­ spondence, PR O MAF 287 /5 1 2 C orrespondence w ith M O D , N ovem ber 1967, PR O M AF 394/1 1 C heshire and D evon C o u n ty C o u n cil correspondence, N ovem ber 1967— January 1968, PR O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 4 ; C heshire C o u n ty C ouncil, M em o o f Evidence to the C o m m itte e , M ay 1968, PR O M AF 2 8 7 /5 1 8 ; N F U Press release, 9 August 1968, N F U Evidence to N o rth u m b erlan d Inquiry, PR O MAF 287/519 1st draft: Interim Report o f Working Party, 1968, PR O M AF 287 /4 7 6 ; M em o o f internal w orking party on F M D , 29 M ay 1968, PRO M AF 283/693 R H inks m em o, PR O MAF 287/484 Provision o f inform ation and advice’, PRO M AF 287 /4 8 4 ; M em o, ‘FM D epidem ic, arrangem ents at M inistry H Q ’, PRO M AF 287/511 T h e above two paragraphs are taken from Daily Telegraph, L ondon, and Chester Chronicle, C hester, N ovem ber to D ecem ber 1967, passim ; W Jones corre­ spondence to Jasper M ore, 8 D ecem ber 1967, PRO MAF 287/488; ‘Foot and m o u th disease’, The Times, L ondon, 23 April 1968, p4, col g; Report o f the Committee o f Inquiry into F M D , 1 9 6 8 -1 9 6 9 , pp 1 5 -2 7 , 56 C orrespondence and m em os, PRO M AF 287/484 H ansard [H C ], 27 N o v e m b er 1967, vol 7 5 6 , col 3 4 - 4 2 ; Peak D istric t N ational Park's Statem ent o f Evidence, M ay 1968, PRO M AF 287/518; N F U evidence to the N orth u m b erlan d Inquiry, June 1968, PR O MAF 2 87/519. Ireland had been free o f FM D since 1942, and was keen to rem ain that way as 60 per cent o f its export earnings came from the livestock trade. Blaney went on to launch a ‘Stay in Britain for C h ristm as’ cam paign to persuade Irish m igrant workers against returning hom e. PR O F C O 2 3 /1 8 6 Parliam entary questions, Hansard [H C ], 28 N ovem ber-8 D ecem ber, passim; A griculture debate, ibid, 4 D ecem ber, vol 755, col 9 6 9 -1 0 8 6 ; Chester Chron­ icle, Daily Telegraph and D aily M a il coverage, 28 N o v e m b e r-1 1 Decem ber, passim; ‘Restrictions on the com m unity’, PRO M AF 287/486; F M D ‘T em po­ rary R estrictions' O rd er, 8 D ecem ber 1967, J H ensley (M A FF) letter to K now les (N F U ), 21 D ecem b er 1967, PR O M AF 2 8 7 /4 8 8 ; ‘E m ergency powers - subm ission to m inister’, PRO M A F 394/11 Inquiry into farm epidem ic’, The Times, London, 5 D ecem ber 1967, p6, col d ‘E nd o f the C heshire we knew ?’ Chester Chronicle, C hester, 15 D ecem ber 1967, p i It takes som e nerve to stand this’, Chester Chronicle, C hester, 1 D ecem ber 1967, p i Ernest D ew hurst, ‘Farms’ lesson from the past’, Guardian, L ondon, 6 D ecem ­ ber 1967, p5 R F Laurence, ‘Buried in the country’, Guardian, London, 23 Decem ber 1967, P5 Chester Chronicle, D ecem ber 1967, passim ; ‘Farm s’ lesson from the past’, Guardian, London, 6 D ecem ber 1967, p5; ‘F& M farms get crop grant’, Daily Telegraph, L ondon, 11 D ecem ber 1967, p i ; ‘V aluation and com pensation’, PRO M AF 287/499

176

28 29 30

31 32

A M anu fa ctu red Plague?

‘A savage m em o concerning the Peak D istrict’, PR O M AF 287/488; ‘Tourists’ M ecca now a ghost tow n’, Daily Telegraph, 2 February 1968, p23 E H Bott, ‘H u n tin ’, Shootin’ n’ Fishin”, 4 January 1968, PRO MAF, 287/486 J Hensley to W Tam e, 5 January 1968, PR O M AF 2 87/486; E H B ott to W Tam e, January-F ebruary 1968, PR O M AF 2 87/487; C orrespondence, PRO MAF 287/488. T he N orthum berland C om m ittee o fln q u iry into the epidemic eventually decided that controls should be based upon veterinary, not political, considerations ‘and produce as little disturbance o f norm al com m ercial and public activities as possible’. Sadly, such considerations were n o t taken into account in 2001. Report o f the Committee o f Inquiry into F M D (1 9 6 9 -1 9 7 0 ), p79 Chester Chronicle, Chester, February-M arch 1968, passim O th e r m em bers included N F U Vice-President Lord Plum b; W illiam Weipers, head o f veterinary education at Glasgow University; M r C ripps, recorder o f N ottingham ; Professor D Evans, FRS, professor o f bacteriology and im m u n ­ ology at L ondon S chool o f H ygiene and T ropical M edicinc; Professor D W alker, professor o f econom ics at the University o f Exeter; and Sir Edward T h o m so n , chair o f Allied Breweries. See PRO M AF 287/522.

The vaccination question 33

34 35

36 37

38 39 40

Examples include the Rural D ean o f Bickley’s letter to the Chester Chronicle, Chester, 8 D ecem ber 1967, p9; Edw ard C olem an correspondence to Daily Telegraph, L ondon, 14 N ovem ber 1967, p i 6; G Brooke correspondence, ibid, 24 N ovem ber 1967, p 13, col a; E J R ichm ond correspondence to Economist, L ondon, 25 N ovem ber 1967, p812. See also ‘Vaccine conflict as farm toll rises’, Daily Telegraph, L ondon, 27 N ovem ber, p7; ‘E nd farm slaughter says RSPCA’, ibid, 28 N ovem ber 1967, p i 5; 'E ditorial’, ibid, 29 N ovem ber 1967, p i 6; ‘Life on the farm in C heshire’, Chester Chronicle, Chester, 8 D ecem ber 1967, p9; W alter H um e, ‘It’s tim e to change the policy’, ibid, 5 January 1968, p25 Q u o tatio n s draw n from Hansard [H C ], Daily Telegraph, Daily M ail, Chester Chronicle, 20 N o vem ber-23 D ecem ber 1967, passim ‘Em ergency; this runaw ay plague is p u ttin g our food in peril’, D aily M ail, L ondon, 24 N ovem ber 1967, p6; N o rth u m b erlan d C o m m ittee o f ln q u ir y m inutes, 5 June 1968, PR O M AF 287 /4 9 2 D C hristie, L Reynolds and E T ansey (2003), p52 ‘Farm plague battle is stepped up ’, Daily M ail, L ondon, 27 N ovem ber 1967, p i ; Peart reply to Parliam entary Q uestion, H ansard[H C ], 28 N ovem ber 1967, vol 755, col 70-71 M inister’s Broadcast, PRO M AF 394/11 R eport from Parliam ent’, Guardian, L ondon, 5 D ecem ber 1967, p2; D H Sm ith correspondence, 1 D ecem ber 1967, PRO MAF 287/461 M ary Brancker was the first w om an to hold this post. For m ore details o f her life and w ork, see M Brancker (1972).

Notes

41 42

43 44

45

I77

D C h ristie, L R eynolds and E T ansey (2 0 0 3 ), p9 ‘M in istry has no plans to vaccinate’, G uardian, L o n d o n , 3 D e cem b er 1967, p 14; ‘M em o: To RVO s, D V O s a n d D E O s c o n ce rn ed ’, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /4 6 1 : F M D Area V accination Schem e, D ecem b er 1967, PR O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /1 G A m os, ‘Personal V iews for oral hearing o f the N o rth u m b e rla n d co m m ittee’, 9 A pril 1968, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /5 0 5 /1 C orrespondence, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /4 6 1 , M A F 2 8 7 /4 6 2 , M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /1 ; F. H B ott m inutes, 17 July 1968, Reid m inutes, 24 January 1969, PR O M A F 2 8 7 / 4 7 9 /1 ; T am e m in u tes, 26 S eptem ber 1968, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /5 0 3 C a rn o c h a n m in u te s, 22 July 1968, P R O M A F 2 7 6 /4 7 6 ; N o rth u m b e rla n d C o m m itte e o f In q u iry m inutes, 5 June 1968, PR O M A F 2 8 7 /9 2 ; C o m m itte e o f In quiry m inutes and ‘Paper V II: V accination Policies’, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /5 0 1 ; C o rresp o n d en ce, S eptem ber 1968, M A F 2 8 7 /5 0 3

To im port or not to import? T h e meat question 46

47

48

49

50

C o rre sp o n d e n c e , P R O M A F 8 8 /2 9 5 , 8 8 /2 9 6 , 3 5 /6 9 6 ; ‘F o o t a n d m o u th disease, A rgentina: N F U discussion’, The Times, L o n d o n , 23 Jan u ary 1958, p 5 , col e; ib id , 17 F e b ru a ry 1 9 5 8 , p 14, col c; ‘F o o t a n d m o u th disease, A rgentina: discussed in P a rlia m en t’, ibid, 6 M arch 1958, p l 4 , col g ‘F o o t a n d m o u th disease - p rev en tiv e m easures’, The Times, L o n d o n , 28 Ja n u a ry 1957, p4, col 5. Peron set o u t to restore A rg en tin a to n a tio n a l and in te rn a tio n a l greatness. H e believed th a t develo p ed n a tio n s h a d a vested in te re st in p re v e n tin g A rg e n tin e in d u stria liz a tio n because th ey w a n ted to c o n tin u e e x p o rtin g m a n u fa ctu rin g goods in re tu rn for A rgentine agricultural p ro d u c e. H e tried to challenge this system by tu rn in g his c o u n try in to an in d e p e n d e n t in d u s tria l pow er. H is in te rv e n tio n s d iv e rte d c a p ita l o u t o f agriculture and in to m an u fa ctu rin g a n d b ro u g h t to an end th e political and econom ic hegem ony o f the rural aristocracy. A lthough later regim es attem p ted to encourage agriculture, cattle ranchers rem ained suspicious o f th eir m otives and the industry failed to expand. G W ynia (1978), p 2 4 0 -4 1 ; D Rock (1985), p298 MAF, C Jewell, T D allin g a n d P Ellis, Evidence to the G ow ers c o m m itte e, P R O M A F 3 8 7 /2 , 3 8 7 /4 , 3 8 7 /1 8 and 3 8 7 /2 5 ; R P Burgess, correspondence to The Times, L o n d o n , 25 N o v em b er 1957, p2, col f; ibid, 24 M arch 1958, p2, col f; C Jewell, corresp o n d en ce to th e D aily Telegraph, 14 F ebruary 1958, P R O M A F 3 5 /6 9 6 ; J Ritchie, ‘F M D in South Am erica, ’Journal o fth e M inistry o f Agriculture, vol 66, 1 9 5 9 -1 9 6 0 , p p 3 2 4 -2 7 C o rresp o n d en ce to Jo h n H are, 12 F ebruary 1958, P R O M A F 3 5 /6 9 6 ; L etter from A n th o n y H u rd , 18 M arch 1958 a n d R ep o rt o f Jo h n R itc h ie ’s trip to South A m erica, 4 Ju n e 1959, P R O M A F 2 55/891 R P Burgess, le tte r to The Times, L o n d o n , 25 N o v e m b er 1957, p 2 , col f; Farmer a n d Stockbreeder, 3 O c to b er 1957; For m ore inform ation see L R andall (1 978), p p 2 3 1—34; E M ilenky (1 978), pp 1 1 -1 9 ; C W atson (1 984), p 6 4 —65; D Cavallo and U M u n d la k (1 982), p20; D R ock (1 9 8 5 ), ch 8

178

51

52

53

54

55

56 57

58 59

60 61 62

^ M a n u fa c tu re d Plague?

‘F o o t a n d m o u th disease — P a rlia m e n t q u e s tio n s ,’ The Tim es, L o n d o n , 1 N o v em b er 1957, p 4 , col f; A H D m em o o n A rg en tin e F M D , 9 D e cem b er 1957, P R O M A F 3 5 /6 9 6 ; P arliam entary Q u e stio n s, 26 February 1958 and 5 M arch 1958, PR O CAB 1 2 4 /1 5 6 3 ; Farm ers’ reply, 5 F ebruary 1958, PR O M A F 3 5 /6 9 6 . For details o f a failed 1958 a tte m p t to reduce A rgentine m eat im p o rts, see A W oods (2 002), p p 2 4 3 -4 4 . A n im a l Health Services Report (1960). T h e pork trade was relatively expendable because British pig p ro d u c tio n was boo m in g . It also presented greater dangers th an the b e ef trade because pigs were n o t vaccinated against F M D a n d their m ovem ents were n o t subject to the Bledisloe agreem ent. ‘Livestock: foot and m o u th disease: discussed’, The Times, L o n d o n , 17 N ovem ber 1960, p7, col a; J M a rtin (2000) p p 8 3 , 87. H u rd to H are, 2 F ebruary 1960, P R O M A F 2 5 5 /8 9 1 ; N o te for M inister, 15 N ovem ber 1960, a n d ‘N ew s from A rg e n tin a ,’ P R O M A F 2 5 5 /8 9 1 ; A n im a l H ealth Services Report (1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 5 ), passim . A n o th e r source suggests th a t the A rg en tin e g o v e rn m e n t’s actions were m o tiv ated also by the US g o v e rn m e n t’s 1959 ban u p o n w et salt-cu red m eat from F M D -in fe c te d c o u n tries. See A B eynon, The F M D situation in Argentina (1 9 6 8 ), P R O M A F 2 8 7 /5 2 0 /1 ‘T h e case against S outh A m erica,’ Farmers Weekly, 10 N ovem ber 1967, PR O M A F 2 4 6 /2 8 2 ; ‘F& M m ay cost agricu ltu re m ore the £ 1 2 m ’, G uardian 16 N o v em b er, p5; N a tio n a l C a ttle B reeders A ssociation letter, 20 N o v e m b er 1967, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 4 ; ‘M eat im p o rts ’, D aily Telegraph, 5 D e ce m b er 1967, p i 4; G eneral co rrespondence, N ovem ber 1967, PR O M A F 2 4 6 /2 8 2 See H ansard [H C ], 14 N ovem ber, vol 754, col 2 2 1 -2 2 ; ibid, 20 N ovem ber, col 9 2 9 -3 1 ; ibid, 2 7 N ovem ber, vol 7 5 5 , col 3 8 -4 2 ; ibid 28 N ovem ber, col 70; ibid, 29 N ovem ber, col 9 4 -9 8 D ig g in es to B e ith , 23 N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 7 , C ressw ell to F oreign O ffice , 24 N ovem ber 1967, P R O F C O 7 /1 0 7 0 T h e sovereignty o f these islands was a lo n g -d isp u te d m atter. In 1966, the B ritish go v ern m en t secretly indicated its w illingness to discuss h a n d in g them over to A rg e n tin a . A t th e tim e th a t th e m ea t ban was im p o se d , F oreign Secretary M ichael Stew art was a tte m p tin g to pro d u ce a politically acceptable form ula for this handover. H is plan was eventually frustrated by the islanders, w h o , o n le a rn in g o f th e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t’s in te n tio n s in M a rch 1968, declared th eir furious o p p o sitio n to beco m in g p a rt o f A rg en tin a a n d lobbied the B ritish press a n d P arliam ent for su p p o rt. See G D illo n (1 9 8 9 ), pp 1—3. M em o: C a b in e t m inisterial c o m m itte e, m eetin g 29 N o v em b er 1967, PR O F C O 7 /1 0 7 0 A griculture D ebate, H ansard [H C \ , 4 D ecem b er 1967, vol 755, col 9 9 8 -9 9 ; Sir B urke T rend to PM , 29 N ovem ber 1967, P R O PR E M 1 3 /1 9 3 4 ; C o rre ­ spondence, P R O M A F 2 87/511 ‘M eat im p o rts’, D aily Telegraph, 5 D ecem b er 1967, p 14 ‘A rgentina stop bids at o u r sales’, D aily M a il, 6 D ecem b er 1967, p i 1 C o rre sp o n d e n c e , D e ce m b er 1 9 6 7 -F e b ru a ry 1968, P R O F C O 7 /1 6 8 a n d F C O 7 /1 0 7 0

Notes

63 64 65

66

67 68 69

70

71

72 73 74 75 76 77

179

‘F u rth e r m easures to h elp e x p o rts’, G uardian, 14 D e c e m b e r 1967, p i ; Economist, 16 D ecem ber 1967, p i 117; J T ho m p so n (1970) Cresswell to FO , 20 N ovem ber 1967, PR O F C O 7 /1070; C orrespondence and press cuttings, D ecem ber 1967-F ebruary 1968, PR O F C O 7/168 For evidence o f the leeway granted to A rgentine establishm ents th at was found to have contravened public health regulations, see PR O M AF 2 7 6 /3 0 6 and 276 /2 6 1 . T his laxity led to the im p ortation o f contam inated tins o f corned beef, w hich caused a 1964 outbreak o f typhoid in A berdeen. Four hundred people contracted the disease. The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak o f 1964: Report o f the D epartm ental Comm ittee o f Inquiry (1964) T h e A rgentines had tried sim ilar tactics w ith the US, to considerably lesser effect; unlike Britain, the US was capable o f producing sufficient m eat to feed th e n a tio n . N evertheless, F M D had an im p o rta n t im pact up o n relations betw een the US and Latin A m erican countries. See M M achado (1969). C orrespondence, Jan uary-F ebruary 1968, PRO MAF 287/522 M em os and correspondence, January 1968, PRO MAF 287 /4 6 4 and M AF 287/4 6 5 ; Origin o f the 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 F M D epidemic (1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 ), p p 2 2 7 -3 4 C orrespondence, February 1968, PRO MAF 287 /4 6 5 , MAF 287 /4 6 6 , MAF 2 8 7 /5 2 0 /1 ; N F U correspondence to prim e m inister, 12 February 1968, PRO PREM 13/1934 C orrespondence and press cuttings, D ecem ber 1 9 6 7-F ebruary 1968, PRO F C O 7/1 6 8 and F C O 7 /1070; M Gale correspondence, 22 and 23 February 1968, G allagher to Sugg, 23 M arch 1968, PR O F C O 42/7 8 . For details of A nglo-A rgentine negotiations upon the power plant, see PRO AB 65/500 and AB 6 4 /1 1 0 7 . Post-w ar A rgentine governm ents were extremely supportive o f the nuclear industry, believing that it w ould raise the dom estic prestige o f the governm ent and the international standing o f the nation as a whole. See D Ponem an (1984), p878. C ited in H ansard [H C ], 30 January 1968, vol 757, col 1170. For further discussions, see Hansard [H C ], 30 January 1968, vol 757, col 113 4 -9 0 ; ibid, 15 February, vol 758, col 15 8 5 -9 9 . C orrespondence, February 1968, PRO MAF 287/465 and M AF 287/466 C orrespondence, February 1968, PRO F C O 4 2 /6 8 , F C O 7 /1 6 8 , F C O 7/ 1070, PREM 13/1934, CAB 130/370 ‘Foot and m o u th disease’, The Times, L ondon, 5 M arch 1968, p2, col a; ibid, p6, col b Hansard [H C ], 4 M arch, vol 760, col 4 0 -4 9 ; ibid, 13 M arch, col 1388 -1 5 0 8 O rigin o f the 1 9 6 7 —1 9 6 8 F M D epidem ic (1 9 6 7 —1968), p p 3 9 , 2 2 7 - 3 4 ; C orrespondence and reports, January-F ebruary 1968, PRO M AF 287/467 As C hapter 4 showed, during the 1920s and 1930s M AF had itself discounted the circum stantial link betw een A rgentine m eat im ports and British F M D outbreaks, so one can hardly blam e the A rgentines for using this argum ent to their advantage. See com m ents by A rgentine m eat board and Cronista, PRO F C O 7/1070; La fiebre aftosa en Gran Bretana anos 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 , F C O 7/71; Text o f statem ent circulated in A rgentine press, 12 M arch 1968, PRO M AF 287/520/1

180

78 79 80 81

82

83

84 85

86

^

M anu fa ctu red Plague?

O b itu a ry : W H e n d erso n (2000) ‘V eterinary Public H e a lth ’, h t t p : / / 1 6 5 . 1 5 8 .1 .1 10/english/pro_salute/history 182.pdf, p5 C orrespondence and ‘Report: T h e FM D situation’, PRO M AF 287/520/1 Cresswell to F O , 5 April 1968, PRO M AF 276/396 Gale to D iggines, 29 M arch 1968, PR O F C O 7 /1 6 8 ; J C arn o ch an to W T am e, 5 A ugust 1968, PR O M A F 2 8 7 /5 2 9 ; M Cressw ell, ‘T h e A n g lo A rgentine m eat problem : sum m ary’, PRO MAF 287/520/1 Cronista, 3 April 1968, PRO F C O 7 /1 0 7 0 . Houssay (1 8 8 7 -1 9 7 1 ) was the m ost p ro m in e n t A rg en tin e physiologist o f his g e n era tio n . H e overcam e unfavourable w orking conditions and persecution under Peron to carry o u t research in endocrinology. H e was well regarded in the W est, and in 1947 becam e the first Latin A m erican to receive a N obel Prize in science; M C ueto (1994) ‘N ow Britain gets blam e for farm plague’, D aily Express, L ondon, 22 April 1968, PR O M AF 276/3 9 6 ; British embassy, Buenos Aires to Diggines, 29 April 1968, PRO F C O 7 /1 0 7 0 . T h e H oussay m ission’s findings form ed the basis for a governm ent W h ite Paper, La ftebre aftosa en Gran Bretana anos 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 , published in June 1968. See PRO F C O 7/171. C orrespondence, M ay-July 1968, PR O F C O 7 /1 6 8 and PRO 7 /1 0 7 0 ; La fiebre aftosa en Gran Bretana anos 1 9 6 7 -6 8 , PR O F C O 7/171 C orrespondence, M a rch -M ay 1968, PRO F C O 7/1070; 'T ill the cows come hom e’, Economist, L ondon, 11 M ay 1968, p p 6 7 -7 0 ; C orrespondence, Ju n e July 1968, PRO BT 11/6959; M em o, 18 Septem ber 1968, PRO FC O 7/168; ‘T h e ban th at becam e a boon’, Economist, L ondon, 25 January 1969, p69 C o rre sp o n d en c e M a rch -A p ril 1968, PR O M A F 2 7 6 /3 9 6 ; F O to British embassy, Buenos Aires, Septem ber 1968, ‘A nnouncem ent o f agreem ent’, 10 O ctober 1968, PR O F C O 7/171; ‘T h e ban that becam e a boon’, Economist, L ondon, 25 January 1969, p69

Post-mortem and aftermath 87 88

89

90 91

Mrs W hite to Miss A Hills, 16 May 1968, C arnochan m inutes, 21 May 1968, PRO MAF 2 8 7 /5 0 5 /1 ; M eeting 10 July 1968, PRO MAF 287/520/1 C orrespondence, PRO M A F 2 8 3 /6 9 3 , M AF 2 8 7 /5 0 2 , M AF 2 8 7 /5 0 3 and M AF 287/504. Significantly, the published version o f this paper discussed only slaughter and vaccination and excluded the politically sensitive issue o f m eat im p o rt policy. See A Power and S H arris (1973). W H ughes to MAFF, 22 M arch 1968, PRO BT 11/6921; reports and corre­ spondence, M arch 19 6 8 -M ay 1969, PRO M AF 283/6 9 3 ; correspondence, Septem ber 1968, PRO M AF 2 87/503. ‘Effects on British trade w ith South Am erica under alternative m eat im ports schem e’, N ovem ber 1968, PR O BT 11/6921 R eport o f the C o m m itte e o f ln q u ir y in to F M D (N o rth u m b e rla n d C o m ­ m ittee), Part I (1 9 6 8 -6 9 ), p93

Notes

92 93

94

95

96

97 98 99

181

A rgentine em bassy and F O , N ovem ber 1968, PR O F C O 7 /1 0 5 0 ; C o rrep o n d ence, M a rc h -A p ril 1969, P R O F C O 7 /1 0 9 4 C o rre sp o n d e n c e M a rc h -A p ril 1969, P R O M A F 2 7 6 /4 0 3 ; H u g h e s g ro u p re p o rt, 1 A pril 1969, P R O F C O 6 7 /7 1 ; D Evans m in u tes, 28 A pril 1969, PR O M A F 2 7 6 /4 0 3 ; Stew art to British embassy, B uenos Aires, 28 A pril 1969, E ID m em o, A rg e n tin a and the U K b e ef trad e’, 30 A pril 1969, Secretary o f State to Richard N o rth , MP, 7 M ay 1969, PR O F C O 7 /1 0 9 4 ; D iscussions on m eat im p o rt tariff, A p ril—July 196 9 , P R O F C O 7 /1 0 5 0 ; M eat D iv isio n response to B oard o f T rade rep o rt, N ovem ber 1968, P R O BT 11/6921 Like its predecessor, the N o rth u m b e rla n d C o m m itte e o f In q u iry conclu d ed th a t the ‘th eo retical’ risk o f vaccinated anim als b ecom ing disease carriers had been exaggerated, and drew exam ples from E urope to show th a t vaccines were capable o f c o n tro llin g F M D . Report o f the C om m ittee o f Inquiry into F M D (1 9 6 8 -1 9 6 9 ), p p 6 4 -1 0 0 H u g h e s g ro u p re p o rt, 2 A pril 196 9 , P R O M A F 2 7 6 /4 0 3 ; C a rn o c h a n to Treasury, 23 April 1969, C a b in e t M inisterial C o m m itte e on E conom ic Policy, 28 A pril 1969, PR O M A F 2 7 6 /4 0 3 ; H G B u tto n m in u te s, 25 A pril 1969, R ep o rt on m eeting at Treasury, 1 M ay 1969, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /1 C a rn o ch a n m inutes, 15 S eptem ber 1969, PR O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /1 . T h e follow ­ ing d o c u m e n ts also provide evidence o f declining enthusiasm for vaccination: R e p o rt by officials’ w o rk in g party, 1 A pril 1968, F C O 6 7 /7 1 ; th e N o r th ­ u m b erlan d C o m m itte e rep o rt, com m ercial policy im plications, 2 A pril 1969, M A F 2 7 6 /4 0 3 ; D raft Parliam entary sta te m en t, 1 M ay 1969, PR E M 13/248 Reid to C a rn o ch a n , 3 O c to b e r 1969, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /1 ‘F M D - ring vaccination co n tin g en cy plan, O c to b e r 1969’, P R O M A F 2 8 7 / 4 7 9 /2 . T h e above tw o paragraphs are draw n from correspondence a n d m em os, P R O M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /1 a n d M A F 2 8 7 /4 7 9 /2 ; D C hristie, L R eynolds and E T ansey

(2 003), p p 6 7 - 6 8 100 T h e m o tiv a tin g force b e h in d the ban was the French farm m inister, Jacques C hirac. Peart, w ho had regained his post as British m inister o f agriculture, was extrem ely re lu c ta n t to s u p p o rt the proposal, b u t agreed to d o so p roviding British b e ef farm ers received ad ditional E E C subsidies. Economist, L ondon, 27 A pril 1974, p l 0 6 ; ibid, 18 M ay 1974, p i 13; ibid, 6 July 1974, p63; ibid, 5 O c to b e r 1974, p 93; ibid, 28 D e cem b er 1974, p 55; E M ilenky (1 978), p p 3 1 , 137, 146

C

hapter

8

Fighting F M D , 1 9 6 8 - 2 0 0 0 1

P R O M A F 3 5 /7 6 5 , M A F 3 5 /8 6 8 , M A F 3 5 /8 6 9 , M A F 2 5 2 /4 8 , M A F 2 5 2 /4 9 9 . T h e O IE was established by the French in 1924 in response to the renew ed th reat o f cattle plague, w hich had appeared in Belgium in 1920. It was charged

182

2 3

4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

20 21

^ M anu fa ctu red Plague?

with collecting and notifying governm ents o f the facts pertaining to contagious anim al diseases that called for international control efforts. It was also to carry o u t research into these diseases and to advise and assist governm ents in their execution o f international agreements concerning veterinary police powers. See A n n u a l Report o f Proceedings under the Diseases o f Anim als Acts (1928), p4; ‘A short history o f the O IE ’, w w w .oie.int/eng/O IE /en_histoire.htm . T h e A ngloFrench controversy over th e fo rm atio n o f the E U F M D reflected and was influenced by the concurrent international political debates over the form ation o f the European Econom ic C om m unity. See A W oods (2002), ch 7. Report o f E U F M D (1969 and 1970) France and Belgium adopted annual mass vaccination in 1962; W est G erm any - where controls were previously left to individual states - adopted it in 1965; Luxem bourg and Switzerland adopted it in 1966; Italy adopted it in 1968 and Spain in 1969. A non (1978), p 195 A M orrow, N Hyslop and L Buckley (1966), pp 192—95; F Brown (2003), PP3~4 Rees (undated), unpublished, table 3 A non (1978), p l9 5 Rees (undated), unpublished ‘Foot and m o u th disease, U N Food and A griculture O rganization m eeting plans’, The Times, London, 17 July 1962, plO , col e; ‘Foot and m outh disease: African type virus: spread reported’, ibid, 18 O cto b er 1962, plO , col d; ‘Foot and m o u th disease, European spread checked by mass vaccination’ ibid, 19 M arch 1963, p9, col b; Anon (1978), p p l 9 6 -9 7 Report o f the E U F M D (1977), appendix 7 Report o f the E U F M D (1970); Report o f the E U F M D (1979) E EC In tra-C o m m u n ity Regulations, PR O MAF 287/490 M AFF com m unication to N orthum berland C om m ittee o flnquiry, 12 August 1968, PRO M AF 287 /4 9 0 Rees (undated), unpublished Report o f the E U F M D (1981), p9 and appendix B6; Report o f the F.UFMD (1983) Report from the Commission on the control o f F M D (1989); Rees (undated) unpublished; G Davies (1993), p p l 1 0 9 -1 0 ; Y Leforban (1999), pp 1755—56; I A nderson (2002) Rees (undated), unpublished ; ‘O IE official “disease-free” status’, www.oie.int/ eng/in fo /en _ statu t.h tm ; T h e Royal Society (2002), p p 3 9 -4 2 O bituary: W H enderson (2001) ‘V eterinary Public H e alth ’, h t t p : / / 1 6 5 .1 5 8 .1 .1 1 0 /en g lish /p ro _ salu te/h isto ry l 82.pdf, p5 F Brown (19 8 6 ), p220; P K itching (1998), p p 9 9 -1 0 0 ; P S utm oller et al (2003), p p l2 7 - 3 0 ; ‘Veterinary Public H ealth’ h ttp ://1 6 5 .1 5 8 .1 .1 10/english/ p ro _salute/history 182.pdf, p p 6 -7 ; ‘PA H O Epidem iological B ulletin, June 1998’, w w w .p a h o .org/english/sha/epibul_95-98/E B _vl9n2.pdf, p p l 4 -1 6 P K itching (1998), p p 9 0 -9 8 Y Leforban, (1999), p p l7 5 8 -5 9

Notes

183

22

E uropean C om m ission Strategy fo r Emergency Vaccination against Foot a n d

23 24

M o u th Disease (1999) J Ryan (2 001), p p 3 -4 1 A nderson (2 002), p p 3 4 -3 6 , 42

Epidem ic, 2001 25 26

27 28 29

30 31

32 33 34

35

36

37

Origin o f the U K F M D epidemic in 2 0 0 1 (2 002), p i 2 ‘M in istry “failed to heed advice on pigsw ill”’, The Times, L o n d o n , 25 M ay 2 0 0 1 , p7; ‘Farm er kept q u iet ab o u t disease’, B B C News, 30 M ay 200 2 ; Origin o f the U K F M D epidemic in 2 0 0 1 (2 002); I A nderson (2 002), p p 4 5 -4 9 A n d e rso n (2 0 0 2 ), p p 4 9 - 5 1 , 5 8 -6 1 ; ‘Q u ic k e r response w o u ld have halved F M D cull’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 16 July 2002 Origin o f the U K F M D epidemic in 2 0 0 1 (2 0 0 2 ), p p 8 -1 0 D u rin g th e la te r 2 0 th c e n tu ry , th e F M D R esearch In s titu te a t P irb rig h t extended its range o f activities a n d began investigations in to o th e r infectious diseases o f farm a nim als. It was later a b so rb ed in to th e th ree -site A nim al H ealth In stitu te. T h is a n d the preceding tw o paragraphs are draw n from I A nderson (2002), p p 6 6 -8 0 A R ichardson (2001); Brigadier’s battle w ith N o 10 over the F M D cull’, Daily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 18 F ebruary 200 2 ; I A nderson (2 002), p p 2 6 -2 8 , 7 8 -8 2 , 8 8 - 9 6 , 1 0 1 -1 0 2 1 A nderson (2 002), p p l 1 5 -1 9 ‘10 m illion anim als w ere slaughtered in F M D cull’, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 18 F ebruary 2002 ‘G reen allies d e m a n d vaccination o p tio n ’, G uardian, L o n d o n , 12 A pril 200 1 , p6; 'N F U “ig n o rin g ” sm all farm ers’, ibid, 19 A pril 2 0 0 1 , p8; ‘Vets in open revolt on “needless slaughter”, The Times, L o n d o n , 19 A pril 2 0 0 1 , p i ; R oger W indsor, address to RCVS C ouncil, 6 June 2 0 0 1 w w w .w arm w ell.com /w indsor ju n e l8 .h tm ; ‘Lessons from an ep id em ic’, N ature, 28 Ju n e 2 0 0 1 , p 9 7 7 ; RG E ddy co rre sp o n d e n c e, N ature, 2 A ugust 2 0 0 1 , p 4 7 7 ; Vets for V accination m e e tin g w ith R oyal Society, Ja n u a ry 2 0 0 2 , w w w .s m a llh o ld e rs.o rg /F M D / nfm g v fv rs2 3 0 1 0 2 .rtf ‘A nim al cull “based o n incorrect assu m p tio n ”, D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 19 F ebruary 2 0 0 2 ; D r Paul K itching, interview w ith C h a n n el 4 new s, 21 A pril 2 0 0 1 , w w w .fa rm ta lk in g .c o m /n e w s-c h 4 -k itc h in g .h tm ; V arious, ‘T h e Small W o rld o f P rofessor K rebs a n d Professor A n d e rso n ’, w w w .w arm w ell.co m / a n d erso n g ro u p .h tm l For a selection o f a rg u m en ts against M A FF policy, see H o u se o f C o m m o n s Research Paper 0 1/35 (2001); ‘F M D cure “was worse th an disease”, Guardian, L o n d o n , 1 O c to b e r 2001. B M epham (2001); N M orris, ‘T h e reality o f the pre-em ptive cull in U K 2001 F M D ep id e m ic ’, w w w .w a rm w e lI.c o m /ju ly lln ic o lam o rriscu ll.h tm ; ‘Farm ers rebel as M A FF ad m its cull b lu n d ers’, Sunday Times, L o n d o n , 22 A pril 2 0 0 1 ,

]

38 39 40 41

42 43 44

45 46

47

48 49 50 51

A M a n u fa c tu re d Plague?

p 28; ‘T h ird o f all “positive” cases are w ro n g ’, G uardian , L o n d o n , 11 M ay 2 0 0 1 , plO ; G T h o m as-E v erard , ‘Briefing note to tem p o rary c o m m itte e on F M D ’, w w w .w arm w e ll.co m /ap l5 e v era rd .h tm l P M id m o re, ‘E co n o m ic A rg u m en ts against an extended cull’, w w w .efrc.com / fm d /fm d te x t/fm d e c o n .p d f F M D L essons L earn ed In q u iry , m e e tin g w ith N a tio n a l F o o t a n d M o u th G ro u p , w w w .w arm w ell.co m /ju ly 4 n fm g ll.h tm ; P S utm oller et al (2003) T alk o f v accination’, The Times, L o n d o n , 19 A pril 2 0 0 1 , p 19; ‘P ropaganda w ar over vaccination c o n tin u e s’, ibid, 21 A pril 2 0 0 1 , p l 4 ‘Farm ers oppose expected U -tu rn on vaccination’, The Times, L ondon 17 April 2 0 0 1 , p8; ‘Farm ers will n o t back vaccination proposal’, ibid, 18 A pril 200 1 , p6; A Kaletsky, ‘W h a t is so special a b o u t the farm ers?’, ibid, 19 A pril 200 1 , p 18 See the various c o n trib u tio n s to w w w .w arm w ell.com ; L Purves, ‘T h is sicken­ ing sham bles m u st be sto p p e d no w ’, The Times, L o n d o n , 17 April 2 0 0 1 , p l 6 See The Times, Telegraph, Independent a n d G uardian, F e b ru a ry -Ju n e 200 1 , passim . J Freedland, ‘A catalogue o f failures that discredits the w hole system’, Guardian, L o n d o n , 16 M ay 2 0 0 1 , p 22; ‘W asted n a tio n : th e tru th a b o u t F M D ’, The Times, L o n d o n , section 2, 24 M ay 2 0 0 1 , p p 2 - 8 ; articles by N ick G reen on w w w .w arm w ell.com ‘Farm ers deny F M D illegalities’, B B C News, 10 April 2001; ‘F M D ’, The Times, L o n d o n , 12 April 2 0 0 1 , p 25; I A nderson (2 002), p p l 4 8 -5 1 ‘Slaughter policy to be relaxed’, B B C News, 26 April 2001; I A nderson (2002), p i 46; S Je n k in s, ‘You m u st vaccinatc or be d a m n e d , M r G ill’, The Times, L o n d o n , 1 A ugust 2 0 0 1 , p 14 ‘D rastic cull is o nly cure’, The Times, L o n d o n , 13 A pril 2 0 0 1 , p i 2; A Kirby, ‘Foot a n d m o u th : a p yrrhic victory?’ B B C News, 3 M ay 2 0 0 1 ; P K itching, ‘S ubm ission to the tem p o rary c o m m itte e on F M D ’, http ://w w w .w arm w ell. c o m /ju ly 2 0 k itch .h tm l ‘N ew green m in istry faces tests’, B S C N ew s, 1 1 Ju n e 2001 DF.FRA (2 001), ‘H istogram o f C o n firm e d Cases’, w w w .defra.gov.uk/footand m o u th /c ases/h isto g ram .h tm ‘Foot a n d m o u th : Blair backs o u t o f p u b lic in q u iry ’, Guardian, L o n d o n , 20 July 2001 ‘R u lin g against p u b lic in q u iry “was flaw ed’” , D aily Telegraph, L o n d o n , 19 F e b ru a ry 2 0 0 2 ; ‘W h ite h a ll n erv o u s as calls for in q u iry grow ’, G uardian, L o n d o n , 19 F ebruary 200 2 ; ‘2 5 0 ,0 0 0 in call for F M D in q u iry ’, D aily Tele­ graph, L o n d o n , 6 M arch 2002; ‘Farm ers lose bid for foot a n d m o u th inquiry', Guardian, L o n d o n , 15 M arch 2002

Notes

C

185

o n c l u sio n

1 W oods (2004a) 2 I A nderson (2002); T h e RoyalSociety (2002); European Parliam ent (2002) 3 A Blake, M Sinclair, G Sugiarto,‘Q uantifying the im pact o f FM D onT ourism and the U K econom y’, w w w .nottin g h am .ac.u k /-lizn g /ttri/P d f/F M D -p ap er4 . PD F 4 N ational A udit Office (2002), p2 5 1 A nderson (2002), p 138 6 I A nderson (2 0 0 2 ), p p 6 -1 9 ; T h e Royal Society (2 0 0 2 ), p pvii-xiv, ch 8; E uropean Parliam ent (2002), pp3, 9—11 7 1 A nderson (2002), p6 8 1 A nderson (2002), p i 3 9 T h e Royal Society (2002), pviii 10 D E FR A (2003), Foot a n d M outh Disease Contingency P lan, www.defra.gov. u k /footandm outh/contingency/con tp lan .p d f 11 N ational Foot and M outh G roup (2003), ‘Response to D EFRA ’s contingency plan’, w w w .w arm w ell.com /nfm gresponseconting.htm l 12 D C am pbell and R Lee (2003), p383

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Public Records Office (National Archives) Records o f the UK A tom ic Energy A uthority Board ofT rade C abinet Office D evelopm ent C om m ission M inistry o f Defence Foreign and C om m onw ealth Office M edical Research C ouncil M inistry o f A griculture

Prim e M inister’s Office Treasury W ar Office

AB, scries 64, 65 BT 11 CAB 27, 124, 130 D 4 D E F E 10 FC O 7, 23, 42, 67 F D 1/1346, 1/4364, 1/5048 MAF 33, 35, 85, 88, 117, 124, 246, 250, 252, 255, 276, 283, 287, 387, 394 PREM 13 T 161 W O 195, 208, 291

Cheshire Records Office C heshire Farm ers’ U nion m inutes, 1 9 2 3 -1 9 2 4 C heshire C o u n ty C ouncil Diseases o f Anim als C om m ittee m inutes, 1923 -1 9 2 4

Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright M inutes o f F M D Research C om m ittee M eetings (F M D R C C M ), 1 9 2 4 -1 9 5 2 FM D Research C om m ittee Papers, (F M D R C C P ), 1 9 2 4 -1 9 5 2 C orrespondence and unpublished reports relating to FM D research, 1 9 2 4 -1 9 5 3 C ollection o f new spaper clippings from 1 9 5 1 -1 9 5 2 FM D epidem ic H Skinner (1 9 8 -), ‘T h e British con trib u tio n to research on F M D prior to 1950’, in ten sections

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BBC News (w w w .new s.bbc.co.uk) British M edical Journal Cheshire O bserver Cheshire C hronicle Crewe C hronicle Daily Mail Econom ist G uardian (w w w .guardian.co.uk/footandm outh) Journal o f the B oard/M inistry o f Agriculture Lancet

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Report o f the ARC, 1 9 5 6 -5 7 , PP 1 9 5 7 -5 8 , C m d 432, vii, p l6 5 Reports o f the 3 r d - 2 4 th Sessions ofth e European Commission fo r the Control o fF M D (FAO, Rom e, 195 6 -1 9 8 1 ) The Aberdeen Typhoid Outbreak o f 1964: Report o f the D epartm ental Committee o f Inquiry { H U S O , 1964) La ftebre aftosa en Gran Bretana, anos 1 9 6 7 -6 8 (Buenos Aires, 1968) Origin o f the 1967—68 Foot-and-Mouth Disease Epidemic, PP 1 9 6 7 -6 8 , C m cl 3560, xxxix, p227 Report o f the Comm ittee o f Inquiry into F M D (N orthum berland Committee), Part O ne, PP 1 9 6 8 -6 9 , C m d 3999, xxx, p867 Report o f the Comm ittee o f Inquiry into F M D (N orthum berland Committee), Part Two, PP 1 9 6 9 -7 0 , C m d 42 2 5 , v, p i 57 Report from the Commission to the Council on a Study Carried out by the Commission on Policies Currently Applied by M em ber States in the Control o f F M D (C om m is­ sion o f the European C om m unities, Brussels, 1989) European Commission Strategy fo r Emergency Vaccination against Foot a n d M outh Disease —Report o f the Scientific Committee on A n im a l Health a n d A n im a l Welfare (1999), w w w .europa.eu.int/com m /food/fs/sc/scah/out22_en.htm l Origin o f the U K F M D Epidemic in 2001 (H M S O , L ondon, 2002) N ational A udit O ffice, Report upon the 2001 F M D Outbreak (L ondon, H M S O , 2002) I A nderson, F M D 2001: Lessons to be Learned E nquiry Report (L ondon, H M S O , 2002 ) T h e Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock (Royal Society, L ondon, 2002) E uropean Parliam ent, Report on Measures to Control F M D in the European Union in 2001 (2002), w w w 2.europarl.eu.int/om k/sipade2?L = E N & O B JID = 9904& L E V E L = 3& M O D E = S IP & N A V + X & L S T D O C + N D E FR A , Foot a n d M o u th Disease Contingency Plan (20 0 3 ), w w w .defra.gov.uk/ footandm ou th /co n tin g en cy /co n tp lan .p d f

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Ind ex

1801 A ct o f U n io n 20 A dam i, Sir G eorge 7 7 -7 8 a d u lte ra tio n o f food 7 A gricultural Research C o u n cil (ARC) 82 agriculture see farm ing alleviation o f sy m p to m s 3 8 -3 9 A n g lo -A rg e n tin e m eat trade xv, 5 1 67, 110, 1 1 9 -1 3 0 A n g lo -Irish T reaty 2 7 -2 8 A nim al Diseases Research A ssociation 81 A nim al H ealth Bill, 2001 150 an im al h u sb a n d ry 4 A nim als (L anding from Ireland) O rd e r 26 anthrax-filled cattle cakes 86 anti-livestock w eapons 86 A R C see A gricultural Research C ouncil A rgentina xv, 51—67, 1 10, 119—126 A rkw right, Joseph 7 2 -7 3 arm y 1 3 9 -1 4 0 artificial feeds 4 a ttitu d e s see opin io n s; perceptions a u to n o m y 78, 81 aw areness raising 17 bacteriology 6 8 -6 9 Beattie, Professor 7 5 - 7 6 , 81 b eef 125 bilateral co n tro l agreem ents 1 3 2 -1 3 7 biological w eapons 8 4 - 8 6 , 8 7 - 9 1 , 90, 97 Bledisloe agreem ent 63, 65, 119, 126, 148

b oiling o f pigswill 58, 59, 87, 138 b one feed 64, 65 b one m arrow 58, 59 boneless m eat trade 124, 125, 1 2 6 -1 2 7 breeders 12, 14, 22, 24, 33, 95 burial 112 C a b o t, D aniel 8 4 -8 5 C an ad a 56, 88 C attle Diseases Prevention Bill 9 cattle plague see rin d erp est centralization 149 C h a m b e r o f A griculture 38 c h ara cte r-b u ild in g policies 100 C heales abattoir, Essex 137 cheese p ro d u c tio n 36 C heshire 34, 3 6 - 5 0 C h ester C h ro n icle 111, 113 chilled m eat trade 5 1 - 5 3 , 55, 57, 66, 125 C old W ar 8 7 -9 1 com m ittees in q u iry 4 8 - 4 9 , 53, 1 0 4 -1 0 7 , 116, 145, 1 4 8 -1 4 9 research 7 9 - 8 0 , 81 c o m m u n itie s 18, 50, 141 com pensation deliberate infection 1 4 4 -1 4 5 isolation 43, 4 7 -4 8 slaughter costs 3 3 , 34, 35, 93, 109, 115, 149 co m pliance 59, 65 c o m p u lso ry vaccination 120 c o m p u te r m odels 139, 141

2 0 2

^ M a n u fa c tu re d Plague?

conflicts 2001 e pidem ic 1 4 0 -1 4 2 d o ctors and vets 73, 7 4 -8 1 historical c ontext xv m eat im p o rt ban 123 o p in io n s 11, 1 2 -1 3 , 2 8 -2 9 origin o f disease 21 co n su m er interests 5 5 -5 6 con tag io n 3 - 4 , 1 1 ,1 5 1869 C o n tag io u s Diseases o f A nim als Bill 12 co n tig u o u s locations 7 3 , 99, 1 3 9 -1 4 0 , 141, 144 co n tin g en cy plans 128, 134, 136, 137, 148, 150-151 co n tro l approaches 19th c en tu ry 8 - 9 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 epidem ic 109, 1 1 1 -1 1 2 A rg en tin a 55, 60, 1 1 9 -1 2 0 , 123 cen tralization 149 controversies 3 3 - 3 5 , 37 costs 32, 1 2 6 -1 2 7 defence o f xiv—xv E U F M D 9 0 -9 1 E urope a n d B ritain co n tra st 73 inspections 16 intensification o f 147 perceptions 62 research c o n tra st 72 responsibilities 49 vaccinations 90, 9 2 -1 0 7 cordon sanitaire 132 cost-benefit analysis 1 2 6 -1 2 7 , 128, 1 3 3 -1 3 4 costs 1 7 ,2 1 ,3 2 , 98, 103, 116, 1 2 6 -1 2 7 see also co m p en satio n ; suffering c o u n try borders see contiguous locations cow leeches 1 C ro fto n , D r W illiam 9 5 -9 6 culling see slaughter policy cures 3 8 -3 9 dairy cattle 2, 4, 17, 36, 1 0 8 -1 0 9 D alling, T h o m a s 9 0 - 9 1 , 105

dead foreign anim als 17 dealers 31 D E F R A see D e p a rtm e n t o f the E n v iro n m e n t, Food a n d R ural Affairs D e p a rtm e n t o f the E n v iro n m e n t, Food and R ural Affairs (D E FR A ) 145, 149, 150 diagnosis 13, 2 8 - 3 0 , 37, 38, 142 d isciplining policies 1 0 0 -1 0 1 1892 Diseases o f A nim als A ct 19 d isinfection 36, 37, 111, 112 do cto rs 4 4 - 4 5 ,7 4 - 8 1 see also m edicine dom estic trade regulations 6 2 -6 3 D one, John 4 6 -4 7 D r Shaw ’s rem edy 39 du al-p u rp o se cows 36 D u n n e tt, G R 106 E aster U prising 27 econom ic aspects 9 3 -9 4 , 108, 122 ed u catio n 109 E E C see E uropean E conom ic C o m m u n ity em bargoes A rg e n tin a 52, 121, 123, 130 E uropean a n d S outh A m erican c o n tra st 5 4 -5 5 Ireland 21, 2 3 - 2 7 , 28, 31 USA 61 see also exports; im p o rts; trade emergency measures 1 2 8 -1 2 9 , 134, 136 endem ic infection e lim in atio n o f 132, 133 E urope 7 3 , 8 2 , 8 5 , 9 9 S outh A m erica 62, 135 e n fo rcem en t 5, 34, 4 6 , 129 epidem iologists 139, 141 epizootic 2 E U F M D see E uropean C om m ission for the C o n tro l o f F oot and M o u th Disease E urope disease incidence 85, 94, 99, 131 -1 3 2 im p o rt policies 1 3 2 -1 3 3

In d e x

inq u iry 149 research 7 0 - 7 4 , 82 slaughter 99 trade 5 4 -5 5 , 5 8 -5 9 E uropean C o m m issio n for the C o n tro l o f Foot and M o u th Disease (E U F M D ) 9 0 -9 1 , 1 3 1 -1 3 2 , 134, 148 E uropean E conom ic C o m m u n ity (E E C ) 130, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 exports 1 8 -1 9 , 33 see also em bargoes; im p o rts; trade extended cull policy 147, 150 Falkland Islands 121, 123 farm ers involvem ent 4 5 - 4 6 , 50 perspectives xiii, 3, 59 suffering 3 9 - 4 0 , 44, 1 1 0 -1 1 1 , 114, 143 vaccinations 140 farm ing 3, 1 5 ,5 6 - 5 7 , 1 0 8 -1 0 9 , 113, 1 3 6 -1 3 7 fat stocks 23, 26, 52, 112 fear xiii, xiv, 16, 17, 63, 146 feed artificial 4 experim ents 6 3 -6 5 pigswill 5 3 -5 4 , 5 8 -5 9 , 6 0 , 65, 87, 138 filterable viruses 28, 71 firebreak culls 139, 150 fires see pyres Fletcher, W alter M orley 7 6 - 7 7 food a d u lte ra tio n 7 France 131, 133 free trade 5, 66 freedom from disease see n ational F M D freedom Frenkel m eth o d 132 frigoricios 5 1 -5 2 funding biological w arfare 89, 90 research 7 0 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 7 , 109 vaccinations 96 veterinary 109

2 0 3

Galloway, D r Ian 103 G am gee, Jo h n 6 - 1 0 , 12 germ th eo ry o f disease 15, 6 8 - 6 9 germ w arfare 8 4 -8 6 , 8 7 -9 1 , 90, 97 G e rm an , H e n ry 3 7 - 3 8 , 41 G e rm an y 85, 133 G lad sto n e, W illiam 20 governm ents 5 5 -5 7 , 1 4 2 -1 4 3 G ow ers C o m m itte e o f In q u iry 1 0 4 -1 0 7 guidelines 134 guinea pigs 63, 64 G uinness, R u p e rt 92 G uinness, W alter 54, 55, 5 8 -6 0 health 3, 5, 8, 122 herd size 36 highly b red pedigree cattle 2, 3, 9, 33, 3 8 ,5 1 H M S D ahlia 7 2 - 7 3 H ughes group 1 2 7 -1 2 8 ignorance xiv, 101, 144 im m u n ity 64, 7 1 , 83, 98, 102 im m u n iza tio n 73, 84, 132 see also in o cu latio n ; serum ; vaccination im perial preferences 6 0 -6 1 im ports agricultural decline 5 6 -5 7 A rgentina 51—52 controversies 1 1 9 -1 2 6 E urope 1 3 2 -1 3 3 foreign grain 15 illegal 136, 138 infection 4, 11, 1 2 -1 3 , 16, 17, 6 5 -6 6 Ireland 22 legislation 6 restrictions 6, 18, 29, 148 vaccinations 1 1 8-1 19, 134 see also em bargoes; exports; trade incidence o f disease xvi in co m p eten ce 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 2 , 4 8 , 49 in d e p e n d e n t inq u iry see com m ittees, inquiry

204

^ M a n u fa c tu re d P lague?

in d e p e n d e n t research 99 In d ia 72 in d irect costs 103 in d u strial revolution 4, 56 infection areas 16, 1 8 ,3 3 ,3 6 , 112, 1 1 5 -1 1 6 , 1 3 9 -1 4 0 costs 17 deliberate 1 4 4 -1 4 5 im p o rts 11, 1 2 -1 3 m eat 53, 5 8 ,6 5 - 6 6 , 7 6 ,8 7 natu ral 99 in fo rm a tio n centres 112 in o cu latio n 6, 28, 64 see also im m u n iza tio n ; serum ; vaccination inquiries see com m ittees, in q u iry inspections 7 - 8 , 16, 23, 3 3 - 3 4 , 34, 63 insurance 115 intensive farm ing practices 108, 113, 1 3 6 -1 3 7 in te rn atio n al aspects 51—53, 131, 134, 1 3 6 -1 3 7 , 137 in te rn e t 143 Ireland xv, 2 0 - 3 1 , 1 13, 133 Iron C u rta in 132 isolation 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 epidem ic 111 C heshire 41 Ireland 21 partial 4 7 -4 8 slaughter c o n tra st 33, 35, 4 3 - 4 4 voting 4 5 - 4 6 , 47 see also q u a ran tin e Iveagh, second Earl o f G uinness, R upert Jo in t C o m m itte e on S tom atitis 30 ju m p in g 112 K elland, Jo h n 64, 83 K elland, P J 4 6 - 4 7 laboratory-based e n q u iry 7 0 -8 1 , 9 9 -1 0 0 lam b m eat 123, 124

landow ners 1 4 -1 5 lay sta ff 1, 34, 111 legality o f slaughter 144, 150 legislation ad u lte ra tio n o f food 7 A rgentina 52 e n fo rcem en t 5, 34, 46, 129 fo rm u la tio n 16 livestock dealers 31 o p p o sitio n to 9 -1 0 public health 5 research 8 2 -8 3 rinderpest 1 1 -1 2 sheep-pox 5 -6 su p p o rt 17 see also political aspects L eishm an, L ieu ten an t-G en eral Sir W illiam 79, 80 leisure p ursuits 110, 113, 141, 143 Lessons L earned re p o rt 148, 1 4 9 -1 5 0 lib ertarian ist views 101 local au th o ritie s 16, 19, 26, 3 4 , 49 Loeffler, Friederich 71 low in p u t-lo w o u tp u t system s 36 M cFadyean, Jo h n 6 9 - 7 0 , 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 0 -8 1 M A F see M in istry o f A griculture and Fisheries M A FF see M in istry o f A griculture and Fisheries a n d Food m edia coverage in fo rm a tio n 112 M A F p ro p ag an d a 102, 103 Phoenix the calf 145 post-epidem ics xiii, 106, 1 4 3 -1 4 4 research 75 slaughter 94, 116, 141 vaccinations 95 see also natio n al press m edicine 6 8 -7 0 see also doctors M in istry o f A griculture and Fisheries (M A F) censoring o f in fo rm a tio n 66 C heshire 36, 3 7 , 3 9 - 4 0

In d e x

G ow ers C o m m itte e o f In quiry 1 0 4 -1 0 7 in co m p eten ce 4 8 , 49 vaccinations 9 6 -1 0 1 veterinary research 7 0 - 8 2 M in istry o f A griculture and Fisheries and Food (M A FF) censoring o f in fo rm a tio n 1 2 0 -1 2 1 co n tin g en cy plans 137 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 epidem ic 109 1 9 6 7 -1 9 6 8 epidem ic 109 2001 epidem ic 1 3 8 -1 4 5 leisure p ursuits 113 vaccinations 117—118, 1 2 8 -1 2 9 M in istry o f D efence (M O D ) 88—90, 98 m ixed farm ing system s 3, 15 M O D see M in istry o f D efence m o rb id poisons 3 m o u th lesions 29, 30 m o u th e d see oral exam inations m ovem ent o f livestock infected areas 18, 33, 36, 1 12, 138 in tern atio n al 136 legislation 6 livelihoods 143 perspectives xiii restocking 115 rin d erp est 11 see also transm ission o f infection n ational differences 73, 99 N atio n al Farm ers’ U n io n (N F U ) 3 7 - 3 8 , 93, 140, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 n ational F M D freedom m ain ten a n ce o f 13, 1 8 ,8 4 , 131, 147 slaughter policy 4 6 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 1 6 -7 U SA 61, 88 1911 N a tio n a l Insurance A ct 69 n ational press 4 1 - 4 2 , 45 see also m edia coverage nationalism 25, 27 natu ral infection 99 N e th erlan d s 58, 105 N F U see N a tio n a l Farm ers’ U n io n n on-vaccinating cou n tries 133

2 05

N o rth u m b e rla n d c o m m itte e 1 2 6 -1 3 0 , 144 O ffice In tern a tio n a le des Epizooties (O IE ) 131, 134 O IE see O ffice In tern a tio n a le des E pizooties oil-based vaccines 132 o pinions challenging 1 4 6 -1 4 7 conflicts 11, 1 2 - 1 3 ,2 8 - 2 9 , 7 3 , 7 4 -8 1 farm ers 59 G ow ers C o m m itte e o f In q u iry 105 p ublic 75, 8 3 -8 4 , 1 16, 1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 129 slaughter 35, 3 7 - 3 8 , 4 2 - 4 4 , 79 vaccinations 97, 129 see also perceptions oral e xam inations 29 origin o f disease A rg en tin a 6 5 - 6 6 , 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 123, 124, 125, 126 conflicts 21 tracing 82, 1 3 7 -1 3 8 O swestry, Shropshire 109, 110 -1 1 1 Pan-A m erican F M D Bureau (Panaftosa) 135 Panaftosa see Pan-A m erican F M D Bureau partial isolation 4 7 - 4 8 p aternalist views 101 Peart, Fred 113, 1 1 7 -1 1 8 , 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 1 2 3 -1 2 4 pedigree cattle see highly bred pedigree cattle penside diagnosis 142 perceptions 19th c en tu ry farm ers 3 A rg en tin ian and B ritish 6 1 - 6 2 , 120 con tag io n 1 1 ,1 5 disease xiii-xiv, 1 4 6 -1 4 7 legislation fo rm u la tio n 16 vaccination 9 9 -1 0 0 see also o p in io n s

206

^ M a n u fa c tu re d P lague?

Phoenix the calf 145 pig-keeping 87 pigswill 5 3 -5 4 , 58, 59, 60, 65, 87, 138 P irb rig h t In stitu te 8 8 -9 0 , 9 1 , 98, 102, 117, 132 p lo u g h in g -u p gran ts 115 political aspects A rgentina 52, 1 1 9 -1 3 0 E urope 1 3 2 -1 3 3 Ireland 2 0 -3 1 leisure pursuits 113 perspectives xiii-xiv priorities 5 5 - 5 7 veterinary influence 79 see also legislation pow er 1 4 -1 5 , 5 2 -5 3 p re-em ptive culling 1 3 9 -1 4 0 p reconceptions 2 9 -3 0 P retym an c o m m itte e o f in q u iry 4 8 - 5 0 , 53 preventative m easures 3 8 - 3 9 , 7 1 -7 2 , 111

prices 13, 54, 5 5 -5 6 , 59, 125 p ro d u c tiv ity xiii, 2, 3, 9 see also highly bred pedigree cattle p ro p ag an d a cam paigns 147 p ublic aspects ap ath y 1 0 6 -1 0 7 h ealth 5, 8 inquiries 145 interest 112 o p in io n 75, 8 3 -8 4 , 116, 1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 129 p u b licatio n o f research 8 3 -8 4 pyres 4 0 - 4 1 , 112 q u a ran tin e 4 - 5 , 6 see also isolation RAS see Royal A gricultural Society rats 7 5 - 7 6 records o f livestock sales 31 R e d m o n d , Jo h n 26 refrigeration 5 1 -5 2 regional v eterinary officers (RVOs) 111

regulations 5 7 -5 8 , 60, 6 2 -6 3 , 133 Reid rep o rt 123, 124, 125 research biological w eapons 8 7 -9 1 co m m ittees 4 3 , 48, 7 9 -8 0 , 81 fu tu re 150 inadequacies 55 legislation 8 2 -8 3 m edia 75 vaccinations 96, 97, 148 veterinary 6 8 - 8 2 virus 54 see also fu n d in g , research; scientific aspects restocking 115, 116 retaliatory practices 56, 1 2 1 -1 2 2 , 124, 130 rin d erp est 5, 1 0 -1 3 rin g vaccination 9 4 , 105, 128, 134, 142, 148 risk research 72, 74, 75, 9 9 - 1 0 0 South A m erican im p o rts 66 vaccinations 101, 116, 134, 1 4 1 -1 4 2 R oca-R uncim an agreem ent 66 Royal A gricultural Society (RAS) 2, 38 Royal Society re p o rt 148, 149, 150 R u n c im a n , W alter 22, 23, 26, 29, 66 Russell, T W 2 1 - 2 2 , 26 RV O s see regional veterinary officers scientific aspects censoring o f results 66 diagnosis 2 8 -3 0 germ th eo ry o f disease 15, 6 8 -6 9 p erceptions xiii-xiv research 6 8 - 9 1 , 150 significance o f 60, 61 s u p p o rtin g evidence 147 test validation 149 virus survival 54, 55, 58, 60, 6 3 -6 5 see also research; fu n d in g , research selective breeding 137, 139 self-interest xv serum 7 1 , 83, 8 4 -8 6

In d e x

see also im m u n iza tio n ; inoculation; vaccination Sewell, C harles 2 sheep 139 sheep-pox 5 - 6 siege co n d itio n s 4 0 -4 7 Sim onds, J B 6 ,9 , 10, 11, 12, 13 Sinn Fein 27 slaughter policy criticism s 3 4 - 3 5 , 4 2 - 4 4 , 4 5 - 4 7 , 93, 1 4 8 -1 4 9 defence o f 9 7 -1 0 1 E E C 1 3 3 -1 3 4 E U F M D 91 firebreak culls 139, 150 h u m a n cpidcm ics 7 4 -7 5 isolation co n trast 33 legality 144 lobbying for 1 8 -1 9 m edia 94, 116, 141 o p in io n s 3 7 -3 8 , 79 persistence o f 146, 147 research 70, 80, 83 rin d erp est epidem ic 11 succcss 4 8 -5 0 suspicion 31, 139 w artim e 87 see also c o m p e n sa tio n ; costs social aspects 13, 14, 38, 4 5 , 56 source o f disease see o rigin o f disease S outh A m erica 5 4 -5 5 , 62, 1 2 0 - 1 ,1 3 5 see also A rgentina Spain 132 sp o n ta n eo u s disease g eneration 3 - 4 , 5, 15 see also transm ission o f infection spread o f infection see transm ission o f infection state in te rv en tio n 4 - 5 State V eterinary D e p a rtm e n t 33 State V eterinary Service 138, 139 S tockm an, Stew art farm er involvem ent 4 4 -4 7 Ireland 21, 22 research 54, 70, 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 4 - 7 6 , 79, 8 0 -8 1

2 0 7

suffering 41, 42, 44 upper-classes 33, 3 5 , 38 store anim als 24, 26, 112 Strategy for E m ergency V accination against F M D 136 subsidies 108, 109, 115 suffering anim als xiii c o m m u n itie s 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 4 , 50, 130 farm ers 3 9 - 4 0 ,4 4 , 1 1 0 -1 1 1 , 114, 143 superiority 1 0 0 -1 0 1 , 102, 116 sy m p to m s 1, 3 8 - 3 9 , 6 2 , 98 T am e, D e p u ty Secretary W 1 0 5 -1 0 6 tissue sam ples 28 T ollem ache, Sir H e n ry 47, 48 tourism 141, 143 tracing 110 see also origin o f infection trade A n g lo -A rg e n tin e xv, 5 1 - 6 7 , 110, 1 1 9 -1 3 0 barriers 149, 1 50 b e ef 125 chilled m eat 5 1 - 5 3 , 55, 57, 6 6 , 125 diseased m eat 7 - 8 export 1 8 -1 9 , 33 free 5, 66 im p o rts 4, 1 1 9 -1 2 7 in tern atio n al 136, 137 Ireland 21, 2 3 - 2 4 , 2 7 -2 8 livestock dealers 31 sales records 31 see also em bargoes; exports; im ports transm ission o f infection E urope 94 fires 4 0 -4 1 indirect 29, 32, 59, 60 infected m eat 5 3 -5 4 , 76 ju m p in g 37, 112 M A F-led research 82, 83 m ovem ent o f livestock 138 see also m o v em en t o f livestock; sp o n ta n eo u s disease generation; viruses

208

^ M a n u fa c tu re d Plague?

tre a tm e n t 2 T urkey 132 types o f F M D 82, 132 u n d e rsta n d in g o f disease 3, 8 - 9 , 13 un io n ism 2 4 -2 5 U n ited States o f A m erica (USA) 61, 88 upper-class aspects 1 4 -1 5 , 33, 35, 38, 95 u rb a n areas 87, 143 u rb an izatio n 4 USA see U n ited States o f A m erica vaccination cessation 1 3 4 -1 3 6 c o m pulsory 120 co n tin g en cy p lan n in g 1 5 0 -1 5 1 controversies 9 2 -1 0 7 , 1 1 6 -1 1 9 , 140 cost-benefit analysis 1 2 6 -1 2 7 , 128 E E C policy 134 free 6 im p o rt policies 133 in fluential bodies 147 in q u iry re co m m en d atio n s 149, 150 last resort o p tio n 1 4 1 -1 4 2 p ro d u c tio n 71, 132 research 8 3 -8 5 , 86, 91, 148 S outh A m erica 1 35 volu n tary 129

see also im m u n iza tio n ; inoculation; serum Vallee, Professor 61, 62 veterinary m edicine advances 109 conflicts 1 4 0 -1 4 1 d e p artm e n tal inco m p eten ce 42 education 7 3 - 7 4 , 78 inspectors 34 RVO s 111 shortage o f vets 138, 139 surgeons xiii, 1, 8 - 9 , 6 9 - 7 0 , 7 3 -8 1 see also research viruses bacteria 9 5 -9 6 filterable 28, 71 id entification 71 survival 54, 55, 58, 60, 6 3 -6 5 type 82 see also transm ission o f infection v o tin g 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 7 , 50 W ald m an n , Professor 85, 87 w ar 66, 85, 86, 100 W aterford head 25 W elfare Schem es 140 W estern E urope 99 w holesale cull policy 146 w ildlife susceptibility 8 2 -8 3 w in d 113 W orld W ar II 67, 86, 100 w orldview s 101

B ritish F M D incidence. 1870-2001

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CATTLE DISEASES PREVENTION BILL. W i s t S m i t i i n r.i.n ,

M nrrk ,VA, tftM . I Am d ir e c te d , a* C h a ir m a n o f a ( ’o m m itt e e a p p o in te d a t n M r a tin g o f O ra x ie r* , fV tlcm m ii, anil o th e r* in te r n a to d in t h e ( 'n tt) n T r a d e , t o m i l y m ir A tte n tio n to n H ill n o w Ite fo r* P a r li a m e n t, ■■nlitlwl, " A H ill to m n k < / " r t / .- r / W w hich a la n d * fo r

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m fiT rn t n f n il |>or*nn' o f |M>rrcct health, a rc o ften affected liy lliin epidem ic lirfo rc tln v n-ach th e ir dcatiuA tioii, nm l th 'n aolely from an ntiiKMpherical inllunuee. T rip lin g , th e re fo re , t h a t you w ill ttae y o u r influence an to m odify th i* H ill, e ith e r h y o b ta in in g the w ith d ra w a l o f th o d iso rd e r in queatim i from th e S ch ed u le »»f di«e**ei«t n r l»y h av in g th e H ill re fo rm ! to a C o m m ittee em p o w ered to m il evidence,

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Plate 2 John Giblett, leaflet on the 1864 Cattle Diseases Bill Source: Reproduced with permission of the Archives and Historical Collection of The Royal Veterinary College, London

Plate 3 J B Simonds Source: R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the Archives a n d H istorical C ollection o f T h e Royal V eterinary College, L o n d o n

Y P l a te 4

George Brown

Source: Reproduced with permission o f the Archives and Historical Collection of T he Royal Veterinary College, London

COUNTY OF LINLITHGOW

FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE TH E LOCAL AUTHORITY o f th e COUNTY OF LINLITHGOW , in v irtu e o f th e p o w e r s c o n ferred upo n th e m by “ T he C o n tag io u s D iseases (A nim als) Act, 1878," an d " T h e S c o tla n d M ovem ent in to D istrict (F oot an d M outh D isease) O rd er of 1882,” w ith th e view of p re v e n tin g th e in tro d u c tio n of Foot an d M outh D isease in to th e C ounty, do h ereb y m a k e th e follow ing R e g u la tio n s, v iz :— I. No a n im a ls sh a ll be m oved in to th e D istrict of th e Local A u th o rity of th e C ounty of L in lithgow w ith o u t a L icense from th e Local A u th o rity of th e County, w hich L icense sh a ll n o t be g r a n te d u n til sa tis fa c to ry evidence h as been ad d u ced to th e Local A u th o rity of th e C ounty th a t th e an im a ls to be m oved— (1.) E ith e r h av e been b re d on th e fa rm o r p rem ises fro m w hich they a r e to b e m oved o r h a v e b e e n p a s tu re d o r fed th e re o n fo r a period o f a t le a s t tw e n ty -e ig h t d a y s before th e g r a n tin g of th e L ic e n se ; (2.) H ave not, w ith in tw e n ty -e ig h t d ay s im m ed iately b efo re th e g r a n t ­ in g of th e L icense, been exposed in a n y m a r k e t, fa ir, exhibition, o r p u b lic s a l e ; a n d (3.) A re n ot affected w ith F oot a n d M outh D isease, a n d h av e not been affected w ith th a t d ise a se n o r been in c o n ta c t w ith a n im a ls affected w ith , o r su sp ected to h a v e been affected w ith , th a t d isease, w ithin th e sa id p eriod o f tw e n ty -e ig h t days. II. L icenses sh a ll be a v a ila b le o n ly fo r F o u r Days a f te r th e sa m e shall h av e been g ra n te d , a n d s h a ll, w ith in Two Days a f te r th e a n im a ls th e re in m en tio n ed h av e been m oved in to th e C ounty, be d eliv ered by th e p erso n to w hom it is g r a n te d to a C o n stab le o f th e L in lith g o w sh ire Police. III. T h e C lerk to th e Local A u th o rity of th e C ounty is h ere b y a u th o rise d to issu e F o rm s of D e claratio n a n d g r a n t th e n e c e s sa ry L icense upon pro­ d u c tio n of th e evidence above specified. IV. T h ese R e g u la tio n s s h a ll ta k e effect fro m a n d a f te r th e 17th day of F e b ru a ry 1883, a n d sh a ll c o n tin u e in force u n til rev o k ed o r a lte re d . BY

ORDER,

ROBERT R. GLEN, C lerk to th e Local A u th o rity . U N U T H G O W , 16tb Febm ary 1883 Norx 1.— The above Regulation! do MX re rtn c t movement of Animai» by railway through the County of Iinlitbgow N o n 2.— If an Animal be moved in cc-ntraventioQ of tb« above Regulation*, the owner thereof, and the pcrvjn causing, directing, o r perm itting th e removal*, a n d the persoo or company moving or conveying the Animal will be liable to prcseoutioc. N o rt 3 — I t is an offence again*: th e Act of 1S7S to t o d or carry, or cau*e to be sent o r earned, on a railway, canal, river, or inland navigation, o r in a coasting vessel or cn a highway, or thoroughfare, any fodder that has Uren in a p b e e infected with l ’loutvPncuuvo:i:a, Koot and Mouth Disease. Sheep Pos. or Swine F e 'e r, or th at hi* been in any place in conUvct with, or u*ed a ta u t a diicoued animal, h one. at*, or tccle. excej-t with a liccnsc of the I.«cal Authority for the district in wbicb tucb place is >iliuiit', .'ii a certificate of an In * j«-.^ r cert.fy in ; iKxl th e moved bas been a* far a* practicable d»:r.ftcU d.

Plate 5 County o f Linlithgow , Foot an d M outh Disease Bill, 1883 Source: R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm issio n o f th e A rchives a n d H isto rica l C o lle c tio n o f T h e Royal V eterin ary C ollege, L o n d o n

P l a t e 6 Group o f Royal Irish Constabulary a t Swords , 1912

Source: Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, Report on FMD in Ireland in the Year 1912, p p l 914, cd 7103, xii, 793

Plate 7

‘M outhing a suspected anim al, Ireland, 1912

Source: Department o f Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, Report on FMD in Ireland in the Year 1912, ppl 914, cd 7103, xii, 793

P late 8 Disinfecting before leaving an in fected place, Ireland, 1912 Source: D e p a r t m e n t o f Agriculture a n d Technical Instruction for Ireland, Report on FM D in Ireland in the Year 1912, p p l 91 4 , cd 7 1 0 3 , xii, 793

P l a t e 9 D isinfecting before leaving, 2 0 0 1

Source: Silence at Ramsclijfe. C o p y rig h t © C hris C h a p m a n 2001

Plate 10 Sir Stewart Stockman Source: Journal o f Comparative Pathology and Therapeutics, 1 9 2 6

Plate 11 Policeman at the gate, 1938 Source: R ep ro d u c ed w ith perm issio n o f R ural H is to ry C e n tre , U n iv ersity o f R e ad in g

P la te 12 The scene a t S tu rm in ste r N ew ton, 1 9 3 5 Source: Reproduced with permission of Rural History Centre, University o f Reading

P la te 13 Research fa cility , P irb rig b t, circa 1 9 2 4 Source: C ourtesy o f Institute for A nim al H ealth, Pirbright

Plate 14 Funeral pyre. Lower Dalby, Yorkshire, 1958 Source: Reproduced with permission of Rural History Centre, University of Reading

BRUSSELS SPROUI GROW ERS

W ftL K

C ancelled TO

ow

FOOT 3c HOUTH

Re s t r i c t i o n s

Plate 15 FMD disruption, 1967 Source: Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the Farmers’ Guardian

SWILL

MUST

BE

BOILED...

THE LAW REQUIRES RAW SWILL TO BE BOILED TOR 1 HOUR BETORE rCEDING TO STOCK

I T ■0*

uo

C—Z_rxTj'*r»ii

Plate 16 ‘S w ill must be boiled’M AFF education poster, 1960s Source: R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the N a tio n a l Archives